AUTHORITY, SOCIAL CHARACTER, AND PERSONALITY

Some Remarks on Concept Formation in the Social Thought of Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Erich Fromm

A Thesis

submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

of

The Australian National University

by

Sylvia Thomm

July, 1976
The author confirms that all parts of the thesis are her own original work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge the encouragement and help given to her by the staff of the Sociology Department, SGS, at The Australian National University. She is particularly indebted to her supervisor, Dr. Peter E. Glasner for patiently reading and commenting upon the often 'unreadable' initial drafts of the thesis. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to Dr. Michael Tooley, who is now the author's husband, for his helpful suggestions on philosophical questions and encouragement at every stage of its preparation.
The study is an exercise in the sociology of sociology. It is mainly concerned with the problem of the influence of ideology upon the internal structures of social thought. From this perspective, the author examines the social thought of Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Erich Fromm as a distinct institutional and ideological product. The first part of the thesis is concerned with the social setting of their work, the 'intellectualisation' of Marxism at the Frankfurt Institut für Sozialforschung in the twenties and thirties, the relationships between scholars at the Institute and other Marxists, and their sympathies with German psychoanalysts of the 'left'. In Parts II and III of the thesis, the author examines the actual content of the ideas expressed by these authors, contrasting those of Fromm with the different perspectives of Horkheimer and Adorno. Here concern with their 'critical' or 'dialectical method' takes precedence over consideration of theory. The author takes seriously the attempt of these scholars to understand the world, and particularly the capitalist world in its 'totality'. From a sociological perspective the various levels within their total system of thought are examined, beginning with an exposition of the assumptions of the authors about the world - man, society, history, nature. This is followed by a discussion of how they break down the 'totality' into interrelated units. Discussion of their concepts of character and personality reveals the structured interdependence of these units. Finally, examination of the process of inquiry attempts to show how the details in their concepts and theories are arrived at.
The author was particularly interested in the continuities and discontinuities in Horkheimer's program of social research as he and the Institute moved from one social setting to another - from the Weimar Republic to the United States of America.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I  BACKGROUND</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Intellectualisation of Marxism</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Psychoanalysis at the Institute in the Early Thirties</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II  ERICH FROMM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Erich Fromm's Humanist Reading of Marx and Freud</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Erich Fromm: Authority and Social Character</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Authoritarian Character</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III  MAX HORKHEIMER AND THEODOR W. ADORNO</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Transplantation of the Institute to America</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Horkheimer and Adorno's Humanism and Epistemological Concerns</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Social and Psychological Theory</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Typologies</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The Authoritarian Personality</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONCLUSIONS</strong></td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDICES</strong></td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

To study the thought of Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and the early writings of Erich Fromm, means to familiarise oneself with 'Critical Theory' or the 'Frankfurt School', the tendency in German Marxism which had such a dramatic impact upon the revolutionary ideas of the student 'left' in the Federal Republic of Germany in the sixties. The sixties saw the emergence of a 'New Left' in Europe as a result, Habermas (1967:261) writes, of the publication of the Paris Manuscripts in which Marx developed his theory of 'alienation', and of general disillusionment with the practical reality of Soviet communism. But unlike the new theorists of the left, who became popular at this time in France (Althusser) and Italy (Della Volpe) with new 'schools' of Marxism, the Critical Theorists had begun to 'reshape' Marxist theory before the Second World War. In addition, the influence of Critical Theory was not confined to the land of its origin, as was initially the case with the Marxist theories of Althusser and Della Volpe, but had an almost immediate impact on 'left' politics in the sixties in the USA. The latter was due in large part to the emigration of these scholars to the USA. Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Europe after 1949 but Herbert Marcuse - a principal contributor to the development of Critical Theory - remained in America, influencing the claims of student radicals in that country. By the 1970's, however, as Dieter Erb (1974) points out, the consensus was that critical theory had failed to demonstrate itself as the 'motor' and the student movement as the 'agent'
of revolution. The violent disruptions of Adorno's final lectures in 1969 by students evidenced these dissatisfactions.

Nonetheless, despite the loss of practical relevance of Critical Theory to revolutionary movements, there are themes contained within it, such as the examination of society's claims and practices, the attempt to clarify the political content of particular ideas and behaviour, and the endeavour through the combination of Marxist and psychoanalytic insights to achieve a higher level of historical and psychological 'self-knowledge', which make its study a worthwhile one.

The author's interest in the social thought of the 'Frankfurt School' was first aroused in the late sixties, while completing an undergraduate degree in sociology. Dissatisfaction with the dominant functionalist framework in sociology and attempts to 'merge' functionalist explanation with an 'action' framework, led her to explore alternatives. Like others in the sixties, the author was interested in the resistance of the Critical Theorists at Frankfurt to formalisation of theory and their refusal to treat current social structures as in any way 'given'. The result was a masters thesis (1972), exploring the theoretical and methodological implications for sociology of R. K. Merton's structural functionalist framework and Jürgen Habermas' dialectical or 'reflexive' approach to the study of society. The writer's sympathy to the general humanist ideals expressed in the work of the Critical Theorists and to their sustained critique of capitalist civilisation guides this further examination of earlier developments in their social research program.
The approach used to study this program may be said to fall under the heading of the broad spectrum of studies, described by the 'sociology of sociology', in that one of the main focuses of the thesis is on the social context of sociological knowledge as a form of 'auto-critique' (Curvitch, 1971: 59). From this point of view, a reason for selecting the research and theory of Horkheimer, Adorno and Fromm, from among the large volume of studies of other scholars associated with the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, was that it provides material on one of the more interesting questions for the sociology of sociology - how a given orientation in social thought transforms itself as it goes from one social setting to another. In addition to the common socio-psychological concerns of these authors, it was felt that the research of Fromm into the nature and incidence of the authoritarian character in Germany could provide a fruitful contrast with the later research into the authoritarian personality directed by Horkheimer and Adorno in America. Moreover, the author was interested in finding out in exactly what respects the study of The Authoritarian Personality is atypical from the point of view of Critical Theory - how far it was affected by the external relations of Horkheimer and Adorno with American academia.

Examination of the research of the above authors involved making several assumptions which are outlined here. It involved the assumption that their work can be viewed as a distinct institutional and ideological product. As an institutional product, this means that while the analyses of Erich Fromm diverge in important respects from those of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, who collaborated on
many of the early formulations of Critical Theory, they are regarded as falling within the same general problematic. It was felt that intellectual differences, in fact, would serve to illuminate more strongly individual positions and the assumptions of the problematic as a whole.

With regard to the ideological nature of the research, the assumption, briefly alluded to above - that examination of the context in which individuals come to hold certain ideas and formulate certain rules and standards is important - was made. In addition, following Florian Znaniecki (1940), the author also assumed that the evaluative nature of the content of ideas is revealed in study of the publics they were addressing. Examination of these sorts of things is generally confined to the first part of the thesis and to the initial chapters of Part III. The remainder of the thesis is concerned with the content of the ideas and research of the authors.

In order to compensate for the reductionist tendency inherent in relating ideas solely to the non-ideational base, the author went on to consider the actual content of the ideas expressed. Here, it was assumed that these ideas possess a fundamental unity and coherence, or alternatively, that the problematic - the substantive questions asked, which include concepts, methods and theories - could be viewed as a distinct entity from the outside (Glucksmann, 1974). The danger of 'artificiality', which lies in this enterprise - in making their ideas more consistent than they really are - it is suggested, is outweighed by new insights into their work, offered by a sociological perspective, which treats their research, not as a product of a single discipline, but which takes seriously
their attempt to understand "men as the producers of their total historical forms of life," in which the demarcation between academic disciplines has not been central.

In the thesis, as the words in the title - concept formation - indicate, and following Bertell Ollman's (1973: 491-510) discussion of Marx, questions of the critical or dialectical method of these writers take precedence over questions of theory, although it is hoped that the discussion of method illuminates important aspects of theory, such as the nature of monopoly capitalism, the autonomy of the individual, the transition to socialism, the nature of a rational society and the political foundations of thought. Examination of the method of these writers in its totality reveals the interlinking of theory and concept formation on the various levels of the totality. Again, we have followed Ollmann in starting with exposition of the assumptions of the authors of the world as a totality - man, society, history, nature. This is followed by a discussion of their epistemology, or how they break down this totality into interrelated units. The structured interdependence of these units is revealed in their concepts - character and personality. Finally, a discussion of inquiry attempts to show how they fill in the details.

As far as possible, the author has used original German sources. The quality of recent German translations of the work of Horkheimer and Adorno in particular was found to fluctuate enormously.
NOTES

1. Critical Theory or as it was earlier known, Critical Materialism is discussed in the thesis. By the 'Frankfurt School', we refer to those closely associated with the formulation of Critical Theory - in the thirties, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Friedrich Pollock - and those associated with its further development in the sixties - Alfred Schmidt, Jürgen Habermas, Albrecht Wellmer and Kurt Lenk.
PART I

BACKGROUND

That Germany is associated with the meeting up in the early 1890s of the first systematic institute in Germany to study questions of an economic nature, undertaken by a former pupil of the social, economic, and political conditions surrounding the situation of the Jewish community in Germany, was due to the fact that Germany was a focal point for economic and social developments. In the early 1890s, the foundation of societies for the advancement of social questions and the implementation of democratic values in human society emerged out of it as an early initiative at the time relatively unsophisticated of related demands. In addition, questions of the financial and economic repercussions of the Jews in Germany, who were increasingly involved in the economic life of the country, became a focal point of discussion. For a fuller and more accurately documented account of the intellectual questions, the reader is referred to Martin Jay's book, The Protestant Enlightenment (1973). The author does not aspire to outline a complete history of the intellectual and ideological material contained within the 208 essays of Jay's stunning volume, but to give sufficient background material for the reader to place the discussions of the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Friedrich von Hayek, which follow in historical perspective.

Because, in the attempt to understand the social history of nineteenth-century Germany, Marxism and social theory is seen within a mastery of their more general political philosophy, it was felt important to spell out some of the social and political events in late-nineteenth-century Germany which preceded the thought of the founders of the Institute and against which they were reacting. In this respect, the reader is referred to Jacob Burckhardt's handsome recent survey of German society and politics, Society and Democracy in Germany (1965). In which
CHAPTER I

THE INTELLECTUALISATION OF MARXISM

This chapter is concerned with the setting up in 1923 of the first academic institute in Germany to study Marxism as an independent intellectual subject. A brief outline is presented of the social, economic and political circumstances surrounding the founding of the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt am Main. The Institute was first to become a focal point for many students and academics in the early sixties who, in demanding democratisation of social institutions and replacement of technocratic values by humane ones, became aware of it as an early (albeit, at the time, relatively unheard) voicing of related demands. In addition, questions of who financed it, who was involved in it from the start, for what purposes it was endowed, who directed, and what kind of Marxism it professed to follow, are discussed. However, for a fuller and more extensively documented account of the latter questions, the reader is referred to Martin Jay's book, The Dialectical Imagination (1973). The author does not aspire in one short chapter to match the wealth of biographical and ideational material contained within the 300 pages or so of Jay's absorbing volume, but to give sufficient background material for the reader to place the discussions of the work of Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, which follow, in historical perspective.

Because, in the thesis, an understanding of the social thought of Horkheimer, Adorno and Fromm is sought within a reading of their more general political philosophy, it was felt important to spell out here the social and political events in Weimar Germany which preoccupied the thought of the founders of the Institute and against which they were reacting. In this respect, the reader is referred to Ralf Dahrendorf's excellent recent survey of German society and politics, Society and Democracy in Germany (1968), in which
Dahrendorf examines the structure of the different social strata and political institutions in terms of the short history of liberal democracy in Germany.

There are two points that are of interest and which are relevant to an understanding of the Germany of the 1920's. First, there is Dahrendorf's presentation of a society undergoing, immediately prior to the First World War, late, rapid, and thorough industrialisation on a scale far surpassing that of England or France. Dahrendorf wrote that during Germany's industrialisation, the state emerged as the largest entrepreneur. It combined this function with a kind of state socialism in the form of an extensive welfare system and comprehensive industrial legislation.

Second, Dahrendorf pointed out that there was a 'slowness' on the part of the German people during the short period of Weimar democracy to freely and publicly assert their political interests. (Dahrendorf wants to argue that this has continued in Germany up until the present day.) Dahrendorf wrote:

For a long time, the social and political rights of participation were far from universal; but above all people were tied by the fetters of tradition so that they could not grow into the modern citizen role. Despite all technical and economic progress, people remained tied and thus unable, and often unwilling to carry their interests freely into the market of political decision. Predemocratic patterns of behaviour remained prescribed for large groups, and this could all too easily turn into the anti-democratic behaviour of a nostalgic demand for the nest warmth of the closed society. (Dahrendorf, 1968:387)

There was a tendency in Weimar, Dahrendorf argued, for people not to welcome the 'modern' politics of the Republic, but to hark back to that blend of "authoritarian severity and benevolence" they had traditionally come to expect from their
rulers. There were, thus, tensions in Weimar emanating from rapid capitalist concentration and the attempt to establish a liberal/democratic regime upon the social and political structures of a predemocratic past.

Politically, the creation and character of the Republic was due to the *solidly working class* Social Democratic Party which came to power after 1918. The major theorist and codifier of the Social Democratic Party was Karl Kautsky. Already before World War I, Kautsky had committed the party to a policy of gradual social and economic *evolution*, but because of the party's lack of *real* power to influence *important* political decisions, he had attempted to combine gradualism with a rhetoric of revolution. In this respect, Lewis Coser (1972: 178) pointed out that Bernstein's revisionism with its stress on reform and gradualism threatened to undermine the 'revolutionary baggage' of Kautsky by exposing "the gap between theory and actual practice in his party."

Moreover, by 1917 it became clear - particularly from its reaction to events in Russia - that Social Democracy was the expression of a mass movement that had lost its revolutionary impulse. The seizure of power by the Bolshevists in November 1917 was originally intended to spark off proletarian revolution in Germany too, for Lenin had been convinced that world socialist revolution was imminent and that the decisive battle would be fought in Germany. But as Lichtheim (1972: 114-5) has observed, the German revolution "never transgressed the boundaries of bourgeois society." What in fact happened was that in November 1918 Ebert, leader of the German socialist government and Groener, representing Hindenberg and the other army leaders after the Emperor's abdication, entered
into an informal alliance. This was hoped to commend the German Republic to the Western Powers as a shield against Bolshevism.

However, as Lichtheim also pointed out, the credibility which the generals sought to establish was in part bought at the expense of the "bloody suppression" of the German Left, particularly the murders of the leaders of the Spartacists, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in January 1919. Jay (1973 :14) noted that although there is no hard evidence that Horkheimer ever belonged to a political party, his early sympathies were with Rosa Luxemburg, and especially, her critique of the Bolshevists' proposals for central organisation of power. But it is also important to note when considering the political philosophies of the group of 'left' intellectuals at Frankfurt, that Luxemburg, as her biographer, J.P. Nettl(1966 :5) commented, raised, in reaction to Kautsky-anism, the question of the separation"between 'theory' and 'praxis', between postulating revolution and being revolutionary." Horkheimer's position differed from Luxemburg's total identification with spontaneous revolution emanating from the masses.

With the founding of the Third International in March 1919, the main issue in the socialist movement which came to divide Communists and Social Democrats was that between proletarian dictatorship, interpreted as one-party rule on the Russian model of workers' councils on the one hand, and socialism within parliamentary democracy on the other. In Germany, Communist parties arose under Social Democratic rule but they had little impact upon the mass of the workers, and were easily suppressed. By 1924, the hope of a revolu-
tion in Germany was generally recognised by Marxists to be illusory and Russia became the 'spiritual fatherland' of all Communists.

It is in this context of the defeat of the German proletarian revolution; rapid capitalist industrialisation accompanied by the bureaucratisation of life; the imposition of liberal democracy which interfered with the aristocratic-bourgeois symbiosis (practical political power had always been in the hands of the aristocracy, who exercised it for a bourgeoisie that politically was a 'laughing stock' and the butt of cartoonists); and the events in Russia; that the founding of the Frankfurt Institute by a group composed mainly of socialists and Jews has to be understood.

There is nothing unusual in itself about the formation of institutes, particularly where new disciplines are seeking to establish themselves. Moreover, in contrast to the political climate of uncertainty and disappointments, the Weimar years were characterised by an upsurge in intellectual experimentation and diversity. The Weimar institutes - the Psychoanalytische Institut and the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin; the Kulturhistorische Bibliothek Warburg in Hamburg; and the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt - were distinctive in that they were all conceived, and they all thrived, in a cultural climate characterised by tremendous intellectual excitement and 'cultural flowering'. There were tremendous advances made in Gestalt psychology. Further, there was the diffusion and extension of the ideas of Freudian psychology, the maturation of German Expressionism, the experiments by Walter Gropius in architecture, and the literary activity of novelists and playwrights, such as Thomas Mann, Ernst Jünger,
Walter Benjamin and Kurt Tucholsky.

The question of whether the impression of 'cultural flowering' given by writers about Weimar is due to the popularity of art forms already ascendant prior to World War I, as for example, Thomas Mann's novels, or, to the popularity of the ideas of intellectuals belonging to the Weimar period after they had emigrated as many did, for example, the novels written by Arthur Koestler, is left to the historian. What is of interest here is that historians seem to agree, first, that the so-called 'intelligentsia' of Weimar consisted of "disparate groups holding conflicting views about almost everything," (Laqueur, 1970:216) and, secondly, that political commitment among this group as a whole declined between 1920-9. Initially, right-wing intelligentsia were shocked by German military defeat, and after the events of 1919 enthusiasm for the Social Democracy of the Republic declined among the left. Furthermore, the monopolization of the Third International by Russian ideologues, and Lenin's unsuccessful attempts to transfer the notion of 'centralism', and the conception of voluntaristic activism initiated by professional revolutionaries, to the European scene eventually lost the Communists support among 'left' intellectuals. Henry M. Pachter (1972) has claimed that the intellectuals, finding no political party they could identify with, felt themselves alienated in the Republic.

Political alienation, however, was certainly not accompanied by social and economic discrimination. According to Pachter, the intellectuals had no cause for complaint as far as social prestige, wealth, and freedom to express unpopular views was concerned - they were the most 'comfortable' rebels
in history. But in the new age of 'mass democracy', Pachter commented that discontent among intellectuals of both 'right' and 'left' was due to lack of power:

There is a further suspicion that what was lacking to fascinate intellectuals was not so much Geist as Macht. (Pachter, 1972 :232)

Definite 'insiders' as far as wealth, prestige, and money were concerned, intellectuals tended to view politics from 'outside' political movements.

It was in this atmosphere that Felix Weil, son of the millionaire German grain merchant, Hermann Weil (who had amassed his fortune in Argentina) decided in conjunction with Karl and Hedda Korsch to call together a small informal group in the summer of 1922 to discuss the different trends in Marxism. Much of the time was apparently devoted to discussion of a manuscript by Karl Korsch, entitled, Marxismus und Philosophie (1925) which appeared in print two years after the publication by Georg Lukacs of a collection of essays entitled, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1923). Lukacs also attended the week-long session of the Summer Academy.

In addition, the participants at the Summer Academy included: Friedrich Pollock, Karl A. Wittfogel, Bela Fogarasi, Karl Schmückle, Breis Roninger, Konstantin Zetkin, Julian Gumperz and Richard Sorge. It is interesting to note that Richard Sorge, who was active in organising political action among mineworkers, later turned out to be a Communist Spy. Jay (1973 :13) has suggested that he may have been using his connection with 'academia' as a cover for his political activities. He may, however, have been informing about the activities of this group for the Communists.

Lichtheim (1972 :211) commented that what passed at this time
for philosophy in Russia and, thus, for Communists of the Third International was a codified Marxism-Leninism. Lichtheim wrote:

For practical purposes the only significant development of Marxist theorising during the 1920's and 1930's occurred in Central Europe, and its authors were heretics whose writings remained highly suspect from the Soviet-Marxist standpoint. (Lichtheim, 1971: 211)

It is, perhaps, understandable that the Communists would be curious about these preliminary efforts on the part of German intellectuals to re-examine the roots of Marxist thought. Besides, of those who attended the Summer Academy, Wittfogel, Gumperz, Lukacs and Korsch, like Sorge, were members of the Communist Party.

Out of the Summer Academy grew the idea for a more permanent arrangement. Felix Weil decided to form an institute. Jay (1972: 6) noted that Max Horkheimer lent his support to Weil's proposal for an independently endowed institute to examine topics neglected in normal university curricula, such as the history of the labour movement and the origins of anti-Semitism. The founders, however, decided it would be prudent to seek affiliation with the recently established University of Frankfurt, and an agreement was reached with the Ministry of Education that the director should hold a chair of the university as a governmentally salaried full professor. This meant that an older man was needed to act as director until one of the younger founding members was old enough to acquire a university chair.

At first Kurt Albert Gerlach, an economist from the Technische Hochschule in Aachen under whom Sorge worked as a graduate student, was foreseen. Unfortunately, Gerlach suddenly died in October 1922 before he could take on
such a task. Another older man, Carl Grünberg, was invited in Gerlach's place.

Grünberg had started his career as a lawyer in his native Roumania before entering the University of Vienna as a lecturer in economics in 1894. From 1909 to the time of his appointment to the directorship of the Institut für Sozialforschung in 1924, Grünberg had held the chair in political economy at the University of Vienna. In retrospect, Nenning (1966: V-XV) has called him the father of 'Austro-Marxism'. This is a little misleading. Norbert Leser (1968: 177) has commented that Nenning's remark is only true in so far as Grünberg's pupils at the University of Vienna were outstanding 'Austro-Marxists', not Grünberg. Grünberg's own Marxism was historical in character. He was extraordinarily well-acquainted with historical schools of political economy, and, according to Alfred Schmidt (1970: 5-6), greatly interested in economic and social history as well as the history of ideologies. Grünberg is, perhaps, best remembered among Marxist scholars for his fifteen volume Grünberg Archiv (1911-30). In the introduction to the first volume, Grünberg (1911: II-III) set out the only criterion for contributors: the use of "recognised historical methods" to study social and economic thought as well as the history of the labour movement and socialism. He did not specify a political direction for articles. However, once installed as director of the new Frankfurt Institute - which had already been functioning for a year without a director, his policy changed.

The tenor of Grünberg's address in dedicating the Institute in 1924 left no doubt about Grünberg's own Marxism nor about the fact that the future research of the Institute
would be 'guided by Marxism. Referring to the uncertain economic and political situation in Germany, Grünberg argued that they were in a period of transition - that of capitalism to socialism. In view of political events, he had, moreover, set on one side his reservations about 'scientific socialism' and come round to the view that historical research should be guided by Marxism understood in a purely scientific sense. For Grünberg (1924:10), Marxism described a "closed economic system, a definite Weltanschauung, and a clearly defined method of research." Alfred Schmidt (1970:16) has pointed out that by 'Weltanschauung', Grünberg was not referring to any dialectical insight, but was expressing at best a "naive optimism" about the future course of history, which he wanted to study within the framework of historical materialism. Schmidt (1970:7) commented further that, although Grünberg was careful to distinguish his method from philosophical materialism and warned of the dangers of using abstract categories in a mechanistic fashion, the 'contradictions' or 'dialectical moments' were diluted in Grünberg's reading of Marx. The result was that his interpretation of history tended to be evolutionary.

Nonetheless, Grünberg was the first professorial Marxist at a German University. The Grünberg Archiv became the journal of the new Institute, which was dedicated to establishing the intellectual and systematic status of Marxism. In general, the articles in the journal are devoted to material history. They include: studies of international labour (Georges Bourgins on French trade unions during the 1914 war, K. Kuwata on the Japanese workers' movement, Paul Haupt's study of Danish workers and Karl A. Wittfogel on Chinese workers);
studies of the international socialist movement (Ludwig Birkenfeld on the Socialist Workers' International, Bernard Reichenbach's history of the German Communist Party, Max Nettlau on the Spanish International and Georges Weill on the French Communist Party); biographical essays (Jan Romein on Franz Mehring, Robert Michels on Kurt Eisner, Alfred Stern on Friedrich Beusts and Stephan Bauer on St. Simon); empirical studies of socialism (S. Gorgas' article on religious socialism and Rodolfo Mondolfo's article on the middleclass and Italian socialism); and articles on theoretical socialism (Henryk Grossmann on a new theory of imperialism, Wilhelm Mautner on the history of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Robert Michels on the concept of the proletariat under pre-capitalism).

In addition to Grünberg and those present at the Summer Academy - Weil, Pollock, Gumperz - Henryk Grossmann, Franz Borkenau and Max Horkheimer were official members of the Institute during these early years. According to Jay (1973:16) Borkenau was an active Communist Party member from 1921-9. His brief involvement with the Institute resulted in the highly scholarly study of the ideological changes accompanying the rise of capitalism and published in, Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild (1934). The highly formal economic analyses of Henryk Grossmann form the core of a tradition at the Institute, which was still represented in the fifties by Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, and A. R. L. Gurland. Briefly, Grossmann, who was an economist with a statistical background, tried to work out from Marx's theory of capital accumulation the economic factors that would lead inevitably and irreversibly to the collapse of the capitalist economy. Grossmann
like Grünberg sought to establish the 'scientific' status of Marxism as opposed to its polemical use and ideological appeal.

The work published by the Institute at this time, including the articles appearing in the Grünberg Archiv, while representing 'solid Marxist scholarship' and establishing the status of Marxism as an academic subject, would seem to take us away from the initial concerns of the group that met in the Black Forest in 1922 to 're-examine', in an atmosphere of dissatisfaction with Social Democracy and suspicions about Marxism-Leninism, the foundations of Marx's political philosophy.

But the enthusiasm generated at the Summer Academy only lay dormant. Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) was widely read and commented by both German and Russian Marxists, as was Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy* (1925) which appeared in the first issue (1925) of the Grünberg Archiv after it had become the official journal of the Institute. Lukacs' book was reviewed by Josef Revai, one of his pupils, in the same issue. In addition the Archiv printed an occasional 'theoretical' article. There was an article by Lukacs on "Moses Hess and the Problems of the Idealist Dialectic" (1926) followed in 1929 by a long critical essay written by Karl Korsch on "Kautsky and the Materialist Conception of History," and, finally, an article by Max Horkheimer on, "A New Conception of Ideology" (1930), in which Horkheimer criticised Mannheim's new 'sociology of knowledge'. The discussions surrounding those books and articles serve to link up the ideas on Marxism expressed at the Summer Academy with those developed under Max Horkheimer's directorship.
after 1930.

Both Georg Lukacs and Karl Korsch attended the Institute's seminars, but they were never admitted to full membership. Jay (1973:14) wrote that, in Korsch's case, his political activism, and what other members regarded as an 'instability' in his character counted against him being invited to participate fully in Institute research. In the case of Lukacs, his loyalty to the party was stronger than the pull of intellectual independence. Unlike Korsch, Lukacs did not reply to his critics, and even by the time his book was published in 1923, he had shifted his position to accommodate to the dictates of the Communist International. Paul Breines (1972:86) wrote that both Lukacs and Korsch "saw the Party and 'work at the Party's need' as the decisive vehicle of historically integrated activity and existence." This political commitment tended to overshadow commitment to theory for Lukacs and Korsch in different ways. While, we noted, Lukacs found he could accommodate his views to those of the party, Korsch's outspoken defence of his views led to his dismissal from the editorship of Die Internationale in 1925 and his expulsion from the Communist Party in 1926.

Because Lukacs and Korsch's work was important for the direction taken by the Frankfurt Institute under Horkheimer's directorship, it is now discussed in a little more detail. First, we noted that their writings have to be understood as a reaction to the orthodoxies of Social Democracy and of the Second International. Second, they provide a reconstruction of Marx's thought as the theory of the proletarian revolution. The latter followed upon the development in Lenin's program, put forward at the Third International in 1919, of 'willed
revolution'. We noted that Lenin, unlike Luxemburg and the Spartacists, did not trust the notion of spontaneous revolution among the masses. He thought that the working classes could only become a revolutionary force if they accepted the leadership of trained revolutionaries. To that effect he initiated a policy of centralism.

But Lenin's policy of centralism, in fact, led the party away from the path of world proletarian revolution. In 1924, Lenin died and Communist uprisings in Bulgaria and Germany in the fall of that year were quashed. The failure of the 'German October' meant the 'outlawing' of the Communist Party by the German government and also loss of its relative independence from Moscow. Hence, the German Communist Party became subject to Russian factional disputes which were resolved in the formulation of a 'scientistic' Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in which the 'economy' had come to be regarded as the 'determining' force in social life.

Paul Breines' (1972) article is an excellent source of material on the reception of Lukacs' and Korsch's work during the twenties by the various Marxist ideologues and parties. For example, Breines (1972:74) noted that Kautsky claimed that for "Korsch Marxism is nothing but a theory of social revolution" and that "Marxism is supposedly correct only for the proletariat." Kautsky argued that Lukacs and Korsch failed to explain the intransigence of historical conditions because of their emphasis upon revolution. Lukacs and Korsch's work, in fact, stood in opposition as a Western theory of revolution, to the centralism of the Communist Party. Breines wrote:
This oppositional project was singularly futile. The 'Verapparatisierung' of the Communist movement, that is its transformation into a bureaucratic apparatus in which all members and units passively followed a unified hierarchy of decision-making, proceeded apace. Those vibrant hopes and theories of the self transformation of the proletariat into the conscious destroyer of capitalism and the builder of an emancipatory Communism which remained in the Communist movement until then were, between 1923 and 1924 quashed and forced into the isolated margins of history. (Breines, 1972:78)

At this time, Marxism came under fire as both an economic theory and a general theory of history. Hence criticisms of the philosophical Marxists abounded. According to Breines (1972:83), Zinoviev, in his opening address of the World Congress of the Communist International in June 1924 openly condemned the 'revisionism' of Lukacs and Korsch.

To turn briefly now to the ideas of Lukacs and Korsch. As noted above, they were at one in reading Marx as providing a theory of proletarian revolution, which hinged for its significance upon grasping the Hegelian element in Marx's writings. In *Marxism and Philosophy*, Korsch emphasised that Marxism cannot be revolutionary as long as it contends that economic conditions are the primary motors of human consciousness. Marxism is only revolutionary, in Korsch's view, in so far as it admits the possibility of human conscious activity ('geistige Aktion') aimed at total change, at transforming the world. He wrote that this requires reconsideration of the dialectical relation of, not only economic, but cultural, ideological and philosophical realities, as moments in the totality of historical life. Pivotal to Korsch's discussion, is the notion of 'praxis' (political activity) and a specification of the unity of 'theory' and 'praxis', of 'consciousness' and 'existence'. Korsch's interest in these questions
was paralleled by his attempt in his own personal life to unify within himself the 'man of ideas' and the 'man of action'. Later Korsch published a further sharp polemic against Kautsky's 'social darwinism' in the *Grünberg Archiv*, in a review of Kautsky's *The Materialist Conception of History* (1927). Korsch wrote that Kautsky left no room for total change requiring *revolutionary activity*.

Lukacs' collection of essays in *History and Class Consciousness* rested on a broader philosophical foundation than did Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy* and covered an assortment of issues not dealt with by Korsch. Here Iring Fetscher's comments are pertinent. Fetscher (1967:19-21) argued that while the Social Democrats and Communists had emphasised the radical difference between the bourgeois and the proletarian revolutions, Lukacs, and later Horkheimer, Benjamin, Adorno and Marcuse stressed the continuity between them, because "the German and Italian bourgeoisie were about under Fascism to betray the ideals of their own past," i.e., just as the proletariat had betrayed the ideals of proletarian revolution. These writers, Fetscher went on, examined the gulf between the liberal principles and humanitarianism of the early bourgeoisie, and the barbarism which they believed that liberal thought had produced within the culture of bourgeois society by a kind of dialectical process. Thus, Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness* may be said to represent not just a return to Hegel, anticipating the Young Marx, but a recovery of certain themes in them, because Lukacs read Marx with the questions of Dilthey, Simmel and Weber in mind. In Lukacs' work, the themes of 'commodity fetishism' and 'capitalist reification' are central, as well as the notion...
that the scientific method when applied to society "turns out
to be an ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie", the idea that
"the reified, fragmented conception of the world" was produced
by a 'bourgeoisie' that had 'socialised' society unconsciously,
and, finally, the notion that the proletariat will shatter the
reified consciousness of capitalism by attaining that con-
sciousness of the world as becoming, as the product of the
relations between men.

The aim of this chapter has been to describe the social,
economic, political, and cultural climate in which the founders
of the Institute met as intellectuals and decided to set up
a research Institute to sort out the various ideologies
attributed to Marx by the Russian and Social Democratic vari-
eties of Marx interpretation. They believed they could do
this by returning to the 'original' Marx. The early group
that met to discuss Marx included Communist Party members and
those that had no particular political affiliation. They
were at one in rejecting all Marxist orthodoxies and dogmas.
The new work on Marx that sparked off debate and the enthusi-
asm for an Institute was the Hegelian Marxism of Lukacs and
Korsch. Lukacs in particular not only pointed to a theo-
retical basis in a more humanist Marx from which to criticise
the later Stalinist variety of socialism but he also provided
a humanitarian basis from which to attack Fascism as the
betrayal of the original ideals of the Enlightenment to free
men from 'blindness' and 'superstition'. While the later
work of the Frankfurt Institute has to be understood both
in the context of the rise of Fascism in Germany, and as
arising out of problems in the Marxist movement itself, the
intellectuals who formed this Institute were not moved to
action. Indeed by 1926 most of them had severed their affiliations with the Communist Party. Lukacs went the other way, following the dictates of the party and eventually recanting his earlier position. After 1926, Lukacs returned to Hungary and had virtually no further contact with the Institute, from whose later work he dissociated himself completely. Korsch also involved himself wholly in politics, attempting to articulate an oppositional movement, 'the decisive left', within the Communist Party, but his efforts were thwarted with the signing of the German-Soviet military treaty in 1926, and Korsch was expelled from the International in June of the same year. Later he edited his own Communist newspaper.

The only official contact maintained with Moscow by the Institute into the thirties was with David Ryazanov, director of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. Photostated copies of unpublished manuscripts by Marx and Engels, received from the headquarters of the German Social Democratic Party in Berlin, were regularly sent to Ryazanov in Moscow who later incorporated them in the famous MEGA (Marx-Engels Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe). In return, Ryazanov invited Pollock to the tenth anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution in Moscow. The result of this trip was a rather pessimistic study of economic planning in the Soviet Union. Institute members thus had early and privileged access to Marx's early writings which were to substantially influence their work.

As far as the Communist and Social Democratic mass movements were concerned, the "Marxism of the professors" was heard only on the fringes of Marxist debate. The critical Marxist theory, developed at Frankfurt by Max Horkheimer in the early thirties was never taken seriously by the 'anti-
intellectual' ideologues of the Stalinist period.

From their privileged material position and position of high social status within 'bourgeois' society of Weimar, members of the Frankfurt Institute were 'comfortable rebels'. Their privately endowed research institute sheltered them further, not only from 'the business of having to make a living', but from all political movements (even among students) within bourgeois society. They could, therefore, criticize the politics of Weimar from the 'outside'. What the Institute was not able to do was to shelter them from the 'anti-intellectualism' of both Stalinism and Fascism, and the threat posed by these new movements to bourgeois culture.
NOTES

1. Dahrendorf's account seems to be the best English treatment of German social structure of this period. Theodor Geiger's sociographic study, carried out in 1925, is a classic. There are also studies in which Germany is dealt with by sociologists in the context of some larger concern. For example, Talcott Parsons' essay, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany," in his volume, Essays in Sociological Theory (1954), in which Parsons argued that the rank order of the military provided the standard for the prestige hierarchy in Germany prior to World War II. There is also J. A. Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1950).

2. The economic units in the form of joint stock and limited liability companies in Germany in the early twentieth century were often more than three times as large as the English ones of the same period. The German economy was characterised by the growth of giant banks, near monopolies and economic syndicates. See Dahrendorf (1968 :36). See also the articles by Friedrich Pollock, one of Horkheimer's 'inner core' colleagues, on the economic crisis during the late twenties and early thirties, which appeared in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (1932 :8-27 and 1934 :321-353).


4. See Peter Gay (1970) for the use of the notion of the 'insider' as 'outsider' and Theodor Geiger (1949 :75).

5. Felix Weil was born in 1898 in Buenos Aires. He was a student at Frankfurt University, completing a doctoral dissertation there in 1921 on political socialisation.

6. The Korschs and Weil were close friends and involved with the whole group around the Malik Verlag, which Weil had also endowed with funds. Felix Weil went to the extent of giving the Korschs the downpayment on their house. See Hedda Korsch (1972 :43).

7. These essays were first published in English, History and Class Consciousness, in 1971.

8. Friedrich Pollock (1894-1970). Pollock was a close friend of Max Horkheimer from as far back as 1911. See Gummior and Ringguth (1973 :13-33) for details about Horkheimer and Pollock's early friendship and Jay (1973) for information about its later 'blossoming'. Pollock, like Horkheimer was the son of a wealthy Jewish industrialist. He was later to become associate director of the Institute and to play a significant role in handling the administrative affairs of the Institute. His publications include; his doctoral dissertation, Sombarts 'Wiederlegung des Marxismus' (1926) and, The Economic and Social Consequences of Automation (1957) as well as several articles in the journal of the Institute.

9. Karl August Wittfogel (1896- ). Jay, having seen the unpublished manuscript of G. L. Ulmen's biography of Wittfogel, wrote that Wittfogel joined the Independent Socialist Party in November 1918 and two years later its Communist successor. Wittfogel became foremost in the field of Marxist studies of China and for his theory of hydraulic societies. The book with which he attained the rank of foremost scholarly
expert on China was, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (1957)

10. Richard Sorge later worked for the Communist Party in Shanghai (1929) and Japan (1933). He informed Moscow of the time of the German attack and the Japanese intention not to take part in the war against Russia. He was imprisoned by the Japanese and possibly executed in 1944.

11. In fact, Lichtheim (1972:211) noted that all that emerged philosophically at this time in Russia was a dull text book by Bukharin.

12. Again Gunmior and Ringguth (1973) and Jay (1973) are major biographical sources. Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) was the son of a wealthy Jewish manufacturer and originally schooled for a business career. Through his friendship with Friedrich Pollock, he developed his interest in literature and philosophy. Horkheimer studied philosophy under Hans Cornelius, obtaining his doctorate and later his 'Habilitation' (which gave him permission to lecture on the basis of a piece of scholarly work) through his work on Kant. In addition to his 'Habilitationsschrift', *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie* (1925), Horkheimer published, *Dämmerung* (1934), a book of aphorisms and, *Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie* (1930) during this period.

13. Jay (1973:8) wrote that Hermann Weil's initial endowment brought in an income for the Institute, amounting to the equivalent of US$30,000.

14. Reticent and reserved, Grünberg himself is scarcely remembered today, but his pupils were outstanding Austro-Marxists: Max Adler, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding and Karl Renner. They were marginally to the left of Kautsky's Marxism. Victor Adler, the founder of Austrian Marxism, was a close political and personal friend of Kautsky.


16. Alasdair MacIntyre (1973:567) quite unreservedly wrote: "The one unquestionably brilliant publication of the Institute was Franz Borkenau's, *The Transition from the Feudal to the Bourgeois World View* (1934) and Henryk Grossmann's reply to it in the Institute's journal, 'The Social Basis of Mechanistic Philosophy ', sets the discussion of the issues firmly in an orthodox Marxist framework." Borkenau tended to be a 'loner', and after his brief association with the Institute wrote several 'classic' works on Communism. For example, *A History of the Communist International* (1938), *European Communism* (1953) and *World Communism* (1962).

17. Henryk Grossman (1881-1950) was professor of economics in Warsaw before Grünberg invited him to Frankfurt. Grossmann was an ardent defender of Marx against all intellectual misrepresentations. In 1929 Grossmann published a major study, *Das Akkumulations-und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems*. For biographical details, see Walter Bräuer (1954:149-51). Bräuer also discusses Grossmann's contribution to Marxism. Grossmann emigrated with other Institute members first to Paris in 1933 and then to New York but in 1949 he became professor of
18. George Lichtheim (1968: 489) wrote that "Lukacs's work provided the chief stimulus for Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, and in this sense he may be said to have been an important link between the sociology of Weber and Simmel and what later became known as Wissenssoziologie."

19. During his years in Germany, Georg Lukacs was exposed to the sociological tradition, particularly the ideas of Max Weber and George Simmel. He was also influenced by the humanism and neo-idealism of Dilthey and Rickert. Lukacs' formulation of the concept of 'reification' owes certain themes to Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes as well as Marx's discussion of 'commodity fetishism'.

20. Lukacs and Korsch's works were widely read. They influenced not only members of the Frankfurt Institute but the French Marxists, Merleau-Ponty and Lucien Goldmann. The only Marxist theorising of any academic merit at this time was done by Western Marxists, i.e., Marxists outside of Russia.

21. In 1930, Lukacs became an associate at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow, where he was able to view the early writings of Marx. In 1933 and 1934, he officially recanted his earlier idealist position and conformed to Stalinist policy.
CHAPTER II

PSYCHOANALYSIS AT THE INSTITUTE IN THE EARLY THIRTIES

This chapter discusses the change of directorship which occurred at the Frankfurt Institute after Grünberg's resignation in 1930, and the "new direction" taken by Max Horkheimer. Of particular concern is the reception given to psychoanalysis by a Marxist Institute at this time.

After Grünberg's resignation, Horkheimer was the clear choice for director of the Institut für Sozialforschung. Neither Weil nor Pollock felt inclined to undertake the responsibility. Horkheimer thus became director of the Institute in 1931, after a Chair of Social Philosophy had been created for him at Frankfurt University.

In his inaugural lecture, delivered at Frankfurt University on January 24, 1931, Horkheimer did not find it necessary to make clear his position on Marx. Instead, he stressed that, unlike the research carried out under Grünberg, who had made no attempt to discuss the implications of a 'philosophical Marx', the research of the Institute would now be *philosophical*. It was clear that the intellectualisation of Marxism was to proceed further during this period, a process culminating in the development of Critical Theory—three decades later, making Horkheimer one of the best-known theoreticians of a Hegelian Marx.

In reaction to the dominant Marxist movements, Horkheimer believed that a really productive reexamination of Marx would necessarily be tied to an analysis of the significance of Hegel for Marx. In this respect he was a representative of that stream of thought founded by Lukacs, Korsch,
and Gramsci, which Merleau-Ponty (1955) was later to call Western Marxism because it broke with the dogma of the Second International and of German Social Democracy.

Horkheimer's reading of Marx, however, differed from that of Lukacs. First, Horkheimer did not subscribe to Lukacs' view, expressed in 1923, that the appearance of the organised proletariat solves the antinomies of history. Horkheimer, like many Marxists after 1926, was beginning to have reservations about the proletariat's role in the historical process, reservations which prevented him from making the proletariat the 'truth', or the 'subject/object' of Hegelian Marxism. Thus, in Dämmerung (1934), Horkheimer wrote of the empirical consciousness of the proletariat: "Insofar as the proletarian opposition in the Weimar Republic did not meet its downfall as a sect, it also fell victim to the spirit of administration." (Horkheimer, 1973:5) Furthermore, on the philosophical level, as Jay (1973:47-65) and Schmidt (1970:10-1) point out, Horkheimer was against all 'metaphysical teleologies', or the postulation of 'absolutes'. For example, in criticising, not Mannheim's relativistic conception of truth whereby all partial truths are viewed as perspectives on the whole, but the absolutist implications of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, Horkheimer (1930) wrote that the lesson of Marx had not been that one should exchange the "old metaphysic" (Hegelian) for a new one, but that the content of knowledge is material and comprises the changes which occur in the concrete social conditions of the lives of individuals. And Horkheimer rejected any attempt to absolutise the latter.
To return to Horkheimer's inaugural address. While Horkheimer made it clear that his understanding of social philosophy was *empirical*, in contrast to some of the conceptions of social philosophy that had been developed in German Idealism, particularly that of Hegel, Horkheimer was also aware of the dangers that a more empirically informed philosophy could encounter, specifically, that of 'absolutising' the material realm. Confronted intellectually with what he viewed as, on the one hand, the 'reification' of ideas by German Idealism and, on the other, the 'reification' of the 'facts' by the social sciences - which he viewed as having developed out of 'positivist' thought - Horkheimer saw his task as that of attempting to overcome this dualism by developing a social philosophy that would clarify the "dialectical" relation between philosophical theory and the scientific 'praxis' of the individual specialisms.

Thus Horkheimer wrote that the function of social philosophy would be to give theoretical impulse to the empirical sciences, while remaining open enough to modify its own framework in the light of new empirical findings. The content of social philosophy would be concerned with individuals in so far as they are members of society, and with their life in "the State, Law, the Economy, Religion - in short, the total material and spiritual culture of humanity." (Horkheimer viewed 'culture' as synonymous with 'civilisation'.) It would be the task of social philosophy to organise research into all these areas. Here he foresaw philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians, and psychologists working together as a *team*. Horkheimer wrote that they
would be:

doing in common what a single researcher in other disciplines is able to do in the laboratory, what all real researchers have always done: namely to examine general philosophical questions with the most developed scientific methods, to modify the questions in the course of their empirical work, to make them more precise, to create new methods, and yet not to lose sight of the general [the relevance of their questions]. (Horkheimer, 1931:11)

Thus, Horkheimer believed that knowledge had to proceed both theoretically and inductively. To that end, he stated that future investigations of the Institute would take the form of a "dictatorship of planned research." Here it seems that with the substitution of empiricism for political activity - empirical concerns for political ones - the 'intellectualisation of Marxism' was complete. The political powerlessness of the Frankfurt group was to be compensated by explorations not into the practical questions of Marxism, but into broader philosophical issues.

Later, in the foreword to the Zeitschrift (1932:1), Horkheimer gives the reader more information about his theoretical premises, and his Marxist starting point. On the level of epistemology, Horkheimer, like Marx, held that there exists a knowable material structure of historical forces beneath of 'chaotic' world of appearances, but he objected to those who had, he argued, made a 'fetish' of Marx's materialist theses. Horkheimer, as is discussed in Part III of the thesis, approached Marx as a nineteenth century thinker. Horkheimer thought that while the "brute facts of economics" play a significant role in determining the social relations of men under capitalism, this is a historical fact, rather than one of 'eternal validity'. Thus, in
Horkheimer's view, not only do forces operating at the level of individual psychology modify the effects of the economic base on social relations (Horkheimer, 1932b:135), but under conditions of twentieth century monopoly capitalism, politics and ideas play a far greater part in determining social relations than Marx had predicted (Horkheimer, 1933). Horkheimer was one of the early opponents of those Marxists whom he charged with underestimating the causal significance of ideas and political processes. He was also an early voice in arguing for the relative autonomy of infra-structural and superstructural processes. Thus he held that research into all areas of man's life in society, and on all theoretical levels, was warranted in the quest for knowledge of the social totality. In his inaugural address, therefore, Horkheimer said that the programme of planned research would examine the question, neglected by Marxists, of the relationships among the social life of the individual, his psychological development, and changes in culture - a question raised by most philosophers, sociologists, and social philosophers at one time or another, and which, Horkheimer claimed, can be framed in the following way:

which relations can be found in specific social groups, in a definite epoch in specific countries between the role of these groups in the economy, changes in the psychic structure of single members, and the ideas and arrangements which they create and are affected by as a whole in the totality of the social process. (Horkheimer, 1931:14)

Having indicated a starting point for empirical investigation, albeit an extremely general one, Horkheimer then went on to outline the research programme of the Institute, which would first concentrate upon analyses of workers and employees
in Germany, before progressing to examine similar strata in other European countries. To this end, it should be noted that Horkheimer was in favour of using every type of advanced method of social analysis available at the time. Thus, for example, the American social survey technique was to be used, together with statistical trends, reports of companies, political organisations, and public bodies, analyses of the economy, and the results of psychological and sociological studies of the press and literature for the relevant groups.

The efforts of the Institute and its predominantly Jewish membership thus began to contrast starkly with the growth in strength of 'anti-intellectual' and 'anti-modern' elements in the 'other Germany', of which Horkheimer and his colleagues had little practical knowledge, and from which they had always been divided by wealth and prestige, and, of late, by their self-created 'ivory tower' - the Institut für Sozialforschung. Nonetheless, members of the Institute were aware of movements in society which threatened to destroy Weimar culture, and to undermine the position of intellectuals within it, particularly those of the left. At the same time, however, they were also aware of their powerlessness to change the course of events. Walter Laqueur has written:

It seems so obvious in retrospect that the intellectuals should have realized that to be effective in politics they ought to have chosen sides, that however repugnant the existing political parties, there was no alternative to working from within these parties. These parties were admittedly neither attractive nor kindly disposed towards the intellectuals. The Social Democrats had always distrusted them, and in the Weimar era they kept them away from positions of influence more than ever. (Laqueur, 1972:223)

The intellectuals at the Institute, like many others in the later years of the Weimar Republic, opted out of politics and
were finally forced to emigrate.

In 1931, the Institute opened a branch office in Geneva. Jay notes that once this was firmly established the bulk of the Institute's endowment was transferred to a company in Holland. (Jay, 1973:26) The branch office was intended to help with the collection of materials for a research project on workers in Europe, but it also provided a way out of Germany which was eventually taken by Horkheimer and Pollock in 1933. Pollock and his assistant Kurt Mandelbaum organised the new office, which was to cope with information from the files of the International Labour Office. Albert Thomas, in Geneva, had given the Institute access to these files. Andries Sternheim also joined Pollock as an assistant, helping mainly with questionnaire preparation. Sternheim became director of the Swiss branch, later known as the Société Internationale des Recherches Sociales, after Pollock emigrated to the United States. Of the original members of the Institute, Grossman continued to publish Marxian analyses of the economy, while Julian Gumperz wrote on politics in the Institute's journal, which now had a new format. Horkheimer had terminated the historically oriented Grünberg Archiv shortly after assuming the position of director. The new journal of the Institute, the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (1932-39), was the main instrument - apart from the publication of books - with which Horkheimer hoped to realise his ambitious programme. Intellectually, in addition to Pollock, Horkheimer had the support of four young researchers who were keen to make his project a reality. They were Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, and Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno,
Leo Löwenthal joined the Institute in 1926 as a sociologist of literature with an interest in popular culture. He became the editor of the new journal of the Institute, to which he also contributed papers on critical literary history. Although these papers of Löwenthal underline Horkheimer's changed emphasis upon factors of the superstructure, Löwenthal's impact on new theoretical developments at the Institute was small compared with that of the other new members. The situation was, for example, quite different in the case of Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse joined the Institute in 1933, after his dissertation on Hegel's ontology - published as a book in 1932 - was reviewed by Adorno and found, apart from its Heideggerian overtones, to be generally in line with the Institute's philosophical position. The secondary literature on Marcuse's work - the first member of the Institute to publish extensively in English - is enormous, and for that reason, together with the fact that he was not involved in any of the Institute's empirical projects, his work will not be treated separately here.

The following chapters of the thesis are mainly concerned with the theoretical and empirical contributions of T. W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Erich Fromm, with special emphasis upon their analyses of 'authority' and 'authoritarianism'. The relation between psychology and socialism will be central to that discussion.

During the thirties, the central core of researchers who contributed to the Institute's main study of authority and the family, which was published as a 900 page report in 1936, included Horkheimer, Fromm, Marcuse, Wittfogel, and
Sternheim. Adorno did not officially participate in this research. Nevertheless, he had already become a close friend of Max Horkheimer, whom he had met in 1922 at a philosophy seminar on Husserl. Adorno was to receive his doctorate shortly after this from Frankfurt University with a thesis on Husserl, written under Hans Cornelius. The two men developed a life-long personal and intellectual friendship. As early as 1927, Horkheimer had persuaded Adorno to write a paper in an area that interested him: the relation of psychoanalysis to the transcendental phenomenology of their mentor, Hans Cornelius. Later, Adorno successfully persuaded Horkheimer's Institute to support the work of Walter Benjamin, the literary critic Adorno admired so much; and, as we noted, both men decided upon offering Herbert Marcuse membership in the Institute on the basis of Marcuse's intellectual position on Hegel and Marx, though Adorno was not at that time officially a member himself.

From the very beginning of the Institute's new program Horkheimer was, as we noted earlier, interested in psychology, because he believed that psychology could provide specialist knowledge that would help free the 'substructure' from the 'mechanistic' interpretations of 'orthodox' Marxists. To understand the material basis as a fundamental determinant of man's life in society meant, for Horkheimer, to understand it historically in terms of its changing relationship to all other spheres of life. This involved, in Horkheimer's view, taking into account the fact that under certain historical conditions - particularly those of rapid economic development accompanied by social and political unrest - the superstructure could not
only affect, but even determine, the course of development of factors traditionally assigned to the substructure. He wrote:

According to circumstances based on the stage of development of men, technology, tools, and organisation of work, i.e., according to the type of process of production, relations of dependency are formed together with their legal and political expressions. But supposing the growth of human productive capabilities makes a new mode of production possible that will fulfill the needs of everyone better than the old one, then the growth of this will be hindered by the continuance of the given social structure with its corresponding institutions and human dispositions that have since become rigidified. The consequences of this are the social tensions which are expressed in the historical struggle and at the same time form the basic theme of World History. (Horkheimer, 1932b:132)

In this article, Horkheimer warned that without supplementation by concrete investigations, the notion of the contradiction between the development of human forces and powers on the one hand, and those of the social structure on the other, could also become a 'dogmatic metaphysic'. He argued that in order to make Marxism adequate as an explanation of contemporary capitalist society, there was no substitute for empirical analyses. Thus the task of the Institute in explaining the form taken by European capitalism would be to undertake an empirical analysis, starting in Germany, of the specific capabilities and dispositions of men which have arisen out of the past social and economic conditions, but which appear, in the present epoch, to have taken on an independent force of their own. Horkheimer went on to argue that in such cases where men's ideas and beliefs are no longer an expression of their class position - as, for example, in cases where it appeared to Marxists that capitalist suppression of the proletariat's material and cultural existence had
reached such heights that it was inconceivable that revolution would not occur - psychology could be used as auxiliary discipline ('Hilfswissenschaft') in supplementing the findings of theoretical analyses of social and economic determinants of social change. Horkheimer, like Fromm, who had recently joined the Institute, felt that psychology could help explain the impact on men of the 'collective illusion' which Marx had claimed men in capitalist society laboured under. Psychology was thus to be used to analyse the human factor, the 'subjective moment' in men's history. Horkheimer wrote:

Despite all variation of interests the subjective moment in the consciousness of men is also not their free will but is to be understood as the part played by their powers, their socialisation, their work, in short, their own history in relation to the history of society. (Horkheimer, 1932b:144)

Thus one of the tasks of Critical Theory, according to Horkheimer, would be to articulate the 'subjective moment' in history by analysing the empirical consciousness of various groups. To return to the basis of this problem, as posed by the concrete political situation in Germany, Horkheimer's emphasis differed from that of Lukacs and Korsch. In the twenties, Korsch had noted that the proletarian revolution had failed to materialise in Germany because the socio-psychological preconditions for its success were lacking. But as Russell Jacoby (1972:2-3) points out, both Korsch and Lukacs had only spoken of these preconditions in non-psychological terms, and had not advocated analysis of them. Lukacs had written that the psychic dimension is contingent and empirical, and therefore 'tied' to the society that nurtured it. As such, he found it uninteresting. For Lukacs,
psychology occupies itself with the existent, whereas the political task is to 'ascribe' consciousness - to make the proletariat aware of its mediating role between past and future, and thus not just of its *existence*, but of its *becoming*. Lukacs was thus nearer to Lenin than to the Spartacists, in subscribing to a revolutionary theory of objective consciousness that is imputed to the proletariat by the intellectuals, or later, by the party, rather than to any theory of 'spontaneity' on the part of the revolutionary class itself. Lukacs wrote:

By relating consciousness to the whole of society it becomes possible to infer the thoughts and feelings which men would have in a particular situation if they were *able* to assess both it and the interests arising from it in their impact on immediate action and on the whole structure of society. That is to say, it would be possible to infer the thoughts and feelings appropriate to their objective situation. (Lukacs, 1970 :51)

While Gramsci had sought, for *practical* reasons, to fuse the 'spontaneity' of the workers with the 'consciousness of the intellectuals', Horkheimer was interested in the 'non-spontaneity' of the proletariat in Western Europe, not only from the point of view of its lack of receptivity to 'reason' and revolutionary ideas, but because of the new threat - *fascism*. Psychological analysis could reveal the form of 'unfreedom' to which the individual was tied. Thus Horkheimer's Critical Theory attempted to explore the dialectical relationship between the psychological and historical dimensions. Horkheimer argued that in the absence of systematic analysis, the psychological dimension is introduced into the historical analysis as an *abstract* entity, thus 'flattening out' the dialectic between the individual and society. On
the other hand, he recognised that there was a danger of losing
the tension between the individual and society if one went too
far the other way and reduced history to the 'psychological'.
Hence Horkheimer (1932b:143) criticised Dilthey's attempt to
understand each epoch of history as arising from a concept of
man's psyche that is unitary, since Dilthey had based his
analysis upon a theory of a 'fixed' human nature. Horkheimer
wrote that individuals in groups in society are psychic beings,
and because the reasons for social antagonisms are complex,
their explanation requires a psychology of history that relates
the psychological realm to the historical one.

There were a number of approaches to psychology that
were seriously being pursued at the time. Gestalt psychology
had achieved academic respectability in Germany in the twenties
- Wolfgang Köhler having been appointed to a professorship at
Berlin University in 1922. Behaviourism and learning theory
were popular in Russia, as a result of the work of Pavlov,
in America, because of the pioneering work of Watson and later
Skinner, and in Europe during the twenties, due also in large
measure to its industrial applications. However, as was
noted above, Horkheimer and Adorno had long been interested
in psychoanalysis, and it was accordingly to this that the
attention of the Institute turned.

George Lichtheim (1972:173) has noted, however, that
while psychoanalysis spread through Central Europe and Russia
during the twenties, when it "briefly enjoyed Lenin's toler-
ance and Trotsky's active encouragement," in the thirties
"everything went to pieces: the Stalinists turned against
psychoanalysis as part of their struggle against 'Jewish
cosmopolitanism'; and their example, in this as in other fields, was aped by Hitler's followers after their accession to power in 1933." The psychoanalytic movement itself was torn by factional disputes, and it was rejected by most German Universities of the time as 'unrespectable'. Furthermore, Freud's message for modern man was pessimistic. For Freud, man, left to the call of his instincts, is greedy, selfish, and destructive, and in the absence of a strong superego only a Leviathan, an external punishing authority, could maintain civilisation. On the surface, Freud's theory would seem to have very little relevance to any theory of radical social change. As a result, it was an important and perhaps surprising event when, in 1929, the relatively new Marxist Institute in Frankfurt opened its doors to psychoanalysis.

According to Jay (1973:87-8), Horkheimer had undergone psychoanalysis in 1928, selecting as his analyst Karl Landauer, whom he persuaded to form the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute as a branch of the Southwest German Psychoanalytic Study Group, which had itself emerged out of a factional split in the psychoanalytic movement. It was a very small group, whose membership comprised Karl Landauer, George Groddeck, Heinrich Meng, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and Erich Fromm. While the extent of the collaboration between the Institutes is not clear, what is certain is that Erich Fromm became the sole representative of psychoanalytical theory on Horkheimer's staff, and he was the only psychoanalyst to remain with the Institute after 1933.

Within the psychoanalytic movement itself in the late twenties and early thirties there were various moves to bring
psychoanalysis closer to Marxism by psychoanalysts of the 'left'. These attempts were more intellectual than the Russian effort to reconcile psychoanalysis with socialism, undertaken by Plechanov (1908). For while Freud had generally been identified as a theorist of bourgeois morality, or as an apologist of political and sexual repression, and the science that he had created had been grouped with that of other anti-utopians - Weber, Durkheim, and Pareto - doubts were raised during the thirties as to the validity of these sentiments by intellectuals who had discovered in Freud's writings, particularly after the publication of *The Ego and the Id* (1927), a radical political and sexual philosophy. Siegfried Bernfeld, Otto Fenichel, Barbara Lantos, Ernst Simmel, Wilhelm Reich, and Erich Fromm all expressed interest in the integration of Marxism and psychoanalysis. Within psychoanalysis they found themselves faced with problems of individual therapy in the context of what appeared an increasingly 'irrational' or exploitative social and political situation. This situation encouraged them to reflect upon the impact of sociological factors upon individuals and, in Reich's case, to seek active political involvement. Politically, they were interested in understanding the new mass movements now emerging out of the 'class struggle' in industrialised countries, and they believed that psychoanalysis could help them do this. But often their reading of Marx was more 'scientific' than Hegelian, and the general materialist conception of history was stressed in preference to the historically specific critique of political economy. Dahmer (1973 :309) claims that Reich and Fenichel 'stylised' psychoanalysis as a natural science in order to protect it from the attacks of Russian ideologues, like
Jurinetz, and later Sapir. After a visit to the Soviet Union, in 1929, Reich was certainly clear about the difference between Russia and the West with respect to the reception of psychoanalysis. Reich wrote:

My overall impression in Moscow was that the Marxist theoreticians will accept psychoanalysis if they are presented with its pure scientific core, i.e., the materialist-dialectical foundations of psychoanalysis, and if a clear distinction is drawn between these and various idealist theories and applications of psychoanalysis. Here is the difference between the position of psychoanalysis in bourgeois countries and in the Soviet Union: in Germany and America psychoanalysis only began to be recognised when it became non-materialist, that is to say idealist in some of its most important aspects (deviation from the theory of libido, emergence of the death-wish theory, the incorrect - in my opinion - application of psychology to sociology and cultural history, etc.) In the Soviet Union it is precisely these aspects of psychoanalysis which are objected to, while the core of psychoanalytic theory could readily be accepted. Jurinetz in his critique of psychoanalytic theory actually speaks of a decay of original scientific psychoanalysis. (Reich, 1966: 53-4)

Wilhelm Reich, born three years before Fromm, had already taken psychoanalysis by storm in the twenties with his attempts to work out the critical and revolutionary implications of psychoanalysis16. Reich's attempts to turn his theory of genitality into a revolutionary movement resulted in his dismissal from the German Communist Party in 1933, and from the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1934. Fromm, on the other hand, was a sexual conservative, and a non-activist. Like Reich, however, he stood politically to the 'left' of Freud.

Both Fromm and Reich's work were influenced by Paul Federn's (1919) critique of the patriarchal-authoritarian structure of bourgeois character. Federn's critique was to emerge in Reich and Fromm's notion of 'character as a mechanism
that sustains bourgeois society while blocking historical consciousness of class. Fromm, in 1929, through his association with Horkheimer's Institute, was offered the opportunity to test the explanatory power of the peculiar combination of Marxism and psychoanalysis on a concrete historical phenomenon - authority and the family. For Fromm, as is discussed in the next section, the problem was one of analysing exactly how the authority of society - which he viewed uncritically as simply a manifestation of the ideologies and rationalisations of the ruling class, mediated by the social institution of the family - produces in individuals socially conformist character structures.

What we have tried to show in this chapter is how the problems that interested Fromm and the other scholars at the Institute arose in part from purely intellectual concerns, and in part from an intellectual, rather than from a politically active interest in social and political movements that were taking place in the outside world: specifically, concern about the rise of fascist mass movements, together with disillusionment with mass socialist movements, both in the East - where socialism was taking the form of Stalinist totalitarianism - and in the West, where the majority socialist parties had failed to construct strong and stable governments.
1. Jay (1973 :8) relates that Felix Weil had never had any interest in the directorship, nor even in the 'Habilitation' - which would have given him permission to lecture, and the possibility of acquiring a professorship - because he felt people would always say that he had 'bought' himself a professorship or the directorship. At this time Weil led the life of a private scholar in Berlin, where he took an interest in the activities of the Malik Verlag, the 'Soziologischen Verlag', and the Piscator-Bühne. In 1930 he left for Argentina to attend the family business. (Gumnior and Ringguth,1973 :34) Pollock had become involved in the administration of the Institute and had little interest in its intellectual directorship.

2. Paul Tillich held the Chair in Philosophy at Frankfurt University in 1931. Jay (1973 :25) wrote that Weil persuaded the Ministry of Education to convert Grünberg's Chair, which his father had donated, to social philosophy. In return, Hermann Weil donated to another Chair in Economics. Paul Tillich supported Horkheimer's application.

3. Positivism denied the Hegelian idea of reason. At the time of Horkheimer's attacks the most significant proponents of formal logic and natural science were the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle - Schlick, Feigl, Carnap, and Neurath, among others. See Herbert Feigl (1969 :630-73).

4. This approach was undertaken in The Authoritarian Personality (1950), which sought to reveal the personality of the 'potential' fascist.

5. Hence Göran Therborn (1970 :74) has argued: "'critical theory' associates itself with the oppressed against class rule, but it is unable to situate this association in the political arena. It remains outside, denouncing bourgeois class politics from the philosophical sphere."

6. Geoffrey Barraclough (1972 :350-1) has written of the extreme polarization in Weimar society not only between those who had access to university education with its potentialities for advancement, or between rich and poor, but also between white-collar and blue-collar workers: they were two societies at arm's length from each other, deliberately kept apart by a rigid school system and, on the side of the bourgeoisie at any rate, by a very real and deep-seated fear and hatred of the proletariat.

7. The emigration of Institute members to the United States is discussed in Part III of the thesis.

8. Leo Löwenthal (1900— ) was the son of a Jewish physician in Frankfurt. He received his doctorate in philosophy from Frankfurt University with a thesis on Franz von Baader. Throughout the late 1920's he wrote critical articles on aesthetic and cultural topics for a number of journals. Two of his major books are: Literature and the Image of Man, Studies of the European Drama and Novel from 1600-1900 (1957); and Literature, Popular Culture and Society (1961).
9. Herbert Marcuse (1898– ) was born into a prosperous Jewish family in Berlin. A student of Heidegger, he was active in German politics for a short period, when he was a member of the Social Democratic Party (1917-19). He left the party after the death of Rosa Luxemburg. After joining the Institute, he was immediately assigned to the Geneva office in 1933. Shortly afterwards he emigrated to America with the others, where he became a naturalised American straight away. During the fifties he held research fellowships at the Russian Research Institute of Columbia University and at Harvard's Russian Research Center. He did not return to Germany in the fifties when Horkheimer and Adorno left to re-establish the Institute. Since 1965, he has lectured at San Diego University. The Critical Spirit (Wolff and Moore, 1967) gives an almost complete bibliography of Marcuse's work up until 1967.

10. Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno (1903-69) was the son of a wealthy Jewish wine-merchant. His mother was a gifted singer before her marriage, and Adorno seems to have inherited her love of music. Adorno went to Vienna in 1925 to study musical composition and persuaded Alban Berg to take him on as a pupil. In his spare time in Vienna Adorno frequented avant-garde musical circles. Jay (1973:23) notes that Adorno was never to abandon the cultural elitism so evident in his years in Vienna. On his return to Frankfurt, Adorno presented a thesis on Kierkegaard's aesthetics, which was accepted in 1931, and which gave him the 'permission to lecture' (Habilitation). Many of Adorno's early works were on musical composition, and aesthetics remained at the centre of all his later work. For further biographical detail, see Jay (1973), and the chapter "Adorno" in George Lichtheim's From Marx to Hegel (1971:125-44).

11. Adorno was successful in persuading Horkheimer to support financially the literary critic, Walter Benjamin, in the difficult years after Benjamin emigrated to Paris in 1933. Benjamin wrote frequently for the Zeitschrift, but his correspondence with Adorno indicates that his work was modified in the light of Horkheimer and Adorno's substantial criticism of it. Horkheimer and Adorno criticised Benjamin's Marxism which, they believed, was too heavily influenced by Berthold Brecht. See Hannah Arendt's introduction to Illuminations - Walter Benjamin (1969), and Heissenbättel (1969:232-44).

12. Industrial psychology was just starting to emerge as a separate discipline.

13. Max Horkheimer seems to claim more collaboration than does Erich Fromm, who has argued (Locarno, February 1975) that there was little direct collaboration. According to Fromm, the Institut für Sozialforschung acted as host to the Southwest Germany Psychoanalytic Study Group, while they in turn organised some lectures in Frankfurt. Horkheimer, in contrast, has written: "The Psychoanalytic Institute in Frankfurt and our Institute at Frankfurt University collaborated in the dissemination of modern social and psychological theory as well as the study of such problems pertinent to both psychoanalysis and social science." (1948:112)
14. Erich Fromm (1900- ) was born into an intensely religious Jewish family in Frankfurt. He was a student of the psychoanalyst Theodor Reik and, like Wilhelm Reich, was influenced by the teachings of the 'Austro-Marxist' Max Adler, who had emphasised the importance of the cultural conditioning of the ego. Fromm was a student at Heidelberg and Munich, and later practised psychoanalysis at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. Subsequently, he joined the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute. For autobiographical details, see Erich Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion - My Encounter with Marx and Freud*, (1962).

15. See Wilhelm Reich, *Massenpsychologie des Faschismus*, (1933), and Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*, (1941).

16. In 1928 Wilhelm Reich founded, outside the International Psychoanalytical Association, the Sozialistische Gessellschaft für Sexualberatung und Sexualforschung in Vienna. This society was to examine questions of sexual politics. In 1930 Reich moved to Berlin, where he soon assembled a following of psychoanalysts similarly interested in political questions.
PART II

As noted in the previous section, that the programme of the Frankfurt Institute was in part determined by a curiosity about the mental consciousness of the mass movements, as well as by an interest in developing the Freudian-Marxist notion of historical consciousness. The latter was to be enriched by Habermas's research programme, in which he aimed at an empirical philosophy of history, supplemented by information about the principles provided by the specialist disciplines. The assumptions about the mental consciousness of the masses, as well as for the empirical history of knowledge, had no limitations upon the acquisition of knowledge. What emerges is that the scientific form was to assume empirical consciousness as necessary. Much of psychoanalysis - the already 'investigated with a theory of historical consciousness', which includes the concept that of habitus and actors, whose view is discussed later.

It is clear from Fromm's autobiography, Beyond the "Pleasure of Violence" (1952: 11-12), that Marxist concerns played a prominent role in his life from an early age. Fromm was raised in a deeply religious Jewish family, and he has said that the writings of, its prophets, and particularly the "wishes of universal peace and harmony between all nations" inspired him deeply when he was twelve and thirteen years old.

Indeed, he wrote that after the outbreak of the 1914 War, "I was not concerned with the problem of war or with a war's solution by the means of violence." The war not only served to strengthen Fromm's humanist convictions, but, as he declared at the time, to discover the underlying reasons for war, it confronted him to his growing suspicions of "all official ideologies." The latter suspicions drew him to socialism, as we noted in the previous chapter, to the horror of
CHAPTER III

ERICH FROMM'S HUMANIST READING OF MARX AND FREUD

We noted in the previous section that the programme of the Frankfurt Institute was in part determined by a curiosity about the empirical consciousness of the mass movements, as well as by an interest in developing the Hegelian-Marxist notion of historical consciousness. The latter was to be enriched by Horkheimer's research programme, in which he viewed social philosophy as capable of being supplemented by information about man provided by the specialist disciplines. In this chapter, Fromm's assumptions about the nature of man and society are examined, as well as his views on ways of acquiring knowledge, and on limitations upon the acquisition of knowledge. What emerges is that the categories Fromm uses to examine empirical consciousness - namely, those of psychoanalysis - are already interlinked with a theory of historical consciousness which is more humanist than that of Horkheimer and Adorno, whose view is discussed later.

It is clear from Fromm's autobiography, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* (1962:3-12), that humanist concerns played a prominent role in his life from an early age. Fromm was raised in a deeply religious Jewish family, and he has said that the writings of the prophets, and particularly the "vision of universal peace and harmony between all nations touched me deeply when I was twelve and thirteen years old." Further, he wrote that after the outbreak of the 1914 War: "I was not concerned with the problem of war as such; I was struck by its senseless inhumanity." The war not only served to strengthen Fromm's humanist convictions, but, in his desire at the time to discover the underlying reasons for war, it confirmed him in his growing suspicions of "all official ideologies." The latter suspicions drew him to socialism and, as we noted in the previous chapter, to the Marxism of
the Frankfurt Institute. But Fromm, unlike Reich, with whom he was associated earlier, was never actively involved in politics.

Fromm's humanist outlook can, in part, be classified as descriptive or empirical, in that Fromm places "men in their social existence" at the centre of an intensive questioning of individual and group behaviour. In his partly biographical account of his views on Marx and Freud, written in the sixties, Fromm stated in retrospect:

I wanted to understand the laws that govern the life of individual man, and the laws of society - that is of men in their social existence.

But Fromm's humanist concern is also 'historical'\(^1\). For Fromm postulates an ideal for man, apart from the formal meaning of human life created by man, which is, in the German idealist tradition, discoverable in history.

Fromm's humanism deserves to be stressed, particularly because it has been questioned, albeit unconvincingly, by John H. Schaar in his book *Escape from Authority* (1961). Schaar contends that Fromm's humanism is only superficial, and "really naturalism in disguise" (Schaar, 1961 :18). But because Schaar's categories lack precision\(^2\), he fails to show that Fromm's concept of human nature embodies the principles of ethical naturalism, rather than humanist ones.

Fromm is, in a sense, both a naturalist and a humanist. But his naturalism, if it is to be properly understood, is best considered from within the Marxian and Freudian problematic in which it was formulated. Fromm is a naturalist in the methodological or epistemological sense of discounting explanations based upon the existence of a 'supra-natural' world. Both Freud and Marx had exposed the 'illusory' nature
of explanations founded on religious teachings. Their theories were, therefore, attractive to Fromm because they opened up the possibility of modern solutions to the problem of man, in contrast to merely religious ones:

Marx and Freud assumed that man's behaviour is comprehensible precisely because it is the behaviour of *man*, of a species that can be defined in terms of its psychic and mental character. (Fromm, 1962:29)

Thus, if we accept Arthur C. Danto's (1967:448) definition of philosophical 'naturalism' as a form of 'methodological monism', it would seem that Fromm should be viewed as a naturalist. Danto describes 'philosophical' or 'methodological naturalism' as a position that repudiates the view that there are entities whose existence cannot be known, or whose behaviour cannot be explained, even in principle, by methods which are always connected in every sphere or level of objects and activities - the paradigm case being the methods of the natural sciences. Danto argues that naturalism so understood is philosophically neutral, in that it does not prescribe what kinds of objects exist, or what types of activities are thought to occur in the universe. It can, therefore, include any of a variety of rival ontologies: materialism, idealism, or dualism.

Fromm, like Horkheimer, is neither an idealist nor a materialist. He did not think that minds and ideas constitute the fundamental reality. But neither did he accept materialism. This fact is clearly expressed in Fromm's later writings, which introduced the 'early Marx' of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* to an English-speaking audience. We noted earlier that Horkheimer's Institute had privileged access to the unpublished early writings of Marx, of which
they despatched copies to David Ryazanov in Moscow, and which Ryazanov compiled and published in German in 1932. Marcuse was very excited about their publication, and stressed the centrality of labour under capitalism as the representation of man's *total alienation*. Fromm maintained a lasting interest in "the humanist Marx" of these early writings. But Fromm's writings at the time that he was actively involved with Horkheimer's Institute reveal very little about his reaction to these early manuscripts to which he certainly had access. For this reason it will be necessary to refer to his later writings in order to set out his earlier views on Marx.

Let us now turn to that task. Fromm, quoting from Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, points out that Marx postulated:

naturalism or humanism [which] is distinguished from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time constitutes their unifying truth. (Fromm, 1961:9)

Ideas did not constitute the fundamental content of reality for Fromm. Moreover, like other scholars around Horkheimer in the early thirties, he argued that Marx had not been oblivious to the power of ideas. The important point, according to Fromm, is that Marx, in arguing against Idealism, had demonstrated that ideas are not significant in themselves, but only in so far as they are rooted in human and social reality.

On the other hand, Fromm was careful to distinguish the apparent materialism of this remark from 'philosophical materialism'. He wrote that Marx had always opposed bourgeois "mechanical materialists," who had tended to regard "matter and material processes" as the sole determinants of all
spiritual and mental phenomena. Carl Grünberg in his inaugural speech in Frankfurt in 1924 had already made the Institute position on philosophical materialism very clear. Grünberg denied any connection between Marxism and materialist philosophy:

Marx and Engel's theory of history is neither a philosophical system nor a metaphysic. In particular it bears no relation to materialism. They are all too often confused with one another or seen as the same thing....But philosophical and historical materialism are conceptually different. (Nenning, 1966 : v)

We noted in the previous section that Marxism had been interpreted by the Institute under Grünberg's directorship as a "closed economic system," a definite "weltanschauung," and "a tightly circumscribed method of research." The 'inner core' of Institute scholars around Max Horkheimer, however, no longer accepted the 'naive optimism' about the inevitable course of history that had been characteristic of the Grünberg period of intellectual Marxism. They thought, in reaction to 'crude' materialist interpreters of Marx who, they wrote, regarded the substructure - the economic and productive base - of society as eternally determining the social structure as a whole, as well as the psychological and political conflicts of people living under it, that Marx should be treated as any other nineteenth century thinker, and that each phase of Marxism should be viewed as historically specific. Consequently, they subscribed to the view that, if man was not to be reduced to a 'mere historical abstraction', the structure of monopoly capitalism required a new statement, specific to each epoch, of the interplay of the material base and the ideational superstructure in the making of history. As a result, as was noted earlier, the Marxism of the Institute under Horkheimer's
leadership, and especially in these initial stages, was very receptive to information from the empirical sciences, such as psychology, which demonstrated that material conditions are modified by other factors.

Fromm's interpretation of Marx began from Marx's general model of history. Marx had never spelled out precisely what should be included in 'base' and 'superstructure', or under precisely what conditions economic conflicts become psychological and political struggles. Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Pollock believed that under conditions of monopoly capitalism, political struggles served - as Marx had shown - to conceal economic struggles. In addition, however, they thought that political struggles operate independently of economic forces. Thus Fromm, by assigning a relative independence to psychological forces vis-à-vis the mode of production, thereby supported Horkheimer's view that the superstructure can, under specific conditions, affect the course of events independently of material factors.

But Horkheimer's discussion of Marx, while considering Marx's general model, does not take as its point of departure the general materialist conception of history found in the early writings of Marx, as Fromm's does. Horkheimer's reading of Marx commences from Marx's Critique of Political Economy, published by Karl Kautsky in 1903, which gives specific historical examples. The Critique of Political Economy contains a history of the categories or concepts of political economy, and an exposure of the concept of social reality that finds expression in them as 'false-consciousness' or 'ideology'.

Fromm's humanist starting point had important consequences for his reading of Marx. It meant that Fromm tended to
abstract from Marx's fragmentary views on the 'nature of human nature' found in Marx's early writings, and presented the later Marx to English-speaking audiences as a humanist.

Although Fromm's humanism is more explicit in his later work in America, especially *Man for Himself* (1947) and *Marx's Concept of Man* (1961), there is evidence of his humanist leanings in his early, programmatic *Zeitschrift* articles, before the emigration of the scholars to America. In 1932, Fromm wrote that what is central for Marx is the view that "man's consciousness is to be explained in terms of his existence in society, in terms of his real earthly life" and the specific way his productive capabilities develop. 'Man' and 'human nature' were the focal points of Fromm's reading of Marx.

Fromm held that the question as to the 'nature of man' has to be examined in relation to the material conditions of life presented to man, and to man's activity:

> Historical materialism sees history as the process of man's active and passive adaptation to the natural conditions around him....Man and nature are two poles here, interacting with each other. The historical process is always bound up with man's own nature and the natural conditions outside man. (Fromm, 1970:125-6)

This view can be made clearer as follows. Fromm agreed with Marx on two things. First, that 'nature' always presupposes human activity: nature as man perceives it is already a *conceptualised reality* presupposing social practices and the technical and economic means for controlling it. And secondly, that nature and natural phenomena form the environment, the world as a whole in which social activities take place - "the natural conditions outside man."

What is non-Marxist in Fromm's account - and will be
referred to again in subsequent chapters - is Fromm's view that "historical materialism sees history as the process of man's active and passive adaptation to...natural conditions..." Marx never wrote about "active and passive adaptation" (Anpassung). The latter seems to imply that nature itself is an unchanging homogeneous stratum to which man reacts or adapts. Alfred Schmidt pointed out that Marx criticised Feuerbach for just such a view:

Feuerbach's anthropological accentuation of man as opposed to the rest of nature was always abstract. Nature as a whole was for Feuerbach an unhistorical, homogeneous substratum, while the essence of the Marxist critique was the dissolution of this homogeneity into a dialectic of Subject and Object. Nature was for Marx both an element of human practice and the totality of everything that exists. By unreflectively stressing the totality alone Feuerbach succumbed to the naive-realist myth of a 'pure nature' and, in ideological fashion, identified the immediate existence of men with their essence. (Schmidt, 1971 :27)

Fromm, however, avoids the 'ahistoricism' of Feuerbach's concept of nature by stressing the fact, following Marx, that neither man nor nature are 'a priori' givens, and that man alters both himself and nature in the historical process through his activity.

Fromm also holds that man's work or productive activity is fundamental. In stressing the ultimate material basis of man's activity, he was probably closer to the general philosophy of Horkheimer's Institute at the time than the more 'radical' exponents of political psychology and sexual economics who had gathered around Wilhelm Reich. But Fromm's discussion of man's activity does not start out from the sphere of economics, nor from Hegelian philosophy, nor from Horkheimer's Marxism. Instead, Fromm derives the general categories by means of which he discusses man's activity
from a philosophical anthropology. In 1932 he cited the now very familiar passage which begins with Marx's assertion that "the production of ideas, conceptions, and consciousness is directly interwoven with the material activity, and the material activity of men; it is an expression of his real life," and ends with Marx's statement that "consciousness can never be anything but conscious being, and man's being is his concrete life" (Fromm, 1970:125). Later, in discussing Marx, Fromm wrote more specifically: "History is the history of man's self-realization [and]...is nothing but the creation of man by human labour" (1961:26); "for Marx, man is alive only inasmuch as he is productive (1961:29); man's activity is the act of man's self-creation; his "self activity" through which he expresses himself; work as an "end-in-itself"; and finally, "the meaningful expression of human energy."

The basic problem for Fromm is the 'nature of human nature'. His philosophical anthropology provides the 'categories of human nature' which can be investigated by the various sciences - biology, psychology, and physiology. These categories can be described as follows. First, Fromm accepted Marx's analytical distinction between the activity of 'natural man' and 'species man'. Fromm wrote that man, as a 'natural being' like other animals and natural objects, is subject to external nature and its laws, which he is unable either fully to understand or to change. But, he continued, man, as Marx pointed out, is also a being whose possession of self-consciousness and awareness sets him apart from all other natural beings, with the result that he can never return to that prehuman harmony with nature enjoyed by all other natural phenomena. Thus, for Fromm, man's self-consciousness
presents man's existence to him as a problem to which he seeks an answer: he has to overcome his separation from nature and find new ways of relating himself to the world. This activity modifies man's nature.

Fromm's acceptance of the latter view leads him to make a further Marxian distinction between man's 'species being' or 'human nature in general', and man's 'social being' or 'human nature as modified by each historical epoch'. Knowledge of the latter can be gleaned from the investigations of the social sciences. Fromm, however, viewed the social and economic activities of men in each epoch as contributing to the development of human nature. He did not seek to relegate nature and all natural consciousness to functions of objective social and economic processes, as Alfred Schmidt was later to write that Lukacs had done (Schmidt, 1970:69-70). Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, it is not clear that Fromm always succeeds in avoiding sociologising man's nature.

Finally, the separation from nature, which Fromm argues man has to overcome, encourages Fromm - as Marx had done with the concept of socialist man - to define a moral route for man. The latter, which is discussed in more detail below, is incorporated by Fromm as an essential and final element in the sum total that defines 'human nature', or the 'human essence'.

There is a certain difficulty with Fromm's usage of the terms 'human nature' and 'human essence' - a difficulty that is aggravated by the fact that Fromm tends to use these expressions interchangeably. Consider, for example, Fromm's assertion about human nature that "it is the essence of man
in contrast to the various forms of his historical existence and, as Marx said, 'the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual'." (1961:25). The main difficulty with Fromm's concept of the 'nature of man' or 'human essence' is that it is a simplifying concept. It already represents a 'fusion' of man's empirical and historical consciousness with his biological nature, from which Fromm then abstracts an 'essence'. Fromm's concept of the 'nature of man' incorporates at least three quite different categories: man as a "natural being"; man as a "social being"; and finally, man as a "potential truly human being."

I now want to examine the moral aspect of Fromm's concept of human nature - an aspect that is of central importance in much of Fromm's work. The ideal in question was that of ethical humanism, so understood that it was, for Fromm, inseparable from an ideal of 'communism' or 'socialism'. Fromm believed that through the activity of understanding, or becoming conscious, man can reappropriate his human essence (become human), and can pass beyond specialisms (i.e., the shaping of one's essence by specific epochs) to unite his subjective understanding with the objectivity of the external world, with the historical process. Fromm believed not only that this potential for self-realisation is universal to all men, but that man would one day achieve this 'completeness'. It is this 'optimism' of Fromm that later divided him from Horkheimer and Adorno, and also from Marcuse, who took up the debate on Marxist Humanism in the fifties. (Marcuse, 1955)

Fromm's ideal of 'completeness', as expressed in Marx's *Concept of Man* (1961) is, it is true, fed by the same ethic or ideal as the political philosophies of Horkheimer and
Adorno - that of the attainment of 'communism'. But unlike that of Horkheimer and Adorno, Fromm's notion of communism is not 'unmediated' or 'open' but *teleological*. It includes within the notion of the 'perfected man' the idea that man has a 'natural end'. Man achieves perfection, according to Fromm, through the realisation of his *inherent potentialities*. Hence Fromm writes that communism allows the "real appropriation of man's essence by and for man." And Fromm contends:

Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism, and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the *definitive* resolution of the antagonism between man and nature. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. (Fromm, 1961: 34)

This belief that communism is the natural end of man, rather than merely one possible value or ideal among others, clearly needs more careful support than Fromm offers, especially in view of many of the intellectual and political manifestations of communism.

Because he believes that communism is the 'natural end' of man, or the 'truth' of human history, Fromm contends that while capitalist society frustrates man's nature because it is a world of 'false-idols', communism or socialism creates the conditions for the actualization of man's nature as a "truly free, rational, active, and independent" being. Fromm also admonishes Catholicism and Protestantism for the "incorporation of certainly objectively valid values into social life," which, Fromm contends, produce 'authoritarianism'. He argues that socialism, in contrast, is 'anti-authoritarian' because it grounds the conditions for the realization of the 'good society' in man's powers and needs, which are 'real' and 'discoverable'. 
While Horkheimer in the thirties was receptive to humanist thought, it is clear that his position was slightly different from that of Fromm. He did not attack Fromm directly, but he did write, in *Autorität und Familie* (1936:20-1) - to which Fromm had contributed the psychological section - that all theories which posit either 'human nature' as a uniform essence, or the emergence of society or the individual out of this ahistorical unity, are limited. Such a theory, he contended:

either takes the form of mechanical evolution: all human characteristics, which arise at a later point in time were originally present in germ; or it takes the form of some variety of philosophical anthropology: the characteristics emerge from a metaphysical ground of being. (Horkheimer, 1936:21)

Horkheimer argued that the deficiency of such theories is most evident in their attempts to account for social change. He maintained that even if they are able to give an account of continuous development, they cannot explain structural changes. He pointed out that structural changes generally occur because of discrepancies between the needs of men and their ways of life which entail sudden psychic changes. They do not occur because society has militated against a supposed 'true human nature'.

Having considered the socialist humanist basis upon which Fromm's psychological approach to ascertaining the nature of man through knowledge of his powers and needs is founded, let us now turn to a consideration of Fromm's approach to psychology. According to Fromm's autobiographical account, his interest in psychology is as longstanding as his humanist interests. It dates back to his childhood, to his puzzlement about the reactions of a moody father and a depressive mother,
and to a general curiosity about the reason behind the behaviour of people in interpersonal relations.

The kind of psychology which interested Fromm was Freudian psychoanalytic theory - an interest which grew out of his early contact with Freud's ideas in his twenties (Fromm, 1962:9), when he was already reading Marx. Fromm wrote that intellectually:

I tried to see the lasting truth in Freud's concepts as against those assumptions which were in need of revision. I tried to do the same with Marx's theory, and finally I tried to arrive at a synthesis which followed from the understanding and the criticism of both thinkers. (Fromm, 1962:9)

At the time of his association with Horkheimer's Institute Fromm also participated in seminars held in Reich's house in Berlin. Reich (1935) noted later that Fromm was the only Marxist sociologist present. At these seminars in 1930 they discussed the possibility of integrating Marxism and psychoanalysis, despite the general verdict among German intellectuals that Freudian theory was conservative, and definitely incompatible with the revolutionary aims of Marxism.

Fromm and Reich had also carried on a lively interchange of idea on this topic at an earlier time - in the twenties. Reich had, at that time, disagreed with Fromm's views about the possibility of extending psychoanalysis beyond individual psychology to the study of social phenomena:

The thesis that psychology only deals with the individual while sociology only deals with 'society' is false. For just as psychology always deals with a socialised individual, so sociology always deals with a group of individuals whose psychic structure and mechanisms must be taken into account. (Fromm, 1970:114)

Fromm's nominalist view of sociology, described here, accorded well with that of Horkheimer, which will be discussed
later. Reich, on the other hand, appears to have been more cautious than Fromm about the dangers of reductionism inherent in this reconciliation of psychology with a nominalist sociology - dangers of which Fromm himself was not unaware. In the thirties, however, Reich also came to accept the view that psychoanalysis could be called in to explain social phenomena.

Fromm's general dissatisfaction with Marxism in the twenties seems to have centred upon the fact that he had not found in Marx a psychology that was specific enough on the topic of 'powers' and 'needs' that serve men's 'consciousness' - although Fromm was later to revise this view somewhat in his book, *Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man* (1968). Marx, of course, was interested in the development of historical consciousness of class, which he saw as inhibited by the relations of production in which men find themselves enmeshed. He was less interested in individuals and their psychic drives, however, than in the determining effect of social relations of production upon man's consciousness. But Fromm, spurred by the political urgency of understanding the Marxist notion of 'consciousness' which had been thrown into relief by the Western Marxist problematic, in which empirical factors inhibiting the emergence of 'consciousness' were sought, was very sure even in the twenties - and Barbara Lantos and Ernst Simmel were of a similar opinion - that psychoanalysis could supplement historical materialism. Later, in 1932, Fromm wrote:

> Psychoanalysis can enrich the overall conception of historical materialism on one specific point. It can provide a more comprehensive knowledge of one of the factors that is operative in the social process: the nature of man himself. (Fromm, 1970:126-7)
Here, too, Reich, who pursued his own theory of the biological and sexual blocks to class consciousness, disagreed with Fromm. He argued that in order to avoid the dangers of psychologism a sharp distinction had to be maintained between the 'objective' and 'subjective' sides of 'class consciousness', and he pointed out that once this is done, psychoanalysis cannot make any contribution to the elements determining class consciousness. It can provide knowledge only of those elements inhibiting the emergence of class consciousness.

The difficulty of understanding historical consciousness is, on Reich's view, augmented by the pitfalls of reductionism. Reich argued that the more 'rational' behaviour is, the more in tune it is with 'class consciousness' and the less the need for psychological explanations. Reich wrote:

Further, it appears that the positive elements and driving forces of class consciousness are not clarified by psychoanalysis. On the other hand, the inhibitions to its development are only to be understood by means of psychoanalysis because they arise from irrational sources. (Reich, 1934 :8)

Horkheimer agreed with this view that psychoanalysis is confined to the study of the 'irrational' sources of behaviour, and thus to the inhibitions upon the development of 'class consciousness' - although he did not agree that it was the only method by means of which the 'irrational' in social action could be studied. Fromm, in contrast, and as we shall discuss later, did not always confine psychoanalysis within these limits, despite the fact that he had, at this time, also pointed out that psychoanalysis locates men's instinctual apparatus among the natural factors that modify the social process, although there are also limits to this modifiability. Man's instinctual apparatus is one of the 'natural' conditions that forms part of the substructure (Unterbau) of the social process. (Fromm, 1970 :127)
Fromm's position, then, was that psychoanalysis could supplement historical materialism by providing greater knowledge of the instinctual apparatus involved in man's nature which plays a role in modifying the social process. He argued, moreover, that Freud, like Marx, was interested in 'man qua man', in 'man as a species', and that, also like Marx, he had offered a 'model of man'. Furthermore, Freudian and Marxist theories seemed to Fromm to be intuitively compatible - in part, no doubt, because he read them both as humanist in intent and materialist in direction. That is to say, he regarded Marx's concept of 'species man' and Freud's notion of the unconscious as representations of the idea that each man contains within himself all of humanity. Fromm wrote in his autobiography:

Freud's defense of the rights of man's natural drives against the forces of social convention, as well as his ideal that reason controls and ennobles these drives, is part of the tradition of humanism. Marx's protest against a social order in which man is crippled by his subservience to the economy and his ideal of the full unfolding of the total unalienated man, is part of the same humanistic tradition. (Fromm, 1962: 26)

Secondly, he viewed Freudian theory as a materialist psychology which, he argued, should be classed among the natural sciences. This reading of Freud as 'scientific', we noted, was prevalent among German psychoanalysts of the 'left', who sought to protect psychoanalysis from Soviet criticism of its speculative nature. Fromm also viewed Marx's political philosophy - though of much broader scope than Freud's, since "Marx was capable of connecting a spiritual heritage of...enlightenment humanism and German idealism with the reality of social and economic facts" (1962: 12) - as 'scientific', and as containing a theory of society as an
"intricate structure with various contradictory yet ascertainable forces." (1962:25)

One of the basic problems facing Fromm was to reconcile his reading of Marxism as 'phylogeny', or the history of the overcoming of 'natural man' by 'species man', with a Freudian theory of 'ontogeny', or the life-history of the individual and man's inner nature. Fromm attempted to do this, as we have noted, with respect to the concrete problem of 'class consciousness'. Thus Fromm wrote of Marxism and psycho-analysis:

They are particularly close in their appraisal of consciousness, which is seen by both as less the driving force behind human behaviour than the reflection of other hidden forces. But when it comes to the nature of the factors that truly condition man's consciousness, there seems to be an irreconcilable opposition between the two theories. Historical materialism sees consciousness as the expression of social existence; psychoanalysis sees it as determined by instinctual drives. (Fromm, 1970:115)

Both Marx and Freud were, on Fromm's view, concerned with the relationship between 'essence' and 'existence'. For, on the one hand, Marx had revealed the rationalisations and ideologies in capitalist society which mask economic realities, in order to demonstrate that the actions of individuals are guided not by 'true consciousness' of their class interests, which would be based upon knowledge, but by 'false consciousness' produced by ideologies. And, on the other hand, Freud had exposed the surface rationalisations and clichés which obscure knowledge of man's inner nature. Because of its concern with individual life history, Fromm felt that Freudian analysis could delve deeper into the nature of the 'subjective moment' of history than a Marxian approach, which concentrated on the unfolding of man's outer nature, or 'species being' - that is, on that
which expresses his *social existence*. Hence Fromm claimed that Freudian psychology could explore the *empirical* ramifications of Marx's thesis that ideologies are translated into the minds of men. It could do this by offering an explanation of "how the material base was reflected in man's head and heart" (Fromm, 1970:127), particularly in cases where there was no obvious relation between economic interests and the production of ideologies. It could show, Fromm thought, that men's ideologies are the product of instinctual drives and needs, as well as being determined by class and economic interest. Fromm therefore argued that Freud's notion of the *unconscious* is of central importance in locating the point within the individual where 'natural' and 'social' conflicts are resolved, and he claimed that the internal mechanisms by which men produce their ideas and ideologies can be explained as the intersection of 'internal individual drives' and 'internalised social constraints'.

However, in order to make Freudian psychology compatible with historical materialism, it was necessary for Fromm virtually to disregard the fact that the categories of Freud's psychology have 'sociological content'. Essentially, Fromm rejected the dilemma in Freud's cultural psychology: that, on the one hand, the child has to suppress his instincts to become capable of cultural adjustment; and, on the other, that this process leads to neurosis. Fromm quite correctly pointed out Freud's insensitivity to non-European culture in his equation of Western civilisation with culture. He also noted the limitation of contemporary psychoanalytic theories at the time that he was writing in Germany, namely, that they "focused on the structure of bourgeois society and its
patriarchal family as the normal situation" (1970 :119), and on the neurotic individual, thereby ignoring both the fact that for the majority of people 'adjustment' does not lead to neurosis, and the fact of the variety of life experiences possible under different social structures. But it has been argued - and again Horkheimer and Adorno distanced themselves from Fromm's theory in this respect - that Fromm rejected the critical element of Freudian thought too quickly. Monopoly capitalism is, after all, another product of Western civilisation, and neurosis is certainly widespread in modern industrial societies. As a result, Fromm's attempt to combine the most naturalistic elements of Freudian theory with a sociology derived from Marx's general notion of substructure/superstructure appears to be too simplistic. Fromm's notion of the 'socialised' individual dilutes much of the dialectical tension between the subjective and objective sides of historical consciousness. This theme will be returned to in subsequent chapters.

Among purists in the psychoanalytic movement, Fromm's reconstruction of Freudian theory led to his work being designated as neo-Freudian, due to Fromm's apparent rejection of the more speculative elements of Freud's thought - the theory of the libido and the centrality of sexual strivings, as well as the Oedipus complex and the 'death instinct'.

Fromm's basic perspective, in reinterpreting Freud's theory, can perhaps best be summed up by considering a later article which Fromm wrote on the topic of knowledge in the social sciences, especially psychological knowledge (1944 :380-4). Fromm contended that there is such a thing as 'historical truth', and that man should strive for "the whole
truth, to understand the totality of phenomena which puzzle him." As we shall see later, Horkheimer and Adorno disagree with Fromm as to whether man can actually attain knowledge of this truth. However they do agree with him that the way to historical truth, the method of obtaining objectively valid knowledge, is via a theoretical or philosophical synthesis of previous truths.

Fromm maintains that even 'great geniuses' (implicitly referring to Marx and Freud) are limited in their efforts to obtain objective knowledge by the fact that they live in specific historical periods:

certain insights had to be phrased and understood in erroneous concepts because of the limitations of thought peculiar to the historical phase in which they were first formulated. (Fromm, 1944:380)

Fromm goes on to argue that the way to overcome the limitation upon the 'knowledge' handed down to us by 'great thinkers', and to facilitate the development of new knowledge, is not by replacing old 'scientific' statements by new ones. The appropriate method for obtaining objective knowledge of man and nature is, Fromm argues, that of historical reinterpretation of older statements about man and nature, "by which their true kernel is freed from distorting elements." (Fromm, 1944:380)

Fromm appears here to accept the view that the methods by which the natural sciences accumulate knowledge are different from those which are used, or which ought to be used, by the social sciences. For while he does not explicitly distinguish between the natural sciences and the social sciences in this context, it is difficult to make sense of his remarks unless one construes him as using the term 'science' in the sense of 'Geisteswissenschaft'.
The description of the accumulation of scientific knowledge which Fromm offers here is very vague. It is not clear, for example, what Fromm means by 'reinterpretation', or what the basis is for the recognition of the 'true kernel' of a statement. It seem likely, however, that the term 'reinterpretation' is being used more or less with the sense given to hermeneutics\(^{15}\) by Wilhelm Dilthey (Dilthey, 1961:7) - that is, to refer to the understanding of particular events by relating them to the wider historical, philosophical, and cultural context of which they are a part.

The need for reinterpretation arises, according to Fromm, from the fact that a person's culture places certain constraints upon the knowledge he can arrive at. Thus, while we owe our knowledge to the great visions of certain men, which are fundamentally true, the modern theorist needs to be aware of the limitations of the thought of these great men, in order to reformulate and develop their basic insights in terms of concepts appropriate to his own time and its problems. Thus Fromm wrote:

This general principle, that the way of scientific progress is *constructive reinterpretation of basic visions* rather than repeating or discarding them, certainly holds true of Freud's theoretical formulations. There is scarcely a discovery of Freud that does not contain fundamental truths and yet which does not lend itself to an organic development beyond the concepts in which it has been clothed. (Fromm, 1944:380-1)

The following chapters deal with Fromm's specific reformulations of the theories of Marx and Freud. His views are not always easy to sort out, since sometimes categories are retained, and sometimes they are changed, as are statements of the relations between different categories, in order
to deal with the problems of a new epoch, and the content of a new discipline: social psychology. In this process of reinterpretation, Fromm developed a new set of theories and concepts which in fact lie outside both the Freudian and Marxian problematics.
NOTES

1. For a fuller account of this distinction, the reader is referred to Michaillo Marković, "Basic Characteristics of Marxist Humanism," (1969 :606), and the next footnote. Markovic distinguishes between 'descriptive humanism' and 'normative humanism'.

2. Schaar's analysis is based upon Man for Himself (Fromm, 1947). Schaar's argument runs as follows. First, he defines humanism as the philosophy that makes "man the measure of any view of the world" (1961 :17), and normative naturalism as the view that "regards goodness as inherent in nature and evil as the result of deviations from nature" (1961 :18). Schaar then argues that although Fromm maintains that "only man himself can determine the criterion for virtue and sin, and not an authority transcending him," he has also written that the "aim of man's life...is to be understood as the unfolding of his powers according to the laws of his nature." Schaar contends that this shows that Fromm, rather than holding that man himself determines what the criteria of good and evil are to be, is really only saying that man discovers the criteria within his own nature. So Fromm is a naturalist, not a humanist. The error in Schaar's analysis turns about a failure to distinguish between naturalism as a position in normative ethics, and naturalism as a position in meta-ethics. When the term 'naturalism' is construed normatively, it refers to the view that "what is natural is what is good." In contrast, when it is used to refer to a position in meta-ethics, it is the view that man's moral precepts originate from knowledge of nature. Schaar does not show that Fromm is a naturalist in this sense; he does not show that Fromm derives his ethical principles from knowledge of natural regularities. And it is only if Fromm were a naturalist in this latter, meta-ethical sense that it would follow that he is not a humanist. There is nothing incompatible with holding both that "what is natural is what is good" and that "man is the measure of all things," contrary to Schaar's contention.

3. The manuscripts were first published in a complete version, compiled by D. Ryazanov, by the Marx-Engels Institute, Moscow (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 1932).

4. Fromm quotes from Das Kapital, which contains fragmentary passages on human nature, and from Die Deutsche Ideologie, which was also published by the Marx-Engels Institute in 1932. The German Ideology, which contains Marx's criticism of the left Hegelians Bauer and Stirner, was first published in English in 1947.

5. The term 'historical materialism' is not Marx's, although Marx does use similar expressions in his later work. It appears to have been coined by Plekanov. Similarly, the notion of 'dialectical materialism' is now generally attributed to Engels. See Claud Sutton, The German Tradition in Philosophy (1974 :103)
6. John Passmore writes: "By somewhat devious metaphysical routes the theory of 'natural ends' leads to the identification of the perfect with the actual; for a man to be perfect is for him to realise what he has it in him to become. This carries with it the conclusion that a good deal of what we ordinarily count as actual is not 'really' actual: sin and evil are defined as negation or privation, as a 'lack' rather than as an accomplishment. By means of such arguments, teleological perfection is identified with the actualisation of potentialities." (Passmore, 1970:26)

7. In 1929 Wilhelm Reich adhered to the position that psychoanalysis is, and cannot be more than, a scientific method and a 'clinical procedure': "psychoanalysis ... according to the definition of its founder is nothing more than a psychological method using the means of natural science for describing man's inner life as a specific part of nature ... the phenomenon of class consciousness is not accessible to psychoanalysis, nor can problems which belong to sociology be taken as objects of the psychoanalytic method." (Reich, 1966 :6-7)

8. In the 1925 article mentioned in the previous footnote, Reich was mainly cautioning 'mass psychologists', whom he regarded as having attempted to generalise illegitimately from the psychology of the individual to society as a whole. Thus, for example, Reich mentioned Kolnai as one who was guilty of this type of psychological reductionism.

   In the same article, Reich conceded that psychoanalysis could become an 'auxiliary science' to sociology, in the form of 'psychology', the subject matter of which would be the analysis of the motivations of leaders of classes, parties, or other groups. Fromm, who was a colleague of Reich in Berlin, shared Reich's fear about invalid inferences, but he believed, as he stated in an article entitled "Psychoanalyse und Soziologie" (1929), that psychoanalytic theory could be used to analyse not just leaders, but individuals composing social groups or social classes, without being reductionist.

9. In an article entitled "Dialektischer Materialismus und Psychoanalyse" (1929), Reich said that historical materialism and psychoanalysis were not mutually exclusive, and that psychoanalysis could be called in to explain social phenomena, and vice versa. See Alexander Mitscherlich (ed), *Literatur der Psychoanalyse* (1973 :305-71), for further historical information bearing on this issue.

10. Marx had written about 'powers' and 'needs of 'natural man' and 'species man' that define their nature in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. Marx had associated 'labour', 'eating', and 'sex', or what he refers to as 'animal functions' or 'physical needs', with 'natural man'. The realisation of man's powers in natural objects, according to Marx, binds him to nature and to other natural beings. In this view, history is the continual transformation of human nature. Further, man as a 'species' is a 'being for himself', that is, he is distinguished from other animals by the capability for 'consciousness', for self-knowledge. The 'powers' and 'needs' of man as a species express the kind of life which man, as distinct from all other beings, enjoys. Natural powers in Marxian theory serve as the basis for species
powers, and at the same time retain the possibility of becoming humanised, or becoming 'species powers', that is, of becoming powers that man consciously uses.

11. The conclusion of a seminar and discussion on the topic of *Socialism and Psychoanalysis* which was conducted by Siegfried Bernfeld in Berlin at the Verein sozialistischer Ärzte in 1926, at which Barbara Lantos and Ernst Simmel were present, was that the class struggle would be enriched by the development of a psychoanalytical social psychology. (Dahmer, 1973:319)

12. At the opening of the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute in 1929, Fromm read a short paper claiming that psychoanalysis could supplement sociology, where the kind of sociology that he had in mind was historical materialism.

13. For further discussion of the historical debate, see "Negative Psychoanalysis and Marxism: Towards an Objective Theory of Subjectivity." (Jacoby, 1972:1-22)

14. A clear statement of Fromm's position can be found in an article, criticising Marcuse's 'instinctivistic radicalism', in which Fromm writes:

   Indeed it is true that Freud was a critic of society, but his criticism was not that of contemporary capitalist society, but of civilization as such....Freud's concept of man was the same which underlies much anthropological speculation in the nineteenth century. Man, as he is molded by capitalism, is supposed to be the natural man, hence capitalism is the form of society which corresponds to the needs of human nature. (Fromm, 1955:342-3)

15. Wilhelm Dilthey followed Schleiermacher in his usage of the term 'hermeneutics'. Schleiermacher had applied the hermeneutic method in its original form - that of philological interpretation of obscure passages - to the study of the Platonic dialogues.
CHAPTER IV

ERICH FROMM: AUTHORITY AND SOCIAL CHARACTER

This chapter begins with an examination of Horkheimer's Hegelian-Marxist bifurcation of authority into 'rational' and 'irrational' authority. As noted in the previous chapter Fromm's Marxism is far from explicit. His theory of authority and authoritarianism is seen as taking its starting point from the Western Marxist problematic within which the 'core' members at the Institute were working in the thirties. Fromm's theory of authority and his notions of social character are designed, within this framework, to explain the intransigence of social systems by revealing the processes which inhibit social change.

We noted in the first section of the thesis that, although preoccupation with 'authority' is longstanding in Germany, the specific and intense concern of intellectuals, writers, and journalists with 'authoritarian' political and social institutions is a more recent phenomenon of the early thirties. Here 'authoritarianism' was generally used in journalistic writings to describe government made independently of parliament and parties and supported by a 'politically neutral' army and bureaucracy (Rabe, 1971:723-7). Moreover, 'authoritarianism' was hardly distinguished from the new phenomenon of 'totalitarianism'. In the situation of 'economic crisis' of the late twenties and early thirties, which affected not only Germany but all industrial capitalist countries, the 'authoritarian state' was seen by many as the solution to Germany's problems where liberalism had failed. It was also viewed as providing a solution to the increasing social problems of the 'atomised masses' concentrated into the cities by the rapid capitalist industrialisation.
of a still largely rural population. Thus, the anti-liberal, anti-intellectual, and anti-capitalist rhetoric of proponents of the authoritarian state found appeal among a sizable portion of the German people even before National Socialists took power in 1933.

The rhetoric, that emerges from a reading of the writings of Horkheimer at this time, is also anti-liberal and anti-capitalist, but, unlike National Socialism, it is not tied to a definite political program stating the ends and means - however irrational - to be realised in practical action. As we noted earlier, Horkheimer did not provide an ideology. Marxism at the Frankfurt Institute was from its inception intellectual Marxism and the interest of its members in social and political events was expressed as an academic interest. Horkheimer's Critical Theory was more a moral position or a statement of ideals than a fully-fledged political philosophy. For the latter, ideally, would embody both ideals and ideologies which would be linked to a theory of society, allowing identification of the agencies that would implement theory.

In addition, while National Socialists sought actively to appeal to the masses, Critical Theorists, because they were reflecting on theory, on Marxism itself, in an intellectual effort to reach out beyond Marx's critique of nineteenth century capitalism, wrote for a select audience. The academic and aphoristic style of their presentation further restricted their audience, not only to intellectuals, but to a minority thereof.
Most importantly, Critical Theory differed from the ideologies abundant in the political milieu in which it was conceived in that its criticisms of liberal capitalism were directed against authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies in the latter, although Horkheimer and his colleagues made no effort to separate these types of tendencies even for analytic purposes. Horkheimer argued in Hegelian-Marxist vein that the authoritarian tendencies recognisable in capitalist society rest on relations of coercion, which he perceived, not only in current social processes, but at the very base of bourgeois thought, upon which, he contended, liberalism and capitalism are founded.

What is important for Horkheimer's critique, is the assumption that all action, even the act of thinking is political in nature. Hence, Horkheimer wrote that the ideas of liberalism and capitalism had been formulated in reaction to French Absolutism and to the English landed aristocracy when it made sense to believe that the 'unfettering' of private initiative would best serve the interests of the whole (das Ganze), or that individual economic interests could even correspond with the 'general good'. But he argued that historically liberal economics had only served to mystify the real conflicts of economic interests which reveal themselves in the twentieth century in the contradiction between great wealth on the one hand and poverty on the other. According to Horkheimer, who followed Friedrich Pollock's brand of Marxist economic analysis, liberal capitalism is 'ideology', or the rationalisations of the interests of an elite. These rationalisations form the mystification to be exposed,
referred to by Marx, and are the source of the 'irrationality' of the capitalist system.

The 'irrationality' of the system is defined by Horkheimer by how it appears for those who have to live under it. Horkheimer contended that for the majority of people capitalism is an 'irrational' system because not only does it not provide for the material needs of the majority of the people, but it purposely obscures the relation of the 'use value' of the product to social need, thereby depriving people of consciousness or awareness of their real needs. People find themselves subject to forces beyond their comprehension and control, and the productive relations they are caught up in appear as numerous uncoordinated activities to which they react as if by chance, because they are unable to understand their part in the 'total system'. In Horkheimer's view the 'obscurity' of capitalist relations of production serves to underline the 'mythological' nature of the 'bourgeois' claim that "no authority be recognised unless it can justify itself to reason".

Horkheimer contended that the bourgeois concept of reason is false because it tends to 'deify' not only the authority of the market but that of bourgeois culture or civilisation as a whole. The way in which it achieves this 'deification' is through the abstractness of its categories - justice, freedom, happiness - which, Horkheimer argued, are empty of any substantive content and can, therefore, be used ideologically to justify any social arrangements. In contrast, Horkheimer followed a historical or Hegelian notion of reason. He, therefore, thought that specific societies had to be under-
stood in relation to the process of their history and the history of the world as a whole. The theorist must, therefore, submerge himself in the content of history, which upon its interiorisation, will reveal to him its 'deeper' rationality. Thus, he wrote, ideas and institutions are 'opened up' to the possibility of change. Horkheimer's discussions of 'authority' have to be understood as involving this Hegelian notion of 'reason'.

Authority, in the form in which it emerged in Germany, was discussed at the Institute most fully in their study, *Autorität und Familie* (1936). In addition to the main work of Horkheimer, Fromm and Herbert Marcuse, there were a wide variety of other contributions relating to authority and the family. The size of the study and the breadth of the papers included in it were due to Horkheimer's directives. We noted that in his inaugural address as director of the Institute (1931), Horkheimer had put forward his plan to construct a general philosophy (social philosophy), which would both incorporate the findings of the empirical sciences and yet be critical of culture. Horkheimer believed that 'authority' or any other social and moral process could not be explained solely by the critique of economy – by economic interest – but had to be understood on the basis of knowledge of the world as a whole, which includes empirical knowledge. Here, he diverged from Marx. Horkheimer wrote that authority had to be examined on the basis of knowledge of the:

continuous interrelationships between the various spheres of culture or civilisation. (Horkheimer, 1936 899)

He believed that only then could 'authority' be detached from "egotistic interests" or designs to exploit. In Horkheimer's
theory, 'authority free from exploitation' becomes both the goal of Critical Theory and the ideal against which to judge social processes.

Like Max Weber (1966), the Frankfurt scholars studied 'authority' as a social relationship, and there are certain similarities as well as differences with Weber's views that are pointed out here.

First, Weber had written that 'authority' differs from power in that while it is backed by threat of the use of force, once force is used authority breaks down and the relationship becomes one governed by 'naked' power. Horkheimer argued that all societies, excepting undifferentiated primitive communities, rely on a system of superordination and subordination, and that simple coercion or naked power alone is not sufficient to guarantee the persistence of societies. Moreover, for both Horkheimer and Weber, what is at issue is the legitimation of power or coercion. Both hold that some degree of voluntary submission by the ruled to the rulers which bestows legitimacy on power relationships is necessary in ongoing societies. They differed, however, on the foundations of this legitimacy.

Weber had gone on to argue that empirically three main types of legitimated power relationships can be identified: the traditional, the legal-rational, and the charismatic. He also maintained that capitalist industrial societies can be described as displaying a predominance of legal-rational authority. Obligation in this form of society is to laws, formally agreed upon or imposed, rather than to men. In addition, Weber referred to the increase in efficiency, calculability, and instrumentality which, he wrote, characterised
men's activities in modern industrial societies, and which he traced in religion, in the political sphere, and in the economy. Weber described this process as the "rationalisation of action".

Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Fromm were primarily interested in modern capitalism and while they certainly agreed with Weber that the spread of 'instrumental rationality', accompanied by the 'secularisation' and 'disenchantment' of the world had increased, they found Weber's notion of rationality limited. Instead, they argued for a more substantive or Hegelian-Marxist notion of rationality, by means of which an attempt could be made to understand the underlying structure of the authority relationship in modern capitalist societies. In doing so, they were not prepared to accept Weber's reduction of rationality to its formal aspects: efficient strategies for reaching already agreed upon ends. Instead, they argued that the total framework of interests within which strategies are chosen and agreed to has to be taken into account. In their view, the process of capitalist rationalisation had realised historically not 'rationality as such' but political domination. The Frankfurt notion of rationality is bound up with their concept of 'socialism', which is also no more than what they mean by a 'rational society'. Horkheimer saw in capitalist society not an increase in rationality - not an increase in work by and for the people - but a trend towards 'irrationalism' or disguised exploitation. In contrast, he contended in Authorität und Familie that a 'rational society' would be characterised by disciplined work based on the plans of men, and the implementation of those plans by and for men.
Horkheimer went on to outline the 'irrationality' of the capitalist system, or how power is concealed from the ruled, in more detail. From his account, we saw that he started from the assumption that power or force forms the basis of all social relationships. Horkheimer wrote:

The so-called social nature of man, whether it be pragmatically, and morally justified or justified by religion, is reducible to the memory of the acts of force by which men were made 'social' and 'civilised'. (Horkheimer, 1936:11)

But in Horkheimer's view, analysis of naked power or coercion cannot explain the acceptance of social hierarchy and the State by those who live under it. His argument here is sociological. Horkheimer contended that explanations of society's persistence in terms of the power of one great man or of the State opposed to powerless individuals reduce the State or individuals to homogenous unities. They neglect the fundamental importance of ideas or ideologies and their connection to power. Horkheimer's sociology is Marxist. The mediating functions of social institutions and the human psyche, so much now a part of sociological thought, are discussed in relation to the problem of the transmission of ideologies. Horkheimer argued that both past and present relations of coercion are internalised by the individual, forming within him relatively stable psychic structures which mediate external power by informing his relationship to it, just as the institutions of society or culture - the church, family and law - mediate the coercion of the State for individuals subject to the rule of law: they contain prescriptions or rules for social action. Thus, Horkheimer stressed the necessity both for analysis of culture or civilisation, which he viewed here as an expression of the human psyche, and for analysis of the human psyche, which he
viewed as an expression of culture or civilisation. But, as we discuss in the next section, Horkheimer did not mean to imply by this the reductionist view that hypothesises the individual as a 'reflection of social institutions'. Horkheimer emphasised that the human psyche and its historical development as to be examined in the context of the 'developing totality'.

Horkheimer also made clear, in this early study, that theories relating to how force is justified in specific societies are theories of social persistence and are distinct from theories of social change. Knowledge of the mediating functions of the human psyche or social institutions such as the family can only explain why a particular culture persists because these functions take place within the given system. Such theories, Horkheimer wrote, indicate that changes of 'world-wide' historical importance are unlikely to occur if men must first change themselves, because the relatively stable psychic structures, formed within men in reaction to conditions of past coercion, militate against change. It, therefore, requires an "immense effort of courage and strength" for men to change themselves. Thus, these theories describe how 'hidden' coercive forces in ideologies are mediated by the human psyche and social institutions. They can indicate why societies do not change.

In contrast, Horkheimer maintained that sudden structural changes which also occur in the life of societies take place, not because of the inevitable progress of history or personal overcoming of interiorised cultural restraints, but because of the actions of individuals composing groups or classes where knowledge - historical consciousness - has
become a 'vital force'. Horkheimer saw Critical Theory's judgement upon capitalist society as opening up the way to the articulation of knowledge as a vital force. Horkheimer (1968:175n) wrote that, "Critical Theory explains: it must not be like this men can alter being, the conditions for doing so already exist." But, as we discuss later, Horkheimer had no revolutionary theory like that of Lenin that would outline the mechanisms by which ideas become the "motive force of change," nor did he identify agencies of change.

It should be fairly clear from the above that the framework, within which the early socio-psychological studies were conducted, was one which sought, in exposing the the *interiorisation* of past relations of force, to explain the persistence of modern social structures. This framework excluded consideration of those forces in the individual, whether social or personal in nature, making for change. As we shall see later, Adorno et al identify the 'revolutionary personality' by means of a formal-logical category, namely, that he *does not possess* the qualities and psychic structures attributed to the authoritarian or fascist personality. The latter is identified positively on the basis of theory.

In contrast to Adorno, Fromm does describe in positive terms the empirical qualities and psychic structures of the revolutionary. But while the revolutionary for Fromm is not a formal-logical category, neither is it based on a theory of social change. The revolutionary for Fromm expresses his humanist version of what 'socialist man' looks like. However, it cannot, even assuming that all revolutionaries are socialist humanists account for social change. Perhaps this can be made a little clearer.
Some have argued that an adequate theory of social persistence ought to be able to explain structural change. This is clearly false if what is meant is that the absence of factors and relations between factors making for social persistence ought to suffice to explain social change. It assumes a complete theory of social persistence. Even natural science theories are rarely complete and are open to disproof by the discovery of new variables. It also leaves out of consideration positive forces 'pushing for change'. In order to give an adequate account of structural change, Fromm's category of the 'revolutionary' would have to be grounded in a theory of change, which would attempt to identify factors and processes positively making for change. As we discuss below, what Fromm's analysis does is to provide knowledge of some of the facts of social persistence (which are 'crystallised' in the notion of social character) to which one has to pay attention in order to understand such general phenomena as the long term transition from capitalism to, what he optimistically hopes will be, a socialist form of society. Working within the Marxian materialist model of history, Fromm viewed his task as one of identifying factors which work independently of economic forces to slow down the inevitable transition to a socialist society. He did not attempt to work out a theory of change based on economic and sociological analysis of Weimar Germany, following upon Marx's studies of specific societies. Instead, it is argued that Fromm attempts merely to insert psychological forces making for persistence of 'the given' into Marx's heuristic substructure/superstructure model of capitalism. The attempt is, nonetheless, interesting as an early effort to give a
psychological explanation of society and politics, as well as providing one of the more interesting attempts to 'merge' psychoanalysis with Marxist social theory.

Let us now consider Erich Fromm's analysis of the reasons why people accept external authorities. Fromm followed Horkheimer in distinguishing between 'rational' and 'irrational' authority, supporting Horkheimer's indictment of the 'irrationality' of the capitalist system which had seen an increase in 'exploitative' as opposed to 'contractual' relations. But Fromm was seeking an explanation, not for the exploitative nature of bourgeois culture, but for the mechanisms by which external authority via rationalisations and ideologies becomes internalised or becomes part of the human psyche.

As a consequence of the Institute's position, that it is the totality of past relations of coercion that are important in forming the attitudes of individuals towards authority, which, we noted, was due in no small measure to a desire to understand the acceptance of domination by the new socialist and fascist masses in Germany, Fromm started out from the assumption that under monopoly capitalism the major reasons for accepting authority are unconscious ones because acceptance cannot be explained in terms of rational self-interest at the conscious level. Moreover, this acceptance appears to be voluntary being based on interiorised ways of relating to authorities.

Fromm, like Horkheimer - who had written that depth psychological analysis could afford greater knowledge of the 'subject' of history - felt that psychoanalysis was the best approach to examine these interiorised patterns. Fromm
believed that historical materialism could lend itself to supplementation and extension by application of the methods of psychoanalysis. Fromm (1970:115) wrote that psychoanalysis and historical materialism were compatible with respect to "their appraisal of consciousness, which is seen by both as less the driving force behind human behaviour than the reflection of other hidden forces."

Fromm's efforts here to understand authority, also represent an attempt to 'bridge' the different psychoanalytic and historical materialist problematics. For example, one of these bridges was an attempt by Fromm to show that the psychoanalytic theory of the human psyche, like the Marxian theory of history is *dialectical*. Freud had divided the psyche into the functional components of ego, super-ego, and id. Of these the super-ego was especially important to Fromm, since acceptance of authority could be related to its development. For Freud had argued that individuals obey authority not only because of fear of punishment by external authority-holders, but because of fear of that *inner censor,* the super-ego, which the individual creates within himself to keep in check the unpredictable impulses of the id. Freud described the function of the super-ego as that of 'reality-testing'. Reality-testing enables individuals to confine impulsive behaviour within socially acceptable limits. However, Fromm's attempt to show that this concept of the super-ego is dialectical and, therefore, compatible with Marxism is rather forced. His argument turns about the point that the super-ego, as conceived by Freud, not only has the negative function of repressing socially undesirable behaviour but it also has a positive
Help in suppressing impulses is but one of the functions of authority. Along with this negative task it always has a positive one: that is to stimulate the individual under its sway to a certain type of behaviour. (Fromm, 1936:909)

Fromm argued that the individual also reinforces authority by projecting onto its representatives, values he has learned and which have gone to make up his super-ego. These are generally 'idealisations' of how the person in authority ought to behave. It is this circuitous 'projection-internalisation' of authority that Fromm wanted to argue is dialectical. In Fromm's own terms, it is not clear that the human psyche always experiences conflicts between physiological urges and external reality. In fact, what seems to characterise the process Fromm describes is its cumulative or augmentative nature. Also, in view of Fromm's search for 'commonalities' between Marxism and psychoanalysis, this seems to be a rather 'strained' understanding of dialectical processes.

In building a further bridge between psychoanalysis and Marxism, Fromm, in contrast to Freud, who viewed the development of the super-ego as the internalisation of external holders of authority independently of the productive process, regarded the development of the super-ego as ultimately dependent upon productive life. Fromm's early aim to explore this aspect of super-ego development, as its dominant aspect, was clearly expressed in an article, entitled, "Analytical Social Psychology" (1932). Fromm wrote:

The task of social psychology is to explain the shared socially relevant psychic attitudes and ideologies - and their unconscious roots in particular - in terms of the influence of economic conditions on libido strivings. (Fromm, 1970:121)
In terms of Marx's materialist model, Fromm was interested in the modifying effects of unconscious urges internal to the individual on factors of the substructure, and, in turn, the impact of the substructure on the development of the human psyche.

In seeking to bring psychanalytic theory into line with theories of 'matriarchy' popular in socialist circles in the thirties, Fromm reinterpreted Freudian theory on the question of the universality claimed for the 'patriarchal family', which he argued was a 'culture-bound' concept. This discussion is important for the development of Fromm's social psychology because Fromm tended to emphasise to a far greater extent than did Horkheimer and Adorno later, the socialisation process and the centrality of the family as mediator of cultural expectations. The main source for Fromm's discussion is an article on "The Theory of Mother Right" (1934) which appeared in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung.

Briefly, Fromm argued that Freud's claim for the universality of the 'Oedipus Complex' had no historical support. In *Civilisation and its Discontents* (1930) Freud wrote that 'aggressiveness' forms the basis of every relation of love and affection among people, with the exception of that between the mother and her male child. Fromm countered that it has not been proved that this relationship is a universal one. In fact, another explanation can be offered for the authority of the father in the bourgeois families of capitalist societies. Following Engels (1884), Fromm contended that the advent of patriarchal society had coincided with the emergence of class society in that both stressed the same or similar qualities in the socialisation of individuals. Hence, the father/
son relationship can also be explained in terms of property relations, where the importance of the son as inheritor and future provider is seen to bring him into conflict with his father.

For Fromm, as Martin Jay (1973:96) has correctly noted, the importance of studying matriarchal societies was not primarily out of historical interest - as the existence of matriarchies in the past is extremely difficult to demonstrate - but, in addition to a refutation of Oedipal theory, they offered a vision of a different reality. Moreover, it is in this particular 'vision' that Fromm and Horkheimer's feminist sympathies are apparent.

Fromm wrote that matriarchies are characterised by female traits, such as, the "ideal of motherly compassion" and "love for the weak," "far fewer guilt feelings," "a far weaker super-ego," and "a greater capacity for pleasure and happiness" than found in male dominated societies. But Fromm differed from Horkheimer in that, while Horkheimer merely used this vision as a standard from which to criticise 'patriarchal society', Fromm interpreted this vision as an inherent potential, belonging to individuals composing all societies. It is thus brought down from the realm of fantasy and interpreted within Fromm's socialist humanist problematic as a concrete possibility. Fromm believed that socialism founded on matriarchy could offer a program stressing peace-loving 'matri-centric' values. In contrast, he argued that the Enlightenment claims for 'equality between the sexes' had resulted in a 'reification of male values' because women were required to adapt to a male-dominated society. Fromm contended in this early essay, that 'true equality' between the sexes can only
exist in a society which allows scope for the unfolding of female as well as male potentiality, i.e., in a rational society.

This position of Fromm's was initially accepted by Horkheimer, who wrote in the introduction to *Autorität und Familie* (1936:66-76) that the qualities induced in the individual by the patricentric complex — "self-control," "sense of labour and discipline," "ability to retain certain ideas," "consistency in practical life," "use of intelligence," "persistence," and "joy in constructive effort" — were the conditions of 'progress' of the last century. While, these qualities are not all negative (because Fromm and Horkheimer argued for a 'rational society' based on both male and female attributes) Horkheimer also criticised the paternalism of the bourgeois liberal stage of capitalism and the position of women within it. He argued that historically, the father became the family's keeper of 'right', 'conscience', and 'power', not because of superiority over other family members in strength or morality, but because of his chance position within the economy, which had made every other member of the family dependent upon him for their material existence. In time, this authority came to be regarded as "God-given," giving him a moral claim on submission. Finally, his authority came to be regarded as 'natural'. As such, it was accepted uncritically and reinforced through the education of the child.

Horkheimer wrote:

> the way to power in the bourgeois world is not through the realisation of value judgements but through adaptation to the given conditions. (Horkheimer, 1936:57)
While Horkheimer argued that authority continued to be uncritically accepted in Germany in the family, he supported Fromm in arguing that psychology could aid in understanding the 'dynamics' of this adaptation. However, Horkheimer emphasised that the aim of this knowledge would be to change the given:

The only mechanisms that are effective in the formation of the authoritarian character have been examined by modern depth psychology. It has shown how, on the one hand, the dependency, the deep sense of inadequacy of most people, the centralisation of the whole mental life on the concepts of order and subordination and, on the other hand, the cultural performance of people are determined through the relationship of the child to the parents and to its sisters and brothers. (Horkheimer, 1936:59)

On another level, Fromm sought to provide a further 'bridge' between Marxism and psychoanalysis. He argued that the notion of the ego is just as important a concept in the Freudian theory of personality structure as that of the super-ego. While the theory of the super-ego describes the processes of interiorisation of external authority, Fromm held that the Freudian theory of the development of the ego indicates 'hope' for the materialisation of an ideal - not of anarchy as the opposite of authority, but of 'rational authority' or socialism as the opposite of the 'irrational authority' and exploitation capitalism represents.

Fromm wrote that the relationship of the ego to id impulses and authority is one of 'rational control'. He viewed 'control', not in a purely instrumental sense, but in the German idealist sense of control based on 'reason'. For Fromm, 'rationality', 'reason', 'self-awareness' and 'consciousness' are psychological attributes of the ego. These are continually contrasted with the attributes of
the super-ego - the bearer of tradition in whose form culture is reified. Fromm wrote:

The weaker the Ego is, the more the individual has to build up such defences against his impulses. But the Ego develops: as man alters Nature in the course of history, the powers and abilities of the Ego grow...the weak Ego seeks the shelter of the super-ego until its growing strength permits it to dominate its impulses independently and without help from its emotional relationship to the super-ego and authority. (Fromm, 1936: 909)

Fromm held that the weaker the ego among individuals in a given society, the more dependent they become upon authority and their 'irrational' emotional ties to the super-ego. Fromm contended:

The analysis so far shows that when social conditions limit the development of the Ego, the suppressing of impulses requires an irrational relationship to authority and its inner psychic representative, the Super-Ego. (Fromm, 1936: 909)

Fromm, therefore, argued the 'irrationality' of reliance upon super-ego controls lies in the fact that the individual is less able to consciously control his life. Socialist humanist values are in this case attributed to the ego.

Fromm was later severely criticised by Herbert Marcuse (1955) on this point. Marcuse argued that Fromm's notions of the fully developed ego and later the notion of the 'productive character' are merely rhetorical, because there cannot be any hope of realising them within established industrial capitalist societies. Marcuse's position represents another version of the argument that structural changes cannot be expected from the individual and personal level alone. Marcuse wrote:

either one defines 'personality' and 'individuality' in terms of their possibilities within the established form of civilisation, then their realisation is for the vast majority tantamount to successful adjustment. Or one defines them in terms of their transcending content, including their socially denied potentialities beyond
(and beneath) their actual existence: in this case, their realisation would imply transgression beyond the established form of civilisation to radically new modes of... 'individuality' incompatible with the prevailing ones... this would mean 'curing' the patient to become a rebel or... a martyr... Fromm... talks of... productive love and happiness as if man could actually practice all this and still remain sane and full of 'wellbeing' in a society which Fromm himself describes as one of total alienation dominated by the commodity relations of the 'market', (Marcuse, quoted in Fromm, 1955:347-8)

Marcuse feared that Fromm and other 'revisionists', by under-emphasising the totally repressive nature of civilisation, had tended to posit a type of 'genuine individuality' that was unrealistic. Freud had shown that in order to overcome natural constraints, man becomes civilised, and in becoming civilised, man represses aggression. Freud's pessimism is expressed in the view that civilised man has not escaped this 'aggressive' aspect of his nature. In contrast, Fromm fastened on to an optimistic element in Freudian theory - the possibility of 'fully developed egos' or 'productive characters' appearing that would fight the forces of social repression.

While Marcuse pointed out the irreconcilability of 'genuine individuality' and a civilisation that is inherently 'repressive', Horkheimer and Adorno also viewed Fromm's social psychology as resolving the 'dialectical tension' between the individual and society too quickly10. Thus, Fromm's road to socialism lends itself too easily to interpretation as the 'unfolding' of the germ that is already present in man from the beginning. Moreover, it articulates an optimism about the concrete possibility of socialism in Europe that the others viewed with more caution, even before the emigration.
On the psychological level, Fromm found Freud's reduction of explanations of authority to the relationship between id, super-ego, and ego too narrow to account for the precise mechanisms by means of which individuals continuously form their relationship to authority. In more concrete terms, Fromm wanted to know what it is internal to individuals which causes them to accept the rationalisations and ideologies of certain powerful groups. Here, he needed to find 'statements' or 'theories' permitting the reduction of social events - ideologies - to the relations between individuals within groups, and further, to the psychological and physiological characteristics of individuals composing groups. Fromm held that a social-psychological 'reinterpretation' of Freud's notion of character could provide these theoretical links.

The 1930's saw the blossoming period of character studies in Germany, and numerous theories were put forward to explain character formation. But Fromm, unlike the military psychologists or educationists, wrote that he was not merely looking for qualities in a person that could be designated his character. Fromm sought a dynamic concept of character, embodying a theory that would link physiological, biological and psychological aspects to social behaviour. While qualities are generally interpreted statically as 'attributes', Fromm sought, in addition, a concept of character that was sensitive to changes occurring within the individual. He argued that Freud provided such a concept.

In fact, Freud's characterology incorporates two theories: a theory of the developmental stages of the sexual libido, which relates physiological to psychological variables; and, a theory of repression expressed in the notions of 'sublimation'
and 'reaction formation'. For example, Fromm noted that Freud's concept of the anal character involves a theory relating psychological states, manifest in behaviour, to fixations, due to reasons in individual biography, at the anal stage of libidinal development. Fromm also noted that the Freudian theory of 'repression', expressed in the notions of 'sublimation' and 'reaction formation', offers an explanation of how the energy of physiological drives is directed and organised to form observable psychological states, such as, various feelings and emotions. Thus, Fromm found Freud's characterology attractive. He held that the theoretical connections between observable character traits and 'unconscious' physiological strivings resulted in a structure which is amenable to scientific or 'empirical' investigation. This structure is arrived at via the logic of 'physiological reductionism', that is, drives or instincts are connected to psychological variables like emotions by means of observed empirical regularity in their joint occurrence. May Brodbeck (1968: 299-300) notes that psychological concepts cannot be replaced in such theories even if all the rules relating the physiological variables to each other and the psychological concept are known.

But while Fromm retained the categories based on Freud's developmental theory of the sexual libido, Fromm 'reinterpreted' the Freudian notion of character. Libidinal theory became increasingly peripheral to Fromm's characterology. Fromm argued that sexual strivings, though not to be disregarded, were definitely, because of their more 'flexible' or postponeable nature, secondary to "strivings for self-preservation." Here, Fromm appears closer to a 'humanist' Marx.
The notion of 'self-preservation' is very general.

Bertell Ollman (1971:75-8) comments that in Marxian theory, what man 'needs' for his 'self-preservation' is linked to his powers. Both powers and needs, moreover, are altered in the development of man's history.

Let us now consider Fromm's characterology, starting from sociology and examine his links between sociology, psychology and physiology from a different angle. We have already noted that Fromm held to a Marxian 'conspiracy' theory of society, the villains being 'big business and the state', what we want to consider here is his logic of analysis at the level of groups.

Like Horkheimer, Fromm believed, against the Durkheimian tradition in sociology, that there is no reality 'sui generis' and, therefore, no group or societal mind, but only the sum total of individual minds - their motives, beliefs, physiological and biological states. Working within an individualist-empiricist framework, Fromm believed that the properties of groups can be known by investigation of the properties of the individuals and their life situations, which compose them. Brodbeck (1968:301-2) has described this position as definitional methodological individualism to distinguish it from the stronger, and less easily defensible, position of explanatory methodological individualism, with which it is easily confused. The latter, unlike the former, declares that the laws of the group sciences are in principle reducible to those about individuals, for example, in the case of sociology and psychology implying that psychology could entirely replace sociology. Fromm sought to avoid this type of reductionism.
Fromm's characterology seems to involve the logic of defining empirical connections between psychology and sociology. Brodbeck's (1968, 298-300) description of this process is useful here. Brodbeck wrote that such explanations depend upon:

a) knowledge of the sociological definition of the group. For example, in the case of stratification, who takes orders from whom,

b) various composition rules which allow one to state, in the example of stratification, how individuals behave in stratified layers,

c) a stochastic assessment of the numerical composition of the group.

Brodbeck wrote that the explanatory methodological individualist would argue that, since all definitions are dispensable in principle, and the composition rules contain only psychological terms, then this position declares there is only one area. But, in practice, knowledge of the composition of groups and rules connecting individuals within groups is imperfect, which means that predictions may fail to take account of crucial variables. Secondly, group behaviour, for example, class behaviour, may be observed to be lawlike and yet it might not be possible to find composition rules to explain such behaviour from the behaviour of individuals.

To return now to Fromm's characterology, Fromm contended that the transition from individual psychology to social psychology is a purely quantitative step. This statement is a little obscure. Fromm seems to imply, (c), that social psychology requires numerical knowledge of the composition of groups. Second, he implied, (a), that from knowledge of the sociological concept, social psychological explanations can be derived. For example, Marx's theory that the workers - a class-in-itself - will be transformed into a class-for-itself assumes the
presence of certain kinds of individual behaviour determined by class position, which Fromm calls 'shared life experiences'. Fromm wrote:

> These life experiences are...identical with the socio-economic situation of this particular group. Thus analytical social psychology seeks to understand the instinctual apparatus of a group, its libidinous and largely unconscious behaviour, in terms of its socio-economic structure. (Fromm, 1970:116)

Life experiences become part of the explanation of social-psychology. Finally, Fromm stated in accordance with (b) various 'composition rules', which explain a person's behaviour in a group, class or society. According to Fromm, social character is less specific than the particular characters of individuals comprising groups. It is the 'essential nucleus' of character traits of the majority of members of a group, which develop out of their common life situation. The composition rule which allows Fromm to make the latter assertion is the theory of 'socialisation'. The latter is used to show why individuals comprising classes are likely to have the same or similar psychic structures (character) and why the group-specific character structure is continually being reproduced. The theory of socialisation is supported by that of 'adaptation'. The inner logic of Fromm's characterology proceeds via an examination of the sociological variable; for example, common class situation and its restatement in terms containing psychological variables; rules for the composition of groups, such as socialisation and adaptation; and, finally, a quantitative or statistical assessment of groups in terms of workers, clerks, etcetera. A further link between psychology and physiology is made by empirical observation of regularity of occurrence of psychological states and physiological strivings.
But Fromm would only have a complete explanation of a sociological concept if he was able to state all the variables entering into the concept and, secondly, if his composition rules do not fail. For example, Marx's socio-historical 'lawlike' statement that the proletariat (a class-in-itself) will be transformed into a 'class-for-itself' involves the empirical sociological notion of a 'class-in-itself' which can only be completely dispensed with and described in purely psychological terms if all the psychological variables are included, and, if the theories of socialisation and adaptation are adequate. We discuss the limitations of Fromm's characterology in this respect below. In practice, Fromm retained both the sociological and the psychological concept of empirical class consciousness. The notion of a 'class-for-itself' is, of course, the undefined category of 'historical consciousness' which, in principle, cannot be replaced by psychological categories.

To return to the Freudian end of Fromm's characterology. It has been objected that Freud's notions of 'sublimations' and 'reaction formations' do not merely link physiological concepts to psychological states, but Freud had also used them to link physiological states and sociological variables. It is, therefore, argued that they were not meant by Freud to be as sociologically or culturally 'neutral' as Fromm interprets them. Unlike Fromm, Freud did not see culture or civilisation as the result of complex social processes. Freud saw culture or civilisation as the product of biological drives that have been repressed by society. Adorno, therefore, claimed that Fromm had 'oversocialised' the biological nature of man. He
wrote:

Concretely, the denunciation of Freud's so-called instinctivism amounts to the denial that culture, by enforcing restrictions on libidinal and particularly on destructive drives, is instrumental in bringing about repressions, guilt feelings, and the need for self-punishment. (Adorno, quoted by Jay, 1973: 104)

In contrast, Fromm regarded instinctual repression as tied to a particular form of society, and the content of social psychology as the "healthy\textsuperscript{19} individual's successful adaptation\textsuperscript{20} to his life situation. Fromm's emphasis upon socialisation processes, the importance of the super-ego and the 'circle of the family' as mediators between the individual and society, as well as hope for the emergence of the 'integrated self' in the form of the ego, meant that Fromm's social-psychology was much more harmonistic and optimistic than Freud's psychology had been or the Critical Theory of his colleagues at the Institute. Fromm's intellectual divergence from some of the basic tenets of Critical Theory became even more apparent in the early years of their stay in the United States, where Fromm's short association, of approximately ten years, with Horkheimer and Adorno came to an end.

Further, it can be argued that the important fact about the Marxian definition of a 'class-in-itself' is not the psychological states or the internal functioning of the individuals making up the proletariat, but the specific social relations of production in which they are enmeshed in each epoch. The latter and not physiological or psychological theories explain empirical or 'false consciousness' for they define the properties of classes. Fromm does not deny this. We have pointed out that physiological and psycho-
logical theories were intended to be supplementary forms of explanation by Fromm, but his emphasis upon psychology meant that he was in constant danger of 'psychologisms'. For example, Fromm regarded 'character' as a kind of 'distillation' of the impact of the social relations of production upon individuals making up classes. For Fromm, since the social character masks man's 'truly human potential', it takes the form of a reified cultural consciousness, incorporating past and present ideas, rationalisations, cliches and ideologies which cause individuals to act and think in certain predetermined ways, despite the fact that those modes of acting and thinking may be outdated or shown to be contrary to rational self-interest. It can be argued, therefore, that the notion of character more closely approaches what Pareto termed the 'residues of persistence of aggregates' than any Marxian theory.

Finally, there are difficulties with Fromm's notion of ideology. Fromm claimed that the notion of 'social character' can be used to explain how "the material basis is reflected in man's head." Like Marx, Fromm defined ideologies as ultimately based on class interest. Marx had defined ideologies as the outward rationalisation of that epoch's economic organisation, and a tool used by the ruling class. Fromm held that ideologies are accepted on a cognitive and conscious level as an expression of class interest. However, this did not explain the success of certain ideologies over others. He hypothesised that the latter appeal to certain unconscious drives within the individual. For example, he held that political and moral ideologies have an emotional appeal and that this enables certain groups to manipulate others. Ideologies appealing to deep-seated emotions, according to Fromm, are interiorised
in the form of convictions. Fromm argued that convictions differ from attitudes in that while an individual may *express* an opinion, he *acts* in accordance with his convictions. Further, in order to obtain psychological, as well as material satisfaction, an individual will adapt to the dominant social and economic conditions, developing "those traits that make him *desire* to act as he *has* to act." Fromm wrote that the needs of society, which are but the rationalised interests (ideologies) of the ruling class, in this way are *internalised,* for example, the need to *work* and to *obey.* Fromm wrote:

> In other words, the social character internalises external necessities and thus harnesses human energy for the task of a given economic and social system. (Fromm, 1941:284)

The main difficulty with this view is that all private convictions may not express group or societal ideologies. They may be the result of other beliefs, for example, religious ones. Furthermore, the dominance of any one ideology, the ideology of the dominant class can be questioned.

In conclusion, Fromm's methodological individualism led him to neglect consideration of how sociological variables enter into his theory. For example, he doesn't really consider the relation of the resolution of conflict between drives and cultural processes *within* the person to opportunities *external* to the person for their resolution, i.e., concrete political possibilities. This is in part due to Fromm's uncritical acceptance of the Institute's analysis of the structure of Weimar society which tended to simplify structural arrangements to monopoly capitalist ones. Finally, Fromm's attempt to 'fuse' psychoanalysis with Marxism may be indicative of the political powerlessness and alienation
felt by intellectuals in Weimar, but it also reflects Fromm's unbounded 'faith' in man. These two factors also explain why, although Fromm set out with the intention of fusing psychoanalysis with Marxism, the result of his efforts is an outlook that is really a further development of secular humanism, rather than one that is either deeply psychoanalytic or deeply Marxist.
NOTES

1. Hannah Rabe (1971:723-4) wrote that the term 'authoritarian' was only introduced into the German language from the French in the early 1930's in the writings of the 'young conservatives'. The latter group, comprising writers and journalists of no political party affiliations, included Moeller van den Bruck, Carl Schmitt, Paul Ernst, and Ernst Jünger. In French, 'authoritarian', had been used in the sense of 'authoritative' (demanding of esteem, masterful). It was introduced at this time to denote the form of the National Socialist state.

2. The implications of this are discussed more fully later.

3. Horkheimer supported Pollock's articles in the thirties on the economic crisis and the critique of State Capitalism in preference to the more orthodox Marxist economic theory of Henrvk Grossmann. Pollock's economic theory was carried out on two levels: ideology critique; and critique of world capitalism.

4. These rationalisations, according to Horkheimer, hide the brute fact of the workings of the 'principle of just and equal exchange'. Horkheimer contended that the market economy cannot function harmoniously to fulfill the material needs of the people, as the liberals claimed, because it is fundamentally unstable. Marx tried to show that, while capitalist accumulation is regulated by the search for profit, the satisfaction of wants is met only incidentally. Production is divorced from consumption, and the two are only brought together haphazardly by the market mechanism so that equilibrium is only achieved by chance and at the cost of periodic upheavals. Horkheimer further argued - albeit from his German experience - that under monopoly capitalism this systemic instability, first noted by Marx, is increased by State intervention in the economy - by the State underwriting entrepreneurial risks. The majority of people, including entrepreneurs, according to Horkheimer, thereby find themselves subject to forces beyond their comprehension and control because the productive relations they are caught up in are presented as numerous uncoordinated activities to which they can only react haphazardly.

5. Herbert Marcuse joined the Institute in 1932. With Horkheimer and Adorno, he was one of the principal contributors to the development of Critical Theory in the thirties. Marcuse later brought out a work on Freud, Eros and Civilization: a Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (1955) which delved into the structure of drives and motives of men in the quest for the possibility of a 'non-repressive' civilisation. Marcuse charged the 'revisionists' (mainly Fromm and Horney) of merely appending a sociological dimension to the psychological one. Marcuse claimed to find an historical and sociological dimension within Freud's theory itself.

6. Weber cautioned that ideal types should not be interpreted rigidly. He thought it highly probable that elements of traditional and charismatic authority would be present even in the most efficient of organisations.
7. Fromm read, for example, J.J. Bachofen and Lewis Morgan who had influenced Engels', *The Origin of the Family* (1884), Malinowski was important to this circle, as well as the work of Briffault, whom Fromm introduced to the German public.

8. This view of Fromm's eventually caused his dismissal from The International Psychoanalytic Association.

9. Martin Jay (1973:103-5) has carefully summarised Adorno's objections to Fromm's ego-psychology in a paper by Adorno, not published in English, but delivered on April 26, 1946 in Los Angeles. It was later published in German in *Sociologica II* (1962).

11. It is interesting to note the etymology of the word, 'character' in antiquity in the *enduring* marks of individual uniqueness which are 'impressed', 'imprinted' or 'entrenched' on the individual. Idealised character traits, which are thought to have determined the development of the individual have often been depicted by the Greeks in their portraits. For example, Homer is shown as the 'ideal visionary'. Even today, catholic teaching sees in the character of the sacraments indelible spiritual features, which are imprinted via christening, confirmation and consecration of the soul. During the Enlightenment, the notion of 'character' acquired with La Bruyere the function of assigning *individual uniqueness* to psychological and moral descriptions. With Kant, character came to denote the ability to act according to unalterable maxims, and, finally, Schopenhauer stressed the innate quality of character as a unique part of the Will. Characterology expanded again after the initial overriding popularity of modern psychology in Germany. In the epoch after Wundt, the impersonal term, 'experimental subject', which fitted in well with the experimental approach, remained even in the work of Rohrshach and Freud, who were examining phenomena characterological in nature. When the term 'character' reappeared in German psychological literature, its reappearance was due to influences outside psychology. For example, in the 1920's, character became a central concept in military psychology, where it was regarded as a 'special quality' of the future officer, or in the educational psychology of L. Klages, where character formation or the way a man related to the world was designated the goal of education.


13. For Freud, the libidinal energy of the child is channelled differently according to the 'stage' of the child's sexual development. This is based on clinical evidence. Freud believed the child went through four stages: the oral, the anal, the phallic, and the genital.

14. In the case of the 'anal character', Freud had observed that 'orderliness', ' parsimony', and ' obstinacy' were regularly observable in the clinical situation in people who had expressed extreme pleasure in bowel movements during childhood. Freud, thus described them as 'fixated' at this stage of libidinal development.

15. In 'sublimation', the individual finds alternative ways of satisfying the original drive. For example, Fromm wrote that anal eroticism may be sublimated in love of dirt or disorder. In 'reaction formation', on the other hand, the individual channels energy in the opposite direction to that of the original drive. For example, the anal character will show stubbornness and parsimony.

17. The reason that Brodbeck views psychological terms as undefinable in nonpsychological language is that she accepts the widely held philosophical view that even though psychological states may, as a matter of fact, be identical with physical states, the meaning of psychological concepts cannot be analysed in terms of physical concepts.

18. Fromm (1970:112) wrote: "the sex-rooted drives can be repressed, while the desires emanating from the instincts for self-preservation cannot simply be removed from consciousness and placed in the unconscious."

19. Fromm argued that psychoanalysts following Freud had tended to 'absolutise' the structure of bourgeois patriarchal society as 'the normal situation', and furthermore that they proceeded by 'analysing' their experience of the neurotic of bourgeois society, who they met in the clinical situation, to individuals in other societies. In reaction to this, Fromm (1970:119) wrote: "They forgot the fact that neurosis - whether a neurotic symptom or a neurotic character trait - results from the 'abnormal' individual's faulty adaptation to his instinctual drives to the reality around him; most people in a society, i.e., the 'healthy' people do possess this ability to adapt. Thus phenomena studied in social (or mass) psychology cannot be explained by analogy with neurotic phenomena."

20. Fromm wrote that the "key conception of psychoanalysis" is "man's active and passive adaptation of the biological apparatus, the instincts, to social reality. What Fromm seems to mean by 'adaptation' is the continual resolution of contradictions between the individual's developing instinctual structure on the one hand, and his life experiences on the other - a resolution which occurs within the person. Resolution is successful in Fromm's so-called 'healthy' individual. In the case of the neurotic, Fromm wrote that adaptation is somehow disturbed. Fromm also noted that the role of the instincts is either active, in which case specific instincts dominate, or passive, in which case other instincts are repressed or sublimated."
CHAPTER V

THE AUTHORITARIAN CHARACTER

This chapter is concerned with the typologies developed by Fromm and utilised by him in his study of the authoritarian character of German workers in the 1930's. Fromm's study was, in part, reported in *Escape from Freedom* (1941). The official research report of the Institute, *Autorität und Familie* (1936), published the questionnaire schedule used by Fromm in his interviews. The study as a whole has still to be published. The main reason for its nonpublication by the Institute seems to lie in personal and ideological differences between Fromm, Horkheimer and Adorno. We have already noted that Fromm's secular humanism and his position on Freud was beginning to separate him from Horkheimer and the others, even in the early years of his collaboration on an Institute project. In 1938, Fromm left the Institute completely.

We noted in the last chapter, that Fromm was attracted to the characterology of Freud because it was not purely descriptive but 'dynamic' or containing a theory able to explain processes. Since Weber, who championed the method of ideal types, social scientists have recognised that types which merely define properties or classes by the principles of genus proximum and differentia specifica, whereby concrete cases are merely subsumed under properties as instances, are inadequate for the subject matter of the social sciences. The social sciences, it has long been claimed, are concerned with the relations between social phenomena which take place in the real world as well as their properties. It follows from this that classification cannot be merely descriptive because the subject matter, which forms the definitional base of the classification, cannot be understood fruitfully simply as 'properties'.

110
At the theoretical level, Fromm constructed two character types, which are examined below: the authoritarian and the revolutionary. On the level of empirical research these typologies were both qualitative and classificatory.

The logic of his classification is a familiar one. Only individuals who possessed all the properties of the type were assigned to that type. Individuals were said to be either 'authoritarian' or 'not authoritarian', 'revolutionary' or 'not revolutionary'. Those falling into neither category were assigned to the undefined 'ambivalent' class. The disadvantage of this approach was its technical crudity: 75% of the sample were left unspecified. Additionally, the strict boundaries of Fromm's classifications left no room for the assessment of gradations of authoritarianism. Later Fromm, together with Michael Maccoby (Erich Fromm and Michael Maccoby, 1970), carried out a study of the Mexican peasant in the 1960's, in which allowance was made for empirical 'blending' of character types discovered by theory and for gradations in distribution of properties. In addition, in this study, Fromm and Maccoby used factor analysis to proceed from the qualitative level of classification to a quantitative one, without having to foreshade, however, the theoretical basis of their classes. In contrast, the classes in the Adorno study, which is discussed in chapter X, had no foundation in a systematic theory of classes and hence the properties of the personality types tended to be far more 'ad hoc' than in Fromm's analysis.

But the logic of analysis used by Fromm to investigate the appearance of what he called the 'authoritarian character' in Germany was not purely classificatory. It was also theoretical, in that it was the logic of 'ideal type' analysis. Ideal
types in sociology are not constructed in order to provide a
taxonomy of the properties of a 'phenomenon' but to provide a
device for explaining and understanding social phenomena.
Weber wrote that 'ideal types' are required, not only to be
causally adequate, but adequate at the level of meaning. The
aim behind every researcher who constructs ideal types may,
therefore, be said to be that of generalisation. Fromm's
aim was to generalise to Marx's general materialist model of
history in order to show that the 'authoritarian character' as
both a product and producer of modern capitalism inhibits the
development of socialism. In addition, Fromm's typology incor-
porates a notion of 'practical reason' supporting his social-
ism - the idea that by critically appropriating the past the
theorist can set norms for the present. This notion guided
Fromm's construction of the 'revolutionary type'. The typo-
logy used by Fromm is, thus, an interpretative schema at a
higher level of generality than the empirical classes it
includes, incorporating, as we saw in the discussion of
Fromm's methodological individualism, theoretical links
between the ideal types and different aspects of modern
capitalism. Further, for Fromm, the theoretical and critical
links, by means of which the sociologist or social psycholo-
gist can grasp the meaning of the development of modern capi-
talism for man, are provided, not by the Weberian method of
understanding, but by the principles of Freudian psychoana-
lysis and socialist humanism.

The above is, perhaps, best illustrated by examples.
Consider then, Fromm's analysis of the bourgeois character.
According to Fromm, the most important behavioural traits
found by Freud in the anal character are: "a love of orderliness that often runs over into pedantry," "a parsimony that borders on stinginess and avarice." and "a stubbornness bordering on insolent defiance." (Fromm, 1970:146) Additionally, "pride," "feeling of uniqueness," "high esteem for possessions," and "maintenance of strict regimens for oneself and others," have been added to the list by other psychoanalysts. Fromm agreed with Freud's theoretical link between these traits and libidinal sources - the socialisation of the child. But in going beyond Freud, Fromm (1970:136) argued, that social psychology has to regard these traits not as the socially maladapted ones of the neurotic but the relatively well-adapted traits of the healthy individual. In addition, he wrote, that they were the continuation of the individual's childhood object relations (loving or hating attitudes to other people himself and objects) and relatively enduring compared with attitudes and opinions. For Fromm, as for Freud, socialisation is not just a process of 'internalisation' but involves the working out of libidinal and social conflicts within the individual. However, Fromm claimed that since society's influence upon the individual - at first through the family and then through other social institutions - has the effect of advancing certain traits by offering economic and psychological rewards, the individual, in order to avoid pain, tends to resolve libidinal conflict in the direction of conformity or adaptation. Fromm stated that, in general, individuals will adapt to "what is considered 'normal'" and "healthy within the given social structure."

From sociology, Dennis Wrong (1966) was later to point out the dangers of the 'adaptation' argument, and thus
warn of the 'dilution' of Freud's critical categories. Wrong wrote that such arguments 'reduce' the inner tension between libidinal impulses and superego controls. This means, according to Wrong (1966:70), that a tendency arises to equate internalisation with "learning" or "habit formation," and thus the "degree to which conformity is frequently the result of coercion rather than conviction is minimised."

In spite of the fact that Fromm retained Freudian categories, Horkheimer was aware that Fromm was never really happy with Freud's theory of man's "destructive, anti-social, anti-cultural tendencies," rooted in instinctual and particularly sexual drives. This becomes even more evident in Fromm's later work and his differences with Institute members are discussed further on in the thesis. In these early years, Fromm did accept a version of libido theory, although one that was relatively free of sexuality.

Fromm's focus on 'healthy' individuals and their adaptations necessitated a sociological interpretation of the anal character. Fromm thought that he could then employ this revised concept to demonstrate the psychological and physiological reasons why people living under capitalism accepted the capitalist 'ideology', which he referred to as the 'bourgeois spirit'. His next step was to specify the elements of the 'bourgeois spirit.' In this, Fromm followed Werner Sombart, who prior to Weber in his study, Der Moderne Kapitalismus (1902), had stressed the importance of the 'spirit of capitalism' as crucial to the development of the modern capitalist economy. Fromm (1970:150) wrote that while Sombart's notion of the bourgeois spirit as the "sum total of psychic characteristics that are involved in
economic activities," is too narrow, a better concept of the "spirit of capitalism" would be, "the sum total of character traits that are typical of human beings in this society - the emphasis being on the dynamic function of character."

But Fromm's above definition of the 'capitalist spirit' does not seem entirely satisfactory. It appears circular and uncritical, as we noted in the last chapter, if all he means is that the 'bourgeois spirit' is the sum total of the traits of the bourgeois character types that participate in it⁴. Weber wrote that, the spirit of capitalism is an ideology, or a set of beliefs and values, the most prominent of which is secular rationality. Marx also wrote that 'capitalist ideology' is a set of beliefs and values. Further, Weber sought the source of the capitalist spirit in religion, in the protestant ethic. And Marx observed that ideologies arise to serve the interests of the ruling class by rationalising the arrangements from which it derives its privileges. Fromm, on the other hand seems to confuse the cause of the capitalist spirit with what the capitalist spirit or ideology is. Social character, in fact, as Helmut Dahmer (1973 :351) has pointed out, in Fromm's analysis, is a 'sediment' left within the individual, a sediment of what Marx described ideology was, the 'collective illusion'. Fromm, while recognising ideology as a separate set of beliefs and values stated quite bluntly:

I am not concerned with 'principles' and 'value judgements' but with the character traits in which they are rooted. (Fromm,1970 :150)

Thus Fromm, unlike Marx, does not concern himself with the 'mystification' to be exposed. Fromm is concerned with a
problem that never troubled Marx - the method of exposing the effects of ideology within the individual mind.

According to Fromm, 'ideology' or the 'bourgeois spirit' is rooted in men. On the basis of historical writings, Fromm wrote that the overt behavioural expression of the psychic traits of individuals making up bourgeois society - the social character - were, duty, saving, orderliness, limitation of sexual pleasure, lack of compassion for one's fellow men, and the spread of 'instrumental rationality'. These traits formed the character matrix of individuals composing bourgeois society. Fromm claimed that while individuals may differ in the traits they display, the tendency will be for them to 'adapt' psychologically to the dominant social character.

The final step in Fromm's analysis is then to uncover the psychic or libidinal sources of the social character. This he does by simple comparison. He finds that the psychological traits of the 'bourgeois character', to which group phenomena have been reduced, exhibit the most similarity with the psychological traits of the 'anal character', which are explained by reduction to physiology. Hence sociological phenomena are explained in terms of physiology. Fromm wrote:

If we compare these character traits with the typical traits of the anal character described earlier, we can readily see that there seems to be a wide spectrum of agreement and correspondence. If this agreement is a fact, then we would be justified in saying that the typical libidinal structure of bourgeois man is characterised by an intensification of the anal libido. (Fromm, 1970:155)

Thus, it seems that what Fromm wanted to say was not simply that the 'bourgeois spirit' is the sum total of traits of bourgeois or anal character types, but to offer a more acceptable thesis - that in the development of
capitalism, the values and beliefs congenial to the biological and physiological strivings of the anal character happened to be promulgated. The anal character matrix flourished and individuals of this type became visible as socially adjusted persons. Anal character types also functioned as 'productive forces', fostering the further development of capitalist social and economic arrangements. Fromm wrote:

Supposing we ask which forces maintain the stability of a given society and which undermine it. We can see that economic prosperity and social conflicts determine stability or decomposition respectively. But we can also see that the factor which, on the basis of these conditions, serves as a most important element in the social structure are the libidinal tendencies actually operative in men...They serve as the 'cement' as it were, without which society would not hold together, and which contributes to the production of important social ideologies in every cultural sphere. (Fromm, 1970:130)

In order to examine the stability of modern capitalism, Fromm related the theory of social character to the Marxian theory of the class-based nature of ideology. In going beyond Marx, he wanted to show the physiological forces in society which act independently of class to welcome or slow down change.

While the three-part, working-class, middle-class, ruling-class model of stratification which Fromm used is a now a trifle outmoded, the materialist thesis that the most powerful groups generally seek to increase their own wealth seems to hold for most societies. Fromm (1963:9) wrote in 1927 that as long as the unequal distribution of wealth continues, the "most powerful social class will aspire to the maximum satisfaction of their own needs first." But, like Horkheimer, he also contended that even very powerful groups cannot rule by force alone. They must grant at least a minimum of satisfaction to the
ruled in order to gain their cooperation. For Fromm sub-
mission is the basis of legitimate power. Fromm argued that
in order to gain submission, the rulers have discovered that
they must appeal, not to rational self-interest, but to deep-
seated libidinous needs that root men internally to their posi-
tion in the social hierarchy. According to Fromm, the outcome
of the conflict between libidinous needs and ideological
expectations is the 'social character'.

Because the social character is formed by individuals
fulfilling the expectations of the dominant culture, which
being tradition-bound is slow to change, Fromm argued, how-
ever that change in the social character often lagged behind
that of social and economic changes. For example, Fromm
claimed that the 'bourgeois character' of nineteenth century
capitalism had gradually disappeared as the dominant type in
German society as a whole, but nevertheless, it was still to
be found, even at the monopoly stage of capitalism, among
the lower middle-class. And even among many members of the
proletariat, anal traits and bourgeois ideologies could be
observed, despite the fact that the workers' position in the
productive process made the maintenance of bourgeois qualities
a handicap. Fromm observed:

In capitalistically advanced countries such as
Germany, this class is economically and politically
powerless; yet it continues to perform its eco-
nomic task in the outmoded forms of an earlier...
capitalist epoch. In today's petite bourgeoisie
we find the same anal character traits that have
been ascribed to the older capitalist spirit.
(Fromm, 1970: 156-7)

At the stage of development of societies, described by
economists at the Institute as that of 'monopoly capitalism',
Fromm set out to investigate the emergence of a different
type of character, with which we are especially interested in here - the authoritarian type of person, characterised by sado-masochistic character traits. The logic used by Fromm in constructing a typology of the authoritarian is the same as that described above, but the theories which inform the typology are different.

At the level of sociological analysis, Fromm's work at this time has to be seen as sharing in the intellectual concerns of Horkheimer (and the close circle of scholars around Horkheimer) in German society and politics. Scholars at the Institute in the thirties were interested in understanding how 'exploitative' systems of superordination and subordination which, they claimed, obviously underlaid the 'so-called' liberal democracy of the Republic (despite a majority socialist party), could be accepted by the majority of the people. Further, they were afraid that what was taking place in the Soviet Union was not socialism but mass communist party dictatorship. Finally, in Western Europe, fascist political parties and their total-authoritarian ideologies were gaining mass support.

What characterises the socio-political critique of the Institute is that it concentrates on one aspect of power alone - the nonrational justifications for the exercise of power. While it was clear, therefore, that there was direct resort to use of power and even terror in total-authoritarian type societies and organisations, Horkheimer - and Fromm concurred - viewed explanations in terms of the direct exercise of power as too simplistic. They argued, such explanations could not account for the emergence and persistence of complex hierarchical forms of organisation. And although at
this time Germany had a government that at least in name was 'democratic', the framework of their critique of liberal democracy suggested that it would be misguided to focus on the exercise of power by persuasion since the latter, ideally, presupposes people are equal in effective or participatory citizenship, and therefore, stand in a nonexploitative, or 'rational', and informed, or 'conscious', relationship to power. In fact, they wrote this state of affairs had never existed in Germany. Fromm's later book, *Escape from Freedom* (1941) has as its thesis, that men were not ready for the equal rights of participation in the social and political process, which, for example, had been formally granted in Weimar, but would ideally characterise socialism.

It is argued that the decision of Horkheimer and Fromm to focus upon the 'justifications' of power alone, considerably weakened their social theory, in which Fromm attempted to ground his theory of social character. Thus, on the level of politics, Horkheimer and Fromm were not interested in separating out 'totalitarian' force contrasted with authority and the different institutional structures arising from these. Political philosophers, like Arendt (1961), however, have distinguished totalitarian and authoritarian regimes structurally. Arendt wrote that while totalitarian regimes may permit in principle equal participation in power, the will of the leader is generally regarded as supreme. In authoritarian regimes, there is no equality of participation but laws are invoked whose source of authority - whether tradition or religion - is external to and superior to that of men. Applying this to the political structure of Germany, Dahrendorf (1968) wrote that immediately prior to Weimar, Germany had
'enlightened authoritarian' rule. The emperor blended severity with a benevolence expressed in a comparatively sophisticated welfare system for the time. Dahrendorf claimed:

'Authoritarian' means something entirely different from 'totalitarian'. The authoritarian state rests on the undisputed claim to leadership of a stratum generally legitimated by tradition. Those in power are not exposed to any decisive control by representative institutions but instead prevent the many from political participation. At the same time, the authoritarian regime is not one of arbitrary power. Its leaders do not rule by terror, but by that mixture of severity and benevolence that characterises the patriarchal family. (Dahrendorf, 1968: 62-3)

Thus, Dahrendorf argued that it was this 'pre-modern' authoritarian political system that was the fore-runner of the new liberal democracy imposed on Germany by the allies and of the totalitarian movements.

In contrast, Horkheimer and Fromm's discussion of politics is psychological. Because of this they were not interested in the specific institutional forms power takes, whether democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian. Horkheimer and Fromm were interested in the impact on the ruled of the justifications of power, and specifically, the mechanics of the historical process of 'interiorisation' and 'adaptation' to coercion, which they claimed takes place within the individual. Consequently, they reduce the institutional forms of power to an essence in order to provide a historical explanation of how power comes to be acceptable to the ruled. For example, Horkheimer (1936) claimed that the social nature of man is reducible to the memory of the acts of force by which he was made social and civilised and that these continuously form psychic structures within the ruled, which modify the effects of radical insights. Moreover, these acts of force tend to change in kind over time. In Weimar, therefore,
coercion had come to mean more than physical punishment, it also meant hunger and other material deprivations, not just terror but fear, and, finally, not fear alone but caution. The 'interiorisation' of these kinds of exploitation had formed relatively stable psychic structures within the ruled, which conditioned them to conform and subordinate themselves. Thus, Fromm later wrote of National Socialism that it was the desire of the German people to submit to strong leadership, which mainly contributed to its success:

Another common illusion... was that men like Hitler had gained power over the vast apparatus of the state through nothing but cunning and trickery, that they... ruled merely by sheer force; that the whole population was only the will-less object of betrayal and terror... We have been compelled to recognise that millions in Germany were as eager to surrender their freedom as their fathers were to fight for it...(Fromm, 1941:4-5)

What we find here, is that Horkheimer and Fromm's concept of authoritarianism contains elements of totalitarianism and authoritarianism, analysed by liberal philosophers, but these remain unanalysed, while the theory itself attempts to be more inclusive in accounting for the total historical influence of coercive relations upon individuals. Thus what the theory gains in the range of phenomena covered, it tends to lose in its analyses of specific societies, i.e., the socio-political assertions about Weimar tend to be somewhat distorted. For example, Fromm wrote, while compiling the results of the study that he had carried out into the character of the German workers, that:

The Fascist system[s] call themselves authoritarian because of the dominant role of authority in their social and political structure. By the term 'authoritarian character' we imply that it represents the human basis of 'Fascism'. (Fromm, 1941:164)

Thus, what Fromm and Horkheimer seem to mean by 'authoritarian'
is a certain homogenous body of justifications of a ruling clique for the exercise of force at the 'final stage' of capitalism – fascism. What Fromm meant by the 'authoritarian character' can only be understood by examining the content of his work, for it refers to the type of man found in German society of the thirties. We turn now to Fromm's discussion of the psychology of the authoritarian character.

Fromm's psychology of the authoritarian character and the authoritarian social system, starts from the observation, that the type that best slots into the system of dependendencies, created by hierarchical social systems, both admires authority and tends to submit to it, while at the same time, having the desire to be an authority himself. Fromm wrote:

In the authoritarian social structure...Each is slotted into a system of dependencies ranged from top to bottom. The lower the individual in this hierarchy, the more the number and the greater the quality of his dependencies on higher instances. (Fromm, 1936:117)

Fromm claimed that the authoritarian system is characterised by the submission of all, even those at the top of the hierarchy, "in the belief that he is carrying out the will of God, or fate." At the same time, each person also has the opportunity to be an authority because even those low on the ladder of control can exercise their will over women, children or animals, and when these do not suffice, slaves, foreign enemies, classes or racial minorities can be artificially 'created' as objects of the will.

A second important aspect of the authoritarian social structure, according to Fromm is that the states of dependency it creates are emotional – people are induced to feel powerless. Fromm followed Horkheimer here in pointing out that economic relations under monopoly capitalism were no longer
comprehensible to the majority of the people, and thus they tended to live out their lives as if they were determined by blind fate, despite religious and moralistic rationalisations of their lot. Accordingly, for those living under monopoly capitalism (which Fromm and Horkheimer both described as 'authoritarian'), life appears to be determined by forces outside the control of individuals. Fromm, therefore, claimed that individuals finding themselves in this situation will tend to cling to the past, which they believe they know, and to outmoded values and ideals, while living in fear of the future. Fromm wrote:

> the more uncontrollable social forces become, the more catastrophes like war and unemployment overshadow the life of the individual as unchangeable forces of fate, the stronger and more generalised becomes the drive structure of sado-masochism and thus the structure of the authoritarian character. (Fromm, 1936: 121-2)

Thirdly, in their analysis of authoritarianism - which is an analysis of a specific society, Weimar - Fromm, and especially Horkheimer, no longer assign as large an autonomous role to the family in the formation of authoritarian behaviour within the individual as they did to the bourgeois family's influence upon the anal-bourgeois character. According to Horkheimer, the state had, in this latest development of capitalism, increasingly intervened to artificially strengthen the unity of the monogamous family unit, which sociologists claimed had shown itself considerably weakened - particularly in the case of the working-class family. Horkheimer wrote:

> In the bourgeois golden age there was a fruitful interaction between family and society because the authority of the father was based on his role in society, while society was renewed by the education for authority which
went on in the patriarchal family. Now, however, the admittedly indispensable family is becoming a simple problem of technological manipulation by the science of government. The totality of relationships in the present age, the universal web of things was strengthened and stabilised by one particular element, namely authority, and the process of strengthening and stabilisation went on essentially at the particular concrete level of the family. The family was the 'germ cell' of bourgeois culture... This dialectical totality of universality, particularity and individuality proves now to be a unity of antagonistic forces and the disruptive element in culture is making itself more strongly felt than the unitive. (Horkheimer, 1936:75-6)

Horkheimer, therefore, placed much more emphasis upon the totality of cultural arrangements that influence the character and behaviour of men than on the family. These arrangements, he wrote, either form an "intellectual cement" bonding society together, or, as in the total-authoritarian state, disrupt and manipulate social relations for particular ends, thereby 'atomising' individuals in society.

Fromm too began to emphasise the psychological importance of social relations, over and above the influence of family-based Oedipal sexual rivalry, in forming the adult's position on authority. Fromm wrote:

The adult's experience of social authority, however, is not a mere reproduction of his childhood experience of paternal authority. Rather is the father himself an expression of the authorities dominating society. no matter how great the role of the Oedipus complex... may be, it must not be forgotten that the strength of this enmity is conditioned by the entire relationship between father and son as it develops on the basis of the individual and social configuration of the family. (Fromm, 1936:908)

The contributor KT to Wilhelm Reich's journal (1936) contended that Fromm had underemphasised the role played by the sexual libido in the formation of authority, stressing instead the importance of transmission of feelings of social inadequacy from the dominant culture by the adult to the child.
In this respect, Fromm's psychology diverged from one of the most fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis - Oedipal theory - and became more sociological.

To turn now to Fromm's theory of sado-masochism, which he believed provided the psychological foundation of the authoritarian character. We noted in the previous chapter, Fromm's theory of the relation of the super-ego and ego to authority. In Fromm's view, the super-ego represents the interiorisation of external authority holders, whose morality and wisdom are, in turn, reinforced by super-ego idealisations of authority holders. For Fromm, the ego also embodies controls but the ego represents a growth in consciousness and above all 'reason', in the sense of historical understanding, on the part of the individual. We also noted that, according to Fromm, when the individual's relationship to social forces is an 'irrational' one - not based on reason - then the individual tends to become more dependent upon the emotional support of the super-ego for controlling his impulses. Here, Fromm accounted in psychological terms for the bourgeois character by relating control of impulses to super-ego repressions at the anal stage of the libido. Fromm's account of the character structure which finds its gratification under the 'irrational' or exploitative relations of the authoritarian state, however, is not anchored in the developmental stages of the sexual libido as was the theory of the bourgeois character type. Fromm(1936:909) wrote that Freudian developmental theory, "does not yet explain that pleasure in obedience and subordination which is so great and so widespread that many social-psychologists believe they can postulate an inherent instinct of subordination."
Fromm believed that the theory of the sado-masochistic character could provide a foundation for such an explanation.

Fromm's account of the sado-masochistic character locates the psychological basis of its structure, not in sexual strivings, but in the need which has followed man ever since his original divorce from nature, the need to overcome his existential feelings of aloneness and powerlessness. Fromm's problematic is a psychoanalytic reinterpretation of Marx's problem of man's total alienation from things, other people and himself.

To turn now to the theory of sado-masochism. Fromm wrote that the problem of 'sadism' or the wish to dominate or hurt, had been less neglected by social philosophers than the problem that some individuals actually like to suffer. Freud, however, had dealt extensively with masochism, but with the consequence, according to Fromm (1936:122) that ever since "one had always the sexual and especially perverse forms of masochism in mind."

Fromm's own account of what he terms "moral masochism" eliminates libidinal elements from Freud's theory while retaining the Freudian categories in the description of the character type. Fromm pointed out that the early Freud had described masochism as an essentially sexual phenomenon related to the individual's libidinal development. Wilhelm Reich (1933), who had also discussed the problem of masochism in depth, had tended to follow Freud and Fromm had (1936:113) admonished Reich for overemphasising sexual determinants. Fromm's position is much closer to that of Karen Horney. Horney argued that among apparently normal individuals general tendencies toward 'suffering' can be
observed, of which the individuals themselves are unaware, and of which the sexual perversion of the neurotic is but a special case. Horney wrote that these tendencies in contrast to 'sexual masochism' had been recognised and described by Freud as 'moral masochism'. But Freud, according to Horney, had also ultimately classed moral masochism as a sexual phenomenon. Horney claimed:

Masochistic drives are neither an essentially sexual phenomenon nor the result of biologically determined processes but originate in personality conflicts. (Horney, 1937:280)

Fromm took up a very similar position to that of Horney and held that masochistic strivings are the outcome of the individual's total character structure. Fromm described masochistic strivings as the presence of feelings of inferiority, powerlessness and individual insignificance, which in the extreme case, Fromm (1941:155) "get hold of the whole person and tend to destroy all the aims which the Ego consciously tried to achieve."

In following Freud, Fromm noted that masochistic strivings are based on the same fundamental need as sadistic tendencies. While the masochist attempts "to give up" his own "individuality and personality," and to fuse his 'self' with somebody or something outside of his 'self' in order to participate in that person's strength, even at the expense of pain and suffering, in the case of the sadist, the unconscious wish is to make another the supine instrument of his will, even to the extent of causing the other extreme pain. Fromm claimed that the masochist seeks to "be swallowed up by the other," while the sadist tries to "swallow up the other."

These strivings, described by Fromm, it is suggested, characterise 'alienated men', who have lost touch with all human
specificity. Fromm wrote that both kinds of strivings are regularly found together because they are 'rooted in the same need', to overcome 'negative freedom'. By 'negative freedom', Fromm (1941:151) meant that individuals are only free in the sense that they are no longer tied to religion or tradition, but find themselves 'alone' with themselves and "confronting an alienated hostile world." The need to overcome aloneness or alienation, Fromm wrote, is stronger than sex or even than the "will to live."

It is suggested, therefore, that Fromm's psychology of the sado-masochistic or authoritarian character can be read as an extension of his humanist reading of the Marxian notion of 'alienated man'. The authoritarian character is described as the ambivalent person, who both tries to dominate others and yet submits to those more powerful than himself. Frommm attempts to explain this in terms of the Freudian theory of 'sado-masochism'. In doing so, he reinterprets Freud's sexually based theory to develop a moral-psychological theory. The 'sado-masochist' becomes the type of person who is troubled by his own isolation and weakness, which he tries to overcome on the unconscious level, by attempting to submerge his own weak self in that of others, or seeking, in exploiting others, to gain some of their strength. Fromm wrote on the condition of 'alienated' man, the concept of which he noted derives from Old Testament writings on idolatry, that:

He transfers to the things of his creation the attributes of his own life, and instead of experiencing himself as the creating person, he is in touch with himself only by the worship of the idol. He has become estranged from his own life forces, from the wealth of his own potentialities and is in touch with himself only in the indirect way of submission to life frozen in idols. (Fromm, 1964:44)
While Fromm's description of the sado-masochistic character type seems to fit the Marxian concept of alienated man, Fromm's account of the revolutionary character indicates what he visualised 'de-alienated man' to be like. Fromm first mentioned the revolutionary character in connection with his theory of the growth and development of the strong ego. The strong ego, which enables man to consciously control his natural and social environment, is the core of Fromm's revolutionary character. The revolutionary is further characterised by his independence, his productiveness, his concern with humanity as a whole, his use of 'reason' to see through human problems, his theistic love of life, his wariness of 'common-sense' interpretations of the world and finally, his capacity for disobeying those in power or authority. Fromm wrote:

One is not a 'revolutionary' in the characterological sense because he utters revolutionary phrases, nor because he participates in revolution. The revolutionary...is the man who has emancipated himself from the ties of blood and soil, from his mother and his father, from special loyalties to State, class, race, party or religion. The revolutionary character is a humanist in the sense that he experiences in himself all of humanity, and that nothing human is alien to him. He loves and respects life. He is a sceptic and a man of faith. (Fromm, 1963:117)

This explicit description of the revolutionary character was written at a much later date (1963) to that of the authoritarian. It was written in response to criticisms that the theory of the authoritarian character tended to overemphasise the persistence of social systems. We also noted earlier that the psychological theories of Fromm were to explain inhibitors on change, or why specifically change in the form of the proletarian revolution did not occur in Germany. Accordingly, the structure of the authoritarian character represents the repository of monopoly capitalist ideologies. Fromm wrote that
the authoritarian may rebel against a ruler, but at the same
time, he is content with the replacement of one ruler by
another. In contrast, the theory of the revolutionary charac-
ter belongs to a different theoretical context, which asks,
how is the attainment of socialism possible? The revolu-
tionary character is Fromm's version of socialist humanist
man. This type of man is not influenced by mere ideological
appeals, even at the unconscious level, but, according to
Fromm, is self-reliant and has no need to feel dependent upon
higher authorities. The revolutionary revolts against a
ruler because he wants none at all. We noted in the last
chapter that Marcuse (1955) criticised Fromm for voicing the
hope that the revolutionary type of person can emerge within
repressive social systems.

Fromm's empirical efforts to seek out and describe the
authoritarian in the specific context of Weimar Germany are
now discussed.

In 1930, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter,
Fromm with a team of researchers set out to examine empirically
the 'strength' of the authoritarian character among the
German workers. In practical terms, Fromm wrote that he
was interested in why individuals were often very receptive
to political ideas and ideologies which were opposed to their
'real' social and economic interests:

The concept of the authoritarian character was born
out of certain political interests: around 1930 in
Germany we wanted to ascertain what the chances were
for Hitler's being defeated by the majority of the
German population, especially the workers and employees
were against Nazism. They were on the side of demo-
cracy as had been demonstrated by political and shop-
steward elections. (Fromm, 1963:103)

Fromm was curious whether the workers would voice opposition
to National Socialism, yet act differently.
The major premise underlying Fromm's research was that a political opinion in itself does not mean very much unless it can be shown to be relatively stable, i.e., rooted in the individual's character structure, in the manner we have already discussed. For then the opinion becomes effective:

As far as opinions were known the (the workers) were almost one hundred per cent against Nazism, but we were convinced that it depended upon the relative strength of the authoritarian versus anti-authoritarian forces in their character structure. (Fromm, 1970:64)

The research strategy used by Fromm, was to amass all the information available from published and unpublished statistics, reports, monographs and newspaper reports concerning the groups he intended to study. The major part of the study concerned the administration and interpretation of an extensive questionnaire.

Fromm selected for study a completely nonrandom sample of German workers and clerks. He felt that working with a relatively homogenous social group would make it easier for the researchers to keep social and psychological factors distinct. There is, however, some ambiguity about the size of the study, which was, in any case an exploratory study. According to the account, prefacing the questionnaire in Autorität und Familie (1936:239), 3000 questionnaires were sent out to skilled workers, clerks and civil servants in several German cities. The workers were represented by the building trade - tilers and masterbuilders - and printers. 1150 questionnaires were returned after, in some cases, written or oral contact with the respondents. Only 700 completed questionnaires were available in 1936. This would collaborate Pollock's comment that 450 questionnaires were
lost (Jay, 1973:117) when the Institute transferred its sphere of operations to America. Fromm (Locarno, February 1975), however, has told me that the questionnaires were administered by *trained interviewers* in the workers' free time; that 2000 questionnaires were taken out but only 600 permitted the interview, which Fromm regards as about normal response for the time. It is hardly surprising that by modern standards the response was so low when the length of the questionnaire is taken into account. The latter consisted of 250 mainly *open-ended* questions which would have taken a considerable amount of time to administer. Because of the ambiguity of reports about the study, it is obvious that nothing much can be said about its representativeness until Fromm publishes it as he intends to do.

One can, however, make some assessment of the questionnaire technique used in the study. Martin Jay (1973:116) notes that Adolf Levenstein was the first to use an interpretative questionnaire in 1912. It seems relatively uninteresting, however, to draw parallels between Levenstein and Fromm's questionnaire, particularly where Fromm denies any connections (Locarno:February 1975), and where the trend at the Institute lay in 'modern' American survey techniques. In fact, Fromm (1936:232) quotes several other related studies, using the questionnaire method upon which the Institute drew in the thirties. He also acknowledged his debt to English, French and American publications for information about this technique. The way Fromm used the technique at the time to gain comprehensive information about the psychodynamics of the *total person* was definitely novel. Further, it was to provide a foundation for the method in the better known study

Here, Marie Jahoda wrote:

As far as content is concerned [Fromm's questionnaire] contained more than thirty questions which come close to what we have now learned to call the PEC scale (political and economic conservatism); and some forty questions about *Weltanschauung* which correspond to F scale (fascism) items. In addition it contains many questions on actual family relations designed to elicit patterns of domination and submission, i.e., the authority structure of the family and a much more detailed account of the respondent's actual life situation in all aspects, than the data in *The Authoritarian Personality* reveal. (Jahoda, 1954: 13-4)

Part of Fromm's questionnaire is reproduced (translated) in Appendix A. However, Jahoda's comments indicate the range of social and psychological processes the measuring instrument was designed to cover, although not quite in the particular form Jahoda writes about in retrospect.

The questions themselves ranged from factual questions about workers' socio-economic positions to questions about political attitudes and leisure pursuits, in an attempt to uncover ideological influences upon the individual in as many aspects of his living situation as possible.

Some objections have been raised, however, to Fromm's psychoanalytic theory presupposed by the evaluation of the answers to the questionnaire, which can be set out here. The important point about the questions is that they were designed in such a way that a 'mechanical evaluation' of the answers was impossible. We have noted the reasons why psychoanalysis was attractive to Fromm for his *theory* of the social character. At the level of empirical research, Fromm viewed psychoanalysis as providing the connections between *theory* and a more or less *systematic procedure for accumulating information about men*. The paradigm case for accumulating
knowledge about individuals for the psychoanalyst is the clinical interview, where the analyst seeks to refine and elaborate upon the subject's innermost feelings to arrive at a course of therapy. In the interview, Fromm attempted to simulate the 'clinical' situation. The closest Fromm could approach the clinical situation in the analysis of large numbers of individuals was to administer an extensive questionnaire in an interview situation. The questionnaires were filled in and then later evaluated by trained Freudian analysts. The essential point about this method is its total reliance on researcher interpretation. What was claimed was that a group of psychoanalysts on the basis of their common training and through discussion with one another, came to agree upon the assignment of the material to classes.

It has been objected, however, that although psychoanalysis may be internally systematic - in the sense that concepts are linked at every stage to theory - psychoanalysis is 'unscientific', in that it postulates highly speculative unobservable entities which depend for their existence upon the subjective evaluations of the researchers themselves. Now psychoanalysis may be 'saved' from this charge by comparison with an area such as physics.

In reply, it can be argued that physics also has unobservables, for example, subatomic particles, structure of atoms, and electromagnetic fields; and yet, theories of physics are not rendered scientifically invalid by the fact that they contain unobservables. But how can any theory refer to unobservable entities, and yet not be speculative? The most widely accepted answer as to why theories of physics are scientifically acceptable, is that although they refer to things that
are not observable, the postulation of the existence of such unobservable entities does have observable consequences, because they causally interact with things that are observable: magnetic fields act upon iron filings; electrically charged particles passing through a cloud chamber will leave a trail of water vapour; the existence of smaller uncharged particles may be detected by their effect upon electrons with which they collide. These are examples of what might be called 'indirect observation' of magnetic fields, electrons and small subatomic particles. The postulation of such objects may also be justified in a slightly different way, namely, in that it allows one to explain empirical generalisations. Thus, part of the justification for the electron theory of matter is that it provides an explanation of the chemical properties of matter. The upshot is that if psychoanalytic theory is scientifically objectionable, it must be for some reason other than the fact that it contains terms that purport to refer to unobservable entities.

For example, in the case of Fromm's study, an attempt was made to formulate the questions in such a way that the replies would represent - for trained psychoanalysts - the observable consequences of underlying psychic needs. Hence, Fromm wrote that masochistic strivings - feelings of inferiority, powerlessness, and individual significance - were often observable in the constant complaints of the interviewee about such feelings, to the point that he or she would seem to be obsessed by them. Where such 'inner feelings' were not strongly expressed, the researcher could indirectly assess the strength and kind of the respondent's emotions by means of a technique derived from the method of 'free association'. Here, the use of certain words and expressions in the interview was examined
from the point of view of weighing and locating the emotion behind them. For example, the cognitive content to an answer would be ignored if the words used expressed some deep-felt emotion. Fromm's example is the replies given to the question: "what do you think of women who wear lipstick?" Fromm wrote that answers, such as, "I think women who wear lipstick are whores," evidenced more than class or time-based distaste of lipstick. He claimed that such replies were interpreted as indicative of destructive traits in the personality, in the way that answers, such as: "it is bourgeois," or "unnatural," were not. The difficulty here, granted that such answers are laden with emotional content, is what emotion to assign to the content of the replies. Fromm resolved this, as we noted, by reliance on the criteria of judgement of the particular community of German 'left' psychoanalysts to which he belonged in the thirties.

Related to the above is the fact that psychoanalytic theory has not yet developed to the level where it can give sufficient conditions for one outcome of unconscious processes rather than another. In the clinical situation, the analyst attempts to compensate for this by extensive periods of therapy. For example, the British School analysts carry out three, four-hour sessions per week (with the patient lying down) over a number of weeks, while the American School analysts utilise one four-hour session per week (with the patient sitting in a chair) over a number of years. The point of this is to put the individual in a position where transference of feelings becomes possible. In the course of transference, it is claimed that the therapist comes to know the feelings of the patient. But, it can be objected, that it is not clear
how far 'transference' is a one-way process, and hence, to what extent the therapist actually 'leads' the patient. Fromm, of course, was not able to claim "transference," of feelings in the short interview situation, and for this reason, psychoanalysts of the above schools would resist description of the technique used by Fromm as in any way psychoanalytic. It does, however, resemble a psychoanalytic approach to understanding individuals.

One further way, in which Fromm's research resembled clinical procedures was that each questionnaire was analysed separately to arrive at a composite character type for each person. This composite character, according to Fromm, was arrived at only after all the answers had been examined. Fromm noted that, after a while it became clear that once the answers to certain 'key' questions were known the responses to the others could be inferred. Fromm claimed that only 'clear-cut' patterns were included in the character classes. An example of the kind of pattern that emerged is the following. Fromm wrote:

The type that had as pictures family photographs, or war pictures, hated the modern style of building, thought that everyone was responsible for his own fate, generally also thought that children shouldn't be sexually enlightened, and that beating was a necessary part of a child's education. While the type who hung up pictures of political leaders, found modern houses beautiful, accused education of producing one's fate was, in addition, also favourable to sex education and against the beating of children. (Fromm, 1936: 271)

To return to the question of the justification for postulating unobservable, theoretical constructs. It was suggested above that part of the justification, in the case of a science such as physics is that such postulation enables one to provide an explanation of empirical generalisations.
involving observable entities. Can a comparative sort of justification be advanced here? In Fromm's study what is at issue is the nature of people's behaviour to the extent that it cannot be explained by reference to 'reason'. In the concrete case of the German working classes, Fromm and other Marxist scholars at the Institute were curious to the reasons why the German workers did not rise up and realise their historical role as the revolutionary class and overthrow the 'crisis-ridden' capitalist system. Instead, they observed that the workers submitted to the reformist strategies of the mass Social Democratic Party. Fromm sought an explanation of the phenomenon Marx's dialectical theory had failed to predict, the non-appearance of 'subjectivity' (proletarian consciousness of itself as a historical subject) because of the development of different forms of capitalist exploitation. Fromm's empirical theses were that the proletariat had lost its revolutionary fervour, and secondly, that Nazism (which represented for these scholars the ultimate in capitalist exploitation of the masses) would find its greatest appeal among authoritarian types of persons.

The results of Fromm's study of the workers were that:

10% of respondents revealed themselves to be AUTHORITARIAN or fascist character types,
15% of respondents were REVOLUTIONARY,
75% of respondents were AMBIVALENT (neither fighters against Nazism nor for Nazism).

Fromm concluded from these results that while the majority of the working class expressed their opinion that they would support the socialism of the majority Social Democratic Party, only 15% were so convinced that they would actively fight against Nazism. The study also showed that despite overt expressions of support for socialism, 10% of the respondents,
if their emotional responses were any indication, would even fight for Nazism. Finally, the emotional responses of the residuary category were so ambivalent, that it was hypothesised that they would be swayed by whoever took leadership. The results given here tended to lend support to the empirical generalisation that the proletariat as a whole had lost its revolutionary fervour. The explanation of this generalisation is provided by the theory of the authoritarian character type, which is a theory of the impact of ideology upon the masses, which had been designed to influence them in a certain way. The theory of the revolutionary character demonstrates the discrepancy between the agent of revolutionary change and "mass man." Fromm found that only 10% of his sample showed any signs of 'historical consciousness' at this time. To the second thesis, that Nazism would find its greatest appeal among authoritarian types of persons, Fromm found that this was corroborated by evaluations of the questionnaires for 'authoritarians'. He was quite satisfied with the fact that such a small percentage of the working-class - from his uncontrolled sample - had revealed themselves to be authoritarian.

The question of how good the theory Fromm offered was depends in part upon the criteria of judgement of other researchers working within the same problematic but also upon the judgement of the academic community in general. Here we noted the reservations towards Fromm's particular psychoanalytic theories and research by other psychoanalysts. We also noted that Horkheimer and Adorno did not find Fromm's approach wholly acceptable, but neither did they reject it completely. The category of the sado-masochistic character type was later incorporated by Adorno into the F Scale.
Theories are also subjected to the criteria of judgement of the scientific community in general. Here a theory might be accepted because it offers a better explanation of the meaning of social reality than other theories (this is returned to), or because researchers working within a similar problem area might find that the theory provides a source of empirically testable hypotheses. This generally, gives rise to follow-up studies in which further hypotheses arising out of the study are derived and tested. Fromm's study, however, was not published and the scientific community in Germany was disrupted by the events of 1933.

For Fromm, like other Marxists, however, the test of theory was 'successful prediction'. He claimed, after World War II, that the results of his research had been borne out by the events of 1933 - 45. Fromm claimed that other researchers had collaborated his thesis that the appeal of Nazism had been greatest among the authoritarian character types typical of the petite bourgeoisie (small shopkeepers and businessmen), as he had earlier predicted. The majority of workers, according to Fromm, had not shown active resistance to the Nazi regime, but they had also not become admirers of it. Thus, for Fromm, the postulation of unobservables seemed warranted, because he felt it had led to a theory which he believed provided a basis for empirical prediction. In fact, as we noted earlier, Fromm carried out a follow-up study of his own with Michael Maccoby in 1970 in which he attempted to provide a psychological explanation of the impact of 'modernisation' upon a peasant village in Mexico. The techniques and theories and categories of character types...
were much more sophisticated than the ones utilised here\textsuperscript{13}.

But there are also things we can say about theories like Fromm's in general. First, there are dangers in accepting theories that introduce generalisations from history into the social sciences, and which, in turn, try to predict socio-historical trends. Part of the problem, as we have seen in this chapter, is that they tend to say things that are not strictly controlled. The 'ideal' countersituation is the laboratory controlled experiment in the natural sciences. In the case of Fromm, while the empirical socio-historical trend he predicted was grounded in Marxian class analysis, supplemented by psychoanalytic knowledge of the 'subject' of history, it was not a controlled prediction in the sense of being based on a relatively 'complete' theory. For example, we noted that the scholars at Frankfurt were weak on sociological analysis of Germany. Fromm could not, therefore, taken into account factors extraneous to his framework that may well have contributed to the phenomena. For example, the fact that the lower middle-class accepted Nazism can be explained just as well by referring to the fact that both their economic position and status had been threatened in the Republic, which encouraged them to grasp at the promises of the new order.

This brings us to the question of how Fromm's theory compares with competing theories that purport to explain the same phenomenon, as a further criterion for judging social science theories. One theory in sociology that has been used to explain the persistence of certain types of social behaviour, and types of socially required behaviour is that of role theory\textsuperscript{14}. The notion of social role allows the socio-
143

logist to examine the social figure of the individual. Roles, are modes of behaviour called forth in the individual by social institutions. For example, father, worker, trade-unionist, German, and so on. Individuals, according to the theory of role, may act against their self-interest in one sphere because they are committed to a certain role. Roles are acquired in various learning situations the individual is involved in, in his life in society. 'Role', like 'character', can account for the persistence of certain types of social behaviour. 'Role' represents a reflection of the norms and values of the social structure. But although 'role' theory indicates that individuals change as persons by taking on certain roles, it is limited to learning theory when it comes to explaining the attachment of individuals to their roles. Fromm attempts to offer a psychological theory of why some individuals rather than others are likely to fulfill social expectations thereby making these types of individuals vulnerable to manipulation. With the concept of the social character Fromm, attempted to offer an explanation going beyond sociological and psychological explanations of the behaviour of individuals in social groups and societies to investigate the effect of changes in the nature of man himself, and the impact of what he saw as more fundamental human existential conflicts upon the consumption of ideologies by specific men in specific societies. He sought to avoid thinking of man as a reflection of society and society as a reflection of man.

Nevertheless, as we have noted throughout, Fromm's theory of the social character is not without its ideological biases and neither are these eliminated at the level of empiri-
cal investigation. Although the reality Fromm sought to understand was more fundamental than that offered by psychological or sociological analyses, we noted that there was a weakness in the Marxian analysis he assumed true of German society - specifically, the tendency of Marxists to view the social and political structure of Weimar as solely dominated by an alliance of big business and the state with fascism as the inevitable conclusion of the working out of this alliance. This tended to affect the way in which Fromm interpreted the results of the study. Here Fromm appeared to want to defend some groups against the illiberal trends in German society and politics and to lay blame at the feet of others, especially at points where he felt it necessary to criticise alternate worldviews. His polemic against the 'commercialism' of the lower middle-class is an example of this. Fromm's own empirical work in Weimar Germany did not extend beyond the study of the German workers, yet in noting that his speculation about Nazism being a phenomenon of the lower middle-class seemed to have been confirmed by subsequent studies of pre-Nazi Germany, Fromm wrote:

As a matter of fact, certain features were characteristic for this part of the middle class throughout its history: their love of the strong, hatred of the weak, their pettiness, hostility, thriftiness, with feelings as well as money and essentially their asceticism. Their outlook on life was narrow. They suspected and hated the stranger... (Fromm, 1941:211-2)

In contrast, Fromm criticised neither the proletariat with whose cause he identified, nor the nobility or 'elite' of Germany. We have noted that, culturally and intellectually at least, this latter was the group the Frankfurt scholars were closest too.
However, it is certainly true that in attempting to offer a systematic theory of social character, Fromm went far beyond more literary studies that had tended to describe the Germans by attributing certain qualities, such as love or order, to them. Fromm offers a psychology of the Germans, but the weakness' in his theory lies in the fact that it is tied to a particularly sparse Marxist interpretation of a specific epoch in German history. Fromm's socialist humanism contains the recognition that there is something fundamentally wrong with modern industrial societies. It is also backed up by an admirable set of ideals which articulate humanitarian goals for man. Fromm's psychology shows how far man has fallen short of these ideals. But Fromm's analysis in assuming a single dominant ideological influence upon individuals is obsolescent outside Nazi Germany, where the individual is now faced daily with a barrage of ideological influences from a whole complex of political associations, parties, governments. The later study of Fromm (1970) corrects these 'sociological deficiencies', by giving a very full account of the historical development of social, political and economic structures within the village society.

Finally, Fromm claimed that the Institute's opinion on Nazism was largely shaped by this first empirical study of the authoritarian character. This claim was later supported by Marie Jahoda, who wrote in 1954:

Before the appearance of The Authoritarian Personality the study of social attitudes as functional from a personality point of view was a rare phenomenon. Fromm and Maslow were lonely pioneers in this respect. The entire conception of The Authoritarian Personality owes a great debt which its authors acknowledge to their thinking. (Jahoda, 1954:13)
The next section of the thesis examines the different theory and results of the study of *The Authoritarian Personality* before returning to further discussion of these problems and others in the conclusions.
NOTES

1. The whole of this manuscript is in Fromm's possession. Its title is, *The Authoritarian Character Structure of German Workers and Employees Before Hitler*. Collaborating on this project with Fromm were P. Lazarsfeld, E. Schachtel, and A. Hartoch-Schachtel.

2. Various reasons have been given for the nonpublication of this study. Jay (1973: 117) writes that "plans were still afoot" to have it published as late as 1939, "but with Fromm's departure from the Institute went a major reason for its publication." "In later years, Pollock suggested that it was never published because many questionnaires were lost in the flight from Germany." Erich Fromm has claimed that no questionnaires were lost. The reason for its nonpublication lies in the personal and intellectual differences between Horkheimer and Fromm. (Interview with Fromm, Locarno, February, 1975)

3. This process is not simple internalisation but proceeds via the psychodynamic processes of 'reaction formation' and 'sublimation', discussed in the previous chapter.

4. In Fromm's theory, social character and ideology are a little difficult to separate, since social conditions ultimately determine group interests, which are then formulated as ideology, and ideology is then internalised as a composite prescription for behaviour. This is discussed further in this chapter.

5. Fromm derived this list of traits from a reading of Sombart, Weber, Tawney, Brentano, Troeltsch, Kraus, Benjamin Franklin and Daniel Defoe - apart from Daniel Defoe, most of these are social historians of the German school. See Fromm, (1970: 151-4).

6. William Ogburn (1922) put forward his theory of 'cultural lag' around this time, pointing out the way in which social and economic changes affect individuals and groups in a given culture differentially because of the resistance of cultural forces to change.

7. Fromm (1936: 113) noted that Freud had first outlined his theory of sado-masochism in an article entitled, *Das Ökonomische Problem des Masochismus*. Fromm also observed that Freud had later developed a theory of masochism that suggested the latter was a product of the death instinct. See Fromm, (1941: 149).

8. The term 'masochism' was originally used by Freud to refer to sexual perversions and fantasies in which sexual satisfaction is obtained through suffering - through being beaten, tortured, raped, enslaved or humiliated.

9. According to Karen Horney (1947: 246), the theory of masochism has three postulates: "that masochism is essentially a sexual phenomenon; that it is essentially a striving for satisfaction; and that it is essentially a wish to suffer." Horney (1947: 274) wrote that all these strivings represent certain aspects of the phenomenon but not its core. "Its core is the attempt of an intimidated and isolated individual to cope with life and its dangers by dependency and unobstrusiveness. The character structure resulting from these
basic strivings is what determines the ways in which wishes are asserted, in which hostilities are expressed, in which failures are justified and in which other neurotic strivings existing simultaneously are dealt with."

10. Fromm (1941:141) noted that his view differed from that of Horney on a different point. Fromm wrote that he concentrates on the isolated individual, while Horney focusses on anxiety.

11. Fromm (1941:150) has written that he is indebted to Reich for pointing out that the goal of masochistic striving just as sadism is pleasure and that pain is a by-product rather than an end-in-itself.

12. Roughly at this time (1930 - 3), Marie Jahoda, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel carried out a study of the unemployed in a village in Austria, Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal (1960). They wrote that disappointment with the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and lost hopes for social and educational reforms in Vienna made them into social psychologists. As social psychologists, they followed Charlotte Bühler's discussion of social relations. Like Fromm, they used a combination of natural sources - voting figures, bookkeeping of cooperatives, statistics, personal interviews. The theoretical influence on this study was logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. Whilst German sociology had been traditionally preoccupied with historical perspectives, this study together with that of Fromm marked a departure in favour of clarifying the connections between theory and systematic observation.

13. Here Fromm lists the names of the German sources, among which is the Levenstein study. He wrote that there was no space to quote the large number of sources they had referred to in the English, French and American literature.

PART III

This chapter briefly discusses how William Cohnkrat's views on critical theory have been influential in the "flight of thought from within Europe" at the Institute in its American exile, and the apparent integration of Horkheimer and Adorno into "academia." The importance of this discussion is further discussed in the context of developing the broader and more critical view of the practical activity of the authors, or the practical activity of society in general. The latter is examined in detail.

MAX HORKHEIMER and T. W. ADORNO

During this period in America, which Marcia Jay (1973) has extensively documented, not only did Horkheimer and Adorno develop and extend the critical theory of society begun by Horkheimer in Frankfurt, but a large volume of sociological research was completed—a fact which tends to be ignored in subsequent monographs upon their work. Not only was the 947-page interdisciplinary study of modernity, Ästhetik und Wirklichkeit, assembled by Maxine and published in German in Paris in 1929, but five volumes dealing with social issues, which were sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, "The Studies in Prejudice," and published in 1934, were also written. The Authoritarian Personality (1939) is the best known of these and is discussed in detail in the following chapters of this section of the book. It is interesting to note that another four volumes dealing with research on the Jewish Labour Committee on the topic of anti-Semitism, which the latter organization was eager to undertake, were completed but never published. Additionally, a major
This chapter briefly discusses what William Outhwaite has metaphorically described as the "flight of reason from unlit Europe," or the Institute in its American exile, and the 'apparent' integration of Horkheimer and Adorno into 'academia'. The importance of this discussion will become clearer if their view of the task of the intellectual, referred to earlier, of developing the principles and problems created by the practical activity of the masses, or the primacy of 'theory' over 'praxis', is kept in mind. The latter is examined more fully in chapter VII.

During this period in America, which Martin Jay (1973) has extensively documented, not only did Horkheimer and Adorno develop and extend the critical theory of society begun by Horkheimer in Frankfurt, but a large volume of empirical research was completed - a fact which tends to be glossed in subsequent commentaries upon their work. Not only was the mammoth 947-page interdisciplinary study of authority, *Autorität und Familie*, assembled in America and published in German in Paris in 1936, but five volumes dealing with social bias, which were sponsored by the American Jewish Committee - the *Studies in Prejudice* - appeared. *The Authoritarian Personality* (1949/50) is the best known of these and is discussed in detail in the following chapters of this section of the thesis. It is interesting, however, to note that another four volume research report on behalf of the Jewish Labour Committee on the topic of anti-semitism, which the latter organisation was eager to combat, was completed but never published. According to Martin Jay
(1973 :225), various reasons were given for not publishing the 1300 page study which is now in Friedrich Pollock's collection in Montagnola, Switzerland (Jay,1973 :355), for example, the insurmountable technical problems of editing and organising it with the concomitant dangers of oversimplification. But Pollock, in his verbal account in 1968 to Jay (1973 :225), stated that the study never went to press because of a decision that the conclusions (which showed that half the workers concerned had an anti-Semitic bias of one kind or another) were too damaging to American labour. This statement itself may be viewed as evidence of two things. First, it is evidence of remnants of the Frankfurt scholars' mixed and uncertain feelings about the role in history of the working class. Horkheimer and Adorno never construed Critical Theory as the 'objective consciousness' of one class, as Lukacs had done, although prior to the war Horkheimer had expressed, in *Dämmerung* (1934), a revived optimism in this Marxist agency of change. This point will be returned to later.

Secondly, it may be viewed as evidence of their feelings of being relative outsiders in American social and intellectual life to which they had been admitted as insiders. Indeed, intellectually, it could be said that they were welcomed with open arms in the exile of their choice. For it is notable that although they thought of themselves as Marxists, they chose to go to America rather than to Russia.

When the decision to leave Geneva came up in 1933, Horkheimer and his colleagues did not even consider 'flight to the East' as more orthodox Marxists had done, such as Georg Lukacs, who had placed 'party loyalty' above intellectual
considerations. Lukacs, however, was forced in Moscow to recant most of History and Class Consciousness. But only a few members of the Institute in the early thirties were active communist party members - Karl A. Wittfogel, Franz Borkenau, and Julian Gumperz - and Horkheimer, it seems, was not among them. Jay has noted that:

Horkheimer's earliest political sympathies were with Rosa Luxemburg especially because of her critique of Bolshevik centralism. After her murder in 1920, he never found another socialist leader to follow. (Jay, 1973:14)

In fact, it is notable that scholars of practical political affiliations, like Karl Wittfogel, never came close to the centre group of the Institute, or else, like Karl Korsch, were admitted to seminars but not to actual membership. Even the work of the literary critic, Walter Benjamin, was 'corrected' by Horkheimer and Adorno because they felt that Benjamin's Marxism was undialectical and too heavily influenced by the practical 'materialism' of Brecht. The Marxism espoused by core members of the Institute was not that of Lenin or Stalin. Moreover, their close collaboration with the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow through its director, David Ryazanov - who had spent some time in Frankfurt in the early 1920's, and through whom Friedrich Pollock had been able to visit the Soviet Union during its tenth anniversary celebrations - and Henryk Grossman's trip to Russia in the midthirties, had disillusioned the scholars about practical communism to the extent that the thought of going to Russia was never seriously entertained. And intellectually, Horkheimer's articles in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung throughout the thirties underline the distance between nascent Critical Theory and the received dogmas inherent in both the
practice of Communism and German Social Democracy.

Hence the decision to move to America by this group of scholars, steeped in the traditions of Marxism, the sociologies of Weber and Simmel, and a growing awareness of the potential of psychoanalytic theory, rather than being fortuitous, appears to have marked a point of identification with the American model of industrial society and democracy - an identification that was to become more differentiated as their stay in America lengthened.

The transfer of many members of the Institut für Sozialforschung from Geneva, where their anxiety about the progress of fascism was mounting in 1933, was relatively easy. Jay (1973:39) notes that over the years the Institute had established lasting contacts with the American academic world, especially with the sociologists Robert MacIver, Robert S. Lynd, and Charles Beard of Columbia University. Horkheimer, through these and other contacts, was able to gain access to Columbia's president, Nicholas Murray Butler, who offered the Institute affiliation with Columbia University and a building, at 429 West 117th Street in New York. Moreover, Friedrich Pollock, who had by now become the Institute's 'business manager', had prudently transferred the Institute's endowment to Holland in 1931. The income from this money - US$30,000 per annum - was sufficient to guarantee the survival of the exiles in America (Jay, 1973:39). In fact, the ease with which the scholars slipped into American academic life was later caustically commented on by Berthold Brecht: "Horkheimer is a millionaire, Pollock only from a good family, because of this Horkheimer can afford to buy himself a professorship wherever he is."10 Horkheimer later drily dismissed Brecht's
accusations. But Brecht, in his *Der Tui-Roman* (1967:589-727),\(^{11}\) nevertheless delights in taking sport at the intellec-tu-els of the Frankfurt Institute. Other German academic emigrants to the USA during this period by no means found the resettlement materially so easy. In fact, members of the Institute were in the position of being able to help fellow refugees (Jay, 1973:114). In one sense, therefore, Horkheimer and Adorno became *insiders* on the American academic scene, and yet, in another sense, their financial independence, which kept them above the 'struggle for existence' of many who had turned to America, contributed to their always remaining aloof, thereby reinforcing their perceptions of themselves as *outsiders*.

In many ways there are parallels between Horkheimer and Adorno's position as relative outsiders in American social and intellectual life, and their earlier position as relative outsiders in Germany society, and with respect to the main currents of Marxist social thought. Here the biographical fact of their birth is crucial. Horkheimer, Pollock, and Adorno all came from *wealthy* families.\(^{12}\) Apart from the brief period Horkheimer spent as commercial apprentice and then works manager in his father's factory, these scholars had virtually no contact with the way the majority of people in Germany were earning their living. At that time it was not unusual for the sons of wealthy Jewish industrialists to use their material independence to enjoy the benefits of the university and 'culture', if not at the urging of their fathers, then out of a distaste for the 'commercialism' that had earned them their freedom to study. Pollock and Horkheimer read together the works of Ibsen and Strindberg,
Zola and Tolstoy, before Horkheimer studied philosophy under Hans Cornelius, and Pollock, economics and politics. Adorno began as a composer and interpreter of modern music in Vienna before moving on to aesthetic theory and philosophy ten years later. They were thus able to enjoy the products of 'bourgeois' culture, whilst remaining aloof from making a living, and accordingly, from movements within the masses. This independence and material security was subsequently reinforced and guaranteed by Hermann Weil's generous endowment.

Accordingly, it might be maintained that the Frankfurt scholars' position as social outsiders was based, not on 'marginality' or 'insecurity', as Martin Jay (1973 :32-4) seems to imply, but on an aloof or privileged social and cultural position, from which they could comfortably subject the 'suffering' of the masses to intellectual analysis. Perhaps this point is best illustrated by their attitude to anti-Semitism. It has already been mentioned that the Institute was originally endowed by the millionaire grain merchant, Hermann Weil. The purpose of the endowment was to further the study of the history of the labour movement, and of anti-Semitism. The early Institute spent much of its time on the former, but anti-Semitism was not seriously studied by Horkheimer until the fact of its existence in Germany was blatantly obvious even to outside nations, i.e., after the Institute had emigrated to America. Jay (1973 :31-36) looks for evidence of the Institute's awareness of anti-Semitism in those Weimar years, in order to demonstrate the social marginality of the Jewish members of the group, and the impact of this upon the development of a 'radical' theory.
such as Critical Theory, but he comes up only with denials of its importance by those involved. In fact, Jay (1973:34) notes that, paradoxically, the Jewishness of the members of the Institute was overtly more of a hindrance to their social assimilation in America than it had been in Germany.

The conclusion, then, would seem to be that Horkheimer and Adorno were 'marginal', or outsiders from society, not from the standpoint of discrimination but from that of privilege. The material, cultural, and intellectual independence of the Frankfurt scholars in Germany protected them from anti-Semitic contacts. They were at the head of Weimar culture. They lived in a world apart from the masses, and their Institute gave them independence from university staffing policies. As Lichtheim (1972:34-5) has observed, the Jews in Germany who had been at the head of political liberalism, modern capitalism, and later socialism, were also at the head of modernism - that movement in art, culture, literature, the theatre, and thought fostered by Wilhelminian Germany, and reaching its flowering point under the Weimar Republic. One need only cite as illustration such names as Bloch, Benjamin, Freud, Tucholsky, Gropius, and Kafka. Moreover, as Peter Gay (1969:36) has pointed out, a large number of independent institutes established in Weimar were 'manned' by Jews:

At first glance, except for housing a high proportion of Jews, these institutes seem to have had little in common: the Kulturhistorische Bibliothek Warburg in Hamburg, the Psychoanalytische Institut in Berlin... the Warburg Institut... the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik... and the Institut für Sozialforschung. Being Jewish was, at that time, no hindrance to intellectual development, and intellectual development in Germany was very
definitely a privilege of an elite, as both Geoffrey Barraclough (1972:351) and Henry Pachter (1972) have noted. Jews were at the head of all that was modern in Germany. Thus, divorced from all class movements, the scholars of the Frankfurt Institute viewed the material and cultural 'suffering' of the masses from a distance. Barraclough (1972:351) has even described the 'white-collar' group headed by the university-educated and the 'blue-collar' group, or workers, as two separate societies. Hence Brecht's remark about the founding of the Frankfurt Institute:

Had lunch with Eisler and Horkheimer. Afterwards Eisler suggested as a theme for the Tui-Roman: the history of the Frankfurt Institute. A rich old man [the grain speculator Weill] dies troubled about the suffering in the world. He leaves in his will a large sum of money for the formation of an Institute which should research the source of the suffering. This is naturally he himself. (Brecht, 1973:443)

In his pointed fashion, Brecht sought to point out the need - which he believed the Frankfurt group was blind to - for an examination, not of the proletariat, but of privilege. At this stage, political events intervened.

It is suggested, then, that the Frankfurt group in Germany were very definitely insiders as far as German society was concerned, and had, indeed, been admitted into the privileged class, but that their very admittance kept them outside the strata of society whose suffering they wanted to eliminate. Moreover, their thoughts on 'privilege', rather than being based on a substantive social or economic theory - such as the theory of 'class struggle' - stop short at an 'announcement' (albeit a very valuable one) of the manipulative and ideological character of privilege. If one looks elsewhere for the reason why they developed a social theory as 'ideology
critique', or what Jay describes as a 'radical' social theory, one must first consider Henry Pachter's remark (1972 :230) about Weimar intellectuals. Pachter wrote that "their alienation from the rest of society expressed itself in dreams of elitist gardens." The members of the Institute were then writing at a time when reaction to the novel phenomena of mass communications and mass society was growing, and the latter were very real threats to the elitist culture which the inner core of the Frankfurt group wanted to protect against standardization.

Intellectually, due to the fact that the Frankfurt scholars had turned to Kulturkritik, and also due to their desire to restore a humanist and idealist interpretation of Marx, members of the Institute were relegated to an almost unheard periphery of European Marxist debate. For as we have noted, German Marxist debate was dominated at this time by two major groups, both involved in practical politics: the Stalinists and the Social Democrats. One should, therefore, heed Barraclough's warning, and not overemphasise the impact of the work of the Frankfurt Institute in the thirties. While they were at the head of 'modern' social thought, and while National Socialism has been interpreted as a reaction to all that was 'modern' in Weimar culture, society, and politics, it would be false to put too much emphasis on the reaction to the left-wing intelligentsia, to Max Horkheimer and my old colleague Herbert Marcuse...Germany did not slide into National Socialism in reaction to the Institut für Sozialforschung. (Barraclough, 1972 :345)

Two years after Horkheimer has assumed directorship of the Institute in 1931, the Nazis seized power. This resulted in a premature termination of Horkheimer's ambitious research
program, and one cannot judge what their impact might otherwise have been. As a consequence, Horkheimer and Adorno's most productive years were to be spent in their American exile.

In America, Horkheimer and Adorno felt themselves to be social outsiders, for they were uncertain of the reaction of American society at large to a group of German Marxist intellectuals. Horkheimer's anxiety seems justifiably to have increased with the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939. According to Helmut Gumniör (1973:60), Horkheimer in a letter to Adorno urged Adorno to eliminate Marxist political content from his writings, particularly that of a materialist nature. Furthermore, Jay (1973:225) cites a letter from Horkheimer to Leo Lowenthal, written in July 1944, in which Horkheimer expressed his anxiety about the reaction of American opinion to a "bunch of foreign-born intellectuals sticking their noses into the private affairs of American workers." In America, moreover, the scholars also became more sensitive to anti-Semitism, but this perhaps is not surprising in the light of both the events in Nazi Germany, and the close collaboration of Institute members with American Jewish organisations from which they obtained financial sponsorship. And finally, their decision to write in German, and to continue publishing the Institute journal in German in Paris, until 1940, also suggests that they were not totally at home in America, and felt of themselves as, to some extent, intellectual outsiders.

Alienation from the culture of their adopted society, coupled with the progress of National Socialism, may therefore have induced amongst the exiles a strong need to preserve
their spiritual home in the culture from which they had been so suddenly uprooted: the culture of the 'other Germany'. After the war, the writings of Germans in exile were to receive a special place of honour in German libraries. But in America, writing in German only served to hinder further the communication of ideas. To a certain extent, therefore, the immigrants from Frankfurt were themselves responsible for their isolation from the American intellectual community. Adorno was perhaps more guilty than the others of seeking to remain distinctly German, and in a way - evidenced by his aphoristic style of writing that even few Germans can fathom - that was scholastically idiosyncratic. Adorno's aphoristic writings on music criticism appealed only to the few, just as Benjamin's literary criticism appealed only to a small intellectual audience. Lichtheim has written of Adorno:

if anything has hampered the acceptance of his work it is the disjunction between his emphatic commitment to democracy and his inability to cast off a stylistic armature impenetrable to all but an elite of readers. (1971 :137)

Adorno, however, was firm in his resolve to maintain his European identity in America. He wrote that he considered himself a European through and through, "from the first to the last day abroad." As a result, much of the work of the Institute is distinctly European in that it is locked in the German academic problematic, despite American influences.

Another factor contributing to the isolation of the Frankfurt scholars was their critique of the empiricism characteristic of the American social sciences of the day. Laura Fermi (1968) described American sociology as a "disconnected mass of particulars." And the story of Adorno's encounter with Paul Lazarsfeld's empirical radio research
project - his first contact with American social science methods - has been told by Adorno himself\textsuperscript{16}, and retold by Jay. The collaboration was not completely successful. Adorno could not reconcile his doubts about the 'methodological circle' of reasoning which he thought underlay the predominant methods used in American empirical social science:

I was particularly disturbed by the danger of a methodological circle: that in order to grasp the phenomenon of cultural reification according to the prevalent norms of empirical sociology one would have to use reified methods as they stood so threateningly before my eyes in the form of that machine, the program analyzer. (Adorno,1969 :247)

On the other hand, Adorno's attempt to demonstrate that what was presented as 'real' was often 'appearance' found little acceptance apart from the support given to Adorno by the translator of Durkheim, and fellow European, Dr. George Simpson. For example, Adorno wrote that the symphony presented by the mass media, as opposed to live performances, was, in view of the actual sound transmitted (at that time there was only monophonic sound of rather low fidelity), the 'atomistic' listening which it encouraged, and the different 'image' produced in the mind of the listener, only the 'appearance', and not the 'reality' of the symphony. Thus Adorno's research orientation, in contrast to that of the empirical sociologists involved in the music project, lay in exposing the 'distortive' effects of the media, which he perceived as attempts to manipulate the newly emerged 'consumer' of both classical and popular music. As a result, Adorno introduced his concept of 'pseudo-individualization'\textsuperscript{17}: a false individualism subject to cultural manipulation and standardisation. This concept was developed further by Adorno and his associates in \textit{The Authoritarian Personality}. 
The latter work is discussed later in this section.

As noted above, Adorno's collaboration with Lazarsfeld's project was not completely successful from the point of view of the merger of Critical Theory and American empirical research. In retrospect, Adorno (1969 : 348) wrote that he felt that "no continuum exists between critical theorems and the empirical procedures of natural science." Lazarsfeld later, after the success of *The Authoritarian Personality*, had some doubts about his own judgment about the irreconcilability of Critical Theory and quantification (Jay, 1973 :224). But the real meeting ground for critical theorists and empirical sociologists had not been provided at Princeton. The difference between the Princeton project and the later California project was that all those involved in the latter had a common interest in psychoanalytic theory - a 'neutral' meeting ground that was not found in the former. Thus Nevitt Sanford, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Theodor Adorno shared a common methodological, or epistemological, perspective which made the psychoanalytic method a starting point, and a basis on which to formulate theory and to develop typologies. Adorno wrote that everything was done by "perfect teamwork," and that he found the project the most fruitful and enjoyable thing he had been involved with in America:

Of course the reason for this easy cooperation had to be not only the American atmosphere of 'teamwork' but also an objective factor - our common theoretical orientation toward Freud. (Adorno, 1969 :358)

As noted earlier, Horkheimer and Adorno's interest in Freud was formed long before the California studies into Prejudice and authoritarianism. They had both been interested
in psychoanalysis in the twenties and thirties in Weimar Germany. Psychoanalysis was widely discussed then, especially in intellectual circles, although regarded with some suspicion. From the Russian left, it was denounced as bourgeois ideology which tended to induce conformity to social problems instead of criticism of them. And Horkheimer and Fromm had themselves viewed the Freudian psychoanalytic problematic as tied up with nineteenth century 'patriarchal' society. Nevertheless, from an epistemological perspective, they found certain notions of Freud both attractive and compatible with their own Marxian positions. Thus they thought, for example, that the notion of the 'unconscious' could be extended and developed to explain 'scientifically' the links between 'society', the 'individual psyche', and 'culture' or 'civilisation'. And in Berlin, stemming out of his seminar discussions with Wilhelm Reich, Fromm had developed a social characterology based principally upon Freud's psychoanalytic theory of the socialisation of the child. Fromm's work had been incorporated into the extensive study of authority and the family before the Institute left Germany. Fromm had rejoined the Institute in the United States, but left shortly afterwards because of personal and ideological differences with Horkheimer. The implications of these differences are discussed elsewhere in this section. After Fromm's departure it was Adorno who came to figure as a major voice in the social psychology of the Institute.

While psychoanalytic theory had not been entirely 'respectable' in Germany during the twenties and was losing 'credibility' there as a form of therapy, psychoanalysis was
flourishing in the United States. It was a crucial period that produced positive reevaluations of Freud's thought, for example, the school of ego psychology which grew up around Erik Erikson, Heinz Hartmann, Harry Stack Sullivan, Karen Horney, and Abram Kardiner. Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (1966 :105) has argued that the popularity of psychoanalysis in America, in contrast to Germany, has to be explained by the specific qualities of American social life. America, with no feudal past, no hereditary aristocracy, no militaristic tradition, and no established church, but instead, rapid technological development which demanded high mobility from its workforce, did not face the problems of 'false class consciousness' or loss of 'status', but problems of social and psychological instability. Psychoanalytic theory was welcomed in a wealthy, competitive society confronted with the problems of 'alienation', 'personal identity crises', and 'anxiety neuroses'.

As a result, Horkheimer and Adorno found common ground to carry on a dialogue, and to work together, with sociologists and psychologists who had been trained in empirical methods. But it needs to be emphasized that this 'neutral ground' of psychoanalytic theory was the only one where Horkheimer and Adorno were to find cooperation possible between themselves and empirically oriented social scientists. Therefore, while the emphasis on the 'subjective moment' in the authoritarian personality studies may have been somewhat one-sided, as later critics have urged, this emphasis is understandable once it is noticed that the scope of the studies were defined from the outset by the limits of the psychoanalytic problematic. Outside this problematic little cooperation between Adorno and the joint authors could have
been achieved.

The extent of Horkheimer and Adorno's integration into academia, which had occurred due to the use of the psychoanalytic problematic, and which was evidenced in the large volume of criticisms and follow-up studies subsequent upon the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*, may even have caught the authors themselves unawares. It took them a long while afterwards to counter the reductionist charges to which they had exposed their work. Only recently, in fact, did Adorno attempt to set the historical record straight and locate these studies within the Critical Theory of society. In response to the reductionist charges of critics, Adorno (1969:356) countered that they had "never questioned the primacy of objective factors over psychological" ones, and that, to be correctly interpreted, *The Authoritarian Personality* has to be read in the context of the "objectively oriented, critical theory of society" which guides it, and which he and Horkheimer had formulated together in California in 1940. This theory is contained in an essay, "Elemente des Antisemitismus," which forms part of the *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1940). It was not, it has to be emphasised, developed in cooperation with the American social scientists who collaborated on the study of prejudice, but *prior to* and *apart from* the theory and research entering into the concept of the authoritarian personality. Nevitt Sanford (1956:262) has emphasised the felt lack of a *general guiding theory* among researchers at the actual time of the empirical study.

In summary, I have attempted to show that Adorno and Horkheimer regarded themselves, socially and intellectually, as *relative outsiders* in America. Socially, they never really
fully assimilated into American society, even though Horkheimer became a naturalised American, and retained his American citizenship even after returning to Frankfurt to reopen the Institute in 1949. Intellectually, the extent of their integration into American academia is circumscribed by the work incorporated in the volumes of the *Studies in Prejudice*.

I have selected out for study here the social psychological research into the nature of the authoritarian personality, rather than the historical studies, because the former best illustrate Horkheimer and Adorno's active collaboration on a research project with other investigators. In addition, it demonstrates both continuity and disjunction with the earlier research of Fromm. The story of *The Authoritarian Personality* is the story of Horkheimer and Adorno's collaboration with American social scientists with respect to the study of the interrelationships between personality and society. But the critical impetus behind the studies, which shows the limits of this collaboration, is only rescued by Adorno long after Horkheimer and Adorno's return to Germany, and after Marxism has become 'fashionable' on the market of 'rhetorics' among the young. In the chapters that follow, the study of *The Authoritarian Personality* is examined in relation to the "critique of civilised thought" from which Adorno in 1969 pointed out it had received its initial impulse.

2. In March, 1933, the Institute doors in Frankfurt were forcibly closed and its 60,000 volume library confiscated because of "treasonable tendencies" of those associated with the Institute. Horkheimer fled initially to the Geneva office, which had been founded in February of that year under the leadership of Friedrich Pollock and Karl Landauer with Andries Sternheim as statistical consultant. The Geneva Office had been established to further Horkheimer's ambitious research project to investigate all areas of social life, and was to deal with the files and records of the International Labour Office to which the Institute had obtained access. Associated with the new Société Internationale des Recherches Sociale were Paul Tillich, Charles Beard, Celestin Bouglé, Alexander Farquharson, Robert S. Lynd, and Raymond de Saussure. Farquharson, who was then editor of the *Sociological Review*, had also expressed interest in a branch office of the Institute opening in London, but this plan was abandoned. In Paris, Paul Honigheim led the French branch of the Institute. Although Adorno was not officially associated with the Institute until 1938, he had built up close informal associations with Horkheimer from 1928 onwards. In 1931 Adorno 'habilitiert' under Tillich with a thesis on Kierkegaard. Max Horkheimer, who emigrated to New York in 1934, reestablishing the Institute at Columbia University, and Paul Lazarsfeld were instrumental in Adorno's emigration to New York in 1938 from Oxford. See Helmut Gumnior and Rudolf Ringguth (1973 :51-2); and T. W. Adorno (Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, 1969 :341).

3. George Lichtheim (1971 :125-42) notes that Adorno's involvement in empirical research was terminated in the late forties when he returned to Germany, and had no further impact.

4. *Studien über Autorität und Familie, Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung*, Libraire Felix Alcan, Paris: 1936. Celestin Bouglé established contact with the publishers in Paris where the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* continued to be published by Alcan until it was forced into silence in 1940.

5. See pages vi-vii, Foreward to *Studies in Prejudice*, (T. W. Adorno at al, 1950). The study, *Dynamics of Prejudice*, Bettelheim and Jahoda, analysed the connection between personality traits and war experience among war veterans; *Anti-Semitism - an Emotional Disorder*, Ackerman and Jahoda, was based upon case histories of individuals who received psychotherapy; Paul Massing, in *Rehearsal for Destruction*, did a historical study of the social roots of anti-Semitism up to the twentieth century; and in *Prophets of Deceit*, Lowenthal and Guterman examined techniques of persuasion of the political agitator.

6. Written under the pseudonym of Heinrich Regius.

7. First written in 1923, Lukacs repudiated its content in Moscow in an address to the Communist Academy in 1934. It first appeared in English in 1971.


10. See Willy Hochkeppel, "Haupt der Kritischen Theorie" (1973).

11. Brecht received the intellectualised Marxism of Horkheimer and Adorno with some disdain.

12. Horkheimer was the son of a prominent Jewish manufacturer, Pollock the son of a wealthy Jewish businessman, and Adorno the son of a wealthy wine merchant and an opera singer.

13. Adorno was interested in avant-garde music and especially atonal composition. He studied under Alban Berg.

14. The millionaire grain merchant, father of Felix Weil - the latter a founding member of the Institute.

15. Henry M. Pachter (1972:236) has written that "whatever had been great and valuable in Weimar politics and letters, seemed to have been leftist, critical, Kulturbolschewist, or Jewish."

16. Adorno (1969). It is interesting to note that Adorno, after a lapse of forty years, sought in his account to correct the strong image which Gerhard Wiebe (whom Lazarsfeld had asked to collaborate with Adorno on a study of jazz) had of him as an elitist. Adorno's perception of Wiebe's reaction to him seems to have struck home: "A certain resentment in him was unmistakeable: the type of culture that I brought with me and about which I was genuinely unconceited ... appeared to him to be unjustifiable arrogance.... However little I, destitute of all influence, had to do with social privilege, I appeared to him to be a kind of usurper."

(Adorno, 1969:348)

17. Martin Jay (1973:173-218). Jay gives an account of the intellectual influences and the musical concepts formulated by Adorno while he was involved in the Music Project.

18. Jay (1973:87) has noted that the interest of both Horkheimer and Adorno in psychoanalysis extends back to the 1920's. In fact, as early as 1927 Adorno devoted two chapters of his thesis, *Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der Transzendenten Seelenlehre*, to the epistemology of psychoanalysis. Here he attempted to relate the latter to Hans Cornelius' transcendental phenomenology. Horkheimer, mainly worried about his competency as a lecturer, allowed himself to be analysed by Karl Landauer in the late twenties.

19. As already noted in the introduction to the previous section, psychoanalytic theory became incorporated into Horkheimer's research programme mainly through the efforts of Erich Fromm.

20. See the previous section of this thesis.
The origin of Horkheimer's Critical Theory in the 'modern' or 'Western Marxism' of Lukács and Korsch has already been mentioned and the position of this Hegelian rereading of Marx located on the fringe of Marxist debate in the thirties. Moreover, the second section of the thesis dealt with the discontents and uncertainties within the psychoanalytic movement which paved the way for the new theoretical reconstruction of Freud by Fromm. In this chapter, the assumptions about the world which Horkheimer and Adorno took over from Marx and Freud, as well as their views on the 'right methods' for acquiring social knowledge and the limits to knowledge are considered.

In the second section of the thesis, Fromm's rereading of Marx in the light of Marx's early writings and his presentation of Marx as a 'humanist' was discussed. The assumptions that induced Fromm to focus on the concept of 'alienation' and factors in his attitude to psychoanalysis that led him to seek the preconditions of alienation in the relationship between the individual or social psyche and society were examined. At issue here are the nature of the assumptions underlying Critical Theory and how these led Horkheimer and Adorno to focus on the 'critique of ideology', and, in particular, on the critique of 'relations of exchange' under capitalism.

Horkheimer and Adorno, like Fromm, are 'philosophical naturalists', not in the sense, pointed out earlier, that they defend the methods of the natural sciences, but in the
sense that they do not admit of explanations like those of religion which depend upon the existence of a supra-natural world. In the previous section we emphasised it is important to distinguish between philosophical naturalism and philosophical materialism, the latter understood as the view that the world is basically material, and matter and material processes are the sole determinants of ideas and mental phenomena. Philosophical naturalism in contrast does not specify what kind of objects exist or what types of events are thought to occur in time and space but only that explanations of the latter lie within the sphere of objects and events and are connected with them. We noted that it is, therefore, compatible with a wide variety of rival ontologies, for example, materialism, idealism and dualism. The latter depend upon independent arguments for their support. As philosophical naturalists, Horkheimer and Adorno were at one with both Marx and Freud.

Further, Horkheimer and Adorno are dualists in the sense that they are inheritors of the ideas of German Idealism, the historical sociology fostered at Heidelberg and the economic and social theory of Marx. For Horkheimer and Adorno, social phenomena exist in so far as they are mental phenomena as well and have meaning for those who engage in social conduct. But although they are inheritors of the idealist tradition, they do not accept the idealist idea of the primacy of 'spirit' over 'matter', any more than they accept the materialist view that 'matter' is ontologically primary.

Following Kant, Horkheimer argued that the 'autonomous individual' is central to any philosophy. Following Hegel, he argued that social philosophy attempts to attribute
meaning to the predicament of the individual who no longer makes 'free' decisions that are ascertainable via introspection, but decisions guided by the objective spirit-of-the-age. For Hegel, Horkheimer wrote, the individual's consciousness of 'freedom' could only be revealed in the context of idealistic speculation about the life of the historical 'whole'. Horkheimer largely concurred with Hegel that 'reason' or 'dialectical thought' were central for an understanding of the individual as a 'culture-creating subject':

[Objective Reason] denotes as its essence a structure inherent in reality that by itself calls for a specific mode of behaviour in each specific case, be it a practical or theoretical attitude. This structure is accessible to him who takes upon himself the effort of dialectical thinking, or, identically is capable of eros. (Horkheimer, 1947:11)

But Horkheimer (1932c) objected to followers of Hegel who treated "the activity which emerges in the given material as spiritual." He viewed all such abstractions which raised 'Objective Spirit' or the 'Social Whole' to an Absolute as questionable:

Idealism glorified the merely existent by representing it as nevertheless spiritual in essence; it veiled the basic conflicts in society behind the harmony of its conceptual constructions, and in all its forms furthered the lie that elevated the existing to the rank of God by attributing to it a 'meaning' that it has lost in an antagonistic world. (Horkheimer, 1947:170)

Horkheimer believed that there can be no 'thought' as such but only the specific thought of concrete men rooted in their socio-economic conditions, just as there is no being as such but only a "manifold of beings in the world." Thus, whilst Horkheimer argued for a Hegelian concept of reason, which implied speculation upon a "discoverable fundamental structure of being" (1947:11), he objected to interpretations of this historical structure as a static one, implying
the achievement of a *premature harmony* between the identity of the subject and the identity of this fundamental structure or 'Objective Spirit'. This objection, known since Kant as the 'Identitätsproblem' in German philosophy is epistemological. Horkheimer's objection to Idealism is not to the notion of an Objective Spirit, which can provide a criterion of truth in history, but to the tendencies of Idealists to elevate the latter to ontological primacy and to identify the *empirical* with 'Objective Spirit'. Accordingly, Horkheimer was critical of Lukács because Lukács thought that through the activity of understanding his own essence as shaped by specific epochs 'man' would be able to *unite* his subjective understanding with the objectivity of the external world of things and *become* *whole* or complete once more. Horkheimer could not share the optimism, in this respect, of Lukács, Bloch or Fromm.

While for Horkheimer, as we have seen above, social phenomena exist in so far as they are mental phenomena as well and have meaning for those who engage in social conduct, Horkheimer in following Marx also believed that social phenomena exist apart from mental contents and are accessible to the methods of science. Furthermore, he agreed with Marx that the correct scientific method for the investigation of social phenomena was dialectical logic.

But while Horkheimer and Adorno opted for the materialist dialectic of Marx, they opposed the 'orthodox' materialist conception because it regards "every fundamental activity as a matter of social labour, whose class-like structure stamps itself on human reactions and theory." (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1968 :193) Horkheimer accepted Marx's categories and the Marxist interpretation of history. Where he differed with
materialist interpreters of Marx was, first, he regarded the categories as not fixed and, second, he viewed Marxism as a *theory of the world as a whole*. The Marxian problematic - the theory of society as a critique of political economy - provided the starting point for Horkheimer's Critical Theory. He viewed the Marxian concepts of goods, values, and money as important starting points for discussion of *concrete social life under capitalism*, for example, as exchange relations:

> The concrete theory of society also begins with abstract conceptions: so far as it is concerned with the present epoch with the characterisation of an economy founded on exchange. (Horkheimer, 1968:173)

Horkheimer believed that the abstract concepts incorporated a theory to explain how bourgeois society had perpetuated itself historically. Horkheimer, therefore, viewed the critique of the principle of exchange as the core of Marx's social theory. But he regarded Marxism as tied to a specific epoch and Critical Theory as the extension of Marx's analysis and categories to contemporary conditions of society which he described under monopoly capitalism. Horkheimer wrote that for Critical Theory to progress from the general underlying structure of exchange relations to differentiated reality, it had to consider the historical movement of the process between society and nature as it manifests itself in different epochs. In so doing it had to take into account all available knowledge about *generic man* and nature:

> Thus, the critical theory of society begins with a definite idea of the principle of exchange from relatively general concepts; assuming all the available knowledge from the data of its own and other research, it then shows that the exchange economy must in the present state of men and things (which change under its influence) and without transgressing the principles described by political economics, necessarily lead to the sharpening of social contradictions, which in the present historical epoch drive towards wars and revolutions. (Horkheimer, 1968:174-5)
Alfred Schmidt points out that there is evidence for regarding Marx's social theory as a theory of the world as a whole from Marx's own writings:

Marx showed, however, that society itself was a natural environment. This was meant not only in the immediately critical sense that men are still not in control of their own productive forces vis-à-vis nature, that these forces confront them as the organized rigid form of an opaque society, as a 'second nature' which sets its own essence against its creators, but also in the 'metaphysical' sense that Marx's theory is a theory of the world as a whole. (Schmidt, 1971:16)

The development of Critical Theory, with which we are mainly concerned here, built on Horkheimer and Adorno's increasing awareness that 'domination' was more and more taking non-economic forms. The fact that Critical Theory became less concerned with class conflict and began to concentrate instead upon the broader conflicts between man and nature has often been accounted for by resort to reasons extraneous to the development of Horkheimer's particular Hegelian method: increased pessimism regarding practical communism; the experience of fascism; and disillusionment with the proletariat as the agent of social change. There is no doubt that these factors had a role to play in the Frankfurt Institute's path away from the roads of 'orthodox' Marxism. Moreover, in America, where there were no 'social classes' in the European sense, it must also be taken into account that the 'critics' of capitalism could only survive if they were not openly Marxist. Horkheimer had recognised this when he stipulated that Marxist categories were to be referred to in America by different terms. For example, the label 'democracy' replaced 'socialism', 'democratic' replaced 'revolutionary' and 'rational society' replaced 'communist society'. The basic concepts, however, did not change but remained rooted in the Marxian -
not the liberal - problematic.

Horkheimer and Adorno's commitment to interpreting Marx's social theory as a theory of the world as a whole and their ongoing preoccupation with the relationship between man and nature in America served to increase their receptivity to Freud. Horkheimer and Adorno had objected both to interpretations of Marx, which viewed man as fully determined by nature (an ontological part of nature), and to those which regarded nature as an essential attribute of man from which he had become estranged in capitalist society. The former view leads to a materialist interpretation of the man/nature relationship, and the latter to a socio-historical determinism in which the implication is that man can reappropriate his own 'essence' or 'natural consciousness' through self-knowledge. While Horkheimer and Adorno were concerned with the relation between nature and human activity and held that human activity alters both men and nature, they did not have an anthropomorphic concept of human nature, which they thought reduces 'nature' to a 'social category'. For Horkheimer and Adorno, nature is transformed by men and in turn transforms men, but at the same time, nature remains external and autonomous to men. Alfred Schmidt has pointed out the relevant pages in Capital for this interpretation. Schmidt wrote:

But in Marx nature is not merely a social category. It cannot be totally dissolved into the historical processes of its appropriation in respect of form, content, extent and objectivity. (Schmidt, 1971:70)

Schmidt emphasised that even when the 'supercession of alienation' takes place with socialism as the 'real mediation' between man and nature, nature's objectivity remains as something external to be appropriated through work. According to
Schmidt, work thus does not disappear under socialism.

Horkheimer and Adorno's discussion of the mediation between man and nature can be found in their essay, "Elemente des Antisemitismus," (1969:177-217) written in 1940, in which they examine man's relation to nature, where nature is regarded as an autonomous element of the substructure in Marx's substructure/superstructure model. In this account they extend Marx's discussion to account for the mechanism by which the dialectical interpenetration of 'man' and 'external nature' takes place. Their discussion involves a notion of 'man', which is indebted to what might be called Freud's metapsychological theory where this is a theory that is concerned, not with the origin and function of the instincts but what gives the life processes direction. It focusses on generic rather than psychological man.

Horkheimer and Adorno concentrate on Freud's basic categories of regression and repetition compulsion. According to Freud, repetition compulsion or inertia was, "a compulsion inherent in all organic life to return to an earlier state of things which the living entity had been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces." (Freud, 1950:47-51). This was, according to Freud, the fundamental principle of both the life and death instincts prior to their differentiation.

Adopting these Freudian categories, Horkheimer and Adorno contended that 'man' was wholly subject to particular or idiosyncratic experiences in his original relationship with nature, and could only find a place for himself in the realm of inhospitable nature by 'repetition' or 'imitation' of nature, or what they label 'mimesis' (a literary expression
which here denotes an attempt to achieve a close external resemblance to inanimate nature). Residues of this 'mime­sis' remain in involuntary biological responses to external stimuli, for example, the stiffening of muscles or the involuntary raising of hair in response to fear.

However, according to Otto Fenichel (1945:59), Freud's metapsychology culminates in a view of man as a tension-reducing being. Freud wrote that the primary dynamic is the struggle between the death instinct or Thanatos and the life instinct or Eros. The Nirvana principle emerges here as the force which seeks to reduce this internal tension. Fenichel writes that because Freud posits a common instinctual root for the antagonism between Eros and Thanatos, the 'regression compulsion' in organic life is a striving to reduce tension by achieving a state of quiescence by the organism. The deep-lying unconscious response of the individual to primary fear is, therefore, to seek tension-reduction or quiescence expressed in the flight from pain and want.

Horkheimer and Adorno incorporate this notion of generic man's response to 'primary fear' into a theory, indebted to Marx, of man's estrangement from nature and his striving to recapture unity with nature. First, they maintain that organic mimesis, the original response of 'man' to threatening nature, explains his estrangement from nature, in that in his efforts to approach the inanimate he reflected upon the fact that his relationship to nature could only be spatial and, therefore, external.

Second they argue that 'individuality' in the form of the ego "has been formed in resistance to this mimicry." In the course of man's history, the authors contend, controlled
mimesis or conceptualised imitation to a large extent replaced organic mimetic behaviour as an attempt by man to control and socialise external nature. Conceptualised imitation, they wrote, characterises civilisation - first magic, and later rational practice and work. In this theory, the ego becomes the reservoir of the repressions of Western civilisation:

Through the constitution of the ego, reflective mimesis becomes controlled reflection. 'Recognition in the concept', the absorption of the different by the similar, takes the place of physical approximation to nature. But the situation in which identity is established, the direct identity of mimesis and the mediated identity of synthesis, the approximation to the condition of an object in the blind practice of life, and the comparison of the objective in scientific concept formation, is still that of fear. Society perpetuates threatening nature as the lasting organised compulsion which reproduced in individuals as rational self-preservation rebounds on nature as social domination. (Horkheimer and Adorno,1969:190)

For Horkheimer and Adorno, civilisation is a response to primary fear and means repression of the instincts by the control of the ego not the super-ego: the rationalisations of the ego in this view control the responses of 'man' and objectify themselves in social domination of nature, without eliminating man's underlying fear of hostile nature which remains beyond his total control. Freud maintained that a repressive organisation of the instincts underlies all historical forms of the reality principle in civilisation. For Freud, civilisation meant renunciation of all instinctual urges, or the demands of the libido because they come to be regarded as 'regressive'. And although the reality principle, located in the ego, ensures control of regression by facilitating the individual's adaptation to the external world, traces of instinctual urges always remain, threatening to break through the controls of the ego.
Accordingly, what Freud termed the 'libido' implied for Horkheimer and Adorno a level of human existence beyond immediate control. The postulation of the existence of the libido was used to strengthen their arguments against materialist views of man, and humanist speculations of man as the 'creator-subject' of society with history as the story of the continuous unfolding of this subject. Martin Jay (1972:292) notes that although Horkheimer and Adorno regarded the second of these desirable, they regarded it as a potential for what man could become rather than an inherent reality. In stressing man's dialectical becoming rather than his being, Alfred Schmidt (1969) has convincingly argued that Horkheimer and Adorno were nearer to the 'real humanism' of Marx, than the anthropomorphic humanism of Lukacs, Bloch and Fromm.

To return to the initial impulse of Critical Theory—to regard the Marxist theory of society as a theory of the world as a whole. Already in 1931, Horkheimer had written that the task of the Institute would be to understand social life in its totality—the interrelationship between the economic life of society, the psychic development of the individual and changes in culture or civilisation—by means of dialectical reasoning. While Critical Theory attacked the methods of the natural sciences for their ahistorical, hypothetical character, Horkheimer was not against using the information collected by the social sciences and interpreted within the framework of Critical Theory. His original program sought to set up a "dictatorship of planned research by means of philosophical construction and empiricism."

(Horkheimer, 1931:12) Significantly, in 1932, Horkheimer had already dropped the term 'social philosophy' for his
project in favour of 'social research'.

But Horkheimer (1968:175) also claimed that in opposition to the different sciences of man the task of Critical Theory is social criticism. He wrote that Critical Theory "is a unique ongoing existential judgement" of man's life in capitalist society. While, in Horkheimer's view, the hypothetical sciences merely state "either it is so or it is not so," Critical Theory building on Marx's thought attempts to demonstrate that "it must not be so, men can alter their being; the conditions for it are now at hand." However, Marx wrote that philosophy could only become a reality with the abolition of the proletariat. In contrast Horkheimer and Adorno became very uncertain about aligning themselves with the proletariat. Albrecht Wellmer (1970:14) wrote that Horkheimer was too well aware that a changed historical situation (monopoly capitalism) required "a corresponding development of critical theory" and in its early stages "the economic crisis-mechanism of capitalist society" (the exchange economy) "had to produce the proletariat as deliberate collective poverty and destitution and consequently as its own grave-digger."

In its early development from Marxism, Critical Theory could claim to clarify the revolutionary message of Marx, but this is not the case later on.

Horkheimer came increasingly to view the task of Critical Theory as theoretical. For Horkheimer, as for Marx, 'truth' was the moment of the realisation of theory in 'praxis'. But unlike Marx, Horkheimer emphasised the function of theory as a guide to action and the role of the intellectual in formulating theory rather than acting as a sounding block for the desires for spontaneous action emanating from the proletariat.
itself. In Germany, however, Horkheimer had experienced no such revolutionary spontaneity from a proletariat which had aligned itself with the 'reformist' Social Democratic Party. Thus, Horkheimer wrote:

There are no general criteria for Critical Theory as a whole; because it always related to the repetition of events and thus to a self-reproducing totality, just as there is no social class whose consent one could hold on to. (Horkheimer, 1968: 190)

Horkheimer believed that the intellectual who is to guide action is neither as 'free-floating' as Mannheim suggested nor completely rooted in his own society and culture. While Horkheimer viewed the intellectual as part of the object he wants to study, Horkheimer also believed that at times the intellectual is capable of transcending or rising above the society to which he belongs in order to reveal the forces of 'negativity' in that society. Horkheimer thought that in doing this the intellectual could point the way to a more 'rational' form of society, i.e., socialism. Thus, in Horkheimer's view, the intellectual is neither fully autonomous nor fully determined.

In America, Horkheimer and Adorno became increasingly absorbed in understanding the forces of 'negativity' or exploitation in capitalist society, less with the intent of enriching revolutionary theory, than with the purpose of studying the impact of these forces upon people who had to live under them. The study of The Authoritarian Personality is an example of this focus.

But the beginnings of Horkheimer's critique of the broader aspects of the domination of men living under capitalist conditions can be found in Horkheimer's critique of the natural science methods of the social sciences, which
forms part of an even broader attack on the ideas of the Enlightenment. Horkheimer claimed that the social sciences were 'ahistorical' and that, therefore, they failed to uncover:

the forces in society that give them their impulse, and thus they silently affirm the current relations of domination as the arbiter of their meaning and value; and knowledge becomes impotent. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1968:194-5)

In contrast, the task of Critical Theory, according to Horkheimer, is to relate the analyses of the separate social sciences to the "tendencies of society as a whole," to its underlying historical processes. The historical tendencies within present society are overlaid by the 'negative' face of capitalism. According to the Critical Theorists, they can only be examined by means of Hegelian reason read, as offering a concept of the potential in history rather than an unfolding of Absolute Spirit. Horkheimer and Adorno view this potential as a motive force propelling men towards a 'rational society'. Thus, when Horkheimer (1968:195) wrote that, "the critical theory of society even as a critique of political econom- has remained philosophical," he meant that with Critical Theory Marxism has retained its Hegelian impulse:

its [Critical Theory's] content is formed by the inversion of the concepts that dominate the economy into their opposites, fair exchange into widening social injustice, the free economy into the domination of monopoly, productive labour into the consolidation of relations restricting production, the maintenance of the life of society into the immiseration of the people. It is not so much a matter of what remains unchanged but of the total historical movement of the Epoch that should come to an end. (Horkheimer, 1968:195)

But Göran Therborn (1970:70) has pointed out that this restoration of Hegelian philosophy to Marxist critique, while countering communist, humanist, and liberal orthodoxies,
had the paradoxical result of leaving the system of concepts of the latter unchanged. For example it goes beyond 'bourgeois' economics, yet leaves its system of concepts intact. The latter are not seen as incorrect but as ahistorical.

Similarly, the Critical Theorists did not find the methodology of the natural sciences incorrect. We noted Horkheimer's willingness from the beginning to utilise the findings of all the sciences of man. With regard to the social sciences, based on natural science methodologies, Horkheimer argued that these sciences lack relevance to the 'true' ends of men at the present moment in history. What we can argue here is that Horkheimer's search for negativity' or exploitation is extended beyond the limits of a critique of political economy to lend fuel to an attack on the instrumental rationality of the sciences. Here, Horkheimer was influenced indirectly by the German sociological tradition. Horkheimer's was a reaction to the ideas of Weber on industrialisation and rationalisation. Horkheimer followed Georg Lukacs' Marxist discussion of capitalist 'reification', which may be said to represent a Hegelian reconstruction of Marx's views on commodity fetishism'. Horkheimer wrote that:

In the theory of society, science has to be counted as a force of production. As a condition of the general movement of thought which developed with science during the last century...science made the modern industrial system possible. In so far as science is a means of producing social values, i.e., exists as a formulated method of production, it is also a means of production. (Horkheimer, 1932a:1)

In capitalist society, the contradiction is perceived by Horkheimer as no longer simply located in the realm of the economy as materialists would have it but also in thought itself. Horkheimer thought that ideas, while not totally
autonomous, have an independent force of their own. Just as the principle of exchange leads to the immiseration of the people, Horkheimer argued that the abstract methods of the sciences serve to obscure the real needs of men. Horkheimer wrote:

Scientific knowledge shares the fate of other forces and means of production: the extent to which it is used is far below its level of development and to the real needs of people. Thus, its further quantitative and qualitative development is restricted. (Horkheimer, 1932:2)

Science in the form of technology and bureaucratisation is regarded as a further form of domination in a disharmonious world which holds back human development.

Horkheimer (1930:57) argued further that the world defies reconstruction in theory as "it lies in the nature of real knowledge, never to be completed." Jay, among others has criticised Horkheimer and Adorno for failing to state what they mean by a 'rational society' or a 'liberated society' in concrete terms, and has even gone so far as to trace their reluctance to clarify this to the ancient Jewish religious taboo against uttering the 'sacred'. But, as Michaela von Freyhold (1975:834-40) points out, it is more helpful in understanding what Horkheimer meant by a 'rational society' if one simply regards the latter notion as denoting 'communist society'. If Critical Theory then, is regarded as Marxist social theory, it is obvious that the Frankfurt scholars were following Marx in being vague about the precise mechanism by which the mystified consciousness of the proletariat seizes hold of itself and the possibilities offered for this within capitalism, and about specifying the 'new'. Horkheimer and Adorno, while believing that
the moment of socialist praxis had long been lost in Germany and that, therefore, the 'alienated consciousness' theorised in the critique of political economy was no longer the 'radical negation', continued to regard communism as the stage towards socialism, where the liberation of men and their possibilities would commence. In following Marx, they attempted to show that "it must not be so, men can alter their being," and to offer the birth of a new history: to provide the resolution of the conflict between man and nature, between freedom and necessity. Believing that capitalist society had been able to refine its techniques of domination, they later became involved in demonstrating the consequences of this for those living under late capitalism by unveiling the total alienation of society and man's repressed nature. In doing so, Horkheimer made clear his intent to align himself with all forms of 'modern' or 'progressive' thought. The following chapters deal with this.

Paradoxically, while Horkheimer's reinterpretation of the dialectic is one which seeks to avoid all absolutes, because dialectical thought also moves through extremes there is a danger that the latter may be raised to absolutes. This danger was real for both interpreters and Horkheimer and Adorno themselves. Because they were never able to spell out the concrete possibilities for transcending or negating the 'mystified' relations between men in late capitalism, and thereby to fully demonstrate Critical Theory as a theory of becoming, the extremes, held fast in their 'existential judgements' of 'moments' in world history and often contained in aphorisms, were always in danger of being bestowed - especially by interpreters - with a timeless
quality, which elevated them to absolutes or ethical oughts. This is not what Horkheimer and Adorno intended. Horkheimer and Adorno viewed Critical Theory as a historical method\textsuperscript{9}, incorporating a notion of practical reason\textsuperscript{10} by means of which men are able to set norms or values that are as far as possible non-arbitrary, and which has to be continuously applied. They constantly contrast this with static, abstract 'value-free' theories about the world which depend for their validity upon empirical testing, and claim to offer a theory "continuous with life itself." Critical Theory, therefore, does not depend upon the separation of ethical, moral, sensuous, political or other human activity from the process of enquiry.

For Horkheimer, each period has its own truth contained in the claims of the society of that period. What is true in these claims, Horkheimer argued, is whatever fosters social change in the direction of a more rational society. Horkheimer and Adorno believed that with theory as a guide to action the 'irrationality' (exploitation) of the current society could be continuously revealed and altered. The most devastating charge that has been raised against Horkheimer and Adorno would, therefore, seem to be that they failed to relate 'theory' to 'praxis', or to locate and state precisely the concrete negation of late capitalism. In America, this aspect of Marxism was abandoned. Away from the revolutionary politics of European 'class society' in a society characterised by high social and psychological instability, consequent upon high job mobility among other things, Horkheimer wrote that 're-education' on the personal and psychological level would remedy social ills. In the foreword to the Studies in Prejudice (1950 :vii) he stated that
the eradication of prejudice was to be attained not through revolutionary action but via "education scientifically planned on the basis of understanding scientifically arrived at." In America, Horkheimer and Adorno were concerned with the social and psychological effects of capitalist 'domination' upon those having to live under capitalism.

While Critical Theory, applied to other modes of acquiring knowledge is used to reveal the limitations of these, the limitations of Critical Theory itself tend to remain obscure. In what follows, it is hoped to make some of the limitations of Critical Theory explicit by examining Horkheimer and Adorno's assumptions and the general lines of the Hegelian-Marxist problematic they were working in, which structured their questions about social life.
1. Culture for Horkheimer meant 'civilisation' and encompassed the State, Religion, Law and the Economy.

2. Horkheimer's objection to the sociology of knowledge was on absolutist grounds. Horkheimer argued that Marx's contribution had been to provide a unitary theory of social change based on the mode of production and giving rise to class relations. Its subject was not knowledge of a totality nor absolute truth but the movement of definite social conditions.

3. The question has often taken the form in the sciences of whether the 'same' object in so far as it appears in different sciences is really the same.

4. In the critique of political economy, the labour process, which is at the same time a process of creating value, is fundamental to the production of material goods. Commodities as the constituents of all wealth are the material depositories of exchange values. But whilst exchange value appears to be a quantitative relationship in which use values are exchanged, Marx showed that this was not so in reality because an article may be exchanged for a variety of goods equally. Exchange value must, therefore, express something equal in commodities. If 'use values' are left out of consideration, then the one property that they have in common is that they embody abstract human labour. Just as the useful qualities of the products are put out of sight so under capitalist production is the useful character of the various kinds of labour embodied in them and they are reduced to the same sort of labour - human labour in the abstract.

5. Horkheimer was not an economist but he supported Friedrich Pollock's economic analysis, based upon the Marxist theory of capital accumulation and the critique of the liberal principle of 'just and equal exchange'. In the early thirties, Pollock drew upon evidence in Germany to show that the 'crisis of capitalism', as Marxist economists described the world economic depression, was not going to lead to the collapse of the capitalist system, as Marxists hoped. State intervention in the economy provided the means to prop up the basically unstable system.


7. Horkheimer and Adorno believed that Freud (1950) offered a dynamic metapsychological approach to man and his relationship to nature in contrast to Wilhelm Dilthey who, they argued, premised a theory of a fixed human nature which reveals itself differently in every epoch.

8. Horkheimer regarded the Enlightenment as a movement to free men from the fetters of superstition but he argued it culminated in Fascist society where its consequence had been to unleash the more terrible inhuman forces of a totally repressed nature upon men.

9. The dispute over methods has a long history in German social thought. While reacting against the positivism of the Vienna Circle, they had also been influenced by the 'anti-positivist' tradition, which had been strong at Heidelberg.
even in the late nineteenth century. It had manifested itself in a distaste for 'bourgeois civilisation in general'. The original dispute over methods or 'Methodenstreit' occurred when Carl Menger published a book on methodology in 1883 intended to vindicate the rights of theoretical analysis and to put the historico-ethical economists in their place. Joseph Schumpeter (1954 :807-29) noted that the 'Methodenstreit' was a dispute over precedence of type of explanation rather than outright 'right' and soon petered out. The Menger faction's arguments were taken up by Böhm-Bawerk among others who attacked Rudolf Hilferding, pupil of Carl Grünberg, on the question of an 'orthodox' interpretation of Marx's critique of political economy. Max Weber followed the tradition of the other faction - Schmoller - developing his 'verstehende' sociology.

10. Paul Lorenzen (1970 :3-11) has noted that Topitsch designates people adhering to this view and who hope for such an intact world in the future, left Romantics. Horkheimer stressed that 'reason' has to be restored as the judge of 'ends' not merely means before a more rationally based society could be hoped for.
CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

This chapter examines the social and psychoanalytical critique informing the empirical investigations carried out by Adorno under Horkheimer's directorship in America. In this work, American society was regarded as another form of capitalism, and capitalist exploitation was again analysed from the point of view of the effects it has upon the individual. The authoritarian personality represents the summation of the effects of the total-authoritarian state on the individual psyche, and the authors held that the presence of such personalities in Germany preceded the advent of National Socialism.

In order to understand the assumptions underlying Critical Theory, and their implications for Horkheimer and Adorno's theoretical development, it is important to realise that Critical Theory is best viewed as a type of political philosophy. It is not, however, a political philosophy in the classical sense which involves an ideology which designates the agencies of action together with definite programs of the means and ends of change. Horkheimer and his group never participated in the political struggle of their time. They were on the periphery of Marxist debate, and it was not until the student rebellions of the sixties that Critical Theory was required to offer an ideology in the above sense.

Critical Theory, however, did embody, from the very beginning, central ideological components. For it provided the framework of language by means of which certain institutions and social practices could be criticised, and others justified. This framework, in turn, was based upon a second component: the articulation of definite values and ideals to
be used in judging events, movements, and men. Finally, it contains theories of man, society, and history, and suggests the method of study appropriate to these.

By the late thirties, the high moral ideals and the sophisticated theories that characterised the position of Horkheimer and his followers had been consolidated into a theoretical position, rather than a political one. In 1937 Horkheimer wrote that:

The unity of social forces, from which liberation is awaited, is - in Hegel's sense - simultaneously variation; it exists only as conflict, which continually threatens the subject conceptualised in it. This becomes clear in the person of the critic; his critique is aggressive not only towards known apologists of the given, but just as much towards conformist or utopian tendencies in his own ranks.

(Horkheimer, 1968:164)

Thus, at this time, Horkheimer's focus was on Critical Theory, on "the theoretician and his specific activity," on "his representation of the social contradictions," and on the theorist's part in stimulating and transforming 'consciousness'. The attainment of 'consciousness' was regarded by Horkheimer as arising neither spontaneously within the ranks of the proletariat, nor through the organisation of the proletariat or party.

It is suggested that the retreat from politics into theory by this Marxist group is explained, in part, by the historical accidents that left Weimar intellectuals in general politically powerless. This general feeling of political impotence is perhaps reflected in Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of authority, which forms one of the topics of this thesis. For, as Martin Jay (1973:118) has also noted, their discussion of authority did not contain a "discrete theory of political
authority or obligation." Jay has suggested that Horkheimer and Adorno's omission in this respect was the result of their viewing 'society' as the 'fundamental reality'. This, however, seems open to question, since, strictly speaking, Horkheimer always viewed society nominalistically, that is, as composed of 'concrete men'.

The direction taken by Critical Theory during the decades from the later thirties up to the sixties was towards a more explicit statement of values and ideals, and towards a more detailed development of theories of man, society, and history. These were tasks that could be carried out in a way that was, politically, relatively neutral. After the emigration to the United States, political neutrality was officially maintained. Nonetheless, the ideological element of Critical Theory remained. It provided the language with which to denounce feudalism, pre-industrial absolutism, and liberal capitalism, even if sometimes it was more implicit than explicit. Later, divorced from all historical agencies it was to become the 'rhetoric' serving contradictory abstracted and general goals of radical student groups. It never really became the ideology of a specific agent of change.

In what follows, an attempt is made to outline the social and psychoanalytic critique which was developed by Horkheimer and Adorno after their emigration to the United States. This critique, which was written in German, and not available in English at the time of the publication of the results of their empirical research, is very important since it provides knowledge of the assumptions that both guided the research into anti-Semitism and entered into the specification of the
authoritarian or fascist personality. The critique, most of which is found in an essay entitled, "Elemente des Anti-Semitismus," was published in the book of essays, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1944), and was first referred to by Adorno (1969:356) in 1969 in order to answer charges that the method of *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) involve 'psychologism'.

The period in America, in fact, marked a spell of intensive collaboration between Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. First, Adorno joined Horkheimer in California in 1941, after a rather precarious career with the Princeton Radio Research Project, directed by Paul Lazarsfeld. In California, Horkheimer and Adorno literally dictated together the volume of essays later published under the title, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. Such was the intensity of their collaboration that, at least for the purposes of this thesis, it would be rather pointless to attempt to separate out their individual contributions.

Secondly, Horkheimer, in America, became director of the Department of Scientific Research of the American Jewish Committee. The American Jewish Committee had made funds available for exploratory research into prejudice in general and anti-Semitism in particular. The conditions of the grant left the maximum leeway for individuals to follow their own 'hunches' (Sanford, 1956). Thus Horkheimer's Institute was again fortunate in the relative intellectual independence which they were thereby able to maintain in America.

It might be noted here that in Germany, too, they had received funds to study anti-Semitism - a phenomenon which, although they were Jewish, had never been a political, religious, or social reality for them since, as was suggested
earlier, their position of privilege had protected them from all discrimination in Weimar. As a result, Horkheimer and Adorno tended to approach anti-Semitism as an *intellectual* phenomenon. This is discussed below.

As far as the actual project was concerned, Horkheimer invited Else Frenkel-Brunswik and Suzanne Reichard to join him. Eventually Nevitt Sanford and Adorno became directors of the project, with Brunswik and Daniel Levinson as associates. The study took six years to complete and, according to Sanford (1956), they were able to publish it as a book instead of as a series of papers due to unexpected financial assistance. It was largely because of this study, *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), that the Frankfurt scholars became known in the English-speaking world.

Before discussing the theory of Horkheimer and Adorno which underlay this work, it should be noted that among the researchers involved there was no unified theoretical orientation to begin with, and they came with backgrounds that were quite diverse. Prior to his cooperation on the study, Nevitt Sanford had been engaged in studies of personality factors "in relation to certain aspects of war morale," using projective tests, personality scaling, and TAT testing. He and Daniel Levinson had worked on the scaling of personality and sociological factors for measuring anti-Semitism. Frenkel-Brunswik had been working half-time with the Department of Child Welfare. Late in 1944 she received a grant from the AJC to study prejudice among children, and worked half-time with the Adorno study. Adorno, of course, was steeped in Hegelian-Marxist thought. Thus what was brought to the study
was a mixture of European sociology, American social psychology, non-psychoanalytic dynamic theories of personality, field theory, neo-Freudian theory, training in experimental statistics, and clinical methods. Horkheimer's interest in utilising all 'progressive thought' certainly seems to have been fulfilled in this study.

In spite of the diversity of backgrounds, cooperation on the project was smooth. Perhaps this was because the researchers met only on the middle-range level of theory. Sanford has written:

everyone shared the same theoretical outlook and there was always a central line of attack: the development of scales that would express in quantitative terms expanding conceptions of what prejudice involves, clinical study of individuals scoring at the extremes on these scales, and the subsequent revision of the scales. (Sanford, 1956:263-4)

Sanford felt that a fundamental agreement on 'psychoanalytic interpretations', and a common interest in a single phenomenon - anti-Semitism - had furthered the collaboration.

Horkheimer and Adorno's aims, however, transcended the purely technical ones which had guided the actual research into anti-Semitism. But, as mentioned above, their theoretical critique of capitalism, and their assumptions about the nature of man and society, were not available to the American public, and possibly not even to the American researchers who formed their team. We now turn to the theoretical basis of the project, which is contained in the essay, "Elemente des Antisemitismus."

"Elemente des Antisemitismus" sets out one part of Horkheimer and Adorno's general thesis of the existence of self-destructive tendencies within Enlightenment thought.
On the level of social criticism, or ideology-critique, it is concerned with the danger of the reversion of enlightened civilisation to barbarism. Horkheimer and Adorno believed that social freedom is "inseparable from enlightened thought," but at the same time, they argued that reflection upon the historic forms the Enlightenment had taken was necessary in order to prevent the misuse of 'progress' for destructive ends:

The fallen nature of modern man cannot be separated from social progress. On the one hand the growth of economic productivity furnishes the conditions for a world of greater justice; on the other hand it allows the technical apparatus and the social groups which administer it a disproportionate superiority to the rest of the population. The individual is wholly devalued in relation to the economic powers, which at the same time press the control of society over nature to hitherto unsuspected heights. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1969a:4)

Prior to this essay, in a critique of the 'ideology' of liberal capitalism, Horkheimer had declared that "liberal economic thought" had had the historical consequence of leading inevitably and irreversibly to the total-authoritarian state:

The basic premise of liberalism: free initiative of the entrepreneur and private ownership of the means of production is today sustained only by a tremendous increase in the power of the State, so that the praxis of the totalitarian State at the moment is the true consequence of liberal economics, a consequence which many of its followers have already drawn. (Horkheimer, 1934:229)

This critique was supported by Marcuse in the same issue of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*. Marcuse claimed that the "change from the liberal to the total-authoritarian state occurs within the framework of a single social order." The argument is that Fascism was the true consequence of liberal thought because the principle of 'just and free exchange'
had required, historically, political supplementation in the form of increasing state intervention in the economy, which in turn had given rise to an authoritarian institutional structure. While the ideology of the liberal economy had, therefore, at first served the interests of economic power (because just and free exchange had never existed in practice), at the stage of monopoly capitalism it had acquired an effect independent of substructural factors in serving to legitimate the 'authoritarian' political controls necessitated in the long run by the market economy.

For Marx and Engels, the prevailing ideology of any epoch, which encompasses religion, law, and other value systems, was the "outward rationalisation of that epoch's economic organisation," and a tool used by the dominant class to hold back the inevitable progress of history which was being propelled forward by the 'class struggle'. Ideas arose from, and were primarily dependent for their force upon the power relations engendered by the economic system. In contrast to this view, the Frankfurt scholars argue that the ideology of liberal economics served, in the stage of monopoly capitalism, to legitimate not only economic power, but bureaucratic and military control.

It is very important here to stress what we noted in Part II, namely, that while Horkheimer and Adorno do discuss the ideological justification of power, they do not touch upon the issue of power as such. Thus even in the context of discussion of the totalitarian Nazi state, where the rule of law was supplemented by terror and the rule of force, Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis is locked in the problematic
of legitimate power, or authority, and the effects of ideological justifications for power upon those subject to it. In addition, instead of discussing concrete power relations, Horkheimer and Adorno's examination of capitalism treats only its essence from the outside, from the realm of epistemology. And finally, the retreat of Horkheimer and Adorno into philosophical critique is complete in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, where they argue that the Enlightenment aim of freeing men from superstition turned into its opposite, and resulted in the rigidity of thought of the fascist.

Horkheimer's philosophical critique - the existential judgment of man's life in capitalist society - leads directly to Horkheimer's own ideological justification for a study of anti-Semitism. For Horkheimer and Adorno, anti-Semitism was not a racial or religious phenomenon, but a facet of fascism, and, like other Marxists, they regarded fascism as the result of extreme right-wing politics. Thus their intention in the study, *The Authoritarian Personality* - which was undertaken at a time when the results of the Nazi holocaust were freshly imprinted upon people's minds - was to discover the potential for fascism in another capitalist society - America.

As we observed above, Horkheimer and Adorno believed that the influence of anti-Semitic ideologies was important, and that these had to be explored in the depths of the *individual* mind. They were interested in uncovering potential fascism as an underlying personality complex related to anti-Semitism.

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the consequences of the ideology of National Socialism for those who had to live
under it had been to produce 'anti-Semitism' as an outlet for the *irrationality* of the system. They argued that anti-Semitism had arisen as an outlet for the emotions of the 'led' against those who rule, when the justification for rule, or legitimations of State power, had become unclear to the majority of the people. From a secular moral standpoint Horkheimer and Adorno denounced anti-Semitism as 'irrational', because, they contended, it is 'deduced' from the dominant 'ratio' itself, and the world which corresponds to its image. Their argument goes something like this. The liberal economy, because of its inherent instability, had necessitated state intervention. This meant that for the majority of the people - entrepreneurs, bankers, and workers - it appeared no longer to be based on the 'principle of exchange', or calculability. On the contrary, it seemed to be nothing but a series of numerous *uncoordinated* activities, which they could neither know nor control. Horkheimer and Adorno argued that 'anti-Semitism' and other irrational forces arose from this irrationality or *uncertainty* in the productive process. Moreover, the authoritarian institutions, which this form of monopoly capitalism, or what they later describe as state capitalism, necessitated, accelerated the development of these forces. Faced with mammoth bureaucratic structures, of whose workings they were largely ignorant, Horkheimer and Adorno maintained that the masses could only act in an irrational, or noncalculable manner. Further, they argued that this 'irrational' action was harnessed by the rulers and directed against the Jews. Thus, for Horkheimer and Adorno, the Fascist or authoritarian order, which produces the anti-Semite, represents
for the masses the ultimate in 'irrationality', where both their economic needs, and their needs as human beings, are constantly frustrated. Anti-Semitism, therefore, becomes the 'counter-ideology' of the ruled:

Those in command who know the reasons do not hate the Jews and do not love their own followers. But the hatred felt by the led, who can never be satisfied economically or sexually, knows no bounds....The organised murderers are inspired by a kind of dynamic idealism. They set out to plunder, and construct a complicated ideology to that end, with illogical claims to be the saviours of the family, the fatherland, and mankind. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1969b:180)

Because the masses are only led, and, therefore, 'blind', they cannot see through the irrationality of the authoritarian order. And because they feel powerless and deprived, some of them react, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, against those whom the rulers have claimed to be the cause of their suppression, but who are only, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, an illusory cause - a 'false image' - for example, the 'image' of the conspiracy of Jewish bankers financing Bolshevism, or the 'image' of the intellectual who has been allowed the luxury of thought, a luxury others cannot afford. Moreover, the Fascist rulers for whom, Horkheimer and Adorno wrote, "business was the whole of politics," while turning the wrath of the people against the 'commercial Jew', claimed for themselves a false image of producers working alongside the workers:

The productive work of the capitalist, whether he justifies his profit by means of gross returns as under liberalism or by his director's salary as today, is an ideological cloaking of the real nature of the labour contract and the grasping character of the economic system. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1969b:182-3)

The anti-Semite is 'blind', according to Horkheimer and Adorno,
because his awareness of the world is built upon these 'false images' of reality which he accepts, and which prevent him from realising the 'truth'. The 'truth' here is a Marxian 'truth': that the economic value of what is produced bears no relation at all to social need, but is dictated by numerous external exigencies which endow products with a noncalculable exchange value. The authors therefore claim that the anti-Semite is exploited. He is led to serve a system that constantly 'cheats' him.

At the level of psychology, Horkheimer and Adorno go on to maintain that the expression of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany resulted from a harnessing of man's primeval instinctual urges by a "mad system." The Jews became the scapegoats for the injustices of the capitalist system, upon whom the anti-Semite lets loose his irrational, lustful, domineering, impulsive, 'id' reactions which had been repressed by a system he did not understand and feared. Moreover, the anti-Semite's image of the Jew represented his own repressed basic fears. Horkheimer and Adorno maintain that in perceiving the world we also project our images of the world on to it: "all perception is projection." But while the ideal we strive for is 'conscious' projection, or the 'life of reason', the morbid aspect of projection is lack of reflection due to fear and hatred. Here the humanistic values of Hegel are being introduced surreptitiously into the 'scapegoat' argument. Horkheimer and Adorno maintain that the anti-Semite in Germany merely acted blindly in response to his false and abstracted images of reality rather than in awareness of his own humanity. Further, the extreme case of the anti-Semite is described as
paranoid and the embodiment of evil. Paranoia, the authors believed, transcends perception of the world as 'merely given'. However paranoia is dangerous, because it is based not on knowledge, but on delusions about reality.

Horkheimer and Adorno's conception of the anti-Semite as evil serves to underscore the fact that moral criteria have been introduced into the argument. The anti-Semite, and later, the authoritarian, are seen as incorporating the total dehumanisation of capitalism. In contrast, the ideal of 'socialist man', or the 'democratic personality', as he is called here, fulfills the true humanism of the Enlightenment.

Thus, while the Jew is the recipient of the repressed emotions of the 'extreme of negativity' of the system, it is the masses, and not a particular class or group, that, in Horkheimer and Adorno's view, are subjected to Fascism's brutality. The 'negation' of capitalism has become diffuse, and no attempt is made by either Horkheimer or Adorno to locate it in a particular group. Instead, they concentrate all their attention upon assessing the effects of capitalism upon men who must live under it.

The 'escape route' that they suggest here is knowledge, where, for Horkheimer and Adorno, knowledge is expressed in the attainment of the Marxist ideal of historical consciousness which, in turn, implies a change in the direction of socialism. They begin by describing 'false knowledge', and refer to the tendency to false projection and paranoia as a symptom of the half-educated man:

The thought which leads to knowledge is neutralised and used as a mere qualification on specific labour markets and to heighten the commodity value of the personality. And so that self-examination of the
mind which works against paranoia is defeated. Finally under conditions of modern capitalism half-education has become objective spirit. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1969b:207)

Half-education is viewed by Horkheimer and Adorno as positing 'limited knowledge' as truth; as leading to denigration of that from which the half-educated man is excluded; and finally, as providing a rationale for evil. Thus the Enlightenment, according to the authors, did not automatically lead to the emancipation of men's minds. It was turned against itself - into domination or exploitation - by those who used its thought to gain power over others.

Secondly, Horkheimer and Adorno maintained that the reversal of this direction taken by capitalism could only be attained slowly via change in the ideals and values of men. Men, in capitalist society, had to obtain awareness or consciousness of how the world is molded in the particular horrific images of a few men. The vision that guided Horkheimer and Adorno's critique here was that of a truly human society where men as private and public persons would be emancipated from dominion, and where they would be able to develop to the full their potential as a species of nature, but at the same time as more than nature. These ideals are undoubtedly admirable ones; however, as was indicated earlier, one does not find in Horkheimer and Adorno's writings any practical account of how they are to be realised.

In addition to the ideals and values of socialism, the desire to preserve and build upon the values of their own particular reconstruction of bourgeois German culture comes out in the essay on anti-Semitism. In the first chapter of this section, it was argued that their desire to preserve German
'high culture' was a motive force behind their decision to write in German in America. And in this essay they lament the loss of bourgeois culture - which arose and spread with bourgeois property - not out of a desire to conserve it as it was, but out of a hope for the different direction it might have taken if it had not become "locked in fixed categories." Bourgeois culture is not directly criticised, nor are its categories rejected. Instead, its categories are retained, but its limitations exposed from the outside - from the perspective of life lived according to 'reason'.

Horkheimer and Adorno therefore argue that Fascism is the extreme case of the "sickness of current industrial society," which takes decisions from the workers in the public sphere by the national administration and trade associations it has set up, and in the private sphere by the system of mass culture. From the specific case of Fascism, Horkheimer and Adorno went on to generalise about all of capitalism. They contended that the Enlightenment claimed for itself not just the anti-Semite, but the human individual. Thus American society was regarded as just a specific case of capitalism, of which Fascism was just another. As a consequence, in America Horkheimer and Adorno sought to examine the effects of the 'delusion' or 'ideology' of the 'power bloc' or 'political ticket' mentality, which they likened to the rigidity of the Fascist, albeit of a less extreme form.

From the foregoing, it is easy to see the direction which the study of The Authoritarian Personality had to take. Horkheimer and Adorno were the only ones involved in the project who had a concern with general theory. Adorno wrote the
theoretical section of the study, and Horkheimer took a great
interest in that project. In contrast, Sanford and Levinson
were more concerned with middle-range theory, and with the
problems of data collection and scaling, while Else Frenkel-
Brunswik studied clinically the impact of the socialisation
process on the psyches of the subjects in the study.

Thus, while all the researchers, including those of
a more pragmatic philosophical orientation, were united on
the explicit aim of The Authoritarian Personality, which was,
not just to describe prejudice, but "to explain it in order
to help in its eradication," it was Horkheimer and Adorno
alone who had developed a Hegelian-Marxist value position
which viewed anti-Semitism as the extreme form of prejudice
symptomatic of the extreme type of capitalist society - the
command economy of State Capitalism. As a result, underlying
Horkheimer and Adorno's aim of eradicating prejudice is the
latent end of eradicating the monopoly capitalist system
which, in its extreme manifestation, they assert, provides
the climate for, and is influenced by, prejudiced thought
and stereotyped thinking.

The 'utopian' ideas of Marx are thus still present in
Horkheimer and Adorno's writings in America. However their
thoughts on the mode by which the eradication of capitalism,
or the establishment of socialism, was to be achieved differed
from that of their earlier position. In America they wrote
that elimination of prejudice (and hence capitalist values)
was to be achieved by education "scientifically planned on
the basis of understanding scientifically arrived at" (Adorno,
1950 :vii). To this end, as we noted, Horkheimer and Adorno
sought to align themselves with the 'positive' aspects of modern thought and of modern science. They were, of course, critical of natural science. However their critique was not directed at changing the concepts and categories of science, but at exposing the ahistoricism of the scientific method. They apparently believed that historicisation of science would involve an extension, rather than a complete revision of scientific concepts. Concepts were to be critically appropriated, i.e., read in a Hegelian-Marxist fashion, and reinterpreted within the context of the historical totality. An attempt at critically appropriating concepts may, however, fail in one of two ways. On the one hand, the meaning of the concepts involved may be more or less completely altered, so that nothing is really retained, and what one has is just a new theory. And on the other, there may be insufficient critical revision of the old concepts, with the result that one's theory is constrained in a conservative direction. It is debatable whether Horkheimer and Adorno were successful in avoiding both of these shortcomings, and the present author is inclined to think that they were guilty of the former, for reasons that will be mentioned in the next chapter.

One thing that one would expect, in the light of the above, is that one would not find, in The Authoritarian Personality, any explicit discussion of the Frankfurt scholars' notions of 'authority' and 'authoritarianism', with which we are here especially concerned. This is in fact the case. As a result, the title, The Authoritarian Personality, seemed peculiar to those not completely versed in the German Idealist
theoretical background, since there seemed to be no discrete theory of authoritarianism guiding the investigations. It appeared that the 'authoritarian' was only identified in the course of empirical investigation. And even Sanford wrote:

we were not studying the authoritarian personality; we set out to study anti-Semitism, arrived eventually at the conception of potential fascism in the personality, and finally chose The Authoritarian Personality as a connotative title. (Sanford, 1956:256)

Nonetheless, it was conceded that the title was meant to indicate some continuities with the work of Erich Fromm and A. Maslow, who had written earlier on the authoritarian character, as Sanford acknowledged. And in the introduction to the study, which was written on its completion, the authors wrote that the research:

seeks to develop and promote an understanding of social-psychological factors which have made it possible for the authoritarian type of man to threaten to replace the individualistic and democratic type prevalent in the past century and a half of our civilisation, and of the factors by which this threat may be contained. (Adorno et al, 1950:x)

But beneath the language of American academia of the fifties, the concept of the 'authoritarian type of man' is, in reality, based upon that of the totally alienated, dehumanised Fascist - the anti-Semite which their prior analyses had purportedly uncovered, while the liberal-democratic individual is simply the potential for de-alienated, socialist man. And in post-war America, the political impetus to the research was to uncover sources of fascism viewed as symptomatic of the demise of capitalist society in the United States.

Later publications of Horkheimer and Adorno's work, after their return to Germany, have made the values guiding their research more explicit. For in addition to the
reference to theory in *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Adorno, in the German edition of *The Authoritarian Personality*, included a study of an American 'fascist agitator' of the thirties, Martin Luther Thomas. Adorno drew parallels between the radio evangelist, Thomas, and the 'paranoid' tendencies of Hitler:

Thomas, through his connections to Deatheredge, Henry Alden and Mrs. Fry is well grounded in the Hitler method; he is well taught in the manipulation of the 'self' for propaganda purposes and has ingeniously adapted the Hitlerian revelation and affirmation of techniques to the emotional needs of his audience—members of the lower middle-class with strong backgrounds of belief in the bible or sectarianism. (Adorno, 1973:362-3)

Adorno described the appeal of the 'fascist agitator' to the emotions of his audience, in whom he implanted the belief that personal weakness can be turned into strength if one were 'let in', or allowed to join the movement. Adorno emphasised that propaganda, while consciously planned and organised, does not, like tyrannical appeals, act through open coercion, or like democratic appeals, through persuasion. He wrote that the success of propaganda lies in its appeal to desires rooted in the individual's unconscious. It provides a kind of wish-fulfilment. Adorno claimed that the extreme aim of the propagandist was the "sadistic suppression" of his audience. In the case of the evangelist, this is accomplished by threats of hell-fire. The followers accept the propaganda out of feelings of gratification for the 'show', for its fictiousness, its imitation of real feeling.

It was emphasised earlier in this chapter that the social critique outlined above was not published in English. It first appeared in English translation in 1972, in the collection of
essays entitled *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. By this time Marxism had become a respectable subject at English-speaking universities. Now Adorno defended the focus of *The Authoritarian Personality*, and its in-depth concentration on social psychological phenomena, and he emphasised that it should be read in the context of their development of theory as a whole:

...we never questioned the primacy of objective factors over the psychological....To be sure, we did not, in contrast to a certain economic orthodoxy, put up a stiff-necked resistance to psychology, but assigned it a proper place in our scheme as an explanatory factor. (Adorno, 1969:356)

The whole, with which we have been concerned here, involves Horkheimer and Adorno's particular intellectual interpretation of socialism and psychoanalysis.

We noted above that the psychological direction taken by the Institute in the earlier study, *Autorität und Familie*, largely followed the guidance of Erich Fromm, who had written the socio-psychological section. However Fromm did not remain long with Horkheimer in America. Adorno came to figure more in Institute affairs, and Fromm left the Institute in 1939 to follow his own clinical pursuits. Indeed, by the time the Institute published *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), Fromm's part seems to have been largely forgotten. Thus Adorno, writing of the authoritarian, said:

This syndrome comes closest to the over-all picture of the high scorer....It follows the 'classic' psychoanalytic pattern involving a sado-masochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex, and it has been pointed out by Erich Fromm under the title of the 'sado-masochistic' character. According to Max Horkheimer's theory in the collective work of which he wrote the socio-psychological part, external social repression is concomitant with the internal repression of the impulses.... (Adorno et al, 1950:759; the emphasis is mine.)
Except on a descriptive level, the concept of the authoritarian personality bears little resemblance to the concept developed by Fromm. The psychological explanations used in the study, *The Authoritarian Personality*, are based on Horkheimer's metapsychological assumptions, outlined jointly with Adorno in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, and they rely heavily upon *libidinal* theory which Fromm had come to reject. Jay has noted that Adorno in 1946 was the first to publicly spell out the Institute's differences with Fromm. Adorno at that time accused the ego psychologists of overstressing the importance of the ego and its "genetic interaction with the id," thereby neglecting, in his view, the *fundamental* fact that culture (or civilisation) brings about repressions and guilt feelings by denying *libidinal* drives, particularly destructive ones.
NOTES

1. Adorno (1969:356) pointed this out in order to clear up a misunderstanding about the method of The Authoritarian Personality which, he wrote, had come to light through various criticisms of the study to the effect that "the authors had attempted to account for anti-Semitism and beyond that fascism in general on a purely subjective basis, thus subscribing to the error that this politico-economic phenomenon is primarily psychological."

2. After his arrival in America, Adorno worked half-time for this project, and half-time for the Institute. See Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (ed), The Intellectual Migration, Europe and America, 1930-60 (1969:338-55 and 322-6) for both Adorno's and Lazarfeld's accounts of this experience.

3. Nevitt Sanford (1956:264) wrote that they were eventually able to finance publication of the study as a book instead of as a series of papers through unexpected financial assistance from the Social Science Research Council, the Rosenberg Foundation, the Research Board of the University of California, and the Graduate Division of Western Reserve University.

4. Marcuse wrote:
The turn from the liberalist to the total-authoritarian state occurs within the framework of a single social order. With regard to the unity of this economic base, we can say it is liberalism that 'produces' the total-authoritarian state out of itself, as its own consummation at a more advanced stage of development. The total-authoritarian state brings with it the organisation and theory of society that correspond to the monopolistic stage of capitalism. (Marcuse,1934:162)

5. The economic foundations for these statements are provided by the studies carried out by Friedrich Pollock and published in the Zeitschrift f"ur Sozialforschung between 1932 and 1934. The evidence presented did not involve any comparisons of capitalist societies, being confined to the German example alone.

6. Horkheimer (1949:1-10) declared most theories of anti-Semitism to be deficient at the time he and Adorno were formulating their project. For example, he argued that rationalistic theses had declared anti-Semitism to be on a par with the 'hoax of the clergy', thus obviating psychological explanation; the formal sociology of Simmel had reduced hatred of the Jews and their specific attributes to the general category of 'strangeness'; and finally, Bebel had written that anti-Semitism is the 'socialism of fools', of those who regard the elimination of the Jew as the easiest solution to their economic problems. Horkheimer, as we have been at pains to note, together with Adorno, regarded anti-Semitism as a social phenomenon which had not received sufficient attention from psychologists and sociologists. On the other hand, Horkheimer regarded Freud's Moses as seminal, and he wrote that "psychoanalytic studies are the only ones from which we can start." Taken together with the facts of an intellectual climate favorable to psychoanalysis, Horkheimer's previous interest in Germany in a
psychology of the unconscious which could supplement socio-historical explanation in cases where the actions of men or groups of men in society seemed to be motivated by forces other than 'knowledge' or 'insight into reality', and finally, Horkheimer and Adorno's interest in the latent impact of capitalism upon men living under it, it is not surprising that they should turn to the psychoanalytic problematic, and attempt to develop it within the confines of their Hegelian reconstruction of Marx.

7. Pollock (1940:200-25) distinguishes totalitarian and democratic forms of State Capitalism. In the former, the State is the 'power instrument' of a new ruling group. In the latter, the State has the same control over the economy, but is in turn controlled by the people. National Socialism fell into the category of totalitarian State Capitalism. At this time, Pollock also believed that the Russian economy was going in the same direction. He also maintained that there was no going back to 'free enterprise', so that the choice for industrial societies was not between totalitarian controls on the one hand, and return to 'free enterprise' on the other: the choice was, Pollock believed, between totalitarian controls, and voluntary controls in the form of economic planning.

8. Horkheimer maintained that it could just as well have been any other powerless minority.

9. Jay (1973:98 and 103-5) has described Fromm's personal and intellectual differences with other Institute members. What was crucial was his disillusionment with Freud and his attempt to eliminate all libidinal forces from his characterology.

CHAPTER IX

TYPOLOGIES

This chapter discusses the way in which Adorno and the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* used the method of 'constructed typologies' to link the theory of the authoritarian type of person with the empirical evidence for his existence. It also discusses how, on the level of middle-range theory, the study also represents a 'coming together' of the techniques of American social science with those of Freudian psychoanalysis and with the theories of the German historical sociological tradition.

In the introduction to this section it was noted that the major empirical effort of the Critical Theorists - *The Authoritarian Personality* - has been criticised as radically departing from the theoretical framework of Critical Theory. In some ways this is correct. Some of the very aims of Horkheimer and Adorno in participating on the research project laid them open to such a charge. For example, Horkheimer and Adorno's express intent to make use of 'progressive thought' meant at least their partial integration into American academia. And it meant, in practical terms, their use of American social science categories. The latter embodied theories which differed from their own. Nevertheless, their work had the advantage of opening up discussion about the nature of social science categories, and eventually of showing that they need not be as fixed and immutable as social scientists had assumed them to be. This result corresponded with their general aim of breaking down the 'fixity' of thought as such. The use of different concepts by sociologists who had been trained in the German tradition of thought thus added a new dimension...
of meaning, and potentiality for further development, to categories which had tended to become rigid. This applied especially to those used in the dominant, functionalist framework in sociology, and in the experimental framework in psychology.

The above may seem to be in conflict with my earlier observation that Horkheimer and Adorno tended to criticise the sciences from the outside, from the realm of philosophy and history, leaving the concepts of science themselves intact. However where they actually did participate in research, their tendency was to utilise the existing conceptual structure, but to modify or extend the meaning of some of the concepts involved. This procedure was certainly in accordance with the dialectical aims of Critical Theory. Horkheimer, in his earlier statement of the Institute's program, had indicated that one of the primary goals would be to reinterpret and extend previous theory, by means of new facts and new theoretical insights, in order, in German idealist fashion, to extract what is 'true'.

The American and German titles of the study - *The Authoritarian Personality*, and *Studien zum autoritären Charakter* - themselves are indicative of a 'cross-fertilization' of ideas derived from two separate psychological problematics - the American and the German. Initially the term 'personality' had a very definite meaning in the development of American social psychology, as had the German word 'Charakter' in German literature and psychology. These meanings were quite different, but in the early fifties they came to be used almost interchangeably. Thus in the 1973 German translation, 'personality' is translated 'Charakter'. A brief considera-
tion of the roots of these terms, and their separate historical development, may be useful here. We will see that the change these terms underwent was essentially one of conceptual broadening, so that they came to include an increasing number of aspects of individuality. Such a broadening of categories has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it may facilitate the formulation of a theory which seeks to grasp the 'historical moment in its complexity'. But on the other, there is an associated loss of technical precision.

The inner core of meaning of the German word 'Charakter' always referred to some inborn, constant law that cemented the different aspects of individuality together and determined its development. The related term in classical Greek was first a verb, denoting 'engraving' or 'notching'. Later, Aristotle used it to refer to the "impressive qualities of a person which helped to distinguish him from others."

In contrast, the term 'personality' is derived from 'person' - a term that had behavioural connotations. In antiquity the term 'persona' meant 'theatre mask'. With Cicero, it came to mean one's role in the game of life.

In Germany, the word 'Persönlichkeit' developed differently from the word 'personality' in American psychology. In Germany, 'persona' became invested by German scholasticism during the Middle Ages with an 'inner quality' connotation, and the word 'Persönlichkeit' was coined. After Kant, the concept attained a special dynamic, or theoretical and moral quality of 'individuality', notably in the writings of Goethe and later in those of V. Humboldt and Schleiermacher, and in the metaphysical writings of the German Idealists, for whom
personality expressed the developing unity of 'reason' and 'particularity' of existence within a single living being. The term, however, was little used in German psychology.

In the United States, the term 'personality' owes its meaning not to German Idealism but to clinical psychology, and to the case study approach. Initially, little more meaning was attached to 'personality' by clinicians that that given to it earlier by experimentalists who had attempted to connect man's conduct and nature with the roles he plays in society. In this general-behaviour conception, it is not the dynamics of individual 'praxis' that are central, but man as acted upon by various processes: 'personality' is a matter of stimulus-response relationships stating that some factor $x$ elicits behaviour of type $y$.

In the late thirties, however, G. W. Allport (1937) and G. Murray (1938) defined personality in a way that expanded its meaning to include sociological influences, and the development of individuality. Allport defined personality as "the dynamic organisation within the individual of those psycho-physical systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment" (1948:48), while Murray wrote that "personality is the governing organ of the body, an institution, which, from birth to death, is ceaselessly engaged in transformative functional operations" (1951:436). What both definitions do is to provide a framework for analysing the effects of social institutions and ideas upon dynamically functioning individuals. Their work thus offered scope for dialogue between, on the one hand, those trained in American psychology, and, on the other, thinkers of a psychoanalytic
orientation, such as Horkheimer and Adorno, who found the
notion of psycho-physical systems sufficiently broad to allow
for a number of theories about how men actually feel or per­
ceive the world around them. Here it might be noted that
the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* used Murray's TAT
tests in their studies, and the American techniques of
attitude surveying and scaling, as well as interviews.

In German psychology, 'characterology' had developed as
a reaction to the 'abstract subject' of Wundt's experimental
approach. Its Freudian development also represents an attempt
to individualise abstract 'scientific notions' of psychological
subjects. In Part II, we noted the prevalence of charactero­
lologies in Germany which attempted to describe the individual
by attributing various unchanging qualities to him. With
Freud, characterology was conceived of as an examination of
the causes of individual behaviour in the internal psycho­
dynamics of the individual. Freud had concentrated on the
individual's largely unconscious patterning of wishes, emo­
tions, and feelings which he designated the individual's
psychic structure. Fromm's reading of Freud had opened this
structure up to historical and sociological influences, even
if, as we have noted, Horkheimer and Fromm were somewhat
dissatisfied with Fromm's characterology, since they felt
that he had harmonistically effected too quick a 'mediation'
between the individual and society.

In order to emphasise the dynamic nature of the concept
of personality used in the study, *The Authoritarian Person­
ality*, Adorno (1950 :1) wrote that personality was viewed not
as behaviour but as potential for behaviour: "The major concern
was with the potentially fascist individual." In addition, Adorno wrote that for purposes of research, the potential anti-democrat, or fascist, is hypothesised as a totality. In contrast, the democratic personality type, which we noted incorporated Horkheimer and Adorno's ideals of 'rational', 'autonomous', or, more forthrightly, 'socialist' man, was not viewed as accountable for by a single pattern:

A question may be raised as to why, if we wish to explore new resources for combating fascism, we do not give as much attention to the 'potential anti-fascist'. The answer is that we do study trends that stand in opposition to fascism, but we do conceive that they constitute any single pattern. (Adorno, 1951:1)

The composition of the totality which describes the fascist personality is first described by Adorno in a very general Freudian manner, as follows: "a more or less enduring organisation of forces within the individual" which, Adorno wrote, can be used to account for 'relative permanence', or consistency, of individual behaviour in response to various situations. It is not a given, but describes individual dispositions or potentialities for action, and lies behind action and within the individual. Here there is a definite resemblance to Fromm's theory of character.

While Adorno, following Freud, wrote that this totality of forces can be viewed as an organisation of conflicting and harmonious needs, his idea of levels of personality organisation is indebted to American social psychology. For Adorno believed that personality could be approached on two basic levels: a more directly observable and measurable level, to which he thought that American theories and methods of scaling were appropriate, and a level lying beneath surface opinion, where indirect measures based on Freudian theory could be
applied. Here the two theoretical directions - the American and the German - meet. Thus, in the methodological section, Adorno wrote that the person is conceived, for analytic purposes, as being divided into a number of levels indicated by surface opinion, by "more or less inhibited" trends, and by forces lying in the subject's unconscious, which together make up the totality of the individual. Throughout his discussion, Adorno referred to personality as a structure, and indeed, the discovery of the first part of the book is that personality embraces variables that have a 'lawful' relation to one another and to personality organisation.

Given his approach, Adorno was necessarily faced with the dangers of 'reductionism' of the psychological or sociological variety that have always plagued attempts to utilise psychoanalysis in sociological research. Wilhelm Reich (1949:159) had described the "genital character" in physiological terms that suggested that there could be healthy sexuality without a social transformation, thus succumbing to the first kind of reductionism, and confining theory to the therapy and sexuality of the individual. Later, Fromm had given a positive description of the 'productive' or 'revolutionary' character which, Adorno believed, had tended to sociologise away individual consciousness as a product of the prevailing norms and values. He charged that this reinterpretation of psychoanalysis promised health and adjustment at the expense of the critical components of its social theory. Adorno sought to maintain the dialectical tension between a governing organ in the sense of an agency which mediates extrapsychic, or socio-economic and historical influences, and personality
as a representation of the libido has developed ontogenetically.

With respect to the latter, Adorno strove to identify empirically a 'subjectivity' which, on the level of theory, he and Horkheimer had analysed as damaged by the repressive forces of monopoly capitalism. Their metapsychological critique had revealed one of the results of this impaired subjectivity, or what came to be called "pseudo-individualism," in contrast to historically conscious individuality, in the primeval fear which had been turned against humanity as such. The problem facing Adorno in *The Authoritarian Personality* was that of explaining the susceptibility of individuals to anti-Semitic or authoritarian ideologies without reducing such explanations either to instinctual roots or to social origins.

There was also another more obvious danger, which Adorno noted in the introduction to the study, of ascribing behaviour which defied explanation in terms of 'rational self-interest' to morally good or evil origins. Adorno wrote:

> Without the conception of personality structure, writers whose approach rests upon the assumption of infinite human flexibility and responsiveness to the social situation of the moment have not helped matters by referring to persistent trends which they could not approve to 'confusion' or 'psychosis' or evil under one name or another. (Adorno, 1950: 6-7)

In the study, *The Authoritarian Personality*, Adorno was concerned with the individual as a totality of varied, yet interrelated forces, which, he believed, nevertheless formed some kind of at least partially ascertainable structure within the individual.

Let us now turn to the notion of ideology employed in the study. The crucial point about the empirical work of
Horkheimer and Adorno is that they temporarily set on one side their theory of the sources of 'ideology' - of the justifications for power - which they had earlier identified theoretically, though not concretely, as involving not just the economy, but all of bourgeois culture, to concentrate upon a theory of the patterning of ideologies within the individual. Adorno wrote:

The authors hold the view...that anti-Semitism is based more largely upon factors in the subject and his total situation than upon the actual characteristics of the Jews, and that one place to look for the determinants of anti-Semitic opinions and attitudes is within the person who expresses them. Since this emphasis on personality required a focussing of attention on psychology rather than on sociology or history - though in the last analysis the three can be separated only artificially - there could be no attempt to account for anti-Semitic ideas in our society. (Adorno,1950 :2-3)

While Adorno recognised the artificiality involved in concentrating upon psychological influences, he appealed to the empiricist apology that analysis of socio-economic and historical determinants of ideology formation lay outside the scope of the study, which was focused upon ideology consumption. It is not clear, however, that by so doing Adorno avoided the psychological reductionism with which the study has been charged. We will return to this issue later.

Left with a socio-psychological problematic, Horkheimer and Adorno deliberately personalised, for purposes of empirical analysis, the notion of ideology, and construed it as referring to an "organisation of opinions, attitudes, and values" which may either represent the individual's total ideology, such as anti-Semitism, or refer to his separate ideologies with respect to politics, economics, religion, and minority groups. This personalisation of ideology, moreover, fitted in with the
pedagogical aims of the study, which were ones of finding ways of eliminating the dehumanising pressures of society in the hope of strengthening *individuality*. Adorno claimed to show why the structures of various psychological processes in individuals, built up in part by the pressures of civilisation, made ideologies designed to appeal to nonrational wishes acceptable, whereas 'rational' ideologies demanding the growth of reason, self-determination, or self-awareness lacked psychological appeal. Once these structures were uncovered, the authors thought that re-education could be planned.

Horkheimer wrote:

Our aim is not merely to describe prejudice but to explain it in order to help in its eradication. That is the challenge we would meet. Eradication means re-education, scientifically planned on the basis of understanding scientifically arrived at. And education in a strict sense is by its nature personal and pedagogical. (Horkheimer, 1960 :vii)

The aim of the study, therefore, was to examine the individual as a *consumer of ideologies*, and the effects of ideology in forming psychic structures underlying the emergence of 'subjectivity'. So the underlying problem is still that of achieving historical consciousness, though the language is no longer that of Marx, but of liberal-democratic American academia.

The term 'ideology' is often taken to refer to a set of beliefs, values, and attitudes of a group that are *nonrationally based*. Horkheimer and Adorno do not use it in this way. For Adorno asserted that while there is no view of the world which is not ideological, and while most ideologies derive their following by appeal to nonrational factors underlying behaviour, this is not so for the rational outlook of an 'objective and thoughtful' man, i.e., socialist man. The
ideology of the 'rational' or 'socialist' man derives its appeal from its connections with personality variables belonging to the ego, the locus of the reality principle.

Fromm too had stressed the development of the ego, which he associated with the growth of reason, or historical consciousness. But in contrast to Fromm, Adorno viewed the ego as damaged by civilisation, so that socialist man was, for him, not an inherent and concrete potentiality, but an ideal possibility that, though ethically desirable, is unlikely to exist either now or in the future. But he viewed this ideal as nonetheless an essential criterion by means of which to expose barriers to the historical unfolding of 'socialist man' - barriers which he and Horkheimer believed could possibly be removed via re-education along socialist lines. However Horkheimer and Adorno were far less optimistic than Fromm. The research work, in fact, when taken together with the earlier theoretical work, reveals Horkheimer and Adorno's increasing pessimism about the achievement of socialism. They had come to believe that economic changes would help only to a limited degree, and that progress along the road to socialism would also require psychological and cultural changes, with the result that they saw the road stretching out into the far distant future.

But while the concern of Horkheimer and Adorno was still with their European problems of socialism versus totalitarian state capitalism, the overt aim of the research - to uncover the fascist potential in the American personality - coincided with the fears of many Americans at that time - particularly those who had attributed the rise of fascism in Germany to
the 'irrationality' of the German masses - that fascism is not just 'of one country', but could arise practically anywhere. Ironically, the confining of socialism to one country in the twenties had disillusioned many socialists in Europe. But at this level Horkheimer and Adorno's integration into American academia was a complete one, and they shared the view common to American scholars at that time (1944), that fascism was a right-wing phenomenon.

Let us now return to the actual research carried out by Adorno in the forties. The research gave Horkheimer and Adorno the change to explore empirically the 'correctness' of their psycho-social critique. The critique (to grossly oversimplify) was that capitalism as it has developed in the industrial nations is evil; the evil is the repression of all forms of individual autonomy; America is a form of advanced industrial capitalism, and therefore individuals living in American society must also exhibit signs of this repression; the categories of Freudian characterology and American personality theory can help to identify empirically this repressed psychic structure. The finding of the study, as later described by Adorno (1969 :356), was that "man is the ideology of dehumanisation."

Adorno argued that the best way to study capitalist society was via the typological approach, because in this way the categories of social oppression could be approximated in theory:

People form psychological classes inasmuch as they are stamped by variegated social processes.... Individualism opposed to human pigeonholing may ultimately become a mere ideological veil in a society which actually is inhuman and whose intrinsic tendency towards the 'subsumption' of everything shows itself by the classification of people themselves. In other
words, the critique of typology should not neglect the fact that large numbers of people are no longer or rather never were 'individuals' in the sense of traditional nineteenth century philosophy....There is reason to look for psychological types because the world in which we live is typed and 'produces' different 'types' of persons. (Adorno et al, 1950:747)

Thus one justification for using a typological approach with all its inherent methodological dangers, of which Adorno was well aware, lay outside the framework of the study itself. Horkheimer and Adorno's essay on anti-Semitism, as we noted, had revealed National Socialist Germany as an extreme form of capitalist society where the 'stereotyped mentality' and the categorisation of individuals had been characteristic. The concept of 'type', derived originally from a general critique of Western civilisation, and found useful in describing one form of capitalism, is thus being applied to another form of capitalism. Jay (1973:227) is therefore correct in stating that Adorno defended the use of typology on historical grounds, that is, on the basis of the results of a previous historico-critical analysis of another phase of capitalism.

But beyond this, Adorno seems to regard the concept of 'type' as a possibly useful starting point for the analysis of modern industrial societies in general, regardless of whether they are capitalist, since he believes that "the world in which we live is typed...." Unless Adorno meant his particular 'world' at the time, which was America, it would seem that he believed that there is something inherent in social processes themselves - their basis in primeval fear, for example - which leads to conformity, and thus to
a classification of people into 'types', with the result that 'types' should be useful in exploring forms of society other than capitalist ones. And here the justification may have been supplemented by 'ad hoc' observation of socialisation processes not just in monopoly capitalist countries, but in other industrial countries as well, together with the hierarchy of control that they seemed to demand. For we noted that the Frankfurt scholars had long been disillusioned with the outcome of industrialisation in Soviet Russia, which stood outside the type of bourgeois culture or civilisation against which their main critique was directed.

Thus Adorno's typing of individuals in this way appears to represent a radical departure from Marx's class structure analysis. Marx also stressed social and political inequality, but his classes were based on the theory of division of labour which explained the division of people into classes via the social relations of production in which individuals were caught up. Thus an individual on Marx's view belongs to the proletariat not because of shared psychic characteristics, but because of his participation in the social relations of production of a particular society.

Let us now turn to a more detailed consideration of Adorno's approach. The logic of analysis used in The Authoritarian Personality to examine the relationship between ideology and personality is described by Adorno as that of 'constructed typology'. As we noted in the Fromm section, the purely classificatory descriptive types used in the biological sciences had long been recognised as inappropriate to the peculiar nature of the subject matter of the social
Adorno argued, for example, that such a procedure never captures the 'unique' and idiosyncratic in behaviour; 'pigeonholing' turns relatively dynamic traits into static characteristics; it is statistically inadequate; and finally, types overlap, necessitating the construction of large residual categories.

The basic point is that in the social sciences even the simplest form of typology — classification — cannot be merely descriptive, but has to rest on a theory. For example, the well-known classification used by Kretschmer (1936) was not merely an exercise in 'pigeonholing' individuals. It depended upon a theory of classes which linked physique with character. In Part II, we noted that Fromm's research into the convictions of the German workers, at the empirical level, used a simple classification of people into types. But Fromm's classification itself was not done on the basis of a series of properties, but by means of a theory which provided rules for empirical assignment of people to classes. The problem with 'typology' on the empirical level is that of assigning subjects to classes which are not simple property classes due to the fact that the classes have to take account of the fact that the individuals assigned to them are complex thinking, acting, social human beings. Thus, like Fromm, Adorno also sought a dynamic or theoretical typology that would not only incorporate assignment rules, but would, on a higher level of generality, relate the empirical classes to 'type' constructs, and which would thereby aid in the understanding of social and historical phenomena.

Adorno's procedure involved the introduction of what he
referred to as the 'constructed type'. True to the tenets of Critical Theory, Adorno thought that the 'constructed type' would help to conceptualise the empirical diversity of the world in terms of its underlying structure. It was a theoretical type aimed at the interpretation of meaning, and may thus be compared with Weber's 'ideal types' which also sought to explicate meaning.

Weber's methodology turned on two concepts - 'ideal types' and 'meant meaning'. Weber proposed 'ideal types' as a method of understanding concrete historical and social phenomena like the development of capitalism in its entirety. In Weber's view (1966 :89), the ideal type is a 'pure type'. It embodies a set of general empirical rules which establish theoretically conceived, subjectively meaningful connections between different aspects of a phenomenon such as capitalism, or the caste system. Thus it is that Hempel (1965 :162) argues that "in intent at least ideal types represent not concepts properly speaking but theories."

Weber also claimed that the ideal type could be used as a methodological device. The logic here is the construction of the 'extreme' or 'pure type'. Weber concentrated mainly on rational ideal types, and he argued that an understanding of social action which is meaningful as well as causally adequate is possible only if the researcher begins by constructing a "purely rational course of action," given his knowledge of the ends of the participants in the event and all the circumstances. This abstraction, which in Weber's view has the merit of minimising ambiguity and maximising clarity, can serve the sociologist as a 'type' against which
actual action may be measured. Thus Weber argued that,
in understanding social action, the 'irrational' factors -
"affects and errors" - (which form, in contrast, the content
of Adorno's analysis) are only called in to explain deviation
from 'rational behaviour':

For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis
it is convenient to treat all irrational, affectually
determined elements of behaviour as factors of devia-
tion from a conceptually pure type of rational action.
(Weber, 1966:192)

Weber thought that by comparison with the ideal type it is
possible to understand how social action is affected by irra-
tional factors.

The construction of the type is based upon the researcher's
close study of his subject matter. According to Weber, this
enables him to abstract its essential qualities, forming not
a pure abstraction like that of 'economic man', but a construc-
tion "clear of nonessential qualities." For example, the main
types of social action for Weber were the theoretically con-
ceived pure types of 'value oriented' action and 'instrumental'
action, while 'affectual' and 'traditional' action formed
residual categories. These categories describe not concrete,
or individual action, but 'ideal', yet objectively possible
courses of action. For Weber, the 'ideal type is both abstract
and general." Thus individual cases are rarely found that
possess all the characteristics of the 'pure type'.

Adorno's constructed types are also theoretical, but
Adorno found Weber's approach limited in several respects.
First, he did not follow Weber with regard to the theory
of subjective meaning which underlies Weber's ideal types.
Weber has written:
Sociology...is a science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its cause and effects. In 'action' is included all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches subjective meaning to it. (Weber, 1966:88)

Weber believed that the researcher's task was to understand what an individual's actions mean for him and what interpretations individuals attach themselves, rather than what they mean for an observer. Apart from the difficulty of detaching the observer's own subjectivity from that of the social object, this prescription of Weber vetoes any other theory of behaviour which does not employ 'subjectively meaningful' motivational concepts. The latter creates a false antithesis between 'rational' and 'irrational' factors. Irrational factors in Weber's theory are a residual category which deviate by their form, but not by their content, from rational factors. Weber's theory does not take into account the content of the end or goal of action. He does not, therefore, exclude the possibility that 'irrational' factors may still be logically explicable by reference to the content of goals. Pareto attempted to describe non-logical action that was not illogical. And in The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno claimed to offer an explanation of the 'irrational' in human behaviour in psychological terms, and by reference to the content of certain values which guide action. Adorno argued that social action is meaningful in the sense that "has been defined in Freud's basic statement that all our experiences are meaningful."

Thus, in offering an explanation of the 'irrational', Adorno did not limit sociological and psychological under-
standing to 'meant meanings' for the individual as Weber had done, but developed a broader historical framework in which to understand psychological phenomena. In his search for 'meaning', Adorno followed the culture critique of the later Freud in seeking to uncover in the 'inner depths of the individual' the psychic mechanisms which modify the process of internalisation of values and which lie beneath the individual's own level of conscious intent and understanding. Adorno claimed that "the marks of social repression are left within the individual soul" (1950:747). Thus the researcher can understand what the subject does not know about himself. He can make sense of the subject's actions by relating the latter's emotions, feelings, anxieties, and wishes to knowledge of the larger historical and social whole of which the subject is a part.

The way that Adorno did this was by means of a theory linking evidence about the affects and emotions, from clinical studies, to his more general critique of the social and cultural totality. Adorno wrote:

Ideas such as those of orality, or of the compulsive character, though derived from highly individualised studies, make sense only if they are accompanied by the implicit assumption that the structures thus named and discovered within the individual dynamics of an individual, pertain to such basic constellations that they may be expected to be representative no matter how 'unique' the observations upon which they are based may be. Since there is a typological element inherent in any kind of psychological theory, it would be spurious to exclude typology per se. (Adorno, 1950:748)

The search for meaning, especially in psychology, Adorno conceded, implied a search for generality, suggested by the possibility of 'recurring nuclei' or 'syndromes' which he believed came close to the idea of types. Thus, Adorno's
differences with Weber were primarily theoretical, based on
the nature of the rules for assessing meaningful action.

Secondly, Adorno found Weber's typology limited as a
methodological device. Adorno disagreed with the method of
one-sided accentuation of features of a type, which he
believed implied a theoretically conceived abstract dichot-
omy:

We do not want to classify human beings by types
which divide them statistically, nor by ideal types
in the usual sense which have to be supplemented by
'mixtures'. (Adorno, 1950:749)

Adorno argued that 'constructed typology' would function to
"unite a number of traits and dispositions" according to their
own inherent logic into a context that had an underlying con-
tinuity of meaning. The categories of Hegelian-Marxism and
the metapsychological theories of Freud would be used here to
understand the underlying structure of psychological conflicts
and their resolutions. Adorno claimed that

confronted with 'genuine' types, even so-called
deviations would no longer appear as accidental,
but would be recognisable as meaningful in a
structural sense. (Adorno, 1950:749)

Adorno's primary concern, then, was not that of classifica-
tion, but that of ensuring that all empirical cases, including
deviations from the constructed types, would be theoretically
understandable. This was to be done, moreover, within the
context of an ideology critique.

On the empirical level, both the constructed and the
ideal types provide the rules and definitions for 'classifica-
tory' or 'extreme' types by means of the theories embodied in
them. Adorno maintained that, at this level, types must have
pragmatic value. And he argued that even "crude classifica-
tions" are often useful even though one is fully aware that if one delves more deeply into the subject matter the distinctions are likely to disappear or overlap. For the use of a small number of such types can at least serve to simplify the approach to the analysis of complex material.

In the case of The Authoritarian Personality Adorno stated that simplification of the data had proceeded by combining sociological and psychological criteria of types, on the basis of established psychoanalytic, clinical categories. For example, the psychological state of admiration of one's father and the social attitude of belief in authority for authority's sake were combined in the category of the 'authoritarian personality'.

There is, it might be argued, an advantage that such an approach has over the more recent one of quantitative reduction of complexity by Q factor analysis, namely, that the types remain theoretical, rather than becoming purely empirical. Thus, on a higher level of generality, they can easily be incorporated into the particular theory involved in 'ideal type', or 'constructed type', explanations.

The use of qualitative categories was, however, combined with quantitative investigations, in order to ensure the attainment of some measure of 'objectivity'. The relationship between these is described by Adorno, in retrospect, as follows:

The categories that underlay the quantitative researches were themselves of a qualitative character and derived from an analytical characterology. Furthermore, we had intended from the beginning to compensate for the danger of the mechanistic element in quantitative investigations by supplementary qualitative case studies. The deadlock that purely quantitative determinations seldom arrive at the genetical depth mechanisms, whereas qualitative
results can easily be accused of being incapable of generalisations and thereby lose their objective sociological value, we sought to surmount by employing an entire series of different techniques, which we only related to one another in terms of the underlying categories. (Adorno, 1969:359)

The techniques used in *The Authoritarian Personality* converged on the categories provided by psychoanalytic characterology. Adorno, working in the context of research receiving some American university support, and with a team that included American-trained social psychologists, felt it was both necessary and desirable to attempt to demonstrate that the qualitative psychoanalytic categories and theories being employed possessed scientific validity. Since those categories involved reference to unconscious mental processes, and hence to *unobservable* entities, a central task would be to indicate observable correlates of the postulated unobservable processes. Subsequent studies of authoritarianism, as Kirscht and Dillehay (1967) report, also attempted to find empirical correlates in order to 'test' the authors' theoretical assumptions.

By the use of typologies, the authors attempted to simplify data from a wide variety of sources. The sources were overt behavioural expressions of attitudes and opinions, more inhibited attitudes and feelings, and deepseated convictions. These were thought to correspond to various 'levels' within the personality organisation. The theories embodied in the typological concepts were to connect all these levels. The theories incorporated in specific character types are discussed in the next chapter.

Finally, the way in which individuals were to be empirically assigned to classes deserves some discussion,
since it is to some extent problematic. Here we must return to our earlier discussion of 'classificatory types'. As we noted in the Fromm section, 'classificatory' and 'extreme' types are not, like 'ideal' or 'constructed' types, invoked as a device for explaining or understanding social and historical phenomena. They operate simply to order phenomena. However the rules for this ordering are generally included in more comprehensive 'constructed' or 'ideal' types.

In understanding Adorno's rules for the ordering of types, it was then suggested that the more recent monothetic/polythetic distinction (Bailey, 1973:291-308) would help to make this clear. Monothetic types are analogous to classificatory types, since they specify qualities of a phenomenon all of which must be present if it is to be assigned to a specific type. Thus monothetic statements take the form: a phenomenon is of type A if and only if it possesses all of the following properties .... Fromm used a monothetic approach in his early study. But while the monothetic approach does have the advantage of internal homogeneity of classes, it has the disadvantage that there may be very few people - as was in fact the case with Fromm's study - that can be assigned to each category, since the absence of a single property is sufficient to place one outside of a given category. In contrast, polythetic categories are much less homogeneous, but much more empirical, since they do not require that the individuals making up a given type be related on all the qualities. Thus, as Bailey says, in a "polythetic group each feature is shared by many members, and each member possesses many features. If no single feature
is possessed by all members, the group is termed fully polythetic" (Bailey, 1973:294). Compare this with the following statements of Adorno: "Our types are justified only if we succeed in organising, under the name of each type, a number of traits and dispositions, in bringing them into a context which shows some unity of meaning in those traits;" "the consistency of meaning...would suggest that as many traits as possible can be deduced from certain basic forms of underlying psychological conflicts and their resolutions;" "we would make a fetish of the methodological critique of typology...if a number of very drastic and extreme differences...were excluded because none of the types is ever represented in classical purity by a single individual" (Adorno, 1950:749). Bailey's discussion, of course, is concerned with the more quantitative factorial methods of typology construction, while Adorno was primarily concerned with theoretical connections involved in the internal dynamics of the types. Both, however, were concerned with the twin problems of reducing the overall number of types in order to account for as many cases as possible within a relatively simple theory, and of reducing heterogeneity within the types in order to simplify the ordering.

One point which Adorno stresses in this connection is that the extent to which given types may seem to involve heterogeneity may depend upon the depth of one's theoretical understanding of the phenomena being studied. He cites the example of psychiatry, where there had been a certain conscious 'superficiality' in typing of patients into categories such as manic-depressives, schizophrenics, and paranoiacs. Adorno
wrote that although "these distinctions are likely to vanish the deeper one goes," they are at least useful initial starting points and, moreover,

the hypothesis may be allowed that if one could only succeed in going deep enough, at the end of the differentiation, just the more universal 'crude' structure would reappear: some basic libidinous constellations. (Adorno, 1950:750)

Adorno used a form of 'extreme type' classification to assign individuals empirically to classes. The assignment to classes was determined by how people compared with respect to relations of the form 'more x than' and 'as much x as', with the end points or extremes of the scales being regarded as empirical types, rather than as conceptually 'pure', Weberian types. The logical operation that was then involved in the study on the attitudinal level was the specification of typological orders by reference to various rating scales, and on the basis of the widening circle of correlations among scales that suggested a general ideology of authoritarianism. The scales involved were: the Anti-Semitic Scale; the Ethnocentrism Scale; the Political and Economic Conservativism Scale; and the Implicit Antidemocratic Trends Scale, or F-Scale.

In summary, Adorno approached the problem of studying the fascist potential in America by means of theories and categories of individuality which had been arrived at earlier by the Institute. Like Fromm, the authors were interested in a theory that would account for the effects of ideology on the total personality of individuals living under conditions of late capitalism. But Horkheimer and Adorno's temporary integration into American academia also led to
attempts, supporting those of their American colleagues, to establish some empirical validity and reliability for their findings. Thus they tried to link the more indirect psychoanalytic measures of traits to more observable and direct measures of attitudes and opinions via the methodology of 'constructed typology'. This method also allowed them to account for more levels of individuality than Fromm's characterology had done, by expanding the notion of character to incorporate personality variables. Thus, for example, the F-Scale was designed to reveal a structure, or what in this section I have denoted a polythetic conceptual unit, made up of subsyndromes of traits that are regularly found together in the clinical situation, and that are not exclusive: authoritarian submissiveness, projectivity, conventionality, and manipulativeness. These presented the researchers with 'different profiles' of the same overall phenomenon. These profiles were interconnected by the theory and by the concept of the potentially fascist personality. In addition, the transition from one profile to another could be worked out by analysing the increase or decrease of 'some specific factors'. Hence Adorno argued that the concept of the potentially fascist personality was a dynamic one, capable of playing a role in accounting for some of the effects of social processes.

An attempt was also made, however, to relate the categories to historical data, and here it appeared that there was a tendency for moral values to be surreptitiously introduced into the research process. Thus, even on the empirical level, Adorno wrote that the discovery of 'types'
represented for him another aspect of social criticism: typology duplicates the inner logic of society which is the 'typing' of individuals. He wrote:

Our typology has to be a critical typology in the sense that it comprehends typification of men as itself a social function. (Adorno, 1950:749)

Adorno maintained that the 'ultimate principle' underlying the typologies in The Authoritarian Personality was whether a person was "standardised" and "thinks in a standardised way," i.e., whether he was a type in the strict sense of one who reflected set patterns and social mechanisms, or whether he was "truly individualised" and opposed to standardisation in the sphere of human experience. Adorno said that for the purposes of the study the latter was regarded as a type only in the formal logical sense in which such individuals are defined, from the outside, as constituting a logical class, and not in the sense of reflecting internally the 'typed' structure of society. The ideal of the 'truly individualised' or 'rational' individual - by which Adorno meant communist or socialist man - is, for Adorno, just as indefinable as the notion of 'irrational' action was for Weber. In both cases the phenomenon to be defined lies outside the scope of theory. Rational or socialist man cannot be identified in advance because, according to Marxism, he will only come into being with the coming of socialist society.
1. Adorno (1969:360) later wrote: "The Authoritarian Personality, though much criticised... was published in a fashion that did not attempt to conceal itself behind the customary facade of positivism in social science."

2. See Adorno et al (1950:744-7) for Adorno's specific criticisms of typologists, particularly E. R. Jaensch, whose book, Der Gegentypus (1938) had reported the S-type (synaesthetic) and the J-type (Nazi). Adorno wrote: "The rigidity of constructing types is itself indicative of that stereopathic mentality which belongs to the basic constituents of the potentially 'fascist' character."

3. This was also an expression used by Howard Becker (1940:17-46) in the forties to discuss 'ideal types'.

4. See Kenneth D. Bailey's article, "Constructing Monothetic and Polythetic Typologies by the Heuristic Method," (1973:291-308). There is some tendency by Bailey to polarise theoretical and empirical typology construction in this article.
CHAPTER X
THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

Horkheimer wrote in the Preface to The Authoritarian Personality that the study would investigate the type of person who seems characteristic of not just Western capitalism but of all highly industrialised societies:

The central theme of the work is a relatively new concept - the rise of an 'anthropological species' we call the authoritarian type of man. In contrast to the bigot of the older style he seems to combine the ideas and skills which are typical of a highly industrialised society with irrational or anti-rational beliefs. He is at the same time enlightened and superstitious, proud to be an individualist and in constant fear of not being like others, jealous of his independence and inclined to submit blindly to power and authority. The authors are imbued with the conviction that the sincere and systematic scientific elucidation of a phenomenon of such great historical meaning can contribute directly to an amelioration of the cultural atmosphere in which hatred breeds. (Horkheimer, 1950 :ix)

We have already noted that there was no discrete theory of authoritarianism to guide the research from the outset but that Horkheimer and Adorno did begin from a general critique of monopoly capitalism (fascism being its final stage) and an interest in the impact of anti-Semitic ideologies (which had nothing to do with the Jews) upon individuals. Since they were really attempting to examine the influence of capitalist industrialisation upon people who had to live under it, Horkheimer could write that the phenomenon they were investigating was of 'great historical meaning'. And, while the study of The Authoritarian Personality was an exploratory one which set out to examine the reciprocal relationship of ideology to personality, it is significant that the authors concentrated on one aspect of that relationship - individuals
not as producers but as *consumers* of ideologies. They were not interested in those in political control and the mechanisms of control, but in the impact of the exercise of power on the ruled: the "suffering of the world". The focus upon the consumption of ideology made personality the primary area of investigation.

Adorno wrote that the major hypothesis of the study was that:

> the political, economic and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a 'mentality' or 'spirit', and that this pattern is an expression of deeplying trends in his personality. (Adorno, 1950 :1)

The hypothesis as it stands, however, is not a genuine one for it does not deny that the convictions of individuals may not form patterns. It only states that they *often* do. The discovery of cases where the political, economic and social convictions of individuals are not patterned would not constitute a rejection of theory. In addition, the predicate of the above 'quasi-theory' is too vague to allow any establishment of evidence for or against it. In the course of the authors' discussion, however, we learn that the convictions of the fascist and not those of the anti-Fascist form a broad and coherent pattern. Finding those individuals whose convictions did not form a pattern would indicate that they were anti-Fascist.

In fact, the nature of the research was found to be such, that the story of how the patterns are made up unfolds gradually and simultaneously with the empirical investigations, as a story of 'covariation' centring on anti-Semitism. Thus, various types of behaviour which covaried with prejudiced attitudes were recounted by means of scales which measured the
potential for anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, political and economic conservatism, and implicit anti-democratic trends. Those whose pattern did not exhibit covariation of all the syndromes fell into a formal-logical category of anti-Fascism. The syndromes were, in turn, related to needs and personality traits revealed in the TAT stories and answers to projective questions. The fact that theory developed alongside empirical investigations, however, raised suspicions that a certain amount of 'ad-hoc'-ness had been introduced into the categories and scales. These, and further criticisms of the study are dealt with later in the chapter.

The above already indicates that *The Authoritarian Personality* was technically much more sophisticated than the Fromm study. Fromm had relied solely upon an extensive questionnaire administered by competent interviewers and interpreted by a team of psychoanalysts for knowledge of the way in which ideologies become interiorised within the individual. But Fromm's questionnaire is not to be underestimated. Marie Jahoda (1954:15-16) pointed out that the questionnaire used by Fromm (Appendix A) contained more than thirty items remarkably similar to items on the PEC scale of the California study, as well as some forty questions corresponding to F-scale items.

Like Fromm the authors believed that the convictions of the potential anti-Fascist could be explored as a pattern within the individual psyche. However, unlike Fromm, they set out to relate convictions to personality variables as well as to characterological syndromes. Accordingly, they sought to ascertain the force of convictions on three levels of individual 'consciousness', and the problem of measurement
became one of devising techniques to measure each level of personality and of determining the interrelations between levels and measures. They decided to survey opinions and attitudes as surface phenomena; more or less inhibited ideological trends in the personality, reaching the surface indirectly, by the more indirect measures of interview and projective tests; and, finally, the unconscious was probed in extensive clinical interviews.

Although the studies were concerned with relations among personality variables, Adorno et al wrote that some sampling of groups was necessary in order to gauge the 'significance' of the findings, and in order to identify 'anti-Semitic' types (those who had consumed or showed the most evidence of positive response to anti-Semitic ideology) in the first place. A questionnaire embodying preliminary forms of scales was initially administered to groups such as college classes. Individuals were selected for clinical studies on the basis of extreme scores ('high' or 'low') on 'anti-Semitism' or 'ethnocentrism'. The authors used the interviews as checks on the questionnaire, revising the scales several times, and readministering the questionnaires. They maintained:

progress lay in finding more and more reliable indications of the central personality forces and in showing with increasing clarity the relations of these forces to anti-democratic ideological expression. (Adorno et al, 1950:13)

Approximately 2,000 questionnaires in all were used. However, any given statistic for a particular questionnaire was only based on some portion of the 2,000 - the questionnaire was not the same for each group. The sample was predominantly middle-class, white (minorities were not included),
Christian, young, mostly living on the West Coast of the USA. Like another major study of the same period, *The Kinsey Report* (1948) the authors began with college students because of the usual reasons of limited resources, availability of respondents and limited objectives. Later, they included other groups as more money for the research was forthcoming. The full list of groups from whom questionnaires were collected is reproduced in Appendix B. They included adult members of schools, unions, church groups, Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs, as well as prison inmates and psychiatric cases. Other limitations on the study were that the subjects were all volunteers, with an average educational level above twelfth grade and not below ninth. The authors claimed that the relationships among the initial college group held up well elsewhere. But by 'elsewhere', they meant the noncollege respondents described above, which they acknowledged was not representative of the population as a whole.

The survey part of the study was severely attacked by Herbert Hyman and Paul Sheatsley (1954:50-122). Their critique is a straightforward evaluation by authors interested in the 'scientific' standing of sociology and, above all, in the precision and refinement of empirical research techniques. It is important to briefly review these criticisms here because, as we noted above, Adorno et al did seek some kind of scientific 'significance' or validity for their findings.

Hyman and Sheatsley contended that the authors did not pay enough attention to the representativeness of the samples used, even allowing for the fact that the authors had not intended to generalise to other groups or to the population as a whole. Further, the validity of the generalisations
about the same groups of people, sampled at different times was questioned. In effect, Hyman and Sheatsley raised the question of the whole nature of evidential support for theory within a pragmatist framework. They felt that factors such as the stability of the population and the stability of psychological phenomena over time, as well as the effects of constant exposure to data collection had not been sufficiently taken into account. In addition, the critics cited several studies showing that interrelationships between specific attitudes varied from sample to sample, as well as the relations between attitudes and personality functions. Further, they claimed that the authors had often arbitrarily generalised from their findings with extreme groups to the 'middle-scorers'.

With respect to the measuring instruments, the critics charged that they were not the most efficient and that their inherent weaknesses worked to confirm Adorno et al's initial assumptions. It is generally accepted that one problem of measurement is that it always introduces a degree of 'artificiality', as the phenomena to be investigated inevitably become changed by the design and technical features of the measuring instrument. Here, Hyman and Sheatsley argued that the authors had shown surprising insensitivity towards the content of their scales and the answer categories with the result that both 'high' and 'low' scorers were forced by the nature of the scales - which mainly included 'Likert-type' items - to subscribe or not to subscribe to arbitrary generalised statements. A further criticism was that, while a positive correlation between authoritarianism and political conservatism was recorded, Hyman and Sheatsley found that multi-collinearity had distorted the
quantitative figure. And finally, it was charged that in the process of constructing the authoritarianism scale, several items which had failed to correlate with anti-Semitism had been deliberately excluded, thereby inflating the value of the resultant correlation.

The Hyman and Sheatsley critique was, thus, extensive and very damaging. In sum, the critics argued that the attempt to combine survey and clinical methods was used to some disadvantage, that the techniques chosen were not the most efficient - although alternative ones are not suggested - and, finally, that the technical limitations of the study worked in favour of the authors' assumptions. In fact, Kirscht and Dillehay (1967) point out that Hyman and Sheatsley's article 'all but demolished the work'. The important point here is that the 'significance' of the more directly observable evidence which, in turn, was meant to lend support to the more speculative Freudian theories and indirect measures used in the study was definitely called into question. Hyman and Sheatsley argued that with their commitment to the 'survey', the authors had also committed themselves to the rules of its application. In this chapter, we are concerned, not with whether the authors measured up to empiricist standards, but with the nature of the biases, which are now generally recognised as contaminating their work, but which have not been raised in the context of their political philosophy as a whole. This is the task of the second part of the chapter.

To return to the study itself. The reply to the Hyman and Sheatsley critique was made by Nevitt Sanford. Sanford wrote that, while he viewed the analysis of the critics
as penetrating and permeated with goodwill, it assumed that the authors of the study were 'wedded' to the methodology of the critics. Sanford claimed:

'Exploratory study' does not mean a self-conscious 'preliminary study' or a casual free-floating observational study; but a study that goes after facts, becomes involved with data, while permitting thinking about those data, or insights derived from them, to determine the next stage of data collection...The impression is strong today that research becomes more and more design-centred - rather than content-centred - more and more conventionalised. Somebody is always taking the joy out of it. (Sanford,1956 : 265)

The central aim of the study had not been to test empirically abstract hypotheses about anti-Semitism, ethnocentricism and authoritarianism. According to the authors, sampling considerations were not vital because they were interested in establishing actual relationships between convictions and other personality variables, rather than measuring their incidence. Nonetheless consideration of the ability of the study to do the latter task seemed to be overwhelmed in the deluge of further criticisms that followed upon the Hyman and Sheatsley critique.

Kirscht and Dillehay(1967 :8) wrote that the data "have questionable relevance to the theory because of technical shortcomings", but supported Sanford in that the "insight which promoted the work" is not minimised by procedural inadequacies. Kirscht and Dillehay provide an excellent and extensive summary of the follow-up studies that ensued in America up until 1965. Many of the follow-up studies were concerned with the reliability of the measuring instruments, particularly the survey, and a whole body of literature grew up around the factor of 'response bias' or 'spuriousness', and the reliability of the 'F Scale' as a measure of authori-
tarianism. The studies dealing with response bias attempted to test how far the structure of the F Scale itself affects the responses given. This research was 'triggered off' by the fact that on the original anti-Semitism, (E) ethnocentricism, and F scales, all 'agree' answers uniformly indicated authoritarianism. Researchers feared spuriousness or results contaminated by a general tendency towards acquiescence. Kirscht and Dillehay (1967:13-29) wrote that; studies measuring acquiescence independently and correlating it with F Scale items; studies reversing the wording on the scale (in practice, virtually impossible to do satisfactorily); studies providing evidence regarding the relationship between the content of the F Scale items and acquiescence; and studies investigating other more hypothetical sources of acquiescence; came up with conflicting and confusing evidence. The studies that generally found acquiescence a contaminating factor were those reversing the scale items. These studies, however, were the most dubious because of the logical and theoretical problems involved in reversing items. The conclusion was that response bias has to be taken into account as a possible contaminating factor in all studies using the F Scale. On the other hand, they warned that this branch of research can too easily lose sight of the real issues:

the theoretical nature of authoritarianism, and overemphasise the study of questionnaire responses while neglecting the implications of authoritarian style and content. Only rarely do investigators use an obvious source of information about the meaning of responses - the subjects themselves. It is as if reliance on properties of numbers, scoring, and correlation coefficients substitutes for probing beyond the checkmark on a paper-and-pencil test/(Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967:29)
Before discussing theoretical developments, the other procedures used in the study - the clinical interviews and projective tests - are briefly outlined. They were designed to support one another and the survey, while analysing deeper conflicts within the personality.

After groups of subjects had filled out the questionnaire embodying the preliminary scales (ethnocentrism), only those obtaining extreme scores (25%-25%) at either end of the scale were selected from the different groups for intensive interview. There were equal numbers of men and women. The aim of the interview was to establish a relationship between attitudes and deeper personality needs. Since only extreme scorers were chosen, it also served as a means of evaluating the reliability of other scales and of providing estimates of other factors not accessible to the questionnaire. The main advantage of the interviews was that, because they were only partially structured, they allowed scope and freedom of expression to the person being interviewed. But this had its disadvantages, especially when it is considered that the interviewers were in possession of the respondents' questionnaire items prior to the interview. Moreover, interviewers were urged to use the responses from the survey as leads into the interview situation. This seriously raised the question of interviewer contamination of the data, and consequently the value of the interview as an independent check on the questionnaire.

Only 150 subjects were interviewed. In contrast to Fromm, who had sought to establish dynamic interrelationships of significant factors for each individual using a very comprehensive interview schedule, Adorno et al compared 'lows' and 'highs', 'unprejudiced' and 'prejudiced' on a number of
factors: family environment, images of parents, remembrances of discipline, sex, friends, values, cognitive and emotional approaches to life. Interviewers were to indirectly probe for verbal information. The findings were coded in order to give an overview of the results for each group. There were about ninety coding categories to deal with the complex multidimensional data they collected. But the coding system was constructed in full knowledge of and reference to the subject's questionnaire scores, adding further uncontrolled bias to an already biased picture. Further, the information on the rating reliability of the two interviewers was sketchy. Finally, the results of the interviews were interpreted in terms of 'Freudian psychodynamics' which, as we discuss later, because they 'fit' Adorno's original theory of anti-Semitism, again raise the question of bias.

The latter point can be illustrated by reference to the interview results. Here the interpretation of single items was often questionable. For example, prejudiced people were found to have a good opinion of themselves and their parents. This response was interpreted as an "idealisation" on the part of the respondent and labelled "self-glorification" and "conventional idealisation of parents." These labels in themselves indicate the value position of the authors in assuming reports of the prejudiced to be inaccurate. In contrast the unprejudiced counter-category is labelled, "objective appraisal." While there may be reason to doubt excessively glowing reports about parents they may be true. The authors seemed to be prejudiced in favour of the anti-Fascist, whom they thought more likely to recognise and confess to his own faults and those of his parents.
The uniformity of the results in indicating two different character syndromes, when different groups of subjects were compared, was matched by the strong dichotomy found in cognitive style. The two coding categories used by Else Frenkel-Brunswik in carrying out this analysis were, "Rigidity vs Flexibility," and "Intolerance of Ambiguity vs Tolerance of Ambiguity." Prejudiced subjects were judged more rigid and more intolerant than unprejudiced ones. The category of intolerance of ambiguity arises from the assumption that the prejudiced personality has a unity of style. Intolerance of ambiguity may initially be motivated by status anxiety and spread to other spheres of psychological action and reaction. Rigidity is used in the sense that the individual is 'walled off'. He resists new ideas. Rigidity was coded wherever intolerance of ambiguity was coded, the two attributes being treated as equivalent.

'High scorers' and 'low scorers' were distinguished on further categories of relationships with siblings, sex, people and self. In general, it was found that individually they did not exhibit all the traits but that "certain individuals seem to possess a relatively large number of either 'high' or 'low' features, while others seem to have features of both patterns, with a relatively slight prevalence of one or the other." This seems to indicate the 'polythetic' nature of the typologies. The assignment rule ranged from those who possessed all the qualities to those who possessed a 'prevalence' of the personality traits. As we discussed earlier, Fromm's assignment rule, was to select only those who possessed all the features of his character types.
Finally, other clinical procedures - the TAT (Thematic Apperception Test) and projective questions - were utilised. The TAT test was developed by H.A. Murray as an 'objective' measure where information of a 'qualitative' nature is sought. The idea behind the test is to give the individual freedom to express his inner feelings or desires, which he might not do if questioned directly. The respondent is presented with a 'thema' (most commonly in the form of pictures) which is then 'impressed' upon the individual. For example, the impression of 'dominance' may lead the subject to express 'deference' in his written or oral response to the picture. The stories produced by the individual are thought to represent his fantasied environment, his feelings about it and ways of coping with it. There are ten standard pictures.

In the Adorno study, the idea behind the use of the tests was that it would allow variables to be examined in combination, thereby obviating the necessity for measuring each variable separately. Hence, it was hoped to make an estimate of how often certain patterns of variables occur. But even here, underlying desires are not always directly accessible. The authors found it was necessary to be sensitive to cues indicating motivation denied open expression by defence mechanisms. Again the burden of interpretation and the danger of bias lay most heavily upon the researcher. The TAT tests and the projective questions were coded by a researcher and a graduate student in ignorance of the (E) Scale scores. However, the authors do not tell how well the coders agreed.

The results of both the interviews and the TAT tests were in the direction of confirming the authors' initial assumptions. With respect to the results of the TAT, they
wrote:

Although the differences can be considered as no more than trends, each variable having at least some degree of overlap between the two groups, a large percentage of our subjects demonstrate sufficient numbers of these trends so that it is possible by considering the content of the TAT to identify them as prejudiced or unprejudiced individuals. (Adorno et al., 1950:543)

The similarity of the results of the interviews to Adorno's original assumptions may be illustrated by comparing them with the early characterisation of the anti-Semite. Adorno and Horkheimer (1969:177-217) claimed in 1944 that the anti-Semite is unable to accept or face up to basic instinctual urges which he tends to repress and project. These are: fear, weakness, passivity, high sex-impulses, aggression against parents. Projection, in turn, reduces the manageability of the individual's needs and leads to stereotyped action for both release of aggression and for repression of criticism of an admired authority figure. Compare this with the 'high scorer', who typically tends to strive for power, is extremely rigid in his orientation towards life, suffers from distortions of outside reality, manifests aggression, has an inverted Oedipal attachment to his father, and forms 'mental sets' which enable him to avoid making decisions. This seems to suggest that the authoritarian exhibits the pattern of traits - now more precisely articulated, and perhaps a little less intense - that were hypothesised to make up the personality of the extreme 'pathological' type of man found in capitalist societies: the anti-Semite.

The results of the projective questions, which were analysed by Daniel Levinson also tended to confirm the authors' initial assumptions. Levinson wrote that, while most 'highs' showed most high variables and similarly for
most 'lows', there were "numerous variations on the central theme."

The total impression left by a reading of the research and analysis is one of a forcing of data to fit the theory. One is impressed by the wealth of 'uncontrolled' biases which enter the study at every stage. Perhaps, the study would have been 'improved' if, as the empiricists suggest, the authors had been trained in the techniques of social science research. But, perhaps if they had, the study would not have provided such a 'rich source of hypotheses' for the empiricists to test, nor would it have provided valuable information for this study on the 'academisation' of what emerges at times as a 'radical' Hegelian-Marxist critique. It is the refusal of Adorno, in particular, to assimilate completely that provides the contrast between the problematic of Critical Theory and that of the dominant social science framework in America.

One important consequence of the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* was the political neutralisation and personalisation of the original concept of the authoritarian, begun at the Institute in the late twenties and thirties. The decision to attempt to analyse the *empirical* or *psychological* factors, preventing the unfolding of 'subjectivity' or 'historical consciousness', followed the decision to reflect upon the categories of Marxism itself. Adorno, in attempting to justify the personalisation of the study of the authoritarian to the study of personality per se, followed Horkheimer's premis that, "ideas are the motive force of social change", and the thesis that the study of the consumption of ideas and ideologies can reveal factors inhibiting social change. Adorno held that personality is a 'product of the social environment
of the past" and could be studied as a useful source of knowledge about the force of ideology. However, he also held that personality in the present constitutes a potential for "self-initiated action," not explicable by social and economic conditions alone. But the question of the conditions under which self-initiated action would occur was not discussed. The question of the conditions under which propaganda or ideology could become so strong as to cause individuals to succumb to its appeals, the authors also confessed, has to be sought in sociological analysis of the most powerful economic groups. They did not do this in the study. They wrote that such analysis would go beyond the limits of their current study:

Historical factors or economic forces operating in our society to promote or diminish ethnic prejudice are clearly beyond the scope of our investigation.... We have not..gone into the social and economic processes that in turn determine the development of characteristic family patterns. (Adorno,1950 :972)

With Fromm's research there had still been some attempt to link psychoanalytic categories with an admittedly simplified reading of historical materialism and the Institute's critique of the ideology of German monopoly capitalism. In contrast, the Adorno study had taken its starting point from the concept of the anti-Semitic mentality as the internalisation of the ideology of 'dehumanisation' which Adorno saw at the 'final stage' of capitalism. This had nothing to do with American ideologies, except in so far as America is another capitalist country. We noted that the extreme form of 'fascist' mentality was sought out in America as if the researchers were intent upon eliminating a 'disease'. The result has been that the idea of the authoritarian as 'pathological', 'socially maladjusted', 'sick', 'schizoid', para-
noid', or 'neurotic' has always remained in the background of follow-up studies. It owes its origin to Horkheimer and Adorno's earlier position on fascism. These follow-up studies are returned to. For Horkheimer and Adorno, *The Authoritarian Personality* very definitely marked a further retreat from the realm of politics to the realm of the private and personal.

But despite this further modification of their earlier political position, and despite the fact that the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* were careful to define their terms so that they coincided with the mainstream of American social science language, when the study was published in 1950 - in a conformist intellectual climate, social stability founded on the acquiescence of the workers, and Cold War abroad - they were immediately attacked for their *Marxism* and for confining their study to 'authoritarianism of the right'. The basic problem was that the F Scale was non-unitary. They had tried to cover both Fascist potential and authoritarianism in general with the one scale. Authoritarianism, presumably can be of the 'left' or the 'right'. Thus, Shils (1954:28) straight away criticised the authors for failing to give an adequate account of the 'authoritarians of the left' - the 'rigid low scorers' - on the items of prejudice. According to Shils, the outmoded unilinear continuum of 'rightism-leftism' led them to concentrate upon authoritarianism as a phenomenon of the 'right'. Shils charged that where the authors did pick up rigidity in the scoring of the 'left' or 'democrats', they introduced *ad hoc* explanatory concepts like pseudo-democrat or pseudo-conservative in order to confirm their original (Marxist) precon-
PART III

MAX HORKHEIMER and T. W. ADORNO
ceptions.

However, Shils himself was caught up in events of the Cold War and the 'end of ideology debate', and sought only to argue that because of similarities which he had observed - also in a study of this period - between communist and fascist industrial societies, the personality structures existing in both political types of society must be similar. Shils urged revision of the F Scale to take account of 'authoritarianism of the left'.

Sanford (1956:264) attempted to defend the study. He argued that the pseudo-conservative category arose legitimately from a study that was by its very nature exploratory and, therefore inductively oriented. (There seems to be no valid reason why exploratory study should necessarily imply induction.) Sanford claimed that the concept of the authoritarian had been arrived at, not at the outset, but at the conclusion of the research, thereby stressing the more 'ad hoc' aspects of the concept. Almond (1953), however, also criticised the Marxist biases which permeated the whole work.

Later S. M. Lipset (1961) attempted to apply the F Scale in a study of 'working class' authoritarianism. Lipset's article, typical of the 'end of ideology' school became subject to the criticism of the critics of the 'end of ideology'. Lipset found that the working class seemed to exhibit more intolerant, tough-minded, and authoritarian attitudes than the middle class. This study was criticised by Miller and Riessman, again on ideological grounds. They wrote:

The metaphysical pathos of Lipset's work seems to be that of the desirability of what might be termed 'progressive moderation' in a period that he believes to be marked by the fortunate end of ideology.

(Miller and Riessman, 1961:273)
Miller and Riessman found the F Scale applicable only to the middle-class and urged that the description, interpretation and evaluation of working-class life should be developed within a more comprehensive framework.

Subsequently, numerous attempts were made to neutralise the F Scale, the most notable of which was that of Rokeach (1960). Initially, Rokeach introduced the notion of 'dogmatism' as a theoretical category underlying the complex of attitudes and values of the authoritarian syndrome. The latter, he wrote, can ever in itself be politically neutral. He viewed dogmatism as defined by the manner in which the dogmatist answers questions, because of his particular psychic structure. The content of the answers was not important to Rokeach. While it would seem that intensive interviews and participant observation would be more suited to Rokeach's problem, he too opted for survey methods. He, therefore, tried to identify dogmatism indirectly and did not avoid the problems of Adorno et al but introduced new ones. Rokeach's main problem was that he did not have a systematic theory on which to base choice of items for his D Scale. He used some items from the F Scale, eliminating those which selected 'right extremes' and introducing some new items of his own. However, it can be argued that the new items were specifically designed to 'catch' left-extremes, for example, the item, "Most people are failures and the system is responsible," or the item, "Best government is democracy run by the most intelligent." Rokeach claimed to be able to demonstrate dogmatism of the 'right' and of the 'left' with the new scale. Earlier, Eysenck (1954) had found both fascists and communists to be authoritarian with his 'tough' and 'tender-minded' scale.
The logic of the above approaches is questionable. It is suggested that the inclusion of items to identify 'authoritarianism of the left' does not neutralise the scale. It does not eliminate ideological content. On the contrary, it introduces new biases. It would seem that the exclusion of those questions containing extreme 'right-wing' bias should have been sufficient to eliminate political content. The rationale behind these studies seems to have been that, since it is known 'quasi-empirically' (without concrete empirical evidence), that communists are authoritarians, then only a scale which shows communists as well as fascists to be authoritarian is ideologically neutral.

But despite American criticisms of its Marxist ideological biases, the Marxism that informed the study of The Authoritarian Personality was a Marxism that had temporarily set on one side its dialectical and revolutionary rhetorical thrust. It was still a Marxism that had questioned the applicability of Marx's categories to contemporary conditions of production, yet it had not been able to provide an alternative theory of the social relations of production. Instead, in the climate of conformity and progressive 'scientisation' of the sociological and psychological enterprises, the Critical Theorists had devoted themselves to an exploration of society as it is shaped within the individual mind.

Follow-up studies on 'authoritarianism', which blossomed in psychological journals were illustrative of the extent to which technical development had become central. The study had provided a rich source of empirical hypotheses and had the unintended consequence - so it seems in retrospect - of promoting a large volume of work almost entirely concerned
with technical perfection, at the unfortunate expense of further theoretical sophistication.

Despite technical naivety, however, on the level of psychology, the general relationship postulated between personality variables seems to have been acceptable. Roger Brown wrote:

On the level of covariation, of one variable correlated with another, the findings of *The Authoritarian Personality* seem to be quite well established. Anti-Semitism goes with ethnocentrism goes with anti-intraception goes with idealisation of parents and self goes with authoritarian discipline in childhood goes with a rigid conception of sex roles, etc. Two of the presumptive correlates are not well-established: status-concern or marginality...

(Brown, 1965: 525)

The implication following on from acceptance that covariation and, thus, relations between methods were established in the study, is that psychoanalytic categories do lend themselves to more quantitative and directly measurable hypotheses. Adorno's own claim was not immodest in this respect. Adorno wrote:

What is essential is not that which is measured but the development of methods, which, after being improved, permit measurement to take place in areas where this had hardly been possible before. Since that time, surely not without the influence of *The Authoritarian Personality* people have often tried to test psychoanalytic theorems by empirical methods.

(Adorno, 1969:362)

The contribution of the study to the theory of authoritarianism is not quite so clear. As technical precision increased, the questions asked in the follow-up studies became increasingly irrelevant to understanding authoritarian behaviour within American society. 'Authoritarianism' in this atmosphere, unlike the atmosphere of the political philosophy that had nurtured it as the'ideology of dehumanisation', came to be regarded as a neutral sociological and quasi-biological
concept, divorced from history and social and economic events.

The tendency of some interpreters of *The Authoritarian Personality* to render the concept of the 'authoritarian' politically neutral was matched by the attempts of others to reduce it to a psychological variable. This reduction to psychology was accompanied by attributing pathological qualities to the concept and designating it as the description of an *extreme* form of behaviour. In many studies the authoritarian is described negatively as belonging to some peripheral social category, such as fascist, racist and later communist. In comparison to the rest of society, which is perceived as democratic and integrated, the authoritarian is perceived as anti-democratic, unsuccessful, sick, maladjusted or, in other words the incarnation of what an 'idealised' society is not.

But the attempts in follow-up studies to identify the authoritarian concretely as pathological failed. Kirscht and Dillehay note:

> On neither absolute nor relative grounds can authoritarian persons be characterised empirically as more (or less) pathological...Generally, the student of authoritarianism thinks of it as maladjustive but more rigorous research (and sampling) is required to verify this assumption. (Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967:53-4)

The results of research carried out over a twenty year period have not brought any evidence forward to show that the 'authoritarian' is a pathological type, yet the 'authoritarian' is still regarded by many as 'sick' or 'maladjusted'. Stozky (1955) in an analysis of the authoritarian personality as a stereotype concluded that students tended to regard the 'authoritarian' as more neurotic than the average personality, even though no significant psycho-pathological correlates have been discovered.
From an interpretative standpoint, the 'authoritarian' is often judged 'abnormal' or 'sick', when measured against ideal norms and values. He does not, in terms of the values of Americans, correspond with what the ideal democrat should be or, in terms of Adorno's political philosophy, with what socialist man should look like. Yet, when sought empirically, statistical analysis reveals the authoritarian personality type in the 'average citizen'.

Fromm's earlier study of authoritarianism had sought to understand authoritarian structures within the type of man, he hypothesised as best adapted to monopoly capitalism. Fromm had been interested in the discrepancies between this 'type' of man and 'socialist man', or the discrepancy between the proletariat as an agent of revolutionary change and the new industrial masses labouring under an ideology which had been designed to influence them in a certain way. Fromm believed that this new type of 'mass man' found, primarily, not just material, but psychological gratification, under the new form of industrial society in Germany. Fromm and Horkheimer in _Autorität und Familie_ (1936) emphasised the socialisation process as a transmitter of ideological appeals with the family and other social institutions acting as mediators. Fromm had tended to emphasise the family to a greater extent than Horkheimer. We noted this made his historico-social analyses less convincing⁴. The authors had noted that past and present socialisation processes are important in pinpointing individuals whose behaviour appears adaptive to institutional structures.

Behind the American study, in contrast, is a critique of the mentality fostered by the highest development of
capitalist repression in the institutional structure of the total-authoritarian state. Moreover, this structure is not analysed but hypothesised as an essence in order to assess its repressive aspects for those who have to live under it. From this point of view, its essence is the 'mystification' of the real interests underlying the institutional structure, which enables those in power to manipulate the others. The view here is that the Fascist contains the total repression of Enlightenment or liberal cultural forms within him and that he perpetuates these repressive forces by constructing the world in his own image - the stress is not on adaptation of the healthy individual and socialisation processes, but on the projections of the prejudiced. In The Authoritarian Personality, it is hypothesised that the repressions of the prejudice find their release in sex and aggression.

Accordingly, Adorno et al payed far less attention to intra-familial socialisation processes than did Fromm. The new syndrome, reported as the authoritarian syndrome in The Authoritarian Personality was explained by reference to Freud's ideas about the resolution of Oedipal conflicts transforming aggression against the father into masochistic submission and sadistic exploitation. Adorno wrote:

The subject achieves his own social adjustment only by taking pleasure in obedience and subordination. This brings into play the sadomasochistic impulse. The pattern for the translations of such gratifications into character traits is a specific resolution of the Oedipus complex...In the psychodynamics of 'the authoritarian character' part of the preceding aggressiveness is absorbed and turned into masochism, while another part is left over as sadism, which seeks an outlet in those with whom the subject does not identify himself...The Jew frequently becomes a substitute for the hated father.

(Adorno, 1950: 759)
Although Adorno retains two of Fromm's characterological categories - authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression - in the F Scale, we noted that Fromm had discarded Oedipal theory as fundamental to an understanding of the 'authoritarian character'. While Fromm had also been unhappy with Freud's libidinal theory, Adorno sought to establish projection, anti-Semitism, and stereotypy in libidinous sources. Adorno did, however, recognise the importance of extra-familial socialisation processes upon the development of personality. Horkheimer had already emphasised the 'crisis' of the family and the importance of agencies of the state in strengthening the weakened structure of the family. But the analysis of the socialising agencies of the state and society which this insight implied necessary was not performed in Adorno et al's study. This 'vacuum' is reflected in the literature which followed the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*. There was little discussion of social structure or socialisation processes, despite the fact that the authoritarian personality was hypothesised as a mediating variable between social processes and the potential fascist. American social structure and politics tended to remain vaguely 'repressive'.

Today, the concept of 'authoritarianism' as a form of extreme behaviour, in the form it took in the fifties in America, seems obsolete. Explanation tended to be reduced to covariation among personality variables. In addition, the sociological side of Adorno's explanation appears to be 'thin'. *The Authoritarian Personality* read in the light of the earlier essay on anti-Semitism leaves us with an Hegelian-Marxist critique of the 'essence' of modern capitalism as a starting
point. Adorno et al did not provide a historical critique of American society (for reasons already given). Instead illiberal structures, while not identified and analysed are assumed by the authors to exist. Moreover, the non-unitary nature of the psychological concept of the authoritarian which embodies both authoritarian elements - in the sense of those influences from institutional structures present in 'premodern' or 'premass' societies - and totalitarian influences from modern institutional forms and movements, makes it difficult to specify a concept of general authoritarianism from personality variables and correlates.

In sum, the discussion of The Authoritarian Personality has meant to indicate that where attempts to 'demystify' what 'society' says it expects, for example, in today's society, the work ethic, performance, going through the right channels, accepting law and order, it is possible to explain or to suggest ways of explaining the 'real reasons' why people fulfill certain expectations. But, one must also be alert to the fact that 'demystifications' are generally not without specific mystifications of their own. This is especially the case where historical material is introduced into the argument. The particular attempt of Adorno and Horkheimer to give an account of social complexity and the individual subject, as two separate and irreconcilable realities locked in the dialectic of history is not without the biases peculiar to their political philosophy, which has already been discussed. Thus, while Adorno attempts to offer a psychology of politics, the theory expressed in The Authoritarian Personality seems to reduce to a warning about the elements of fascist ideology manifest in the observable personality syndrome of prejudice,
rigidity, stereotypy, projection, submissiveness and conservatism based on repression of primitive urges.

1. It was found that low scores exhibited a disorder syndrome associated with rigidity, stereotypy, projection, submissiveness and conservatism based on repression of primitive urges.

2. The dichotomy between 'bright' and 'dim' on rigidity was as follows:

- **RIGIDITY**
  - intolerance of ambiguity
  - pseudoscientific
  - rigidity

- **LOW SCORES**
  - flexibility
  - tolerance of ambiguity
  - scientific-skeptical

This corresponded with the subject's appraisal of parents.

- **FEELINGS OF VICTIMIZATION**
  - submissive out of fear
  - dependence for things
  - manipulative relationship
  - regard family as 'in-group'
  - image of father: stern
  - denial of parental conflict
  - image of mother: sacrificing, kind, submissive
  - harsh discipline

3. While [1947] wrote that, "the entire tone of investigative proceedings as it there were an entirely scale of political and social attitudes at the extreme right of which people the... fascist... and at the other end that the authors call the complete democracy who... actually holds the views of the con...

4. See chapter 4 of the thesis.
NOTES

1. It was found that 'low' scorers exhibited a character syndrome associated with: active ego, low aggressiveness, willingness to face up to ambivalence, normal Oedipal relationship, internalisation of norms and values of society, strong ego, realistic orientations, and little concern with ill-health. High scorers were found to show more liking for behaviour associated with the character syndrome of: anality, ego dependency, manifestations of aggression, inability to cope with ambivalence or indecision, inverted Oedipal attachment to the father, externalisation of the superego, weak ego, repressed instinctual tendencies leading to distortions of outside reality and concern with symptoms of ill-health.

2. The dichotomy between 'highs' and 'lows' on rigidity was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIGH SCORERS</th>
<th>LOW SCORERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rigidity</td>
<td>flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intolerance of ambiguity</td>
<td>tolerance of ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pseudoscientific</td>
<td>scientific-naturalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suggestibility</td>
<td>autonomy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This corresponded with the subject's appraisal of parents:

idealisation of parents

feelings of victimisation

submission out of fear

dependence for things - manipulative relationship

regards family as 'in-group'

image of father: stern

denial of parental conflict

image of mother: sacrificing, kind, submissive

harsh discipline

objective appraisal of parents

genuine positive affect to parents

principled independence

dependence for love

family composed of individuals

image of father: relaxed and mild

verbalisation of parental conflict

image of mother: loving, understanding

assimilation of principles

3. Shils (1954:28) wrote that, "The entire team of investigators proceeds as if there were an unilinear scale of political and social attitudes at the extreme right of which stands the Fascist... and at the other end what the authors call the complete democrat who... actually holds the views of the non-Stalinist Leninist.

4. See chapter 4 of the thesis.
CONCLUSIONS

In the course of this dissertation, we have covered a lot of ground and reached conclusions in several areas. First, we have not only looked at the individual backgrounds of the authors, but have explored their work in the context of the intellectual community to which they belonged and of the public they were addressing. In doing so, we have considered their position in the social and political structures at Weimar Germany and the United States and attempted to assess the influence of the latter on their research. Secondly, we were not only interested in locating the writers within their intellectual and social milieu, but in examining the influence of the latter on the kind of research they proposed and the theory which informed it. The detailed exploration of Part II and Part III of this thesis was accompanied by this effort to uncover what is sociological in their work, as well as the kind of intellectual frameworks only other within which to understand current sociology and sociological formations.

In examining Nietzsche's, Husserl's and Peirce's potential intellectual and social milieu, it was suggested that the notion of the 'insider as outsider' or the 'latent outsider', used by Peter Gay (1999: 411-97) in his analysis of the transformation of German Philosophy in Weimar Germany, was very significant here. Thus, although it is true that intellectually they were not outsiders in that their work forms part of the continuum of
CONCLUSIONS

In the course of this discussion, we have covered a lot of ground and reached conclusions in several areas. First, we have not only looked at the individual backgrounds of the authors, but have examined their work in the context of the intellectual community to which they belonged and of the publics they were addressing. Moreover, we have considered their position in the social and political structure of Weimar Germany and the United States and attempted to assess the influence of the latter on their research. Secondly, we were not only interested in locating the writers within their intellectual and social milieu, but in examining the influence of the latter on the kind of research they produced and the theory which informed it. The detailed exposition of Part II and Part III of the thesis was necessitated both by this, and an attempt to uncover what is sociological in their work, as well as the kind of critical framework they offer within which to understand current society and social formations.

In examining Horkheimer, Adorno and Fromm's personal, intellectual and social milieux, it was suggested that the notion of the 'insider as outsider' or that of the 'relative outsider', used by Peter Gay (1969:11-93) in his analysis of the transplantation of German philosophy in America consequent upon the 'German emigration', is very revealing here. Thus, although it is true that intellectually they were not outsiders in that their work forms part of the mainstream of
the diversity of intellectual products characteristic of Weimar, what was found was that Horkheimer, Adorno and Fromm were relative outsiders in social and political life.

They were Marxist and Jewish; but this wasn't what made them outsiders, since the evidence to show that they felt social and intellectual discrimination on these grounds in Germany appeared to be weak. It was found, upon examination of other aspects of their milieu and their personal backgrounds, that their position as 'outsiders' was one brought into being by 'privilege' and dependent upon the elite position which privilege grants rather than the fact that they felt in any sense social marginals or 'outcastes'. Thus, they were all of wealthy middle-class families. This meant in many cases, that they could afford to enjoy the life of a 'scholar of independent means'. Contemporary historical evidence was cited to show that the intellectuals in Weimar Germany - if low on power - still held well-paid positions which carried a large amount of social prestige. They formed, so to speak, a small elite - a society apart, within the rigidly stratified German social system. In this respect, it was suggested that, although the scholars at Frankfurt were very definitely insiders in German society, they were separated from all other social groups and their material and political struggles. They were untouched by the "suffering of the world," which the millionaire Hermann Weil had endowed the Institute to examine, and which Gummiar and Ringguth(1973:7) noted continually concerned Horkheimer from the time he spent as manager in his father's factory to the end of his intellectual career. Protest about the injustices of the world, mixed with a
guilt that had a certain distant quality, were the early impetuses to Horkheimer's work, as this extract from a letter written by the young Horkheimer to a nephew of his relates:

> Who complains about suffering? You and I? - We are cannibals, who complain that the slaughtered meat gives us belly-ache. No - no, much worse: You enjoy peace and property, for which those outside choke, bleed to death, roll up in pain and endure the inner consequences of terrible fates...You sleep in beds and wear clothes, the manufacture of which we coerce from the hungry with the tyrant's whip of our money; and you do not know how many women have fallen by the machine for the production of material for your 'cut'. Others burn alive by full consciousness on poisonous gasses in order that your father does not lose the money with which you pay for your therapy and you find it terrible that you cannot read more than two pages of Dostoyevsky. We are monsters, yet we are punished too little. It is quite comical, as if the butcher in the slaughterhouse were to complain that his white apron were bloodstained. (Horkheimer quoted by Gummior and Ringguth, 1973:7-9)

A social philosophy built upon the recognition that there is something fundamentally wrong with current forms of social organisation is the lasting contribution of Critical Theory.

As the above quotation indicates, Horkheimer - and this is true of Adorno and Fromm - did not identify with the commercial interests of their fathers, who were all wealthy merchants and manufacturers. Their opposition was expressed in the medium they - as an educated stratum - knew best: the written word. We noted that very early in his academic career, Horkheimer was to express the view that "ideas form the motive force of social change:" that the expression of opposition can influence the direction taken by society.

As intellectuals, the scholars at Frankfurt can again only be described as an elite - their privately endowed research institute left them completely free from teaching and other duties, despite the official affiliation with Frankfurt University, and thus able to pursue their own
academic interests. This separated them slightly from other academics. But this gulf was not nearly as great as that between the intellectuals and other social classes, which we noted above.

The intellectual climate of the Weimar Republic seemed to allow complete freedom of expression - except for those who had openly denounced the clandestine German rearmament program - and even unpopular views were tolerated and attracted small followings. It is therefore not surprising that within this atmosphere of 'intellectual pluralism', the idea of studying the thought of Marx as an academic subject should not only have occurred but come to fruition, particularly where the reasons why 'practical activity' had not 'gripped the masses' was a pressing problem for Marxists.

It was pointed out that the Institute was the first of its kind in Germany to pursue Marxism as a respectable academic subject. While some of the original founding members like Karl Wittfogel did have party affiliations, by the thirties most had given up their original party memberships, and there is no evidence to suggest that any of the 'core' members of the Institute, under Horkheimer's directorship, were at all politically active. In fact, it was noted that for men like Korsch and Wittfogel, political activity seemed to be a 'disqualifier', in the one case for Institute membership, and, in the other for joining the 'inner core' of Critical Theorists.

Further, the idea of studying Marx academically had its intellectual roots in a tradition, which Merleau-Ponty called Western Marxism in order to distinguish it from Marxism as it developed in Russia. It was suggested that this tradition
influenced the Frankfurt Institute and its following through the philosophical or Hegelian interpretations of Marx by Karl Korsch and Georg Lukacs. Concerned initially with the failure of the proletarian revolution in Europe, and later with the appeal of mass Fascist movements, this brand of Marxism turned inwards to examine the very roots of Marx's thought, in order to tackle the substantive Marxist problem of the discrepancy between 'empirical consciousness' and 'historical consciousness' of the proletariat.

Carl Grünberg, the Institute's first director, had given the Institute a firm foundation in solid, scholarly, materialist studies, but it was the philosophical and theoretical rereading of Marx that influenced the younger men and that was to be stressed by Max Horkheimer after he had succeeded Grünberg to the directorship.

But in stressing a Hegelian re-examination of Marxist theory, the Frankfurt scholars stood on the margins of Marx interpretation. They were 'relative outsiders' in the debates about practical political activity that were going on elsewhere. For while, they were quite definitely against the 'bourgeois' and the commercialism of capitalist society, and while they protested about the human suffering which they saw as the inevitable consequence of capitalist development, there was no political movement they felt they could align themselves with in order to bring about change. Although the idea of a more 'rational' or socialist society was appealing, they felt they could neither support the reformism of the majority socialist party - the Social Democrats - nor the Russian way to socialism of the Third International.

Moreover, by the mid-thirties, when the decision had to be made
to leave Germany, they chose to make their home in the USA rather than in Russia. Up until that time, the Frankfurt scholars formed part of the intellectual fringe of European Marxism, providing the rhetoric with which to denounce the dehumanisation of capitalist bureaucratic organisational forms and the exploitative interests underlying the capitalist system as a whole.

But in leaving Germany, the Frankfurt scholars had to relinquish their participation in what had been a period of cultural creativity in the German Republic. Hence, the way in which the Frankfurt scholars were to attempt, in isolation, in America, to preserve the 'high culture' to which they had belonged, was to make their association with Marxism an unusual one. In Weimar, they had been very definitely a part of all that was modern in art and literature. For example, we noted Adorno's early interest in avant-garde music and his lasting interest in aesthetics; the Institute's first building was a 'Bauhaus' design; the new aphoristic form of writing of Walter Benjamin was applauded; and the 'fragmented' and essay forms of writing were experimented with. With respect to Weimar 'high culture', the scholars at Frankfurt were unequivocally insiders. If their rhetoric denounced the politics of the 'bourgeois', it was nevertheless the culture of bourgeois society of Weimar - which had given them complete freedom of expression in all spheres - that they wanted to preserve against the inroads of 'mass culture' spread by the mass media, and fostered by a kind of society which they believed was becoming progressively more and more inhuman.

We suggested, further, that the emigration years spent in America by Horkheimer and Adorno provide additional evidence
of their allegiance to the 'high culture' of Weimar, an allegiance which they never betrayed. Their use of German as their cultural means of expression rather than English and their criticisms of American culture - especially Adorno's music critique bear witness to this fact. The maintenance of this cultural heritage within their own small community of scholars in the US also helped to keep alive the 'other Germany' in contrast to all that was happening under the Nazis. It meant, however, that they never fully participated in American cultural life.

Another factor that made their association with Marxism an unusual one was their link with another modern movement - psychoanalysis. Erich Fromm's connection with the Institute in the thirties was important in this regard. His work also supplemented their attempt to read Marxism as 'ideology critique' in the context of twentieth century capitalist industrialisation.

Horkheimer and Adorno felt more uncomfortable socially in America as Marxists and Jews than they had in Weimar. Accordingly, they accommodated themselves to the expectations of American society, of which they never really felt a part, by maintaining socially a 'low profile' and by diluting the implications of their post-Marx writings. We noted that, especially after the Stalin-Hitler pact, Horkheimer warned Adorno about the use of Marxist expressions in their written work. And the terminology in Institute articles was changed to 'fit in' with the norms of their host country: 'democracy' came to be used for 'socialism'; 'rational society' for 'soci­alist society'; and the Marxist problem of 'subjectivity' by the problem of identifying the 'potential Fascist' in American
social life. This may have helped them to survive the McCarthy period. Additionally, Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of the 'mechanisation' of Marxism, as well as their existential judgement on the repressiveness of capitalist industrial civilisation in general, were written in German. Recently, of course, Marxist questions have become acceptable topics of discussion in America. Peter Hamilton (1974), for example, has discussed the 'mechanisation of Marxism' within a sociology of knowledge framework and Neil McInnes (1972) capitalist industrial repression, in the context of an examination of the 'remystification' of Marx. But in the forties and fifties, the working out of Western Marxism, in America, within the framework of Critical Theory was slowed down by the necessity to maintain not only nonparticipation in but intellectual distance from social and political events in that country. Horkheimer and Adorno never formulated a specific critique of American capitalism.

In order to work out the theoretical implications of Marxism as Critical Theory, Horkheimer and Adorno preferred to remain outsiders as far as the more pragmatically inclined social and philosophical community in America was concerned. The main area where Horkheimer and Adorno did effect a brief and limited integration into American academia - perhaps even to their own surprise - was in the new area of social psychology. In a society were rapid technological development had meant high mobility, bringing with it social and psychological instability, psychoanalysis was widely practiced and discussed. While Erich Fromm left the Institute to turn to clinical practice for a while, Horkheimer and Adorno found that their psychoanalytic orientation provided common ground upon which
they could cooperate with American social psychologists and sociologists - the result of which was the study, *The Authoritarian Personality*.

To turn now to the actual research. Here the findings of the thesis relate to the way in which value judgements covertly enter into 'statements of fact', and are incorporated into a given body of sociological knowledge.

An examination of the consequences of Horkheimer's attempt to arrive at a social philosophy that would both give impetus to the social sciences and remain flexible to the findings of these sciences seemed interesting. It was thought that such a social philosophy would presumably incorporate those aspects of Marxian thought judged to be ideologically admirable. But in addition, it would involve modification and development of Marx's social theories. It was found that Critical Theory, like Marxism, while not sociology does contain theories about men in society.

Horkheimer's program as a whole was viewed not only as social philosophy but as a genus of *political philosophy*. This political philosophy is atypical in the sense that it contains not an ideological call to action - as in the case of Marxism, Liberalism or Conservatism - and a specification of the agents of revolution, reform or conservation, their strategies and programs, but a political *rhetoric* containing concepts and phrases in terms of which certain institutions and practices are defended or justified and others attacked. The rhetoric seems to be a political remnant consequent upon the intellectualisation of Marxism. It rests, itself, on an articulation of *ideals* or criteria by means of which the theorists judge men and events, assess the present state of
society and the direction society may be moving in.

Horkheimer and Adorno's views on this matter were practically inseparable, especially after the emigration to America where they dictated papers together. But Fromm differed from Horkheimer and Adorno on several points. This affected his accommodation to the dominant theoretical perspective and political rhetoric within this close-knit intellectual community, and the theories of man and society he produced. While Horkheimer and Fromm were fairly close in the late twenties/early thirties, it soon became clear that Horkheimer's political philosophy, expressing similar ideals, was somewhat more pessimistic about the possibilities in current forms of society for achieving them than the more optimistic socialist humanism of Erich Fromm. The social theories developed by Horkheimer are social criticisms which often take the form of 'ideology critique'.

Parts II and III contained detailed exposition and examination of the work of Fromm and Horkheimer respectively, the aim of which was to dissect out, and then evaluate, the basic elements of their political philosophies. The primary findings were as follows. First, Fromm's orientation was seen to be basically humanist, and an attempt was made to specify the particular humanist philosophy which guided his reading of Marx and Freud. Here, Fromm's efforts to approach what Alfred Schmidt described as the 'real humanism' of Marx were defended against non-Marxist critics like John H. Schaar who want to interpret Fromm as a 'naturalist'. It was argued that there was some confusion about the terms 'humanism' and 'naturalism', and that what Fromm had meant by them could only be understood
within the context of the general humanist Hegelian-Marxism which had dominated the Institute's work after 1930. Accordingly, Fromm's theory of 'human nature' or the 'essence of man' and his 'naturalist' methodology or epistemology were spelled out in these terms.

The evidence of Fromm's writings on human nature, taken together with relevant sections of the thesis, dealing with Horkheimer's views, supported Martin Jay's contention that the scholars at Frankfurt shared Marx's critique of the 'abstract humanism' of Feuerbach. Further evidence also supported Schmidt's view that Horkheimer and Adorno were actually nearer to the 'real humanism' of Marx than Fromm, because they repudiated what they saw as a static philosophical anthropology underlying Fromm's categories. Fromm's anthropomorphism is even clearer in his later work where he argues from the fact that, because there may be something that commonly defines human nature in physiological terms, i.e., a 'physiological human nature', there must be a 'psychological human nature'. Moreover, Fromm then appeared to make another logical leap from knowledge of man's psychological nature to claims about man's social and moral nature. However, these are only assumptions, and ones that were questioned by Horkheimer and Adorno.

Horkheimer strongly argued for a notion of substantive historical truth which would avoid the almost inevitable anthropomorphism in the study of man. He believed that stressing man's becoming rather than his being was the key to this. Fromm's anthropomorphism was, therefore anathema to Horkheimer and Adorno, because they thought it reduced human nature to a metaphysical category of 'being', to an 'essence'.
Horkheimer and Adorno were afraid that this would lead not to liberation for men, but to other forms of domination by nature, since they contended that nature cannot be regarded merely as a social category. Nature is itself autonomous, and therefore lies beyond the control of men. Horkheimer and Adorno believed that in labour man changes or humanises nature but does not create it. At the same time, man changes his own nature. Nature is thus both autonomous and social.

Horkheimer wrote:

The human being, in the process of his emancipation shares the fate of the rest of the world. Domination of nature involves domination of man. Each subject not only has to take part in the subjugation of external nature, human and nonhuman, but in order to do so must subjugate nature in himself. Domination becomes 'internalised' for domination's sake.

(Horkheimer, 1947:93)

This basic assumption - that man can never free himself completely from all forms of domination - is continually returned to by Horkheimer and Adorno. Thus, they could not join Fromm in positing dealienated man as a concrete possibility inherent in the nature of man, and there is very little in their work on 'alienated man' - a concept central to Fromm. Adorno could not foresee a world entirely free of capitalist reification and alienation.

The discussion of the nature of man, it was then argued, has to be seen as guiding the attempt of Hegelian Marxists to ground debate on 'man's consciousness of himself' in his 'historical becoming', in factors extraneous to historical materialism. Horkheimer convincingly rejects the eternal truth of materialism by arguing that while historical materialism had some validity for the period in which it was formulated, the phenomena it applied to have changed and no longer exist in their old form. Thus a new theory is required for
modern period, where, although material conditions fundamentally determine relations among men, political factors and other ideational forces appear to have a determining influence of their own. Here, we found that Horkheimer read the materialism of Marx as a dialectical theory of the world as a whole. Also Horkheimer sought in following the efforts of the political 'outsiders', Lukacs and Korsch, to link the Marxist theory of the effects of the general underlying and determining structure of exchange relations upon 'class consciousness', with the content of a 'differentiated reality'. For Horkheimer this differentiated reality encompassed more than social and historical forces and thereby went beyond the theories of Lukacs and Korsch. In his program for the Institute, Horkheimer expressed his aim to promote research designed to account for the historical or dialectical movement between society (or the activity of concrete men) and nature (or the concrete totality - as opposed to any metaphysical concept of the whole), which also has a separate dialectical movement. Horkheimer wanted to account for all aspects of the societal, cultural and natural conditions in which men live and work.

It was therefore suggested that in Horkheimer's reading of Marx - and this goes for Adorno and Fromm too - there is a continuation of the confrontation between humanism and historical determination taken up from Marx's early writings. The Institute's economic analyses, particularly those of Friedrich Pollock, were used as evidence in support of the theory that the characteristics of the substructure are often highly overlaid and concealed by those of the superstructure. Thus, an attempt was made to rescue 'man' from the abstrac-
tion he threatened to become in deterministic theories of one kind or another.

But the flexibility of explanation that Horkheimer won. by the distinction of levels in the totality and the interplay of factors of the superstructure and their separate force on the development of historical consciousness, had its drawback in a loss of theoretical simplicity. The more complex theoretical formulations of the Critical Theorists never gained popularity among Marxists - possibly because complex theories tend to lose out among competing theories, unless the explanatory power of the theory and the range of phenomena the theory can cover is tremendously increased. More important than this, however, is the fact that Marxists expect theory to provide an explicit ideology. They did not find this in Critical Theory. Horkheimer had sought to provide not an ideology but a theory that would explain the phenomenon of monopoly capitalism. A Critical Materialism (Schmidt, 1971:41)\(^2\) as described above, seemed to accomplish this

In Fromm's case it was noted that the fact of interaction between substructural and superstructural levels is treated as a theoretical given. Fromm uses Marx's model as a heuristic device in order to show how emotions, wishes and other non-rational urges can prevent, modify or supplement the impact of ideological forces. The 'subjectivity' of the proletariat is assumed - in contrast to Lukacs' protestations to the contrary\(^3\) - to have two dimensions; a philosophical-historical one and a psychological-empirical one. Psychological forces are also postulated as determining forces. They act internally to modify or further economic interests by channelling the impact of class-based ideologies upon individuals. This
is what Fromm meant by saying that psychological forces are a part of the substructure.

In addition, Fromm believed that psychoanalysis interpreted as a science of the 'psyche', could supplement historical materialism by providing systematic knowledge of the psychological mechanisms operating below the level of human consciousness. Thus, Fromm 'reinterprets' psychoanalytic theories to explain how mechanisms in the unconscious work to resolve deeplying conflicts between instinctual, or in his later theory, socio-biological strivings and social influences.

Like Fromm, Horkheimer and Adorno believed that psychoanalysis could supplement Marxism. However, they thought it could do this not just at the level of the particular theory of historical materialism but at all levels of the historical totality. In attempting to understand the dialectical 'interpenetration of man and nature', Horkheimer and Adorno turned, not to a 'scientific' reading of Freud, but to what might be called his metapsychology. These more speculative theories of Freud are concerned with what gives life processes their direction. The notions of regression and repetition compulsion, which Horkheimer and Adorno found fundamental here, are based on this later work of Freud. Horkheimer and Adorno were interested in the notion of the development of civilisation as a whole, out of a response to generic man's primaeval fear of an external and threatening nature. They wrote that man's underlying fear of hostile nature persists because nature always remains beyond man's total mastery. The development of civilisation is viewed by Horkheimer and Adorno as arising out of the struggle of man with nature, described by Marx, which is 'crystallised' in the form of the Ego, described by
Freud. This development of man's rational control, located psychologically in the Ego, and bought at the expense of instinctual repression, threatens continually to break down releasing 'uncontrolled aggression'.

As a result, Horkheimer and Adorno's message for modern man is more pessimistic than that of Fromm, for man is never completely free from the determinations of nature, which lie beyond his control. Secondly, this theory implies that the 'subject' of history is not determined to the same extent by historical or socio-economic factors. Because determination of historical consciousness becomes more complex, the individual gains in autonomy. It seems that this autonomy is not 'true autonomy', however, but a 'pseudo' autonomy for man is subject to unknowable natural forces in the depths of the psyche. The only real form of autonomy, according to the Critical Theorists is 'rational autonomy' which is gained through development of self-awareness and reason. This form of autonomy has to be worked for but hope of actually attaining such a state is slim. Contrast this with Fromm's view that the 'natural end' of man is knowable, and with his optimistic hope that man is perfectible, i.e., that man can achieve his 'natural end' which is to live in harmony with nature, and that this 'end' is inherent in each individual.

Let us now consider the findings related to the substantive problems underlying the research of Fromm, and Horkheimer, and Adorno. Since Fromm's usage of 'authority' and 'authoritarianism' largely followed that of Horkheimer, we first considered the ways in which Horkheimer used these terms in the thirties. Again it was found that, because of the history-laden nature of the concepts, values intruded at
every stage of the argument.

It was found that the concept of 'authority' was politicised by Horkheimer on all levels of analysis. For example, on the levels of epistemology and social criticism. On the level of epistemology, Horkheimer used the concept of 'rational authority' or 'authority guided by (Hegelian) reason' to distinguish Critical Theory from other historical approaches, particularly, those characterised by 'rampant empiricism'.

Horkheimer wrote:

The more the mere collection and description of events is regarded as preliminary work rather than the goal of history and the more decisively, the requirement is made as against the positivistic conception of science not to regard description as the stringing together of isolated facts, which in its subjective aspects is left to the taste and perspective of the historian, but as the use of conscious methodical work, grounded in theory then Authority appears more clearly as the leading category in the historian's conceptual apparatus. (Horkheimer, 1936:22-3)

Further, Horkheimer distinguished 'rational authority' from 'irrational authority' or authority as a form of domination. His particular example here is the positivist thinking of the Vienna Circle - the methods of which, he believed, lead to the 'reification' of human relations. Like his social thought, Horkheimer's analysis of the authority of thought is bound up with his attempt to reconcile his socialist ideals with the reality of capitalist exploitation, which he pointed out, permeates the very categories of thought itself.

On the level of sociological analysis, we noted that Horkheimer viewed all social relationships as authority relationships, i.e., political relations. Moreover, he was primarily interested in exposing the 'real' impact of these relations within individuals - in exposing their 'damaging effect' with respect to the attainment of 'historical
consciousness. Rational authority for Horkheimer was not tied to the notion of the instrumentality of ends and means, but to that of a rational or socialist society, based on conscious decision about both ends and means by men and for men. Modern capitalism, according to Horkheimer, involves the presence of irrational authority, i.e., mechanisms that function to mislead, and hence to exploit.

As an account of exploitation, we noted that the above analysis fell outside the socio-economic framework developed by most Marxists. Describing exploitation as 'irrational authority' Horkheimer thereby supplemented Marxist explanations by introducing political factors as independent forces generated by the superstructure. The question has been raised, however, of whether this form of analysis is a development of Marxian thought or not Marxism at all?

Here, we observed that Fromm followed Horkheimer's social criticism. He assumed like Horkheimer, that the dominant class was a uniform class with a uniform ideology - contrary to other sociological evidence about Weimar today - and was primarily interested in developing a theory of how psychic structures arise and persist within individuals in response to ideological influences. Fromm's notion of rational authority differed from that of Horkheimer, being based on a notion of socialist humanism which posits the individual's potential for integration into his life world as more of a concrete possibility than Horkheimer would allow.

With regard to Horkheimer and Fromm's analysis of 'authoritarianism', we found that their concepts were tied to evaluations of the claims of Weimar and Nationalist Socialist
Germany. Fromm wrote, shortly after the outbreak of World War II, that authoritarianism is the "human basis of fascism."

Fromm believed that the ideologies of late capitalism in Germany - those of mass democracy, as well as of the new mass parties - had engineered mass allegiance, not explicable by reference to the social or economic interests of the masses. It was argued that the basis of this allegiance lay in changes wrought by ideology within the person. Fromm argued that these ideologies had given rise to a new type of person, and that getting clear about the psychology of this 'mass man', in comparing him with an ideal of socialist man, would throw light upon the nature of factors, inhibiting the 'true consciousness' of socialist man. Fromm's analyses of the authoritarian, therefore, pertain to the elements of ideologies which are thought to become 'crystallised', in the form of psychic structures, within the individual, rooting him to his position in the socio-economic structure and preventing the emergence of true individuality, or the individual as the 'true' subject of history. Fromm's theory of the socialisation processes by which this occurred is commonplace now, although not quite in the novel Freudian way formulated by Fromm. For Fromm postulated, not a simple process of learning, but a continual resolution of intrapsychic conflict. This was Fromm's description of the psychological development of the 'average man' of late capitalism, who, if not materially satisfied, at least obtains certain psychological gratifications from the system.

Analysis of Horkheimer and Adorno's research showed that, while their interest in factors inhibiting 'historical subjectivity' ('fired' in Weimar Germany) continued through
Adorno's research into the authoritarian personality, they placed less emphasis upon socialisation processes, and upon Freud's theories of personality than did Fromm. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the authoritarian is not the 'average person' of a particular type of society, rather he is perceived - on the basis of their analysis of fascism as the culmination of capitalist development, and its essence as the total dehumanisation of the world - as totally de-individuated. He is the 'subject of history' who has lost his 'subjectivity' and become the repository of 'total restraint', placed upon the individual at the final stage of capitalism. The primary object of their American study, The Authoritarian Personality, therefore, was to seek out the 'dehumanised subject', whom they viewed as a symptom of the decay of capitalist civilisation, in the belief that the exposure of this dehumanisation would itself contribute to the collapse of capitalism. A central conclusion, then, was that the theories embodied in the concepts utilised in the actual research carried out in the thirties and forties in Germany and America, implicitly involved evaluative assumptions sometimes of a very controversial sort. In addition, the thesis examined the logic of analysis involved in the studies, the empirical concepts and the strategies of inquiry.

Perhaps the first point that needs to be made concerns the methods employed in these studies. Horkheimer had, at various times, criticised the methodology of the natural sciences from the realm of historical social philosophy for their ahistoricism and rhetorically laid the blame for the exploitation in capitalist society at the feet of the Enlightenment. However, it was not his view that these methods
are completely worthless. He thought that, properly harnessed, they could be employed to arrive at genuine knowledge. Thus, where Horkheimer and Adorno did do research, all advanced methods, including those based on natural science premises were utilised (as in the California study). Fromm's early study, carried out under Institute auspices, also used the 'new' methods of questionnaire compilation.

Both the study of Fromm, and the later study of Horkheimer and Adorno used the logic of typology construction in order to conceptualise the psychological effects of capitalist ideologies. In Fromm's research, the typologies were character typologies, initially based on Freud's theories of the developmental stages of the libido, which in their internal structure linked observable behavioural traits to psychological states. These traits and psychological states were also explained in physiological terms by a theory of 'repression'. Fromm made two changes in Freud's characterology. First, Freud's characterology was 'reinterpreted to allow explanation of what Fromm called social character, that is the typical character of a group or of a society. Secondly, Freud's libido theory became less important in the character typology of the sado-masochistic or authoritarian character.

We found that Fromm linked all the various levels within his concept or typology of character by means of the logic of reductionism. It was argued that the resultant multidimensional and dynamic concept of character goes beyond sociological theories like role theory, which also attempt to explain patterned behaviour. Fromm's concept of character involves physiological, psychological, moral and sociological levels which are all interlinked by theories. But, we noted
in this type of construction that make internal consistency questionable. The two most important areas where serious problems arise concern, first, assumptions about the important variables entering into the basic concepts, and secondly, claims about the composition rules - socialisation and 'adaptation'. Fromm's assumptions in both areas are open to criticism.

First, Fromm's character studies were based on the analysis of a particular society as specific points in its history: the anal-bourgeois character corresponded to the early stages of capitalism in that society, and the sado-masochistic character was thought to be typical of the monopoly capitalist stage. But while Fromm stressed the importance of socialisation processes in influencing the way the child relates to the world, he appears to have failed to notice the relevance, in the present context, of the fact that these processes take a generation before they are manifest in the psychic structures of adults. Thus, in the case of the sado-masochistic character, it seems improbable that socialisation in the 'democratic' period of the Weimar Republic had much to do with the formation of the submissive-sadistic type of person, whom Fromm describes as 'typical' of the lower middle-classes, since that generation would have been shaped by the patriarchal-authoritarian family patterns of around 1900-10 or earlier. Fromm described the latter patterns as having influenced the development of the bourgeois rather than the authoritarian character. Moreover, Fromm wrote of the period before 1918 that:

the authority of religion and traditional morality was still firmly rooted. The family was still unshaken and a safe refuge in a hostile world. (Fromm, 1941:213)
And while Fromm also claims that, after the 1918 War, the middle-class family was considerably weakened, and that ideological influences mediated by other social groups affected the ways in which individuals related to the world, the adaptations or what Fromm later terms 'assimilations' (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970) to authoritarian controls still seem unlikely — if one follows Dahrendorf's (1968) analysis that there were no effective social and political groups introducing illiberal institutions in Weimar. These did not emerge until after Fromm had collected his data on the sado-masochistic character, and emigrated to America as the National Socialist Party came to power. Yet, Fromm wrote in retrospect that his study was based on the assumption that "the authoritarians would be ardent Nazis." But the most reasonable conclusion would seem to be that the sado-masochist character was not in fact called forth by German social structures, but the ideology of a new mass movement. This is supported by Dahrendorf, who wrote of Fromm's summary of the research:

Naturally, the particular interest of the socio-psychoanalysts is devoted to the genesis of authoritarian behaviour in the individual. Erikson and Fromm both use Hitler's Mein Kampf as a basis of their often free associations about the childhood and youth of the authoritarian. (Dahrendorf, 1968: 372)

The next question considered was whether, in view of the fact that Fromm's concept of the authoritarian is an historical concept, it is in fact a unitary one. It seems to embody, on the one hand, the notion of socialisation within the family producing internal commitment to traditional norms and values imposed by external authority figures. At the same time, it embodies something different, which relates to the influence of powerful ideologies designed to influence
the individual in certain ways - adaptation to external authorities out of fear, and an ambivalent love/hate relationship towards them because of their power in comparison to the weakness of the individual. Thus, it is suggested that Fromm, and also Horkheimer and Adorno, in their concepts of the authoritarian do not distinguish between the desire to conform because of an inner emotional satisfaction gained in adapting to social prescriptions and conformity because of an ambivalent relationship to powerholders, both of which are facets of their concepts of the authoritarian.

Further, Adorno questioned Fromm's concentration on the healthy individual's adaptations, arguing that Fromm had thereby minimised the effect of more fundamental biological variables upon men. Adorno was far from convinced of either the psychological health of individuals under capitalism, or the inherent potential within the individual for the growth of the integrated Ego. The latter notion, Adorno argued, neglects the fact that culture is bought at the expense of instinctual repression, particularly repression of destructive drives, which manifests itself in various psychopathological conditions in today's society. Thus the variables and composition rules, entering Fromm's characterology, as the above illustrates, were attacked on historical, moral-philosophical, and sociopsychological grounds.

To turn now to the level of inquiry and Fromm's research into the incidence of the authoritarian character among the working classes in Weimar Germany, we found that the open-ended questionnaire and interview technique used by Fromm, while very comprehensive in that it sought information about all levels of the total life situation of each individual
in order to present a composite character type for each subject. The 'technique' while offering more information about each individual subject than the average survey was open to several objections on the question of the evaluation of responses. For example, the interpretation of the responses depended almost wholly upon the interviewer and his particular psychoanalytic training.

We also noted, from the point of view of evaluation of the findings, that there were some who would discount the explanations as too speculative since they rest on unobservables. But we noted that physics postulates unobservables too, and we suggested two sorts of ways in which such postulations might be acceptable. First, it was pointed out that the postulation of unobservables can enter into explanations if it can be shown that they causally interact with entities that are observable. And it might be argued that the explanations advanced by Fromm are of this kind, since he did attempt to specify conscious behaviour that regularly occurs with specific emotions. We noted the difficulty here lies in substantiating the claim since either appeal to statistical joint occurrences or a 'metaphysical' rule of some kind can be questioned.

A second way of justifying the postulation of unobservables is if they allow explanation of an empirical generalisation. For example, in chemistry, the electron theory of matter is called in to explain the chemical properties of matter. We found Fromm 'called in' characterological concepts embodying theories that would explain why the proletariat had lost its revolutionary fervour, and that would account for the appeal of Nazi ideologies.
However, we noted that there are other criteria of judgement upon which a theory is assessed: the norms of the 'scientific community', or the particular theoretical following within that community. First, with respect to the latter, we found that Fromm's concepts and what was published of his research, while provocative, was not fully accepted either by Freudian psychoanalysts or by Critical Theorists. It did however, gain acceptance among Freudian 'revisionists', and partial acceptance by Horkheimer and Adorno in that the concept of the sadomasochistic character was incorporated into Adorno's F Scale. But theory is almost always subject to the judgement of the scientific community as a whole, where acceptance is dependent upon what is demanded of theories or concepts. For example, researchers concerned with similar phenomena may want an explanation that is scientifically rigorous in the sense of providing a rich source of empirically testable hypotheses. If the original theory does not do this, other researchers may attempt to derive hypotheses and 'test' them. As we saw in the study of The Authoritarian Personality, which was made public to the American scientific community, a large number of follow-up studies attempted to 'mine' the study for hypotheses. While Fromm's books have been widely read - for his psychologies of modern societies are interesting - there have been few empirical studies following on from his work. Fromm himself along with Michael Maccoby recently (1970) completed a further study - a psychology of a Mexican village. This study incorporated a number of theoretical and methodological refinements, and a systematic historical analysis of the socio-economic and cultural forces to which the village had been subject. Fromm
however, claimed that the results of his study had stood the test of history. Here, we warned of the dangers in accepting theories that introduce generalisations from history into the social sciences, since there is no strict control over the relevant variables.

Let us now consider very briefly some further findings of the later research carried out by Adorno in America. We noted that this particular study represented the height of Horkheimer and Adorno's cooperation with American researchers, mainly because they had common Freudian ground to meet on. Horkheimer and Adorno's ideology critique, written in German, was available only in broad outline to the American social scientists who collaborated with them. The latter tended to assume there was no systematic theory guiding the study, and social analysis was kept to a minimum. Read retrospectively, and in the light of Horkheimer and Adorno's essay on anti-Semitism, we were able to identify more readily, in the concepts used in the research, Hegelian-Marxist values and ideals under names that had been altered to accommodate them to American academic and societal norms of the McCarthy period.

Like Fromm's study, Adorno et al used a typological approach to provide a conceptual starting point. But, we noted that Adorno's justification for using a typological framework was not one based on consideration of alternative technique for arriving at the information he sought, rather it was a justification based on ideology critique - upon Adorno and Horkheimer's earlier existential judgement that in capitalist societies people are regularly 'typed' and 'classified', therefore, the appropriate way to study individuals in society is through identification of actual types or pseudo-
indivduals. For when compared with Critical Theory's criterion of 'true individuality', people living in capitalist society had never become 'individuals'. The aim of typology was to understand what it is in current capitalist culture that leads to these classifications as a replacement for autonomous thought and action. Roger Brown, however, pointed out that the qualities of the types utilised by Adorno et al bore a remarkable resemblance to those of Jaensch's J-Type. The theories and ideals embodied in the types or concepts, are, nevertheless, radically different to those of the Nazi psychologist.

With respect to the types themselves, we found that they represented a complex whole that could be distinguished on several interrelated levels - unconsciously felt emotions, wishes, drives, and deep-rooted convictions are separated out from more conscious aspects of the personality and its adaptations to ideological influences and their interrelationships explored. The study, in fact, was one of covariation of components of ideology and other more or less observable personality variables. But the ideological components Adorno was particularly interested to identify - those of ethnocentricism, fascism, anti-Semitism - were not derived from a systematic critique of American capitalism, nor were they related to a theory of American society, but drawn from Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis of anti-Semitism as the counter-ideology of fascism. Since fascism was perceived as the 'extreme' development of capitalism, it was these elements that Adorno sought to identify in the hope that 're-education' would lead to a 'rational' or socialist society. In identifying fascist elements in society, Adorno was in the mainstream.
of American thought, since Americans in the forties tended to regard 'fascism' as a movement of the 'right'.

On the empirical level, it was found that Adorno used a logic of classification, perhaps best described as a form of theoretical 'polytheticism'. In attempting to avoid the 'abstractness' of Weberian 'extreme' types, Adorno sought a more **pragmatic** simplification of the data. He attempted to uncover traits and dispositions in the personality via their *own logic*, i.e., he assumed the existence of an inner logic or underlying continuity of meaning among personality dispositions. For example, the F Scale was designed to reveal an underlying structure made up of subsyndromes of traits - authoritarian submissiveness, projectivity, conventionality and manipulativeness - on which individuals were scored on a scale ranging from 'high' to 'low'. These variables were incorporated in subsyndromes, which presented the researchers with different profiles of the same overall phenomenon connected by the underlying theory of anti-Semitism. The features of the F-syndrome were so closely interrelated that a clear expression of one subsyndrome permitted inferences to be made about others. Thus, Adorno argued that this concept of the potentially fascist personality is both theoretical and dynamic - allowing understanding of the phenomenon and how the phenomenon changes by analysing increases or decreases of specific factors.

We found that the study of *The Authoritarian Personality* was substantially criticised after its publication, but our interest in the study was not so much in mechanical contamination, or its implication for personality, but with the way in which values and ideologies tended to get introduced unannounced
at every stage of the research. Here, we detected a certain amount of 'forcing' of the categories to fit the theory of the authors, so that the technical biases always seemed to work in favour of the assumptions. Part of the problem here was that theory was added to in an apparently 'ad hoc' fashion as the research progressed. Openness of categories is fine if the personality categories are grounded in an adequate sociological theory, but we noted that the authors while strong on psychology were weak on a theory of American society.

Related to the latter point, was the observation that the study seems to have had a temporary neutralising effect upon the Critical Marxism of the authors. While the more dialectical themes in their writings were again taken up by Horkheimer and Adorno after their return to Germany - and they were encouraged in this by a more politically critical student body - in the forties and fifties in America their work became caught up in the conformity and progressive 'scientisation' of social science. They tended to answer reticently questions regarding the conditions under which an anti-democratic personality might arise, and to point out in a programmatic fashion that these processes ultimately had to be sought in society itself. But they did not offer an explicit social criticism of American capitalism. Concern with the 'true subject' of history had become a 'negative' concern with the empirical psychological forces that impede 'individuality' or 'historical consciousness'.

Despite their reticence in putting forward a critical theory of society, the study was immediately attacked for its ideological biases. But the attempts to 'neutralise' the study of political content resulted in a tendency to reduce the authoritarian to a sociological or psychological
variable divorced from society and history. Moreover, the reduction to psychology was accompanied by the tendency to treat the concept as overlaid with pathological qualities. It was suggested that the source of the latter can be found in Horkheimer and Adorno's ideology critique. They viewed societal definitions of the 'health' of individuals in capitalist societies as ideological. For them, only socialism corresponded to a rational or psychologically healthy society.

In sum, an attempt has been made to emphasise and specify the ideological and evaluative content of the socio-psychological categories of authority, character, and personality (on all levels of analysis) which belong to a branch of research, occupying a central position in the Institute's program during the thirties and forties. The fact that the authors sought to conceptualise 'capitalism in its totality', or 'socialism in its totality' in categories like that of the 'authoritarian' or 'revolutionary', meant that their concepts were not only non-unitary but subject to criticisms from a variety of social science disciplines as to the nature of the variables entering the categories and the rules linking the various levels within them. For example, it was found that in concentrating upon the 'total system man', there was a neglect, in the case of Horkheimer and Adorno as well as Fromm, of sociological factors. They failed to ground the authoritarian in an adequate theory of the society which had nurtured his growth. Thus, while reduction of phenomena like capitalism to an essence may provide provocative comment upon the direction modern societies may be taking, such as Erich Fromm's (1973)
exposure of 'destructive', 'mechanistic', or 'cybernetic'
men in today's industrial societies, it is another thing to
attempt to present a psychology of a specific society without
identification of the political, economic and social institu­
tions within which such men are located.

Further, there is a suspicion that the critique of the
authors was largely informed by National Socialist propaganda,
particularly since substantive sociological, political or
economic analyses of National Socialism only started to
appear after Fromm's study and after The Dialectic of
Enlightenment had been completed in the forties. This was
combined in the case of Fromm with a Marxist 'conspiracy'
theory of the domination of all spheres of society by 'big
business' and the 'state'. In this connection, we noted
the vagueness with which the authors used the terms, 'totali­
tarianism', 'fascism', and 'authoritarianism'. However,
while Fromm at least sought to understand the authoritarian
as the 'average' man of a specific society, Adorno sought
to identify not the average 'rigid conformist' or 'power
assertive' authoritarian but a 'mentality' which he described
as 'fascist'. Adorno et al always referred to the F Scale
as The Implicit Antidemocratic Trends or Potentiality for
Fascism Scale and never as the Authoritarianism Scale.
Fascism, totalitarianism and National Socialism tended to be
used synonymously by Adorno. We concluded here that the
concept of the authoritarian in its old form, in both eras
of the Institute's work, is historically redundant, particularly
that of the potential Fascist.

Nevertheless, it is still interesting to return to the
starting point of Fromm and ask what kind of people still accept inequality and hierarchy, because the societies in which most of us live seem to perpetuate such structures despite governmental and institutional measures to modify them, and despite political participation, particularly by unions and other pressure groups to liberate public life from many of the former controls of the few over the majority. Perhaps other studies might examine current socialisation processes in different sectors of society with regard to how far individual autonomy is impeded from the outset because individuals, while inculcated with 'performance orientation', 'acquisitiveness', 'competitiveness' and other requirements of the institutional structure, lack the type of knowledge that would enable them to control and gain satisfaction from the natural and human environment.
NOTES


2. Schmidt (1971: 41) wrote that, "Critical materialism disdains to continue the tradition of mere philosophising by investigation 'the riddles of the world' or, with unflinching radicalism, putting itself continually in question in the style of modern ontology. Its intellectual construction was undertaken by finite men and grew out of the definite historical tasks of society. Its aim is to help men out of their self-made prison of uncomprehended economic determination."

3. Lukacs believed psychological 'consciousness' was a static concept which would only be defined in terms of the society in which it arose, whereas 'class consciousness' was historical in the sense of German Idealism and Marxist utopianism, i.e., 'the sense become consciousness of the historical role of class.'

4. Roger Brown (1965: 476-9) describes the work of the psychologist E. R. Jaensch who coined the S-Type and the J-Type in 1938: "The S would be a man with so-called 'liberal' views; one who would think of environment and education as the determinants of behaviour; one who would take a childish wanton pleasure in being eccentric, S would say 'individualistic... J made definite, unambiguous perceptual judgements and persisted in them. He would recognise that human behaviour is fixed by blood, soil, and national tradition. He would be tough, masculine, firm; a man you could rely on."
APPENDIX A

The Authoritarian Character Structure of German Workers and Employees before Hitler - Selections from Erich Fromm's Questionnaire*. 

Questions designed to elicit political convictions:

I 21. Are you satisfied with your works council? Yes/No
28. Do you like your works newspaper? Yes/No
29. Why [not]?
31. Are you a member of the factory savings bank? Yes/No
33. Are you a member of the factory sports club? Yes/No
35. What do you think about automation?
36. What kind of relationship do you have with your professional or work colleagues**?
37. What kind of relationship do you have with your immediate superiors?
38. And with those even higher?

II 48. Which newspapers and magazines do you now subscribe to?
49. Which ones did you subscribe to before the war?
50. Did you also subscribe to periodicals with insurance [companies]? Yes/No

III 1. Do you or your wife shop in a discount house or delicatessen?
2. Why?
3. Are you a member of a consumers' cooperative? Yes/No
4. Why [not]?

28. What influenced your opinion?
29. In your opinion, how can a Second World War be prevented?
30. What do you think of the German legal system?
31. In your opinion, who is to blame for the inflation?
32. In your opinion, who holds the real power of the state?
36. Which party are you a member of?
37. Since when?
38. Why [not]?
39. Do you read party literature? Yes/No Which?
40. Do you regularly attend party meetings? Yes/No
41. Are you a party functionary? Yes/No
42. Which party do you vote for?
43. What stops you from more participation in politics? Family, Employer...
44. How do you judge your party? Politics...Leader...Organisation...
46. In which union are you?
47. Since when?
48. Do you regularly attend union meetings?
49. How do you judge your union? Leader...Organisation...Literature...Support...
50. Do you read the union paper? Yes/No
51. Are you a union official? Yes/No
52. What prevents you from participating more in union affairs? Family, Employer...

* Taken from Autorität und Familie (1936: 240-8)
** Note the professorial language in which the questions are phrased.
## APPENDIX B

### THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

Groups From Whom Questionnaires Were Collected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>No of Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form 78 (January to May 1945)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California Public Speaking Class Women</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; Extension Psychology Class (adult women)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Women (public school teachers, social workers,</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public health nurses) (San Francisco area)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>295</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Form 60 (Summer 1945)                                                  |               |
| University of Oregon Student Women                                     | 47            |
| " " " and University of California Student                              |               |
| Women                                                                  | 54            |
| Student Men                                                            | 57            |
| Oregon Service Club Men (Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary Clubs) (Total B         | 68            |
| questionnaire)                                                         |               |
| Oregon Service Club Men (Form A only)                                  | 60            |
| **Total**                                                              | **286**       |

| Forms 45 and 40 (November 1945 to June 1946)                           |               |
| A Form 45                                                              |               |
| University of California Extension Testing Class (adult women.)        | 59            |
| Psychiatric Clinic Patients (men and women) (Langley Porter            |               |
| Clinic of the University of California)                                | 121           |
| San Quentin State Prison Inmates (men)                                 | 110           |
| **Total**                                                              | **243**       |

| Form 40                                                                |               |
| Alameda School for Merchants Marine Officers (men)                     | 343           |
| US Employment Service Veterans (men)                                   | 106           |
| **Total**                                                              | **449**       |

| Form 40                                                                |               |
| Working-Class Women:                                                   |               |
| California Labour School                                               | 19            |
| United Electrical Workers Union (CIO)                                  | 8             |
| Office Workers                                                         | 11            |
| Longshoremen and Warehousemen (ILWU) (new members)                     | 10            |
| Federal Housing Project Workers                                        | 5             |
| **Total**                                                              | **53**        |
Groups From Whom Questionnaires Were Collected (cont):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working-Class Men:</th>
<th>No of Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Electrical Workers Union (CIO)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Labour School</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longshoremen and Warehousemen (ILWU) (new members)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Seamen's Service</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle-Class Women:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parent-Teachers' Association</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Labour School (middle-class members)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban Church Group</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitarian Church Group</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Women Voters</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle-Class Women's Club</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle-Class Men:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parent-Teacher's Association</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban Church Group</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Labour School</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>California Service Club Men:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiwanis Club</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Club</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| George Washington University Women Students | 132 |
| Los Angeles Men (classes at University of California and University of Southern California, fraternity group, adult evening class, parents of students, radio writers group) | 117 |
| Los Angeles Women (same groupings as above) | 130 |

| Total | 779 |
| Total Forms 45 and 40 | 1,518 |
| Overall Total of all Forms | 2,099 |

a In most cases each group taking the questionnaire was treated separately for statistical purposes, e.g., San Quentin Prison Inmates, Psychiatric Clinic Men. However, some groups were too small for this purpose and were therefore combined with other sociologically similar groups. When such combinations occurred, the composition of the overall group is indicated in the table.

b Form A included the scale for measuring potentially antidemocratic trends in the personality and half of the scale measuring politico-economic conservatism.

Taken from *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950:21-2)
BIBLIOGRAPHY

WORKS CITED

Theodor W. Adorno

1973 *Studien zum autoritären Charakter.* Translated by Milli Weinbrenner. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford

Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer
1969a *Dialektik der Aufklärung.* Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.


Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer (eds)

Gordon W. Allport
1948 *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation.* London: Constable. (First published in 1937.)

G. Almond

Hannah Arendt
1961 *Between Past and Future.* London: Faber.


Kenneth D. Bailey

H. E. Barnes
Geoffrey Barraclough

Franz Borkenau

Walter Bräuer

Berthold Brecht

Paul Breines

May Brodbeck

Roger Brown

Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds)

Lewis Coser

Helmut Dahmer

Ralf Dahrendorf
Arthur C. Danto

Wilhelm Dilthey

Dieter Erb
1974 "Die Gourmets vom Starnberger See - Wie die kritische Kritik zu ihren Ende kommt." Die Welt 30,12.

H. J. Eysenck

Herbert Feigl

Otto Fenichel

Laura Fermi

Iring Fetscher

Sigmund Freud
1923 The Ego and the Id. London; Hogarth.

Michaela von Freyhold

Erich Fromm
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Publisher/Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>&quot;Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>American Sociological Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>&quot;Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man.&quot;</td>
<td><em>Social Science Information</em> 7,3:7-17.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erich Fromm and Michael Maccoby</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Gay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>&quot;Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider,&quot; in Donald Fleming and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bernard Bailyn (eds), *The Intellectual Migration, Europe and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>America, 1930-1960.*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambridge: Harvard University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theodor Geiger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miriam Glucksmann</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Henryk Grossmann

Carl Grünberg
1924 "Festrede gehalten zur Einweihung des Instituts für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt am Main." Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurter Universitätsreden.

Helmut Gumniör and Rudolf Ringguth

Georges Gurvitch

Jürgen Habermas

Peter Hamilton

Helmut Heissenbüttel

W. Hellpach

Carl G. Hempel

Willy Hochkeppel

Max Horkheimer

1931 "Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgabe eines Instituts für Sozialforschung." Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurter Universitätsreden.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Max Horkheimer (Psn Heinrich Regius)
1934 Dämmerung. Zurich.

Max Horkheimer (ed)

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno
1969a Dialektik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (eds)
Karen Horney

Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley

Russell Jacoby

Marie Jahoda

Marie Jahoda, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel

Martin Jay

Alfred C. Kinsey, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. E. Martin

John P. Kirscht and Ronald C. Dillehay

Hedda Korsch

Karl Korsch
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ernst Kretschmer</td>
<td>Physique and Character. Translated by W. J. H. Sprott. New York:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Harcourt, Brace, and World.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Walter Laqueur</td>
<td>&quot;The Role of the Intelligentsia in the Weimar Republic.&quot; Social</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Norbert Leser</td>
<td>&quot;Introduction.&quot; Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arbeiterbewegung (1911-30) (Reprinted 1966) 1:v-xv.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>George Lichtheim</td>
<td>&quot;Gyorgy Lukacs,&quot; in David S. Sills (ed), International Encyclopedia of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From Marx to Hegel. London: Orbach and Chambers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paul Lorenzen</td>
<td>&quot;Enlightenment and Reason.&quot; Continuum 8,1:3-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Paul Lorenzen</td>
<td>&quot;Enlightenment and Reason.&quot; Continuum 8,1:3-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Leo Löwenthal</td>
<td>Literature and the Image of Man - Studies of the European Drama and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Novel from 1600-1900. Boston; Beacon Press.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>History and Class</td>
<td>Consciousness. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. London: Merlin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consciousness.</td>
<td>Press.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Herbert Marcuse</td>
<td>&quot;Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen Materialismus.&quot; Die</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gesellschaft 9,2:136-74.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1955a  

1955b  
"The Social Implications of Freudian 'Revisionism'," Dissent 2,3 (Summer): 22-40.

Mihailo Marković  
1969  

Karl Marx  
1965  
The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and Wishart. (First published in English in 1947 by International Publishers Co.)

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels  
1932  

Maurice Merleau-Ponty  
1955  

S. M. Miller and F. Riessman  
1961  

H. A. Murray  
1943  

1951  

H. A. Murray, et al.  
1938  
Explorations in Personality. New York: Oxford University Press.

J. P. Nettl  
1966  

William F. Ogburn  
1922  

Bertell Ollman  
1971  

1973  

William Outhwaite  
1973  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilhelm Reich</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Massenpsychologie des Faschismus.</td>
<td>Vienna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Characteranalyse Technik und Grundlagen für studierende und parktizierende Analytiker. Vienna.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>&quot;Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis.&quot; Translated by Anna Bostock in Studies on the Left 6:5-46. (First published in 1929 as Dialektischer Materialismus und Psychoanalyse.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
George K. Romoser

W. Röpke

Hendrick M. Ruitenbeek

R. Nevitt Sanford

John H. Schaar

Alfred Schmidt

Joseph A. Schumpeter

Edward A. Shils

D. Stewart and T. Holt

B. A. Stotzky

Claud Sutton

Göran Therborn
Sylvia Thomm  

KT  

Max Weber  

Felix Weil  

Karl August Wittfogel  

Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore Jr. (eds)  

Dennis H. Wrong  

Florian Znaniecki  
1940 The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge. New York: Columbia.

OTHER WORKS:

Theodor W. Adorno  


Theodor W. Adorno, H. Albert et al  
Nigel Armistead

Rolf Bauermann and Jans-Jochen Rötscher
1972 Dialektik der Anpassung. Frankfurt am Main: Marxistische Blätter.

Reinhard Bendix

T. B. Bottomore

Karl Dietrich Bracher

Leon Bramson

Paul Breines
1972 "Notes on Georg Lukacs." Telos 5 (Spring).

Wilhelm Burian

Manfred Clemenz

Percy S. Cohen

Ralf Dahrendorf

Joachim C. Fest

Charles Frankel

David Frisby

Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills
Jürgen Habermas  

Carl G. Hempel  

Dick Howard  

Martin Jay  

Gareth Stedman Jones  

Karl Korsch  

Hans-Jürgen Krahl  

Karl Löwith  
1941 Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart.

Neil McInnes  

Karl Mannheim  

Don Martindale  

C. Wright Mills  

Detlef Oesterreich  

P. L. Reichel  
J. H. Robb  
1952  "The Contribution of Psychopahtology to Sociology."  

Paul A. Robinson  

Günther Rohrmoser  
1970  *Das Elend der kritischen Theorie.*  Freiburg: Rombach.

James Schmidt  
A Response to Martin Jay."  *Telos* 21 (Fall): 168-80/

E. L. Trist et al  

Max Weber  

Albrecht Wellmer  
1970  "Empirico-alytical and Critical Social Science."  
*Continuum* 1 & 2 (Summer).