IDEOLOGY AND THE MASS MEDIA: A 'STRUCTURALIST-MARXIST' APPROACH TO BROADCASTING.

By

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts,
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September, 1980.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. S. K. Mugford, for his assistance in the preparation of this thesis. I am also indebted to Dr. M.C. Bulbeck for the concept of 'class segments', introduced in Chapter Two, and to other colleagues for their comments, suggestions and criticisms of various parts of this work.

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and all sources used have been acknowledged.

Gregory Mundy,
September, 1980.
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ERRATUM:

After page 145 all page numbers are incorrect. Page 156 should be 146 and so on. The page numbers in the index match those which appear at the top of each page.
This thesis attempts to prepare the ground and begin the
construction of a new, and hopefully more systematic and coherent, approach
to the sociological study of the mass media and, in particular, television.
In so doing little in the way of completely new empirical material is
presented, indeed no research project of the types common in sociology
(such as survey research, observation, interviewing etc.) was carried out.
Rather what is attempted is a re-ordering and re-evaluation of existing
material, of works by sociologists, historians, economists and so on,
in an enterprise which is accurately described as 'library research',
since that is where most of the 'data' contained here was obtained. This
is not to say, however, that no new knowledge may result from this
enterprise since it is my contention that by making the connection between
previously discrete areas of enquiry, and by re-ordering our existing
knowledge, something new and qualitatively different may be obtained.

This is what I hope I have achieved in this thesis. My more
specific aims are outlined in the text, particularly towards the end of
the first chapter, but here they may be characterised as an attempt to
re-structure our existing sociological knowledge of mass communications
institutions and processes, to re-order the information already available
to us, and, by inserting this material into a new conceptual framework,
to suggest that new conclusions may be drawn concerning the sociological
significance of the mass media of communication, and new approaches to
its study opened up.

My task is necessarily somewhat broad in scope since it is to develop
a framework rather than to exhaustively examine a particular issue or
specific empirical problem. Thus I have been constrained to set out the
concepts to be used rather than systematically review and examine each one
of them in detail. Where possible I have mentioned, either in the text
or in footnotes, some of the alternative views on particularly contentious issues but I have refrained as much as possible from entering into these debates (such as that concerning the separation of the state and civil society under capitalism, cf. Frankel 1978: 29) myself, preferring to concentrate on developing the argument rather than on defending it at every point. In place of a discussion of the theoretical subtleties, a task whose importance I do not wish to underestimate, but which would be impossible to combine with developing the whole theoretical framework within the confines of a single thesis, I have attempted to demonstrate the utility, applicability and explanatory power of my approach by using it to account for certain crucial aspects of the mass media, in particular the recent history of broadcasting in Australia (cf. Chapter 7).

There is one other limitation which has been placed on the writing of this thesis. This concerns the history of broadcasting in Australia. While I have been able to piece together most of the data necessary for my account, the fact remains that an authoritative and definitive history of Australian broadcasting has yet to be published. There are no volumes such as Brigg's history of the BBC (Briggs 1961, 1965, 1970), or Barnouw's account of United States broadcasting (Barnouw 1966, 1968, 1970) to which the would-be sociological historian of Australian broadcasting can turn, making the task of rendering a sociologically coherent history all the more difficult. The 'official' view is fairly easy to document, from sources such as the Parliamentary Papers, which include all the relevant reports of commissions, enquiries etc., as well as the debates concerning these, but has obvious limitations for academic enquiry. There are a number of partial accounts of the history, such as that of Curnow (1963), Mackay (1957), Nixon (1972), and Hall (1976), but these are of a much more limited nature than the British and American works (which, in addition, are amply supplemented by other accounts), and to a certain extent their shortcomings are, of necessity, reproduced in these pages, in the discussion.
of Australian broadcasting in Chapters Six and Seven. Again, given the choice between documenting each particular point in detail and mapping out the complete perspective, I have chosen to concentrate on the latter. I do not pretend to make a virtue out of this necessity, merely to state its existence and presence in this thesis.

Thirdly, I have employed the term 'broadcasting' to refer to both radio and television. This usage is, I believe, accurate but is at variance with that employed in some other Australian accounts which reserve the use of 'broadcasting' to refer to radio alone and thus talk of 'broadcasting and television'. If we take the term 'broadcasting' to refer to a particular social arrangement for the dissemination of various ideologies (the view put forward in this thesis), a particular mass medium (or media) of communication, then it applies with equal aptitude to both radio and television.

Finally, why should we study the mass media? In the account which follows I will show how they may be seen as both a product of particular social structures, and thus a key to the nature of those structures, and as contributors in their own right to the maintenance and/or modification of the social formations in which we live. The media are an obvious and highly visible feature of our society which require explanation. In addition to this, there is a need for Australian social scientists, not least sociologists, to come to grips with a thorough-going analysis of Australian society. The study of Australian mass media (in this instance primarily broadcasting) may be seen as an important part of this enterprise. I have attempted, in this thesis, to contribute both to a general understanding of the mass media, and to the specific application of this knowledge to the Australian social formation.\(^{(1)}\)

Perhaps the final word in this introduction should go to Marx who drew attention to the modern media of communication over a century ago:
Up till now it has been thought that the growth of the Christian myths during the Roman Empire was possible only because printing was not yet invented. Precisely the contrary. The daily press and the telegraph, which in a moment spread inventions over the whole earth, fabricate more myths ... in one day than could formerly have been done in a century. (Marx, Letter to Kugelmann 1871, in Cohen and Young 1973)

FOOTNOTE: INTRODUCTION

(1) See Chapter 2, p.34 for an explanation of this term.
The mass media of communications have long been of interest to sociologists. From about the time of the second world war, when propaganda became a household word and a topic of research, to the present day, a vast and diverse body of sociological literature has been built up dealing with various aspects of mass communications and the media which carry them. It is my intention in this chapter to review the main themes in this literature, identify their shortcomings and to begin to suggest an alternative approach. In classifying such a copious and diverse sociological tradition into a few broad categories there is an obvious danger of oversimplification, miscategorisation and failure to do justice to the subtlety of the original works within each tradition. However, it is the genre rather than the oeuvre which sets the limits to enquiry - when there are so many contributions to the field - and thus we may review schools of thought, as represented by particular authors rather than those authors per se.

The method of this review consists of asking of the various schools, genres and authors: 'What question does this work seek to answer?' My critique centres on the oversights and shortcomings of the various questions rather than on the adequacy of the answers provided to them but, naturally enough, the quality of the question asked sets very strict limits on that of its answers. In a sense this method is that of a 'symptomatic reading' (cf. Althusser 1970: Ch.1 and passim) in that it seeks to identify the 'silences in the discourse' of the sociology of mass communications and ultimately to pose the unasked question which is thereby revealed. This method reveals that despite the richness of this body of literature, it seeks to answer only two main questions namely: 'What are the effects of mass communications on their audiences?' and 'What are the processes
involved in media production?' These two questions are approached from a number of different angles, using a diverse array of sociological and other methods, but with a few partial exceptions, detailed below, may be seen as the primary basis on which the sociology of mass communications has been established. We will see below some of the various ways in which these questions have been posed and we shall see something of the confusion and incompleteness of the answers that they have generated. It is my contention that this confusion, incompleteness, and inconclusiveness is at least partly attributable to the failure to pose explicitly a simple, but fundamental, question: 'What are the mass media of communications?' That is, in the literature of 'media sociology', the nature of the object has not been adequately theorised. (Though, as we will see, some attempts to do so have been made.) To demonstrate that this is so, I have outlined the major contributions to the existing literature below, beginning with the research into the effects of mass communications.

1.1 The Effects of Mass Communications

The longest and perhaps best-known tradition within the sociology of mass communications is that which seeks to answer the question, 'What are the effects of the various mass media of communications on their audiences?' Researchers such as Lazarsfeld (1949), Merton (1949), Schramm (1954, 1963 et al.) and others are to be credited with the establishment of this field, which is still very much alive today (see for example Peshbach 1976, Kaplan 1976, or, for a relatively recent review of this area, Davison and Yu 1974). It was the logical question to ask in the immediate post-war period, when television became established as a new and arguably powerful medium, on a massive scale and in a very short period of time; especially for a sociology concerned with the normative basis of social order. Thirty years of experience with television have perhaps produced a rather more sanguine attitude towards it, but the concern
with an apparatus which would seem to directly address the assumed basis of social order (normative consensus) remains. A number of subsidiary themes developed in this period, dealing with particular aspects of this general question, and research designs, far too numerous to detail here, have been developed to investigate them. One such theme, with its associated set of research methods is that of content analysis. As Holsti describes it:

Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages. (Holsti 1969:25)

We may note that these inferences may not necessarily concern the effect of such messages and indeed content analysis techniques will reappear in the discussion of the second major tradition in media sociology, but these techniques do have an obvious place in the assessment of effects. If, for example, television programming does have an effect on its audiences (and I think that it may) then it is reasonable to assume that different sorts of television programmes will have different effects, which in principle might be correlated with these different messages, correctly identified. Studies such as those by Auster (1954), Blumler and McQuail (1968), Brustein (1961), Goldstein and Perrucci (1963), and Harvey (1953), each approach different aspects of this question. One more modern variant of this enterprise is sometimes referred to as the 'Uses and Gratifications' approach (Davison and Yu 1974: 11-34). This approach looks at the way in which different types of media output are 'used' by viewers etc., to fill either measured or assumed psychological needs. This approach suggests in fact that the 'effects' of the mass media are not so much imposed as created by the audience, that is people use the medium rather than vice versa (c.f. Davison and Yu 1974: 16), and that the mass media compete with other sources of gratification of psychological needs. As a result of these considerations, it may be suggested, the mass media are perhaps not such a pernicious influence after all. The problem with such an approach
lies in the lack of 'a relevant theory of social and psychological needs' (Davison and Yu 1974: 21) which tends to render much of the explanation offered teleological. It does however avoid some of the problems of the crude stimulus-response model of media effects. (cf. McQuail 1969a: 79, 85)

This 'uses and gratifications' approach to the study of the mass media combines the study of 'message content' referred to above with another area dealing with the nature of audiences which has received considerable treatment in its own right. The size of audiences is perhaps the most common measure (particularly since the various ratings, bureau of circulation etc., organisations regularly assess it) but their nature, in terms of age, sex, class, occupational status and religious composition, has also been extensively researched. This is both a measure of a very basic level of effect (holding attention) and a precondition of any further effect, providing some basis for assessing potential variability of mass media impact. Examples of works which make or incorporate such an analysis include Abrams (1956), Bogart (1956: Ch.4), de Vera (1968) and Elliot (1972), while a critique of the assumptions commonly made about the findings of such research is provided by McQuail (1969b: 75). One variant of television audience research which has been particularly popular in the years in which television services have been inaugurated is the comparison of characteristics of a sample of viewers with a sample of non-viewers e.g., Belson (1959) or Hamilton and Lawless (1956), or a pre-TV, post-T.V. longitudinal study such as the one carried out in Australia by Clark and Olley (1958) or that of W.J. Campbell (1962). These studies cannot, of course, fairly conclude that any net differences between their paired samples are due solely to the presence or absence or television, since many other, and some intervening, variables are also present.

A further theme, related to the study of media audiences, concerns not the composition, but the social structure of the audience. These
studies look at the way in which media messages are further mediated by
the interaction between viewers. The 'two-step' model of communication
in which 'opinion leaders', usually those with some central socio-metric
status, guide the interpretation of media material by members of their
network (see for example the study by Arndt 1968), or models which see
small-group discussion of media material as crucial in determining its
effect (e.g., Brodbeck 1956), are examples of this. They provide either
an explicit or implied critique of the concept of 'mass' in mass
communications since the audience is no longer seen as undifferentiated
or completely passive, as this term would seem to imply. Instead audience
reaction is regarded as inherently social (cf. Friedson 1953). We may
note that there is also an implied critique of some of the atomistic
assumptions of the 'uses and gratifications' school contained within
this approach in that, as McQuail puts it:

... the selection of communications content ... and
its significance to the audience will both be governed
by existing mechanisms of social control. (McQuail
1969a: 49) (my emphasis)

One of my aims in this thesis is to develop a coherent framework for
investigating this selection process from a more macro-sociological
perspective than that employed by the above authors. (q.v. Ch.4.)

We may also find a number of studies which look at the variable
interpretation of media material, not according to the varying
psychological needs of the views but rather by a conceptual framework
constructed on the basis of other experiences, that is, the varying
interpretations which a sample of viewers may place on a particular item
are explained in terms of the categories, notions and preconceptions which
they bring to bear upon it and which are derived from other sources.
Elliott's study contains such an analysis about which the author comments:
... all these differences (in viewers' interpretations) tend to indicate how the real life (and other media) experiences of viewers markedly affect which aspects of television programmes are best remembered. (Elliott 1972: 117) (my insertion)

This view is generally consonant with that argued for in the materialist conception of ideology, as we shall see in Ch. 4.

Then there are a number of works which seek to address the question of the effects of television and other mass media in a comprehensive and direct manner, incorporating some of the insights of the partial approaches outlined above. Examples of this include Belson (1959), Emery (1959) and Himmelweit (1962). A summary of this type of research is provided by Klapper (1960) and Schramm (1954, 1963). As well as this there are authors who look at the effects of television on children in particular, such as Abrams (1956), Campbell (1962) and Musgrave (1969). We might also note that there is a large body of non-sociological literature, consisting of psychological and lay accounts of the supposed effects of television viewing. The former tends to overlap with some of the sociological approaches I have mentioned here, such as the 'uses and gratifications' approach, and I do not propose to treat it separately. The latter, the lay theories of effect, are to be found in editorials, the discourse of moral crusaders, politicians and so on, but since such accounts are primarily prescriptive rather than explanatory we need not consider them here.

There are other sub-themes in the investigation of the effects of television and other mass media but I think we have seen a representative sample of the field and may ask: 'What has thirty years of research in this area discovered?'
1.2 Findings on the Effects of Television

There is consensus on the results of this field only in a negative sense. That is, there seems to be some measure of agreement that the effects of television are by no means simple, uniform or direct. In terms of the impact of television programmes on the attitudes, beliefs and so on of viewers, the main focus of this research on effects, McQuail concludes that, while there is some evidence that such material may reinforce existing sentiments, there is little evidence that it may act to change them (McQuail 1969a: 47). Despite sophisticated research on what McQuail terms 'generally plausible hypotheses' the results which have been attained have been largely inconclusive or negative. (McQuail 1969a: 51)

Should we conclude then, despite the massive exposure of adults in western societies to television programmes, and despite the large amount of time, money and effort which goes into their production and dissemination, that the effects of all this are minimal? Certainly claims to this effect have been made but we should, I think, be suspicious of them for three main reasons. Firstly, the notion that television programmes have a minimal effect on their audiences provides a very useful defence against the critics of programme standards, and is used as such by broadcasters (Brown 1969: 155). The idea that television programmes and the criteria for the selection and presentation of news etc., only reflect the public taste, and therefore cannot be considered culpable for the shortcomings (however perceived) of that taste, is rather too convenient an excuse to be accepted at face value.

Secondly, we should note that this claim of minimal effect is not made with respect to advertising. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a television company, dependent on advertising for its revenue, making such a claim/while I think there are some differences between advertising and programme material (q.v. Ch.4), I do not think one could hold that one is 'effective' and the other inconsequential.
Thirdly, the argument that television programmes only reflect public taste does not address the question of how that 'taste' is created in the first place. While it may not be possible to separate empirically the 'effects' of television from the whole matrix of ideological rituals present in society, we may not conclude that it is therefore powerless. We should perhaps not be surprised to find that television does not seem to change something it has helped to create but we cannot dismiss its role in such a creation merely because we cannot detect it empirically.

It is my contention that a great deal of the confusion surrounding the question of the effects of television can be resolved by a reformulation of the problem along the lines suggested in this thesis and outlined at the beginning of this chapter (see also Ch.4). Before beginning this project, however, we should examine the other main school of thought in the mass communications literature.

1.3 The Process and the Product of Television Production

The second major tradition of sociological research into television (and other mass media) developed somewhat later than the first, receiving much of its definitive content in the mid-late 1960's. Its concerns are twofold but, in my view, closely related. They are: 1) to analye the 'weltanschauung' or 'world vision' (cf. Goldmann 1964: 15 and passim) of television in a manner analogous to that of the sociology of literature; (3) and 2) to examine the social processes involved in the production of television, from a variety of perspectives, in order to account for the view of the world which is presented. We may now look at some of the ways in which this has been done.

Firstly, we may look again at the research which employs the techniques of quantitative content analysis. As well as being used to help ascertain the effects of communications, the method has also been used
to discover or infer qualities and properties of the communicator, and to make general comment on the values and beliefs of a society. We may note that the development of content analysis techniques was undertaken partly in connection with propaganda research, the idea being to discern policy changes from changes in the tone etc., of official statements in settings such as Nazi Germany or the USSR (especially in the cold war period) where first-hand information was difficult to obtain. That is, the techniques were partly intended to supply information about the communicator or the society generally (cf. Budd et al. 1967: Ch.1.). Examples of the use of content analysis techniques for inferring properties of the communicator include, Albrecht (1956), Auster (1962), Brustein (1961), Cox (1969) and Nussbaum (1960).

The problem with such analyses is that if they are to move beyond mere description of content, they must, in the absence of other sources of information, remain inferential. They may be able to provide a comment on modern popular culture with regard to such issues as racial discrimination (e.g., Cox 1969), but really beg two questions. One of these is the question of the 'meaning' of such material to its audience, a variant of the vexed question of 'effect', and the other is that which asks: 'How did this programme (or film, book etc.) come to present its particular view of the world?' What social processes have been involved in the selection and presentation of this material?

This question has been the explicit focus of a number of writers and is, in a sense, the most 'sociological' question in the mass media literature we have so far discussed. Its focus is not on aggregates (such as audiences) but on identifiable social units and social processes; it need not rely on inferential judgements but is amenable to empirical investigation.

It is in this area that most of the recent media sociology research has been concentrated and it would appear that the (English-language) locus has shifted from the United States to Britain in such centres as the
Leicester Centre for Mass Communications Research or the Glasgow Media Group. Despite the current Anglo-centric nature of this field one of the true pioneer studies in this area was carried out in America by Warren Breed (Breed 1972). In this article entitled 'Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis', Breed examines the processes whereby a newspaper's editorial policy comes to be internalised by its junior staff, and, as a result, to be consistently presented in its pages, even though its staff may regard their work as objective and neutral and believe that the items they write about are chosen according to a universal criterion of 'newsworthiness'. (see also Edgar 1979a: Ch.1, Tuchman 1971)

Much of this research focuses on the 'news' rather than for example, drama programmes or advertisements, partly perhaps because there the production process is more immediately visible and repeated at least daily, being therefore more amenable to sociological analysis since the 'typicality' of processes and so on may be more readily assessed. Studies such as that by Buckalew (1969), Halloran et al. (1970), Warner (1969a, 1969b), and the much earlier one by Lang and Lang (1953) look at the way in which items are selected for television news, according to what criteria and subject to what institutional pressures. Stark (1962) draws attention to one of the main areas which would, on a prima facie basis, seem to cause problems for news organisations. He claims that there is a conflict between the values of reporters, which are generally 'liberal' and those of managers, which are generally 'conservative' and that this 'role strain' is managed and minimised by selective recruitment in the first instance and by techniques of 'scapegoating', 'coercion' and 'inducements' in the day to day operation of a newsroom. While not necessarily accepting Stark's perspective or terminology, he has I believe correctly identified one of the main features of the organisation of an 'ideological apparatus' (q.v. Ch.4).

Much of the British work on the 'manufacturing' or 'processing' of news (cf. Cohen and Young 1972 - The Manufacture of News) has looked at
the presentation of deviant and criminal behaviour by the mass media. Cohen's *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (Cohen 1973) is one such study, looking at the stereotyping of juvenile delinquency by the media and the 'amplification' of the original behaviour that may result from this (cf. The Deviancy Amplification Cycle - Young 1971).

Another study which seeks to compare television and other media news coverage of events with eye-witness accounts of 'what actually happened' is that by Halloran, Elliott and Murdock (1970). These authors make explicit the claim that '... the production process in the mass media has not been adequately studied'. (Halloran *et al.* 1970: 10) especially when compared with studies of viewer reactions etc., and according to them, both are important (Halloran *et al.* 1970: 29). This study (*Demonstrations and Communications*) also focuses on 'deviant' behaviour, specifically on an anti-war demonstration in London in 1968, and looks at the ways in which news stories of this event were structured; in the case of television principally to achieve the maximum visual impact and dramatic effect.

Perhaps the most comprehensive of these studies of the production process in television is Elliott's *The Making of a Television Series* (Elliott 1972). This looks at documentary rather than news production and, in the words of the author:

> ... the central aim of this book is to throw light on the relationship between culture and social structure as it is mediated through television. (Elliott 1972: 6)

Again mention is made of the preoccupation of media sociology with audience effects (p.5, p.13) which are dealt with by Elliott in the specific context of the documentary series whose production he was studying. He suggests that the content of television programmes reflects the ideology of their creators, in this instance a 'liberal-rational' world view (cf. Elliott Ch.7) which is imposed as a result of a seemingly technical practice of production rather than a deliberate attempt to sermonise. He says:
In sum, programme content was less a manifest consequence of decisions about its substance than a latent consequence of its passage through the production process itself. (Elliott 1972: 85)

Thus the content of a programme reflects the values of its producers and the structure of its production process through which:

... the society as audience is presented with an image of itself, the society as source. (Elliott 1972: 17)

That the audience does not uniformly recognise or accept this image is demonstrated in Elliott's Ch.6.

As well as particular studies such as these and the ones included in Cohen and Young's collection (Cohen and Young 1973) or that of the Glasgow Media Group (Glasgow Media Group 1977) there are a number of works which take up the question of media production and the role of producers, TV journalists etc., in a more general way. Chibnall's study (Chibnall 1975) while focussing on a particular area (crime reporting) in fact constitutes an account of how:

... economic, political and social interests come to be reflected in media representations and accounts. (Chibnall 1975: 49)

He rejects the notion of gatekeeper, employed for example by Breed (1972), as being 'dangerously simplistic' (p.49) particularly since it de-emphasises the creative role played by the journalist and his editors, and the complex interaction between reporters and their sources (Chibnall 1975: 53). Gerbner (1969) uses the reporting of 'education news' to investigate the 'Institutional Pressures Upon Mass Communicators' in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR. He suggests that 'the mass media are the chief cultural arms of the industrial order from which they spring' (Gerbner 1969: 206).
Halloran's introduction to the collection in which Gerbner's article appears (Sociological Review Monograph No. 13, 1969) proclaims that:

... methods are in advance of theory in mass communications research.

And that:

Attempts must be made to locate both the communicator and the recipient within the social structure. (Halloran 1969: 5-6)

He further suggests that an attempt should be made to correct the prevailing emphasis of existing studies of production on lower echelon staff (p.6), a view which is endorsed in the same volume by Brown (1969) and to a certain extent carried out in practice in Blumler's article in the same collection (Blumler 1969). The emphasis here is on the explicit development of what I referred to earlier as the inherently more sociological character of this sort of research and the de-emphasis of audience effect investigations. Thus the content of television programming is looked at for the information, insights etc., which it may give us into the production of culture, which as Chibnall points out, is carried out under a predominantly commercial aegis (Chibnall 1975: 49), and into that culture itself.

Fairly recently research of this general type has been carried out in the United States as well as in Britain. Roshco's study of Newsmaking (Roshco 1975) investigates two basic questions based on the assumption that '... the news is a social and an organisational product'. These are the questions of 1) how the press is related to other institutions in society and how these determine its operation; and 2) how the United States press is shaped by the values of United States society. With a greater emphasis on the production process and the personnel responsible for it is Becker's examination of the world of artistic production in general (Becker 1976). He suggests that:
... an art world consists of the people and organisations who produce those events and objects that world defines as art. (Becker 1976: 703)

I suggest that the 'television world' is a specific instance of such a world. Becker's approach is summarised thus:

Works of art can be understood by viewing them as the result of the co-ordinated activities of all the people whose co-operation is necessary in order that the work should occur as it does. (Becker 1976: 703)

Peterson's approach to this general sociology of culture attempts to set up the 'study of production' method as a means of synthesising the best points of previous approaches to the study of culture (Peterson 1976). He suggests that there have been three main approaches to the study of culture by sociologists: 1) the view that culture and society are autonomous systems; 2) the view that social structure creates culture - the (crude) materialist view in which culture is seen as a more or less accurate mirror of social structure, which structure may then be revealed by content analysis; and 3) the idea that culture creates social structure, as perhaps symbolic interactionists would argue. The study of the processes of production he suggests should be able to place correct emphasis on these various views, though in doing so it may explain 'normal culture' at the expense of the ability to account for 'cultural revolutions' (Peterson 1976: 673).

The danger of losing an historical perspective which Peterson implies here is also recognised by, inter alia, Briggs (1969) who among other things has been the official historian of the BBC (Briggs 1961, 1965, 1970). He examines the historical development of different systems of the social control of broadcasting in both the United States and Britain and how these have changed since the inception of broadcasting (Briggs 1969: 42). His analysis is somewhat similar to the one contained in
Chapter Three of this thesis in terms of the data deemed significant, though, as will be seen, the theoretical framework is different. In another, earlier article (Briggs 1960), the historical framework is still broader dealing with the commercialisation of mass entertainment in general. In this context broadcasting is a relative newcomer after music publishing, penny novels, newspapers, spectator sport, movies and so on. We may note that this point - that broadcasting is a relative newcomer in the mass media field - is also made by Tunstall in the context of 'media imperialism' (Tunstall 1977: 23).

From this point of view, the professional communicator, the subject matter of most of the above analyses, is seen as a specific historical phenomenon. Carey (1969) sees the 'communications revolution', which brought the career communicator into existence as the third phase in a broad historical process beginning with the Industrial Revolution and what he calls the cultural revolution, the three stages being seen as causally linked (Carey 1969: 24). He also notes that this communications revolution has resulted in the downgrading of the status of communications professions, such as journalism - it being changed from an intellectual pursuit to a rather technical one - (Carey 1969: 32). This may be the case, and it would seem to parallel the history of a number of other professions such as that of the clerk, but against it we must counterpose the rise of completely new occupational categories such as those of producers, directors, disc jockeys, comperes and so on in the electronic media. The position of 'professional communicators' will be examined again in Chapter 2, where they are located as members of a 'new petty bourgeoisie'.

There have been a few other studies which have looked specifically at the 'professional broadcaster' as part of the general interest in the processes of media production. Kumar's analysis (Kumar 1975) of the professional status of the broadcaster, which shows how professional status may be used in maintaining independence from both the state and
commerce (he is discussing the BBC) is one such. Briggs, in his history of the BBC (see especially Vol. 2), documents the way in which this professional image was built up (Briggs 1965) and Shaw (1964) shows how an attempt was made to break with this tradition when BBC was set up, by recruiting staff from other than the traditional sources. In a later article (Shaw 1969) the same author discusses some of the problems faced by the professional broadcaster who must retain his professional status and the independence which is seen to stem from this, without 'losing touch' with popular sentiments (Shaw 1969: 117. See also Blain 1977).

A number of authors within this general tradition have, in effect, turned the audience-effect methods 'on their head' and instead of investigating the effect of media output on the audiences' attitudes and beliefs have looked at producers' attitudes and the effect these have on the media product. Blumler (1969) examines the attitudes of BBC producers towards coverage of the 1966 British General Election and comments that:

...the television journalists seemed to be moved by a sense of responsibility to the standards of their own profession. (Blumler 1969:90)

His view is that 'visibility' of the points of view of the various contending parties is the critical factor, thus conceding the unlikelihood of voters' minds being changed by slanted coverage but still allowing for some influence by television in terms of 'agenda-setting'.

Brown's concern is with 'mass media ideologies' more generally (Brown 1969). He draws attention to the vague knowledge of the audience which is available to producers and, like McQuail, points to the fact that this 'uncertainty about the audience' allows the 'public interest', the nominal master of television ceremonies, to be defined in terms of editorial policy or professional ideology (Brown 1969: 165; McQuail 1969b: 79-81). McQuail in fact outlines four possible responses to this situation of uncertainty in terms of the prevailing ideology of the
communicators. These are: 1) Paternalism - the 'Reithian' ideology of the BBC in its formative years. 2) Specialisation - the 'differentiation of activities along functionally specific lines' - so that in effect no overall ideology prevails. 3) Professionalism - where broadcasters explicitly define their own standards and ethics. According to McQuail, this is the prevalent value and the one most likely to succeed. 4) Ritualism - the following of tried and true formulae and known audience preferences. With regard to this fourth category McQuail cites Merton's definition of ritualism: 'a device for allaying anxieties by engaging in routinised action' (McQuail 1969b: 81). McQuail concludes by saying:

Many features of mass communications ... may derive not ... from the absolute predictability of the mass audience, but from rather high levels of uncertainty about it. (McQuail 1969b: 83)

He thus draws attention again to Halloran's injunction to 'locate the communicator and recipient within the social structure' (Halloran 1969: 6).

1.4 The 'Silence in the Discourse' of Media Sociology

This point of Halloran's is indeed crucial. It draws our attention to the main problem, the central shortcoming in all the above-mentioned literature - the question which remains unasked by both of the major traditions in media sociology. Though approached from various angles, especially by the exponents of the second school, the question: 'What are (sociologically-speaking) the mass media of communications?' has rarely, if ever, been explicitly posed. It has equally rarely received a satisfactory answer and yet is crucial, both to Halloran's protocol and to the sociology of the media generally.

If we look briefly at three reviews of sociological research on television the extent of this neglect will become apparent. The crucial status of this question appears generally to have been overlooked, a fact
which goes some considerable distance towards an explanation of some of
the confusion in the field. Firstly, Bogart's (1958) classification
which is almost exclusively focussed on the audience-effect nexus. He
uses four categories to divide researchers in this field: 1) Social
Reformers, concerned with the potential for good or evil contained within
television, particularly with regard to its 'effects' on children. 2)
Public opinion researchers using the survey method (e.g., Lazarsfeld 1949),
propaganda studies are included in this category. 3) Psychologists and
Social Psychologists engaged in the investigation of why people think what
they do. 4) Behaviourists employing stimulus-response models. The
research field may be further divided into market research conducted by
business agencies and academic research carried out in universities but
overall the emphasis is on quantitative, a-historical research using a
variety of statistical techniques (Bogart 1958: 332 ff).

Secondly, McQuail's account (McQuail 1969a) begins from much the
same material as Bogart's but adds in a number of more qualitative areas.
He has five major areas which are as follows: 1) Research into the
behaviour, interests and structure of the audience (McQuail 1969a: 36).
2) Research into the effectiveness and persuasive power of media (Ibid).
3) Concern with the 'general social effects' of mass media, in maintaining
a political consensus for example, and a consideration of conditions and
mediating factors of those effects (McQuail 1969a: 47). 4) Research
into the internal structure and external relations of mass communications
organisations (McQuail 1969a: 66). 5) The study of the products of mass
communications organisations via the various methods of content analysis
(McQuail 1969a: 67 ff.). Thus McQuail begins to point to the importance
of locating the mass media in the social structure generally, in pointing
to the importance of organisational studies of the mass media, but stops
short of an explicit posing of the question.

Similarly and thirdly, Davison and Yu's more recent (1974) survey
points to the importance of this question but does not recognise it.
They review work concerned with the relationship between communications in general and mass communications; the uses and gratifications approach mentioned above; the studies of the results of exposure to media and research into the nature of media organisations (Davison and Yu 1974: Chs. 1-4 and passim).

Thus most sociological research into the media to date has not concerned itself with a theory of its object and without this, I suggest, a coherent and systematic approach to the area is not possible. Several authors have strongly implied the centrality of this question however, and there are a number of partial attempts to answer it. For example, the researchers in Davison and Yu's first category, those interested in the relationship between communications in general and the mass variety do supply an answer to the question 'What are the mass media?' The answer offered by, for example, Schramm (1954, 1961) is that of a systems model of communication, analagous to the very electronic media he is trying to explain. That is, a model composed of such elements as transmitters, encoders, channels, decoders, receivers and so on which form analogues for the various empirically identifiable parts of media systems. This approach thus does supply an answer to the question, 'What are the mass media?' But it is not a very satisfactory one. In effect Schramm is saying that the mass media are a system of communication like any other and is thus unable to grasp the specificity of functions and processes necessary to a sociologically meaningful understanding of the mass media. On this basis, for example, we cannot distinguish between interpersonal communication and mass communication. Thus this answer to the question of the identity and nature of the mass media tends to explain the question away.

More promising are the various attempts to locate media institutions and processes in the political and ideological structures of (mainly capitalist) societies. Some of the work already reviewed, such as for example that of the Glasgow Media Group (CMG 1976), takes this position
explicitly or implicitly but only as an assumed starting point for a focus on media processes and messages and not as the focus of rigorous analysis in its own right. While such authors may supply many of the components of an answer, and will be used for this purpose in this work, they have not provided a complete or explicit theoretical definition of a mass medium.

One author who does, however, come close to this is Williams (1974) whose book *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* begins from the premise that television was a deliberately sought-after technology, rather than, as is often assumed, an accidental discovery or invention. He argues, persuasively, that television was developed in a particular manner, deliberately, for the purposes to which it is now put: in short as a mass medium of education, information and entertainment. It has been shaped by various economic, political and ideological forces which confer on it its present nature. He does not, however, rigorously theorise these factors after identifying their influence; a task which is taken up in the following chapters of this thesis. For example, he attributes the differences between British and United States broadcasting to the nature of the ruling class and the type of state in each instance, an analysis which I believe is fundamentally correct, but he does not (perhaps, to be fair, cannot, in a short book concerned primarily with television) go on from this to a comprehensive analysis of television in terms of class and political structures. Such an analysis forms the general aim of this thesis.

Perhaps significantly, Williams' approach is from a Marxist (or at least quasi-Marxist) standpoint. One of the slightly curious features of the sociological literature on mass communications is the relative scarcity of Marxist accounts. Counihan documents this shortage when he points out that, with the exception of the Frankfurt school (Marcuse *et al.*) there are very few Marxist contributions to this field which are not overly simplistic, and almost no Marxist theory of this domain (Counihan 1973:
However those accounts which do exist are explicitly concerned to locate the mass media in their social context and to deal with both their nature and their effects in that specific context. An example of this type of treatment which goes some way towards providing a theoretical definition of television is McQueen's account of the monopoly control of the media in Australia (McQueen 1977).

McQueen's work stands out not only because it recognises that the (sociological) nature of the mass media is the primary question, but also because its focus is on Australia and its explanation cast in terms of class and class conflict. The thesis McQueen advances however, is somewhat oversimplified and much of his evidence anecdotal. He states that the key to understanding Australian television is to be found in its predominantly commercial nature, as a medium for advertising, and in the profit motive of its owners. He says, for example:

... the commercial mass media are advertisements which carry news, features and entertainment in order to capture audiences for the advertisers. (McQueen 1977: 10)

And that:

Advertising is the key link ... between the mass commercial media and monopoly capitalism. (McQueen 1977: 9)

Both of these statements undoubtedly contain an element of truth but McQueen's theoretical framework, though it sounds promising, for example:

The media are seen in the context of monopoly capitalism and are analysed in terms of the requirements of a system based on class exploitation. (McQueen 1977: 1)

is not really adequate for a comprehensive analysis. He has difficulty, for example, in dealing with the ABC since it does not carry commercial advertising (cf. McQueen 1977: Ch.7) and his predominantly single-factor explanation is unable to satisfactorily account for the content of the
programming of either the ABC or the commercial stations. Further, he leaves unexamined the question of how this system got to be the way it is, the answers to which (examined in Chapter Six of this thesis) would reveal the limitations of his rather too narrow explanation.

The work of Hall (1977a) and Connell (I) (1978), referred to in Chapter 4, should also be mentioned here, since these authors do address this fundamental question.

1.5 Conclusion, Filling the Silence

Thus there is something of a 'silence in the discourse' of media sociology concerning the nature of its object. It is a silence I intend to fill in subsequent chapters but before doing so I will outline the nature, scope and limitations of the analysis.

Firstly, my arguments are not intended to render the whole of the sociology of mass communications reviewed in these pages redundant. Rather, I intend to provide a framework in which much of it may be relocated in order to provide a more coherent and systematic approach to the sociology of the mass media. Thus many of the insights, findings and arguments put forward by media sociologists have a place in the account I will offer, though it may not always be that intended by their authors.

In the terminology of Althusser, this existing material could be referred to as constituting a 'Generalities 1'. My 'Generalities 2' would then be the concepts and propositions of 'structuralist marxism' which, when applied to the 'Generalities 1' material, should produce 'Generalities 3', knowledge of the mass media in this problematic (cf. Poulantzas 1973: 18. Althusser 1969: 183 ff.). The result of this for the sociology of mass communications is, again to cite Althusser:

... not a resolution of the problem as it emerged at the beginning, but a complete change in the terms of that problem. (Althusser 1970: 154)
That is to say the questions concerning the 'effects' of media contact and those dealing with the processes etc. of media production are to be reformulated as a result of posing the more fundamental question concerning the nature of the object. This reformulation occupies much of the body of this thesis. The 'new terms' of the problem of the analysis of the mass media, as I see them, are spelt out in the following chapters.

Secondly, my ultimate aim in this thesis is to provide a theoretical account of broadcasting in Australia. That is I mean to provide an answer to the question, 'What is the nature of broadcasting?' in a specific (spatial and temporal) context (q.v. Ch.7). In order to illuminate the particular case of Australia however, I have firstly looked at the development of broadcasting in the United States and Britain partly because these histories are documented in sufficient detail to enable an account of the general principles involved to be developed, and partly because the Australian case cannot be understood in isolation from these.

Thirdly, my main focus is on television broadcasting and its precursor, radio, rather than on the mass media as a whole. However there are many aspects of these which cannot be considered in isolation from other mass media, and many of the general principles discussed apply with equal force to these other media. It is for this reason that, in my review of the literature, I have not confined my attention to works solely concerned with television but have looked at several works concerned with other media, and with media in general. This does not mean that there are not important differences between media, on the contrary I believe that there are, and will refer to some of these at various points. However, the other media of mass communication the press, the film industry, the recorded and live music industries, publishing and so on would each merit study in their own right and they are referred to here only insofar as they contribute to the account of television and radio.

The following chapters, then, are an attempt to examine the question:
'What is the nature of television (and radio) broadcasting in Australia?'

The strategy adopted in developing an answer is made up of two, closely related parts - one which examines the structural role played by broadcasting apparatuses (especially Chapters Four, and Five), and one which looks at the historical development of these apparatuses, considered as a history of the struggle between competing classes and fractions of classes for control of the medium (especially Chapters Two, Three and Six). It is also necessary, in order to explain the particular case of Australia, to consider 'media imperialism' and how this prevents the autonomous development of Australian television. This topic is also considered from the standpoint of structural and class determination (Chapters Five and Six).

My aims in this thesis are thus as follows:

1) To locate broadcasting institutions, broadcasters and the recipients of broadcasting in the 'broader social structure'.

2) To do this by reference to specific historical instances, the United States, United Kingdom and Australia.

3) By presenting an account of the nature of broadcasting institutions (a theory of the object) attempt some integration of the main areas of media research outlined in this chapter.

Chapter Two begins the elucidation of the concepts to be employed.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER ONE

1. Strictly, the term 'propaganda' and research into its various dimensions originated after the First World War (cf. De Fleur 1970: 112-4). Both the phenomenon and its study became greatly enlarged however, during and after the Second World War.

2. I use the word 'developed' here to indicate that the focus of sociological interest in the mass media has shifted from 'effects' to this new area. In a strictly chronological sense, in terms of its date of origin, this second approach is not significantly more youthful than the first but has been developed later.

3. In terms of its focus rather than the methods employed, many (but not all) of which would be totally foreign to sociologists of literature.

4. This study is perhaps a candidate for pioneer status along with that of Breed, cf. Note 4.

5. See Chapter Five of this thesis.

6. See also Enzensberger 1970 for an account of some of the reasons for this neglect.

7. Put in this way, this question may seem a little broad and ahistoric in its reference. It cannot, however, be answered apart from a specific historical context and this is the strategy employed in this thesis.
CHAPTER TWO

STRUCTURAL AND CLASS DETERMINANTS OF BROADCASTING

My aim in this thesis, as outlined in the first chapter, is to account for the development and present functioning of television broadcasting via a consideration of the particular configurations of structures and the class struggle in the social formations in which it developed. This chapter begins to develop the concepts necessary for this task, derived largely from the work of the French, so-called structuralist-Marxist school and in particular that of Nicos Poulantzas (Poulantzas 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976). In so doing it is engaged in a double task, the scientific study of a particular feature of modern societies; and, at the same time, a test of the usefulness and applicability of this problematic. This dual task receives its most concrete treatment in the analysis of Australian broadcasting in Chapter 7.

The object of my analysis is, at the outset, an empirically-given, 'common-sense' reality (the institutions and practices of broadcasting) to which I bring to bear the concepts and propositions of a particular stream of Marxist theory, in an attempt to develop a more coherent and systematic account of those phenomena than is present in most of the relevant literature. It should be made clear at the outset how this argument differs from the empiricist ones it is intended to supersede. By locating the empirical referent 'broadcasting institutions' in the structures of particular capitalist social formations (principally the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia) and by demonstrating their determination by those structures, and the particular configurations (conjunctions) of the class struggle, we arrive at an account of particular apparatuses as determined by a complex matrix of structures which accounts for their action, without falling back into an empiricism of the object. The term 'broadcasting institutions' while sometimes retained for shorthand purposes, is logically replaced by those of 'ideological apparatus',
'commercial enterprise' etc., that is, concepts which in a sense cover the same empirical ground but which may be inserted into a coherent and systematic historical materialist problematic. That there is no one-to-one correspondence between the objects defined in this way and those of common sense is both a consequence of, and evidence for, the replacement of an empiricist problematic, which takes social objects as given, by an historical materialist one, which in a sense 'creates' its objects.

Thus, in posing (and beginning to answer) the question largely ignored by other sociologists of the mass media in the way that I have chosen, we are not merely adding something which was missing from their analyses (though at the level of 'symptomatic reading' this is what has occurred) but rather transforming the whole ground of their enquiry. This chapter, then, begins the task of this transformation, a task which is continued in subsequent chapters, by setting out the general concepts to be employed, beginning at the most abstract level and, as it were, moving down from there.

2.1 The Origin of the Concepts Employed

The concepts to be employed in this analysis are derived from the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Gramsci via the work of the French 'structuralist-Marxists, principally Poulantzas (1973, 1974, 1975, 1976) and Althusser (1969, 1970, 1971). Though by no means claiming that this work is definitive, I have concentrated here on its exposition and a demonstration of its usefulness and applicability rather than a systematic review of the approach taken by those theorists, since my main aim is not to speculate on the merits or otherwise of this particular problematic but rather to account for a specific feature of the social world. As noted above it may be that in doing so I am providing evidence for the evaluation of this approach and it is my belief that such an evaluation should be positive. Ultimately, however, it must be left for
the reader to judge whether this is so.

Since we are ultimately concerned to account for a particular object, or set of objects, which are structured by a number of factors, each themselves the 'product' of more general determinants, we will begin with an examination of the general (formal-abstract) concepts to be employed. The first of these is that of the Mode of Production.

2.2 Mode of Production

A Mode of Production is best seen as a system of relations between elements, a system of structures which may be divided into three regions: the economic, the political and the ideological each with its own concepts and each to a degree autonomous as well as inter-linked. Exactly what is meant by 'elements' will become clearer when we examine particular structures but we may note here that much of Marx's own analyses were concerned with the development of a regional theory of the economic, characterised by such concepts as the relations of production, forces of production and so on. Poulantzas argues that the political and ideological regions are present in economic analyses such as Capital but only insofar as they intervene in the region under study (Poulantzas 1973: 19-20). He sets out in Political Power and Social Classes to construct a regional theory of the political. The ideological region (which is of particular importance in the analysis of broadcasting) has perhaps received less explicit attention but, as is the case with the political and ideological regions in Capital, it is present in Political Power and Social Classes where it intervenes in the region under analysis. It has received some explicit attention by Althusser (1971), Hall (1977), Laclau (1977), Therborn (1977, 1978), and in various of Poulantzas's works (1973, 1974, 1975, 1978) but this work is still somewhat fragmentary and there is only a limited amount of agreement on the correct mode of analysis of this field.
It is customary in Marxist analysis to speak of these regions of a mode of production as being divided into base (the economic region) and superstructure (political and ideological regions) and while different schools of Marxism have attributed varying degrees of importance to these; for example, we may speak of economism which attributes only secondary, derivative status to the superstructure or voluntarism with a directly opposite emphasis; in this analysis the Althusserian notion of 'structures in dominance' is followed (cf. Althusser 1970: 319). In this conception the regions are 'relatively autonomous', but one is always dominant and the whole is subject to determination 'in the last analysis' by the economic region. As Poulantzas puts it: (6)

The economic base 'determines' (i.e., in the last instance) which element is to be dominant in a social formation. Hence it is a structure in dominance. But the dominant element is not fixed for all time, it varies according to the overdetermination (7) of the contradictions (i.e., between the regions) and their uneven development. (Poulantzas 1973: 14n) (my insertion)

As we shall see below, it is argued that the dominant role in Capitalist social formations has shifted from the economic (which still remains determinant in the last analysis) to the political in the present, imperialist phase of capitalist development (q.v. Chapter Five below, cf. Poulantzas 1974: 42).

A specific mode of production may be identified by the form in which surplus is extracted in the labour process. That is, by the specific combination of the relations of real appropriation, the form of which determines the structure of the political and ideological regions, without thereby negating the autonomy of these fields (cf. Poulantzas 1973: 27-28). In the present analysis we are dealing with the Capitalist Mode of Production in which relations of property (ownership of the means of production), which Poulantzas refers to as 'economic ownership' (Poulantzas 1975: 19), and relations of real appropriation (relations
between the producers and the object and means of labour), which Poulantzas terms 'possession' (p.18), tend to coincide. That is, both of these forms of ownership (which should be understood as effective economic ownership rather than formal, legal (i.e. ideological) ownership) are typically vested in the capitalist. One consequence of this is the separation of the political region from the economic under capitalism as opposed to their close articulation under Feudalism (Poulantzas 1973: 27-28).

In a pure Mode of Production, considered as an abstract-formal object, there can never be more than two classes:

... each of them present in their full economic, political and ideological determination ... the exploiting class, which is politically and ideologically dominant, and the exploited class, which is politically and ideologically dominated. (Poulantzas 1975: 22)

Thus, in the Capitalist Mode of Production we find two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, who are the bearers of the structures of this mode. However it is not suggested that 'actual societies' are composed of only two classes, this is made particularly clear in Poulantzas' work and it is clear that Marx himself did not suggest that 'actual societies' were composed of only two classes (see for example, 'The Class Struggles in France' _MECW_, Vol. 1: 186-299). In order to account for this we need to introduce the concept of a social formation.

2.3 Social Formation

The concept 'social formation' is a less abstract one than that of 'mode of production'. Its field is such that it effectively replaces the notion of 'actual societies' in this problematic and like modes of production, social formations involve three structural regions (economic, political and ideological) but also historical specificity which is unique in every case.
The mode of production constitutes an abstract-formal object which does not exist in the strong sense in reality. Capitalist, feudal and slave modes of production, which equally lack existence in the strong sense, also constitute abstract-formal objects. The only thing which really exists is a historically determined social formation i.e. a social whole, in the widest sense, at a given moment in its historical existence. (Poulantzas, 1973: 15)

Within any particular social formation we will find several modes of production in combination, normally with one of these being dominant. (9)

Social formations, however, are not the simple concentration or extension of modes and forms of production existing in their 'pure' form; they are not produced by the latter being simply 'stacked together' in space. The social formations in which the class struggle is enacted are the actual sites of the existence and reproduction of the modes and forms of production. (Poulantzas, 1975: 23)

Thus we may say that the relation between a mode of production and a social formation is one of simple: complex, abstract: concrete etc. It is this relation which enables us to deal with the 'problem' that modes of production contain only two classes whereas 'actual societies' (social formations) in fact contain more than this. I will discuss the determination of classes further below but here we may note,

... a concrete society (a social formation) involves more than two classes, insofar as it is composed of various modes and forms of production. No social formation involves only two classes, but the two fundamental classes of any social formation are those of the dominant mode of production in that formation. (Poulantzas, 1975: 22; see also 1973: 71)

The reason for this is that, as stated above, the concept 'social formation' is at a less abstract level than that of 'mode of production'. Thus the multiplicity of classes characterising all social formations, in which classes belonging to other modes of production appear ('remnants' of the peasantry, aristocracy etc.) is to be explained not by impurities or residues resulting from the imperfect 'match' of reality with an
abstract concept but rather by the increase in concrete specificity involved in moving from the level of modes of production to that of social formations.

As Poulantzas notes,

The final aim of the process of thought is the production of the most concrete concepts, in other words those richest in theoretical determinations, which allow knowledge of real, concrete, particular objects, namely social formations always original in each case. (Poulantzas, 1973: 17)

The concept 'social formation' differs from the concept of 'society', as this is generally used, in that a social formation is a theoretical object rather than an empirical aggregate, and has clearly defined dimensions insofar as it is composed of economic, political and ideological structures, which produce as their effect in the field of social relations, a multiplicity of classes.

2.4 Structures and Social Relations

The next step we must take, in order to locate the concept of 'class' is to distinguish between structures and the field of social relations since:

Social classes are the global effect of the structures in the field of social relations. (Poulantzas 1973: 64)

We should note first what this distinction does not involve. It is not a conception of a relation between static and dynamic in which structures are seen as 'ossified practice'. Nor is it a distinction between an empirical reality (social relations) and a theoretical one (structures) in the sense of a 'group' and its determination (Poulantzas 1973: 64-68). Rather we are dealing here with two distinct fields of social reality which must be treated as distinct in order to account for the influence of one upon the other. Social classes are the effect of the matrix of
structures in a social formation, which effect consists of distributing agents into classes. Thus the concept of class is not that/the effect of one structural region on another, for example, the economic on the political and ideological regions, since these are equally involved in the determination of class (Poulantzas 1973: 64). Rather it is the effect of all the structures taken together on a different field, that of social relations. Poulantzas also rejects the historicist position in which classes are conceived as the subjects of history, the view of such authors as Lukacs, Goldmann and Marcuse (p.60). He also dismisses the dualistic view taken by what he terms 'functionalist' interpreters of Marx (Geiger, Dahrendorf and Bordieu) which sees structure as the static element in a social formation, the subject of synchronic analysis, and class and class conflict as the dynamic/diachronic element (p.61).

Both of these approaches, and the related 'economist' interpretation, argues Poulantzas, tend to reduce the concept of class to the economic level alone (see pp. 62-3). And, according again to Poulantzas,

> It can in fact be stated that Marx's analyses of social classes never refer simply to the economic structure (relations of production) but always to the ensemble of the structures of a mode of production and social formation, and to the relations which are maintained there by the different levels. (Poulantzas, 1973: 63, original emphasis)

Thus social classes are composed of agents who are the bearers/supports of the structures of a social formation taken together. We may thus talk of economic, political and structural determinants of classes to the extent that these regions are relatively autonomous from one another (as the economic and political regions are held to be under capitalism).

2.5 Structure and Class

Within this problematic there are thus two forms of determination of the social world, two analytically distinct, though closely
articulated sets of factors which shape the course of human history. We may refer to these as structural and class determinants. It is the emphasis given to the former which has given the Althusser-Poulantzas school its title and has been the focal point of many of the criticisms which have been made against it. However it is my contention that both forms of determination are integral to this approach and both are necessary, though, as we shall see, the relation between them presents a few problems.

It is true to say that it is part of the distinctive (though perhaps not unique; it is shared for example by Hall (1977) and Swingewood (1977)) contribution of this problematic to insist that structural determination is not confined to the economic region alone, but rather extends to the regions of the 'superstructure': the political and the ideological. This extension is deemed essential by Althusser and Poulantzas if we are to avoid certain alleged distortions or revisionist formulations of historical materialism/marxism especially economism, empiricism, voluntarism, idealism and historicism.

We will see below (Chapters 2 and 4) something of the relations which are held to characterise the structures of the political and ideological fields and the relations between these regional elements. We have referred already to the effect of the structures on social relations but we need also (to avoid Miliband's change of structural super-determinism, Miliband 1972: 258-259) to note the relative autonomy of the field of the class struggle.

Now the effect of structures on social relations is fairly straightforward. It consists, as we have seen, the distribution of agents into classes; in the case of the C.M.P. the bourgeoisie and the proletariat each economically, politically and ideologically determined. We will go into this effect in more detail below (Section 2.6) but here we must concern ourselves with the reciprocal relation, that of the field of social relations (composed of class practices) on the structures. Poulantzas's
position on this crucial question is as follows. He firstly asserts that the critical level in the field of social relations is the political, that is political class practices, which are forms of political class struggle.

Social relations consist of class practices, in which social classes are placed in oppositions: social classes can be conceived only as class practices, these practices existing in oppositions which, in their unity, constitute the field of the class struggle: (Poulantzas, 1973: 86)

And,

... the political struggle is the over-determining level of the class struggle, in that it concentrates the levels of class struggle. (p.92)

Thus the question of the reciprocal effect of social relations (the class struggle) is posed in the following terms:

... how does political practice affect the structure? (p.94)

And the answer that is given is that:

... the interrelations between structures and class practices are of the same type, as the relations in each of these fields ... their so-called 'interaction', which is in fact the mode of intervention of one level on another, consists of the limits within which one level can modify the other. (p.94)

The effectiveness of the structure on the field of practices is thus itself limited by the intervention of political practice on the structure. (p.95)

So, in the determination of 'historical actuality', to cover which Lenin's notion of conjuncture (= the present moment) is employed (see p.93), two interrelated factors - structure and class - are employed. In his examination of European Fascism, Poulantzas is as some pains to stress the importance of determination by the class struggle. He notes approvingly that:
Lenin and Mao stress that while economics plays the determinant role in the last instance (the fundamental contradiction), it is the class struggle (i.e., in the end politics and the political class struggle) which has primacy in the historical process. (Poulantzas, 1974: 40)

Later in his review/critique of Althusser's essay on Ideological State Apparatuses, Poulantzas criticizes Althusser for neglecting this dimension (Poulantzas, 1974: 300-1n) though in fact it is referred to by Althusser, if not given much prominence (Althusser, 1971: 152, 154, 157; also Hall 1977a: 336).

We can see then that although great prominence is given to structural determination, the field of the class struggle is seen as equally important by writers in this problematic (perhaps Poulantzas particularly) and that their view of the world is thus less deterministic than might at first appear. That is not to say that there are not problems in the relation they posit between structure and class, there are and I will discuss some of these below.

2.6 Multiple Classes

With these two distinctions in mind (viz., that between mode of production and social formation; and that between structures and social relations) we can begin to account for the multiplicity of classes which characterizes all social formations and the dislocations which characterize their practices at different levels. We have already noted that while a pure mode of production is made up of only two classes, concrete social formations contain more than this. This is due firstly to the presence of more than one mode of production in any concrete site. From this we may get not only residual classes from a former mode—which remain as a distinct category even though their place in the structures may be radically re-assigned by their insertion into the new mode, but also particular effects of the forms of combination that these different modes adopt.
The effect of this structural complexity in the field of social relations is the splitting, dissolution and fusion of classes in a manner which is always original in each instance and does not follow simply from the modes which are mixed. Thus the number and nature of classes in a particular social formation cannot be ascertained simply by examining the modes of production that are 'mixed', since we need also to know how they are combined in a particular site. This, we should add, is a question for empirical research and not something which can be settled a priori. Poulantzas argues that we can:

...identify a class or fraction as a social force when the relation to the relations of production is reflected on the other levels by 'pertinent effects'. (Poulantzas 1973: 79)

That is, a class, or fraction of a class may be said to exist when its economic determination is reflected by the insertion of a new element in the political and ideological structures and in political and ideological class relations. Poulantzas also notes that such a class or fraction of a class need not have a distinctive political or ideological organisation of its own in order for it to have 'pertinent effects' at these levels (Poulantzas 1973: 80).

These fractions of classes, identified by the criterion of pertinent effects, may be distinguished from two other sub-class units. Poulantzas calls these 'categories' and 'strata'. Class fractions which constitute the substratum of eventual social forces (the realization of which potential renders them autonomous fractions) typically include such examples as the commercial, industrial and financial bourgeoisies, fractions of capital, whose differential relation to the production process may be seen as producing 'pertinent effects' in the political and ideological regions. Social categories are seen by Poulantzas as 'ensembles' with 'pertinent effects' which are not based on a distinctive economic determination. Examples include the government bureaucracy and intellectuals and, more
importantly for our purposes, certain 'media men' (i.e. persons).

Social strata are the 'secondary effects' of the combination of modes of production, an example of this being the 'working-class aristocracy'. These may be distinguished from categories and fractions in that both of the latter are capable of becoming social forces, i.e., of having pertinent effects whereas strata cannot, though they may influence the action of genuine social forces. (For this classification see Poulantzas 1973: 84-85). The concept of 'pertinent effects' is of some importance in the identification of these sub-class units (12) and therefore requires some attempt at definition. Poulantzas' own definition is as follows:

We shall designate by 'pertinent effects' the fact that the reflection of the place in the process of production on the other levels constitutes a new element which cannot be inserted in the typical framework which these levels would present without this element. (Poulantzas 1973: 79)

While this definition in itself may seem a trifle unclear, Poulantzas provides some measure of clarification when he goes on to discuss the example of the small-holding peasants which Marx discusses in The 18th Brumaire. (q.v. Poulantzas 1973: 79; MESW, Vol. 1: 394-487). He suggests that while this ensemble did not possess a political and ideological organisation of its own, its economic existence was nevertheless marked by pertinent political and ideological effects, in particular the phenomenon of Bonapartism which would not have existed but for the small-holding peasants. This, Poulantzas argues, may be contrasted with the case of the German peasants whose 'political presence' could be accounted for by a simple variation within the limits of the existing (predominantly feudal) state. (Poulantzas 1973: 80-81)

The important point to note with regard to these sub-class ensembles is that their existence, and, as we shall see below, their interests and power are questions for empirical investigation rather than a priori
definition. The concepts are intended to denote, however, something more permanent and more structured than the notion of a more or less ad hoc pressure group. Since, ultimately, classes only exist in the class struggle, their existence may not be simply 'read off' from the structures but this is not to say that they are not subject to structural determination (i.e. in the last analysis). This will become clearer if we consider the notions of 'interests' and 'power' (see below).

It is true however that the notion of pertinent effects as outlined by Poulantzas remains not entirely clear. However, as we shall see below and in Chapter Three, it may at least point to identifying the social forces involved in the struggle for control over broadcasting. We should perhaps note however, that authors such as Miliband (1973) reject this notion of pertinent effects entirely.

The significant point we need to take account of is that the class struggle in capitalist social formations cannot realistically be seen solely in terms of a clash between the two great classes; capital and labour. Rather we also need to note the occurrence of intra-class conflict and the existence of divisions, some temporary and related to specific issues and some relatively long-term and fundamental, in each of the two major ensembles. For our purposes we need to take particular note of divisions in the capitalist class and the struggles which occur across them, though we should not lose sight of the fundamental commonality of interest and drift into visions of pluralism.

2.7 Class Interests

When we turn in Chapter Three to discussing the effect on broadcasting of the struggle between various classes, fractions, categories and strata, we will do so in terms of the 'interests' that these various ensembles may be said to have. Now within this problematic the concept of interest is clearly not related to personal feelings, desires,
inclinations etc., since we are not dealing with either individuals or social groups as the elements of our analysis. In fact in some respects the word 'interest' may be a dangerously anthropomorphic one to use. Therborn casts doubt on its viability as a term in scientific discourse for just this reason (Therborn 1977). However, it may be defined or redefined in a way which rules out this sort of interpretation.

Poulantzas defines class interest as:

... the extension of the field of the practice of one class (or fraction thereof) in relation to those of other classes. (Poulantzas 1973: 113) (my insertion)

The effect of the matrix of structures on the field of social relations may be at one level a threshold effect, setting up the existence of a class by distributing agents into it; and, at the same time a horizon effect setting up the limits of its operation, defining its interests at each of the three levels. (Poulantzas 1973: 107-8, 111) Thus at one level the interests of a particular class are a direct structural effect, so that one might say for example one of the interests of the bourgeoisie is to counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. However, the interests of a particular class are also circumscribed by those of other classes:

Class interests, as limits of extension of a specific class practice, are displaced according to the interests of the other classes present. (Poulantzas 1973: 112)

For example, the interests of the commercial bourgeoisie may be limited by those of the financial fraction of that class. Class interests are thus subject to a double determination by the structures of a social formation both directly and through other classes, themselves subject to structural determination. Interests refer then to a 'potential for development' circumscribed by structural factors and the action of other classes, fractions etc. and can be seen to include not only economic, but also political and ideological dimensions (p.112). Ideology can, of course,
give rise to imaginary and illusory interests (q.v. Ch. 4.) and can conceal the limits of practices from the agents concerned but it is objective interests which Poulantzas sees as the object of power (Poulantzas, 1973: 112-3).

2.8 **Power**

The extent to which a given class (or fraction) is able to realise the potential of its interests is precisely what is embraced by the concept of 'power' in this problematic. As Poulantzas puts it:

\[(\text{power is}) \text{ the capacity of a social class to realise its specific objective interests.} \quad (\text{Poulantzas, 1973: 104}) \quad (13)\]

Thus if, for example, the commercial bourgeoisie is able to secure the furtherance of its interests, this will be at the expense of the interests of other classes (and fractions) over whom it can be said to have exercised power. Power is thus something which is exercised by classes and not individuals and which relates to the (partly) structurally-determined conflicts between these classes. The concept is located in the field of social relations, class practices, rather than in the structures but power is nonetheless constrained by the structural matrix which delimits interests. However, we must tread carefully here if Poulantzas's approach is not to collapse into a form of 'structural super determinism', the accusation levelled at it by Miliband (1973: 258-9), in which power is seen simply as an effect of the structures. We need to recall the distinction I drew attention to earlier between the distinct fields of structures and social relations and the relative autonomy of each. The particular issue we must confront is where does a class get its power from, and the answer we must avoid if we wish to avoid 'structural super determinism' is 'from its position in the structures and that alone'. This response would vitiate the relative autonomy of the field of social relations and,
I contend, not do justice to Poulantzas's intention if not the letter of his work.

We need then to create the source of a class's power in the field of social relations (which acknowledging that this field is conditioned by the structures) and this source is identified by Poulantzas as class organisation. The power of a class (the 'amount' of power it may exercise in realising its interests) is due to the level of its organisation, specifically the strategies it follows and the alliances it may force in the pursuit of its interests. These factors are of course constrained in the same way as class interests, by the structures and by the actions of other classes, but nevertheless, Poulantzas insists, must be seen as relatively autonomous. Indeed they must or the notion that 'men make history', even reformulated as social classes (bearers of structures) make history, disappears and we are left with the idea that structures make history and men are merely puppets (Poulantzas, 1973: 107-9).

2.9 Hegemony

While social formations are characterized by a multiplicity of classes and fractions each with a degree of autonomy, these are not arranged unsystematically. Rather their political relations are marked by what is known as 'hegemony'. This concept, derived from Gramsci, is used by both Poulantzas and Althusser in two senses, both of which apply to the political practices of the dominant classes in a social formation. These are as follows:

1) (Hegemony) indicates how in their relation to the capitalist state the political interests of these classes are constituted as representative of the 'general interest' of the body politic. (Poulantzas 1973: 140)
Thus we can speak of hegemonic rule by a particular class or fraction in a social formation. Secondly we can talk of hegemony within the dominant classes themselves.

2) The capitalist state and the specific characteristics of the class struggle in a capitalist formation make it possible for a 'power bloc' composed of several politically dominant classes or fractions to function. Among these dominant classes and fractions one of them holds a particular dominant role, which can be characterized as a hegemonic role. (Poulantzas 1973: 141)

This concept enables us to locate precisely the difference between the conjectures in the United States and United Kingdom in terms of which section of the bourgeois class generally was exercising hegemony at the time when broadcasting first developed. It becomes particularly clear, as we shall see in the next chapter, when we examine the particular form each apparatus took in the name of representing the general interest. That is, in the United States, it ended to be couched in terms of giving the people what they wanted and in the United Kingdom what they were deemed to need. The concept of hegemony will be referred to again in Chapter Five in the context of imperialism, a system of domination in which a particular social formation may be said to exercise a hegemonic role.

2.10 Critical Remarks

There are several lines of criticism which have been pursued in response to the 'structuralist-marxists' in general, most of which can be directed at Poulantzas whose work I have taken as the main example of this problematic. It is true (and admitted to a degree - see Poulantzas, 1976b) that the Althusserian school is guilty of excessive formalism, an excess which is partly responsible for the sometimes turgid and only semi-penetratable prose-style which these authors adopt. Examples of this shortcoming are given by Laclau (1975: 107 and passim) as well as by Miliband (1973) and others. The main thrust of this critique is that
purely formal relations between concepts are substituted as metaphors for real relations between concepts and that any grasp on the 'real concrete' level is thereby lost. To the degree that this is a valid criticism it is not sufficient to dismiss the structuralist-marxist problematic in its entirety. If formalism is the problem then concrete analysis provides the solution and this analysis may remain within the problematic while developing it. Certainly Poulantzas claims that this is possible and the work of Carchedi (1975) provides, I think, an example of how it may proceed (whether the concrete analyses could have been completed without the formalism is open to question, but I think doubtful).

It follows from this that, in moving from the level of formal/abstract relations between concepts expressed in a metamorphical manner to that of real relations between concepts, that the formal-metamorphical relations may be modified or altered, found to be false, inaccurate and so on. That is to say, particular modifications/criticisms of Poulantzas which seek to reformulate particular points without dismissing the overall position are possible and indeed examples of them may be found within the works of Poulantzas himself as well as those of his critics. (14)

Thirdly however, and I think more fundamentally, we need to examine the critique by Miliband (1972) which gives rise to the change to 'structural super-determinism'. The suggestion is made that the model put forward by Poulantzas does not allow for any influence on the structure of society or the course of history by human action, that everything takes place at the level of structures and history is thus shaped by some 'unseen hand'. That, despite Poulantzas's insistence to the contrary, his position ultimately denies any autonomy to the field of human action, the class struggle.

In Miliband's words:
For what (Poulantzas's) exclusive stress on 'objective relations' suggests is that what the state does is in every particular and at all times wholly determined by these 'objective relations': in other words, that the structural constraints of the system are so absolutely compelling as to turn those who run the state into the merest functionaries and executants of policies imposed on them by 'the system'. (15) (Miliband, 1972: 258-9)

Now we have seen that Poulantzas insists on the relatively autonomous status of the field of the class struggle but in that section this was explained in purely formal terms. (16) However, in order to escape the change to 'super-determinism' and 'abstractionism' Poulantzas needs to introduce a non-formal conceptual account of the relative autonomy of the class struggle which locates agents of production as something more than mere 'bearers of structures'. His approach to this is via the concepts of class organisation and class position (strategy and alliance) which relate to the issue of power. This concept (power) is crucial. As Poulantzas has it:

... power reveals relations not directly determined by the structure, and depends on the exact relation of the social forces present in the class struggle (Poulantzas, 1973: 108)

This presence of a class as a social force in fact presupposes a certain organisational threshold in the broadest sense of the term. (Poulantzas, 1973: 107)

It is this organisational ability which determines the amount of power a class has within the limits imposed by the structures on its interests (p. 111) and those imposed by the power of other classes (p. 112). In fact Poulantzas 'allows' classes more autonomy than this because a class (such as the labour aristocracy) can take up a position which does not correspond to its interests (Poulantzas, 1975: 15). Thus 'class determination is not reducible to class position' unless we wish to argue that the labour aristocracy actually becomes bourgeois by taking up a bourgeois position (ibid).
Thus it seems we are not too far removed from the traditional Marxist schema which allows that a class may have 'false consciousness', that is take up a position in the conjuncture which does not conform to its specific objective interests. Neither it seems is Poulantzas's insistence on structures and class relations as relatively autonomous fields at variance with the dictum that,

Men make history but they do not make it in circumstances of their own choosing.

It is probably a fair criticism however to note that, in his more abstract works, Poulantzas devotes much space to an analysis of structural determination and rather less to the arena of the class struggle. Miliband's comment to the effect that:

...the 'class struggle' makes a dutiful appearance, but in an exceedingly formalised ballet of evanescent shadows (Miliband, 1973: 86)

is perhaps as overstated as it is poetic but does suggest the main area of weakness, I think, of the 'structuralist' problematic in general and Poulantzas as an example of it. In his last work, however, Poulantzas devotes much more time to the field of the class struggle (Poulantzas, 1978).

However, I do not wish to do much more than delineate the problem here. If I am to avoid the change of abstractionism and formalism myself it is high time that we turn to examining the problematic of 'structuralist-marxism' in action, in its application to the apparatuses of broadcasting. In doing so, this problem will not disappear but it may be clarified in revealing its significance on a more concrete level of analysis.

2.11 Formal Determinants of Broadcasting

We may now set out, in formal terms at this stage, the determinants of broadcasting. These are twofold. Firstly the role of broadcasting
is partly determined by its place in the structures of a social formation, principally as an ideological apparatus (see Chapter Four). Secondly, it is, in the particular forms which it assumes, the product of particular conjunctures of the class struggle. I shall briefly summarize the principal structural determinants of broadcasting here before examining in more detail its class determination. The role of broadcasting as an ideological apparatus is taken up in more detail in Chapter Four.

2.11.1 Structural Determinants of Broadcasting

In general terms, my proposition is that the operation of broadcasting occurs within limits set by the matrix of structures which, as it were, assigns it a (set of) general role(s).

This structural determination of broadcasting may be, for analytic purposes, divided into three parts, economic, political and ideological, though empirically these roles are combined in a variety of complex ways. We may begin by examining the economic determinants.

1) The principal economic structural determination of broadcasting lies in the commodity status of radio and television receivers and the structure of the economic region in capitalist social formations. The argument may be outlined thus. Receiving sets are products of a process of capitalist manufacture and are thus commodities to be sold on a market with the aim of realizing a profit. One of the principal demands of a capitalist market is its continued expansion in order to counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (cf. *Capital*, Vol. 3, Part 3). This expansion may take the form of opening up new geographical areas for capitalist exploitation (via colonialism or imperialism, q.v. Chapter Five), or of intensifying the development of the domestic market, by for example, creating a demand for new products, such as radio sets. As we shall see, both of these strategies were followed in the development of broadcasting, but in its initial
stages it is the latter which is most important. Secondly, not only radio and television sets, but broadcasting itself, came to be a sort of commodity (though in different forms in different social formations) sold on the market to advertisers and sponsors, with surplus labour being extracted from producers, actors and technicians etc. We may note that this, too, is connected with the process of intensifying the development of the market. Radio and television programmes may also be sold to other broadcasters (q.v. Chapter Five).

As will be shown below, these features of the economic structure tend to produce as their effect in the field of social relations a variety of fractions and divisions of classes whose interests are partly determined in terms of their relation to these relations of production.

2) The political structure of capitalist social formations is also important in the determination of broadcasting. In particular, the nature of the state in a particular social formation may be of decisive importance in determining the nature of its apparatuses, and, as will be seen below, this factor may be invoked in accounting for the differential development of broadcasting in the United States and the United Kingdom. The structure of the capitalist state will receive more attention in Chapter Four, but here we may note that its function is that of providing for the reproduction of the relations of production, by acting as the factor of cohesion in a social formation (cf. Poulantzas 1973: 44; Althusser 1971: 128). The political structure is also a determinant of classes and fractions and gives rise specifically to class fractions, or perhaps more accurately, categories, whose interests lie in the overall maintenance of capitalist relations as opposed to the often more sectional interests produced by the economic structure.
3) The ideological structural determination of broadcasting is the subject of Chapter Four and will thus only be mentioned here. We may note however, that the role of the ideological region is closely bound up with that of the political, particularly in the case of overtly public ideological apparatuses such as the mass media of communication. The existence of formal apparatuses concerned with the dissemination of ideology is a feature of the ideological region and may be said to have produced a distinct social category of 'ideologues' which we will be concerned with below and in later chapters.

2.11.2 Class Determinants of Broadcasting

Again the account of these may be divided, for the purpose of analysis into three levels, which we may call the economic, political and ideological class struggles, according to the object of the struggle and the mode in which it is carried out. In a sense all class struggles are political since they bear on the conjuncture with the object of maintaining or transforming it, but the term 'political class struggle' will be reserved for those practices which bear upon the state and its apparatuses. It is admitted that the distinctions between the different levels of class struggle are sometimes difficult to ascertain but they are nonetheless useful in explanation. We may begin with a brief outline of each of these three levels.

1) Firstly the economic class struggle, considered here in the specific case of broadcasting, should be seen as a struggle to optimize the position of particular classes and fractions vis-à-vis the relations of production. We may identify a number of class fractions with economic interests in this sphere. Among these we may include:
i) The industrial and commercial fractions of the bourgeoisie, represented by the manufacturers of radio and T.V. sets and manufacturers of other consumer goods whose sale may be promoted through advertising. That is, a particular fraction (or alliance of fractions) of capital whose (structurally-determined) economic interests may best be met by commercial broadcasting, financed by advertising. Within this complex we may identify an internal struggle between monopoly and non-monopoly, domestic and foreign capitals and so on.

ii) The employees of broadcasting apparatuses, who tend to be members of the new-petty bourgeoisie, or new middle class *(cf. Poulantzas, 1974; Carchedi, 1975; Wright, 1978)* where economic struggle is concerned with wages and conditions of work, for example, against the tendency to 'proletarianise' their labour. This group is discussed below.

iii) A 'category' or 'stratum' of the whole bourgeoisie which seeks to minimise the commercial exploitation of broadcasting in the interests of preserving it as a more general ideological apparatus. This group does not have an economic interest in broadcasting but struggles against the first group which does.

(See below and Chapter 4)

2) Secondly, the political class struggle, closely articulated with the economic one outlined above, but which may result in a displacement of economic goals in favour of political ones. This struggle takes place on the terrain of the state and its formal expression is to be found in the various statutes, charters and regulations imposed on different broadcasting institutions by the state. The contending parties in this struggle include those mentioned above but we may mention a few other ensembles who play, or have played, a part in this conflict. For example
the various political parties, church groups, trade unions and
the military have each at some time attempted to gain some measure
of control over particular apparatuses.

3) Thirdly the ideological struggle, again in close articulation with
the other two levels. This is where we may locate a great number
of the academic treatises on broadcasting, the various 'moral'
crusades which are staged over issues such as violent programmes,
pornography and so on. It is also, of course, the level of
struggle in which broadcasting apparatuses themselves are pre-
dominantly engaged. This is a theme which will be explored in
later chapters.

Though the distinctions between these levels of struggle may become
blurred, we may note here the significant difference between the outcome
of this struggle in the United Stated and the United Kingdom. In
America control of broadcasting passed largely to commerical interests in
a 'laissez faire' system of 'free' competition. As a result the dynamics
of that system may be largely explained in terms of the economic struggle
between those various interests. The political struggle which resulted
in these groups becoming dominant is continued as a defensive action
against attempts to 'de-commercialize' broadcasting. In Great Britain
the parties in the political struggle to gain control over broadcasting
appear to have been more evenly matched as a result of which the commercial
interests which came to dominate in the United States did not do so in
Britain. Economic struggle was thus far less important in determining
the shape of broadcasting there, though as we shall see, it was not
entirely absent.
2.12  Level of Explanation

Thus in our analysis of broadcasting we may identify the classes, fractions, categories and strata who engage in the various levels of the struggle for control over this apparatus. We can do this mainly by considering the outcomes of their various skirmishes which we may term the effects of this struggle. I have cited the concepts developed by Poulantzas as a model for this explanation but we should be aware that they pose for this analysis as a problem of level of explanation. It is a problem concerned with different levels of generality and specificity. The problem is this. Poulantzas is engaged in elaborating a system of concepts for the analysis of whole social formations whereas we are concerned to explain a particular feature of such formations (i.e., broadcasting). Thus we are dealing, in a sense, with even smaller units than are designated by 'fractions', categories etc., since we need to consider these as they bear on our particular object. Thus, while an important class fraction in the struggle for control over broadcasting is that of commercial capital-industrial capital (strictly perhaps, an alliance of fractions), the whole of that fraction is not involved directly but only that part of it concerned with, for example, the manufacture of radio and television sets. This segment is not even exclusively concerned with broadcasting. At some points in the explanation, then, we will be dealing with competition within particular fractions such as that between rival commercial enterprises. Similarly, while the staff of broadcasting institutions may be classed as part of a 'new petty bourgeoisie' (cf. Poulantzas 1975: 205 ff. and below) and indeed hold many features in common with the rest of that class (e.g. the ideology of professionalism - see below), they are not identical with the whole of that ensemble.

The particular site and focus of the class struggle we are considering thus cuts across the determination of the fractions involved
at the level of social formations. This is due to the fact that specific apparatuses, such as those of broadcasting, are not merely determined by the class struggle and the exercise of class power, but also:

... possess their autonomy and structural specificity which is not as such immediately reducible to an analysis in terms of power. (Poulantzas 1973: 115)

Here we can see the importance of recognizing the dislocation between the field of structures and that of social relations, not only in that these constitute two different fields of enquiry but also in that there is no necessary homology between them (cf. Poulantzas 1973: 90). This dislocation is an important factor in explaining the fact that while broadcasting was set up largely by commercial interests it has never been totally subordinated to these, because it forms part of the ideological structure and part of its functioning is determined by this. Here we can locate the source of McQueen's error in seeing commercial television as simply the product of advertising when in fact its determination is more complex than this (McQueen 1977: Ch. 1. Cf. Chapter One of this thesis).

2.13 Broadcasting, Power and the State

We have established, then, that no apparatus should be seen simply as an instrument, organ or appendix of the power of particular social classes since it is also subject to determination by the structures. This is not to say that particular apparatuses, or the state itself may not be under the control of a particular class or fraction since the concept of hegemony discussed previously clearly suggests that it can, but rather that this control is circumscribed by the structural determination of the apparatus. It should be pointed out, however, that in this conception, apparatuses such as those of broadcasting do not possess a power of their own but materialize and concretize class relations, which are relations of power, within limits set by the structures (cf. Poulantzas
1973: 115). Thus to speak of the 'power of broadcasting', or of advertising or television in anything other than a strictly metaphorical sense is to obscure the fact that it is the power of particular classes (and fractions etc.) to realise their various economic, political and ideological interests which is concretized in particular broadcasting apparatuses. (This, of course, is precisely what is obscured in the analyses of many conventional media theorists). This same consideration applies to a discussion of the power of the state. In a strict sense, the state does not 'possess' a power of its own, but is rather the site and particular focus of the political class struggle, as well as being the structural instance whose function is that of maintaining the unity of a social formation. Thus we cannot really say of the difference between the British and American systems of broadcasting that the narrower range of class interests present in the latter is due to a state with insufficient power to control broadcasting. We must rather locate the difference in the different forms of the capitalist state present in each instance and the different exercise of hegemony.

It is readily apparent that different institutional forms of control of broadcasting have arisen in different social formations. The laissez-faire model epitomised by the U.S.; the government-controlled systems, such as the O.R.T.F. in France, and the public-corporation type, of which the B.B.C. and A.B.C. (also C.B.C.) may be taken as examples. Insofar as these different modes of control represent different modes of state intervention in the ideological (and economic) regions, from regulation of commercial interests to direct involvement, we can say that these differences are partly due to the semi-autonomous intervention of different configurations of the political structure. That is, the different forms which broadcasting apparatuses exhibit in various social formations are due, in part, to different forms of the state. Hull (1959) notes how the similar political structures of Australia and Canada - both are Westminster-
Federal amalgams for example - have given rise to similar and distinctive 'dual' systems of control of broadcasting - that is, combinations of the public corporation mode and state-regulated private enterprise (Hull, 1959: 13 and passim).

We will examine Althusser's (arguable) assertion, that all ideological apparatuses are ipso facto a part of the state, regardless of what he (correctly) terms the 'ideological' distinctions between public/private property (Althusser, 1971: 144), below. Here we may note that the form of the state, which in this problematic is the instance in which class relations are condensed, the prime arena of class struggle, is an important factor in the determination of broadcasting apparatuses.

2.14 The New Petty Bourgeoisie

In my earlier discussion of the various classes, fractions, etc., involved in the struggle for control over broadcasting, reference was made to an ensemble tentatively entitled the 'new petty bourgeoisie'. The empirical referent of this class in the discussion of broadcasting is the programme staff of broadcasting institutions, including producers, directors, some technicians and the various actors and other performers - the agents who actually operate the apparatus. An examination of the class 'membership' of these agents is important since it will enable us to account for many features of the 'behaviour' of broadcasting apparatuses which do not follow directly from their structural determination or their class ownership. This ensemble is important because they place a distinctive 'stamp' on the output of broadcasting apparatuses.

In this discussion we will not be concerned with the essentially empiricist question '... To what class does this or that individual or mass of individuals belong?' (Poulantzas 1975: 203) but rather, 'What place or places in the social division of labour are filled by this group?' In other words the determination of the place is more important
and logically prior to the distribution of agents into it. We are also not directly concerned with the whole of this class but rather with that section of it which operates broadcasting apparatuses. The relationship between the 'staff' of an apparatus and the class or fraction 'in charge of' the state will be examined in Chapter Four.

2.15 Economic Determination of the New Petty Bourgeoisie: Poulantzas

There is considerable debate among marxists as to the correct method of identifying the theoretical determination of this ensemble (cf. Wright 1978: 30). As well as Poulantzas's attempt (Poulantzas 1975) which is the basis for the following discussion, the work of Carchedi (1975a, b) and Wright (1978) is relevant here and will be referred to below.

Poulantzas' account of the new petty (or petit) bourgeoisie (n.p.b.) begins with an attempt to identify their distinctive economic determination, as follows. He argues that, in order to identify this class, the first characteristic of its agents which we must pay attention to is that, in general, they are not engaged in productive labour. We must be careful to spell out the dimensions of the distinction between productive and unproductive labour since it is this, according to Poulantzas, that forms the basis of the economic determination of this class. That is, its structural determination at this level which means that it is neither bourgeois or proletarian. It is fairly clear that the new petty bourgeoisie (which are referred to in a loose fashion elsewhere as the 'middle class(es)') do not form part of the bourgeoisie since they have neither economic ownership or possession of the means of production (Poulantzas 1975: 209). The main problem is thus to distinguish them from the working class to whose agents they are superficially similar, in that they are paid wages (or a salary) and are employed by capital. Poulantzas locates this distinction in the fact that the new petty bourgeoisie are not engaged in productive labour (Poulantzas 1975:
This does not refer to any criterion of utility of the products they produce or to intrinsic characteristics of the work they perform, since neither of these factors is relevant to a consideration of the economic structure of capitalism. Rather the 'productive' character of labour refers to the social relations of production within which the labour is carried out (Poulantzas 1975: 211). This means that we are dealing here not with productive labour in general (though a definition of this is possible) but with capitalist productive labour. Poulantzas puts it as follows:

Thus, what is productive labour in a given mode of production is labour that gives rise to the dominant relation of exploitation of this mode; what is productive labour for one mode of production may not be so for another. In the capitalist mode of production, productive labour is that which directly produces surplus-value, which valorizes capital and is exchanged against capital. (Poulantzas 1975: 211)

However, the appearance of surplus value in a particular economic apparatus combined with the wage form are not sufficient to define the labour involved as productive since, on the global level, capitalist production may not only be divided into production, distribution and exchange, but is also characterized by the processes of the circulation of capital and the reproduction of the conditions of production. Now while each of these elements may be necessary for the extended reproduction of capitalism, they are not directly productive of surplus value; i.e., they do not add to the total amount of surplus produced.

Thus, wage labour in the sphere of the circulation of capital; in commerce, accounting, banking, insurance etc., and particularly for our purposes, in advertising and marketing, is not involved in a process of value creation but one of a transfer from productive capital (Poulantzas 1975: 212). Similarly, the 'wages' of teachers, doctors, lawyers, etc., are typically paid for as services out of revenue. They are necessary for the reproduction of the relations of production in various ways but
but they do not themselves produce surplus value in the sense mentioned above. Thirdly, the labour of the various other state apparatuses while necessary is not productive in the strict sense of the word.

Now all this does not amount to saying that these workers are not exploited, but it does indicate that this exploitation is of a fundamentally different character to that of the working class. The exploitation of the working class is the result of the appropriation of surplus value.

2.16 Further Economic Determinations

However, this difference may be more apparent than real. Wright for example argues that;

... there is little basis for regarding the distinction between productive and unproductive labour as determining the boundary of the working class at the economic level (Wright 1978:44) since this distinction does not give rise to different economic interests (i.e. structurally delimited class interests, as described above) in each ensemble (1978: 48). Rather both productive and unproductive workers in Poulantzas's terms have a basic (= fundamental - Wright) interest in socialism (1978: 49).

Let us consider two further aspects of the economic determination of the new petty bourgeoisie. The first is that in the present phase of monopoly capitalism, the wage form tends to be extended to cover new types of labour.

From medicine through to the liberal professions (law, architecture etc.) and including entertainment and the media, the agents providing services have overwhelmingly become employees of capital, which has seized hold of their activities. (Poulantzas 1975: 215) (my emphasis)

While this process has sometimes been referred to as the 'proletarianization' of the labour of these agents, this may be a usage by analogy only as a statement about economic class determination. Is it in fact the case that these workers, when they become employees of capital, begin to produce surplus value? And, if this is so, does their distinctive economic
determination disappear?

In the case of a worker who provides a service, surplus value may be said to be extracted when the labour power of the worker is purchased by the capitalist in order that it may be resold as a service to a customer at a profit. This service may then be considered as a commodity like any other produced by wage labour. As Wright notes, the distinction Poulantzas draws between the production of material commodities (physical objects) and services (Poulantzas 1975: 216) is an arbitrary one, since services (such as accounting) may contain both use value and exchange value like any other commodity (Wright 1978: 46). (N.B. it is not the worker who is re-sold, which would be a case of exchange, but the service he performs, such as, for example, an audit, it is this that enables the extraction of surplus value). Braverman documents the process whereby service labour, once it is inserted into capitalist relations or production, takes on the features of other types of commodity production: for example the increasingly detailed control of the labour process by capital (cf. Braverman 1975: Ch.16). The case of clerical labour is especially clear, the mechanisation of the office enables a degree of control equal to that of the assembly line to be exercised. In many instances the work of 'white collar' workers is so closely bound up with the 'actual production process' however, that we would not want to distinguish them from productive labour of the manual variety (Braverman 1974: Ch.15). We are left still with a large number of workers in service industries though whose position is not so clear. We have seen that surplus value may be produced by them and, according to most Marxists, this makes them productive workers. On the other hand from the point of view of a capitalist system as a whole they may be engaged not in the production of surplus value but in its realisation and distribution among the various branches of capital. Or again, what of the workers whose function is primarily in the reproduction of the conditions of production, i.e., the employees of state apparatuses?
From this global point of view this labour, though it may assume the same empirical form as productive labour, and though a profit may be made from it by its immediate controllers, represents an expenditure out of revenue rather than an investment in production in the part of capital. From the point of view of the (structurally-determined) interests of these workers however, both Poulantzas and Wright agree that we must turn to the political and ideological dimensions in order to clearly delimit their class position. (Poulantzas 1975: 224, Wright 1978: 94-5) This is taken up below.

However, the labour of banking, insurance and advertising workers, as well as that of the more obvious providers of services such as doctors, lawyers, teachers etc., may be seen as non-productive at the global level. It does not add to the total amount of surplus value produced. But, this does not clearly establish the class position of these agents.

2.17 Productive Labour Redefined?

There is one further strand in Poulantzas's attempt to identify the economic determination of the new petty bourgeoisie. In order to distinguish more clearly between unproductive and productive labour, and thus to establish the economic determination of the new petty bourgeoisie, Poulantzas argues we need a more specific definition of productive labour. He attempts this as follows:

Productive labour is labour that produces surplus-value while directly reproducing the material elements that serve as the substratum of the relation of exploitation: labour that is directly involved in material production by producing use-values that increase material wealth. (Poulantzas 1975: 216)

This however, merely shifts the problem to the decision as to what counts as direct involvement, and leads to the somewhat odd conclusion that only those workers who produce material objects are part of the working class.
Clearly, Poulantzas has not solved the problem, and the economic
determination of the new petty bourgeoisie remains somewhat vague.
The distinction between the production of physical objects and the
provision of services (rejected by Wright, as noted above) does not seem
to me to be a valid one.

What emerges here is the fact that the new petty bourgeoisie do not
have a clear and distinct economic determination. Rather, as Wright
described it they have a genuinely 'contradictory class location' (1978: 62) or, as Carchedi has it, an ambiguous place 'between' capital and
labour (Carchedi 1975a: 1). In terms of economic determination alone,
it is impossible to distinguish precisely the distinctions between;
the upper levels of these workers and the bourgeoisie proper; and the
lower echelons and the proletariat. (21)

In order to identify the distinctive role played by the media workers
in the social division of labour then, we need to turn to an examination
of their political and ideological determination of the new petty
bourgeoisie.

2.18 Political Determination of the New Petty Bourgeoisie

We need here to consider the place of this class in the relations
of domination and subordination in a social formation. There are two
aspects to this. Firstly this class enjoys a position of domination over
the working class. The role of foremen and supervisors is particularly
clear in this respect but we may also point to the role of doctors,
lawyers, and other professionals who tend to exercise power over working
class agents. In Wright's schema these workers hold contradictory
(loosely, petty-bourgeois) and bourgeois positions, respectively,
in political relations (Wright 1978: 95-6).

Secondly, new petty bourgeois agents are 'relatively autonomous'.
That is, compared to the working class they experience a relative freedom
from direct class domination. This political autonomy is perhaps most clearly evident in the case of those agents whose labour has not been subjected to the commodity form such as lawyers, whose ideological claim to be in possession of specialized knowledge, coupled with professional control of entry into the trade (cf. Johnson 1972: 45-47) acts to secure a favourable rate of exchange from their services and to maintain a certain amount of autonomy. These two factors also serve to distinguish them from the lower strata of service workers such as household servants. Their position in political relations is thus analogous to that of the (traditional) petty bourgeoisie in economic relations (cf. Wright 1978: 96).

We should note here that this political autonomy, like the economic determination of this class, is subject to the process of polarisation and thus should not be considered to be fixed for all time. Johnson's description of the various modes of occupational control and the tendency for 'mediative' control to replace professional or collegiate direction is apposite in this regard (Johnson 1972: 75).

The concept of polarisation refers to the tendency for the agents of intermediate classes and fractions to become members of either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Thus a doctor for example, may move into the hospital business or he may become a salaried employee, to the extent that he retains the distinctive political and ideological status of the new petty bourgeoisie, however he may still be considered as a member of that class.

2.19 Ideological Determination of the New Petty Bourgeoisie

The ideological determination of the new petty bourgeoisie is possibly its most distinctive feature and stems, according to Poulantzas, principally from the ideological division between manual and mental labour. (As will be seen in Chapter Four, this is a paradigm case of a relation of qualification and subjection.) This effect sets up a
continuum rather than a sharp dichotomy (cf. Poulantzas 1975: 256) and is the product of a specifically capitalist division of labour designed to increase the control of the work force by capital. It does not refer to the commonsense distinction between working with one's hands or one's head, but rather to the separation of planning and execution of production (and other) tasks. That these are not the same distinction is made clear in the case of the skilled craftsman (a declining occupational category) who, although he may work with his hands, is also engaged in mental labour to the extent that he is responsible for the design and planning of his task. Poulantzas argues, and the work of Braverman (1974) provides detailed evidence in support of the claim, that under capitalism there is a progressive differentiation of manual and mental labour and an increasing separation of planning from execution (see also Carchedi 1975b). This is the product of the capitalist division of labour whereby, as Marx put it:

What is lost by the detail labourers is concentrated in the capital that employs them. (Cited by Poulantzas 1975: 235) (from Capital, V.1: 361)

Poulantzas locates the new petty bourgeoisie on the side of mental labour, those agents responsible for the planning rather than the execution of the enterprise under consideration. This classification plainly locates a large proportion of the workers known as managers, but also such groupings as engineers, technicians and for our purposes, certain of the personnel involved in the production of broadcasting.

2.20 Broadcasting Workers and the New Petty Bourgeoisie

We may now summarize those characteristics of broadcasting workers which identify them as members of the new petty bourgeoisie. In doing so we should bear in mind mainly the upper levels of such workers, principally those who are responsible for the design of the ideological
product, such as producers, actors, senior technicians and so on, rather than the lower level employees.\(^{(23)}\) We are then dealing with the key element involved in shaping the final product as described for example by Elliott (1972) and Kumar (1975). (q.v. Ch.1, p.15-16)

Firstly, at the economic level, these workers share many of the characteristics of Poulantzas's 'new petty bourgeoisie', Carchedi's 'new middle class' and Wright's 'contradictory class locations'. They tend to be employed in the sphere of the circulation of capital, insofar as they are concerned with advertising, rather than in production. They thus satisfy Poulantzas's criterion of unproductive labour and Carchedi's of performing part of the global function of capital without ownership of the apparatuses concerned (Carchedi 1975a: 44). They are also engaged in the ideological reproduction of the conditions of production (q.v. Ch.4) which is not productive labour even if we accept Wright's (reasonable) objection to the hard distinction drawn by Poulantzas (c.f. Wright 1978: 88).

The fact that broadcasting services may be run at a profit, as commercial broadcasting typically is in Australia (q.v. Ch.6), does not alter the basic point that broadcasting workers, of the type specified above, are not either proletarian or bourgeois according to the criteria of Poulantzas and Carchedi or Wright. Wright disagrees that this results in a third economically-determined set of class interests but agrees that the workers in the Ideological State Apparatuses (q.v. Ch.4) may be petty bourgeois on political and ideological grounds (Wright 1978: 95-6). As noted above, it is in this area that the new petty bourgeoisie emerge most distinctively.

Secondly then, the political determination of these agents tends to place them in the ranks of the new petty bourgeoisie. Their work is typically characterised by a far greater degree of autonomy than is experienced by most sections of the working class - particularly in the case of the upper level workers mentioned above. It may well be that the lower levels of broadcasting workers are indistinguishable empirically
from the working class, but for our purposes, it is the 'creative'
personnel, those who design, create and produce, who are important
and whose political determination is held to be different to, and in some
senses between that of the working class and the bourgeoisie. The case
for the domination of the working class by this group similarly places
them in an intermediate position. The whole enterprise of broadcasting
is geared to the ideological subjugation of the working class (as will be
seen in later chapters) though the direct domination exercised by, for
example, foremen and supervisors, is also in evidence within broadcasting
apparatuses. This involvement in the ideological domination of the
working class suggests that these broadcasting workers, together with
journalists, popular authors and so on, constitute a particular category
defined by its role in ideological relations. That is, they form part of
an ensemble which produces 'pertinent effects' in the ideological and
political regions but which does not have a separate economic position
from the rest of the new petty bourgeoisie. Insofar as their particular
unique effect is grounded in the ideological structure of a social
formation they may be said to form part of a category of 'agents of
ideology' or 'ideologues' along with, for example, teachers, artists
generally, ministers of religion and so on. (c.f. Poulantzas 1973: 85)

Thirdly, while the division between manual and mental labour occurs
within the new petty bourgeoisie and within broadcasting apparatuses
themselves, it also serves to differentiate this ensemble from the
working class. These 'creative' personnel, the 'ideologues', typically
fall on the side of mental labour in that they exercise control and
planning functions in their work. This ideological determination is
clearly closely tied to the political autonomy referred to above and serves
likewise to mark out these agents of broadcasting apparatuses as members
of the new petty bourgeoisie.
2.21 Class and Structural Determination of Apparatuses

We can establish then, that the personnel of broadcasting apparatuses, particularly those concerned with the critical creative functions, form part of the new petty bourgeoisie as it is defined by Poulantzas. We have also mentioned the fact that these agents may simultaneously form part of a category of ideologues because of their particular role in the dissemination of ideology. It is important to establish the class determination of these agents, not because they determine the function of the broadcasting apparatuses, since this is a structural variable, but because they do produce the particular modes in which this function is exercised and profoundly affect the internal structure of the apparatus.

As Poulantzas puts it:

...the internal structure of the apparatuses ... depends on the classes present there and thus on the class struggle that takes place within them ... (however) ... the various apparatuses are not defined by their intrinsic organisational structure, but rather by their social functions. (Poulantzas 1975: 277)

The fact that the apparatuses of broadcasting are operated by petty bourgeoisie agents does not determine those social functions, since as will be seen again in Chapter Four these are structurally determined. However, the new petty bourgeoisie's view of the state as a neutral, regulating body, has important consequences for the detailed operation of broadcasting, giving rise as it does to such notions as 'balanced coverage', 'lack of bias', 'public service', 'news worthiness', etc., in the production of programmes. Their relative political autonomy and ideological position allows the development of notions of professionalism, 'integrity' and 'art' which may well modify the overall role of the apparatus without changing its basic function. We may note that the conception of broadcasting as a politically 'natural' service acts to reinforce its structural role because of the profoundly conservative implications of this position, as noted by Hall (1977b) in the British case.
2.22 Conclusion

In this chapter I have been concerned to introduce some of the basic concepts employed in my analysis of broadcasting and to demonstrate in my outline of the structural and class determination of broadcasting apparatuses how these concepts are to be employed. In subsequent chapters some of the flesh is added to this skeletal structure and its precise implications for the explanation of broadcasting apparatuses spelt out in more detail. Chapter Three provides an account of the detailed historical 'events' which this double determination produced and Chapter Four takes up from this point the analysis of the function of broadcasting apparatuses.
1. The word 'problematic' is used here as a noun, a translation of the French 'problématique', which refers to a discrete theoretical field defined by the questions it asks, and the scope of its concepts. Thus, as well as the problematic of 'structuralist-marxism' we could identify a structural-functionalist problematic, a Freudian problematic and so on. For a discussion of this term see Brewster (in Althusser, 1970: 316).

2. See below for an explanation of this term. (p.34)

3. See below for an explanation of this term. (p.39)

4. For the sake of brevity I have concentrated on this work. I am fully conscious of the fact that considerable debate surrounds these authors and that there are other significant contributors to this field of enquiry, whose approach may supplement or supplant that of Althusser and Poulantzas. The works of Miliband (1969, 1970, 1973); Godelier (1972); Callinicos (1976); Cutler et al. (1977), to name just a few, offer rather different Marxist accounts of the phenomena discussed in this chapter, but as stated in the text, this is not the place to debate the many complex points and issues which fill the pages of the New Left Review (e.g., Nos. 58, 59, 82, 95). A summary and review of many of the central points at issue in these discussions is provided by Frankel (1978).

5. For example, in the discussion of the ideological region in Chapter Four.

6. In a footnote discussing Althusser's position, hence the wording here is partly Poulantzas' and partly that of Althusser.

7. The concept of 'overdetermination' refers to the fact that the 'structure in dominance' determines the place, function, and internal structure of other regions. "The relations which thus constitute each lever are never simple but overdetermined by the relations of the other levels." (Poulantzas 1973: 14)

8. It is however 'real' as opposed to imaginary, heuristic etc. Such abstract-formal objects as a mode of production ... are the condition of knowledge of real-concrete objects' (Poulantzas, 1973: 13).

9. The example Poulantzas gives is Bismarck's Germany '... characterised by a specific combination of capitalist, feudal and patriarchal modes of production ...' in which the capitalist mode is dominant, hence it was a Capitalist Social Formation (Poulantzas 1973: 15).

10. That is the effect of the structures taken as a whole.

11. See Section 2.3.

12. This designation refers simply to the fact that such units are at a more detailed level of analysis than 'whole classes' and are thus 'parts of classes'. In the final analysis they are all part of whole classes.
13. We may note in passing how this definition of power differs from that of Talcott Parsons who, in the process of stressing the unity of social systems defines power as '... the capacity to carry on certain functions to the profit of the social system considered in its entirety' (cited in Poulantzas, 1973: 105).

14. See, for example, Poulantzas's revised position on the distinction between ideology and science and the possibility of power struggles not based on classes (Poulantzas, 1978: 43, 111).

15. A similar point is made in reference to Balibar by Hindess and Hirst (1975: 7, 12-3).

16. '*... the interrelations between structures and class practices are of the same type as the relations in each of these fields ... their so-called "interaction", which is in fact the mode of intervention of one level on another, consists of the limits within which one level can modify the other'. (Poulantzas 1973: 94)

17. The term 'conjuncture' refers to 'the present moment', that is any historically-specific, synchronic view of the ongoing relations in a social formation. It is defined by Poulantzas, following Lenin, as the object of political practice, which aims at its transformation (af'. Poulantzas 1973: 42).

18. This 'narrower range' refers to the dominance by one set of interests and not a lower number of interests.

19. We should note here that while no class or fraction is determined at the economic level alone, this is particularly true of the new petty bourgeoisie, whose political and ideological determination is of particular importance (af'. Poulantzas 1975: 207).

20. The 'old' or 'traditional' petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers, artisans etc.) are distinguished from capital by the fact that these agents do not exploit wage-labour to produce surplus value.

21. This is not to say that this ensemble does not have any economically-distinguishing features, rather that it has a number of these, all of which are not necessarily shared by all members we would wish to include in this grouping. My argument is that economic factors alone do not serve to precisely mark out the interests of the new petty bourgeoisie. It is at this (admittedly rather general) level that a measure of agreement may be found between Poulantzas, Carchedi and Wright.

22. Though not the most senior management who are best considered as part of the capitalist class. Carchedi and Wright agree with Poulantzas on this point (Carchedi 1975a: 20, Wright 1978: 50).

23. A list of these senior personnel might reasonably be based around the names appearing in the credits for particular productions.

24. Produce in its strict 'dramatic' meaning, the role of a producer.

25. That is the domination exercised within the apparatus, by for example producers and directors over lower echelon staff, camera operators, make-up persons and so on.
CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORY OF BROADCASTING

As pointed out in Chapter One, most sociological accounts of broadcasting do not concern themselves with a theory of their object. Still less do they attempt to account for the present behaviour of broadcasting apparatuses in terms of the history of their development, too often the institutions, as they present themselves to the sociological researcher, are taken as given. Where this history is considered, it is usually premised on some version of technological determinism; in which the 'invention' of a few men (usually, in the case of television, this is Baird for British writers, Zworykin for Americans) is seen as being responsible for the massive effects which form these authors' main interest (cf. De Fleur 1970: Ch.4.). However, it is my contention that a more useful approach is to consider radio and television broadcasting as deliberate, if haphazard, creations of pre-dominantly social rather than technological forces. This approach, I believe, explains much of what other writers take for granted and derives from the work of Williams (1974).

I will maintain in this chapter that this history of broadcasting is a history of the struggle between competing classes and fractions of classes for control over the medium.

This history may be divided, for analytic purposes, into two general areas; the social determination of a technology, which is central to the discussion of the formative years of broadcasting; and the struggle to control the apparatuses which this social determination created. Thus we will look at the way in which a disparate set of technico-scientific 'discoveries' were combined in a social apparatus, broadcasting, and, later, at the structural and class determinations of broadcasting institutions themselves. As mentioned in Chapter One, I will concentrate here on the American and British cases, that of Australia being take up in Chapters Six and Seven.
3.1 The Social Development of a Technology

We must, at the outset, be careful to distinguish analytically between the invention and development of a technology (a technical apparatus for the transmission of signals without wires) and the invention and development of a social apparatus - broadcasting. For, although the two are combined in just about every social formation in the world, it is the latter which is the determining influence and which, in the final analysis, has shaped the development of the technology. We may state this relation in general terms: that in the articulation of the forces and relations of production it is always the latter which predominate. As Poulantzas puts it:

The labour process and the productive forces, including technology, do not exist in themselves, but always in their constitutive connection with the relations of production ... the relations of production always dominate the labour process and the productive forces. (Poulantzas 1975: 20-21) (my emphasis)

Carchedi (1975a: 24) makes a similar point when he asserts that the production of use values is subsumed under the production of surplus value in a capitalist mode of production. In other words, a technology, such as radio, does not exist in itself, but only as part of a social arrangement which dominates it. In the case of radio, this was initially the social arrangement of telegraphy and only later that of broadcasting.

The invention of what we now call radio is usually attributed to Marconi, but it would be more accurate to say that Marconi combined the inventions of a number of other people (Lodge, Hertz, Maxwell and others, cf. Barnouw 1966: 8-9; Briggs 1961: Ch.1; Sturmey 1958: 16) into a specific technical application because he saw the commercial possibilities in the transmission of messages without the prior need to establish networks of wires. In fact radio is not a 'thing', in the sense that it could be invented, at all. As Sturmey comments:
Radio is not an entity, a thing in itself; it is simply the use of electro magnetic forces travelling in space. Invention in radio covers the designing of equipment for the better utilization of the properties of these forces. (Sturmey 1958: 15)

The earliest 'utilisation' of Marconi's 'Improvements' patent was in the field of point to point communication. In fact it was the potential usefulness of his discoveries to shipping that led Marconi to come to Britain in 1896.

Marconi developed radio to extend the social apparatus of telegraphy and the interests controlling that apparatus largely took control of this new technical device also, shaping it to fit the needs of commercial point-to-point communication, particularly where the installation of telegraph wires was not possible, or difficult.

Marconi had come to England from Italy because he believed that England, with her large mercantile marine, would prove the more profitable market for the discoveries he had made. (Sturmey 1958: 17)

Marconi's 'invention' thus appealed to a particular range of capitalist interests, and was fitted into an existing social apparatus. As well as serving the needs of commerce in the field of shipping, there were fairly obvious military uses to which radio could be put, and various branches of the military, particularly the naval ones, had a clear stake in the control of wireless telegraphy.

The possibility which radio offered of being able to communicate simultaneously with large numbers of people from a single point was initially regarded as a big disadvantage, since it rendered personal communication vulnerable to unlimited eavesdropping. It was only later, when the development of 'continuous wave' broadcasting techniques occurred, that the possibility of using this new medium for 'entertainment' was visualised. However the possibility of broadcasting messages, music and so on had already been anticipated in the relaying of concerts etc.,
via telephone wires to individual households and other venues in the 1890's. This practice was not encouraged by the telephone companies, being considered a frivolous use of that medium.

The combination of Marconi's techniques for the utilisation of electromagnetic forces and the social arrangement of broadcasting appears to have occurred initially in a very unsystematic manner and almost, we might say, by accident. However, the forces behind this combination were far from accidental. This becomes clear if we abandon the voluntarist (and ideological) conception of technological invention and development as being the product of accidental discoveries by cloistered individuals, who stumble across devices and gadgets such as radio, and treat these 'discoveries' as deliberately sought-after products of a more or less focused search for a means to a socially determined end. (cf. Williams 1974: Ch.1). In the case of radio at the time of its 'invention' by Marconi, this end can be seen in two parts.

The first, already hinted at, was the need to develop greater flexibility in telegraphy, particularly for maritime purposes, serving the needs of commerce, and of the military and again particularly its naval branches. Indeed much of the early history of radio broadcasting can be seen in terms of the rival demands of commercial and military interests, resulting in a gradual series of concessions and accommodations extending well into the middle of the twentieth century. (1)

This association of radio with telegraphy has never been entirely severed and manifests itself in a number of ways. For example, in both Britain and the United States the interests controlling telegraphy, the Post Office and firms such as American Telephone and Telegraph, were always deeply involved in the development of broadcasting - the former as a licensing authority from which concessions had to be wrung by broadcasting interests, and the latter as a commercial developer of broadcasting in its own right, principally through its shareholding in the RCA-NBC combine (Barnouw 1966: 68ff). Similarly, in Australia, the Post Office
(now Telecom) has been the authority ultimately responsible for broadcasting.

Secondly, however, and perhaps more directly influential in the advent of broadcasting, there was a pre-existing, if not yet fully-developed, demand for mass entertainment. Coincidences may not be theoretically significant, but in 1896, the year Marconi arrived in Britain, one of the largest mass circulation newspapers, the Daily Mail, was launched and the first motion picture demonstration was given in London (Briggs 1960: 8). 

The beginnings of what we may now loosely call 'mass culture' were established, as were those of the mass market. These two have never, in fact, been entirely separate, though the closeness of the link between them can be seen to vary between and within particular social formations. The conditions for the emergence of each are similar and include such things as:

1) A large urban population
2) An increasingly affluent working class
3) An increase in leisure time
4) Urban public transport

All of these factors contributed to:

a) the growth of the retail trade;
b) the growth of public entertainment, such as vaudeville; and
c) a 'popular culture that was becoming commercialized under the impact of capitalist economy' (Briggs 1960: 9).

These developments did not take place simultaneously in every capitalist social formation but, despite differences, the parallels are remarkably close. There was, undoubtedly, a third factor at work here, related to the mass entertainment issue but distinct from it. This was the more or less explicit use of media of mass communications as means of ideological control. As we shall see, this factor remained fairly well
in the background in the United States but was more prominent in both Britain and Australia. We will return to consider this function more closely below (see esp. Ch. 4).

3.2 The Beginning of Radio Broadcasting

Thus, when amateur and corporate agents began experimenting with voice and music transmission, they virtually stumbled into (since they were not at first aware of the possibilities) a mass market waiting to be exploited. This market was first and foremost for consumer 'durables', radio sets, and it was the manufacturers of these who rushed in to exploit the possibilities not of a technical invention, radio, so much as a social one, broadcasting.

This clearly took different forms in different social formations. In the United States the early development of broadcasting was a free-for-all, or, if one prefers, the domain of laissez-faire capitalism. There was very little in the way of state regulation in the U.S. Once military control of radio was relaxed after the war, the field was left open to all comers, (or relatively so since many frequencies, effectively all except one, were still in military hands, cf. note 3). The first regular broadcasting service began in Pittsburgh in 1920, as an outgrowth of an experimental demonstration of Westinghouse equipment which proved to be extremely popular (Sturmey 1958: 137). By 1922 there were five-hundred stations on the air and new ones were being licensed at the rate of over fifty per month (Barnouw 1966: 92-93). It is difficult to establish how many receiving sets were in operation during this period, since no licence or other registration was required, but in 1922 alone, $60 million worth of radio sets and parts (many sets were home built) were sold and in 1923 this figure rose to $136 million (Barnouw 1966: 120). There were problems in these early days, mainly stemming from the fact that no regulation on wavelengths was in force and the many stations tended to drown each other
Small manufacturers were also faced with problems with patent licensing after the large manufacturing interests such as Westinghouse, General Electric and AT&T bought out many amateur patents before world war one and had pooled these in their joint subsidiary, the giant RCA combine (Barnouw 1966: 41). Reich (1977) documents the fact that, in this new industry, holding the right patents at the right time was the key to success, a form of corporate life insurance (Reich 1977: 209).

In the terms of the framework of concepts developed in the previous chapter, we can begin to make sense of this state of affairs. We are dealing with the fact that control of a certain (set of) apparatuses passed into the hands of certain parts of the capitalist class with certain structurally-delimited class interests. This should be seen as a particular outcome of a class struggle between the industrial/commercial fraction of capital, represented by such as A.T.&T. and those ensembles who sought to preserve radio (broadcasting or wireless telegraphy) for other purposes, such as point-to-point communication (in which the military were most interested), or non-commercial ideological uses. We will return to this form of argument below.

In Britain events took a different turn. The Post Office exerted strict control over radio transmission, using its monopoly over wireless telegraphy to facilitate this. The first broadcasts were made by the Marconi company in 1920, but were limited in duration by Post Office regulation and it was not until 1922 that regular broadcasts began. In 1922 the Marconi Co. was joined in the broadcasting field by two Anglo-American companies, Metropolitan-Vickers and Western Electric but all were still limited by Post Office regulation. In the official rhetoric of the day, this regulation was justified in the interests of avoiding the 'chaos of the ether' which was occurring in the United States with virtually unregulated transmission. The solution which was eventually adopted to avoid this chaos, and to avoid foreign control of the new medium,
was monopoly control of broadcasting, initially in the hands of a consortium of 'bona fide' British radio manufacturers, the British Broadcasting Company (Briggs 1961: 95-123), and under the regulation of the Post Office.

Thus, although a similar range of interests were at stake in Britain, and although there too the manufacturers of radio sets figures prominently, the outcome was by no means the same. Here, the interests of the ensemble I have called the industrial/commercial fraction of capital were held in check by the actions of other ensembles including the Tory aristocracy, and an agency of the state (the Post Office) whose effective contribution was to preserve broadcasting as a general ideological apparatus, capable of furthering/conserving the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, rather than a particular section of it. If the early broadcasters were a little unsure of precisely how to operate the medium, they were certainly aware of its ideological potential. (cf. Briggs 1961: 165)

3.3 The Early Years of Broadcasting

It is after the 'birth' of radio broadcasting that the British and United States systems begin to diverge markedly, though they were never identical. In the 1920's the official rhetoric concerning broadcasting was couched in terms of providing a public service by which the public would be 'informed', 'educated' and 'entertained'. This idea was expressed with equal vehemence on both sides of the Atlantic, and in Australia, but, as we know, these systems evolved in rather different directions. These differences may be explained by reference to the different structural and class determinants in each case. These are outlined below, but we must begin with the proviso to the effect that the 'interests' we are discussing are those of the agents of particular classes and fractions of classes in capitalist social formations. Thus we are not dealing simply with 'pressure groups' or individual companies, but
with (principally) fractions and segments of capitalist ruling classes. Thus, as we have seen in Chapter Two, their 'interests' are defined by their relation to the relations of production and to Political and Ideological structures in the social formations in which they are located. As pointed out too in the previous Chapter, the interests of these various fractions etc., are also limited by the actions of each other. The outcomes of the interaction of these various fractions, etc., should not, then, be understood as being predetermined by their structural position. That is to say we are dealing here with neither a mechanistic-deterministic model, where fixed structures determine their own development, nor with a voluntaristic interaction of 'free' agents. Rather we are dealing with a dialectical interplay in which 'action' - the class struggle, determines and is determined by, the structures of a social formation. Marx's epithet to the effect that:

-Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. (Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in MESW Vol. 1: 398)

is apposite here.

Like the advent of broadcasting, the early years of its development cannot be explained by reference to the nature of the technology considered as a set of technical apparatuses. Rather, we must refer to the social relations and the relations of production under which broadcasting was set up. In any case, the technology (technical apparatus) was virtually identical in both places, since a degree of exchange of ideas took place under the wing of international capital movements. That, in some detailed aspects, the technical equipment did diverge in later years is further evidence for its determination by the social relations under which it is constituted.

The fine detail of complex historical processes is difficult to explain in a meaningful way in an analysis of essentially macro processes.
such as this, but we can begin by isolating some of the most obvious and important distinctions between the United States and British systems and, as it were, move down from there.

The most apparent distinction is that the British system of broadcasting was, at every stage but particularly from the 1920's onwards, planned in advance under the control of a state agency, the Post Office, whereas the United States system grew first as an aggregate of competing 'free enterprise' stations subject to very little state regulation. Some degree of regulation was introduced later, but control remained clearly in private hands. By contrast most Western European broadcasting systems grew up as essentially integral parts of the state subject to direct ministerial or similar control (Williams 1974: 32-33).

In the terms of the theoretical model outlined in Chapter Two, these different systems of control are to be explained in terms of the particular nature of the class struggle (both inter and intra class struggle) in each case. It is insufficient, though not totally incorrect, to say that in the United Kingdom a 'stronger' state was responsible for the centralised control of broadcasting, since, firstly, this would be a somewhat circular argument, and secondly, within this problematic, the state is not really an entity, a thing in its own right. State apparatuses, such as the British Post Office,

"...do not possess a power of their own but materialise and concretize class relations, relations which are precisely what is embraced by the concept 'power'". (Poulantzas 1975:26)

Thus, it is the relation between elements of the ruling class which is ultimately responsible for political 'outcomes' such as these different arrangements for the control of broadcasting, and it is, in this sphere, principally the nature of the class struggle between the fractions of the ruling class which dictates the mode of state intervention (though not exclusively, since 'popular struggles' etc. are also relevant).
Thus, in the United States, this productive fraction of capital was sufficiently powerful to control not only the apparatuses of broadcasting, but also the utilities; power, telephones and so on, and to operate these for profit, rather than as a service. In Britain, productive capital did not enjoy this hegemonic position. Its interests were kept in check by the action of other fractions of capital (e.g. finance capital and landed capital, the latter enjoying some institutionalised power in the House of Lords). Broadcasting in Britain came to be defined as a service, like the telephone service, and as an important ideological 'tool' for capitalist order generally, and not as a source of profit for one particular fraction.

There are two questions which might legitimately be raised about this. Firstly, how do we know that this is what occurred? We really need to say more than this or that fraction must have been more powerful because it won. And secondly, what were the consequences of that victory? This second question forms the subject matter of a large part of the remainder of this chapter, and will not, therefore, be examined separately here, but the first does require careful consideration.

What is involved in answering it is the identification of the sites in which these struggles took place, which will indicate the 'parties to the dispute'; and an examination of the outcomes of each encounter, which gives us the best available index of the relative power of each ensemble, given the definition of power outlined in Chapter Two.

These sites include the negotiations supervised by the Post Office in Great Britain, which led to the establishment of broadcasting, and the various state-sponsored inquiries into broadcasting, such as the Sykes (1923) and Crawford (1926) committees (cf. Briggs 1961: 21). They include the legislative apparatuses of the state, where measures such as the Tugwell Bill in the U.S. were debated (see below), and which were responsible in Britain for setting up the above inquiries. And, they include the capitalist market, where the competition for control of the
radio-manufacturing industry was fought out. (cf. Reich 1977, Sturme 1958). This was, in many senses, a struggle within a particular fraction of capital. An examination of these sites reveals the following list of participants;

1) The industrial-commercial fraction of capital engaged in the manufacture and distribution of commodities. In this early phase of the development of broadcasting this ensemble is represented primarily by the manufacturers of radio sets and parts. In later years, as we shall see, other commodity producers and distributors became interested in radio as a vehicle for advertising.

Set against this first ensemble there were a number of other segments of the bourgeoisie with an interest in this new technology. These included:

2) The military leadership: a 'category' in Poulantzas's terminology, since they are identified with the bourgeoisie on primarily political rather than economic grounds.

3) Certain sections of the political leadership of the bourgeoisie (i.e. part of a category) whose interests lay in preserving the long-term reproduction of the capitalist social order. In Britain this group was supported by the representatives of landed capital and finance capital and found a focal point in the Post Office apparatus. In the U.S., the organisation of these interests was more diffuse and, as we shall see, relatively powerless. (Though defined rather imprecisely at this point, the nature of this ensemble will emerge more clearly when we turn to examine interests.)

As well as these bourgeois ensembles, certain other groups were involved in the struggle to control broadcasting, including:

4) Parts of the political leadership of the proletariat, such as the ALP in Australia (qv. Ch.6).
but were actually barred from fitting their sets with valves (without which they would not work) which were produced under an R.C.A. monopoly. The customer would have to fit R.C.A. valves to such sets himself!

Holding a near monopoly in the technology, enabled R.C.A., Westinghouse and General Electric to bargain from a position of strength.

Secondly, the overall balance of class forces in the post-war U.S. had given rise to a laissez-faire, generally non-interventionist state. Faced with a degree of chaos in the early days of broadcasting, with hundreds of stations crowding the airwaves, Secretary of Commerce Hoover invited the industry to regulate itself (Barnouw 1966: 94-95). Objections were raised to monopoly control of the industry (1966: 124) but not, in any significant fashion, to its commercial nature. When the state did intervene in legal battles over monopolisation, it did so by taking the side of the monopolists (Barnouw 1966: 182).

There was very little government regulation of broadcasting until 1927. In that year the first Federal Radio Commission was set up (Barnouw 1966: 180) but it had very few powers. It was principally concerned with the allocation of frequencies (an urgent task given the previously uncontrolled proliferation of stations). Some broadcasting licences were revoked, or not renewed by the F.C.C., for example, that of a station which advertised the benefits of goat-gland transplants! (Barnouw 1968: 29). But, generally speaking, control of the format and content of broadcasting was left to commercial interests (cf. Barnouw 1968: 26). The position of strength held generally by the monopoly manufacturers was, in some instances, self-reinforcing. A.T.&T., for example, was able to use the large network of telephone lines it already possessed to build radio networks; hinder its competitors from doing the same (internal competition); and thus dominate large sections of the laissez-faire market in broadcasting (Barnouw 1966: 159), which had emerged because of the strength of this fraction in preventing regulation.
In Britain, the manufacturers of radio sets and parts were instrumental in setting up radio broadcasting, but under the supervision of the Post Office, which had statutory control over radio-telegraphy and, by extension, over other forms of radio, under the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1904 (Briggs 1961: 95). It exercised that control by 'refereeing' the contest between large and small radio manufacturers with the eventual formation of a broadcasting consortium at the end of 1922. It proposed to a committee of radio manufacturers that they come up with a system for radio broadcasting within the following limits:

1) that only bona-fide British radio manufacturers be allowed to broadcast.

2) that the hours of transmission and power of stations be limited to prevent interference (Briggs 1961: 100).

The resultant consortium (called the British Broadcasting Company, B.B.Co.) involved a pooling of the patents of the various contenders and the funding of the service by a ten-shilling licence fee and royalties on the sale of sets: all three being proposals that had been vigorously rejected in the U.S. (cf. Barnouw 1961: 156). An independent chairman was required, the first being Lord Gainford an ex-Post Master General (Briggs 1961: 123), and while the quality of the service was the responsibility of the company, this was subject to Post Office scrutiny.

Thus limits were placed on the commodity-manufacturers, the effect of which (a state-controlled monopoly) was to make radio, not a highly-profitable industry (though profits were made), but a "cultural institution" a status which was later institutionalised (see below).

3.4 The Development of Broadcasting: 1) The United States

These initial determinants of broadcasting are, of course, by no means the end of the story. By continuing the account, by following the development of broadcasting through the advent of television, we will
arrive at a more coherent sociological description of broadcasting systems and apparatuses than has been achieved to date. Armed with that knowledge, we will be in a far sounder position to account for their 'behaviour' and 'effects'. The form of this account is the same as that applied to the origins of broadcasting and may be summarized thus:

It is the class struggle which determines the forms and modifications of the apparatuses. (Poulantzas 1975: 27)

The period from 1920 to the early 1930's is seen, from this perspective, as being one of concentration and consolidation of capital, resulting in the formation of nationwide networks of owned or controlled stations. It also marks the period in which broadcasting began to be profitable in its own right with the beginning of paid advertising. A.T.&T.'s toll radio station WEAB(5) began to make profits in 1924 (Barnouw 1966: 158), also the year in which the first coast to coast network was established (Barnouw 1966: 141). At this time, too, mass advertising, particularly of products such as tobacco, processed foods and patent medicines was becoming a boom industry and radio was an obvious target for expansion. (cf. Ewen 1976: 45-6 and passim) This was not merely due to the advertising industry wishing to expand, though it did so very rapidly, but also to the fact that the funding of the broadcasting industry had been dependent on the sale of radio sets and the boom in the sale of these had inevitably to pass. Three solutions to this problem of finance have been sought in different social formations, according to the particular configuration of class relations pertaining in each. We might label these the European, British and American solutions after the formations which first adopted them.

The first solution is that of direct state funding, a payment or subsidy to broadcasting out of tax revenue. This is usually associated with fairly direct state control of the medium and was the 'option' adopted in several European countries, particularly the Fascist ones. It was not
a viable option in the United States, where the hegemonic rule of monopoly capital was exercised by a laissez-faire type of state, which was only open to challenge on issues directly affecting the alliances within this hegemonic bloc (cf. Poulantzas' 'power bloc', Poulantzas 1973: 141, 148), such as monopoly trading itself. For example, where one manufacturer, such as RCA, seeks to prevent others with a similar degree of power, such as Westinghouse, from competing with it. (7)

Secondly, we have what might be described as the British model, in which revenue is obtained by a sale of licences to listeners. This option was discussed in the United States but never adopted. The ideological discourse of the time suggested that it was 'unconstitutional' to sell a right of access to a commonly-held property, that rather quaintly referred to at the time as 'the ether', in the same way as it would not be 'The American Way' to licence people to breathe the atmosphere. However, this did not prevent the sale of the 'ether' to the sponsors of programmes, or its virtual monopolization by a few networks. As with all ideological statements we need to examine this one carefully and sceptically. (8) The networks did not want a licence fee because they wanted to do nothing to inhibit the sale of radio sets. Such a fee would almost certainly have to be collected by a state agency which would give a power to government bodies they otherwise would not have. We may note that the radio manufacturers and broadcasters fought every other state incursion into their industry for as long and hard as they could. (cf. Barnouw 1966: 94-95 and passim)

Thirdly, finance could come from advertising, from selling 'space' in the same way that newspapers do. (It may be noted here that opposition to commercial broadcasting was very strong in the United Kingdom on the part of newspapers, until they were allowed to share in its ownership with the introduction of commercial television in 1955-56.) This, of course, was the solution which was massively adopted in the United States. There can be little doubt that it was successful from the point of view of just
about every large manufacturer or distributor of 'consumer goods' in
the United States, including the radio groups themselves. It was the
option chosen by the industrial-commercial fraction of capital.

Advertising on the radio took two principal forms; the sponsored
programme, and the spot advertisement or 'insertion'. In the former
the advertising agency would, in consultation with its client, pay the
production and other costs of a particular programme, including a
substantial margin of profit for the agency and the radio station. The
station could thus obtain free, or profit yielding material with which to
attract audiences (or as they came to be known, markets) to attract yet
more sponsors, and so on. This is clearly a form of competition in
which the rich get richer and the independent stations and small networks
either join a larger one (are taken over, or merge); attempt to operate
on a strictly local-advertising basis, offering particular rather than
huge markets; or go out of business altogether.

The sponsored programme gives a certain amount of 'editorial' control
and direction to the sponsor, who wants to present his product or service
in the best possible light, and a network dependent on sponsors for its
programmes, as NBC\(^{(9)}\) and CBS\(^{(10)}\) were by 1932, is going to present a
rather different schedule of programmes from one that is not. Initially
there was very little news on United States radio (Barnouw 1968: 17), which
may go some way towards explaining why newspaper interests did not regard
radio as such a threat as they did in Britain. Also, of course, many of
the newspaper chains, such as that controlled by Hearst, owned radio
stations themselves. Apart from these, though, the general lack of news
was due to the fact that the newspapers and press associations would not
allow broadcasting of their copy without the payment of a fee and, at first,
no sponsors could be found for the news. In the very early days of radio,
the newspapers allowed the use of their material free of charge but, when
radio appeared to be interfering with their circulation, this practice was
discontinued. When sponsors did begin to express an interest in the news, NBC and CBS began 'collecting' their own news for broadcast. This gave rise to an uncharacteristically frank admission of the class character of United States broadcasting in the form of such programmes as the 'News brought to you by Esso'. (Barnouw 1968: 20)

The second type of advertising, the 'spot' commercial, in which a ten, twenty or thirty second segment of time was sold to an advertiser, became more common in later years. It gave substantially greater editorial freedom to broadcasters, though they were still tied to attracting the largest possible audience, and also more flexible financial control to the networks (Barnouw 1970: 49). This however, was a much later development and occurred mainly in television rather than radio (Barnouw 1970: 49).

Some attempts were made by the state to regulate advertising but were generally not dramatically successful, for example, the Tugwell Bill which sought to enforce strict standards on the labelling and advertising of food, drugs and cosmetics. (Barnouw 1968: 13) Though the broadcasting companies were not at first averse to some cleaning-up of an advertising industry which could claim that cigarettes were an aid to slimming (since you can't smoke and eat at the same time!); the reaction from advertisers was swift and effective. They quickly reminded the broadcasting companies where their revenue came from and mounted a strong campaign against the Food and Drug Administration which had prepared the bill (at the instigation of R.G. Tugwell who was an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and an adviser to Roosevelt). They succeeded in getting advertising exempted from the provisions of the bill (Barnouw 1968: 13-14). The Tugwell bill is interesting because it represents one attempt by the reformist Roosevelt (New Deal) administration to 'tidy-up' American capitalism and because it was defeated (or at least deflected) by a stronger force, the advertising industry, the ideological vanguard of manufacturing-commercial capital.
3.5 The Introduction of Television: (1) The United States

Even more than radio, television must be seen (!) as a deliberately sought-after invention, rather than an accidental one. Like the original technical development of radio, some of the initial work was done on a fairly amateur basis, more or less simultaneously in several different countries. However, as with radio, the turning of a technical 'gadget', really a collection of quite disparate scientific and technical discoveries only related by their eventual inclusion in television, into a saleable commodity, took place under various corporate aegises, principally RCA in the United States, and EMI and Baird TV Ltd. in Britain. This new commodity was inserted into an already existing set of social relations: those of radio broadcasting. Though the development of television took place simultaneously in the United States and Britain (and elsewhere), I will examine them separately here.

We have already seen, in passing, one of the reasons why corporations such as RCA would be interested in investing in television research and development. This is the passing of the radio boom. The commercial possibilities for the mass-marketing of 'consumer durables' such as television sets, perhaps one of the key factors in the survival of capitalism in the twentieth century, were readily apparent and the necessity for capitalist enterprises to grow in order to survive is well documented in Marxist economics. (11)

Similarly, the broadcasting industry itself stood to gain from the introduction of a new medium for advertising, one which promised to be even more lucrative than radio. In fact, television development in the United States took place largely at RCA, and their subsidiary NBC, who began experimental broadcasts in 1932, using a television system usually attributed to Zworykin who is credited with the 'invention' of electronic scanning (Barnouw 1966: passim and 1968: 35). Development of television, with its great commercial possibilities as suggested above, was given
preference over other technical developments, such as FM radio, and regular broadcasts began in 1939, only to be temporarily halted by World War II (Barnouw 1968: 128).

In 1945 television began again and, after a two-year FCC imposed 'freeze', began a booming growth, far outstripping that of radio in the 1920's (Barnouw 1968: 242). By 1953 television was widespread, (Barnouw 1968: 310) and beginning to develop into an international industry (See Chapter Five below). It was largely under the control of the established powers in radio, although Barnouw comments:

Television in 1953 was a chaotic scramble for position and ultimate control. The outcome was in doubt. (Barnouw 1970: 8)

I believe that with knowledge of the contending interests, considered as class fractions, the outcome becomes rather less doubtful (cf. Williams 1974: 36).

3.6 The Development of Broadcasting: (2) The United Kingdom

Whereas the development of United States broadcasting during this period is best explained by reference to a struggle for economic advantage on the part of agents of the industrial-commercial fraction of the bourgeoisie, in Britain the history of broadcasting is more concerned with ideological and political considerations. Its chief distinguishing feature is that, in contrast to the laissez-faire development of the social apparatus of broadcasting in the United States, the social arrangement of broadcasting in Britain was more or less consciously designed by an alliance of ruling class segments. Again a quasi-chronological account will illustrate this process.

The beginnings of the BBCo. in 1923 have already been described above as being the outcome of 'tough commercial bargaining within wireless interests' and between these and the Post Office (Briggs 1961: 3). It was
set up as a private company but never acted as a typical profit-seeking capitalist enterprise; its dividend was limited by law to 7½% and one was never declared. It was dependent for revenue on a state (Post Office) collected licence fee and, from the start, it was run primarily as a 'public service', according to its staff, and particularly its first manager, Reith (q.v. Briggs 1961: 4, and passim). Its first task was, of course, to provide a market for radio sets, by establishing a regular and nationwide service of programmes, which it soon achieved (Briggs 1961: 216).

Finance was obtained from a share in a 10s. licence fee and at first also from a royalty on the sale of receivers (Briggs 1961: 164). These fees were collected by the Post Office and a portion (the size of which was the subject of frequent dispute) passed to the BBCo. (Briggs 1961: 148). This system was reviewed in 1923 by the first of a regular series of government inquiries into broadcasting, the Sykes committee. The royalty was removed, the licence conditions revised and the question of advertising reviewed (Briggs 1961: 163ff. esp. 187, 189). Spot or insertion advertisements had been occasionally broadcast in pre-BBCo. days but were banned under the licence granted to the BBCo. Sponsored programmes were allowed but, according to Briggs, were seldom, if ever, used (Briggs 1961: 189). The absence of advertising was explained in ideological terms; such as not wishing to commercialise and trivialise such a potentially powerful medium (Briggs 1961: 165); but this clearly is not a sufficient explanation, since the same sentiment was also voiced in the early days of United States broadcasting (Barnouw 1966: 96). Nor can the absence of a demand for radio advertising be cited as a sufficient reason, though the development of the mass consumption economy may have been less advanced in Britain than in the United States. The reason for the lack of advertising is to be sought in the nature of the class control of the BBCo. As outlined above, it was set up as a monopoly,
under the authority of the state in order to prevent it becoming the tool of any particular fraction of capital. The conditions included in its first licence (see above) are clearly designed to prevent its control by the industrial-commercial fraction, the most likely contender given the United States experience, and its later removal from the commercial arena altogether in 1926 (see below) reinforces this situation.

As in the United States, the relationship of broadcasting with the established 'commercial' ideological apparatus, the press, was marked by some conflict. The BBCo., as a result of Press Association pressure on the Post Office, was not allowed initially to broadcast news (Briggs 1961: 130). An initial agreement to provide daily summaries of the news on the condition that they were not broadcast until 7 p.m., after evening editions of papers had been sold, was reached, but the BBCo. soon began collecting its own news (Briggs 1961: 132). A ban on the advertising of radio programmes in newspapers was met by the launching of the Radio Times by the BBCo., in 1923 (Briggs 1961: 142).

As was the case with the United States data, these developments, and the others detailed below, are rendered sociologically coherent by considering them as the outcomes of particular instances of the class struggle. Williams offers us an explanation in these terms of why the BBC was set up differently from either the American (laissez-faire) or European (state-run) broadcasting systems. He sets out three conditions, which, he suggests, led to this development:

i) The early development of Britain as an industrial society with an extended communications network over a relatively small geographical area, had already to an important extent 'nationalised' its culture; it had, for example, led to a predominantly national press.

ii) A dominant version of the national culture had already been established in an unusually compact ruling class, so that public service could be effectively understood and administered as a service according to the values of an existing public definition, with an effective paternalist definition of both service and responsibility.
iii) The character of the British state which, because of the compactness of its ruling class, proceeded in many matters by appointment and delegation rather than by centralised state administration. This permitted the emergence of a state-regulated and state sponsored public corporation which was not yet subject to detailed state control. The flexibility which was latent in this kind of solution, though continually a matter of dispute, permitted the emergence of an independent corporate broadcasting policy, in which the independence was at once real, especially in relation to political parties and temporary administrators, and qualified, by its definition in terms of a pre-existing cultural hegemony. (Williams 1974: 33-34)

Though this contains a somewhat static conception of class (it does not refer to struggle), read as a statement about a particular conjuncture in the class struggle it does provide an account of the conditions of development of the BBC as a 'public corporation', a status which was formalized in 1926 on the recommendation of a second government investigation by the Crawford committee (Briggs 1961: 21). The lack of 'detailed state control' should not suggest to us that ultimate control of British broadcasting did not rest with the state generally and with the government of the day in particular. The case of the 1926 General Strike provides us with an example of how this control was secured with the consent and occasionally willing co-operation of the BBC staff (Briggs 1961: 360 ff).

The role of the BBCo. in this dispute provides a key to its class allegiance. It was partly bound by law and could be taken over by the government if it saw fit to do so. However it chose to adopt a role as a 'force for control with moderation' (Briggs 1961: 360) and claimed that it did so in order to maintain its independent position. However this independence was constituted primarily by the fact that the BBC management, who are, as we have seen, representatives of the bourgeoisie and part of the new petty bourgeoisie, held no particular brief for mine owners (the General Strike having originated in the coal industry), only a general one for the maintenance of bourgeois order. BBCo. management exhibited therefore what Briggs calls 'A general bias towards the government'
(Briggs 1961: 374) and took up a position which was not unique but similar to that held by other ruling class fractions and elements (it was strongly supported for example, by Baldwin (P. 361-2). It was not in fact able, or particularly eager, to pursue its own policy of balance, since government pressure prevented the Labour point of view from being broadcast (Briggs 1961: 376-7). This pattern of voluntary acquiescence and overt state regulation was always latent but became more obvious in times of crisis such as the general strike and in a more prolonged fashion during World War II (q.v. Briggs 1970: passim). We will see in Chapters Six and Seven a similar pattern in the case of the A.B.C. in Australia.

3.7 The Introduction of Television: (2) The United Kingdom

As in the United States, the development of television in the United Kingdom was prompted largely by the commercial possibilities of the mass consumer market. Television was developed by the manufacturers, or would-be manufacturers, of consumer durables, principally the Anglo-American consortium EMI and Baird TV Ltd. The BBC was by this time a public corporation rather than a consortium of manufacturers and played the role of a 'standards institute' or consumer in this development.

The 'pre-history' of television as a technology can be traced back as far as 1839 when Bequerel discovered the electro-chemical effects of light. As with radio, a number of originally unconnected 'discoveries' were eventually embodied in television and it is only with the benefit of hindsight that we can judge which of these were important. By the 1920's however, a concentrated and concerted effort was being made to develop television and one of the first concerns involved in this was the company formed by Baird in 1925 (Briggs 1965: 518). This company began a long dialogue with the BBC, at first mainly with its engineers, principally concerning the quality of the product, which at first was not very good.
Unlike the broadcasters in the United States, the BBC had no direct financial interest in television except as a potential monopoly buyer.

Public interest in the development of television was reported to be high in the 1920's and in 1926, Baird's company was granted two experimental transmission licences to test his crude and low definition system (Sturmey 1958: 192). Baird's company was never on a particularly sound financial footing and the BBC was dubious about the merits of the Baird system. They thought its quality (of the picture) not good enough to be of more than curiosity value and were concerned at the amount of radio bandwidth necessary for television transmission (Sturmey 1958: 192-194). Nonetheless, Baird continued the development of his system, introducing a form of colour television in 1928 (Sturmey 1958: 195) and, with the assistance of the Post Office, secured a trial of his system under BBC auspices in 1929 (Briggs 1965: 541-543).

Other companies in Britain were also experimenting with television systems at this time, including the Marconi Co. and the Gramaphone Co. as well as EMI. This involvement of a number of firms with an existing stake in the mass entertainment industry suggests clearly that the future direction of television had already been defined to a large extent. When Baird's company finally received financial backing it came in the form of a take-over by Gaumont-British, a film distributor, and the eventually successful television system was developed by perhaps the largest company in the commercial mass entertainment business, EMI.

The development of television at EMI is a model of capitalist technological development and a useful corrective to the view that sees inventions as occurring in the attics of bearded amateurs. EMI was a British company with a 27% United States stockholding (Briggs 1965: 574), which gave it access to Zworykin's work in the United States (Briggs 1965: 568). It had various links with the Marconi Co. and Sarnoff, the first director of RCA, was on its board. It assembled what Briggs calls a 'team of brilliant research engineers' and with them developed the world's
first high-definition television system. By 1932 this system was giving better results than Baird's, the two being run in experimental competition for a while by the BBC (Briggs 1965: 576). Yet another government inquiry was instituted (the Selsdon Committee, q.v. Briggs 1965: 587) which gave government sanction to the BBC's right to operate television and to choose between the rival systems. Regular broadcasts, using the two systems, began in 1936 (The world's first regular service), but the Baird system was dropped the following year. As Sturmey comments, it seems that Baird lost this competition at least partly because he could not afford the development expenditure of EMI (Sturmey 1958: 212). The service ran on a 20 hour per week basis until 1939 when the beginning of World War II forced its temporary closure. By this time, the sale of sets had not really got going and it was not until 1946 that television began to be a truly mass medium, (q.v. Sturmey 1958: 206).

3.8 Television After 1945: (1) The United States

The modern (i.e., post-war) history of television broadcasting in the United States is marked by its success as a commercial venture; its recognition as a powerful ideological apparatus (not necessarily in those terms); and the necessity for its historians to examine not only its domestic structure, but also its role in promoting and facilitating the American Imperialism which characterizes the history of this period generally (see Chapter Five). The commercial and ideological roles of broadcasting represent the concerns of different fractions of the United States ruling class, they are sometimes in harmony and sometimes in conflict, but always united by the interests of that class as a whole.

Firstly, we may examine the strictly economic forces at work in the determination of our object. Of these, the burgeoning consumer economy was perhaps the most important. It has been argued (by, for example, Baran and Sweezy 1968) that the Great Depression of the 1930's was due primarily
to an under-utilization of productive capacity that was only ended by military expenditure during World War II. After the war, the avenues for imperialism which had been opened by such devices as 'lend-lease' and foreign aid, were expanded via, for example, the Marshall plan.

This was external expansion. As well as this though, an internal expansion was under way in the post-war United States based around the deliberate intensification of consumption. (cf. Ewen 1976: 25) This was important, not only to prevent a slide back into depression, but also to provide tangible ideological vindication for the 'American Way'.

Television was intimately involved in both of these processes of expansion (Chapter Five will deal with external expansion) and was also itself greatly affected by them. The internal expansion of the United States market affected television broadcasting in two ways. The first was to create a television industry on a massive scale in a short period of time, and thus promote the sale of receivers (and, once this was largely achieved, the sales drive was shifted to colour television); and the second was to provide funds for their operation and growth through the sale of advertising facilities. Thus, the TV boom of the 1950's was both dependent upon, and a contributor to, the consumer boom of that period. This process had several dimensions, as we shall see below.

At the beginning of the post-war television era, most television material was 'live'. That is, it was produced in much the same way as a stage presentation, but before cameras rather than, or as well as, an audience. There was thus an opportunity for performers from other forms of 'live' entertainment to gain employment in television. Anti-trust moves against the Hollywood film production and distribution oligopoly had forced a number of its employees out of work and some of these found employment in television (Barnouw 1970: 6). Similarly in New York, the financial decline of live theatre (known collectively as 'Broadway') had led to a number of those performers moving to television and the replacement
of live artists by recorded music on radio also provided a portion of the labour force of the new and growing television industry.

However, live production was expensive, due mainly to the need for extensive rehearsals, and subject to unpredictable developments at the last minute and a gradual move towards pre-recorded material began in the early fifties. This move, apart from defining the limits of what was possible in television programmes, paved the way for a number of other developments as we shall see below. We may note that it also facilitated the sale of programmes overseas, as we shall see in Chapter Five.

It was during this immediate post-war period that the format of the main part of today's television programming was established. This was the episodic series formula, which had already proven its success in radio. It had two main advantages. Firstly, it tended to regularize audience patterns; that is, by maintaining continuity of actors, setting etc., it built up, or at least provided for, audience identification, recognition and support. This measure of audience predictability, as provided by the series format, not only makes for ease of production, since only detail plot elements need to vary from episode to episode, but also facilitates regularity of income from sponsors. If a television network can demonstrate that a particular item regularly attracts an audience of a certain size, then it is in a position to demand pro-rata payment for its broadcast. This commerical logic also determines two other features of post-war television broadcasting: the competition for ratings, and the continual cost-cutting in production. We will deal with these below.

An alternative to the episodic series format was the drama anthology, in which the 'time slot' was regularized, on the basis of so many minutes at a certain time each week for example, but the material presented consisted of individual plays by distinct (and often well-known) authors. The content and quality of these plays might vary quite markedly.
especially by comparison with the homogenous episodic series. The same audience-retaining logic dictated by the needs of advertisers applies to this format but it did not share all the advantages of the episodic series. Firstly, the authors were often well-known playwrights who had an established reputation based on their achievements in live theatre. While the presentation of 'quality' plays enhanced the image of television networks as being 'patrons of the arts', this 'image' was only of minor importance to the sponsors who were paying for it. Further, these authors tended to maintain independent, non-commercial criteria of what a play should attempt to do; i.e. principally 'artistic' ones, which often went beyond the considerations of lowest common denominator mass entertainment beloved of sponsors. Barnouw argues that the 'realist' school in particular, with its emphasis on portraying the 'monotonous world of the ordinary', as exemplified by, for example, Chayefsky, did not appeal at all to the advertising profession, whose stock in trade was fantasy. Realistic drama had the effect of making its sponsors' fantasy-oriented advertising appear fraudulent (Barnouw 1970: 36). Thirdly, this format tended to produce items of varying audience appeal and the desirable predictable audience size was more problematic. Lastly, because of the lower degree of control over content inherent in this system, advertisers were occasionally embarrassed by the shows they sponsored (Barnouw 1970: 36). For these reasons, this anthology format declined from a never dominant position and was abandoned by the majority of stations.

In this we can see something of the degree and nature of the influence of a new contender for control over broadcasting, the advertising agency, a rising element in the fraction of capital principally composed of the mass manufacturers and distributors of consumer commodities. The alliance between advertisers and the broadcasting networks, while often uneasy at the level of programme production, where the interests of production personnel in such intangibles as 'integrity'
may be threatened, was firm at the level of economic ownership and ultimate control. This is to be expected since, as pointed out above, broadcasting in the United States was owned and controlled by a particular part of the same division of capital, the manufacturers of radio sets. While different elements within this class division might be in competition with each other, for example, for cheaper rates of advertising, they are unlikely to be in conflict about the parameters of the system on which they all depend equally.

The degree of control over content vested in sponsors was, at first, quite extensive. Not only was some material censored by its sponsors (q.v. Barnouw 1970: 36) but a great deal of detailed, product-related prescription was written into drama scripts. For example, a series entitled *Man Against Crime*, sponsored by a cigarette company (Camel Filters), was produced under the proviso that cigarettes were to be smoked by the characters in it, and, what is more, they were to be smoked 'well', that is, free from any suggestion of addiction, dependence, bad taste etc. As Barnouw puts it: 'No-one could cough on *Man Against Crime* ' (Barnouw 1970: 23). Sponsors were often given editorial control in the planning stages of series, which were typically prepared in consultation with advertising agencies and sponsors.

By no means all of television programming in these days, however, consisted of commercial drama. The beginnings of a documentary tradition were established in the early 1950's and the best of this material pushed the more liberal themes of bourgeois ideology, as against the repressive climate of the McCarthy era. The documentary series *See It Now* attacked the 'guilt by association logic inherent in the McCarthy hearings' as being contrary to the (bourgeois) democratic ideal of justice (Barnouw 1970: 49). This material never became more than a minority interest however, and the *See It Now* series was taken off the air to make way for a game show, *The $64,000 Question*. Documentary production survived, but
was concentrated in the least popular viewing hours and in non-commercial television, which also had small audiences. In this then, the reformist zeal of the ideologues of the new petty bourgeoisie was defeated by the commercial zeal of their employers.

Thus, the overall shape of United States television was determined by its role as a medium for commercial advertising and the ruling measure was provided by estimates of audience size, or 'ratings' as they became known. A simultaneous, and not entirely complementary, influence was exerted by the need to reduce the cost of the production of this audience-attracting material. This was achieved in a variety of ways, some of which are set out below. They include: a decline in live production; the 'contracting out' of production; the simplifying of formats; the use of inexpensive formats; the resale of the programmes overseas.

The move towards filmed production began in the early 1950's and much of the impetus came from Hollywood where, as has already been indicated, restrictions in the movie industry had made labour and capital available for reinvestment. This method of production tended to be easier to organize, cheaper to produce and to be more predictable. It also facilitated the use of more 'action' oriented drama, including the violence beloved of audiences and berated by moral critics, than was possible in live performances and had a cheap source of such action footage in unused (cut) movie material. The move to 'telefilms', as they came to be known, encouraged a lot of independent production of this material by small companies, as opposed to 'in-house' production by broadcasting companies, and it also shifted the main locus of production from New York to Los Angeles. The 'Hollywood' serial became the staple fare of United States television and, as we shall see, of television in many other parts of the world. It will be noted that the telefilm is already in exportable form.

Along with the general cost-cutting drive was a move towards simple and inexpensive formats. The 'western' and the 'crime' series stand
out as being the most prevalent of these. They were popular and, as mentioned above, could draw on a vast stock of unused movie footage to provide action sequences. By concentrating on 'action' in the form of gunfights, fistfights, riots, etc., the costs of scriptwriting were cut and the need for expensively-trained professional actors was also minimised.

Thus, we can begin to see how it is that artistic, or at the least cultural, forms are shaped by economic factors. We may note that as production budgets became gradually more lavish, with the growth of overseas markets and of advertising revenue, these initial low-budget parameters were changed. This increase in the 'sophistication' of United States telefilms has profound consequences for the media imperialism debate, as we shall see in Chapter Five.

The sale of American telefilms overseas has both economic and politico-ideological ramifications. It began in the 1950's and quickly reached quite massive proportions. The consequences of this are dealt with in more detail in Chapter Five, but it should be noted in this context that the sale of telefilms overseas, while providing the opportunity of a new source of revenue, was not over-exploited for this purpose, especially while this overseas market was being established. The material sold overseas had generally more than covered its production costs by being broadcast and sponsored in the United States, and was usually dumped, sold cheaply, in foreign markets for longer-term economic, political and ideological purposes.

Three other developments in United States television concern us here. They are: the televising of movies; the role of non-commercial television; and the decline of single-sponsor programmes.

The deluge of old, mainly Hollywood, movies on United States TV began in 1955 when the RKO organization sold its entire stock of old movies for $25 million (Barnouw 1970: 64). Television stations, in many instances, stopped live production altogether in the face of this far
cheaper source of programmes. This development paved the way for a boom in profits in 1956-57 during which television fortunes were made virtually overnight (Barnouw 1970: 64).

Non-commercial TV, the existence of which had been facilitated by the FCC, was not so fortunate (q.v. Barnouw 1970: 70). It was obliged to eke out its existence on a small budget, with small audiences, catering to mainly educational and minority interests. Its freedom from the constraints imposed by sponsors, however, enabled it to escape the bland, lowest common denominator logic of the big networks and it occasionally exhibited political contentious material; for example, during the Vietnam war, the non-commercial stations were among the first media organisations to cast doubt on the role of the United States.

NBC, the largest of the big networks, was the first to attempt to limit the editorial control of sponsors by encouraging multiple, rather than single, sponsorship, and spot advertising (Barnouw 1970: 59, 309). Not only did this arrangement give the networks greater control over their revenue, but also more autonomy. They were able to exploit the competition for prime-time advertising by diluting the influence of particular sponsors.

Thus, we can see something of the determinants of the nature of United States television after the Second World War. These are basically structural, with the demands of capitalist economics looming very large, and due to the class control of these apparatuses. It is due to the fact that a particular fraction of the bourgeoisie was in command of American television that it took the precise form that it did. As we shall see in Chapter Five, the consequences of this are by no means confined to the United States social formation, as the formats which were set by the financial structure of the television industry in the United States reappear in other formations.

3.9 Television after 1945: (2) The United Kingdom

Television broadcasting, and the development thereof, was halted in
Britain during World War II (Briggs 1965: 623). However, there is a sense in which the influences which shaped it in the post-war period continued to operate during the war years; as well as this, there were some changes which can be directly attributed to wartime developments. The broad theme running through these wartime developments is commercialisation, and, in many ways, Americanisation. This phase of the history of British broadcasting is one of 'peaceful invasion' by American capital and culture and the only partially successful rearguard action which was fought against it.

Firstly, the 'popularisation' of the BBC's radio service was begun in 1940, with the introduction of the General Forces Programme which was modelled on the United States style of presentation, minus the advertisements, and which became the 'Light' programme in 1946. That there was a demand of market for this sort of programme is demonstrated by the pre-war popularity of the European 'pirate' radio stations, mainly Radio Luxembourg and Radio Normandy, which broadcast American-style programming, with British advertisements, to fairly large audiences in the United Kingdom during the 1930's and again after the war. As Tunstall points out, the fact that British broadcasting had been protected from the United States influence had not prevented the import of culture in other forms, particularly films and recorded music (Tunstall 1977: 91, 127 ff). If we add to this the effect of millions of United States servicemen daily advertising the American affluence, we can perhaps see that the climate was becoming more favourable for United States culture (cf. Wilson 1961: 23 ff).

This was one important precipitating factor in the introduction of commercial television in 1955. We shall see that this was done under a Conservative government avidly seeking to broaden the base of its support, in this instance by providing a service for which there was evidence of a popular demand.
This factor was, however, by no means the only important one and
the organisational change in British television was a product of far more
specific forces than this general cultural deference to American customs.
The specific form which commercial television took in Britain was due to
the power of particular segments of the ruling class and only one of many
possible responses to the 'popularisation' of culture. Again, an
examination of the interests contending for control of broadcasting is
useful. These fall into three main groups: the manufacturers of
television sets; British and American advertising agencies; and financial
institutions. The site of this particular struggle was again the state,
but not in the form of commissions and committees, as was the case with
radio (Sykes and Crawford committees), but in parliament itself and
particularly within the Conservative party. It was thus clearly a
struggle within the ruling class.

The television manufacturers' interest was again in providing a
market for their products. They were of the opinion that the BBC
television service was not maximizing these sales opportunities, since it
did not cater exclusively for 'popular' taste, and was not, in fact,
particularly popular. They were conscious of the slow growth of the
television audience and could compare this with the boom under way in
the United States. They wanted, in short, a more popular television
service which would promote the sale of sets. This need not necessarily
have been a commercial service but, plainly, a self-financing operation
is to be preferred to a costly one and, as in the American case, mass
marketing and advertising is an important factor in the marketing of all
consumer goods, including those produced by the TV set makers.

The advertising agencies were, of course, directly interested in the
introduction of commercial television and it is on this class segment
that the United States influence is most overt. The style of advertising
throughout the capitalist world is dominated by the United States model,
which is not surprising since the advertising industry is dominated in terms of ownership and control by United States enterprises (q.v. Tunstall 1977: 54). One of the largest of these is the J. Walter Thompson agency and a director of the United Kingdom subsidiary of this firm, a newly-elected MP, was among the leaders of the Conservative back bench move to introduce commercial television (Wilson 1961: 63). Potential users of the 'service' were also interested and among the groups to make representations to the Beveridge Committee, (15) were Horlicks Ltd., Lever Bros. and Unilever Ltd., Rowntree and Co. Ltd., Reckitt and Colman Ltd., and Thomas Hedley and Co. Ltd.; all manufacturers of mass consumer goods, principally soaps and confectionery, who stood to gain immediately from the opening up of a new and powerful medium for advertising their products (Wilson 1961: 51).

The financial institutions involved were interested primarily in the investment prospects indicated by the United States television boom and the economic expansion which consumerism would produce.

The defence against this invasion was led by those elements of the British ruling class who did not wish to be taken over by United States capital, and petty-bourgeois movements, such as listeners associations, who 'deplored the debasement of national culture', as they saw it. This opposition seems to have lacked a directly economic base, which may partly account for its very limited success. As was indicated earlier however, the status of broadcasting as an ideological apparatus was explicitly recognised in the United Kingdom and the concern to prevent its total commercialisation on the United States pattern may be seen as a reflection of this recognition. It may be noted that even some of the parties who argued most strongly for the commercialisation of television, conceded that it must be limited to preserve this status (Wilson 1961: 214).

Thus, television broadcasting in the United Kingdom acquired something like its present shape in the mid-1950's. It was, and is, an
amalgam of commercial interests and more general ruling class ones; in its overt structure, as well as in its function. It may be noted that, while United States capital and United States ideology did permeate British broadcasting, some measure of independence was retained in, for example, the amount of United States origin material which is screened. A strict quota on non-Commonwealth origin programmes (14% of the total) was imposed, which, as we shall see in Chapter Five, is in marked contrast with the rest of the world. This relative independence is due to the fact that Britain, while subservient to the general hegemony of the United States, is a junior partner in the imperialist world system, rather than an exploited formation. The position of Australia, as we shall see in Chapter Six, falls somewhere between the status of Britain and that of the third world.

3.10 Conclusion

We have seen in this chapter something of the way in which the apparatuses and the products of broadcasting, both radio and television, have been moulded by the forces at work in particular social formations. I have suggested that the most important of these are determination by the structures of the social formation and by the class struggle between whole classes and fractions, categories and segments of these. Before we can go on to an account of broadcasting in Australia, a task which will be taken up in Chapter Six, we must first examine in more detail the 'function' of broadcasting as an ideological apparatus, the subject of Chapter Four, and consider the international structure of broadcasting, alluded to in this chapter, in a consideration of the 'media imperialism' thesis in Chapter Five.
1. Thus, one of the events which held back the development of radio broadcasting was the first world war. While this was in progress, the Admiralty in Britain took over the Marconi Company's British works and the United States Navy took over radio interests in the United States. Similarly, in Australia, control of radio was placed in military hands during the War (Walker 1973: 8). This control was relinquished after the war, allowing broadcasting to develop, but a continuous rearguard action by the military followed. We may note that, during world war two, radio broadcasting was again subordinated to military interests but, by this time, broadcasting had established itself as a social force and was used as a weapon rather than suppressed. This by no means spelled the end of military involvement, as is demonstrated by the close military supervision of satellite communications in the post-war period (cf. Tunstall 1977: 138-139).

2. We may note that mass-circulation Sunday papers predate this by several decades. It is the daily press which is referred to here (cf. Williams 1979: 17).

3. In fact a form of regulation was in force in that all frequencies bar one or two, were reserved for military use. There was no regulation of the broadcasters though. The problem was compounded by the fact that early receiving sets were not very 'selective', i.e., could not be very accurately tuned.

4. See Chapter Two for a definition of this term.

5. These mainly belonged to the Marconi Co.

6. WEAF. started in 1922 with its owners, A.T.&T., arguing that selling a communication facility was the same on radio as it was for the telephone. This was perhaps the first step in the later massive commercialisation of radio in the U.S. (Barnouw 1966: 107)

7. A successful anti-trust suit was brought against RCA's broadcasting subsidiary, NBC, which resulted in the forced sale of one of its two networks (Barnouw 1968: 190).

8. For a discussion of what is meant by 'ideology' see Chapter Four.

9. RCA's broadcasting company.


11. This argument runs thus: the capitalist enterprise must a) control its prices; and b) expand in order to counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. This expansion can either result from the opening up of new (geographical) areas to exploit, or from the more intensive development of domestic markets via the stimulation of consumption, planned obsolescence etc. (cf. Capital Vol.3, or Baran and Sweezy 1968).

12. An improved form of radio 'invented' in 1933 by Armstrong with money he made from the sale of patents to RCA (Barnouw 1968: 42).
13. There were actually several Baird TV companies nominally concerned with various different aspects such as development, marketing and export.

14. At first only the size of audiences was measured by ratings, its composition by age, class, purchasing power etc., became a factor in later years.

15. The Beveridge Committee was set up in 1949 and its majority recommendation was not in favour of commercialising TV. However, as noted above, the real struggle was conducted in Parliament and the Beveridge recommendations reversed (Wilson 1961: 44, 60, 78-80).
I have, in several places and especially in Chapter Two, fore­
shadowed the need for a detailed examination of the 'function' of broad­
casting apparatuses; a function which is defined both by their place in
the structures and the class struggle. In this chapter, these issues will
be taken up in a consideration of the role of ideology and the contribution
which broadcasting apparatuses make to it.

It is here that we will generate the most explicit answer to the
question posed in Chapter One, i.e., 'What is broadcasting?' The general
form of this answer is that the institutions of broadcasting are ideological
apparatuses.

We have already seen that a mode of production is characterised by
three structural 'levels' or 'regions': the economic, the political, and
the ideological. The economic level has been the subject of detailed
Marxist analysis, starting with the three volumes of Capital and continuing
to the present day. Its key distinguishing concepts are those concerning
the relations of production, which in a class society are relations of
exploitation. The political level has received rather less thorough
treatment, being treated often as a superstructural epiphenomenon, (for
example, by the economist-voluntarist misreading of Marx). The work of
Poulantzas (1973, 1974, 1975, 1976) which provides the basis of this
analysis, has filled this gap in part, identifying the principal political
relation as being that of domination/subordination and the object of
political practice as being the conjuncture (Poulantzas 1973: 41). In
Political Power and Social Classes (Poulantzas 1973), he sets out the
principal dimensions of the political region and begins to specify some
of its main concepts, such as 'the state', 'state apparatuses', 'power'
and so on. In so doing, he makes frequent reference to the third level
of structure and practice; the ideological. This region is treated therefore principally insofar as it affects the political region, and not as an object for detailed analysis of its own right. In this account, some of Poulantzas' formulations and insights will be employed, together with those of Althusser (Althusser 1971, Hall 1977a and Therborn 1977). There are a number of factors to consider.

1) The place and 'function' of the ideological region in a social formation.
2) The concrete forms that this assumes in particular social formations.
3) The structure of the region itself.
4) The articulation of this region with other regions.
5) The 'effect' of this structure in the field of social relations, in ideological class practice, and in the class struggle generally.

4.1 The Ideological Region

We will begin by examining the place and function of the ideological region, in other words by asking, 'What does this region "do"?' In fact a region does not 'do' anything, it is rather the site of particular forms of activity. Thus, the economic region is the site of the production of material wealth, and of realisation etc., of surplus value (in the various forms that this assumes in different modes of production) and the political region is the site of relations of domination and subordination, which act to maintain, modify or smash the existing relations of production. Similarly, the ideological region is the site of ideological relations (see below) which, like political relations, are involved in the reproduction of the relations of production. As Althusser puts it:
Every social formation must reproduce the conditions of its production at the same time as it produces and in order to be able to produce. It must therefore reproduce:
1) the productive forces, and
2) the existing relations of production.
(Althusser 1971: 128)

We may thus move beyond the descriptive simplicity of the traditional base/superstructure metaphor by assigning a specific scope to the regions of the superstructure, the political and ideological. That is, political and ideological relations are concerned with the reproduction of the conditions of production. There are many dimensions to this reproduction, including the renewal and maintenance of the forces of production (including labour-power); the maintenance of the relations of production etc., and these must be understood as relations and forces pertaining to a particular mode of production or social formation, rather than the objects of a general reproduction process. That is, it is specific modes and formations which are reproduced. (Cf. Hall 1977a: 316)

Once this is understood, we may appreciate the necessity for the reproduction of political and ideological conditions conducive to the extended reproduction of capitalism (and conversely, the smashing of these in a transition to socialism). These conditions include:

1) Bourgeois law and order, though many variants of this may be found, both as it is employed to repress the masses and to regulate the competition between capitalists.

2) The reproduction of relations of domination and subordination in the workforce.

3) The reproduction of the 'rightness' of these relations in the ideological field.

These conditions, together with many others, must be fulfilled in order for capitalist production to take place.
Though aspects of the reproduction process may occur within particular apparatuses, (1) it is fundamentally a global process; one that takes place at the level of social formations. This is clear even in the case of the reproduction of the material conditions of production, (raw materials, machines etc.) when one considers the provision of such services as railways, roads, banking laws, etc. For these to function effectively, they must be co-ordinated at the global level, a function which is typically assigned to the state. In the case of the reproduction of what we might call the 'human factor' of production, it is also argued, by Althusser, that the processes are global ones and typically are controlled by the state. (Althusser 1971: 131-2) That is, the reproduction of labour power, both in the sense of facilitating the maintenance or increase of the number of workers; through, for example, state medical facilities, Factory Acts etc. (q.v. Capital Vol. I, Ch.10); and in the reproduction of the relations of domination and subordination, in reproducing labour power as labour power, through such apparatuses as the school. It is because of the global nature of these reproduction processes that Althusser refers to the reproduction apparatuses as State Apparatuses of which he sees two types: repressive and ideological. Since this usage may seem to be at variance with our common sense conception of what is or is not part of the state; it may be remarked for example, that our main object of focus, the apparatuses of broad-casting, are often 'private companies'; we will examine this designation a bit more closely.

4.2 Ideological State Apparatuses

Althusser justifies this usage (Ideological State Apparatuses) as follows. He begins by referring to Marx's writings on the Paris Commune, The Communist Manifesto etc., and Lenin's State and Revolution.
where the state is explicitly conceived as being a repressive apparatus (Althusser 1971: 137). While he concurs with this, he also maintains that this conception, at the necessary but limited level of 'theoretical description' (q.v. Althusser 1971: 138) may be developed. He stresses the distinction between state power, which as we have seen in Chapter Two is class power, and state apparatuses, which are not simply instruments of class power (see Chapter Two). Althusser also notes the necessity of the destruction of the existing state in a transition to socialism (Althusser 1971: 141).

To this conception, which so far does not depart significantly in content from many other Marxist accounts of the state, he suggests an addition: namely the ideological state apparatus...

...which is clearly on the side of the (repressive) State Apparatus, but must not be confused with it...
(Althusser 1971: 142)

More correctly, he refers to a plurality of Ideological State Apparatuses, as opposed to the singular Repressive Apparatus, which tend moreover to be located in the private rather than the public domain (Althusser 1971: 144). This 'private' status of many ISAs is, of course, the main source of the objection to regarding them as part of the state. Althusser's answer to this objection is in two parts as follows. Firstly:

The distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its 'authority'. The domain of the state escapes it because the latter is 'above the law': the state which is the state of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private. (Althusser 1971: 144).

Thus Althusser rules out the disqualification based on the public/private dichotomy, principally since this distinction is internal to bourgeois ideology. He also offers us a positive reason for regarding these apparatuses as part of the state, a reason in line with the central
argument of this section of Chapter Four, when he suggests that it is their function in the global process of reproduction which renders these apparatuses part of the state.

Private institutions can perfectly well 'function' as Ideological State Apparatuses. A reasonably thorough analysis of any one of the ISAs proves it. (Althusser 1971: 144)²

Now an examination of the functions of every candidate for this status is obviously outside the scope of this work, but our object of focus, broadcasting apparatuses, can be examined in this light. If Althusser's designation is to be applied to these apparatuses, two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, they must be involved in the global process of the reproduction of the conditions of production, and secondly, that they do function primarily 'by ideology' (cf. Althusser 1971: 145).

Let us begin with the first of these. If we take the question, 'What are the state apparatuses?' we may say firstly that they are involved in the reproduction of the relations of production. This reproduction function is:

... for the most part ... secured by the exercise of state power in the State Apparatuses, on the one hand the (Repressive) State Apparatus, on the other the Ideological State Apparatuses. (Althusser 1971: 148)

In order to fully appreciate the role of broadcasting in this process, we would need to anticipate the discussion of the nature of ideology which follows, but at this point we may summarise its contribution thus:

1) Broadcasting apparatuses are involved in promoting the consumption of material goods, whether these be radio and television sets or the whole range of commodities promoted by advertising. Thus, they are not directly involved in the chain of production-consumption (except to the limited extent that they themselves are consumers of, for example, transmitting
equipment, and producers of programmes for sale) but in securing favourable conditions for consumption to take place. They are engaged, for example, in the case of commercial/ advertising institutions in reproducing the consumer as consumer. The importance of this, in its counteraction of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, by providing for the more intensive exploitation of an existing market, has been referred to in Chapter Two. What is important to recognise here is that this service, the provision of a medium for advertising (and a demonstrably powerful one) is analogous to that provided by, for example, railways or public utilities, in that its primary function is not the process of material production and the extraction of surplus value, but the provision of a service to facilitate the continuance and (ideally) extension of that process and extraction. Thus, while advertising, marketing etc., are undoubtedly integral components of a capitalist economy, their primary function is not the production of material wealth but the reproduction of the conditions of that production. We must, however, beware of labouring this point too far, since the functions of broadcasting, even in the most commercial of institutions, are not, typically, confined to this aspect of reproduction. They are also engaged in the reproduction by ideology, of other aspects of (for our purposes) capitalist social formations. The manner in which this is achieved is dealt with in more detail below, but here it is necessary to stress the broadcasting apparatuses' global scale of operation.

2) Generally speaking, broadcasting apparatuses are involved in the processes of 'legitimation' of the status-quo. Exactly how this is achieved is indicated below, but a recollection of what this 'status-quo' consists of: a class society under bourgeois
domination, characterised by a class struggle whose object is state power, indicates the state role which broadcasting may (and generally does) fulfil. It is generally speaking a role of cohesion; as Gramsci described it, ideology may be seen as the 'cement' of a social formation (cited in Poulantzas 1973: 119). It is this role which would define the institutions of broadcasting as state apparatuses, whether they be under the control of public or private interests. This is not to say that there are no important differences between, say, the BBC and the United States NBC network. Indeed the evidence presented in Chapter Three clearly indicates that there are. These differences, however, may be seen as falling within the limits set by the location of broadcasting apparatuses as state apparatuses, and indeed, they may be viewed as forming parts of slightly different forms of the capitalist state.

One has only to recall the insistence on the part of conventional mass media sociology that the media, particularly the press and electronic news media, form part of the system of democratic government (see, for example, Mayer 1964, Ch.1); the importance placed on media by governments in the dependent formations in the imperialist chain (q.v. Tunstall 1977: 143 ff.); in particular for fostering nationalism; or to study the massive daily output of television in Australia to find evidence for this assertion (cf. Ch.7). Moreover, even on the basis of the public/private distinction, the mass media, whatever the form of their ownership and control, are predominantly public in character, by their very nature as mass media. Furthermore, commercial broadcasting in the United States, Britain and Australia, operates on a state licence to use a 'public' medium, that is, certain parts of the electromagnetic spectrum originally referred to as the 'ether'.
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Thus it seems that Althusser's designation, Ideological State Apparatuses, may be an accurate one, at least as far as the broadcasting apparatuses are concerned. Certainly, as we have seen in Chapter Three, these apparatuses are both a site and an object of the struggle between classes, and their role is in the reproduction of the conditions of production on a global scale. However, the terminology we choose to adopt is not as important as the theoretical location of these apparatuses. The institutions of broadcasting are certainly ideological apparatuses and whether we regard them as apparatuses of the ruling class, or as apparatuses of the state, is perhaps not important. What is important is that whatever designation we give these apparatuses, they should not be seen as 'tools' to be simply manipulated by the victors in the struggle for control over them, since their function is partly determined by their place in the structures of a social formation.

We should note that it is because of their perceived function that Althusser locates ideological apparatuses as part of the state even in the case of those apparatuses located within the 'private' sphere. Poulantzas tends to share this point of view (though he disagrees with several aspects of Althusser's treatment of the problem (Poulantzas 1974: 299-309)) but we should note that there are at least two major problems in this formulation. Firstly, as Laclau points out, there is a circularity in the argument which reduces the state to a quality rather than an instance. That is, the initial statement (made by Poulantzas and Althusser) that the state is the instance which maintains cohesion in a social formation, is rendered tautological by complementing it with the notion that everything that maintains that cohesion is part of the state. Thus, according to this view, that state is a cohesive quality present in anything (Laclau, 1975: 100-1).

Secondly, we should, to be consistent with the problematic as a whole, at least admit the possibility that some ideological apparatuses do not contribute to the cohesion of a social formation and, in fact, seek
to subvert it. Socialist political parties, 'underground' newspapers etc. would seem to fit into this category. We need to be careful not to include in our schema only those factors which contribute to the extended reproduction of the social formation, when the general thrust of Marxist analyses suggests that contradictions rather than complementarities are the key to analysis. We need to avoid, in fact, the classic functionalist fallacy: that every feature of a society contributes to its maintenance simply because it is an existing feature of that society. (3)

However, in the case of the apparatuses of the mass media of communication, quite clear linkages to other apparatuses, clearly of the state are in evidence. Not only are many of the electronic media apparatuses in various social formations run by branches of the state administration, (4) but those which appear as 'private enterprises' exist at the pleasure of bureaucratic regulation, though this may ultimately prove ineffective. Their existence would seem to run parallel to that of privately-owned utilities, not identical to public utilities but closer to them than to the capitalist productive enterprise, and involved, of course, in the ideological sphere rather than the economic.

The case of mass newspapers is perhaps less clear. Their function is made possible by state action, the removal of newspaper tax, the enactment of libel laws which accord fair and accurate reporting a certain amount of privilege and so on, but these measures in themselves are not sufficient to locate newspapers as a part of the state. However arguments in functional terms are quite strong in this case. Non-marxist media writers have long linked the press very closely with the political sphere in referring to it as the 'fourth estate' and there are many pieces of sociological research which document the role of the press in maintaining the legitimacy of particular political orders (e.g. Cohen and Young, 1973; Glasgow Media Group, 1976; Hood, 1972); a function which is covered by Althusser's definition of the state as the factor
of cohesion. It is not necessarily a circular argument either as it is possible to conceive of newspapers performing a 'disruptive' role even if, commonly, they are not seen to do this.

I do not intend to sum up, once and for all, the case for regarding mass media institutions as Ideological State Apparatuses, here. The question is too complex, perhaps, to do this but I have indicated above some of the complexities of the debate and would suggest that if the mass media are not, as ideological apparatuses, part of the state, then they are associated quite closely with it.

4.3 Determination of Apparatuses

Having established that if broadcasting apparatuses are not actually part of the state they are at least very state-like in their operation, we now need to examine more closely the concepts of 'apparatus' and 'ideology'. I shall begin with that of 'apparatus'.

The main point addressed in Poulantzas' treatment of this subject concerns the problem of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus from the ruling and politically dominant classes. It is thus, in a sense, the converse of the problem just dealt with - of locating these apparatuses as part of the state - but the argument is constructed from the same premises - that the apparatuses of the state are determined both by the structure of the political region and the class struggle.

Insofar as the state apparatuses have power, this power is that of the classes in control of the state, namely the hegemonic class or fraction in a particular social formation and, we may add, not that of the class to which the staff of the apparatus 'belong'.

The hegemonic class or fraction which in the last analysis holds political power should not be confused with the class or fraction which is 'in charge' of the state apparatus. (Poulantzas 1973: 249)
We may note, in passing, that this discrepancy covers the problem dealt with in the sociology of mass media literature by, for example, Breed (1972) of ensuring that the personnel of the ideological apparatuses 'conform' to the policies of those institutions. In line with the appearance, the ideological nature of the bourgeois state, however, these apparatuses are never presented overtly as instruments of class domination:

... but rather as the 'unity', the organising principle and incarnation of the 'general interest' of society. (Poulantzas 1973: 216).

A particularly popular expression of this is to be found in discussions of the BBC (cf. Briggs 1970), but it is also readily apparent in discussions of other broadcasting systems. Since, as I have argued in Chapter Two, the broadcasting apparatuses are staffed principally by members of the new petty bourgeoisie, and it is this class which adheres most strongly to a view of the state as a 'neutral', 'regulatory' agency, we may suggest that this is why conflict between the interests of the new petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie in those apparatuses is kept under control. Now to say that the class or fraction 'in charge' of these apparatuses does not thereby have power, is not to say that the functioning of the apparatuses is not affected by the class membership of their personnel. Indeed, as we shall see later, the apparatuses of broadcasting are profoundly influenced in their day-to-day functioning by the predominantly petty bourgeois ideology of their staff, for example, that of professionalism, referred to in Chapter Two. What it does mean however, is that, in the last analysis, the functioning of the apparatuses corresponds to the political interest of the hegemonic class or fraction and not that of the class in charge (cf. Poulantzas 1973: 336).

It is important, however, to note that there is a distinction between the single Repressive State Apparatus for which the above remarks hold true, and the diverse Ideological Apparatuses, where some
modification of them may be necessary. Althusser notes that:

Whereas the (Repressive) State Apparatus constitutes an organised whole whose different parts are centralised beneath a commanding unity, that of the politics of class struggle applied by the political representatives of the ruling classes in possession of state power, the Ideological State Apparatuses are multiple, distinct, and relatively autonomous and capable of providing an objective field to contradictions which express, in forms that may be limited or extreme, the effects of clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class struggle as well as their subordinate forms. (Althusser 1971: 149)

Thus we have a strong reason here to stress that determination by the hegemonic class or fraction occurs 'in the last analysis'. We may also ask how it is that these multiple, distinct apparatuses manage to act in concert at all, and not simply cancel each other out; the answer being that:

... the unity of the different Ideological State Apparatuses is secured, usually in contradictory forms, by the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class. (Althusser 1971: 149)

In other words, the ideological apparatuses, to the extent that they do fulfil a 'state-like function', are co-ordinated by the ideology that they 'carry', that of the hegemonic class.

We should stress though that this 'ruling ideology' should not be seen as homogeneous, logically consistent discourse, devoid of internal contradictions. Contradictions within bourgeois ideology, such as that between the rights of the individual as a citizen and as a worker, would seem to be norm rather than the exception. The connection between the apparently contradictory assertion of political freedom and simultaneous economic enslavement is to be found in the contradictory logic of capitalism and not in the Logic of discourse (cf. Hall 1977a: 323-4; and below).

The ideological apparatuses of the state, the 'power centres' of the ideological class struggle, may be seen as somewhat more autonomous
than the RSAs and there is a possibility that particular ideological apparatuses may serve the interests of the subordinated classes in a social formation. In the case of broadcasting, this tends not to be the case, though it may be for other organs of the media, e.g., the underground and socialist press. (We will refer in Chapter Seven, however, to some possible cases of alternative radio in Australia).

This is because control of this apparatus is firmly vested in particular factions of the bourgeoisie who control not only the existing institutions of broadcasting, but also, to an extent, the technological definition of the medium. Because television was developed as a centralised medium, television equipment has been designed to be centrally controlled. The possibility of an 'underground television' is thus obscured by the existing social determination of the technology. Though there are some signs that this technologically-exercised control may be weakening (with the development of 'home video recorders' and 'access television'), at present, the centralised technical structure of broadcasting (one transmitter, many receivers) is presented as a 'practical necessity': stemming from the nature of the technology, but used to retain centralised control in a few hands, while at the same time being a product of that control.

4.4 Ideology

We have already discussed, albeit briefly, the 'functions performed' in the ideological region; that is, those concerned with the reproduction of the relations of production without recourse to direct repression.

We now need to consider how this is achieved, and to ask, 'What is Ideology?'

It is firstly necessary to break with those conceptions of ideology which regard it as an ideational system, a system of concepts, beliefs etc., and to regard it instead as having a material existence (q.v. Althusser 1971: 165-166, Therborn 1977). As Poulantzas puts it:
... it is necessary to break with a whole conception of ideology as a 'system of ideas' or a coherent 'discourse' and to understand it as an ensemble of material practices. (Poulantzas 1975: 17)

This is a difficult proposition, not least because it may be subject to both 'strong' and 'weak' interpretations. The 'strong' interpretation would rule out any consideration of discourse, belief etc. in favour of an analysis of 'action' however this may be conceived, and I believe is incorrect, or at least overstated to the point where the specificity of the concept of ideology is lost. The 'weak' position is captured in this passage from Poulantzas:

Ideology consists of a specific objective level of a relatively coherent ensemble of representations, values and beliefs; just as 'men', the agents within a formation, participate in an economic and political activity, they also participate in religious, moral, aesthetic and philosophical activities. (Poulantzas 1973: 206)

This, I believe, is somewhat closer to the mark but a bit too 'weak' to avoid slipping back into an idealist account of ideology. Perhaps the best account of the materiality of ideology is that provided by Therborn (1977) who explicitly contrasts the materialist conception with orthodox sociological ones.

He argues that the 'classical' or 'conventional' conception of ideology has three main characteristics. Firstly, ideologies are seen as 'possessions'. Beliefs, attitudes, notions etc., are the property of various individuals or groups and, as such, may be possessed, given, internalised or transmitted and are studied by such sociological theories as those concerning socialisation, not to mention those concerned with the effects of the mass media. Secondly, ideology is seen as a determinant of action, actors act in line with their values, interests and beliefs etc. Both Weber's and Parsons' theories of action are seen in this way. (9) Thirdly, the classical conception operates in an historicist problematic of the subject. In this problematic, ideologic-
ally-determined subjects make history. These subjects may be either individuals or groups (as in the various Marxist versions of this conception) and through them ideology becomes a motive force in history (Therborn 1977a).

Therborn sees this conception of ideology as constitutively bound up with the whole enterprise of sociology, whose object he regards as the ideological region, the Ideological Community (Therborn 1976: passim) and while some versions of it may be far more sophisticated than this simple outline would suggest, a 'more fertile ground' is provided on the terrain of historical materialism.

Therborn sets up the three opposing characteristics of the historical materialist conception of ideology as follows. Firstly, ideology is an ongoing social process and not an object or set of objects in the sense that they may be possessed. As Poulantzas notes, class ideologies are not number plates worn on the back of class subjects! (Poulantzas 1973: 205). Secondly, ideology is a determined/determining part of the complex structure of the economic, political and ideological regions. Ideology cannot be regarded in this problematic as a motive of action since the notion of causality that this implies is replaced by that of the dialectic and the cause/effect couple by contradiction and over-determination (q.v. Althusser 1969: 87-128). The consequence of this is the classical Marxist notion that 'Men make history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing'. This leads us to the third characteristic of Therborn’s historical-materialist conception of ideology, that history makes subjects and not vice versa. That is, ideology constitutes individuals (or groups) as subjects in a manner which is outlined below. (10)

The conception of ideology as a set of material practices rather than an ideational system is given perhaps its clearest treatment by Hall. He argues that ideology is:
..."the distinct area in which classes 'experience' their own practice, make a certain kind of sense of it, give accounts of it and use ideas to bring to it a certain imaginary coherence ..." (1977a: 322)

Thus the 'ideology of the free market', which Hall sees as a fundamental theme of capitalist ideology, is the result of individuals (or agents, if we insist on this distinction) giving an account of their experience of market practices. This ideology thus exists, is lived, in those practices. (Hall 1977a: 323)

From this we may begin to appreciate the materiality of this theory of ideology. We have determined that its role is in reproduction of the relations of production, that it is a social process which constitutes individuals (or groups) as subjects and that it is a (semi-autonomous) structural instance along with the economic and political regions. We may now consider the general (a-historical) definition of ideology, ideology in an abstract-formal sense. As Althusser has it:

Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. (Althusser 1971: 162)

Or, to cite Therborn:

(It is) an ensemble of perceptions etc., through which men live their lives as reflecting human beings. (Therborn 1977a) (my insertion)

Poulantzas is in substantial agreement with this position when he says:

The status of the ideological derives from the fact that it reflects the manner in which the agents of a formation, the bearers of its structures, live their conditions of existence; i.e., it reflects their relation to these conditions as it is 'lived' by them. (Poulantzas 1973: 206)

Thus, we are dealing not with a view of some 'objective reality', which may be more or less distorted, but with reflections of the relations of agents to their 'real conditions of existence' which, because they are imaginary
relations, may be more or less distorted. As Althusser puts it:

...it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world that 'men' represent to themselves in ideology, but above all it is their relation to these conditions which is represented to them there ... it is the imaginary nature of this relation which underlies the imaginary distortion that we can observe (if we do not live in its truth) in all ideology. (Althusser 1971: 164)

In particular, according to Hall, the distinction between 'real relations', such as the relations of exploitation between wage-labour and capital, and 'how they appear', that is as relations of exchange in a 'free' market, is mediated by language.

"...the ways in which men come to understand their relation to their real conditions of existence, under capitalism, are subject to the relay of language: and it is this which makes possible that ideological displacement or inflection, whereby the 'real' relations can be culturally signified and ideologically inflected as a set of 'imaginary lived relations'." (Hall 1977a: 329)

Therborn goes on to specify three dimensions of the relation of agents to their real conditions of existence which he calls questions of what is, what is possible, and what is right, good etc. These are three dimensions of the ideological interpellation of individuals as subjects referred to by Althusser (1971: 170) and, in a slightly different way, Laclau (1977: 100-1). We will examine this below.

The first of these questions gives a sense of identity, it is the answer to the question: 'Whom am I?' It also covers, in part, the sphere of knowledge about the social world, particularly if we consider both the preoccupation with the question, 'What is the nature of man?' in the social sciences and the range of answers which they produce.

The second question sets levels of aspiration and confidence/competence. It is particularly important from the point of view of political action. It is clear that these first two questions are inter-
related, the answer to the first setting limits on the range of possibilities of the second.

The third question is that most commonly dealt with in conventional social science treatments of ideology, covering such questions as legitimation, normative behaviour/deviance etc., but, for our purposes, it is no more important than the first two (Therborn 1977).

Ideology, however, does not exist on its own, in a vacuum, and neither is it, in this problematic, a spontaneous creation of subjects. It is rather organised in systems, institutions etc., which act to subject individuals to its practice. As Althusser puts it:

... an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice or practices. This existence is material. (Althusser 1971: 166)

He also describes a theoretical hierarchy of determinations of ideology as follows:

...the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief. (Althusser 1971: 170)

The role of broadcasting institutions is at the apex of this hierarchy. Before we go into more detail concerning their role however, there is a further aspect of the theory of ideology which we must consider. This is the fact that ideology functions by 'interpellating individuals as subjects' (Althusser 1971: 170; Laclau 1977; Therborn 1977).

This interpellation operates in the three modes outlined above; what is, what is possible, and what is right, and sets up the basic relation of the ideological region, that of qualification and subjection (Therborn 1977). That is, ideology qualifies actors as conscious initiators of behaviour at the same time as it subjects them to a definite social order.
We have now covered the main concepts involved in the operation of an Ideological Apparatus. Before going on to examine the operation of broadcasting apparatuses in the light of this, a few further remarks on the nature of ideology are in order. Firstly, it may be re-emphasised that the ideological region is an integral part of the structures of any social formation. Thus there is no sense in which a transition to socialism, for example, brings about an 'end to ideology' in this problematic. (Still less can Bell's thesis be sustained (Bell 1960)).

While on the whole I agree with Marx's refusal to speculate on the nature of future modes of production, we can say with confidence that the general form of the superstructure, with its role in the reproduction of the conditions of production, and the field of the ideological; the interpellation, qualification and subjection of agents, are features of any possible society, though plainly the form that each takes can vary quite widely.

We may now turn to the question of the ideological region in particular social formations. We have seen that ideology always operates through an apparatus, and that, at least in the case of broadcasting, these apparatuses may be part of the state. As was shown in Chapter Three however, the control and functioning of particular broadcasting apparatuses varies within broad limits according to the role assigned to these apparatuses by the structures of, and the class struggle in, the social formation. In particular, we noted the emphasis given to the ideology of 'commercialism' which has as its intended effect the extended reproduction of the consumer in the United States System. This is opposed to the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois 'liberalism' which characterised the early years of the British system. We will examine the Australian system in Chapters Six and Seven, but we may note in passing here that the effect of imperialism in setting up the Australian apparatuses as dependent ones has had particular effects on the type of ideology which is disseminated by them.
The particular themes espoused in the ideology presented in the
different social formations also vary quite noticeably. Some of this
variation may be explained by reference to the same structural dis-
locations and different configurations of the class struggle mentioned
above, but this sort of explanation must usually remain at a general
level, far short of the specificity of particular ideological artefacts
(i.e., programmes). Reference must also be made to some concept of
what we might call the 'general cultural milieu'; the totality of the
ensemble of ideological themes in a formation, which itself is partly
the product of the above factors, but is also possessed of a history
'of its own'. The role of subordinate and dominated classes in a
formation may also be important; particularly insofar as the struggles
of these classes evoke particular responses from the controllers of the
apparatuses. The struggle of blacks in the United States to achieve
'equal rights' is an example of this. In the case of television, some
of the responses this struggle evoked include the appearance of the
notorious 'token' blacks, through to, in more recent times, black
protagonists in drama programmes and so on.

Mention has already been made of the typically centralised structure
of broadcasting preventing the emergence of, for example, an 'under-
ground television'; however this centralisation is a matter of degree,
and is rather less advanced in the United States than it is in either
the United Kingdom or Australia. This centralisation/decentralisation
couple may be seen as an effect of the intervention of the political
region in the ideological and of political practice in ideological
practice. As Poulantzas points out, the intervention of one region in
another takes the form of the setting of limits (Poulantzas 1973: 17).
In this particular case, the political over-determination of the
apparatuses of broadcasting sets limits on the amount of decentralisation
which is possible. The struggle for control of broadcasting was, and
is, a political struggle between principally, fractions of the bourgeoisie
for the control of an ideological apparatus. Similarly the ideological region sets limits on the political, for example, in defining what is or is not legitimate and by placing normative restraints on the exercise of repression (for example, in doctrines of free speech). Thus, the two regions of the super-structure are closely articulated with each other, each setting limits on the operation of the other. It is this close articulation which leads, under capitalism, to the association between the ideological and the political which results in the designation Ideological State Apparatuses. By contrast, one could argue that, under feudalism, the ideological apparatuses were relatively united under the control of the church and the political apparatuses were rather more diffuse, being under the control of the various barons, lords etc. Similarly, in many tribal societies, the family fulfills the majority of repressive 'state' functions as well as the ideological ones which Althusser attributes to it under capitalism. Thus, the articulation of the regions of the superstructure with each other is an historically variable process.

We may note too, that even within the bounds of one particular social formation, the intervention of one region in another may change from time to time. The way in which codes of censorship develop provide an example of this variation within the limits of the general relation between ideological apparatuses and the repressive apparatus of the state. That is that the ideological apparatuses are regulated by the repressive apparatus and operate under its protection and direction.

Of particular relevance in a consideration of broadcasting institutions as ideological apparatuses, is the distinction drawn by Thernborn (1977) between 'ego' and 'alter' ideology. His suggestion is that the ideology of a particular class (he refers mainly to the ruling class) may take two directions; one reflecting the relation of the members of that class to their conditions of existence (ego ideology) and one which is designed for consumption by the other classes in a
formation, mainly the subordinate ones. Thus, we may draw a crude
distinction between particular apparatuses according to which of these
forms of ideology tends to predominate in them. In the case of
Australian newspapers for example, we may characterise the Financial
Review as being primarily concerned with the ego ideology of the ruling
class and the Daily Telegraph with its alter ideology. The familiar
phenomenon of advocacy of 'equality' by those who enjoy the fruits of
inequality is also of relevance here, as an example of an 'alter'
ideological theme.

As applied to broadcasting, this distinction is relevant to the
changing pattern of the British system as discussed in Chapter Three,
in that an increasing emphasis came to be placed on alter ideology, a
phenomenon referred to earlier as 'popularisation'. The British
system was at no time exclusively an apparatus for the dissemination
of only one of these types of ideology of course, it is a matter of
emphasis rather than of type. A similar distinction can be applied to
the differences in output of different broadcasting systems, according
to whether they are concerned with an ego or an alter ideology. The
distinction is typically not one between a bourgeois ego ideology and
a bourgeois alter ideology directed at the proletariat since by the very
structure of a mass medium it is alter ideology which tends to predominate.
To the extent that an ego ideology is presented it tends to be that of
the petty bourgeois broadcasting agents (cf. Elliott 1972: 17 and passim).
The common-sense distinction drawn between different types of broadcast
material according to whether they are 'high-brow' or 'low-brow' may
correspond with Therborn's distinction as well as being an expression
of the manual/mental labour division in a particular context. Thus,
in accounting for the ideological themes presented by, for example,
television, we must take account not only of who creates the ideology
but also of its designated target.
Further, and of particular importance in assessing effects, we may take note of the distinction drawn by Hall (1977a: 322) between 'culture' (such as e.g. 'working-class culture') and 'ideology proper'. 'Culture' refers to the lived experience of agents and 'ideology proper' to the ways in which they may attempt to give an account of this experience. It is at the level of 'ideology proper' that a dominant, alter ideology may intervene.

Thus far, we have established that ideology represents the relation of the subject to his conditions of existence in an imaginary form, and that this is materialised in rituals of qualification and subjection and organised in apparatuses. Mention has also been made of the fact that ideologies are class based in the sense, that they are related to the 'experience' of particular classes, not that particular ideologies are the exclusive property of a particular class. It is to this dimension that we will now turn.

The class basis of ideologies follows from the definition of ideology. The relation of individuals to their conditions of existence is structured by the basic distribution of agents into classes; the effect of the structures of a social formation in the field of social relations. That is to say that the relationship of individual agents to their conditions of existence is not random but structured by the nature of those conditions (such as market relations) and the ideological apparatuses, themselves formed by the class struggle. In principle then we can identify typical themes in the ideology of a particular class or fraction, according to the conditions of existence of that class or fraction. In practice this may prove to be a complicated process, given the number of complicating factors (the ego/alter distinction for example), but Therborn suggests one way in which this might be done. He suggests a fifteen-fold derivation of the ideological themes of just one class. Though this is complex, it pales beside the complexity
involved in accounting for the ideology of the multiplicity of classes and fractions present in a social formation, not to mention the secondary effects produced by class alliances, the organisation of hegemony and so on. However, Therborn's classification does provide a way into this problem and his diagrammatic representation of it is reproduced in Figure 1. His scheme sets out five different determinants for each of the three basic questions of ideology, thus giving rise to fifteen themes in the ideology of a particular class. There are a number of problems posed by this taxonomy, not the least of which is the fact that it is somewhat static and cannot take into account the dynamics of the ideological class struggle. Therborn himself admits (1977) that the model stands in need of empirical evidence to demonstrate its utility, but it does indicate more specifically what is meant by saying that ideology is an imaginary representation of agents' relations to their real conditions of existence and how these are structuted along class lines.

**FIGURE 1**

Content of the ideology of a single class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force of production</th>
<th>Relations of production (1)</th>
<th>Relations of production (2)</th>
<th>Relations of production (3)</th>
<th>Relation to the polity, the state etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is possible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THEMES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is right etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Relations of production (1) refers to economic property relations which Poulantzas refers to as 'possession' and 'economic ownership'. Relations of production (2) refers to the social relations of production those pertaining to the object and means of labour (e.g., factory Division of Labour). Relations of production (3) refers to the objective of production, under capitalism this means the production of material wealth and the creation of surplus value.
Therborn's model, despite its problems, is in accord with Marx's comment to the effect that:

It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the earthy core of the misty creations of religion (and ideology generally) than, conversely, it is to develop from the actual relations of life the corresponding celestialised forms of those relations. The latter method is the only materialistic, and therefore the only scientific one. (Marx, *Capital* I, 1954: 367) (my insertion)

We should note too, that this schema should be seen as determining the use which is made of particular ideological themes rather than their specific nature. As Poulantzas (1972: 205) and Laclau (1977: 100) point out, particular ideologies do not 'belong' to particular classes, rather than may be *used* by those classes in 'making sense of' their position(s).

4.5 Conclusion

We are now in a position to summarise and conclude our account of broadcasting institutions as Ideological (state) Apparatuses. We may say, firstly, that they are such because of their 'role' in the reproduction of the relations of production, the 'global' (or *mass*) scale of their activity and the fact that they function by ideology. Their precise functioning in an actual empirical case, that of Australia, will be examined in Chapter Seven, but we have seen here the general principles which are involved. We have seen, for example, that ideology ('ideology proper') operates by 'interpellating individuals as subjects' in three basic modes (the questions of what is, what is possible and what is right, good etc.).

Secondly, we have seen that the operation of particular ideological apparatuses is constrained by their structural position and the nature
of class struggle over and within them. As a result, broadcasting apparatuses are typically engaged in disseminating a bourgeois 'alter' ideology, supplying materials (information etc.) to be used by the subordinate classes in making sense of their position, interpellating these agents as subjects who will enact (if the appeal is successful) roles conducive to the extended reproduction of capitalism. We have stressed that ideology is to be seen as a set of material practices rather than as a system of beliefs (etc.) and pointed out that, as a result of this, ideologies do not need to be consistent at the level of discourse.

We have then at least a preliminary answer to the question: "What are the institutions of broadcasting?" We have suggested that they are ideological apparatuses and usually closely associated with the state. Before we can properly apply this designation in an account of the Australian broadcasting system, we need to examine the specific location of that system in its articulation with other such systems. The next chapter then, is devoted to examining the concepts of imperialism, media imperialism and the export of culture.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER FOUR

1. For example within economic apparatuses or enterprises. The reproduction of the authority of foremen takes place within the factory.

2. It would seem to me that a 'reasonably thorough analysis of any one apparatus' could only demonstrate its own role and not that of all apparatuses.

3. This is of course the trap which Davis and Moore fall into in their famous functionalist theory of stratification. For an account of the debate they initiated, which raises this point, see Tumin (1970: Ch. 9).

4. Noone would deny, I think, that the administrative bureaucratic apparatuses form part of the state.

5. In his discussion of the state, Poulantzas refers to the apparatus of the state in the singular since he is mainly concerned with the repressive apparatus, the state bureaucracy etc.

6. That is, not all Ideological Apparatuses are State Apparatuses.

7. That is, with the introduction of new consumer products.

8. The reference in this chapter to Therborn 1977, is to a seminar series delivered at the ANU in 1977. For this reason no page references can be given. The small letters indicate which paper in the series of four is being referred to.

9. That is, they posit a separation of beliefs and action, since one determines the other. It is this which the materialist theory seeks to avoid.

10. That is, it provides agents with a social identity, it 'creates' them as social beings of a particular type. Thus the television viewer or radio listener learns to be a 'watcher' or a 'listener' or becomes part of an audience and of public opinion etc., i.e., is constituted as an ideological subject. See below for an outline of how this is done.

11. That is, they are Ideological Apparatuses. They are plainly not alone in this and neither are they necessarily the most important apparatuses.

12. 'Token Blacks' are those actors etc., who are given usually minor parts in dramatic productions to demonstrate to the world that the organisation concerned does not have a discriminatory employment policy. Their status is 'token' to the extent that they do not represent a real change in policy so much as 'window-dressing'.
13. Subordinate classes are not typically in a position to disseminate an alter ideology themselves, since ideological apparatuses tend to be controlled by the dominant class(es). They do have an ego ideology though this too may be subordinated to the alter ideology of the ruling class, depending on the level of development of their class consciousness.

14. We know, for example, that serialised drama shows, televised during the afternoon, are designed for viewing by the largest segment of viewers during these hours - housewives. The emphasis that such drama places on romantic love, maudlin sentimentality and so on, may then tell us much about the position of women in a particular social formation, as interpreted by the producers of this drama.
In our analysis so far, mention has been made at several points of the fact that the Australian broadcasting system, the ultimate object of our enquiry, cannot be seen in isolation. Rather, it must be located in the matrix of imperialism and the extent of its dependence on the metropolitan social formations documented. Before this is possible, we need to examine the processes of what is commonly termed 'media imperialism' from a general point of view. To this end, this chapter is concerned with a discussion of media imperialism, beginning with an account of imperialism in general, the general case of which media imperialism is a specific instance.

5.1 The Highest Stage of Capitalism

It has become commonplace to remark that the period since the second world war has seen the domination of the (non-communist) world by the United States of America. This domination has its apologists (e.g., W.W. Rostow 1960) and its critics (e.g., Fanon 1967, Frank 1969) and it is generally the latter who refer to it as 'imperialism'. There is a variety of interpretations offered as to the causes and principal dimensions of this phenomenon, but we may say that, generally-speaking, three aspects of imperialism have been dealt with. These are firstly; military domination, the establishment of 'foreign' bases and the various wars conducted against nationalist and communist movements (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Korea, Vietnam, etc.). Secondly there is cultural domination, with accounts ranging from those cast in terms of McLuhan's 'global village' (McLuhan 1964) to the media imperialism
thesis dealt with later in this chapter. And thirdly, there is economic dominance, seen in terms of a 'lead' possessed by the 'more advanced' countries by writers such as Rostow (1960), or by Marxists as the result of capitalism's need to expand in order to survive. In these various Marxist accounts, economic imperialism is seen as the 'base' on which the other dimensions depend (e.g., Jenkins 1970).

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review all of the extensive literature on the subject of imperialism in general, even the work of the Marxist critics of imperialism must be considered to be voluminous, but rather I shall present an account consistent with the problematic used in Chapters Two and Four which covers the main features of imperialism as they concern us here.

We have seen that social formations, the actual site and mode of existence of modes of production, may be seen as divisible into three structural levels or regions, each in a complex articulation with the others and characterised by a corresponding articulation of the various levels of the class struggle. Thus far, the concept 'social formation' has been used in a way which may suggest that it is coterminous with the ideological notion of 'nation-state'. However, a moment's reflection on the epistemological status of these terms will reveal that that cannot be the case. The concept 'social formation' is not, unlike that of 'nation-state' (or 'society'), arrived at by an empiricist abstraction from some observable, commonsense 'reality', but rather from the application of a particular scientific mode of enquiry (historical materialism) to 'the world'. If we were to examine the notion of 'nation-state' in the light of this theory we would find that it designates two principal things in the terms of our enquiry. These are: a particular unit, i.e., a particular state with more or less recognisable boundaries, where a particular geographically-located ruling class subjects a geographically-located subordinate class to its domination;
and a particular ideological community whose subjects may identify themselves as Americans, Australians etc., though these claims need not be 'correct'. Economic relations are generally not involved in the notion of 'nation-state' \( ^{(2)} \) and, indeed they are very difficult to deal with in such a framework. \( ^{(3)} \)

However, the concept of 'social formation' necessarily involves an important (determinant in the last analysis) place for the economic region. The boundaries of any particular social formation are thus not set exclusively by ideological notions of nationhood (though these are of course involved), or by particular political structures, but also by economic relations, relations of production.

Now the location of these structures in a particular geographical area does not necessarily suggest that this location is exclusive of interaction with other such formations. In fact, in the historical development of capitalism this has hardly ever been the case, though I am not suggesting that capitalism has always involved imperialism. There has, however, been a more or less continuous process of internationalisation which has led up to the present pattern of imperialism. As Poulantzas puts it:

The Capitalist mode of production is characterised, in its extended reproduction, by a two-fold tendency: to reproduce itself within the social formation in which it takes root and establishes its dominance, and to expand outside of this formation; the two aspects of this tendency act simultaneously. (Poulantzas 1975: 42)

Now various explanations of this tendency to expand have been advanced, but it is this link between the internal and external development of the capitalism of a particular social formation which I believe is important. The very existence of the capitalist system depends on its continued expansion, for example, to counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (q.v. Poulantzas 1975: 42). This is achieved by increasing the rate of exploitation of the working class, by making the
labour process more intensive, by for example, mechanisation; or extensive, by setting up the capitalist labour process in new places. Similarly, market demand for the products of capitalist manufacture may be intensively (via advertising) or extensively (via exporting) developed. This tendency of the Capitalist Mode of Production to reproduce itself in a new social formation does not, in itself, account for an imperialist chain dominated by one particular formation, the United States. It is hypothetically possible, at this abstract level, that a 'chain' of more or less equal 'competing' formations may result, a chain which would correspond, at an international level, to the *laissez-faire* models of domestic economies, beloved of classical and marginal economics. However, this ignores the tendency of capital to concentrate into larger and larger units, and the historical fact of the uneven development of the various social formations.

This uneven development is more than a simple disparity of historical stages which could be rectified by the dependent formations 'catching up' to the metropolises, since the relations of dependence, once established, tend to maintain and extend themselves. To quote Poulantzas again:

> The imperialist chain is itself characterised by uneven development; each link of this chain reflects the chain as a whole in the specificity of its own social formation. (Poulantzas 1975: 42)

Poulantzas maintains that this uneven development can be further specified in terms of a basic division between dominated and dominating formations (Poulantzas 1975: 43), and while in general this may be correct, it does pose problems, as we shall see in Chapter Six, for locating Australia as a social formation in this chain.

This uneven development and polarisation takes place in each of the three regions of the social formations involved, though since these levels are themselves characterised by uneven development, the relationship
is a complex one: social formations which occupy a similar position in terms of economic domination/dependence may have quite different political and ideological structures according to their unique, local history. These political and ideological structures will both be constrained however, by the imperial connection. Each structural region is involved in the imperialist relation. As Poulantzas puts it:

A social formation is dominated and dependent when the articulation of its specific economic, political and ideological structure expresses constitutive and asymmetrical relationships with one or more other social formations which enjoy a position of power over it. (Poulantzas 1975: 43)

We may now consider what a 'constitutive and asymmetrical relationship' consists of in each of the structural regions.

5.2 Economic Imperialism

The economic dimension of imperialism is possibly the best known and certainly the most written about. While a great variety of indices can and have been used to describe the economic dimension of imperialism, they generally refer to one central concept. This is the domination of a subordinate domestic economy by capital whose economic ownership (and often possession) is vested in the bourgeoisie of another social formation. This may take a number of forms. It may be that the domestic commodity market of the dependent formation is dominated by imported products, or that its industrial, financial or commercial capital is predominantly controlled by overseas interests. In each case the principle, domination by exogenous capital, and the effect, the distortion of the domestic economy in question to serve the needs of a foreign rather than a domestic bourgeoisie, is the same, though the degree to which this occurs can obviously vary quite widely. One could cite, for example, the cases of West Germany and Taiwan as exhibiting different degrees and modes of control by United States capital.
These different modes of penetration by foreign capital (in the mid-late twentieth century this usually means United States capital) form the basis for Poulantzas' division of imperialism into stages. He argues that the present phase is characterised by the export of capital rather than commodities; that is, the export of capital has become the fundamental and determinant factor in modern imperialism; the export of commodities, while continuing, no longer has this role (Poulantzas 1975: 42). This mode of penetration is an important factor in any discussion of a particular social formation, such as Australia since:

The process of imperialist domination and dependence henceforth takes the form of the reproduction within the dominated social formations themselves, and in forms specific to each of them, of the relation of domination which binds them to the imperialist metropolises. (Poulantzas 1975: 43)

One such effect, which Poulantzas sees as being of particular importance in Western Europe, is the displacement of the dominant role in these formations from the economic region to the political. This occurs, he says both within and between these social formations (Poulantzas 1975: 42; see also Mandel 1970).

5.3 Political Imperialism

In the political region of imperialism, we are dealing with a whole range of phenomena, from military occupation, direct colonial rule etc., to the various international agreements and alliances, whose legal phraseology obscures the fact that they are commonly instruments or expressions of imperial domination.

We have noted in Chapter Four that the political region, together with the ideological, is the site of processes concerned with the reproduction of the conditions of production. This is as true of the
imperialist chain as it is of individual formations. The political region of imperialism is the site of the maintenance and reproduction of the political conditions for the economic exploitation of the subordinant formations. The most extreme examples of this would probably be the various instances of colonial rule under military administrations, for example in Africa, these however, generally belong to history with some recent, bloody exceptions. Nowadays, the political conditions are more likely to be secured by 'consent' or deception in the form of exploitative contracts under the guise of 'aid', or the provision of favourable conditions for 'foreign investment'. In this regard we may note the role of the Gatt talks (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) which aim to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, barriers to the penetration of international capital (i.e., to arrive at so-called free trade). If successful, the advantage to the United States as the strongest trading nation would be considerable. (5)

The effect of the international system of political domination on the internal structure of a formation may also vary quite widely, depending on the position of the formation in question in the chain and its own peculiar features. The most visible cases are those of formations whose political order has been imposed from outside, or at least where an outside power has been instrumental in installing a particular regime, by direct intervention, subversion or other pressure, such as the cutting off of foreign 'aid'. Of these, we may draw up a fairly lengthy list: Chile, Greece, Spain, Portugal, being only some of the more recent examples (cf. Poulantzas 1976).

The more subtle cases are more difficult to identify by their very nature. It may be claimed that the provision of a 'stable climate for investment' is aimed at strengthening the domestic economy and that encouraging overseas investment is part of promoting economic growth. However, the fact remains that, in practice, the pursuit of such
practices in Australia, has reinforced its economic domination by the metropolitan formations, particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. Speculation about more direct, but covert, manipulation of the domestic political structure by such agencies as the American CIA remains idle in the absence of direct proof, but this would seem to be an atypical mode of political control, used as a last resort. The normal mode of political domination results from the effect on the social relations of a formation of its domination by foreign capital. That is, the creation of a 'comprador' fraction of the domestic bourgeoisie which 'occupies the place of' foreign capital and consists of the managers of the local branches of multinational corporations, i.e., a fraction of the ruling class whose position in that class is secured by 'possession' of foreign capital. (cf. Playford 1970) It is this effect that constitutes the typical form of the 'reproduction within the dominated social formations ... of the relation of domination which binds them to the imperialist metropolises' in the political region. (6)

5.4 Ideological Imperialism

Again, the general formula here is that ideological imperialism acts to secure the conditions for the reproduction of imperial domination. That is, the reproduction of the ideological subjection of the dominated formations and the reproduction within them of their dependence on metropolitan formations. Since it is this dimension of imperialism that most concerns us, we must examine it fairly closely.

We must firstly recall the historical materialist definition of ideology presented in Chapter Four; that its effect consists of qualifying/subjecting agents and thus locating them in an imaginary relation to their real conditions of existence. We must recall the materiality of ideology and the hierarchy of its determination by rituals
and apparatuses and that its 'function' is to provide for the reproduction of the relations of production. In discussing the internationalisation of ideology, we are then dealing with the internationalisation of apparatuses and of ideological rituals (themes) which contribute to the maintenance and reproduction of the relations of production, in this instance those of imperialism.

Now although my main interest is in broadcasting apparatuses and the rituals they prescribe (q.v. Chapter Four), we may note here that there are other apparatuses relevant to the process of ideological imperialism. The influence of churches and other religious apparatuses is one such consideration. While it is common to talk about the secularisation of modern societies, and often to proceed from this to a dismissal of the significance of religion, there can be little doubt that religious ideological apparatuses play a very significant role in many lesser developed countries (LDC's). The role of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America, Southern Europe and parts of Oceania is a case in point. While not suggesting that this role necessarily encourages the subordination of the formations concerned to the economic and political domination of the metropolises in a direct manner, the internationalisation of culture which results from the dissemination of (for example) Christianity, may well be an important contributory factor in the introduction of the capitalist mode of production into the now dependent formations, and, since the introduction of religion tends to pave the way for trading links, or at any rate to be closely associated with such links, the insertion of these formations into the imperialist chain is contemporaneous and closely linked with their spiritual conversion. (cf. Edwards, et al. 1972: 419)

Similar comments might be made about education, particularly in consideration of its funding by the World Bank; sport, the arts and so on, in as much as each of these contributes to ideological imperialism.
They do this by providing answers to the questions of what is, what is possible and what is good which facilitate the extended reproduction of capitalism.

This may seem to be a somewhat extravagant claim, to assert that such a wide range of activities contribute to the ideological defence of imperialism, but I am not suggesting that this is all such activities amount to, merely that this is one of the structures which they may bear. Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, the lack of centralised control of many ideological apparatuses may permit the existence of critical ideologies and apparatuses concerned with the destruction of imperialism rather than its maintenance. As history reveals, these counter-imperialist actions are sometimes successful and the role of Ideological Apparatuses in independence movements has often been quite important. Even under non-revolutionary conditions, when a strong anti-imperialist independence movement does not exist, not all of the ideological apparatuses in a particular social formation will be acting in support of imperialism; for example, those which support and disseminate the ideology of a nationalistic, but non-revolutionary domestic bourgeoisie, and those criticisms of 'foreign ownership' and destruction of 'national culture' beloved of the new petty-bourgeois intellectuals etc. (8)

However, we shall see when we come to examine the specific case of media imperialism, and in particular the case of the electronic media (radio and television), that such voices as would seek to oppose imperialist domination of their culture are often ineffective in the face of the economic and political power of the metropolitan formations. However important the contribution of the various apparatuses mentioned above may be to the ideological region of imperialism, it is 'media imperialism' that is our primary concern here. It is a particular instance of ideological imperialism and one for which a particularly strong case can be made.
5.5 Media Imperialism

The development of what is commonly referred to as the 'media imperialism thesis' has been the work of a number of authors. In his review of this work, Tunstall (1977) cites Guback's *The International Film Industry* (Guback 1969), Schiller's *Mass Communications and American Empire* (Schiller 1970) and Well's *Picture Tube Imperialism* (Wells 1972) as being representative of this tradition, and to this list we can add Tunstall's own book entitled *The Media and American*. There is a common theme running through all of this work (as their titles may suggest) and a basic consensus on the nature, if not the magnitude, of the central issue: the domination of the mass media of communications throughout most of the world by the United States of America, with some support from other imperialist metropolises, principally Britain. As Tunstall puts it:

In most of the world's countries the media are only there at all, on the present scale, as the result of imports in which the American media (with some British support) predominate. (Tunstall 1977: 17)

This facet of imperialism itself can be seen as having economic, political and ideological dimensions, which we will examine below, but it also has a history which greatly illuminates the present situation. Media imperialism did not begin with television, or even radio, and it is to a brief examination of their antecedents that we will now turn.

5.6 Newspaper Imperialism

Tunstall argues, persuasively, that the newspaper was the key invention in the development of a world media system. The significant developments here were the separation of the press from official government control, pioneered in the United States, and its subsequent
development as a commercial product, and the development of international news agencies, based on telegraph cables, which provided material for these papers (Tunstall 1977: 23).

This development, which had produced the first mass circulation newspapers in the United States in the 1830's (slightly later in the United Kingdom) (Tunstall 1977: 25), may be seen as an early stage in the subordination of popular culture to capitalist relations of production which is discussed in a more general context by Briggs (1960) and referred to in Chapter Three. The format, now familiar throughout the world, of the news-entertainment-advertising newspaper was developed in the nineteenth century and was already becoming internationalised by 1900. This internationalisation follows a pattern which, as we shall see, was later re-enacted in the electronic media whereby emulation of a 'more advanced' formation, combined with international monopoly power in the distribution of a basic commodity (in this instance 'news'), resulted in the ideological hegemony of a particular formation (or formations). This hegemonic formation is then able to set the standard to be followed throughout the world. These two factors, mimicry of the apparatuses of the metropolitan social formations (in the form, for example, of the many imitations of the London or New York Times found throughout the world), and the operation of a monopoly on an international scale (in this instance over the cable network centred on London), formed the basis then for the first form of media imperialism, located mainly, it would seem, at the level of the export of commodities, albeit in this case 'ideological commodities' which are not necessarily produced for profit.

These two factors were also important in establishing and reproducing the dominance of the United States film industry (cf. Guback 1969), particularly after World War I, when European film production lost a lead which it was never to regain. With a sound domestic
market, based on the rapidly-growing, immigrant-filled cities, and monopoly control of this market from 1900 - 1914 by the 'Motion Pictures Patents Co.', a sound basis for expansion overseas was laid (Tunstall 1977: 69). Though this original monopoly was broken, it was replaced in the 1930's by a cartel of even greater proportions, which made the world its oyster. This particular industry also became involved in broadcasting and particularly in television production after World War II, and still maintains an undisputed position of world leadership in film production (at least in terms of quantity).

5.7 Broadcast Imperialism

The above developments, then, predated radio and television imperialism, the main focus of this chapter. They are important, not as Tunstall suggests because they formed a model for later developments; the suggestion being that radio and television imperialism was a copy of a pattern set by newspapers and films (Tunstall 1977, Ch.3); but because they were the product of substantially similar structural determinants. That is, though there are direct relations between the film industry and television, there are more basic connections between both of these and the particular form of capitalist production which characterises this stage of imperialism. These connections may, for analytic purposes, be divided into economic, political and ideological determinations and are outlined below.

We have already seen, in Chapter Three, how broadcasting was developed under the aegis of radio set manufacturers, on a laissez-faire basis in the United States and under 'public control' in the United Kingdom. It was suggested that their 'motivation' to provide a broadcasting service was to provide a market for their product and
to maximise the exploitation of that market. The slightly later adoption of radio (and later still TV), as a medium for advertising was cited as another economic determinant of the nature of broadcasting. We may add to this the production of programmes as commodities, a development associated with advertising, since advertisers were the main customers in the United States, and we have a resume of the main economic factors concerned with broadcasting and the economic class interests at stake.

In part, the development of (mainly United States) media imperialism resulted from the 'export drive' of these interests. Reference has been made in this chapter to the need for continued expansion in a capitalist economy and, in part, media imperialism may be seen as a particular result of this. It has been the advertising and programme sales aspect which has provided most of the impetus, and it is the latter which is most often used as a data source by commentators like Tunstall.

On the economic level then, media imperialism consists of the metropolitan apparatuses exporting commodities (programmes and technology), investing capital, and servicing the capital investment of other capitalists by providing an advertising service. The detailed (legal) arrangements under which this takes place will obviously vary according to the particular formation concerned, but the general principle is much the same everywhere.

The export of programmes is probably the most obvious feature of electronic media imperialism and in this, the undisputed world leader, in terms of quantity, must be the United States. Its history begins in the period after the second world war when American television companies began to move away from 'live' productions to the use of 'telefilms', prerecorded programmes which could be broadcast at any time (see Chapter Three). This move was associated with the entry of the Hollywood film production companies into the
television industry and, as well as the technical facilitation for exporting which telefilms provided (it being easier to export a few film cans than a live production), this move also created an economic structure conducive to exporting. Firstly, a successful telefilm could easily cover its production costs by its sale to sponsors in the United States. Since the cost of production of a few extra copies of a film is minimal compared to the initial production cost, it was possible to sell telefilms overseas at whatever price the intended market would bear and for much less than the cost of local production. For example, when commercial television was being established in Australia in 1956, the selling price for telefilms distributed by the major United States networks (CBS, NBC, and MCA) was up to $US3,000 per hour. The estimated cost of a local production was then $US20,000 per hour (Barnouw 1970: 114) and while Australia, like other countries, introduced a quota on imports, (9) the local content could be made up cheaply with quiz shows (largely copied from successful American formats) and sport. When the cost of television is measured in CPMHPCM's (cost per thousand homes per commercial minute), a difference in price of the order mentioned above cannot be defeated, except by government intervention. To indicate the extent to which prices are set according to what the market will bear, the following figures are reproduced from Barnouw (1970). The figures are for 1968, by which time it was estimated that 140 million television sets were in use around the world, not including those in the United States. The prices refer to the amount asked for a typical, successful sixty minute telefilm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>$US7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$US6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>$US6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$US6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$US4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$US4,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(see also Chapter Six)

And at the other end of the scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>$US60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[xx \text{ for more recent figures see p177 below}\]
The foreign earnings from the sale of telefilms, which in 1958 amounted to $US15 million, by 1968 had risen to $US78 million, despite a temporary boycott on imports in Australia, the result of a dispute over the price rather than the principle of imported television (Barnouw 1970: 309). In Varis' view, profit is the prime mover in this enterprise:

"The production of television programs for international distribution (unlike that of radio programs which are often used for propaganda purposes) is primarily aimed at making money." (Varis 1974: 103)

We may note that some countries have been more successful than others in resisting the tide of United States exports (cf. Appendix A). The two which stand out in this respect are the United Kingdom and Japan, which have been relatively successful in imposing very restrictive quotas on imports and are in fact substantial exporters in their own right. For example Britain initially had an ordinance which allowed only 14 per cent of television programmes shown to be of non-Commonwealth origin, and this has been maintained (Varis 1974: 104-5), though this figure does not represent the full significance of import penetration since many of the imported programmes are shown in prime time (Barnouw 1970: 115). However, the relatively strong position of Britain is demonstrated further by the fact that...

By 1975 British TV exports were probably earning about as much as those of the United States, if feature films on TV are excluded. (Tunstall 1976: 43; see also Read 1976: 73)

These then are the rough dimensions of the commodity export side of media imperialism. Though the most apparent manifestation of that imperialism, it is probably not the most significant from an economic point of view. If we set the $78 million earned by telefilm exports in 1968 against the budget of the United States networks, or
against the total value of commodity exports from the United States, it looks rather insignificant by comparison. However, if we begin to look at the advertising which accompanies these programmes, their true significance begins to increase.

The spread of American (and British) advertising firms around the world may be said to represent the 'export of capital' dimension of media imperialism, (though only in part, since the setting up of overseas production companies (cf. Varis 1974, de Cardona 1975) is also representative of this phase). Although the amount of fixed capital involved in advertising may not be very large, since little in the way of plant, etc., is involved, the penetration of this industry into the dependent formations is a very important development. It is important because it represents a qualitatively different mode of penetration and because of the proportions it has now reached. According to Tunstall:

By 1973, and with the exception of Japan, in each of the other leading advertising countries, West Germany, France, Canada and Britain, at least half of the twenty largest advertising agencies had an American name.

(Tunstall 1977: 54)

In Australia in 1974, eight of the biggest ten advertising agencies were wholly or partly United States-owned (Tunstall 1977: 107). This means that the control over revenue for broadcasting and hence a great deal of influence, if not absolute control, over its input is vested in 'foreign' hands. Even if local content quotas were raised substantially, the overall output of television would be unlikely to change markedly in character if this economic control remained unchanged.

This United States control of advertising, which since advertising is part of 'commerce' rather than 'culture' is less subject to quota-type controls than imported programmes, has had important effects on the class control of the medium. Wilson (1961) documents the role played by United States and British advertising firms in the campaign
for commercial television in Britain in the 1950's. He notes in particular the role played by newly-elected Conservative MP's, several of whom were from advertising companies and one in particular a director of the British branch of the United States J. Walter Thompson firm. One may also note the phenomenon of the 'pirate' radio stations which were ultimately successful in bringing about the introduction of commercial radio in the United Kingdom, after more than thirty years of beaming United Kingdom-origin commercial programming from foreign stations to Britain from Luxembourg and Normandy and from ships moored at sea. This venture too was backed by the advertisers, under American direction, and was eventually successful because of political action.

In Australia, as we shall see in the next chapter, television was commercial from the start and as Tunstall comments:

(Australia) 'was forced from the start into massive imports of TV programming' due to its 'thinly-populated' nature 'with few TV sets and low revenue'. (Tunstall 1977: 106)

Indeed, Tunstall further asserts that Australians tend to see more United Stated television than many light viewers in the United States (!) (Tunstall 1977: 106), as well as many United States sponsored adverts (though most, if not all, advertisements are made in Australia). Australia is also one of the largest importers of programmes in the world (in terms of dollars spent). As Read notes:

For the year 1971, when the exporter's association estimated that foreign revenues totalled $US85 million, TV Guide (April 29, 1972) calculated that Canada, Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom paid two-thirds of the total. (Read 1976: 70)

Thus far we have dealt with entertainment programmes and advertising, from mainly an economic standpoint. However,
another significant dimension of television imperialism lies in the dissemination of news. As mentioned above, the historical origins of media imperialism may be sought in the establishment of the international news agencies and their modern electronic counterparts play much the same role. The world leader in the field of electronic news dissemination is 'Visnews', an organisation owned jointly by Reuters and the BBC with a 25 per cent minority holding divided between Australia, Canada and New Zealand (ABC, CBC, NZBC). The service provided by Visnews is used by one hundred and seventy broadcasting services throughout the world and seen on 99 per cent of the world's TV sets (Tunstall 1977: 23). It provides a ten-minute daily feed to Australia and, on average, has about thirty televised news items per day for its customers to choose from, averaging out at eight-ten per client (Tunstall 1977: 36). It is a flexible service, since clients can edit or provide their own commentary to serve their own ideological purposes, and is not run to reap massive profits (in 1975-6 Visnews earnings were only $3.8 million). It is argued, however, that penetration of Visnews paves the way for more lucrative ventures and, of course, its ideological importance should not be underestimated.

Two other similar services exist. They are UPITN (jointly owned by British Commercial TV news - ITN and United Press International, the American news agency) and CBS News (a subsidiary of the American CBS network), which Tunstall suggests is the least objective and neutral of the three (Tunstall 1977: 49). Virtually all overseas news on Australian television comes from one of these three sources, though some is 'gathered' by the employees of Australian broadcasting organisations, the so-called 'special correspondents'. While it is true that the material obtained may be 'neutral' and 'unbiased', it is nevertheless necessarily a selection from the total possible range of items and thus its content is structured according to the criteria
of 'newsworthiness' in operation in the metropolitan apparatus. The fact that the news thus provided is relatively cheap has two consequences. These are, firstly, that the cost for a dependent formation of setting up its own service is usually prohibitive and, secondly, that these formations may be better informed about the events in the metropolitan formations than about those concerning their own interests.12

While an account of the specific ideological effect of this arrangement for the dissemination of news would require far too much detailed analysis to be undertaken here, a few general remarks can be made. Firstly, since 'news' (and perhaps particularly TV news) is one of the main sources of answers to the question 'What is?' the fact that it is largely prepared overseas, or even if local in origin, tends to follow the format in use in the metropolises, automatically gives some sanction (ideological support) to the imperialist system. If one is subjected to daily messages suggesting that events in the metropolises are important to those living in dependent formations, and particularly if these messages are overwhelmingly uncritical of this arrangement, then a measure of legitimacy is accorded imperial domination.13

Secondly, and related to this, are the various versions of the 'star' system and its correlate, known in Australia (colloquially) as the 'cultural cringe' (for the origin of this term see Phillips 1958: Ch.5). This is the notion that artistic trends, fashions (and, by extension, such things as technological innovation) occur first in the metropolises and are only later copied in the dependent formations. This has as its effect an answer to the question 'What is good?' which says, 'Anything that originates in the metropolitan formations'. This effect is not, of course, confined to news, being if anything stronger in the case of entertainment, literature etc. (cf. Phillips 1958: Ch.5).
The concept of emulation, the reproduction of the cultural forms of the metropolises in the dependent formations, is not such a voluntaristic one as the above passages may suggest. While most commonsense discussion of cultural imperialism is cast in idealist-voluntarist terms, I believe it is possible to identify a material basis for the undirectional flow of culture. If we briefly consider the case of popular music, the apparatuses through which this occurs are revealed.

An examination of the styles, themes, etc., in popular music would reveal that the various, mainly short-lived, trends which characterise this medium originate almost exclusively in the United States or Great Britain. There is evidence of considerable demand for these cultural artefacts, both in the metropolises themselves and throughout the system which they dominate. It would also seem that what local products do succeed in this milieu are most often close copies of the imported originals. This may be explained by reference to notions of copying, lack of an appropriate indigenous cultural tradition, etc., or even in terms of the notorious 'global village': but it is also a reflection, in ideology, of the imperialist world system. This ideological ritual of cultural deference is prescribed by the apparatuses responsible for the dissemination of popular music, the multinational record companies such as EMI and RCA in association with broadcasting apparatuses, themselves locked into a system of media imperialism. Thus, if a dependent formation appears to be incapable of producing a distinctive culture which is not a copy of a metropolitan one, it should perhaps not be regarded as much as a failure of that culture, so much as a victory for imperialism. In short while 'emulation' is an important factor, it cannot be considered apart from the general ideological hegemony of the dominant formations or the world-wide network of ideological apparatuses which are, to varying degrees, under their control.
A further element in the discussion of media imperialism centres around the nakedly propagandist efforts of the United States government and military controlled stations. Much of this originates in what is known as the cold war era when stations such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (formerly Radio Liberation) were set up to broadcast to communist (or Russian-occupied) territory. They were a continuation of war time propaganda exercises and relied heavily on the services of exiles from the Iron Curtain countries (Barnouw 1970: 91). Radio Free Asia was formed along similar lines in 1952 but met with only limited success. Apparently most Vietnamese who heard the broadcasts thought that they referred to freedom from French colonial rule rather than from communism (Barnouw 1970: 92). As well as these CIA-run, hard line propaganda stations, the military had another broadcasting outlet in the American Armed Forces Network. Officially intended for consumption by American garrisons abroad, these stations typically broadcast a mixture of popular music and soft-sell propaganda stressing the virtues of the United States way of life (Barnouw 1970: 88). Various policies of drowning out Radio Moscow have been followed at various times, with mixed success (Barnouw 1970: 88). The most significant involvement of the military in broadcasting today however, is probably in the field of satellite communications.

In this area, the United States had a head start and established a frequency allocation agreement which gave it extensive control over this new medium. This was achieved as a result of large-scale military spending on rockets and satellites, the monopoly control being defended on defence grounds and on the claim that, since the United States paid the development costs, it should retain control. With the advent of worldwide satellite communications, it is argued that the United States has finally defeated the British cable monopoly (q.v. Tunstall 1977: 139, Galloway 1972). Tunstall draws a parallel between this military involvement in communications and the involvement of the United States
Navy in the formation of RCA, which he says was partly intended to supersede cable communication with radio. The advantages of the international consortium Intelsat for the United States were not lost on the United States/Department who pointed out that, despite the nominally international nature of the consortium, 92 per cent of the total spent went to American contractors, and 50 per cent of the ground stations (worth $US125 million) were built by American firms (Galloway 1972: 156). The contribution which satellite communication could make to United States imperialism was not unnoticed either, as Galloway points out:

The Intelsat system has also brought modern and direct communication to many areas of the world which previously had none, thus enabling American business to better utilise its operations in many countries. (Galloway 1972: 156)

Though the United States has a clear lead in this field, we should note that other countries are preparing to enter the satellite business (the European Launcher project, for example, and various Japanese projects). We should remember also that the United States is not alone in overseas broadcasting either, the BBC World Service and Radio Australia may both be seen as generally comparable to the apparatuses described above.

5.8 Conclusion

Tunstall argues in his critique of the television imperialism thesis, as advanced by Schiller (1970) et al., that United States supremacy in this field is declining. He suggests that its influence was probably at its peak in 1947-48 and has declined somewhat since then (Tunstall 1977: 143). In particular, he refers to a number of moves for nationalisation in the early 1970's (i.e. after Schiller's book was published) but, inevitably, any claims for such a decline vary with the indices used to measure it. De Sola Pool also argues that the 'television imperialism' phenomenon is declining and states:
The evidence is strong that the present flow (of programmes) which is predominantly from a few centres in the developed countries to the rest of the world, will change rapidly to a more dispersed network. (de Solo Pool 1977:139) (my insertion)

However, this evidence is based solely on the export of commodities and does not take into account the export of capital, which as we saw, characterises the present phase of imperialism. And, as Varis comments:

The United States is still the leading originator of programs, but changing production conditions and the outflow of production capital from the United States make it difficult to estimate the aggregate total of American programs sold or produced abroad and distributed to various countries. (Varis 1974: 103) (my emphasis)

The long term significance of this decline is thus somewhat open to questions which Tunstall is unable to answer. Though his book is excellent in many respects, it is lacking in one basic area concerning the theory of imperialism. None is presented, though several are briefly reviewed and this is, I believe, the reason for the rather indeterminate answer Tunstall provides to the media imperialism thesis (Tunstall 1977: 262). If we add to Tunstall's analysis the notion that the media may play political, commercial and ideological roles, either separately or together, this indeterminacy becomes a positive rather than a negative quality, a critique of determinism rather than a sign of confusion.

To summarise then, media imperialism is a phenomenon with several important dimensions. It is a pervasive phenomenon, however one decides to measure its effect and extent and should be regarded as part of a more general process of imperialism. It takes place in an imperialist chain of social formations, under the hegemony of the United States, but with internal divisions and local variations. Thus we can account, in broad strokes, for the phenomenon of media, and particularly television imperialism. This is necessary since Australian television is, at least in part, the product of this imperialism and cannot be understood apart from its international context. Many of the general issues raised in this chapter will be taken up again, and made more specific, in reference to the Australian television system in Chapter Six.
1 The apologists for imperialism generally prefer to refer to it as 'modernisation', 'development', and so on. They may refer to essentially similar empirical data but the treatment it receives is radically different to that attempted in this chapter.

2 Even when economic factors are invoked, as in the frequent warnings that multinational corporations threaten 'national sovereignty' the economic structure is typically seen as something outside of the nation state, a factor which may bear upon it, rather than an intrinsic part of its structure (cf. Lichtheim 1971).

3 For a discussion of the concept of 'nation state' within this problematic see Poulanzas (1978: 93-120). Here Poulanzas attempts to locate the nation state in terms of the historic-spatial specificity of social formations. It is "... a complex case if ever there was one." (1978: 93)

4 We note that this usage of the term 'power' may appear slightly at variance with that employed in Chapter Two where it was 'the capacity of a given class to realise its specific objective interests', but the contradiction is more apparent than real since this is precisely what is involved in the consideration of imperial domination, viz., the subordination of classes in the dependent formation to the ruling class in the metropolis, whether this be direct (as in some colonies) or mediated through various 'domestic' apparatuses.

5 Or to Japan or whoever is the strongest trader. The point is that free trade penalises the weaker formations (cf. Jenkins 1970: 184-5).

6 We may note, however, that it may be combined with other forms. That is, the power of the comprador bourgeoisie may be reinforced by subversion etc. (cf. Poulanzas 1976: passim).

7 One might suggest that this connection is particularly strong in the case of protestant religions (cf. Max Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism).

8 For example, the concern over the relative lack of Australian drama on Australian television which is discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, see also Senate Select Committee (1963).

9 On an informal and voluntary basis at first. A target of 40 per cent Australian content was agreed to be reasonable by the broadcasters.

10 The fact that these agencies are identified by the presence or absence of an American name is obviously less precise than an account of shareholding etc., though it does perhaps reflect the importance of 'emulation' in this field as discussed below.

11 See also Walker (1973: 48) who discusses the power of advertising agencies over commercial broadcasters, but refers to the J. Walter Thompson and Patterson agencies as two of Australia's largest!
An attempt has been made by Third World nations to set up their own international news service and counteract these factors. To date it has achieved only limited success, internal disagreement among the participating countries being one of the major reasons for this. (see the هندستان تايمز 22/7/1976)

There is a sense in which metropolitan events are important to dependent formations, the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam war, for example, did have important consequences for Australians. This is not the manner in which foreign news is typically presented however.

See for example the references to the popularity of American style music in Briggs 1970, and Wilson 1961, and the role this is deemed to have played in the introduction of commercial television into Britain, see Chapter Three.

The cost of local production may also be a relevant factor, but it is control over distribution which is critical in this field.

By 1975 there were an estimated 154 million T.V. sets in use outside the U.S. (Read 1976:72) and the scale of charges corresponding to those cited on p.166 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>$8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>$10,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$8,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$5,000  (see also p.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>$70     (Read 1976:71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SIX
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BROADCASTING IN AUSTRALIA

In this chapter, I will begin to draw together the strands developed in previous chapters in an account of a more specific object, Australian broadcasting and, more particularly, television. In order to explain the structure and mode of functioning of Australian broadcasting, it is necessary to consider the media imperialism question from the receiving end, as it were. In order to do this, we need, firstly, to locate Australia in the imperialist chain in a general sense; we need to ask, in other words, what is Australia's position vis-à-vis the metropolitan formations of the United States, Western Europe and Japan, before we can account for a specific consequence of this location, broadcasting.

Secondly, we need to examine briefly the class structure of Australia; the part this has played in the historical development of broadcasting and plays in shaping its current structure. This will be taken up later in the chapter.

6.1 Australia's Place in the Imperialist Chain

The single most striking feature of Australia's position in the world imperialist chain of dominant and subordinated formations is its apparent ambiguity. It appears, at first, that Australia is in some senses part of the so-called 'first world' and in others part of the third world of underdeveloped formations. In fact, its position is genuinely an intermediate one when considered from the point of view of the movement of capital and can be seen as such in the terms of the problematic of historical materialism which governs the rest of my analysis.
Firstly, we may recall the generalised asymmetry of the imperialist chain, as noted in Chapter Five. As Poulantzas notes:

The imperialist chain is itself characterised by uneven development: each link of this chain reflects the chain as a whole in the specificity of its own social formation ... Uneven development is produced by the articulation within these social formations between the CMP as it reproduces itself and these other modes and forms of production (i.e., those pre-existing the advent of imperialism).

(Poulantzas 1975: 42) (my insertion)

This may be more simply expressed by saying that the uneven development of social formations is due to the presence within them of other modes of production (e.g., peasant ones) to varying degrees. In the case of Australia, the traditional mode of production characterising Aboriginal society was rapidly destroyed by genocide, disease and the wholesale appropriation of Aboriginal land by the squatters and selectors, etc., so that we are dealing here with those forms of production which date from the colonial era. In this respect, Australia is quite unlike most other ex-colonies, such as those discussed in Wallerstein's Social Change (Wallerstein 1966: 1-9).

While some of this development can be explained in terms of a spontaneous local adaption to Australian conditions, the very fact that it was a colonial society means that we must look beyond Australia for the dynamics of its development. This is as true today as it was in the colonial era proper. In my view, no serious analysis of the structure of the economic region in Australia, or of its political and ideological structures, can be made without reference to Australia's domination by the metropolitan formations, principally the United Kingdom, the United States and (in more recent years) Japan.

The effect of this domination in general terms is summarised by Poulantzas:
The process of imperial domination and dependence henceforth takes the form of the reproduction within the dominated social formations themselves and in forms specific to each of them, of the relation of domination which binds them to the imperialist metropolises. (Poulantzas 1975: 43)

Thus, to begin to spell out Australia's 'intermediate position': it is relatively close to the metropolitan formations since it is not 'encumbered' with the remnants of previous (e.g. peasant) forms of production, yet not identical with them since, although its development has been 'wholly capitalist', it has taken the form of a dependent formation, as a supplier of raw materials and a market for consumer goods. Australia does not have a highly developed industrial base, other than that required to fill domestic needs. What it does have is an industrial structure dominated by foreign capital which both exploits Australia directly, by repatriating surplus value, and uses Australia as a base for the exploitation of the Pacific and South East Asian regions (cf. Catley and McFarlane 1975: 244-247).

The economic structure of Australia is thus dominated by metropolitan capital. Its political structure is similarly affected, principally due to the fact that, as a result of its economic dependence, there is little basis for an autonomous domestic bourgeoisie, such that it could adopt the hegemonic stance of a ruling class. Instead, there are a number of bourgeois class fractions who compete in the political arena for control of the state. It is a struggle between a limited domestic bourgeoisie, a comprador-like fraction representing foreign capital, both old and new petty bourgeoisies, and an imperfectly organised working class. The bourgeois fractions are further split between industrial capital, finance capital, agricultural capital, mining capital and so on. An uneasy and fluid balance is repeatedly arrived at between these fractions of capital, in which the agents of foreign capital tend to predominate. The political structure of Australia is, then, constrained by its economic dependence.

We will return to this question in chapter seven.
The ideological region will receive more detailed treatment below, particularly in terms of the 'media imperialism' which was the subject of Chapter Five, but here it will be noted that it does fulfil Poulantzas' third condition of a dependent formation. He says:

A social formation is dominated and dependent when the articulation of its specific economic, political and ideological structure expresses constitutive and asymmetrical relationships with one or more other social formations which enjoy a position of power over it. (Poulantzas 1975: 43) (my emphasis)

It is my contention that Australia is in such a position, a position of dependence and subordination vis à vis the metropolitan formations and a position of, partly surrogate, domination over the Pacific (etc.) region.

There are three consequences of Australia's position, as outlined above, which are particularly important for the analysis of its broadcasting system. These are outlined below.

Firstly we need to note that, as Poulantzas puts it:

... the popular masses of the dominated formations are exploited by the classes in power in the dominant formations: an exploitation linked to that which they experience from their own ruling class. (Poulantzas 1975: 44)

In attempting to demonstrate that the 'popular masses' in Australia are exploited both by the Australian bourgeoisie and the ruling classes of the metropolitan formations, it is necessary to qualify the use of the term 'popular masses'. It denotes those ensembles in a social formation which are not part of a ruling bloc, not in a position of power and so on. (cf. Laclau 1977: 107n, 108). It would be mistaken to regard this category as being in any way an homogenous unit however, particularly since in Australia the 'popular masses' are internally divided as a result of Australia's imperial subordination. Further, this term should not, I believe, be used
to cover the new petty bourgeoisie, the ensemble 'in charge' of
the apparatuses of broadcasting, since this group, while not part of
a ruling bloc, may ally itself quite closely with those elements.

However, despite these qualifications, it is possible to
demonstrate that, throughout Australia's history, its working classes
and other dominated elements (peasants, convicts, petty bourgeoisie etc.)
have been exploited both by elements within Australia and by the
ruling classes of the imperial metropolises. This becomes clear
after even a brief examination of Australia's economic history from
a Marxist standpoint. There are two factors involved. Firstly,
that Australia is a capitalist formation and is therefore divided
into classes with exploitative relations between the upper and lower
classes; for the purposes of this analysis this will be assumed.
Secondly, we need to show that this form of exploitation occurs in
a context of imperial domination and exploitation resulting from
Australia's position in the world imperialist chain as it has developed
since 1780.

In the first few decades of the colony of New South Wales the
social structure of white Australian society resembled nothing more
closely than an armed camp. Though this state of affairs could not
persist, since convicts were continually released on termination of
their sentence, this early period does mark the beginning of Australia's
economic development as a subordinate formation. The economy was, of
course, at the outset almost totally dependent on that of the United
Kingdom except for the most basic of subsistence needs and the very
limited internal market. Whether this period should be regarded as
a 'primitive accumulation' phase of local capitalist development as
Buckley (1975) argues, or as characterised by a non-capitalist mode of
production termed 'convictism' as Dunn (1975) suggests, is not at issue
here. What is important is that, whatever interpretation one places
on the internal logic and rationality of the Australian economic system,
the economic and political links with Britain are...
asymmetrical and constitutive. This 'outside determination' continues through what Clark (1975) terms the second and third phases of Australia's economic history, covering the periods 1850-1890, 1890-1930, though at the same time an 'internal history' is also developing (Clark 1975: 50-68).

The directness of Australia's connections with Britain is demonstrated by the parallel relationship between the 'health' of British capital and the level of immigration to Australia. This is unlike the inverse relation between British capital expansion and immigration to the United States and Canada (Clark 1975: 57).

The first of these two periods (1850-1890) and the period up until about the first world war, Clark suggests, may be seen as a partnership in capitalism rather than a simply exploitative relation (Clark 1975: 58). It was, for example, the investment of British capital to overcome the colonies' chronic labour shortage which resulted in the high-productivity, high wage character of Australian industry in that period.

The second of these periods (1890-1930), while still to be seen mainly in terms of the senior-junior partner relation between Britain and Australia, also sees a growing divergence of interests between the two. Critical to this development were the effects of World War I on the Australian economy; in terms of increased production of primary staples and the accelerated development of import-replacing industries. Both of these developments rendered the Australian economy vulnerable to external market fluctuations when their initial cause, the war, was removed (Clark 1975: 63-64). Thus, in the depression of the 1930's, when the influx of British capital slowed dramatically and commodity prices (e.g., wool) crashed, the disadvantages of being a junior partner were compellingly underlined.
It is towards the end of this period and in the following one (number IV on Clark's model) that one might begin to doubt the extent of Australia's dependence on Britain, but only to the extent that Britain's role was supplanted, later to be more thoroughly replaced, by the United States and, lately, Japan. It is during this time also that two of the most prominent features of Australia's economic dependence came to the fore. These are protectionism (the setting up of tariffs - partly to maintain war-developed industries) and its consequence, the setting up of local subsidiaries by multinational firms and secondly, the general overshadowing of commodity imports by capital imports. Both of these factors are clearly evident in their effect on the class structure of Australian society in that they provide the economic basis for a comprador-manufacturing fraction of the bourgeoisie and a fraction based on finance capital, both of which are involved in the exploitation of the popular masses referred to above.

Thus, I am suggesting that the popular masses in Australia have been exploited and continue to be exploited not only by the national bourgeoisie, but also either directly, or through the comprador medium, by the ruling classes in the metropolitan formations.

The second major consequence of Australia's dominated position concerns its economic and political structure. As Poulantzas puts it:

In the present phase of imperialism:

... the metropolitan mode of production reproduces itself, in a specific form, within the dominated and dependent formations themselves ... this individual reproduction of the CMP within these formations extends in a decisive way to the domain of their state apparatuses and ideological forms. (Poulantzas 1975: 46)

This reproduction of the metropolitan mode of production within Australia, extending to its state apparatuses and ideological forms, cannot be understood simply as the reproduction of capitalism in Australia, since Australia has been capitalist since it was created
as such by British capital in the early nineteenth century. Rather it should also be understood in terms of the reproduction of particular forms of capitalist production, and particular forms of apparatus etc.

In other words, I am suggesting that one effect of Australia's dependent position is the emergence within it of techniques of production, forces of production and relations of production etc., which originated in the metropolitan formations - not as a result of the inherent efficiency or suitability of such techniques, though to a certain extent they may be dictated by the logic of capitalist production, but rather due to the penetration of imperial capital. Thus, in a somewhat simplistic vein, one could point to the similarities between Australian car assembly plants and those operated by the same companies in the United States (though here the size of the market is an important variable) or to the growing concentration of retail trading along American and European lines (malls, plazas, etc.).

Similar effects may be observed in the political and ideological spheres. Our parliamentary system is quite explicitly modelled on an amalgam of Westminster and Washington-Ottawa models and is still, at least nominally, subordinated to the British monarchy. The party system, the cabinet system and the state bureaucracy may all seem to be at least partly imitative and, as we shall see, this extends clearly to the ideological apparatuses, such as those of broadcasting (cf. Hull 1959).

At this point, we should consider the question of the 'causes' of these similarities. Thus far, I have suggested that they are the effects of Australia's position in the imperialist chain and, in the last analysis, of Australia's insertion as a dependent capitalist economic formation into that chain. However, it may be objected that similarities such as those referred to above are due to such factors as 'shared values', 'common cultural heritage' etc., rather than determination in the last analysis by the economic region. However, this alternative position,
based on the premises of structural functionalism rather than historical materialism, is not capable of dealing with economic history, whereas my approach can deal with political and ideological history. A further objection might be made from a position which accepts the general primacy of the economic region but disputes the consequent imposition of political and ideological forms, arguing that these are not so much imposed as a natural consequence of a capitalist economic system. This position would imply for example, that, once a capitalist economy is established, the political and ideological forms follow automatically and that, for example, Australian methods of car production are to be explained, not in terms of the American parentage of the local 'big three' manufacturers, but rather in terms of the internal logic of capitalist commodity production and special Australian conditions. It is true that factors such as these are important in an analysis of Australia, but they do not themselves provide a sufficient explanation of the particular forms which capitalist production and bourgeois politics and ideology take in Australia. They could explain, perhaps, why bourgeois liberal democracy is the ideology of Australian politics, but not why a Westminster version of this is practised. They could not explain the similarity between the ABC and the BBC.

Thus, Australia's position of dependence and subordination in the imperialist chain has as its effect, the reproduction of the metropolitan mode of production in the economic, political, and as we shall see below, ideological regions.

Thirdly, in our account of the main features of Australia's subordination, we need to note the direction of that deference. Up until the second world war, Australia was very clearly located in the British camp. Since that time however, the hegemonic role, both in the systems of world imperialism, and as this applies to Australia, has clearly shifted to the United States. Though a strong involvement
of British capital still characterises the Australian economy and a clearly British stamp remains on many of our political institutions, there can be little doubt that the United States influence is growing at a much faster rate. This American hegemony ...

... has been achieved by establishing relations of production characteristic of American monopoly capital and its domination actually inside the other metropolises (e.g. Britain) and this similarly implies the extended reproduction within them of the political and ideological conditions for this development of American imperialism. (Poulantzas 1975: 47)

Finally, in this brief review of Australia's position in imperialism we need to note Australia's own quasi-imperialist role in the Pacific basin. In this there are two predominant features; firstly, the involvement of Australian domestic capital (e.g., BHP) in the Pacific region and secondly, that of Australian-based subsidiaries such as those of Ford, General Motors, Dunlop, ITT and Coca-Cola (q.v. Catley and McFarlane 1975: 244-7). New Zealand, Indonesia and New Guinea are probably the most important targets of this enterprise which has important political (including military) and ideological components also (the role of Radio Australia is relevant here, cf. Age 'Green Guide', 4-10/7/1980).

6.2 The History of Radio and Television in Australia

Having briefly reviewed Australia's position in the imperialist chain generally, we may now go on to examine the development of its broadcasting apparatuses, in terms of their determination by the structures of imperialism and their local history, to the extent that this is autonomous. There are two main areas to consider. The determination of the apparatuses by the class struggle and by the structures of the Australian social formation.
As was the case in Britain and the United States, the technology (in the narrow sense of a set of techniques) of radio was used at first for wireless telegraphy under the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1905 (Walker 1973: 3). The first station was owned and operated by the British Marconi Co., and by the time of the first world war, fourteen wireless telegraphy stations were in operation (Mackay 1957: 16).

In 1913, the Amalgamated Wireless of Australasia (AWA) company was formed with Australian and British capital buying the Marconi and Telefunken interests in wireless telegraphy (Mackay 1957: 17). Thus, from the outset, the development of Australian radio was, at least in part, a product of imperialism. It was also, we may note, in the hands of wireless equipment manufacturers; as Ashbolt notes, AWA is the nearest Australian equivalent of the American RCA company or to the original British Broadcasting Company (Ashbolt 1975: 180).

It was AWA who made the first radio transmissions from Australia to the United Kingdom and who pioneered the use of short-wave radio in the Commonwealth (Mackay 1957: 17; Sturmey 1958: 109). It operated radio stations in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth in the days of wireless telegraphy. However, AWA's early involvement did not include the operation of broadcasting stations as such:

"AWA, at this time (1922) was not concerned with acquiring stations, but merely building them, equipping them, selling sets, and receiving royalties for the patent rights it held. It was not until 1930 that it went into the radio station business with 2AY Albury." (Walker 1973: 11)

This involvement in broadcasting developed from this point, so that today AWA holds 7 radio licences and operates one other station (Walker 1973: 11). Even in the absence of direct ownership, AWA's influence over the emerging radio industry was, as Ashbolt suggests, profound (see also Cole 1966: 12). It was also challenged by other radio manufacturers, radio amateurs and the press (with the exception of the Sydney Morning Herald which held shares in AWA (Curnow 1963: 89)), who successfully challenged the AWA sponsored 'sealed set' system (see
Broadcasting as such began in Australia in 1923, initially financed by the British system of licence fees, but on a private enterprise basis. For the first ten months of operation, a system of sealed sets, receivers only able to pick up preselected frequencies, was used to ensure that only those services which had been paid for by the licence fee could be received but, faced with the opposition referred to above, this cumbersome and far from foolproof system was soon abandoned. In the absence of a centralised system of control or a unified policy approach (deciding whether to give people what they want, or what is deemed to be good for them for example), a licence system was not entirely viable either, or entirely to the liking of equipment manufacturers, to whom a licence fee represented a barrier to sales, and in 1924 a new system was inaugurated (Cole 1966: 17).

This new system was a compromise between commercial interests and those who advocated a BBC type of approach. It reflects the inability of any of the competing ruling class agents to gain unqualified ascendancy as they did in Britain and the United States (see Chapter Three). There were two types of station under the 1924 scheme: 'A' stations dependent on licence revenue, and 'B' stations whose income was to be derived from advertising. Both systems were still run almost wholly on private enterprise lines but the uneasy combination of public licensing for private gain in the case of the 'A' stations was to be rather short-lived. A Royal Commission, set up in 1927, proposed that the 'A' stations be replaced with a National Broadcasting Service (like the BBC) to operate alongside the 'B' stations, which would continue much as they were (Mackay 1957: 28-9). The commission's recommendations were adopted, but not in a straightforward manner. During 1928-9 the government through the Postmaster-General’s Department bought the 'A' stations from their licencees but it did not propose still to operate...
the national service as a state enterprise. Instead, the Postmaster-General called tenders for the provision of programmes, the successful tenderer being the Australian Broadcasting Company, a consortium of theatre companies, which worked with the Postmaster-General on the new service (Mackay 1957: 31-32). Again this arrangement was relatively shortlived for the ABCo.'s contract was not renewed in 1932. Instead, the Broadcasting Commission Act was passed and the Australian Broadcasting Commission acquired the twelve ABCo. stations. Technical control still remained with the Postmaster-General, as did nine shillings of the twenty-one shillings licence fee. Since the new ABC was a public commission rather than a government department, there was always some degree of independence from the government of the day and, though this was increased in 1942 (Mackay 1947: 49), it always remained a qualified freedom. The licence fee, originally thirty-five shillings but reduced when AWA patents expired, was, as with the BBC, never quite sufficient for the new commission's needs and though the 'A' stations had been allowed to carry some forms of advertising, the new ABC was not. Thus effectively the purse-strings were held by the Federal Government, as Dixon's 'inside' account makes clear (Dixon 1975). The conditions which made the independence of the BBC possible in Britain (q.v. Ch.3) did not exist in Australia due to the rather more diffuse nature of its ruling class, as indicated above. In Australia, the class fraction which pushed for the setting up of the ABC was rural capital, as represented by the Country Party. This fraction had a particular sectional interest to pursue: the provision of a broadcasting service in remote areas (Cole 1966: 21, Edgar 1979b: 215). Mackay claims that the ABC had a more 'democratic' approach to broadcasting than the BBC, in the sense that it attempted to provide 'something for everyone', rather than a programme of middle class culture (Mackay 1957: 66), and this too may be explained by the absence in Australia of a class or fraction which could supply an undisputed ideological leadership in terms
of an ethic of 'public service', as Williams (1974) argues, was the case in Britain. We may note that there are problems associated with Mackay's definition of democracy as the provision of 'something for everyone' but that is not immediately at issue here.

Though the ABC and the BBC are in many senses quite dissimilar, being based on differently structured ruling classes, and as a result making qualitatively different contributions to the structure of broadcasting in their respective social formations, they are often seen as related institutions. This is due to the relation of ideological domination between Britain and Australia which results in practices of 'emulation' etc. as seen in Chapter Five. 9

The commercial radio stations, whose revenue was, after 1924, entirely derived from advertising and the use of sponsored programmes, were owned by a variety of interests. As we have seen, AWA was an early licensee (cf. Ashbolt 1975: 184) but so was the Australian Labor Party which operated station 2KY in Sydney from 1925. There was also doubt concerning the financial viability of commercial radio; of the ninety-seven stations operating in 1941-42, forty-four were losing money (Mackay 1957: 114). However, when such factors as networking and the better organisation of advertising began to make radio a profitable venture, there was no shortage of investors to guarantee its future. Newspapers were one important group and remain so to the present day, but other sources of capital are in evidence (Ashbolt 1975: 184-186, Walker 1963: 13).

The creation of networks is explained by Mackay (Mackay 1957: 123), as partly an attempt to counter the ABC, but they are obviously more than this. The two most important networks, known as the 'Major' and 'Macquarie' networks were set up as a result of the activity of two United States-based advertising firms (Mackay 1957: 152). Thus, the networking of radio stations amounted to more than a simple
copying of an American organisational arrangement, it was a more direct result of the penetration of American capital into the Australian media industry.

There was government action in the 1940's to limit the size of networks to eight stations (Mackay 1957: 154) and it is perhaps as a result of this that the networks developed as 'co-operatives', whereby the stations control the networks rather than vice versa. Since the government embargo was on the ownership of stations in a network, this new arrangement permitted the effective control of a network by any block of up to eight stations (cf. Mackay 1957: 148-9). Mackay argues that the networks have had an almost uniformly positive effect on Australian radio broadcasting in 'raising standards' (p.150), providing country stations with city programmes (p.168) and he says that, in general:

... there is no doubt that network broadcasting serves Australians efficiently and effectively. (Mackay 1957: 168)

They also, however, provide for much easier exploitation of radio for commercial purposes, which is only arguably in the service of Australians, particularly since the advertising industry, as we saw in the last chapter, is largely controlled by United States capital.

Thus, the early years of Australian broadcasting may be understood in terms of the penetration of British and United States capital and the class structure of Australian society, itself partly a result of that penetration. This is not to deny that 'domestic' political, economic and ideological exigencies have been important, but it remains the case that these are, to varying degrees, conditioned by external factors. We may examine an example of partially autonomous development to illustrate this point.

The introduction of community radio in 1975 represents an explicit attempt to place control of some broadcasting apparatuses in the hands of the Australian community (q.v. Ch.7). However, even this
development, representing a fairly small adjustment to the structure of radio broadcasting, could not be made without taking into account the international nature of the broadcasting industry. As the report on public broadcasting to the Minister for the Media makes clear, the availability of wavelengths for new broadcasters is dependent on the manufacture of suitable receivers. It is technically possible to greatly increase the use of the existing medium-wave broadcast band, and thus provide for a more diverse media industry without displacing existing interests, if radio receiving sets of greater selectivity are used. However, there is very little manufacturing of radio sets carried out in Australia today, most sets being supplied by Japanese manufacturers (WPMM 1975: 13). These manufacturers do supply high-selectivity sets in countries such as West Germany, where there is an existing demand for them but, at a saving of a few cents, omit the necessary parts from sets sold in Australia. The problem for a government wishing to intensify the usage of the MW band is thus intensified by the need to secure the co-operation of foreign suppliers. The report to the minister suggests that this might be achieved by selective tariff policy, as indeed it might, but the point is that the pattern of public broadcasting is partly set by Australia's overseas suppliers of radios and thus cannot be seen as entirely a matter of domestic policy.

Secondly, and most importantly, here we may examine the case of the introduction of television into Australia. Again there is an interplay of domestic and international factors at work.

6.3 Australian Television: a Subordinate Apparatus

We have seen, briefly, that the broadcasting industry in Australia has developed partly as a result of, or a response to, the penetration of foreign capital. We may now examine the dimensions of this influence and its consequences for Australian television.
Firstly, the degree of actual shareholding in Australian broadcasting by overseas capital is quite small, and has been limited by various measures taken by the Federal Government. As noted above, NBC (through NBC International, Bermuda) and the British ATV company have fairly small shareholdings in a number of television companies. The Pye Company (now part of the multinational Philips combine) had, until recently, a rather more substantial investment, and a number of British newspaper firms own fairly small parcels of shares in several companies. This degree of ownership, if expressed as a percentage of the total, or placed on a rank order of the size of shareholding, does not appear to be terribly significant. Even when one takes into consideration the possibility that a 10 per cent shareholding may be sufficient to control a modern company with diffuse shareholding, this overseas ownership does not seem to be terribly significant, since it is set not against widely diffused small shareholders, but much larger blocks firmly in the hands of, for example, the newspaper combines.

In fact, the most obvious feature of commercial television in Australia is its ownership and control by the established media giants, the Press. This point is documented in virtually every account of the Australian media such as Ashbolt (1974); McQueen (1977); Western (1972); and is beyond dispute. This ownership is not confined to the metropolitan centres either, as the ABCB report on provincial and country areas makes clear (ABCB 1960). However, it would be unwise to dismiss the significance of the small overseas shareholding out of hand. Electronic Industries Pty Ltd (controlled by the Pye company) were the original licensees of GTV Melbourne and thus a founder member of the commercial television industry (ABCB 1960: 77). Though this interest was later sold to the Packer organisation (Hall 1976: 26), other small pockets of foreign capital remain. These may not be sufficient to control a company, but they still provide access to information etc., as well as some interest in the financial success of Australian television.
If Australian television companies are not dependent on overseas supplies of capital, they are so dependent for the supply of raw materials, programmes. They are also dependent to a large degree on overseas capital for revenue, to the extent that the companies who advertise on commercial television are foreign-owned. If we accept McQueen's account of the logic of Australian commercial television for a moment, we would see that it is determined by a fairly simple set of parameters. That things are not so simple or straightforward will be indicated below, but for the moment we may look at the basic principles of commercial broadcasting. Commercial television exists primarily to make a profit for its owners. Its revenue is obtained by selling 'time' in units of between twenty and sixty seconds to advertisers on the understanding that this 'time' holds the attention of several thousands of viewers, the numbers of which are estimated through the various techniques of 'ratings'. Thus, two types of selling, in a general sense, are involved in the operation of commercial television. A station must firstly 'sell' a product (the programme) to viewers, before it can actually sell its real product, 'advertising time', to its paying customers, the advertisers. The product 'sold' to viewers may be actually produced by the company concerned or merely distributed by them, in which case the television company acts as a sort of 'retailer'. In either event, as we saw in Chapter Five, the performance of this product is measured in terms of its cost/effectiveness in holding the attention (at whatever level) of the viewers. The unit CPTHPCM was referred to in Chapter Five as a typical measure of this performance (cf. Barnouw 1970: 114), and successful performance is inversely proportional to this index. It is therefore in the economic interests of the commercial television company to make, or acquire, and screen those programmes which attract the largest audience for the least cost and to arrange a sequence of such programmes in an attempt to retain the audience for a whole viewing period. It is this cost/effectiveness
Overseas-made programmes are firstly indisputably cheaper than locally-made equivalents, not because they are necessarily cheaper to make in the United States or in Britain, indeed this may well not be the case (SSC 1963: Vol.2: 49 ff), but because of the structure of the television programme market which is dominated by a few sellers. Barnouw documents Australia's entry into this market as a consumer of American telefilms. In 1956, the first year of operation for Australian commercial television, the United States networks CBS, NBC, MCA were selling films, which had already paid back their production costs by being televised in the United States, for up to $US3,000 per hour compared with an estimated local production cost of $US20,000 per hour (Barnouw 1970: 113-4)(cf. Read 1976).

A commercial venture such as broadcasting cannot go against the purchasing logic dictated by figures such as these and it has taken government action in the form of Australian content quotas to induce local TV drama production for commercial television. Though, as Hall (1976: 34) argues, there is some evidence, in the ratings success of the programme 'No. 96', of a demand for Australian content. The early quotas were set at a low level and were voluntary and non-specific. This meant that locally produced sporting programmes and quiz shows could make up the quota, while imported drama dominated prime time hours. This was modified in later years, with specific requirements being introduced, but from the very beginning Australian commercial television was dependent upon, and dominated by, the media imperialism metropolises. Breen (1975) suggests that Australia is 'attempting to sever the American Connection'. He comments:

Australia is hooked on United States programming, but is attempting to kick the habit. (Breen 1975: 183)

But he also notes that only the weaker recommendations of the 1973 Tariff Board Report were ever implemented. (Those concerning the 'points' system
for local productions and the setting up of the Film and Television
School, Breen 1975: 184-5). The suggestions that a bulk-buying pool
be established was not adopted.

Secondly, as well as the undisputed cheapness of United States and
British programming, we may discuss questions of fashion and taste, the
trends in which are largely set in the metropolises. In part, the idea
that everything new happens first in America or Britain is a product of
the sort of marketing described above. If American products are 'dumped'
in Australia at a price which discourages local production, and if the
market is dominated by established interests, making it difficult for new
entrants to compete without government protection, then it is hardly
surprising that the standards, trends and so on, are set by the big
sellers. Thus, even the limited degree of local production which is
carried out in Australia, tends to be largely imitative. Many local
television programmes are virtually carbon copies of American or British
formats in which only the names, the locales and the accents have been
changed. That there is some genuinely 'local culture' on Australian
television is not denied, but it tends to be in the minority.

I do not, however, wish to locate notions of 'fashion' and 'taste'
as mere epiphenomena of the economic region which underpins them. It
would seem that cultural imperialism may have a certain degree of autonomy
and even reciprocal effect on the economic. As an example of such an
effect, one might cite one of the factors leading to the introduction of
the BBC's Light programme, and eventually to commercial radio in Britain,
which was the popularity of American music and musical styles, as we saw
in Chapter Five. We might note also that the cultural dimension may
provoke state action in the regulation of broadcasting, as occurred in
Australia with the Vincent Committee's Report (SSC 1963), where concern
over the lack of Australian material on television prompted the imposition
of stricter quotas. The 'popular demand' for Australian drama (such as
'No. 96') may also be cited as evidence for the partial autonomy of culture
A further dimension of the subordination of Australian broadcasting apparatuses is to be found in the field of advertising. The importance of advertising for commercial broadcasting has already been referred to, but there are two important facets of this involvement pertinent to the media imperialism thesis. The first is that the forms and styles of advertising used in Australia are a cultural import, in the same way that television programmes or popular music are. The second is that the advertising industry is to a substantial degree made up of American firms and their subsidiaries. As we have seen, in Tunstall's estimate in 1974, of the ten largest advertising agencies in Australia, eight were wholly or partly American-owned (Tunstall 1977: 107) and, given the degree of foreign capital penetration in the economy generally, many agencies would also be working for British and American firms. It is this domination of the advertising industry, rather than direct ownership which vests a large degree of control of the Australian commercial television industry in the hands of (mainly United States) capital. The degree to which this control is actually exercised in the day-to-day running of television stations is probably minimal, but it is in the setting of parameters, rather than in detailed instruction, that this influence is felt.

In addition to these factors, we may note a related one concerning the world-wide dissemination of news. That this news is structured by an imperialist ideology, to the effect that events in the metropolises are deemed more important than any others, as attested to in Chapter Five, is readily apparent. The fact that the death of one Englishman or American appears to be as 'newsworthy' as the deaths of thousands of Africans or Asians is one example of this 'metrocentricity'. That this news is supplied by such agencies as Visnews, UPI TN, and CBS was indicated too in Chapter Five. Like the dominance of foreign programmes, this domination of news services is secured by economies of scale made possible by an historical supremacy, in this case founded in the days of newspapers.
With respect to this system of distribution of world news, Australia is more favourably placed than some other countries, reflecting its 'junior partner' status. Not only can it choose between the three major services, but it can also obtain material from cable news services (such as AAP or Reuters) and, on occasion, send its own crews to foreign locations. That these locations (London, Paris, New York) are chosen in the context of Australia's imperial connections, is to be expected, as is the fact that co-operation with the relevant local television services is required. The point is, however, that Australia is not in a position of total dependence when it comes to foreign news.

Neither is Australia in any sense a last and lowest link in the imperialist chain. Australia is an overseas broadcaster in its own right with particular emphasis being placed on broadcasts to Indonesia and South East Asia (Tunstall 1977: 131). We may note that Australian 'special correspondents' also report from these places from time to time. Australia is also, in a small way, an exporter of programmes to the metropolises, often as a result of co-productions with metropolitan broadcasting organisations, and, in recent years, the Australian feature film industry has shown some signs of revival, thanks to the investment of state funds (cf. SSC 1963: Proceedings, Sun-Herald 6/7/80).

Thus far, we have dealt mainly with the development of commercial television in Australia and its dependence on the system of media imperialism. However, we also need to consider the case of the ABC in both radio and television. Firstly, we should note that its television service is not particularly important in the main cities, from the point of view of its 'market share' and only slightly more popular in the country areas where there is often only one commercial channel. While the three commercial channels in Sydney and Melbourne strive to maximise their ratings at around 30 per cent of the viewing audience, the ABC tends to be seen by less than 15 per cent of all viewers. (See Appendix C).
In fact ABC television has always, in some senses, been a step behind the commercial channels. It began some months later than the commercials and is required to provide a number of uneconomical services. It did achieve country-wide coverage, which the commercial channels by their very nature have not, but, as a result of this, is heavily dependent on state funding (particularly since the licence fee was abolished in 1974). Not only does the ABC have to meet the costs of broadcasting to country areas, in terms of providing staff and facilities, but it must also pay more than the commercial channels for the programmes it imports, by virtue of its larger audience. Whereas the commercial networks pay, on average, $US5,000 for a one-hour telefilm for Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Adelaide (one run and 50 per cent repeats), the ABC must pay about 20 per cent more than this (ca. $US6,000 per hour). These prices are for 'prime-time' telefilms bought from United States distributors (Variety, 22/10/1975, cited in Read 1976: 71).

The ABC is also subject to a degree of outside control by ministers of the crown and has been perceived by a variety of governments as a politically useful apparatus. If we wanted to characterise its role, as it has evolved since its inception in 1932, it would be in terms of its carrying of 'middle-class culture' (cf. Connell 1977: Ch. 7).

It is the ABC, both in radio and television, which is the sole disseminator of classical music, the major purveyor of serious drama, documentaries, ballet, rugby union and so on. In fact, when the ABC was set up it was seen by many of its supporters (in the urban context: mainly middle-class liberals and intellectuals, see for example, the witnesses appearing before the 1927 Royal Commission on Wireless (RCW 1927)) explicitly as an antidote to the 'mass culture' commercialism of its commercial rivals.

It has been ambivalently nationalistic. At the same time imitative of the Reithian model of public service and defensive of a nascent Australian (high) cultural tradition. It is partly by nature, due to the class position of its staff, and partly by virtue of its subservience to
governments, overwhelmingly non-partisan, at once the only possible channel of non-establishment ideology on television and radio, and one of the principal vehicles of expression of that establishment.

It is, in many senses, an Ideological Apparatus of the State, but it is true to a degree that, as McQueen (1977) suggests (rather too strongly), it is also governed by some of the same ratings-oriented logic as commercial broadcasting. Since it is designed as a 'public service' institution it may be required to demonstrate that it is providing such a service in terms of the size of its audience. Thus, the output of ABC television may sometimes only be distinguished from that of the commercial channels by the absence of advertisements (except those which McQueen notes it makes for itself!) (McQueen 1977: 29n). Certainly the ABC is heavily dependent on foreign sources for its programmes, in much the same way as the commercial channels and, like them, much of its local content is made up of sports.

It would appear then that the ABC was set up for a number of reasons, but partly at the behest of the middle class wanting an alternative to commercialism and the government who sought to exploit the ideological potential of a national means of mass communication. (The interests of rural capital were also important, as indicated above.) Thus, it may be seen in part as a reaction against media imperialism, an apparatus controlled by the domestic bourgeoisie and new petty bourgeoisie. Certainly it is responsible for a substantial proportion of Australian television production and is not directly subject to the influence of the United States-controlled advertising industry.

6.4 Class Determination of Australian Broadcasting

We may now review the class character of the current system of broadcasting in Australia, from the point of view of the control of the apparatuses, and from that of the effects or functions of the system.
There are three factors to consider in the class control of Australian television broadcasting:

1) The question of 'ownership' of the commercial apparatuses.
2) The nature of the state and its 'ownership' of the ABC.
3) The class position of the management and creative staff of broadcasting apparatuses.

We will need to qualify the degree of influence of each of these factors according to three factors: their reciprocal influence on each other, the actions of other parties not directly concerned with broadcasting, and the structural limits within which these apparatuses must operate. Thus, the model set out here is necessarily somewhat simple but seeks to identify the most significant features.

6.5 Ownership of Commercial Television

As has been often remarked (and noted above), the ownership of Australian commercial television is largely vested in the hands of the already semi-monopolistic press (see Appendix B). Though other interests are represented in the shareholding of the commercial television companies, as set out above, overall we can say that the commercial broadcasting apparatuses are firmly in the hands of the domestic bourgeoisie, though, as was noted above, in close co-operation with foreign capital. We may note that this dominance has been achieved partly as a result of the financial strength of the newspapers, which has enabled them to buy and control potential opposition, and partly as a result of government action prohibiting overseas control of broadcasting by limiting the amount of foreign shareholding (cf. ABCB 1960: 89 and passim).

From the point of view of individual enterprises, monopoly is prohibited, since no one firm may own more than one station in any one
metropolitan area (i.e., in any one city), more than four stations in any one state and so on (Royal Commission 1954: 780). From a slightly more general perspective, however, an effective monopoly or near monopoly exists, in the commercial media industry, since the ownership of its various apparatuses is concentrated in a few, essentially similar, hands. Further considerations of monopoly are raised by the fact that entry to this industry is restricted, in that only those operators who are licensed by the Post Office (PMG) may broadcast.

Commercial television is then substantially owned by the domestic bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{15} Such nationalist independence as this might confer is, however, limited by the fact that much of the revenue of these apparatuses is channelled through the United States-owned advertising agencies, and that they must, for reasons outlined above, obtain much of their raw material, the programmes, from foreign sources. These apparatuses exist primarily to make money for their own owners and any ideological role they perform, apart from that of selling, must take second place to this. This is perhaps illustrated by the fact that, despite control of the apparatuses by a domestic bourgeoisie, they have been unable to increase the Australian content of television without government prodding, because of the costs involved in doing so (see for example, SSC 1963).\textsuperscript{16} This is not to imply, however, that no more general ideological role is performed by the commercial apparatuses, merely to suggest that this takes place within limits set by the relations of production of commercial television. As Nixon puts it:

There are economic realities concerning the functioning of the media industry which have implications for the media's psychosocial effects. Monopoly ownership of several organs of communication - newspapers, radio station and television channel, for instance - may not only reduce the variety of messages that users receive, but may ensure that these organs speak with a united voice and promote a consistent set of values. (Nixon 1972: 194)
'Ownership' of the Australian Broadcasting Commission is vested in the state and it is controlled by its commissioners who are appointed by the government in power. There is a sense in which the 'ownership' of the ABC is a qualitatively different sort of phenomenon from that of the commercial stations, since it is difficult to conceive of this apparatus as constituting part of the means of production. Its role has very little connection with the production of, or the realisation or distribution of surplus value in any direct sense at all. Rather the ABC is an ideological apparatus which may be controlled by the class(es) or fraction(s) 'in charge of' the state. The commission's nominal controllers, the commissioners, in many senses epitomise the hegemonic role assigned to the ABC. They tend to be senior public servants, clergy, and other 'pillars of society', though until recently a measure of 'industrial democracy' had been attained with the (temporary) inclusion of an ABC staff representative; in other words, a collection of figures well chosen to present the 'alter' ideology of the classes in charge of the state and the ruling class generally, without appearing to do so. The commissioners may be likened to the directors of a capitalist enterprise, in that, although they may not 'own' the apparatus, they do represent the interests of its 'owners' and are in principle appointed by those 'owners'.

However, the result of this delegation, together with the role performed by the staff of the apparatus and its structural determination, is that the ABC is not merely a tool or instrument in the hands of the governing class any more than is, for example, the CSIRO or the Elizabethan Theatre Trust. But it is not an independent apparatus, operated by its new petty bourgeois staff (see below), entirely in their own interests either. The history of the ABC contains a long tradition of manipulation by governments, and opposition to this on the part of its staff, generally without success. For some published examples of this going back to the early years in radio we may refer to Dixon's
'inside account' (Dixon 1975; e.g., p.133), though, by the very nature of such conflicts, much of the evidence for them remains unsubstantiated. We may also, however, refer to evidence given by one of the ABC's commissioners in person, detailing five years of involvement by Labor and L.-NCP governments in the running of the ABC (Harding 1979: Part One) (see also Chapter Seven)

6.7 The Staff of Broadcasting Apparatuses

The staff of the broadcasting apparatuses, taken as a whole, is obviously a rather diverse ensemble. On the one hand, the top level management would be members of the bourgeoisie proper, in the same way as the directors of the economic apparatuses are, and at the other extreme, the cleaners, office staff and lower-grade technicians would be virtually indistinguishable from the working class. In between these two extremes however, we may locate many of the key personnel in terms of the shaping of the apparatus' output: the acting, production, direction and senior technical staff who, as we saw in Chapter Two, are members of the new petty bourgeoisie. It is this group whose distinctive stamp lies on the output of television stations and which, within the parameters set by the structural position of the apparatuses and the directions of their owners, determines the ideological content of the media message. It is the centrality of this ensemble and the role which it plays in the detailed operation of the apparatuses which make the electronic media repositories of middle-class culture (cf. Connell 1977: Ch.9, esp. pp.194-5, 204).

This grouping is itself not an homogenous one however. Indeed, given the complex determination of the new petty bourgeoisie, as outlined in Chapter Two, it could not be expected to be so. It does, however, have distinctive and pertinent features which affect the nature of broadcasting and, to a certain extent, the ideological practices
prescribed by the apparatuses of broadcasting are chosen by that
category within the new petty bourgeoisie that I have called 'ideologues'
(Ch.2). They are not necessarily the practices of this class, since
much of the output of television is directed at 'the masses', the accuracy
of this direction being assessed by the various ratings schemes.

In this regard, the distinction made by Therborn and reviewed in Chapter
Four, between 'ego' and 'alter' ideology is apposite (Therborn 1977).

To grasp the essential fact about Australian broadcasting, at the risk
of great oversimplification, we might say that the ABC is run by new
petty bourgeois ideologues for consumption by the new petty bourgeoisie
and the commercial channels by the new petty bourgeois ideologues for the
'popular' masses. To say in this way that a service is run for a
particular segment of the population implies only that it is designed
for consumption by them and not that it is provided for their benefit
in any stronger sense of the term. We may note that this distinction,
between a 'high-brow' and a 'popular' apparatus, need not be made on
wholly subjective grounds, as Namenwirth and Bibbee demonstrate, in
the case of 'prestige' and 'mass' newspapers, with the aid of Bernstein's
concepts of elaborated and restricted speech codes:

(Like Speech) Newspapers also exhibit either a restricted
or an elaborated code for conveying their messages. It
is our hypothesis that 'mass newspapers' use a restricted
code while 'prestige newspapers' use an elaborated speech
code. (Namenwirth and Bibbee 1975: 51)

We do need to be careful, however, as Swingewood points out
(Swingewood 1977: 107 ff.), not to exaggerate this distinction.

Thus we may summarise, within the limits specified above, the
nature of the class control of Australian broadcasting apparatuses.
This is similar to that practised in other social formations,
especially capitalist ones, but with a uniquely Australian content.
That is, we are dealing with the Australian bourgeoisie and the
Australian new petty bourgeoisie etc., with their own unique histories, interests and capabilities.

6.8 The Practices of Australian Broadcasting: A General Overview

In previous chapters, I have noted the general contribution which broadcasting may make to the ideological structure of social formations and some of the main parameters which act to shape this contribution. We may now examine the end-result, as it were, of these determining processes by looking at the nature of Australian television programming.

We may note firstly the predominance of foreign programmes, the reasons for which were dealt with in the previous chapter. In 1963, the Senate Select Committee, 'For the Encouragement of Australian Productions for Television' (SSC 1963) (known as the Vincent committee after its chairman) found that, of all programmes on Australian commercial television (not including advertisements), only 39 per cent were of local origin (SSC 1963: 442). In the 'drama' category, which according to the ABCB Annual Report for 1963 occupied 54.5 per cent of the transmission time of commercial television stations in the main cities, by far the largest category of programmes, less than 2 per cent was of Australian origin. Various measures were advocated by witnesses to remedy this situation, such as the provision of a subsidy for local production, the imposition of a tariff on imported programmes and so on (SSC 1963: Part Two, passim) but, in fact, such changes as have occurred have been rather more gradual and very little was done by way of state regulation. The local television production industry has survived however, and gradually become more healthy, so that fifteen years after the Vincent report the proportion of locally-produced television in all categories of programme is rather higher and, as recent reports suggest, a large proportion of the expenditure of television stations is in buying Australian productions (The Canberra Times, 10/7/78). However, given
the small size of the Australian market, the viability of the production industry, containing as it does several independent production companies (of which the best known is probably Crawford Productions), is dependent on its being able to achieve full junior partner status and become an exporter in its own right. Co-productions with organisations such as the BBC, British commercial production companies, and others, have been seen as one move towards achieving this. These programmes are broadcast in the countries of both of the producers and added to the sales lists of the metropolitan company with established export networks. A limited amount of direct Australian exporting to, for example, New Zealand, has also been achieved and, one presumes, will continue. Further, the Feature Film Industry has revived somewhat of late, as the beneficiary of State and Federal governments and, though it does not approach its former status, it does represent a growth area in the ideology industry. (Australia produced the world's first feature-length film and had a flourishing industry until bought out by United States capital in the 1920's and 1930's.) (Perry 1975: 117)

Whatever the dimensions of the penetration of Australian television broadcasting by overseas products, which perhaps should be put into perspective by comparison with less-developed countries (see de Cardona (1975) for an account of media imperialism in Columbia), it is the consequences of this cultural imperialism which are ultimately of greater interest in an analysis of the Australian social formation. In short, what is the significance of this foreign-fired ideological bombardment for Australians? We have seen the processes of imperialism of which it is one symptom, but we need to ask what is its specific effect?

However, though we may ask this question, and indeed produce a number of partial and hypothetical answers to it, we cannot, in my opinion, expect to produce any definitive answers, given the current state of media research, as reviewed in Chapter One. We may demonstrate that the importation of television programmes stunts the development of a local
production industry (within the limits of a counter-factual argument) (see for example, evidence provided by H. Crawford, SSC 1963: Part Two), an important effect in its own right, but we are not really in a position to separate out the ideological effect of foreign programming from the multitude of other ideological practices and rituals which are carried out by its viewers. We can state, with some confidence, that this programming does not provide much information relevant to an understanding of Australian society and culture (except at a fairly low level) and tends to misinterpret the nature of its society of origin. We cannot, however, easily gauge the degree of dramatic licence imputed by its viewers. We are not in a position to assess accurately the extent to which the viewers of these foreign programmes (or indeed of Australian productions) evaluate, interpret and translate the view of the world which is presented to them in their living rooms. We can say that they do not accept it 'verbatim', as it were, but rather insert it into the whole ensemble of their ideological practices, and measure it against the 'output' of other ideological apparatuses and their own view and experience of the world as structured by those apparatuses. We can, in short, demonstrate some of the processes at work in the building up of agents' ideologies, but cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, evaluate the contribution of any one of these practices to the end result.

With these reservations in mind, we may examine the content of Australian television further, in terms of what sort of ideological practices it prescribes. Though we may not be able to accurately ascertain the degree to which these prescriptions are 'taken as directed', we can see the prescription as a sociological key to the prescribing apparatus and as an integral part of our description of the apparatuses of broadcasting. With this in mind, we may ask: 'What are the themes/rituals/practices of Australian television?'
They may be divided into a number of categories, as is done by the ABCB for example, (Serious Drama, Drama, Light Entertainment, News, etc.), though, again, the degree to which these classifications are employed by viewers is problematic; or into sections according to the aspect of 'life' which is presented (Family Life, Race and Ethnicity, Crime and Deviance, Politics, etc.), or according to the manner in which they provide answers to the questions of What is? What is Possible? and What is Good? We will examine aspects of these classifications below, but firstly we need to take account of a perhaps more basic distinction, between the programmes as such and the advertising which, on the commercial channels, pays for them.

6.9 Advertising

Advertisements are worthy of some separate treatment here because the great majority of them prescribe a clearly identifiable and relatively simple ritual, which we might call 'consuming'. While the measurement of consumption patterns may not give an exact index of the efficacy of advertisements, it is at least a much simpler operation than that required to assess the impact of, for example, violence. The behaviour an advertisement is intended to induce is a fairly simple one: to buy a certain product, rather than an alternative product or no product at all, and the techniques for assessing the success of advertising are at least developed enough to allow the commercial viability of advertising agencies. Similarly, the techniques of making television commercials, in terms of technical skill (of film-making etc.) are probably among the most sophisticated in the industry. While techniques such as subliminal suggestion may be formally illegal, there is some evidence that they are occasionally employed and there are many other, similarly sophisticated psychological devices employed in the cause of selling. Research into the 'effect' of television commercials is also a rather
more sophisticated enterprise than similar research into programmes, but then the parameters are rather different. Television commercials are typically ten to thirty seconds in duration (though sixty and ten second or less advertisements are not rare); they are seen not once but several times often during the course of one 'evening's viewing' and their impact is measured in terms of relatively simple, short-term behaviour; buying the advertised product. Research into the relationship between eye-movement and memory retention would be almost unbelievably esoteric applied to television drama (and probably not very informative given the relative durations involved) but it is not at all out of place when one is attempting to make the most out of a $1,000 per minute time slot with a production budget of many times that amount (for an account of eye-movement research see Krugman 1965).

Though television advertisements take up only 8-9 per cent of the transmission time of commercial stations in Australia (the calculation being based on five minutes of paid advertising in every hour, not including trailers, station commercials etc.) and their short-term efficacy appears demonstrable, i.e., they do sell, or at the very least are believed to sell, products; some consideration may also be given to the secondary, more general ideological theme of advertisements.

As well as the selling of particular products, some authors (for example, Williams 1974; McQueen 1977; Tunstall 1977) point to the fact that they also contribute to a general celebration of consumerism. They form as it were, the litany of the high mass consumption society, the hymn and the prayer of consumerism. And, as such, they have been roundly criticised, by the traditional purveyors of hymns and prayers, by the liberal intelligentsia of the new petty bourgeoisie, and by the Frankfurt school 'marxists' such as Marcuse (cf. *One Dimensional Man*, 1964, q.v. Enzensberger 1970: 18-19). They have also been criticised for the particular themes and values they promote. Along with
motherhood and the Australian way are sold alcohol, patent medicines, sexism, racism (cf. Culley and Bennett 1975), selfish individualism and a host of other temptations and vices which bourgeois ideology otherwise treats as anathema. Here however, we are getting into the area of the more general ideological rituals of television which are present in the programmes as well, and indeed may be said to constitute them.

6.10 Capitalism Rules - O.K.?

Interspersed with advertisements on commercial television, as some would say, are the programmes, and it is to the nature of these that we may now turn. My remarks will of necessity be of a general kind, a detailed analysis of particular programmes or sets of programmes is beyond the scope of this present work, but will, I hope, nonetheless be an accurate portrayal of the ideological prescription filled by Australian television.

Firstly we may say, as noted above, that the ideology presented by television in Australia, falls into two broad categories; ego and alter ideology. The alter ideology, which as I have suggested above is designed explicitly to reach the popular masses, while not the sole preserve of the commercial channels, is certainly concentrated there. It is 'designed' to do two things, to provide for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production in a general sense, and to stimulate consumption, of consumer goods which is a particular case of this general process.

The ego ideology presented is largely that of the new petty bourgeoisie, the 'middle classes', and is most clearly presented by the ABC, an organisation which, as we have seen, was set up partly as a result of pressure from segments of the new petty bourgeoisie. It must be remembered, however, lest a pluralist model of society be implied,
that the n-p-b is itself a subordinant class and its ideology, while often critical of many aspects of Australian society, does not challenge the fundamental premises of that system which it holds as self-evident. Thus, there is nothing inconsistent in the fact that the n-p-b, in disseminating its ego ideology is in fact putting forward a version of the ruling ideology. In fact, the operation and 'output' of the ABC is fairly strictly controlled by statute and by the state and, being directly dependent on the Federal government for its funds, cannot afford to step too far out of line, should it want to (cf. Harding 1979: Chs. 1-3).

How then does Australian television operate as an Ideological Apparatus? In short, by providing statements of what is, what is possible and what is right, good, etc., which aim at the reproduction of the relations of production of 'junior partner capitalism'.

These statements may, of course, take many forms. They range in subtlety from the sublime to the quite blatant and among them we may find a number of exceptions to the general rule. We may not assume either that the prescription is necessarily 'swallowed' though there is evidence that much of it is (Cohen 1976; Goldsen 1975: 45; Keating and Latané 1976), but we can examine a few of the ways in which these statements are presented. If we ask: 'How do various television programmes provide statements in support of capitalism?' we can identify a number of strategic themes which recur in different guises in a whole range of television discourse.

1) Drama

Firstly, and perhaps most pervasive, is the ideology of individualism. The theme of the individual protagonist, using his or her individual skills to provide comic relief, overcome the forces of evil, whether these be represented by 'criminals' or 'spies' etc., to rise above his origins and to combat the facelessness of collectivism, is probably the single most common motif in all forms
of modern western literature, let alone television. The reduction of all social and political issues to the level of individual, psychologised conflict is so pervasive that we tend to take it for granted. And yet it is not inevitable, as the few exceptions which exist will demonstrate.24

As well as the reduction of political conflict to the individual level, a process which occurs in non-fiction news and documentaries as much as it does in fiction, a large proportion of television eschews the political altogether and presents a glossy family-situation-fantasy model of the world which, while probably not corresponding very closely to its viewers experiences, nevertheless presents a coherent view of what is possible - within 'the system'. In the rare cases of 'social drama' which seek to deal with political issues at something other than an individual level and which may even hint at the structural roots of social problems, a number of devices are commonly employed to defuse the political significance of what is presented. The most common of these is the setting of the 'action' of the drama either in an historical period or a 'foreign' place so that any implications for political action are rendered indirect at the very least. The viewer is, of course, free to contrast this picture of past and foreign with the rather more glowing account of contemporary times contained in much of the remaining programming. The 'foreignness' of these settings is, of course, compounded in Australia, where the majority of television programmes are imported in the first place.

There are, of course, many other ways in which television drama may act to reinforce the status quo. Authority and status distinctions may be legitimised by their reproduction on the small screen and the forces of law and order are nightly glamourised and 'licensed to kill'. As Goldsen comments:
Credentials, uniforms and guns merit deferential treatment on prime-time television programmes. (Goldsen 1975: 44)

2) News and Documentaries

Volumes have been written on the production of, and selection and distribution in television news presentation and documentary production (see for example, GMG 1976; Elliott 1972; Murdoch et al. 1970). Though Australian analyses of a similar character are hard to find (cf. Sgro 1974), I see no reason why the Australian newsroom should be qualitatively different from its American or British counterpart, except in that Australian television news probably carries more 'foreign' news than either of them, for reasons discussed in the previous chapter. Again, we may make a slight distinction between the ABC and the commercial stations, in terms of the selection and presentation of news, in that the latter tend to emphasise 'sensational' and 'human interest' items, but the distinction is by no means clear cut.

News, by its very nature, is involved in defining what is (i.e., what is 'newsworthy') and by a variety of means, what is possible and what is good. Evaluation of the news in terms of its 'fairness' or 'accuracy' must be secondary beside its 'selectivity', the items it chooses to bring to our attention, and its record in this is clear. To take the example of the reporting of industrial conflict as one instance, there are several analyses available of its pro-management, anti-labour bias, often presented in terms of essentially irrelevant criteria such as 'reasonableness', or meaningless ones such as 'the national interest' (= whose interest?) (cf. Hyman 1972), but apart from this, the very fact that capital-labour conflict is 'newsworthy' tells us a great deal about the assumption of harmony of interests which such events are deemed to violate.
The reporting of crime and deviance as 'news' has received much attention by sociologists (see Chapter One) and deservedly so, since this material forms such an integral part of news fare in Australia just as much as in Britain. This theme has numerous points to make: we need a strong police force; other people are not to be trusted; the ills of our society are largely the product of a few deranged individuals; private property is sacred and so on. To say that its effect is therefore to divert attention from the real problems of Australian society, class exploitation, racism etc., is perhaps to make a number of unwarrantable assumptions, not least about the receptiveness/gullibility of the audience and one's grounds for saying what is or is not a real problem, but the fact remains that an alternative selection of 'newsworthy' items is possible. I do not propose to review here the argument that this news is what people want to hear, except to point out that 'they' have very little choice in the matter.

3) Televiewing as a Practice

Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of the content of television programming, we may examine the nature of television viewing per se. We have seen in Chapter Three how television was designed as a 'consumer durable' to be sold on a one (or more) set per home, receiver only, basis and the various forces which acted to produce this state of affairs. We may ask though what are the consequences, in terms of the nature of the ideological practices of television watching, of this arrangement?

The relative passivity and separateness of the viewers is one such consequence. It is a factor which leads writers such as Williams (1974) to doubt the appropriateness of the usage 'mass medium' since it is only rarely that radio and television have been used to address groups significantly larger than family-household units.
The exception Williams cites is that of street-corner radio in Nazi Germany (Williams 1974: 24) but a few others exist, for example, television in hotel bars etc. In this regard, television is similar to books and newspapers and unlike the cinema, church, demonstrations and rallies etc. Though common to millions of people, television is not a 'shared experience' in the true sense of the word. Thus, despite the centralised distribution of television, its reception is diffuse and not directly productive of feedback to its producers, its 'impact' is problematic and subject to a potentially infinite variety of interpretations. Its effect as a mass medium, as in the case of an advertisement designed to make millions buy a certain product, is dependent on harmonising these individual responses.

We may also note that this aspect of modern television acts to reinforce the privatisation and individualism of agents which is characteristic of a capitalist social formation. While not wishing to subscribe totally to the argument which suggests that while the proletariat are at home watching television, the bourgeoisie may rest easily in their beds, I think it is fair to regard this aspect of television viewing as a contributory factor, along with others such as suburbanisation, affluence and so on, in the depoliticisation of the working class.

Television as a passive, receiver-only medium may not create apathy but it may well reinforce it, and be a response to it, part of a larger process of the 'bureaucratisation' of everyday life which is a feature of modern capitalism (cf. Briggs 1960; on the commercialisation of other forms of popular entertainment such as football — for a critique of this notion of 'bureaucratisation' see Frankel 1978).
There are numerous other features of television programming in Australia to which we could point as evidence for the role of television as an Ideological Apparatus, engaged in the reproduction of capitalist relations of production and carried out largely under the direction of new petty bourgeois ideologues. The broadcasting of church services, sporting events (circuses?), travelogues and quiz shows may all be seen as both symptomatic and supportive of a bourgeois ruling ideology. Real's study of the American 'Super Bowl' (Football Final) shows for example, how a televised sporting fixture carries 'expressions of values and functions of the larger social structure' (Real 1975: 31), and in particular:

North American (and Australian?) professional football is an aggressive, strictly regulated team game fought between males who use both violence and technology to gain control of property for the economic gain of individuals within a nationalistic entertainment context ... Rather than mere diversionary entertainment, it can be seen to function as a 'propaganda' vehicle, strengthening and developing the larger social structure. (Real 1975: 42) (my insertion)

Though the n-p-b may support various versions of nationalism, they also contribute to the subordination of Australia to cultural and media imperialism. Fashions, trends and standards of quality are all set from overseas, and in the pursuit of 'quality' (in art for example), this state of affairs is reproduced by these new petty bourgeois agents.

6.11 Television and Other Ideological Apparatuses

Finally, in this account of the nature of television broadcasting in Australia, we may attempt to assess its overall significance and its relation to other institutions and apparatuses. Firstly, there is no doubt that, in many senses, television occupies a prominent place in the lives of most Australians. In terms of the distribution of set ownership (90+ per cent of homes have TV), average number of hours spent viewing etc., there can be no doubt that television is a prominent force
in our society. But, equally clearly, it does not act alone; there are other apparatuses engaged in comparable rituals and practices which we may not discount. For example, the education system, particularly primary and secondary schools, is quite obviously involved in a continuous interaction with television via its pupils. Reports of children spending as much (if not more) time watching television as they spend at school (e.g., ABCB 1976: 40-41) are reasonably common, and the question of which exerts the stronger influence on the 'developing mind' is a vexed one. We should bear in mind though that the influence of the school is direct, controlled and relatively specific compared with that of television and should therefore be in a stronger position, other things being equal.

The interaction of television with other mass media should also be taken into account. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the press and television are closely linked in Australia, and one would assume that, at least in some senses, these apparatuses tend to reinforce each other, though the style of presentation in each medium will produce significant differences. But there are several other important ideological apparatuses at work in Australia: radio, cinema, publishing, churches, political parties and so on which may not prescribe the same rituals as does the bulk of television.

To take the three mass media cases first (radio, cinema, and publishing), it can be seen that, although their structural role as ideological apparatuses is similar, the class control is not identical and there are important differences in the way in which their respective messages are consumed.

Though radio tends to be owned by much the same class fraction as controls television, its ownership is rather more diffuse (to be expected since there are far more radio than television stations) and extends to groups such as those which operate campus/community/ethnic radio, who are effectively excluded from operating television stations.
at present. Thus, while some radio is 'more commercial than commercial television' there are alternatives which do not exist in television. The use of radio by its 'listeners' is also rather different from the use of television by its viewers. Radio has largely been supplanted by television (and Hi-Fi?) as the main source of 'living room' entertainment, but its go-anywhere flexibility and relative cheapness (radios can be bought for under $5) ensured it a continuing role.

We are not, I think, in a position to quantitatively evaluate the relative 'impact' of radio and television but we may point out that both may be effective ideological apparatuses in their own way. Attempts at such an evaluation have been made, such as Cohen's analysis of radio and television coverage of an Israeli election campaign, but this succeeds only in demonstrating that differences between the two media exist and cannot quantify these differences in any meaningful way. Significantly Cohen's investigations were conducted in a laboratory setting and thus contain an element of artificiality, though it is difficult to see how else one could proceed in this direction (Cohen 1976: 29-36; see also Keating and Latane 1976).

The cinema may be seen as another ideological apparatus whose former greatness has been eclipsed and eroded by the advent of television, though the extent to which television is responsible for the decline of the cinema is open to question (cf. Bogart 1960: Ch.8, 163). We may note that, if anything, the cinema is even more locked into the media imperialism nexus than television, with both production and distribution being largely United States-owned and controlled. As with radio, the cinema has close connections with television, many of its products being sold 'second-hand' to television or, especially in the United States, the same company may produce material for both cinema and television. The cinema is no longer the pre-eminent mass
medium that it once was but its ideological influence should not be
discounted because of that. Like radio, but for rather different
reasons, the cinema has a much more flexible criterion for what
counts as a successful product and is not so strictly bound to the main-
stream of the ruling ideology.

Publishing is a qualitatively different sort of mass medium.
Though it is at one level a sales-conscious, big business type of
endeavour, it is not thereby constrained to publish only material
supportive of the ruling ideology. There is nothing uncommon about
a multi-million dollar publishing house making money from the sale of
books on, for example, Marxism.

Though the mass market in publishing may be controlled largely
by the large publishing houses, there are many smaller ones with a
wide variety of political and ideological affiliations, though
generally with rather small readerships.

We may also consider the role of, for example, churches and
political parties as ideological apparatuses which act alongside,
though not necessarily in harmony with, television. These apparatuses
too are purveyors of answers to the questions what is, what is possible,
and what is right, partly in association with the mass media (via e.g.,
party political and religious broadcasts) and partly by their own
organisation (meetings, services etc.). Other potential rivals to
television as an ideological apparatus include, for example, the
commercial music industry, the fine-artistic establishment, organised
spectator sport and so on. This reinforces Althusser's comment that
whereas there is usually only one, unified Repressive State Apparatus
there is a plurality of ideological apparatuses in any social formation
(Althusser 1971: 145). That these do not act entirely independently
of each other, in a way which might tend toward a mutual cancelling of
effect, is ensured, according to Althusser, by their common involvement
with the dominant ideology (ibid.) and, we may add, by the commonality
of their class control.
Thus, there is a very real problem of specificity involved in the assessment of the importance of television in the Australian social formation. Is it possible to rank the relative influences of these different apparatuses? Let us examine a few of the problems involved in doing this.

1) Firstly, there is the question of duration versus intensity of effect. (The dimensions McLuhan refers to as hot-cold, McLuhan 1964: Ch.2). A book may lack the multi-sensory appeal of a film but is available at the user's convenience and may be 're-experienced' virtually at will.

2) Since it is very difficult to quantitatively evaluate works within one medium; apart from the very crude ratings or sales measurements, which tell us nothing about the impact of the work concerned; it is also difficult to rank different items presented in different media. The debate over whether the book is better than the film is an example of this. Can we decide whether a thirty-second television advertisement is more powerful than a consumer affairs journal, and if we could, would this hold true for all viewers and readers?

3) Could we agree on a criterion of effect? What would make one medium more important than another? The magnitude of its distribution is one obvious measure but by no means a sufficient one. The association between the media message and subsequent modified behaviour on the part of its consumers is another possibility, it is in fact the principle underlying much of the discussion of the effect of television violence on children, but it can only address the question of modification, whereas reinforcement of the status quo is equally important, and it does not easily escape the methodological problem of isolating a specific effect.
We could go on to list many more problem areas involved in measuring the specific effect of television on its viewers (cf. Ball 1976), but for the moment it is sufficient to point out that such an exercise is by no means straightforward. A research strategy to illuminate these empirical problems could perhaps be designed but it would have to be radically different to those of the orthodox paradigm of media research reviewed in Chapter One (including Ball 1976).

6.12 Conclusion

We may account, then, for the main features of the development and present functioning of broadcasting in Australia, by paying attention to the structure of the social formation and its relations with other social formations qua imperialism. The key variables of structure and class have been used throughout this analysis to present a sociological account of the apparatuses of broadcasting. To summarise the picture of Australian broadcasting which has been built up in these pages we may list briefly the main factors.

1) Television is an ideological apparatus, as it exists at the moment its function in the reproduction of the relations of production allies it quite closely with the state.

2) Its actual structure is the product of a particular history, understood as a struggle between competing classes and class fractions.

3) The development of television in Australia was not spontaneous or local but imposed by the imperialist metropolises and kept in a dependent position by this imperialism.

4) While the effects of this television are problematic, television itself, as an effect of the processes mentioned above, is not. It can be located in the structures of a social formation, given
a sociological nature. It is my contention that this would then enable us to look afresh at the problem of 'effects'.

The final chapter of this thesis is an attempt to take up, in a more specific fashion, the question of the determination, by class and structure, of Australian broadcasting. In examining the developments in broadcasting of the last decade, my analysis is given its most concrete and specific application.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER SIX

1 Leaving aside here the question of 'convictism' as a different mode of production. The development here refers to Australia's colonial development.

2 For a discussion of the alliance of fractions which make up the Australian bourgeoisie see Playford (1970) and Connell (1977: Ch.5). Though neither of these authors would necessarily share my framework, both point to the diversity of elements which make up the ruling or dominant class. We should recall too that fractions are 'conjunctural' rather than entirely 'pre-given' (q.v. Ch.2).

3 I refer particularly to the effects of post-war immigration. The creation of a 'labour aristocracy', as argued for by Collins (1975), is one example of this effect.

4 Understood again as Australia's white history.

5 The nature of the link with the United Kingdom provided for the emergence of a (short-lived) class of officer-capitalists for example. Thus, a specific and, at the time, very important feature of Australia's social structure was forged directly by the nature of the imperial connection.

6 With the provisos concerning the specific character of production in the early colonial days which were referred to earlier.

7 Closer, in fact to RCA than to the BBC.

8 As it was in the United States where AT&T attempted a sealed set system in an attempt to find a way around its 1920 agreement with RCA (Reich 1977: 225). In Britain a form of sealed set system was in use, sets were made which could only receive the BBC (Curnow 1963: 100).

9 We may note that there are also close parallels between the Australian system of broadcasting and the Canadian one. Not only do these formations share links with Britain (and, in different ways, the U.S.), but they also both have to deal with the problems of distance and servicing remote areas (cf. Hull 1959).

10 The Broadcasting Control Board who heard the initial applications for commercial television licences, enforced restrictions on foreign ownership, and subsequent legislation attempted to give this permanence (Hall 1976: 23-24). The Broadcasting and Television Act (as amended) is not retrospective however, enabling the Herald and Weekly Times group to control more than the specified number of stations, see Appendix B.

11 The precise degree of control could only be established after quite detailed empirical investigation.

12 And often racist.

13 These figures are necessarily approximate since: a) being the result of competition they are constantly changing; b) an average figure is rather meaningless. For a discussion of ratings see SSC (1963). See also Appendix C.
Connell is discussing newspapers, rather than broadcasting, but his argument can be extended to cover radio and television, especially the ABC.

That is, if we count the International News Ltd. empire of Rupert Murdoch as Australian in origin.

Once a demand for such programmes was 'discovered,' though, this reluctance to screen Australian material disappeared. See above.

This is not to suggest that the commercial stations are not also ideological apparatuses, merely that they have a commercial, economic role in a way which the ABC does not (cf. McQueen 1977: 19-20).

The relative cost of these must be taken into account however.

That is we may, in the manner of much content analysis research (q.v. Ch.1), infer characteristics of the communicators from the nature of the message more easily than we can assess the effects of that message (cf. Budd et al 1967: Ch.1).

To put this into perspective, how many sociological consultancies could be commercially viable?

Subliminal suggestion refers to the inclusion of single frame images showing desirable objects or situations in a sequence advertising a product, where the inserted frame is not discernible by the naked eye or conscious mind but is retained by the subconscious and associated with the advertised product. Sexual imagery is most commonly associated with this technique.

The evidence I have for this comes from a study conducted in Eastern New South Wales, by sociologists. Since the practice is illegal, a written account of it in any detail would be in principle, libellous, so I will refrain from providing one here.

That is, the bourgeois alter ideology preaches restraint in these matters. What is actually practised by members of the bourgeoisie is a different matter.

Exactly which programmes count as exceptions in this regard is open to argument. One which I would suggest qualifies is the series entitled 'Days of Hope'. The radio programme 'Broadband' may be another example.

It is much easier for film-makers to recoup production costs over a period of time than is the case with television. Radio has much lower costs.

Althusser of course refers to them as Ideological State Apparatuses, see Chapter Four.
CHAPTER SEVEN
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING IN THE SEVENTIES

In the previous chapter, I sought to delineate some of the historical and societal determinants of Broadcasting in Australia and to locate Australia in the system of 'media imperialism'. Having done this, we may turn to an examination of some aspects of the recent history of Australian broadcasting, as these are illuminated by the concepts developed above. This chapter then, attempts a brief historical analysis of a particular set of apparatuses, located in a particular social formation: focussing in particular on the class determination of broadcasting apparatuses and practices, and how different forms of this determination were associated with changes of political regime. In particular, we will examine the nature and alignment of class forces in Australia during the seventies; the ways in which changes in this configuration underlay the changes in political regime which took place and the ways in which developments in the field of broadcasting can be related back to these broader factors.

Consistent with the form of argument in previous chapters, we cannot really understand developments in broadcasting independently of the history of the social formation in general. Thus, we need to know something of the broader political developments which occurred in Australia in the 1970's and the shifting balance of forces underlying them.

At the most observable level of politics in Australia, the two most significant events of the decade would seem to be the election of a Labour government in 1972 and its dismissal by the Governor-General in 1975. Though this change of regime did not have the profound effects some expected on Australian broadcasting (cf. Hall 1976: 155), some changes were made and even those that were thwarted may reveal something of the dynamics of the class struggle in the Australian social formation during this period.
Specifically, I wish to argue that a shifting balance of power within the Australian bourgeoisie facilitated Labor's election in 1972 on a platform which promised restructuring of Australian capitalism, including an accommodation of the newly-powerful mining capital fraction. Labor did provide the initial opening for this restructuring, but the manner of its government, some aspects of its policies and the fact that L-NCP coalition adjusted its policy, personnel and allegiances to suit the new power bloc, meant that what support it had within the bourgeoisie soon disappeared. In 1975 the coalition emerged triumphant as the new political leadership of the bourgeoisie and was able to carry out reforms in the field of broadcasting, in some ways far more sweeping than those Labor, with its unusual and temporary supporters, had been able to implement. The government of the day and its policies are thus seen as mediating elements between the class struggle in the social formation as a whole and a particular set of apparatuses (cf. Poulantzas 1973: 249, 336).

In the field of the media specifically, the seventies saw the emergence of a journal expressing a left-liberal view of the media from the inside (The New Journalist), the establishment and subsequent disbanding of a ministry of the media, several other changes to the administrative structure of Australian broadcasting and further, gradual concentration of media ownership in the hands of four main groups. Colour television, F.M. radio, electronic news gathering and computerised typesetting appeared (or re-appeared) on the technical front and the possibility of a domestic communications satellite began to be discussed towards the end of the decade. The 'points system' for encouraging Australian television production was re-vamped, Australian productions began to dominate the ratings and stricter standards for Children's television were introduced, to give just a few examples of the developments which occurred.
We could go on to list events and developments in Australian broadcasting in the seventies, but little purpose would be served in doing so. What is important here is that such developments should not be seen as a random series of events but as particular outcomes, at least in part, of the structural and class determination of Australian broadcasting. We can make sense of this history if we employ a framework, such as that developed in the earlier chapters of this thesis, examining the structural constraints and the configurations, alliances and strategies pursued in the class struggle.

7.1 Australia in the Seventies

The beginning of the decade saw Australia nearing the end of a thirty-year post-war boom, fuelled by large-scale immigration, a large nett inflow of capital and presided over by a government composed of a coalition of conservative political parties. This political coalition should be understood as the overt expression of the organisation of (principally) ruling-class fractions into a power-bloc (cf. Poulantzas 1975: 93). It is important, for our purposes, to identify these fractions, since the conflict of interests (q.v. Ch.2) between them goes a long way towards explaining events at the more visible level of parliamentary politics.

Connell's well-known analysis identifies three major groups on whose support the Liberal-National Country Party (L-NCP) coalition depended (Connell 1977: 78-79). These were the owners, directors and managers of established Australian businesses; the owners (etc.) of multi-national groups with investments in Australia; and new entrepreneurs, the owners (etc.) of local companies which moved up to wealth and influence in the 1950's and 1960's. From these three groups, and from the ranks of "political entrepreneurs", the top parliamentary and executive leadership of the Liberal-Country Party coalition" (p.79) were drawn "...the players in the ruling class power
games of 1970-2...." (p.78). Other analyses by the left of the structure of the Australian ruling class focus on the divisions between domestic and foreign capital, monopoly and non-monopoly capital, between different industries or, with Connell, on the nature and personnel of the dominant ensembles (cf. O'Shaugnessy 1978: 40,41n).

In the terms set out in Chapter Two of this thesis, and partly following O'Shaugnessy's (1978) analysis of 'Conflicts in the Ruling Class', the main divisions in the Australian bourgeoisie are seen here as class fractions (and 'categories') and are as follows:

1) Fractions of Capital. Here we may identify five relatively autonomous ensembles: i) Finance ii) Rural iii) Manufacturing and Services iv) Mining and v) Commercial capitals. Manufacturing and Services are grouped together here since 'services' includes construction, transport, communications, i.e. genuinely productive activities, as well as the provision of community services etc. (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 43n). Mining and Rural capital are constituted as distinct fractions within the productive sector by their relation with the world economic system - a relation which also divides manufacturing into import-competing and 'naturally-protected' areas such as building and transport (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 44).

2) These fractions may be internally divided (at different levels in each - cf. O'Shaugnessy 1978: 46) between monopoly and non-monopoly elements and between domestic and foreign capital.

3) The group Connell calls 'political entrepreneurs' seem to fit very well with Poulantzas' concept of a 'social category' (q.v. Ch.2). They do not have a distinctive economic determination of their own, but do have a distinct role in the political and ideological spheres. We are really dealing with a number of partially distinct ensembles under this heading too, the politicians themselves, senior public servants and, as we shall see in more
detail below, certain media persons. Each of these may be aligned with a variety of class interests as well as their own. That is, we may identify particular sections of the public service leadership (in e.g. Treasury) which in its policies, reports and recommendations etc. supports the interests of a particular fraction or fractions (e.g. mining capital) and other sections whose allegiance lie elsewhere.

The politicians are of course divided along party lines, though we should beware of attaching too much (or too little) significance to this. As Head and Patience argue (1979: 1-8) there were some marked differences between the major parties in 1972, though these were by no means attributable to any simple nexus of class allegiance (see also Catley & McFarlane, 1974: Ch. 1, and below). We have, in principle then, a number of capitalist fractions making up the dominant class. In practice, of course, these diverse ensembles do not all act in contrary directions, but rather are, as Poulantzas suggests (1975: 93), organised into a power bloc under the hegemony of a particular, politically dominant fraction. In fact, in Australia, as O'Shaugnessy argues, the post-war period has been characterised by the emergence of two definable blocs, "... one led by manufacturing capital and the other by rural and mining capital" (1978: 48).

Using tariff policy as a key," O'Shaugnessy argues that up until 1972, the bloc led by manufacturing capital held the hegemonic position, based on a formula he refers to as the Menzies-McEwen solution (1978: 51-52). However, by 1972, this form of allegiance was becoming less effective. For a number of reasons, as O'Shaugnessy and Connell both point out, this particular leadership of the bourgeoisie began to falter. According to O'Shaugnessy:

"... it ran into increasing difficulties towards the end of this period. It was incapable of responding to the increasingly urgent need for restructuring Australian capitalism. The coalition parties were too closely tied to particular
interests to carry through the radical surgery needed to increase the rate of capital accumulation in Australia, which was well below that of comparable—and competing—national capitals." (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 52)

And, in Connell's view:

"The political leadership, in fact, was paralysed by a rising level of conflict within the class from which it arose and on which it depended." (Connell 1977: 102)

One way in which the necessary restructuring of the pattern of economic dominance of the capital class could proceed was in the direction of a greater emphasis on mining capital, which was beginning to expand in the wake of the minerals boom of the late 1960's. The L-NCP coalition, being closely tied to manufacturing and a subordinated rural capital, was not in a position to secure the political conditions for this re-organisation, but the ALP, who owed no primary allegiance to any capitalist fraction, could, and did, carry out such a policy.

It should be made clear that the implication of this is not that the ALP became a mining lobby, a "... conduit for the immediate interests of mining capital" (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 52) but rather that it sought to advance Australian capital generally (to 'improve the economy'); to increase economic growth in order to finance its reforming social welfare (etc.) policies.

The beginning of the seventies then, saw the disruption of the complex set of alliances, whose figurehead was the L-NCP coalition. It is clear, and fairly well documented, that in 1972 significant sections of the dominant class temporarily shifted their party-political allegiance from the L-NCP coalition to the reformist and mildly social democratic ALP because their interests, or the more general interest of Australian capitalism, would be better served under the new regime. Mining capital monopolies such as BHP gave some support to Labor, since they had not got along well with the McMahon government (Connell 1977: 106).
Murdoch's *News Ltd* Media Group (also with mining interests); the 'Business Executives for a Change of Government' group and even members of the infamous 'sixty families' such as Kenneth Baillieu Myer gave tangible and public support to Whitlam's election campaign (Connell 1977: 103).

The Whitlam government promised to attempt some rationalisation of the process of economic growth, amongst other things this involved some ".... extension of involvement with business, and an extension of services to it" (Connell 1977: 118). Further, it had the sort of policy - in its welfare, urban planning and social security components - which may be seen as contributing to the long-term stability of the capitalist system by alleviating some of its most visible inequities (cf. Maravall 1979: 278 pp.). Such a programme might appeal not only to far-sighted capitalists, but also to large numbers of voters whose importance we cannot entirely discount.

There is, in fact, a rather large gap left by the discussion so far which is filled by the dominated, subordinate and perhaps a few intermediate ensembles in the Australian social formation. There is not space here to develop a fully-fledged theory of electoral politics, but we must remember that while the political parties depend on the support of the groupings outlined above, (we might also refer to trade-union support for the ALP), they must also win electoral approval. This approval, the so-called mandate, is primarily dependent not on the various fractions of capital or categories, depicted above, since these are numerically quite small, but on the popular masses.

We need, in order to complete our account of the rise of Labor, to look at the difficult question of the relationship between the securing of hegemony within the ruling class; the re-organisation of the power bloc referred to above; and the securing of hegemony within the social formation as a whole. In short, how was it that declining, or at least divided, bourgeois support for the L-NCP coalition was translated into its (temporary) electoral demise?
Connell discusses this problem and suggests a contingent link between the conflict within the coalition and the declining quality of its leadership.

"This conflict of interest . . . had led to inconsistency in the political leaderships behaviour and a loss of credibility in the run up to the election." (Connell 1977: 108)

This, combined with a revival in Labor party and trade union organisation "created the conditions for Labor's electoral victory" (Connell 1977: 110). We might add to this that media support for the ALP was greater in 1972 than at almost any other time, that the Labor coffers were less strained than normal due to the business support described above (Connell 1977: 103), and we may have some idea of the ways in which ruling class support may be translated into electoral success.

We need to be careful to stress here that we are not necessarily (or perhaps even at all) dealing with a shift in the balance of power between the major classes (i.e. capital and labour) when we are discussing the success of Labor, but rather with shifting alliances within (principally) the capitalist class and between different fractions of that class and the politicians. We are interested in these alliances, not for their own sake, so much as to gain an understanding of the forces at work constraining and directing media policy in the seventies. It is clear that mediating factors are also at work, among them the ALP leadership, its policies and the established interests in Australian media. Before turning to look at developments in the field of mass media specifically, however, we need to examine the general character of the ALP programme.

7.2 The Labor Programme

Various authors have characterised the nature and ideology of the Whitlam regime as being social democratic, technocratic and reformist
(Catley and McFarlane 1974, Connell 1977, Patience and Head 1979), rather than committed to any form of parliamentary socialism (cf. Catley & McFarlane 1974: 1), but what do these terms imply? What sort(s) of programme(s) did the Labor government put forward?

Patience and Head (1979: 283) conclude that there were 'some significant divergences between the Labor programme and that of their coalition rivals. They comment:

"Overall, these divergences may be analysed in terms of the interventionalist role played by the Federal government in regulating the economy and/or redistributing social and economic resources" (1979: 283)

They note that the state in Australia has always played a fairly interventionist role (since Federation at least) but that this had commonly been in the interests of private capital rather than in areas such as welfare or social services (1979: 283-4). The programme outlined by the ALP in 1972, and carried out to a degree in subsequent years, thus marked a significant change in the nature (and amount?) of state intervention in the economic region.

If we are to analyse the 'class character' of this programme we must be careful to spell out what is meant by this. In particular, we need to take account of the fact that the Australian Labor Party is not a simple class-based organisation such that we could analyse its strategies in terms of class position and class interest (cf. Poulantzas 1975: 24ff). Rather there were four major ensembles which the Labor policies attempted to serve. The largest and arguably most important of these consisted of the urban, industrial proletariat, principally as organised by and represented in the Trade Union movement. The class position of this group is predominantly (though not exclusively) economist, being concerned above all with wages, conditions of work and material standard of living, though there are many undercurrents and sub themes to be found (e.g. environmentalism, sexism, anti-sexism).
Secondly, we have the ensemble which is widely regarded as being electorally decisive for both parties, the new middle class, composed of new petty bourgeois and labour-aristocratic elements represented by white collar, middle income, professionals. This group, it is argued, holds the 'balance of power' in the Australian electorate (possibly in the social formation as a whole), particularly since it may contain a large proportion of the 'swinging voters' whose choices may decide elections. We might also note, in passing, that this is the class of origin of many of the Labor leadership, including Gough Whitlam. The ALP made a special point of appealing to this group both in terms of an altruistic ideology of reformism, appealing to what Encel describes as 'middle class radicalism' (Patience & Head 1979: 284), generally concerned with quality of life issues such as environmentalism, and in terms of their own objective, but short term, class interests. A technocratic, interventionist state offers a great deal of scope for advancing professionals in their careers either as employees (e.g. academics) or, as was the case with the medical profession, beneficiaries of state funding.

We should be careful to note, however, that while certain sections of the new petty bourgeoisie gave visible support to Whitlam, the evidence that it was the 'swinging' of this group which put Whitlam into office is open to question. Rowley (1976: 11) points to the "hopelessly unscientific classification of occupational data by the pollsters" into categories such as blue and white collar workers, which serve to blur the class basis of voting, especially, we might add, in the case of the fluid, polarising new petty bourgeoisie. He suggests that if we remove proletarian white collar workers from the 'middle class' grouping, we are left with a much more solidly anti-Labor middle class than is commonly depicted. 10 This does not alter the fact that Labor sought the votes of 'middle class' 'white collar', 'professional' ensembles, and gained them in some measure.
Thirdly, one may identify an ensemble of 'marginal workers', consisting of the beneficiaries of e.g. anti-poverty welfare programmes, policies of full employment, aboriginal aid schemes and so on. By definition almost this ensemble is fairly powerless but important here, not because their support means a lot to a political party (though most can vote), but because of the attention that welfarist policies devote to them. 11

Lastly, the ALP government could not afford to ignore the dominant class, especially those sections of it which, as indicated above, had given it (qualified) support in the 1972 election campaign. The ALP was a reformist party, committed to change within the system and endorsed the notion of 'fair profits' (cf. Connell 1977: 122); in short it was by no means an 'anti-capital' party, but it was not the party with which capitalists were used to dealing and had problems, almost from the start, in maintaining cordial relations.

The ALP programme was then, reformist, technocratic (cf. Catley & McFarlane 1974: 9), welfarist and, largely, designed to strike some sort of balance between the interest of the above four groups. As we shall see below, this balance took a particular form in the case of the ALP media policy.

We should perhaps beware of the static implications of the word 'balance'; in fact, as Poulantzas is at pains to stress, the apparatuses of the state (including the ALP as an ideological state apparatus (q.v. Ch. 4)) are traversed by class struggle which is ongoing and dynamic. As well as this, the State is, of course, subject to structural determination and the sorts of pressures described above should be understood as occurring within the limits so prescribed. 12 (see also Chs. 2 & 4)

However modest and circumspect the ALP programme was, it was not long before opposition to it began to be mounted. Two attempts to remove the Whitlam regime by parliamentary (or quasi- parliamentary)
means were made, in 1974, unsuccessfully, and in 1975 when the Liberal-Country Party coalition now under Fraser, was returned to office.

It is difficult to locate precisely the main sources of opposition to Labor's mildly social democratic campaign. Obviously, much of it was mediated through the conservative opposition in the Federal Parliament (and through several L-NCP State governments) and this tends to rather obscure the class-interests which the ALP programme violated or threatened to violate. We can however identify some broad areas of conflict. Firstly, as Connell notes, capitalists began by the end of 1973, to complain about their 'lack of access' to ALP cabinet ministers (Connell 1977: 118). In general, it appears that certain sections of the capitalist class began to feel that, while not entirely opposed to their interests, the Labor regime was not as sympathetic to them as a L-NCP government, the norm for the previous 25 years, would be. As well as this unspecific mistrust, we can identify a number of particularly contentious areas.

The first of these is in the area of wages and prices policies. The various attempts made by Labor to safeguard the interests of its Trade Union supporters; support for full indexation of wages, price restraint schemes, attempts to tax food exports (cf. Watson 1979: 167) and so on, were against the interests (perhaps narrowly conceived) of most capitalists, and opposed by the coalition parties, by capitalist spokespersons and by a variety of non-cooperation tactics on the part of business (cf. Connell 1977: 120-122). In fact, the measures actually taken, like the setting up of a Prices Justification Tribunal with virtually no powers were, in the end, fairly weak.

Secondly, the nationalism of certain sections of the government, most notably the policies of Connor in the field of mining, provoked strong opposition from the foreign capitalists themselves, from Australian capitalists whose activities were linked to foreign capital
(e.g. brokers) and perhaps also from a more general suspicion of government regulation of and partnership in business. Labor's alleged attempt to by-pass conventional channels by raising capital for such ventures, the so-called 'Loans Affair', was a big item in the campaign to present Labor as inefficient/incompetent managers of the economy, which arguably contributed much to their electoral defeat in 1975 (cf. Edgar 1979a: Ch.5; Rowley 1976: 12). Labor's decision to cut tariffs, not a measure which could alienate the whole capitalist class, since many sections (especially exporters) stood to benefit from it, nonetheless earned it some enemies and the removal of the super-phosphate bounty probably merely confirmed the low opinion of Labor held by rural capitalists.

Perhaps more fundamentally, however, the capitalist bloc led by mining capital and rural capital, now, thanks to Labor's economic interventions, in a more powerful position in the power bloc, found itself a new, and perhaps more sympathetic, political vehicle in the Country Party now led by Anthony.

"In the 1950's manufacturing capital had been able to sidestep rural opposition to its programme of industrialisation by capturing the only political formation that could have expressed this opposition. In the 1970's mining capital won the Country Party back so it could express the real interests of exporters, achieving what rural capital itself had failed to do." (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 53)

As stated above, Labor had never been a representative of mining capital in any direct sense, and since many of its policies in that area, notably the nationalisation of Connor, were hardly likely to endear it to the mining capitalists (many of whom were foreign-owned), it is not surprising that the support Labor had from this quarter in 1972 quickly deserted it.

The middle-classes, the new petty bourgeois and labour-aristocratic elements, who many authors suggest were responsible for tipping the electoral balance in Labor's favour, also became less enthusiastic about the Whitlam/ALP regime. Some particular ensembles were
directly involved in Labor's policies. Doctors, for example, were profoundly affected by the Medibank scheme and the establishment of a Hospitals and Health Services Commission because they saw these as infringing on their autonomy, as attacks on the notions of fee-for-service payments and professional self-regulation which formed the basis for that autonomy. However, it seems that their incomes were not so much under threat and may have been boosted by some of the ALP measures (cf. Palmer 1979). Other professionals, such as, for example, social workers (or academics!) benefitted from Labor's centralist welfare programmes which advanced both their status and their salaries. On the other hand, it was the upper-level salaried workers (especially those without access to tax avoidance schemes i.e. those on PAYE) who bore a large part of the burden of the Labor taxation changes. One would expect that large sections of this ensemble, too, would be unimpressed by the apparent inefficiency and ineptness of the Labor regime and not entirely content with its, albeit limited, attacks on privilege. There are no doubt many other factors which led parts of this ensemble to withdraw the support they had (by and large) given to Labor for 6 years or more (i.e. since 1969 when the ALP narrowly lost the election), but withdraw it they did in 1975.

What of the other two groupings above, the proletariat and 'marginal workers'? We can conclude from voting figures that significant numbers within these ensembles switched from Labor to Liberal in 1975, though a majority of them still supported Labor (Rowley 1976: 11). These groupings were advantaged by Labor's re-distributive and welfare measures, but perhaps not to the extent that they had been promised, for reasons which are indicated above. The opinion polls reveal that the most significant issue for voters in the 1975 election was that of competence in government, especially in managing the economy - the terms in which the Liberals, aided by the mass media, sought to define voters' choices (Rowley 1976: 12; Edgar 1979).
Doctors, for example, were profoundly affected by the Medibank scheme and the establishment of a Hospitals and Health Services Commission because they saw these as infringing on their autonomy, as attacks on the notions of fee-for-service payments and professional self-regulation which formed the basis for that autonomy. However, it seems that their incomes were not so much under threat and may have been boosted by some of the ALP measures (cf. Palmer 1979). Other professionals, such as, for example, social workers (or academics!) benefitted from Labor's centralist welfare programmes which advanced both their status and their salaries.

On the other hand, it was the upper-level salaried workers (especially those without access to tax avoidance schemes i.e. those on PAYE) who bore a large part of the burden of the Labor taxation changes. One would expect that large sections of this ensemble, too, would be unimpressed by the apparent inefficiency and ineptness of the Labor regime and not entirely content with its, albeit limited, attacks on privilege. There are no doubt many other factors which led parts of this ensemble to withdraw the support they had (by and large) given to Labor for 6 years or more (i.e. since 1969 when the ALP narrowly lost the election), but withdraw it they did in 1975.

What of the other two groupings above, the proletariat and 'marginal workers'? We can conclude from voting figures that significant numbers within these ensembles switched from Labor to Liberal in 1975, though a majority of them still supported Labor (Rowley 1976: 11). These groupings were advantaged by Labor's re-distributive and welfare measures, but perhaps not to the extent that they had been promised, for reasons which are indicated above.

The opinion polls reveal that the most significant issue for voters in the 1975 election was that of competence in government, especially in managing the economy - the terms in which the Liberals, aided by the mass media, sought to define voters' choices (Rowley 1976: 12; Edgar 1979).
Ch. 5) and it seems that on this issue Labor lost some of its traditional working class support. The ALP did not help its case with these voters by concentrating in its 1975 campaign on the constitutional/legal propriety of its dismissal since this was not seen as important by many voters. As Rowley comments:

"Swinging voters are usually the least class-conscious and politically-alert sections of the working-class and the middle-class, the most likely to be hoodwinked by demagogic slogans and empty promises" (1976: 12)

In any event, it would be a mistake to assume that all members of these ensembles are necessarily habitual Labor voters, though this would be their most common choice (cf. Rowley 1976: 11). It is fairly clear that fixed income earners, such as pensioners of various types, are among those at most risk from inflation and the charge that Labor policies were responsible for the relatively high levels of inflation in 1974-75 was one of the key themes in the Liberal election campaign. Whether this specific ideological appeal was a successful one is difficult to determine precisely, but it was, as Edgar demonstrates (1979a: 135-6) carried with some enthusiasm by the mass media, and the opinion polls, referred to above, suggest the importance of this factor. In any event, these two groups, though numerically large, have very little power in a capitalist society. The chief weapon of the working-class, the strike, is at best only a defensive tactic and one not open to the marginal workers anyway and, apart from this, these ensembles have only their votes, which are subject to many sorts of manipulation (from ideological persuasion to electoral boundary setting).

For these sorts of reasons, then, opposition to the Labor regime, seated in the ruling class, but drawing support from other elements mounted to the point where, in late 1975, the Labor regime was removed from office. As Connell notes, it was not necessary for the whole of the bourgeoisie to support the Fraser Liberal platform for this to
be achieved. The support of key elements, particularly the banking arm of finance capital, with the acquiescence of other fractions, was all that was necessary (Connell 1977: 123ff).

The new government represented a shift in direction in state policies. Over a period of 2–3 years it dismantled many of Labor's welfare planning schemes (in, for example, housing, health, education), pursued a monetarist line in economic planning (using the Freidman-Phillips tactic of high unemployment to lower inflation (c.f. Hughes 1979)) and attempted, as far as it is possible to do so given the structural limits on a capitalist state in the era of 'Late Capitalism', to adopt a policy of 'small government'. Power was given back to the states, in areas such as Health Care, and to private enterprise and, perhaps largely symbolically, the superphosphate bounty was reinstated.

The 1970's were then notable for a change in political regime, reflecting but by no means simply reducible to shifting strategies and alliances in the class struggle. In the foregoing section I have attempted to reveal some of these changes using electoral politics as an admittedly imperfect index.

7.3 Broadcasting in the Seventies

Having briefly examined the political history of Australia in the seventies, and thus having developed a background, we may now turn to our main object of interest - the apparatuses and institutions of broadcasting.

I have argued above that the rise of Labor in the early seventies was in no small part due to the reorganisation of the 'power bloc' which exercised hegemonic rule within the dominant class and within the social formation as a whole. The ALP government, in effect, facilitated the growth in power of mining capital and was the parliamentary means by which a 'reshuffle' of bourgeois fractions was achieved.
Given the importance of the mass media, as Ideological Apparatuses in contributing to the 'cementing' of a social formation (q.v. Ch. 4), it is interesting to look briefly at the ways in which the media apparatuses were involved in giving ideological sanction to the change in regime, and at the policies Labor attempted to pursue in reforming this sector.

7.4 The Media and Labor

It is a widely recognised fact, demonstrated by a number of content analyses (e.g. Windschuttle 1976) and other studies (e.g. Edgar 1969a), that the four commercial media empires which dominate broadcasting in Australia (q.v. Ch. 6) are generally favourably disposed towards the L-NCP coalition, this being particularly evident at election time.

However, in 1972, just as the normal run of bourgeois support for the coalition was interrupted, so the 'normal', homogeneous anti-labor stance of the press was marked by a notable exception. The Murdoch News Limited Group joined the defectors in 1972 and supported the Whitlam regime. We should not exaggerate the uniqueness of this support, though it is unusual. Murdoch also supported Labor in 1963 (when his empire was much smaller); the Fairfax group gave Labor some support in 1961 (when Labor was narrowly defeated) and the Age newspaper also supported Whitlam in 1972 (Lloyd 1977: 179). Generally, however, the press supports the Liberals. The position of the Murdoch group is consistent with the account of 'power bloc' changes outlined above.

Firstly, the Murdoch group was the newest of the four media monopolies, thus qualifying it for inclusion in Connell's group of new capitalists (1977: 78-9). This meant that, unlike the three established groups, Murdoch had missed out on the initial distribution of capital city commercial television licences, his holdings being confined to Wollongong and Adelaide (cf. Hall 1976: 42). Secondly, Murdoch was also involved in mining and minerals, specifically in the Aluminium industry.
There were thus two powerful reasons why the Murdoch group should support the revitalisation of Australian capitalism promised by Whitlam in 1972; it was in two ways excluded from the established 'ruling bloc'. It had not been the recipient of political patronage in the media field, a process occurring mainly in the 1950's with the allocation of commercial TV licences in which, as Hall pithily puts it, 'new toys were supplied to old friends' (Hall 1976: 12), and was thus not as closely tied to the L-NCP regime as the other groups. And, secondly, the Murdoch group was associated with the very fraction of capital (mining) which had most to gain from a change in government.

I do not wish to even suggest a conscious (or any other) conspiracy here. Rather, I wish to point out that the Murdoch group had structurally-defined interests, which set it apart from the other groups, and that for a time it chose to pursue these via the strategy of supporting Whitlam. The strategy was not successful, the Whitlam government did nothing to further News Ltd.'s interests, and indeed for a time mused about withdrawing the third commercial licence in each of the capitals (which included Murdoch's Adelaide station) (Hall 1976: 156). As we will see below, the ALP media policies largely left the established pattern of ownership untouched, it being left to Murdoch's own devices and the stock market to improve News Ltd.'s position. And, as we saw above, Labor's support for mining capital was qualified and heavily tinged with the nationalism of R.F.X. Connor. Murdoch's support for Labor in 1972 gave way to "tepid support" for the L-NCP in 1974 and "violent opposition" to the ALP in 1975 (Lloyd 1977: 180). It had had neither of the above interests furthered and, as pointed out above, the coalition now represented mining capital far more effectively than Labor ever had and was a more 'trustworthy' political representative, especially since its own reshuffle, of Australian capital.
The other media groups, with the exception of the semi-independent Age group\(^{20}\) retained their traditional loyalties throughout this period. I do not mean to imply by this that these various commercial ideological apparatuses give unqualified support for the traditional political leadership of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, given the divisions between the various fractions and blocs within the dominant class, this would be a difficult thing to achieve. Rather, what is purveyed is a generalised form of legitimation of the capitalist social order, not without internal contradictions and variations, but clearly and demonstrably oriented towards the interests of the bourgeoisie (see for example NJ4: 3, NJ31: 12).

However, despite these qualifications, it is the case that the commercial media have overall, given their ideological sanction to the coalition parties. There are a number of reasons why this should be so. Firstly, it is true that, as McQueen asserts, the media are big business (1977: Ch. 2) and therefore tend to align themselves\(^{21}\) with the political party which traditionally represents big business. That is to say, certain aspects of the performance of these media apparatuses are delimited by their structural determination as capitalist enterprises, as McQueen argues. But, secondly, there are also ideological apparatuses acting to legitimate, via appropriate interpellations, the status quo (q.v. Ch. 4). Thirdly, the three established media empires were closely linked with the L-NCP coalition through the history of patronage referred to above (cf. Hall 1976: 26-27).

As well as the fact that the normal unanimity of support of media capitalists for the conservative parties was not present in 1972, and in keeping with the general scenario of developments outlined at the beginning of this chapter, there was a mounting level of struggle within the media apparatuses. The 'middle-class radicalism', which I suggested above was an important factor in Australian politics in the early seventies generally (though its electoral importance should not be exaggerated), was manifested in the media field most visibly in the form of the New Journalism...
movement. This began largely as a result of dissatisfaction on the part of some journalists with their union, the AJA, and its journal *The Journalist* in 1972 and received its most visible expression in a new journal, the *New Journalist* (NJ) first published in May of that year.

As with petty-bourgeois radicalism generally in this period, the *New Journalist* covered a spectrum of left-liberal views. The first issue (N.J. 1, 1/5/72) declared the somewhat syndicalist sentiment that 'Proprietors are not a necessary part of newspaper production' (P.1); advocated workers control of the press in the event of a lockout and provided brief instructions as to how to go about this. Other topics in early issues included analyses of shareholding in Australian newspapers (NJ2, 6-7/72:15), a debate on the status of Public Relations persons, should they be allowed in the AJA? (NJ4 9-10/72: 1, NJ5 (11-12/72): 1) and reference to the liberating potential of new technologies such as the offset press and IBM typesetting (NJ3 8/72): 2.

It is important to stress that the *New Journalist* movement is not monolithic, its editorship has been rotated several times and its editorial pronouncements reflect this pluralism rather than pursuing a consistent firm line. NJ 13 (3-4/74) for example, contains a claim by the editor that it (i.e. he/she) is 'non-Marxist (p.8) whereas NJ14 (5-74) declares that it is committed to a socialist policy for the media (in contrast with the Labor created Ministry of the Media which was exercising a rather inept technocratic form of tinkering well within the existing parameters of the media industry). NJ16 (9-74) contains yet another slant favouring a) Universal Rights of Communication, b) A greater scope, sensibility and accountability of the media and c) Industrial democracy within media organisations (P.1-2) and one can find an even greater range of political colours among the other articles in various editions. One can identify other signs of this petty-bourgeois
radicalism in the history of media apparatuses, the strike by journalists at *News Ltd.* in late 1975 (cf. Lloyd 1977: 181-198), the fact that many journalists supported the new government in various ways (Edgar 1979a: Ch.4) and the various books written by journalists, ex-journalists and others all point to various degrees of radicalism among members of this ensemble.

7.5 Labor and the Media

In discussing the history of Australian broadcasting in the seventies, we are dealing with three principal ensembles, the government appointed ABC management, the commercial media capitalists and the petty bourgeois staff of the apparatuses. As well as this, we have all the groups outside the actual media organisations but with an interest in their operation, for example, rural capital with its interest in a service to remote areas, advertisers and their clients and the social category of 'politicians' who depend on the various media for a large part of their operations. We might also refer to the complex relations between various groups of (non-English) migrants and the media as described, for example, by Dugdale (1979: *passim*); and academic critics such as McQueen, Edgar, and so on.

Thus, when the Whitlam regime took office in 1972 the broadcasting field was composed of the ABC and the commercial empires, one of which had supported the ALP campaign, while the other three retained their traditional stance of implacable opposition to the ALP. What sort of policies did this new regime, based as it was on the sort of alliance described earlier, attempt to pursue in the broadcasting (and other media) field?

The most visible early move was the establishment of a Department of the Media under Senator D. McClelland, which was to take over the broadcasting related functions of the Postmaster-General's Department.
and to extend its involvement to include the press and other media. Though it has been suggested that the creation of this ministry was something of a last-minute move, designed to provide an extra job for someone in the large newly-elected ALP cabinet (cf. Harding 1979: 24), it was consistent with the general technocratic ethos of the Whitlam regime, described above. Broadcasting policy, as in many other areas of government activity since World War II, had been an ad hoc, less than visionary affair which had provided a service which was outstanding mainly in the way in which it generated large profits for the established media combines. One does not have to be a Labor supporter to recognise the scope for coordination, planning and foresight in the broadcasting field (cf. Edgar 1979b, Hall 1976).

However, the initial mood of McClelland (D) and his department was cautious (Edgar 1979b: 215). Most of the senior staff of the new ministry were drawn from the commercial industry (p.217) and it seems that the department was anxious not to offend the media barons. As in many other areas of its administration, Labor was very cautious in its treatment of established bourgeois interests. We can perhaps begin to see why this should be so if we recall the nature of its constituency, the loose coalition of classes and fractions supporting labour and the (consequent?) nature of its programme.

Firstly, it is clear that the Labor programme of reform financed through the proceeds of economic growth (Connell 1977, Catley & McParlane 1974: Ch.1) depended on a degree of cooperation on the part of the dominant class. Not only was the ALP not ideologically disposed towards a wholesale confrontation with the Australian bourgeoisie (picking off some elements with the connivance of others being an entirely different proposition); a posture which it demonstrated repeatedly - even after the 'coup' of 1975; but there is no evidence to suggest that it would have had sufficient support from the popular masses to be able to implement such a strategy. By
accepting the existing ground rules of policies, Labor was inextricably bound by the structural limitations of and on the capitalist state - it had to 'manage the economy' and preserve law and order and so on. Reform, in short, had to proceed cautiously. 25

This was particularly so in the case of the commercial media apparatuses (ideological state apparatuses held by media capitalists) which arguably have the power to bring down regimes they do not like (or at least assist in such a process) (cf. Harding 1979: 4); whether these be ALP or L-NCP, as the events of 1972 and 1975 illustrate quite nicely. Since it was not prepared for a head on confrontation, Labor had to proceed cautiously.

Secondly, it seems that Labor (like the Menzies regime in the 1950s) did not have a comprehensive policy for the media. The innovations it did attempt (e.g. 2JJ, 3ZZ & 2 & 3EA etc., see below) were generally ill thought-out and ad hoc. Indeed, Hall suggests that there may have been a contradiction between the goals Labor did have and the means employed to attain them. She lists the general goals as being 'a healthy public broadcasting system, a vigorous, independent ABC and a commercial service which could afford both a fair quota of Australian content and programmes appealing to a wide variety of tastes and attitudes (Hall 1976: 174) and suggests that a ministry of the media, albeit one with greatly circumscribed powers, might tend towards less independence, less public involvement and a more intransigent commercial sector. She cautiously advocates instead the establishment of an independent public authority to regulate broadcasting in all three sectors, able to shape policy without being subject to ministerial whims (Hall 1976: 181-2).

One obvious factor to consider in explaining the low priority given to broadcasting policy by Labor is the level and source of support for reform in this area. I have already referred to the principle ensemble involved in this, the new-petty bourgeois media-workers and intellectuals...
as illustrated by the New Journalism movement and, for example, the formation of the 'Friends of the ABC' in 1976.\textsuperscript{26} Dugdale's account of the history of the public broadcasting station 3ZZ also illustrates the key role played by new petty bourgeois elements in attempting to 'democratise' the media (Dugdale 1979: passim). There was also some support from the proletariat, in the form of the trade union apparatuses, who were conscious of the general bias against them in the media, but this was of a fairly limited nature and it was only very late in the term of the Whitlam regime, and under Fraser, that the distrust of n-p-b elitism was overcome to a sufficient extent to permit some joint action.\textsuperscript{27}

Generally, however, these two ensembles who, if united, may have carried the day, did not act in concert. Separately they could not overcome the power of the media capitalists or persuade the Whitlam government to take bolder steps. We should remember also that the 'radical' wing of the new petty bourgeoisie was in no way a majority of that class (cf. Rowley 1976: 11).

We must not forget either that the rule of the ALP regime was by no means absolute. They were nominally in command of only a few apparatuses of the state, key ones certainly (referred to as the Treasury benches), but always confronted by hostile forces who retained control of other important apparatuses. Of these, control of the senate (which must ratify all legislation) by the L-NCP parties is perhaps the most important.\textsuperscript{28} Given that they (the ALP) were committed to the rule of bourgeois law and limited by the provisions of the existing Broadcasting Act, which the senate would not allow to be amended, there was relatively little they could do.

However, some new measures were introduced, despite the above constraining factors. Two in particular are worthy of examination, these are the creation of public broadcasting and of 'ethnic broadcasting', at first confined to radio (ethnic television has now (1979) been introduced). These measures are interesting because they exemplify
some of the main features and key contradictions of Labor's approach to broadcasting. Both developments were made possible by the 'discovery' that the existing AM broadcast band could carry more stations than it did (cf. Hall 1976: 9). Public broadcasting represents a partial democratising of radio, whereas the ethnic service represents direct government control, greater than that experienced by the ABC. In this respect, they represent the two opposite poles of left parliamentary politics, democratisation and statism (cf. Poulantzas 1978: 251).

Public broadcasting was introduced first, the first stations going to air in 1975. Some licences were granted to particular interest groups such as 'community organisations' (3CR), some to existing student radio stations (2XX, 5UV, 3RRR - FM etc.), and these have survived as low-budget, low power (of transmitters) generally vaguely leftist29 enterprises to the present day. Two extra licences were granted to the ABC one in Sydney and one in Melbourne. The Sydney station 2JJ was (and remains) primarily a rock-music station, playing music which the rating conscious commercial broadcasters had ignored, and quickly carving out a sizeable niche in the radio audience - much to the annoyance of commercial broadcasters (Harding 1979: 7). 2JJ provides a different sort of programming and information (about eg. forthcoming demonstrations and so on), but is in most other respects much like other ABC radio stations. The (now defunct) Melbourne station 3ZZ was rather different. This station represented virtually the extreme of democratisation since its rationale was one of public access, any group which could produce a radio programme on any topic, (provided it was not defamatory or obscene etc.) with a very few exceptions, could broadcast it on 3ZZ. It soon became apparent to both Labor and L-NCP governments that this was a dangerous experiment since it gave a voice and a focal point to
groups who were being exploited because they lacked these things. In particular, migrant groups seized this opportunity to gain a voice in their own language, where they could say what they chose, within quite broad limits. Further, the conflicts between different sections of migrant groups, such as those between Croatian and other Balkan groups, were given a public airing on 3ZZ, contradicting the image of order and harmony which the state is usually concerned to promote.

This experimental station, which was closed by the Liberal government in 1977, is particularly interesting because it was at best only marginally an ideological apparatus of the state. Though funded by the ABC, its 'access' philosophy meant that its programming was not subject to editorial control, thus neither political regulation or commercial considerations were able to secure conformity with dominant ideologies, though contributors were free to espouse these if they chose. This independence was fairly staunchly defended by the staff of the station, in terms of petty-bourgeois liberal populism (cf. Dugdale 1979: Ch.1). The logic of operation of 3ZZ had not been foreseen by the Labor regime, it seems that they did not appreciate that 3ZZ would be anything other than a minority interest station like e.g. 3CR. An uncontrolled, largely free mouthpiece for Victorian ethnic communities, which cut across the assimilationist logic of Australia's migration policies since World War II, since it allowed ethnic communities to make their own programmes, was not generally welcomed by Labor (Dugdale 1979: 76-77) and anathema to the Liberals (p.65). The setting up of a government-controlled migrant language service was a counter to 3ZZ. I think it would be wrong to regard the establishment of 3ZZ (and the other public stations) as a deliberate and calculated move on the part of Labor. Rather the general idea of public radio was approved and the actual forms taken by it were the product of social forces outside government control and largely
We should remember too that the ALP is hardly a homogeneous grouping and, while figures on the left of the party, such as Moss Cass, the minister for the media after early 1975, may have supported 3ZZ, other sections of the party were not impressed (Dugdale 1979: 76).

Ethnic broadcasting, as suggested above, was kept under much closer government control, prohibited from broadcasting 'controversial' material and designed to serve government policy rather than oppose it. When the system was reformed under the L-NCP government, being placed under the control of the Special Broadcasting Service (under fairly direct ministerial control), this merely confirmed the status it held under Labor. These two innovations in radio enable us to look again at the notion of an ideological apparatus as developed in Ch.4.

The history of 3ZZ, in particular, emphasises how important is the concept of struggle in determining the form taken, by an ideological apparatus. It shows that one cannot simply 'read off' the function of an apparatus from its position in the structures, since if this were so the station would never have come into being. Nor, however, can we dismiss structural determination as providing limits to the effectiveness of particular struggles since it was this, among other things, which led to 3ZZ's closure. The station, while it existed, was an anomaly; funded by the state but not controlled by it, and while this tension may not have determined the fate of 3ZZ, it certainly contributed towards it. (The government simply withdrew the funds necessary to operate 3ZZ in 1977)

Ethnic broadcasting (2EA, 3EA etc.) presents no such problems. It allowed for community participation rather than 'community control'; and defined democracy as the provision of something for everyone rather than the decentralisation of control. The other (surviving) public radio stations are in a rather different position to the late 3ZZ.

Many espouse and broadcast non-dominant and anti-dominant ideological
themes, though they would, I think, be prosecuted if this material became seditious, but these deviations seem to be tolerated, much in the same way that left-wing journals are allowed to exist. The reasons for this 'tolerance' are probably several. Firstly, the hegemony of the dominant classes in Australia is based on consent rather than outright repression, though one suspects with Althusser that repressive forces stand ready in the event of serious threats to bourgeois rule (Althusser 1971:150). A necessary feature of such a legitimation is that consent should be seen to be based on some form of choice; the forced closure of left-wing radio stations would undermine the credibility of this 'democratic' bourgeois hegemony since 'freedom of choice' would then quite visibly be subject to state imposed limits (which of course it is, but presently in a time-honoured manner). Secondly, it does not appear that any serious threat to bourgeois rule is posed by the alternative media. The failure of the left to mobilise the Australian masses is legendary and radio stations, such as 3CR, do not seem to be exceptional in this. Were they to become a more serious threat, the nature of bourgeois rule could reasonably be expected to change in the repressive direction, as the closure of 3ZZ illustrates.

Thirdly, the influence of these non-state ideological apparatuses is kept within quite strict limits (their 'failure' alluded to above should in no sense be seen as a failure of will on their part). Their sources of funds are limited, they are permitted to carry no advertising and, unlike 3ZZ, receive no government grants. The power of their transmitters is limited; they have to provide their own facilities, studios, etc. and, perhaps above all, the alternative messages they may carry have to compete with the massive, polished and glittering outpourings of the commercial and state apparatuses, the effects of years of formal schooling, of many religious apparatuses, of politicians and commentators; in short, the public broadcasters
have to compete with the general ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie. In this respect stations such as 3CR which are clearly and avowedly leftist are open to the charge of left-wing bias and minority interest in a way in which 3ZZ, which had no editorial line, was not. 3ZZ could be accused (and was) of being taken over by extremist groups, but its chief problem was perhaps not that it allowed the expression of 'extremist' views, but rather that it reproduced divisions in 'the community' and countered the official view of order and harmony.

The decisive factor leading to its closure, while the other public stations remained in operation, was probably its reliance on state funding, which meant that its closure could be presented as an administrative move, a result of more general cost-cutting rather than as an overt act of repressive censorship (Dugdale 1979: 109). The closure of 3ZZ may be seen, then, partly as a consequence of its anomalous position referred to above. We should not be surprised though that its staff, among others, did not see it in this light (cf. Dugdale 1979: 105 ff).

7.6 Liberals and the Media

I have suggested earlier that the rise of Labor in the seventies, and the associated temporary demise of the L-NCP coalition, may be linked with a reorganisation of capitalist fractions in the power bloc and that certain capitalist fractions supported the ALP in an effort to facilitate this re-shuffle. Their support, such as it was, was always likely to be temporary, provided that the L-NCP parties could successfully orient themselves around the new power bloc (in which mining capital now had a much more prominent position), and display a willingness to put the overall health of Australian capitalism before the interests of their traditional supporters (manufacturing capital).
By 1975 I would suggest that there was some evidence that they had begun to do this. I do not wish to review the policies of the 1976-80 coalition government here, though even a cursory examination would reveal the emphasis given to minerals development in promoting Australia's 'economic recovery', but we may note that not only was the Country Party now led by a pro-mining capital element (as noted above), but the Liberals had also chosen as their leader someone (Fraser) from outside of the manufacturing/urban fraction of capital. 33

I do not wish to explore the policies of the Fraser government generally, partly because there is much evidence in the media field that it was firmly the new leadership of Australian capital and was intent on tidying up the broadcasting field, on putting the house of ideological apparatuses in order. There is a sense in which the Fraser government in the late seventies was doing the job, in the media field, of providing political leadership for the Australian bourgeoisie, in an area that the ALP media ministry had struggled with in the earlier years of the decade.

The Robinson ministry of 1975-77 was formally concerned with Posts and Telecommunications, but included in the staff of this department were most of the personnel of the old Media Department and virtually all of its functions. It succeeded in carrying out the 'most far-reaching transformation of broadcasting in 28 years' (Edgar 1979b:223). Though this may have been "...accomplished with excessive and unexplained haste, and political meddling, particularly within the ABC" (ibid.), it does suggest that the Fraser regime recognised the necessity of maintaining an efficient legitimation apparatus (perhaps particularly after the events of 1975 and during the deepening recession), a role clearly in line with its status as the new leadership of Australian capital.

The fact that the Liberal media policy was able to be implemented, despite some opposition from broadcasters and the ABC (Edgar 1979b:228)
is a measure of the strength of the Fraser regime, not only in electoral terms but in terms of its class support. It was also 'managed' fairly well; after Robinson had made himself unpopular with broadcasters, and after the most sweeping organisational changes had been made (the Broadcasting Tribunal and other recommendations of the Green Report - see below), he was replaced by Staley (Edgar 1969b:228), who could then adopt a 'steady as she goes', 'stable government' posture as befits his structural role as an agent for the new committee of the whole bourgeoisie.

Further, the Fraser regime's intervention in the media area was not entirely opposed to the interests of the commercial broadcasters. It reduced funding for the ABC, in line with its general policy of reducing state expenditure and thus weakened the opposition (cf. Harding 1979: 49, 56-57), and, although the Green report created some uncertainty for commercial broadcasters (Harding 1979: 50), and some opposition to its recommendations (Harding 1979: 88-89), particularly its refusal to hand FM radio licences to existing AM licencees (p.89), the subsequent legislation was more responsive to their demands and the appointment of Bruce Gyngell, a figure closely associated with commercial broadcasting, as head of the new Broadcasting Tribunal could be seen as an attempt to pacify the media monopolies (p.94-5).

The effect of the Liberal policies in broadcasting was perhaps less dramatic than some industry sources feared. After all, the media monopolies were still in command of the broadcasting apparatuses after the Green report, even if they were denied direct control of FM radio. They were now, however, under rather tighter government supervision. The Broadcasting Tribunal had powers to police the amended Broadcasting and Television Act which the old Control Board had never exercised (it is arguable whether it had had such power cf. Hall 1976: 161,172) and planning in broadcasting policy was now under direct, unitary ministerial control (Harding 1979: 96). The ABC had been 'brought
into line', by restricting its funding, which, as we saw, forced it to
close 3ZZ, and by placing as its chairman ... "a tough authoritarian
holding ultra-conservative views about the functions of government
and the nature of society" (Harding 1979: 57-58). Though Bland did
not stay long in the job, being rather too intransigent for Fraser's
liking, which had the effect of making ABC affairs into prominent news
(Harding 1979: 97), his replacement did not seek to increase the ABC's
independence. Norgard sought to 'get the ABC out of the headlines',
by leaving the day-to-day running of the ABC to its management and,
according to Harding:

"Fraser had belatedly recognised that, if there was still a
need to control the ABC, it could best be done by letting
management run it. The natural conservatism of a Public
Service oriented organisation would tend to hold radicalism
and dissent in check." (1979: 97)

The same end, government control of the ABC, was thus being pursued
by different means.

The Fraser government's media policies should then be seen as those
of a reformulated political leadership of Australian capital engaged in
consolidating its position as the political representatives of a revised
'power bloc'. The name of the 'game' it is engaged in is 'hegemony';
the aim is to provide for the reproduction of the conditions of class
rule in Australia and the apparatuses of broadcasting are useful re-
sources in this endeavour. To ask who will win the 'game' is to
speculate, but nothing I have said in this section should be taken as
an indication that it is not a real contest.

7.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to indicate the utility of the
approach outlined in this thesis by accounting for a specific set of
historical processes in the terms of the Poulantzas-derived problematic.
Obviously, in one chapter not everything can be included; there are probably many other developments in Australian broadcasting in this period which the above analysis could illuminate, but I hope that by concentrating on government media policy at a fairly general level I may have provided a framework within which such analyses could be worked out.

Whether or not such an approach, such a strategy for developing an understanding of the mass media in Australia, is considered to be useful depends on several things, not least on the criteria one adopts for deciding what is or is not a useful explanation. The generally structuralist point of departure employed in this thesis has, I believe, certain strengths: it attempts to be rigorous in identifying the relations between elements of a social system; it enables links to be made between different areas of enquiry within media sociology, I have attempted here to draw some of the important areas together into a coherent whole; and it attempts to relate our understanding of specific areas, such as the mass media, to the broader, dynamic and historically specific social structure.

How well this work, or the diverse field of 'marxist-structuralism' in general, succeeds in its appointed tasks is a question which must be left for readers to decide.
1. Various accounts of these developments are available. For example Hall (1976), Harding (1979). I do not intend, in this chapter, to deal with all of these phenomena specifically, since to do so in any worthwhile detail would be a much longer project and little in the way of fresh insights would, I think, be gained.

2. These industries are only 'naturally-protected' against commodity-imports not against imports of capital and, in fact, both the building and transport industries have been penetrated to a degree by foreign capital. They are still in a different position from import-competing manufacturers though.

3. O'Shaugnessy in fact argues that each fraction is divided twice, once along the monopoly/non-monopoly line and then into capitalists proper/small capitalists i.e. petty bourgeois producers. Monopoly capitalists are thus opposed to other capitalists and petty bourgeois producers (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 42). I have simplified this for convenience.

4. Since these two blocs have diametrically opposed interests on this issue, tariff policy reveals whose interests are being catered for. In fact O'Shaugnessy's key is more sophisticated than this taking account of exchange-rate policies as well as tariffs per se. (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 51).

5. This involved a fairly high level of tariff-protection for manufacturing capital and the provision of subsidies (such as the super-phosphate bounty) to rural producers to partially compensate them for the loss of income this resulted in.

6. We should note here that both Poulantzas and, following him, O'Shaugnessy are careful to point out that economic dominance and political hegemony are not the same thing, and not necessarily exercised by the same fraction. (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 47-8, Poulantzas 1975: 93).

7. By cutting tariffs by 25% and revaluing the dollar by 7% soon after being elected, Labor gave a boost to mining capital partly at the expense of manufacturing (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 52).

8. See E. W. Campbell The Sixty Rich Families Who Own Australia (Current Book Distributors, Sydney 1963) for the origin and denotation of this term.

9. Patience and Head comment that 'It was not always successful' due to e.g. ministerial ineptitude and opposition control of the senate, but the ALP regime did raise the percentage of G.N.P. going through the public sector and began to alleviate some inequalities (1979: 284-5).

10. Rowley suggests that Whitlam's electoral defeat in 1975 should then be attributed to a loss of proletarian support (the blue collar ALP vote declined from 63% in 1972 to 52% in 1975), rather than to swinging middle-class voters, whose support for Labour in fact remained steady at around 44% (no clear figures given, Rowley 1976: 12).
11. The case of migrant groups is of particular relevance in the case of broadcasting policy since their perceived special needs led to the establishment of two new types of broadcasting institution. These are discussed later in this chapter.

12. This factor goes some way towards explaining why the ALP is necessarily reformist; it is constrained by the structural role of the capitalist state in e.g. 'managing' the economy, keeping law and order etc. This is not to say that this structure is immutable, but it does exist and does constrain the actions of governing parties.

13. By raising the base level of social services in e.g. education and health the margin between the base and summit is put under pressure, the 'margin for skill' may be devalued.

14. Labor's share of the total House of Reps. vote in 1972, 1974 and 1975 was 49.6%, 49.3% and 42.8%, a nett loss of 6.8% or approximately 450,000 votes (Penniman 1977: 351-6).

15. This support being important, given the way the 1975 'coup' was produced by the refusal of supply by the Senate. Arguably, the banks could have cooperated with Labor's attempts to get around this, but they didn't. We may note that Labor's search for cheap finance for mineral development had not endeared it to banking capital (O'Shaugnessy 1978: 53n).

16. Not 'simply reducible' since structural constrains (see note 7), the peculiarities of the electoral system, and the fact that the political parties do not simply reflect class positions, complicate the issue.

17. Strictly speaking the media combines do not form a monopoly since they compete with one another. However in a wider sense media ownership in Australia is monopolist (cf. McQueen 1977: 35).

18. Murdoch finally acquired Channel 10 in Sydney and Melbourne in 1980, a move which is currently under investigation by the Broadcasting Tribunal, but which was completed by big spending on the stock market in acquiring Ansett Transport Industries the licencees of Channel 10 (formerly Channel 0) in Melbourne.

19. See Below, Section 7.6.

20. Semi-independent since David Syme & Co., the proprietors of the Age group are themselves partly owned by the Fairfax group. See Appendix.

21. In employing personal pronouns such as 'themselves' I am aware that an incorrect image of apparatuses as simple tools, rather than complex organisations with their own internal struggles may be conveyed. This is not my view. The usage here is for convenience only and it is not my intention to suggest that the processes in which ideologies are formed and aligned in e.g. the press may be reduced simply to the whims and predispositions of the 'press barons', though plainly these are not irrelevant either (cf. Lloyd 1977: 180).
22. It is, of course, quite possible to be a non-Marxist socialist but this is not the position conveyed by these two contradictory articles.

23. For example see Lloyd, C. & Clark, A. Kerr's King Hit (Cassel, Sydney 1976); Kelly, P. The Unmaking of Gough (Angus & Robertson, Sydney 1976); Oakes, L. Crash Through or Crash (Drummond, Melbourne 1976).

24. The A.L.P. leadership told the unions and its other supporters not to go beyond traditional parliamentary-political channels in 'maintaining their rage'.

25. Labor may have been over-cautious of course, but this is a different matter.

26. The 'Friends of the ABC' organisation was formed after Labor's defeat but is still illustrative of the sources of support for media reform (Harding 1979: 53, Blain 1977: Ch.1).

27. During the strike by journalists at News Ltd. for example the printers gave some limited support to the journalists (cf. Lloyd 1977: 193).

28. Other important conservative strongholds included certain sections of the public service, the judiciary and so on.

29. 3CR for example is prohibited by its (self-generated) charter from broadcasting sexist, racist or anti-worker views.

30. That is 3ZZ allowed these groups to organise themselves as 'ethnic groups' and to identify themselves as e.g. Greeks, rather than as New Australians.

31. For an account of the establishment of 3ZZ which gives this impression see Dugdale (1979: Ch.1).

32. Though the reasons for this are too complex to be entered into here, I am not suggesting that these alternative radio stations would have made a decisive difference. We might also note that the ALP does own a number of radio stations but these are very conservatively run (N.J. 9: 6-7).

33. Other Liberal leaders such as McMahon had been recognisably associated with the urban-based manufacturing capital fraction. I am not suggesting for a moment here that the Liberals abandoned manufacturing capital, merely that they now represent a new alliance of capitalist fractions in which the prominent position of manufacturing-capital is now at least shared with mining capital.

34. 'Liberal-Doing The Job' was one rather inelegant slogan employed in the 1977 election campaign.

35. They were not altogether excluded from this field however and several of the 'Big Four' media combines hold some shares in FM radio companies.
APPENDIX A

DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED TELEVISION PROGRAMMES
(By number of hours, including repeats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imported</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada/CBC (W)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada/RC (W)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/16 commercial (W)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/18 non-commercial (W)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina/Canal 9BA (A)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina/Canal 11BA (A)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (W)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (W)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic/Canada 3/9 (A)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (W)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico/Telesistema (A)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (W)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany/ARD (A)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>Norway (A)</td>
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<td>Sweden (A)</td>
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<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland/Deutschw (W)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
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<td>United Kingdom/ITV (W)</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>Bulgaria (A)</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.D.R. (A)</td>
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<td>Poland (A)</td>
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<td>Romania (A)</td>
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<td>73</td>
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<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia/Beograd</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia (A)</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>China/Shanghai (W)</td>
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<td>Taiwan/Enterprise (A)</td>
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<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hong Kong/RTV &amp; HK-TVB English (W)</td>
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<td>Hong Kong/RTV &amp; HK-TVB Chinese (W)</td>
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<td>Japan/Commercial stations</td>
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<td>Korea/Tong-yang (A)</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>Malaysia (A)</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines (A)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore (W)</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand/Army TV (W)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dubai (A)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irqa (A)</td>
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<td>Israel (A)</td>
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<td>Kuwait (A)</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon/Telibor (A)</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi-Arabia/Riyadh TV (W)</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi-Arabia/Aramco TV (W)</td>
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<td>United Arab Republic (A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.R. Yemen (W)</td>
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<td>Ghana (W)</td>
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<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda (W)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia (W)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
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</table>

A = Annual figures  
W = Data based on sample weeks

APPENDIX B

OWNERSHIP OF AUSTRALIAN MASS MEDIA

1. Metropolitan Daily Papers
   a) Melbourne Herald Group
      Sun News Pictorial(M); Herald(M); Courier Mail(B); Telegraph(B); Advertiser(A); West Australian(P); Daily News(P); Mercury(H)
   b) Fairfax Group
      Sydney Morning Herald(S); Sun(S); Canberra Times(C); Age(M); Australian Financial Review(N)
   c) Murdoch Group
      Daily Telegraph(S); Daily Mirror(S); News(A); Australian(N)
   d) Packer Group
      Nil

2. Weekly Papers
   a) Melbourne Herald Group
      Sunday Press(M); Sunday Mail(B); Sunday Mail(A); Sporting Globe(M); Weekly Times (Rural VP); The Countryman(P); The Sports Review(P)
   b) Fairfax Group
      Sun Herald(S); National Times(N); Sunday Press(M)
   c) Murdoch Group
      Sunday Mirror(S); Sunday Sun(B); Sunday Telegraph(N); Sunday Times(P); Sunday Mail(A)
   d) Packer Group
      Nil

3. Other Papers
   a) Melbourne Herald Group
      South Pacific Post(NG); Niue Gini Toktok(NG); Cairns Post(QP); New Nation(S); Kalgoorlie Miner(WAP); Bendigo Advertiser(VP); Bundaberg News Mail(Q); Daily Mercury(Q); Maryborough Chronicle(Q); Morning Bulletin(Q); Warwick Daily News(Q); Messenger Press(AS)
b) Fairfax Group

Newcastle Morning Herald (NSW); Illawarra Mercury (NSW); Shepparton News (VP); Suburban Publications (8, with Packer); David Syme Publications (10 suburbs M)

c) Murdoch Group

Truth (M), Northern Territory News, Barrier Miner (BH); Dandenong Journal (MS), Northern Daily Leader (NSW); Cumberland Newspapers (23S, 7M, 6B); Sun (London Daily); News of the World (London Weekly); National Star (US Weekly)

d) Packer Group

Maitland Mercury (NSW); Manning River Times (NSW); Lower Hunter News Pictorial (NSW); Cessnock Advertiser (NSW); Suburban Publications

4. Magazines

a) Melbourne Herald Group

Listener-In TV (M); Australasian Post (N); Home Beautiful (N); Your Garden (N); Aircraft (N); 3 half-yearlies, 1 yearly, 4 bi-yearlies

b) Fairfax Group

Woman's Day (N)*; Pix/People (N); Dolly (N); Belle (N); Pol (N); Woman's World (N); Cosmopolitan (N); Walkabout (N)* (now (1980) emerged)

c) Murdoch Group

New Idea (N); TV Week (N); Best Bets (N); Parade (N); The Australian Student (N)

d) Packer Group

Woman's Weekly (N); TV Times (N); Bulletin (N); Australian Home Journal (N); Cleo (N); KG Murray Group (N); 28 Monthlies; 28 bi-monthlies; 15 quarterlies, 4 half-yearlies, 57 yearlies

5. Radio

a) Melbourne Herald Group

VH Stations, Vic.2; Qld.3; SA.4; WA.4; Tas.1

b) Fairfax Group

Macquarie Network - 30 stations, David Syme Trust - 15 stations, David Syme Co. 1 station

c) Murdoch Group

4 stations, WA.2; NSW.1; SA.1
d) **Packer Group**

5 stations

6. Television

a) **Melbourne Herald Group**

HSV(M); BTQ(B); ADS(A); TVT(H)

b) **Fairfax Group**

ATN(S); QTQ(B); CTC(C)

c) **Murdoch Group**

NWS(A): WIN(NSW) (since 1980 Ten 10 and ATV10)

d) **Packer Group**

TCN(S): GTV(M)

7. Other

a) **Melbourne Herald Group**

J.C. Williamson(1/3)

b) **Fairfax Group**

Australian Newsprint Mills Holding Ltd.(30%)

c) **Murdoch Group**

Bay Books Ltd., Festival Records Pty. Ltd. Nationwide Air Services

d) **Packer Group** (Since 1980, Ansett Airlines)

Nil

**CODE:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Melbourne Suburban</td>
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**SOURCE:** Western 1975; 12-13. (Format Adapted)

Principal developments since 1975 in brackets.
### APPENDIX C

**METROPOLITAN TELEVISION STATION RATINGS (7-10 p.m.)**
*(average all surveys, calendar 1971, sets in use)*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>ATN-7</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCN-9</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEN-10</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABN-2</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>HSV-7</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GTV-9*</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ATV-0</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABV-2</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>BTQ-7</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QTQ-9</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TVQ-0</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABQ-2</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
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<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>NWS-9</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADS-7</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
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<td>SAS-10</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>12.1%</td>
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<td>Perth</td>
<td>TVW-7</td>
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<td>STW-9</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
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<td>Hobart</td>
<td>TVT-6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ABT-2</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
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SOURCE: Adapted from Western 1975: 29

* now A.T.V.10
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