DIALECTICS: PARODY OR PARADIGM?
A review and analysis of dialectical writing in contemporary sociology.

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"Praxis, "extasy", "subjective realism", "authenticity" all refer to an image of man that would underlie his existential integrity, his freedom to risk, and the moral nature of his responsibility, and would grant his history a fundamental direction and relevance. It is a portrait that I would honor. But it is not one that should drive us from methodological surefootedness, away from the patient and precise ordering of the given empirical world toward a well-intentioned but woolly-headed confusion of tongues." 1

Robert Friedrichs.
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INTRODUCTION

The idea of paradigm was first introduced into the methodology of science with Thomas Kuhn's essay The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Although it has been refined and employed in less than twenty-one volumes, the original conception of it, the present thesis being based on the explicit definition given in the book, is
The thesis takes departure from Robert Friedrichs' text *A Sociology of Sociology* which appeared in 1970.¹ In this book, Friedrichs claims that the use of dialectical notions in sociology is becoming so prevalent as to suggest that a new 'dialectical paradigm' might be in the ascendant. His argument, though impressionistic, makes persuasive reading. But how valid is the momentous claim contained in it? Would it survive an independent assessment of contemporary dialectical writing in sociology?

The delineation of this project opens up yet further questions: Which species or meaning of paradigm does Friedrichs have in mind? How would one isolate and discuss such a paradigm anyway? And how determine what in the literature would be pertinent to such an assessment? Each of these will be answered as the thesis proceeds, but first, it is necessary to return to some basic definitions.

**The meanings of 'paradigm'**

The notion of 'paradigm' was first introduced into the philosophy of science with Thomas Kuhn's essay *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962).² Although it has been argued that Kuhn employed no less than twenty-one senses of the term in that book,³ and although Kuhn himself has since revised his conception of it,⁴ the present thesis derives from the explicit definition given the term in the 1962 essay.
By using the term 'paradigm', Kuhn wrote, I mean to suggest

...accepted examples of actual scientific practice — examples which include law, theory, application and instrumentation together — [and] provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.  

The words "accepted" and "actual scientific practice" are significant here, for they underline Kuhn's interest in the sociological as opposed to logical nature of scientific activity. The paradigm operates within the scientific community shaping the habits of its members with an institutional determinism. Entry into the community follows on socialization and professional initiation rites which ensure the perpetuation of the established paradigmatic world view.

The study of paradigms...is what mainly prepares the student for membership... he there joins men who learned the basis of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals. Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice.  

This sociological emphasis is part of the reason why Kuhn prefers the term paradigm to theory, for, "...as a locus of professional commitment (the paradigm is) prior to the various concepts, laws, theories and points of view that may be extracted from it."  

The second point of emphasis stems from Kuhn's repetitious use of the word "example" in his definition. For though the paradigm may be prior to theory it does provide 'a model' around which a coherent tradition will
grow. What exactly is this more concrete aspect? Kuhn talks about

...exemplary observations and experiments
...sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity...
sufficiently open ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to solve...

Elsewhere he mentions concrete puzzle-solutions, tricks, devices and kinds of apparatus. In his 1969 Postscript to the second edition of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* he develops the exemplary aspect of the paradigm and names it "an exemplar". His new claim is that although a paradigm may already inform scientific inquiry, only the emergence of an exemplar marks the advent of mature science. Whereas the paradigm has represented "...the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a scientific community" the exemplar replaces all this. Now there is no longer any need for explicit rules of procedure.

Kuhn seems to be suggesting that in the earlier stages of a science the constellation of beliefs and values, a paradigm's metaphysical focus is predominant. But this poses a difficulty, because he has already asserted that the exemplary precedes the theoretical. Which facet of the paradigm comes first, or which of its meanings is the proper one - those questions constitute another debate. It suffices here to observe that the metaphysical sense of the paradigm, what Masterman has identified as "a general epistemological viewpoint", "a philosophy" or "something
which defines a broad sweep of reality',

is the aspect of Kuhn's work that most scholars have attended to.

Tracing the dynamics of the paradigm Kuhn writes "...the successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science." The paradigm, in as much as it defines problems, may tend to block the scientist's perception of anomaly in his field. But if the anomaly persists, a new framework or gestalt will eventually be put forward to account for it. If the postulated alternative is strongly supported by the evidence, the discipline may be polarised between competing frames of reference. Even a multiplicity of incommensurable paradigms can appear during this critical phase, but generally one particular view will find more 'converts' than the rest. Consolidation will begin again and another period of normal scientific progress will become possible.

paradigms and sociology

Kuhn's thesis was built around his reading of the history of the natural sciences, but there have been several attempts to extend it to social science. Effrat's article 'Power to the Paradigms' (1973) and Ritzer's 'Sociology: A Multiple-Paradigm Science' (1975) are two examples of this, but Friedrichs' book is the most comprehensive in scope. Friedrichs argues that the term 'paradigm'

...has become particularly popular among sociologists of late because it communicates the notion expressed by the term 'model' without invoking that word's physical imagery. A paradigm is an 'example', but one that is typically linguistic in base rather than
physical, a conceptual reference rather than a perceptual one. But it is a prime example that serves as a common frame of reference, 'a definition of the situation' that provides a basic focus of orientation. Normal science proceeds within the confines of a single paradigm, a relatively 'classic' study or experiment that has been sufficiently compelling to shape a discipline's sense of where its problems lie, what its appropriate tools and methods are, and the kinds of solutions for which it might settle. It is grasped before a conceptual schema, a 'law', a theory or a set of methodological postulates are articulated, and communicates 'a sense of the real' that elicits commitment and out of which further commitments are then drawn.13

Friedrichs assumes that sociology is now "a mature science" that owes its paradigmatic consolidation to the shift in focus from social action to system which came about during the decade of the Fifties. The new 'structural-functional' analysis of Parsons, Davis, Homans and others coincided with, and was reinforced by, the growth of computer science and cybernetic theory. Culturally, this was a period of cold-war conservatism and home front pragmatism, a static era. The practitioners of sociology were beginning to conceive of themselves as professionals and the prevailing social-systems theory provided them with a suitable creed.

Yet there were others, such as the conflict theorists, the Freudians, behaviourists, phenomenologists and writers on alienation, who stood out from the general trend. In fact, Friedrichs is obliged to comment that for some reason, perhaps because of the peculiar logic of the social sciences and their inextricable connection with human values, the
same degree of commitment to a single paradigm is rarely manifest by them. The most significant anomaly to appear concerned the failure of the systems paradigm to account for change - the issue of social dynamics. And so, guided by Mills and Dahrendorf, the conflict image was to become a strong contender for theoretical supremacy, leaving the discipline polarised in revolutionary struggle. Meanwhile, true to the observation of Kuhn, the critical phase generated a frantic self-searching as sociologists turned to explore their philosophical and methodological roots. At this point the sociology of sociology was born.

The Sixties opened with a mood of ideological dissention, political activism, social unrest and a search for cultural alternatives. The New Left revived curiosity in what the humanistic Marx had had to say, and professionally, the international sociological establishment was making moves to bridge the post-war ideological gap between East and West.

The sociologist of sociology therefore, began to suspect that the dialectic unencumbered by a special ideological cast, might provide a strikingly "functional" alternative to a choice between system and conflict as the sixties moved in to the seventies. 14

'the dialectical paradigm'

A dialectical paradigm would be an open commitment, writes Friedrichs, which

...like the paradigm of "democracy" in the truly pluralistic state, grants a place to competing paradigms, if but a secondary place. 15

In entertaining the possibility of such a paradigm, however, Friedrichs recognises that he is parting company with Kuhn.
For the theory of recurrent scientific revolutions become now a theory of complementarity and epistemological pluralism. Scanning the sociological literature in support of his argument for the ascendant paradigm, Friedrichs finds that already four thinkers have worked out a social philosophy based on the dialectic - Gurvitch, Sartre, Berger and Luckmann, each in his own way intensely concerned with the interpenetration of the subjective and objective phases of social reality. Others like Schelsky, Adorno and Dahrendorf preoccupied with this interaction of the two, analogous to quantum mechanics, are led "in some of their minds" into an impractical transcendentalism. Yet others, while actually adhering to the systems paradigm underscore the importance of polarities in sociology, Kuhne, for example, and Bendix and Berger, Moore, Gross and Jedrzejewski. In Tiryakian, Friedrichs observes "a dialectical relationship between the qualitative and quantitative that would appear akin to that found in Marxist theory." The phenomenologist Schütz, he notes, comprehends the problems of everyday life as dialectical, while Mead's genesis of the subjective 'I' from the objective 'Me' implies a dialectic of emergence. Even mainstream American sociologists, such as van den Berghe and Loomis, are found playing about with dialectical notions like negation. Some among them, notably Simpson and Yinger, Werkmeister, Barber and Streeton appreciate the implications of recognising knowledge as an active variable in research - Merton's "self-fulfilling prophecy". Barrington-Moore goes
so far as to suggest that Hegelian logic is a more appropriate basis for social science. Finally, Friedrichs points out, there exists in the work of Mannheim and of Seeley, a dialectic of social enlightenment and societal reconstruction, which will emancipate man from the compulsions of culture.16

Friedrichs believes that the fundamental reason why "a dialectical posture is likely to gain a respectable hearing in the decade ahead" is that it examines the relationship between scientific subject and scientific object. The image the social scientist has of himself as agent necessarily affects the sort of sociology he engages in. Kuhn, extrapolating from the natural sciences had no need to accommodate this dimension within his theory. So Friedrichs departs from Kuhn yet again, and formulates his notion of first and second order paradigms.

The paradigms that order a sociologist's conception of his subject matter...may themselves be a reflection or function of a more fundamental image: a paradigm in terms of which he sees himself.17

Somewhat carried away with his own rhetoric perhaps, Friedrichs adds "I would expect and encourage a pluralism at the level of self image, just as, ...,at the level of substantive paradigm."18 This recommendation will not be explored.

Friedrichs' innovation, the primary paradigm, rests on the philosophic concept of the reflexive, and this is the rationale behind his demand for reappraisal of the identification of the logic of the natural and social
sciences. Awareness of the findings of social science may enhance control of the environment, but the same awareness also introduces the possibility of the negation of what has just been reliably established. Friedrichs decries the attempts of his predecessors in the sociology of knowledge to determine once and for all a stable matrix that can be called "social reality". In his view, they have succumbed to Comte's view of the sociologist who would "voir pour prévoir", "prévoir pour prévenir". Thus conceived, the sociologist's role is one of collating sequences constant over time, yet

...the very discovery of an order in the realm of the social must inevitably, by the grammar that adheres to social or behavioural research, act to some degree as a new and unique element in the stream of empirical events that make up human interaction. No matter what uniformities one uncovers in the activities of sub-atomic particles or in the chemical processes involved in the life history of the cell, that knowledge by itself would appear to have no effect upon the order that has been perceived...we may, of course, consciously act to alter the arrangement and prevalence of the particular atomic or chemical processes of which we have become aware. But such action in no way reduces the fundamental reliability of the order revealed.

This is not the case at the social level. The simple knowledge of a given empirical sequence is a cognitive factor, interactive with the cognitive, affective or evaluational factors that are part of the societal matrix...which includes both the researcher and his subjects, transforming it in some measure from the matrix that might have been, if the order had not been revealed. 19

The "prévoir" is thus, inadvertently or otherwise, overtaken by the "prévenir".
The new and unique element defies definition as a systemic feedback phenomenon because it cannot "in principle" be accounted for by prior programming. Friedrichs specifies "learning" and man's capacity to manipulate his knowledge as the basic process which makes possible this fracture with repetition, this unpredictability of events at the human level. Knowledge is no longer seen as a dependent variable but is now potentially an independent variable in any situation. This means that all research becomes essentially action research.

The logic of the natural sciences which rests on order and repetition has no application here, and by extension the search for fundamental laws of human action, laws governing peculiarly social events, is a meaningless one. These things are idiophenomena.

The involvement of subject and object which the reflexive dialectical position entails leads into philosophical paradox persuading Friedrichs that Hegel's logical formulation of thesis-antithesis-synthesis may well provide the most appropriate grounding for the new paradigm. At the same time however, he takes care to distinguish this from its materialist application in the natural sciences. Marx, Engels and Lenin had stressed the existence of 'an objective reality' independent of the human mind. A truly dialectical sociology, Friedrichs reminds us, is concerned with "an examination of the relationship between sociology and the sociologist as subject."
the problem - testing Friedrichs' claim

This, in outline, is Friedrichs' argument for a dialectical sociology. The problem is to test his claim that the use of dialectical ideas in sociology will become such as to constitute a paradigm. As he puts it "if the dialectic does not seriously challenge system and conflict for paradigmatic status, during the 1970's, it will not be because of inadequate formal credentials."22 This is not made any easier by the fact that neither terms - 'dialectic' or 'paradigm', receive precise definition in A Sociology of Sociology. The introductory definition of a paradigm that Friedrichs gives his readers weighs heavily on the exemplary aspect of the word. The book itself, predictably leans towards its sociological sense. Only the summary of the work presented in the British Journal of Sociology (1972) leaves no doubt that has prime concern has been to elucidate the epistemological problems of the discipline. It is a metaphysical paradigm that we will be looking for.

Now although Kuhn's revised work does spell out some of the component characteristics of paradigms,29 neither Kuhn nor Friedrichs have articulated the metaphysical paradigm in any systematic way. A methodical examination of Friedrichs' hypothesis thus requires that an appropriate framework of analysis representing a set of paradigmatic features, be developed and applied to his and other dialectical writing, in order, as the positivist would say 'to hold the material constant'. This exercise coincides with the second unresolved difficulty introduced by Friedrichs, the undefined nature of the term 'dialectic'. The present
essay does not start with a prior commitment to any particular brand of dialectic nor to dialectics in general. Rather, it is anticipated that a common definition, which condenses the contemporary meanings of the term, will emerge from the systematic comparison of authors undertaken with the analytic framework.

rationale and instrument

Patently, such a framework should consist of a list of the categories commonly used in the philosophy of social science for drawing distinctions between phenomena and the ways in which they are regarded. Hence a wide reading has been involved, but ultimately, it was the straightforward texts like Nagel's *The Structure of Science* (1961), Bunge's *Causality* (1959), Gibson's *The Logic of Social Inquiry* (1960), Kaplan's *The Conduct of Inquiry* (1964), and two more recent works in the philosophy of social science Radnitsky's *Continental Schools of Metascience* (1968) and O'Neill's collection of famous essays republished under the title *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism* (1973) which proved most useful. Yet these works, with the exception of Radnitsky's book, provided epistemological categories which described only conventional social science. New dimensions appropriate to a dialectical epistemology had to be added. A comprehensive list of these was compiled after an acquaintance with the literature of the tradition had been made. Hall's article on 'Dialectic' in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1967) was a helpful introduction to this, as it traces the career of the term from antiquity
through to Kant and Hegel. Selsam and Martel's Reader in Marxist Philosophy (1963) with selections from Marx, Engels and Lenin covered its materialist phase. From here it became a matter of reading contemporary works such as Lefebvre's Logique formelle, logique dialectique (1940), Sartre's The problem of method (1960), Marcuse's One Dimensional Man (1964), Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), Althusser's For Marx (1966), and Levi-Strauss' Structural Anthropology (1963). One further article which pin-pointed some characteristics of the mode was Schneiders' 'Dialectic in Sociology' published in the American Sociological Review (1971).

The categories of the analytic framework are not logically exclusive items, the philosophical alignment of a sociologist influences his metaphysics or ontology and this in turn, shapes his epistemology or the methodology he attempts to apply to this reality. These cardinal positions give rise to yet further items, each of which is included on the framework so that the deeper consistency of 'the paradigm' can be examined. Hence one would expect to find an overall pattern running through an author's attitude to the exact sciences; to value freedom and generalization; in his view of the nature of determination; the type of explanation he considers appropriate; its focus-cause, meaning or other factor; its purpose or outcome; his choice of method - empirical or hermeneutic, diachronic or synchronic; whether he regards the dialectic as a method, as part of some external reality, or both;
his attitude to formal logic; to the 'laws' of dialectics and where he locates the dialectic in social reality.

Such a frame should not be regarded as a definitive list but rather as an arbitrary, if reasonable, device allowing comparative statements to be made. A closer acquaintance with the material to be examined may suggest that additional dimensions be included – the 'dialectical paradigm' if one exists, is an uncertain quantity at this stage. The rationale for the use of such a frame is this: the derived set of categories or features represents one axis, A, of a contingency table, of which the second axis, B, includes each of the dialecticians under review. Each author can be assessed for the presence (X) or absence (O) of a specific characteristic and ultimately the commonality of the body of writing reviewed becomes apparent.

This method, though a form of content analysis is open to computer treatment. It closely resembles the clumping process used by taxonomists in the natural sciences, since the questions 'does this group of plants constitute a species' and does this group of social theories constitute a paradigm' are clearly parallel in form. In numerical taxonomy,

Classifications based on many characters are called 'polythetic'. They do not require any one character or property to be universal for a class... In such cases a given 'taxon' or class is established because it contains a substantial portion of the characters employed in the classification. Assignment to a given taxon is not on the basis of a single property but on the aggregate of properties...
In this case the analysis proceeds from face valid or non-numerically determined clusters or groups of authors. For purposes of definition an item is considered representative of a given group of dialecticians if two-thirds of the authors in that group acknowledge it. If a representative item is shared by two-thirds of the groups, then it is interpreted as a paradigmatic feature. If two-thirds of the total number of items listed on the analytic frame are paradigmatic features so defined, then a common paradigm will be said to be present.

Unavoidably an element of subjective discrimination enters this process with the decision over the applicability of a given category to a given entity. In the case of authors, who are 'temporal entities' it can become extremely difficult to make the appropriate judgement. An author may entertain different theories at different stages of his career. The commitment to one position at a certain stage in his thought may have no more significance than that it serves as a launching pad for yet a further development which contradicts it. At times, a statement can be made which, on the face of it indicates a clear commitment to a particular position, but, given a knowledge of the whole output, the statement itself may be in fact a falsification of his views. Inference becomes necessary.

Authors, being human, are also fallible. It is reasonable to expect that they will sometimes omit consideration of significant issues and so some categories will remain inappropriate in both the X and the 0 sense.
They may also be inconsistent, so that two analytically related categories may yet have to be marked X and 0 or two categories with contradictory implications marked X and X. Inference may at times be unavoidable, but the basis of each judgement may be made explicit by placing the relevant category number in brackets beside the phrase in the text which has indicated it.

It is this qualitative aspect of the sorting process, a prerequisite to coding material for objective, mechanical analysis by computer, that calls into question the usefulness of the latter. It might be described as the dialectic of the inverse relationship between meaningfulness and certainty. Once a computerized classification has been established, it still remains to 'understand' why the relationships between entities are the way they are. For this reason, while the basic rationale of quantitative taxonomy is followed here, the present analysis will be made 'by hand', thus preserving a breadth of comprehension and a flexibility that is not available through the computer.

the case of Freidrichs

...a classificatory procedure must be outlined in such a form that any scientist or a properly programmed computer can carry out the indicated operations and given the same input data arrive at the same results.24

The categories and method of analysis are introduced by articulating the paradigmatic features of Friedrichs' own tacit epistemology. Most of the categories are familiar or self explanatory, where uncommon notions are used additional commentary is introduced.
category 1  a) no philosophical alignment  
b) has philosophy but non-Marxist  
c) aligns with Hegel/early Marx  
d) aligns with orthodox Marxism  

The philosophical alignment appropriate to the new paradigm is, Freidrichs believes, rooted in Hegel and the young Marx (1c), whose manuscripts began to appear in English only in the late Fifties "...philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it."25 "Alienated" social science traditionally turned both the practitioners and the subject-objects of research into "things", gaining a falsified knowledge in the process. The function of the new dialectical sociology comments Friedrichs, is to 'liberate' men: an existential dimension complements the empirical exercise.

category 2  a) there is a unity of the sciences  
b) sociological methods are distinct  

The positivists' unified sciences ideal, where explanation is envisaged in terms of reduction to the discipline immediately below it in the epistemological hierarchy, is for Friedrichs, an untenable aspiration. For Friedrichs, following in the tradition of Dilthey, the logics of the natural and social sciences are qualitatively distinct (2b). "I have never claimed that there was complete symmetry between the biography of a social science even as sociology and any of the natural sciences, indeed the nature of their fundamental disparity is the central message of my book."26
category 3  a) reality is here and now, actual, objective  
b) reality is relative to the perceiver  
c) reality is negation, potential, essence

The essentialist metaphysic, as opposed to the naive realist or positive one, comes from Hegel. In his theory critical Reason was juxtaposed to the faculty of the Understanding which, he said, perceived only in terms of 'given' common sense categories 'a reality' of determinate things and existences. These 'actualities', in fact merely appearances and contingencies, were confused with 'the real' while the essential qualities, the changing relations, the immanent, possible and necessary qualities of the matter were disregarded. For the Hegelian, reality is never given but is the negation of the world of appearances. For him, the product of 'empirical' perception is a static, passive and superficial world view. And because it lacks grasp of the compulsive inherence of change, its practical implications are conservative. 27

The notion of subjective relativism is plain enough, but the term here applies also, to theories in which reality is "intersubjectively constituted".

Friedrichs' statement on the nature of social reality vacillates. On the one hand he dissociates his notion of the dialectic from the materialists' who maintains that reality exists independent of man's capacity to grasp it. "...neither Marx, Engels nor Lenin subscribed to the logic I have put forth..."25 Yet he sees the empirical approach of the objectivists as complementary to the hermeneutic one in sociology and the two 'alternating lenses' related as "nested frames". "...we should never allow ourselves
to ignore the fact that a nested hierarchy of lenses - one artificial and one given - is the more fundamental epistemological paradigm.\(^{28}\) His recommendations that the dialectical sociologist operate from within a plurality of self images coincides with an epistemological relativism (3b). Finally, his acceptance of the reflexive and emergent character of reality implies a commitment to the essentialist view - one where potential, the negation of the 'here and now' appearances or actualities is the fundamental condition (3c).

category 4  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a) sociology is a value free activity
  \item b) sociology is committed
\end{itemize}

On the question of value freedom, Friedrichs is plainly in favour of the committed stance in social research (4b). "It should be abundantly clear by now that those involved in social research are incapable, even in principle, of disengaging themselves..."\(^{29}\)

category 5  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a) sociology is a nomothetic discipline
  \item b) sociology is idiographic
  \item c) both complement each other
\end{itemize}

Friedrichs envisages a dual epistemology, where "the ideographic in human experience...is in dynamic relationship to the nomothetic..."\(^{30}\)(5c). Elsewhere, however, he writes that "conceptual closure, violates the openness of dialectical theory,"\(^{31}\) and that "...the search for "laws" of human nature and for \underline{fundamental} social processes that are in \underline{principle} stable is ultimately destined to be futile."\(^{32}\)
category 6  a) explanation is deductive  
   b) it is probabilistic  
   c) it is functional  
   d) it is genetic  
   e) it is dialectical

In the tradition of Hempel the essential characteristic of formal deductive explanation can be said to be that the explanandum is a logically necessary consequent of the premises or explanans, which assert sufficient and sometimes necessary conditions for its occurrence. In order to predict, it is necessary to have explained deductively.

Probabilistic or inductive statistical explanation may permit predictions of events within certain limits of probability, but at its weakest it suggests mere tendencies.

Functional explanation is teleological, and characteristically identifies as the cause of an event some end-state of the system of which that event is a part.

In genetic explanation each stage is linked to its successor by means of a general principle which makes the occurrence of the latter a likely probability given the former.

A definition of dialectical explanation is hard to come by, however Bunge recognises it as a possibility.

Typically dialectical explanation consists in the exposure of inward and outward conflicts that keep certain processes running, or that bring about the emergence of entities endowed with new qualities... dialectical explanations employ some other categories of determination such as interaction and causation...

Allardt points out that dialectical explanation falls midway between causal and finalistic or teleological explanation.

Friedrichs speaks of dialectical explanation in these terms (6e):
Whenever a social scientist does isolate a specific manifestation of order in the social world, his awareness of that order represents an entirely new factor in that world and will feed back, through his own actions and the actions of those to whom he communicates that awareness, to deny to some degree the full validity of that order in the future. 36

category 7  a) the outcome of explanation is prediction
   b) the outcome of explanation (or description) is understanding
   c) the outcome of understanding is action

Explanation and description are not clearly distinguished by Friedrichs whose historical leaning is strong. He sees the goal of understanding as consciousness raising - an enlightened awareness of the human condition with liberating or "therapeutic" social action as its consequence (7c).

category 8  a) sociological methods are empirical
   b) are hermeneutic or interpretive
   c) both methods complement each other

Friedrichs observes that both methods are used and that they complement each other (8c).

...scientists and non-scientists alike - register experiences that cluster about the complementary poles of the intra-subjective and the intersubjective, the unique and the recurrent, the existential and the rational. Given a preference for efficient prediction, some...will use a polarised lens to filter out the first of each pair, and focus simply upon the second, projecting order over time in the manner of science. Given the opposite aim - the delineation of the intra-subjective, unique and existential in experience - a complementary lens may be substituted that blocks the opposite polarities... 37
While Friedrichs insists that both empirical and hermeneutic methods play complementary roles in social research, he plays up the importance of human meaning and the reasons for action (10) rather than the causal properties of social situations. The immanent is also acknowledged however (11); for along with Mead, Friedrichs would go

...beyond the natural scientific assumption that effects could at least in principle be reduced to their causes, by arguing that there was in the effect an 'emergent' that in turn would condition the context such that the so-called 'effect' was incapable of being deduced from the so-called 'cause'.

Friedrichs appreciates the problem of alienation, but does not explore the related issue of false-consciousness or Merton's distinction between latent and manifest meaning levels (0).

Friedrichs pulls away from objective determinism in favour of an active role for the human subject. The dialectic that he advocates nevertheless does involve a reciprocal determination (13c).
category 14  a) the whole determines the nature of the parts
    b) the parts determine the nature of the whole
    c) part and whole are reciprocally determining

Item 14a represents the standard functionalist line, but the
sympathy of the liberal Friedrichs lies more with individual
part rather than the whole or system. Again, however,
complementarity is the rule (14c).

category 15  a) social analysis is diachronic
    b) social analysis is synchronic
    c) both complement each other

These are favoured terms of the structuralists, Piaget and
Levi-Strauss. Friedrichs dismisses static structural or
synchronic analysis and insists that the social is always
ongoing and open ended - "a stream of empirical events,"
(15a).

category 16  a) the dialectic is a method
    b) the dialectic is reality
    c) it describes both
    d) it describes the interaction of both

Friedrichs recognises that the term dialectic describes
both social methods and social reality, and the interaction
which this implies. "...the epistemology of our sociological
calling is as fundamentally interactive, and thus as capable
of transcending the yoke of compulsive order, as is our
subject matter" (16d).29

category 17  a) dialectics rejects formal logic
    b) dialectics uses formal logic

In Aristotelian logic, the law of identity serves to fix
a symbol to its referent, A=A. The law of contradiction
specifies that A and its negation, not -A, cannot overlap,
because this would challenge the law of identity. The law
of the excluded middle asserts that no third term can exist between A and not-A. A dialectical logic however, would be based on the possibility that A may = not-A. Friedrichs believes that formal logic should be supplanted by dialectical logic in (some) social analyses (17a). "For Hegel's formulation of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis trinity does appear to be the peculiar logic in question..."40 A practical dialectical logic for sociology has not yet been devised.

category 18 a) the motive force in dialectical logic is simple contradiction
b) it is multiple contradiction
c) it is some other factor

Conventionally, the dialectic, including Marx's is moved by an internal contradiction, that is, a term in logical opposition to another. The notions of irony and paradox often found in literary allusions to the dialectic are corollaries of the logic of contradiction. If two terms are opposites in reality then they are contraries (18c) not contradictories. Many authors use the term contradiction for what should in fact be called a contrary. The analytic ratings follow author usage here and not logical usage of the term. In other words if an author speaks of contradiction he is rated as referring to contradiction even if this is in fact a contrary or other factor. Recently, the French structuralists who follow Mao Tse Tung in this matter, have introduced the notion of multiple contradiction and over-determination. Friedrichs does not identify a motive force of the dialectic but he makes frequent reference to its paradoxical nature (18a).
Engels attempted to substantiate the working of the dialectic within physics and chemistry. Marx's early usage of the term located it at the point of involvement of man with the physical world, that is work, production or praxis, was the proto-typical dialectical mode. The interpretation of history that was his later pre-occupation, lifted the dialectical process to an institutional level where it characterized the struggle between social classes. While not rejecting the 'macro' historical process, Sartre has concentrated on the intersubjective dialectic between individuals. In Freud and Mead a dialectic between the components of the individual psyche is implicit. To regard the dialectic as a thought process is to return to Hegel, though modern cognitive psychologists such as Festinger would appear to assume a similar phenomenon. The structural-functional concern is with the institutional level, a by-product of the collective consciousness. The structural dialectic proper is motivated by the essential, immanent properties of a collective unconscious, an infra-structural model.

Friedrichs rejects the materialist notion of a dialectic operating in nature, and although he does not dismiss the Marxian dialectic at the level of production, his emphasis
is on a dialectic of the intersubjective and of cognition or reflection (22), (24): "...social research actually stands within the dialectic that is social interaction..." Gurvitch, Sartre, Berger and Luckmann are his mentors here.

category 26 the law of the interpenetration of opposites is recognised
27 the negation of the negation is recognised
28 the law of emergence is recognised

These 'dialectical laws' which were developed mainly by Engels, connect the logic and the ontology of dialectics. The law of the interpenetration of opposites entails that all entities, being complexes of opposing elements and forces, exist in a state of continuous self-transformation. The law of the negation of the negation involves the thesis-antithesis-synthesis sequence, each synthesis resolving the contradictions that emerged during the previous phase. The law of emergence or the transformation of quantity to quality and vice versa, implies that cumulative quantitative change may, once a certain point is reached, precipitate a new quality which is not mechanically reducible to the matter from which it emerged.

Although Friedrichs does not list the dialectical laws as such, he does acknowledge the significance of polarity, interpenetration, negation and emergence in other dialectical writing, (26), (27), (28).

category 29 a) the dialectic relates to a systems model
b) it relates to a conflict model

Friedrichs prefers the more 'open' conflict model of society (29c) to the systems model. Nevertheless, again he advocates
a "dialogical" complementarity of these. "Neither "system" nor "conflict" need be denied; rather they become necessary elements in a larger dialectical gestalt."\(^{43}\)

category 30  a) dialectics offers an exemplar
    b) dialectics is only a perspective

A Sociology of Sociology does not pretend to dialectics as an exemplar or concrete method of problem solving, it is seen only as a perspective (30b). Later work by Friedrichs attempts to amend this.

selection of material

Having now articulated the features of Friedrichs' 'dialectical paradigm', it remains to survey contemporary dialectical writing, find its common strands, and compare this with Friedrichs' vision.

It will be recalled that the conclusion to his summary biography of sociology was the expectation that a dialectical paradigm, unencumbered by any ideological cast, should gain prominence as the Sixties move into the Seventies. The material with which he attempted to demonstrate this assertion was however fairly slight. He mentioned four acknowledged dialecticians - Gurvitch, Sartre, Berger and Luckmann, each of whom show radical variations of approach. Three old guard sociologists, Mead, Mannheim and Merton, were called in. He listed a group of systems theorists interested in dialectical notions such as polarity, negation and conflict. The phenomenologists Schütz and Tiryakian were acknowledged, as were the 'transcendentalist' Frankfurt group. Finally there were the methodologists, who had
little else in common but the recognition that 'understanding' of the nature of events in a social process is 'a new variable' which may affect the outcome of that process. All of this received additional significance because it was viewed through a cloud of resurgent interest in the humanist writing of the young Marx.

A comprehensive search of the literature beginning with the Sociological Abstracts a decade before the appearance of A Sociology of Sociology revealed a large amount of material that Friedrichs had not accounted for. A cursory review however, showed that not all of it was relevant to the project at hand. The Index to the abstracts conventionally uses two headings: Dialectics and Dialectical Materialism. The work under the latter head consists in the main of publications from the Eastern European journals Sociologicky Casopsis in Czech, Sociologija in Serbian, the Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta and Filosofskye nauki in Russian. An occasional article from the West following the Soviet line also appears here and so do specific criticisms of Marxist theory. This body of work is not appropriate for inclusion in the present assessment of the dialectical paradigm though, because in Friedrichs' terms, it is not free of an ideological cast. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that "The freedom that adheres to the fullest application of a dialectical logic is no more welcome to the dogmatic materialist than it is to the presumptive systems theorist." And while Friedrichs at times entertains the possibility of a convergence of Marxist and non-Marxist sociology under the dialectical
paradigm, the communist response to this, judging from reports of the 1970 International Sociological Association Conference at Varna where his thesis was delivered, is one of cool indifference.\textsuperscript{45} Meanwhile, some of the publications listed under Dialectics are consistent in bias and content with those under the Diamat classification. It has been assumed that these were incorrectly indexed, so these also are excluded from the present investigation.

Several other considerations have shaped the selection of material. Works using 'dialectic' in its ancient sense of debate or dialogue are omitted. Works in which the dialectic refers to a philosophy of history, a theory of political or economic change, or a psychological process, in other words, where the context of the term is non-sociological, a publication is eliminated. Criticisms of the dialectic are also excluded, because the present search is for adherents of the tradition. Secondary sources, reviews and evaluations, while not disregarded are used only as points of reference for primary dialectical thinkers. Finally, in order to tailor the scope of the present investigation, which is already wide, no works published before 1960 are included for consideration.

A preliminary reading of the material reveals that the dialectic has crossed paths recently with several discrete intellectual traditions - existentialist, structuralist, even functionalist social theorists have toyed with the notion. For this reason, the exposition which follows falls naturally into a series of chapters each devoted to a particular school of thought. A matrix summarising the formal characteristics of each author follows each chapter.
THE REVIEW:

DIALECTICS 1960-1972
HERMENEUTIC DIALECTICS

GROSS

SOROKIN
Hermeneutics is the art of understanding through interpretation. The hermeneutic dialectic originates from the Platonic dialectical mode which has been described as "...a movement of the mind...through dialogue and discussion, for the clarification of a concept...". The process involves a "tacking between perspectives" at various "altitudes" of generalization.

In Europe the hermeneutic tradition has joined the emancipatory exercise of the sociology of knowledge. American interest in it appears to be an expression of homespun philosophic pragmatism.

The first sociologist to write in favour of an hermeneutic dialectic was Llewellyn Gross in the American Journal of Sociology, 1961. His article, an extended version of a conference paper presented to the sociological establishment, is entitled 'Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework for Sociology'. Gross is deeply disturbed by the lack of intellectual awareness that marks professional sociology. The relevant questions are simply not being asked, he says, and he sees his "neo-dialectical framework" as a panacea to this, (16a, 24).

In Gross' view, Hegel and Marx had worked with an "historically restricted species of dialectical theory". His own more general framework, which might be called...
"perspectival assessment" or "contextual appraisal", is ancient in its inspiration and involves a procedure whereby every problem is confronted by a multiplicity of contending and opposing theoretical alternatives (1b). Gross advocates imaginative conjecture, rhetoric, non-demonstrative inference, and a form of validation that would take into account both artistically and scientifically motivated endeavour (2b). He does not spell out the details of this proposal but admits that it extends well beyond conventional rules of logic and criteria of credibility (17a).

Perspectival assessment is a species of semantic clarification. Gross writes that every assertion has to deal with an indeterminate range of meanings issuing from it, since every concept is itself a composition of contexts each calling for assessment. Sentences may appear logically contradictory but will not be found to be inconsistent in intended meanings after contextual analysis of customary usage is carried out (8b). Terms representing "dialectical relationships" such as interaction, isolation, domination, differentiation, equalization, adaptation, need to be tidied up "in respect to contexts of meaning, and transitional qualities" lest they be assumed to be "simple unilinear processes" (7b).

The sociologist who is interested in working within a neo-dialectical framework should ask the following questions according to Gross (30b):

1. What are the opposites implied by a sociological term, proposition or scheme (26)?
2. What are the transitional or intermediate regions through which opposites are joined to one another?
3. Where are the contexts of opposition and apposition that appear at various levels of logical and empirical analysis?

4. What are the methodological and substantive principles through which opposites can be integrated, synthesized or unified?

5. What opposites are given priority by being treated as premises or antecedents for analysis?

He recommends this sort of analysis for substantive issues such as associative and dissociative processes: the dynamics of attraction and repulsion: work on the convergence of modal personalities with socio-cultural prescriptions: and the rural urban dichotomy as it affects the community.

There is an implicit dialectic in sociological writing, Gross maintains, and it occurs mainly in symposia, editorials, reviews and rejoinders, wherever there is debate, actual or contrived and analysis of coincidence and divergence. However, when Gross proceeds to record what he considers are the "neo-dialectical instances" in sociological theory, then his understanding of the notion stretches towards some sort of dialectic beyond the purely semantic function.

He begins with Bendix and Berger's exploration of "polar concepts" in sociology (26). Of more interest though, are the writers he sees as tending to use "a broader dialectical reference": Mannheim, for example, who sought objectivity through a "synthesis" of perspectives and whose ideology and utopia were "ideas which transcend the existing social order" (28): Simmel, who viewed "conflict as unity" (29c): Sorokin, with his cultural systems (29c) ideational, sensate and idealistic, representing the triad of "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" (27): and Pareto who focused on
cycles of integration and decay and posed the "mutually inconsistent" residues and derivations. Gross regards Parsons' dichotomous pattern variables as neo-dialectical, while Merton's contrasts of latent and manifest (12), his stress on "diversity and interconnection" in theory and procedure, complete the account. 53

Gross loses grasp of his "neo-dialectical frame" during his exposition and indeed, he admits there are no real guidelines. Nevertheless, his conclusion is momentous: the new metatheoretical framework will withstand the interplay of alternatives as various as positivism, behaviourism, organicism, formalism and functionalism. In fact, he has succeeded merely in opening the forum for debate.

Pitrim Sorokin's text Sociological Theories of Today (1966) has a whole section devoted to dialectical writing which he regards as in renaissance, both in the West and among Soviet scholars. Sorokin traces the historical sources of the dialectic in Eastern mysticism and in Western theology. Much of his survey is drawn from Gurvitch's Dialectique et sociologie (1962) which he gives generous commentary to, followed by briefer accounts of Sartre and the sociology of polarities developed by Kuhne (1958). 55

Following Gurvitch Sorokin feels that dialectics is not necessarily part of any one philosophical tradition (1a). On the other hand, the wide divergence of meanings given to the term and the reinterpretations of it by van den Berghe (1963) and Dahrendorf (1959) have blurred its
distinguishing characteristics beyond repair. For instance, their stress on endogenous change as peculiarly dialectical is misleading, since this is a common feature of theories of historical change. The author's second caution is that exponents of dialectics have indiscriminately applied the term to many levels or classes of totality and their subdivisions. Thirdly, he notes that polar-dualistic and triadic typologies of social systems have been extremely common in German sociological writing and that such schemes do not necessarily involve a dialectic. Conflict, even alienation, Sorokin feels, can be studied satisfactorily without resort to dialectics. The phase which succeeds an alienated state need not necessarily be a swing to its opposite, but simply a "different phase". Sorokin accuses the dialecticians of making vague and general statements about totalizations, interpenetrations and equilibriums, without any serious study of "basic socio-cultural processes" (5a, 29a). They do not ask how and why these social systems originate, become organised and adjust to change. His fifth criticism identifies the traditional application of the term 'dialectics' to both method and object of comprehension as a logical confusion.

In Sorokin's view there is no distinct dialectical logic or method which might replace the laws of formal logic, rather he feels the former should be seen as a special category of the latter (16a, 17b, 24). Its specific function would be directed at:
a. making explicit the implicit tensions and multi-meaningfulness hidden in many concepts of class phenomena, especially of socio-cultural class phenomena (7b,30b),

b. and in clarifying the correlations and mutual implications of the meanings of many concepts, that otherwise, when taken alone, without reference to their correlative concepts, are meaningless, as the concept of the absolute is meaningless without its correlative concept of the relative... 57

Enlarging on this statement, Sorokin describes the deficiency of extreme, unidimensional interpretations of phenomena, the behaviourist position might be a case in point. The corrective dialectical analysis will reveal the complementary dimensions within the matter.

His summary evaluation is that "the program " has had its most successful excursion in the realm of the "infinitely multi-dimensional, total, ultimate reality", which encounter has shown the impossibility of defining the total reality by finite concepts (3c). More mystifying is his addenda that "For the same reasons, dialectical logic has been fruitfully applied to the analysis of general multi-dimensional classes of socio-cultural phenomena..." and such application is notably enhanced, if and when used hand in hand with empirical methods (8c)...." 58 Finally, he charges the dialectician to go beyond "mummified" Hegelian-Marxian schemes and study the "multiple rhythms of socio-cultural systems".

The writing of Gross and Sorokin is scholarly in tone, but heavy and repetitious in style and woolly in comprehension. Further still, it is peculiarly out of touch with contemporary developments in both dialectics and hermeneutics.
<table>
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Comments on the Summaries

The two hermeneutic dialecticians share four principal characteristics.* They use the terms explanation and description as interchangeable; they regard heightened understanding as the appropriate end of this interpretive process or dialectic; and since they see this as a method only and not a description of a thing 'in reality' itself, it is thus a cognitive phenomenon here, a perspective.

Gross' recognition of the dialectic as a purely hermeneutic exercise or method on the one hand, and his acknowledgement of special "dialectical relations" such as interaction, adaptation, the "transcendant" and the "mutually inconsistent", is somewhat problematic. Again, his rejection of formal logic scarcely complies with the implicit acceptance of the 'scientific' systems model in his work.

Sorokin makes similar mistakes combining his comprehension of the dialectic as method, with reference to some "infinitely multi-dimensional total, ultimate reality", a dialectic of reality based on a latent essentialism which again is hard to reconcile with the systems approach.

* A principal or cardinal feature is indicated where there is acknowledgement of an item by at least two-thirds of the authors in a cluster.
Another Republican derivative is the critical dialectic commanded by the group of German sociologists known as the Frankfurt School. Based on an empiricalist or positivist philosophy, the critical world view rejects that any actuality in favour of the potentiality in all thought and being.

During the sixties, a debate flared up in European circles between the critical theorists, led by Adorno, and the analytic-positivists, led by Karl Popper. The construction of the unanswerable world view can never be completed. Some of the debate is published in what follows.

Critical Dialectics

Marcuse
Adorno
Hansen
Habermas
Schütte

The Dimensional Man (1964) is an application of the critical dialectic by an expatriate member of the School, Herbert Marcuse. The study is an extensive attack on advanced technological societies and their intellectual culture, including the philosophy of science.

Marcuse returns to Greece and beyond him to those strands of classical Greek philosophy in which the world, being, is visualized as antinomous within itself, subjected with end and negativity (ibid., 280). Classical dialectics, he stresses, reflect this ontological duality in its preoccupation with opposites such as being and non-being, norm and fact, potentiality and actuality. The book...
Another Hegelian derivative is the critical dialectic expounded by the group of German sociologists known as the Frankfurt School. Based on an essentialist or negative philosophy, the critical world view rejects fact and actuality in favour of the potentiality that inheres in all thought and being.

During the Sixties, a debate flared up in European circles between this group of dialecticians, led by Adorno, and the analytic-empiricists, led by Karl Popper. The contention, a product of two incommensurable world views, has never been settled. Some of the debate is reflected in what follows. 59

One Dimensional Man (1964) is an application of the critical dialectic by an expatriate member of the School, Herbert Marcuse. 60 The study is an exhaustive attack on advanced technological societies and their intellectual culture, including the philosophy of science.

Marcuse returns to Hegel and beyond him to those strands of classical Greek philosophy in which the world, Being, is visualised as antagonistic within itself, afflicted with want and negativity (1c, 29b). Classical discourse, he observes, reflected this ontological duality in its preoccupation with opposites such as Being and non-Being, essence and fact, potentiality and actuality. Its logic
was responsive to the flux of reality, and meaning too, in the Platonic dialectic, was something "gradually structured in the process of communication...never closed" (16d, 17a, 24). But if the laws of thought were the laws of reality, this identity, because of the antagonistic nature of things, implied also the contradiction of reality by thought. Marcuse puts it this way. The objects of thought are identical in content and meaning with, and yet different from the real objects of immediate experience. 'Identical' inasmuch as the concept is the result of reflection which has understood the thing in the context of other things which did not appear in the immediate experience, and which 'explain' the thing (mediation). What is not immediately given in experience, but inherent to the concept is potentiality (3c, 11); "...terms have many meanings because the conditions to which they refer have many sides, implications and effects which cannot be insulated and stabilized." This silent potentiality within the concept gives it a transitive meaning - beyond mere descriptive reference to the object; the concept contains alternatives which may subvert the given state (26, 27). Further than this, "the subversive character of truth inflicts upon thought an imperative quality...is implies an ought." Theory implies practice (7c). "This contradictory two dimensional style of thought is the inner form, not only of dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes to grips with reality (18a)." Paradoxically, the critical intention of this practical philosophy leads
When historical content enters into the dialectical concept and determines methodologically its development and function, dialectical thought attains the concreteness which links the structure of thought to that of reality. Logical truth becomes historical truth. The ontological tension between essence and appearance, between 'is' and 'ought' becomes historical tension, and the 'inner negativity' of the object — world is understood as the work of the historical subject — man, in his struggle with nature and society (13a, 15a). Reason becomes historical Reason.65

The formal logic of Aristotle, while remaining partly committed to the classical metaphysics, abstracted unity or identity from the tension of opposites; neutralised the material content and sought a universal validity for propositional forms and their connections. The neutralisation of the content factor, though expressing an indifference towards the object itself, made it amenable to symbolisation and discursive treatment. Along with the removal of context, the latent "ought" was removed, and attention turned from "final" to "first" causes. The move towards symbolisation and calculability was a move towards instrumentality and manipulation.66 Philosophy had been born of the search for the good life, that is, life in accordance with the essence of man. "Scientific thought had to break this union of value judgement and analysis, for it became increasingly clear that the philosophic values did not guide the organisation of society nor the transformation of nature."67
The formal logical proposition \( s = p \) disguises a dialectical proposition which states the negative character of empirical reality (3c). Dialectical thought thus "denies the concreteness of immediate experience", secondly, it appears antithetical to science because it contains a judgement that condemns the established reality. But, this judgement is imposed upon dialectical thought by its very faithfulness to the object. Dialectical logic cannot be formal because it is determined by the real, which is concrete...it is the rationality of contradiction, of the opposition of forces, tendencies, elements, which constitutes the movement of the real, and if comprehended, the concept of the real (26).68

"The stuff of thought is historical stuff no matter how abstract, general or pure it may become in philosophic or scientific theory."69 This experiential stuff is the conceptual universal, but its universality is not a formal one, it is constituted in the relationships between subject and object world. Logical abstraction thus calls for sociological abstraction (5a).

For the factors in the facts are not immediate data of observation, measurement and interrogation. They become data only in an analysis which is capable of identifying the structure that holds together the parts and processes of society and that determines their interrelation...Analysis of the meaning of a term or form demands its development in a multidimensional universe, where any expressed meaning partakes of several interrelated, over-lapping and antagonistic 'systems'. For example, it belongs:
(a) to an individual project...
(b) to an established supra-individual system of ideas...
(c) to a particular society which itself integrates different and even conflicting individual and supra-individual projects.
And so to Marcuse's judgement of contemporary society.

He regards society as a "whole", which exerts power over the individual (14a). "It has its empirical hard core in the system of institutions, which are established and frozen relationships among men."70 Society shapes itself through an historical project or choice among alternatives, which results from the activity of dominant interests within it.21 The techno-society is the latent expression of such a project - that of the organisation and transformation of the world (25). But "the technological a priori is a political a priori, inasmuch as the transformation of nature involves that of man, and inasmuch as the 'man made creations' issue from and re-enter the societal ensemble."71 The project determines too, the whole universe of discourse and action, intellectual and material; it determines what attitudes and skills are desirable - social needs thus become individual needs, and the opposition between private and public interest dissolves. With this internalisation of the social, individual alienation reaches new depths. The totalitarian features of these developments reveal the so-called neutrality of technology to be a lie (12). The productive apparatus has become in fact, an irrational force "destructive of the free development of human needs and faculties..."72

The technological project introduces what Marcuse calls a closing of the political universe. The chief manifestations of this are close cooperation between government and large corporations; the fusion of economic planning with military
alliances and technical assistance programs; and internally
the assimilation and neutralisation of sectional interests
under the impact of domestic media. The sense of societal
cohesion is enhanced by an ever-present "threat" in the
foreign relations sphere. "This absorption of ideology
into reality does not, however, signify 'the end of ideology'...
today, the ideology is in the process of production
itself."73 There is an enormous growth of parasitical and
alienated structures which rationalise the intentional waste
of this society shaped by advertising, public relations and
planned obsolescence. Marcuse notes that every aspect of
the technological culture conforms to its functional
requirements (14a). Literature reveals a flattening of
the opposition between everyday social reality and other
"transcendant" dimensions of experience. The linguistic
constructions themselves demonstrate the pervasive logic
of domination: "They have in common a telescoping and
abridgement of syntax which cuts off development of meaning
by creating fixed images which impose themselves with an
overwhelming and petrified concreteness."74 This expression
through images works against conceptualisation and hence
against thinking itself. Language use becomes anti-critical
and un-dialectical, for as Marcuse reminds us it is the
concept which "denies the identification of the thing with
its function; and distinguishes that which the thing is
from the contingent functions of the thing in established
reality."75 Philosophy too works in the service of the
instrumental mentality. Its function, as that of psychology
and sociology, is a therapeutic one, concerned with the
exposure of absurdities, illusions, and oddities, but at
the same time, it is entirely non-theoretical: description
alone is considered feasible, and should take the place of
explanation. 76

The corresponding developments in the philosophy of
science have the same paradoxical outcomes. The physicist's
"matter" appears to fade into mathematical and topographical
"relations". He uses a vocabulary of events, projections,
possibilities. But these are "meaningfully objective only
for a subject - not only in terms of observability and
measurability, but in terms of the very structure of the
event of relationships. In other words, the subject here
involved is a constituting one..." 77 Methodologically,
this trend leads to a suspension of inquiry into the "nature
of reality" and an emphasis on the specific operations
required to deal with it - a functional approach. Marcuse's
summation nevertheless is that the scientific method is so
far the only method to claim practical success (8c). Its
unfortunate aspect, he feels, is that the domination of
nature it has promoted has led to the domination of man.
What is called for, he urges, is a "redefinition of values
in technical terms as elements in the technological process
(4b)". 78

Sociological research under the domination of the
operationalist mentality, has likewise entered into the
uncritical and therefore ideological "empiricism" of the
sciences. Its analysis of social conditions is deceptively
concrete because it treats facts removed from their theoretical context (2b). This approach would be harmless if the given social form were the ultimate frame of reference for theory and practice - but obviously, in the light of Marcuse's critique of society, it is not. Marcuse reflects on the classical and influential study in labour relations made at the Hawthorn Works of the Western Electric Company (30a). The original researchers, he finds, considered that workers' complaints such as "the washrooms are unsanitary" or "rates are too low", were vague and seemed to lack "objective reference" to "standards" generally accepted. The researchers thus proceeded to reformulate or "operationalise" these statements in order to designate accurately the particular situations from which they had arisen, and the particular actions that would be needed to change these conditions. The universal concept of 'wages' would thus be reduced to "B's present earnings"...

the personal discontent is (thus) isolated from the general unhappiness...the worker B, once his medical bills have been taken care of, will recognise that, generally speaking, wages are not too low, and that they were a hardship only in his individual situation. His case has been subsumed under another genus - that of personal hardship cases. [By contrast] the untranslated statement, established a concrete relation between the particular case and the whole of which it is a case - and this whole includes the conditions outside the respective job...80

This elimination of the universal and hence transitive concept has meant only one thing - suppression of the Reason which is history (6c).
Certainly the most obscure addition to critical dialectics has come from Theodor Adorno. His *Negative Dialectics*, published in 1966, would leave behind the notion of a dialectic which produces something positive by means of negation, supplanting a further negative for it—and this is the key to the title of his book (27). This vast work embraces a critique of Heidegger's ontology, Kant's conception of freedom, and Hegel's logic and philosophy of history. The models of "negative dialectics" Adorno promises at the beginning of the book are really remedial essays in these areas expressing their author's determination to emancipate dialectics from the philosophy of Hegel. His dialectic aligns itself with Marx's historical materialism, denying both the positive Marxists' primacy of matter and the existentialists' primacy of the subject (1c, 15a).

*Dialectics*, Adorno writes, begins with the fact that an object is never totally accounted for by its concept—subject and object, for example, "constitute one another as concepts as much as by virtue of such constitution they depart from each other" (13c, 16d, 24). The first premise here is the untruth of identity (17a). Yet, to think, is to identify. Aristotleian logic and its law of the excluded middle are based on this assumption and whatever is inconsistent with it is termed contradiction. Dialectics, on the other hand, is "the consistent use of non-identity", and this is where Adorno parts company with Hegel, for the latter, he feels, was still under the sway of "the identity philosophy":

81
82
83
In Hegel there was a coincidence of identity and positivity; the inclusion of all non-identical and objective things in a subjectivity expanded and exalted into an absolute spirit was to effect the reconcilement...it is precisely the insatiable identity principle that perpetrates antagonism by suppressing contradiction (18a).84

For Hegel, the negation of the negation produced a positive—a schema borrowed from the logic of the formal mathematics that he was supposed to have rejected. But this leads straight back to consequential thinking, argues Adorno. Further than this, it gives weight to "the methodology of science", which uncritically, comes to be called philosophy (26).

Paradoxically, Adorno describes negative dialectics as more positive in its allegiance to the object than positivism:

Dialectically...cognition seeks to say what something is, while identitarian thinking says what something comes under, what it exemplifies or represents, and what, accordingly, it is not itself. The more relentlessly our identitarian thinking besets its object, the further will it take us from the identity of the object (36, 8b, 11).85

In this book, dialectics is anti-system, it is not even a standpoint. Rather it entails an attitude of philosophic self-reflection (30b). Its rationale is this: the revolution failed, now it is time to "understand" (7b).

A lesser known sociologist, James Hansen, joined the critique of empiricism with his article in Catalyst, 1967.86 Empiricists such as Nagel and Hook tell us to submit our findings to the
experimental procedures of science for "verification"; psychologists insist on use of the "laboratory" or "computer"; sociologists collect "data"; philosophers urge that even ethical claims should be supported "scientifically". Only after such verification are claims considered meaningful, yet Hansen points out, what these vaguely delineated slogans really mean, is a question that is never asked.

Hansen expands: the empiricist outlook is based on a view of the world of "facts" as "objectively given". Objectivity or meaning is thought of as inherent to the object itself, rather than, as the phenomenologists would say, "intersubjectively constituted" (3b). This is not to deny the existence of a "referendum external to consciousness" of course the dialectician is not to be confused with the idealist. But what the dialectician sees before him is the empiricist unwittingly trapped in a "fetishism of facts and objects...created to serve his own interests" in the first place. As Engels put it "...it is precisely the alteration of nature by men...which is the most essential and immediate basis of human thought...". Such inquiry is inevitably value laden, linked as it is to specifically generated human needs (4b).

The notion of 'fact' is thus, for the dialectician, relative to some historically evolved theory or way of seeing. And the empiricists' emphasis on "correct procedure" stands in sharp contrast to the dialecticians' theoretical and methodological pluralism. It leads to a
view of science as static, resembling Kuhn's "normal scientific activity", as opposed to an open ended variety of research. This is not to say that dialectics is synonymous with cognitive anarchy. The dialectician is "...bound by certain natural or ontological conditions", though these may change. What he tries to avoid is "setting up particular criteria as the criteria".

It is a condition of closed empirical research that facts be "consistent" with theories, yet as Feyerabend remarks, what this implies is that a new theory may be eliminated...

...not because it is in disagreement with the facts, but because it is in disagreement with another theory, a theory moreover, whose confirming instances it shares. It thereby makes the as yet untested part of that theory a measure of validity...[and] contributes to the preservation of the old and familiar.88

Hansen observes that even piecemeal knowledge, "the result of a lot of running around by fact-collectors" is grounded in theoretical presupposition and there is no getting away from it.

The cumulative character of empirical knowledge leads it into yet further reification - the view of a hierarchical relationship between the sciences (2b). Nagel writes, "The objective of the reduction is to show that the laws or general principles of the secondary science are simply logical consequences of the assumptions of the primary sciences."89 By contrast, the dialectician pulls away from the structure of actuality and explores potentiality (3c) - Feyerabend describes the implications of this:
Dialectical philosophers have always emphasised the need not to think in a "mechanical" way, that is, in a framework whose concepts are precisely defined and kept stable in any argument, and they have pointed out that arguments precipitating progress usually terminate in concepts that are very different indeed from the concepts in which the question was originally formulated (17a). They have also paid due attention to the fact that the development of our knowledge presupposes the development of at least two alternative systems of thought, of a thesis and of an anti-thesis (26).90

Hansen summarises his perspective (30b): in place of a fetishistic enslavement of man by the sciences he has created, dialectical or negative thinking pre-supposes investigation into the nature of concepts themselves (24), and thus offers an escape from the contemporary subjugation to the "given".

Jurgen Habermas is the third member of the Frankfurt School to provide a normative dialectical framework for social science (30b). Habermas' work is yet another argument with the prevailing positivist theory of knowledge but this one is based on an anthropological reconstruction of the dialectic of theory and practice. This contribution to the "critical theory" developed in his Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968),91 rests on a phenomenological modification of the Marxist notion of material synthesis or human development through labour and is achieved by the reinstatement of reflection as a self-realizing activity.92

Habermas' normative anthropology is summarised in five theses:
The achievements of the transcendental subject (13a) have their basis in the natural history of the human species. Knowledge equally serves as an instrument and transcends mere self-preservation. Knowledge constitutive interests take form in the medium of work, language and power. In the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest are one. The unity of knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic that takes the historical traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been repressed (16d). 93

The knowledge constitutive interests (4b) named in the theses are seen by Habermas as basic "moments" in the dialectic of social evolution (14a, 15a). They are of three kinds - technical, practical and emancipatory, corresponding to the three media-work (20), language and power (21, 24). 94 Leaving aside the emancipatory interest (23) for the moment, it becomes apparent that what Habermas has done is to replace Marx's notions of forces and relations of production with his own notions of instrumental and normative activity - labour and social interaction. This move returns to the Hegelian emphasis on the dialectics of moral life and brings his thinking into line with the Weber-Parsons sociological emphasis on systems of action (1c, 29a).

Instrumental action is purposive rational action guided by empirical knowledge and technical rules. Social action is expressive action guided by intersubjectively shared meanings and rules, including roles. The latter rules are
not reducible to the technical rules, and so a dual epistemology replaces the Marxist reductionist model of substructure determining superstructure. In turn, the overthrow of the substructure is not sufficient to liberate men from the constraints on them; for these arise from conventional distortions and blockages in language and culture.

While instrumental action corresponds to the constraint of external nature and the level of the forces of production determines the extent of technical control over natural forces, communicative action stands in correspondence to the suppression of man's own nature. Only a reflective comprehension of these historically evolved behavioural and conceptual schemes can release the individual from their influence. This critical activity constitutes the emancipatory cognitive interest.

Habermas develops his critical sociology around Horkheimer's distinction between critical and traditional theory. The traditional notion of pure theory which should inform action is misconceived. Both the natural and social sciences have tried to operate with such an assumption - a theory which comprehends reality as structured and independent of the life processes of the knower. This objectivist attitude is called positivism in the natural sciences, historicism in social science, and phenomenology is only another variant of it. The renunciation of the practical life aspect in scientific thinking is indicated by the term value-freedom, but at the same time,
...it presupposes the transcendental framework that is the precondition of the meaning of the validity of such propositions. As soon as these statements are understood in relation to the prior frame of reference to which they are affixed, the objectivist illusion dissolves and makes visible a knowledge constitutive interest (26).98

The empirico-analytic sciences incorporate an instrumental interest, that of technological rationality. But science and technology have become self legitimating authorities owing to the uncritical epistemology of positivism, and so this fact is disguised. The historical hermeneutic sciences incorporate a practical cognitive interest, which is the basis of understanding in both everyday life and in the scientific community. Hence the dual model, described above, simply reverses the order of reduction by replacing the materialist dynamic with a normative one.

Explanation in the empirico-analytic sciences is deductive; in the historical hermeneutic sciences it tends to be narrative. As for sociology, Habermas distinguishes two types of explanatory activity: the systematic sciences of social action which proceed as does nomological science (2a), and on the other hand, the critical sociology which should reach "...beyond this goal, to determine when the... invariant regularities of social action...express ideologically frozen relationships of dependence that can in principle be transformed..."99 The two sociologies will mediate each other achieving a balance between objectivity of fact (2a, 3a) and critical orientation (2b, 4b).

Habermas describes ideology as the compelled suspension of doubt. Institutions are repressive orders
which become split off from their motivational foundation (25) structures of distorted communication and exist with unquestioned legitimacy. The focus of the critical sociology is to bring about the emancipation of self-conscious agents by encouraging reflection on their formative life processes (7c). As in the five theses, this unity of knowledge and interest will become a dialectic that reconstructs what has been repressed - that is, the distorted behaviours and language games imposed by socialization.

The critical sociology will use both causal explanation and understanding of meanings in a dialectical way (9, 10), working after the psychoanalytic model: "What is called rationalization at this level is called ideology at the level of collective action. In both cases the manifest content of statements is falsified by consciousness unreflected tied to interests (13)...". The explained empirical structures are also intentional structures, so that self reflection can reach and dissolve up the unconsciously caused behaviours - releasing the subject from "hypostasised powers". The depth hermeneutic (8b) demonstrates its explanatory power once the object of understanding is shown to have been overcome. Dialectical explanation is validated by this translation of theory to practice (5e, 7c).

Despite himself, Habermas' contribution to the critical theory is highly systematized almost mechanical at times. A curious contrast to the sylph-like dialectic of Adorno's book.
The methodological complacency of Australian academic sociology remained intact until the 1972 meeting of the profession. But the event was heralded quietly a year earlier by the appearance in a small Marxist publication, Arena, of a paper called 'Positivism and Dialectics'. Its author, Heinz Schütte, is a German fluently acquainted with the European debate. He identifies with "Critical Theory" and its preoccupation with the relationship between theory and practice.

The aim of the sociologist he argues, is to produce an hermeneutic of the ongoing socio-historical situation in order to further individual self-determination (7c, 1b, 15a). The objectivist or positivist approach would extend the logic of the natural sciences into sociology, deducing social facts from nomological hypotheses, producing experimentally falsifiable theories of an explanatory and prognostic character. A method, of course, which involves strict separation of the logic and the psychology of research, separation of factual statements and value judgments, a "Methodological Dualism" in Gouldner's sense. Schütte considers that to work deductively like this is to exclude the possible encounter with alternatives (2b).

Positivism in research supports the status quo by assuming a reality that is positively "given". In examining interaction patterns in a company, for example, the question becomes: "How do individuals communicate in a hierarchically stratified system?" The implications of this definition of the problem, Schütte points out, are that "the company"
itself is accepted as an irreversible fact. The hierarchy is not questioned, and what is sought is the most efficient communication pattern which in application will minimise conflicts and maximise profits - the in-built goal of the system (12).

The dialectician faced with a similar problem will not differ from the positivist in the use of empirical techniques and quantification where appropriate (8c), but his definition of the research situation will lead him to ask: "what are the roots of social conditions where men are found in positions of authority over other men? How are sociological findings first, influenced by, and second, used by, outside interests? How should the social context be changed so that the findings of such research are accessible to everybody?" Implicit to all this is the sociologist's awareness of his active involvement in the socio-historical situation (4b, 30b).

The positivists, even those directed by "piecemeal social engineering", intend that reality should become "...technologically controllable; the theory produces the conditions for its explanation, its prognosis and its planning. Its interest lies in a global growth of formal and material rationality...". Dialecticians...
It is as if positivism and dialectics face social reality from opposite sides of the objectivation-alienation cycle; the social emancipists would dissolve the alienating-objective-conditions by understanding them, thus giving social reality back to the men who create it (13c, 16d); the social technologists would adapt man to the objective-conditions, so producing "a society which has come to an end within itself and permanently reproduces itself."
### Analytic Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigmatic Features</th>
<th>Marcuse/Adorno/Hansen/Habermas/Schutte</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a no philos. align.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b non Marxist philos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c Hegel-early Marx</td>
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<tr>
<td>d philos. late Marx</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>2a unified science</td>
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<tr>
<td>b soc. method distn.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>3a objectivist meta.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b relativist meta.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c essentialist meta.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>4a soc. value free</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b soc. committed</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>5a soc. nomothetic</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b soc. idiographic</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c both complement</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>6a expl. deductive</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b expl. probabilistic</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>c expl. functional</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>d expl. genetic</td>
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<td>e expl. dialectical</td>
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<td>7a expl. prediction</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b expl./descr.-undst.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c undst.-action (c.r.)</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>8a method empirical</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b method hermeneutic</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c both complement</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>9 analyses causal</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>10 analyses seek reasons</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>11 analyses seek immanent</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 latent v.manifest m.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>13a determinism subj/obj</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b determinism obj/subj</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c determ.reciprocal</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>14a determinism whole/part</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b determinism part/whole</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c determ.reciprocal</td>
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<tr>
<td>15a analyses diachronic</td>
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<tr>
<td>b analyses synchronic</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c both complement</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>16a dia. is method</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b dia. is reality</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c dia. is meth.&amp; reality</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>d dia. is interaction mr</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>17a rejects formal logic</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b uses formal logic</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>18a dia. simple contrad.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b dia. multiple contrad.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c dia. other factor</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>19 physical dia.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>20 production dia.</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>21 institutional dia.</td>
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<td>22 intersubjective dia.</td>
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<td>23 intrasubjective dia.</td>
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<td>24 cognitive dia.</td>
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<td>25 structural (infra) dia.</td>
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<td>26 uses law int. of opp.</td>
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<td>27 uses law neg. of neg.</td>
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<td>28 uses law of emergence</td>
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<tr>
<td>29a uses systems model</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b uses conflict model</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c both complement</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>30a applies dia. (exemplar)</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b perspective only</td>
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Comments on the Summaries

The critical dialecticians reveal six major features - they stress the methodological distinctiveness of sociology; its committed stance; regard analysis as concerned with the ongoing historical process; the dialectic as expressing the interaction of this process with comprehension of it; and they see the dialectic as primarily a cognitive phenomenon; a perspective on sociology, which is not applied.

Marcuse is committed to an essentialist epistemology but like Friedrichs he also gives credit to the empirical methods of the exact sciences. This is not easy to explain.

The transcendental historical subjectivity found in Marcuse and Habermas has an interesting status, it is a subjective, yet objective determinant of individual action. It appears on the matrix as subj/obj and whole/part. The transcendental subject is an underlying factor or infrastructure, hence there is a structuralist component in the thought of both Marcuse and the 'objectivist' Habermas. This same preoccupation with the immanent is found in Adorno's writing and it is a peculiarly un-humanistic feature of the Frankfurt approach.

Habermas with his two levels of sociological explanation seems to vacillate like Weber before him, between a commitment to scientific explanation and verstehen. His acknowledged interaction of method and social reality strains his objectivist epistemology and systems inclination.

Hansen's position reveals a confusion between a phenomenological version of reality as intersubjectively
constituted, that is a brand of relativism, and an epistemological essentialism.

Schütte's article is one expression of Frankfurt theorising which avoids any methodological pitfalls.
REFLEXIVE DIALECTICS

SARTRE
BERGER AND LUCKMANN
YOUNG
GOULDNER
FRIEDRICHES
The reflexive dialectic descends directly from the philosophy of Hegel and is founded on the assumption of reciprocal determination of subjective and objective, individual and social domains. Its major implication for sociology is an emphasis on the sociologists' inevitable involvement in the on-going social process and on the impossibility of his assuming a value-free stance in his research.

An early contribution to the philosophy and method of reflexive dialectics was Jean-Paul Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1960). The book has had wide currency, possibly owing to its fortuitous launching into a community alert for alternatives. The introduction to the work, translated and published separately as *The problem of method* is particularly well known. The approach here is not systematic, nor is it free of polemic, but there is no pretence to dialectical laws - such regularities are anathema in the existentialist variant of Marxism.

Dialectical materialism had become, through Engel's agency, a total philosophy of nature. His *Anti-Dühring* (1867) and *Dialectics of Nature* (1882) presented a distinctly positivist dialectic which was intended to convince members of the Second International of the scientific authenticity of the revolutionary theory. It was essential that the working class appreciate not
only the "inexorable laws" of economics, but the "natural inevitability" of their own role in social change. Sartre breaks with the "vulgar Marxist" dialectic of nature and draws a methodological distinction between the natural and human levels of discourse (2b). As a phenomenologist, he has little interest in the status of the material world. Whether one wishes to postulate dialectical connections operative in the natural world, or not, is a matter of personal conviction only, as far as he is concerned. In any case, the existence of such relations will have no bearing on the uniquely human capacity for 'freedom'.

The ontology of the original existential dialectic was, like Hegel's\(^{107}\) which Sartre is heavily indebted to, an historical one; but no longer based on a sense of history as some immanent rational force. In the original version, history expressed the contingency of existence, leaving the present distinguished by its seeming disconnectedness with the past; a world of brute fact and absurdity. Only what did not 'exist' had reason or meaning, and the contingent was not, as the materialist would have it, necessity in disguise (3c). Thus the past did not determine human action, rather, this action found its determinations in the future, in choice of a project. History, the collective outcome of individual praxis is called "totalisation" and its direction is unpredictable (5b).

The revised position of Sartre in relation to Hegel and Marx which is expressed in the *Critique*, returns to the notion of immanent historical reason as somehow guiding at least the less alienated individual choice (1c, 14a). Sartre's
comment is almost autobiographical "History is less opaque than it was. The proletariat has discovered and released its secret (11, 25)." 108 The idea that man makes history, but other than he believes himself to be making it, while it, in turn, makes him, other than he believes himself to be (12, 14c, 15a) now takes on new dimensions, but the basic instrumentality of alienation which is central to the historical process remains "The realisation of the possible necessarily results in the production of an object or an event in the social world. This realisation is then an objectification, and the original contradictions which are reflected there testify to our alienation." 109

What is the appropriate method of comprehending this dialectical process in all its mediations (7b, 16d)? Sartre puts forward what he calls the regressive-progressive method, which he considers takes into account "at the same time the circularity of the material conditions and the mutual conditioning of the human relations established on that basis (13c)." 110 He enlarges:

We should define the method of the existentialist approach as a regressive-progressive and analytic-synthetic method. It is at the same time an enriching cross-reference between the object (which contains the object in its totalisation). In fact, when the object is rediscovered in its profundity and in its particularity, then instead of remaining external to the totalisation (as it was up until the time when the Marxists undertook to integrate it into history) it enters immediately into contradiction with it (18a). In short, the simple, inert, juxtaposition of the epoch and the object gives away abruptly to a living conflict. 111
This is nowhere a lucid text. What Sartre appears to be about is a form of contextual analysis (8b) with special attention to the behaviour of successive contradictions and synthetic totalisations. For example: a study of the past, the growth of the individual, his milieu, his project, and reconstruction of the "reciprocity" of relationships between those.

Sartre rejects organicist Marxian sociologies which universalise and totalise the social object (5b). Like Marx himself, he insists that this totality is nothing more than a multiplicity of relations among men (22). It is at the most - "a de-totalised totality". Within it, the individual praxis cuts across the field of instrumental possibilities. In relation to the latter, which is given, the action is negative; in relation to its intention it is positive. Paradoxically this same positivity opens out into the non-existent and future. What characterises man above all, is this capacity to go beyond the situation (28). The original urgency for this transcendence is found in simple material "need".

Identification of the origins of consciousness with a negative state, need, introduces the subject as being-for-itself, as nothing and as ultimate freedom. The subject stands opposed to the culturally given, matter, being-in-itself, objectivity. The man who, conditioned by the given, acts out a role and confuses this empirical self with his own consciousness, submits in bad faith to an alienated existence (12). He becomes a determinate being-for-others
(22), playing into the hands of the scientistic - those who would "deny the specificity of structures" and "reduce change to identity" (17a).

The dialectical method, on the contrary, refuses to reduce, it follows the reverse procedure. It surpasses by conserving, but the terms of the surpassed contradiction cannot account for either the transcending itself or the subsequent synthesis: on the contrary, it is the synthesis which clarifies them (26, 27, 28)...it is the choice which must be interrogated, if one wants to explain (10)...13

The focus on the negative is a significant dialectical feature of Sartre's writing, though it is not particularly prominent in the essay under discussion. His theory of knowledge rests on the assumption of consciousness as Nothing; if consciousness were itself being-in-itself, it could not at the same time be that which intends being-in-itself in the act of knowing. Secondly, the intellectual differentiation of one object from another calls for a constant process of sifting, comparing and re-defining of each object as 'this' and not 'that'. Cognition is a constant process of nihilation and transcendence (24).

Dialectics for Sartre, as for his predecessors, refers to both connections between events and to the method of knowing these. The dialectical reason reaches towards truth, and truth is conceived as a dynamic relationship involving being and knowing, object and thought (4b, 16d). In an extended footnote to The problem of method, Sartre acknowledges the discovery of microphysics - that the experimenter is part of the experimental system - as the first principle of knowing. However, he does not examine
how this applies to use of the regressive-progressive method itself; he merely reiterates his point that "the revelation of a situation is affected in and through the praxis which changes it (7c, 30b)."115

The dialectic of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann links the synthesis of sociological perspectives that constitutes their theoretical contribution The Social Construction of Reality (1966).116 The treatise involves a redirection of the sociology of knowledge away from its traditional pre-occupation with the history of ideas, towards a new understanding of the every day, taken for granted, common-sense stock of knowledge (30b). In its articulation of this common-sense reality, Berger and Luckmann's project reaches in scope from the Durkheimian sociology of externally 'real, factitious and objective structures to the Weberian interest in the subjectively meaningful. The two sociologies are mediated by the social theory of Schütz and by Mead's symbolic interactionism.117 In this way, the authors forge a bridge between the objective-social and subjective-individual spheres and between sociology and psychology as disciplines.

The dialectical sociology of Berger and Luckmann locates itself among the humanistic disciplines and it draws its foundations from both phenomenological and historicist thought (2b). However, the approach is not necessarily anti-empirical; 'reality', for example, is defined as "a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognise as having a being independent to our own volition" (3a),
while "knowledge" exists as "the certainty that phenomena are 'real' and that they possess specific characteristics."\textsuperscript{118} Nor does this sociology exclude the possibility of a value-free science of men (46), and in this, it departs somewhat from the logic of its historicism and the relativist tendencies of the sociology of knowledge. It is thus not surprising to find that the basic dialectic here emerges from a species of absolute - the biological realm. The processes to be explored originate in a dialectic between nature and society, "between the individual's biological substratum and his socially produced identity."\textsuperscript{119} The organism limits what is socially possible, resists to some extent the moulding process of socialisation, but modification does occur and biological frustrations are inevitable. This social 'reality' which imposes on biological man (20, 21) is not, however, an independent concrete reality in itself, but the cumulative product of his own habit patterns (9). "Institutionalisation occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors....Institutions further imply historicity and control" (9).\textsuperscript{120} The dialectical paradox is thus: "Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product" (13c, 16d).\textsuperscript{121} The authors are careful to point out that their dialectic should in no way be confused with Engel's dialectics of nature. The latter "projects specifically human phenomena into non-human nature and then proceeds to theoretically dehumanise man by looking upon him as but the object of natural forces or laws of nature."\textsuperscript{122} The departure here,
is rather from the Hegelian-Marxian-Sartrian notion of objectivation (1c): 

The process by which the externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity is objectivation (20). The institutional world is objectivated human activity...man, (not, of course in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each other. The product acts back upon the producer. Externalization and objectivation are moments in a continuing dialectical process. The third moment in this process...is internalization (by which the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness (24) in the course of socialization)....

The expanding institutional order develops a corresponding canopy of legitimations (12), stretching over it a protective cover of both cognitive and normative interpretation. These legitimations are learned by the new generation during the same process that socialises them into the institutional order (29a).123

It is in this way then, that subjective intent becomes objective facticity. Accepted activity patterns, objectivated by participation in a common sign system or language, become sedimented over time. Furthermore, this body of traditional knowledge or "universe" is maintained and rationalised by elaboration of the conceptual apparatus of which it partakes. Mythology and religion are examples of legitimating ideas. Occasionally it happens by reverse; and institutions are changed in response to a theory. Either way a dialectic of knowledge is at work (24) and definitions of reality tend to be self-fulfilling in character (16d).124

"By virtue of this accumulation, a social stock of knowledge is constituted, which is transmitted from generation to generation and which is available to the individual in
everyday life." The dialectic operating at the objective, collective or social level is thus grounded in the psychological. Here, externalisation, objectivation and internalisation are no longer simultaneous phases in an historical complex, but actual sequences in the individual biography (15a, 23). Internalisation is the first and fundamental process, and the self-identity which is its outcome is crucial to the orientation of the self in a meaningful social reality.

I live in the common-sense world of everyday life equipped with specific bodies of knowledge. What is more, I know that others share at least part of this knowledge, and they know that I know this. My interaction with others in everyday life is, therefore, constantly affected by our participation in the available stock of common knowledge (22).125

And so the objective facticity enters the subjective. The child undergoing the primary socialisation assimilates the definitions of reality which the significant others in his life-world seem to hold. Berger and Luckmann write:

It entails a dialectic between identification by others and self-identification; between objectively assigned and subjectively appropriated identity. The dialectic which is present each moment the individual identifies with his significant others is, as it were, the particularisation in individual life of the general dialectic of society.126

It is noteworthy that Berger and Luckmann in their attempt to unify the social and psychological by means of a dialectical model reject the contribution of Freud, himself a great dialectical psychologist. Their comments here reflect also on their stance vis-a-vis the Frankfurt
theorists' blend of psycho-analytic and Marxian insights, for they insist that "Freudian psychology...is fundamentally incompatible with the anthropological presuppositions of Marxism." The dichotomy falls between "the conception of man as a self producing being [Marx] and a conception of 'human nature' [Freud]." The political implications of the two views are enormously at variance.

There would seem to be something idiosyncratic in the eclectic Berger and Luckmann's rejection of Freud, especially since they recognise his own vacillation between a theory of human nature and his assertions about the plasticity of the libido. Certainly the conflicting philosophical orientations of Weber and Durkheim did not stand in the way of their theoretical integration by the authors. They admit towards the end of their book that "...in the fully socialized individual there is a continuing internal dialectic between identity and its biological sub-stratum." The rejection of the Freudian schema and its postulated 'unconscious' is a rejection of the conceptual machinery which would serve to enlarge this intrasubjective dialectic of theirs.

Berger and Luckmann's notion of legitimation - the dialectic of rationalization is taken up by L-C. Young and applied (30a) to an analysis of rural stratification in Republican China (21, 24). Young's paper, which is published in the 1970 issue of Social Research, develops from Weber's argument for an oscillation between status-stratification and class-stratification accompanying technological and economic change.
The late 1930's saw the gradual disintegration of status-stratification and of social integration as the country was vitiated by world depression, famine, internal banditry and heavy land taxes on the peasants. At the same time a body of radical scholars espousing a class-conflict theory emerged. Young writes, "...we must conclude that there existed a high degree of symmetry between the conflict... and the objective reality (3a) of stratification."\textsuperscript{131}

For, according to Berger and Luckmann

\begin{quote}
...the rise and fall of definitions of reality does not take place in isolation from the blood and sweat of general history (15a, 16d)....Social change must always be understood as standing in a dialectical relationship to the history of ideas. [Furthermore] definitions of reality have self fulfilling potency...\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

As the status system declined the class-conflict system consolidated, confirming the image of the scholars. Young concludes that theoretical legitimation is not only a reflection, but also a modifier, of social reality.

While Friedrichs was mapping his course for a dialectical paradigm in sociology, Alvin Gouldner came forward with his radically outspoken plan for a reflexive attitude in the discipline.\textsuperscript{133} His \textit{Coming Crisis of Western Sociology} (1970) which describes the rise and decline of functionalism and the growth of a new ideological polycentrism, also outlines the historical mission of his perspective, the "Reflexive Sociology" (30b).
It would require that knowledge of the world cannot be advanced apart from the sociologist's knowledge of himself and his position in the social world or apart from his efforts to change these (2a, 4b)...it seeks to transform (15a) as well as to know the alien world outside the sociologist as well as the alien world inside of him (7c, 16d)...it would accept the fact that the roots of sociology pass through the sociologist as a total man, and that the question he must confront therefore, is not merely how to work but how to live. 134

This attitude introduced a new historical sensitivity, and the end of the "Methodological Dualism", which Gouldner writes, has dominated social science so far. The sociologist will now treat his own beliefs as he is accustomed to treating the beliefs of others, by questioning them – this bringing him closer to those he studies. The new approach will be based on something akin to the method of Verstehen (8b). It will not be characterised by "what" it studies so much as by the mutually constitutive relationship established between the enquiring subject and the studied object (3b, 13a, 22). Awareness of self on the part of the sociologist presents the crucial starting point for this operation (10, 23), which in no sense pretends to value freedom (4b).

Oddly enough, the term 'dialectic' is not to be found in the extensive index to the Coming Crisis.

In a paper entitled 'Dialectical Sociology - An Exemplar for the 70's, Robert Friedrichs returns to examine Kuhn's paradigmatic style known as "the exemplar" or "concrete puzzle solution." Its author had held this to be a feature
only of natural scientific paradigms, but Friedrichs finds that it too, like its predecessors, has a place in sociology, particularly in understanding the machinations of the sociological establishment itself.135

Friedrichs draws on some earlier publications of his own in the area of religious and ethnic prejudice, and reinterprets the material in the light of his mature theoretical interest in dialectical epistemology and the prophetic sociological mode (30a).136 He writes that it is his intention to demonstrate how "social change might be maximised by combining a dialectical understanding of social research with a prophetic image of the sociologist's calling, i.e., with a commitment to the altering of the given order that has been perceived" (7c).137

Facing the question of prejudice and residential discrimination against negroes in urban America, Friedrichs looked at the research and found the indications were that typical churchgoers should be more bigotted than those who attended seldom or not at all. He made the assumption that frequent church attendance and other-direction would be linked, and that therefore, if re-definition of the situation were to be introduced (13a, 16d, 24), this group would be the more responsive. He next developed a survey questionnaire to provide reliable data on these dimensions. He planned to communicate his "expected" findings via an "embarrassed" pulpit and "hoped" that on re-testing, the bigotted, frequent churchgoers would index the highest degree of attitudinal change on the question of the entry of blacks into their
own neighbourhood. There was indeed "a massive shift towards at least a verbal expression of tolerance on the part of the typical churchgoer." The extremes in attendance shared no attitude change.

A notable feature of Friedrich's presentation of his research is that he avoids "alienated" and "scientistic" modes of accounting for what he did. He says deliberately "I hoped" not "I hypothesized", "I embarrassed" my subjects into a certain line of action, and so on; reflecting an existential involvement in his work (2b, 4b). The report also manifests a diachronic focus (15a); Friedrichs' research takes place in an ongoing social process: "The two major factors that I had not anticipated were that the clerical leadership of one of the churches changed hands during the process...while the newly appointed clergyman was evidencing complete willingness to co-operate with my aims...and a civic group dedicated to open occupancy arose, both factors speeding up the author's "hoped for" feedback. The mass media too, had begun to focus on the issue by this time. However, Friedrichs emphasises that the research program did serve as an independent variable in its own right.

The 1972 report is a piece of consciousness raising aimed at the sociological profession. Friedrichs says that his original papers were conceived in conformity with the research exemplars of the dominant journals, and this overshadowed the author's original intent in pursuing this form of research. Having confessed this, Freidrichs takes up a
polemical stand. He pleads that Radical Sociology commit itself to

piece-meal dialectical research [of this kind] - empirical research unencumbered by grand schemes for the future (8a). For, each effective effort in the form of social research, transforms in some measure the social constructions that it reveals, - including the social constructions that guide and motivate those who had framed the research (8c).

The modesty of the exemplar I offer, he urges, "suits a future that dialectically escapes the ideologues net." (1a). 139
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<td>7a expl. prediction</td>
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<td>13a determinism subj/obj</td>
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<td>16a dia. simple contrad.</td>
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<td>20 production dia.</td>
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<td>30a applies dia.(exemplar)</td>
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<td>b perspective only</td>
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Comments on the Summaries

The reflexive dialecticians share five cardinal points - a commitment to the methodological distinctiveness of social science; to its diachronic focus; to the dialectic as a phenomenon of interaction between the method and reality of social research; to an intersubjective sociology; and a cognitive dialectic.

Sartre's philosophy manifests the strain between an idiographic and a nomological philosophy of history. There is ambivalence between the analyses of human reasons and of immanent factors. The deep 'structural' historical subjectivity reappears, somewhat ironically in an adversary of Levi-Strauss. Sartre's reference to the laws of dialectics is not a literal minded one as it was with the materialist Marxists before him.

The dialectic of Berger and Luckmann combines an objectivist epistemology, causal emphasis and value freedom with a commitment to the methodological distinctiveness of sociology, to interaction and reciprocity. Again there is a fairly unconsidered application of the dialectic to many levels of phenomena, and the systems model reappears beneath it all despite the phenomenological flux.

Young is another who uncritically combines an objectivist epistemology with an assumed reciprocity of subjective and objective factors.

Gouldner's statement on the dialectic is too brief to contain any inconsistencies.
Friedrichs 'exemplified' dialectic wants a complementarity of hermeneutic and empirical processes even though the two may require fundamentally conflicting epistemologies.
MARXIST DIALECTICS

LEFEBVRE
GUUNDER-FRANK
KARMEN
The heading Marxist dialectic groups together three sociologists who profess an orthodox Marxist-Leninist line. Engels' laws of dialectics — the interpenetration of opposites, the negation of the negation, and the law of emergence, are basic to their thought. They are characterised by a tendency to reify and a drive to systematize.

Henri Lefebvre, now a professor at the University of Paris, sharply anticipated the other dialecticians here. His Logique formelle, logique dialectique first appeared in 1946, but was extensively revised for a second début in the Sixties. The book is essentially a distillation of the orthodox Marxist theory of knowledge (1d) resting on the distinction between formal and dialectical or concrete logic (17a). Lefebvre describes the laws of dialectics (5a) as "suprêmem ent objectives, étant à la fois des lois du réel et des lois de la pensée (16c, 19, 24), c'est à dire, des lois de tout mouvement..." The abstract principles of formal logic, identity, causality, and so on, have little relevance to concrete thought. The latter manifests laws of "becoming", permitting neither deduction nor prediction, but manoeuvring in dialectical rapport as a syllogism moves between the concrete and the universal, mediated by the particular.
Lefebvre characterises the dialectical method by a series of laws: first, there is the universal law of interaction, treating of the connection or reciprocal mediation of all things (2a, 14c). To isolate a phenomenon is to deprive it of all meaning and content, he writes. It is a violation of nature by a comprehension based on metaphysics. Rational or dialectical research considers the phenomenon within the ensemble of its relations with other phenomena (8b). This constitutes its essential reality (11).

The second law acknowledges the universality of movement through and between, internal and external, to these related phenomena. The dialectical method penetrates beyond the superficial stability of appearances to the manifestations of becoming (3c). The fundamental connection of things, expressed by this movement, is reflected in the logical connection of ideas.

Third in emphasis is the law of the unity of contradictions (18a, 26). In formal logic the two aspects of a contradiction are mutually exclusive. Looking dialectically there exists simultaneously both inclusion and an exclusion, which Lefebvre calls active. The method seeks to comprehend the movement that has given rise to these contradictions in order to find their resolution.

Fourth, appears the law of the transformation of quantity to quality (28). Quantitative change is a slow and continuous becoming. Qualitative change, by contrast, may issue in tumult. It is brought about by internal
crisis in a thing, an intensification of its contradictions. Economic or political crises constitute examples (21). Human action, the subjective factor, intervenes, both to produce and to resolve such transformations. The point of crisis is intersected by an ensemble of realities, subjective and objective conditions, and it is called, after Hegel, the node.

The fifth law treats of dialectical development as a spiral process "le retour au-dessous de dépasse pour le dominer". It describes a change that does not involve the destruction of matter but envelops and deepens it (15a, 27). Even between the living and the merely material there is a dialectical continuity. And then again, the living process is itself elaborated by thought. The basis of this understanding is but an organ, the human hand, "le point d'insertion perpetuel de notre raison concrete dans l'interaction universelle" - Marx's praxis (20), though Lefebvre does not emphasise this term which has recently become so popular.

This summary exposition of the laws of dialectics is followed by some rules of thumb from Lefebvre for the would be dialectician: go straight to the thing itself; locate the ensemble of connections integral to it, its characteristic movement; grasp both its contradictory aspects and its unity; analyse the internal conflict of these, the positive and negative tendencies; don't forget the mutual reliance of each thing upon another, its relativity, what is insignificant one moment becomes
essential the next; look especially at transitions; don't forget that the deepening complexity of phenomena is infinite; always penetrate the simple observed co-existences and proceed to the fundamental; regard the thinking process itself as it constantly transforms itself, go backwards and forwards in your steps actively reviewing these phases - and the dialectic will reveal itself as a productive and vigorous method (7b, 30b).

In 1963 an article suggesting that it was now time for a theoretical convergence of the dialectic with functionalism, provoked the Marxist Andre Gunder-Frank to a reply which was published in the 1966 volume of *Science and Society*.144

The author of the proposed "synthesis", Pierre van den Berghe, is right in that the two approaches are holistic (14a), asserts Gunder-Frank, but that is where the comparison ends. The "whole" that the functionalist studies is no particular social whole, whereas for the Marxist it is the world wide capitalist system (1d). Second, the functionalist works from "the parts to the whole" and for this reason he sees conflict as "integrative". The Marxist however, will first

...analyse and explain the origin, nature and development (15a, 29a) of the entire social system and its structure as a whole, and then use the understanding of the whole thus gained, as the necessary basis for the analysis and understanding of its parts (8b, 30b).145

It is unthinkable that the dialectic should be reduced to a static equilibrium model, for social reality is moved
by a disequilibrating negativity. The functionalist ignores revolutionary conflict but the Marxist can make use of both disintegrative and integrative situations because of his ability to deal with contradiction (18a, 29c).

The fundamental distinction between the two theories on the question of evolution is also clear to Gunder-Frank. In functionalism "...the social structure is the source of change, and not, as in Marxist theory, change the source of social structure..." 146

In sum, argues Gunder-Frank, In order to achieve theoretical synthesis of functionalism and dialectics, functionalists must leave dialectics shorn of its theory and analysis of the formation, existence and transformation of the determinant social whole. They must deny the identification of this process with historical materialism as untenable, dismiss dialectical division and interpenetration of opposites (26) as confused, and regard extra-systematic stimuli as incompatible with dialectics. 147

Gunder-Frank calls van den Berghe's attempt at synthesis "synthetic", but to be fair, he does not confront all the points raised, as will be seen when the functionalist himself is discussed.

Perhaps the most hardheaded look at dialectics by a modern sociologist is Andrew Karmen's comparison of the Marxian perspective (1d, 30b) with the method of path analysis - The Human Factor, 1972. 148 Path models, he comments, are built in order to replicate the workings of social phenomena, but these dissociate mechanisms, and break them down into
discrete, isolated, fragmented components which can then be labelled and measured. The dialectical method on the other hand, denies the existence of mere collections of definite things in favour of interlocking social processes (14a).

Path analysis forces all inter-relationships into unidirectional cause and effect networks of operationalized variables, whereas dialectics excludes rigid causality and comprehends the instantaneous reciprocal influence of mutually interdependent and interpenetrating processes (17a, 26).

The sources of change and influence in path models are external, but Karmen reminds the reader, the motor for growth, development and change are from a dialectical view, inherent factors, internal contradictions, opposing forces and disintegrative tendencies (18a).

Path analysis requires continuous numerical variables for linear regression calculations which produce only quantitatively varying outcomes of the same kind, while dialectics postulates the possibility of qualitative change once a nodal point is reached (28).

Karmen observes that path analysis, because it uses cross-sectional survey data, is limited to flat, a-historical slices through time. Yet, because of the focus on causal analysis, prediction and statistical inference, it looks like sequential analysis. The dialectical method by contrast assumes a spiral process of emergence of the new from the old, in which higher stages negate out moded forms, relationships and arrangements (15a, 27).
Karmen believes that path-analysis is a limiting research tool whose use precludes recognition of the very real need for social change. Dialectics is more than method for Karmen (16c).
## ANALYTIC SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigmatic features</th>
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### MARXIST DIALECTICS

- Lefebvre/Gunder-Frank/Karmen
Comments on the Summaries

The Marxist dialecticians reveal a commonality of ten features - a basis in orthodox Marxism; a hermeneutic approach; and diachronic focus; a comprehension of the dialectic as both method and reality; a rejection of formal logic; an emphasis on simple contradiction as the motive force; use of the three dialectical laws - interpenetration of opposites, negation of the negation and emergence and contribution of a dialectical perspective only.

The materialist, objectivist stance of the Marxists is consistently used with an image of the dialectic as both method and reality but not the interaction of these.

Lefebvre departs from this with his acknowledgement of the immanent, an essentialist credential.

Gunder-Frank's acknowledgement of system leads him into trouble with the notion of reciprocity.

Karmen is not really open to criticism. His article suggests alignment with the objectivist and nomothetic stream, but does not make a precise statement on this.
STRUCTURALIST DIALECTICS

LÉVI-STRAUSS
ALTHUSSER
COULSON AND RIDDELL
MURPHY
The cardinal feature of structuralism is the determination of individual phenomena by objective structures. These structures or totalities may be obvious, such as relations between economic factors, or they may be infrastructures, deeply buried in the human condition. The structuralist dialectic is anti-historical, only the analysis of relations in stasis is considered properly scientific and amenable to computer process.

The structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss supposes that both "social reality" and "science" are dialectical (16c, 24). The source of this dialectic is deep in the human mind and its subsequent cultural objectifications.

Consistent with the emphasis on the unity of the sciences found in both French and Marxist positivism (1d), Lévi-Strauss' concern, as stated in La Pensée Sauvage (1962), is to locate culture within nature (2a): "...I believe the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute but to dissolve man...the reintegration of culture in nature and finally of life within the whole of its physico-chemical conditions...". And so, somewhat ironically perhaps, he constructs after Kant, a theory of unconscious categories, the expression of organic structures in the brain. All possible meanings are given in the relationships between these structures (25);
simply remains for the subject, object of this superior subjectivity (13a, 14a), to actualise them, and this is what happens when culture is formed.

In order to explain the suppression of certain categories within some cultures, a theory of alienation is required, but this in turn, renews the split between nature and culture. The alienation theme is not stressed in his work, although he does see it as a species of ideology critique.

Structural anthropology aims to be a semiological science, but as Lévi-Strauss points out:

...man has meaning only on the condition that he views himself as meaningful... it must be added that this meaning is never the right one: superstructures are faulty acts which have 'made it' socially. Hence it is vain to go to historical consciousness for the truest meaning.151

This rejection of experience in favour of another order of reality (11) puts Lévi-Strauss at odds with the phenomenologists. Experience and reality are discontinuous, he urges, appearances do not pertain to the essence of things - and this point is crucial to his dialectical theory of explanation.

Whenever man attempts to think about himself he becomes confused; only through the products of his mind can he be known. Kinship patterns and myths, both demonstrate the working of a latent infrastructure that is preoccupied with polarities, contraries and their transformations (27). Thus, as he puts it in an early methodological essay 'Social Structure' (1953), the apparent contingency of kin exchanges is explainable by reduction to a number of rules (5a).
however, by means of those rules or "conscious models, which are usually known as norms". The conscious model is not a structure.

The social anthropologist proceeds from simple description of kin exchanges in the field or with the account of a myth, to a suspension of the time dimension and substitution of signs for the persons involved (15b). Coding the material in this way brings to light its structural properties, and comparison of several different institutions within one society or one institution across several different societies may elicit further common formal properties - the invariants which constitute the essential infrastructure (3c, 25).

The model may be developed in one of two ways: the sign substitution may be made at the level of persons or other culturally meaningful units, and this is known as a mechanical model, or the substitution may be imposed on statistical regularities. The choice between the two kinds of procedure follows the rationale of the exact sciences where "...the theory of a small number of bodies belongs to classical mechanics, but if the number becomes greater, then one should rely on the laws of thermodynamics, that is, use a statistical model instead..." (10).

Coding makes the material amenable to computer analysis (17b) through communications theory or the mathematics of games. It means that the unconscious or derived model can be subjected to experimentation, as the sign systems are arranged in various combinations and their possible
transformations deduced. The structural model is thus both explanatory and predictive (6e, 7a).

If, as we believe it to be the case, the unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing form upon content, and if these forms are fundamentally the same for all minds...it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure underlying each institution and each custom, in order to obtain a principle of interpretation (8b) valid for other institutions and other customs, provided of course, the analysis is carried far enough.

It may seem puzzling to hear Lévi-Strauss, adversary of Sartre and Ricoeur, talking in terms of "a principle of interpretation". But his semiology does involve an hermeneutic, and this operates at two levels. First there is the understanding of the cultural item as it is understood by those who live through it, "...every anthropologist tries...to put himself in the place of the men living there, to understand the principle and pattern of their intentions (10)...". The second hermeneutic involves the translation of this into the anthropologists' own frame of reference, that is, the construction of sign-systems which when deciphered, give up the authentic or "structural principle" of interpretation. The structural or unconscious model however, may contradict (12, 18a) the meanings of the conscious model at certain points - namely where the infrastructure has been negated in its transformation into superstructure (21). Explanation by the structural model untwists this contradiction by asserting its opposite - a negation of the negation (27).
...a series of preliminary operations, that is, permutations or transformations
...furnish the key to the correspondence. If this hypothesis is correct, we shall
have to give up mechanical causality as an explanation and instead, conceive of
the relationship between myth and ritual as dialectical...

Lévi-Strauss talks about this "dialectical reason" towards the end of *La Pensée Sauvage*. It is "something additional in analytic reason" (17b), he writes, and its role is "to put the human sciences in possession of a reality which it alone can furnish them".\(^{159}\)

The author does offer an exemplar, but its loose and frankly arbitrary hermeneutic stages mean that it is more open to imitation than empirical replication (30a).

The structuralist dialectic of Louis Althusser rests on a new "scientific problematic" that distinguishes sharply between dialectical materialism - a philosophy of practice and historical materialism - the scientific study of society. The "Hegelians", of course, do not uphold such a distinction - the so called historicists, pragmatists, voluntarists and others with a "bourgeoise humanist" inclination. Lefebvre, Sartre and the Frankfurt School fall into this category along with Engels,\(^{160}\) whose insistence that the historical process itself enters into the very structure of the conceptual model is, for Althusser, nothing short of a denial of the possibility of authentic theorising (3a, 4a).

The structuralist dialectic of Althusser, whose collected essays in *For Marx* (1966)\(^{161}\) substitute a systems analysis perspective (30a) for the German metaphysics that sustained
the original dialectic, takes its departure from what is identified as "an epistemological break" in Marx's writing occurring in 1845. From this date Marx's conception of history no longer rests on some universal essence of man, but on radically new concepts - scientific structures (1d, 2a) - the social formation, forces and relationships of production, ideologies. The new problematic assumes the unity of human society, a totality, over and above the individual praxis (13b, 14a). Humanism remains here only as an ideological structure, "a social fact", to be considered in analysis. The Hegelian conception of the totality as expression of a single historical principle, Reason, becomes now "a de-centred totality" with many determinations. Contradiction as identity of contraries is replaced by "over-determination", a consequent of the inseparability of interactions within the structure. Marx himself had not worked sufficiently towards this pluralism, but Althusser claims to complete the method, at the same time turning attention from diachronic to synchronic analysis (15b).

Althusser develops his dialectic of theoretical practice from some comments of Marx's in The Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). Marx writes that though it seems to be correct to begin with the simplest concept, it is not. Analysis should proceed from the abstraction, the imaginary concrete, until the real and concrete is arrived at. Once this is attained, it can return to the abstraction, not as some indefinite integral
whole, but the aggregate of many conceptions and relations (8b, 9). Althusser identifies the three stages of this process as three generalities. The first generality does not coincide with the product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it is the prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call Generality I) constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality II), which is a knowledge.163

Generality I, the thesis, is a synthesis of already elaborated concepts belonging to an earlier theoretical or "ideological" phase. The transformation of this through the encounter with a new body of material, the antithesis or Generality II, leads to the progress of science through organisation of knowledge on a new level or synthesis, Generality III. The movement or transformation of Generality I to Generality III is "a production process", an objectification, whereby knowledge assumes a concrete character, concrete-in-thought, that is (16c, 20, 24). This is what distinguishes the materialist dialectic from Hegel, who had conceived of the thesis as a self-transforming entity.

A second contention with Hegel concerns the nature of contradiction which, Althusser insists, even though Lenin had not departed from the view, is more than a simple process with two opposites. Althusser's thinking here comes straight from Mao-Tse-tung who distinguished not only principal and secondary contradictions, but a principal and secondary aspect within each contradiction.164 Only a very simple
process would contain a single pair of opposites, but most social processes involve complex structures with multiple and uneven determinations, the dominant contradiction being responsible for the structural unity. But "...the secondary contradictions are so essential even to the existence of the principal contradiction, that they really constitute its condition of existence, just as the principal contradiction constitutes their condition of existence." This is the substance of Althusser's unique contribution to dialectics - over-determination (18b). "Only over-determination enables us to understand the concrete variations and mutations of a structured complexity such as a social formation, though not as the accidental variations and mutations produced by 'external' conditions", for that would be to think mechanistically. In sum, whereas contradiction, the motive force, was negativity in Hegel, for Althusser "it cannot be reduced to the development of the idea of its own alienation... rather it implies a real struggle, real confrontations, precisely located within the structure of the complex whole (21, 29a)...".

As the structuralist sees it, the social formation at any given moment is a "conjuncture" of autonomous forces - economic, legal, ideological. These, corresponding to the original substructure-superstructure, are mutually determining and in Althusser's terms each has its "specific effectivity". He takes Mao's view, which in turn was inspired by Lenin, that the uneven development of the structures provides the contradictions within the totality and enhances yet further
transformations. The over-determination that characterises the totality may exist in antagonistic form where, operating by analogy with the Freudian idea of "condensation", forces will be compressed and an explosive or revolutionary situation result. Alternatively structural tensions may fuse or become "displaced", a transformation that makes for stability (26). The law of uneven development means that at any one time there will be one particular "structure-in-dominance", but in the final analysis (which is never made of course) the economic factor will be found to be its determinant (5a).

An introductory text called Approaching Sociology (1970), by two young teachers of the discipline, Margaret Coulson and David Riddell, brought the structuralist dialectic into the classroom. The authors who are radically opposed to functionalism illustrate their position by way of a comparison of American and Yugoslav textbooks, these representing what they call the "static-substantive" versus "dynamic-structuralist" emphases respectively. Many of the mathematical tools developed by American sociology, they argue, are not suited to the analysis of interactive and holistic phenomena (14c) because they "...depend on freezing social reality at a particular moment, and then predicting by assuming that the relations between factors are constant over time" (15a) - an error that Althusser could not possibly make, they observe.

Coulson and Riddell commend Althusser's work on "overdetermination" (18b) but align themselves with a
variety of Marxism (1d) coined by Lefebvre and known as "historical or dynamic structuralism". They write: "If we are concerned with interrelations over time of groups of people in social structures, then we are trying to understand processes from interactions in structures (21). This is a dialectical analysis." But they also use the term dialectical when speaking of the relationship between theory and empirical research and again of the relationship between social structure, consciousness and false consciousness (12). This is not a well defined statement on the dialectic (30b).

The most adventurous and enthusiastic exploration of dialectics in sociology is Robert Murphy's The Dialectics of Social Life (1971). The book entails, in part, a resume and evaluation of dominant strands in anthropological thinking - evolutionism, functionalism and structural-functionalism; but this provides merely a counterpoint to the elaboration of the "negative" or dialectical tradition which is Murphy's main object. The author conceptualises his own basic opposition between "norm" and "action" and attempts to demonstrate that the theories of Hegel, Marx, Freud, Simmel and Lévi-Strauss each confronted this same dialectic. It is very much an exercise in creative theory building where the scaffolding is homemade but the bricks are stolen. Apart from the primary opposition between norm and action, Murphy's text makes reference to a number of other dialectical polarities which this simplified introduction juxtaposes to his overall theory.
Murphy finds that the first consensus in sociological theory, that of Radcliffe-Brown and Parsons, was faulty in that it subjected social life, which Durkheim earlier had recognised as consisting of "free currents perpetually in the process of transformation and incapable of being mentally fixed by the observer" to static abstraction in the quest for its essential qualities. This meant a resort to one-dimensional categories - social facts would become manipulable if thought of as "things"; data would needs be fixed. The reification of the social tended to project spatio-physical properties on to its subject matter. The upshot of this false materialism, in conjunction with the organicist model of society, was a difficulty in the conceptualisation of social change.

The postulation of an equilibrium model at the social level, likewise deployed the focus of attention from individually produced variations in behaviour. The psychological level was largely taboo - though Durkheim was ambivalent on this point, and Parsons deluded, according to Murphy. Furthermore, Parsons' schema of cultural social and personality systems was "really" a dual opposition between norm (represented by the cultural system and its extension the "role") and behaviour, on the other hand. But, through the instrumentality of socialisation, the social and personality systems were rendered unto the cultural level - inert, autonomous and self perpetuating. The structural-functional model thus could scarcely account for incongruities between norm and action or differences between action and ideas about action. Murphy argues that
at every stage of social analysis three questions should be asked: "What do people really do? What do they think they are doing? What do they think they should be doing?".172

Methodologically, Murphy identifies the dialectic as a critical approach in every sense of that word. This standpoint is made necessary as a result of the alienation of human existence, which the objectifying symbolic processes of the mind have brought about. "The continuity, wholeness and movement of the world of practical activity appears in the world of thought, language and culture, as discontinuity, limitation and fixity."173 The positivist operated under the assumption of a homology between the phenomenology of the mind and that of the world external to it; but to the dialectician, the process of symbolisation has meant that objects are "defined by what they are not" (3c). The object is characterised by a negativity that represents all those qualities excluded in the attribution of thingness. Dialectical thought thus "denies the objective validity of the here and now".174 The inherent negativity, "potentiality", will ultimately destroy the artificially constituted universe of common-sense thought.

Murphy writes that

The method (16c), and the epistemology, of dialectics is contained in this process of negation. According to the doctrine, time and force are more real than substantive things, and the essence of reality is the process of transformation of perceived reality. Things are not to be understood as fixed entities, but are in a continual state of transition into other forms of themselves. The structure of reality (16c) is a structure of oppositions, of elements that contradict
each other and limit each other's possibilities (14c, 26). Out of this clash of antagonistic tendencies, new forms arise that incorporate the opposing elements (28), albeit in altered form and with their contradictions now resolved.175

Clearly the main features of the dialectic as understood by Murphy can be found in Hegel's phenomenology (1c) which also taught that the estrangement of Subject and Object developed from the individual's failure to see that objectivity was constituted by his own mind as locus of reality. Murphy's "norm" versus "act" conflict is a reappearance of Hegel's Idea under the actualising force of the motive Will. This transformation of a form into a new form revealing its yet unrealised character, is summarised by the thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad (27), a logical unity, Murphy urges, not a temporal sequence. The containment by a form of its own negation is expressed in the formula of non-identity, A = non A (17a), for "the definition of a phenomenon does not lie in an inner quality that endows and gives substance to the phenomenon, it derives from its boundaries or limits, the parameters beyond which it becomes something else. Things have no independent autonomous existence but exist only in their relationship to other things."176

The dialectical exercise...requires us to look for paradox as much as complementarity, for opposition as much as accommodation....It portrays a universe of dissonance (29b) underlying apparent order and seeks deeper orders beyond the dissonance. It urges critical examination...of...commonsense interpretations of reality that lie at the core of our cultural systems...the result of all this may fall far short...
of...the discovery of general social laws (5b)...177 [For] the total impact of a dialectic is destructive of neat systems.178

Murphy traces the opposition of Will and Idea in the idealist dialectic of Reason, forward into Marx's materialist dialectic of History. Marx's singular contribution was the substitution of class interests for Will, as the active principle, and he reversed the Hegelian priority so that action assumed primacy over idea. Mind or consciousness, thus came to be regarded more as the product of history rather than its genitor. But the Marxist theory of the determination of consciousness was not a sociological determinism in the positivist sense. According to Murphy, if one works from the earlier Marx, it is the active praxis which shapes both the world and the idea (1c). Ideas and reality are divorced only where praxis is not informed by revolutionary intent. When man attempts to resolve the contradictions of his condition and misapprehends or inverts the social reality - ideology is the product, and false consciousness the result. "Man produces illusions of the world (24), which by becoming social have an empirical reality of their own. The levels of culture and social action (21) are, therefore, non-homologous because of a continuing dialectic between mind and society."179

Murphy's own singular contribution to the dialectic is his attempt to extend its operation into the individual and psychological sphere (23), and to make this workable as social theory by continuing to identify the concepts of norm and action as the crucial polarity. First Murphy sets out
to show how Freud, perhaps the greatest of psychologists, was entirely committed to a dialectical view of psychic functioning. Parsons' version of Freud, which has penetrated social thought is a violent deviation from this position. In Murphy's opinion the master was decidedly and consistently non-structural and non-positivist in his treatment of personality. The latter was understood as a flux of ambivalence and negation, transformation and becoming. The dynamic was conflict, introduced by the demands of social life, and its outcome was the defensive suppression of truth. Sublimation, one such means of dealing with the individual versus society dialectic, turned back again, creatively, feeding the external, socio-cultural realm. This psycho-analytic parallel with the objectivation process has been treated at length by Marcuse.\textsuperscript{180} The surrender of the individual to the wider society was symbolised by the Oedipal resolution - a negation of the negation - as Murphy sees it, but on the whole the individual remained an imperfectly socialised being, whose daily life manifested the continuing struggle of activity against norm, of organism versus society in Berger and Luckmann's terms.

In his drive towards synthesis, Murphy has oversimplified the dialectic in Freudian theory. The mind here is a tripartite entity and so offers the possibility of three qualitatively distinct interior conflicts. The introduction of the social, "other", adds at least a fourth - an external dialectic to the matrix, and so on.\textsuperscript{181} The lack of a carefully specified referent for the word dialectic
considerably weakens the value of Murphy's thesis here, as elsewhere. Throughout his discussion of Simmel, for example, one becomes aware of references to the interplay of "mind" versus "interaction"; "consciousness" versus "society"; "image" versus "reality"; "subject" versus "object"; "self" versus "culture"; each of which diverges slightly from the "norm" versus "action" dialectic that Murphy is pursuing.

Simmel's status as a dialectician was established by Coser in 1956. Here too, there was emphasis on ambivalence and change and Simmel was also conscious of the alienation question. He saw in the subject-object dualism "a radical contrast: between subjective life, which is restless but finite in time, and its contents, which, once created are fixed but timelessly valid...." The creation of the mind, that is, culture, assumed autonomy and demonstrated "an immanent logic of development" indifferent to the human condition.

The dialectic between the individual and the collective demonstrated for Simmel by the conflict which, he observed, is "a necessary counterpart of positive sociation", and further by the fact that "...the very inclusiveness central to the definition of the group, bespeaks its exclusiveness..." Meanwhile, "lies, illusion and ignorance" appeared to him as essential to social interaction as knowledge. Generally, Simmel tended to find that norms were fairly irrelevant in daily life while rituals of conduct received much attention. At this point, Murphy leaps from Simmel to Claude Lévi-Strauss,
whose structural theory offers the conceptualisation par excellence of this disparity between norm and action. This has already been discussed however, and will not be taken any further here.

The norm versus action theme is not new to anthropological thought. Boas observed that they were commonly out of phase with each other; and he believed that actions generally were more stable than ideas. Robertson-Smith's theory of ritual or action as prior to belief, was another case; he considered beliefs to be rationalisations of behaviour. In fact, as Murphy illustrates, even Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown's writing can be interpreted along these lines. What is strange is that although Hegel, Marx, Freud and Simmel all have appreciated that actions and intentions may be out of phase, it is a professional disregard of this phenomenon which has kept sociologists in business over the years. There is a constant pursuit (and hence assumption) of rationality, i.e., congruity between action and norm. Sociologists strain for consistency.

Murphy claims that his thesis is crucial to a dialectical theory of knowledge.

It implies that people react to normative systems and that their behaviour may be systematically non-congruent with the norms (21, 23, 24). Their ideas of the social world do not correspond with its phenomenology but are part of the phenomenology....One source of error in the conventional perception of the world is that it is teleological or oriented to canons of relevance....

Dialectics and phenomenology are both committed to the "false consciousness" argument.
The dialectical questioning of these common-sense categories of experience has an analogy in the phenomenological notion of "multiple realities"...the phenomenologist and the dialectician both stress the conventionality of our images of everyday activity (12), and state that this level of reality is warped, bounded, and incomplete.186

The dialectical method then, follows Levi-Strauss' two level hermeneutic (8b, 10, 11).

Murphy remarks that on the whole there is "enormous elasticity in the systems of social action, allowing the actors to thread their way through the culture rather than conform to its norms."187 Sketching out the dialectic of norm and action in more detail (30b), he finds that the two poles are contradictory in form and content (18a). In form, norms which are thought about, verbalised and codified are specific and bounded. In content, norms are diffuse, multiple and unbounded. Actions which tend to be unique and situation responsive are less articulated, more diffuse in form. Actions are always specific in content, however.

"Activity is sequential in time, continuous and non-repetitive; norms are timeless, discontinuous, repetitive and one dimensional. Norm and activity seldom meet, and there must always be strain between them...[But there are some] norms and actions [which] by partaking of each others' qualities could serve as mediators of the contradiction between norm and act."188 A hopeful note?

The sum of Murphy's manifesto is this:

The sociological separation of cultural, social and personality systems, assumes that the three together form the totality of social life, but that each is an
expression of the other on a different analytic level. We would suggest them as a unity, but a dialectical one. Rather than being expressions of each other, they are transformations of each other, and the totality of social life is a product of their clash. This is an untidy, conflict-prone model, but we may ask whether or not it indeed represents the world as we know it.189
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigmatic Features</th>
<th>Structuralist Dialectics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paradigmatic Features</strong></td>
<td><strong>Levi-Strauss/Althusser/Coulson &amp; R/Murphy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a no philos. align.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1b non Marxist philos.</td>
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<td>1c Hegel-early Marx</td>
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<td>1d philos. late Marx</td>
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<td>2a unified science</td>
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<td>2b soc. method distn.</td>
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<td>2c objectivist meta.</td>
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<td>2d relativist meta.</td>
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<td>2e essentialist meta.</td>
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<td>3a soc. value free</td>
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<tr>
<td>3b soc. committed</td>
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<td>4a sociomothethic</td>
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<td>4b soci idiographic</td>
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<td>4c both complement</td>
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<td>5d expl. genetic</td>
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<tr>
<td>5e expl. dialectical</td>
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<tr>
<td>6a expl. -prediction</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<td>6b expl. descr. -undst.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6c undst. -action (c.r.)</td>
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<td>7a method empirical</td>
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<tr>
<td>7b method hermeneutic</td>
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<tr>
<td>7c both complement</td>
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<tr>
<td>8a analyses causal</td>
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<tr>
<td>8b analyses seeks causes</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>8c analyses seeks reasons</td>
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<td>8d analyses seeks immanent</td>
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<td>8e latent v. manifest m.</td>
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<td>9b dia. is reality</td>
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<td>10a dia. is method</td>
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<td>16d dia. is interaction m.r.</td>
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<td>17a rejects formal logic</td>
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<td>17b uses formal logic</td>
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<td>17c uses other factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>18a dia. simple contrad.</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>18b dia. multiple contrad.</td>
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<td>18c dia. other factor</td>
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<td>19a physical dia.</td>
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<td>20a production dia.</td>
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<td>20b institutional dia.</td>
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<td>20c intersubjective dia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21a intrasubjective dia.</td>
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<td>22a cognitive dia.</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>23a structural (infra) dia.</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>24a uses law int.of opp.</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>24b uses law opp.of neg.</td>
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<td>24c uses law of emergence</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>25a uses systems model</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>26a uses conflict model</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>26b uses other factor</td>
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<td>27a uses other factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>28a uses other factor</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<tr>
<td>29a uses other factor</td>
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<td>30a applies dia. (exemplar)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30b applies dia. (exemplar)</td>
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Comments on the Summaries

The structuralist dialecticians manifest eight major characteristics - an alignment with later or orthodox Marxism; an hermeneutic method; interest in the play of latent as opposed to manifest meaning; a view of the dialectic as both a method and something in reality itself; and that is expressed in both cognitive and institutional spheres use of the law of the interpenetration of opposites and recognition of the dialectic as a perspective only.

Lévi-Strauss' commitment to the unity of the sciences and his methodological essentialism leads him into a pitfall of many Marxists. So does his combination of nomological interest and hermeneutic procedure. The attention to latent and manifest meaning levels leads him to seek both human reasons for action and immanent forces, a seemingly illogical position that is rescued only by postulation of the transcendental historical subject-objectivity. Again in agreement with his Marxism the dialectic is viewed as a method and a real thing but not an interaction of the two.

Althusser also demonstrates the Marxist tendency to join objectivity and hermeneutic interpretation together. There is not really an infrastructural dialectic in Althusser. His transcendental historical force is really an economic entity, and therefore an objective institutional structure, rather than a psychological one. The cognitive dialectic demonstrated by Althusser applies to his method and again is a material (production) process.
Coulson and Riddell do not spell out their dialectic in enough detail for any analytic treatment of it.

Murphy's phenomenological image of the dialectic is out of character with his appreciation of it as method and reality without interaction of the two. His allocation of the dialectic to many 'levels' of analysis is indiscriminate.
FUNCTIONALIST DIALECTICS

GURVITCH
CAZANEUVE
VAN DEN BERGHE
COLE
SCHERMERHORN
GROSOFF
PERINBANAYAGAM
SCHNEIDER
BLAU
Functionalism rests on a fusion of the social organism analogy with an objectivist view of social reality. The social whole, system or gestalt is a product of normative consensus, which integrates conflicting interests by institutionalizing disruptive tensions. The system is thus a clockwork of interrelated parts, an equilibrium model, where explanation is in terms of the needs of the whole. The functionalist dialectic introduces dialectical mediation to its treatment of the relationship between part and whole.

Georges Gurvitch, author of *Dialectique et sociologie* (1962) - was probably the first to attempt the establishment of an actual "dialectical sociology". His brand of dialectic, "empirico realist", conforms recognisably to the organicist traditions of French social thought, which is not surprising since Gurvitch was a successor to Durkheim's Chair at the Sorbonne and editor of *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*.

Gurvitch sees his empirico-realistic dialectic as part of the progressive "dialectization" of the exact sciences in the 20th century. This methodological revolution affected physics first, with Bohr's complementarity principle, according to which two equally valid but mutually exclusive theories might not be applied at
the same time, since one would destroy the viewpoint of
the other. Next, the general theory of relativity erased
the universal conceptions of time and space in favour of
a multiplicity of space-times. Finally, came Heisenberg's
demonstration of the impossibility of simultaneous measurement
of the position and activity of microphysical entities.
The culmination of these developments occurred in 1947 with
the institution of an academic review *Dialectica* under the
Swiss mathematician and philosopher Ferdinand Gonseth. The
journal was to be directed at a clarification of conceptual
and experimental difficulties within the ambit of dialectics.
But Gurvitch writes, generally this interdisciplinary
awareness failed to confront the fundamental aspects of
the relationship between the natural and social sciences.
In particular, there has been a failure to appreciate the
special nature of the humanities (2b), where use of the
dialectic leads to a compounding of difficulties, for, not
only the method, but "la réalité humaine et sociale est
elle-même dialectique".191

The discovery of the dialectic within social reality
Gurvitch attributes to Fichte's studies in morality and
natural law. Proudhon, Marx and recently Sartre have
developed this "material" dialectic, but not in an anti-
dogmatic manner.192 The dialectical method as exercised
by Gurvitch will liberate the social sciences from
philosophical biases (1a): "la dialectique débarrasse
des vieilles oppositions d'école telles que matérialisme,
positivisme, spiritualisme, rationalisme, criticisme ou
sensualisme, tout en ouvrant la voie..." to a synthesis
of all scientific knowledge.193
This essentially "negative" character of the dialectic is among its most recurring and therefore most authentic qualities. But dialectics alone is a vain pursuit, only an empiric dialectic (8a), writes Gurvitch, will allow the "purification" of knowledge by the confrontation with experience which opens it to negation. Further than this, the critical attitude of the dialectician involves his denial of formal logic (17a), and beyond this, the abstract and discursive (and with it rhetorical notions) are rejected too. The dialectic typically combats what is static in the real world and the artificial crystallisation of knowledge that conceptualisation gives it. It seeks instead to penetrate the complexity, "flexibility" and sinuosity of reality. It exposes tensions, "oppositions", contraries and contradictories (true antinomies or polarities), and the mutual conditioning of these (though not the contradictions) (18a, 26). It traces through the intermediate stages of such oppositions - quantity and quality (28), liberty and determinism, for example. And its fourth enduring characteristic focuses on the simultaneous "movement" of wholes and their constitutive elements and the reciprocal interaction between these (14c). The movement of unity to multiplicity and of multiplicity to unity is presupposed in this.

The dialectic for Gurvitch has a threefold expression. It is a real movement (16b):

C'est la voie prise par totalités humaines...et la lutte que ces totalités mènent contre les obstacles internes et externes...."
It is a method:

La manière de connaître adéquatement le mouvement des totalités sociales réelles et historiques...toutes les sciences, même naturelles ou exactes, ont affaire à des cadres de référence plus ou moins artificiels où intervient l'humain, et par son intermédiaire, la perspective sociale.

Its third expression is:

La rapport dialectique qui s'établit entre l'objet construit par une science, la méthode employée et l'être réel (l6d). Or l'intervention de cette dialectique est particulièrement intense en sociologie...[ôù] les totalités réelles étudiées sont pénétrées par de multiples significations humains...194

Only the unification of these three expressions "a dialectization of the dialectic" will open the way to apprehension of the "total social reality".

Gurvitch's assessment of the differences between the sciences of men and of nature leads him to re-examine the appropriateness of the dialectic of complementarity for social analysis. He finds that in fact, in the social sciences, no less than five such operational procedures are called for. These he applies both in his treatment of social phenomena and in his analysis of the relationships between the disciplines. The "dialectic of complementarity" (8c, 29c) he describes as pointing to alternatives, real or conceptual, which at second glance are found to be complementary in relation to each other, since each provides an aspect of reality or point of view that is lacking in the other. Another complementarity dialectic is that of "compensation" or orientation in an inverse direction, the third, complementarity of "double orientation", represents
a compounding of the second form, with movement in two
directions as befits the pluri-dimensional constitution
of social reality.

The "dialectic of mutual implication" points to
alternatives, real or conceptual, which at second glance
are found to interpenetrate each other to a degree (13c,
14c). In other words, they are not, as in the
complementarity dialectic, mutually exclusive terms.

The relationship of social and psychological phenomena
is a case in point.

The "dialectic of ambiguity" points to the fact that
positive and negative valuations may characterise the same
object. The social network, for example, generates both
security and constraint. Extreme ambiguity may develop
into ambivalence and eventually elements of the structure
become antinomic.

The "dialectic of polarisation" points to this antinomic
organisation of elements in a situation, whether arising
from relations of complementarity, mutual implication or
ambiguity. This is the classic dialectic of opposites (26)
and Gurvitch claims that, in its distinct form, it is not
often found in social reality. It has special pertinence
to the study of alienation, social disintegration, conflict
and acculturation.

The "dialectic of the reciprocity of perspectives"
points to alternatives, real or conceptual, which are neither
identical nor totally separate, and which are symmetrical
in outcome. The mutual conditioning of individual and
collective processes in the historical totality is one such manifestation, but this itself takes place only in a context of polarisation and dialectical ambiguity.

The context in which Gurvitch envisages this dialectic is an irreducible reality of "social facts" (3a), "a complex of dynamic and fluid systems" made up of unstructurable, structurable, and structured" phenomena (29a). This sociology is divided into micro and macro aspects. The microsociology (22) deals with the unstructurable classes of sociability, the various relations between ego and alter, their intensity and constraint. The macrosociology is an expanded classification of the totalities (21) which go to make up the total social reality. These are the structurable elements of which Gurvitch recognises ten depth levels ranging from the morphological or eco-level of the statisticians, through organised and symbolic patterns of conduct to hidden psychic dispositions (23). The levels penetrate each other by means of the dialectical processes just described. The actual structured totalities, groupings, classes and even global societies (i.e., capitalism) are weighted according to function, size, duration, rhythm, organisation, and so on, running to fifteen criteria in all.

Beyond this is Gurvitch's notion of social structure, which is alien to the mainstream of structuralist thought and quite difficult to grasp. It seems to represent a gestalt or equilibrium system (29a) made up with reference to sociability, the depth levels, social time and the symbolic expressions of organised activities.
Gurvitch assures the sociologist that with the set of interlocking matrices provided by these multifarious dimensions, he can pinpoint exactly the nature of his object. But this sociology is never more than a typology (5a): and he admits— it tends "towards" explanation only. This is not to say that explanation in sociology is impossible in his view, but accurate predictability via causal laws is extremely rare. Determination is such a relative and multiform thing. For instance, social determinisms belonging to the a-structural microsociological frameworks are conceptually separate from the sociological determinisms of concrete global societies (29a). Yet even the latter are not conducive to probabilistic generalisations, owing to their dialectical nature. The a-structural, structurable and structured elements are constantly in conflict with each other, only reference to the total social phenomenon can serve as the basis for explanation. But even here a single causal line is always doubtful. Instead, sociology demonstrates "functional correlations" between two elements in a system, and patterns or tendencies towards regularity over time (6b, 9).

Other elements may be explained by direct "understanding" of their presence in the social whole (7b). Gurvitch insists that while history answers the "why" questions better than sociology does, the two disciplines complement each other (15c): "...une science historique continuiste qui étudie une réalité historique inclinant...vers la discontinuité... une sociologie discontinuiste par sa méthode typologique,
Gurvitch's writing on explanation resembles that of the other French dialecticians, Lefebvre and Althusser. The movement of explanation is from abstract to concrete, with domination of the whole over the parts (14a); and the process of explanation is scarcely distinguished from understanding for these are another complementary pair.

Determinism is the integration of particular facts into one of the real, multiple frameworks or concrete universes (actually known or constructed); it situates these facts, that is explains them in relationship to its understanding of the framework (30b).

Gurvitch believes that experimentation has only limited success in sociology, observation is preferable. A study in controlled observation by Cazaneuve and other disciples of Gurvitch - 'Enquête sociologique sur la connaissance d'autrui' illustrates his approach with a comparison of social class differences in person perception (30a).

Enlarging on Scheler's theory of the immediate experience of other selves, the authors surmised that both direct apprehension and knowledge of others should be active in interpersonal perception and that these should feed or modify each other through the dialectics of complementarity (8c, 29c), mutual implication (13c, 14c), and polarisation (26). A hypothesis was formed that the mode of perception used by a subject in his perception of others is related to the social grouping to which he belongs, and hence modified by the degree to which he is
integrated into this grouping. It was felt that such a study should be carried out on a group that had been ongoing for some time and which had a developed social structure (21) and microcosms of sociability (22). For this reason eight occupational groups representing the categories - intellectual, industrial, administrative and rural were selected and subjected to partially structured depth interviews on their attitudes to a work partner.

The interview schedule sought to determine direct intuitions of the other: "what was striking at first glance?": use of stereotypes, "what permits you to reach a more precise image?": the influence of others in the group on the image formed and the relative importance of verbal and non-verbal cues. The responses to the questions were treated as a yes/no option (17b). The number of positive responses per item were compared for each group and presented graphically. Descriptive statistics only, appear to have been used.

Bosserman reports that the central hypothesis expecting a positive correlation between forms of knowledge and social frameworks was validated (6b, 8a). Analysis of trends showed a particularly strong difference between intellectual and industrial groups on the first item - intuitive perception. Verbal and non-verbal communications were found to be relied upon equally by all groups. Generally, each group exhibited a characteristic profile of perceptual techniques.

Basically this study is a mere collation of what Gurvitch calls "functional correlations" and the specific
role of dialectical operations mentioned at the outset does not receive any further attention. The student of dialectics will have to look elsewhere for convincing applications of Gurvitch's conceptualisation of the tradition.

The next publication to draw attention to a dialectic of a functionalist sort is Pierre van den Berghe's 'Dialectic and Functionalism' in the American Sociological Review, 1963. Its author, it will be recalled, believes that both traditions fail to provide a complete model for society, but that put together, they do constitute one.

The functionalist or structural-functionalist approach as formulated by Parsons, Merton and Davis involved the following postulates, according to van den Berghe: societies should be considered historically as systems of interrelated parts; causation is multiple and reciprocal; social systems, though never totally integrated, maintain a state of dynamic equilibrium; dysfunction, tension or deviance tends to be resolved or institutionalised by built in adjustive mechanisms; changes are generally gradual and adaptive, sudden change affecting mainly the superstructure; the value system facilitates socio-cultural integration through imposition of a consensus; the sources of change may be external to the system, occur through internal differentiation, or through innovation.

Van den Berghe finds that on examination, conflict and dissention are aspects of social reality as essential
as consensus is (29c), and that the supposed connection between consensus and integration cannot honestly be regarded as a necessary one. Integration may favour change, while stability and inertia give rise to disequilibrium. The functional model also has difficulty accounting for the fact that adaptations to external forces may be maladjustive, while there is no place at all for revolutionary change. What particularly interests the author is the role of contradiction and internal conflict in development, something which the incomplete emancipation of functionalism from organicism has so far disallowed. The article thus offers an expanded equilibrium model that will meet these shortcomings.

This reformulation using "a minimum dialectic" entails that "the social structure (be recognised) as the source of a crucial type of change" and that this may be the product of "contradiction and conflict between two or more opposing factors" (18b) such as values, roles or institutions. The minimum dialectic may operate at the conceptual level (24) (Hegel's contribution), at the level of opposition between groups (21) (Marx's), and on the level of institutionalized interests such as autonomous structures. This third level is difficult to envisage. Logically it would seem to represent a blend of the other two.

The reconciliation between this dialectic and functionalism is considered possible on the grounds that both are holistic approaches (14a). Van den Berghe qualifies this however; the former leans towards unidirectional
causation (9) and conflictual interdependence, the latter to reciprocal causation and integrative interdependence. Nevertheless, both consistently underestimate the autonomy of parts in the social whole. The second convergence is in the key concepts of consensus and conflict; both overlap in their roles, consensus leading to either integration or disintegration and conflict behaving likewise. The third point concerns the evolutionary nature of change in the two theories. The functional differentiation and the dialectical spiral both imply a succession of stages in which elements of an early phase are reorganized in a later and more advanced modification (28). Finally van den Berghe comes to the strongest area of rapprochement between the two, the equilibrium model. The dialectical triad with equilibria at thesis and synthesis and disequilibrium at antithesis (27) is such a cycle; there are elements of inertia in both schemes, integration or resolution are recurring phases.

Van den Berghe claims that the new blend involves a rejection of both Hegel's and Marx's moncausal theories, and Marx's and Dahrendorf's use of binary models. Polarisation writes van den Berghe,

...is an empirical tendency rather than a necessary condition of conflict. A pluralistic model thus seems to impose itself. If one argues that dualism is intrinsic to dialectical thinking, I am prepared to abandon the term 'dialectic', though not the elements thereof which are essential to a balanced view of social reality.
In passing, it is noteworthy that van den Berghe's bibliography contains no references to dialectical thinkers, unless Coser and Dahrendorf be so classified, while some twenty or more articles on functionalism are listed.

A second proposed convergence of structural-functionalism and dialectics was developed by Robert Cole in the *Sociological Quarterly*, 1966. Marx's dialectic of the history of class society was over specialised and yet not specific enough according to Cole. The real concern is when, in what way and which dialectical mechanisms are effective and how these interact with integrative forces in society to shape a given outcome.

Cole argues for a pragmatic and empirical (8a) "assessment of the net balance of the aggregate of consequences" as opposed to the "dogmatic and mystifying notion of dialectics as an all pervading principle of reality which explains change by showing how each entity calls forth its own negation. Conflict is "empirically both a normal and essential element of the social structure." This is why Dahrendorf's advocacy of function and conflict models as optional analytical schemes is inadequate, the two approaches must be resolved (15c, 29c). The immediate goal is thus one of "disengaging the dialectic from its ideological moorings (1a) and making it trim for sociological analysis."

The functional system, writes Cole, traditionally consists of two sorts of elements - the social structure
and its component items. The activity of the researcher here is an "interpretation of items (both at the level of values and institutions) by establishing their consequences for the larger structures in which they are implicated." \[206\]

Parsons' preoccupation with normative relations resulted in neglect of the sources of instability however. It is obvious that the presence of some items may threaten the maintainence of the structure, while others, structural constraints, compensate for these. The constraints operate as equilibrating factors only up to a certain point, but beyond this, strains or tensions - Merton's "dysfunctions" show up. The latter's formulation though, ignores the "fundamental ambivalence which derives from the essential negativity of all existing structures (3c)" , the inherent contradictions \[18b\]. \[207\]

Sociologists have traditionally concentrated on unilinear functions, variables, but the dialectical view is based on the assumption of interlocking processes \[14c\]. Constraints and support systems may be interlocking, for example, those who benefit from the established order will be instrumental in setting up other structures which strengthen it. But this also implies that change, generated in one, is facilitated by transfer through the others. The functionalist model of structural differentiation thus reveals inadequate comprehension of internally produced change.

Cole continues "...when the dialectical mechanisms \[3a, 16b\] are barely superior to the integration mechanisms, we should expect \[9, 21\] a relatively continuous process
of change (evolution) ... when the dialectical mechanisms are clearly superior, we would expect rapid discontinuous change (revolution) .... 208 The time factor is important in another way as well, for the functional consequences of an item at one time may be dysfunctional at another time and under another set of circumstances. The phenomenon resembles Schneider's category "the anticipated versus unanticipated consequences of social action." 209 Over-specialisation has a similar paradoxical effect, since by denying adaptive flexibility it leaves an institution open to unanticipated eventualities.

Cole commends Marx for his perception of ambiguity in relation to the capitalist organisation of labour which, if undesirable, did at least allow for the rational exploitation of material resources. Marx's analysis was wrong in its ultimate prediction, however, because it failed to take account of socially integrative mechanisms along with the dialectical ones. It is not enough to assume simply an intensification of the dialectic and consequent revolutionary overthrow of the prevailing structure. Sometimes oligarchy may replace democracy, sometimes a totalitarian structure will, it depends on "the balance of operative factors" (18b).

Weber's model of the decline of democracy was more accurately dialectical in Cole's view. Here, democracy served the growth of bureaucracy while the latter in turn assisted the destruction of aristocratic privilege. Meanwhile, the excessive proliferation of bureaucracy
reduced participation and a new order of authoritarianism set in. Simmel's tragic conception of culture was similar: form or organisation, the elaboration of life processes would bring about their eventual suffocation. Marx, more optimistic than Simmel saw contradiction as agent of a new and glorious synthesis.

Turning his attention to the sociology of development, Cole remarks that while democracy is not guaranteed by industrialisation, it is enhanced by it. However, the restrictions in consumption that rapid industrialisation requires, brings rigid government controls which may increase "beyond the point where compensation can occur (28) and the democratic structure is replaced."210

The anthropologist Leach, who analysed the political systems of highland Burma, gives further evidence to the argument for dialectics, writes Cole. He has observed that

...when the increase in equality reaches a point where it conflicts with the basic aristocratic norm of higher status for the wife's family, then it has exceeded the limits within which it can maintain the democratic structure. The democratic structure is then replaced by the aristocratic structure. 211

But Cole's summary of Leach lends itself to the equilibrium model, as much as if not more than to a dialectical one. Perhaps, he reluctantly admits, this "suggests that in some cases it is a problem of terminology and different starting points.... 212 But this confession brings him right back to Dahrendorf's optional methodological perspectives which he earlier rejected.
In fact, Cole's position (3b) is full of ambivalence and of inadequately worked out implications. He denies the mystifying notion of an all pervasive negativity yet, we find him criticising Merton for not sufficiently appreciating this inherent tendency. He writes of conflict as both an empirical and an "essential" entity, yet if he were a true empiricist the essential quality would have no logical significance for him. He claims to reject the teleology of dialectics, and both unilinear and cyclical views of change, but his tolerance for the equilibrium model reintroduces both teleology and cyclic change. Finally, under the influence of Marcuse, Cole describes the dialectic as counter to positivism in all its forms because the latter accepts only the ultimate authority of fact and observation, while dialectically "...future events rather than the present existing fact can serve as a "method" of verification" (6e,16a).\textsuperscript{213} He is not only a confused dialectician, but when it comes to verification procedures, he seems to be a confused empiricist as well.

Robert Schermerhorn, in his \textit{Comparative Ethnic Relations} (1968)\textsuperscript{214} is another functionalist who favours dialectical analysis (16a). It has immense value for the social scientist, he writes, because it cuts across both structural and dynamic perspectives without being essentially incompatible with either (29c). He turns to Gurvitch for clarification of the meaning of dialectics and finds that it involves: the simultaneous observation of the movement
of both wholes and their constituent parts; focuses on the interpenetration of opposites in this movement (26); regards stable structures and fixed forms as problematic; and studies the character of the various dualisms that operate in the process of change. As a viewpoint (30b), that is, apart from its mediating role between system and conflict, the dialectic keeps the researcher aware of the "fluid complexities" of social situations and works against simplistic (including ideological) explanation (1a). It also gives due weight to the limited perspectives of actors in any situation (10). The true dialectician recognises that in the "multiplicity" of causal chains (9), both predictable and unforeseen factors play a part; and "unlike Marx", he will not use the approach as an a priori means of knowing his answers in advance. "The dialectic is therefore a "way" of knowing suitable to continual social change, although in itself, it explains nothing."215

Schermerhorn's book is intended to be a contribution to the methodology of race relations. He describes research in the field as exploratory, and his own volume attempts to correct this by laying down some systematic foundations. After scanning the literature, he develops what he calls a set of heuristic devices after the manner of Kaplan's pattern models.216 These open-ended, inductive typologies, he suggests, should serve to generate testable propositions. The gradual development of the field (8a), will give rise to more and more studies in deductive explanation (5a), but these models, Schermerhorn feels, will complement, rather than replace, the inductive approach:
...the distinction is dialectical rather than dichotomous, for 'from the nature of the whole pattern and some of its parts we can deduce the others; conversely, a deductive relationship might itself be viewed as constitutive of a cognitive pattern.217

Schermerhorn summarises the rationale of his methodology. The inductive typologies present the parameters which account for integration or conflict in relations between super and subordinate ethnicities (30, 21). Along one dimension the parameters or independent variables are the phases in these interactions which unfold historically; the degree of institutional or structural representation of groups; and accessibility to resources. Variables which intervene and modify these factors include the degree of value congruence between groups; the multi-national sector or cultural affinity to which the society in general belongs; and whether or not this society is an economically or politically dominated totality. Along the other dimension the dependent variables list relative institutional participation, including social mobility; degree of satisfaction with conditions; and direct expression of conflict behaviours. The parameters are not mutually exclusive classifications, in other words, an interactive model will be called for.

His tabulation of findings in the field does reveal certain regularities (5a). For instance, where the economy of a society is subjected to wide political supervision, he finds that ethnic groups are also likely to be openly controlled, rather than informally checked by mores. The author also introduces a paradigm which characterises the
interaction of parameters through the operation of centripetal and centrifugal trends, making for assimilation, pluralism, forced segregation and other outcomes. However, the crux of Schermerhorn's substantive probe into ethnic relations is the determination of factors related to the emergence of integration out of conflict (28). Examples of this dialectical linkage of opposites are antagonistic co-operations, peace in fued, and accommodative measures.

Theoretically, the macro-sociological approach which this field demands has been based on the work of two groups; Lenski and Dahrendorf representing the "power-conflict" school, and Parsons and Levy the "systems" perspective. The former have tended to emphasise the autonomous identity of ethnicities, and the latter concentrated on the functions of ethnic groups in the whole, and on the adjustments by which such subsystems can be integrated. Schermerhorn's work involves a critique and synthesis of both of these, and he considers his solution to be a dialectical one. He recommends that the researcher practice an alternation of perspectives between dynamic and structural, diachronic and synchronic analysis (15a, 15b), according to the needs of the particular problem at hand: "...perhaps no field of inquiry is better fitted to exemplify the dual relevance of such ostensibly clashing theories than the sphere of ethnic relations." 218

In 1970, a group of American sociologists led by Elliot Grosof and including Llewellyn Gross, claimed to have
discovered dialectical forces at work in the adaptation of individuals to an organisational context (29a, 30a).

Their paper 'Anchorage in Organization' carried the promising sub-title 'A Dialectical Theory'.

The focus of their study is described as the dialectical resolution of organizational demands and societal constraints [on low status workers] in which selective mechanisms (9) [such as restricted status achievement] mediate between organizational processes, cultural values and participants' strategies.

The researchers interviewed (3a, 8a) a large group of hospital personnel and ranked them for social status and employment stability. Correlations between the two dimensions showed that, in every case, low status individuals - coloureds, females, and less educated males, had greater stability in employment. Apart from the obvious economic explanation for this low mobility, it was suggested that in the hospital context low status workers gain considerable personal reward by participating in culturally esteemed goals such as the preservation of life and mitigation of suffering (10).

The social recognition thus achieved helps anchor these individuals in the organisation.

Inside the organisation itself three possible anchorage points are identified: the authority structure, co-worker relations and client relations (21, 22). Worker attitudes to employment conditions at each anchorage point were sampled and correlated with job satisfaction scores. Generalisation from this exercise (5a) led to "The theory
that in each anchorage system heightened attitudinal ambivalence is associated with stable employment."

The most effective anchorage system was the authority structure. Examining low status and attitudinal ambivalence here, the authors found individual workers forced to resolve a dilemma imposed by participation in a structure at once "coercive and subordinating" yet "liberating and equalizing". This resolution was generally brought about by a combination of identification and submission. Workers aligned themselves with the authority system and created an environment of mutual respect and approval. Meanwhile the authority system gained in control, usually in inverse proportion to the worker's technical competence (13c, 14c).

The authors conclude that Authority anchorage in hospitals is dialectical (16b)... identification (instant submission) leads to absolute equality between superordinates and subordinates (organisational contradiction); submission (without identification) leads to absolute ressentiment (cultural contradiction). 222

Paradoxically, from a functionalist viewpoint the outcome of authority anchorage was found to be detrimental to both co-worker and client interactions and hence to the prime organisational concern.

R.S. Perinbanayagam's paper 'The Dialectics of Charisma' attempts to engage the sociology of Mead in what he calls "a social psychological and communicational theory" of charismatic leadership (1b). 223 Following Bauman and not Trotsky's expressed opinion here, Perinbanayagam insists
that dialectics and pragmatism are not antagonistic. Both reject the notion of a static formalised universe in favour of a "...processual and transient definition of reality (16b)...", furthermore, "...both deny the adequacy of a formal logic based on the law of identity (17a)....".

A primary implication of this "paradigmatic task", the unification of dialectics and pragmatism, is that

...a social event cannot be fully apprehended for purposes of analysis without taking full cognizance of its developmental nature (15a) and the multifarious meanings (10) it can mobilize. In the context, it is necessary to call attention to Mead's definition of meaning as the tendency of a gesture or symbol to mobilize coincident responses from the participants in a social transaction (1932a). An act or gesture then, receives meaning only when it has mobilized a particular set of responses. Thus Mead opens the way for a conceptualisation of meaning as an emergent variable (28) and hence for the creation of contradictory or antithetical meanings by some act or gesture....Mead's perspectives allow one to conceive of the fundamentally transformative character of meaning: events and occurrences change their significance to the same audience as they unfold, just as much as they can have dissimilar meanings to different audiences (3b).

On dialectics, Perinbanayagam quotes Bosserman's translation of Gurvitch "...the dialectic concerns social reality...its various dimensions, expressions and manifestations. As a real movement the dialectic is the way (dia) followed or taken by human groups" Bosserman lists the scientific and explanatory advantages of dialectical sociology (6c) as permitting the study of unanticipated consequences, of complementarity and
contradiction, ambiguity, opposition and the mutual perspectives of participants as aspects of the same reality (18c, 26): "...aspects of a social whole, which relate to each other in such a way that both total identification and separation are denied. They are mutually immanent (14c)." 226

Charisma is understood basically in Weber's terms, as a form of legitimated leadership which may bring about profound social change through some hold over the masses by persuading them to reject tradition and law.

Perinbanayagam puts forward his dialectics of charisma in four propositions:

Charisma is "created by symbolic processes" (24) such as Goffmann's identity management and Burke's rhetorical strategies;

these processes involve "selective and purposive activities" which consequently create both responsive, indifferent and hostile audiences;

the possible responses may be "direct responses, antinomies or ambiguities";

the responses may "create and sustain structures (21) that are antithetical and inimical to each other." 227

He then proceeds to exemplify this theory with a reconstruction of the career of Gandhi (30a).

Gandhi deliberately projected the enhanced identity of the sadhu or ascetic Hindu holy-man using such rhetorical instruments as the loin cloth and fasting. Likewise the spinning wheel was his symbol of Indian integrity versus British economic exploitation. With death a possible
outcome of the fast, the latter held claim to sainthood, and so the practice evolved into a contest between good and evil - one frail, dedicated man against the British government. When Gandhi's demands were won, this identity was validated.

Perinbanayagam points out that basically the appeal of the sadhu, non-violence and the sacredness of the cow, depended on evocation and crystallization of deep buried Hindu traditions. It was not a total ideological consensus however. Although his plea for Hindu-Moslem unity brought him favour with the Moslems, his intransigent commitment to the sacred cow aroused their hostility, so did his advocacy of representative government, which left them uncertain about their future. Meanwhile the extreme orthodox Hindus of North India were also opposed to Gandhi on the question of representative government because he was seen by them, as too lenient to the Moslems. It is also probable that many high government officials, tired of his continual political interference were not adverse to his eventual elimination.

Perinbanayagam concludes

...the very processes that created his charismatic appeal, also created antinomous audiences which often saw him in terms of what could be termed counter-charisma, or as Burke (1962) puts it 'scapegoat'...it was inevitable that the same processes that created the charisma of Gandhi should create antithetical structures (groups, classes, individuals and institutions, etc.). Charisma emerges in a field of conflict and contradictions and so is sustained (29c). 228
Writing on 'Dialectic and Sociology' for the American Sociological Review 1971, Louis Schneider recognises a "dialectical bent" active in sociological thinking for over two hundred years; but the multiplicity of meanings given the term, he feels, has prevented consideration of this as a workable scheme. To talk of a dialectical "method" is thus quite absurd, writes Schneider, Hegel's own dialectic was "at the most a method of exposition.... Dialectical 'bias' or 'bent' or 'perspective' is quite a different matter from method" (30b). Schneider warns that dialectical argument has often used the terms negation and contradiction in contexts beyond the logical system in which they were developed, and that invariably such writing falls to the level of "word mongering". Nor has dialectics been disciplined by alliance to any one system of philosophy, he reflects (1b).

Schneider separates six strains of meaning that predominate in dialectical thinking, the seventh that he adds is really elaboration of an earlier one. The first of these strains has to do with discrepancies between aim or intention and the outcome of social action. This was a significant element in Hegel's perception of history, the 18th century Scottish Moralists recognised it, Spencer too is listed as acknowledging that "conditions and not intentions determine" (13b, 16b). Merton in 1936, discussing the "unanticipated consequences of purposive social action" found Marx, Wundt, Pareto and Weber, to be aware of the problem, and MacIver has also interested himself with it.
The second meaning cluster Schneider names, following Wundt, is "the heterogony of ends". It describes a process whereby unintended outcomes are absorbed into new intentions or old means become new ends (28). The psychologist Allport's "functional autonomy of motives" or Adam Smith's view that economic greed may be found at the base of general welfare, are cases in point, reflecting this "irony of sudden reversals".232

Schneider's third category follows on from the second, but deals with evolutionary progression, where one stage of adaptation may prove inimical to further advance - success thus bringing failure. As Spencer observed, organisation favours growth only to a certain point of complexity after which it impedes it. Weber too, discussing the dependence of bureaucracy on technological superiority has remarked that there can be evolutionary advantages in backwardness. Or again, the successful practice of the puritan ascetic and work ethic leads straight into the temptations of wealth; while for the Marxist, the successful accumulation of surplus value brings about the fall of the capitalist system. Schneider himself points to modern urban planning, where a highway built to relieve traffic congestion is as often as not found to be increasing it. Modifications to a system may be positive in outcome as well as negative, although the original "Hegelian negation" implied a "lifting up" (21, 27).

A fourth aspect of dialectics treats of development through conflict, this is perhaps its most commonly known
feature and he sees it as the one which leave it most open to attack from those who do not appreciate the mechanisms involved (26, 27, 28).

The fifth group of meanings to be isolated focuses on these mechanisms, particularly "contradiction" and its corollaries opposition, paradox, negation, dilemma. Schneider mentions the dilemmas posed by "charisma" in Weber's theory; psychoanalysis abounds in such turns; "the contradictory logic of passion" is Schneider's favourite phrase for it (18a).

The final cluster surrounds the problem of conflict resolution through dialectical coalescence of opposites (26, 29b). Simmel's recognition that antagonism among those with close ties is always more intense than antagonism among those without affection for each other, is an example of this.

In all its meanings the "dialectical bent" expresses "paradox" and "the irony of sudden reversals". Schneider believes it will have useful application in discriminating between types of social change and that it should provoke reassessment of the notion of feedback. The most he will say for its status however, is that it promises "a shrewd taxonomy".²³³

Peter Blau was interested in the dialectical idea as early as 1964. In the last chapter of his book Exchange and Power in Social Life he wrote "There is a dialectic in social life (16b), for it is governed by many contradictory
forces. The dilemmas of social associations reflect this dialectic, and so does the character of social change. 234

He illustrated the theme with an analysis of the relationship between reciprocity and imbalance:

Reciprocity equilibrates, giving is balanced by obligation, but where reciprocation is not possible an imbalance of power results. A secondary exchange is thus superimposed upon the first. Power, in turn, is moderated by the degree of social approval it receives. Too heavy exercise of power meets with disapproval. However, the total acceptance of power by subordinates legitimates it and reinforces the imbalance. Conversely, collective disapproval threatens stability through the creation of opposition. The multiple consequences of a social force are another reason it may have contradictory repercussions in the social structure. The forces set in motion to restore equilibrium in one respect, or in one segment of the social structure, are typically disequilibrating forces in other respects, or in other segments.... Many incompatible requirements exist in complex social structures...(and) there is much resistance to social change...Structural change, therefore, assumes a dialectical pattern (27). 235

In 1972 Blau was again associating himself with the dialectic. At a meeting of graduate students at Colombia University, among them Karmen, and in the presence of Robert Merton, he took up the issue of 'Functionalism and Dialectics' and defended a variety of the latter. 236

It is plain from the published summary of his contribution to the discussion that Blau's theoretical orientation continues to fall clear of the Marxist line (1a). He recognises dialectics and functionalism as two
complementary heuristic perspectives (30b) because the first "focuses on the issues and dilemmas posed by the conflicting interests of different groups" and the second "focuses on the adjustment and integration of various groups and interests" (21,29a).\(^{237}\)

Blau departs from the main body of opinion at the meeting over this, (as most see the two as incompatible epistemologies) and over the question of evaluative criteria for theories. Explanation and prediction are essential corollaries of adequate theorizing, he agrees, but he rejects the contention that a theory should impel to social action - look at the case of Hitler.

In the new statement on dialectics, "dilemma" is still Blau's key theoretical notion. He defines it as a contradiction (18a) not resolvable under existing social conditions. This is what makes it an important "dynamic force" - an emergent concept (28). He realises that "...whether a conflict or difficulty is looked upon as a mere social problem or tension in need of adjustment, or as an unresolvable dilemma with dynamic potential, depends on one's conceptual framework".\(^{238}\) Marx's was a framework for social change, he comments, but he sees his own as more appropriate to a detached theoretical analysis that allows consideration of both sides of a social conflict.

It is not a profound considered viewpoint.
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Comments on the Summaries

The functionalist dialecticians overlap on three points - the focus on a dialectic in reality itself; which operates at the institutional level and commitment to a complementarity of systems and conflict models.

The so-called 'structuralist' Gurvitch is classified here as a functionalist because of his emphasis on the objective facticity of the social whole and his freedom from any commitment to immanent or latent forces. His uncompromising systems orientation is difficult to reconcile with the complementarity dialectic of reciprocity, ambiguity, etc. His entertainment of synchronic and diachronic perspectives is problematic, since social reality is seen by him as ongoing and continuous (diachronic) while the sociological method is a static or (synchronous) analysis. Again he appears to conceptualise the dialectic as method, as reality and as interaction, separately.

Cazaneuve's contribution is too brief for critical comment.

Cole confuses the objectivist and essentialist epistemologies at times; is undecided between diachronic and synchronous analysis and a dialectic that is method or reality.

Schermerhorn is interested in both reasons and causes for action - these are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the objectivist epistemology is definitely not compatible with the notion of reciprocity.

Grosof et.al. make this mistake as well.
Perinbanayagam starts off with a pragmatic relativist stance and ends up with an objective systems model growing out of it.

Schneider does not put forward an explicit position, but rather describes some cardinal features of the dialectic. No particular inconsistencies are apparent in what he says.

Blau's statement again is an incomplete one, but several points do not resolve - he rejects any philosophical alignment but asserts that the dialectic is a 'real' phenomenon. He blends system and reciprocity in the Marxist style, but rejects identification as a Marxist.
CONCLUSION

The reader is now in a position to evaluate substantively the logical consistency of Friedrich's views. Towards the end of A Sociological Interpretation he writes: "If the dialectic does not seriously challenge ontology and system for paradigmatic status during the 1890s, it will not be because of inadequate formal credentials. What are those formal credentials? Is the paradigm now be projects a logically consistent proposition? A priori changes, 'dialectic' paradigm in the open to how showing a 'dialectical' consistency of perspectives and procedures of science within the whole.

The paradigm is said to be supported by the availability of many sorts of concepts in quantifying and their interpretation to a relatively high 'prima facie' which rationalizes this. As the possibility of the beginning of a current phase of social sciences and foundations of a new phase in a relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative data in fact coincided as dialectic theory.

A consequence of all this is that traditional sociology where a sensibility difference is inevitably linked to in the social attention of today, where knowledge has become an independent variable, where all research is by
The reader is now in a position to evaluate Friedrichs' argument for a dialectical paradigm.

**the logical consistency of Friedrichs' claim**

Towards the end of *A Sociology of Sociology* he writes: "If the dialectic does not seriously challenge conflict and system for paradigmatic status during the 1970's, it will not be because of inadequate formal credentials." What are these formal credentials? Is the paradigm that he projects a logically consistent proposition?

A prime characteristic of Friedrichs' "dialectical paradigm" is its open structure allowing a "dialogical" complementarity of perspectives and procedures to operate within its ambit.

The paradigm is said to be supported by the polarity of many sets of concepts in sociology and their interpenetration; by a reflexive logic, "probably Hegelian" which rationalises this; by the possibility of the negation of a current phase of social reality and emergence of a new phase in "a relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative akin to that found in Marxist theory".

A consequence of all this, is a reflexive sociology where a self-conscious sociologist is inevitably involved in the social situation he studies; where knowledge has become an independent variable; where all research is by
definition action research and its goal is the social emancipation of those involved.

The final consequence of the reflexive sociology in which knowledge is an active variable, is the unpredictability of social events and hence, the inappropriateness of any search for generalizing statements or sociological laws.

One might argue, following Kuhn, that Friedrichs' dialectical paradigm with its epistemological pluralism is by definition no paradigm at all. And, that by inventing this complementarity argument he is both having his cake and eating it. Whether or not one believes that his revision of the theory of paradigms is justifiable, the concession to the complementarity of nomothetic and idiographic, of systems and conflict, empiricism and hermeneutics, does introduce logical difficulties.

Systems theory and its manifestations in structuralism and functionalism, are based on a metaphysical assumption of the stability and objective facticity of their data. It follows that empirical methods are considered appropriate to the study of these and that law-like generalizations are expected to emerge from this study. In short, it transposes a model of natural scientific activity into the social sphere. Friedrichs writes however, that "System theory, presuming conceptual closure, violates the openness of dialectical theory" which his elaboration of reciprocity and inter-penetration, negation and emergence, self-consciousness and emancipation, is an impressive monument to. Furthermore, he believes that "...the search for 'laws' of human nature
and for fundamental social processes that are in principle stable, is ultimately destined to be futile" because whenever a social scientist does isolate a specific manifestation of order in the social world, his awareness of that order represents an entirely new factor in that world and will feed back through his own actions and the actions of those to whom he communicates that awareness, to deny to some degree the full validity of that order in the future.

In fact, he states quite plainly concerning the methods of natural and social science, that "the nature of their fundamental disparity is the central message of my book." 

His summary stock taking of the thesis put forward in *A Sociology of Sociology* takes up the complementarity argument again, and here he maintains that while the term "dialectical" has traditionally been used to characterise the nature of a single logic....A crucial characteristic of the present formulation...is that it seeks to engage two quite distinct epistemologies...the two predispositions - the one suitable to the concern for reliability evidenced by natural science and the other appropriate to the risk demanded by a sensitivity to the ground that is personal existence - must inform each other....

The competing "frames of discourse" are more than mere alternatives, for at "another level" they can be seen to be "nested frames". And, of this "nested hierarchy of lenses", one is "artificial and one given...."

Thus, the sophist concludes that the dialectical paradigm "...does not reflect a metaphysical or ontological dualism of any sort: [for] experience, its grounding referent, is one." 

Friedrichs should not need to be reminded however, that 'raw' experience, whatever it may be, is certainly
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigmatic Features</th>
<th>Herm</th>
<th>Crit</th>
<th>Rel</th>
<th>Marx</th>
<th>Struct</th>
<th>Funct</th>
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<td>1b. Non Marxist philos.</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2a. Unified science</td>
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<td>3a. Objectivist meta.</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>16b. Dia. is reality</td>
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<td>16d. Dia. is interaction m.r.</td>
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<td>21. Institutional dia.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>24. Cognitive dia.</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>26. Uses law int.of op...</td>
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<td>27. Uses law neg.ofneg.</td>
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<td>28. Uses law of emergence</td>
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<td>29b. Uses conflict model</td>
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</table>

**ANALYTICAL SUMMARY**

**DIALECTICAL SCHOOLS**
not what Kuhn meant by the term 'paradigm'. Unfortunately, Friedrichs' "dialectical paradigm" does exhibit logical shortcomings.

The empirical feasibility of Friedrichs' claim

The measure of Friedrichs' thesis against the actual output of dialectical writing reviewed depends on two inquiries: does the body of literature share a common paradigm? And, if so, how do the properties of this paradigm compare with Friedrichs projection?

Judging from the dispersion of relevant publications since 1960, the high points in dialectical writing have been 1966 and 1970, with 1971 and 1972 following up. After this, there is a sharp drop in the interest of sociologists in dialectics. If this trend continues into the Seventies then Friedrichs' projection will be demonstrated to have been misconception, at least as far as its timing goes. At the time of writing the evidence weighs against Friedrichs on this point.

The material on which the present empirical assessment is based is summarised in the matrix entitled - Dialectical Schools.

The criteria on which the assessment is based are, to recapitulate:

an item is considered representative of a given group of dialecticians if two thirds of the authors in that group acknowledge it. (These items are underlined in red on the matrix.)
If a representative item is shared by two thirds of the groups, then it is interpreted as a paradigmatic feature. (These items are underlined in blue on the matrix.)

If two-thirds of the total number of items listed on the analytic frame are paradigmatic features, so defined, then a common paradigm will be said to be present.

In general the writing can be described as falling into a continuum of clusters ranging from the 'soft' dialecticians - hermeneutic, critical and reflexive schools oriented around the subjective and the 'hard' dialecticians - Marxists, structuralists and functionalists who reach for an objectivity of some sort. The relationships are more complex than this conventional dualism would suggest however, for there is also a third element running through the matrix not readily identified with either poles, and this is the essentialism expressed by many of the authors.

Looking at the representative items of the various schools it is apparent that the critical and reflexive sociologies are in many respects scarcely distinct, and similarly the Marxists and structuralists agree on several items. The two clusters dominated by American sociology - hermeneutics and functionalism - are quite literally poles apart.

As for the paradigmatic features, there is fundamental agreement on only two points; the dialectic is a cognitive phenomenon (24) and a perspective (30b). The first inquiry must be answered in the negative.
There is no paradigm, but what are the trends contained in the writing? The analytic frame contains sixty-two items filled out by ratings on twenty-eight authors. The lack of overall relatedness is again underlined by the fact that only five of these items are acknowledged by more than half of the authors. That is, they receive a total of fourteen or more ratings across the six groups. An examination of these items according to the number of ratings received across groups, suggests a dialectic that is highly consistent with the orthodox Marxist position on all but three items.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>paradigmatic features</th>
<th>ratings</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30b perspective only</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 institutional dia.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 cognitive dia.</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>15a analyses diachronic</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 uses law int. of opp.</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 uses law neg. of neg.</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 uses law of emergence</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>2b soc. method distn.</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>8b method hermeneutic</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>16d dia. is interaction m.r.</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>17a rejects formal logic</td>
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<tr>
<td>18a dia. simple contrad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14c reciprocal whole/part</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>3c essentialist meta.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 latent v. manifest m.</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Two of these, 2b and 16d, are heavily weighted by the reflexive dialecticians, and a third, 12, is weighted by all but the present sample of Marxists and functionalists for some obscure reason.

A dialectical paradigm based on this 'latent image' would be a theoretical perspective and not a practical model or exemplar. It would focus on phenomena at the
institutional level and there would be an interaction of this substantive concern and the method used, in other words a cognitive dialectic of understanding would permit an interaction of method and reality. This interactive aspect would involve the sociologist in the flux of social reality, a diachronic perspective, to be distinguished in methodology from that of the exact sciences. The engagement of sociological hermeneutic with institutional order would introduce the possibility of contradiction of that order—this being the motive force of change. The cognition of the dialectician and the institutional order, representing part and whole respectively, would be reciprocally determining factors and the three laws of dialectics would describe phases of this emergent interactive process, a sociology transcending the rules of formal logic. This paradigm, based on the continuing emergence or manifestation of meaning that was latent until the application of sociological understanding to the institutional order, would thus be grounded in an essentialist metaphysic.

Juxtaposing this hypothetical composite of trends against Friedrichs' scheme, all but three of the fifteen features are found to coincide with twelve of Friedrichs' twenty-six items. (These items are marked by an x on the analytic summary of Friedrichs position.)

The latent paradigm does not reproduce Friedrichs' problematic complementarity theme, while Friedrichs does not refer to an institutional dialectic (21), to a purely hermeneutic method (8b) or to the existence of latent and manifest meaning (12).
The latent paradigm of course, is generated from only the fifteen most rated or recurrent items for all authors and is in no sense a fully developed statement on the dialectic. Furthermore, the set of features contained in it does not resist distortion by the addition of new information. The comparison with Friedrichs' "paradigm" is merely a heuristic exercise, and does not bear on the empirical feasibility of Friedrichs' claim in any way.

The empirical feasibility of Friedrichs' thesis cannot be upheld. Not only does contemporary dialectical writing in sociology fall into several distinct intellectual traditions, which are metaphysically and epistemologically incompatible, but incompatibilities exist even among the authors within these several groups. Beyond this, as the chapter summaries reveal, there are logical inconsistencies over dialectics within the thinking of the individual authors themselves.

The image of the dialectic that emerges from the present review of the literature falls well short of the status of 'paradigm'.
The introspective attitude in sociology in recent years has frequently resorted to the metasystem provided by Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). The paradigm debate that began with Friedrichs' *A Sociology of Sociology* (1970) and Gouldner's *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (1970) has been carried forward by Mullins' *Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American Sociology* (1973), by Effrat's 'Power to the Paradigms' (1973) and by Ritzer's 'Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science' (1975). Each of these authors argues against the domination of sociology by any one paradigm and the dialectic is not given particular credence, although Mullins and Ritzer do acknowledge the potentially paradigmatic status of critical theory.

Mullins' approach to the genesis of paradigmatic styles - a sociometric one - is unique and grounded in thorough investigation. On the whole though, the calibre of the paradigm debate has been unimpressive. Effrat has tended to confuse paradigms with theories and as a result has identified a plethora of these operative within the discipline - symbolic interactionist, exchange, phenomenological, ethnomethodological, Marxian, Durkheimian, Freudian, Weberian and Parsonian. Ritzer's more parsimonious analysis has isolated three major styles - one preoccupied with social 'facts', another with 'definitions' and a third 'behavioural' paradigm. Ritzer contends that he has at last given formulation to the elusive term 'paradigm', but
the four 'component parts' that he distinguishes - the exemplar, image of the subject matter, theory, method and instruments, are each interdependent phases of theory, so this is no real advance on the earlier efforts.

The present exercise articulates a paradigmatic framework based on a comprehensive set of epistemological alternatives. It holds the substantive theory constant against this frame for assessment by a technique adapted from quantitative taxonomy. It is thus structured in such a way that an empirical evaluation of the theoretical issues is made possible. The method is illustrated by testing Friedrichs' case for the dialectical paradigm and Friedrichs' hypothesis is demonstrated to be unfounded. In short, the thesis, by devising an instrument for determining the paradigmatic character of sociological writing sets the stage for relocation of the paradigm debate at a more fundamental level of discourse.
NOTES


6. Ibid., p. 11.

7. Ibid., p. 11.

8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Ibid., p. 175. Kuhn now substitutes for the somewhat sullied term "paradigm", the idea of a disciplinary matrix: "disciplinary" because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a discipline; "matrix" because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further specification". (p. 182). The constituents of the matrix are symbolic generalisations or algebraic formulae which look like laws of nature; shared beliefs, such as gravity for example, or shared models; and shared values which determine selection and decision procedures. The fourth component of the disciplinary matrix is "the exemplar" or concrete problem solution.

10. Ibid., pp. 62-65.

11. Ibid., p. 12.


15. Ibid., p. 325.

16. The references here are to Friedrichs (1972) pp. 43-44, 51-54, 184-86, 276-81, 302, 309-12: the authors cited are listed in the bibliography to the present study.

17. Ibid., p. 56.

18. Ibid., p. 372.


20. Friedrichs' acquaintance with Hepel is obviously slight, the logical trinity was actually expounded by Fichte. When it appears in Hegel it can be assumed that this is at the hand of his English translators. Hegel himself used the terms "affirmation", "negation" and "negation of the negation".


22. Ibid., p. 297.


26. Ibid., p. xxvi.


29. Ibid., p. 291.

30. Ibid., p. 297.

31. Ibid., p. 52.

32. Ibid., p. 181.


37. Ibid., pp. 298-99.

38. Ibid., p. 185.


40. Ibid., p. 184.


43. Ibid., p. 297.

44. Ibid., p. 172. This would agree with Talcott-Parsons' observation that while visiting the Soviet Union he found no difficulty in establishing dialogue with sociologists there over a number of issues "not affected by ideology" - for example, the study of worker incentives, family organisation and public opinion surveys of "various social problems". He praised the Soviet work, particularly the surveys, for the high level of "technical proficiency reached. Talcott-Parsons, a personal communication, Sydney, 23/5/75.

45. See Hartman, H., World Congress for Sociology in Varna - Observations and Commentaries, Soziale Welt, 1970, 21, 100-117, (Ger.) Abstract. What did happen at Varna however was this: "Under the banner of development, a meta-ideological alliance was created between the great bureaucracies of power of East and West. The price of agreement was a reduction of sociology into a purely instrumental discipline, which focuses only on its research, themes and orients itself by the power of the day...." Ferrarotti. I., Between two domains: or Sociology for Whom? La Critica Sociologica, 1970, 15, 3-9 (Ital.), Abstract.

47. The characterization comes from Radnitsky, G., Continental schools of Metascience, Akademifolaget, Goteburg, Sweden, 1968, which offers an appraisal of the hermeneutic tradition from the European point of view. Whereas "...logical empiricism goes towards increasing the precision and clarity of problems...the hermeneutic dialectic tradition goes towards increasing emancipation and transcendence" (op.cit., p. 3). This evolution of comprehension follows an "hermeneutic circle" according to Radnitsky. Also writing on the philosophy of hermeneutics are Apel, K. The Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften, New York, Humanities Press, 1967; Gadamer, H. On the scope and function of Hermeneutics, Continuum, 1970, 8, 77-95; and Ricoeur, P., The Model Text, Social Research, 1971, 38, 528-62. The dialecticians discussed in the present text are untouched by both the sophisticated methodology of European hermeneutics and by its political implications which come to the fore with the critical theorists. Because of this, the term Semantic Dialectics is in some ways a more appropriate rubric for their work.


52. Ibid., p. 134.


58. Ibid., p. 516.

59. The most straight-forward accounting of this is Frisby, D., The Popper-Adorno Controversy, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1972, 2, 105-19.


62. Ibid., p. 93.

63. Ibid., p. 110.

64. Ibid., p. 111.

65. Ibid., p. 117.

66. Ibid., p. 114. Marcuse acknowledges Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T., here, with a quotation from their Dialektik der Aufklarung, Amsterdam, 1947, p. 25: "The general concept which discursive logic has developed has its foundation in the reality of domination." Formal logic, according to Marcuse, proceeds from the reduction of secondary perceptual qualities to primary qualities - a development favouring manipulation consequent upon visualization.


68. Ibid., pp. 116-17.

69. Ibid., p. 170.

70. Ibid., pp. 154-58.

71. Ibid., p. 126.

72. Ibid., p. 9.

73. Ibid., p. 23.

74. Ibid., p. 83.

75. Ibid., p. 86.

77. Ibid., p. 123.

78. Ibid., p. 182.

79. For "theoretical" read "neo-marxist".

80. Ibid., pp. 97-98.


83. Ibid., p. 5.

84. Ibid., pp. 141-42.

85. Ibid., p. 149.


90. Feyerabend, op. cit., p. 252.


92. This is a highly contracted statement of the substance of the first three chapters of Habermas' book. It is not intended here to trace the philosophical genesis of his ideas.


94. Habermas says that the knowledge constitutive interests are known through phenomenological reflection. There is some resemblance here to the structures elicited by Levi-Strauss, though the latter's are of a diachronic sort. Interestingly, the word "generative-logics" is used to describe them by one reviewer. See Schroyer, T., Marx and Habermas, *Continuum*, 1970, 8, 52-64.
95. Habermas, op. cit., p. 53, (Italics mine).


97. The influences on this aspect of Habermas' thought are multiple: among them - Peirce's pragmatism, Dithey's historicism, Mead's symbolic interaction and Wittgenstein's language games.


99. Ibid., p. 310.

100. Ibid., p. 311. There seems to be a contradiction in Habermas' thinking. On the one hand culture is seen as repressive of (some innate qualities) the essential humanity, while on the other hand is his definition of reality as culturally relative: what is real is that which can be experienced according to the interpretations of a prevailing symbolic system." (Ibid., p. 192).

101. Schütte, H., Sociology: Positivism and Dialectics, Arena, 1971, 25, 33-42. The meeting in question was the S.A.A.N.Z. conference held in Sydney, August 1972.


103. Ibid., p. 37.

104. Ibid., p. 42.


110. Ibid., p. 75.


119. Ibid., p. 201.

120. Ibid., p. 71.

121. Ibid., p. 72.

122 Ibid., p. 233.

123. Ibid., pp. 78-79. (Italics mine.)

124. Berger and Luckmann recognise psychological and (some) sociological theories as legitimations in the same sense as myth (ibid., p. 196). "The emergence of psychologies introduced a further dialectical relationship between identity and society - the relationship between psychological theory and those elements of subjective reality it purports to define and explain." (ibid., p. 196).

125. Ibid., p. 56.

126. Ibid., p. 152.


128. Ibid., p. 220.

129. Ibid., p. 203.


133. Gouldner, A., The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, New York, Basic Books, 1970. Meanwhile, in England, the year 1970 saw the establishment of a chair of Sociology at Cambridge University and the inaugural lecture, by Professor John Barnes, again leans to an historical as opposed to natural science perspective on the subject. In the present context, one sentence of Barnes' has particular significance, - "We can adopt the view that sociology is concerned with the regularities and lack of regularity in social institutions and that there is a two way or dialectical relation between the conceptual apparatus of the sociologist and the world view of the people whose actions, sentiments and beliefs he seeks to understand." Barnes, J., Sociology in Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970. p. 19. (Italics mine.)


138. Ibid., p. 453.

139. Ibid., p. 454.


143. Ibid., p. 223.

145. op. cit., p. 140.

146. Ibid., p. 145-46.

147. Ibid., p. 147.


150. Rather than Freud, for example, although the interest in manifest versus latent meaning in his work does converge with psychoanalysis.


153. To give an example of this operation: "....the genetic model of the myth - that is, the model which generates it and simultaneously gives it structure - consists of the application of four functions to three symbols. Here, the four functions are defined by the two fold opposition elder/younger and male/female, from which stem the father, mother, son and daughter functions. In the myth of the pregnant boy, the father and mother each use a different symbol, and the functions of son and daughter are merged under the third available symbol, the child. In the Mandan - Hidatsa ritual, it is the father and son who are distinguished, while the wife of the son embodies the functions of mother and daughter. The Hako appears to be more complex..." (ibid., p. 239-40).

154. Ibid., pp. 333-34.

155. Ibid., p. 284, (Italics mine.)


157. This account of the explanation by contradiction is influenced by Murphy's reading of Lévi-Strauss. See Murphy, R., The Dialectics of Social Life, London, Allen and Unwin, 1972 (1971). In Lévi-Strauss' own writing, the procedure is not so explicit.


162. The relevant passage can be located in Selsam and Martel, op. cit., p. 181.

163. Op. cit., p. 183. It is important to recognise that the term "concrete", which connotes solid fact or "actuality" for the English reader, refers in the context of European writing rather to an "essential" "aggregate or synthesis of many determinations."


165. Althusser, op. cit., p. 205.

166. Ibid., pp. 210-15.


169. Ibid., p. 171.


173. Ibid., p. 87.

174. Ibid., p. 94.

175. Ibid., pp. 94-95/.

176. Ibid., p. 96.

177. Ibid., p. 117.

178. Ibid., p. 90.
Many dialectical interpretations are possible at the psychological level. The basic dialectic of socialization can be seen as a perfect triad of thesis (id) versus anti­thesis (superego) producing synthesis (ego). This scheme is fairly compatible with transactional psychotherapy.


Simmel, op. cit., p. 27 and p. 42.

Murphy, op. cit., p. 137-38, paraphrasing Simmel.

Boas, F. Anthropology and Modern Life, New York, Norton, 1928. Robertson-Smith is not annotated in Murphy.

Gurvitch's brief history of the dialectic (ibid, pp. 29-176), though coloured by his empirico-realist bias, is a valuable compilation and commentary on sources within a scattered tradition.
196. This is one of Gurvitch's special sociologies along with his sociologies of law and of knowledge. See *The Spectrum of Social Time*, Korenbaum, M., and Bossermann, F., (transl.) Dordrecht, Holland, Reidel, 1964.


200. van den Berghe op. cit., note 56.


202. Ibid., p. 701.


205. Ibid., p. 39.

206. Ibid., p. 40.

207. Ibid., p. 51.

208. Ibid., pp. 46-47.


210. Ibid., p. 52.


212. Ibid., p. 53.

213. Ibid., p. 34.


218. Ibid., p. 51.


221. Ibid., p. 85.

222. Ibid., p. 86.


225. Ibid., p. 389. The reference is to Mead, G., Mind, Self and Society, University of Chicago Press, 1932. (Italics mine.)


227. Ibid., p. 391. (Italics mine.)

228. Ibid., p. 395, (Italics mine.) Perinbanayagam is referring here to a recent edition of Burke (1945) op. cit., note 50.

229. Schneider op. cit., not 209. Another author concerned with an adequate formulation for dialectics is Barreras, A. Is Dialectics at Fault? Épistemologie Sociologique, 1969, 7, 81-83, (Fr.) Abstract. He defends dialectics against the claim that it is not "methodologically operative" and argues that this will depend on the possibility of integrating deductive and inductive methods with an understanding of "the mutability of the universe."

230. Ibid., p. 667.

231. Merton, R., The unanticipated consequences of progressive social action, American Sociological Review, 1936, 1, 894-904. In contemporary writing the issue merges with the phenomenon of objectivation and consequent alienation which features in Berger and Luckmann's work.


233. Ibid., p. 676.


238. Ibid., p. 12.


240. Ibid., p. 52.

241. Ibid., p. 181.

242. Ibid., p. 187.

243. Ibid., p. xxvi.

244. Ibid., pp. 322-23. (Italics mine.)

245. Ibid., pp. 289-99. (Italics mine.)

246. Ibid., p. 323. (Italics mine.)

247. This table summarises the scatter of sociological articles pertinent to the notion of the dialectical paradigm over time and across traditions.

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248. op.cit., note 12.
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