USE OF THESES

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1892 - 1952 (Book 2)
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Glossary

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Thus far, our study has surveyed how the West's invasions and knowledge reactivated classical Arab identity elements among modern Egyptians before 1918 --- but with pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism the main political counter-community. This second Book will now trace how the West --- the scope of its imperialism now expanded over the whole Arab World --- continued to multiply highlight elements from the classical Arabs in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Now, though, a still somewhat wide, but much more intimate and solid, pan-Arab nation is narrowed down as the main supra-Egyptian political community that the acculturated intellectuals pursue.

The first volume of this thesis surveyed the implantation of Western cultures and technologies in Egypt up to 1918 through 'Alid self-modernization and also through the colonial rule of the British, some of whom calculatingly debilitated standard Arabic and the psyches of educated Egyptians. The traditionally-educated pan-Islamists (al-Afghani, al-Nadim) inspired Westernizing-educated youth to (a) politically resist Westerners while (b) adopting those modern sources of their strength that could now be synthesized with classical Arab-Islamic elements. Book 1 showed how first the older pan-Islamists, and then the Kamilists as the spearhead movement of a new acculturated generation, made the imposition of classical Arabic within modernity the key battle for the survival of Egypt's nationality. Evoking a divine Islam less, the Jaridists largely concurred. The high level of consciousness whipped up before 1918 against the Anglicization campaigns, forced the British to concede more scope to Arabic in the schools although not in the state bureaucracy. This second volume of our study has as its context the continuing vulnerability of Arab-Islamic culture after the 1922 independence, in the face of Britain's ongoing occupation, the linguistic weight of the resident Europeans and the increasingly dynamic Western culture and mores. The post-1922 odds against Islam and
its Arabic, though, fueled a crucial literary minority's drive to further recreate the classical Arabs' past and the successor pan-Arab community. Book 2 will demonstrate that West-based scholars have exaggerated the ascendancy of radical westernism and neo-Pharaonist particularism in the heyday of the 1920s, in which a new pan-Arab linguistic nationalism simultaneously crystallized (Chs. 7, 8).

Before the 1919 uprising, al-Jaridah and Kamilist acculturated intellectuals had no access to political or state power, monopolized by the British. In the 1930s and 1940s, such former al-Jaridah intellectuals as Taha Husayn, Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat had become either establishment politicians and top administrators or intellectual leaders who could shape government policies. Chapters 9 and 10 set out their efforts to prompt and direct Arab nationalist measures by successive Egyptian administrations in education, State-fostered high culture and in regional relations and economics, up to Nasser's 1952 Revolution. In praxis in the 1930s and 1940s as the ideology of a powerful establishment, pan-Arabism extended and solidified itself in many ways. We nonetheless analyze such politician-intellectuals as Taha and Haykal as after 1930 in, for instance, their institutionalist drive to make classical Arabic cover modernity, fulfilling an aesthetic dynamic that had crudely started in their pre-1918 writings, not completely westernist or particularoid.

The mix of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals to be analysed now changes. In Book I we concentrated on the pan-Islamist Mustafa Kamil and his adherents since that Patriotic Party most influenced the thinking of the literate; we allocated less space to the more frequently secularist, thoughtful circle of Lutfi al-Sayyid/al-Jaridah/the Ummah Party. In this second part of our inquiry, writers associated before 1918 with Lutfi and al-Jaridah have more prominence than others who had been in the party of Mustafa Kamil. Former Jaridists active from 1922 in the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists and around its newspaper al-Siyasah had seminal influence upon both particularoid and Arabo-Islamic thinking among
the educated Egyptian public. A few key figures --- the pioneer pan-Arab capitalist Tala'at Harb or the al-Risalah editor Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat --- combined Jaridist-Ummah with Kamilist backgrounds and themes. In any case, the distinctions between the Jaridah-shaped and pan-Islamoid acculturated groups remained as partial and blurred in the parliamentarist-monarchical state (1922-1952) as under the British. Contributors to al-Jaridah and al-Siyasah may have subjected Islam to critical discussion more, yet they remained at most unsure whether to reform or destroy it, and had their own pan-Islamic dimension, always liable to flare against the hierarchical Westerners to whom they reached out. The groups shift, but the individuals sampled in this second Book are still mostly of the same generation of acculturated intellectuals that formed under British rule before 1918. Thus, Part 2 traces the working-out in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, as the intellectuals won more cultural and political power, of elements and tensions --- for example, long-term trauma at the wounds Britain dealt Arabic --- present only in unresolved form in acculturation under colonialism before World War I. Certainly, the actions and reorientations of this age-group of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals after the 1922 "independence" would be unintelligible without taking account of their colonized formative youth before 1918.

Chapter 4 showed that the pan-Islamism of the party of Mustafa Kamil, while centred around "Turkey", was a new, modern and ultra-acculturated ideology. Traditional Ottoman status and obligations were only a subordinate, attenuated, component in this Egyptian pan-Islam which sprang from, and was structured to reverse, the novel experience of colonization. The West-analyzing Kamilists structured pan-Islamism to duplicate the strengths of the imperialists in order to roll them back. "Turkey"-centred pan-Islam blended intensified religious elements --- the globally-diffused Caliph rather than a suzerain Sultan --- with an up-to-date symmetrical calque upon imperial Western technologies: it wanted to reverse Britain's progression via production and trade to Empire and political power with
an interlocking chain of self-industrializing, trading, Muslim nations who would fit their complementary economies together for strength. This book shows how the new successor pan-Arabism of the 1930s and 1940s, too, reblended (a) revitalized, mutated Islamic and archaic classical Arab motifs with (b) highly conscious duplication of the economic and technological bases of the imperialist West's power and expansionism. Much more than pre-1918 Kamilist (and muted Jaridist) pan-Islam, the Egyptian pan-Arabism that progressively structured and diversified throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s instanced the acculturated elite's disposition to interweave and synthesize strips from two civilizations— as did their responses to the Zionist threat. The mounting reaction by acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals against Zionism after 1922 was like earlier pan-Islamism in combining (a) religious stakes in Palestine and global (now both "Jewish" and pan-Muslim) religio-political communities with (b) concern that Zionism threatened the most modern West-like prerequisites for narrower pan-Arab integration.

Book I traced some pre-1919 more secularoid imperialism-countering community impulses from the movement of Mustafa Kamil. The Kamilists had considered secular-materialist explications of imperialism and toyed with images that a religiously diverse bloc of "Eastern" peoples together resisted the imperialists. Pragmatic and sects-spanning concepts were much more structural in the internal Egyptianist political community, to unite Muslims and Copts, that the Kamilists and Jaridists evoked. In the 1920s West-dyed Muslim Egyptian intellectuals articulated and culturized earlier much more rudimentary images of the millennia-old Egyptian political people (discussion of neo-Pharaonism in Appendices 1 and 2). Chapter 10, on the al-Azhar-educated (although also French-literate) Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat shows that less religious sectors of old and recent Arab language and literature could be accommodated or even prized by a religiously-educated practising Muslim, with acceptance that Christian and Muslim Arabs were now developing them together, as
partners. A key inquiry of this second Book therefore must be if (a) non-Islamic or open facets of the Arab past, (b) the carry-over from sects-integrative impulses in Egyptianism, and (c) the West's intermittent secularism can, in tandem, lead to a sects-incorporative rather than Islamoid pan-Arab ethnic nationalism. Book 1, though, presented several sectors where not just the West's imperialism but the Christianoid personality persistent in its modernity, decisively heightened Islamic identifications among West-steeped Egyptian intellectuals. In the context of post-1922 pan-Arabization, too, the West continued to sectarianize and Islamize them.

Our examination of the more sovereign 1922-1952 period is still, like Book 1 on the colonial period, concerned to trace the strong reciprocal influence on the intellectuals' perceptions of (a) unequal relations between nations and (b) of their Arabo-Islamic and (c) Western cultures. The breadth of classical Arab culture meant that quality and modernity from the West in most cases only knocked away some segment of classical Arab and Islamic culture and thought, while re-highlighting others. Amid the weakening parliamentarist West's post-World War I crises, recurring conciliatory political outreaches by dual-cultured Egyptian intellectuals will again underscore their elite's deep-seated cultural and liberal-ideological as well as class links with imperial Westerners. Despite their spiritual confrontationism against imperialism, Mustafa Kamil and his colleagues were West Europe-patterned constitutionalist parliamentarists. During the 1920s, the *al-Siyasah* intellectuals might fulfil Kamilism in constructing an actualized parliamentary system that at last would constrain the monarch: indeed, despite malfunctions in the 1930s and 1940s, Haykal, Taha Husayn, al-Zayyat and other older intellectuals persisted in the liberal-parliamentary enterprise that repeatedly bound them to the liberal Western capitalist polities that devastated Arab interests. The Arabo-Islamic reaction of modern-educated Egyptians in the 1930s and 1940s maintained covert sectors for further borrowings from the West.
(Chapter 9). For both the period of British colonial rule and the post-1922 liberal-parliamentary polity, our investigation is above all concerned to reconstruct a special acculturated pre-1952 Egyptian Islam that was non-totalistic, dense in strips and elsewhere pervaded by the West but always present in at least unpredictable ad hoc atoms.

For the most part, I found the Arabic materials and data sampled from the 1922-1952 liberal-parliamentarist monarchy more complex than those from the simpler era of British colonial administration that we analysed in Book 1. For this second Book, then, I acknowledge, with the deepest gratitude, the continuing long-distance suggestions and comments that Geoffrey Jukes of ANU made from Britain at cost to his own writing: without his care and interest in early 1990 I could never have condensed and bound this second part of the study within the time set. To the end, Dr Nasih Mirza of Melbourne University indefatigably unknotted literary Arabic idioms from what was a new period of linguistic flux in Egypt after World War I.
CHAPTER 7: EGYPT AND THE REGION IN THE 1920S: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ISLAM AND ARABISM

This Chapter sets wider contexts and groups that influenced supra-Egyptian community ideas evolved (Ch.8) by acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals in the 1920s. The expansion of imperialism in the Arab world after 1918, local Egyptian political situations, class interests, attempts to make Egyptian society conform more to Western norms, all stimulated or dampened these intellectuals' articulation of pan-Araboid themes. Chapter 6 showed that relatively secular al-Jaridah publicists in the pre-1918 period were cold to Turkey, yet they too could veer towards special relationship with the Ottoman Empire when it looked as though it was modernizing. They too had modernist/Islamo-Arabist duality towards Westerners and towards literary language, that in spasms led them to share some de-particularizing attitudes in the Kamilist independence movement. al-Jaridah projected the land of Egypt and Egyptians as a human unit but not evoking a coherent discrete culture or history. In the 1920s, far more solid images of a contrary Pharaonic past or culture, surveyed in this Chapter, spasmodically weakened identification by some Muslim Egyptians with the classical Arab Muslims and contemporary Arabs beyond Egypt. But we also discuss how neo-Pharaonism enabled acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals to vent and focus hostility to intimidatory Westerners and to their Western culture — prefiguring the Arab-Islamic reaction of the 1930s and 1940s. This Chapter traces ways in which modernization, including novel economic relations, began to unprecedentedly integrate Egyptians with other Arabs in the 1920s. Chapter 8 will analyse the actual crystallization in the 1920s of a pan-Arab ideology among those secular-educated successors of al-Jaridah who simultaneously toyed with neo-Pharaonism (al-Siyasah/ the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists).

Britain in Egypt in the 1920s
After World War I ended, the British authorities in Egypt refused to allow a *wafd* (delegation) headed by the ex-minister Sa'd Zaghlul to go to Paris to plead for Egyptian independence at the Peace Conference\(^1\). In response, the range of classes in Egyptian society --- peasants, secular lawyers, students, Islamic 'ulama', veiled urban elite women\(^2\), even the Coptic clergy\(^3\) --- conducted an uprising and prolonged militant mass independence movement against the British. On 28 February 1922 the British issued a unilateral declaration that granted Egypt a limited internal independence while also legalizing Britain's ongoing armies of occupation. A

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3. Carter traced the important role of Muslim 'ulama' and Coptic clergy in the 1919 revolution, both in fomenting opposition to the British and in cementing unity; the priest Marqus Sergius was crucial. E. Lynn Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics, 1918-1952* (London: Croom Helm 1985) pp. 61-63; as the Copts' leader at the time, Sergius repeatedly stated that if the achievement of Egyptian independence required the sacrifice of a million Copts, this must be willingly accepted on their part. Salamah Musa, *The Education of Salamah Musa* tsd L. O. Schuman (Leiden: F. J. Brill 1961) p. 108. See also Leland Bowie, "The Copts, the Wafd and Religious Issues in Egyptian Politics", *The Muslim World*, v. 67:2, April 1977 pp. 106-126.
parliamentary-monarchical secularized Egyptian national state then developed. Throughout the 1920s the most powerful politicians and opinion-leaders in the new state were overwhelmingly bilingualized, acculturated, Muslim Egyptians; many had been educated as secular lawyers. After 1922, Britain's armed forces remained in Egypt's cities until they were finally withdrawn to the Suez Canal zone in 1946 - 1947. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Capitulations kept the European residents' extensive economic and other activities beyond the jurisdiction of all Egyptian governments. Britain in her 1922 declaration of Egypt's "independence" arrogated to herself the role of protector of European interests and European minorities in Egypt. The continuing need to negotiate more independence from the British, other foreign powers and the resident European non-citizens brought bilingualized, West-tinctured politicians and officials to the fore in Egyptian politics after 1922.

The violent struggle with the British for independence made the Muslim Egyptian masses in the cities and countryside xenophobic for many years against Westerners in

4. Egypt was kept completely subject to the Capitulations until the signing in 1938 of the Montreux Convention which phased them out over a period of ten years. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experiment: 1922-1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977) p. 169.

5. Getting the British troops evacuated and the Sudan back, and the establishment of Egyptian legal and financial authority over the powerful European residents, required that any Egyptians who aspired after 1922 to become political leaders had to be able to negotiate with Westerners actively in French or English or both. Monolingual Arabic-speaking politicians could not win advancement even in the more populist Wafd. Pathallah Barakat, adroit at handling people and organizing the rural population, might have become the Wafd's leader when Sa'd Zaghlul died on 27 August 1927: but Pathallah knew no foreign language and the Wafd therefore chose Mustafa al-Nahhas instead. Ibid, pp. 73-74, 105.

6. Xenophobic Egyptian masses: even in March 1922 there were regular assaults on Britishers in Cairo and such hostility to foreigners in general that Europeans and even resident Syrians took to wearing tarbushes in place of their normal hats "out of fear of being assaulted". "al-Qutr al-Misri", from a correspondent in Cairo, al-Bashir (Bayrut) 4 March 1922 p. 3. For the peasantry's sufferings from forced labour in Palestine during World War I see Salamah Musa, Education, pp. 91-93. For the violent excesses by the ten regiments of Australian troops sent to...
But during the 1919-1922 upheavals the British also antagonized the secular-educated elite. Egypt's National Bar Association played a leading role in the rebellion of 1919 and the British considered Westernizing-educated Egyptians the leaders of the Revolt. Accordingly, when sweeping through the countryside, Australian troops went out of their way to degrade before the public members of the "effendi" class who wore European clothes.

Yet class interests, shared Western culture, and apprehension about Britain's remaining imperial might and violence motivated the emergent Egyptian ruling elite and associated intellectuals in the 1920s to seek independence through compromises with the occupying British. Such delicately-balanced, hair-trigger gradualism was most overt, or around, the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists (Hizb al-Dusturiyyin al-Ahrar), founded on 30 October 1922 by a group of elitist Muslim Egyptian landlords and high civil servants who split from the more populist Sa'd Zaghlul and his Wafd. The acculturated intellectuals continued to assume in the 1920s that the West's societies were a modern model to which Egyptian society had to be adjusted: this in turn made them unduly credit, even after the post-War clashes with Britain, British colonial officials' self-validating stance that they had been indispensable critics and modernizers of Egyptian society before World War I. A Liberal mouthpiece, Haykal's al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah, in 1927 even printed an Arabic translation of a critical discussion by Cromer of the pacify the Delta countryside see Suzanne Brugger, Australians and Egypt 1914-1919 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 1980) pp. 78-76, and M. Sabry, La Revolution Egyptienne pt. 2 (Paris: J. Vin 1921) p. 31.

7. Farhat Ziadeh, Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 1968) p. 151.

8. Brugger, Australians and Egypt pp. 120-121.

status of Egyptian women, not noting Cromer's campaign in
tirement against female suffrage in Britain\textsuperscript{10}. Under
British auspices during the forty years of colonial rule,
the rising class of large Arab-Egyptian landowners had been
steadily taking over the peasants' small land-holdings,
reducing them to tenants or dirt-poor day-laborers\textsuperscript{11}.
Nadav Safran (1961) stressed the fear of such great
Muslim-Egyptian landlords as the Liberal
Constitutionalists' leader Muhammad Mahmud that any
populist independence movement was apt to turn into an
attack by the masses against landed property itself\textsuperscript{12}. The
future Liberal Constitutionalist leaders who drafted the
1922 Constitution as Wafdists made it protect their class
interests and their core class constituency: article 9
guaranteed to large landowners that their land holdings
would not be taken away from them except on extraordinary
grounds of public interest\textsuperscript{13}. The Wafd originally had a
populist anti-imperialist character, and drew its leaders
and workers from diverse strata in the Muslim middle and
upper classes, including support from some Arab-Egyptian

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Lord Cromer, "al-Mar'at al-Misriyyah" (Egyptian Woman), tsd "N.
Y." al-Siyasah al-Usub'iyyah 17 September 1927 p. 24. Cf. the
retired Cromer's reflections in 1908 that the inferior status of
women there was one of the main reasons for the Islamic world's,
including Egypt's, backwardness. Cromer, Modern Egypt (2 vols,
London: Macmillan 1908) v. 2 p. 135. "N.Y." was an acronym for
Antun Zakariya, a Copt who was secretary of the Egyptian Museum's
library. He glorified ancient Pharaonic Egypt in numerous
newspaper articles and in his book Ta'rikh Tutankhamun, Muharriru
Misr al-'Azim (The History of Tutankhamun, Egypt's Great
Liberator) (Cairo: Maktabat Zaydan c. 1926) also published under
his "N. Y." acronym.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Brugger, Australians and Egypt pp. 90-91; cf. Samuel Becker
Grant Jr., Modern Egypt and the New (Turco-Egyptian) Aristocracy
(University of Michigan: Ph.D 1968) pp. 39-41. Brugger also notes
that "when the War began, population pressures had already raised
rents to the point where the average fallah could make only a
minimal profit, if any, yet the [Egyptian large] landlords devised
further surcharges which whittled away even this narrow margin".
By 1919 "the countryside was smouldering with discontent".
Australians and Egypt p. 91.
\item \textsuperscript{12} In 1919 while the upper Egypt landowner Muhammad Mahmud was in
exile with Sa'd Zaghlul for nationalist activity, a peasant mob
assembled to burn down the house of his father Mahmud Pasha
Sulayman. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community
\item \textsuperscript{13} Shillig, Hizb al-Dusturiyyin p. 32.
\end{itemize}
large landlords. But down the decades, the Zaghlulist Wafd's leaders, including those from humbler bourgeois backgrounds, acquired more and more landed property. This increasingly was to motivate them to negotiate a compromise settlement flexibly with Britain. Chapter 8 will show that contributors to Haykal's al-Siyasah in 1929 feared that Zionist-Palestinian bloodshed was activating the Arab masses in Egypt, as in other Arab countries, and that these anti-imperialist pan-Muslim masses threatened non-confrontationist political strategies to contract imperialism, and modernize, in the region.

The rage British behavior built up in the Egyptian elite throughout the 1920s nourished empathy for other colonized Arabs. Unable to break with the past hierarchical pattern, British representatives on the spot in Egypt, despite occasional misgivings in London, repeatedly resorted to threats, violence and gun-boat diplomacy to keep the Egyptians in cowed submission to Britain's strategic postures. When the Sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian army, Sir Lee Stack, was assassinated on 19 November 1924, British High Commissioner Allenby dislodged Zaghlul from the premiership by occupying the customs house in Alexandria. Allenby enraged Egyptians of all classes and parties when he demanded that Zaghlul's government accept unlimited irrigation of the Gezirah in the Sudan, which would punish all Egyptians economically with a rival cotton crop there and might open up some threat to Egypt's vital supplies of Nile waters. The next British High Commissioner, George Lloyd (1925-1929), earlier a colonial governor in India, regularly called in British gunboats to control or bring down Egyptian governments, for instance if they tried to replace British advisers in the small Egyptian army or elsewhere. Lloyd, in conjunction with

14. Wafdist of limited "fallah" origins and urban lawyers and professionals prominent in the Wafd in its populist first stage, as the years went by acquired more and more landed property and intermarried into the big landowning class that conducted parliamentary politics. Safran, Egypt in Search pp. 194-195; al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experiment pp. 16-17.
15. al-Sayyid-Marsot, Liberal Experiment p. 62.
16. Ibid, pp. 96, 100-102, 126.
King Fu'ad, continually strove to prevent Sa'd Zaghlul and the Wafd, who had popular support, from taking or holding government. The British policy of the 1920s sharply reduced the prospects of parliamentary democracy succeeding in Egypt, and thereby contributed to the later crisis that faced Egypt's transplanted Western institutions and West-influenced ideology in the 1930s and 1940s.\(^\text{17}\)

The Wafdists in the 1920s, although less strongly later, demanded abrupt, far-reaching independence from Britain and underlined their demands by mobilizing Egyptians from all classes. As more gradualist nationalists, the Liberal Constitutionalists --- the Wafd's bitter opponents --- strove to win the same independence from Britain in stages by negotiating incremental compromise agreements with her, without activating the disruptive masses into participation.\(^\text{18}\) But Britain tenaciously maintained control over Egypt after 1922. She humiliated and intimidated both the Wafdists and the "moderate" nationalists she used and cast aside, refusing to give up enough ground quickly enough to the incrementalists for them to win credibility with many Egyptians. The Labour Foreign Secretary Henderson enticed Liberal PM Muhammad Mahmud into negotiations for an overall settlement in June of 1929, but only offering "proposals" rather than a draft treaty that would have helped the minority Liberals in Egypt. Before the British undermined his administration, though, the supple, determined Mahmud negotiated out of them an unprecedented if abstract implication that the British-Egyptian "alliance" could be ended after 25 years of a Treaty.\(^\text{19}\)

The Other Arab Countries

Actions by Britain and other Western powers in the

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18. The Liberals' cool incrementalism is discussed as a serious tactic for achieving independence by al-Sayyid-Marsot, Liberal Experiment p. 184 and Safran, Egypt in Search pp. 132-133.
19. PM Mahmud's 1929 negotiations with the manipulative British are discussed by Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 84-85 and Shillig, Hizb al-Dusturiyyin pp. 169-179.
1920s in the other Arab countries, not just in Egypt, influenced how Egyptians viewed Westerners, and by extension their civilization, in this period. The 1920s were the decade in which European powers violently subjugated and repressed Arab populations across the whole Arab world.

In keeping with what its potential bourgeois constituency wanted, Haykal's Liberal Constitutionalists Party from its formation on 30 October 1922 included in its core principles the inseparability of Egypt and the Sudan. The Liberals and the Wafd long competed to negotiate the return of the Sudan back from British control. Britain had used British troops to conquer and control the Sudan, and from 1898 until 1919 depleted Egypt's financial reserves to develop its administration there. British suppression of nationalist demonstrations in the Sudan in 1924 provoked angry condemnation from all parties in the Egyptian parliament. As her Sudanese troops mutinied in November 1924, Britain expelled all Egyptian troops and officials from the Sudan, and the Liberal Constitutionalists criticized the confrontationist Wafd for losing Egypt its remaining influence there. On one hand, the British were infuriatingly slow to allow the successive

20. Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 68. Haykal and colleagues on al-Sufur magazine early in 1919 had formed the Egyptian Democratic Party, the precursor of the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists. In 1922, 'Aziz Mirham, writing for the Party, urged King Fu'ad to declare himself "King of Egypt and the Sudan" immediately. That would be one way to foil Britain's "manoeuvres" to "tear" the Sudan from Egypt, after all the sacrifices of "spirits and money" that the Egyptians had made to unify both into "the single land". "al-Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Misri wal-Sudan" (The Egyptian Democratic Party and the Sudan), al-Mugattam 11 May 1922.


22. See "Mashi'at al-Ummah wa Ijma' al-Ahzab" (The Nation's Will and the Unanimity of the Parties), al-Mugattam 25 June 1924 p. 1; "Qadiyyatu Misra fi Majlis al-Nuwwab" (Egypt's Cause [title to the Sudan] in the Chamber of Deputies) al-Mugattam 26 June 1924.

Egyptian governments more control even within Egypt's borders. On the other, they progressively separated Egypt and the Sudan throughout the 1920s. In the same decade under 1924 "closed districts" regulations, the British also separated the predominantly non-Muslim Southern Sudan from the Islamo-Arabic North. Britain's drive to wrest the Sudan irrevocably from Egypt repeatedly ran the Liberal Constitutionalists through politically damaging, enraging situations as they sought to negotiate compromise agreements with the English. When the Liberal Premier Muhammad Mahmud signed with Britain the Nile Waters Agreement of May 1929 he removed fear of any future British threats from the Sudan to Egypt's water supplies. Yet it proved easy for the opposition Wafd to denounce him for helping the British to sever the Sudan from Egypt on the grounds that the agreement placed administration of the Sennar Dam in the hands of Britain's Sudan government, ending supervision of Sudanese irrigation by the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works. Throughout the 1920s the British used Christian missionary educationalists in the sealed Southern Sudan to impose English in the place of pidgin Arabic as the lingua franca between the Southern tribes and to stop Southerners becoming Muslim. By 1932 Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Inan would denounce in harsh words different missionaries' roles as instruments with which the British separated the Southern Sudan from the Northern Sudan and Egypt, and the French colonialists separated Muslim Berbers from Muslim Arabs in Morocco. By the 1930s, (magnified) perception among the al-Siyasah intellectuals of Christian elements within the configuration of Western imperial power was making them veer from incrementalist outreach to Western states to perception of them as neo-Crusadist enemies of Muslims: a revival of the Kamilists' two warring politico-religious

Great Britain's systematic destruction of Egypt's links and interests in the Sudan in the 1920s deepened doubts --- and not just outside their ranks --- whether the Liberals' approach of moderate demands, give-and-take and gradual change in Arab-Western relations ever would pay off when dealing with the British. We shall see how the Liberal Constitutionalist-linked al-Siyasah in 1929 again vented in regard to Palestine the enraged perception that provocative British treatment of Arabs there was destabilizing Egypt and the Middle East, and thus threatening the position of the very gradualist elements that most strove to achieve a modus vivendi with Britain.

Across Egypt's Western borders, in Libya, continuous fighting raged throughout the decade between Muslim-Arab resistance forces and the Italian armies engaged in conquering the country. The Italian commander Graziani from January 1930 herded the entire tribal population of Cyrenaica into immense concentration camps, to deprive the resistance fighters of supplies and auxiliaries. This finally enabled him to crush the Sanusi-led resistance²⁷. Throughout the 1920s Egypt was a haven for Libyan leaders and refugees; funds and supplies sent from Egypt with the connivance of Egyptian border officials greatly helped the Libyans to keep fighting for so long²⁸. Through al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah, organ of Ahmad Shafiq and Ahmad Zaki's Cairo-based Eastern League, a Libyan resistance fighter in

observed that those Egyptians who studied in Europe once had been apostles of Western civilization in Egypt. Now, however, these intellectuals were coming to understand that the European countries that claimed to have emancipated themselves from religious fanaticism were fanatical states which had never forgotten the crusades. Haykal was inclined to endorse in this 1932 article al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah and the YMMA. Quoted Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 p. 163.


1930 depicted the Libyans as "Islam's victims" and urged "the Muslims" to aid them against the Italians, who aimed to destroy Islam.29 When Graziani captured the Libyan resistance leader 'Umar al-Mukhtar and executed him on 16 September 1930, the veteran pan-Islamic Egyptian poet Ahmad Shawqi, an Eastern League-linked figure, mourned him in one of his most beautiful elegies.30

After the capture of Damascus from the Turks on 1 October 1918, the Syrians built up an independent secularoid state headed by the Hijazi Hashimite sharif Faysal. In June 1920 the French occupied Syria and expelled Faysal: the Egyptian pan-Islamist poet Muharram (1877-1945) voiced solidarity in 1920 but simultaneously saw the ill-treatment by the French as retribution because the Hashimites and the Asian Arabs had revolted in 1916 against the protective Islamic political community with the Turks.31 In 1930 the Damanhur secular-law expert Muhammad Farid had a modernist sense that Tala'at Harb's Egypt-Syria Bank, the Eastern League (Rabitat Sharqiyyah) and other "literary, economic and material efforts" by Egyptians were decisively integrating Egypt and Syria, inseparable throughout history: he still, however, saw France and Britain's occupation and dismemberment of Syria and West Asia after 1918 as retribution for rising against the Turks despite Egyptian advice.32 France tried to dismember Syria on sectarian lines as the best method to perpetuate her rule there. The French proclaimed a separate supposedly Maronite-dominated sectarian statelet of Greater Lebanon in September 1920 and in 1922 followed

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32. Muhammad Farid, "Misr wal-Buldan al-'Arabiyyah" (Egypt and the Arab Countries), al-Mugattam 21 August 1930.
it with another for the 'Alawi sect around Latakia and another in Jabal Druze with a puppet "Druze national government" proclaimed "independent" in April 1922\(^{33}\). To foil this sectarian fragmentation by France, local anti-imperialists made their Arab identifications more religiously neutral and sects-integrative. We shall see that Egyptians in al-Rabitat al-Shargiyah (the Eastern League) in the 1920s resisted France and Britain's post-World War I partitions of the Fertile Crescent as throwing up new barriers to the Arab world's integration. Eastern League intellectuals in the 1920s skilfully articulated varieties of Arab identity designed to attract the very Christian Lebanese whom France strove to detach. Hatred and violence recurred between the occupying French and the Syrians and Lebanese throughout the 1920s\(^{34}\), with full coverage in Egypt's Syrian Christian press\(^{35}\), making a deep cumulative impression on Egyptians. In 1925 a revolt against France broke out in the Jabal Druze and Sunni Muslim Syrians quickly joined the Druze: insurgents penetrated into Lebanon and in October 1925 entered Damascus itself\(^{36}\). The French bombarded Islam's historic


\(^{34}\) For instance, early in 1920 a ribald anti-clerical French play \textit{Les Mousquetaires aux Convent} was staged, mainly for French troops, in Bayrut. It set off fist-fights between shocked bilingualized, educated Catholic Lebanese youth and French officers and troops. See \textit{al-Bashir} (Bayrut), 20 January and 26 January 1921.

\(^{35}\) To cite one out of numerous campaigns, \textit{al-Muqattam} in 1924 attacked the appointment of a Frenchman who had served in the African colonies as governor of Lebanon, instead of giving experience of self-government to the Lebanese. "Hakim Lubnan al-Jadid wa limadha la Yakunu Wataniyyan — Bayn al-Intidab wal-Sha'b" (Lebanon's New Governor and Why Cannot He be a Native — Conflict Between the Mandatory and the People) \textit{al-Muqattam} 20 June 1924.

Umayyad capital Damascus for two days, arousing fury in Egypt. France finally crushed the Syrian insurgency only in 1927. Both the mass-supported Wafd and the Arabism-orientated Eastern League condemned French actions in Syria and sent financial aid to the Syrians\(^37\). French repression and violence in Syria-Lebanon and North Africa had certainly earned her hatred among modernist Egyptian intellectuals by the mid-1920s --- hatred, however, both delayed and then intimated and deepened by cultural and ideological affinity. The dual-cultured leaders of the Eastern League, for a time, had striven to reverse the enemy relationship into which France and the Arabs were becoming locked. In 1922, the League had sent to the quality French press an appeal to France, inventor of "the rights of man", to grant Syria its "national aspirations" and thereby "regain the love of the Eastern nations"\(^38\). It was a latter-day echo of appeals in the 1890s and early twentieth century by Mustafa Kamil and his independence movement for French intervention to dislodge Britain from the Nile Valley: these too had won no aid and therefore enraged.

The great diversity of religions and sects in Lebanon-Syria, reflected in the Christian and heterodox Druze as well as Sunni components of the forces resisting France, plus the need to foil divide-and-rule, all pointed to secular Arab rather than pan-Islamic solidarity from Egyptians.

Britain's actions in 'Iraq throughout the 1920s


presented Egyptians with many vivid instances of intimidation and force in the political relationships between Westerners and Arabs or Muslims. The British conquered 'Iraq from the Turks during World War I. In uprisings in May 1920, the 'Iraqis massacred British garrisons: Britain required 40,000 troops and an annual expenditure of 30,000,000 pounds to hold them down. Then the British in 1921 by force imposed the Hijazi Hashimite Amir Faysal on the 'Iraqis as their King, and kept them quiet not by an expensive large garrison but by the threat of air bombardment from planes of the R.A.F stationed on the Euphrates\(^{39}\). However, 'Iraq's gradual integration and modernization into something like an Arab national state after 1921 provided temporary contract posts there for many acutely observant Egyptian intellectuals, many --- such as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and Mahmud 'Azmi --- associated with the \textit{al-Jaridah}/ Liberal Constitutionalists-\textit{al-Siyasah} milieu. Through their writings, Hashimite 'Iraq registered vividly on educated Egyptians.

The 1920s saw massive fighting between Westerners and Muslims on the Arab World's farthest Western margin, Morocco, as on its East in 'Iraq. From 1921 to 1926 the \textit{qadi} Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi ('Abdel Krim') led devastating attacks by the Rif Berbers against the Spanish and then French rule in Morocco. Classical Arabic was the literary medium of these fighters for independence, although their daily speech was Berber\(^{40}\). Combined French-Spanish forces of 250,000 men finally compelled "Abdel Krim" to surrender on 27 May 1926.

Diverse Muslim milieus in Egypt gave moral and in some cases --- notably, the Eastern League --- material support to Ibn 'Abd al-Karim's Riffians\(^{41}\). Both the Wafd's and the


\(^{41}\) For Eastern League aid to 'Abdel Krim in 1926 see Jankowski, "Eastern Idea" pp. 657-658.
Liberal Constitutionalists' Arabic newspapers and magazines in the 1930s and 1940s would repeatedly assail France's policies in Morocco and also Algeria and Tunisia. These forums of liberal Egyptian nationalism particularly denounced France's attempts to disintegrate Morocco's joint community of Berbers and Arabs by disestablishing Islamic law and even Islam itself among Morocco's Berbers \(^{42}\). In the early 1920s al-Siyasah and the Wafdist press called for shrinking the roles of Muslim 'ulama' and their traditional Muslim law in the life of modernizing Egypt. But the Western colonists' divide-and-rule assaults in North Africa and the Sudan repeatedly highlighted traditional Islam as the indigenous integrant that sustained resistance to the West. This helped stimulate the Egyptian modernist intellectuals' shift to defence of Islam from the late 1920s.

ANTI-TRADITIONALISM, ISLAM AND THE CLASSICAL ARABS

Scholars writing in Western languages have stressed drives by Egypt's ascendant acculturated politicians and intellectuals in the 1920s to duplicate some Western patterns in Egypt. Nadav Safran (1961) emphasized how such sectional westernization cut segments of traditional or

\(^{42}\) On 16 May 1930, the French induced the young Sultan of Morocco to sign the Berber Zahir ("Dahir" - Decree) which would strengthen and perpetuate Berber customary law. The Wafdist Kawkab al-Sharq denounced the French stratagem. "al-Zahir al-Barbari" (The Berber Dahir) in "Shu'un al-Sharq" (Affairs of the East) page of Kawkab al-Sharq 21 May 1933. The article, in a pan-Islamic tone, condemned this divide-and-rule tactic by the French to detach Berbers from Arabs in Morocco, to "de-Islamize" the Berbers. Another attack on France's Morocco policy was supplied by the Geneva-based Lebanese Druze pan-Islamist Shakib Arsalar with the title "The Berber Dahir is a Black Stain that an Advanced Government of the Like of France is Duty-Bound to Obliterate from its History": Kawkab al-Sharq 21 May 1933, p. 2. The Egyptians paper also published the denunciation from Moroccans resident in Southern Syria. They charged that France was threatening Islam, trying to turn Berber areas of Morocco into "another Andalusia" following the dahir of 1930. Through the dahir France threatened Morocco's "Arab-Muslim nation" (ummah 'Arabiyyah Muslimah). "Bayan ilal-' Alam al-'Arabi min al-Jaliyat al-Maghribiyah fi Suriya al-Janubiyyah" (Statement to the Arab World from the Moroccan Community in Southern Syria), Kawkab al-Sharq 3 May 1933.
established Islam out of Egyptian mainstream life. The 1923 Egyptian Constitution drafted by Haykal, 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi and other future Liberal leaders, Safran noted, substituted the West-inspired particularist nation-state for the traditional concept of ummah and ruled out any "Islamic superstate". The Constitution nowhere mentioned Islamic Law and strove "to reduce Islam and its institutions to the level of custom and usage ... subject to the sovereign will"43. Jankowski (1980) characterized that such "zealous Westernization of mores and customs" and accompanying "denigration of the Arab-Islamic tradition" in sectors of the elite in the 1920s lessened empathy in Egypt for the Palestinians and other outside Arabs44.

Our interest in elite attempts to change or eliminate traditional Muslim elements in Egyptian life in the 1920s is the effects for supra-Egyptian community consciousness. 'Umar 'Inayat and the Liberal Constitutionalist Azharite 'alim 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, in assailing the traditionalist Muslim 'ulama' and their shari'ah law, did sharply criticize or reject very wide sectors of the classical Arab-Islamic past. Radical deromanticization or repudiation of the great classical Arabs and their heritage could sap commitment from Egyptians to a successor current supra-Egyptian Arab-Muslim community, which novel modern factors now encouraged. It is, however, important not to assess the modernists' campaigns of the 1920s against the traditionalist Muslim elite narrowly within their formal ideological terms, the drawback of Nadav Safran's and Charles D. Smith's Eurocentric accounts. Critiques by such al-Siyasah intellectuals as Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Taha Husayn, Mahmud 'Azmi, Mansur Fahmi or 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq of the classical Muslim Arab past or sensibility, or of comprehensive Muslim traditionalism, were also arguments that spotlighted Islam and the classical Arabs in the 1920s, and relayed a flood of data about them to acculturated Egyptians. We assess critiques of Islam and

its classical past from the Liberal/al-Siyasah milieu in the 1920s as an indispensable conduit that transmitted the supra-Egyptian Arab-Islamic past to young bilingualized strata with only attenuated links to the past.

Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Inan in al-Siyasat al-Ubsu'iyyah in late 1927 projected the diminished roles of Catholic clerics in secularized France after the Revolution as the pattern to which Egypt's Islamic officials should be made to conform. The journal also held up the new constricted "republican Islam" developing under Ataturk's repressive Westernizing dictatorship as the model for other Muslim countries. Himself married to a Turco-Egyptian woman, Muhammad Husayn Haykal was an enthusiastic observer of the new Kemalist Turkey. In the same year, 1927, Haykal stopped over in Turkey on his way to Paris, and wrote up his impressions for al-Siyasah's Egyptian readers.

Modernist Egyptians in the 1920s publicized in great detail the new institutions and West-patterned life Ataturk and his colleagues built up in Turkey. Laicist Kemalist Turkey's achievement of strength won deep and enduring respect among all ideological groups in Egypt, including its Islamist critics. In March 1924 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey abolished the Caliphate: of all the actions by Mustafa Kemal and his collaborators this change most challenged and altered educated Egyptians' long-established community attitudes. The secularizing Copt Salamah Musa recalled how Egyptian Muslim leaders under British colonial rule, for instance Mustafa Kamil, had persistently linked Egypt's anti-colonialist movement.

47. Haykal, "Fil Tariq ila Baris: al-Nahdat al-Turkiyyah" (En Route to Paris: The Turkish Renaissance), al-Siyasat al-Ubsu'iyyah 18 October 1927 p. 10. Haykal was still appreciative of the separation of Church and State in Turkey in his 1931 Waladi. Safran, Egypt in Search p. 143.
to the revered "State of the Caliphate" (Ottoman Turkey). By withdrawing Turkey from "the East" in 1924, Kemal Ataturk, in Musa's view, forced Muslim Egyptians now to give their undivided loyalty to a completely discrete Egyptian independence and nationhood.

When it adopted the Swiss civil code in 1926, the new laicist Turkey made civil marriage obligatory, banned polygamy and unilateral repudiation by men of a wife, and granted a Muslim woman the right to marry a non-Muslim man—completely cutting away the 'ulama' and traditional Muslim family law. al-Siyasah and al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah offered detailed coverage of the progress of the emancipation of women in Kemalist Turkey: for instance, a special correspondent in Istanbul in 1927 sent an interview with Nazihah Hanim Muhyiddin, President of the Turkish Women's Union. Already at the close of 1923, the radical modernist 'Umar 'Inayat in al-Mugattam denounced the Egyptian 'ulama' as depraved enemies of women and their emancipation because they stubbornly defended polygamy against the drive of Egyptian secularizers to outlaw and eliminate it. He titled his article "The Ladies of Islam in Egypt and Turkey" to underscore that the "reforms" to the position of women in Turkey were a pattern that Egyptian modernizers would duplicate. The class of 'ulama' in Egypt refused to adjust the old interpretations of law in the books of the salaf (model early generations of Islam) to the demands of the unprecedented features of the modern age. The traditional 'ulama' were anachronistic enemies of "the modern sciences" and "Progress", who had to be removed to clear the way for Egypt's modernization.

Liable to sap the development of pan-Arab national identification in Egypt was 'Inayat's denunciation of the great supra-Egyptian classical Arabs, the first standard-bearers of the original Islam, as motivated in their sweeping conquests by the drive to seize unlimited numbers of women as concubines and "plunder", which made

48. Salamah Musa, Education pp. 110-111.
them kill off the male populations they conquered. The 'ulama' in their determined rear-guard fight argued that the socially comprehensive Muslim traditionalism should be maintained because it was the indigenous identity. 'Inayat derisively replied that "nations living close to nature in a state of nomadism need to strengthen their group spirit but we, thank God, are not they." Qasim Amin, at the turn of the century, had been as angry as 'Inayat at the bad conditions and treatment women faced in late-traditional Egyptian society, but characterized these as a deviation, under the corrupting influence of non-Arab new converts, from the original Islamic model of the classical Arabs. The Muslim Egyptian modernists' glorification of Kemalist Turkey always retained a certain duality: reforms there substituted Western patterns for traditional Islam but there was satisfaction that the Turks beat back Christian Europeans, or held them at bay, with the strength that self-modernization conferred --- a residue of pan-Islamic community.

During the 1920s, the Egyptian feminists militantly assailed the holistic traditional law that the 'ulama' defended as Islam, calling for the abolition of the veil and of polygamy and juvenile marriage, features of the Prophet Muhammad's own life. The al-Siyasah

50. 'Umar 'Inayat, "Sayyidat al-Islam fi Misr wa Turkiya" (The Ladies of Islam in Egypt and Turkey), al-Muqattam 5 December 1923. When Mustafa Kemal abolished the Caliphate 'Inayat defended the measure, amid an outpouring of Egyptian sympathy for the Ottoman royal Caliphal family that drowned out his voice. He derided the nominal aid the other Muslim peoples had given the Turks in their heroic war to maintain independence from the Greeks after World War I. Non-Turkish Muslims had no right to advise, let alone veto, Kemal now. 'Umar 'Inayat, "Ilgha' al-Khilafah" (The Abolition of the Caliphate), al-Muqattam 14 March 1924 p. 2. Clearly, not just the sweeping secularization drives of the Kemalists but his remaining pan-Islamic community emotions, fed 'Umar 'Inayat's identification with them.

51. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 164.

52. Muhammad married 'A'ishah, the daughter of Abu Bakr, when she was only a child playing with her dolls; the Islamic shari'ah accordingly permitted child marriage. The Egyptian statute enacted in 1923 did not dare outrightly prohibit something the Prophet had done but carried provisions designed to end the practice. Alfred Guillaume, Islam (2nd ed, London: Penguin Books 1964) p. 172.

53. Both Huda Sha'rawi and her feminist coworker Nabawiyyah Musa...
Huda Sha'rawi (1879-1947) and the elite urban women in her Egyptian Women's Union shared the acculturation of the new state's establishment male liberal nationalists. The question was whether the feminists would repudiate the classical Arabs' past (and language?) and Islam in toto as anachronistic sources of the subordination of women. The female educationalist Nabawiyyah Musa (1890-1951), Sha'rawi's coworker, argued in 1927 that Arab women had enjoyed all personal and social rights prior to and during the early period of Islam.

Sha'rawi argued in 1927 that reforms in Muslim women's personal status should be in accordance with the spirit of Islam's law: Islam's recognition of women's rights to possess and manage property had been progressive, and was inconsistent with the practice of forcing women to cover their features with a veil. Thus, Sha'rawi's feminist movement, while striving to modify or replace some patterns validated by traditional Muslim law, maintained extra-Egyptian classical Arabs and images of an original Islam as the definitive past. She and her colleagues became activist pan-Arabs in the 1930s.

Braving an Egyptian public opinion that overwhelmingly wanted to restore the Caliphate, Muhammad Husayn Haykal and other al-Siyasah intellectuals vocally opposed any restoration. Their stand would keep the way clear for all-round Westernization and secularization of Egyptian life, and reduce the likelihood of Egypt being drawn into conflicts with Western powers over their colonial treatment of Arab or Muslim peoples beyond Egypt. The Liberal Constitutionalist shari'ah judge 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq in his 1925 book al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Bases of Government) argued that Islam was a spiritual religion

contributed articles to al-Siyasah in 1926. Shillig, Hizb al-Dusturiyyin p. 97.

54. Given the low ratio of education and literacy among Egyptian women then, Labibah Hashim in 1910 wanted the language of feminist oratory and books to become much more like colloquial Arabic. al-Jaridah 18 April 1910 p. 5.


that did not seek or pattern any political state or
prescribe any Caliphate or monarchy, both of which he
angrily denounced as inherently oppressive. However, the
arguments about the lapsed Caliphate brought out all the
tensions dogging the relations of all Muslim Egyptian
groups with Britain and other Western colonial powers. The
Egyptian forces striving to maintain or restore the
Caliphate justified it on the grounds that the West would
always be hostile to the Muslim peoples, and would never
truly accept them as independent member-states in such a
West-led comity of states as the League of Nations.
Therefore the Muslim peoples had to develop their
alternative international bloc, which had to be directed by
one Caliph. Already in mid-1925 Haykal echoed the
antagonism that the Islamist circles demanding the
Caliphate voiced towards the Western powers. He accused
Britain of fostering the moves for a new Caliphate in order
to place some "king" or "amir" under its influence in the
office: he vitriolically accused Britain of trying to play
God in the Muslim countries. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq had
outspokenly advocated friendship with Britain in the past
but then in 1925 courted his destruction when he opposed a
new Caliphate. Why could he not have "left creation to the
creator until the Caliph be set up ... and Britain be
pleased?" In denouncing Britain's manipulation of
traditionalist sacred Islamic symbols for her imperialist
end, Haykal's tone in 1925 already was like Mustafa Kamil's
during colonial rule when he assailed Britain's perceived
plot for a compliant Arab Caliphate.

In regard to Egypt's internal political balance, an
Islamic Conference was to be held in Cairo in May 1926 to
discuss how to revive the Caliphate. If King Fu'ad won

57. Mahmud Shakir, "al-Khutwat al-Ula fi Sabili I'la'i Sha'n al-Din wa
Ahlihi wa Tawhidi Jama'at al-Muslimina wa Rabtihim bi-Ribatin
Qawiyyin Matin" (The First Step to Win Preeminence for the
Religion and its People, and to Unite the Community of the Muslims
and Bind them Together with a Firm, Strong Bond), al-Mugattam 10
June 1924.

58. Haykal in al-Siyasah 22 July 1925 quoted Muhammad 'Imarah,
al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm li 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq (Bayrut:
even sectional support from Arabs or Muslims abroad for a proclamation of himself as Caliph, or for himself as the patron of a new Caliph, the office would enable him to dominate the Egyptian political parties. 'Abd al-Raziq's denunciation of all Caliphs --- and kings (= Fu'ad, Egypt's 'Alid dynasty) --- as tyrannical deviation from Islam robbed meaning in advance from a Conference that might give Fu'ad more political clout. The Wafdists, including Sa'd Zaghlul, well understood at the time that this was why Fu'ad encouraged the al-Azhar 'ulama' to strip 'Abd al-Raziq of his position as an Islamic judge (qadi)\textsuperscript{59}. But 'Abd al-Raziq could not have primarily written so risky a book asal-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm to control King Fu'ad within Egyptian politics. Fu'ad seized the pretext of 'Abd al-Raziq's unconventional and unpopular thesis to oust the Liberals from government: both the monarchist Ittihadists, recently the Liberals' coalition partner, and the Wafd cited the work to denounce the isolated Liberals as "atheists"\textsuperscript{60}.

'Ali's book could have been expected to politically devastate the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists because it so far-reaching challenged the assumptions about Islam and classical Arab history most cherished in Egypt's Arab-Islamic culture. In an initial private reaction to al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, the Wafd leader Sa'd Zaghlul (1860 - 1927) --- Azhar-educated but a French-speaking secular lawyer --- raged that 'Abd al-Raziq's attacks against Islam had surpassed those of "the Orientalists", of whose works Sa'd had read many. 'Abd al-Raziq was "ignorant" of the simplest bases of the religion in which he was an Azharite 'alim graduate, in claiming that Islam is non-temporal and prescribes no system of government. Islam regulates innumerable aspects of secular human interactions, such as sales. Had 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq "not read that numerous nations were governed solely by the regulations of Islam for long periods which were the most

\textsuperscript{59}. Zaghlul's early private assessment on 20 August 1929 to his secretary Muhammad Ibrahim al-Jaziri quoted \textit{ibid} p. 110.
\textsuperscript{60}. Smith, \textit{Islam and the Search} p. 79.
flourishing of ages?" 61. Sa'd's reaction showed how Islam and classical Arab Caliphates, given that their wide impact in universal history rivalled the modern imperialist West's, offered a crucial psychic rallying-point to colonized Egyptians. For Sa'd and those acculturated Egyptians who had his attitude, 'Abd al-Raziq's images of even pristine Arab Islam as commencing a chain of political dark ages assaulted the core of the indigenous identity with which modern Egyptians faced the more powerful Westerners. Sa'd's fury in 1925 was very much in the acculturated, bilingualism-heightened modality of Egyptian Islamic Arabism, where acute awareness of the Western orientalists' criticisms of Islam and the classical Arabs steeled the resolve to defend both. In youth he had been a Nadim-like disciple of al-Afghani and said that without al-Afghani's seminal anti-imperialism the post-World War I Wafd and its struggle could not have come about 62.

Kedourie atomized 'Abd al-Raziq's book and Zaghlul's failure to support him against King Fu'ad and the Azharite establishment in 1925 as both determined by party politics: even Hourani and Safran could only perceive that the Wafdist Zaghlul would not save a leading figure of the opposed Party of Liberal Constitutionalists 63. But the competition between Egyptian political forces can only be one explication of either 'Abd al-Raziq's critique in 1925 or the stances various Egyptian politicians adopted towards him or to the future of Islam's Caliphate. Rather, the

62. Sa'd once remarked that "I am not the creator of this Renaissance as some of your orators say. Rather, your renaissance stretches back to Muhammad 'Ali and 'Urabi: and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his followers and disciples had a great effect upon it". Abd al-Basit Muhammad Hasan, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani wa Atharuhu fil-'Alam al-Islami al-Hadith (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah 1982) p. 188.
63. Kedourie, "Egypt and the Caliphate", Chatham House Version pp. 190-193; Arabic Thought p. 216, where Hourani regards Zaghlul as having betrayed liberalism, his personal ideology, for party benefit; even Safran, Egypt in Search pp. 174 – 180, banalized Sa'd's support for the 'Ulama's action against 'Abd al-Raziq as a party political ploy to embarrass Liberal Constitutionalist members of the government and hopefully bring down the Ministry.
critique and the furore heightened and detonated the tensions and uncertainties about Arab ethnic identity and Islam that had built up among those Muslim Egyptian strata most pounded by gun-point deculturization under British colonial rule. Sa'd Zaghlul as Minister for Public Education from 1906 had struggled to check the Anglicizing linguistic assaults by British "advisors" upon Egyptians in the schools and gradually to restore literary Arabic in Egyptian life. A realistic observer, he saw in 1925 that the new generation of Westernizing-educated youth still had only a very uneven knowledge of standard literary Arabic and the past Islamic civilization it expressed. He feared that 'Abd al-Raziq's book might push to a final psychological break with the Islamic heritage "many young people still without a strong understanding in national knowledge, and whose Western culture makes them admirers of anything new" (al-jadid: a rallying cry of al-Siyasah in the 1920s). al-Siyasah was directing the educated youth to 'Abd al-Raziq's work, which assailed the very bases of Islam. The Wafd leadership scrupulously integrated Copts and Muslims: its silent endorsement when al-Azhar defrocked 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, then, stemmed in part from the broad cultural and ideological crisis that his critique articulated.

'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's scrappy work was short but in its brief compass presented diverse quotations from classical Arab poets, theologians, historians, not to say caliphs. Rashid Rida, 'Abd al-Raziq's fellow Eastern-Leaguer, in his al-Khilafah aw il-Imamat al-Uzma had argued that the Prophet's hadith and sunnah prescribed the Caliphate and described the Caliph as chosen in voluntary contract by "the people of binding and loosening". However, 'Abd al-Raziq mordantly drew attention to the historical "reality" that Caliphs in Islam had been imposed by "terrifying force" with the first three Caliphs the only possible exemptions. He tried to show from many examples

64. Sa'd's spontaneous private remarks to al-Jaziri, 'Imarah op. cit pp. 109-110.
65. Ibid p. 129. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's images of the career of Muhammad and the historical Caliphates are given more coherence...
that tyrannical rulers throughout Muslim history highlighted their supposed link with the Divine as Caliphs so that their Muslim subjects could never even question their autocratic political power. Most blatantly self-serving was the 'Abbasid Caliph Abu Ja'far al-Mansur's claim that he was God's Sultan in His earth and as such empowered to allocate or withhold funds without any accountability to the subjects. But 'Abd al-Razig over-homogenized the changing classical Arab Caliphates to stress that the Caliphs had always been associated with God in ways calculated to confer despotic authority, even in the Umayyad period. The praise of two Umayyad Caliphs by poets al-Farazdaq (d. c.728) and Turayh Ibn Isma'il al-Nafaqi that 'Abd al-Razig cited, that they were God-chosen superhumans who could stop or divert floods, would have been seen by most readers as enjoyable Arab poetical hyperbole, rather than as a theology that strengthened political autocracy.

'Ali 'Abd al-Razig's 1925 work had cultural, linguistic and community impacts upon acculturated youth at variance with the theses about Arab and Muslim history that it argued. He formally contended that classical Arab-Muslim political history was violent, blood-soaked and tyrannical, and that Egyptians had to move from it to a new type of polity built on a vague European constitutionalist parliamentarism. In the process of arguing this, however, 'Ali gave citations from ancient Arab political poetry: these linguistically equipped young acculturated Egyptians to explore classical Arabic literature on their own account --- a task for which their formal educations seldom

67. Ibid p. 118.
equipped them.

Perhaps hinting that Western parliamentary democracy was the only means to control despotism, 'Ali dismissed Islamic political and legal thought as a poor tradition that strengthened tyranny by giving it religious sanction. But the primary materials he cited established the diversity and political insights of classical Arab thought. In reality, his critique of the Caliphates was heavily derivative from Ibn Khaldun, whose incisive poise in analysing the political motives and behavior of classical individuals and groups compared favourably with 'Abd al-Raziq's virulence. Ibn Khaldun considered that the pure religion-implementing Caliphate lasted only to the death of 'Ali, and unsparringingly traced subsequent self-serving or corrupt behavior under Islam's emblem—

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the critical stance of many classical Arab historians.

Particularization of Muslim History?. 'Abd al-Raziq stressed that the fragmentation and multiplication of political centres in later 'Abbasid history did not entail any loss for the practice and rituals of the religion (Islam) in Baghdad or elsewhere. In 1925, then, he depicted Islam as a universalist religion but the private, ritual one of individuals that had never inspired any religio-political state. Some might have concluded that Muslim Egyptians therefore were wrong to revere Sunni Arab Caliphal states, based in Mecca, Damascus and Baghdad, as universalist Islamic states. 'Abd al-Raziq's argument made it easier for his countrymen to shift their consciousness of Muslim history to Egypt, the demand of Haykal around that time from al-Siyasah. Haykal exulted that after al-Ma'mun the Islamic Caliphate lost all temporal authority and became purely spiritual like the Papacy; after her governor Ahmad Ibn Tulun achieved autonomy from Baghdad, Egypt thenceforth was "a completely independent nation", "erecting towering edifices of civilization and knowledge that surpassed everything Baghdad knew". Haykal here

69. Ibid pp. 136-137.
broke with the pre-1918 Kamils' idealization of classical Arab wide Islamic states centred in West Asia, although in various ways he still blurred Egypt into a wider Muslim-Arab community. But 'Abd al-Raziq himself could achieve only a much more limited consciousness of Egypt: in speaking of autonomous Muslim rulers in Egypt, he nowhere in his work used the term al-Misriyyuna, Egyptians. He nowhere indicated that Egyptians had a clear sense of themselves as a distinct political community or nation in the Arab-Islamic period. He did not evoke Egypt in classical Arabo-Muslim history with particular solidity: the details he gave of Shi'ite and Khawarij dissidents who resisted the Caliphs in West Asia were more vivid. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq thus perpetuated the extra-Egyptian Arab-Islamic historical consciousness among the new generation of Egyptians.

Arab Ethnicity. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq in al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm minimized religion, Islam, as a motive in the development of the political state in Arabia under Muhammad and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. This ethnicized his account of the Arabic-speaking state and, then, wide empire. 'Abd al-Raziq stressed the drive of the Arabs to achieve a national unity, become "colonizers", as the motive that made them establish "the state of the Arabs" (dawlat al-'Arab) after Muhammad's death. Islam was less a motive than an emblem. The book's quotations from Ibn Khaldun highlighted the Arab dimension of the successive Caliphs, including the 'Abbasid Caliphate; the "partisan collective spirit of the Arabs" ('asabiyyat al-'Arab) was crucial for sustaining the Caliph's authority and when that 'asabiyyah died it enabled "the Kings of the non-Arabs" (muluk al-'ajam) to wield monarchical political power in virtually independent statelets, only giving the Caliphs

71. Haykal himself left no doubt that no nationalism of a modern type existed in Egypt in the classical Islamic period. However, Egypt was isolated from any neighbors by seas and deserts that could be traversed only by great difficulty, when Ibn Tulun established effective independence. Ibid pp. 18-19.
72. 'Imarah, al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm pp. 174-175.
73. Ibid pp. 116-117.
lip-service. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq provided Egyptians with materials that would influence them to perceive the classical Arabs' greatness as expressing their Arabness as much as their Islamic identity.

al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, then, even more than most writings by al-Siyasah intellectuals in the decade, had an arrestingly non-conventional but transitional and inconclusive quality: the materials it offered pointed in several directions in addition to its central argument.

'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq humanized and desacrilized the Arab past, yet it is open if his marginalization of religion as a determinant was clearing the way for Egyptianist or for pan-Arab nationalism. The dense detail of the writings of the classical Arabs had a grip on his psyche shown by his attempts to break free from the prescriptiveness of their history. Zaghlul's fears were unfounded: the great contribution of the book and all the publicity and arguments around it was to get many secular-educated youth started off on their own explorations of that past and of Islam. A few young acculturated Muslim Egyptians would have gone on to read the well-documented books about the Prophet Muhammad's career and the classical Arab Caliphs that his Islamic-educated opponents wrote in refutation.

In the other direction, al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm offered only the most romantic, sketchy remarks about the Western, particularly British, political thought that it vaguely envisaged as an alternative to the Arabo-Islamic tradition: it was not a deeply Westernizing work, although it tried to destroy much of Islam's thought and past.

The national debate over 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's book enabled such Westernizing-educated al-Siyasah intellectuals as Haykal to project their radical-modernist opposition to

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the traditional Muslim clergy and their theses. Yet, within the controversy process, both (a) the Islamic-educated intellectuals such as 'Abd al-Raziq in the core of al-Siyasah intellectuals and (b) traditionally-cultured intellectuals who argued against 'Abd al-Raziq, further educated (c) the solely Westernizing-educated al-Siyasah modernists in the detail of classical Arabo-Muslim history. The politically dangerous arguments about classical Arabs made such multi-lingual modernists as Haykal learn quickly as they hurriedly scanned sources. Islamic-educated colleagues such as 'Abd al-Raziq and Mahmud Shaltut and his faction of "enlightened 'ulama'" at al-Azhar, and more removed 'ulama' (such as the Azharite shaykh Muhammad Bakhit who shared the Liberals/Eastern League milieu) got a fair amount of data about the classical Arabs and Islam across to Haykal, 'Inan and other West-educated al-Siyasah intellectuals in the 1920s. In a 1926 refutation, al-Shaykh Bakhit denied 'Abd al-Raziq's claim that Islam had neither prescribed nor achieved a state: the al-Siyasah modernists with whom he rubbed shoulders, however, had helped pull Bakhit towards acceptance of West-developed parliamentary institutions as what Islam prescribed. Future research, though, should trace ways in which Islamic 'ulama' --- within the inner al-Siyasah clique, contiguous, or remote enemy polemicists --- subtly dyed, modified, Arabized, Islamized the al-Siyasah modernists over time. These controversies of the 1920s were an educational process that equipped modernists with knowledge for a quite different orientation after their still divided attitudes to that past further changed.

NEO-PHARAONISM

'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's negative book denying that Islam prescribed Caliphate or a universal Arabo-Muslim state did not coherently image either a Western or any indigenous counter-order. In contrast, themes that a Pharaonic golden age enduringly defined all subsequent Egyptians, articulated by more imaginative al-Siyasah intellectuals in
the 1920s, did try to offer a considered and systematic, "indigenous", alternative to traditionalist Islam and the classical pan-Arab past. Elaborated earlier, neo-Pharaonism influenced and clarified --- sometimes just by inspiring detailed Arabist counter-arguments --- many themes in the Egyptian Arabism gradually articulated in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Long after any serious neo-Pharaonist lobby remained in Egypt, the Arabists cultivated an energizing memory of Pharaonist themes. In the 1920s, neo-Pharaonism certainly tested the strength of Arab identity elements among those Muslim intellectuals whom the West had most changed. Given the bulk of neo-Pharaonist communications in the 1920s, our detailed data had to be transferred out of this chapter to Appendices 1 and 2. The first appendix sets out the development of Pharaonic motifs by intellectuals around the Liberal Constitutionalists' mouthpiece al-siyasah and assesses how coherent a counter-ideology and high-culture these became to Arabo-Islamic identity. Appendix 2 details the dysfunctional Arab identity elements and elements from the classical Arabs perpetuated within Pharaonism itself, and its functions for disengagement from the West. This Chapter can only survey some trends in post-1922 neo-Pharaonism that challenged, stimulated or prefigured the Islam-tinged Egyptian pan-Arabism that was to mature in the 1930s and 1940s --- keeping the documentation and illustrative matter in the appendices.

During the 1920s, neo-Pharaonism was a widely-accepted, establishment identification: the monarchy, the populist Wafd politicians, intellectuals and politicians linked to the Tory-elitist Liberal Constitutionalists Party, and even long-standing pan-Islamic and Islamic-educated writers, all celebrated the Pharaonic past. A good number of Western and Arab scholars have agreed that Muhammad Husayn Haykal was the seminal ideologue who in the 1920s articulated a range of neo-Pharaonist themes that Young Egypt leader Ahmad Husayn was still extending in the 1930s after Haykal lost interest. Western and Arab analysts have also tended to
see the neo-Pharaonism of Haykal and other al-Siyasah intellectuals as a "weapon" by which they tried to marginalize or cut out Islam and its traditionalist 'ulama' from the core Egyptian self, patterned by the much more ancient formative pagan golden age: that cleared the way for sweeping Westernization. Certainly, neo-Pharaonism in general repeatedly stressed that Pharaonic Egypt started the evolution of Western political institutions, science and industry that Arab Egyptians could now reborrow. The Pharaonist self-identification is also assessed to have weakened empathy and support among Egyptians in the 1920s for other colonized Arabs, including the Palestinians during their clash with the Zionists and British in 1929.

At their most intense, the Pharaonist intellectuals strove to transfer to the territorial homeland or collective human nation the emotions of self-sacrifice and the hope of meaning or immortality traditionally directed to God. Haykal perhaps showed more taste in drawing motifs from genuine Pharaonic religious texts in order to sanctify the homeland of Egypt, symbolized by the Nile, within the new political particularism --- whereas the attempt of Tawfiq al-Hakim to graft Pharaonic divine monarchy onto the decolonization leadership of Sa'd Zaghlul was forced and artificial. Such writers tried to propagate and politicize elements of a past that were unknown or thin in the consciousness of the educated. They strove to weave Pharaonic motifs into the familiar texture of modern rural Egyptian life: this Pharaonist populism, though, was predoomed for Haykal by an irreducible Arab-Islamic core in his culture and by his class distance from illiterate peasants that, together, made him abhor the polytheist or un-salafi and colloquial particularities his Egyptianism obliged him to embrace. al-Siyasah intellectuals in the 1920s linked Egypt's Copts and Muslims, together, to a continuous Pharaonic popular psychology and way of life separate from those of other Arabs and Muslims. al-Siyasah intellectuals showed semi-deculturized ignorance of Islam when they used Pharaonism to downgrade it but could not decisively snap their sense of membership in Islam. Their
repudiation of Pharaonism at the end of the 1920s was amid overt sectarian conflict with the competitively modernizing Coptic elite, straining post-1922 joint particularist political community of Muslims and Copts.

Many of the religious and social patterns of ancient Pharaonic Egypt ran dead against those of Islam and by de-indigenizing it did open the way for Westernization. *al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah* (1926) applied Pharaonic Egypt's acceptance of public female semi-nakedness and the wide roles its women won in public life to denounce Islam for having segregated women within the home, and to demand free mixing and public political roles and perhaps jobs for women in post-1922 Egypt. Such negative views of the impact of Islam in Egyptian history were spasmodic but denied definitiveness to the advent of the classical Arabs, ruling out that Egyptians had a pan-Arab nationality. Few analysts, however, have registered the extent to which the neo-Pharaonism of the 1920s, far from assailing Islam or Arab elements, really replied to British and other European power, contempt and violence. From the outset, neo-Pharaonist evocations of ancient Egypt could (a) connect it to ancient Greece and Rome, foundation of the West or (b) exalt Pharaonic Egypt as separate and superior. Muhammad Husayn Haykal's neo-Pharaonism had this stacatto duality but, overall, vented hostility towards the West more. Mediterraneanist Westernizers such as Taha Husayn in the 1920s and 1930s motivated Egyptians to Westernize by depicting Pharaonic Egypt as the "first cradle" of art, democracy, rational thought, "civilization", assimilative Greece as its second cradle and the West's modernity as the culminating development from Pharaonic breakthroughs --- now flowing back home to Egypt. Haykal was both (a) attracted to Graeco-Roman antiquity and the West's arts and high literatures, and (b) aware that imperialists cited them as justification to conquer and rule the Easterners in a "civilizing mission". As early as 1923, he therefore seized on the art treasures of Tutankhamun's tomb to counter-shrink in culture the status of contemptuous Western imperialists: ancient Egypt
was the "peak" of civilization, not its cradle, and the West's Greek, medieval and proto-modern arts insignificant before those of the Pharaohs. During the decade, Haykal increasingly structured his neo-Pharaonism to disparage not just the West's arts and literatures but its "materialist" broad-guage secularist-positivist ideologies as well: such West-rebuking proto-religious rhetoric within Pharaonism already in the 1920s set some al-Siyasah intellectuals moving towards their further Arabo-Islamic --- but still incomplete, still acculturated and spasmodically liberal --- disengagement from the West in the 1930s. Both Haykal's distilled hatred of the violent, hierarchical Westerners and his checking class and cultural-ideological affinities with them lasted throughout his Pharaonic and then his Arabo-Islamic orientations, if with the mixes constantly changing. Overall, the duality and tensions in Haykal's unstable Pharaonism in the 1920s ushered in his Islamoid and pan-Arab distancing stances to Western culture and Westerners in the 1930s and 1940s. Into the 1930s, the playwright Tawfiq al-Hakim applied Pharaonism as Haykal had, to both deny that the eternally nomadism-warped, unoriginal, materialistic classical Arabs defined Egyptian identity and to dismiss the likewise "materialistic" West's rational thought and aesthetic culture as alien to "spiritual" Egypt. Pagan antiquity was often cited to foster a casual attitude to ancient and modern Western culture: this was so materialistic as to be barely worth the trouble to understand, or too different to graft creatively onto indigenous Pharaonic (later Arab or Islamic) culture. Yet such Pharaonist or Arabist distancing of the West was often not much more than psychological compensation for further covert --- but sectionalized --- borrowings from the West.

Pharaonic art works and architecture had real appeal for al-Siyasah and other Muslim Egyptian intellectuals in the 1920s and early 1930s, with motifs being incorporated into a new creative Egyptian nationalist art. The intellectuals, however, became increasingly aware that they were progressing with painful slowness, if at all, from
visual impressions of ancient Egyptian life to understanding its alien non-Muslim ethos --- if that could be reconstructed after the lapse of millennia.

Religion was a central aspect of the Pharaonic past that Haykal and other neo-Pharaonists had to represent, yet the obsession with Islam at all points pervaded the paganism they evoked. Their most radical blasphemies bore witness to the grip Islam kept on their psyches, and their acculturated duality and swings were as marked within neo-pagan particularism as in all their enterprises. In their radical mode, al-Siyasah neo-Pharaonists in the 1920s challenged the reality of the Qur'an's narrations of past events in the region: the casting of Moses into the Nile and his being picked out by Pharaoh never happened, Haykal imagined --- it was a rehash of the Pharaonic myth of Osiris, Seth and Isis. (Taha Husayn in 1926 similarly questioned if Abraham and Ishmael ever came to Arabia to build the Ka'bah as the Qur'an stated). In Haykal's neo-Pharaonism of the 1920s, the Pharaonic Egyptian nation could assume functions ascribed to God in Islam: that nation, not God, originated the Pharaonic archetypes of religious myths later mutated in the subsequent Semitic religions of Judaism-Christianity-Islam that crystallized within Egypt's radius. Such more radical denial within neo-Pharaonism of Christianity's and Islam's claims sidestepped discontinuity in Egyptian history: Islam and the classical Arabs did not transform Egyptians or snap their discrete nationhood because it was only a variant of Pharaonic beliefs that flowed back. The threads of unbelief in Islam in Pharaonism helped alienate a few al-Siyasah intellectuals in 1929 from Islamic solidarity with the Palestinians in Egypt --- yet, even with them, only in spasms for a time. Within a widely accepted collective nationalist ideology, though, the abortive unbelief could have set the Muslim-Egyptian bourgeoisie free to Westernize Egypt wholesale.

That the tenets of much Pharaonic religion clashed with Islam created openings for Westernization: but the strangeness also made conjunction with it strenuous and
half-hearted. Plural Pharaonic gods, animal or humanoid, remained unacceptable in the deeper psyches of al-Siyasah intellectuals and their well-off Muslim elite. Haykal attempted a minimalized aesthetic identification with the old institutionalized paganism instanced in the Apis god-calf cult: more than core Pharaonic texts, he here drew upon warped images of Egyptian beliefs in Greek and Roman works mined by turn-of-century French and British aesthetes. Haykal evoked the old polytheism as a patch of vivid color in the nation's remote golden age, but motifs from Pharaonic mythology injected into the new Arabic "national literature" were short-lived --- little in pre-existing Arabic literature gave them resonance or intelligibility.

Arabo-Islamic Survivals. The image of Pharaonic Egypt as despotic and socially oppressive or exploitative was a synthesis of the Qur'an's critique of Pharaonic "divine" monarchy and some themes of Western Egyptology. The classicist pan-Islamic poet Shawqi in the 1920s celebrated contributions by Pharaonic Egypt to monotheistic ideas and to Greek civilization: however, he dichotomized Pharaonic monarchical despotism with the constitutional parliamentarism of post-1922 Islamic Egypt. The sense that ancient Pharaonic monarchy was oppressive had been deep-seated in Haykal in his youth; denied in the 1920s, it resurged among acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals in the 1930s (e.g. Taha Husayn, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini) as they repudiated the neo-Pharaonic identification. The acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals tried to evoke Pharaonic Egypt as a separate origin to distinguish Egyptians more from other Arabs: yet Arabo-Islamic conditioning, started with folklore and popular epics in childhood, often made them project origins for linguistic Arabness, Islam-like monotheism, and the community of the populations that spoke Arabic in the twentieth century, back into that same Pharaonic antiquity. The sense of many intellectual leaders that ancient Egyptians were Semitoid in language or race instances how their blended sensibility selected those
West-supplied data that would extend key assumptions in Egypt's Arab-Islamic ethos. Haykal in 1925 argued that Islam and the classical Arabs finalized a unity between Egypt and the other Arabic-speaking lands that had been evolving for millennia: it was the opposite of the secularized Copt Salamah Musa's anger that Islam and the Arabs shattered the continuity of Egypt's indigenous identity. al-Siyasah (and other) neo-Pharaonism of the 1920s --- at the very same time that it denounced the bonds of Arabism and Islam --- pervasively transmitted to a new almost deracinated Muslim Egyptian generation many linguisto-aesthetic elements and motifs of the earliest classical Arabs: it painted and explained ancient Egypt from the palette of pre-Islamic Arabia and 'Abbasid' Iraq. This innate Arabism of the neo-Pharaonists perpetuated the vulnerable classicist culture that worked to standardize the sensibility of Egyptians with those of other Arabs.

The Copts and the Liberals

The Copts were a very large Christian minority in Egypt that had to be considered by Muslim writers as they formulated their community identifications. Only intense community emotions or strong self-interest could motivate Muslim intellectuals to articulate themes of identity that would divide Copts from Muslims --- especially since al-Siyasah intellectuals were well aware of the eagerness of the British to establish themselves as the protector of minorities to get leverage.

A duality of alternating attitudes --- Pharaonic-Arabist, secularist-Islamist ---, a sort of transitional self-division, is a striking feature of al-Siyasah communications in the 1920s. Pharaonist arguments by Haykal and his colleagues that peasant Islam was only a shell over the immemorial Pharaonic personality (like Coptic Christianity) pointed to the unitary Egyptian political community of Copts and Muslims together, integrating after 1922. However, Haykal's language casually revealed his assumption that the main readership of al-Siyasah and al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah, however
modernist, was Muslim and that he himself belonged to that inner community: rural Islam was only a patina over Pharaonic practices and "who knows if our Coptic brothers do not have as much, or more, of [the Pharaonic religious survivals] that we have?"\(^75\). When Sa'd Zaghlul died in 1927, having become the symbol of the Egyptian nation, al-Siyasah opposed building his tomb in the midst of a mosque, instead toying with some Pharaonic style\(^76\). But three years later, after the Wafd came to power, Haykal and al-Siyasah repeatedly condemned it for planning to build the mausoleum after a "pagan" neo-Pharaonic design. The racially more Pharaonic Copts had claimed a special place in Pharaonism; Haykal condemned the excessive number of Copts in the 1930 Wafd cabinet, charging that Coptic Wafdist originated the idea of a Pharaonic tomb for Sa'd, in violation of Islam's religious law\(^77\). C.D. Smith explained away Haykal's stand against any Pharaonic design as tactical and determined by the opposition Liberals' need within Egyptian party politics to discredit the ascendant Wafd. "That Haykal had advocated Pharaonism as a new basis for an Egyptian cultural ethic in opposition to Islam throughout the 1920s" showed "the political inspiration and cynicism" of his Islamist denunciation of the Mausoleum in 1930, Smith argued\(^78\). Smith dichotomized Islam and neo-Pharaonism, but Haykal in the 1920s could, for instance, patronize the "somber austerities" and renunciatory withdrawal to desert cells of Coptic Christianity as a denial of the "opulence" of the Nile Valley: the instant the Egyptians heard from Islam's missionaries that they could both enjoy the world and approach God, simultaneously, they welcomed and "lodged" the invading Arabs and embraced the religion they bore in great multitudes (afwajan). This stance reflected the

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76. Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 p. 173.
Qur'an's style and concepts. Already for the younger Haykal, Pharaonic Egypt could be fulfilled in Islam; he now applied incurious, unsympathetic stereotypes to the Christianity of his Coptic compatriots although not blasting either at that stage. The literature has somewhat registered the rapid on-off alternation of sharply dissonant radical secularist and Islamic-sectarian stands by al-Siyasah in the 1920s. Jankowski (1980) highlighted a 1 September 1929 al-Siyasah editorial that denounced Palestino-Syrian propagandists in Egypt and their "sectarian" Egyptian supporters for making Egyptian Jews, a hard-working element in the Egyptian nation, insecure over Palestinian-Zionist clashes. However, Jankowski also noted that a couple of weeks later the Liberal al-Siyasah denounced the Wafd as controlled by "fanatic" Christian Copts: in a long-term conspiracy to subjugate the Muslim Egyptian nation, the fanatical Copts had gradually taken over the Wafd, and when that party ruled awarded the choice civil service jobs disproportionately to coreligionists. (Jankowski did not register secular-sectarian alternation within the diverse, see-sawing al-Siyasah responses to the 1929 bloodshed in Palestine).

al-Siyasah's 17 September editorial against the Copts, ascribed by Smith to Haykal, argued that European societies required their leaders to be of the religious majority: for instance, Disraeli, a Jew, could become Prime Minister of England only after he converted to Anglicanism. This

79. Haykal, Tarajim p. 18. Haykal's heterogeneous Arabic style reflected his acculturated ideological duality: here, again, it blended revivalist Qur'anic imagery into a non-traditional West-patterned prose: afwajan (multitudes) derives from Qur'an 110:2 referring to the conversions to Islam all over Arabia in the last months of the Prophet Muhammad's life. Haykal's disdain for Christian renunciation accorded with the Qur'an's statement (7:32-33) that believers shall have in this world adornment and good provisions (but not the indecencies) of which unbelievers also partake: on the Day of Resurrection those good things shall be exclusively the believers'.


validated not allowing Egyptian Copts many higher posts in independent Egypt's cabinets and civil service. The author (Haykal?) specified "intellectuals", both Muslim and Coptic, as one audience category most liable to accept this argument.

Smith's residual Eurocentric frame could not register that, more than latter-day Muslim traditionalism, the West's own politico-social patterns influenced acculturated Egyptians --- much more than other groups --- to install communalism in the new particularist polity. For Smith, citation of the communalist example that the anti-Semitic British set was but an inappropriate Western quirk of language of the elitist Haykal as he cynically played on "mass" "religious passions" --- the Liberal Constitutionalists' new tactic to draw Muslim popular support from the Wafd and shake off their own radical secularist reputation. Haykal "thought he was appealing to mass emotions while using a form of discourse completely incomprehensible to them"82. In reality, acculturated pan-Muslim anti-imperialists in particular, with some Islamic-cultured ones also, had long been familiarizing the full range of literate Muslim Egyptians with European anti-Semitism83. The example and actions of even internally less violent European states such as laic France or Britain could only sap the impulses that secular-educated Muslim Egyptians had after World War I to tighten Egyptianist political community with non-Muslim compatriots competing with them for jobs. Butrus Ghali was a Coptic Prime Minister assassinated in 1910 by the

82. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 84.
Kamilist al-Wardani for collaborating with British efforts to extend the Suez Canal concession and for signing the Sudan over to Britain under a condominium. In a scrupulously fair al-Siyasah study on Ghali, Haykal deplored the communalism of both Coptic and Muslim journalists in that period — but parallel antagonism between Christians and Jews was commonplace "in the most civilized of nations". B.L. Carter (1985), somewhat like C. D. Smith, saw the al-Siyasah publicists' anti-Coptism as an insincere tactic to draw Muslim votes away from their much more popular Wafdist rivals. Carter showed, though, that as early as 1923 a Liberal mouthpiece al-Kashkul repeatedly implied that the Chamber election was a struggle between Copts and Muslims, Wafdists and Liberals; this makes less tenable Smith's portrait of Haykal as an unreserved believer in Pharaonism and non-plural Egyptian nationality who in 1930 suddenly feigned anti-Pharaonist and anti-Coptic postures he abhorred out of political desperation. Carter's data shows the lengths to which Haykal and the Liberals systematically carried their anti-Coptism: changing society, the Liberal government of 1928-1929 set up a tax collectors' school that trained Muslims to enter a sector that before, like accountancy, had been a Coptic preserve. Overall, Haykal and the Liberal Constitutionalists' vanguard Copt-baiting from the late 1920s so set back the integration of Egyptians, and was accompanied by such verbally violent repudiation of Pharaonic civilization, as to rule out that he discreetly pursued the same secularist-Egyptianist enterprises as before. Haykal's "retention of his idealism" as an Arabo-Islamist in the 1930s and 1940s was amid real, not feigned, shifts and growth of Islam-focussed attitudes that he and his strata had always had, contracting or excising other facets. The Liberals' exaggerated later hyper-communalism sought political opportunities, yet was

86. Ibid p. 263.
88. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 156.
built up on the flatter if firm sense his Muslim elite had had for decades of a limited conflict with its Coptic competitor. The technologically innovative Coptic landlords and the upward-pushing Arab-Egyptian landowning class that produced such Liberal Constitutionalist leaders as Muhammad Mahmud and Haykal, had been rival groups since the late nineteenth century: moreover, al-Siyasah articulated the interests of wider burgeoning secular-educated Muslim strata blocked by the disproportionately established Coptic professionals. During the 1923 election campaign, the Liberal press connected its communally-phrased attacks on the Wafd to earlier communal tension under British colonial rule: it reminded voters of the names of those Coptic Wafd candidates who had attended the 1911 Coptic Congress, which made communal demands against Muslims. In the 1920s, Haykal recalled to al-Siyasah's readers how Mahmud Sulayman, President from 1907 of the Ummah Party and father of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party's future President Muhammad Mahmud, took part in the moderate Muslims' counter-conference at Heliopolis: the landlord Sulayman "refuted the assertions of the Copts and showed that they had a ratio of high civil service posts much greater than their proportion of the population": they now had to rejoin "the unity of the nation". During the 1911 tension, Haykal's mentor Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, the editor of al-Jaridah, described Arabness of race as further distinguishing Egypt's Muslims from its racially more Pharaonic Copts, although both made up one Egyptian nation. From formative British colonial rule, then, Haykal and his modern Muslim elite had had mixed feelings towards elite modernized Copts: affinity and contact motivated a drive for integrated joint nationality that was

90. Haykal, Tarajim p. 201.
to peak in neo-Pharaonism, but they would thenceforth also work to expand opportunities for educated Muslims in the civil service --- where the Copts had too many jobs.

Smith and Carter rightly credit the Liberal Constitutionalists' earlier Pharaonist themes and drive to control Muslim traditionalism and its officials. As clear, though, are the real elements of a core of Muslim identity that last in these intellectuals and into which political interests --- those of their party or the broad and long-term class-needs of their modernizing Muslim constituency --- could interlock. Seeming abrupt switches by Haykal or other Ummah/Jaridist or Liberal/al-Siyasah intellectuals from territorialist or secular stances therefore have to be seen in terms of conjunctions of multiple factors. Resistance and pressures from wider non-acculturated Muslim strata, including "masses", were another factor in switches. Yet new Islamist postures towards non-Muslims or history or community within politics by Haykal and other Liberal publicists blended cultural qualities and needs peculiar to their educated modernist Muslim strata.

Appendix 2 sets out increased awareness among Egyptian writers by the early 1930s that neo-Pharaonism was proving sterile in creative literature, and that Egypt's new role as leader of pan-Arabism now ruled out non-Arab Pharaonoid architecture. These factors wove into the acculturated Muslims' chipped-down Muslim identity, their class-economic conflict with the Coptic counter-elite, the West's intolerant model and the competition for votes to produce al-Siyasah's Islamic denunciation of the tomb, and the joint Coptic-Muslim territorialist community of which it was an emblem.

THE DRAWING-TOGETHER OF EGYPTIANS AND OTHER ARABS IN THE 1920s

In the 1920s, an unprecedented number of secular-educated Egyptians had first-hand contact with other Arab countries and other Arabs. The improving rail and road links between Egypt and Lebanon and the low costs
while in Lebanon enabled not just a few propertied Muslim Egyptians but less affluent, wider strata of the Muslim Egyptian middle class to holiday there away from Egypt's stifling summers.

When they holidayed in Lebanon and to a lesser degree Palestine in the 1920s, Egyptians often encountered Arabic speakers who were Christian. Secular-educated Muslim Egyptians, whether government officials, private professionals, businessmen, landowners or intellectuals, felt at ease in Lebanon because it was the most West-tinctured point in Arab West Asia — more so than predominantly Sunni Muslim Syria. The cluster of modern educational institutions developed by French and Anglo-Saxon missionaries since the nineteenth century had built up a Lebanese bilingualized or multi-lingual elite that was disproportionately Christian but shared the modern interests and acculturation of the Muslim Egyptian intellectuals. Four graduates of the (Protestant) American University of Bayrut at a banquet for visiting Egyptian surgeon 'Ali Ibrahim (1880–1947) in 1924 hailed him as the sort of figure that "the renascent East" required in its new age. As a Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in Cairo

By 1922 residents of Egypt travelling by rail across Sinai and Palestine reached Bayrut within 24 hours: from there, buses and cars took them to Lebanese summer resorts in the cool mountains. "al-Amn wal-Istiyyaf" (Security and Summer-Vacationing), al-Bashir 8 July 1922, p. 2. These summer trips of residents of Egypt to Lebanon were organized through a regular company, Sharikat Masayif Lubnan, the Lebanon Summer Holiday Resorts Company. Ibid. Another al-Bashir article quoted an Egyptian who enjoyed a holiday in al-Shuwayr, a jabal Lebanon village mainly inhabited by Orthodox Christians. al-Bashir observed that "the Egyptian" prefers Lebanon to other (non-Arab) vacation places (in Europe?) because the language and customs are similar to Egypt's. "al-Masayif al-Lubnaniyyah" (The Lebanese Summer Vacation Places), al-Bashir 22 June 1922, p. 1. An anonymous Egyptian vacationer in 1924 paid tribute to the Maronite Catholic town of Dayr al-Qamar, mountain Lebanon, as a scenic summer-holiday place that suited "those with light pockets". "Dayr al-Qamar — Tabaq al-Ism al-Musamma" (Dayr al-Qamar — a Town that Merits its Name) al-Mugattam 26 July 1924.

93. "Mutakharriju-Jami'at al-Amiriyyah Di-Bayrut Yukarrimuna Tabiban Misriyyan Shahiran" (American University of Bayrut Graduates Honor Famous Egyptian Doctor) al-Mugattam 25 June 1924, p. 4. Dr. 'Ali Ibrahim (1880–1947) was born in Alexandria. He was thus nearly 44, an established professional, when he came to Bayrut in 1924. Biodata supplied by Dr. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr.
University, President of the Egyptian Medical Association and as a Minister of Health (1940), Dr Ibrahim in the 1930s and 1940s was to promote the integration of the Arab countries, like many modern Egyptian specialists (Ch. 9).

In the 1920s, then, tens of thousands of acculturated Egyptian professionals came as tourists to various lands in Arab West Asia, but especially to half-Christian Lebanon and partly-Christian Palestine. Chapter 8 will show that modernist Muslim Egyptian contributors to al-Siyasah and al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah in the 1920s repeatedly discussed tightening "social relations" between "Eastern nations" or "the Arab peoples". In truth, these were no more the special experience of a few Egyptian intellectuals but one common in the wide secular-educated Muslim Egyptian constituency they addressed. Direct experience of other Arab countries through tourism in the 1920s helped to enduringly pan-Arabize the thinking of Muslim Egyptian professionals from a range of specialized strata, not full-time writers only.

We shall see that some Muslim Egyptian writers of al-Siyasah and al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah who visited Lebanon and Palestine in the 1920s and interacted with local Christians in West-originated Christian structures such as YMCA's, designed the pan-Arabism they were formulating so that it would integrate Arab Christians. But Dr 'Ali Ibrahim by 1931 wanted Egypt to carry forward West-patterned modernization and lead the Arab world "within the framework of Islamic civilization". Despite their contact with Westerners and Western sciences and concepts, Egyptian modern professionals or specialists maintained Islamic reflexes that could filter out the

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94. Poll of Egyptian intellectuals, "Hadaratuna l-Qadimah — Fir'awniyah Am 'Arabiyyah Am Gharbiyyah?" (Our Coming Civilization — Pharaonic, Arab or Western?), al-Hilal 1 April 1931; cf. "Ra'yan fi Wahdat al-'Arabiyyah — 'Ali Basha Ibrahim wa 'Abd al-Rahman bik al-Rafi'i" (Two Views on Arab Unity — 'Ali Ibrahim Pasha and [the Patriotic Party's Secretary] 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i), al-Muqattam 13 May 1938, p. 7. By the 1931 al-Hilal survey, 'Ali Ibrahim had become Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo University; at the 1938 al-Muqattam interview he was President of the Egyptian Medical Association.
non-Muslim components in the Arab populations that they encountered. Chapter 8 will show that ingrained Islamic assumptions activated by Palestinian-Zionist violence abruptly obscured secular and non-Muslim aspects of Palestinian reality even for ultra-modernist, iconclastic al-Siyasah intellectuals who knew different types and sects of Palestinians.

Christian Syrian-Egyptian intellectuals too, maintaining dual ethnicity in the 1920s, regularly took summer holidays in Lebanon (and Syria and Palestine to lesser extents), even when they had been born in Egypt and grown up there. Such visiting Syrian-Egyptian writers as al-Hilal's editor Amil Zaydan returned to Egypt with their own fresh images of Lebanon-Syria which they then diffused among Egyptians through their publications or from within early proto-pan-Arab Egyptian organizations: Amil was active in Ahmad Zaki Pasha's Eastern League (al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah) in the 1920s.

New communications media from the West soon vividly conveyed other Arab countries' specificities to the masses of Muslim Egyptians who never left Egypt. 'Azizah Amir, the first person to produce a fictional film in Egypt, in 1928 went to Lebanon to shoot Mount Lebanon's breathtaking scenery for a new fictional film that was "to show the national customs of the Lebanese".

The regional economic activity of a new Egyptian capitalism also helped bring Egyptians and other Arabs closer together in the 1920s. In the 1920s, Egypt's first Arab-Muslim entrepreneurial-cum-capitalist class of a modern type was born. The acculturated Tala'at Harb (1867-13 August 1941) founded Bank Misr in 1920 which

96. "Lubnan fil-Sinama" (Lebanon in the Cinema) al-Mugattam 11 September 1928. The film was a true pan-Arab venture: 'Azizah had commissioned some Lebanese litterateurs to produce a script. 'Azizah Amir and her husband Ahmad al-Shari'i had founded the "Film Isis" company — a name that conformed neo-Pharaonic particularism. Ibid.
97. Biodata al-Mawsu'at al-Muyassarah (Cairo: Franklin/Dar al-Sha'b
then built affiliated enterprises in internal Egyptian and wide Middle East transport, and in textiles, fisheries, insurance, oil, mining, cinemas, print etc. Pointing forward to the coming linguistic — as distinct from Egypt-framed — nationalism, Harb from the outset made extended classical Arabic the medium of accountancy, correspondence etc in his enterprises. He strove to make all the Arabic-speaking countries — not just the discrete territorial unit Egypt — the sphere of his new capitalism's activity. Bank Misr in the 1920s and 1930s bought steamers to carry Egyptian pilgrims to the Hijaz, and established Air Misr between Cairo, Khartum, Damascus and Baghdad. The affiliate Banque Misr-Syrie-Liban, which opened in January 1930, pursued commercial business more than financing industries in the French-mandated territories; Syrians and Lebanese owned half of its share-capital. Economic collaborations with the multi-sectarian Lebanese and Syrians might dilute Islamic tints in the Egyptian entrepreneurs' community identifications. Working in the other direction, by enabling more and more Egyptians to make the Islamic pilgrimage to the Hijaz cheaply and comfortably, Egyptian capitalism fostered an Islamic revival among Egypt's modern classes that had major effects in the 1930s and 1940s.

Harb brought together in a new potent synthesis: (a) Kamilism, the pre-1914 pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism; (b) Islamic neo-restorationism symbolized in the veil; (c) the pragmatic, utilitarian nationalism of the Ummah/al-Jaridah

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98. A list of affiliates founded throughout the 1920s and 1930s is given by al-Sayyid-Marsot, Liberal Experiment, p. 33.


and Liberals-al-Siyasah; (d) new nationalist capitalist economics; (e) Eastern Leaguism; and (f) Arab classicist high culturism focussed on pre-Islamic Arabians, early Islamic states and Umayyad and 'Abbasid West Asia. Harb already had close ties with Mustafa Kamal while just a law student at the Khedivial Law School in the 1890s. From the 1919 uprising he had been linked to the Wafd but from 1922 tended to take the side of the incrementalist Liberal Constitutionalists, arguing that economic independence might precede full political independence; Zaghlul became cool towards him. The Liberal-linked al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah publicized in 1927 not just Harb's textile company but his conservative Islamic views on women's roles --- a measure of the extent of the Westoid-modernist and traditional-religious swings of which that publication and the Liberals were capable. Ahmad Shafiq Pasha and his Liberals-linked Eastern Leaguers from 1923 mustered all the contacts and publicity they commanded in Arab West Asia to expand Bank Misr throughout the Middle East, including in Palestine.

Some post-1922 Egyptian Arabism aggrandized Egypt as more advanced than the other Arabs it aided. The relations that Harb and other Egyptians in his bank built up with the Lebanese and Syrians (he thought in terms of one ongoing greater Syria unit) were equal: they helped Egypt modernize as well. In the late 1920s and early 1930s he brought Muslim Syrian families from Damascus and Aleppo to help establish in Egypt specialized upholstery and textile production that could compete against foreign merchandise; some of the Syrians he imported had rare Western technical

102. Davis, ibid pp. 99, 121.
103. Ibid p. 100.
104. Ibid pp. 171-173. For an appeal by Ahmad Shafiq to the Palestinians to support Bank Misr's drive to set up a branch in their country see "Khutbatu Ahmad Shafiq Pasha fi Haflat Iftitah al-Masjid al-Aqsa" (The Speech of Ahmad Shafiq Pasha at the Ceremony of the Reopening of the al-Aqsa Mosque), al-Mugattam 11 September 1928 p.3.
105. Thomas Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt 1725-1975 (Beirut/Weisbaden: Frank Steiner 1979) pp. 140-141. The Shurbaji, Qabbani, Mardini, Halbuni, Abu 'Awf and Kasm families had been explicitly encouraged by Bank Misr and Tala'at Harb to come to Egypt with the purpose of setting up a local competition to ...
degrees. The Lebanese-Syrians also had much to teach Egyptians in the joint modernization of Arabic. In the 1920s, Harb built the restoration of the classical Arabs' Qur'an-prescribed standard Arabic into his new Arab-Egyptian capitalism. In a mid-1925 address in Damascus, he vented all the acculturated "torment" (madad) that he and other Egyptians had felt before 1919 when foreigners imposed Western languages as the medium for instruction for "modern" (i.e. West-derived) knowledge, denying Arabic's capacity to convey it. This deculturization motivated features of the Arab capitalism Harb now constructed. He told his Syrian listeners that both the restricted post-World War I Egyptian governments in restoring Arabic as the medium in primary and secondary schools, and his companies' using it as the medium for their accounts and correspondence, had achieved an essential step to national independence. Another, though, had been achieved only by the Syrians to date: addressing Syrian merchants at Damascus' Arabic Language Academy, Harb hailed the use of Arabic as the medium of instruction in faculties of medicine and West-derived secular law in Syria. He over-optimistically projected that the Egyptian government would soon follow this Syrian example and make Arabic the medium of instruction for modern scientific and technical subjects in all Egyptian tertiary institutions. Overall, Tala'at Harb and his colleagues had a collaborative, rather than superior, attitude to non-Egyptian Arabs.

Harb meant his indigenous capitalist venture to achieve the blended material-cultural well-being and sovereignty of an "Egyptian people", and of other, foreign goods and companies for which Egyptians did not have the capacity on their own. Harb wanted the immigrant Syrians in particular to produce hosiery and underwear and also materials for furniture upholstery. Ibid.

106. Excerpts from Tala'at Harb's speech at a banquet given for him by the merchants of Damascus in Hijazi, 'Urubat Misr pp. 217-218.
107. Ibid p. 217. The Syrian University in Damascus was opened in 1923 "with the object of providing higher education in Arabic". Hourani, Syria and Lebanon pp. 174-175. It pioneered for the whole Arab world the use of Arabic as a medium of teaching such modern non-humanities subjects as Western medicine.
interlocking but still discrete, Arab peoples. In the 1920s he more and more saw the restoration of the classical Arabs' language within West-patterned modern processes and specializations as the joint enterprise of the different Arab populations.

Orating in Bayrut in mid-1925, Harb depicted modern economic endeavours as the means by which Arabic-speakers could achieve their "national aspirations" (amal qawmiyyah) --- a joint "economic independence" of still distinct Arab peoples. He stressed the importance of stepping up "trade between us". Clearly, Harb hoped to develop markets in Arab West Asia, to prepare the way for Egyptian enterprises to import more raw materials from there and to win investments for Egyptian capital in the Fertile Crescent's developing economies.

In the Fertile Crescent, Harb already voiced in 1925 motifs about the Middle East's post-1800 history that were to become central in the semi-establishment Egyptian Arabism of the 1930s and 1940s. He depicted the nearly ten-years Egyptian occupation of Lebanon and Syria (1832-1840) as an equal alliance between Egypt's modernizing dictator Muhammad 'Ali and Lebanon's ruler Bashir Shihab II: it enabled Lebanese-Syrians and Egyptians generally to collaborate to mutual benefit. Harb lamented that the European powers in 1840 "cut" this political unity between the "two sister regions/lands (gutrayni shaqiqayn)" Egypt and (wide geographical) Syria.

108. Excerpts from Harb's speech at a banquet in Bayrut in July 1924, Hijazi, 'Urubat Misr pp. 216-217. Coury discusses this speech, "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?" --- 2, p. 460. A scanning by us of the Bayrut Catholic al-Bashir for July 1925 failed to turn up any notice on, or response to, Harb's speeches. But the paper was not unmindful of the efforts from Egypt to launch a supra-Egyptian indigenous capitalism. In July 1925 al-Bashir's correspondent in Cairo reported that a group of financiers had been formed there to set up real estate banks in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The Egyptian group called itself "the Association of Studies for Setting up a Real Estate Mortgage Company" ("Jam'iyyat al-Mabahith li-Ta'lif Sharikati Rahn 'Agariyyah"). Each share in the Association cost 1,000 Egyptian pounds. Some members were now touring Palestine, Lebanon and Syria in the summer holidays to study the local economic conditions at first hand. "al-Qutr al-Misri", al-Bashir 21 July 1925 p. 3.
that had bade fair to transform "the destiny of these peoples [sic] in the East." 109 Thus, a new Egypt-based proto-pan-Arab (still "Eastern") capitalism in 1925 was fulfilling Muhammad 'Ali's earlier political amalgamation of Egypt and Arabic-speaking West Asia by military conquest. But Harb and his colleagues were not in the 1920s striving to duplicate Muhammad 'Ali's political fusion of the Egyptians with contiguous Arabs: the new capitalist activity from Egypt passed across the international frontiers of the post-World War I statelets imposed on the Arab East, without demanding their abolition. Although Harb long labored to tighten a humane community of Arabic-speakers within a widened economy, he came to term them "Arabs" --- a contemporary unitary nation like the classical Arabs he had always evoked--- only in 1939 110. The Cairo-resident Syrian journalist Amin Sa'id in 1938 held up the alleged pan-Arabism of Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammad 'Ali's son and governor in Syria, as a prototype for a new official Egyptian pan-Arabism 111. The

111. Amin Sa'id, "Haqiqat Mawqif Misr min Qadiyyat al-Khilafat al-Islamiyyah: Misr wa Mashru' al-Ittihad al-Arabi" (Egypt's Real Position Towards the Question of the Islamic Caliphate: Egypt and the Project of Arab Federation), al-Mugattam 6 May 1938 pp. 1, 4. The Christian Palestinian George Antonius, who had lived in Egypt in his early life, in his 1938 history of Arab nationalism presented Muhammad 'Ali's adventures in Arabic-speaking Asia as a "false start" towards an Arab national rebirth. "Mehemed Ali" wanted the Arabs to figure as dutiful subjects in his "empire-to-be"; but Antonius presented the son Ibrahim as Arabized by rearing and residence and Egypt as a culturally Arab country. Ibrahim aimed to strengthen his father's empire but was linking it to the ideal of "the regeneration of the Arab race". Antonius' concept of Arabhood did, however, have a racial dimension: he drew a distinction between linguistic and racial Arabization: "while Arabic went on advancing ... the tide of racial penetration found itself dammed within narrower confines". "The portions now known as Palestine and Transjordan received and absorbed the largest proportion", "Egypt the smallest, while Syria and Iraq occupy a midway position". Antonius also claimed that Ibrahim Pasha won a political response from the Syrian population to his 1833 invasion of Syria: "based though it was on flimsy grounds, a belief arose and became widespread that an Egyptian conquest would bring freedom to the Arabs" from "the detested rule of the Turk". George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (Hamish Hamilton 1938) pp. 16-17, 26.
Palestinian nationalist Ahmad Shuqayri in 1939 appealed to King Faruq to renew the pan-Arab achievement of his "great ancestor" Muhammad 'Ali foiled by the imperialists in 1840, but met only a tepid response from the Palace. However, Ahmad Husayn's Palace-linked Young Egypt movement by the late 1930s was exalting Muhammad 'Ali's "vast empire" in West Asia as a restoration of "the glory of the Pharaohs and the Arabs".

In the 1920s, then, Harb pioneered a distinguished blend of archaist Arab literary classicism, motifs in more parochial Egyptian nationalism (e.g. Muhammad 'Ali's conquests in West Asia), and new economic possibilities. However, in the same decade, Haykal from the aligned al-Siyyasah already lamented that the "imperialist" states of Europe destroyed the Egyptian fleet at Navaraine out of fear that "Palestine and Syria would join themselves to Egypt as they were in most periods of history and that Egypt would thereby dominate the Mediterranean and the Red Sea." Haykal, though, was aggrandizing Egypt --- although blurring its borders out --- in comparison to Harb's early pan-Arab applications of Muhammad 'Ali's empire.

Overview

The spread of Western rule over the whole Arab world after 1918, and Western-Arab violence, could draw militant pan-Arab reactions from Egyptians in the 1920s. Yet the financial and property stakes of the political group and the interests with which al-Siyyasah intellectuals --- and the Eastern Leaguers --- were linked had to dampen and retard their impulses to resist. Rising neo-Pharaonic particularism in Egypt could also hold back Egyptians from solidarity and involvements with other Arabs. Pharaonism and Westernization drives together entailed critiques or downgrading of the classical Arabs that placed in question

113. See eg. Ahmad Husayn, "Khutbat al-Ra'is fi Ijtimaa' Misr al-Fatat" (The President's Speech at the Young Egypt Meeting), Misr al-Fatat 14 April 1938 pp. 2, 12.
if they would remain the golden age definitive of nationality. Overall, though, different types of cultural, political and economic elites or vanguards overlapped and interpenetrated in Egypt in the 1920s, more than they were polarized or compartmentalized. Contiguous Islamic-educated intellectuals transmitted enough data about Islam and the classical Arabs to al-Siyasah modernists to save them from facile iconclasm. The conjunction of diverse elites and planes was to give Eastern League and al-Siyasah proto-Arabism richness and depth in the 1920s (Ch.8).
CHAPTER 8: PAN-EASTERNISM AND THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF PAN-ARAB NATIONALISM IN THE 1920s

Western studies have magnified how far secularist-Western and particularist-Pharaonic ideas in the 1920s were able to delegitimize Islam and homogenizing pan-Arab high culture as retarding or non-indigenous, among Egypt's modernizing-educated elite. This chapter instead examines functionalities and development of classical Arab elements within the modernist and new literary modernist enterprises of West-stimulated intellectuals, many of them also trying out neo-Pharaonism. It analyses acculturated Muslim Egyptian opinion leaders in three main, interlocked, groups: (a) the Eastern League Society (active 1922-1931), (b) al-Siyasah/the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and (c) the Young Men's Muslim Association (founded 1927). We examine interactions with other traditional Islamic, archaist-classicist and Christian Asian-Arab elites that continually took modernists through classical Arab

1. Safran in particular imaged a mythologized elan, unambivalence and undivided harmony of world view among liberal intellectuals in the 1920s: "the work of the intellectual leaders was characterized by a vigorous rationalist spirit, a confident Western cultural orientation ... a bold assertion of Liberal Nationalist principles and themes. The writers themselves were unanimous in spirit and united in their efforts". Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1961) p. 140. Safran stressed that the intellectual leaders, such as Haykal and Taha Husayn, took their ethical views from Western sources, with no suggestion of superhuman or otherworldly sanction. Ibid p. 161. He also stressed Taha Husayn's 1926 denial that the Qur'an had authority for historical events (ibid pp. 154-155); Ahmad Amin's approval of the breakdown of the classical great Arabo-Muslim states (ibid p. 162); and acceptance of Darwinian evolution, including its social Darwinian offshoots, among such liberal intellectuals as 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, Haykal, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Taha Husayn and Ahmad Amin (ibid p. 281; cf. p. 58). Likewise Westernist and Islam-marginalizing accounts of modernist Muslim Egyptian intellectuals in the 1920s were also offered by Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: OUP 1986) passim, and Charles D. Smith, *Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn Haykal* (Albany: SUNY Press 1983) pp. 60-108. For Smith, Islam and Arab elements in the 1920s were exterior pressures from outside their psyche to which modernist intellectuals later sometimes went through the motions of adaption.
materials and into the new supra-Egyptian successor-community. The mutating old Arab and Islamic elements flowed into contacts and modern integration between Egyptians and other Arabs in the decade. Our concern is the capacity of deculturation-slimmed Islam and Arabism to interweave and blend into modern secularist ideologies --- and new technologies and economics --- coming from the West. Features of pan-Easternism and the Christian or secularist nature of many Asian Arabs whom al-Siyasah, Eastern Leaguers and the YMMA encountered, pointed to a new secular pan-Arab community. We trace, though, how most acculturated Muslim Egyptians in the 1920s and early 1930s conceived the crystallizing pan-Arab community as Islamic: especially amid bloodshed in Palestine in 1929.

Classical Arab Alongside Pharaonic Elements for New Literature

Western scholarship has surveyed the development of a Pharaonist "national" literature in the 1920s and early 1930s that strove to aesthetically bond Arab Egyptians to the ancient past, for example Tawfiq al-Hakim's use of the novel to evoke immemorial Pharaonic traits as the fuel of the Egyptian people's 1919 uprising against the British. Gershoni and Jankowski were also impressed by use of drama to concretize Pharaonic settings by Mahmud Murad, Ahmad Sabri (1929) and in Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi's 1927 play on the humanist, pacifist, proto-monotheistic Pharaoh Akhnaton. "An Egyptian play" Tutankhamun was being performed in March 1924 and was extremely popular. But the same aesthetic forms imported from the West were also used in the 1920s to make the already much more established and solid

Arab-Islamic past and culture vivid to Egyptians. The pan-Arab historical consciousness was continuing to grow within its matrix of multi-lingualized acculturation, heightened by Europe's Islamophobic history. In late 1927, an Arabic play The Enchantress based on a French drama by Victorien Sardou (1831 - 1908) portrayed "the life of the Muslims and the Arabs of Andalusia and the persecution they suffered at the hands of the Spaniards". The play depicted torture of Muslims by the Inquisition and the expulsion from Spain of all Muslims who would not embrace Christianity. The free Arabic translation of Sardou's drama was made by "the [secular] lawyer (al-muhami)'Abd al-Wahhab al-Bura'i" --- multi-lingualized acculturation. On a more intellectual level, the Paris-educated secular lawyer Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Inan (b. 1896), who simultaneously articulated neo-Pharaonism in the Liberals' al-Siyaşah, had already published in 1924 his first book on the history of the Arabs in Spain --- a sector of classical Arab history with which in the 1930s and 1940s he was to focus a new historiography of eternal conflict between Islam and a Crusader West capable of genocide.

5. "al-Sahira 'ala Masrah Dar al-Tamthil al-'Arabi" (The Enchantress on the Stage of the Arabic Theatre), al-Muqattam 4 November 1927.

6. Citation of 'Inan's 1924 Ta'rikh al-'Arab fi Asbaniya (History of the Arabs in Spain) in Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, supplement band III (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1942) p. 212. 'Inan's portrayal of the West as waging perpetual Crusaderist war against Islam and the Muslims is discussed in Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (N.Y.: Mentor Books 1959) p. 106. 'Inan evoked Muslims locked in mortal combat with invading Christian Europeans over the whole breadth of the classical Arab world --- West Asia, Egypt, North Africa, Spain --- in his 1929 Mawaqif Hasimah fi Ta'rikh al-Islam (Decisive Moments in the History of Islam), which had gone through five editions by 1962. Mawaqif included a grim chapter on the victorious Castilian Christians' attempts to Christianize the Andalusian Muslims by force and terror after the fall of Granada in 1492, culminating in the final exiling of them from Spain. Mawaqif (4th ed., Cairo: al-Khanji 1962) pp.311-325. Other books published by 'Inan in the 1930s or 1940s that recreated Muslim Spain were Dawlat al-Islam fil-Andalus (The Islamic State in Andalusia), Duwal al-Tawa'if (The Petty Arab Andalusian Kingdoms), and Nihayat al-Andalus wa Ta'rikh al-Arab al-Muntasirin (al-Andalus' End and the History of the Morisco Arabs). In 1947 'Inan published his dictionary of Andalusian and other classical Arab biographies Tarajim Islamiyyah Sharqiyyah wa...
Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah

Ultra-particularization has particularly one-dimensionalized Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah (d.1953), whose Islam Westernizing education threatened to snap early in the century until Chief Mufti Muhammad 'Abduh resolved his youthful doubts; he subsequently diffused Western philosophical thought in copious Arabic writings. In youth Jum'ah acted as secretary of the Kamalist independence movement's 1910 Brussels Conference. Gershoni and Jankowski highlighted Jum'ah's apologetic defence of ancient Pharaonic society as not despotic as some charged but the very inspiration and source of democracy in Greek antiquity, his sense in 1931 that Egyptians and other Arabic speakers retained their sense of belonging to separate identities even as they communicated in Arabic, and his 1922 view that Arab unity could take centuries to realize. But Jum'ah in the 1920s simultaneously popularized amongst Egyptians the life and poetry of the pre-Islamic peninsular Arabs. In an almost endless chain of articles titled "On Pre-Islamic Poetry" serialized in the Syrian Christian-owned al-Mugattam in 1926, he had tended to idealize desert life as closer to virtue than settled life. He searched Western archeology and Semitics for documentation that the Arabians had had developed societies and civilizations centuries before the rise of Islam, albeit these then declined and were lost to memory.

Andalusiyah: these discussed classical Arab creative culture and thought more than Mawagif had.

7. See Dr 'Abd al-Fattah al-Didi, Yanabi' al-Fikr al-Misri al-Mu'asir (Cairo: al-Anglo al-Misriyyah 1982) pp. 107-108 for Jum'ah's participation in the 1910 Conference; he was certainly prone to the paranoia about spying by European intelligence agencies current among Kamalist emigres and their Egyptian student supporters in Europe at this time. Ibid. In regard to Jum'ah's Kamalist and Arabist connections, it is to be noted that as an English teacher he influenced 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, who after World War I became a pioneer pan-Arab and then first Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. Ibid p. 102.

8. In the 1930s and 1940s, Jum'ah translated Russian and other European stories for Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and his al-Risalah.


He characterized the period of urban classical Islam and the institutionalized Islamic thought and sciences in 'Iraq under the 'Abbasids in particular as the fulfilment of the genius that the Arabs had already narrowly demonstrated in their barren peninsula. The ethics and natural geographical environment of the Arab[ian] people predisposed it to poetry, as did "the Arabic language itself which all Orientalists and linguists agree is ultra-poetical" --- a tribute that ran against the spasms of rejection Haykal sometimes voiced against perpetuation of the integral language of those first Arabians in new literature. In addition to Western stimuli, the dual-cultured Jum'ah was also orientated to pre-Islamic Arabian poetry by tributes of the 'Abbasid theologian, essayist and proto-sociologist al-Jahiz (c.776-869), "one of the landmark writers of world literature". The pre-Islamic Arabs' lack of organized states, revealed religion or literacy, was outweighed by the precocious greatness of their oral poetry. Jum'ah noted that in this they surpassed the Indians, Greeks and in particular the Romans: Latin poetry reached its peak only in the age of Augustus and Tiberius --- eight centuries after they founded their state. Taha Husayn was to make a similar comparison seven years later in al-Risalah when arguing the centrality of Arab culture in the Egyptian personality against the die-hard Pharaonist Tawfiq al-Hakim. Steeped by non-Arabic schools and tertiary education in the classicist belles-lettres of the British and French, Jum'ah had to parallel European and Arab antiquities. He had built up his once-threatened Arab and Islamic identities, penning one of six books published to refute Taha Husayn's 1926 Fil-Shīr al-Jahili, which denied the authenticity of the pre-Islamic Arabian poetry: that would have cast doubt on the traditional

11. Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah, "Fil-Shīr al-Jahili" (On Pre-Islamic Poetry), instalments 12 and 14, al-Muqattam, 8 August 1926 pp. 1, 3 and 21 August 1926 pp. 1, 3. The article's title implies it refuted Taha Husayn's 1926 book of the same name. However, Jum'ah's aesthetic appreciation connected Egyptians to the integral life of pre-Islamic Arabia: he, for instance, very much responded to the wild poetry of the black outlaw Ta'abbata Sharran. Ibid, 21 August p. 1.
interpretations of the Qur'an that jahili citations helped gloss; it also fleetingly questioned if the existence of Abraham and Ishmael was proven because the revealed Qur'an stated that they founded Mecca. Jum'ah, then, linked up with the counter-assault by traditionally-educated Azharite 'ulama against Taha. Pace Safran et al., acculturated-liberal intellectuals were at odds over Arabism and Islam in the 1920s, individual intellectuals could develop particularoid and Arab-Islamic identities simultaneously and once-decultured intellectuals could wrest, and then transmit, massive mastery of the classical Arabs' heritage with almost no grounding from their formal educations.

The determination and success with which Jum'ah's pattern of intellectual combined and blended old Islamic-Arab and Western elements must be stressed. He propagated Darwinism from adolescence yet insisted that it never shook his religious faith; as early as 1904 he was arguing that Islam's first four Rightly-Guided Caliphs prefigured twentieth-century Western socialism; in 1904 he compared Tolstoy to the Syrian sceptic poet Abul-'Ala al-Ma'arri; and although he popularized the full range of Western philosophy from Plato onwards in Arabic translations, essays and books, he published in 1927 a History of the Philosophers of Islam. Yet, when Jum'ah


14. Jum'ah in 1904 was synthesizing Saint Simonian socialism with Islam. Since he developed his Islamic socialist themes into the 1940s, he must be regarded as a precursor of Nasser's Arab socialism. Ibid p. 105.

15. This was the first lecture of the Society of Intellectual Studies, a group of secondary and tertiary students and young intellectuals that he founded to explore Western --- but also Islamic --- thought and philosophy. Ibid p. 102.

16. Citation of Ta'rikh Falasisfat al-Islam fil-Mashriq wal-Maghrib
responded in 1922 to an *al-Hilal* poll of writers on cooperation for "the Arab renaissance", his intense Arab identity elements were constrained by (a) a certain sense of plurality that could be fitted into particularism and (b) his semi-inability to delimit an Arab sphere distinct from the wider Muslim world. Did the poll "mean the Arab lands proper", he first queried: "that is to say the lands of the Arabs" (*bilad al-'Arab*: as in some pre-1910 Kamilist communications, peninsular Arabia) "comprised of the Hijaj, Najd, Yaman and Hadramawt?" Or did the Arab or Arabic-speaking territorial units (*al-aqrar al-'Arabiyyah*) also include those lands/countries conquered by the Arabs in early Islam that "to this day continue to be directed by the institutions/regulations (*anzimah*) of the Arabs" --- clearly the Arab development of Islam since in his next spasm he wondered if other populations that spoke Arabic but were non-Muslim should be included. In a final spasm that blurred primarily Arabic-speaking populations into all the Muslims, Jum'ah felt the impulse to categorize within the Arab lands "the lands that profess Islam and submit to Arab civilization by reason of the language of the Qur'an". While Jum'ah in 1922 had some affinity to the particularists in awareness of territorial categories, his other aspect was supra-Egyptian emotions that were ultra-powerful --- if still nebulous in application --- because language-centred Arabness and the religion Islam were almost fused. His *al-Risalah* colleague Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s would gradually sort out and separate the two community categories, pan-Arab and pan-Muslim, still blurred in the confused explorations of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals in the 1920s.

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PAN-EASTERNISM AND THE SOCIETY OF THE EASTERN LEAGUE

Much of the articulation and integration of pan-Muslim and pan-Arab communities by Egyptians in the 1920s was within, or by writers associated with, the Society of the Eastern League (Jam'iyyat al-Rabitat al-Shargiyyah), active between 1922 and 1931. This association was formed in February 1922 at the prompting of the Egyptian-resident Iranian merchant Mirza Mahdi Rafi' Mashki, and Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1867 - 1934) a graduate in the secular law that Egypt derived from France and retired Secretary of the deposed Khedive 'Abbas' Council of Ministers who had specialized in French-Arabic translation. Jankowski showed that the League's initial leadership was genuinely supra-Egyptian, with native Egyptians barely half the office-holders. Non-Muslim Lebano-Syrians included Amil Zaydān and Habib Lutfullāh, and Fertile Crescent Muslims the salafi revivalist Muhammad Rashīd Rida as vice-president and the Islamic Shaykh 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Kazimi, an emigre from British-occupied 'Iraq. The Egyptian membership and office-bearers was a mix of bilingualized-secularoid and traditional Islamic intellectuals: activist al-Siyāsah modernist-secularoids such as Mahmud 'Azmi, Mansūr Fāhmi and (the Azhar-educated gādi) 'Alī 'Abd al-Raziq were prominent alongside the Egyptian Islamic clerics Shaykh Muhammad Bakhīt — Chief Mufti of Egypt — and al-Sāyyid 'Abd al-Hamīd al-Bakrī, head of the Sufi orders in Egypt. Bakhīt and al-Bakrī were on the administrative Council of the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists when it was founded in October 1922, delivering Islamic sermons on the occasion. The Eastern League and the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists were interlocked structures within each of which relatively secularist, acculturated and more traditional-Islamic

intellectual elites dyed each other. As early as 1923, the League was collecting donations from Egyptians for al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni's renovations of the al-Aqsa and Dome of the Rock mosques in Jerusalem: among a host of counter-projects designed by the Palestinians to draw in the world's Muslims in order to checkmate Zionism's mobilization of the world's lukewarm Jews around sites in Palestine associated with Judaism.

Ahmad Zaki Pasha, the driving-force behind the League, had interacted a good deal with Europeans within the scholarly institutions and freemasonry that they built up in Egypt. Yet theosophism and freemasonry, like other outgrowths of Western society and thought, now contributed to the comprehensiveness and fluidity of the Eastern counter-community to the West. Traditionally Islamic-educated members too, not just its modernist following, assented that community with non-Muslim Afro-Asians went with indigenous resistance and revival. The acculturated editorial of the first issue of the League's magazine equated "the Yellow Peril" of which Westerners fearfully spoke with pan-Islamism as manifestations of the single Eastern Renaissance. The exploratory pan-Eastern format helped such younger West-transformed intellectuals as Haykal to (a) partially disengage from the West ideologically and (b) learn more about Islam and other Arabs by offering contact with Azharite and other Egyptian Muslim clerics and with non-Egyptian Arabs. The open heterogeneity of the League's perceived "East" and of the "Easterners" whom it received and projected (it sponsored a reception for the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore when he visited Cairo in November

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22. The League's announced aim of increasing cultural "understanding and solidarity between all Easterners regardless of their races and religions" drew from the Indian Muslim reader Abul-Hasanat al-Nadawi the objection that that contradicted al-Afghani's drive to revive the Islamic states and the Caliphate. Rashid Rida responded in his salafi journal al-Manar that the Easternist and pan-Muslim communities each strengthened the other and that al-Afghani had advocated both together. Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2, p.116. Ibid v. 2, p. 116.
1926)\textsuperscript{24}, did not pressure intellectuals stamped with European positivism and secularism to rush their reconjuncture with Islam and Islamic forces. Although handicapped (Jankowski 1981) by its lack of figures from the populist Wafd\textsuperscript{25}, the League from the outset got its drive for supra-Egyptian community across to the educated Egyptian public because Liberal Constitutionalist, Islamic and emigre Christian Syrian journals published its activities and communications\textsuperscript{26}.

Haykal's emergent anti-populist faction in acculturated Wafd nationalism, among those lobbying for Egypt's independence in Europe and in intellectual and political circles back in Egypt, had realized by earlier 1920 that Egypt could not hope for backing from European or Western governments. The Peace Conference agreements had recognized Britain's protectorate, defining Egypt's fate as a bilateral matter to be settled between England and Egypt; a journey by future Liberal Constitutionalist Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmud to the USA won little support for Egyptian independence. "A group" therefore considered linking Egypt's independence movement to those of other "Eastern" countries likewise struggling against rule by Western colonial powers, so as to introduce a new third element into the bilateral contest between Egypt and Britain.

That some "Eastern" figures or independence movements effectively resisting Britain or other Western powers at that time were non-Muslim, or predominantly non-Muslim, helped pull the new Egyptian pan-Afro-Asianism away from the pan-Islamism of the pre-World War I Kamilist independence movement. The Easternism recalled by Haykal focussed on predominantly non-Muslim India, on the Hindu Gandhi and his non-violent "passive resistance" movement against the same Britain from which Egypt also demanded independence. New cultural and ideological influences,

\textsuperscript{24} Jankowski, "Eastern Idea" p.657.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid p. 655.
\textsuperscript{26} It thus did not constrain communication that the Rabitat only got publication of its own monthly (edited by al-Siyasah intellectual 'Ali 'Abd al-Razig) underway in 1928; it quickly won outlets in other Arab countries. \textit{Ibid} p. 661.
some mediated through the unfolding intellectualism of the West, some direct from India, further encouraged Haykal's circle to seek inspiration in Hindu culture, ideas and political movements well into the 1930s.

Nonetheless, Haykal and his intellectual circle immediately after World War I responded in a much more intimate way to the conditions in other Arab countries: it was with the liberation movements of the Arab countries that such Egyptians would link their own independence movement if they seriously pursued the idea of an Eastern community. Haykal discussed in his memoirs the efforts of "the Arab lands which had separated from the Ottoman Empire" to achieve the independence promised by Britain (MacMahon) during the War, recalling military action by France to end Faysal's brief reign as King of independent Syria. He described France and Britain (who deliberately broke her war-time promises to the Arabs) as working in conjunction to divide the Middle East between them after the War: consistent with the Eastern orientation, he here viewed all European imperialists as one entity. Proto-pan-Arab antipathy to France, almost equalling that towards the British occupiers, was sharpened by her greater aesthetic and ideological impact upon Egyptians within acculturation --- which had long fostered constantly dashed expectations for international relations. All Western powers were as ferocious, but Haykal in the early 1920s rejected the proposal of his friend Mansur Fahmi to join in the founding of the Eastern League (al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah). His grounds applied less strongly to the Arab countries than to the maximum community of Eastern peoples: "the disparity between Egypt and those Eastern lands culturally and in their languages and their fundamental national characteristics ... might distract us [Egyptians] from concentrating our efforts on the cause of our homeland ... and impel us to take up a burden too heavy for us to bear".27 However, Haykal and various colleagues were to develop many Easternist themes from the columns of

al-Siyasah, and contribute to the League magazine, although Taha Husayn responded only to its promotion of inter-Arab contact, rejecting the anti-Western impulse to link up with Hindus, Chinese and Japanese.\(^\text{28}\)

**With Non-Arab Muslims**

The full extent of the populations of the wide Muslim world were in interaction with Egyptians within Eastern League structures, diluting or retarding its pan-Arabizing effects. The sayyid Muhammad Ibn Hashim al-'Alawi, previously editor of Hadramawt, headed a Javan educational mission to Egypt made up of graduates of the boarding school of the same name in Java. He praised the Eastern League for arranging free lectures on Qur'anic exegesis by the Azhar specialist 'Ali Surur al-Zankaluni (an Eastern League Council member)\(^\text{29}\). In organizing this intensive course for a segment of intellectual leadership among Indonesian Muslims (one still centred around Southern Arabian immigrants such as al-'Alawi) the Eastern League contributed to Indonesian Islam's further Middle Easternization. The Eastern League successfully mediated a dispute between Javanese and Malayan ulama\(^\text{30}\). In 1927, Mahmud Yunus al-Indunisi ("the Indonesian") who was at Cairo's blended Islamic-modern Dar al-'Ulam College, stressed in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah the contribution of reformed Islamic ('Abduh-inspired) madrasah education to Indonesia's national awakening. He criticized the proto-nationalist Budi Utomo (founded 1908) because too many members and followers were petty native functionaries in the colonial Dutch administration: they lacked independence, unlike self-employed activists in the overtly Islamic Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyyah.\(^\text{31}\)

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\(^\text{30}\) Jankowski, "Eastern Idea" p. 661.

\(^\text{31}\) Mahmud Yunus al-Indunisi, "al-Nahdat al-'Ilmiyyah fi Indonesia" (The Educational Renaissance in Indonesia), al-Siyasat al-Ulbsu'iyyah, 3 September 1927, p. 11. Budi Utomo ("Sublime Endeavour") welfare organisation was founded on 20 May 1908 by Dutch-educated Javanese students from Batavia (Jakarta) and...
Indonesia here ran in *al-Siyasah* against an equivalent of the secular-professional, bilingualized, nationalism that the paper normally fostered in Egypt. Similar *salafi* Manarist forces in Egypt would peak in Muslim Brotherhood fundamentalism a decade later. For all their gadfly sniping at Muslim traditionalism, anyway, even the radicals in *al-Siyasah* retained some affinities with the al-Afghani-triggered Egyptian *salafiyyah*, itself stripped-down.

The efforts of King Fu'ad and diverse groups and interests in Egypt to influence or corner the restoration of the Caliphate abolished by Turkey in 1924 also helped keep the interactions of Leaguers wide and diversely Islamic rather than just pan-Arab. In the wake of the Cairo Caliphate Congress (May 13-19, 1926), in which delegates from fourteen Muslim countries discussed some successor-Caliphate, the Eastern League invited the conferees to a tea-reception in its premises. Its president 'Abd al-Hamid al-Bakri spoke on the theme "the East is the homeland of all the Easterners": "the veins of the Egyptians throb with the blood of the East's common life". All Easterners were determined to realize "the East for the Easterners" --- the not-so-covert anti-imperialism that fired most Rabitat activities. The modernist Dr Mansur Fahmi --- a Paris-educated philosophy lecturer at Cairo University long dogged by controversies focussed around his way-out views on women and Islam\(^{32}\) --- called

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\(^{32}\) In 1915, Fahmi had helped Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Taha Husayn to bring out the paper *al-Sufur* which called for changes in the
for "a relationship between the renaissant units in the East", observing that, more than foreigners, "the rigid elements are the enemies of rebirth". This was unmistakable support for the aggressively Westernizing and secularizing regimes of Riza Khan in Iran and Kemalist Turkey. Two --- on some issues opposed --- ideological groups within the Rabitat, then, were simultaneously striving to tighten relations with non-Arab Muslim peoples.

Some members of the new secularoid Iranian establishment in the 1920s reciprocated the interest of modernizing-positivist Egyptians. In 1926, members of the Iranian parliament expressed interest in appointing Egyptian staff to the Tehran Law School, and in the despatch of an Iranian mission to study (West-patterned) Egyptian educational and scholarly institutions. The position of women in Egypt and for limitations on the roles of traditional Muslim 'ulama'. Haykal, Muḥakkirat v.1 p.75. Fahmi was co-founder with Haykal of the Egyptian Democratic Party in 1919. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 66. Fahmi had studied philosophy in Paris for five years, defending there in 1913 a doctoral thesis that critically analysed the conditions of women in Islam, including in the pristine period of the Prophet Muhammad's leadership. Antonie Wessels, A Modern Arabic Biography of Muhammad: A Critical Study of Muhammad Husayn Haykal's 'Hayat Muhammad' (Leiden: Brill 1972) p. 37. As a lecturer in the history of philosophies at Cairo University (opened 1925), Fahmi was a prominent representative of modernist, quasi-secularist thought along with fellow lecturers Taha Husayn and Mustafa 'Abd al-Raziq. Enemies of Fahmi at Cairo University charged "atheism" in his dissertation on women and Islam as grounds to dismiss him from his lectureship, a dismissal that was not reversed for seven years. Baber Johansen, Muhammad Husain Haikal, Europa Und der Orient im Weltbild eines Agyptischen Liberalen (Bayrut: Franz Steiner Verlag 1967) p. 86; Ahmad 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi, Ru'yah Hadariyyah Tabaqiyyah li-'Urubat Misr (Bayrut: Dar al-Adab 1979) pp. 269, 270.


34. For the sharpening of this contradiction when, from 1928, 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq as editor favorably publicized Ataturk's Turkey, Riza Shah's Iran and Amanullah's Afghanistan in the League's new journal see Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs pp. 267-268.
Egyptian Ministry of Education expressed readiness to facilitate the enrolment of Iranians in the Egyptian university and baccalaureat classes. The Eastern League involved Egyptian Arabs or Egypt-resident Arabs in interactions with Turks, Iranians and other non-Arab Muslims that were vivid to the parties. Thus, the League's Irano-Egyptian leader Mirza Mahdi Mashki, and 'Abduh's disciple Rashid Rida, became involved in contacts with both Iranian diplomats and the followers of Ibn Sa'ud. Shi'ite Iranians still feared iconclastic Wahhabism that had devastated Shi'ite shrines in 'Iraq, although Ibn Sa'ud was now reining in his followers: the salafi Rida in contrast was increasingly exalting Wahhabism and the Sa'udis and characterized Shi'ism in terms of accretions to the true Islam. Highly-publicized acrimony between Rida and Mashki brought vividly home to Egyptians the positivist-Westernizing drives of the new Iranian establishment. The important pattern here is the increase in the 1920s (not any decrease) of interactions of Arab Eastern Leaguers and other Egyptians with Persians both within the League and with the far-away Iranian ruling class.

In the 1920s, then, the Eastern League was an important focal point for connections with non-Arab Muslim Middle Easterners, somewhat countering the League's own

36. Mirza Mahdi Mashki, "Itharat al-Fitan Bayn al-Muslimin: Man Hum Muq'idu Nariha?" (Inciting Clashes Between the Muslims: Who are the Ones Fueling Them?), al-Muqattam 19 June 1926 p. 1 and 20 June 1926 pp. 1-2. When Riza Khan's Iranian government prohibited its citizens from visiting the Hijaz, the site of the hajj pilgrimage, Rida had denounced it as malahidah (atheists) like the Young Turks who once opposed Islam's Arabs and like their Westernizing Kemalist successors. Defending the Iranian-Shi'ite ethnicity of his Egyptian minority, Mashki retorted that the new Sa'udi regime there was not an orderly government, hence the Iranian government's decision, and derided Rida as a "walking shari'ah court" who instantly declared anyone he disliked an infidel — an ironical thrust at the neo-Hanbalite Rida's own slight acceptance in Islamic institutions in Egypt. Mashki had acted as interpreter for Rida during discussions with Iranian diplomats and officials. Ibid. For the development of Rashid Rida's attitudes to Shi'ism, Hourani, Arabic Thought pp.230-231, 239.
pan-Arabizing aspects. Egypt's major cities retained smallish but still influential ethnic minorities — Turco-Circassian landlords and royalty, Iranian merchants — determined to promote relations with Turkey and Iran. At both ends of the ideological spectrum — Muslimo-modernist and Islamist — Muslim Egyptians long continued to be emotionally bound to the Turks after World War I. *al-Liwa' al-Misri*, organ of the remnants of the pre-1918 Kamilist Patriotic Party, in 1924 vented hatred both of Mustafa Kemal's laicist regime, which it hoped would fall, and of the Christian powers of Europe for having incited non-Turkish nationalities to destroy the Ottoman Empire. Yet, partly under influence of Western theories of linguistic nationalism that it projected, it was equalizing language with religions as integrators of political states. The Turco-Circassian Eastern Leaguer Ahmad Shafiq Pasha was encouraged by Turkish officials to open a branch of Bank Misr in Istanbul. However, Egypt's

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37. Although it was moving towards linguistic criteria that could legitimate Ataturk's nationalist withdrawal from the Middle East, *al-Liwa' al-Misri* was still Islamist. Thus, it hostilely printed — and then took issue with — a formulation from West Europe's (France's?) laicist-anti-clerical nationalist thought which denied "that religion in any period has ever been a factor for forming nations, since religion has been in ancient ages and is still in our own time one cause of ... numerous divisions likely to disunite a nation and render it an easy prey to any aggressor". The newspaper's stand in 1924 that religion (Islam) was a factor of the first importance in integrating political nationalities would identify the linguistically diverse Muslim populations in the bygone Ottoman State as a potential viable political nationality had some circumstances developed differently: or it could point to a new Islamic pan-Arabism. Egypt's populous Coptic community might have asked where religion as one integrant for a political nation left the developing bisectarian (homeland-framed) Egyptian national community. However, *al-Liwa' al-Misri* in 1924 approvingly quoted a European writer's view that "among the strongest factors that work to build nations is the linguistic bond between people. For mutual comprehension between them makes them desire men of their own people to assume authority over them, for fear that people who are foreigners to them might casually wreak havoc upon their traditions since the question of their survival or non-survival would be a matter of indifference to them". Such formulations might make the West Asian Arabs' revolt for independence against the Ottoman Empire natural, and could contribute to long-term pan-Arabism in Egypt. See coverage of Turkey and the dynamics of European nationalism in *al-Liwa' al-Misri* 18 May 1924.
stronger surviving commercial links with the Peritile Crescent and acculturated Arabism assured that the branches were opened in Lebanon and then other Arab countries, instead. Given pre-1918 'Alid involvement in Ottoman politics and Arab dissidence in the Empire, bursts of ill-feeling periodically broke out in the 1920s between Turkish and Egyptian officials and journalists — yet amid sourness, impulses for social, economic and cultural reconnection persisted among Egyptians and Turks. Muted Islam sustained deep identification with Turks even among Egyptian modernists who approved sectors of the destruction that Ataturk wreaked. The religious, historical, and modernizing affinities acculturated Muslim Egyptians had with the Turks even after Ataturk withdrew from the Middle East remained great. In view of the Egyptian intellectuals' penchant for modern instruments and processes to integrate wider communities, the connections with Turkey could have ushered in a modern Arab-Turkish grouping if further conditions had obtained. In the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, though, the narrower sphere of Arabic-speakers, only, met enough preconditions to cohere.

39. In 1927, a perceived attack on the car of the Turkish ambassador in Cairo led the (officially-inspired) Turkish press to publish caricatures of the King of Egypt as a fawning puppet of the British. "Nahnu wal-Sihafat al-Turkiyyah" (We and the Turkish Press), Roz al-Yusuf 4 August 1927 p. 4. One Egyptian Ambassador, however, ascribed press articles against Egypt in Turkey to former adherents of the Khedive 'Abbas or Egyptians who had fled to Turkey for political reasons — and who were out to make trouble when the Egyptian embassy refused to employ them. Ambassador Muhammad Hadayah Pasha depicted Turks as friendly to Egyptians and anxious for them to again summer-holiday on the Bosphorus on the same scale as before World War I. With encouragement from his interviewer, he praised Kemalist Turkey's improvement of its agriculture, navigation and commerce. He saw Egypt as pursuing economic and educational modernization that paralleled that of Turkey and was hopeful, with the recent signing of an agreement between them, that Turkish-Egyptian trade would expand. "Hadith ma'a Wazir Misr al-Mufawwad fi Turkiyyah" (A Talk with Egypt's Representative in Turkey), al-Muqattam 21 August 1926 p. 1. Approval of the strength-conferring Westernizing reforms of Ataturk persisted in Egypt: editorial "Nahdat Turkiya wa Nahdat Misr" (Turkey's Renaissance and Egypt's), al-Ahram 15 November 1938 p. 1.
Muhammad Muhammad Husayn simplistically argued that the Eastern world community for which al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah called was a code synonym for Islamic: in its first number all the Eastern nations mentioned "were Islamic-majority nations ... or inhabited by a large number of Muslims reaching tens of millions at times" (China, India etc) \(^{40}\). Some League members or supporters were more drawn than that to those lands' pagan majority-communities —— but could not, despite Westernizing educations, make that final breakthrough to the maximum Afro-Asian community wider than the sphere of Islam. Here, one Eastern League motif continued the failure of the "Patriotic Party" independence movement led by Mustafa Kamal to 1908 to carry through the impulse to ally with the "Eastern" Japan that beat Russia (Ch.4). Colombe noted that, from 1928, the Eastern League's journal al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah and its founder Ahmad Zaki maintained for several years the "illusion" that Islam was spreading in Japan, not just that the Japanese and other yellow peoples would unite with Egypt against the West \(^{41}\). For the West-tinted Kamilists and Eastern Leaguers alike, Easternism attracted but without Islam was not enough to sustain international political community.

More promotion of earlier Kamilist pan-Islamic attitudes and personnel was the Eastern League's publicization of the Young Men's Muslim Association (Jam'iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin). Formed in November 1927 by the France-educated lawyer 'Abd al-Hamid Sa'id, a former Kamilist, the Association drew many of its members from among students in the secular or missionary secondary schools and Fu'ad I University of Cairo (instituted

\(^{40}\) Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 pp. 115-116.
\(^{42}\) For instance, an Arabo-Islamist university student Ma'mun Ridwan figured in Najib Mahfuz' novel al-Qahirat al-Jadidah, published in 1958 but set among the first generation of Cairo University students of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The novel opens with the ambivalent reactions of male BA students to female students: remote mild sexualization alternates with apprehension that the women will become competitors for jobs after graduation. The pro-YMMA Ridwan is concerned at the strength of the current of
1925): within two years it had established 21 branches in other Arab countries. Reflecting the acculturatedness of the strata it aimed to recruit, the YMMA's charter contained an oath to resist atheism and permissiveness --- needed, YMMA editorialist Yahya al-Dardiri specified, to identify what sectors of "modern Western civilization" henceforth should be adopted or rejected: further cautious Westernization. The first issue of al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyah lauded the YMMA as "an Eastern movement" as against Egypt's YMCA which it dismissed as "a Western, American movement" --- for Muhammad Husayn more use of "Eastern" as code for Islamic. The YMMA, however, modelled the sporting activities it offered young Egyptians, especially secular-stream students, on the YMCA, with which it was competing for the same modern-acculturated Muslim youth. The YMMA had acculturated, coolly realistic knowledge of Westerners. It could sharply focus on the real drives of imperialist enemies on their own secular terms, sidestepping Christian-Muslim emotionalisms: an instance was its flat, cool response to France's mid-1930 Berber dahir in ilhad (atheism) among the students but his faith defies "philosophy" --- Plato, Pascal, Descartes, Bergson (clearly, the territory of Taha Husayn). With his "dreams of Islam, Arabism and Virtue", he voices contempt for the high Egyptian government officials who attended the opening of the University by King Fu'ad. Ma'mun Ridwan refuses to recognize "the Egyptian question" since "there is only one question --- that of Islam in general and Arabism in particular". Most of his fellow-students deride him as "the unawaited Mahdi", because they want to enjoy life, or are committed to Western-style "science" and "philosophy" or because they are budding Marxist-materialist socialists: yet Ridwan and his Arab-Islamic group within acculturation clearly have already, at the close of the 1920s, won grudging recognition that they are a contender. Mahfuz, al-Qahirat al-Jadidah (Cairo: Dar Misk lil-Tiba'ah 1962) pp. 4-15.

44. Not just foreign Catholic clergy but some French officials had a certain urge to Christianize at least the Berbers at the time of the Berber Dahir. John P. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism 1917-1944 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1967) pp. 73-74. The traditionally French-subsidized al-Ahram stressed the laicism of French governments in order to refute the impression in Egypt that France was hostile to Islam in Morocco. The YMMA's reply was that official secularism within France had not stopped the French parliament from allocating financial subventions to French Catholic religious missionaries abroad "because they spread French
Morocco. YMMA publications did explore favorable views of Arabic or Islam among some Westerners, Tagore's Easternist but non-Muslim critique of the West and the sceptical classical Syrian-Arab poet Abul-'Ala' al-Ma'arri, and printed aggressively non-traditional "contemporary" (asriyyah) poetry by the isolationist-particularist Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi because it was aesthetic.

Rashid Rida's contribution to the League's activities, its promotion of the YMMA, and joint YMMA-League organization of aid to the Palestinian Arabs from 1929, shows how such an extensively acculturated and sometimes radically secular --- but anti-Western --- structure as the Eastern League could set modernist Egyptians off towards a simple, stripped-down but politically activist and explosive fundamentalism of the later Muslim Brotherhood pattern.

Proto-Pan-Arabism

Even in outreach to movements in the Arab world or on

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culture or in other words prepare the way for French imperialism. It is not love of Christianity that motivated France to commit its misdeeds but love of imperialism". Islam's teachings were a barrier to her aims in North Africa: thus, Islam had to be sapped in Morocco for pragmatic reasons. "Jam'iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin wa Muslimum al-Maghrib al-Aqsa" (The YMMA and Morocco's Muslims) al-Muqattam 4 September 1930 p. 3. However, the shaykh Muhammad 'Abūh had prefigured such secularoid views about French and other imperialists in his turn-of-century controversy with Hanotaux in al-Mu'ayyad.

46. One YMMA intellectual prepared to discuss the ideas of non-Muslim Easterners and tolerate fringe semi-Muslims, was the Cairo-resident Muslim Syrian Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (died 1970), a prime mover behind the foundation of the YMMA. One 1926 number of his monthly al-Zahra' carried an account by Ahmad Zaki Pasha of a bedouin feast, an article by Muhammad Badr al-Din al-'Alawi on liking for the Arabic language among Europeans, another on al-Ma'arri, some avant-garde poetry by secularist-Pharaonist Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi, and an article by Tagore on "The Civilization of the West and the Civilization of the East". "Majallat al-Zahra'" (al-Zahra' Magazine), al-Muqattam 4 September 1926 p. 8. Abu Shadi in 1926 explicitly rejected both pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism because each was liable to divide Muslim and Coptic Egyptians: in contrast a consciousness of shared Pharaonic race and "a purely national culture" would integrate the two Egyptian sects. Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi, Mašrah al-Adab, d. pp. 165-167 excerpted in Chaim Rabin, Modern Language Readers (London: Lund Humphries 1947) pp. 132-136. Abu Shadi was extremely abhorrent to conservative elements in Egypt for his pro-Western, modernist views. Daghir, Masadir, pp. 55-64.
its margins that had classical Arabic as their written language, several factors maintained identification with the East at the expense of Arabness. An instance was the war in the Rif between the mainly Berber forces led by 'Abdel Krim el-Khattabi against the Spaniards and the French. Humanitarian relief donations likely to help sustain the insurgency were collected from Egyptians by the Eastern League in conjunction with its Turco-Circassian royal backers such as Prince 'Umar Tusun whose home language was not Arabic, enhancing a supra-Arab category for integration. In this appeal were Azharites apt to think in pan-Muslim terms despite their cultural Arab-centrism. In the context of this aid, Muhammad Shakir, former Wakil (Registrar) of al-Azhar, lamented the surrender of 'Abdel-Krim in terms of "the East" and its mortal struggle against imperialism, not of Arabs specifically. He did, though, refer to the parallel of the Byzantine capture of a Hamdanid prince a thousand years before --- an instance where the multi-lingual Muslim Egyptian modernists' preoccupation with classical Arab high poetry was similarly politicized by a religious Azharite intellectual 47. (Taha probed the aesthetic creativity of Hamdanid Aleppo in his 1934 Ma'al-Mutanabbi 48). By the mid-1920s Eastern terminology had such momentum that even very traditional Azharite leaders applied it to pan-Islamic or quasi-pan-Arab causes.

The Syrian Christians. Easternism and the Society of the Eastern League in particular, derived much of their publicity and secular pan-Arab features from Syrian

47. "Sumuww al-Amir 'Umar Tusun wa I'anat Jarha l-Rif" (His Highness Prince 'Umar Tusun and Aid to the Wounded in the Rif), al-Muqattam 26 May 1926 p. 3; "'Abd al-Karim al-Rifi fi Asr Faransa" (Abdel-Krim the Rifian A Prisoner of the French) al-Muqattam 1 June 1926 p. 1. In this particular drive, 1,370 Egyptian pounds were collected for the Rifians. For editorial support from this Syrian Christian newspaper, "al-Sharq Yatamalmal" (The East is Stirring) al-Muqattam 2 June 1926 p. 1.

48. This work of literary criticism by Taha is discussed in David Semah, Four Egyptian Literary Critics (Leiden: Brill, 1974) pp. 134-137. al-Mutanabbi, panegyrist of Aleppo's Hamdanid amir Sayf al-Dawlah, had preoccupied Muslim Egyptian modernists throughout the 1920s.
Christian participants resident in Egypt. The League Administrative Council formed on 7 March 1922 included the editor of the Cairo al-Hilal Amil Zaydan, whose father Jurji — author of many novels on classical Arab history — had founded the magazine in 1892. Secularist SC publications — especially al-Muqtataf from 1885 — had indispensible introduced such Muslim Egyptians as Taha Husayn in adolescence to Darwinism and other avant-garde Western "science". On the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of al-Muqtataf, al-Muqattam editor Khalil Thabit praised Egypt as "today the bearer of the banner of knowledge and art in this East, the alert patron of the glories of the Easterners and the heritage of the Arabs", a sanctuary for the ill-treated such as the editors when they brought al-Muqtataf in 1885 to Egypt; Hafiz Ibrahim echoed it on behalf of Egyptians with an ode. The various

49. For al-Hilal and Jurji Zaydan's evolution of a pan-Arab community thought that would reconcile his bond to Lebanon-Syria with his residence in Egypt see Thomas Philipp, "Language, History and Arab National Consciousness in the Thought of Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914)", IJMES v. 4 (1973) pp. 3-22; Daghir, Masadir pp. 442-448.

50. Ya'qub Sarruf (1852-1927) was educated at the Syrian Protestant College, Bayrut. His scholarly magazine al-Muqtataf dedicatedly popularized in Egypt the modern sciences, natural and social, including Darwinian and Spencerian evolution. Safran, Egypt in Search p. 58; Hourani Arabic Thought pp. 246-247; c.f. the Tribute of Daghir (Masadir v. 2, pp. 540-548) to the 118 volumes of al-Muqtataf as "a scientific encyclopaedia" of the practical and theoretical natural sciences, discoveries and inventions that attained a Western scientific level. As an increasingly alienated student at al-Azhar before World War 1, Taha's great relief was the summer holidays in which he could return to his village — because there he and his brothers read the latest secular magazines and books. Taha in his autobiography recalled reading Sarruf's articles in al-Muqtataf; while that SC journal's scientism was clearly a formative influence on Taha, his humanist, aesthetic bent was also drawn during those crucial "holidays" to Jurji Zaydan's al-Hilal articles and innumerable novels on classical Arab history — which deeply pan-Arabized the historical consciousness of Egyptians. Taha also read Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul's Arabic translation of E. Demolins' A quoi tient la superiorite des Anglo-Saxons?. Taha Husayn, al-Ayyam (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1962) v. 2, pp. 175-176.

51. "Misru Tukarrim al-'Ilm: Khamsuna 'Aman fi Khidmat al-Sharq" (Egypt Honors Knowledge: Fifty Years in the Service of the East), al-Muqattam 2 May 1926 p. 1. The ceremony was accompanied by an ode by Hafiz Ibrahim eulogizing Ya'qub Sarruf in terms of the necessity of the highly secular, Western knowledge al-Muqtataf offered for "the East" but without referring to Arabs or Arabness, ...
categories in the Muslim Egyptian cultural elite interconnected on many planes with modernist and more conservative categories of SC writers in the 1920s. 
al-Majallat al-Suriyyah (The Syrian Magazine) was started in Egypt by the priest Bulus Qar'ali in 1926 but was dyed by the secularist Syrian-Egyptians: it celebrated Maronite education in Lebanon but argued that Darwin's theory of evolution was compatible with the teachings of the Catholic Church. It traced the economic collaboration of Phoenicians with the Pharaohs in antiquity (a theme that Egyptian pan-Arabs also stressed to nullify the two particularisms by the end of the 1920s), and described the reception lately accorded Taha Husayn and Ahmad Zaki Pasha in Bayrut as an instance of "the cooperation of the two brotherly peoples". Ahmad Zaki Pasha in the 1920s relied on the Syrian Christian Cairo daily al-Muqattam and its scientific-learned sister-magazine al-Muqtataf (and SC al-Ahram) for publication of his articles on classical Arab history and current pan-Arab issues: the rich, insecure SCs needed some supra-Egyptian nexus with their Muslim neighbors more after 1919.

Even veteran pan-Islamic Egyptian poets like Hafiz Ibrahim or Shawqi somewhat responded to SC scientism and secular community thought. Eastern League-linked Shawqi in 1922 eulogized the Maronite-born but often America-resident Amin al-Rayhani (1876-1940) who opposed the French-directed

unlike some of his poetry relating resident Syrian Christians and Muslim Egyptians as both Arabs during British colonial rule. Ibid.

52. The priest Qar'ali started al-Majallat al-Suriyyah in 1926 but transferred it to Lebanon four years later. The magazine's major interest was the history of the people of Lebanon and Syria — both of which Ahmad Zaki Pasha also bracketed — and to legitimize the presence of the Syrian Christians in Egypt by citing their beneficial contributions to culture and the economy. Thomas Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt 1725-1975 (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag 1985) p. 152; but c.f. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 646-648, who lists historical works that Qar'ali published on the roles of Muhammad 'Ali and Ibrahim Pasha in Lebanon-Syria, as well as on local rulers there in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.


54. Before the 1919 uprising, al-Muqattam had been subsidized by the British to propagandize against Egyptian nationalism. In March 1919 its offices were sacked. Philipp, Syrians p. 149.
partition of Lebanon from geographical Syria after World War I, and romanticized the Muslim, nomadic Arabian peninsula. In 1926, Shawqi's poems in support of the Syrian revolution against France were printed alongside those by Christian and Muslim Syro-Egyptians in an SC-promoted volume. The Eastern League collected "relief" funds to sustain the Syrians and protested to the League of Nations. The detailed communications about the Lebano-Syrian armed struggle against the French from SC journals and intellectuals were effective: they involved Egyptian Muslim youth within ultra-deculturizing structures, not just generations of Egyptian intellectuals who had formed before World War I.

For Muslim Egyptian intellectuals in the 1920s, the non-Muslim Syro-Egyptian peers remained one point of entry into Fertile Crescent affairs. The non-Muslimness of most shawamm, and their radical Western secularist ideas, tugged Egyptians to less Islamic perceptions of colonialism and resistance in Arab West Asia. But the involvement of the League in the politicized Palestine shrines made its more modernist leaders, too, see

55. Ahmad Shawqi, whom the Eastern League was to try to make poet-laureate of the whole Arab world in 1926-1927, hailed al-Rayhani at the 1922 reception as "the star of Syria". Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 p. 129. A list of al-Rayhani's essays and books in Arabic and English romanticizing the Arab countries, especially the Arabian peninsula, is given in Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 404-411.

56. "Diwan al-Thawrah li-Akabir Shu'ara' al-'Asr" (The Poetical Collection of the [Syrian] Revolution by the Greatest Poets of the Age) al-Muqattam 12 September 1926 p. 7. Such anti-imperialist poetry by Shawqi (with Hafiz Ibrahim's) was largely responsible for transmitting the French bombardment of Damascus to educated Moroccans at the time. Halstead, Rebirth pp. 131-132.


58. Mustafa Lutfi, a student at the American University in Cairo, sent to al-Muqattam a donation for the suffering victims in Syria, expressing the wish that he could "join those mighty lions who sell their noble souls gladly in the cause of liberation of their country". "I'anat Mankubi Suriya" (Aid to Syria's Victims), al-Muqattam 8 August 1926 p. 2. The item also mentioned support for the Syrians from Egyptian trade unions.
Arab community more as Muslim. Ahmad Shafiq Pasha was an instance among the older generation of bilingualized Muslim Egyptians: he could allow 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq to project the secularist "reforms" in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in the League but his modern economics-orientated proto-pan-Arabism also responded to the shrines. At the 1928 reopening of the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem after the completion of repairs by al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni's Supreme Islamic Council, Shafiq praised that "zealous patriot" --- endorsement of Palestinian struggle against Zionism --- for his care for Allah's Holy Houses. He appealed to his Palestinian audience to help Tala'at Harb's Bank Misr open a branch in Palestine. Such branches in West Asia would enable "the sons of Arabic" to establish a semi-independent pan-Eastern economy whose members would consume Eastern products by preference. A recurring pattern once more manifested here is that excitement at politicized religious shrines could lock into --- rather than clash with --- modern technologies and economics, supra-Egyptian in scope, being adopted from the West. The dual, alternating reactions of younger acculturated al-Siyasah intellectuals to the 1929 bloodshed sparked at the al-Aqsa-Wall shrine suggest that the politicization of those Holy Places by the Palestinians and Zionists in the decade had been sapping their secular stances, too, for years before.

Despite ecumenicizing SCs (and India, China and Japan) in their Easternist milieus, al-Siyasah intellectuals characterized the East's Arab core as unmistakably Muslim in the 1920s and 1930s.

AHMAD ZAKI PASHA'S CONTRIBUTION TO PAN-ARABIZATION

59. "Khutbat Ahmad Shafiq Basha, Ra'is al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah fi Haflat Iftitah al-Masjid al-Aqsa" (The Speech of Ahmad Shafiq, President of the Eastern League, at the Ceremony of the Reopening of the al-Aqsa Mosque), al-Muqattam 11 September 1928 p. 3.

60. al-Siyasah in August 1932 urged the government to adopt a clear "Eastern" policy because "the East is closer to us and we are of it and it is of us": "the bonds of language, religion, neighborhood and long history bring us together". Belief in the East could supply a cultural ideal with which to face the West's thought and culture. Shillig, Hizb al-Dusturiyyin p. 507.
In the 1920s, Zaki was far from offering the new generation of Egyptians in the fledgeling particularist state a systematic counter-ideology of pan-Arab nationalism. Zaki never wrote a single sustained book of his own. Amid all the leisure he had as a prematurely-retired man of the ex-Khedive in the 1920s, his preferred medium was rather his flood of almost daily articles on atomized points of classical Arab history or geographical names or about the modern Arab world: the ever-hospitable SC-owned Arabic dailies and magazines gave these a wide cumulative audience. This very journalistic fragmentedness restored threads from the classical Arabs' past, literature and idioms to younger acculturated students and professionals with limited Arabic who were not yet ready to attempt old books.

Zaki consciously targeted those younger West-shaped educated Muslim Egyptians most alienated from the pan-Arab past and culture. As lethal as colonialism was tafarnuj, the purposeful self-internalization by Egypt's secular-educated elite of European languages and behavior: it still led them to repudiate their indigenous Arab past, culture and values. Abdallah al-Nadim had sounded the tocsin about al-tafarnuj even before the British imposed their rule in 1882 (Ch. 2), and Ahmad Zaki Pasha carried on the fight throughout the 1920s and beyond. He verbally adopted severely utilitarian stances towards the West: "I do not object to us taking from Europe everything by which we can strengthen ourselves" but Egyptians/Arabs had to proudly maintain their "customs". Lassitude, not the Arab civilization, led to the extinction of Andalusia's Arabs; Khedive Ismail was wrong to try to incorporate Egypt into Europe. Zaki's considered position, though, was that "he who does not evolve will perish" --- and thus he did not want twentieth-century Egyptians or other Arabs to restore "Islamic civilization" in toto, which would inflict "stagnation". Rather, the Arabs should modernize themselves on the basis of Western sciences and patterns but deriving inspiration "from the enduring heritage of our forefathers", instead of cutting the link with them.
Himself acquainted with several European languages, Zaki skilfully won a hearing for his attempts to relate the classical Arabs to Western modernity from al-Siyasah's much younger Westernist intellectuals and readers. In al-Siyasah in 1924, he argued that "the Arabs" tried to reach America from both Lisbon and Ghana, more clear-mindedly than Christopher Columbus who stumbled over it while looking for India.  

During British colonial rule, at the height of de-Arabizing imposition of English in education and public life, he arranged publication of 55 ancient manuscripts that he had procured or copied. Most classical Arabic literature had been destroyed centuries before and most of what survived did so precariously in manuscripts. Through his cumulative publication of manuscripts, and popularizing articles, Ahmad Zaki gave the West-tinctured classes, especially youth, the chance to know what the indigenous heritage was before they repudiated it.

As well as absurdities of popular Egyptian Islam at variance with his classical Arab sources, Zaki sometimes challenged the Azhar-educated 'ulama's understanding of the Qur'an, interpretation of which they considered their preserve. For instance, in 1933 he denied that the talking naml mentioned in the Qur'an were ants as the traditional 'ulama contended following the form of the noun: the naml were really humans, the Qur'an's phrase wadil-naml a simile to indicate that the valley was densely populated.

62. Ibid pp.128-129.
63. Details of classical works printed under Zaki's project, financed by the Council on Ministers in ibid pp. 60-67.
64. For instance, Zaki refuted that the Sayyidah Zaynab mosque in Cairo could contain the tomb of Zaynab the daughter of 'Ali because she never came to Egypt. Ibid pp. 145-148. In a mordant touch, Zaki suggested that the tomb attributed to "Zaynab" in Cairo might have originated as an ancient Pharaonic pagan shrine.
65. The narrative of the naml is in Surat al-Naml, Qur'an 27: 17-19. The Hebrew King and Prophet Solomon's ability to understand the speech of the naml was affirmed there in the context of his comprehension of the languages of a range of birds and non-human beings.
He cited the Mu'tazilite, non-Sunni classical 'Iraqi proto-sociologist al-Jahiz (d. 869 AD) in support. The Azharite shaykh Sadiq 'Arjun assailed him (1933) in the press for this heresy, although Zaki's popularizing discoveries on classical Arab glories and helpfulness to the Azharis kept him a following in their ranks. The acculturated Muslim Farid Wajdi (1886-1954) in 1933 hailed Zaki's reinterpretation of the meaning of al-naml as undercutting the "sceptics" who tried to misrepresent the Qur'an as irrational — no doubt he meant to the modern-educated. Aided by the earlier classical Arab — extra-Egyptian — intellectualism, Zaki surgically restructured understanding of Islam in ways that eliminated contradictions with Western rationalistic and secular attitudes: his West-colored elite now could enjoy both traditions simultaneously, as they craved.

67. Ibid pp. 208-209. It is to be noted that 'Arjun himself, in answering Zaki from al-Ahram, had to pay tribute to his past "Andalusian and geographical inquiries and historical rectifications and Arabist discoveries": only, Zaki henceforth had to leave the Qur'an alone. Ibid. At the memorial function after Zaki's death, Rashid Rida extolled the care with which "the Shaykh of Arabism" sought "the company of the men of religion" for searching religious discussions with them, to extend his understanding of Islam. The Liberal Constitutionalist philosopher-politician Mustafa 'Abd al-Raziq, paid tribute to Zaki's contributions to the welfare of the Azharites when he was a member of that religious university's Supreme Council; Azhari students present shouted out for the long life of the memory of the lost one. "Ta'bin Shaykh al-'Urubah" (Meeting in Commemoration of the Shaykh of Arabism), al-Mugattam 19 January 1935 p. 8.
68. Ibid p. 168. Wajdi stopped short of unqualifiedly endorsing Zaki's reinterpretation of naml, judiciously citing the Qur'an's own statement (Qur'an 3: 7) that God sent down two kinds of ayats: clear/precise (muhkamat) and others whose meanings were ambiguous or allegorical (mutashabihat) and which thus might never receive any single interpretation binding on the believers. Ibid. Wajdi devoted decades of his life to churning out articles that depicted Islam and concepts and data from the West as compatible. This was to dissuade West-influenced Egyptians and Arabs from finally breaking with Islam under influence of Western books they read. For Wajdi's sometimes inept articles in this mode while editor of al-Azhar's organ Majallat al-Azhar (1933-1952) see Cantwell-Smith, Islam in Modern History pp. 127, 137-161.
Differentiation of Islamic Nationalities

Up to Ahmad Zaki's death, Egyptians thought of him as a person who brought not just Arabs but all Islamic peoples together. In 1932, the liberal Arabo-Muslim monthly al-Ma'rifah described him as no longer an Egyptian but a man who had incorporated into his being "all the tendencies of the whole East". Zaki was dedicated to propagandize "the glory of the [classical] Arabs and to ... nourish the growth of Arabism in the heart of every Arab and in every Eastern tongue in whose elements Arabic is well represented" --- clearly, such Islamic languages as Turkish, Persian, Urdu, Malay-Indonesian etc. The crowded gatherings at his "Abode of Arabism" (Dar al-'Urubah) were thronged with Arabism's "outstanding figures and leaders" and brought every Egyptian who attended "face-to-face with an Hijazi or an 'Iraqi or a Syrian or a Yemeni or an Afghan or a Persian or an Indian or a Moroccon or a Javanese or a Chinese etc". The writer enthused that this forum for "eminent people, scholars and litterateurs" had decisively fostered the new Arab community consciousness that had brought the realization of "Arab Unity" "near". The latest function at Zaki's Abode of Arabism, however, had been to honour the Indian Muslim delegation to the Islamic Conference, headed by Mawlana Shawkat 'Ali and "the great poet Muhammad Iqbal".

Thus, the activities of Zaki and his Eastern League subordinately pan-Islamized as well as pan-Arabized the contacts and thinking of some modern-educated Egyptians. The Eastern League had extended the community energies of some Egyptians out far beyond the sphere of daily Arabic speech up to the 1930s. This had become a drag on demarcation of the tighter pan-Arab community cohering by 1932.

Nonetheless, Zaki did build some ethnicizing dynamics into interaction with a range of Muslim nationalities. He simultaneously evoked (a) the affinities and relationship

between different Muslim language groups in the East and
(b) the differences in their cultures and backgrounds. He
approved that Muslim peoples closely connected in the past
now might accentuate, rather than reduce, some of their
respective discrete identity elements in the short term
through Westernizing nationalisms.

The pan-Eastern milieus that Zaki fostered made vivid
to Egyptians both the linguistic similarities and
differences between predominantly Muslim peoples. In a
1921 speech at the home of the Egypto-Iranian Mashki, he
voiced his pleasure at hearing the Egyptian, Syrian and
North African dialects of "the sons of Arabic" as well as
Persian, Turkish, Indonesian and an unspecified Indian
language: he carefully distinguished "the nations of
Arabism" from the others in "the lands of the East".²⁰

Zaki felt that "the three nations" (umam) the Arabs,
Turks and Persians --- the Muslim core-region --- had
special affinity in the East. In a 1925 article he hailed
the struggle of "the sons of the Arabs" to smash the
shackles of "imperialism"; he did not expect Turks or
Persians or Arabs to aid each other in the short term. By
now he was clearly excited at the Westernizing reforms in
Iran and Turkey. It was later, in 1928, that Ataturk
substituted the Roman script, but it was already clear by
1925 that his new establishment was resolved to slash the
Arabic and Islamic content of Turkish. Yet, Zaki rejoiced
"that Turkish culture has entered a new bold period" and
that the Persians, too, were preparing "to recover their
ancient authentic glory". Both military dictator Reza Khan
and his son "Shah" Mohammed Reza after 1941, stressed the
pagan Sassanid period, preceding the Arab conquest, as the
core of Iranian national identity, downgrading Islam.
Zaki's own campaigns to expel Turkish words from literary
Arabic contributed to differentiation. But he believed
that the political struggle these three predominantly
Muslim peoples had with the West would motivate them to
integrate in unprecedented, modern ways in the long term:

70. al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki p. 230.
"a gigantic bloc would form in the Near East able to stand in the face of European imperialism so that it will see it as in its vital interest to treat the East equally". Zaki in 1925 toyed with the idea that this self-defensive grouping, in conjunction with the West-inspired self-modernization by Turks, Persians and no doubt Arabs, would usher in a revival of "the triangular culture" (Arab-Persian-Turkish). Renewing the vision of al-Nadim in the 1890s, Zaki visualized the rise of some "developed class (al-tabaqat al-raqiyyah) of eminent men knowing the three languages" in the Turkish-Persian-Arab bloc. Of course, the Turco-Circassian landed aristocracy in Egypt with its Arabic-Turkish bilingualism, the Shi'ite clergy (but also some secular writers) in Iran who read Arabic as well as Persian, and traditional-religious and secular Turkish intellectuals who knew all three languages, had somewhat prefigured such a pan-Muslim trilingualism.

To Linguistic Nationalism

During British colonial rule, Ahmad Zaki as a translator (from 1892) and then Secretary (1897 - 1922) to the Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Nuzzar) drove long-current Turkish, European and colloquial Egyptian loan-words from official correspondence. From the outbreak of World War I, he was often asked to provide various ministries with Arabic terms for ranks and recondite bureaucratic titles: he supplied many from the Arabic sources about the classical "Islamic governments", in which he was steeped. While in office prior to 1922, Zaki invented or made current such common purist terms of standard modern Arabic as sayyarah for motor-car, sihafah for press, or darrajah for bicycle. Due to the dominance

71. See mid-1925 article by Ahmad Zaki in al-Ahram excerpted by al-Jundi in ibid p. 236.
72. It was crucial for enabling him to make many Egyptians at least understand sayyarah that Zaki could include it in the texts of the official traffic laws he helped draft. al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 74-76. The case of sayyarah, which Zaki used governmental structures to propagate from 1901, underscores the limited ability of governments to impose neo-classical word-coinings in extensively illiterate Egypt. Literate Egyptians came to understand sayyarah when they read it, but in daily speech all...
of Western tongues in education and modern life, many Egyptians had only limited knowledge of standard literary Arabic when the British proclaimed Egypt "independent" in 1922. Zaki, when he retired in that year, bequeathed to the West-tinctured, bilingualized Egyptian elite that took over the new state a core of correct neo-classical literary Arabic to develop as the medium of its government and official life, if they chose.

In 1923, from the Syrian Christian-owned al-Muqattam, Zaki demanded that the Egyptian government refuse to use "avenue", or any other substitute for the classical Arabs' "al-jaddah". "The Turks used this authentically Arab word to name the greatest thoroughfare in Islam's capital of capitals... Can they then be more zealously devoted to the language of the Qur'an than we are?" Thus, his enterprise of extending the classical Arabs' speech into a medium of Egypt's West-patterned modern government and life was in part inspired by religious emotions. He simultaneously implied that Egypt and Turkey were long-standing rivals to lead the world of Islam: when Egypt was under British colonial rule Constantinople had been the Muslim world's leading city. The Turkish Muslims were withdrawing from the Islamic world when Zaki wrote in 1923. In March 1924 the Westernizing Ataturk abolished even the title of a Caliphate, and the Wakil (Registrar) of Cairo's mosque-University of al-Azhar, Muhammad Farraj al-Munyawi, urged the Muslim world to hold its conference to discuss a future Caliphate in Cairo, centre of "the language of

classes even today use the popular coining 'arabiyyah for car. 'Arabiyyah was a popular extension of 'arabah, cab or carriage, to cover the modern invention. "Automobile" was also long used in spoken Egyptian Arabic.

73. Ahmad Zaki Pasha, "Ifriz, Jaddah lil-Lughati wal-Ta'rikh" (Footpath, 'Avenue' --- A Linguistic and Historical Discussion), al-Muqattam 7 December 1923. In this article, Zaki scanned classical Arabic literature about the 'Abbasid empire in West Asia, the earliest period of Arab rule in Egypt imposed by 'Amr Ibn al-'As and the Fatimid Caliphate, in search of authentic classical equivalents of "trottoir" (footpath) and "avenue". Cairo's Department of Roads and Building (al-Tanzim) had already started substituting shari' for "avenue" on its signs: but Zaki opposed this fait accompli because the earliest attestation of shari' in the meaning of street or avenue was in the writings of the 'Iraqi al-Jahiz (b. c. 776 al-Basrah; d. 868-9 al-Basrah).
Islam", not in any capital to which "the language of the Qur'an is alien" 74. Thus, the sense of ethnic difference between (a) Arabic-speaking Muslims, headed by the Egyptians, and (b) the Turks etc, was heightening among both the secular-educated and Islamic-educated Egyptians.

Keeping up his press appeals in 1930, Zaki argued that Arabic equivalents for the host of modern objects and concepts could be created by reviving old Arabic terms with any bearing on new inventions. If classical Arab sources offered no materials, Western words pragmatically had to be used to keep up the quick communication of modernity --- but in forms modified by Arabic's phonology, following the procedure under which the classical Arabs had adopted modifications of originally non-Arab words 75. The nature of the issue that Zaki repeatedly addressed over the decades --- extending standard Arabic so that it could convey modernity --- increasingly defined Egyptians as a section in the contemporary linguistic Arab nation. By 1930 he spoke of the necessity for al-Ummat al-Arabiyyah, the whole Arab nation, to agree on all new Arabic terms devised for modern inventions 76.

Throughout the 1920s, then, Ahmad Zaki Pasha impressed upon secular-educated elite Egyptians that the standard Arabic language was the essence of their identity. The installation of that Arabic in West-developed secular modern life also, ending compartmentalized bilingualism, would make modern activities equip the secular-educated professional classes to understand the old writings of the

76. Quoted al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki p. 183. Already in 1908, Zaki's mind was moving in the direction of a contemporary Arab group defined by language. His proposed Arabic language Academy was to adjust loanwords from European languages to Arab phonology so that "they offend neither the tongue nor taste of the Arab". "al-Ta'rib".
classical Arabs. Zaki's stances on language problems ushered in linguistic, pan-Arab nationalism. He had served the process of Westernization of Egypt in his official career, and seldom voiced detailed unease about the structures, or economic or social patterns or non-traditional elite Egypt was developing under influence of West European models. For him, the classical Arabs had not bequeathed a comprehensive alternative Islamic ideology or social order: the continuity that Egyptians should maintain with the classical Arabs was linguistic and ethical. The Arabs would accept West-derived patterns, institutions and technologies --- but then exclude the West linguistically from them.

Zaki's Relationship with the Christian Lebanese

Islamic emotions sometimes got tangled into Zaki's Arabism. Basically, however, the inner Arab community was something that for him was determined by language (classical Arabic). Zaki well understood that the Arab nation originated in the pre-Islamic Arabian peninsula, and thus originally consisted of Arab pagans and some Arab Christians. He became Secretary-General of the (old) Egyptian University when it opened in December 1908 and lectured on "the conditions of the Arab Nation (al-ummat al-'Arabiyyah) before Islam." He was aware of the indispensable contributions by Arab Christians to Umayyad and 'Abbasid civilization and deeply respected the crucial role of such Lebanon-resident Catholic scholars as Nasif al-Yaziji and the Jesuit Father Louis Shaykhu in reviving the classical Arabs' language and publishing their almost lost literature. The Syrian-owned al-Mugattam and al-Ahram readily published Zaki's numerous articles on pan-Arab historical and current themes: supra-Egyptian pan-Arab consciousness among Egyptians would legitimize long-term relationship by Syrian Christians in Egypt with their land of origin, geographical Syria. As the son of a Palestinian father, Zaki moreover was empathic to such SC

77. al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki p. 77.
loyalty to natural Syria.

After 1918, the French strove to create a distinct Lebanese state and nationality separated from predominantly Muslim hinterland Syria. Zaki in the 1920s tried to dissuade the Catholic Lebanese from withdrawing from the pan-Arab community, and indeed from the traditional Greater Syria. Sensitively attuned to recent non-religious intellectual trends among them, he tried to undermine identification by Christian Lebanese with ancient Phoenicians that alienated them from the current Arab community, arguing that those were really East Arabians who migrated to the shores of Palestine as well as of Lebanon in antiquity, setting up a shared, basically Arab civilization in those two lands. In this argument, Zaki tried to make modern archaeology's rediscovery of the Middle East's ancient history foster unitary Arab nationality, not particularist (Lebanese) separatism. Here, he was pioneering themes to be much developed in Egypt's Arab nationalist thought. 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad mounted a similar identification of ancient Semitic civilizations with Arabism in 1946. He claimed that Arabs originating from the Arabian peninsula have dominated the whole of the Middle East for 5000 years, that all the Semitic peoples that populated it --- including the Hebrews --- were Arab, and that whatever benefits Europeans have gained from the

78. "How can I accept it that my cousin choose for his land and his people a European name that has no origin acceptable either to me or my forefathers? This 'Phoenicia' is a Greek word meaning palm tree...The Lebanese emerged in the original cradle of their race in the islands of Bahrain near the Eastern shore of the Arabian peninsula's al-Ahsa region which is indisputably Qahtanite in origin, Ya'rub in lineage. A group of that sub-section of the Qahtanite tribes on those islands were forced to migrate ... 3,000 years before Christ [and] ... finally settled on the shores of the Mediterranean where these nomadic Arabs (a'arib) established their state ... The civilization that emerged in those towns of Bahrain is the same that produced parallel cultures on the shores of Lebanon and Palestine, especially around Sidon and Tyre. The two civilizations are bound together by the tight bond of historically recorded Arabism supported by archaeological discoveries". The ancient populations of Lebanon were thus racially just a "branch" of the "tree" of Arabism, according to Zaki in 1929. al-Mugattam 13 October 1929 and 16 October 1929 quoted al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 137-140.
region throughout the ages was an Arab heritage.

Zaki's emotional attachment to the Lebanese Christians as an intellectual community that revived classical Arabic and the classical Arabs' literature, appears in a 1925 letter. He had been hurt and disappointed when a cultural body in Bayrut sent him an invitation to a conference in honor of Father Louis Shaykhu (1859-1928) too late for him to reach it in time from Egypt. In his vulnerable, half-jocular, whimsical letter dated 29 January 1925, Zaki


80. He could, however, voice some Egypt-centric prickliness when he thought the Lebanese were being given too much credit for the nineteenth century revival of standard Arabic and its literature. In 1928, from the Syrian-Christian-owned al-Ahram, he had angrily rebutted a writer who gave credit for the modern Arab cultural revival to Lebanon. "Lebanon was not a teacher to Egypt", Zaki responded. "I am the first who knows and pays tribute to" the contributions of the Lebanese "but these had no existence in the first part of the Egyptian renaissance". It was Egypt that culturally nurtured Lebanon's sons so that they later returned to their homeland heavily indebted to her, Zaki argued. al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki p. 289. It was indeed open to Zaki to argue that Egypt under Muhammad 'Ali began its modernization in 1805 while Lebanon remained far more backward until Egypt embarked on its occupation of Lebanon-Syria in 1831. Muhammad 'Ali early started the printing in Egypt of classical Arab and modern technical works in Arabic: Egypt exported these to Lebanon which itself at that time only produced hand-written Arabic books. For a list of Arabic books printed in Egypt, both in modern Western sciences and classical Arab works, that circulated in Lebanon-Syria in the 1830s see A. L. Tibawi, American Interests in Syria 1800-1901 (OUP 1966) pp. 69-71.

81. For a list of the classical — and especially pre-Islamic peninsular Arabian — Arabic texts that Shaykhu edited and printed from rare manuscripts, see Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 515-524. Shaykhu pertinaciously argued the Christian faith of pre-Islamic or early Islamic-era peninsular poets, many of whom were really pagans just lightly touched by Christian language or concepts — if even that. He was also prone to polemics against Islam. These Christianity-centric features were the object of the irony of the secularist Daghir, otherwise appreciative of Shaykhu's pioneering contributions to scholarship, especially to the study of classical Arabic literature, in part as editor of the seminal Jesuit al-Mashriq.
objected to this thoughtlessness as a discourtesy that disrupted communication "between those devoted to the service of science and literature". It disrupted the pan-Arab community of language and blood-relationship between the "cousins" of the two sister countries Egypt and Syria: "neighbors or brothers" who had to cross "desert or sea" had been prevented from attending the Lebanese function. Zaki was aware in the letter of the sense some Catholic Lebanese were developing of a separate Mediterranean Latin-orientated identity. (The French put themselves forward as protective successor-Latins to Rome). He maintained in this 1925 letter his consistent sense of a Greater Syria of which Lebanon was a component: Egypt and al-Sham (Syria: he put Lebanon in al-Sham) were al-gutrayn al-shaqqayn (the two brother lands) that should always be united.

Ahmad Zaki's interactions with Lebanese and Syrian Christians show that (literary) language on its own, without Islam, could integrate intimate community for some high-culturized Egyptian political nationalists.

Assessment. The wide Arab identity that Ahmad Zaki Pasha communicated was contoured by sectional self-Westernization and ultra-acculturated. What the aliens said in their European languages fed his consciousness of classical and contemporary Arabs or Muslims in blends with indigenous Arabic sources. Zaki maintained the acculturated strata's duality towards the imperialist West: he had all acculturation's explosively sharp sense of Westerners as lethal destroyers of "the

82. 1925 letter of Zaki in al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 262-265.
83. In 1923, Zaki published in al-Mugattam (SC) a lament for Aswan, occasioned by floods that had devastated the town. The article showed his sense of Egypt's Islamic history as Arab, although the tragedy also increased his sense of parochial closeness of Muslim and Coptic Egyptians. Zaki vehemently blamed British construction of the Aswan dam to serve their own rather than Egypt's economic interests for the disaster, and then placed that within the wider frame of the end of sovereignty of "the lands of the East and its peoples", "the destruction of their golden age and prosperity" at the hands of the "tubercular" infiltration of "the alien". Ahmad Zaki Pasha: "Aswan: Dam'atu Aswan 'Ala 'Izamatiha 1-Ghabirah bi Munasabat Nakbatih 1-Hadirah" (Aswan: Aswan's Tear for Her Bygone Greatness on the Occasion of her Current Tragedy), al-Mugattam 5
East" but on the other hand, he kept up the Kamilists' approach that there was a better, moral West --- represented by orientalists --- whose aid should be courted before resorting to violent struggle. As with Mustafa Kamil earlier, cultural affinity to Westerners and the vested positions of his acculturated constituency prescribed negotiations and appeals to liberal Europe before revolution.

THE AL-SIYASAH INTELLECTUALS: FROM EASTERNISM TO THE MUSLIM PAN-ARAB NATION

The transition from far-flung "Eastern" community to a narrower, language-demarcated pan-Arab nationality is clear in Haykal's article "The Eastern Nations and their Moral Links ... The Arab East is a Single Moral Nation" (published in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah 4 December 1926). It recognised that the community of Arabness had now become almost as imperative as Egyptian particularist nationalism.

The article was occasioned by the visit that the Bengali Hindu poet Rabindranath Tagore had recently made to Cairo. Tagore's spiritual East-versus-materialist West polarity dovetailed into Oswald Spengler's ideas of the decline of the West --- with potent appeal to the whole gamut of colonized Muslim Egyptian intellectuals, even the YMMA. Haykal opened on a note of hope for a potential general Eastern community that could, for instance, unite Egyptians with non-Muslim Indians; he however then shifted to a narrower Arab community that he was coming to recognise had attributes of a linguistic nation. In the article, he repeatedly recognised the West's crushing military and material superiority over the peoples it colonized --- like many intellectuals in his group, counselling Egyptians and other Arabs to avoid any precipitate confrontations with its power. Any explosion could destroy the Egyptian elite's class stakes. Haykal's

December 1923 pp. 1-2.

84. Zaki invited such orientalists as Nallino, Margoliouth and Littman to Eastern League functions and appealed to them there to change "public opinion" in Europe so as to pressure the Western governments to grant "full independence" to "the Arabs". al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 238-239.
hatred of European power, seeped outwards in empathy to even very distant, non-Arab or non-Muslim, Afro-Asian peoples colonized by the West: fostering the wide "Eastern" identification, including its construction of new cultural community.

Thus, Haykal reflected, the "love" with which the Egyptians had welcomed Tagore was due to their awareness of his "Easternism", responding to "the gulf which the Western nations have set up between East and West ... and this united front for which its [the West's] politicians still call [as the means] to resist the East and its demands". However, his article cautiously ruled out, for at least the short term, any political application of this developing wider "Eastern" community. It immediately called only for promotion of "the existing instruments" of the moral unity of Easterners, which would mean contact between their literary personalities, translations etc.

For this only partially secularized Muslim Egyptian writer, Afro-Asian unity would not just be a fleeting instrument with which to break the West's control, and which would then lapse. It was not just that the West had power that the colonized East wanted to wrest back. The Eastern nations have in common a spirituality that the materialistic Westerners lack. The positive basis of the moral unity of the Eastern nations was "the religious spirit that first appeared in the East and which is similar in all its religions", Haykal mused. Such ideas --- spiritual East versus materialistic West --- might sap the acculturated Egyptian intellectuals' will to assimilate the secular modern civilization of the West that they already politically rejected for its imperialism. Their sense of the spiritual East, though, was not yet in the 1920s exclusively Islamic but ecumenical. Haykal recognized that other religions of Easterners, not revealed Islam only, validly expressed the Easterners' inherent, general

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85. Haykal, "al-Umam al-Sharqiyyah wa Silatuha l-Ma'nawiyyah ... al-Shaqr al-'Arabi Ummatun Wahidah Ma'nawayyah" (The Eastern Nations and their Moral Links ... The Arab East is a Single Moral Nation), Al-Siyasat al-Ubu'iyyah 4 December 1926, p. 16.
spiritual orientation. Hailing Tagore, he respected Hinduism, not even related to Islam as Christianity is. The wide East was inclusive of Muslims and non-Muslims: could that attitude be applied to integrate Egyptian/Arab Muslims with Christian Arabs in the narrower Middle Eastern core?

Concentric Eastern Community Zones

The sphere of the classical Arabs' conquests and relations greatly determined with what Afro-Asian peoples Haykal felt Egypt/the Arabs had more affinity, in this 1926 article. Books translated from Persian or the Indian language (al-Hindiyyah) draw an echo in the Egyptian reader's own sensibility, in part because the Arabic-speaking, Persian and Indian "nations had very close contacts with each other for hundreds of years in the past". The classical Arabs had incorporated the Persians into their empire and studied and translated into Arabic Indian literary, intellectual and scientific works. al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah into the 1920s at least introduced its readers to the cultures and literatures of non-Muslim Easterners: for instance, the classical Sanskrit playwright Kalidas. Post-classical Indian works would reflect some acculturation of Hindu culture by Islamic civilization as the consequence of incorporation of Hindus into later non-Arab Muslim states. Haykal in 1926 felt the cultural and other ties of modern Arabic-speakers with (Hindu) Indians as closer than with the Far East. Japan's striking self-modernization gives it some interest for Haykal, yet the Far East is too remote to have much relevance for the Arab East. The "nations of the Arab East" are searching for an ideal upon which to found their future life and wish to derive it from one of their number rather than from a European nation or from a nation of the Far East.

87. "al-Umam al-Sharqiyyah".
To The Pan-Arab Nation

In this article, Haykal well knew that the short-term relations at least between the Arabic-speaking "nations" would be closer than with, for instance, the sub-continent represented by "the Indian poet" Tagore. The long-term goal was to promote a comprehensive Eastern solidarity overarching the differences of languages, religions and political conditions among Easterners. Immediately, however, more than "the general (Eastern) community", a "narrower community" must be strengthened --- "the community of the nations of the Arab East".

The classical Arabs and their supra-Egyptian states were on Haykal's mind in the 1926 essay. Now it focussed on the discrete Arab history and characteristics that set the modern Arabic-speaking "nations" together apart from other populations in the vast East. Haykal approached the verge, even in regard to the overt concepts, of exchanging the established Egyptian for an Arab national identification:

All these nations [of the Arab East] are all one nation in the moral sense ... These nations that the Arabs conquered in the first days of Islam and in which their religious call and language became firmly established more than 1,200 years ago have ... never ceased to be moved by ... an indivisible oneness of feeling. Although each [of the nations of the Arab East] has preserved its national stamp that its natural environment and historical inheritance imposes upon it, a common spirit ... makes each emotionally respond to what affects the other. Whatever evil or good befall Syria, 'Iraq, the Hijaz, Yemen or the lands of North Africa, we here in Egypt feel it profoundly.

Because of the shared language, he continued, all these "nations" of the Arabic East were inevitably eager to learn about and assimilate each other's evolving institutions and ideas. However, he envisaged Egyptian cultural, educational and moral leadership of the other, less modernized and developed (and still politically subject) Arab nations. Egypt, as the "big sister" (al-Shaqiqat al-Kubra) of the other Arabic nations, would "with all joy" assume the "heavy" responsibilities of her position. But Haykal's article was saved from paternalism
by his eagerness to encounter, to learn about, as well as
to teach, Egypt's sister Arab countries: to build up the
proper long-term co-operation with the other Arab nations,
he warned, Egypt would have to send to the other Arab
capitals the same kind of educational missions that she had
sent to the capitals of the West since the early nineteenth
century. Already in 1926, Haykal voiced a concern for
detail and the creation of new instruments for the
long-term engineering of pan-Arab community.

al-Siyasah writers in the 1920s encouraged the
under-employed Egyptian graduates to seek positions in the
understaffed, expanding educational systems and civil
services of other Arab countries. But al-Siyasah further
understood that all parties in the new pan-Arab
relationship --- not just their Egyptian elite --- had to
equally benefit if it were to last. The other Arab parties
in the coming relationship had to be drawn into the
Egyptian institutions and systems which would educate them
so that they could compete with Egyptians while accepting
Egypt's leadership. al-Siyasah in 1927 demanded that the
Egyptian University be opened to the youth of "the Arab
East", publishing appeals to this effect from non-Egyptian
Arab thinkers, including the Palestinian Ishaq Musa
al-Husayni. al-Siyasah contributors in the 1920s
already set out broad lines for educational integration of
the Arab states for which Taha Husayn was still detailing
procedures in his 1937 The Future of Culture in Egypt (Ch.
9).

Pan-Arab possibilities could further the economic
interests of a secondary but growing component in the
Liberal Constitutionalist Party. While large rural
landlords were prominent in the Party, many of them since
World War I had also been investing the wealth they made
from land in the development of banking, in commerce and in
manufacturing companies. The Party leaders and members

88. Ibid.
89. Ralph M. Coury, "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?",
who entered commerce and industry often did so through the Bank Misr after its foundation: the Bank's founder and first President, Tala'at Harb, worked hard in the 1920s to extend its operations over all Arab West Asia, succeeding in Lebanon but not --- despite strenuous efforts--- in Palestine. However cautious al-Siyasah intellectuals were about political entanglements beyond Egypt that they foresaw their crude pan-Arab identification might impose sooner or later, they were adventurous in formulating --- and seizing --- new pan-Arab economic possibilities. An al-Siyasah editorial of 28 March 1927 demanded "an Eastern monetary union" that would eliminate customs barriers. al-Siyasah writers were visionary about the region's economic integration through a new pan-Arab private-enterprise centred in Egypt, since what had been achieved was still modest.

The Political Dimension of Pan-Arabization
Travel in West Asia in the 1920s brought home to al-Siyasah writers the popularity the paper had won among educated Arabs there, in particular the modern intelligentsia, and their readiness to accept the Egyptian intellectual leaders as an ideological avant-garde for the region as a whole. This bestowal of leadership greatly melted away isolationist Pharaonist tendencies among al-Siyasah intellectuals.

Haykal had holidayed in Lebanon/Syria in the Ottoman period. He visited it again in the early 1920s at a time when a Wafdist ministry was prosecuting him for attacks he had waged from the columns of al-Siyasah. The local belletterist and journalistic intelligentsia (arbab al-aqlam wa rijal al-sihafah) told him that the helpfulness of officials and other Lebanese in getting him, his family and his baggage through customs and away from Bayrut port up to Brumanna was due to the interest of literate Lebanese

91. Ibid pp. 112-114.
92. Ibid p. 509.
93. Brumanna is a resort town at a height of 720 metres, 23 kilometres from Bayrut.
in the radical-modernist journal he edited in Cairo. This deeply encouraged Haykal at a time when he faced in Egypt such pressure from the government and a medical operation.

The French authorities in Lebanon, however, left no doubt that the intellectual exchange his journal was promoting between Arabic-speakers had to clash with the European powers' partition of the Arab world. A French officer politely complained in Alay of a letter published in al-Siyasah from its Bayrut correspondent which threatened to create "a bad atmosphere" among al-Siyasah's Lebanese readers because it described a figure the French had exiled (actually a mere outlaw) as a hero and the French administration in Lebanon as "a tyrannical administration... persecuting the heroes of patriotism". Haykal's exquisitely modulated conversation with the officer catches well the latent, ignitable dislike many multi-lingualized Muslim Egyptians had towards the unfriendly France in which they had studied.  

Haykal's reactions in Lebanon and Damascus at the height of Westernizing, isolationist particularism in Egypt illustrate how the operation of shared language would cause the discrete Egyptian entity to break down even as a political community. Communication with other Arabs within the shared literary language was setting Egyptians at odds with Europe or the West as a whole, not only with occupying Britain. al-Siyasah in the 1920s had an almost daily section "Ma'rid al-Ara': al-Bilad al-'Arabiyyah" (Forum for Ideas: the Arab Lands). It stressed Egypt's

94. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 1 pp. 202-204. Haykal assured the French officer that al-Siyasah had not meant to defame France's reputation but had simply published the letter of a correspondent in whom it had confidence as a leading Lebanese journalist: it would happily publish a correction from the (French-supervised) Government of Lebanon. "Could we", the French officer remonstrated, "correct every error occurring in every newspaper around the world?" Replied Haykal: "If such a correction holds no importance to you it can only mean that no ill-effects are anticipated from [the letter]... I would remind you that most editors of al-Siyasah gained doctorates in Paris and that they are not motivated by any hostility towards France --- quite the contrary. But if they come to feel that they are to be called to account whenever they go on holiday in Lebanon or France, I fear that might change... their... love!" Ibid p. 204.

95. Shilliq, Hizb al-Dusturiyyin p. 508.
role as a sanctuary for "free emigres" (al-ahrar) since antiquity and in 1923 called on "the Arabs" to support the Moroccans, "the speakers of the tongue of the Arabs" that "a people among the non-Arabic speakers (gawm min al-'Ajam)" was resolved to destroy. Such items drew the quaint culture struggles and terminologies of the classical Arabs towards a coming pan-Arab interventionism against Western great powers. But alternating spasms of militancy and caution persistently characterized al-Siyasah. In 1932, Haykal denied that the caution and deliberation with which Egyptians considered Arab unity meant that they did not desire its achievement, inevitable at some point. But "we believe that cultural unity is the natural first step to [Arab] Unity". Given the divisive imperial control of Britain over Egypt, Palestine and 'Iraq and of France over Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria and Lebanon, the Western powers had the will and the means to forestall any speedy political Arab "alliance" or U.S.A-style confederation (ittihad). In the article, Haykal played down his erstwhile neo-Pharaohism.

The Arab community evoked in Haykal's early 1926 Tagore article prefigured later anti-Western Arabo-Islamic reaction in Egypt in the 1930s. The religious orientation general to the East is one of the points of difference in its conflict with the opposed camp of the West. However, the definition of religious spirit is still inclusive and integrative of Muslims and non-Muslims when he thought of the community of the East in general. In contrast, the article's description of the classical and modern Arab community was Islamic in flavor. Thus, when Haykal narrowed his focus to the Arab world, he could revert to diluted Islamic community emotions: he defined the classical Arab community at least too much in terms of Islam, without enough regard to Arab Christians. In contrast, neo-Pharaonic Egyptian particularist nationalism, where the national community was defined by secular territoriality,

96. Ibid p. 508.
97. Ibid p. 511.
carefully made room for Copts as equal members in the nation alongside their Muslim Egyptian compatriots. However, the Egyptian Arabist Dr. Mahmud 'Azmi took care to formulate pan-Arab identifications that would attract Copts and Lebanese, Syrian and 'Iraqi Christians into an Arab national community with Muslim Arabs.

Mahmud 'Azmi (1889-1954) had studied in France with Haykal and was al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah's first parliamentary reporter. In 1924, 'Azmi published an article opposing proclamation of King Fu'ad as Caliph of Islam following Kemal Ataturk's abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. This resistance stemmed from 'Azmi's general secularism and the party-political need for the Liberal Constitutionalists to block a measure that would so enhance Egypt's monarch. Mahmud 'Azmi's Ataturk-modelled hostility to tradition prior to the anti-Western, Arabo-Islamic reaction of the 1930s and 1940s delighted the Coptic secularizer Salamah Musa: "when I invited him ('Azmi), at the end of 1930, to write an article for al-Majallat al-Jadidah, he" for a long while "would only accept on condition that his contribution be printed in Latin characters." The visits by Mahmud 'Azmi to Arabic West Asia again underscored to al-Siyasah intellectuals that the real scope of their endeavours was not Egypt alone but rather a general Arabic-speaking entity. 'Azmi avoided the emotions of pan-Islamic community that such contacts could excite even in modernists. al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah, in a 1926 article on "the social relations between the Eastern nations" suggested that Palestine's and Egypt's intellectual lives were now becoming one:

In the same way as Mahmud 'Azmi is well-known and famed in Egypt for his copious literary production ... so is he in Palestine. The people here [Palestine] ... know ... the literary movement [in Egypt] and follow it as they read their own [Palestinian]

98. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 1 p. 122.
newspapers and know their own particular literary movement.

'Azmi spoke before the Young Mens' Christian Association in Jerusalem; the speeches he gave or was welcomed with there were very secular in tone reflecting his ideology at that time and the mixed sectarian make-up of the Palestinian audiences.

Mahmud 'Azmi maintained unusual empathy for the situation and psychology of Arabic-speaking Christians in West Asia and Egypt into the 1930s. In 1938 he penned an article titled "A Front of Arab Peoples: the Necessity of Creating It and the Means to Bring It Together" for the SC al-Hilal which had evoked Arabness as the nexus with Egyptians since 1892. 'Azmi's article was to define the units he wished to unite as "the peoples who belong to Arabic" (shu'ub al-'Arabiyyah), indicating that although they had prior racial origins and histories, the decisive bond of language gave them broad unity. Egypt's thinkers "repeat in season and out of season that [the Egyptians] lead Islam through their long-active al-Azhar". What some Egyptians really aimed at --- even some modernists under "Easternism" code --- was thus a far-flung Islamic entity or Islamic Unity wider than Arabism that would also encompass Iranians, Turks and other Muslims even in China --- a prospect that "raises spectres in front of their Coptic brothers". 'Azmi also warned that the persistence of the peninsular Arabian governments and movements and the North Africans in regarding unity between Arabs as expressing Islam "meets with hesitant wariness" from Lebanon's Christians who still had memories of communal bitterness under Ottoman rule. Instead, sect-neutral aspects of Arab unification should be carried forward --- standardization of educational curricula, academic exchanges, economic unification to remove customs barriers and link currencies, the political coordination of the

international foreign policies of Arab entities --- as the means to integrate Egyptian and West Asian Christians into the pan-Arab movement. 

'Azmi's 1938 retrospect that "Easternism" was an only formally creed-neutral term that carried forward Islamic community was already true for some coverage of Arab identity and other Arab countries in al-Siyasah in the 1920s, amidst its anti-theocratic line. Moreover, the outside Arabs who responded to the dualistic al-Siyasah were ideologically very diverse. Both Fertile Crescent Christians and secularists and very traditionalist Islamic elements voiced favor. The Yemenite Zaydi-Shi'ite Imamic prince Sayf al-Islam Yahya, for instance, praised Mahmud 'Azmi (representing al-Siyasah al-Usbu'iyyah) for his (anti-monarchist, 'ulama-sniping!) paper's efforts to strengthen "the Eastern link" (al-rabitat al-sharqiyyah [sic]). 'Azmi was much more consistently secularist than most al-Siyasah intellectuals, but how far could --- or would --- even he de-Islamize Arabism for the sake of the Christian Arabs? In a 1933 article --- in the face of resurgent political Islamism --- he re-endorsed the marginalization of divisive religion in the post-1918 localist independence movement. 'Azmi nominated pan-Arabism as the natural extension of that community, rejecting a pan-Islamic community given that non-Arab Muslim nationalities (Turks, Persians) were culturally withdrawing. While marginalizing men of religion in the Egyptian-pan-Arab community, he nonetheless evoked a massive less religious "Islamism" --- Islam as patterns of government, economics, society ---, a permanent outcome of "historical development" to be accepted as identity by Muslim, Christian, Jewish and atheist (himself?)

102. "Jabhatun min al-Shu'ub al-'Arabiyyah: Darurat Khalqiha wa Kayfiyat Ta'lifiha" (A Front of Arab Peoples: The Necessity to Create it and the Way to Bring it Together), al-Hilal, November 1938, pp. 1-7; excerpted Muhammah Husayn, Ittijahat. As an instance of Islamic pan-Arabism, 'Azmi mentioned a treaty signed between Sa'udi Arabia and Yemen which the two parties termed the Treaty of Islamic Friendship.


104. Dr Mahmud 'Azmi's 1933 article "Uyyuha Nuqaddim: al-Rabitat al-Shargiyyah am il-Islamiyyah am il-'Arabiyyah?" (Which Should We
Western concepts brought by acculturation can knock out and replace whole bases of what is indigenous. But massively intact Arabo-Islamic sectors, some of them newly re-excavated, flow back around the Western strips. It would be hard to separate Egyptian or Arab community from pervasive Islam, even in modernist contexts.

CULTURAL BASES FOR THE MODERNISTS' PAN-ARABISM

Haykal's Responses to Classical Arab Literature

Although he followed modern Western literary models much more, Haykal in the 1920s was also influenced and constrained by classical Arab works. He was reading fairly widely in the classical Arabs' prose high literature. His limited Arabic vocabulary, however, the legacy of his formal education being almost solely in English or French, sectionalized the classical poetry he could enjoy: pre-Islamic Arabian poetry and styles remained persistently difficult.

The literature, notably Gershoni and Jankowski, has focussed on critical comments by Haykal and other al-Siyasah intellectuals in the 1920s on the classical Arabs, their high literature and on neo-classicist writers in Egypt who strove to model new literature on their integral styles. But Haykal's responsive as well as critical discussion of that ancient literature always stopped short of the radical rejection of classical Arabic literature and the modern literary Arabic descended from it voiced by mainly Christian writers even in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah. Those way-out articles took up the racist thesis of Renan that Semites, the Arabs most of all, were inherently incapable of coherence in literature: literary Arabic in Egypt had always stayed the alien Semitic tongue imposed by the Arab conquerors: peasant folklore was the only "national" literature that survived. By the


Semah, Four Egyptian Literary Critics pp. 87-88.
mid-1920s, Haykal was already withdrawing from the literary faction-fighting between "partisans of the new" and "partisans of the old" in Egypt. He more and more perceived the "war cries" and "ranks" of the two coteries as literary vaudeville motivated by the defense of turf as much as the ostensible issues of literary style and content. He was more alert, now, to shared features at stake in the literary language that he and his modernist colleagues, too, were perpetuating --- but also extending and modifying in their new modernizing literature --- with the archaists.

The two Egyptian factions' joint continuities with the language of the classical Arabs were brought home to him when he visualized both together vis-a-vis radically secularist, iconclastic, in origin Christian, Lebanese writers. Such Lebanese writers as Jubran Khalil Jubran, Amin al-Rayhani and Ilya Abu Madi patterned their styles to the rhythms of their distinctive colloquial spoken dialect with a pervasiveness that jarred such an Egyptian "modernist" as Haykal. With a degree of truth, Haykal in 1925 described the articles and essays of such al-Siyasah modernists as Dr Mahmud 'Azmi as written "in a clear Arabic style" that had broad points of affinity to that of such neo-classicists as Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i: no Egyptian modernist he approved "slapped the rules of traditional grammar and conjugation" in the way that essays of al-Rayhani and Jubran "and those in their camp" did. The full pan-Arab community that used the Arabic literary language had input into the discussions about language development in Egypt in the 1920s. Haykal had read such literature of the radical Lebanese diaspora in the Americas as Jubran's *Broken Wings*, half responding to its "poeticalimaginativeness": however, its chaotic "revolution" of

107. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, *Fi Awqat al-Faragh* (Cairo: al-'Asriyyah 1925) p. 365. Haykal's sense of the basic, son-like (if qualified) affinity that modernists had to maintain with the indigenous old (al-qadim) --- the progenitor of which they were "heirs" --- heightened in his later writings. He came to equate extreme archaists and extreme apers of the West. Haykal, *Thawrat al-Adab* (Cairo: 2nd ed Mitba'at Misr n.d) pp. 50-51.
style threatened the continuity of the language in all its periods. The Egyptian modernists, too, knew that "every present unconnected to the past must perish very quickly," although they did not force modern meanings into the classical literary forms in the total way their archaist compatriots attempted. In 1925 he highlighted Jubran, al-Rayhani and other Lebanese as the arch-Westernizers intent to destroy "the decrepit antiquated language of the [classical] Arabs" and replace it with not just "the life, knowledge and literature of the West" but its stylistic forms: he depicted them as biding their time in disdainful anticipation as Egyptian modernists and archaists used up their energy on a pointless vendetta. Haykal's 1925 paradigm disregarded vocal Islamophile and Arabist attitudes of al-Rayhani, and Jubran to a lesser extent --- attitudes that however structured their quasi-pan-Arab conceptualizations of contemporary community much more than their non-traditional styles.

In his conciliatory gestures towards the neo-classicists in 1925, Haykal distinguished different periods of classical Arab literature, some of which were much more linguistically comprehensible and enjoyable for Westernizing-educated Egyptians of his type than others. Here, he was still uneasy at ultra-totalist archaism from such figures as Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i: "we would not suppose that any of the partisans of the old would confine

110. Ibid p. 366.
111. Jubran's early writings teem with denunciations of the Maronite clergy and the direction they exercised over society and sexuality, and rejected on Syrianist grounds the crude Lebanonist identity and motifs that had been articulated before 1918. Yet, when an Arab Syrian state led by Muslims under Faysal actualized, Jubran put his name to a memorandum by Christian Lebanese writers to the Peace Conference in Paris (also signed by Nasib 'Uraydah and 'Abd al-Masih Haddad) that denied the Syrians were Arabs, claimed that the Arab conquest imposed the Arabic language and implored France "to assume her responsibility in protecting and guiding us". Memorandum text al-Mustaqbal 1 April 1983. al-Rayhani in contrast dynamically resisted the French conquest of Lebanon-Syria and the 1920 creation of Grand Liban, without any ambivalences.
language or literature in our current age to the character they had in the first pre-Islamic peninsular Arabian paganism\textsuperscript{112} --- the exact sector of classical poetry from which al-Rafi'i had drawn much of his vocabulary and idioms. Echoing Taha Husayn's recent tributes in \textit{al-Siyasah} to the 'Abbasid poet Abu Nuwas (died c. 815) as spontaneous, semi-colloquial and accessible to modern Arabic-readers, Haykal reminded the neo-classicists that such 'Abbasid verse --- like Andalusian poetry --- was linguistically very different from pre-Islamic Arabian poetry; he also distinguished between the prose-styles of diverse 'Abbasid authors\textsuperscript{113}. In part, Haykal here may have been controlling the neo-archaists: the classical Arabs had bequeathed no single invariably binding style. But his structurally Western psyche had also been colored by classical Arab works: he had dilettantishly dipped into a fair range of those then in print, although unlike such Islamic-educated modernists as Taha Husayn he did not also explore the much more diverse classical manuscripts at hand in Egypt.

Haykal in 1925 sensitively registered a certain persisting need of even radical, in sectors vocally Westernist, Muslim Egyptian modernists --- exemplified by those in his own \textit{al-Siyasah} group --- to maintain or affirm some aesthetic or conceptual continuity with the Arabo-Islamic past that they subordinated in the 1920s. He patronizingly depicted the archaists as content to live within "the walls of the palaces of the glorious past", penning their new literary works from the relics (\textit{mukhallafat}) of its literature and idioms. These neo-classicists welcomed only those aspects of "the present" that could be conceived to be among the "branches" sent out by the Arab-Islamic "trunk". In contrast, the innovators were intent to naturalize in Arabic the West's perennial creativity in "wisdom [\textit{al-hikmah}], science and poetry". Yet they, too, also had the reflex --- for them more subordinate --- to connect or blend the elements they

\textsuperscript{112} Haykal, \textit{Fi Awqat al-Faragh} p. 367.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid} p. 367.
imported with others in Arab-Islamic civilization: if a "genuine connection" came readily, it was welcome, and if not, then one less genuine could meet their "deep-seated desires" (hawal-nufus) by "clothing the novel meanings and images".  

As early as the mid-1920s several issues of the standard Arabic language pushed Haykal to see all its populations as one category or community. The pan-Arabizing challenges and elements included: (a) the pan-Arab nature of the indigenous past in the language being extended to assimilate the West; (b) the scale of the modernization needed for Arabic, requiring complementary efforts of all its litterateurs, not just Egyptians; and (c) modernity's semi-fusion of the globe's populations. With modern communications, not just the West's civilization but also the literatures and thought of Hindus, Chinese and (classical?) Arabs were contributing to, and good-humouredly competing within, an emerging community of unprecedentedly blending cultures. Relating Arabic to modernity made him see the neo-classicists and "modernists" as partners: together they were constructing the many-faceted medium of future great literature that would maintain the continuity of the language with its past, while representing all the new creative products of "civilization". The entity that was laboring to make the joint literary Arabic viable "within this present civilization" was the (supra-Egyptian) sons of "the Arab East".

While he appreciated aspects of aesthetic creativity achieved in the classical Arab-headed states, Haykal defined that bygone community as "the Islamic nation" (al-ummat al-Islamiyyah) as much as Arab. In view of the major contributions that racial non-Arabs had made to Arabic literature under classical Islam, and that many of them had continued to speak other languages in daily life, Islam had connected ongoing ethnic groups. Yet many non-Muslim Zoroastrians or Syriac Christians had

114. Ibid p. 370.
contributed to the classical Arab literature and thought as well as non-Arab Muslims: it was thus equally problematical for Haykal to characterize that community and its intellectual and literary activity as Islamic or Arab.\footnote{116}

Synthesis (Westernization) Validated. As an acculturated author, Haykal believed that writers, to produce creative literature, had to apprehend the best international thought of their era by reading foreign languages: reading all the high literature in their own language was not enough. This was truest of his era, justifying his elite's transplantation of the West's literary genres and sensibility into Arabic.\footnote{117} But this acculturation-inculcated attitude also highlighted to him the influence of non-Arab ideas and literatures — Greek, Persian, Indian, Spanish — on the development of classical Arabic literature.\footnote{118} He was, in the 1920s,

\footnote{116. A typical, almost gratuitous, "Islamic Nation" reference by Haykal: "Ancient Arabic literature has been erroneously accused of lacking fiction (stories). The grounds on which this is argued is that the ancient Arabic literature has no stories or long poems such as we find in the history of the Greeks but fiction is of long standing and in reality is the core of all classical Arab prose literature ... The major books of adab are full of short and long stories that I cannot doubt were composed under the primary inspiration of the imagination. That is why it cannot be taken as historical evidence for the historical events it narrates although it may validly be cited as evidence about the Islamic nation/community (al-ummat al-Islamiyyah) in the times in which this literature was composed". Haykal, Thawrat al-Adab p. 75. Haykal here was writing of the Kitab al-Aghani of Abul-Paṭraj al-Isbahani (897-967) and the Andalusian Ibn 'Abdi Rabbihi's al-Iql al-Farid, and of other humanist narratives of love or Arab tribal wars not always too connected with Islam proper.}

\footnote{117. Thawrat al-Adab pp. 25-28.}

\footnote{118. The classical Arabs (al-'Arab) "when Islamic civilization flourished in the days of the [Syria-based] Umayyads and the [Baghdad-based] 'Abbaside" were "very seriously translating the sciences of the Persians and the Greeks and the Romans and their literatures ... into the Arabic language". Haykal argued that "much" classical Islamic theology (notably the rationalist, free-will, anti-determinist views of the Mu'tazilites) and Islamic mysticism, drew on preceding concepts of the Greek philosophers and of the Persians. As well as extra-Arab concepts, he also argued direct aesthetic influences upon Arabic literature from originally non-Arab populations whom the Arabs linguistically assimilated in their empires. The mixing of the Arabs with the non-Arab nations of West Asia and "the nations of North Africa and Andalusia [Spain] and Sicily" produced such new forms in Arabic literature as the muwashshah in Spain. Haykal, Thawrat al-Adab pp. 28-29. The muwashshah has clinching refrain-lines ...
reading classical Arab works with pleasure for their own sake, and as a spin-off justifying from them (a) his group's culture-borrowing from the classical Arabs; and (b) tentative new West-patterned free-mixing between the sexes in his elite Muslim class (Sukaynah the daughter of Husayn the son of 'Ali). The range of classical Arab or Muslim works he read, and now cited to justify a new blending of Arabo-Islamic and non-Muslim cultures, was limited, consisting of masterpieces of mannered literary prose (Ibn al-Muqaffa' 120, al-Jahiz 121), poetry (Abu Nuwas)

in vernacular Spanish, supporting Haykal that it was a verse genre begat by some Romance model.

119. Dual-cultured, Haykal argued from classical Arab as well as European motifs for a liberal society with free-mixing between the sexes in the still tradition-bound Egypt of the 1920s. Besides the illiteracy widespread in the Arab East and scant patronage from government, the rareness of creative narrative (verse or prose) in modern Arabic literature was also due to an emotionally impoverishing lack of a class of educated women, present in Europe's eighteenth century salons and in its twentieth century, who could mix on an equal footing with writers and encourage them. Such equal women had greatly promoted the blossoming of Western literatures: similar women could be found "if we refer to the Arabs in the jahilyyah (pre-Islamic age of peninsular Arabia), and in the first pristine period of Islam (sadr al-Islam) and in the days of Islam's flourishing and greatness". He cited Sukaynah, daughter of Husayn son of 'Ali, and granddaughter of Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet, who inspired, patronized and encouraged literature, using the prestige of her lineal descent from "the Arab Prophet". Ibid pp. 89-90. Cf. "Sukaynah" EI(l).

120. Haykal (ibid p. 29) also described as a Persian in ethnic origin the 'Abbasid Ibn al-Muqaffa', who translated directly into Arabic a Pahlavi version of the Indian Panchatantra animal fables and the Persian Book of Kings. He also instanced as another racial-ethnic Persian who synthesized non-Arab with Arab elements Badi' al-Zaman al-Hamadhani (969-1008), originator of the maqamah (dramatic assemblies) form of Arabic literature (ibid). Ibn al-Muqaffa' did indeed transplant into Arabic intact components of pre-Islamic Iran's literary tradition.

121. Haykal bent the classical reality to depict ancient Arab authors as multi-lingual precursors of his Egyptian intellectual colleagues when he exaggerated al-Jahiz's acculturation: "al-Jahiz's Arabness is a matter for doubt although his knowledge of Persian is not ... because it is mentioned in his book al-Bayan wal-Tabyin" (on Arabic rhetoric). Ibid p. 29. Persian words and phrases were numerous in the spoken Arabic of the racially-mixed urban populations of 'Iraq among which al-Jahiz (c. 776-868) moved, and therefore appear in his accounts of social life; however, this in origin partly Abyssinian writer's demolitions of the pretensions of non-Arab shu'ubi writers who asserted their nations' equality with the Arabians revealed limited knowledge of — and hostility to — Iran's pre-Islamic past. The number of classical Muslim writers who could read the
and Qur'anic exegesis (al-Zamakhshari\textsuperscript{122}), that had been standard since the 1890s for acculturated Egyptians who aspired to master literary Arabic in order to write or orate.

Nonetheless, the old Arab works stimulated Haykal's shift from an Egyptian to a pan-Arab identity. His interest in cultures-synthesis and diverse ethnic groups under classical Islam made him conceive the classical Arab-Muslim states and societies as Islamic rather than Arab. It also directed him to urban-literate Arab-Islamic culture and thought developed in 'Iraq, Syria or Arab Spain, rather than provincial Egypt for the Islamic period; this extra-Egyptian indigenous heritage would blend into, and provide impetus for, the achievement of cultural modernity. An exception was his argument --- borrowed from al-Siyasah colleague 'Abdallah 'Inan --- that the Thousand and One Nights (Alf Laylah wa Laylah) was an expression of the Egyptians' (national?) gift for creative narrative/fiction\textsuperscript{123}. (Given their inherent pan-Arab

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\textsuperscript{122} Haykal cited al-Zamakhshari (1075-1143) who despite Haykal's description of him as "one of Arabic literature's outstanding figures" (\textit{min fuhul al-adab al-'Arabi}), contributed more to formal philological, religious and philosophical thought. al-Zamakhshari held the Mu'tazilite heresy and his commentary on the Qur'an, "its sting ... drawn in an expurgated edition by al-Baydawi ... remains to this day the most popular commentary". H. A. R. Gibb, Arabic Literature: an Introduction (OUP 1974) p. 123. It is to be noted that al-Baydawi's version of al-Zamakhshari's tafsir of the Qur'an seems to be the source of much of the vocabulary and idioms of the political speeches and journalism of Mustafa Kamil and other acculturated Egyptian nationalists active from the mid-1890s.

\textsuperscript{123} Haykal, Thawrat al-Adab p. 85: yet it was typical of his and the al-Siyasah intellectuals' distaste for Egyptian late classical or post-classical products in comparison to the 'Abbasid great tradition that Haykal found the superstition of the Arabian Nights repugnant. Ibid p. 78. Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Inan's approach to Alf Laylah wa Laylah and more classical Arabic literature (Following Dr Muhammad Ghallab) in 'Inan, "al-Athar al-Hayyah li-Misr al-Chabirah fil-Mujtama' al-Misri al-Hadith" (The Living Traces of Bygone Egypt in Modern Egyptian Society) al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah 5 October 1929. This article is discussed in Appendix 2 on dysfunctional Arabism within Pharaonism.
authorship and content, scanning old Arabic works for Egyptian specificity pan-Arabized particularists anyway). Generally, in regard to the past of Arabic, Haykal accepted a rather unitary, territorially far-flung classical Arab tradition in which Egypt's contributions did not figure much.

In the 1920s, Haykal and his journal al-Siyasah had alternated homeland-sanctifying particularism with prototypes of later pan-Arabism. By the 1930s, Haykal could stand back from the Egyptian territorial unit and see it as one in a range of alternatives around which Egyptians could build a modern Arabic literature: the varying strengths of various cultural components in the individual formations of Egyptian writers, himself included, influence what territorial bounds they set upon community in their creative literature.

He still in spasms tended to feel that the engagement of intimate personality essential to inspire quality literature was more likely when the writer depicted "our life and the life of our forefathers and the environment of our homeland". But were the Pharaohs or the Arabs his "forefathers"? He was more and more aware that other Arab lands, too, could command intimate or semi-intimate emotions in Egyptians even when, unlike Egypt, not directly experienced in childhood: literary experiences could weight the balance. In his 1933 collection Thawrat al-Adab, Haykal maintained intact a 1929 passage in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah that had invested the Nile (Egypt) with pseudo-Pharaonic divinity. But during a 1932 visit to Syria, Haykal passed Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, birthplace and residence of the blind Syrian religious sceptic, ascetic and poet Abul-'Ala al-Ma'arri (973 - 1057). al-Ma'arri's imagined form and his works of literature, wisdom and philosophy --- "a part of my youth" --- surged up in his mind's eye: "I felt as though this town which I had never seen before held a portion of my life". Haykal had never studied al-Ma'arri's works in a detailed scholarly way,

125. Ibid pp. 118, 125-126.
having carefully read only In Memory of Abul-'Ala by "my friend Dr. Taha Husayn". If his reaction to Abul-'Ala's birthplace could be so strong, what would be the case of "those who study the history of all our ancestors in the various Arabic-speaking countries" at a level "that knits their souls to these ancestors (aslafl) and to their age and their civilization?" 126.

Even in the neo-Pharaonic 1920s, Haykal had argued the compatibility of the positive aspects of the West's civilization with indigenous identity as often in terms of the classical Arabo-Islamic civilization as of some Pharaonic culture. By the 1930s he was wavering towards the general Arab past, rather than an independent, originally Pharaonic Egyptian one, as the basis to which new Arabic literature should link the Egyptian present:

Is it necessary that the connection ... be to the lands of the Arabs [bilad al-'Arab --- Arabia] so that all the lands which speak the Arabic language have continuity to [Arabia's] history, culture, monuments and teachings like the continuity that all lands of the West demonstrate with ancient Greece and Rome? Or should the link between present and past be a continuity of every Arabic-speaking nation with its past so that Egypt would be bound to ... the Pharaohs, Cyrenaica to Carthage, Syria to the Phoenicians with classical Arabic as the link between [separate particularist neo-pagan] cultures? 127

Here, modern Western high literatures reinforced the acculturation-eroded classical Arabs as the definitive people for the modern self, in comparison to the faint Pharaohs. Europe's distinct literary languages still derived central genres, shared images and vocabulary and basic intellectual concepts from ancient Greece and Rome. Europe's classicism here was nudging Haykal to accept the

126. Ibid p. 115.
127. Ibid pp. 105-106. However, Haykal was aware of the quarrel between the ancients and moderns in French literature and saw such writers as Moliere, Rousseau and Diderot as "throwing off the garments of Athens and Rome". Ibid p. 39. Even here, though, where the French pattern validated a milder break by Egyptian modernist literature with archaist cultivation of the idioms of classical Arabs, he was aware that French innovators maintained continuity with Greek and Latin and that the Egyptian modernists would have a much tighter relation to the classical Arabs' language.
classical Arabs as the starting-point for the new literatures of the Arab countries that were to have been "national". Even had he remained a literary particularist, Qur'an-defined Arabic had to stay the sapping medium of the images of divergent antiquities in new particularisms. Like his master Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, he had impulses to loosen some linguistic constraints of the classical Arabs --- but could never carry through the differentiation of separate written languages that begat plural nationalities where Latin had been spoken.

**Taha Husayn's Historical-Literary Arabism**

Throughout the more modernist 1920s, then, the acculturation-thinned steel band of literary Arabic never ceased to link Haykal to the classical Arabs beyond Egypt and to contemporary writers in the lands in which they had lived. This basis for a modern successor pan-Arab community persisted despite such destructive Western influence as the post-1918 partition of the region. Haykal's intermittent, shaky, home-made formation in classical Arabic and Islam was common in his class. Dar al-'Ulum or Azhar-educated members of his modernist group celebrated diverser aesthetic-literary creativity of the classical Arabs: they transmitted many of those elements to their solely Westernizing-educated intellectual colleagues, both passing them on to the common audience.

In the 1920s, West-patterned cultural and modernizing enterprises often determined what areas of the classical Arab literature and past al-Siyasah intellectuals chose to evoke. Nonetheless, basic aesthetic features of the classical Arabs' literature limited how much West-patterned innovation or ad-hoc development most modernist Muslim Egyptian intellectuals could accept. Both Taha Husayn, representing modernists of blended Islamo-Arab and Westernizing educations, and Haykal --- those with purely Westernizing education --- protested against radical-modernist Christian Lebanese or Syrians who too far-reachingingly snapped continuity with the main idioms bequeathed by the classical Arabs. Thus, Taha from
al-Siyasah voiced divided responses to the diaspora
Lebanese Ilya Abu Madi, who at the age of nineteen migrated
to America. Taha was probably outraged at the outset by
the frame verse with which Abu Madi opened his diwan
al-Jadawi: "you cannot be my companion if you suppose
poetry consists of words or metres". Brushing aside
compliments that Abu Madi acquired his limpidity of style
during his secondary education in Egypt, Taha observed that
the poet had elevated his incapacity to use metres
correctly into the credo for a new school in Arabic
poetry. He responded to Abu Madi's themes --- hedonism,
wine, quasi-socialist egalitarianism and Ma'arri-like
scepticism --- but the violations of classical grammar and
metre disqualified them from being poetry.\(^\text{128}\)

This disregard of poetical forms in favour of
"meanings" had not been known either in the "Lands of the
Arab East": it rather originated in the (mainly Christian)
Syrian diaspora of the two Americas, and was now infecting
a section of Egyptian youth. Sounding like 'Abdallah
al-Nadim in his xenophobic tirades on language and nation
(Ch.2) Taha depicted himself as standing almost alone
against "foreign corruption" and non-Arab unintelligibility
(al-ratanat al-A'jamiiyyah) in his combat to save literary
Arabic.\(^\text{129}\). Taha's deep response to the poetry of the
Lebanese Fawzi al-Ma'luf\(^\text{130}\) showed his identification with
mountainous Lebanon and his empathy for the Lebanese in the
diasporas of the two Americas: for Taha, al-Ma'luf's grief
of separation from Lebanon in his exile carried forward
"yearning" (hanin) for irrevocably lost "encampments" and
the loved ones that throughout the ages since pre-Islamic
Arabia had been the main aspect of "the soul of the Arab"
expressed in poetry. Taha was eager to graft onto Egyptian
poetry verse by such a Christian Lebanese as al-Ma'luf that

\(^{128}\) Taha Husayn, Hadith al-Arba'a (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1964) v. 3
pp. 195-201.

\(^{129}\) Ibid pp. 200-201. Taha was to prove cold and unsupportive
towards the new, experimental --- sometimes non-metrical ---
poetry written in Arabic after World War II. Muhammad Mustafa
Badawi, Modern Arabic Literature and the West (London: Ithaca

\(^{130}\) For Fawzi 'Isa Ma'luf see Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 720-726.
adapted the classical Arabs' metres and idioms to modern experience without breaking the continuity of Arabic poetry.\(^{131}\)

None of them very religious in the 1920s, and influenced by such humanistic French writers as Hugo, the al-Siyasah intellectuals had a flexible attitude to human nature that cherished positive qualities or areas of goodness in individuals corrupted in other respects or prone to unbridled passions.\(^{132}\) Taha characterized the classical Arab past in West Asia thus in the 1920s from al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah. He tugged Egyptians away from the stereotypically heroic and triumphalist terms in which many of them had viewed and were to view the classical Arabs, but in de-idealizing those Arabs still valued their lives and history. Taha in 1924 vividly reassessed the Umayyad Caliph al-Walid Ibn Yazid whose brief reign (743-744) ended when he was killed in a rebellion. Works composed under the destroyers of the Umayyads, the 'Abbasids, branded him the ultimate Umayyad infidel libertine who withdrew from Islam and the burdens of public life into the desert where he swam through pools of wine and targeted the Qur'an with his bow. Taha cautioned about 'Abbasid propaganda exaggeration and traced with human warmth the intrigues of his uncle to prevent him from assuming the Caliphate, that drove al-Walid into the desert and to alcohol. Looking at al-Walid "from the literary point of view", Taha responded to the royal Umayyad honesty and self-pride and vivid accounts of hunting and drinking scenes in his extant poetry. Although often a loser in politics and love, and certainly not a figure who could be fitted into modern-day Muslim traditionalism's behavioral demands, the Caliph al-Walid Ibn Yazid in Taha's revisionism exhibited crucial good qualities in classical Arab life that made him the peer of other Umayyad and 'Abbasid Caliphs honored by historians.\(^{133}\)

Beyond a doubt, Taha's humanist recreation in the

\(^{131}\) Taha, Hadith al-Arba'a v. 3 pp. 178-185.
\(^{132}\) Safran, Egypt in Search p. 158.
\(^{133}\) Taha, Hadith al-Arba'a v. 2, pp. 139-159.
1920s of Umayyad and 'Abbasid life --- which stressed libertinism, religious doubt even among Islamic religious scholars and inter-ethnic exchanges and tensions in 'Iraq --- clashed with attempts to articulate a neo-theocratic or fundamentalist Islamic ideology by modern-educated Egyptians (some of them close to the al-Siyasah milieu: Tala'at Harb, Young Men's Muslim Association). Taha's articles on classical Arab subjects in al-Siyasah, later collected in Hadith al-Arba'a', were interpreted as instrumental by Charles D. Smith (1983). Taha's major commitment was to the unique rationalist creativity launched by ancient Greece, Smith's paradigm ran: he evoked increased disrespect shown to the Caliphs and Islam, and an atmosphere of free thinking, in the first two centuries of Islam only to suggest that change towards the Greek-Western model was possible in Egypt. Smith's Eurocentric point of vision could not catch the aesthetic grip the classical Arabs kept on Taha, compelling him to restore their (more congruent) literature alongside the Western thought and literature he implanted in Arabic.

Taha on one plane was lancing the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Arabs against (a) Islamists who projected them as a prescriptive pietist model for modern societies and (b) neo-archaists who wanted to impose densely Jahili and rhetorical classical language within modernity (his enemy Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i). However, many youth in his acculturated audience had very limited understanding of or interest in the classical Arabs or their literature: his resort to such themes reduced as well as swelled the audience for his unusually Westernist secularist modernism. Like Haykal, Taha after World War I had been alarmed by the deculturated attraction many secular-educated Egyptians felt to the English, French and German poetry of "the Western civilization": in contrast, one friend informed Taha, the classical Arab poetry he promoted was unreadable because its language and life-styles were so different. Taha meant to lead into

accessible classical verse young Egyptians whom impenetrable pre-Islamic and early Islamic compositions alienated. That popularization of classical Arab literature would "realize our nationalism and prevent us from dissolving into the foreign"\textsuperscript{135}. Taha restored the full range of classical Arabic literature from \textit{al-Siyasah}: he relished the half-Persian libertine Abu Nuwas' satires against the retention of old Jahili poetical conventions in very different urban 'Abbasid 'Iraq\textsuperscript{136}; but himself offered a panoramic overview of jahili Arabian poetry\textsuperscript{137}.

The classical Arabo-Islamic subjects and issues on which Taha and his \textit{al-Siyasah} colleague Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Iran chose to publish from the early 1920s were to diverge more and more radically. Taha's lukewarm responsiveness to more political 'Abbasid verse that celebrated the formally Islamic Caliphs sprang from his limited interest in political power: the functions of the Islamic scholars and legists and those of the religious Caliph --- indeed all official institutions --- were charades: the real centre of Arab life and creativity was the permissive private lives of individuals voiced by the poets. In contrast to Taha's attraction to disorder --- hedonism, irreverence, philosophical doubt and \textit{zandagah} heresy --- in classical Islam, the colonized 'Inan was drawn to classical Arab prowess and cohesion: their initial Islamic conquests but even more the internationally feared Umayyad and 'Abbasid superstates. 'Inan was to take the annual summer expeditions of the 'Abbasid Caliphs against Byzantium as an exciting aspect of the millennial war between Muslim East and Christian West\textsuperscript{138}.

\textsuperscript{135} Taha in \textit{Wafdist al-Jihad} in 1935: \textit{Hadith al-Arba'a} v.1 pp. 9 - 17.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid v. 2 p. 96.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid v. 1 pp. 18-145. Taha's recreation of jahili peninsular Arabian poetry would have done Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i proud for thoroughness and extent.
\textsuperscript{138} See the biography of 'Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid in 'Inan's 1947 book \textit{Tarajim Islamiyyah: Sharqiyyah wa Gharbiyyah} (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji, 2nd ed, 1970) pp. 10-16. Most of this material was published as articles in the preceding fifteen years. C.f. fn 6 for 'Inan's Crusaderist characterization of the West.
In the 1920s, Haykal tried to structure his particularist celebrations of the Pharaonic period and the determinism of the land of Egypt so as to bring Christian and Muslim Egyptians together within the new nationalism. In respect to characterizations of classical Arab literature and history, Taha's accounts of Umayyad Syria and 'Abbasid 'Iraq fitted in best with greater closeness between Christian and Muslim Arabs: the interactions of Muslims and Christians sounded relaxed, and antithetical to Islam when alcohol was the nexus. In contrast, Haykal took official Islam in classical Arab states more seriously, despite his sharp awareness of non-Muslim influences, and had a reflex to characterize those states and the community each promoted in terms of Islam at the expense of Arab ethnicity and religious minorities. Coptic and other Arab Christians would not feel at ease in an Arab past whose Islamicity Haykal maintained despite secularized interests. Yet the al-Siyasah intellectuals' obsession with language spotlighted contemporary Christian Lebanese writers to Egyptians.

Assessment. Many of Haykal's and Taha Husayn's stances and procedures on literary and language issues worked against Egyptianist principles that they and more extreme writers also affirmed in the 1920s. Haykal in the 1920s was sharply aware how deeply colonialist parsimony and foreign presences had impoverished the knowledge of classical Arabic among younger-generation Egyptians. Taha saw himself as an almost lone warrior defending the buckling literary norms of the classical Arabs. Sometimes they got impatient with the archaists but in the final analysis neither was prepared to risk radical experiments on a vulnerable literary language that might fall apart.

In the 1920s, then, Taha (and Haykal less densely) recirculated humanistic components of classical Arab life and literature distinct from Muslim traditionalism. Their flood of West Asian classical Arab materials diluted specific Egyptian elements of language and history in new generations. The dense, vivid sectors of the classical Arabs that Taha presented made other intellectuals like
Haykal or 'Inan more aware of that pan-Arab past when developing a new pan-Arab community, and responding to Zionism, in the 1920s.

RESPONSES TO THE 1929 CLASHES IN PALESTINE

In August 1929, communal clashes flared between Muslim Arabs and European Jewish settlers in Jerusalem and then other parts of Palestine; 800 people were killed or injured. The bloodletting in Palestine brought the latent contradiction between the secularoid-particularist and Arab-Islamic identity elements that al-Siyasah intellectuals had been simultaneously developing in the 1920s to a head, forcing them to make choices.

The 1929 violence had some non-religious sources. Palestinian peasants evicted throughout the 1920s by Zionist purchases from the lands they had tilled now hit back at any Jews, including anti-Zionist ones at Hebron. Yet Zionist organizations throughout the 1920s had carefully focussed their conflict with the Palestinians around religious shrines in Jerusalem in order to attach apathetic diaspora Jews. The ostensible stakes were thus religious sites in Jerusalem: the Jews' Wailing (Western) Wall, and the Muslims' al-Aqsa mosque built by the Umayyad Caliph 'Abd al-Malik in 691 AD where Muhammad was thought to have stopped during his night-ascent from Mecca to Paradise. The 1929 clashes came at the peak of a ten year "two-track" drive by the verbally "moderate" Zionist agencies and by Vladimir Jabotinsky's armed Zionist militants (whom the official Zionist agencies in public rebuked) to take over the Wall area, raze the contiguous Mughrabi quarter and expel its native Arab inhabitants.139

139. Mary Allen Lundsten, "Wall Politics: Zionist and Palestinian Strategies in Jerusalem, 1928", Journal of Palestinian Studies, Autumn 1978, pp. 3-27. The "extremist" Revisionist Jabotinsky complained that the Zionist Commission headed by Weizmann requested and financed his [Jabotinsky's] organization of the military Hagana from 1917 but in public put the blame on him. "Wall Politics", p. 10, fn. 20. In 1918 Jabotinsky's Jewish battalions marched on the Wailing Wall in defiance of a British order and engaged in street fighting with Arab passers-by. Ibid. p. 7. The Hagana claimed credit for the bombing of a Mughrabi Arab home near the Wall in retaliation for harassment,
In addition, for many years Zionists in the diaspora and the Hebrew press in Palestine had repeatedly called for the rebuilding of the Temple of Solomon. This would entail razing the al-Aqsa shrine: a perception important in involving Muslim Egyptians, even more Westernized ones, in the Palestinian-Zionist conflict.

Such West-influenced milieus as the Eastern League (al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah), the Young Men's Muslim Association, and the al-Siyasah intellectuals/Party of Liberal Constitutionalists, and their wider audiences, had been left in no doubt that the Palestinians were a composite Muslim-Christian community. Haykal's and al-Siyasah's preoccupation with issues of the standard Arabic literary language drew contributions from Christian as well as Muslim Palestinians. The Orthodox Christian writer Khalil al-Sakakini (d. 1953) published literary and linguistic studies in al-Siyasah that he republished as a book in Jerusalem in 1925. In the Ottoman period,

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140. Lundsten cited statements by Sir Alfred Mond in 1921, and by Hebrew newspaper Haaretz in August 1929 that called for the ancient Temple to be rebuilt. Lundsten, "Wall Politics" pp. 9, 23.

141. al-Sakakini titled this 1925 Jerusalem collection Mutala'at fil-Lughah wal-Adab. Shillig, Hizb al-Dusturiyyin p. 132. al-Sakakini also taught in Egypt in 1921-1922. Daqhir, Masadir v. 2 p. 459. Zaki Mubarak in 1940 paid tribute to his writings in...
al-Sakakini had been among the "Arab Orthodox" militants who, arguing that language determined identity, for years strove to break the grip of the Greek-speaking higher Orthodox clergy over their sect and to affiliate it to Palestine's Muslims in one Arab nationality. Modernist Palestinians in the 1920s linked up with forces among Muslim Egyptians abhorrent to Islamic traditionalists. In 1926 the Palestinian female writer Sadhij Nassar appealed to the Egyptian feminist movement of Huda Sha'rawi (which burnt the veil) to guide Palestinian women for the national struggle and in their drive to win more modern education and roles: her husband Najib had propagandized for the Bolsheviks. As the pan-Arab --- rather than just Egyptian --- women's leader in the 1930s, Sha'rawi was to support Palestinian nationalism.

Christian and radical-secularist Palestinians had, then, communicated their existence to Muslim Egyptians, in the decade leading up to the 1929 bloodshed. But the Zionists' strategy of focussing their drive against the Palestinians at Jerusalem's shrines made the Palestinian national movement develop a more religious leadership and

Haykal was aware in 1925 of controversies between al-Sakakini and the neo-classicist Druze pan-Islamist Shakib Arslan over new and old in Arabic literature. Haykal, Fi Awqat al-Paragh p. 353.
142. For a waspish view of al-Sakakini's anti-Greek Arabism that finally took him out of Orthodoxy and his involvement in Young Turk radicalism and Arab dissidence before 1918, and in anti-Zionism, Elie Kedourie Chatham House Version pp. 337-342. For sweeping, detailed, abrasive demands by "the sons of the Arabs among the Orthodox" in Jerusalem to its Orthodox (Greek) Patriarch see "al-Orthuduks fil-Quds al-Sharif" (The Orthodox in Noble Jerusalem), al-Bashir (Bayrut) 16 November 1908 p. 2. Incitation by Czarist Russian diplomats was hinted by the Patriarch of Jerusalem: "a foreign hand is behind the actions of the Arabs". Ibid.
143. Letter from Sadhij in al-Muqattam 10 June 1926 p. 3. Her Orthodox husband, Najib Nassar, editor of the Hayfa al-Karmal, had from the outset of the Bolshevik regime defended it in the Lebanese and Egyptian press from hostile images relayed from America and West Europe. For Najib Nassar's anti-Zionism see David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch (London: Faber 1977) pp. 30, 31-32, 34. Muslim as well as Christian Palestinian women in the 1920s were alert to modernization opportunities: they were, for instance, eager to go to study medicine at the Medical College in Damascus. "Sayyidat Muslimat fi Dimashqa Yadrusna al-Tibb" (Muslim Ladies in Damascus Study Medicine), al-Muqattam 16 September 1926 p. 5.
global counter-outreach in response. The Supreme Islamic Council headed by the Chief Mufti al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni became more and more prominent at the expense of the bi-sectarian Arab Executive Committee. The "religious" appeals for aid by both the (extensively atheistical) Zionists and the ascendant Palestinian faction to coreligionists in the outside world made even very acculturated, modernist, Muslim Egyptian intellectuals much more likely to perceive the conflict as religious. In mid-1922, 'Abd al-Qadir Muzaffar, head of an Islamic Palestinian delegation visiting Cairo, warned that the Zionists planned "hideous aggression" against the al-Aqsa and al-Sakhrah mosques in Jerusalem, "Islam's first prayer-direction" (awwalu qiblah lil-Islam), in order to rebuild Solomon's Temple. "The Islamic Palestinian people" (al-sha'b al-Filastini al-Islami) had guarded the mosques for 1,300 years; now the Egyptians and all other Muslims to Java had to aid them. al-Siyasah intellectuals after the 1929 clashes were very conscious that Palestinian spokesmen had long been stressing threatened shrines and pan-Islamic solidarity in their appeals to Egyptians. They had not registered, though, that such rising, youthful,

144. As regards one stream of Yishuv Zionism, Berl Katzenelson in 1934 voiced a rather unusual misgiving against his Labour Zionist tradition's wholesale destruction of traditional diaspora Judaism: he wanted not God but the holidays of Passover (exodus from slavery) and Tishah b'Ab (commemorating the destruction of the Temple) to be adapted by the Yishuv in Palestine into national rituals that would maintain the memory of the "Jewish nation's" diaspora sufferings. Arthur Hertzberg The Zionist Idea (New York: Atheneum 1976) pp. 390-395. Even this only called for neutrality towards Judaism as such.

145. "Nida'un ilal-Ummat al-Misriyyah al-Rashidah min Ikhwanihim wa Jiranihim al-Filastiniyyin" (Appeal to the Right-Guided Egyptian Nation from their Palestinian Brethren and Neighbors) al-Mugattam 5 July 1922, p. 2. Muzaffar used the religious shrines the most in appealing for Egyptian aid. But he also worked in themes of the material ruin or harm Zionist implantation would inflict on the Palestinians — and also Egyptians and other Arabs. He quoted the statement by Chaim Weizmann that Palestine had to be made as Jewish as England is English. Muzaffar warned Egyptians that once the Zionists established their "kingdom" (mulk) in Palestine, it might well threaten Palestine's neighbors. Ibid. Weizmann's projection of a restricted future for non-Jewish populations in Palestine was made at the Paris Peace Conference. Storrs, Orientations p. 421.
Palestinian leaders as Muzaffar and al-Hajj Amin installed their own particularoid Palestinian nation within the globe-circling pan-Islamic community they evoked --- so as to preempt any pressure to reintegrate Palestine into a "natural" geographical pan-Syria. Muzaffar and Amin in 1919 had set up "the Palestinian Association" in Damascus; they became disillusioned when they found that aid to the Palestinian fight against Zionism was not at the top of the agenda of the Arab nationalists in Damascus under King Faisal. With Syria and Palestine mandated to separate imperial powers, the Sunni Husayni elite centred in Jerusalem now had freedom as leaders of a separate Palestinian national movement. Their globe-circling pan-Islamism and new pan-Arab relation with the Egyptians diluted any claims of special relationship that the Sunni Syrian elite might try to impose.

Literature in Western languages has contrasted perceptions about Jews and the 1929 violence in Palestine among (a) religious or traditional Egyptians and (b) modernist, political, circles in Egypt. Jankowski (1980 and 1986) cited the Society of the Islamic Banner, the Islamic Guidance Society, the Egyptian Society for the Defence of the Sacred Enclosure and the Islamic Holy Places, Islamic 'ulama and lawyers of the district of Jizah, the Young Men's Muslim Association and, in a way, the Eastern League --- as "religious societies" that responded with strong support for the Palestinians. As Jankowski's "dichotomy" ran, secularized, particularism-articulating Cairo publicists such as in al-Siyasah stressed "national rather than religious conflict in Palestine", ascribing it to the attempts of

146. Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1988) p. 172. The Jaffa Muslim-Christian Association submitted a memorandum to General Sir Gilbert Clayton on 2 November 1918 objecting to the Jewish national home policy in the name of "our Arab homeland Palestine"; no mention was made of Palestine being part of Syria. Ibid p. 177. However, some Palestinians sometimes did characterize Palestine as "Southern Syria" earlier in the Mandate: "Filastin: Da'wa 'ala Hukumati Filastin bi-sabab al-Tawabi' al-Baridiyyah" (Palestine: A Case against the Government of Palestine in Regard to Postage Stamps), al-Bashir (Bayrut) 10 September 1925 p. 2.
"Zionists" (oftener than "Jews") to implant a Jewish national home in an Arab-inhabited area — although, as Haykal did in one article, sometimes depicting British imperialist divide-and-rule as the reason Palestinians and Zionists fought. In contrast to these detached, political, analyses, religious Egyptians saw the issues as encroachment by "Jews" (rather than Zionists) upon the traditional status quo at the Wailing Wall/Dome of the Rock area. This had caused the violence which "could seemingly be resolved in religious terms alone", by the British re-enforcing traditional Muslim religious privileges in the disputed area, Jankowski characterized citing a Rabiitat Sharqiyyah (Eastern League) communication 147.

In reality, at least some clerical Egyptians also blended secular-material and religious perspectives on the bloodshed. Following the clashes, the Shaykh (Rector) of al-Azhar, Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi, alerted Egyptian Muslims to decidedly secular --- political and material --- stakes at issue in the conflict: "secular causes" (asbab madaniyyah), somewhat more than religious shrines, had produced the explosion.

The Arabs and the Muslims in Palestine see ... their country passing from their hands and fear that the holy shrines and the al-Aqsa Mosque could fall under the authority/rule (sultan) of other people --- ...material and moral death.

al-Maraghi did apply his standing as Rector of al-Azhar to urge Egypt's angry Islamic clerics to first give the British mandatory a chance to settle the conflict over the shrines and conduct a fair inquiry into the bloodshed 148.

al-Maraghi in 1929 was like the governing Party of Liberal Constitutionalis in striving for gradual negotiated solutions with the muscular British for both Egypt and Palestine, side-stepping devastating showdowns.


As Rector of al-Azhar in 1928 and 1929, he was associated with the Liberal Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmud. In 1932 al-Maraghi published in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah a long article championing translation of the Qur'an, denounced as an heretical endorsement of the Ataturkists' lethal "reform" of Islam in Turkey. al-Siyasah often projected unconventional proposals from Azharites to revamp Islam so that it could operate within the modern world. When again Rector in the 1930s, al-Maraghi was to promote the Liberal Haykal's 1935 Life of Muhammad, checking traditional Islamic scholars' attacks on its West-influenced "rationalistic" features. Sunni 'ulama' in Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s and their institutions are not to be compartmentalized from the secular political parties and intellectuals.

Like the Young Men's Muslim Association, sectionally very Westernized Muslim Egyptians in the Eastern League responded to the 1929 Palestine violence with alternations or blends of traditional Islamic motifs (e.g. the shrines) and ultra-political, modern, national ones. When the Zionist militias and Muslim Palestinians clashed at the al-Aqsa Mosque/Wailing Wall shrine, Ahmad Zaki promptly called from the Syrian-Christian owned daily al-Mugattam: "hear O Egypt, hear, for the Masjid al-Aqsa is crying out for your help." In 1930, the Eastern League sent a

150. Muhammad Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 p. 313 fn.
152. In 1907 Ahmad Zaki translated and published in serial in Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's al-Jaridah Jules Verne's 1865 From the Earth to the Moon. The modern West somewhat directed Zaki's restoration of the classical Arabs whom he credited with prefiguring such European breakthroughs as aviation and the discovery of America. al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 43-47.
153. Zaki in al-Ahram 17 November 1929 quoted al-Jundi Ahmad Zaki
delegation to testify before the League of Nations commission inquiring into the conflict: in a long French speech on behalf of Palestine's Supreme Islamic Council, Zaki argued the historical rights of the globe's four hundred million Muslims "to its most sacred relics". The dual-cultured Zaki spent as much effort collecting notices from European as from Arab works for this historical justification. Yet as well as shrines and Muslims to Indonesia, his speech to the League of Nations commission also evoked the spatial "Palestinian Nation" and its refusal to recognise the British mandate or anything that would foster "what is called a Jewish national home". Analysis of early Egyptian solidarity with the Palestinians has to take account of a modern, West-tinted Islamist sector that could alternate or synthesize concern for shrines, and the community of all the believers, with ultra-politicized awareness of a bisectarian Arab Palestinian political people also defined by territoriality and Arabness. Addressing a 1929 YMMA protest meeting on the shrines violence, Zaki applied the Arab component in the Palestinians' identity to the Egyptians also. His two-and-a-half-hour speech sought contributions for a YMMA fund to send an Egyptian medical mission to treat injured Arabs in Palestine. Although now 62, he skilfully brought acculturated students in his audience to tears over the deaths of "Arabs" in Palestine. Zaki calculated that he could galvanise his educated audience into giving material support to the Palestinians.

p. 247.

154. Ibid p. 249.
155. Recollections of Zaki's friend the shaykh Muhammad al-Chanimi al-Taftazani who was with him when he was writing the brief in Egypt before he left to Jerusalem. al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki p. 247.
156. Ibid p. 250. Sometimes, however, Zaki placed Palestine within the context of greater Syrianism. In the YMMA newspaper al-Shura of 22 October 1924, Zaki declared that "for me, Palestine is but a fragrant branch of that towering tree of sister Syria ... that blessed region which extends from the Taurus mountains in the north to the two trees of al-'Arish in the south, from the banks of the Euphrates to the shore of the Mediterranean". Zaki in this mood denounced the Great Powers' post-World War I partition of Syria into mandated mini-states as "dismemberment fated to disappear quickly because it is unnatural". al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 246-247.
by appealing to "the blood of Arabism" that ran in the Egyptians' veins: he hailed "the sons of Palestine, both Muslims and Christians" (abna' Filastin Muslimihim wa Masihiyyihim)\(^\text{157}\). Thus, in this speech, too, Zaki combined (a) Islamic religious shrines threatened in Palestine, and global pan-Islam with (b) smaller Arab political communities --- or one Arab community --- defined by factors other than religion. He and other pioneer Egyptian Arabists in that period had been accustomed to perceive a Christian component in the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese populations because such Christians were active in the Eastern League and Cairo-based emigre support-groups lobbying on behalf of those three Arab communities. Towards the end of 1933, the YMMA in a French petition to the League of Nations demanded that Zionist immigration into Palestine and purchases of Arab land there be immediately stopped: that "invasion" threatened to drive the Muslim and Christian Arabs from their "homeland" Palestine\(^\text{158}\).

Overview. The cluster of overt Islamist groups in Egypt that sympathized with the Palestinians in 1929-1931 had students or graduates of (a) monolingual Islamic schools and (b) graduates and students of Westernizing schools and tertiary institutions that seldom used Arabic. Some bodies such as the Eastern League and the more acculturated YMMA mixed the two groups. Even traditionally-educated Islamic clerics could balance secular political and material issues with the shrines as causes of the conflict. The Westernizing-educated Islamists, too, blended secular and Islamic perspectives. Ahmad Zaki Pasha was rationalist in his reinterpretations of the Qur'an and had popularized in Arabic the most


avant-garde European modernism: yet Western culture fueled his sense of shrines, and of global pan-Islam --- within which he still saw the secular Palestinian people.

The YMMA-Eastern League association of strong acculturated awareness of the West with threatened shrines and modern global religio-political communities (pan-Islam and Zionism) held even for the al-Siyasah modernist-particularists, also.

The al-Siyasah Intellectuals

Gershoni and Jankowski were right that a --- not, however, invariably "Olympian" --- component in the psyche of al-Siyasah Muslim modernists strove to keep Egypt uninvolved in the 1929 Palestine disturbances\(^\text{159}\). But this was only one part in these intellectuals' make-up. Of all the groups in Egypt, the al-Siyasah publicists responded with the most ambivalent, contradictory, torn --- but often far-seeing --- formulations and emotions. They incisively identified international Zionism, not Britain, as the main enemy of "the Palestinian people" and as a possible formidable enemy of Egypt and other Arab neighbors of Palestine in future years.

In line with its articulation of pan-Arab identity in past years, al-Siyasah's initial spontaneous reaction to the violence on 31 August 1929 was strongly anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian: "the Jewish national home" that "British policy" was imposing upon Palestine would award the Jewish minority, a mere one-fifth of the population, the political power and influence that were the indigenous Arab majority's by right. This British "favoritism" inevitably had sustained a secular-sounding "national struggle" by the Palestinian Arabs for many years. America's Jews wanted to send 10,000 volunteers to fight the Arabs in Palestine\(^\text{160}\). Yet, the next day, an

\(^{159}\) Jankowski, "Egyptian Responses..." pp. 6-8; Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs pp. 252-254.

\(^{160}\) "Ibrat al-Ma'sat al-Filastiniyyah: Wasa'il al-'Unf Tunaqid al-'Asr wa Mabadi'ahu" (The Lesson of the Palestine Tragedy: Methods of Violence Contradict the Age and its Principles), al-Siyasah 31 August 1929, excerpted and discussed by Tripoli-born Orthodox Egypto-Syrian Nasim Sayba'ah, "Ibrat..."
al-Siyasah editorial denied (in actuality heavily Christian) Syrians resident in Egypt the right to propagandize the Palestinians' cause because it was dividing Egypt's Muslims and Jews, arousing religious community emotions that might split the religious "elements" which made up the Egyptian nation's bloc (kutlah). al-Siyasah was drawing back as it saw that the Egyptian Muslims' solidarity with Palestine could restructure Egypt's post-1922 particularist political community of Muslim, Coptic and Jewish Egyptians. Pioneer Muslim Egyptian capitalists associated with the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists had been helped to get started by Arabic-speaking Jews with an established place in Egypt's foreigner-dominated modern private sector. Accordingly, Tala'at Harb appointed the head of Egypt's Jewish community Yusuf al-Qattawi Pasha to be Vice-President of Bank Misr: al-Qattawi had had a position in the Wafd independence movement of the 1920s and been a member of the administrative council of the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists. Amid the 1929 Palestine violence, the Liberal tribune al-Siyasah only registered such long-standing relations within particularist nationalism when it described the Jews as an appreciated active element in the Egyptian people that had to be kept at ease. The Tripoli-born SC Nasim Sayba'ah, however, charged from al-Muqattam that Egypt-resident Jews with European nationalities visited al-Siyasah and pressured it to switch from support for the Palestinians by threatening to influence those European governments not to lift the capitulations from Egypt. That would have installed

161. al-Siyasah's 1 September 1929 editorial "Misru La Tufarriq Baynal-Tawa'if, Da'wah Ta'ishah La Tusighuha Misr" (Egypt Does Not Discriminate Between Sects; An Irresponsible Call that Egypt Cannot Accept). Excerpted and refuted by Sayba'ah, loc. cit. C.f. citation and discussion by Jankowski, "Egyptian Responses ..." pp. 7-8.
162. Davis, Bank Misr pp. 93-94.
164. "Misru La Tufarriq ...", editorial, al-Siyasah 1 September 1929.
165. Sayba'ah, "Ibrat ..."
long-term fury against Zionism.

'Inan on 7 September 1929 published in al-Siyyasat al-Uspbu'iyyah an oscillating article titled "Palestine Between the Jews and the Arabs: the Lesson of the Present Tragedy". In it, he depicted Britain as the Power that deliberately held down "the Palestinian people" or "the Muslims" in Palestine in order to enable "world Jewry" to move into, and seize, Palestine: the Palestinians fought for political self-determination. Elsewhere, though, 'Inan specified the past year of "intensifying" "conflict" between "the Muslims" and "the Jews" over the al-Buraq Western Wall Shrine --- a religious factor --- as the outstanding cause of violence. Cohesive, ultra-political "international Jewry" was moving around the world to impose its "national home" through "violence" in Palestine. In response, "the Arab peoples" were tightening their inherent unity to ward off "Jewry's" assault on the "heart" of "the Islamic world". But 'Inan in spasms tried to check the Egyptian Muslims' growing involvement in the Palestinian struggle, because British imperialism and "world Jewry" had such strength with which to hit back. Nonetheless, 'Inan projected that the conflict between (a) the world's Jews and (b) the Palestinians and other "Arab peoples" might well be long term.

This transitional article by 'Inan was both self-contradictory and incisive in bursts. Projecting out these intellectuals' previous secularism, al-Siyasah in supporting the Palestinians on 31 August 1929 brushed aside religious disputes over shrines as just a recent irritant in the long, basically secular, contest for political power between the Palestinians and "world Jewry". Now 'Inan highlighted the Jerusalem shrines as from the outset of British control constantly central among the motives of


167. Ibid.

168. "'Ibrat al-Ma'sat al-Filastiniyyah ...", al-Siyyasah 31 August 1929 quoted Sayba'ah "'Ibrat ...".
both the Palestinian and "Jewish" parties to the conflict. More, in some sentences he himself now emotionally responded to the shrines --- like Islamist YMMA Egyptians --- as stakes worth fighting for. At other moments he feared that "sectarian" elements in the Palestinian national movement could endanger the tenets and precarious state venture of Egyptian particularist nationalism: this activated his reflex to keep Palestinians and Egyptians separate.

Mingling sympathy and a sense of difference, 'Inan thus wrote that the national movement of what he elsewhere termed "the Palestinian People" (al-Sha'b al-Filastini) was hampered by having to fight two powers --- Britain and the Zionist settlers --- at once, by the numerical weakness of the country's Arabs, and by the fact that "some extremists who still think with the mentality of the Middle Ages, are attempting to propagate theories and utopian projects like the concept of pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism". Such retrograde "calls (al-da'awat) in our age have come to sap the vitality of the local territorial (mahalliyyah) national movements and bring about the disintegration of collective popular commitment to them (wa tu'addi ila nhilal 'asabiyyatiha) and squander away energies they require" on extraneous objects. For 'Inan here, the Palestinian leadership's pan-Islamic or pan-Arab postures were dysfunctional for any mobilization of Palestine's multi-sectarian population in order to wrest independence. However, he was most worried about the damage pan-Islamic appeals by Palestinians, and the inherent religious stakes in Palestine, looked set to do to the embryonic, fragile particularisms in Arab lands beyond Palestine --- Egypt's included. Like one or two other al-Siyasah items that rejected the Palestinian independence movement as ideologically pre-modern, 'Inan here betrayed the apprehension that particularism had never consolidated in the loyalties of ordinary Egyptians, and that the Palestinian national movement's religion-focused struggle

169. 'Inan, "Filastin Bayn al-Yahud ...".
against Britain and the Zionists was winning a popular pan-Islamic response from the Egyptian people itself. At this point, 'Inan shared the 1 September al-Siyasah editorial's fear that al-da'awat al-diniyyah or religious appeals were potently involving the masses of Egyptians in the Palestine conflict. But the "sectarian" riots over an area in Jerusalem claimed as a sacred religious site by both Islam and Judaism activated an area of 'Inan's own personality:

For more than a year now, the conflict has been intensifying between the Muslims and the Jews in Palestine over the wall known as al-Buraq which constitutes the Western wall of al-Masjid al-Aqsa. It is, then, without any doubt a purely Islamic shrine (athar). But the Jewish myths say that it is the last remnant of the Temple of Solomon.

'Inan here brushed aside all notion that Jews in the world had any genuine religious shrine of their own at al-Aqsa's precincts that the Palestinians or outsiders Arabs had legal obligation to conciliate --- liable to fuel the conflict. The earlier al-Siyasah items, secularist in some stances, had still already identified "the Jews" as the antagonist assailing the Palestinians. Now 'Inan throughout his article repeatedly spoke of "the Muslims" as the Palestinian party in conflict with "the Jews" or "World Jewry".

Discussions of language and literature in al-Siyasah throughout the 1920s had evoked a classical literary community covering the whole region that Haykal defined as Islamic; not Egyptians alone but a range of contemporary Arabs --- including Palestinians --- had debated language and the common new Arabic literature in the journal. The 1929 bloodshed activated all these pan-Arab linkages in 'Inan, sapping his sense of historical, racial and cultural differences that he elsewhere perceived separated.

170. Ibid; citation of al-Siyasah, 1 September 1929 in Sayba'ah, "Tbrat..." Not only students but "some workers" attended the YMMA meeting on Palestine. These workers, too, contributed to the YMMA medical mission fund, spurred by 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar who held up a Zionist photograph of the al-Aqsa mosque's haram and the Wailing Wall over which was written "Eretz Israel" (The Land of Israel) in Hebrew characters. "Itjima'un Hafil ...".
171. 'Inan, "Filastin Bayn al-Yahud ...".
Egyptians from other Arabs/Muslims. His 1929 projections pointed towards the transforming Arabo-Islamic commitment by Egyptians in the 1930s and 1940s, to culminate in Egypt's 1948 entry into the first Palestine war:

As for the effects of this tragedy, this would be hard to assess today, but as it appears they will prove far-reaching. Jewry had moved throughout the world... and will certainly make its voice heard in every new policy followed towards Palestine. The Arab peoples too have moved, showering a flood of sympathy upon Palestine... The national homeland that Jewry labours to build rises in the heart of the Islamic world and in the heart of the Arab peoples. It would be difficult for these peoples to remain unaffected by the trials and sufferings that afflict the Palestinian people. Whatever the causes of these bloody events and whoever's the responsibility for promoting them, Jewry cannot ignore this truth that the Jewish homeland cannot rise upon the policy of violence in the heartlands of peoples unified by racial, religious and historical bonds the effects of which can never be ignored.

Zionism's "Expansionism", 1929. The Zionists in Palestine were monitoring the reactions to the 1929 violence in Egypt's Arabic press. al-Siyasah, and the elitist Liberal Constitutionalists who sustained it, had much influence upon educated Egyptians, although lacking the numerically wide, popular following of the Wafd and its papers. In quick answer to 'Inan's warning in the 7 September number that neighboring Arab nations might intervene one day in Palestine, Ha'aretz editor Moshe Medzini173 assured al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah's Egyptian readers that "the Jewish people" wanted to "conclude an

172. Ibid.
173. Moshe Medzini was born in Siberia in 1897 where he attended Russian Officers' School and served as a member of the Jewish Community Council in Irkutsk. He settled in Palestine in 1920 and worked as a correspondent, deputy editor and editor of the general Zionist daily Ha'aretz between 1921 and 1947. Medzini was a General (non-Labour) Zionist who had ambitions to become the Foreign Minister of the new state when it would be founded. He was a Vice-President of the General Council of the Confederation of General Zionists in Palestine and a member, after the Israeli state was formed, of the Liberal Party. He published two Hebrew books: Ten Years of Policy Toward the Land of Israel (1928) and Zionist Policy (1934). I am deeply grateful to Professor Dr Eugene Kamenka, History of Ideas Unit, Australia National University, for gathering this biodata of Medzini while in Israel in 1981-1982.
honorable pact with the Islamic world". Medznizi intimated that al-Siyasah's coverage and comments on the violence in Palestine had been level-headed compared to the general body of Egyptian Arabic journals, up to 'Inan's 7 September article. In a cutting rejoinder in the same issue, 'Inan mockingly dismissed all Medznizi's assurances, and retorted that not just "the Palestinian people" (al-sha'b al-Filastini) but other peoples in the Islamic world had long felt threatened by the Zionist settlement. "After all these long years", 'Inan reflected, "we are very far from understanding the real borders/limits (hudud) of this homeland which Jewry sees fit to establish in its ancient cradle. In the period of British colonial rule, the Zionists for years pressed the British to let them colonize Egypt's Sinai --- with the Nile to supply water for irrigation. In May 1927, more than two years before 'Inan's responses to the 1929 Palestinian bloodshed, Mustafa al-Shurbaji and Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab Sulayman in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies warned the Government not to allow mineral-rich, strategic Sinai to be annexed to Palestine, as the Zionist movement was supposedly influencing Western governments to arrange. Demands


175. 'Inan's reply to the Ha'aretz editor, "Filastin Bayn al-Yahud wal'Arab: Madha Ta'nil-Yahudiyyatu bil-Watan al-Qawmi?" (Between the Jews and the Arabs: What Does Jewry Mean by the National Homeland?), al-Siyasat al-Ushbu'iyyah, 28 September 1929.

176. In 1902 and 1903 Herzl unsuccessfully negotiated with the Foreign Office and with British "Consul" Cromer in Cairo, for Zionist colonization of Sinai at al-'Arish. Cromer finally refused to grant permission after an irrigation expert reported that five times the water projected would have to be brought from the Nile. Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1972) pp. 120-122. But in mid-1911 one of British proconsul Gorst's officials in Cairo pressed London to allow the Zionists to establish colonies in Sinai facing Rafah as a buffer against Turkish forces. 'Isam Diya' al-Din, "al-Hizb al-Watani fi Misr wa 'Alaqatuhi bi-Turkiya l-Fatat" (The Patriotic Party in Egypt and its Relationship with the Young Turks), Afag 'Arabiyyah (Baghdad) v. 2: 1, September 1976 pp. 22, 27 citing letter of Cheetham in Cairo to Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, 17 June 1911.

that Egypt act to prevent the emergence of a Jewish state for self-defence or Egypt's future pan-Arab economic interests, as well as for the Palestinians, became common from al-Siyasah intellectuals and other Muslim Egyptian modernists in the 1930s.

Ambivalence and Hostility Towards Britain

Because they drew support from rich, strategically-sited Jewish communities in a range of powerful Western countries, the Zionists were an enemy in some respects comparable in strength to imperial Britain, al-Siyasah writers feared. al-Siyasah in 1929 exaggerated support from diaspora Jewries for a Zionism that in 1929 still remained a controversial, minority ideology for many Jews: 'Inan and others made an almost undivided "international Jewry" (al-Yahudiyyatu fil-'alam) into a clone of the Kamilists' globe-circling pan-Muslim ummah. For 'Inan in 1929, the Zionists were the main antagonist out to harm the Palestinians. However, he also depicted the mandatory, Britain, as Zionism's indispensable patron. Throughout the 1920s, the Liberal Constitutionalists had opposed militant confrontations against British power in Egypt, seeking independence in installments through rational negotiations: however, Britain, with her inflammatory gun-boat diplomacy, had throughout the 1920s humiliated and enraged the Liberals as well as the populist Wafd. In his 7 September 1929 article, 'Inan advised the Palestinians on

178. As regards the period in which the al-Siyasah intellectuals responded to Palestine, on three occasions between 1927 and 1930 British warships were despatched to Alexandria, twice to exert political pressure on the Egyptian government and once to be in readiness in case political disturbances got out of hand. A. J. Toynbee (ed.) Survey of International Affairs (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1936) p. 663. Among more specific tensions, the Liberal Government of PM Muhammad Mahmud allowed itself to be put out on a limb by attempting to negotiate a comprehensive settlement with the British in the second half of 1929. al-Siyasah and al-Siyasat al-Ubsu'iyyah discussed the bloodshed in British-ruled Palestine amid the final British undermining of Mahmud's Liberal government: he duly submitted his resignation on 2 October 1929. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 84-85.
pragmatic-rational grounds to appease Britain's power, in accord with the Liberal Constitutionalists' non-confrontationist strategy for changing Egypt's relationship with her. But he characterized the British as the ones who had built up the explosive situation in Palestine. They had by 1929 cumulatively destabilized the whole Arab East, making rational negotiations and gradualist compromises --- not to say the political position of those Egyptians and Arabs who had pursued them --- almost untenable.

'Inan obviously believed that Britain could crush the Palestinians and any Arab people, including Egypt, that took their side. The violence in Palestine was the result of "a kind of despair" at the denial of self-determination, but a policy of violence could not be "an appropriate road for the Palestinian people to take to realize its aspirations because the policy of violence has become today a perilous path which even the strong no more feel safe to take, let alone the weak". Calling for a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem, 'Inan wrote that "this is our firm belief in all that appertains to our Egyptian national cause, and ... to other Arab nations", equally.

At points, 'Inan very nearly endorsed the Palestinians' perceived violent or rebellious militancy as the only response the British and incoming Zionists had left open to them. On the other hand, however, he advised the Palestinians to try to negotiate some at least short-term modus vivendi with the British, partly from awareness of how hard the British (or the Zionists) could hit. In addition, though, the multi-lingual 'Inan understood how much the new mass destructive warfare of World War I had demoralized Britain and other "strong" European imperial powers. Now so weakened themselves, they really might prefer to negotiate compromises with even the "weak" Arab peoples they ruled at gunpoint.  


180. C.f. Haykal's high awareness of the exhaustion and demoralization that the slaughter of millions during World War 1 inflicted upon
Liberal politicians by 1929 had become furious at the decade-long failure of the British to reward the party's incrementalism by conceding Egypt more sovereignty, and more control in the Sudan — keeping their Party unpopular. However, the vested interests of landowning and neo-capitalist Muslim Egyptian strata made them reluctant to militantly resist Britain or support parallel mass resistance to her in Palestine, 'Iraq or the Sudan. As an intellectual linked to the property-holding rich Tories of Egyptian politics, 'Inan could not but be disturbed by Palestinian mobs carrying crude weapons. A pan-Arab showdown with British imperialism across the region could devastate wealth and property, and pass political leadership to populist "extremist" groups. 'Inan and other al-Siyasah observers in 1929, however, took militant rhetoric from Palestine at face value, not registering that the Jerusalem-centred Muslim Palestinian political elite around al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, too, had property and position to maintain vis-a-vis the insurgent Palestinian peasantry and neo-proletariat: they, like the Liberals in Egypt, tried to avoid violence with the Zionists or the British.181 Nor had 'Inan caught the covert Palestinian particularism vis-a-vis Syria in Palestinian "pan-Islamism".

For some Egyptian leaders in the al-Siyasah/Liberals milieu, the 1929 violence in Palestine triggered a conversion to Arab nationalist consciousness more

Europeans over the long term of the post-War era. It was a considered hedonism of Europeans that turned its back on "wisdom and the intellect" in favor of a shrunk literature that evoked petty gratifications, as a distraction to dull forbodings that the morrow might bring back the same horrors of death, injury and misery. Haykal, Thawrat p. 8.

totalistic than 'Inan's shift. A case was Muhammad 'Ali 'Allubah. An al-Hizb al-Watani activist prior to the 1919 Egyptian Revolution, 'Allubah was in the Wafd delegation that then lobbied the Western states for Egyptian independence in Paris; a modernist Muslim determined to reform latter traditional Muslim practices, he served as a Liberal Constitutionalist Minister of Awqaf (Islamic Endowments) in a cabinet under PM Ahmad Ziwar in 1925. 'Allubah, fresh from his legal defense of the Arab Palestinian cause before the League of Nations inquiry into the al-Buraq/Western Wall conflict, denounced in Damascus "that tiny band in Egypt" that did not want Egypt to unite "the Arab nations" (al-umam al-'Arabiyyah) as their elder sister "because you are not of them, you are Pharaonic". In reply, 'Allubah argued that the Pharaonic period was dead, that there was no Pharaonic race and that even if there were the Egyptians were Arabs because the "single language, identical traditions and customs, common sufferings, and the same hopes" made all Arabic-speakers ummah wahidah, one nation, not several. Language and thought determined any individual's nationality, "not flesh, blood or bone". Connected to the Misr group of companies, he would not want a Zionist state to block Egypt's trade with Arab West Asia.

The reactions of 'Inan and 'Allubah showed how
perceptions of conflict between Jews and Arabs/Muslims for control of Jerusalem's religious shrines in 1929 further pan-Arabized the self-identifications of modernist Egyptians. (The conversion, though, left some later spasms of residual Egypt-centrism).

Assessment

The whole 1920s were an era of ideological dividedness: pan-Arabism and Egyptian particularism took shape simultaneously and alternated not just in the same acculturated group(s) but also within the psyche of many an individual Egyptian intellectual. Like pre-World War I Kamilist pan-Islamism, the crude Egyptian pan-Arabism that crystallized by the close of the decade was a West-steeped modern ideology intent to apply the West's technologies as the means for indigenous integration (benefitting Egypt's elite classes). With direct British colonial rule removed, Egypt now developed somewhat more economic instruments for wider communities than the theoretical Kamilists ever had. Yet acculturated Arabism was more a politico-cultural response to the West --- to threats from its violent imperialism and deculturizing drives, but also to its high culture, science and liberal or secular ideologies, from which Egyptian intellectuals drank. Islam and classical Arab culture in the 1920s maintained enough weight and coherence, even among bilingualized Egyptians, to both resist and assimilate the West, however much imposed Western cultures had attenuated it. The West's pressure on some sectors of Muslim traditionalism speeded the intellectuals' shift to earlier Arab classicism that could dovetail into the West and ethnicize supra-Egyptian community. Yet Islam remained subtly pervasive as a community impulse among even such anti-traditionalists as Mahmud 'Azmi, Mansur Fahmi, 'Inan et al as they reached out to Muslim Turks and Iranians who were disestablishing Islam. If more modern factors had helped, Islam could have integrated an Egyptian-Arab bloc with such non-Arab Muslims in the region. The secularish nature of much classical Arab culture, and the prominence of West Asian
Christians within it and the modern successor, pointed to a composite Christian-Muslim pan-Arabism for modernist Egyptians. But the al-Siyasah intellectuals would stand only with an Islamic Palestine, refusing to register Christian Arabs when the context was imperialism and Zionism—seen as Christian and Jewish political communities. For dual-cultured Egyptian intellectuals, the religions and modern instruments fused into new wide political communities with global scope.
CHAPTER 9: THE 1930s AND 1940s: DILUTED ISLAM PERSISTS AMID HEIGHTENING ARABISM

Chapters 7 and 8 traced how the classical Arabs' culture and a successor new community became an alternative to Egyptianism in the 1920s. In the 1930s and 1940s, most of the intelligentsia and establishment opt for and pursue pan-Arab identity. Pan-Arabism developed as Westerners continued to threaten Arabic and, by imposing Israel, the survival of the acculturated intellectuals' establishment.

The Period

The 1930s opened amid economic havoc caused by the Great Depression, which knocked the bottom out of Egyptian cotton prices. The decade, and the 1940s, were also marked by rapid migration of peasants to the cities where the proletariat and lumpen proletarians more and more protested their misery in wild-cat strikes and demonstrations and later through recruitment into radical movements. Islamist and pan-Arab ideologies formulated by

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1. Not just the economic effects of the Great Depression from 1930, but the socially selfish policies of the landowning elite dominant in parliamentary politics, sank the living standards and opportunities of the peasantry, the urban semi-proletariat and, most dangerously, the often unemployed holders of higher degrees. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1961) pp. 198-202, 284-285.

2. The very lack of cooptive institutionalized trade-unionism led to a mushrooming host of small, fleeting workers' bodies and spontaneous wild-cat strikes by such deprived workers as the municipal street-cleaners. A strike by the latter in 1938 led al-Mugattam to urge the Egyptian government to grant them paid holidays and place them under strict supervision that would make them do their work more satisfactorily than they had been. "Insaf al-'Ummal --- Kannasul-Shawari'" (Fair Treatment for the Workers --- the Street Sweepers) al-Mugattam 6 May 1938 p. 4.

al-Mugattam noted in early 1935 "the problem posed by the workers", still in its first stages, but which already required that institutions be set up to defend their rights and improve their conditions. The model should be unionism in the industrial lands, in particular West Europe; the Wafd was making efforts to regulate the conditions of unionists. "al-Ummal wal-Muta'allimun wal-A'nal" (The Workers, the Educated Classes and Business Activity), al-Mugattam 27 February 1935. Charles D. Smith argued that fear of the growing urban proletariat and lumpen proletariat motivated much Islamic apologetics by Haykal in the 1930s and 1940s.
such older liberal intellectuals as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and Muhammad Husayn Haykal thus unfolded amid --- and responded to --- social crisis, although their protest elements should not be misread as more socially radical than was the case.  

The 1930s and 1940s saw many short-lived governments, often coalitions. In June 1930, the ex-Wafdist autocrat Isma'il Sidqi began three years of semi-dictatorship as Prime Minister, furthering the interests of King Fu'ad; the two almost crushed the Wafd but restoration of the 1923 Constitution in mid-1936 led to the reelection of a Wafdist government. On 26 August 1936 the Wafd signed a twenty-year military "alliance" that was to perpetuate the British occupation for another 25 years, but which abolished the capitulations and gave Egyptian governments more freedom to conduct diplomatic activity abroad: this helped make pan-Arabism part of mainstream politics in Egypt. The populist Wafd's prestige was weakened by its greater preparedness to compromise with the British; from 1937 the new handsome young King, Faruq I, further undermined the Wafd by rewarding defectors from it, by fostering Ahmad Husayn's new right-monarchist paramilitary Young Egypt party (formed in 1933) and by associating himself with mild Islamization of politics orchestrated by the Rector of al-Azhar, Mustafa al-Maraghi. The Party of Liberal Constitutionalists became involved with the

3. Haykal exaggerated elements in Islam to maintain the threatened position of his land-owning establishment in his 1935 life of Muhammad: "Islamic Socialism does not at all require the abolition of private property, unlike Western socialism". Some people would remain above each other in degrees (darojat) because God had decreed that [cf. Qur'an 6:165]; the rich man would command the respect of poor men, as he granted charity within Islam's "spiritual brotherhood". Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Hayat Muhammad (Cairo: 15th ed Dar al-Ma'arif 1979) pp. 541-542. Charles D. Smith saw Haykal's Islamic socialism as meant to contain Ahmad Husayn's linking of Islam to class discontents in order to overpower the ruling groups. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn Haykal (Albany: SUNY Press 1983) pp. 121-122, cf. pp. 131-132. Hayat Muhammad could, however, heighten mass expectations and strain the system by its projection of a sort of Islamic welfare state in which the treasury (bayt al-mal) had to support all who were genuinely out of work. Hayat Muhammad p. 542.
Monarchy and its Islamization and pan-Arabization of politics: Haykal both penned books glorifying early Arab Islam and within the Party supported collaboration with Faruq through coalition cabinets. That Britain's occupation continued was underscored to all on 4 February 1942 when British tanks surrounded Abidin Palace and imposed upon King Faruq the compliant Wafdist government they wanted. This final discrediting of the Wafd's nationalism cleared the way for the decisive rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) and the Young Egypt fundamentalist-religious rightists and of the Marxist left --- groups committed to abolishing liberal parliamentarism on principle. Between 1949 and 1952, the old political parties were unable to govern: they cancelled each other out in sterile struggles for office and became locked into cycles of mutual terrorism against the Ikhwan and other extra-parliamentarist paramilitary groups that by 1952 had destroyed the authority of the establishment.

The monarchical-parliamentarist system's crumbling, though, had been a gradual process to which older-generation liberal intellectual leaders and politicians themselves were crucial on the plane of ideology: Haykal, in particular, cleared the way for the rise of neo-fundamentalism among middle-class Egyptians through his Islamic and pan-Arab writings after 1930 that denigrated the "Crusaderist" West and its "materialism" as lethally anti-Muslim and unable to actualize human happiness. For some time into the 1930s, the Ikhwan Leader Hasan al-Banna was acutely aware of his movement's marginality to mainstream politics and society. Instead of moving to overthrow the West-steeped land-holding

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4. Haykal's collaboration with Faruq at various points between 1937 and 1952 is stressed by Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 146-149 and 161-162. This misses those aspects of Haykal's projection of pristine Arab Islam to mass audiences in the 1930s and 1940s that delegitimized or contained monarchy. B 196-7; fn. 102.

5. Salih 'Ashmawi, lieutenant to the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, in 1950 wrote that the Brotherhood had been greatly encouraged to demand the implementation of integral Islam when such ex-Westerner liberal intellectual leaders as Haykal stated that "Western civilization [was] crumbling, and ... failed to give men security and happiness". Safran, Egypt in Search p. 289.
establishment, he tried to attach his Islamic revivalist movement to it, at one point offering the leadership of the Ikhwan to Haykal, and trying to get into parliament\(^6\).

Acculturated older-generation ideologues and politicians no longer controlled events or thinking to the extent that they did in the 1920s but retained enough centrality in the psyches of most Egyptians, including youth, to merit analysis.

The gradual elevation of pan-Arabism to an establishment ideology in the 1930s and 1940s coincided with the rise of a modern native Egyptian capitalism. For instance, the Bank Misr, to which many Liberal Constitutionalists and al-Siyasah intellectuals were linked, continued to extend its branches in other Arab countries, facilitating financial relations between the Arabs\(^7\). The Second World War decisively expanded Egypt's indigenously-owned industries, especially the 'Abbud complex, to supply needs in Egypt and other Arab countries no longer being met from Europe, and those of the Allied war effort\(^8\).

The development of international

\(^{6}\) Hasan al-Banna's offer of leadership of Ikhwan to Haykal: Smith, Islam and the Search p. 188. In 1942 Hasan al-Banna decided to contest the parliamentary seat of Isma'iliyyah, the birth-place of his movement, but withdrew his candidature under pressure from the Wafdist Prime Minister who warned that the British would not accept his presence in parliament. The Ikhwan ran candidates in Egyptian national elections in 1942, 1944 and 1950 but were entirely unsuccessful, because they could not command the family connections and material interests with which the landlord leaders of traditional parties controlled the votes of the illiterate rural masses. Fathi Osman, "Ikhwan and Democracy: Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt: What Might Have Been", Arabia, October 1986, pp. 30-31.

\(^{7}\) Yehoshua Porath, In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945 (London: Frank Cass 1986) p. 155. It has, however, to be borne in mind that Bank Misr collapsed in September 1939, nineteen years after its establishment.

\(^{8}\) Barbara Stowasser (ed) The Islamic Impulse (London: Croom Helm 1987) pp. 89-91. Egyptian administrations and the government bureaucracy labored to maintain the new industries thrown up by the war-time isolation. In mid-1947, the General Committee for Industries in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry considered reports from a range of sub-committees in industries such as cotton textiles. Such problems as the lower productivity of Egyptian workers in comparison to European ones were discussed honestly in public. "al-Nuhud bil-Sina'at al-Misriyyah wa Himayat Sina'at al-Harb" (Promoting Egyptian Industry and Protecting War Industries), al-Muqattam 19 July 1945 p. 3. Dr Husayn 'Ali
broadcasting from the late 1930s greatly diffused a passive understanding of standard literary Arabic among largely illiterate masses down to village level in all Arab countries from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. The advent of the wireless politicized, for instance stiffening resistance to Britain and Zionism in Palestine where villagers previously had understood only a few Qur'anic verses in classical Arabic. European and Arab radio stations provided shared cultural activities that fostered the sense of a joint community among the most far-scattered Arab populations in the Middle East, North Africa and even the Americas. Side by side with all this quasi-classicist homogenization, Egyptian broadcasting, films, phonograph records, the increased residence of Egyptians in other Arab countries, reciprocal tourism, and especially the regular holidays of Christian Egypto-Syrians in their areas of origin in Lebanon and Syria, all made

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10. At the end of 1944 the BBC announced a competition in Arabic poetry open to listeners in the Middle East, Africa, North America and Central and Southern America. This span of the competition would connect the culturally vulnerable Muslims of French-occupied North Africa into the pan-Arab network forming around Egypt. But in opening the forum to the heavily Christian diaspora of the two Americas, the new BBC technology fostered multi-sectarian Arab community. "Mubaratun Jadidah fil-Shi'r al-'Arabi" (A New Competition in Arabic Poetry) al-Muqattam 23 December 1944.

11. A columnist of the Lebanese Catholic daily al-Bashir of 23 January 1941, p. 1, noted "a delightful, touching song describing the ardor of life and the enthusiasm of youth titled 'Zayy al-Kibrit' [like matches --- inflammable] which Egypt exported to us a few years ago and which sped through our streets and homes". al-Bashir in 1939 reprinted from an Alexandria paper a colloquial Egyptian zajal on adulteration and use of unhygienic materials in the ice-cream sold by the itinerant vendors in Alexandria. Since the vowelless Arabic alphabet only very ambiguously represents dialects, al-Bashir evidently assumed many of its Lebanese readers had a wide passive knowledge of Egyptian colloquial Arabic. "al-Humma fil-Dundurmah" (The Fever in the Icecream), al-Bashir 3 September 1939 p. 3.

12. The "Syrian" Christian minority resident in Egypt was an important channel for the diffusion of colloquial Egyptian Arabic in Lebanon
colloquial Egyptian Arabic understood in Arab West Asia.

**RISE OF ARABISM; PHARAONISM'S DECLINE**

Successive numbers of the Syrian-Christian-edited *al-Mugattam* in 1930 carried a cacophony of views on whether Pharaonic Egypt or the classical Arabs determined the identity and nationality of the modern Egyptians. Although they had yet to articulate the coherent, all-round critique of the Pharaonist identification --- and ancient Egypt --- that came two or three years later, the immature pan-Arabs were on the attack, offering counter-interpretations of antiquity that justified pan-Arabism and far-reaching political proposals for pan-Arab confederation. The arguments that thenceforth unfolded in Egyptian publications, mainly between members of the West-aware secular-educated intellectuals and professionals, Muslim and Coptic, addressed three main elements:

1. The classical Arabs and their language patterns and literature; plus, Islam.

2. Distinctive Egyptian culture and history, Pharaonic

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and Syria in the 1930s and 1940s. Successful professionals of the minority, accompanied by their offspring, took summer holidays in their areas of origin in Lebanon and Syria. The pan-Syrian particularist ideologue Antun Sa'adah noted in 1935 that their participation in Egyptian life had given them Egyptian characteristics. "So it is that one of them on returning to Syria, greets you with the (Egyptian) dialectical 'izzayyak', instead of 'how are you' and 'khabar 'eeh' instead of (the Syrian) 'shu sar' etc." Antun Sa'adah, *Nushu' al-Umam* (5th ed., Bayrut: Syrian Social Nationalist Party n.d.) p. 140. Sa'adah was citing the phenomenon as evidence that it is a combination of a shared environment but also shared socio-economic life that produces the cultural characteristics of a shared community rather than the latter that produce a common community with a common life.


al-Taftazani, a Sufi cleric, was active in Ahmad Zaki Pasha's Eastern League in the 1920s. A refutation was Nashid Sayfayn, "Misru Fir'awniyyah, Lahman wa Daman" (Egypt is Pharaonic by Flesh and Blood), *al-Mugattam* 10 September 1930, p. 7. A proposal of a USA-style pan-Arab federation was made by Hasan 'Arif in "Hal Misr Fir'awniyyah?" (Is Egypt Pharaonic?), *al-Mugattam* 12 September 1930 p. 7. For fuller analysis of these items see B 430 - 432.
and subsequent.

3. The West's modern material civilization and positivist-scientific ethos.

**The 1931 al-Hilal Poll**

On April 1931 the monthly magazine *al-Hilal* --- also Syrian-Christian founded and owned --- published a poll of eminent Muslim Egyptian intellectuals and educationalists titled "Our Coming Civilization --- Pharaonic, Western or Arab?" Already in 1931, the magazine registered unprecedented ideological division in Egypt between Westernizers, Pharaonists and Arabizers. Nonetheless, these three rough ideological categories among intellectuals in the 1930s were not as "incompatible" and hard and fast as *al-Hilal* imagined. Although so patterned by Western, particularly French, romanticism and nationalism, neo-Pharaonism could focus spiritualist, Easternist rejection of the West for (for example) playwright Tawfiq al-Hakim (Appendix 2). Acculturated pan-Arabs could feel affinities to the Westernist faction or flay them as "materialist".

Dr 'Ali Ibrahim Pasha, Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo University, in his poll response felt religious emotions: "spirituality" was what was integrating Eastern populations and set them apart from the implicitly "materialist" West. "Present-day civilization" lacked the vital "spiritual" dimension and Egypt's mission might be to fill this spiritual deficiency.

The oriental mentality has never died. I see it alive and strong in Egypt and outside Egypt. Since we have outstripped the Eastern peoples --- those in the Middle East and including Turkey --- we will keep this intellectual leadership and lead the Arab world. Beyond dispute our advance will be in the framework of Islamic civilization.

Given his summer-holidaying in multi-sectarian Lebanon from the 1920s (B 43-44), Dr 'Ali Ibrahim's quasi-pan-Arabism in the early 1930s maintained something of the liberal,

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incorporative --- almost Theosophical --- "Easternism" that had characterized Ahmad Zaki Pasha's Eastern League and many al-Siyasah intellectuals in the 1920s: wide Islamic community emotions still rejected neither Christian-Arab, Hindu, Buddhist nor Shintoist "Easterners". In likening Egypt to Westernizing Kemalist Turkey as two of the most advanced of the Eastern peoples, Dr. Ibrahim implicitly endorsed some modernization on European models by both since World War I:

We will neither throw ourselves unreservedly into the arms of the Western civilization nor reject it entirely. It is indispensable, too, that we borrow from the civilization of the Pharaohs ... just as it is wholly valid that we should seek inspiration in the civilization of the Greeks or the Assyrians.

By weaving off and diluting the Pharaonic element into a host of ancient civilizations and cultures --- some of them very marginal or foreign --- Ibrahim downgraded it from its status as the core of indigenous identity for particularists in the 1920s.\(^{15}\)

Dr Mansur Fahmi --- cofounder with Haykal of the Democratic Party (1919) --- in his reply to the 1931 al-Hilal poll much more explicitly excised the foundations of Egyptian neo-pagan particularism. An al-Siyasah-cum-Eastern League intellectual in the 1920s, Fahmi served as Dean of Alexandria University until 1946, later serving as Nasser's ambassador to the UN. In reply

\(^{15}\) 'Ali Ibrahim's pan-Arabism had the drive to neo-classicize modernity that was characteristic of the Westernizing-educated specialist professional classes in Egypt: he was to promote "the unification of (Arabic's) medical terms" on the basis of classical Arab medical terminologies, as well as contacts and conferences between Arab physicians. He regarded such efforts by the Egyptian medical association as an important contribution to the integration of the Arab cultures and lands, still all-too-disconnected. "Ra'yan' il-Wadhat al-'Arabiyyah --- 'Ali Pasha Ibrahim wa 'Abd al-Rahman Bik al-Rafi'i" (Two Views on Arab Unity --- 'Ali Ibrahim Pasha and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i), al-Muqattam, 13 May 1938 p. 7. For a friendly, humorous account of 'Ali Ibrahim's personality and his distaste for politics, which made him something of a misfit as Minister of Health in 1940, see Karim Thabit, "al-Duktur 'Ali Ibrahim Pasha Bayn al-Wizarah wal-Jami'ah wa Shari' al-Sanafiri" (Dr 'Ali Ibrahim Between the Ministry, the University and al-Sanafiri Street), al-Muqattam 4 August 1941 p. 3. 'Ali Ibrahim gave facilities at Cairo University to Young Egypt in its initial period.
to the 1931 al-Hilal poll, he off-handedly dismissed the crucial assumption of the neo-Pharaonic nationalists that race was an important determinant of national-political communities. He voiced some regard for the long-standing argument of the particularists that Egypt's specific geographical environment somewhat stamped its inhabitants. But he then strongly argued that the Arabic language had acted as a channel for the Arab culture to massively enter Egypt and totally transform the population's characteristics:

The majority of the people of these lands received from the Arabs the language and the religion, being all alike in this those of them who have a connection with the Pharaohs or the Greeks or the Romans or the Tatars or other races. The sons of Egypt of whatever blood they may be — assuming that blood has any importance in communities — are Egyptian at any rate through their belonging to their environment which moulds their facial features/complexions (suhan) ... If the Egyptians are Egyptians after this fashion, they are Arabs by virtue of their language and the emotions and ideas that language has brought into their souls.

The coming of Arabic, then, had decisively transformed the Egyptians. In comparison to Dr Ibrahim, the still more secular Dr Mansur Fahmi in 1931 visualized the Arabs much more as a culturally distinctive, tightly-integrated national group within the Muslim belief-community and wider Afro-Asian world. In the 1920s, Fahmi's notoriety had derived from his Westernist critical analyses of the position of women in pristine Islam and his presentation of secularizing Turkey and Iran as models for Egypt and the Arabs. Yet as early as the mid-1920s, Fahmi in Eastern League settings had focussed on "spirituality" to differentiate "the Easterners" from the West: this incipient reaction, though, was stimulated by Westerners and their pro-East intellectualism and still welcomed their calls for cooperation between the two civilizations.

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16. "Hadaratun-UL-Qadimah ..."
17. As early as 1925, Mansur Fahmi — briefly a radically secularizing intellectual — had focussed on "the spiritual high development of the East" (al-ruqiyy al-ruhi al-Sharqi) to distinguish it from the West. The matrix of Easternism, though, was one of intense acculturation and interaction with Westerners. Fahmi was speaking at an Eastern League (Rabitat Sharqiyyah) ...
inability of imported Western institutions and liberalism to cope with Egypt's internal dislocations after 1930, and the West's coinciding plight, deepened and Islamized his reaction. At a 1941 semi-official conference, Fahmi --- as Haykal and other al-Siyasah intellectuals more and more did from the late 1920s --- stressed that Western civilization had not delivered the "happiness" it promised humanity: he justified Islam's title to guide social acts and social reform --- but still acculturately, citing Comte in support. Adapting language from classical Islam, Fahmi in 1941 kept Islam's coming "correct/healthy civilization and renaissance" flexibly open to more appropriate scientific Western elements --- persisting modernism missed by disappointed Copts and totalistic secularizers who had admired him. Fahmi always maintained the acculturated function at which two of the main speakers were European: one of them, Madame Valentine de Saint Point, head of the Egyptian chapter of the International Society of Modern Education, had praised the Easterners and called for cooperation between the Eastern and Western civilizations: Fahmi was responding favorably to that call. al-Mugattam 31 May 1925 p. 2. For Fahmi as a pro-Ataturk Westernizer in the 1920s, see B 65-66, including fn. 32.

18. This speech of Fahmi opened a session of the 1941 conference in Cairo on "Islam and Social Reform", held at the Royal Geographical Society, that brought together Cairo University and al-Azhar lecturers. In his address, Fahmi spoke on the spiritual and social bases of Islam that "purify the human soul" in its social acts. He quoted Auguste Comte that Islam of all religions most successfully connected action with belief. While Fahmi was clear that Islam had to influence social life, he stressed the "flexibility" in its "general principles" that make it suitable for every age. Thus, intellectuals need not apply Islam's law with unvarying totalism: the Prophet had counselled believers to follow the revelations transmitted from God but to critically scrutinize his private example as a fallible human because he could sometimes err. On this point, Fahmi ascribed a hadith to the Prophet Muhammad: "When I communicate to you what is of God, take it, but when I tell you what is of myself know that I am only a human being like you: I can be right and I can err" (Ma'akhbartukum bihi 'an illah, fakhudhuhu, wa ma akhbartukum bihi 'an nafsi, fa'innama ana basharun mithlukum usibu wa ukhti').

Excerpts from Mansur Fahmi's address in "al-Islam wal-Islah al-Ijtima'i: al-Halqat al-Thaniyah lil-Mutamar" (Islam and Social Reform: The Second Session of the Conference), al-Mugattam 19 April 1941 p. 5. According to Dr 'Abdul Khaliq Kazi, Senior Lecturer in Arabic in the Department of Asian Languages and Anthropology in the University of Melbourne, Fahmi's most probable sources for this citation would be the hadith collections of al-Bukhari and al-Tirmidhi. For a lament by left-secularist Copt Louis 'Awad that Fahmi turned from critical discussion of women in Islam in the 1920s to religious homilies in the 1930s, see P. J.
sense that Arabism-Islam and the materialist, but productive, Western civilization were complementary: the Arabs had to borrow, for instance, Western technologies to produce industries and tanks as Amin al-Rayhani said. He also kept particularism's awareness of plural racial colors (al-\textit{wan}), "facial features" (suhan) and dialects in the Arab lands but believed that shared (Qur'an-derived literary) "language" in particular, backed up by geographical contiguity and resemblance, the joint classical Arab past and the inimitable Arab ethics it patterned, common sufferings from imperialist ill-treatment and by Islam, would actualize a tighter \textit{ittihad} (undefined unity, unification, confederation or federal joint state). Fahmi had a strong unificatory drive but like most high-culturist Egyptian Arabists sharply registered current practical difficulties and plural units.

Fahmi's 1931 sense of Arabic as a transforming conduit that made itself the core of Egyptian personality, was to strengthen among liberal-acculturated Muslim intellectuals: in 1933 his old al-\textit{Siya\textsc{s}ah} colleague Taha Husayn was to lance this theme of the power of Arabic at Tawfiq al-Hakim's hankering to inject Pharaonic motifs into forthcoming Arabic literature. In his response in 1931 to al-\textit{Hilal}, though, Taha was more intent to limit both the old Pharaonist and the burgeoning Arab-Islamic cultural impulses where these might sap commitment to Egypt's Westernizing enterprises. Of the three elements in Egypt --- Arab-Islamic, Western and Pharaonic --- he gave the last least importance in 1931. Taha dismissed the notion that even the most fervent Pharaonists "would want for Egypt that it would affect the religion of the Pharaohs and their language or their political and social institutions". He also dismissed the possibility that

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19. Ahmad 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi, Ru'\textit{y}ah Had\textit{\textsc{a}}riyyah Tabaqiyyah li-'Urubat Mis\textit{r}: Dirasah wa Watha'ilq (Bayrut: Dar al-\textit{A\textsc{d}ab} 1979) pp. 279-282.
21. "\textit{It\textsc{l}al-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim min al-Duktur Taha Husayn}" (To Mr Tawfiq al-Hakim From Dr Taha Husayn), al-\textit{Risalah} 15 June 1933.
Arabic-speaking Egyptians could learn the hieroglyphic language on any wide scale --- a clear restriction of input from real Pharaonic culture into new Arab-Egyptian literature and intellectual life. The only Pharaonic aspect that Taha seriously wanted to install in new culture was the "glorious" Pharaonic art: Arab Egyptians would adapt it to "portray their modern life". Taha in 1931 already sensed that the Arab-Islamic orientation could far-reachingely delegitimize Western elements in Egypt: he reacted with ambivalence to the indigenous culture to which language bound him tightly. Against particularists and utilitarian total Westernizers, he observed that there were two basic Arab elements in Egyptian culture "of which it would be at once a sin and a futility to try to get rid ": "the Arab religion and the Arab language". "Arab religion" denoted a human legacy, not the traditional concept of divinely-revealed Islam that detailed social and economic life. Islam might have had wide functions in social life but many of these had been superseded by the pervasive "European civilization" continuously moving into modern Egypt. Modern Western civilization was not excessively "materialistic". "Try to ask anyone you like among the ordinary people to give up any of the commercial, industrial or economic institutions that European civilization imposed upon them and live their daily life as the Arab or Egyptian ancients used to like to live".

I repeat what I have said more than once: that one of the greatest disasters people could suffer would be for you to attempt to treat them with the medicine of Ibn Sina [Avicenna] or al-Razi, forsaking Pasteur or other scientists of the West. The same thing could be said in philosophy and in science and in literature 22.

22. "Hadaratunal-Qadimah ..." Cf. Taha's 1938 mention of "the ancient Egyptian artistic element" in his 1938 characterization of the components of Egyptian culture. Taha Husayn, The Future of Culture in Egypt (tsd Sydney Glazer) (Washington: Council of American Learned Societies 1954) p. 153. The future ideologue of Nasserite "Arab Socialism" Isma'il Mazhar, like Taha saw art as the main enduring contribution of Pharaonic Egypt. In 1936, Mazhar reflected that "Egypt is linked to two cultures that are among the most glorious" --- the culture of the Arabs, "which Islam and the Arabic language fostered in Egypt" and "the culture of the Pharaonic Egyptians in the art and the life". "There is no doubt that the two cultures are very much intermingled in the Egyptians" as "the traditional culture of Egypt with which our
Taha Husayn in 1931 was still basically relaxed. A French-patterned sceptic, he had no urge to assault inherent "Arab" elements that he cherished as an artist. He ridiculed that the Arab element could prescribe distinct political institutions in twentieth century Egypt: in 1931, institutions patterned from Western parliamentarism still held substantial respect among Egyptians.

Taha's old al-Siyasah colleague, the Azhar-educated shari'ah judge 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, published al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Principles of Government) in 1925 to undermine the Egyptian King Fu'ad's claim to the Caliphate, just abolished by Ataturk. For this, the book had argued that the wide Islamic empires of the classical Arabs, notably those headed by the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Caliphs, were oppressive monarchies (B 20-29). By the 1931 al-Hilal poll, however, 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq projected that the coming civilization Egypt was to enjoy "shall not deviate from the requirements of Arabo-Islamic civilization as regards language, religion, the customs and the general spirit". Turning his back on the particularist isolationism of the 1920s, he saw Egypt as having enjoyed intellectual leadership over the whole Arabic Middle East "since the time of the Mamluks to this day". Arabo-Islamic civilization, as for Taha, would continue to determine much of social life through "custom", but was not to be a detailed socio-economic alternative to imported Western institutions. Nonetheless, 'Abd al-Raziq in his 1931 reply had moved towards the classical Islamic civilization whose institutional framework he had previously condemned as undemocratic. In calling for Egypt to resume the "international" leadership she enjoyed in the days of the Mamluks (when wide areas of Arab West Asia were administered from Egypt), 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq in 1931 was shifting from the narrow homeland-defined political unit that al-Siyasah had favored in the 1920s to the historical...
wide indigenous Arab-Muslim community which had legitimized Fu'ad I's pursuit of the Caliphate.

The 1931 al-Hilal poll showed the waning of some salient particularist concerns of the 1920s: the respondents did not allocate much energy or resources to the pursuit of the Pharaonic past and culture except for its art. Language as a conduit transferring culture and identity was now stressed like 'Abdallah al-Nadim's nineteenth century linguistic understanding of nationality. Disinterest in discrete racial origins was to recur in much Egyptian Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s. Both Fahmi and al-Zayyat in exalting language as the determinant that incorporated diverse races in the national community ignored streams in classical Arab tradition concerned to ascertain lineage--which post-Nasser Egyptian pan-Arabs have registered. West-aware Arabism under the monarchy had an episodic holism that could drop facets of the classical Arab golden age at sharp variance with European liberalism but then abruptly transmit a flood of minutaes from other sectors that clashed less. Egyptian liberal classicist Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s often could enjoy collages of integral strips from both the classical Arab and Western civilizations.

The 1931 al-Hilal poll nonetheless contained omens that the questioning by acculturated Muslim Egyptians of "materialist" facets of Western civilization would become more radical.

23. "Hadaratunal-Qadimah ..."
24. The high selectivity with which Egyptian Arabism has persistently utilized the classical Arab past it exalts was more recently instanced, shortly after the collapse of Sadat's regime, by Dr Muhammad 'Imarah's steely 1982 review of currents in Islamic thought. Historically, evolving Arabism rejected both "the Shu'ubiyyah that denied the Arabs their vanguard, leading role in the [classical Islamic] State[s], and indeed religion". But simultaneously, the nation rejected the "pagan solidarity of the Arabs" which would have based Arabism on lineage, race and arrogance, instead founding it on shared "civilization and culture" and loyalty to it as the only criteria of who is an Arab, disregarding ancient racial origins or preceding cultural connections. 'Imarah, Tayyarat al-Fikr al-Islami (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal 1982) pp. 8-9. Cf. his characterization of non-Arab mawali in the Mu'tazilites in such terms, p. 144.
Haykal's neo-Islamist condemnations from the early 1930s of the West as waging perpetual Crusaderist wars against the Muslims, and his formal repudiation of his previous Pharaonic nationalism, are well-known in both the West and the Arab World. 'Abd al-Mun'im Shamis (1967) saw Haykal as having prefigured "the Arab national restoration of 1952" (Nasser) in his 1937 statement that, in contrast to the immemorially dead Pharaonic culture, only the seed of Islamic history can bear fruit in a new modern life. al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah had been banned by Isma'il Sidqi in February 1931; the revived journal, in its first number, in 1937 promised to again offer a "liberal" link "between East and West and vigorously struggle for reviving Islamic, Arab and Eastern civilization by the modern scientific method and support those bonds between the Arabic-speaking lands that have remained firm in the face of history and the main features of which all the capriciousness of the world after the Great World War proved unable to obliterate or weaken. This 1937 editorial, then, condemned the dominant Western

25. Haykal's Islamic writings were widely read in the 1930s and 1940s; key passages from them bearing such messages were then conveyed to new generations under Nasser and Sadat through the successive editions of Muhammad Muhammad Husayn's 1954-1956 work. Eg. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fi-Arab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut: Dar al-irshad 1970) v. 2 pp. 170-172. This anti-Western, nationalism-rejecting passage from Haykal's 1936 Fi Manzal al-Wahy, on his pilgrimage, was translated by Safran, Egypt in Search pp. 174-175; cf. ibid pp. 169-173 on Haykal's 1935 biography of Muhammad.


powers' partition of the Arab lands into particularist state units following World War I --- compartmentalization the journal's Pharaonism had helped in that era but its proto-Arabism over-leaped. The editorial was right that the blend of elements was changing, more than discontinuous breaks. The first frame-issue of the revived magazine excerpted Haykal's reactions to his Islamic pilgrimage: joint worship of the One God brought Europeans, Africans and Asians --- all the populations of the earth --- together as ethereal brothers despite the differences of their races and languages28. As in the 1920s, the revived al-Siyasat al-Uusbu'iyyah from 1937 publicized, in its supra-Arab pan-Islamism, the vulnerable struggles of the Malayan and Indonesian Muslims against Chinese merchants and Western colonialists. Such Egyptian intellectuals, though, still did not have the consciousness or will to forge new instruments to seriously integrate the Arabs with far-off non-Arab Muslims29. The al-Siyasah pan-Muslim

29. For al-Siyasah (and other acculturated Egyptian) awareness of colonized Malays and Indonesians in the 1920s see B 64-65, esp. the 1927 article from the Malay-Indonesian side by Muhammad Yunus al-Indunisi. Geographical distance and divergence of language remained formidable barriers to development by Egyptians in the 1930s and 1940s of sustained relationships with such non-Arabic-speaking Muslim nations. On 22 January 1937 (pp. 12-13) the new al-Siyasat al-Uusbu'iyyah published an article "al-Muslimuna fi Juzur al-Malaya" (The Muslims in the Malay Archipelago). The article expressed deep concern at the educational backwardness of the Muslims in Indonesia (under Dutch colonial rule) and peninsular Malaya ruled by Britain. It also voiced solidarity with Malay and Indonesian Muslims in their economic conflict with Chinese money-lenders and merchants. But it got written only because the Arab-Singaporean leader al-Sayyid Ibrahim 'Umar al-Saqqaf al-'Alawi was visiting Cairo and could give first-hand information. al-Siyasat al-Uusbu'iyyah requested Indonesian youth resident in Egypt to "carry out publicity here for their homeland" so that a relationship could get started between Malays/Indonesians and Egyptians, who knew little about those far-off lands. There was still little thought in 1937 that Muslim Egyptian intellectuals might learn other Muslim languages (here Malay-Indonesian) to research and analyse non-Arab Muslim populations on their own account and in order to communicate with them. Kawkab al-Sharq, Taha's Wafdist newspaper, in mid-1933 carried a spread of news from Indonesia covering such subjects as a new Islamic party, the activities of Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia leader Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo, and the spread of culture...
impulse now integrated new community within the narrowed Arab sphere, where it could work in combination with a host of other affinities.

Writers who wanted to maintain a Pharaonist contemporary identity registered the swing of the educated Egyptian public to the classical Arabs and pan-Arab community: that support might now enable pan-Arabs to excise Pharaonic elements from high culture and public life. Ahmad Badawi in 1932 accordingly presented the particularist enterprises begun in high literature in the 1920s as complementary to the classicist Arab community and language patterns. In further expanding Egypt's twentieth-century literature it would "not harm Arab unity in the least that we lyrically celebrate our [Egyptian] environment and give accounts of our [distinct] life [and] ... constantly extol our [Pharaonic] forefathers and the

in the archipelago. But this coverage, too, was taken from al-Ruda, the immigrant Hadramawi newspaper published from Singapore. The Egyptians were not actively researching the Malayo-Indonesian world: individuals from it had to supply them with the data in Arabic. "Akhbar Indonesia" (Indonesian News), Kawkab al-Sharq 23 May 1933 p. 2.

30. The new al-Siyasat al-Usub'iyyah actualized pan-Arab community with Arabs beyond Egypt. The visiting 'Iraqi Yunus Bahri published an article mourning the death of 'Iraq's King Faysal: "The Hashimite Apostle of Arabism — He Died, the One who Said that there Can Be no Borders between the Lands of the Arabs" ("al-Hashimi Rasul al-'Urubah --- Mata alladhî Qala La Hududa Bayna 'Aqtar al-'Arab"), al-Siyasat al-Usub'iyyah 13 February 1937, p. 9. The article, however, stressed the growing trade between Egypt and 'Iraq and the two countries' cultural and educational cooperation (including Egypt's provision of teachers and lecturers to 'Iraq). The new Siyasat al-Usub'iyyah gave generous coverage to all Arab countries — although its predecessor in the 1920s had also copiously reported them. It published a feature on King Sa'ud of Arabia ("Fil Mir'at --- al Malik Ibn Sa'ud", al-Siyasat al-Usub'iyyah 16 January 1937).

extensive civilization they established that is the mother of civilizations". Egyptians could
add to it the glory of the [classical] Arabs and their religion and the wisdom (hikmah) and civilization that they developed ... that dominated the world and rose to the very stars. I fancy, though, that those who call for Unity now have no thought that the Egyptians should forget their ancient history which is part of their own soil ... How great and glorious it is that our history should ... shine with two suns

Ahmad Ahmad Badawi in 1932 identified the religion of the classical Arabs as a crucial connection that in 1932 was making even West-steeped Egyptians build a successor pan-Arab community. al-Afghani and 'Abduh From 1880 had stressed classical Islam's hikmah or rational thought that drew on Greek philosophy and science, justifying borrowing from the West thenceforth (Ch. 2). Modern Western imperialism and international power made Badawi in 1932, as it had al-Afghani's disciple 'Abdallah al-Nadim in the early 1890s, seek a hope of future sovereignty from wide classical Arab Muslim empires that indeed had dominated much (though not all) of the world.

The literary and language forms of the classical Arabs were stimulating new creative literature in Egypt. Badawi tried to safeguard responsiveness to the Egyptian environment and the option of a simplified literary Arabic that modestly echoed some local colloquial patterns achieved by Egyptian writers in the 1920s: the new era of "Arab Unity does not demand of us that we make our literature follow the patterns of the ancient Arabic literature which used to express souls narrow in their hopes and an unvarying uniform environment". "We cannot deny the effect of the evolution/development (tatawwur) that has transformed everything in life". Badawi's futurism did not limit utilization of motifs from the fragmentary Pharaonic literature or past. However, he was waging a fundamentally defensive rear-guard action to contain the emerging neo-Arabist high literature31.

Egypt's Muslim liberal opinion leaders in the 1930s and 1940s imaginatively foresaw the larger cultural-intellectual, economic and then political community that their countrymen could weld with Arabs and Muslims beyond Egypt. But they simultaneously conveyed that smaller units were established psychic realities that it would take a long time to fuse. The acculturated novelist Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini --- who helped Haykal and 'Inan to write a book protesting Isma'il Sidqi's suppression of al-Siyasah --- in 1938 held up before Egyptians the prospect that their Arab race ("blood") and religion could soon restore the unity the Arabs had under classical Islam as "one Arab nation".

But al-Mazini (1890-1949) well knew that many Egyptians in the 1930s did not consider other Arab countries part of their homeland. In 1930 he quoted a phonograph vendor that his best-selling record was one bemoaning "exile from the homelands": Egyptian officials bought it before departing to the Sudan. In 1930, al-Mazini himself was still in transition. The terminology of his article maintained plural Arab and Muslim peoples determined by geography. Like the territorialist nationalists of the 1920s, he believed that the land of Egypt had helped change Islam itself after it was imported. But unlike them, al-Mazini had returned to salafi attitudes that accretions to the original Islam brought by the Arabs had to be excised, the attitude that had persisted in the 'Abduh-influenced modernist stream of Qasim Amin and the young Haykal --- and in turn flowed into the evolving world view of the al-Siyasah intellectuals of the 1920s. "The Egyptian Muslim differs from the Syrian Muslim, or the Arabian Muslim (sic: al-Muslim al-'Arabi) or the Indian Muslim: fatalism (al-jabariyyah) is general in

32. Israel Gershoni, The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt (Tel Aviv University: Shiloah Centre 1981) p. 63. For al-Mazini's role as an al-Siyasah sub-editor, and his collaboration with Haykal and the Liberal Constitutionalists in resistance to Sidqi's suppression of the Party's papers see Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (2 vols Cairo: Mitba'at Misr 1951-1953) v. 1 p. 327
Egypt ... in ways without any parallel in the other Islamic nations (umam). To be easily satisfied with very little is second nature with Egyptians". The influence of their distinctive bountiful homeland and "ages of despotism" distorted Egyptians' behavior and understanding of Islam, but for al-Mazini the standard Islamic religion's central concepts and practices did survive in Egypt. He did not in 1930 go as far as Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Ahmad Husayn who in recent years had --- unlike him, approving --- depicted Pharaonic survivals and territory-imposed patterns as a much more totally pervasive content in Egyptian Islam.

It is true that the pan-Arabizing intellectuals viewed the plural territorial identifications that lingered among Egyptians as semi-morbid. They had come full circle back to the criticism of the Egyptian natural environment by the young pre-Pharaonist Haykal for sapping energy and resistance to tyrants (Ch.6). For all his acculturated drives to install aspects of the sensibility of the Russian novel in new Arabic fiction, for al-Mazini the essential religion and language of the classical Arabs had to be the vessel of modernity, excluding clashing Egyptian elements. Thus, in 1933 he protested from al-Risalah against Pharaonic nationalist motifs and against raw Egyptian colloquial dialogues that Tawfiq al-Hakim injected into his neo-Pharaonist novel 'Awdat al-Ruh on the 1919 uprising: that readers in other Arab countries might not understand now ruled such discrete Egyptian elements out of fiction, al-Mazini contended.

34. al-Mazini, "'Awdat al-Ruh lil-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim", al-Risalah 25 June 1933 p. 3. This review of al-Hakim's novel blasted its pseudo-populist use of "the coarsest" colloquial Egyptian Arabic in the dialogues, the contorted, non-indigenous (= French patterned?) style of the literary Arabic of its analytical passages and the heavyhanded motifs from Pharaonic mythology. al-Mazini contrasted al-Hakim's jerky, declamatory novel to muted, precise description in Russian novels that also started a revolution. Ibid. al-Mazini --- deputy editor in the Liberal Constitutionalists' al-Siyasah in the 1920s --- was a pioneer of
At the close of 1947, al-Mazini was among those loudest in demanding that Egypt intervene in Palestine to stop the birth of a Zionist state out to uproot the native Palestinian "people". But the entity about to enter Palestine was the plural "Arab peoples" (al-shu'ub al-'Arabiyyah), each defending its particular land and interests, as well, from the expansionist Zionists.

Yet some in Egypt in the 1930s did already articulate the Arab national idea with highly unitary, organic, hypnotic imagery. The Liberal Constitutionalist politician Muhammad 'Ali 'Allubah vividly evoked indivisible Arabness and Palestine at an Islamic Conference held in 1933 in Baghdad, mainly to safeguard threatened Palestine. There, he took up the metaphor of a previous speaker that "the Arab Nation" (al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah) is "a bird whose right wing is 'Iraq and its left wing Egypt. It can fly only when (its) two wings cooperate". Religion tinged 'Allubah's grief for Palestine, "an area among the Holy Areas now swept by current catastrophies which have wounded her at the core". But he very much viewed the struggle unfolding between that indivisible Arab nation and the Zionists through the prism of acculturation: to merit and win freedom, he told the Baghdad conference, the first

the naturalization in Arabic of techniques from Russian psychological fiction (Safran, *Egypt in Search* pp. 137-138), but keeping the literary language continuous with the classical Arabs. Salamah Musa even equated al-Mazini with Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i, the neo-classicist who wanted new literature cast in the integral antique idiom. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, *al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir* (Bayrut: Dar al-‘Irshad 1970) v. 2 pp. 223-224. For further 1935 preference by al-Mazini for living Islamic "Arab civilization" over the pride-conferring but dead Pharaonic civilization, and his consequent political-economic pan-Arabism see Hijazi, *'Urubat Misr* pp. 328-331.

35. al-Mazini in *al-Asas* of 4 December 1947 quoted Husanayn Karum, *'Urubat Misr Qabla 'Abd al-Nasir: 4 Fibrayir 1942 - 23 Yulyu 1952* (Cairo: al-‘Arabi 1981) v. 1 p. 115. In this article, al-Mazini appealed to angry Egyptians not to damage Egypt's reputation by harassing or attacking foreigners or Jews living in Egypt. Ibid. In this item, he warned — his Egyptianist aspect — that any forthcoming Zionist state could expand against Egypt and other neighboring states. He had however been voicing apprehensions in the Egyptian press that the Zionists might oust the Palestinians from their country as early as 1936 or 1937. James Jankowski, "Egyptian Responses to the Palestine Problem in the Interwar Period", *IJMES* v. 12 (1980) pp. 22-23.
necessity was "knowledge", education\(^{36}\).

The widening impulse to assert Arab and Islamic elements soon impinged upon even those aesthetic areas in which particularists had got substantial separatist creativity underway in the 1920s. The artist Muhammad Naji had tried then to incorporate Pharaonic sites and art principles into his own realistic sketches and paintings of popular Egyptian and Black African life. But in 1934 he painted a canvas of Ibn Sina (Avicenna), one of three depicting the stages through which the development of medicine had passed in Egypt\(^{37}\).

Dr Zaki Mubarak (1892 - 1952), partly Azhar-educated, and with a Doctorate in Arabic literary criticism from the Sorbonne, was one of Egypt's outstanding poets and critics. In 1937 --- exactly like Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat much earlier --- he was to go to Baghdad to lecture in Arabic literature at the Teachers' College: he popularized a modernizing Islamic 'Iraq to Egyptians\(^{38}\). The neo-Pharaonists and particularist de-Islamizers had since the 1920s called for Egypt's "non-Arab" rural folklore and dialect idioms to be put into a new separatist "national literature", depicting the Egyptian peasantry as racially Pharaonic, unique in the Arab world --- a thesis that al-Majallat al-Jadidah, edited by the secularized anti-traditionalist Copt Salamah Musa maintained well into the 1930s\(^{39}\). However, Mubarak in 1934, even from the pages


\(^{37}\) Sa'd al-Rhadim, al-Hayat al-Sha'biyyah fi Rusum Naji (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1958). Early Pharaonic influences on Naji pp. 11-12; their influence on his representation of Ethiopian subjects pp. 16-18; growing Arab influences in his works pp. 30-34.

\(^{38}\) Mubarak's monumental 1938 Wahy Baghdad gave Egyptians sharp images of Baghdad, which exhilarated him as an "Eastern city" like Cairo two generations back, for the incisiveness of its intellectuals, and as an Islamic city that rigorously maintained the Ramadan fast while striving to enter the twentieth century. Chaim Rabin, Arabic (Lund Humphries Modern Arabic Readers) (London: Lund Humphries 1947) pp. 60-66.

\(^{39}\) An almost Nazi-like quest for racially pure Pharaonic Egyptians among twentieth-century upper-Egyptian Copts and Egyptian peasants --- as distinct from urban Muslims who had somewhat intermarried
of al-Majallat al-Jadidah, traced thematic and stylistic connections between Arab folk-culture, the semi-popular literature of the Arabian Nights and the high literary maqamat dramatic assemblies of Islam's fourth century. Mubarak vividly evoked a continuity of Arab culture at all its levels over a millennium, categorizing his compatriots with all the other Arabic-speakers in the ongoing collectivity of the Arab nation 40.

**Official Egyptian Pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s**

By the middle of the 1930s the pan-Arab attitudes voiced in the 1920s by al-Siyasah and Eastern League visionaries had become an establishment identification ascendant among writers and fostered by the monarchical regime to raise its standing inside Egypt as well as abroad. Rather more than in the 1920s in al-Siyasah, pan-Arabism now strongly voiced Egypt's political, economic and literary leadership over other Arabs. In 1938 the Arabic Language Academy member Hasan Husni 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, speaking of the prestige King Faruq commanded in Tunisia, argued that

> Egypt by virtue of her geographical position occupies the central position among the Arab nations (al-umam al-'Arabiyyah). ... In this situation they make Egypt the lamp by whose guiding light they direct their steps, whether in literature, in industrial development and indeed politically. Egypt in relation to them is the head of the caravan.

Reviving a concept of Arab-orientated al-Siyasah intellectuals in the 1920s, Husni 'Abd al-Wahhab characterized Egypt in the new pan-Arab high-tide as viewing those countries "after the fashion of the elder sister (al-ukht al-kubra) obliged by duty to feel solicitude for her younger sisters and to take their hand and guide them". The 1938 speech looked back competitively to the period before the early 1920s when Turkey as the

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with Turks, Circassians, and Arabs —— was Musa's "al-Wajh al-Misri, al-Ana wa Ayyam al-Fara'inah" (The Egyptian Face, Now and in the Times of the Pharaohs), al-Majallat al-Jadidah April 1934 pp. 13-15.

only relatively strong, sovereign Islamic state had exercised moral leadership over the Arab lands at the expense of the largest Arab country, colonized Egypt. He expressed relief that Ataturk's republic had relinquished Turkey's title to "the Islamic leadership of the Arab nations" because "the eyes of the Islamic world now turned to Cairo as the best substitute for Istanbul." The speech thus implied the persistence of supra-national pan-Muslim community emotions among ordinary Arabs: the fortuitous withdrawal of the Turkish leadership had been crucial to their shift from pan-Islamism to national pan-Arabism.

The new official Egyptian pan-Arabism of the 1930s and 1940s often shaded out into pan-Islamic activity. In 1941, the former Royal Chamberlain Hasan Nasha'at Pasha, as ambassador in London sought to promote cultural and economic relations between the two countries. One means through which he strove to achieve this was an Egyptian cultural centre, which, however, would double as an Islamic institute and mosque in the heart of London. The project was pan-Arab in that it had collaboration from 'Iraqi and Islamically conservative Sa'udi diplomats but also from eminent Indian Muslims, with encouragement from the British. King Faruq personally followed the project.

Generally, the propertied Westernized Muslim Egyptian intellectuals and politicians were cautious in their

41. "Misru wa Tunus: Jalalat al-Malik Faruq al-Awwal wa Ta'alluq al-Shu'ub al-'Arabiyyah bi-Jalalatihi" (Egypt and Tunisia: His Highness Faruq I and the Attachment of the Arab Peoples to His Royal Person), al-Muqattam 13 January 1938 pp. 1, 4.
42. "al-'Alaqat al-Thaqafiyyah Bayna Baritaniya wal-'Alam al-'Arabi" (The Cultural Relations Between Britain and the Arab World) al-Muqattam 22 July 1941 p. 2. Nasha'at may indeed have had strong backing from Faruq for his endeavors in London: he had long had close relations with the monarchy, for as Royal Chamberlain under Fu'ad in the 1920s he had funneled financial support to the Caliphate Committee of al-Azhar and those set up in the provinces, to search for a successor to the Turkish Caliphate abolished by the Kemalists. Fu'ad hoped to make himself or a protege the new Caliph of the Muslim world. P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt 3rd ed (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1985) p. 303. The Indian Muslim figure whom Nasha'at involved in his Islamic Institute scheme was Sir Firoz Khan Noon, a prominent pro-British politician who from 1936 served as India's High Commissioner in London.
growing pan-Arabism. They tried to use pan-Arabism and new regional Arab-Islamic groupings to increase Egypt's leverage and bargaining power in international relations vis-a-vis Western imperialists who could hit hard\textsuperscript{43}. After World War II, Egypt's Westernized Muslim elite hoped to exploit the rivalry between the old imperial states and the U.S.A. which was moving into the region. Most Egyptian thought still viewed pan-Arabism as an alliance of interest between individually weak states which had had a shared history and cultural-linguistic background but were conceived of as discrete units.

Pursuit of Egypt's interests and widened independence through pan-Arabism was clear from a 1947 address by Mahmud Hasan, ambassador of Egypt in Washington, presenting the League of Arab State as "an indivisible unity ... the axis of security in the world" whose "friendship it is the interest of the Great Powers to win". He demanded the withdrawal of British troops from the Sudan and the holding of a plebiscite there. He then designated "the colonial system" as "the foundation of all evils" and stated that "Egypt and the states of the Arab League will always be prepared to cooperate with the United States and serve the cause of peace on condition that the states of the Arab League, including Egypt, enjoy equality of rights and sovereignty". "If the Great Powers are prepared to give up their privileges in the Middle East, they shall find us prepared to shake them by the hand. In the other case we shall be compelled to resist them"\textsuperscript{44}. Egypt's conception

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\textsuperscript{43} From the early 1930s, West Asian Arab leaders, such as Riyad al-Sulh in 1931, had tried to entice Egyptians into pan-Arabism by projecting that the connection with other Arabs would strengthen Egypt's hand when negotiating with Britain for independence. Coury (1982) characterized Egyptian politicians as increasingly prepared in the 1930s to use other Arab countries in an Egyptian sphere of influence for "leverage" and as "a bargaining chip" to "bluff" more sovereignty for Egypt out of imperialist powers somewhat weakened by World War I and the Depression. Ralph Coury, "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism? --- 2", IJMES, v. 14 (1982), pp. 461-462.

\textsuperscript{44} "Isti'dad al-'Arab li-Muqawamat al-Isti'mar: Safir Misr bi-Washington Yuhajim Siyasat al-Inkiliz bil-Sudan" (The Preparedness of the Arabs to Resist Imperialism: Egypt's Ambassador in Washington Attacks the Policy of the English in the Sudan), al-Bashir 13 April 1947.
of the Arab League as a means through which she, and other even weaker Arab states, could by combining their policies lift themselves to bargaining status with the West is also suggested in Egypt's post-World War II actions at the newly-formed United Nations. Her delegation there feverishly worked "for the principle of geographical zones and regional pacts to be adopted as the basis for choosing small peoples in the Security Council. "The opposing proposal was that the ability of states to contribute to the preservation of peace should be the basis for choice of membership of the Security Council."

No doubt elite land-owning Egyptian politicians explosively resented the British refusal to accept them as partners in the region rather than underlings. But, as ever, their verbalized anger was contained by shrewd awareness that their classes' property and leadership could be devastated in an all-or-nothing war of independence to drive the Powers from the Arab countries. The bombastically verbal, cautious, meaning that "struggle" had for establishment (now including Wafdist) politicians in Egypt, and for the interlinked land-owning political cliques in neighboring Arab lands, was clear in pan-Arab solidarity during ill-feeling between Syrians and the French overlords in 1933.

46. Towards mid-1933, the Wafdist newspaper Kawkab al-Sharq reported that the bold patriotic deputy Fakhri Bey al-Barudi fainted while shouting in condemnation of the compromising statement issued by the Syrian cabinet of the day: "Are you a subject French chamber, or a nationalist assembly truly committed to Syria's interest?" The Wafdist Egyptian Christian leader Makram 'Ubayd telegrammed him: "I was much upset by the fit of unconsciousness to which you fell victim following your noble stand of struggle for Syria. Bodies are often too feeble to follow to actualization the striving of great souls". "Barqiyyat al-Mujahid al-Kabir ila Fakhri Bik al-Barudi" (Telegram of the Great Struggler [Makram 'Ubayd] To Fakhri Bey al-Barudi), Kawkab al-Sharq 13 May 1933. The trial of wills between France and the nationalists in Syria was being followed closely in the Wafdist press; eg. "Wahdat Suriyya wal-Azmat al-Wizariyyah li Za'im Suri" (The Unity of Syria and the Ministerial Crisis — An Account from a Syrian Leader), Kawkab al-Sharq 12 May 1933. al-Barudi's usually staid "National Bloc" Party was to get the unfavorable treaty France demanded rejected in the Syrian Parliament in November 1933.
Economic Integration

In the 1920s, the Egyptian financier Tala'at Harb had striven to build up from Egypt a capitalism that would cover the whole Arab world. In the 1930s and 1940s, industry and native commercial ventures developed with every encouragement from successive Egyptian governments. After World War II efforts were made to build up modern pan-Arab capitalist structures from Egypt more specialized, more numerous and more complex than those the Mier group had developed hitherto. From 1945, the new League of Arab States provided additional personnel and facilities for these endeavors to weld one unitary pan-Arab economy. This aspiration was voiced in the foundation in 1947 of the Cairo-based "Arab Company for Mines and Quarries". The public subscription for its shares, to be held at "the Arab Bank", was advertised in the Syrian-Christian-owned al-Mugattam in October 1948. An extended period for subscription was given for Arab countries beyond Egypt: "every Arab has the right to subscribe". The advertisement's list of leading share-holders underlined the interpenetration of (a) the in aspiration pan-Arab Egyptian businessmen and capitalists, (b) the secular West-tinctured Egyptian intelligentsia, (c) the leading state bureaucrats and (d) pan-Islamic and pan-Arab ideologues, in Palestine as well as Egypt.

Egyptian businessmen and capitalists, the list included Egyptian university and college lecturers in specialized West-derived subjects, such as geology, metallurgy and petrochemicals --- budding technocrats of pan-Arabism$^{47}$.

The Company for Mines and Quarries, then, was a serious, purposeful thrust by Egypt's capitalists, official class and specialized modern technocratic intelligentsia to widen the unit of indigenous economic activity to include the other Arab countries. Ideological hopes and motives as much as calculations about gain determined this risky thrust beyond Egypt's borders.

**EASTERN OR PAN-MUSLIM WIDE COMMUNITY?**

We traced in Chapter 4 drives by leaders and writers in the watani independence movement of Mustafa Kamil under British colonial rule to develop solidarity with various non-Muslim African or Asian populations in conflict with Westerners. India offered Egyptian nationalists a substantial independence movement, led by the Indian National Congress since 1885, that reiterated the principle that Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Christian Indians were becoming one political nation$^{48}$. The Japanese could defeat the Westerners, but for the Kamilists at least, consolidation of relationship with the Japanese required that they accept Islam. The Kamilists projected special


$^{48}$ Gandhi on 1 December 1931 told the Second Round Table Conference in London that "Congress alone claims to represent the whole of India, all interests ... It is a determined enemy of communalism ... The Congress is the only all-India-wide national organization, bereft of any communal basis". Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press 1984) p. 128.
triumphalist affinity with the Muslim minorities in India and China that alienated Coptic readers.

Interest in the past cultures and current ideologies and struggles of non-Muslim Chinese, Japanese, Indians and Negroes mounted among Egyptian intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s as they repudiated a West that had enslaved, slaughtered and exiled Muslims and colored peoples. But the pre-1914 Kamilist pattern reasserts itself: a sizeable section of acculturated intellectuals in the event could only sustain transcontinental identification with Muslim populations in such "Eastern" countries.

Easternism in the 1930s and 1940s had two main types. The more widespread was ideological pan-Easternism: this repudiated or relativised modern secularist-positivist Western civilization by exalting the "spiritual" religions or religio-philosophical thought, high cultures and achievements of (often non-Muslim) Asian and African peoples. Westernist pan-Easternism, to contain such

49. The pan-Arab Zaki Mubarak called in the magazine al-Ma'rifah at the outset of 1932 for the Egyptian University to give courses in the "ancient" "spiritual" philosophy of "our Chinese brothers ... in Easternism": he specifically mentioned Lao Tzu, founder of quietistic Taoism. Zaki Mubarak, "Nazarat Sari'ah fi Thaqafat al-Sin al-Ruhiiyyah" (Quick Impressions of China's Spiritual Culture), al-Ma'rifah, 1 January 1932, pp. 1031-1034.

50. In 1930, Dr Ahmad Farid al-Rifa'i glorified in the SC-owned al-Hilal the revolt of Toussaint L'Overture against French rule in Haiti. The French regime those insurgent blacks fought was that of Napoleon --- that is to say, the liberal or revolutionary, laicist sector of Europe to which acculturated Francophone Egyptian intellectuals had so often appealed for aid against Britain. The violent campaign by that France showed that all Westerners were equally evil or genocidal. al-Rifa'i linked the French in Haiti to France and Britain's colonization of Arab West Asia after World War I under the cloak of the mandate system: in the Arab lands, too, the natives could wrest independence only by insurrection. Dr Ahmad Farid al-Rifa'i, "Rawla Batalin Zinjiyyin 'Azim: Rasul al-Wataniyyah Toussaint al-Fatih" (On A Great Negro Hero: The Apostle of Patriotism Toussaint L'Overture), al-Hilal 1 March 1930 pp. 553-560. al-Rifa'i was neo-classicist and Arab-centric: he republished the classical Arab encyclopaedia of writers Mu'jam al-Udaba' by Yaqut adding his own notes, and wrote a three-volume book 'Asr al-Ma'mun (The Age of [the Seventh 'Abbasid Caliph] al-Ma'mun). al-Rifa'i had contributed to al-Mu'ayyad under British colonial rule. Biodata from Dr Arthur Goldshmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University.
critiques of the West, championed totalist adoption of Western patterns and ideology as the means to achieve sovereignty from the Western powers (Turkey, Japan). The Coptic secularist Salamah Musa and some Muslim Egyptian contributors to his magazine al-Majallat al-Jadidah had to perform acrobatics in the 1930s and 1940s: they made Gandhi as much the Westernizing enemy of Hindu traditionalism as of the British, a brown Ataturk.51

A sectionally Islam-promoting ideological pan-Easternism --- one, however, that validated openness to aspects of the West --- was elaborated in Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's literary-intellectual weekly al-Risalah (1933-1953). The Eastern identification of al-Zayyat and his colleagues did offer openings for radical critiques of the secularist-ameliorist foundations of the "materialist" West. However, their Easternism also functioned as a diluting, detotalizing appendage to Arab and Muslim community. An instance was al-Zayyat's 1935 indictment of the Westernizing reforms imposed by Mustafa Kemal, titled "To Where are the Turks Being Driven?". In it, he voiced great fury at the Ataturkist regime's separation of Islam from the State, abolition of Islamic holy days and its drive to cut the peasantry and --- more dangerous --- the youth it was educating off from "the guidance of Islam". For this Egyptian Arabo-Islamist in 1935, the heavily Arabic common Islamic civilization and high culture that the Ottomans maintained, and the joint Islamic political

community that Arabs and Turks had shared for centuries, were the main stakes that Ataturkism threatened.

But a looser, wider community was under Ataturkist attack as well: "the East". al-Zayyat defined the entity that the Turks had been forced to repudiate in terms of a range of pagan or non-Muslim ancient civilizations as well as revealed Judaism-Christianity-Islam: "did not the East produce today's Japan as it produced China and India and Babylonia and the Persians and Hebrews yesterday?" Old Arab books had disposed al-Zayyat to revere the ancient pre-Islamic Persians, the Indians and the Chinese from whom the classical Arabs had taken knowledge and technology essential for their new Islamic civilization. The classical Arabs long traded with China and India. Such interaction was a prototype for the new far-extending pan-Eastern community from Japan to Morocco.

Japan had taken many elements from the West to achieve strength and other Muslims could do the same. al-Zayyat's objection to Ataturkism was against the totalism of its borrowing: unlike the Japanese, the Turkish leaders were substituting Western elements also in the core identity area of religion, orthography and aesthetics --- a depersonalization that could cut the Turks off from their past and from the Arabs.  

Supra-Muslim al-Risalah Easternism was well represented in a 1934 anti-imperialist article "O East", "O my wide homeland" by Mahmud al-Bakri al-Qalusnari. But this article also characterized the Afro-Asian (Eastern) community with language that would admit anti-imperialist religio-political traditions that were not just non-Muslim but completely outside the Semitic religions which the Qur'an recognized. "If Europe could boast of Napoleon or Nelson or of Wellington because he slaughtered a million or more human beings then the East could boast of Sa'd Zaghlul because he conquered the English [from 1919] without

recourse to sword or spear and Gandhi because he shook the foundations of English rule without needing fire or weapons of steel and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk because he vanquished in the field of war those who had asphyxiating gasses at their command and soaring aircraft and machine guns!" al-Qalusnari thus attached to the now gradualist Egyptian independence movement and its class vested interests Gandhi's adoption of Hinduism's ahimsa non-violence motif for decolonization. Islamic and Middle Eastern elements were balanced and diluted enough to make Ataturk's de-Arabizing, de-Islamizing Westernizing measures less offensive in broad Easternist perspective: al-Qalusnari tacitly blessed Ataturk-patterned Westernization where it restored strength to Easterners.

A less ahimsic part of al-Qalusnari rejoiced for "the East" that Egyptians in the time of Muhammad 'Ali (1824) as well as Ataturk had hit Greeks, whose land was the foundation of the modern West, such Mediterraneanists as Taha Husayn repeated in season and out 53.

AntI-Hindu Egyptian Views of India's Muslim Minority in the 1930s

Not all acculturated Muslim Egyptians integrated Hindu spirituality and the Indian independence movement into their reaction against the West: some saw Hinduism and Islam or Hindus and Muslims as in conflict. By the 1930s, the Congress-Khilafat alliance was no more: the ill-feeling mounting between Hindus and the still-leaderless Indian Muslims registered in Egypt in the Wafd-leaning dailies Kawkab al-Sharg (1933) and al-Wadi (1935) — both edited at various times by secularist Arabist Taha Husayn.

With the common acculturated duality, the 1935 al-Wadi writer both (a) denounced the colonialist British in India 53. Mahmud al-Bakri al-Qalusnari, "Ayyuhal-Sharg" (0 East), al-Risalah 21 May 1934 p. 860. al-Qalusnari's sense of the wide "East" --- including Hindu India --- as his "homeland" was not unique: Eastern League figure Ahmad Shafiq in 1928 and al-Siyasah contributor Jalal al-Din Husayn in 1930 wrote of "Eastern nationalism". Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs p. 256.
as anti-Muslim but (b) could stomach mainly those strata of India's Muslims educated in knowledge from the West (ie. Britain). As they now embraced more acculturated Muslim communalists in India, West-tinctured --- simultaneously neo-classical --- Muslim Egyptians voiced almost as much abhorrence for undiluted traditionalist Indian Muslims as for the caste-Hindu revivalists perceived to be baiting them. In accord with the neo-classicist Arabism rising in the 1930s, the author signed himself only "One of the Sons of the Arabs" and titled his article "'Aja'ib al-Hind" ("The Wonders of India") --- re-evoking Buzurg Ibn Shahriya's 10th-century classical book of the same title and the classical Arabs' sense of India as a land on the margin of inner Arabo-Islamic community. Yet, the West's prescriptiveness, and his neo-classicist sense of Arabs as Islam's authentic guardians, made the al-Wadi author sharply register the suffering that the fanaticism of non-Arab petty Islamic clergy or mullahs could inflict on uneducated "ignorant" Indian Muslims. During the Khilafat movement in 1920, mullahs persuaded about 30,000 Muslim peasants (mainly from Sind and the Punjab) --- on the grounds that India had become an apostate land --- to make a hijrat, or Islamic religious exodus, from India to Afghanistan. The rapacity they met at the hands of the "harsh" "Afghan people" almost made the refugees unbelievers. The Indian Muslims' unrealistically unitary pan-Islamism ran against the sense acculturated Muslim Egyptians had developed by the mid-1930s of the specificity of plural nation-units, within Islam's global community.

The 1935 article cited another area of self-penalizing protest by the Indian Muslim minority against British colonial rule: their religion-citing boycott of West-derived modernizing education. The acculturated al-Wadi writer also ascribed the backwardness of Indian Muslims to the traditional 'ulama's takfir (declaring unbeliever) of all Muslims who took service in the British administration or who learned English.

The al-Wadi writer underrated indigenous Islamic educational institutions in India (some of which, indeed,
incorporated some modern knowledge into their curricula. In contrast, he praised the main tertiary institution linguistically Anglicizing the Indian Muslims in 1935: Aligarh Muslim University. Founded by the Westernizing, politically pro-British Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan in 1875, this "Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College" offered --- like Egyptian universities it often used a Western language as the medium of instruction --- the access to the West's prosperity-conferring thought and sciences that the al-Wadi writer desired for India's Muslims. Aligarhians shared three patterns with bilingualized liberal-modernist Muslim Egyptian intellectuals: (a) communalist competition with non-Muslim compatriots; (b) both recognized plural Islamic nations, rejecting thrusts for fusion without consideration of difficulties and costs and (c) bilingual use of a Western language. During his career, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817 - 1898) had championed Arabic-script Urdu against a rising, expanding Hindi. He discouraged uncritical pan-Islamic solidarity with Ottoman Turkey where it would embroil India's Muslims in profitless conflicts with their British rulers. Sir Sayyid had pressed for separate Muslim and Hindu electorates and opposed the mainly Hindu Indian National Congress (formed 1885) in order to safeguard the interests of the Muslim minority in the Hindi-speaking provinces. However, economic and cultural conflicts between this less developed acculturated Muslim professional elite and the West-tinctured modern Hindus were sharper than the tensions between modernized Coptic and Muslim professionals in Egypt.

In language that vented acculturated dislike of self-contained late-traditional Muslim culture, the al-Wadi writer extolled the effectiveness of Aligarh's graduates in "spreading the thought of civilization" among India's otherwise benighted Muslim minority. He and his acculturated stratum deemed ability to use a Western language almost a prerequisite for being categorized as "civilized", the valuation that Aligarh's curricula encouraged its graduates, too, to put on the modern West. Yet the al-Wadi overview of Aligarh's history was very much
a product of its period in Egypt: the high-tide of political, cultural and spiritual reaction against the West in the 1930s and 1940s. The British and the Muslim strata around Sir Sayyid had been allies in the nineteenth century. Ignoring Aligarh's collaborative origins, the writer used language that suggested the British had always worked to destroy the College/University they initially financed. Reversing reality, he made the Hindu forces around the All-India Congress Party and Gandhi allies of the British against the Aligarh-centred Muslim forces.

This 1935 Egyptian article sanitized decades of collaboration with British imperialism out of Sir Sayyid Khan's and Aligarh University's past. Yet it registered with some prescience the direction in which the elite formed in Aligarh was setting off in 1935: political confrontations against Indian nationalism that would culminate in the Pakistan movement and partition only a decade later.

The al-Wadi writer manifested towards the masses of traditionally religious Muslims and Hindus in India the same dualities that 'Abdallah 'Inan and other al-Siyasah intellectuals voiced towards the clashes between Muslims and Jews over shrines in Palestine in 1929-1931 (B 126-135). The "Son of the Arabs" article depicted Hindu villagers stopping Muslim villagers from praying. Here he had 'Inan's ambivalent fascination with the inflammability of the masses during conflict games centred around religious shrines or rituals --- sectarian polarizations the Westernized side of such writers could dissect from Mount Olympus. He regarded knowledge of Western languages and science as essential in the modern world; yet (like 'Inan) his openness did not encompass the sectarian group (Hindus/Jews) in conflict with the Muslim group. "The Indian Pagans, for all their impurity and uncleanness, never touch any Muslim or have dealings with him, or even speak to him, such is their care to spare themselves the consequent ritual pollution". For this 1935 Egyptian observer, the violence-fostering religious incompatibility between "the Pagans" (al-Majus) and Muslims
made a united Indian political nationality or independence movement "to expel the foreigner" impossible.  

A shared struggle against Britain, philo-Indicism in classical Arabo-Islamic civilization, and incorporation of Indic theosophical Hindu themes into liberal modernist and Islamic thought since 1922 all fostered Egyptian-Indian conjunction. But the 1935 al-Wadi item shows how images of conflict at elite and rural village levels between Hindus and vulnerable minority Muslims shattered for some decidedly anti-traditional Egyptian Muslims the drive for cultural and political community with Hindus and revived pan-Islamism.

The acculturated Islamist Egyptian critique of Indian nationalism was deepened by an October 1933 editorial in the Wafdist daily Kawkab al-Sharg, edited by Taha Husayn. The item depicted Muslims in India as insecure, and assessed Gandhi's campaign to drive the British from India as subordinate to his drive to maintain Hinduism as India's dominant culture and social pattern. The paper ascribed Gandhi's campaign to integrate Untouchables into the mainstream of Indian life to census statistics that 6,000,000 Untouchables had embraced Islam in recent years, and a sense that India was encircled by Muslim countries. Gandhi had devoted the rest of his life to saving his religion. "Let independence be postponed, religion may better preserve life than independence."

Islamizing modernist Egyptian intellectuals were


55. Editorial under heading "Shu'un al-Sharg" (Affairs of the East), Kawkab al-Sharg 11 October 1933 p. 2. The right to Islamize Untouchables on the same basis as the homogenizing Hinduization of them Gandhi sought had been demanded by the pan-Islamist Mawlama Muhammad 'Ali Jauhar at the 1923 Cocomanda joint session of the Khilafat Committee and the Congress, and serious procedures were being at least talked about in 1936 by Raghib Ahsan and Khwaja Habibullah, Nawab Bahadur of Dacca. "Islamization of Dalits (1935-1936)", Dalit Voice (Bangalore) 4 January 1986 p. 16. In the mid-1930s, Ambedkar, and his protest Untouchable colleagues, for a time kept open Islam as the religion to which Untouchables might convert for liberation. Yoginder Sikand, "Did Dr Ambedkar Criticize Islam?", Dalit Voice 16-31 August 1990 p. 8.
developing a critical scrutiny that broke India up into all its diverse social units. They now saw how formal caste-Hindu spiritualist and nationalist discourses functioned in these units' endless tugs-of-war. The Untouchables' leader Ambedkar often aligned with the Muslim League from the late 1920s against Gandhi and Congress: yet Kawkab al-Sharq wishfully exaggerated the conversions among Indian Untouchables to Islam then taking place.56

The rejection of Hindu-led Indian nationalism in al-Wadi and Kawkab al-Sharq once more showed how hard it was for even West-transformed Egyptian intellectuals to carry through "Easternist" (Afro-Asian) global political community with non-Muslims. As in the days of al-Afghani and Mustafa Kamil, self-interest dictated alliance with all resisting the common British enemy. They had had a real impulse to reach out to a range of Hindus (including Untouchables) from a modernist liberal Egyptian Arabism that significantly alienated them from traditional Indian Islam. But, in the end, the bond of Islam even when the West had greatly attenuated it, made them stand with Indian Muslims against Hindu compatriots.

As Egyptian intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s moved from West-influenced territorial-secularist principles of community to more religious or ethnic ones, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat switched from Indian nationalism to pan-Islamic support for the secession of Pakistan and a similar

56. For three years before the Kawkab al-Sharq editorial, Untouchable forces led by Dr B. R. Ambedkar (1881-1956) had coordinated politically with the Muslim League and other Muslim groups vis-a-vis the Congress. A hunger-strike by Gandhi made Ambedkar give up his demand for separate electorates for Untouchables like those the Muslims won: he had to sign with Gandhi the compromise Poona Pact of 25 September 1932 in which the Caste Hindu Congressites promised reservations (quotas) in education and government to the Untouchables. B. R. Ambedkar, Poona Pact (Jalandar: Bheem Patrika Publications 1973) and What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to Untouchables (Bombay: Thacker and Co 1945). In Pakistan or Partition of India (Bombay: Thacker and Co 1947), Ambedkar was as sympathetic to Jinnah's Muslim separatism as to the Indian National Congress. He however drafted the constitution of independent India in August 1947. In October 1956, he and hundreds of thousands of Untouchable followers in Maharashtra quit Hinduism for Buddhism, not Islam as subcontinental and Arab Islamists had dreamed.
partition of China. It was a residue of his erstwhile multi-sectarian Easternism that he --- like many Egyptians --- still suspected that the imperialist British (Viceroy Mountbatten) had to some extent engineered the birth of Pakistan. Egyptian suspicion of Pakistan as pro-Western helped Nasser to form a non-aligned axis with India in the 1950s.

Language Development and Pan-Arabism

Pan-Arab national self-identification was entangled in the 1930s and 1940s with the issues and choices that language development posed in Egypt. The 1935 article "Hayrah" ("Confusion") by "al-Sharif al-Radiy" conceded that Arabic as it stood was inadequate to meet the needs of modern life. However, the article opened with a frank avowal of the religious basis of the attachment that Arabs everywhere felt to standard Arabic --- "the language of Islam, the language of the Noble Qur'an, nay" (the author hurriedly added) "the language of the three religions in our Arab world [which spans] Asia and Africa". The writer also made the "rescue" and development of Arabic contingent upon the new ideological drive to weld a pan-Arab "bloc" or "Arab league". Long-standing linguistic divergence in "the Arab World" could be closed by inculcating "love for the Arab homeland, the love for Arab nationalism".

Many Muslim Egyptian intellectuals active in the Arabic Language Academy founded in 1934 themselves had

57. In 1947 al-Zayyat wrote: "The League of Arab States has been born: its formation was necessary even if [British Foreign Secretary] Eden gave the signal. The Islamic State of Pakistan has formed, its birth being natural even if [British Viceroy of India] Mountbatten worked for it." al-Zayyat, "al-Jami'at al-Islamiyyah hiyal-Ghayah" (An Islamic League is the Aim), written 30 June 1947 for al-Risalah, Wahy v. 3 p. 230.

58. "al-Sharif al-Radiy" (pseud.), "Hayrah" (Confusion) in section "Fi Hulbat al-Adab" (In the Field of Literature), al-Muqattam 22 January 1935.

59. King Paysal of 'Iraq had creatively patronized Arabic-restoring institutions since his interregnum in Syria. It was in the context of a drive by 'Iraq to take cultural and other leadership in the Arab world from Egypt that King Fu'ad --- also long a patron of scholarly institutions --- founded the Cairo Academy in 1932. Rached Hamzaoui, L'Academie de Langue Arabe du Caire: Histoire et Oeuvre (University of Tunis 1975) pp. 49-51. The
the homogenizing pan-Arab ideological drive to express twentieth-century needs in ways that would extend the Qur'an's and the classical Arabs' vocabulary and language patterns. Such members of the Academy were against pragmatic injection into the written medium of West-derived vocabulary accepted in urban colloquial speech. The Dar al-Ulum-educated Egyptian 'Ali al-Jarim (1881 - 1949) vividly evoked the great classical pan-Arab past, especially tragic Muslim Spain, in a stream of poems and novellas. On behalf of the Arabic Language Academy, he in 1934 worked with al-Shaykh Ahmad al-Iskandari and Ahmad al-'Awamiri to draw up neo-classical vocabularies for house-construction, household furniture and for office equipment and activities. These and other vocabulary lists covering (Western) clothes and personal adornment, biology

Academy had many former al-Siyasah modernist intellectuals as office-bearers: Mansur Fahmi was its first permanent secretary: Mustafa 'Abd al-Raziq (brother of 'Ali), Taha Husayn, Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini and Ahmad Zaki Pasha were all active. Ibid pp. 51, 55, 65.

and medicine, telephones, radios, engines and some industries, drew sharp criticism in early 1935 from al-Mugattam. A Westernizing-pragmatic "Writer" objected that the Academy would not be able to popularize such word coinings. At best it would produce only a written language and books for the elite incomprehensible to the masses in speech.

This writer had a pragmatic concern to express modern urban objects in Arabic as quickly and urgently as possible and using the vocabulary that would convey them to the widest Egyptian audience. The way to do so was the automatic adoption of numerous loan words from Western languages for the proliferating objects and concepts of modern life. The wisely anonymous writer voiced a utilitarian, modernist, Westernizing stance by some elite Egyptians that also fiercely fought to maintain Western languages in education and life in the 1930s, against rising Arabism.

Yet purism, and the pan-Arab nationality into which it connected Egyptians, was attractive to professionally insecure middle-class Muslim Egyptians shakily grounded in standard Arabic. The blood of secular-educated West-tinctured Muslim Egyptian strata, including in Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt), boiled at the persisting linguistic --- not just economic --- ascendancy of the Francophone European minority in the cities, at the limited employment of educated Egyptians in the European-owned stores and firms. Purism's fusion of


62. Muhammad Kamil Mustafa in 1933 registered the strength of the rising neo-classicist Arabo-Islamic dynamic in cultural and public life. Identifying all purely Arab and Islamic culture with the "calcification" (jumud) that had afflicted al-Azhar and the Azharites, Mustafa observed that Egyptians had grown "fond of the different foreign cultures present among us in Egypt. They energetically strive to absorb, study and enjoy them further ... indicating that the mentality of the Egyptians has undergone some change and they want to be liberated from the shackles of the old that inflicted backwardness on us". Muhammad Kamil Mustafa, "La Fir'awiyyah wa la 'Arabiyyah" (Neither Pharaonic nor Arab), Kawkab al-Sharg 1 October 1933 p. 3.

63. See eg. al-Sayyidah Misriyyah Sa'd, "al-Mu'tamar al-Watani ---
classical antiquity with modernity offered a parochial rallying-ground.

Purist restorative neo-classicism, then, was a central thrust of linguistic pan-Arab nationalism in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s. Cairo's Arabic Language Academy provided the first modern structure or instrument for comprehensive efforts to at least linguistically unify and homogenize the Arabs and the different eras of their changing history. West-tinted intellectual elites in other Arab countries --- for example Catholic Lebanese Arabists --- responded positively to the Academy's drive for classicist terminologies to cover modernity.64

Egyptian Specificity Under Classical Islam Affirmed

Mutually-reinforcing literary dynamics pulled Egyptians in quest of quality and aestheticism in the 1930s and 1940s towards the historical and high cultural terrain of the Arabists. New historical writings and high literature by liberal or ex-liberal intellectuals grounded secular-educated Egyptians in the broad past and some literary patterns of the classical Arab Muslims, gradually equipping them to read and respond to classical Arab texts --- of which the printing presses were diffusing more and more. Writers who retained particularist impulses now

Khatarat wa 'Ibar" (The National Conference --- Reflections and Lessons) al-Mugattam 23 January 1935 p. 1. Ahmad Husayn's Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) movement, although so persistently Egypt-centred, from the outset had a strong basis for linguistic nationalism --- its stress on the non-Arabic speech of the alien residents whose modern economic roles denied national sovereignty. Although Young Egypt in regard to new art primarily strove to make it absorb Pharaonic patterns and current local reality, the Party's strong Arabizing linguistic motivation appeared in its drive to prise resident foreigners out of commanding positions in art institutions. In 1938, Misr al-Fatat sarcastically reprinted a French invitation card issued by the Societe des Amis de l'Art, connecting it to its patron King Faruq. "Jam'iyat Muhibbi al-Punun al-Jamilit al-Mashmulah bil-Ri'ayat al-Malikiyyat al-Samiyah wa Kayfa Tazdari Lughat al-Bilad?" (The Societe des Amis de l'Art That Enjoys Exalted Royal Patronage, and How Can it Despise the Language of the Land?), Misr al-Fatat 4 April 1938 p. 10.

64. Ilyas al-Huwayyik, "al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah wal-Sihafah: al-Iqbal 'alayha fi Lubnan wa Misr wa Haluha fi Kullin min al-Baladayn" (The Arabic Language and the Press: The Demand for it in Lebanon and Egypt and its Condition in Each of the Two Countries) al-Bashir 9 December 1939.
sought specificity within the past and literature of classical Arab Islam, rather than in a Pharaonic Egypt that had turned out sterile for them. Yet this quest in classical Arab historiography and high literature only homogenized the Egyptian educated public more with those in other Arab countries because of the undivided nature of those materials.

In the late 1920s as he advocated the installation of Pharaonic elements in a new Arabic national literature, Haykal also asserted that the environment had maintained the Egyptian personality throughout history: its ethos continued to develop in high literature produced in Arabic in Egypt in the Arab-Islamic period. Reversing his youthful sense of the unusual completeness of the victory of Arabian literary elements in Egypt, he therefore demanded that Arabic literature produced in Egypt be treated like that of Muslim Spain as a "separate chapter". He urged Egyptians to read newly published texts of, and new literary criticism about, poets who resided in Egypt in the Islamic period, notably al-Baha' Zuhayr (1186-1249) who mingled Egyptian colloquial elements into the classical poetic idiom, and described the land and society of Egypt, instead of imitating the poetry of the Arabian desert. Certainly, there has to be scrutiny if these territorialist-particularist criteria were what mainly drew Haykal to works that could subvert his group's attempts to define an Egyptian society, history and sensibility separate from the Arabs ('Abdallah 'Inan was a similar case). Haykal was prepared to accept as Egyptian national literature, poetry penned in Egypt that referred to the Nile, even when the poet had grown to adulthood in another Arab country as had Zuhayr who moved from the Hijaz to Egypt in early manhood. Such non-Egyptian origins were

common among the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk poets exalted as Egyptianist in the 1930s after Haykal lost interest. The classical literary elite in Egypt was just a wing of a pan-Arab cultural elite: exploration of its literature could help pan-Arabize intellectuals over the long term.

Egypt became the centre of Arabic poets and scholars only towards the end of the classical period and most cultivated Egyptians considered its achievements in high literature secondary to those of West Asia and Andalusia. One post-neo-Pharaonic particularoid writer 'Ayn 'Ayn in 1933 fumed that new Arabic anthologies and literature courses in secondary schools and universities were inculcating in new generations a unitary classicism that saw Egyptian writings as merely a manifestation of a tradition most creative outside Egypt's borders. Another particularish writer, Muhammad Kamil Husayn, wrote in the same year in the Wafdist Kawkab al-Sharq that Egyptian writers and historians applied themselves to the study of "literature of other countries", "the literature of Iraq and Andalusia and Syria", ignoring their classical

66. Post-Pharaonic particularism: 'Ayn 'Ayn expressed his astonishment at finding "archaeological students in the School of Archeology toiling away to memorize the hymns of the priests and the myths of the gods of the days of the ancient Pharaohs at a time when I do not find a single lecturer among the lecturers in the Arabic language with the interest to add to extracts he anthologizes from Jarir and al-Farazdaq and Abu Tammam and al-Buhturi a single extract of Egyptian Arabic verse: so that the young promising writers, nay the established masters of literature, grow to maturity believing that the Egyptians do not know poetry or poetry know them". 'Ayn 'Ayn (pseud.), "Mifr al-Sha'irah --- al-'Asr al-Misri: 'Asr al-Qawwati wal-Jamal" (Poetical Egypt --- The Second Age of Egyptian Poetry: The Age of Strength and Beauty), al-Balagh 14 June 1933. For this writer --- and/or for his disillusioned modern-educated audience --- Pharaonic literature, because pagan, had offered only motifs steriley alien or unintelligible for a Muslim Egypt: aesthetically fulfilling particularity had to be sought in past high writings in classical Arabic.

67. 'Ayn 'Ayn, ibid. This article was specifically written in protest at the official anthology al-Muntakhab min Adab al-'Arab: in its 1,000-odd pages, he found not even one piece by an Egyptian writer. The anthology was compiled by "the outstanding scholars of literature in Egypt": 'Ayn 'Ayn wrote to pressure them to restructure it to accord with an "Egyptian pattern" ('ala ghirar Misri) in the second edition. Ibid.
"national literature" as ghathth (worthless, meagre). Husayn specified the viability of the political particularist identification as at stake in the recently-commenced search of some Egyptian writers for long-forgotten, "lost" pre-Ottoman works penned in Egypt: only a "national literature" evoking the Egyptian environment could inspire real "patriotism" among Egyptians. The classical literature was sapping particularist national identification more strongly than in the mid-1920s, when Salamah Musa had assailed its inculcation of "loyalty to Arab culture".

We study the books of the [classical] Arabs, learning their expressions off by heart...; we study Ibn al-Rumi and investigate the origin of al-Mutanabbi and are fanatical partisans for al-Jahiz. Addiction to the study of the Arabs prevents an Egyptian literature from forming.

Such a preference remained socially acceptable in 1933: 'Ayn 'Ayn fumed that one eminent Egyptian elegantly ridiculed the notion of any Egyptian component of aesthetic quality in classical Arabic literature to the agreement of assembled top-notch writers and scholars who were his guests. Kamil Husayn demanded "redoubled" efforts to locate and publish manuscript "buried treasures" penned in pre-Ottoman Egypt. 'Ayn 'Ayn's attempts to direct unenthusiastic Egyptians to poetry produced in, or written about, Egypt under classical Islam was dogged by a problem of quality for some periods. The Ikhshid-period Ibn Waki' al-Tanisi subtly "depicted his self, his age and his Egypt" and broke with the stereotyped idioms, melody and rhythms of "much of the poetry of the [classical] 'Iraqis". The fresh wine-verses by al-Tanisi cited were more in the tradition of late 'Abbasid poetry than specifically Egyptian. 'Ayn 'Ayn was striving to clamp down

68. Muhammad Kamil Husayn, "Fil-Adab al-Misri --- al-Adab al-Misri Qubayl al-Path al-'Arabi" (On Egyptian Literature --- Egyptian Literature Shortly Before the Arab Conquest), Kawkab al-Sharq, 17 May 1933 p. 3.
70. 'Ayn 'Ayn, "Misr al-Shahirah al-'Asr al-Thani ..."
71. Muhammad Kamil Husayn, "Fil-Adab al-Misri ..."
territorialist-particularist criteria for classical Arabic literature in place of the established aesthetic and technical ones: Ibn Waki' "may not have attained perfection as regards a polished beauty" but "it suffices him that he was" in his subject-matter (Cairo, the Nile etc) "an Egyptian poet".

Nor did the Egypt-centred political entities depicted offer real prototypes --- either in any delimitation of territoriality or in social discreteness --- for the twentieth-century Egyptian people that particularists asserted. Thus, Ibn Waki' al-Tanisi was not racially Egyptian at all, his parents having come from Baghdad, and 'Ayn 'Ayn made it plain that he "did not cut his connection with Baghdad but took a journey to it to see relatives there. The poets and leaders of the land honored him, reciting their poetry to him and listened to his recitations". Like other non-Pharaonist or post-Pharaonist particularoids (e.g. Taha Husayn), 'Ayn 'Ayn stressed the political fragmentation of the universalist Muslim 'Abbasid empire. When al-Tanisi versified, Egypt was governed by an autonomous Ikhshidite state, the Hamdanids were in control of Northern Syria and the Fatimids were thrusting from North Africa. The materials into which 'Ayn 'Ayn and others read Egyptian nationality however only brought home to literary-minded Egyptians how durable the social as well as cultural community remained between Egypt and other Arabic-speaking lands still ruled by their 'Abbasid suzerains.

The Shi'i Fatimid state, which founded its capital of Cairo in 969, proclaimed its drive to overthrow the 'Abbasids: unlike other late classical states centred in Egypt, it was thus separate in formal ideology, not just in de facto political autonomy, from the universalist 'Abbasid Caliphate. 'Ayn 'Ayn (like 'Abdallah 'Inan in 1932) attempted to define the Fatimid empire as some sort

73. Ibid.
of an Egyptian nation-state. "God the Glorified willed that Egypt should be the radiating point of a kingdom, and the abode of a Caliphate and that its two wings should extend between Persia and the Atlantic Ocean". These borders better fit a pan-Arab linguistic nation than a particularist Egyptian one, although for 'Ayn 'Ayn they aggrandized Egypt.

In arguing that Egyptian poets in Arabic had equalled the works of West Asia and Andalusia, Muhammad Kamil Husayn's psyche remained gripped by non-Egyptian classical works. al-Mas'udi, the towering Arab historian-geographer born in Baghdad at the end of the 9th century, had visited Egypt and characterized it in detail in his great works: the Arab Caliphs and the classical historians of the Arabs all had expressed the highest regard for Egypt, Kamil Husayn assured his readers.

Taha Husayn and Arab Identity

Egypt's West-patterned educational institutions were propagating the de-territorializing literatures and world views of extra-Egyptian classical Arabs more than traditional Islamic institutions ever had. Muhammad Kamil Husayn was trying to implant a focus for particularist "patriotism" within those mainstream modern institutions: he quoted the "glorious professor" Taha Husayn as having

74. 'Ayn 'Ayn, "Misr al-Sha'irah: al-'Asr al-Thani ..." In a particularist twinge in 1932 occasioned by the Conference of Eastern Students, and loud-mouthed Palestinian, 'Iraqi and Syrian pan-Arabs there, 'Abdallah 'Inan in al-Siyasah termed the old Islamic states centred in Egypt "the Greater Egyptian State". Egyptians had inherited from the Arabs their language and Islam but preserved all their other Egyptian characteristics intact as "a great national bloc", although he felt "this complete political incorporation" with other Arabs in even the Egypt-centred Islamic states. Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 pp. 152-154.

75. Muhammad Kamil Husayn, "Fil-Adab al-Misri ..." Even more comically vulnerable to classical Arab perceptions was Ahmad Amin, the great historian of classical Arab Islam: who in 1934 fumed that diverse (classical) Arab leaders and historians and geographers denigrated the Egyptians as base, passive and subservient. Such slurs against Egyptians under classical Islam tended to racially link them to bygone Pharaonic Egypt. Ahmad Amin, "Safhatun Sawda" (A Black Page) al-Risalah 5 February 1934. But cf. Hasan Jalal, "Bal ... Safhatun Bayda" (Nay ... A White Page), al-Risalah 19 February 1934 pp. 286-288.
called for the establishment of a chair in Egyptian [classical Arabic] literature at Cairo University. Taha Husayn had chaired the department of Arabic and Oriental Studies at Cairo University from 1925 yet the curricula he stimulated and his life-long stream of articles and books on pre-Ottoman Arabic literature mainly projected the classical jahili, Umayyad and 'Abbasid literature of West Asia. Taha had mild affinities to, but also differed from, the Egyptianist views 'Ayn 'Ayn and Muhammad Kamil Husayn voiced. In the month after Kamil Husayn published his article, and in the same month (July 1933) that 'Ayn 'Ayn published his, Taha in al-Risalah lancetted out wooden Pharaonist motifs and themes for new Arabic literature that could harm Egyptians by alienating them from the wide literature of the classical Arabs, although he saw modest Egyptian tinges, a humorous, rueful, mildly mystical attitude to life, as having survived within that strongly unitary classical high literature. Taha's popularizing literary criticism in the 1930s and 1940s attuned Egyptians to peninsula Arabian elements --- a "purely Arab spirit" --- in the classical literature. He vacillated whether non-Arab influences in the wide Islamic empires enriched or sapped the Arabia-originated elements, but clearly regarded copious Arabian vocabulary as indispensable in all creative literature in, for example, 'Abbasid 'Iraq. Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Egypt was a sanctuary for the Arabia-defined unitary tradition against encroaching 'ujmah

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76. Muhammad Kamil Husayn, "Fil-Adab al-Misri . . ."
77. "Ilal-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim min al-Duktur Taha Husayn" (To the Scholar Tawfiq al-Hakim from Dr Taha Husayn), al-Risalah 15 June 1933.
78. See, for example, Taha's "al-Hayat al-Adabiyyah fi Jazirat al-'Arab" (Literary Life in the Arabian Peninsula), al-Hilal March 1933. Respectful of pre-Islamic Arabic heroic poetry here, Taha still argued that contact in the new Islamic empire with Syria, 'Iraq and Egypt stimulated such new forms of peninsular creativity as 'Umar-Ibn Abi Rabi'ah's flirtation poetry (ghazal). The constant flow of Arabians to Syria, 'Iraq and Egypt supplied the poetry produced in cities there with the copious Arabic language and Arab spirit essential for literary creativity. When the flow of Arabians thinned, the non-Arabs and their urban luxury dominated Arabic poetry, and it became "a body almost lacking life". Ibid.
(non-Arabness of speech), as the 'Abbāsid empire, and Arab leadership in it, dissolved. By the end of the 1930s, the specialized academic, scientific and professional sub-elites in Egypt had revolted against holistic Westernization. More and more Easternist and Islamist, they increasingly distinguished (a) overall "materialist" Western civilization from (b) selected specific West-developed sciences from which Egyptians or Arabs could borrow, but critically.

As the most persistent Westernizer among Arabist intellectuals, Taha Husayn responded with alarm to this mounting resistance to Westernization from the very scientific and academic elites supposed to implement it, in his 1938 Mustaqbal al-Thaqafah fi Misr (The Future of Culture in Egypt). He particularly had in mind as milieus that now affirmed Eastern religious spirituality the scientific and humanities faculties of Cairo University.

The main West-rejecting concept that Taha tried to fight in The Future of Culture in Egypt was that Egypt was part of "the East". To sap it, he now argued that Egypt had always belonged to one common Mediterranean cultural and intellectual community with Europe in contrast to the true East of Persia, India, China --- and a Japan that was

79. Taha's view of Egypt as a sanctuary into which was funnelled the classical pan-Arab literary culture of 'Iraq and Andalusia and North Africa threatened by 'ujmah, specified that this role began under the Fatimids: he was implicitly hostile to Turkish praetorian guards who had come to control the 'Abbāsid Arab Caliphs, the Persian Shi'ite Buyids (who entered Baghdad in 945) --- and who patronized Arabic literature --- and the Saljuq Turks who overpowered the 'Abbāsids in 1055. Taha equated such non-Arab Muslims with Spaniards gradually reconquering Muslim Andalusia as both enemies of Arabs. Taha Husayn, "Hafiz wa Shawqi", al-Hilal December 1932 pp. 161-165. For one political application of the 'ujmah linguistic concept against French rule in North Africa from al-Siyasah even in the early 1920s see B 96-97.

80. Safran noted that the book's "sharpness and urgency of tone" "reflected [Taha Husayn's] apprehensions about the strong reservations towards Western culture that were spreading in intellectual circles". Safran, Egypt in Search pp. 177-178. Taha was specific about the defection of the modernizing-educated classes: what he termed the "irony" that while al-Azhar was Westernizing itself "the Egyptian University, an offspring of this era, is inclining in the opposite direction". Taha Husayn ("Hussein"), The Future of Culture in Egypt (tst Sidney Glazer) (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies 1954) p. 19.
Westernizing itself to equality while Egyptians argued\(^{81}\). The secular-educated Muslim Egyptian youth, "demoralized", were following the West-dyed scientific and academic elite's Easternist rejection of the West\(^{82}\).

The community application of the shift back to religious values among the modern intelligentsia and their widening rejection of the West was rising Islamoid pan-Arabism. Taha was ambivalent towards this: himself originally Azhar-educated and steeped in classical Arab literature, he both promoted pan-Arab integration and voiced alertness to its Islamic origins and dynamic. In *Future of Culture in Egypt*, Taha's rejection of the "true" "Far" East did not exclude ongoing cultural interaction of Egypt with the lands of daily Arabic speech. He may have spluttered in 1938 at pursuit of contacts with peoples of the Far East by Ahmad Zaki's Eastern League in the 1920s, but he endorsed its tightening of the "relationships between us and the Near East" because of shared "language, religion, geographical propinquity and similarity of origin and historical evolution". His Mediterraneanist frame ratified immemorial, continuing relationship by Egypt with "that Near East" of Palestine, Syria and (in actuality non-littoral) 'Iraq ---termed by him "the East Mediterranean" but corresponding exactly to the Asian portion of the Arab homeland of the pan-Arabists\(^{83}\). Taha was frank that a specific Islamic bond, "religion", also, was drawing "the Arab countries" together into educational and cultural cooperation along with "language and ideals, not to mention important economic interests"\(^{84}\). A wider

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82. Ibid p. 22. The idealization of the spiritual East, including Hindu India and China, was associated with the Arabo-Islamic reaction of acculturated liberals rather than a more exclusive Islamism associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Taha's al-Siyasah colleague Haykal was in this Easternist-liberal blended mode of partial disengagement from the West: his interest in Tagore and India and a broad religious spirit similar in all Eastern countries, however their religions and languages differed (B 90-92), ushered in his neo-pan-Islamist denunciations of the West in the 1930s and 1940s.
83. Taha, Future pp. 5, 3.
84. Ibid p. 150.
involvement going beyond even any conceivable Arab sphere was implied in Taha's call for Egypt to "strengthen the link ... between herself and the scholarly organizations and institutions in the Arab or rather the Islamic East."\(^{85}\)

Taha Husayn, originally al-Azhar educated, was drawn to Arab Asia in the 1930s by a blend of (a) Arab and Islamic aesthetic and historical legacy with (b) Egypt-centric elements. He balanced his recognition of Islamic al-Azhar as intellectual and linguistic integrator of the Arabs --- (c.f. the secular-educated Ahmad Husayn, B 218)--- with his observation that al-Azhar "ceased being so only" after the Ottoman conquest of 1517.\(^{86}\) al-Azhar pointed to a wider pan-Muslim intellectual or cultural community but Taha tried to give it an anti-Turkish, purely Arabist function. Yet Taha's characterizations of classical Arabic-speaking communities as Islamic\(^{87}\) --- a persistent habit of thought even if for him Islam had been diluted out of any traditional religious meaning --- took little account of well-known contributions by Syriac-speaking Christians to, for instance, the development of 'Abbasid medicine and philosophy. Like many acculturated Muslim intellectuals, for instance Haykal, Taha gave scant attention to making pan-Arabism historically attractive to such Christian Arabs as Egypt's Copts --- whose culture and even religious ethos he could

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85. Ibid p. 152.
86. Ibid pp. 151-152. In Taha's folklorically simplistic paradigm, the Ottoman Turks were the lethal enemy of the general Arab culture and civilization of which Egypt had become custodian. Egypt continued after the Mongol destruction of Baghdad in 1258 to shelter the fleeing scholars of Arabic culture, maintaining "Arabic literature" and "Islamic life" until the 1517 Turkish conquest drove them within the walls of al-Azhar. Taha Husayn, "Hafiz wa Shawqi". He made the Ottoman Turks, whose destruction of learning and culture in Egypt and the whole Near East he likened to the barbarians who cast Europe into the Dark Ages, Egypt's and the Arabs' alibi for backwardness. Future pp. 9-10.
87. E.g. writing of early periods in which Arabs exercised political power: "the contact of the Islamic World with the Arabian peninsula in the first centuries of Islamic history ..." Taha Husayn, "al-Hayat al-Adabiyyah fi Jazirat al-'Arab", p. 597. "Throughout the Islamic era, Egypt was a fountain of knowledge for the whole Arab World", Future p. 151.
accommodate in a parochial Egyptian setting.

In the 1930s, Taha vigorously promoted efforts by the Egyptian Ministry of Education to achieve inter-Arab cooperation in integrating the primary and secondary educational curricula of the various Arab countries. His aim here was "preliminary preparation" for the students whom Egypt's developing tertiary institutes were drawing from all over the Arab world, so as to reduce the failure-rate of such "foreigners". Taha called for Egyptians to respond with carefully considered action to the title other countries had awarded Egypt, "the leader of the Arab East", to "maintain our self-respect". He had pressed 'Ali Mahir Pasha, when he was first Minister of Education in 1925-1926 (he became so again in 1930) to "build primary and secondary schools" in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine to match the "intellectual influence of foreign schools" there, which Taha had observed when attending an archeological conference.

Many of Taha's modernist colleagues on al-Siyasah had repeatedly denounced British, French and Italian imperialism, and Zionism, even in the 1920s. He never did under the monarchy. However, his 1938 remarks in Future

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88. Taha, liberal if not post-Muslim as to beliefs, regularly attended Coptic masses, thinking of Egyptian --- rather than Arab --- nationalism: "the Coptic Church is an ancient Egyptian glory, a mainstay of the Egyptian Nation". At the same time, the "sub-standard Arabic" of their prayers and church services jarred his unitary classicist purism: he wanted the Egyptian government to intervene to have the priests taught to use standard Arabic correctly. Future pp. 138-140. Cf. the Copt Farid Kamil's concern three years later at fractured classical Arabic among his sect's clergy but that even Coptic parliamentarians could not actively use it without gross errors. Too many Copts learnt only the minimum of classical Arabic needed for careers: he urged Coptic youth to read the classical Arabs' high literature and pen creative literature. Farid Kamil, "al-Qibt wa ma Yajib 'alayhim Nahwa hadhihil-Lughah" (The Copts and Their Duty Towards this Language), al-Muqattam August 1941 pp. 263-266.

89. Future pp. 149-151.

of Culture relished Egypt's coming role as a resolute, adroit cultural competitor with such colonial powers as France, Britain and Italy in the Arab lands those powers ruled. His projections for an Egyptian educational role in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, 'Iraq and the two Saudi Arabian Islamic religious cities of Makkah and Medinah had resolute practicality about devising and allocating resources and finance.

Taha's *Future of Culture in Egypt* seriously pursued the cultural and economic integration of the Arab lands demanded by his modern-educated constituency. However, he tried to control Islamic potentiality in the new pan-Arabism where it might impede Westernization, and to forestall Egypt's abolition as a state unit. For Taha, residual Pharaonic race could never inhibit total absorption of non-Egyptian Arab high literature, but he could raise Pharaonic genes, as he did in 1938, as a device to sober down the pan-Arab integration underway. He used the Pharaonic motif in part to put the enthusiastic non-Egyptian Arabs at arms length in the 1930s and 1940s: but, like his mentor Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, in blocking demands for swift pan-Arab political federation, he was simultaneously, in the very same interview to *al-Makshuf*, far-reaching and radical about economic as well as cultural "beneficial" integration with other Arabs.

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91. Adroit, adaptive competitiveness: Mahir Pasha as Minister of Education had argued that the colonial powers would not permit an Egyptian cultural or educational expansion into their mandated territories in Arab West Asia. Husayn replied that the principle of reciprocity was basic to the Montreux Convention that Egypt had signed in 1936 with the Western states: henceforth Egypt could "establish educational institutions in Arab countries still more or less under the control of Europeans, since their schools in Egypt enjoy the fullest measure of autonomy within the limits of our laws". *Future* p. 150.

92. Ibid p. 151.

93. In this 1938 interview with the Lebanese magazine *al-Makshuf*, Taha argued against Egypt's participation in a federal state modelled on the U.S.A. or Switzerland for which pan-Arabists were working on the ground that "the overwhelming majority of the Egyptians are not linked to Arab blood but rather are directly linked to the ancient Egyptians". Therefore, Egypt will never enter into an Arab political federation whether equal to or dominating the other party, and regardless of whether the federation's capital would be Baghdad or Cairo. Quoted Ghali...
Haykal's activity as a frequent Minister of Education in the 1930s and 1940s instances the compensative linguistic nationalist drive that multi-lingualized older intellectuals who faced deculturation under the British now pursued in the pan-Arab era. These Arabizing drives had costs for their Westernist enterprises.

In his 1951 memoirs, Haykal presented himself as, while Minister, the Europeanizing-educated nativist who labored to reverse the pre-1922 deculturizing colonial education that had produced him and other bicultured intellectual leaders. The nationalist assumption motivating Haykal when Minister was that "language is among the preconditions for a nation to have life". Haykal's 1951 memoirs presented his drive to strengthen Arabic in the schools in 1941 as a continuation of a sort of revolt by his generation of secular-educated professionals to define the self by literary classical Arabic, in the face of the foreign languages in which British colonial rule immersed them. When editor of al-Siyasah (founded in 1922), he had recruited graduates of higher colleges/faculties (kulliyyat) of (Europe-derived, secular) law or commerce to help him "renew" Egyptian journalism: they proved unable to write up even short news items in acceptable Arabic prose. Promotion of Arabic in the government schools by post-1922 Egyptian governments contracted such linguistic alienation. However, the failure of the latest generation of Egyptian children and

Shukri, Salamah Musa wa Azmat al-Damir al-'Arabi (Saida: al-Maktabat al-'Arsiyah 1965) pp. 59-60. Taha here showed he knew — and that he knew non-Egyptian Arabs knew — that more Egypt-centric Egyptians, as well, were now becoming attracted to a pan-Arabism that offered Egypt leadership of a federation. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Taha's old mentor, similarly alternated (a) a far-reaching economic and cultural unification with (b) postponement of political federation until all Arab state-units became independent in a 1938 interview to an 'Iraqi journalist: "we are Arabs in our language, our belief (ie. religion: 'aqidah) and in our culture". Rafa'il Batti, "Min Kabir Suhufiyi al-'Iraq ila Misr" (From the Dean of the 'Iraqi Press Corps to Egypt), Misr al-Fatat 28 July 1938 p. 10. Taha assumed that Muslim Egyptians were descended from classical Arabs in Future, p. 143.
adolescents to master standard Arabic for Haykal denied meaning to Egypt's political independence. Egyptian pupils had to be conscious of their "responsibility": under Britain's colonial rule "we used to study all subjects, except the Arabic language, in English in secondary schools"; in contrast, the new generation of students in Egyptian government schools "studied all subjects except the foreign languages in Arabic", "the government is their government". If the students mastered standard Arabic they would "raise up their homeland". Haykal believed that no ordinary child could learn two radically different languages before he was nine or ten years old. In line with pressure from zealot Arabist officials in his Ministry, he cut the residual teaching of English in the government primary schools. This drew attacks from the English-language Egyptian Gazette --- Haykal believed the British Embassy inspired it --- that "fanaticism" and "xenophobia" had motivated him. His response quickly generalized out from Britishers and Egyptians in Cairo in 1941 to Europeans in general as enslavers and economic exploiters of "the Muslims" and "the children of the East" since generations: when the Muslims/Easterners tried to throw off their yoke or compete for the wealth and resources of their own land the Europeans defamed them with "fanaticism" and "xenophobia". Emotions of cultural and national identity might motivate Haykal to impose classical Arabic at expense of Egypt's modernization. Yet he objected to unretrained graduates of Islamic institutions as teachers of Arabic: he wanted to synthesize restored classical Arabic with

95. Ibid pp. 113-118. Compared to Haykal, Taha had a much more comprehensive drive to teach the full range of important European cultural languages — even ancient Greek and Latin — within secondary and tertiary education. In regard to the primary schools, though, he was like Haykal. Classical Arabic, grammatically complex and not spoken by anybody in daily life, was still, despite independence, not adequately taught: for Taha, too, the solution was to grant it more hours by eliminating European languages from the primary schools. Taha, Future of Culture in Egypt pp. 86-87, 68.
implantation in Arabic of Europe-originated literary forms and concepts. Now, though, the drive to make classical Arabic pervade life circumscribed Western elements. He wanted new courses to teach classical Arabic through which Egyptian pupils would grasp the universal "concepts" (ma'ani) also used by contemporary Westerners, but without "the words of actual expressions being exchanged". That is to say, Haykal by the 1940s had moved much further towards the neo-classical purists' stance: he opposed introduction of loan-words conveying modernity into literary Arabic, in contrast to advocacy of this in Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's circle during the period of British colonial rule.

The Pan-Arab Factor. Haykal's "concern that our children master the [classical] Arabic language" was not just because it was Egypt's national language but also because "Arabic is the language of the lands extending from 'Iraq in the East to Marrakish [Morocco] in the West". West Asian Arabs had early influenced the development of his positions on language. In Lebanon in 1924, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, that "outstanding figure of Syrian patriotism", impressed upon Haykal that only fourteen million Egyptians would read authors who wrote in the Egyptian dialect, but that seventy million Arabs in West Asia and North Africa and millions scattered in the new and old worlds would read Egyptians who published in the classical language. Haykal's youthful novel Zaynab, set in rural Egypt and published in 1914, had innovatively used modified rural Egyptian dialect in many dialogues. By 1941, however, he had become conscious of the damage that the dialects did to the political solidarity of the Arab "nations" as well as to their literary-intellectual communication. "The ages of darkness" that the Arab "nations (umam) underwent brought down/degenerated the language (hawat bil-lughah)" into dialects which made 'Iraqis, North Africans and Egyptians unable to communicate with one another, so that these "nations" became

96. Ibid pp. 105-108.
indifferent to each others' fate or, even, mutually hostile. Here, like many Egyptians, he for the time maintained the long-standing sense of plural nations in the Arab world even in the new era in which its populations pondered confederation. But Haykal's periodization of Arabo-Islamic history into some ancient golden age (Umayyad, 'Abbasid, Andalusian?), the dark ages (rule by non-Arabs?) and current renaissance, identified the dialects as a survival of the dark ages to be made "extinct" through mass education and literacy (tandathir). As Minister of Education he proposed innovative use of Europe-originated media and technology to popularize literary Arabic among the common people as well as the student strata. However, shortage of funds prevented production of broadcasts and films for this universalization, although he was able to develop school broadcasting.

Intent to bind Arabic-speaking people units in a pluraloid politico-cultural bloc, Haykal in the 1940s strove to eliminate many speech differences but did not yet consider the Arabs exactly one people.

While Minister, Haykal devised ministerial ceremonies to impress upon the --- he feared, unenthusiastic --- post-independence student youth how vital it was that they exert themselves to master classical Arabic. In a 1941 address to pupils of government and private secondary schools who excelled in the Ministry's Arabic Literature Competition, he stressed that (a) he and other Egyptian educationalists who had "struggled" against deculturization under colonialism and (b) the youth receiving the prizes, stood for two generations. The pupils should seize the educational opportunities that Egypt's independence had brought to become "great authors and scholars in Arabic". Haykal's 1941 appeal to Egyptian students justified classical Arabic as the core of both a narrower territory-determined Egyptian community and a wide pan-Arab one. "If you truly want to preserve love of your homeland

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and of the Arab lands (al-bilad al-'Arabiyyah) which band around Egypt and consider her their beacon, then beware, beware never to forget your language". That unificatory literary Arabic would take up specifically Egyptian idioms less. However, Haykal was preserving some residual particularoid commitment to Egypt as a more advanced leader upon which the other Arab populations were dependent for light\textsuperscript{98}.

Past assaults from European languages and cultures, then, motivated Haykal's acculturated generation to educationally mould new post-independence generations into its at least linguistic opposite: Arabic monolinguals who form, think and create literature within literary Arabic. Haykal's and Taha's hope that they could maintain the West's best thought and sensibility within such Arabization was wishful.

**Haykal's Classical Arabs and Local and International Politics**

After decades of rage against the liberal but imperialist West that refused to bestow equality, the ageing Haykal again stood with it in its vulnerable time, hoping yet again for the humane comity of liberal nations. His 1942 radio talks on the classical Islamic Empire drew frequent, detailed parallels between the experience and institutions of the classical Muslim Arabs and the standard Western political platitudes reiterated in the Atlantic Charter\textsuperscript{99}. Like other Arabo-Islamists such as his friend Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Haykal voiced support for the Western parliamentarist polities fighting Nazism. The

\textsuperscript{98} Extracts from Haykal's speech in "Iyyakum, Thumma Iyyahum 'an Tansaw Lughat al-Bilad" (Beware, Beware, Lest You Forget the Language of the Land), al-Muqattam 30 March 1941 p. 2.

\textsuperscript{99} Haykal, al-Imbiraturiyyat al-Islamiyyah wal-Amakin al-Muqaddasah (The Islamic Empire and the Holy Places) (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal 1961) pp. 94-95. Edited by Ahmad Haykal, this is a posthumous collection of the texts of broadcasts his father made on early Islam and Palestine's Jewish, Christian and Muslim shrines in 1942. Haykal had been Minister of Education up to 2 February 1942. In 1937, Haykal had spent ten days in Palestine in order to meet Palestinian (and Zionist?) figures and visit the Holy Places. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 1 pp. 431-433.
hostile reaction of many liberal Arab intellectuals to Nazi racism (but also earlier against its French progenitors Renan and Drumont) was manifested in Haykal's formulation that Islam, refusing to recognise any boundary of race or language to its universal brotherhood, "has not awarded preference to the Arab over the non-Arab (Persian) as some did to the Aryan over the Semite."\(^{100}\)

Haykal's account that the Muslim community drastically limited the power and actions of the Caliph under the earliest, most Islamic Arab-Muslim government (the Rightly Guided Caliphs) obliquely obstructed Faruq's thrust to despotism in contemporary Egypt. Haykal drew the Liberal Constitutionalists into alliances for office with Faruq but kept his pro forma tributes to him non-Islamic and simultaneously counteracted damage to parliamentarism. His broadcasts denounced later 'Abbasid concepts of the Caliph as the Shadow of God on earth who derived his authority directly from God without being accountable before people etc\(^{101}\) as deviation from original Islam. Thus, somewhat like 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's deflation of the Caliphal ambitions of King Fu'ad in the 1920s, Haykal's classical Arab Muslims of the 1940s sapped Faruq's drive for arbitrary power in the name of Islam.\(^{102}\)

\(^{100}\) al-Imbiraturiyat al-Islamiyyah p. 63; for specific branding of "dictatorships" as to blame for igniting world war, p. 86.

\(^{101}\) Ibid p. 23.

\(^{102}\) Haykal well understood the importance of Faruq's patronage of Arab-centric high culture not just for consumption by Egyptians but also as a nexus for the drawing-together of the Arabs under Egypt's leadership. In December 1944, King Faruq unveiled a bust of the poet Ahmad Shawqi in the Royal Opera House. In his speech as Minister of Education, Haykal somewhat went along with Faruq's aggrandizement as the symbol of Egypt's Arab leadership but carefully praising him and his dynasty in secular and controlling constitutionalist terms that awarded no special relation with God or Islam. The purposeful idealism for which Shawqi's verse had called, now that Faruq was actualizing it, has extended beyond Egypt to all the Arab countries, in which Faruq's name had come to embody "mercy, righteousness, liberty and greatness" and the hope of a juster future. Gesturing to a monarchical view of history, Haykal highlighted Faruq as the crucial figure who would play the key role in "effecting the rebirth of Arabic and its sons". Faruq would restore the past of Arabic (patronize the widening publication of classical texts) and invigorate its new literature in "Egypt and the lands of Arabic". Haykal reminded Faruq and his audience that on 19 April 1927 a great host of delegations "from..."
In his youthful writings Haykal had explicitly identified many intellectual and cultural elements that had gone into classical Arabo-Islamic civilization as foreign, while praising their assimilation by the Arabs as a creative synthesis (Ch. 6; B 105-108). In his later Islamist writings in the 1930s and 1940s Haykal's focus had narrowed from the urban centres of the Arabs' far-flung Islamic Empire or universalist state to their original Arabian peninsular homeland; chronologically, too, he had shifted to the earlier period of the Prophet Muhammad's mission and the first Rightly Guided Rashidi Caliphs. The focus now was on the early periods of Islamic history before the Arabs had interacted much with foreign cultures.

**Ethnicizing Islam.** Haykal described the democratic or egalitarian Rashidi relation of leader and led in terms of Islam's motivating revelation --- the Qur'an characterized the Prophet as "nothing but a human being like yourselves" (innama ana basharun mithlukum) --- but also of "Arab simplicity". To the proto-democratic "Arab concept" which Abu Bakr and Umar had expressed in their speeches upon being chosen as Caliphs, Haykal contrasted a later "foreign" concept that triumphed under the 'Abbasids. The proto-republican Arab concept that the led could depose an errant leader, and Islam's stress on the humanity of the Prophet were repudiated by absolutist "Kings of the 'Abbasid dynasty": influenced by the "foreign" Persian officials, they instead claimed to derive their authority direct from God and to be accountable to Him alone --- the classical thesis that the Caliph was "the Shadow of God on Earth". Haykal equated this with claims of Divine Right of Kings in the West --- covering the development of 'Alid monarchy within Westernization in Egypt.

Haykal noted that it was only when Persians assumed the highest positions of state with the 'Abbasid dynasty --- all the Arab lands --- from 'Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, the Maghrib countries --- had conferred the title of Amir of Arab poets upon Shawqi in the very same Opera House. "Khitab Ma'ali Wazir al-Ma'arif" (The Speech of H.E. the Minister of Education), al-Muqattam 18 December 1944.  
103. al-Imbiraturiyyat al-Islamiyyah p. 23.  
104. Ibid p. 23.
that the foreign governmental model decisively triumphed\textsuperscript{105}. At this point, he remarked that the 'Abbasid age was also characterized by the translation of Greek philosophy into Arabic and that this philosophy's theories started to influence development of the Islamic State's public life. He thus implied that some streams within Greek philosophy, too, helped pull the egalitarian or proto-democratic Arab and Islamic pattern of government towards its diametrical opposite (al-nagid), "absolutist government"\textsuperscript{106}. He did, however, elsewhere juxtapose the democratic patterns of the liberty-loving city and nomad Arabs at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the earlier democratic system of the ancient Greek city states\textsuperscript{107}. In the 1930s and 1940s, he still approved some influences from the West --- classical or modern --- upon Arab-Islamic societies but synthesis and acculturation were no longer almost invariable blessings.

Haykal's projection in the 1930s and 1940s of earlier Arabian Muslim patterns, whether by intention or not, singled out a less elaborated Islam that might clash less with some Western elements that had been imported into Egypt. It also worked to ethnicize and contract within the Arab sphere the successor supra-Egyptian community that Egyptians would now construct. But --- in ethnic-universalist dualism similar to 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam's vision of classical Islam --- Haykal had other spasms that fostered a modern successor pan-Islamic community. In the time that the classical Islamic empire maintained social justice and intellectual freedom "there almost arose a universal state (dawlah 'alamiyyah) to incorporate all the nations of that age"\textsuperscript{108}.

\textbf{1942: Haykal and The Palestine Shrines}

"Muslim Misri" (an Egyptian Muslim) in al-Mugattam in 1938 refuted claims by local Arabic-speaking Egyptian

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid p. 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid p. 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid p. 73.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Ibid p. 13.
\end{itemize}
Zionists that the Zionist settlers in Palestine were pacific and had no design on Islamic Holy Places there. A bad impression had been left among Muslim Egyptians by a telegraph of the Arab East News Agency that Zionist publications distributed in London had Hebrew captions above photographs of Islamic shrines in Palestine: they were taken to indicate "the appetite of the Jews to seize control of those Holy Places". The reply in al-Mugattam by the local "Jewish lawyer" Victor Hazzan shows that in 1938 --- even after the 1936 Palestinian uprising electrified Egypt --- it remained somewhat acceptable for Egyptian Jewish professionals to identify themselves as Zionist: "as a Jew with a full knowledge of Zionism, I can state unequivocally to you that it has never at any time entered into the mind of any Jew or Zionist to take possession of the Christian and Islamic Holy Places in Palestine".

In reply, the anonymous but well informed "Egyptian Muslim" quoted copiously from correspondence and statements of such Ashkenazi Jewish leaders as the British Zionist Sir Alfred Mond, who demanded that the Temple of Solomon be rebuilt in place of the al-Aqsa Mosque, and the Chief Rabbi of Rumania¹⁰⁹. This strongly religious Egyptian modality of resistance to Zionism felt human solidarity with the threatened Palestinians, but was also drawn to intervene by the fear that Islam's shrines were about to be wrested away by resurgent Judaism. Steeped though they were in secularist Western thought, and preoccupied with the material harm a Jewish state could do a prospective pan-Arab economy centred around Egypt, the al-Siyasah intellectuals, too, continued to be drawn in by a similar sense of threat to Palestine's sacredness¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁹. "al-Amakin al-Muqaddasah wa Matami' al-Yahud fiha" (The Holy Places and the Designs of the Jews on Them), al-Mugattam 14 May 1938 p. 5. If Hazzan in 1938 did not expect his Zionism to end his law practice, the SC-owned al-Hilal in 1931 was also prepared to take Chaim Weizmann on face value for the time. Its reporter let him give the impression that he was a moderate trying to narrow the gap between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, who should be exempt from political questions. When the reporter said that he respected Weizmann as a scientist but could not as an Arab accept his "principle", Weizmann replied: "But that does not stop us from being friends". al-Hilal 1 March 1931 p. 814.

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Christianity and Christians. Haykal’s 1942 radio talks did not give Muslim Egyptians more empathy for the beliefs of Christian Arabs, which could have facilitated bisectarian Arab nationalism. He evoked no positive Christian Arab activity around shrines in Palestine for his focus was Western Christians: an almost pagan Constantine, the Churches of the Nativity and the Holy Sepulchre as old pagan shrines rebuilt, and invading Crusaders who could fuel Islamic Arab nationalism defined against the Christian imperialist West.\(^{111}\)

The Jews and their Shrines. In contrast to his perfunctory and sometimes sour coverage of Christianity and Christians, Haykal’s treatment of the Jewish ritual lamentation at the Wailing Wall did evoke in immediate, sympathetic detail the ritual life of a real contemporary religious community.\(^{112}\) Haykal was so sensitively attuned to the Jews here because the Hebrews were the first Muslims —— submitters to the One God —— with whom the venture of Islam started: "in that idolatrous/pagan world" in which religious consciousness was confined to "direct sensation", the Children of Israel attained the plane of "Abstraction": "the Creator of the Universe guided them to His Oneness and to the Eternity of His Nature: thereby they became His chosen people."\(^{113}\)

‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq in his 1925 Islam and the Bases of Government had argued that Muhammad only accidentally became a political leader, that individualistic Islam required no state. Had Haykal, under apologetic Islamic

111. See al-Imbiraturiyat al-Islamiyyah, pp. 148-9, 156-8, 175.
Haykal wrote that the world’s Christians were attached to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre by virtue of investment of past sacrifices during the Crusades (ibid p. 161) —— an exaggeration for Western Protestants in particular, despite some memories of those wars against the Muslims. On the other hand, he offered some non-hostile images of Crusaders reconstructing that Church after it was razed by the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amrillah. Ibid pp. 160-161.
veneers after 1930, covertly kept propagating a secularism intent to separate state and religion (C.D. Smith's characterization\(^\text{114}\)), he could in 1942 have patternedapolitical and anti-legalistic prophethood from Jesus: instead, he depicted Jesus as a leader of "revolt against the oppressor [Roman] invaders" by the Jews as much as heading "revolt against Judaism's deviation from the Law (shari'ah) of the Torah\(^\text{115}\). The major uprising for independence against Rome "forty years after Jesus' death" derived from "the seeds of revolt that Jesus' preachings disseminated"\(^\text{116}\). Especially in comparison to the generations it took Christianity, Muhammad quickly achieved a political state for a revealed religion (Haykal argued in 1935)\(^\text{117}\); yet in the 1942 talks the arch-Jew Jesus, too, resolutely set the same drive in motion: divine religion needed its sovereign state. Thus Haykal --- stimulated by R. Eisler's 1929 reevaluation of Jesus as an insurgent Jewish proto-nationalist Messiah?\(^\text{118}\) --- projected back upon Jesus both (a) the Muhammad pattern of the political prophet at war and (b) his almost Ikhwan-like fury at Egypt's humiliation when British tanks imposed a ministry of his party's Wafd enemies on 4 February 1942. Haykal's bitter identification of the Jewish rich and clergy as collaborating with the Romans for position or self-interest would pattern a radical populist independence struggle in his own Egypt: unlike his Islamic delegitimizations of Communism, here he was inflaming the Egyptian poor rather than dampening down or controlling them in the 1930s and 1940s (pace Smith).

Haykal's 1942 radio talks encouraged his Egyptian listeners to take Zionism seriously as an extension of Judaism. The Wailing Wall chants he quoted were not simply

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115. al-Imbiratutiyyat al-Islamiyyah p. 171.
116. Ibid.
lamentations over bygone Israel's past glory: prayer was directed to God to "let the Kingdom of Zion soon return" and "gather the sons of Jerusalem on one ground". Haykal exaggerated the urgency and centrality with which common people of Jewish faith felt a sense of exile and the hope for return to a restored Zion --- the motive of "every Jew since the Romans conquered them, wiped out their state and destroyed their temple". The Christians and the early Islamic state and indeed "all people" had refused to allow the scattered Jews a stable alternative homeland in which to settle.

Haykal by 1942 had not advanced from the religious, simplistically unitary, almost mythic, way in which al-Siyasah had viewed "international Jewry" during the 1929 Palestinian-Zionist bloodshed. Archaic Islamic materials hostile to the peninsular Arabian Jews of Muhammad's age conditioned his responses to twentieth-century Zionism and vice versa: a proto-Zionist drive to make Arabia a base for a return to Palestine motivated Jewish Arabian tribes to oppose the Prophet, Haykal's 1935 biography of Muhammad argued. He even thought in 1935 that the 1917 British conquest of Palestine succeeded because of support from Jews intent to use the conquest to "make the Promised Land" once more "the national fatherland of the Jews". Elsewhere, he took Allenby's 1917 conquest of Jerusalem to incarnate the anti-Muslim crusader spirit animating the West in its international relations. Like many al-Siyasah and other acculturated Muslim-Egyptian intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s, Haykal thus could fuse the West's Zionist and Christian-imperialist enemies of the Egyptians and Muslims, perceiving each as the assault-instrument of the other.

Overall, Haykal's 1942 radio discussion of Palestinian shrines presented Islam-like images of Judaism and Christianity that bore out how inherent it was for each of

120. Ibid p. 168.  
121. Ibid pp. 172-3.  
123. Haykal, Hayat Muhammad p. 266; cf. Wessels op. cit 159-161.
the three religions to seek a sovereign state and wide conquests. This fitted into the movement of Egyptians to religious politics or religious political community, and to Islamist supra-Egyptian perceptions of imperialism and the West. The talks further fed the religious fixation of urban Egyptians on the Muslim shrines in Palestine, which was to contribute to Egypt's entry into the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Haykal, however, soberly made Egyptians take into account what "the Jews" (well, a lot of them, anyway) felt about the same sacred areas in Jerusalem.

Haykal in Arab Resistance to the Birth of Israel

In 1947 the greater number of the members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) finally recommended its partition into Jewish and Arab states. PM Mahmud al-Nuqrashi made Haykal the head of the Egyptian delegation to the UN General Assembly.124

In New York, Haykal feared that Jewish American control of much of America's press, radio, film industry and financial markets, and their political centrality in New York with the 1948 US presidential elections only a year away, would make Truman's government back

124. In December 1946 Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha formed his second cabinet, made up equally of Sa'diists and Liberals: it lasted to 28 December 1948. Afraid to alienate King Faruq, Haykal reluctantly consented to head the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly for the fall session of 1947: he would have to follow al-Nuqrashi's policy on the dispute with Britain while being excluded from the negotiating party in the Security Council. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 166; Colombe, L'Evolution pp. 348-349. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had failed to furnish Haykal, despite his requests, with any documents about Palestine for the debates, excepting the recommendations of the majority plan from UNSCOP which it handed to him on the night of his departure. Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyaasat al-Misriyyah v. 3 (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'a'rif 1978) pp. 27-28. I am grateful to Dr Ibrahim Abu Lughod for supplying me with a xerox of the whole book from America.

partition. But not all his human contact in the USA bore out the assumption al-Siyasah intellectuals had long voiced that Westerners were automatically hostile to Muslims, and supported the Zionist drive to wrest Palestine as revenge for the Crusaders: most Americans might be deeply indifferent to both Jews and Arabs outside Jewish New York.

Throughout the 1920s, intellectuals who contributed to al-Siyasah had a simple, quasi-homogeneous image of the globe's Jews that accepted their Zionism as natural. In 1947-1948, Haykal and his colleagues saw "international Jewry" with more racial and cultural differentiation, yet that deepened the crisis for more secular Arab community impulses. The final 1947-1949 drive by the Zionists to establish the Jewish state in Palestine for Haykal threatened the survival of modern criteria of nationalism, whether territorial or linguistic, as the determinants of political life in the region. "The Jews who migrated to Palestine" he argued to American Secretary of State Marshall on the eve of partition "are bound together by no other link than common religion: in everything else they differ completely. They are different in their nationalities, for among them there are German Jews and Polish Jews and a great variety of other nationalities, all of which have little acquaintance with each other. They are as different in their languages as in their races: they differ in everything except that they are Jews." The

126. An American professional journalist, whom Haykal met at a UN General Assembly session, allowed that the Jews controlled major banks, radio stations and at least the New York newspapers, but pointed out that the apathetic majority of non-Jewish Americans resident outside New York seldom read its press. The Jews had real power and clout only in New York and Washington. Ibid p. 37.

127. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 3 p. 28. As in al-Siyasah in the 1920s, Haykal in 1951 still exaggerated the extent to which scripture and religion had motivated Ashkenazi Zionist migration to Palestine. Ibid pp. 11-12. In contrast to his group's non-differentiation of the globe's Jews in 1929, Haykal when lobbying Americans and Western or Christian UN delegations in 1947 characterized Jews as a non-race. America and the other Western States she pressured had no justification to offer the Jews a state at the expense of the Palestinians when there was no racial basis to "the claim of the Jews that they had had possession of..."
Palestinians were more descended from Hebrews, some of whom had stayed and embraced Islam\textsuperscript{128}. In his conversation with Marshall, Haykal made a not-too-hopeful attempt to speak with the Americans a common language of parallel humanist-liberal values descended from the Enlightenment. From the time the Rights of Man were proclaimed in France and in America, and in other civilized states, it has never occurred to anyone that a state could be set up anywhere in the world on a religious basis and be termed the state of the Christians or of the Muslims or of the Jews. To set up a state in Palestine on the pattern proposed by the UN's Partition Commission would mean to return humanity back to the ages of religious fanaticism and of the Crusader Wars\textsuperscript{129}. In 1947 William A. Eddy, special assistant to the Secretary of State, echoing State Department thinking, had objected to the UNSCOP partition plan because a "theocratic racial Zionist state" reminiscent of "the Dark Ages" would affront America's "non-clerical political democracy"\textsuperscript{130}; but Zionist-controlled media and domestic Jewish political clout produced compliance from Truman as Haykal perceived\textsuperscript{131}. Haykal's fury at America's use of the UN to impose a Jewish state in Palestine was understandable: as well as the Palestinians, it could destroy his own elite, and its liberalism, by igniting a

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\textsuperscript{128} Ibid. However, Haykal could also speak of the Palestinians as descended from the Arabians who originally conquered Palestine under Islam's banner. Rejecting UN\textsc{Sc}op's call for partition, "the Arabs" demanded that Palestine "be for its indigenous inhabitants who have lived there since the Arabs conquered it in the first Islamic century (the eighth century AD)". \textit{Ibid} p. 27. Haykal in this twinge may have been reiterating hoary folkloric assumptions of Fertile Crescent delegations that he encountered at the 1946 Bludan pan-Arab conference on the Palestine issue where he headed the Egyptian delegation. \textit{Ibid} pp. 25-26.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Ritchie Ovendale, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars} (London: Longman 1987) pp. 103-104. Secretary of State George Marshall went along with State Department resistance to partition as likely to establish a Russian strategic presence in the area. \textit{Ibid} p. 104.

\textsuperscript{130} Haykal, \textit{Mudhakkirat} v. 3 pp. 28, 36-37.
fire-storm from the neo-theocratic Muslim forces rising in Egypt.

The Palestinians. Haykal and his modernist Muslim Egyptian colleagues had since the 1920s propagated images of the established Palestinian leadership including al-Hajj Amin as extremist and insurgent. But in the context of international manoeuvres around 1936, Haykal perceived the Mufti as prepared to conclude with the Jewish Agency a compromise settlement sabotaged by "the extremists" in his own Palestinian camp. Under this perceived deal, "the Jews" would influence France to grant semi-independence to both Syria and Lebanon in return for their recognition of the National Home. Hearing of this, "extremist" elements in Palestine launched the Palestinian revolt of 1936-1939 so that none of the Syrian and Lebanese politicians involved could dare recognize the National Home132. In day-to-day contact with e.g. Jamal al-Husayni who headed the Palestinian delegation at the UN, Haykal in 1946-1947 developed a more nuanced view of the pressure from the masses faced by the Palestinian elite133, and of


133. During the UN lobbying, the head of the Equadorian delegation advised Haykal that the Arab delegations, instead of negativism, should present a detailed alternative cantonization proposal to take the wind out of the sails of the Zionist drive for partition. Jamal al-Husayni, the Palestinian delegation leader...
Christians in Palestinian nationalism. As al-Siyasah had in 1929, he still swallowed Zionist exaggeration of their influence on Western governments (France in Lebanon-Syria).

Arab Diaspora. Haykal and other Egyptian and Arab officials in the United States made ad hoc attempts to improvise an Arab-American lobby to counter the ethnic Jewish lobby, by then extensively mobilized for the Jewish state. Since the 1920s he had been sharply aware of America-resident bilingual Lebanese Christian writers such as Jubran Khalil Jubran or Amin al-Rayhani as stylistic innovators and secularists. Accordingly, he addressed in Arabic Arab Americans who attended a function organized by the Arab delegations: however, most there had grown up in the States and could not follow him because standard literary Arabic had not been transmitted to new generations. The Arab-Americans responded but had lacked enough trans-generational cultural and political structures to be immediately recruitable as a

speaking for the Arab League delegations, was requested by them to fly to Palestine and Bayrut to get his uncle al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni's ratification. He refused, not for any objection to the concept but because he might be assassinated as a traitor. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 3 p. 35.

134. From the outset of the 1920s, the al-Siyasah intellectuals had interacted with Christian as well as Muslim Palestinians (B 118-119). Still, Haykal's language in 1951 suggested that the Christian component in Palestinian nationalism was brought home to him by Liberal Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmud's reception of the World Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Muslim Countries for the Defense of Palestine held in October 1938 in Cairo: Mahmud voiced a much more serious drive Egypt to solve the Palestinian question "in a manner that would meet the demands of the Christian and Muslim Arabs of that country and spare Egypt from formidable burdens in the future". Ibid p. 17; further bisectarian characterization pp. 11, 23. C.f. James Jankowski "The Government of Egypt and the Palestine Question, 1936-1939", Middle Eastern Studies v 17:4 (October 1981) pp. 435-437; Porath, In Search of Arab Unity pp. 170-172.

135. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 3 pp. 37-38. The Arab delegation in New York despatched Lebanese emissaries to the Latin American countries to urge the large Lebanese communities there to pressure their governments into support for the Arab position on Palestine at the UN. Ibid p. 33.

136. In the early 1940s there were around 450,000 "Syrians" — mostly Christian — in America, only 140,000 born in the Middle East or with parents who were. By the time Haykal addressed them, America-born second or third-generation Arab Americans were entering the independent professions such as law and medicine.

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counter-lobby\textsuperscript{136}. Yet Haykal and the other Arab statesmen in the USA in 1947–1949 had started outreach to them that Nasser carried forward\textsuperscript{137}.

Such American behavior as duress on the Philippines and other small nations to switch to partition at the UN\textsuperscript{138}, released all the bitterness against Westerners in Haykal's psyche. He and his fellow Arabs had made yet one more outreach --- the most crucial ever --- to the rigged liberal international order imaged by Westerners. The US, for fleeting, parochial electoral expediency, had inflicted generations of Balkans-like volatility and devastation on Egypt (Haykal's class most of all) and the whole Middle East\textsuperscript{139}. For Haykal and the Arab delegations, the West's creation of Israel again showed the world to be a Darwinian battleground where only the caprices of "carnivorous" economically and militarily strong powers counted: justice and world peace were mere words\textsuperscript{140}. More aware than ever that the Zionist state, awarded the Naqab, would sever Egypt's pan-Arab economic access to Arab West Asia\textsuperscript{141},
Haykal shared the impulse of most Arabs to fight, although apprehensive that Britain might stab the weak Egyptian army from its rear.\(^{142}\)

**AHMAD HUSAYN**

Ahmad Husayn's initial activity in Egyptian politics was as a student representative, in the Cairo University Law Faculty, of the "Egyptians Buy Egyptian Goods" League. This League, with its multi-sectarian and Pharaonic coloring, was founded by the secularoid Copt, Salamah Musa in 1930 to urge Egyptians to boycott English goods and to purchase Egyptian textiles. Musa saw Ahmad Husayn's "Young Egypt" (Misr al-Fatat) movement, founded in 1933, as an attempt to revive his League after its suppression by PM Isma'il Sidqi; however, he disapproved of its puritanical "attacks on cafes, the flirting with Fascist ideas, the praising of Mussolini and Hitler."\(^{143}\) Nonetheless, as late as 1938, the second of the "Ten Principles" to make followers into "good soldiers" of Misr al-Fatat ran "do not buy from a non-Egyptian and wear only clothes manufactured in Egypt."\(^{144}\) Ahmad Husayn and his followers conducted a youth movement that defined itself in opposition to both the generational age and the parliamentarist liberalism of the veteran leaders in the established political parties, in particular the Wafd. Nonetheless, both the top leaders and most younger recruits of Misr al-Fatat were formed within bilingualizing educational Westernization somewhat like that the older-generation leaders of the established parties had once undergone. Throughout even the 1930s, roughly double the periods were still allocated in government secondary schools to teaching foreign languages as to instruction in standard Arabic and Islam.\(^{145}\) It is

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\(^{142}\) For examples of Haykal's fear and paranoia towards the mighty, machiavellian British in the context of post-World War II Palestine and the birth of Israel, also, see Mudhakkirat v. 3 pp. 33-34, 41 and 44.

\(^{143}\) Salamah Musa, Education pp. 137-138.

\(^{144}\) "al-Mabadi' al-Ashar Ilkayma Takunu Junidiyan min Junud Misr al-Fatat" (The Ten Principles for You to Be One of Misr al-Fatat's Soldiers), Misr al-Fatat 17 February 1938 p. 16.

also notable that Ahmad Husayn and Fathi Ridwan, the main architects of Misr al-Fatat, contributed as teenagers to
the press (al-Siyasat al-Usubiyyah) and youth wing of the
Party of Liberal Constitutionalists, in both of which
Haykal had articulated Pharaonic particularist nationalism
in the 1920s. Misr al-Fatat for a while was influenced,
superficially or inhibited by Islam, by Fascism and
Nazism. Initially a secular Pharaonic nationalist, by
1939 Ahmad Husayn was calling for religion to be applied to
solve Egypt's social problems such as disintegration of the
extended family, disorientation of the villager and
corruption in the city. In 1940 the Young Egypt Party
changed its name to the National Islamic Party. It now
gave prominence in its program to the reapplication of
Islamic law and zakat, and the abolition of
interest-banking and usury. Having evolved beyond the
narrow limits of Egyptian nationalism, the movement was now
committed to combating imperialism in all the Muslim
lands. After World War II the Party shifted left, calling
for an Islamic socialism that would limit land ownership to
50 feddans. It supported China in the Korean War and Ahmad
Husayn openly called in 1951 for a struggle against
"feudalists and capitalists" involving the overthrow of the
monarchy — with which he had collaborated before the
War. The party had, by the 1952 revolution called for a
"United Arab States." 148

2.

146. Ibid pp. 9-11. Ahmad Husayn later stated that his initial Young
Egypt Society received occasional financial support and monthly
allowances from such Liberal Constitutionalist politicians as
Muhammad Mahmud and from pro-Palace 'Ali Mahir. Ibid p. 19.

147. During a mid-1938 visit to Germany, Young Egypt leader Ahmad
Husayn lauded the Nazi Party's summer work camps as the approach
to bring all classes together in common labor for the benefit of the
nation. Ibid p. 59. However, Mustafa al-Wakil in 1938
lumped together compulsory military conscription in Germany and
Italy with that in France — all model because they had "glory"
—and felt he had to justify such Western conscription as
prefigured by Islam. Mustafa al-Wakil, "Amma li-Hadhal-Fawda min
Akhir? La Najat illa bi Ta'alim al-Islam wa Mabadi' al-Islam" (Is
There No End to this Chaos? There Can Be No Salvation Except
through the Teachings and Principles of Islam), Misr al-Fatat 25

148. Overview of Misr al-Fatat's evolution in P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser
Radicals in Pharaonic particularism in the 1920s challenged the God-revealed nature of Islam in order to assert the historical primacy and continuity of Egypt's tradition. In contrast, sympathisers or members of Misr al-Patat, amid the Arabo-Islamic reaction of the 1930s affirmed continuity with Pharaonic religion in more qualified ways that made clear Islam's divine prescriptiveness. Dr. Muhammad Ghallab, a veteran of the Pharaonism of the 1920s, ascribed the detail of Pharaonic religion to conditioning by the natural environment. Ra', the god controlling the sun, headed the various gods that in the Egyptian pantheon represent the other forces of nature, whereas the ancient Greeks ascribed to their supreme god Zeus control of thunder, lightning and rain, salient in Europe's cloudy climate. Compared to Husayn Haykal's romantic Pharaonic rhapsodies in the 1920s, Pharaonic religion had become by the 1930s more local and temporary in significance. Ghallab now, while moved by his people's quest in antiquity for religious meaning in life, carefully differentiated such inherently flawed "human speculation" from the truths of revealed religions. With his clear distinction between pagan --- human --- religion and the "vast revolutions" wrought by the God-revealed message of the Semitic prophets that supplanted it, Ghallab parted company from neo-paganist implications in the 1920s that Judaism, and hence Christianity and Islam, were products of human speculation inspired by a pre-existing, proto-monotheistic, Egyptian religion.149

For Ghallab the doctrinal discontinuity between pagan-ancient and the modern Islamic Egypt had thus become radical. The only real continuity is the consistently religious nature of Egypt's people. Pharaonic Egyptian religion has left an enduring aesthetic legacy with such cultural by-products as the mortuary sculpture. Mainly, it provides historical illustration that religion (with a

149. Dr Muhammad Ghallab, al-Din wa-Wala' lil-'Arsh Daruriyyani lil-Hayat al-Salihah fi Misr (Religion and Loyalty to the Throne: two Necessities for a Viable Life in Egypt), Misr al-Patat, 24 February 1938.
monarchy) is indispensable to viable government and society in Egypt.

Ahmad Husayn's addresses, even in 1938, still demonstrated contradictory impulses. His object of worship was the political land, and the national collectivity that resided in it. On the other hand, his audience worshipped a monotheistic God who sent prophets. Husayn tried by skilful, incantatory juxtaposition to transfer the aura of the sacred from what they worshipped to the land and nation.

The Nile is nature's miracle ... It created life from nothingness, from desert and waste it created Egypt, the most fertile land in all the world and the most beautiful. It is, then, not strange that our forefathers should sanctify the river because the [conquering] Arabs themselves declared its holiness the instant they saw it. If you open the books of hadiths, you shall find there recognition that the Nile springs from Paradise.

Ahmad Husayn's problem was to keep the entity of Egypt at the centre of the unfolding drama of Divine-inspired monotheistic religion. "Holy Egypt ... carries the most supreme blessing of Allah by the text of the Qur'an, the Torah and the Gospel". (He was still trying to recruit Egyptians of all those three religions). "It was in Egypt that God spoke to Moses; the first who witnessed to the truth of his new heavenly religion ... were the Egyptians, Pharaoh's magicians" whom he then tortured to death: "the Egyptians were the first to believe and pay the price of their belief in suffering and persecution, even unto death --- always the case with Egypt and the Egyptians.

150. Ibid.
151. Ahmad Husayn's speech in Misr al-Fatat, 14 April 1938, pp. 2, 12. He was right that old Islamic sources imaged that the Nile flowed from Paradise. Upon his night-ascent (isra' wa mi'raj), the Prophet Muhammad was reported to have been shown two rivers in Paradise (al-jannah): the Nile and the Euphrates. Modern orthodox Muslims interpret this as only a symbolic vision, by which God assured Muhammad that his message was to have many followers in those fertile valleys whose populations would then bear Islam down generations: it was not the case that the Nile or the Euphrates literally began their flow from Paradise. Muhammad Bin Muhammad al-'Alami, "al-Tsra' Ayatun Kawniyyatun Mustamirrah" (The Night-Ascent is a Continuous Cosmic Sign), al-Irshad (Rabat) February 1989 p. 76. This article drew on the classical hadith collections of al-Bukhari and Muslim and upon Ibn Hisham's...
The activity of Islam's and Christianity's prophets and messengers to some extent overlap. However, to integrate Egypt's Copts into the Egyptian nation Ahmad Husayn celebrated Christianity proper in Egypt which an orthodox Muslim would not do. He voiced pride in "Christian Egypt" as continuing Egypt's spiritual supremacy over other nations following the loss of Pharaonic, imperial, military supremacy. Egypt was the country which welcomed Christianity while the Romans threw Christians to the lions, and hence Egypt, not Rome, was the cradle and centre of the real papacy. Husayn is proud of Coptic Egypt -- the Coptic Martyrs who "preferred death to apostacy from their great heavenly religion at Roman hands". His account of "Islamic Egypt", Holy Egypt's final reincarnation, celebrated only Islamic empires that had their capital in Egypt -- earlier Islamic states or the Ottoman Empire in which Egypt was a mere province could clearly bring out his estrangement from Arabs and non-Egyptian Muslims. However, Ahmad Husayn's celebration of Islamic Egypt underscored (a) the difficulty of defining Egypt as a self-contained political unit in its Arabo-Islamic period and also (b) the sense of Egypt as locked in hostilities alongside other Muslims/Arabs with an anti-Islamic West -- characteristic of the Arabo-Islamic reaction of the 1930s. The highlight of Husayn's review of Egypt's historic role as a spiritual leader may be the age of Saladin under whom Egypt became a "fortress" of Islam and "on her own defeated the allied states of Europe". The very early biography of Muhammad, for those rivers, as did the Pakistani Mawlana Irshadul Haq Thanvi, "Mi'raj", Quranulhuda (Karachi) February 1990 p. 17.

152. Egypt, after losing its Pharaonic sovereignty, not only sheltered Mary and the infant Jesus, but was the country which welcomed Christianity while the Romans threw the Christians to the lions: hence Egypt, not Rome, was the cradle and centre of the real papacy. Husayn is proud of Coptic Egypt -- the Coptic Martyrs who "preferred death to apostacy from their great heavenly religion at Roman hands". Ibid. Against our view of the Christian Churches as outside the meaning of an Islamic history might be cited the Surah of the Byzantines (Surah 30, al-Rum). Revealed following a defeat inflicted upon the Byzantines by Persia, the Surah suggests that the Christian entity of Byzantium might have some relation to Islam: after ten years the Rum would be given victory from God over those who defeated them and on that day the believers will rejoice.
modernizer Muhammad Ali in restoring Egypt's independence early in the 19th Century ironically incorporated her into a new Arab political unit, since "the Egyptian people surged forward behind Muhammad Ali to erect a vast empire [in Ottoman Asia] that could restore the glory of the Pharaohs and the Arabs."\[153\]

In its transition from Pharaonism, Misr al-Fatat found itself in the difficult position of exalting Islam as Divine Truth while expressing racial distance from (a) the classical Arabs who had first taken up the banner of universal Islam and from (b) contemporary Arabic-speaking populations outside Egypt.

Ahmad Husayn clearly expressed his sense of the Arabian peninsula and Arabians as radically separate, geographically and culturally, from the land and people of Egypt in a three hour speech to a thousands-strong audience in April 1938. It contrasted (a) Egypt's militarily powerful, united state, led by a single king or supreme leader, and devoid of a plurality of parties down 4,000 years with (b) the chronic tribal warfare, idolatry and lack of government of the Arabian peninsula when the Prophet Muhammad was about to proclaim his message. In marked contrast to his contempt for the individualistic, tribal Arabs was his favorable perception of the authoritarian, centralized, militarily strong, literate Byzantine and Persian Empires\[154\].

\[153\] Ahmad Husayn's speech in Misr al-Fatat, 14 April 1938, pp. 2, 12.

\[154\] Ibid. Ahmad Husayn's extreme dismissal of pre-Islamic Arabia and its Arabs could fit into more Muslim themes of the shu'ubiyyah movement of racial non-Arabs under classical Islam who, to denigrate the Arabs, dichotomized the early Arabians against Islam. The Indian-Pakistani fundamentalist ideologue Abul-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) in his 1932 Risalat Din'iyyah described peninsular Arabia as shrouded at the time of revelation in a darkness heavier than that of Persia and Byzantium (respected by Ahmad Husayn). Arabians did not have a single library: theirs was a country without a government or security of life where tribes were at daggers drawn; any trivial incident could spark off a ferocious war. Mawdudi's motifs about idolatry, treatment of females and sexual practices also paralleled those of Ahmad Husayn six years later. See Abul A'la Mawdudi, Towards Understanding Islam (tds. Khurshid Ahmad) (Muslim Students Association of the US and Canada 1980) pp. 43-44; but cf. 'Azzam-like tributes to the peninsular Arabians' fresh virility p. 41. As against Ahmad...
Misr al-Fatat for a time also tried to maintain racial and social distance from contemporary Arabic-speaking populations beyond Egypt. Development of communications, economic and educational exchanges were drawing all the Arabic-speaking countries together in the 1930s. Many Egyptians went as teachers and lecturers to 'Iraq (among them al-Zayyat and Mahmud 'Azmi). Misr al-Fatat highlighted not the affinities but the tensions that closer contacts stimulated. A 1938 article "A Lesson from 'Iraq" stressed that the 'Iraqis were fanatically patriotic, regarding Hijazis, Syrians and Egyptians as foreigners. Incidents in which Egyptian lecturers were stabbed reflected "the simplicity of the [nomad] Arabs" whereby 'Iraqis expressed their resentment at their dependence on foreigners. The article implied that Egyptians should take a leaf from 'Iraq's book instead of allowing "Egyptianized people" from other Arab countries to rise to high positions in Egypt even when they did not bother to speak the Egyptian dialect properly. Attacks published in Misr al-Fatat against foreign artists resident in Egypt --- accused of stifling young Egyptian talent --- classified Christian Lebano-Egyptians with such European artists.

Thus, Misr al-Fatat spasmodically stressed the remoteness of both classical and modern non-Egyptian Arabs from the Egyptians, for much of the 1930s. This was at a time when the Egyptian public was increasingly attracted by pan-Arab elements --- the primacy of which had already been brought out for Ahmad Husayn himself, though, in a 1931

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Husayn, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in 1933 derided the Byzantines as enfeebled by luxury and debauchery and the "corrupt" Persians as greedy and treacherous at Muhammad's birth --- in contrast to the free, noble pre-Islamic Arabians. "Dhikral-Mawlid" (The Prophet's Birthday), written for al-Risalah 1 December 1933; al-Zayyat, Wahy al-Risalah v. 1 (Cairo: Maktabat Nahdat Misr 1953) pp. 30-1.

155. "Dars Min al-'Iraq" (A Lesson from 'Iraq) Misr al-Fatat, 11 July 1938, p. 3.

156. Eg. the attack by "the nationalist artist" (al-fannan al-cawmi) upon the prestige and power of "foreigners" in Egypt's artistic life assailed George Sabbagh in the same terms as European artists resident in the country: "al-Taswir wa-Naht wa-Zukhrufah fi Ma'arid al-Fannanin al-Misriyyin" (Painting, Sculpture and Ornament in the Exhibitions of Egyptians Painters). Misr al-Fatat, 4 April 1938, p. 11.
Cairo University debate "Should We Implement Pharaonic Civilization or Arab Civilization?". The University Students' Union had wanted Ahmad Husayn, the young student activist, to speak on the Pharaonist side of the debate ("do you not plague us with Pharaonism every morning and evening?") but he chose the Arab side. The Pharaonist case was ably put by the eminent attorney Lutfi Jum'ah --- who had his own massive Arabo-Islamic facet --- and by Abd al-Karim Abu Shaqqah, known as "the Orator of the University" at that time. The vote of the crowd of educated Egyptians packed into the auditorium of the Faculty of Law looked set to be heavily in favor of Pharaonic civilization as the indigenous basis for modern Egypt's life. Ahmad Husayn in 1931 was drawn to the pan-Arab choice for Egypt by the geopolitics of Egypt's struggle to remove Britain: so long as the Arabs "remained divided, occupation and imperialism will continue". In the age of the big blocs "our culture" could be viable "only by forming a bloc with the [fifty million] Arabs". Urgent modern economic and political "interests" required that Egyptians repudiate a Pharaonism that divided and thereby politically weakened Arabic-speakers. (His lack of any inkling in 1931 who the veteran salafi editor Rashid Rida was --- although the two shared the pro-Arab rostrum in the debate --- certainly showed how little students at the still French-pervaded Faculty of Law at Cairo University knew about Islam in 1931). Could there be any suggestion, which is what any serious Pharaonic orientation would entail, that the Egyptians shake off the religion of Islam, and worship the One God and return to the worship of Amun, Ra or Osiris? Did the proponents of Pharaonism expect "us Egyptians to give up our Arabic language, the language of the Qur'an, and return to the hieroglyphic (ancient Egyptian) language, the pronunciation of which we (now) can never know, since we only know how it was written or rather drawn since that writing system was nothing more than pictures. Is it wanted of us that a brother could marry his sister and that he hold cats and serpents sacred?" 157

Ahmad Husayn's deepening spasmodic rejection of the Pharaonic past as his identification taught him more about it was to intensify among West-saturated particularist intellectuals in general. For instance, Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah, his neo-Pharaonist opponent at the 1931 debate, in 1937 was to repudiate the Pharaohs as despotic social exploiters—a key theme hammered by the totalistic unitary pan-Arabs such as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, in their drive to eliminate the Pharaonic identification in the 1930s. Jum'ah had popularized massive foundations for Arab historical identity simultaneously with neo-Pharaonist arguments in the 1920s (B 56-59): in the 1930s, however, ex-particularists realized the incompatibility and chose Arab nationality on the criteria of formal linguistic culture that surged up in Ahmad Husayn's psyche during the 1931 debate.

The very early readiness of Ahmad Husayn to swing to either a rather basic Islamoid Arabism or to his at that time predominant neo-Pharaonist particularism was understandable given his recurring interactions with the rump of the Egyptian pan-Islamic Patriotic Party founded by Mustafa Kamil: anyhow, Husayn's adolescent al-Siyasah-Liberal milieu had always had much the same particularoid-supra-Egyptian (Arabo-Islamic) duality.

Real shifts within the parochial Egypt-centred ideology and in the increasingly Arab-orientated, Muslim-Egyptian middle class constituency in the 1930s finally led Misr al-Fatat into a long-term commitment to pan-Arabism. However, the party's leaders sensed that its pan-Arabization could end the coalition of Muslims and Copts. Misr al-Fatat's leaders left no doubt that Islam more than non-sectarian elements of language and culture motivated their increasing support for the unification of the Arab "peoples". Interviewed in 1936 in (Fascist) Rome on his conception of "pan-Arabism" or "Arab Unity" (al-Wahdat al-'Arabiyyah), the Leader Ahmad Husayn enumerated bases for unity potentially integrative of a

158. Gershoni, Emergence of Pan-Arabism p. 59.
plurality of sects: "language, culture, the common past, common national aspirations, that is to say interests". But then he touched on "religion" as a basis: Egypt "will naturally be the beating heart of this union [or federation or confederation: ittihad] because she has been so for a whole millennium, that is to say from the day in which the al-Azhar university was established". The ninth of the Party's ten injunctions instructed members that their "aim is that Egypt should become over all, a proud state composed of Egypt and the Sudan, allied to the Arab states and leading Islam".

Misr al-Fatat's adoption of an Islamist pan-Arab drive convinced some Copts that the party stood for Muslim supremacy. It contributed to disruption of the united, Egyptianist front Copts and Muslims had maintained since the 1919 uprising against Britain. In his 1938 article "Misr al-Fatat and the Copts" Ahmad Husayn almost gratuitously took up a crank letter from an anonymous Copt denouncing Misr al-Fatat's pan-Arabism as a project to "organize, or likely to cause, the extermination of an immemorial people" --- i.e. the Copts! Husayn's reply could not relate his movement's new pan-Arabism to its fading secular, multi-sectarian, neo-Pharaonic particularism. He closed with the conventional particularist denial that "the Copts in Egypt are a people independent of the [Egyptian] nation (ummah)". His language, though, reveals the extent of the mistrust building up between the two Egyptian sects:

Do you think that the Muslims in Egypt, they being the overwhelming majority, migrated to it with the Arab conquest and settled there? Do you therefore imagine that you are the masters of this land and we are alien settlers? No, a thousand times no! If you studied the history of the Arab conquest you would know that the number of conquering Arabs was very small, and some of them moved on to North Africa. These millions of Muslims in Egypt now are the original inhabitants of the land who merely adopted the new religion. Therefore all the monumental [Pharaonic] history and ancient glory you think is yours is ours with you.

160. Misr al-Fatat, 17 February 1938, p. 16.
because we are all Egyptians together with no
distinction between us and you.

Husayn's Islamic phrasing of pan-Arabism, though, showed no
comparable concern to make that community attractive for
Copts. At the same time, his stress on Egypt's interests,
her role as leader, and even his preference for Islam over
Arabness, all implied that the Egyptians as a political
unit would not amalgamate into an undifferentiated larger
Arab people:

Would any single Egyptian --- be he Coptic or Muslim
--- deny that the official religion of the Egyptian
state is Islam and that Egypt is surrounded by Islamic
states, or that Egypt is the most developed of these
states and the most civilized? Does any Egyptian
exist who would deny that Egypt must lead the East and
... that first of all it must lead those states close
to us which surround us and which are Islamic
states?161

For Ahmad Husayn at least, it was clear that Egypt would
continue to pursue its own identity and interests within
pan-Arabism. But it is also clear that his gratuitous
harping on Islam as the bond in a pan-Arab unity, towards
which more secular factors were then also working,
signalled that he was more eager to unite with
fellow-Muslims outside Egypt's borders than to retain the
good-will of his Christian countrymen within.

In the long term, Ahmad Husayn's motif of a new
Islamo-Arab empire prefigured the dissolution of Egypt's
discrete political borders, although still characterizing
the Arab and Islamic lands as "theatres of Egyptian
self-realization" (Jankowski 1975). Although the Party
long retained a sense of Egypt's distinctness within
pan-Arabism, it was a progression towards a unitary Arab
nation that the new set of Party principles drafted in 1941

161. "Misr al-Fatat Wal-Aqbat" (Young Egypt and the Copts), Misr
al-Fatat, 24 September 1938, p. 2. From early 1937 Misr al-Fatat
figures, and from January 1938 Ahmad Husayn himself, had
increasingly charged undue Coptic influence over its massive rival
the Wafd. Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels p. 57; B. L. Carter,
264-265. To draw support from their rivals, Misr al-Fatat's
acculturated Muslims by 1938 had thus decided to fan --- or
sincerely echoed --- the often careerist communalsism in their
Muslim urban effendiyyat constituency.
stated that "your fatherland (watanuka) is all the Arab and Islamic lands": watan had denoted the most intimate, inner political community in all past particularist discourse.\footnote{Jankowski, \textit{Egypt's Young Rebels} p. 55.}

\textbf{Misr al-Fatat and the Problem of Palestine and the Jews in Egypt}

In moments of lucidity, Ahmad Husayn and other Misr al-Fatat leaders realized that entanglement in the issues evoked by the vocal pan-Arabists was destroying the Egypt-centred priorities and the parochial multi-sectarian territorial community that the party had so painstakingly built up.

Misr al-Fatat's communications on Palestine accordingly alternated between fiery proclamations of a pan-Islamic commitment to the Palestinian Arabs and muted misgivings about the damage that that commitment might inflict upon Egypt's internal construction, interests and unity. At one time Misr al-Fatat had sought to enlist Arabic-speaking Jews in Egypt in the cause of a united Egyptian nation: its "Ten Points" made Egyptian Jews welcome in the party. Thus, point 4 exhorted followers to "pray to your Lord. Go to the mosque on Friday, if you be a Muslim, to Church on Sunday if you are a Christian, and to the synagogue on Saturdays, if you are a Jew."\footnote{\textit{al-Mabadi'} al-'ashar likayrna takunu . . . ." Misr al-Fatat, 17 February 1938, p. 16.}

Some intellectuals associated with the movement did sense that its increasing application of puritanical, Islamic ethics could strain the common particularist front with Jews and Christians. Dr. Muhammad Ghallab, denying that ethics could ever be separated from religion, brushed aside such fears.\footnote{Dr Muhammad Ghallab, "Religion and Loyalty to the Throne are Two Necessities for a Viable Life in Egypt", \textit{Misr al-Fatat}, 24 February 1938.}

Misr al-Fatat tended to stress that Egyptians were resisting Zionism not as Arabs belonging to a secular multi-sectarian community but rather as Muslims motivated by religious solidarity with the Palestinians. \textquote{Let the
English beware --- for their policy in Palestine is on the point of raising the Muslim world in revolution against them. There was no way that Egyptian Jews could identify with an Islamic Holy War conducted by Egyptian Muslims against other (European) Jews, in neighboring Palestine.

Some gloomy 1938 observations of Ahmad Husayn on the consequences of the Palestine conflict for Egypt reflected his regret that it had finished his parochialist drive to recruit Egypt's Jews. Also obvious are his misgivings that Egyptians were becoming involved in a struggle on the margin of their national interest, siphoning off limited resources needed for their internal crisis.

England will lose the friendship of the Arabs and Muslims by her position (in Palestine). The Jews will lose more because they will be expelled from all lands of the world on the day that they get a foothold in Palestine. And we will be forced to boycott and expel them also ... Had Palestine not been of Egypt and the Palestinians of us, I should have hesitated to take up my pen in my hand and write an article on a non-Egyptian question ... irrelevant to this poverty, this injustice, this oppression that ... bear down with all their crushing weight on the poor classes in Egypt.

It is to be noted that Ahmad Husayn and other ideologues in Misr al-Fatat still pursued Egypt's discrete interests in resisting, with the Palestinians, the Zionist enterprise. They for instance feared that a Zionist state, once established, would try to expand at Egypt's expense in Sinai, which in fact Israel was to do in 1956 and 1967. Palestine and West Asia would constitute a strategic border or buffer area for residually particularoid Egyptian pan-Arabs (c.f. 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam).

Ahmad Husayn's adoption of a strident, fundamentalist, Islamic posture in the late 1930s helped Young Egypt keep political initiative from the broadening...
disciplined, new Muslim Brotherhood. Around 1939 Young Egypt began destroying bars and wine shops, outflanking the Ikhwan's denunciations of immorality imported from the West. The politically much more vulnerable Ikhwan Supreme Guide Hasan al-Banna could only write voicing moral support for Young Egypt but advising alternative approaches for eliminating alcohol: for example mobilization of pressure to end the granting of licences for liquor shops. At that time, al-Banna was hamstrung by almost uncontrollable young followers who wanted to use violence to establish Islam in Egypt. Thus, Ahmad Husayn, who had begun his political life ten years before as a West-dyed Pharaonic nationalist, around the close of the 1930s had made the Muslim Brotherhood look half-hearted in comparison to his own now hyper-Islamic movement.

'ABD AL-RAHMAN 'AZZAM

'Azzam, first Secretary-General (1945-1952) of the League of Arab States, in the 1930s and 1940s took the old acculturated supra-Egyptian Islamic tradition to a culmination. He synthesized (a) archaic Islamic and Arab motifs with (b) the latest challenges his elite faced from new economic patterns and technologies in the West, and increasingly from wider classes within Egypt. Activism, dual high culturism, historical vision and futurism that were present in the elites around Faruq --- despite personal and class corruption --- blended at their most judicious in 'Azzam.

'Azzam (1891-1971) in youth had been a student leader in al-Hizb al-Watani, the independence movement founded by

167. Reminiscences of Hasan al-Banna's son Sayf al-Islam, in "Ahmad Sayf al-Islam al-Banna: al-Shuyu'iyyuna fi Diyarina Yamhujuna Mantiq al-'Umala" (Ahmad Sayf al-Islam al-Banna: the Communists in Our Lands Follow the Logic of Agents), al-Mujtama' (Kuwayt) 22 December 1987 p. 21. Jankowski, however, saw Misr al-Fatat's launching of violence against bars, alcohol and prostitution in January 1939 more as a defensive, desperate attempt to "out-Brotherhood the Brotherhood", which by this time was "attracting to itself some of the youth who had previously followed Young Egypt" as well as eating into Young Egypt's natural clientele: government functionaries, artisans, urban laborers. Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels pp. 38-43.
Mustafa Kamil. At around the age of 21, he in 1912 interrupted his medical studies in London to go to Libya: he fought there at the side of Turkish and Arab forces against the invading Italians and later also in the Balkan wars. Following Britain's grant of limited independence to Egypt in 1922, 'Azzam was able to return and was elected a deputy of the anti-monarchical Wafd in 1924. He was at times short of money in the 1920s and in a report to the Wafd proposed that 100 feddans be the maximum land any individual could own. In the 1930s and the 1940s, though, 'Azzam achieved high offices in association with King Faruq (r. 1937-1952): in 1939 and 1940 he was Minister of Islamic Religious Endowments (Awqaf) and then Minister for Social Affairs in the second ministry of the pro-Faruq 'Ali Mahir Pasha.

In the 1930s and 1940s --- the period of Arab-Islamic reaction against the West in Egypt --- 'Azzam had close and friendly working relations with some figures associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Nonetheless, the core of his writings on political community in the 1930s and 1940s had an Arab national focus in principle excluded from Brotherhood publications. His article "The Arabs, Nation of the Future" published in 1932 in the Palestinian magazine...

170. Biodata in Gershoni, The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt pp. 35-36, 95; Colombe, L'Evolution p. 342; Hijazi, 'Urubat Misr p. 259. 'Azzam in the 1930s and 1940s remained a bipartisan figure to some extent: Coury characterizes him as "a kind of technocrat of Arabism" available to advise any Egyptian government on wider Arab issues and contacts. Coury, "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?", pp. 257-258. As a non-partisan Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, 'Azzam's relations with King Faruq gradually cooled; the King avoided meeting him from 1950, although al-Dalî mainly ascribed that to Faruq's family and psychological problems. al-Dalî, Asrar pp. 110-111.
172. This article shows how 'Azzam was equally concerned to convey his pan-Arab communications to Arabs beyond Egypt and to his...
al-'Arab exalted an Arab national community far narrowed down from Islam's wide belief community or from the pan-Islamic community once pursued by Kamil. 'Azzam was already moving to a unitary Arab national thesis, with proddings from acculturation: the difficult unification of Italy and Germany in the 19th Century --- European linguistic nationalism --- offered models for an amalgamation of the various states among which "the Arab peoples" had become divided. But already in 1932 the theme of the decline of the "materialist" West is well-developed: in "struggling against ignorance and ... against the colonialists" the Arabs could save not just themselves but "this whole world whose civilization has become senile and ... over which materialism has spread its wings since Arab Civilization waned". Such perceptions were Islamoid but also acculturated so far as they drew on Oswald Spengler's "decline of the West". 'Azzam in 1932 already anticipated the outbreak of violent class warfare as one of the factors that could destroy a materialist West strained to snapping point by the Great Depression. His affirmations that "the Arab race" offered the world an alternative spiritual "equality" was meant to block Western left ideologies penetrating Arabic-speaking lands.

'Azzam's observation in 1932 that Great Britain, the fellow-Egyptians. Teachers in Palestine's schools required their pupils to learn 'Azzam's article off by heart and it was published simultaneously in Egypt: "al-'Arab Ummat al-Mustaqbal" (The Arabs, Nation of the Future) al-'Arab (Palestine) 27 August, 1932 and al-Fath (Cairo, Organ of Young Men's Muslim Association), 7 Jumada al-Ula 1351. Gershoni, Emergence p. 94. The essay became a long-term seminal pan-Arab text among Egyptians: it was republished without change by Mustafa Amin in Akhbar al-Yawm in 1946 and again in 1976, less than a month before 'Azzam's death. al-Dali, Asrar p. 33.

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175. Montagne, "L'Union Arab" pp. 191-192. 1937 article quoted Gershoni, Emergence p. 54. However, al-unsur al-'Arabi at that time might only have meant "Arab community" or "element" rather than "Arab race".
U.S.A., France, Russia and Japan, fighting together, had been unable to shatter Germany's national unity certainly showed his continuing respect for one European nation lately Muslim Turkey's ally. His acculturated awareness of the continuing strengths of Western powers --- one-crop Arab statelets could not be sovereign in the age of the vast new blocs of the cartels and trusts --- greatly stimulated his drive to achieve the countering pan-Arab union. Along with European linguistic nationalisms, Western defamation of the early Muslim Arabs as barbaric, destructive conquerors deepened his sense that they defined the contemporary community, as with 'Ali Mubarak in the 1890s.

176. Ibid. p. 190. Admiration for Germany's military prowess among Egyptians such as 'Azzam or 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri or Salih Harb who had all served with German-trained Ottoman armies before 1918 was argued by Coury not to have entailed as much anti-British sympathy for Nazi Germany in World War II as the literature long assumed of the Palace circle. Coury, "Who 'Invented'?" pp. 269-273. However, Jankowski (1975) saw General al-Misri and such Palace-centred forces as 'Azzam, 'Ali Mahir, and Young Egypt as more full-heartedly working towards the organization of a rebellion against the British in 1940-1942, actively seizing German military successes rather than opportunistically adapting to them as Coury characterized. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels* pp. 81-85.

177. 'Azzam's article (in al-Hilal 1 February 1934) on the necessity to revive "the Arab Empire" (al-Imbiraturiyat al-'Arabiyyah) in Hijazi, *Urubat Misr* p. 266.

178. The case of Italy's unification confirmed for 'Azzam that common language welded diverse racial stocks into one nation-state. There seemed no link early in the nineteenth century between the lean, brown-skinned, black-eyed Sicilian and the fair-complexioned Piedmontese, "corpulent and of a Nordic temperament". Far-divergent dialects and a multiplicity of civil, military and religious leaders made it seem impossible ever to unite Italy's ramshackle states. Yet Mazzini and fellow Italian nationalists achieved it. Montagne, "L'Union Arabe", p. 189.

179. The Westerners defamed the early Islam-united Arabs as nomads who only conquered for loot, barbarians like the Huns and Vandals who destroyed Byzantium and Persia, twin bulwarks of civilization against barbarian attacks. 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, *The Eternal Message of Muhammad* eds. Caesar E. Farah (New York: Devin Adair 1964) p. 190. 'Azzam published the first Arabic edition of this work, al-Risalat al-Khalidah, in 1946 when he was settling into his position as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. In 1892, 'Abdallah al-Nadim and 'Ali Mubarak --- the young Kamil's mentors --- hoped publication of the Arabic translation of Sedillot's 1854 *Histoire des Arabs* would refute to Arabic readers, especially acculturating-educated youth, European slanders that "the poverty of the classical Arabs led a group of..."
'Azzam's generalizations about the Arabs having a mission to guide or save all humanity could open up into some Islamic universalism. But in the 1930s he at most times territorialized a specifically Arab political community. Adapting an old Kamilist motif, he defined the Arabs as occupying the southern half of the Mediterranean's sphere, between the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Intimate Attitudes Towards Turks. 'Azzam in youth had been a later participant in the Kamilists' prolonged pan-Islamic relationship with the multi-national Ottoman Empire: during World War I, he, like his mentor Muhammad Farid, witnessed in exile the disintegration of the Islamic Ottoman State into warring Turkish and insurgent Arab nationalities. (Before travelling to Tripoli, Libya, by Turkish submarine!) 'Azzam told Farid in May 1918 that most Turks had abandoned pan-Islamism for "their new Turanian policy": Enver Pasha was the only one left in Constantinople who still held to the policy of pan-Islamism. However, the more pan-Islamic young 'Azzam did not swing towards secessionist Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Empire as far as Farid did in his secret them to adopt brigandage as a means to win wealth" and "they marched under (Muhammad's) banner to attack and plunder the lands", and that the Arabs destroyed Roman Civilization by destroying Byzantium, its custodian. "al-'Alim Sedillot al-Paransawi al-Shahir" (The Famous French Scholar Sedillot), al-Usta'dh, 30 December 1892.

180. Montagne, "L'Union Arabe" p. 190. 'Azzam's 1932 observations that the Arab homeland was characterized by a moderate climate were reminiscent of Kamilist revival of motifs in classical Arab geographers thirty years earlier. A 1904 al-Liwa' article, which addressed the "disease" of lack of will-power supposedly "chronic" in Egypt, sought confidence in Ibn Khaldun's division of the world into cold, hot and temperate zones. The latter, in which the 1904 item situated Egypt, fostered energy and strong wills. It had been the site of the Divine revelations to the prophets and the first cradle of the civilizations of antiquity from which all humanity had borrowed. "al-Minbar al-'Amm: al-Hayat wal-Akhlaq — 3: al-Iradah" (Forum: Life and Ethics --- 3: Willpower), al-Liwa' 16 July 1904 pp. 1-2. In 1934 'Azzam again termed the Arab homeland "al-mintaqat al-mu'tadilah" (the temperate region or zone). Hijazi, 'Urubat Misr p. 263.


182. al-Dali characterized that 'Azzam remained pro-Ottoman throughout World War I. Asrar p. 13.
Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s progressively disengaged from pan-Islamic identification with the Turks (Ch. 10). In contrast, as late as his 1946 work on Islam's eternal message, 'Azzam equated classical Arabs and the Ottoman Turks as two Islam-motivated groups that tried their best to establish Islam's universal state: in both empires all "were as equal as the tooth of a comb: no preference was shown for an Arab over a non-Arab except in regard to his piety and a Muslim claimed no more authority over a non-Muslim than what God had decreed." In contrast to devastation of North Africa by nomadic Sulaym and Hilal Arab tribes in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Turks' Qur'anic justice won over Christian peasants in the Balkans, Bessarabia etc, once oppressed by feudal masters. For 'Azzam in 1946, then, the Ottoman Turks, especially in their Empire's earlier centuries, had been Arab-like in conciliating conquered (Christian) populations --- as against ethnicizing contrasts drawn by salafi Rashid Rida before 1914 and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat from the 1930s and 1940s (Ch.10).

For Egyptian youth in 1946, the Ottoman Empire was a vanished past and the contemporary Turks clearly determined to thin out residual contacts with Arabs. Yet the older-generation 'Azzam's pan-Ottoman experiences and images of bygone Turks one day might help integrate a modern grouping in the region wider than the Arab League given preconditions: economic interaction with the Arabs became crucial for Turkey from the 1970s.

Classicist Social Justice. By the 1930s, intellectuals in the monarchical establishment, whose parties helped the landowning and neo-industrial rich classes, stressed the danger posed by the deprivations of the poor so rapidly increasing around the urban centres of

184. Ibid pp. 59-60. In addition to his pre-1918 experiences with Ottoman forces in the Balkans, 'Azzam made a study of agricultural conditions in situ in Rumania in 1930 in his capacity as a Wafdist deputy. al-Dali, Asrar p. 18. His 1946 remarks about nostalgia for the era of Muslim-Turkish rule in Bessarabia thus may have drawn upon real communication with Christian peasants.
power. Karim Thabit, the incisive Christian Syrian-Egyptian al-Muqattam editor, was only one advocate of precautionary social engineering. As an under-budgeted Minister for Social Affairs in 1940, 'Azzam took the first steps. As an ideologist he applied motifs from early Islam to (a) make the poor accept subordination to paternalistic Egyptian and other Arab leading classes and (b) hold those elites to a new deal to placate the subject classes. To drain the rage of the poor and youth off from Arab elites onto the West, 'Azzam in 1946 mythologized that religious fear of the hereafter (he did not mention human Arab virtues) made Arab societies care for the poor before the West's materialist impact threw the classes into conflict. This though he was speaking as Secretary-General of the Arab League at the American University of Cairo with its many Christian Arab students. His Islamist noises offered openings for radical revivalist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet non-Muslims were free to detach the "principles" and "regulations" that had made "our ancestors" (the classical Muslim Arabs) great and with them then realize international peace.

185. Like 'Azzam with his calculated nativist images of Islam, Thabit recognized the need to motivate the ruling classes to give more back to the masses. In 1944, he sharply observed how vividly a short documentary film on Red Crescent women workers brought home to an affluent urban Cairo audience (King Faruq attended) the suffering of peasant victims of malaria being treated in Upper Egypt. The film made the well-to-do audience ask how it was permitted that similar conditions exist only hours from Cairo. Thabit wanted the Ministry of Health to show the documentary in Parliament, in the committee of expropriations and "everywhere" to galvanize every Egyptian into a maximum effort to rescue the lives of "compatriots". But the documentary also suggested to pan-Arab Thabit that all Misr studio documentaries should be shown in the other Arab countries as "good propaganda there for Egypt". Karim Thabit, "Aflam al-Sinama ka-Wasilah lil-Di'ayah li-Misr fil-Kharij" (Cinema Films as a Means to Publicize Egypt Abroad), al-Muqattam 14 December 1944 p. 3.; cf. his "Wizarat al-Shu'un al-Tijima'iyyah wa hal Tabqa?" (The Ministry of Social Affairs and Will it Last?), al-Muqattam 8 April 1941 p. 3.


187. Ibid p. 149.
'Azzam peeled off Islam-imposed virtues --- abhorrence of discrimination between races, equal human rights, rejection of class distinctions but also of class warfare --- from Islamic belief and community as things that could be universalized. In thus turning the tables of borrowing on the war-devastated West, both he and al-Zayyat after 1945 nonetheless covertly maintained the setting for ongoing borrowings from Westerners. 'Azzam also dissipated the "struggle" needed to regain sovereignty out over internal Arab conditions (e.g. "ignorance") as well as colonialism.

'Azzam in this January 1946 address did dilute Islam by including pagan Pharaonic, Babylonian, Phoenician and Carthaginian civilizations with "Moses, Jesus and Muhammad" as sources of the new pan-Arab nation's personality and message. Here he was trying, as Secretary-General of the Arab League, to incorporate Arabic-speaking Christians and Jews and the weakening particularisms most hospitable to non-Muslims. Overall, though, his projection of the League failed to make Arabic-speaking Christians feel at ease with pan-Arabism. This was although 'Azzam had been in recurrent contact with Egypto-Syrian journalism and intellectualism (al-Ahram was a key forum of his pan-Arabism and political career), and he was well aware of the Palestinians' Christian component and the influence they could have on Western Christian opinion. Like Haykal's 1942 broadcasts, 'Azzam's 1946 book on Islam's eternal message did cite Christian Arabian Tayy and Taghlib tribes that fought bravely with conquering Muslim Arab forces against the Persians in the battles of al-Jisr (AD 634) and Buwayh (AD 635): Taghlib remained Christian and

188. Ibid p. 151.
189. For 'Azzam's friendship with Lebanon-born Antun al-Jumayyil (1887-1947), editor of al-Ahram and author of a 1909 play on al-Samaw'al --- the pre-Islamic Arabian Jew who was the model for Arab faithfulness to undertakings --- and with its SC proprietor Bisharah Taqla, see al-Dali, Asrar p. 32.
190. As the Zionists made their decisive push to achieve Israel, 'Azzam wooed support of Pope Pious XII for the Arab position, in the hope that this would weaken support Zionist diplomats were winning in Latin America. He tactfully drew the Pope's attention to the (Orthodox) Christianity of the Palestinian lawyer 'Isa Nakhlah who was in his delegation. Ibid pp. 99-100.
refused to pay the jizyah poll-tax on tributaries

('Abdallah al-Nadim had foiled divide-and-rule similarly in the 1890s --- Ch.2). It could validate full Christian membership in the modern pan-Arab nation --- yet 'Azzam also extolled the dhimmi system "in Muslim law". 'Azzam's historicist Islamism was chess in Egypt's internal social contradictions and a nerve-steadier for interactions with Europeans but the watered-down Islamic language would turn off Christian Arabs who were too often an afterthought.

Africanization and Egyptianization of Arabism

Universalist Islam motivated him to perceive the wide Arab nation as a new synthesis of diverse races, rather than one unmodifying Arabian race (although the Arabian peninsula provided the pan-Arab Nation's racial core). Developing the old Kamilist proto-Africanism, he already wrote in his al-'Arab article that the classical Arab race's conquests and dispersals "permitted it to mix with [and absorb] the black people and all other peoples that it has overcome", from which it derived new "youth" for its post-classical rebirth. This was in contrast to older nations, likewise great in antiquity, but now subject to

193. An account of more communal, non-responsive perceptions among Copts of pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s, including Salamah Musa's distrust of 'Azzam and his "Islamic League"(!), is given in Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics p. 107.
194. The negroid half-Sudanese Duse Muhammad 'Ali (1867-1945) from July 1912 up to 1919 published from London African Times and Orient Review; it championed the cause of Egypt's independence, but also black Africans under the rule of European colonial powers and ill-treated U.S. blacks. 'Ali's journal was a pioneer forum of anti-colonialist pan-Africanism. Duse Muhammad 'Ali was an admirer of Mustafa Kamil and mixed much with pro-Hizb al-Watani Egyptian students in Britain in the years when Muhammad Farid led the Party, after Kamil's death. 'Azzam was among these. This brought him into contact with Duse and his Egyptian nationalist and black nationalist ideas; for instance, both Duse and 'Azzam delivered speeches in English at the reception of the visiting Egyptian nationalist leader Muhammad Farid at the Savoy Hotel on 21 February 1914. Farid, Awraq Muhammad Farid v. 1, pp. 140-141.
"senility". 'Azzam in this 1932 essay felt himself an African and an Egyptian racially somewhat different — and Hamites were not originally Semites — from the Arabic-speaking Palestinians and Syrians whom he addressed. His Arab nation, although narrowed from the full globe-dispersed community of Islam, in 1932 retained something of the atmosphere of an Islamic ideological enterprise open to non-Arab populations to join, if they believed in Islam and regularly used its Arabic. That attitude could help integrate Kurdish, Berber and Negro Muslims, with their non-Arabic household speeches into coming shaky Arab states.

On 4 January 1946 at the American University of Cairo, 'Azzam orated that all men are equal and "this Arab nation is made up of the black and white within the limits of this vast land". By the end of World War II, Egypt's monarchy and governments strove to lead pan-Arab activities in the region and the headquarters of the League of Arab States had been established in Cairo. Moreover, in his January 1946 address 'Azzam outrightly stated that "the League of Arab States will support the North African Arabs in their demand that the French withdraw from North

196. In 1934 in al-Hilal, 'Azzam argued the need for a new "unified" "Arab Empire": "Despite the fact that the bloods [of the Arab peoples (shu'ub)] are descended from Semitic and Hamitic origins" "The Arab Nation (al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah) is a cultural and social unity begat by a common history". Hijazi, Urubat Misr p. 264. Here, in a dynamic vision of the historical foundation of the pan-Arab nation, 'Azzam accepted disparate origins. In some contexts in the 1940s, he evoked that immigrants from peninsula Arabia were the progenitors of the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians or intermixed with them long before Islam.


198. Haim, Arab Nationalism, p. 164. The Egyptian pan-Arabs and at least some of the governments that founded the League of Arab States openly wrote their intention to aid non-signatory Arab peoples ruled by colonial powers into the League's very covenant. The Covenant of the League included two annexes to this effect: one annex dealt with Palestine and the other with "Arab countries which are not members of the Council of the League". The Zionists protested to Britain that the Arab League annex on Palestine derogated from her authority as mandatory there. Kedourie, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy" in his The Chatham House Version, pp. 219-220.
Africa198. That independence would further shift the
centre of gravity of Arab nationalism away from West Asia
(Syria, 'Iraq) to Africa. 'Azzam's stress on the blacks'
place in Arabism would incorporate dark upper Egyptians and
racially not too Arabian Sudanese199. Pressure from the
North African Arabs themselves in part drew 'Azzam and the
League into such still verbal and abstract challenges to
French rule there200, unsupported by the benign attitude of
Britain to Arab dissent in Lebanon and Syria. The
gradualist 'Azzam was persistently cautious in challenging
Britain and the Zionists. He was well aware of how weak
the Arab League would remain for a long time201.

Residual Egypt-Centrism. The inspiration for 'Azzam's
drive to restore the "state" (dawlah) or "Empire" that the
Arabs by their nature should have was the wide classical
Arab empires: in a 1934 piece he specifically mentioned the

199. The figure of the Sudanese Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad, and his successor
the Khalifah 'Abdallah, were as vivid in 'Azzam's new political
pan-Arabism in 1934 as that of Muhammad 'Ali who not only
modernized Egypt but established "an Arab Empire". Both instanced
Arab capacity. 'Azzam did not mind that the Mahdi inflicted
defeats on Egypt as well as the British. Hijazi, 'Urubat Misr
pp. 262-263. For 'Azzam, though, the intimacy was only that with
any Arab population. He did not install the old special
Egyptian-Sudanese relationship or claim within Arabism: from the
early 1920s he had striven to avoid a costly clash with the
British over the Sudan that at best could win Egypt only a burden
if she somehow wrested that country back. Coury, "Who 'Invented'
1", p. 264.

200. Morocco's Arabic press demanded that a place be kept open for
France's Maghrib colonies in the League. Husanaym Karum, 'Urubat
Misr Qabl 'Abd al-Nasir: 4 Fibrayir 1942 - 23 Yulyu 1952 (Cairo:
al-'Arabi 1981) v. 1 pp. 27-28. However, 'Azzam was sincerely if
ambiguously revisionist, musing that he was "among those who are
not content with just this present League, because I am among
those who believe in a single nation however the forms
and institutions differ". Arab unity had to "evolve to encompass the
Arab Nation from its furthest West to its furthest East".

201. Coury, "Who 'Invented'?'" pp. 268-269. 'Azzam had a realistic view
of the capacities of the various shaky Arab member-states and
elites: the League of Arab States could only gradually become a
strong international organization of a Western type, as the Arabs
progressed technologically and scientifically. al-Dali, Asrar
pp. 50-51. From the outset, the League was harnessed by conflict
between Egypt, allied to Saudi Arabia, with Hashimite 'Iraq and
Jordan over the Fertile Crescent and Greater Syria projects.
Ibid pp. 91-94; Karum 'Urubat pp. 77.
lightning expansion of the pietist Rightly Guided Caliphs' state, which within ten years incorporated the Persian and most of the Byzantine empires; and the Umayyad, 'Abbasid, Fatimid, Muwahhid, Murabit and Hafsid empires. These were all centred outside Egypt, except for the Fatimid Empire. But this early article also illustrated that West-furnished data about Pharaonic Egypt could still stimulate in him comparatively Egypt-centric or instrumental attitudes towards other Arab communities. The English Egyptologist Arthur E. Weigall (1880 - 1933) had written that whenever Egypt was independent in its ancient history --- notably the 12th, 18th and 29th dynasties and under the Ptolemids --- it had had to be an Empire; whenever her grip over the neighboring nations ('umam) slipped, Egypt became "the prey" of "conquerors". Egypt was vulnerable, surrounded on all sides by open, indefensible deserts. In the modern age, too, mused 'Azzam, Egypt "either would win control over Tripoli, the Sudan, Palestine and Syria or be a conquered nation ruled by somebody else". The 1934 essay alternated between the "great" "present Arab nation" (al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyat al-haliyah) and a sense of the reality of plural "Arab peoples" resultant from decadence and geographical distance and West-imposed "artificial boundaries". His warning that Egypt's military "safety" (salamah) was at stake in achieving a pan-Arab state, and his equation of the wide pan-Arab state with Pharaonic Egypt's empires, in 1934 were in part his attempt to draw the still substantial numbers of particularists and insularists ("the sceptics" --- al-murtabin) into pan-Arabism. Undoubtedly 'Azzam expected Egypt to lead the coming united Arab entity, and in 1953 discussed other Arab countries as a destination for migration to relieve Egypt's rapid population increase and a source of

raw materials for her industrialization\textsuperscript{203}. On the whole, though, his Arabism did not provide many foci for particularoid residues because the Arab culture and past he celebrated were mainly non-Egyptian.

Although so much of his pan-Arab themes in the 1930s and 1940s extended Kamilism, he had retreated from that youthful matrix's insistence that the imperial power withdraw before talks could start. The moral, liberal, true, West to which appeal could be made against imperialism now was even represented within imperialism itself in those friendlier or more pragmatic British officials in the region --- "friends" like CIA director Allen Dulles\textsuperscript{204} --- with whom a mutual adjustment of interests might be negotiated. There were tensions and ambivalences in 'Azzam's pan-Arab communications between his unificatory concern at the political fragmentation his Arab League itself might consecrate, and his short-term wariness about how destructive a showdown could be for Arab populations but especially their elites. His Arabo-Islamic rhetoric --- like the Easternist and Islamic writings of Haykal --- had spasms that wished the West would die at some point, that excited and aroused the masses as well as soothed them. But, like Haykal giving the Atlantic Charter the benefit of the doubt for the time, 'Azzam could also make the classical Muslim Arabs endorse a new post-1945 order of world peace that would gradualistically equalize relations with the weakening Western powers, rather than


\textsuperscript{204} Coury sets out services 'Azzam did the British by moderating their relations with 'Iraqi nationalists following his appointment as minister plenipotentiary to 'Iraq, in 1936. Coury, "Who 'Invented' -1" pp. 267-268. For what 'Azzam saw as his personalized "friendship" with C.I.A. director Allan Dulles and John Foster Dulles during Suez in 1956, see al-Dali, Asrar p. 72. Even in youth, the Anglophone 'Azzam had sought out equal interactions with the occupying British, conducting dialogues in first class train carriages with British officers about nationalism and British rule. He also tried to develop and keep up long-term acquaintanceships with English aristocrats, win their respect for the new Egypt-centred pan-Arabism by a firm but non-hostile attitude to them as individuals. al-Dali, Asrar pp. 19-22.
smash them out of the region. 'Azzam pervasively defined the past and the modern identity of the Arabs in Islamic terms: this disqualified his Arabism as an integrator of Christian and Muslim Arabs. Yet the Islamist platitudes helped him keep in the new pan-Arabism such theocratic states as Saudi Arabia for whom Egypt's or Syria's or Lebanon's modernity made even modest educational exchanges or integration abhorrent.²⁰⁵

**Perspective**

The Chapter particularly explicated the post-1930 development of pan-Arabism in Egypt in terms of the West-heightened development of elements from Arabic high literature and language. The craving of educated Egyptians for an aesthetically rewarding, viable, indigenous high tradition now ended past exploration of a fragmentary Pharaonic culture that had failed to come alive. The stepped-up integration of the pan-Arab community was in association with a drive towards a linguistic healing in which the indigenous high literary language --- constrictive of Egyptian particularity --- was to be restored within the modernity from which aliens excluded it after 1881.

The post-1930 Egyptian pan-Arabism examined solidified amid both neo-capitalist opportunities and growing political and social crisis. The modernizing, secular-educated section of Muslim Egyptians was gaining entrepreneurial, capitalist and technocratic skills that increasingly enabled it to compete with or supplant

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²⁰⁵. Saudi Arabia only intermittently attended 1944 discussions in Alexandria that led up to the formation of the Arab League and delayed signing the Protocol. 'Azzam had to strenuously reassure Ibn Sa'ud that the League enterprise would not harm either Islamic unity or the Islamic shari'ah. al-Dali, Asrar pp. 60-71. In a 3 January 1945 letter, the Saudi representative demanded among "bases" for signing the Protocol that League efforts to unify Arab culture and legislation were not to effect the "special position" of the Saudi state as the custodian of the Holy Places: it could not be obliged to adopt any principle of education or legislation at variance with the Islamic religion. Ibid p. 73.
established resident aliens (including a section of Jews), Copts and imperial Westerners. Anti-Christian and anti-Zionist themes in acculturated pan-Arabism did lock into modern Muslim Egyptian competitiveness, and sharpening clashes of interest, with those outgroups --- but also special features of the acculturation the established intellectuals had undergone a generation or two before under British rule. The new West-aware Arabo-Islamic historiography, creative literature, criticism and ideology of the 1930s and 1940s scrutinized capitalism and modernity and sometimes sought to anaesthetize, control or coopt and incorporate wider restless, strengthening petty bourgeois and working-class forces that were increasingly challenging the establishment. Yet at most points it was a gamble if the Arabo-Islamic past or new community would further class or establishment interests more than the earlier more self-contained Egyptian polity. Islamoid Arab identifications were not a sustained considered instrument through which such intellectuals as Haykal carried forward the supremacy of their cluster of classes or West-patterned secularizing endeavors in the face of public reaction. The Arabo-Islamic writings of most of these dual-cultured intellectuals also had fertile undecidedness, exploratory openness, and swings that could destabilize their establishment's position. 'Azzam, Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, Isma'il Mazhar, Haykal, Taha Husayn, 'Abdallah 'Inan, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Ahmad Husayn and others in the 1930s and 1940s made far-sighted social demands and spasmodically voiced anti-Western antagonisms, pursuit of which might have destroyed the elite with which they interacted.

Acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals had some grounds for growing self-assurance after 1930 because of accumulation of the Arab World's cultural achievement, because of increased independence Britain granted Egypt in 1936, and because France's "mandates" were being decolonized in Arab West Asia. However, old extreme deculturizing situations continued and new Western dangers (notably Zionism and Israel) were looming. As the highly
Westernizing-educated group that knew Westerners with more intimacy than all other Muslim Egyptians, the acculturated intellectuals responded with distilled anger to ongoing Western drives to subordinate Arabs. The layers of Islamoid militancy in their communications of the 1930s and 1940s, though, heightened anger that had been more modestly present in the earlier Pharaonist Egyptianism of the 1920s. As anti-Crusaderist Islamists, intellectuals like Haykal shared some visceral anti-Western emotions of the Muslim masses, and had others that responded to their elite strata's special experiences with Westerners and their tendentious world views. Although even such an accommodationist or gradualist as 'Azzam outspokenly wished the West death in some spasms, the distilled, explosive fury of the intellectuals was persistently repressed and structured to maintain access to those facets of creativity in Western societies that the intellectuals blended into Arabism and Islam. The parliamentarist West's further ideological weakening and collapses of nerve and institutions in the 1930s and 1940s encouraged significant thrusts for greater Arab-Islamic cultural, ideological and political autonomy among such intellectual politicians as 'Azzam and Haykal.

The West and the modernity proceeding from it diluted, modified or debilitated the Islam of various acculturated intellectuals and politicians sampled. Even amid sharp modernist alienation from traditional Islams, though --- even in the psyche of a post-religious Taha Husayn --- Islam persisted as a community criterion in both wide Eastern and now narrowed, delimited, pan-Arab community. This made Egyptian pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s not so attractive for non-Muslim Arabs --- however little religious meaning "Islam" or "Islamic" kept among the acculturated Muslim pan-Arabs who turned Copts off.

The Muslim intellectuals examined more satisfactorily sharpened perceptions of Arab historical and cultural specificity and a current Arab territoriality, further stimulated by patterns in European linguistic nationalism ('Azzam). Haykal progressively ethnicized classical
Arab-Muslim history in the 1930s and 1940s. Although he (and other al-Siyasah writers) and 'Azzam had impulses for wider pan-Muslim community, they did not squander injudicious energy on its pursuit at an historical juncture in which efforts to integrate pan-Arab community bore quick fruit. Although most of the Egyptian writers sampled had been for the most part de-Pharaonized by the mid-1930s, they kept up a residual particularoid commitment to Egypt as a human unit with some distinct interests: they were soberly aware of difficulties and plural units in the Arab community that modern economics and technology would now unprecedentedly integrate.

The aesthetic need of the intellectuals for their language was very great. Even in the 1930s and 1940s, the capacity of standard literary Arabic to strengthen or even survive remained in doubt. When the prospect that the language of the classical Arabs might die concentrated their minds, modernist intellectuals-politicians such as Taha or Haykal were ready to promote it at considerable or fatal costs to their implantations of Western elements.

Most statements analysed in this Chapter highlighted high cultural elements --- and networks of pan-Arab intellectuals-politicians engaged in Arab high culture --- as the main fuel of the Egyptian pan-Arabism of the 1930s and 1940s. Indigenous cultural experiences and needs determined the new Islamoid pan-Arabism more strongly than the social and economic motives Marxists stress --- or the ongoing Westernizing drives Euro-centric accounts magnify.
CHAPTER 10: AHMAD HASAN AL-ZAYYAT; FROM ISLAM'S COMMUNITY TO THE WIDE PAN-ARAB NATION IN THE 1930s AND 1940s.

al-Zayyat Vis-a-Vis Modernist-Accultured Intellectuals In General

This Chapter analyses the literary critic Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's progressive articulation in the 1930s and 1940s of tighter, more rigorous supra-Egyptian Arab identifications.

The Azhar-educated, but also acculturated, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat was in the van of the advance of the pan-Arab national identification among modern, educated Egyptians in the 1930s and 1940s. The solely Westernizing-educated Muhammad Husayn Haykal, representative of a whole class of modernist intellectuals educated under British colonial rule, had to painfully put together his view of the classical Arabs by his own private reading over many years. In contrast, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, who started his academic education at the Azhar when just an adolescent, was always at ease in the literature and history of the classical Arabs. Yet, he was like the exclusively Westernizing-educated modernist intellectuals in his acute consciousness not just of the West's superior might but of its superior creativity, and in wanting the Arabs to assimilate even Europe's high literature. His weekly magazine al-Risalah largely addressed the same secular-educated Muslim strata as the more acculturated modernist intellectuals: indeed figures such as Tawfiq al-Hakim and Haykal often published in it. al-Zayyat's writings in the 1930s and 1940s illustrate ways in which challenges --- but also beauty --- from the West, incessantly registering upon these multi-lingual intellectuals, continued to enhance the classical Arabs' past and culture as the core for proud indigenous identity. The motifs from the classical Arabs in turn solidified the new pan-Arab community developing between the modern Arabs, with the Egyptians as the core, that was the political bloc with which to face the West's strength. Book 1 traced Egyptian special relationship with other
Arabs within anti-imperialist pan-Islamism up to 1918: Muhammad Farid became sympathetic to the West Asian Arabs who in 1916 rose up against the Ottoman Turks: he could not, though, conceptually break with the ideal of a multi-national pan-Islamic political community or state. al-Zayyat much more thorough-goingly rejected the Ottoman empire and made a transition from the theoretical pan-Islamic to the territorially delimited pan-Arab political nation.

al-Zayyat: Acculturated Arabo-Islamic Intellectual

Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat was born in April, 1885, in the village of Kafr Damirah in the governorate (muhalafah) of al-Daqahliyyah. After memorizing the Quran in the village Qur'anic school, he was admitted to al-Azhar before he turned thirteen and studied there from 1898 to 1908. In his final year there, he --- like his friend Taha Husayn --- also had contact with the new secular (old) Egyptian University, attracted by its new approaches to classical Arabic literature under influence from European orientalism. al-Zayyat's ten years as a teenager and young man at al-Azhar, studying classical Arabic language and literature, Islamic law, and the history of Islam, gave him his life-long overriding Arab-Islamic culture and community orientations. al-Zayyat and his class-friends Taha and Mahmud al-Zanati in this initial period of their lives earned the hostility of most of al-Azhar's students

1. The data for this overview of al-Zayyat's life was drawn from Dr Mahdi 'Allam, "Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat", Majallat Ma'had al-Buhuth wal-Dirasat al-'Arabiyyah No. 1 March 1969, pp. 153-177, and to a lesser extent from Jamal al-Din al-Alusi, Adab al-Zayyat fil-'Iraq (Baghdad: Maktabat al-Muthanna 1971). The writer is grateful to Dr Muhammad Safiyy al-Din Abul-'Izz, Director of the Institute of Arab Researches and Studies (Ma'had al-Buhuth wal-Dirasat al-'Arabiyyah) (Cairo), for forwarding photocopies of these two essays. For an assessment of al-Zayyat as a stylist and literary critic, Ni'mah Rahim 'Azzawi, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat Katiban wa Nagidan (Cairo: al-Hay'at al-Misriyyah lil-Kitab 1987).

2. Nallino, Guigi, Santillana, Littmann and Massignon were among the foreign orientalists and scholars who lectured at the old pre-World War I Egyptian University. Anouar Louca, "Taha Hussein and the West", Cultures v. 27:2 1974 p. 120.
and traditionalist faculty for their vocal revolt against its post-classical Muslim scholasticism, on behalf of the early vital Arab literature. They were inspired in this by their beloved teacher in Arabic literature the shaykh Sayyid al-Marsafi, whom Muhammad 'Abduh had imposed upon al-Azhar. Only intervention by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, editor of al-Jaridah, saved them from expulsion in their final year. In an Arabic literature class of al-Marsafi, the three youths had denied --- latitudinarianism or neo-Wahhabism? --- that the Umayyad governor of 'Iraq al-Hajjaj Ibn Yusuf should be declared an unbeliever, the view of most classical legists, because he said that Muslims who circumambulated the grave and pulpit of Muhammad "only go around decayed bones and sticks".

3. al-Zayyat never revealed in his own subsequent writings the extent to which he, Taha and Mahmud al-Zanati were alienated from al-Azhar when they were students there. Taha, however, gave a quite full account in his autobiographical trilogy al-Ayyam (written from 1929). al-Zayyat, Taha and al-Zanati, known as "the gang" ("isbah), openly declared that they preferred reading the ancient Arab books to the late-classical or post-classical al-Azhar books. They praised Sibawayh's Book of Arabic Grammar and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jurjani's work on rhetoric: the three rectified some of the "licentious" poetry of the classical Arab poets in al-Azhar's hallowed precincts, and even some of their own compositions in that vein. This attracted some young students who wanted to learn poetry and literature from them but it angered the older pupils. Taha Husayn, al-Ayyam 3 vols (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1962) v. 2 p. 168. al-Marsafi also taught al-Zamakhshari's grammar book al-Mufassal, which Taha attended. Ibid p. 161.

4. According to Taha, the teaching of classical Arabic high literature had been imposed upon al-Azhar by the reforming shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh when he was Rector. The largely traditionalist faculty therefore regarded it as not part of al-Azhar's real curricula but --- along with geography and arithmetic --- "modern sciences" that 'Abduh forced upon the university. al-Ayyam v. 2 p. 160. al-Marsafi's constant ridicule of al-Azhar's traditionalist shaykhs, ibid pp. 161-2. For community categories in al-Marsafi's 1879 Risalat al-Kalim al-Thaman, including a crude proto-Pharaonic concept, see Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) pp. 139-140.

5. al-Zayyat's recollections of the incident were excerpted by 'Allam, "Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat" p. 156. al-Zayyat's version gives the impression that the three students' latitudinarian stance in a class towards al-Hajjaj's irreverence was a unique incident that by itself provoked the university authorities to expel them. Taha's account leaves little doubt that their defence of al-Hajjaj was only a late trigger: al-Zayyat, Taha and al-Zanati had long...
Late in his studies at al-Azhar, al-Zayyat, again like Taha, began to learn French privately. Prior to World War I, he taught Arabic for about seven years in a Catholic missionary school at al-Khurunfush. In 1914, he transferred to a secondary school in the al-Zahir quarter of Cairo that had been founded by the pan-Islamist 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish, a later editor of the Hizb al-Watani daily al-Liwa, and from there helped write and publish revolutionary pamphlets during the 1919 national movement. From 1922 al-Zayyat lectured at the American University of Cairo as Head of the Department of Arabic, and in that year also commenced studies for the Licence in Law at the French Law School in Cairo, completing the third, final year in 1925 in Paris. From 1929 to 1933 he lectured for three years in Arabic literature at the Teachers' College in Baghdad. After returning to Cairo, he in 1933 began publishing the literary-intellectual weekly al-Risalah that came out for almost twenty years. Under Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, al-Zayyat also edited the Majallat al-Azhar (learned magazine of al-Azhar) for several years. In 1962 he was awarded the State Prize for Contribution to Literature which he received from the hands of President Nasir, of whose relatively unitary pan-Arabism he indeed had been an intellectual precursor. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat died in early 19686.

al-Zayyat's initial tertiary education and most of his subsequent careers and roles all constantly reimmersed him in the supra-Egyptian literature and history launched by the classical Arabs. However, after he completed his al-Azhar course, he passed through a succession of Western, bilingualizing structures and milieus that enabled him to complete the conjunction he wanted with limited sectors of European culture and thought. The Freres' French-medium school at al-Khurunfush, where he taught for seven years, composed and recited at al-Azhar stinging verses "satirizing [al-Azhar's] shaykhs and students". al-Ayyam v. 2 p. 164. When the Rector of al-Azhar called them to his office he had students brought forward to testify to the three youths' statements about precisely those shaykhs present to sit in judgement. al-Ayyam v. 2 pp. 168-9.

founded his extensive knowledge of French and its creative literature: he searched in French (rather than the classical Arabs') literature for works to articulate the most personal emotions of his love-deprived youth. By 1919 he was translating Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* into Arabic, following it with translations of Lamartine and other French writers prized to this day as masterpieces of Arabic high style. al-Zayyat's most complete and uninterrupted immersion in a French-speaking environment was in 1925 when he did the final year of his French Law diploma in Paris, at the College de France. The orientalist Casanova assigned a female final-year law student Miss Fernand as an (increasingly platonic) guide. She had already read Mardus' translation of the *Arabian Nights* and her vivacious conversation gave al-Zayyat glimpses of the most varied French identifications: revolutionism, Bourbon monarchism, romantic identification with the Crusaders' conquest of Palestine (but almost simultaneously with the Arabs' conquest of Spain), with Western "materialism" or rationalism as vibrantly as with the East's "spirituality". After he returned to Egypt at the end of 1925, al-Zayyat in 1928 played host and guide to her and her husband. Although the husband was a French

officer en route to French-occupied Syria, al-Zayyat maintained friendship with these two young French people, one of its props being the admiration of both for the genius of "the East" (rather than Egypt only) manifested in the Pharaonic and Islamic monuments that he showed them. Although he achieved considerable bilingualized interaction with French culture and people in the 1920s, al-Zayyat did not match the continuous interactions with Europeans of Westernizing fellow ex-Azharite Taha Husayn who studied in France for four years, married a Frenchwoman and attended many conferences in Europe throughout his life.

**al-Zayyat's Egyptian Masters**

al-Zayyat was colored by a wide range of West-tinted pan-Islamic and quasi-Egyptianist nationalist intellectuals and movements. He was from his teens always steeped in the life and writings of the West-stimulated religious reformer Muhammad 'Abduh, whose traditionalist obstructors at al-Azhar he in 1935 insultingly compared to the pagan opponents of the Prophet Muhammad at Makkah. al-Zayyat had friendly interactions over decades with Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, whose youthful association with a Western-looking, free-mixing 'Abduh was recorded in al-Risalah. Exaggerating Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's knowledge of Western as well as Muslim languages, al-Zayyat portrayed him as a figure who blended "the culture of the East and the West in ancient and modern times". He

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8. "Min al-Dhikrayat al-Jamilah" (Some Beautiful Memories), written on 18 July 1938; Wahy v. 1 pp. 448-451. A discordant note in al-Zayyat's account of the visit of the French officer and his wife to Cairo was his closing apprehension that Westerners misjudge "the East" on the basis of "these [latter-day] degenerate morals, malfunctioning systems (institutions) and shameful scenes" prevalent in modern Cairo, with its poor, ignorant inhabitants. Ibid p. 451.

9. al-Zayyat, "al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh", penned for al-Risalah 15 July 1935; Wahy v. 1 pp. 247-8. al-Zayyat (accurately) specified 'Abduh's Western-style dress, fraternization with Europeans and travel in Europe in his earlier manhood, and his Arabic translations of such Western authors as Herbert Spencer, as among the sources of the traditionalists' hostility to him. Ibid p. 247.

10. al-Zayyat, "Sa'ah Ma'al-Ustadh Lutfi al-Sayyid" (An Hour with the Scholar [Ahmad] Lutfi al-Sayyid), Wahy v. 1 pp. 23-9.
accurately presented al-Afghani as a West-aware modernist in Istanbul in 1869-1871, whose Ottoman Muslim clergy --- led by the top cleric the Shaykh al-Islam --- drove him away to Egypt. In regard to al-Afghani's seminal eight years in Egypt, al-Zayyat stressed his promotion of representative government, more than the pan-Islam he later upgraded. His account of al-Afghani's final period in Turkey paganized the Sultan 'Abdul Hamid into a despot who strove in vain to coopt the fiery constitutionalist, decentralizing anti-imperialist. al-Zayyat endorsed "the democratic revolutions" ignited by the 'Urabists in Egypt, the Mahdists in the Sudan, the Unionists in Turkey, the followers of Sa'd Zaghlul in Egypt, the Hashimites against Turkey in the Hijaz in 1916, even the Westernizing --- linguistically de-Arabizing --- Pahlavis in Iran, as all successor movements that fulfilled al-Afghani's "spark". Even into the 1950s, long after he had developed sweeping Islamist positions, al-Zayyat still maintained central facets of the radical secularoid liberalism once articulated by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and the young Haykal. Addressing the Women's Union in 1951, al-Zayyat eulogized Qasim Amin (1865-1908), the pioneer writer on the emancipation of women who inspired the young Haykal, as "the great reformer". He equated Amin with the anti-imperialist pan-Islamist al-Afghani and with 'Abduh: all defended Egypt, the Arabs and Islam against the charges of such "imperialist satans" (abalisat al-isti'mar) as Duc d'Harcourt, Hanotaux and Renan --- but then out of "national pride" proceeded to "purify the East" of these "vulnerable points". Rather than the French-language apologetics Amin fired back at Westerners, al-Zayyat had perhaps first internalized his discreetly Westernizing drive from his Arabic critiques of "the ailment of the

Egyptians" in economics, religion, education, the family and the civil service, published in the pan-Islamic al-Mu'ayyad. al-Zayyat's rather conservative reading stressed that Qasim Amin, while against the veil, segregation of women, and denial of educations to them, largely meant to enable them to better discharge home-centred roles as educators and socializers of Muslim males and that he kept within Islam's bounds. Yet he almost openly favored --- as Qasim Amin had --- the pattern of the tightened West European bourgeois family for Egypt that had also tinted the Kamilists' Islamism. The liberal, fiercely anti-traditional, dilutedly Muslim stance of Qasim Amin held in al-Zayyat despite his concern in the 1930s and 1940s at "de-Islamizing" side-effects of Westernization on young urban Muslim Egyptian women.

A 1940 tribute by al-Zayyat to Mustafa Kamil mainly paid tribute to his intransigent anti-imperialist integrity: given the relations he had built with the Ottoman "Caliphate", with the Khedive and with the Egyptian public, Kamil could have done a deal with the British and won position and wealth but instead kept up the struggle dictated by his "principle". Unlike his al-Risalah pieces on al-Afghani and 'Abduh, al-Zayyat did not reread any

12. "Qasim Amin bi-Munasabat Dhikrahul-Sanawiyah" (Qasim Amin, On The Anniversary of His Death), address to Women's Union written 30 April 1950; Wahy v. 4 pp. 17-25. For equation of Qasim Amin with al-Afghani and 'Abduh as all waging apologetics vis-a-vis an imperialist West, cf. ibid pp. 256-7.

13. Despite the post-traditional range of his own interactions with females, al-Zayyat was disconcerted by increasing public sun-bathing by upper-middle-class or elite Muslim Egyptian girls and women. "'Alal-Shati'" (On the Beach) written for al-Risalah 15 August 1933; Wahy v. 1 pp. 37-41; cf. "al-Thaghr Yadhak" (Egypt's Laughing Shore) written for al-Risalah 16 July 1945; Wahy v. 3 pp. 222-223. In the latter item, al-Zayyat observed that the "naked" "pearls" on show at Stanley Bay could, unlike those pearls that divers drew up near the beaches of 'Uman, be bought for a glass of liquor in a bar or a dinner in a restaurant. His racial feeling overlapped with Islamic puritan rejection: he thought the environment "foreign"; the people "other than our people"; the language of the beach French, "not the language of Egypt"; and "its brownness the brownness of the sun not the brownness of race". Great was al-Zayyat's shock when he discovered one of his former female students on the beach with female and male relatives and friends. "'Alal-Shati'" loc. cit p. 36 and passim. Cf fn. 22.
primary Arabic sources for his tributes to Kamil, whom he projected as a champion of "patriotism", not adequately addressing the supra-Egyptian Islamic and Arab dimensions that had historically characterized Kamilism.\(^\text{14}\) al-Zayyat participated in, and long cherished, the populist, verbally anti-Turco-Circassian and nativist, Wafdist independence movement conducted by Sa'd Zaghlul from 1918 to 1927.\(^\text{15}\)

As editor, al-Zayyat kept \textit{al-Risalah} open to contributions from radical neo-Pharaonist or modernist writers who assailed standard Arab culture elements that he was reviving. More, he sustained with intellectuals like Tawfiq al-Hakim and Haykal very public friendships fostered by (a) his own affinity to their western culture and (b) --- after all those intellectuals' intermittent rebelliousness against their Islam and Arabism --- by their own sometimes platonic yearning for his more complete classical Arab past and successor language.\(^\text{16}\) al-Zayyat

\(^{14}\) al-Zayyat, "Mustafa Kamil Basha Ba'da Thulthi Qarn" (Mustafa Kamil Pasha After a Third of a Century), written 20 May 1940; \textit{Wahy} v. 2 pp. 196-9. In a nostalgic 1934 lament at the now dilapidated offices of Kamil's daily \textit{al-Liwa'}, al-Zayyat characterized it as, alongside its functions as the centre inspiring Egyptian patriotic resistance to the British occupiers, "the sanctuary of Islam in the whole world". "Darun Tabla" (A Decaying Building), written for \textit{al-Risalah} 3 December 1934; \textit{Wahy} v. 1 p. 165.

\(^{15}\) Despite his closeness to, for instance, Liberal Constitutionalist politicians and litterateurs, al-Zayyat always depicted Sa'd Zaghlul as the militant representative leading the (Egyptian) nation to independence and parliamentary democracy. "Arwa'u Ayyam Sa'd" (The Most Wonderful Days of Sa'd) written 29 June 1936; \textit{Wahy} v. 1 pp. 319-322. al-Zayyat was in a 1921 delegation that went to Zaghlul's house to swear allegiance to him when the incrementalists in the Wafd had split off and the government they formed under 'Adli Yeken was doing him real harm. "Sa'd Pasha Zaghlul", written 29 August 1935; \textit{Wahy} v. 1 pp. 265-271. In the mid-1930s, al-Zayyat was still enough of a Wafdist to exult when Isma'il Sidqi's elitist-monarchist cabinet fell in 1934 (\textit{Wahy} v. 1 pp. 161-4, 167): but cf. fn. 44.

\(^{16}\) Tawfiq al-Hakim repeatedly tried to pull his literary Arabic towards Egyptian dialect in his novels, stories and plays, and argued neo-Pharaonist and Egyptianist theses (often from al-Zayyat's \textit{al-Risalah}!). Yet, in 1948 al-Hakim nominated al-Zayyat, his friend, to the Shawqi chair in Arabic literature at Cairo University: a post al-Zayyat refused on the grounds that he...
hailed the return of not just West-steeped authors like Haykal but even Tawfiq al-Hakim in such neo-Islamic drama as his 1936 Muhammad to their Araco-Islamic roots in the 1930s and 1940s.  

Overall, al-Zayyat eclectically synthesized intellectual and political milieus in Egypt. He offered ad hoc unpredictable blendings of institutionalized Arab-Islamic and bilingual Westernist intellectual-professional streams. Similarly, he ran together pan-Islamic (Kamilist), and Ummah-Jaridist, Wafdist and Liberal-Constitutionalist political motifs, from ideologies that had had varied approaches to the British, to Islam and to wider groups of Muslims.

Pursuit of the West's Culture

al-Zayyat's first revolt at al-Azhar against late Muslim traditional scholasticism was inspired by rediscovered early elements of the classical Arabs' literature, not by the West. However, it opened him as a youthful aesthete to Western writings.

wanted to direct his limited energies as he aged to his unstructured explorations and criticism of literature. "Sadiqi Tawfiq al-Hakim" (My Friend Tawfiq al-Hakim), written for al-Risalah 20 May 1948; Wahy v. 3 pp. 267-268. al-Zayyat sometimes got entangled in the storms that blew up in the very mixed relationship of Taha and Tawfiq. al-Zayyat, "Bayna Uslubayn" (Two Styles Compared), written 9 July 1934; Wahy v. 1 pp. 311-314.

17. In a 1936 review of Tawfiq al-Hakim's play Muhammad, al-Zayyat wrote from al-Risalah that "Haykal attempted to discover the divine radiance by way of reason and offers the evidence. Taha Husayn attempted to portray it by way of the heart and constructed the fable. Tawfiq al-Hakim attempted to present it by way of the natural disposition (gharizah) and used the dialogue". Quoted in Antonie Wessels, A Modern Arabic Biography of the Prophet Muhammad: A Critical Study of Muhammad Husayn Haykal's 'Hayat Muhammad' (Leiden: Brill 1972) p. 33, fn. 174. Charles D. Smith dismissed Taha Husayn's turning to themes set in Arabia around the commencement of Muhammad's prophethood, in his 1933 'Ala Hamish al-Sirah: the work did not abandon his controversial radical scepticism of the 1920s, but aimed, before a resurgence of politicized Islam, to educate the masses in the same "rational" outlook to the extent that it could be made intelligible to them: the book sought to undermine the credibility of Islamic traditions. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn Haykal (New York: SUNY Press 1983) pp. 94-5. Clearly, Taha responded to the high and popular Muslim traditions more than Smith allowed, if mainly aesthetically or romantically.
The traditionally-cultured pan-Islamic precursors --- Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, 'Abdallah al-Nadim --- had urged the Arabs and Muslims to incorporate the West's technologies and social and economic thought and organization as preconditions for strength in the face of imperialism. In the 1930s and 1940s, al-Zayya carried forward those more utilitarian drives, but he now also installed aesthetic components of the West in the intimate psyche of the Arabs. In 1945 --- fleshing out a 1938 concept of Taha Husayn --- he proposed in _al-Risalah_ that the Egyptian Ministry of Education establish an independent Institute of Translation, employing two hundred full-time translators, to put the masterpieces of the West's post-medieval literatures --- including Russian and American authors --- into Arabic. al-Zayyat hoped it could produce Arabic versions of the whole collected works of such "global geniuses" as Hugo, Goethe, Shakespeare --- available in all "languages of civilization", including Turkish, with Arabic the sole exception. This plan in its comprehensive definition of the Western literatures to be appropriated, and in precise alertness to practical difficulties, procedures and possibilities --- al-Zayyat's whole modern insistence upon institutions-building --- surpassed vocally Westernizing intellectuals with much more non-Arabic, European education than he ever had. He declared outright that the aim of the translations was to install the genres, forms and sensibility developed by the

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18. In his 1938 _Future of Culture in Egypt_, Taha called on the Ministry of Education to make grants to the existing "dubious" Egyptian learned societies so that they could "set up a special bureau to translate European scientific and literary masterpieces". Taha wanted to make Western works accessible in Arabic in part out of concern that the minority of the population literate only in Arabic remained "scornful" of belles-lettres such as himself who extolled "modern [ie. Western] civilization". Taha, too, evoked the classical 'Abbasid Arabs and al-Ma'mun's patronage of translation of Greek works into Arabic --- but, in comparison to al-Zayyat, more to manipulate the resistant Arabist-Islamist audience. Taha Husayn ("Hussein"), _The Future of Culture in Egypt_ (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies 1954) pp. 143-144.

19. "Nuridu Daran lil-Tarjamah, Ya Ma'ali al-Wazir" (We Want an Institute for Translation, Mr Minister), penned for _al-Risalah_ 23 April 1945; Wahy v. 3 p. 39.
modern West in Arabic literature itself --- the preconditon to make it 'alami (of international level or universal)\(^20\). Deriving here more from much earlier pan-Islamists obsessed with strength, imperialism and sovereignty, al-Zayyat also declared that American and European sciences enabled weak Man to master the heavens, and were the instrument by which the West dominated the East. Arabic translations by his Institute of the West's scientific works would popularize the Western sciences among all sectors of "the people" (al-sha'b)\(^21\).

Endorsement of the West's Polities

al-Zayyat followed the recurring pattern of most acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals analysed in this thesis. His liking for the West's languages and literatures made him hopeful of good from its liberal political principles and systems. But when Westerners refused to apply these to Arabs and Muslims he comprehensively rejected things Western.

The varieties of (mainly French) continental European literature that took al-Zayyat's fancy in youth lastingly tinctured him: he even wove French vocabulary and literary motifs into his adapted Muslim perceptions of local social change, for instance to roles of the sexes\(^22\). More


\(^21\). Ibid p. 40.

\(^22\). In 1945 when he was sixty, al-Zayyat was pursued by a teen-age girl from an ultra-traditional Upper Egypt Muslim family. Travelling alone, she escaped from that rural "tomb" to the longed-for modernist sanctuary of Cairo. When they met in Groppi's restaurant, al-Zayyat instinctively recounted a fable of a she-goat and the wolf by Alphonse Daudet in order to persuade her not to break away from the oppressive supervision of her brother and cast herself adrift into an anonymous urban milieu in which she could --- as later happened --- meet personal tragedy. "Min Mudhakkirati al-Yawmiyyah: Qissatu Fatat" (From My Diaries: Story of A Young Woman), Wahy v. 3 pp. 303-330.
superficially, the capitalists of Britain and America, charitable benefactors of their workers, were long the model alternative that al-Zayyat held up against the profiteering absentee landowning political elite and Turco-Circassian royalty who oppressed ordinary Egyptians. His unevenly informed admiration for the pluralist liberal parliamentarism inside Britain and France long softened and retarded his political reaction against their colonialist suppression of fellow Arabs in international relations. His delicately-balanced ambivalence towards Britain was manifest in an early (1933) article on Palestine published in al-Risalah's first year. This equated Britain's role in "Arab Palestine" --- selling a land and people she did not own to another people, or the relation of a beast of prey to its victim --- with the slave trade she had once abolished, a new barbarism less frank than the old because it terms usurpation a civilizing mandate. And yet al-Zayyat's liberal admiration for Britain's internal political institutions is clear in the article: she is "one of the nations with the most long-standing traditions of liberty" based on "a deep-rooted ... constitution".

From his period in 'Iraq (1929-1933) onwards, al-Zayyat in 1939 tried to convince a complacent Egyptian parliamentary deputy that Egypt's rich should ameliorate the sufferings of the poor by granting charity, as religion (Islam) required. Capitalist America was one model for such (self-maintaining) ameliorative charity by Egypt's rich classes. "Most facilities in America are the work of the rich man. How, then, could the poor man harbor resentment against him when he learns in his school as a child, receives treatment in his hospital when sick, finds shelter in his home when aged?" The millionaire in America, in the labor through which he first earns his millions and in the purposes for which he then spends them, is a model of "patriotism, humanity, religion". He wages "war on ignorance, misery and evil" and promotes "harmony and love". "Mantig al-Ghani" (Rich Man's Logic) written 6 March 1939; Wahy v. 2, p. 27. al-Zayyat considered America and Britain "the religious states" whose governments and charitable rich individuals had nearly eliminated "misery": both showed the rich Egyptians that they had to fight poverty with "the weapon of religion". "Kayfa Nu'alij al-Faqr" (How We Can Deal with Poverty) written 6 February 1939; Wahy v. 2, p. 12.

23. "Filastin" (Palestine) written for al-Risalah on 11 December 1933; Wahy v. 1, pp. 68-71.
al-Zayyat's wide pan-Arab contacts presented him with constant evidence of repression and violence by colonialist Britain and France in Palestine, 'Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and North Africa. But his dual-cultured affinity to the high literatures and pluralist-parliamentary political systems of those two powers for the time made him --- like Haykal --- urge the Arabs to stand with weakened Britain and France against the challenges and assaults from Fascist Italy and Germany, whom he could have welcomed as deliverers. More than most Egyptians, al-Zayyat felt that British promotion of Zionist immigration imperilled the Palestinians' residence in their land, provoking their 1936-1939 revolt, which the British forces finally crushed with severity25. Yet one year after the "Inter-Parliamentary Congress of Arabic and Islamic Countries for the Defence of Palestine", held in October 1938 in Cairo26, he argued that only "the free democratic states" now defended religion-derived ethics, the sole protection of the weak: the Arab nations therefore had to support the democratic states' war against the "satanic" Nazis, and land-hungry Italy expanding from Libya27.

al-Zayyat lamented the collapse of France which he described in extravagant language like that of Mustafa Kamil so long before as "the most exalted" model of "patriotism" and "democracy" "in history": he hoped that even after Petain's capitulation the French would fight on against "the devils of Nazism"28. Ill-informed affection


27. "Jarirat al-Naziyyah 'alal-Insaniyyah", (Nazism's Crime Against Humanity), written 9 October 1939; Wahy v. 3 pp. 87-90.

28. "Faransa Tanhar" (France Collapses) written 24 June 1940; Wahy v. 2, pp. 208-211. This account of France's defeat pointed to one patch of acculturation in al-Zayyat: he used the expression "Achilles heel" and gave a gloss at the foot of the page showing...
for ancient Greek drama, philosophy and democracy tinctured his strong support in May 1941 for Greece after it fought back stubbornly against a lumbering invasion by Mussolini.\(^{29}\) Here al-Zayyat reapplied images of classical Greek and Roman antiquity long current in the circles of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and Taha Husayn, his milieu. Britain used naked military power to impose a compliant Wafd government on King Faruq and Egypt in February 1942. But al-Zayyat's liberal hatred of the totalitarian Axis dictatorships and his support for the "democracy" of the Allies, lasted to the end of the war.\(^{30}\)

Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, then, for as long as he could, exemplified his category of acculturated Muslim-Egyptian intellectuals' quest since the 1890s for cultural synthesis and humane international political community with liberal-parliamentarist Western polities. To the very end of World War II, he persistently cared about the survival of the liberal West and its pluralist institutions, because of shared culture.

In opening up emotionally to those Western societies they knew best and seeking cultural and political association with them against others, al-Zayyat and other liberal Egyptian intellectuals during World War II made themselves vulnerable. When the courted Western polities responded with cold repression, it activated the other attitude of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals that all Western peoples (defined to include the fascist and Communist states) were, after all, the same --- one enemy camp.

\[^{29}\] Some knowledge of Greek mythology. Ibid p. 208 fn.
\[^{29}\] "Ma Khallafathu Athina wa Rumah" (What Athens and Rome Bequeathed) written 12 May 1941; Wahy v. 2 pp. 278-281. al-Zayyat expressed his admiration for ancient Athens' "miracles of intellect which can never die", "one valid basis for every [subsequent] civilization". Ibid pp. 278, 281. As he saw it, the enduring Athenian civilization inspired the modern Greeks to resist Mussolini.

\[^{30}\] For al-Zayyat's contemptuous reaction to the deaths of Mussolini and Hitler see "Nihayatu Diktaturayn" (The End of Two Dictators) written for al-Risalah 7 May 1945; Wahy v. 3 pp. 28-32. Cf. "Ummat al-Tawhid Tattahid" (The Nation of Monotheism is Uniting) (1940); Wahy v. 2 p. 244 for barren Italy's land-hunger and Britain as "the faithful watch-dog".
Reaction Against the West

al-Zayyat always perceived all facets of the West --- even at his most incorporative --- through Islam and the wide classical Arabs. A process of judgement of the modern West was thereby initiated within even his sympathetic responses to its plight. al-Zayyat's accounts of the most contemporary conflicts and wars among Westerners in the 1930s and 1940s, given his inextricably blended sensibility, solidified the alternative past of the classical Arabs in the minds of his West-shaped bourgeois and elite Muslim readers.

In a 1940 encomium to Britain's war effort, al-Zayyat characterized the British under Churchill, as they defied Hitler, in terms of the yet unsullied classical Arabs when they were just surging out from their peninsula. The secret of the capacity of the British to fight on after other European states crumbled was their ethics, fostered by their island isolation --- just as the isolation of the Arabs in their peninsula had ethically prepared them to conquer. After they carved out their empire, the British had maintained their ethics by holding aloof from other peoples whereas "the sons of the desert" lost theirs by intermarrying with the peoples they conquered. al-Zayyat swung from this more racial Arabism, reminiscent of some of 'Abdallah al-Nadim's nineteenth-century visions of classical Islamic history, to his usual Islamist stance that "the ethics of the Qur'an made us a model for the strong" during classical Islam but that misunderstandings of Islam then sank the Arabs-Muslims in decline 31. He was back to his usual more open, linguistic-religious, Arabism: that Islam could incorporate originally non-Arab populations, including Egyptians, within the Arabs.

al-Zayyat's topical condemnations of fascist Italy and the Nazis thus also recreated the long-bygone classical Muslim-Arab world: the slaughter from the mechanized total warfare that Nazi Germany unleashed against Europe.

31. "Injìitarra hiyal-Mathal" (England is the Example/Model), penned 25 November 1940; Wahy v. 2 pp. 246-249.
highlighted by contrast the religion-guided classical Arabs who conquered more humanely. He wove into his initial horror at Hitler's blitzkrieg some judicious references about the inherent limits to tribal warfare in pre-Islamic Arabia, the Islam-inculcated humanity with which the early Muslim Arabs conquered their empire, and ways in which Arabic literary culture moderated the combat between Muslim sects in classical Islam. al-Zayyat interpreted the Nazis' mechanized blitzkrieg as a neo-paganist rebellion by the German nation against the revealed religions and religion-based ethical values for which the classical Arab Muslims stood with some lapses. Out of revulsion at the mass slaughter, his code of Islam, and from sheer fear for Egypt and the Arabs, al-Zayyat stood with "watchdog" Britain against Nazi Germany. Yet his solidarity with the liberal democracies bore the seeds of his later sweeping repudiation of the whole West: in denouncing Fascism and Nazism in 1939 and 1940 he already tended to reject the modern West's secular sciences as inevitably murderous without the old revealed religions' values. It was one step from that to other acculturated Muslim intellectuals' dichotomies of materialist-colonialist West versus spiritual East/Muslims/Arabs. In August 1940, al-Zayyat equated Italian-German forces advancing towards Alexandria with two crusader invasions of Egypt centred around

32. "al-Harb Bayna Amsi wa-l-Yawm" (War Yesterday and Today), written 10 June 1940; Wahy v. 2 pp. 204-207. al-Zayyat instanced that even the Kharijite sectaries would suspend combat against Umayyad forces to debate with them the relative merits of the poets al-Parazdaq and Jarir. Ibid pp. 205-6. The forces of Muhallab Ibn Abi Sufrah, the Umayyad governor of Khurasan, were about to give battle to the Azariqah sect of the ultra-puritanical, violent Kharijities. One of his champions asked his Azraqi adversary 'Abidah Ibn Hilal, before single combat, to inform him which was the better poet --- al-Parazdaq or Jarir? 'Abidah quoted a verse of Jarir and gave judgement in his favor. Reynold A. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs (Cambridge University Press: 1953) p. 239. For Nicholson, this illustrated how poetry in the early Arab empire was not the possession of an elite but the semi-universal element spanning the most diverse and often opposed classes and factions. al-Zayyat narrated the incident to show how a common Arab literary culture somewhat dampened fitan (civil wars) under classical Islam, in contrast to the pitiless mechanized slaughter between the Axis and the Allies.
Damietta (Dumyat): that led by John of Brienne (1217 – 1221) and the French King Louis IX's crusade in Egypt (1249 – 1254)\textsuperscript{33}. He sought here to make Egyptians identify with the British forces but crusader motifs in Mustafa Kamil's turn-of-century pan-Islamism and Muhammad Husayn Haykal's recent post-1930 Islamic apologetics had branded all European states as one camp that persistently waged crusaderist war against the Muslims\textsuperscript{34}. al-Zayyat reapplied crusader themes in this way against Britain and France after World War II. Exactly as with Haykal in the same period, his pre-1945 critiques of Nazi racist concepts carried smouldering hostility to the longer-standing imperialism of in particular France. Aware that the Nazis wanted to "obliterate every race other than the German", al-Zayyat in 1939 stood with the Jews, members in the family of the Semites that produced Moses, Jesus and Muhammad --- God-missioned prophets who established equality between races and peoples. Hitler's contempt for Semites could indeed strike Arabs and Muslims as well as the Jews: he in reaction defended German Jewry as "the creative head" that made Germany's achievements possible. However, he linked his stance against Nazi anti-Semitism to earlier theories that Aryans had "original intellect" superior to the Semites: that it was their inherent nature to exercise political power and "to own the earth and civilize the world": "the imperialists exploited this concept to steal away the kingdom of the [Islam-upholding] Arabs"\textsuperscript{35}. Thus, al-Zayyat's anti-Nazism carried forward refutations of the Frenchman Renan's imperialism-validating racism by Arab-centric pan-Islamists al-Afghani and 'Abduh in the nineteenth century and by Taha Husayn in 1933\textsuperscript{36}.

\textsuperscript{33} "Khawatir Muhajir" (Thoughts of a Migrant), written 19 August 1940; Wahy v. 2 pp. 230-233.


\textsuperscript{35} "Jarirat al-Naziyyah 'alal-Insaniyyah" (1939) Wahy v. 2, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{36} al-Zayyat had some acquaintance with Renan's writings on Semitics, ascribing to him in 1950 the characterization that the Semitic
al-Zayyat in 1941 in one twinge was not too sorry that the Fuehrer had given imperial "Latin" France her come-uppance: he warned Egyptians to eliminate from their own personalities the decadent "Latin" characteristics that they had imbibed from writers and French-medium missionary educationalists --- otherwise Egypt would suffer defeat like France and Italy 37.

Conflict and war between Fascist Italy and Germany and the parliamentarist Western states, then, ushered in al-Zayyat's comprehensive repudiation of the whole West, whether "dictatorial" (Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union) or those "imperialist" states that were pluralist at home (Britain, France and the USA). Already in a 1942 article --- after Lampson imposed the Wafd with tanks --- al-Zayyat defined the "nations" of the great "Islamic homeland" and the West (Axis or Allied) as two distinct antagonistic worlds without half-tones that previously credited the West's capitalist democratic institutions or even her moral-democratic pretensions in the international arena 38. "Democracy, Communism, Nazism

languages owed their survival to religion: without Judaism, Hebrew would never have survived, without Christianity Syriac would not have, while it was Islam that preserved Arabic down a millenium. al-Zayyat, "al-Wad' al-Lughawi wa Haqq al-Muhdathina fiha" (Linguistic Innovation and the Right of the Moderns to Exercise it), Wahy v. 3 p. 182. Characterization by Renan of Semitic languages as religious could have been more pejorative than al-Zayyat, with his Islamist assumptions about Arabic, supposed. Noting the gulf between Arabic dialects and the literary language confined to Muslim schools, Renan mused that since "the Semitic race ... made its mark in history through religious creations, it is mainly as religious languages that the Semitic tongues have achieved an important role. Thanks to Judaism, to Christianity, to Islam, Hebrew, Samaritan, Chaldean, Syriac, Ghez, literary Arabic live today as the medium of a liturgy, as the idiom of a sacred book or a version of the Bible, the antiquity of which surrounds it, in the eyes of the people, with the prestige of sanctity. It is to the form given by this first literature that each nation had chosen to remain unchangingly attached". Ernest Renan, Histoire General et Systeme Compare des Langues Semitiques (Paris: Michel Levy Freres 1863) p. 441.

37. "Bayn al-Latiniyyah wal-Jarmaniyyah" (Latinism and Germanicism Compared), written February 1941; Wahy v. 2 pp. 258-261.

38. "Min Khawatir al-Harb: La Budda lil-Islam Min Mu'tamar" (Wartime Reflections: Necessity of a Conference for Islam) written for al-Risalah 30 March 1942; Wahy v. 2 pp. 345-8. It is true that this item, sharply different in tone from previous articles as it morally equated the liberal-capitalist West and the totalitarian Axis powers as alike waging war for imperialist
and Fascism", he observed in 1946 "are all synonyms for the colonization of the East and enslavement of its people". Britain and America during the War conveyed vital supplies to the Soviet Union across Iran, and guaranteed Iran's independence. Now, the War over, he (very wrongly) perceived, Britain and America were looking the other way while the Russian "bear" swallowed Iran down. When Muslim Indonesia sought independence in accordance with Britain and America's tongue-in-cheek Atlantic Charter, these two powers helped Holland crush the Indonesians. Britain's responsibility for the Zionist settlement that threatened the Palestinians, the problem of the Sudan under British rule, France's subjugation and exploitation of "Arab [North] Africa" and her massacres in Indo-China, finally led al-Zayyat in 1947 to regret that Adolf Hitler lost the war.

Thus, at the end of the time-span of our study, al-Zayyat repeated the pattern of the early watani acculturated anti-imperialists who, during British colonial rule, sought the general West's aid to expel Britain from the Nile valley. When liberal secular nationalist

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39. "Urubba wal-Islam" (Europe and Islam), 7 January 1946; Wahy v. 3 pp. 47-48. On 1 December 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin had, as al-Zayyat alluded, signed the Tehran Declaration promising to "maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran". At Yalta, in February 1945 and subsequently, Britain and America put pressure on the Soviet Union to get its troops out of Northern Iran before the date stipulated by the Anglo-Soviet-Persian treaty. Russia fostered an autonomous Azeri-speaking republic of Aqharbayjan, and it was with full American and British support that PM Qavam as-Saltanah took Iran's grievances to the UN in March 1946, securing the withdrawal of Russian troops by 9 May. Rose L. Greaves in Hossein Amirsadeghi (ed), Twentieth-Century Iran (London: Heinemann 1977) pp. 57-64.

40. al-Zayyat, "Urubba wal-Islam" p. 48. Cf. "al-Muslimuna fi Mu'tarab al-Khutub" (The Muslims in the Thick of The Momentous Events), written 5 January 1948; Wahy v. 3 p. 103. This latter item saw the UN as the instrument of Nazism-enfeebled Holland's reconquest and suppression of the Indonesians.

41. "Rahim Allahu Adolf Hitler!" (God's Ruth on Adolf Hitler!), written for al-Risalah 27 January 1947; Wahy v. 4 pp. 224-5.
principles alone could not motivate some Western state to
demand independence for a Muslim people from another
Western state, the bicultured Egyptian intellectuals
concluded that old religious communities still bound Muslim
nations with Muslim nations and European states with
European states, in opposed camps. al-Zayyat concluded
this in 1946: the Western states did not call a halt to De
Gaulle's imprisonment and killing of patriots in "Arab
[North] Africa" because "the murderers are Europeans who
believe in Jesus, while the victims are Africans who
believe in Jesus and Muhammad". "The fear of Islam"
bequeathed by "the priests of the dark ages" motivated
modern Westerners, the discoverers of atomic energy,
unitedly to subjugate Muslims42.

World War II and its carnage was an important catalyst
for al-Zayyat's final complete rejection of the whole
West. From the end of the War he rejected the complete
range of internal political and social systems and the
literary cultures offered by the Western countries --- not
just these states' international subjection of Arabs or
Muslims or other "Easterners". He argued that French-style
symbolism could only suit the West because it was "the
daughter of the clouded horizon, the complicated soul, and
the ambiguous tongue": while Arabic was "the daughter of
the open desert, the bright sun, and frank natures". Once
he had installed Lamartine and Hugo in Arabic literature

42. "Uruba wal-Islam" p. 49. On 8 May 1945, several thousand Muslims
demonstrated at Satif near Constantine to celebrate the Allied
victory in Europe, sparking communal killings between Muslims and
colons that spread to other cities. Army, police and colon
firing and aerial and naval bombardment killed 1,300 Muslims by
French figures: "other reliable estimates vary from 6,000 to as
high as 'probably 15,000'". Algeria: A Country Study
(Washington: American University 1979) p. 45; Manfred Halpern,
pp. 191-202. Waves of arrests were frequent in following years.
Sir Edward Spears, as British Minister to Syria and Lebanon during
World War II had worked for eviction of the French and for Arab
federation under British tutelage. However, the British
government sacked him in December 1944: it impeded consulta-
tions for a pan-Arab community that could pressure Britain to oppose
France in Lebanon, Syria and North Africa at a time when she was
again becoming an important post-War power. Yehoshua Porath, In
but by 1950 --- at least in spasms --- he considered Western literatures and Arabic literature as immutably separate as the world's distinct climatic zones. He now urged young Arabs --- with their shaky literary Arabic --- to read al-Jahiz and al-Mutanabbi instead of seeking meaning in human experience from Sartre's newly-arrived existentialism or in Western genres such as symbolism that could not be transferred into the self-contained modern Arabic literature he wanted by 1950.\(^4^3\)

**Ideological Repudiation.** al-Zayyat mostly stood with the West's liberal democracies against new totalitarian systems until 1945: yet socially unitary Islamic attitudes had long pre-conditioned him to reject the pluralist principle behind the imported parliamentary system. In a 1941 article he dismissed the bitter party-political divisions among Egyptians at that time as non-ideological, motivated by factionalism and the lust of individuals for positions. No difference of principle divided Egyptian parliamentary parties such as the Wafdists, Sa'dists, Liberal Constitutionalists or the party of Isma'il Sidqi or the Patriotic Party founded by Mustafa Kamil so long before: these parties should all unite, just as should the competing bodies formed to promote Islam in Egypt.\(^4^4\)

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43. "Hādir al-Adab al-'Arabiy" (The Present of Arabic Literature), 26 August 1950; Wahy v. 3 p. 209. To be fair to al-Zayyat, this isolationist outburst was sparked by a decultured Egyptian younger generation that --- in order to call itself "civilized" --- read Hugo, Voltaire and Lamartine but not al-Jahiz or al-Mutanabbi. Ibid. al-Zayyat's maximal insularism of 1950 still stated the inherent need of the Arabs to continue to borrow science from the West, while barring influence by the latter upon the intimate cultural-aesthetic core of personality. Ibid.

44. "al-'Asabiyyah Da'una l-Mawruth" (Partisan Sectionalism is Our Inherited Disease), written 21 March 1941 for al-Risalah. While al-Zayyat's denial of differences between the Wafd and the Sa'dist Front that broke away from the Party might ideologically have some validity, this thesis cannot apply to Isma'il Sidqi and his Hizb al-Sha'b. Sidqi replaced the 1923 Constitution in 1930 with one giving decisive power to the King. Not only did Sidqi manipulate the electoral system to keep the still populist Wafd from power but also formulated an open ideological repudiation of the universal suffrage concept, application of which would sweep the Wafd back to power. It is to be noted that Sidqi for a time had been active in the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists in the 1920s after it broke away from the Wafd: many intellectuals in the Liberals (eg. Haykal, Taha) were al-Zayyat's life-long friends.
1936, Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood's Hasan al-Banna but also some modernists allied to call for the dissolution of parties and creation of an integrated political front as the parliamentary system malfunctioned: for Von Grunebaum it was a typical outcome of predoomed Muslim Arab adoption of "a reflection" of European practice (here: parliamentarism in the 1920s) without accepting the West's attitudes towards the world and man. In 1942, al-Zayyat reflected that Islam's effective answers to poverty disproved "that the law of Napoleon" or the system of Karl Marx were "more beneficial to the world" than Islam's system and shari'ah law --- repudiation of both (a) Egypt's liberal-secularoid Westernizing tradition once articulated by his old al-Jaridah, al-Sufur, al-Siyasah friends (Lutfi, Taha, Haykal et al) and (b) newer Arab Marxist left-Westernizers. By the end of the Second World War he had turned his back irrevocably on all European-Western ideologies and social systems. All man-made systems, he wrote in 1950, had now proven "nothing but a rainless cloud and a deceptive mirage". While "destructive" modern ideological sects incited revolution and unrest or divided states with devastating wars, Islam's God-bestowed "complete code" could regulate and harmonize the affairs of the individual and collective for every race and every age, in every land. "All their social ideologies have failed" he assessed in 1946: the only means Westerners now had to renew their devastated societies and restore peace in their international relations was to test features from Islam's ideology --- since the dislike they had inherited from medieval Europe's priests ruled out their embracing Islam proper. (While reversing the roles of the Western and Muslim parties, al-Zayyat here

maintained a remnant of the central attitude of the acculturated intellectuals that a civilization could slice techniques and components off another and absorb them without having to accept the core belief system or structure of the other Western entity: he still, here — like 'Azzam B 228-9 — covertly held open further narrowed borrowing from the West).

The Azharite 49 al-Zayyat was steeped in the full range of the writings of the classical Arabs, much more so than many acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals: yet he was representative of them. Like Mustafa Kamil and his student-professional colleagues so long before, al-Zayyat in the first hopeful phase, because of his Western culture component, took the liberal political principles implemented inside European states seriously: he hoped that the Egyptians/Arabs could persuade at least some of those parliamentarist states to impose those principles in the Middle East, and end colonialism, establishing a new order.

49. Whereas his Azhar class-mate and life-long friend Taha long tried to constrict al-Azhar's roles in Egyptian education and public life, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat strove to reform it into an element that could "lead" "the renaissance of the East" within modernity. al-Zayyat threw al-Risalah's support behind a group of young lecturers and students at al-Azhar, including (a) Mahmud Shaltut, its future rector under 'Abd al-Nasir, and (b) Muhammad al-Bahiyy. Such "youth of al-Maraghi" had broken with the mosque-university's uncritical transmission of tradition to apply Islam as "the religion and law of this age". In his drive to eliminate inauthentic religious accretions, "the holy falsehoods" (al-abatil al-muqaddasa), al-Zayyat was fighting for the then almost aborted reform-Azhar tradition of Muhammad 'Abduh. "Hal Inba'ath al-Azhar?" (Is al-Azhar Reviving [at Last]?), al-Risalah 28 April 1941; Wahy v. 2 pp. 274-7. In supporting the reformative efforts of Rector al-Maraghi, al-Zayyat made bitter attacks on al-Azhar's use of post-classical works written by non-Arabs that introduced religious "heresies" and un-Arabness of speech (al-ujmah: cf. B 96-7 and B 185-6). "Fi Sabil al-Azhar al-Jadid" (In the Cause of the New Azhar), 22 April 1940; Wahy v. 2 pp. 184-5. al-Zayyat demanded that al-Azhar return to the early religious and rhetorical texts of Arab-led classical Islam such as grammatical writings of Sibawayh (Abu Bishr 'Amr Ibn 'Uthman) (ibid) who, interestingly, was both born (c. 760 at al-Bayda) and died (c. 793 at Shiraz) in Persia, outside the Arab homeland. Cf. "Hadd Hasim li-Mushkilat al-Azhar" (A Decisive Solution to the Problem of al-Azhar), penned 4 April 1946; Wahy v. 3 pp. 65-8; "Islah al-Azhar Bayna Du'atihi wa Ubatihi" (The Reform of al-Azhar: the Views of its Advocates and Opponents), written 6 May 1946; Wahy v. 3 pp. 69-73.
of international relations founded upon reciprocal sovereignty. The disappointment of this acculturated outreach to the West fueled his and his peers' return to the traditional Muslim sense of two cohesive warring religious blocs in international relations. Britain was Egypt's overlord but the diversity of Western languages and literatures in Egyptian acculturation made the intellectuals view even Britain through the prisms of parallel supremacisms in France and other Western states as well: there was one malevolent Christian Western camp and there had to be one indigenous Arab-Muslim camp to beat it off.

**Classical Arab Motifs and the Contemporary Community**

Language matters were the field in which, for al-Zayyat, the corpus of classical Arab works could veto non-normative change in the most detailed way. The prescriptions of the Revealed Qur'an --- but also delusory or anachronistic images that classical Arab authors had propagated of their ummah's political and sectarian history --- could also clamp down limits to the range of social changes that he could countenance. When more of the heterogeneity of the classical past was intact and accepted, his responses to modernity and the definition of the contemporary Arab successor-community could become more nuanced and open.

al-Zayyat's rejection of Communism instanced the topically Islamist political functions that his images from classical authors could assume. Communism, he raged in 1950, openly denied the God of Islam on the ground that verses of its revealed Qur'an legitimized social and economic inequalities --- and prescribed private property, individual inheritance and religious bequests (waqf) and had bound woman with marriage. This 1950 refutation of Communism as it now penetrated workers and the...

50. Anwar 'Abd al-Malik traced (1968) how after World War II the factionalized Egyptian Communists supported the Wafd in the 1950 General Election and reached the urban working classes through trade unions and the National Popular University. "Anouar Abdel-Malek", *Egypt, Military Society: the Army Regime, the Left*
countryside\textsuperscript{50}, defended specific passages of the Qur'an that 'Iraqi or Egyptian Communists denounced. But he also characterized the modern Communists' assaults on private property, sexual morality, the family and nationality as no new phenomenon but a renewal of the attempts by "the vicious sects" of Mazdak and of Babak al-Khurrami and -- stemming from Isma'ili Islam -- Abdullah Ibn Maymun, the Qaramitah (Carmatians) and later the Shaykh of the Mountain, al-Hasan al-Sabbah, to destroy Islam and communize property and women\textsuperscript{51}. Babak al-Khurrami's anti-Islamic insurgency in Azerbayjan had been a threat to the 'Abbasids before al-Mu'tasim executed him in 838; the originally Isma'ilism-inspired Carmatians had devastated many great Arab cities\textsuperscript{52}. The books of the classical Arabs

and Social Change Under Nasser tds Charles Markmann (New York: Random Books 1968) pp. 29-31. Botman (1988) characterizes that Egypt's Marxists prior to 1952 "could not penetrate the countryside" and never "found a language in which to speak to the population of Egypt, nor the policies to attract more than a small number of committed activists". Selma Botman, The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press 1988) pp. 150, 156. However, al-Zayyat imagined that the illiterate or semi-illiterate peasants of his home village were fuming on the stone bench at acts of deception and exploitation by a landowning 'Alid prince and by a landlord elected to parliament on unkept promises. They toyed with Communism as liberation from such. al-Zayyat warned them that Communism does not, as it promised, provide people with land, or freedom, and creates equality only in the sense of reducing all to a common enslavement and poverty. It impoverishes the rich man by confiscating his property but does not give to the tenant the land it confiscated from the rich. The farmer becomes an exploited wage-laborer of the state. "This is apart", al-Zayyat warned his peasant listeners, "from (Communism's) disbelief in the religion that God has chosen for you and that its awards to all the enjoyment of that wife whom the religious law (\textsuperscript{1}sharia') linked to you". "al-Shuyu'iyyah 'alal-Mistabah" (Communism on the Village Stone-Bench) written for al-Risalah on 27 March 1950; Wahy v. 3, pp. 293-4.

51. "al-Islam wal-Madhahib al-Haddamah" (Islam and the Destructive Ideologies) written for al-Risalah on 13 March 1950; Wahy v. 3, p. 188. al-Zayyat mentioned specific Qur'anic verses that he said Communists cited as proof that Islam validated property-holding classes at the expense of the poor: Surat al-Nahl, ayat 71, "wallahu faddala ba'dakum 'ala ba'din fir-rizq" (and God has preferred some of you over others in livelihood) and the idea of God having raised some humans above others in degrees (\textsuperscript{2}darajat) described as "to try you in that which he [God] gave you" in al-An'am, ayat 165. This may have been al-Zayyat's memory of some private exchange that he had with some 'Iraqi or Egyptian communist or of some article. Cf. Haykal's application of \textsuperscript{3}darajat B 140 fn. 3.

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were as real to the Azhar-graduate al-Zayyat as the century in which he lived: he applied classical denunciations of non-Islamic and Shi'ite insurgencies by the historian of religious and philosophic sects al-Shahristani (1089 - 1153) and by Ibn Taymiyyah (1263 - 1328) to apprehend the new challenge from Soviet Communism. However, the pan-Islamic tradition in Egypt further encouraged al-Zayyat to connect old and new threats. His assumptions that sexual license was the main inducement that those old sects used to attract followers, and that modern European socialists, communists and anarchists carried forward their endeavors, closely paralleled Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's 1881 Refutation of the Materialists which Muhammad 'Abduh had translated into Arabic. There was a net of pan-Islamic and pan-Arab authors who over generations built up and reinforced stock motifs from the great classical Arab-Islamic past within perception of modernity and

52. Mazdakism, a dualistic religion with Communistic practices founded in pre-Islamic Iran by Zaradust-Khuragam became prominent in the late fifth century under Mazdak-i-Bamdad. The sect converted King Kavadh (488-531); it survived into Islamic times. Babak al-Khurrami imparted new vigor in Adharbayjan to the Khurrami insurgent religious and social-protest movement derived partly from Mazdakism: he was executed by the Caliph al-Mu'tasim in 838. Hasan al-Sabbah (died 1124) was the first da'i of the Shi'ite Isma'ilis at Alamut during the Crusades. Isma'ilid Qarmati leader Abu Tahir Sulayman devastated al-Basrah and al-Kufah and attacked Makkah in 317/930 in order to destroy it as a place of pilgrimage: he carried off the Black Stone. Jeremy Salt, "Military Exploits of the Qaramitah" Abr Nahrain v. 17: 1976-1977 pp. 43-51; art. "al-Djannabi" El 2; art. "Karmati" El 2.

53. These two classical sources were suggested by Dr Nasih Ahmad Mirza of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Melbourne.

54. In the Refutation al-Afghani depicted Europe's Socialists, Communists and Nihilists as successors of the hedonist-materialistic "naturism" of Mazdak and the batini (esoteric) Isma'ili movement; he mentioned the Alamut period without naming Hasan al-Sabbah. al-Afghani, like al-Zayyat, stressed the sexual permissiveness of the movements he attacked. "The Truth About the Neicheri Sect" in Nickie R. Keddie An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968) pp. 155-7, 160. al-Afghani was specifically talking about the incapacity of the classical Muslim community to maintain political sovereignty over the areas conquered by the early Muslims, to beat off attacks by infidel Mongols, Crusaders etc, when subversive sects within Islam's borders stabbed from behind.
topical international relations: it orientated al-Zayyat from youth and he then contributed in his turn. (al-Afgani had in the first place recycled the old Sunni Muslim defamations of insurgent Ismai'ilism mainly to smear Muslim liberal modernists who collaborated or might collaborate with the British imperialists in India).

Thus, Islam and the linked indigenous Arab golden age, especially together, could clamp down real restrictions on acceptance of novel, radical ideologies from the West. Yet, sometimes the motifs from the classical Arabs functioned more like a language than a structuring ideology: lacking hard-and-fast meanings, they could be applied to damn or praise very different modern phenomena. Still, in using that old language, al-Zayyat reevoked a classical Arab past and his and his readers' continuity with it, within novel modern situations.

al-Zayyat identified the survival of nationality with (a) the transmission of the whole literature of the classical "Arabs" and (b) use in modernity of an extension of their language that would keep their literature intelligible. But his classical Arab past itself prescribed not a self-contained Arabic literature but one that would incorporate Western works: this would always require at least an acculturated Arab elite to translate. His 1945 proposal for an extensively-staffed Institute or Dar for the systematic translation of masterpieces of world (immediately, Western) literature into Arabic contributed to the development of the unitary Arab national identification in Egypt: in it he so completely identified --- even racially --- with a larger Arab entity stretching across West Asia, into the Sudan and across North Africa to Morocco, and historically into Spain. To the objection that it was impractical to launch an institute for translation when the Education Ministry did not have the necessary 200 skilled translators, al-Zayyat replied in terms of both the present and classical history of the Arabs. The condition of the largely "ignorant nation" was particularly shameful since "our fathers were the ones who taught the world". al-Zayyat cannot mean the ancient
Pharaonic Egyptians here: he cited the position that "the Arabs" won for "our language" in Spain "in the days when we were the masters of Andalusia". A Christian priest in Cordova then bitterly described the popularity of the Arabic language and its high literature among Christian Spanish youths, who had almost ceased to read Christian scripture and refused to read a Latin book when offered on the grounds that "the benefit from reading [them] does not equal the effort involved". Language development here thus fused the modern Egyptians into a far-flung unitary Arab nation that had on its Western margin ruled Spain for a period. Although he was basically mobilizing the Egyptian public and politicians, outside Arabs had already responded to his proposal, "contributing their own ideas"; if 200 competent translators from European languages could not be mustered within Egypt the deficiency might be met with "translators from among our Arab brothers, since the scientific [educational] aim is the same [common] and cultural cooperation is already underway" between the Arab lands. The new League of Arab States could bear some costs to employ translators. Within al-Zayyat's thought-frame, then, all issues of elite literary and intellectual culture --- even the technical tasks of modernizing Arabic and incorporation of Western works into it --- strengthened the pan-Arab community-identification whether as imaged

55. "Dar al-Tarjamah Aydan: La, Hadhal-Tariq La Yu'addi" (The Institute for Translation Again: No! This Course Will not Effect the Purpose), 4 June 1945; Wahy v. 3, pp. 45-6. al-Zayyat was quoting Alvaro, Bishop of Cordova, as quoted by R. Dozy in his Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne Jusqu'a la conquete de l'Andalousie par les Almoravides (711-1110), Leyden 1861, v. 2, p. 103 seq. Alvaro's statement had passed through several languages by the time that al-Zayyat offered his compressed, free translation from the French version of Dozy's history; a more accurate and fuller version of the Bishop's lament at the preoccupation of "all young Christians of conspicuous talents" with "the language and writings of the Arabs" may be found in Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs pp. 414-5. For the implacable Alvaro's own admiration for the "elegant facility" and grandeur of the Qur'an, Gustave Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation (University of Chicago Press 1953) p. 99.

56. "Dar al-Tarjamah Aydan" (The Translation Institute Again), op. cit pp. 42, 44.
classical past, or by multiplying the new integrative joint endeavors.

al-Zayyat left no doubt that Western literature in the modern age has a universal vitality even for those born within radically separate religious groups or civilizations. Arabic, today significant as the language of a specific classical heritage, stands outside the ongoing creative modernity of which European languages are the medium. The youth of the Arab countries in quest of living "literature, science, philosophy or sociology" stand vis-a-vis the tongues and literature of the West in the same relation in which enterprising Christian youth of Arab-occupied Spain stood to the Arabic language: Arabic in the modern world, like Latin in the Europe of the dark ages, is a language of classical and religious heritage that has become static and uncreative. al-Zayyat was not tied up in knots over the comparative statuses of Arabic and Western literatures despite the context of Western imperial supremacism in which he wrote. For him, classical Islam's Arab golden age underscored that exchanges and borrowings between literatures and languages --- even from very different religious zones of the globe --- was a condition in all cultural creativity anywhere. His translations Institute proposal was nothing new, but "the method of yesterday" followed by "our most ancient forefathers when they translated the sciences of the Greeks, Indians, Jews, Syriac-speakers, and Persians"; he elsewhere specified the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun. The literature, thought and science developed under classical Islam thus were regarded by al-Zayyat as having derived important elements from civilizations of the Greeks,

57. Ibid pp. 41, 45-46.
58. "Nuridu Daran lil-Tarjamah Ya Ma'ali l-Wazir" (We Desire an Institute for Translation, Mr Minister), 23 April 1945; Wahy v. 3, pp. 38-40. al-Ma'mun (786-833 AD), the seventh 'Abbasid Caliph, encouraged naturalization of Greek thought in Islam, notably through his academy for translation of Greek philosophical and scientific works, the Bayt al-Hikmah. It is to be noted that the translators attached to the Bayt al-Hikmah were most often Christians. al-Zayyat compared al-Ma'mun to Pericles, Augustus and Louis XIV. Ibid p. 38.
Indians or Persians outside not simply Islam but even outside still somewhat related Jewish or Christian "monotheistic" traditions. His proposal for the translation of the modern West's creative literature was, however, far more wide-sweeping than the very limited translations effected by the classical Arabs. These had included scientific and philosophic works, and some Indian stories and overviews of pagan Greek and Hindu religious thought, but not the poetry, dramas or epics of Greece. al-Zayyat's new pan-Arab community would be aesthetically less self-contained than the classical Arabs.59

Neo-Classicism Fosters Modern Plural Community?

Liberal by native temperament, al-Zayyat responded to a diversity of literature, life-styles and beliefs in the classical Arab states that narrower Islamist ideologues would have refused to register at all. Classical Arab culture could now validate in the twentieth century a varied and plural pan-Arab successor-community appropriate for the far-flung, heterogeneous, Arab world of his era.

al-Zayyat's articles in al-Risalah left his Egyptian and other Arab readers in no doubt that the official Islamic ideology of classical Arab states only from time to time restricted the attitudes to life that authors voiced. Thus, a certain ambivalence tinged his responses to the "licentious literature" (adab al-mujun) of some eminent poets among the classical Arabs. Ideologically, al-Zayyat expressed the wish that religious "conscience" prick authors to avoid "indecency" in their work. Accordingly, he voiced no objection to the Caliph al-Mahdi's command

59. The cultivation of Greek logic by the Arabs fostered method and order in all branches of Arab learning such as grammar, theology, geography. The Arabs extended the Greek sciences. But, since they had derived their access to Greek works so much from Syriac translations, the Arabs "never came into contact with Greek literature as a whole", and remained ignorant of its intellectual and aesthetic qualities in poetry, drama and belles-lettres.

H.A.R. Gibb, Arabic Literature: An Introduction 2nd ed. (London: OUP 1963) pp. 49-50. The efforts of al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd and, to some extent, Qudamah Ibn Ja'far to transfer the categories of Greek literary criticism into Arabic criticism failed because the two literatures were too different. Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam pp. 325-6.
that Bashshar Ibn Burd be whipped to death. The racially non-Arab Bashshar (died c. 784 A.D.) is placed outside Islam by a quotation from Malik Ibn Dinar: "Nothing more led the people of this city [Baghdad] to fornication than the poems of that blind atheist". al-Zayyat also endorsed the Caliph al-Amin's imprisonments of Abu Nuwas for indecency in his poetry. Such literary criticism by al-Zayyat placed him between (a) a fundamentalist stance to the great Islamic past and (b) his friend Taha Husayn, who from 1922 had painted 'Abbasid 'Iraq as virtually a pagan state, society and culture that now would validate secularist, Westernizing Egyptian urban society (B 113-7). al-Zayyat regarded the official Islamic ideology of the ruling 'Abbasids as more serious than that: its guidelines had sometimes channelled cultural expression. Yet, he had little enthusiasm for the application of classical Muslim penalties, like al-Siyyasah modernists regarding moral aberrations as deep-seated in human nature: he clearly respected Bashshar and Abu Nuwas as great poets.

The great diversity of sects, beliefs, social attitudes and lifestyles imaged by classical Arab authors, in the twentieth century offered something to attract liberal Islamists, religious Christians, secularist Muslims and Christians, and social conservatives and social radicals. The negotiations for the formation of the loose Arab League confederation between Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, 'Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, then nearing

60. "Adab al-Ladhndhati wa Adab al-Mujun" (Literature Meant to Entertain and Licentious Literature), penned 29 May 1950; Wahy v. 3 pp. 199-205. Typically of al-Zayyat, this essay was dual-cultured: the example of Augustus in exiling Ovid for penning the Ars amatoria, on the art of seduction, confirmed the right of Islamic rulers to censor and repress authors who became too irreverent or voluptuous. Ibid p. 202. al-Zayyat maintained his matter-of-fact attitude to explicit literature up to his death. When questioned by al-Adab (Bayrut) in 1960 about new writing in the West and in Arabic devoted to sexual experience, he accepted its title to be categorised as literature: short stories, novels and poetry had to examine sex, because it was a basis of life like bread. But he still preferred a "muted" or "reticent" literature (al-adab al-malfuf) that would refine rather than lower or provoke instincts and emotions. Faruq Shushah, "Ma'al-Udaba': Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat", reprinted al-Ra'id (Hayfa) March 1961 p. 231.
completion, were described by al-Zayyat as inspired by "the common language" and specifically such cultural activities as the inter-Arab "Conference of Physicians, the Conference of Lawyers, the Festival of Abul-'Ala [al-Ma'arri], the Conference of Arab Women". al-Zayyat himself left Egypt to attend the pan-Arab millenary of Abul-'Ala al-Ma'arri (973 - 1057) in Syria. For that Festival, given all its pan-Arab cultural and political dimensions, al-Zayyat prepared himself seriously, steeping himself from the quiet of his country residence for over two months in the blind Syrian's poetic and prose works. He considered al-Ma'arri, despite his probable atheism, among "the geniuses of thought" so few that they could be counted on the fingers of one hand from the time of Adam. al-Ma'arri's world-denying asceticism and reclusive retreat from a corrupted urban life spoke to al-Zayyat's own Islamist rejection of the disintegration of community and sexual morality in the modernizing Egypt in which he lived. Egypt's unprecedented crisis stemmed from "the original natures" of human beings: correction "could only be the work of God alone".

Here again, then, the classical Arab past provided motifs for analysis of contemporary social realities in Egypt in the period of the Arab-Islamic high-tide. That many of the classical Arabic authors had not been in harmony with Islamic criteria also orientated Egyptian writers to now coexist with counter-ideologies and counter-life-styles within the pan-Arab community solidifying in the 1930s and 1940s. The communist intellectuals in the Fertile Crescent highlighted al-Ma'arri because his work was indigenous, pan-Arab and

61. "Tabashir al-Jami'at al-'Arabiyyah" (Auspicious Omens for the Arab League) written January 1945; Wahy v. 3 p. 9. Cf. "Abul-'Ala' al-Ma'arri bi-Munasabati 'Idihil-Alfi" (Abul-'Ala' al-Ma'arri on the Occasion of his Millenary), al-Risalah, 27 March 1944; Wahy v. 2, p. 389. For al-Zayyat's admiration of al-Ma'arri's predilection for "the extinct features of the language" which effectively confined the audience of his poems to his immediate students see ibid pp. 390-1.
62. "Ba'd al-I'tikaf" (After Self-Seclusion), penned 11 December 1944; Wahy v. 3 p. 5.
classicist but did not nourish the theocratic Christian-particularist and Islamist movements sprouting amidst the still West-attuned Arabo-Islamic identifications of the 1930s and 1940s. The non-religious or on occasion anti-Islamic sectors of classical Arab culture were thus common ground upon which such Arabo-Islamic intellectuals as al-Zayyat would encounter and interact with a very wide variety of pan-Arab intellectual elites: these extended from socially conservative but in literary style neo-classicist Lebanese Catholic clergy to Marxist writers who fancied that they were about to trigger a social transformation in the Middle East. As editor of al-Risalah, al-Zayyat was prepared to publish Marxoid writers in line with his policy that his journal should be an open forum. One such contributor was Isma'il Ahmad Adham, an Alexandria-resident Russo-Turk. A corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Adham published in Arabic atheistical, scientific-materialist, studies of Islamic subjects. However much al-Zayyat disapproved of

63. al-Ma'arri was crucial in the campaign by the Lebanese Communists to evoke indigenous roots for their Party's ideology. Dr George Hanna, on the occasion of al-Ma'arri week in Bayrut, stressed that poet's "doubt" and "sarcastic comments on people and the gods" (sic) and his founding of his philosophy on "reason alone". al-Ma'arri's "exaltation of rationality and his respect for matter" was fulfilled in modern science: he inspired the Lebanese youth who celebrated him to end "sectarianism, oppression of women, and isolation" (the religious Maronite particularists). "al-Duktur Jurj Hanna: al-Tawjih al-Fikri fi Siyasat al-'Ahd al-Jadid" (Dr George Hanna: Ideological Direction in the Policy of the New Era). Sawt al-Sha'b 4 April 1944 pp. 1-2. Hanna by 1959 endorsed Islam for taking the Arabs from peninsular tribalism to a wide social life, including with Christians in their empire: this was the precondition for modern Arab nationalism led by Nasser's "revolution": Kemal H. Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Praeger 1968) p. 63-5. The Jesuit-founded pro-French al-Bashir, a forum for Maronite forces opposed to the sect's opening to Arab nationalism, closely followed the promotion of study and discussion of al-Ma'arri by Syrian politicians under the Mandate. On plans to establish a library alongside a mausoleum at al-Ma'arrah: "Darih Abil-'Ala' wa Mablagh Nafaqatihi" (Abul-'Ala's Mausoleum and the Estimate of its Expenditures) al-Bashir 24 November 1939 p. 3. The French tried to leapfrog aboard the band-wagon: "Maktabat Abil-'Ala' fil-Ma'arrah Tahtamnu biha al-Mufawwadiyyat al-'Ulya wa Tujahhizuha bil-Kutub al-Lazimah" (The [French] High Commission Takes Interest in the Abul-'Ala' al-Ma'arri Library and Provides it With the Necessary Books), al-Bashir 11 December 1939 p. 3.
"the Communist mentality of the Russians", he admired the courage and self-denial with which the penurious Adham maintained his analysis, so unpopular in Egypt, when he could have made a good living, as many money-grubbing Egyptian writers did, by feigning minimal religious beliefs when he penned his studies of Islam and Islamic history.

Islam and Islamic features of the indigenous golden past influenced al-Zayyat to restrict the modern Pan-Arab community to Muslims while, conversely, his aestheticism, his joy in beautiful high Arabic for itself, whatever it was expressing, in various ways could admit Christian, secularist and Marxist Arabs --- as could his respect for any intelligent view about that past. He registered enough diversity of thought and life-styles among classical Arabo-Islamic litterateurs to prefigure integration of the very diverse, far-flung Arab world of his own modern age.

The Assault on Pharaonism

In late 1933, amid sharpening disagreement among Egyptian intellectuals over how much scope things Pharaonic now could have in Egypt's high culture and political identity, al-Zayyat published in al-Risalah an article titled "[Neo-] Pharaonists and Arabs". In it, he ruled out any role for images of a Pharaonic past in the creative literature, art or collective community identifications of Arab Egyptians: the modern Egyptians were Arabs with no connexion to ancient pagan Egypt that mattered now. al-Zayyat affirmed that the culture founded by the classical Arabs was still and would remain the pervasive living culture of modern Arabic-speaking Egypt and its sole "living past". Religious abhorrence dovetailed into his social critique of the Pharaohs' monarchical despotism and exploitation of subordinated classes: the pagan religion and priesthood taught mindless obedience to the king and the governing class. Addressing al-Risalah's small, select audience of Egyptians dedicated to high literature, al-Zayyat mounted a practical argument that all significant

64. al-Zayyat, Nihayatu Adib (A Writer's End), written 5 August 1940; Wahy v. 2 pp. 216-9.
ancient Egyptian literature had been irrevocably destroyed by time and that materials were therefore lacking for any revival of the Pharaonic "spirit" in Arab Egypt as "a basis for our contemporary culture". Now in 1933, language, but especially the homogenizing literary norm of high literature, determined to what nationality individuals and populations belong: it overrode racial ancestries or lands of residence. For al-Zayyat in 1933, the classical Arabs had conquered permanently in culture also: they had erased the preexisting languages and identities, irreversibly substituting their own Arabic and the literature and historical memories that were its content as the indigenous culture of their provinces: "Islamic Egypt can never be anything else than a chapter in the book of Arab glory, for it can find no nourishment for its vitality nor any support for its strength nor any foundation for its culture other than the mission/message of the Arabs (risalat al-'Arab)".65

al-Zayyat elsewhere was sharply aware of transmission of the memory of the classical Arabs in less literate, pietistic popular settings in Egypt.66 However, his 1933 denunciation of neo-Pharaonism was very literary both in the high culturist facets of nationality he chose for analysis and in addressing a tiny group of

65. "Fir'awniyyuna wa 'Arab" (Pharaohists and Arabs), written for al-Risalah, on 1 October 1933; Wahy v. 1 pp. 49-52.
66. al-Zayyat in 1935 feared that radio was taking away the audiences that popular epics about classical Arabs had commanded among the uneducated in such traditional quarters of Cairo as al-Husayniyyah. He associated this "purely Arab culture" with pietistic observance of the fasting-month of Ramadan, neglected in Westernized, mechanized, materialistic Western Cairo. Among epics recited by the dwindling number of traditional coffee-house poets, al-Zayyat mentioned that on the pre-Islamic black Arabian 'Antarah, of the pre-Islamic Yemenite Sayf Ibn Dhi Yazan and that of Abu Zayd al-Hilali. He also associated this fading immemorial Arabist popular culture with specific Egyptian focii in pan-Arab history: Cairo's old ultra-Arab quarters had maintained continuity with the Fatimids (he mentioned al-Mu'izz li-Din Allah, founder of the dynasty's power in Egypt); the "scent" of the Fatimids still pervaded Eastern Cairo. "al-Radiyu wal-Sha'ir" (The Radio and the [Coffee-House] Poet), written for al-Risalah, on 30 December 1934; Wahy v. 1, pp. 173-5. For analysis of how the Abu Zayd al-Hilali cycle developed within popular Egyptian culture and life, see A. H. Yunus, al-Hilaliyyah fil-Ta'rikh wal-Adab al-Sha'bi (Cairo: 1956).
West-acculturated intellectuals with little regard even to other cultural elites such as the Azharites. al-Zayyat dismissed Pharaonism as a phantom conjured up by a tiny literary clique but he was really striving to convert that clique --- which was his own preferred clique --- into a vanguard of his own Arab orientation. An unrepresentative handful ("two or three") of Egypt's publicists (kuttabanal-suhufiyyna) had declared Egypt Pharaonic: their prolific articles finally were convincing "the cousins" in Syria and 'Iraq that "Egypt, head of the Arab Lands, had turned (its) minarets into obelisks, its mosques and churches into temples and its 'ulama into a pagan priesthood". al-Zayyat was writing in a context of ill-tempered exchanges between Egyptian and Syrian and 'Iraqi writers inflamed by an article in Kawkab al-Sharg, edited by Taha Husayn at the time, that had called Menes greater than Ya'rub, the putative forefather of the Arabians. Admirers of Taha in other Arab countries, however, rightly pointed out that there was little Pharaonic content in his works, that had long recreated the classical Arabs.

67. al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyyuna wa 'Arab".
68. In a 1933 editorial titled "MISR" (Egypt), Taha in his newspaper Kawkab al-Sharg discussed a local political matter: he, however, absent-mindedly mentioned the Arabs in a list of foreign invaders who had cumulatively weakened Egypt. His young disciple Muhammad Subayh 'Abd al-Qadir retorted to denouncing West Asian Arab ideologues that if Ya'rub was great, then Pharaoh Mina (Menes) was greater. Taha's attitude to this controversy that he had inadvertently sparked was flippant, mischievous and ideologically uninvolved throughout. Rafa'il Batti, "Min Kabir Suhufiyiyil-'Iraq Ila MISR" (From the Dean of 'Iraq's Journalists to Egypt), MISR al-Fatat 28 July 1938 p. 10; Muhammad Subayh al-Qadir, "Ila-Baghdad Min al-Qahirah" (To Baghdad from Cairo), MISR al-Fatat 11 August 1938 pp. 10-11.
69. In a defence of Taha Husayn in Syria, the Syrian secularist Sami al-Kiyali, editor of the Aleppo al-Hadith, offered extracts from all the academic volumes in which Taha had conveyed the characteristics and civilization of the (classical) Arabs. Set beside these, Taha's passing remark about Ya'rub and Menes for a political article had no weight. al-Kiyali rather tellingly challenged the critics to collect even a page with genuinely neo-Pharaonist or neo-shu'ubi positions from all Taha's writings. Sami al-Kiyali, "Misru wal-'Arab" (Egypt and the Arabs), Kawkab al-Sharg 19 October 1933 p. 7. al-Kiyali with pitiless Darwinism called on the Arab populations who had shared the Ottoman experience to apply Ataturk's Westernizing revolution...
al-Zayyat in 1933 was determined to end the harm that Pharaonic self-identification was doing to two crucial levels of the pan-Arab nationality solidifying in Egypt: (a) contacts Egyptian writers and intellectuals were developing with parallel modern, educated elites in other Arab countries and (b) the drive to install extensions of the high language of the classical Arabs within modern life. The Islam-motivated al-Zayyat carefully dovetailed his argument that ancient Egypt was religiously irrelevant into modernist impatience with Pharaonic identifications mounting among secularist intellectuals. He also wove other criticisms of Pharaonic social structure into his religious rejection. Such eclecticism could heighten attitudes in the Qur'an with post-archeological Western perceptions of Pharaonic despotism; al-Zayyat's critique of inequality and oppression under the Pharaohs also chimed in with increased awareness of corruption, inequality and social breakdown in Egypt in the 1930s, and the opening of youth to radical Marxist and Fascist solutions. He argued in 1933 that a Pharaonic identification was impossible when the thirteen centuries of Arab history that defined modern Egypt "had cancelled everything before as the morning sun cancels out the enveloping darkness of night". If the Pharaonists were, hypothetically, able to obliterate Egypt's Arab spirit and past, then asked al-Zayyat rhetorically:

Would anything remain [of Egypt] except the shattered limbs left by the whip and the emaciated victims of oppression and ghosts of a band chanting the Book of the Dead and humbled foreheads prostrating to rocks [Idols] and tendering obedience to dumb animals and graves with golden bowels that have swallowed houses until earth was pressed up by their swelling, and mythological [superstitious] arts so pre-occupied with death that they forgot the world and denied life?

70. al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyyuna wa 'Arab". Learned and popularizing works of Western Egyptology were prepared in that period to transmit English and French literary stereotypes that the Pharaohs were despots who fused exploitation with religion. Budge in 1926 even reprinted Whyte-Melville's 1871 poem "The Cry of the Oppressed in Egypt": "Work --- it is thy mortal doom! --- / Pharaoh lives forever!". E.A.W. Budge, The Dwellers on the Nile
al-Zayyat's ironical reversal was mordant here: this dead, buried civilization was not getting bigger. His incomprehension of the worship of dumb animals reiterated a perpetual blockage in the Muslim Egyptian psyche: his colleague Muhammad Husayn Haykal in the 1920s had with ambivalences of his own tried to make his educated countrymen at least aesthetically accept the pagan Pharaonic calf-god Apis

al-Zayyat, then, imaged that the pagan Pharaonic religion mentally conditioned ordinary Egyptians to accept a highly unequal and oppressive social order: elsewhere he persistently attempted to relate Islam --- as a protest counter-"system" --- to socio-economic disparities in contemporary Egypt.

Death imagery expressed al-Zayyat's almost physical repulsion from pagan Egypt: the neo-Pharaonist particularists fight with Decay to wrest forth "decayed bones of the Pharaohs" from the graves. However, no line of cultural transmission has survived to convey products of any hypothetical Pharaonic literary-intellectual culture as a basis for Arab Egypt's new modern life. al-Zayyat, al-Azhar graduate and author of a multi-volume history of Arabic literature, placed much stress upon a continuity of formal literary culture, as the decisive factor transmitting the "spirit" of a given people to successive generations of a population. Any continuity of formal literature with the Pharaonic "remotest past" having been snapped, the generations of Egyptians since 'Amr Ibn al-'As's conquest have been incorporated into the Arab nationality that produced the formal literary culture they extend.

The above formulations pervasively equated ancient Pharaonic Egypt or its civilization with Pharaonic

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72. al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyuna wa 'Arab".
religion. It followed that the abandonment of that pagan religion robbed the Pharaonic civilization of its relevance and raison-d'être: ancient Egypt "passed away with the gods" because it was constituted of "scrolls of death the secret of which was lost with the passing of the priests". Thus, the survival of Pharaonic culture was interdependent with that of the religion it expressed.

al-Zayyat's argument that Egyptians changed nationality following the elimination of Pharaonic religion and intellectual culture was a telling point, but did not address continuities in lifestyle and attitudes to life that particularists argued modern Egyptians had with Pharaonic precursors 73.

al-Zayyat energetically denied that racial descent could define an individual's cultural-national community. Nationality is cultural. When we call someone an Arab or a Frenchman or a Turk we refer not to his race but to his having been stamped with the social characteristics of a given people "such as language and the literature and ethics and emotion [inclination or commitment --- al-hawa] and religion". al-Zayyat considered religion only in its broadest sense, without regard to sects, as among the cultural determinants of nationality that made the Calvinist-born Rousseau, in spite of his Swiss origin, a Frenchman --- or, in the Islamic world the protest Shi'ite "Mihyar an Arab although in origin he was Persian". For al-Zayyat, a person's nation is determined by the objective reality of the cultural-intellectual community in which he takes part, independent of his racial background or will: if the neo-Pharaonist particularists looked into the sources of their own thoughts, sensibility and inspiration "they would see the Arab spirit resplendent in their heart as religion, coursing in their blood as literature, flowing on their tongues as language, overflowing in their sentiments as [Arab] dignity" 74. His argument in 1933 that

73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. al-Zayyat had attuned his critique of Pharaonism to classical Arab cultural motifs --- here the figure and poetry of Mihyar al-Daylami --- which his neo-Pharaonist opponents used: cf. B 433-434.
use of Arabic as a literary language made people of Persian or other non-Arab racial origins in classical Islam Arabs reapplied al-Afghani's definition of Arabness in his 1883 reply to the anti-Semitic Renan. al-Nadim in the 1890s had applied this idea that nationality was conferred by the language of education or formal discourse and could change with a change of languages to the contemporary colonized Egypt of his time --- in order to galvanize resistance against the deculturizing foreigners (Ch.2).

The acculturated al-Zayyat tried in 1933 to make his Arab orientation fit in with economic modernization and Western elements: it was rather neo-Pharaonism that anachronistically clashed with these, he imaged. Applying the old pre-1914 West-derived utilitarianism of Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah to rule out Pharaonism, he argued that greater benefit (naf') to humanity made contributions from other nations preferable: "is not the dam" (constructed at Aswan by the British in 1902 and heightened the year before al-Zayyat wrote) "better than [the Pharaonic monuments at] al-Karnak and al-Azhar better than the pyramids and the Dar al-Kutub (Egypt's national library) more precious than the Egyptian Museum of Archaeological Relics?" The closing paragraph clinched the interweave of (a) religious Islamic and old literary Arab elements with (b) Western elements:

To sum it all up, our modern culture is based in its spirit on Islam and Christianity, and in its literature on Arab and Western literatures and in its science on purely European-originated modes of apprehension (qara'ih). As for the culture of the papyrus, no link connects it to Arab Egypt, either to its Muslims or to its Copts. 75.

Given that Salamah Musa and other post-traditional Coptic writers had woven celebration of a Pharaonic golden age into Coptic communalism, al-Zayyat here was anticipating objections from the Christian minority. He was wooing Westernizing modernists as well when he imaged how harmoniously modernity and culture from the West would blend with the linguistically semi-integral pan-Arab culture that he demanded. Yet al-Zayyat's own catholic

75. Ibid.
openness in 1933 to the intellectual achievements and high literatures of Europe was almost as generous as the holistic humanist Westernization of Taha Husayn --- his friend since late adolescence at al-Azhar. In denying that any Pharaonic culture had been transmitted to Arab Egypt, al-Zayyat challenged the Pharaonic particularists to declare whether they had "discovered" a single Pharaonic library recording a philosophy comparable to that of the Greeks or legislation like the law of the Romans or poetry like the poetry of the Arabs. This bracketed the West’s classical thought and law --- he mentioned its modern high literatures elsewhere --- with the literature of the classical Arabs that so fueled his pan-Arabism: all were essentials for Arab Egypt. The classical Arabs had appropriated Greek thought. In one essay he mingled the 'Abbasid poet Ibn al-Rumi's appreciation of a sunset with Phydias' sculptures, Raphael's paintings and a closing assessment of the relation between art and nature from Cicero.

In the early 1930s at least, al-Zayyat's Arabist de-Pharaonization fitted in well with the drive of humanists to naturalize the West's literatures and thought. In his circle, Taha Husayn had shortly before been angered when Tawfiq al-Hakim's call in al-Risalah for a neo-Pharaonist, ultra-Egyptianist "national literature" discouraged Egyptians from adopting Western literary genres and Western rationality. Since the Arab conquest, al-Hakim claimed, Egyptians had been in "a semi-coma", their authentic Pharaonic cultural personality nearly "asphyxiated" by the literature of the classical Arabs. al-Hakim equated the classical Arabs and the somewhat more creative classical Greeks --- and thus the modern Western "humanist" and rationalist thought and literature descended from theirs --- as both "materialist". Arabic-speaking Egyptians had to inject Pharaonic concern for the spiritual and eternal and ancient Pharaonic literary patterns into their new national literature to achieve partial

76. Ibid.
77. "Fil-Jamal" (On Beauty), Wahy v. 1 pp. 10, 13.
"independence" from Arab and Greek-Western "intellectual logic", blinkered this-worldness, and Arab and Western literary models (al-Hakim condemned Valery's "acquired Graecism"). For al-Hakim, the logic of Socrates had ended forever any potentiality that those in the Western tradition could apprehend transcendent and eternal reality. In July 1933, Taha Husayn in reply defended both the Greeks and the "Greek-like" classical Arabs, architects of his two cultures, and ruled out installation of any Pharaonic element in Egypt's modern Arabic literature. This reply furnished themes that al-Zayyat fired in his own assault on neo-Pharaonism three months later. Taha energetically argued against al-Hakim's stereotypes the high spirituality achieved by Socrates and Plato: three months later, al-Zayyat challenged the neo-Pharaonists to produce an ancient Pharaonic philosophy equal to that of the Greeks. Taha argued that Egypt's emerging Arabic literature could not be given Pharaonic content because no "intellectual civilization" or substantial literature deserving the name had survived from Pharaonic Egypt: thus, no basis had been transmitted for "very many of these judgements that literary figures, poets and people in the arts so copiously pronounce on the mentality of the ancient Egyptians and their spiritualism". Three months on, al-Zayyat challenged the neo-Pharaonists to produce an intact Pharaonic library needed as the basis for a genuine neo-Pharaonic literature in Arabic. Taha dismissed the neo-Pharaonist de-Arabizing impulse as predoomed as "the Arab element comes to us [Egyptians] from the language, the religion and the civilization". For al-Zayyat, however, Islam was revealed from God; in contrast, Taha characterized it fondly as "the Arab religion", a human culture that the Arabians had brought from the Arabian peninsula, but which became Egypt's indigenous culture. Taha, like al-Zayyat, was

78. "Ilal-Duktur Taha Husayn min al-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim" (To Dr Taha Husayn from the Scholar Tawfiq al-Hakim), al-Risalah 1 June 1933 pp. 5-8.
committed to the literature of the classical Arabs as a central component both in his personality and for Egypt, one however, that he subordinated to his more integral European culture and secularism. For Taha, non-Egyptian classical Arabs had to massively flow over in idioms and vocabulary into modernity and new Arabic literature that would be West-patterned in structure/genres and much of its content.

The ferment in identity concepts among fellow liberal intellectuals offered many motifs to al-Zayyat when he assailed neo-Pharaonism in 1933 --- the Westernizer Muhammad Kamil Mustafa, too, pragmatically ruled out any Pharaonic identification because ancient paganism would always be abhorrent to urban monotheistic Muslim, Christian and Jewish Egyptians. al-Zayyat was, however, ahead of the period in the thorough-going character of his Arabo-Islamic repudiation of any link. His radicalism was instanced in his indifference to whether the ancient Arabians and ancient Egyptians were racially connected. From the turn-of-the-century, the early Muslim Egyptologist Ahmad Kamal (d. 1923) had impressed upon educated Egyptians that the populations of Arabia originated from the colonization of the peninsula from Egypt, that "the Arabic language and the ancient Egyptian language were from one origin," and that the ancient Egyptians were monotheists. His son Dr. Hasan Kamal developed this theme of both racial and linguistic kinship in the 1930s as the tide of Arab-Islamic reaction rose. Dr. Hasan as Egyptian

80. Ibid passim; al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyya wa 'Arab" passim.
81. Muhammad Kamil Mustafa, "La Fir'awniyyah wa La 'Arabiyyah" (Neither Pharaonic nor Arab), Kawkab al-Sharg 1 October 1933 p. 3. Since al-Zayyat wrote his assault on Pharaonists on that day, he may have read and had Mustafa Kamil's article in mind.
82. A general account of Ahmad Pasha Kamal's life and role, including his lecturing at the (old) Egyptian University when it opened in 1908 and at other tertiary bodies like the Teacher's College (Madrasat al-Mu'allim) and a list of his French and Arabic books was given by "N. Y." (Antun Zakari) in his Ta'rikh Tutankhamun, Muharrir Misr al-Azim (Cairo: Maktabat Zaydan al-'Umumiyyah, nd --- 1926?), pp. 278-281. His thesis that ancient Egyptian was a Semitoid language was ridiculed by Jurji Subhi, "Nushu' al-Lughat al-Misriyyah al-Cadimah" (The Birth of the Ancient Egyptian Language), al-Mugtataf, December 1923, pp. 336-7, 339, 340.
government Director of Village Health Publicity and just back from Mecca, argued in al-Muqtataf in 1939 that the Egyptians had originally come to Egypt from the Arabian peninsula via Bab al-Mandab and the Sudan before the Pharaohs and that (as he quoted his father) the populations of all "the lands that now speak Arabic" had one common origin in pre-history. Such pan-Arab politicians as 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam (Muslim) and Makram 'Ubayd (Protestantized Copt) in the 1930s and 1940s argued the racial kinship of Arabians and Pharaonic Egyptians in antiquity to project the political community of modern Arab States under construction on the basis of religion and the language, backwards to the furthest origins of Egypt's population. Arabization of Pharaonic antiquity became a bandwagon in the 1930s: in the Ministry of Health, Hasan Kamal's colleague Dr 'Ali Bey Shushah gave lectures about Arabian-Pharaonite blood-relatedness: Kamal urged him to undertake a "scientific" analysis of the bloods of a sampling of Egyptians and Arabians\(^{83}\). But in 1933 al-Zayyat refused to soften the antithesis between modern Arab and ancient Pharaonic Egypt. "We do not want to use in argument against them [the Pharaonic publicists] what modern scholars have reported, that is to say that pagan Egyptianity" [or "the pagan Egyptian language"] has some racial relation to pagan Arabia [or "Arabic of the pre-Islamic period"] (annal-misriyyat al-jahiliyyah tanzi'ubiti-'irgin ilal-'Arabiyyat al-jahiliyyah\(^{84}\)). Such propositions would require time-consuming documentation "and the debate would not end there". The present observable reality suffices: "present-day Egypt is based on thirteen and a third centuries of Arab history that have completely cancelled out all that was before"\(^{84}\).

\(^{83}\) Dr Hasan Kamal, "al-Rawabit al-Qadimah bayna Bilad al-'Arab wal-Quitr al-Misri" (The Ancient Ties between the Arabian Peninsula and the Egyptian Region), al-Muqtataf v. 94 (1939), pp. 471-3.

\(^{84}\) al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyuna wa 'Arab". The assertions about Arab-Pharaonite joint origin or intermarriage in antiquity were noted — but brushed aside — by the Westernizer Muhammad Kamil Mustafa. A remote common origin of Pharaonic Egyptians and Arabs or "almost complete" "contact" between the two before or following the Islamic conquest is almost inconsequential in that the Egyptian mind has formed within the frame of the Egyptian

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al-Zayyat may have sensed that in the 1930s, with the intellectual climate pan-Arabizing, linking Pharaonic Egypt to Arabism and Islam might help the hard-pressed particularists. The thesis of kinship made it harder to excise Pharaonic culture or religion as non-Islamic or non-Arab. Such use of the theories of a common origin for the particularist cause was made in 1938 by Dr. Muhammad Subayh 'Abd al-Qadir, a Misk al-Fatat (Young Egypt) activist who had been a neo-Pharaonist participant in the 1933 polemics over Egypt's Arabism. On the one hand, 'Abd al-Qadir denied that the few quickly assimilated Arabs who came to Egypt ("only a few tens of thousands through the whole extent of their history") had substantially modified the racial type or way of life of the Egyptians so that "we regard Islamic Egypt today as precisely the ancient Egypt of Pharaoh". Shifting ground, he cited "the theory of many ethnologists (that) link the ancient Egyptian people with the Arabs by the tightest bonds of blood and common origin" to suggest that "it is Pharaonic Egypt that is Arab Egypt and knew monotheism since five thousand years ago", and thereby forestall "the attempt to bind Egypt to Arabism by separating it from ancient Egypt". 'Abd al-Qadir was sensitive to charges by "the apostles of Arabism" that "pride" by Egyptians in "their ancient history" would "separate Egypt from the Arabs or Islam". Thus he seized on identification of the ancient Egyptians with Arabs or as natural monotheists to deflect Arabist charges against Pharaonic Egypt that were winning more and more response from modern-educated Muslim Egyptians as the 1930s progressed.

al-Zayyat's excisive highlighting of victims of oppression and the crack of the Pharaonic whips in 1933 found a wide hearing: in 1938 Dr. Muhammad Subayh 'Abd

geographic homeland. The life and even the Arab culture of Arab tribes that migrated to Egypt were transformed into something new and different from the life or culture of Arabs elsewhere, by their adopted Egyptian geographic and human environment. Mustafa, "La Fir'awniyyah wa La 'Arabiyyah".

85. Dr Muhammad Subayh 'Abd al-Qadir, "Rasa'il ila Baghdad min al-Qahirah" (Letters ila Baghdad from Cairo), Misk al-Fatat, 11 August 1938, pp. 10-11.
al-Qadir still raged that "they" (the pan-Arabs) had "accused our ancient history of every crime in order to defend the concept of Arab unity". 'Abd al-Qadir's article carried an elaborate defence of "the system of classes in Egypt in the days of the Pharaohs before Roman rule". He denied that "forced labor" or the kurbag (whip) had been imposed on "authentic" Egyptians --- as distinct from Asian or African prisoners of war --- in construction of the pyramids and other monuments in Pharaonic times. The collective labor was voluntary, reflecting the unity of "the people, especially the peasantry, with its king" --- an early precursor of the work camps obligatory upon all Germans in Nazi Germany. Dr 'Abd al-Qadir also stressed that, like "many of our great thinkers", "al-Zayyat, who took part in that old campaign in defence of Arabism" had since reconciled himself to the Pharaonic element: "when he visited Luxor and stood before the monuments of [our] ancient glory he found himself to be of it and that there is no incompatibility between his Arabism and his Egyptianity."

al-Zayyat may have published his early 1934 impressions of his visit to Luxor as a gesture of contrition for some of his more uncompromising stances in 1933: he opened that it was inescapable for one who had participated in controversies on the glory of the Pharaohs to visit Luxor. Whereas in many articles he stressed the unimportance of race or that the modern Egyptians were of Arab descent or mixed Arab and Pharaonic extraction, his account of his Luxor visit did refer with pride to the modern Egyptians' sharing some 'arumah or racial lineage with the ancient Pharaonic people who had originated human civilization. He did also observe that the "thought" initiated by the ancient Egyptians had inspired the Greeks and even the Hebrews in various aspects of "religion, art and beauty". al-Zayyat was awed by the architectural

86. Ibid. 'Abd al-Qadir may have had some grounds since the ancient Egyptians had no notion of a category of slaves who would be owned, property, in the native population. Dr Colin Hope, Department of Classics, Monash University, 3 October 1990.
grandeur of many of the monuments. He contrasted the "mediocrity of the present": modern Egyptian "dwarfs", the descendants, "making their conceited pilgrimage today on a boat to whose manufacture they have contributed neither iron nor wood" to Thebes, for the construction of which the Pharaohs had moved "pieces of mountains" down the Nile. But he restated with new details drawn from what he had seen at Luxor his earlier thesis of Pharaonic social inequality. The innovative construction and thought of the Pharaohs "would have been a good beginning for humanity were it not for the tyranny of the dictatorial individual and the authority of an oppressive religion". al-Zayyat turned the very "titanic" scale of the "awe-inspiring dense forest of pillars" at al-Karnak into an indictment of the Pharaonic social system: their size showed the price paid by the malnourished common people to construct such monuments to a selfish ruling minority under the Pharaonic "whip": the still-flowing "lake of Osiris" ran with the blood of the oppressed forefathers who had died in constructing it, causing his party "sorrow" and "regret" amidst its "pride".

Once more a distaste for Pharaonic religion was intertwined with the critique of Pharaonic social structure: the concept of immortality had so enslaved the minds of the Pharaohs that to serve it they enslaved the bodies of the people. In their self-sanctification and self-aggrandization, they violated the respect due to the common people: they denied the power of death. Viewing a statue of Ramses the Great stepping forward with the key of life in his hand across death to eternal immortality al-Zayyat reflected that whereas God had immortalized the spirit the Pharaohs attempted to immortalize the body. Overall, al-Zayyat's accommodations to the particularist literary ethos in his 1934 Luxor article were

87. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, "Fil-Aqsur" (In Luxor) written for al-Risalah on 12 February 1934; Wahy v. 1, pp. 81-94.
88. Ibid, pp. 86-7, al-Zayyat mentioned as his companions on the journey the University lecturers Ahmad Amin, Ahmad Zaki and 'Abd al-Raziq al-Sanhuri. Ibid p. 92.
89. Ibid pp. 87-8.
secondary. It recognized that achievements in the Pharaonic era had expressed inherent Egyptian racial capacity --- which, however, had to be relinked for Egypt's forthcoming renaissance with "the Arab Divine brand" that had restored Egypt's waning youth earlier in her history. Occasionally, in contexts where Arab Egyptians faced subordination or attacks from Europeans or Zionists, al-Zayyat wrote of them as descended from both the ancient Egyptians and the classical Arabs, the two blended origins bestowing self-confidence. But all his odd motifs about territorial homelands or racial specificities were kept peripheral by the language forms and high literature that shaped his community thinking. His religious unconnectedness with the ancient Egyptians always made it very hard for him to apprehend their past.

In rejecting neo-Pharaonism in 1933, al-Zayyat met quarter-way those writers --- such as Haykal, his colleague ---\footnote{Ibid p. 84.}.

\footnote{"Ya Hadi al-Tariq Hirt", (I've Lost My Bearings, Guide), written for al-Risalah on 5 November 1934; Wahy v. 1 p. 154. One aspect of the modern Arab-Egyptians' innate capacity about which Pharaonic Egypt reassured was military prowess. Hence al-Zayyat in 1939 hailed "the immortal Egyptian spirit" when, as World War and a threat by Mussolini against Egypt from Libya loomed, the Egyptian radio broadcast the strains of a modern Egyptian soldier blowing into one of the Pharaonic war-trumpets dug up after 33 centuries from Tutankhamun's tomb in 1922. This was an omen of the resolve and ability of twentieth century Egyptians, after millennia of submission to foreign conquerors and aversion to military service, to again fight effectively to preserve Egypt's independence like their ancient ancestors: "Nafkh al-Sur" (The Blowing of the Trumpet), written 17 April 1939; Wahy v. 2, pp. 37-40. Such aberrant and unaccommodated flashes of Pharaonic awareness could not be integrated with al-Zayyat's Arabo-Islamic thought-frame. A 1939 article "Fi Yawm wa Laylah" (written 22 May 1939; Wahy v. 2, pp. 49-52) inspired by the Egyptian Army's military parades, ascribed Egypt's resurgent martial spirit in the face of the threat of an Italian thrust to the re-emergent Pharaonic "metal" which had first created history and civilization and remained latent in the Egyptian peasant over the intervening period of "softness" and "sloth". The article, however, concluded its warning of Egyptian capacity to resist, directed to Mussolini, by comparing King Faruq to 'Amr Ibn al-'As. This comparison --- perhaps valid from the viewpoint of East against Christian West and Fascist Italy as a new Byzantium (p. 51 "al-jarrad al-rumi": "the Italian locusts" or the "Byzantine locusts") --- flew in the face of Egyptian particularist rejection of 'Amr and the Arabs as one more "foreign conquest".}
on many magazines --- who in the 1920s had tried to evolve a modern Egyptian "national literature" distinct from the Arabic literature of other areas and especially the old literature of the classical Arabs: this differentiation was to come through use of distinctive Egyptian language patterns, evocation of local Egyptian scenes and situations and by the non-Semitic Pharaonic past. al-Zayyat could now make conciliatory gestures towards writers who still thought on those lines: with the independent Pharaonic golden age knocked out, the only distinctiveness they could henceforth install in fiction or poetry would be another cluster of local color and sparing local idioms --- which some other Arab lands had long before achieved in the strongly unitary classical Arabic literature. "The message of the [classical] Arabs" had to be the basis of modern Islamic Egypt's culture, but

Environment is a facet of Nature that varies in every [Arabic] region (qutr) ... Nature and the spirit of [a writer's] environment, a local coloring (al-sibghat al-mahalliyah) is a prerequisite for imaginativeness, sincerity of style and sound portraiture. Of old, the coloring of literature in the Hijaz differed from that in Najd, in 'Iraq from that in Syria and that in Egypt from its tint in Muslim Spain. But such variation neither came in response to any9 [particularist] call nor fostered any to emerge later .

In 1933, then, al-Zayyat assessed that Egyptian writers since World War I had expressed facets of Egyptian specificity within the limits of diversity set in the classical Arabs' literature. They had not developed any discrete new Egyptian national literature because the only

92. al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyyuna wa 'Arab". In his 1933 defence of Taha as an Arabist writer against hot-headed Syrian youths who had placed him among the neo-Pharaonists, Sami al-Kiyali made the same point. The call for national literature in Egypt, he argued, was --- Pharaonist rhetoric aside --- just a demand that new literature depict the Egyptian environment with immediacy, that it have local color. That would not exceed the secondary differences that had distinguished regional categories --- for example Syro-Umayyad and 'Iraq-centred 'Abbasid --- in classical Arabic literature or, say, the modern diaspora Arabic literature of the Americas from new Egyptian or 'Iraqi writing. Yet all those "springs" meet in the ocean of a single far-extending Arabic literature. Sami al-Kiyali, "Misru wal-'Arab" (Egypt and the Arabs), Kawkab al-Sharq 19 October 1933 p. 7.
radical specificity they asserted, the Pharaonic elements, were neutralized by the heavily classical Arab provenance of the standardized literary language with which it was evoked. "Talk to your heart's content about the huge scale of the [Pharaonic] monuments, the grandeur of the Nile, and the beauty of its Valley and the condition of the people, but never forget that the spirit you breathe into the mummy of Pharaoh must always be that of 'Amr" Ibn al-'As (the Arabian who conquered Egypt between 639 and 642) "and that the language with which you celebrate Egypt's glory is that of [the ancient North Arabian tribe] Mudar".  

al-Zayyat was correct that his belletrist colleagues had not broken continuity of language with the classical Arabs in their localist and even neo-Pharaonist writings in the 1920s. The Azhar-educated Taha drew copiously on those extra-Egyptian Arabs' idioms to describe the Egyptian countryside. Haykal's classical Arab culture was more West-limited but he too had not kept up either his use of the colloquial for peasant dialogues or his exaltation of the Pharaohs. The standard literary language --- steel-strong even when attenuated --- always continued to link writers in al-Zayyat's group to the definitive classical Arabs.

The Delimitation of the Arab Nation

al-Zayyat often felt strong supra-Arab Islamic community emotions in topical contemporary contexts and perpetuated themes about pristine classical Islam from the old pre-World War I type of political pan-Islamism in Egypt. He carried forward al-Afghani's identification with the world-wide military conquests of the early Muslim Arabs, and the universalist Islamic states (empires) that they founded almost overnight. This supra-Middle Eastern scope of the classical Arabs' role posed problems for the rigorous territorialization of an Arab nation, indispensable for a viable Arab nationalism in Egypt.

93. al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyyuna wa 'Arab".
al-Zayyat presented the classical Arabs' sweeping conquests as an Islamic ideological action. In regard to 'Uqbah Ibn Nafi', halted by the Atlantic Ocean after conquering North Africa, the conquest was of the modern Arab homeland's Maghribi western wing and thus territorially corresponded to concepts of the twentieth century's secular unitary Arab nationalists. However, al-Zayyat gave parity with 'Uqbah to Qutaybah al-Bahili conquering far from any twentieth century Arab lands deep into Turkic Central Asia (bilad al-Atrak) towards China under a religious inspiration: "my confidence in the victory Allah confers"94. The model classical Arabs thus delimited no clear territorial boundaries for a modern Arab homeland.

al-Zayyat's strong sense of Muslim brotherhood and of the scope of the classical Arabs' Islamic universal state fostered his very open, fluid conception of Arab nationality as something acquirable through adoption of a language and the associated religion (Islam). He tended to regard current populations that had once undergone rule by the classical Arabs and in the process accepted Islam and Arabic as a literary, second, language, as Arab. He could identify with an Arab ethnic distinctiveness that preceded Islam but which universalistic Islamic roles thenceforth denied stable territoriality and deracialized. In a 1933 article commemorating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, al-Zayyat wrote that the "natural selection" of their harsh peninsular environment had made the Arabians in their paganism a race of "supermen" in "vitality, and perfection of manhood and clarity of perception". In their parochial peninsula, though, they had misdirected their vitality into internecine feuding; once Islam and Muhammad united them and they became world leaders of Islam without any territorial limits, other racially non-Arab populations entered the Arab nation. Conversion to Islam brought together the diverse populations who later amalgamated into the new expanded Arab nation. "The different peoples whom

the personality of the Arabs melted into one and the culture of the Arabs stamped attained brotherhood and unity only by following Muhammad's way [method, program: minhaj] and guidance"95.

Steeped as he was in Arabic literature, al-Zayyat's discursive essays wove nationality issues under classical Islam even into his discussions of problems that beset Egypt a thousand years later. In 1941, while repudiating the multi-party parliamentarist system as divisive and malfunctional in Egypt, he again imaged that the human composition of the classical Arab nation had been open-ended, incorporative, expansive and shifting, like the frontiers of its action. The bitter internal party-political divisions setting Egyptians at loggerheads in 1941 were culturally "inherited" (mawruth) over a millennium of history from the divisive partisan "fanaticisms" ('asabiyyah) that had "ruined the entity of the Arabs and enfeebled the structure of Islam" in the classical period. The partisan conflicts were over interests of personal or sectional power, not valid differences over "principles to set the world right and strengthen religion". Muhammad during his mission held in check the consistent tendency of the Arabs towards partisan division. With its resurgence upon his death, "the Arabs became divided up into Hashimites and Umayyads, then into Qaysites and Yamanites, then between 'Ali's party and 'Abbasids, then between Arabists and Shu'abis". al-Zayyat thus refused to accept the statement of the shu'ubis --- those who affirmed non-Arab nationalities under classical Islam --- that they (or the populations from which they sprang) were non-Arabs. He treated the dispute between shu'ubis and champions of the Arab party in the 'Abbasid era as a sectional internal division that got out of hand within the Muslim-Arab quasi-national group like the bitter party-politics dividing Egyptians in the 1940s: both conflicts although separated by one thousand years and occurring on different continents equally instanced a

95. "Dikhr al-Mawlid" (On the Prophet's Birthday), written for al-Risalah 1 December 1933; Wahy v. 1, p. 31.
common "lust for power ... divisiveness of the Arabs of all periods and lands". Clearly, al-Zayyat would find it hard to think of the Egyptians of his day and the far-extending classical Arabs as separate communities. In 1945, during the difficult negotiations for the formation of the League of Arab States, al-Zayyat urged the contemporary "leaders of the Arabs" to unite: he referred to the classical division between Arabists and Shu'ubis as one past pointless internal Arab division that had disastrous consequences.

The high literature and societies in which the classical Arabs led overflowed into al-Zayyat's analyses of the issues facing Egypt and the Middle East in his time. He registered real sustained interactions, and ensuing conceptual blurring of Arabness, under classical Islam when he accepted as part of that historical Arab nation not simply those populations that got completely Arabized, but also others, the Persians or Furs most notably, that retained separate native tongues and for whom non-Arab shu'ubi poets and writers proclaimed countering non-Arab nationality in the Umawi and early 'Abbasid periods. The

96. "al-'Asabiyyah Da'una 1-Mawruth" (Partisan Division is Our Inherited Disease), written for al-Risalah on 21 March 1941; Wahy v. 2, pp. 266-268. The ethnic and territorial shu'ubi (but also Arabist) self-identifications of Iranians from various social categories in the Umayyad and 'Abbasid empires — poets and (rapidly Arabizing) Irano-Aramaen clerks in 'Iraq and Syria, commoners and landlords on the Iranian plateau — were reviewed by Mottahedeh (1976). Bashshar Ibn Burd, a poet who fascinated al-Zayyat, did declare himself to the Caliph al-Mahdi as Arab in language and clothes, while identifying with his far-off Iran region of origin, Tukharistan. Roy P. Mottahedeh, "The Shu'ubiyyah Controversy and the Social History of Early Islamic Iran", IJMES v. 7 (1976) pp. 161-182. Cf. Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam pp. 202-206.

97. al-Zayyat, "Udhkuru, Ya Zu'ama' al-'Arab" (Remember O Leaders of the Arabs), 8 January 1945; Wahy v. 3, p. 13.

98. al-Zayyat's attitude that the use of Arabic made Persians or individuals descended from them Arabs under classical Islam could cite teachings ascribed in the period to the Prophet and the early Muslims. When Muhammad heard "a hypocrite" (sic) denigrate the Arabness of his pious follower Salman the Persian he was said to have ruled that "the Lord is One, and [your] progenitor one, none among you derives Arabness from father or mother: it is only language so that whoever speaks Arabic is an Arab". "al-Wad' al-Lughawi wa Haqq al-Muhdathina fihi" (Linguistic Innovation and the Right of the Moderns to Exercise it), text of the lecture...
religion of Islam disposed al-Zayyat to perceive the classical and modern populations of North Africa and the Middle East in a unitary way in which the core Arab ethnic group blurred out into wider Muslim populations among which Arabic had currency at some point. During his 1941 treatment of 'asabiyyah, religious emotions blurred demarcation between the core "entity of the Arabs" (kiyan al-'Arab) and the other populations comprising the classical wider religious community of the Muslims. Thus, the term ummah in al-Zayyat's Qur'an-adapting characterization of the Arabs/classical Muslims ("God made them a Middle Nation, they believe in Allah and in the Last Day and command the good, forbid the bad and vie in good deeds") could almost equally denote (a) a culturally and ethnically heterogeneous religious Muslim nation in which all would acquire some Arab characteristics through the religion or (b) a nation equally Arab and Muslim to which some originally non-Arab groups had been attached and comprehensively assimilated at some time. Such quasi-universalist religious community emotion made it harder for him to demarcate or bound the Arab or Arabic-speaking Muslims either territorially or demographically. As old Arabic works around him recounted, Iranian elites and sectional strata of various types, in Iran proper as well as amidst much larger numbers of Arabs in 'Iraq, had adopted and developed Arabic as their medium of administration, law, intellectual life and poetry under the 'Abbasids in particular. But parallel with the decline of the Arab 'Abbasid Caliphate, destroyed by the Mongols in 1258, the development of Persian as a literary language delivered to an Arabic Language Academy conference on 26 December 1949; Wahy v. 3 pp. 177-8. Nicholson viewed such hadiths as concocted by that sector of 'Abbasid-period Persians determined to Arabize: "as clients affiliated to an Arab tribe, they assumed Arab names and ... provided themselves with fictitious pedigrees, on the strength of which they passed for Arabs". A Literary History of the Arabs pp. 279, 281.

99. al-Zayyat, "al-'Asabiyyah ..."; Wahy v. 3 p. 267. His Arabic description of the classical Arabs and Muslims was "ja'alahun ullahu ummatan wasatan, yu'minuna billahi wa-yawm il-akhiri wa ya'nuruna bil-ma'rufi wa yanhawna 'an il-munkar wa yusari'una fil-khayrat", adapted from the Qur'an's two surahs al-Baqarah (2:143) and Al 'Imran (3:114).
between the tenth and twelfth centuries made the displacement of Arabic possible in Persian-speaking lands beyond 'Iraq outside the sphere of religious Revelation, theology and law common to all the Islamic ummah. The Iranians were the most striking instance of reversal in Islam's late classical and post-classical age of the wide linguistic and cultural Arabization to which the Arabs had led so many nationalities — and Riza Shah attempted Ataturk-like de-Arabization of Farsi itself. Such post-classical diversification of Islamic cultures and literary languages did not, however, register much on the Arab-centric classicist al-Zayyat. Yet he sometimes hoped that the modern descendants of those Iranians might be involved in the contemporary moves for "Arab" unity that he publicized in terms of his own literature-determined assumptions.

al-Zayyat's blurring of Arabs into Persian or other Muslims whose daily speech was not Arabic for his own (as well as Islam's classical) age would be patronized as confused or atavistic by post-1952 Egyptian pan-Arabs, more secular. However, Arab states in West Asia and Muslim Iran and Turkey had been forming regional groupings that aroused interest among Liberal Constitutionalists governing Egypt: for instance, the Sa'dabad Non-Aggression Pact, signed on 4 July 1937 by Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and 'Iraq, was designed to create a regional bloc to withstand Great Power interference whether from the growing Mediterranean ambitions of fascist Italy or from the traditional Middle Eastern rivalry of Britain and

100. The rise of a secularist Iranian nationalism that was anti-Arab in its view of history and came to be promoted with the resources of government under the Pahlavis was examined in Homayoun Katouzian, "Nationalist Trends in Iran, 1921-1926", IJMES 1979, pp. 533-551 and by John R. Perry in "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran", IJMES 1985 pp. 295-311. Perry's study stressed the limitations placed upon the drive of Shah Riza and hard-line ideologues to de-Arabize Farsi by silent obstruction from the linguists and grammarians appointed to the institutions that were supposed to transform the language.

101. George Kirk, The Middle East in the War (London: OUP 1952) pp. 489-490. One-and-a-half years after it was formed, Liberal Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmud in 1939, war menacing, proposed to cabinet that Egypt join the Sa'dabad Pact: Haykal in his memoirs
Russia. Three years later, in 1940, al-Zayyat hailed discussion among "some Arab circles" for an undoubtedly pro-Allied "Arab Alliance" (Hilf 'Arabi), immediately because such a grouping of states would strengthen the individually weak Afro-Asian member-countries against expansionist fascisms. According to the al-Ahram report as cited by al-Zayyat, (it seems at that stage non-Egyptian, Asian) "Arab circles" visualized that the Alliance would embrace Egypt, Syria, Palestine, 'Iraq and the Hijaz: later, however, "it might expand to cover Iran and Afghanistan". Taking up the proposal of confederation, al-Zayyat tightened it into a loose state-federation somewhat wider than the Arab entity: to ward off the perils facing small states in a world of war and violence "let there be between neighboring lands such as the fourteen peoples of Islam something parallel to the united foreign policy, the common defence and the law-giving constitution shared by the forty eight United States."

al-Zayyat's community responses in the 1940 article to moves for an "Arab Alliance" were not thought through or consistent: he alternated --- but in other places also blended --- divergent Arab and wider Muslim unificatory drives. On one hand, he voiced a sharp awareness of (Muslim) Arabs as a highly specific entity in the sphere of the world community of Muslims. Giving a particular impression of coherence and solidity was his term "the Arab body" (al-jism al-'Arabi) but al-Zayyat elsewhere used the less organic-sounding "Arab world" and "the Arab nations" to describe the populations to be unified. Less directly religious factors for political community are indicated in the items: blood, lineage, the geographical continuity of neighboring (mutajawirah) states and implicitly but with centrality shared (Arabic) language. There was the

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claimed to suspect that Britain was promoting that Pact, as it later supposedly promoted the formation of the Arab League, in order to hold control of the region. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah 2 vols (Cairo: Mitba'at Misr 1951-1953) v. 2 p. 147. For British obstruction of pan-Arabism, and the development of the Arab League. See fn. 42.


potential for a delimited national Arab political community here. On the other hand, al-Zayyat clearly hoped that the regional drawing-together of states sharing common human characteristics of Arab speech and "the link of blood" might also lead to a wider religious Islamic political bloc or confederation. His choice for the article of the title "the Nation of Monotheism is Uniting" underscored his teleological sense of the Divine unfolding in history, particularly Arab history, that made it so hard for him to narrowly or rigorously define "the Arab world" (al-'Alam al-'Arabi) whose unification the discussions were supposed to initiate. (The term monotheism or tawhid had moreover been consistently applied by Arab Muslim theologians to distinguish the belief of Muslims in one God from Christian trinitarianism: al-Zayyat did not often even phrase his pan-Arabism to make unification palatable to Coptic and other Arab Christians). Fascist propaganda broadcasts in Arabic, he observed, held out an alliance between the Axis and "Islam" --- the Arab nationalist movements opposing the dominance, colonial and overt or disguised, of Britain and Free France. In response, he denounced the Axis as an expansionist "union organized by Satan of Nazism, Fascism and Paganism/idolatry (al-wathaniyyah)"; the forthcoming Arab-Muslim confederation had to stand with the Allies. In 1940, to the Satanic confederacy of pro-Fascist states and forces that have "disbelieved in God's laws" and plunged the world into war, he opposed a pan-Arab "Union designed by Allah out of the link of blood and the lineage of the spirit".  

al-Zayyat's thought on questions relating to ethnicities and nationhood, then, unfolded over the years within his persistently Islamic perception of current history. He was aware of secular Arab attributes such as "blood" but shared religion reinforced them within the Arab entity and could attach to it contiguous Muslim populations of mainly non-Arabic daily speech, as he saw things in the early 1940s. The thousand-years-old memories from the

104. Ibid pp. 242-5.
classical high literature fogged increased self-differentiation of Persians from Arabs under Riza Shah.

In the 1940s, al-Zayyat felt Muslim Iran belonged in an Arab confederation; however, he gradually differentiated Persian, Turkish and Arab nationalities much more. He came to separate pan-Arab and multi-national pan-Muslim communities as different planes of political community. Nonetheless, he still proposed a wider Islamic as distinct from a narrowly Arab grouping or association of states more than once over the years. In 1947, after the League of Arab States had been formed with headquarters in Egypt, al-Zayyat dropped the impulse for a widening-out of the Arab grouping into an alliance of contiguous Islamic states: instead, he proposed a simultaneous Islamic League to supplement the Arab League. Multi-national pan-Islam still pulled at his emotions but had become loose, territorially unbounded and global, distinct from the regional integration now narrowed to the contiguous areas of daily Arabic speech only. al-Zayyat in 1947 exulted at what he rather precipitately interpreted as more distant manifestations of Islam's "resurrection" (inbi'ath): the independence movement of Indonesia and the establishment of the Islamic State of Pakistan, two examples China's Muslims would in their turn soon follow to establish "the second-most Islamic State in strength and number". Although al-Zayyat sometimes showed awareness of historical, regional, cultural or racial bonds between Muslim peoples, the religious perspective is here, as elsewhere, consistent. The "pan-Islamism" of the new states is the consequence of the discredit into which "contradictory" man-made ideologies and laws had fallen: "humanity's sense of loss for that Divine Order which can direct its steps". With imperialist Europe (al-Zayyat mentions Holland as well as England and France) enfeebled and discredited by the late World War, even laicist Turkey in the end "will turn [again] to the East and its politicians return to Islam: Turkey will furnish the bloc of Muhammadan States with spirit and aid". On that day the believers will rejoice to see God's word Supreme, His bond
the firmest and His party victorious. Like Iran, Turkey was contiguous with some of the lands of daily Arabic speech, and from classical Islam onwards the Arabs had had multiple interactions and racial blending with Turks that proved more persistent than those with Persians. Turkey and Iran were in the Middle East region with the Arab heartlands yet here al-Zayyat, in the post-World War II period, was slicing them off and categorizing them with far-away Muslim Indonesia and Muslim China on the other side of the globe.

al-Zayyat's comments about Muslims in China, whose numbers he grossly overestimated, had delusory features. However, he was not idiosyncratic in the Egyptian context. Mainstream Arabic newspapers and magazines in Egypt from the 1930s opened their columns to Turkic Muslim secessionists from Sinkiang; the Egyptian monarchy had

105. "al-Jami'at al-Islamiyyah hiya l-Chayah" (The Islamic League is the Aim), written for al-Risalah, 30 June 1947; Wahy v. 3, pp. 230-1.

106. al-Jahiz offered favorable images of the intelligence and fighting spirit of Turks in order to win Turkish soldiers who had migrated into 'Iraq due respect as a more and more prominent component in the now ethnically diverse armed forces of the 'Abbasid Caliphs al-Mutawakkil. Risalah ilal-Fath Ibn Khazan fi Manaqib al-Turk wa 'Ammat Jund al-Khilafah, available in the edition of G. Van Vloten, al-Jahiz: Tria Opuscula (Leiden 1903); a translation was offered by C.T. Harley Walker in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1915 pp. 631-697. Although this essay argued that various races had specialized functions, with military ones allocated to the Turks, al-Jahiz also suggested their capacity, given the right conditions, to intellectually and culturally equal the Arabs. "If in their part of the world there had been prophets and wise men ... and they had had leisure to attend to them, they would have made you forget the learning of al-Basrah and the wisdom of Greece and the crafts of China". JRAS 1915 pp. 675-6; Tria Opuscula pp. 37-8. Increased sexual interaction with Turkish women modified the ideals of beauty among classical Arabs. Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam pp. 208-9. The Hijazi leadership group whom the British instigated to launch the 1916 Arab Revolt was linked in both language and race to the Ottoman Empire's Turkish-speakers. The Sharif Husayn, whose second wife was Circassian, spent much of his life in Constantinople with his consequently bilingualized sons, and "in a burst of pleasure thanked [Ronald Storrs] once in Turkish and then hastily corrected himself". Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson 1939) pp. 166, 191.

107. Often independent or autonomous, Turkic-Muslim Sinkiang was reinvaded by the Ching dynasty in 1876 which again declared it a province of China in 1884. In 1931 the Eastern Turkistanis mounted a successful rebellion against the feeble Chinese...
transmitted major cultural resources to China, stimulating the Sunnification or sectional Arabization of its Chinese-speaking Hui Muslims\textsuperscript{108}; al-Zayyat was wishful but had not himself dreamed up his over-estimate of the number of Muslims in China\textsuperscript{109}.

control. In 1933 an independent Islamic-Turkic state was founded, with its capital at Kashgar. The Wafd's particularist nationalism held that the territorial homeland welded all Egyptians, Muslim, Christian or Jewish, into one Egyptian nation. This might predispose some Wafdists to regard Muslims in China and India as components of predominantly non-Muslim Chinese and Indian nations. Nonetheless, on 2 July 1933 the Wafdist al-Balagh published a long article "The Patriotic Movement in Turkistan --- How it Emerged and What are the Factors for its Success" (al-Harakat al-Wataniyyah fi Turkistan --- Kayfa Nash'a't wa ma hiya 'Awamîl Najahihaa). The author was introduced as "the Turkistani, Chinese Literary Figure Mansur Jankiz Khan". Three days later, in its issue of 5 June 1933 al-Balagh published another article by the same writer, "Chinese Sovereignty in Eastern Turkistan --- the Causes of its End and its Consequences" (al-Siyadat al-Siniyyah fi Turkistan --- Asbabu Zawaliha wa Nata'ijuha). In its numbers of 14 June 1933 and 23 June 1933 p. 2 al-Balagh published pleas and arguments by Jankiz Khan to Egypt and other Arabs and Muslims to recognize and aid the new Turkic Muslim state in "East Turkistan" (Sinkiang). The Chinese Nationalists soon reconquered Sinkiang with aid from the USSR. In 1944 a new revolt achieved an independent state of Eastern Turkistan with the capital at Ili. In 1949 the Communist Chinese seized the area. (But cf. B 167, fn. 49 for Zaki Mubarak's Easternist interest in non-Muslim yet "spiritual" Sinic culture).

\textsuperscript{108} Pillsbury applies the term Sunnification to the process in which China's Muslims, after centuries of isolation and sinification, in the twentieth century re-established connection with the world mainstream of Islam. To this process of religious reform the post-World War I Egyptian particularist State contributed by providing printed materials under King Fu'ad; later, Fu'ad's son King Faruq "donated a massive number of Islamic texts --- and donated money for the purchase and translation of many more --- to a Muslim library in Peking subsequently named 'Faruq Library'. He also created the ... Faruq scholarship which paid for graduates of Muslim theological colleges in China to pursue advanced study at al-Azhar Theological University in Cairo"; on return to China they became theologians, educators and diplomats. Barbara Pillsbury, Cohesion and Cleavage in a Chinese Muslim Minority (Ph.D thesis, Columbia University 1973) p. 26.

\textsuperscript{109} The Christian missionary Marshall Broomhall who worked in Hui (Chinese Muslim) areas had in 1911 estimated the Chinese Muslim population at seventy millions, a high estimate. "By 1937 the China Handbook, a government publication, was reporting the astonishing figure of forty-eight million Muslims, almost ten per cent of the estimated total population" and Barbara Pillsbury (1973) herself concludes that "most credible is a figure of between thirty and fifty million". (Some estimates, however, were as low as ten million). It is relevant to al-Zayyat's vision of emergence of a Chinese Muslim state ranking after Pakistan or Indonesia that "were it possible to verify the pre-1949 figure of..."
The fluid, territorially open-ended Muslim Arab political nation emerging and crystallizing in al-Zayyat's consciousness in the 1930s and 1940s is not to be dismissed as only a period curiosity. His blended Islamic-Arab community consciousness could help integrate into the Arab community Muslim linguistic minorities resident in the sprawling lands that were to become defined as the Arab Entity or the Great Arab Homeland. At that time, the 1930s and 1940s, Muslim Kurds could enter into mainstream 'Iraqi and Syrian society because Arab identity could be met by Islam and facility in Arabic as a second language acquired outside the home, without any requirement of Arab race. In the contemporary Arab world, Muslim Berbers and Sudanese who speak acquired Arabic can be accepted as full members in consciously Arab societies. In a different category, the Arab League's extension of membership to Muslim Somalis for whom Arabic is a non-daily, acquired tongue could also fulfil incorporative, pan-Islamic open-endedness in al-Zayyat's earlier, less resolved, pan-Arab identifications.

Universalist Pan-Muslim Community. al-Zayyat felt a deep spiritual need to vitalize and tighten the relationship Egyptians and Arabs in general had with non-Arab Muslim populations around the globe. In practice, he failed to conceive paths to viable political or even cultural community with non-Arab Muslims. One reason was his limited Arab-centred classicist view of Islamic culture and history. al-Zayyat was an instance of Arab Muslims' persistent ethnicizing "periodization" of Islam, a glaring

forty-eight million, then China would have had the world's third largest Muslim population (after Indonesia and Pakistan), more Muslims than in any single country in the Islamic Middle East heartland": Pillsbury, Cohesion and Cleavage p. 9. In 1981, Pillsbury speculated that the 1935-6 Chinese Year Book had drawn its "highly inflated" estimate of almost 50 million Muslims from high-up Chinese Muslims intent to demand "proportional representation in the government" from the ruling Kuomintang. No census of the Chinese populations had been taken: the Chinese Communists in 1953 estimated 10 million Muslims in China. Barbara L. K. Pillsbury, "The Muslim Populations of China: Clarifying the Questions of Size and Ethnicity", Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs (Jeddah) v. 3:2 (Winter 1981) pp. 35-8. H. Yusuf Chang estimated 20 million Chinese Muslims in 1950: ibid p. 66.
feature of Ahmad Amin's historical works. Muslim creativity is located in Islam's earlier periods when Arabs and the Arabic language had dominance: precipitate, long-term, decline follows the Mongols' destruction of the 'Abbasid State and murder of the last "Arab" Caliph al-Musta'sim in 1258. al-Zayyat had the full Arab insensitivity to original intellectual and cultural creativity among Muslim Persians, Turks, Indians etc. in Islam's post-classical period after leadership had been passed from Arab hands. In 1939 he mused that

Islam outside the land of the Arabs is a bizarre medley of the beliefs of the first Islamic generations and fake Sufism and inherited mythologies and wrong interpretations. Later this medley changed with ... passing of time and the severing of the link and increasing non-Arabness of tongue (al-'ujmah) to [a drug] lulling people to sleep ... impeding them from effort ... barring them from thought ... dulling their awareness of ... the movement of the heavenly bodies. The Muslims in Albania, in Yugoslavia in the Lands of the West and in China and the East Indies (Indonesia) in the Lands of the East are distinguished from their compatriots by a doltish asceticism, a death-like ignorance and a fatalistic reliance on God that makes them a burden on people. They imagine that Islam is not concerned with this world. 

A bilingual grasp of Arabic among the educated was a precondition for a viable Islamic religious and intellectual life in non-Arab Muslim populations. al-Zayyat therefore proposed that al-Azhar promote through education the spread of Arabic as a shared second language throughout the far-flung lands professing Islam.

The Arab-centric al-Zayyat, then, had scant interest or respect for original ideas about Islam among the non-Arab Muslim peoples to whom Egypt was to conduct outreach around the world. Contact with Egypt's Islamic institutions was essential to them for their dead, nominal Islam to become the real thing. The Egyptian and other Arab Muslims, on the other hand, did not stand to gain any new information or insight about Islam from any non-Arab Muslim people, although they would fulfil an Islamic duty

110. al-Zayyat, "Risalat al-Azhar" (al-Azhar's Mission), written for al-Risalah 27 March 1939; Wahy v. 2 p. 29.

111. Ibid pp. 31-2.
by enlightening them. The role of global teacher also activated in al-Zayyat the fundamentalist drive to simplify and eliminate rather than to blend and synthesize even for the corpus of Arab Islamic knowledge itself. He wanted al-Azhar to condense Qur'anic interpretations, hadiths and the prescriptions of Islamic law into a limited number of Arabic volumes that would eliminate all differences of opinion: these could then be diffused around the Muslim world to produce uniformity.

Islamic activity by Nasir's Egypt, utilizing al-Azhar, in Black Africa and the Malay world in the 1950s and 1960s, and then by Sa'udi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s, fulfilled al-Zayyat's 1939 teachers-destroyers paradigm of Arab outreach to non-Arab Muslim populations.

al-Zayyat's Islamic impulse to encounter and fuse with non-Arab Muslims in the Middle East and also beyond was heart-felt. Yet, the Arab-centrism inherent in the structure of his Islamic culture and thought limited his capacity to perceive the others and thus to develop reciprocal interactions and exchanges with them. Thus, Islam did not always obstruct the ethnicization of al-Zayyat's attitudes that finally led him to rigorous Arab nationalism.

The Disengagement of Turks and Arabs

al-Zayyat's Arab-centric culturist Islam proved most unable to sustain relationship with non-Arab Muslims in regard to Turks. Turks and Arabs had had multiple intimate interactions and relationships since the 'Abbasid period, in which al-Zayyat was steeped. As an unconsciously ethnocentric pan-Islamist, he protested in 1935 Ataturk's severing of the cultural community of Turks with Arabs. Such passages, however, ironically underline al-Zayyat's assumption that non-Arab Muslim peoples derived all that was positive in their culture from the Arabs.

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112. Ibid p. 31.
113. al-Zayyat, "Ila Ayna Yusaq al-Atrak?" (To Where are the Turks Being Driven?), penned for al-Risalah on 11 March 1935; Wahy v. 1 pp. 199-202. "What would remain of the Turks and the language of the Turks and the culture of the Turks if you
As was also the case with Muhammad 'Abduh in his turn-of-century polemic with Farah Antun, there was not much awareness of, or interest in, original additions to a general Islamic civilization by the Turks --- that empathy for distinctness as well as affinity in the other essential for true relationship. Like the "Shaykh of Arabism" Ahmad Zaki Pasha in the 1920s, in demanding in 1936 that Turkish words be purged from Arabic to be replaced by pure Arabic neologisms al-Zayyat was severing a linguistic community between the Arabs and Turks like Turkey's Westernizing Kemalists.

The linguistic dynamic within al-Zayyat's culturist Arabism was bound to make Egyptians or Arabs more different

114. "Istiqlal al-Lughah" (Linguistic Independence), 3 December 1936; Wahy v.1, pp. 333-9. al-Zayyat cited instances of Turkish words that he wanted purged from Arabic: Bash Katib (Chief Clerk); Nawbatgi (officer on duty; Commander of the guard), Bostagi (Postman), tabur (column), Yuzbashi (Captain), Sagh (army rank between Captain and Major), and Amiralay (Commander of a regiment: approx. colonel). It is to be noted that al-Zayyat was impressed by the success of the Ataturkists in Turkey in ending use of foreign languages in commercial companies (ibid p. 338). He also saw the new secular Turkey as a model for Egypt in the extensive translation of Western literary masterpieces into the national language. See "Sahib al-Ma'ali Wazir al-Ma'arif", 18 December 1939, Wahy v. 2, p. 125.
from Turks. However, by itself it could not have snapped his incurious pan-Islamic emotion of almost undivided cultural and religious community with Turkey. Other elements as well were needed to lead al-Zayyat from the pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottomans traditional in Egypt to the contention of the Arab nationalists in West Asia that the Turks were a separate nation who became enemies of the Arabs, justifying the armed rebellion against them proclaimed by the Sharif of Makkah Husayn Ibn 'Ali in June 1916. One was the parochial dislike against the local absentee Turco-Circassian landowning aristocracy long felt by many rural Arab Egyptians. The second, decisive, stimulant was the anti-Turkish world-view of 'Iraq's authors and ruling pan-Arabs, into which al-Zayyat was socialized while in 'Iraq from 1929 to 1932.

In the early nineteenth century Egypt was under a Turkish-speaking oligarchy: the ruling dynasty was composed wholly of Turkish-speakers as were all officials above the rank of shaykh al-balad (village headman) and all army officers of higher rank. Extensive official land grants made the "Turkish" element the most important land-owners in nineteenth-century Egypt. But with the British conquest, "the Turks" lost political power, their former predominance in the administration and army, and gradually their position as the largest landowners 115. Rising rural Arab-Egyptian families that had been accumulating both Azharite and West-patterned educations, and land, over generations now in landed property came to equal or elbow aside --- or intermarried with --- them. Yet this thrusting, ambitious new Arab-Egyptian landowning elite continued, under the British, to anachronistically talk as though they were Egypt's wretched of the earth subjected to the kurbag and tax extortion at the hands of the

Turco-Circassian "foreigners" they were replacing or incorporating. Such blended ethnic-class antipathy to Turco-Circassians was pervasive in the childhood of Haykal whose wealthy landowner father was an innovator of the latest agricultural techniques. Parents and grandparents impressed upon Arab-Egyptian children of Haykal's rural class at the turn of the century that the era of the autonomous 'Alid Khedives up to the British conquest was "the black past" of "the rule of the Turks". For "our generation" though, Haykal reminisced, these "Turks" and their whips were "only an image traced in talk" since "nothing remained in reality" of that past.

However, the old ill-feeling between the Turkish-speaking and Arab-Muslim ethnic groups in Egypt fueled the pre-1914 particularistic opposition in Haykal's al-Jaridah/Ummah Party setting to pan-Islamic community with the Ottoman Empire.

al-Zayyat had hung around that al-Jaridah/Ummah Party milieu in youth and held anachronistic antagonism to Egypt's vanishing Turco-Circassians at white heat decades after Egypt's 1922 independence. In his mid-1939 article "Images from the Past", he recalled that in the previous century the peasants were constantly beaten and robbed by predatory "Albanians and Circassians whose task was to collect taxes on everything at any time and by any means", smashing into houses to search for forbidden or monopolized commodities like salt or soap acquired through other than the government. They terrorized, beat and robbed the peasantry. After the reorganization of the government administration following 'Urabi's revolution (that is to say, by the British!) the role of "this species" became

118. The religious reformer shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh had a similar ethnicity-tinged vision of the price paid by the Egyptian common people in the countryside for the modernizing changes imposed by the despotic Turco-Circassian elite around Muhammad 'Ali and later members of his dynasty. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (London: OUP 1962) p.130.
confined to the farms of the umara (princes of the 'Alid house) and "the country estates (chifliks) of the [Turco-Circassian] lords". al-Zayyat transmitted into his pastiche of 'Abbasid Arabic the folk-narrative from childhood of a handsome young Egyptian peasant beaten to death in the late nineteenth century with the kurbag before the eyes of "delighted Aghas" (here: Turco-Circassian officials, police or military), because he had been caught trying to steal a bunch of grapes for his village sweetheart from the garden of a Turkish mufattish (estate overseer)\textsuperscript{119}.

al-Zayyat in 1939 had real empathy for Arab-Egyptian peasants: he caught not just heroic suffering but how upsetting it was for them in their local world that Turkish-speaking intruders casually shot village ducks and crows\textsuperscript{120}. He had recast fading collective memories from dead or dying generations of illiterate peasants into an antique neo-classical Arabic that thenceforth would perpetuate antipathy to Turco-Circassians among new generations of Egypt's culturist elite. Such discourse in the 1930s and 1940s involved not just deprived rural strata he encountered long before in childhood or bygone Turco-Circassian strata that were melting away into the Arab Egyptians but also current elite groups. A Turco-Circassian ethnic core remained in the Egyptian establishment: the royal family of Muhammad 'Ali whose estates in Egypt were the most notable exception to decline of land ownership by "Turks". All members of this family

\textsuperscript{119} "Mid Suwar al-Madi" (Some Images from the Past), 19 June 1939; Wahy v. 2 pp. 61-4. Although born in 1889, al-Zayyat does not claim that he personally witnessed acts of oppression by Circassian or Albanian aliens: the oppression entered his consciousness as vivid heresay through the talk of adults that he overheard while a small child (wa ana sabiyyun dun al-yafa'ah): ibid p. 63. Nonetheless, his village and seven neighboring ones still had the status of lands granted in perpetuity to the family of 'Ali Sharif at the close of the nineteenth century. Ibid p. 61. It is to be noted, though, that the Turco-Circassian monarch Fu'ad had an Arabo-Egyptian guard flogged for picking dates from his palace garden: he built up vast estates on which he exploited the workers. Hugh McLeave, The Last Pharaoh: The Ten Faces of Farouk (London: Michael Joseph 1969) p. 49.

\textsuperscript{120} Wahy v. 2 p. 62.
spoke Turkish even in the 1940s; Faruq was the first ruler of the 'Alid dynasty at whose court Arabic was spoken. In underscoring the Albanian provenance of many oppressive nineteenth-century officials, al-Zayyat was getting close to the Turco-Circassian royal family whose founder, Muhammad 'Ali, had come from there. In one 1939 attack upon Turco-Circassian elements of his own time, al-Zayyat characterized the group's differences with the general Egyptian population in quasi-national (as well as social-economic) terms that included the issues of language and relationship with Turkey. Titled "Peasants/Tillers and Princes!" (Fallahuna wa Umara), the article was immediately a response to the declared reluctance of the Riding Club's Turco-Circassian President, "the noble" 'Amr Ibrahim to admit autochthonous, Arabic-speaking Egyptians of standing and economic substance to membership on the grounds that they were fallahin (peasants or tillers). 'Amr Ibrahim, al-Zayyat retorted, was wrong to characterize Egyptian society as fixed in the mould of a system of static classes:

Can you tell me what is the difference between your elevated class and our lowly class when the constitution to which both classes submit may make the son of a servant who cleans your shoes for you he with whom you will sit and your superior/Prime Minister?

Disparate ethnicities defined by language sharpened but also fogged the class identifications of the two parties: al-Zayyat understood 'Amr Ibrahim to have alluded to "Semitism and Turanism" in his haughty justificatory letter to al-Ahram. Goaded, al-Zayyat, too, spelled out quasi-national dimensions that a spectrum of Arabic-speaking Egyptian groups perceived to their conflict with privileged groups that happened to be Turkish-speaking. The class of "princes" believe that God created it for "ownership ... wealth, for government and us ... to serve and worship" although in verity "what distinguished your class from ours was that you used to hold the kurbag (whip), while we held the hoe, that you would eat gold while we ate dust ... that you spoke Turkish

121. Baer in Holt, Political and Social Change p. 149.
while we spoke Arabic”. However, the class nature of other Arab-Egyptian figures firing from his side at the Turco-Circassians has bearing on al-Zayyat’s egalitarian rhetoric that nominated the sons of shoe-boys to the Prime Ministership. Egypt’s Prime Minister at that time, the Liberal Constitutionalist Muhammad Mahmud Pasha, denounced ‘Amr Ibrahim’s attempt to “restore the system of classes”, comfortably remarking that “we here are in a democratic land” and proudly affirming that “I am a peasant/farmer (fallah) and the son of a peasant/farmer (fallah)”\(^\text{122}\). Although he too had formed to some extent in the al-Ummah-Constitutionalists’ milieu, al-Zayyat was certainly to the left of Mahmud, whom he well knew was no populist: his articles denouncing landlord-MPs’ use of the parliamentary system to further control and exploit the peasants in their constituencies\(^\text{123}\) clashed with Mahmud’s

122. “Fallahuna wa 'Umara” (Peasants and Princes), 5 June 1939; Wahy, v. 2, pp. 53–6. Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmud Pasha, who denounced 'Amr Ibrahim’s attempt to "restore the system of classes", had begun his political career as a leading figure in the Hizb al-Ummah, formed in 1907, which had expressed the interests of native non-Turkish-speaking Egyptian land owners hostile to Egypt’s "Ottoman" connexions with Turkey. His comfortable remark that "we are in a democratic land" and his proud identification as "a fallah” (ibid p. 54) indicate that the division, between not simply upwardly mobile but sometimes long-established and privileged Arabo-Egyptian elements and the Turco-Circassian element could be socio-economically less radical than rhetoric suggested. al-Zayyat, however, did not expect himself to join an exclusive club determined by any criterion of "aristocracy", be it "blood or wealth or position" (ibid p. 53). On Mahmud Pasha’s death in 1949, al-Zayyat praised him in terms of his successful blending of the best features of modern Western life with Islam in his personal and family life. However, al-Zayyat’s language did not depict Muhammad Mahmud as a man of the people: he "combined aristocracy of lineage, wealth, education and position" and maintained a courteous distance from the public. "Muhammad Mahmud Pasha" 9 February 1949; Wahy v. 2 pp. 156–9. A British observer well indicated the socio-economically inclusive nature of the egalitarian-sounding Egyptian term fallah ("peasant" or farmer). "The fellah is a man, irrespective of class, who cultivates the land ... A fellah may be a farmer or only a farm laborer. He may own but a portion of an acre or many acres or he may own but the labor he gives in return for the means of eking out an existence". M. Travers Symons, Britain and Egypt: the Rise of Egyptian Nationalism (London: Cecil Palmer 1925) p. 64. For King Faruq’s respect for PM Mahmud’s advice and rebukes, McLeave, Last Pharaoh p. 98.

123. "Yazharu anna Yawm al-Intikhab Qarib" (It Looks as though Election Day is Near) written for al-Risalah 14 February 1949; Wahy v.
image of "democracy". al-Zayyat's most radical social critiques denounced Egypt's landowner classes without ethnic differentiation. But when ethnicity concentrated his social anger against Egyptians of non-Arabic-speaking origin, it deluded him that great hereditary Arab-Egyptian landowners like Mahmud were the kinsmen and champions of Arab-Egyptian shoe-blacks and agricultural laborers.

al-Zayyat also fitted the Turco-Circassians, though Muslim, into the complex of factors that threatened the establishment of high literary Arabic as the medium of modern life in Egypt. In a 1950 address to a pan-Arab cultural conference, al-Zayyat presented the standard Qur'an-preserved Arabic as having maintained the pan-Arab community down the ages but warned that the widening scope for colloquial dialects now threatened it. He then bracketed a group of clearly Turco-Circassian "great ones" (al-kubara') who had learned their indifferent colloquial Arabic "in their palaces" from governesses, with Christian Arab educationalists presiding over equally indifferent teaching of the literary Arabic language in foreign schools in Egypt. An Egyptian woman teacher told al-Zayyat that she had been asked by the 'Alid Prince 'Abbas Halim to arrange education of his two sons. When she observed that they spoke Arabic with a Turkish accent and were ignorant of its elementary grammar he smilingly replied: "No, I want neither the talk of al-Azhar nor the talk of the sons of the land"124. Popular and high literary Arab linguistic

3 pp. 291-2; cf. "al-Qaryat Amsi wal-Yawm" (The Village Yesterday and Today) penned for al-Risalah 15 October 1933; Wahy v. 1 pp. 57-60. "Egypt's great cities live in the twentieth century, adopting [drawing on] its civilization, its light and its comfortable living, as though the relation between the Village and the City is that which existed between master and slave: the slave owns things but only for his lord's benefit, produces — but what he produces passes to another", ibid p. 59.

124. "Hadir al-Adab al-'Arabi" (The Present of Arabic Literature), 26 August 1950: Wahy v. 3 p. 210. Despite al-Zayyat, 'Abbas Halim was no conventional scion of Turco-Circassian Alid royalty. He ran a paramilitary Labor Party with some following among workers: 'Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot assessed him as "interested in trade unions", he was the "black sheep" of the Royal Family, not its agent, and had merged his General Union of Trade Unions with the Wafdist one in 1931 to oppose, not help, the pro-Palace Sidqi government, mustering pressure on it to regulate child labor from the IFTU. al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experiment,
consciousness blended in al-Zayyat's rejection of Turco-Egyptians as Nasser's 1952 bourgeois-Arabist revolution drew close.

al-Zayyat sustained year-round ethnic hatred against the whole Turco-Circassian group far above the occasionally-activated embers of the past in the sub-consciousness of politician-intellectuals in the Liberals-al-Siyasah milieu nearby (Haykal, Mahmud etc) --- who had taken the monarchy as their ally against the Wafd and had socially and sometimes sexually (e.g. Haykal) fused with the diluted minority. al-Zayyat snipped

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125. For al-Zayyat, when the context was contemporary society and politics, the disliked Turco-Circassian out-group was only those who still spoke Turkish --- 'Alid Royalty and a few absentee landlords --- rather than all of Turco-Circassian descent. For instance, al-Zayyat did not communalize his criticisms of, or responses to, the pro-palace Isma'il Sidqi (fns 15 and 44): unlike the denunciations of that regime as "Turkish" by the secularized Copt Salamah Musa, whom the Sidqi government squeezed out the Academy for the promotion of scientific culture. Musa, Education p. 89. Cf. ibid pp. 30, 43. For Haykal's marriage to an aristocratic Turco-Circassian woman after World War I, see Smith, Islam and the Search p. 52.
through any notion that there was a shared Islam that could ever have linked Arab Egyptians and Turco-Circassians in a humane community. The umara, the princes of the royal 'Alid house whom the Prince Regent Muhammad 'Ali headed as amir al-umara, the Chief of the Princes, ignore religion's social obligations because spending a portion of their wealth on the relief of the sufferings of the worker or peasant would be at the expense of Satanic activities --- among which al-Zayyat enumerated not merely lewd feasts but money "spent without any reckoning upon Turkey the Disobedient/Transgressor" 126.

In the early March 1935 indictment of Kemalism, al-Zayyat had assailed the severance of the cultural community of Turks and Arabs. Now in 1947, however, he denounced privileged Turkish-speakers resident for generations in Egypt for maintaining touristic, social and other relations with the populations of Turkey that he could have approved as links between two Muslim peoples 127.

126. "Ya Aghniya'ana: Qulu Aslamma wa la Taqulu Amanna" (O Our Rich People: Say that we have Announced our Islam but Do not say 'We Have Believed'), written for al-Risalah on 3 November 1947; Wahy v. 3 pp. 242-3. At Kfur Naga, where Prince Muhammad 'Ali owned 7,000 feddans, sabotage and arson provoked harsh repression. Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution (tsd Jean Stewart) (London: Faber & Faber 1972) p. 662. al-Zayyat in 1947 was responding to pietism from the Prince, who in 1945 denounced plans by "a small minority [of Westernizers] in the towns" calling for replacement of existing Islamic laws permitting divorce and polygamy. Apart from being God-revealed and therefore eternally valid, Islam's laws should be preserved intact to maintain Egypt's international position as "the leader of Islam": "al-Amir Muhammad 'Ali Yahyaddatru 'an al-Khalal al-Hukumi wa Taqyid al-Talaq" (The Prince Muhammad 'Ali Talks About Governmental Inefficiency and Restriction of [Islamic] Divorce), al-Mugattam 14 July 1945, p. 3. Such Islamism might have been an instrument of the Prince Regent, a Mason, to counter populist disruption by the Wafd. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 146. Prince Muhammad 'Ali had been a sort of pioneer of pan-Arab unity during a 1910 tour of Syria (al-Jaridah 7 April p. 7 and 16 April p. 5); and from al-Siyasat al-Ubusiyyah under the monarchy (Berque op. cit p. 512). However, the Prince was accommodating towards the Zionists: in 1937-1938 he lobbied both the British and the Zionists to break the Palestine impass by a Jewish Zone/quasi-state that would be a unit in a pan-Arab federation. Porath, In Search of Arab Unity pp. 70-1.

127. Note Salamah Musa's distaste, bordering on paranoia, for Turco-Circassian summer-travel to Istanbul in the pre-1918 period and the residual if much-weakened, "network of intrigues" that still linked Cairo to the Turkish capital in the 1930s and 1940s.
'Iraq: Catalyst of Disengagement from the Turks

al-Zayyat's residence in 'Iraq from 1929 to 1932 decisively crystallized his unitary Arab nationalism in cultural and political distinction from the wider community of Islam. It was impossible for any Egyptian professional to live in 'Iraq and avoid the issue of pan-Arab linguistic nationalism because it alone legitimized the leadership that the country's still-newish --- only in part 'Iraq-born --- pan-Arab elite had exercised since 1921. Urged by the Arab nationalists who had built up strong anti-Turkish movements of a modern type in Constantinople and Syria (more than 'Iraq), the Hashemite Sharif of Mecca Husayn Ibn 'Ali revolted in June 1916, proclaiming himself "King of the Arab countries". His son Faysal was briefly King of an independent, Arab-nationalist Syria from September 1918 until occupation by France in mid-1920. Britain sponsored Faysal as the first monarch in a quasi-independent Kingdom of 'Iraq: he deftly wooed Shi'ite 'Iraqi populations, to whom he was non-Shi'ite and a non-local, in the lead-up to his 1921 coronation. Once Britain had irreversibly committed her prestige to him, Faysal nimbly linked up with the anti-British 'Iraqi "extremists" to slash his imperial benefactors' control --- an independent spirit now praised by Ba'thist historiography, that long excoriated the Hashimites as stooges. The 'Iraq that al-Zayyat

130. Dr Muhammad Muzaffar al-Adhami, writing in early 1989 in the 'Iraqi armed forces' newspaper, somewhat over-stressed Faysal's resistance in 1922 to any imposition of a Mandate and connected Treaty by Britain, in this seeing him as closer to the semi-insurgent "extremists", whom the British needed his aid to control. The Arabic article carried photostats of the English telegrams and correspondence between Secretary of State for the Colonies Churchill and a worn-down Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner for 'Iraq. These sources showed Faysal was deeply suspicious of his British patrons --- he smelt a procedure to make him resign in a British suggestion that he go to London for "personal discussions". al-Adhami speculated that British assurances of support for him during his Syrian interregnum,
experienced was subordinate to British "advisers", and Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id --- one of the 'Iraqi Ottoman officers who defected to Husayn in 1916 --- negotiated a 20-year treaty with Great Britain before 'Iraq's formal independence in 1932.

The very mixed pan-Arab elite ruling 'Iraq, then, had come to political power by way of armed nationalist insurrection against the Turks who dominated the Muslim Ottoman Empire. The classicist high Arab culture and some Arab-centric features of the Islam that al-Zayyat brought with him predisposed him to accept that Arabist rejection of political community with fellow Muslims. In addition, he projected his hostile perceptions of Turkish-tinctured classes within Egypt's internal society out upon the separate and rather different Turkish-speaking populations and administrative classes in Turkey and Arabic-speaking Asia. During sympathetic exchanges with elite anti-Turkish 'Iraqis about the causes of the Arab independence movement, "we started citing instances" of Turkish ineptitude for culture or politics or administration "from the things that happened in 'Iraq and Egypt"\(^{131}\).

Parallels of language show how the (by then for many Egyptians time-attenuated) historical antagonism between Turkish-speakers and the Arab majority in Egypt predisposed al-Zayyat to accept the West Asian Arabist anti-Turkism to be encountered in 'Iraq. The small, parochial old folk anti-Turkism of Arab Egyptians was thereby attached to a new macro-historical national-ideological frame lacking in strictly Egyptian consciousness. In his bitter 1939 piece on mistreatment of the Egyptian peasantry by racially alien Muslims, al-Zayyat had referred to the "irredeemable

\(^{131}\) followed by their acceptance of France's conquest of Syria as an implementation of the Sykes-Picot Accord and the San Remo Conference's mandates, had left Faysal convinced that the British were congenitally two-faced. Dr Muhammad Muzaffar al-Aghami, "al-Sira' Bayna Baritaniyya wal-Malik Faysal al-Awwal" (The Struggle Between Britain and King Faysal I) al-Qadisiyyah (Baghdad) 9 March 1989 p. 12.

131. al-Zayyat, "Min Fukahat al-'Ahd al-Turki fi Baghdad: Haddathani l-Marhum al-Zahawi" (One of the Jokes about the Turkish Era in Baghdad: What the Late [Jamil] al-Zahawi Told Me), written 10 July 1939; Wahy v. 2 p. 74.
ignorance" and stupidity allegedly characterizing the rural Albanian ma'mur (estate overseer): the aliens as tax collectors before the advent of 'Urabi Pasha had used "terrorization and violence"; the peasantry lived "the life of slaves"; the ma'mur ruled through the whip and kurbag. Similarly, he and his 'Iraqi/West Asian Arab friends perceived the Ottoman Turks as representing "terrorization" among the Earth's nations by reason of the Empire's liberal use of "poison, the sea, prison, the sword and the whip". Like Turkish-speakers in Egypt, Old Turkey's governors over Arab provinces in West Asia used to "spread terror, reaping wealth and people's souls through taxes and bribes and confiscation and murder"; the exceptional Turkish governor who lasted in power long enough to address himself, beyond the spoils of his office, to needs of "religion, education or reform" would prove himself of dull understanding.

al-Zayyat through socialization internalized the anti-Turkish dichotomies of the pan-Arab ideologues ruling 'Iraq. While resident there, he used to attend the gathering of ministers, political leaders, and writers held by the then Governor of Baghdad, al-Sayyid Subhi al-Daftari in his house every Friday. al-Zayyat in fact hung his observations about incompetence and ignorance of Turkish governors upon an obviously fictionalized story about such a Turkish administrator in Baghdad recounted at one of those gatherings by the 'Iraqi poet Jamil al-Zahawi.

al-Zayyat by and large accepted the 'Iraqi pan-Arab ideological view of past Arab-Turkish relationships: this stressed the "ignorance, degradation and poverty" that connection with Turkey inflicted on "the Arab nation" (al-ummat al-'Arabiyyah). His acceptance of this anti-Turkish Arabist viewpoint revalued Turkey's claim to the Caliphate and leadership of an integrated Muslim universal State supposed to unite a variety of Islamic peoples in equal partnership:

133. al-Zayyat, "Min Fukahat ...", p. 73.
134. Ibid.
Bygone Turkey ... gathered in its powerful hands the margins of the Orient and the West, then wound about its terrible crown a halo of the Caliphate of the Prophet so that ... hearts reverently submitted to its authority. But (Turkey) could not consolidate her kingdom by a strength of spirit and masterly intellect and genius for expression as the Arabs did. Thus she continued to stand before her rebellious peoples (shu'ubiha l-tha'irah) ... arrogantly with drawn sword.

In a 1947 article advocating a grouping of pan-Islamic states to include Turkey, al-Zayyat was again aware of the Turkish use of religion for political manipulation: for example, the use of official pan-Islamism by 'Abdul Hamid as a bogey to deter the "vulpine" Western powers from attacking the now "senile" Ottoman State. However, in 1947 al-Zayyat now swung back to acceptance of the Ottoman State as at its initial foundation a serious attempt to restore the classical Arab universal Caliphal State shattered by the murder of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil (December 861): "the Turks when they occupied the throne of the Caliphate were able to reconnect the thread but were not able to thread the beads back onto it". The ready agreement of al-Zayyat and his Arabist 'Iraqi hosts that "war and its burdens wholly absorbed the gifts of the Turks, leaving them an insufficiency for politics and culture" was a

135. Ibid. al-Zayyat's argument --- that the Turks lacked, in contrast to the classical Arabs, the genius to enduringly reconcile to their leadership the peoples they conquered --- had affinities to a 1900 argument of the salafi Syrian-Egyptian Rashid Rida', disciple of Muhammad 'Abduh. Rida argued that the Arabs contributed more to Islam though their conquests than the Turks because they effectively propagated Islam in the lands they conquered --- whereas most of the lands conquered by the Turks remained "a burden on Islam and the Muslims and are still a warning of clear catastrophe". Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism, an Anthology (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1962), pp. 22-23.

136. al-Zayyat, "al-Jami'at al-Islamiyyah Hiyal-Chayah" (An Islamic League is the Aim), penned 30 June 1947; Wahy v. 3 p. 231. Even Fertile Crescent pan-Arabs remained ambivalent: Amin Sa'id, an al-Muqattam editor in Egypt under the monarchy, stressed the consent of Arabs of Egypt, Hijaz and Syria to the Ottoman Turks' conquest and early state, because it ended the weakness of the Mamluks and warded off the Christian states: they accepted that the Ottomans had won title to the Caliphate and to lead "nationalism had no existence in that age". Amin Sa'id, Thawrat al-'Arab fil-Qarn al-'Ishrin (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, n.d. --- 1960?) p.6.

137. "Min Fukahat ...", p. 73.
critical development of the military narrowness implied in his praise elsewhere of their early maintenance of Muslim sovereignty. In demonstrating a military prowess that could roll back hostile Christian Europe the Turks might have been conceived by him to have been Arab-like, but they had lacked the statesmanship to build a workable, unity-fostering, partnership between the leading element and other conquered peoples that could win enduring assent by the latter to the state. The basis for relationship therefore degenerated into simple force, in contrast to the success of the flexible, persuasive classical Arabs in reconciling the peoples they conquered to their state and then assimilating them. (In contrast, 'Azzam still saw the Turks as having reconciled and cooperated with other populations better than some classical Arabs: B 227).

Alone, the irritants of negative social relations with Turkish-linked groups within Egypt or the Arab bias of al-Zayyat's periodization of Islam and its civilization might not have sufficed to break commitment to wider unitary Islamic community --- which so long retarded the emergence of a full Arab nationalism in Egypt. His acceptance of secessionist anti-Ottoman Arab nationalism in 'Iraq required that he endorse Kemal Ataturk's parallel withdrawal of Turkey from its former close-knit community with Muslims and Arabs which al-Zayyat was usually so loth to accept: "the pure brave Turks slashed off the long appendage" (of the Ottoman State) "that they had dragged behind them, then surged to glory behind Kemal; as for the happy authentic Arabs they cast off that heavy burden, setting out swiftly towards a kingdom behind Faysal."

Thus al-Zayyat in the end endorsed both the politically parallel movements of Arab and Turkish nationalism that shattered the last half-credible multinational Islamic state.

Support by Egyptian Muslims to the Ottoman State, as the sole substantial independent Muslim State --- one with

138. "Qat' al-Uqdah Ashal min Halliha" (Cutting the Knot is Easier than Untying it), 14 May 1934; Wahy v. 1 p. 119.
a long-term capacity to contribute to the release of Egypt from Britain's veiled protectorate --- made them oppose Arab autonomist or independence movements weakening the Ottoman Turks' control in Asia\textsuperscript{139}. 'Iraq's pan-Arabs, among them the Hashimite King Faysal, his son Ghazi, and 'Ali son of Husayn, deposed from his throne in the Hijaz by Ibn Sa'ud, strove in their dialogues with al-Zayyat to meet the long-standing Islamist objections of Egyptians to Asia's Arab nationalist tradition. Thus, in his meetings with al-Zayyat, King 'Ali said that he used to try to convince Egyptians who had chosen to treat him as an enemy for the sake of the Turks that the revolution of the Arabs against the Caliphate was right and to further Right, and that his father had advised the Turks without cease to stop insulting the honor of the Arabs, that they give up their politics of ignorance, that they stop their crimes of murder\textsuperscript{140}.

Thus, it was the inflexibility of the Turks that compelled the Arabs to rise against fellow Muslims. 'Ali was correct that Husayn had been ideologically reluctant to rise up against "the Caliphate" and was much less of an Arab nationalist than his son 'Abdallah\textsuperscript{141}. For all the verbal

\textsuperscript{139} During the First World War, respectable Egyptians insulted Sharifian (rebel Arab) officers from the Hijaz whom they encountered in a theatre. Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism p. 47, citing the eye witness account of Abd al-Fattah Abul-Nasr al-Yafi. In an engaged account of Arab ethnic protest poetry in West Asia up to and after the sharif Husayn's 1916 uprising, al-Zayyat noted that Egyptian writers refused to join in the celebration of Arab independence, because of the English role. "Fadl al-Adab 'ala Wahdat al-'Arab" (The Contribution of Literature to the Unity of the Arabs), Wahy v. 3 p. 273.

\textsuperscript{140} "al-Malik 'Ali" (King 'Ali) 18 February 1935; Wahy v. 1 p. 191.

\textsuperscript{141} The sharif Husayn was slow to internalize the central political assumption of the ethnic nationalisms unfolding in the Ottoman Empire. He accepted that 'Abdul Hamid and the Ottoman Empire had exercised a passable Islamic Caliphate: Husayn tended to see divisive politicized ethnicity as the non-Islamic failing of his neo-Turkicizing but centralizing Committee of Union and Progress opponents. Thus, even in urging the Arabs to revolt in 1916 and 1917, Husayn reproached the CUP for losing lands from the Empire in Europe and Libya. His son 'Abdallah, the future king of Transjordan, was rated by Dawn as having in contrast (tardily) converted to the ideology of Arab political nationality developed prior to World War I by, for instance, the Arab community resident in Constantinople. See C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1973) pp. 54-86.
tribute by both the Egyptian Islamist and his pan-Arab hosts in 'Iraq to the principle of unitary Islamic community that had legitimized the Ottoman Empire, al-Zayyat's endorsement of the revolt by Asia's Arabs became total. An example was a piece he wrote in mourning for Faysal's youthful son Ghazi on the latter's premature death after a short reign as King of 'Iraq. Faysal in his rebellion had been "the model of supreme manliness" chosen by destiny to "effect a revolution and found a state and erect a throne". He and his comrades, the heroes of the Arab Revolution, "fought until the homeland was liberated". The Hashimite family of Faysal was the "solid foundation" of 'Iraq's renaissance as an Arab nation-state; but it was in terms of the Hashimite dynasty's pan-Arab enterprise, larger in scope than 'Iraq or any individual Arab state, that al-Zayyat endorsed Ghazi. Ghazi represented "the youth of the Arabs" that would unite the provisional Arab entities.

Shadows and Dissonances: the Quality of al-Zayyat's Relationship with 'Iraq

The preceding section showed that 'Iraq's pan-Arab nationalists and its (in origin extra-'Iraqi) Hashimite royalty greatly stimulated al-Zayyat's transition from pan-Islam to a pan-Arab ethnic nationalism. But the warm al-Zayyat could not confine his wide-ranging dealings, and friendships, to that group in 'Iraq --- the establishment pan-Arabs --- that most commanded his ideological support. During his three years in 'Iraq, he got sufficiently off-stage to understand the disunities within the establishment and even to form close bonds with 'Iraqi figures very much outside its bounds. His writing well caught the elan of the new Arab nation-state of 'Iraq, as it restored Arab culture and identity, after centuries of Turkish rule. The Ottoman State had propagated Turkish through its limited primary and secondary schools: from the

earliest post-Ottoman years when the British ruled
directly, the 'Iraqis hired Egyptians to develop
Arabic-medium education, even from primary level\textsuperscript{143}. But
al-Zayyat also conveyed political and economic shadows and
dissonances in the new 'Iraq, and the potential for
instability of so heterogeneous a land.

al-Zayyat chose 'Iraq as the subject of the first book
he wrote, al-'Iraqu Kama Ra'aytuh ('Iraq as I Saw It), the
manuscript of which he lost before it could be published.
A surviving fragment printed in al-Risalah caught the
relaxed and democratic relationship that the Sharif Faysal
achieved with 'Iraqis. Sitting in a cafe by the Euphrates,
al-Zayyat saw a shepherd drive a flock of sheep across
Maude Bridge on its way to the abattoirs. Faysal happened
to be returning from al-Zahur palace, and, unattended by
any guard, patiently waited in the crowd by the bridge for
the herd to pass\textsuperscript{144}. While in 'Iraq, al-Zayyat often
visited Faysal's son Prince Ghazi who left a similar
impression: "Ghazi's sublime humility" so seldom found in
"royal youth"; his Hashimite forbearance/tolerance
(samahatihi al-Hashimiyyah) would set the pattern for a
gentle regime under which "consultation" (al-shura) and
democracy would flourish\textsuperscript{145}. (Against his sense that the

\textsuperscript{143} "In the summer of 1918 a Department of Education was organized and
the pertinence in 'Iraq of things Egyptian was again recognized by
putting at the head of this new department a member of the
Egyptian Ministry of Education". Henry A. Foster, The Making of
215.

\textsuperscript{144} "Min Mudhakkirati 1-Yawmiyyah" (From my Diaries), written for
al-Risalah on 15 January 1940; Wahy v. 2 pp. 136-9. Some
foreign observers who had the patterns of European monarchies in
mind, missed the mutual acceptance that Faysal and ordinary
'Iraqis reached. The American Charge d'Affaires reported that he
often saw the King pass along the main street but that only
"foreigners took notice and paused to lift up their hats". For
Kedourie --- alienated from all Middle Eastern nationalisms by
sectarian background --- it indicated that "a decade of rule" had
not increased the "foreign", British-imposed Faysal's popularity

\textsuperscript{145} "al-Malik Ghazi" (The King Ghazi), written for al-Risalah upon
Ghazi's untimely death on April 10 1939; Wahy v. 2 p. 34;
al-Zayyat's second tribute to Ghazi "Huzn al-Malik al-Tifl" (The
Sorrow of the Infant King), written 15 May 1934; Wahy v. 2 p.
46.
Hashimites were relatively democratic monarchs, al-Zayyat was disposed to accept that Faisal and General Nuri al-Sa'id had been right to impose a "moderate dictatorship" on the 'Iraqis when they became too bitterly divided: this policy should be resumed under Faisal II, who succeeded when Ghazi was killed in an automobile accident after a brief reign.\textsuperscript{146} al-Zayyat, then, usually strongly supported the title of the Hashimites to found and lead the Arab 'Iraqi state: they embodied the Islamic qualities of the Hashimite family of the Prophet Muhammad, as 'Iraq's pan-Arab leaders they were the successors of the 'Abbasid Caliphs who directed the Arabs' classical golden age from Baghdad, and they commanded legitimacy among 'Iraqis because they embodied the authentic Arab democratic attitude that he felt Turcophone royalty and politicians glaringly lacked in Egypt.\textsuperscript{147}

But al-Zayyat's lost book on 'Iraq also critically analysed the political and social divisions in transitional 'Iraq. His "great friend" the (generally in opposition) 'Iraqi politician Yasin al-Hashimi assessed in his Cairo hotel that "it might be better for us and for you to postpone publishing the book's political section for a while\textsuperscript{148}. In 1924, al-Hashimi's leadership of those 'Iraqis opposed to the ratification of the Anglo-'Iraqi treaty caused the apparently amenable Constituent Assembly that the British had fostered to veer around against it\textsuperscript{149}. Yasin won esteem in Egypt as a pan-Arab.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{146} "al-Malik Ghazi" p. 35.
\textsuperscript{147} Faisal had led 'Iraq with the intelligence of the Prophet's son-in-law, the fourth Caliph 'Ali and the genius-like shrewdness (daha') of Mu'awiyah from the throne of the 'Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid. "al-Malik Ghazi" p. 33.
\textsuperscript{148} "Min Mudhakkirati 1-Yawmiyyah", p. 137.
\textsuperscript{149} Kedourie, Chatham House Version p. 265.
\textsuperscript{150} Yasin al-Hashimi In 1936 was viewed by al-Zayyat as a driving-force in exchanges between 'Iraq and Egypt that could one day obliterate their borders: he was integrating Egyptians and 'Iraqis as effectively as the veteran pan-Arab Egyptian capitalist Tala'at Harb or the then Egyptian Minister of Education Muhammad 'Ali 'Allubah. al-Zayyat, "Shabab al-'Iraq fi Misr" ('Iraq's Youth in Egypt), written 3 March 1936; Wahy v. 2 p. 300. Nuri al-Sa'id, a participant in the Sharif Husayn's 1916 Arab Revolt, was Foreign Minister in al-Hashimi's government and wanted tightened pan-Arab relations with Egypt to open into a military...
although his group had Ottomanist twinges against establishment 'Iraqi pan-Arabs'. During his stay in Baghdad, al-Zayyat had got on cordial terms with a circle of six discontented 'Iraqis prominent in the army, administration, education and politics. Among them was the leftist Kamil al-Jadirchi who placed himself on principle in the ranks of successive oppositions. al-Jadirchi was Yasin al-Hashimi's right hand in the (opposition) Hizb al-Ikha' al-Watani (Patriotic Fraternity Party) for a time until that party also, when it compromised about Britain's presence, won in March 1933 an invitation to form an administration. al-Jadirchi thereupon left the Ikha' and joined the al-Ahali group, founded by young anti-establishment intellectuals, which from 1934 advocated the application to 'Iraq's social development of al-Sha'biyyah (Populism). Influenced by communism, the Sha'biyyah ideology explicitly rejected all nationalisms because nationalism by its nature caused --- or hypocritically justified --- bloodshed and tyranny.

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al-Zayyat, "al-Halqah..." (The Ring/Circle...), n.d, Wahy v. 1 pp. 328-331. This name "al-halqah" was given by Yasin al-Hashimi, well-acquainted with its members. Ibid p. 328. al-Zayyat listed them as Taha al-Hashimi, Chief-of-Staff of the 'Iraqi Army, Naji al-Asil the director of the Teachers' Tertiary College in Baghdad where al-Zayyat was lecturer in Arabic literature, Yusuf 'Izz al-Din (Supervisor of the Budget), Kamil al-Jadirchi, Muwaffaq al-Alusi the director of the Law College and Shawkat al-Zahawi, a Ministry of Health physician. Ibid pp. 328-329.

The important point is that al-Zayyat was granted a regular "soft seat" at the discussions of a group that fancied itself to represent "younger generation 'Iraq", "the common people before the elite and 'Iraq before Arabism". He was in touch with figures on the very margin of tolerated opposition to the monarchy-centred self-validatingly pan-Arab political establishment and to the British military presence. (However, because of Islam, al-Zayyat always opposed the 'Iraqi Communists, the radical opposition). Hikmat Sulayman, a Turkophile "friend" of the "ring", brought many of its members into the not over-Arabist government that the Kurd Chief-of-Staff General Bakr Sidqi ushered in when he briefly overthrew parliamentary government in October 1936. Sidqi, whose brutality al-Zayyat detested, tried to rebuild the Army on Ataturkist lines.

al-Zayyat's 1940 obituary to the lately-assassinated Rustum Haydar, a Syrian-born Shi'i, advisor to Faysal on both internal and foreign policy and frequently a minister in the 'Iraqi cabinets, blended sympathy and critical analysis. It vividly evoked Haydar's intelligence, application, consciously cultivated dignity and his controlled, tense vitality: invariably reserved, the minister's quietness was that of deep water under whose cold surface thoughts and secrets eddied. al-Zayyat came to respect Rustum Haydar, but faulted two aspects:

1. Education: as King Faysal's foremost advisor on financial and economic matters, Rustum exercised his

154. "al-Halqah...", Wahy v. 1 p. 330. Another Egyptian, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzaro, as Egyptian Minister in Baghdad, was able to establish rapport with the Ahali group, although they were non-Arabist, after Sidqi's October 1936 coup. Coury "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?" IJMES 1982 p. 267.

155. Pan-Arabism was down-graded in 'Iraq following the seizure of power by the in origin Kurdish General Bakr Sidqi in 1936. Khadduri, Independent 'Iraq pp. 97-8, 100. Bakr's collaborator as Prime Minister, the elder politician Hikmat Sulayman had been educated in the Ottoman period in Constantinople and modelled his "reformism" on Ataturkism. Ibid pp. 77-8. For Hikmat as the "friend" of the "halqah" who bestowed cabinet posts on its members after the coup, see al-Zayyat, "al-Halqah", Wahy v. 1 p. 331. al-Zayyat clearly detested Sidqi as "chronically ambitious" (tammah) and murderous. Ibid.
influence to restrict secondary and higher education (while expanding primary and technical education) because he feared that a growing, under-employed intelligentsia might one day challenge the power of the established political leaders in 'Iraq.

2. He misused the government's allocation of lands to politically control restive tribes farming them, by grant or withdrawal of agrarian leases. When al-Zayyat was in 'Iraq in 1932, his friend Hasan al-Suhayl, amir of the Banu Tamim, opted for an opposition party: Rustum as Minister of Finance promptly ended his tenure of 15,000 feddans of land, citing specious administrative criteria to a remonstrating al-Zayyat. Kedourie over decades exaggerated communal conflict between (a) Sunni Arab 'Iraqis, ruling 'Iraq in partnership with the non-'Iraqi pan-Arabs who come with the Sunni Faysal, and (b) the more numerous but poorer Shi'i Arab 'Iraqis supposedly subordinated under the Hashimites.

156. "Amal wa Dhikra" (Hope and A Memory), 29 January 1940; Nahy v. 2 pp. 145-7. Rustum Haydar, in origin a Syrian non-'Iraqi Shi'ite who came with Faysal and other ideological pan-Arabs to 'Iraq following World War I, was Faysal's Chief of Royal Divan and served as minister in various 'Iraqi government portfolios; at the time of his assassination on 18 January 1940, he was Minister of Finance in a cabinet headed by General Nuri al-Sa'id. He was known as a champion of 'Iraq's underprivileged Shi'ite community. Khadduri, Independent 'Iraq, pp. 15, 39, 48-9, 86, 102, 121, 144-6. Cf. Kedourie's generalization that the pan-Arabs dominant down the decades of the Hashimite monarchy in 'Iraq manipulated land-holdings to enrich themselves, punish political opposition, and to build up a "servile clientele of tribal shaikhs". Kedourie, Chatham House Version, pp. 266-9.

157. Indicating the pan-Arab Hashimite 'Iraqi state as Sunni-supremacist, Kedourie in 1970 printed in full a communalist denunciation by a self-appointed "Executive Committee of the Shi'ahs in 'Iraq", sent on to the British Government in 1932. The "proclamation" charged that the establishment systematically seized the Shi'i's religious endowments and lands, discriminated against them in the allocation of ministries, and withheld from Shi'i majority areas educational and health facilities provided to the Sunni-populated regions. "The Shi'ah sect shall take charge of the administration". Kedourie, Chatham House Version, pp. 283-5. In 1988 Kedourie extended his sectarian explication of 'Iraqi politics to the fall of pro-British PM Salih Jabr, in 1947-1948 the country's first Shi'ite in the post (he was succeeded by another). Elie Kedourie, "Anti-Shi'ism in 'Iraq under the Monarchy", Middle Eastern Studies v. 24:2, April 1988, pp. 249-253. al-Zayyat had empathy for both Lebano-Syrian...
He argued that the pan-Arab ideology propagated by Turkicized Syrian Arab educationalist Sati' al-Husri in 'Iraq's schools, stimulated ill-will between 'Iraq and neighboring non-Arab Iran. Persistent bad relations between the monarchical 'Iraqi government and Sa'udi Arabia were similarly contrary to 'Iraq's interest of having good relations with its neighbors: the Hashimites sometimes dreamed they could wrest back the Hijaz, their place of origin, from the Sa'udis. al-Zayyat's impression was that the multi-sectarian --- not exclusively Sunni --- pan-Arabs who came with Faysal could rather flexibly interact with 'Iraq's more backward Shi'i community, and arbitrate its conflicts with 'Iraqi Sunni elements traditionally dominant in the bureaucracy and the military. Rustum Pasha was "mistrusted by the prejudiced Sunnis" and the "nativist 'Iraqi" anti-Syrian elements because he "championed the cause of the Shi'i community." al-Zayyat stressed the collaboration when Rustum Haydar's influence on policy was paramount between palace-government on one hand and the internal Shi'i interest on the other: "it was Rustum's policy after reliance on the Thames [England] to rely on the Euphrates before the [Sunni-peopled] Tigris because [the populations around] the Euphrates were Shi'ite in doctrine and on its banks were settled powerful nomad tribes."

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CHRISTIANS AND 'IRAQ'S SHI'ITES VERSUS THE SUNNITES

TRADITIONALLY DOMINANT IN "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKS"

AL-ZAYYAT, "ANTUN AL-JUMAYYIL" WRITTEN 17 OCTOBER 1949, WAHY V. 3 P. 157.

158. KEDOURIE, CHATHAM HOUSE VERSION P. 274.
159. Ibid p. 272; al-Zayyat, though, who knew King 'Ali --- briefly the Hijaz' last Hashimite monarch --- well in Baghdad, remembered him as not disoriented by his nostalgia for his lost "rocky" Hijaz kingdom from sustaining a moderating and mediatory role in Baghdad's heated politics. "AL-MALIK 'ALI" PP. 189-190.
160. KHADDURI, INDEPENDENT 'IRAQ P. 145.
"strengthening his position through [alignment with the 'Iraqi] Shi'is", Rustum incidentally hoped that they would be a force to keep "Najd" (ie. the threatening Wahhabi Sa'udi Arabian State) at bay and to promote cordial relations with Iran.\textsuperscript{161} al-Zayyat thus perceived that the Hashimite and pan-Arab establishment's feud with Sa'udi Arabia at least sometimes dovetailed into its conciliation of local Arabic-speaking 'Iraqi Shi'ites, and Shi'ite Persia externally. Common resistance to the Sa'udi-led Wahhabis, whose raids had devastated shrines of twelver Shi'ism in 'Iraq, provided a point for identification by 'Iraqi Shi'ites with the Hashimite-led pan-Arab 'Iraqi state. An anti-Sa'udi foreign policy provided common ground for 'Iraqi Shi'ites, for the 'Iraqi Sunni bureaucratic and military strata once a component of the Ottoman State that had fought the Wahhabis, and for the Sa'udis' dynastic rivals the Hashimites. Recent historiography has stressed efforts by some Shi'ite leaders from the 1920s to integrate a new political community with Sunni 'Iraqis under the Hashimite monarchical system. These Shi'ites projected that participation, not polarization, was the approach to raise their community to political and economic equality with the traditionally more developed, less numerous, Sunni Arab 'Iraqis, and to remove the British.\textsuperscript{162} From the outset aware of Shi'i under-privilege and ethos, Faysal, until his death in 1933, applied what resources his state had to educate the Shi'is, expand their opportunities, and integrate them with

\textsuperscript{161} al-Zayyat, "Amal wa Dhikra" p. 146.

\textsuperscript{162} Batatu (1987) stressed that the Shi'ite 'ulama had only feeble influence upon the tribally fragmented rural Shi'is when the 'Iraq state was formed in 1921. Ja'far Abul-Timmam, the Shi'i trader from Baghdad, worked for Sunni-Shi'i unity to eliminate the power of the British, sidestepping any sectarianization of politics. Hanna Batatu, "'Iraq's Shi'ah: their Political Role and the Process of their Integration into Society", in Barbara Freyer Stowasser (ed.), The Islamic Impulse (London: Croom Helm 1987) pp. 204-207.

\textsuperscript{163} Batatu assessed that Faysal I (r. 1921-1933) and the monarchy until it sided with the British in 1941, satisfactorily brought the underprivileged Shi'ah into the government bureaucracy and, through conscription, into the army in order to integrate them with the Sunnis. \textit{Ibid} p. 207.
The secondment of Egyptian teachers and educationalists to 'Iraq after 1918 acquainted them and 'Iraq's pan-Arabs with each other. Mahmud 'Azmi, a former al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah publicist, argued in a 1938 al-Hilal article that Sati' al-Husri, by propagating as Minister of Education in 'Iraqi schools an exclusive Arabism, created hostility with the Kurds within the State and, in foreign policy, with neighboring non-Arab Iran. al-Zayyat knew and admired al-Husri and Rustum Haydar alike, evaluating each as equally "inflexible in opinion": other non-'Iraqis or pan-Arabs such as Rustum Haydar limited al-Husri's influence on the development of 'Iraqi education, as well as his capacity to impose the distance that his pan-Arab nationalist ideology demanded between Arab 'Iraq and non-Arab Iran. al-Zayyat depicted al-Husri much less than 'Azmi as a nationalist ideologue intent to politicize student youth, more as an educationalist with a concern to propagate the general humanities more widely in 'Iraq, for their own sake, through an expansion of secondary and higher education. While al-Zayyat was in 'Iraq (1929 - 1932), Sati' al-Husri's demand that higher humanities education be expanded to spread "pure knowledge" without regard to political or sectarian considerations was successfully blocked by a group in the establishment, led by Rustum Haydar, that urged contraction of theoretical secondary and higher education. Rustum was determined


165. Reeva S. Simon allows that before 1918 Sati' al-Husri was a liberal Ottomanist who stressed the role of the individual in society and the linguistic rights of minorities; he opposed the (Turkish) linguistic nationalism being developed by Ziya Gokalp. She also traces his opposition to Sami Shawkat's drives to install a racist Arab militarism, with its Hitler youth-style paramilitary Futuwwah, in 'Iraqi schools. Nonetheless, Simon still views al-Husri as, following a conversion when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, a much more single-mindedly pan-Arabist educationalist than did al-Zayyat. Reeva S. Simon, "The Teaching of History in
to offer more primary schools to his constituency in the Shi'ite areas\(^{166}\); he also wanted to limit the politicizing influence of imported Egyptian educationalists on 'Iraqi students. He left al-Zayyat in no doubt as well that many Egyptians' support during the First World War for the centralizing, still formally Islamic, Ottoman State when its Arabs rose in 1916, still rankled with the pan-Arab establishment in the 'Iraqi state into the 1930s. For this complex of reasons "Rustum Haydar used to turn his face away from Egypt"\(^{167}\).

al-Zayyat's relationship with 'Iraqi ideologues and writers continued to develop after he returned to Egypt, down decades through their contributions to his Cairo magazine al-Risalah, a crucial conduit through which these 'Iraqis got through to educated Egyptians. Thus it was al-Risalah in 1938 that first published the article "Between Egypt and Arabism" and a further article "On Arab Unity" in which al-Husri polemically exaggerated motifs by the in reality Arab-centricizing Taha Husayn that Egyptians were Egyptians before anything else, were unrelated to the Arabs by blood, and had a separate history. al-Husri deepened the impact of his argument to Egyptians by publishing collections of his articles and addresses as books in Cairo; he migrated to Egypt and in the last phase of his Arab nationalist career was director of the Institute of Arab Research and Studies that the League of Arab States established there\(^{168}\). (al-Husri left a

\(^{166}\) Affirmative action in various fields had long had backing from King Faysal. Rustum Haydar's educational policy, despite his non-'Iraqi origin, was similar to that pursued by native 'Iraqi Shi'i educationalists such as Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali, who nonetheless maintained al-Husri's desectarianizing Arab nationalist curricula. Simon, ibid pp. 38-39. In contrast to al-Jamali's concern to offer primary and vocational education that would bring practical development to Shi'i areas, al-Husri argued that the fallahun should first be given a new national consciousness and then improved methods in agriculture. Ibid p. 39.

\(^{167}\) The perspective on Rustum in this paragraph was that of al-Zayyat in "'Amal wa Dhikra" pp. 145-7.

persisting influence upon pan-Arab thinking among subsequent generations of Egyptians under Nasir, Sadat and Mubarak: he again became widely read in Egypt as pan-Arab nationalism revived in the 1980s).\textsuperscript{169} \textit{al-Risalah} also extensively published the poems of the 'Iraqi poets Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi (1863-1937) and Ma'ruf al-Rusafi (1875-1945), whose friend al-Zayyat had become during his residence in 'Iraq earlier.

al-Zayyat had early, while in 'Iraq (1929-1933), become aware of the clout of British officials there. To the late 1940s, though, he depicted the Hashimite monarchy-centred systems in 'Iraq and Transjordan as serving the Arab interest: spiritually fusing 'Iraq and Egypt, he ignored mounting rivalry between their two monarchies. al-Zayyat was the least concerned of all Egyptian pan-Arabs that pan-Arabism promote Egypt's interests but even he in 1947 was finally unable to stomach the two Hashimite States' tacit support for Britain against Egypt in the UN Security Council. Syria and Lebanon's support for Egypt's complaint in the Council had "made the face of Arabism shine" in contrast to Transjordan and 'Iraq, held under imperialist control by

\textsuperscript{169} In 1985, writing at the end of a period in which "some of the Arabs extended their hands to Israel", the Egyptian critic Raja' al-Naqqash hailed Sati' as the Arab thinker in the 20th century who had propounded the concept of Arabism with most "depth" and "clarity". He tended to accept al-Husri's self-image that he had been locked in almost lone combat with a serious "secessionist" neo-Pharaonic movement out to establish colloquial Egyptian as a particularist literary language and give Egypt a Western personality. al-Naqqash found very attractive al-Husri's non-racial linguistic nationalism --- an Arab was anyone who spoke Arabic and belonged to Arab society in his interests and future, even if he had Turkish, Berber or Negro origins. Islam was the venture in history that brought the Arabs together with many other peoples, fusing them all into a new Arab nation, "the principles of Islam" fostering "a new concept of Arabism"; but like al-Husri, al-Naqqash in 1985 was careful to make room for Christian Arabs in the historical Arab nation. With the arguments al-Husri had used in the 1930s and 1940s, he tried to draw Muslim Egyptians away from wide pan-Islamism, to narrow their energies within the sphere of a pan-Arab unification, ostensibly a preliminary. Raja' al-Naqqash, "Mihnatu Mufakkirin 'Arabi" (The Ordeal of An Arab Thinker), al-Nahar (Sydney) 8 March 1985 p. 8. For Husri's 1944 prototype of the latter argument, Haim, Arab Nationalism pp. 147-153.
Glubb, British commander of the Transjordanian army, and by Kinahan Cornwallis in 'Iraq. "The youth of the Arabs" were kindling "a Holy Fire" that would consume the scorpion-like fake pan-Arabs planted in their region by imperialism.\(^{170}\)

al-Zahawi had from the late nineteenth century been championing the emancipation of women, and modern science as he understood it, in Egyptian newspapers.\(^{171}\) He had innovated a simplified poetical language more like ordinary speech, breaking with traditional classicist poetical diction.\(^{172}\) al-Husri, al-Zahawi and al-Rusafi had all mastered Turkish, had all lived for prolonged periods in Ottoman Constantinople. They transmitted to al-Zayyat the political tyranny and insecurity of life in Constantinople under both 'Abdul-Hamid and the Young Turks. All had the secularist spirit that spread among educated Ottoman Turks, which Ataturk later embodied in the Turkish national state. Their lack of traditional Islamic belief disconcerted al-Zayyat --- but also gave him a much livelier, more modern vision of late Hamidian and early CUP-led Turkey, in which it became an option for intellectuals to ridicule traditional Islam in public, if at picaresque risk to their life and limb as Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi found as a post-1908 Ottoman parliamentarian.\(^{173}\)

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170. "Awliya' wa A'da'" (Friends and Enemies), written 3 February 1947; Wahy v. 3 p. 226. al-Rabit al-Shari'iyah, magazine of the Liberal Constitutionalists-linked association of that name, in 1930 reacted coldly to 'Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id's proposal for "an Arab Alliance". The magazine suggested that he proposed the scheme at the prompting of Britain, with which 'Iraq had just signed a treaty, in order to "limit French influence in Syria ... and also to combat Soviet and Italian influence in Yemen". Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 pp. 186-7. King Faysal's and Nuri al-Sa'id's schemes of unity were rejected by Britain as impractical ... The British tried very hard not to give offence to French susceptibilities". Porath, In Search of Arab Unity p. 315.


173. Although a vocal freethinker, Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi became a director of the government press and editor of the official newspaper in Baghdad in the Hamidian era. After the Committee of Union and Progress overthrew 'Abdul Hamid's absolutism in 1908, al-Zahawi became a deputy representing 'Iraq in the Ottoman Parliament (Majlis-i-Mab'uthan). When a large sum was to be
al-Rusafi for 11 years studied Arabic, Islamic and linguistic sciences under 'Iraq's great (Arab-centric) religious scholar Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi who tried to ignite his own salafi revivalist Islamist zeal in his pupil. But, al-Zayyat observed, al-Rusafi emerged from these studies Muslim in tongue, jahili (pagan) at heart\textsuperscript{174}. Such 'Iraqi intellectuals' secularism, however, sapped a basis of the Asian Arabs' pre-1916 political community with the Muslim Turks and now helped al-Zayyat, also, see the bygone Ottoman State from new, less respectful --- less religious --- angles that registered pre-1918 ethnic conflict between its Turks and Arabs more.

al-Zayyat was unusually totalist and undivided in his identification with other Arabs beyond Egypt and to be sure his pan-Arabism was very much shaped by the ancient books allocated in the budget for recitations from al-Bukhari's collection of hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) "for the blessings" that would bring navy vessels, he ironically interpolated that the money should come from the Ministry of Religious Endowments, not from the Defense Ministry: "the ships of the fleet are propelled bil-bukhari la bil-Bukhari" (by steam, not by al-Bukhari). al-Zahawi had to evade fury in the chamber and riotous violence from the common people. al-Zayyat, "Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi", written 26 March 1937; Wahy v. 1 p. 360.

\textsuperscript{174} al-Zayyat, "Ma'raf al-Rusafi", written 26 March 1945; Wahy v. 3 p. 20. While lecturing in 'Iraq, he had visited the poet in his house in the Baghdad prostitutes' quarter where he would die in destitute squalor. The aesthete al-Zayyat was prepared to tolerate the late poet's exhibitionist rakishness and vocal but eloquent atheism: "al-Rusafi --- may Allah be kind to him --- was the authentic tribune of 'Iraq" who long articulated its drive for independence (p. 20); "as regards his belief ('aqidah), this is for God, not people, to decide whereas his poetical gift merits assessment by the literary critics" (p. 22). al-Zayyat deeply responded to al-Rusafi as the fearless, altruistic political poet who satirized the despot 'Abdul Hamid before the 1908 Young Turk revolution, recounting the ups and downs of his attempts to find a career in Hashimite, Arab nationalist 'Iraq: its Mu'awiyah-like king Faysal at first placated al-Rusafi's satire with a seat in Parliament but then, inevitably, barred the honest poet from it. al-Rusafi's life-long insecurity and poverty provoked some of al-Zayyat's most alienated characterizations of the Hashimites, whom his language now (1945) bracketed with 'Abdul Hamid: even King Faysal, successor of the 'Abbasids, had not in al-Rusafi's case altogether transcended the eternal reluctance of those who govern to subsidize any poetry except when the public's response could affect political authority. Ibid pp. 21-22; "al-Rusafi wal-Agha Khan: aw al-Za'im al-Adabi wal-Za'im al-Dini" (al-Rusafi and the Agha Khan: or the Literary Leader and the Religious Leader), written 9 April 1945 --- Wahy v. 3 pp. 25-26.
and ancient experiences separate sets of people only tenuously connected to twentieth century Arabs. Yet even al-Zayyat, the acme of ardent and energetic Egyptian pan-Arabism, did not maintain the romanticism where it could have dangerously obscured 'Iraqi realities that he experienced. He did not deviate from that common sense and alertness to practicalities so salient in pre-1952 pan-Arabism in Egypt. al-Zayyat conveyed to Egyptians 'Iraq's plural reality: a real multi-ethnic and factionalized Arab country, not some ideological chimera; he analysed with critical intelligence 'Iraq's pan-Arab establishment, which he in general endorsed.

Although 'Iraq was less developed and less ethnically integrated than Egypt and long dependent on Egyptians for its educational development, al-Zayyat clearly respected 'Iraqis as equal in aesthetic matters in particular. In 1945 he equated the (he allowed, atheistical) al-Rusafi, who had just died at seventy, "one of the five strings of the lute of purely Arabic poetry" --- with Egypt's two greatest modern poets Hafiz Ibrahim and Ahmad Shawqi. The radically secular religious scepticism of some 'Iraqi poets had caught the attention of even that ultra-modernist enemy of traditional Arabo-Islamic culture in Egypt, Salamah Musa --- dissolving his insularity even in the much more Pharaonist 1920s. Hierarchical attitudes of noblesse oblige vis-a-vis 'Iraq did not fatally stain the majority of Egyptian intellectuals after World War I. There can be no doubt that the contribution such expatriate

175. "Ma'ruf al-Rusafi" p. 20.
176. The far-reaching religious unbelief of the aged al-Zahawi electrified two extreme Egyptianist modernist secularists he met in Egypt in 1924, Zaki Abu Shadi and the Copt Salamah Musa, who found the anti-religious ms. diwan he left unpublishable in Egypt. The Education of Salamah Musa pp. 164-5. However, the meeting also brought home to Musa how alike all Arabic-speakers were and their common struggle to beat off the various violent imperial powers attacking them. For the pan-Arabizing aspect of Salamah Musa's reaction to al-Zahawi in 1924 see Coury, "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?" - 2, IJMES v. 14 (1982) p. 472. There was much Egyptian press publicity about al-Zahawi in 1924, for example, "Tarjamat Faylasuf al-'Iraq Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi" (An Account of 'Iraq's Philosopher Sidqi al-Zahawi) al-Mugattam 26 June 1924, p. 2.
Egyptian intellectuals as al-Zayyat made to the three-tier development of education in 'Iraq was decisive for the new state's modernization and integration, in the diversification of its neo-classicist Arab high culture, and in the propagation of the standard literary language as the medium of culture and modern life, and for the solidification of pan-Arab nationalism as the ideology of the largest single group of educated 'Iraqis. In the 1980s, eminent 'Iraqi Ba'hist intellectuals and decision-makers remembered the seminal contributions of al-Zayyat and other compatriots in that era.

Christians in al-Zayyat's Arabism

Literature and its standard language intimately linked al-Zayyat to Arabic-speaking Christians, in particular those in, or from, Lebanon-Syria. However, he did not transfer Muslim-Christian interaction within literature and culture over into the political community of Arabism.

al-Zayyat's pan-Islamism was limited by ethnicity. At best, Islam stands in his thought as a basis for effective community, cultural-Intellectual or political, between Arabs and non-Arab Muslims only where the latter wholeheartedly adopt Arabic as their standard medium of literature and government. He was sharply aware of the Arabs as historically a distinct --- if incorporative --- community within Islam. al-Zayyat's articles had some potential to somewhat detach the Arabic language and the specific Arab culture, developing down the centuries from origins in pre-Islamic Arabia, from Islam. Could Arabic and Arab cultural patterns then become bases for political community without regard to sect --- offering Arabic-speaking Christians membership in al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah, the Arab Nation?

177. 'Abd al-Salam Muhammad 'Arif, the foremost Nasserite leader in the 1958 'Iraqi revolution that overthrew the monarchy, told Musa Sabri that "al-Risalah was the forum from which we received our most crucial lessons of [Arab] Unity, nationalism and literature". Shushah, "Ma'al-Udaba'...", al-Ra'id March 1961 p.230.
Christians as participants in at least the cultural community of Arabic in the classical but especially in the modern periods. Appreciating the standard Arabic language for itself and not simply as the medium for Islam, he hailed the crucial role of Lebanese Christians in (a) publishing almost lost classical manuscripts and (b) adapting Arabic prose to express modern life. Al-Zayyat's personal friends among Christian Lebanese/Syrians resident in Egypt included "Mayy" (Mary Ziyadah). The Nazareth-born Islamophile Mayy was a stylistic and intellectual innovator in Arabic literature in the 1920s particularly, conducting a salon attended by such Egyptian writers as her neo-classicist lover Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i and such al-Siyasah intellectuals as Taha Husayn. Although Taha was a sectionally Westernist enemy of al-Rafi'i, he also rightly was seen as partly neo-classicist himself by that milieu al-Zayyat linked May's pride in her language to her pride in "Arab race" and described her as "the Arab woman Mayy who took the light of Arabism from"

178. Giora Eliraz, "The Social and Cultural Conception of Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i", Asian and African Studies (Haifa) v. 13:2, July 1979, p. 106. Mayy's father, Ilyas Ziyadah, as editor of the Cairo al-Mahrusah had instanced Christian "Syrian" political identification with Muslim Turks and Arabs. During fighting between the Ottoman State and Greece in 1912, al-Mahrusah called for Egyptians, as Ottoman subjects, to donate to the fitting-out of the Ottoman fleet against the Greeks. "Hadith Ma'a Yunani -- A'mal al-Wataniyyat al-Fa'alah" (Conversation with a Greek -- the Effective Acts of Patriotism), al-Mahrusah 15 October 1912 p. 3; cf. "al-Tahammus fi Bayrut" (The Fighting Spirit in Bayrut), ibid. Identification of Egyptians as Ottomans, like common Arabness, would, of course, deny that the immigrant Ottoman Christian Syrians were marginal aliens in Egypt.

179. In the milieu of Mayy's salon, Taha was viewed as himself an Arabo-classicist as much as Western-orientated figure, given, for example, his unbroken flow of books and articles on such non-Egyptian classical Arabs as Abul-'Ala' al-Ma'arri. Mayy correctly recognized Taha's blindness as one of the common points she no doubt saw religious doubt as another that enabled him to write with so much empathy about the blind hermit of al-Ma'arrah. Underestimating his sensitivity to his disability, she nick-named Taha "Abul-'Ala'", drawing a reproachful letter from him. Bassam Mansur, "Ma'aqtirab Maw' id Mi'awiyyat Milad 'Amid al-Adab al-`Arabi: Mu'nis Taha Husayn: Abi Kana Qummatan fil-Tafa'ul wa Qummatan fil-Ya's" (As the Centenary of the Birth of the Doyen of Arabic Literature Draws Near: Mu'nis Taha Husayn: My Father Could Be the Acme of Both Optimism and Despair), al-Nahar (Sydney) 19 October 1989 p. 14.
Cairo's Syrian Christian-owned journals al-Hilal and al-Mugtataf: he clearly felt that Arabic literature was helped to revive by the Western culture --- and even the mildly Christian ethos --- such Syrian Christian writers injected180. Mayy introduced al-Zayyat in 1934 to a Lebanese Catholic, Antun al-Jumayyil (1887 - 1949), editor of al-Ahram, who became his close friend181. al-Jumayyil in 1909 published in Cairo his play al-Samaw'al aw Wafa' al-'Arab (al-Samaw'al or the Loyalty of the Arabs). The pre-Islamic Arabian Jew al-Samaw'al Ibn 'Adiya, as the embodiment of Arab faithfulness to plighted word, refused to surrender some arms entrusted to him by Imra' al-Qays to the latter's enemies when they surrounded his (al-Samaw'al's) stronghold --- even when they killed his captured son before his eyes. al-Zayyat was well aware of other Christian Lebano-Syrian or Egypto-Syrian writers --- such as Nasif al-Yaziji (1800-1871) --- whose revival of the integral idioms of the classical Arabs in new high

180. "Bi Munasabat al-Arba'in: Ba'd al-Kalam fi 'May'" (On the Occasion of the Forthieth Day Since Her Death: Some Observations on Mayy), 8 December 1941; Wahy v. 2, pp. 312-5. al-Zayyat in this tribute was aware that she was educated in the 'Ayn Turah Catholic school in Kisrawan, Lebanon. Ibid p. 313. He saw the grounding Lebanese and Syrian Christians received in Western languages in such schools, and consequent influence from secular European literature and sciences as well as the Bible, as a source of renewal for the "yellowing", rigid Arabic literature of Muslim Arabs, such as that patterned by al-Azhar. Ibid. al-Zayyat tried to leave the impression that al-Rafi'i had only had a one-sided infatuation with Mayy at her salon. Ibid p. 315.

181. "Antun al-Jumayyil", al-Zayyat's speech on assuming membership in the Arabic Language Academy following al-Jumayyil's death. Written 17 October 1949; Wahy v. 3, pp. 150-160. In this speech, al-Zayyat traced many crucial or important contributions by both neo-classicist and West-patterned modernist Christian Lebano-Syrian writers to the renaissance of Arabic literature. al-Zayyat also had empathy for Christian Lebanese/Syrians as facing discrimination in the Ottoman Empire that prodded them to migrate to Egypt and elsewhere. Ibid p. 157.

182. al-Zayyat contrasted Christian neo-classicists to the modernist Christian Lebanese-Syrian writers who originated for all Arabic-speakers adequate vocabularies for "the different arts and modern inventions through [their] translations, original works, theatre, press and commercial activities". In the first, uncompromisingly neo-classicist category was the Lebanese Catholic Nasif al-Yaziji (1800-1871) who in his Majma' al-Bahrayn (The Conjunction-Place of the Two Seas) imitated al-Hariri's Maqamat, and his son Ibrahim al-Yaziji's Lughat al-Jara'id (The Language of the Newspapers) which followed al-Hariri's Durrat

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literature\textsuperscript{182} came close to the preciousity of Muslim Egyptian neo-classicists, such as al-Rafi'i. It at once moved and amused him that Catholic Arabic scholars of Arabic he knew echoed the Muslim Arabs' Islam-stimulated linguistic myths, about Arabic\textsuperscript{183}. One balance, though, and something like Taha (B 74), he was more interested in the Fertile Crescent Christians' more crucial installation of Western modernity within Arabic, a contribution he knew was still not quite integrated\textsuperscript{184}. Sects-neutral, secular elements of the classical Arab heritage and the common enterprise of preserving and modernizing Arabic did provide ground on which al-Zayyat could meet Christian Syrians, especially, as fellow Arabs. The question was if this cross-sectarian cultural community did not always readily translate into a multi-sectarian

al-Ghawwas, al-Yaziji had spent his youth in service of the Amir Bashir; and became Christian Lebanon's first leading neo-classical Arabic grammarian and writer. As al-Zayyat observed, he modelled his style upon classical Arab authors such as al-Hariri. Ibid pp. 155-6. Abu Muhammad al-Qasim Ibn 'Ali al-Hariri was born in 1054 AD near Basrah and died in the city in 1112 AD: in his 50 Maqamat al-Hariri Ibn Hammam narrates in ornate rhymed prose his repeated encounters with the vagabond and confidence trickster Abu Zayd al-Saruji. al-Hariri's Durrat al-Ghawwas fi Awham al-Khawass (The Diver's Pearl in the Errors of the Elect) is a grammatical treatise discussing the solecisms which people of education were wont to commit; it had been edited by Thorbecke (Leipzig, 1871).

\textsuperscript{183} al-Zayyat in 1950 affectionately noted Arab Christian clergymen who somewhat shared the assumption of the classical Muslims that Arabic conferred loan words on other languages but seldom borrowed any itself. He cited attempts by his late Arabic Language Academy colleague Fr Anastas Marie al-Karmali (1866-1947) to contrive Arabic origins for such commonplace French words as "imbecile" or "garçon". al-Zayyat, "al-Wad al-Lughawi wa Haqq al-Muhdathin fihi", Wahy v. 3 pp. 178-9. al-Zayyat was ironical in this address about the classical philologists' restrictive identification of Arabic with Godhead, and their reluctance to allow word-coining subsequent to early peninsular Arabian Islam: he nonetheless was steeped in the classicist tradition in language that he wanted to make more flexible and saw it as having some modern Christian Arab members. Wahy v. 3 pp. 175-185 passim. For the drive of classical Muslim scholars such as Abu 'Ubaydah and al-Tabari to deny the existence of words of non-Arabic origin in the Qur'an, Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam pp. 344-345. al-Karmali had been editor of the pioneering periodical of Arabic linguistics Lughat al-'Arab and published a short history of Baghdad, Khulasat Ta'rikh Baghdad. George 'Abb al-Salib, 7 October 1990.

\textsuperscript{184} "Antun al-Jumayyil", pp. 152-3, 155-6.
political Arab community. Citing a 1896 poem by the Maronite Ibrahim al-Yaziji, which called on the Arabs to awake instead of submitting to Turkish disdain, al-Zayyat after Nasser's 1952 Revolution projected a sense of the Christian and Muslim Arabs as cοvictims of the Ottoman Turks who ultimately waged a common fight for independence as a linguistic nation. Antun al-Jumayyil had let 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam use al-Ahram as a forum for pan-Arabism; but the Islamist al-Zayyat failed even more than 'Azzam to make the contemporary pan-Arab political community religiously neutral and evoke Christians in it.

Prior to the 1952 Egyptian revolution, al-Zayyat proved unable to himself realize the potentiality of political national community of Muslim with Christian Arabs latent in the essential contributions of the latter to the modernization of Arabic and its literature. Decolonization in the Middle East in the 1930s and 1940s activated al-Zayyat's traditional religious community identification. In 1936 he assured a visiting 'Iraqi youth delegation that Egypt would join the forthcoming Arab union because "her religion has remained your religion and her religion has remained your religion and her religion has remained your religion".

185. (Radio broadcast?) "Nahdat al-'Arab wa Thawratuhum fil-Qarn al-'Ishrin" (The Renaissance of the Arabs and their Revolution in the Twentieth Century), Wahy v. 4 p. 226. For Ibrahim al-Yaziji's part in the reawakening of Arab national consciousness under the Ottomans, Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 276-7. Zeine N. Zeine and Sylvia Haim argued that the Arabism affirmed by such Christians as al-Yaziji was meant to sap the sectarianism of their Muslim Arab compatriots as much as Turkish rule. Ibrahim al-Yaziji was a member of a group of young Christians, many of whom had studied at the Syrian Protestant College in Bayrut, who in 1880 stuck up placards in Bayrut, Tripoli and Damascus calling on Muslim and Christian Arabs together to expel the Turks. Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: with a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East (Bayrut: Khayats 1966) pp. 59-66. al-Yaziji's appeal to the slumbering Arabs was certainly anti-Turkish: "you have no State that offers you support in times of distress: you are of lowly status in the eyes of the Turks, your rights usurped at their hands": Wahy v. 4 p. 266. In a view close to speculation by Zeine and Haim, al-Zayyat observed that the liberal Turkish governor of Syria Miḥdat Pasha "encouraged" such "warning cries" as Yaziji's ode because "he nursed the ambition to become independent in Syria as Muhammad 'Ali became independent in Egypt". Ibid p. 267. Cf. Haim, Arab Nationalism p. 5. Of al-Yaziji's group, Faris Nimr and Ya'qub Sarruf migrated to Egypt in 1885 where they founded al-Mugattam and al-Muqtataf.
language your language". He depicted the struggle to expel "the alien" as bursting forth from congregational mosques: Baghdad's uprising occurred in the Haydarkhanah Mosque, Damascus' "anger" exploded from the Umayyad Mosque, Jerusalem's cry from the Masjid al-Aqsa, Cairo's upsurge originated from the al-Azhar Mosque. al-Zayyat depicted Islam's survival as at stake in Arab North Africa's independence struggles. Decadent France was exercising her authority to cut North Africa off from "its two parents of Islam and Arabism", to compel it "to assimilate to and be lost in her, to live under a flag not its own, to speak someone else's language and to believe in other than its (native) religion". al-Zayyat's sense of decolonization as a religious struggle against a West inimical to Islam made him unaware of Arabic-speaking Christians at the side of the Muslim Arabs struggling for independence. In 1945 al-Zayyat accused De Gaulle's France of attempting to force upon "the Arabs in North Africa and Lebanon and Syria" a French nationality the price of which was relinquishment of "religion". al-Zayyat's analysis in a rough way fitted the situation of the wholly Muslim North Africans,

188. al-Zayyat was not completely accurate here. The Blum-Viollette Plan had prescribed a procedure for "assimilation" (sic) under which qualified, educated Algerians could become French. They did not have to abandon their Muslim legal status, an earlier condition, in order to acquire French citizenship, although they were expected to adopt French as their daily as well as cultural language. Irene L. Gendzier, Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study (London: Wildwood 1973) p. 122. It was only a short time before al-Zayyat wrote that standard Arabic started to become a competitor to French as a literary language among modernizing Algerians. French educators were, as al-Zayyat imagined, trying to cut Algerians off from their parent Arabism. Some French inspectors of primary education in the Algiers department laid it down in 1954 that "neither dialectical Arabic, which has only the status of a patois, nor grammatical Arabic, which is a dead language, nor modern Arabic which is a foreign language, can constitute a compulsory subject of primary education". Neville Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib) (London: OUP 1959) p. 240.

188. al-Zayyat, "Nahdat al-'Arab Mushkilah" (The Renaissance of the Arabs Poses a Problem), penned 2 July 1945; Wahy v. 3 p. 221.
not all of whom spoke Arabic, and for whom shared religion provided a ground on which to resist the French colonialists. However the formulation left the impression that French policy threatened the Islam as well as Arab cultural identity of "the Arabs of Lebanon and Syria" --- many of whom in actuality were non-Muslim Christians. The movement for independence from French rule in Lebanon was the joint enterprise of the Maronite and Sunni Muslim political bosses after they concluded the 1943 National Pact. Under it, Christian leaders would not seek alliances with Western powers and Muslim Lebanese would not seek union with other Arab states. In his references to the anti-imperialist movements in Arab West Asia in the 1930s --- and especially the 1940s --- al-Zayyat in general demonstrated less awareness of the actual coalitions of Arab Muslims and Christians striving to wrest independence in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and 'Iraq than, for instance, the Wafdist leader Mustafa al-Nahhas.\(^{189}\) al-Zayyat knew that half-Christian Lebanon and Syria with its Protestant Foreign Minister were Egypt's main supporters when she complained to the UN Security Council in 1947, but he saw the confrontation in Islamic terms.\(^{190}\)

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\(^{189}\) During a visit to Palestine in 1943, al-Nahhas was hailed as "the Leader of Arabism" but also got hailed in the al-Aqsa mosque as the protector of "the Islamic ummah" (nation) by its imam. Husanayn Karrum, 'Urubah Misr Qabla 'Abd al-Nasir, 1942 - 23 July 1952 (Cairo: al-'Arabi, 1981) v. 1 pp. 20-25. However, during the preparatory congress for the formation of the Arab League in Alexandria in September 1944, al-Nahhas did not --- as he did before --- mention religion among the factors for Arab unification: he was well aware that the Lebanese foreign minister who spoke was Christian. Ibid pp. 41-2. For al-Nahhas' violent protests when France dismissed the Maronite Bisharah al-Khuri's government and Egyptian mobs attacked French property and nationals, ibid pp. 29-31.

\(^{190}\) Following the 1947 Security Council session during which Transjordan and 'Iraq tacitly supported Britain, al-Zayyat thanked Lebanon and Syria. The President of Lebanon then was the Arabist Catholic Bisharah al-Khuri and the Protestant Foreign Minister of Syria Paris al-Khuri served as Chairman of that Security Council session. Yet al-Zayyat at the time saw "the Arab nations" as "spiritually sustained" from Islam for their struggle against imperialism. He thanked his "friend" Paris for his discreet aid for Egypt's cause, but Egypt's delegation derived strength from the (Islamic) crescent in its national flag, its "Book of Allah" and "the states of the Arabs and Islam". al-Zayyat, "Awliya' wa A'da'" (Friends and Enemies) written 3 February 1947, Wahy v. 3
One exception to al-Zayyat's general unawareness of Arabic-speaking Christians as participants in political decolonization in the 1940s is his 1947 statement as the first Palestine war loomed that "driving the Zionists from the heart of Arabism is not a matter that concerns Palestine or the Muslims alone, but a matter concerning all the Arab countries and all the Arabs, whether Muslims or Christians, equally". The issue is not one of religion or race but of resistance to imperialism. In Egypt, Copts had been taking part in resistance to Zionism. However, the religious significance of the land of Palestine, Islamic shrines, always strongly motivated al-Zayyat to resist the establishment of a Jewish state there.

191. al-Zayyat, "Salibiyyah min Naw'in Jadid" (Crusaderism of a New Kind), penned 15 December 1947; Wahy v. 3 p. 247. al-Zayyat in 1934 was also aware of Christian participation in the "life and death struggle" of the Palestinians: Musa Kazim al-Husayni, the recently deceased veteran Palestinian who had conducted negotiations in London, "had denied sectarianism". al-Zayyat, "Kazim al-Husayni", penned 26 March 1934; Wahy v. 1 p. 107.

192. After the outbreak of the Palestine Revolt in 1936, the President of the Young Men's Muslim Association, 'Abd al-Hamid Sa'id, became President of a Supreme Committee for the Relief of Palestinian Victims that also included Dr Muhammad Husayn Haykal. The YMMA formed a special Coptic Committee, which included Coptic politicians such as Tawfiq Dus, to conduct a fund-raising campaign for the Palestinian Arabs within their community. Thomas Mayer, "Egypt and the 1936 Arab Revolt in Palestine", Journal of Contemporary History v. 19:2 (April 1984) p. 277. Although the veteran cleric Sergius declined, the Coptic Patriarch and other Coptic religious dignitaries attended 1947 rallies against the partition of Palestine. B.L. Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics (London: Croom Helm 1986) p. 109.

193. In one 1938 response to the sufferings of the insurgent Palestinians, al-Zayyat identified the land of Palestine with past religious revelations and shrines, and was equally anti-British and anti-Jewish. "Yallahi li-Filastin" (God's Ruth on Palestine), penned 1 August 1938; Wahy v. 1 pp. 452-4. Also to be noted is...
al-Zayyat’s cultural and aesthetic Arabism admitted non-Muslim Christian Arabic-speakers into an intimate partnership to preserve and extend Arabic and its literature. For him, as had been the case with 'Abdallah al-Nadim in the nineteenth century, language almost rivalled religion as a bond and definant of social groups. In the context of the Arabic language he shared with Arab Christians, al-Zayyat could have an empathy for their minority experience and fears rare among Muslim Egyptians. However, when the indigenous populations faced the Western imperialist camp, his deepseated instinct was to evoke Islam as the rallying-point for resistance, excluding other dimensions that anti-imperialist Arab struggle had in the 1930s and 1940s. The simplistic, galvanizing Islamic dimension of Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat’s political pan-Arabism would turn off most Christian Arabs: in this failure his pan-Arabism resembled 'Azzam’s.

al-Zayyat: Contributions and Influence

As an older-generation intellectual, al-Zayyat offered new generations of Egyptians in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s the full ardor of the impulse towards wide supra-Arab pan-Muslim community released in the school of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mustafa Kamil. He combined both the Kamilists’ ultra-politicized drives to restructure international relations by assembling a pan-Muslim bloc and al-Zayyat’s characterization of the Egyptian army that was to fight the Zionists in Palestine as "the Army of Islam". "Lillahi Jayshu Misr" (May God Aid Egypt’s Army), written 31 May 1948; Wahy v. 3 p. 253.

In his 1949 tribute to al-Jumayyil, al-Zayyat was sensitive to the communal insecurity that "the bloody civil war" of 1860 bequeathed in Lebanon’s Christians (he equated them here as "the Lebanese"!), motivating them to migrate from their outlying villages to Bayrut, now the centre of modern foreign education, and from there to Egypt. He compared the Christians under the Ottomans, denied access to education and culture in the metropolis, to the mawali — racially non-Arab clients — whom the Umayyads excluded from government positions. Christians in Syria could hope for no place in "the government of the Turks". "Antun al-Jumayyil", pp. 152, 157. For the mawali, Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam pp. 199-202. For a revisionist, Druze, ascription of the outbreak of the 1860 civil war to a Maronite offensive from 1842 see Adnan Kasaminie, The Crippling of Lebanon (University of Sydney: Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific 1989) pp. 6-17.
the pervasive immediacy of the classical Arabs for the books-steeped Muhammad 'Abduh (especially vis-a-vis modernity). Continents-spanning pan-Islamism could become a mode of international politico-economic association following nationalism, if prerequisites were met. Even in the late 1940s, though, al-Zayyat still visualized non-Arab Muslim populations in a vaguer and more ethnicity-blurred way than had the Kamilists at the turn-of-century: their awareness of modern political and economic possibilities for Muslim integration was distinguished in comparison.

al-Zayyat did increasingly recognize, as the Kamilists had at last so many years before, that the Arabic-speaking inner (nation) community was to be more tightly integrated than the multi-national pan-Islamic camp: these became two separated planes of association. al-Zayyat's pan-Islam bequeathed to his Arabism, though, attitudes that posed problems for actualizing a sects-inclusive pan-Arab political community.

Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat was entirely typical of acculturated intellectuals in finally feeling conflict with Europe and the West in general rather than a narrow national struggle against only Britain. As his second language that pervaded his personality, it was through French that European Westerners registered upon him aesthetically, as potential liberal partners and as racist neo-crusaders.

al-Zayyat's Arabo-Islamic vision did not always cohere, and often he reacted to events with little more than banal topicality. Yet it assured the success of his pan-Arabizing role that even when mired in the atomized mundane he always had more words than ideas, was able to convey local reality in an adaption of 9th and 10th century West Asian Arabic that built up access to an earlier, wider universe beyond the present and beyond Egypt. Taken individually, the elements that al-Zayyat projected and synthesized were far from unique to him among intellectuals. In regard to a new written language, for instance, idioms and vocabulary from the classical Arabs colored most of Taha's writing also: Taha, however,
selected mainly the classical vocabulary that a sizeable audience could follow, whereas al-Zayyat served up classical splinters and blocks that he often had to gloss: he was content to construct only a small ultra-committed constituency with the resolve to complete the jolting journey to a semi-integral Arabic that within modernity now would fuse all ages of the Nation's experience. Like Zaki Mubarak, 'Ali al-Jarim and Taha to a lesser extent, al-Zayyat offered a form of literary Arabic to modernity that in itself embodied, was the Arab nation and its literature. It was seized as an exhilarating expansion or liberation out of a parochial particularism and failed post-1922 political order by a section of secular-educated youth. For many whom the Egyptian government schools --- or deculturizing French missionary girls' schools --- left with a shaky grounding in their language, al-Zayyat's holistic, millenium-spanning nationalist high Arabic offered historical coherence.

al-Zayyat's 1933 rejection of neo-Pharaonism was a distinguished linguistic-nationalist definition of Egypt's identity that unified in one totalistic assault most of the points of dissatisfaction former or ongoing Liberal-Constitutionalist-al-Siyasah intellectuals now felt with that identification. The carefully-aimed assault showed his acute attunedness to modern and West-patterned cultural endeavors of a group of thinkers with which he had spent more time than with any other --- all the while impervious to those theses incongruent with Islam. al-Zayyat smashed out only the neo-Pharaonic weak link in his acculturated clique's overall territorial-particularist ideology. He accurately read them as, in any case, even when linguistically eroded by the West, basically continuous like him with the classical Arabs' "Arab eloquence" and thus now ripe for linguistic pan-Arab nationalism. The decisive role of the inclusive al-Zayyat was to combine and bring to a head the elements for a pan-Arab aesthetic personality scattered and fragmented out among individual writers.

Since he was no systemizing, Islamist ideologue like
Sayyid Qutb, the classical Arab-Islamic past al-Zayyat imaged had a certain openness and diverseness that could help integrate secularist, left or Christian Arabs into pan-Arab community, also. Given the influence written language had on al-Zayyat, the contribution of modern Lebano-Syrian Christians to classicist Arabic studies and literature bonded him to them more than to the millions of Copts in Egypt. The political context of conflict between the Arab peoples and imperial powers, though, activated his religion-inculcated sense of the pan-Arab nation as Islamic, making it less attractive for Christian Arabs.

al-Zayyat may not have been able to bequeath a precise, hard-and-fast, Islamic or even pan-Arab ideology but he did fire a section of the secular-educated younger generation with a resolve to restore language patterns of the classical Arabs within new modern life. The attitude of the group that all Arabs were one became legitimizing orthodoxy after 1952 under Nasir, and al-Zayyat's admirers and followers found jobs or roles in such preexistent institutions as the Arabic Language Academy where, clustered around their master for the next decade, they have ever since been a force for purism in language development. His classicist self-perceived elite with their resolute, detailed ideas of what the language had to become also took their places in university departments of Arabic, in secondary and primary education and in the Arab Socialist, pan-Arab and Islamic research and propagation institutes that Nasir established. Overall, al-Zayyat crucially identified, and initiated responses to, issues of social inequality, pan-Arab integration and Arab linguistic identity that a committed mini-elite within the elite then carried forward with steel-hard resistance under inhospitable Sadat and Mubarak, not under Nasir alone.
Conclusion: Sectors Where Acculturation Heightened Egyptian Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism

The literature published in the West has been right to view pre-1918 pan-Islamism, and the pan-Arabism that then developed in Egypt, as continuous in historical anti-Western themes. Like the previous pan-Islamism it narrowed down, however, the Egyptian Arab community impulse incorporated sectors of the modernity of the West with which the intellectuals and politicians had to deal on a day-to-day basis. Both pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism sought to make the West's innovative creativity and organizational forms their own not just for utilitarian integration of the indigenous community, but because its liberal and progressivist internal ideologies tinted the intellectuals' psyches. During British colonial rule (1882-1922) the Kamilists and Jaridists had already accepted West European liberalism as prescriptive for a future independent Egypt --- although in both circles Islamic autonomy was already asserted for key sectors such as the roles of women. From the 1920s, sectors from the full extent of the West's aesthetic experience from antiquity colored various intellectuals, fostering a compound, intimate affinity with Westerners. In the other direction, political, linguistic and professional supremacism from Westerners negatively stimulated pan-Islamic and pan-Arab identifications in Egypt.

Before Western languages threatened the Arab identity of new generations, the pioneer pan-Islamists had already got a flexible, incorporative, obdurate resistance by standard Arabic and Islam started. Figures like al-Afghani, 'Abduh and al-Nadim were from the outset of British rule already proto-acculturated themselves given, for instance, their links to (a) Muslim Egyptian technocrats and specialists already produced by the decades of 'Alid modernization and (b) to Francophone Syrian Christian intellectuals. The pioneer pan-Islamists from the outset gave priority to enlisting and shaping the coming West-exposed Muslim Egyptian professional and
specialist elite. Sharply aware of the West's modern institutions, developing sciences, and technologies, they early formulated detailed programmes to implant and extend the classical Arabs' language within that modernity. 'Abduh skilfully kept ahead of new deculturizing distortions of modernization under imperialism, even lobbying for Arabic in London itself.

Egypt's encounter with Western culture amid colonization highlighted the classical Arabs in multiple ways. Classical Islam's bygone struggles with --- and borrowings from --- non-Muslim civilizations and states suggested useful patterns for response to both the threats and opportunities from the modern West. At the outset, in the 1880s and 1890s, the older traditionally-educated pan-Islamists (al-Afghani, 'Abduh, al-Nadim) installed the classical Arabs at the center of the minds of new generations of Westernizing-educated youth. The Arab occupation of Spain and the wide 'Abbasid Islamic Empire that fought Byzantium, held out the hope of a military strength with which the Egyptians and other Muslims could wrest back and maintain sovereignty. Yet, the theme that --- for example --- Muslim Spain had been the source of Europe's Renaissance not just made borrowing of modern knowledge from the West more bearable but was part of a genuinely open and liberal sense of all human culture and knowledge as one indivisible whole. The pioneer Arabic-educated pan-Islamists had already moved beyond apologetics or borrowing for modern survival to acceptance of the necessity for every creative culture to draw knowledge and ideas from all others as interesting in themselves. (The successor multi-cultured Muslim Egyptian intellectuals later moved far beyond the furthermost limits of --- largely scientific-philosophical --- borrowing in classical Arabo-Muslim culture by incorporating not just novel secularoid-liberal political and social ideas from Europe but also its aesthetic-literary sensibility and genres). As the British prepared their coming linguistic assault, al-Nadim had made vivid current threats to Qur'an-defined Arabic by evoking situations within which it
had come close to death in the past: he highlighted old
defensive counter-measures employed by the classical Arabs
to keep their Islam-defined high language dominant in their
vast empire amid the ocean of racial non-Arabs. The
linguistic and ethnic consciousness of the classical Arabs
was already, by the early 1890s, politicized and placed
within a crude linguistic nationalism that noted European
nationalisms. Virtually all the acculturated-liberal
Muslim Egyptian intellectuals that we sampled maintained,
into the 1950s, al-Nadim's vision of Qur'an-defined Arabic
as the endangered core of identity and resolutely mustered
the facilities needed for its survival --- even when that
risked their culture-borrowing and modernization
enterprises. al-Afghani and 'Abduh had barbarianized the
pre-Islamic Arabs whom Islam "transformed" but their
periodization of the glory of Islam under its early Arab
leadership in contrast to later decline was a basis for the
later pan-Arabizing recreation of an Arab golden age. In
advance, then, the old Arabic-educated pan-Islamists
bequeathed vivid and diverse but interlocking pan-Muslim
and ethnicizing pan-Arab (extra-Egyptian) historical images
that could sustain complex resistance to imperialism down
generations.

There is no doubt that from 'Abdallah al-Nadim to
Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, the Egyptian intellectuals sampled
repeatedly conceived Western states as far more motivated
by Christianity than they were vis-a-vis Arab or Muslim
peoples. Yet the pre-1918 period of European history and
imperialism was a persistently religious age for Europeans
as well, despite Darwin: the multi-lingual Egyptian
intellectuals did not imagine the British and French
hatred, apprehension or disdain towards Islam that they
overheard. The local Western personnel and educational
institutions that formatively acculturated upper-middle
class and elite Muslims in Egypt, exposed them
disproportionately to Christian sectors of European
societies and cultures. Before 1922 the British filled up
the government primary and secondary schools with
non-conformist British Protestant teachers whose
anti-Islamism --- along with class-room influences as well from nineteenth and early twentieth century English romantic poetry --- did influence the choice and treatment of classical Arab-Islamic themes by the intellectuals decades later in the 1930s and 1940s. Even then, when the Egyptian leaders, notably Haykal as Minister of Education, Arabized and Islamized the government schools more, the private European schools that continued to de-Arabize elite Egyptians remained missionary bodies. And beyond Egypt, the Islam-stimulated sense of a unified Christian-Western camp warring against the Islamic camp seemed confirmed at both ends of our time-frame by (a) the Kamilists' failure to win France's support to dislodge Britain and (b) Britain's refusal after some helpfulness, to sanction comprehensive Arab independence from eg. French rule.

The great solidity and extent of the literature and past of the classical Arabs must be stressed, although it took to the 1940s for publication to bring crucial sectors out of obscurity. Interactions with Westerners greatly stimulated Egyptian pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism in our period but almost always by activating a diverse ancient Arab literary achievement that registered even upon the ultra-activist Kamilists. The Arab-Islamic civilization, even in the face of deculturation and imperialism, was both flexible and steel-strong, the configuration that had come closest in history to equality with that of the Christian West.

Arab culture and Islam showed their capacity to survive and mutate in strata that the West had in many ways removed from either. The vehicle of this identity base was a complex literary language radically different from that of speech in a country with a limited literacy. Compounding the threat, standard Arabic was moreover a language which the British for forty years were only too happy to impoverish, neglect and marginalize and from the traditional and classical content of which influential intellectuals and politicians voiced some Egyptianist alienation in the 1920s. French language and literature, the Western alternative to English, had parallel messages
of the inherent doomed inferiority of Islam and Semitic Muslims. The threat to the survival of standard Arabic and self-esteem continued well into the 1940s because Western languages remained salient in schools and in the mixed cities. Preprogrammed by al-Nadim, the Francophone Kamilists set the tone for recurring campaigns by the acculturated Muslim elite up to 1952 to restore literary Arabic against all odds: deeply committed to implanting the West's sciences, they still insisted that that had to be done only in an extension of the language of the religion, prophet and classical Arab forefathers of the Egyptians. They specifically rejected any role for colloquial Egyptian Arabic in education or public life. Kamilist identification of the threat to Arabic with one to Islam dynamically whipped up a (sectarianizing) psychosis around the literary language that fired educated Egyptians to fight for it as the core of identity threatened by imperialism's Anglicizing assaults --- pointing forward to later linguistic-ethnic rather than territorial nationalism. Egyptian public pressure forced the British to give more facilities to the language, yet many elite Egyptians continued to have only a sketchy passive reading knowledge of literary Arabic after 1922. The theses of a continuous Pharaonic national identity argued from al-Siyasah in the 1920s and around Ahmad Husayn's Young Egypt in the 1930s certainly evidenced how little that acculturated if not decultured elite --- or at the very least secular-educated strata it addressed --- had retained of Islam. Yet such extreme threats of deculturization themselves detonated compensative Arabist and Islamist postures from such unevenly-grounded defenders as Haykal. In imposing standard Arabic in Egyptian schools in the 1930s and 1940s, Haykal resolved the hierarchical, deculturizing relationship that the British had clamped on his generation before 1918. His sense as he did so that the British had made "the Muslims" and "the Easterners" their slaves instanced how discourses of the British decades before had conditioned his generation, however modern, to continue to feel that they belonged to a
religious political community. The recurrent Muslim community identification among not just pan-Islamic intellectuals but those formally more secular or Egyptianist, was not just atavistic remnants from Egypt's pre-Western past nor a posture assumed to placate the public's Islamic upsurges, but genuine self-image. The Arabo-Islamic survivals, however deculturation-thinned or splintered, the expectations of the voting (but also the narrower bourgeois) public, but above all the anti-Semitic dislike of Muslims and Jews that so many Westerners expressed in combination underscored a religio-political counter-community to modernist Egyptians.

The intellectuals whose development we traced over decades often tensely alternated Westernist or West-accommodating Egyptianist stances with Arab-Islamic ones in both high culture and international relations. These sharp spasms or swings — with potentiality for militancy or visionary supra-Egyptian outreaches beyond restraining short-term class interest — were often fueled by impoverishing or degrading acculturation experiences specific to imperialism: much of the best in Arabo-Islamic and modernist Western cultures as such could interact or blend. The problem was audible racism within high culture and enraging educational experiences and interactions that threatened the core of personality of Muslim Egyptians who initially had at least impulses to be the equal friends of Westerners. The drive by Britishers and foreign residents to take over the professions constricted the advancement of the Muslim petite-bourgeoisie before 1922, but economic deprivations were not what worked to radicalize and Arabize most of our intellectuals. The more affluent al-Siyasah intellectuals' rising Arab-Muslim landowning families could educate them to doctorate level in France. Our study highlighted other ways that one group can impoverish another than to deny property or capital, and other torments than not to know where next month's rent or next term's fees will come from.

Acculturation, however, created real bonds of thought and sensibility with Westerners that prompted educated
Egyptians to avoid or contract their conflict with imperialists and repeatedly appeal to one set of Europeans or a general true West to pressure smaller groups of Westerners --- the British or just specific imperial transgressors --- to grant sovereignty. Even to the end of World War II, the liberal intellectuals were to stand with the Western democracies that ruled the Arabs against new totalitarian white powers (Germany, Italy, Russia). British rule had fostered the growth of the Arab Muslim large land-owning class that financed al-Jaridah and al-Siyasah: and al-Jaridah expressed readiness to accept Dominion status, a long-term relation, rather than complete independence. In the 1920s, this developed into the non-populist incrementalism with which the al-Siyasah-Ahrar successors sought independence by instalments though successive compromise agreements that would finally make Egypt's landowning-capitalizing elite semi-equal partners of the British in the region rather than their separated enemy. Despite all the social interests that tugged the Jaridists-Ummah and after 1922 the al-Siyasah-Ahrar circle towards accommodation, such intellectuals could barely repress the hostility they felt about the supremacist Westerners whom acculturation tuned in so sharply.

al-Jaridah had already --- in contrast to the much more narrowly Francophone Kamilists --- sucked in some of the intimate aesthetic sensibility of the British: both the al-Jaridah and al-Siyasah intellectuals always heard at least the supremacist press and official propaganda voices of Britain loud and clear in English. There was a reactive sector in the psyches of Jaridist and al-Siyasah intellectuals, that was as anti-imperialist as the verbally militant confrontationism of the independence movements of Mustafa Kamil and the Wafd. Accommodation to, and repressed or igniting fury against, the interests of one or a range of Western powers influenced how the modernist intellectuals' perceptions of, and relations with, other Arabs developed.

**Acculturated Pan-Islamism**
al-Jaridah did carry calls by Haykal and others for totalistic Westernization of the roles of women: it also printed articles calling for purportedly classicist-Islamist regulation of interactions between the sexes amid the construction of a West-patterned modernist Muslim bourgeoisie with a drive to industrialize. For all shades among the acculturated intellectuals, whether in al-Jaridah or al-Liwa', such an issue as the status of women was a flash-point in their sense of the antipathy of almost all Westerners to Islam, so important for making them learn about the faith and visualize the whole West as one anti-Muslim camp against which Egyptians had to integrate the pan-Muslim, narrowed Arab or Afro-Asian counter-community. European antipathy --- in French as well as in English --- to the Islam of populations being colonized around the world both (a) kept the al-Jaridah and al-Liwa intellectuals' community identifications supra-Arab and (b) helped bind them to Muslim populations in North or sub-Saharan Africa or Central Asia from which their sense of Egypt's greater development could otherwise have alienated them. That European journalists, authors, missionaries and officials dichotomized European rule and Islam as incompatible or in tension disconcerted even wine-sipping acculturateds: the far-away imperial exclusion or drives against Islam fused with the social exclusion or inferiorization they personally faced and made them wide pan-Muslims. That this particular pan-Islamic impulse had as its matrix the imperial metropolis or its language and printed communications made specific Arabness less of a bond. Anglophone Indian Muslims whose apologetics in London ascribed almost Victorian Christian attitudes about war, women, knowledge and other issues to Muhammad or the great classical Arabs resonated for acculturated Egyptian intellectuals, similarly both bonded to, and in conflict with, modern Europe. Overall, both the more militant Kamil-originated and more "accommodationist" Jaridist-al-Siyasah-Ahrar acculturated streams were ultra-sensitive to Islamophobic attitudes among West Europeans.
Well before World War I, Lutfi al-Sayyid already prefigured the Islam-tinted wide pan-Easternism to be developed by his disciples from al-Siyasah in the 1920s. His strong identification with mainly Muslim and often Arab Easterners beyond Egypt was very much structured by the racist discourses of such imperial opponents as Cromer, which lumped Egyptians together with other colonized Afro-Asian populations as incapable of parliamentarist self-government or modernity. Acculturation's sharp awareness of the richness of the cultures, literatures and institutions that the Westerners offered, and good class reasons to become partners, made these intellectuals vulnerably sensitive to all discourse that excluded or devalued other Arabs and Muslims, as well as Egyptians. Writers in al-Jaridah characterized acculturation under colonialism as a threat to not just the literary patterns of the classical Arabs but to the virtues their old literature would foster in new generations of Egyptians, North Africans etc. Such themes, also developed by pre-1918 pan-Muslim newspapers and by such early pan-Arabs as Ahmad Zaki in the 1920s, were both hypersensitively attuned to the discourses of Westerners and blended them with very old Arab motifs.

On the whole, drives for pan-Islamic and/or pan-Arab community in the modern Muslim Egyptian elite focussed and expanded its conflicts with the West. Their cultural duality made the intellectuals strive to blend (a) pan-Islamism/Islam-tinged pan-Arabism with (b) humane political community with most Westerners. The interactions with the latter in turn heightened and redirected their evolving supra-Egyptian identifications. From the outset of his very early lobbying against Britain in Europe, Mustafa Kamil had tried to structure the pan-Islamic camp he evoked so that France, whom he courted against Britain, could ally with it. His early identification his Egyptian independence movement as Muslim and pan-Islamic to the European nations expressed his shaky modern Muslim elite's choice to maintain --- and novelly reapply --- contracted Islam. This liberalism-tinged, self-definition as
pan-Muslim in Europe --- sometimes wishy-wahy --- was kept up there by the subsequent leaders of the Kamilist independence movement after his death. For the Kamilists, and the Jaridists as well, the inner Egyptian nation-unit united Muslims and Copts, with religions to be in the private lives of individuals as Western liberal nationalism imaged. Beyond the watan frames, though, religions almost always continued to determine camps --- each with plural nations --- in international relations. Western societies with their sectarianism and anti-Semitism were often the reverse of a secularizing alternative to the nativist impulse to define political community --- wider or Egyptian --- Islamically. Matching elite Europeans' blending of secular-liberal with residual Christian identifications, the earliest Kamil hoped that his open, only dilutedly Islamic, nationalism could usher in a new humane international grouping of liberal European with modernizing-liberal Muslim states, against Britain. He could have lobbied for just Egypt's independence in Europe, a cause he did not help when emotions made him stand there with the Ottoman Turks against Christian nationalisms. The inherent emotional dynamic of pan-Islam, for both Muslims and Westerners, was to juxtapose all Muslims --- colonized or threatened --- as a camp against another camp of all the imperial Western powers, including France. Pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s occasioned similar contradictions and tensions and finally breakdown in Egypt's relations with the West. A figure like 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, first Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, wanted to reassure the British --- later America and the CIA. --- that pan-Arabism could be an ally that would only gradually alter their traditional imperial position in the region. Initially, Britain would help the Arabs prise Italy out of Libya and France out of Lebanon and Syria --- 'Azzam's reversal of Kamil's alliance with one imperial power (France) to expel another. But the wide revisionism of pan-Arabs against France in the Arab world threatened disorder unacceptable to Britain as well. In intervening to prevent by force the birth of Israel, Egypt's
acculturated elite stumbled into a confrontation with the whole West and its revised order in the Middle East. Not just a situation that the elite could not control, and not only the vehemence of the fundamentalizing urban Egyptian masses, but the now old intellectuals' own typically blended modernist-religious perceptions of Jews and Zionism prodded them towards war, and camp-confrontation against the Western states as a bloc.

Covert proto-particularism in the independence movement of Mustafa Kamil has been explored in other studies from the West. In respect to the more Egyptian inspirations of pre-1918 pan-Islamism, we rather traced its crystallization in part in reaction to immediate multi-cultural and multi-ethnic stimuli somewhat special to British-occupied Egypt. Mustafa Kamil knew that his early identification with the Ottoman Turks risked harm to his lobbying for Egypt's independence in Europe, yet to his death he always maintained some Ottomanist postures. Pro-Ottoman pan-Islam detached some simplified themes from traditional Islam but within a new West-imposed, pervasively bilingual, urban matrix. It was the Francophone resident Greeks and Armenians encountered daily from adolescence in the cosmopolitan quarters of Cairo and Alexandria that early made the Greek and Armenian Christian nationalisms threatening Turkey so vivid. The multi-lingualizing acculturation that elite or elitizing Muslim Egyptians underwent from 1882 had multiple levels but parochial Francophone Greeks, with their local French-medium press, were a competing ethnus whom the Kamilists and Lutfi's Ummah party had to court lest it support the occupation. Support for the Ottoman State against Christian nationalisms and neighboring Christian states --- as, too, identification with Arabs outside Egypt by such an Ummah intellectual as Lutfi --- were often sparked amid grating interactions with Turcophobic Egyptian Greeks and Frenchmen. The hostility of such British rulers as Gladstone to the Turks --- fury that Egypt's enemy out of political Christian emotions awarded Armenians, Bulgars etc an independence it denied Egypt --- was very important
in involving Kamil and his followers in a religiously-polarizing "Eastern Question" their secularoid-modern component hung back from. Kamilist (and muted Jaridist) pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism before 1914, and much Egyptian solidarity with other Arabs under French rule in the 1930s and 1940s, had a swinging, intimate antipathy against the British, with sharp awareness of their ideological mouthings, quite unlike monocultural anti-imperialism. This intimate quality of pan-Islamism recurved over decades in, for instance, Mustafa Kamil's vehement reactions against Gladstone's claim to be for humanity rather than against the Turks and Haykal's denunciation that supposedly laicist or anti-clerical European writers had only carried forward the church's old crusaderist onslaughts against Muslims. Facade-like travesties of European liberalism or of rationaloid-secularoid thought hurt and infuriated because the Egyptians in question had considered them before the Westerners refused to apply them to Muslims.

The durability of the emotional relationship of almost all the acculturated intellectuals with the Muslim Turks long modified or retarded the growth of the Arab historical consciousness and relations with the other Arabs. The exceptionally particularoid Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid --- like the pan-Islamic Kamilists much more strongly --- in spasms might even have accepted confederal reintegration of Egypt into the Ottoman Empire had it achieved modernized West-patterned parliamentarism and economic strength to hold back the West. As with pan-Arab identity elements, the inability to disengage from the Ottoman Turks was no anachronistic relic from Egypt's political status in an earlier era that had to be at odds with modernity and current realities: rather pan-Muslim pro-Ottomanism was an open community drive that could incorporate the most novel opportunities as, also, the most up-to-date technologies coming from the West. The wide rather than territorialized strength of Western powers, along with Islam, suggested pan-Islam. The Kamilists' exaltation of 'Abdul Hamid as the Caliph of a globally-diffused Muslim world could fend
off demands that Egyptians rejoin a narrower unitary Ottoman state. Their pro-Ottoman pan-Islam was nonetheless more than a legal ploy to stop Britain from annexing Egypt: it acculturately applied the modern West's economic and technological sources of strength to construct a novel global Muslim-"Eastern" counter-bloc, with (a not over-enthusiastic) Istanbul its rallying-point, that would economically and militarily integrate itself with modern instruments devised in the West: railways, steamers, trade. The potential capacity of the Ottoman State, which had retained the sovereignty Egypt had lost, to apply modern Western technologies and liberal parliamentarism reinforced the old indigenous bond of Islam. Post-1908 politics in the Ottoman Empire attracted colleagues and disciples of Lutfi not just because they might pattern some Westernization for the region, but because in justifying movement towards West European norms in Islamic terminology the Committee of Union and Progress also might perpetuate a diluted Islam within a modern sects-harmonizing parliamentary system. That would actualize a blending evoked by 'Abduh, whose Islamic works had greatly formed the al-Jaridah intellectuals. The al-Siyasah intellectuals' response in the 1920s to the laicist modernization of Turkey had similar duality. They welcomed Ataturk's implantation of very far-reaching Western elements yet hoped those would not just contract Islam but maybe dislocate it to seize contemporary opportunities. Limited following of the new Turkey's Islam-disestablishing example would, of course, maintain closeness between the constituent parts of Islam's old ummah.

**Particularism**

The Greeks and Armenians within Egypt's very local Francophone settings early mediated Europe's politicized homeland (watan) nationalism, but Kamil and his followers thenceforth transmitted into Arabic the endeavors and basic concepts of Polish, Magyar, French, Boer, Irish, Italian, German and other nationalisms. Some of those were more like linguistic than territorial nationalism and former
watanists such as 'Azzam in the 1930s and 1940s rather highlighted blended linguistic-territorial nationalism such as the Italian or German that fused plural state units, patterning Arab unification. Al-Jaridah before 1914 took a rather basic idea of territorial nation from the West: the Anglo-Saxon world tinged the magazine's young contributors aesthetically or in regard to British utilitarianism, more than on the plane of national community ideology. Insular Egyptianist proto-particularism before 1914 was more a homegrown, pragmatic adoption of the territorial political unit developing since Muhammad 'Ali as the best approach at hand to dislodge Britain. The Jaridists and the Kamilists were very much aware of the aesthetic --- but also the Islamic legal --- heritage of the classical Arabs: both factions maintained a sense that ancient Arabs and Islam helped define the inner Egyptian political community to which they belonged.

A fair range of items published in al-Jaridah already evoked the non-urban land of Egypt so that it ruled out the Kamilists' pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottoman Turks; al-Siyasah added neo-paganist Pharaonic themes in the 1920s. Some contributors to al-Jaridah had already voiced pragmatic preparedness to move written Arabic more in the direction of daily Egyptian speech if the urgent need to educate the common people and women for modernization required. Even before 1914, Haykal more radically called for applications in language and literature of a particularoid principle of Egypt's distinctness as a geographical unit from the peninsular Arabia that originated the classical Arabs. Haykal early voiced unease at the efforts of archaist neo-classicists to restore the language of the classical Arabs in toto, in new modern literature: Dunlop's almost de-Arabized schools and French-medium tertiary institutions had left it gratingly hard for him to follow some vocabulary of the peninsular jahili Arabians. In debunking pre-1918 idealization of the ancient peninsular Arabs, Haykal substantially responded to some realistic jahili verse. The young Haykal's attitudes to Islam were ambivalent or discontinuous. He yielded to no
al-Jaridah contributors in radical demands for 'ulama-blocked changes to the status of women, but reacted sharply when the Christian Syrian Jurji Zaydan excluded the Qur'an and Muhammad from his overview of the literature of the classical Arabs. Romanticizing Arab-centric writers early put into Haykal's head seeds of Islamic and ethnicizing themes that his Islamic historiography of the 1930s and 1940s would work out.

The cultivated neo-Pharaonic identification in the 1920s drew motifs for its "national literature" from Western literature, including its classical Greek and Latin component. Much neo-Pharaonism did not draw substantially from Egyptology: the intellectuals were more often bellettistic than scientific vis-a-vis the West. While it lasted, the evocation of a Pharaonic culture and golden age from al-Siyasah was certainly a threat to the already-eroded Islamic beliefs and Arab identity of an acculturated social layer; but the paper was radiating Islamoid proto-pan-Arabism at the very same time. A host of factors ensured that neither the Jaridists nor the al-Siyasah intellectuals would carry through their twinges, pragmatic or Egypt-centric, that pointed towards a radical Egyptianist cultural nationalism to sharply differentiate Egyptians from other Arabs. The al-Jaridah and al-Siyasah writers, even Haykal, were like the Kamilists or its Young Men's Muslim Association successor in that the classical Arabs and their language were the non-Western heritage that substantially registered, even when deculturation-narrowed or rebelled against. Indeed, the initial Haykal rather rebelled against (perceived) Egyptian patterns, in favor of sectional Westernization allied to 'Abduhist salafi Islam. In the 1920s, their class and the classical Arabs' language assured that neo-Pharaonists like Haykal would not more than glancingly connect with popular distinctly Egyptian behavioral and speech patterns.

Even in the early 1920s, the colonized intellectuals already vented within a neo-Pharaonism more conducive to secularization, drives to beat back Western aesthetic
culture and intellectualism. One or two, notably Tawfiq al-Hakim, continued into the 1930s and 1940s to couch their sharpening reaction against Westerners in neo-Pharaonist motifs for a time but most from 1930 graduated to a much more real Arabo-Islamic past and legacy that more effectively restructured the relationship with the West and Arabs. Despite Egyptology, the classical Muslim Arabs remained more central in the minds of Westerners as much closer --- in some ways disturbingly so --- to the origins of the post-Renaissance West.

**Evolving Pan-Arabism**

The Kamilists before 1918 had their own particularoid reflex to maintain Egypt's discreteness vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire. Parochial ethnic dislike of local Turkish-speakers within Egypt fueled stronger impulses from the al-Jaridah/Ummah Party circle to separate much more far-reaching from the Ottoman Turks; the Jaridists were sharply aware of the parallel anti-Turkish protest ethnicity of the Asian Arabs, their literary soul-mates --- but did not connect the two Turcophobe Arab ethnicities. In contrast, the Kamilists voiced no antagonism to Turkish-speaking Egyptians. Some Kamilists did at last come to side with West Asia's Arabs in the last stage of the Ottoman Empire but without finally breaking with the ideological ideal of one Islamic, multi-national Ottoman State. It was only in the 1930s and 1940s that Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat finally brought together Egypt's old parochial anti-Turco-Circassianism and ethnicizing celebration of the classical Arabs and their high culture, with the West Asian Arabs' anti-Turkism to ideologically endorse secessionist pan-Arab nationalism (plus Kemalist Islam-disestablishing Turkism and anti-Arab Pahlavi-promoted Iranian nationalism). The now ageing al-Zayyat thus completed after 1933 the shift from pan-Islamism and pro-Ottomanism to linguistic-ethnic Arab nationalism started by his generation before 1918.

The net of contacts that bound the Jaridists to the populations of the Ottoman Empire were more diverse and
hence opened more long-term pan-Arabizing possibilities than those that the Kamilists kept up: the Jaridists more often side-stepped the stance of Egyptianist professional-economic hostility to the local Syrian Christian "interlopers" and kept al-Jaridah open to SC writers who wanted to fuse Egypt and their homeland of origin with Arabist as well as Ottomanist dimensions, and a new regional economy. Both before the 1919 uprising and after in the 1920s (the modest regional pan-Arab capitalism pursued by the successor al-Siyasah-Ahrar-Bank Misr circle), the achieved economic integration with Syrian Arabs either in Egypt or in West Asia lagged behind the very intense interaction between modernist Muslim Egyptian writers and Egypt's secularoid Syrian Christian intellectual elite. More than economically actualized class interest, modern Muslim Egypt's symbiosis with Christian Asian Arabs was the necessary relationship between two intellectual elites in the face of the threat of deculturization from colonial and neo-colonial situations. Syrian Christian writers offered modernized forms of old West Asian Arab culture, and recreations in Arabic of the West's sciences and capitalist ethos, without which the Muslim Egyptian intellectuals on their own probably could not have kept standard Arabic going within modernization.

The Kamilists identified to some extent with the ethics and poetry of the pre-Islamic Arabians. But this secularizing peninsular setting was over-shadowed by their much stronger interest in the widely-conquering Islamic Arab Empires which patterned strength, interventionist bureaucracies and diverse educational and intellectual life akin to the modernity the new acculturated elite was grafting from the West.

By 1922, the Egyptian intellectuals had bequeathed developments of non-Islamic or secularish classical Arab motifs that had some potential to integrate the sects in one Arab nationhood. Yet, pre-Islamic peninsular and other classical sects-neutral Arab elements tended, in our sampling, to be recreated more by less West-modified
intellectuals --- and by Syrian Christians: it was the acculturated Muslim Egyptian writers wrestling with the full West who consistently preferred those periods and sectors of the classical Arab past that they could define as "Islamic", in however thin a way.

Various acculturated intellectuals sampled made the classical Arab past and sensibility into little more than a language of discourse with which they could arbitrarily express their own --- and Egypt's --- existential responses to the West and its thought. Nonetheless, that language made explorations of the West or its skills still pervasively carry at least some authentic materials from the classical Arabs. Such habits of thought or style or imagery, though no counter-system, enabled Arab and Muslim community identification to survive through Westernizing or relatively particularist periods, and then strengthen.

The very diverse configuration of Islam and the past of the classical Arabs offered many more detailed aspects that could be related to the power and positive culture of the modern West than did the fragmentary Pharaonic past. All writers in the pre-1918 colonial period who recreated the classical Arab past were --- whether their own formation was traditionally Islamic or West-patterned --- consciously responding to the West's imperialism and devaluing attitudes. All types of Muslim writers, monolingual or multi-lingual, already evoked "the Arab Nation" (al-`Umimat al-`Arabiyah) with deep respect before 1918, but usually as a bygone Islamic ideological community. We found no case where the term covered contemporary Arabic-speakers including Egyptians under British colonial rule. However, Muslim contributors to both Kamil's al-Liwa' and to al-Jaridah, when writing of the need to restore that Nation's literature and language patterns, bound the Egyptians to other contemporary Arabic-speakers with chaotic transitional Arabist terminology that debilitated definition as a discrete nation.

In regard to pre-Western indigenous history, both the Kamilists and more particularist Jaridists highlighted the
long-departed classical Arabs much more than they did more recent great Ottoman Turks who also conquered in the name of Islam or the even fainter pagan ancient Egyptians. It took time, though, for the historicist-Arab high culture of the Kamilists to structure their conception of the contemporary supra-Egyptian community (closing proto-pan-Arab solidarity with Ottoman Arabs over Araboid Turks). It is as late as the 1930s and 1940s with ex-Kamilist, ex-Jaridist Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, that the Arab past is applied in a modern successor pan-Arab nation of a unitary type that he did cumulatively distinguish from other Muslim nations and territorialize.

Like much earlier pro-Ottomanism, the development of later pan-Arabism, too, interwove (a) local, acculturating, quotidian realities in the city and sharp if uneven awareness of Western societies with (b) the drive for the wide indigenous community. For instance, Western or Westernized Zionist Jews were prominent in the capitalist settings, local French-language press and artistic milieus through which many intellectuals and professionals passed, or had friction with, in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. The parochial Zionist propagandists evoked their wide Western connections to blackmail Egyptian Muslims out of support for fellow Arabs in Palestine: they continually concretized to Egyptians the enemy the Palestinians faced. From 1922 to 1952, there was, in regard to Zionist-Palestinian conflict, recurrent alternation in the psyches of al-Siyasah intellectuals between (a) secular-Western-modernist elements and (b) Arabo-Islamic identifications. During the 1929 bloodshed in Palestine, al-Siyasah-Ahrar writers realized that that conflict was breaking up the multi-sectarian Egyptianist political community: they therefore had impulses to keep Egypt out of it. Yet, almost simultaneously, they themselves responded to Palestine's Islamic shrines and to undivided Arabo-Islamic solidarity with the Palestinians. Synthesis was more common: modern-Western and Islamic-Arab motifs more usually blended into acculturated resistance to Zionism. Data from the West, however partial, greatly
stimulated the al-Siyasah intellectuals' religions-focussed perceptions of the Zionist threat. At all points at which we examined them, from the 1920s to the 1950s, such al-Siyasah intellectuals as Haykal and 'Inan consistently saw the world's Jews, and Zionism's "return" to Palestine, as far more motivated by religion than was the case. Both during the 1929 bloodshed and after, al-Siyasah-Ahrar writers and politicians were sharply --- exaggeratedly --- aware of the participation and political clout of Jews within Western polities, and their command of modern technologies and resources, but did not register how much modern Western ideologies had transformed (and disunited) Jewish thinking and how hostile to Judaism Zionism was. Their images of Jews and Zionism were a mirror of their own Arabo-Islamism's blending of (a) archaic but cut-down, highly functional, religiosity focussed by shrines with (b) modern situations and technologies. Various Christian and anti-Semitic themes in French and English lumping all the Jews everywhere together as one undivided, ultra-religious community obsessed with Palestine encouraged the al-Siyasah intellectuals' own non-pluralizing image. But the al-Siyasah intellectuals' resistance to the drive for a Zionist state in Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s --- simultaneously with shrines --- sprang from the central West-patterned economic enterprise of the supra-Egyptian tradition: by breaking the geographical connection between Arab Africa and Arab Asia, a Zionist state in Palestine would end the hope that Egypt could become the centre of a modern capitalist-commercial pan-Arab economy --- the successor of the likewise Westernoid global pan-Muslim economy of which the Kamilists had dreamed. The establishment of Israel shifted and detonated all long-standing dimensions of the intellectuals' interactions with the West. Haykal, although old, responded observantly to the specificities of the Christian American society that the Zionists were lobbying to impose Israel: he and his Arab League colleagues tried to manipulate the American elite's fear of Communism, organize an Arab-American counter-lobby and use Enlightenment secularism as a common
language with that American elite. When America and the West nonetheless imposed theocratic Israel and detonated the fundamentalism that destroyed his elite it only underscored for the final time the West's consistent dual influence, secular-theocratizing, upon the Middle East and its modern intellectuals.

In the 1920s most crucially, given official detachment, but in the Arabist high-tide of the 1930s and 1940s also, the Egyptian writers—particularly al-Siyasah ones—powerfully integrated the Arabs. Their intellectualism, journalistic liberalism and aestheticism made Egypt register in the psyches of West Asian Arabs in particular in the pre-radio age of the 1920s. Backgrounds of study in France made many Egyptian intellectuals sensitive to the oppressiveness, arrogance and confessionalizing divide-and-rule they encountered in her "mandates". The radical positivist-secularist outlook al-Siyasah writers voiced fitted in with the modernism of the partly Christian elites forming in Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and 'Iraq. Yet the international strategies of the Zionist and Palestinian leaderships, both highlighting the same joint shrines area in Jerusalem, made modernist Egyptian intellectuals perceive Palestinian-Zionist conflict as religious, in swings alienating and (lastingly) engaging al-Siyasah secularoids. Anyway, a persisting if eroded component in their make-up preferred to define the inner Arab political community as Muslim, although this would not always impose private observance.

Although so much of the West and its modernity were blended into both pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, the latter did not achieve a break-through into the sects-integrative nationalism imaged in the writings of European ideologues. This does not rule out that the same sets of Muslim Egyptian intellectuals could have integrated the Egyptian sects within the particularist identification had they perservered. Overall, though—like the overtly religious or sectarian pan-Islamism that preceded it—pan-Arabism sharpened the divide between (a) Muslims and (b) Arabic-speaking Christians or Jews in Egyptian and Arab
life. Pan-Arabism did this against the grain of the sects-integrative nature of much of the literary materials that helped pan-Arabize such thinkers as al-Zayyat, Haykal or Taha Husayn, and their extensive interaction with immigrant Fertile Crescent (more than Coptic) Christian Arabs within high literature and intellectualism. Islam looks like a stubborn indelible ink that continues to inhere in Egyptian Arabism, as a matter of choice by modernist intellectuals themselves, even when much diluted by West-derived and secular impulses.

The Egyptian pan-Arabism of the 1930s and 1940s did have strong mythological impulses in which the undivided God entered into and structured human history, with pan-Arab unification to reflect His Oneness. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat was perhaps the most genuinely religious of all the acculturated intellectuals whom we examined, but even he bore out the pattern that the wealth of perspectives their multi-culturedness provided leads to a flexible and realistic responsiveness to other Arab countries when substantial interaction comes. Sincere Egyptian pan-Arabism under the monarchy was happy to learn from as well as teach the other Arabs: it fanned out across the other Arab countries but was quick to register and then weave around specific problems and obstructions it encountered there. Pan-Arabism under the monarchy evoked culturist images of a unitary classical Arab past, did not conceal its diluted Islamic motive and put more and more visionary irons in the fire yet in general experimentally and with common sense about probabilities and practical ways and means: it changed enterprises that proved sterile for other approaches. The Egyptian elite wanted their country to lead the other Arab states and that such pan-Arabism should serve Egypt's interests. This, however, usually did not make Egyptian Arabism hegemonistic given its cautious reluctance to tighten political community too precipitately. Egypt's prominence in pan-Arabism gave the West Asian state units security and more room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis each other: the West-shaped Egyptian elite won Christian-led Lebanon a place in the new community of Arab
nations beyond Syrian irredentism.

The continuing blended duality of Muslim Egyptian intellectuals was manifested in both their pan-Easternism and in the pan-Islam from which it was persistently unable to break. The pan-Islamic anti-imperialism of the Kamilists sometimes had the impulse to extend out into a wider and more secular pan-Afro-Asian anti-imperialism. *al-Liwa'* under the editorship of Mustafa Kamil already felt attracted to non-Muslim Indians, Japanese, Chinese, Congolese and American Blacks: but this was a negative bond of joint resistance against a shared cluster of Western enemies. In the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, the limited contact the Kamilists already had with Hindu nationalist militants and terrorists was fulfilled in the detailed post-1918 awareness among nationalist Egyptians --- whether secularist or West-setionalizing --- of a basically Hindu Indian independence movement.

Post-1918 pan-Easternism, dual-cultured, was fed by (a) acculturated sensitivity to Western racial fears about yellow perils and brown Indians and (b) old classical Arab interactions with "Easterners" and (c) exploration of the "spiritual" religious cultures that colored Indian, Chinese and Japanese nationalisms. More Islamic West-steeped Egyptian intellectuals, however, could not carry through their conjunction with non-Muslim anti-imperialists in the wide East. The Kamilists wanted the militarily modernized Japanese to accept Islam as a basis for a new community with the Muslims against the West: yet an Islam synthesized with modernity had to be offered Japan, not traditionalist Sunnism. In the 1930s and 1940s, intellectuals attracted to India and Gandhi's Congress independence movement instinctively identified with Indian Muslims in conflict with Hindus while as Arab-centric Westernists disliking traditionalist Indian Islam. To a large extent, Egyptians after 1918 saw India's Hindus and Muslims acculturately, through communications from within the West itself. Although prone to a blended or watered-down Islam pervasively functional within modernity, pan-Easternism also diluted and controlled it: Easternism could usher in
an Islamic reaction and pan-Muslim counter-community against the West and its secularoid civilization, but also held it back while the intellectuals worked out where they wanted to go. The intellectuals were blended synthesizers: although they had some swings, in respect to pan-Eastern community as to other issues we do not have a new rational, modernity-registering orientation disrupted by archaic Islamic survivals: rather, here again, Islam as a community determinant alloyed with West-imposed situations and possibilities in the intellectuals' compound psyches.

The writers sampled maintained their blending of their two cultures, Arabo-Islamic and Western, to the very end of pre-1952 Egypt, even amid their --- or their constituency's --- sharpest reaction against the West. From the early 1880s, the old non-Westernizing-educated pan-Islamists had highlighted the 'Abbasid Empire which purposefully borrowed from non-Muslim civilizations, and in particular the Greek philosophy it adapted. In the 1930s and 1940s the acculturated intellectuals added Fatimid Egypt. The heretical Fatimids also revered and incorporated Greek philosophical rationality and like other old Arab states legitimized the desire of liberal intellectuals, despite their reaction against aspects of the West from 1930, to continue to blend facets from other civilizations into indigenous high culture. Fatimid esoteric Isma'ili Shiism was hardly recognizable as Islam for Egyptian traditional late Sunnism, yet the intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s still identified with those Caliphs as a Muslim dynasty that presided over an Islamic state --- rather than a multi-sectarian Arab one ---, again turning off Arab Christians.

Islam and the sensibility and past of the classical Arabs, whether densely intact in whole sectors as it was religiously and aesthetically for al-Zayyat (only aesthetically for Taha), or in bits with Haykal, always imposed at least some vetoes over the amount of West-patterned changes. For al-Zayyat, it ruled out Communism although he himself was socially discontented for his set of establishment-linked intellectuals. For Haykal,
that past and high literature remained irreducibly Islamic and went with his sense of the far from traditional inner class constituency as still Muslim, marginalizing the Copts and other Arab Christians. For Taha Husayn, the language patterns of the classical Arabs put definite limits on modification of formal language by colloquial and Western influences. A liberal Muslim Egyptian intellectual like al-Zayyat accepted Christian Egypto-Syrians as Arab fellow-writers reviving a joint Arabic language and literature, yet mostly conceived decolonization struggles in Islamic terms even when the Arab populations were multi-religious.

Of all the acculturated intellectuals examined, Taha Husayn had the most clear-minded, consistent and totalistic drive to impose the whole culture, secular thought and social patterns of the liberal-capitalist West. He was almost exempt from the assumption in his clique that the classical Arab states had been uniquely noble polities that could still often prescribe patterns for current Egyptian political organization. This spasmodic Islamist attitude did recurrently surge up in other modernist colleagues who also often exalted Western elements, and could, like Haykal, be highly critical of classical Arabs. Even from his early youth, Taha had tried to clamp European historical and linguistic concepts or sciences down upon even the language and literature of the classical Arabs, the core of indigenous counter-identity, itself. On the plane of political ideology, Taha nullified the classical Arabs much more radically than other secularoid intellectuals: it was not just that classical Islam as a state ideology had been distorted by despots and now was outdated by parliamentarism but that it had never meant much to the classical Arabs whose creativity came from their hedonism and philosophical free thought patterned by Greek philosophy. Yet Taha only illustrated how within acculturated Egyptian Arabism when incoming blocks of Western civilization knock out preceding Arabo-Islamic elements, the Arab-Islamic complex has so many facets and sectors, some of them just being published in the 1930s and
1940s, that it flows and teems pervasively around and into the imported blocks. Certainly, the abundant chaotic life and literary language of the classical Arabs always pervaded Taha's mind amid all his modern enterprises so that his West-motivated writings, too, maintained his readers' linguistic access to them. In Taha's writings, Islam and old high Arabness were blended into, and controlled by, the sensibilities of Westerners in contrast to al-Zayyat in whose even most topical writings ancient Arab vocabulary and idioms were much more uncompromisingly integral.

Haykal's (and 'Abdallah 'Inan's) Islamist denigration of the West after 1930 for perpetual Crusaderist sectarian war against Muslims in international relations and as a political order were serious and al-Zayyat added a call for aesthetic withdrawal. Yet, more reduced, slimmed-down, quasi-fundamentalist visualizations of Islam in the period of Arabo-Islamic reaction left room for some Western elements to continue or come in. Haykal's classical Arabs of the 1930s and 1940s were congruent with at least some patterns and institutions of the liberal-particularist West. Thus, he presented the development of authoritarian monarchy under the 'Abbasids as a deviation not just from Islam but from original Arabian egalitarianism. His intensification of Arab ethnicity, as of Islam, in the 1930s and 1940s remained acculturated: it could maintain some transplantation of Western institutions, here a parliamentarism threatened with a general breakdown. Unlike the ever-unambivalently Westernist Taha but less strongly than al-Zayyat, Haykal in the 1930s and 1940s (a) voiced reservations about borrowing and (b) pursued reexplorations of the classical Arab past that do not ring like a functional containment of anti-Westernism in the public: they would take steam out of past Westernist drives. These writers' inherent impulse to synthesize had been debilitated to break-down by the threat Western influences had posed to the survival of standard Arabic in their youth and by the refusal of the Westerners to relax imperial supremacism, making the intellectuals yearn for
the death of the crisis-wrecked West.

The Egyptian Arabism whose development we traced thought less and less in terms of an Arab race, diverging from (a) the ethos of the pre-colonial popular epics about classical Arabs and (b) from the sense among the Kamilists and the al-Jaridah intellectuals before 1918 that Muslim Egyptians (not Copts) had Arabian blood. The shift to the concept (inherited by the Nasserites after 1952) that the Arab Nation was a community integrated by a language from many races responded to the threat of deculturization under imperialism, which highlighted the indigenous language. It also incorporated some of the sense of plural racial-territorial units in the Arab world evoked by neo-Pharaonic particularism in the 1920s. Trans-racial or races-amalgamating Arabism, a transformation of the modern realities, excised ethnic, hierarchical pride in lineage among the ruling classical Arabs, although to some extent it did extend some old universal Islamic motifs and kept up residues of newer pan-Islamism.

For both Taha and Haykal, pan-Arabism of the 1930s and 1940s was the culmination of the standardizing dynamic in the formal language of journalism and literature that had been mounting through all their permutations since even their comparatively radical youth at al-Jaridah. There was an inevitability about Taha's development into a resourceful pan-Arab educationalist after 1930. But Haykal, too, had maintained a fundamentalized adaption of the language of the classical Arabs amidst his modest experimentations and he now in maturity as a Minister of Education took over the central contention of former neo-classical opponents that the spoken dialects were a barbarizing threat to real Arabic: by now, though, for Haykal, they also alienated Arabs from each other, delaying pan-Arab unity. A long-latent literary dynamic, the special aesthetic experience of a smallish minority, thus now potently blended with new official and popular political realities in the region. Typically of Egyptian pan-Arabism under the monarchy (cf. neo-capitalist pan-Arab integration), Haykal applied the most innovative
West-originated technology to propagate standard literary Arabic at a mass level, but the system could not deliver some resources that his vision required. The enduring cultural survivals of Arabism, the reverse of anachronisms, wove into novel political realities and technologies shaped by Westerners, as perceived by those Muslims who had been most immersed in the languages of those aliens.

Despite harsh intellectual limitations from his monolingualism, al-Nadim already registered in some detail the range of modern institutions that made the West's internal strength, and its imperialism abroad, possible: he prescribed indigenous counter-institutionalization as the means to rebuild sovereignty --- specifying modern Muslim institutions that should be supra-Egyptian or even supra-Arab, for instance a composite institute to coordinate and standardize the modernization of Arabic, Turkish and Persian. The construction of West-patterned modern supra-Egyptianizing institutions was adequately conceptualized --- and sometimes actualized --- by the acculturated pan-Arabizing intellectuals after 1922: al-Siyasah detailed in the later 1920s the academic facilities and efforts that would be required to integrate the Arab intelligentsias and lands, Taha from the mid-1930s further elaborated to top politicians procedures and institutions to actualize such integration, while al-Zayyat's proposal for a literary translations institute dynamically blended classical Arab and modern Ataturkist with Western institutional experiences. al-Zayyat's translation institute only found fulfilment after 1952 in the Nasser regime's financing and coordination of extensive translation of Western works. On the other hand, the Misr and 'Abbud group of companies under the monarchy, with which many liberal intellectuals were linked, used Western capitalist structures to economically connect diverse Arab populations with greater effect than the Nasser regime amid its running war with the reactionary regimes. Overall, the liberal Muslim Egyptian intellectuals were competent, hard-nosed institutionalizers and many institutions they proposed, but which the system's laissez faire attitudes
starved, were to be actualized, in mutated forms, by the ultra-bureaucratized Nasser regime.

The West-acculturated intellectuals always had an at least intermittent resolve to maintain old Arab culture and Islam and gradually accumulated a lot of data about both, outside structures. Other cultural elites that locked into these intellectuals within, for instance, independence movements, even somewhat secularoid political parties, Easternist and other associations and comprehensive institutions like those to promote the Arabic language, were further conduits that poured the non-Western language of the classical Arabs, and their learned religion, into the special elite we reconstructed. Our multi-lingualized writers and nationalists kept verbal and written exchanges going with other explicitly religious intellectual elites: with Azharites and mystics, with the modernized-Islamic Arabic-medium Dar al-Ulumists. Various al-Siyasah intellectuals had impulses in the 1920s to reduce Islam and the writings of the classical Arabs to a fallible human heritage open to judgement and analysis from the secular thought of the West. Yet real modernists might have ignored that heritage to oblivion. al-Siyasah writings on that past in the 1920s had multiple energies other than their shaky Westernism. The contribution of this modernist group to pan-Arabization and Islamization of the growing acculturated elite was that all the iconoclastic books and articles and the torrents of refutations, many of them from traditional Islamic clerics, functioned as a kind of unstructured, arrestingly pluralist, incessantly debating university of Islamsics and classical Arab humanities that built up the linguistic access of new generations still vulnerable to deculturalization. The different Egyptian elites, multi-lingualized and Islamic, were at most points prepared to tolerate what they perceived as the inadequacies and vices of each other, and exchange sectors of their respective visions and data, because all soberly realized in calm moments that no elite alone had enough resources to stave off deculturization within modernity.

This study has highlighted multiple, but
non-standardized, ways in which the Arab-Islamic and Western cultural resources of our intellectuals interacted or blended to produce reinforced pan-Islamic and pan-Arab stances. While a very strong, intermeshing network of supra-Egyptian Arabo-Islamic identifications accumulated over the 60-year period studied, the Egyptian intelligentsia did not standardize one binding closed system out of them: even amid the final very bitter showdown with the West, Egyptian liberal Arabism retained some openness to the Western modernity and high culture it critiqued. Egyptian Arabism mounted and solidified but kept its disorganized fluidity that flowed around, tinted and then steeped, but also contained --- more often than it knocked away --- elements and sectors imported or imposed from the West. The supra-Egyptian Arabo-Islamic identity and wide community impulses of the liberal intellectuals never quite became totalistic in the eliminative sense but always, at even their most weakened, pervaded, however thinly and dilutedly, all sectors of multi-lingualized Muslim Egyptian thought, sensibility and perceived experience. It is this adversity-steeled, flexible, resilient, ideas-grabbing Arab-Islamic high culture that motivated the drives for supra-Egyptian political communities more than the other class, economic and political factors into which it interwove.
Appendix 1: Post-1919 Neo-Pharaonism: Challenges to Islamic and Arab Identities in Egypt.

The following two appendices assess Pharaonic nationalist themes developed by al-Siyasah intellectuals in the 1920s, in order to sharpen the literature's analyses of ways in which neo-Pharaonism worked to disestablish traditional Islam and its elites, and challenged Arabness as the core of Egyptian identity. They will trace where West-stimulated neo-Pharaonist themes and Pharaonist motifs aided Westernization endeavors, but also how old Arabo-Muslim elements and reflexes persistently structured or dyed even Pharaonist discussions: Appendix 2 details patterns where Pharaonisn perpetuated instead of replacing key Arab-Islamic assumptions among educated Egyptians. We trace there how the neo-paganism of al-Siyasah intellectuals vented and heightened their rejection of many aspects of the West besides its political imperialism, and thus, especially in the late 1920s, foreshadowed their Arabo-Islamic reaction against the West in the 1930s and 1940s.

Analyses of Neo-Pharaonism

Many Arab and Western scholars have exaggerated the extent to which the "wave" of neo-Pharaonism won over the thoughts of Egyptian modernist intellectuals in the 1920s. Most of these analysts identify Muhammad Husayn Haykal and other contributors to his paper al-Siyasah and al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah as those who decisively articulated, elaborated and heightened the fashionable neo-Pharaonic particularist themes in the decade. The Arabo-Islamist Egyptian scholar Muhammad Muhammad Husayn (1959) raged that Haykal in particular tried to put in cultivated Egyptians' minds ideas that maybe Pharaonic Egypt's religion and rites, not God, originated Judaism-Christianity-Islam. Spatialist Pharaonic self-identification made young Egyptian litterateurs seek a delusory cultural unity between all generations that lived in Egypt from the dawn of its supposedly formative Pharaonic era --- which Haykal
argued in the 1920s. This, he argued, left them little energy to invest in their relationship with past generations of non-Egyptian Arabs or Muslims, or contemporary fellow Arabic-speakers and Muslims beyond Egypt --- supra-Egyptian communities that the "secessionist" "extremists" among the neo-Pharaonists now denied existed. Ignoring the consistent pan-Arab interests and circulation of al-Siyasat al-Usub'iyyah in particular, Muhammad Husayn thus saw this neo-Pharaonism as an unprecedented, totalist, isolationist particularism that ruled out and sapped pan-Arab and pan-Islamic community.

J. Jankowski (1980) similarly noted in the 1920s "various 'Pharaonic' tendencies of thought" in Egypt: calls for Egyptian "national" literature, most vocally by al-Siyasah and its editor Muhammad Husayn Haykal, "growth of a school of visual art harking back to ancient Egyptian motifs" and "widespread" assumption by "Egyptian writers" of a continuity of "soul" between the pagan Pharaonic forefathers and contemporary Muslim Arabic-speaking Egyptians. Jankowski argued that the intellectuals' new Pharaonist Egyptianist self-identification, coupled with "zealous Westernization of customs and mores" that downgraded Arab-Islamic traditions, weakened their solidarity with outside Arab peoples --- at least the Palestinians --- in the decade. Generally non-Egyptian scholars agree that the heightened Pharaonic self-definition in the 1920s (a) delegitimized and weakened --- sometimes intentionally --- Islam in Egypt but (b) thereby opened the way for sweeping borrowings from the West. Mainly discussing Muslim Egyptian contributors to al-Siyasah and al-Siyasat al-Usub'iyyah in the 1920s, Marcel Colombe concluded in 1951 that the intellectuals' affirmations of the Egyptian "nation's" connectedness with its Pharaonic "distant past" had at least a negative impact: "it certainly did enable Egyptian thought to more

freely exercise its judgement upon Muslim civilization which, in the several millenia of which the history of the Nile Valley consists, had figured for only a few centuries. Neo-Pharaonists "raised the question if [Egypt] would again become 'Pharaonic' or remain Muslim". As a positive influence, however, Pharaonism never became more than a fleeting "light-weight literary movement".

Writing in retrospect in 1943, the scholarly, if partisan, Palestinian pan-Arab Yusuf Haykal denounced the more committed neo-Pharaonism as little more than a weapon concocted by unbelieving Egyptian intellectuals to eliminate Islam from Egyptian life. He viewed Pharaonism as having crystallized in and serving Egypt's post-World War I climate of Westernization and supposed downgrading of pan-Arab contacts. Charles D. Smith likewise characterized neo-Pharaonism as "a weapon" with which such acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals as Haykal in the 1920s hoped to end or shrink roles of obstructive Islam or its religious officials in Egyptian society, clearing the way for far-reaching Westernization. Smith extrapolated

4. Dr Yusuf Haykal, *Nahw al-Wahdat al-'Arabiyyah* (Towards Arab Unity). (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1945; 2nd ed.), p. 27; first edition mid-1943. Dr Haykal's observations were partly his response to Pharaonic particularists he encountered in his visits to Egypt in the 1940s: those publicists carrying on the surviving Pharaonism in Egypt were separate from the al-Siyasah intellectuals who had advocated Pharaonism in the 1920s but then shed it. Yet Yusuf Haykal also looked back over and judged Pharaonism of earlier decades, especially the 1920s. He somewhat distinguished between the "good-intentioned" main body of Egyptian politicians and writers that after World War I gave contacts with the West precedence over the development of contacts with "the Arab East" and a "small number of authors" who were obstreperous extreme Pharaonists. However, the extremist Pharaonists who called for the [classical?] "Arabic language to be abandoned" could carry this drive forward by hiding "their true aims" in "the robes of the Egyptian patriotism" dominant in the period. *Ibid.* Dr Yusuf Haykal: b. 15 August 1912, educated at London University and University of Paris where he took his doctorate in Law; a district judge in Palestine 1943-1945.
5. "Clearly, Pharaonism was integrated with the desire to modernize and was seen as a weapon against Islam and the 'ulama'". Haykal's Pharaonism in the 1920s was "a means of finding a non-Islamic, specifically Egyptian cultural heritage ... the basis for a new nationalism, ... for national revival which would avoid the obstacles Islam represented to progress". Smith in a personal
from Haykal's late (1929) book of Western and Egyptian biographies that throughout the decade he distinguished a definitive Pharaonic antiquity "untainted by religious influence" from "foreign Islam" brought by alien Arab invaders. Smith barely noted Haykal's use of Pharaonism and Pharaonism-tinted new "national literature" to differentiate Egypt from the West as well as Islam and the Arabs. By and large, Smith considered Haykal's lauding of Pharaonic Egypt as "cradle of civilization", originator of "realistic art" and "scientific" achievements as more than compatible with increased borrowings from Europe. "The message of accomplishment did not detract from the value of modern European culture, but served to complement its contributions by creating a sense of Egyptian nationalism distinct from any outside influences".

A discussion of neo-Pharaonism by Gershoni and Jankowski (1986) gave much weight to Haykal, "together with [secularist Copt] Salamah Musa", as the chief formulators in the 1920s of the Pharaonist thesis that modern Egyptians retained enough psychological, cultural and genetic connection with ancient Egypt for it to define their twentieth-century identity. They explained the 1920s territorialist Egyptianist orientation as "a way out of tradition as embodied in the historic Muslim community" and "the Arab cultural legacy". By reorientating Egypt to its "natural" milieu of "the Mediterranean and the West" neo-Pharaonism might help the Egyptian nation to "join the universal enterprise of modernity" determined by the West.

To date, then, most Arab and West-resident scholars


have characterized Haykal's, and other al-Siyasah intellectuals', neo-Pharaonism as a national identification likely to harm Islam but help Westernization. Rejecting that consensus, 'Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot queried (1987) the scant note taken by Gershoni and Jankowski of the intimidatory British occupation --- little changed by the "independence" of 1922 --- when they characterized Pharaonism:

Those who lived in that period felt the heavy hand of Britain everywhere. The entire modernist current rose in response to colonialism. The early intellectuals tried to show that Egypt was a nation, because the British, especially Cromer, denied it as one excuse for their occupation. Haykal and others were addressing the colonial power as much as each other in trying to show themselves as modernized and therefore worthy of total independence in reaction to another excuse for the Reserved Points and continued British presence, the alleged need to "educate" Egypt.

al-Sayyid-Marsot stressed that unpleasant interactions with Westerners motivated much of the content of territorialist Egyptian modernist particularism up to the early 1930s. She warned against taking "at face value" definitions of Egyptian identity by Haykal and Tawfiq al-Hakim that marginalized Arabism and Islam, without examining the international political context and their "motivation".

"The pro-Arab current was deliberately stifled by British threats of negative repercussions on Anglo-Egyptian relations"10.

Our study will move beyond the literature's stereotype of neo-Pharaonism as an homogeneous and self-assured anti-Arab or Islam-disestablishing ideology. To balance ways in which neo-Pharaonic particularism could open Egypt to the modern West, we trace in Appendix 2 how Pharaonism often focussed resentment against not just imperialist Westerners but also their high cultures and even their positivist thought, in Egypt in the 1920s and early 1930s.

The Extent of Pharaonism's Impact in Egypt

Egypt's limited independence was proclaimed on 28 February 1922. On 7 November of that year, Howard Carter discovered the tomb of Tutankhamun, one of the last kings of the 18th Dynasty. al-Siyasah intellectuals excitedly impressed on their readers the dazzling craftsmanship and beauty of Tutankhamun's treasures and the wealth and power of the Pharaonic state that produced them. 'Abdallah 'Inan in 1925 published in al-Siyasah a translation of an article by Carter that conveyed to Egyptians how well the art in the tomb caught, for example, minor intimate episodes in the daily life of the youthful Pharaoh and his wife, or tragic sympathy for lions killed in royal hunts. Coming from the outset of Egypt's life as a formally independent state, the excitement in Egypt and in the world press over the tomb and its art greatly encouraged educated Egyptians to adopt a Pharaonic national identity: it could command respect for their new state in

11. al-Siyasah commented as Tutankhamun's mummy was slowly unwound that the precious jewels and articles successively produced from each layer "reduce men's minds to perplexity". They showed the "advancedness" (ruqiyy) and "wealth" (ghana') of Egypt in the age of that "Great King". "Tutankhamun: al-Juththah wal-Nafa'is allati Ma'aha" (Tutankhamun: the Corpse and the Treasures with it), al-Siyasah 15 November 1925; N.Y., Tarikh Tutankhamun p. 194. In the weekly al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah "pictures of Pharaonic objects or scenes frequently accompanied articles dealing with Pharaonic Egypt". The Wafdist al-Balagh al-Usbu'i and the modernist al-Majallat al-Jadidah published multi-page photo-essays on Pharaonic subjects. Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs p. 176. Zakari bound into his book an opening section carrying scores of poorly reproduced photographs and sharp, interesting line drawings of the art objects of Tut's tomb and of other Pharaonic inscriptions, reliefs and statues.

12. Howard Carter, "Tutankhamun, Sayduhu wa Kilabu Saydihi" (Tutankhamun His Hunts and his Hunting Dogs) translated 'Abdallah 'Inan "the Lawyer", al-Siyasah 29 November 1925; Zakari, Ta'rikh Tutankhamun pp. 200-211.

13. Antun Zakari: "The newspapers of all the nations ... published copious descriptions ...; they reproduced in their illustrated press many photographs and sketches". "N.Y.", Ta'rikh Tut 'Ankh Amun, Muharriru Misr al-Azim (Cairo: Mitba'at Zaydan al-'Umumiyyah n.d. 1926?) p. 28. "N.Y." was the acronym for the Christian Antun Zakari, then secretary of the library of the Egyptian Museum. The Illustrated London News provided Zakari with not just photographs of objects discovered in Tutankhamun's tomb but reproductions of earlier art of the mortuary cult of Horus that Zakari integrated into a dense discussion of Pharaonic mythology. Ibid p. 90.
the Western powers. Religiously, the mutation in ancient Pharaonic civilization that Tutankhamun evoked was relatively intelligible for the Islam of modern Egyptians. The Pharaoh Akhnaton (reigned 1379 - 1362 BC) had imposed a proto-monotheistic cult of the sun-disk Aton. In Tutankhamun's brief reign (1361 - 1352 BC) the priesthood had restored the worship of Amun. Nonetheless, the continuous publicity about Tutankhamun throughout the 1920s occasioned much discussion of Akhnaton's fleeting proto-monotheism as against mainstream Pharaonic cults more unintelligible and grating to the Arabo-Islamic Egyptian

14. As Pharaonism's appeal to Muslim Egyptians, in particular, crumbled at the close of the 1920s, neo-Pharaonists stressed status in the West to stem the nascent pan-Arabism. The Copt Nashid Sayfayn highlighted platitudinous compliments to ancient Egypt in the welcoming speeches and toasts with which King George of Egypt and the President of the French Republic et al received King Fu'ad during his 1929 tour of Europe. It was "Testimony from the world" that identification with Pharaonic Egypt would offer all Egyptians a respect in the West that Arab self-identification could not command. Nashid Sayfayn, "Misru Fir'awniyyah Lahman wa Daman" (Egypt is Pharaonic by Flesh and Blood), al-Muqattam 10 September 1930 p. 7.

15. Howard Carter discovered the steps leading down to the entrance gallery of the tomb in November 1922. But it took the following eight seasons (October to April) for Carter to salvage the treasures within the tomb and transfer them to the National Museum in Cairo. Every piece of the set of burial objects had to be emptied from the sepulchre and restored on the spot, a process that took six years. Thus, excavations and work within the tomb were completed only in 1928. Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, Life and Death of a Pharaoh: Tutankhamun (London: the Connoisseur and Michael Joseph 7th ed: 1969) pp. 9, 20.

16. Akhnaton was, for instance, the dominant personality in Dr Hasan Kamal's article "Tutankhamun: Bahthun Ta'rikhiyyun Tibbi" (Tutankhamun: A Medical-Historical Study) al-Muqattam 8 December 1925. The medical examination of Tutankhamun's mummy only underscored that Tut assumed the throne at 12 at the most and died aged around 18. Thus, he was never a ruler but a powerless minor who ratified the will of his military commander Horemheb, and of the Theban priesthood who pressured him to restore Amun. For Dr Kamal, then, Tutankhamun's tomb highlighted not Tut but the ideological tensions between Akhnaton's monotheism and resurgent traditionalist Pharaonic polytheism. The art treasures from Akhnaton's capital Akhetaton (from which Tutankhamun moved to Thebes) manifested this ancient Egyptian proto-monotheism of the solar disk, not a pagan polytheism. Dr Hasan excerpted Akhnaton's cuneiform correspondence with the rulers of Asia. Antun Zakari published in the well-circulated al-Ahram careful Arabic translations of Akhnaton's hymns to his nationalities-spanning unitary God: reprinted Ta'rikh Tutankhamun pp. 115-8.
This gave Egyptian intellectuals more leeway and options in relating Islam and Pharaonic religion. *al-Siyasah*, organ of the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists, voiced the most original, coherent, and unremitting neo-Pharaonism in the 1920s. But the populist Wafd, King Fuad, and establishment politicians loyal to the Palace against the Wafd, participated with the Liberals in public rituals celebrating Tutankhamun, the Pharaonic period, or Pharaonic identity in new modern nationalist art (especially the sculptor Mukhtar) and architecture\(^\text{17}\).

As well as the Westernizing-educated elite that led Egypt after World War I, other intellectual elites educated as much in classical Islam as in Western knowledge now developed more pride in Pharaonic Egypt. The teachers' training college Dar al-'Ulum strove to synthesize the Islamic heritage transmitted by al-'Azhar with the modern West's sciences and thought. In a 1929 science-citing work of Qur'anic exegesis, the Dar al-'Ulum graduate and academic the shaykh Tantawi Jawhari (1862–1940) --- before 1918 closely linked to the Kamilist independence movement\(^\text{18}\) --- was more positive towards Pharaonic Egyptians than most Muslim Egyptians, who had tended to view them as polytheist enemies of God-sent prophets.

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17. Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs* p. 168, 186–190 bring out how the monarchy, pro-Palace politicians and Haykal's Party of Liberal Constitutionalists all used public ceremonies at Tutankhamun's tomb, and successor neo-Pharaonic public art and architecture to win leadership at expense of their rivals.

Jawhari stressed the speed with which ancient Egyptians accepted Moses' monotheistic teaching, extolling the swift and thereafter steadfast belief in One God by the repentant Egyptian magicians ("the scholars of their people") against all god-king Pharaoh's threats, and contrasting it with the fragility of faith of "the ignorant Israelites" who succumbed to the call to worship the calf. Pharaonic themes could cross from one cultural elite to another. At the end of the 1920s, the secular law graduate Ahmad Husayn voiced satisfaction that the Children of Israel worshipped the "Pharaonic" golden calf as soon as Moses' back was turned, claiming that it showed how strongly Egyptian their residence in Egypt had made them. However, the reaction of the 1930s made modern-educated Egyptians and therefore their leaders more Muslim: by 1938 Ahmad Husayn, then Leader of the acculturated youth-based Young Egypt party, defended the worth of the Pharaonic Egyptians by citing their immediate readiness to be martyred for their inherent monotheism by Pharaoh. The Paris-educated acculturated nationalist Ahmad Husayn thus came to take up the motif of the Islamic shaykh Jawhari.

The often visually splendid Pharaonic legacy stimulated tributes in the 1920s to Pharaonic greatness even from such older neo-classical poets as Hafiz Ibrahim (1870 - 1932) and Ahmad Shawqi (1868 - 1932). They and


20. The Qur'an itself testified that residence in Egypt's geographical and social environment had made the Hebrews Egyptian despite all their ethnic hatred for Egyptians: after they left Egypt, they rebelled against their leader (sic) because he had not provided them with Egyptian-style food, and quickly turned to worship of a Pharaonic-style golden calf. It testified that territorial homeland units and the social units they framed structured the identity of all who entered them, overriding separate races and languages of origin. Ahmad Husayn, "Misr fir'awniyah idh hiya la yumkinu an takuna illa Khadhalik" (Egypt is Pharaonic Because It is Unable to be Anything Else), al-Mugattam 16 September 1930 p. 3.

21. Text of address by Ahmad Husayn in Mihar al-Fatat 14 April 1938 pp. 2, 12.

22. For Pharaonist poetry by Hafiz in 1921 in connection with negotiations by Egyptian nationalists with the British for
other poets of their type differed from al-Siyasah’s younger contributors by criteria of (a) separate generations, (b) adherence to classical Arab literary idioms from which al-Siyasah sometimes wanted a partial break, and (c) the older poets’ long-standing pan-Muslim identification with Ottoman causes, versus the unsustained particularoid critique of pan-Islam in the al-Jaridah milieu through which Haykal had passed in adolescence. Gershoni and Jankowski depicted Shawqi in particular as now full-heartedly celebrating in verse roughly the same themes about the Pharaonic past that such younger modernist writers as Haykal, Salamah Musa and Tawfiq al-Hakim expounded in prose, including Egypt’s role as cradle of civilization and originator of both monotheism and classical Graeco-Roman civilization. This simplification of Shawqi’s attitudes exaggerates the range of appeal Pharaonism for some time exerted in the 1920s. It was not just that it supplemented rather than replaced or overrode the longstanding supra-Egyptian orientations of Muslim Egyptian litterateurs, so that even Pharaonist poems voiced, for example, an anti-British pan-Islamism that kept up solidarity with the Muslim Turks. More importantly, traditional Islamic reserve about Pharaonic Egypt, long

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Egyptian independence see Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2, pp. 146-7.  
24. Shawqi was inclined to credit the well-founded suspicions of Pharaonist intellectuals and civil servants that the British discoverers intended to spirit art objects from Tutankhamun’s tomb out of the country. However, this possibility was strengthened for him by the local Egyptian pan-Islamic myth that the British imperialists had kidnapped the last Ottoman Sultan-Caliph Vahideddin when he fled Kemalist Turkey on a British warship in 1922. Poem by Shawqi published in al-Ahram 3 January 1923; Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 pp. 154-5. Carter’s patron Lord Carnavon publicly stressed that, having financed the discovery of the tomb, he had a right to retain at least some of its objects. In contrast, Carter said in public that the collection should be maintained intact and handed over to the custody of the National Museum in Cairo. Leonard Cottrell, The Secrets of Tutankhamun (London: Evans 1965) p. 22. In 1978 Thomas Hoving, a Metropolitan Museum director, claimed that Carter and his patron, Lord Carnavon, indeed took some objects from the tomb without the permission of Egyptian officials. “Their action”, observed Hoving, “has been, for 50 years, one of the best-kept secrets in the history of Egyptology”. Thomas Hoving, Tutankhamun — The Untold Story (New York: Simon and Schuster 1978) pp. 301, 318-325.
seen as tyrannical and polytheist in pre-1918 pro-Ottoman Egyptian nationalism and among its poets such as Hafiz Ibrahim, time and again resurfaced in particularism-tinged poetry that Shawqi wrote extolling Pharaonic antiquity in the 1920s. For instance, he penned four odes (gasidahs) influenced by the discovery of Tutankhamun's tomb. Yet that of 3 January 1923, while proud of ancient Egypt's pioneering contributions to humanity, was saved from a pagan spirit by, for instance, Shawqi's preference for Fu'ad as a Muslim and a constitutionalist monarch over the polytheist despot Pharaoh. His 1925 ode satirized the new fashion among youth and even "seasoned scholars" of identifying with a Pharaonic Egypt whose despotic politics anachronistically clashed with the parliamentarism of post-1922 Egypt. In 1925 he advised his compatriots to leave "the tyrant" harmlessly "sheathed" under his sarcophagus: set back on his throne he might menace the necks of its inhabitants once more.

Shawqi's balanced, realistic, Islam-structured Pharaonism carried weight among literate Egyptians in the


1920s, in which he won recognition as "Prince of Poets" of the whole Arab East. Even in the 1920s, before the full Arabo-Islamic reaction, Pharaonist ideologues strove to counteract such images of Pharaonic despotism and exploitation of the masses, arguing that the Pharaonic polity and society pioneered the democracy that the Greeks took up and developed (Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah 1929)\textsuperscript{28}. With the Arab-Islamic reaction by acculturated Muslim Egyptians in the 1930s and 1940s, the charge that the Pharaohs were despots who enslaved and exploited ordinary Egyptians was to be often lanced at die-hard Pharaonists by such early pan-Arabs as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat\textsuperscript{29}. Shawqi was of a different generation from the youngish modernists who published in al-Siyasah, although, like many of them, educated in France. Many younger al-Siyasah intellectuals in the 1920s asserted their quest for a more distinctively Egyptian and also modern literary language and style, drawing on the insights of Western literatures. This new idiom would diverge from the traditional themes, motifs and vocabulary of at least the earliest, desert-dwelling, classical Arabs, perpetuated by Shawqi and Hafiz in their poetry. Nonetheless, younger al-Siyasah intellectuals such as Haykal and Taha Husayn themselves had good-humoured personal relations with, respected, and were culturally colored by, Arabist classicists such as Shawqi\textsuperscript{30}. Haykal

\textsuperscript{28} Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs p. 180.
\textsuperscript{29} For example, in 1933 Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, the Arabo-Islamist editor of al-Risalah, ruled out Pharaonism as an identity option for Arab, Islamic Egypt. As one ground, he characterized Egypt's Pharaonic history in terms of "shattered limbs left over by the whip", "wasted bodies of the victims of oppression". al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyuna wa 'Arab" (Pharaonists and Arabists), written 1 October 1923; Wahy v. 1 (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Msr nd) p. 50.
\textsuperscript{30} For instance, Haykal in 1927 took a ride on a Nile steamship "with a group of my friends, among them the two great poets Hafiz Ibrahim and Khalil Mutran", in connection with the 1927 celebrations that installed Shawqi as amir al-shu'ara' (Prince of Poets) of Arab countries. Instead of opposing, Hafiz and Mutran politely echoed Haykal's barbed observation that modern Arabic poetry now had to escape ancient Arabic metres that corresponded to the ambling gait of peninsular Arabian camels. Haykal, Thawrat al-Adab (2nd ed. Cairo: Mitba'at Msr nd) pp. 55-6. Haykal quoted frequently from Hafiz (ibid pp. 46-7, 54-5) as he did from many other neo-classicists he criticized. For a later tribute by an al-Siyasah opinion leader to Shawqi and
addressed the specific points at which Shawqi portrayed Pharaonic and modern Egypt as unconnected: religion, and the political discontinuity between parliamentarism and despotism. In 1926 he admitted these and other transformations, such as language, and that "many" deemed them decisive, but argued that the psychological continuity of modern Egyptians with Pharaonic Egypt outweighed such breaks.

In the 1920s, then, pride in Pharaonic Egypt was felt --- and relayed --- by varied categories of intellectuals:

1. Modernist, relatively young, al-Siyasah intellectuals with extensive Westernizing educations. Their neo-Pharaonic themes were also developed by less innovative intellectuals in Wafd publications.

2. Older neo-classicist, pan-Islamic, pro-Ottoman poets (eg. Hafiz and Shawqi), not completely "carried away" by the Pharaonism of (1).

3. Intellectuals associated with synthesized modernist-Islamic Dar al-Ulum.


WESTERNIZATION AND DE-ISLAMIZATION

Western and Arab analysts both argued that neo-Pharaonism validated or fitted in with Westernizing endeavors in the 1920s in Egypt, marginalizing obstructive Islamic motifs.

Ancient Pharaonic greatness would build up the morale of Egyptians as they strove to borrow the West's patterns of modernity in the 1920s. In 1924 al-Mugattam observed that Pharaonic Egypt had great impact on ancient Greek authors, "aiding them in founding their civilization ... the parent of America and Europe's civilization as it exists in our age". Here ancient Egypt was used to foster confidence in indigenous capacity to modernize and become

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Hafiz on their death, see Taha Husayn, "Hafiz wa Shawqi", al-Hilal December 1932, pp. 161-5.


like and equal to Westerners. The Pharaonic forefathers had originated what Egypt now took back in a more developed form from the modern West. The al-Muqattam item also specified that ancient Egypt "laid the foundations of science and industry"\(^{33}\), to lessen misgivings that the new Western ideas, institutions and technology were alien or harmful to an indigenous Arab-Islamic traditional civilization.

**Islam's Regulation of the Sexes De-Indigenized**

Aspects of the Pharaonic past were evoked that would most galvanize Egyptians to duplicate specific features of Western modernity --- for instance, a widening of roles for women in the public and political life of the new post-1922 Egypt. The Coptic al-Siyasah contributor Antun Zakari wrote about acquisition of political power by exceptional women in the Pharaonic period, the most outstanding being Queen Hatshepsut, who reigned from c. 1503 - 1482 B.C. with the full powers of a Pharaoh\(^{34}\). al-Siyasah, al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah and especially Haykal, sometimes contrasted the wide scope that Pharaonic culture offered women in public and political life with Muslim tradition's long exclusion of them. Women seldom had major roles in ancient Egyptian administration: nonetheless, many Pharaonic queens were influential in politics, women could own land and property and wove linen fabrics in factories. The Pharaonic Egyptians had no aversion to female nakedness: their art represented Pharaonic queens in topless or diaphanous clothing\(^{35}\). Haykal and other al-Siyasah particularists had no choice but to take on the Islamic code of modesty in women's dress in order to make their readers accept a feature of Pharaonic life highlighted in the art. A 1926 article in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah "How

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35. I am grateful for overviews of the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians' mores and concepts from Dr Colin Hope, Department of Classics, Monash University, Australia.
Egyptian Women Used to Live 4,000 Years Ago" presented Pharaonic elite women as appearing topless in public and first equal competitors against men, then as having wrested supreme authority "in all spheres/departments of public life". Egyptian women withdrew from public life only with the spread of Christianity, and disappeared behind walls only when Islam gained currency. In that condition she --- with rare exceptions --- remained until the middle of the past century, when she woke from her slumber after ages of obscurity and proceeded in a burst of activity to storm the world ... There is nothing new under the sun 36.

The Pharaonic past imaged here, then, blamed Islam for the subordinate and limited roles of Egypt's women. Pharaonic patterns prescribed support for the efforts of Egyptian Muslim feminists to end their veiling and segregation and open jobs for them in the professions.

West-stimulated dissatisfaction with women's roles in Arab Egyptian society recurred in Haykal's writings for almost his entire career. In youth, he had called for abolition of the veil and polygamy --- which he noted Islamic 'ulama (religious scholars) defended; he advocated that women be granted the vote and equal education with men 37. The images that Haykal juxtaposed in the 1920s of female goddesses and powerful queens in Pharaonic antiquity and free-mixing, wine-quaffing modernist male and female rich Egyptians now reconnecting with them 38 assailed


Haykal in the 1920s was apt to rather salaciously image the exercise by women of political power in the ancient Middle East and their often unclothed sexual beauty, simultaneously, as interconnected: he evoked the Assyrian queen Semiramis or 'Semiramis' in such terms. "Semiramis", al-Siyasah 8 March 1925; Fi Awqat al-Faragh pp. 298-9. Such only ostensibly light pieces shocked and assailed Islamic mores of feminine modesty.

37. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 39, 48-52. Haykal was extending the earlier demands for reforms to the conditions and roles of Egyptian women by Qasim Amin (1865-1908). Ibid pp. 22-4.

38. In Haykal's dialogues from the 1920s, the half-jesting Pharaonic art motifs and rituals served as validating emblems of identity over a non-traditional, de-Islamized, Westernized, life-style. The setting of this new Muslim Egyptian high bourgeoisie was

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traditional Islamic assumptions that remained deepseated among even more modernized Muslim Egyptian males. In 1925 he had one of his neo-paganist characters muse in a dialogue exploring Pharaonic mythology that "the periods when women rule nations invariably see civilization, thought and art flourish". He cited such Egyptian queens as Hatshepsut, Cleopatra --- and Shajarat al-Durr, who briefly ruled Egypt as the only queen of its Islamic period. This pattern of golden ages under female monarchs was manifested in the reigns of Elizabeth I and Victoria in Britain. But their duality of cultures compelled al-Siyasah intellectuals to apply their West-inspired concern that women have more roles like those of men in the public sphere to Arab-Islamic history. 'Abdallah 'Inan was to highlight the power wielded by one extraordinary Egyptian woman, Shajarat al-Durr, even in Islam: during the sickness and immediately after the death of her husband the Sultan al-Salih she inspired resistance to the onslaught of Louis IX's Crusaders upon Egypt, making possible his defeat at al-Mansurah in 1250 A.D. 'Inan underscored how precarious and shortlived her later attempt to set herself up as ruler had to be in Egypt's Islamic context. The acculturated elite feminists led by Huda Sha'rawi (who brought out her journal L'Egyptienne in French as well as Arabic), though, developed an Islamoid pan-Arab rather than

characterized by flirtativeness with Nefertiti-featured fashionable young women, "all varieties of drinks in flasks of silver" spread over table-cloths of Pharaonic design, but also by the presence of Westernized Christian Syrian-Egyptians. ("Our Eastern neighbours who had traditionally worn hats down many generations so that there was no distinction between them and Europeans, and their Arabic almost took on non-Arab features"). Haykal "Ra'iyyat Hator" (The Shepherdess of [the Cow-Goddess] Hathor), republished in his 1933 collection Thawrat al-Adab (reprinted) p. 171; inebriation as a contributor to cordiality and good fellowship ibid pp. 184-185; and p. 169. Despite the fleeting Pharaonic emblems, the milieu thus early had significant pan-Arab social linkages.

Pharaonic modernizing identity. The scrappy attempts at a neo-Pharaonic "national literature" by al-Siyasah intellectuals often had a substantial Western literary texture. In the 1920s, Haykal published several light dramatic dialogues in which he used leisured post-1918 Muslim Egyptian characters to evoke a few of the pagan religious rituals and gods of ancient Egypt. He was trying to lead his readers to a minimal, aesthetic, acceptance of Pharaonic polytheism --- for instance, the calf-god Apis --- abhorrent to their Islam but pervasive in ancient Egyptian culture. Haykal was early aware that Greek and Roman mythology, thought and law inspired much of Europe's post-renaissance literatures.

41. For early twentieth century feminists Nabawiyyah Musa and Huda Sha'rawi, active in the 1920s, see Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Basima Qaltan Bezirgan, "Huda Sha'rawi: Founder of the Egyptian Women's Movement" in Middle Eastern Islamic Women Speak ed. Fernea and Bazirgan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977) pp. 193-200, and Debbie J. Gerner-Adams, "The Changing States of Islamic Women in the Arab World", Arab Studies Quarterly, v. 1 (1979):4 pp. 330-1. On 1st April 1931 the Cairo monthly al-Hilal polled a range of eminent Egyptians if Egypt should follow Islamic-Arab civilization, Western civilization or resurrect ancient Pharaonic civilization. Sha'rawi envisaged both Egypt's indigenous "Arab civilization which based itself on religion --- and every civilization must have a religion" --- and "the present-day civilization [with] its numerous faults and numerous virtues" as increasingly joining together as parts of the larger, developing "human civilization". She in effect called for selection of synthesis from both Western and Arabic civilization but "the further we go in the assimilation of Western civilization, the more certain we become that our civilization has its [own] beauty and greatness". Of late Western civilization had begun to borrow from "Arabo-Islamic civilization" --- eg. the system of divorce; while Arabo-Islamic civilization had recognized the rights that women were striving to win in Egypt. "Hadaratuna al-Qadimah: Fir'awmiyyah aw 'Arabiyyah aw Gharbiyyah?" (Our Coming Civilization: Pharaonic or Arabian or Western?) al-Hilal 1 April 1931. Huda Sha'rawi's deft rhetoric not only associated Arab women with the birth of the League of Arab States in 1945 but courted its liberal-secularoid veteran Arab male leaders to incorporate Arab women into the new Arab political community, still only the "League of half Arabism". "Jami'at Nisf al-'Urubah: (The League of Half Arabism: Reply of [Christian Syrian Prime Minister] Faris al-Khuri to Mrs Sha'rawi), al-Mugattam 24 March 1945 p. 3.

42. See Haykal's dialogues "Apis" and "Samiramis", Awqat pp. 269-301 and the later ones "Isis", "Ra'iyat Hator" (The Shepherdess of [the Cow-Goddess] Hathor), and "Afrudit", Thawrat pp. 152-200. In an early 1921 review of a volume of Arabic translations of Greek dramatic poetry by Taha Husayn, Haykal observed that...
and even underlay its contemporary secularoid-positivist thought and civilization. Prodged by Taha Husayn, he himself modestly responded to ancient Greek high literature. Classicist elements in modern French and English literature somewhat patterned Haykal's abortive attempt to use Pharaonic myths to express Egypt's new national culture. He derived much of his detail about Pharaonic gods --- Isis, Osiris and Apis --- not from the fragmentary hieroglyphic texts but from later warped Greek interpretations by Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus. His friend and colleague on al-Siyasah, Taha Husayn, throughout the 1920s repeatedly stressed ancient Greek works as the uniquely creative source of the modern West's thought and literatures; Haykal in 1924 echoed this in justification of Shakespeare, Racine and Corneille, in addition to natural genius, derived their greatness from the Greek and Roman masterpieces upon which they drew. Review of Dr Taha Husayn's Suhuf Mukhtarah min al-Shīr al-Tamthili 'ind al-Yunan, first published in al-Ahram 6 January 1921; Awqat p. 188, cf. p. 184.

44. Haykal, Thawrat al-Adab pp. 11-12. In 1933, as in 1921, Haykal still called Racine and Corrielle revivers of "the literature of the Greeks" but saw Moliere in his comedies and tragedies as revolting against them and their Greek models. Thawrat al-Adab p. 234. Some time in the late 1920s, Haykal told Egyptians that Rousseau, Diderot and Voltaire ended Europeans' "slavery" to ancient Graeco-Roman literature and helped usher in an independent modern Western literature. Ibid pp. 38-9.


46. In first penning dialogues set among the Muslim Egyptian haute bourgeoisie but recreating Pharaonic mythology, Haykal "paralleled [those Pharaonic gods] with the gods of the Greeks who from above Mount Olympus had inspired Europe's current civilization". Haykal, Thawrat, p. 147.

47. Haykal in one of his Pharaonist dialogues justified ancient Pharaonic Egyptian deification of animals from Diodorus Siculus' explication: what the ancient Egyptians really sanctified in the animals was the "benefits" they offered humans. Thawrat pp. 160-1; cf. fn. 50. Haykal cited Plutarch (born 45 AD) for details of the legend of Horus and Osiris. Thawrat p. 167. Written some two and a half millennia after the Pyramids texts, Plutarch's long monograph on Isis and Osiris deviated from the original Egyptian myth: he wove odds and ends from Pharaonic religion into a systematic theology that served his own Platonic philosophy. R.E. Witt, Isis in the Graeco-Roman World (London: Thames and Hudson 1971) pp. 21, 37.
his master Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's withdrawal from politics to translate Aristotle's works into Arabic. In a different context, Haykal justified using ancient Greek sources on the beliefs and life of the Pharaonic Egyptians on the grounds that Greece and Egypt were mutually sympathetic neighbors in antiquity. (This image of Pharaonic society, culture and religion as interacting with the classical West would fit into Mediterraneanist arguments for cultural self-Westernization by Salamah Musa in the 1920s and Taha in the 1930s). That Haykal first approached ancient Egypt's unavoidable religious aspect through classical Greek sources was thus influenced by the classicism of European writers as well as by Lutfi's and Taha's totalistic definition of Western literature and thought.

Such French writers as Anatole France and Andre Gide used classical mythology and Graecophile themes to diminish or delegitimize Christianity; some of Haykal's evocations

48. To criticisms that Lutfi was turning his back on Egypt's urgent political needs to offer irrelevant intellectual relics of antiquity, Haykal replied that "the philosophy of the present age" could not be understood without a mastery of Greek "ancient philosophy" since "the literature and philosophy of the present are most closely linked to the Greeks" and "complete understanding of something can come only after investigating its sources and origin". "Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid: Tarjamat Aristutalis" (Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid: the Translation of Aristotle), al-Siyasah, 7 December 1924, Awqat, pp. 159-60.

49. While arguing in 1926 the psychological continuity of modern Egyptians with Pharaonic Egypt, Haykal observed that writings of ancient Greeks about contemporaneous Egyptians and their beliefs portrayed Pharaonic Egypt with more life and sympathy than modern Western works: "this is not surprising because Greece and Egypt were two neighboring lands and the spirit of the age bound the two parties closely together". Haykal, Thawrat, p. 139.

50. In one passage, Haykal even equated specific Pharaonic deities, including animal ones, with various Greek and Roman gods and goddesses. Thawrat pp. 182-3. Diodorus noted that "the Greeks appropriate both the heroes and the gods which are most famous of Egypt. So the same goddess Isis is variously named Demeter, Theosmophorus, Selene, Hera and even all of these, where Osiris is Serapis for some and Dionysus for others". Witt, Isis in the Graeco-Roman World, p. 38. Haykal identified Diodorus as one source of his Pharaonic dialogues. Thawrat p. 160.

51. Taha Husayn saw the classical world he loved through the anti-clerical sensibility of such French aesthetes as "his great exemplar Anatole France" and Andre Gide. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (London: OUP 1970) p. 328. The younger Haykal had great reverence for Anatole France: Pi Awqat...
of ancient Pharaonic beliefs and life similarly cut away at Islam. Indeed, long before he took up Pharaonic myths, the young Haykal had applied the Greek myths of his sceptical master Anatole France to relativize the interpretations that the Qur'an offered for human history.\(^{52}\)

**Homeland: Surrogate God**

Some Pharaonic texts popularized by the Arabic press celebrated the Nile as divine.\(^{53}\) Such elements, wrenched from the ancient ethos, could contribute to the new surrogate religion of territorial nationalism that worshipped the land of Egypt, under construction by the particularists in the 1920s. Haykal claimed that when he returned from overseas in August 1928 and saw the Nile in flood for the first time in several years he experienced towards it feelings of virtually religious devotion. These linked him to the beliefs and "soul" of his long-departed ancient Pharaonic "forefathers" for whom the river was "their Worshipped One who gave them life". He imaged himself as offering the Nile a spurious "prayer" of his own "that it stay content in bestowing its flood with covering the land in fertility and blessings, that its anger should not descend on [the land] drowning its inhabitants."\(^{54}\)

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al-Faraghi pp. 27-44 (1924), 45-63 (1924) and 64-71.

52. For example, Haykal penned an Arabic version of Anatole France's satirical retelling of the Greek myth that Uria created humanity while drunk as explication for the feminine faint-heartedness of some men and the man-like combative ness of some women. Haykal equated the Greek mythology in which this creation story was one component, with the "new truth" of the Christian and Islamic scriptures which got people to accept that they were descended from Adam and Eve. "Anatole France: Khurafah Yunaniyyah" (Anatole France: a Greek Myth), Awqat pp. 83-5.

53. Antun Zakari, "Unshudat al-Nil li-Qudama' al-Misriyyin" (Hymns to the Nile by the Ancient Egyptians) al-Mugattam, 31 August 1926, pp. 1-2. Zakari had done these flattish but interesting Arabic versions from other translations in Western languages made from hieroglyphic papyri by Egyptologists Maspero and Gibbs: such dependent access to Pharaonic texts at a double or triple remove through European languages was characteristic of Muslim al-Siyasah intellectuals throughout the 1920s, also.

54. "Misr al-Sahirah wa 'Uqq Abna'iba bi Jamaliha" (Egypt the Enchantress and Her Sons' Denial of Her Beauty), al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah 28 September 1929. "Misr al-Sahirah wa 'Uqq Abna'iba bi Jamaliha" (Egypt the Enchantress and Her Sons' Denial of Her Beauty) al-Siyasah al-Usbu'iyah, 28 September, p. 29. In regard to Haykal's evasion of the non-modern and
Haykal termed the Nile "the god-river" (al-nahr al-ilah)\(^\text{55}\). For him in 1929, the Nile stood for the whole homeland. He selectively appropriated celebratory reverence that Pharaonic religious writings voiced towards it to legitimize a novel Egyptian territorial particularism stimulated by European nationalisms. The Dunlopian anglicization drives had daily plunged the adolescent Haykal at school through English texts that depicted heroes worshipfully devoted to their territorial homeland. Macaulay's "How Horatius Kept the Bridge" was one such poem that had helped preorientate him from adolescence to see a river as an object of worship, insofar as it embodied the homeland for which individuals had to sacrifice their lives\(^\text{56}\).

**Successors.** Before 1908, Mustafa Kamal already had declared Egypt his Paradise and Ka'bah and redirected to it the Islamic mystics' drive for union with God\(^\text{57}\). For

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56. Horatius, the Captain of the Gate, outnumbered and wounded, held off a vast Tuscan host out to sack and conquer Rome, while the Romans destroyed the only bridge to their city over the Tiber. He was ready to sacrifice his individual life out of devotion to "Tiber, father Tiber, to whom the Romans pray!". Haykal passed through Italy before his return to Egypt in 1911 and these English verses of Macaulay swam up into his mind when he saw the Tiber. What fascinated him about them was "the tone of someone who sanctified and worshipped" the river that embodied the homeland. Haykal, "al-Adab al-Qawmi" (National Literature), Thawrat p. 116. Haykal recalled the verses on which he had been force-fed in Dunlop's schools, but not the names of the hero or author. Ibid.

57. Fritz Steppat Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamal in Die Welt des Islam v (1956) p. 264. Haykal himself saw, before World War I, the appeal of Mustafa Kamal's militant nationalism to students. In secondary school, Haykal regularly read the Kamilists' mouthpiece al-Liwa', although their support for the Ottoman Empire's territorial position during the 1906-1907 Tabah border dispute against (British-occupied) Egypt for him discredited both that newspaper and the movement. Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah 2 vols (Cairo: Mitba'at Misr 1951-1953) p. 26. At Law School, Haykal had had many...
Haykal in the 1920s the Nile and the land of Egypt were al-ma'bud, "the Worshipped Being": whereas playwright Tawfiq al-Hakim in the 1930s rather applied the term to charismatic political leaders — Pharaohs or their modern successors — who won total, self-sacrificing loyalty from the collective Egyptian people. al-Hakim's 1933 novel 'Awdat al-Ruh suggested that Sa’d Zaghlul became a latter-day Pharaoh-like Worshipped Being for whom the people willingly suffered and sacrificed their lives when he detonated their national uprising against the British in 1919. Although Tawfiq al-Hakim published Awdat al-Ruh (his literary debut) only in 1933, he had written much of it in the 1920s, and it was thus very much his development of neo-Pharaonist particularist theses that Haykal and his al-Siyasah colleagues had diffused in that decade.

al-Hakim in the 1930s again stressed that the territorial homeland determined a particularist identity that had stayed stable throughout millenia: for instance the Nile's annual rebirth conditioned Egyptians from Pharaonic times to a religious quest for resurrection, immortality and the Spirit's triumph over death, time and place. Egyptians, after Pharaonic religion, pursued their distinctive national quest through their adaptions of Christianity and Islam — yet al-Hakim himself at the time probably saw the eternal Egyptian homeland or its ever-resurrected collective Egyptian nation wresting back sovereignty in arguments about the Patriotic Party Kamil founded with "my friend 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i", later its outstanding historiographer. Ibid p. 64. Cf. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 37-8. Haykal in 1929 saw the massive attendance at Kamil's 1908 funeral as indicating that by then he had won supporters even from "the people of the countryside who came from far-flung corners of the land". Haykal, Tarajim p. 141. Kamil's idea that nationalists should partially redirect to Egypt the traditional Sufi drive for self-obliteration (fana') in God was later again redirected by the Turco-Syro-'Iraqi pan-Arab Sati' al-Husri to the pan-Arab Nation and state. Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism: an Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press 1962) p. 44.


this world as the only meaning or immortality for individuals after death.\textsuperscript{60} al-Hakim here broke with Islam's core doctrine that individuals had personal resurrections, judgements and after-lives.

Neo-Pharaonist particularism after World War I, then, tried to rechannel to the Egyptian physical homeland, and to the Egyptian nation it framed, the sense of the sacred that Islam directed to God. Both Haykal in the 1920s and Tawfiq al-Hakim later detached genuine slivers from Pharaonic religion as motifs to help weave a quasi-religious sanctity around a territorial nationalism more derived from the modern West than from the Pharaohs' conceptual world. With Haykal there was fervor in the reconnection with the "divine" land of Egypt, but also the self-conscious embarrassment or wariness of a constrained pose when he asserted affinity with the dissonant pagan religious aspect of Pharaonic Egyptians.

**Modern Egyptians Continuous With Pharaonic Egypt**

Haykal, 'Abdallah 'Inan and other al-Siyasah intellectuals throughout the 1920s repeatedly argued not just that the Pharaonic past was the Egyptian nation's golden age, but that it enduringly determined the continuous personality of all subsequent Egyptians. This new historical perspective denied that either Islam or Arabic had transformed Egypt and thenceforth constituted her indigenous identity. If accepted, this Pharaonist marginalization might well sap the potential that Islam and Arabic still had in 1922 to heighten elite or bourgeois Egyptians' pan-Muslim or proto-pan-Arab identifications, so strong in such classes before World War I.

The once-new religion and tongue brought by the Arabs from outside inescapably pervaded Haykal's society: he tried vehemently to minimize the unequalled break they

\begin{verbatim}
60. al-Hakim, Tahta Shams pp. 212-214. al-Hakim hung these reflections around a Pharaonic hymn on Horus and Osiris. The "resurrection" (ba'th) with which "the spirit" would triumph over time, space and death for Egyptians would be "not to another world without time or place but to this very world and to this very land". Ibid p. 109.
\end{verbatim}
wrought in the culture and perceptions of Egyptians. Thus, he denied in 1926 that the changes of "political institutions, religious beliefs and of language" since the fall of the Pharaohs "made us nearer to the Arabs or to the Romans than we are to those who developed the Valley of the Nile in the thousands of years which preceded Christianity". Here, Haykal denied the classical Arabs any special impact upon Egyptians, equating them with any of numerous alien invaders who only temporarily occupied and influenced Egypt. 'Abdallah 'Inan in 1929 agreed with Dr. Muhammad Ghallab that "the view which holds Egypt's modern culture to be an Arabo-Islamic legacy is wrong". What really happened was that the enduring "traditions of the ancient Egyptians ... had done nothing except evolve and enter into the new life by adopting the new forms and colors that suited them" from Arabic and Islam. With such arguments the al-Siyasah intellectuals in the 1920s attempted to break free from their own deep-seated assumption that, as Haykal put it before World War I, Egyptians --- unlike Spain's Arabic-speaking Muslims --- failed to develop "an independent literature and taste ... because we were incorporated into the conquering [Arab] nation". Their preceding sense of intimate racial and cultural bonds with Arabs who came from or lived outside Egypt coexisted with their novel neo-Pharaonism, nourishing their integration of a pan-Arab community that was to impose political choices by 1929.

When arguing that Arabic-speaking Egyptians had remained Pharaonic, writers such as Haykal, 'Inan and Ghallab often focussed on Egypt's unsophisticated peasantry and its folklore. In his novel about rural Egyptian life, Zaynab, written before World War I but to have its main

63. Quoted Smith, Haykal (thesis) p. 68.
impact between the two World Wars, Haykal several times hinted that his peasant Egyptian heroine and her class represented a continuing Pharaonic ethos. In the 1920s, Haykal argued in detail that modern Egypt had purest continuity with the outlook and behavior of the Pharaonic forefathers at village level. Preservation of Pharaonic elements by modern Muslim Egyptians was particularly evident in the vehement rural way of mourning, inspired by continuing Pharaonic beliefs about the suffering of the ka after death. He also argued that local, i.e. rural, Muslim saints and their shrines were just adaptions of gods of the Pharaonic pantheon. Some Egyptian religious Islamic rituals were identical with some rites of the Coptic Christians, suggesting that both had really been handed down from the common Pharaonic forefathers, "especially in the countryside where this inheritance (descent) is intact, its manifestations undevastated by the storms of urban life."

Inan once argued in 1929 that the Egyptian peasantry above all other groups had preserved Pharaonic civilization virtually intact in its customs, behavioral ideals, narratives, songs, humor and popular religion, all of which had been only superficially Arabized or Islamized. These contentions were based on a French book arguing Pharaonic survivals in modern Egyptian folklore that al-Siyasah contributor Dr. Muhammad Ghallab had originally submitted as a thesis in France. Haykal and his al-Siyasah colleagues drew on, and exaggerated, elements on the fringes of Western Orientalism and Egyptology in arguing that Pharaonic residues continued in Egyptian rural Muslim saints and folk Islam.

Community Consequences? The al-Siyasah intellectuals could have tried to fill literary Arabic with those "national" language peasant features most deviant from the Qur'an and classical non-Egyptian Arabs. A separate Egyptian literary language could have snapped the inter-intelligibility drawing modern Arabs together in the 1920s. 'Inan's view that the Pharaonic era still determined Egyptian personality worked to deintimize current links with other Arabs, making him and other al-Siyasah intellectuals less ready to aid them against ferocious imperialists and Zionists (Chapter 8). Moreover, some neo-Pharaonist evocations of ancient religious beliefs challenged the faith that Islam was factual and God-revealed, the bedrock of traditional pan-Islamism and much pan-Arabism then developing.

Pharaonic Religion and Islam

The twentieth-century Egyptian peasants now seen as custodians of Pharaonic identity still assented to a normative Islam massively solid and assertive throughout modern Egyptian history. That this Islam had originated outside Egypt itself challenged evocation of continuity in Egyptian history. Moreover, Islam, severely monotheistic, excoriated ancient Pharaonic religion's self-styled incarnate man-god Pharaoh. Re-echoing the Qur'an's image of a tyrannical, cruel Pharaoh, the younger Haykal had tended to see small cause for pride in the pyramids, because the Pharaohs had built them with slave labor at the expense of the Egyptian common people. Haykal reacted to

well as from Muhammad 'Abduh, arguments that Muslim Sufi saints or awliya were Pharaonic survivals may have come to Haykal from orientalism: Goldziher had speculated (1890) that pilgrimages to the mosque-tomb of the Sufi saint Ahmad al-Badawi (c. 1199 CE – 1276) at Tanta derived from ancient Egyptian processions to Bubastis described by Herodotus. Art "Ahmad al-Badawi", El2, which suggests some other possible borrowings.

68. Smith, Haykal (Ph.D thesis) p. 122. Cf. God to Moses and Aaron: "Go off both of you to Pharaoh. He has transgressed the bounds" (or "waxed tyrannical": tagha) (Qur'an 20:43); for Pharaoh's sadistic execution of his magicians when they believed Moses' claim that he represented God: Qur'an 20:70-2. When Moses came to Pharaoh as a prophet of God, Pharaoh told his chiefs that "I know not that ye have any god other than me". Qur'an 28:38.
Islamic obstruction inconsistently, alternately accommodating Pharaonic religion to Islam's monotheism and in other spasms groping towards a radical revaluation of Islam that would derive it from Pharaonic Egypt. He thus expressed his own dividedness.

Even Haykal's generally modern-educated, somewhat West-tinctured readers would find it hard to break with Islam's basic concepts. His more radical reflections drew his braver readers in the 1920s towards questioning Islam's self-description as an authoritative revelation from God. His defence of Pharaonic continuity challenged the reality of accounts given by "the heavenly religions", Judaism, Christianity and Islam, of ancient events in Egypt and the region. For instance, in 1926 he suggested that the Bible and Qur'an's narrative of Moses cast into the Nile and picked out by Pharaoh never happened. He speculated that it rather was developed from the legend of Seth's betrayal of Osiris by casting him into the sea and Isis' lifting him onto the shore of Phoenicia^69. (His al-Siyasah colleague Taha Husayn similarly questioned whether Abraham and Ishmael had ever come to Arabia and built the Ka'bah as the Qur'an stated)^70.

Such equation of Pharaonic religion and monotheistic scriptures as related man-made myths was to enrage Arabo-Islamist Egyptians for many decades thereafter^71. Other motifs of his denial that Islam transformed the "Pharaonic" Egyptians, however, showed the gaps in the knowledge acculturating-educated intellectuals of his type --- or at least their modern-educated audience --- had of Islam and the wider Muslim world. Haykal asserted in 1926 that the talqin (instruction of the believer for interrogation in the grave by the angels Munkar and Nakir)

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71. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn in 1954 still fumed that Haykal in the 1920s compared ancient Pharaonic paganism to "the Heavenly Religions" and speculated that Pharaonic ideas "influenced" the latter. Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2, p. 295.
in Egyptian Islam originated from beliefs handed down from Pharaonic Egypt rather than Islam itself: that this interrogation was "not popularly followed by most Muslims" outside Egypt, and ultimately derived from the Pharaonic religious concepts of questioning and judgement of the dead. He casually added: "and who knows whether our Coptic brothers do not have as much as we or more" of such Pharaonic survivals? The talqin was a standard tenet of Islam, accepted by Muslim communities around the globe. It, nonetheless, was one of many Islamic phenomena in Egypt that he explained away as only shells within which Pharaonic beliefs and culture continued. He sometimes dismissed both Christianity and Islam in Egypt as only veneers over one common continuing Pharaonic national personality.

Islam taught to cherish Hebrew prophets and abhor ancient Egypt's polytheism and blasphemous "divine" monarchy. Haykal tried to sap the status of the monotheistic religions by writing that Pharaonic paganism originated their concepts or rites. He also veered to the defensive argument that authentic Pharaonic religion was as monotheistic as Christianity or Islam. Thus, he makes a leisured character in one of his dialogues deny that the divinity that the Egyptians bestowed on their gods in the Pharaonic ages exceeded belief by the Christian masses in saints, or by the Muslim masses of modern Egypt in their Islamic saints (awliya) and pious "men of good works" (al-salihin). Another character is made to argue that the men of religion of ancient Egypt were monotheistic, and the gods symbols they devised to concretise "exalted meanings" that the masses would not otherwise comprehend: modern Egypt was like ancient Egypt in that while the men of religion were truly monotheistic "the masses deem holy such symbols of their desires as the ancient calf-god Apis".

73. Circumcision was a requirement associated with Islam in all lands where Muslims lived. Haykal depicted it as a Pharaonic custom that passed into Judaism and Islam. Thawrat p. 165.
In this spasm, Haykal was no more attached than his audience to integral Pharaonic religion or distinctive popular Egyptian Islam. It was not just that he here narrowed those aspects of Pharaonic civilization he would try to revive down to what the minimalized but ingrained Islam of his secular-educated constituency could tolerate. Rather, he himself was already ambivalent towards Pharaonic Egypt's plural, incarnate gods. Haykal's evocation of the priesthood's cult of the calf-god Apis, embodying fertility and Egypt (= nationalism), was literary neo-Pharaonism at its most strenuous and thus short-lived. When, in 1933, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Taha's and Haykal's old colleague in the al-Jaridah, al-Sufur and al-Siyasah, assailed the Pharaonic orientation, he seized on ancient Pharaonic worship of dumb animals (al-'ajmawat) to illustrate that Pharaonic culture was too bizarre to revive in Arab, Islamic Egypt.

Haykal's neo-Pharaonist orientation in the 1920s had had to make Muslim Egyptians in some sense come to terms with ancient Pharaonic animal-worship because of the inescapable centrality it had in Pharaonic religion and the whole culture. Haykal vividly evoked the black physicality of the carefully selected calf-bull. The pagan atmosphere was deepened by his suggestive images of the postures of barren

75. Ibid p. 286.
77. Originally, Haykal had intended to write many literary pieces drawing on Pharaonic mythologies and publish them in an independent book Hadith al-Alihah (Conversation of the Gods). But the precise research he had to do to ascertain Pharaonic deities and then weave them into deceptively-spontaneous dialogues was too much for Haykal, and he stopped. Thawrat p. 148.
78. al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyuna wa 'Arab", written for al-Risalah on 1 October 1933; Wahy al-Risalah v. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Nahdah nd) p. 50. However, for an attempt to understand, cf. "Kayfa Kan al-Misiyuna Ya'budun al-Hayawan: Bahthun fi 'Ibadat al-Para'inah" (How the Egyptians Used to Worship Animals: A Study of the Worship of the Pharaohs), al-Hilal Part 5 1930, pp. 568-571.
Pharaonic women who come to implore fertility from the newly-chosen calf-god. Upon the calf's death the Pharaonic Egyptians shaved their heads in mourning. There were small touches of a checking Anatole France-like scepticism: the calf, should it outlive the maximum twenty five years of god-bulls, is suicided by the priesthood ("drowns himself"). One of the characters in the dialogue is "Apis' familiar" (najiyy Apis): a young man who goes every week to the Egyptian Museum to view the sacred objects from Tutankhamun's tomb and mutters "prayers, no doubt Pharaonic", before the statue of Apis. Such literary irony manoeuvred Haykal and his cultivated Egyptian audience around deeper engagement with preposterous Pharaonic religion that might brusquely snap their identification with ancient Egypt. He applied Qur'anic terminology to the Pharaonic cults of human-like and animal gods to reduce their strangeness.

Haykal's enterprise of differentiating a particularist nation pushed him to embrace those things in Egypt, past or present, that most diverged from the classical Arabs, their Islam and their standard language and literature, and thus required him to highlight as "national" and indeed "Pharaonic" modern peasant customs and speech-patterns under the same logic that made him stand with Pharaonic animal or human-like gods. Yet other aspects of his personality simultaneously abhorred these distinctive Egyptian elements. Even while mounting modernist critiques.


81. The devotees of Isis used to go to her temple every morning to pray the dawn prayers "before a white thread become distinguishable from a black thread" (ibid pp. 176-7): the phrase of the Qur'an fixing the starting-point of the Ramadan fast (Qur'an 2:187). When Isis went to coastal "Syria" (al-Sham) to search for the remains of her murdered husband Osiris, "she sat gloomily by a spring, without talking to anyone" (la tukallimu insiyyan) (Thawrat p. 156): cf. the same phrase for Mary's silence in the period when she was pregnant with Jesus (Qur'an 19:26).
of Arabist neo-classicism in literature after 1922, partly meant to open the way for a lightly Pharaonic national literature, Haykal continued to reveal an as yet atomized dislike for the main features of ancient Pharaonic society — for example, its totalitarian priesthood — that paralleled the Arabo-Islamists' charges of Pharaonic oppression and despotism. In Islamic twinges in the 1920s he not merely adjusted to but shared the Muslim attitude that most Pharaonic religion had not been good: he retained only what fitted with Islam. Moreover, his sectionally Westernizing modernism had crystallized in his adolescence on the margin of al-Afghani and 'Abduh's salafi idealization of classical Arab Islam centred outside Egypt. Committed to this pre-traditional religion as prescriptive for West-resistant identity, al-Afghani and 'Abduh had striven to excise from popular Egyptian Islam such perceived pagan accretions as saints' festivals that Haykal now more specifically identified as Pharaonic. This purificatory, standardizing Arab-Islamic drive of the

82. In bursts of irritation with, for instance, neo-classicist factional opponents in Egyptian literary politics, Haykal revealed hostile stereotypes about ancient Egyptian religion that were very close to those of Arabist critics of the identification. In demanding that all new literature conform totally to the literary and thought patterns of the classical Arabs, the neo-classicists claimed a life-and-death authority over all who differ with them, like the dictatorship that pagan priesthood exercised in ancient Egyptian society. Thawrat pp. 144-145.

83. In his much later autobiography, Haykal recalled the deep impression made on him in adolescence by both al-Afghani's and 'Abduh's writings. Haykal appreciated the crucial aid that their "liberal thought" within Islam gave to the struggle against the "rigidity" (jumud) of late Muslim traditionalism. In adolescence, he appears to have mainly registered al-Afghani's, and 'Abduh's celebration of rationalist 'Abbasid Islam that incorporated Greek ideas. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 1 pp. 27-9.

84. Haykal spasmodically felt in the 1920s that popular festivals of local Muslims saints (mawalid) had to be cherished because they transmitted pre-Islamic Egyptian patterns. The school of al-Afghani and 'Abduh also viewed these mawalid as semi-pagan. al-Afghani accordingly wanted Egyptians to stop participating in such popular festivals in order to rather send the money they wasted there for converting syncretist illiterate Indian Muslims to a revivalist Islam more "Middle Eastern" in pattern. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani — Dhikrayat wa Ahadith (Jamal al-Din al-Afghani — Memories and Conversations) Iqra' Series (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1948), pp. 72-73.
supra-Egyptian salafiyyah continued to be applied after 1919 by acculturated pan-Arabs such as Ahmad Zaki Pasha and deeply dyed Haykal himself, given the importance of al-Afghani and 'Abduh's works in his first grounding in classical Arabic. This ingrained element in his psyche, combined with his class identity as a land-owner's son, together powerfully ensured that Haykal would not pursue for long his brief identification with peasant popular traits and culture and indigestible Pharaonic paganism. Landlord authors in the al-Jaridah-Ummah-al-Siyasah-Ahrar milieu, committed to the standard language that characterized their class, were short-lived as particularist narodiks.

Overall, then, neo-Pharaonism was articulated in the 1920s by a wide range of literary figures from different generations and sects. It was ultra-acculturated, stimulated by awareness of Western perceptions of the Pharaonic past and the West's media and high literatures (including that of Greece and Rome), which patterned the neo-Pharaonic "national literature" attempted from al-Siyasah. Neo-Pharaonism was de-Islamizing in its drive to make the homeland and nation replace the forms of Godhead and immortality offered by Islam and Christianity, and in clearing the way for the capitalist West's allocation of roles between the sexes to replace those roles traditional Sunni Islam regulated for women. Yet

85. For instance, Zaki refuted that the Sayyidah Zaynab mosque in Cairo could contain the tomb of Zaynab, the daughter of Muhammad's son-in-law 'Ali, because she never came to Egypt: it might rather have originated as an ancient Pharaonic pagan shrine. Anwar al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki al-Mulaqqab bi-Shaykh al-'Urubah (Cairo: Mitba'at Misr --- 1964?) pp. 145-8.

86. For 'Abduh's reserve vis-a-vis the peasant masses, one originated in his childhood rural class milieu, see Smith, Islam and the Search p. 19; for the paternalism, aloofness and apprehension towards peasants that his formative 'umdah (village notable) milieu inculcated in Haykal, ibid pp. 33-5, 45-6, 50-1, 121-2. Smith characterized that such elitist apprehension about the masses motivated another Islamic cleric, al-Azhar Rector Mustafa al-Maraghi (also linked to Haykal's Liberals party), to support Faruq in the 1930s: as an Islamic king, Faruq would be most able to control potential disorderliness, political activism and insurrection from the peasant and urban masses. Ibid pp. 145-7.
resistance from the modern-educated Muslim Egyptian classes to "polytheist" Pharaonic culture persisted throughout the monarchy and after Nasser's 1952 bourgeois-military revolution. In any case, Islam always structured the al-Siyasah conceptualizations of Pharaonic paganism in the 1920s whether they tried to dovetail the two or (briefly) lanced Pharaonic religion at their audience's belief in Islam.
Appendix 2: Arabo-Islamic Survivals in Neo-Pharaonism
Checked Westernization and Sapped the Sects-Neutral Egyptian Community

NEO-PHARAONISM FOCUSSED ANTI-WESTERN FEELINGS

Neo-Pharaonism shrank the areas in which Islam and the classical Arabs were prescriptive for modern Egyptians. Some aspects of ancient Egypt imaged in the 1920s could validate features of modern Western life that traditional Muslims resisted. However, recurring facets of al-Siyasah neo-Pharaonism throughout the 1920s progressively solidified disaffection from the West, including from sectors of its progressive civilization, among Egyptian intellectuals. The Arabo-Islamic motifs and tensions with Westerners within Pharaonism could really be resolved only by the wide Arabo-Muslim identification and political community of the 1930s and 1940s.

The Option of Mediterraneanism

It is important for assessing anti-Westernism in Haykal's neo-Pharaonism that Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and Taha in particular had successfully connected ancient Greece and the modern West in the minds of Muslim Egyptian intellectuals. In an early 1921 review of a volume of Arabic translations by Taha Husayn of Greek dramatic poetry, Haykal observed that Shakespeare, Racine and Corneille drew on Greek and Roman masterpieces. In the 1920s, Haykal sometimes recognised at least partial, inherent continuity of most later European literature and thought --- even Comtian positivism --- with Graeco-Roman civilization (though also to some extent with Christianity). At such points, he moved towards --- but

1. Haykal's 1921 review of Taha's Suhuf Mukhtarah min al-Shi'r al-Tamthili 'ind al-Yunan, reprinted Awqat p. 188.
2. Haykal was well aware of the enduring influence on the Western psyche of such religious --- and also classicist --- writers as Dante and Milton. Protestantism was intimately woven into the beginning of Western modernity, and even the large body of anti-Christian and anti-clerical writings from Voltaire onwards in a way continued to bond Westerners to Christianity as well as to secularism and science. Haykal, Thawrat pp. 234–6.
stopped short of --- his friend Taha's insistence that Western civilization was an indivisible continuity, its classical Greek base as indispensable for Egyptians as its modern positivist, secularist development. Although he perceived less continuity between classical and modern Western cultures than Taha\(^3\), how he related ancient Egypt and Greece could also express or alter his attitudes to the modern West.

Mediterraneanist mutations on the margin of Pharaonism early locked Egypt from formative antiquity into community with the West. The golden age of indigenous history broadened into interactions that prescribed twentieth-century self-Westernization. Already in the 1920s, the Copt Salamah Musa described Egypt as "the first cradle" of civilization: the "second cradle", Greece, developed its science, philosophy, literature and art from Egyptian materials and then diffused that Egypt-derived civilization to the world\(^4\). Musa and Dr Muhammad Sharaf first developed the theme that a joint "Mediterranean civilization" has from antiquity made Egypt "an inseparable part of Europe": it now had to adopt current European civilization in toto, repudiating the alien Arab-Islamic cultural elements that had infiltrated from Asia\(^5\). In the 1930s, Taha Husayn and some Muslim-Egyptian disciples stressed gradual fusion of (a) Pharaonic Egyptians and their culture into (b) ancient Greek civilization specifically to prefigure (c) sweeping self-Westernization in the twentieth century. Taha's 1938 *The Future of Culture in Egypt* argued (a) that contributions from

3. Haykal's modernist bent could take a much less holistic view than Taha of Western literature. In contrast to the value that Taha put on ancient Greek literature, Haykal on occasion assessed that its "images and themes" launched modern European literatures not because Greek and Roman literature had supreme quality, but because there was still no other alternative to medieval Christian writings. Post-Renaissance European literatures soon developed new themes and areas of sensibility: yet it was right that Latin and Greek, although "dead", continued to be taught to new generations, whatever their inherent value, because their vocabulary and images would always pervade literary French and English. *Ibid* p. 38-9.
Pharaonic Egypt helped launch Greek civilization but that (b) the superior Greek culture later flowed back to Egypt and was naturalised there. He stressed that ancient Egyptian influences stimulated the emergence of ancient Greek "architecture, sculpture, ... painting ... sciences ... political conduct"\(^6\), and contended that Mediterranean Egypt had remained an integral part of the Graeco-Roman tradition since antiquity, remaining Mediterranean while participating in Greece-influenced Arab-Islamic civilization. His more strident 1938 Mediterraneanism aimed to undermine the mounting criticism of Westernization as alien from not just the "official and popular Islam" Smith stressed, but much more from defecting Westernizing-educated Muslim Egyptians, including most top secular academics\(^7\). In 1933, Taha's disciple Muhammad Kamil Husayn sounded content that Greek replaced hieroglyphic Egyptian as Egypt's literary language following Alexander's 332 BC conquest. His tone was that Hellenistic Egypt under Ptolemies and Romans was a peak period of Egypt's pre-19th century history that offered pride to Arab Egyptians. He stressed how the "large community" of immigrant Greek scientists, philosophers and writers made possible the intellectual and literary life in Greek that flourished in the period: Greeks and autochthonous Egyptians alike contributed to Iliad-modelled Attic creative literature in Greek\(^8\). Kamil Husayn was not

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7. Smith, *Islam and the Search* pp. 151-2; *Future* p. 19 for Taha's bewilderment that the modern Egyptian University was Easternizing itself while the religious al-Azhar accepted Western influences.  
concerned to argue that native Egyptians introduced distinctive aesthetic or conceptual elements of Pharaonic provenance into Greek writing. His classical Arab element, though, had reinforced his Hellenism: he to some extent saw Ptolemy's Almagest --- which he stressed was canonical in astronomy from the Byzantines, classical Arabs and Europeans up to the Renaissance --- from the viewpoint of its classical Arab admirer al-Qifti.  

These various Mediterraneanists after 1919, then, all justified stepped-up self-Westernization in terms of indigenous history: they blurred the Egyptian nation's Pharaonic beginning into the West's Greek-Hellenistic basis and thus its modern development. From the earlier 1920s, Haykal, too, at times argued that concepts and culture had circulated between Egypt and Greece in antiquity: "the mythologies around the Mediterranean [were] similar". In a 1929 essay on the last Ptolemaic ruler Cleopatra, he saw Greek materialist and Egyptian spiritual philosophies as having blended under the Ptolemies, producing the distinctive Egyptian philosophy of the Alexandrian school. Even during the later period of intense Arab-Islamic Egyptian reaction against the West, Haykal in his 1935 biography of the Prophet Muhammad, would portray Pharaonic Egypt, Greece, Rome, Islam and the modern West as having successively passed cumulative civilization from one to the other, each helping to develop it into the modern global civilization.  


11. Haykal, Tarajim Mieriyah wa Gharbiyyah (Cairo: np. 1929) pp. 14-5; cf. analysis Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs p. 152. Taha in one unrepresentative exchange with Salamah Musa echoed Haykal that the ancient Egyptians "absorbed Greek philosophy and imprinted it with a special Egyptian stamp". This instanced Egypt's perpetual will to independence down the ages after the Pharaonic period. Taha, Hadith al-Arbi'a v. 3, p. 98.
close as he ever would go to Taha's sense that "Mediterranean" community with Westerners raised Egypt intellectually and culturally to new levels above the Pharaonic period.

Even in these more West-orientated items, Haykal and other Muslim Egyptian intellectuals stood far from the contentions of Taha and his disciples in the 1930s and 1940s that through Greek, Egypt under Ptolemies, Romans and Byzantines adopted integral classical Western culture and functioned within a standardized Hellenistic cultural-intellectual community. Haykal, Ahmad Husayn and other Pharaonist nationalist writers endorsed the Ptolemaic rulers specifically where they restored or maintained Egyptian national sovereignty and interests, pre-existing Pharaonic religious concepts and Egypt's international standing, but were less interested than Taha in classical Greek culture beyond the Egyptian homeland. As they saw it, the new Graeco-Roman philosophical synthesis under the Ptolemies at least equally benefitted the defectively "materialist" original Greek thought exalted by Taha as of unique, permanent excellence. But Haykal and other al-Siyasah publicists sometimes even characterized the Ptolemaic-period mixing of Greek with subordinated Pharaonic elements as fatally harmful to the latter. In his 1929 set of biographies, Haykal wrote that after mixture with Greek teachings under the Ptolemies, Pharaonic religion lost its capacity to inspire Egyptians who accordingly turned to newly-born Christianity which, in part derived from Pharaonic "spirituality" through Judaism, offered the deprived and oppressed a consoling paradise after death, and also a focus for resistance to alien Roman


14. Haykal, Tarajin pp. 15-17. This spasm of dislike towards composite Graeco-Egyptian Ptolemaic civilization ran against Haykal's implication previously that the syncretic Ptolemaic religion helped incorporate the royal family and Greek-descended elite elements into the Egyptian people. "Although Ptolemy I was..."
In contrast to Taha and Kamil Husayn's interest in the flourishing of classical or modern Western elements in Egypt, some items in al-Siyasah promoted indifference to imported Greek elements as unnecessary for Egypt's development, or too alien to graft onto indigenous Pharaonic culture.

In respect to art or architecture, this marginalization of Western elements to Egypt's antiquity went with a cold rejection of new opportunities for joint cultural activity with modern Westerners that Westernist Egyptian intellectuals would seize. Haykal once observed that Egypt's Graeco-Roman architecture merited literary treatment as a later aesthetic element in the history of the continuous Egyptian nation that should be conserved in conjunction with "Pharaonic civilization", but did not evoke any synthesis between (a) "the Greek art" that the Ptolemies introduced into Egypt plus the architecture of the Romans for which that prepared with (b) any pre-established Pharaonic elements. As editor, he published in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah in 1926 a denial by the Islamophile Egypto-Syrian Christian Mayy that there were more scrupulous in observing the rites of the Greek religion, his son Ptolemy II was Egyptian in his religion, Egyptian in his customs, Egyptian in his blood. Ibid p. 14.

15. Haykal, Thawrat pp. 140-142. This text is a sharpened but not fundamentally altered version of his 1926 article "Misr al-Hadithah wa Misr al-Qadimah: Khuldu Hayat al-Iman" (Modern Egypt and Ancient Egypt: The Immortality of the Life of Nations), al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah 27 November 1926.

16. Mayy Ziyadah was born of a Maronite father (Ilyas Zakhur Ziyadah) and a Palestinian mother in Nazareth, Palestine. She was culturally formed in a bilingual French-Arabic matrix, in Catholic schools at Nazareth, 'Ayn Turah and Bayrut; she and her father migrated to Egypt in 1911. 'Isa al-Na'uri, "'Awdatun ilal-Hadith 'an Mayy Ziyadah" (A Further Discussion About Mayy Ziyadah), al-Nahar (Sydney) 2 April 1982. At the suggestion of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, who gave her a copy, Mayy steeped herself in the Qur'an, utilizing its idioms for her own Arabic style. Jaques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution tsd Jean Stewart (London: Faber 1972) p. 513. She often expressed her contempt for Arabic Bibles as a stylistic model alternative to the Qur'an. Although her salon gradually declined, the al-Siyasah intellectuals, the successor-circle to Lutfi and al-Jaridah, cherished her to her death. Such Muslim Egyptian al-Siyasah intellectuals as Haykal, Mustafa 'Abd al-Raziq, Mansur Fahmi and Taha Husayn all contributed to a January 1942 special issue of al-Adib devoted to Mayy. Daghir, Masadir, v. 2 p. 438. Mustafa 'Abd al-Raziq, educated with Haykal in Paris, was an ...
ever had been any fruitful synthesis between Pharaonic and Greek aesthetic elements in antiquity, or that Arab Egyptians and twentieth-century Westerners should accordingly tighten their artistic relations. A Scandinavian claimed in a letter to the "neo-Pharaonic" sculptor Mahmud Mukhtār (1891 - 1934) that Scandinavian and Pharaonic architecture and other art had emerged in common contact in the past, and should be synthesized anew in the present. The fanatical Westernizer, the Copt Salamah Musa, had been often humiliated by the British he admired: now, in diffusionist articles he depicted the ancient Scandinavians and Britons as a cultural and racial extension of the Aryan Pharaonic Egyptians; inspired more by theosophy, Antun Zakari asserted the discovery of ancient ships made in Norway with Pharaonic designs. But Mayy mordantly quashed the offer of cultural partnership.

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historian of classical Islamic philosophy who (against Renan) argued original Arabic contributions to it: his stress on ijtihad (independent judgement in theology and legal matters) under classical Islam kept a door open to further borrowings from the West. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 142-143; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (London: OUP paperback, 1970) p. 163. Mustafa was the brother of the controversial 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq. For Taha and Mayy, B 333-334, incl. fn. 179.
18. Salamah Musa's reminiscences of his adolescence at the Khedivial Secondary College between 1903 and 1907 when "the English teachers took pleasure in our suffering". Musa, Education p. 28. The French with relish reminded him that the British were his masters, during his early experiences in Paris. Ibid p. 149.
20. "N.Y.", Tut'ankhamun pp. 137-8. Antun Zakari quoted a diffusionist British astronomer that some ancient monumental structures, probably astronomical, in Brittany and the British isles were engraved with the Pharaonic Egyptians' sacred cross with the circular head ('ankh), more evidence of inspiration from Egypt. Ibid.
from Europe, ascribing it to hope "of commercial gain and profit", rejecting any possibility of a synthesis of Egyptian and Scandinavian arts on the grounds that no evidence existed from archaeology or intact major artistic or architectural works to suggest any link between Scandinavian and Egyptian art. Where in antiquity there had been fusion between Pharaonic and Western arts within the Egyptian environment, she discouragingly dismissed the synthesis as sterile and impoverishing. Successful instances of synthesis included Graeco-Roman art, the inspiration Roman and Latin models gave to modern Europe in its artistic renaissance, and the classical Arabs' art which imprinted its special character on elements taken from previous civilizations: one of them, Byzantine art, had itself resulted from an earlier "synthesis". In contrast to these successful syntheses, Mayy contended that the blending of Pharaonic and Greek arts had produced only "the very inconsequential Ptolemaic art". Mayy --- and ordinary Egyptian visitors to the Egyptian Museum --- contrasted the overwrought, tawdry, Ptolemaic jewellery and ornaments with the previous tasteful, precisely-worked ornaments from "the Egyptian art" of the earlier, great Pharaonic dynasties.

Haykal and Mayy, then, saw Greek, Roman, Renaissance and modern Western culture and thought as connected, although in a more qualified way than Taha. All al-Siyasah intellectuals knew that the Ptolemies had affiliated Egypt to a Greek-medium community with the West. Westernists like Taha seized on that connection to legitimize a widened Westernization of Arab-Egyptian culture; but both Haykal and Mayy in the 1920s sometimes characterized ancient Pharaonic culture or civilization as better while separate and not debilitated by mixture with disparate elements from classical Europe.

Disengagement from the West

If ancient Greece provided a source or core of the

21. Mayy, "Nazratun fi Fann Mukhtar".
modern Western civilization, to reject it might amount to marginalizing the modern West, its descendant. Among al-Siyasah intellectuals, Haykal in particular progressively structured his vision of past Pharaonic greatness to rule out Greece as second cradle of civilization and thus the modern West as the fulfilment of Pharaonic Egypt.

From its milder onset after World War I, Haykal's developing Pharaonist pride rejected aspects of the West that he had accepted so wholly before. Some reaction against things Western was inevitable from an intellectual of his type. Before 1920 he had propagated the culture and secularist thought of Western Europe with a convert's fleeting totalism while increasingly coming to associate it with its context of hostile, terroristic imperialisms.

Schooled in English, Haykal before 1918 tended to internalize British colonial themes that Egyptians were chronically passive and backward, and that Egyptian independence could not come soon because for a long time the British colonial rulers and European minorities would be indispensable agents in making feeble Egypt modern and progressive. In 1916 he published a set of articles on the difficulties Egypt posed for such sectional Westernizers as Qasim Amin. He argued that the natural environment and climate had always sapped initiative and energy from Egyptians and made them meekly submit to despots and foreigners: the successive Pharaonic dynasties had not included one indigenous Egyptian. It was European architecture that first "gave existence to the

22. Smith, Islam and the Search, p. 44; Haykal (Ph.D) p. 71: Haykal specifically mentioned the necessity to keep foreigners as teachers in secondary schools and tertiary colleges. Ibid.
23. Haykal, "Qasim Amin" (1916) Awqat pp. 104, 109-112. Haykal's scant regard in his first phase for Egypt and its indigenous characteristics and history was determined by the West's power and cultural creativity. Yet his attitude showed his dual culture: his arguments drew on hoary stereotypes in the writings of classical or such early post-classical Arab writers as the Egyptian historian Taqiyy al-Din al Maqrizi (1365-1422) and the Egyptian encyclopaedist Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (1446-1505) that geographical environment and climate made Egyptians submissive, passive and luxury-loving. Cf. Ahmad Amin, "Safhatun Sawda" (A Black Page) al-Risalah 5 February 1934, pp. 205-7.
meaning of proportion and symmetry. Haykal had studied law in France from mid-1909 to 1912; in Europe he excitedly embraced Greek and Roman as well as modern European art and architecture, French literary models, post-religious positivist thought, commercial and industrial activity, the idealized French nuclear family and European orchestral music — all of which he wanted to impose as models on the Egyptians, so abjectly inferior in all those fields. Clearly, Pharaonism had to contract the West's prescriptiveness and perfection for sheer self-respect: through it Haykal and his audience now could see the land and history of Egypt as attractive. Qasim Amin and the young Haykal in Paris had endorsed France's mobilization of the general "patriotic" population behind her purposeful conquest of Indochina. That imperial drives of Westerners, however, had always been so inescapably salient as the Muslim Egyptian liberals strove to transplant Western patterns made it the more likely that later rejection would be comprehensive rather than merely aesthetic. Westerners themselves tangled the West's imperial violence and supremacism abroad with its creative high culture and secularoid thought at home, often depicting it as a unity since pagan antiquity, but including persistent Christian hostility to Islam. Much more sensitive to colonialism than Taha, Haykal was less and less able to borrow from Western literatures as though they were self-contained and apart from international politics. "The writers and politicians of the West" cited their nations' literary achievements as a pretext for imperialism: they said that a cultural or civilizing mission, not their actual "appetites", motivated them to conquer and rule the "nations" of the culturally inferior East. Aesthetics and high literature thus were pervaded by Egyptian awareness of the West's political imperialism.

24. Haykal, "Qasim Amin" (1916), Awqat p. 118.
27. Haykal, Thawrat p. 86.
Qasim Amin, Lutfi al-Sayyid, Haykal and other acculturated Muslim intellectuals on al-Siyasah had interacted with French-speaking Westerners in Egypt and West Europe, as well as the British. The racism and anti-Muslim supremacism that they met from both pushed them to react against a range of interconnected societies, the general West, rather than to see their quarrel as with the British alone. In the 1920s, neo-Pharaonism was one rallying point for self-assertion on a broad front --- one, however, not yet nourishing the Christian-Muslim antagonism still so deep-seated in the post-traditional elites of both West Europe and Egypt, or a pan-Muslim counter-bloc.

An earlier stage of Haykal's gradual reaction against the West appears in a 1923 article recording his visit to the newly-discovered tomb of Tutankhamun. The duality of attitude towards much of the high culture of the West, not just its violent political imperialism, was already well developed. The more positive vein of the article suggested affinity or continuity between the Pharaonic achievement and the West's subsequent development of civilization. Westerners would confess if they saw the treasures of Pharaonic art in Tutankhamun's tomb that "our progenitors are the progenitors of art and ... Egypt the cradle of civilization". There was the chance here to present Pharaonic culture and later Western culture as two connected or compatible things that Arab Egyptians could pursue simultaneously. But in his pride-seizing nationalistic response to the treasures of Tutankhamun's tomb, rather than stressing continuity, the colonized Haykal chose, by the comparison, to disparage the Greek achievement which he elsewhere recognized as a foundation of the modern civilization developed in the West. The art in the tomb of the eighteenth-dynasty King Tutankhamun "equals the statues of the Greeks and Romans and surpasses them" as, too, such medieval and proto-modern works as Gothic sculptures or Michelangelo's sculptures and paintings: Greek and Roman monuments shrink, would almost be "forgotten", before the Pharaonic monuments of Luxor and al-Karnak. Greece and through it the modern West's
civilization did not now fulfil the Pharaonic achievement in Haykal's 1923 reflections because "ancient Egypt was not the cradle of civilization but its peak and ultimate end".28

This 1923 article by Haykal, here, characterized ancient Pharaonic Egypt as not a Mediterraneanist cradle but a unique and thus far unduplicated "peak" --- cutting out the whole course of the West's arts and other endeavors as decline that did not merit too strenuous pursuit. Here Haykal, a respected intellectual leader, already in 1923 could demoralize local cultural Westernizers. Of course, he swung between contradictory attitudes even within given single articles. In his Europeanizing moods in the 1920s, Haykal could write as though Islamic restrictions robbed the classical Arabs of the motivation to produce sculpture, drawing or painting: therefore, for art and music, cultured Arabs in the twentieth century had to turn to Western works29. His contrary impulse in 1923 --- to disparage and withdraw from the West's art to Pharaonic art and architecture --- was to recur in the 1930s: the Muslim-led Young Egypt movement then wanted to contract the exposure of Egyptian artists to European artistic influences, substituting Pharaonic works30. Some of Young Egypt's founders had started out as contributors to al-Siyah, and

28. "Qabr Tutankhamun" (Tutankhamun's Grave), al-Siyah, 8 January 1923; Awqat p. 265-6. For more Pharaonist counter-disdain by Haykal in 1923 against Western art and architecture he had seen in Greece, Rome and France, ibid p. 269.
30. In 1938, 'Abd al-Rahman Salih Ahmad called in the Misr al-Fatat mouthpiece for measures to prevent Western culture "asphyxiating" the Egyptian spirit in the works of young artists. Promising young Egyptian painters and sculptors should not be "shipped off" in their impressionable years to Europe for studies "until such time as they completely mature in their Egyptian environments". Pharaonic art and the land of Egypt together would then foster in them an independent aesthetic sensibility. The article also proposed that the Ministry of Education limit Western influences in Egypt itself: the College of the Beaux Arts should be placed in purely Egyptian hands so that Egyptian artists, replacing foreign staff, could solidly ground future artists and sculptors in Egypt's discrete "national culture". However, this call cited backing from European figures. Salih Ahmad, "Thya' al-Fann al-Misri" (Renewing Egyptian Art) Misr al-Fatat 17 February 1938 p. 16.
in its drive against Western influences the Party committed itself in the 1940s to impose an Islamic state, breaking with its earlier Westernized flavor and bi-sectarian particularism.

Westerners casually justified their colonialism in terms of the superiority of their ideologies of Progress and their political patterns, not just their high cultures. Already in 1923, Haykal felt a still inchoate impulse to use Tutankhamun and Pharaonism to shrink the West's status in its broad-gauge ideologies, not only its art, literature or imperialism. In Tutankhamun's age humanity had attained the ultimate of "power, invulnerability, youth" to which it could ever aspire. For Haykal, the beauty of the treasures of Tutankhamun's tomb decisively disproved that "these great ancestors were preparing for that foolish materialistic civilization under the burdens of which the world is oppressed today". In contrast to West-dominated humanity's lack today in "initial youth" of "wisdom", Egypt, defined by and continuing its Pharaonic age, offers materialism-benighted mankind --- if it will only accept Egypt's leadership --- "mature intellect...true civilization...human development ascending through the spirit to the kingdom of the angels, nay the gods".

Haykal's education and personal culture always gave him some life-long affinity with the secularoid or humanist ideologies that Westerners evoked to brand Easterners as in urgent need of tutelage. His impulse to reflect symmetrical counter-scorn back at the West's materialist-humanist ideologies would become more significant with the years, but what Pharaonic past was at hand in 1923 far from offered him the coherent alternative he needed. However, his West-rebuking proto-religious rhetoric already was setting off towards the

31. Haykal, "Qabr Tutankhamun" (1923) Awqat p. 266. In another 1923 neo-Pharaonist article, Haykal patronized "the great efforts" "humanity today" was expending to achieve strength, pride, power and happiness because all it had realized thus far was "a mirage" that might take centuries to amount to anything. "Tibat al-Ahya'" (Thebes of the Living), 14 February 1923. Ibid p. 270.
universalist-transcendental Islam with which Egyptian modernists were to differentiate themselves against the West in the 1930s. The Arab-Islamic identification was then to offer the world's Arabic-speakers and Muslims as a ready field for wide leadership by Egypt around much of the globe, craved in earlier neo-Pharaonism conscious of France's global, violent, civilizing mission.

Much more than the dominance of Arabism and Islam stressed by Gershoni and Jankowski, then, the West and its grip was the formative context that neo-Pharaonism addressed. Years after the sensation over Tutankhamun's tomb had subsided in Egypt, Haykal characterized Westerners as predatory colonialists who waged calculated psychological warfare against Egyptians in order to paralyse them into accepting political subjugation. "The imperialists who want a nation subserviently to submit to them try to put into its head that it has consisted of subservient slaves throughout history and that it therefore is inevitable that it should continue as a nation of subservient slaves". Thus, Egyptians before 1922 had felt "despair" of their "capacity to possess life". This was what made the precious relics excavated from Tutankhamun's tomb so excite the intellectuals: they restored "self-pride" (i'tizaz al-nafs bi-dhātiha), hope that since the "forefathers" in Tutankhamun's day had scaled such a "high peak" of civilization, their modern Egyptian descendants had the inherent capacity to scale it too32.

The blended cultural-political supremacism of Westerners had inflicted its deepest wounds on those intellectuals such as Haykal whom acculturation most exposed to the West. Neo-Pharaonism was bound to trigger long-accumulated impulses to disengage from Westerners in general, not just the British. But the class factors that checked Haykal's Pharaonic and later Arabo-Islamic reaction against Westerners must be stressed. For instance, his above-cited reflections also registered the comfortable position that his rising Arab-Egyptian landowner class had achieved by

1922 under forty years of British colonial rule. The man who derived pride from wealth and hereditary family status confidently forged through difficulties, where the miserable poor man's morale crumbled: for Haykal, regaining self-respect through the Pharaohs, particularism, only extended the propensity of his literate class to trans-generational memory. Showdowns with imperialists could devastate one's own wealth. The diffused anger against the West solidifying within Haykal's neo-Pharaonism was further dampened by the reader understanding his formation offered of the West's culture and concepts, in comparison to the fragmentary Pharaonic past or even its successor-identification, the Arabo-Islamic legacy.

Nonetheless, the disengagement from Westerners and their social ideologies that Pharaonism set in motion had already been prefigured in his early doubts as a young man dazzled by the West whether its sciences and religionless rationalism could offer human happiness. During his neo-Pharaonic phase, Haykal felt that survival of any indigenous identity was threatened not just the Westerners' political superracism but also the homogenizing effects of their modern technologies. In 1926, while affirming that Egypt's psychological continuity with the Pharaonic era would survive, he betrayed real fear that modern communications --- railways, steamers, aircraft --- one day might annihilate international borders and perhaps in consequence all patriotisms, a prospect his youthful al-Jaridah milieu had on occasion projected with

34. In 1916 Haykal treated with Anatole France-like irony early Arab Muslims' association of the rising and setting of the sun with the never-ending trial of wills between angels and satans. Modern European science now has revealed that the sun is an inanimate star: "science has deprived us of enjoyment from the beauty of such myths", offering as consolation the conviction "whether true or not we do not know, that at last we do know". "Hadith al-Shams" (The Sun's Conversation), al-Sufur 29 September 1916; Awqat pp. 199-202. In 1923 Haykal probably still shared the hedonist Pierre Loti's assumption that there was no life after death, but felt the desolateness. "Pierre Loti", al-Siyasah 17 June 1923; Awqat pp. 86-95.
35. Haykal, "MISR al-Hadithah wa MISR al-Qadimah", al-Siyasat al-Ubdiyyah 27 November 1926. Haykal was now reacting emotionally against a long-term possibility that patriotisms would
equanimity. Pharaonism was the first rallying-point from which Haykal tried to hold this depersonalization at bay.

Like his earlier articles in the 1920s, Haykal's late Pharaonist communications still visualized the development of an Egyptian spiritual alternative to the West's materialism as of global, not local, significance. If modern Egypt's writers did produce a new Arabic literature drawing on the arts, history and spirituality of both Pharaonic and Arab-Islamic Egypt, that would discharge a universal mission. The West, Haykal charged, had through the "materialism" of its civilization plunged the whole contemporary world into darkness: the "light" of Egypt's renewed youthful spiritual life could liberate West-benighted humans. The continents-spanning scope of Islam made him stress Egypt's role in "the Islamic civilization that flourished on the Nile and illuminated the world with its light for long centuries". Haykal now designated not Pharaonic spirituality on its own but al-adyan, the successive religions that Egypt had experienced and to which she contributed as the universalist alternative she could offer to the West's materialism. Islam was the culmination of these religions of Egypt (tuwwijat bil-Islam).

Given the animus against the West that Hakal vented in his neo-Pharaonist stories and essays of the 1920s, it rings true that he had at the outset toyed with the idea of rather taking Egypt's war against the Crusaders as the subject for a new "national literature". He did not proceed with his impulse to recreate certain eras of Islamic Egypt in high literature because it would make him vulnerable to attack from political and personal enemies, whereas "the Pharaohs and their gods" were beyond objection. Haykal had accurately read the much more
secular tone of Egyptian public life in the earlier 1920s and when he did celebrate prowess against the Crusader invaders presented it as by a "completely independent Egyptian nation (ummah)"; after the Caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 813-833), the Islamic Caliphate had become purely spiritual and Egypt henceforth was subordinate to it only in the sense that the Christian states of Europe were subordinate to the Pope of Rome. Clearly, though, Haykal's Egypt-centred celebration of the Crusader wars in the 1920s had some wide anti-Western, camps-integrative, religious energies, and Arabist-particularist duality uncontainable within the period's Egyptianist language: "Egypt's glory and pride in the Crusader Wars when all Europe combined together to overpower the Muslims in the Holy Places of Palestine, laying its hands on them in the name of the Cross".\textsuperscript{38} al-Siyasah's Pharaonist or pan-Easternist spiritual-materialist dichotomizations of Egyptians against the West lodged, but diluted, ongoing resistant Muslim identity, but the Crusader themes made the religious differentiation explicit, reigniting historical memories of bloodshed much more vivid than the themes of resistance by mildly Hellenized, still Pharaonic, Egyptians against the Roman occupiers with which Haykal also toyed. The mesmerizing shrines in Palestine, finally fusing with modern West-derived concerns, were to potently draw the al-Siyasah acculturated Muslim intellectuals into the Constitutionalists when he published his first March 1925 neo-Pharaonist dialogue (on Apis), instead of a recreation of the Crusader wars. World views in politics were a context at the time but jealousy among litterateurs was also destructive in the period. Thawrat p. 98.\textsuperscript{38} Haykal, Tarajim pp. 19-21. Pan-Islamizing, campist, pan-Arabizing energies in the Crusades theme in the 1920s were brushed aside by Gershoni and Jankowski: it was just another Egypt-centricizing sector. Egypt, Islam and the Arabs p. 159. Haykal's rather shrill assertion of Egypt's political and cultural equality, from Ahmad Ibn Tulun, with 'Abbasid 'Iraq revealed how reverently bonded to it his category of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectual would remain: although some historians considered these among Egypt's centuries of subservience, Egypt was really "erecting towering edifices of independence and knowledge that surpassed all Baghdad knew". Tarajim p. 20. He was aware of Mamluk Egypt's role as a sanctuary for Arabic scholars who fled the Mongols from 'Iraq and Syria. Ibid pp. 23-24.
contest between the Palestinians and the Zionists from the late 1920s.

Haykal's Neo-Pharaonism with more diffused, unpredictably surging hostility to the creativity and concepts as well as imperialism of Westerners threatened a breakdown of his Westernizing drives. C.D. Smith characterized him as at heart disappointed that the West lost confidence in its cultural achievements, science and ideologies after World War I and turned for spiritual guidance to Eastern religions. In this view, the themes he developed of Eastern spiritualism versus Western materialism and then a specifically Islamic orientation were little more than veils he draped over his Westernizing message in order to fend off the religious masses and increasingly constrictive resurgent Islamic officials. Yet our scanning of his earlier Pharaonic writings has highlighted a part of his colonized psyche that from the early 1920s was bound to exult at and exploit any setback or demoralization that befell the overbearing West. The modernist intellectuals' reaction against political imperialism almost automatically flowed over into the spheres of high culture and broad-gauge secularist-positivist ideology, where Westerners likewise domineered. Semah argued that Haykal progressively retreated from around 1928 from (a) his identification with the West's science and positivism and (b) from Pharaonist Egyptian particularism to (c) a sincere spiritualist, Easternist, Arabo-Islamic orientation. This downgraded the materialistic West and elements of Egyptian cultural particularity such as the use of colloquial dialect in new Arabic high literature. In reality, Pharaonism itself had got his shift from the West --- and even from some essential components of particularism itself --- under way from the early 1920s.

In contrast to Salamah Musa or Muhammad Sharaf, Haykal stands for an ambivalent variant of neo-Pharaonism that was

pervasively West-aware more than consistently Westernizing. West-dyed intellectuals like Haykal understood the aesthetic culture, social patterns and more secular ideologies of the Westerners more readily than Pharaonic or Arabo-Islamic alternatives they would have to cobble together from bits and pieces. But Westerners made these into emblems of their global political supremacism: that built up pressures within Muslim Egyptian modernists to repudiate the culture and ideologies of Europe, not just its imperialism. The anti-West or West-downgrading impulses within Pharaonism were not confined to the aesthetic sphere, but rather produced a diffused loss of commitment to Western patterns. These facets of neo-Pharaonism among the acculturated intellectuals in the 1920s thus prefigured their resort in the 30s and 40s to the Arab-Islamic orientation, as a more fitting instrument with which to marginalize the suffocatingly close Westerners and Western elements.

ARAB AND ISLAMIC DYSFUNCTIONS

Antiquity Prefigured the Pan-Arab Community

Egypt's ancient past not only made Muslim Egyptians feel apart from neighboring Arabs: sometimes that past rather suggested how far back into antiquity their contacts and affinities with other Arabs stretched. For instance, Westerners engaged in archeological rediscovery in the 1920s impressed on Arabic opinion makers in both Egypt and Lebanon that Pharaonic Egypt and the Phoenicians had had close political and cultural relations. On their side, Egyptian neo-Pharaonist publicists in the 1920s stressed to

41. A royal Phoenician tomb excavated at Jubayl (ancient Byblos) contained gifts from Pharaohs Amenemhet III (1850-1800 BC) and Amenemhet IV (1800-1792 BC). "Iktishaf Qabr Muluki Jadid fi Jubayl" (Discovery of a New Royal Tomb at Jubayl), al-Bashir 27 November 1923, p. 2. The French excavator at Jubayl, P. Montet, in a talk to the Egyptian Scientific Institute in Cairo, stressed the evidence his excavations had unearthed of the closeness of Egypt and Lebanon's relations since antiquity, that Syrians and Egyptians together had made the objects he excavated at Jubayl. "al-Athar al-Muktashafah fi Jubayl" (The Relics Discovered at Jubayl), al-Bashir, 20 January 1923, p. 2.
educated Egyptians the Pharaonic relics in Arab West Asia, including those then being excavated from the Phoenician site at Jubayl. Taha in 1938 was very aware of ancient Egypt's "strong and continuous" contacts with Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, which influenced "the intellectual, political and economic life of all the countries concerned." For him, Pharaonic influence beyond Egypt was one of a range of considerations that validated an at least cultural-educational and economic pan-Arab outreach by Muslim Egyptians to Arab West Asia. His sense in the 1930s of Pharaonic Egypt's exchanges with Semitic West Asia wavered from an hierarchical attitude to recognition that Egypt had gained crucially from its relationship with, for example, the Phoenicians. Already in the 1920s, Haykal's neo-Pharaonic pieces evoked an antiquity that blurred West Asia and Pharaonic Egypt into each other. Jubayl, from the 1920s solidifying the particularist political consciousness of acculturated Christian Lebanese, was at the same time one setting of the myths about Pharaonic gods that Haykal strove to popularize in Egypt. One of his Pharaonic

42. "al-Athar al-Khalidah: Yawmu Wadi al-Muluk" (The Immortal Monuments --- the Day of the Valley of the Kings), al-Muqattam, 7 March 1924. In regard to publicity in Arabic of movement by Semites into Egypt, the neo-Pharaonist Antun Zakari translated the young English journalist H.V. Morton's portrait of Tutankhamun's Thebes as a cosmopolitan trading city: Phoenicians, Syrians, Babylonians and desert Arabs (as well as some Cretans) rubbed shoulders in it with autochthonous Hamitic Egyptians. "N.Y.", Tutankhamun pp. 49-51.

43. Taha, Future of Culture in Egypt p. 3. As well as a sense of relatedness, pagan antiquity also fostered hierarchical tints towards West Asian Arabs in Taha's outreach: "our mythology relates that the Egyptian gods crossed the Egyptian frontiers in order to civilize the people in those regions. Historians tell us that the Kings of Egypt at times extended their sway over them". Ibid.

44. Taha Husayn in 1933 rejected Tawfiq al-Hakim's isolationist drive to reduce interactions with Arab and Western cultures. It was not in Egypt's own interest to cut off its interactions with "the foreign element which has always influenced Egyptian life". Egypt had to conserve "all it gains through its contact with the civilized nations in the East and the West. It came from the Greeks, Romans, Jews and Phoenicians in the ancient period ..." "Ilal-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim: Min al-Duktur Taha Husayn" (To the Writer Tawfiq al-Hakim: From Dr Taha Husayn), al-Risalah 15 June 1933.
dialogues depicted how the chest in which Seth enclosed the good god Osiris floated down the Nile across to "Jubayl in Syria" and how Isis then brought it from the royal court there back to Egypt where she could resuscitate Osiris. Other neo-pagan dialogues of his celebrated the Assyrian queen-goddess Semiramis, the embodiment of feminine beauty, "who invaded Egypt and ruled it for a long time". For Taha in 1938 such ancient myths validated new pan-Arab roles for Egypt in Arab West Asia: "our mythology relates that Egyptian gods crossed the Egyptian frontiers in order to civilize the people in Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia."

Haykal's recognition in the 1920s that the populations, cultures and religions of the Middle East were interconnected in antiquity could sap either Islam or the restoration of Pharaonic identity. On the one hand, particularism obliged him to argue the continuity of the Egyptian nation. To hold that Egypt and West Asia were one culturally-integrated region from antiquity implied that Pharaonic religion originated aspects of Judaism-Christianity-Islam. Islam then would only have flowed back to Egyptians, without transforming their beliefs and culture. On the other hand, the reinterpretation would not motivate the rescue from oblivion of anything that distinguished Egypt from the Semites. Asked Haykal rhetorically:

Are not Christianity, Islam and Judaism ... all in the sources of their inspiration to be traced back to Egypt, to Palestine, to the Arabian peninsula, all ... most closely contiguous? Is not Judaism --- the most ancient of them all --- closely connected to the Pharaohs and ancient Egypt? ... Then do not the languages of the Pharaohs, the Arabs and Syria depict a life closely similar in ancient history as it is nearly the same in modern history?

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45. Haykal, Thawrat p. 156.
46. "Semiramis", al-Siyasah 10 June 1925 and Fi Awqat al-Faragh pp. 293-306; Thawrat pp. 155-6. Haykal's evocation of "Semiramis", the Greek form of Sammuramat (flourished late 9th century BC), may have drawn on Diodorus Siculus who elaborated a whole legend about her in Bibliotheca Historica 2:4-20. Diodorus was one source of Haykal's images of Apis, Osiris, Isis and Seth. Thawrat p. 160.
47. Taha, Future of Culture p. 3.
In such passages he was suggesting in the 1920s that Pharaonic Egypt, not God, was the ultimate source of the monotheistic religions that unfolded in West Asia. With its divine authoritatively thus contracted, Islam might less restrict Egyptian self-Westernization and development of independent identity. But, nullifying that, his mode of argument further meshed Egypt with the Semitic West Asians, in a perceived community of religious concepts, culture and life-style now projected back into remote antiquity.

In one 1925 essay Haykal presented the Arab-Islamic community established by the classical Arabs as a further integrative step in a process that had been progressively binding together the populations of the lands between the Persian Gulf and Morocco from a millennium before the Arab conquests. Here he was validating as normal for the region and a natural development from pagan antiquity the unified Arabophone-Islamic administration and cultural-intellectual community that had extended from Iran to Muslim Spain in its heyday. The populations that spoke Arabic daily when Haykal wrote in 1925 he still saw as "nations", each of which had its own language and belief before the conquering Arabs brought unifying Arabic and Islam --- but even in antiquity already derived from "races closely related to each other". Before the Arabians came, the populations that were to participate in Islamic civilization had already interacted and communicated a lot, with easy access to each other resulting from their location along or near the Southern Mediterranean. The new Arab wide state framework

48. Haykal, "Misr al-Hadithah wa Misr al-Qadimah: Khuldu Hayat al-Umam" (Modern Egypt and Ancient Egypt: The Immortality of the Life of Nations) al-Siyasat al-Uslu'ilyyah 27 November 1926; Husayn Ittijahat v. 2 pp. 148-150. However, in one spasm of his 1925 article on the Arabs and Islamic civilization, Haykal felt an impulse to differentiate in antiquity "the nations (umam) of Africa [which were] almost separated from the nations of Asia". In the muddled sentence, Haykal possibly also excised Arabia and Mesopotamia from an Arabism-prefiguring community with Pharaonic Egypt in antiquity although he excepted "Syria and Palestine and what is adjacent to them: they were in tight contact with Egypt in most periods of history although they remained independent in their Aramaic language from hieroglyphic Egyptian and other languages" (Ptolemaic Greek?) "that got established on the banks of the Nile". "al-Arab wal-Hadarat al-Islamiyyah" (The [Classical] Arabs and Islamic Civilization) (1925), Awqat pp. 376-7.
and religion, reactivated their creativity, and merged their civilizations in the new tighter Islamic one. "The contact of the [classical] Arabs with all these nations was as neighbors, in race and through commerce".49 Here, Haykal pushed Egyptian folklore's sense of racial input from classical Arabs into Egypt and other units that became Arabic-speaking, of blood relationships between Arabic-speaking "peoples", back much further into antiquity than either classical Arabic literature or popular Arab-Egyptian culture had ever conceived. West-stimulated depiction of the region's antiquity interlocked with traditional conditioning to draw the particularist territorial units together.

Haykal's synthesis in the 1920s, then, ran that Islam and the Arabs finalized a unity between Egypt and the other Arabic-speaking lands that had been evolving for millennia, the opposite of Salamah Musa's resentment of Islam and the Arabs as an alien force that shattered the continuity of Egypt's indigenous Pharaonic identity.50

By arguing that earlier pagan civilizations had contributed to Arab-Islamic civilization, Haykal diluted its "Islamicness" and made it more secular. In this 1925 article he also stressed the non-Arabs' contributions to classical Arabic literature and Islamic thought and philosophy, seeing the role of Arabs more as patrons and directors of the literary and intellectual activity. Yet he still depicted the contributing non-Arabs as Muslim and the civilization they helped develop as "the Islamic

49. Haykal, "al-'Arab wal-Hadarat al-Islamiyyah" (1925), Awqat pp. 388-9. The political skills of the classical Arabs as an imperial elite, the language they contributed and their religion were important, but to decisively integrate, the new community had to have the pre-existing interactions established in antiquity. Iran and Andalusia on that grouping's margin, had not shared in its racial and cultural interaction prior to the Arab conquest. Although Iran and Andalusia came within the orbit of Arab rule and the Arabic language for a time, it was therefore natural that both returned to their elements and peeled off from the inner grouping of lands that adopted Arabic as a further integration that came naturally. Ibid p. 386.

Thus, he still in 1925 saw Islam as the integrant of wide community, even if his perception of borrowings from previous traditions (some pagan) within Islamic civilization made the religion now less transformative and the conquering Arabs less original. Certainly, his depictions of Islam as a common denominator that held the state of the classical Arabs, or at least its culture and thought, together ignored the crucial role of Syriac-speaking Christians in translating Greek philosophical texts: in the end, he could not define the classical Arabs' entity in any way likely to attract Arabic-speaking Christians into any modern successor community. The pan-Islamic writer 'Abdallah al-Nadim (1844–1896), under early British colonial rule, had in the 1890s seized on commerce, immigration, intermarriage and empires ruled jointly from Egypt by Canaanites and Egyptians in antiquity. These associations "in ancient and modern times, in paganism and under Islam" were additional precedents to justify the unity of Muslim Egyptians and (Christian) Lebanese-Syrians that shared Arabic and joint resistance to British imperialism required in 1893. The Young Egypt leader Ahmad Husayn, who drew wholesale on Haykal's thought, in 1939 similarly incorporated facets of Pharaonic antiquity he had cherished as a particularist into his vision of the historical stages of integration of the pan-Arab community. By claiming the Pharaonic Egyptians as Arabs who established cohesive body-like unity with the Phoenician, Assyrian and Babylonian states, he specifically reduced Islam's later role in the genesis of the pan-Arab community. But he was like Haykal earlier, in that his party could not transfer into its later pan-Arabism the integrative drive of its earlier Pharaonic patriotism, which had welcomed Copts and Jews as well as Muslims.

By the end of the 1920s, the most radical pan-Arabs cited the archeological evidence of Egyptian political and

52. al-Nadim in al-Ustadh 23 May 1893 p. 932.
53. Israel Gershoni, The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt (Tel Aviv University: Shiloah Centre for Middle Eastern Studies 1981) p. 52.
cultural presence in West Asia to question whether antiquity supported the particularists' argument of an Egyptian particularist nation confined within its modern borders. The Eastern League's Arab Secretary, the Egyptian Sufi shaykh Muhammad al-Ghanimi al-Taftazani cited such evidence to refute the self-contained Egyptian nation of the particularists:

If these ancient monuments give grounds for relating current nations to those who produced them then Syria too would be Egyptian and Pharaonic because the relics of Jubayl and other sites of excavation in Lebanon and Syria prove that a Pharaonic and Egyptian glory once existed there.

Despite his traditional Islamic tertiary education, al-Taftazani followed the new facts archeology was still uncovering about his region's pagan history. In the 1930 exchanges his drive to integrate a wide pan-Arab community frankly reinforced by Islam made him reject Pharaonic monuments with harsh, totalistic language as standing for an irretrievably dead, lost and incomprehensible pagan culture that could never have any relevance for Arab Egypt. In this 1930 item at least, he did not display even the most modest pride in ancient Egypt, but he was abreast enough of the West's discoveries about it to fire at the particularists archeological data that did not fit their arguments. The particularist Capt Nashid Sayfayn retorted that it was "sophistry" to argue that Lebanon was Egyptian because it contained Pharaonic monuments: no intelligent person would argue that the English were Roman because the

54. Eastern League leader Muhammad al-Ghanimi al-Taftazani, "Misru wal-Buldan al-'Arabiyyah" (Egypt and the Arab Countries), al-Muqattam, 30 August, 1930, p. 1. al-Taftazani's attempt to use the West's archeology to support pan-Arabism and discredit neo-Pharaonist particularism, was foreseeable given that non-Western Islamic clerics of his type had, throughout the 1920s, been carefully grounding themselves in the Pharaonic past. In 1923, the Coptic ideologue and Egyptologist Jurji Subhi, a lecturer at Cairo's Medical College, delivered an archeological lecture at the Teachers' College club: the sayyid 'Abd al-Hamid al-Bakri, head of the Sufi orders in Egypt and President of al-Taftazani's Eastern League, was prominent at the occasion, although in a friendly way. "Muhadarah Athariyyah fi Nadi [Madrasat] al-Mu'allimin al-'Ulya" (An Archeological Lecture at the Teachers' [College] Club), al-Muqattam 4 December 1923 p. 1.
Romans had left remains in Britain or that the Spaniards were Arab because the long-departed Moors had left some Arab architecture in that country. The drawn-out controversy in al-Mugattam in 1930 as to whether Egypt was Arab or Pharaonic was sparked by the testimonies of al-Taftazani and Ahmad Zaki in Jerusalem before the League of Nations inquiry into the clashes between Palestinians and Jews at the al-Buraq/Western Wall: the degree of Arabness argued for Egypt, then, could determine the extent to which Egyptians would become involved in politico-religious conflict in neighboring Palestine. There were already proposals for a U.S.A.-type federation of Arab state-units.

Arabism-Fostering Elements Within Neo-Pharaonism

In the 1920s more than now, standard literary Arabic was still pervaded by vocabulary, idioms and references of classical Arabs origin. It was in literary Arabic that neo-Pharaonist intellectuals tried to revive Pharaonic culture elements, and solidify a discrete Egyptian nationalism around them. But the language and the classical supra-Egyptian Arabic literature onto which it opened, only bound them and their secular-educated audience the more to the experience and culture of the wide classical Arab empires, and thereby to other contemporary Arabs beyond Egypt with the same heritage.

Territorial-particularist intellectuals after World War I drew themes wholesale from the late-classical sociologist and historian Ibn Khaldun (1332 - 1406) and from the ethnic protest shu'ubiyyah centred in West Asia under classical Islam, to disparage the classical Arabs and

56. See Hasan Arif (LLB), "Hal Misr Fir'awniyyah?" (Is Egypt Pharaonic?), al-Mugattam, 12 September 1930, p. 7. The Arab confederation would be to get free of "the noose of imperialism" and "catch up with the Western nations in their civilization". Ibid. "We youth of the Arab East" should strive to achieve in the future "a single state" for "this Arab Nation". Hasan Arif, "Misru wal-Buldan al-Arabiyyah" (Egypt and the Arab lands), al-Mugattam, 4 September 1930.
their culture. In a less considered category, a 1924 contributor to *al-Muqattam*, noting the pilgrimage of eminent, moneyed, and fashionable Egyptians to Tutankhamun's newly discovered tomb, headed his article with the classical Arabic couplet "my people conquered time when it was young: they walked above the heads of the ages." He here was quoting from an ancient 'Abbasid poem in which the "Persian" ex-Magian convert to Islam, Mihyar Ibn Marzuwayh al-Daylami (d. 1037) exalted his Persian nation over the Arabs who conquered them in early Islam. Such Egyptian publicists, steeped in classical Arab authors, spontaneously burst into their idioms at emotional peaks or to clinch crucial points. Their ingrained duality of vision often led them to perceive both Egypt's ancient past and its present in terms of patterns of experience of ancient classical Arabs situated outside Egypt. In their more conscious, lethal mode, neo-Pharaonic particularists fired classical Arab experiences against Egypt's Arabism, yet the old Arab motifs were an intellectual language they shared with the culturist pan-Arabs. The Islamist pan-Arab Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat denied in 1933 that descents were a determinant of


59. "Qawmi stawlaw 'alad-dahri fatan / wa mashaw fawaça ru'us il-hugubi" (My people conquered Time when it was young / And walked above the heads of the epochs). This and following couplet by Mihyar quoted 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri, *al-Judhur al-Ta'rikhiyyah lil-Shu'ubiyyah* (Bayrut: Dar al-Tali'ah 1962) p. 82.

60. For a discussion of this phenomenon in Arab journalism as it persisted into the 1950s, see Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* 4th ed. (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz 1979) p. ix. For a 1927 instance of dysfunctional quotation of a classical Arab poet — Farazdaq — in order to assert the peerless lineage of the Pharaonic Egyptians, see Gersconi and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs* p. 185. The Pharaonist insurrections of these acculturated intellectuals bound them within the sphere of the classical Arabs' modes of discourse.
nations. He classed the racially Persian but Baghdad-resident Mihyar on social and linguistic criteria as belonging to the Arab people, in whose "tongue" he penned his ethnic shu'ubi verses. The classical Arab patterns did not fit perfectly with either neo-Pharaonism or the deterritorialized linguistic nationalism towards which al-Zayyat, Haykal and others groped in the 1930s. Most shu'ubis under classical Islam were not proto-nationalists seeking to secede from the Arab-Islamic states, but within them glorified --- in Arabic --- pre-Arab pasts in order to counter claims of superior descent from Arabs with whom they were fusing (Mihyar was one such shu'ubi). On the other hand, the great importance of lineage for the classical Arabs and, in a less specific way, for ethnic elites challenging their declining leadership was very different from al-Zayyat's race-blind insistence that language conferred automatic Arab nationality.

Articles in al-Siyasah and al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah in the 1920s explored or expounded ancient Pharaonic ideas with reference to classical Arab concepts. Muhammad Farid Muhammad in 1927 tried to convey to his readers the Pharaonic concept of the ka or spirit supposedly attached

61. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyyuna wa 'Arab" (Pharaonists and Arabs), written for al-Risalah 1 October 1933; al-Zayyat, Wahy al-Risalah v. 1 (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr nd.) pp. 49-50.

62. Abul-Husayn Mihyar Ibn Marzawayh al-Daylami was born in ethnically mixed but Arabic-dominated and Arabizing Baghdad, where he also died in 1037. His father was a Persian-speaking Magian or Zoroastrian. Mihyar embraced Islam at the persuasion of the Shi'ite poet al-Sharif al-Radiy (970-1016), a racial Arab descended from the fourth Rightly-Guided Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib. al-Radiy eulogized 'Abbasid Caliphs and wazirs. Mihyar made al-Radiy's poetical style the starting point for his own Arabic poetry: which, despite shu'ubi themes, was therefore full of the archaic Arab idioms preferred by his master. Fu'ad Afram al-Bustani, al-Majani al-Hadithah 'an Majani al-Ab Shayku (Bayrut: Manshurat al-Adab al-Sharqiyyah 1948) v.3 p.193; Hanna al-Fakhuri, Ta'rikh al-Adab al-Arabi (Bayrut: al-Mitba'at al-Bulusiyyah 1960) p. 712; Clement Huart, A History of Arabic Literature (London: Darf Publishers 1987) p. 86. Whereas Fakhuri placed Mihyar's birth in Baghdad, Huart wrote that not just his father but Mihyar himself was born in Daylam, the mountainous region south of Gilan on the Caspian coast. Mihyar often celebrated Islam in his verse, drawing on Muslim theology (kalam). al-Fakhuri, op cit.
to each person, and the provision that Pharaonic funerary rites made for the ka of the dead. He drew a not particularly appropriate comparison from the hamah (owl-like bird) said by the pre-Islamic peninsular Arabs to issue from the head of a murdered person and screech until vengeance was taken. He also drew parallels to the ka tenet from modern Arabic-speaking, Muslim Egyptians' popular folk-beliefs about spirits. He did so ambivalently, almost applying the Prophet Muhammad's rejection of local Arabian superstitions both to the Pharaonic ka and the modern folk-superstitions now seen as derived from ka. The subordinated reservations he voiced against Pharaonic and modern peasant Egyptian particularities in the particularist al-Siyyasah were like those of its editor. Like Haykal and other al-Siyyasah intellectuals in the 1920s, he voiced spasms of blended Islamist and Westernist (and elitist) disdain towards both Pharaonic tenets and folk-superstitions. In quoting Muhammad's hadith invalidating pagan Arabian concepts, he was attracted to the almost modern, rationalist austerity of a prohibition that would also excise comparable Pharaonic concepts. The important, recurring pattern is that even those acculturated Egyptian writers who most internalized modern Western literature and thought before 1922 had also accumulated a stock of the historical memories, concepts, and poetry (even pre-Islamic) of the classical Arabs. Such accumulation was inseparable from the process of mastering standard Arabic in order to become even a relatively modernist writer. The parallels that neo-Pharaonist publicists, especially in al-Siyyasah, repeatedly evoked between Pharaonic Egypt and classical Islamo-Arab concepts and experiences helped improve the

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63. Muhammad Farid Muhammad, "Khurafat al-Umm al-Qadimah" (Superstitions of the Ancient Nations), al-Siyyasah al-Ushu'iyah 15 October 1927 p. 2. The writer cited the hadith of the...
Prophet Muhammad: "Neither contagion [of mange from one camel to another], nor ill-omens, nor any soul-bird from the head of a murdered person that calls for vengeance, nor snakes in the bellies supposed to bite causing hunger-pangs, have any existence" (la 'adwa wa la tirah wa la hamah wa la safar). Ibid. By safar, though, Muhammad may have meant the pagan Arabian practice of postponing the sacred truce-month of Muharram to that of Safar, also abolished by Islam. Ill-omens (tirah), as the root indicates, were originally drawn from the flights of birds. Ibn al-Athir in al-Nihayah fi Gharib al-Hadith wal-Athar, forwarded by Dr Michael Carter of the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures at New York. G.D. Hornblower's "Traces of a Ka-Belief in Modern Egypt and Old Arabia", Islamic Culture 1 (1927) pp. 426-30, narrowly preceded Farid Muhammad's own comparison of the two paganisms.
sketchy grounding of secular-educated youth in the classical Arabs' language and past.

The Islamist and pan-Arab Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in his 1933 polemic against neo-Pharaonists reminded them with relish of the insuperable problem that literary Arabic posed for their venture. The literary Arabic that they used had almost inherent extra-Egyptian pan-Arab content. "The tongue with which you propagate/resurrect the glory of Egypt is the tongue of Mudar [North Arabian tribe active before Islam] and the lute on which you tune melodies to the Nile must be the lute of Imra' al-Qays", the pre-Islamic Arabian poet, lover and warrior (died c. 540). al-Zayyat taunted them that the only "spirit" they could breathe into the dead mummy of Pharaoh would be "the spirit of 'Amr Ibn al-'As, who conquered Egypt for the Arabians in 639 - 646. Thus, his perspective was that classical Arabs outside Egypt had permanently determined both the vocabulary and idioms of literary Arabic. Modern Egyptian intellectuals who used classical Arabic to exalt Pharaonic Egypt and a particularist personality only further diffused the language that inherently assimilated Egyptians to non-Egyptian classical and modern Arabs. This homogenizing Arabness prevented any discrete Egyptian nationality from cohering.

The odds were against authentic writing about, or drawn from, the Pharaonic era getting published in Arabic in the 1920s. European scholars long almost barred Egyptians from studying hieroglyphics. In publicizing Hasan Afandi Subhi's volume of Arabic translations of ancient Egyptian stories, Haykal justified their having been made from the versions offered by Egyptologists in Western languages as a stop-gap procedure until Egypt developed its own Egyptologists who could translate from the originals. The Pharaonist intellectuals had to provide, or direct their audience to, real sources of

64. al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyun wa 'Arab".
Pharaonist culture. But, further foredooming the pursuit of that chimera, even Western-educated Pharaonist writers could not wrench themselves outside the classical Arab works that increasingly fascinated them. Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Inan's culture-inculcated reflex was to seek a legacy from Pharaonic Egypt where he felt at home, in old Arabic books. In 1929 he reflected how laughable were the bizarre "fables" that "the Muslim historians" almost unvaryingly wove around Pharaonic Egypt's history. Unable to understand Pharaonic inscriptions, historians of the Islamic period considered them "pagan symbols": only 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi had the "scientific mentality" to speculate that they contained accounts of "states and a ... bygone civilization". However, 'Inan had written this article precisely to uproot his Muslim compatriots' assumptions that the long centuries of Egypt's Islamic society had obliterated any memory or traces of the "extinct" Pharaonic society. He argued that even the long sections about ancient Egypt in classical Muslim histories, while clearly not historical accounts as purported, drew their "enjoyable" "beautiful" fables from an unbroken popular oral folklore that had transmitted Pharaonic beliefs and customs, intact, through the centuries. 'Inan thus validated such old Arab works as Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam's history of the Arab conquest of Egypt and North Africa as source-books that "offer us real glimpses of the psychology of the ancient Egyptian people and its social life".

Clearly, the old Arab works that 'Inan recommended in 1929 would pan-Arabize and pan-Islamize, more than Pharaonize, the thinking of acculturated Egyptian intellectuals. Wherever its garbled legends about ancient Egypt came from, Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam's Futuh Misr wal-Maghrib gave copious data on companions of the Prophet who came to

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Egypt, the chief Islamic judges of Egypt down to 860 --- Islam's unitary tradition in Egypt --- and an account of the conquest of North Africa and Andalusia. 'Inan, following Dr Muhammad Ghallab, correctly argued in 1929 that the Arabian Nights contained some tales ultimately derived from Pharaonic Egypt. But the Nights also copiously transmitted pre-Islamic peninsular Arabian stories such as those of Hatim al-Ta'i, images of the Arab Muslim conquest of North Africa, many stories set in Abbasid Baghdad and al-Basrah and heroic tales of the Islamic counter-crusades. 'Inan's article shows the wide knowledge he already had of classical Arabic works about Egypt. But any quest by intellectuals for a national identity there could only immerse them in the most homogenizing classical Arab Islam and the wide life of the classical Arabs as a supra-Egyptian community, fostering a pan-Arab historical identification.

Although the West and its languages pervaded their consciousness, many Egyptian intellectuals could never lose the deep-seated reflex to install the classical Arabs and their detailed language --- and, indeed, Islam --- in all things that they perceived, including Pharaonic Egypt. Previously, under British colonial rule, they long had found it psychologically hard to conceive ancient Egypt as

69. As Noeldeke pointed out, "the clever rogue 'Ali al-Zaybaq and his companion Ahmad al-Danaf have their prototype in the bold condottiere Amasis, and the treasure of Rhampsinit is found in the story of 'Ali al-Zaybaq". Art. "Alf Layla wa Laylah", EI2 v. 1 p. 363.
70. Ibid pp. 363-4.
71. 'Inan specifically mentioned, and clearly had enjoyed reading, Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Ibn Zawlaq, 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, al-Maqrizi and al-Mas'udi. Abul-Hasan 'Ali Ibn al-Husayn al-Mas'udi (b. 9th century in Baghdad, died 957 in al-Fustat) was the first Arab to combine history and scientific geography in a large-scale work. al-Mas'udi was not born an Egyptian and his wide travels represented in the extreme the wandering, pan-Arab careers of many classical Arabic writers. He was resident for the last ten years of his life in Egypt. Abu Muhammad al-Hasan Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Zawlaq al-Laythi (919 AD - 996 AD) was an Egyptian historian who wrote on Egypt in the time of the Ikhshidids and early Fatimids. Art. "Ibn Zulak" EI2. al-Maqrizi (1364 AD - 1442 AD) was an Egyptian historian of the Ayyubids and Mamluks.
racially, linguistically or religiously distinct from the classical Arabs. The scholar of hieroglyphic Egyptian Ahmad Pasha Kamal (died August 1923) had popularized in Egypt his theory that the "Arabic language and the ancient Egyptian language were from one origin ... if not a single language" and that the sense of obscure Pharaonic words could be most accurately deduced by searching out words that sounded similar in classical Arabic. He had argued this thesis from around 1905: it included his contention that colonization from Egypt in remote antiquity contributed to the populations of Arabia, establishing Arabic there. He impressed upon educated Egyptians that the ancient Egyptians and the Arabs were closely related, in race, language and monotheistic attitudes. His many volumes of dictionaries and readers in hieroglyphic, and his general history of ancient Egypt, were the most solid accounts in Arabic up to the collapse of British rule in 1922, and he had also produced many public lectures and popularizing articles on Pharaonic subjects. He had also published monographs and learned articles about the Pharaonic period in French. All this had won him recognition as an

72. During the transition of the 1920s, as both Egyptianist and Arab community identifications solidified and jostled, Antun Zakari — crucially, from within Pharaonism — regaled Ahmad Kamal's thesis, as he had propounded it in a 1914 lecture to the Teachers' College. N.Y., Tutankhamun pp. 279-280.

73. Ahmad Kamal Pasha argued in his Bughyat al-Talibina fi' Ulum Qudama', al-Misriyyin that Egyptian belief had originally, before the dynastic period, been monotheistic. He quoted expressions of Pharaonic religious thought ("everything the Great God created of Himself") that sound similar to some of the monotheistic teachings of Islam and concluded: "many of the scholars of the ancient Egyptian language have agreed upon the monotheism of the Egyptians; as for the plurality of gods about which the monuments talk it is only an apparent thing by which it was intended merely to illustrate the attributes of the Sublime Being". In 1939 his son Dr Hasan Kamal concluded that "thus — even in religion — the people of Egypt and the people of the Arabian peninsula emerged in Oneness and ended with the same faith at the hands of the Prince of Messengers [Muhammad], may the best of blessings and peace be upon him!". Dr Hasan Kamal cited his father's theory in 1939 in the context of the tightening pan-Arab relationship between Egypt and other Arab entities. Dr Hasan Kamal, "al-Rawabit al-Qadimah Bayna Bilad al-'Arab wal-Qutr al-Misr'i" (The Ancient Ties Between the Arabian Peninsula and the Egyptian Region), al-Muqtataf v. 94 (1939) p. 476.

74. A list of Ahmad Pasha Kamal's French and Arabic books and a
Egyptologist prior to 1922 not only from the pan-Islamic watani (Patriotic Party) independence movement at home but even to a modest extent abroad. The dearth of literature in Arabic about Pharaonic Egypt at the birth of the Egyptian parliamentarist state in 1922, and Kamal's posthumous standing as one of the few Egyptians who had come near being an Egyptologist, ensured that his writings would continue to shape how Arab Egyptians saw ancient Egypt for decades after his death in 1923. Although himself a theosophized Christian, Antun Zakari in his c. 1926 rag-bag volume Tutankhamun reprinted Kamal's interpretation of a set of Pharaonic Egyptian words in the light of similar-sounding archaic Arabic words. Such general account of his life and roles including his lecturing at the (old) Egyptian University when it opened in 1908 and at other tertiary bodies like the Teachers' College (Madrasat al-Mu'allimin), was given by "N.Y." (Antun Zakari), Tutankhamun pp. 278-281. Ahmad Kamal spent 25 years laboring on his 22-volume Arabic-French-Egyptian dictionary stressing Semitic affinities of Egyptian. Although it was well-known among Egyptian intellectuals, the plans for publishing this dictionary fell through at his death. Donald Reid, "Indigenous Egyptology" p. 237. A committee formed at King Fuad I University in 1937 to produce an Arabic dictionary of ancient Egyptian had achieved only "inconsequential results" by 1945. The Dean of the Faculty of Arts, 'Abd al-Wahhab 'Azzam, therefore charged the head of the Institute of Antiquities to plan a translation of Erman's Berlin dictionary from German. al-Mugattam 21 September 1945.

75. al-Liwa' in 1908 informed its nationalist readers that "the active scholar and great historian" Ahmad Kamal was starting to give regular lessons in the hieroglyphic language at the politicized, watani Higher Schools Club (Nadil-Madaris al-'Ulya). Mustafa Kamil's Patriotic Party independence movement had organized that Club as a milieu to steep tertiary students in nationalism and then recruit them into the political independence movement. al-Liwa' thanked Ahmad Kamal for "this great service to the Egyptian Nation" (al-Ummat al-Misriyyah). "Darsun fil-Lughat al-Hayrughlifiyyah" (A Lesson in the Hieroglyphic Language), al-Liwa' 22 April 1908. Thus, Kamilist Patriotic Party milieus and media propagated Ahmad Kamal's Arabism-tinged Pharaonic Egypt that sapped as well as fostered the particularist "Egyptian Nation".

76. The Deputy Director of the Egyptian Museum, Salim Hasan, in mid-1922 visited Berlin's Agyptisches Museum, still under the Altes und Neues Museum. Its director Dr Heinrich Schafer inquired about the health of Ahmad Pasha Kamal, in decline by then. N.Y., Tutankhamun p. 265. I am grateful to Patrick Singleton of Melbourne University's Baillieu Library for tracking down data on Schafer.

77. "N.Y." Tutankhamun pp. 245-7. Antun Zakari indicated that Kamal in his heyday had published this now reprinted article in several unnamed Arabic newspapers (nasharahu ... fil-jara'id). In the article, Kamal himself had offered his heavily
interpretations by Kamal and others were teaching his readers more about the language of the extra-Egyptian classical Arabs than about that of Egypt's ancient Pharaohs. Some Western scholars before and during the 1920s argued a Semitic element in ancient Egyptian and even the identity of some ancient Egyptian words with roots in Arabic specifically. Kamal, however, went far beyond them by applying antique Arabic wholesale to interpret Pharaonic vocabulary. Exposure to Kamal's equation of ancient Egyptian and Arabic took place amid reinforcing statements from other ideologues such as Antun Zakari that immigrant Semites had been one of the races that fused together to produce the Pharaonic people in prehistory. Some particularist intellectuals, determined to establish an image of a discrete Pharaonic language and past as the core for the new nationality, tried to prevent Arab Egyptians connecting the ancient Egyptian language with classical Arabic. In 1923 the Copt Jurji Subhi rejected theories that "the original Egyptian race" was Semitic, or the ancient Egyptian language related to the Semitic family of languages. He dismissed in especially brusque language the theory of some unnamed person that "every word in the [Pharaonic] Egyptian language must have existence in the

Arabic-patterned derivations of the hieroglyph Pharaoh and connected ancient Egyptian words as only tentative and controversial. But Zakari in 1925 clearly regarded Kamal's interpretations of "Pharaoh" as authoritative, the only ones worth printing.

78. "Egyptian shares the principle peculiarity of Semitic in that its word-stems consist of combinations of consonants, as a rule three in number ... There are, moreover, many points of contact in the vocabulary (exx. hsb 'count', Arabic hasaba; Eq. 'ink 'I', Hebr. 'anoki' [Arabic 'ana'] ...). Alan H. Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar: Being an Introduction to the Study of Hieroglyphics (OUP: Clarendon 1927) pp. 2-3. In arguing in 1927 the importance of a Semitic element in ancient Egyptian, Gardiner followed earlier writings of the Egyptologist Adolf Erman (1854-1937), whom Arab Egyptians interested in Pharaonic Egypt, such as Ahmad Kamal, also read.

79. "N.Y.", Tutankhamun pp. 94-5, 132. Gardiner classified ancient Egyptian as a language that stood outside the Semitic group despite a core Semitic component. He characterized Pharaonic Egyptian in that respect as a composite "language, which, possibly owing to a fusion of races, had, like English as compared with the other Teutonic dialects, disintegrated and developed at an abnormally rapid pace". Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar p. 3.
Arabic language in meaning and pronunciation" and that close relations existed between ancient Egyptians and Arabs. But Kamal had left his mark on the psyche of modernist Muslim Egyptians. Taha Husayn, an uninhibited columnist in al-Siyasah in the 1920s, in youth had attended Kamal's classes. Taha remembered "Professor Ahmad Kamal ... talking about ancient Egyptian civilization ... making his point by reference to words from ancient Egyptian which he related to Arabic, Hebrew and Syriac, as the evidence required." Images of close contacts between Egyptians and Semites in West Asia in antiquity modestly reinforced more crucial considerations that drew Taha from particularism to various pan-Arab drives in the 1930s.

The 1930s started the era of Arab-Islamic high-tide in Egyptian community identifications. Throughout the decade, Kamal's linking of Arabs with Pharaonic Egyptians grew more prominent in the minds of Egyptians, strengthening their growing attraction to other Arabs beyond Egypt. In 1939 his son Dr Hasan Kamal, then a government Director of Village Health and Health Publicity and --- significantly --- writing after a pilgrimage to Mecca, argued in al-Muqtataf that the ancient Egyptians had originally come from the Arabian peninsula via Bab al-Mandab and the

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80. Jurji Subhi, "Nushu' al-Lughat al-Misriyyat al-Qadimah" (The Birth of the Ancient Egyptian Language), al-Muqtataf December 1923, pp. 336-7, 339-40. Of the Western authorities, Subhi most criticized Erman, who first argued a relation between Egyptian and Semitic: Erman and his theory were now considered outdated among Western scholars. Although Subhi did not name Ahmad Pasha Kamal, he was probably a target as he had published in al-Muqtataf of September 1921, the article "Bahth Lughawi" (A Linguistic Inquiry) arguing the oneness of origin of ancient Egyptians and Arabs and their respective languages. Ahmad Kamal Pasha had died in August, four or five months before Subhi's article and in his late sixties or early seventies: Subhi may accordingly have preferred not to attack him by name. Ahmad Kamal was revered in this period: the Egyptian government named him director of the Egyptological school it founded in August 1923 but he died the same day: Reid, "Indigenous Egyptology" p. 241. Some arresting connections between ancient Egyptian and Semitic verbs were to be drawn in 1954 by T.W. Thacker, The Relationship of the Semitic and Egyptian Verbal Systems (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1954): e.g. the Pharaonic verb "to hear" pp. 216-217. For Subhi's public lecturing, fn 54.

Sudan. At the very least, the ancient Egyptians and the populations of Arabia, Palestine, North Africa and Nubia --- as he quoted his father, all "the lands that now speak Arabic" --- were of common origin. In addition to restating his father's old thesis, he approved "the interpretation by his Excellency [Ahmad Pasha Kamal] in his vast [Hieroglyphic-Arabic] dictionary of all words of the ancient Egyptian language by reference to the Arabic language".82.

Generation after generation of Egyptians, then, were exposed to Ahmad Kamal's theme that ancient Egyptians and the Arabs were related in blood and language. His view was transmitted to precisely those secular-educated Egyptians with more interest in the Pharaonic period. The theme was applied by nationalist ideologues for different purposes in the 1930s and 1940s. The Copts were a key minority in Egypt, yet some of them held back from pan-Arabism at that time, when it sounded too Islamic. The Anglophone Muslim 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, to become the first Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, argued in 1943 that Arabians emigrated into Egypt in Pharaonic antiquity, so that Egypt was an Arab country before the birth of Jesus and many of its Copts more Arab than the inhabitants of Mecca and Madinah at the time of the Arab conquest83. The Protestant Coptic Wafdist Makram 'Ubayd in 1939 argued that Egyptians are Arabs because they were

82. Dr Hasan Kamal, "al-Rawabit al-Qadimah ..." pp. 471-474. In developing his father's theory of Pharaonite-Arabian connectedness, Dr Hasan turned it the other way around. In 1921, Ahmad Kamal had speculated that the 'Anu, the original ancient Egyptians, had spread out, imposing their language, in the neighboring lands: thus, the ancient Egyptian language was the origin of the Arabic language. By 1939, the son strenuously insisted that this presentation of Arabic as autochthonous to Egypt "does not contradict with the theory ascribing the origin of the most ancient Egyptians to the Arabian peninsula and their arrival through Bab al-Mandab via Ethiopia". Influenced by Sir Flinders Petrie, Dr Hasan speculated further arrivals of invading Arabians across the isthmus of Suez in the "administrative chaos" at the end of the eighteenth dynasty: he now exalted the Hyksos, long vilified as alien occupiers by particularist historiography, as Phoenicians and hence fine Arabs. Ibid.

descended from Semites who migrated from the Arabian peninsula long before the Islamic conquest\textsuperscript{84}. Israel Gershoni explicated 'Ubayd's argument --- like similar argumentation by Young Egypt leader Ahmad Husayn --- as calculated to dilute the role of Islam in early Egyptian pan-Arabism by placing the origins of the Arab nation before the Golden Age of Islam\textsuperscript{85}. Speculation that Arabs and Pharaonic Egyptians had been related even in pre-history could potently sap the very historical core for a discrete Egyptian identity, even among Copts but much more strongly among Muslim Egyptians. Yet, as the Arab-Islamic reaction deepened, the concept could be used by particularist and Arabist factions against each other. After the pan-Arabs became ascendant, intellectuals who wanted to maintain some of the Pharaonic motifs seized the theme of connection in antiquity to block Arabist assaults. Writing for the Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) party's mouthpiece in 1938, Dr Muhammad Subayh 'Abd al-Qadir sounded traumatized by the offensives against neo-Pharaonism that such pan-Arabs as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat had waged in the decade. Subayh had to prevent the pan-Arabs differentiating Arabism and Islam from the Pharaonic past. If he succeeded, pan-Arabs could not demand removal of Pharaonoid elements precariously installed in post-World War I culture as incongruent with Arabism.

The theories of many ethnologists ... link the ancient Egyptian people with the Arabs by the tightest bonds of blood and common origin. Therefore, the attempt to bind Egypt to Arabism by separating it from ancient Egypt is truly a violation of historical accuracy, for it is Pharaonic Egypt that is Arab Egypt. The Egypt that knew monotheism five thousand years ago ... quickly hastened to embrace Islam, the religion of monotheism ... [Pride in ancient Egypt] will not separate Egypt from the Arabs or Islam\textsuperscript{86}.

The Pharaonist communications examined in this section showed the persistence of Arab cultural and ideological

\textsuperscript{84} Gershoni, \textit{Emergence} pp. 51-2.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Dr Muhammad Subayh 'Abd al-Qadir, "Rasa'il --- ila Baghdad min al-Qahirah" (Letters --- To Baghdad from Cairo), \textit{Misr al-Fatat} 11 August 1938 pp. 10-11.
elements even in so unfavorable a context as Pharaonist particularism. Pharaonist journalism by Farid Muhammad, 'Inah and others ironically filled many gaps that formal education had left in the knowledge of youth about the classical Arab past. The non-spoken literary Arabic accumulated classicist supra-Egyptian elements in the psyches of al-Siyasah intellectuals over decades. In addition, Egyptian folklore had for centuries exalted classical Arabians and descent from them at the grass roots level in villages. Such conditioning from childhood predisposed Muslim Egyptian intellectuals to perceive racial and linguistic links between Pharaonic Egyptians and Arabians.

**The Breakdown of Pharaonism**

Acculturated Muslim intellectuals around al-Siyasah met many frustrations as they strove to install Pharaonic motifs into Arab-Egyptian culture and nationalism in the 1920s. The ancient culture and world view that they tried to explore and project often proved disconcertingly impenetrable, or clashed with established Arab culture and beliefs, Egypt's current needs and West-derived concepts. Predictably, their enthusiasm for things Pharaonic, always selective, declined and broke down in the later 1920s.

Even enthusiast Haykal himself early voiced misgivings. It was difficult to restore selected motifs from the Pharaonic past as the instrumental emblem over a twentieth-century political nationalism since the ethos asserted itself more integrally. In identifying with the Pharaonic culture, Haykal's group had to expose their constituency to the broader, unstructured segments of it, presented with high drama by the West's own random archeological discoveries (Tutankhamun's tomb most inescapably). A feeling sharpened that, despite rediscoveries, Pharaonic beliefs and customs were too fragmentary to offer coherent content for a new Egyptian nationalist identity.

In his 1925 dialogue Apis, Haykal attempted to make his acculturated audience accept at some level the
animal-like and human-like deities that the ancient Egyptians worshipped: polytheist and pagan aspects of the Egyptian nation's definitive golden age. One device he used only showed his own growing pessimism as to whether Arab Egyptians could ever comprehend the Pharaonic tradition, let alone restore aspects of it. He had one character say that modern people could not judge ancient worship of the god-bull Apis and the Isis-Osiris-Seth cult because they lacked the means to understand how the ancient Egyptians had conceived their gods. Even Egyptologists, despite the extensiveness of their studies and excavations, were not confident that they had access to sufficient texts or monuments to form a clear picture of the life of ancient Egypt. The discovery of Tutankhamun's tomb had induced these scholars to admit the need to revise radically all that had been written on Pharaonic antiquities — and other tombs might be uncovered. Moreover, even if all manuscripts of those ages had survived intact, it is not certain that scholars could truly understand from them the emotions and thinking of the six-thousand-years-old Egyptian soul. Even when translation is from one contemporary language to another, the translator does not reflect the form of the original but through his representation of it rather his own image, as a colored or uneven mirror reveals its own pigmentation and contours in its representation of the objects it reflects. Its original age and environment give a word highly specific associations and boundaries very different from those of the nearest equivalent in another language, especially if of another age: "what [then] do you think would be the case with translations from a language which has been extinct for thousands of years", whose speakers lived in "the bygone ages" and "conceived of the worlds and constellations in ways radically different from ours?"87.

In this dialogue, then, Haykal raised the possibility that the Pharaonic beliefs and ethos were not just different but unknowable by modern Egyptians. This line of

thought could only make intellectual leaders and their educated audience wonder if, after all, they ever could culturally reconnect with ancient Egypt and if there was an Egyptian nation continuous in outlook across the ages. In 1933, al-Zayyat and Taha Husayn would argue simultaneously that no substantial hieroglyphic literature had survived intact: hence modern Arab Egyptians could not comprehend in detail what ancient Egyptian concepts and culture had been and simply lacked genuine Pharaonic materials to sustain a non-Arab particularist literature or national identity in Arabic. Haykal would conclude from his failure to reconnect that the Islamic legacy was the approach with which to face the West and its modernity.

The fragmentary nature of surviving Pharaonic writings and their poor quality as literature had discouraged even enthusiasts in the 1920s. Taha in 1933 was to argue that

88. Taha Husayn, "Ilal-Ustadh Tawfig al-Hakim ..., al-Risalah 15 June 1933 p. 7; al-Zayyat, "Fir'awniyya wa 'Arab" written al-Risalah 1 October 1933, reprinted Wahy v. 1 p. 51. al-Zayyat had been a friend of Taha's since they studied together in al-Azhar as teenagers. In 1937, Haykal reviewed in retrospect the crumbling of his neo-Pharaonism: "I found that time and mental inertia had severed the bonds between us and that age... Our Islamic period is the only seed that grows and fructifies". Quoted Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1961) p. 175. Alarmed at acceptance by educated Egyptians, Hasan Subhi reassured in al-Risalah that the ancient Egyptians had pioneered for humanity a vast high literature with such genres as nature poetry --- that on the Nile usable for his particularism ---, love poetry, martial verse, satire, eulogy and religious poems: "the most modern categories of contemporary poetry". Hasan Subhi, "Fil-Adab al-Misri al-Qadim: Funun al-Shi'ir al-Fir'awni" (On Ancient Egyptian Literature: Artistic Categories of Pharaonic Literature), al-Risalah 1 August 1933. In al-Siyasat al-USbu'iyyah in 1929, Subhi had marginalized classical Arabic and its literature as confined to a ruling elite. Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs, p. 156.

89. "The Egyptians wrote down upon papyri everything that was to be written ... books of counsels and wise sayings, and books of stories and myths and narratives of the gods and books of history and collections of poetry". "N.Y.", Tutankhamun p. 215. But Pharaonic propaganda inscriptions aggrandizing the monarch of the day, hardly amounted to the "books" of an historiography. Zakari hoped (vainly) that a library of intact papyri might be retrieved from Tutankhamun's tomb. Ibid p. 255. He feared that the poor quality of the Pharaonic literary fragments he translated might lose him readers. "These are the most ancient stories in the world. If they appear to you to be nothing remarkable, then you should remember that everything has a beginning". Ibid p. 189.
neo-Pharaonist intellectuals, uncontrolled by any genuine literature from the Pharaohs, had read whatever meanings they wanted into the Pharaonic "silent art" and architecture that they inspected. A 1929 overview in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah by "M.'M." had already concluded that the intelligentsia had failed thus far to either apprehend or project the ancient Egyptians and their ethos. Mere contact with the sometimes enigmatic Pharaonic art or just moving around Pharaonic sites could not inspire writers to produce "national literature" with an authentic Pharaonic sensibility. For the intellectuals to achieve a truly neo-Pharaonic national literature, "we must cultivate an authentic taste for Pharaonic ethics ... Development of such a sensibility must be via a precise Arabization of the important papyri piled up and stored away in the Egyptian Museum and [inscriptions] on the walls and statues of temples". But let alone translations of primary sources, confessed the writer, "we can in our language hardly stumble over any genuine detailed history of ancient Egypt's numerous gods or the intimate social life, customs, activities and tastes of the Pharaohs". If writers had access to translations of inscriptions during their visits to Karnak and other popular sites, their understanding of Pharaonic culture would increase. It would help them lay a foundation for a truly neo-Pharaonic literature instead of randomly responding to the surface architectural features of sites that remained "riddles". Making clear that his criticism was directed at some neo-Pharaonists in Haykal's circle, M.'M. appealed to al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah not to open its columns to any but "mature" neo-Pharaonic literature, lest "we concoct something that might become a tempting target for the irony of those who come after us". Immature pseudo-Pharaonic literature would harm Egypt's "nationalism". The audience for a real neo-Pharaonic


90. Taha, "Ilal-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim" pp. 6-7.
national literature would be "the Egyptian youth"\textsuperscript{91}. "M.'M." in 1929 did not go as far as Haykal's misgiving in 1925 that maybe Pharaonic thought and culture were too fragmentary and different for modern Egyptians ever to understand. Anticipating Taha four years later, M.'M. brutally recognised that, in the decade, few genuine elements from the ancient Egyptians' sensibility had registered even among the al-Siyasah intellectuals themselves\textsuperscript{92}. But this criticism was still only of wrong procedures and the lack of seriousness with which they approached the Pharaonic mind and sensibility: M.'M. had yet to despair of ancient Egypt and its literature per se as a future cultural base for an Egyptian particularist nationality.

In the 1920s, the public had been bemused by Mukhtar's huge, cumbersome statue on Egypt's Awakening --- a disveiling peasant woman beside a Sphinx views the distance --- which took so long to install\textsuperscript{93}; Mayy denied

\textsuperscript{91} M.'M. "al-Adab al-Fir'awni: Ayn al-Wasilah ilayhi wal-Sabil li-Ijadihu" (Pharaonic Literature: Where Lies the Means to Attain it and the Pathway to Bring it About?), al-Siyasat al-Ubsu'iyyah 7 September 1929 p. 11. Typically of the whole acculturated al-Siyasah school, M.'M.'s drive for a neo-Pharaonic high literature was heightened and somewhat patterned by West European high literatures. He held up as a model for "authentic Pharaonic fiction" Egyptian writers in his group had not really achieved thus far, "the immortal play La Foi" (1909) by the eminent Academie Francaise social-realist campaigner-playwright Eugene Brieux (1858-1932). Brieux had come to Egypt to meticulously study the region in which he set the work, and to consult with experts on Pharaonic art about details of ancient Pharaonic lifestyle: all the greatest French journals in the field of literature, such as L'Illustration, had praised the work. Ibid. La Foi made a qualified plea for religious faith. John Gassner and Edward Quinn, The Reader's Encyclopedia of World Drama (London: Methuen 1970) pp. 86-7.

\textsuperscript{92} In bewailing the lack of Arabic accounts of Pharaonic mythology and social life, M.'M. had not been impressed by Zakari's rambling excursions into those areas, or by general textbooks on the Pharaonic period written for the Egyptian school system in the 1920s that did touch on Egyptian beliefs and gods. Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs pp. 176, 308.

\textsuperscript{93} "Timthalu Nahdat Misr" (The Statue 'The Revival of Egypt'), Ruz al-Yusuf 30 December 1926 p. 2. While incomprehension or resistance from Egyptians to neo-Pharaonic art such as Mukhtar's in the 1920s is important, it did build up a certain acceptance even in some Arabo-Islamic circles: when Mukhtar died in 1934, Dr Sami Kamal elegized him in the pan-Arab al-Risalah --- stressing the Pharaonic aesthetic patterns Mukhtar revived in sculptures
it had much genuine Pharaonic content.94The early 1930s saw a growing reaction against the use of Pharaonic motifs in public art by precisely those intellectuals who had been neo-Pharaonic particularists or who adapted motifs from ancient culture. A celebrated instance is Haykal's rejection of a Pharaonic design for the tomb of Sa'd Zaghlul in 1930. Another was Husayn Shawqi, author of slight, amusingly cynical or plaintive stories set in Pharaonic Egypt that shrank its society and religion down to unheroic, sometimes farcical dimensions. His 1933 al-Risalah story, "The Son of Pharaoh Learns", lamented the passing of Akhnaton's proto-monotheist worship of the sun-disk and presented the restored idolatrous religion of the Theban priesthood as a deliberate and threadbare fraud: there was no suggestion of any possibility for the vulnerable young prince to resist or protest.95 In 1934, Husayn Shawqi, reflecting the growing anti-Western feeling of the time, rejected the notion of Egyptian public or private buildings in a non-indigenous, Western style, and ruled out coexistence of the Pharaonic style with Arab architectural patterns, firstly on the aesthetic ground that duality of styles was unharmonious, but then with the political argument that "Cairo is now the capital of the whole Arab world". Egypt's public architecture therefore had to be in a standardized Islamic, pan-Arab style.96

Thus Haykal's reaction against the use of Pharaonic motifs in public nationalist buildings or art in 1930, was

94. Mayy, "Nazrah fi Fann Mukhtar" (A Glance at Mukhtar's Art), al-Siyasat al-Ussb'iyyah 13 November 1926. There is a well-focused account of this sculpture and its party political context in Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs pp. 186-188.

95. "Ibnu Fir'awn Yata'allam" al-Risalah 1 October 1933 pp. 35-6. A similar cynical perspective of Pharaonic religion as repressive or irrelevant to the needs of individuals, but a screen behind which they sometimes achieved their interests, is clear in Shawqi's conte "The Nubian Prince" (Amir al-Nubah), al-Risalah 29 January 1934 p. 39.

96. Husayn Shawqi, "Hal Li Misra Tiraz?" (Does Egypt Have a Style?) al-Risalah 30 April 1934 p. 730.
only one rather early and dramatic instance of a wider shift among acculturated Muslim intellectuals, that had multiple contexts. When Sa'd Zaghlul died in 1927, having become the symbol of Egyptian nationalism, al-Siyasah opposed building his tomb inside a mosque, raising the possibility of some Pharaonic style. But three years later, after the Wafd was elected to power, Haykal and al-Siyasah repeatedly charged that Coptic Wafdists originated the Wafd's plan of a Pharaonic mausoleum, in violation of Islam's religious law. Arab-Islamist historians appreciated Haykal's new stance as a major change of heart away from particularist nationalism towards a purposeful Arab-Islamic orientation amongst his group of intellectuals and politicians. Their delight was understandable: his denial that Pharaonic elements could have a presence in the shrine of the founder of the independent Egyptian state would brusquely cut Pharaonism out of Egyptian public life. C.D. Smith, however, explained away Haykal's stand as tactical and determined by his and the Liberals' need to discredit the ascendant Wafd party. For Smith this was an early case where Haykal, bidding for Muslim votes, only verbally denied the elements of the secularizing-Westernizing ideology that he would never cease to promote beneath Arab-Islamic veneers.

Smith's paradigm failed to note the hostility against the secular West within Haykal's neo-Pharaonism in the

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100. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 85.
1920s that prefigured themes in his Arab-Islamic successor-identification in the 1930s and 1940s. Haykal's repudiation did indeed offer a chance to court support from a range of Muslim groups against the Wafd. However, the context of warming pan-Arab community and the greater diffusion of classical Arab literature also inspired many Egyptians in the 1930s and 1940s --- for example, the artist Mahmud Naji --- to shift from Pharaonic-derived to Arab-Islamic motifs and styles in public art or buildings likely to define the collective identity of Egyptians in the future. Ahmad Husayn's Young Egypt movement may have maintained Pharaonic visual elements strongly for much longer, but it, too, increasingly blended in motifs from Arab and Islamic architecture and art. Haykal's switch could also be viewed narrowly as a symptom of the inner evolution of the post-traditional Muslim Egyptian intellectuals who had tried out Pharaonism in the 1920s. The al-Siyasah litterateurs, backed by the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists, had been among the most activist of the modernist Egyptians who earlier invested time in

101. Pharaonic art (especially at Luxor) influenced the sense of form of Muhammad Naji's post-1918 sketches and canvases of popular current Egyptian life. In one large canvas in 1919, he depicted the rising of the cortège of Isis as a symbol of Egypt's struggle for independence: it came to be hung in the Egyptian parliament. He symbolized the encounter of Egyptian and Western cultures in a canvas of Alexander the Great offering a sacrifice to Amun at his temple in Siwah oasis. Sa'd al-Rhadim, al-Hayat al-Sha'biyyah fi Rusum Naji (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1958) pp. 12, 26. But in 1934, Naji painted a canvas on Arab medicine, pivoting around Ibn Sina (Avicenna), one in a set of three hung in the al-Muwasat hospital in Alexandria to represent the stages through which medicine passed in Egypt. Ibid p. 30.

102. Ahmad Husayn came to call for the reconstruction of Cairo as a modern city that would blend Arab and Pharaonic architectural styles after his party came to power. His originally Pharaonist-parochialist Misr al-Fatat movement also came to encourage new painting by such youthful artists as Muhammad 'Izzat Mustafa that highlighted Arab and Islamic aspects of popular urban Egyptian life. A nationalist artist who celebrated the martyrdom of Taha 'Afifi during the "revolution of 1935", Mustafa "acts as an historian like Canaletto in his canvases of Arab, Eastern Egypt with her mosques". "Nahwa Ihya' al-Funun: al-Naht wal-Taswir wal-Zukhrufah fi Ma'arid al-Fannanin al-Misriyyin" (Towards Reviving the Arts: Sculpture and Canvases and Ornament in [Current] Exhibitions of Egyptian Artists), Misr al-Fatat 17 April 1938.
experimenting with Pharaonic elements, but had not got enough back. Particularly for the needs of a new national literature, their frustration had mounted throughout the 1920s at the slowness of relevant, coherent, and enriching Pharaonic culture elements to eventuate --- frustration that might well make them abruptly turn their back on the whole neo-Pharaonic enterprise, and move on to the Arabo-Islamic community identification dominant in the 1930s and 1940s. Some Pharaonic art and architecture, and a few motifs detached and adapted by particularist artists and architects for novel national needs, had been aesthetically meaningful in the 1920s. Some political intellectuals active around al-Siyasah and the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists retained residual affection, as they developed Arab-Islamic identification, for the Pharaonic visual arts: for them, however, that was now outweighed by the strenuous sterility of neo-Pharaonism and the complex of realities, especially the standard literary language, that connected Egypt into the common classical pan-Arab culture and the current successor pan-Arab community. In 1938 Muhammad Mahmud, Liberal Prime Minister in three Egyptian governments, noted the admiration Egyptians had developed for "the splendor of Pharaonic art". However, the Egyptians were proud Arabs: Pharaonism could not constitute a real nationality or nationalism because "a distinctive language" was a prerequisite that determined every nation, and the Pharaonic language had become extinct millenia before.\footnote{Israel Gershoni, \textit{Emergence of Pan-Arabism} pp. 59-60.}

Thus, wide-ranging though not evenly deep exposure to the West's history and thought, within its context of imperialism, led various Egyptian intellectuals to three perceptions of antiquity in the 1920s in particular. One stance associated the Pharaonic and European cultures of antiquity and depicted them as blending into a higher stage through Mediterraneanist interactions. Haykal very occasionally harmonized his components like that; Taha would pay more and more lip-service to Mediterraneanism to

carry Westernization forward in the 1930s amid Easternist, Arabist and Islamist attacks. However, Pharaonist anti-Westernism was much more common in the writings of Haykal and other Pharaonist particularists in the 1920s. In this second set of moods, Haykal asserted the superiority of ancient Egyptian civilization over the culture and thought of the modern as well as ancient West and wanted Egyptian elements to be separate from those of the West in ancient and modern history: he was not like the Mediterraneanist Salamah Musa or Muhammad Sharaf here. A third ultra-Westernist stance, that of Taha, denied that first Egypt and then Greece contributed to a joint Mediterranean civilization in antiquity because such Mediterraneanism could be applied to downgrade the uniqueness of Greek civilization and its necessity for Egypt — and even open the way for a pan-“Easternism” that would dilute modern Egypt’s links with the West104. Taha was perceptive here: even Haykal’s acceptance of Greek-Pharaonic synthesis under the Ptolemies had ambivalently marginalized Western influence in Egypt, as we saw.

Continuing Anti-Westernism in Pharaonism in the 1930s

In 1933 the die-hard Pharaonist Tawfiq al-Hakim (1902-1987) entered a controversy with Taha Husayn in Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat’s pan-Arab al-Risalah. It underscored the persistence with which Pharaonism focussed the resentments against the West felt by West-steeped acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals.

In one anti-Western twinge in the 1920s, Haykal had decided the Ptolemies did not stand for synthesis: Cleopatra was not of pure Egyptian blood and her forebears had never sincerely worshipped the gods of the ancient

104. In an exceptionally frank outburst to his fellow al-Siyasah intellectual Mahmud ‘Azmi, Taha refused to term the Mediterranean culture that ‘Azmi evoked anything else than “Graeco-Roman culture in either its ancient or modern age”. Taha applied condescending irony to the stress by “those devoted to the East that civilization emerged in Egypt and that the Phoenicians [then] transferred it to Greece”. Taha, Hadith al-Arbi’a v. 3 pp. 136-7.
Pharaohs. The capriciousness of Greece's gods and their promotion of short-sighted hedonistic enjoyment of the present sprang from natural conditioning by Greece's mountains and valleys and the changeable weather those entailed. In contrast, the year-round bountiful succulence of the Valley of the Nile with its perpetually-clear skies made Egyptians reflect on holy things and long-term eternity: the eternity of the Valley cast its tranquility over the brows of all the Egyptian gods, including that of evil, and indeed those of all Egyptians depicted in Pharaonic art. al-Hakim in 1933 now developed all Haykal's old dichotomizations of Egyptian and Greek geographical environments, spirituality versus materialism and of Pharaonic and Greek arts.

In the 1930s, Tawfiq reapplied the geographical determinism of the 1920s particularism as much against Westerners and their civilization as against the classical Arabs. His 1933 open letter to Taha denounced the classical Arabs' culture for having almost suffocated Egypt's independent Pharaonic personality, demanding that Egyptian writers henceforth distinguish Egyptian from classicist Arab elements in high literature and promote the former. But he characterized ancient Greeks and the (classical) Arabs in comparable ways. In the 1920s, various Egyptian modernists, including Haykal, had spasmodically stressed the barrenness of the Arabian peninsula and the nomadism its deserts imposed on the early Arab nation as a factor that limited Arab traits and cultural creativity even in later periods. In his letter to Taha, Tawfiq contended that this geographic conditioning had permanently limited the character and cultural achievements of the classical Arabs: long after their conquests had carried them far beyond their peninsula of origin, they could only superficially assimilate the advanced civilizations that they conquered. But Tawfiq

106. al-Hakim, "Ilal-Duktur Taha Husayn min al-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim" (To Dr Taha Husayn From the Writer Tawfiq al-Hakim), al-Risalah 1 June 1933 p. 5.
depicted the Greeks' barren geographical environment, too, as having permanently limited Greek personality and insights, even after they expanded over a far-flung Hellenistic world. Bountiful Egypt and India freed their peoples to seek spiritual meaning in the universe. In contrast, the Greeks' barren land, like the desert that formed the Arabs, "compelled that nation to struggle for survival, to pursue Matter ... war after war, conquest after conquest and wandering throughout the lands of the East and the West". The materialist Arab-like Greeks therefore always lacked the "sense of stability in the land, that inspires thought of what lies beyond the land and beyond this life". Although he made a patronizing exception of the Parthenon frieze, al-Hakim dismissed most Greek art as dominated by "humanism", "life" and Matter to the exclusion of Soul, Spirit and transcendent Eternity that Pharaonic art and architecture explored. Ignoring the Islamic ethos that structured it, he in part equated Arab art with classical Greek art as both non-spiritual and non-religious, delighting in visual beauty to compensate for deprivation in the two barren lands of origin 109.

Taha Husayn had offered Egyptians Arabic versions of ancient Greek dramatic poetry: for him, some Graeco-Roman aesthetic elements and concepts were indispensable to Egypt's new Arabic literature as bases for creative culture and thought anywhere. Although himself stimulated here by

108. Because they once had been deprived in their barren peninsula, the Arabs always remained intent only on "sensory pleasure and material things". The perpetually nomadic "Arabs passed by different civilizations, snatching off from horseback [only] their more readily enjoyable elements". "Even when they translate from others they leave out all literature based on structure: they never translated a single epic or a single tragedy or a single story". "Ilal-Duktur Taha Husayn" pp. 6, 7. Cf. Gershoni and Jankowski, op cit p. 106.

109. al-Hakim, "Ilal-Duktur Taha Husayn" p. 6. The eclectic al-Hakim always had anti-Western impulses that however sometimes lanced ancient Greece at the modern West. In 1949 he hoped the human ideal of the Greeks would become a powerful weapon to help the Arabs conquer the destructive human concept of the West. The Greeks and the classical Arabs had similar attitudes to the position of man in nature, denying him the central position that the Occident perceived. Greece could aid the modern Arabs against the atheistical materialism of the West. G.E. Von Grunebaum, Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press 1962) p. 232.
ancient Greek writers, Tawfiq in contrast in the 1930s voiced his intention to create a new Egyptian Arabic drama drawing its style from the ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead and other religious papyri. In 1933 he contrasted ancient Greece's obsession with fates in this life against the Egyptians' Pharaonic drive to pass beyond Time and Place to the Eternal. His rejection of the West, if contained within genres of literature and art, would have permitted sweeping Westernization in other spheres. But for him, the West's aesthetic shortcomings only manifested its overall spiritual and intellectual inadequacy. In his letter to Taha, Tawfiq dismissed the general body of Western culture as limited and sterile because the ancient Greeks had built a coarse materialism into its formative period. He branded the classical Arabs and classical Greeks as both superficial "materialist" peoples: their logical, this-worldly consciousness found it hard to understand the

110. al-Hakim, Tahta Shams al-Fikr pp. 115-6. al-Hakim's impulse to draw drama back to the chorus had the plays of Euripides as one catalyst. Yet that area of beauty in ancient Greek literature — lyric, chorus, the religious dance that Nietzsche identified as the origin of the ancient Greek literature — had been borrowed from ancient Pharaonic drama, the source that al-Hakim now would tap directly. Scientific Western Egyptology contributed, more than usual in acculturated neo-Pharaonism, here: shortly before, al-Hakim had received from Etienne Drioton, a director of the Egyptian Service of Antiquities, a new precise translation of dialogue of some ancient Pharaonic heroes that presented it as an early form of "holy" drama. Ibid. Cf. E. Drioton, Le Theatre Egyptien (Editions de la Revue du Caire 1942). Ancient Pharaonic dramatic texts, congruent with al-Hakim's spiritualist rhetoric, remained rooted in cult to the end: in late centuries, the priests would don masks and act the part of gods. Siegfried Morenz, Egyptian Religion trans. by Ann E. Keep (London: Methuen 1973) p. 7. Cf. H.W. Fairman, The Triumph of Horus: An Ancient Egyptian Sacred Drama (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd 1974) pp. 1-13, which also argues an extensive Pharaonic drama, heavily religious as al-Hakim assumed. al-Hakim's groping for guidelines for a new national drama in old Pharaonic writings was acculturated indeed: he was also prodded by Herodotus' impression that he saw the Egyptians on festival days acting the parts of their gods in public squares, with some girls representing earth and fertility. al-Hakim, Taht al-Misbah al-Asghar (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Tawakkul 1942) pp. 24-5. Antun Zakari in 1926 already made Egyptians aware that Gardiner, and such scholars in the Berlin Museum as Ipocher, were collecting and reconstructing ancient Pharaonic papyri that they interpreted to have been the first plays. Zakari, Tutankhamun pp. 277-278.

111. al-Hakim, Tahta Shams al-Fikr p. 108.
insights into the spiritual offered by "[Pharaonic] Egypt and India, two civilizations founded upon the Spirit". Asiatic elements derived from India in early Greek paganism --- notably Dionysus, god of ecstasy and the Spirit --- had offered a potential for spirituality, but Aristotle's logic excised it forever from Western thought and culture. Since Greece and the ultra-materialistic modern West even more had failed to synthesize Matter and Spirit, Egypt might do so, drawing on Pharaonic religion and Rabindranath Tagore's sense of divine forces immanent in Nature and extending beyond this Universe.\(^{112}\)

Tawfiq al-Hakim's Pharaonist characterizations of Egyptian history in 1933 minimized or delegitimized the influence of Arab elements and (by implication) Islam. If this cleared away any Arab-Islamic disincentives to self-Westernization, his Pharaonism threw up others in the psyches of precisely those readers who had moved farthest from Islamic tradition and had more exposure or access to Western culture. al-Hakim's more anti-Western spasms in 1933 dismissed the West's overall rational intellectual tradition and aesthetic culture from the Greek origins as barely worth taking the trouble to understand. In the previous decade, various al-Siyyasah intellectuals had vented ill-feeling towards the West simultaneously in neo-Pharaonism and through pan-Easternism. Tawfiq in 1933 again combined both means to express counter-disdain or hostility against Western civilization and culture and contemporary eminent European writers such as Paul Valery. His sense in 1933 that Hindu India offered reinforcing spirituality that could help neo-Pharaonic Egyptians face the materialist West had been prefigured by Haykal and al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah's interest in the 1920s in Tagore and even in classical Sanskrit literature. Tawfiq al-Hakim in the 1930s respected the ancient Sanskrit drama and its non-Muslim religious origins on the banks of the Ganges, although like Greek drama, it originated from the Pharaonic priests' ritual instruction for the dead.\(^{113}\) If Sanskritic

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112. al-Hakim, "Ilal-Duktur Taha Husayn" pp. 6, 8.
literature was one supra-Muslim Eastern influence on his own Arabic drama, al-Hakim also drew for ideas for a new Egyptian drama in Arabic on Muslim Persian writers like Firdawsi (c. 935 A.D. – c. 1026) who, however, often reworked pre-Islamic Iranian themes. The West-diluting Easternist impulse also fostered his borrowing from ethnicizing classical Arab materials.

Tawfiq in 1933 was differentiating himself not just from ancient Greece but from modern French culture whose writers cherished Greek elements as the origin of French and modern Western civilization. In patronizing ancient Greece he was vomiting out the Graecophile French literature and thought in which he had been steeped in Paris. He was claustrophobically close in his attitudes to the materialist West that he berated and patronized. His spurious Pharaonic spiritualism only boiled down to a vicarious immortality for individuals in the eternal Egyptian nation or homeland akin to post-Christian nationalist ideologies in Europe. Yet,

114. Of the great Muslim Persian writers, al-Hakim was particularly enriched by Firdawsi, author of the Shahnameh, Persia's national epic. Al-Hakim published a longish article titled "Firdawsi's Version of the Romeo and Juliet Theme". He presented Firdawsi's account of Dastan and Rudabeh, the Persian equivalents of two people who want to marry but are kept apart by a feud between their two families: the whole weight of the social system is thrown against their love finding fulfilment in marriage. Firdawsi handled this theme of creative literature 500 years before Shakespeare in Romeo and Juliet: the conflict Firdawsi described ended happily when the forecast of astrologers that a great son would be born of the two lovers' union caused the King to relent. Art. "Romeo wa Juliet 'ind al-Firdawsi" (Firdawsi's Version of the Romeo and Juliet Theme) reprinted Taht al-Misbah al-Asghar pp. 26-40.

115. As well as Greek literature, al-Hakim cited Paul Valery's genuinely classicism-tinged French poetry as a source for his generalization that ancient Greece (and such French successors as Valery) stood for intellect, logic and movement against spiritual Egypt's stillness. He argued this around Valery's "Cimetiere marin", a soliloquy of the theme of death, first published in 1920 but which Tawfiq apparently read only shortly before he penned the 1933 open letter to Taha. "Ilal-Duktur Taha Husayn" p. 6. Tawfiq placed his realization that Greek art and spiritual Pharaonic art expressed incompatible mentalities in the second half of the 1920s, during arguments in the Montparnasse quarter while studying law in Paris. Ibid p. 5. In contrast to al-Hakim, Taha tried to fit Arabo-Islamic Egypt into Valery's classicist categories. Taha, Future p. 10.
al-Hakim's Pharaonist outbursts could sap motivation to further Westernize Egypt: they were an impulse to disengage prefiguring his later Islamic apologetic writings that lashed the "imperialist" West for its strong-arm behavior abroad.

Taha in 1931 had sanctioned new use by Egyptian sculptors and writers of some Pharaonic artistic motifs and myths, so long as those were subordinated within increased borrowings from overall West-derived "modern life". But Tawfiq's open letter in 1933 again brought home to him that Pharaonic emotions in the 1930s could still concentrate free-floating electric antipathy to the West among acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectual leaders, threatening the final conjunction with its civilization that they had been about to complete. Accordingly, Taha, counter-attacking, ruled out in al-Risalah any central use of Pharaonic motifs in the modern Arabic-medium high literature and thought being developed in Egypt.

Taha's razor-sharp rejoinder dismissed Pharaonic thought and literature as irretrievably lost and extinct. It defended against Tawfiq and other Pharaonists both (a) the unique creativity of the ancient Greeks and the overall Western civilization they endurably defined and (b) the classical Arabs whose language patterns and literature inherently had to have centrality for every generation of Arabic-speaking Muslim Egyptians.

Against Tawfiq (and by implication others like Haykal in the 1920s) who exalted Pharaonic Egypt over Greece (= the West) in thought and culture, Taha identified the Greeks as "the ones who produced the most developed heritage in literature, art and philosophy in antiquity". Taha repeatedly stressed the "spirituality" of Greek writers from Homer onwards but especially such philosophers as Socrates and Plato: the Greeks had synthesized spirit and matter in a permanently valid way that could still meet the needs of such Egyptian intellectuals as Tawfiq in the

116. "Hadaratuna al-Qadimah: Fir'awniyyah am 'Arabiyyah am Gharbiyyah?" (Our Coming Civilization: Pharaonic or Arab or Western?) (poll), al-Hilal 1 April 1931.
twentieth century. Taha's strenuous denials that the Greeks and the modern West lacked spirituality showed concern that neo-Pharaonist, pan-Eastern and neo-Islamist litterateurs in Egypt had successfully stigmatized the Greeks, and post-Reformation Westerners who revived and developed their heritage, as "materialist" in the minds of many educated Egyptians. Similarly, Taha assessed Tawfiq's reading of a West-downgrading spiritualism back into Pharaonic art and architecture as likewise "shared by many [Egyptians] with European education/culture". Neo-Pharaonist "writers, poets and artists" such as Tawfiq made up out of their own imaginations ancient Egyptian world views with a spirituality alternative to the West "as a basis for our modern Egyptian literature": They could not reconstruct a philosophy from the fragmentary extinct Pharaonic culture, of which only art and architecture had survived relatively intact. In his preceding open letter Tawfiq had praised Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Taha and Ahmad Amin (1886 - 1954) for developing distinctive Egyptian vocabulary, styles, subjects and concepts, because that broke the hitherto "suffocating" grip that the classical Arab literature and thought immemorially had had on writing in Egypt. Tawfiq now wanted alleged Pharaonic elements to be central to a further stage of much more far-reaching Egyptian literary "independence". Egyptian writers in Arabic, Taha retorted, could never base "our new literature" on "the life and intellectual civilization --- if it merits that name --- of ancient Egypt", at expense of the classical Arabs' civilization, simply because it now was impossible to ascertain what the world view and literature of the ancient Egyptians had been. To contribute at all to a new Egyptian literature and aesthetic sensibility in Arabic, ancient Egypt would have to offer a literature and thought of its own, but had bequeathed neither. Because "we know no [ancient Egyptian]

118. al-Hakim, "Ilal-Duktur Taha Husayn", p. 5.
literature in the proper sense of the word", it was impossible for Egyptian intellectuals to achieve any clear understanding of the ancient Egyptian mind. In weighing the works of classical Arabs against Pharaonic Egypt as literature, Taha rejected Pharaonic culture with contempt as an irrelevancy that could disrupt creativity precisely because it lacked real existence. While opting for the literatures of the classical Arabs and Europe, he did note that "the [ancient] Egyptians have their art" --- the only flicker of appreciation in all his 1933 attempt to excise things Pharaonic once and for good from creative literature and intellectual life 119.

Taha often sounded unenthusiastic about measures to reconnect with Pharaonic Egypt: his rejection of it 1933, however, was unusually harsh and totalistic even for him. He was both (a) acculturated and committed to Europe's cultures and patterns of life and (b) a dilutedly neo-classicist stylist in Arabic, familiar with the high literature of the classical Arabs since his ambivalent youthful studies at al-Azhar. In 1933 Tawfiq simultaneously tried to shrink the scope in Egypt's Arabic literature for both components in Taha's dual personality: Taha's predictable counter-assault against Pharaonism blended Western and Arab literary and ideological elements. If Tawfiq's Pharaonism vibrated with intermittent tension towards all Western high literatures from the Greeks on, Taha's defense fitted the classical Arabs and their cultural bequest to modern Egypt into Western cultures and secular values. To cite one instance, the humanist Taha cherished Islam as an expression of Arab creativity rather than God. The Arab element inherently comes to the Egyptians "from the language, the religion, and from the civilization" so that

119. Taha, "Ilal-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim", pp. 7-8. In his 1938 work laying out the future development of culture in Egypt, Taha again specified art as the aspect of ancient Egypt to be maintained in new national culture: "Egyptian culture may be broken down into the ancient Egyptian artistic component, the Arab-Islamic legacy, and the borrowings from the best of modern European life". Future p. 153.
We will never be able to free ourselves from it no matter how hard we try, nor weaken it, nor lessen its influence on our life, because it has mingled with this life to an extent that has made it a precondition of its personality so that all that is intended to damage [Arabness] damages this life and obliterates [our] personality. Do not say it is a foreign element. The classical Arabic language is not a foreign language but rather our language that is nearer to us one thousand and one times than the tongue of the ancient Egyptians. The same could be said of religion, the same of literature.

Pharaonists like Haykal in the 1920s, and Tawfiq in the 1930s, sometimes argued that classical Arabic literature had lacked genres found in the literatures of antiquity. In his 1933 reply to Tawfiq, Taha compared the classical Arabs favorably with the ancient Greeks and Romans. Like the Romans, the Arabs early became pupils of the Greeks in literature, art and philosophy, but they surpassed the Romans in that they already had their own "distinguished" native literature before they encountered Greek culture and thought. Greek high literature could be argued to be superior to classical Arabic literature but the two characterized very different environments, and could not fairly be compared. The 19th century Aryanist racist Renan (1823 - 1892) depicted the Semites, especially Arabs, as congenitally inferior in thought and

120. Taha, "Ilal-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim" p. 9.
121. Haykal in 1925: authentic Arab writers, reluctant to innovate beyond jahili patterns, composed no sustained fiction or plays — genres present in the Greek and Latin literature familiar in Egypt and other lands that the Arabs conquered. Haykal "al-'Arab wal-Hadarah al-Islamiyyah" (The Arabs and Islamic Civilization) (1925), reprinted Awqat pp. 387-8. al-Hakim, 1933: classical Arab "prose and poetry are not based on structure: [they have] no epic stories or theatre — it is only inlaid ornament to delight the senses ... They avoid any literature characterized by structure: they never translated a single epic or a single tragedy or a single story". al-Hakim, "Ilal-Duktur Taha Husayn" p. 7.
122. Taha, "Ilal-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim", p. 8. A similar comparison that Roman literature took centuries to develop while the Arabs entered universal history with a distinguished pre-Islamic literature, had been made by Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah in 1926 in al-Muqattam: B 57. Jum'ah, though, did not anticipate Taha's point of the greater dependence of the Romans on Greek literary models. For Taha earlier "purely Arab literature" was far superior to "purely Roman literature", while --- his residual Azharism --- the classical Arabs' development of Islamic law nearly matched the Roman legal achievement. "Ilal-Ustadh Tawfiq" p. 8.
culture to the Aryan Mind and praised ancient Egypt as non-Semitic. In the 1920s some neo-Pharaonist intellectuals had taken up Renan's theme, tending to ascribe creativity in Arabic literature and Islamic civilization to the non-Arab peoples whom the Arabs conquered and ruled. But now Taha in 1933 defended the classical Arabs' roles as patrons of literature and the arts in the states they conquered as itself creative and Greek-like:

The role of the Arabs in art, literature and philosophy after the first Abbasid age is like that of the Greeks in respect to all these things after Alexander's invasion of the East. They inspired and aroused activity, gave impetus to productiveness, offered their language as a vehicle of all that diversity of intelligence and talents could produce.

Taha, in refuting the particularist twinges of Tawfiq al-Hakim and others, thus characterized the classical Arabs as great and the Arabic literature they produced or fostered as a rich indispensable part of indigenous Egyptian identity. He berated al-Hakim and similar local writers for parroting unfair criticisms of the classical Arabs by "a group among the Orientalists" that included Renan and Dozy. In the Paris Journal des Debats in 1883, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had skillfully shredded Renan's racism, listing contributions by racial Arabs and related Christian Syriac Semites to sciences, philosophy and other aspects of classical Islamic civilization that Renan attributed solely to Aryans or other non-Semites. Indeed, al-Afghani here set in motion the prolonged Egyptian critique of Renan's whole racist frame, pointing forward to his disciple al-Nadim's theme a decade later that language alone determined Arab, or any other, nationality, assimilating diverse racial

123. See Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs pp. 102, 105 and 107-8. Ibid pp. 111-2 analyses 1925 arguments by Haykal that the Arabian peninsula's aridity imposed (a) nomadism and then (b) compensatory subsequent hedonism among classical Arabs after they got out of it, and their supervisory rather than contributory role in cultural and intellectual creativity by populations in their empire — points sharpened by al-Hakim in 1933.


At the time that Taha wrote his reply, this description of the classical Islamic past was being applied by the early pan-Arab Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, to nullify particularist assertions that Arabic-speaking Egyptians had a Pharaonic racial origin and were non-Arab. Taha, himself, retained a certain particularist sense of plural and increasingly sovereign Islamic nations with special roles for the Arab Muslims in classical Islam. While Taha did not write of an incorporative unitary Arab nation in classical Islam or the present, he fostered its acceptance by characterizing the supra-Egyptian classical Arabs and their literature as a core component in Egyptian personality, and denied any Pharaohs-originated continuous Egyptian intellectual tradition or literature discrete enough to separate Egyptians from standard pan-Arab culture.

The 1933 controversy between Taha and Tawfiq al-Hakim, then, showed that some Pharaonism could brake Westernizing impulses among intellectuals, but also that some commitment to Arab-Islamic heritage could fit in with more self-Westernization. Taha characterized the classical Arabs as having borrowed from Western civilization's Greek core in their heyday. This pattern might recur in the twentieth century: further borrowing from Western thought and literature and selective restoration of classical Arab elements in Egypt might prove in the 1930s as harmonious as the symbiosis in the classical pan-Arab past. In contrast, Tawfiq's Pharaonic golden age slashed at both the Westernization and the pan-Arab culture component in Egyptian intimate personality that Taha's Hellenism ratified. Tawfiq's synthesis of West-marginalizing Pharaonism and culturist Easternism was his not-too-original contribution to a long-lived complex of anti-Western themes among ultra-acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals. Rabindranath Tagore, the very savior proposed by Tawfiq to the West's benighted materialism in 1933, had already while visiting Egypt in 1926 triggered off not only anti-Western pan-Easternism but

126. Eg. Taha, Future pp. 5-6.
also neo-Islamoid proto-pan-Arab reflections by Haykal in al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah. Haykal had already in the 1920s vented sourness or rejection against many facets of the West through both Pharaonism and pan-Easternism. East specificity, specifically identification with India and Hindus, was to continue into the 1940s as a facet of reaction against the West by precisely those elite Muslim Egyptians most steeped in Western culture. Taha was desperately intent in his 1938 The Future of Culture in Egypt to discredit elite scientists and academics who dichotomized spiritual East and materialist West: "they would be the last to ... live like the Chinese or the Hindus" but they demoralized the secular-educated youth, leading them "away from the European civilization which they know toward the Eastern civilization they do not know." (In this 1938 work, however, Taha did not dismiss Pharaonic Egypt as he had in 1933; instead he evoked its contribution to the foundation of Graeco-Roman civilization and the free choice by Egypt to ally with the Greek city states against Persia, thus ushering in Egypt's Mediterranean affiliation with West against East). In a more qualified way than Haykal, al-Hakim also illustrated a common sequence of never-completed disengagement from the West. In stage (1) Pharaonism and Easternism serve as the initial anti-Western rallying points for Egyptians on whom

127. Haykal, "al-Umm al-Sahrqiyyah wa Silatuha l-Ma'nawiyyah" (The Eastern Nations and their Moral Bonds), al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyah 4 December 1926 p. 16: see discussion B 90-95. For acculturated, in sectors covertly West-tinted, Egyptian Muslim pan-Easternism in the 1930s and 1940s, B 166-76.

128. Taha, Future pp. 21-2. Taha's observation that Egyptians who derided European civilization and praised the spirituality of the East would be the last to live like the Chinese or Hindus (p. 22) certainly applied to the West-steeped Tawfiq al-Hakim.

129. Taha wrote that the Pharaohs had established Greek colonies in Egypt before the first millennium B.C. "We resisted [Persia] fiercely until the Alexandrian era", aided by "Greek volunteers" and the Greek cities. Taha, Future p. 4. For Pharaoh Achoris (29th dynasty), any enemy of Persia was an ally for Egypt. However, Greeks, mercenaries rather than Taha's "volunteers", fought Persians for money, not an affinity between the Egyptian and Greco-Aegean "minds". They might switch sides for money. Information from Greek mercenaries in the Egyptian army helped Cambyses II to conquer Egypt in 525.
acculturation and the Western disdain it relayed continually jarred: these ill-defined non-Islamic idioms of protest did not require Islamist repudiation of Western secular values to which the intellectuals had got used. Yet the West's own Islamophobia helped prod the most West-modified intellectuals to learn more about an Islam in which they lacked basic grounding: so that in stage (2) radical-sounding Islamist postures become part of the stand against the West. As with Haykal, al-Hakim's compound acculturation opened him to more than the secularism of the West: each could voice a degree of respect for Jesus --- and indeed Christian beliefs about him --- aberrant for orthodox Islam, but both al-Hakim and Haykal more often saw this persistent Christian dimension in the West as fueling neo-Crusaderist hatred or violence against Muslims in which even the most secularist Western elements took part.

Islamization. In 1933, Tawfiq al-Hakim wanted to distinguish true Egyptian from Arab elements and to excise some of the latter. Yet his attitudes towards the classical Arabs and their writings varied greatly, even earlier in his career in the 1930s. In the very issue of al-Risalah that carried Taha's withering Arabist riposte, Tawfiq himself was already turning to the uniquely muscular and

130. In writing his biography of the Prophet, Hayat Muhammad (serialized 1932; published in book form 1935) Haykal --- at least aesthetically --- somewhat responded to the "beautiful [concept] of the offering of Christ's blood for the sin of his brothers, the children of men". Wessels, A Modern Arabic Biography of Muhammad p. 221. Here, as elsewhere in composing Hayat Muhammad, Haykal was colored by the language of Emile Dermenghem, author of the 1928 La Vie du Mohamet. Ibid. al-Hakim wrote lyrically of the optimism and idealism of nations in their youth, reflected in their art, and unenthusiastically noted that life and time forced nations and people to submit to "reality" and "contentment" in place of aspiration, producing realist art. "Idealism first then the reality, Jesus and then Muhammad ... Even the religions submit to this law ... Nay, are not religions before everything another deep expression of the emotions in the soul of humanity!" al-Hakim, Taht al-Misbah al-Asghar (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Tawakkul 1942), pp. 191-195.

131. For Haykal's growing sense in the 1930s that the secularoid writers begat by the Enlightenment took up on their own account the Church's animosity against Muhammad and genocidal crusades against Muslims, Safran, Egypt in Search pp. 172-173.
comic prose of the Iraqi polymath and rationalist theologian al-Jahiz (776-868/869)\(^{132}\), who had attracted Haykal in the 1920s. al-Hakim found in al-Jahiz passages very close to dramatic dialogue that reminded him of the comedies of Alfred de Musset: he felt the impulse to extract such never-matured "elements" for drama in Arabic literature and construct from them a Western-style drama. He wrote a play al-Qiran set in the court of the 'Iraqi Caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. 746 - 801) and "the [ancient] literature" patronized there: it was performed in January 1938 on the occasion of the wedding of King Faruq (cultural pan-Arabization of public life)\(^{133}\). al-Jahiz with his Mu'tazilite rational Islam, which drew frankly upon Greek philosophers such as Aristotle, was very different from the late traditional Sunni Islam that twentieth-century Egypt had inherited. In criticizing the classical Arabs in the 1930s, al-Hakim had distinguished between (a) the materialistically-motivated Arabs and (b) Islam which he only marginalized in the sense of denying that it had transformed (although it did suit) the Egyptians. But as early as the mid-1920s, he was shocked by the hostility to Islam expressed in Voltaire's play Fanatisme ou Mahomet le prophète. al-Hakim duly used his West-derived genre of the drama to refute such denigration in his 1936 play Muhammad. This play made the life of Muhammad pass in revue in ninety-five fast-paced scenes that faithfully cast in modernized dialogue slabs of material from the classical Arab sirah (biographies of Muhammad)\(^{134}\), and showed that Tawfiq responded at least artistically to the element of the miraculous in Muhammad's life\(^{135}\). Thus, Tawfiq

\(^{132}\) "Min Adab al-Jahiz", al-Risalah 15 June 1933, pp. 15-16.
\(^{133}\) al-Hakim, Taht al-Misbah al-Asghar pp. 140-150. In the 1940s al-Hakim described al-Jahiz, "although more than a thousand years have passed since his death", as "the direct master of most of the men-of-letters in contemporary Arabic literature" because of his approval of innovation and direct functional expression of real content over stylistic ornamentation for its own sake as diversion or entertainment. al-Jahiz would have blessed the new style in Egypt's Arabic literature --- a remark al-Hakim lanced at the neo-classicists. al-Hakim, Fann al-Adab (Cairo: Maktabat al-'Adab 1952) pp. 32-3.
\(^{134}\) Wessels, A Modern Arabic Biography pp. 10-11.
\(^{135}\) Ibid pp. 13, 12.
al-Hakim sometimes shared the acculturated-apologetic Muslim Egyptian sense that Europe's secularoid-positivist tradition was as hostile as its clerical Christian stream to Islam and Muslims. In such moods, like Mustafa Kamil or Haykal, he rallied to an extra-Egyptian or deterritorialized Islam --- religion and religious states --- as the identity with which to face the hostile West. The 1933 exchanges with Taha in al-Risalah had defined Tawfiq and others who repudiated the West through Pharaonism as intellectuals whose formal education had plunged them into almost stiflingly intimate encounters with Western culture. In reacting against it as well as the disdain and imperialism of Westerners, Tawfiq did not lose the ambivalence typical of acculturation towards the West's Christianity as well as its secularism. However, Western imperialism fueled his transition from Pharaonist to a more Arabo-Islamist criticism of the West that accelerated in the 1940s. He voiced anger that "wherever the rays of the sun fall you will find there a Western flag and imperialist ambitions!" 136. His earlier Pharaonism, though denouncing the West, had tacitly maintained certain Western materialist assumptions. Now his new Arab-Islamic posture enabled him to make radical critiques of Western science. The Qur'an was right that "the Spirit is a matter appertaining to [or: that comes by command of] my Lord: you have been only been given a little knowledge about it" [Qur'an 17: 85]. Modern science's attempts to create artificial life were vain because the Spirit was a latent intelligent quantity additional to the mere mechanical biological life that was all most scientists understood. With a duality typical of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals, al-Hakim's attack on the West in the aspect of its scientific endeavors wove elements plucked from the West's culture and modernity into his thrusts against it. He highlighted more religious responses to the Universe by

136. al-Hakim, Fann al-Adab pp. 118-119. Although published in 1952, this volume was primarily drawn from articles that he had published in Egyptian newspapers and magazines in the later 1940s.
the less materialist Einstein, whose acceptance of a "religious vision" as a "source" of scientific endeavor held out hope for Tawfiq that a further stage of "science's progress" could help "us tomorrow ... to become firmly anchored in religion". He did not, however, always retain contracted Western elements within every facet of his new Arabo-Islamic synthesis. In a post-World War II blast, he assailed the West for demanding at the UN equal rights for the women of other countries while its own women's personal and property rights lagged behind those of Eastern women: Islam's understanding of democracy could teach the West how to correct its corruptness, if only it would admit its need for correction. In this twinge, Tawfiq transferred himself to one of the most long-standing, politicized and spiritually violent fronts of Muslim Egyptian apologetics: the comparative statuses of women in the West and in Islam, on which Westerners had repeatedly harped to validate their superiority over, and title to govern, Muslims. The pre-World War I Islamic leader Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908) had studied law in France; his independence movement proposed roles for women in the renascent Egyptian nation influenced by tightened nineteenth century bourgeois West European families: for instance, he and his acculturated stratum made the Qur'an prescribe monogamy. However, Kamil waged a long and bitter campaign against Qasim Amin who from 1899 called for

137. Ibid pp. 102-5.
138. Ibid pp. 121-122. France was the Western country in which al-Hakim had studied and in whose language and literature he was steeped. In the early post-World War II period, France in particular remained vulnerable to his charges that Western males denied their women rights that Islamic law granted females. Traditionally, the French civil code had required a married woman to have the consent and signature of her husband in order to withdraw money from a bank, resort to legal actions, mortgage etc. It was only in 1961 that the French government and National Assembly granted married women the right to manage and dispose of their own separate property, previously managed by the husband --- with resistant amendments to the bill from the Senate. "La Reforme des Regimes Matrimoniaux: la Senat demande que les biens propres de la femme soient geres par le mari", Le Monde 6 May 1961 p. 7.
139. 1899 speech cited by Salah 'Isa, "Mustafa Kamil Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" p. 112.
changed roles for women --- for example, ending the veil --- demanded by Westerners: Kamil urged a Cairo audience to keep their wives and daughters veiled because "every nation has its own civilization". However deeply exposure to Western liberal concepts and societies dyed Kamil, bilingual Muslim Egyptian intellectuals of his type retained an irreducible traditional Muslim core that could fiercely reject the West on sensitive issues such as the roles of the sexes. Tawfiq al-Hakim also studied law in France but the West's high literatures and cultures formed him much more than the activist nationalist Kamil, who mainly noticed liberal and rightist political ideologies in Europe. French literary influences stimulated treatment of encounter and romantic love between the sexes in Tawfiq's works although with graftings from pan-Muslim and dubiously Pharaonic materials, reminiscent of Haykal's attempts to reconstruct male-female interactions within the Pharaonic "national literature" in the 1920s). Yet conjunctions of tensions in cultural duality and colonial status could motivate even someone as West-steeped as Tawfiq al-Hakim to assert autonomy around Islam in the ultra-intimate sphere of relations between the sexes. The survival of an Islamic inner core after such all-round Westernization sealed the failure of earlier attempts by al-Hakim and other liberal intellectuals to define a relationship with the West around a territorially delimited Egypto-Pharaonic identity.

Tawfiq al-Hakim's long-term evolution as an opinion leader, then, again illustrated how self-assertion against the West, first attempted with Pharaonism, was later fulfilled in the Arab-Islamic orientation developed by Egyptian intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s. Despite its anti-Arab themes, neo-Pharaonism in many ways was a precursor of Islamic-Arab nationalism in Egypt. Taha's concern in 1933 that neo-Pharaonism, wedded to extra-territorialist pan-Easternism, was sapping any will among the modernist, relatively acculturated, educated

140. Ibid.
classes and youth to carry Westernization forward, proved justified. Both Pharaonism and then Arabo-Islamic themes sustained and solidified the wish of the intellectuals to disengage from the Western culture and Westerners who enveloped them. The Arab-Islamic stance could fulfil the spiritual yearnings that Tawfiq and others had pursued so fruitlessly in Pharaonism; elements within it, already half-familiar to the Egyptian public, could challenge a much greater variety of patterns or institutions borrowed from, or present in, the West. Yet the acculturated Islamic Arabism in Egypt retained at the close of the 1940s the blending with now more sectionalized liberal Western elements that had characterized its prototypes since the 1880s. If Tawfiq increasingly devalued the West's liberal democracy, societal structure and more materialist science, he also felt that a superior stream of Western science ran parallel to Islam and the wisdom of the East: Arab-Islamic and some Western elements could blend in a new eclectic synthesis, although the mix of elements was changing. Both Pharaonism and Arabism-Islamism, then, could be applied in a range of ways. Tawfiq applied both identifications to deflate the West, but without severing the connection. In contrast, a Westernist like Taha offered Egyptians substantial components from classical

141. al-Hakim's penchant for eclecticism limited his anti-Western postures within both his Arabo-Islamism and his Easternism. On one hand, he wanted to push back sectors of Western culture and influence through these two reindigenizing enterprises. Each Eastern culture could be renewed and the cluster of Eastern cultures then be linked to produce a new vital general Eastern culture that would command the respect of the Westerners. Yet al-Hakim gave Egyptians and Arabs confidence for their Easternist and Arabist cultural endeavors by stressing that Arab elements borrowed by Goethe and Heine had been crucial for their literary creativity. As a precondition, every vital literature had to incorporate the most possible quality from all other literatures around the world, not just those of other languages within its own civilization. Hence, the restoration of old classical Arab literature or literary elements by his Egyptian or Arab contemporaries had to be blended into accurate translation into quality Arabic of Western literary masterpieces. Articles "al-Thaqafat al-Sharqiyyah" (Eastern Culture) (n.d.), reprinted Tahta Shams pp. 117-123; "Ihya' al-Thaqafat al-'Arabiyyat al-Qadimah" (Reviving Ancient Arabic Literature), ibid pp. 124-5.
Arab creativity that would not disrupt, or could strengthen, the Western patterns under adoption. More liberal intellectuals from the 1920s vented resentments against Westerners within Arab and Islamic identifications. But even those Pharaonic and Arab-Islamic identifications most critical of the West did not aim to sever cultural and intellectual interaction with it.

**NEO-PHARAONISM IN MUSLIM-COPTIC RELATIONS**

Post-1919 neo-Pharaonism functioned to integrate a composite Egyptian nation comprised of both Muslims and Copts. It was a shared ideology of the Muslim and Coptic acculturated elite with which each narrowed the roles of their respective clergies and diluted divisive traditional religions, Christianity as well as Islam, in identity. Yet Coptic-Muslim divergencies and perceived Muslim extra-Egyptian linkages persisted within neo-Pharaonism, which became a focus of intersectarian conflict as modernist Muslims moved to ethnic-linguistic pan-Arabism.

We saw that Haykal in the 1920s applied Pharaonic mythologies to question the divine origin and historical accuracy of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (at least as regarded Moses). Christian as well as Muslim neo-Pharaonists did this in the period. The theosophised Christian Zakari suggested around 1926 that the Christian tenets of the suffering, crucifixion and resurrection of the man-god Jesus were only mutations of earlier Pharaonic myths of Osiris who was murdered by Seth, and then raised from the dead to become Judge of people after death.

The nationalist attempt of Christian Egyptians to reconnect with Pharaonic Egypt opened them to Western archeology that could devastate traditional Coptic belief in the Bible. Antun Zakari speculated around 1926 that Pharaonic and derived Sumerian and Assyrian flood myths were the source of "original sin" and Yahveh's retributive Flood in Genesis (now just lumped away in "Hebrew Literature").

143. Zakari, Tutankhamun, pp. 81-83. The stiff Arabic suggests that Zakari lifted most of this section from some decidedly...
al-'Ibraniyyah). Neo-Pharaonism thus could delegitimize Christianity (as well as Islam) as at best a non-divine product of Pharaonic religion or a lethal invader: a few Copts, too, thus apostacized from their sect's defining religion. Like the Muslim neo-Pharaonism of such writers as Haykal, though, even most of its more radical Coptic proponents remained ambivalent towards the Coptic Church and sect. One one hand, like many Westernizing elite lay Copts, Musa was so embarrassed by the traditional Coptic Church that he accepted the claim of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant missionaries to be purifying it of pagan-like Mariolatry. Neo-Pharaonism helped them move to an indigenous identity that bypassed the non-Western Christianity into which they had been born. On the other hand, exposure to Church Coptic from childhood fostered greater readiness by such secularized Copts as Musa to identify with Pharaonic Egypt, from whose speech Coptic descended. Claims by Salamah Musa, in concert

post-Christian English or American article. It's materials reviewed George Smith's discovery and decipherment of the epic of Gilgamesh, completed while in Nineveh on behalf of the Daily Telegraph in 1873, which presented a pagan flood story that long preceded Genesis. A myth, engraved on the walls of the tomb of the Pharaoh Seti I seventy years after the passing of Tutankhamun, ran that an aging Pharaoh won rejuvenation when he executed rebels: their blood reddened the Nile in its flood. Zakari tenuously argued that an immemorial Pharaonic prototype of this, muddled in "the neighboring lands", patterned the Sumerian and Assyrian myths and then Judeo-Christianity's "original sin" and the cleansing flood in Genesis. Ibid p. 83.

144. Copts who turned to Pharaonic Egypt after 1922 regarded this orientation as fulfilling or stemming from Coptic communal identity. Nonetheless, Salamah Musa vividly depicted the incompatibility of neo-Paganism with traditional religion in his sketch of Kamil Ghabriyal Pasha, who after studying Coptic and the ancient hieroglyphic Egyptian from which it had sprung, "because of his attachment to the ancient Egyptian tongue ... turned his back on Christianity, which he regarded as a foreign creed that had expelled the national Egyptian religion". Musa, Education pp. 177-8.

145. Musa felt that Coptic ecclesiastical lore "had become fossilized under the Byzantine Empire". The Protestant missionaries "were quite justified in calling our form of Christianity at the close of the nineteenth century a "mariology". The missionaries prodded the Coptic Church "to adopt a more genuinely Christian consciousness", shaking it out of "medieval slumber". Musa also credited the Protestant missionaries and their Coptic converts with influencing the Orthodox Copts to end the Muslim-like veiling of their women, a "western" step. Musa, Education pp. 14-15.

146. Church Coptic, to which he was exposed in childhood and youth,
with Muslim neo-Pharaonists such as Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi, that the aberrant Akhnaton originated monotheism, showed defensiveness and aversion vis-a-vis the polytheist, pagan character of most Pharaonic religion comparable to Haykal's: Musa's repressed dislike of the Pharaonic past, though, was more purely Westernist-modernist. Although that was not at first among the main purposes of at least Muslims who developed the identification, neo-Pharaonism served and influenced the development of a joint bisectarian political and social community of Christianity and Muslims in Egypt in the 1920s. Selecting a pagan period long preceding the division of Christianity and Islam as definitive of a modern Egyptian nation marginalized or bypassed the religious split between Coptic and Muslim Egyptians that otherwise could have impeded political integration.

The extra-Egyptian, pan-Islamic interests of Mustafa Kamil's independence movement had alienated Copts otherwise attracted to it before 1914. But from 1919 Copts such as...

147. For treatment of Akhnaton in drama and poetry in the late 1920s by Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi and Ahmad Sabri see Gershoni and Jankowski, Islam, Egypt and the Arabs p. 183; Salamah Musa's argumentation that Akhnaton's heresies prefigured or originated Judaism, Christianity and Islam, ibid p. 177. Musa's "modernist" drive to Westernize Egypt alienated him from even aesthetic restoration of Pharaonic pagan mythologies. In 1933 he mused that poetry, even when "delicious", was "unimportant" because it ran against "logic" and "science". Poetry always made people look anachronistically backwards: classical Arab poets under Islam from the markets of Baghdad yearned for pre-Islamic pagan Arabia's nomadism, deserts and camels. "Our poets now are crazed enthusiasts for the gods of [Pharaonic] Egypt and Greece". "One of them will [typically] publish a magazine which he titles with the name of an extinct ancient deity": Salamah Musa's Muslim fellow-Pharaonist Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi edited Apollo. Salamah Musa, "al-Shi'r wal-Shu'ara'" (Poetry and Poets), al-Balagh 10 July 1933 p. 1. Musa's writings often modernizingly rejected perceived Pharaonic survivals — whether supposed beliefs or immemorial technology — among the peasants of his era: see eg. Education pp. 87-88.
Makram Ubayd, later a pioneer of political pan-Arabism in Egypt, became a component of the inner leadership of the Wafd in its campaign for Egypt's independence. Innumerable Coptic laypeople and clergy demonstrated or fought alongside their Muslim compatriots to dislodge the British from the Nile Valley, and like them faced imprisonment, exile, the torching of their homes or death. The radical secularist Copt, Salamah Musa, an eye-witness to the 1919 national revolution, recalled the unconditional commitment of Copts to the joint patriotic struggle. They had firmly resisted "the sly tactics of the English to cause religious discord" and thus split the ranks of the Egyptians in 1919: they refused to do any bargaining with the English on the matter of minority protection.

148. Among the eighteen-man delegation that Sa'd Zaghlul led to the Paris Conference in 1919 there were five Copts: Sinut Hanna, Jurji Khayyat, Hunayn Wasif, Jurji Dumani and Wisa Wasif: see Leland Bowie, "The Copts, the Wafd, and Religious Issues in Egyptian Politics", The Muslim World v. LXVII (No. 2) April 1977, p. 108 fn. 10. Makram 'Ubayd, an Oxford-educated Protestant Copt fluent in English, was soon brought in for his ability to communicate Egypt's case to public opinion and politicians in Britain and America. B.L. Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics (London: Croom Helm 1986) p. 63. Makram in 1928 was welcomed back by the Wafd in Alexandria, with Coptic activists disproportionate. He had converted from Protestantism to Orthodoxy in 1923 but his Angloid Protestant name was still used: "many a'yan (rural Arab-Egyptian notables) and grandees and [secular] lawyers and delegations from the provinces were awaiting the arrival of the scholar William". At the International Parliamentary Congress, Makram had cited Egypt's acculturated elite: challenged how a nation with only 5% literacy could deserve a Constitution, "he replied that there are 800 students at European institutions thanks to the Egyptian parliament". 'Ubayd noted that in the Wilsonian era his title "Holy Warrior" (muḥājīd) was now bestowed on anyone who strove to serve his homeland "with peaceful means". "Istiqbal al-Ustadh Makram 'Ubayd: Muhimmatu fil-Kharij: Mawaqif al-Nahhas Basha" (The Reception for the Scholar Makram 'Ubayd: His Mission Abroad: The Positions of al-Nahhas Pasha), al-Muqattam 20 December 1928 p. 5. 'Ubayd's vision of "struggle" for decolonization by other Arab populations, too, increasingly stressed legal, parliamentarist methods in the 1930s and 1940s: B 164-5 fn. 46.

149. Musa, Education, p. 108. Leland Bowie mentions the wide-spread rejection from the Coptic community that faced the Copt, Yusuf Wahbah, when he accepted an appointment as Prime Minister from the British occupiers. Musa called this British "sly tricks" to foster separatism: see Bowie, "The Copts, the Wafd and Religious Issues" loc. cit p. 109. Carter absolves the British of trying to divide and rule the Egyptians by such manoeuvres against the Wafd as their appointment of the colorless Wahbah. The Copts in...
Under British colonial rule before World War I, vocal, prosperous sections of the modern-educated Copts --- competitors of the rising Arab-Egyptian landowning elite --- had called for proportionate representation for the dispersed Copts in Provincial Councils and the Legislative Assembly and for increased Coptic representation in government posts. Tawfiq Dus --- a later Liberal Constitutionalist --- was one of the Coptic communalists who articulated such demands at the 1911 Coptic Congress. From the 1919 national uprising, though, most politically active Copts wooed and expressed trust in, Muslim Egyptians, assuming an intimate national community with no need for the 1922 Constitution to confessionalize the new parliamentarism as again demanded by Dus. Salamah Musa's reminiscences noted an "initial distrust" among Muslims of the new anti-colonialism of the Copts in view of that minority's past opposition to Mustafa Kamil's pro-Ottoman Islam-tinged independence movement.

No doubt some Copts in the 1920s also wondered if their leap of faith from political communalism to an undivided Egyptian nationalist polity would prove realistic. Popular among Copts before World War I because of his rejection of Ottoman suzerainty, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's Ummah Party supplied ideological themes and many leaders for the post-1918 Wafd, the nationalist party that retained widest support during and beyond the 1920s. Despite the

Egyptian Politics pp. 67-70.


151. "When the Constitutive Committee was discussing the electoral law and Tawfiq Dus Pasha demanded that the rights of the Copts must be safeguarded by a sufficient number of their representatives being appointed ... we, the [Coptic] young people, rose in protest, disowning his opinion as wrong and maintaining that we must rely on elections only". Musa, Education, pp. 108-9.

152. Musa, Education, p. 108.

153. Salamah Musa recalled how strongly Lutfi and his anti-Ottoman secularist paper al-Jaridah appealed to Copts before World War I. Previously, they had felt alienated from Egyptian nationalism articulated by the Khedive-financed paper al-Mu'ayyad and by Mustafa Kamil's al-Liwa because both at least verbally supported re-tightening Egypt's traditional Ottoman relationship with the Muslim Turks on the grounds that membership in "an Ottoman Empire was the only weapon we had to combat British imperialism". Musa, Education, pp. 42-4.
supra—Egyptian pan-Arab and pan-Muslim links that they both developed, Mustafa Kamil and Lutfi-al-Jaridah had each bequeathed precarious "patriotic" devotion to an Egyptian territorial homeland over to the new era of the 1920s.

Developed into an unprecedentedly central component in territorial particularism, the neo-Pharaonism of the 1920s helped it psychologically integrate Copts and Muslims much more. Addressing mixed, modernized, audiences, Coptic intellectuals in the 1920s stressed that Pharaonic Egypt could unify Egypt's Arabic-speaking Muslims and Copts --- if only both sects, each so long indifferent to the Pharaonic heritage, now made it the core for shared Egyptianness. In a lecture on the Coptic Museum at the American University in 1926, Marqus Pasha Sumaykah, the museum's founder, highlighted that, prior to the Arab-Muslim conquest, the Greek term aigyptioi from which "Copts" derived had meant Egyptians only\(^{154}\). Thus all twentieth century Egyptians, whether Christian or Muslim, were in that sense "Copts", Sumaykah told his acculturated, mixed Muslim-Coptic audience: "some of you are Muslim Copts, some Christian Copts, for all of you are descended from the Ancient Egyptians". This equation of the modern Muslims and Christians in Egypt as one by virtue of common Pharaonic race and heritage required wealthy, elite young Muslims he addressed to cut the long-standing Muslim sense of special relationship with the classical Arabs. In this 1926 talk at the American University in Cairo, Sumaykah argued that Egypt has lost its independence with the fall of the last of the Pharaohs more than 2,300 years before. From that age, "this country, because of its excellent geographical position and enormous wealth, fertile soil and beautiful climate which God marked out for her, has become the object of the ambitious attentions of Abyssinian, Greek, Persian, Roman, Arab, Turkish and European

\(^{154}\) Before the Arab-Muslim conquest of Egypt by 'Amr Ibn al-'As in the seventh century, the Greek word aigyptioi originally signified the people and the language of Egypt, but in later times the word, under its Arabic form qibti or Copt, became "the distinct name of the Christian minority". See article "Coptic Church" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1965 ed., v. 6, p. 477.
conquerors. This vision of Egyptian history ruled out traditional images that Egypt's membership in classical Arabo-Islamic empires was distinctively fruitful and thereafter definitive of Egypt. Other neo-Pharaonist Copts duplicated this racist periodization of Egyptian history into Pharaonic golden age and non-sovereign ill-treatment under foreign rulers thereafter. The radical secularizer Salamah Musa rejected the claim of the Turco-Circassian Muslim Egyptian poet Ahmad Shawqi that his 1917 play The Death of Cleopatra restored the reputation of a defamed Egyptian heroine. The Copt Musa rejected her as in actuality foreign: his race-citing dislike of the "Greek" Ptolemies interlocked into his sectarian-cum-ethnic rejection of the title of the modern Muslim Turco-Circassians, represented by Shawqi, to be considered Egyptian. In contrast, such ethnic Muslims as Haykal and Ahmad Husayn celebrated the Ptolemies and Cleopatra as zealous naturalized Egyptians who developed Egypt's sovereignty and culture. In terms similar at several points to Sumaykah's, Salamah Musa in the 1920s saw the Arab conquest, and the subsequent Islamic periods as disastrous for Egypt because all true Egyptian national consciousness and culture were so thoroughly eliminated. This was denied by al-Siyasah intellectual Taha Husayn who justified the Muslim Fatimid and Mamluk dynasties as as Egyptian as the Pharaonic dynasties.

156. Salamah Musa, Education p. 162. For Musa's detestation of the declining (Muslim) Turco-Circassian landed aristocracy from the days of the pre-World War 1 British colonial rule, ibid, pp. 22-3, 30, 50 and 89.
158. Ibid, p. 113. Taha's denial of Musa's theme that after the Pharaohs the Egyptian nation "died" and lost its independence and culture for two thousand years, came in his review of the 1926 book Selections from Salamah Musa (Mukhtarat Salamah Musa). Taha used particularist language to legitimate the Ptolemaic period as well as Arab-Islamic dynasties: like the Mamluks and the Fatimids, the Macedonians opted for "Egyptian nationality" in a country that never forgot its independence for one day. Taha Husayn, Hadith al-Arbi'a, v. 3 (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1962), pp. 98-99. However, sometimes Salamah appreciated the styles of such classical Arab prose-writers as Ibn al-Muqaffa' and al-Jahiz and...
Clearly, Coptic neo-Pharaonists such as Musa and Sumaykah still had sectarian apprehensions about Islam and even Muslim fellow-Egyptians that somewhat structured their neo-Pharaonism in the 1920s. Before the 1919 uprising against British rule, Sumaykah had been a frankly anti-nationalist Coptic communalist: he wanted the Copts as a Christianity-defined community to accept British colonial rule rather than support any independence movement that would bring them under the control of perceivedly anti-Christian Muslim Egyptians. In the 1920s, though, he consistently projected a Pharaonic identity that would unite Muslims and Copts: in his more accommodating moods this interwove, while subordinating, their respective post-Arab sectarian cultures, for example in architecture.

But whatever residual Pharaonic cultural elements continued after the fall of the Pharaohs, the cultural life and consciousness of Egyptians thenceforth was contracted and poor compared to the sovereign golden age. Sumaykah lamented that in their ages of post-Pharaonic ignorance the population of Egypt lost all awareness that the Pharaonic monuments of their "forefathers" were their own national civilization:

the heretical philosophy of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and al-Parabi (Education pp. 38, 44, 86 and 183-4): the classical Arabs originated the experimental method and thus Europe's Renaissance (Shukri, Salamah Musa p. 54) --- they and the Pharaohs were (limited) culture sources for modernizing Egyptians (ibid p. 61.


160. Marqus Sumaykah Pasha to a group, organized by the Ministry of Public Education, touring the Coptic Museum in 1925. He was specifically drawing their attention to letters of the Muslim formula bismillahir-Rahman ir-Rahim (in the Name of Allah the Compassionate, the Merciful) set amid "tastefully-placed" crosses in the finely worked pierced wood of the roofed balconies overlooking the Museum's courtyard. This longstanding interweaving of Coptic and Muslim religious emblems in Coptic art was now made to demonstrate that the bi-sectarian Egyptian Nation preceded contact with the West in the nineteenth century. In his speech, Sumaykah chiefly valued the Coptic language that the Copts preserved because it provided one key that made it possible for Champollion "to decipher the symbols of the ancient hieroglyphic language". During the tour of the Museum, speculated Pharaonic survivals in Coptic art and architecture were highlighted. "Mushahid", "al-Rihilat al-'Ilmiyyah: Qasr al-Sham' wal-Mathaf al-Ñibti", al-Muqattam, 3 December 1925, p. 7.
destroyed them to get stone blocks for building their own new houses. Shared descent from Pharaonic Egyptians was the main theme with which Sumaykah tried to kindle a new integrating Pharaonic national consciousness in the educated Muslim and Christian Egyptians he addressed. The secularizing Copt Salamah Musa, too, into the 1930s on and off, highlighted racial kinship, ongoing "blood of the Pharaohs", as the factor uniting the Nile Valley's modern Arabic-speaking Muslims and Copts with each other and both with the definitive ancient Egyptians.

Some Muslim Egyptians in the 1920s matched, or responded to, the racial neo-Pharaonism with which Coptic intellectuals strove to integrate the homeland's sects. Thus Salamah Musa's friend, the secular modernist Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi, called on writers in 1926, in the period immediately after the inception of the Egyptian particularist state, to "shape a purely national culture" that would educate "the rising generation" and make it --- whether Muslim or Christian --- aware that Egyptians "form one race irrespective of religious differences". Shadi believed that a scientific examination of the "blood of the sons of the Egyptian people" would find it to constitute, regardless of sect, "only one single blood, devoid of any alien element". Such a new scientific, racial consciousness would downgrade the other traditional divisive supranational communities of pan-Islamism, international Christian community and pan-Arabism to permit the emergence of a narrower consciousness "that we are Egyptians before everything". Abu Shadi, like Salamah,

was an admirer of H.G. Wells and in the 1920s penned a drama and much poetry glorifying ancient Pharaonic Egypt. His sects-integrative racial neo-Pharaonism, however, was too thorough-going and durable to be representative of most liberal Muslim Egyptian litterateurs who having been modernists and particularists in the 1920s, then took part in the subsequent "Eastern-traditionalist" (Arabo-Islamic) reaction against the West. In contrast, Abu Shadi exiled himself to New York in 1946 (where he died in 1955) in protest against this reorientation of Egypt --- which however repudiated "modern civilization" rather more selectively than he and his friend Salamah Musa supposed. Muslim Egyptians who glorified ancient Pharaonic Egypt in the 1920s and (decreasingly) in the 1920s often diverged significantly from the themes of Coptic neo-Pharaonists. Acculturated Muslim Egyptians defined the connectedness with Pharaonic Egypt less in racial terms; also their particularism cherished Egypt's post-Pharaonic history and standard Arab culture in it more than did Coptic particularists less able to feel at ease with those periods in which Islam was ascendant. The al-Siyasah Muslim contributor Muhammad Zaki Salih did write parallel to Salamah Musa of "the blood of Ramses" of contemporaneous Arabic-speaking Egyptians. But even in Pharaonism's heyday, Muslim particularists stressed territory, the homeland Egypt, as the frame within which essential Pharaonic culture or personality could be transmitted down to modern times. Territorialism enabled Muslim particularists to accommodate, as well as constrain, classical pan-Arab culture elements and their Muslim.

which he wrote poetry and books. Salamah Musa, Education, p. 261.


165. This interpretation of Abu Shadi's emigration to New York as a protest at the shift in identifications of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals was vehemently argued after his death in 1955 by his Coptic friend Salamah. Musa, Education, p. 165. While the hostility of conservative Egyptians to Abu Shadi prior to his departure is mentioned by other writers such as the Syrian-Egyptian Yusuf As'ad Daqhir, Arabo-Islamoid publications such as al-Zahra' in the 1920s were still prepared to publish Abu Shadi's unconventional poetry. See B 72 fn. 46.

166. Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs, p. 165.
Egyptian constituency's persistent sense that partial
descent from Arabs and other Muslims from outside Egypt
diluted any Pharaonic blood. Churches exposed Copts to the
liturgical Coptic that was genuinely descended from the
ancient Pharaonic language 167. The religious difference
meant that Copts had not intermarried with incoming Arabs
or Turcophones as Egyptian converts to Islam had. Copts
had more Pharaonic blood than Muslim Egyptians would
claim. Muslim Egyptian neo-Pharaonists stressed Pharaonic
blood less as a basis for joint nationality because the
theme clashed against the reality of the racial links many
of them had through descent or marriage to Muslims from
beyond Egypt 168 --- blood connections that Coptic
intellectuals lacked. Haykal himself had married a woman
from the old declining Turco-Circassian land-owning and
administrative elite 169, influencing his identification
with Turkey within Easternism --- and how far he would take
notions of "Pharaonic blood" among modern Arabic-speaking,
Muslim Egyptians. True, Haykal in 1926 did write of
Pharaonic ajdad ("forefathers") and that the "blood" they
had bequeathed was one of the factors that would continue
to link Muslim Arabic-speaking Egyptians in "tight
psychological continuity" to the long-departed Pharaonic
Egyptians. But his argumentation defined the crucial
inheritance transmitted across the millennia from Pharaonic

167. See fn. 146 above. This exposure to Church Coptic from childhood
gave Copts a smattering of some of the roots of ancient
hieroglyphic Egyptian, its ancestor: that headstart over Muslim
Egyptians made Copts disproportionately numerous among the
indigenous Egyptologists who multiplied after 1922. Reid,

168. Tawfiq al-Hakim, the most eloquent and persistent of the Muslim
neo-Pharaonists, was born in 1902 of an Arab-Egyptian farmer and a
mother of Turco-Circassian descent; his mother made him very aware
in childhood and adolescence of the Egyptian-Turcophone cleavage
in the society. Note by L.O. Schumann in Musa, Education, p.
256. 'Abbas Mahmoud al-'Aqqad in the 1920s was a neo-Pharaonist
columnist for the Wafdist al-Balagh; he had been born in 1889 in
Aswan of an Egyptian father and a modern woman of Kurdish
descent. Ibid, p. 255. Haykal considered that the champion of
women's emancipation, Qasim Amin (1865-1908) "was born an
Egyptian", but was aware at the same time that he had "Kurdish
blood flowing in his veins". Haykal, Tarajim p. 165.

Egypt more in terms of motivating "psychological emotions" and rural customs and folk rites in popular Islam. In the same 1926 article, Haykal tried to incorporate the reality of large-scale immigration of Arabs and subsequent Muslims within particularism by arguing that "the natural environment" is the determinant of personality that moulds or modifies "languages, beliefs and sensibilities", unifying people from divergent races: although many non-Egyptians had invaded Egypt, after they were settled there for some generations, the natural environment had taken away "all the specifics of their old races" (kulla sifat ajnasihim al-qadimah). For Haykal in the 1920s, then, not Pharaonic race but the territorial homeland Egypt was the essential frame that sustained the transmission of a Pharaonic personality from the ancient Egyptians to Egypt's modern inhabitants --- even when the latter had non-Egyptian Muslim ancestors.

al-Siyasah neop-Pharaonism in the 1920s, then registered divergencies of blood that distinguished Coptic and Muslim Egyptians. Haykal ambivalently perpetuated perception of separate Coptic and Muslim social units even while he affirmed that they shared one continuing Pharaonic culture. In one 1926 passage he did assert that local Egyptian Islam and Coptic Christianity both perpetuated the same unique Pharaonic religious concepts and practices and therefore fundamentally differed from Islam and Christianity outside Egypt. But after arguing that specific tenets of Muslims in Egypt ultimately derived from the ancient, Pharaonic, religious concepts of the questioning and judgement of the dead, he casually added: "and who knows whether our Coptic brothers do not have as much as we or more" of such Pharaonic religious

172. For similar territorialist arguments in a 1929 civics textbook by Tawfik Hamid al-Mar'ashli see ibid, p. 138.
174. Ibid, p. 135. Haykal often revealed his assumption that his...
survivals. Here, Haykal revealed his assumption that the modernist core audience of his newspaper in the 1920s was a specifically Muslim group, although one he clearly felt should now identify more with the contiguous --- still separate --- Coptic elite within the new bi-sectarian political nationalism. The twentieth century Coptic compatriots and their variant of Christianity seldom won more than a faint, blurred presence in even those al-Siyasah items in the 1920s that abstractly argued that Copts and Muslims were one continuous nation. On the other hand, Haykal and other Muslim writers with his orientation had to structure the neo-Pharaonism they propounded so that it could incorporate images of extra-Egyptian Islamic racial links --- Arab, Turkish, Circassian and other ---- retained by many in their educated Muslim Egyptian audience. Haykal's determination that the new "national literature" cover Egypt's post-Pharaonic periods, Muslim leaders with outside blood-links, and Arabo-Islamic culture, finally broke with the Coptic neo-Pharaonists' dichotomization of a sovereign Pharaonic age with later --- in particular Islamic --- dark ages. Haykal in 1927 refused to

avant garde, in many ways Westernist and anti-traditional, elite inner audience remained residually defined by Islam. The recreation of Pharaonic Egypt in a new Arabic high literature illustrated that adoption of Western literary and research techniques by no means necessitated "casting away our heritage in our capacity as Egyptians, Easterners and Muslims". Thawrat p. 149. Charles D. Smith presented Haykal's years as a student in Paris (1909-1912) as the period in which he became a post-Muslim Westernist positivist and particularist. Islam and the Search pp. 40-44. However, while there, Haykal was a member not just of its Egyptian Society but also of the Islamic Society open to "Muslims from all the different countries of the earth" living in France, although supposedly non-political. Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (Cairo: 2 vols. Mitba'at Misr 1951-1953) v.1, p. 40.

175. For a 1929 attempt by Haykal to identify Coptic Christianity with an Egyptian national opposition to the Byzantines, Gershoni and Jankowski, op. cit, pp. 153-4. Haykal in 1933 very fleetingly projected "the churches and monasteries that Christianity constructed" in Egypt as one possible subject for a new specifically Egyptian literature, although he sounded more enthusiastic about Islamic architecture as a source of inspiration. Thawrat pp. 141-2.
confine renewal of our literary nationalism to the relics of Pharaonic civilization: that would absurdly violate the immortality of nations. You may observe that these Middle Ages in Europe, which they call the Dark Ages, have undeniably contributed to the development of Western literature... I may not have gone too far if I take issue with those who claim that Egypt submitted after the Pharaohs to the rule of foreigners, replying that she in that only followed the law under which most monarchical nations submit to the reign of originally foreign dynasties... All this glorious past is a heritage... whose memory we must restore to our and our children's life.176

The awareness of supra-Egyptian Muslim racial links was transmitted intact to the new acculturated generation, the thinking of which derived its starting point from older intellectuals like Haykal.

In 1930 the younger-generation acculturated Muslim Ahmad Husayn, just returned from Law studies at the Sorbonne, countered the continuing extra-Egyptian racial identifications of Muslim Egyptians by varying Haykal’s earlier territorialist and Pharaonist arguments and terminology. Husayn was immediately responding to recent articles by al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghanimi al-Taftazani, Arab secretary of the Eastern League (al-Rabitat al-Shargiyyah), many of whose members contributed to al-Siyasah. As Haykal and other al-Siyasah intellectuals had done in the 1920s, Ahmad Husayn in his 1930 replies evoked Pharaonic blood as something that Muslims as well as Christians had in Egypt: it had had the strength to absorb the other bloods that entered in its post-dynastic periods. Significantly, though, the Arab racial identification of the Muslim Egyptian audience he strove to convert or hold obliged him in 1930 to celebrate Pharaonic race within admissions that the classical Arabs had diluted it with their blood. Husayn conceded that the inhabitants

176. Haykal, "Misr al-Haditha wa Misr al-Qadimah"; Thawrat pp. 139-141. Cf. Tarajim pp. 12-13 where Haykal again argued that the blood of kings does not make dynasties foreign: Napoleon was originally from Corsica, English monarchs had non-English blood but presided over the largest empire in the world. Haykal ignored here the wider Arab cultural and social connections and supra-Egyptian borders over which such leaders presided. These had a Muslim dimension that Coptic particularists, for instance, might fear.
of whole provinces of Egypt retained intense pride that they had racially originated from Arabia. He instanced al-Sharqiyyah, through which the Arabs had entered Egypt. He wrote in exasperated, contemptuous tones of customs cultivated as "Arab" in Egypt: excessive veiling in al-Sharqiyyah in contrast to peasant women who worked unveiled in public elsewhere in the Nile Valley, particularist Arabian costumes, and the continuing pride in past Arab tribal "battles" in al-Fayyum, which "claims it preserves its Arabism although Allah knows that they are Egyptians, Egyptians!". Although he sectionalized Arab consciousness to specific provinces, Ahmad Husayn here, somewhat as Haykal sometimes did, associated Egyptian Arabness with traditional rural settings, folklore, and anachronistic clan feuds. His and Haykal's acculturation in Egyptian cities and in Europe had created an alienating gap between them and rural Egyptian traditional Arab identity. Whatever his hopes in 1930 that Arabism would wane further among them, Ahmad Husayn recognised the persistence of the sense of Arab race among not just the rural masses but the educated Egyptian public: hence his concern that al-Taftazani and his Eastern League might well graft their heightened Arab identification onto it. At one point the young Ahmad Husayn himself sounded as though his own Egyptianism might buckle: "even if we concede for the sake of argument this claim that our origin is Arab we would not be so today" because "the people is begot by its environment (bi'ah)". Thus "we today are as Egyptian in thought and temperament as Ramses and

177. "Misru Fir'awniyah idh hiya la Yumkinu an Takuna illa Kadhalik" (Egypt is Pharaonic because it is Unable to be Anything Else), al-Mugattam 16 September 1930, p. 3. Ahmad Husayn signed himself "Ahmose" (after Ahmose I founder of the 18th century dynasty who reigned c. 1570-46 BC) at the foot of the article. 178. As late as his retrospective memoirs of 1950, Haykal in a thought-spasm saw an heroic and chivalrous but anachronistically "nomadic" Arab ethos as pervasive in Egyptian villages, but as also competing with the West's modernity for the loyalties of educated Egyptians in the cities, even in secular universities. Haykal, Mudhakkirat, v. 1, pp. 10-2. 179. Ahmad Husayn, "Misru Fir'awniyah ...", al-Mugattam, 6 September 1930, p. 7.
Tutankhamun". However in respect to the prescriptive ancient Pharaonic Egyptians themselves, Ahmad Husayn in 1930 was undecided whether they had originated from Hamitic immigrations in pre-history or whether they might have originally been Semites who came from West Asia across the isthmus of Suez. Pan-Arab ideologues were to evoke such a Semitic provenance of ancient Pharaonic Egyptians in order to sap Pharaonist particularists throughout the 1930s and 1940s. After Nasser's death in 1970, the theme of racial kinship in pre-history with other populations in the Arab world was to stop elements for an Egyptian community separate from other Arabs cohering among Egyptian intellectuals, despite the blow that Egypt's 1967 defeat dealt to the pan-Arab national identification.

The exchanges about race, Pharaonism and Arabness in al-Mugattam in 1930, then, showed that even the most Pharaonist Muslim modernists such as Ahmad Husayn were already ambivalent to the Arab affiliation they still resisted. Just one year later in a 1931 Cairo University debate he argued for the pan-Arab option against a Pharaonic identification most in his audience supported. In this 1931 somersault, Ahmad Husayn would extol as determinative for Egyptians' current culture and nationhood exactly those supra-Egyptian factors --- language and "the religion of Islam ... worshipping the One God" --- that he had written territorial homeland overrode in 1930.

180. Ibid, p. 3. Like Dr Hasan Kamal at the end of the decade, Ahmad Husayn may have been influenced by Sir Flinders Petrie to view Semites who crossed the isthmus of Suez as the progenitors of the ancient Egyptians. Cf. fn 82.

181. For example, the Egyptian geographer Dr. Jamal Hamdan's 1970 work The Personality of Egypt on the basis of a common pan-Arab origin in the Paleolithic era ruled out a discrete Pharaonic identity for Egypt. Smith, Islam and the Search, pp. 194-5.

182. Ahmad Husayn's reminiscences of 1931 University Students' Union debate titled "Should We Follow Pharaonic Civilization or Arab Civilization?": excerpted in Ahmad 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi, Ru'yah Hadariyyah Tabaqiyyah li-'Urubat Misr. (Bayrut: Dar al-Adab 1979), pp. 335-342. Ahmad Husayn in 1931 was probably not adjusting to a new reaction among his student constituency at Cairo University against Pharaonic culture and towards a pan-Arab identity. He recalled that "youth" at the time were preoccupied with the choice between Pharaonism and Arabism (ibid, p. 235): to that extent, they were vacillating. But he also felt that the bulk of the mainly student crowd at the debate, before he spoke...
his motifs of Egyptian racial distinctiveness and superiority were to recur well into Egypt's (and his) official pan-Arab era, leading Ghali Shukri (1965) to equate Misr al-Fatat and the sectarian-fundamentalist Coptic Nation as both chauvinist Pharaonic-racist movements. Young Egypt leaders like Ahmad Husayn and such members and sympathisers as Muhammad Subayh 'Abd al-Qadir persistently developed motifs of Egyptian racial separateness from Arabians that they originally took from such a Coptic anti-Arabist as Salamah Musa. While the sense of shared Pharaonic race persisted in Ahmad Husayn as he Islamized, by 1938 it no longer meant enough to make him strive to hold the ravelling coalition of Copts and Muslims — strained by his hyper-Islamic pan-Arabism — together.

The preceding data showed that the distinctive neo-Pharaonisms of Coptic and Muslim acculturateds had substantially different structures and mixes of materials. Each internalized, as well as tried to control, in

for Arabism, were still pro-Pharaonic. Ibid, p. 337.
183. Shukri, Salamah Musa p. 64.
184. Dr Muhammad Subayh 'Abd al-Qadir's 1938 view that Muslim Arabic-speaking Egyptians were as racially Pharaonic as the Copts, being just that portion of the indigenous population that accepted Islam, assumed that "only a few tens of thousands of Arabs had come to Egypt throughout the whole extent of its history". 'Abd al-Qadir, "Rasa'il ila Baghdad min al-Qahirah", loc cit. His Leader Ahmad Husayn in his reply to a Coptic communalist in the same year had mentioned the same small number of Arabs and that some of them moved on to North Africa. Husayn, "Misr al-Fatat wal-Aqbat", Misr al-Fatat 24 September 1938 p. 2. Both these Young Egypt ideologues derived this theme of the scant number of Arabians who settled in Egypt under Islam, and hence slight Semitic racial input, from the secularized but still often communal Copt Salamah Musa who in 1934 wrote that "even the Arabs did not mix much with the population as is clear from successive incidents in which they were remunerated by the Egyptian rulers (umara') to move on from Egypt to Tripoli and North Africa". Musa, "al-Wajh al-Misri, al-Ana wa Ayyam al-Fara'inah" (The Egyptian Face, Today and in the Days of the Pharaohs), al-Majallat al-Jadidah April 1934 p. 14. Musa was probably referring to the tribes of Banu Hilal and Sulaym, originally of Najd but settled in Upper Egypt. Under the Fatimid Caliph Ma'add al-Mustansir, they were induced in 1052 to move westward, where for years they ravaged Tripoli and Tunisia. Cf. 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam's 1946 perception of Sulaym and Banu Hilal, B 227.
185. Ahmad Husayn, "Misr al-Fatat wal-Aqbat" (Young Egypt and the Copts), Misr al-Fatat, 24 September, 1938, p. 2.
neo-Pharaonism features of their two immemorial religious cultures and the human sect units those had defined. Both the Muslim and Coptic intellectuals developing the identification after 1919 used it as a weapon on behalf of their secular elites to slash the roles of their respective clergies. While Muslim neo-Pharaonism had some features designed to throw more links across to the similar Coptic elite, such integrativeness was secondary or an after-thought. In contrast, Coptic intellectuals and leaders pervasively structured their Pharaonic data and images so that the identification would enhance their sect's interactions as a minority with Muslims. The Pharaonic period, as a shared legacy, would integrate sects; but, in focussing some non-Pharaonic blood in Muslim Egyptians, neo-Pharaonism could offer Copts a somewhat superior racial status: this thought was to usefully differentiate and solidify the modern elite of the sect in steadfastness as their Muslim Egyptian peers made Islam one basis in pan-Arab political identity in the 1930s and 1940s. The Coptic intellectuals' neo-Pharaonism was always ambivalent to Muslim Egyptians: in arguing Pharaonic racial oneness of Muslim and Coptic peasants, at least in Upper Egypt, it nonetheless noted the entry of Arab, Kurdish, Turkish and other non-Egyptian Muslim blood into urban Muslim strata in Lower Egypt. Here, Pharaonic art was significantly applied to differentiate Muslims and Copts racially at the level of precisely the urban modern sectarian elites, in which the communal rivalry and competition over jobs was sharpening by the 1930s 186.

186. Salamah Musa in his 1927 al-Yawm wal-Ghad saw the classical Arabs as having injected inferior "oriental" blood into the Indo-European Pharaonic blood of the Egyptians. Ibrahim Ibrahim, "Salamah Musa", p. 349. In 1934, Musa tried to argue that in Upper Egypt at least, Muslim Egyptian peasants and Copts were both of reasonably pure Pharaonic race. In his quest for racial purity bypassing "non-Egyptian" ruling classes, Musa in his 1934 article juxtaposed illustrations of "five Egyptian faces, one of them of a still-living Copt of the Sa'id [Upper Egypt] as painted by a Belgian lady ... and the remaining four ancient Egyptian faces some of which are more than five thousand years old". One "statue made during the fourth dynasty in which the pyramids were built" revealed a countenance "that none will dispute often occurs [today] in the countryside": "despite a slight admixture of
Throughout the 1930s, then, Coptic intellectuals and politicians had, in communications mainly addressed to Muslims, repeatedly made neo-Pharaonism highlight or serve the interests of the Copts. By 1930 they had long connected (a) a neo-Pharaonist particularism that virtually cut out the Arab and Islamic periods with (b) the communal relationship between modern-educated Copts and modern-educated Muslims. The linkage of neo-Pharaonism with Copts in mainstream politics, then, was not something new that Haykal and the Liberal Constitutionalists suddenly concocted at the close of the 1920s as just a symmetrical political manoeuvre to draw Muslim votes away from the Wafd that since 1925 had charged them with atheism over 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's critique of the Caliphate.187

Haykal's unease about Copts can be traced back to his formative youth in the circle around al-Jaridah, which definitely responded in a modernism-diluted Islamoid way to the Coptic-Muslim communal tension between 1910 and 1913.

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foreign blood the [modern] Egyptian fellah preserves the ancient Egyptian countenance". This racial continuity resulted from the hermetic social self-sufficiency of the Egyptian village where intermarriage was usually confined to families in the actual population of the village itself and "outside [foreign] blood could find scarcely any way to penetrate, as remains the case today". Musa however, had a sharp perception that "Turkish and Circassian blood has been widely spread among the Muslims" in the cities and towns of Lower Egypt, making some of them look distinct from Copts. Musa, "al-Wajh al Misri al-Ana wa Ayyam al-Fara' inah" (The Egyptian Countenance Now and in the Days of the Pharaohs), al-Majallat al-Jadidah, April 1934, p. 12-14. Despite his secularist-socialist past, and doubtful belief in Christianity, Musa became, as editor of the Coptic newspaper Misr in the 1940s, a fiery communalist champion of better career opportunities for Copts, opposing Islam as state religion and any pan-Arab foreign policy because that would be fuelled by Islam. Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 131-132.

187. Citing 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's 1925 denial that Islam prescribed Caliphate, the Wafd in the 1926 election charged Haykal and the Liberals with atheism and working to destroy Islam. Accordingly, Leland Bowie and Charles D. Smith interpreted the 1930 Liberal denunciations of the Pharaonic mausoleum for Sa'd as insincere symmetrical retaliation by the Liberals, politics. Smith, Haykal (PhD) pp. 221-223 and Islam and the Search pp. 77-80, 85; Bowie, "The Copts, the Wafd..." pp. 123-125; cf. Carter's awareness that the Liberals voiced sourness towards Copts from much earlier in Egypt's post-1922 parliamentarism, although she basically accepts the charge of Wafdists and recent American academics that Haykal and other Liberals were posing as Islamists for political gain: Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 259, 282.
During his early studies in France, he had been made aware that the British could highlight any Muslim-Coptic tensions in Egypt — specifically, the communal coloring they gave to the 1910 assassination of the pro-British Coptic Prime Minister Butrus Gali — in order to convince other Westerners that the Egyptians were too "fanatical" to deserve independence. Coptic-Muslim communal animus before 1914, and the danger such conflict could pose to his community's sovereignty, recurred in his writings in the 1920s. Demands from some Copts to confessionallyize politics and the state administration were a live issue in the Constitutional Committee and the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists as Haykal launched his political career after World War I. The Liberal Tawfiq Dus won little support from his own Coptic community for his demand that the Constitution be so drafted as to prescribe a fixed proportion of Coptic representatives in Parliament. However, Tawfiq was to represent the Liberal Constitutionalists' Party as a cabinet minister until 1925. His advocacy of parliamentary reservations for Copts brought home to Muslims who became Liberals, among them Haykal who served on the Committee drafting the Constitution in 1922, the threat that Coptic-Muslim divisiveness could pose to the viability of the new Egyptian polity. Tawfiq Dus tried to manipulate the fears of Haykal and other Muslim colleagues about the drive of the British to set themselves up as protectors of the Copts.

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188. During the 1909-1910 academic year, as he sat in his Paris rooming house with French co-boarders, a French secondary school teacher told the youthful Haykal that "fanaticism" had inspired "a young Egyptian Muslim" to shoot PM Butrus Ghali dead. In reply, Haykal detailed political nationalist grievances that could have motivated al-Wardani to execute the collaborationist Ghali, only coincidentally Christian: the teacher held fast that "the Christianity of the Minister" was an important motive in addition to nationalist grounds that he himself had read al-Wardani pleaded. Haykal, Mudakkirat v. 1 p. 41.

189. All members of the Constitutionalist Committee became members of the anti-Wafd party of Liberal Constitutionalists on its foundation on 30 October 1922. Tawfiq Dus as a Liberal Constitutionalist was Minister of Agriculture in the second pro-palace cabinet of Ahmad Ziwar from 13 March 1925 to 8 September 1925. Marcel Colombe, L'Évolution de l'Égypte (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve 1950) p. 333.
as well as of resident foreigners: assured representation in parliament under the Constitution, the Copts would not have recourse to the British to protect their interests. Allowing for some preparedness to hear him and other communist Copts out --- although contact within the same Party also entailed personal illfeelings --- the then secularist Liberals by and large opposed Dus' drive to confessionalize parliamentarism.

Haykal made a sober and serious attempt to grapple with the history of the roles of Coptic professionals in Egypt's modern sector and the problem of Muslim-Coptic communalism in his 1929 volume of Eastern and Western biographies, which included a study of Butrus Ghali. He clinically dismissed all suggestions that Ghali had discriminated to advance fellow-Copts in government, finding that he treated all Egyptians equally in all his official roles. Haykal was, however, inclined to view him as involved in treason when as Foreign Minister he signed the 1899 Sudan Agreement with England. Haykal dispassionately observed that that document did not give

190. Haykal, Mudhakkirat, v. 1, pp. 140-1. Tawfiq Dus in 1925 failed to resign from the Zivar cabinet in solidarity with Mustafa 'Abd al-Raziq, Haykal's friend, when al-Azhar dismissed him from his post as Islamic gadi (judge) because of his secularist revaluation of Arab-Muslim history. Instead, Tawfiq resigned from the Liberal Constitutionalists amid the ill-feeling in the Party over the 'Abd al-Raziq affair. Smith, Islam and the Search, p. 78. Tawfiq Dus' arguments and efforts in the 1920s to achieve proportional representation for minorities in parliament are evaluated by B.L. Carter, The Copts, pp. 133-141.

191. B.L. Carter depicts later radical al-Siyasah secularist Mahmud 'Azmi as in 1922 supportive of Tawfiq Dus' call for fixed minority representation in parliament. She noted Wafdist charges that supporters of 'Adli, the prototype of the Liberals, were acting to help the British, fellow-enemies of Zaghlul, divide Muslim and Copts. B.L. Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 136-137. The ultra-secularist 'Azmi always bent over backwards to give Christian Arabs a hearing and offer them a secure place in Egyptian and then pan-Arab nationalism. Carter, however, has not caught the fluidity of his stances, in which he also condemned proposals for fixed proportional Coptic representation in parliament, ministries and the administration. Mahmud Azmi, "Da'wah Khatirah" (A Dangerous Demand), al-Muqattam 25 June 1922 p. 6. An overview of 'Azmi's drive in the 1930s for a pan-Arabism defined by language only, without regard to Islam, and thus attractive to Copts and Maronite Catholics is Gershoni, Emergence of Pan-Arabism pp. 56-57.
Britain all that much more authority than she already had wrested, and that Ghali had been unjustly singled out for blame in the propaganda by Mustafa Kamil and his pan-Islamic Patriotic Party that finally incited Ibrahim al-Wardani to assassinate him in 1910. The Tory Haykal shuddered at petty-bourgeois assassins with guns, but he did in a semi-detached way share some of the sense of modern-educated but sectarian Muslims that Ghali somehow represented the Copts when he signed that agreement "to curry favor with the English by relinquishing rights of his country". Butrus Ghali did many acts of kindness to Muslims, but Haykal saw his sectarianizing modern sector context: ultra-communalistic Coptic newspapers always came to his defence as the embodiment of the Coptic sect, and some Islamic newspapers --- Haykal was undoubtedly thinking of what al-Liwa' became under 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish --- more than matched such Coptic sectarianization of political differences. The history of substantial alienation of the rival modernizing Coptic elite from the independence movement of Muslim Egyptians in the past, when it was tinged with pan-Islamism, and further signs that some individuals in it considered collaborating with the British after 1919, increasingly disturbed Haykal in the 1920s. In the sometimes tendentious memoirs that he published much later around the collapse of the monarchical-parliamentarist order, he recalled that he was shocked in the early 1920s when "a Coptic youth" who claimed connection with the British Embassy, offered Coptic help to destroy the Wafd and bring Haykal's minority Liberal Constitutionalists to office, once Liberal leader 'Adli Yakan accepted a constitutional provision allocating Coptic community seats in Parliament. Copts were over-represented among Wafd parliamentarians but the Coptic communalists feared that the Muslim public would later elect none, the old pattern of the pre-War Advisory

Council. Haykal claimed that the youth reminded him that the Copts had once burned their own churches and blamed the Muslims to achieve a sectarian aim. 193

Haykal's earlier youthful awareness of politicized communal ill-feeling between the modern Coptic and Muslim classes before 1914 was common in his al-Jaridah circle, precursor of the post-1922 al-Siyasah-Liberals milieu. He had become cumulatively worried by the end of the 1920s at the capacity of Coptic communalists and politicians to harm Egyptian independence in coordination with the British. They offered to help the Liberals against the Wafd thereby, but in the process could easily manipulate and harm Haykal's party. However, the bulk of Coptic politicians would stay with the Wafd as enemies of Haykal's Liberals. Haykal's and the Liberals' condemnation of Sa'd's neo-Pharaonic mausoleum in 1930 and of Copt-spearheaded "paganism" in the Wafd, then, had roots of three decades in Egyptian politics and elite evolution. It did not originate as a pose to wrest the Muslim popular vote: it did, however, exaggerate for that purpose the long-mounting and calmly-considered determination of the modern Muslim Egyptian elite to rebalance power with their successful Coptic peers within a shift to Islamo-Arab nationalism. High cultures --- the communalizing patterns of the tense Western polities, and the aesthetic pull of the supra-Egyptian Arab past and language, given the sterility of Pharaonism --- carried through the shift of orientation that parochial divisions alone could not have sustained.

Neo-Pharaonism: Perspective

The forty years of British rule over Egypt prior to the 1922 independence had seriously impoverished Islamic institutions, modern education --- especially that in Arabic --- and the position of standard literary Arabic in administration and public life. The neo-Pharaonic national identification and literary orientation after 1919 verbally challenged classical Arabic and Islam within the bequeathed

situation of widespread elite deculturation. Although, as a West-stimulated cultural orientation, neo-Pharaonism had too few roots in either elite or mass culture to solidify and become accepted identity, it was important in the development of Arab nationality in twentieth-century Egypt. Given that pan-Arab ethnicity and possibilities were also concurrently explored in the 1920s, the unrewarding Pharaonist-particularist trip helped secular-educated Muslim intellectuals define who they were not. When tested, neither Egypt's territorially nor dead or current cultural specificities had enough strength to define the nationality of Arabic-speaking Egyptians.

As a new, national, high literature, neo-Pharaonism proved anaemic: to sculpture and painting, though, it contributed new specificities of form that did prove aesthetically nourishing. Press and periodical reproductions of, and artistic borrowing from, ancient Pharaonic art did after 1919 make Egyptians and other Arabs feel culturally somewhat more different. The positive attitude of Muslim Egyptians to Pharaonic art persisted over the decades as a variety of processes progressively wove all Arabs more and more together. Overall, the often contrived, lifeless, Pharaonic elements and motifs could not contend either in high literature or in collective political identifications with deepseated and dynamic Arabic and Islamic ones. Indeed, Arab and Islamic data and structures of perception interspersed neo-Pharaonism itself, and were transmitted within it after 1919 to a new Muslim Egyptian generation still at risk of de-Arabization.

Our reassessment of neo-Pharaonism has highlighted its functions as a rallying-point against the West's high literatures, secularoid ameliorism and imperialism — not just against homogenizing Arab elements or Islam, as previous scholars stressed. True, even in its anti-Western twists, neo-Pharaonism remained very close to the aestheticism and post-Christian ideologies of the West it challenged. The West itself often justified its conquests and rule over Arabs, Muslims and Easterners from the superiority of Western thought and high cultures, which the
colonized Egyptian intellectuals accordingly counter-denigrated with "spiritual" Pharaonism. Yet the geographical determinism with which Haykal or al-Hakim, among others, marginalized Westerners as well as peninsular Arabians was itself very materialistic. More genuinely religious and universalistic impulses had to await these writers' Arabo-Islamic successor-orientation of the 1930s and 1940s. Neo-Pharaonism has been supererogated by some observers as mythologization beyond particularism's territorialist portrayal of current Egyptian reality and needs. Yet humans often need to link their inner social identity into some enterprise with impact on universal issues felt by a range of peoples. Pharaonic Egypt could not sustain the claims of global import or universal religious or aesthetic worth that such writers as Haykal made: it was Arab nationalism that would combine an ethnic identity with a world religion. In many ways, our communications sample underscored, the neo-Pharaonism of the 1920s and very early 1930s prefigured, and then shaded into, the likewise qualified and acculturation-stimulated Arabo-Islamic disengagement from the West, stereotyped as its opposite. A few Pharaonist splinters were even incorporated into the new establishment Egyptian pan-Arabism of the 1930s and 1940s, focussing distinct Egyptian interests or sub-personality within the interactions with other Arabs.

Long after neo-Pharaonism ceased to be a contender, triumphant Islamo-Arabists in the 1930s and 1940s continued to evoke it as a now-fictional threat to Egypt's ethnic-linguistic Arab nationality. The clarifying test of that counter-identity was an energizing memory they took care to transmit to new generations of Egyptians.
GLOSSARY

afandiyyah: see efendi.

agha: a military title given to high-ranking officers: in turn-of-century rural Egypt it simply meant Turco-Circassian officials, police or military.

alim: a graduate in Islamic theology and canonical law. The rank of scholarship is termed 'alimiyah. See 'ulama'.

amir: tribal chief, prince of a dynasty, or a commander: governor of an 'Abbasid province or commander of an 'Abbasid military force (pl. umara').

Amir al-Mu'minin: Commander of the Faithful i.e. the Caliph of Islam.

'asabiyyah: tribal, ethnic or factional partisan spirit in Arab-led classical Muslim societies and politics.

Ashkenazim: Europe-resident Jews who follow the "German-rite" synagogue ritual, or descendants of such Jews in the Americas and the Middle East, in distinction from Oriental Sephardic Jews in the Muslim world.

awliya': see wali (Muslim mystic saint).

a'yan: plural of 'ayn. Those who were in the public eye, that is, people of public standing and therefore of influence. A'yan was used to refer to the native Egyptian elite as compared to the dhawat who were generally the Turco-Circassian elite. The a'yan therefore mostly came from the class or group of Arab-Egyptian 'umda and shaikh al-balad, with a rural background and landownership, unlike the dhawat who were urban-based. (Professor 'Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot of UCLA).

'ayn (sing.): see a'yan.

batiniyyah: rejection of the literal (zahir) meaning of Qur'anic verses and Muslim rituals and regulations for a symbolic or allegorical exegesis: practised by the Shi'i Isma'ilis, their Druze offshoot and by the Nusayris. The Isma'ilis were condemned by al-Afghani, 'Abduh and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in various political contexts, but their cosmology had carried forward borrowing from neo-Platonism
and other Greek sources often approved in such post-1890 supra-Egyptian Arabo-Islamic writings.

chiflik: royal Khedivial rural estate (Turk.)
dhawat: plural of dhat. Literally people of rank, notables, but usually Turco-Circassian absentee landowners resident in cities, in the denunciations by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and Muhammad Husayn Haykal.
dhimmi: a non-Muslim tributary under classical Islam who paid poll-tax in return for exemption from military service.
efendiyyah: largely urban members of Westernizing-educated professional and bureaucratic middle strata. Sing. efendi (Turkish).
Fatimids: Shi'ah Isma'ili empire centred in Egypt in the 10th, 11th and 12th centuries: see "Shi'ah".

haram: al-Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) is the third holiest Muslim sanctuary located in the south-eastern part of the Old City of Jerusalem. The most important sanctuaries in the Haram area are the Qubbat al-Sakhrah (Dome of the Rock) and the al-Aqsa mosque.

Hashimites: (a) dynasty of about 100 Hasanid Sharifs (descendants of the Prophet through 'Ali's son al-Hasan) who ruled Mecca almost without interruption from the 10th century AD until late 1925. (b) The line included the sharif al-Husayn Ibn 'Ali who proclaimed the Arab revolt against the Turks in June 1916. Husayn's son Faysal, commander of the Arab Northern Army, became briefly King of Syria after World War I and King of 'Iraq from August 1921 until his death in 1933. He was succeeded by his son Ghazi (died 1939). al-Husayn's son 'Abdallah was Amir and King of Transjordan from 1920 to his assassination in 1951.

Hikmah "wisdom": originally a Qur'anic term, it came under classical Islam to draw on the sciences (eg. medicine) and philosophy the Arabs borrowed from the Greeks, and was increasingly distinguished from religion by such philosophers as Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Hikmah was often mentioned as an incorporative characteristic of classical Islamic civilization by al-Afghani and 'Abduh
from 1890. Applied by Haykal in 1925 to the West's
generalist secularoid-positivist world views as distinct
from its science and aesthetic literature.

- **hizb**: a political party.
- **ijtihad**: a learned individual's independent opinion on
  a legal or theological issue.
- **Isma'ilis**: see Shi'ah.
- **jahili**: pagan, pertaining to pre-Islamic times.
- **jahiliyyah**: pre-Islamic times and pagan "ignorance" or
  licentiousness in the Arabian peninsula.
- **jiflik**: see chiflik.

**kalam**: the scholastic Muslim theology that developed
in Arabic under classical Islam.

**Khawarij**: terrorist sectaries who repudiated both
the assassinated third Caliph 'Uthman and his rival and
successor 'Ali whom they assassinated in 658. The Khawarij
waged war against the Umayyads: their most dangerous threat
to the unity of the Muslim Empire was the insurrection led
by Nafi' Ibn al-Azraq that gave the Khawarij temporary
temporary control of Kirman, Fars and other Eastern provinces.

**Khilafat**: (a) Caliphate; (b) specifically, a
political-religious movement in British India after World War
I, organized in September 1919 to defend the Ottoman
Caliphate against plans by Western states to partition the
Ottoman Empire.

**kurbag**: hide whip used as scourge by Turco-Circassian
royalty and dhawat (qv) against Arab-Egyptian peasantry.

**mamluk** (pl. **mamalik**): literally "possessed one",
slave: a caste of imported slaves serving in the army, at
court and in the administration who ruled Egypt from the
late Ayyubian period (1169-1250) until the Ottoman Salim I
conquered in 1517.

**ma'mur**: a native (district) sub-governor in
British-occupied Egypt. Under mudir (qv).

**maqamah** (Arabic: "assembly", pl. **maqamat**), Arabic
literary genre in which entertaining anecdotes, often
written about rogues, mountebanks, and beggars, written in
an elegant, rhymed prose (saj'), are presented in a
dramatic or narrative context. This erudite, poetical form
of fiction was founded with the magamat of al-Hamadhani (d.
1008). It consists mainly of picaresque stories in
alternating prose and verse woven around the unscrupulous
wandering improviser Abul-Fath al-Iskandari. al-Hariri of
al-Basrah (1054-1122) revived the magamah and
al-Hamadhani's realistic description of the common life of
the Islamic city, pivoting his magamat around the eloquent,
learned, importunate old beggar Abu Zayd al-Sarruji. Gibb,
Arabic Literature, pp. 100-102, 123-126.

Maronites: one of the Eastern-rite communities in the
Roman Catholic Church prominent in Lebanon, the Maronites
trace their origin to St Maron, a Syrian hermit of the late
4th and early 5th centuries. They were Monotheletites,
followers of the doctrine of Sergius, patriarch of
Constantinople, until they united with Rome in the 16th
century. Under the Ottoman Turks, the Maronites maintained
considerable autonomy due to Lebanon's mountainous terrain
and protection by "Catholic" France, a great power.

mawla (plural mawali): lit. "clients", that is,
non-Arab converts to Islam who were adopted into Arab
tribes in the first century of Arab expansion.

Menes: semi-legendary leader reputed to have first
united Upper and Lower Egypt, initiating Egyptian dynastic
history and organized statehood.

millah/millat: a religion, a spiritual community or
sect. Used in Turkish and Persian in particular to mean
nation, people (or state), influencing usage in Arabic.writings of the school of al-Afghani and the Kamilists.

Mina: Literary Arabic form of Menes, qv.

Misr: Arabic name of Egypt, as in the pan-Arab Bank
Misr founded by Tala'at Harb in 1920.

Mudar: great-grandson of 'Adnan, legendary ancestor of
the tribes claiming origin in Northern Arabia (al-'Arab
al-muta'arribah/al-musta'ribah).

mudir: a native provincial governor in
British-occupied Egypt.

mutakallim: a classical Muslim theologian who practised
kalam (q.v.).

Mutfi: a salaried state appointee who offers legal opinions, fatwas, derived from Islam's shari'ah religious law in response to questions from judges, officials or private individuals.

mullah: a petty Muslim cleric in the Eastern margin of the Middle East that speaks Iranian languages, and in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

muwashshah: an Arabic poetical genre in strophic form developed in Muslim Spain in the 11th and 12th centuries that, from the 12th century onward, spread to North Africa and the Muslim East. The muwashshah is written in classical Arabic, and its subjects are those of classical Arabic poetry: love, wine, court figures. It sharply differs in form, however, from classical poetry, in which each verse is divided into two metric halves and a single rhyme recurs at the end of each verse. The muwashshah is usually divided into five strophes or stanzas, each numbering four, five or six lines. A master rhyme appears at the beginning of the poem and at the end of the strophes, somewhat like a refrain: it is interrupted by subordinate rhymes. A possible scheme is ABcdeefABghghABijijABklklAB. The last AB, called kharjah or markaz, is usually written in vernacular Arabic or in Spanish Mozarabic dialect; it is normally rendered in the voice of a girl and expresses her longing for her absent lover.

Pahlavi: dynasty established after World War I by Riza Khan: it only had two Shahs altogether, himself and his son Muhammad Riza whom the Khumayniites overthrew in 1978.

Priyayi: Javanese elite class with elaborate code of etiquette that became a civil service caste after the Dutch conquest of Mataram (18th century). The priyayi were the first to become exposed to Western education.

gadi: a Muslim judge who renders decisions according to the canon law of Islam, the shari'ah.

Qahtan: legendary ancestor of tribes of South Arabian origin (al-'Arab al-ba'idad): hence Qahtaniyyah, a secret
Arab quasi-nationalist society formed in 1909 in Constantinople.

*quatr*: a geographical-territorial unit that lacks the force of "country" or "homeland" and fits in with a territorialities-spanning ethnic-linguistic Arab nationhood.

**salaf**: the pious model first generations of Islam. The term is ambiguous in that it may be restricted to the generations up to the early Umayyad Caliphate or may --- as al-Afghani and 'Abduh used it to justify openness to other civilizations --- be stretched to cover the generations under the 'Abbasids who assimilated Greek and Indian philosophy and sciences.

**salafiyyah**: a movement to return to the pristine normative patterns of the great salaf evoked in the writings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida. A political mass movement based on these themes was developed by Hasan al-Banna' in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun), founded in 1929.

**sayyid**: a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad through his grandson al-Husayn.

**shari'ah**: Islam's comprehensive law, systemized in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Muslim era. It was derived from (a) the Qur'an, (b) the sunnah or way of the Prophet, (c) the ijma' or universal agreement of the scholars and community and from (d) qiyas or analogical reasoning, which sustained ijtihad.

**sharif**: (Arabic: "noble"), a descendent of the Prophet through his daughter Fatimah and son-in-law 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib: the line of descent is through one of two grandsons of the Prophet, Hasan and Husayn.

**shawamm**: colloquial Egyptian plural of shami ("Syrian"): applied to all immigrants from Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon up to the early 1950s.

**shaykh**: the title of the head of a tribe, usually elected, and one who had authority whether spiritual or political: a savant. Also a graduate or lecturer at al-Azhar. In construct, the term can mean Rector of al-Azhar.
shaykh al-balad: village headman.

Shi'ah: minority sect in Islam, originally the weaker faction (shi'ah) that felt that the imamate or Caliphate should rather have gone to 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the cousin of Muhammad immediately upon the latter's death. The ithna 'ashari (twelver) Shi'ah came to claim that the Imam was the infallible guide in all matters, who alone could interpret the Qur'an. The twelvers still await the return of the twelfth imam who disappeared into occultation in the tenth century. The founder of Egypt's acculturated Arabo-Islamic community tradition, al-Afghani, was born a twelver Iranian. The sevener Isma'ili Shi'ah appeared in history in the form of the insurgent Qarmatians (Qaramitah) during the middle of the ninth century. Under their fourth caliph al-Mu'izz, the sevener Isma'ilis based a Shi'ah empire in Egypt, founding Cairo in 969: the Fatimid Caliphate was overthrown in 1171.

shu'ubiyyah: the national dispute between (a) racial Arabs (and their supporters) and (b) Muslims of non-Arab origins in the Umayyad and 'Abbasid empires and in Muslim Spain, under classical Islam.

sunnah: custom or usage of the Prophet Muhammad studied and imitated as a complement to the Qur'an.

Sunni: the largest sect of Islam, in which Egyptian Muslims are members, that recognizes the first four Rightly Guided Caliphs and adheres to one of the four Sunni schools of law.

tafsir: scholastic exegesis of the Qur'an.

taftish: Turco-Circassian-owned rural estate or latifundia. For al-Zayyat's angry ethnicizing perceptions, B 305 - 307.

tawhid: monotheism, the unity of Godhead held by Muslims to distinguish their religion from incarnationist Christianity.

'ulama (pl. of 'alim: learned man): scholars or authorities of Islam's religious sciences and its legal and educational institutions.
umara': pl. of amir.

'umda': land-owning head of a village.

ummah: (a) the undivided community of all Muslims, conceived as ideally a single political entity by classical Muslim writers; (b) a racial, linguistic or territorial national community, as, for example, the classical al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah (pl. umam); and (c) any highly specific group in traditional loose usage.

vilayet: a province administered by a wali (governor) in the Ottoman Empire.

Wahhabis: a sect centred in Arabia and Qatar, named after its founder Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787): it follows Ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali school of Sunni law and the theologian Ibn Taymiyyah. The Wahhabis captured and devastated the Shi'i holy site of Karbala in 1802 and constantly attacked 'Iraqi Shi'ites and the Sunni Ottoman State up to its collapse in 1918.

wali: one who is close, a friend: hence a Muslim Sufi mystic saint with intimate access to God (plural awliya'). Also, one who exercises power conferred by God: i.e. a sovereign or governor. The Turkish pronunciation of governor of an Ottoman province was vali.

watan: homeland.

watani: appertaining to a specific homeland; a patriot; a member in or appertaining to the independence movement launched by Mustafa Kamil in the mid-1890s. Kamil in 1907 publicly declared al-Hizb al-Watani, giving a name to what had existed for years.

wazir: a minister of state (= vizier).

wilayah or wilayat: see vilayet.

Ya'r'ub Ibn Qahtan Ibn Hud: mythological founder of the kingdom of the Sabaens and supposed first Arab to speak Arabic.

Yishuv: the settlement in Palestine established by (increasingly Zionist) Ashkenazi Jewish immigrants from the Tsarist empire, from the early 1880s.

zajal: popular colloquial Arabic poem in strophe form
of 19th and 20th centuries, prefigured, however, by Spanish poet Ibn Quzman (d. 1159).

*zindiq*: a heretic in 'Abbasid West Asia who only outwardly professed Islam. Pl. *zanadigah*. 
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