ACTING ON WARNING:
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT

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As regards para. 4.4 (page 2), I, David Biggs, hereby pledge that the work of the attached sub-thesis, Acting on Warning: the United Nations and the Prevention of Conflict, is my own work and that all sources have been acknowledged.
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INTRODUCTION

Early-Warning: The Problem
"...I think the great failing, to me, of the United Nations is in not taking preemptive action. It is almost impossible to put Humpty-Dumpty together again once he has fallen off the wall. Where the UN should do more is in keeping him on the wall in the first place". Sir Anthony Parsons, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations during the Falklands/Malvinas War.1

Between 1945 and 1984, 137 international disputes made the agenda of the United Nations. While many of these disputes between member states are long-term and continue today, only a small fraction escalate into crises and then into open conflicts. Many member states possess the military capabilities to go to war, yet few possess hostile intent. Capabilities, such as the acquisition of a new weapons system, tend to be tangible, as the build-up of capabilities takes time and therefore can be scrutinized. A nation’s intentions can change quickly, however. Intentions can also be ambiguous -- one nation’s hostile intent can be used to intimidate (e.g., to achieve a better negotiating position); another nation’s hostile intent can be used to prepare for war. Furthermore, there are no clear-cut divisions between the dispute, pre-crisis and crisis stages of a potential conflict situation. There are similarly no fine divisions between what Betts terms the three phases of warning: "political warning" ("...increase in tension that raises the possibility that deterrence can fail."), "strategic warning" ("...indications that the enemy is mobilizing...in a manner consistent with a plan of attack") and "tactical warning" ("...the detection of initial movements of the attack itself...").

3 Gerald Hopple, "Intelligence and Warning: Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War", World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1984, p. 344. [In Latin America alone, there have been 30 long-term bilateral conflicts since 1945, many of which are still active.]
6 Betts, p. 4.
7 Betts, p. 5.
The difficult task faced by the United Nations is to identify and act upon -- at an early stage -- those disputes which "appear" to be set on the path towards conflict. If the UN cannot or does not act on warning, and open conflict ensues between the two parties in a dispute, the task of resolving the conflict arguably becomes more difficult, especially if member states are unwilling to utilize the collective security measures (e.g., diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions) provided in the UN Charter.

More importantly, the waste in economic, human, and political terms is difficult, if impossible, to recover. Despite the Organization's recent successes in conflict resolution (e.g., April 1988 Geneva Accords in Afghanistan, August 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, December 1988 implementation of the independence plan for Namibia), approximately 1.2 million people have died in Afghanistan and 5 million have become refugees, 1.5 million people have perished in the Iran-Iraq War, while 15,000 people have died in Angola and 600,000 have been displaced.8

I have structured the sub-thesis, "Acting on Warning: The United Nations and the Prevention of Conflict," around two case studies: the April 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War and the April 1989 Namibian crisis. In Chapter 1, the "warning rationale" of Britain in the lead-up to the Falklands/Malvinas War is discussed to provide the perspective of a nation-state in an early-warning environment. Like its counterparts worldwide, the national intelligence service of Britain is tasked to assess the capabilities and intentions of other nations, particularly those nations which possess the potential to threaten its national

interests. Thus, Britain's intelligence community is not only tasked to (1) collect information which provide clues of another nation's intentions, but it must also (2) assess the hostile threat (or lack thereof) in those intentions, and (3) relay the warning signals in a "threat assessment" to the proper political authorities in time for appropriate policy action. These three steps of the "warning rationale" -- collection, assessment, and timely use of early-warning information -- provide an appropriate framework in Chapter 1 to examine the performance of British intelligence in the pre-crisis period (the early months of 1982) and crisis period (after the 19 March South Georgias incident) leading up to the 2 April invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by Argentina.

In Chapter 2, I apply the framework outlining the warning rationale -- collection, assessment, and timely use of early-warning information -- in the context of the United Nations. Chapter 3 describes the collection, assessment and use of early-warning information by the United Nations in the lead-up to the April 1982 invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by Argentina. Chapter 4 discusses the early-warning improvements in the Organization which have taken place since the Falklands/Malvinas War. Chapter 5 outlines the actions of the Organization in the lead-up to the April 1989 Namibian crisis. The final chapter sets out several conclusions which can be drawn regarding the ability of the United Nations to "act on warning".

For purposes of clarification, "acting on warning" in the context of the United Nations is used here to denote the ability

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9 The term "warning rationale" is introduced by the author. The 3 steps of the term are adapted from Arie Ofrie's "Crisis and Opportunity Forecasting", in "Forum: Intelligence and Crisis Forecasting", ORBIS, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter 1983, pp. 821-827.
of the Secretariat of the Organization (e.g., Office of the Secretary-General and other political departments) to act on a likelihood of potential conflict by (1) verifying the likelihood of such a conflict and (2) issuing the warning for the purpose of preventing the conflict. The aim of the sub-thesis, while acknowledging the complex institutional and political obstacles which exist in the context of the United Nations, is to determine whether the Secretariat's focus on early-warning since the 1982 South Atlantic War has produced qualitative, substantive improvements.
CHAPTER 1

The Argentine Invasion of the Falkland
(Malvinas) Islands: the 'Warning Rationale' of Britain
I. THE CRISIS: THE SOUTH GEORGIAS INCIDENT

The crisis which lead to the 2 April 1982 invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by Argentina began on 19 March 1982. An Argentine metal-scrapping party landed at Leith, in the South Georgia islands, and reportedly raised the Argentine flag. [Located about 800 miles southeast of the Falklands, the South Georgia islands is a dependency of the Falklands.] British sightings of the event prompted a Whitehall protest on 20 March. On 23 March, based on an outcry in Parliament (and reversing its message to Argentina of 21 March), the British government ordered the HMS Endurance to evict the Argentines. On the same day, the military junta in Buenos Aires ordered the Bahia Paraiso (with 3 landing craft and a military helicopter) to defend the metal-scrapping party. By 24 March, the day the Bahia Paraiso disembarked Argentine naval personnel at Leith, 90 Members of Parliament in the House of Commons had presented a petition requesting the Government to maintain a sufficient surface force to repel an Argentine invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. On 26 March, following the 25 March reports (based on widespread rumors in the British public media) that a small British task force was planning to head for Port Stanley, the Argentine Junta ordered the invasion of the Falklands.1

On 31 March, two days before the invasion, the Current Intelligence Group of the British Foreign Office was still reporting in London that there was "...no intelligence suggesting that the Argentine Junta had taken the decision to

invade the Falkland Islands...". Yet on the same day, the British defence attache in Buenos Aires was quoting Argentine press reports of air force transports being readied to lift troops to the south of Argentina and of a general mobilization.

How did this lack of consensus in the British intelligence community arise?

II. INTRODUCTION

The general focus of the case study is an examination of the rationale by which the British government interpreted the events which took place in the lead-up to the invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands on 2 April 1982 by the military forces of Argentina. In order to understand why certain events were not judged by the British to be "warning indicators," or signals of Argentine intent to abandon the status quo of bilateral negotiations and invade the islands, it is relevant to reconstruct the historical context in which Britain found itself in early 1982.

The British government built its warning rationale on a foundation of self-deception, components of which included distraction, domestic economic and political constraints, and cultural misperception. However, it would not be prudent to argue that the British response to the events of early 1982 was irrational, given that similar reactions have occurred in other prolonged disputes. As Betts has documented, sudden attacks occur in situations of prolonged tension. An understanding of the warning rationale of a nation-state in a long-term dispute

3 Freedman, p. 318.
situation will be useful in subsequent chapters, when the warning rationale of the United Nations is examined.

Another issue worthy of discussion here is the relationship between political, strategic and tactical warning indicators. In the lead-up to the South Atlantic War, the British understanding of the relationship between these signals was misguided. Although London was aware of what Betts terms political warning, London attributed the early 1982 tension to yet another intimidation campaign by Buenos Aires, not unlike the 1977 crisis. Whitehall thus failed to detect what Betts terms strategic warning because -- based on past crises -- London relied on one basic strategic assumption. If Argentina had decided to invade, it would opt for a gradual escalation scenario in the lead-up to the invasion; for instance, by severing transport and communication links with the islands, before opting to invade. Visible Argentine preparations for war in this formula would be interpreted as no more than intimidation.5

When the tactical indicators began to reveal Argentina's sudden intent to change the status quo -- via the 19 March 1982 South Georgia Islands incident -- the benign political and strategic indicators were still accepted until the tactical indicators could provide unambiguous proof of Argentine plans to invade.

III. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

The key question posed by intelligence task (1) -- the collection of information on the opponent's intentions -- is whether British intelligence assets were adequately deployed to

5 Freedman, p. 314.
collect warning information. On the surface, there seemed to be no lack of intelligence-related information being sent to London. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)6 of the Cabinet Office in London, responsible for warning the government of impending foreign threats, had access to all cable traffic from the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires and, in particular, all military intelligence from the defence attache there. As a NATO ally, Britain also had access to intelligence data gathered by the United States government, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT) and image (e.g., satellite photo-reconnaissance) intelligence (IMINT).7

What happened in early 1982, however, reveals that certain gaps in the collection of military indicators by the intelligence community led policymakers in London to rely heavily on the political indicators. First, there was a lack of adequate collection of military intelligence in the pre-crisis period leading up to the 19 March South Georgia Islands incident. According to the January 1983 Franks Report -- the official inquiry into the British government's responsibilities in the period leading up to South Atlantic War -- there was no coverage of Argentine military movements within Argentina, as there were no funds available for the British defence attache to investigate military activities in the country's (widespread) bases and ports (e.g., Comodoro Rivadavia, Mar Del Plata, Rio Gallegos, Rio Grande).8 Moreover, as no study had been made on

6 The chairman of the JIC is a Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
8 Oswald H. Ganley and Gladys D. Ganley, "Unexpected War in the Information Age: Communications and Information in the Falklands Conflict", Program on Information Resources Policy,
normal Argentine military activity, the military attache could not identify abnormal activity.9

Second, there was a lack of proper political intelligence concerning the possible intentions of Argentina in the lead-up to the 20 March South Georgias crisis. Despite a June 1981 JIC request for more intelligence data on the intentions of Argentine policymakers, no extra resources were available from Whitehall. To cut costs, the UK had steadily been reducing covert activities in South America, with the result that human intelligence (HUMINT) sources were scaled down in favor of signals intelligence (SIGINT).10 Consequently, when the South Georgia crisis erupted, and SIGINT transmissions revealed a more hostile Argentine military, such transmissions were masked in the JIC assessment because, as there was no justifiable distinction between abnormal and normal Argentine military activity, the JIC did not want to rely on SIGINT data. SIGINT provided the best idea of the Argentine military's intentions, but as it could not be categorized, it was not given as much countenance as the traditional (political) strategic assumptions.11

Third, there was limited third-party collection of intelligence, as U.S. intelligence assets were not useful until after hostilities began on 2 April. According to the Franks Report, no intelligence about the invasion came from US sources before it took place, from satellite sources or otherwise.12

9 Freedman, p. 314. [As the British defence attache himself pointed out (in a March 1982 assessment), no system had been established to identify those Argentine military moves which would "force the issue." ]
10 Ganley and Ganley, p. 29.
The US, in fact, learned of the invasion only 48 hours in advance, through British rather than American intelligence reports. While one can assume that there was coverage of Argentine ship activities via the "Fleet Ocean Satellite Information Center" (FOSIC), both London and Washington were aware that Argentina had publicly announced plans to exercise with the Uruguayan Navy on 23 March.

Finally, Britain found itself distracted by other international developments in early 1982. The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands was reportedly only one of 90 "tinder boxes" identified by the Thatcher government during the South Atlantic conflict. Whitehall was also in the midst of another battle in the EEC budget process and the Foreign Secretary was planning an official visit to Israel.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF HOSTILE INTENT

According to the Franks Report, the last intelligence assessment prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee before the invasion -- July 1981 -- held that Argentina would favor negotiation as long as it perceived London's "...willingness to negotiate genuinely about, and eventually to transfer, sovereignty." If not, there would be a high risk of "resorting to measures...and that it might act swiftly and without warning...(M)ilitary action against British shipping or

London, January 1983, p. 91. [There was also no satellite photography available on the disposition of Argentine military forces. See p. 94]
13 Ganley and Ganley, p. 28.
14 Lebow, p. 90.
15 Ganley and Ganley, p. 100.
17 Franks, pp. 26-27.
a full-scale invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands could not be discounted."18

Other assessments by the JIC, however, predicted that Argentina would choose a "gradual escalation scenario." Accordingly, as the Anglo-Argentine negotiations on the question of sovereignty of the islands represented the modus operandi between Buenos Aires and London, the Argentine government might try to increase its bargaining position by taking diplomatic and economic measures (e.g., disruption of food and oil supplies) before invading the islands.19 Why did London, in early 1982, give credence to the latter "gradual escalation" scenario, instead of the "swift, no warning" scenario? Here, it is essential to consider the effect of past Argentine-British crises on the British assessment psyche.

For London, the series of incidents between 1975 and 1977 represented a likely escalation scenario by Buenos Aires. In December 1975, an Argentine Navy vessel fired a shot at the British ship RSS Shackleton.20 In the first weeks of 1976, the British embassy in Buenos Aires reported that several Argentine newspapers were advocating invasion "in veiled terms."21 In December 1976, a British helicopter discovered an Argentine military presence on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands (dependencies of the Falkland Islands).22 By 1977, Argentina had cut off fuel supplies to the Falklands,23 and both countries had recalled their ambassadors.24

18 Franks, p. 27.
21 Franks, p. 9.
24 Makin, pp. 396-397.
As Betts wrote in *Surprise Attack*, "...the victim's strategic assumptions trigger the serious miscalculations that produce surprise...". The high ranks of the British intelligence community in London had developed several strategic assumptions about a future crisis instigated by Argentina, based on the length of the ongoing dispute, the earlier false alarms, and the rhetoric of the Argentine press. Central to these assumptions was the belief that Argentina was not genuinely dissatisfied with the bilateral negotiations. Factors which reinforced these assumptions were self-assuring: General Galtieri appeared preoccupied with domestic issues in early 1982, the bilateral talks at the UN in February 1982 had been marked by "cordiality," and Argentina was improving its relations with Europe and the USA. Discounted by London were events such as the 3 March unilateral communique by the Argentine Junta, which was attributed to Argentine propaganda and bluff, and not to a hardening of the Argentine position.

After the 2 April invasion, according to author Ned Lebow, the Thatcher Government claimed it had been a victim of a "cry-wolf" phenomena. It believed it had been desensitized by Argentina via a constant campaign of threats, propaganda and intimidation. In other words, Whitehall believed that Buenos Aires in 1982 was bolstering its negotiating position by bluff and intimidation as it had done in 1977.

25 Hopple, pp. 344-345.
26 Hopple, p. 347.
27 *Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, United Nations Security Council*, S/PV.2350, 3 April 1982, p. 11. [Argentina said it "...reserves the right to put an end to ... (the negotiations) ... and freely choose the procedure it deems most fit in accordance with its interests."]
28 Lebow, p. 107.
However, 1982 was not like 1977. As Lebow writes, "(p)erhaps the most important difference between 1977 and 1982 was that in the interim Argentine leaders had lost faith in negotiations with Britain and had concluded that they would never achieve sovereignty over the Falklands by diplomacy." 29

In general, British intelligence leaders arguably held fast to a form of psychological denial called "bolstering", in which their original strategic assumption (Buenos Aires' gradual escalation scenario) was reinforced in lieu of an alternative assumption. 30

In particular, as the Foreign Office provided key personnel in charge of the Joint Intelligence system, more weight was attached to the political indicators than the military indicators in the lead-up to the Argentine invasion. 31

Another example of British self-deception cited by the Franks Report was the claim that the intelligence community had underestimated the significance of the Argentine press campaign of early 1982 compared with past press campaigns advocating a military takeover of the islands. The Franks Report made the following observation of the Argentine press:

"...(W)e are not sure that at all important times the assessments staff were fully aware of the weight of the Argentine press campaign in 1982. As a result it seems to us that they may have attached greater significance to the secret intelligence, which at that time was reassuring about the prospects of an early move to confrontation...". 32

Although the UK embassy in Buenos Aires informed JIC of the views being expressed in the Argentine press, British capabilities for propaganda analysis had reportedly declined, as

29 Lebow, p. 95.
30 Lebow, pp. 103-106.
31 Freedman, pp. 312-313.
32 Franks, p. 85.
the embassy was "...unable to take full advantage of even Argentine press coverage of the crisis." For instance, according to Guillermo Makin, landmark articles -- many of which openly advocating military action -- appeared in Clarin, Conviccion, La Nacion, La Prensa, and Latin America Weekly Report from early January to late March 1982.

Another component of the British government's self-deception in early 1982 was the failure to analyze adequately Argentina's interpretation of British intentions. According to the Franks Report, the changes in the position of Argentina were "...more evident on the diplomatic front and in the associated press campaign than in the intelligence reports." To Buenos Aires, some of the British moves which signalled a lack of commitment to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands were the British Nationality Bill (which excluded the Falkland islanders from an automatic right to British citizenship), Britain's continued selling of arms to Argentina, the planned sale of the British aircraft carrier HMS Invincible, the October 1981 announced closing of the British Antarctic Survey base in Grytviken (South Georgia Islands), and the October 1981 elections for the Falkland Islands Legislative Council (which voted for a freeze of the bilateral talks on the question of sovereignty for 25 years).

A critical sign of British recalcitrance on the issue was the 1981 Defence White Paper decision to withdraw the HMS Endurance from the South Atlantic. [In reaction to the HMS Endurance decision, several Argentine newspapers had reprinted

33 Freedman, p. 313.
34 Makin, pp. 399-401.
35 Franks, p. 85.
37 Gamba, pp. 100-102.
an article in the British Daily Telegraph which asserted that the UK was "abandoning the protection of the islands." In a late 1981 report, British intelligence suggested that Argentina had viewed the withdrawal of the HMS Endurance as a deliberate political gesture, instead of the true British motive, economic cutbacks.\textsuperscript{38} Another important sign of British reticence was an Argentine military presence on Southern Thule, which had been tolerated from 1977 to 1982, despite the fact that UK had privately labeled it a violation of British sovereignty.\textsuperscript{39}

Finally, Whitehall underestimated the extent to which British domestic economic and political constraints affected its Falkland Islands policy and, most importantly, the extent to which Buenos Aires may have interpreted these constraints as a change in the status quo (of negotiations leading towards a transfer of sovereignty). For instance, sending a "tripwire" force to deter the Argentines would have cost money. In late 1981-early 1982, the British Ministry of Defence was belt-tightening. The Economist claims that a request from the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington for a naval force any time before 29 March (when British intelligence allegedly received evidence of the likelihood of an Argentine attack) "would probably be laughed out of court."\textsuperscript{40} On the other hand, if London had decided to assuage Argentine intimidation vis-a-vis a concession on sovereignty, it would have faced an immediate backlash among conservative elements of Fleet Street and Parliament.


\textsuperscript{40} Lebow, p. 102.
V. USE OF WARNING SIGNALS BY BRITISH POLICYMakers

This issue involves two questions: (1) whether British policymakers received adequate intelligence assessments of the situation in the South Atlantic, and if so, (2) whether policymakers acted effectively on the basis of intelligence assessments. With regard to (1), the JIC assessments received by British policymakers did not account for the not-so-benign situation "on the ground" which occurred in March 1982. When the South Georgias crisis occurred, and the SIGINT intercepts revealed less benign Argentine military movements, the SIGINT data was discounted in the JIC assessments. As the British defence attaches report through ambassadors, and thus through to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), there was a tendency for their raw military intelligence to get lost in a report which had been "over-assessed" by the political Foreign Office staff. Approximately 90% of the intelligence received by ministers of the UK government was in "processed form" -- not raw data but the politicized assessments compiled by the JIC.41 Thus, without a classification of military warning indicators, British policymakers interpreted any visible Argentine preparations for war as intimidation and thus fell back on their strategic escalation scenario.42

With regard to (2) -- whether policymakers acted effectively on the warning available in the intelligence reports -- according to Lebow there were no strongly worded warnings from London to Buenos Aires (even private warnings) until 31 March, "...when the invasion was all but a fait accompli...".43

42 Freedman, p. 314.
43 Lebow, p. 110.
As mentioned, the fear of provocation was a key element in London's decision-making. British government policy towards Argentina and the Falkland Islands was never formally discussed outside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office after January 1981. The Defence Committee, a committee of Cabinet, could have been held at any time, if necessary at short notice. However, no Defence Committee meeting was convened until 1 April 1982, the eve of the Argentine invasion. There was no reference to the Falklands in Cabinet until Lord Carrington reported on the events in South Georgia on 25 March 1982.44

On the other hand, British policymakers believed they had few options in responding to Argentina. First, because of the distance between Britain and the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, at least three weeks of warning time would have been required to provide an effective British response.45 Second, the timing of the Argentine invasion proves that Argentina was not concerned initially with the British response. In early April 1982, much of the British fleet was back home for Easter, thereby facilitating the rapid assembly of the British Task Force.46

Third, the actual Junta order for the invasion was given late in the day -- 26 March -- and London would have learned of the invasion date only if there had been a leak in the Junta itself. According to excerpts of the Rattenbach Report -- the official Argentine post-war investigation -- a tri-service

44 Franks, p. 79.
46 Ganley and Ganley, p. 27. [If Argentina had waited for only two months, the British fleet would have been dispersed (with some elements as far away as the Indian Ocean). The Task Force would have also taken more time to arrive in the South Atlantic two months later -- in the southern hemisphere's winter. Also, Argentina was acquiring new arms -- Exocet missiles and Super-Entendard aircraft from France -- and would have been much better-equipped a few months later.]
planning cell was formed in Buenos Aires in January 1982 to set up the Falklands invasion, but the earliest planned landing date was 9 July 1982. However, when the British press sensationalized the South Georgias incident on 21 March, and 90 Members of Parliament presented a petition in the House of Commons on 24 March for a sufficient surface force to repel an Argentine invasion in the Falklands (not South Georgia),47 the Junta, on 26 March, abruptly brought forward the invasion date to the night of 1-2 April.48 Between 26 March and 31 March, the benign British political intelligence slowly fell into line with the not-so-benign military intelligence reports -- the cancelling of all naval leave on 28 March, the deployment of almost all the Argentine naval fleet,49 and the breakaway of 5 Argentine warships from the Uruguayan manoeuvres to the South Georgias on 30 March.50

VII. CONCLUSION

Although the crisis culminating in the 2 April 1982 Argentine invasion essentially began after the 19 March South Georgia Islands incident, according to Lawrence Freedman, "...there were a number of prior indications that the situation was getting critical..."51 In effect, the so-called "intelligence failure" was not due to London's inability to predict the timing of the Argentine invasion (tactical warning), but its failure to foresee the likelihood of the invasion

47 Gamba, pp. 117-126.
48 King, p. 337.
49 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, United Nations Security Council, S/PV.345, 1 April 1982, pp. 8-11.
50 Freedman, p. 317.
51 Freedman, p. 319.
There were tremendous forces of self-deception among British policymakers which contributed to the failure to foresee the likelihood of an Argentine attack. The bureaucratic rivalry between officials of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence on the Joint Intelligence Committee, the denial behavior which high-ranking officials of the JIC exhibited, and the cultural misperceptions which British policymakers held about their counterparts in Buenos Aires (e.g., the decision to withdraw the HMS Endurance) represent examples of such a "human failure". The common denominator was the belief that Argentina, still interested in the bilateral negotiations, was pursuing an intimidation strategy via the South Georgias incident to achieve a better negotiating position.

It was the South Georgia incident in late March -- the crisis period -- which highlighted the flawed relationship between the tactical (military) indicators and the strategic (political) indicators. As the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands dispute had lasted so long without an Argentine invasion, high-ranking members of the JIC believed that Argentina, despite its bluff and intimidation, would not abandon the negotiations. To change its tried-and-true strategic assumption, JIC wanted crystal-clear tactical indicators. At the height of the crisis period, the problem was not the tactical indicators -- which were now less ambiguous -- but the fact that the Foreign Office-dominated JIC was still unwilling to alter its benign strategic rationale.

CHAPTER 2

The 'Warning Rationale' of the United Nations
I. INTRODUCTION

The general aim of the chapter is to examine the concept of warning in the context of the United Nations. The particular aims of the chapter are to (1) identify the warning actors in the United Nations system, and (2) discuss the degree to which institutional and political "realities" in the Organization affect the warning actors.

II. FAILURE OF UN COLLECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES

The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945. According to Article 1 of the Charter, the first purpose of the United Nations is "...(t)o maintain international peace and security...to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace...".1 Since the end of World War II, however, Article 1 has been consistently breached -- approximately 150 armed conflicts have occurred, with between 16 and 20 million deaths.2 Despite the collective means available in the UN Charter to prevent or remove threats to international peace and security, conflicts have repeatedly evolved from disputes between member states.

First, with respect to the removal or resolution of conflicts, the architects of Article 1 had envisioned a world in which the post-war Allies, utilizing the Security Council and the collective security measures (e.g., diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, military force) within Chapter VII of the Charter, would act essentially as the UN's policeman against

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1 Charter of the United Nations, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, September 1986, DPI/511, p. 3.
other member states which had violated the tenets of the Charter. However, with the onset of the Cold War and the realignment of the post-war Allies into East and West blocs, conflict resolution measures in Chapter VII did not acquire legitimacy. Today, if a conflict involves either the five permanent member states of the Council or their allies, for instance, it is likely that one of the "Big Five" will veto a resolution calling for the removal of the conflict.3 Similarly, if there is a lack of consensus in the Council on the presence (or lack thereof) of a conflict, Council action may be limited or delayed.4 Finally, states parties to a dispute can simply refuse to heed the resolution of the Council. Accordingly, any assertive UN role to restore the peace may be interpreted as a violation of Article 2.7 of the Charter, which prohibits the Organization from "...intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...".5 Thus, from the outset of a conflict, the Security Council is placed on the periphery of events.

Can the Security Council be warned of a potential conflict? Institutional and political constraints cast doubt on such a likelihood. First, many of the disputes between member states are long-term, yet as Betts has documented, most surprise

3 Anthony Parsons, "The Prevention of War", International Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 1, May 1984, p. 14. [It is likely, for instance, that the United States would have vetoed any mandatory resolution against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, while the Soviet Union would have vetoed any mandatory resolution against Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia in 1978.]
4 Parsons, p. 15. [In the lead-up to the 2 April invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the Argentine military junta made an assessment of the UN. It concluded that the Security Council "...never acted to avoid a confrontation, because of the political pressures involved at this level. It acted only after a crisis or intervention had taken place. Mechanisms in the United Nations moved after a fait accompli, never before...". See Gamba, pp. 136-137.]
5 DPI/511, p. 5.
attacks occur in long-term situations of prolonged tension. Accordingly, member states would not tend to warn the Security Council of a potential conflict if there is a low level of hostilities between the two parties to a dispute.

More importantly, while the Security Council can (via Article 34) "...investigate any dispute...to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security...", a formal, fact-finding mission of the Security Council is often regarded as too public, too political. Similarly, a public warning to the Security Council by a member state in a dispute arguably invites involvement by the 15 members of the Council. Open, formal use of the Charter registers public positions of the states; subsequently it may be too difficult to backtrack from these public positions without "losing face".

The Secretary-General also possesses the formal mandate via the Charter to provide public warning of a potential conflict. Article 99, which according to Cordovez is the only article in the Charter that provides the Secretary-General with authority and responsibility comparable to member states, authorizes the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Security Council "any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." In the

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7 DPI/511, p. 19.
9 Elaraby, p. 187.
10 DPI/511, p. 50.
past, however, formal invocation of Article 99 by the Secretary-General risked heightened expectations and the hype of media attention, so much so that it was rarely used formally -- in the Congo (1960), Cyprus (1974), and Iran (1979). By formally invoking Article 99, the Secretary-General in effect focuses the world's attention on the Security Council for action, of which there is no guarantee.\textsuperscript{11}

In accordance with his official mandate, the Secretary-General is tasked to execute and implement the resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly, working within the guidelines of the Charter. In practice, however, the Secretary-General has not been restricted by the Charter because he has used Article 99 informally. \textit{Informal} use of Article 99, in the words of Cordovez, "...can provide formal authority for informal action."\textsuperscript{12} Such informal actions of the Secretary-General fall within a framework of activities commonly known as "good offices." The dynamic advantages provided by "good offices" are secrecy and trust which the Secretary-General promotes among himself and the member states in a dispute. He does not intervene as a "mediator," but offers his services as a "good officer," and makes "suggestions" to member states in a dispute.

For instance, although he typically notifies the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General can dispatch special representatives on fact-finding missions with the consent or invitation of the member states, yet without formal authority from the Council.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} Elaraby, pp. 187-189.
\textsuperscript{13} Elaraby, p. 200.
III. THE UN AND THE WARNING CONTEXT: COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

Not unlike member states, the UN Secretariat gathers information on developments in the world. Unlike many states, which possess their own covert human-, image-, and signals-intelligence networks, the Secretariat is obliged to rely on information available in the public domain.

Beyond these general limitations, however, the Secretariat suffers from intelligence-gathering problems common to many member states. For example, in the years prior to the Falklands/Malvinas War, British intelligence had categorized Argentina in a low priority for intelligence collection.14 Although there are certain disputes in which the Organization can have little effect (e.g., internal disputes because of Article 2.7), in theory, it must categorize every dispute as a potential spark to interstate conflict and thus a threat the maintenance of international peace and security. In the three months leading up to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands invasion by Argentina, for example, the Security Council met to discuss the situation in the Occupied Arab Territories, the Middle East, Nicaragua, and the Falklands/Malvinas. Three of these situations, in fact, were discussed in the Security Council on the same day as the Argentine invasion.15

Given that member states are not likely to sanction a covert intelligence capability operated by the Organization (e.g., signals intelligence), it is reasonable to state that (using Betts' terminology) the Secretariat will be able to collect signals of "political warning" and possibly "strategic

warning" but not "tactical warning." In other words, the Secretariat will be able to detect warning of a likelihood of a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security (in a best-case scenario), but not the time, date and location of that threat.

This scenario holds so long as (a) a potential conflict is monitored by the international news media,16 and (b) the news report of the potential conflict is monitored by the Organization. Unfortunately, as many sudden attacks occur in situations of prolonged tension,17 the international media tend to overlook these stalemates and turn towards new, more exciting events.18 In the Iran of the 1970s, according to Philip Robins, the American press "...contributed significantly to the 'surprise' that the (Iranian) revolution presented."19 In the 1987 "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf, Britain's media reportedly underestimated the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 598 of July 1987, because "...the slow build-up to its endorsement was not racy enough to make the UN a big story." Instead, Fleet Street focused on the "...swashbuckling nature of the conflict in the Gulf...".20 Secondly, news blackouts -- prior to or during a military action -- are commonly used by

16 Ann Florini and Nina Tannewald, The Front Lines: the United Nations' Role in Preventing and Containing Conflict, The Multilateral Project, United Nations Association of the United States of America, New York, 1984, p. 13. ["...(M)onitoring of the press is gradually being extended, but developments not picked up by the global media are still all too likely to escape the notice of the Secretariat...".]
17 Betts, p. 95.
18 Parsons, p. 20. [In the summer of 1980 (before the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September), the international media's attention was focused on the Teheran hostage crisis, despite the fact that border conflicts were occurring between Iran and Iraq.]
20 Robins, p. 597.
member states to stem information flows to the international media. Finally, cultural bias among the people reporting international news may allow for one nation's media to downplay a threatening event that another nation's media would find threatening. For example, in the three months prior to the 2 April 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the British media allegedly did not pick up the warnings appearing in the Argentine press (advocating a military option) until very late in the day. According to Guillermo Makin, the British press "...made no analysis which would put the 1982 signals coming from Buenos Aires into some perspective."21

The Secretariat's detection capability cannot be taken for granted, however. In the lead-up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the British intelligence community managed to gauge the intentions of the Argentine military (e.g., cancelling of military leaves) via Buenos Aires press reports. In the Secretariat, newspaper and news wire reports revealing the intentions of member states (e.g., movements of military troops and/or supplies) are made available to the Secretary-General on a time-urgent basis. Most importantly, whether the international media is sensitized to a potential conflict or not, there is still a high probability that the Secretary-General will become aware of it via his private consultations (e.g., UN permanent representatives, foreign ministers, heads of state). One could even argue that the Secretary-General possesses the best strategic-

tactical-level information in the world, provided that the information which foreign leaders deliver is genuine.

IV. THE UN AND THE WARNING CONTEXT: USE OF WARNING INFORMATION

If it takes too long for a member state's policymakers to decide whether the warning issued by their intelligence community is correct and unassailable, there is no early warning in effect. Warning time is therefore useless if it cannot be acted upon by policymakers. In the Organization, although the Secretary-General may possess the relevant information to issue a warning, there is obviously no guarantee that he would publicly utilize this capability. It is important to keep in mind that the effectiveness of "good offices" is the Secretary-General's impartiality, discretion and trust. The act of a public warning may create the publicity bonanza that is contradictory to the spirit of the Secretary-General's "good offices." The Secretary-General's press spokesman touched on this point during a daily press briefing at Headquarters:

"...The Secretary-General did not feel that it was his business to pass judgment on the motives and intentions of the parties in disputes. The only way he could be helpful in disputes was if both sides trusted him and would make use of him...By coming out with flamboyant statements condemning the intentions, motives and actions of one party, he would obviously lose his usefulness." (my emphasis)

Thus, it is difficult to believe that the Secretary-General would publicly "call out" one or both parties to a dispute for allegedly threatening to violate the maintenance of

23 DPI Press Briefing, Department of Public Information, United Nations, 5 February 1982, p. 4.
international peace and security. He may provoke one or more of the parties in the dispute and thus negate a future role for his office, whether formal or informal.

V. CONCLUSION

To characterize warning as having a "rationale" in the context of the United Nations may be a misnomer. No one actor is solely responsible for such a rationale. The Organization is repeatedly blamed by member states for not being able to prevent conflicts, yet it is not the UN but the 159 member states which must share the blame. As the Secretary-General has written, "...(t)he United Nations is in no way a super-State. The organization has no sovereignty of its own..." Any warning "rationale" of the Organization in conflict prevention is doubtful as long as member states fail to provide warning (via Chapter VI) so that the Organization may settle disputes peacefully.

And the alternative? Chances are that while member states will not warn the Security Council of a potential conflict, they will demand that the Council remove the conflict once it begins. Conflict resolution then becomes more difficult as long as member states refuse to use diplomatic sanctions and economic sanctions provided in Chapter VII. Even if the Organization were able to deploy a well-equipped military force within Chapter VII to punish violators of the Charter, many member states possess the military hardware to repel such a force. In the final analysis, once member states in a conflict suffer

24 Cordovez, p. 172.
26 Parsons, p. 15.
casualties, bridges to negotiation are more difficult to cross. "Saving face" is pursued military, not diplomatically.

Even allowing for the political constraints on the Organization's warning "rationale", however, there are still considerable institutional constraints. Warning involves a firm understanding of the relationship between the collection, assessment and use of information. Assessments prepared for the Secretary-General, for instance, will not adequately reflect the situation "on the ground" in a potential conflict situation if the Secretariat has not adequately collected and verified information on a (long-term) bilateral dispute between two member states.

There is room, however, for the Secretariat to work positively within the existing constraints to improve its "warning rationale." The nucleus of such dynamism is the Secretary-General, who can privately warn the two parties to a dispute to use restraint as well as provide suggestions to the parties along the lines of his "good offices" practices. Crucial to the success of the work of the Secretary-General is a timely awareness of the proper "political vacuum" to offer such good offices practices. Such a vacuum is possible in the lead-up to a crisis, before intense international attention prevents the parties to a dispute from backing down for fear of "losing face."

Privately, the Secretary-General can choose the correct moment to promote a role for himself. Whether he facilitates communication, provides suggestions or acts as an arbiter, the Secretary-General must find the correct opportunity to offer his services. As Pérez de Cuéllar concluded, "...I am Secretary-General of 157 countries comprising both developed and
developing countries... I must therefore be very careful at all times to respect the initiatives of Member countries. It is only when I see that there is a vacuum that I think the United Nations should try to come forward and take the initiative." 27

27 Gunnar P. Nielsson, "Mediation under Crisis Management Conditions: The United Nations Secretary-General and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands Crisis, April 1 -- June 14, 1982", Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Pa., December 1988, p. 44.
CHAPTER 3

The Argentine Invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands: the 'Warning Rationale' of the United Nations
I. INTRODUCTION

The general aim of the chapter is to examine the "warning rationale" of the United Nations in the lead-up to the 2 April invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by the military forces of Argentina. For purposes of continuity, the framework utilized in Chapter 1 (to describe the intelligence-gathering tasks of the British government) is utilized here in Chapter 3 to describe the information-gathering tasks of the United Nations. Along such lines, the UN is responsible for (1) collecting information which provides clues of a nation's intentions, (2) assessing the hostile threat (or lack thereof) in those intentions, and (3) relaying the warning signals in a "threat assessment" to policymakers for appropriate policy action.

Following the last round of the bilateral negotiations under United Nations auspices on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands prior to the conflict -- at UN Headquarters in New York on 26 and 27 February 1982 -- Argentina and Britain issued a joint communique. According to the press release, the meeting "...took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense."1

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Yet in Buenos Aires, the joint communique was not published, and two days later, on 3 March 1982, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a unilateral communique, which it later called a "forewarning" to the British: "...(I)f there is no response from the British side [to the Argentine proposal], Argentina reserves the right to put an end to the operation of such a mechanism and freely choose the procedure it deems most fit in accordance with its interests."3

The next public acknowledgement of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands at Headquarters in New York occurred on the eve of the Argentine invasion. On the morning of 1 April, the Secretary-General, "...alarmed by press reports," called the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and Britain to Headquarters and urged restraint on both sides.4 Before leaving the Secretariat in the afternoon of 1 April (on an official trip to Europe announced 25 March), the Secretary-General issued a statement urging both governments to continue to use diplomatic means to resolve the outstanding issues in the dispute.5

In the Security Council, the crisis which had erupted from the South Georgias incident hit the 15-member body "like a bolt from the blue...".6 On the day of the invasion, the President of the Security Council issued a statement calling for restraint on both sides.7 The delegate of Canada to the Security Council later asked how such an invasion could have taken place when the

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2 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, United Nations Security Council, S/PV.2345, 1 April 1982, p. 6.
3 S/PV.2350, 3 April 1982, p. 17.
4 S/PV.2345, 1 April 1982, p. 11.
5 S/PV.2345, 1 April 1982, p. 11.
7 S/PV.2349, 2 April 1982, p. 6.
Argentine-UK bilateral negotiations were being conducted in "a civilized spirit." 8

II. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

At first view, it is no surprise that a dispute over a group of islands with a population of 1,800, situated approximately 780 kilometers northeast of Cape Horn, 9 could be a peripheral issue to member states. According to Parsons, the British Permanent Representative to the UN during the crisis, "...(Q)uite honestly except for conversations between myself and my Argentinian colleague in the previous three years I genuinely do not remember the Falklands being mentioned to me once by anybody before 1 April 1982...". 10

What may be surprising is that the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands was being "monitored" by the Decolonization Committee of the General Assembly (comprised of 24 member states), as well as several political departments in the Secretariat. 11 In 1965, on the recommendation of the Decolonization Committee 12 made to the General Assembly --

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8 S/PV.2362, 23 May 1982, p. 87. [The delegate of Jordan, who admitted having become aware of the conflict the night before the Argentine invasion, poignantly remarked that "...(s)ilenced guns do not mean that potentially explosive conflicts are not still simmering...." (See S/PV.2366, 25 May 1982, p. 21.)]
11 At least four departments -- the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs (OSPA), Department of Political and Security Council Affairs (PSCA), and the Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization (PATD) -- may have been monitoring in-house to some degree the Argentine-UK dispute.
12 Gunnar P. Nilsson, "Mediation under Crisis Management Conditions: The United Nations Secretary General and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands Crisis, April 1 -- June 14, 1982", Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Pa., December 1988, p. 29. [The Decolonization Committee, or "Special Committee of 24", was established to
Resolution 2065 (XX) -- Argentina and Britain were "invited" to enter into negotiations over the islands and were "requested" to keep the Decolonization Committee and the General Assembly informed. Argentina and Britain thus delivered a formal procedural report after each of the bilateral discussions on the dispute. Yet as Parsons claimed, the Decolonization Committee was interested in those territories where "...something was happening: if there had been fresh elections in the Turks and Caicos or the Cayman Islands...But the Falklands was taken on the nod. We sent in our information about it every year...."14

In the Secretariat, the last working paper prepared by UN staff for the General Assembly on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands prior to the April 1982 South Atlantic War was published in August 1981.15 Divided into four chapters -- "General," "Constitutional and political developments," "Economic conditions," and "Social and educational conditions" -- the working papers were prepared annually by the Secretariat for the Decolonization Committee, based on information transmitted to the Secretary-General by Great Britain, as well as published articles (e.g., Argentine and British press reports).16

The working papers typically contained outdated information. In the August 1981 paper, for example, no press report was dated later than January 1981. In fact, Britain had

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13 Nielsson, pp. 29-30.
14 Foreign Affairs Committee, p. 70.
[The Secretariat issued the next working paper on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands on 10 August 1982, A/AC.109/712.]
16 A/AC.109/670, pp. 1-11. [Britain, as an Administering State of the Non-Self Governing Territory under Article 73 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, had been obliged since 1946 to present annual reports on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands to the General Assembly. See Nielsson, pp. 28-29.]
delivered its information for the August 1981 report on 22 October 1980, covering the year 1979.17 Thus, the formal and routine rhetoric of the Anglo-Argentine diplomatic reporting process, coupled with the outdated nature of the Secretariat's reporting process, may have effectively desensitized many member states to the possibility of a sudden deterioration in relations between Argentina and Great Britain.

If member states were not sensitized to the dangerous events occurring in the South Atlantic, was the Secretariat staff? First of all, no one office in the Secretariat was exclusively mandated to monitor the dispute. In 1982, there were nine departments in the political sector of the United Nations.18 Second, the Secretariat's capability to collect multiple sources of timely information was far from optimal. The main sources of up-to-date information in the Secretariat in the first three months of 1982 were the daily news bulletins produced in the Section for Co-ordination and Political Information of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs (PSCA).19 Although the reports did utilize the Reuters news wire service, they were considered rudimentary, based primarily on American newspapers.20

Third, the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) in Buenos Aires reportedly did not pouch and/or cable copies of the bellicose articles coming out of the Buenos Aires press (e.g., La Prensa, Clarin, Conviccion) to the Secretariat in the first

17 A/AC.109/670, p. 2.
20 Confidential interview.
three months of 1982. Finally, the "distraction factor" in the Secretariat was particularly high in early 1982. The Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was not only new—he had only been in office since January 1982—he was (i) conducting consultations, (ii) attending meetings of the Security Council, and (iii) fulfilling his obligations as head of Administration in the Organization. In particular, he was occupied with other political issues that were not being discussed in the Security Council at the time—Afghanistan, Cyprus, Iran-Iraq and Namibia. Similarly, the Security Council was dealing with a large number of issues in the first four months of 1982 (e.g., the Occupied Arab Territories, the Middle East, Nicaragua, and the Falklands/Malvinas). From 1981 to 1988, in only one year—1986—were there more Security Council meetings from January to April than in 1982.

Despite the aforementioned obstacles, however, the Secretariat was indeed aware of certain developments in the South Atlantic in early 1982. Although it is doubtful that the Secretary-General was aware of the articles in the Buenos Aires press in early 1982 calling for a military invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the head of the Organization

21 Confidential interview. [In early 1982, there was no official mandate allowing UNIC Directors to send information on peace and security issues to Headquarters. However, several UNIC Directors had diplomatic experience and were more aware of peace and security issues. These Directors were sending publicly-available information on such issues to Headquarters. As of May 1989, copies of such information which had been cabled or pouch from UNIC/Buenos Aires to Headquarters in early 1982 have reportedly been discarded or destroyed at Archives/Headquarters to make room for later materials. The original clippings and related correspondence at UNIC/Buenos Aires have also been discarded or destroyed for the same purpose.]

reportedly was aware of the 19 March 1982 South Georgias crisis. In the international press, the crisis was picked up by United Press International (22 March), The British Broadcasting Corporation (24 March), The Associated Press (24 March), and Reuters (24 March). In addition, verbal information on the situation in the South Atlantic may have been transmitted to the Secretary-General via his private consultations with representatives of the member states. According to UN documents, at no time prior to April 1 -- the day when the Secretary-General requested consultations with the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the UK -- did the Secretary-General officially discuss the situation in the South Atlantic. On 23 March, the Secretary-General met with representatives of Argentina and the US, and representatives of Argentina and the UK on 25 March and 29 March respectively.

23 Confidential interview.
27 1982 Reuters, Ltd.; Reuters North European Service. [See articles of 24 March through 30 March, many written by Reuters correspondent Robert Powell in Buenos Aires.]
28 DPI Press Briefings, Department of Public Information, United Nations, January-April 1982.
29 Two days after the end of the 26-27 February 1982 negotiations in New York -- the last negotiations before the conflict -- representatives of both Argentina and Britain met with the Secretary-General in separate consultations. On 23 March, the Secretary-General met with Jeanne Kirkpatrick, President of the Security Council for the month of March 1982, and Ernesto De La Guardia, Representative of Argentina to the Law of the Sea Conference, during separate consultations. On 25 March, the day that his spokesman announced the Secretary-General's trip to Europe on 1 April 1982, Pérez de Cuéllar received the credentials of the new Permanent Representative of Argentina, Mr. Eduardo Roca. On 29 March, the Secretary-General met with the UK Permanent Representative, Mr. Anthony Parsons, and the following day, he attended a luncheon of the Security Council members given by Ms. Kirkpatrick. [DPI Press Briefing, 1 March 1982, pp. 1-2; DPI Press Briefing, 23 March 1982, pp. 1-2; DPI Press Briefing, 25 March 1982, pp. 2-3; DPI Press
There is also evidence that the President of the Security Council for the month of March was aware of the South Georgias crisis. This point cannot be overstated, however. Not only is it unlikely that the Secretary-General could become aware of the intentions of the three-man junta in Buenos Aires, the junta itself was more impatient vis-a-vis the Falklands issue than the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which handled the sovereignty negotiations under the auspices of the UN).

III. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION

Can the Secretariat assess intentions of the member states of the Organization; can it authoritatively determine the existence of a potential conflict situation? In early 1982, during the lead-up to the Falkland/Malvinas conflict, no political department in the Secretariat possessed a specific mandate to provide early-warning to the Secretary-General. Second, no department was exclusively responsible for preparing assessments on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Third, as there was a low degree of information-sharing between departments, the information base of each department's assessment was likely different. As some departments may have been privy to information in the Secretary-General's office (e.g., reports of consultations between the Secretary-General and representatives

30 S/PV.2362, 23 May 1982, pp. 94-95. [Ms. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN and President of the Security Council in March, reported after the invasion that the United States had offered its good offices to help find a solution in the South Georgias incident. Ms. Kirkpatrick also had bilateral contacts with the members of the Council and the Secretary-General (e.g., DPI Press Briefing, 23 March 1982, p. 3), but the substance of those discussions is not known.]
of Argentina and Great Britain), their assessments of the Argentine-UK dispute may have varied from other assessments. Finally, as bureaucratic rivalries (e.g., "turf wars") tended to preclude information-sharing between the departments, the possibility existed that the department "better connected" to the Office of the Secretary-General could have had its assessment favoured.

IV. USE OF WARNING SIGNALS BY UN POLICYMAKERS

If one examines the use of warning in the UN context, the central question is whether policymakers act on the lead-time provided by the assessments. Member states carry the first responsibility for providing early-warning in the UN context. In early 1982, the British government did not transmit intelligence information to the Secretariat until the eve of the invasion, 1 April, at the first Security Council meeting on the crisis. It may have deliberately not done so, or it may have not been in a position to do so.32

The Secretariat likely carries the second responsibility for early-warning. Not unlike the British policymakers in the JIC, the UN policymakers did not believe that the Anglo-Argentine dispute was dramatically different in early 1982 than past years.33 If Argentine actions in early 1982 had been perceived as serious to Secretariat staff, it is reasonable to argue that the Secretary-General (1) would not have taken an

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32 Lawrence Freedman, "Intelligence Operations in the Falklands", Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1986, p. 316. [The British embassy in Buenos Aires did not report the 25 March incident (in which two Argentine destroyers broke off the joint Argentine-Uruguayan naval manoeuvres and sailed between the Falkland and South Georgias islands) to London until 29 March, and then on the basis of press reports.]
33 Confidential interview.
official (announced 25 March) trip to Geneva on the eve of the Argentine invasion, and (2) would have offered his mediation before accepting the U.S. government offer to mediate the crisis on 7 April. As it stands, the Secretary-General did not get officially involved until 2 May, after the U.S. mediation effort had failed and one month after the invasion.34

V. CONCLUSION

In the lead-up to the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Secretariat's behavior resembled in many ways the behavior of Britain. There was a gap in collection and assessment; the Secretariat had little idea of the intentions of the military junta, because the news articles of the Buenos Aires press, (which had been fed deliberately to the Argentine press by the Junta)35 were not made available to the Secretariat from the UNIC/Buenos Aires.36

Did the Organization properly use the warning which it had collected? The UN made a private call for restraint (Secretary-General with the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and Great Britain) and a public call for restraint (by the President of the Security Council). Of course, neither act of warning deterred Argentina from invading the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands the following day. As the Secretariat staff acknowledged the real danger in the South Atlantic at a very late stage -- 31 March -- there was no lead-time to establish a framework for

34 Parsons, pp. 169-179.
36 Confidential interview. [DPI/New York allegedly cabled UNIC/Buenos Aires and UNIC/London on the eve of the invasion and instructed both offices to be on "alert."]
decreasing tensions between Argentina and Great Britain. Had the Secretary-General been sensitized to the likelihood of a dramatic rise in tension in the South Atlantic -- vis-a-vis the bellicose articles coming out of Buenos Aires between January and March 1982 -- he may have been able to offer an early, private role for himself in order to stem the rise of tensions.

While the Secretary-General thus can act on warning by taking on such a deterrent role, it may be politically naive to believe that in 1982, with Western confidence in the United Nations at a low ebb, the British government or any other government would have allowed the UN to get involved at an early stage in the South Atlantic. But as there was little awareness by the member states of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the Organization may have seen fit to take on a greater role. For all intents and purposes, the early 1982 Argentine press campaign, the South Georgias incident and the overall background on the Anglo-Argentine dispute were a mystery to many member states.

Furthermore, having decided that there was a likelihood of conflict, the UN would have acted (e.g., fact-finding mission) in a manner which would not have provoked an "action-reaction" phenomenon. While a response by Britain to the likelihood of a conflict may have been interpreted by Buenos Aires as threatening, a response by the UN would have aroused less controversy. There is no assurance that had the UN acted earlier, the conflict in the South Atlantic would have been prevented. But with the gift of hindsight, an earlier UN role in the South Atlantic was not a high price to pay compared with trying to end a conflict which continued one month after the UN became officially involved and cost almost 1,000 lives.
CHAPTER 4

Has the Organization’s 'Warning Rationale'
Improved Since the Falklands/Malvinas War?
I. INTRODUCTION

The general aim of Chapter 4 is to chart the course of the United Nation's "warning rationale" since the Falklands/Malvinas War. The framework first introduced in Chapter 1 is used here to describe the information-gathering tasks of the Organization.

Relative to its performance in the lead-up to the Falklands/Malvinas War in early 1982, the Organization is better sensitized to the demands of warning in 1989. However, several areas of concern remain, such as (i) information gaps with respect to the collection of information, (ii) absence of adequate staffing to assess information, and (iii) lack of a "UN presence" in the pre-crisis area to verify the warning issued by UN policymakers.

II. THE YEAR OF INITIATIVE: 1982

The year 1982 provided the catalyst for an intense reexamination of "conflict prevention" in the Organization. Secretariat officials found themselves possibly overwhelmed by what the Secretary-General called "...an alarming succession of international crises as well as stalemates on a number of fundamental international issues...": Afghanistan, Central America, Cyprus, Lebanon, Kampuchea, the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Horn of Africa, the Iran-Iraq War, the Occupied Territories, and Western Sahara.1 These conflicts arguably had a profound impact on both the member states and their new Secretary-General. In particular, three sudden crises -- the alternating offensives and cease-fires by Iraq and Iran in the April-June period of the Gulf War, the early April invasion of the

Falklands/Malvinas, and the early June Israeli invasion of Lebanon — alarmed both the Secretary-General and the member states.

As a result of these shocks, the Secretary-General engineered substantive improvements in the collection of information. In July 1982, one month after the end of the Falklands/Malvinas War, the "Secretary-General's Information Briefing Books" was established. These books, delivered to the Secretary-General every Friday for his weekend reading, consisted of summaries of international newspapers, periodicals, news wire services and reports from the UNICs, organized along UN-oriented issues and related political questions.

In September 1982, a watershed in the "early-warning" rationale of the Organization occurred when the Secretary-General made the following unprecedented call in his first Report on the Work of the Organization:

"In order to avoid the Security Council becoming involved too late in critical situations, it may well be that the Secretary-General should play a more forthright role in bringing potentially dangerous situations to the attention of the Council within the general framework of Article 99 of the Charter. I wonder if the time has not come for a more systematic approach... In order to carry out effectively the preventive role foreseen for the Secretary-General under Article 99, I intend to develop a wider and more systematic capacity for fact-finding in potential conflict areas...". (my emphasis)

3 Confidential interview.
4 UN Chronicle, p. 13.
As a direct consequence of the Secretary-General's Report on the Work of the Organization, the News Service of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs (PSCA) was expanded, providing for more coverage of non-US newspapers and non-US wire services.5 Another important by-product of the 1982 Annual Report was the mid-1983 directive by the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Public Information (DPI) requesting the United Nations Information Centres (UNICs) to pouch to Headquarters publicly-available articles dealing with peace and security issues on a weekly basis, and also cables for "fast-breaking events".6 Even though the reports were "...by strict mandate, based solely on information already in the public domain and are generally accompanied by abundant press clippings..."7 they sparked much controversy among member states. Since their establishment by the the General Assembly in 1946, the UNICs had disseminated information about the United Nations, not collected information on behalf of the Organization.8 After the landmark 1983 decision, some member states expressed fear that the UNICs in their capitals would be intelligence-gathering sites.

Also a result of the Secretary-General's 1982 Report on the Work of the Organization, as well as the recommendations of the 1986 "High-level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of

8 "Measures to Strengthen the Capacity and Enhance the Role of the United Nations Information Centres: Report of the Secretary-General", General Assembly, A/AC.198/45, 4 May 1982, p. 2. [In 1946, the General Assembly had established the UNICs "...to ensure that the peoples in all parts of the world receive as full information as possible about the United Nations." ]
the United Nations," the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) was established within the Office of the Secretary-General (OSG) in March 1987. The Secretary-General announced that ORCI was created "...to take full advantage of the Secretariat's capacity to identify threats to peace at an early stage...". One of the broad functions of ORCI, as defined in its organizational mandate, is to "...provide early warning of developing situations requiring the Secretary-General's attention...".

The reexamination of the UN's role in conflict prevention was not a campaign waged solely by the Secretary-General. In the General Assembly, member states requested the "Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization" (Resolution 38/141 of 19 December 1983) to examine the area of "...the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and of situations which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute." Member states also have submitted several proposals in the General Assembly under the programmes "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States" and "Maintenance of International Peace and Security." ORCI was established, in fact, because member states had called for the Organization to

13 A/AC.132/L.47 (Romania), A/AC.182/L.38/Rev.2, (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and Spain), and A/AC.182/L.48 (Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland).
"...deal in a timely and urgent manner with potential or actual threats to the pace or with acute humanitarian situations..."14

III. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

In quantitative terms, there is little doubt that the inputs in the timely collection of information have been improved in the Secretariat. Examples of these improvements include the seven news wire service teleprinters,15 approximately 12 domestic and foreign newspapers (either same day or previous day)16 and the summary of local broadcasts and newspaper clippings from the United Nations Information Centres (UNICs).17 Technically speaking, if an event is reported in print in any of the 159 member states, it could be made available to the Office of the Secretary General (OSG) the following day. The event could be reported by (1) major Western newspapers, (2) news wire services, and/or (3) local newspapers.

There are collection problems, however. Given the budgetary constraints imposed by the General Assembly for the 1990-91 budget, ORCI is responsible for delivering more programmes with less personnel.18 This shortage of staffing is particularly acute in the two Data Units -- Africa & Asia and Americas & Europe. Six professional officers in these units are

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15 News wire service teleprinters -- AFP (France), DPA (FRG), REUTERS (UK), TANJUG (Yugoslavia), TASS (USSR), UPI (US), and XINHUA (PRC) -- are located in ORCI. Other news service agencies, such as EFE (Spain), operate offices in the Secretariat building.
18 Confidential interview.
theoretically responsible for providing "global coverage" -- monitoring and analyzing developments in over 159 countries as well as studying regional and bilateral relations. Similarly, radio broadcasts published in either the British Broadcasting Corporation's "Summary of World Broadcasts" or the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) are made available to ORCI, although not in a timely fashion. 19 Third, that a "fast-breaking" locally-reported event in Country X could be made known to the Office of the Secretary-General in a timely fashion also assumes that the text of the event is cabled to Headquarters in New York by one of the 67 UNICs. 20 [Of the 67 UNICs, over 20 also possess facsimile capabilities. 21] Finally, there is no ability to gather information in ORCI if land-line communications -- which facilitate the transmission of cables, facsimile, and telephone conversation -- are destroyed either in natural or man-made disasters.

19 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts are made available in ORCI within three to five days of publication. FBIS reports are made available from five to seven days of publication.
20 [This assumes that UNIC directors possess the ability to identify threatening events reported in the local press and cable the text of these reports to Headquarters, instead of pouching the reports. In 1983, one article actually predicted an event, but as it had been pouchied by the UNIC to Headquarters (in lieu of being cabled), by the time the pouch reached Headquarters, the event had already taken place.]
21 In the field, facsimile machines are located at United Nations Information Centres (UNICs) in Athens, Bangkok, Belgrade, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Copenhagen, Geneva, Jakarta, Lima, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Manila, Mexico City, Paris, Rio, Rome, Sydney, Tokyo, Vienna, and Washington. Other UNICs share space with the offices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Resident Representatives, many of which possess facsimile machines. At Headquarters, facsimile machines are located in the Department of Public Information (Office of the Press Spokesman of the Secretary-General), the Office of the Secretary-General, and the Communications Service.
IV. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION

Today, ORCI has replaced five political departments in the Secretariat. Analysis of information has been improved in ORCI because (1) the collection of information -- the basis of every assessment -- has been centralized in one office, and (2) the terms of reference of the assessments are better defined, because the Office of the Secretary-General provides specific direction. Dr. James Jonah, director of ORCI, provides insight on the latter point:

"...You see, you may have had some person doing some research -- say, on the Gulf or on the Middle East -- but not being part of the Secretary-General's Office, they may not be aware of the factors that may influence the kinds of conclusions that they draw. On the other hand, you may have somebody in the Secretary-General's Office who is privy to these statements and confidential comments but has not been involved in the research. So you bring these two together to get a richer output."23

Yet problems still exist vis-a-vis the output of information -- the assessments -- produced by the professional officers. First, there are few opportunities for the officers in ORCI to conduct in-depth studies of countries and identify those trends (e.g., "worst-case" scenarios) which could lead to a potential conflict situation. Tasked to monitor so many countries, the officers of the Data Units spend the majority of their time collating information instead of analyzing it.24

More importantly, despite the mandate of ORCI to provide "...early warning of developing situations requiring the

24 Confidential interview.
Secretary-General's attention...".25 to date there is no institutionalized process whereby a professional officer in ORCI may pass a warning through the head of the office to the Office of the Secretary-General (OSG). Even if the professional officers are encouraged by OSG to "cry wolf," there is a high likelihood that the Secretary-General will not read the assessment himself. As the Secretary-General's daily schedule is filled with administrative, diplomatic and political commitments, his advisers (e.g., Chef de Cabinet) will determine which assessment is relevant for his attention and which is not.

V. USE OF WARNING SIGNALS BY UN POLICYMAKERS

Following the framework developed in previous chapters, the use of warning in the UN context involves two questions: (1) whether the Organization receives adequate warning assessments, and if so, (2) whether UN policymakers act effectively on the lead-time provided by the assessments. With regard to (1), although there are fewer political departments in the Organization, the possibility still exists that one department's assessment will be favored over another department. Although "turf wars" have declined, they still exist.

With respect to (2), some would argue that an early "UN presence", in the form of a fact-finding mission, could effectively take advantage of lead-time, decrease information gaps and act as a form of deterrent on behalf of the Organization. The likelihood of a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security -- the pre-crisis period -- should represent the critical period for the United Nations to act on warning, while time exists to prevent the threat from

becoming a violation of the maintenance of international peace and security.

In a March 1989 working paper submitted to the General Assembly, five Western member states proposed that the Secretary-General "should be encouraged to undertake fact-finding missions in areas where in his opinion a dangerous situation may arise or exists, in order to collect as much relevant information as possible for his own use...". Needed, of course, is lead-time to position the fact-finding mission. Given proper lead-time before the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Secretary-General may have seen fit to dispatch a fact-finding team -- including UN military staff -- to either the South Georgias area or the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands within the mandate of Article 99. The downfall of past fact-finding missions, however, is the fact that many have had little if any deterrent effect; typically, a crisis or a conflict has already occurred when a mission is organized, and the Organization wants to know more about the "on the ground" situation. As Boudreau phrases it, such missions are "...an exercise in 'conflict control,' not conflict prevention."27

Another way by which the Secretary-General may gain lead-time is to be warned of potential conflict situations by member states. In the past, member states have offered to transmit private information to the Organization, provided that there

were "strings attached" (e.g., that the UN would share the final product of its information-gathering). The Secretariat refused to cooperate, and to date, relies to a substantial degree on various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International to verify information provided by governments. In the future, several "pro-UN" member states, such as Canada and Sweden, could agree to routinely transmit intelligence information to the Secretary-General. In the short-term, the Secretary-General's fact-finding capabilities would be upgraded; in the long-term, such an "intelligence initiative" could be normalized via some form of cooperative arrangement among the UN Permanent Missions in New York City. Another option is for the Organization to request various non-governmental organizations (e.g., SIPRI) to monitor certain intelligence-related tasks (e.g., arms transfers).

VI. CONCLUSION

Since the 1982 South Atlantic War, the Organization has made dramatic improvements vis-a-vis the collection and analysis of warning-related information. More news services and newspapers are monitored; an office has been created specifically to deal with "early-warning" for the Secretary-General; information is being verified as never before.

Beyond these quantitative improvements, however, there are qualitative needs which must be addressed. In trying to come to grips with too much information, Secretariat staff must sift the priority information from the trivial information ("noise"). Thus, the Organization must verify information which member states pass onto it -- without provoking accusations of working

28 Confidential interview.
"behind the back" of other member states -- and it must possess enough lead-time to issue a private warning. Several "verification options" exist for the Organization. Currently, with the low-cost, high-return benefits provided by the facsimile machine, the UN can act as a "clearing house" for information sent from member states, NGOs, and UNICs. In the future, it is hoped that all member states will routinely fax the UN such information. If normalized, such a process should encourage fewer charges of political bias by the Organization. Member states will not likely charge the UN with political bias when the UN receives information from many actors.

Finally, the Organization could develop a UN-operated verification capability. As argued in Chapter 2, given the particular needs of the Secretary-General and the Security Council for verifiable evidence of a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, the crucial test is for the Organization to be able to check the allegations of one government against another "on the ground" in the pre-crisis area. The early deployment of a fact-finding team has been cited as one UN-operated option. The feasibility of using reconnaissance assets -- both airborne and satellite -- will be discussed in Chapter 5 as another means whereby the Organization can secure verification.
I. INTRODUCTION

Has the warning rationale of the United Nations improved since the Falklands/Malvinas War? The general aim of the chapter is to identify the warning-related problems encountered by the Organization in the lead-up to the 31 March 1989 incursions by over 1,200 armed guerrillas of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) into northern Namibia.

The particular aim of the chapter is to ask whether the Organization could have solved these problems. As the Organization arguably suffered from an information gap "on the ground" in the lead-up to the Namibian crisis, for instance, it is useful to examine whether airborne and/or satellite reconnaissance may have enabled the UN to act on warning.

II. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

In the months prior to the 31 March 1989 incursions by SWAPO, some would argue that the Organization possessed political warning. Roughly between mid-February and mid-March, on at least nine occasions, South African newspaper reports, radio broadcasts, and government press releases had specifically cited a build-up of SWAPO fighters below the 16th parallel (approximately 200 kilometers north of the Angolan-Namibian border), in violation of the Protocol of Geneva, signed by

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1 Richard Betts, *Surprise Attack*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 4. [Political warning is defined as an "...increase in tension that raises the possibility that deterrence can fail."]

Angola, Cuba and South Africa on 8 August 1988. [According to clause 5 of the Protocol, "...Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, once the total withdrawal of South African troops is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO's forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel...".]

Similarly, the UN possessed what Betts terms strategic warning. Some weeks before the SWAPO incursions, Pretoria made public complaints that SWAPO guerrillas were massing near the Angolan-Namibian border. Finally, the UN received tactical warning. Hours before the fighting began on Friday night, 31 March, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha showed UN Special Representative Marti Ahtisaari and United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) military commander Gen. Prem Chand a map in Windhoek, pointing to sites where SWAPO forces were grouping near the border.

4 Betts, p. 4. [Strategic warning is defined as "...indications that the enemy is mobilizing...in a manner consistent with a plan of attack."]
5 David Zucchino, "For the U.N., failure in Namibia", The Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 April 1989. The South African army says it provided a detailed briefing of SWAPO activities to UNTAG's military commander, Gen. Prem Chand, but got no response. [A day after the border incursions, SWAPO claimed that it had invited Gen. Chand on 22 March "to discuss all the necessary steps of troop demobilisation and confinement to bases." That discussion, according to SWAPO, never took place. See FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, "SWAPO On Incursion, Cease-Fire," 4 April 1989, p. 15]
6 Betts, p. 4. [Tactical warning is defined as "...the detection of initial movements of the attack itself."]
7 Roger Thurow, "South Africa Wins a Diplomatic Coup Fighting Guerrillas With U.N. Blessing", The Wall Street Journal, 5 April 1989, p. A10. [According to Foreign Minister Pik Botha, "...we showed Gen. Prem Chand a map and told him it did not matter what they [the UN] told us, there was a danger that that very night, or the next day, SWAPO could cross the border." See "Pik Botha Discusses SWAPO Incursion", FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 April 1989, p. 23.]
If the Organization had collected political, strategic and tactical warning signals, then why did it not use the warning? In line with the argument developed in previous chapters, this question would depend on two sub-issues: (1) whether the Secretary-General possessed adequate assessments of the warnings of Pretoria, and, if so, (2) whether the Secretary-General acted effectively based on the lead-time provided by the assessments.

III. ASSESSMENT OF HOSTILE INTENT

In the run-up to the Falklands/Malvinas War, the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) policymakers found themselves torn between the "benign" political assessments from the Foreign Office personnel and the not-so-benign military assessments from the UK embassy staff in Buenos Aires. Similarly, in the lead-up to the 1 April incursions by SWAPO in northern Namibia, the Secretary-General deliberated between several different assessments submitted by various UN departments. On one hand, for instance, he was aware of the danger posed by SWAPO bases below the 16th parallel, because the Office of Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) had reportedly been providing the Secretary-General with oral and written briefings on the border situation since December 1988. On the other hand, the Secretary-General reportedly was receiving assessments by his Special Representative (Mr. Ahtisaari), and in particular, the UNTAG military force commander (Gen. Prem Chand), which labeled the warnings of Pretoria as exaggerated and alarmist.

The other major dilemma faced by the Secretary-General was the confusion surrounding the diplomatic agreements which the UN was honoring -- the UN protocols (e.g., Security Council

8 Confidential interview.
9 Confidential interview.
Resolution 435)10 and/or the non-UN protocols (e.g., Geneva Protocol). After 1 April, for instance, the UN claimed it had "no official knowledge" of the Geneva Protocol, and thereby no knowledge that Angola and Cuba were responsible for ensuring that SWAPO forces were to be deployed north of the 16th parallel, 185 miles north of the Angolan-Namibian border.11 Before the SWAPO incursions, however, the UN likely was aware of the issue of the 16th parallel. Notwithstanding the assessments provided by ORCI to the Office of the Secretary-General, the UN was represented (by the head of peacekeeping operations) as an observer — along with the US and USSR — at meetings of a "Joint Commission" in late February and late March 1989. [As parties to the Protocol of Brazzaville, which created the Joint Commission in December 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa possessed the mandate to "...facilitate the proper resolution of any dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation..."12 of the Brazzaville agreement.13] Indeed, roughly one month after the 31 March incursions by SWAPO, approximately 4,000 SWAPO guerrillas had moved north of the 16th parallel as they

10 The Security Council called for [in Sec.Res. 435 (1978)] the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for a period of up to 12 months to "ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations."
12 "Note verbale dated 14 December 1988 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", Security Council, S/20325, 14 December 1988, p. 4. 13 S/20325, p. 2. [Angola, Cuba and South Africa had agreed in the Brazzaville Protocol of 13 December 1988 to recommend to the Secretary-General that 1 April 1989 be established as the date for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).]
had been required to do under the Geneva Protocol. In the interim, 316 Namibian deaths, 27 South African deaths and a serious blow to the Namibian independence process took place.

IV. USE OF WARNING SIGNALS BY UN POLICYMAKERS

Did the Secretary-General act effectively on the available warning? Faced with two different assessments, the Secretary-General allegedly came down in favor of "the people on the ground" -- Gen. Prem Chand and the advance personnel of UNTAG, who had arrived in Windhoek on 26 February. In hindsight, this decision appears paradoxical, because although the UN had been in touch with the Angolan government concerning SWAPO bases, advance personnel of UNTAG reportedly did not tour southern Angola. On 6 March, Gen. Prem Chand, who had just returned from a fact-finding trip to northern Namibia, described the situation in northern Namibia at a press conference as "normal".

In defense of the Secretary-General, however, why should Pérez de Cuéllar have believed the warning signals supplied by Pretoria? Although South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha stated (in a press release from the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN) he would take up the issue of SWAPO forces below the 16th parallel with the UN Secretary-General, sources

16 "UN's Prem Chand Addresses News Conference", FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 10 March 1989, p. 25.
17 "Racist agents tell lies to UN personnel -- trade unions", The Herald (Zimbabwe), 10 March 1989.
18 ["On the issue of SWAPO's presence south of the 16th parallel, Mr. Botha said he would take up the matter directly with United Nations Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar...". See "Discussions 'Cleared the Air'," FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 27 February 1989, p. 7.] This appeared in a Johannesburg Television Service broadcast on 25 February, and was also reported in "News
in the Secretariat claimed that no warnings were verbally transmitted by the South Africans. 19 Second, both Angola and South Africa were the sources of a good bit of "noise" in early 1982, as each nation had accused the other of violating multilateral agreements. 20 Third, countless false accusations of Angolan and SWAPO improprieties by the government-controlled media in South Africa may have caused any news emanating from Pretoria to be discounted in the Secretariat. 21 Reinforcing this "cry-wolf" rationalization was the irrationality of a SWAPO incursion from southern Angola into northern Namibia. Why would SWAPO, which had been funded and heavily supported by the UN, invade Namibia and contravene a UN-brokered agreement (Security Council Res. 435)?

Thus, the issue was complex; there were signals warning in favor of an incursion by SWAPO elements and against such an incursion. Additionally, the perception of the Secretariat officials in early 1989 was a factor to consider in the equation. In early 1982, the British intelligence community discounted the possibility that Argentina would invade the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, whatever the (military) warning signals. Similarly, in early 1982 the UN wanted the Namibian

Highlights from the South African Media," 1 March 1989 (7/89), The Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations. 19 Confidential interview. 20 Charges and counter-charges between Angola and South Africa transpired in the lead-up to the 1 April incursions. Luanda blamed South Africa for backing UNITA forces in attacks on the FPLA in southern Angola, while Pretoria claimed that SWAPO was maintaining bases south of the 16th parallel. [See "'Substantive Meeting' on Angola, Namibia Planned", FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 22 February 1989, p. 8. ] On 19 July 1989, South African territorial administrator Louis Peinaar had warned that 1,900 SWAPO guerrillas were about to enter Angola. However, UNTAG visited the border area and reportedly found no evidence to support the allegation. [See Allister Sparks, "Tensions Rise in Namibia Over Troop Deployments", The Washington Post, 20 July 1989.] 21 Confidential interview.
independence timetable to stay on track, whatever the "warnings" from Pretoria. Not maintaining the course might have realized the worst outcome for the Organization: UNTAG withdrawing, South Africa re-invading Angola, and Cuba redeploying its troops in Angola.

With regard to Item (2) -- whether the Secretary-General acted effectively based on the lead-time provided by the warnings -- to believe that the UN should have been sensitized to the likelihood of a SWAPO infiltration is one thing; to believe that the UN could have actively prevented the conflict between SWAPO and South African forces on the border is quite another. As mentioned, not the UN but Angola and Cuba were officially sanctioned to ensure that SWAPO forces would be deployed above the 16th parallel by 1 April. [On 17 February, however, Pretoria claimed publicly that the Angolan and Cuban components of the Joint Commission had refused to permit inspection visits to the region (southern Angola). And in late March, Luanda admitted that it was unable to guarantee that SWAPO troops would be confined to their bases north of the 16th parallel.]

Even had the Organization itself acted on the lead-time which it had arguably possessed since mid-February, it is doubtful that UNTAG could have militarily prevented the SWAPO incursions (e.g., by forming a buffer between SWAPO and the South African military forces) in northern Namibia. Although UNTAG was responsible in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) to "...keep the borders under surveillance and prevent

23 "Obligations of SWAPO", The Times of London, 6 April 1989, p. 15.
infiltration," UNTAG's Gen. Prem Chand did not concentrate on such a task, principally because his troop strength had been cut severely by the Security Council in February 1989.24 Not only was the UNTAG force decreased in February from the original 7,500 personnel (as mandated by the Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978) to 4,650,25 there were only 921 troops in Namibia on 1 April, and they were "...busy monitoring the withdrawal of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and watching the disbanding of the local South West Africa Territory Force...".26 Most importantly, the approximately 1000-mile Angolan-Namibian border was difficult, if not impossible, to monitor even with 7,500 men.27 Even the approximately 100 troops which UNTAG had deployed in the north of Namibia on 1 April were monitoring the South Africans, not the border.28

24 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) Concerning the Question of Namibia", Security Council, S/20412, 23 January 1989, pp. 14-15. The original mandate of the military component of UNTAG, as approved in Security Council resolution 435 (1978), included task Item (f): "To keep the borders under surveillance and prevent infiltration." This item was apparently omitted in the Secretary-General's 23 January 1989 recommendation to the Security Council (S/20412) concerning the implementation of 435 (1978). However, in an explanatory statement (S/20457) concerning S/20412 of 9 February 1989, the Secretary-General remarked: "Paragraph 54 (a) of my report specifies only the tasks on which it is envisaged that the Force Commander would concentrate. No tasks have been eliminated."
27 [According to South African media reports, SWAPO infiltrations appeared to have taken place between Eenhana, about 30 kilometers east of Oshikango, to the Ruacana areas some 250 kilometers to the west. See FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 April 1989, p. 26.]
Finally, in the event of violations, there was no clear mechanism for contacting SWAPO at the battlefield level. 29

If anything can be gained by the UN's performance in the lead-up to the 31 March incursions, it is that the critical ingredients to the Organization's "warning rationale" are (a) the need for a UN-operated "on the ground" capability to verify warning-related information, (b) lead-time to act on the warning, and (c) the ability to effectively communicate with all parties in the (possible) conflict. Angola and Cuba did not possess either the facilities or the political will to monitor SWAPO to base. Had the Organization possessed a capability to monitor SWAPO in mid-February -- the "pre-crisis" period -- it is reasonable to argue that the UN would have possessed enough lead-time to deter SWAPO without putting the independence timetable in jeopardy. The next question debated here is whether satellite and/or airborne reconnaissance could provide the Organization with "on the ground" information.

V. SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

Consider the following scenario of mid-February 1989 -- the "pre-crisis" period -- in Namibia: In response to the public warnings issued by Pretoria of the presence of SWAPO guerrillas below the 16th parallel, the Secretary-General, acting under the provisions of Article 99 (and/or the authority conferred on him

29 Carlin and Dowden, p. 1. [Many SWAPO battlefield military commanders had no radios (See Dowden, "Swapo leader ordered incursion, envoys say", The Independent, 5 April 1989, p. 1.); South Africa also as a practice jammed SWAPO radio frequencies. [While the UN should have been able to contact SWAPO headquarters in Luanda, SWAPO itself could not communicate with its guerrillas in the field." See John Carlin, "Security forces pour into border zone as fighting subsides", The Independent, 5 April 1989, p. 12.]
by the Security Council under Article 34) requests that the Organization acquire optical images of the areas below the 16th parallel in southern Angola.

Setting aside the possible political problems in this scenario, is it feasible to use satellites in crisis-monitoring today? In the 1983 UN study entitled "The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency" (ISMA), a UN Group of Experts concluded that international crisis-monitoring, such as the surveillance of border violations or preparations for aggression, was technically feasible.

Clearly, military reconnaissance satellites operated by the US and USSR meet the demands outlined by the Group of Experts -- and those of the Secretary-General according to the scenario. However, as these programs are covert or "black", it is almost

30 Charter of the United Nations, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, September 1986, DPI/511. Article 99 reads as follows: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." (p. 50) Article 34 reads as follows: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." (p. 19)

31 "The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency: Report of the Secretary-General", Department of Disarmament Affairs, New York, 1983, E.83.IX.3, p. 67. [The Group concluded that satellite coverage of the "pre-crisis" period would be necessary once in every five to seven days, while a higher coverage frequency (possibly 2-3 times a day) may be appropriate in the crisis period. (See p. 29)]

32 Torleiv Orhaug, "Technology Requirements for a Satellite Monitoring Agency Focused on Europe", in Satellites for Arms Control and Crisis Monitoring, Bhupendra Jasani and Toshibomi Sakata, eds., SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1987, p. 94. [To date, neither superpower has officially admitted to this type of activity, but there is evidence (e.g., the orbital inclination of a satellite) that the US and/or USSR have monitored the Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969), the Indo-Pakistani crisis (1971), the Arab-Israeli War (1973), the Cyprus crisis (1974), and others.]
certain that the superpowers will not supply the images or the collateral image-interpretation to the Secretary-General.33

Today, the only space-based alternative to military satellites — civilian remote sensing satellites — could not meet the demands of the Secretary-General either. Civilian satellites, in fact, face the same problems delivering timely imagery to the international news media today as they would delivering imagery to the Secretary-General. In its landmark study, Commercial Newsgathering From Space: A Technical Memorandum (May 1987), the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) found that the American EOSAT (the private US company which operates 2 LANDSAT satellites) and the French SPOT ("Satellite Pour l'Observation de la Terre", a Belgian-French-Swedish consortium) "...lack the high resolution, timely delivery, and assured access to data that some media experts feel could make satellite imagery an integral part of the newsgathering process...".34 The OTA report, however, cited the following key requirements for a satellite appropriate for the international media: 5-meter or less spatial resolution, sensors operating in at least three spectral bands, frequent

33 On 13 May 1989, The Washington Post reported that President Bush had proposed to revive former President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal. Bush offered to involve allies from both power blocs in a program of mutual unarmed airborne surveillance flights — complemented by satellites — to provide "unprecedented territorial access for both sides." On 17 May, the Post reported that the Soviet Union had rejected Bush's proposal, saying it was "...'senseless' in an era of satellite surveillance and mutual on-the-ground arms inspections." [In Namibia, it is believed that the US provided satellite image intelligence to South Africa and the USSR provided satellite image intelligence to Angola, but only after the 1 April incursions.]

revisits (1-2 days), and quick delivery time to the media (24 hours or less).35

First, with respect to ground resolution, neither EOSAT 36 nor SPOT 37 can provide the ground resolution necessary for crisis-monitoring. Second, the image-collecting sensor on both LANDSAT and SPOT is susceptible to atmospheric disturbances.38 Third, with regard to revisit capability, civilian remote sensing satellites lack manoeuvrability as their orbits are fixed. If the crisis were to occur near the Equator, for instance, SPOT could target the same area 7 times during the 26 days of its normal orbital cycle -- an average revisit of 3.7 days.39 By contrast, each LANDSAT satellite crosses any particular longitude at the Equator only once every 16 days.40

Fourth, quick delivery time or "turnaround time" -- the time elapsed between the buyer's request for a ground image and the delivery of the image -- may take as much as two weeks for

35 OTA, p. 40.
36 OTA, p. 39. [The latest LANDSAT "Thematic Mapper" (TM) satellite is capable of providing images of 30 meters (98 feet) over a ground track of 115 miles wide.]
37 John Tirman, "International Monitoring For Peace", Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. IV, No. 4, Summer 1988, p. 56. [SPOT currently provides a 10-meter-resolution photo -- about 33 feet -- for black-and-white or "panchromatic" imagery of any desired area, 60 miles square.]
38 "Expansion of the Network of SPOT Satellite Direct Receiving Stations", Press Release, SPOT IMAGE, September 1988, p. 1. [Although SPOT's two main receiving Earth stations (Toulouse, France and Kiruna, Sweden) have received and stored more than 530,000 60x60 kilometer images (by July 1988), only 20% of these images are usable. Better said, only 20% of the collected images contained less than 10% cloud cover.]
39 "Images a la carte", SPOT IMAGE, 1987, p. 3. [SPOT's side-looking "off-nadir" sensors enable it to target larger areas (allowing scene centers to be targeted anywhere within a 950 kilometer wide strip centered on the satellite track), thereby improving the satellite's revisit capability. Also, the satellite is able to revisit quicker at higher latitudes. If a crisis were to occur northward near latitude 45, the same area could be targeted 11 times in a cycle, an average of 2.4 days.]
40 OTA, p. 39. [Because LANDSAT 4 and 5 are days apart in their orbiting cycles, they can provide coverage at least every eight days.]
civilian remote sensing satellites such as LANDSAT and SPOT. Neither the satellites' sensors nor the business structures of the civilian remote sensing companies were designed to produce imagery on a time-urgent basis.

Delays are possible when, for instance, a commercial client requests imagery which has been collected by a foreign ground receiving station. Both EOSAT and SPOT rely on foreign ground stations to collect data when the satellite is unable to transmit imagery to Earth stations in the United States and France. Theoretically, foreign ground receiving stations are supposed to provide nondiscriminatory access to all customers. In practice, however, ground stations have been known to refuse to sell data, delay the shipment of data, or deny that the data ever existed.

Furthermore, as crisis-monitoring demands frequent revisits by the satellite, the parent satellite company may have to postpone or discontinue other (more profitable) commercial orders for images, something it may not be willing to do. Some critics allege that the data interpretation of the civilian satellite-collected images could be found wanting. Without the

42 OTA, p. 10. [In August and October 1988, for example, the "Commercial Observation Satellite Project" tried to place orders with SPOT for military exercises requiring prenotification under the 1986 Stockholm Accords. On five occasions, SPOT could not fill the order because it was not properly positioned "...within the narrow time frames of interest...". SPOT could not obtain suitable ground tracks at particular times. See Michael Krepon, "Spying From Space", Foreign Policy, No. 75, Summer 1989, p. 104.]
43 OTA, p. 22. ["...(C)ertain countries were notorious for refusing to release data. For example,...it was very difficult to purchase data from India, particularly if they contained scenes of the India/Pakistan border."]
44 Theoretically, a potential aggressor could order multiple images in one geographic region from SPOT, and then conduct a military operation in another geographic region.
covert intelligence information which is used together with images collected by military satellites, the data interpretation for civilian remote sensing satellites may be poor.45

Finally, even if the civilian satellite technology exists to provide adequate resolution, revisit capability and timely delivery of imagery, the possibility still exists that the imagery would be unreliable. Not unlike the military satellites, the civilian remote sensing satellites can still be deceived, or "spoofed".46 As their orbits are fixed, civilian remote sensing satellites are particularly vulnerable to spoofing. Consequently, there is the chance that military personnel in the target image area would be aware of both the ground track and the overflight time of the satellite. They could either elect to postpone their military activities during the overflight of SPOT, or they could camouflage these activities.

Of course, the debate on the use of satellites in crisis-monitoring is in constant flux because of the multiplier effects of new technology. With regard to ground resolution, for instance, civilian satellite ground resolution is rapidly approaching the scale of military satellite ground resolution. As the third and fourth SPOT satellites are due to be launched in the 1990s, for instance, SPOT's resolution is projected to be 5 meters (about 16 feet).47 Similarly, radar sensors which

45 William M. Arkin, "Long on Data, Short on Intelligence", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 43, No. 5, June 1987, p. 5. [SPOT images of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site in the USSR, for instance, were so obscure that they could not demonstrate that the Soviets were prepared to restart their nuclear testing program (as the analysis had led many to believe).]
image ground targets through clouds (e.g., "synthetic aperture radar", or SAR) and infrared sensors which can detect movements at night48 may decrease the limitations of civilian remote sensing satellites.49 With respect to "turnaround time," competition to achieve the best delivery time could be keen in the near future. By the close of this century, a number of nations, including Brazil, Canada, the European Space Agency (ESA), France, India, Japan, and West Germany "...either will have developed or will be in the process of developing increasingly sophisticated remote-sensing satellites."50

VI. AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE

Today, airborne reconnaissance for monitoring purposes could meet the demands of the Secretary-General. Aircraft could have been deployed at airfields in either northern Namibia (e.g., Ruacana, Rundu) or southern Angola, either in the pre-crisis period or the crisis period.

generally recognized as providing military reconnaissance. [In the future, as SPOT is said to be a precursor to the French government's military satellite program, "Helios", the 1-meter resolution of Helios may be also included on later SPOT satellites. See Thomas E. Cremins and David Reibel, "Crossroads: Enhanced Space Cooperation?...or Space Weapons?", Spaceline, Institute for Security and Cooperation in Outer Space (ISCOS), Spring 1988, pp. 3-4.]


49 Florini, p. 115. [Canada, for example, is planning to deploy a SAR-based "RADARSAT" to provide 7-meter all-weather imagery, and by the late 1990's, this imagery could be as good as 1 meter.]

50 Robert J. Mrazek, "Rethinking National and Global Security: And the Role of Space-Based Observations" (original text of article in May 1989 edition of Space Policy). [In July 1987, the Soviet Union announced that it would sell images of any non-socialist country with a resolution of 5 meters. Turnaround time vis-a-vis the Soviet civilian remote sensing program "Soyuzkarta", however, is still in months.]
In contrast to satellites, reconnaissance aircraft can revisit a ground target as many times as necessary, and can circle around a target for hours.\textsuperscript{51} In terms of ground resolution, reconnaissance aircraft not only can be equipped with (1) optical sensors with military-capable ground resolution (even as low as below 1 meter), and (2) all-weather/day-night sensors, but are also less susceptible to atmospheric disturbances because they can manoeuvre in and out of clouds. In terms of "turnaround time," images collected by aircraft can be transmitted \textit{in real-time} to a ground receiving station. Most importantly, airborne reconnaissance costs a fraction of a satellite system, particularly when a satellite must be deployed continually over a crisis area.\textsuperscript{52}

Aircraft reconnaissance for monitoring and verification purposes is not new; since the 1986 Stockholm Agreement on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, unarmed aircraft or helicopters -- \textit{without} photo-reconnaissance equipment; only visual, "eyes-only" equipment -- have been used to visually inspect large-scale troop manoeuvres.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, there are new technological developments in the field of airborne reconnaissance, such as the introduction of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs).\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51} Joe Clark, "Don't Dismiss Open Skies", \textit{The New York Times}, 5 June 1989, p. A17. [If a satellite fails, it may take years to replace it; reconnaissance aircraft can be replaced at a relatively rapid rate.]
\textsuperscript{52} Burrows, pp. 153-154.
\textsuperscript{53} "CDE Delegations Reach Accord on Military Activities in Europe", \textit{Department of State bulletin: The Official Record of United States Foreign Policy}, Vol. 86, No. 2116, November 1986, p. 24. [Helicopters were reportedly used by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), 1973-79 in the Sinai Peninsula.]
\textsuperscript{54} Bernard Edinger, "Israel to Unveil Remote-Guided Aircraft for Peace and War", \textit{Reuters}, 15 May 1989. [Israel is promoting the "Impact" UAV which can fly at a maximum altitude of 19,000 feet, remain airborne up to 12 hours, and transmit television pictures \textit{(day or night)} in real time to controllers up to 90 miles away.]
VII. CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed two questions: (1) whether the UN possessed an adequate understanding of the "on the ground" situation in southern Angola, and (2) whether satellite- and airborne-reconnaissance could have improved such an understanding. With regard to Item (1), it would be too easy to conclude that there was a "human failure" in the assessment of warning; that the Secretary-General reportedly gave credence to the assessment provided by "the people on the ground" instead of a political department in the Secretariat. There were confusing signals as to whether the South African warnings were reliable or simply "noise." For all intents and purposes, though, UNTAG apparently had little idea of the developments occurring north of the Angolan-Namibian border. Having received published "warnings" from Pretoria since mid-February 1989 that SWAPO might indeed infiltrate Namibia, the UN could have reassessed its benign warning rationale if it had attempted to verify the warnings provided by the ORCI assessments on the ground.

Had the Organization been able to monitor -- in the pre-crisis period of mid-February to mid-March -- the presence of SWAPO elements below the 16th parallel in southern Angola which could enter Namibia on short-notice, it may have been in the position to act on the warning time. Such action could have taken the form of a private UN warning to SWAPO regarding the dangers of a unilateral push south of the border.

Could satellite and airborne reconnaissance have provided the Secretary-General with the capability to verify the warnings by South Africa? With respect to ground resolution, in a "best-outcome" operational framework, SPOT could currently detect large groups of personnel (according to South Africa, there were
approximately 4,000 SWAPO guerrillas in at least four base camps) in southern Angola but not identify and describe these large groups.\textsuperscript{55} More importantly, however, SPOT-acquired images arguably would have arrived too late to the Secretary-General in the crisis period of late March 1989 unless the satellite's ground track happened to be positioned in the area of southern Angola.\textsuperscript{56} For UN policymakers, the key juncture to request image orders in the Namibian case was the pre-crisis period -- between mid-February and early March. Such images may have acted as a "trigger mechanism" to alert the Secretary-General, the Security Council and/or member states to evidence of a build-up of SWAPO forces in southern Angola below the 16th parallel.

If the technical problems in this scenario can be addressed, what about the political problems? As the 1967 Outer Space Treaty effectively legitimized satellite travel over any nation's territory, there is no prior consent to overfly foreign soil.\textsuperscript{57} However, in the "real world" member states would likely deny the UN permission to overfly satellites or aircraft over their national boundaries. Despite the de facto universal "Open Skies" policy which exists today (e.g., satellites), it is

\textsuperscript{55} E.83.IX.3, p. 30. [The ISMA report stated that crisis monitoring would require satellites with ground resolution of 1 meter or less. Ground targets which would best approximate the deployments of SWAPO -- troop units or bivouacs -- could be detected at 6 meters, recognized at 2.1 meters, identified at 1.2 meters and described at 0.30 meters.]

\textsuperscript{56} As there are only a handful of staff members in the UN Secretariat with image-interpretation experience -- and only natural resource image-interpretation, not strategic reconnaissance image-interpretation -- the Secretary-General today would have to rely on the commercial satellite companies to provide image-interpretation. Turnaround time could therefore be longer.

\textsuperscript{57} Florini, p. 119. [The Security Council could legally request ISMA services for the monitoring of a particular crisis situation pursuant to its investigative powers under Article 34 of the Charter. See E.83.IX.3, p. 67]
difficult imagining the Secretary-General going ahead with a UN reconnaissance operation if denied. The other major area of doubt is financial: (a) whether the UN could attract financing from member states to deploy a UN-operated capability, and (b) what strings would be attached (e.g., identifying the end-users of ground images) if member states were to contribute the hardware.

However, if member states are genuinely interested in UN-monitored agreements, the Secretary-General could request permission to deploy the least controversial means of reconnaissance, such as "eyes only" aerial reconnaissance (e.g., Stockholm Accords), to gain mutual trust between member states and the Organization. Such an initiative could routinize the process of aerial reconnaissance to the point that image-acquiring aircraft and satellites could be practicable in the future.
CONCLUSION:

Early-Warning in the UN Context: To Deter is to Prevent
In the lead-up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the Secretariat's "warning rationale" was for all intents and purposes *ad hoc*. Its information collection system lacked timeliness as well as a wide range of sources. No coherent regime existed for the verification of incoming information. Too many political departments submitted assessments, each office with its own turf and each with its own connections to the Office of the Secretary-General.

Today, how much has changed? Since the Falklands/Malvinas War, quantitative improvements have indeed been made. Facsimile machines have been added; news wire teleprinters have been installed. There is no assurance, however, that the Secretariat's ability to "act on warning" will be credible as long as substantive, qualitative improvements are not put into place. And even if such improvements are forthcoming, the Secretariat's early-warning effectiveness will depend in many ways on the cooperation of member states. States must possess the political will to actively (1) provide warning-related information to the Secretariat on a regular basis, and (2) cooperate when the Secretariat requests information (e.g., fact-finding mission).

The sub-thesis has outlined several ways in which the Secretariat can make such qualitative improvements in order to "act on warning" for the purpose of preventing conflict. In the body of the sub-thesis, however, three considerations have surfaced which question the success of such a capability. According to the first consideration, the institutional dynamics of warning are too complex for the Secretariat to provide warning of a threat to international peace and security. While there are many disputes in the world, only a small number of
crises evolve from these disputes and even fewer conflicts escalate from these crises. If Britain, which possessed both covert and overt warning capabilities in the lead-up to the Argentine invasion, could not issue a warning in the lead-up to the Falklands/Malvinas War, it is hardly likely that the Secretariat itself will be able to focus on one situation and sound a warning on that situation. Too many limitations exist beyond the Secretariat's control, such as the neglect which the international media may show for long-term conflict situations, and the number of disputes with which the Organization may be seized at any time.

Following the second consideration, if member states are not themselves ready to actively provide warning-related information to the Secretariat, any renewed focus on warning will continue to lack political support. Despite the provisions of the Charter, member states opt for unilateral solutions over multilateral solutions. [Yet when unilateral efforts to prevent hostilities fail, and conflict ensues, member states call the UN to resolve the conflict.]

Most importantly, in line with the third consideration, while the Secretariat may be able to "act on warning" by assessing the likelihood of a potential conflict situation and issuing a private warning, there is no direct causation between the act of warning and the prevention of conflict. If the Organization had possessed warning in the lead-up to the Namibian crisis, for instance, it could not have actively prevented infiltrations by SWAPO along the 1000-mile Angolan-Namibian border. UN military forces in the crisis period are no substitute for UN diplomatic pressure in the pre-crisis period.
Following these three considerations, the working assumption in the Secretariat is that conflicts are bound to occur with little warning. For all its renewed attention to the demands of warning, the UN cannot change certain "realities" such as a policymaker's tendency to bolster an original assessment, to be "lulled to sleep" by the same pattern of activity in a long-term conflict situation, or to simply choose the wrong decision based on imperfect information. Accordingly, "warning" represents an opportunity for the Organization to create options for UN activity after a conflict breaks out, not before a conflict breaks out. "Worst-case" options for UN action must be identified in advance of the conflict, so the Secretary-General and/or the Security Council will not be uninformed, peripheral players if one or both parties in a dispute requests a UN role. With the Office for Research and the Collection of Information acting as a focal point, the Secretariat does its warning "homework", creates its options for UN action and remains ready to remove the conflict at the outset of open hostilities.

While acknowledging the complex institutional and political constraints which exist on the Organization, I have argued that the Secretariat can wield more deterrent capability if it (1) possesses the political will to act on the likelihood of a conflict situation, (2) acts on the basis of credible, verifiable information, and (3) acts along private channels of communication. While the Organization could never have militarily prevented the SWAPO infiltrations on 31 March 1989, for instance, it could have put authoritative pressure on SWAPO to not infiltrate at an early stage. In the final equation, the UN cannot get involved at such a late stage that active military
force (e.g., via UN peacekeeping forces) becomes an option to attempt to prevent the conflict. Offers of mediation, "suggestions", or arbitration must be in train long before the stage when either (1) member states to a dispute consider military means to settle the dispute, or (2) the Organization considers deploying a military force to prevent open hostilities.

To provide the optimal deterrent capability, the Organization must be able to issue a warning at an early stage, to bring attention to the states parties in a dispute that the Secretariat will be able to offer suggestions to normalize the dispute. The utility of the Secretary-General vis-a-vis other UN actors is the centerpiece of such a deterrent posture. In theory, the Secretary-General is a servant of the Security Council; in practice, however, the Secretary-General can often, via his "good offices", react more quickly and more effectively to an incipient conflict situation than the Council. As he gathers a good deal of information through his private consultations with foreign leaders (e.g., UN permanent representatives, foreign ministers, heads of state), the Secretary-General possesses quite useful private information which, combined with the public information available to ORCI, represents a formidable collection and assessment tool.

It is essential, however, to establish a high degree of credibility each time the Secretary-General opts to act on warning. The head of the Organization therefore must utilize information which correctly reflects the situation "on the ground." Verification proposals introduced in the sub-thesis include (a) intelligence cooperation between the UN and several "pro-UN" nations with "no strings attached"; (b) an
institutionalized scheme whereby all member states routinely transmit warning-related information to the Office of the Secretary-General; (c) early use of fact-finding teams by the Organization, and (d) a UN-operated satellite- and airborne-reconnaissance capability.

It is also essential for the Secretary-General to use private means to act on warning. As pointed out in the sub-thesis, the Secretary-General risks too much if he issues a public warning, particularly (1) political damage if the warning is a "hit" and the conflict ensues anyway, or (2) criticism for "crying wolf" if the warning is a "false alarm" and no conflict occurs. Privately, however, the Secretary-General can send notice to the parties that the UN is aware of the potential conflict without removing a role for himself. Such preventive actions by the Secretary-General (e.g., offer of "good offices" suggestions) provide a deterrent capability which cannot be ignored.
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