USE OF THESES

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by Dennis Patrick Walker.

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University.
This is to certify that all analysis and collation of materials, and the research to assemble the communications sampled, was my own work only. Supervision and some facilities were provided by A.N.U.

signed:-

D.P. Walker

Dennis Patrick Walker
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PAN-ISLAM AND ARABISM UNDER BRITISH COLONIAL RULE (1892 - 1922)

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For my mother and father:

A tune is more lasting than the voice of the birds,
A word is more lasting than the riches of the world.
Foreword and Acknowledgements

Like all research works, mine was almost as much authored by the net of generous advisors and institutions that made its conclusion possible. In respect to intellectual stimulation and guidance with historical facts, I owe most to the unstinted aid given by Dr Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University. My first book on the pre-1918 period of British colonial rule, in particular, owes its sharply-focussed biodata and more sober attunedness to broad historical patterns to Professor Goldschmidt’s untiring help over the years.

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Most of Chapter 6 that reassesses Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and the pre-1915 al-Jaridah circle within a different, Arabo-Islamic perspective, and Chapter 9’s discussion of ’Abd al-Rahman ’Azzam as a pan-Arab in the 1930s and 1940s, were made possible only by
international inter-library loans arranged by Ms Gail Schmidt of the State Library of Victoria, Australia. I am, here, deeply grateful to Mrs D.M. Ring, Assistant Librarian at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, for kindly granting me the international loan of reels from the College’s precious microfilms of *al-Jaridah* --- a decisive facility for anyone researching Egyptian Arabism from faraway Australia. Dr Safiy al-Din Abul-'Izz, Director of Cairo’s Institute of Arab Researches and Studies (Ma’had al-Buhuth wal-Dirasat al-’Arabiyyah) for sending me xeroxes of crucial bio-data on Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat.

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Dr Michael Carter, firstly as Lecturer in Arabic in the Department of Semitic Studies at Sydney University and then amid even more strenuous duties in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures at New York University kindly unknotted for me by correspondence several obscure but strategic quotations from classical Arabs made by our sampling of modern Egyptian writers.

I owe a special debt to Mrs Gene Wannan, who rough-typed my bloated first and second drafts with a now-rare competence, and to my son, al-Radi Billah Walker who, through innumerable printout revisions and changes, carried the final draft through to completion on an Amiga word-processor.

At various junctures, important financial aid towards typing expenses was kindly provided by the ’Iraqi Cultural Centre in Sydney, at that time directed by Mr Dawud Sa’dun Salman, by Dr Anis Morsey of the Australian-Arab Association, and by the Arab Libyan-Australian Friendship Association in which Brian McKinlay and Bill Hartley merit special thanks. The Egyptian Information Bureau in Canberra, and its successive Directors Muhyiddin Fawzi and Mrs Buthayna Wahbah, arranged for the Egyptian government to purchase and send to me specific Arabic books on the period of British colonial rule in Egypt --- a major facility for anyone striving to finalize research about any Middle Eastern country from Australia.
The final race to meet the respective deadlines for the binding of the two volumes of this work was greatly eased by 'Izz al-Din al-Rafi’i of the NOW Onestop Welfare Center, Melbourne. He and the Center granted me use of its automatic self-sorting photocopier, enabling me to get the five copies of my work within hard covers much sooner than would have otherwise been the case. 'Izz al-Din also resolved for me some flights of 'Abbasoid rhetoric by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat (Chapter 10).

This thesis could never have reached completion without the incessant sacrifices and support of my father Patrick Joseph Walker, and of my mother Grace Annie Walker. My mother died shortly before my work went to the binders, and thus could not see the outcome of our collective effort.

Our histories of other peoples extend, but also shift and objectify, our personal formations. The working-class Irish-Australian ethos of my childhood extended family helped me build up such feel and empathy as this research work may have achieved for colonized pre-1952 Egyptian Arabist nationalists.

Dennis Walker
Melbourne, December 1991
SUPRA-EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC AND PAN-ARAB IDENTITIES AND ACCULTURATED MUSLIM EGYPTIAN INTELLECTUALS, 1892-1952
Dennis Patrick WALKER.
PhD, Australian National University 1991.
Chairman: Professor Anthony Johns.

This dissertation surveys the development of pan-Islamic and pan-Arab identifications among two main groups of Westernizing-educated intellectuals: (a) those in the independence movement launched by Mustafa Kamal (to 1918) and (b) that around the newspapers al-Jaridah (1908-1914) of the Ummah Party and then, after 1922, around the successor al-Siyasah and Party of Liberal Constitutionalists. Our focus on the conflict and interblending of Arab and Western high cultures stresses impoverishing and positive educational and aesthetic experiences in the age of imperialism as the motive for the pan-Islamic and pan-Arab identification that this Muslim Egyptian elite built up.

Book 1 (1892-1918). The literature has over-stressed Egyptianist and pan-Islamic attitudes in Kamal’s Hizb al-Watani and Egyptianist and secularoid ones from Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s al-Jaridah --- doubly neglecting pre-1918 Egyptian Arabism. This study details respectful or at least very engaged evocation from both groups of "the [classical] Arab Nation". Neither group rigorously articulated a contemporary Arab successor-community, but we review proto-pan-Arab interactions and disorderly transitional terminology in contexts of Arab World literary activity that did point forward to the later post-1922 modern pan-Arab nation. Despite it's particularoid homeland frame, pre-1913 Egyptian political nationalism already had features more like linguistic nationalism. Dual-cultured, both Kamilist and al-Jaridah writers became more and more aware of modern sectors of life that the standard literary Arabic of the classical Arabs had to be extended to cover. They made the ultra-politicized Qur’an-defined deterritorializing high Arabic their rallying-ground of struggle against the British. Language only instanced how extensively the intellectuals had, by 1914, integrated their Arab-Islamic and modern make-up. Kamilist pan-Islam, a spiritual stage ahead of Western nationalisms, had already synthesized the global technology and economic drives of imperialism into the chipped-down essence of Islam’s wide community impulse.
Book 2: the post-1922 evolution of pan-Arabism. This will focus the ongoing ---
galvanizing --- vulnerability of standard Arabic and its high literature after the nominal
independence. It assesses from al-Siyasah further alternation or conflict --- but, again, also
Kamilist-like blending and synthesis --- between (a) secularoid Western and (b) politicized
classical Arab and Islamic motifs. Post-1922 Zionism again alternated and blended this elite’s
two cultures. Real data and prejudices from Western polities about Jews there blended into (b)
Islam’s old community concepts and shrines to (c) define Zionism as an internationally coherent
Darwinian enemy.

Our examinations of the growth of pan-Arabism into Egypt’s official community
ideology in the 1930s and 1940s show it was still often fitting well into Western liberal cultures
and technology. The new post-1930 establishment Arabism was only sectionally neo-classical:
advancing to a purely linguistic nationhood, it dropped fondness for Arab race or lineage in the
classical high literature and in Egyptian villages in order to integrate the diverse Arabic-speaking
populations (using the West’s economic and technological modernity). Although the
intellectuals still developed affinities and outreaches to wider non-Arab Muslim and Eastern
peoples, the inner more unitary political community is gradually contracted and separated to
within the sphere of daily Arabic speech (we concentrate on Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat).

The classical Arabs’ language had some less Islamic literature and extending it to cover
all modernity was a joint enterprise of Muslim Egyptian and non-Egyptian Christian Arab
intellectuals. Despite patches of transformation from the positivist West, however, Islam held as
a community basis for the Muslim intellectuals: they could not carry through a fusion with Copts
within abortive post-1922 neo-Pharaonic particularism and in the 1930s and 1940s failed to
adequately perceive within political decolonization West Asian Christian Arab groups that they
culturally appreciated.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTORY: AN OVERVIEW OF ACCULTURATION IN EGYPT; THE MINORITIES

This chapter sets out the origins of the small bilingualized Muslim Egyptian (M-E) elite that solidified during the forty years of British colonial rule (1882 - 1922). It surveys broader patterns of acculturation and deculturation, some continuous across both the colonial period and the partially-independent monarchical state (1922 - 1952). The wider range of ethnic and cultural groups that colored or inhibited acculturated Muslim community concepts are defined.

DESIGN AND INQUIRIES OF THESIS

This study of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals between 1892 - 1952 explores how classical Arab culture and Islam --- and the new wide political communities they proceeded to define --- not just survived, but were stimulated by, the West’s global power and culture. We draw most of the multi-lingual writers and nationalist leaders examined from two intellectual-political settings: (a) the pan-Islamic independence movement launched by Mustafa Kamil (1874 - 1908) and (b) the milieu of the pre-1915 al-Jaridah, edited by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, and its post-1922 successor, the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists with its organ al-Siyasah. al-Siyasah and its weekly literary supplement were edited by Lutfi’s disciple Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888 - 1956).

Chapters 1 and 3 review Anglicization policies of the British in education and public administration up to 1919 that, by threatening the Qur’an-derived literary Arabic language, made it more central for M-E elite identity in the age of Imperialism. The threat of deculturation --- like the military presence of the British themselves --- lingered after the limited independence of 1922. Our second Book shows where elaboration, politicization and implementation of linguistic Islamo-Arab nationality in the monarchical-parliamentary state (1922-1952) by our category of often long-lived intellectuals, worked out traumas that colonial deculturation had inflicted on them in youth prior to 1922.

Our inquiry will trace ways in which Islam and the classical Arabs both (a) clashed with and (b) were made relevant by, Westerners and their liberal-secularoid and racist discourses. In the face of Imperialism, Islam and Arabism offered a ready-made rallying-ground for writers
more formally-educated in those imperial countries' thought and literatures. However, as against some West-resident scholars who have over-dichotomized Arabo-Islamic elements and the West, this thesis is always alert to elements in classical Arab Islam that equaled and dovetailed into sectors of post-Reformation Western creativity. Needs of the modernity that the intellectuals were grafting often led them to select comparable facets in Islam and the past of the classical Arabs. In this pattern, the West was one catalyst that helped restructure the modern elite’s vision and exploration of Islam, its classical history and the high literature of the classical Arabs that was still being recovered.

Pro-Ottoman Pan-Islamism. Our discussion of Kamilist pan-Islam (Chs. 3 and 4) and the Jaridists’ more covert or qualified pan-Islamic impulses (Ch. 6) seeks stimulants in French and British intellectualism and in the Islamophobic or racist political discourses of Westerners (eg. Gladstone). The pan-Islamism of multi-lingualized elite Egyptians detached gripping, primary motifs from the Qur'an and traditional Islam that were already universally understood among all Muslim classes. More than trans-classes mobilization, Ch. 4 is concerned to identify novel --- only recently restored --- aspects of the classical Arabs’ proto-modern creativity that contributed to the new synthesis of Kamilist pan-Islam. Overheard imperialist fear and scorn against resisting African and Asian Muslims expanded the frontiers of pan-Islam for multi-lingualized Kamilists and Jaridists, but with ambivalences. We will stress the multi-cultured newness of Egyptian pan-Islamism that blended the modern West’s designs and instruments, unfamiliar sectors of the Muslim Arab golden age, and the ongoing relationship with Muslim Turks for unprecedented tasks.

Egyptian Arabism. It is in respect to the development of pan-Arab nationality that West-published analyses most over-dichotomize periods in post-1882 high Egypto-Arabic literature and culture and in the contemporary communities they fostered. We reinterpret the periods more as altering blends of a range of elements, all always present from the outset in at least basic form. However much attitudes --- even of individual writers within short time-spans --- varied towards them, at least shards of classical Arab elements always survived, accumulated and then finally cohered as pan-Arab linguistic nationalism. Chapters 2, 5 and 6 show how shared classical language always made Muslim Egyptian writers acutely sensitive to the experiences and aspirations of West Asian Arabs under Turkish rule prior to 1919: the
West-resident analysts' obsession with particularoid and pro-Ottoman identifications that dampened solidarity from the Kamilists and Jaridists has missed how strongly the joint, if still-fragile, culture of standard Arabic was already fostering future pan-Arab community. Book 2 sets out post-1922 establishment or governmental pursuit of pan-Arabism through neo-capitalism and as official foreign policy: it will place the crystallization of modernist pan-Arab nationalism, and the conversion of the intellectual leaders essential for official Arabism, back earlier than usual (into the 1920s). We challenge Orientalist stereotypes that that decade was neo-Pharaonist or particularist in any full-hearted way.

Our inquiry underscores how necessary, if strenuous, it is to relate the two acculturated-elite identifications of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism. Both were thoroughly modern and West-aware orientations. Both Kamilist pan-Islamism (Ch. 4) and post-1922 pan-Arabism sought to integrate the globe's Muslims or the narrowed Arab sphere with modern instruments and technologies developed in the West --- railways, steamers, trade, industrialization. Pan-Islamic impulses and images long persisted around the in some respects very modernist pan-Arabism being developed in the 1930s and 1940s (eg. Arab League SG 'Azzam's impulse to relink with the Turks: Ch. 9): we trace how Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat finally territorially delimited a pan-Arab nation and fused parochial-ethnic and wider Arab elements to connect Egyptians at last into the West Asian Arabs' revolt against the Turks (Ch. 10).

Pan-Muslim and pan-Arab community got differentiated, but Islam could persist as one precondition for community amid self-modernization at variance with Sunni orthodox traditionalism. We test this with repeated examination of the evolution of Kamilist, Jaridist and Siyasadist perceptions of non-Muslim "Easterners" and (mainly Christian Fertile Crescent) Arabs, over the six decades. Collaboration was fruitful for reviving a vulnerable standard Arabic --- but would Muslim Egyptians after 1930 correspondingly perceive the Christian Arabs who transformed them as comrades in the Arab Nation's decisive decolonization struggles? (al-Zayyat: B 332-340).

We view the Egyptian intellectuals sampled as persistently positive and incorporative for their context of imperialism and colonization. Their adaption of Arabism and Islam into modern, liberal successor-community was a tribute to their capacity to relax amid gunfire. Amid inferiorization and violence by Britishers, French, Italians and Spaniards that could make Arabs
hurl out the baby with the bath-water, our intellectuals continued, even in the Arabo-Islamic high tide of the 1930s and 1940s, to select from thought and aesthetic expression in those subjugating states. Such Eurocentric Orientalists as Von Grunebaum and more recently Vatikiotis, Charles Smith and Gershoni and Jankowski have been reluctant to perceive the pervasive presence of Arabo-Islamic culture in dual-cultured intellectuals: their facile dichotomizations white-out Arabo-Islamic identifications from those periods (notably, the 1920s) and those strata in which Western influence was strong; when Islam is seen as coloring modern Egyptians this --- rather than the West’s behavior --- has to predoom their adaption of Western liberal parliamentarism (Von Grunebaum); serious commitment by intellectuals to Western insights minimizes their growing incorporation and synthesis of Arabo-Islamic elements after 1930 into a defensive mock-adaption to a reaction in other wider classes (C.D. Smith)\textsuperscript{1}. Yet even tensions and destructive conflict between Western and Arabo-Islamic elements also related and fitted

\textsuperscript{1} For C.D Smith’s dismissal of the development of Arabo-Islamic identifications by veteran Jaridist-Siyasahist politician-litterateurs as a veneer to fob off wider groups, see his "The 'Crisis of Orientation': The Shift of Egyptian Intellectuals to Islamic Subjects in the 1930s", \textit{IMES} v. 4:4 (October 1973) pp. 382-410, and \textit{Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn Haykal} (Albany: SUNY Press 1983) pp. 89-198. Cf. our thesis B 36-42 and B 450-454. In contrast to Smith’s simple Westernist image of Haykal and other acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals, Von Grunebaum atomized their persistent blending of cultures, reducing them to their inhering Arabo-Islamic essence. For instance, he dismissed Egypt’s post-1922 liberal-parliamentarist experiment almost as predoomed. For Von Grunebaum, a 1936 conflict between parliament and the executive in which modernists as well as the Muslim Brotherhood allied to call for the dissolution of parties showed the non-seriousness of an Arab parliamentarism that had indeed been a bit non-Western. That call to replace party strife with an integrated political front, the abandonment of parliamentarism, was the only possible outcome from a tendency to adopt "a reflection" of European practice without accepting the West’s theory or attitude towards the world and man. Gustave Von Grunebaum, \textit{Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity} (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1962) p. 139. Alternation of Westernist and Islamist stances is important for acculturated intellectuals, but the electrifying call to abolish parties itself also has to be related to Egyptian party politics: it was promoted by the rump of the Kamilist al-Hizb al-Watani (Patriotic Party) as a means to eliminate the Wafd and its offshoots after they signed the 1936 Treaty with Britain. Zakariya Sulayman Bayyumi, \textit{al-Hizb al-Watani wa Dawruhu fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah 1907-1953} (Cairo: Wikalat Fabrant 1981) p. 85. As more context, our Second Book reviews British behavior after 1922 designed to prevent a strong democracy and any successful nationalist parties from developing in Egypt --- not just the Wafd, but the incrementalist Party of Liberal Constitutionalists whom the British used up to trip up the Wafd. If Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and other old \textit{al-Jaridah/al-Siyasah} intellectuals finally dichotomized the liberal West and Islam/Arabism, that was after unforced solidarity with it against the advancing Axis yet again did not pay off with (enough) decolonization (B 250-263). Although able to read Arabic, Vatikiotis in 1961 shrunk Egypt’s Arabism to not much more than the "imperial instrument" with which Nasser tried to dominate outside Arabs. Inside Egypt itself, Arab nationalism was something contrived or imported that the military clique had its work cut out even to "superimpose" upon the immemorial Egyptian nationality of bemused ordinary Egyptians --- so much harder than Syrians to "Arabize". P.J. Vatikiotis, \textit{The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations?} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1961) pp. 204-210. We contextualize Nasser and his rising petty-bourgeois Arab-Muslim class as heirs of a century of synthesis of Arabness with modernity by the A-M Egyptian elite they dislodged. Because elite and masses shared one popular Arab culture, elite pan-Arabism readily threaded Egyptian classes together in the nationhood alliance: Taha fn 138; al-Zayyat B 274 fn 66).
Islam-Arabism and the West into each other as comparable alternative histories. Deeply
dualistic, M-E liberal intellectuals stood with the pluralist-parliamentary West against fascism,
and only contracted borrowing from it, long into their limited Arabo-Islamic reaction against its
imperialism and racism (Chs. 9 and 10).

Already relating several high cultures to each other and to political history, this work can
hardly resolve all broader-gauge issues. Since our concern is the supra-Egyptian communities
that acculturation, imperialism, religion and language fueled, space forced us to sidestep some
questions about the nature of Islam as a religion. Some of our more West-shaped intellectuals ---
Haykal and Ahmad Husayn were glaring instances --- were ignorant of central components of
Islam when they started to write. Their final adoption of Islam as collective identity in the 1930s
does testify to its inherent vitality through all the odds of exclusion from the public and modern
sector by aliens. Our focus remains, though, the supra-Egyptianization of the self-image of
indigenous community in the modern elite. While this was fueled by a diversification of imaged
Islamic theologies among the West-tinted bourgeoisie, it is not within the scope of this inquiry to
opt for --- or exclude --- any of these alternatives as "true Islam". Can Islam survive the death of
religious ritual practice and even belief in God? Its function, for example, as a socio-political
demarcator in al-Jaridah/Ummah Party and al-Siyasah-/Liberal Constitutionalist conflicts with
Copts can figure for us only in the aspect that territorial particularist community breaks down
and the polemics open into wider pan-Muslim and pan-Arab community identifications.

Our review, from a variety of cultural and political angles, of the development over
decades of West-aware Muslim Egyptian political and opinion leaders puts in truer perspective
that elite’s balance of supra-Egyptian and local identity elements.

**NINETEENTH-CENTURY MODERNIZATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF
ACCULTURATED MUSLIM PROFESSIONAL CLASS**

It was under Britain’s constricting colonial rule (1882-1922) that Muslim secular-stream
students, lawyers, civil servants and other professionals who received and implemented
Europe-derived knowledge, solidified into an elite strictly separate from Egyptians who received
traditional Islamic education. However, this acculturated elite in many ways was the
end-product of cumulative efforts to modernize or Europeanize Egypt by Muhammad 'Ali and the Khedive Isma'il (ruled 1863-1879), in particular, prior to British rule.

Muhammad 'Ali, the Turkish-speaking Albanian adventurer who ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1849, had been impressed by the military strength that enabled France to conquer and occupy Egypt (1798-1801). He strove to modernize Egypt on European lines, mainly in order to achieve the military strength to maintain his own independence as ruler of Egypt, and perhaps carve an empire out from the Ottoman Empire. In 1811, to aid the Porte, he despatched an army of 8,000 men to Arabia to fight the Wahhabis and in 1820 he ordered the conquest of the Eastern Sudan. Between 1831 and 1833, his troops conquered Syria, which he occupied until 1841. Muhammad 'Ali's occupation of Ottoman Arab lands in West Asia bequeathed long-term ill-feeling between Ottoman Turks and Egyptians, which was to hamper efforts by Egyptian anti-imperialist intellectuals, notably Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid, to build up the pan-Islamic alliance between Egypt and the Ottoman State, during the period of British colonial rule. Muhammad 'Ali's rule over Arabs who were subjects of the Ottoman Empire set the pattern for ex-Khedive Isma'il and the Khedive 'Abbas (reigned 1892-1914) later to assert leadership of restive Ottoman Arabs, challenging the Ottoman State's authority (Chapter 5). Muhammad 'Ali's long-bygone empire moreover further justified pursuit by Egyptians --- still led by 'Alid monarchs --- of new economic and political Arab unification in the 1920s (B 49-50), 1930s (B 50; transition from Pharaonism to pan-Arabism by Ahmad Husayn B 213-214) and in the 1940s.

Mainly to support military strength, Muhammad 'Ali strove to modernize Egypt's economy and to create new specialized institutions and personnel. In the process he transformed Egyptian society. While he laid foundations for the long-term development of the acculturated Muslim Egyptian strata, 'Ali devastated the traditional Islamic-educated elite or 'ulama' (religious scholars) that could have impeded the new strata's rise and Europe-derived concepts. Partly to eliminate any further challenge from them, he confiscated the 'ulama's extensive religious land-holdings. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, many 'ulama were poor and of peasant origin and the class' moral influence over Egypt's Muslim community had declined with the economic deterioration². If Muhammad 'Ali undermined the social strata that

had had custody of traditional Islamic culture and civilization, his modernization endeavors also started to revive and spread the classical Arabs’ language, past and literature. The hoary classical Arabic and Turkish had to be extended into flexible instruments to convey the new knowledge from Europe, an aim served by publishing these two languages’ resources of past literature, previously available only in manuscripts. Muhammad 'Ali established the Bulaq printing press in 1821 mainly to produce the modern text books needed to train personnel for his new Europe-modelled army and administration. However, it also diffused long-neglected Arabic works of Arab or Islamic history, theology and high literature among unprecedented numbers of Egyptians and neighboring Arabs. P.J. Vatikiotis observed that the "printing and translation" initiated by Muhammad 'Ali simultaneously led to "the revival of the Arabic language and Arabic studies generally, which ultimately resulted in a neo-classical tradition".

The printing press, European technology that Muhammad 'Ali imported to diffuse Europe-derived knowledge in Egypt, from the outset simultaneously conveyed to the new educated Muslim strata increasingly diverse minds and experiences of Arab antiquity.

Turkish-medium military colleges trained mostly Turco-Circassian officers. Partly to meet military needs, the tyrant also founded such higher schools as those of Medicine (1827), Languages and Translation (1834) and of Veterinary Science. This less military category of new secular colleges had a high proportion of Arab Egyptian students, in large part drawn from religious Islamic kuttabs (Qur'an schools) or al-Azhar, and exposed them extensively to

3. The term "classical Arabs" in this dissertation means individuals whose native speech was Arabic or who used Arabic as their main language and identified with the Arab entity in history, up until the Mongols sacked Baghdad and murdered the last "Arab" Abbasid Caliph al-Musta'sim in 1258. By "classical Islam" or classical Arab Islam we mean Islam as conceptualized, led and implemented by Muslims whose literary language was Arabic and who used Arabic in daily life because it was the established language in government and society, up to the fall of Baghdad.

4. A.L. Tibawi documented circulation in Syria during the Egyptian occupation (1831-1840) of classical or early post-classical Arabic works printed for the first time by Bulaq press. Among them were grammatical works of the Spanish-born Ibn Malik (1203-1274), including his thousand-verse Alfiyyah summarizing previous Arab grammatical thought but which established rules of grammar from hadiths, not just the pre-Islamic Arabic poetry and the Quran which all previous grammarians favored (see art. "Ibn Malik" EI2). Also printed was the dictionary of Arabic by al-Firuzabadi (1329-1415), Persian-born but who mostly lived in Jerusalem, Mecca and Yemen (see art. "al-Firuzabadi" EL2): this book, too, was sold in Syria during the Egyptian occupation. Bulaq also distributed in Egypt-occupied Syria its printing of Kalilah wa Dimnah (The Fables of Bidpai) of the 'Abbasid Ibn al-Muqaffa' (c. 720 - c. 756). A.L. Tibawi, American Interests in Syria 1800-1901: A Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Work (London: OUP, 1966) pp. 69-70. A propos of the Bulaq press' pan-Arab radiation, its first director Nicolas al-Masabki (d. 1830) was of Christian Lebanese origin. Art. "Bulak" EI2.

European technologies, culture and thought. Because most of their students were Arab Egyptians, textbooks in literary Arabic were provided, and lectures, for a time delivered by Europeans in French or Italian with extempore Arabic translation, came to be given in Arabic.

Muhammad 'Ali introduced large-scale cotton cultivation for export, binding Egypt's economy to the West's markets --- a pattern that accentuated throughout the periods of British colonial rule and the monarchy. To educate staff in the Europe-originated knowledge needed to run his administration, enterprises and army, he allowed mission schools to operate and sent student groups to Europe, as well as improvising his own new government-run educational system in Egypt. Residence in post-revolutionary secular France even for the practical, strength-building studies favored by Muhammad 'Ali endurably transformed the outlook of several writers who greatly influenced Egypt's subsequent development. Rifa'ah Badawi Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) was one Arab Egyptian sent in the educational missions who subsequently held up French ways and creativity for imitation in numerous Arabic works.

Muhammad 'Ali showed his occasionally broad conception of the European civilization he wanted to implant when he encouraged al-Tahtawi to pen or supervise many Arabic translations from French books about ancient, medieval and modern European history, as head of the School of Languages from 1836. From modernization's nineteenth century beginnings, Europe's concepts and patterns stimulated the bilingualized intellectuals' identification with the classical Arabs. Already, al-Tahtawi tried to synthesize their model qualities with those of the modern French and suggested that classical Arab mariners discovered or nearly discovered America long before Christopher Columbus --- a theme that the pioneer Egyptian pan-Arabist Ahmad Zaki

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8. ibid pp. 71-72.
9. References to al-Tahtawi's Arabic works in Ahmad 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi, Ru'yah Hadariyyah Tabaqiyah li-'Urubati Misr: Dirasah wa Watha'iq (Bayrut: Dar al-Adab 1979) pp. 157-159. al-Tahtawi likened the
Pasha (1867-1934) still was developing in the Egyptian press in 1924 (B 79). al-Tahtawi anticipated later multi-lingualized liberal intellectuals in the intimate --- ambivalent --- sharpness with which he caught in Arabic free-mixing between the sexes in France\textsuperscript{11}. As multi-lingual Liwa’ists were to do in the early 1900s (A 154-162), al-Tahtawi synthesized restoration of very old Arab elements from pristine Islam with the pattern of the West European bourgeois family: Islam and the classical Arabs would henceforth validate equal educations to Woman, but concentrating upon literature in order to equip her to be the intelligent life-companion of a monogamous husband, an effective educator of children within the home and a productive, textiles-spinning housewife\textsuperscript{12}. It was unclear how far al-Tahtawi’s transformed design might have gone.

French in their faithfulness to their plighted word, in pride, and love of honor and freedom to "al-'Arab" (the [classical] Arabs) --- affinity not shared by "the Turks". Hijazi, \textit{ibid} p. 157. al-Tahtawi proudly referred to his Arab descent in his writings and claimed that the ancient Arabs of Himyar, Yemen, "ruled the whole world, both 'Arabs and non-Arabs ('Ajam)" and that the conqueror-prophet Dhu-l-Qarnayn, mentioned in the Qur'an, was one world-conquering Himyarite. \textit{Ibid}. While "al-'Arab" often clearly means the bygone classical Arabs in al-Tahtawi’s usage, modern France also sometimes stimulated in him a sense of "al-'Arab" as a juxtaposed contemporary community: as where he wrote that European women fix their hair above their heads with various devices in contrast to "the women of the Arabs" who let their hair hang down. Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi in "al-Mar‘ah fi Mu'allafat Rifa‘ah Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi" (Woman in the Works ofRifa‘ah Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi) in \textit{Mahrajahu Rifa‘ah Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi} (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A'la li-Ri'ayat al-Funun wal-Adab wal-'Ulum al-Ijtima'iyah 1960) pp. 57-58.

\textsuperscript{11}. The best-documented and most vivid overview of al-Tahtawi’s statements about women and the distributions of roles between sexes in various societies may be Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi’s essay in \textit{Mahrajahu} pp. 47-89. C.D. Smith speculated that "al-Tahtawi’s real views on reform" were more radical than his public statements. "He argued all his life for equal education for men and women" but with retention of veiling and separation (1872: justifying Khedive Isma'il's opening of a government school for girls). Smith contrasted to this the 1830 \textit{Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz}, written in Paris, in which al-Tahtawi came close to openly favoring "the relative freedom of French women in public life compared to the seclusion of Muslim women". Charles D. Smith, \textit{Islam and the Search} pp. 13-14. al-Tahtawi did reveal some responsiveness in \textit{Takhlis} to the glamorous dress of the Parisian women of the time, and to the meeting of young men and women every Monday evening in the gardens along the Champs Elysees. \textit{Mahrajahu} p. 55 --- though the rush of mostly old Arabic love-poetry that these conjunctions set off shows his perpetual Western/classicist-Arab blendedness. al-Qalamawi viewed al-Tahtawi as self-divided, vacillating and disorientated by the roles of women in Europe, rather than modifying a single Westernist message for varying contexts. al-Tahtawi also encountered, and approved, the roles of women as eminent writers and translators in France etc. \textit{Ibid} p. 59.

\textsuperscript{12}. al-Tahtawi often prefigured the ad hoc blendings of classical Arab motifs and modernist Western elements by Qasim Amin, the Kamilists and the Jaridists, in restructuring the relationship between the two sexes. al-Tahtawi cited the Qur'an and hadiths, the Umayyad-period proto-Sufi al-Hasan al-Basri, Ibn Zurayq al-Katib al-Baghdadi and al-Ghazzali to validate for Muslim countries much-tightened (and preferably monogamous?) marriages, sometimes concluded through encounter and prolonged chaste love rather than arranged, that sound like the French bourgeois nuclear family. He specifically praised the modesty and loyalty of wives of "the middle category of people" in France as against those of aristocrats and "the rabble" there. al-Qalamawi, \textit{Mahrajahu} pp. 56, 60, 84-85: for the same selection from Europe's classes by Qasim Amin in his 1900 book \textit{The New Woman}, see Hourani, \textit{Arabic Thought} p. 169. al-Tahtawi regarded the universalization of education for both males and females in Germany and France as one factor that made these among the strongest states in the world. However, he also justified teaching Egyptian females literature, arithmetic and religion from the literacy, knowledge of religion, eloquence and consequent political influence of various wives of the prophet. \textit{Ibid} pp. 68-70. Education was primarily to make women the intelligent companions for their husbands and productive textiles-weaving.
advance to such radical Westernization as abolition of veiling, and to not just education but public jobs for women outside their homes. Whatever, encounter with the West was making the classical Arabs more, not less, vivid, and from new angles. al-Tahtawi’s attempts to transfer into Arabic literature the French neo-classicist literary adaption of Greek mythology --- his long translation of Fenelon’s Telemaque interested subsequent generations of intellectuals --- implanted the covert model of the West-disparaging neo-Pharaonic "national literature" of the 1920s (appendices 1 and 2: B 374ff)\(^\text{13}\). Exposed in France to the early Egyptology sparked by Champollion’s decipherment of hieroglyphics, al-Tahtawi soon promoted pride in the Pharaonic Egyptians\(^\text{14}\). More massive, and prefiguring central features of future modernist Egyptian Arabism, was his publication of data about the life of the Prophet Muhammad and his copious quotations from forgotten classical West Asian Arab works --- some tinged with quasi-rationalistic philosophical concepts, heretical for Egypt’s established late Sunnism ---, evoking a broader-minded indigenous culture that could admit some borrowings from Western states, while denouncing their imperialism against Arabs and Muslims\(^\text{15}\).

al-Tahtawi’s writings and translations had long-term influence. In the 1880s and 1890s, they were a crucial conduit that got some concepts of European scholarship --- for instance, the geographical thought of Malte-Brun (A 103) --- tardily across to the monolingual pioneer pan-Islamist 'Abdallah al-Nadim (1844-1896) (Ch. 2). In the twentieth century, they continued to help lead Islamically-educated intellectuals such as the very young Taha Husayn to their first housewives, like the model women of early Islam. Ibid p. 71. They could, however, work outside if that were a necessity.

13. Fenelon’s 1699 Les Aventures de Telemaque ostensively narrated Telemachus’ adventures in search of his father Ulysses, as an imaginative continuation of Book IV of the Odyssey. It really expressed symbolically Fenelon’s fundamental liberal political ideas: it implied criticisms of the autocracy of Louis XIV that cost him favor at that monarch’s court. In al-Ahram in mid-1881, 'Abduh categorized al-Tahtawi’s Talimaq with Ibn al-Muqaffa’s Kalilah wa Dimnah among (originally non-Arabic) works of fiction widely read by Egyptians as models of literary style, and as sources of virtues and data about the nations. Mahrajanu p. 159. The lift in al-Tahtawi’s prose responded with gusto to the classical setting and myth-narratives of Odysseus’ much-buffeted return home to Penelope, etc. Ibid pp. 159 - 160.

14. While in Paris, al-Tahtawi interacted deeply with such Orientalists as Silvestre de Sacy, and through them became aware of the discoveries of the Egyptologists in that science’s first great age. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 70. Items 1, 2 and 3 in Daghir’s list of al-Tahtawi’s publications were voluminous books on the ancient history of Egypt and its region. Yusuf As'ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi’ Lubnan 1956) p. 570.

conjunction with European thought and culture. The works were not for Taha in 1911 one preliminary step --- but, rather, a quality prototype for a synthesis of (a) borrowing of modern Western "sciences" with (b) "resurrection" qua medium of the semi-integral language of the classical Arabs, which had been dying amid the dialectized barbarization of the Arab lands prior to 1805 (Muhammad 'Ali's coup). Taha paid tribute to that "glorious commander/ruler (Amir)" and later 'Alid Khedives for, through translations programs, missions to Europe and new education, giving standard Arabic the role within modernization that saved it16 --- paralleling tributes by al-Nadim in 1893 (A120).

'Abbas I (1848-1854) cut westernization and Europe-modelled education. Sa'id Pasha (1854-1863) revived the Arabic-promoting government school system, but in particular subsidized the multiplication of foreign, especially French, schools in Egypt, which bilingualized Egyptians while modernizing them17.

**Westernization Under Isma'il**

The Khedive Isma'il, who ruled Egypt from 1863 to 1879, had received a French education at the Staff College in Paris. His energetic Europeanization endeavors greatly increased the number of Egyptians exposed to Western concepts and languages. Isma'il knitted Egypt and Europe much closer together by dramatically extending Egypt's internal and international communications, its commerce and to a lesser extent its industries: he built 64 sugar mills18. He encouraged the immigration of Europeans who developed Egypt's banking system, transportation, importing and exporting, and land sales19.

Isma'il gave development of state education top priority, hiring European educators such as

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18. In 1866, Isma'il had the port of Alexandria enlarged to make it the largest harbor in the Mediterranean; other harbor works were constructed at Suez. He also built a string of lighthouses along the Mediterranean coast. The Suez Canal was opened to international traffic in 1869 and by 1880 a score or more of steamship lines touched Egyptian ports. By 1880, 1,300 kilometres of railways had been laid, and 5,200 kilometres of telegraph lines, which Isma'il even stretched far down into the Sudan. Art. "Egypt" EB 14th ed (1929), v. 8, p. 92; Raymond Flower, Napoleon to Nasser: the Story of Modern Egypt (London: London Editions 1976) p. 95.

as the Swiss Dor Bey. When he acceded, the number of schools in Egypt had dwindled to 185; in the sixteen years of his reign they reached 5,820, thirty-two times as many. Like Sa’id before, Isma’il encouraged foreign European (Christian) schools in Egypt --- bilingualizing, de-Islamized educational milieux for children of wealthy Muslim Egyptians. Tertiary education bilingualized Egyptians more: from 1868 the Law School conducted classes in French. Isma’il patronized opera in European languages and Europe-modelled theater in Arabic: European high culture was now sought for itself in Egypt’s ruling circles.

Europe-derived secular law, independent of Islam, was born as the consequence of ‘Alid-ruled Egypt’s ever-increasing interaction with Europe, and with foreigners resident on Egyptian soil. The European powers had rejected any jurisdiction by Egypt’s indigenous Islamic shari’ah courts over their subjects. It was partly in the vain hope of drawing those residents within Egypt’s legal jurisdiction that Penal and Civil Codes drawing on French law were promulgated in 1875 and Mixed Courts employing European as well as Egyptian judges were set up in 1876. Native Courts based on French law and procedure came into existence in 1883. Islamic law was disestablished: the 1880 law on the shari’ah courts explicitly limited their competence to matters of personal status and homicide.

The establishment under Isma’il and Khedive Tawfiq of a France-derived legal tradition necessarily brought into being a class of Egyptians, educated in European law and civilization, to apply and execute it. In the periods of British colonial rule and the monarchy, this group of Egyptian professionals was one core for the development of a distinct highly Westernized Muslim intelligentsia. The stratum of Muslim secular lawyers had its beginnings amid intense, bilingualism-imposing acculturation, which could occur on the soil of Egypt after French was

21. By 1875 there were nearly 20,000 pupils in foreign schools of all kinds. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952 p. 115. Most were resident Europeans but some were sons and daughters of wealthy Muslim Egyptians. To advance Egypt’s modernization, Isma’il also aided Coptic private schools, also de-Islamizing though less Arabic-sapping than the European Christian schools. He granted them 500 feddans of the best Egyptian land, and allocated an annual grant from the Egyptian budget. Samirah Bahr, al-Aqbat fil-Hayat al-Siyasiyyah al-Misriyyah (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian, 1979), p. 22. Eminent Muslims educated in Coptic schools included Turco-Circassian Husayn Rushdi, Prime Minister in World War I under British military rule; and ‘Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, a minister and Prime Minister of the post-World War I Party of Liberal Constitutionalists. Ibid p. 23.  
22. Aroian, Dar al-‘Ulum p. 185.  
made the medium of instruction of the School of Law in 1868; other Muslim Egyptians studied secular law abroad in Europe. The nascent Muslim secular legal stratum was small and was not to become properly defined until somewhat after Britain’s 1882 conquest of Egypt. Monolingual Islamically-cultured intellectuals and Arab-Egyptian soldiers provided leadership in the constitutionalist movement that culminated in the 'Urabi revolt. It was later during Britain’s colonial rule (1882-1922) that (often youngish) secular lawyers such as Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Farid, Sa’d Zaghlul et al headed political nationalist movements and that Egyptian society readily accepted the stratum’s leadership. The internationalization of the Egyptian question after 1882 called for a new political leadership with the knowledge of European languages and thought to persuade Europe to end an "illegal" Occupation.

**Pre-British Containment of Westernization**

Other Muslim populations in India, Indonesia, Central Asia and Africa knew little of Western thought and cultures before the British, French, Dutch and Russians conquered them. In contrast, the Egyptians were pre-equipped to respond to the West’s civilization on their own terms by Britain’s 1882 Occupation. Classical Arabic had already been revived over 75 years as one medium within West-patterned modernization.

Already, Arabo-Islamically-cultured Egyptian followers of the anti-imperialist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had warned against milder multi-lingualization and deculturization taking place in the modern Muslim elite before 1882. They orientated educated Egyptians in advance to recognize, parry and defeat the onslaughts against neo-classical Arabic that British colonial rule was to bring.

'Abdallah al-Nadim in 1881 disputed the assumption of Europhile or pragmatic modern Muslim Egyptians that European tongues offered "precise meanings" that Arabic was unable to convey, that they went with the "age of civilization" while literary Arabic was a relic from a bygone "age of barbarism". al-Nadim himself, before the British invasion, approved the modern classes’ pursuit of necessary and useful European sciences and thus European languages; yet he also warned that preferred use of French etc in daily life ruptured educated individuals from their

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24. "Until 1888 there were only thirteen Muslim lawyers among the first forty-five registered with the Court of Appeal". Some Muslim secular lawyers were Azharites who crossed over into secular law without formal training for it. Ziadeh *Lawyers* p. 40.
parents, siblings and society and from Islam, psychologically preparing them to commit political treason: whoever surrenders his language in daily life may well surrender his homeland later. This pre-British ultra-politicization of languages could open out into ethno-linguistic rather than territorial nationalism. However, the Arab ethnicity that al-Nadim already evoked against adoption of French splinters and mores by youth was usually still kept parochial, an assumption that hermetic Arabness of language was part of being Egyptian.

Pre-British modernization in 1872 established an institution, Dar al-'Ulum, that later (a) produced numerous grammars of classical Arabic as the Kamilists defended it under British colonial rule and (b) related Islam to the Europe-originated sciences for acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals. The Dar was designed to prepare graduates of the Islamic al-Azhar to teach the Arabic language and some modern subjects in Arabic medium in the State’s primary and secondary schools. The lecture schedule tried to combine modern Europe-derived knowledge (including substantial instruction in European languages) with dense courses in the classical Arabs’ religious sciences, language and literature. In the British period, (a) the Dar al-'Ulum students and scholars and (b) acculturated students, intellectuals and professionals who tried to synthesize classical Arab Islam with modernization (eg neo-capitalizing pan-Islamist and pan-Arab Tala’at Harb), were collaborating elites. Among Dar al-'Ulum intellectuals, Tantawi

25. Extracts from the 1881 article “Ida’at al-Lughati Taslimun lil-Dhat” (To Lose One’s Language is to Surrender the Self) in Najib Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim, Khatib al-Thawrat al-'Urabiyyah (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyyah c. 1963) pp. 133-134; 'Ali al-Hadidi, 'Abdallah al-Nadim. Khatib al-Wataniyyah (Cairo: Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, n.d) pp. 119-120. al-Nadim had a unerring eye for the detailed, painful edges of the West’s quotidian linguistic impact in Egyptian society. In a rueful 1881 piece titled “An Arab Who Got Europeanized” ("'Arabi Tafarnaj"), he depicted a young man who, returning from studies in Europe, would not respond to Arabic greetings from his father. He cannot even make his mother understand what dish he wants, because he now knew only the French term for "onion" having forgotten the Arabic basil. Article "'Arabi Tafarnaj" published in al-Tankit wal-Tabkit excerpted Tawfiq op. cit pp. 167-8; al-Hadidi op. cit p. 113.

26. The acculturated Kamilists evoked and tried to explore the great classical Arabs; Dar al-'Ulum authors provided guiding new materials that were modern in arrangement. Its faculty included Hasan Tawfiq al-'Adl (1862-1904), the pioneer of the study of classical Arabic literature: his Ta’rikh Adab al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah was the first modern history of the subject in Arabic. Mustafa Kamil attended his 1904 funeral. Aroian Dar al-'Ulum, p. 128.

27. Aroian gave Dar al-'Ulum’s initial lecture schedule in 1871 as made up of Literary Sciences, Astronomy, Natural Sciences, Architecture, Mechanics, General History, Hanafi Fiqh (religious law), Tafsir (Qur’anic Exegesis) and Hadith, Physics and Botany. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum, p. 37. Students at Dar al-'Ulum studied foreign language for five hours per week until foreign language study was abrogated in 1904. Ibid p. 184.

28. Dar al-'Ulum and the true acculturating-educated M-E intellectuals collaborated in the recovery of the classical Arabs’ past. For instance, Tala’at Harb’s 1905 Ta’rikh Duwal al-'Arab wa-'Islam (History of the States of the [Classical] Arabs and Islam) was used to teach history at the Dar. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum, pp. 201-202. Harb (d. 1941) was an 1889 graduate of the Law School in Cairo, the matrix of Kamil and his watanist anti-imperialist comrades; he hung around the Kamilists --- and after World War I became a towering Egyptian capitalist (B 45-51).
Jawhari (1862-1940), who had strong links with Kamil’s movement, strove in many works to achieve a symbiosis between the modern West’s science and Islam\textsuperscript{29}.

Before the British conquest, then, Egypt’s ‘Alid rulers conducted modernization that already acculturated some Muslim Egyptians. Arabizing and Islamizing agencies, however, had been built into modernization: these reassembled the classical Arabs’ literary language and extended it to convey and incorporate modernity from the West. After 1882, this neo-classical, fed from such institutions as a grammatically purist Dar al-‘Ulum, would fend off both Britain’s linguistic onslaughts on the M-E elite and high cultural expression of Egyptian particularity (any dialectization in literature). Arab culture and Islam and modernity had already been extensively intermeshed by 1882.

**Acculturation in the Period of British Colonial Rule (1882 - 1922)**

Hisham Sharabi surveyed the emergence in the Arab East in the decades prior to World War I of the first educated elite "since the high Middle Ages ... distinctly separate from the closed religious stratum of the 'ulama' who for generations had monopolized ... intellectual activity"\textsuperscript{30}. The new intelligentsia were "administrators, professionals particularly lawyers and doctors, hommes des lettres", "journalists and essayists who with the written word exercised considerable influence upon political development", and, crucially, the politically activist secular-stream student group focussed from the mid-1890s by Mustafa Kamil’s movement for independence from British colonial rule\textsuperscript{31}. Sharabi also characterized that the pre-1914 modern-educated Muslims’ preference for careers lay in government service, the army and law rather than in commerce or industry --- although Jaridist and Kamilist M-E acculturateds had, in the period of British colonial rule, already become more at least conceptually interested in the resident Syrian Christians’ "entrepreneurial spirit" than the patterns\textsuperscript{32}. Arab Egyptian neo-capitalism was actualized from the later 1920s, but the rudimentary aspiration among Arab

\textsuperscript{29} Yusuf As’ad Daghir’s assessment was that "he strove in all his works to reconcile science and what came in the Qur’an". Daghir, *Masadir* v. 2 p. 281. Jawhari had to leave Dar al-‘Ulum when World War I broke out because of his links to the Patriotic Party founded by Kamil. Aroian, *Dar al-‘Ulum* pp. 129-134.


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid pp. 88-89.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid p. 20.
Muslim-Egyptian and SC Jaridists already entailed crude ideas for economic pan-Arabism before 1915 (A 328-329).

A consistent feature of the British colonial period was that those Egyptians who passed through the secular, non-Islamic stream in education were increasingly immersed in European languages: French, but also more and more English. On the other hand, British policies often reduced the scope for neo-classical Arabic. Prior to the British conquest, Arabic was the medium of several tertiary colleges in Egypt, among them the College of Medicine. As the British established their authority, they imposed European (mainly English) faculty upon the College and English as the medium of instruction: "in 1911 the School of Pharmacy, attached to the Medical School, did not graduate a single student, while the Medical School graduated only six". Fewer Egyptians were graduating from tertiary institutions, but those who could were acculturated more. Acculturated Muslim Egyptians formed under British colonial rule were insecure both in linguistic identity and professionally. Competition from immigrant Europeans constricted career openings in the fields of medicine, architecture, engineering and to some extent the secular law. Lutfi al-Sayyid’s al-Jaridah vented the modern-educated Egyptians’ resentment at British restriction of medical education and hence the class’ growth in that field.

Westernized-Legal Nationalist Vanguard Forms. After 1882, European or Europe-originated law was studied both on Egypt’s soil and in Europe (mainly France). The School of Law, Egypt’s best tertiary institution, taught in French and, in response to unremitting pressure from British officials, later increasingly in English medium. The French professors communicated to their Egyptian students not just the specificities but also the institutional foundations of modern Western law, ideas of the rights of nations and sovereignty of the people --- concepts that furious British officials regarded as subversive of their colonial rule. Degree

34. "Egypt had a dangerously low ratio of doctors and pharmacists to the total population, even in the wealthier cities of Cairo and Alexandria. The restricted supply of graduates from the Medical School" meant that frequently unqualified immigrant foreigners "dominated the practice of medicine in Egypt". Ibid p. 333. al-Jaridah fumed in 1907 that "no one denied that doctors are few in [our] land and most of them are foreigners. Everyone who knows the great disparity between the number of medical students and number of students at the Law School" would demand that the Ministry of Education should subsidize study in the School of Medicine to attract more students to it. "Nazarat al-Ma’arif --- al-Majaniyyah wa Madrasat al-Muhandiskhanah" (The Ministry of Education --- Free Education and the School of Engineering), al-Jaridah, 23 May 1907, p. 3.
study at the Egyptian Law School lastingly tinctured with French even graduates’ intimate or
domestic life, even when they did not undergo subsequent higher studies in Europe or much live
or travel there (eg. al-Jaridah’s Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid)36. The deep commitment to
secularoid-positivist France --- a true liberal West alternative to imperialist Britain? --- certainly
proved very deep-seated in the acculturated Muslim Egyptian psyche. More accommodating
than the Watanists to Britain, al-Jaridah still encouraged Egyptians to study law in France in
preference: it would make degrees much harder given that the British had filled Egypt’s schools
and colleges with English --- but would renew the "independence" relationship Mustafa Kamil
had established with France through Lambert, director of the School of Law whom the British
had finally replaced with an Englishman in 190737. The attachment of top Kamilist and Jaridist
intellectuals to French as the preferred medium through which to approach Europe’s thought and
modernity kept them chasing the will-o’-the-wisp of intervention by France to evict Britain38.
The tri-lingualoid new vanguard of law students and professional secular lawyers henceforth
usually organized the political movements against British rule with the cautious approach
dictated by its legal culture and class linkages. In regard to the more militant al-Hizb al-Watani
(Patriotic Party), its founder Mustafa Kamil (d. 1908) was educated at the University of Toulouse
in French Law while his successor as party leader, Muhammad Farid, graduated from the

36. The Azhar-educated Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat (1885-1968), after he launched the seminal literary
monthly al-Risalah in 1933, paid the Egypt-centric modernist Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1954) a visit in his villa.
Lutfi was educated at the Egyptian Law School, apart from which he had attended a brief summer school on
literature and philosophy in Geneva in 1897. During al-Zayyat’s visit to his villa in c. 1933, Lutfi gave orders in
French to his dog, who readily obeyed them! Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Wahy al-Risalah v. 1 (Cairo: Dar Nahdat
37. "al-Katib al-Ma’ruf’ (pseud.), "Fil-Safar Aydan: al-Wusul ila Marsilya wal-Safaru minha" (Travelling,
Yet Again: Arrival in Marseille and Departure From It), al-Jaridah 2 September
1909.
38. In the years leading up to World War 1, the Jaridists often mocked the Kamilists for relapses into their
old culturally sentimental lobbying for French intervention (A 320-321). Yet they, too, were a bit prone to the
syndrome. In concluding the 1904 Entente Cordiale with Britain, France accepted that British rule in Egypt would
last. Yet, in a 1908 address in ethnically mixed Alexandria, Lutfi still tried to dissuade resident aliens --- and
probably the France with whom many were affiliated --- from going along with Britain’s manipulative proposal for
an international legislative council, a ploy to deny Egyptians a constitution. "The French, who once could aspire on
good grounds to be the first among the States in influence in Egypt --- given the moral impact that they have had, the
long-standing influence of their language and law and of their educational patterns/ideologies (anmat ta’alimihim)
--- find themselves stripped of this preeminence". Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta’rikh
Lutfi was explicitly conveying Egyptian aspirations to the residents’ foreign-language papers, whose old
anti-Britishism was fading, and he probably hoped that the French government, too, would hear yet another offer of
an association from an Egyptian.
Egyptian Law School in 1887 and became a deputy Attorney-General at the Court of Appeal: he wrote and orated French fluently. The secular law students became a well-organized, activist core of opposition to British rule, which Kamil raised to a new level when he organized in 1906 the first of innumerable strikes in the Egyptian Law School. Secular Muslim Egyptian lawyers took the lead in 1907 in founding the moderate nationalist al-Ummah Party, moderated by its propertied Arab-Egyptian landowners.

Literary Arabic's Survival Threatened. Once they consolidated their rule, the British waged a constantly expanding campaign to impose English as the core and medium of instruction in Egypt's government schools, primary as well as secondary. This drive was directed over the years by the Scots ex-missionary Douglas Dunlop (1861-1937) whom Proconsul Cromer appointed "adviser" to the Egyptian Ministry of Education in 1887. By 1900 "a large number of courses in the primary schools were given in English; in the secondary schools all subjects except Arabic and some mathematics were either in English or French."

From the turn of the century, government secondary schools concentrated on teaching post-Renaissance European history (Russian, French, German and Austrian as well as British): such British-fostered curricula Europeanized and de-Arabized Egyptians' historical consciousness. The linguistic depersonalization built compensating Arabizing, anti-European reflexes into the youthful personality of Muhammad Husayn Haykal, that he was to resolve much later as a pan-Arab educationalist in the 1930s and 1940s: he was to apply Western technologies then to enable the schools to popularize classical Arabic as the crucial definant of selfhood, counter-constricting the Western languages of the "enslavers" of "the Muslims" in primary and secondary education.

Virtually all strata of literate Muslim Egyptians bitterly opposed the imposition of

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40. "Some prominent lawyers who had looked askance at the National Party's radical approach joined with a number of notables to form the Ummah Party" (Ziadeh). Ziadeh mentioned Fathi Zaghlul, president of the Cairo Court of First Instance, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Qasim Amin a judge, Ahmad 'Afifi a judge in the courts of appeal, 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahrni a prominent advocate --- and 'Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, then an outstanding official in the Ministry of Justice, and a future post-independence Liberal Constitutionalist PM (cf fn 21). Ziadeh, Lawyers p. 90.
42. Ibid, pp. 325-326.
English on the schools, given that the Qur'an had to be read in Arabic\textsuperscript{44}. Chapter 5 will show that the Kamilists, for all their exposure to European languages and concepts, had in full this tradition-rooted reflex that European languages in Egypt's schools and life threatened access to Islam. However, a cluster of separate intellectual elites, whose formal educations ranged from monolingual traditional-Islamic to the most Westernizing, strove together to safeguard Arabic as the core of identity. Another disciple of al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), having returned from exile in 1888, developed a stormy career as Mufti of Egypt (1889-1905) under the British. 'Abduh's formal education was Arab-Islamic, yet he skilfully lobbied metropolitan England to rein the anglicizing drives by British officials in Egypt. After visits to London, 'Abduh in 1905 got the anti-imperialist Liberal M.P. John Robertson to publish, in English, a book of "letters from an Egyptian" that appealed to the British to reverse the policy because it threatened the Egyptians' language and thus their religion\textsuperscript{45}. In Egypt, 'Abduh tirelessly published almost lost classical Arab works for acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals already curious about Islam's golden age (Ch. 2). The Kamilists, in particular, long resisted English with French as well as neo-classical Arabic, but by 1910 even their younger activists had become fluent in it\textsuperscript{46}. They were coming to use English to communicate Egypt's demands to Anglo-Saxons, whose utilitarian liberalism they adopted more and more, like the Jaridists\textsuperscript{47}.

\textsuperscript{44} In 1900 the editor of the Cairo Himarat Munyati wrote that Dunlop had decreed "that our children should learn all subjects in English or they would be dismissed from [the] schools" and satirically observed that there would be nothing wrong if the students had to study even the Qur'an in English: "they shall either read it in English or omit it altogether from the curriculum". Himarat Munyati v. 3:20 (17 August 1900) pp. 310-311 quoted Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri p. 157.

\textsuperscript{45} 'Abduh's letters were published anonymously after his death under the title Letters from an Egyptian to an English Politician upon the Affairs of Egypt (London: G. Routledge and Sons Ltd, 1908), with an introduction written by John M. Robertson, M.P. 'Abduh vividly depicted the linguistic depersonalization of the younger generation of Egyptians under Cromer's rule: "the result of teaching nearly every subject in English is that the young Egyptian at the age of fourteen or fifteen speaks the language well ... entirely without accent. He can read and write English fluently ... But at what cost does he acquire this proficiency? ... Everything else almost --- and religion and the Arabic language most of all --- is sacrificed to achieve this end". Letters p. 143, quoted Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri p. 158.

\textsuperscript{46} British endeavors to make English the literary language of Egypt's educated modern classes had effects even in the ranks of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) organized by Mustafa Kamil to drive them out. Dr. Mansur Rifa'at, an exiled Party member, in 1917 during a conflict with its leader Muhammad Farid, wrote a cold letter to him from Berlin in idiomatic glacial English quite in the style that an educated born Englishman would have used. Photocopied in Farid, Awraq Muhammad Farid (Cairo: v. 1 al-Hay'at al-Misriyyah lil-Kitab 1978) p. 376.

\textsuperscript{47} There was marked political and ideological convergence of al-Jaridah/Hizb al-Ummah with the Kamilists during in particular the repressive incumbancy of Gorst. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 147. al-Jaridah in mid-1910 publicized the English monthly newspaper Egypt that al-Hizb al-Watani youth activist Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah had just started to bring out from Geneva: he was particularly directing it to British parliamentarians, while striving to inform general "English public opinion in England and Ireland". Lutfi Jum'ah evoked English liberalism
Private European Schools. The British were slow to extend government schooling for girls. As before 1882, the wealthiest Egyptians sent in particular their daughters to the exorbitant French-medium missionary schools. Generations of upper-class Muslim Egyptian women educated by missionaries in French and English grew up unequipped to read even simple Arabic books. Images of mass-attending Muslim Egyptian children greatly stimulated linguistic nationalist stances among Egyptian intellectuals, even those more inclined to territorial identity and pragmatic self-Westernization. Ideologically converging, al-Afghani’s disciple the traditionally-cultured 'Abdallah al-Nadim, the Egypto-Syrian Islamic revivalist Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and the relatively Westernizing- and territorially-oriented Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1954), educated as a secular lawyer, all denounced the Catholic Freres’ and Soeurs’ schools to sap the English will to stay on in an Egypt that clearly did not want them. The newspaper took as its motto a phrase by John Stuart Mill that only self-government by a nation could have meaning: any rule by one nation over another could neither have meaning or be real. Had not the former Liberal Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman stated that good government was no substitute for self-government? The first number of Egypt carried an article by the old anti-imperialist war-horse Sir Wilfrid Scawen Blunt on the Suez Canal Concession: much of the number was meant to deter the British campaign to get that extended to 2008 (fn 55). The newspaper denied connection with any political party... "Jaridah Jadidah lil-Difa' 'an Misr" (A New Paper for Defending Egypt), al-Jaridah 19 May 1910 p. 5. For the evolution of Jum’ah’s ultra-acculturated Arubo-Islamism to his death in 1953, A 98-99, B 56-59, B 216-217.

48. European observers confirm the sustained strength of the French educational and cultural impact, and the centrality of the Catholic missionaries in it, throughout the whole period of British colonial rule. Symons fumed as late as 1925 that the Freres’ and Soeurs’ widespread provision of French-medium education, and the much weaker British and American missionary counter-effort to provide English medium schools, had enabled the French to “triumph” linguistically over Britain although, politically, the latter ruled Egypt. M. Travers Symons, Britain and Egypt: The Rise of Egyptian Nationalism (London: Cecil Palmer 1925) p. 296. However, Symons had in mind the French schools’ successful attraction of Syrian Christian and “Levantine” students as much as original Egyptians. In regard to English-diffusing private primary and secondary schools, during British colonial rule there usually were around one hundred American Presbyterian schools in Egypt. Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri p. 146.

49. 'Abdallah al-Nadim (initial ideological mentor of the young Kamil) warned that the schools of the Freres or Jesuits or Protestants in Egypt or in such Ottoman provinces as 'Iraq assimilated their native students to the European nationalities of the teachers: they made the students a "third group" (qism thalith) that was Eastern in race and speech, but acted on behalf of the West. Wendell, Egyptian National Image, p. 156. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid was as apprehensive that Freres’ and Soeurs’ schools denationalized Egyptian students and undermined the unity essential for building the Egyptian national political community. A young woman who graduated from some school of nuns was bereft of any common ground of costume, tastes or conversation with either her mother or other Egyptian females of her age. She had been alienated from her people (qawm) by an educational system that failed to ground her in the ethics of her religion. The education offered by Catholic and other missions cut students off from their nation (ummah), failed to ground them in the ummah’s commercial and economic life, and left them unable to view events through the ethos of their countrymen. Yet the mission schools in Egypt had not truly brought modern educational methods (or modern thought --- al-madhahib al-hadithah) to Egyptians. Lutfi, "al-Hukm al-Dhati: al-Ta’lim al-‘Amm: Qa‘idatuhu" (Autonomy: Public Education: What its Basis Should Be) al-Jaridah, 17 September 1907; Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah pp. 118-119. For Rida’s denunciation of the education provided by the Freres, Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West p. 51.
The British never dislodged French as the common language of the resident Europeans dominant in the cities' modern economy; educated Egyptians transacted with them in French daily. Because French was already known to Egyptian officials and far more convenient for English appointees than literary Arabic, and because the English legally were not supposed to administer Egypt for long, even British officials in their puppet Egyptian government often had to use French as the medium of administration, even up to World War I. Thus, the government apparatus long consolidated and diffused French rather than English among Egyptians.

The ever-available French press of the local resident Europeans built up modern-educated Muslims' grasp of the language and some metropolitan French thought-patterns --- but also from very adolescence could embitter against several categories of Europeans. Cromer did not dare censor these long-critical papers, linked through the capitulations to Britain's rival France. Even the monolingual 'Abdallah al-Nadim, Mustafa Kamil's first ideological mentor, in 1892 noted Le Phare d'Alexandrie's services to Egypt and respect for the Egyptian princes, which had won it "the love of the natives". The first generation of educated Muslim Egyptians being acculturated under British rule, of which Kamil was one, from adolescence read Le Phare, or Bosphore Egyptien because they criticized the British occupiers. However, these newspapers also reflected simmering socio-economic ill-will between the resident Europeans and still-modernizing Muslim Egyptians. Borelli, editor of Bosphore, campaigned against British

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50. Anglo-Egyptian officials in the Department of Education long had to converse and correspond in French. Peter Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst: the Overshadowed Proconsul (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Hoover Colonial Studies 1977) p. 51. Symons fumed as late as 1925 that the bizarre habit of two British officials in separate Egyptian government departments corresponding with each other in poor French, not English, was still in vogue even during World War I. His account makes clear that Egyptian staffs' knowledge only of French apart from Arabic constrained these British officials from using English. "The Official Journal continued to be printed in French, with only certain parts in English, the Cabinet made all its announcements in French, and the laws were promulgated in French and Arabic". Symons, Britain and Egypt, pp. 298-299.

51. In the early years of the Occupation, ten French newspapers were published in Egypt, all of them hostile to Britain. Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abdal Rahman Shukri, p. 144. In his 1907 valedictory address, Cromer reminisced that, after he arrived in 1883, the local French papers regularly denounced him as "the beast Cromer" and even Moloch --- but lately were starting to accept him as a father-figure. Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah p. 90. He could afford some good-humor: the local French newspapers, mouthpieces of resident Europeans increasingly frightened by rising Muslim Egyptian nationalism, had been moving towards his Residency for some time.


53. "In the hands of such men as Borelli and Gavillot, a paper like the Bosphore frequently made trouble for the Government; whence the resentment felt against it by the British authorities, and its prestige in Egyptian opinion". Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution tsd. Jean Stewart (London: Faber and Faber, 1972) p. 207. Berque identified the "European papers published in Egypt" as the model for the development of a modern Arabic press, "this modern source of power". Ibid.
rule over Egypt, but argued for joint rule by European powers ("internationalization"), not Egyptian independence --- a viewpoint he got across to metropolitan France at the exact time that Mustafa Kamil arrived to lobby for Egyptian independence. Polemics with these papers of the residents in various ways pulled acculturated Egyptians' thought out from territorial Egyptian community to wide religious communities. Chapter 4 will show how support by Le Phare d'Alexandrie's Greek editor for Greece against the Ottoman State during their 1897 war involved the young Mustafa Kamil more deeply in that extra-Egyptian conflict. Apprehensive that Kamillist nationalism might harm their economic position, the residents came to accept the Occupation more. The more incorporative Jaridists, too, fumed when even less anti-Egyptian local French newspapers backed Britain’s efforts to extend the Concession of the (France-based) Suez Canal Company to 2008 --- or chimed in with British themes that the drive to found an Egyptian University was more xenophobic Islamic "fanaticism." Pragmatic in spasms, the Jaridists sometimes sounded more prepared than the Kamillists to admit Western terms, or current Egyptian usage, into the formal Arabic being extended for modernity --- not just the classical Arabs’ idioms. Yet al-Jaridah, too, published characterizations of Western languages as a threat to Arabic or sovereignty. The salience of French alongside English in Egypt made contributors think not of Egyptians-versus-Britishers but two wider camps: "the Easterners in general" against "Imperialist Europe". This vacillating mid-1911 response saw missionary educationalists as (a) an instrument by which their not invariably Christianity-motivated States implanted their languages and cultural "influence" to


55. After the Journal de Caire mistakenly contrasted "moderate" al-Jaridah to nationalist elements opposing extension of the Suez Canal concession, Yusuf al-Bustani, a Syrian Christian al-Jaridah sub-editor, set out economic and political advantages for Egypt in rejecting any extension. Yusuf al-Bustani, "Mas'alat Qanat al-Suways" (The Suez Canal Question), al-Jaridah 24 June 1911 p. 1. al-Jaridah had been intent to court the Journal as an important avenue for giving Egyptian nationalism a respectable image in Western states, particularly France, so important for independence. Recognition that Journal de Caire would be happy to help in this, though, was in the context of one communal organization of the resident Greeks condemning the paper for not automatically standing with resident aliens who violated Egyptian laws. "Bayn al-Misriyyina wal-Nuzala" (Between the Egyptians and the Resident Europeans), al-Jaridah 28 June 1910 p. 1.

56. Lutfi, "Ma lil-Siyasah wal-'Ilm?" (What Does Politics Have to do with Knowledge?), al-Jaridah, 25 May 1907; Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah, pp. 170-172.
soften Muslim countries for colonization or (b) in their drive to Christianize Muslim children and societies at variance with the modernist laicism of, for instance, (goodish?) French governments that pressured them to offer neutral knowledge. Such Jaridist hatred of missionaries saw the staying-power of Christianity in the societies and politics of Western states: but was non-traditional in its differentiation of a host of political, religious and ideological factions there whose voices are tuned in. al-Jaridah’s pluralization of Westerners prefigured nuanced, mixed, religio-secularoid explications of French imperialism in North Africa from the Young Men’s Muslim Association milieu in 1930 (B 71-72fn).

The opening of the Canal in 1869 had made Egypt the highway that linked Europe and Asia. Under Britain’s efficient administration, Egypt’s internal and international communications further developed, making Europe even more accessible. It became commonplace for well-off, relatively modernized Muslim Egyptians to holiday in summer-time in Europe, a practice defended against its own insularists by sectional Westernizers in Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s al-Jaridah. As much as they could, the British blocked Egyptians from getting tertiary humanities education within Egypt or Europe: some Jaridists championed summer

57. “al-Madaris al-Ajnabiyyah fil-Qutr al-Misri: Kalimah fi Sabil Allah” (Foreign Schools in Egypt: Time for Some Plain Speaking), al-Jaridah 11 May 1911 p. 4. This item throbbed with all the contradictions of acculturation. It sharply characterized the acculturated new specialized elite: the schools provided by the Freres, Jesuits and Americans made possible the subsequent qualifications and careers of “a large proportion of our physicians, lawyers, engineers and government officials”. The purpose of the schools, though, was to convert those Egyptians whom the modern knowledge bait drew in. The central paradox of acculturation, then, was that the stratum of Muslim Egyptians most intimately exposed to Western Christianity and clerical elites was the modern bilingualized professionals --- not Islam’s monolingual guardian scholars and clerics. The West’s religious elites had elaborately interwoven their sects into modernity and its instruments: they were a deadly opponent that would not fade away of itself in face of the world’s Progress. Yet such M-E acculturateds could swing in different directions. They could view the overall modern West, its governments included, as still motivated by Christianity to be anti-Muslim. Or they could view secularoid Westerners as neutral at least: dichotomizing missionaries and other fanatical Christians against that now central better West. This item sometimes approved a post-Christian good West, quoting denunciations of the Catholic Church and its schools by French anti-clerical ministers and prime ministers. One French Prime Minister, Rene Waldeck-Rousseau, had regretted that French governments could not prohibit parents from sending their children to Catholic schools --- “but we can, as is our most sacred duty, withhold government employment from those who do not study in our purely scientific schools”. "Madaris..." This Egyptian acculturated had been drawn into France’s hatreds but the ambiguity is the range of sometimes sub-conscious motives for his militant conjunction with Western anti-clericalism as a means to harm foreign Christian structures in "the East".

58. The Europe-avoiders were not a faction outside al-Jaridah but a variant concentration of elements amply present even in its interactionism. One mid-1910 item item fumed at the hemorrhaging of money overseas. The increasing preference for overseas holiday destinations had halved the number of Egyptians who summered along the Alexandrian coasts: Europe and Istanbul were raking in L100, 000 that could have benefited Alexandria’s fellow-Egyptians, apart from huge sums rich Egyptian gamblers squandered at Monte Carlo. The claim by some that they were going to Europe to observe its public affairs was only a blind: they had more personal and idiosyncratic aims. Anon, "Fasl al-Sayf” (The Summer Season), al-Jaridah 9 July 1910 p. 2.
tourism as a precious opportunity to encounter the latest European thought and science and diffuse them back in Egypt. However, al-Jaridah’s very defence made clear that precisely these already-acculturated Egyptian tourists who most strove to communicate with Europeans were jarred by the disdain some of them evinced towards "the Easterners". France could be a detailed model for Egypt’s "Reform", but tin-pot supremacism or rudeness met there would quickly ignite an identification with an internationally hard-hitting classical Arab entity centred outside Egypt: this, though, was still as "the Egyptian Nation" in "the East" counter-camp.

al-Jaridah alternately saw the interaction of (a) Britishers/Frenchmen/Europeans with (b) Egyptians/Arabic/Muslims/Islam/the East from multiple perspectives that it could finally blend: eg. in terms of a range of Western ideologies, some secularoid but others Christianoid, several Western polities simultaneously, and in almost all items also from some parallel situation under classical Arab Islam. The semi-intimate responsiveness to France and to French --- but eventually even British --- culture and thought, defined the self/Arabic and Western elements

59. An unsigned 1907 al-Jaridah editorial tried to check one-sided criticism of the custom of summer holidays in Europe. The critics contended that wealthy Egyptians who holidayed there squandered the country’s money in gambling, gave a bad image of Egypt by committing indecencies and returned full of contempt for their land of birth. al-Jaridah in reply depicted this contact between "the Easterners and the Westerners" through tourism as educational for both. The holidaying Egyptians, being mostly educated, acquainted themselves in Europe with its society, sciences, educational curricula and latest books and spread knowledge about them among their fellow-Egyptians when they returned. They would see Europe’s factories and new agricultural inventions, and upon return introduce such technology in Egypt. This editorial, ostensibly a defence of contact with Europeans, fully manifested the ambivalent, tense attitudes to them characteristic of Lutfi’s modernist proto-particularist group. It assumed that European politicians and travel-writers had implanted contemptuous ideas about Egypt/the East there: Egyptians holidaying in Europe should try to convince its philosophers, opinion-makers and leaders "that the East is not devoid of all literature and morality as most [Europeans] suppose". "al-Istiyafi Urubba" (Summer Holidays in Europe), al-Jaridah 29 May 1907, p. 1.

60. "Fil-Safar Aydan" loc. cit. The specific area of "Reform" or modernization for Egypt that France suggested to this traveller this time around was the sanitary housing provided to urban and rural poor and laborers: no French farmer tethered his livestock inside his home near where he slept, as was the case in Egypt. The writer chided the Turco-Circassian absentee landed aristocracy headed by the Khedivial family for not carrying through the building of equivalent pilot housing for tenants on their vast estates. Ibid. For the similar nausea felt by Lutfi and his young disciple Muhammad Husayn Haykal at the squalor of rural Egyptian family houses during their 1911 tour of al-Daqahlawiyyah, see Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 285 fn. Despite his feel for rural France, the al-Jaridah writer was not star-struck by it, being well aware of inherently different aspects of Egyptian agriculture. The classical Arabs rose up in his mind when he experienced nonchalence and abrasive ill-treatment in Marseille from petty French customs officials "of less standing and rank than most of those standing in that queue". The exorbitant customs-dues they exacted on the luggage of incoming Egyptians made him doubt if "the modern Western nations [can soon] attain the civilization of that [classical] Arab Nation that placed freedom of trade and prohibition of imposts and duties among the fundamental principles of the righteous religion". The writer recalled "the Arab woman" in the reign of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mu'tasim who came to trade "Arab goods" in the Byzantine Empire. When she refused to pay customs dues, the Byzantines ill-treated and imprisoned her --- drawing the retaliatory campaign by the Arabs that sped the Byzantine State on its road to extinction. So ethnicistically Arab as regarded the past, this 1909 writer only termed contemporary Arabs "the Easterners". "Fil-Safar Aydan".
against each other with ultra-sharpness. France’s French-staffed facilities for tourists brought home that "the language of the Qur’an" was being cosmopolitazned into a patois in multi-ethnic Egyptian cities --- where visiting and resident foreigners, adept at networking, syphoned what wealth they brought in or stimulated, for instance in tourism, off to Europe. Jaridists and Kamilists tended not to respond in a compartmentalized or discrete way to specific groups of Westerners or specific cultural problems, but rather pulling together and bracketing all Arab history with the whole West or most Western nations. This unification of perspectives energized the pre-1919 struggle of acculturated M-E movements to save literary Arabic. One 1909 article traced the crisis to sharply-focussed features of social and political power in Egypt: "general ignorance": too many Turco-Circassian "rulers" grew up without learning the standard language and then refused to encourage or promote it: foreigners heading government departments made their language the medium of administration: the use of English and French as mediums for government primary and secondary schools, the inferior remuneration and promotion opportunities awarded Arabic teachers etc. But --- simultaneous perspective from classical Arab history: it was essential "for the preservation of our nationalism/nationality (qawmiyyatina)" to restore the integral styles of the literary language once patronized by "those Kings who exercised power from Andalusia and the coasts of Morocco to India". That those governing Arabs could eliminate languages that otherwise would have threatened Arabic --- Coptic: and Persian nearly, until the Persians came to rule themselves again --- showed the vulnerable dependence of all literary languages upon political power (Algeria peril).

Many patterns of interaction with Westerners and Western cultures before 1919, then,

61. "Fil-Safar Aydan".
62. "A Student in the Khedivial Teachers' College", "al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah fi Misr" (The Arabic Language in Egypt), al-Jaridah 9 July 1910 pp. 1-2. This youthful essay succinctly anticipated many of the themes and stances explored by Taha Husayn in a series of al-Jaridah articles on language and literature in the following year. As Taha was to do in more detail then, this anonymous student exulted at Arabic's destruction of Coptic, to which a particularist would have felt at least some ambivalence. Like Taha, he had ambivalent awareness of the Persians who almost fused with the classical Arabs: "the language of the Persians almost faded away into extinction after the Arabs conquered their land. Their scholars became Arabized and composed more --- and more precious --- Arabic books than the Arabs themselves. Their language was resurrected up from the embers again only after political power trickled back to them". While alert to all disadvantages facing literary Arabic in Egypt and to all resources that could be mustered to save it, this writer was --- as Taha was to be in late 1911 --- well aware that the peril literary Arabic faced under the French in Algeria and Tunisia was much deadlier: he likened the hybridization and degeneration of the forms of Arabic that lingered there to the composite Maltese and Hindustani languages.

Ibid. The item's condemnation of those West-influenced writers who did not maintain the classical Arabs' styles would impinge on Haykal but not Taha.
fostered pan-Muslim and pan-Arab counter-identity. The threat of linguistic deculturation that the small modernizing-educated elite faced under colonialism could make it identify literary Arabic, more than homeland, as the core of selfhood. That the intellectuals long sought interaction with France and its versions of Western thought and culture, in preference to imperialist England’s version, would finally make them relate the two as both components in one often anti-Muslim Western camp: assaults on the Arabic of Algerians were more ferocious. The great classical Arabs were not only a handy equal counter-past but a source of genuine perspective about the interweave between political power and languages in macro-history.

Overall, acculturated M-E intellectuals before 1919 understood the British enemy, but also the wider cluster of European states and cultures, more variedly than the British deculturizers did Egyptians. The acculturateds’ greater motivatedness and clearer vision of languages in history enabled them to fight Dunlop’s banal Anglicization campaigns to a halt.

Study in Europe. In July 1909, Haykal sailed to study law for three years at the Sorbonne. It was a strain after his Dunlopian primary and secondary education to build an active command of French. The youthful Haykal committed himself deeply in France both to its literature and its positivist thought. barely arrived the French co-lodgers made clear to him that they could apply laicist repudiation of “fanaticism” to brand the Egyptians as retrograde Muslims and gratuitously stand with the British. In the diaries he kept in Europe, 63. The young Haykal arrived in Paris on 13 July 1909, the eve of “the Day of Liberty”. He responded enthusiastically to France as a centre of modernity which “deepened man’s belief in freedom of belief and opinion and that fanaticism is to be detested”. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 1, p. 40. But then, on 20 February 1910 back in Egypt, the Europe-educated Muslim Egyptian pharmacist Ibrahim al-Wardani assassinated the pro-British Coptic Prime Minister Butrus Ghali. The young Haykal, an impressionable 21 years old, had been in France slightly above six months. Over a meal in their rooming-house, a French secondary-school teacher told him that “fanaticism has led a Muslim Egyptian youth to shoot Butrus Ghali dead”. Haykal “quickly” argued in reply that al-Wardani’s motive for the assassination was “political”, Butrus Ghali’s long series of acts of collaboration with British colonial rule: Ghali had signed the Anglo-Egypt accord for the Sudan in 1899 which put that country under British administration disguised as a condominium, Ghali “was the one who headed the exceptional tribunal which tried the Egyptians at Dinshawai [in June 1906] and passed cruel sentences against them made even crueler because they were carried out in a savage manner unknown in the Middle Ages”. The French teacher replied: “It’s true that the youth said what you say. But I fancy that the Prime Minister’s Christian faith influenced this youth to commit his crime”. Ibid p. 41. For the background of Ghali’s premiership and his assassination, B. Lynn Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics (London: Croom Helm 1986) pp. 12-13. Nasif al-Miqdadi, a Coptic publicist who had studied in Europe with al-Wardani and knew him well, wrote a letter from Switzerland in the wake of the assassination, denying that the youth was religiously fanatical. Relatives of al-Miqbadi brought out the militantly Coptist al-Watan daily. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani pp. 56-57.

64. The school teacher’s Islamophobic anti-Egyptianism aside, Haykal found the French impossible people to connect with as human beings. He responded enthusiastically to the freedom of expression, especially in celebration of eros, that he found in the canvases of the Louvre --- such a vital contrast to the fake "virtue and
Haykal already perceived hostility from the French --- as from the British and other Westerners --- in campoid terms: the competition between the European powers to seize Morocco in August 1909 made him hope that "the Easterners" would awake in Islam-focussed "revolution" to free their lands of "the rule of the [enslavers] who seize their fruits". Morocco, though, did in 1909 make him conceive the Easterners as having made themselves colonizable by long "slumber" following greatness --- ambivalence matched by the dual-cultured Kamilists' intermittent alienation from Moroccan, Black African and other traditional Muslims who had not borrowed from the West (Ch. 3)\textsuperscript{65}. The youthful Haykal's first more critical responses to Europe and its attitudes prefigured the al-Siyasah pan-Easternism in which pan-Arab linguistic nationalism was to crystallize in the 1920s (B 90 - 95). Such surviving bonds to Islam in the 1930s and 1940s were to thicken and intermesh into his Arabo-Islamic reaction against the West. As a young student in Europe, though, the West's modernity had relativized Egypt's religion: Carlyle's \textit{On Heroes and Hero Worship} reassured that Muhammad had been one great man but had the sincere prophets received their inspirations from God or their subconsciousnesses?: the obstructive 'ulama' had to realise that every age offered a different path for the upward Comtean Progess of nations, about to contract their roles in society as the Renaissance did Western clergies\textsuperscript{66}. (In the 1920s, such modernist responsiveness to laicizing Kemalist Turkey allowed a residue of pan-Muslim relationship to continue: B 17 - 19).

Most Muslim Egyptians who studied in Europe responded to its more religiously neutral thought, if less deeply than Haykal. Yet when they saw Europeans opposing in unison the aspirations of Muslim peoples, such intellectuals often swung back to some wide Muslim/Arab bloc as a more appropriate means to face Europe than Europe-modelled territorial nationalism. Hisham Sharabi has stressed the language difficulties, dislocation and culture shock experienced

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\footnotesize{Haykal's Paris diaries, 11 August 1909, analysed Johansen, \textit{Haikal} pp. 11, 252; 28 February 1910 cited \textit{ibid} pp. 15, 253. For Kamil's marginal ambivalence to Morocco and other Muslim countries still little touched by the West's modernity, A 169-171 ; for the Jaridists', A 296, A 321.}

\footnotesize{Ibid p. 16; cf Smith, \textit{Islam and the Search} pp. 41-42.}
by most Arab-Muslim students who studied in Europe prior to 1914 and concludes that "Europe never appeared so distant as it did from the heart of Paris". He cited al-Nadim's recognition that "many young men who studied in Europe" resisted Europeanization (tafarunik) and "came back with their traditional customs and manners intact". The older Islamically-educated pan-Islamists had at the outset of our time-frame shrewdly sized up the emergent acculturateds, so assaulted by deculturation and all the Western hatred they overheard, as the elite that --- instead of caving --- might be steeled to lead an ultra-conscious countering Arabo-Islamism. al-Nadim and 'Abduh had skillfully passed seeds from the classical Arabs' past across the inter-elite divide.

We surveyed France-modelled modernization by 'Alid rulers up to 1882 that founded modern administration, semi-secular state education and West-derived law. These over the long term brought into existence strata of secular students, secular lawyers, bilingualized civil servants. Prior to 1882, Arabic's resurgence within modernization (the bureaucracy and education) limited linguistic Europeanization. Egyptians transformed in Muhammad 'Ali's specialized colleges or on missions in Europe had nonetheless often been drawn from graduates of the ancient Islamic al-Azhar. "The continued elaboration of educational institutions taking place under the British ... accelerated the division of Egyptian society into definite groups". The Westernizing educational system, which prepared Egyptians to undertake specialized functions in the government bureaucracy, became self-contained, separated from the Islamic schools which now just prepared religious personnel and school teachers. Few Egyptians under British rule crossed from one educational system or elite to the other "since regular channels of access did not exist".

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67. Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West p. 90.
68. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 386-387. For a while under British colonial rule, the legal requirements for practising Europe-derived law were not too strict and some Muslim Egyptians who had received Islamic formal education did cross over into the field of secular law. Sa'd Zaghlul (1860-1927) was one instance. Born in al-Gharbiyyah province, he was educated at a local old Islamic school and at al-Azhar. In 1880 he became an editor of the Arabic Official Journal al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah. The conquering British imprisoned him for a time. In 1884 Sa'd began to practise at the secular bar, learnt French and studied at the French School of Law in Cairo. His career as a lawyer and judge in the secular Europe-derived law drew him into Egyptian government and politics. Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 210-211. Sa'd's Paris-educated lawyer brother Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul translated into Arabic Rousseau's Social Contract, Bentham's Principles of Legislation, E.R. Desmoulin's A Quoi Tient la Superiorte des Anglo Saxons?, Gustave Lebon's Spirit of Society. Ibrahim al-Hilbawi was another Egyptian on the staff of al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah who never received formal modern legal training but became an eminent secular lawyer after 1882 and President of the National Bar Association upon its formation in 1912. Ziadeh Lawyers, p. 39.
Acculturation in "Independent" Egypt (1922-1952)

The collapse of British colonial rule in the wake of World War I ended restriction by British officials of standard literary Arabic. The politicians, officials and modernist intellectual leaders of the new Egyptian nation-state gradually widened its scope in Egyptian life.

As part of the new governing elite’s partial reaction away from English, Fu’ad I University long used French as the medium of instruction for many humanities and up to 1952 for law subjects. Fu’ad I, and subsequent additional institutions such as the University of Alexandria (opened 1942), always used English as the medium of formal lectures in science subjects into the Nasser period. Egyptians who had learnt French in the schools under and immediately after British rule were only a fraction of the number taught English. The use of French as a medium for instruction at King Fu’ad I University made assimilation of Western thought and culture stressful for this young generation. Robert Graves, who taught English Literature there, found that the Faculty of Letters had a full complement of highly-paid professors ... predominantly French and Belgian. The Frenchmen lectured [in French] with the help of Arabic interpreters, which made neither for speed nor for accuracy ... Only one of my colleagues could speak English and none had any knowledge of Arabic; yet of the two hundred Egyptian students, mostly sons of rich merchants and landowners, fewer than twenty knew more than a smattering of French --- just enough for shopping purposes in the elegant stores --- though every one of them had learned English in the secondary schools. All official correspondence was conducted in classical Arabic.

In 1926, 'Abd al-Latif Ramadan, speaking particularly for students at the Egyptian University’s Law Faculty, protested "the misery" and the threat to the students’ futures caused by the use of French as the medium of instruction: the students "had been unable to follow a single lesson". Egyptian tutors who stumblingly extemporized Arabic translations during the lectures distorted them and prevented the students from asking the French professors questions. Elementary French classes had not helped the students cope with complex French lectures on Philosophy, Political Economy etc. The students protested the length of the law course (five

years) and that they had to study Latin as the key to Roman Law although they could not hope to get a working knowledge of it within the two years provided. The Westernizing educationalist Taha Husayn stressed that Greek and Latin were the languages of Western Civilization's classical base. He early strove to implant both Greek and Latin in Fu'ad I University as crucial humanities subjects, not just for specialized studies of Western law --- and even to get them offered in government secondary schools.

The 1925-founded University of Cairo, then, was designed by the new governing elite to implant in Egypt the West's whole civilization, not just to convey strength-conferring Western sciences and knowledge useful for widening Egypt's new independence vis-a-vis Europe. The early Fu'ad I University clearly would enduringly acculturate and multi-lingualize those who lasted. Its graduates, however, would be unlikely to feel at ease in relation to the West, or to the western knowledge and languages they had acquired at such cost.

The small political and cultural elite that led Egypt under the monarchy persistently maintained its preference for French and French variants of Western aesthetic culture over British. During a visit to Cairo early in the reign of King Faruq (succeeded 1936) to foster dialogue between British and Egyptian religious intellectuals, Rom Landau noted that Egyptian Foreign Ministry officials conversed with the rector of the Egyptian University in Arabic

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70. 'Abd al-Latif Ramadan, "Shikwa Murratu'n Yabuththuha Talabat al-Jami' at al-Misriyyah" (A Bitter Complaint from the Egyptian University's Students), al-Muqattam 17 January 1926. The student Ramadan claimed to be presenting the grievances of "we students of the University", the whole student body, although chiefly those of the Law Faculty's students. Ramadan mentioned an extraordinarily wide range of subjects as being taught in French, to students who were still writing simple essays about camels and horses in the emergency French classes: Philosophy, Political Economy, Ancient History, Latin and Greek Literature, French Literature, even Arabic high literature --- "all those we study in the French language". Ibid.

71. When Taha returned to Egypt in 1919, his first academic appointment was as a lecturer in ancient history at the old Egyptian University: he commenced his prolonged popularization of Greek and Latin thought and literature through Arabic translations and essays. 'Ali Mahir while Minister of Education in Ahmad Ziwar's second Ministry (13 March 1925 - 7 June 1926) "put Latin and Greek into the curricula of the Faculties of Art and Law" at the new Fu'ad I University, which he founded: even, he abortively introduced "Greek [and] Latin ... in a few secondary schools". See Taha Husayn's tribute in The Future Culture of Egypt (1938) tsd. Sidney Glazier (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies 1954), p. 34. Taha undoubtedly had a hand in Mahir's aborted promotion of Latin and Greek in 1925-1926. "Taha Husayn [tried] on several occasions to introduce Greek and Latin into secondary school curricula". Anwar Louca, "Taha Hussein and the West", Cultures v.2:21974 p. 130. After 1925, Taha chaired the Department of Arab and Oriental Studies at Fu'ad I University. Mohamed H. El-Zayyat, "Taha Hussein and the Arab World", Cultures v.27:2 1974, p. 105. Taha was the main Egyptian protagonist in bitter disputes in the new Fu'ad I University's Council between those who briefly imposed Latin as a compulsory core subject in the Faculty of Law and those who wanted to eliminate it. He defended Greek, Latin and classical studies in the Faculty of Arts until in 1932 Isma'il Sิดqi's government dismissed him from his post of Dean of the Faculty of Arts and eliminated the Department of Classical Studies at Fu'ad I University. Future pp. 74-75.
"constantly interspersed with French". "Although the British embassy was supposed to represent the most effective center of Egyptian government, native diplomacy and manners were entirely under the spell of the French".

The foreign resident European minority, to which most Armenians and Jews were affiliated, maintained French as its main written and educational language. When Nasser finally nationalized European schools following the 1956 attack by Israel, France and Britain, French-medium private schools in Egypt still had 150,000 pupils, of whom 40,000 were Muslims. Because of these French-medium schools, the French language and Catholic influence pervaded whole family units of the Muslim haute bourgeoisie to 1952. Their female Muslim Egyptian pupils graduated as fluent French speakers but almost without any grounding in literary Arabic or the fundamentals of Islam. Najib Mahfuz's novel Qasr al-Shawq (1956?) depicted this situation in the 1920s. Kamal, son of a petty-bourgeois merchant, and then aged about fourteen, at his government Arabic-medium secondary school becomes a friend of the rich Husayn Shaddad, son of a (Turco-Circassian?) "aristocratic" family once close to the Khedive 'Abbas. In Husayn's home in the then exclusive al-'Abbasiyyah suburb of Cairo, he meets Husayn's sister, 'Ayidah, whom he loves hopelessly. 'Ayidah is being educated in French medium at the Mere de Dieu Catholic secondary school, where she sings hymns at mass. She plays European music on her household piano and proposes that Kamal read Balzac, George Sand, Madame De Stael and Pierre Loti as models for the fiction he wants to write.

For Husayn and 'Ayidah, Kamal represents "the quarter of Religion" al-Husayn and the populist nationalism led by Sa'd Zaghlul --- both alien to their Francophone, politically cautious class. For Husayn --- but not for Kamal --- it is life-or-death to get to Paris and immerse himself in French culture and society. However the habit of reading Arabic political

74. Najib Mahfuz, Qasr al-Shawq (Cairo: Maktabat Misr n.d.) pp. 19-24. Kamal first went to Husayn's house and met 'Ayidah before the British exiled Sa'd Zaghlul the second time --- that is to say, before late 1921.
75. Ibid pp. 204-205.
76. On the picnic Kamal emits an Islamic religious exclamation at the natural beauty to which 'Ayidah reponds in French. Husayn tells him "you always find behind things either God or Sa'd Zaghlul ... Your habit of mentioning God gives you a special religious appearance as though you were one of the men of religion ... But what wonder, when you are from the quarter of the Religion!". Ibid p. 199.
77. "I may prefer to be in France than in Egypt ... I love France". Ibid p. 198. On the picnic Kamal tells
maintained literary Arabic among haute bourgeois youth most dyed by the West: leaders of Haykal’s elitist Party of Liberal Constitutionalists recur in Husayn Shaddad’s family circle, including at the beloved ’Ayidah’s (champagne-and-orchestral!) wedding.

French continued to sap neo-classical Arabic in wealthy Egyptian high society in the 1930s and 1940s. That haute bourgeoisie might have provided crucial patronage for Arabic’s impoverished creative writers. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat knew French well but he suffered culture shock at a 1937 literary dinner and party. Society women there flaunted French as their language for cultured conversation and made clear to the invited Egyptian writers their ignorance of, and low esteem for, modern Arabic literature and the literary Arabic language. In his 1938 program for future Egyptian education and culture, the very Westernist Taha Husayn was insistent that the government should impose controls to assure "the national language" Arabic and the "national religion" Islam, and Egyptian history and geography, be properly taught to Muslim Egyptian children attending missionary-run foreign schools. Retaining some sensitivity to feminist dissatisfactions from his earlier Jaridist-al-Siyasah modernist milieu, al-Zayyat skilfully drew Francophone Egyptian women into al-Risalah’s archaicist integral Arabic and Islamism.

Husayn that he in contrast would be very unwilling to go outside Egypt. But Kamal has enrolled at the Teachers’ College not in preparation for a career as a teacher but because the English "professors" there offer initial grounding in (European) literature, philosophy, history, education and psychology, and in English, the linguistic instrument he has chosen for his own explorations and future writings on these subjects. Taha Husayn’s 1938 Mustaqbal al-Thaqafah fi Misr (The Future of Culture in Egypt) summarized in Hourani Arabic Thought p. 336.

78. Ibid pp. 347, 170, 110, 210, 220.
79. The Arab-orientated modernist Egyptian writer ’Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini (1890-1949) had been publishing fiction and articles for thirty years. A woman who fancied herself a potential new writer, on being introduced at the function, asked him if he came from Syria or Egypt. al-Mazini and al-Zayyat and others present clearly were enraged by the Francophone high society women’s ignorance and successful imposition of French as the language of discourse at a party supposedly held to honor the Arabic language’s masters. On the other hand, al-Zayyat’s account confirms that most Egyptian writers and intellectual leaders knew French intimately. Of the eminent writers present, only a few drifted to the margin of the party because English was their foreign language or they only knew, or would speak, Arabic. All the other journalists, creative writers and university lecturers, "the leaders of the Arabic language", spoke French with the society women. al-Zayyat, "Fi Haflatin Adabiyyah" (At A Literary Function), written in al-Risalah, on 7 March 1937; Wahy v. 1, pp. 418-420.
81. In 1933, and again in 1939, al-Zayyat conducted in al-Risalah a painful dialogue with "Miss Hayat". She was a subscriber in Cairo’s elite Ma’adi suburb who had passed through the French-medium foreign missionary schools and whose language of considered thought and written discourse consequently was French; al-Zayyat had noted French articles by her in (Zionist) Leon Castro’s La Liberte. She had gruellingly taught herself enough high Arabic to passively follow al-Zayyat’s writings: but still necessarily wrote all her letters to him in French, so that he
A 1939 article that the tawjihī (sciences) student Ahmad Muhammad Zayn published in the Alexandria secondary school magazine Majallat al-Masa‘i al-Mashkurah assessed the influence that Western languages and life-patterns exerted upon the new middle-class generation at the outbreak of World War II. The Masa‘i al-Mashkurah were a chain of Arabic-medium private schools that imparted modern knowledge and skills, as well as Islam. Zayn underscored how the presence of non-Arabic-speaking European communities, notably Greeks and Italians, stimulated limited active use of French or English by middle-class as well as wealthy Egyptians. The injecting of Western words into Arabic speech had especially spread among fashionable Egyptian women: the writer challenged his readers to pass through the leading (European-owned) stores to hear for themselves "what will make you laugh or weep". Walking one summer along Stanley Bay --- frequented by the resident European element but also increasingly by educated young acculturated Muslims ready to defy Islam’s conventions of dress and separation of the sexes --- Zayn "heard only seldom an Egyptian speaking Arabic". (Cf Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat’s puritanical reactions in 1933 and 1945: B 246 fn). Ahmad Zayn’s fellow secondary students extensively larded their conversations with French phrases. The wide diffusion of European languages in Egypt was due to the prestige won by the West through its military might: "the conquered ever imitate the conqueror". Splinters of Western languages were also spread in urban Egyptian society through the acculturated Egyptian upper classes’ use of them as a marker to register their ascendancy over monolingual Egyptian classes.

The by then veteran litterateurs of the generation we sample were very worried by the persistent lowly status of Arabic in those urban enterprises that resident Europeans dominated in the 1930s and 1940s. al-Zayyat:

You may enter any store or bank or some casino or a company and read only advertisements and documents in a foreign script and hear only foreign languages ... If

had to translate for excerpting in al-Risalah. The need of two Egyptians to use two languages to communicate aroused his "bitter fury" against the foreign-language missionary schools that broke "national unity". Miss Hayat had resisted all efforts of nuns and classmates to convert her from Islam --- but she had internalized there West European prescriptions on the roles of the two sexes. Moving towards al-Zayyat’s liberal conservatism, she by 1939 rejected the "permissiveness" of the al-Jazirah function of the [Prince] Muhammad 'Ali Charity, where the top elite’s men and women mixed freely with Parisian manners, gambled and danced. "Min Barid al-Risalah: Bayn al-Risalah wal-Mar‘ah" (al-Risalah’s Mail: Between al-Risalah and Woman), al-Risalah 1 June 1933 pp. 3-4; "Min Barid al-Risalah: Jawab al-Anisah Hayat" (al-Risalah’s Mail: Miss Hayat’s Reply), al-Risalah 15 June 1933 pp. 3-4; and "Min Barid al-Risalah" (In al-Risalah’s Mail) written 26 February 1939: Wahy v. 2 pp. 163-166.

82. Ahmad Muhammad Zayn in Majallat al-Masa‘i al-Mashkurah 1939 number 2 (2nd year) p. 11.
you try to communicate in Arabic because you are proud of it or know no other tongue, you shrink in the eye of the person you address so that he speaks to you with utter inattention. To save Egyptians' capacity to use Arabic, al-Zayyat in 1936 demanded that the Egyptian government "expel the linguistic occupation from the companies". Sharing the alarm of the older intellectuals, Ahmad Husayn's "Young Egypt" movement exhorted Egyptians in 1938: "Do not speak except in Arabic, and do not reply to anyone who does not speak to you in it, and do not enter any premises the name of which is not written in Arabic.

Older liberal intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s noted with concern that the new government mass primary and secondary education still failed to ground new generations in the integral Arabic language. Ahmad Amin from 1929 to 1953 published a series of books that in aggregate reviewed the whole of classical Islamic-Arab history in its Prophetic, Rashidi, Umayyad and 'Abbasid periods. In 1933 he warned that even up-and-coming writers were not linguistically equipped to understand ancient classical Arab texts. In the later 1920s, Haykal had become sharply aware how difficult it was for modern-educated Egyptians to follow the style or presentation of classical Islamic histories. His first of many histories of non-Egyptian classical Arabs was his 1935 Hayat Muhammad (The Life of Muhammad): he wrote it lest "growing youth" at foreign Christian educational institutions in particular might "change" from attenuated Islam to Christianity.

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83. al-Zayyat, "Istiqlal al-Lughah" (Linguistic Independence) written 3 December 1936 for al-Risalah; Wahy v. 1 pp. 336-337. Cf B 178 fn. The Westernist Copt Salamah Musa did not lack a touch of the same blending of linguistic (Arabic-focussed) and economic resentment of resident foreigners: Ghali Shukri, Salamah Musa p. 50 (citing a 1932 statement).

84. Ibid p. 339. al-Zayyat in this article mentioned several bilingualizing agencies in Egyptian life in which he wanted Arabic to replace the dominant European languages: trade fairs, industrial enterprises, places of pleasure, shops, banks, casinos, aristocratic bars and clubs, the mixed courts, and in regard to establishing Arabic as the educational medium "the foreign schools, ... faculties of the Egyptian University" (the science faculty especially?) "Istiqlal al-Lughah" passim.

85. "'al-Mabadi' al-'Asharatu likayma takunu Jundiyyan min Junudi Misr al-Fatat" (The Ten Principles by Which you May Become One of the Soldiers of Young Egypt), Misr al-Fatat 17 February 1938 p. 16. For further linguistic compensation pushing Misr al-Fatat from particularist to Arab nationalism see B 179fn.

86. The works were Fajr al-Islam (The Dawn of Islam) published in 1929; Duha al-Islam (Islam's Pre-Noon) published in 3 volumes 1933-1936; and Zuhr al-Islam (Islam’s Noon), published in 4 volumes.

87. Ahmad Amin, "Turathuna 1-Qadim" (Our Ancient Heritage) al-Risalah 15 March 1933.

88. Haykal observed in 1929 that numerous though classical Arab histories were, their extensive material "has been presented in old forms and images unsuited to modern thought and taste". "Tanzimu Dirasat al-Ta’irik al-Misri" (Organizing the Study of Egyptian History) al-Siyasat al-Yawmiyyah 12 April 1929 quoted Smith Islam and the Search p. 99. This specific article was focussed on Egypt’s history in the Arab-Islamic period.

modern high Arabic journales for them, omitting supernatural themes in the classical histories as accretions.

Many graduates of secondary schools into the 1950s could not read with appreciation the older acculturated intellectuals' simplified neo-classical Arabic, let alone get through works by classical Arabs. With concern, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat early in the 1950s noted "youth's hatred of [literary] Arabic", a hatred not due to it being inherently difficult but "to the poor methods used to teach it". Not great classical Arab works nor the limited modern Egyptian literature, but masterpieces read in Western languages first inspired some young Egyptians to try to write poetry and other high literature. In this pattern of acculturation, raw European content and idioms flooded into Arabic literature without adaption to its past legacy. Indeed, as al-Zayyat observed, when such West-inspired youth tried to become creative writers, their limited literary Arabic could not cope and they therefore wrote in the colloquial\(^{90}\).

Acculturation and Deculturation: Overview

The preceding review showed that Westerners and Western languages continually threatened the survival of classical Arabic from 1892-1952. This made nationalism in Egypt likelier to take ethno-linguistic --- rather than territorial --- turns. Overall, the odds, more than demoralizing, galvanized West-transformed Egyptians to explore, defend and extend neo-classical Arabic within modernity as the core of selfhood. In India, English was Western civilization and interaction with Westerners largely a one-on-one relationship with Anglosaxons. Egypt was different. The ultra-international context of Britain's rule, outreach by Egyptians to France, the elite's penchant to balance English with French in acculturation, the non-British, Francophone European minority in Egypt, all made Egyptians always see a range of Western polities and cultures together. The diverse nature of Egypt's exposure to Westerners thus encouraged intellectuals to think in terms of wide blocs: (a) Europe, the West and (b) Arabs/Muslims/Easterners.

\(^{90}\) "Shababun wa Shuyukh 'aw 'Ammiyyatun wa Fusha" (Youths and Old Men or Colloquial and Classical Arabic) Wahy, v. 4 pp. 121-122. al-Zayyat appealed to young men who wanted to become creative writers to devote the same "effort" and "time" they directed to "the study of French or English" to mastering standard Arabic. Ibid.
KEY ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

THE TURCO-CIRCASSIANS

The declining Muslim Turkish-speaking minority affected the evolution of Egyptian pan-Arabism in diverse ways after 1882. Some have argued that having a non-Arab 'Alid dynasty delayed the cohering of Arab national identifications and pan-Arab policies in Egypt. The TCs, by existing and as patrons, tended to make supra-Egyptian community supra-Arab as well --- pan-Islamic or pan-Eastern. Yet if the 'Alid family connected Egyptians to the Turkish Ottoman elite, into which it was so incestuously, so competitively locked, that also opened up some ethnicizing relations with Arabs under Ottoman rule, too.

Small Turkish-speaking groups have played crucial political and social roles in Egypt over a millenium of its Islamic history. Arab forces conquered Egypt in 640-642; following appointment as acting governor of Egypt in 868, Ahmad Ibn Tulun, son of a Turkic slave from Bukhara, used a Turcophone slave-army to start a dynasty of governors in Egypt (868-905) virtually independent of the 'Abbasid Caliphs. Rule from Constantinople by Ottoman Turks who used Turkish as one language of administration (1517-1798), and the weight of Turco-Circassians under Muhammad 'Ali and the Khedives brought Turkish loan-words into colloquial Egyptian Arabic. Such language-oriented Egyptians as 'Abdallah al-Nadim and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat (A 120, 258), abhorred the Turks' use of Turkish in administering Egypt and other Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

The secularist Copt Salamah Musa, on the grounds that all Prime Ministers, most Ministers and many wealthy families were then "Turkish" and that it was fashionable to spend one's summer holidays in Istanbul, thought late 19th-century Egypt "in reality a Turkicized

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91. "There are multiple reasons underlying the absence of a sense of Arabism among Egyptians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. ...The major developments in nineteenth century Egypt --- equally in the political, the socio-economic and the intellectual spheres --- pulled articulate Egyptians towards concepts of Egyptian territorial patriotism rather than towards ethnic-linguistic nationalism. Thus, Egypt's de facto separate political existence under the family of Muhammad 'Ali; ...the non-Arab (Turco-Circassian and European) origin of much of Egypt's elite." James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914", The Muslim World v. 70 nos 3-4 1980 pp. 245 - 246.

92. al-Nadim, especially, felt that the use of Turkish for government threatened Arabic in the Ottoman Empire’s Arab regions. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha'" (Language and Composition), al-Ustadh 1892 p. 176. Relevant here is Stanford J. Shaw's observation that many materials originating in Egypt sent by Ottoman officials to Constantinople prior to 1807 were in Arabic. Shaw, "Turkish Source-Materials for Egyptian History", Holt, Political and Social Change p. 33.
society". This culture that persistently bulked large to Arab Egyptians was, however, dying. The religious-legal Islamic establishment centred in al-Azhar had remained an alternative elite diffusing high Arabic, including for Turks. Muhammad 'Ali's new Europe-modelled army was mainly officered by Turkish-speakers and Turkish therefore was often a medium of instruction in the military colleges he founded. From the outset, however, Arab Egyptians were the majority of students in fields crucial for modernization such as Agriculture and Medicine with the result that colleges teaching them used Arabic. Turkish could not continue in Egypt as a medium within modernizing education, although influential TCs made sure that it was taught as a subject in government schools under the British in order to transmit a passive reading knowledge to new generations. The Kamilists' pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism was supportive of keeping Turkish as a subject, although primarily intent to make Qur'an-derived standard Arabic pervade all education. Before the British conquest, as Arab Egyptian recruits increasingly outnumbered Turkish officials, Arabic had replaced Turkish as the language of government administration; it also became the language of deliberation of the Constitutional Assembly and even of the Council of Ministers (largely Turco-Circassian). Under British rule the linguistic Arabization of the

94. "Even under Muhammad 'Ali, a majority of the qadis is the towns and villages outside of Cairo were native Egyptians rather than Ottoman Turks". Samuel Becker Grant Jr, *Modern Egypt and the New Turco-Egyptian Aristocracy* (University of Michigan: Ph.D 1968) p. 91.
95. In the elite Staff College at Khanqah, geometry was taught in Turkish and arithmetic in Arabic although French was the chief medium of instruction. J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (London: Luzac, 1939) p. 119. The Nakilah at Jidah Abad to train junior officers had 500 students in 1826 who were mainly taught in Turkish, which they spoke but could not write; although there were three European instructors and mainly modern European knowledge was being taught. Ibid p. 120. In the Damietta Infantry School for officers and under-officers, Turkish, Arabic and Persian were taught. Ibid p. 138.
96. Grant traced this pattern from Ilyas Zakhura'h's biographies of lesser as well as major Turco-Circassian figures. Grant, *Turco-Egyptian Aristocracy* p. 115.
97. A 1903 *al-Liwa'* article assailed the British-directed Egyptian Education Department because it had reduced Turkish to an optional subject in its schools, a derogation from Egypt's status as a possession of the Ottoman State. "Mudarris" (A Teacher) "Dusturun am Istibdad" (Constitution or Despotism), *al-Liwa'*, 10 January 1903, pp. 1-2.
98. For the ethnic-Arab terminology with which the Khedive Sa'id exhorted non-TC Egyptians to seize opportunities for recruitment as officials and army officers, see Baer, "Social Change" p. 148. The ethnic tension as the growing numbers of Arab Egyptian recruits came to challenge more experienced TC officials with technical skills is traced in F. Hunter, "Egypt's High Officials in Transition to a Turkish to a Modern Administrative Elite, 1849-1879", *Middle Eastern Studies* v. 19 (July 1983) pp. 277-300. Stanford J. Shaw observed that "while the language of administration gradually became Arabic, especially under Muhammad 'Ali and his successors, the bulk of government records were kept in Turkish until late in the 19th century". Shaw, "Turkish Source-Materials for Egyptian History", Holt, *Political and Social Change* p. 33.
99. Grant, *Turco-Circassian Aristocracy* p. 121. The Khedive Sa'id (ruled 1854-1863) made Arabic the official language of government and the Khedive Isma'il in 1869 made it the official language of the country. Ibid.
Turco-Circassians entered the final stage (excepting the royal Khedivial court milieu). Arabic showed more vitality than Turkish as a medium for journalism directed to, or preferred by, Egyptians of Turco-Circassian extraction after 1882 --- with the wholly Arabic al-Mu’ayyad the main mouthpiece of the TC Khedive ’Abbas. In the twentieth-century, members of the minority increasingly intermarried with Arab Egyptians, previously uncommon: Haykal’s wife and Tawfiq al-Hakim’s mother were TC.

The exception to comprehensive linguistic Arabization was the ’Alid royal family, the minority’s apex. From 1892 to 1914, the Khedive ’Abbas Hilmi was Egypt’s nominal head of state under the British. His financial support of movements of protest against British rule gave him prominence in the minds of Egyptians in those years. The public ceremonies of ’Abbas’ reign strongly impressed upon his subjects that he (and the whole ’Alid family) was Turkish-speaking. "Until his death in 1973, Taha Husayn remembered how boys of school age in his native province of Menya, Upper Egypt, were taught to chant a Turkish song about justice, equality and liberty when a train carrying the Khedive ’Abbas stopped in town": none comprehended the Turkish.

100. al-Oan!An al-Asasi, published by Muhammad Qadri at the turn of the century, was one of the last papers with Turkish as well as Arabic sections. Grant, Turco-Circassian Egyptian Aristocracy p. 128. The secularist Cpt Salamah Musa recalled that scions of aristocratic Turco-Circassian families routinely read the wholly Arabic al-Mu’ayyad at turn-of-century as the mouthpiece of the Khedive and their class: P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1969) p. 226. That anti-Hamidian and then anti-CUP emigres from Turkey itself used Egypt as a base from which they published anti-regime magazines in Turkish, kept some TCs, too, in touch with the latest forms of the language. Nineteenth century Arabic-Turkish bilingualism among TCs sometimes matched the totalistic high-culturist trilingualism (Turkish-Arabic-Persian) characteristic of court strata in Istanbul. Cairo-born TC ’A’ishah al-Taymuriyyah (1840-1902), a pioneer writer on women’s issues like the veil and unveiledness, was an archaist given to rhymed-prose she modelled upon such mannered ‘Abbasid literature as the Kalilah wa Dimnah of Ibn al-Muqaffa’ and the maqamat of al-Hamadhani and al-Hariri (cf B 107fn and B 500-501): she also brought out diwans in Turkish and Persian. Her poetical eulogy was concentrated upon the Khedive. Sincerity and taste in her poetry still won her analysis in Haykal’s modernist al-Siyasat al-Usbu’iyyah in 1928 and an edition of her diwan as late as 1952. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 238-240. She was appreciated by SC authoress Mayy Ziyadah (1886-1941), al-Siyasah al-Usbu’iyyah’s women’s page editor, as a pioneer of Arab women’s literature and emancipation. Widad Sakakini, Mayy Ziyadah: Fi Hayatiha wa Athariha (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif nd) p. 96fn. Cf Cairo-born TC Hasan Husni al-Tuwayrani (1850-1897) who edited Turkish newspapers in Istanbul and Arabic ones in Cairo. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 580-583.

101. Grant, Turco-Circassian Aristocracy pp. 129-131. Towards the turn of the twentieth century "among Turkish women it was considered advantageous to marry an aspiring government employee of Egyptian birth and this was undoubtedly the case with" the [Turco-Circassian] mother of the Egyptian playwright Tawfiq al-Hakim (1889-1987). The contempt she voiced towards (Arab) "Egyptians", though, figured in al-Hakim’s fiction and drama. Ibid p. 131.

'Alid royalty over many decades drew Egyptians into varied cultural as well as political interactions with the Turks of the Ottoman State and then Mustafa Kemal’s republic of Turkey. The Khedive Isma’il (r. 1863-1879) naturalized musical modes of the Ottoman Turks so that they provided one component of subsequent modern Egyptian music. The Turco-Circassian 'Alid milieu continued to diffuse Turkey’s music in the post-1922 Egyptian nation-state. The 'Alid Prince Muhammad 'Ali, in 1926, arranged for a visiting Turkish orchestra to perform its music in his palace; he invited figures from Egypt’s political and social elite. Many of the Prince’s cultural interests would foster a specific Arab identity; yet this item’s terminology illustrated how his and his 'Alid royal House’s special ethnic links with Turkey’s Turks was one factor that, for the 1920s, blurred supra-Egyptian pan-Arab community out to a supra-national pan-'Eastern' community identification. Of those Arab Egyptians present at Prince Muhammad 'Ali’s 1926 function, the lawyer Ibrahim al-Hilbawi more than a decade before in March 1914 had publicly condemned the Young Turks’ arrest of the Egypto-Ottoman officer 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri, involved in Arab ethnic movements in the Ottoman Empire, although in the name of Egyptians’ even friendship for "the Ottoman community whether Turkish or Arab" (al-ummat al-'Uthmaniyyah Turkiiyyatan aw 'Arabiyyah).

Turco-Circassians in the 1920s legitimized their continuing non-Arab identity and

103. "Isma’il, who found the Turkish art more pleasing to the ear, sent his court minstrel 'Abd al-Hamuli to Constantinople to become better acquainted with Turkish music. He later returned with an entire orchestra; in time such forms as Turkish melodic and rhythmical modes became institutionalized as types of Egyptian music". Grant, Turco-Egyptian Aristocracy pp. 126-127.

104. "Haflatun Musiqiyyatun Sha'iqah fi Saray al-Manyal" (A Spendid Musical Performance at [Prince Muhammad 'Ali’s] al-Manyal Palace) al-Muqattam 12 January 1926 p. 5. (The name and ethnic group of writer was not indicated). Among those invited were the Turco-Circassian Liberal Constitutionalists’ party leader 'Ali Yakan (to be Prime Minister in the ministry of 7 June 1926 - 19 April 1927); the Sa’idi Arab-Egyptian Muhammad Mahmud, a great landowner, future Minister of Education in 'Ali Yakan’s Ministry and Prime Minister 27 June 1928 to 2 October 1929, and in three ministries from 30 December 1937 to 12 August 1939; Isma’il Sidqi, of Turco-Circassian descent, fellow-exile with Zaghlul in the Seychelles but to rule Egypt in anti-Wafd autocracy from June 1930 to September 1933; and Ibrahim al-Hilbawi.

105. The al-Muqattam item on the function of Turkish music mentioned that Prince Muhammad 'Ali had built up a beautiful collection of Arab art objects (al-athar al-'Arabiyyah) at his al-Manyal palace, and "encouraged" outstanding artists of "Arab music in particular and Eastern music in general". He, however, did this as part of a general endeavor to "raise up the East" and realize "the welfare of the Easterners" --- not a discrete Arab entity. Ibid.

106. "Khutbatu Hilbawi Bik fi Haflat 'Aziz Bik al-Misri" (Mr Hilbawi’s Speech at the Meeting About 'Aziz al-Misri), al-Muqattam 26 March 1914 pp. 1-2. Cf fn 68. al-Hilbawi was an old disciple of al-Afghani who acted for the British as prosecutor against the peasants of Dinshaway in 1906; he was elected President of the National Bar association upon its formation in 1912. For al-Hilbawi see Farhat Ziadeh, Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 1968) p. 39. He was associated with the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists after 1922.
ongoing special relationship with Turkey’s Turks when they participated in the pan-Eastern identification. The former palace official Ahmad Shafiq was on the Administrative Council of the Eastern League Society founded in February 1922; 'Alid princes 'Umar Tusun and Yusuf Kamal partly financed the Eastern League’s monthly, published from 1928107. Shaykh Rashid Rida, and perhaps other Arabs from West Asia in the League, had an Arab-centrism steeled in conflicts with Ottoman Turks; but TC participation in it held up the demarcation of the discrete pan-Arabism crystallizing within pan-Easternism in the 1920s (Ch. 8).

Pre-1914 pan-Islamism and then a pan-Easternism that could accommodate Ataturk’s de-Islamizing Turkey, may have validated Turco-Circassians keeping up contact with Turkish and Turkey. 'Alid princes and other TCs were at the fore of organizing Egyptian aid to Turkey during the 1911-1912 Italo-Ottoman War. Yet the relationship between the expansionist house of Muhammad 'Ali and the Ottoman Sultans (self-styled "Caliphs") had been one of conflict from the outset. 'Abbas II’s prolonged public subversion --- ably aided by the Prince Muhammad 'Ali himself! --- of Arabs chafing under Turkish rule, made Arab Egyptians hyper-aware of early Arab nationalism in West Asia. It sucked into Arab-Turkish conflict even Egyptian nationalists aligned with the Ottoman Turks within pan-Islamism (Chs. 5 and 6).

TC Links to Arabness. Egypt’s Arabness somewhat attuned 'Alid royalty to understand Arab national feelings. Even the 'Alid royal family only partially withstood the general Arabization of Turco-Circassians. Harry Boyle, a British official who knew Arabic and Turkish, wrote that the Khedives "Sa’id and Isma’il spoke at best only a sort of broken Arabic jargon"108: yet preliminary, passive Arabization already was under way in the case of Isma’il, for he patronized and regularly viewed nippy colloquial comedies written by such a pioneer of Egypt’s early Arabic theater as Jewish-Egyptian Ya’qub Sannu’ (1839-1912)109. The Khedive 'Abbas II spoke Turkish most naturally and for formal purposes was most at home in French but did communicate with Arab Egyptians in colloquial Egyptian Arabic: indeed for many years he

conducted an Egyptian independence movement and numerous intrigues with Ottoman Arabs, in spoken Arabic \textsuperscript{110}.

The 'Alid family did somewhat promote high literary Arabic as one emblem of their state’s autonomy from the Ottoman Turks. The 'Alid Prince 'Umar Tusun used neo-classical Arabic as the learned language in which he wrote his books on modern Egyptian history and exploration of the Nile Valley \textsuperscript{111}. In the interwar period Tusun gave leadership and finance to the Kamilists’ rump al-Hizb al-Watani against the Wafd \textsuperscript{112} and encouraged calls for (a) an Egypt-based Caliphate to replace that abolished by Mustafa Kemal in 1924 and for (b) some pan-Easternism/proto-pan-Arabism alternative to post-1922 insularist particularism. Another tri-cultured Arabism-tinctured Turco-Circassian prominent in the Turcophone Khedivial milieu was Ahmad Shafiq Pasha (1860-1940), a leading historian in Arabic of modern Egypt and its politics \textsuperscript{113}: as a pan-Easternist in the 1920s he helped lead Palestinians as well as Egyptians to narrowed pan-Arabism (B 47fn). He was chief of the Khedivial cabinet under 'Abbas Hilmi, with whom he spoke Turkish \textsuperscript{114}. Despite this Turkish-pervaded work-milieu, Shafiq was friendly with some Arabs who weakened Egyptians’ relationship with the Ottoman Turks --- among them Muhammad 'Abduh’s disciple Rashid Rida, the Syrian-Egyptian writer who developed the salafiyyah (Islamic reformative return to Islam’s first pious generations) in the direction of anti-Turk, secessionist, Arab nationalism. Shafiq was also close to the M-E Arab

\textsuperscript{110} Muhammad Farid, Kamil’s successor as leader of the Patriotic Party, excerpted copious, fluent colloquial Arab retorts made by 'Abbas during his acrimonious political conversations with Mustafa Kamil, Farid and watani Mahmud al-Nasr in August 1904 in the French spar-town of Divonne. Farid, Awraq Muhammad Farid v. 1 pp. 51-52. Harry Boyle’s judgement that “Abbas II did not get beyond a style of speech acquired from the native servants of the harem” (Grant, Turco-Egyptian Aristocracy p. 114) does not square with 'Abbas’ use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic as the medium through which he conducted his prolonged political relationship with Kamil, Farid and many other watans in organized Egyptian nationalism. He also turned his Arabic to good use to subvert Ottoman Arabs throughout his reign.

\textsuperscript{111} A listing of Prince 'Umar Tusun’s numerous Arabic works was given by Yusuf As’ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah, v. 2 pp. 574-577.

\textsuperscript{112} In regard to Egypt’s domestic politics, after World War I Tusun headed (along with Turco-Circassian ex-Prime Minister Muhammad Sa’id) the al-Wafd al-Watani (“the Patriotic Wafd”), a short-lived alternative to Zaghlul’s Wafd, to demand independence from the British. Most of al-Wafd al-Watani’s other members belonged to the administrative committee of al-Hizb al-Watani (the Patriotic Party), that Mustafa Kamil had founded. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., "The National Party from Spotlight to Shadow", Asian and African Studies (Haifa) March 1982 pp. 22-23. The Turco-Circassian ex-Prime Minister Muhammad Sa’id, financed the full slate of candidates that al-Hizb al-Watani ran against the Wafd in the 1923 elections. Ibid, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{113} Yusuf As’ad Daghir listed the numerous books published by Shafiq in Arabic and French on modern Egypt and its unfolding current politics. Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v. 2, pp. 185-187.

Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1867-1934) who as a translator and finally General-Secretary of the Egyptian Council of Ministers between 1892 and 1922, drove Turkish as well as European loanwords from government Arabic (Zaki’s post-1922 Arabism: B 77 - 90).

The classical Arabs’ language patterns and their past in desert pre-Islamic peninsular Arabia, 'Abbasid ’Iraq, Muslim Andalusia etc, were salient in the poetry and dramas of TC Ahmad Shawqi --- which on publication immediately electrified and transformed Arabs from Morocco to ’Iraq115. Like Shafiq, Shawqi (1868-1932) was educated in France (in law) at Khedivial expense, and was long the Khedive ’Abbas’ court laureate. Racially non-Arab, Shawqi grew up in a Turkish-speaking household116, while French was the language of his formal education and intellectual culture: he early steeped himself in Victor Hugo, Musset and Lamartine, as well as such classical Arab poetical models as Ibn al-Rumi and al-Mutanabbi117. Shawqi’s situation as a Turco-Circassian in Arab Egypt sometimes influenced him to evoke a

115. Works by Shawqi upon classical Arab subjects, some of them set in pre-Islamic peninsular Arabia, included his 1931 poetical drama Majnun Layla, his 1932 Amirat al-Andalus (inspired by his period of exile in Spain during World War I as a man of the Khedive ’Abbas) and his 1932 drama 'Antarah. There is a good discussion of Majnun Layla in Antoine Boudot-Lamotte, Ahmad Shawqi: L’Homme et L’Oeuvre (Universite de Lille III: Service de Reproduction des Theses 1974) v. 1 pp. 523-535. In accord with the ethnicism of classical Arabo-Andalusian sources, Shawqi in Amirat al-Andalus or Ghaniyat al-Andalus depicted the King of Seville, al-Mu’tamid Ibn ’Abbad, as a noble sensitive poet he had been cruelly wronged by Morocco’s puritanical --- Berber --- Murabit despot Yusuf Ibn Tashufin. When al-Mu’tamid and other petty Muslim kings of Spain called Yusuf in a second time to beat back Alfonso V of Castille, Yusuf sent him into exile in Morocco to herd camels: al-Mu’tamid died there in chains, a pauper. There is an interesting illustration of the speed with which Shawqi’s poetry and drama were propagated across the length and breadth of the Arab world and the intense emotions they released. When, in 1933, the play was performed by a Fas troupe in Marrakish, which contains Yusuf’s grave, the Moroccan poet Muhammad Ibrahim, a nationalist activist, wrote an ode defending his actions as in defence of Islam, and mocking al-Mu’tamid and Shawqi. The luxurious hedonism of al-Mu’tamid --- indeed, that of the Spanish Muslims in general --- was reviled and it was charged that al-Mu’tamid had made Alfonso such a menace in the first place by allying with him against other Muslim petty monarchs. Mustafa al-Qasri, "al-Shi’rn fi Khidmat al-Haqiqah wal-Ta’rikh" (Poetry in the Service of Historical Truth), al-Bahth al-‘Ilmi (Muhammad V University, Rabat) v. 1:1 January-April 1964 pp. 113-128.

116. For Shawqi’s sense, blending criteria of cultures and the diverse stocks of his extended family, that he was simultaneously Arab, Turkish, Greek and especially Circassian, Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 9fn. In this passage, Shawqi was very aware that not just he but both his parents were born in Egypt, where some forefathers were buried: homelands integrate plural blood-identities. Ibid. For classical Arabic’s compulsive hold over him as his choice as literary medium despite his family and education rather inculcating Turkish and French, Berque, Egypt p. 356.

117. An extravagant tribute by Shawqi to Victor Hugo showed how much that ultra-political French poet-novelist had shaped his own verse, never far from current politics. Boudot-Lamotte, Shawqi v. 1 p. 738. Shawqi had not frequented literary circles while studying in France and Taha Husayn regretted his glaringly sectional exploration of French literature: Shawqi gained so much from Lamartine but never spoke of Baudelaire, Verlaine, Prudhomme or Mallarme --- he had never examined such “philosophers” as Taine, Renan and Borges. For Taha, this failure to attempt a comprehensive self-acculturation was typical of young Egyptians who studied in Europe at the turn of the century. Ibid v. 1 pp. 141-142, 747.
territorial Egyptian nationhood open to all who lived in the land regardless of their racial origins or languages (eg. his 1917 play *The Death of Cleopatra*). Prior to World War 1, his political poetry encouraged pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottoman Turks against Christian nationalities and states; after 1922 he became a pan-Arab culture symbol --- and himself contributed to pan-Arabism with poetical tributes to Libyan and Syrian uprisings against imperialists (B 11fn; B 76fn) and to King Faysal I of ’Iraq. Shawqi and the less elegantly neo-classicist Arab-Egyptian Hafiz Ibrahim (1871-1932) were older-generation poets who offered al-Jaridah modernists like Muhammad Husayn Haykal a poetical idiom both directed to topical issues, and continuous with the classical Arabs’ masterpieces: Haykal and others in their very Egyptianist criticisms kept up understanding of that supra-Egyptian idiom (B 384-386).

Egypto-Turco-Circassians always had at hand multiple ethnic identifications --- Turco-Ottoman, Arab, territorial-Egyptian --- from which they could unpredictably select, but also blend, at any point. They played both pan-Islamizing and narrower pan-Arabizing roles, connecting Arab Egyptians to factions and movements among both Turkish and Arab Ottomans. Subjective influence: while most elite Arab Egyptians did allow themselves to be influenced, some --- notably Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat --- denied hard-core Turco-Circassians title to be Egyptians or participants in high Arab culture or to play important roles in Islam. Anachronistic, mythological ethnic images of Turco-Circassians as oppressors of Arab Egyptians and enemies of Arabic did, projected outwards, help lead Arab Egyptians to a conjunction with Arab nationalists in West Asia who had revolted against a very different set of Turkish-speakers (al-Zayyat: B 302-318).

THE RESIDENT SYRIAN CHRISTIANS

The Syrian Christians, like the Turco-Circassians, were a tiny minority central in the...
thoughts of Arab-Muslim Egyptians into the early 1930s. This was in part due to the weight their modernist-scientific (but also restorationist-Arabist) literary contributions had for acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals aware of the peril facing the standard language under imperialism. Negatively or positively, the c. 30,000 Christian Syrians in Egypt influenced the development of pan-Islamic and pan-Arab consciousness among Muslim Egyptians more than all Egypt's native Coptic Christians, climbing to one million under British colonial rule. That newspapers established by pro-British SCs in Egypt publicized Arab national protests in the Ottoman State in the short term made some Muslim Egyptians more pro-Turkish. The SC minority's disproportionate economic success, as well as collaboration with the British occupation by key Syrian Christian journalists, sparked negative Egyptian responses to the minority and against connected West Asian Ottoman Arabs.

The Europeanizing Khedive Isma'il (r. 1863-1879) found Syrian Christian graduates of foreign European missionary schools in Lebanon-Syria useful by reason of their grasp of West European languages for the running of his modernizing administration. The English after their 1882 occupation similarly utilized such Syrian-Christian graduates as petty officials, especially those trained at the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Bayrut). Such SCs rendered essential service as physicians, pharmacists, clerks and officials in the civil and military services of the administration of Egypt and the Sudan; without them, British officials admitted, it might have been impossible to maintain the Occupation. Their Arabic made them useful to spy on and control the Egyptians. In the British colonial period, Syrian Christians won an increasingly prominent role in the modernizing sector of the Egyptian economy,

121. Philip K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present* (London: MacMillan 1957) p. 474. Cromer was much given to contemptuous generalizations about Arab "Orientals" regardless of their religion. It was a tribute with no parallel that he felt educated Christian Syrians who knew both a European language and Arabic made "intelligent employees" who "from their training and habits of thought possessed some aptitude for assimilating European administrative procedures". Quoted Fakhrel-Deen, Abdal-Rahman Shukri p. 27.
122. Anti-imperialist Muslim Egyptians' hatred against the whole Syrian Christian minority was fueled by the careers in Egypt of such oppressive immigrants as 'Abdallah Pasha Sufayr al-Shami ("the Syrian"). This Syrian Christian was born in Bayrut in 1854, and migrated to Alexandria when he was sixteen. Sufayr rose swiftly under the British from a clerk in the European Department to Assistant Commissioner of Police in Alexandria, to Commissioner of Alexandria Police, to Director of the Intelligence Police force in Egypt (under the Ministry of the Interior) from 1891 on. Muhammad Farid though that this Syrian Christian figure, an instrument of British control in Egypt, might have channeled funds to the faction from the Patriotic Party trying to bring him (Farid) down from the presidency of the Party, to which he had been elected after Mustafa Kamil's death in February 1908. Farid, *Awraq Muhammad Farid* v. 1 p. 69.
especially in the cities and towns, as middle-men, entrepreneurs and small businessmen directly competitive with the European immigrant communities. They reached perhaps 30,000 by the end of British colonial rule in 1922: this small but successful community’s disproportionate share of Egypt’s national wealth, however, was 50,000,000 pounds sterling or one-tenth in 1907. Some Syrian Christians were money-lenders in villages, and this influenced perception of the minority in Egyptian folk-lore, but the Syrians’ private enterprise had no conflict with the landowning Arab Egyptian politicians and intellectuals around al-Jaridah, who needed SC ideas for organizing a future M-E entrepreneurial-financial counter-class to the resident Europeans. A Muslim Egyptian private-enterprise bourgeoisie really got off the ground only around 1930.

**Muslim Egyptian-SC Ethnic Antagonism.** Pre-1918 acculturated M-E professionals resented that immigrant Syrians took jobs in the civil service, medicine and law that incoming British recruits and resident Europeans left over. Pressured, the veteran statesman Riyad Pasha almost issued a law in 1900 prohibiting Syrian immigrants from taking up government positions. Between 1892 and 1914, the Kamilists denounced dukhala’ (intruders) and ghuraba’ (aliens) who served the British and exploited Egypt.

The religious difference was crucial among the factors keeping Syrian Christians a group apart from the Muslim-majority Egyptian host community, despite residence in Egypt that had

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123. Hitti, *Lebanon in History* p. 474. The British did not collect precise statistics of the number of Syrian Christians resident at given times in Egypt during their rule. They tended to lump them in one category with Muslim immigrants from Syria or even with all immigrants from the whole Ottoman Empire. "It is not possible to state how many Syrian Christians there are in Egypt". Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (London: MacMillan, 1908) v. II, p. 214. Philipp’s rough estimate, based on an "extremely low birthrate", projected that Egypt in 1910 had a Syrian Christian community made up of 10,000 Greek Catholics, 6,000 Maronites and 5,000 Syrian Orthodox. Philipp, *Syrians in Egypt* p. 86. Over one in 15 Greek Catholics, one of 50 Maronites and one of 60 Greek Orthodox in Lebanon-Syria had migrated to Egypt.

124. Cromer wrote that a Syrian "usurer" was to be found in almost every village of rural Egypt and that Syrians were thus "regarded by the mass of the population with those feelings of dislike which improvident debtors usually entertain towards creditors who hold them in their grip". Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (London: MacMillan 1908) v. II, p. 214.


126. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, *al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu’asir* (Bayrut: Dar al-Irshad 1970) v. 2 p. 213. Total exclusion of Syrian Christians from government posts was not pursued. By late 1902, however, al-Muqattam complained that the doors to government positions were being closed in the faces of Syrian applicants. For instance, the Egyptian Department of Health now gave preference in recruitment to Egyptian graduates of the Qasr al'-Ayni Medical School, and was reluctant to employ qualified Syrian doctors. "Misr wal-Muhajarah" (Egypt and Migration) al-Muqattam 1 December 1902 p. 1.
extended to several generations by the Palestine War of 1948. Christianity and Islam ruled out
assimilation through intermarriage\textsuperscript{127}. Clearly, though, Muslim Syrian immigrants shared with
the SCs characteristics of dialect, non-Egyptian customs and separate homeland of origin ---
bonds that helped draw all sects of Syrians together into specific urban areas\textsuperscript{128}. The ultimate
point of the Kamilists' fear of sniping against Ottoman governments from the emigre SC press,
was that it might recruit Muslim Arabs in West Asia, starting with such Muslim Egypto-Syrian
resident intellectuals as Rashid Rida, the editor of 'Abduh's al-Manar. Rida regarded the
Kamilists' denunciations of Syrian "intruders" as also targeted against Muslim intellectuals like
himself, and indeed the immigrant Muslim Syrians in general. Rida's support for 'Abduh's
attempts to reform al-Azhar, controlled by the Khedive 'Abbas, also led the M-E al-Mu'ayyad
and the Kamilists to include him in the dukhala'\textsuperscript{129}. Rida skilfully tried to unite Muslim and
Christian Syrians both in the diaspora and in an Arab autonomist movement in Ottoman West
Asia itself\textsuperscript{130}, projected from al-Jaridah as well as the SC al-Muqattam (Chapter 6). Some
Muslim Egyptian hostility to SCs associated Muslim Syrians with them: the secularist Copt
Salamah Musa juxtaposed neo-classicist Islamit poet Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi‘i whose family had
come from Syria\textsuperscript{131}.

**Syrian Christian Contributions to Arabic**

SC Culturist Arab Neo-Classicism. Economic and political factors set SC and Muslim
Egyptians in conflict, but SC writers made possible whole sectors of the Arab culture and

\textsuperscript{127} Economist Charles Issawi (SC), who was born in 1916 and grew up in Egypt, wrote after the
monarchy collapsed: "the relative absence of race feeling, together with the fact that women are prohibited from
marrying non-Muslims, has greatly increased the country's capacity to assimilate Muslims, while making extremely
difficult any solution to the problems presented by its non-Muslim minorities. Lebanese and Syrian Christians, for
instance, find themselves still unassimilated after five or six generations of unbroken residence in Egypt. Syrian
Muslims, on the other hand, are often Egyptianized a few years after arrival, and invariably after one generation.
Similarly, Negroes, Tunisians, Arabians and even Indians have been quite easy to assimilate". Charles Issawi, *Egypt
"Language, History and Arab National Consciousness in the Thought of Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914)", *IJMES* 4

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid, pp. 113-114. Rida's ethnicity here placed him in the position of defending as the best, SC
journals whose scientism and secularism would be happy to subvert all religion.

\textsuperscript{130} Hourani, *Arabic Thought* p. 303 and Philipp, *Syrians in Egypt* pp. 114-117.

\textsuperscript{131} By 1900, around 240 members of the al-Rafi‘i family lived in Egypt. Philipp, *Syrians in Egypt* p. 56
fn. For Salamah Musa's evocation of Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi‘i's Syrian descent in a 1929-1931 campaign from
al-Majallat al-Jadidah to discredit his neo-classicist, Islamit message, A 335 fn 126.
personality Egyptians developed. Hourani has rightly noted the zeal with which Lebanon/Syria’s Christian clergy, especially the Maronite clergy, from the eighteenth century studied antique Arabic literature and language forms, and strove to revive them through church schools and publications. Some Maronite neo-classicists had considerable impact upon Muslim Egyptian intellectuals. Among Lebanese Catholic writers who revived the old idioms and history of the classical Arabs was Ibrahim al-Yaziji (1847-1906) who came to Egypt in 1895 and brought out there the magazine al-Diya’ (1898-1906): he meant it to be a purist watchdog on the Arabic of all writers in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. al-Yaziji’s ultra-archaising writings influenced the young M-E Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat’s development of his own neo-classical style and his acceptance of the Syrian Christians’ viewpoint that they had been oppressed by the Muslim Turks --- a stance crucial for transition by Muslim Egyptians from pan-Islam to narrowed language-determined pan-Arabism (B 332-339). Literary restoration of the classical Arabs was a joint enterprise in which, to take the ethnically-divided British colonial period, (a) Egypt-resident Syrian Christians and (b) both Mustafa Kamīl’s party and the Jaridists, and (c) Dar al-’Ulumists could all meet. The youthful Kamil encouraged the Paris-domiciled Lebanese Maronite Shukri Ghanim to write a French-language play 'Antarah, celebrating that pre-Islamic black hero, to get Arab heroism across to the French public: the play was hailed in al-Jaridah and helped inspire Ahmad Shawqi’s 1932 poetical drama Antarah. The Bayrut-resident (but 'Iraq-born) Jesuit Louis Shaykhu (1859-1928) published, and wrote literary criticism about, much pre-Islamic, Umayyad and 'Abbasid Arabic literature, stressing contributions from

132. In his 1941 tribute to the recently-deceased Mayy Ziyadah, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, under Nasser to become editor of al-Azhar’s learned journal, saw the Lebanese stream of writers as having been indispensable to the revival of the fossilized Arabic language and literature. Here he was viewing the Lebanese Christian litterateurs more as adapters and transmitters of creativity from the West; and he was primarily concerned with those SC Lebanese writers who had lived in Egypt. He however noted both integrally neo-classicist SCs --- he mentioned Ibrahim al-Yaziji’s Cairo magazine al-Diya’ (1898-1906) --- and the SC modernists around al-Mugattam and al-Muqtatita as sources of the Mayy’s "Arabism". al-Zayyat, "Bi-Munasbat al-Arba’in: Ba’d al-Kalam fi ‘Mayy” (On the Occasion of the Fortieth Day Since Her Death: Some Observations on Mayy), written 8 December 1941; Wahy al-Risalah v. 2 p. 314. Cf. B 336 fn. Ibrahim al-Yaziji agreed with the Ottoman modernists that the East was in a deplorable condition, but was concerned only with the Arabs. To him the Arabs were the most remarkable of nations because they achieved more in a short period than any other people. The Europeans had been able to progress rapidly only because they borrowed from the Arabs. The Arabs had declined after the non-Arabs (Turks) came to dominate them and reduced learning to the religious sciences and fanaticism. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism p. 132. For the influence of al-Yaziji on multi-lingualized Jaridists: A 292 fn 25).

Christian Arabs. Shaykh’s scholarship made M-E Ahmad Zaki Pasha, when pioneering pan-Arabism after World War 1, conceive Arabism as a community in which Lebanon’s Christians, as well as various Muslim populations, participated (B 86-89).

Modernization of Arabic. Christian Egypto-Syrian intellectuals crucially helped make the Arabic bequeathed by the classical Arabs the medium of political and scientific modernity. The SC brothers Salim and Bisharah Taqla launched al-Ahram, Egypt's first, greatest (and still-extant) newspaper in 1875. The pre-1882 constitutionalist movement by Arab-Muslim Egyptians against the Khedives Isma'il and Tawfiq and the Turco-Circassian caste had linguistic and Araboid aspects: SC journalists such as Salim al-Naqqash and Adib Ishaq (1856-1884) stressed their Arab identity in order to participate. In the ensuing period of British colonial rule, Syrian Christians long nearly monopolized the editorship of the important Arabic newspapers and magazines in Egypt, and at all points up to the Palestine War brought out key Arabic newspapers and magazines with mainly Muslim Egyptian readership: al-Ahram (widely read by Muslim Egyptians between 1882 and 1922 because it opposed the British occupation), another daily al-Muqattam (1889-1952), its sister science-popularizing magazine al-Muqtataf, and Jurji Zaydan’s magazine al-Hilal (founded 1892) which for decades popularized the great classical Arabs and the community of the contemporary population that spoke Arabic. These durable SC organs for decades poured into the consciousness of Egyptian Muslims an uninterrupted stream of information about Arab populations of West Asia, the Egypto-Syrians’ region of origin. Key M-E pan-Arabs like al-Zayyat and Arab League SG ’Azzam worked closely with al-Ahram SC editor Antun al-Jumayyil after 1922 (B 229-230; B 334). Sects

134. For a list of the anthologies and almost lost classical Arab ms diwans and prose works that Shaykh edited and published, Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 521-523, 517-521. Egypt was ever the arena and audience for the disputes that Syrians had with each other over the common Arab heritage: the Islamic cleric Rashid Rida’ lent his Cairene al-Manar as a platform for attacks on secularizing revaluations of the classical Arabs’ past and literature by SC Jurji Zaydan. Rida’s al-Manar Press published a critique by the equally religious Jesuit Shaykh --- a razor-penned foe of all freemasons --- of Zaydan’s new vision of Arab civilization: Intiqadu Kutubi Ta’rikh Adab al-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah wa Tabaqat al-Umam. Ta‘lif Jurii Zaydan, Daghir, Masadir v. 2. p. 518.

135. The 'Urabists' slogan Misru lil-Misriyyina (Egypt for the Egyptians) was devised or taken up by the Egyptian-resident Christian Salim al-Naqqash. The Egypt-resident SC Adib Ishaq was conscious of his specific Arab identity --- although in at least his later writings he subordinated it to Ottomanism as a broader front with which to face the Westerners. C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973) pp. 149-150, 20. Jankowski has shown that during his support for the 'Urabists, Ishaq spoke of a linguistic nationality (presumably one that would fuse immigrant Christian Syrians and Muslim Egyptians): "we in the watan are brothers joined by the bond of language". Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914" p. 252.
persisted as units among Egypto-Syrians and vis-a-vis Muslim Egyptians. Yet SC writers, in particular, wanted to forge some new community that would span all sects of Christianity and Islam. The sombre Anglo-Saxon missionary-Protestant educational background of Faris Nimr, Ya’qub Sarruf and Shahin Makarius, editors of al-Muqattam and al-Muqtataf, always tinted them and was common ground with the (likewise post-Christian?) Cromer. However, their youthful encounter with Western sciences at Bayrut’s tense (American) Syrian Protestant College had triggered their life-long propagation of Darwinism. The Arabic-medium post-Christian scientism and Darwinism of SC writers resident in Egypt was crucial for first enabling such Coptic writers as Salamah Musa and such Muslims as Taha Husayn to grapple with Western secular thought, while still within the sphere of Arabic. The Christian Egypto-Syrians were acutely attuned to developments in Western thought and societies which they then transmitted into Arabic, as we see in sometimes judicious and far-seeing dissection of

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137. For the formative impact of Darwinianism on the American-run Syrian Protestant College! --- on the Anglophone Orthodox and Protestantized Lebano-Syrians who later edited al-Muqattam and al-Muqtataf from Cairo, see N. Farag, “The Lewis Affair and the Fortunes of al-Muqtataf” in Middle Eastern Studies v. 8 (1972) pp. 73-83. For an 1893 denunciation by the early nationalist al-Nadim of the post-religious Darwinist scientism of al-Muqattam(-al-Muqtataf) --- their vulnerable point with the Egyptian public --- see A 103 fn 81. Philipp rightly remarks that “for the founders of al-Muqtataf and al-Muqattam, Faris Nimr and Ya’qub Sarruf, it was the Protestant dogmatism of the [American administrators and faculty] of the Syrian Protestant College that made them leave Bayrut in 1884 to look for better opportunities in Egypt, ... not Muslim persecution nor Ottoman oppression”. Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt, 1925-1975 p. 79. SC co-editor Khalil Thabit’s statement at the 1926 anniversary of al-Muqtataf that Egypt had been a sanctuary for “the ill-treated” avoiding naming those who had driven Nimr and Sarruf out of Lebanon-Syria in their youth: B 74. Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914), the secularized Maronite who founded the monthly al-Hilal in Cairo in 1892, had also been a medical student at the Syrian Protestant College. Probably yet another SC post-Christian freemason, he diffused such components of Anglo-Saxon civilization as the self-help work ethic, rather than Protestant Christian concepts.

138. Egypt-resident Syrian Christian modernist writers gave some Coptic as well as Muslim Egyptians their crucial first glimpse of the West. The Coptic secularist Salamah Musa, for example, stumbling benighted around 1906 in neo-classical Arabist rhetoric, instantly won from a chance copy he read of Farah Antun’s al-Jami’ah a "new perspective, a first glance of the new world of European literature ... the literature of rebellion". Musa, Education p. 41. Musa viewed Antun as a French-style “free-thinker” who popularized Nietzsche and Rousseau but also tried to take an active part in the Egyptian independence movement. Indeed, Antun even edited the Kamilists’ al-Liwa’ for a while. Ibid. p. 154. Ya’qub Sarruf, and his journal al-Muqtataf were another transformatory influence, as was the immigrant Syrian Christian Shibli Shumayyil (1850-1916) whose Arabic translation of The Origin of the Species occasioned polemics as far away as ‘Iraq. Musa, Education pp. 33, 37-38, 124, 254. This was the translation of Darwin that Lutfi al-Sayyid read as a secondary school student: Smith, Islam and the Search p. 25; Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 208. As late as a 1950 number of al-Muqtataf, Salamah paid grateful tribute to all he had gained from the journal as reader and contributor over 50 years. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 p. 545. For the sciencizing impact of Sarruf and al-Muqattam on the adolescent Taha while still an al-Azhar student, B 74 fn 50. Taha also remembered that during those vacations from al-Azhar he also read Jurji Zaydan’s articles and traditional popular literature that would orientate towards ancient extra-Egyptian Arabs: “stories of ‘Antarah and Sayf Ibn Dhi Yazan”. Taha Husayn, al-Ayyam (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif 1962) v. 2 pp. 175-176.
Western socialisms by \textit{al-Siyasat al-Usbu’iyyah} sub-editor Mayy Ziyadah from 1923\textsuperscript{139}. Her Western languages and modernity fostered her romantic, ever-separated, responsiveness to the Qur’an: the macro-historical scope --- and competition from --- Greek, Latin, English etc helped her accept Islamic bases of classical Arab culture and the standard language\textsuperscript{140}. Visiting the Lebanon of her birth almost annually, its development of a Catholic particularism after 1920 was meaningless to her: to her death in 1941, she tried to connect her two homelands as both "Eastern"\textsuperscript{141}. (In the 1920s, Mayy’s acculturated feel for macro-history made her block

139. Mayy’s contribution to the development of socialist ideas in the Arab countries is discussed by Sakakini, \textit{Mayy Ziyadah} pp. 101-106. Her book \textit{al-Musawat} (Equality: 207 pages), composed and first published as articles from 1923, discussed various moderate and radical schools of Western socialism. In it, Mayy traced connections between originating ideas in Hegel and the materialist socialism subsequently developed by Marx --- which, however, she, after consideration, judiciously sidestepped. \textit{Ibid} p. 103. "The Morrow" would witness the triumph of egalitarian Socialism, which in a succeeding stage would be superseded by a successor-system led by a "class of the Future" that had been defined by capacity within "the heart of socialism". \textit{Ibid} p. 104. As a liberated Arab woman-intellectual, Mayy lacked a stable position or function in the Egyptian society of the 1920s. Her feminist bitterness spilled over during a discussion of the various types of slavery in human history: women remain chained in slavery in the very age in which they have begun to educate themselves and demand their emancipation amid calls for socialism: necklaces, bangles, earrings and welcome tributes to their beauty by male authors are but other means to buy them and terrible shackles upon their souls. \textit{Ibid} pp. 104-5.

140. In some remarks on the reasons for the survival of Arabic down the ages, Mayy extolled "the Arab Prophet Muhammad" --- who had traded in Syria in youth on behalf of Quraysh --- as the founder of "this national civilization... The source of that civilization is the Qur'an". Mayy felt the Qur’an’s verbal power: it had spread with greater speed than any other book in history, and captivated nations whose distinctive, immemorially-developed civilizations might have been expected to remain impervious to its injunctions. The main attraction Mayy felt was to Arab elements fostered within Islamic civilization: "the Qur'an brought into being an Arab religion, an Arab state, Arab laws and Arabic literatures that all became [complimentary] components of one single nationalism that bound together peoples which had not had Arabic as their language". Although drawn to Muslim history by her purely linguistic bond with Islam, Mayy had dipped into the classical Arabs’ Islamic sciences and geographers and had a generous feel for ways in which the Qur’an’s motifs and requirements stimulated even such sciences as geography, mathematics and astronomy. Her defence of the unique greatness of standard Arabic in universal macro-history far beyond the Arab sphere of her day, requiring that she accommodate Islam, was a sort of acculturated competitiveness with the scope of the ancient Greek and Latin of the West. \textit{Ibid} pp. 237-9.

141. Mayy was truly pan-Arab, so irrevocably had she blended Egypt and Lebanon in her personality --- and in her routine of residence. From her father’s migration to Cairo in 1908, it was essential for her to holiday in every summer in Mount Lebanon, yet with home-sickness for Egypt. Although responsive to Egyptian nationalism, she could not convey herself with either "Egyptian" or "Syrian" in either of her two matrixes. She groped for terms of public self-definition that would get across her inherent blendedness. Mayy evoked an "Eastern" community as the collective to which she contributed. When a literary-minded notable in Duhur al-Shuwayr, Lebanon, built her a sapling hut to write in, she orated to thank them for the zeal with which they "encouraged the Eastern Woman in general", not just herself as an individual. \textit{Ibid} pp. 79-80. In a long "Hymn to the East", she saw the totality of its mountains, rivers, plains and its broiling desert winds in one vast canvas. The poor, ignorant, "dismembered" East as yet lacked the skyscrapers, institutes, museums, banks and factories --- the deposits of wealth extracted from the most distant lands --- that "the strong" of her age commanded as they moaned in their darkness. But now the East had to awake for the new dawn of which it would be the tower. \textit{Ibid} pp. 225-6. Her "East" was undoubtedly centred on the Middle East but perhaps not just the period synonym for Arabs that Sakakini supposed (p. 56): Mayy may not have been thinking of far-away Buddhists but the term undoubtedly covered the Turks vivid in her childhood Lebanon, whose language had Arabic in it, and who remained engaged under Ataturk in parallel self-modernization
mythologization of the Pharaonic past into a pretext for Westernization --- or exploitation by Westerners: B 412-414).

1922-1952: The Syrians Under the Quasi-Independent Monarchy

A large number of the most political immigrant Syrian intellectuals went back to the new Arab state-units of the Fertile Crescent after 1919. The settled intelligentsia that remained around al-Mugattam, al-Muqtataf, al-Hilal and other SC publications made the leap from support or neutrality towards the Occupation to accommodation to Egyptian nationalism which, however, they now strove to pull towards a crude pan-Arabism.

The daily al-Muqattam in the 1920s maintained identification with a sort of international Syrian "nation". This was made up of the populations actually resident in the Greater Syria territorial homeland but also of the diaspora communities --- including those in the Americas that could not keep up the Egypt-resident Syrians' periodical contact with Syria through summer vacations. A contributor from the Americas, writing on the problems of Syrian immigrants in Argentina and Brazil, in August 1910 described al-Muqattam as "the mouthpiece of the Syrian nation (al-ummatt al-Suriyyah) in particular" among "the Arab(ic) nations" in general142.

Syrians in Egypt recurrently resisted taking Egyptian political nationality, which would sever formally their community with the homeland of origin. In the British colonial period the Jaridists spoke out for naturalization for immigrant Syrians, and even the Kamilists at odd times discussed whether they could become Egyptians: however, both Egyptians and the immigrant Syrian Christians formally were subjects of the same Ottoman Sultan. After World War 1, the particularist Egyptian nation-state and the French-mandated Lebanese and Syrian states were born, confronting Egypt-resident Syrians with a choice of mutually-exclusive citizenships. al-Muqattam in July 1926 published a lawyer's article protesting legislation allegedly designed to force Syrians and Lebanese in Egypt to either become citizens or leave the country "despite their wishes and the wishes of the Egyptian people which has no enthusiasm for this immature Egyptianisation". Some SCs had "come to Egypt solely as refugees". Despite the sufferings they had endured because of this "valid nationalist commitment to Syria" under the Ottomans, the

--- in, for instance, the roles of women.

142. "al-Suriyyuna fi Amirika" (The Syrians in America), al-Muqattam, 10 August 1910.
article also defended the similar reluctance of Turks in Egypt to take citizenship\textsuperscript{143}. Whatever their criticisms, the SC press always so intimately fleshed West Asia's Turks as well as Arabs out to Egyptians over decades.

\textit{al-Muqattam} in 1926, then, evoked a stubborn commitment to the land and people of Syria that made it impossible to accept exclusive Egyptian nationality after decades in Egypt. The attitudes and procedures of Egyptians after 1922 also helped keep generations of Egypto-Syrians marginal. \textit{al-Muqattam} in 1945 still referred to the problems in getting passports and visas faced by two SC categories: (a) those who had maintained Ottoman citizenship or derived Syrian, Lebanese or 'Iraqi nationalities and (b) those who had accepted Egyptian citizenship. The paper hoped that the formation of the League of Arab States, meant to increase travel and contact and standardize laws between Egypt and the Arab states, would end their problems in getting passports and visas for travelling to other Arab countries from which they or their forefathers came\textsuperscript{144}. SC insecurities in Egypt thus further fueled their journals' encouragement and projection of the Arabo-Islamic high-tide in Egypt after 1930.

Under the monarchical Egyptian nation-state, Egypto-Syrian professionals maintained a commitment to Lebanon-Syria that sometimes continued to reject a separate state-entity of Lebanon even after World War 2. The multi-lingual, business-orientated SCs developed ever closer interactions with Europeans in Egypt\textsuperscript{145}: so often, though, proximity nourished some special antipathies. A 1945 \textit{al-Muqattam} article bitingly linked the implantation of political sectarianism in Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century to the penetration of (West Europe's)

\textsuperscript{143} "al-Suriyyuna wal-Lubnaniyyun wa Qanun al-Jinsiyyat al-Misriyyah" (The Syrians and the Lebanese and the Egyptian Nationality Law) \textit{al-Muqattam} 15 July 1926.

\textsuperscript{144} "al-Jinsiyyat al-Misriyyah wa Ithbatuha: Jawazat al-Safar wal-Iqamah" (Egyptian Nationality and Proving [Entitlement to] It: Passports and Residence Permits) \textit{al-Muqattam} 16 July 1945 p. 3. The writer's language shows his continuing sense of national or semi-national territory-determined groups in the Arabic-speaking world: he expected the Arab League's council to discuss the Egypto-Syrians' nationality and travel problems in the context of "promoting contacts between the League's peoples" (shu'ub) and reciprocal treatment between its "lands" (\textit{aqtar}). Ibid.

\textsuperscript{145} Cecil Hourani considered the World War II years "the Indian summer" of a closed Anglo-Levantine society made up of Turco-Circassian aristocracy, "the wealthy Lebanese and Syrian families who had made their money in commerce and industry or were prominent civil servants or writers", and a few select Arab Egyptians: in the Muhammad 'Ali and Gezira clubs British generals lunched with Egyptian pashas, and Lebanese-Egyptian bon vivants and wealthy SC women played bridge. Hourani, \textit{Unfinished Odyssey} p. 43. In comparison to Philipps' dichotomization (Syrians pp. 118, 133-5, 152-6), Cecil Hourani's recollections image better acceptance of SC pan-Arab intellectuals like Nimr among the SC commercial elite, admittedly intent to tighten its commercial and cultural relations with resident Europeans. For greater intermarriage with resident Europeans than with Egyptians, Philipp, \textit{Syrians} pp. 150-152.
"knowledge" (al-'ilm) and civilization (al-tamaddun). It equated the Ottoman Turks and the European powers as "foreign elements" motivated by selfish "interests" when in 1861 they set up the autonomous sanjaq of Lebanon on sectarian lines, to the lasting harm of the Lebanese. After World War I, al-Muqattam had been a vocal mouthpiece for resistance by Egypt’s Christian and Muslim Syrians to France and Britain’s partition of the erstwhile wide geographical Syria into Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan. France proclaimed the expanded state of Greater Lebanon in 1920. al-Muqattam pitted itself against the sectarian Catholic Maronites who collaborated with French rule and partition for the ascendency it offered over other sects. Thus, in 1924 it printed a call from the Cairo-based Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Syria and Lebanon addressed to Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians in the homeland and in the diaspora that defined them all as one people (sha'b). The separate states of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine into which the victorious Allies had partitioned geographical Syria were a pluralization of names out of one name. In 1925, the French Foreign Minister Briand, echoed by the Parisian Press, dismissed "Syria" as a geographical expression: those "peoples" could never form a political nation. al-Muqattam replied that there were no national divisions in Syria, only divisions of sect that outsiders had inflamed artificially from the mid-19th century. Christians, Muslims, Druzes and Arabic-speaking Jews in Syria were all sons of a single Syrian race whose forefathers had happened to adopt different religions. al-Muqattam proudly and

146. "al-Hizbiyyatu wal-Ta'ifiyyah fi Lubnan" (Divisive Party-Partisanship and Sectarianism in Lebanon), al-Muqattam 5 September 1945 p. 3.

147. "Nida' ila Ahli Suriyyah wa Lubnan wa Filastin" (A Call to the People of Syria and Lebanon and Palestine), al-Muqattam 28 June 1924. This Appeal was very much a communication from diaspora Syrians of diverse sects whose Syrianism was the outcome of having been thrown together outside Syria, and the uncertainty hanging over their position in Egypt. al-Shaykh Rashid Rida’ (Muslim) had launched the Syro-Palestine Congress in Cairo in August 1921 with financial and organizational support from the Egypt-resident Orthodox Mikha'il Lutfullah. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate (London: OUP 1958) p. 143.

148. "Muhimmatu Faransa fi Suriyyah: Hal il-Suriyyuna 'Ummah?" (France’s Task in Syria: Are the Syrians A Nation?) al-Muqattam 22 December, 1925 p. 1. One motif in this editorial underscores the continuity over decades of al-Muqattam’s reserve vis-a-vis the Catholic sectarian basis of the separate Lebanon state. The Catholic Greater Lebanonists constantly cited Druze and Muslim massacres of Christians in 1860. In order to dismiss any need for a separate Lebanon polity, the al-Muqattam editorialist denied that the population of Lebanon had had serious sectarian divisions in the early nineteenth century. Rather, he argued, Lebanon’s society was divided into partisan groups that cut across the sects: the Yamani group had both Druze and Christians in its ranks, as did the opposed Qaysi faction. Thus Christians in one partisan group would fight Christians in the opposed group and Druze other Druzes. "Muhimmatu Faransa ..." Thus al-Muqattam in 1925. Twenty years later, the 1945 article of lament at party division and sectarianism in the independent Lebanese state repeated the same argument. Before Western influence became strong, the population of Lebanon was divided into Qaysiyah-vs -Yamaniyyah factions (later Yazbakiyah-vs-Junbulatyyah), each group having both Druze and Christians in its ranks so that Druze were fighting Druze and Christians Christians. Lebanon’s sectarian structure and sectarian politics thus originated from
excitedly covered the 1925 armed revolt by mainly Sunni Muslim and Druze Syrians against French rule. It sought a deeper and longer-term effect on Egyptians through regular books, too, including a 1925 work on the Druze in the Syrian Revolution (B 12-13). al-Muqattam was the main publication from which SC intellectuals like Nasim Sayba’ah tried to draw Egyptians --- including Haykal and al-Siyasah --- into Zionist-Palestinian conflict in 1929 (B 126-131).

The Egypto-Syrian intellectuals energetically and effectively resisted Britain and France’s post-World War 1 partition of geographical Syria into the mandated statelets of Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan. Even after World War 2, during decolonization, some Egypto-Syrians accepted the new sub-Syrian statelets reluctantly and grudgingly.

**Supra-Syria Arabism.** al-Muqattam projected not merely the cause of the Druze and Muslim-dominated Syrians’ post-World War 1 uprising against the French, but also the war of the Rif led by ’Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi against Spanish and French colonialism in Morocco. Indeed an al-Muqattam editor even published a book ’Abd al-Krim wal-Harb al-Rifiyyah (Abd al-Krim and the Rif War). The Egypt-resident Syrian Christian Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914) in the period of British colonial rule had already written of the contemporary Arabic-determined "Arab nation" (al-ummat al-'Arabiyyah) extending over Iraq, Syria, the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Sudan, the Maghrib (North Africa) al-Muqattam had regularly assailed French misrule in the western wing of the Arab world until the 1904 Entente: al-Ahram showed the same impulse but feared discontinuation of the subsidy it received from the French Government to sustain its criticisms of British rule in Egypt.

In the 1930’s, when Syria of Damascus, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan consolidated
as separate state units, Christian Egypto-Syrians lost heart in endeavors to put geographical Syria together again into one political unit. Instead, they accepted that Lebanon at least had irreversibly become a political state separate from Syria. In 1938, al-Muqattam’s editor Khalil Thabit proposed that the challenge of Zionism and the Jewish national home in Palestine be solved by annexing Palestine to Egypt. Thus, the shifting ethnic needs of the SCs was one factor prodding the Egyptian establishment towards a pan-Arab adventure in Palestine. Khalil’s son Karim Thabit became pan-Arabist editor of al-Muqattam and an advisor who guided King Faruq through the maze of Lebanon and Syria’s sects and factions: after 1945, Egyptian pan-Arab policy helped consolidate an independent Christian-led Lebanese state against any irredentism from Syria’s Sunni elite.

To sum up, Christian Egypto-Syrian journalists and intellectuals persistently felt bonded to a Syrian people with Christian, Muslim and Druze components. Migration and life in the Egyptian geographical environment in various ways dislocated them from the sectarian units that retained more importance for those SCs active in Egyptian commerce. SC writers explored and propagated supra-territorial concepts of pan-Arab unity or Arab nationality that could offer community with Egyptians without excising their own links with their homeland of provenance. The floods of information that SC newspapers and magazines got across about political and social conditions in “Syria” were important for involving Egyptians in, for instance, the Druze-Sunni Syrian uprisings against France in the 1920s.

**THE COPTS**

Numerically, the most important minority in Egypt was the country’s Copts. These Arabic-speaking Christians made up substantial enough a proportion of the indigenous population to present a fundamental problem to all who tried to define political community throughout the whole period (1892-1952) covered by our inquiry. In 1917 there were an estimated 857,000 Copts as against 11,624,000 Muslims in Egypt. In 1937 the number of Copts was estimated at 1,099,186 as against 14,552,704 Muslims. Copts were more

153. EB, 1917 art. “Egypt”.
concentrated in Upper Egypt, constituting over 20 percent of the population around Asyut, but there were no areas in Egypt of any extent where they formed a demographic majority. They lived interwoven with the Muslim majority populations of Egypt's villages, towns, and cities, although still sometimes clustered somewhat in particular sections.  

Egypt's large minority of Christian Copts --- perhaps one-eighth of its population --- inevitably influenced the acculturated Muslim intellectuals' shifting community identifications in all periods to 1952. They shared the language but not the religion of their Muslim compatriots. Both under outright colonial rule (1882 - 1922) and in the period of nominal independence, Muslim-Egyptian anti-imperialists feared that Britain would pose as the Copts' protector and detach them from the independence movement. This could motivate Muslim intellectuals to favor more secular identifications likelier to enlist the Copts --- after 1922, neo-Pharaonist particularism.

Sectarian Inter-Elite Conflict. However, social and economic changes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries drew modern-educated Copts and similarly-educated Muslims into conflicts. Intercommunal ill-feeling confirmed the traditional assumption that religious sect was a determinant of community to precisely the modernizing-educated Muslim strata most intellectually orientated to build new secular communities. Copts traditionally had held a virtual monopoly over clerical positions in government and as late as the beginning of the twentieth century 97-98% of all sarrafs (tax collectors) were still Copts. But as Egypt modernized, the emergent elite of Arab-Muslim secular-educated intellectuals-professionals more and more tried to enter such careers. This clash between two competitive elites culminated in the rival congresses of Copts and Muslims held in 1911. The most enterprising Copts had shrewdly seized new technology and possibilities. Combining trade with agriculture, by the end of the nineteenth century they had established for the first time in Egypt's history a Coptic landowning aristocracy. One English observer described them as "a few wealthy Copts" who

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155. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule p. 308; Baer, "Social Change..." in Holt (ed.) Political and Social Change pp. 145-6. Although the strict segregation of urban Coptic communities in "particular quarters ... for defence" that prevailed in the first half of the nineteenth century had ended by the beginning of the twentieth, "there still were quarters almost exclusively inhabited by Muslims, such as Khalifah and Sayyidah Zaynab in Cairo or Minat al-Basal in Alexandria: in 1897 there were 56 shiyakhat (sub-quarters) in Cairo, out of 195, in each of which lived less than 10 Copts, and in Alexandria 34 out of 108. Ibid.

156. Ibid p. 146.
through "scientific agriculture" and "the introduction of every sort of modern appliance", especially in regard to irrigation, had achieved perennial agriculture on estate lands that formerly only bore one crop from the annual flooding of the Nile; these landowners reclaimed "pure desert and brine-logged earth". Sir Eldon Gorst, Cromer's successor as Britain's Consul-General, in his report of 25 March 1911 described "the organizers of this [Coptic] Conference" as "a small clique of wealthy landowners in Upper Egypt" who "did not claim to represent more than some 12,000 out of the 700,000 Copts of Egypt".

The Coptic communalists did have some real grievances. Whereas modernization was breaking the Copts' monopoly of some governmental functions, the British reserved the most responsible administrative positions, the offices of mudir and ma'mur for Muslims, on the ground that rural Muslims might not accept the authority of Copts in such positions. Fighting back against Dunlop, educated Muslim Egyptians were getting more Qur'an-pervaded curricula into government primary and secondary schools, exposing Coptic pupils to Islam.

During the period of British colonial rule, then, two modernizing West-tinctured elites, the Coptic and the Muslim, came into sharpening competition. Their economic and careers competition made some modernizing-educated Muslims and Copts more conscious of the capacity of sects to determine political community than traditional Muslims and Copts were.

**British-Coptic Alienation.** Coptic scholars have stressed that the constitutionalist "Egypt for the Egyptians" movement of the early 1880s was supported by Copts, including Pope Kirillus V; and that Copts actively supplied and transported Ahmad 'Urabi’s troops when the British invaded. Anglo-Saxon missionary assaults upon the Coptic Church had laid a foundation of dislike of Anglo-Saxon Protestants well before the British occupied Egypt. In 1867 Kirillus V went to Asyut, to announce excommunication of any Copt who sent his children to the (mainly American) Protestant missionaries' schools or visited their libraries or befriended any

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158. Gorst's report quoted Kyriakos Mikhail, Copts and Muslims under British Control (London: Smith Elder & Co 1911) p. 36. Carter has to concede Gorst's point: "no leading Cairene family seems to have taken part in the conference; mainly Upper Egyptians were in attendance" --- although the Patriarch opposed because he was "senile", under government pressure. Carter, Copts in Egyptian Politics p. 13.
159. Carter, Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 223-225.
160. Bahr, al-Aqbat pp.23-27. Samirah Bahr drew for this original interpretation of the constitutionalist movement upon unpublished researches of the Copt scholar Dr. Zahir Riyad, upon political texts from the period and upon works by Muslim scholars.
missionary\textsuperscript{161}. The Protestant missionaries' frontal assaults on the Coptic Church, meant to bring Copts into alternative new native Protestant Churches, went on in the period of British colonial rule. Zafar Ishaq Ansari characterized the Coptic Church as "a national Church, confined to Egypt"; this apartness from Europe's Churches consolidated their status as "an integral part of the Egyptian nation" in both their and the Egyptian Muslims' eyes\textsuperscript{162}. Ever since their Church broke with Byzantine Orthodoxy, the Copts' relations with European or Western Christians had been ambivalent at best. Shared elements of Christianity were not enough of a bond for the Copts to collaborate with the British: Cromer long lumped them contemptuously with Arab-Muslim Egyptians. It was vital in international diplomacy that the Muslim Egyptian intellectuals lobbying for independence for Egypt be able to claim support from the Coptic minority. Embarrassing them before foreigners, some militant Copts rejected the pre-1919 Kamilist independence movement as anti-Christian because pan-Islamic\textsuperscript{163}.

**Coptic Influence On Community Ideologies**

The inherent inwovenness of the Copts in Egyptian life, combined with the need to win them over to a united front able to end British control, led nearly all the Muslim-Egyptian intellectuals we examine to affirm at some point that Egypt's Muslims and Copts made up one common patriotic community. Crudely under British colonial rule (1882-1922), but with increased ideological sophistication during the parliamentarist-particularoid nation-state (1922-1952), almost all acculturated Muslim figures examined, at some time affirmed that secular factors of shared race, a shared Pharaonic golden age, shared geographical homeland etc could unite Copts and Muslim Egyptians in an Egyptianist political community.

\textsuperscript{161} Bahr, al-Aqbat p. 21.
\textsuperscript{162} Zafar Ishaq Ansari, "Egyptian Nationalism vis-a-vis Islam", Pakistan Horizon v. XIII (1960) p. 34.
\textsuperscript{163} In 1910, Farid tried to laugh off suggestions by visiting American ex-President Teddy Roosevelt that Christian-Muslim conflict had so seriously disturbed public order that the Egyptians could not be ready for independence. The British-subsidized al-Mugattam opened its columns to the Coptic communalist Ikhnukh Fanus to challenge Farid's title to speak for other than Muslim Egyptians. Fanus claimed that when he travelled with him on a steamer to Istanbul, a year earlier, Farid told him in the presence of two delegates to the Ottoman Parliament that al-Hizb al-Watani had only gone through the motions of verbally endorsing the appointment of Butrus Ghali as Prime Minister out of political expediency, without believing that a Christian should occupy such a position in Islamic countries. Polemical letter from Ikhnukh Fanus in al-Mugattam 2 April 1910. Fanus organized a short-lived Pharaonic Egyptian Party (sic) that worked to keep Copts out of the Muslim-led independence movements: this would have helped perpetuate the British hold. B. Lynn Carter The Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 11-12.
The presence of the Copts could dampen, but never eliminate, the deep supra-Egyptian impulses of acculturated Muslims. The inhibiting Copts only made Egyptians likelier to alternate (a) insular patriotism with (b) their development of wider Islamic and pan-Arab communities. Both the Kamillists and Jaridists instance pre-1919 alternation. In the period of British colonial rule, Mustafa Kamil could both affirm (a) the partial Arab race of Muslim Egyptian peasants and (b) joint Egyptianness --- even the predominant Pharaonic "blood" of that same Muslim peasantry --- with Copt compatriots (Ch. 5 on pre-1919 Arab identity in Egypt: A 239, A 227-280). In Chapter 6 we note such alternation from the more anti-Ottoman particularoids around Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah: they did formulate (a) sometimes rigorous paradigms of integrative secular Egyptian territorial nationality during Coptic-Muslim ill-feeling but at the very same time (b) a sense that Muslim Egyptians had a partial Arab descent, which focussed elite M-E communal interests against those of the equally acculturated Coptic professional counter-elite. Our study will give particular attention to ex-Jaridist Muhammad Husayn Haykal’s arguments in the 1920s that Egypt’s pagan Pharaonic golden age originated, and eternally defined a continuous Egyptian nation, over which subsequent Christianity and Islam were a mere superficial patina (B 385-405). We shall see that the need to unite Copts and Muslims in the post-1922 proto-independent state was one --- but only one --- consideration for Haykal and other al-Siyasah intellectuals’ development of this abortive neo-Pharaonic identity. Amid uneasy relations between Coptic and Muslim modernizing-educated professionals in the Arabo-Islamic-orientated 1930s, Ahmad Husayn, leader of Misr al-Fatat, again was to soothingly argue that Pharaonic Egypt, Christian Egypt and Islamic Egypt were phases through which the single, continuous Egyptian nation passed (B 218-220).

In one recurrent pattern, then, the Copts’ preferences or presence strengthened the acculturated Muslims’ consideration of community confined to Egypt. They constrained the acculturated Muslim intellectual leaders’ development of perceivedly Islam-promoted wider communities --- Ottomanoid, pan-Islamic or pan-Arab --- lest they undermine bisectarian Egyptian national community.

The Copts and Pan-Arabism. It is striking that the Copts did not, just by being there, more often dam the modern-educated Muslim Egyptians’ development of frankly Islamic
states movement (A 4 to 9 presents a few efforts the 1930s independence 1940s --- for instance by 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, later Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (B 229-230; B 443-4) --- to make pan-Arabism more sects-neutral and attractive to Copts and other Arab Christians. A common pattern presented there, though, is of ideological discontinuity between religions-marginalizing neo-Pharaonist particularism and a sudden pan-Arabism tinctured with Islam. An example is Young Egypt leader Ahmad Husayn: after anti-Arab Egyptianism that integrated Egypt’s Copts, Muslims and Jews, he abruptly switched to a vocally Islamic pan-Arabism, snapping his relationship with the Copts as he did so (B 216-220). Chapter 10 traces Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat’s gradual differentiation in the 1930s and 1940s of the language-determined Arab nation from other nations in Islam. al-Zayyat socialized with Copts and resident SCs and was aware of Christian contributions to the classical and modern Arab cultural community. Could he perceive Arab Christians as full participants also in the contemporary Arab political nation and its struggles for independence?

Stances that Copts, themselves, took towards classical cultural elements that nourished pan-Arabism and to pan-Arab issues, helped shape the community’s relationship to the Arab nationalism unfolding in Egypt. Syrian Christian intellectuals in Egypt wrote extensively on the classical Arabs and classical Arab literature and language: these writings impressed Fertile Crescent Christians as Arabs upon the minds of even Muslim Egyptian pan-Arabs much attached to Islam. The Copts developed no comparable Arabist culturism, but did have elements for something similar. The Coptic historian Mikha’il Sharubim in a turn-of-century overall history of Egypt had rather judiciously balanced or counterpointed the Pharaonic period and the emergence of Arab Islam in Arabia as sources of Egypt’s history and personality. His first volume of Sharrubim’s history set out Egypt’s pagan and early Christian history. The second surveyed the history of the ancient pre-Islamic Arabs and the rise of Islam in the Arabian peninsula, in a mostly non-Western classicoid-Arabist way: a Christian divergence was its muting of reverence for the Prophet Muhammad, while still allowing the classical excerpts to depict him as a great human leader. Sharrubim felicitously drew on the histories of Ibn Khaldun’s disciple al-Maqrizi (1364-1442), of al-Mas’udi (born Baghdad: d. 957 in al-Fustat) and Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam (798-871), to depict Arabia, the classical Arab Caliphates and the Arab conquest of Egypt: from Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, he characterized that the Copts aided the invading Arabs as a chance to destroy the rule of their Byzantine persecutors. Ibid pp. 49-50. All these classical Arab writers were utilized as dysfunctionally pan-Arabizing sources within the post-1922 neo-Pharaonist particularism of such Muslim Egyptian...
wholesale incorporation of archaic passages by classical Arab authors, and his own backwards-looking Arabic style --- and some awareness of "the sons of this tongue" as a contemporary supra-Egypt community or audience ---, were acceptable to some Coptic educators whose sectarian schools might have come to propagate something like the integral neo-classical that non-missionary Maronite schools diffused in Lebanon. The Coptic Church, though, was long content to use literary Arabic of a poor standard: an apalled Taha Husayn offered his help to rewrite its Arabic liturgy --- with odd Coptic neo-classicists in the 1930s urging their community to move beyond careerist attitudes to literary Arabic, read the classical Arabs' masterpieces of rhetoric and match Muslim stylistic purism in new creative literature (Farid Kamil 1941). Sharubim prefigured stances and conflicts in post-1922 neo-Pharaonism among both Copts and Muslims. Much of the European data he incorporated into the account of ancient Pharaonic Egypt that made up volume 1 was pre-Egyptological, but he had nonetheless attempted a survey: and information about Pharaonic Egypt already suggested doubts about the Bible's inerrancy --- the post-religious pattern recurrent in later culturist Egyptianist intellectuals as 'Abdallah 'Inan (B 437-438). Sharubim at the close of the nineteenth century was thus already as well-read in classical Arab historiography as M-E intellectuals becoming serious historians in the 1920s and 1930s.  

165. The archaic, culturally pan-Arab, features of Sharubim's work were acceptable in the milieu of a developing Coptic elite still pervasively, if lightly, tinted by the majority's Arabo-Islamic learning. A tribute to his vast history by Wahbi Bey, Director of Coptic Schools, while no doubt aware of its recreation of the Pharaonic era, and references to Coptic Church history under Islam, in part also saw it in Araboid terms as reestablishing "the ancient history" of "the sons of this tongue" --- which would include Sharubim's detailed recreation of pre-Islamic and early Islamic peninsula Arabia. Wahbi on his own account referred to the classical Arab-Muslim historians Ibn Khallikan, 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (1162-1231) and Ibn Khaldun, none of them born in Egypt and all recurrent influences in both the particularoidism and heightening pan-Arabism of our acculturated Muslim intellectuals in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Ibid p. 516.  

166. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 334.  

167. Farid Kamil, "al-Qibt wa Ma Yajibu 'Alayhim Nahwa Hadhiihih-Lughah" (The Copts and Their Obligations Towards This Language), al-Mugtataf August 1941 pp. 263-266. The specific works of classical Arab "eloquence" and rhetoric that he cited were the same ones that Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 'Abdallah 'Inan and other Jaridist or Siyasahist intellectuals educated in Western languages were always citing: the pre-Islamic Arabian "suspended odes", al-Jahiz' al-Bayan wal-Tabyin on rhetoric, the Andalusian al-'Igd al-Farid, the diwans of al-Buhturi and Abul-Tamam. Ibid p. 265. Kamil saw himself as furthering a modest high Arabic tradition within the Coptic community also represented by Wasif Ghali Pasha, one of the first Copts to join Zaghlul’s Wafd in the lead-up to the initial struggle. He referred to Ghali’s efforts to discover and publish old Arabic literary masterpieces, and his transmission of the classical Arabs’ literary sensibility to French audiences through French works that he published in Paris. Farid Kamil proudly excerpted a eulogy by Shawqi to these services to Arabic literature by Ghali. Ibid p. 266. As a Christian, Farid Kamil was encouraged to hope for a new role for the Copts in Arabic letters by the eminence therein of Egypt-resident SCs, such as modernists Sarruf and Nimr and neo-classicist poets such as Khalil Mutran. He was also aware of the politician-poet Bisharah al-Khuri in Lebanon and the 'Iraqi Catholic purist philologist Fr Anastas al-Karmali (who so fascinated the M-E pioneer pan-Arabist Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat: B 335 fn183). Ibid p. 264. See also B 189 fn 88.
nationalism\textsuperscript{168}.

SC Arabist aestheticism and scientism were bases for a new sensibility of literate Muslim Egyptians. In contrast, the Coptic literary faction that most stimulated a modernist Arab M-E consciousness did so negatively by spasmodically denouncing supra-Egyptian Arab culture and community. Salamah Musa (1887-1958), in the name of the West's modern secular values, and Egypt's non-Arab Pharaonic origin, for decades assailed classical Arab cultural elements and --- intermittently --- pan-Arab community identifications in Egypt. His calculated provocations, extending free speech in Egypt, stimulated some constructive responses by Muslims in the Egyptian press. 'Ali 'Awni (1935) accurately identified anti-religious Darwinianism as Musa's central drive, and Pharaonism as secondary and an instrument with which to parry the (Islamic) spiritual revival now pressing in. 'Awni, like the Kamilists and like the Jaridists in their Arabist spasms, identified language as "the very heart of nationalism" in rejection of Musa's Egyptianism\textsuperscript{169}. Yet he admitted Musa's charge that Qur'an-defined literary Arabic had not been expanded to convey modern sciences or kept pace with other (=Western) literatures --- Arab
intellectuals now had to meet Musa's challenge by achieving both\(^{170}\). 'Awni had a rich aesthetic component of which the utilitarian Fabian Musa was bereft: it was essential to maintain enough connectedness of vocabulary to keep classical Arab writers like al-Mutanabbi intelligible, just as (=acculturated parallelism) Britishers continued to steep themselves in Shakespeare while reading Salamah's master H.G. Wells\(^{171}\). In youth, Musa and Jaridist-Siyasahist intellectuals together had sniped Muslim stylistic neo-classicists: from the 1930s he enragingly heightened their Islamoid pan-Arabism\(^{172}\). Salamah Musa sometimes opposed solidarity with the "Eastern" Palestinians because he felt more akin to the Western modernity and scientism of the supremacist Zionists\(^{173}\). His Coptic disciple Louis 'Awad electrified Egypt's Arabist intelligentsia by demanding from 1947 that colloquial Egyptian replace standard Arabic as literary language --- his atheist strategy to starve Islam\(^{174}\). But Musa and similar post-Christian Westernists were not

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\(^{170}\) 'Awni: "Arabic, which expanded to absorb and convey an ancient civilization and spread throughout many lands, would have the capacity to keep pace with modern civilization if only it could find people to care for it with the attention it met from its ancient masters. If we find that Arabic falls short of the mark, is too limited for modern sciences and is unfitted to keep pace with other literatures, then let us blame ourselves". Ibid.

\(^{171}\) Ibid.

\(^{172}\) In his book al-Balaghat al-' Asriyyah wal-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah (Education p. 80), Salamah Musa dismissed neo-classical high rhetorical stylism from Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i et al as a survival from long-extinct exploitative feudal societies: it had to replaced with functional styles that could convey Egypt's realities and the requirements of industrial modernity. Cf Ghali, Salamah Musa wa Azmat..., pp. 75-80. In a mordant review, 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, once a denouncer of al-Rafi'i, wrote that the author had proven one important thing --- that he was not an Arab. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's Arabo-Islamic journal al-Risalah was as caustic: Musa's book on Arabic had only once more illustrated that its author had a better grasp of Latin than Arabic. Shukri, Salamah Musa wa Azmat..., p. 75.

\(^{173}\) Writing in al-Majallat al-Jadidah in early 1934, Musa described the future as "dark, indeed grim, for the Palestinians, for the number of Jews in the month of last January reached 245,000 --- 63,000 of them having migrated to there in the last two years". Musa had no illusions about Zionist motives: the Jews were "using all modern scientific and economic means to achieve sovereignty for themselves over the Palestinians". Yet, as a modernist, he could not but admire the futuristic energy with which the Zionists were building cities, founding factories with an international export market and "tilling the land with modern machinery which has enabled them to dispense with the Palestinian peasant". He did not much like the Palestinians, whom he stereotyped as "stagnant, clinging to their Easternism which must inevitably inflict defeat upon them before the modern methods with which the Zionists are dealing with them". al-Majallat al-Jadidah editorial of March 1934.

\(^{174}\) Carter cited 'Awad's ideologically systematic call to make the colloquial the literary language --- which would harm only Islam's priests, not Islam proper --- in his introduction to his 1947 Plutoland, a collection of poems he wrote in dialect. In much franker remarks in a private interview to her on 29 February 1980, 'Awad said that he had wanted such use of the colloquial to snap access to Islam, and usher in a secular society. Carter, Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 120-121. Although mainly directed --- if discreetly --- against Islam, Plutoland contained a colloquial poem in which he denied there was any God in even fifty heavens above to hear him, and offered to trample underfoot any church to which he was led: "Khamsin sama fu' rasi/Ma fiha min ilah yisma' li/Iddini ay kanisah/Adusha taht na'lli". Hilmi Muhammad al-Qa'ud, "Luwis 'Awad: Usturat al-Ta'assub wal-Hiqd al-Aswad---Aw al-Tamarrud al-Rafid li-Hadaratina al-Islamiyyah" (Luwis 'Awad: the Legend of Fanaticism and Black Malevolence --- Or, the Insurrection to Eliminate Our Islamic Civilization), al-I'tisam (Cairo) June 1990 p. 29. As editor of al-Ahram's literary page under Muhammad Husanayn Haykal, 'Awad had published post-Islamic
representative of the non-radical temper of the Coptic middle classes: and their later Coptism was hyper-militant to compensate for its on-off quality\(^{175}\). They were inconsistent, not carrying the elimination of standard Arabic components through even in their own prose. Salamah, though mainly modernist, benefitted from some classical Arab authors’ styles and lauded classical Arab science (B 479 fn 158).

Copts who contributed to pan-Arab identifications in the 1930s and 1940s included the Wafdist leader Makram 'Ubayd, inspired by a blend of (a) his unusual self-cultivation of classical Arab literature, (b) the viability a wider Arab entity might give the capitalism his haute bourgeoisie was constructing and (c) to increase regional bargaining power vis-a-vis the British.

Overall, the Coptic 10% of Egyptians influenced the Muslim Egyptian intellectuals’ particularism more than their developing Arabism. Had M-E writers taken greater pains to secularize Arabism they might have been able to draw the Copts more into it.

THE CLASS CONTEXT OF SOME INTELLECTUALS

The Muslim intellectuals we will sample did not formulate their supra-Egyptian identities on a high cultural Mount Olympus uninfluenced by the social realities below. Their connections to often increasingly well-off Arab-Egyptian classes sometimes orientated, heightened, or moderated the range of supra-Egyptian drives they articulated.

The economic solidity of most of the writers and politicians analyzed must be stressed. Their families were able to finance higher educations that would qualify them for leading positions in society. It is true that the British recruits and resident Europeans increasingly blocked the graduates from entry into the professions up to 1918; still, our writers and orators did not often come from those more embattled neo-bourgeoisifying families whom Cromer’s tightness knocked out of the education game\(^{176}\). Kamil --- although his father, as an engineer, non-metrical poetry. al-Qa’ud argued that 'Awad’s evocation in the late eighties of Christian influences upon the blind sceptical Syrian poet Abul-'Ala’ al-Ma’arri showed a residual self-identification as Christian. Ibid pp. 31-32.

175. Salamah Musa’s rather ambivalent and tense relationship with the educated Coptic class that produced him has been reconstructed by Vernon Egger, A Fabian in Egypt: Salamah Musa and the Rise of Professional Classes in Egypt, 1909-1939 (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America 1986). Musa’s woolly-headed socialism, radicalism and Darwinist atheism were in aggregate unacceptable to his conservative class; after he became editor of the Coptic he compensated with an aggressive hyper-communalism that some Copts feared invited attacks in a period in which the parliamentarist order was breaking down. Carter, Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 297-8.

176. Cromer contracted a sector that could have bourgeoisified when he slapped tuition fees on primary
was one of the non-traditional technocratic class created by the 'Alids --- did not have a private income and may have depended upon the Khedive to finance his higher studies in France. His Patriotic Party had a heavier proportion of urban merchants' and petty bourgeois' sons than the Ummah Party that al-Jaridah supported. But wealthy Arab-Egyptian landowners were prominent in its leadership and an even more conservative influence was dependence on donations from wealthy Turco-Circassians. In contrast, Lutfi, al-Jaridah and Hizb al-Ummah sometimes opposed that declining non-Arab aristocracy. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, whose transition after 1930 from pan-Islamism to a narrowed Arab linguistic nationalism we examine in Chapter 10, does not seem to have had too affluent a rural family background and had to teach for years before attempting higher education in France. Taha, his class-friend at al-Azhar, was somewhat better off. Yet, whatever their often woolly hankerings for more social justice, both men associated for decades with the magazines and newspapers of first the Ummah Party and then its post-1922 successor, the Liberal Constitutionalists, both dominated by Arab-Muslim Egyptians with huge hereditary landholdings. Such intellectuals were bound to --- Haykal was a member in --- a rich social group that, whatever its egalitarian-sounding Araboid ethnic motifs (Liberal PM Muhammad Mahmud's rural nativism in 1939 when an 'Alid Prince excluded rich Arab-Egyptians: B 307-9), wanted to keep other classes separated and under hegemony lest they wrest away property. The future Liberal leader, Muhammad Mahmud, while still a member of the Wafd mass independence movement, refused to share accommodation with another (but only bourgeois) Wafdist on the ground that he "was not a member of his social class". (For the class schools, and took other measures, to thin out those who only took primary school certificates and entered government service at a junior level. Tignor. British Colonial Rule p. 324.


178. Goldschmidt clearly regards Kamil’s Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) as more diverse than the al-Ummah Party founded shortly before September 1907 from wealthy notables, senior officials and intellectuals. Nonetheless, the limited class base of al-Hizb al-Watani identified it as "not truly a national party" although it did successfully mobilize the small Muslim urban middle class. "The formal leadership of the party came mainly from wealthy beys and pashas at first, but a number of younger members prominent in the Nationalist press and other activities were elected to the 1911 administrative board. The overall picture invites comparison with the Wafd". Lack of funds, and British repression, prevented the Party from carrying on the outreach to the urban proletariat and peasantry begun under Kamil’s successor, Muhammad Farid. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 333.

179. Discussing the declaration of the al-Ummah Party on 21 September 1907, Bayyumi notes that many a‘yan saw party activity as a means to advance their class interests against the growing number of small landholders who were competing socially and economically. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 41. Smith would see Haykal, but not all Jaridists and Ummah members, as fitting into some such paradigm. Islam and the Search pp. 45-47.

antagonism of Arab-Egyptian peasants to his father during the 1919 independence movement, B 5 f12).

It is true that the pre-1918 al-Hizb al-Watani independence movement of Mustafa Kamil, the most extensively analyzed in Book 1, drew members and support from a variety of urban petty-bourgeois as well as richer strata, towards its end mobilizing even some urban workers and peasants. The post-World War 1 Wafd was a diverse mass nationalist movement that retained participation from a range of ideological groups and classes up until Nasir’s 1952 military revolution --- yet the petty bourgeois populist component in its upper leadership quickly got assimilated into the landowner class after 1922, softening its struggle against Britain (B 5-7; 1933 bombastic spectator-solidarity with Syria B 164; 1942 entrance of cabinet imposed by British tanks B 140-141).

The party of Liberal Constitutionalists and the intellectuals around their mouthpiece, al-Siyasah on whom Book 2 focuses, were successors of Hizb al-Ummah (and al-Jaridah) in personnel and the continuing rural kobar al-'a'yan class core. Both newspapers/parties claimed leadership over Egypt with an abrasive elitism fed by class as well as the highly-educated acculturation of some of their publicists. The pre-1918 Kamilists and then the Wafd reached out to a wider range of classes than al-Ummah and Haykal’s post-1922 Liberals: yet their educational formation as Francophone lawyers --- watertight legal briefs as the path to independence ---, and class stakes in evolution, made the Kamilist founder-leaders oppose violence against the British by youth militants 181. Most intellectuals whom we analyze would try

109. al-Siyasah used to refer to the moneyed background of the landlord-financier founders of the Liberal Constitutionalists Party as a qualification for political office in contrast to plebeian, almost-socialist, Wafdists who had to degrade politics into a commerce because it was their only means to get bread to eat. They were the cigarette-butt collectors who had stumbled into Egyptian political life. Ibid p. 108. The Party of Liberal Constitutionalists under the monarchy was viewed as a structure through which the rural kobar al-a'yan maintained their interests vis-a-vis the peasants and the urban-based Wafd, in Hamied Ansari, Egypt: the Stalled Society (New York: SUNY Press 1986) pp. 70-78.

181. Instead of insurrection, Mustafa Kamil urged the Khedive 'Abbas to restore a constitution and parliamentarism as the pathway to independence: it might prove hard for the British to stop a real legislative assembly from scrutinizing all new regulations and laws given the promises with which they had justified their Occupation. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 103. Muhammad Farid, Kamil’s successor as Patriotic Party leader, similarly urged 'Abbas to restore the 1881 Constitution as a transitional basis for a parliamentary system that would lead to independence, as against Gorst’s containment-strategy of expanding the powers of provincial councils. Ibid p. 104. When Ibrahim al-Wardani, a Europe-educated Hizb al-Watani activist, assassinated pro-British PM Butrus Ghali in 1910, it underscored that at least the most frustrated secret societies around the Party were lurching to revolution. Gorst and Kitchener made violence likely by hounding the Watanists into exile. Ahmad Mukhtar, a student at the military academy in Istanbul, smuggled issues of the magazine al-Oisas (“Vengeance”) --- which
out various forms of lobbying and appeals in and to Europe first: only when desperate would they trigger the action by the masses that could devastate property.

Hizb al-Ummah/al-Jaridah and the Liberal Constitutionalists/al-Siyasah instance the tenacious growth and drive for political power from the 1850s to today of the Arab-Egyptian a'yan landholding stratum. This rural class skilfully white-anted and survived Nasir’s fleeting Arab socialism. After their 1882 conquest, the British long maintained a quasi-monopoly of the Turcophone element in the Egyptian cabinets. But the American Civil War that starved Europe of cotton made the capitalist transformation of Egypt’s agriculture irreversible: its further integration into the world capitalist market under British rule made many rising Arab-Egyptian landowners rich. Egypt’s role as a cotton producer made the developing rural-based Arab-Muslim (and Coptic) elite dependent upon the European states: it was in their interest to moderate their drive for independence so as to maintain exchanges with Westerners. Sharp fluctuations of cotton prices on the world market, though, gave the new elite reservations about Europe, further deepened by the audibility of European anti-Muslim racism as education trilingualized. These factors contributed to the ambivalence and resentment of the al-Jaridah and al-Siyasah intellectuals towards all imperialist powers, their alternation of accommodationism and Islamoid militancy towards states almost determined to expose and destroy the very Arab elites that sought partnerships. (Eg. Siyasahists’ fury that Britain/the West set up explosions between Arab masses and Zionists over Palestine in 1929 and 1947-1948 --- B 133-135; B 203-206).

Egyptian historians 'Asim al-Disuqi and Ahmad Shilliq have shown that large landowners of Haykal’s class were prominent among those who invested in industrialization and the creation of a modern Egyptian private enterprise, commerce and banking --- through, for instance, the Bank Misr, closely linked to the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists. This called for terrorism against Britishers and extolled al-Wardani --- back into Egypt. Mukhtar belonged to a secret society in Istanbul headed by Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish, enemy of Party leader Muhammad Farid. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 118. Farid was uninformed about, and non-responsive to, the "terroristic" and socialism-tinged al-Oisas: Farid, Awraq pp. 88-89.

183. Ibid pp. 61-69.
extending Arab-Egyptian class elite was early intent to control the urban working class like the peasants, but with constructive paternalism. al-Jaridah noted wild-cat worker militancy but Haykal called for the workers to be given the right to strike: they had to be made subordinate partners in the same way that Bismarck and German governments had offered improved conditions and welfare. Building an Egyptian capitalism required development of a numerous, skilled and satisfied industrial proletariat, and pan-Arab markets beyond Egypt. From 1930, Haykal used Arab-Islamic nationalism to constructively thread his neo-capitalist elite, Egyptian workers and poor who had to be reconciled, and the outside Arabs.

SOME INTELLECTUALS ANALYZED IN THESIS

1. Period of British Colonial Rule (1890-1919)

'Abduh, Muhammad (1849-1905). Born in a Nile Delta village. Formal education was traditional-Islamic: received degree of alim (Islamic scholar) from the al-Azhar mosque university in 1877. 'Abduh became a disciple of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in 1872 and in 1880 editor of al-Waqa'i al-Misriyyah (Egyptian government's official gazette), in which he advocated reforms. Involved in 'Urabi's movement to free Egypt from foreign control; exiled by...

al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din (1838/1839-1897). Persian Shi’ite born in As’adabad near Hamadhan in Persia. Formal education: Islamic. Educated in youth in Arabic medium in Karbala’ and al-Najaf, Shi’ite centers in 'Iraq (Arab-centerizing linguistic and cultural milieu). Lived in Egypt from 1871 to 1879, where he inspired Christian Syrian disciples Salim al-Naqqash and Adib Ishaq to bring out the newspapers Mîsr (1877) and al-Tijarah (1878) as forums for anti-despotic, anti-imperialist ideas; expelled by Kheđive, in 1884 he brought out the pan-Islamic journal al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa from Paris to hit British colonial rule in Egypt and India. His periodization of Islamic history offered an initial Arab-led golden age liable to foster pan-Arabizing tendencies in Egyptians.


Farid, Muhammad (1868-1919). Born Cairo of Turkish descent. Educated at Egyptian Law School, achieving active spoken and written French, although unlike Kamil without studying in Europe. Initially worked as a translator for the law department of the Khedivial estates, then transferred to become a deputy attorney general at the Court of Appeal. Wrote extensively in magazines al-Adab and al-Mawsu’at on such subjects as British and French expansion in Black Africa. After Mustafa Kamil’s death in 1908, Farid succeeded him as leader
of the Patriotic Party leading the independence movement. In contrast to Kamil’s concentration on a student constituency, Farid strove to mobilize the depressed class of Egyptian industrial workers, encouraging strikes, and through cooperatives the peasants. Driven into exile in continental Europe and the Ottoman Empire by repression under Proconsuls Gorst and Kitchener. Lobbied continental governments and built nationalist movement among Egyptian students in Europe. Assessment: transition from (a) Egyptian patriotism and pan-Islamism to (b) pan-Arab political nation separate from the Turks.

Kamil, 'Ali Fahmi (1870-1926). Acculturating, non-Islamic, non-traditional education. Born and died in Cairo. Educated there at the School of Languages and at the Military Academy, 'Ali Fahmi became an Egyptian army officer. His nationalist principles brought him into collision with the British who stripped him of his rank and interned him. Translated Juliette Adam’s 1922 L'Angleterre en Egypt into Arabic and long publicized Egypt’s cause in articles published in French in France. Assessment: Bilingualized Muslim nationalist whose acculturation went with, or fostered, strong pan-Islamic aid for the Muslim Ottoman Empire.

'Ali, Sayyid (1880-1932). Intensively acculturating or bilingualizing formal education, journalistic work and residence abroad. After secondary school he worked as a translator in al-Liwa'. He studied at Cairo’s French Law School. When Mustafa Kamil established L’Etendard Egyptien in 1907 he appointed Sayyid 'Ali to translate excerpts from the Arabic press into French for publication. Sayyid 'Ali went to Paris to be correspondent of al-Liwa' there in 1907. For his synthesis of puritanical neo-Islamic and West European bourgeois attitudes to women and the family: A 156-157. Assessment: bilingual acculturated Muslim Egyptian who presented favorable images of general Europe as benign, and wanted Egypto-Muslim life-styles to be adapted to modern Europe’s patterns, long after most pan-Islamic Kamilists rejected the West (not just Britain, Egypt’s occupier) as hostile to Muslims.

Kamil, Mustafa (1874-1908). Non-traditional West-derived formal education in government and European French-medium schools. To support right of eighteen-year-old Khedive 'Abbas to change his Prime Minister without consulting British Consul-General, Mustafa at eighteen led student demonstration in front of office of pro-British daily al-Muqattam. In 1894 obtained licence in French law from University of Toulouse. In 1894 returned to Egypt
and became leader of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) founded by former 'Urabist Latif Salim. May 1895: funded by the Khedive 'Abbas, Kamil sailed to Paris to lobby France and other European governments to force Britain to evacuate the Nile Valley. On 2 January 1900, he launched his independent daily al-Liwa', widely read by secular-stream Egyptian students and professionals. 'Abbas financed it but Kamil was now developing independent base among student and professional classes. 1906: Kamil greatly stimulated angry reactions among Egyptians against Britain's bullying of Ottoman State over the borders of Sinai (the Tabah crisis) and against her repression of peasants of Danishway. 1907: Kamil proclaimed al-Hizb al-Watani (Patriotic Party) but died aged only 34 on 10 February 1908 before he could lead Egypt to independence. Assessment: Acculturated pro-Ottoman pan-Islamist --- but neo-classical Arab-centric in his view of Islam's past and culture.

Hilmi, Ahmad (1875-1936). Purely Arab-Islamic (and restricted) formal education; but learnt French from urban milieus and self-education. He was born in February 1875 in Cairo's Khan al-Khalili bazaar quarter, the son of a merchant named Hasan al-Mahdi, who sold clothing there but died before the baby was born. Hilmi was sent to Khan Ja'far maktab (Islamic primary school) in Cairo and this was all the formal education at any institution that he received. However, he learned French from working for a private company in cosmopolitan Alexandria and, paralleling the acculturated-professional pattern, became a government clerk. Ahmad Hilmi often functioned as senior staff writer of the Kamilist independence movement's daily al-Liwa' (founded 1900), up to 1908. For a time he was editor of the Kamilist al-Qutr al-Misri. He served a period in prison when the British revived the Press Law in their crackdowns following Cromer's retirement, an experience recorded by him in his book al-Sujun al-Misriyyah fi 'Ahd al-Ihtilal al-lnglizi (The Egyptian Prisons in the Era of the British Occupation), published in Cairo in 1911. Assessment: Hilmi's strikingly quasi-secular, pragmatic stances and Europe-derived community ideas checked the pan-Islamic drives of his Kamilist milieu.

Lutfi al-Sayyid, Ahmad (1872-1963). Father an 'umdah who was a rich landowner. From 1906-1915 edited al-Jaridah, daily mouthpiece of the Ummah Party of rural landlords. Termed "Teacher of the Generation" for formulating a comparatively secular if Muslim-led Egyptian Nationalism, for translating Greek philosophical works into Arabic, and for his salon in which many younger intellectuals such as Taha Husayn, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 'Abdallah
'Inan and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini before 1915 received their first ideological and political orientation. After World War 1, took part in Wafd and its lobbying for independence in Paris. Became Professor of Philosophy at Cairo University and then Rector, serving it for 20 years.

Zaki, Ahmad (1867-1934). During British colonial rule, acculturated high official and "Khedive's man" who popularized the classical Arabs in the Egyptian press and imposed extended forms of their language in government. See biodata section 2.

Intellectuals Active in the Independent State (1922-1952)


Haykal, Muhammad Husayn (1888-1956). De-Arabizing English-medium and French-medium primary, secondary and tertiary education in Egypt and France. Born 1888 son of a wealthy Arab-Egyptian 'umdah or village headman who was technologically innovative in his farming. Attended secular government schools from the age of seven at height of British campaign to impose English as medium of education and government. Obtained doctorate in Law from Sorbonne in 1912. While in Paris 1909-1912 wrote Zaynah, the first novel in Arabic about Egyptian rural life. In 1922 Haykal was a leading founder of the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists, politically incrementalist ("moderate"), being opposed to Wafd's socially disruptive populist struggles against Britain's presence in "independent" Egypt). Haykal also edited the party's daily, al-Siyasah, the forum of radical-secular-liberal thought in the 1920s. Isma'il Sidqi (ruled 1930-1933) banned al-Siyasah and its weekly literary supplement on 2 February 1931; al-Siyasat al-Uusbu'iyah came out again in January 1937. 1935: Haykal published Life of Muhammad in accord with wide pan-Arab reaction in Egypt against West and particularist Egyptian identity. When his party's leader Muhammad Mahmud died in 1941,
Haykal succeeded him and led Liberal Constitutionalists into the coalition that ruled Egypt 1944-1949; he was president of Egyptian Senate in these years. Haykal was Minister of Education 27 April 1938 until 12 August 1939. Assessment: despite acculturation a recurrently Arab-orientated sectional westernizer.

**Husayn, Ahmad (1911-).** Formal education: secularizing, West-derived secondary and law studies in medium of French as well as Arabic. Tertiary education: graduated in Europe-derived law from Cairo University’s Faculty. Ahmad Husayn began political activity as representative at the Law Faculty of the "Egyptians Buy Egyptian Goods" League founded by the secularist Copt Salamah Musa. 1933: Husayn founded Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt movement or party), which called for a secular Pharaonic particularist nationalism open to all of Egypt’s Arabic-speaking sects: Muslims, Copts and Jews. Islamization and pan-Arabization of his ideology: in 1940 the Young Egypt party changed its name to the National Islamic Party, which demanded reapplication of Islamic law and zakat, abolition of interest-banking and usury and pan-Islamic support for all movements against imperialism in the Muslim countries. After the U.N. General Assembly’s recommendation in November 1947 that Palestine be partitioned, Ahmad Husayn participated with Hasan al-Banna, Salih Harb and Muhammad 'Abdallah in "the Nile Valley Committee" to rescue Palestine. Husayn sent the Mustafa al-Wakil brigade of Young Egypt Volunteers to fight with the Palestinians against the Zionists. After World War II Ahmad Husayn renamed his party "the Socialist Party": it shifted sharply leftward, calling for Islamic socialism to limit landownership to 50 feddans, the overthrow of Egypt’s capitalists and monarchy, and a United Arab States. Assessment: The Francophone Ahmad Husayn evolved from a secular-territorial Egyptian Pharaonic nationalist into an Islamist pan-Arab.

**Husayn, Taha (1889-1973).** Formal tertiary education: both traditional Islamic (al-Azhar and extreme acculturating, bilingualizing tertiary education in France. Born in a small Upper Egyptian town in 1889. Taha studied Arabic language and grammar and other Islamic religious sciences for ten years at al-Azhar. Attended lectures at the secular Egyptian University 1908-1914, submitting doctorate (in Arabic) on classical Syrian Arab poet Abul-'Ala' al-Ma'arri in May 1914. From 1914 to 1919 studied French, Latin, Greek, sociology, history and Roman Law at the Sorbonne, and submitted a doctoral thesis on Ibn Khaldun there. 1919: on his return, Taha was appointed Professor of Ancient History at Fu’ad I University, and popularized ancient
Greek literature and thought by publishing translations. While Professor of Arabic Literature in 1926, he published *Fil-Shi'r al-Jahili (On Pre-Islamic Arabic Poetry)* which questioned the authenticity of pre-Islamic poetry, a basis of Qur’anic exegesis: this raised controversy that the Isma’il Sidqi government exploited to dismiss him from his office of Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Cairo University. A Liberal Constitutionalist and *al-Siyasah* contributor in the 1920s, Taha was a Wafdist from the early 1930s. As adviser to the Ministry of Education 1942-4 and Wafdis Minister of Education 1950-2 he founded Alexandria University and mass education in Egypt. Assessment: post-Muslim Westernizer and multi-lingualizer but maintaining the classical Arabs’ old literary language as the identity-marker when joining the West.

**al-Hakim, Tawfiq (1899-1987).** Born into a well-to-do family, his mother being of aristocratic Turkish descent. After studying Law at Cairo University, he went to Paris to continue his legal studies, but instead devoted most of his time to the theatre. On his return to Egypt in 1930, he worked for the Ministry of Justice in a rural area, as well as for the Ministry of Education in Cairo. However, he resigned in 1936 to devote himself to writing novels, stories, essays and plays, becoming the Arab World’s greatest playwright. Developed Haykal’s linking of popular Egyptian rural life and a "spiritual" --- anti-Western? --- Pharaonic golden age. West-steeped anti-Western, anti-Arab neo-Pharaonist in early 1930s who later moderately Islamized.

**Zaki, Ahmad (1867-1934).** Bilingualizing formal education in France-derived law, bilingualizing professional life in government and service of the Khedive, reinforced by extensive travel in Europe and regular interaction with scholarly Europeans in Egypt. Graduated with Law Diploma in 1887. 1889-1922, government career: translator then (1897) Second Secretary, then (from 1911) General Secretary to the Egyptian Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Nuzzar). From 1906 Zaki was the Khedive ’Abbas’ Master of Ceremonies. He used his official positions to drive out Turkish and European loan-words from official correspondence, imposing rigorous neo-classical Arabic, and to get Ministry of Education funds to publish old classical Arabic texts (from 1911). Zaki was briefly General Secretary of the (old) Egyptian University when it opened in 1908 in Cairo where he lectured about pre-Islamic and Umayyad classical Arabs. Commenced his life-long glorification of Arab Andalusia in Egypt’s Arabic press from his first visit to Spain in 1892. On his "retirement", from government service, in 1922
Zaki embarked in his full-time, public career as a prolific popularizer of the classical Arabs’ ancient history and literary relics in Egypt’s daily press, and as an early pan-Arab politician. In Palestine in 1930, argued Muslims’ legal title to al-Buraq-Wailing-Wall shrine in testimony before the League of Nations Inquiry that followed the September 1929 clashes between Zionist settlers and Palestinians. Leading founder January 1922 of "the Eastern League" (al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah) that drew Egyptians out from particularist nationality to supra-Egyptian pan-Islamic and pan-Arab communities. Zaki and his hospitable home were a nexus of social, intellectual and political interaction between Egyptians and non-Egyptian Muslims and Arabs, up to his death in 1934. Assessment: acculturation-stimulated pan-Arab and pan-Islamist: his images of past and present supra-Egyptian Arab or Muslim communities served, or adjusted to, the needs of facing the dominant West.

CHAPTER 2: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY PAN-ISLAMISTS’ LEGACY TO LATER ACCULTURATED INTELLECTUALS IN EGYPT

Inquiries and arrangement of the Chapter

This Chapter examines a group of pioneering anti-imperialist intellectuals who in youth steeped themselves in classical and traditional Arab-Islamic thought and culture: they politicized it and formed the crucial bridge over which it passed to later Europeanizing-educated intellectuals formed under the British occupation, such as Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Farid, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam and Muhammad Husayn Haykal. Jamal al-Din al-'Afghani" (1838/1839 - 1897) was Iranian-born, not an Egyptian or Arab. However, he was bilingual in Arabic as a result of his youthful education in 'Iraq’s Shi'ite centers of Karbala' and al-Najaf; he resided from 1871 to August 1879 in Egypt, where he fanned local constitutionalism and republicanism, and in 1884 he issued from Paris the anti-British Arabic magazine al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa that to a great extent addressed Egyptians under British colonial rule. Muhammad 'Abduh (1849 - 1905), a native Egyptian, graduated as 'alim from al-Azhar in 1877, and became al-Afghani’s disciple in 1872. He was implicated in 'Urabi Pasha’s rebellion of 1882 and exiled, and in 1884 collaborated with al-Afghani in the publication of al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa. In 1888 the British allowed him to return to Egypt and commence a judicial career: he was Mufti of Egypt from 1899 to his death in 1905. The chapter examines views expressed by 'Abduh that would predispose Egyptians to supra-Egyptian Arab-Islamic political communities: his persistent international pan-Islamic anti-imperialism, his Araboid definition of the ethnicity of Egypt’s Arabic-speaking Muslims, above all his evocation of the wide classical Arabs, centered outside Egypt. The third traditionally-cultured pan-Islamist examined is 'Abdallah al-Nadim (1844 - 1896). An Egyptian disciple of al-Afghani, al-Nadim participated as an incendiary mass-orator in the movement by the Constitutionalists and 'Urabi.1

1. On 9 September 1881, 'Urabi led the march by Egyptian troops on 'Abidin square that forced the Khedive to change prime ministers. Extolling al-Nadim’s effective exhortation of the soldiers on that day, 'Urabi described him as “my most dear, brave friend”. Najib Tawfik, 'Abdallah al-Nadim: Khatib al-Thawrat al-'Urabiyyah (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyyah 1970) p. 120. A judicious overview of al-Nadim’s role in 'Urabi’s constitutionalist movement as orator, organizer of mass demonstrations and editor of the anti-foreign al-Ta’if was given by Gilbert Delanoue, "Abd Allah Nadim (1845-1896): Les Idees Politiques et Morales d’un
Following the 1882 British conquest of Egypt, he wandered the Delta in various disguises for nine years until he was captured and the British exiled him. Briefly allowed back before Cromer had him re-expelled, al-Nadim from August 1892 to June 1893 published the anti-occupation weekly al-Ustadh. We assess from this journal al-Nadim’s contribution to identification with the supra-Egypt classical Arab past, to the development of linguistic nationalist drives and to contemporary supra-Egyptian Arab or Islamic communities among new secularizing-educated intellectuals.

1: AL-AFGHANI: ANTI-IMPERIALISM SPOTLIGHTED CLASSICAL ARABS

While living in Egypt between 1871 and 1879, al-Afghani fanned constitutionalist and social discontent against the 'Alid monarchs Isma’il and Tawfiq. However, his Arabic journalism and oratory already charged the British with expansionist imperialism, although they were to conquer Egypt only in September 1882. That development made the 1884 al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa the peak of al-Afghani’s life-long activism against the British empire. The need for an indigenous source or inspiration for international strength and resistance was now bound to make al-Afghani and 'Abduh reexplore the classical Arabs and their early Islam because their greatness had been so many-faceted. Their swift, globe-circling conquests and military prowess could restore the fighting morale of Muslims facing conquest or colonial rule. But classical Arabo-Islamic civilization, further, uniquely patterned the blend of intellectual and technological openness and military-political impenetrability towards aliens that these modern Muslims needed.

al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa did not denounce ongoing expansion at Muslim expense by France and Russia, whose aid al-Afghani and colleagues courted to dislodge Britain from Egypt and India: their efforts prefigured later much more acculturated, sophisticated, bonded lobbying for

2. The journal Mīr, the launching of which al-Afghani had inspired, in August 1878 published a denunciation by him of Britain’s rule in India and her past and present designs on Afghanistan. Nikkie Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972), pp. 102-103. As his relations with the new young Khedive Tawfiq deteriorated, al-Afghani, according to a left-wing French journalist present, rebuked Tawfiq to 4,000 people in a Cairo mosque for serving British ambitions in Egypt and called upon the Egyptians to revolt to save Egypt’s independence. al-Afghani was expelled from Egypt shortly thereafter in August 1879. Elie Kedourie, al-Afghani and 'Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam (London: Frank Cass 1966) pp. 29-30.
3. Of the European powers, al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa attacked only Britain by name; yet its generalized
aid by Mustafa Kamil and his followers in Europe (Chs. 3 and 4). As Britain’s conquests and colonial repression demoralized the Muslims of India and Egypt, al-Afghani-’Abduh calculatedly exulted in 1884 that the early (Arab) Muslims, although few and ill-equipped, conquered a world-wide empire that stretched from the Pyrenees to the Great Wall of China, within only eighty years. They flattened mountain peaks under their horses’ hooves, replacing them with mountains of the skulls of those who had rejected their rule. Thus, the two political activists manipulated images of mighty classical Arabs to repair the confidence of their conquered Egyptian and Indian Muslim readers. It checked contribution from this theme to Arab national consciousness among Muslim Egyptians that al-Afghani also mentioned other later Muslims --- Turks and Persians --- as conquerors. Other Muslim peoples --- and the definition of Muslim is now so inclusively ecumenical --- can substantially duplicate the classical Arabs’ international military might because Islam produced it, rather than the Arabs’ human attributes. Islam’s belief that God predestined the affairs and fates of human beings was what made the Muslims almost discussions of the Muslim need for military strength through unity could equally apply to French or Russian imperialism. In the articles attacking British imperialism that he published in Egypt while there between 1871 and 1879, al-Afghani praised French rule in Algeria, which had made its people so much happier than the Indians. He also eulogized the contributions of French personnel to West-patterned higher education in Egypt since the time of Muhammad ‘Ali. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" pp. 102-103. Kedourie charged that al-Afghani was a French and then Russian agent: Afghani and ’Abduh pp. 39-40, 56-57. It is to be noted, though, that in 1882 in Calcutta, al-Afghani had equated France, which had just "seized Tunisia" with Britain that from India now threatened Afghanistan: "the Europeans" were taking over "every part of the world". Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (Berkeley: University of California Press 1968) p. 102. al-Afghani and his colleagues may have hoped to manipulate France and Russia to dislodge Britain from Egypt or India (Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din pp. 221-223) but al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa left no doubt that the French government was faint-hearted (parliament less) when international opportunities came for self-assertion over Egypt. "Injilitarra wa Faransa" (England and France), al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa wal-Thawrat al-Tahririyat al-Tahririyyat al-Kubra (Cairo: Dar al-’ Arab 1956) pp. 325-328; "al-Ittifaq" (The [Anglo-French] Agreement), ibid pp. 329-332; for a more hopeful assessment "Injilitarra wa Faransa", ibid p. 404. al-Afghani’s disciple al-Nadim very bitterly attacked French colonialism in Tunisia a decade later in his magazine al-Ustadh.

4. "al-Qada’ wal-Qadar" (God-decreed Predestination), al-Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 53-54.
5. "al-Nasraniyyah wa-Islam wa Ahluhuma" (Christianity and Islam and Their Followers), al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 27. Islam’s fundamental aim is supremacy, military might, and conquest. The Muslims should be the premier military nation (millah) in the world ahead of all others in invention of weapons, and in study of the sciences that sustain military supremacy --- physics, chemistry, geometry/engineering (al-handasah) etc. Ibid, p. 26. al-Afghani or ’Abduh undoubtedly would have placed the widely-conquering Ottoman Turks, who terrified Europe, among the Persians and Turks (as well as Arabs) who conquered many kingdoms. Yet their orientation towards early salafi Islam here again strongly draws their historical vision back to "the Muslims in the youth of their religion". The article thus cites Turkish Muslim conqueror Mahmud of Ghaznah, son of Sebuktigan, who invaded India seventeen times between 1001 and 1026. The weak later ’Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad encouraged the conquests of the virtually independent Mahmu; he is a late classical, not post-classical, non-Arab Muslim. The article approvingly cited Mahmud’s use of artillery against Indian pagans and (non-Arab) Muslim leaders’ use of artillery-like fire weapons against the Crusaders. Ibid p. 27.
suicidally fearless in "the early days of their emergence" (fi awa’ili nash’atihim) so that they vanquished mighty states\(^6\). To prove that religion, especially Islam, was the transforming force indispensable to establish ethics, justice and civilization among human beings, al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa pointed to "the [classical] Arab Nation" (al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah). Before Islam it was "among the most immemorially savage, cruel (hardhearted) and uncouth of nations": then transforming Islam "raised [it] up to the highest stages of wisdom (al-hikmah) and civilization in the shortest period"\(^7\).

Despite some supra-Muslim utilitarian leaven\(^8\), al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa was interested in the classical Arabs less for their own human virtues or accomplishments than as the nation that exemplified the strength Islam could enable any believing group to achieve. The followers of Mustafa Kamil, up to World War 1, would long maintain al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa's sense of the Arabs as a prototype of Islamic creativity that Ottoman Turks as well as Egyptians or Arabs could now fulfill in modernization.

**Classical Arabs Validate Borrowing**

al-'Afghani and 'Abduh’s yearning for indigenous military and political strength that could beat off the Western powers was shifting the gravity of Muslim history back to the classical Arabs with their universalist states. That Islam propelled the Arabs up to al-hikmah, the

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\(^6\) "al-Qada' wal-Qadr", al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 49-53 for al-Afghani and 'Abduh’s argument that Predestination (al-qada' wal-qadar) sustained the early Arab Muslims in their sweeping international conquests. The article distinguished Islam’s qada wal-qadar from non-Islamic or at best heretical doctrines of al-jabr (determinism): that God compels human beings to carry out their deeds in an absolute way that would leave them no volition. No extant sect of the Muslims --- (incorporatively) comprised of Sunnis, (Twelver) Shi'is, Zaydis, Isma'ilis, Wahhabis, Kharijites --- believes in such a will-sapping fatalistic doctrine. Ibid pp. 51-52. In its sharp awareness of European stereotypes (fatalistic Muslims) and deep need to refute them, this 1884 item of al-Afghani and 'Abduh was already acculturated after a fashion.

\(^7\) "al-Ta'assub" (Fanaticism), ibid p. 43.

\(^8\) al-Afghani’s article on Predestination does suggest a utilitarian, relativist interest in political by-products of religious belief --- cohesion, international military might --- for themselves. In fact, just before he exalted the conquests that Islam’s tenet of predestination motivated the classical Arabs to undertake (Urwa, pp. 53-54), al-Afghani implied that traditions other than Islam had somewhat parallel beliefs that would similarly motivate their followers to conquer. Even the "ignorant" person who denied that a Creator initiated cause and effect recognises predestination when he admits the effect of natural phenomena upon human will. Some (atheistical or agnostic political?) sages of the Westerners cogently argued the reality of Predestination. Ibid p. 52. From the origins of human society in remotest pagan antiquity, belief in Predestination has been the indispensable precondition for conquest, needed to free the conqueror from fear of death before battle: Napoleon Bonaparte was the most tenacious believer in it. Ibid pp. 55-56. For al-Nadim’s recognition of post-Christian ideologies in the West and its nationalisms, fns 81 and 161.
height of "wisdom", though, was terminology that evoked the post-conquest symbiosis of (a) Islam and Arab elements with (b) philosophy and sciences borrowed from the ancient Western and other non-Muslim civilizations under the 'Abbasids. The 'Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 813 - 833) created a Bayt al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad to systematically bring out Arabic versions of Greek philosophical works. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa itself was clear:

[The Arab Nation’s Islamic] religious law and teachings motivated it to seek diverse sciences/arts [funun] ... They transferred into their own territories the medicine of Hippocrates and Galen, Euclid’s geometry, the astronomy of Ptolemy, the wisdom of Plato and Aristotle. Before the religion’s impact, they had no inkling of such things.

Thus, the pristine model Islam that al-Afghani and 'Abduh imaged in 1884 prescribed that "every" Muslim "nation" (ummah) assimilate as one condition for Islam’s sovereignty the best achievements of all human minds. The Muslims had to seize and then originally develop not only sciences and techniques of utility for strength and well-being but distinguished speculation by non-Muslims about existence. The classical Arabs had thus far best achieved this synthesis in Muslim history --- which validated learning from, while resisting, modern Westerners.

The challenges from the West were thus shifting historical focus backwards from later non-Arab Muslims and Egypt’s late Sunni traditionalism to the classical Arabs, in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa. Blending might and incorporationist rationalism, the classical Arabs both (a) fitted into adoption of Western technologies and liberal political systems for strength to resist imperialism and (b) could reverse a deculturizing Westernization turning the new elite that had to direct the borrowing into collaborators with imperialism.

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9. "Madil-Ummah wa Hadiruha wa 'Ilaju 'Ilaliha" (The Past and the Present of the Nation and How to Treat its Ailments) al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 21. In this Arabic article, al-Afghani concentrated on applied Greek sciences as the object of classical borrowing. In an 1882 lecture in Calcutta to Indian Muslims, he spelled out that philosophy was the crucial motive for the Caliph al-Mansur’s program of translations of Greek scientific texts into Arabic. In this Indian set of his communications, the philosophical outlook founded by the classical Arabs now required Muslims to concentrate on assimilating the sciences of the modern West. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" pp. 161-165.

10. Keddie faulted al-Afghani for not setting out to Arabs and Muslims in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa the immense technological, scientific, economic, political and educational advances that their societies would have to carry out in order to really dislodge or hold back the Western states. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" pp. 226. We could contrast at least this Arabic journal of al-Afghani to much more detailed argumentation for adoption of the West’s sciences and modern mechanical civilization in his Persian-language essays and speeches to Indian Muslim audiences: writing from a princely state of South India in 1880-1881, he was aware of --- and mentioned along with railroads and photography --- phonographs or telephones only just invented in the far-away USA in 1876-77. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism pp. 121-122. However, al-Afghani had already written of
intellectuals whom we examine repeatedly refer to the classical Arabs’ assimilation of Greek thought, earlier argued by al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa, some (Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Taha Husayn, Tawfiq al-Hakim) obviously to justify assimilating sectors of modern Europe’s Greek-originated civilization, but perpetuating the non-Egyptian classical Arabs’ definitiveness, too.

**Particularization-Retarding**

al-Afghani and 'Abduh’s presentation of Islam’s past in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa ran against the crystallization of national political consciousness framed within Egypt. The periods they glorified were the earlier ones in which wide Arab (but also possibly other post-classical Muslim) empires most tightly controlled Egypt. Because their concern was international strength against the West, the indigenous past that al-Afghani and 'Abduh favored was the far-extending but administratively integrated Rashidi, Umayyad and 'Abbasid empires. al-Afghani and his Egyptian disciple denounced the emergence of alternative provincial power centers, and then the break-up of the 'Abbasid Empire, as initiating the disintegration of the Muslim millah’s "body" which finally led to the situation in which Britain could conquer the Egyptians, Persians and Afghans one by one without meeting co-ordinated resistance. This strongly identified the classical Arab Muslims’ intellectual creativity with the political unity of their empires. The process of disintegration and weakness that made the Muslims colonizable began when the temporal authority, the Caliphate, ceased to promote knowledge (ilm: religious learning, science), and original opinion (ijtihad) in religious matters. From Islam’s third century, divisive doctrines multiplied, and the unity of the Caliphate broke up into three states: the 'Abbasid based in Baghdad, the Fatimid in Egypt and North Africa, the Umayyad in Spain. The consequence was that "the word of the ummah was split up ... Caliphate degenerated into monarchy, losing the phonographs and telephones as well as Western republicanism and constitutionalism in Misr (Alexandria) in 1878. Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" p. 91 fn. In 1884, al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa’s tenor throughout was that sources of Western strength had to be urgently duplicated, although the focus was more on the West’s military technology than in al-Afghani’s other Arabic and Persian publications. For al-Afghani-'Abduh’s concern that the Westernizing-educated elite in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire had to have a coherent political identity so that they would apply their modern functions to maintaining the interests of the indigenous community, as it faced imperialism: "Madil-Ummah wa Hadiruha...", al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 16-19.

12. Ibid p. 31.
respect [of people], so that those seeking to rule as kings or to win authority [as Sultans] (tullab al-mulk wal-sultan) dared to seize power by military force without attention to the Caliphate”.  

Though with religious rather than ethnic pride, such passages in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa imaged as the archetype for an indigenous polity wide but organically undivided Islamic states in which Arabs and Arabic dominated and Egypt was a province. al-Afghani conditioned Muslim Egyptians in the later independence movement of Mustafa Kamil to deplore as fragmentation changes in the 'Abbasid empire that enabled leaders resident in Egypt to wrest autonomy or independence and keep more money and resources at home (A 187-188). The internationally mighty early empires lanced back at the British were all centered outside the land of Egypt in Mecca, Damascus and Baghdad. It braked the development of Egypt-centered historical consciousness, which was to crystallize only in the 1920s. Indeed, in over-asserting after 1922 that later Egypt-centered states produced Arabic literature or intellectualism or international might equal to Baghdad’s (Book 2), temporarily particularoid intellectuals such as those around al-Siyasah never shook off al-Afghani and 'Abduh’s reverence.

Language and Arabness

As a Persian bilingual in Arabic since his youthful studies in 'Iraq’s Shi’ite centers, al-Afghani was emotionally bound to the classical Arabs and to the 'Iraq they had ruled. The pre-Islamic peninsular Arabs had composed fine heroic poetry but their nomadism, irreligion and failure to produce coherent political states or intellectual life had little appeal to him. In some formulations, al-Afghani did move closer to commitment to the Arabs as a

13. Ibid p. 34. A decade later, and in Egypt, al-Nadim reinforced that the later decentralization and disintegration of the 'Abbasid Empire led to intellectual and cultural stagnation. The Arabs established freedom of thought: it was with the break-up of the large Muslim states that "those rulers in rebellion proceeded to kill the scholars and burn books and destroy schools so that the light of Eastern sciences was snuffed out and the kings of the East constricted the writers" (= scholastic Sunnism?). "Bi-ma Taqaddamu wa Ta'akhkhama wal-Khalq Wahid?" (By what Things did they Achieve Progress and we Fall Behind When we and they were Created Equal?), al-Ustadh 29 November 1892 p. 348.

14. Even during his career as a pan-Islamist in the Sunni world, he was known there to have done his formative higher studies in 'Iraq’s Shi’i holy cities of Najaf and Karbala: "his writings and lectures [showed] knowledge of the tradition of Islamic philosophy, particularly of Ibn Sina ... more easily come by at that time in the Shi’i schools, where the Avicennian tradition was still alive, than in those of Sunni Islam". After this formation in classical Arab texts that validated borrowing from non-Islamic sources much more than those offered in Sunni institutions in the Middle East, al-Afghani, still young, moved to India. There "he acquired ... his first knowledge of the sciences and mathematics of modern Europe". Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London: OUP paperback 1970) p. 108.
human group. His most spirited, proto-nationalist defence of the (classical) Arabs came in his 1883 reply in the Paris Journal des Debats to Renan’s attacks upon Islam and the classical Arabs as inimical to rational intellectual life. More than God-revealed Islam, al-Afghani, despite his Persian origin, defended the Arabs, arguing their creative, decisive contribution to classical Islamic civilization against Renan’s racist attribution of its achievements to subjugated Aryan peoples, especially the Persians. Against Renan’s disparagement of the capacity of Semites for creative and rational thought, he argued that the Arabs had demonstrated “their natural love for sciences” and following their conquest of their Islamic empire quickly assimilated and developed such originally foreign sciences as Philosophy. At points, al-Afghani addressed Renan’s own racial world-view: to argue the Arabs’ creativity he enumerated leading Islamic scientists and philosophers of Arabian provenance or descent. At another point, he showed an impulse to challenge Renan’s assumption that races could define nationalities or intellectuality. Islam’s rational sciences in Arabic and racially non-Arab thinkers who produced them, al-Afghani argued, belonged to “Arab civilization” because it is the language used, not racial origins, that determines the group or culture to which individuals feel that they belong. The Arabs can claim the racially Iranian Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Spain-resident Islamic philosophers of mixed descents, so long as the French claim Mazarin and Napoleon. al-Afghani also argued the Arabs’ racial capacity for scientific and rational thought from the also Semitic Syriac-speaking Christians’ capacity for it: he stressed their close interactions, especially intellectual, with the classical Muslim Arabs.

al-Afghani’s theme that fluidly-bordered languages weld each nation or a coherent civilizational community around it, from many races, was to be crucial in the development of pan-Arab linguistic nationalism in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s (Chapters 9 and 10: esp. 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat). 'Abdallah al-Nadim a decade later (1892) was to tighten --- and already applied to contemporary history --- al-Afghani’s 1883 theme that

an adopted language of formal discourse attaches to its nation individuals from various racial origins.

Overall, al-Afghani in 1883-1884 offered a body of images from classical indigenous history suited to suggest a contemporary wide pan-Arab nation. That application to contemporary history and politics, however, came later and from others. In 1883, al-Afghani mentioned in the Paris L’Intransigeant intrigues by the British to establish an Arabian Caliphate at Mecca at the expense of the Ottoman Sultan’s authority. Keddie at least considered the possibility that al-Afghani, at odd points anyway, worked for some such scheme, and with the new Egyptian Khedive ’Abbas, in the period 1883-1895. ’Abbas Hilmi did unceasingly fan such unrest in Arab West Asia until the British deposed him in 1914 (Chapter 5). However, al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa did not give its classical Arabo-Islamic identity elements any contemporary application divisive for the Ottoman State, the last core for Muslim sovereignty.

The Supra-Arab Pan-Muslim Sphere

al-Afghani’s calls in this period for unity and simultaneous Muslim uprisings and resistance to the British Empire over much of the globe was not a context that encouraged him or

16. al-Afghani, “le Mahdi”, L’Intransigeant 11 December 1883, reprinted Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh, pp. 80-81. The passage shows al-Afghani’s sharp awareness that many peninsular and other Arab subjects of the Ottoman State wanted a Caliphate vested in a member of the Prophet’s Arab Quraysh tribe. Thus, the Ottoman Sultan could not sap any future Arab uprising, perhaps to be sparked by some sweeping success of the Sudanese Mahdi, by citing his status as a sort of Caliph. al-Afghani specified that Britain intended to set up as a mock-Caliph one of the Banu ‘Awn family, of which a member was currently Sharif of Mecca, as the means to impose their domination on the Muslims. Ibid.


18. For argumentation that Islam had obliterated divisive national loyalties, leading Muslims to accept political rule by Muslims from other national groups, see “al-Jinsiyyah wal-Dinayat al-Islamiyyah” (Nationality and the Islamic Religion), al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 9-12. Yet, years later, while supporting the Sultan ’Abdul-Hamid’s pan-Islamism, al-Afghani proposed a restructuring of the Ottoman Empire to take more account of the special position of its Arabs. The Empire had to give up indefensible Balkan territories altogether, make the Arab provinces semi-autonomous “khedivial states”, adopt the language of the Qur’an as an official language overshadowing Turkish, create a “capital of Islam” in Baghdad, and invite Iran, Afghanistan and Muslim India to attach to the Empire in a pan-Islamic union. The Caliphate would remain vested in the house of Osman. Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: the Formative Years 1875-1914 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 1970) p. 123.
his disciples to differentiate Muslim nationalities or homelands. The model classical Arabs’ sphere of conquests and rule encompassed almost the whole Islamic area visualized by al-Afghani and he made clear in al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqa that Persian- and Turkish-speaking Muslims had conquered far beyond defined territorial units.

While interweaving all Muslim populations, the somewhat "utilitarian"[19] al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqa could in the same appeals highlight proto-elements for much later Arab, Iranian and Turkish nationalisms if only to help improvise very specific coalitions of Muslim groups against imperialism (Britain). A cultural semi-fusion of Persians with Arabs under classical Islam was countered by stress upon a separate contemporary Persian linguistic zone in the article "Call for the Persians to Unite with the Afghans". It tried to convince the antagonistic Shi’ite Persians and Sunni Afghans to ally against the British in India. al-Afghani enumerated fundamental contributions by at least proto-Sunni Persians in Arabic to mainstream Islam in its definitive classical period: it was right for them now to "renew the Islamic unity" with Islam’s majority Sunni community (the Afghans most urgently) against imperialists[20].

Awareness of massive contributions by Persians to Arabic literature under classical Islam, in the twentieth century was to contribute, for example, to Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat’s preparedness in the 1930s and 1940s to associate Persians and Afghans with a pan-Arab political confederation (Ch. 10: B 291-297). But al-Afghani also conveyed to his Egyptian/Arab readers[19]. The decidedly unaesthetic SC Farah Antun did not have even his master Renan’s feel for the language and past of the classical Arabs. Yet Antun, from American exile in 1906 after his controversy against ‘Abduh on Ibn Rushd, finally came to sense this-wordly, ultra-political, rather West-shaped sectors, far from traditionally orthodox, in those pan-Islamists’ relation with Islam. By 1906, Antun was writing that al-Afghani had been using the Islamic religion as a “means” to negatively resist Europe (although thereby incapacitating the resistant population from absorbing its strength-conferring science). Al-Afghani’s utilitarian or pragmatic (naf‘) drive to maintain religion as “the thread holding together the social system” threatened religion itself. The fundamentalist secularist Antun, though, still equated Islam with passivity: al-Afghani’s call would sap all will among the Muslims to modernize and enable the men of religion to keep exploiting them. Haydar Hajj Isma’il, al-Mujtama‘ wal-Din wal-Ishtirakiyyah: Farah Antun (Bayrut: np. 1972) pp. 29-30.

[20]. Breaking down his Arab and other Sunni readers’ automatic equation of Persians with Shi’ism, al-Afghani mentioned among “those whom the lands of Iran produced” the authors of six classical hadith collections canonical for Sunnis. (However, he also mentioned Muhammad Ibn Ya‘qub al-Kul, Iranian compiler of a purely Shi’ite collection). He also characterized many classical grammarians of Arabic as Iranian: “the people of Persia were among the first to serve the Arab tongue and found its genres of literature”. He further represented as “Iranian” such major contributors to classical Arab high literature as Abul-Faraj al-Isfahani (b. 897 in Persia but of pure Arab race, d. 967) who assembled Kitab al-Aghani a compendium of pre-Islamic Arabian, Umayyad, and ’Abbasid songs, poetry and social life and Badi’ al-Zaman al-Hamadhani (968-1008) who originated the semi-dramatic maqamat “assemblies” genre. "Da’wat al-Furs ilal-Ittihad ma’ al-Afghan" (Call for the Persians to Unite with the Afghans), ‘Urwat pp. 106-110.
post-classical thinning of Arabic as a second learned literary language, dividing the modern Muslim world into several language spheres. He distinguished (a) "the lands of the Arabs" where Arabic remained a daily spoken or literary language and al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa had its direct audience from (b) another sphere --- Persia, Afghanistan, India (and Central Asia?) --- in which people understand Persian although the native tongues of the different peoples vary. The Afghans will readily respond to any call to Islamic unity from the Persians, and not only for linguistic reasons: the Afghans and the Persians are both of "the ancient Persian stock/origin (asl)" --- together, they could duplicate the strength German nationalism brought when it united a people similarly enfeebled before when they let a secondary sectarian difference within one religion divide them.

al-Afghani’s sometimes transitional Arabic writings greatly sharpened awareness of modern or contemporary Afghan, Iranian, Turkish and Indian Muslims among Egyptian and Arab Muslims. His attacks on the pro-British Indian Muslim educationalist Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a modernist theologian whom al-Afghani branded a "materialist", at least introduced Egyptians to a sector of India, a composite Hindu-Muslim country that was to focus important dilemmas of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals.

21. "Da’wat al-Furs ..." p. 106. al-Afghani had a realistic understanding that only a limited number in the sphere of Persian read Arabic well, yet it sufficed to relay al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa by proxy, since Persian papers (Ittila', Firhang) published translations of al-'Urwat’s anti-imperialist articles. Ibid. With less realism, the Egypt-resident Syrian Christian Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914) viewed the Arabic language as an established instrument of communication that united "the Easterners in India, Persia and Turkistan, in addition to Iraq, Syria, Egypt, the Arab countries". Thomas Philipp, "Language, History and National Arab Consciousness in the Thought of Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914)" IJMES v. 4 (January 1973) p. 10.


23. For denunciation of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his Westernizing, collaborative school of Muslim modernists as a tool of the British, see "al-Dahriyyuna fil-Hind" (The Materialists in India), al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 383-387, translated in full by Keddie in An Islamic Response to Imperialism pp. 175-180. Kedourie argued (Afghani and Abdul p. 36) that al-Afghani’s attacks on Sir Sayyid in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa and elsewhere lacked ideological content: he objected more to Sir Sayyid’s political collaboration with the British than to his heterodox modernism that resembled his own. Kedourie’s and --- for a time, Keddie’s --- speculation that al-Afghani had naturist and West-influenced views akin to, and influenced by, those of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, were refuted by Aziz Ahmed, "Afghani’s Indian Contacts", Journal of the American Oriental Society v. 89 (1969) p. 489. For a bitter warning to the newly conquered Egyptians of the poverty to which the British had reduced Indian farmers and urban workers, "Tasarruf al-Injiliz fil-Hind" (The Conduct of the British in India), al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 289-291; 'Urwat articles were translated in Urdu journals, "al-Suhuf al-Hindiyyah" (The Indian Press), ibid p. 275.
2: MUHAMMAD 'ABDUH: RESTORATION OF THE CLASSICAL ARABS WITHIN ASSIMILATION OF WESTERN CREATIVITY

After 1882 al-Afghani more often narrowed his appeals to Arab audiences down to pan-Islamic self-defence: he thenceforth advocated adoption of the West’s political institutions and sciences more in generalized language. In contrast, 'Abduh after he came to terms with the British and returned to Egypt in 1888, centered his publications and activities around (a) constructive reforms in part patterned on the modernity of Western societies and (b) the revival of aspects of Islam and the classical Arabs that could be synthesized with that modernity. 'Abduh too, however, further catered to the needs of the bullied small acculturated elite solidifying under the British by discreetly weaving in --- and developing --- muted, distilled, themes from the old rage against the West in al-Afghani’s pan-Islamism.

We now examine 'Abduh’s replies, published in 1902 in Rashid Rida’s al-Manar, to the secularizing Syrian Christian Farah Antun’s observations about Ibn Rushd (Averroes): echoing Renan, these had characterized Islam and past Islamic government as hostile to science, in contrast to the greater scope that Christianity gave science because it separated the temporal and religious authorities. From Ibn Rushd --- the very rational-scientific Arab-Islamic golden past that al-Afghani and 'Abduh had so long evoked --- Antun justified "materialist science" to Muslim Arabs as the only basis for social progress: al-Afghani and his followers had only...

24. Antun set out his views on Ibn Rushd and Islam in several articles in his Alexandria magazine al-Jami’ah. These were published with revisions as Ibn Rushd wa Falsafatuhu (Alexandria: 1 January 1903). The controversy was discussed by Hourani, Arabie Thought pp. 253-259 and by Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London: OUP 1933) pp. 89-90. We cite 'Abduh’s Islam-centric counter-characterizations of Ibn Rushd and classical Muslim philosophy in this final semi-official period of his life from the collection al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah ma’ al-‘Ilm wal-Madaniyyah (Islam and Christianity Vis-a-Vis Science and Civilization), with the comments of Rashid Rida, who edited al-Manar in which ‘Abduh published his replies to Antun (Cairo: Muhammad ‘Ali Subayh & Sons, n.d.).

25. The orientalist perspective on Muslim philosophy, as it stood by the late 1980s, had veered to 'Abduh’s old Islamic characterization of Ibn Rushd and away from Renan’s (and Antun’s) dichotomization. E.I.J. Rosenthal, who edited an extant Hebrew text of Ibn Rushd’s commentary on Plato’s Republic, again reviewed recurring opposition from the dialectical theologians (mutakallimun): however, both al-Murabit and al-Muwahhid Caliphs were often Ibn Rushd’s patrons and allies against them and he did get appointed chief qadi of Cordova, a key Islamic post not confined to the administration of justice. Ibn Rushd harmonized (a) the shari’ah and Islam with (b) philosophy and the nomos or law of Plato’s philosopher-king. "There is only one truth for Averroes, that of the religious law, which is the same law that the metaphysician is seeking. The theory of the double truth was ... formulated [later] by ... the Latin Averroists. Nor is it justifiable to say that philosophy is for the metaphysician what religion [the Hereafter] is for the masses. Averroes stated explicitly and unequivocally that religion is for all three classes”. Rosenthal, "Averroes", EB 15 ed.

26. Antun tried to use Ibn Rushd to establish an indigenous rationalist-naturalist framework within Islamic thought itself. Man could know God less by prayer than by research into the universe (science). Yet for Antun,
fostered "backwardness" by trying to found a political community upon religious unity. Antun was pressing for the full integration of the minority Arab Christians into a new secular political community with Muslims.

Colonialism: The Persisting Context

In his responses to Antun, 'Abduh was ambivalent towards Arabic-speaking Christians but much more tensely divided to the West. The post-Christian Antun had swallowed the modern West's own evaluation of itself as liberal, secular, Progressive, although he rebuked the Western powers' expansionist and colonial drives. 'Abduh, too, prized many areas of Western modernity but as a Muslim had to be much more aware of the durable Christianity-focused anti-Muslim attitudes in its imperialism. 'Abduh's latter preparedness to coexist with the British regime in Egypt had only dampened down and shelved, not eliminated, the fierce resistance to European colonialism that he and al-Afghani had propagated from al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa. After 1888, 'Abduh alternated two attitudes to imperialism, prefiguring the duality of acculturated intellectuals from his landowning, a'yan Arab-Egyptian background in the twentieth century:

humanity alone is eternal and replaces God: he rejected life after death. The philosophy of Ibn Rushd was really, like modern naturalism, "a materialist philosophy based on science". Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals pp. 74-76. In a later work, perhaps partly in amends, Antun praised the classical Arabs for lifting Greek sciences and philosophy out of a stagnation caused by a long conflict between Rome and Constantinople over the nature of Jesus. He ascribed the success of the Arabs in so rapidly carving out their empire to not just their monotheism but their racial quality as Semites fostered by Arabia's natural environment: he cited Semite-phobe Renan but exalted the Phoenicians as well in relation to Indo-Europeans. Farah Antun now stressed the affinity of the Syrian Nestorians' view of Christ to Islam and (repeating the 1902 'Abduh) the security they enjoyed under the patronage of the Caliphs as they translated Greek philosophy into Arabic, making possible such later Arab philosophers as Ibn Rushd. Isma'il, al-Mujtama' wal-Din pp. 150-154.

27. See fn. 19. Antun's most far-reaching critique of al-Afghani and 'Abduh's ideas came some years after the initial controversy after he had migrated to America (1905): from there he began to publish again his magazine al-Jami'ah, further extending his analysis. It was only through science, not religion, that social progress could be made: al-Afghani's setting up of religious unity as the basis for social progress had led only to "increasing weakness ... retrogression and backwardness". Sharabi op. cit pp. 78-79. Cf. citations from vol 5 (1906) of al-Jami'ah in Isma'il, Farah Antun pp. 28-29: Antun now was specifically rebutting al-Afghani's Refutation of the Materialists, in 'Abduh's translation: a text that would long color Egyptian Arabism. (For classical Arab motifs from al-Afghani's Refutation in 1950 resistance to Communism by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, see B 263-266).


29. In his polemic, Antun was at pains to dissociate the Eastern Christians from Western missionaries and Western powers that misused religion for political purposes: "we are not responsible for what Western Christendom has done; our loyalty is to the East --- we have always been faithful to the Sultan". Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 259. Sharabi even views Antun as, despite his objection as a Christian to pan-Islam as the basis for political community, discreetly aware of its "benefit as an instrument of resistance". Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals p. 78. During the polemic, Antun cited, al-Nadim-like, the Crusader wars as one of many occasions in which the Eastern Christians had united with their Muslim compatriots to defend their joint "homelands" against Western Christian powers. Isma'il, al-Mujtama' wal-Din pp. 51-52.
denunciations of it as lethal and a constrained accommodation. In the latter mode, 'Abduh
advised the Muslims of Algeria and Tunisia during his 1903 tour to deflate tensions with their
French rulers by avoiding politics or any attempt to set another colonial power against France
(Mustafa Kamil courted France to dislodge Britain from Egypt). The Algerians and Tunisians
should strive to progress by pursuing both modern-secular and religious education, with
assistance from a French government eager to court indigenous support in Algeria in particular.
'Abduh and his Syrian-Egyptian adherent Rashid Rida, editor of al-Manar, at their most
conciliatory remained disguisedly hostile to France and other European powers: shunning any
political movement did not mean that the natives should not communicate their grievances to the
government and if it was unresponsive they had title "to wait for ill-fortune to befall it"\(^{30}\). A
word of criticism in al-Manar and the French would ban that life-line’s entry to the Algerian
Muslims deprived of Arabic publications\(^ {31}\) --- and it was certainly advisable to court more
liberal governors in North Africa when France could be so draconian against protest. Yet
'Abduh and Rida’s salafi Islam was like the Kamilists or later acculturated Muslim Egyptian
intellectuals --- also interested in French North Africa --- in its concern to communicate with
better Westerners, so as to win their support against the worst: and, beyond expediency, the two
clerics had much the same self-conscious craving to stand well in the eyes of those people who
radiated global Progress and clout.

Farah Antun’s idealization of the secular West as patterning a de-Islamized modernity for
Egyptians and Arabs triggered all 'Abduh’s pent-up rage against Europeans that, however, he
still kept sectionalized. In 1900 he had conducted a fierce polemic in al-Mu’ayyad against
French historian and Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux: it saw both France’s violent imperial
expansion against Muslim (but also pagan) populations and resistance by the latter as motivated
by non-religious interests, although recording how Europeans and the Muslims they hit or ruled
defined themselves and each other in terms of the religions\(^ {32}\) (cf. the Young Men’s Muslim

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\(^{30}\) Rashid Rida, Ta’rikh al-Ustadh al-Imam, v. 1 (Cairo: Mitba’at al-Manar 1931) pp. 871-874. 'Abduh is
presented as, during his journey, working to equip and steel his Algerian hosts to resist France in Muhammad Burj’s
much later, very nationalist, "al-Jaza’ir fi Kitabat Muhammad 'Abduh" (Algeria in the Writings of Muhammad

\(^{31}\) Syrian (but Egypt-resident) pioneer pan-Arab 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakabi (c. 1849-1902) protested
France’s refusal to allow Arabic newspapers and magazines to enter Algeria. Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals p. 99:
"al-Kawakibi viewed the Arab nation as extending over North Africa as well as 'Iraq".

\(^{32}\) Burj, "al-Jaza’ir fi Kitabat..." pp. 15-22. Hanotaux’s original article in Journal de Paris in early 1900
Association’s non-religious explication in 1930 of even French manoeuvres to detach their Berber subjects from Islam: B 71-72 incl. fn 45). Now, in reply to the Christian-born Farah Antun, 'Abduh charged that French colonialism in North Africa, motivated by "fanaticism", violently attacked the subjected Muslims and denied them elementary religious toleration. He assailed general Christian European imperialism around the world: Europeans, from religious fanaticism, violently oppressed "non-followers of the Christian denominations" in the Dutch-colonized East Indies, in the Transvaal State before its fall and Natal, in Russia’s lands twenty years back, and in Algeria and its neighboring lands. 'Abduh denounced France's "cruelty against the Muslims" in the lands that it had conquered. The English were the exceptional European nation that granted religious tolerance to Muslims, in return for their submission to colonial rule; they had learnt this tolerance from the Muslims whom they fought during the Crusades, although they had not yet developed it to Islam’s level. Yet 'Abduh had confronted Egyptian Muslims with the secularist-Christian duality persisting in the personality of the French, as of other imperial peoples. On one hand, he was proud of the laicist reforms that France had achieved and dismissed the Muslims as inflicting backwardness upon themselves, and requiring colonization, by refusing to separate Church and State in the same fashion. On the other hand, Hanotaux recognized Christianity as a part of the French personality. Christianity’s Trinity --- God’s immanence in human life --- and free-will had fostered French secular activism in contrast to Islam’s transcendence and predestination that paralysed its believers with the sense of man’s insignificance and helplessness. Adams, *Islam and Modernism* pp. 86-9. Haykal would become more and more aware after 1922 of the persistence of Christian anti-Islamism in anti-clerical West Europeans.

33. *al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah* pp. 147-149.
34. *Ibid* p. 146. Afrikaner settlers in the Transvaal proclaimed "the South African Republic" in 1857. The British annexed the Transvaal in 1877 but the Afrikaners regained independence in 1881. War between the two parties broke out in 1899; the Republic became a British colony when peace was concluded in 1902. The oppression by Christian Europeans that 'Abduh had in mind for the Transvaal, then, would be the Afrikaners’ mistreatment of indigenous Africans in their periods of independence. The British annexed Natal in 1843, and mainly British immigrants replaced departing Afrikaners. From 1860 onwards, many Indians entered Natal to labor in its sugar plantations. Thus, 'Abduh by Christian-European oppression for Natal meant racial segregation and discrimination that the British authorities imposed upon these Indians, mostly Hindus but including many Muslims. 'Abduh’s denunciation of European Christian mistreatment of non-Christians in Natal might conceivably have again meant Africans: Britain’s annexation of Zululand to Natal through the 1879 British-Zulu war. 35. When referring to Russian ill-treatment of non-Christians twenty years before, 'Abduh may have had in mind the mass expulsions and flight of Cherkess and other Muslims southwards caused by Russia’s sanguinary advance into the Caucasus and annexation of Batun, Kars and Ardahan in the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman war. The Ottoman government resettled many such Caucasian Muslims in Syria, where 'Abduh was exiled. Kemal H. Karpat "The Status of the Muslim Under European Rule: The Eviction and Settlement of the Cherkess" *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Jeddah, v.1:2/v.2:1 pp. 7-11. (Cf. fn 133). Or 'Abduh might have meant bloodshed through which Russia imposed its authority over the Central Asians, such as the Turkmens (the 1881 Geok-Tepe massacre and the occupation of the Merv Oasis in 1884).
37. *al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah* p. 149-150. The passage may have been ironical. 'Abduh did mention Walter Scott as one of the English writers who early appreciated the Muslims. Scott’s 1825 novel *The Talisman* which depicted a relationship of respect between Richard the Lionhearted and Salah al-Din ("Saladdin") was translated into Arabic. R.A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs* (London: Cambridge University Press
seems to have meant British racial segregation and discrimination against (Muslim and Hindu) Indians in Natal. (The Kamilists around this time were denouncing British segregation and discrimination against South Africa’s Indian Muslims38, with whose problems 'Abduh interacted as Mufti of Egypt39). In his last years he discreetly, skilfully resisted the British administration’s progressive contraction of standard Qur’an-derived Arabic in Egyptian education40.

The later 'Abduh, then, recognized Egyptian (or North African Arab) comparative backwardness which tutelage might benefit: but submission in the first place was because the Westerners commanded such devastating military strength. In areas 'Abduh mapped for collaboration such as education, however, the British then infuriatingly excised the Qur’an-derived standard literary language: they exacted depersonalization as the price for what modern knowledge they delivered.

Islam and Classical Arabs Promoted Rational Thought and Culture

In affirming that the classical Arabs had been crucial to the development of human science and rational thought, 'Abduh maintained Islam as the emblem of collective identity for a new generation of elite Muslim Egyptians with less institutional access to it. He himself had repeatedly reinterpreted Qur’anic concepts so that they corresponded to recent West European science and social institutions, raising the question why the secular West should not be frankly accepted as the source for the elite’s new thought and life. ‘Abduh and other Muslims in al-Afghani’s circle had been friends of secularized Syrian Christian intellectuals, drawing on their stock of radical Western concepts: an undivided sects-integrative indigenous community relegating Islam to the private sphere would fulfil such interaction. In his reply, however.

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39. As Mufti of Egypt (1889-1905) 'Abduh received inquiries from South Africa’s Muslims about how to apply Islam in their difficult conditions as a depressed minority in a non-Muslim land. 'Abduh issued the famous 'Transvaal fatwa' permitting South African Muslims to eat food served by non-Muslims in public places. 'Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad, al-Ustadh al-Imam Muhammad 'Abduh, 'Uqūriy al-Islah wal-Ta’lim (Ministry of Culture and National Guidance: Series 'A’lam al-Arab 1) (Cairo: Maktabat Misr nd.) pp. 210-211.
'Abduh refused to set Islam aside as Egyptians and Arabs entered modernity.

The Qur'an stated that God governed the universe with regular natural laws, commanding the believers to trace causality in the material world: this spurred the classical Arabs' development of science and rational philosophy. In contrast, Christianity stressed miracles, the capacity of its followers to reverse natural laws at will. The Christians' religion thus made them enemies of science. Islam established no religious hierarchy that would limit freedom of thought; instead, it virtually separated religion and state, leaving every Muslim to interpret the Qur'an etc. how he liked, without any intermediary. (Haykal repeated this amid the Arabo-Islamic reaction of the 1930s and 1940s, to maintain the right of his West-tinted group of intellectuals to interpret Islam independently in face of a somewhat more assertive Muslim clergyp)

'Abduh thus fitted Islam into the modern secular West's values, facilitating a transfer of custodianship of it from the 'ulama' to the West-dyed secular-educated elite.

'Abduh in 1902 made extra-Egyptian classical Arabs, particularly 'Abbasid 'Iraq, the definitive historical community as Egyptians borrowed from the West. Description of that classical Muslim entity as "the Arabs" was stimulated by use of the term by Islamophile American and European writers whom he copiously quoted. All contemporary "sons of the Arab nation" (abna al-ummat al-'Arabiyyah) should feel his pride in those Muslims who

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42. 'Abduh tried to document denial by Christianity of rational laws and causality from the report that Jesus assured his followers that one mustard seed of faith would enable them to command a mountain to move at will (Matthew 17:20) or cast mountains into the sea (Mark 11:23). al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 22, 165. Antun replied in al-Jami'ah that the Qur'an itself in surahs such as Al 'Imran, endorsed or increased the miracles noted in Christianity, Isma'il, al-Mujtama' wal-Din p. 49.
43. Ibid pp. 56-57.
44. Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn Haykal (Albany: SUNY Press 1983) pp. 137-140. Smith sees 'Abduh and Haykal as concerned that the Muslims benefit from Western science. He however sees Haykal in the 1930s and 1940s as eliminating, in his Arabo-Islamic writings, limits on reason kept by 'Abduh and as narrowing Islam's prescriptive age down to the Rashidun (=Rightly-Guided) Caliphs whereas 'Abduh accommodated 'Abbasid intellectual Islam within the indigenous golden age. Yet a wider scan of Haykal's writings would show frequent praise of the incorporative 'Abbasid achievements 'Abduh exalted: B 106-108.
45. Eg. description by the Islamophile American John William Draper of "the early Muslims in the time of the Caliphs" as "the Arabs" in al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 15-16. The ethnicizing impact on 'Abduh of use of the term "the Arabs" by European writers, like Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931: La Civilization des Arabes, 1884), is clear in his discussion of "the sciences of the Arabs and their discoveries". al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 86. For use of Draper in 1922 by a later Muslim modernist apologist to denounce the Crusaders see Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam p. 221.
originated the observational-experimental method and thus true science. 'Abduh affirmed the Arabs’ innovative creativity in astronomy, chemistry --- in which the Greeks produced not a single experiment, the Arabs "hundreds" --- in inventing clocks and time-pieces and in physics (the properties of bodies). In very cautious language, he hinted (even while denying) that some classical Arabs had anticipated nineteenth century Europe’s theories of evolution of species. 'Abduh’s portrayal of the classical Arabs as reviving and transforming the "dead" sciences/knowledge that they took from the Greeks recapitulated al-Afghani’s arguments to Renan in 1883. Farah Antun depicted Ibn Rushd as a proponent of a "materialist", scientific explication of the universe, and in consequence in conflict with Islam and the Islamic state. 'Abduh replied that Ibn Rushd and his like represented mainstream Arab-Muslim society: Islam’s causality led its theologians (al-mutakallimun) to research medicine, the sciences of animals and plants and minerals. The roundness of the world was widely held under the 'Abbasid Caliphate, although Christianity opposed it with violence later. Christopher Columbus said that the books of "Averroes" (Ibn Rushd) first suggested to him that the world was round and prompted his voyage to America. The Muslim authorities --- the Islamic Caliphs, kings and governments --- fostered rational philosophical and scientific enquiry and awarded its sages (hukama: the practitioners of hikmah) and scholars/scientists ('ulama') the highest degrees and positions. Shams al-Dawlah (Persian Buyid prince, d. 1022) appointed the philosopher Ibn Sina his wazir and personal physician, al-Farabi had a similar position with the ruler of Aleppo Sayf al-Dawlah Ibn Hamdan (r. 947 - 967), Ibn Rushd was Islam’s chief qadi (judge) at Cordova. The religiously sceptical blind Syrian poet 'Abul-'Ala' al-Ma’arri

46. Ibid pp. 84-85.  
47. Section on the sciences of the Arabs and their discoveries, pp. 84-88. Even 'Abduh’s slipping of Evolution onto the agenda, which looks so West-stimulated, was simultaneously impelled by classical Arab influences. The 'Abbasid essayist and proto-sociologist al-Jahiz, al-Masu’di and the Ikhwan al-Safa’ speculated evolution --- a gradual ascent of life "from mineral to plant, from plant to animal, from animal to man". Gustave Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam: a Study in Cultural Orientation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1954) p. 331.  
48. 'Abduh, al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 156-157. This long quotation from Antun gestures more than other formulations by him to the religious and mystical sufi emotions of classical Arabs such as Ibn Rushd, and their modern Muslim successors.  
49. Ibid p. 164.  
50. Ibid p. 37.  
51. Ibid p. 38.  
52. Ibid p. 20.  
beloved of Haykal and Taha Husayn --- publicly said what Voltaire and Rousseau never dared to say: yet the people of his native al-Ma'arrah delegated him to negotiate a peace with the besieging chief of Aleppo.

'Abduh in 1902 almost exclusively extolled figures whose intellectual language was Arabic and who flourished in lands and periods in which racial as well as linguistic Arabs ruled politically. To Egypt's East (Western Asia) he mainly mentioned lands --- 'Iraq, Syria --- still of Arabic speech in his day. In 1902, 'Abduh's Islamic historical consciousness was nearly unaware of rational-intellectual or scientific creativity by post-classical non-Arab Muslims: the only exception was his remark that (Turkish-speaking) Muslims in Constantinople invented immunization. His Risalat al-Tawhid (Epistle on Monotheism), written in his Bayrut exile (1885-1888), had had stray passages that apparently criticized Persians whom even the first 'Abbasid Caliphs --- grateful for Persian aid in overthrowing the Umayyads --- already appointed to high posts at court, as ministers and in government administration. Many of these Persians, 'Abduh imaged, were only nominal Muslims who discreetly propagated preceding Iranian religions or irreligion, obliging the Caliph al-Mansur to order the composition of refutations of this zandaqah heresy. The work similarly condemned Isma'ili esoteric interpretations of the Qur'an as imported by non-Arabs. 'Abduh's ethnoid criticisms were more devices to make the extinct 'Abbasid-period mu'tazilah free-will theologians and even Muslim philosophers who drew on the Greeks look orthodox and akin to at least Ash'arite Sunnism in comparison.

54. Ibid p. 20.
55. Ibid p. 38.
56. Muhammad 'Abduh, Risalat al-Tawhid ed. Tahir al-Tannahi (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal 1963) pp. 25-41. For 'Abduh, the 'Abbasid period unmistakably was the definitive articulation of Islam. The first four Rightly Guided Caliphs --- locked in wars and expansion against non-Muslim enemies outside the peninsula and then political conflicts and civil wars between the Muslims themselves --- had neither the time nor inclination to go beyond the outward meaning of the most straight-forward Qur'anic verses while the next dynasty, the virtually pagan 'Umayyads, simply lacked the interest in religion to promote and guide its study, with the exception of the pious Caliph 'Umar Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. 'Abduh here adapted the propaganda historiography with which the 'Abbasids validated their own successor-dynasty. The 'Abbasids were the first Muslim rulers he mentioned as having promoted systematic literature to meet the intellectual challenge from established religions of the conquered populations. The insistence of the early Mu'tazilites that "reason" (al-`aqid) be applied to all sectors of religion, even rites of worship, was, tut-tutted 'Abduh, "an excess in support for the line of the Qur'an" which had awarded freedom to thought. Having a bit each way, he alternatingly characterized those 'ulama' who defied the 'Abbasid Caliphs' imposition of the mu'tazili doctrine of the Qur'an's createdness as (a) over-literal adherents to the surface meaning (zawahir) of the Qur'an and Sunnah and (b) persecuted or martyred resisters of an "heretical innovation" (bid'ah). 'Abduh verbally endorsed Abul-Hasan al-Ash'ari (873-935), founder of Sunni kalām (theology), as holding a rational mean between traditionalist proponents of al-salaf (the first pious generations of Muslims) and Mu'tazilism's more unbridled subjective speculators. Ibid.
Muslim modernists such as Qasim Amin, Muhammad Husayn Haykal (B 106) and Taha Husayn were to widen 'Abduh’s use of classical Muslim ethnicity and non-Sunni Greeks-tinted mu’tazilism and falsafah to keep indigenous identity open to the West’s modernity and contain or liberalize Egypt’s Sunni 'ulama’ --- or, later, Muslim Brotherhood fundamentalists57. Yet even manipulation of classical Muslim ethnicity still cumulatively ethnicized the intellectuals.

Over the long term, 'Abduh's heavily Arab-directed scientific-rational Muslim past would dispose Egyptians to an Arab national successor-community narrowed down from pan-Islam58.

Community with Indigenous Christians. 'Abduh described in detail the 'Abbasid Caliphs’ unstinting patronage of Syriac-speaking Christian (and some Jewish) tutors, physicians, astronomers/astrologers, philosophers and translators (chiefly of Greek philosophical and medical texts). The Caliph al-Mutawakkil granted great tracts of land to Hunayn Ibn Ishaq (808 - 873, translator of Hippocrates, Galen, Aristotle and Plato into Arabic)59. By a funny if misconstruable anecdote, 'Abduh conveyed the secure familiarity of such learned non-Muslims with the Arab Caliphs, their patrons60. A cumulative human tradition of rational thought, originated independently of religions, provided a neutral common ground for Muslims and Christians. 'Abduh designed his portrayal of the closeness of Arabic-literate Christians to the

57. Egyptian pan-Arab ideologues who resisted the America-allied Sadat and Mubarak regimes in the 1970s and 1980s developed an Arabist classicism that --- very like 'Abduh so long before --- exalted Mu’tazilism as the first, definitive articulation of Islam’s inherent rationalism, one made to defend Islam (and Arabism) in the 'Abbasid Empire against other religions. For Muhammad 'Imarah (1982), Mu’tazilism assimilated elements in Greek philosophy of use to Islam as the 'Abbasid Caliphs patronized its translation: it patterned the synthesis of openness with ethnic-nationalist and religious self-defence that he wanted for Egypt. Mu’tazilites of non-Arab descent opted for Arabism and defended it against the Shu’ubis. Thus, the Mu’tazilites represented the crystallization of the intellectualist "national-rationalist current" in the Arab personality, linked to merchantile strata. Dr Muhammad 'Imarah, Tayyarat al-Fikr al-Islami (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal 1982) pp. 61-145.

58. Antun was aware of the elements for a contemporary Arab ethnic identity in 'Abduh’s writings, his sense that Islam could be restored if its centre of gravity moved from Turks and Persians back to Arabs. Antun provocatively argued that the Turks’ military virtues and the culture of the Persians had revived Islam, not destroyed its strength, as 'Abduh perceived at odd times. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 258. However, both 'Abduh and Antun’s terminologies for contemporary indigenous communities were very confused, inconsistent and transitional.


60. "Bukhtishu’ Ibn Jibriil" (d. 870; the Caliph al-Mutawakkil’s physician for twelve years) "was one day in the presence of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil who seated him at his side. Bukhtishu' was wearing a silken Byzantine-type durra’ah (loose shift slit in front) in which was a tear. al-Mutawakkil proceeded to chat with Bukhtishu', but absent-mindedly fiddling with the tear until it reached the broad area of the robe (al-nayfah). Their conversation continued until al-Mutawakkil asked him: 'By what symptom do you physicians know when the deranged person needs to be tied up?’. Bukhtishu’ replied: "When he fiddles with the tear of the durra’ah of his physician until it reaches the garment’s broad part we tie him up’. al-Mutawakkil laughed until he fell onto his back". al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 18. For this family of eminent Christian physicians under the 'Abbasid Caliphs see art. "Bukhtishu’" EI2.
intellectual and political mainstream of 'Abbasid life to make contemporary Arab Christians feel at home in some modern Arab, predominantly Muslim, successor-community. But he was not prepared to state that Islam no longer mattered or had never been important in indigenous creativity, that the public community was undifferentiated as Antun wanted.

New Acculturated Elite Accommodated and Inducted

'Abduh may have been right that, for all his Gallic free thought, Antun residually identified with Christianity as a community marker. However, it was Christianity's stubborn emblemic salience in Western imperialist states that now made 'Abduh denounce all Western Christianity --- the Protestantism of the Britain that colonized Egypt and India, and the Catholicism that still colored imperialist France despite all laicism. He depicted the Catholic Lateran Council (1502) cursing all who read the philosophy of Ibn Rushd and painted a horrifying picture of the Inquisition's cruelties. 'Abduh, however, in 1902 was anxious to disillusion Muslim readers that Protestantism was in some way better than "the Roman Catholic Church", was a true movement of religious reform that encouraged ordinary people to examine the original scriptures for themselves and created tolerance that enabled modern science to emerge. (al-Afghani sometimes viewed the Protestant Reformation as having provided the impulse for innovations and creative competitiveness that produced the modern West and on occasion saw himself as Islam's coming Luther). As al-Nadim, a former colleague in the

61. Other Christians mentioned by 'Abduh included Yuhanna al-Batriq whom the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun appointed to direct translation of books of medicine and philosophy; Nubakht the Maronite astrologer/astronomer who also gained al-Ma'mun's patronage; Tiyufil Ibn Tuma, an astrologer who translated Homer into Syriac and wrote historical works: he received the patronage of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mahdi. Ibid pp. 16-17.
63. Ibid pp. 40-42.
64. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: Dikhrayat wa Ahadith (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1948) pp. 98-100. By setting men's minds free from the Catholic clergy, Luther --- politically --- also undermined the authority of despots. While al-Afghani saw Protestantism as Europe's crucial transition to modernity, he also mentioned many other factors: borrowings from Muslims through Andalusia and during the Crusader Wars, printing, the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope and the discovery and conquest of the Americas. (al-Afghani confirmed the misgivings of his Arab disciple al-Maghribi that the parallel religious reformation he wanted for Islam would entail a radical assault on traditional Islam, clerical and popular: the orthodox had made hadiths about the last days their fatalistic excuse not to achieve in this life). Ibid. In contrast, 'Abduh in 1902 stressed Luther's bigoted opposition to Aristotle, whom Muslims termed the First Teacher, and depicted Calvin burning Michael Servetus at the stake in 1553 over a secondary disagreement about the nature of Christ Jesus. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyah pp. 40-41. Cf. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 16.
school of al-Afghani, had already done in the 1890s, 'Abduh in 1902 gave heart-rending accounts of Christian Spain’s dispossession and expulsion of the Moors in 1502, which he compared with her 1492 expulsion of the Jews. These genocides were "the [Catholic] Church pouring its anger upon Jews and Muslims together" because of their association with Ibn Rushd’s philosophy, which sapped Christian beliefs. It was all "Christianity’s persecutions of the Muslims and the Jews and scholars in general". Post-classical, modern-day dispossession of Muslim populations that faced Slavic and Greek nationalisms and states probably also deepened 'Abduh’s sense that Christianity genocidally ruled out plural societies. He bitterly contrasted Islam’s tolerance of the non-Muslims it conquered and the expulsion of all populations that refused baptism from "every land that a Christian nation securely conquers". He ascribed the Christians’ pitiless violence to their religion, citing exhortations to slaughter non-Hebrew populations in the Old Testament. The Christian religion has always been inimical to all rationality and science, in East as in West (its destruction of Alexandria’s Greek library and burning of "the Egyptian woman Hypatia").

Putting the blame on Christianity for imperialism exonerated non-religious sectors of the West from which Arab and other Muslims now could continue to borrow. 'Abduh had placed the persecuted Renaissance founders of modern Western secular science next to the Muslims in one trench from which both, together, faced attacks from Christians. The bulk of 'Abduh’s reply

65. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 36-37. Long after 'Abduh died, the impulse to at least condone Queen Isabella’s genocide against the Muslim and Jewish enemies still springs perennially from the heart of triumphalist Catholicism. There were moves by the Vatican Congregation for the Causes of Saints in 1990 to beautify Queen Isabella, for all her collective expulsions and auto de fe. As protests and pressure mounted from Jewish and Muslim groups around the world, the Vatican Pontifical Council for Christian Unity passed a resolution against the proposal. Debra Nussbaum Cohen, "Catholic-Jewish Relations Improved: Queen Isabella was no Saint --- Vatican", Australian Jewish News 5 April 1991 p. 22.


67. 'Abduh cited verses from Deuteronomy (Ch. 20), contrasting to such calls to Hebrews to wipe out non-Hebrew populations the Prophet Muhammad’s injunction to the believers that non-Muslim subjects "have [the rights] that we have and [the duties] that we have" (lahum ma lana wa 'alayhim ma 'alayna). al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 64. However, 'Abduh was hamfisted in attempting to argue that the shedding of blood was incited by statements and doctrines ascribed to Jesus --- belief and unbelief would separate daughters and sons from mothers and fathers, Jesus came with a sword, not peace, communion was a drinking of blood, Jesus’ blood would atone for humanity’s sins. Ibid pp. 41-42, 64-66.

to Antun reviewed the past intellectual relationship between the classical Arabs and the Greek-derived non-religious civilization, that the Arabs developed to a new level of true science which the Renaissance Europeans then took and developed to a further stage: Western science, borrowed back, would in no wise clash with true Islam. The demonization of Christianity and Westerners who supposedly implemented it in history, contained and channeled the hatred that Muslims could not help but feel away from the science, technologies and secular-ameliorist thought-systems unfolding in the countries of the imperialists.

'Abduh’s attraction to products of Western creativity went beyond their utility for Muslim survival. His acquaintance with modern European thought was through Arabic translations until he learned French at the age of forty in order to read Western works at first hand. 'Abduh translated Herbert Spencer’s work on Education from a French version into Arabic in order to utilize its insights when drafting his plans for the reform of Egyptian schools. If his vision of Islamic theology and classical Muslim greatness validated intensive borrowing from the West --- and thus the new specialized-acculturated professional classes ---, by learning French he made himself liable to some of their special sensitivities, cleric though he was. His sarcastic section "comparison between warlike Islam and peaceful Christianity" was the response of one upon whom, the cushioning filter of linguistic incomprehension lifted, the Islamophobia of Europeans intimately registered.

'Abduh’s straight-forward --- but indigenous and classical--- style in his replies to Farah Antun would convey classical Arab-Islamic civilization to acculturating-educated intellectuals linguistically unequipped to move in the old Arabic primary sources. He made Islam and the classical Arabs come alive to young Muslim Egyptian professionals almost deracinated by the British linguistic Anglicization campaigns. An instance was Muhammad Lutfi Jum’ah who always restored classical Arab literature and philosophy, but as a particularist in the 1920s was to depict ancient Egypt as the egalitarian inspiration of later Greek democracy. Jum’ah until early in the 1930s opposed hasty steps to "Arab unity"; but then substituted Arab-Islamic for Pharaonic nationality (B 56-59; B 216-217). In childhood and youth he had undergone severe de-Islamizing submersion in the English language and culture in the secular government schools

70. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 64-67.
as the British had structured them: "I grew up as every Muslim grows up knowing nothing of my religion except its name". Jum’ah’s was the common acculturated modality of reconnection with Islam and its classical Arabs: from within the very European high literatures in which intellectuals were formed under colonialism. Edwardian belles lettres: the philosophy of Bacon had triggered his exploration of Ibn Rushd (Averroës), he wrote in 1904 as a youthful student to 'Abduh. With Ibn Rushd --- the classical Arab-Islamic philosophy that appropriated the rationality of Greece --- Jum’ah was coming into contiguity with al-Afghani and 'Abduh, whose writings would give him what he now wanted. He had felt attracted to the Qur’an at school but was alienated by the insistence of the 'ulama' that they alone were entitled to interpret it. The youthful Jum’ah confessed his religious "uncertainty" (ishkal) and sought in the Qur’an confirmation of the account of Western science that God created Earth by separating it from the sun: there were also hints that Darwin’s theory of evolution could be validated by Islam. His adoring tone towards 'Abduh in 1904 was natural. 'Abduh’s writings offered a linguistically accessible --- rationalized --- Islam and indigenous Arab past with which secular-educated Egyptians could stand before Europe and its science. Jum’ah wanted houris to stand for "spiritual perfections" in Paradise and 'Abduh had many more allegoricist reinterpretations of the Qur’an to thicken the almost snapping hair of belief that held such acculturated youths to Islam."

'Abduh’s Islamically-educated but self-cultivatedly modernist group and the most bilingualized anti-imperialist Egyptian intellectuals had many connections and exchanges. Mustafa Kamil and 'Abduh were at loggerheads since Kamil’s acculturated independence movement was long financed by the Khedive 'Abbas, the inveterate enemy of 'Abduh’s efforts to reform establishment Islam in Egypt, in particular al-Azhar. Yet in commitment to a liberalized Islam that could assimilate the strength of the West and to the pan-Arab golden age, Kamil and his followers were close to 'Abduh. When 'Abduh in 1900 replied to Hanotaux, the French-financed Syrian Christian-edited al-Ahram defended the record of the French and other Christian Europeans in regard to the Muslim peoples. Kamil’s al-Liwa' promptly blasted all varieties of European colonialism, prompting the deputy editor of al-Ahram, who had come from Paris just before he assailed 'Abduh, to challenge Kamil to a duel."

Overall, Muhammad 'Abduh under British colonial rule skilfully implanted within the modern functions of the new West-formed students, professionals and specialists relevant, durable sectors of Islam and the rediscovered classical Arab-Muslim past. He maintained --- however adapted to European sciences and secularoid ideologies, and to the demands of local Arab Christians --- the essence of Islam in history: that religions continue to define political units and blocs.

'Abduh’s 1902 explication of imperialism in terms of Christianity --- rather than economics or racist layers in Europe’s secularoid concepts and cultures --- had dysfunctionalities. It warped his readers’ understanding of Christianity. With Egypt under consolidated British occupation, by 1902 it had become unprecedentedly urgent to bring Copts (plus other Arab Christians) and Muslims together. Yet the mature 'Abduh, writing when as Mufti of Egypt his words reverberated most, divisively rejected all Christianity as evil per se.

'Abduh in 1902 accepted the normativeness of the West’s secular civilization nearly as much as Antun but saw it as a sector in still highly Christian European communities. He defended less a revealed Islam than the past Arab-Muslim community and its right to continue in an age in which Europe was sweeping the world.

Linguistic Aestheticism. 'Abduh’s aesthetic influence extended beyond those Egyptians liable to his sense of (a diffident) Islam as the public emblem of community. His limpid but musical Arabic style, which he could simplify for acculturated audiences, and the vanishing manuscripts of classical Arab high literature and grammar that he got printed, connected all categories of intellectuals into the styles and literary sensibility of the classical Arabs. He offered a continuity with aspects of those Arabs’ language and sensibility not always closely connected with Islam’s design, and pan-Arabizing over the long term. In publishing beautiful

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73. 'Abduh’s Arabic interests were directed to classical Islamic scholastic theology (kalam), relics of Mu'tazilism, and to classical Muslim philosophy. However, he published in Bayrut his commentary on the magamat of Badi' al-Zaman al-Hamadhani (969-1008) --- one of the classical Arab writers who were to shape Haykal’s identifications: B 107 fn. His widely-read commentary on the Nahj al-Balaghah, too, was on the margin between religion and literature: he hoped that the classical work ascribed to the fourth Caliph 'Ali would enable students to cultivate classical Arab eloquence and also a sense of monotheism and Islam’s greatness: he, however, believed that later additions to ‘Ali’s original aphorisms in it ruled out use of the work as an accurate source on the Caliphate or theology. Rida’, Ta’rikh al-Ustadh al-Imam v. 1 p. 778. Almost lost MS classical works that 'Abduh got published to revive correct Arabic literary style included those of the literary critic and grammarian 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani (d. 1078). Adams, Islam and Modernism p. 85.
ancient Arab texts and their works of rhetoric, literary criticism and grammar\textsuperscript{74} from al-Azhar as Rector, 'Abduh set such young Azharites as Taha Husayn and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat off to a neo-classicist aestheticism that cherishes the whole language of the classical Arabs but humanizes and relativizes them and then ranges from that classical Arab beauty to the West's aestheticism or even positivism or liberalism and back --- repeatedly blending the two ad hoc. The new devotion to old beautiful literature as a good in itself even where distinct from Islam clashed against the late scholastic texts and personnel of al-Azhar (Taha, al-Zayyat: B 241). 'Abduh’s publication of the texts reinforced parallel activity by such secular-educated members of the bureaucratic and professional elite as the multi-lingual non-shari‘ah lawyer Ahmad Zaki Pasha, Secretary to the Council of Ministers (1897-1922). Because of his roles in drafting Arabic texts of laws, 'Abduh was able to lastingly install terminologies of the classical Arabs in the secular law derived from Europe, which the purist "Shaykh of Arabism" Zaki also did for other secular laws, for official ranks and in government correspondence. Taha Husayn in 1911 viewed 'Abduh as having provided crucial resources to make an extended version of the language of the classical Arabs --- not a West-distorted vulgarization --- the medium for modern government administration derived from the West\textsuperscript{75}. As al-Afghani had in 1883, 'Abduh in 1900 carefully refuted Hanotaux’s Renan-like dichotomization of creative Aryans and sterile Semites, stressing that the Semites were equal precursors of Europeans from antiquity and that Aryans and Semites went well together, and had to borrow from each other, both within classical Islam and in the modern world\textsuperscript{76}. This pointed forward to post-1930 refutations by Taha and al-Zayyat and


\textsuperscript{75} Taha, "Hal Tastaridd..." p. 1.

\textsuperscript{76} In his 1900 controversy with Hanotaux, 'Abduh was intent to argue the equal creativity of Semites with Aryans in a way that appreciated both and depicted it as a necessity that they borrow from each other. In part responding to West European classicism’s time-frame, he projected fertile interaction between the two back far before Islam. The Greeks derived their civilization from contact with Semitic nations. When Europe knew no other civilization than war and bloodshed, Islam came bringing the arts, sciences and learning of such Aryan peoples of Asia as the Persians and Indians and of the Egyptians, Romans and Greeks. All nations borrow from one another according to need. Adams, \textit{Islam and Modernism} p. 87.
in philosophical history by Mustafa 'Abd al-Raziq of such Western anti-Semitic anti-Arabism: these mainly stayed constructive and open towards overall Western thought and culture while pan-Arabizing. 'Abduh's drives to excise various aspects of late-traditional Sunni Islam gave such young sectional Westernists as Haykal more room --- but his offering of a multi-planed version of the language of the classical Arabs most crucially linked the styles of Haykal and other modernists to them in the face of deculturation.

3. AL-NADIM'S AL-USTADH (AUGUST 1982 - JUNE 1893): THE CLASSICAL ARABS, RESISTANCE TO IMPERIALISM, AND MODERNIZATION

al-Ustadh analyzed many social and cultural problems of Egypt but for the most part as phenomena that had made, or now kept, Egyptians colonizable. The broad themes about classical Arabs greatly shaped al-Nadim's responses to Egypt's current conditions and to an expanding West. In youth he had been too individualistic, and as a baker's son too penurious, to pass through the Azhar system and thus lacked extensive formal education at traditional Islamic universities, which al-Afghani and 'Abduh had. al-Afghani and 'Abduh read religious and philosophical classical works, al-Nadim more classical, especially Abbasid, works of high literature and grammar --- which directed his development of pan-Islamism much more towards Arab linguistic nationalism.

Not Pharaonic Egypt, but the classical Arabs imaged Umayyad-style as a "race" with the right to rule others, were al-Nadim's indigenous golden age. Yet the expanding West's features, and its attitudes towards Muslims, made certain elements in the classical Arab past likelier to surge up in his communications than others.

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77. Eg. Taha in 1933 refuted stereotypes by Renan (and, perhaps, Dozy) --- snapped up by neo-Pharaonism --- that the racial Semitic Arabs did not contribute much to the brief literary and intellectual creativity under classical Islam, that these came from subject Aryans: B 464 - 465. It should be noted, though, that similar themes had been argued by classical Muslim writers, some of them shu'ubis but also including the Arabian-descended Ibn Khaldun and which European scholars and neo-Pharaonists took up. Taha resisted Ibn Khaldun's theme from the 1920s, quoting the Orientalist Cassanova that "it is very hard to determine the origin of the Muslim philosophers and scholars because of the mixture of races". Assad N. Busool, "The Development of Taha Husayn's Islamic Thought", The Muslim World v. 68:4 (October 1978) pp. 280-281.


al-Nadim’s Awareness of the West

The Master al-Afghani had an appreciative eye for the sources of strength of the West he resisted. In Arabic writings while in Egypt he "referred not only to Western concepts of republicanism and constitutionalism" --- argued by him as the best forms of government --- but to telephones and/or phonographs invented only a year before he mentioned them. al-Afghani learned to passively read French. al-Nadim never learned a European language, yet he sensitively registered some crucial creative aspects of the modern West which Egyptians and other Muslims had to duplicate to wrest back and sustain sovereignty. He also identified de-Arabizing aspects of the acculturation of the emergent Westernizing-education Egyptian Muslim elite that could pull its members towards collaboration with the occupying aliens.

al-Nadim drew the maximum insights from those encounters with Westerners and Western thought that his monolingualism allowed: through freemasonry, from al-Afghani’s Francophone Syrian Christian disciples such as Adib Ishaq, steeped in French anti-clerical "rationalism", and from the few Western works available in Arabic translations in the period. al-Nadim had developed a friendship with a French rural estate owner prior to the Occupation with whom he then continued to arrange meetings at risk of capture: the subjects they talked

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80. See fn 10.
81. The post-Christian freemason Ishaq’s relationship with al-Afghani and his feud with the Jesuit and other Catholic clergy in his native Lebanon-Syria is reviewed by Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs pp. 82-99. The Catholic clergy were reluctant to give Ishaq (1856 - 1884) a church burial, and finally did so in order to contain the use to which his admirers would put any funeral to project his militant rationalism: ibid p. 85. Although al-Nadim had been Ishaq’s colleague in the constitutionalist movement before the British conquest, he in 1893 homed in on the post-Christian Darwinism of the SC editors of al-Muqattam and al-Muqtataf. al-Nadim now blasted an unnamed newspaper of "hirelings" who fill its "sciences section" with translations of the discourse of those who believe in no religion and ascribe the miracles of the prophets to natural phenomena and chemical compounds and the Creation itself to matter and Nature, denying the existence of the True God. “A’da Allah wa Anbiya’ihi” (The Enemies of God and His Prophets), al-Ustadh 23 May 1893 pp. 923-924. Against these infidel collaborators with imperialism, al-Nadim contrasted a group of “Egyptian writers” that included “he whose memory is redolent, Adib Ishaq” at the side of Muhammad ‘Abduh! ibid, p. 938. al-Muqattam editors-to-be Faris Nimr and Ya’qub Sarruf had migrated to Egypt in 1884 after American missionaries ended their tutorships at the Syrian Protestant College because they gave space to Darwinian ideas in their magazine al-Muqtataf. A.L. Tibawi, American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1966) pp. 244 - 248. For the strong long-term effects of al-Muqattam-al-Muqtataf scientism on Muslim Egyptian thought, B 74 (for 1926); Hourani op. cit. pp. 246-7.
82. During his underground period after the 1882 conquest, al-Nadim had in his reading matter a geography of Conrad Malte-Brun (d.1829) in the translation of Rifa’at al-Tahtawi, as well as an exegesis of the Qur’an. Tawfiq, ‘Abdallah-al-Nadim p. 103. For a list of translations of French geographical and legal works by al-Tahtawi (d.1873) see Yusuf As‘ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi’ Lubnan 1956) pp. 570-1. For al-Tahtawi’s blending of a restoration of classical Muslim philosophical discourse with oblique justification of Westernization by the ‘Alid Khedives, so as to contain the traditional Islamic ‘ulama’. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 12-14.
about in Arabic included religions, international relations and reports in the English press of continuing criticism in the House of Commons against the occupation of Egypt. The religious psyche of the colonizers came across with unprecedented vividness: al-Nadim angrily noted the verbal arguments, sidewalk pamphlets, and schools, with which American missionaries and Jesuits tried to convert Muslim Egyptians to Christianity. Religions were thoroughly politicized: Christian evangelism was seen as made possible by the protective military occupation, and a weapon to perpetuate it. al-Nadim saw Christianity as blending into the lethal nationalisms of Europeans which had to be imitated for wrestling back independence. The schools of the resident Europeans, which transmitted chauvinist Europe’s blended religious-linguistic nationalisms in unfavorable Egypt, prompted curricula of the Arabic-medium national education that he promoted in (a) his pilot so-called Islamic charitable schools before the British invasion and then (b) through his dynamic theoretical discussions in al-Ustadh. He wanted new "patriotic" Egyptian schools to give priority to the indigenous equivalents of the core subjects of those alien schools: the language, the religion, patriotic education, history, and then other subjects. Such political education had enabled the European states to progress and achieve wealth. He voiced disdain for the traditional religious scholars ('ulama') of the East who, in contrast, only taught and studied religious sciences in isolation: the native rulers (al-umara) now only consulted others for ideas for education.

al-Nadim’s knowledge of Europe and its ideological drives, if uneven, was remarkable for a monolingual Muslim. Wendell traced al-Nadim’s sharp awareness that the West’s

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84. The Americans and the Jesuits were handing out Arabic leaflets in the streets of Egypt, Syria and Arabia. al-Nadim felt a twinge of sympathy for Hindus, Buddhists and Taoists in India and China now facing the same --- not genuinely religious but political --- evangelizing onslaught. "A Tataqallab al-Umam bi-Taqallub al-Ahwal wa Nahnu Nahnu?" (As the Nations Transform Themselves to Meet Changing Conditions, Can We Remain As We Are?), al-Ustadh, 20 December 1892 pp. 418 - 419. For a lethally documented account of the ethos and programs --- especially translations of the Bible into a multitude of Asian and African languages --- of evangelical Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, see “Hadha ’Indakum fa-ma Muqabiluhu ’Indana?” (This is What you have Going: What Equivalent to it do We Have?), al-Ustadh, 25 April 1893 pp. 812 - 827. For education of Muslim minors in the schools of the Freres and Americans as a threat to their Islam and language, "Law Kuntum Mithlana la-Fa’altum Fi’lana" (If You were Like Us, You Would Do As We Have), al-Ustadh, 17 January 1893 p. 527.
mathematicians, scientists, engineers, schools, scientific and religious societies and commerce sustained its global activity and colonialism. Western heads of government were only "servants" of those institutions and specialists. Humble "imitation of Europe" alone could pull Egypt into the ranks of "the civilized nations", al-Nadim warned Egyptians. Traditionally-cultured pan-Islamists of his pattern stated tasks of sectional self-Westernization that they nominated a very different, multi-lingual elite, formed by the West, to detail and direct. al-Nadim offered al-Ustadh as the forum in which Egypt’s acculturated specialists could set out the programs. His interest in the classical Arabs interacted with that of one of Egypt’s early acculturated intellectuals 'Ali Mubarak (1823 - 1893) --- like al-Nadim, a crucial mentor of Mustafa Kamil in his formative student years. Mubarak was educated as an engineer in various secular schools established by Muhammad 'Ali and in France for five years from 1884 - 1849/50 (two years at the military engineering school at Metz). During his long career as an educationalist, Mubarak synthesized high Arab-Islamic civilization with modernizing educational techniques derived from Europe. Thus, in 1870 he created the Dar al-'Ulum, "a teachers training college modelled on the French Ecole Normale Superieure". The College trained Arabic-medium teachers of modern subjects such as geography and mathematics as well as developing teaching of the Arabic language and Islam. Mubarak was Minister of Education from 1881 - 1891 during which he introduced the study of foreign (European) languages from the first year of primary school. As a sectional Westernizer, he published in al-Ustadh in 1893 his article "On Education" in which he outlined the educational progress and policies of Prussia, Belgium and Austria-Hungary. Introducing the essay, al-Nadim described education as the means by which Europe achieved its modern scientific advances, prosperity and world primacy: Eastern peoples therefore should study European education to achieve the same things. al-Nadim noted here that

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90. Aroian, op. cit, p. 185.
Europe had gained the initial impetus for its revival from the Arab, Turkish and Persian books it translated, as the Arabs earlier derived impetus for their intellectual vitality from Greek, Nabatean and Latin works that they had translated. The bilingualized technocrat Mubarak was al-Nadim’s partner in restoring an historical consciousness of the classical Arabs. Proconsul Cromer denounced him as "corrupt, retrograde and extravagant" because he wanted to multiply the number of schools with state funds. An essay that Mubarak published in al-Ustadh shows how the classical Arabs maintained the self-esteem vis-a-vis Europe of precisely those Egyptian professionals borrowing most strenuously from it and whose careers colonialists wanted to end. Taking up stereotyped denigration by European anticlerical writers of Europe’s religious Middle Ages, Mubarak wrote that Europeans

before Islam’s light shone and Arab power extended were sunk in the seas of ignorance and oppression, chained with the fetters of slavery, none of them knowing his rights... Most [Europeans] lived then in huts and caves or wandered through the forests... Then the Arabs entered and spread among them justice and virtues and commercial and agricultural achievements and architecture.

Besides flashing back after 1882 the rulers’ excisive racial disdain, such early acculturated Arabism also enabled the Muslim Egyptian professionals to hold under provocation their eclecticism towards the modern West. Mubarak’s argument that Europe had had to borrow from the Arabs before it could emerge from the Dark Ages viewed large areas of the classical Arabs’ civilization as secular and non-religious: Europeans could adopt these components without getting Islamized themselves. Conversely, modern Muslims could now borrow extensively from Europe, but remain Muslim: the cumulative stock of rational knowledge and technology that all human beings could draw on and develop.

al-Nadim and Mubarak were an early case of collaborative reprojection of the classical Arabs by two West-obsessed Muslim Egyptian elites --- one monolingually educated, the other with linguistic access to specialized aspects of Europe. The traditionally-cultured pan-Islamists

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92. Ibid p. 874.
93. Letter of Cromer in 1883, early in his incumbency, to Granville FO. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum p. 34. Another British official, Portal, in 1890 reported to London that Mubarak was "a narrow fanatical old agriculturist of the worst type". Ibid.
and their West-controlling classical Arabs henceforth would draw most recruits in the bilingualized, West-dyed acculturated intellectuals, civil servants and professionals, whose jobs the British recruits were already determined to take.

**Islamic Reexploration of Classical Arabs**

The school of al-Afghani was aware of Darwin, but Christian and Islamophobe motifs continued in European expansionism towards the Middle Easterners. This made the early pan-Islamists characterize the classical Arab past more religiously. For al-Nadim, the classical Arabs showed Muslims the way to build the international strength to again beat back the opposed entity of Europe or the West. The conquests of the Arabs spanned three continents --- Africa, Asia and the margins of Europe (Spain). Hitherto-divided Europe was however able to repel the advancing Arabs by adopting the sources of their strength: politically unifying "religious solidarity", purposeful pursuit and assimilation of knowledge, development of crafts or industries (al-sana‘i‘) and readiness to sacrifice life to defend the homelands. Like al-Afghani and 'Abduh a decade before, al-Nadim in *al-Ustadh* viewed international military strength and sovereignty as eternally a product of religious faith but also energy in the assimilating and development of all human knowledge and techniques.

The West’s Christian negativity towards the classical Arabs pervaded and Islamized an Egyptian reexploration so dependent on Western works to recover that past. Mubarak’s remarks on the Arabs’ transformation of the Europeans were in his preface to the Arabic translation, commissioned by him as Minister, of L.A. Sedillot’s 1854 *Histoire des Arabes* In introducing Sedillot’s work, al-Nadim mentioned slanders by Europeans that "the Islamic religion forbids Paradise to women, even when pious", and "abuse ... of he who is innocent of all fault, our lord Muhammad" or that Islam originated when "poverty [of the classical Arabs] led a group of them to adopt brigandage, so that after choosing for that purpose a chief of the name of Muhammad son of 'Abdallah, [they] marched out under his banner to attack and plunder the nations and lands". The value of Sedillot’s work is that it will reassure “every [acculturated] Muslim” of the

untruth of "lies of the scholars of Europe" against the religion.\(^{(97)}\)

In 1892, then, al-Nadim argued the idealist view that Islam motivated the expansion and administrations of the classical Arabs, dismissing crude economic explications from modern Europeans. He was monolingual. The Christianity-originated distaste of Europeans for Muslims registered much more upon the true acculturated intellectual Mubarak who had lived in France. In reaction, he too argued that the Arab conquests were ideological --- to free humanity from savagery and bad customs by bringing justice and law derived from the Qur'an. They represented "Islam's light". His religious perception of history could make him unable to separate the classical Arabs from the general community of believers in Islam down history. European "slanderers" argued that the Greeks and Romans established civilization and that the Arabs' destructive conquests then contracted learning and human liberty. Such Westerners "desire to extinguish the light of truth, but God insists that He complete His Light", which one-sixth of humanity now has freely chosen, including Europeans building mosques in their own cities.\(^{(98)}\) Mubarak's universalistic identification of the Arabs with all who subsequently adopted Islam, helped delay the tendency of such images of classical Arabs to focus a discrete modern Arab nationality.

al-Nadim, and Mubarak more, reacted to reincarnations of Christian Islam-phobia in a European neo-classicism as liable to lance Greece and Rome against Jesus or the Church. The Enlightenment rights-of-man values that already helped shrink the Christian Europe of the Middle Ages vis-a-vis the classical Arabs could desacralize Egyptian understanding of classical Arab societies over the long term. Mubarak, however, was an early instance of how European writings, secularoid as well as Christian, rather for decades were to Islamize perceptions of the classical Arabs among acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals. Europe's residual fear of the medieval Arabs who had threatened France spotlighted them as the indigenous past with which to face imperialists in general --- not just the British.

The Europeans' hostile themes and positive scholarship, alike, were indispensable for commitment to the classical Arabs as the definitive precursor community. Few Arabic-speakers now had access to the old Arabic manuscripts about the history of classical Arabs scattered in

\(^{(97)}\) al-Nadim in "al-'Alim Sedillot ...", pp. 422-423.

\(^{(98)}\) Mubarak, "al-'Alim Sedillot ...", p. 424.
libraries around the world. European studies of classical Arabs marred by anti-Islamic malice or linguistic misunderstandings "harmed our [acculturated] youth in its religious and temporal life". For a countering fair overview of "the [classical] Arab nation’s" history, Mubarak ironically had to resort to translating another European work, Sedillot’s survey 99.

The Arabic version of Sedillot’s history offered Egyptians and other Arabs a new coherent vision of the Arabs as one, historically continuous, entity that spanned Asia, North Africa and Spain. It offered novel detail of the Muslim Arabs’ wars with Byzantine, Spanish and French Christians. Book III’S account of "the expulsion by the Christians of the Moors (al-Magharibah) from Spain" 100 reviewed a lethal depth in past Muslim-European conflict that acculturated intellectuals around al-Siyasah and al-Risalah in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s were to repeatedly recreate as a key to modern international relations, including the Palestinian-Zionist conflict.

To Sects’-Integrative Arabism?

al-Nadim depicted the classical Arab empires as culturally and religiously pluralistic: subject non-Arabs were allowed to keep their languages and Muslims, Christians, Jews and al-Majus (Zoroastrians primarily but also Hindus and Central Asian Buddhists) had equal religious freedom. In this pluralistic society that the Arab Muslims led, "the sciences were exchanged between" the different linguistic and religious groups 101. al-Nadim’s argument that Christian minorities had equality and therefore stood with Muslim rulers in wars against European fellow Christians, such as during the crusades 102 was meant to help integrate Copts and

100. Ibid, pp. 426-427.
101. "al-Hayat al-Wataniyyah" (Patriotic Life), al-Ustadh 30 August 1892 pp. 29-30. al-Nadim wrote that the (Arab) Caliphs employed Christian, Jewish and Majusi (mainly Zoroastrian) subjects "in clerical tasks, accountancy (computation) and scientific-rational-philosophical (hikmi) tasks", so that a community based on the territorial-patriotic bond integrated under Islam’s non-discriminating law. "al-Jami’at al-Wataniyyah wal-Ikhtilat al-'Imrani" (The Community of Homeland and Social-Economic Mixing), al-Ustadh 13 September 1892 p. 74. When the Arabs’ conquests brought millions of non-Muslims under Muslim rule "they came under the just law and it was ruled that they are like us in the patriotic rights" --- (lahum ma lana wa 'alayhim ma 'alayna: they have our rights but must carry out the same duties as us). "al-Jami’at al-Wataniyyah ..." p. 73. ’Abduh, too, cited the same phrase about the dhimmis, which he described as a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 64. For ridicule of al-Nadim’s sects-uniting characterization of the classical Muslim past as "pure fabrication": Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 151-2.
Muslims in contemporary bi-sectarian Egyptian patriotic community against Britain --- but could contribute over the long term to bi-sectarian pan-Arab nationality (application by 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, future Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, in the 1940s: B 229-230).

**Arab Nation’s Pre-Islamic Arabian Origins.** al-Afghani and 'Abduh in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa (1884) denigrated the pre-Islamic Arabians as cruel and barbarous, an in part religious habit of thought that he never shook off\(^{103}\). To beat back the West, the pan-Islamists wanted indigenous military strength, strong states and literate rational civilization, which the pre-Islamic Arabians could not offer. However in 1887 'Abduh urged study of pre-Islamic Arabian culture, on the face of it to understand Islam. The Qur’an is “the source of the successes of the Muslims”: modern Muslims therefore now had to study the preceding idioms, history, customs and modes of disputation of the Arabs, so as to respond to the Qur’an as had its first audience of Arabian shepherds and camel-drivers\(^{104}\). Review of the Qur’an and earlier Islam for new purposes, and to bypass post-classical Sunni traditionalism and sufi mysticism, would expose the Egyptian Muslim public to the pre-Islamic and early Arabians’ (originally oral) poetry, linguistically so different.

In the school of al-Afghani, al-Nadim was closest to that commitment to the continuous nation (the classical Arabs) in all its periods of religious beliefs that leads to true linguistic nationalism. He had recourse to the pre-Islamic, as well as early Islamic, Arabs to ethically guide contemporary Egyptians, for example interactions between the sexes in new urban conditions of more nuclear families, freer mixing and anonymity. An Arabian “would travel and leave his wife at home; his neighbor would give her provisions and be the last of people to make advances to her ... because she was in his charge until the husband’s return”\(^{105}\). al-Nadim’s acceptance of pre-Islamic as well as early Islamic Arabs as still the model in ethics and

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103. al-Afghani kept on calling the pagan Arabians savages to Arab disciples even into the last period of his life in Constantinople after he went to live there in 1892: the Qur’an transformed the Arabs from “a condition of indescribable barbarism” so that within one and a half centuries of its revelation they ruled the world of that time, and politically and in knowledge, philosophy, industry and trade surpassed all the other nations on earth. al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani p. 58.


language\textsuperscript{106} suggested Arab identity’s substantial independence of Islam. A non-sectarian Arab successor-nation could have Christian as well as Muslim members. The Christian Syro-Egyptian Jurji Zaydan and the Muslim Egyptian Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i were simultaneously to idealize pre-Islamic Arabian ethics and language (Ch. 5).

One Syrian Christian tried to detach and extend the aspect of Arabism in al-Nadim’s anti-imperialist political nationalism. As he forwarded his subscription, the Syrian, a resident of Saint Petersburg, lauded “your Arab patriotic line [that you help] propagate among the speakers of the 
\textit{dad} [Arabic]” because it disregarded “variation of the religions”: now Arab unity can advance and withstand the attacks of all the types of enemies. The Christian correspondent undertook to “circulate your [unifying] magazine among both Muslims and Christians” in Russia. al-Nadim used the term al-Ummat al-\textit{' Arabiyyah} (the Arab Nation) to evoke a revered bygone classical entity rather than for a tightening contemporary community as the correspondent wanted, yet a shared sense of Arabness was clearly one motive why he published the letter. He also cited it to refute charges from Syrian Christian journalists and government officials collaborating with the British in Egypt that al-Ustadh was promoting “religious fanaticism or splitting the Eastern Word”. Yet al-Nadim could not leap with the Syrian correspondent from (a) the unique worth of standard literary Arabic in all periods of history and of the Arab Nation in past history to (b) a contemporary "Arab nation" as the prime loyalty.

If this excellent individual had said that we were calling for the maintenance of the Eastern unity compromising Arabs, Persians, Turks, Circassians, Kurds, Armenians and others regardless of the differences of religion, he would have hit the mark. That is what we advocate, not the Arab league (al-
\textit{jami‘at al-\textit{' Arabiyyah}) on its own\textsuperscript{107}. al-Ustadh, then, highlighted a classical Arab nation, Arab qualities and languages as a determinant in political communities and differentiated linguistic communities both within Egypt and in the Middle East. Yet, al-Nadim refused to draw the political conclusion of separate sovereignty-seeking nationalisms in the Middle East. His indigenous classical Arab golden age

\textsuperscript{106.} Many of al-Nadim’s essays (although not his colloquial dramas or dramatic sketches) drew on the \textit{mature-classical} ‘Abbasid \textit{badi’} style or \textit{maqamat}. However, the much earlier pre-Islamic Arabs could also contribute to the style of modern Egyptians: he printed a prose letter from the pre-Islamic Arabian poet al-Nabighah al-Dhubyani appealing to ‘Amr Ibn Harith, King of Ghassan, to release captives from al-Nabighah’s tribe. al-Nadim glossed archaic words with footnotes. "Ghurar al-Kalam" (Classic Passages from Literature), Ramadan literary supplement to \textit{al-Ustadh} 13 June 1893, pp. 30-32.

\textsuperscript{107.} Letter by unnamed Christian Syrian from St Petersburg, \textit{al-Ustadh} 6 June 1893 pp. 1004-5.
highlighted Islam as a dynamic of international strength; in contemporary history the Muslim East and Christian West were in life-and-death conflict: Turks and Arabs therefore had to unite with each other more in the 1890s. Later during British colonial rule, the party of Mustafa Kamil (initially al-Nadim’s disciple) would long refuse to extend its high culturist and historical Arabism into divisive political support for West Asian Arabs against Ottoman Turks (Chapter 5).

The classical period of the pan-Eastern system fostered Arab ethnic pride because it had been led by "the Arab race/folk" (al-jins al-'Arabi). For the post-classical period, however, the pan-Eastern unity that "the Arab race" originated would run against the crystallization of an Arab political nationality. al-Nadim wrote in a situation in which the Ottoman Turks governed some Arabs in West Asia and claimed authority over others in Egypt, the Sudan, Tunisia and Algeria. It was the disunity of the Easterners, increasing for four centuries past, that enabled Europeans to conquer them. The multiplying divisive "solidarities of race, language, religion and homeland" --- along with "selfish interests and personal power" --- split the pan-Eastern unity which had enabled the classical Arabs to beat Europe back. When his perspective was more international, al-Nadim thus opposed linguistic and geographical solidarities operating in his day that might eventually lead to an Arab political nationalism or political state (or smaller Arabic-speaking sub-nationalisms) within Islam’s belief-community. The integrated "Eastern" system once originated and led by Arabs now would strengthen the authority of non-Arab Turks over Arabs in the Ottoman state and general pan-Islamic political community.108

Ethnicity Within the Egyptian Homeland

al-Nadim in his magazine al-Tankit wal-Tabkit in 1881 depicted a young Egyptian, disembarking after four years study in Paris, who refused to embrace or kiss his father on the quay. "[I] am not the rural person. You sons of the Arabs [abna’ al-'Arab] are like animals. Say bon arrive and shake hands". al-Nadim gave this story the title "'Arabi Tafarnaj" ("An Arab who got Europeanized")109. Ordinary Muslim Egyptians did not just speak Arabic but were themselves Arab. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa assailed Nubar Pasha, a non-Arabic-speaking Armenian

who held office as Prime Minister under British rule from 1884 - 1888, as "not a Muslim that he should have zeal to safeguard this religion, nor an Egyptian that he should be fired with regard for his homeland, nor an Arab that pride to protect his race/racial nationality (jins) would seize him". Parochial Egyptian ethnicity in that period perceived a combination of geography, religious belief and Arabness (language, descent) as defining Egypt’s majority indigenous ethnic community.

al-Nadim while underground following the British conquest encountered ongoing perception of distinct Arab-Egyptian and Turco-Circassian ethnic groups among Egyptian Muslims. His identity was discovered by a Circassian Army officer who, however, did not arrest him: "although I am Circassian in origin, I am Arab in chivalry (al-muru’ah) and in noble compassion for others (al-shahamah)". Prescriptive in origin pre-Islamic Arab virtues were to figure in the evolution of Arabism in the party of Mustafa Kamil (Ch. 5) and after the limited independence of 1922 (Ahmad Zaki Pasha, Ch. 8). al-Nadim repetitively used the terms "Arabs" and "Turks" in his lists of non-Western ethnic groups in Egypt: these had "the Copts" as another category while not otherwise mentioning Arabic-speaking Egyptians. For him, for his modern parochial Egyptian context, "Arabs" meant Muslim Egyptians whose mother tongue is Arabic. Language, then, profoundly influenced al-Nadim’s perception of the units in the Egyptian community of his time but in combinations with religions. His sense that race also contributed to define the ethnic communities only deepened his perception of Egypt’s Arabic-speaking Muslims as Arab because of the popular belief of some remote racial descent from incoming Arabs. But al-Nadim assumed that the Coptic community that maintained the Christian faith did not receive any Arab blood, and excluded them instinctively from the ethnic

110. "al-Lurd Nurth Bruk, Hakim Misr al-Jadid" (Lord Northbrook, Egypt’s New Ruler), al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa, p. 375. Cf. "Jaridat al-Ahram" (The Newspaper al-Ahram), ibid p. 389 for a similarly-phrased attack on Nubar: the Muslims are there defined as the millah and the Arabs as the jins (racial nationality or ethnicity) from whose interests Nubar was alienated by his separate identity. Nubar Pasha Nubarian (1825-1899) was born outside Egypt in Smyrna, Izmir, Turkey. When he resigned from his third, last term as Prime Minister in 1895, he went to Paris for his retirement. Tignor sees Nubar as trying to delay the extension of British control after 1882, albeit to maintain his and his Turcophone clique’s authority and interests, not for nationalism. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882 - 1914 (Princeton University Press 1966) pp. 174-175. However, al-Nadim in 1882 placed among "the Egyptian pioneers" (al-Misriyyin al-uwal) some multi-lingual Armenians such as Hekakyan who served in the earlier nineteenth century modernization initiated by Muhammad 'Ali. al-Ustadh v. 1 p. 38.

111. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 66.
category of the Arabs of Egypt. 

al-Nadim in al-Ustadh, then, sharply defined a multitude of plural ethnic groups or units in Egypt, even in the ranks of the believers in Islam. Allowing the Egyptian independence movement to the restive Turco-Circassian Khedive 'Abbas, he used a cherishing tone in evoking the "Sons of the Turks" as distinct from "the sons of the Arabs". His disciple Mustafa Kamil, long in need of funds, would carry forward this cooperation with parochial Turco-Circassians, checking Arabness. The Ummah Party-al-Jaridah milieu would perceive parochial Sons of the Turks and Arabs more sourly (Ch. 6).
Languages and the Evolution of Nationalities

A dominant, expanding race can absorb other races, itself somewhat changing in the process. A world religion such as Islam can provide a framework within which the dominant race's amalgamation with (but cultural assimilation of) other races takes place. He was conscious that concurrently with the expansions of Islam in Africa and Asia and "parts" of Europe, "the Arabs mixed/intermarried with the Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, Turks, [Byzantine] Greeks, Goths, and some Italians and French, Sudanese, the Abyssinians, the Indians, the Uigurs and others". Strengthened by a unifying religion, a new distinct "Arabized" jins (race/people) resulted, no members of which had any racial loyalty to external entities. Issues of linguistic and social survival once faced by the classical Arabs decisively corroborated for al-Nadim those streams of West European nationalism that identified language, more than static homelands, as the crucial determinant of political communities.

Ancient struggles of the classical Arabs to maintain their integral language in the oceans of non-Arab subjects could offer intense linguistic consciousness with which to resist threats to classical Arabic under the British. al-Nadim now, in the early 1890s, was installing in the confused acculturated youth --- the core now forming for the coming elite --- juxtapositions that were to last. He made Arab leaders of classical Islam, dead for 1000 years, speak in their own words to the issues of language with which colonialism and modern functions confronted youth such as Mustafa Kamil. Mighty classical Caliphs, but also the grammarians they encouraged to codify Arabic against change, now focussed resistance to imperialists in language. al-Nadim's fusion of (a) grammarians and classical written language with (b) political Caliphs with (c) new resistance to imperialism, defined continuity of Arabic as an essence of sovereignty --- to 1918 a stance of both the independence movement launched by his disciple Kamil and, less sustainedly,

in the Ummah-al-Jaridah milieu. Also to last in these and other acculturated-modernist Egyptian groups was al-Nadim’s portrayal of the classical Islamic leaders’ sense of (mainly linguistic but also somewhat physical) difference from non-Arabs (the Caliph ’Ali): classical Islam would henceforth legitimize symbiotic blending of religion and Arab ethnicity for West-modified Egyptians. In al-Nadim’s writings of the early 1890s, classical Arab-Muslim figures already tilted national identity for colonized Egyptians away from territoriality to an ethnic orientation for which the language actually used determines nationality. He cited ’Ali and the more profane (Umayyad-appointed governor) Ziyad Ibn Abihi to guide the Arabic-speaking Egyptians of his day to ward off the influx of "alien" European words into "our written and oral communications ... our formal/official and colloquial speech." 

al-Nadim’s observations of modern European national movements increased his tendency to perceive history (including contemporary Egypt’s) in terms of language conflicts between fluid, incorporative linguistic nationalities. Many nations (umam) temporarily subjected by more powerful nations had yet maintained their separate languages which later resurrected them to independence. Had such nations abandoned their languages for that of the nationality ruling them, they would have merged with it into a single nation. al-Nadim cited as examples "the Turks, the Persians, the Greeks, Spain, Rumania, Portugal, the Bulgars". Change of languages changes a given population’s nationality. The passing of power from (a) the classical Arabs to (b) Persians and Turks validly expressed the continuing separate nationalities the latter maintained when they refused to adopt alien Arabic. That the Persians and Turks became Muslim following their encounter with the Arabs but still regained "independence" (political

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116. al-Nadim affectionately listed classical grammarians who labored to record hitherto orally-transmitted Arabian literature and formulate phonetic and grammatical rules to save pure Arabic from "collapse" in face of the non-Arabian majority’s impact in the Islamic Empire. He associated early religious Arabian leaders with them: the fourth pious or "Rightly Guided" Caliph ’Ali Ibn Abi Talib "the Commander of the Faithful", in early Islam gave the pioneer grammarian Abul-Aswad al-Du’ili --- putative founder of the Basrah school of Arabic grammarians --- a sheet setting out the rules for pronunciation and grammar of "the first Arabs". The Caliph ’Ali wanted to reverse a linguistic situation where, he reportedly said, "the speech of the Arabs has become corrupted through mixing with this red-faced multitude" of non-Arabs (al-hamra’). al-Nadim, "al-Lughatu wal-Insha’" al-Ustadh 11 October 1892 pp. 170-172.

117. Ibid p. 178. 'Abbasid historiography had depicted the Umayyads as secular usurpers after the Rashidi (Rightly Guided) Caliphs. In addition to the Caliph 'Ali, venerated by Sunni as well as Shi'i Muslims, al-Nadim presented Ziyad, governor of al-Basrah under the machiavellian Mu’awiya (first Umayyad Caliph, r. 661-680) as also promoting Abul-Aswad’s initiation of the classical grammar and linguistics, as the means to preserve prescriptive standard Arabic. Ibid.

power?) shows the potential in al-Nadim’s writings for more secular political communities constituted on other bases as well as religious belief among the Muslims. al-Nadim was aware of deep conflict between European nationalities such as the British and French, expressed in violence and war. Some European nationalist movements he knew, however, only bore out his Arabo-Islamic tradition’s association of languages with religious communities. Language forms with religion "the two great fundamentals": by holding fast to both against Turkey during the five centuries of her rule, Serbs, Bulgars, Montenegrins and Rumanians assured their future independence. al-Nadim was particularly conscious of the role that the Christian religion played as a basis of personality that made possible Greek independence from Turkish rule. Here again, though, the religion and the literary language were one since al-Nadim misconceived the Christians’ "Gospel" (al-Injil) as, parallel with the Arabic Qur’an, "revealed in the Greek language". Although Turkish was not a scriptural language of Islam, al-Nadim thus argued that if the Greeks had abandoned their original (religious) language they would have become not merely "Turks" but "Muslims by virtue of the language", never to recover independence.

al-Nadim thus depicted all languages not as neutral communication instruments but as pervaded by the content of the particular religions predominant among those who spoke them. His theories about languages, religions and national identities paid little regard to Egypt’s great Coptic minority, integration of which required religion-neutral culture or plural cultures in the shared Arabic. al-Nadim’s sense of nationality as something that could change with a change of language, and that religion or the change of religion could reinforce or disrupt such functions of language, offered elements for the racially open-ended, incorporative way that Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and ’Abd al-Rahman ’Azzam were to characterize the Arab national community in the 1930s and 1940s (Chs. 9 and 10).

120. Wendell, Evolution p. 157. Given Egypt’s historical links to the Turks, al-Nadim was particularly conscious of the development of political nationality among marginal European peoples under Ottoman rule. He also had a broad awareness of the death, through amalgamation, of various nationalities in West Europe where conflict had been linguistic without the religious polarization between Christianity and Islam of the first category. The assimilation of the originally Germanic Normans when they learnt French was one such warning to Egyptians. "Tarbiyat al-Abna' " (Educating New Generations), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 204.
Classical Arabic: Focus for Resistance Against the British

al-Nadim and al-Ustadh were the prototype for the galvanizing psychosis about the survival of classical Arabic to be whipped up by the acculturated independence movement of Mustafa Kamil (1874 - 1908). Kamil in formative first youth was al-Nadim's disciple. There was certainly a wide gap between the language of literature that the Arabic Qur'an had defined a thousand years before and the grammatically simplified dialects that al-Nadim's countrymen spoke in their daily lives. He thought that the British and other imperialistic Christians singled out the vulnerable crucial standard Arabic for attack, in order to destroy the Egyptians' nationality and religion, and thus incapacitate them from further resistance. The use of French, English etc as mediums of education and government, and the influx of European terms for the objects of modern life into everyday colloquial Arabic, threatened Islam's survival.

Because it was impossible to translate the God-revealed Qur'an, Egyptians could retain access to it only if all areas of their lives maintained their general grasp of classical Arabic. The miraculous Arabic Qur'an was "the target of everyone fighting the language and endeavoring to destroy it". Even if circumstances and the needs of modernization forced them to use European languages widely, Egyptians should still maintain Arabic as the medium of their own dealings.

122. al-Nadim, while striving to politicize the semi-literate urban poor and women with some colloquial dialogues in al-Ustadh, alertly courted the new generation of Muslim Egyptian youth now receiving higher education under the Occupation. al-Ustadh in early 1893 noted Kamil's editorship of the school magazine al-Madrasah and his production of student plays, mainly on ancient non-Egyptian Arab subjects; al-Nadim became the responsive young nationalist's mentor and instructor. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 213, 217; al-Ustadh 28 February 1893 p. 666 and 28 March 1893 pp. 759 - 760. He advised Kamil to avoid conflict with the Khedive, which had so contributed to his own and the 'Urabists' downfall and to the post-1882 British rule. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919" in P.M. Holt (ed), Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic, (London, Oxford University press, 1968), pp. 311 - 312. At its inception, Karnil recognized his new movement's continuity with the preceding generations of West-aware but non-acculturated pan-Islamists. In 1894, while in Paris to activate the Egyptian community and to lobby Europeans to make Britain evacuate the Nile Valley as promised, Kamil telegraphed a report to the now old Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, languishing in forced retirement in Istanbul under 'Abdul-Hamid. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil in Welt des Islams IV, 1956, p. 247 fn. Wendell saw the emotionalist vehemence of Kamil's denunciations of the British imperialist enemy as a continuation of al-Afghani's outlook and style. Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 245.

123. Expressed eg. in cautious terms by al-Nadim in an article assailing the proposal by Sir William Willcocks to make colloquial Egyptian Arabic Egypt's literary language, in place of the classical. This proposal to "achieve the death of the language of the Qur'an" revealed to all Egyptians "a secret of the secrets of Europe" previously known only to "those concerned with the study of Europe's aims in the East". al-Nadim was concerned in the article to present al-Ustadh as a "scholarly/scientific" (ilmiyyah) rather than political journal. "Bab al-Lughah" (Language Section), al-Ustadh 30 January 1893 pp. 475-477. Sir William Willcocks (1852-1932), the British civil engineer who designed the first Aswan dam completed in 1902, had come to Egypt from India in 1883 to work in the Egyptian Public Works Department. ER (15 ed) Mic.
and literature --- and restore it as the medium for West-patterned modern education --- "for the survival of the religion and race [or nationality: jins]"\(^{124}\). The influx of loan-words conveying chemistry and other modern sciences from European languages into Arabic was producing a younger generation, neither Egyptian nor foreigners, who were concocting a bizarre new composite language without grammatical rules. If this became dominant "it would be hard for the future generations of descendants of [today’s] Muslims to know their religion or their Scripture because of the need of a translator to translate the Arabic in that case"\(^{125}\).

al-Nadim proposed that leading Azharite ulama' and teachers conversant with foreign languages form a society to invent Arabic equivalents of the Western medical, chemical and engineering terms entering the elite’s spoken Arabic\(^{126}\). He conducted an acrimonious controversy with the Syrian-Christian al-Hilal which refused to accept proposed Arabic-Semitic coinings to replace such European loan-words as "advocate", "numero", "telephone" and "balcony"\(^{127}\).

The monolingual al-Nadim hoped to enlist in the enterprise to extend Arabic out to convey and cover all modern life precisely those educated classes with the best knowledge of the European languages to be replaced.

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124. Ibid p. 469-470. Very old Islamic emotions fed al-Nadim’s sense that "language is the emblem that makes nationality cohere and preserves it", and that a society accordingly should be established to revive and extend Arabic. But the imposition of totalistic national languages in European states also fueled his demands that classical Arabic cover all modernity: "they bring out all textbooks in the language used in their homeland: you find no Frenchman who learns through English, or Greek in German or Austrian who learns in Russian". The exception to particularity was certain standard Latin and Greek terms used in all those national languages. "Tarbiyat al-Abna’", al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 pp. 203-204.

125. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha'" pp. 182-183. al-Nadim was equally alert to (a) atomized Western linguistic diffusion in broader social interactions and that (b) in a more exclusionist way, the foreign languages were coming to monopolize modern specialized structures and functions: those of theoretical and applied sciences most strikingly. Thus, he objected that all subjects in the School of Agriculture (except Mathematics) were being taught in English. "al-Zira’ah fi Misr" (Agriculture in Egypt), al-Ustadh 21 February 1893, p. 628. He listed over three pages of al-Ustadh European loan words for chemical substances: mufin, Oksayd al-Potassium etc. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha’" pp. 180-183. On the other hand, he as inventively applied his classicist high culturism to cut out the more casual Western linguistic atoms multiplying in the new acculturated elite’s off-duty, colloquial socializations. al-Nadim argued that bakh should replace "bravo" because "the most eloquent of the eloquent" Muhammad exclaimed bakh bakh to express admiration at a Qur'anic verse. He urged Egyptians to replace Bon Jour and Bon Soir with the ancient pre-Islamic 'Im Sabahan and 'Im Masa’an. "Mujtama’ al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah bi-Misr" (The Society for the Arabic Language in Egypt), al-Ustadh 7 March 1893 p. 678.


127. "Mujtama’..." pp. 675-680. al-Nadim wanted the school teachers and members of a forthcoming Egyptian parliament to propagate the neologisms to be coined by the Arabic Language Society. Ibid.
Language: al-Nadim's Attitudes to Ottoman Turks and to Arabs in Ottoman West Asia

As editor of al-Ustadh, al-Nadim was a pan-Islamist intent to strengthen the Ottoman State as a core for political sovereignty and strength of the world's Muslims. Yet in registering the Turkish language's development of an official status in Egypt, he was as hostile to the Ottoman State as to Europe's imperialism. Before Muhammad 'Ali's seizure of power in Egypt "the use of the Turkish language in official communications" had brought literary Arabic to "its death gasp". By imposing Turkish as the language of administration upon "all the Arab lands", and appointing Turkish officials, the Ottoman State forced "the native population" to learn the Turkish language for dealings with the "rulers". Had it not been for al-Azhar, (literary) Arabic would have totally died out. (al-Nadim's complaints that the Ottoman State suppressed Arabic as a medium of even primary school education anticipated similar themes of later, twentieth century, Arab nationalists in Ottoman West Asia, the Araboid Jaridist acculturateds before 1914 [Ch. 6] and the more radical Egyptian pan-Arabs who by the 1940s had led stubbornly pan-Islamic Egyptians to finally support the West Asian Arabs' revolt against the Turks) The 'Alid dynasty's gradual restoration of Arabic as the medium of administration and modernizing Arabic-medium education remarkably revived the language. In 1892, al-Nadim appealed to the Ottoman Sultan to open primary schools in villages that would teach through the medium of either Arabic or Turkish --- whichever was the predominant local vernacular. Some Turks, Circassians and Kurds should be taught through Arabic to equip them to communicate with the populations of Arab provinces to which they would be sent as administrators. al-Nadim in 1891 in exile had interacted with Jaffa's literati and 'ulama': now, in 1892, he depicted Turks

129. For the anger of Muslim Arabs educated in the Ottoman modern-stream schools and colleges of Lebanon-Syria see Amin Sa'id, Thawrat al-'Arab fil-Qarn al-'Ishrin (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal n.d. --- 1960?) p. 7 and Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Falsafat al-Ta’rikh al-‘Uthmani: Asbab In hi tat al-Im biraturiyyat al-‘Uthmaniyyah wa Zawaliha (Bayrut: Farajallah 1954) p. 188. The Egyptian Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, a pioneer of more unitary Egyptian pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s, in 1953 charged that the Ottoman Turks "expelled the Arabic language from the offices of state, even from the courts of the Islamic law, and used Turkish in education, even in the lessons of [Arabic] grammar". "al-Adab wal-Thawrah" (Literature and [Arab] Revolution), one in a 1953 series of radio talks, in Wahy al-Risalah v. 4 (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr 1966) p. 266.
132. For al-Nadim's interactions with Islamic 'ulama' and sufi mystics in Jaffa, Nablus and Jerusalem, and his pilgrimages to shrines associated with prophets in Palestine, see Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 76-77. al-Nadim kept up his links with the scholars of Jaffa after his return to Egypt. He reported to Egyptians the death of al-Sayyid Sa'id al-Dajani al-Husayni, surveying such works of Sa'id as his diwan of verses and his critical
ruling West Asia's Arabs disorientedly and not justly promoting Arabic where it was the popular speech. However, he made such critical remarks in order to suggest procedures to strengthen the multi-national Muslim Ottoman state.

The centrality of language in al-Nadim's understanding of political community could have influenced him to stand with early Arab ethnic dissatisfaction in the Ottoman Empire. However, the powerlessness and colonization Egyptians were suffering as al-Nadim brought out al-Ustadh made him emotionally need to defend any remaining sovereign Muslim state --- and Egypt's self-interest ran against any weakening of the Ottoman central government that could permit British power to spread out in the region. Resident Europeans were multiplying: he saw waning commitment to the Ottoman State as part of the dangerous Europeanization of the new Muslim-Egyptian elite developing under British rule. He analyzed the challenges facing the Ottoman Empire with empathic realism. It was weak militarily because it lacked rail communications and economically because it lacked perennially-flowing rivers: its agriculture was thus at the mercy of irregular rainfall. Outside Christian powers could exploit the Empire's religious and linguistic diversity to destroy it. Religion, anti-Islamic Christianity, was the motive of the European states' drives to dismember it: it is the sole Islamic power among fifteen Christian states. "The men of Europe" unceasingly promoted unrest and revolt among those populations in the Ottoman State with affinity of creed or race to them. 

Given the structure of international relations in the early 1890s, then, religious and anti-imperialist solidarity with the Turks overrode al-Nadim's perceptions that they were linguistically non-Arab and constricted the Arabic language of the West Asian Arabs. And in the 1890s the immemorial identification of Arabic with Islam built an Arabic component into the literary languages of Muslim Persians and Turks. At that stage of the development of Muslim

examination of hadiths about the isra' and mi'raj (night-ascent of the Prophet Muhammad). al-Nadim, "Ritha' wa 'Aza" (Elegy and Consolation), al-Ustadh 15 November 1892 pp. 311-312.

133. al-Ustadh 17 January 1894, quoted Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut: Dar al-Irshad 1970) pp. 21-22. al-Nadim was alert to signs of modernization under 'Abdul Hamid: in 1893 he hailed the Sultan's increased provision of modern primary schools in villages as well as towns --- no Caliphs before him had attempted his drive to "universalize compulsory education", a precondition to develop a modern commerce and agriculture. He also referred to 'Abdul-Hamid's reclamation of long-disused lands, especially in such Arab areas as al-Karak and the Hawran: the Ottoman government resettled Cherkis, Kurds and Arabs in such underpopulated areas, where it provided them with agricultural implements. "Mahasinu Amir al-Mu'minin, Ayyadahullah!" (The Virtues of the Commander of the Faithful, God Strengthen Him!), al-Ustadh 2 May 1893 pp. 866-9. For the resettlement of the Cherkis refugees by 'Abdul-Hamid, see fn 35.
nationalities, commitment to developing Arabic could still seem to Egyptians to be a common enterprise that united Arabs, Turks and Persians. al-Nadim thus had the illusion that the rulers of "the Eastern nations", generally, would promote the coming Arabic language academy of (a) Azhar scholars and (b) educationalists who combined their native Arabic or Turkish with European languages. He thought that its pure Arabic neologisms to replace European engineering, medical and chemical terms would also be adopted in other Muslim languages --- (Cf. Ahmad Zaki Pasha even in 1925: B 82-83)\textsuperscript{134}.

The Turkish language had a real presence in urban Egypt in the 1890s as the minority ethnic culture of the Turco-Circassians. Arab Egyptians had a multiple linguistic, aesthetic, intellectual and religious relationship with Arab elites under Turkish rule that would be the strongest once fully activated. Yet perceived or potential cultural links to Turks, the solidarity of religion, and Egypt's political interests and anti-imperialism for the time held Arabist Muslim Egyptian political activists in an almost confederal pan-Islamic political community with the Turks of the capital Istanbul more than with the Arabs in the Ottoman provinces. For a long time this pattern was to hold with the pan-Islamic independence movement of Mustafa Kamil that al-Nadim first triggered.

The Syrian Christians

For many Egyptians under British rule, then, Islam and international conflicts interwove and blurred relations with Ottoman Arabs and Ottoman Turks. The Arabic-speaking Syrian Christian minority in Egypt, however, because it was non-Muslim separated Arabic as a determinant of community from Islam, and tested how much strength it could command on its own in the 1890s.

Syrian Christians had been migrating into Egypt from the rule of Muhammad Ali. Many had been educated through Western languages at missionary institutions in Syria --- access to

\textsuperscript{134} "al-Lughatu wal-Insha'... p. 180. al-Ustadh publicized the Persian magazine \textit{Hikmat}, edited by Dr Muhammad Mahdi al-Tabrizi on behalf of Irano-Egyptians. al-Ustadh 11 October 1892 p. 191. al-Ustadh was well aware of the earlier writings of Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1860-1934), after 1922 the "Shaykh of Arabism", noting that he had devoted his youth to bringing out beneficial translations from French. Notice on Zaki's translation \textit{Misr, wal-Jighrafiyyah} on geographical activity and works promoted by Egypt's 'Alid dynasty: "Taqariz" (Eulogies), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 216. Even Zaki's translations from French were often on classical Arab subjects: list, Daghir \textit{Masadir} p. 424.
modernity that al-Nadim knew Egypt needed. SC intellectuals played the main role in founding the independent Arabic press in Egypt prior to Britain’s 1882 occupation. al-Afghani inspired his Syrian Christian disciple Adib Ishaq to bring out the key constitutionalist newspapers Misr (from 1877) and al-Tijarah (founded 1878) from Alexandria: al-Nadim in his early nationalist career published in both. Pre-1882 constitutionalism focused parochial ethnic sourness and conflict between (a) Turco-Circassians and (b) (Arab) "Egyptians", most sharply in the armed forces. Separate languages distinguished the two groups, and common Arabic enabled immigrant Christian Syrians to contribute to the still-fluid Egyptian national concepts: the Syrian writer Salim al-Naqqash first sloganized "Egypt for the Egyptians".

The recent collaboration still led al-Afghani and ’Abduh in 1884 to bracket such Syrian and Muslim Egyptians within a contemporary Arab entity. When Ishaq died, al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa lamented that "Time’s inevitable misfortune untimely snatched away the adornment of the Arabs and the flower of literature, our close friend Adib Effendi Ishaq".

As the British consolidated their rule in Egypt, though, this earlier acceptance came under strain. Some Syrian Christians served the British as petty clerks, intelligence agents --- or in Arabic newspapers that propagated for the Occupation, notably Faris Nimr and his British-subsidized daily al-Muqattam, launched in 1888. al-Nadim, in al-Ustadh, wavered between (a) denial that collaborationist Syrian individuals were representative (other SC


136. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 240. Adib Ishaq’s adoption of old classical forms of the Arabic language for his very anti-traditional --- and, indeed, sometimes frankly post-religious --- writings also led Christian Lebano-Syrian writers to characterize him and the wider modern community he served in similar Araboid ways. Iskandar al-'Azar (1855-1916) elegized him as "the model that inspired us in mannered rhetoric and ... devotion to Humanity ... He was the flower of literature in Syria and the sweet-basil of the Arabs in Egypt". Daghir, Masadir v. 2 p. 113. al-'Azar was on the fringes of Arab ethnicist dissidence in the Ottoman Empire, including that from the Hijazi sharif Husayn in the lead-up to his 1916 uprising against the Turks.

137. al-Nadim in 1893 exploited the post-religious or anti-religious connotations of SC scientism to get at al-Muqattam’s Cromer-subsidised Syrian Christian editors while sidestepping British attempts to make nationalists look anti-Christian: see fn. 81.
intellectuals fostered resistance to the British and recovery of the Arab past\(^{138}\) and (b) rejection of the Syrian Christian immigrant community. In both stances, though, he affirmed that common Arabness prescribed unity between Muslim Egyptians and Syrian Christians\(^{139}\).

Whether or not resident Syrian Christians and Egyptian Muslims united would affect the Egyptian territorial nation’s interests (decolonization). Unlike such quasi-particularists as Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid later, however, al-Nadim did not pursue incorporation of Egypt-resident Syrians into an exclusive patriotic Egyptian nation framed by the homeland. For him in 1892-1894, more at stake in the tensions was the supra-Egyptian pan-Arab community of common language and race that spanned and could negate the territorial units in the (Middle) "East". The wide unity of "the Easterners" to beat off Europe and coordinate assimilation of its strength-conferring civilization could validate plurality of nations: al-Nadim mentions Indians and Afghans as well as Egyptians, Arabians and Turks all in unison facing the West. To argue away the division between Egyptians and Syrian Christians in Egypt, however, he virtually denied plurality of territorial or racial nationality for the narrower Arabo-Islamic East. "The Egyptians and the Syrians (al-Shamiyyina) and al-'Arab [here = "Arabians"] are united by "the community of language and [Ottoman] authority for all of them, of religion" (Islam) "for most of..."\(^{139}\) al-Nadim did not in his tributes to Salim Taqla specify Arabness as the connection. He did, though, when the resident Syrian Christian Shibli Shumayyil proposed that the dialects of Arabic be developed into separate literary languages: with deep hurt, al-Nadim reminded him that it was his modernist and literary writings in the classical that had made him popular among "the Sons of the Arabs" in Egypt and Syria, "his people". "Bab al-Lughah" ([Arabic] Language Section), al-Ustadh 3 January 1893 pp. 474. In such transitional passages, the classical Arabs and their language were getting close to entailing a contemporary Arab community that spans plural homelands like Egypt and (Greater) Syria and overrides the Christian-Muslim divide. Even one of al-Nadim’s angriest denunciations against SC collaborators described the SC collaborators as tasting a morsel dipped in the blood of their own race (jins) --- very intimate terminology that in that spasm had already "become a kind of pan-Arabism" (Wendell). "Law Kuntum Mithlana...", al-Ustadh 17 January 1893 pp. 530 - 532; Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 157 - 158. Such early Arab bonding is minimized in James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860 - 1914", The Muslim World v. LXX (1980) nos 3-4 pp. 249 - 250.
them and race for the majority of them, and contiguity which in aggregate render them effectively a single homeland". Race could not divide (resident Christian) Syrians and Egyptians because the two groups had mixed and lived together and intermarried following mutual conquests for so long a time as to virtually make the race (jiins) of the two areas’ populations one.  

al-Nadim in the earlier 1890s, then, articulated elements for pan-Arab identity strong enough to match homeland but which did not yet do so because of situations.  

Religion.  al-Nadim did not in al-Ustadh identify religion as a factor influencing Muslim Egyptians’ attitudes to Syrian Christians. On the other hand, he showed sensitive awareness of the insecurity that any member of a religious minority feels about the survival of his/her religion, reassuring the resident Syrians that there was no danger to their Christianity from Egypt’s Muslim majority. "The community of religion (jami’at al-din) compelled" those Syrian Christians who collaborated with the British, although that alliance with the occupiers brings only "humiliation" in contrast to the "dignity" (al-izz) that a common patriotic struggle for independence offers. It could be objected here that the Syrian Christians in standing with their (imperial) British coreligionists only acted rather naturally in terms of al-Nadim’s repeated recognition that religion could sustain wide international political solidarities of linguistically disparate nations against a nation of another religion so long as it threatened one of their number.

al-Nadim had interacted in depth with Christian (and Samaritan) as well as Muslim "Syrians" during his exile in Palestine. Syrian writers blended archaic classicist Arabic...
with rebellion against traditional elites and "ancient customs" in regard, for instance, to the position of women --- with al-Ustadh one of their forums. But a whole complex of political objectives and needs preoccupying Egyptians in that period for the time blocked or subordinated the crude trans-Arab community emotions that al-Nadim and other Egyptians felt towards non-Muslim Fertile Crescent Arabs. al-Nadim's Arab racial-linguistic nationhood transposed some motifs about wide classical Arabs into his discussion of the contemporary resident Syrians but he usually stopped one step short of terming the latter, or the contemporary Egyptians with whom they should rebuild relationship, "Arabs". Only one or two odd passages in al-Ustadh objected to sniping against the Ottoman Empire from emigre Syrian Christian journalists: this was to alienate acculturated Kamilist pan-Islamists from the minority much more in the twentieth century.

Proto-Particularist Motifs

Twentieth century particularism has stressed the homeland, Egypt, as the secular definant that under Islam continued to separate an Egyptian nation from other Muslims and Arabic-speakers. During the British occupation, in contrast, al-Afghani, 'Abduh and al-Nadim most often solidified the resistance of Egyptians around religious, historic and linguistic themes that would foster Arab or Islamic communities extending far beyond Egypt. Proto-particularist concerns towards which these older pan-Islamists occasionally lurched, however, included: territorial homelands, awareness of the problem of division between the sects in the single homeland, and that the homeland-framed nation's Muslims have some continuity with a pre-Islamic pagan civilization.

and the magazine for "diffusing his fields of knowledge among the two peoples, the Egyptian and the Syrian, so as to enlighten people's thoughts and bring people who are far removed from each other together in communication and to reconcile those who are at odds with one another". The letter of this non-Muslim Samaritan mentioned "Eastern Unity", not Arab. al-Nadim noted that he had written an unprecedented book surveying the Samaritans' religion, customs and history: he had collected the materials from their priests during his recent exile in Ottoman West Asia. The British were not to allow al-Nadim enough time back in Egypt to publish this now lost work, as he promised, in al-Ustadh. "Taqariz" (Tributes), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 216. 143. al-Ustadh published a defence of the Lebanese Sa'id al-Bustani's novel Samir al-Amir. Set in Mount Lebanon, the melodrama condemned "ancient customs", and demanded free marriages across clan and class lines against the old jabal feudal aristocracy; however, al-Bustani couched his modernist, West-inspired message in archaist, neo-classicist high Arabic. "Riwayat Samir al-Amir" (The Novel Samir al-Amir), al-Ustadh 14 March 1893 pp. 723 - 727.

144. For an example of a crudely stated joint Arab nationhood between Muslim Egyptian Egyptian and SC intellectuals, see fn 139.
In an 1882 Calcutta address to a predominantly Muslim audience, al-Afghani sought to motivate them to acquire modern Western sciences by evoking the ancient (pre-Islamic, Hindu) Indians --- "the inventors of arithmetic and geometry" from whose vedas and shastras Roman and all later Western law derived. Addressing Egyptians in 1878 from the columns of Misr, al-Afghani refuted the arguments of India’s British rulers that the native population could not govern itself by describing the Indians as "the sons of Brahma and Mahadiv" who founded human laws when the British were savages. Continuity of Indians could reinforce for Egyptian audiences odd --- much thinner --- statements by al-Afghani (and the young 'Abduh) that the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians defined modern Egypt’s Muslims. Keddie highlighted an appeal by al-Afghani during unrest that finally culminated in 'Urabi’s revolt, to take inspiration from the ancient Egyptians who built the pyramids, and overthrow tyranny.

al-Afghani and 'Abduh occasionally opposed ill-feeling and disunity between Muslims and non-Muslims in both India and Egypt. In 1884, they tried to dispel in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa reports of tension between Muslims and Copts in the town of Jarja in Upper Egypt: they admitted, here, that communal fighting had occurred during the British conquest. Keddie painted al-Afghani as a precursor of the "composite" Indian nationalism of the early twentieth century, and of Egyptian particularism: both used a pagan antiquity to unite two sects. This is somewhat one-eyed in terms of her own data. al-Afghani made clear to readers of Misr in 1878 that only the extreme rapacity of the British made possible in India the anti-imperialist "alliance of sects ... holding such extremely opposite views that, under other circumstances, they would have gladly drunk one another’s blood". For him, the incompatibility inherent in Islam and Hinduism divided Indians. More than uniting Hindus and Muslim Indians for joint struggle,

146. al-Afghani in Misr in late 1878 quoted in Keddie’s Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-'Afghani” p. 105.
149. Art. "al-Sudan wa Misr" (The Sudan and Egypt), al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 309.
150. For Keddie’s characterization of al-Afghani as promoting in India a prototype of later territorial-linguistic, sects-integrative, “composite” Indian nationalism, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-'Afghani” pp. 157-160.
151. 1878 Misr article by al-Afghani, Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din p. 102.
al-Afghani’s images of a pagan antiquity adapted motifs about India from classical Arab-Islamic books to give Indian Muslims racial confidence that they could assimilate Western science and modernity to beat back imperialists. In post-1892 discourses in Istanbul, al-Afghani urged Arab Muslims and the Ottoman State to conduct Islamic instruction courses for illiterate syncretist Muslims in India to purge beliefs and practices they had borrowed from their "idolatrous" Hindu neighbors.

Nor did al-Afghani evoke Pharaonic antiquity to integrate Copts and Muslims in joint resistance to Britain. His 1878 denunciations of immemorial governmental oppression and foreign conquerors --- among whom he included the Muslim Arabs --- were meant to incite the masses against the Khedivial house of Muhammad 'Ali and were anti-monarchical or constitutionalist. Although not directed to the Muslim-Coptic division, such statements of al-Afghani --- and by 'Abduh prior to his decision to serve under the British in 1888 --- did suggest that Egyptians were some sort of collectivity continuous since the Pharaohs that had absorbed all conquerors in some sense. Neither offered data of Coptic participation in classical Arabo-Islamic civilization.

Considering their awareness that Coptic-Muslim conflict could help Britain strengthen her grip, it could not be said that al-Afghani and 'Abduh in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa structured their...
imaged territorial homeland (watan) to integrate resistance by the two Egyptian sects\textsuperscript{155}. However, al-Nadim did after 1882. He early wrote a play The Homeland (al-Watan) and had it performed by the pupils of his Islamic Charitable School before Khedive Tawfiq in 1879\textsuperscript{156}. He addressed the group fighting the invading British in 1881 as "sons of Egypt": al-'Arab were formations in the Egyptian forces recruited from Egypt’s nomads although 'Urabi was "the jewel in the Arab necklace"\textsuperscript{157}. al-Nadim thus made his audiences aware of the homeland, Egypt, and "the Egyptians" as the inner entity for which they were struggling. al-Nadim in the 1890s sometimes betrayed apprehension that the Copts might ally with the British occupier, Christians like them. He therefore structured his Egyptian homeland to give them an inherent place: al-Ustadh was careful to write in a respectful tone of the Coptic Church and the Coptic community\textsuperscript{158}. His young Egyptian disciple Mustafa Kamil took up his integrative concept of homeland, extending it in relation to the pan-Islamic and historical Arab identities into which al-Nadim had blurred the Egyptians.

al-Nadim often evoked the current territorial homeland to integrate Copts and Muslims against the British but not Egypt’s particular pagan antiquity. al-Ustadh did give some publicity to ancient Egyptian items held in local museums, noting the publication of an early guidebook to the Gizah Museum by Ahmad Kamal Pasha\textsuperscript{159}. However, Kamal’s Egyptological publications well into the 1940s were to convince many secular-educated Muslim Egyptians that the ancient Egyptians were racially and their language (and monotheism!) related to the Semitic Arabians (B 439 - 444).

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{155} al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa in 1884 argued the freedom of conscience of non-Muslims in the classical and post-classical Muslim states and that they rose unimpeded to the highest positions: this was, however, a side-issue in its argument with Europeans as to whether Muslims or Europe had practised "fanaticism". Art. "al-Ta’assub", al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 44.
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Tawfiq, ’Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 49-50.
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Ibid p. 210.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} For sympathetic coverage by al-Nadim of the Coptic community, wracked by conflict between (a) the patriarchate and (b) some clergy see "Ghibbat Batriyark al-Aqbat" (His Eminence the Patriarch of the Copts), al-Ustadh 7 February 1893 pp. 598-599. In further arguing the oneness of the Egyptian people spanning Copts and Muslims, al-Nadim called for the setting-up of some bisectarian organization to integrate the two sections under the patronage of the Khedive 'Abbas. "al-Muslimuna wal-Aqbat" (The Muslims and Copts) al-Ustadh 21 March 1893 pp. 749-750. He praised the nine years-old Society for the Preservation of Coptic History in Asyut: it had recorded the death of Khedive Tawfiq and the accession of his son 'Abbas II. "Tahni'ah" (Congratulation), al-Ustadh 27 September 1892 p. 143.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} "al-Khulasat al-Wajizah wa Dalil al-Mutafarrij 'ala Mathaf al-Jizah", al-Ustadh 28 March 1893, pp. 756-7. The article’s title is that of Ahmad Kamal’s book.
\end{itemize}
The Long-Term Legacy: Overview

al-Afghani, al-Nadim and 'Abduh, then, put into the minds of subsequent generations that the earlier wide Islamic empires centered outside Egypt were the indigenous states that matched the religion-focused international strength exemplified by modern Europe. More than the other two, al-Nadim evoked the territorial homeland but fused it with a delocalizing literary language: Mustafa Kamil and his al-Hizb al-Watani independence movement were to keep the two fused as the basis for political independence. al-Afghani and al-Nadim’s sense of religion as one key instrument with which any society or camp, Muslim or other, integrated itself vis-a-vis rivals politicized and relativized religions in a utilitarian way. This deleted much of late-traditional Islam160: but could accommodate a nuanced awareness of new secularoid ideologies in "Europe" as the long-term pan-Christian enemy camp161 requiring a wide pan-Muslim counter-camp. The perception of international relations in terms of religion-glued conflicting camps, Eastern-Muslim versus Western-Christian, was long to retard Egypt-centric identifications.

Particularist publicists in the 1920s were to it very hard to wrench the minds of modern-educated Egyptian Muslims around to some acceptance that later classical or

160. In 1892, al-Nadim depicted al-Azhar in al-Ustdadh as an institution in which students were debilitated by sickness or skipped most lectures: its courses did not equip its graduates to read classical Arabic high literature. He disliked the unstructured, individualized relationship students had to their shaykh in traditional Sunni Islam and urged Egyptians to transform al-Azhar into a (Western-style?) university that would offer the modern mathematical and other sciences as well as religion and in which the students would read political newspapers. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 130-132. Cf. Delanoue, loc cit p. 112. Prior to the British conquest, al-Nadim was wont to flay traditional Egyptian Islam, categorizing "the charlatans" of the Sufi mystic brotherhoods with such social evils as illiteracy, alcoholism and hashish --- the mystics and divines exploited the peasants just like the magicians and village usurers. Delanoue, op. cit. p. 88. It is to be noted, though, that Sufis gave al-Nadim shelter during his decade underground after the British crushed 'Urabi: he himself belonged to the Khalwatiyyah order. Ibid p. 94.

161. al-Nadim’s alertness to the centrality of Christianity in the life and policies of European states was not unnuanced: his Syrian Christian and European friends had left him well aware of the erosion of traditional religious belief in the secularizing Western societies. Ignoring --- perhaps rightly --- militant anti-clericalism and rationalism in West Europe, al-Nadim portrayed that all "civilized" Europeans had fused religious and secular education: every school had a church in which all pupils were required to pray before, and to close, the school day: the mathematics and physics textbooks were interspersed with religious principles. Educated Europeans who followed "free thought" still, although post-religious (la yadinuna bi-din), participated fully with their families in those Christian rituals that Europeans had made compulsory "for children, women, youths and the aged". The European free-thinker was careful to close his shop on all Christian holy days, however much he disbelieved in them, scrupulously called in the priest as a family member died, and far from criticizing Christianity in any public or elite literary gathering, penned vigorous apologetics to defend it against denigration. The Easterners had to duplicate religion as the tool with which Europe had achieved the "social unity" that sustained its modernity and power. "Tarbiyat al-Abna", al-Ustdadh 18 October 1892 p. 203. Cf. fns. 8, 81. al-Nadim advised any Egyptian freethinkers to imitate this participatory respect by their European senior brethren for religion as the great social cement. Delanoue, loc cit p. 102.
post-classical smaller states centered in Egypt were not deviant from Islam or divisive facilitation of Western inroads. In any case, the universalist Arab-led empires of classical Islam resurfaced in the psyches of the liberal opinion-leaders themselves in the 1930s, Haykal re-evoking them in the context of incessant war between Crusaderist-Western and Arab-Muslim camps throughout history, somewhat as al-Afghani and al-Nadim had (Ch. 9: B 153-4; cf. 'Abdallah 'Inan B 55-6).

al-Nadim’s drive to generalize supra-Egyptian neo-classical Arabic was to be carried forward more totalistically by Mustafa Kamil’s independence movement up to 1914. Some in the more insular circle of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid occasionally voiced pragmatic unenthusiasm. Nonetheless, in the period of the post-1922 Egyptian particularist state such former youthful disciples of Lutfi as Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Taha Husayn would increasingly promote extended, modified classical Arabic in the name of the great classical Arab tradition. For them, the territorial entity of Egypt retained presence in the face of the definitive wide classical Arabs but failed to sustain distinctness on the plane of formal language. The pioneer Islamo-Arab nationalist Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s achieved the apogee of the attitude that the classical Arabs’ Arabic must be extended to serve as the medium for all modern (West-derived) life.

al-Nadim’s stands on language issues would foster in Egypt the orientation that the classical Arabs’ Arabic is the core of the nationhood of Egyptians, that finally led to linguistic pan-Arab nationalism, in place of geography-determined Egyptian particularism.
CHAPTER 3: BRITISH COLONIAL RULE, AND THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FORMATION OF MUSTAFA KAMIL’S INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

This chapter sets out features of British rule (1882 - 1922) that constricted the size, the career and political opportunities, and the Arab culture of (in particular urban) secularizing-educated Muslim Egyptians. It traces the development of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) independence movement of Mustafa Kamil as the instrument to meet the class and cultural needs of that bullied acculturated Muslim bourgeoisie. Splintered cultural resources and connections to other Arabic-educated cultural elites enabled the Kamilists to unevenly develop Arabic culture and Islamic ideology in the face of imperial deculturization. From the outset, the Kamilists lobbied support from the true liberal West to evict Britain. Instead of instrumentalities, this Chapter focuses the acculturation-inculcated emotional needs for humane community with Westerners in such outreach.

The Kamilist independence movement passed through three rough periods:

1. 1893 - 1908: Under Kamil’s direction, the movement concentrated on organizing the acculturating-educated students and professionals, a small but crucial minority in Egypt’s population.

2. 1908 - 1910: Under the leadership of Muhammad Farid, al-Hizb al-Watani, the political party that the late Kamil founded, reached out to the urban proletariat and lumpen proletariat by establishing workers’ night schools, trade unions and to the peasantry through rural cooperatives. The Party was in the process of becoming a mass independence movement, a united front of a range of classes. But the British, by closing its newspapers and waves of arrests, drove al-Hizb al-Watani’s leaders into exile.

3. The period of exile.

COLONIALISM AND THE KAMILIST RESPONSE

The Consolidation of British Rule

In 1882 a British expeditionary force defeated the first Egyptian proto-nationalist movement at Tal al-Kabir. National feeling remained stunned for many years by the shock of defeat and by Britain’s military power: over a decade passed before a new generation began to develop the organizations necessary to lead independence movements. From 1883 to 1907, Egypt was ruled in a "Veiled Protectorate" by Britain’s Consul-General Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer). Cromer left "an appearance of rule" to the Khedives and (mainly Turkish-speaking) Egyptian Government ministers while flanking the latter with British "advisers" who were the administrators in the Ministries.

Britain’s progressive extension of control in the administration threatened the economic livelihood and career prospects of the emerging Muslim student and professional class. Lt.-Colonel P.G. Elgood observed that by the early twentieth century Cromer had
placed Englishmen, Advisers in name, Controllers in fact, at the side of Ministers ... The actual government of the country had passed into the hands of the British Advisers who ruled through an increased British Inspectorate. But ... presently Englishmen in the Ministries in Cairo ruled every Department of State. As the Egyptian head of such a Department died or was pensioned off, his title and pay would be taken by the Englishman, and the latter’s place be filled by a newcomer of the same race. This anglicization of the new Central Administration took time to complete ... But ... in 1914 there were few Egyptians controlling any State business of importance.

Elgood noted the resentment among students and their parents, the overall "professional class", at the influx of British recruits: "no boy attends a Government school in Egypt who is not inspired mainly with the ambition of entering later the Civil Service". No wonder that Mustafa Kamil, from the outset of his career, recruited heavily among city-based students and less established professionals and by his death in 1908 had almost completely mobilized the secular-stream student class.

The Larger West. Important to understand the relationships of Kamil and other Westernizing-educated Muslim intellectuals with the general West is that the main threat to Britain’s rule in Egypt long came from the reluctance of other European states to accord it recognition. France’s economic and educational interests and resident nationals in Egypt had exceeded Britain’s prior to the occupation. An agency representing Egypt’s European creditors, the Caisse de la Dette Publique, had been set up in May 1876 with control of Egyptian finances to ensure payment of Egypt’s debt. This international Commission maintained a considerable

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1. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919” in P.M. Holt (ed.) Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt (London: OUP 1968) p. 308. “Understanding their ambivalent position in the Egyptian population, the British chose mostly Turko-Circassian collaborators to sit as figure-heads over the ministries. The exceptions to this rule were three Muslim Egyptians" (ie. Arab-Muslim Egyptians) "and three minority sect officials of the total twenty-five ministers who held office from 1882 to 1908". Jeffrey Collins, The Egyptian Elite Under Cromer 1882 - 1907 (Ann Arbor PhD microfiche nd) p. 223.

2. During the period of British colonial rule, "religion as well as nationality was highly correlated with rank and power within the state apparatus. Non-Muslims were extremely numerous among the government elite, constituting 18.84% of the total although they accounted for only 7.7% of the national population in 1897. Non-Muslims were particularly numerous in the ministries of Finance (56.52%), the Mixed Administrations (44.76%), Health (43.75%) and Justice (23.59%)". Collins, Egyptian Elite p. 243.

say in how Britain directed Egypt’s economy under the Occupation. Through her participation in the Caisse, and the extraterritorial rights of her foreign residents, France could always obstruct Britain’s government of Egypt until the 1904 Entente Cordiale.

In 1892 Britain’s puppet Khedive Tawfiq died. He was succeeded by his seventeen-years old, Austrian-educated son Abbas. Khedive Abbas Hilmi II (reigned 1892-1914) wanted truly to rule in Egypt and thus was in consistent conflict with Egypt’s actual ruler Cromer --- an adversary relationship crucial for development of nationalist organizations during the Veiled Protectorate. In an 1893 ministerial crisis, the Khedive dismissed Mustafa Fahmi, who had Cromer’s confidence, from the Prime Ministrieship. Cromer forced Abbas to appoint Riyad Pasha as a compromise, and make a formal promise to follow the advice of the British in all important matters thenceforth. In the 1894 “Frontier Incident” Kitchener, Sirdar (Commander) of the Egyptian Army, attempted to resign when the Khedive disparaged British officers in the Army. Cromer maintained Kitchener in his position and forced Abbas to express satisfaction with the roles of the British officers in the Egyptian army.

In 1898 a French military expedition, led by Captain Marchand, attempted to establish French predominance in the Upper Nile Valley, bringing France and Britain to the brink of war until he surrendered to British forces at Fashoda. Egyptians opposing British rule had hoped to win the aid of France to dislodge the British from the Nile Valley. The Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 8 April 1904 ended their lingering hopes that France ever would act as such a third force. In return for freedom of action to subjugate Morocco the government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country (Egypt) by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation, or in any other manner.

4. Tignor, op cit p. 105. Mustafa Fahmi was perhaps the most compliant of the Turco-Circassian politicians whom Cromer hand-picked for high office. Louis Brehier, a contemporary, described him as “un Algerien des plus dociles” --- while Cromer called him “a weak man” whose docility and "well-known sympathy with English policy" kept him in office as Prime Minister for thirteen unbroken years. Citations Collins, Egyptian Elite pp. 225 - 226; cf. ibid p. 224 for other confidential British assessments of other "dummies". The 1894 clash between Abbas and Cromer over Fahmi remained etched for decades in the mind of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid despite his view that the Khedive was despotic. Lutfi (1908: al-Jaridah), Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta‘rikh al-Harakat al-Istiqaliyyah fi Misr (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p. 145.

5. Art. "Egypt", Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed. 1910-1911) v. ix p. 17. The French recognized Britain’s predominance in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco. Some scope remained to the nationalists, though, to link up with French interests to obstruct British power. As late as 1909, the French dragged their feet in cooperating with Gorst in his enforcement of the 1881 Press Law against nationalist Arabic journals as a tactic to extract more British support in tightening French control over Morocco. Peter Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst, the
Cromer retired in May, 1907. His successor, Eldon Gorst (British Consul-General 1907-1911), achieved an alliance with the Khedive against the nationalists. Gorst struggled to check the annual influx into the Egyptian Government departments of British recruits who would take jobs from the educated and professional Egyptians inclined to support nationalism. While conciliating the strata from which the nationalists recruited, Gorst cracked down harder than Cromer on the organized nationalists themselves. He applied the 1881 Press Law, which Cromer had never invoked, to shackle and ban al-Hizb al-Watani's newspapers, and jailed or drove into exile its spokesmen and leaders. Gorst's alliance with the Khedive isolated Britain politically by driving the constitutionalist al-Ummah/al-Jaridah group, that had collaborated with Cromer to some extent, towards the radical nationalists.

In November 1908, Gorst appointed the Copt Butrus Ghali Pasha as Prime Minister in succession to Mustafa Pasha Fahmi, who had held the post (with one interruption in 1893-5) under Cromer since 1891. In February 1910, Egypt's quasi-parliamentary General Assembly overwhelmingly rejected a measure to extend the Suez Canal concession for forty years beyond 1968. A few days later, a Muslim militant nationalist, al-Wardani, assassinated Ghali who advocated the extension. The assassination heightened conflict between Coptic and Muslim

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7. Gorst's rigid and uncompromising rejection of organized nationalist movements was illustrated by his 1909 advice to the Foreign Office in London not to receive the moderate Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, associated with the Ummah Party, who was warning the British not to apply the Press Law. Lutfi said that he had refused many overtures from the Germans. Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst p. 182.

8. The assassination of Ghali by al-Tadamun al-Akhawi --- the "Fraternal Brotherhood", one of the militant secret societies spun off from the Patriotic Party as its base broadened under Farid --- brought out the (still incomplete) transition of some acculturated Muslim Egyptians in al-Hizb al-Watani from a more traditional sectarian to a secular-territorialist ideology of political community. Ghali's Muslim assassin Ibrahim al-Wardani, educated as a pharmacist in Switzerland, was no pan-Islamist and regarded multi-sectarian territorial political nations as the norm. In a private letter predating the killing, he had written that "I had opposed the admission of Copts into our [secret] Society, not because they are Copts, the Copts being our brothers and we making up with them the children of a single homeland, but because the Copts are a small sect in the land and experience has shown that a small sect will seek shelter and protection with the government and fanatically take its part. This the Muslims do in India: they align themselves with the English government against the Hindus and sons of their homeland because the Hindus are more than they in number". al-Muqattam 4 April 1910. Thus, independence movements should not have any sectarian restriction, but temporary sectarianisms in larger society had to so limit them for a time. For the Ghali assassination as another motif in tensions between the Jaridist-Siyasahist stream of acculturated nationalism and Westerners, B 492 fn. In regard to the growing connections of al-Hizb al-Watani to militantly anti-imperialist Hindu rather than Muslim Indians, the noted Indian revolutionary Khirishnavarna offered Egyptians a thousand francs prize in memory of "martyr Wardani". Goldschmidt, "The National Party from Spotlight to Shadow", Asian and African Studies (Haifa) v. 16:1, March 1982 p. 17.
communalists in Egypt. Gorst admitted in his report for 1910 that his policies for containing
discontent in Egypt had failed.

Sentences of imprisonment against al-Hizb al-Watani leaders and suppression of its
newspapers forced the party to become an exile movement, operating from Europe and the
Ottoman State. Kitchener, however, won the landowner-led Ummah party back into
collaboration, by reorganizing a new advisory Legislative Assembly with high property
qualifications that favored landowners involved in the Ummah. He also, however, made modest
efforts to conciliate the peasantry with agricultural and hydraulic projects, distribution of lands,
and the first small-scale extension of modern health services to the countryside.

Turco-Circassians. The political and social importance of Egypt-resident
Turco-Circassians culturally linked to the Turkish core of the Ottoman State influenced the turns
supra-Egyptian identifications took from 1882 to 1922. Until the 1904 Entente Cordiale, the
young Turkish-speaking Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II stood at the very head of resistance to
Britain's ever-tightening control over Egypt's government and institutions. Even after, 'Abbas
fell into intermittent conflicts with the British ending with his deposition in 1914. Abrasive
attempts by such British figures as Cromer and Kitchener to subject the Khedive would enhance
Muslim Egyptians' identification of him and his Turco-Circassian family and court as heading
the Arabic-speaking Egyptian population. The Turkish-speaking 'Abbas declared himself a
Turkish national after World War I and, like many Turco-Circassians, usually went annually to
Constantinople for the Islamic feast of Bairam. The British exploited the House of Muhammad
'Ali's Ottoman State links to wrest the Ministry of Waqfs from 'Abbas. Overall, Egypt's
Turco-Circassian Khedivial royalty and declining landowning aristocracy were one major factor
that continually involved Arab Egyptians in the Turkish-speaking (more than the
Arabic-speaking sector) of the Ottoman Empire, although 'Abbas did entangle Egyptians in its

9. For British actions under Kitchener against the Watani Party and the latter's drift into exile, see
Arabic and Muslims --- had the impression that his 1911 "Five Faddans Law" won the Consul-General wide
popularity among the poorer fallahin: Arden G.H. Beaman, The Dethronement of the Khedive (London: n.p. 1929)
p. 55. The Law prohibited expropriation for debts of the land, houses or equipment of peasants owning five faddans
of land or less. It proved unenforceable and "various devices of the moneylenders, short of outright expropriation,
deprived the peasants of real control over their land". Tignor, op.cit pp. 239-240.
12. Ibid p. 72.
early Arab nationalism as well through his fanning of the "Arab Caliphate" idea (Chs. 5 and 6).

The Development of Nationalist Parties

Westernizing-Educated Students. Mustafa Kamil’s first major appearance in the history of Egyptian nationalism was at eighteen, when he led a demonstration of students in the higher schools of Cairo, notably the Egyptian government-run School of Law, before the offices of the Syrian-Christian owned pro-British al-Muqattam in 1893. The Khedive subsidized higher law studies abroad through which Kamil obtained the licence in law from the University of Toulouse in 1894.

When Kamil returned to Egypt in that year, the former 'Urabist Latif Salim had founded the secret Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani); Kamil joined and soon was the secret society’s leader. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid participated with Mustafa Kamil in 1896 in the secret Society for the Revival of the Nation (al-Jam'iyyah li'-Ihya' al-Watan) of which 'Abbas was the head.

Appeals to Europe. Support by the Khedive was critical for enabling Kamil to commence his role as spokesman for Egypt’s independence aspirations in Europe. It was with palace funds that he sailed to Paris in May 1895 intending to exploit the world-wide colonial rivalry between Britain and France to persuade French politicians and public to press Britain to carry out her frequently-promised evacuation from the Nile Valley. In Paris, Kamil in "his first international act" presented a petition to the French Chamber of Deputies in the name of the Egyptian people, appealing for help from France which had declared the Rights of Man and liberated so many peoples. Kamil also met in Paris the unusually non-imperial French nationalist Juliette Adam (1836-1936), with whom he maintained a son-like friendship and political collaboration until his death; henceforth her journal La Nouvelle Revue published his articles campaigning for Egypt’s independence. According to Robert L. Tignor, "during the 1890s Mustafa Kamil probably

13. Financial dependence of Kamil on the Khedive in regard to his early student magazine al-Madrasah and his legal studies in France speculated by Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 312.
15. Ibid p. 313.
17. Juliette Adam’s Anglophobia was of long standing when the precocious young Kamil met her. During Britain’s 1881-1882 seizure of Egypt, she had blasted the French minister of Foreign Affairs for recalling France’s Consul General when he supported Egyptian independence, although France had had the predominant place in Egypt since the rise of Muhammad ‘Ali. Adam was no French jingo, even though she did on the eve of the British conquest stress all the capital that France had sunk into Egypt, that her Suez canal had transformed the country and
spent as much time in Europe trying to propagandize the Egyptian question as he did in Egypt\textsuperscript{18}. However, the failure at Fashoda of Marchand’s 1898 expedition made clear to Kamil and his comrades (and to the Khedive) that France would not risk war to drive Britain from the Nile Valley.

As the Khedive ‘Abbas moved in the wake of France’s backdowns to accommodate himself somewhat to the strengthening British presence, his relations with Kamil cooled. Throughout the 1890’s, Kamil and his followers had widened their internal oratory and journalism as a means to expand their following in Egypt, and thus develop a basis for action against British rule independent of either the Khedive or Europe. Kamil had opened his activity as a spellbinding public orator in early 1896 when he addressed two public meetings in Alexandria, at which he called for British evacuation\textsuperscript{19}. He had published extensively in the anti-British al-Ahram (SC) and al-Mu’ayyad from 1894, and on 2 January 1900 he launched his own daily, al-Liwa’. The Khedive “may have subsidized [al-Liwa] for a time to annoy Cromer”\textsuperscript{20}.

An instrument used by Kamil and his colleagues to politicize and organize the strata of students and secularizing-educated professionals was the Nadil-Madaris al-‘Ulya (Higher Schools Club) "which brought together the students and graduates of Egypt’s several professional schools in a distinctly nationalist milieu"\textsuperscript{21}. Kamil in 1906, as a development of his mobilization of the student element, "organized a strike at the School of Law which began a long period of student agitation that only came to an end when political activity itself came to an end under the military government of 1952"\textsuperscript{22}. The British authorities obviously found it difficult to counter this new weapon of the independence movement. The

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that her citizens there numbered 40,000 compared to a paltry 7,000 resident Britishers. She wanted France to be the partner rather than ruler of the Egyptians. In her liberal pan-nationalism, "to be national elevates one’s sentiments to active admiration for the patriotism and love of nation that others equally feel"; she had supported “the Greek heroes of 1821, the great Hungarians of 1849, the great Italian unificationists, the Slavs fighting for liberation from Germanic tyranny" --- and the brief pre-British nationalist Egyptian parliamentarism, as much directed to loosening French as British control. Ella-Rachel Arie, "Juliette Adam et le Nationalisme Egyptien", Orient 1962 pp. 121, 123, 138.

19. One meeting was in Arabic for Egyptians, the other primarily for European residents, whom Kamil wanted to conciliate so that the British could not coopt them. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 315.
striking students ignored an ultimatum by the Director that he would expel every student who did not return at once, compelling Cromer himself to intervene and mediate before the students would go back to their studies23.

The Jaridists. While Kamil’s independence movement broadened out, a group of wealthy Arab-Egyptian landlords, prominent government officials and young intellectuals launched in March 1907 the daily al-Jaridah around which in September 1907 the Hizb al-Ummah or Party of the Nation formed. The national issue was important in the birth of this party. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid had originally called the group's first meeting following the outbreak in January 1906 of Britain’s territorial dispute with the Ottoman State over Tabah: he accepted Britain’s claim to be fighting Egypt’s legal battle for her, and was furious that the pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottoman State expressed by Kamil’s movement, seemed to weaken commitment to Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai24. The class of Arab-Muslim large landowners who sustained al-Jaridah and the later Party was somewhat bound by economic interest to the British colonial administration. George Lloyd viewed the Ummah Party as the “result of his [Cromer’s] efforts” to group "moderate-minded men of influence and standing" into an “active organization" that could "check the (Kamilist) Nationalist Party’s campaign" to end British rule25. British officiadom, near panic before the wide opposition expressed by Egyptians in the wake of the Tabah and Dinshaway incidents, thus actively stimulated the formation of al-Jaridah and the Ummah party. Yet Cromer’s, and especially Gorst’s, restrictive stances towards the development of parliamentary institutions made infuriatingly clear how secondary for British policy at that time was the possibility of collaboration with this Egyptian group26.

Writers of the al-Jaridah/Hizb al-Ummah group viewed the political scene at their group’s emergence much as alarmed British officials did --- that Mustafa Kamil, following Tabah and Dinshaway, was reaching out beyond the student and professional classes to "the common people" (al-‘ammah) and that a destructive mass independence movement might result.

26. In his final report before retiring, all Cromer would hold out in the way of a prospect of constitutional advance was an international Legislative Council in which resident foreigners would have parity with Egyptians --- enraging for Hizb al-Ummah and the Jaridists who wanted to become political partners. Mellini, Gorst p. 132. For bitter 1908 criticisms by Lutfi that the British under Gorst allied with the despotic Khedive to constrict the powers of the Consultative Assembly to those of a municipal council, see Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah pp. 122-129.
One al-Jaridah writer admitted in 1914 that when the newspaper was launched in 1907 the masses of Egyptians had, at the incitation of a group of political journalists (=the Kamilists), begun to demand an "unreasonable" independence which they believed within their grasp: limitations of freedom of expression (i.e. a British crackdown) threatened. "A party of the notables of the people" (=Arab-Egyptian large landowners) chose Lutfi al-Sayyid, and launched al-Jaridah as his forum, to "bring the mood of the people to moderation to enable it to obtain its reasonable demands through peaceful ... argument, so that its demands be not discredited before European public opinion". Lutfi, representing Hizb al-Ummah, sought dialogue with the British instead of organizing resistance to them. He could not, the al-Jaridah writer admitted, hope to win to his side the masses, in need of prolonged re-education as preparation for eventual independence:

A nation like the Egyptian, caught in a period of development, still emergent and struggling up the stairs of civilization --- still, indeed, in their first stage --- cannot possibly be fit to turn moderate principles to use save after the passage of long time. That is the reason the common people did not endorse the principles that Lutfi Bey’s articles expounded, although they were the most eloquent ever written on their subject, modern in style, their approach logical and oratorical in a way that the intellectual elite of educated people would prefer27.

The bond uniting the people of property and position who headed the Ummah Party was that they were all personae non gratae at the Khedive’s (Turcophone) palace (al-'Aqqad, 1953)28. Lutfi in 1907 advocated that Egypt be led by an enlightened elite of "government officials, members of the liberal professions and the a’yan" ([Arab-Egyptian] land-owning gentry/affluent people)29. The elitist Ummah party proved important for Egypt’s long-term twentieth century political development. It provided leaders for the Wafd and leadership and policies for the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists when these formed following World War 1. Several of the acculturated intellectuals whose post-World War 1 community thought we examine -- e.g. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mahmud 'Azmi, Taha Husayn, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat -- were during the British Occupation youthful disciples of Lutfi or published in

29. Quoted ibid p. 283.
al-Jaridah.

Hizb al-Ummah was formed in September 1907. In October, Mustafa Kamil returned from Europe and proclaimed the Patriotic Party, which in reality had existed for years, "with the objectives of the immediate evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil and the grant of a constitution by the Khedive". However, Kamil died prematurely on 10 February 1908. The Scots Christian missionary Temple Gairdner, no sympathetic observer of either Islam or the institutions in Muslim lands, made clear the mass, universal character of the mourning among Muslims. In a few hours, by word of mouth alone, all Cairo "had the news even on the night of his death". When Gairdner went to Kamil's house next morning

many were already in tears, especially young men of the effendi class. Then the coffin, borne aloft by bearers and covered with the red Egyptian flag, appeared, swaying slightly in the doorway. The whole of the vast assembly in the court beneath burst into tears as by one impulse. Neither on that day nor at subsequent great meetings when thousands of Muslims were gathered together to hear orations to his memory did I hear insulting or revengeful or violent words... The students, the schoolboys, the younger Government officials --- it is they who have made this man their idol and hero, and wept for him as the young weep for their heroes.

Gairdner, then, identified the effendi class, the student youth and the younger government officials as still Kamil's core constituency at his death.

The British-subsidized SC al-Muqattam described organized collective participation by the urban student class in the funeral in the midst of the mourning masses:

At three o'clock in the afternoon the funeral march began to move in a great procession the farthest extent of which the eye could not attain. The march was headed by police mounted and on foot and behind them the most enormous number of school students. The students of every school participated as a body, marching separately from the others, bearing banners draped with black. Marching first were the students of the late leader's school, then the students of the preparatory school, then the students of the Victoria College, then the students of the Agricultural School bearing a tree hung with black, then the students of the Teachers' College, then the Dar al-'Ulum, then those of the Khedivial School, then the Medical College, then the Law School. The bier had been wrapped with the Egyptian flag and above it had been raised a green banner upon which had been written "the proprietor of al-Liwa'".

The al-Muqattam correspondent lists as sources of organized groups in Kamil's funeral

32. al-Muqattam 12 February 1908 p. 5.
the most prominent West-patterned institutions of secondary and tertiary education. Significantly, the only religious Islamic institution mentioned as providing an organized body of mourner-marchers was the post-traditional Dar al-‘Ulm founded in 1871 to produce teachers of Islamic subjects and Arabic simultaneously trained in modern secular subjects. \textit{al-Muqattam} identified elements of the adult professional classes as present in number: notably professional people in the judiciary or law, private or government-employed (rijal al-qada’ wal-niyabah)\textsuperscript{33} for admission to whose ranks Kamil had originally been educated.

At Kamil’s death, then, his movement had organizationally covered the whole of the Muslim secular-stream students and, less completely, the graduate professionals such as civil servants, lawyers and teachers\textsuperscript{34}. \textit{al-Hizb al-Watani}’s anti-imperialism, patriotism and pan-Islamism spoke to the needs of this core class-constituency, so constricted in employment and culturally assaulted by the British and the resident foreigners.

The Threat of Deculturation Under the British

\textbf{Linguistic Assaults.} British educational policies worked to create a small modern Muslim elite sharply separated in class background and culture from Egyptians in general. In 1902, the British spent on education less than 1\% of all Egyptian state expenditure: in response to nationalist criticism, the rate increased between 1907-1912, but never exceeded 3.4\% of total budget\textsuperscript{35}. Cromer imposed stiff fees to knock the children of the poor and the petty bourgeoisie out of the government’s secular-stream primary and secondary schools. Such restrictions on popular education shrank the pool of students for tertiary medical, engineering and law colleges, deeply alienating the Jaridist-Ummah paternalists, motivated to collaborate by all that the British had done to foster the growth of their land-holding Arab-Egyptian elite\textsuperscript{36}. By 1900 the British

\textsuperscript{33. Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{34. The Jesuit-founded Bayrut Catholic mouthpiece \textit{al-Bashir} printed a report from Cairo observing that Kamil had been given "a rarely-paralleled funeral in which thousands of the leaders, scholars, headmasters, army officers and students of the country walked... The crowds of people stopped the trams from traveling for about two hours". \textit{al-Bashir} 17 February 1908 p. 5. Ghali characterizes al-Hizb al-Watani at the death of Mustafa Kamil as "a party of youth, students, civil servants, [secular] lawyers", drawing on Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s contrast of "the youth" in Kamil’s party to the seasoned mature notables in Hizb al-Ummah. Ibrahim Amin Ghali, \textit{L'Egypte Nationaliste et Liberale de Moustapha Kamel a Saad Zagloul}, 1892-1925 (Hague: Martimus Nijhoff 1969) p. 82, \textit{al-Muqattam} stressed the wine-like irrational impact of Kamil on "the Egyptian youth" who followed him "refusing to listen to other arguments". \textit{al-Muqattam} 11 February 1908 p. 6.


\textsuperscript{36. \textit{al-Jaridah} was concerned at the small numbers of Egyptians enrolling in medicine and engineering in
had imposed English as the main medium of education in government primary and secondary schools, opening teaching positions for despised lower middle class Britishers who might have not found jobs at home\textsuperscript{37}. This replacement of classical Arabic by English drew attacks from educated Egyptians and from British liberals. As a concessive gesture, Cromer in 1906 had the former 'Urabist, Sa'd Zaghlul, associated with the group that was to found al-Jaridah and the gradualist nationalist Hizb al-Ummah in 1907, appointed Minister of Education with permission to award more scope to Arabic in the schools. To control Zaghlul, Cromer simultaneously promoted as Adviser to the Ministry of Education the ex-missionary Douglas Dunlop, who had been associated since the late 1890s with linguistic anglicization campaigns in Egypt's schools\textsuperscript{38}. Despite the nationalists' attacks, Dunlop kept control of education until after the First World War\textsuperscript{39}. In a poem of farewell to Cromer on his departure from Egypt in May 1907, Hafiz Ibrahim wrote "you destroyed the mother of languages [Arabic] which is our destruction or a
pathway to [encompass] it. Gradually, English became the main second language read and spoken by the younger generation of the Muslim petty bourgeois class "who lacked means for private education and the acquisition of culture" and sought careers in a civil service that the British were changing over from French to English. French held out in the School of Law, Kamil's and Lutfi's Alma Mater, where French lecturers strove to transmit not merely the elements for specialized legal careers but generalist Enlightenment concepts such as the Rights of Man that they relished might destabilize the British in Egypt --- and which had drawn many Muslims such as Kamil to the school. Linguistic Anglicization was meant to provide jobs relief for Britishers and to fit some Muslim Egyptians to serve as docile functionaries, not to open into fundamental encounters with any Western culture: Cromer tried to prevent any Egyptians at all going to study in unsettling Europe, and obstructed the opening of the small-scale (old) Egyptian University, which went ahead only under his successor. This Arabic-medium core for a University was the joint achievement of a decade-long drive by the Kamilists, Muhammad 'Abduh and his disciples, the Jaridists, al-Mu'ayyad and the Khedivial family, and the SC al-Ahram and al-Muqattam. The foundation of the University drew attacks from Le Progres branding such innocuous disciples of 'Abduh as Qasim Amin as Kamil's fellow-'revolutionaries'. Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah were drawn into religio-political polarization of (a) resident Europeans and the British against (b) all Egyptian groups and political factions, branded as collectively "fanatical". The French-modelled nature of Egyptian law, some scholarly institutions, and the urban private sector because of the resident Europeans,

42. Berque correctly notes the purely functional contact with English language and culture to which the British wanted to confine the Egyptian elite. "It proved a disadvantage to English to be thus limited to these practical ends, aiming no higher and no deeper, and thus satisfying neither the Arabs' powerful intellectual aspirations nor their ideological interests, which for a long time found champions in the Ecole de Droit". Ibid. Upon finishing high school, Mustafa Kamil wrote to his brother of his intention to join the Egyptian Law School because it was "the school for writing, oratory and the ascertainment of the rights of individuals and nations". After one year there, he concurrently joined the French Law School, which prepared Cairo students for examinations given in France, Farhat Ziadeh, Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 1968) p. 63.
43. Lutfi's bitter mid-1907 exchange with Le Progres, Safahat Matwiyyah pp. 170-172. The University opened in 1908 with distinguished European Orientalists among its lecturers, although they taught in Arabic: Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 337-338. "Intellectual members of the Ummah Party were in the lead of those Egyptians who in 1908 successfully realized through general subscription the creation of the Egyptian University". Ziadeh, Lawyers p. 91.
all helped maintain French as an intellectually more prestigious opposition to English and the British: yet the alternation of the two languages also increasingly brought home the shared anti-Muslimism of Europeans in general. Even for the wealthiest Muslim Egyptians, the utmost linguistic Anglicization seldom opened humane interaction: future Liberal Constitutionalist PM Muhammad Mahmud was popular at Oxford but on returning home found himself unwelcome in the clubs and sporting societies within which Egypt’s British had irreversibly segregated themselves. So often, Jaridist-Siyasahist pan-Islamism, pan-Easternism and pan-Arabism had that quasi-intimate fury ignited when an admired group rebuffs and excludes. The Jaridists respected the economic and technical skills of Cromer and his colleagues --- the perennialization of irrigation and the booms enriched their class --- and even the Kamilists paid tribute to Britishers who benefited Egyptians. Yet British linguistic depersonalization in education, their restriction of primary, secondary and tertiary education and their subjection of what Egyptians they recruited into the civil service radicalized the conservative Ummah-Jaridists almost as much as the less-propertied, more urban-bourgeois Kamilists.


45. al-Liwa’ approved when a meeting of Egyptian writers decided to send a letter of thanks to the Englishman Ernest Cassel for his work to combat eye diseases in Egypt: the remissness of “our rich ones” in promoting popular health lost them the respect Cassel won. “Shukr al-Muhsin” (Thanking a Benefactor), al-Liwa’ 13 January 1903 p. 2. In mid-1908, Lutfi paid tribute to British irrigation works that had restored international financial confidence to Egypt. While assailing the political stagnation, Lutfi categorized Cromer as a great economist and financier who made Egypt solvent again: “how greatly the area of cultivated land has increased from 1883 to today [1908]; how much the value of agricultural land and real estate has been raised due to his policy”. Safahat pp. 142, 71. Lutfi believed that Cromer had striven with success to release the peasants from usurers by establishing the Agricultural Bank. Ibid p. 71. In his generally mordant poem farewelling Cromer, Hafiz Ibrahim, too, gave him credit for the hydraulic works that made many Egyptians rich, while denouncing his contraction of education. Shararah, Hafiz p. 110.

ALTERNATION AND SYNTHESIS OF CULTURES AMONGST KAMILISTS

The Cultural Duality of Kamil and His Watani Followers

Both contemporary British observers and subsequent Orientalist analysts were struck by the influence of European concepts, culture and life --- in particular their French variants --- upon Mustafa Kamil and his colleagues. Nadav Safran (1961) characterized Kamil as "the son of an engineer who had been educated in the schools established by [the Westernizer] Muhammad 'Ali and who had spent all his life in government service. The only traditional [Muslim] education ever received by Mustafa was one year of learning the Qur'an between the ages of five and six. Following that, Mustafa attended secular primary and secondary schools" and tertiary secular law institutions, which made him bilingual in French. "A specimen of the newly arisen modern class with no attachment to previous forms of social organization, Mustafa was instinctively orientated towards the modern [= West European] concept of the nation state as the basic political-social entity" 47.

Lord Lloyd in 1933 described Kamil as "opportunistic" in preaching pan-Islamism. Describing Kamil's dress and appearance as dandyishly European, he wrote that "his culture was essentially French and as a Moslem he was not devout, not even particularly croyant. Such was the leader who became the pioneer of the young nationalism: the older Moslems looked somewhat askance at him: but the students followed him eagerly, and, when he died, mourned him with real fervor" 48. However, the Turcophile French writer Pierre Loti, a sort of friend of Kamil, came to understand his cultural duality. When the two called together on the Rector of al-Azhar in 1907, Loti was struck when Kamil engaged with the Rector in an intense discussion --- "as if it was a matter of present-day interest" --- about "events which followed the death of the Prophet, and the part played by 'Ali".

In that moment how my good friend Mustafa, whom I had seen so French in France, appeared all at once a Muslim to the bottom of his soul! The same thing is true, indeed.

of the greater number of these Orientals, who, if we meet them in our own country, seem to be quite pariasianized; their modernity is only on the surface; in their inmost souls Islam remains intact. Loti had grasped a key aspect of acculturation: that modern Muslim Egyptians did not have to have been formally grounded much within educational institutions in the Qur’an, Islam and the literature of the classical Arabs to be influenced by them. The pan-Islamist Kamil’s interaction with the Rector of al-Azhar had its political functions: it still instances how political activism regularly exposed acculturateds to a range of monolingual, non-Westernizing-educated Islamic counter-elites who offered them intact sectors of Islam and the Arab past. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah, and after 1922 the West-steeped Husayn Haykal and al-Siyasah, also kept continual exchanges and personal interaction going with Azharite and other Islamic elites at which their modernist contributors nonetheless sniped.

Kamil and his multilingual colleagues kept up a talking relationship with Muslim learned clerical elites who could give the Islamic and Arab knowledge that Dunlop --- and French lecturers in the School of Law? --- denied them in formal education. Loti was right that nationalist acculturateds of Kamil’s pattern came to hold their own with Azharites, but missed the Kamilists’ sense that al-Azhar’s curricula and learning were not enough on their own --- not restructured enough to function --- in the modern world. Relevant here is a distinction of Tignor between (a) the intellectuals of Khedive Isma’il’s time who “having been trained in [the] institutions” of traditional society “were not ready to admit that the West was superior to the East in anything except naked power” and saw the problem as effective resistance to the West’s expansion, and (b) “the later generation” of students and professional people produced by more modern, Western schools. The latter Egyptian generation (Tignor characterized) came to favor

49. Pierre Loti, Egypt tsd. W.P. Baines (London: T. Werner Laurie Ltd., nd ---1909?) p.66. Kamil over the years got himself well and truly associated in the minds of his French sympathisers with Islamic religious revivalism and pan-Islam, as well as the Egyptian cause narrowly considered. For instance, the Turcophile Pierre Loti dedicated La Mort de Philae to “the memory of my noble and dear friend Moustapha Kamel Pasha who succumbed on the 10th February 1908 to the admirable task of re-establishing in Egypt the dignity of the Homeland and of Islam”. Quoted Ghali, L’Egyphte Nationaliste p. 43. Cf. fn 89.

50. Lutfi’s relaxed access as editor of al-Jaridah to the al-Azhar hierarchy was shown when an impressive coalition of the mosque-university’s lecturers and students moved to expel Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Mahmud Zanati and Taha Husayn in their iconoclastic late adolescence. Taha might have liked an ultra-public martyrdom, but Lutfi only telephoned al-Azhar Rector Hassunah al-Nawawi that the three young men should not be branded apostates for life because they had been indulgent to an unconventional classical remark about Muhammad’s grave: al-Nawawi at once cancelled their expulsion. Dr Mahdi `Allam, “Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat”, Majallat Ma’had al-Buhuth wal-Dirasat al-`Arabiyah March 1969 p. 156. See B 241.
wholesale adoption from the modern West of a liberal constitutional regime and laissez faire economic system that would assure their own political and economic predominance. (Certainly, al-Jaridah's interest in private commercial and capitalist possibilities already fostered crude pan-Arab impulses even before 1915: Ch. 6). Passages in al-Liwa' by people who obviously know Europe, developed al-Nadim's much earlier recognition of the West's dominance in the modern world and his call for a pupil-like adoption of the techniques and institutions that gave it strength. Such writers in al-Liwa' sometimes demonstrated an admiration for the excellence of Western civilization transcending the narrower question of the West's power over the East. One 1903 number of al-Liwa', for instance, described European civilization as "a light that could not be resisted with darkness". Another 1903 article by "Katib Majid" was titled "How Can the Nation Progress/Evolve? How can that Objective be Attained?" "There is no escape from imitating the West whether the soul desire it or hate it". Relentlessly cataloguing the revolution in the environment, in architecture, in clothes, in the forms of life that the advance of Western civilization had produced in the East in the past century, the author warned that "for a man ... to try to side-step or escape it is to cut himself off from life itself ... In short there is no remedy for the sickness of backwardness that backward nations are afflicted with in this age other than skilful self-transformation and imitation of the West, the lord of this age's life". The only alternative to modernization for Egypt was subjugation: there was no longer any refuge to which nations that rejected modernization could flee.

Behold, the flood of civilization's waters have surged out engulfing even the plains and the wilderness. These backward nations with their bare feet run before it as it overtakes them from behind and he whom the waters overtake and engulf is dead.

In regard to the consistency or inconsistency of Kamil's statements to varied audiences, the section of this chapter examining the international community identifications of his movement during lobbying will show that Kamil from the outset presented himself in France as a pro-Ottoman pan-Islamist. This is despite his statements in later years identifying French people as hostile to Muslims as an international group.

Arabic communications of members of the party of Mustafa Kamil --- intended for

52. al-Liwa', August 17, 1903
internal Egyptian (not French) audiences where any motive for political manipulation was absent --- corroborate the movement's sincere emotional commitment to Western civilization, strongly identifying the latter with France's specific culture and history, as in Kamil's speeches and writings (Arabic as well as French). An article published in al-Liwa' in May 1908 opposed the teaching of British history at the Egyptian University, opened on a small scale in that year. It cited as grounds that the English had no history, literature or philosophy that merited teaching at a tertiary level, but interestingly proposed the French Revolution as embodying alongside "the exalted Arab civilization" those aspects of humanity's past development that liberal education for Egyptians had to cover. The article, with its gross errors about the details or socio-political issues of the Wars of the Roses, illustrated Britain's continuing low cultural prestige in comparison to France, a much longer-standing collaborator in Egypt's modernization and still revered as the pioneer and enduring model of liberatory Western civilization.

We ask the Committee of the Egyptian University what benefit the Egyptian students could gain from being taught the history of a nation [England] lacking any history in the proper sense of the word? What advantage will the Egyptians get from instruction in the history of a nation that --- until a recent age --- was involved with [primitive] passion in the pursuit of raids and invasions of every kind, a nation devoid of any ancient civilization from which people could learn the process of Man's gradual upward development; devoid, too, of any historical work(s) from which the advancement of mankind's thought can be understood as is the case, for instance, with the history of the great French Revolution and that of the exalted Arab civilization. What have I to gain from learning the judgement of the two roses and the outbreak of war between two kings among Britain's monarchs occasioned by nothing else than the desire of one of them as the bearer of the red rose to gain precedence in functions (hafalat) over the wearer of the yellow rose?54.

The aim that al-Liwa' held up to the Egyptian University was thus a cultivated Egyptian equally well read in (a) the literature and histories produced by the classical Arabs' Islamic civilization and (b) the modern positivist-secular West initiated by France's Enlightenment and Revolution. The concern for a thought and upward development (rusiyu) of mankind extending beyond the Arabo-Islamic heritage (which it relativizes), and the consequent assumption that no Egyptian is truly educated if not equipped to apprehend the literature and history of the modern

54. "'A Misriyah hadihil-Jami'ah 'am Inkiliziyah?" (Is this University Egyptian or English?), al-Liwa', May 1908, p.5.
secular West, showed how far Kamil's Egyptian quasi-nationalists had moved by 1908 from any insular Egyptian Islamic traditionalism.

This Kamilist formulation that the Arabo-Islamic heritage is an indispensable component of a comprehensive humanism was representative. Kamilist communications often instanced the tenacious appeal of sectors of the classical Arabo-Islamic tradition to Egyptians far removed from it by their formative non-indigenous institutional educations and by prolonged interaction with Europe and Europeans. A few ultra-modernizing al-Liwa' items did envisage further, much more far-reaching, West-modelled repatterning of Egyptian, Arab and Ottoman education, rejected for not having truly duplicated the (lethal) Western dynamism without which the Egyptians and Ottomans could never have a true "Renaissance" --- such discussion, though, solidifying the sense of some supra-Egyptian community, Ottoman, Arab, Muslim, Eastern, facing that West.

Sometimes the Western and high Arabo-Islamic facets alternated in spasms: more often, the two blended in unstandardized but often constructive ways.

The Kamilists' Links to Arabo-Islamic Culture and Thought

al-Hizb al-Watani reconnected Egyptians to the classical Muslim Arabs in two main sectors: (a) aesthetic-literary and (b) ideological: ie. Islam should somewhat prescribe in even modern societies. (The Kamilists thus maintained al-Nadim's two great fundamentals of nationhood --- the continuity of the language and the religion). In contrast, al-Jaridah's narrower Arabist humanism stressed that West-influenced writers had to read the classical Arabs' works and reapply their language patterns within modern literature and discourse (Ch. 6). This relativized aesthetic continuity of the Jaridists did not require the classical Arabs to be superior

55. al-Liwa's pragmatic correspondent in Istanbul grimly set out "all the eternal means --- commerce, agriculture, industrial, domination, force, enslavement" --- used by "the West" to effect that subjugation of all humanity to which it had dedicated "its whole life". "The East" could examine and strive to duplicate patriotic (secular, anti-clerical-DW) education in France --- it was survival "to imitate the Westermer in everything that has helped him Progress (ragghahu) and made him a man". The item scathingly derided the educational "renaissance of the dead people" brought by the non-religious governmental schools established in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Turkey: these inculcated no motivating values and the only aim of those who attended was to win on graduation modestly-paid careers in the state bureaucracies and some empty titles and ranks. The item was interesting for its proto-pan-Arab perspective within Ottomanism, and probably implied the necessity for a new Muslim modern private enterprise and for constitutional limitations on the Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid and other Muslim rulers (=the Khedive 'Abbas?). Despite its concern to learn from Westerners to become equal with them, the item understood why "Eastern" parents who had to hand their children over to foreign schools in Egypt and the Ottoman State ("hadhihil-bilad" --- "these lands") felt "heartbreak":= the irreducible hard Muslim core in Kamilism. "Dar al-Sa'adah --- al-Inqilab fil-Ta'lim" (Istanbul --- the Revolution in Education), al-Liwa' 17 January 1903 p. 1.

or even quite equal to recent Western creativity --- whereas Kamil and some of his colleagues sometimes thought that they still had to pattern in a range of fields sometimes, not just language or literature.

**Classicoid Aestheticism.** The earliest, youthful Kamil, not yet totalistically political, in an initial period had a sensitive ear for poetic beauty in old Arabic literature, transmuting the Andalusian style anthologized by Ibn Hazm into the vigorous dialogues of his 1893 play *Fath al-Andalus* (The Conquest of Spain), a triumphalist celebration of the early Arab Muslim capacity for conquest, therapeutic for the colonized Kamil. International strength and the al-Nadim-like clashes and warfare of rival religion-focussed far-extending blocs, already the perspective within which Kamil depicted the struggle for Spain, would henceforth always be central for the Kamilists. The play was interwoven enough into the parochial ethnic and political Egyptian realities of the day: its 'Abbad, the Chief Minister who had lived all his life among the Arabs but was Byzantine-descended, tried to dissuade them from invading Spain: that warned Egyptians not to trust the resident Christian Syrians and Armenians, liable to collaborate with Cromer. Yet, more than just a political-ethnic barb, *Fath al-Andalus* also presented 'Abbad, courted by Byzantine emissaries, as an individual wracked in specific ways by the dual loyalties that can make members of a marginal sect betray a religious nation to Christian outsiders.

Kamil could have become a creative writer with nuanced ad hoc insights: even as a political organizer and orator, though, he always maintained love for its own sake of a classical Arabic that subverted his and his audiences' Egyptian specificities, powerfully homogenizing them with past and present Arabs outside Egypt.

**Guidance in Modern Society.** The language and poetry of the classical Arabs kept their sometimes integral grip on Kamil, although he selected and restructured their history and social

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56. Mustafa Kamil, *Fath al-Andalus* republished Cairo 1973 passim but esp. pp. 25 - 28, 35, and 46. I am deeply indebted to Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University who took the time to locate, xerox and airmail this edition to me from Cairo while researching two books of his own there. The play's original edition was published in Cairo by al-Adab Press and reprinted by 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil fi 34 Rabi`an (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa' 9 vols 1908 - 1911) v. 2 pp. 165ff. Dr Michael Carter, an authority on classical Arabic literature, assessed that the play's passages of poetry "do capture the medieval ethos, largely because they are so entirely within the convention of the love poetry of the period. You can verify this by browsing through Ibn Hazm's *Tawq al-Hamamah*, which is more or less an anthology of Andalusian love poetry with all the theory added in the form of commentary". Personal letter from Dr Carter, at that time Lecturer in Arabic at the Department of Semitic Studies, Sydney University, 2 August 1982. The play's figure 'Abbad may be meant to cast doubt on the loyalty of such *dakhiliya* (interlopers) as the Egypto-Armenian Nubar Pasha, several times Foreign Minister and Prime Minister: fn 112.
and political realities to serve the needs of his colonized compatriots. The vehement "superficial religiosity" of his highly political Arabo-Islamic past\(^{57}\) would not make SCs or Copts feel more welcome in Egyptian Arabism but, as much or more than aestheticism, recurred in the responses of Liwa'ists to classical Arab materials. The Azhar-educated 'Abduh might have published the *Nahj al-Balaghah* (Highroad of Eloquence) ascribed to the fourth Caliph 'Ali, from aestheticism, as beautiful high literature decidedly not by that Caliph, but some *al-Liwa'* acculturateds did turn to it for religious-social guidance. A pseudonymous *al-Liwa*' writer warned that those who would nominate themselves to tomorrow become the planners and the executors and the spokesmen in the service of this dear homeland EGYPT must give this book the thought it deserves, so that, when they have comprehended its secrets and understood its aims, they can put its incomparable verses into practice ... to help them overcome their illusions and the devils from which they suffer: that it may smash the chains and shackles that the party of greed and imperialism have placed around their necks, hands and feet\(^{58}\).

Like al-Nadim, then, this 1908 *al-Liwa* writer was alert to the political effects of acculturation, which in some respects gave the modern Muslim professional classes more affinity with ascendant aliens than to Egyptians in general. There was the sense in the ranks of the Kamilists that the dual-cultured elite from which they recruited could swing either way politically, as well. Exposure to the primary classical Arab works of, or on, Islam's first period of greatness was crucial to morally emancipate the educated elite from the "illusions" as well as vested interests that still bound it in collaboration to the masters, hampering it from assuming the leadership role it alone could play in the imminent period of decolonization. The article, however, also conceived both "the Islamic spirit" and the "Muhammadan Civilization" (*al-madaniyyat al-Muhammadiyyah*) in partially socio-economic terms broader in scope than the moral liberation that the *Nahj al-Balaghah* 's "wisdom" offered from imperialism and

\(^{57}\) This is a translation of Fritz Steppat's concept of "oberflächliche Religiosität" in *Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil* pp. 269 - 271. The simple Islam-fired conquering Arab superhumans that Kamil depicted took scant account of the Prophet Muhammad's warning to victorious followers that they had returned from the lesser struggle (*al-jihad al-asghar*) to the greater struggle (*al-jihad al-akbar*), that to subdue their own passions. The play's Arabo-Muslim heroes are harmoniously one in their ideological drive to expand the realm of the universal Caliphate centred in Damascus. Kamil did not mention such personality clashes and jealousies as that the Arab governor of North Africa, Musa Ibn Nusayr, at Toledo whipped and put in chains his conquering Berber lieutenant Tariq Ibn Ziyad for refusing to obey orders to halt in the early stage of the campaign. Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs, from the Earliest Times to the Present* 10 ed. (London: Macmillan 1970) p. 496.

\(^{58}\) "Mufakkir" (pseud.), "Hal Sami'tum bimithli hadha min Qabl?" (Have You Heard Anything Like This Before?), *al-Liwa* 16 May 1908, p.2.
self-interest. Anybody wanting to be well-informed about the Islamic spirit and "the laws/codes/foundations (qawā'id) of Muhammadan civilization cannot confine himself to simple study of the Qur’an and the sunnah (practice) of the Prophet". He must also closely examine, as recorded in the classical works, "the principles and the socio-economic and political regulations and keys to happiness in both this world and the next world" (mafatih al-sa’adatayn) that the Qur’an and the sunnah contained as further implemented in the statements and actions of the first generation of Muslims upon whom the Prophet Muhammad had himself bestowed his personal guidance and instruction. Beyond personal religious beliefs, worship and morality, Islam was thus presented as, in at least its first period of greatness, a comprehensive code impinging in detailed ways upon social, economic and political life.

The impression that a socio-economically prescriptive "Muhammadan Civilization" could be implemented in Egypt’s present, too, was strengthened by an accompanying item that presented a "monumental study on usury" by the Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar. This distinguished Dar al-'Ulum scholar, after World War I, took part in the Young Men’s Muslim Association (Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin) founded by veteran pan-Islamists from Kamil’s movement. al-Najjar was to be active in organizing the YMMA’S solidarity with the Palestinians during their clashes with Jewish settlers in 1929 and well into the 1930s (B 130 fn).

The acculturated Kamilists encouraged Dar al-'Ulum authors to produce new guiding works to the classical Arabs’ complex civilization that were modern in arrangement. Dar al-'Ulum lecturer Hasan Tawfiq al-Adl (1862 - 1904) published the first modern history of Arabic literature in Arabic, Ta‘rikh Adab al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah: Mustafa Kamil along with Shaykh Muhammad ’Abduh attended al-’Adl’s 1904 funeral in Cairo. The Dar al-'Ulum intellectuals formulated Islam and the old Arab learning in ways that addressed modern Europe-developed knowledge and contemporary situations, thus exactly meeting some very special needs of the modernity-conscious Kamilists. Tantawi Jawhari (1870-1939), an Azhar graduate and Dar al-'Ulum lecturer, in encyclopaedic writings amalgamated Qur’anic motifs and the West’s modern sciences: he voiced activist anti-British nationalism from the pages of

59. Ibid.
61. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum p. 128.
al-Liwa'\textsuperscript{62}. Before Kamil's death in 1908, Dar al-'Ulum intellectuals were influencing al-Liwa' more, for instance through the recruitment of the Tunisian-born 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish (1867-1929) as editor, in which role he intensified the ethno-sectarian conflicts Muslim Egyptians had with Copts and the Syrian Christian residents. Yet as editor of al-Hidayah, Shawish, like Jawhari, was striving to document the harmony of Islam with Europe's modern scientific theories while answering Christian missionary attacks\textsuperscript{63}.

**KAMILIST ATTITUDES TO WOMEN**

**Islam-Qualified Adjustment to the Urban West**

Changing relations between the sexes measured (a) how far the Kamilists would adjust to West European norms, and conversely (b) how seriously they wanted to install Islam as social ideology or at least as discourse motifs within the new urban modernity. Some members of the movement and its constituency had, or would have when they launched their careers after their studies, the economic means to maintain households in which the women could be secluded and economically non-productive and perhaps bear the heavy cost of polygamy if they wished.

Among Egyptian historians, Salah 'Isa tried to explain away Kamil and al-Liwa's "savage" and "prolonged" campaign against Qasim Amin's arguments for the abolition of the veil and women's (qualified) right to employment as "political" --- motivated by the intensely conservative attitudes of the Egyptian public, or by enmity between Amin and Kamil's then political patron the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi caused by other issues\textsuperscript{64}. Ibrahim Amin Ghali claimed that Kamil in the controversies that Qasim's writings triggered "became the prisoner of the ideas of his compatriots" --- an argument that maintains intact his presentation of Kamil as "l'homme evolue" who had assimilated, and was committed to implant, the culture of the West. Kamil publicly took sides with "a reactionary conception" because of his political need to stand

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid p. 250. Many of Shawish's al-Liwa' articles were about "Egyptian Woman" and thus contributed to the further Islamization of discussion of that issue in al-Liwa', examined in the next section. Shawish's collection of his al-Liwa' articles titled \textit{Abhath 'an al-Mar'at al-Misriyyah wal-Shu'un al-'Ammah} noted Daghir, \textit{Masadir} p. 251.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Salah 'Isa, "Mustafa Kami! Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" (Mustafa Kamil as a Bourgeois Thinker), \textit{Qadaya 'Arabiyyah} (Bayrut) March 1976 p. 113.
\end{itemize}
well with the Khedive and because championing changes to the status of Egyptian women would divide the by and large still conservative society that Kamil before everything was intent to unite in struggle against imperialist rule.65

Urban students and professionals made up the core following and constituency of Kamil’s movement; yet their secular West-modelled educations did not always preclude conservative stances towards women shared with other strata and classes. Muhammad Husayn Haykal’s memoirs attest that young Egyptians being educated in French or English medium, and who generally supported Mustafa Kamil’s activities to end British rule, overwhelmingly perceived Qasim Amin’s call for the liberation of women as a threat to their religion, Islam. Haykal first became aware of the controversy over Amin’s writings while a student at the Khedivial Secondary School, probably through the pan-Islamic political papers most students read66. Around 1906 Haykal entered the School of Law, participating there in the 1906 Law School strike organized by Mustafa Kamil: Amin’s writings and the literature of reply forced "youth" --- he obviously means the acculturated group receiving West-modelled education --- to "think seriously about the issue" of the position of women. "Most of them", though, viewed Qasim’s call as "an apostasy from religion paving the way for atheism"67.

The stance that Islam should limit or direct change was pronounced in a 1908 al-Liwa’ article assailing increased free mixing between men and women, and titled "Religion Obliges the Giving of Good Counsel". The article quoted the Qur’anic verse "and I did not create jinn or human beings except for them to serve/worship me": worship/service of the Creator had to regulate human relations in detail. To assail the growing freedom of movement and repudiation of the veil by women, the article in addition to Qur’anic verses mustered supporting quotations from genuine and some less assuredly authentic hadiths: "the best mosques for women are the rooms of their houses" and "whoever looks at the attractive features of an unrelated woman out of lust, his eyes will be afflicted on Resurrection Day". But there is also the muddled "quotation"

66. Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (Cairo: 2 vls Mitba’at Misr 1951-3) v. 1, p. 24. Haykal mentions Qasim Amin’s Tahrir al-Mar’ah (The Emancipation of Women), first published too early (1899) for Haykal, born in 1889, to have read an initial serialization in al-Mu’ayyad as an adolescent, as too, perhaps, was Qasim’s 1900 al-Mar’at al-Jadidah. But his interest in Qasim Amin’s writings may well have been first aroused by continuing controversies around his ideas in the political and pan-Islamic papers.
68. "Wa ma khalaqtu l-jinna wal-insa illa liya’buduni", Qur’an 51:56.
from memory of a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad is supposed to have said "what has the meaning" (ma ma‘nahu) "I am a man who feels jealousy and there is no man who does not feel jealousy unless he has lost self-pride". The quality of shavrah (solicitude, possessiveness, jealousy over a spouse) the article saw as having been lost by "some men" who negligently allowed their wives to leave their chambers at home and go forth unveiled in the full light of day without reason, leading to the corruption of many for "their going forth in this condition is a temptation to those men in whose heart is a sickness, and many are they". The article imaged widespread change in Egyptian society: "the vulgar unveiled costume has spread widely among all the classes, alas!".

Other al-Liwa' items perceived changes in the life-patterns of women in better-off or educated strata, again implying assent from their menfolk. Sayyid 'Ali interlocked contemporary patriotism with traditional "religious" regulation of human behaviour to resist increased freedom of movement and mixing between them in his May 1908 article titled "Shame and Chastity Cry Out for Rescue Before the Free Movement/Unveiledness of the Fair Young Women". Sayyid 'Ali argued that spreading free movement and disuse of the veil by (urban?) women was an issue in which "every person who is sincerely devoted to homeland (watan), his children and to saving Egypt’s feminine society from pollution is obliged to take an interest". As with most al-Liwa' articles on the theme, this was no one-sided criticism of the female younger generation. Men

69. "al-Din al-Nasihah" (Religion is Advice) al-Liwa' in 9 April 1908, p.2. In our examination of this and other al-Liwa' items we translated the root tabarraja roughly as signifying repudiation of the veil and unregulated movement outside the home on the part of women, al-Liwa' uses tabarruj which in modern standard Arabic means makeup in a wider, more inclusive, classical Islamic sense. The Qur'an in Surah al-Nur (24:60) permitted women past any prospect of marriage (al-qaw'aid) to take off their outer clothes "ghayra mutabarrijatin bi-zinatin" --- without flaunting or displaying any ornament. al-Baydawi’s interpretation of the "root meaning" of al-tabarruj is "to purposely reveal that which would be hidden". Safinatun barijah is thus an uncovered ship; al-baraj is expansion of the eyes to show white parts around the iris normally covered. For a woman it thus means "her purposely displaying her ornament (zinah) and her physical charms (mahasinaha) to men": al-Baydawi, Anwar al-Tanzil wa Asrar al-Ta'wil (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi. 1955) pt. 2, p. 6. al-Baydawi’s gloss of the use of tabarraja in this verse thus demonstrates that it could have been applied by al-Liwa' to mean displaying the normally covered face or other parts of the body with sexual appeal rather than, narrowly, using makeup after eliminating the veil. al-Baydawi seems to regard the root as elsewhere also connoting movement by women. The wives of the Prophet are instructed in Surah al-Ahzab (33: v.33) "wa qarna fi buyutikunna wa la tabarrajna tabarruj al-jahiliyyat al-ula": "stay in your houses and do not flaunt/display your finery (adornments) or physical charms as was done in the first paganism". al-Baydawi explains that in "the first paganism", --- the time between Adam and Noah or the period of kufr (unbelief) preceding Islam --- "women used to wear pearls and walk in the road exhibiting themselves to men". Ibid pt 2, p. 131. Thus the classical Islamic use of the term would cover dispensing by women with the veil and their displaying of their ornaments, makeup, or areas of their body, perhaps while moving outside in public, with the purpose or effect of arousing male sexual feelings.
also must spend more time at home shunning bars, clubs, coffee-shops and houses of ill-fame: "Will they do so, then, to protect their honor and the reputation of their families and to ward off from Egyptian society a danger before which those perils most destructive of societies pale into insignificance?" 70. Sayyid 'Ali’s blending of Islamic and Western elements was typical of Kamilist dual-culturedness. In blasting bars, he responded to the effects that European milieus in Egyptian cities had upon post-traditional Muslim men and their family life; their apathy to unveiled movement in public places by their womenfolk had adjusted to Western patterns. 'Ali’s demand for veiling and segregation of women as a precondition for close-knit family units drew on traditionalist religious puritanism. On the other hand, equating coffee houses with infidel bars and brothels criminalized a normal male Muslim form of leisure: his insistence that Muslim Egyptian husbands and wives spend the maximum time together in their homes thus covertly ushered in the Europe-patterned bourgeois monogamous family. Kamilist demands that women be educated to within sight of the level of men --- not for careers but to equip mothers to educate their sons in hyper-patriotism in the home --- further fostered tightened bourgeois soul-mate marriages, although not with Qasim Amin’s less blended Westernism.

Not all items in al-Liwa’ identified only changes in the behavior or roles of women as threatening the (Muslim) territorial nation. The past or established situation of Egyptian women was one cause contributing to the Egyptian nation’s backwardness. One 1903 front-page al-Liwa’ article "What Must be Done by a Nation that has Lacked the School of the Mother?" blamed the lack of education of many mothers as responsible for their transmission of grotesque superstition, cowardice, servility, cruelty, hatred for education and other anti-social behavior, and moral and intellectual damage to their children 71. This article is aware of a new age and that modernization required sharp breaks with features of traditional Egyptian society. The 1903 article carried forward Qasim Amin’s 1899 argument that the relations of mother with child are a main source of the social virtues, that the virtues which exist in the family will exist in the

70. Sayyid 'Ali, "al-Haya'u wal-'Iffah Yastaghithani min Tabarruj al-Ghaniyat" (Shame and Chastity Cry Out for Rescue Before the Unveiledness of the Fair Young Women) in al-Liwa’ 17 May 1908, p. 5. My analysis of this and the other al-Liwa’ articles on women’s issues owes much to two sessions of discussion in 1981 with Ms Pam Doherty, an Arabic graduate of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Melbourne University who has done historical research in Egypt and Jordan. She identified these items’ incorporation of patterns from the West European bourgeois family within assertion of Islamic puritanism, a key aspect I had not noticed.

71. "Madha Yajibu 'ala Ummatin Faqadat Madrasat al-Umm?" (What must be Done by a Nation that has Lacked the School of the Mother?) al-Liwa’, 17 August 1903.
nation, and that Muslim countries are decaying and backward because neither women nor men are educated to create a real family life.\textsuperscript{72}

Kamil's own pronouncements on women sometimes were like moderately West-influenced liberal writers of the later \textit{al-Jaridah} or the less post-religious liberal Arab nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s, in adjusting a cherished Islam to the central European patterns. In a second category of communications, though, he evoked incongruent sectors of Islam almost with relish, to contrast the national collectivity against the West. In the first mode, Kamil spoke for his small acculturated Muslim elite, and its adjusted ethos, when he observed that "all the educated people in Egypt hate polygamy": the Qur'an had required husbands to treat any plural wives with complete equality in order to prevent "custom from distorting heavenly religion" --- heading for the standard interpretation of Arab (eg. Jaridist) and Indian acculturated-liberal Islam that Qur'an 4:3 recommended monogamy. (Yet Kamil was as aggressive as defensive towards the Westerners who repatterned him --- the Christians permitted themselves in the name of romantic passion the polygamy that the Muslims permitted with Islam). Was Emancipation of Women so needed in Islamic countries in which the Qur'an urged believers to respect and obey their mothers?\textsuperscript{73} Women had to be given extensive education so that they could skilfully inculcate nationalism in their children. In his somewhat more integralist Islamic mode, however, Kamil warned that unadapted Western or Western-style education might influence Egyptian women who received it to repudiate the veil etc and therein posed "a great danger to the future of the nation". The significant point, though, is that in affirming the distinctness of Egypt's social patterns in respect to women from the modern West, he closely identifies the authenticity of the Egyptian "nation" with the wider non-Western communities of a general Islamic "civilization", the world's Muslims, "the East". Kamil in 1899 founded the distinct personality of the Egyptian nation threatened by importation of West European female education, upon a separate non-Western civilization (madaniyyah) irreconcilable in areas with the West's:

Every nation has its own civilization. It would not become us to be apes blindly imitating foreigners. We must preserve our good virtues and take from the West only its virtues.

Kamil described the veil as "a protection from sin" (\textit{ismah}) in the East and advised his

\textsuperscript{72} Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age p. 164.
\textsuperscript{73} 'Isa, "Mustafa Kamil Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" pp. 112-113.
Cairo audience to accordingly maintain their wives and daughters in it\textsuperscript{74}.

The regulation of the relations between the sexes is a singularly sensitive and intimate aspect of any society and in any individual’s psyche. This area instanced the deep influence of the modern West on dual-cultured nationalists of Kamil’s type, his tenseness towards Westerners as he acknowledged their impact, and his compensating impulse to sectionally differentiate Egypt from them with Islam. He strove to reconstruct and unify Western and Islamic concepts in the context of dialogue with such French friends as Juliette Adam, who came to accept Islamic and Egyptian theory and treatment of women as better than their subordination under French custom and law\textsuperscript{75}. The comparative statuses of women in the West and Islam/"the East" continued as a spiritually violent front of reaction by such France-educated Egyptian intellectuals as Tawfiq al-Hakim against the West into the 1950s (B 470 - 471).

\textit{In Parochial Partisan Politics}

In one (admittedly very factional) context, Kamil in violent language denied the right of a woman to choose a marriage partner against her father’s wishes. He took the lead of the hostile campaign that his al-Liwa’ waged against the 1904 marriage of al-Mu’ayyad’s now pro-British editor Shaykh ’Ali Yusuf to the daughter of the Shaykh al-Sadat (a head of the descendants of the Prophet in Egypt) against her father’s wishes. "The Khedive supported the marriage although it scandalized Egyptian Muslim public opinion", Kamil publicly breaking with the Khedive on the issue\textsuperscript{76}.

At issue in the savage denunciations by Kamil and colleagues of this marriage is the extent to which traditionalism continued to exert a hold over their emotions, thoughts and actions in despite of their massive exposure to Western-type education. The left-Arabist Salah ’Isa describes the case as presenting two fundamental and far-reaching issues to Egyptian society:

1. Whether an adult sane (rashidah) woman had the right to marry herself under Islamic Law to someone she chose and who chose her regardless of her guardians’ opposition.

2. Whether social standing derived from inherited (DW:extra-Egyptian, Arabian) lineage

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid
\textsuperscript{76} Goldschmidt, "Egyptian National Party" p. 319.
or from an individual’s efforts to raise himself and serve his homeland\(^77\).

Goldschmidt characterized that Kamil’s sensitivity as a politician to public opinion, overwhelmingly hostile to 'Ali Yusuf’s marriage, decisively led him to oppose the match\(^78\). In trying to explain away the non-modernity of Kamil’s hostile reaction, Salah 'Isa stresses Kamil’s ideological-political conflict as an anti-imperialist patriot with 'Ali Yusuf as the latter accommodated himself (with the Khedive) to British power in Egypt following the 1904 Entente Cordiale\(^79\). Another factor was the journalistic-professional rivalry that had gradually developed between the younger Mustafa Kamil and the older Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf. The Shaykh’s \textit{al-Mu’ayyad} had provided the pan-Islamic forum for Muslim Egyptian aspirations when Kamil launched his nationalist career in the 1890s. Long dependent on \textit{al-Mu’ayyad}’s columns to reach Egyptians, Kamil in 1900 launched his own \textit{al-Liwa’}, making himself a newspaper proprietor comparable to Shaykh 'Ali\(^80\).

We now directly analyze communications from Kamil’s movement on the relationship between the Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf and the Shaykh al-Sadat's daughter. Mustafa Kamil’s first savage article from Devon titled "From Scandal to Scandal" vented long-standing personal dislike of 'Ali Yusuf. Yet the denunciation entailed emotionalist exaltation of an independent Islamic social order out of any control from the broader Westernizing outlook and aims some ascribe to Kamil and his acculturated colleagues:

> Which of the two is better: a man of us unpredictable in his principles who makes a mockery of Holy Law (\textit{yaskharu min al-shai‘ah}) and customs and ethics and morals and makes a trade of personal abuse or a foreigner to us proclaiming open hostility against us

\(^77\) 'Isa, "Mustafa Kamil...", p. 114.
\(^78\) Goldschmidt, "Egyptian National Party" p. 319.
\(^79\) 'Isa, "Mustafa Kamil..." p. 114.
\(^80\) 'Ali Yusuf was the pioneer of native Egyptian political journalism and pan-Islamism who founded \textit{al-Mu’ayyad} in 1889 to voice Egyptian and pan-Islamic views at a time when Syrian Christian editors almost monopolized the Arabic press. Tignor, \textit{British Colonial Rule} pp. 152 - 153; P.J. Vatikiotis, \textit{The History of Egypt from Muhammad 'Ali to Sadat} (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1980) pp. 202-204, 228-229. 'Ali Yusuf was a supporter of the Khedive as was the much younger Kamil for a time; for a jaundiced account of Yusuf’s participation in the Khedive’s promotion of Arab proto-nationalism in Ottoman West Asia, his increased accommodation to the British along with his royal patron, and of the evolution of Kamil’s initially dependent relationship with him see \textit{Awrak Muhammad Farid} v. 1 (al-Hay’at al-Misriyat al-‘Ammah lil-Kitab 1978) pp. 122-123. In fairness to Shaykh 'Ali, he refused to share some of the Khedive’s enemies; "although ... not in sympathy with 'Abduh’s progressive religious philosophy, he was never the bitter personal enemy of the man that 'Abbas became. Indeed, he tried to reconcile the two, and remained on good terms with such friends of the Mufti as Hasan ‘Asim and Sa‘d Zaghlul". Aroian, \textit{Dar al-‘Ulum} p. 500. The Shaykh 'Ali of course let 'Abduh use \textit{al-Mu’ayyad} as a forum to conduct his fierce 1900 polemic against French Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux.
in weal or woe? .... Should not disobedience by daughters against their fathers be considered destruction for the Family ... and obliteration of the influence that the purified Shari'ah Law has on people’s souls? 

At the least, this outburst by Kamil would again constitute his recognition as a percipient politician of the continued attachment felt by his Muslim student and white-collar professional constituency and the press’ general literate readership, to Islamic Law (shari’ah) insofar as it would regulate roles and relations of the sexes.

The Kamilists’ denunciation of Shaykh ’Ali Yusuf’s match in terms of Islamic religion and law put further strain on relations between Muslims and Copts whom Kamil’s movement was supposed to integrate in a united Egyptian national struggle. The somewhat pro-Occupation Coptic al-Watan felt obliged to defend ’Ali Yusuf on this occasion also, although with at least verbal expression of diffidence because Islam and Islamic law were supposedly involved. al-Liwa’ in reply described the Christian newspaper as disrespectful of Islam, as “wounding the feeling of the masses and elite of the Muslims” and denied al-Watan’s right to examine the testimony of witnesses that preceded the Shar‘i Court’s decision against ’Ali Yusuf. Mustafa Kamil’s followers on al-Liwa’ were thus, even during his lifetime, prepared to pursue and develop the Islamic religious terms of the attack upon Shaykh ’Ali Yusuf where that accentuated the sense of difference between Coptic and Muslim Egyptians, to detriment of multi-sectarian territorial Egyptian nation-building.

The above responses by Kamil and his followers to issues involving male-female relations ran against simple Westernization or a pure secular bi-sectarian territorial nationalism. The input from a spasmodic and politically selective classical Islam, here, again underscores that the Kamilists were not a simple Westernized or Westernizing but dual-cultured decolonization movement. With the blending typical of acculturation, the Kamilists adapted to West Europe’s monogamous ethos but synthesized radical Islamic restorationism with the close-knit West European bourgeois-urban nuclear family. The new family as the basic cell of the territorial nation, and their discussions of inter-sex issues, alike resistently focused classical Arabic and classical Islam as definants of the political community.

Acculturation As One Motive in Outreach

In appealing to France, in particular, to eject Britain, Kamil and similar intellectuals were measuring the strength of the international rivalry of these two powers. However, as secular lawyers they had been educated both in Egypt and France in French legal and political concepts, and in book-myths, that were highly formal and theoretical. Kamil mistook the extent to which appeal to these could further draw the French to confront Britain in the Nile Valley. Attaching Egypt’s need to the Enlightenment, he compared himself to Benjamin Franklin when he asked Voltaire to urge French aid for American independence. Fueling French rage over British pressure on French personnel and French in the School of Law and other Egyptian institutions, Kamil sometimes rather manipulatively fused France’s interests and Egyptian nationalism. Yet these cultural motifs were more than levers for Egypt’s interests: Kamil in his precocious, fast-adapting appeals also was testing out French conceptual structures installed by education in his --- and his proto-elite’s --- provisional personality. Would the French take back their liberalism and radicalism from Muslims as real coinage for new wider communities? (His elite was sure to swing sharply if the mentors of Progress rebuffed). Outreach was more than cultural naivety: independence via Europe would spare Kamil’s still fragile elite from having to ally with popular classes for a devastating direct showdown with Britain. Kamil in France sincerely praised the French as Egypt’s most important instructors in "civilization" before 1882 and probably did hope that they could become so again for the long term after evicting Britain. In a

84. In an early Nouvelle Revue article, Kamil welcomed British description of the Egyptian Nationalists as "the French party" as recognition "by our enemies" themselves that "our cause and that of France form but one". Kamil, "L’Absorption par l’Angleterre" p. 811. Similarly tongue-in-cheek for the long term, greatly though the Caisse hindered Cromer, may have been Kamil’s 1895 assurance to the French that Egyptians did not want, and never had, to manage their country’s finances other than under the "international institutions" set up by the powers for Egypt’s European creditors. Ibid p. 821.
85. Tignor argued that building up an anti-British movement at home would have meant going outside the narrow student and professional sectors supporting Kamil’s campaign for independence and that such "broadening of the nationalist movement implied concessions in Mustafa Kamil’s political, social and economic program to other groups, such as the urban proletariat". So long as hope of securing Britain’s evacuation from Egypt through pressure from (in particular) France remained, the Watani movement "preferred to take a try at the easier way of obtaining independence" by lobbying in Europe. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 268-269.
courteous but firm way, though, he made clear that his movement sought complete independence for Egypt. France had never tried to dominate Egypt before the British conquest, Arabic had been the medium of teaching in the schools and tertiary colleges Frenchmen helped set up under Muhammad 'Ali and Khedive Isma'il and was to become so again after the British, Britain was striving to abolish the mixed courts as a bar to its complete control but Kamil left little doubt that the Egyptian nationalists hoped Europe would dismantle them after independence. Kamil's vulnerability was --- would the French accept that the cultural affinities of his elite entitled Egypt to an equal alliance and independence?

Pan-Muslim Self-Identification Before West

From his earliest appeals for support to French audiences, Kamil identified himself, his independence movement and Egypt as Muslim and allied to the Ottoman State. He reiterated to his French audiences that the world's Muslims were a loose political community. This, and his constant characterization of Europeans as Christians, harked back to traditional Muslim habits of thought. The very young Kamil, though, wanted to synthesize the traditional wide Muslim community with new associations across religions imposed by the modern age. In 1895, he proposed, to the French public, an alliance of Turkey with Russia and France against England, which would check Britain's alleged encouragement of secessionist Christian movements to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Kamil's proposal amounted to an association of the two European powers with the world's 300,000,000 far-dispersed Muslims against "anti-Muslim" Britain. Support by France and Russia for "weak and humiliated Turkey" and Egypt's freedom from British rule would put the two European powers on "good terms with the Islamic world"

86. Ibid p. 812.
87. Kamil stressed that Arabic, "the national language of the country", was the medium of instruction in the numerous schools that Frenchmen helped establish from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. The British had ended Arabic's role as the language of instruction. Ibid p. 814. Kamil's French audiences would have understood that the nationalists' promotion of Arabic after independence would limit the scope of French while eliminating English.
88. Ibid p. 812.
89. As Wendell observed, "Kamil's annual banquets and speeches, generally given in Paris, on the anniversary of the Sultan's coronation, were ... not likely to convince anyone that he was not a loyal Ottoman subject and a supporter of the pan-Islamic ideology". Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 250. Kamil in 1897 was active in organizing appeals among Egyptians resident in France for the Ottoman war effort against the Greeks. Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kamil: Hayatuhu wa Kifahuhu (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Saadah 1958) p. 113. This despite Mme Adam's philo-Hellenism! Cf. fn 49.
and further "lasting reconciliation between Muslims and Christians"\(^90\). Addressing the French early in his career, Kamil evoked a new age of open, fluid relations between the Muslim and Christian worlds. He foresaw negative alliances by Muslims with European states against Britain’s imperialism and more long-term associations to realize non-religious "joint interests": yet Christianity and Islam would continue to sustain their two distinct political "worlds". Kamil rather vividly evoked to his French audience the capacity of religious emotions over distant external issues --- not local interests --- to inspire violent action by a Muslim population against Europeans. In Paris in 1895, he depicted India’s Muslims as ready to make the blood of their British masters flow and die themselves because clashes between distant Turks and Armenians seemed to them a British action against "the Caliphate"\(^91\).

Kamil's consistent affirmation down the years to European and Muslim audiences alike that Muslims were a "world", a far-flung religio-political community, argues that he always sincerely felt some pan-Islamic emotions.

The fortunes of the Ottoman Turks and those of the Egyptians would remain so connected that he had to promote both in Europe, he believed. His French communications sometimes were a thinking-aloud that strove to get an analytical grip on his region, rather than diplomatic images of it modulated to advance Egypt’s interests of that day. Kamil could even analyze the revered Caliphate in an alienated way as an instrument that, misapplied, could harm. The Ottoman Caliphate had on occasion undermined rather than heightened the Muslims’ resistance to British imperialism. Kamil thought that the Sultan 'Abdul-Majid’s disapproval at once quelled all resistance by India’s Muslims during the Rebellion of 1857 to the British, his Crimean allies\(^92\). Similarly, 'Abdul-Hamid’s declaration that 'Urabi Pasha was a rebel destroyed the will of Egypt’s soldiers to resist the British conquest\(^93\). Kamil characterized the Turks in unflattering terms as dupes of British diplomacy in the events of 1881 and 1882 through which Britain conquered Egypt\(^94\). He expressly condemned Turkish foreign policy which since the 1877-1878

\(^92\) Ibid p. 836.
\(^93\) Kamil, "Une Alliance qui s’Impose" p. 379.
\(^94\) Ibid pp. 378-381.
Russo-Turkish war aligned Turkey with Britain while isolating it from other European States. His French audiences must have noted Kamil's wariness of harm that the Ottoman State's conduct of its international relations might do to Egypt's national interests. Yet by already depicting Egypt's and the Turks' sovereignties as so interdependent, he could not be pursuing nationalism of an atomistic kind in international relations. Dislike of Turks had deep roots in French high culture. Kamil virulently denounced in La Nouvelle Revue those Christian subjects who challenged the authority of the Muslim Turks. Avoiding serious discussion of intercommunal relations in the Ottoman State or of Armenian nationalism, he instead presented the Armenians as an instrument of the British imperialists. Bearing British arms and the British flag, the Armenians were the aggressors who "provoked" or carried out the massacres throughout the Ottoman Empire. Kamil was aware of the "excited support" that they had won in Europe, he implied somewhat even in France and Russia with which he wanted the Ottoman State allied. He may, to some extent, have been right that Armenian nationalists sometimes did launch attacks against Muslims in the Ottoman

95. Ibid. pp. 377, 382. Kamil also had to accommodate to the specificities of the Anglophobia of his French supporters. When Kamil Pasha (1832-1913; Ottoman Grand Vezir 1885-1891, 1895, 1908-9 and 1912-1913) was again appointed to the Chief Vezirate in 1895, Juliette Adam described him as "l'homme de l'Angleterre". She depicted England and Germany, both detestable to her, as controlling many prominent Ottoman statesmen. Juliette Adam, "Lettres sur la Politique Exterieure", La Nouvelle Revue, 15 October 1895 p. 833.

96: See Clarence Dana Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature (1520-1660) (Paris: Boivin 1940). Mahomet the Conqueror's career drew from Philippe de Commynes an early instance of the Western stereotype of the shrewd, cruel and lascivious rulers of the Turks, dividing their time between wars of conquest and the luxury of the seraglio: p. 27. There was "intense popular concern in France upon occasions of some especial menace of the Turks, as when public rejoicings followed Christian victories over the Turks at the Siege of Malta (1565) and the battle of Lepanto (1571), or when French armies were helping to repulse the Turks in Hungary (1593-1601). Ibid p. 357. Francis I took pains to disguise and deny his alliance with Sulayman --- proof enough of strong hostile opinion in France against the Turks. Ibid.

97. In an 1895 letter from Paris, Kamil was inclined to seek lessons and organizational patterns for Egypt's independence movement from the "Eastern" (sic) Armenians' activism. But he also described the Armenians as having "no right entitling them to win their demands whereas your [the Egyptians'] rights are the greatest of rights". 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil Pasha fi 34 Rabi'an v. 3. p. 65. However, there was a basis in the demographic realities for the refusal of the acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals to consider the Armenians' claims for independence. H.G. Hogarth pointed out that there was no "geographical unit of the Ottoman [Empire] in which Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of Angora, Sivas, Erzeroum, Kharput, and Van, i.e. in easternmost Asia Minor, than elsewhere, ... they are consistently a minority in any large administrative district". Where, then, was it possible to constitute an autonomous Armenia? Quoted Sir J.A.R. Marriott, Europe and Beyond: A Preliminary Survey of World Politics in the Last Half Century, 1870-1920 (London: Methuen 1933) p. 253. Juliette Adam had already foreseen the demographic impossibility of an Armenian state: La Nouvelle Revue January-February 1895 p. 413. There were about 1,500,000 Armenians in the Ottoman Empire around the end of the nineteenth century, and 1,000,000 under Russian rule. Art. "Armenia", ER 10th ed. v. xxv. p. 637. The populations of Armenians ruled by Tsarist Russia had some importance for Kamilist journalism. These inhabited Karabakh (incorporated from the Ottoman Empire in 1813), Erevan and Nakhichevan (taken from the Ottomans in 1828) and Kars (conquered from the Ottomans in 1878).
Empire in the 1890s, triggering off some bloody reprisals --- although to manipulate the British more often than the other way around.\(^{99}\)

The French Anglophobes with whom Kamil had linked had little hostility left over for Muslims and Turks, but this was already a preliminary fault-line between them and the Egyptian nationalists. In remarks preceding Kamil’s very first article in *La Nouvelle Revue* Juliette Adam, while accusing Britain of fostering the Armenians’ “Christian fanaticism”, warned the Sublime Porte that "the massacres must stop, Muslim fanaticism must be brought under control at all costs".\(^{100}\) Henry Spont observed in *La Nouvelle Revue* after a 1903 tour of complex, strife-torn Ottoman Macedonia that French public opinion “favors the Bulgars although it knows nothing about them” because "they are Christians and that suffices" --- anti-Muslim phobia throughout Europe of which the Kamilists were ultra-conscious by then.\(^{101}\) Kamil’s readiness to identify himself and Egypt’s independence movement with a not particularly popular Turkey in France/Europe does attest to his pan-Islamic impulse. When discussing the Armenian question to his French (Christian) audience Kamil --- quite oblivious to the Copts’ existence, here, --- spoke of Egyptians only as an Islamic community.

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98. Kamil’s accounts varied somewhat. Armenians, armed with British weapons and bearing the British flag, "provoked" massacres in the Ottoman capital itself. “L’Angleterre et l’Islam”, loc. cit. p. 836. Or "Armenians disguised as Muslims, even 'ulama', with arms furnished by the English [committed] all the excesses and massacres, to sow ruin and death in all the Empire, then win as the prize of their misdeeds so much aroused (excited) support! France and Russia themselves had to intervene". “Une Alliance qui s’Impose” pp. 376-377. Cf. findings that Armenian nationalists provoked the communal clashes to involve the Powers, in Jeremy Salt, *Britain and the Cause of Ottoman Reform 1876-1896*, Australian Middle East Studies Association Working Paper 8 (August 1986) pp. 17-18 and passim.

99. Elie Kedourie argues from official British documents of the time that Armenian nationalists in the 1880s and 1890s mounted armed attacks on Muslims with the deliberate intention to provoke maximum Turkish violence against their own Armenian communities. The “clear” aim of Armenian nationalists in such organizations as the Dashnakzoution (Armenian Revolutionary Federation established in 1890) “was to create ‘incidents’, provoke the Turks to excesses and thereby bring about the intervention of the Powers” --- who would force the Turks to grant autonomy (ultimately independence) to the Armenians. Armenian committees in Erzerum were procuring arms for revolt as early as 1882. Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Essays* (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970) p. 295. Kedourie, a Jewish Iraqi scholar by ethnic origin, opposed all Middle East nationalisms. Cf. Salt, *op. cit.*


101. Henry Spont, "A Travers La Macedoine", *La Nouvelle Revue* 1 May 1903 p. 52. An article titled "al-Mas’alat al-Maqduniyyah" (The Macedonian Question), *al-Liwa’* 16 February 1903, noted that hatred of Turkey had reached a peak in general Europe. Gladstone in 1876 had promoted press campaigns to whip up feeling over Bulgarian massacres as an excuse to dismember the Ottoman Empire. But even if a major European newspaper took Turkey’s side now, "the policy of the [European] States toward her would not change for a single instant". Turkey had no one to help her in Europe: she could rely only on the sword she had in her hand and on her brave troops.
Their acquired French culture conditioned the bilingual Kamilists to seek humane relations with a true liberal Europe, against an unreprentatively predatory Britain. Egyptian interests further fostered selective perception of Europe. Kamil's call that "the Sultan take the hand of Russia and France" ignored --- only for the time --- the fate of extensive Muslim populations in Central Asia under Russian rule and of the North African and sub-Saharan Muslim populations conquered, or being conquered, by France. Continuous interaction with French culture and France was to confront such anti-imperialist Egyptian intellectuals as Kamil and especially Muhammad Farid with French colonialism in Algeria in particular (Chs. 4 and 5). Seeking France and Russia's help to dislodge Britain, the anti-colonialist Egyptian intellectuals may even in this initial phase have felt, but repressed, reservations about French and Russian colonization of Muslims.

Kamil's presentation of himself to the French as the spokesman of a wider pan-Muslim political community as well as of Egypt was consistent throughout his whole nationalist career. In one plain-spoken 1903 Le Figaro article, he introduced himself as a link of communication between two civilizations, "the brilliant, immortal [Islamic] civilization" and that of the West: "he who addresses [Frenchmen] now is a Muslim Egyptian who yet received his education from French professors and is inclined with all his soul to promote conjunction and lasting peace between Muslims and Christians". France had not yet signed the Entente Cordiale, but Kamil by 1903 voiced a depressed awareness of how far the educated French public shared a general European distaste for Muslims and of France as a participant in imperialist conquests and colonialism. It was "a false charge" that the Muslims hate "the contemporary sciences" and "modern civilization"; "if the Muslims hate Europe and its civilization and everything that comes from it, that is only because it ... robbed them of their independence". Kamil was thus consistent over a decade that dual culture emotionally pushed him and his small elite to seek an alliance with Europe: but the colonialist drive of European powers, including France, against

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Muslims had ignited a popular fury against everything at all linked to the West that jeopardized even internal modernization by West-orientated Muslim elites like his own. (Haykal and the Liberal Constitutionalists in the 1920s, but especially after 1945 as the West imposed Israel, had some parallel perceptions: Britain and other Western states were not adequately rewarding acculturated incrementalists who wanted to move to equal alliances --- indeed, in inflicting Israel, they ignited fundamentalism likely to destroy the dual-cultured elite: B 133 - 135; B 203 - 209).

Circumstances of international politics and Egypt’s interests cannot wholly explicate the Watani intellectuals’ statements that general Europe did not mean harm to the Ottoman State. Years after hopes for alliance with European states to dislodge Britain from Egypt faded, Kamilist intellectuals occasionally felt an urge to deny that general Europe was hostile against the Ottoman State and the world’s Muslims. As late as April 1908 Sayyid ‘Ali in al-Liwa’ tried to counter the impression that a range of European States were pursuing policies detrimental to "our Ottoman State". He advised his Egyptian readers "to look for the English hand in the troubles of the Ottoman State": it was England that incited "the States of Europe to draw the sword of enmity in the Ottoman State’s face". "Were we to scrutinize every event in which a State among the States has appeared as hostile to the Caliph we would find that it was the English hand which ignited the fire from behind a screen". Sayyid ‘Ali’s argument might pragmatically concentrate Egyptians’ hatred of the imperialist, Christian West against the British enemy who had to be dislodged from Egypt’s chest (internal mobilization). But we view his argument that general Europe was fundamentally benign towards the Islamic Ottoman State as also determined by culture. It was Sayyid ‘Ali’s private French self-bilingualization and continuing interactions with France that made him psychologically unwilling to credit the reality that most Europeans disliked Muslims and that this had to affect the policies of their governments to the Ottoman State.

105. Sayyid ‘Ali (1880-1932) after secondary school studies worked as a translator in al-Liwa’. He studied at Cairo’s French Law School. When Mustafa Kamil established L’Etendard Egyptien (March 1907) he appointed Sayyid ‘Ali to translate excerpts from the Arabic press into French for publication, and in 1907 sent him as a correspondent of al-Liwa’ to Paris. I am grateful to Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. of the University of Pennsylvania for supplying me with this biodata on Sayyid ‘Ali.
Early Kamilist outreach to Europe was not too expedient. Kamil’s frank discussions to the French were clearly not meant to appease the Ottoman State, which did have legal title to endorse Britain in Egypt: he rather was feeling for a complex, long-term alignment of Egypt, the Ottoman State and France-Europe strenuously built to last. To both French/European and Egyptian audiences, Kamil long presented himself as representing the chain of acculturated elites modernizing the Muslim world. Conditioned by Arabic, he defined the extensively laicist French more as Christian (and Egypt more as Muslim) than he need have. His earlier impression that French culture could tolerate alliance with a Muslim camp and his later one that France was a component in a Christian camp subjugating Muslims both heightened his consciousness of a wide pan-Muslim political community.

**Acculturation Could Also Alienate From Other Muslims**

Kamil’s early stress to European audiences on Egypt’s achieved or prospective Europeanization was more than manipulation. Connected with self-image in his suggestions that Egypt might become a conduit or intermediary for French/European culture and interests to flow to still-traditional Muslim peoples, this was a cultures-determined identification. It will recur at intervals whether appropriate to the political situations these intellectuals face, or not.

Throughout all the shifts of his attitudes to other Muslims and Westerners, Kamil remained consistent that a Europe-derived facet was central to his elite. Statements by Kamil in 1895 (Paris) and 1906 (to the English) voiced with consistency these intellectuals’ acculturation-created marginality between (a) the general xenophobic Islamic and Afro-Asian world and (b) the colonizing West. In 1895, he warned *La Nouvelle Revue*’s readers that around half of the world’s Muslims believed in the “systematic hostility” of general Europe against Islam: in contrast, he represented that “small minority” of “old students of France” now struggling to draw a xenophobic Muslim world into alliance and collaboration with the European states (minus Britain)\(^\text{106}\). In 1906, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey justified the Dinshawai executions as a response to fanaticism spreading along all northern Africa. Denying in a 1906 interview to the *Daily Chronicle* that Egypt’s Muslims were “fanatical” against Christians or would politically reamalgamate an independent Egypt in the Islamic Ottoman State

\(^{106}\) *Un Alliance qui s’impose* p. 377.
Kamil observed

We have taken great pride in our schools and in our intellectual movement ... since the days of Muhammad 'Ali because the Egyptian nation is the first Islamic nation to embrace the European civilization. However, it seems to us now that the English look upon us as though we were the natives of the Congo! It is well known that our young men used to be sent from a century back to France and Germany and England to receive their education ... in those countries' institutions. The result is that we Egyptians now enjoy a higher education in no wise less than that available in the greatest of the European countries. It is an error, then, that we be compared to Morocco or to the natives of Lake Chad as the majority of the English compare us.

He was at risk here of internalizing “civilizing mission” motifs, with which France would justify her conquest of Morocco and of (partly Muslim) black West African populations (Lake Chad, Zinder), motifs with which the Belgians rationalized their ravaging of the Congo. Unconsciously, Kamil was undermining political solidarity by Egyptians with major Arab and African populations resisting colonization. His humiliation as an acculturated that Britishers should associate Egyptians, perceived by him as widely European-educated, with Morocco voiced scant regard in this particular context for unmixed traditional Arab-Islamic culture, which Morocco had. Indeed, Kamil bracketed traditional-literate Islamic Morocco with the non-literate (if until recently Arab-influenced) animist Congo.

Kamil conceived the black African populations with which he refused to identify Egypt in London in 1906 as to a great extent Muslim. Those around Lake Chad (Central Africa) and in Zinder (West Africa) mentioned by him included many Muslims with some Arabic literacy. Kamil in England specifically connected rejection of sub-Saharan black Africans of Lake Chad and Zinder to his rejection of traditional Islamic “fanaticism” which fostered hostile acts against Europeans merely because they were non-Muslim:

No ... Egypt is not at all fanatical, and it would be truly bad faith to compare it to Chad, tc


108. France’s conquest of Morocco was progressing when Kamil gave his 1906 London interview. In 1902 the young modernizing Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz was forced to recognize French authority in the Tuat region of the central Sahara. In 1903, the French occupied Colommb, and in 1904 Berguent, on the Algerian frontier. In 1904 England had given France a free hand to conquer Morocco in return for France’s recognition of the permanency of British rule in Egypt. In 1912, Sultan 'Abd al-Hafiz signed the Treaty of Fez, establishing a French Protectorate over the whole country. Juliette Adam's own Nouvelle Revue published a racist article by Albert de Pouvourville in 1904 anticipating the extinction of Algeria’s Arabs. The article envisaged Morocco as one of the “successive annexes” of future French expansion from Algeria. Albert de Pouvourville, "Peuplement Rationnel de l’Afrique du Nord", La Nouvelle Revue 15 September 1904 pp. 147, 148, 153.
Zinder and to other lands sunk in the worst darkness of ignorance 109.

Kamil’s 1906 outburst at British application of anti-Islamic stereotypes against Egyptian nationalism brought out that he sometimes somewhat shared their view of the overall Muslim world. He empathized why most Muslims felt as they did about Westerners but Egypt’s Europe-derived facet could never fit into insularist Muslim societies, whether pre-colonial or those reacting against colonial rule. Kamil even implied that the Ottoman state had progressed less on the spectrum away from those purist Muslim societies than Egypt: he felt some alienation in respect to modernization from the Turks, also. In this type of spasm, he wanted to limit Egypt’s reintegration with the Ottoman Turks and certainly with pre-modern Muslim societies whose xenophobia clashed with the acculturative functions of his class. He wanted to direct some time and energy away from other Muslims into building new relationships with Western societies.

Gradual Equation of all Europeans as Fanatical Against Muslims

Not always facile or slick, Kamil made clear to Europeans that he was working for a new extension of relationship not just between Egypt and France but between an array of Muslim and European communities. The compound architecture could fail and could endanger his elite. New secular nexuses between Muslims and Europeans --- common interests, liberal-progressive ideology, French culture --- initially subordinated, but for Kamil never eliminated, Islamic and Christian impulses and identities. There was little reason why he had to raise Armenians and Turks at all in France from the angle of Egypt’s narrow interest: yet Kamil thought the new energies and bases for relationship that had opened in the European mind gave him leeway to address points of Muslim-Christian antagonism. He was banking that most Europeans were unfired by the anti-Islamism that Britain whipped up, that there was religiously neutral liberalism as well as imperialists in Europe.

He early had doubts that the British might not be so unrepresentative. To a French

109. Mustafa Kamil’s press conference on 26 July 1906 at Carlton Hotel, London, in Juliette Adam, L’Angleterre en Égypt p. 161. In denying that Europe-dyed Egypt was “fanatical” like pre-modern Morocco etc., Kamil was refuting British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. In order to justify the executions of peasants at Dinshaway, Grey rambled in Parliament that “all this year a fanatical feeling in Egypt has been on the increase. It has not been confined to Egypt, it has been stretching along the north of Africa generally. It is for that reason a little time ago that the garrison had to be increased”. The Times 6 July 1906 p. 7c.
audience in 1895 Kamil made the barbed observation that "the European powers have seized the countries of the Orient under the pretext of civilizing them". But "Egypt has been civilized" (had Europeanized itself of its own will) "without having to be subjected to any power" (force -- puissance). There was incipient scepticism here about the motives of most Europeans in international relations. Stronger, though, is Kamil's hope that Europe will treat Egypt, because it had modernized itself, differently from non-self-modernizing peoples it colonized. Europe should free Egypt, given its record of self-modernization, "to prove that Europe works disinterestedly for the happiness of all men" 110.

Differences of religion and race were possible barriers to sympathy from Europeans. Already in 1895 Kamil sensed a racial orientation in the French whom he addressed. Appealing for Europe's aid to free Egypt from British rule, he rhetorically asked whether the same rights did not apply to the man of Africa as to the man of Europe 111? Kamil ultimately came to consider Western religious hostility to Islam the reason why Europeans refused to treat the Muslim Egyptians as they treated other Europeans. In his initial optimistic appeals to Europe, however, he obviously thought prejudices against Islam secondary in the personality of the French: he would not otherwise have repeatedly mentioned Egypt's Muslimness.

He had, of course, been aware that British politicians took account of the Islam of Egyptians. As Prime Minister, the Liberal leader Gladstone presided over Britain's conquest of Egypt in 1882. Yet, as Kamil grew to manhood, Gladstone in violent language demanded autonomy or independence for Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. Kamil at first thought in terms of nations forming relations across religious lines as interests dictated, but then circumstances entangled Egypt's independence with European pan-Christianism and conflicts between Muslims and Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire, in his mind. Kamil in 1896, in two letters, asked Gladstone to call for British evacuation from Egypt. But Gladstone, who had recently championed the rights of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, did not raise his voice for the liberation of Egypt. Steppat presents this incident as a turning-point in Kamil's attitude to the general West, rather than to Britain alone. Gladstone's contrasting attitudes to

110. "L'Absorption par l'Angleterre" p. 822. Kamil's choice of words associated British imperialism and that of the other European countries whose aid he sought (France in the first place). The European countries "se son emparees de" (have seized) the countries of the Orient. Britain's great aim was "s'emparer definitivement de l'Egypte". Ibid. p. 820.

Christian Armenians and (predominantly) Muslim Egyptians opened up a chasm between the Christian West and the Muslim Orient in the young Kamil's mind, and he generalized from the individual Gladstone's inconsistency that a religious fanaticism was the driving force of general European politics.\footnote{112. Steppat, Nationalismus p. 307-308.}

Kamil had been already hostile to Gladstone in his communications to the French in the previous year, in which he identified him as incarnating British forces acting from Christian drives against Muslims, especially "les Turcs" and the Egyptians. Kamil vitriolically assailed Gladstone’s pretensions to "have only humanity in view", to "have no bias against the Turks", to be "the liberal man".\footnote{113. "L’Angleterre et l’Islam" p. 836.} The British distorted Europe’s secular humanitarianism to cloak their anti-Muslim expansionist drive. Could they thereby corrupt even the French, whose aid Kamil sought? Even in 1895, he had a stab of apprehension. He characterized Britain as endeavoring to create "a profound abyss between Islam and Christianity in its own interest and only in its own interest".\footnote{114. "L’Absorption par l’Angleterre" pp. 821-822; “L’Angleterre et l’Islam" pp. 836-837.} Kamil defensively mentioned to the French alleged British charges that Egyptians opposed the Occupation out of religious fanaticism: he probably feared that such British charges might activate Christian anti-Muslim feelings in even the more secularized French and other Europeans --- making them legalize British control. He sometimes revealed considerable apprehension that any incident could involve France in joint political action with Britain against Muslim interests. Thus, he tried to convince French readers that Britain organized "the disturbance at Jeddah in which were wounded the consuls of England" (sic) "of Russia and of France", to involve the two latter powers more deeply in Ottoman Armenia.\footnote{115. “L’Absorption par l’Angleterre" pp. 821-822; “L’Angleterre et l’Islam" pp. 836-837.}

At the time of the early 1895 appeals to Europe, Kamil wanted to believe that "there is no prejudice against Islam" in general Europe. France and Russia had intervened in the Armenian question as mediators, not like Britain as the Ottoman State’s enemy.\footnote{116. "L’Angleterre et l’Islam" p. 837.} Kamil’s Arabic

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\textbf{112. Steppat, Nationalismus p. 307-308.} Kamil saw the Armenian Nubar Pasha, at various times Egypt’s Foreign Affairs minister and Prime Minister under the British, as collaborating with them in the expectation that they might help his people carve an independent homeland out in the Ottoman Empire. The young Kamil’s sense that Armenians were collaborative "interlopers" (dakhala’) comparable to certain subsidized SCs was fueled by praise of Nubar by Colonel Baring, brother of Cromer, with whom Kamil conversed on a steamer en route to Paris for a lobbying session. Letter by Kamil to Khedivial official Ahmad Shafiq Pasha, cited Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu’asir (Bayrut: 2 vols Dar al-lrshad 1970) v. 1 pp. 222 - 223.
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\textbf{114. “Une Alliance que s’Impose” p. 377.}
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\textbf{117. “Une Alliance qui s’Impose” p.377. Yet Russia always was much more manipulative than Britain, and}
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speeches suggest that his interactions with Europe very quickly convinced him that Europeans in general were religiously hostile to Ottoman Turks: this sharpening perception worked to alienate him from non-British Europeans quite independently of their attitudes to Egypt’s independence. Kamil lost hope that European powers would intervene to expel Britain from the Nile Valley when Britain intimidated France to back down at Fashoda in 1898. Even in the previous year, though, he was speaking of the European states in general as hostile to the Ottoman State out of animosity to Muslims in general. Resident foreigners criticized Egyptians for sending aid to the Ottoman State in the 1897 - 1898 Greco-Turkish War. In a speech of 7 June 1897, he replied:

From the religious viewpoint no intelligent person could blame Egypt for the aid she gives to the Khilafah (Caliphate), for the governments of Europe have openly proclaimed that the basis of their policy in the East is to assist Christians by all means. This is a principle to which they have clung tenaciously and carried far.\(^{118}\)

Kamil in that speech did not name France, which claimed to protect Ottoman Syria and 'Iraq’s Catholics, and sought a special status in Syria\(^ {119}\). Even at that rather early date, however, he clearly perceived that religious sectarianism determined the foreign policies of the European states in the Muslim East: they were banding together to harm the Muslims’ interests. Responding in self-defence, Muslims were banding together on the international stage on a basis of shared religion as well as shared interests. Two hostile religious international blocs were forming. The situation is becoming like the classical dar al-Harb vs dar al-Islam paradigm. Kamil’s recent dream of secular alliances between Muslim nations and Christian European states was already collapsing.

The most secular Western concepts may have pulled the very young Kamil towards the attitude that religions need not define either atomistic nations or their international relations at all. His and his colleagues’ pan-Islamism, though, is not to be viewed narrowly as a resurgence of Arabo-Islamic cultural survivals (that culture, anyway, always remained vital under pounding and resource-starvation) when Europe’s anti-Muslimism so strongly worked to pan-Islamize the

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\(^{118}\) Rashad, Mustafa Kamil, p. 116.

\(^{119}\) Steppat, Nationalismus pp. 309-310, cites Kamil’s awareness of competition between the European powers to take over the Holy Cities of Palestine. This would cover French ambitions in Syria.
Egyptians in most contact. The anti-Muslim texture of French high culture trickled over into the conceptualization of international affairs by the journalistic and political opinion leaders whom Kamil had to draw into support for Egypt’s independence. The anti-Islamic phobia many Europeans had against the Turks constantly jarred his nerves as he propagandized for Muslim Egypt, uphill enough a venture in itself. Kamil cited solidarity with Armenians and Bulgars by such British Christianist Turcophobes as Gladstone to bring home to Europeans how normally Europeanoid was his own movement’s symmetrical --- but similarly limited --- counter-solidarity with the Turks. But it was the French opinion to which he opened himself with least reservations, that showed how pervasively Christianity defined European nations both internally and in world affairs. Kamil repeatedly encountered in France anti-Semitism sparked by the drawn-out Dreyfus affair, which dragged on from 1894 through 1906: such mainly French anti-Semitism was one more phenomenon driving home to him that "religious fanaticism" was after all the fundamental force in European politics.

Given their cultural and emotional vulnerability during pre-1919 outreaches to Europeans, the incorrigible Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in all Western states had to bulk somewhat out of perspective for Kamil and other acculturated intellectuals. They did not, though, dream up these lethal heritages that mutated more than they guessed for post-Christian settings. Europe’s example could sectarianize as well as secularize the Egyptian polity and its

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120. Kamil’s London Chronicle interview, tsd “al-Sultan wal-Islam”, al-Liwa’ 28 July 1906 p. 1. If Gladstone could call the Armenians his “Christian Brothers”, the Egyptians had the same right to a parallel "inherent natural sympathy" for the Turkish cause. They would not, however, be reincorporating Egypt into the Ottoman Empire. Ibid. For the accusations of "fanaticism” that Kamil was answering from Sir Edward Grey, see fn 109.

121. Steppat, Nationalismus p. 310. Edouard Drumont, the anti-Semite who edited La Libre Parole and wrote La France Juive was one of the rightist literati to whom Mme Juliette Adam introduced Kamil and who helped open the pages of leading Paris newspapers to him. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party” loc. cit pp. 314-315. Drumont branded French Jews as disloyal in his newspaper following Captain Dreyfus’ conviction for treason in 1894. Drumont’s paper was among a few far-right organs that kept up attacks on Britain in Egypt after the Entente Cordiale detached mainstream French conservatives from Egyptian nationalism. Aric, "Juliette Adam” pp. 135-6. Kamil, though, at last let slip what he thought of such continental elements at a 1906 press conference in London. Egyptians were not religiously fanatical (as Sir Edward Grey was charging), he told the British --- "it is impossible that there could exist in Egypt parties like the anti-Semitic parties or the extreme political parties or the religious parties found in Europe now”. London Daily Chronicle interview translated in "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan and Islam), al-Liwa’ 28 July, 1906, p. 1. This stance was traditional among Egyptian pan-Islamists: 'Abdallah al-Nadim’s paper had argued that eruptions by Russians against Jews showed Europe’s Enlightenment and philosophers had not overcome the persecutory fanaticism almost inherent in its brand of Christianity. "La Ikraha fil-Din” (No Compulsion in Religion), al-Ustadh 27 December 1892, pp. 442-443. For European anti-Semitism as a motif in acculturated Muslim Egyptian anti-Coptism at the close of the 1920s B 38-39. Cf. Stephen Wilson, Ideology and Experience: Anti-Semitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair (Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1982).
international relations: Haykal was to cite British restrictions on Jews to justify political limitations against Egyptian Christians at the end of the 1920s (B 38 - 39).

Assessment

The Kamilists were much more a movement of youth --- specifically, of that youth minority receiving the most Westernizing educations --- than was any other political current in British-ruled Egypt. The age-category of the bulk of members and followers, and the cultural deprivations amid which they grappled with two civilizations, had to entail some half-baked episodism. Yet, for all the gaps that the British enemies mocked, Kamil and his collaborators got a great body of data about both Islamic and Western civilization and societies across to an emerging, shaky Muslim Egyptian elite --- and were already often able to relate and interweave those two worlds. Egypt between 1882-1922 did not encounter either Britishers or British culture at their best and the Kamilists did not attempt some younger Jaridists' engagement with the purple poetry as well as thought of Britain and English-speaking America. Nonetheless, they gave at least French liberal secularoidism recurrent hearings and, in their lobbying outreach, recycled and tested it as the basis for a new equalized world order. Kamil and his colleagues could selectively highlight exactly those sectors of the Arabo-Islamic past of most use to focus current resistance to imperialism, but they did not concoct the slabs they presented. For many Muslim teenagers whom Dunlop otherwise could have cut off in his secular-stream schools, al-Liwa' offered continuous access to Islam and its classical Arab history --- as it did many busy professionals who read and heard mainly French and English in Alexandria and Cairo. Islam and the classical Arabs fitted vividly with the modern West in symbiosis or dichotomized, but the Kamilists need not have kept them that central. The British had phased standard Arabic out of modern institutions but the Kamilists would never leave it alone in the mosques to die. It could have made good sense for instantly mobilizing all classes of Egyptians had they orated or even written in the colloquial. Instead, al-Hizb al-Watani with never-ceasing classical-medium plays, mass oratory, indoor functions, lectures, anti-British poetry --- and an al-Liwa' each of whose 40,000 copies was read by and intoned to multiple individuals --- obliged at least educated Egyptians to daily follow standardizing pan-Arabic in their most topical concerns.

There were always some tensions between the Kamilists' Islamic-Arab and Western
components but at all stages they held the two in gradually-changing mixes. It was in regard to the allocation of roles between the sexes that Islam made Kamil and his colleagues (including Muhammad Farid\(^{122}\)) significantly diverge from even their France, yet we showed that the Liwa’ists’ ostensible restorationism was really a covert synthesis with West Europe’s urban bourgeois nuclear family. Outreaches to Europeans engaged the Watanists more deeply with Western secularoid ideologies. Yet, the very young Kamil made clear from the start to the French he courted that his aim was a completely independent Egypt with standard Arabic as its official and educational language: the French would have roles only as allies and advisers. From the outset, Kamil strove to build a lasting association with European states: accordingly, he urged, notably, the French to fit an adjusted relationship with the Ottoman Turks into the coming alliance with Egypt, given that relations with one of these two Muslim peoples entailed a relationship with the other. He sincerely, not diplomatically, admired a French language and thought that were a component of his and his colleagues’ psyche, and the early tensions in his outreach sprang less from Arabo-Islamic incongruence with more secularoid French liberalism and nationalism than from his doubts that the French or other Europeans would live up to the leeway for friendship with Muslims that their formal ideologies offered.

Their earlier exposure to modernist European thought and languages significantly alienated Kamil and his comrades from monocultural, traditional Muslim populations, Arab or black African. Later, their progressively heightening sense that Westerners and Muslims/Easterners were becoming two warring blocs was to make them feel more like Muslim populations (and Congolese) that had not self-Westernized with the resolve of Egypt since Muhammad ‘Ali. Nonetheless, their initial pursuit of the West permanently marked the Kamilists. They always kept their sense that Egypt and Muslims had to duplicate not just the West’s technologies and patterns of strength but its internal liberal-parliamentary order. The first thrust for independence of these Francophone secular lawyers had been water-tight legal briefs presented to the true Europe: and even after Gorst and Kitchener drove them out of Egypt, such al-Hizb al-Watani leaders as Muhammad Farid would remain very reluctant to take the road of

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122. In 1913, Muhammad Farid in his diaries rapped the defeatism of Rifa’at Pasha, Ottoman ambassador to Geneva, who accepted that “the Muslim Woman” in Turkey would have to give up the veil. Farid in contrast wanted women to be educated at all levels including the tertiary, but could not but “deeply disapprove any proposal to make the Muslim woman like the European woman in morals, after the moral corruption we see here [in Europe] among all classes as a result of free-mixing”. Farid, Awraq p. 118.
counter-terrorism. Their liberal Western culture and legal-professional functions and their class interests in tandem long delayed the uprising to which the class-broadening of the Party after Kamil was a preliminary. Yet, in so many ways, it had been the intimacies and broad-scatter courting of such a range of Europeans that pulled together Kamilism’s longer-term image of the West as one enemy entity and fueled its counter-integration of the Arabo-Islamic camp (Ch. 4).

The Europe-bound Kamilists of the 1890s were the archetype for all subsequent predoomed, radicalizing outreach by other groups of Muslim Egyptian acculturateds up to the 1952 coup. Despite repeated rebuffs, the later Kamilists, the Jaridists and post-1922 al-Siyasah/Liberal Constitutionalist intellectuals and politicians clung to the cultural illusion that appeals to the West’s formal liberal ideologies --- after 1922 its literary aestheticisms also figure more --- would convince Westerners that they owed Egyptians concessions or aid. The languages and journalistic and intellectual discourses in the West had become a part of their make-up. Through their outreaches, Egyptian intellectuals repeatedly set themselves up for sweeping reaction against Westerners or things Western when too many rebuffs came.
CHAPTER 4: PAN-ISLAMISM AS A MODERN IDEOLOGY IN THE PARTY OF MUSTAFA KAMIL

ATTITUDES TO OTTOMAN TURKS

Egyptianist and Islamic-Campist Dualities in the Kamilists’ Relations with the Ottoman State

Mustafa Kamil and his comrades tirelessly strove to achieve Egypt’s independence. They also devoted much effort, however, to relating their movement to the Ottoman Empire and its cause. Educated Egyptians have naturally differed about the ultimate meaning of the movement launched by Kamil. Was it primarily Egypt-centred, ushering in a self-contained Egyptian nationalism? Or did Kamil’s movement unleash Islamic community emotions of strength that might:

(a) Abort the growing consciousness of an Egyptian territorial nation of Copts and Muslims.

(b) In the long term reamalgamate Egypt as a political entity with another Islamic state (the Ottoman State).

In the period of British colonial rule, Kamil’s colleagues put about equal weight upon his promotion of pan-Islamic community and his contribution to the growth of specifically Egyptian national consciousness. Such dual characterization spoke to the pan-Islamic orientation of Kamil’s urban efendi constituency. The 1908 evaluation of Kamil published soon after his death by his successor Muhammad Farid balanced in this fashion Kamil’s pan-Islamism with his promotion of specific Egyptian interests and identity:

Has he [Kamil] not played the main role in calling on people to adhere to the most illustrious throne of the Caliphate, to be devoted subjects of His Highness our Lord the Commander of the Believers and to ward off the evil designs of the invader authorities from the legal Khedivial authority? Has he not been a long-standing advocate of the Egyptian national university and the strengthening of the Islamic fleet and aid for the project of the Hamidian Hijaz Railway and ... with his two strong hands smashed in the doors of prison, releasing the Dinshawai prisoners?1

However, in an oration at Kamil’s grave, Farid hailed Mustafa Kamil as having by his sacrifice

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1. Farid’s tribute was printed in Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil Fi Arba’a wa Thalathina Rabi’an (Cairo: Mitba’at al-Liwa, 1908 -1911) vol. 1. pp. 50-51.
of his youth unified the Egyptian nation in all its elements, Muslim, Christian and Jewish "as one man". In his published tribute, too, Farid credited Kamil with having pioneered a new Egyptian consciousness. It was founded on pride in belonging to the Egyptian homeland and directed to political action to achieve that homeland's independence.

In contrast, a former member of al-Hizb al-Watani, the historian 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, in 1939 argued that Kamil's affirmations of a relationship with the Ottoman State were a mere tactic. Kamil limited his patriotic struggle to the British occupation because he "rightly" saw that their withdrawal would in itself give Egypt full independence. With the British gone, getting free from Ottoman suzerainty would be easy, for the Turks' suzerainty "had long been getting looser and looser, nothing remaining of its visible manifestations save the jizyah" --- which Egypt in any case paid to Turkey's European creditors until 1935. Kamil's lip-service to Ottoman suzerainty al-Rafi'i called "a wise national stand" that enabled him to disingenuously ask the British to end their ostensibly "temporary" occupation of Egypt and thereby fulfill the international treaties to which they were signatory: especially the 1840 Treaty of London in which the Great Powers recognized Egypt's independence under the family of Muhammad Ali, with a nominal Ottoman suzerainty. Kamil was "unable to achieve both the abolition of Ottoman sovereignty and a British evacuation simultaneously".

al-Rafi'i's thesis that Kamil's relationship to the Ottoman State was nothing but an international legal expedient to achieve Egypt's independence has become almost an orthodoxy among secularist Egyptian historians, including pan-Arabist ones. Such post-World War I accounts of Kamil sometimes rather blatantly rewrote history --- including, on occasion, the

3. Farid's full formulation ran that Kamil "was the first Egyptian whose voice resounded in the East and the West. He was the first Egyptian to firmly and consistently demand evacuation and the end of the occupation. He was the first Egyptian who raised his head with an open pride in declaring that he belonged to the Egyptian homeland and in mounting a public campaign to defend its reputation and dignity; he was the first Egyptian who saw that national anniversaries and indigenous occasions were observed --- using them to remind, alert, and warn and also to give hope of the future". 'Ali Fahrni Kamil, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
5. Among pan-Arabs, Salah 'Isa in a 1974 seminar on the centenary of Mustafa Kamil's birth organized by the Egyptian Society for Historical Studies, argued that Kamil only used to "appear an Ottoman sometimes" under compulsion of "alliances"; much the same thesis was argued there by Muhammad 'Imarah in his paper "Mustafa Kamil and Ottoman Community". Salah Isa, "Mustafa Kamal Mufakkiran Burjwaziyan" (Mustafa Kamil as a Bourgeois Thinker) Qadaya Arabiyah (Bayrut) March 1976 p. 105.
biographical record of the authors themselves\(^6\) --- to make him and his party more attractive in the era of the Egyptian nation state and Arab nationalism.

The fact remains that the Kamilists did regularly adopt positions liable to motivate a tightening of Egypt's bonds with the Ottoman Empire, rather than the steady loosening visualized by al-Rafi'i in 1939. Under Farid's leadership, the Hizb al-Watani responded to the Committee of Union and Progress' 1908 restoration in Turkey of constitutional politics with the request that representatives of Egypt be admitted to the new Ottoman parliament. This demand was also directed against the Khedive 'Abbas, adverse to a constitution for Egypt, and Farid's personal enemy\(^7\). Parochial-factional and adventitious dimensions, though, cannot detract from the avant-garde grip the rebirth of its parliamentarism gave Turkey on the psyche of Egyptians.

Farid, like his predecessor Kamil, had a sense of an (Arab) Egyptian homeland and nation that was to make trouble for the young Turks later: yet achievement of modernity and strength by the Ottoman State could downgrade and dilute it. Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah in 1908 feared, perhaps rightly, that the attraction of an Ottoman State now both modern-parliamentarist and Muslim could draw Egypt into a federation incompatible with the discrete nationhood Egypt had been developing since Muhammad 'Ali\(^8\). By trying to enter the restored Ottoman parliament, the

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\(^6\) Muhammad Husayn Haykal in his 1951 memoirs remembered "my friend" 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i as in the British-Ottoman period "an enthusiast, since he was a student at the Law School, for the principles of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) ... intense of belief in the Caliphate of the Ottoman ruling family". Haykal, *Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah* (Cairo : Maktabat Nahdat Misr 1951), v.l, p. 63. If Haykal recalled accurately, al-Rafi'i's 1939 non-Ottomanist characterization of Kamil's career was one more adaption by an Egyptian intellectual formed before 1918 to post-World War 1 Egyptianist and Arabist ideological fashions.


\(^8\) "Some of us think that it is in Egypt's interest for us to have deputies in the Majlis-i-Mab'uthan (Parliament in Constantinople)... that that will not lose us our right of independence and our internal sovereignty (autonomy). Indeed, they almost say that our Government remains despotic, and that a sovereignty that has no resul or serves no interest of the nation is meaningless and that it is better then for the nation to forego that autonomy and join the Ottoman State so long as it be constitutional ... [They believe] that the privileges given to Egypt [under the rule of Muhammad Ali by the Ottoman Sultan] were given to the royal family alone, not to the whole Egyptian nation as an entity". Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, *Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta'rikh al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyyah* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p.37.
Kamilists were attempting a confederal first step. The residual sense that Egypt was a part or extension of the Ottoman State sometimes had consequences for nationalism’s educational and cultural policies. al-Liwa’ assailed the British-directed Egyptian Government’s Education Department for describing Turkish as optional and failing to allocate it fixed periods in the schools. While Turkish was a prerequisite of any serious relationship with the Ottoman Empire, it was a side issue here to restoration of Islam’s classicist Arabic in Egyptian education and life.

That Egyptians and outside Turks should remain politically apart in two separate states, despite shared belief in Islam, was strongly argued by Ahmad Hilmi in al-Liwa’ of 19 August 1906. After waging so hard a struggle to wrest independence from Britain, Hilmi argued, Egyptians would not open the doors of Egypt to the Turks because they are Muslims ... If you have an ornate — or perhaps a not quite so fancy — house and someone had usurped it, and you dispute with this usurper until you regain your house, it certainly goes very hard for you to leave it for your brother who is of your mother and father. But this does not exclude your being independent in your house and loving your brother at the same time, simultaneously.

Hilmi’s primary political unit is thus Egypt. His affirmation here that the Egyptian independence movement of his party was separate from — and yet so lovingly related to or aligned with...!

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9. Mudarris (“Teacher”), “Dusturun am Istibdad?” (Constitution or Despotism?) al-Liwa’, 8 January, 1903, p.1. The religious motivations of this article must be stressed, although French and other European linguistic nationalisms structured his detailed programatic vision of the extensions to Arabic and to published works in it, needed to make it cover all modern education and life. Qur’an-defined standard Arabic must be made the standard medium of instruction in Egypt’s schools because it is the tongue of the Egyptian’s “religion and prophet” — a formulation that did not much perceive the Copts and Syrian Christians in the Egyptian landscape. Restoration of Arabic is motivated by devotion to Islam and to “your [Ottoman] Sultan” (the pan-Muslim Ottoman link) — could there be anyone who would deny (=’Abbas? British-fostered SC journalists?) that Egypt was a possession among the possessions of the Ottoman State? This modernity-addressing pan-Muslim, if proto-Arabist, article showed the seriousness of its quest for religious political community by its drive to ground Egyptians in the Turkish of the other party. Ibid.

10. Ahmad Hilmi, “al-Istiqlal! al-Istiqlal!” (Independence! Independence!), al-Liwa 9 August 1906. Ahmad Hilmi (1875-1963) seems to have been senior staff writer for al-Liwa’ up to 1908. His articles often had a secularist thrust which he wove into the period’s Islamic community emotions. Hilmi would have absorbed Western nationalism’s secular outlook from the acculturated milieu of the journalistic-oratorical intelligentsia and through self-education. He did not receive acculturating formal education. His father, a Cairo (Khan al-Khalili) bazaar merchant named Hasan ‘Ali al-Mahdi, died before he was born. “Hilmi was then raised by his mother’s brother, a government clerk in the Irrigation Department, who seems to have expected that Hilmi would follow in his footsteps. Accordingly, he sent the boy to a maktab called Khan Ja’far in the Husayni quarter of Cairo. Hilmi learned French by working for a private company in Alexandria, and gained further knowledge of Islam and Arabic from an Imam in an Alexandria mosque. He became a government clerk. But he never received more than a primary certificate”. Private letter from Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr utilizing Ahmad Ahmad Badawi, Mu’a al-Suhufi al-Mukafih, Ahmad Hilmi (Cairo, n.d.).
the Ottoman State may, though, have been partly to fend off Egyptian circles enraged by the Kamilists’ support for Turkey’s territorial position in Sinai during the May 1906 Tabah crisis. Yet, in November 1907, al-Liwa’ voiced apprehension that Turkey, legally Egypt’s suzerain, might conclude an agreement with Britain in which it would sacrifice Egypt\textsuperscript{11}.

A discrete Arabo-Egyptianist nationalism had from the outset been solidifying in the movement Kamil launched in 1893. In reply to a foreign journalist who had depicted him as an instrument of Turkish policy, Kamil denied (1907) that "we want freedom for Egypt only to restore it to the rule of the Turks". The aim "Egypt for the Egyptians", "unequivocally stated thousands of times" by the watani movement was the chief principle guiding "our life and actions"\textsuperscript{12}. In a 1906 interview to the London Chronicle he depicted Egypt’s national political community and her religion-founded international relationship with the Ottoman State as two separate planes of association. Kamil exalted the papacy-like "religious influence" that the Ottoman State’s Sultan exerted as Caliph over all Muslims in the world including the Egyptians regardless of the plural state structures. This in effect whited-out the specific political suzerainty that the Sultan traditionally had over Egypt, once. Kamil denied that a single state would in future unite Egypt and the Ottoman State. The English were wrong to suppose that the Egyptians would again enter under the protection and rule of Turkey upon withdrawal by Britain of her garrison. The Ottoman Sultan as Caliph exerted over the Egyptians as Muslims a religious authority like that which the Papacy exerted over the world’s Catholics, but nothing suggested that "Turkey" (sic) intended to intervene politically in Egypt’s affairs. "Turkey" had always respected "internal independence" ("autonomy" --- al-istiqlal al-dakhili) which it granted Egypt in 1840 in the Treaty of London, resisting the European States’ pressure upon her to send troops to Egypt at the time of ’Urabi’s revolt. And Egypt had all the means to defend herself in the twentieth century\textsuperscript{13}.

The role allocated to the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of the world’s Muslims, here, kept him at arm’s length as far as Egypt’s administration was concerned. Kamilist pan-Islamism had made Egyptians like remote Indonesians whom Turkey had never ruled: the Sultan could lead ---

\textsuperscript{11} On 14 November 1907, al-Liwa’ published an article voicing apprehension that an agreement could be concluded between Turkey and Britain at Egypt’s expense. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 31.
\textsuperscript{12} al-Rafi’i, Mustafa Kamil p. 345.
\textsuperscript{13} Mustafa Kamil, "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan and Islam), al-Liwa’ 28 July 1906, p.1.
but had no specific title to govern. Diffusing the Ottoman State’s leadership out over the whole far-flung Muslim world made the Sultan’s traditional claim to administer nearby Egypt fade from mind.

Kamil in Europe may have muted his movement’s real Islamic commitment to the Ottoman State, as by 1906 the Kamilists well understood the antipathy towards the Muslim Turks existing everywhere in Europe. The Egyptians, Kamil told the British, did hope that “Turkey” --- post-Ottomanist terminology! --- would modernize and become an internationally strong state like Japan. He reassured his English audience, however, that neither Egyptians nor “Turks” intended to merge in one state again “because we know very well that that would unite Europe together in opposition against us.” By now, Kamil saw mainstream or official France as having much the same attitudes to Muslims, including Egyptians, as his nation’s British enemy. The interconnected Islamophobic discourses of the British and French spurred him to tighten pan-Islamic relationship with the Ottoman State beyond his common sense about the weakness of all Muslims. In September 1906, Kamil responded with hurt and anger when the establishment *Le Temps* readily echoed a French journalist in Cairo that his movement wanted Turkish troops to invade in order to restore Egypt to administration by Istanbul: Kamil, *Le Temps* soon stereotyped, had made “L’Egypte vilayet turc” his followers’ guiding slogan.

14. Ahmad Hilmi noted that “there exists in England a large party opposed to further colonial expansion. However, this party does not incline to Turkey to the extent that it does not wish to even hear her name, such is its extreme hatred”. “Quwwat al-Wataniyyah” (The Power of Patriotism), *al-Liwa’* 7 August 1906, p. 1.

15. Kamil, “al-Sultan wal-Islam” (1906). Kamil did not dream up --- although he overrated --- the capacity fear of pan-Islam had to bring together European nations that usually loathed each other. French diplomats learned in 1881 that exiles contributed from Istanbul to the Algerian rebellion of 1871, with modest facilities from Ottoman officials, and were fanning preparations for another uprising (shortly to break out in Wahran). The French greatly feared this rising tide of “Muslim fanaticism”, and kept the British informed of all they learned about the world-wide agitation --- implying that the two powers, despite their differences, had a common interest in controlling pan-Islamic anti-imperialism together. Kemal H. Karpat, “Pan-Islamism: Imperial Plot or Muslim Popular Resistance to Imperialism?” (preliminary paper prepared for ICOPS conference on Ottoman studies, June 30-July 4 1981, Madrid) pp. 14-15. One French ambassador to Istanbul, though, had enough common sense to assess in 1880 that the pan-Islamic “conspiracy” existed mostly in the minds of the French and English: all the Porte actually wanted in establishing closer relations with far-off Muslim leaders was to strengthen its position at home and to have the help of Muslims in case of a war between the Ottomans and Europe. *Ibid* pp. 16-17.

16. Kamil, “Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme”, *Le Temps* 8 September 1906 pp. 1-2. Kamil wrote this article to refute a denunciation of him and his movement by an anonymous French journalist resident in, or at least writing from, Cairo: “Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte”, *Le Temps* 22 August 1906. This writer charged that the *al-Liwa’* nationalists were hostile to all European powers, including to France and her control in North Africa, and that this “fanaticism” had turned all French-language newspapers in Egypt against Kamil. Significantly, Kamil did not in his reply claim to have any friends left in Egypt’s French press, nor did he much localize that press and its criticisms as promoting the communalist self-interest of resident Europeans more Francophone than French. Rather Kamil accepted its increased support for the British Occupation as a reflection of the convergence of metropolitan
Kamil mocked the joint paranoia of the French and British that "the peoples of Islam" would either want or be able to band together to wage war on Europe. The never-ending uprisings of peninsular Arabian insurgents against the Porte cast doubt on Turkey's capacity, as well as will, to lead other Muslim peoples into any such conflict. "Pan-Islamism as understood in Europe has no existence" because "the Muslims, Turkey at their head, have understood for a long time that no nation can live isolated" --- to be cut off from the West's modernity was to be "condemned to death" for his cultures-incorporating "enlightened" elite. The other side of Kamil, though, ignited that "Europe intervenes in Turkey for the Christians and in the name of humanity" --- "anti-Muslim actions" that made him defiantly defend pan-Islamism as the natural counter-measure\(^\text{17}\). Here, Kamil perceived anti-pan-Islam as a culture-motif with which British leaders like Sir Edward Grey --- reinforcing joint interests from the 1904 Entente --- could well win the assent of France about Egypt.

Discrete "Interest of the Homeland". To Egyptian audiences, Kamil did defend alliance with the Ottoman State as in Egypt's interest. He was Egyptianist enough to carefully try to keep space between the two political units, but failed to award Egypt the self-contained history and freedom of action vis-a-vis the neighboring nation that West European nationalisms stipulated. Thus, in an 1897 speech in Alexandria, Kamil defended his party's support for the Ottoman State in its current war with Greece in terms of Egypt's interests: "what would have been the political fate of Egypt had --- God forbid! --- the Ottoman troops been defeated?" The defeat and partition of the Ottoman State, Egypt's legal suzerain, would have led to "Egypt being lost forever in the hand of the occupiers". To the argument of his critics that Egypt had under Muhammad 'Ali fought the Ottoman State, Kamil rhetorically replied:

France's interests with those of Britain since the Entente Cordiale. "Le Patriotisme..." His opponent was very French in his defence of his British co-imperialists: they had eliminated previous tyranny and almost doubled Egypt's trade: the flaw was their arrogant self-segregation from natives who wanted to self-Europeanize under their direction (= versus France's gregarious missionary assimilationism in Tunisia and Algeria). Le Temps accepted his claim that Kamil wanted the Turks to take Egypt in "Le Pan-Islamisme en Afrique", Le Temps 23 August 1906 p. 1, and in "L'Effervescence Musulman en Asie" ibid 24 August 1906 p. 1.

17. Kamil, "Le Patriotisme..." Despite his clear sense by 1906 that all European powers, including even more laicist France, were very susceptible to pan-Christian anti-Ottoman, anti-Muslim emotions and appeals, Kamil yet again refused to move away from the ideologies of large religious supra-national camps or political communities that turned Frenchmen against Egyptian independence. As he had in 1895, he yet again offered an alliance of pan-Muslim and pan-Christian camps: "as Muslims, we are for an entente between the Islamic World and the Christian World". His reply in Le Temps once more amounted to making Egyptian "patriotism" take responsibility before French opinion for the Ottoman Turks' conflicts with the Christian nationalities they had ruled or continued to govern --- as if winning some sympathy for Egypt was not a big enough task! Ibid. Cf A 171-175.
Yet are Egypt’s hostilities with the Ottoman State in 1840 inherently fated to last forever? Are not nations, like individuals, brought together by interest and common benefit? Did France not fight Russia in 1854 yet today they have become united? Did not Germany fight Austria and Austria fight Italy, and yet these three states united and remain united? Was not England a friend of Turkey, yet today has become her greatest enemy?18

Here Kamil for the while disregarded traditional Islamic political concepts. These had considered the political unity of the Muslims to be prescribed by religion, and disunity as a reproach. Kamil in this passage formally argued that Egypt and the Ottoman State were two discrete political units. These would adopt friendly or hostile relations towards each other, in the same way that independent nation-units in Europe alternately warred and allied as their shifting discrete interests decreed. Moreover, Kamil’s observations about change in relations between England and Turkey implied that the same fluid alliances of interests could also occur between a Muslim and a Christian-European state.

Kamil’s ingrained assumption of the inherent (if non-unitary) political community of all Muslims left him unable to duplicate the atomistic nationalism that Europe patterned, even in the same speech:

Yes, Egypt was against the Ottoman State in 1840 and was in grievous error to be so. Yes, Muhammad ’Ali was wrong and he knew before his death that he had been misled and erred. Politically, Egypt’s hostility with the Ottoman State was a great error; a mistake, too, in terms of Egypt’s and the Ottoman State’s interests alike19.

Under the surface of the words and arguments exchanged with the European enemies of his movement, Kamil maintained intact key attitudes from traditional Islam. He never genuinely considered the possibility that a clash of fundamental interests between two Muslim political units could lead to a true antagonistic relation, of which war would be the natural resolution. Not that a Muslim population or polity might in pursuit of its interests ally with a European State against a Muslim enemy. For Kamil, Muslim nations had no absolute right to pursue their external interests at the expense of other nations in Islam’s international bloc-community. He could not bring himself to be cold-blooded about the Turks or other Muslim nations in the way that a secular Egyptianist nationalist could be.

al-Rafi’i and later Egyptian historians were right, then, that Mustafa Kamil wanted to keep Egypt a separate state. Kamil was no reunificatory neo-Ottomanist and, as Steppat

assessed, was not striving to construct a unitary universal Islamic theocracy. On the other hand, his multi-faceted relationships with the Ottoman State cannot be reduced to a legalistic device to obstruct the consolidation of British rule. The Kamilists, repeatedly rebuffed by an expansionist Europe prone to parallel anti-Muslim discourses, came to view international relations as between broad antagonistic blocs or camps (Christian Europe and Islam) rather than atomistic nations. To beat back the West, they wanted to solidify and more tightly integrate the far-flung Muslim world. Most of it was now colonized --- with the enfeebled Ottoman State its residual core for sovereignty. The world’s Muslims had to strengthen it so that one day it could become a strong modern state, and not just militarily --- a rallying-point for Muslims to recover strength against the colonialist Europeans.

Although it was not a drive to reincorporate Egypt into the Ottoman State, West-activated Kamilist pan-Islam so identified the Ottoman "Caliph" with Islam as to irreversibly restrict the policy options that the leaders could consider. The enraging Islamophobe discourses of most Europeans and the slivers from traditional Islam locked together in an almost fated way, here. And in a 1903 La Figaro article, Kamil finally almost assented to become something akin to what the French (of whom he had despaired) insisted he and all Muslims could only be:

There is a lot of talk in Europe about Muslims uniting. They consider it a great danger to peace and more evidence of Islam’s mythical fanaticism. We must place everything in its context forcefully to refute this charge, since ... Islam has prescribed mutual assistance by Muslims as a pre-condition for their strength and military preparedness --- although the stupidity of some [local] princes/rulers (umara’) and the ignorance of the rabble have undone the bonds of unity between the Islamic nations for past centuries, tempting Europe to enslave them one after the other. But the covert Crusader Wars that Europe wages against Islam have alerted the Muslims to [the necessity for] mutual love and maintaining interest in each other’s affairs and for rallying around the banner of the Sultan, who is at once the Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Mu’minin) and their Khalifah (Caliph), that is to say the religious and political head of the whole Islamic World.

However uneven his acquaintance with classical Islamic terminology, Kamil’s 1903 cri

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20. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil in Die Welt des Islams v. iv (1956) pp. 287-289. Kamil once stated that to return Egypt to the status of an ordinary Ottoman province would be at variance with the age of civilization and international law. At most, he was at odd times prepared to include Egypt among the "Ottoman nations" in the plural, but never in a single "Ottoman nation" (al-Ummat al-‘Uthmaniyyah). Ibid p. 288.

de coeur to *La Figaro* and the French had an unusually vehement and undivided pan-Muslim community impulse. This derived its force from an uncommon conjunction of (a) the most noxious European attitudes --- including unrealistically unitary ways in which Westerners perceived Muslims --- with (b) Arabic’s high cultural memory of earlier grand classical Arabo-Muslim empires (already adapted by al-Afghani and Kamil’s mentor al-Nadim). Conceivably, had enough such Western and Arab culture pressures coincided with masterly Ottoman self-modernization, Kamil might have accepted some kind of reincorporation. As Egypto-Arab history proceeded to develop, though, the communication is most significant as a view of indigenous history that for decades was to sap and obstruct particularist evocation after 1922 of a separate Egyptian history under Islam. Here, early Arabo-Islamic united empire was the golden age and later break-up barbarization. After Egypt obtained independence in 1922, however, secularish writers such as Ahmad Amin, Taha Husayn, Tawfiq al-Hakim and 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad seized on the breakdown of the political unity of the 'Abbasid Muslim empire through the ambition of various usurpers as asserting a discrete Egyptian nation’s will to independence. From the 1930s, poetry by classical Arabs resident in Egypt was scanned for cultural expression of a separate territorial Egyptian nationality (B 179-184). The more quasi-unitary pan-Muslim statements by Kamil and his colleagues before 1918, prefigured how persistently classical Arab culture would continue to condition Egyptians to lament the later pluralization of power centres and state units in Islam as decline and dangerous weakness before the West --- not the particularoids’ restoration of normality. This negativity would be crucial to the triumph of the pan-Arab ethnic national identification in the 1930s and 1940s. Kamil’s 1903 and 1906 remarks to the two Paris papers, though, show how semi-unitary periodization of Arabo-Muslim history (he just maintained *umam*, plural Muslim nations) could get heightened through self-definition against the discourses of an imperialist Europe. One needed the foreign languages, though, to hear the Western voices that Islamized.

22. Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1961) p. 143. Ahmad Amin in 1929 and 1945 cited Ibn Tulun’s ninth century secession from the Baghdad-centred 'Abbasid Empire, the establishment of the anti-'Abbasid Fatimid state in Cairo, and the later Mamluks. Amin admitted that the partition of the ‘Abbasid Empire weakened Islam internationally, but argued that the multiplication of Muslim political centres improved local administration, kept each country’s wealth at home, and furthered local development of culture. *Ibid* pp. 143-144 and 162.
Modern Pan-Muslim (Post-Ottoman) Relationship with the Ottoman State

This Kamilist enterprise blended pre-1798 non-Western elements with the novel needs of a new age in which the varieties of strength that the imperialists commanded had to be duplicated. Their sense that Egypt could not go it alone, but would have to build joint economic and political as well as military strength with a Muslim bloc centred around the Ottoman State, was structured as a response to the global scope of Western nation-states in the era of imperialism.

Classical and post-classical theories of Islamic Caliphate varied: all preferred one united Islamic state, but some offered leeway for plural Muslim state-units. The journalists and orators of Kamil’s movement synthesized emotional motifs from universal Caliphate with modern technologies and ventures, to put together a quite new relationship with "the Turks". Their pan-Islam did have some nostalgia for early Ottoman prowess against Europe, but usually did not seek to reincorporate Egypt into the Ottoman Empire it helped restrengthen.

The modern West’s own pan-Christianism in international relations fueled and legitimized the symmetrical pan-Islamic community that the Kamilists early constructed around the Ottoman State. Chapter 3 showed that Kamil during the 1897-1898 Greco-Turkish War already defended his movement’s fund-raising for the Ottoman Army --- while "religious" --- as a response to all the aid a range of European states (not just Britain) gave Christian nationalities in "the East" to revolt against, or attack, the Ottoman Empire (A 174). Kamilist writers depicted the drive to strengthen the Ottoman State to the followers as a religious duty imposed by Islam, comparable to the duty to win independence for Egypt. Ahmad al-Badawi in an al-Liwa' article on "Islam and Independence" defined the lifting of the yoke of occupation as "our first demand".

23. According to H.A.R. Gibb, "even in the Sunni community, there was no one universally accepted doctrine of the Caliphate". Gibb, "Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate", Studies on the Civilization of Islam (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962) p. 148. al-Mawardi (d. 1058) denied that there could be two Caliphs at one time --- although 'Abd al-Qahir Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) already accepted the legality of the existence of two Caliphs in widely separate lands. "al-Mawardi’s Theory of the Caliphate", in ibid p. 153. The Caliph Harun al-Rashid in 800 AD had recognised the hereditary amirate of the Aghlabites (theoretically vassals) over North Africa, although al-Mawardi tried to centralize every function of state upon the 'Abbasid Caliph. Ibid pp. 162, 153. Later theories held that rulers who enforced the shari‘ah won title to be termed caliphs in their own domain without any expectation that any would come to rule all Muslims: figures like the Grand Moghul Awrangzreb in India and the Ottoman Sultan were accepted as simultaneous caliphs, although they lacked any blood-link to the Prophet. "...Sunni Theory of the Caliphate", ibid pp. 144-147. It looks a contradiction that Kamil (a) exalted the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of Islam and sought to make and tighten a host of novel linkages with his State, while (b) not raising or sidestepping political reincorporation. Yet he may not have been so unconnected with Muslim tradition given the diversification in Sunni thought that Gibb uncovered.
but "our first duty" as "to hold fast to the Holy Caliphate". By giving material "support for the Commander of the Believers" in Istanbul, in "expending generously and unstintingly of what the Khalifah has commanded us to give" "we [Egyptians] would be discharging a religious obligation". al-Badawi thus readily accepted the title of 'Abdul-Hamid as Caliph to command outside Muslims to undertake specific international acts designed to help him defend his state. The colonialist West's power made al-Badawi think in terms of all Islam, of the early Arab Caliphs' Islamic universal empires, of the need of the world's modern Muslim nations for a successor international power centre:

Islam was established only through the aid men gave it [the Caliphate], had strength only through preservation of its [the Caliphate's] entity ... [and] can have glory only through the sacrifice of martyrs and property when the time comes to defend it [the Caliphate]; Islam has no boast except through the Caliphate's independence and repelling all enemies who try to touch even a span of its [the Caliphate's] land.

A 1903 article titled "The Ottoman State's Need of a Fleet" likewise conveys the Kamilists' intense involvement in the survival and strength of the Ottoman State. The Ottoman Sultan, and the interests of his state, are closely identified with universal Islam. M. 'Izzat identifies with the Ottoman State from Egypt's (and the general Islamic world's) condition of colonial rule. Powerless, subjugated Muslims desperately yearn for Islam's world power-centre, the Ottoman State, to achieve strength on their behalf:

The recent war between the Ottoman State and the Greeks had hardly broken out ... before all Islamic nations were craning their neck ... to find out how much resistance [the State] could mount ... The Muslims now, in all areas of the earth are not forgetful of the promise the Khalifah made to them to continue his efforts to restore Islamic naval strength to its previous might and past glory, that the [Ottoman] State may gain capacity to resist all adversities and demonstrate before the European world a might that will win respect ... Ah, it is as if I can see all the Muslims who have veritably flocked to the Residence of the Caliphate (Dar al-Khilafah: Constantinople) from every side and corner and have lined up before the Yildiz palace ... all begging with a single voice 'O Commander of the Believers... Can you not bestow one piercing glance on the Islamic fleet and resurrect it anew... that you may revive the hopes of the Muslims ... all devoted to you, be they your subjects or non-subjects, alike?'

This sense of the Ottoman State's Sultan as international Islam's "Caliph" perpetuated some

24. Ahmad al-Badawi "al-Islamu wal-Istiqlal" (Islam and Independence) al-Liwa', 23 August 1903. We did not find any biodata about Ahmad al-Badawi.

25. M. Izzat, "Hajat al-Dawlah li-Ustul" (The Ottoman State's Need of a Fleet), al-Liwa' 8 August 1903 p.1. I found no biodata about M. 'Izzat.
archaic attitudes. The Ottoman bureaucracy and ministers have been slow to effect the reforms and modernization necessary, for instance, to build naval might. M. 'Izzat proposed an illusory solution: direct appeal in spirit by the world’s Muslims to the charismatic individual, the Sultan-Caliph, who heads Islam’s universal faith as well as the Ottoman State. This Leader then activates his semi-magical power to instantaneously make "the broken inert wood" of the Islamic fleet "throb with the blood of new life". This in part late-traditional messianic Muslim outlook could, in spasms, obscure the engineering and detail of administrative institutions and processes. The Sultan-"Caliph" 'Abdul-Hamid’s very religion-justified autocracy might have hampered initiative and increased specialization in the bureaucracy. More complex, diffused government was a prerequisite for constructing modern armed forces, navies and merchant fleets. 'Izzat vividly evoked the military greatness of the Ottoman State’s early past: "that happy age in which the Ottoman family had a fleet that was a byword for invincibility and people titled their Sultan 'Sultan of the two Continents and Emperor of the two Seas'". Pan-Muslim restoration of the Empire as a centre of military and economic strength for the globe’s Muslims had to renew, and was inspired by, the Ottoman Sultans’ early internationally feared might. Only, when the Ottoman Sultans were strongest, their rule over Egypt, then a province of their Empire, was tightest. Working in the other direction, "non-subjects" could be members in the pan-Muslim political community with the "Caliph" along with "the subjects".

'Izzat and al-Badawi pervasively connected the Ottoman State’s Sultan, as "Caliph", to Islam. This religious definition would not orientate the constituency to a pragmatic, reversible alliance with the Ottoman State. Both writers gave the Ottoman State’s Sultan-Caliph an international religio-political standing that would entitle him to command Egyptians to undertake specific measures to strengthen his State. Moreover, 'Izzat’s priority that Muslims achieve international strength, and nostalgia for the might of the Ottoman State (when it firmly ruled Egypt), might have assented to reamalgamation with it had it really managed to modernize itself.

Both, though, knew that any such happy outcome could be in the distant future: like Kamil sometimes, they saw the current Ottoman State as ramshackle and vulnerable, and bound to remain so for some time at the least.

Kamilist pan-Islam ran gripping, vivid, primary motifs from traditional Islam as a

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26. Ibid.
motivating fuel into a collective nations-spanning self-modernization frankly out to naturalize sectors of Europe's civilization in the Islamic world. Incorporative of non-Muslim strength --- but also liberalism ---, Kamil declared to a British audience in 1906 that Egyptians hoped the Ottoman State could become a strong state with developed civilization like Japan. A 1903 number of al-Liwa' carried an account of the Ottoman Imperial factory at Herkeh, so productive that the Sultan ordered installation of electric lighting to make night shifts possible. But al-Liwa's Istanbul correspondent on the same page saw the lack of practical education in "the East" as the great stumbling-block to the development of indigenous manufactures and commerce that the pan-Muslims craved. With its usual reflex, acculturation viewed self-Westernization by Turkey as carrying forward the dynamic of classical Arab Islam. In 1893, the youthful Kamil hailed "the Commander of the Faithful" 'Abdul-Hamid's construction of numerous Europe-modelled government schools throughout his State as restoring to "the Easterners" the educational endeavor of the first Caliphs: that "the quality of education offered" was "no less than in comparable schools in Europe ... promises a bright future" to "us Ottomans". If the Ottoman State truly developed modernity able to contend with the West's, it could build up assent to reincorporation in Egypt --- if the Sultan and then the CUP had enough interest and courage to press for that. Kamil and his colleagues, though, to his death learned from the Ottoman State as another self-modernizing entity comparable with Egypt, rather than a more advanced model. However, collective modernization could unprecedentedly integrate a widening pan-Muslim community extending far beyond any borders the Ottoman Turks had ever governed, making memories of past political unity between Egypt and the Ottoman State less pertinent. The Kamilists sought West-like commercial and economic means --- not an amalgamation of states --- to unprecedentedly integrate the far-flung international Islamic community.

A case in point is a 1903 al-Liwa' article titled "A Great Islamic Project" detailing discussion in Constantinople among "the major Muslim traders" of plans to expand trade.

28. al-Liwa' 17 February 1903.
30. 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil fi Arba'a wa Thalathina Rab'ian 10 vls (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa' 1908-1911) v. 2 p. 9.
between Constantinople and the Far East. A Muslim international trading company was to be established with large capital to "win control over the resources of trade between Islamic lands from the Near East to the Far East". The implicitly anti-Western project would utilize a Muslim-owned fleet of steamers to transport grain from al-Basrah and Baghdad and salt from other Ottoman territories to India; from China the steamers would bring silk and tea; from Java and Sumatra tea and spices and other products from the tropics; from Rangoon rice, from Calcutta jute and indigo, and so forth.

al-Liwa' gave an enthusiastic front-page welcome to this ambitious project to economically integrate geographically very far-flung regions inhabited by Muslims --- in some, such as China, only as a minority. Once more, the desired Muslim political community was being expanded out far beyond Egypt's historical Ottoman political community. The item instanced how (a) the Kamilists' Islamic ideology and (b) their perceptions of current international activities and realities still controlled by the West, structured each other and inter-penetrated. The item on the Islamic Fleet is like al-Liwa's coverage of the Hijaz railway project, discussed below. In both categories, the paper interwove and fused Islam as a ritual religion into modernizing temporal endeavors: religion, geo-political power and economics are synthesized. The ritual of hajj is a common element present in the two ventures that points the Kamilists' adroit acculturated unification of (a) immemorial religious rituals and (b) the modern and secular sector. During the hajj season, the forthcoming Company's steamers would transport the pilgrims. Like the Hijaz railway, the project to economically mesh the Ottoman Empire, India and Burma, China and Indonesia would thus "facilitate the hajj for the pilgrims to God's Sacred House in all the Islamic lands". Somewhat as for the Ottoman Empire's construction of the network of railroads for heavily military-strategic --- although, to a lesser extent, also economic --- purposes, a connection with the pilgrimage to Mecca thus heightened the description of the economic venture of trade between Constantinople and the Far East as "Islamic". As with communications calling for aid to the Ottoman State itself, including its geo-political Hijaz railway project, vocabulary and assertions were applied to inject Islamic religious content into what would seem to non-Muslims not particularly religious --- economic or military --- phenomena. Constantinople was, in accordance with consistent Kamilist practice,

termed Dar al-Khilafah ("the Abode of the Caliphate"). The proposed commercial fleet was termed "Islamic" although some places with which it would have dealings --- Rangoon, East and West India, China, and (less markedly because there were Bengali Muslim elements) Calcutta --- could not accurately be described as predominantly Muslim. al-Liwa' still categorized them among "the Islamic lands". However, Sumatra did have solid orthodox Muslim populations.

The Ottoman Turks had supplied artillery, munitions and military advisers to Acheh’s Muslims during their sixteenth century wars with the Portuguese in Malacca. Acheh appealed to Turkey in 1873 for protection against the invading Dutch; there consequently was consciousness of this past relationship with Sumatra among the Middle East’s Turks.

The Islamic fleet project stemmed from some Ottoman Turks’ history and interests, but the Egyptian intellectuals’ acculturation motivated the enthusiastic welcome they gave this non-Egyptian project. These Western-cultured intellectuals knew too well Europe’s modern instruments of military and economic strength --- which they wanted Muslims to duplicate as tools with which to integrate Islam’s global sovereign community. The economic scope of British power --- spanning homelands and continents and through trade present in lands Britain did not administer --- imposed the new comprehensive world Muslim counter-community or bloc. Modern imperialism-fostered communications patterned means to pull together the widest Muslim community in new integrations that would not require a single state. Kamilist ideology exalted and applied the Caliphate in new ways that could restore meaningful leadership over the Muslim nations to the Ottoman Sultan: a future strong Ottoman State could help colonized Muslim peoples, near and far, rebuild sovereignty. The Islamic Fleet project made the Kamilists expect that a resurgent Ottoman State would direct economic resources and instruments it achieved out to Islam’s most far-scattered peoples, to mutual benefit. With no individual Muslim nation viable alone in the age of global imperialisms, the scope of pan-Islamic community and interactions, cultural, political and economic, had to expand further and further.

32. Ibid.
33. The Ottoman Turks’ relationship with the Muslims of Acheh was surveyed by Anthony Reid, "Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia", Journal of Southeast Asian History (Singapore), v. x (1969) pp. 395-414. The Turks mainly supplied arms in the sixteenth century to the Achehnese Sultan 'Ala' al-Din Ri’ayat Shah al-Qahhar (1537-1571). Descendants of Turkish and Syrian advisers and artisans lived in the village of Bitay named after Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem). Ibid p. 398. Dr Reid mentioned a semi-scholarly article on the historical Ottoman relationship with the Achehnese --- a 1912 article by the naval historian Saffet Bey in the historical magazine Tarihi Osmani Encumeni Mecmuasi. However, that was nine years after our al-Liwa' item.
out from the Ottoman State and Arab lands it still ruled or once had. Kamilist ideology demanded that the Caliph lead Muslims, rather than govern them. With peoples whom the Ottoman State never governed being integrated into this supra-statal pan-Islamic community, Egypt's separate statehood would not look un-Islamic.

**The Hijaz Railway**

Known in Arabic as al-Sikkat al-Hamidiyyah, the Railway of 'Abdul-Hamid, this was to link Arabia to the main arteries of Turkish railways in Anatolia and 'Iraq. The section from Damascus to Medinah was completed in 1908 but the extension from Medinah to Mecca never was. 'Abdul-Hamid adopted a project of a railway to Arabia in response to an 1898 insurrection headed by the Imam of Yemen and defeats that Wahhabis led by 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud inflicted upon the Turks in Eastern Arabia. "The main reasons for initiating the Hejaz Railway were ... military and political, to strengthen the Sultan's authority in the Arabian Peninsula, chiefly in the Hijaz and Red Sea area." However, the Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid stressed in communications to the world's Muslims that the railway would facilitate pilgrimage to Mecca. This religious characterization made outside Muslims generously donate towards its construction costs. We shall see that the Kamilists were to appeal to Egyptians to contribute towards the railway on grounds that it would tighten Ottoman control over Arabia, not just facilitate pilgrimage. The Kamilists also repeated to Egyptian audiences justifications of the railway as a means to bring economic development to nomadic and semi-nomadic Arabs, made to Arab populations under Ottoman rule.

The Kamilists had to knit together a range of classes to aid this life-and-death Ottoman enterprise. Kamil's, and the other Kamilist leaders', mobilization propaganda addressed to their widest Egyptian audiences identified 'Abdul-Hamid as Caliph and therefore entitled by divine-revealed Islam to command believers resident in any state to contribute. In a 1903 Arabic article, Kamil wove references to Islamic congregational prayers into his plea for Egyptians, especially the wealthy, to help finance the railway. Every Friday the Muslims gather in mosques in the furthermost Eastern and Western reaches of the earth to call for aid to the Commander of

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the Faithful and the strengthening of his State --- "a call necessitating the uniting of these nations (umam) and peoples (shu’ub) around the banner of the Caliphate". The item thus identified political support for the Ottoman Sultan’s cause as a religious duty of Islam, as binding as its prayer-rituals. It inextricably wove Turkey’s Middle East power interests and instruments into the ritual life of the world religion that the Sultan headed. In Kamil’s presentation, Islam is of wider scope than ritual devotions linking the individual believer to God. Islam’s religious rituals galvanize the believers once more into collective participants in contemporary international political history, still controlled by the West:

The whole world has its eyes on the Muslims in these days and is asking: Are they so weak and their resolution so dead that they are incapable of helping the Ottoman State extend a railway when the most insignificant of companies in Europe construct numerous railways on the initiative and efforts of a few individuals? Westerners made history at that point of time. Yet this selective ultra-political Islam could motivate the Muslims, including Egyptians, to construct the modern economic and strategic instruments to beat them off. This reformulated Islam, polarized as the antithesis of the West, would build up the will and structures among Muslims to economically as well as militarily become like --- as well as dislodge --- those enemies.

Kamil to Egyptians pervasively alternated, juxtaposed and identified the Ottoman State’s instruments of political power with international Islam and its survival in the world. Egyptians who do not help the Caliph in Constantinople extend the Baghdad railway to Mecca and Medinah, whatever their intentions might be, in reality offer "support for the sentence of eternal death and extinction that Westerners pronounce on Muslims" as a whole. "Muslims in all corners of the world" know that the religion’s and their own survival depends on the survival of the Ottoman state that maintains the Caliphate.

Islam was a unifying trans-class and trans-elite bond. The Kamilists might materially aid geo-political instruments to integrate and defend the Ottoman State in other provinces. Yet the Hijaz was religiously very special for Muslim Egyptians --- the land into which God sent down his Qur’anic revelation to the last Prophet, Muhammad. Pilgrimage to Mecca was also a central religious obligation prescribed by Islam for every able Muslim: pilgrims to Mecca usually then

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
visited Medinah, 225 miles north-west, where Muhammad lived for ten years and was buried, and then often the Masjid al-Aqsa in Jerusalem. Responding to the frustrated religious drives of the bourgeois constituency, some of the first numbers of al-Liwa' attacked the Egyptian ministers for placing restrictions upon the pilgrimage to Mecca. Educated Egyptians' religious needs would strongly motivate the Kamilists to support the new railway, which would offer swift, comfortable transport to Mecca. Egyptian pilgrims had suffered hardships and maltreatment by nomads in journeying on foot and camel to Mecca.

Religion and its shrines were again fused with regional politics in a speech delivered by Mustafa Kamil’s brother 'Ali Bey Kamil at an open-air meeting in the provincial township of al-Zaqaziq in 1903. 'Ali Fahmi applied the idiom of religious fervor to raise donations for the Hijaz railway from an audience possibly more popular and less sophisticated or secularizing-educated --- less urban --- than the movement’s usual Cairo constituency. 'Ali Kamil knew that this religious consideration would win generous donations.

Like Mustafa, he identified the Sultan and his geo-political requirements with Islam and God:

My dear brothers, the person ordering the Railway’s construction is His Highness the Commander of the Faithful, the Khalifah (Successor) of the Prophet of the Lord of

40. For al-Zaqaziq (“Zagazig”), capital of al-Sharqiyah province, see *The Statesman’s Year Book of 1903* (London: MacMillan & Co 1903) p. 1195 and *EB* 11th ed 1911. It contained large cotton factories and offices of numerous European merchants: its population in 1907 was 34,999, including 1,355 Greeks. Ibid.
41. 'Ali Fahrni Kamil’s career as an officer in the Egyptian army proved abortive. His nationalism brought him into collision with the British, who stripped him of his rank and interned him. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 316. 'Ali Fahmi translated into Arabic (1909) Juliette Adam’s collection of letters from the late Mustafa: *Lettres Egyptiennes-Francaises adressées à Mme Juliette Adam, 1895-1908*; and also her 1922 *L’Angletern en Egypte* --- transmuted into *Injilitarra fi Misr* (Cairo; 1922). Among 'Ali’s own French writings that explained Egypt’s cause to Europeans was his "La Question d’Egypte", *Orient et Occident* May 1922 pp. 5-20. Thus, 'Ali Fahmi Kamil was acculturated to a degree with some active bilingualism in French. Data supplied by Dr Arthur Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University, in part drawing on al-Zirikli’s al-A’lam.
Worlds, the Sultan our Lord 'Abdul-Hamid Khan, may Allah aid and support him! ... If we want to be Muslims who hold on to our Islam we have no choice but to follow the path of true guidance and to gather around the banner of the Sultan.

'Ali Kamil's cry was "Come, O Ye Muslims". Certain of his words and phrases suggest that the Sultan's authority or commands derived from or were the authority or commands of God Himself. For instance, he reproaches the Egyptians because they still lack "the Arab initiative, the religious zeal and the Islamic fervor the bearer of which knows nothing but obedience to the command/authority (amr) of Allah and so obeys him who has charge of authority (waliy al-amr)".

Pan-Arabism Subsumed Under Ottomanism. The railway would facilitate commerce between regions (aqtar) of the Ottoman Empire. It would also "develop agriculture in those golden lands" (Transjordan and peninsular Arabia). Contribution by Egyptians to the Hijaz railway was "charity" (al-ihsan) that would "bring prosperity to your Arab brothers". It was "the relieving of the sufferings of orphans and the poor, righteousness, commanded by religion". Religion in such Egyptian pan-Islamic communications had economic and social life as a sphere.

As ever in Kamilism, religion and political power, too, were closely connected in 'Ali Kamil's speech, intensified by the religious Hijaz context. 'Ali was well aware that this "purely religious project" of the Hijaz railway was, among other aspects, an instrument to redistribute regional political power. Once completed, it would enable the Ottomans to stop Britain from further expanding her influence among the tribes from the coastal colonies and trucial states that she already held in the peninsula: it would strengthen the Ottoman State's authority in Arabia. The Railway would make possible swift Ottoman troop movements not just to quell lawlessness by nomads affecting the movement of pilgrims but "to resist the hidden hands that work in the dark to rob this vast glory from the ummah" (= here the Muslim world community or nation).

43. Ibid
44. Ibid. 'Ali Kamil's justifications of the Hijaz railway to Egyptians recall earlier ones that the Ottoman establishments argued to convince that Empire's Arabs. Thamarat al-Funun, a Sunni Muslim paper in Bayrut, had predicted in 1900 that the railway would help repopulate southeastern Syria, pacifying the nomadic tribes and halting their raids. It would stimulate agriculture and the exploitation of natural resources, help the Sultan impose his authority and enable Muslims from all over the world to make the pilgrimage. Landau, Hijaz Railway p. 20. Muhammad 'Arif Ibn al-Sayyid al-Munir al-Husayni al-Dimashqi, a Damascus educationalist, wrote a book in Arabic championing the railway. Like 'Ali Fahmi Kamil and Thamarat, he, too, stressed its economic as well as purely religious advantages: for instance, it would facilitate the introduction of civilization among "savage populations" --- Arab desert nomads, towards whom the Kamilists, too, had their ambivalences. Ibid p. 196 (Arabic).
Other al-Liwa' items presented material aid to 'Abdul-Hamid's railway in the Hijaz as a religious test for the Islam of Egyptians. Thus, one al-Liwa' writer, reflecting on the reduction of pilgrim hardships, mused in 1904 that "there cannot exist a single Muslim believing in Allah and the Last Day" who could do anything but respond to the Sultan's call for aid. Calculating that al-Liwa's modern-stream student readers for religious reasons supported the Hijaz railway, this writer tried to discredit al-Mu'ayyad editor 'Ali Yusuf --- = the Khedive 'Abbas who financed the paper and had turned against the increasingly populist Kamil --- by charging that he refused to aid "this great Islamic project":46. Muhammad Farid in his tributes to Mustafa Kamil upon his death assumed that Kamil's support for the Hijaz railway would seem creditable to the educated followers.

The audiences addressed by Kamil and by co-leaders even during his life-time perhaps were already starting to widen out into groups beyond the attached acculturated core-constituency --- reaching urban workers and even some peasants47. But modernizing-educated Egyptians were as readily mobilized into aiding the Hijaz railway by identification of it with religion as Muslim Egyptians in general. Indeed, the drives to extend ritual religion into contemporary international relations and economics, to make Europe-developed instruments of economic or political power (railways, steamers) serve a religion-founded international political community, were the product of the conjunction of the two traditions, Islamic and Western, through acculturation. It was the religious duty of Egyptians to obey 'Abdul-Hamid's geopolitical commands. The scope that the

45. 'Ali Fahmi Kamil at al-Zaqaziq, loc. cit.
46. "Nahnu wal-Mu'ayyad" (We and al-Mu'ayyad), al-Liwa' 3 August 1904. Yet 'Ali Yusuf's pan-Islamic pro-Ottoman zeal had cooled as the Khedive moved from 1904 towards rapprochement with the British presence in Egypt. Wendell documented from a 1907 al-Mu'ayyad article the convergence of his later positions with the --- at least in formal argumentation --- more systematic and ideologized Egyptianist particularism of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyi and the Jaridists who (at least on the plane of verbalization) called for pan-Islamism and the link with Ottoman Turks to be phased out, ignoring their own deep bonds to that Empire's Turks and Arabs. Lutfi-like, 'Ali Yusuf denied in 1907 piece that al-Jami'at al-Islamiyyah --- ambiguously, either wider Islamic community or pan-Islamism --- ever had had, or ever could have, a political expression. Yusuf now argued that a political pan-Islamism by "the Muslim nations" would band European states together against the Muslims in a countering "Christian league" (jami'ah Masihiyah). Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From Its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) p. 229.
47. George Young, writing in retrospect after World War I and Egypt's recovery of limited independence, characterized that the pre-1914 nationalist movement's "spokesmen were journalists, its thinkers... lawyers". Yet his impression was that al-Hizb al-Watani at some point came to reach out beyond its urban efendiyyat constituency to rural audiences; nationalism's "main activity became a vituperative anti-British agitation in French and Arabic journ... which were discussed in the town cafes and declaimed aloud in the villages". Young, Egypt 2nd ed. (London: Ernes Benn 1930) p. 179. Haykal recalled that the rural population was already being reached by Kamil's death, since even people from far-flung corners of the countryside came to his 1908 funeral in Cairo: B 394-5 fn 57.
Kamilists award him to direct Egyptians is material support to the instruments that strengthen and integrate his Ottoman state: he would not give orders about Egypt's strictly internal matters. Despite this restrictedness, the religious rhetoric with which the Kamilists appealed to Egyptians to materially aid the Ottoman State committed them too deeply to leave open a reversible alliance of convenience. Religiosity would not equip any Egyptian group to critically assess the Ottoman State's policies and needs from the viewpoint of Egypt's interests. However, the British Arabophile Wilfrid Scawen Blunt in 1906 characterized Kamil as allied with the Ottoman State out of fear lest 'Abdul-Hamid barter away Egypt's independence to Britain "for some personal interest or fear" --- a perspective perpetuated by such West-resident scholars as Wendell and 'Afa Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot48. Aid to the Ottoman Empire's judicious railway projects would make it less ramshackle before Western powers.

There were individuals or groups in Istanbul, both officials and private merchants, who called for construction of a modern Ottoman navy and also merchant fleet that could command military and economic respect. And the Ottoman Turks had some historical linkages with even such faraway Muslim countries as Indonesia. Nonetheless, M. 'Izzat's perception that Ottoman officialdom was not getting enough done quickly enough towards making the Islamic fleet a reality, and that pressure to get the project moving came from the Caliph's non-subject Muslims beyond his Empire as much as from the subjects he administered within it, was lucid. Kemal Karpat's researches indicate that more ambitious international pan-Islamism to checkmate or sap or confront the expansionist West and centred around the Ottoman core, was not of much interest to the cautious, practical 'Abdul-Hamid II: rather, "the idea belonged to the outside or peripheral Muslims who were seeking a rallying-force" (colonized or threatened Muslims in Egypt and Nort

48. Wilfred Scawen Blunt, My Diaries (London: Martin Secker, 1919-1920) v. 2 p. 156. Blunt wrote this mid-1906 entry immediately after he met Kamil for the first time. He had the impression that Kamil "like all educated Egyptians hates and distrusts 'Abdul-Hamid as a tyrant and a dangerous man": his hope lay in the Sultan's death and "a liberal and reforming successor to the Caliphate". It is to be noted, though, that Blunt was a Turcophobe: Gladstone-like, he penned a pamphlet against 'Abdul-Hamid over the 1894-1896 "Armenian massacres". Ibid p. 45. It is a fact that Kamil's September 1906 communication on pan-Islamism to Le Temps showed some acquaintance with the writings of liberal-secularoid Young Turkey exiles in Europe opposed to 'Abdul-Hamid. "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme" loc cit; cf. Steppat, Nationalismus pp. 290-291. Karpat assessed Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid II as quite prepared to sacrifice or cede attached lands or peripheral areas of the Ottoman Empire to expansionist Christian powers as part of his strategy to buy peace and time for the Ottoman core that he was intent to preserve. "Pan-Islamism..." pp. 5-6, 27. 'Afa Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, too, assessed nationalists such as Kamil as afraid that a treaty with Turkey might win Britain a legitimate sanction to remain in Egypt permanently. al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: Praeger 1969) pp. 47, 130.
Africa, "Russia" and India.\(^49\) From opposition to revolutionary movements and change, 'Abdul-Hamid shifted to passive acquiescence to rising Muslim resistance to Westerners. "He did not seek leadership of the awakening in the Islamic World but was forced by pressure from both Europeans and Muslims --- who had entirely opposite reasons for wanting him to take part in the movement --- to accept an important role" as Caliph-symbol. The global Pan-Islamic movement needed that central emblemic authority-figure "to achieve the degree of unity necessary for resistance". The Sultan-"Caliph" evoked pan-Islamism in order to manipulate colonial powers fearful of its appeal to their Muslims --- Britain, France and Russia --- into acquiescence with the continued "integrity of his realm, rather than actually to oppose European imperialism". Some "high Ottoman officials such as Sa'id Pasha, Khayruddin Pasha and several generals --- not to speak of religious leaders --- developed elaborate projects for organizing an Islamic Union", but 'Abdul-Hamid adroitly kept them only paper schemes.\(^50\)

'Abdul-Hamid had manipulated the Kamilists, like other colonized Muslim groups, into strengthening his realm by contributing to the Railway. He had met their minimum requirement by not legalizing Britain's Occupation of Egypt, which would have ended his own bargaining-power as well. Yet Kamil and his colleagues --- more modern as well as more religious in their supra-statal concept of sovereignty than either 'Abdul-Hamid or post-World War II orientalists --- wanted much more.

Anti-Turkish Christian Nationalisms

Kamilist solidarity with Turkey against Christian nations she had once ruled, or which were still fighting her for independence, perceived those nationalities vividly from a number of acculturated angles. Like the Jaridists (Ch. 6), the Kamilists imaged Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars etc almost as intimately as they characterized Turks --- making their pan-Islamism very different from the simpler variant of monolingual Egyptians. Kamilist opposition to these Christian nationalisms was diverse and inconsistent, the more emotionally involved because of multiple angles and ambivalences. It was unpredictable and out of control of calculated pursuit of Egypt.'

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50. Karpat, "Pan-Islamism: Imperial Plot or Muslim Popular Resistance to Imperialism?" pp. 6-7, 28-29.
international interests that required a strong Ottoman State.

Early in the Nasir period, the Egyptian pan-Arab journalist-analyst Ahmad Baha’ al-Din faulted Kamil for identifying his independence movement so closely with the cause of the Ottoman regime: it could only harm his lobbying of European support to evict Britain, given that such "European peoples" as the Greeks were "revolting against Turkish imperialism". Although not so much as would have been the case had he mainly addressed the British public, Kamil undoubtedly found his support for 'Abdul-Hamid against Greek, Armenian and other Christian nationalisms a PR problem when appealing to the French. Mme Juliette Adam and associated French nationalists may have sometimes even gone so far as to credit British manipulation of Greek and Armenian insurgencies against the Turks for expansion, but it was delicate chemistry and even La Nouvelle Revue might not lapse into Turcophobia when serious blood-letting got underway. It would be inadequate, though, to view Kamil’s posture of opposition to those insurgent Christian nationalisms only as a residual traditionalist dysfunction in his psyche that resurges against requirements in the Francophone milieus he had to court. Greeks and Armenian

51. Ahmad Baha’ al-Din, under Nasir an incisive pan-Arab columnist in al-Ahram and the weekly al-Musawwar, felt that the Kamilists’ vocal apologetics for Turkey lost the cause of Egyptian independence support from Europeans sympathetic to the Christian nationalities fighting for independence, and also, to a degree, even to Turks working to replace 'Abdul-Hamid’s despotism with constitutional government. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani 30. Did Mustafa Kamil know Egypt’s interest, Baha’ al-Din queried, given that the Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid had issued the famous statement that 'Urabi was an apostate rebel, as the British attacked? --- to which we saw (Ch. 3) the youthful Kamil’s eyes were well open as he put together his initial Pan-Islamic-Egyptianist position in Europe: A 164.

52. The chemistry of La Nouvelle Revue could ignite either way, although it usually scorched Britain aroud the time of Kamil’s conjunction. The extreme of anti-Britishism was Juliette Adam’s 1895 formulation that "the terrifying [British] octopus is fastening its tentacles around the bodies of all the nations": it was Britain that was inciting the Cretans as well as Armenians to dismember the Ottoman Empire in order to occupy 'Iraq and make Armenia its route to India. La Nouvelle Revue November-December 1895 pp. 387-389, 166-167. Classicist literary Graecism and their residual but durable identification with all Christians, in combination made La Nouvelle Revue contributors open to Hellenic nationalism --- more than to Armenian insurrectionism. The 1897 struggle and war on Crete won 'Abdul-Hamid and the Turks unfriendly notices in La Nouvelle Revue. The Greek nationalists had an of forum, presenting images of "les massacres de nos freres Cretois", sanitizing out the latters' pogroms against the Muslim-Cretan minority: "S.L." (Athens), "La diplomatie Europeane dans le conflit Greco-Ture", La Nouvelle Revue July-August 1897 pp. 618-627; cf Jean Pischari, "Les Armeniens, les Cretois et l'Europe", La Nouvelle Revue May-June 1897 pp. 54-70 and Comte de Chalo, "En Yacht au Pays de la Guerre Greco-Turque", La Nouvelle Revue September-October 1897 pp. 480-497, 694-713. Juliette Adam, too, responded with comparatively moderate and judicious sympathy for the "wise" Orthodox Cretans --- voicing the hope that they would win from the Powers, without whose duress 'Abdul-Hamid would not budge, an autonomy that foresaw something very like what they we in fact to be granted. Adam’s item had a sharp, cherishing awareness of contemporaneous Greek royalty. La Nouve Revue May-June 1896 p. 716. Massacres against Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire and despotic repression by 'Abdul-Hamid --- although with some sympathy for his constitutionalist Turkish as well as Armenian victims, also --- were flayed by Joseph Denais in "Le Sultan", La Nouvelle Revue March-April 1897 and his "Les victimes du Sultan: la demission de Fouad Pacha", ibid May-June pp. 71-78.
were salient in the Francophone community of resident Europeans in Egypt: day-to-day bilingualizing interaction in his own country thus had exposed him and his colleagues in advance to themes by those two nationalities in conflict with the Turks. The diluted Christian consciousness with which he had to cope from the French, further irritated and inflamed his sour perceptions of the disparity between (a) Muslim Egyptians and (b) minority Christian Greeks or Armenians in Egypt who linked out into distant anti-Ottoman nationalisms. Kamil voiced considerable awareness to the French of Egyptian PM Nubar’s Christianity and that he was racially non-Egyptian, a member of an Armenian nation centred outside who pursued its interests within Egypt. To dispel impressions in France that (Muslim) Egyptians were religiously fanatical Kamil in 1895 observed that "Nubar Pasha, who is Christian, presided last year in the Khedive’s name over our most important [Islamic] ceremony, the ceremony of the sacred cloth [mahmal], and that to the applause of the crowd" 53. Elsewhere, though, Kamil argued to his French readers that Nubar’s non-Egyptian origin made him readier to betray Egypt’s interests than Muslim ministers, themselves often Turco-Circassian, who collaborated with the British occupation. Following the 1882 conquest, the Sudanese revolted, and the British pressed the Egyptian government to renounce its rights over the Sudan. The Prime Minister Sharif Pasha resigned rather than comply. "But Nubar, the Armenian, taking power, accepted that which so outraged his predecessor and renounced the Egyptian Sudan"54. In Kamil’s mind, Nubar sacrificed Egypt’s Sudan because his supreme political loyalty was extraterritorial, to the Armenian nation: Colonel Baring, Cromer’s brother, told him that Nubar had asked the British to work for Armenia’s national independence from the Ottoman State to reward his services to Britain’s policies in Egypt and the Sudan55.

Bad parochial relations with an immigrant Christian minority also fed his solidarity with the Turks before Europeans in regard to Greek nationalism. The Kamilists’ support for the Ottoman State in the 1897 war brought tensions with Egypt’s resident Greeks near flash-point.

Kamil hastily returned to Egypt from Paris in 1897 (as he wrote to Juliette Adam) to head off near-successful attempts by the British to incite resident Greeks to rise up and attack "the Muslims". Kamil's statements in Egypt worsened Greek-Muslim relations. He publicly proposed to the victorious Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid that Turkey not withdraw from Thessal until Britain withdrew from Egypt. The proposal triggered off an accusation by the Greek-owned Phare d'Alexandrie that Kamil was anti-Greek. Kamil's perceptions of Greeks in Egypt were very much religious. In 1895 he told the French that the Greeks living among the non-fanatical fallahs in Egypt's villages "traffic in alcohol and take interest, both prohibited in the Muslim religion".

Although parochial sourness was important, Kamil and fellow acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals had also been exposed from formative adolescence to articulations of Greek nationalist ideology by resident Greek journalists. Those local French newspapers and such Hellenophile metropolitan French organs as La Nouvelle Revue built up a substantial feel for the historical view of Greek Nationalism among Kamilists --- who evoked it to mollify Egypt's Greeks to the extent possible while supporting Turkey against Greece. An instance was Mustafa Kamil's reply, published in Alexandria's French-language La Reforme in mid-1897, to attacks by the Greek John Haicalis in his Phare d'Alexandrie upon Kamil's proposal that the Ottoman State withdraw from Thessaly only when Britain withdrew from Egypt. Kamil urged Egypt's Greeks to respect our views as we respect yours. You see things from the angle of the interest of the Greeks while we see them from the vantage-point of Egypt's interests. It is only just that each of us should be sincere in devotion to his homeland ... Regardless of all these politic considerations, and the sensitivities of our ummah (nation), we do appreciate the patriotism of the Greeks, for any Egyptian cannot but respect all who defend their homeland whatever their nationality might be.

It was not only when conducting intercommunal diplomacy for Egypt's independence that Kamil expressed interest in the ideologies motivating the struggles of Christian nationalities against the Islamic Ottoman State. He showed in communications to his Egyptian followers a genuine analytical interest in more secular aspects of these anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim movements.

Kamil early recognized that these Christian nationalities had a more advanced stage of

56. Rashad, Mustafa Kamil p. 113.
57. Ibid pp. 113-114.
organization, and held them up as the model according to which Egyptians should organize their own independence movement. A letter by Kamil to his followers from Paris in 1895, widely diffused among the general Egyptian public by its publication after his death in 'Ali Fahmi Kamil’s collection, applied to anti-Ottoman Christian nationalities the very positive Kamilist term “Easterners” (šarqiyinā) and held up their nationalist activism for emulation:

Do you not have in some Eastern races like the Serbs, Bulgarians and others a tremendous lesson? Remember now the Armenians who do not flag one instant in founding societies and delivering speeches although they have never before known the meaning of independence, and who to date have never tasted the sweetness of unity of action and freedom from the dead hand of foreign [rule] over their country in the way that you yourselves tasted their sweetness in the age of the noble Khedivial dynasty. Besides that, they have no right entitling them to win their demands, whereas your rights are the greater of rights. You have no way to recover them except through publicizing the facts in Europe and seeking her help 60.

In at least this formulation, Kamil demonstrated some preparedness, then, to view the Ottoman government like the Armenian nationalists, as "foreign" rule by one nation over another in Armenian-populated areas. Kamil did take a stride in this 1895 letter towards a true nationalist world-view, which would accept secession by non-Turkish nationalities from the Ottoman Empire as natural as Egypt’s --- still much more legalistic --- struggle for independence from British rule.

Contact with anti-Ottoman Greek nationalism helped Ahmad Hilmi to develop towards such an atomistic secular-nationalist world-view. In a 1906 al-Liwa’ article, Hilmi denied the reality of supposed supra-national communities, pan-Christian or pan-Muslim, inspired by emotions. He argued Egyptians would not when they regained independence from Britain reamalgamate Egypt in the Ottoman State merely because Turks were fellow Muslims. Cultural factors, or common European identity, played no role at all in the support that Russia gave to the early struggle of the Greeks for independence from the Turks’ rule. European states were motivated by cold self-interest; they therefore still would give the same support to an effective Egyptian independence movement that Russia gave to the Greeks’ original independence struggle. Hilmi’s latter thesis had an acculturated impulse to keep up the fruitless lobbying of Europe, and to negate the growing sense in the Kamilist movement that European states, as a virtual camp,

60. 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil Basha fi Arba’a wa Thalathina Rabi’an v. 3 p. 65.
discriminated between Muslims and Christians in "the East".

Hilmi’s fair knowledge of Greek nationalism might, as with Kamil, have been picked up from the resident Greek journalists who owned or published in local French papers. His 1906 article was reasonably well-informed on the nature of the Philiki Etaireia ("Friendly Band") "terrorist" organization founded in 1814 at Odessa to launch the liberation of Ottoman-occupied Greece from the sanctuary of Russian soil. The Russian Tsar Alexander I's patronage of, and material support for, the Greek uprising for independence Hilmi interpreted not as due to the Tsar being "a lover of the ancient Greeks" (or to common Orthodox Christianity?) but a tactic in power-politics --- an attempt by the Russian to weaken his great antagonist, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud. Despite his obvious dislike for the Philiki Etaireia terrorists, Hilmi added that like then the Egyptians could also get the European powers’ support against occupying Britain "if we get u and act"61.

This article was another example of the Kamilists seeking to learn about the ideology and techniques of all nationalist groups, even the most anti-Ottoman and anti-Islamic, with the purpose of adapting their methods where suited to Egypt’s own struggle for independence. Muhammad Farid in late 1908 similarly expressed respect for the energy and skill with which the Bulgarians and their monarch had wrested independence, while voicing al-Hizb al-Watani’s ongoing support for the Ottoman State’s suzerain rights over Bulgaria62. The Kamilists’ inherent pan-Muslim connection with the Turks, and the genocidal lack of pity which insurgent Slavs, Bulgaria ar


al-Liwa’ would vituperatively deny the Christians of that Ottoman province title to secede ---
despite their own insistence on British evacuation. al-Liwa’s engaged highlighting of
Christian-Muslim slaughter in such faraway Ottoman provinces as Macedonia, like its coverage of
 conversions to, or progress of, Islam in China and India, alienated such more secular and open
Copts as Salamah Musa from Kamil’s independence movement. Although more diverse than
usually imaged in the literature, Kamilist pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottoman Turks did
hamper the non-sectarian territorial nationalism Kamil professed, and thus a united independence
movement, from getting off the ground. Yet the Kamilists kept it up because they cared about the
Turks and Muslims in the Balkans, as well as Coptic fellow-Egyptians.

The ill-controlled and unpredictable character of Kamilist responses to anti-Ottoman

63. Traumatized by the mass killings of Muslims, al-Liwa’ in 1903 condemned the refusal of Bulgar
independence fighters to collaborate with the Ottoman reforms conducted by Governor Husayn Hilmi in Macedonia.
"Those are the evil souls which blew up houses and castles and assassinated pure men, made orphans of children and
devastated their land. They claim that the Ottoman State (may Allah protect it!) treats them with a constant oppressor
and injustice that are incompatible with any code, so that they have sought independence through threat and menace"
"Lima Qataluhum wa Hum Abriya’?" (Why Have They Killed Them When They Are Innocent?), al-Liwa’ 15 Augus
1903 p. 1. The complex, bitter, prolonged Macedonian problem, including the religious and ethnic diversity of its
population, and the subversion by rivals Bulgaria and Greece that intensified the slaughter, are surveyed by Stanford
and Ezel Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press 1976-1977) v. 2 pp. 207-211. Macedonia contained Turkish-speaking and Slavic Muslims, slightly
outnumbered by Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks and Vlachs. This degree of diversity had no equivalent in Egypt; and Husay
Hilmi (to become Ottoman Grand Vezir in 1909) no doubt carried out his reforms in the "excellent" manner al-Liwa’
imaged. The fact remains that al-Liwa’ advised the Macedonian Orthodox to accept Ottoman status and an Ottoman
military presence while denouncing Egyptian Ministers who worked with British "advisers". "Had our ministers
shared our nation’s patriotic feelings... not a single [British] soldier would remain to... make the hearts [of Egyptians
bleed with his sight]." Sayyid ‘Ali, "Hadhihi Natijat al-Istislam Ayyuhal-Wuzara‘' (This is the Consequence
of Surrender O Proud Ministers), al-Liwa’ 8 April 1908.

64. ‘Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot assessed that Kamil’s "support for Turkey on religious grounds... frighten
away" from his movement many prominent or gifted Copts attracted by its drive for independence and Egypt-centric
motifs. al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer p. 160. Salamah Musa’s social radicalism, marked even from his yout
before World War 1, was rare in his sect, but he did faithfully illustrate some perceptions --- and misunderstandings
about --- Muslim Egyptian pro-Ottoman pan-Islam that alienated from Kamil Copts who might otherwise have join
up. In his 1927 al-Yawm wal-Ghad, Musa depicted the Khedive ‘Abbas, al-Mu’ayyad and Mustafa Kamil as
responsible for "an apostasy from the patriotic idea": all "returned to Islam as the community bond (jami‘at al-Islam;
saying that Egypt was a possession of the Ottoman State. Musa vehemently assailed al-Mu’ayyad and al-Liwa’ for
claiming that Egyptians were "Ottoman [subjects] obliged to fight the Macedonians to defend ‘Abdul-Hamid and his
subjects, that ‘Abdul-Hamid was the Caliph of the Muslims whom every Egyptian was duty-bound to obey. Mustafa:
Kamil and the editors of his paper almost caused a communal clash among [the Muslims and] Copts through this
stupidity and raving". Musa’s al-Yawm wal-Ghad cited Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 p. 225. In hi
1947 autobiography, Musa again wrote that the collective Coptic minority shunned the nationalism articulated by
al-Liwa’ and al-Mu’ayyad because it mingled recognition of Ottoman suzerainty with demands for Egypt’s
face value, as a dangerously unitary Ottomanism, al-Mu’ayyad editor ‘Ali Yusuf’s call for Egyptians to send
representatives to the CUP-restored Ottoman Parliament; ibid p. 34. This missed Khedive ‘Abbas’ "Arab Caliphate"
undermining of all Istanbul regimes --- and that Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid assessed Yusuf’s call as only ‘Abbas’ ploy to
block an Egyptian constitution or parliament: Ch. 6, fn 53 (A 304).
Christian nationalisms has to be stressed. The Kamilists were not able to synthesize together the sectors of the world-view they evoked. The availability of multiple perspectives in al-Liwa', some of them relatively open or cold-blooded, fleshed out the Serbs, Greeks, Armenians and Bulgars to Egyptians, making their voices heard with that immediacy enemies have in modern multi-lingual nationalisms. Moreover, as each people in a string of Christian nations is concretized, the oppose Christian camp takes form. French and British publications and politicians had made the threat to the Ottoman Empire of those Christian nationalisms central in the minds of the Kamilists. Kamilist counter-solidarity with the Turks (pan-Islam) --- modern and acculturated --- had many features symmetrically patterned by the pan-Christianism underlaying British and French support for Greeks and Armenians. Kamil was surely correct that Europeans had no right to deny him his mirror-retort as atavistic "fanaticism" --- although it was precisely this charge in Western languages that could spiritually fuse the Kamilists with threatened Turkish and Slavic Muslims.65

THE WIDER PAN-MUSLIM WORLD

The present section analyses later, 20th-century communications of the Kamilists denouncing subjugation or mistreatment by Europeans other than the British of Muslim populations outside Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. We choose Kamilist views of European imperialism in the later period in which they reacted against general Europe.

The section will trace the intellectuals' mounting sense, as they reject the West, that religions determined international political actions and associations.

Steppat underscores the campicizing comprehensiveness of Kamil's reaction against Europe when it did not respond to his early appeals on Egypt's behalf. Europe never freed a single Muslim nation. The Dutch tyrannized the Javanese, Austria confiscated the religious properties of the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina (detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878), Russia the wealth of Kazan's Muslims. Europeans oppressed Muslims in the Caucasus, the Crimea, Algeria, Tunisia, India and Zanzibar.66 In his earlier hopef approaches to Europe, Kamil's concern was concentrated upon narrower segments of the world's

Muslims: upon his Egyptian nation and the Muslims of the contiguous Ottoman state. He initially pursued in Europe Egypt's and the Ottoman State's interests with talk of a vague wide "Muslim world". Smarting from Europe's indifference to Egypt's cause, Kamil then developed a sharp Muslim internationalist consciousness. He frequently denounced European governments that had done Egypt no harm, for ill-treating around the globe distant Muslim populations with which Egypt had few contacts or common secular interests. Steppat credits Kamil with popularizing consciousness of a far-flung "Muslim world" in Egypt: al-Liwa had a Muslim correspondent in Calcutta and was distributed as far as Singapore.

The Problem of "Fanaticism"

The Muslim intellectuals' treatment of European imperialism in the Muslim world was given direction by their acculturation. Thus, they addressed the Europeans' concept of "religious fanaticism" almost as much as real military, administrative and economic phenomena of imperialism in Muslim lands. The intellectuals' attempts, even in Arabic, to harmonize their promotion of the causes of Muslim populations with modernist repudiation of religious fanaticism show that they continued to hear the criteria evoked in liberal European intellectualism.

Wendell has outlined the appearance of the problem of "fanaticism" among Muslim intellectuals in the nineteenth century. He argues that pious Muslims, and even the in some respects non-traditional Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, found difficulty in understanding "the nature of the accusation" of fanaticism made against Muslim populations by expansionist Westerners. Wendell shows the affinity of (a) Kamil's argument that fanaticism in Egypt was due to ignorance of true Islam and would disappear when the Muslims were adequately educated in their religion with (b) similar early argumentation by 'Abduh. The use of the charge to screen Britain's record in Egypt from scrutiny enraged Egyptians as never before in the wake of Dinshawi. al-Liwa' in 1906 quoted British Foreign Affairs Secretary Sir Edward Grey's dismissal of Egyptians' reactions to Dinshawi as "fanatical". Grey predicted that as their

69. Kamil's view ibid p. 253; 'Abduh's p. 199.
political thinking advanced they would become disillusioned with pan-Islamism. Kamil, in England around that time, tried hard to refute credence there that Egyptians opposed the Occupation out of atavistic "religious fanaticism" against Christians.

Grey's argument that the fanaticism of the Egyptians was linked to related Muslim fanaticism against France in North Africa was granted a hearing among colonialist-expansionist circles in France. A Catholic Syrian friend of Kamil, Shukri Ghanim, tried to reassure the French from Eclair that there was no "fanaticism" in Egypt against Christians in general: writing from Cairo, a French journalist replied in Le Temps that Kamil fitted Grey's analysis, and that his pan-Islamic movement was indeed out to subvert French authority in Tunisia and Algeria. Rising to its imperial responsibilities, Le Temps assessed that elite Algerians and Tunisians were reading Egyptian pan-Islamic journals and that 100 --- "far too many" --- were studying at al-Azhar. But North Africans were necessarily accepting irreversible French settlement and municipal elections, forgetting Islam: it was in French sub-Saharan Africa (eg. Zinder) that pan-Islamic fanaticism fanned from Egypt still might harm. However, the anti-Muslim, imperialistic Louis Bertrand (1866-1941) heightened French fears of the effects that Kamil's

70. Summary of Sir Edward Grey's speech and an Egyptian reply in "al-Jami'at al-Islamiyyah wal-Siyasat al-Injiliziyah" (Pan-Islamism and British Policy), al-Liwa' 8 July 1906. Grey's bracketing of Egyptian and North African discontent as "fanaticism" caught French attention, and also ignited even the fury of Copts like Salamah Musa when the British-subsidized al-Muqattam used the motif to justify Dinshawai executions. Musa, Education pp. 31-33. "Although Grey defended the policy [of the British in Egypt following Dinshawai] and contended that severe action was warranted in the light of the growing Muslim fanaticism in Egypt, his defence was only lukewarm. The private correspondence of Liberal-imperialists like Grey reveals that they, too, were extremely embarrassed by the harshness of the British policy". Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 283.

71. Andre Servier, Islam and the Psychology of the Musulmans Tsd A.S. Moss-Blundell (London: Chapman and Hall 1924) p. 260. Servier was a shadowy but spasmodically well-briefed writer who may well have worked in some French agency; his book was in gestation in the pre-War years. He characterized al-Liwa', al-Muqattam and (sic) al-Jaridah as "tribunes of Islam" that threatened French rule in North Africa. Ibid. Servier's tenth chapter, "The Nationalist Movement in Egypt", described Mustafa Kamil Pasha as the "the leading spirit" of a new, more dangerous form of pan-Islamism. Although not as primary as alarmist French operatives feared, Lutfi and the Jaridists did have their pan-Muslim and proto-pan-Arab twinges that made them sympathetic to North African Muslims under French rule: A 259-260.

72. Anon (from Egypt), "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte", 22 August 1906.

73. "Le Pan-Islamisme en Afrique", Le Temps 23 August 1906 p. 1. Although somewhat concerned at the possibility of coordinated resistance by widely separated populations, Le Temps --- and the French ruling class for which it spoke --- could also rein in its fears. An editorial perceiving Muslim ferment throughout the whole of Asia, portrayed Muslims attacking Armenians and Russians in the Caucasus, identified the mullahs as the crucial group responsible for the Shah's conceding of an Iranian National Assembly, and saw Mustafa Kamil as a sinister agent of Istanbul --- yet, against British paranoia, assessed that few Indian Muslims, whatever their respect for the (Ottoman) "Caliph", wanted to give him any political authority over them. "L'Effervescence Musulman en Asie", Le Temps 2 August 1906 p. 1.
movement might have on Muslim Algeria.\textsuperscript{74}

By 1906, Kamil and his colleagues saw "fanaticism" and linked motifs as a common European imperialist ethos able to band Christian European states together as a broad bloc against the Muslim populations that they colonized. The article of attack from Cairo contemptuously crushed Kamil's claim that he led an enlightened elite intent to bridge Western civilization and Islam: modern-educated Egyptians were an insignificant handful and Islam and the West's humanism irreconcilable\textsuperscript{75}. In reply, Kamil defended \textit{al-Liwa}'s printing of letters from Algerians and Tunisians --- their only way to get their "suffering" and the arbitrary "asphyxiation" and "enslavement of human beings" across to France: "Egypt's Muslim newspapers" were "criticizing" France for her own self-reform, not "attacking". Unlike Muhammad Farid's attacks on France, Kamil did not, at least here, evoke shared Arabness while bracketing (a) Egypt and (b) Algeria and Tunisia as all Muslim. His response was pan-Muslim, rather than Arabist. Kamil retained a residue of his old attitude that France could be better than Britain: \textit{al-Liwa} had praised more well-intentioned governors such as Jonnart who honor France in Algeria --- but then he distinguished two Frances, the political and the scientific-literary. France had long before abandoned Egypt, whose nationalists now relied on themselves\textsuperscript{76}.

Kamil, then, kept on addressing the French even after Egypt's short-term interest had less to hope, given that they had become Britain's "best friends and auxiliaries"\textsuperscript{77}. His ultra-acculturated elite retained some emotional cultural bonds with France that kept them talking, and some sense of difference from non-Westernized North Africans whom splendidly-endowed France could have uplifted with a different approach. It showed the widening of the Kamilists' delimitation of inner indigenous community that he tried to get how "the Muslims" of Algeria felt across to a French establishment that drew calm satisfaction from all its achievements there. France, universal as ever, will continue to print your Parisian cadences, Moustafa, although haven't you fully worked out yet that only Gaul-like Aryanoid Berbers who have the blue eyes and renounce Islam can have scope to prosper, in their station, in

\textsuperscript{74} Ghali, \textit{L'Egypte Nationaliste} p. 43. This, though, would have been mainly in \textit{Le Mirage Oriental}, published after Kamil's death in 1909.
\textsuperscript{75} "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte" \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{76} Kamil, "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme", \textit{Le Temps} 8 September 1906 pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
our new Algeria department --- its Arabs with your olive skin and crimped hair, because their fanaticism refused to fit in, have bound themselves off for extinction.\textsuperscript{78}

On the whole, France’s antipathy to Islam and Muslims, and her colonialism, was fusing her with Britain --- and fusing Algeria with Egypt --- for the now intensely campist Kamilists.

\textbf{Crude Secular Explication of Colonialism and Muslim Resistance: Zinder, West Africa.}

The previous Chapter excerpted 1906 London press statements in which Kamil disdained the sub-Saharan Black African Muslims of Zinder as (along with traditional, illiterate Moroccans) a separate category from the sectionally self-Westernizing Egyptians. A side of him was inclined to accept French claims that anachronistic Islamic "religious fanaticism" motivated discontent against colonial rule there.

A few days after its account of Grey’s "fanaticism" speech, \textit{al-Liwa'} printed a front page item ironically headlined "Islamic Fanaticism" ("al-Ta’assub al-Islami") on a supposed attempted revolt in what had since 1899 been the French-occupied town of Zinder\textsuperscript{79}. Zinder is situated on the northern margin of the West African Soudan and had importance in the early twentieth century as an exporium of the textiles and spices trade across the Sahara between the Hausa

\textsuperscript{78} In 1906, \textit{Le Temps} brushed aside with statistics any misgivings that the European settlement and agricultural development of Algeria had been at the expense of the natives, or would seriously harm them in future. The colons had developed much of their fertile agricultural lands from previously uncultivated waste-land. Europeans had had to confiscate some very fertile lands from Algerians, yet although the lands that remained in the hands of Algerian farmers now were poor for the most part, their adoption of some European techniques had more than compensated by raising yields. The Algerian peasants and landowners were learning the value of the market-place: it would draw them into a mutually profitable community with Europeans in which Islam would be forgotten. The fair-haired, blue-eyed Berbers were predestined to flourish in partnership with the French community in the new Algeria: in this process, though, "the Arab element which refuses to adapt to our way of life necessarily will be eliminated". "Une Enquete Sur La Colonisation en Algerie: Les Effets de la Colonisation Sur La Societe Indigine", \textit{Le Temps} 24 August 1906 p. 1. In a 1904 call for "rational [European] settlement of North Africa", Albert de Pouvourville sharply distinguished the Berber race, stable or increasing in number, from the Arabs in Algeria. That conquering race, in Algeria only to prey on and enslave the country "following the method of Mahomet", lost its reason to exist when the French wrested away its power: "the old [Arab] ruling race is diminishing day by day, and the time is not distant when it will completely disappear". Albert de Pourvourville, "Peuplement Rationnel de l’Afrique du Nord", \textit{La Nouvelle Revue} 15 September 1904 pp. 147-8, 153. Ageron has synthesized a grim survey of massive land confiscations, the pauperization and deliteratization of the rural Algerian population, responding savagely-suppressed revolts, and routine French political repression, throughout the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. Charles-Robert Ageron, \textit{Modern Algeria: A History From 1830 to the Present} (London: C. Hurst 1991). The contribution of the colons to Algeria’s economic development, and the prejudice they faced because of Spanish or Italian origins from the real French, has been stressed by Prochaska, but he, too, documented the destruction of indigenous Algerian institutions and society. David Prochaska, \textit{Making Algeria French} (Cambridge University Press 1990).

\textsuperscript{79} "al-Ta’assub al-Islami" (Islamic Fanaticism), \textit{al-Liwa’} 29 July 1906 p. 1.
states of the South and the Tuareg lands and Tripoli in the North. The city thus had long had economic and ethnic as well as religious bonds with the North African wing of the Arab World. Prior to the 1899 conquest, Zinder had been the capital of a Muslim dynasty established in the eighteenth century.

al-Liwa rejected the claims of Temps that the motive of the 1906 unrest in Zinder was religious fanaticism when incidents more violent and terrible than that are undertaken against Christian governments by their Christian subjects seeking freedom, justice and equality. Why do the French say that the motive of the population of Zinder is religious, not political, when the misdeeds that the rulers commit against the subjugated force the latter finally to sacrifice their blood for liberty and independence?

The formal argument of the al-Liwa item on Zinder --- as Ahmad Hilmi argued about the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Russia --- thus marginalized religion in international politics. Secular political and socio-economic interests mainly, motivated the French to conquer and fired the (Muslim) West Africans to revolt against them. The item equates violent resistance by Zinder’s Muslims against non-Muslims with social, economic and political uprisings by oppressed Christian social groups and nations against other Christians in Europe. It is strikingly secular to award the same inevitability to both. These sub-Saharan African populations are Muslim. But the political independence or sovereignty for which they revolt is not motivated by either their or their oppressors’ sect. The same violence would automatically break out when any nation deprived another of its natural political sovereignty even if both had one faith.

However, an article’s emotional impact can be different from its formal argument. In answering French arguments, al-Liwa took up the Islam-versus-Christianity perspective of France’s colonial Governor-General Roume and of a conservative and sometimes jingoistic French newspaper. Le Temps’ perceptions did (qualifiedly) prod the Liwa’ists to connect Muslim discontent in French West Africa, unrest against French rule in North Africa, Egypt’s

80. Art. "Zinder", EB (MCMII) v. 33 p. 927. From the French exploration and geographical literature, especially the 1899 account of Feureau, this article described turn-of-century Zinder as “a large and fine town surrounded with high earthen walls, very thick at the base and pierced with seven gates. It covers a large area, and its houses, in part built of clay, in part of straw, are interspersed with trees, which give the place a pleasing aspect”. Ibid. Zinder is today situated in South Central Niger and is the town centre of an important peanut-producing region of Africa. The town served as the capital of French West Africa until 1926: unrest in 1906 could threaten France’s hold over the region.
81. "Zinder" EB (MCMII).
Kamilist pan-Islam that definitely did fuel the latter, and an Ottoman State whose will and capacity to harm the French overrated (Le Temps was chafing at the bit to hit the Ottomans in Libya)\(^\text{83}\). The French press impressed upon Egyptians the Islamophobia of all European powers, and that Islam was one bond with sub-Saharan Africans under French rule.

**Secular-Islamic Duality.** Robert Tignor has drawn attention to duality in Mustafa Kamil’s accounts of the West’s imperialism. On the one hand there was his neo-traditionalist "emphasis on the anti-Muslim drives in European civilization". On the other hand, notes Tignor, Kamil was indebted to European leftist thinkers for concepts of imperialism as "economically motivated, undertaken for the purpose of exploiting Egypt’s resources"\(^\text{84}\). This powerfully supra-Egyptianizing synthesis of religious and left-secular perspectives was present in Muhammad Farid’s 1903 account of French rule in Tunisia and Algeria. Before the 1904 Entente ended the last hopes that France might break ranks with England and take Egypt’s side, Farid already in 1903 lamented the "ill-fate" that brought Tunisia and Algeria "under French colonialism". On the one hand Farid stressed agrarian dispossession, "the unjust laws that France issued in Algeria and had others issue in Tunisia to rob the lands of the tribes" and hand them over to French colons. Here, he viewed French colonialism as motivated by material-economic drives to seize property, natural resources and wealth from the indigenous inhabitants.

On the other hand, however, Farid described French actions in Algeria and Tunisia as also motivated by religious-confessional fanaticism or ta’assub: "the fanaticism of the French against the Arab". Basing himself on Muhammad Abduh’s impressions during a 1902 visit to Algeria, Farid stressed the damage that agrarian dispossession by the French did to the religious-charitable

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83. *Le Temps* had described the Zinder incidents as "of a local nature": it nonetheless related the Zinder unrest to other "sporadic" wider "effervescence" in West Africa "mainly due to religious fanaticism" --- although therefore "devoid of political importance" according to M. Roume, Governor General of French West Africa. Among manifestations of Muslim fanaticism, Roume mentioned the assassination of Lieutenant Fabre at Nyame, and the murder of two guards at Kokobitanda. "Les Incidents de Zinder", *Le Temps* 20 July 1906 p. 1. The "Zinder plot" was one symptom of a "religious fanaticism that is manifesting itself at various points, widely separated from each other, in our African territories". "Le Complot de Zinder", *al-Liwa* 23 August 1906 p. 2; directly above this appeared the item "Arrestation d’un Agitateur en Algerie". Aware of the volatility of Zinder and other possessions in the Soudan, *Le Temps* elsewhere advocated that France maintain its prestige by occupying the two oases of Djanet and Bilma, over which the Ottoman State claimed jurisdiction from Tripoli. With insulting ominousness, it warned the Ottoman State not to foolhardily assert any claim. "Djanet et Bilma", *Le Temps* 3 August 1906 p. 1. In November, *Le Temps* charged that riders driven off with heavy loss of life from a French post at Bilma had come from Tibesti at the instigation of Turkish authorities in the Fezzan. "Affaires Coloniales: un Incident a Bilma", *Le Temps* 10 November 1906 p. 1.

Islamic awqaf. While Farid perceived economic drives in French colonialism, he thus additionally popularized that anti-Muslim, Christian hostility to Islam also motivated its "oppression" of the Algerians and Tunisians.

More secular analyses of imperialism and resistance from Kamilist acculturateds could draw on those already installed in the Afghanist-'Abduhist classicoid view of overall indigenous history. 'Abduh had earlier alternated non-religious, cold-blooded responses to French imperialism with Islamist ones in various turn-of-century replies to Gabriel Hanotaux, French historian and a former Foreign Minister (1894-1896). From al-Mu'ayyad, 'Abduh described France as cynically manipulating Catholic missionary activity and education abroad to gain control over the Islamic lands, notably the Ottoman Empire --- in particular Lebanon/Syria, which he had viewed as an exile. In France itself, he derided, the very same laicist French governments expelled Jesuits and limited the Church's authority. 'Abduh characterized that differences of religions did not much motivate either French colonial policies or resistance by the Algerians to the French: "if the entire French nation embraced Islam, with M. Hanotaux at the fore, but still treated non-French people in the fashion familiar in Algeria and Madagascar, could it hope that the populations of its colonies would... not seize any opportunity to revolt?" This is like the Zinder item's affirmation that the colonized fight imperialists over secular sovereignty, not religion --- and states that a single religion cannot on its own impose or define a humane political community. But could the parallel struggles of Muslim Algerians and non-Muslim Madagascans against the same enemy open into some loose anti-imperialist political community or alliance that would span Afro-Asian sects?

Deep emotional hostility could narrow perceptions of imperialism by acculturated Egyptian writers: yet the 'Abduh-Manarist, Kamilist and Jaridist schools built up a diverse

85. Muhammad Farid, "Halat al-Jaza'ir wa Tunus" (The Condition of Algeria and Tunisia), al-Liwa', 29 September 1903. Farid wrote up his impressions of his repeated journeys to Algeria, Tunisia, (Ottoman) Tripolitania and --- in the best acculturated Arab-ethnicizing pattern --- Andalusia, in his 298-page book Rahlatu Muhammad Farid: Yusuf As'ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 1956) p. 635. 'Abduh had made his visit to Algeria in 1902, the year before Farid's al-Liwa' article. Advance notice of the visit in al-Manar had assured 'Abduh a good reception from local followers of his unusually liberal salafi Islamic revivalism, notably Shaykh 'Abd al-Halim Bin Simayah and Muhammad Ibn Mustafa Khojah. Muhammad Burj, "al-Jaza'ir fi Kitabat Muhammad 'Abduh" (Algeria in the Writings of Muhammad 'Abduh), al-Asalah (Algiers) December 1977 p. 23.
86. Burj, "al-Jaza'ir" p. 23.
87. Ibid p. 21.
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enough shared stock of angles on Western behavior to discipline their Islamic anger and help
them sidestep simplicism. 'Abduh’s ability in 1900 to take some of Islam’s lenses off and
scrutinize the French anew to figure out what really drove them was to persist in Egypt’s
Arabo-Islamic community tradition. The Young Men’s Muslim Association was to ascribe the
drive of the French to detach the Berbers from Arabic, Arabs and Islam through the mid-1930
dahir to the secular power drives that ‘Abduh had considered thirty years before. Accepting that
the French political establishment was truly laicist and anti-clerical, the YMMA analysed that
France was trying to break Islam in Morocco for the pragmatic motive that it was an obstacle to
the strengthening of her control. The non-Christian French ruling class promoted French
missionary activity as a catspaw for its imperial expansion: B 71-72 fn. Condemnations of
France in North Africa by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and his journal al-Risalah (from 1933),
developed the Kamilists’ and Jaridists’ interest and concern. However, despite his excellent
French and acquaintance with even some classical French works, al-Zayyat --- like Kamil and
Farid more than ‘Abduh --- was, in his denunciations, fixated on Christian, Islamophobic drives
in French misdeeds in the Arab West (B 259, 337).

Remote Muslim Populations Oppressed by Europeans: Russia’s Muslims, Indonesia

Other al-Liwa’ items lack such quasi-secular explanations of conflicts between Muslims
and Westerners in history. The Kamilists sometimes projected their religion-determined Muslim
international community identification out onto European colonialists almost mechanically,
without seeking the latters’ real motives. al-Liwa’ conveyed to Egyptians images of violence
and murder around the world by the most diverse range of Europeans against Muslims ---
explicating the attacks in terms of Christian “religious fanaticism”: it was in these terms that it
reported such remote massacres as an alleged 1906 Cossack pogrom against Muslim Ingush in
the Caucasus88. A failure to have a direct source that could provide facts from the area may be at
issue in an item about Indonesia carried by al-Liwa’ in August 1904. This consisted of a report
from its correspondent in Java (“limukatibina”) dated 21 July 1904 claiming a massacre of 100
innocent Muslim villagers by Dutch troops at Surabaya but headlined (as it seems by al-Liwa’)

"The Fanaticism of the Europeans against the Muslims" 89. There was much fighting between Dutch colonial armies and Muslims in Sumatra, particularly in Aceh, in 1904. But there does not seem to have been any clash at Surabaya comparable to that claimed by al-Liwa' 90. Rashid Rida tried to demonstrate that, despite its dateline, al-Liwa' did not truly have a correspondent in Java --- yet the Kamilists really may have been disinfomed by tawdrier pan-Islamists from there 91.

The Zinder item dismissed religious antagonisms as a false issue evoked to disguise from French public opinion the sordid politics of the subjugation of a West African population. The Surabaya item presents a more traditional, Islamoid conception of Europeans. Rather than alternation, though, blendings of selected old Islamic motifs with radical-modernist patterns enabled the Kamilists to integrate some unprecedented pan-Muslim relationships. The Kamilists' expanding links with Russia's faraway Muslims were an example. The Kamilists chose to evolve these not with traditionalist Islamic leaderships in Russia and Central Asia but with the opposed jadid movement, launched by the great Tatar educationalist Isma'il Gaspirali (1851-1914). This current wanted to lance out whole sectors of Sunni late-traditionalism and synthesize those heightened Islamic elements maintained with modern Western patterns. In Gaspirali's vision, though, there could be no salvation for individual Muslim nations outside a unified and regenerated world of Islam: he came to Egypt and in 1908 tried to initiate a Universal Islamic Congress to be held in Cairo. Excited by jadid attempts to perpetuate Islam within a modernization of Muslims, al-Liwa' declared in November 1907 that if the Islamic world could achieve a renaissance, this would be due to the efforts of the Russian Muslims so brilliantly represented by Gaspirali 92. By 1916 the jadidists were to have built 5,000 schools throughout the Tsarist Empire 93. al-Liwa' publicized, and took sides with, the vulnerable jadidists' efforts for a Reformation of Islam in all the still very medieval Central Asian statelets ruled from Russia: a 1904 item titled "Education in Bukhara" printed an inside jadidist view of the movement's

90. I am indebted to Dr Anthony Reid of the Australian National University for his observations on this matter.
91. Steppat, "Nationalism us" p. 282. Dr Reid has described misleading propaganda diffused over the Middle East, charging Dutch mistreatment of Indonesian Muslims, by Kiamil Bey, Turkish Consul-General in Batavia from 1897-9. There were attempts to define Indonesians, especially those of Arab descent, as Ottoman subjects. Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia", Journal of Asian Studies v. 26:2 (February 1987) pp. 267-283, esp. pp. 280-282.
educational endeavors in that ultra-hostile traditionalist city, a centre of immemorial religious schools and colleges\textsuperscript{94}. al-Liwa’s coverage of Russia’s Muslims placed emphasis upon educational matters\textsuperscript{95}.

The Kamilists got material aid through to Russia’s Muslims where needed. In 1907, Kamil organized throughout Egypt the collection of a fund for the relief of famine-stricken Muslims in Nukha\textsuperscript{96} in Adharbayjan. The money was conveyed to them through the Ramiev brothers, editors of the Ohrenburg Tatar journal Waqt (Vakit). A letter of thanks to Kamil was published immediately after his death in an Arabic daily al-Nahdah, which Gaspirali briefly edited from Cairo in early 1908\textsuperscript{97}. Pro-jadid Islamic theology students in Egypt were a bridge-elite with active command of classical Arabic. They and Gaspirali could not sustain the Arabic al-Nahdah, the hoped-for forum for a much more far-reaching conjunction of the Tsarist Empire’s self-Westernizing Reformed jadid Islam with the politically more vocal, but likewise acculturation-stimulated, Kamilist pan-Islam. Yet, the Kamilist press published both Arabic and French versions of Gaspirali’s addresses in Cairo\textsuperscript{98}. Translated extracts from Waqt articles also appeared in Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s al-Jaridah as well as the Kamilist media: these denounced the drive of Russian chauvinism to stop Muslims from taking part in the Tsarist Empire’s abortive post-1905 parliamentary politics (A 296 fn 36) --- also raised by Gaspirali in al-Nahdah. In his communications to Egyptians, Gaspirali (like al-Liwa’) condemned the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Thomas Kuttner, “Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World: Isma’il Gasprinskii in Cairo --- 1906”, Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique v. xvi: 3-4 (July-December) 1975 p. 389. For all the movement’s reverence for the West’s modernity, instruction in Arabic and in religious sciences with Arabic texts still took 53\% of teaching-time in jadid-influenced schools on the eve of the 1917 revolution. Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Harvard University Press 1960) p. 289.
  \item \textsuperscript{94} “al-‘Ulum fi Bukhara” (Education in Bukhara), al-Liwa’ 20 August 1904. Gaspirali’s account to his Egyptian readers of his 1893 visit to Bukhara, indicated that its Amir received him with official respect and munificent facilities. Gaspirali, though, voiced to Egyptians many criticisms of social decay and ignorance in that traditionalist Amirate. Kuttner, “Gasprinskii in Cairo” pp. 399-400.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} al-Liwa’ on 11 July 1906 (pp. 1-2) published accounts of the Association of Teachers at Baku, a petition by Crimean (Tatar) Muslims to the Duma, and the foundation by Muslims in Ashkabad of a scientific-industrial school. al-Liwa’ also carried a lengthy front-page round-up of news about Russian-ruled Muslims in its issue of 1 April 1908.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} Nukha is in the Northern part of the Adharbayjan Republic, on the south of the Greater Caucasus. The Russians conquered this former Khanate in 1806. Nukha is in a fruit-, rice- and silk-producing area: the city had 37,000 inhabitants in 1932. The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World (New York: Columbia University Press 1962).
  \item \textsuperscript{97} Kuttner, “Gasprinskii in Cairo” pp. 407-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{98} For some examples, ibid p. 421 fn 37.
\end{itemize}
Egyptian ruling classes' ill-treatment of the peasantry\(^{99}\): like the Kamilists, he sniped at late-Sunni scholastic education as the reason for Muslim backwardness, demanding new education that would incorporate the West's strength. Paralleling the Kamilists, he argued from \textit{al-Nahdah} that Muslim women had to be almost equally educated so as to effectively rear children in the home: he went beyond Kamil, however, by advocating deveiling and the right of women to work, for instance as government-school teachers, as the completely Westernized Polish Muslim women did\(^{100}\).

The encounters and exchanges between (a) Kamilist Egyptian pan-Muslims and (b) Turkic jadidists artistically repressed by the Russians, illustrate that small Muslim elites alienated from late Sunni Islam, rather than traditional clerics, have the strong Islamic community drive to link up across very great distances. The Kamilists and Jadidists both drew energy from combining (a) energetic borrowing of modernity from Westerners with (b) a sense of the same Westerners as malevolent subjugators and excluders of Muslims, with a camp or bloc the retort. Watanist Egyptians and Russia's Jadid intelligentsia did effectively use their media to exchange thought and experiences. The Kamilists showed that they cared for their distant coreligionists by delivering the aid required for their survival.

**POTENTIALITY FOR SECULAR MULTI-SECTARIAN AFRO-ASIAN COMMUNITY**

The section tests potentiality for multi-sectarian Afro-Asian community in Kamilist communications. The data, though, again underscores Islam's at least short-term ability to pervasively tint and determine the conceptualization of communities in this acculturated party.

\(^{99}\) For a denunciation by Gaspirali from his Arabic \textit{al-Nahdah} of the Egyptian ruling class' ill-treatment, exploitation and neglect of the ignorant Egyptian peasantry, \textit{ibid} pp. 406-407. The outburst may have been influenced by Russian populism as Kuttner speculates: he is wrong, though, that the Tatar modernist was introducing educated Egyptians to a more radical social consciousness. Kamil's \textit{al-Liwa'} had, years before in 1903, mordantly advised the Egyptian government and the British "advisers" who directed it to supply hygienic drinking-water to the Egyptian countryside, not just Cairo and Alexandria --- after all, epidemics that broke out in the villages would read them, too, in the end! "Miyah al-Sharb" (Drinking Water), \textit{al-Liwa'} 7 January 1903. \textit{al-Liwa'} thanked the Anglo-Jewish international financier and philanthropist Ernest Cassel (1852-1921) for his work to combat eye diseases in Egypt, such a contrast to the "remissness" of rich Egyptians. "Shukr al-Muhsin" (Thanking a Benefactor) \textit{al-Liwa'} 13 January 1903 p. 2. Cassel had organized Egypt's modern banking system and the financing of the construction of the Aswan dam, and was a close collaborator with Cromer. Tignor, \textit{British Colonial Rule} pp. 368-9, 222 and 373.

\(^{100}\) Kuttner, "Gasprinskii" p. 392.
1. Kamilist Responses to the Emergence of New Japan

The new self-modernizing, militarily powerful Japan made a more powerful impression upon the Kamilists than any other non-Muslim Afro-Asian group. Her defeat of Russia in the 1904-1905 war came at a time when France was coming to terms with her former enemy England and Egyptian nationalists had lost hope of aid from Europe. In a period when Westerners seemed to be drawing together against the East, Japan’s victory showed that Eastern peoples could achieve sovereignty and strength by their own efforts. Kamil’s reaction against general Europe was clear in a statement to French friends. "Are not the Japanese the only Oriental people which has put Europe in its place? How could I possibly not love them?" 101

As Kamil responded to Japan’s victory, his sense of a Muslim international community widened out to an Afro-Asian sphere of solidarity. Steppat analyses this as natural: the neo-traditional "Islam-Christianity antithesis" had been dormant at first in the young Kamil’s initially rather secularoid thought. It was the circumstances of the clash with the imperialist West that activated it, so that the dichotomy of Islam versus Christianity now "symbolizes" for Mustafa Kamil the opposition between the Orient and Occident. When Japan’s victory over Russia in the 1904-5 war suggested a new source of hope for Egypt against imperialism, Kamil’s feelings of pan-Islamic solidarity readily got "overlaid" with the broader Oriental solidarity-feeling 102.

Before we analyse Kamilist responses to victorious Japan, it might be noted that Japan’s self-modernization had impressed Middle Eastern Muslims even earlier, in the nineteenth century. Such interest was shown by both Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and by the Ottoman Sultan ’Abdul-Hamid. ’Abdul-Hamid had in 1890 sent the screw training-ship Ertogrul to Japan: however, that wooden vessel went down within sight of the Japanese coast (25 November 1890) 103. The attempts by pan-Islamic Turkey to link up with the new, militarily self-strengthening Japanese, however, were in conjunction with an impulse to Islamize them.

101. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283 fn 4. Kamil’s French friends, who had hitherto mainly seen his Francophile motifs, were disconcerted by his exultation at the downfall of Russia, an ally on which France depended. The article "al-Yabaniyyuna fi Biladihim" (The Japanese in their Land), al-Liwa’, 24 July 1904, spoke with scathing contempt not merely of Russia, but also of its ally France.
103. Art. "'Abd al-Hamid II", EI2 v. 1 p. 64.
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, during his second stay in Istanbul (from 1892), advised 'Abdul-Hamid how to achieve it. The Sultan was thinking of sending a delegation of his capital’s 'ulama', in accordance with an invitation from the Japanese Emperor, to spread Islam in Japan, but al-Afghani disagreed. "The 'ulama',", he replied, "have alienated the Muslims from Islam so it is most likely that they will turn the unbelievers against it. My view is that you should send some presents to the Emperor with a letter in which you shall promise him to meet his request, and that we then work hard to graduate/produce a group of 'ulama' fit to convey Islam’s message and able to approach missionary activity in a rational way"\(^{104}\).

Jamal al-Din had been alienated by rational sectors in the Islamic heritage, and by contact with the West’s thought, from traditional Islam and its clergy. Yet Islam still held as a basis for all positive international communities in his thought.

The Kamilists’ responses to the new Japan tested how much connection they kept up with Islamic tradition. Their preparedness to accept non-Muslim Japan, following its victory over Russia, as a model for reorganization and modernization of Muslim countries retreated from Islam as a comprehensive socio-economic order. \(\textit{al-Liwa}^\prime\) in August 1904 advertised Mustafa Kamil’s book \textit{al-Shams al-Mushriqah} (\textit{The Rising Sun}) as

the source from which Egyptians could understand Japan’s progress and development, the secrets of her power and greatness and the devotion that her leaders show in her service ... the most momentous lessons for the nations of the Orient that have been ignorant of patriotic sentiment so that they became disunited ... giving the foreigner sway over them\(^{105}\).

The non-Muslim Japanese had found answers to the challenges of life in the modern world that were independent of Islam. They provided an effective model for Muslim Egyptians’ own achievement of sovereign nationhood. The advertisement indicated that Kamil meant to provide Egyptians with detailed accounts of Japanese society, politics and geography.

Kamil himself planned to visit Japan. Such direct contact would certainly have been an important step towards establishing a real reciprocal relationship with the "Eastern" Japanese.


\(^{105}\). "al-Shams al-Mushriqah" (\textit{The Rising Sun}), \(\textit{al-Liwa}'\) 9 August 1904. "al-Yabaniyyuna fi Biladihim" (The Japanese in their Land), \(\textit{al-Liwa}'\) 24 July 1904, almost endorsed inhuman fanaticism antithetical to Islam. The article printed the report of a European traveller that a Japanese whose wife had died, and who found no one to care for his two children save himself, killed them in order to serve in the army. "The Homeland is dearer than these two" he cried, as he plunged in the knife.
He was, however, unable to make the visit.\textsuperscript{106}

Paradoxically, one al-Liwa' writer manifested his alienation from Egyptian traditionalist Islam while anticipating that Islam could be made a common element in relationship through conversion by the Japanese. The 1906 item was occasioned by a conference on world religions in Tokyo. The writer thought that the activity of Chinese, Indian, Tatar and British Muslims attending or in correspondence with the Conference had led the Japanese scholars present to show "some leaning towards us". The Conference had been convened in order to "make an overall review of the beliefs of the human race and choose from among them what would most suit their [Japanese] scientific and social-economic advancement". The Japanese might adopt Islam as they had adopted wholesale the West's scientific and industrial knowledge: hence, al-Liwa' alerted, preparations should be made for Egypt, as a centre of Islamic learning, to receive future delegations of Japanese scholars. They would want to join the al-Azhar university for instruction in Islam's traditional sciences (\textit{al-'ulum al-naqliyyah})\textsuperscript{107}, to return back to Japan after graduation to transmit their new knowledge to their people. This article clearly indicated the ambivalence of the modern-educated but believing Kamilists towards Arabo-Egyptian traditionalist Islamic learning. Bitingly, the al-Liwa' writer commented that al-Azhar should be radically reformed well in advance if the modern-minded Japanese were to master Arabic and Islam "since the Arab who speaks Arabic cannot after spending twenty years at learning Arabic in the Azharite fashion... correctly understand an eloquent \textit{maqal} (article/essay)\textsuperscript{108}.

The writer's contempt for the ineffectiveness of al-Azhar's timeworn methods in transmitting Islam and its "sciences" manifested the European-type education received by many in al-Hizb al-Watani. Maintaining continuity with the traditionally-educated pan-Islamic school of al-Afghani, however, the writer wanted to cull and upgrade the ancient Sunni religious learning, and its clerical elite, and incorporate them in international modernity, not eliminate

\textsuperscript{106} Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283 fn 4.
\textsuperscript{107} "\textit{al-'ulum al-naqliyyah}". Wendell gives a list of these traditional subjects of Sunni scholasticism. They included jurisprudence (\textit{fiqh}), theology (\textit{tawhid}), traditions of the Prophet (\textit{hadiith}), Qur'anic exegesis (\textit{tafsir}), Qur'anic recitation and such "sciences" of language as semantics and expression (\textit{ma'anı}), rhetoric (\textit{bayan}), stylistic embellishment (\textit{badi'ı}), logic (\textit{mantıq}), syntax (\textit{nahw}), and prosody (\textit{'arud}). Wendell, \textit{Egyptian National Image} pp. 205-206. The al-Liwa' writer thought the Japanese students and scholars who would come to Egypt should be instructed in the "pith" or "quintessence" (\textit{lubah}) of all these sciences, rather than exhaustively master them.
them. The acculturated Arabo-Islamism of al-Jaridah before 1915 and of Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat after 1930 would develop this impulse to take over and restructure Islamic learning and its clergy elite to then reapply them in Islamizing activity around the globe (A 287–288; B 300-302).

The contraction of the modern world, and the shared interest that far-flung Eastern populations now had unitedly to beat back the West’s power, might bring widely-separated Egyptians and Japanese into relationship. It would be founded upon radically different bases from preceding international communities of Egyptians that had been determined by contiguity and religion. Some Kamilists, however, refused to accept the terms of a novel secular situation. They wanted to make the Japanese "pillars of [the Muslims’] community/league (jami'atihim) and guardians of their unity". The Japanese would still have leadership as the model for self-strengthening modernization but within the constraints of membership in Islam’s 'ummah'. For attraction to become community, the Japanese would have to embrace Islam.

2. Kamilist Attitudes to Non-Muslim Negroes

As late as 1906, the acculturated Kamil had a reflex when addressing Europeans to dissociate Egypt from black Africans (Muslim as well as pagan) stereotyped as primitive in Europe (along with pre-colonial Moroccans). But as their all-embracing repudiation of the whole West gained momentum, the acculturated intellectuals whom Kamil headed declared their identification with powerless groups that Westerners despised and ill-treated the most. Met are condemnations, for instance, of Belgian atrocities in the Congo, committed to force the Blacks to grow rubber there. al-Liwa' expressed sympathy for Negroes facing discrimination and violence in the United States in two articles bitingly headlined "Hamajiiyyat al-Mutamaddinin" (The Barbarism of the Civilized People).

Neither Belgians nor Christian Americans had politically harmed Egypt or the Ottoman

111. One of these articles (al-Liwa' 8 March 1903, p. 1) assailed bigoted reaction among "both the elite and the masses of Americans" to President Theodore Roosevelt's gestures of inviting a black lecturer (Booker T. Washington) to dinner, or appointing an American black as head of a post office. The whites' reactions included threats from the Southern states to have Roosevelt assassinated as Lincoln had been. The other article under this heading (al-Liwa' 25 July 1904, p. 1) detailed violation by whites of black women in the USA's Southern states, lynchings and torture of a black man and his wife who fled from Doddsville, Mississippi, after being falsely accused of killing a white farmer.
State or Muslims. Long-standing Islamic hostility to a generalized "Abode" of Unbelief (narrowed to Western Christians by al-Nadim etc) continued in these intellectuals’ drive to condemn the whole Christian West. Some very distant Afro-Asian populations of course included Muslim minorities. The Kamilists’ channel of communication with such areas would tend to be the Muslim minority: they therefore imbibed and diffused those distant minorities’ viewpoints about non-Muslim neighbors. Propagating such viewpoints might hamper Muslim Egyptians’ development of a sense of affinity and community with non-Muslim Afro-Asians.

The Kamilists’ perceptions of black Africans demonstrate the problem. On one hand, *al-Liwa’* berated mistreatment by white Belgians and Americans of Negroes. But in 1903 it also diffused in Egypt rejection by Indian Muslims in South Africa of community with the country’s Africans. *al-Liwa’* printed an article from its correspondent in Pretoria condemning racist treatment by the British of South Africa’s Indians of whom a section was Muslim. However, the Muslim Indian writer did not absolutely oppose British racial segregation of public facilities etc: his objection was rather that the British were treating South Africa’s Indians on the same level as the Negroes (*al-‘abid --- "the slaves") "although we are as the Europeans in education, knowledge and perception". Although he accepted Gandhi as the political leader of all sects of Indians in the country, he manifested the same sense of social distance from Hindu Indians. The British forced the Muslim Indians to use, along with Hindu Indians and the Bantu, segregated post-offices with the sign "Hindu Post Office". This phrase infuriated the (Indian) Muslims "because the Hindus are the idol-worshippong pagans"112.


(a) Anti-Imperialist Territorial Patriotism. *al-Liwa’* approved the non-communal nature of mourning in Calcutta and Sylhet where Hindus and Muslims joined to express their sympathy to the Egyptian people at their loss of "Mustafa Kamil Pasha the great leader of the Egyptian patriots". The atmosphere evoked here is of bi-sectarian nations, the Indian and the Egyptian, determined by secular factors of territorial homeland, perhaps race, and history. These factors

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112. "Pretoria, fi 15 Shawwal li-Hadrati Mukatibina" (Pretoria, on 15 Shawwal from Our Esteemed Correspondent There), *al-Liwa’* 16 February 1903 p. 1. Cf. text of petition denouncing residential segregation submitted by Gandhi to Colonial Affairs Secretary Chamberlain during his visit to South Africa. *al-Liwa’* 1 March 1903, pp. 1, 2. Although unfriendly to Hinduism, the correspondent was prepared to accept Gandhi as the representative of Indians as a general entity including Muslims.
would distinguish Egyptian Muslims from Indian Muslims, while uniting Muslim Indians with Hindu Indians, and Muslim Egyptians with Copts. However, Kamil’s followers were made aware of Islam as a bond between Egypt and the Bengal populations in question. By his death, Kamil really had caught the attention of some up-and-coming young nationalist Hindu leaders in Bengal and other areas of India — his impact was not an illusion of al-Liwa’s Cairo head office. Already, Hindu communalism dogged the Indian nationalism of Sri Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950), editor of the Calcutta Bande Mataram: Ghose was well aware in his 1908 tribute that "the religious solidarity of Islam" had been pursued by Kamil alongside appeals to Europe to advance Egyptian independence — "but he never suffered it for a moment to interfere with the distinct existence of Egyptian Nationality". Thus, Kamil’s similar territorial-Egyptianist "patriotism" and the harm he did the common occupier outweighed his perhaps instrumental pro-Ottoman pan-Islam for Bengali Hindu Anglophobes.

The relationship with Indian militants deepened after Kamil’s death. In August 1909, al-Liwa even praised Madha Lao Dhingra, a 25 year-old Hindu from the Panjab who on 1 July 1909 had assassinated Lt. Col. Sir W.H. Curzon Whyllie, Political Aide-de-Camp to the Secretary of State for India, in London. Explosive members of al-Hizb al-Watani came to prefer militant nationalist Hindus over Muslim Indians whom — so Ibrahim al-Wardani, assassin of PM Ghali, perceived — collaborated with the British out of minority insecurity.

The Indian revolutionary Krishnavarna encouraged the exiled Watanis to proceed along the path of terrorism and insurrection: established lawyer-leaders such as Muhammad Farid were not

113. al-Liwa 14 April 1908. The deeply religious — but bi-sectarian — character of Bengal society was conveyed to Arab readers by the item. The meeting of mourning in Sylhet consisted of teachers and students: the headmaster chairing the gathering concluded his speech by urging the Muslim and Hindu students to go to their respective houses of worship to pray for God’s mercy for Mustafa Kamil’s spirit. The Calcutta meeting was chaired by Mawlana Sayyid Shams al-Huda “and was attended by a great gathering of leading Hindus and Muslims”. Those presiding announced that they would send condolences to Muhammad Farid, the successor as President of al-Hizb al-Watani and to Kamil’s family: the Bengali sympathisers thus had correspondence contact with Egypt’s pan-Islamic independence movement. Ibid.


116. For text A 135 fn 8. The Jaridists, too, tended to image that India’s Muslims were more liable to collaborate with the British than the Hindus, the pace-setters of the movement for Indian independence; eg. Lutfi al-Sayyid, October 1911 A 317.
enthusiastic\textsuperscript{117}.

(b) Sectarianizing, Divisive Islamist Drive. The Kamilists' recognition of bi-sectarian nationalities such as the Indian or Egyptian, each integrated by its struggle against British rule, anticipated key assumptions about the national and the Afro-Asian communities later developed in Nasirism. But \textit{al-Liwa}'s non-pragmatic commitment to Islam's propagation as a necessity for itself ran against such secularization of national and wider community. \textit{al-Liwa} in 1906 in its "Barid al-Islam" (Muslim World Reports) section reported that "four virtuous Brahmans have embraced the upright religion of Islam in the town of Lahore ... This results from India's '\textit{Ulama}' carrying out their religious duties as regards the propagation of Islam according to the Quran's precepts". It was time, \textit{al-Liwa} bitingly commented, that "all the 'ulama' of Islam fulfil their religious function" and convey the Quran to those non-Muslims from whom its teachings "are covered even today": would \textit{al-Liwa} even support a missionary movement to Islamize Christians in Egypt, as well?\textsuperscript{118} \textit{al-Liwa} presented China's Muslims as prosperous and flourishing: "as a result, the pagans there incline to them, entering into the religion of Allah in great multitudes"\textsuperscript{119}. Such Islamist coverage of China and India by \textit{al-Liwa} convinced such Copts as Salamah Musa that Kamil's independence movement was not for non-Muslims\textsuperscript{120}.

In covering India and China, then, \textit{al-Liwa} manifested two contradictory attitudes to the world. On one hand, it viewed multi-sectarian nations, each welded by a territorial homeland from diverse sects, as humanity's main community units. Territorial nationalism would direct energies very much to temporal politics, immediately to achieving the nation's independence


\textsuperscript{118} "Barid al-Islam" (Muslim World Reports), \textit{al-Liwa}' 11 July 1906. It is to be noted that unfulfilled plans by Kamil to travel to India were specifically to visit "Islamic India". Steppat, "Nationalismus" p.282 fn 4. Kamil's early images of Indian Muslims were --- perhaps quite acutely --- of their pan-Islamism: their preparedness to almost suicidally attack the British to defend the Ottoman State's Caliphate, without mentioning Indian independence as their goal. Kamil, "L'Angleterre et l'Islam", \textit{La Nouvelle Revue} 15 October 1895 p. 835. Haphazard pan-Islam: the Francophone Kamil won access to this Indian Muslim mood only because he had recently met an Englishman who translated for him the substance of an article in a Madras journal. \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{119} "al-Muslimuna fil-Sin" (The Muslims in China), 7 July 1906 p. 1. The phrase "entering into the religion of Allah in great multitudes" is a quotation from the Qur'an, surah 110 "al-Nasr" (Victory), describing the mass conversions of Arabia following the Prophet Muhammad's final triumph.

\textsuperscript{120} Salamah in his 1927 \textit{al-Yawm wal-Ghad}: "Mustafa Kamil out of his ignorance of our age's spirit used to inform us --- as the remnants of the editorial staffs of \textit{al-Mu'ayyad} and al-Hizb al-Watani continue to inform us Egyptians --- about Islam in China under the heading 'Islamic World News'". Quoted Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, \textit{al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir} v. 2 p. 225.
from Western colonial rule. Full-hearted commitment to territorial nationalities as the overriding human units would help the Kamilists clinch international anti-imperialist alliances with an Indian or Chinese political nation.

Attitudes of live-and-let-live towards each other's disparate religious beliefs would be crucial to (a) the viability of individual territorial multi-sectarian nationalities and (b) international alliances between them. But the Kamilists' religious side wanted Islam to advance sweepingly around the world at the expense of other faiths. Such rapid mass conversions to Islam in countries like India and China could not but activate communal tensions disruptive of territorial political nationalisms. Involvement by the Kamilist movement itself in Islamic missionary activity abroad would rule out alliance on the basis of secular common interests (anti-colonialism, modernization) with predominantly non-Muslim nationalisms, such as the Indian.

The tensions and dilemma about the wide East caused by the Liwa'ists' mix of elements unfolded over the next few decades in acculturated Egyptian Arabo-Islamism. Joint interests such as achieving independence from the same colonizer, cultural exchanges with Hindu Indians, and acculturated distaste for traditional Islam in India as in Egypt, all tended to facilitate an Egyptian conjunction with Indian nationalism from 1922. Paradoxically, though, the ultra-acculturateds' very preoccupation with modern international realities and transformations, their Westernized knowledge of new means to connect continents, simultaneously equipped them to become the directors of an international modernist Islamism that disrupts multi-sectarian nationalisms or Afro-Asianism. The balance in these intellectuals between (a) Arab-centric and modernizing dislike of the decidedly non-classical Islam of ordinary Indian Muslims and (b) religious gulf vis-a-vis non-Muslim Afro-Asians whom joint interests link to Egypt, was always very delicate. These Egyptian intellectuals could swing either way in regard to the wide multi-religious "East", in the 1930s and 1940s as in the time of Mustafa Kamil (eg. vis-a-vis Indians: B 60-4, B 90-3; B 170-176).

KAMILIST PAN-ISLAM: ASSESSMENT

The literature in Arabic as well as Western languages has tended to view the Ottoman-centred pan-Islamism of the party of Mustafa Kamil in terms of a modest carry-over or
residue from Islam: the Ottoman Empire was dwindling away, Egypt’s links with it progressively attenuating, and even the Kamilists were rigorous about an Egyptian nation and its need for a discrete state. Yet the Islamic Ottoman Empire as so habitual a part of the conceptual universe of Egyptians would continue to bulk large until World War I smashed it.

Our communications sampling highlighted more the experimental potency of Kamilist pan-Islam as a novel synthesis of (a) functional segments selected from Islam with (b) elements and patterns from the West. Scholarly discussion around whether the Kamilists would or would not have reincorporated (or confederated) Egypt into the Ottoman State has overlooked the unprecedented character of pan-Islam as a drive to effect with the West’s technologies a supra-statal camp-community to hold back the West. Kamilist pan-Islam alternated an impressive range of themes --- grippingly simple Islamic rituals, classical Arabs, contemporary holy war against Christian incursions, new crusades, the titanic contest for survival between two wide camps --- to galvanize Egyptians into modernizing behavior and enterprises modelled from the West, internally and regionally. The Kamilist bracketing of old Islamic motifs with even economic modernity today might look half-baked or preposterous or manipulative or transitional --- but may have affinities to some supra-nationalist rightist-Christian or pan-Latin ideas that after 1945 were to foster West European and pan-American counter-integrations against the communist camp.

For a colonized country, the Kamilists often effectively integrated their new, wide Muslim community. Their media did achieve patchy or selective exchanges of ideas and experiences with comparable West-tinged elites in the Ottoman Empire, India and even Muslim populations ruled by Russia. Nor did the exchanges stay cultural: they got not just Arabic books but some food to far-off hungry non-Arab Muslims. In their narrower supra-Arab region, they mobilized diverse Egyptian strata to help the Ottoman State build railways by which it could stop Britain expanding from Egypt. The Hijaz Railway was an effective instrument of regional power that did tighten the Ottoman Empire’s hold on the Arabian peninsula and proved hard for the British to destroy during World War 1. Although Kamilist pan-Islam had rational, instrumental enterprises patterned by the model enemy West’s capitalism, the West’s racist, Islamophobic and high literary discourses also ignited or inflamed other of its more subjective and emotionalist aspects. On the whole, Kamilist pan-Islamism was pervasively tinted and structured by a West
perpetually overheard through acculturation.

The Kamilists' ideological and political exchanges with Ottoman Turks were not superficial. In aesthetic matters the relationship could not match the knitting of Egyptian with other Arabs that the Kamilists fed by their promotion of a single standard language. Pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism politically retarded the evolution of an Egyptian-led pan-Arabism before 1919 to the extent that it led the Kamilists to stand with the Turks against autonomist or nationalist protests from Ottoman Arabs (Ch. 5). Yet Kamilist pan-Islam left long-term legacies to post-1922 Egyptian political pan-Arabism. Although sometimes only perceiving other Muslims, it increased interest in Algerian and other North African Arabs. It started the flow of Egyptian foodstuffs, guns and fighters to Libyans resisting Italy. And the Kamilists' attitude that sovereignty was larger than Egypt or any single Muslim state-unit, and their ceaseless discussion of modern economic instruments for integrating that camp, fostered a frame of mind that after 1922 was to try to integrate the Arabs with steamers, cross-investment and regional companies.
CHAPTER 5: ELEMENTS FOR ARAB NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN BRITISH-OCCUPIED EGYPT.

Chapter 2 presented ethnicizing stress by traditionally-educated pan-Islamists upon Islam’s Arab-led earlier conquests, wide empires and urban intellectual centers. This Chapter traces contemporary applications by the Kamilists of such Arab classicist motifs: to the parochial struggle between Arabic and Western languages, the definition of self in the face of imperialism, in internal Egyptian ethnicities, and to the regional relations with Ottoman Arabs and Turks.

Chapter 4 showed that Europe’s expansionism made the acculturated Kamilists close ranks with the Ottoman central government: we now see how long they stayed hostile to efforts by Ottoman Arabs to wrest powers or independence from Istanbul’s Turks. The pan-Islamic Kamilists urged Egyptians to donate to the Hijaz railway in order to tighten the Turks’ hold over their Arabian territories against Britain --- if also to help modernize "Arab brothers". This Chapter sets out countering Arab ethno-linguistic affinities that finally even led some Kamilists to cheer the Sharif Husayn’s 1916 Arab Revolt.

Two potential types of Arab identity or community are suggested by formulations to be examined in this Chapter. One is an identity combining Arabic with Islam --- a pan-Arab nation within Islam’s belief-community. But the present chapter also examines relations of Muslim Egyptians with resident Syrian Christians and Copts to test if the Arabic language and images of the classical Arabs’ past can detach from Islam to thread together divergent Arab sects and homelands of origin.

Accumulating Parochial Arab Ethnicity in Egypt

Nineteenth century Muslim Egyptians were conscious of at least partial descent from Arabian who had moved into Egypt during or following the Islamic conquest. Egyptian peasants expressed their sense of being Arab in distinction from the other Muslim ethnic groups by applying the proverb “the oppression of the Turks rather than the justice of the Arabs” to oppressive Arabic-speaking Egyptians appointed by Muhammad ’Ali as district governors, previously generally appointed from the Turks1. al-'Arab, however, also meant in spoken Arabic

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the Arab nomads of the desert by this period and Lane referred to a term awlad al-'Arab or sons of the Arabs with which Arabs living in houses described themselves². The terms awlad al-'Arab and abna’ al-'Arab (sons/children of the Arabs) was applied to Egypt’s general sedentary Arabic-speaking population in the second half of the nineteenth century to mark them off from other ethnic-linguistic groups. The Khedive Sa'id, in trying to replace Turks in (mainly lower ranks of) the administration in the 1850s addressed the Egyptians appointed as abna’ al-'Arab "making them responsible, in case of failure, for perpetuating the rule of abna’ al-Turk"³.

Arabness: Possibility for Christians? 'Abdallah al-Nadim and 'Ali Mubarak (Ch. 2) located Egyptians’ "forefathers" in "the Arab Nation" (al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah), viewed as a non-current Islamic ideological community. al-Nadim’s one-time constitutionalist comrade the Jewish Egyptian-nationalist journalist and playwright Ya'qub Sanu’ (1839 - 1912) in his 19th century play al-'Alil applied the term awlad al-'Arab to Arabic-speaking non-Muslim Egyptians, also. The true love of the man Mitri is about to be married off by her father against her will to a Monsieur Hunayn: when the beloved protests to Mitri that she will never accept such a match, he observes ruefully that

such talk would be in place with European families, but as regards us, children of the Arabs (awlad al-'Arab), a girl has no say, even though we have started getting civilized [al-tamaddun: wordplay "settling down in towns"?] and it is allowed for us to enter and go out among each other⁴.

The term awlad al-'Arab is here used by non-Muslim Arabic-speaking Egyptians to distinguish a multi-sectarian ethnic group from the resident Europeans. Arabness was evoked as a means of identifying with Muslim Egyptians by Syrian Christians, also, in the circle of al-Afghani. The Muslim al-Nadim was seen in Chapter 2 to have in 1892 used ibn 'Arab and ibn

². Ibid, p. 27, fn. 1.
⁴. Quoted in Sa’d al-Din Hasan Dagham, al-Usul al-Tarikhyyah li-Nash’at al-Drama fil-Adab al-'Arabi (Arab University of Bayrut: Dar al-Ahad Press 1973), p. 123. In his play Moliere Misr wa ma Yugasihi (Egypt’s Moliere and all he Suffers), Sanu’ bracketed the two terms awlad al-'Arab and awlad biladi (the Sons of my Country) to designate the community for which he was creating an "Arab Theatre". Ibid p. 194. From Paris exile following Britain’s 1882 Occupation of Egypt, Sanu’ in 1888, 1901 and 1907 celebrated the (classical?) Arabs’ generosity, honesty and treatment of women. Irene L. Gendzier, The Practical Visions of Ya’qub Sanu’ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966) pp. 131, 174. An account of Sanu’s pioneering contribution to
Turk to distinguish native ethnic groups from Europeans in context of the groups’ educated youth adopting European languages in place of indigenous Arabic and Turkish⁵. al-Nadim let Syrian Christians evoke Arabness as a joint community with Egyptians and himself did so even towards SC residents who collaborated with the British occupiers. On the other hand, we encountered no communication in which he termed Copts Arabs. As well as first language, some racial-kinship link with Muslim classical Arab "forefathers" was another determinant of Arabness, leading al-Nadim sometimes to use "Arabs" and Copts as mutually exclusive ethnic categories in the Egyptian context despite the Copts’ Arabic speech.

Multi-Elite Restoration of Classical Arabs

The period of British colonial rule saw an accelerating, increasingly documented and original, restoration of the classical Arabs within intellectual life and high literature. The mutually-reinforcing efforts of a range of culturally divergent elites in Egypt --- but also from other Arab countries --- by 1919 had built up a diverse body of Arabist motifs and elements: acculturated Muslims could pick what met their needs. The power of the West was on the mind of all elites that contributed, even representatives of traditional monolingual Sunni Muslim learning.

'Ali Mubarak published his translation of Sedillot’s 1854 Histoire des Arabes in 1892. In that same year, the rather more acculturated Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1867 - 1934), a graduate in the French-derived secular law (1887), a professional Egyptian government French-Arabic translator and Arabist who extensively interacted with orientalists in Egypt and in European conferences, made his first journey to Spain. Ahmad Zaki viewed himself as "the Arab Muslim" during an audience with the Regent Queen Christina⁶, toured the Arab sites in the main Spanish towns and commenced forthwith in al-Ahram his forty-year-long Egyptian press popularization of Arab Spain as "the Lost Islamic Paradise"⁷. Zaki represents tense, ambivalent stances towards the West manifested by some acculturated intellectuals. Colonized, these intellectuals must

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simultaneously (a) present past Muslim military prowess to build confidence in Muslim capacity to beat back the West and regain sovereignty and (b) legitimize the Arabs’ present adoption of aspects of the West’s modern culture and sciences by depicting Christian Europeans as past borrowers. Spain hearteningly illustrated Arab contribution to the emergence of modern Europe and "the power attained by Islam ... when its banners fluttered above Andalusia, its peoples spreading ... civilization ... the days when the Western Caliphate surpassed its Eastern rival in luxury, grandeur and intellectual life to the extent that the Kings of Europe curried favor with the Caliphs, seeking their patronage and protection"\(^8\). Even more in the twentieth century, acculturated Egyptian intellectuals were apt to connect the modern Egyptians to the Arabs in Spain when arguing the political relationship between Egyptians and the occupying British. The highly acculturated, racially sensitive Duse Mohamed, in 1911 flung back at Britishers who were disdainful of Egypt’s Westernizing-educated intellectuals, the Arab capability witnessed "by those who have visited Spain, gazing admiringly on the Alhambra and other remnants of Moorish architecture wrought by the forebears of that very Arab stock who at present inhabit the [Nile] Delta"\(^9\). The anti-Muslim Louis Bertrand observed in 1910 that it had become the fashion for Egyptian nationalists to go to Spain and meditate in the gardens of the Alcazar of Seville or in the Alhambra of Granada on the defunct splendors of Western Islam. Such Egyptians tended to ascribe to Europe’s modern civilization an Islamic Saracenic origin, "the total annexation of France to Morocco"\(^10\).

Contributions from very diverse Arab --- not just Egyptian --- elites fed the rise of acculturated Arab historical consciousness. The Khedive 'Abbas’ mouthpiece al-Mu'ayyad publicized research works on the classical Arabs published by traditional scholars in the whole Arab world. In 1905 it gave a general account of the three-volume work Bulugh al-Arab fi Ma'rifat Ahwal al-'Arab published in 1899 in Baghdad by the 'Iraqi Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi (1857 - 1924), identifying the Cairo bookshop selling it. Most of the work was an account of the peninsular Arabians in their pre-Islamic period. In assessing this work’s potential to promote a non-religious sect-integrative Arab national identity in Egypt, the religious orientation of both

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the pan-Islamic al-Mu'ayyad and al-Alusi should be borne in mind. Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi came of a Baghdad family with a tradition of scholarly Islamic writing\(^1\), he was basically a latter-day follower of Taqiy al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah and many of his works listed by Daghir were tracts on purely religious controversies\(^2\). Study of the pre-Islamic Arabs and their poetry by Muslims was to explicate meanings of the revealed Qur'an and Islam's initial history. This religious impulse is mentioned by al-Mu'ayyad as inspiring al-Alusi to write his work, but in conjunction with his national identification with even pre-Islamic Arabians. The (1889) International Congress of Orientalists, held in Stockholm, called on the East's scholars to write about the history of the (classical) "Arab nation". Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi "moved by Arab zeal and the racial link and the religious community" thereupon penned his monumental work on the classical, chiefly pre-Islamic, Arabians. Hailing it, al-Mu'ayyad, saw the early Arabs as providing (a) the model for Arabic language usage and (b) for cultivating such virtues "as magnanimity and courage in battle/readiness to aid the hard-pressed (al-najdah) and chivalry and compulsion to take the side of any in distress (al-hamiyyah) and group spirit and preservation of family honor and attention to the rights of neighbors and honor shown to guests and sacrifice of one's own life in defence of a stranger". An important point is that the Arabians had already developed their model virtues before --- and independently of --- revealed Islam. al-Alusi's work, al-Mu'ayyad informed its Egyptian readership, "began from the first [pre-Islamic] emergence of the Arab nation" (al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah). It gave a detailed account of the customs and tribal genealogies of the Arabian peninsula's pre-Islamic racially unmixed "authentic Arabs" who spoke the original pure Arabic (al-'Arab al-'Ariba'), "their fine ethics", "their poets, their sages and their religion of worship before Islam and the tactful way in which the Prophet Muhammad changed their inherited mores and the traditions that they had zealously handed down"\(^13\). The Prophet Muhammad and Islam modified but harnessed and fulfilled rather than replaced the characteristics that the Arabians had already developed.

al-Mu'ayyad in the al-Alusi item speaks of "the Arab nation" as a bygone entity which on

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the strength of its unique virtues gained pre-eminent glory over all other "states and nations" in "the ancient ages". It nonetheless provided the "origin" (uss) in which the contemporary successor entities of "the sons of the Arabs" (abna' al-'Arab) and "the East" can command "honor" before the West\(^\text{14}\). The non-Egyptian al-Alusi's work, through subsequent Cairo editions, conveyed authentic data about the early Arabians to Westernizing-educated Muslim Egyptians in the isolationist-particularist 1920s and during the 1930s (Arabo-Islamic reaction against the West)\(^\text{15}\). Its non-Muslim classical Arabs could validate Arab political community with Christians.

**al-Mu'ayyad** also publicized contributions by local Egyptian authors to the literature about the classical Arabs. In 1905 it hailed the *Ta'rikh Duwal al-'Arab wal-Islam* (The History of the States of the Arabs and Islam) by Muhammad Tala'at Harb, the pioneering Egyptian businessman, financier and industrialist (d. 1941)\(^\text{16}\) --- who was to be a pioneer of economic pan-Arabism in the 1920s and 1930s (B 45 - 51). Harb had links to Mustafa Kamil's al-Hizb al-Watani but was closer to al-Jaridah and the less anti-British al-Ummah Party\(^\text{17}\).

**al-Mu'ayyad** presented the classical Arabs, conceived as ethically formed before Islam, as a behavioral model to reform contemporary Egyptians. One article ruefully accepted the charge of the English-owned Cairo *Morning News* that Egyptians were congenital perjurors, made to present them as unfit to rule their own country. Yet "falsehood is not of the inherent nature of either the Arab or the Easterner. Rather truthfulness was the adornment of the Arab, more than with any other race, in a number of ages before Islam and after it". In assessing the secular community potential in this sense of "the Arabs" as independent in origin of Islam sight, once more, must not be lost of the symbiotic Islamic function of the virtue in question, here truthfulness. True testimony is crucial to the functioning of Islamic religious law (shari'ah):

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\(^{14}\) Ibid.

\(^{15}\) Details of a 1924 Cairo edition, a 1925 review by SC-owned *al-Muqtataf* calling the modernist intelligentsia's attention to the work, and of a 1935 abridged Cairo edition in Daghir, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

\(^{16}\) *"Ta'rikh Duwal al-'Arab wal-Islam"* al-Mu'ayyad 17 July 1905. Harb's Islamic conservation was illustrated when in 1323H (1905 AD) he published a 199 page reply titled *Tarbiyyat al-Mar'ah wal-Hijab* (The Education of Women and the Veil) to Qasim Amin's call for the emancipation of women.

\(^{17}\) Muhammad Farid, who succeeded Kamil as leader in 1908, felt that Tala'at Harb was using financial connections with al-Hizb al-Watani to try to take over its press and twist al-Liwa's militant opposition to the British to the perceivedly pro-Occupation line of al-Hizb al-Ummah and al-Jaridah. *Awraq Muhammad Farid* v. 1, (Cairo: al-Hay'at al-Misriyyah al-'Ammah lil-Kitab 1978) pp. 70-71.
intentional perjury is in consequence termed al-yamin al-ghamus, "the plunger oath", because "it plunges he who commits it into sin or into hell-fire as though complete belief (iman) is synonymous with complete truthfulness". Islam deepened the Arabs' innate truthfulness, which made them the most tenaciously truthful of the nations "in the days of their first power/glory".18

Important is the article's implicit periodization of Islamic history. "Muslims whether in Egypt or elsewhere" are dishonest today because, after the end of the Arabs' "days of first power/glory" long ago, Muslim governments inflicted oppression and ignorance upon "these nations".19 The periodizing low esteem for post-classical --- largely non-Arab --- Muslim governments is akin to the al-Alusi review's concept that latter day "ages [dahr] of corruption and pressure of the kings of despotism" threatened with extinction the Arabic works that alone can preserve the history, virtues and language of the classical Arabs.20

All the writers thus far examined were Muslims who always saw the classical Arabs in relation to the entity of Islam. But Syrian Christians resident in Egypt also exalted the prescriptive virtues of the sects-neutral, pagan pre-Islamic Arabians. An instance is the 1909 play al-Samaw'al aw Wafa' al-Arab (al-Samaw'al or the Faithfulness of the Arabs) by Antun al-Jumayyil (1887 - 1948). Editor of the Catholic-Jesuit al-Bashir while in Bayrut, in Egypt he became an editor of the (from 1930 pan-Arab) al-Ahram and later a member of the Egyptian parliament. al-Jumayyil's play illustrated the pre-Islamic Arabs' prescriptive faithfulness to trust: it depicted the Jewish pre-Islamic Arabian al-Samaw'al Ibn 'Adiya's choice, rather than hand over to enemies of Imra' al-Qays the daughter whom Qays left in safe-keeping, to see them murder his own captured son before his castle's walls.21 (For al-Jumayyil and al-Ahram and pan-Arab Egyptians 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s: B 229, B 334).

THE KAMILISTS

The West's Presence. The modern West's broader creativity as well as might is very

19. Ibid.
often a context of restoration of the classical Arabs. Muslim Spain’s past military superiority over Christian Europe perhaps offered hope for future decolonization. That Spanish and other Arab Muslims stimulated the birth of modern European civilization, made borrowing from the latter psychologically tolerable for Egyptian Muslims. The West was present in one or another capacity in the al-Mu’ayyad items on perjury and the book that al-Alusi wrote in response to a scholarly institution in the West.

As a movement dedicated to wresting political sovereignty back from imperialist Christians, the Kamilists identified more with the wide conquests and organized, internationally powerful state empires of the Muslim classical Arabs, than with pre-Islamic Arabia.

Steppat pointed out Kamil’s youthful pride in the achievements of the classical Arabs, which he expressed in a vivid play he wrote titled *The Conquest of Spain*22. Often performed, the verisimilitude of its recreation of the Andalusian Arabs’ poetic idiom diffused pan-Arab historical identifications and the ability to read classical Arab sources, over decades, in Morocco as well as Egypt23. Kamil’s play celebrated the wide Arabs’ demonstration of Muslim capacity to match or surpass Europeans’ military strength, an aspect of al-Nadim’s and Ahmad Zaki Pasha’s attraction to Muslim Spain in the early 1890s. However, Kamil also was prepared to somewhat identify himself and Egypt with the pre-Islamic pagan Arabians in the eyes of Europe (secular Arab virtues). Thus, he was the one whose urging motivated the Syrian poet Shukri Ghanim to compose his French play 'Antarah in order to acquaint the European public with the

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23. Halstead equated Kamil’s play and his books on Egyptian and pan-Islamic issues with Jurji Zaydan’s magazine al-Hilal and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat’s al-Risalah as all crucial stimulants of the development of an urban-centered Moroccan nationalism. Kamil’s *Conquest of Spain* was frequently acted in Morocco in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s and thus helped bring the growing urban Muslim middle classes and workers into a form of Moroccan nationalism with significant wider pan-Arab connections and historical consciousness. John P. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation: the Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1967) pp. 130-131. The odds against standard Arabic becoming the language of a modern successor-collectivity were much more severe in French-occupied Morocco than in British-occupied Egypt. In 1952, while in Marrakish, A.J. Arberry found that even recitors of the *Thousand and One Nights* were dependent on editions of individual tales imported from distant Tunis: “for in Morocco itself, that ancient Moslem land of once-brilliant culture, no books, or virtually none, are being printed in Arabic”. Arberry, *Scheherazade: Tales From the Thousand and One Nights* (London: Allen & Unwin 1953) pp. 21-22. Moroccan youth were dependent for modern forms of Arabic culture on the dribble of publications that the French could not stop getting through from Egypt. In the Moroccan context, the classical language was becoming confined and moribund within mosques: Kamil’s play helped extend it into a new public politicizing sphere, giving wider classes of Moroccans the bases to understand classical Arabic literature.
heroism of the Arabs. Like his master al-Afghani before him, Kamil defined Arab greatness in history as having been due to "the light of Islam" which had transformed the initially nomadic Arab nation from a state of "total ignorance" into the conquerors and educators of the world: "a degree of knowledge not witnessed [today] and which never will be witnessed."

In such explications of history, Kamil falls into a traditional commitment to Islam: a divinely-revealed religion is the transforming factor enabling a people incapable in their human resources, not just to conquer but to sustain a long-term literate-intellectual civilization. Kamil stereotyped the Arabs at Islam's revelation as nomadic despite the Qur'an's criticisms of the mercantile urban life of Mecca, immediate milieu of Muhammad's message.

As with al-Afghani earlier, Kamil's movement worked for the construction of modernized Muslim states with the strength to maintain or wrest back political sovereignty in face of the West's dynamism. The classical Arabs became a source of confidence for strength-building, self-Westernizing endeavors in the aspect of the educational dynamic and intellectualism in their organized wide states under the Arab Caliphs. In an early (1893) essay, Kamil attributed the first Arab conquests and the Arab Empire's success in popularizing Arabic and Islam, and thereby maintaining itself, to Islam-prescribed "universalization of education."

Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid's construction of West-modelled schools in his empire, Kamil thought in 1893, restored this educational dynamic of "the Easterners" under "the first Caliphs."

The Umayyad and 'Abbasid states presented a prototype of organized Islamic states with interventive

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24. According to 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Ghanim was a personal friend of Kamil. Kamil was the one whose urging first prompted Ghanim to write his French play 'Antarah, which was performed in Egypt as well. Kamil paid eloquent tribute to Ghanim's poetry at a Cairo reception held for him in January 1906. al-Rafi'i, Mustafa Kamil: Ba'iith al-Harakat al-Wataniyyah (Cairo: np. 1939) p. 390. Shukri Ghanim in collaboration with Georges Samne, expounded Syrianist rather than Lebanonist national ideas from Paris, although they, too, had some encouragement from the Quai d’Orsay. They were committed to the classical Arabic language and its "memories" as a basis for identity in Syria. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 286. Ghanim's criticisms from Paris triggered a high-point of ethnic tension between Turks and Ottoman Arabs in 1910: fn 77. After the Sharif Husayn launched the 1916 Arab Revolt, Samne called for France to impose a protectorate on united Syria so that it would not come under the rule of a more nomadic population liable to impose Islamic religious law at the expense of liberal, Europe-oriented Christian minorities in Syria. "Sharif Makkah wal-Wahdat al-Suriyyah" (The Sharif of Mecca and Syrian Unity), Fikr (Bayrut) April 1982, reprinted al-Nahdah (Sydney) 6 January 1983 pp. 5, 7-8.


27. Ibid v. 2, p. 9.
bureaucracies able to direct society’s development. In contrast, pre-Islamic Arabia lacked organized government or educational institutions: it was the Arab period of least use to the Kamilists.

The Kamilists’ preference for wide, at least nominally Islamic, classical Arab states made future Arab nationalism less likely to be secular and worked against the narrower Egyptian homeland framing political community.

It is revealing to compare Kamil’s Arabizing conceptions of the race and culture of Egypt’s peasantry to those of true particularist nationalists. Of course, in certain situations, to make Muslim Egyptians and Copts feel closer during sectarian polemics, Kamil and his followers did evoke the Egyptian population’s partial Pharaonic racial origin across sect differences. Yet they did not on that account develop theories parallel to those tangentially suggested by Lutfi al-Sayyid under the British occupation and elaborated after World War I by Muhammad Husayn Haykal, ’Abdallah ’Inan and Tawfiq al-Hakim: that the Egyptian peasantry as a cultural and to some extent racial Pharaonic core had preserved Egypt’s eternal self from the impact of the Arabs and other alien conquerors and immigrants. The peasantry in Kamil’s thought, too, was a repository of Egypt’s authentic identity, but unlike Lutfi al-Sayyid’s or Tawfiq al-Hakim’s Pharaonic core, owed its nobility and the characteristics it prescribed to its Arabization in blood and values:

Arab generosity as still intact in the Egyptian peasant in all its expressions. Wherever you go you will find the doors open to the guest, the tables set up and loaded, and a joy general whenever any stranger comes, without regard to his religion or race. The reason why this custom is so deeply rooted or innate among the Egyptians after they were famed from a thousand years for miserliness and greed for money is that Arab blood mingled with theirs and its nobility of ethics became predominant among them, to the extent that a man will give his own life as ransom for yours if you seek refuge with him or invoke the protection of his standing --- and so with other renowned and exalted Arab characteristics

When comparing this 1898 passage to Kamil’s observations upon the relation between

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28. Excerpts from a study by Kamil on the Egyptian Peasant first published in an Italian agricultural journal on 1 April 1898: excerpts ibid v. 6 pp. 211-212. Sometimes in affirming that the wide classical Arabs are definitive of modern Egyptians, Kamil rather attempted to relate and synthesize the separate Pharaonic and Arab motifs in his nationalist communications. He once argued that Egyptians merited political independence because they were “the heirs to two great civilizations --- the Pharaonic and the Arab --- and it is our right and our duty to sit among the civilized nations”. Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image. from Its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) p. 248.
the fortunes of the early Arabs and transforming Islam, one is struck by the rather secular nature of the Arab influences and qualities transplanted into the Egyptian environment.

Some Arab qualities such as hospitality that Kamil in 1898 mentioned the classical Arabs as having naturalized overlap with virtues that the 1903 al-Mu’ayyad item on al-Alusi originated in the Arabs’ pre-Islamic period. The pro-Khedive, Islamic al-Mu’ayyad had been one of Kamil’s main forums before he founded his al-Liwa’ in 1900. The Arab readiness of Egyptians to give their lives as ransom for any who seek protection is akin to the hamiyah --- the flaming compulsion to go to the aid of those in trouble --- ascribed by al-Mu’ayyad to the classical Arabs. Westernizing-educated anti-imperialist intellectuals typified by Kamil, and traditionally-cultured Arab Muslims with Islamic formal education projected from al-Mu’ayyad, were both developing related basic concepts.

Mustafa Kamil in 1898 depicted the incoming Arabs’ blood and social virtues as having transformed Egyptian social mores and behavioral patterns for the better --- running against particularist theses of continuity of Egyptian national personality down the ages. He was prepared to view the Egyptians’ established pre-Islamic ethical norms as incompatible with the incoming Arabs’ ethics, but to opt for the latter. It was left unclear how extensively Kamil rejected the Pharaonic "golden age". His phrase that Egyptians were notorious for miserliness and greed for 1,000 years prior to the Arab advent might rhetorically characterize all Egypt’s pre-Islamic past. If precise, the time-span for which Egyptians were bereft of basic ethics would be mainly covered by foreign Persian, Macedonian, Ptolemaic, Roman and Byzantine rule.

Kamil’s remark ultimately derived from Josephus and possibly other late classical and early post-classical writers in Greek. Josephus (37 AD - c. 93 AD), in a communalist apologetic, ascribed persecution of the prosperous Jews in Egypt following the death of Joseph, to the Egyptians’ "love of lucre". Josephus’ anti-Egyptian stereotypes could have passed into Byzantine and modern Greek Christian literature, and thence into such Greek-edited Egyptian

29. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, tsd by H. St. J. Thackery (London: Heinemann, 1930) v. II, p. 251. Josephus’ most sustained abuse of the Egyptians occurs in his Against Apion: this refuted the anti-Semitism of, among other writers of Greek, Apion, Alexandria-educated grammarian and historian who, however, was born in Upper Egypt, and the Egyptian priest Manetho. A Latin letter of Hadrian in Ammianus Marcellinus described the Egyptians as long-celebrated for their love of money and their hatred of paying taxes. Art. "Kibt", ElI p. 999. In regard to Kamil’s image that the pre-Islamic Egyptians were miserly, Smith in A Dictionary of the Bible (London: John Murray, 1863, p. 501) described the ancient Egyptians as "frugal", although without specifying the classical or Christian source.
French-language newspapers as *Le Phare d'Alexandrie*. Kamil in 1897 engaged in polemics in Egypt's French press with John Haicalis, Greek editor of *Le Phare d'Alexandrie*, when he accused Kamil of expressing hostility to Greeks --- including Egypt's Greeks --- over the 1897 war between Greece and Turkey. Kamil's homogenizing Arab-centrism may have made him take up the slur from a Francophone Greek or from classical Arab sources, with their abundant Hellenistic materials.

**Persistent Kamilist Arabism.** Kamil's brother, 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, printed the Arabic translation of the 1898 article, originally published in an Italian journal, in the collection of Kamil's speeches and writings edited by him following Kamil's death in 1908, giving it its widest, most authoritative impact on the mourning secular-educated constituency. Although Egypt's ancient Pharaonic period was also being internalized more, the Arabness of Egyptians recurred in wide circles associated with Kamil's independence movement, up to World War I. Thus, *al-Liwa*’s senior staff writer Ahmad Hilmi in August 1906, still approved when Egyptian secondary school students justified Egypt’s independence by simultaneously claiming the supra-Egyptian classical Arabs and the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians as ancestors:

> We have received a letter from the Khedivial School informing us that the teacher of history said that 'the European states were solely inspired to help the Greeks win independence from the Turks because they were the descendants of the heroes of the past ages'. This teacher (I do not know what I should call him) had hardly finished delivering this sentence before the brighter of his students began to ask ‘If this is the reason, why, then, does Europe not help us win independence, when we Egyptians are either the descendants of the ancient Egyptians who created sciences and civilizations, or descendants of the Arabs who conquered (all) lands and established justice between (God’s) servants (humanity) and were distinguished by the noblest qualities and became the spring from which Europe drank deep of science and philosophy?’.

Such comments show that the seeds of the love of independence have begun to grow in the souls of Egyptian students.

Ironically, post-World War I particularists would have condemned this (qualified racial) identification of an Egyptian political nation with the classical Arabs as --- in contrast to the link of descent affirmed with the Pharaonic Egyptians --- more a false than a nationalist.

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consciousness. The school students represented a new politicized, anti-imperialist generation, and yet there had not been much advance towards particularist Egyptian nationality independent of the Arabs from when Kamil and his peers had been in school. Ahmad Hilmi, a member of the older founding generation of acculturated nationalists (he was born in 1875, the year after Kamil), endorsed the adolescent students’ 1906 identification of Egypt’s political nationality with wide classical Arabs centered outside Egypt.

The Khedivial College students in 1906 carried forward al-Alusi’s, al-Mu’ayyad’s, Kamil’s --- and disliked (post?)-Christian Egypto-Syrians!’ --- sense that the classical Arabs are the source of prescriptive virtues. They also developed the religion-inspired 1893 motif of the West-steeped educationalist 'Ali Mubarak that the Arabs conquered in order to give humanity justice under law, offering access to Qur’anic divine revelation.

**Arabic and Education**

Islam the religion and the classical Arabs were among the motives of an al-Nadim-level commitment to Arabic in the party of Mustafa Kamil. The Kamilists and the more pragmatic proto-particularists around Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid/al-Jaridah diverged on language issues. al-Jaridah’s coverage showed that public feeling ran with the Kamilists’ vehement drive to establish classical Arabic’s primacy in education and public life. Both (a) some Jaridists’ contrasting pragmatic pursuit of modernization, which subordinated their commitment to Arabic and (b) the depth and extent of the public feeling developing for Arabic, were caught by the tone of an anonymous 1907 writer on the language issue in Lutfi’s al-Jaridah. Moderate, neutral, giving both sides of the argument and disposed to propose two linguistic streams, Arabic and foreign-language, in education, the writer yet found in 1907 "the question of instruction in Arabic medium the talk of the meeting-places". Its supporters, he noted, argued that "rejection of this proposal would pain the whole nation without exception: never in this country has there been such unanimous approval for anything as for this demand". Shortage of Arabic-medium teachers and the inadequacy of Arabic for expressing modern sciences was al-Jaridah’s argument for a linguistic duality in education. This writer apparently viewed the Egyptian education system’s urgent task as to import and diffuse the modern West’s sciences in backward Egypt: promoting Arabic for its own sake was a secondary luxury. Arabic had never been the medium of a true
self-sustaining science, not in its classical heyday, not under Egypt’s ‘Alid family in the nineteenth century, he argued. The West’s languages were the media of the true modern science. To give Egyptians the best direct access to that science he would support instruction through the medium of European languages, in higher stages especially.  

In contrast to the utilitarian pro-Western stance of a few in Lutfi’s group was the Kamilists’ and al-Liwa’s fierce ideological commitment to (classical) Arabic as the only acceptable medium for all education in Egypt. Mustafa Kamil and his followers manifest an attitude in which promoting standard Arabic for its own sake has priority in nationalist activities of education and political mobilization. Steppat points out that Kamil, while still a student, "in al-Madrasah expressly rejects al-lughat al-darijah (colloquial Egyptian Arabic) on grounds that --- a considerable error --- almost everybody understands al-lughat al-fusha". Kamil’s use of an uncomplicated classical style to mobilize Egyptians is contrasted by Steppat to ’Abdallah al-Nadim’s preparedness to write sometimes in colloquial to reach the widest popular audience. The Kamilists’ tightened-up use of classical Arabic broke with al-Nadim’s practice, but implemented his ideological drive to make the classical Arabs’ tongue again current.

The acculturated, West-obsessed Kamilists wanted to diffuse the West’s modern sciences as important for the nation’s renaissance. Their propagation through education, though, had to be combined with the overriding aim of imparting mastery of classical Arabic by imposing the language as the standard medium of instruction.

al-Liwa’s stance was partly influenced by ethnic-linguistic European nationalisms as well as immemorial identification of Arabic with Islam. One 1902 al-Liwa’ writer thus paid tribute to the struggles of the Maltese, the Bohemians in the Hapsburg empire and the Poles to preserve

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32. Ahad al-Kuttab ("a Writer"), "al-Ta’lim bil-Lughat al-’Arabiyyah" (Education in the Arabic Language), al-Jaridah 11 March 1907, p. 4. The writer tended to identify as model for possible linguistic duality of education in Egypt the experience of Turkey. There the Dar al-Funun (the Muslim’ World’s first indigenous university, opened in Constantinople in 1900) used Turkish in teaching --- while the Maktab-i-Sultani used purely French medium to teach modern subjects.


34. Ibid.

35. al-Nadim masterfully used the colloquial in al-Ustadh’s written dialogues to raise Egyptians’ national and social consciousness. Sight must, however, not be lost of his attitude, resulting from the classical Arabs providing the language norm, that the colloquial was a temporary evil for communicating. al-Ustadh’s short colloquial section was al-Nadim’s means to "lead the ignorant common man from a hatred of hearing books to love of books ... Then there will be no need to write other than correct [language]". "Bab al-Lughah", al-Ustadh, 30 January 1893, p. 468.
their languages. These European nationalisms confirmed that the study of foreign languages in Egypt should be mainly confined to professional translators. These would be trained in all international languages at special institutes, to translate all important books about overseas industries, discoveries and reforms into Arabic in order that "all education be in the official language of the country, of its religion and of the indigenous population that properly possesses it as is the norm in all countries". The article was written, (as it seems by a teacher since the author uses the pseudonym "Mudarris") in context of pressure in the Egyptian parliament that had "sought from the Education Ministry of this Arab(ic) land that its language get its due position" as the medium for teaching "the contemporary sciences". But the Egyptian Ministry of Education "looked with no kindly eye on the proposals of the representatives" of the Egyptians --- as though nothing remained of Arab zeal (al-hamas al-'Arabi) in this Arab(ic) department". Egyptians should take a leaf from the book of the foreigners in Egypt who "faithfully served their land, their nation and their kingdom" by reducing use of Arabic to one fourth of the teaching-time at secondary level. The 1903 al-Liwa’ denunciation of education under the Occupation identified the survival of standard Arabic with that of Islam. The "spokesman" of the Ministry is virtually calling upon "the Egyptian nation" to "come ... that I may recite to you sacred foreign languages to make you relinquish your religion, repudiate your language, and forget the feats of your ancient forefathers...". The European languages and Arabic thus additionally represent two warring religions, Christianity and Islam --- developing Abdallah al-Nadim’s themes of the early 1890s. To eliminate or disestablish Arabic is to attack the Islam to which the language gives the Egyptian nation (ummah) access. Elsewhere, the writer defines Arabic as "the tongue of the Egyptian’s forefathers, of his religion and his prophet"36. Emotionalistic commitment to Islam and its de-particularizing language could make Egyptians accept as their definitive forefathers the Arabian people who conveyed the Qur’an to the world --- not the Pharaonic Egyptians. In this very much West-stimulated Kamilist vision of history, Arabic had a dual character: it provided the Egyptian nation’s means of access to a divine religion, but also to the "feats" of the historical classical Arab human community ("ancestors").

Both Kamilists and Jaridists celebrated the physical land or watan of Egypt, but standard Arabic, too, was crucial and central in nationality for each. Kamilist definitions of what was

"national" language were oftener incompatible with Egyptian particularity. Mudarris’ identification of the student’s national language as the classical standardized --- not the spoken Egyptian --- form was categorical and uncompromising: "some sciences such as arithmetic are taught at primary level in Arabic" but "what type of Arabic is that? They are taught in the colloquial Arabic that pupils know from their earliest childhood (leading to) ignorance of their language and the tongue of their forefathers". This position rejects the distinctive everyday usage of contemporary Egyptians as a corruption or deviation from the norm of their linguistic identity established a millennium before by Islam and early Arabs, mainly outside Egypt. Extensions of this attitude long were to inhibit development in creative literature of even a distinctive Egyptian style, let alone literary language.

Many highly Westernizing-educated Egyptians associated with Kamil’s independence movement strove like Mudarris to combine (a) maintaining continuity of language with --- and thus access to --- extraterritorial classical Arabs and (b) propagating the West’s contemporary sciences in Egypt. An instance is a 1907 article by Dr 'Uthman Ghalib in l'Etendard Egyptien opposing the Occupation-period contraction of government education and imposition of foreign languages. In reply to those who accused Arabic of "sterility" as an instrument to express scientific thought (some Jaridists as well as Britishers?) Ghalib described Arabic as "the scientific language par excellence under the civilizations of Spain and Baghdad". He viewed the development of Arabic as the medium of instruction in the tertiary colleges, many scientific or technical in nature, initiated by Muhammad 'Ali as the achievement of the Egyptian scholars who "recovered from oblivion the scientific nomenclature of the Arab savants of Spain and Baghdad". Pan-Arabizing: Ghalib argued that restoration of the Arabic-medium secular higher education suppressed by the British would serve not Egypt alone "but all the lands of Arabic speech".

Like the Jaridists, Ghalib denounced the occupying British for dismantling previous mass

37. Ibid.
38. Dr. Osman Ghalib, "Le Mouvement National et la Question de l’Instruction", l’Etendard Egyptien 5 March 1907; reprinted Juliette Adam, L’Angleterre en Egypte (Paris: Imprimerie du Centre 1922) pp. 101-107. Ghalib was a lecturer in Medicine at the Qasr al-'Ayni Medical College, and an old friend of Muhammad 'Abduh. Ibid p. 168. Duse Muhammad was acculturated beyond most of al-Hizb al-Watani’s leadership by continuous residence in the colonizing West’s very heart, London. Nonetheless, here again he closely follows the Kamilists’ stances. The Arab science and culture in the Middle Ages give the lie to the British administrators’ excuse that there were no textbooks with which to teach sciences in Arabic. In The Land of the Pharaohs p. 278.
education in Egypt. al-Hizb al-Watani wanted to diffuse modernizing knowledge widely among Egypt's Arabic-speaking masses. But Ghalib did not champion Arabic in education only pragmatically as an instrument to popularize. In the first place, he demanded a very specific form of Arabic as also essential in itself --- an extended form of the high classical Arabic developed by the 'Abbasid Empire's and Islamic Spain's scholars and scientists. Ghalib probably had at the back of his mind some idea that instruction of Egyptians in modern knowledge through that Arabic would simultaneously build their linguistic access to the classical Arabs' sciences and literature. Juliette Adam characterized Mustafa Kamil as attempting to modernize Egypt by engrafting "modern science upon ancient Pharaonic traditions and upon the old Arab science which dominated the world over centuries ... thereby safeguarding the pride of his race which would not accept in this hour anything but the return of that which it presented to Europe in another time" 39. Colonialism and the very extent of the Westernization which these intellectuals had to undergo activates a reflex where their dignity can naturalize the West's modernizing sciences only on an affirmed basis of some indigenous tradition. The Pharaonic tradition would further Egypt's self-containedness. The supra-Egypt classical Arabs would not yet their rational thought and sciences could be portrayed as originating Europe's science and modernity in more detail and with more centrality than the remoter Pharaonic civilization. And Arabic was the language of Islam. The Kamilists wanted that standard Arabic to pervade education, government and public life in Egypt.

The Watanists' drive to establish classical Arabic in all sectors of Egypt's life would tend to assimilate Egyptians to the historical consciousness and culture of the classical Arabs, without regard to Egypt's borders.

A few more pragmatic Jaridists had, in comparison to the Kamilists, a more urgent modernizing drive that might not balk at outright Westernization. A few days after Dr. Ghalib exalted the classical Arabs' science and Egypt's nineteenth-century Arabic-medium tertiary education as renewing it, al-Jaridah's "Writer" contemptuously brushed aside notions that either classical Arabs or nineteenth-century Egyptians developed true science in Arabic 40. He voiced
concern that identification by Egyptians with the classical Arabs’ science would encourage them to rapidly replace Western languages with Arabic in education, which in turn would menace access to the West’s scientific knowledge.

THE SYRIAN CHRISTIANS

Resident Syrian Christians and Supra-Egypt Communities of Acculturated Muslim Egyptian Intellectuals

Egypt’s resident SC intellectuals were readier than some Copts to develop with Egyptian Muslims a positive historical view of the classical Arabs. They depicted them more as tolerant and as having offered abundant scope for the economic, cultural and intellectual endeavors of Arabic-speaking Christians. The supra-Egyptian, classical Arabs might validate SC attempts to keep up simultaneous relationships with Egypt and the Syrian homeland of origin. They did not share Islam or Egyptian dialect, but fused their and the Egyptian Muslims’ pasts in standard Arabic and a single classical Arab culture.

Conflict Between anti-British Acculturated Muslim Egyptians and Resident Syrian Christians

The Syrian Christians’ very presence in British-ruled Egypt was an important early test-case for "pan-Arab" integration or amalgamation of two populations that were Arabic-speaking but from separate homelands. In the short-term relationship between Syrian Christians and Kamilist anti-imperialists, common Arabic could not stand as a community bond before the two groups’ political and economic conflicts and supra-Egyptian communities alternative to Arabism.

The immigrant Syrian Christians in Egypt were a numerically tiny minority of about 30,000. However, they were concentrated in the cities where they were entrenched in publishing, journalism, commerce and the civil service. When the British occupied Egypt in 1882 they found Syrian Christians educated at Bayrut’s Syrian Protestant College a "godsend"

nineteenth century Egypt had contributed a single invention acceptable to true modern science. The Egyptians were still in the cradle or crawling on hands and knees in relation to the scientific knowledge of which the West was the custodian. "al-Ta’lim bil-Lughat al-’Arabiyyah", al-Jaridah 11 March 1907 p. 4.
for recruitment as physicians, pharmacists, clerks and intelligence agents to help them control and administer Egypt. The acculturated Muslim intellectuals' very modernizing education equipped them to compete for specialized functions in the bureaucracy that traditionally had been left to Copts and other Christians such as Syrians, sharpening communitarian ill-feeling between the Arabic-speaking sects.

Some Christian Syrian individuals also harmed or challenged Egypt's vital political interests. Mustafa Kamil's first political operation was to head in 1893 a student demonstration at the offices of the pro-British, Syrian Christian-owned al-Muqattam. Serving its British subsidizers, al-Muqattam brutally brushed aside the political aspirations of the whole class of modern-educated Muslim Egyptians, and constriction of their economic and professional livelihood caused by reservation of the powerful, best paying positions in the Egyptian civil service for British officials.

Chapter 4 presented as the main enterprise of the Kamilists' pan-Islamism the alliance they built up with the Ottoman Empire. Syrian Christians tended to be alienated from that State by Abdul-Hamid's continued identification of it with its Muslim element and internationally with verbal pan-Islamism. Prior to the 1908 CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) coup and restoration of constitutional politics in the Ottoman Empire, one SC mused in 1910, the Kamilists "used to accuse us of apostasy from Ottomanism and betrayal of the State because we strove to overthrow the government of despotism while they were glorifying it". The secularizing CUP revolution launched from Macedonia fulfilled the long endeavors of Syrians (although also Armenians and even Turks and Albanians) to destroy "religious and racial fanaticisms". In assessing the hatred among Kamilists for resident Syrian Christians, the extreme virulence of the assaults of their papers upon the Sultan and his Muslim State must be


42. One tongue-in-cheek 1910 al-Muqattam article held out as the appropriate response to Egyptian demands for self-rule (1) long-term implementation of Cromer's oft-reiterated plan for a "mixed" (in distinction from the demanded "national") "representative council ... representing all races with interests in this land after the ratio of their respective interests" or (2) more immediate grant of "a representative assembly which would have no control over government finances". As though British needs to find work for sons of their governing classes played no part in the annual despatch of British recruits to the "Egyptian government", al-Muqattam advised native Egyptian officials to diligently perform the tasks allotted them. When Egyptians eventually demonstrated they were the more hardworking and efficient, the British would favor them in appointments and promotions over Europeans! al-Muqattam 1 April 1910, in polemical reply to al-Liwa'.

43. SC letter in al-Jaridah 19 April 1910 p. 5.
borne in mind. One 1901 al-Muqattam article openly incited the amorphous, multi-ethnic "Young Turkey" opposition to assassinate 'Abdul-Hamid\textsuperscript{44}. The Kamilists charged that such SC immigrants had betrayed their own country\textsuperscript{45}.

Kamilist denunciations of specified statements and acts of collaboration by SC individuals sometimes implied rejection of the whole group. Throughout his career as a nationalist leader, Kamil denounced some Syrian Christians as "intruders" or "aliens" (dukhala), Egypt's "real enemy"\textsuperscript{46}. A 1903 al-Liwa\textsuperscript{a} item on "Aliens in Egypt" opened by saying that some migrants to Egypt were an asset to their country of adoption. Others, however, were "evil in their origin and unclean in their branch ... poison that courses through a healthy body changing its strength into weakness". The article mentioned al-Muqattam and its criticisms of the Khedivial family\textsuperscript{47}. A party of resident Syrians went to the also SC-owned al-Ahram, and persuaded it to print an appeal to al-Muqattam to moderate its pro-British propaganda campaign against al-Hizb al-Watani "lest [the resident Syrians'] Egyptian brothers conceive that al-Muqattam's error is theirs"\textsuperscript{48}.

\textsuperscript{44} "Hifzu Karamat al-Dawlah" (Preserving the State's Dignity), al-Muqattam 23 August 1901. al-Muqattam lampooned the weakness and disorganization of the Ottoman Empire, the last remaining substantial independent Muslim State, specifically to ridicule the Egyptian Muslim intelligentsia's demands for British withdrawal. "Many Egyptians pine and yearn to be independent after the Ottoman fashion [but] there is no reason to regret an independence in which he who is independent is a feather whipped between the winds of the conflicting ambitions and policies of [the Powers of] an aroused Europe". al-Muqattam 1 July 1901, p. 2. al-Muqattam in 1901 snapped up the vituperations of Western Turcophobes and dubious fugitives from 'Abdul-Hamid's court to depict him as cynically presiding over a non-government of corrupt, subservient, incompetents as the Empire decayed ... yet looking to the Turkish architects of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution and the later liberal Young Turkey opposition to 'Abdul-Hamid rather than evoking ethnicist Arabs who would want to secede. "Wuzara' al-Sultan wa Hashiyatuh" (The Ministers of the Sultan and his Entourage), al-Muqattam 1 April 1901 p. 1.

\textsuperscript{45} Mustafa Kamil in his 1906 Egyptiens et anglais: "They have repudiated their homeland and have repaid Egypt's generosity and hospitality only with ingratitude and hatred". Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 208. Cf. the thesis of Ahmad Hilmi that the migration of "some peoples among our Eastern brothers" was evidence that education not designed to arouse patriotic feelings --- i.e. the sectarian educational system of the Ottoman Empire's Christians, in which European missionaries participated --- "distances man from the love of the homeland". Ahmad Hilmi, "al-Sha'b al-Misri" (The Egyptian People), al-Liwa', 26 February 1903.


\textsuperscript{47} "al-Ghuraba'u fi Misr" (Aliens in Egypt), al-Liwa', 15 February 1903 p. 1.

\textsuperscript{48} "al-Ahram w al-Muqattam wa Mutatarrifi l-Hizb al-Watani" (al-Ahram, al-Muqattam and the Patriotic Party's Extremists) al-Muqattam 7 May 1910 p. 4.
Rejection of Syrian Christians Outside Egypt. From the outset of his political career, Kamil sweepingly rejected the whole [Christian] Syrian group, even individuals who had never gone to Egypt to become collaborators. On his first sea-voyage to Europe (1893), he obviously considered the Syrians foreigners like the French, Italian and British passengers. The Syrians’ poverty repelled rather than moved him:

As for the Syrians, most of them were passengers of the fourth class where people must sleep on the sea-deck, suffering hardships to gain a subsistence. The most that the Syrian desires is to get money and drink wine. As regards their ethics, what stands out is the most dense stupidity. Most of those who were with us had the aim of going to the Chicago Fair49.

The Syrian passengers’ public wine-drinking may have been a marker for Kamil that they were Christians. It is not the case that the Kamilists thought of Syrians as one religiously undifferentiated collectivity. They were conscious of communal conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ottoman-administered Syria --- al-Liwa’ in September 1903 reported communal clashes which left fifty-one persons dead in Bayrut. Interestingly, its correspondent there blamed the outbreak on the incitative newspapers brought out by the whole class of Bayrut’s Christian journalists50.

The virulent attacks by some Syrian Christian newspapers from Egyptian soil upon the Ottoman State’s Islamic system made anti-imperialist Muslim Egyptians view the minority in the worst regional context. In the Kamilists’ mind, European powers working to subject or disintegrate the Ottoman Empire fostered unrest among its Christian populations. Parochial SC publicization of the Ottoman Muslim Arabs’ grievances thus associated early West Asian Arab nationalism with imperialist subversion, for a time.

SC Cultural Arabism.

Antun al-Jumayyil’s 1909 play on the virtue of the pre-Islamic Arabian Jew al-Samaw’al was an instance of Syrian Christian portrayal of a sects-neutral ancient Arab past: Shukri Ghanim’s ’Antarah thrilled Kamil.

Jurji Zaydan (1861 - 1914), resident from the early 1880s, developed a crude, still heavily cultural, pan-Arab national identification to integrate his Christian Egypto-Syrians with Muslim

49. 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, op. cit v. 1 pp. 267-268.
50. al-Liwa’ 23 September 1903 p. 2.
Egyptians and to allow relationship with Syria while living in Egypt. Deepening the Arab identifications of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals over the long term, Zaydan published 21 best-selling prosaic novels covering all classical Arab "Islamic history" as he did in studies such as his 1912 Ta’rikh al-Tamaddun al-Islami (History of Islamic Civilization). The Arabs first conquered under Islam's formal banner. Thenceforth, though, Christian merchants and farmers and Christian Syrian translators of Greek philosophy into Arabic, as well as Muslim rulers and scholars, helped build classical Islamo-Arabic civilization --- Zaydan secularized.

Zaydan opposed making divisive Arabic dialects written literary languages, because restricting the classical link language might disintegrate the contemporary community of the populations that used Arabic: "the Arabs" or "the Arab nation" (al-ummat al-'Arabiyyah) of Iraq, Syria, the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Sudan and the Maghrib. The Kamilists opposed the use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic in schools because only the standardized classical Arabic gave access to works of the classical Arabs and to Islam --- a Muslim ethos to which the post-Christian freemason Zaydan attuned his own promotion of the classical.

The following, sixth, chapter examines criticism by the youthful Muhammad Husayn Haykal of Zaydan’s conception of the Arab nation as formed before an Islam imaged to have only lightly tinted its Umayyad and 'Abbasid literary creativity. Haykal reacted against Zaydan’s presentation of the pre-Islamic Arabians as a partial ethical model for new social organization.

52. Ibid p. 15.
53. Ibid p. 14. To amalgamate Syria and Egypt, ending his marginality as a Syrian in Egypt, Zaydan described Egypt and Syria as one country (balad wahid) since no natural boundaries such as mountains, deserts or seas separate them. Ibid p. 53.
54. al-Nadim hailed from al-Ustadh (1892 pp. 42-43) the first publication of al-Hilal: he was at that time a formative influence on the young Mustafa Kamil. Zaydan tried to relate his advocacy of standard Arabic to the Islamic worldview of his Muslim Egyptian readers. From its very first year, al-Hilal identified the Qur'an as the agent that preserved the standard Arabic down the centuries --- which would mobilize Egyptian Muslims' religious emotions in defence of the standard language. Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 21-22.
and practices by modernizing Arabic-speakers.

The Syrian Christians and the Jaridists

Among acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals, the Jaridists were more prepared than the Kamilists to give a hearing to SC arguments of Arab affinities between Syrians and Egyptians. At the level of principle, Lutfi al-Sayyid occasionally equated SC links with their Arab homeland of origin outside Egypt as threatening Egyptian nationalism like extraterritorial consciousness among such European communities as the Greeks. Lutfi’s 1913 rejection of pan-Arabism (al-Ittihad al-’Arabi), not only pan-Islamism, would cover the evocation by resident Syrian Christians of a supra-watan Arab community between Egyptians and Syrians.

However, the Jaridists’ secularoid-particularist ideology offered Syrian Christian groups more opportunity than any other Egyptian Muslim group’s for integration with Egyptians. A 1907 essay by Lutfi argued that patriotism was able to foster a sense of a “general interest” that would integrate the followers of even sharply different religions living in the same land. For Lutfi, territoriality could integrate into the Egyptian nation individuals of extra-Egyptian origin diverging in their race, language and creed, provided they gave loyalty. But the Jaridists clearly thought such assimilation most practical with immigrants from other Ottoman lands who already had something --- Islam or language --- in common with the Egyptians.

al-Jaridah, radically secularist, was intent to combat sectarian hatreds in Egypt. It also wanted to hit at its Kamilist foes. It published replies by resident Syrian Christians to Kamilist campaigns. One such 1910 reply published in al-Jaridah, gestured towards its editor’s (Lutfi’s) integrative territorial patriotism. The writer did not truly, however, attempt to persuade

57. "al-Wataniyyah fi Misr --- ma huwa l-Watan" (Patriotism in Egypt --- What is the Homeland?)[2], al-Jaridah 11 March 1907.
58. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 177.
60. "The first duty of patriotism is to strive to reconcile the hearts of the elements from which the state is made up". By inciting hatred against immigrant Syrians, the Kamilists thus violated Egyptian patriotism. The anonymous Syrian Christian writer in al-Jaridah countered charges that the immigrants came poor, hungry and naked to Egypt to grow rich at its expense, by exalting all their achievements in commerce, industry, agriculture, journalism and intellectual life. The immigrant Syrian Christians’ contributions to Egypt entitle them to acceptance
secularized Egyptian Muslims that resident Syrian Christians wanted to give exclusive loyalty to Egypt, as Lutfi’s ideology demanded. Rather, he argued Arabness as Egypt and Syria’s common denominator, to give Syrians resident in Egypt the right to maintain simultaneous relationship with both homelands for generations. The writer is as concerned to defend his birthland as the honor of his own "Syrian" community within Egypt. "Is not Egypt an Arab land like Syria?". The writer condemns those (the Kamilists) who spread false reports that Syrians in Egypt would hate their Egyptian brothers to be given the constitution for "attempting to divide against each other two noble Arab races/communities (unsurayni 'Arabiyyayni karimayni) united by bonds of common Ottoman loyalty, coresidence, unity of language and of interests" 61.

The writer’s constant stress that Syrian Christians are Ottomanists in harmony with the constitutional Ottoman regime tapped the appeal that the post-Hamidian, "liberal-parliamentarist" Empire now had for the Jaridists too, who had long sniped the Kamilists’ pro-Ottomanism.

_al-Jaridah_ on its own account projected a special relationship between Egypt and Syria, integrating with Egyptians those Syrian Christians who through migration to Egypt had transcended _watan_ or _qutr_ in the exclusive sense. Sometimes shared Arabness and the specific migrations are affirmed to bind Egyptians also to Syrians (Christians included) resident in Syria itself. An instance was _al-Jaridah_’s detailed coverage of the Khedivial Prince Muhammad 'Ali’s 1910 tour of Syria 62. The declarations by Christians as well as Muslims there that Arab identity in her society and life. Anonymous Syrian Christian’s long letter of reply to al-Hizb al-Watani’s anti-Syrian campaigns, published _al-Jaridah_ 19 April 1910, p. 5. Cf fn 61 seq. 61. Syria is not inherently poor as hostile Egyptians imagined: only 'Abdul-Hamid’s despotism held it back. The “noble Arab qualities”, intelligence and energy of its people would assure rapid development of Syria’s rich resources under the Ottoman post-Hamidian constitutional regime. _Ibid_. There was a secular territorial-regional dimension in the long SC-Egyptian conflict apart from the sectarian difference. The Egypto-Syrian salafist Muslim Rashid Rida, main popularizer of 'Abduh, in 1904 and 1907 interpreted that the pro-Khedive al-Mu'ayyad, Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid, despite their disclaimers, really directed their accusations and attacks --- and applied their abuse-term dukhala’ --- against all from Syria including Muslims like himself. SCs in _al-Mugattani_ were not the sole target! He ridiculed the Egyptian stereotype that the Syrians came poor to Egypt and enriched themselves at its expense or without loyalty. Rida defended SC-edited newspapers and magazines as the most successful simply because they were better. Thomas Philipp, _The Syrians in Egypt 1725 - 1975_ (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag 1985) pp. 113-114. 62. Dr. Kamil Efendi Tuma, speaking for a welcoming delegation of twelve Orthodox Homs notables headed by the city’s Archbishop, in 1910 told the visiting Prince Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, brother of the Khedive, that "I greet an Egyptian Ottoman Prince; I salute you in welcome upon your happily safe arrival from Egyptian Ottoman Arab lands to Syrian Ottoman Arab lands". Dr. Tuma was also speaking on behalf of "the Homs Christians residing in the Egyptian lands ... those Ottomans ... who have been investing their capitals and their labors in those happy lands for fifty years" and the few thousand Homs people who exported their locally-manufactured textiles to
as well as formal Ottomanism united Egypt and Syria and the publicity given to the Khedivial family’s role in the whole Middle East region ran counter to al-Jaridah’s anti-Khedivial and territoralist Egyptian stances.

al-Jaridah, then, was prepared to amplify resident Syrian Christians who advocated an explicitly Arab contemporary community between Syrians and Egyptians. These communications flew in the face of Lutfi’s ideological position that anyone in Egypt who publicly declared that he belonged to another land committed a “crime” and menaced Egypt’s “progress” 63. al-Jaridah’s coverage of Prince Muhammad ‘Ali’s visit to Syria, however, conveyed a wider community of Egypt and Syria as two Arab homelands bound by language, and economic and human exchanges. It ran against Lutfi’s more proto-particularist formulations that Egypt had natural borders which decisively separated the Egyptians from adjoining populations 64. al-Jaridah accommodated SC pan-Arab identity elements not just as a means at hand to integrate the sects in the homeland but because its Egyptian contributors had deep Arab identity of their own.

Muslim Egyptian Acceptance of Arab Community With Syrian Christians: Hafiz

Our sampling turned up no formal ideological assent from acculturated Egyptian Muslim intellectuals in the Kamilist movement or around al-Jaridah to Syrian Christians proposals of pan-Arab joint community.

However, a stylistically classicist Muslim Egyptian poet, Hafiz Ibrahim (c. 1870 - 1932) did express, under Britain’s colonial occupation, a close Arab identification with Syrians including Christians, possibly in hope of payments from rich Egypto-Syrians. Arabic can detach itself from Islam and support a multi-sectarian Arab community.

Hafiz’ desultory education and employment in secular law placed him on the margin of the strata of acculturated Muslim intellectuals and professionals 65. His public, topical political

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64. Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 238. Lutfi’s full formulation was: “We have our own peculiar color, our own peculiar tastes, and a single, universal language ... Our fatherland has clearly defined natural boundaries which separate us from everyone else. [These are] not imaginary borders such as exist in so many countries but natural boundaries which practically cut us off from all others”. Versus Zaydan fn 53.
65. A general account of Hafiz’ life was given by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Wahy al-Risalah v. 1 (Cairo:
verse long diffused the modernizing endeavors, anti-British themes, and attachment to the Ottoman Turks of the Kamilist independence movement. Hafiz also greatly stimulated the development of the young intellectuals around al-Jaridah, who reacted to his pan-Islamic worldview and homogenizing neo-classicist Arabic style, which they were to criticize for obstructing development of a distinct Egyptian national culture. Hafiz must also be regarded as an ongoing element after World War I in the cultural makeup of acculturated intellectuals as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and Taha Husayn who promoted cultural pan-Arab integration in the 1930s and 1940s.

For Hafiz Ibrahim, language --- more than territoriality --- was central as a human bond. Thus, in 1913 he described Egypt and Syria as two brothers or two plants sprung from one root (sinwani), inseparable because Arabic was their common mother. For Hafiz, shared language and race links resulting from past migrations from Arabia over the whole region (the classical Arabs) could almost obliterate separate territoriality of Syria and Egypt: "the Arabs" are "forefathers" of both Egypt and Syria. To a 1913 gathering of resident Syrians, Hafiz Ibrahim stated a crude unitary Arab nationhood bracketing Egyptians and non-Muslim Syrians:

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Dar Nahdat Misr 1953), pp. 255-258. Hafiz' father died when he was two years old. After completing primary education he worked in the offices of several secular lawyers for some years (ibid p. 255) and thus got on the fringe of the Westernizing-educated professional classes at that time. Hafiz learnt a limited amount of French and translated Victor Hugo's Les Misérables from French into Arabic.

66. Hafiz recited verse extolling Mustafa Kamil's educative endeavors at the 1906 distribution of prizes at Kamil's secondary school. He recited an elegy to Kamil at a religious ceremony of mourning following the leader's death. Texts "Madrasat Mustafa Kamil" (Mustafa Kamil's School) in 'Abd al-Latif Shararah, Hafiz: Dirasah Tayliliyyah (Bayrut: Dar Sadir 1965) pp. 67-71, and "Ritha' Mustafa Kamil" in ibid pp. 217-225. Hafiz' verse often had very similar world-view and interests to the pro-Ottoman Kamilists'. An instance is Hafiz' painful, engaged attempt in 1908 at a judgement of the fallen 'Abdul Hamid and the new political era that the Ottoman State was entering following the CUP coup. "al-Inqilab al-'Uthmani" (The Ottoman Revolution): Shararah, Hafiz pp. 126-133. Like the Kamilists, Hafiz hailed the new Japan that vanquished Russia in 1904: "Shabbat al-Yaban" (The Japanese Maiden), ibid pp. 98-104.

67. Taha Husayn described Hafiz and Ahmad Shawqi on their death in quick succession in 1932 as "the two tongues expressing [Egypt's] aspirations" (lisnayha n-natiqayn) and "the two great poets" of "the Arab East" in his article "Hafiz wa Shawqi", al-Hilal, 1 December 1932 pp. 161-165. This is an Arab-centric article viewing modern Egyptian culture as a synthesis of the secular West with the high unitary Arab classical literature of which Egypt was a late guardian: Napoleon meeting al-Azhar. In youth, Taha was, if anything, more committed to continuity of style with the classical Arabs than Hafiz or Shawqi: in 1911, in al-Jaridah, he criticized both poets for language errors. The Anglophone Romantic poet 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri published a reply. Tarek A. Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri (1886 - 1958): An Egyptian Writer in the Age of Imperialism and Nationalism (Ph.D: New York University Press 1972) pp. 141-142.

68. 1913 poem of tribute by Hafiz to the Christian Epypto-Lebanese poet Khalil Mutran in Shararah, Hafiz p. 189.

69. Hafiz' 1913 "Suriya wa Misr" recited at Shepherd's Hotel. Shararah, Hafiz, p. 72.
This is my hand which shakes with you on behalf of the sons of Egypt. Take it then so it may pass that the Arabs shake each others' hands. al-Kinanah [ie. Egypt] is nought but very Syria at whose reaches noble-born gentlemen of [Syria's] sons stopped/alighted.

Hafiz also saw migration of overwhelmingly Christian Syrians even to the Americas as gain for "the Mother of Languages" because they spread and promoted Arabic in new lands.

Jurji Zaydan highlighted in al-Hilal Syrian promotion of Arabic in the Americas through their schools and newspapers, to forestall demands by Islamist Egyptians that the revival of Arabic serve Islam and the Muslim sect only.

For Hafiz Ibrahim, too, the classical Arabs' Arabic can become a relatively secular nexus for a current Arab community with both Christians and Muslims. This ran against application by such Kamilists as 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish of Islam and pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism to exclude Syrian Christians from integration in Egyptian society.

His conceptual fusion of the Muslim Egyptians with the Syrian Christians realized those Arab identity elements that the Kamilists had, but subordinated within pan-Islamic community with all (Muslim) Ottomans.

Resident Christian and Muslim Syrians and Egyptian Muslims' Development of Pan-Arabism

Pursuing their supraterritorial ethnicity, Syrian Christian intellectuals in Egypt under British rule viewed the Ottoman State from its Arabic-speaking provinces, rather than Turcophone Istanbul, the seat of the Caliphate for Egyptian pan-Islamists. Egypt's SC journalists publicized the Ottoman Turks' maladministration in the Arabic provinces.

al-Mugattam's editor, Faris Nimr, had been a pioneer Arab nationalist. Ya'qub Sarruf (1852 - 1927), Faris Nimr (1856 - 1951) and Shahin Makariyus, who founded al-Mugattam in 1889, had earlier been members of a Bayrut secret society which attempted to unite Christian and Muslim Arabs against the Turks. In Nimr's handwriting was the famous anonymous placard that

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70. Ibid p. 77.  
71. Ibid p. 76.  
72. Philipp, "Language, History ... Thought of Jurji Zaydan", loc. cit p. 16.  
73. Hafiz blamed as creating the communal ill-will "men among us [the Egyptians] and among them [the resident Syrian Christians] who have gone to extremes in their politics". "Misr wa Suriya", ibid p. 77. This must mean al-Mugattam and some --- parochially anti-Christian --- Kamilist journalists. 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish often assailed Copts and SCs as editor of al-Liwa' after Kamil's death; some of the more cultivated Kamilists may have become embarrassed by his vituperation against the Syrians, which did not enhance the dignity of the post-Kamil Hizb al-Watani. al-Liwa' 31 March 1910 quoted al-Mugattam 1 April 1910. Cf. the discreet disdain for Shawish's anti-Coptism of 'Uthman Sabri, brother-in-law to Mustafa Kamil, when subsequently editor of al-Liwa'. Musa, Education pp. 127-128.
the society distributed in Bayrut in 1881, calling on "the Arabs" to expel "the Turks" from Arab lands.

However, Kamil, from the inception of his career as an anti-imperialist nationalist, expressed violent hatred against Nimr and al-Muqattam for serving the occupying British. Publicization by al-Muqattam of Ottoman Arab discontent might not recommend it to the Kamilists, but did early bring the problem home.

Numerous articles in al-Muqattam depicted maladministration and murder by Turkish officials in its Arab provinces (eg. in Yemen in 1910) but were not necessarily secessionist. For a while following the CUP'S 1908 coup, Christian and Muslim Syrians in Egypt worked together for reform rather than break-up of the Empire. But al-Muqattam relayed mounting national antagonisms between Turks and Arabs to Egyptian Muslim readers. These ethnicizing articles helped prepare Egyptians to accept the Arabs’ 1916 uprising for independence, for instance, as natural. al-Muqattam highlighted issues of language that would distinguish Muslim Turks from Muslim Arabs, but associate Muslim with Christian Arabs:

It appears from these statements which I have translated for my readers that the Turkish newspapers are ignorant of the conditions of the Ottoman lands. The Constitution makes it compulsory for primary teaching to be in the local, that is indigenous, language. If this is the case, then why has the Turkish language not been replaced in the Bayrut Government Primary School, for instance, by the Arabic language? Arithmetic, Geography, even the grammar and declension of Arabic are taught in Turkish medium.

al-Jaridah spoke for secularized Arabic-speaking Egyptian intellectuals, some opposed to

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74. Cf B 74 and B 336 (incl. fns). Lebanese historiography in the 1980s stressed that this masonic Arab-ethnicist society was responding to Abdul-Hamid’s suspension of the Ottoman constitution and parliamentarism, and that the placards innovated political appeals to "the Syrian homeland" as well as "Arab pride" as rallying-points against "the Turks" (= mainly Abdul-Hamid’s specific regime?). Dr Wajih Kawtharani, al-Ittijahat al-Ijtim'iyyah wal-Siyasiyyah fi Jabal Lubnan wal-Mashriq al-'Arabi min al-Mutasarrifiyyat al-Ulumaniyyah ila Dawlat Lubnan al-Kabir (Bayrut Manshurat Dahsun al-Thaqafiyyah 1986) p. 111.
75. 'Uthmani ("An Ottoman") in "al-Islah fil-Yaman" (Reform in Yemen), al-Muqattam 28 April 1910, detailed such practices of Turkish administrators there as beheading chiefs of restive villages. However, the writer argued that "the Turks" as a group had not oppressed "the Arabs" in the Yemen: he still hoped that "reform", including the despatch of more conciliatory Turkish officials, might yet reintegrate the Yemen into the Ottoman State. See fns 78 and 94.
76. 'Izzat al-Jundi’s article "Damad Farid Pasha Calls His People to Confine Authority in their Own Hands", al-Muqattam 10 March 1910 p. 1, was pervaded by a sense of conflict between Turks and Arabs in the Ottoman Empire. al-Jundi denied any positive contributions by Turks to the development of the Ottoman State. Even the soldiers who carried out the Ottoman conquest had been non-Turks, among them Arabs --- already one argument in 1905 by the secessionist Arab nationalist Najib 'Azuri (Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 278). Unlike 'Azuri, al-Jundi did not openly call for abolition of the Ottoman State.
77. "Bayn al-Turk wal-'Arab: Baqiyyah fil-Zawiyah" (The Turks and the Arabs: The Conflict Unfolds), al-Muqattam 20 April 1910 p. 1. The Istanbul press discussion of Arab-Turkish discord that this and other al-Muqattam items took up in April 1910 had been sparked off by a critical letter to Le Temps from the Paris Syrian
Egypt’s own ties to the Ottoman State: it, too, drove home to Egyptian Muslims the progressive crystallization of adversary nationalisms around language conflicts (Ch. 6). al-Jaridah reported in April 1910 that the Istanbul Turkish newspaper Iqdam was briefly suspended and fined because of the reaction of the Arab community in the capital to its regular attacks on Arab culture and its demand that the Turkish language be purified of Arabic words.\(^{78}\)

**Muslim Egypto-Syrians.** Perception of the Young Turks as first neglecting Islam and Arabic, and then attempting to replace Islam’s Arabic with Turkish, finally led Muhammad ’Abduh’s Syrian disciple Rashid Rida (1865 - 1935) during World War I to support Arab independence from the Islamic, Ottoman State. With al-Hizb al-Watani leaders concerned that he was serving British expansionism, Rida agonized over Arab-Turkish conflict in his religious magazine al-Manar\(^ {79}\), widely read by reformist-minded religious Egyptian Muslims such as the then youthful Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat (1885 - 1968). Charges that al-Zayyat directed throughout his life against the Ottoman State correspond as well to the materials that al-Muqattam carried in the period of British colonial rule. Somewhat like al-Muqattam in 1910, al-Zayyat in 1953 charged that the Ottoman Turks expelled Arabic from government administration, and used Turkish in education "even in the lessons of [Arabic] grammar."\(^ {80}\)

**MUSLIM EGYPTIAN PERCEPTIONS OF WEST ASIAN ARABS**

Muslim Egyptian writers under British colonial rule felt special affinity with

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\(^{78}\) al-Jaridah 4 April 1910 p. 4. Some Arab students who took part in protests against Iqdam were interrogated by a Constantinople military court. The Arab deputies sent four of their number to the Chief Vezir, threatening to boycott parliament if the Arab students were in any way harrassed: they demanded that the proprietor of Iqdam be punished under law. Lisan al-Hal (Bayrut) 19 April 1910 p. 2. Iqdam was edited by 'Ali Kemal (1867 – 1922), a politician of the opposition Liberal Union to which elite Arabs tended to gravitate against the centralizing CUP. al-Muqattam ascribed the demonstration by forty young Arab students to an Iqdam article on Yemen by Khalil Hamid: this had argued that the way for the Ottoman State to weaken Yemen’s imamate, the obstacle to its authority, was money --- "the Arabs, by nature and custom, will cast themselves to destruction in their greed for money, they will even sell their honors/women for love of money". "Abna’ al-‘Arab wa Jaridat Iqdam" (The Sons of the Arabs and the Newspaper Iqdam), al-Muqattam 15 March 1910.


\(^{80}\) al-Zayyat (1953), "al-Adab wal-Thawrah", Wahy al-Risalah v. 4 p. 266.
Arabic-speakers beyond Egypt, seen as distinct from other Muslim populations. Their romantic perceptions of outside Arabs were heightened by their literary or folk culture's positive stereotypes about classical Arabs, especially model virtues. The controlling context, though, was the Kamilists' and even the Jaridists' overriding sense of the multi-ethnic community of Muslims before the European states' expansionist colonizing drives. Fears of these aroused strong support for the territorial integrity of the multi-national Ottoman Empire.

Egypt's separateness of statehood since Muhammad 'Ali limited the capacity of literature to integrate Egyptians with outside Arabs. Kamil and his followers often voiced a sense of tajanun, a relatedness or homogenization that grouped Egyptians, Syrians and the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula, a product of past unity under the common government of the internationally powerful classical Islamic states. Kamil sometimes spoke of an "Arab nation" that was the ruling people of those Islamic states of the Caliphs. However, Steppat concludes that Kamil did not conceive of that nation as a contemporary entity.  

Narrower Arab affinity interwove with the sense of Christian Europe's religious hostility to Muslims in general to shape Egyptian perceptions of French colonization of North Africans. Activated literary or folk images of the classical Arabs sharpened the Egyptians' ethnic, Arab perception of North Africa's Muslims, in conjunction with contemporary shared language. Very much as Kamil's successor Muhammad Farid had done in 1903, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid in a 1908 article equated French occupation forces in Algeria and the British imperialist figures of Gladstone and Lord Cromer as representing Europeans' general dislike of Islam. In an 1897 Geneva gathering "in which I was the only Muslim", he took issue with a young French comte, who had done military service in Algeria and claimed that Islam commanded its adherents to murder and plunder any non-Muslim in a desert. Lutfi in reply described Islam as a religion not of treachery but of brotherhood and equality, the religion of the [classical] Arabs, of najdah (aid to those in distress) and muru'ah (chivalry). Najdah and muru'ah were among the list of stereotyped virtues of the classical Arabs given by al-Mu'ayyad in its notice on al-Alusi's book. Clearly, Lutfi viewed the classical Arabs and their human virtues as having played the central role in the historical configuration of Islam. Like pro-Kamil Muhammad Farid in 1903, Lutfi in

the 1908 article described Algeria's native inhabitants as "the Arabs". In this traditional layer of Lutfi's consciousness, the classical Arabs and the contemporary ethnic traits (virtues) they bequeathed are almost inextricably woven into Islam. Defence of Islam meant exaltation of the classical Arabs and vice versa. Arabness so tightly interlinked with Islam seems to offer little common ground for contemporary Arabic-speaking Christians and Muslims. It was to take time to detach such Arabness from the dynamic of Islamic communities integrating different (Muslim) linguistic groups.

**Perceptions of Arabia**

The Kamilists thought of pursuing a special relationship with the Arabian peninsula and its inhabitants as a subordinated component in their pan-Islamic support for the Ottoman State. Like Lutfi's and Farid's identification with North Africa's "Arabs" a context was expansionist imperialism. Intimate relationship with the Arabians was ascribed to both Islam and Arabness. 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, brother of Mustafa Kamil, expected in 1903 that an appeal to his al-Zaqaziq audience's own "Arab initiative/energy" (al-himmat al-'Arabiyyah) would motivate them to aid the Hijaz railway, the means to "bring prosperity to your Arab brothers". al-Liwa's interest in the Arabian peninsula's politics voiced romantic cultural elements, like the motifs that led Lutfi to view colonized Algerians as heirs to the classical Arabs' virtues. The writer Muhibb al-Dawlah repeatedly gave partisan support to the Amir Ibn Rashid of Najd in his struggle against Ibn Sa'ud. His idealization of peninsular Arabians dismissed Arabic press reports that the Hanbali Sa'udis were finally about to topple the Rashid amirs, for him Islam's and the Ottoman State's bulwark against Britain's expansion in the peninsula. This was on grounds of the Arab characteristics exemplified by the al-Rashid ruling family:

Anyone with the slightest acquaintance with Arabia [al-bilad al-'Arabiyyah] knows that the Arab [Arabian?] whether great or small, an Amir or base person, is not easy to get the

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82. "al-Inkiliz fi Misr" (The English in Egypt), al-Jaridah 14 April 1908; Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta'rikh al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyyah ed. Isma'il Mazhar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) pp. 109-110. For Muhammad Farid's sympathy for Algerians under French rule see fn 136. Ahmad Zaki Pasha in a 1928 al-Ahram, outraged at an Austrian traveller's charge that a Saharan chief gave him poisoned food, was to perceive the Berbers involved in terms of Arab virtues and as Arabs, or Arab-like successors of long-bygone North African Islamic states in which Berbers and Arabs had been partners (bookish classicism): al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 136-137.

better of. The possibility that he will take some revenge is not to be neglected; wrong cannot be done his neighbor in his house without argument, a struggle and fighting by heroic warriors ensuing.

"Muhibb al-Dawlah’s" perception of the Najdis here is similar to Mustafa Kamil’s sense of the Egyptian peasant as Arabized and thus ready to give his own life in ransom for whoever seeks his protection. The Najdis, however, were (half-prescriptively) differentiated from the now more sedentary Egyptians, more subject to strong central governments, in the observation that the end of the Rashidi state cannot be near when "these people are Arabs in their pristine nomadism who refuse to recognize the rule of any state over them, who, indeed, as we hear, do not much savor the word 'Amirate'"84.

For Kamilist oratory and journalism, then, language, a certain amount of Arab blood, Arab characteristics and Islam connected Egyptians to the Arabians. However, the contact Egyptians had with predatory, lawless nomads during the pilgrimage to Mecca sometimes produced hostility towards some Arabians85.

Mustafa Kamil himself, not just writers in his al-Liwa’, was interested in developing relations with the Shammar chieftain Ibn al-Rashid, and planned to make a journey to central Arabia to meet him86. Kamil was early aware that bilateral contacts between Egyptians --- or at least Egypt’s Khedivial family --- and Ibn al-Rashid were regarded as subversive in Constantinople87.

Some items in al-Liwa’, however, had affinities to the Khedive ‘Abbas’ attempts to build a special relationship with restive Ottoman Arabs at the expense, ’Abdul-Hamid feared, of the Ottoman State’s authority. al-Liwa’ in 1908 exalted Ibrahim Pasha’s conquest of the Wahhabis (1816 - 1818) as a religious endeavor by Egyptians to make the road of pilgrimage safe for God’s

85. One important ground on which one 1904 al-Liwa’ item justified contributions by Egyptians to the financing of the Ottoman Hijaz railway was that the railway, when completed, would end "the sufferings that pilgrims must undergo to reach Allah’s sacred house and the grave of His Prophet, on whom be blessings and peace, because of the barbarous treatment of the nomads" --- the ‘irban, not al-'Arab. "Nahnu wal-Mu’ayyad”, al-Liwa’ 3 August 1904, p. 2.
87. Mustafa Kamil noted that reports of a visit by Prince ’Aziz Bey, cousin of ’Abbas Hilmi, to Ibn al-Rashid prompted ’Abdul-Hamid to suspect that the Khedive was conspiring with that Amir against the Porte. Ibid. Steppat here cites ’Ali Fahmi Kamil’s collection of Mustafa’s writings and speeches (v. 4 pp. 124f.); I could not check up these observations from Australia --- but the collection abruptly cuts out at 1900.
creatures. The al-Liwa’ writer supposed that this campaign in Muhammad 'Ali’s expansion into the Arabian peninsula had won for Egyptians an enduring pre-eminent standing in the area between Mecca and Medinah, recognized by all Muslims of the world 88. The Kamilists may not have envisaged that Egypt would again become guardian of the Hijaz’ holy places, the Ottoman State’s role, but 'Abbas presented himself to Ottoman-ruled Arabs as taking up the relations which the House of Muhammad 'Ali had established with Arab populations in West Asia through Ibrahim Pasha’s conquests.

Various concepts of the Kamilists might have led Egyptian nationalism in other circumstances to assert roles for Egypt in Arabia competitive with the Ottoman Turks’. One such idea was that the sacrifice of the forefathers’ blood to make the pilgrimage safe for all Muslims entitled Egypt to a special position in the Hijaz. Still, the secularizing-educated Kamilists identified with the Turkish government’s attempts to economically modernize and integrate Arabia through, notably, the Hijaz railway. The Arabians’ own interest was to become part of the economy that the Turks directed. The expansionist presence of the British in Aden, 'Uman and the Shaykhdoms of the Gulf led the Kamilists to support strongly the Ottoman State’s drive to establish effective rule over the peninsula, through the railway. For the time, Egypt’s interests checked sympathy for West Asian Arab discontent against the ruling Turks. A strong, cohesive Ottoman State would continue to legally block outright British annexation of Egypt.

Khedivial "Arab Caliphate" Subversion

Egypt’s Turkish-speaking royal house maintained multiple, intimate bonds with the Ottoman Empire and its ruling Turkish element: these drew them into the Ottoman State’s politics, while equally facilitating interventions by the Sublime Porte in Egypt’s affairs. Figures of Egypt’s royal house fell repeatedly into bad relations with the suzerain Ottoman Sultan or governments in Constantinople. Members of Egypt’s 'Alid royal family were proud of past military expansion under Muhammad 'Ali into Ottoman West Asia, mainly in Arab areas: they never let the Ottoman

88. "Madha hum qa’ilun", al-Liwa’ 21 February 1903 p. 1. Despite its arguments about Egypt’s preeminent position in Islam’s Arabian holy places, the al-Liwa’ article was in response to a fall of the numbers of Egyptian pilgrims in the most recent hajj to 28 as a result of an "Egyptian government” tax.
Empire's Arabs and Turks forget. Touring Syria in 1910, the 'Alid Prince Muhammad 'Ali declared at Ba'labakka that the aims of his journey were to choose Arab thoroughbred horses and see the sites of the conquests of his great forefathers.

The ex-Khedive Isma'il had resented that 'Abdul-Hamid deposed him under pressure from the Powers. He financed the London al-Nahlah (published from 1877) and al-Khilafah (The Caliphate --- published from Naples from 1877) which questioned 'Abdul-Hamid's title to the Caliphate. The Sharif of Mecca might be made an Arab Caliph under the temporal protection of an Egyptian Sultan.

Marmaduke Pickthall found propagandists sent by 'Abbas Hilmi preaching such an "Arab Caliphate", an Arab Empire, in Palestine in the mid-1890s. Cromer confidentially reported to Prime Minister Salisbury in 1897 that 'Abbas was sending emissaries to the Hijaz and the Amir of Najd, Ibn al-Rashid. Constantinople in 1899 cabled its governor in Basrah to arrest emissaries sent by 'Abbas and by the Amir of Najd with "dangerous advice" that might concern Mecca. Towards the end of 'Abdul-Hamid's reign, the Khedive's dogged supporter Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf called in al-Mu'ayyad for a constitution for Egypt with the Khedive as an independent ruler "with a hint that an Arab Caliphate might be instituted and thus be transferred from Turkey to Egypt". The Ottoman government banned al-Mu'ayyad from the Ottoman territories in which it previously circulated widely. The official British observer Ronald Storrs

89. "al-Brins Muhammad 'Ali f Suriya" (Prince Muhammad 'Ali in Syria) al-Mugattam 1 April 1910, p. 4. Cf. fn. 62. al-Hizb al-Watani’s second leader Muhammad Farid readily credited the charge of the pro-CUP Syrian Rashid Mutran (Christian) that Prince Muhammad during tours of Syria was acting as 'Abbas' agent to fan Arab discontent against the Turks. Farid, Awraq p. 116.

90. Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 269-270. The Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid, or some faction at his court, paid the Khedives back in kind. al-Mugattam, hostile to both the Sultan and the Khedive 'Abbas, in 1902 noted the publication by Ibrahim Haqqi Bey of a magazine Islamic Echo, from Liverpool in English and French. It praised the Sultan and al-Sayyid Abul-Huda (ethnic Arab sufi leader originally from Aleppo), while assailing 'Abbas and the elements in the Ottoman establishment favorably disposed to him, such as 'Izzat Pasha al-' Abid. "Sada al-Islam" (The Echo of Islam), al-Mugattam 31 October 1902 p. 3.


94. Duse Mohamed, In the Land of the Pharaohs p. 325. al-Mu'ayyad offered its pages as a hospitable forum for angry Ottoman Arabs. In mid-1905, it published a collage of criticisms and condemnations of misgovernment by Turkish governors and officials in the Yemen from, for instance, a wisely anonymous "rich notable from the wealthy of al-Hudaydah", and from the famous traveller Sayf al-Din al-Yamani in Singapore. Although unflinching, such West Asian Arab scrutiny of Turkish officials was not yet secessionist: if the Ottoman State sent the Yemenis "just, moderate governors" instead (cf fns 75-77), "the Arabs" there would calm down,
assessed the July 1914 attempt on 'Abbas' life in Constantinople as managed by the Young Turks for "removal of the Khedive as possible head of an anti-Turkish Arab Confederation".  

Hourani, Sylvia Haim and Ann Elizabeth Mayer all speculate about a possible connection between Khedive 'Abbas and his court and the Aleppan Syrian 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849 - 1902) who published Umm al-Qura (The Mother of Cities) from exile in Cairo. This work called for a shift of leadership in the community of believers of Islam from the Turks back to the Arabs, and advocated an Arabian Caliph, in the line of Quraysh, who would have authority in spiritual questions throughout the Muslim world, but also exercise temporal authority in the Hijaz.

'Abbas' extra-Egyptian activities and his circle prefigure the post-World War I pan-Islamic/pan-Arab current running counter to self-containedness of the Egyptian particularist polity. Egypt's post-World War I "Eastern League" (al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah) was to involve Egyptians in the West Asian Arabs' affairs. A former employee of 'Abbas active in the League was Ahmad Shafiq Pasha (1860 - 1940), of Turco-Circassian ethnic origin, who had studied law and political science in France, published books in French as well as Arabic, and was chief of the Khedivial cabinet under 'Abbas Hilmi. Another acculturated intellectual later active in the League was Ahmad Zaki Pasha, to become interbellum "Shaykh of Arabism". In the period of British rule, he occupied various positions in the Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Nuzzar) over submitting completely to the great Caliph". Those Yemenis excerpted from al-Mu'ayyad's extensive mail on the subject, called for the Porte to send them not mediocrities but officials of international calibre such as those it despatched to reform its Balkans territories: men like Husayn Hilmi Pasha (Inspector-General of Rumelia 1903-1908) who won the confidence of Europe. Nonetheless, such al-Mu'ayyad items did raise the possibility that the Ottoman State could one day conceivably lose such an Arab province as Yemen, bracketed with the seceding Christian nationalities. "Zalamat al-'Arab" (The Grievances of the Arabs), al-Mu'ayyad 17 July 1905. Muhammad Farid considered al-Mu'ayyad editor al-Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf perhaps the Khedive 'Abbas' most active collaborator in the Arab Caliphate subversion: he knew so much that 'Abbas never dared withdraw his patronage up to his death in 1913. Farid, Awraq pp. 122-123.

95. Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson 1937) p. 145. Muhammad Farid stated that the Turks did not want 'Abbas Hilmi to accompany their armies moving through Syria towards Egypt: there was too much support in Syria for 'Abbas' plan for an Arab Sultanate of Egypt, Syria and Arabia. Mayer, 'Abbas Hilmi II p. 563. 'Abbas probably collaborated with Turkish political opponents of the CUP. The Anglophile former Grand Vezir Mehmed Kamil Pasha (1832-1913) left to exile in Egypt in February 1913. From Cairo, Kamil continued to intrigue against the CUP. The CUP regime viewed the Khedive as hostile and as supporting the activities of Kamil Pasha and other Turkish exiles in Cairo. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (London: OUP 1969) pp. 126-129.


thirty years, and from 1906 was 'Abbas' Master of Ceremonies. Also to prove active in the Eastern League was the Egypt-born Ottoman army officer 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri, an early insurrectionist Arab nationalist. al-Misri acted on 'Abbas' behalf to induce the Sanusi to make peace with Italy following her defeat of Turkey in the 1911-1912 Tripolitanian War. 

Ahmad Zaki was an intimate of Ahmad Shafiq. During thirty years of secretarial duties in the Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Nuzzar) Zaki systematically replaced Turkish words used in official correspondence with pure Arabic terms, as energetically as he eliminated current European loan-words. When visiting Palestine, Syria and Lebanon in 1904 and 1924, Zaki made a point of visiting Marj Dabiq where the Ottoman Turks under Salim the Grim crushed Egypt's Mamlukes in 1516, initiating the period of Ottoman rule of Egypt, and Nisibin where Ibrahim Pasha defeated the Turkish army in 1839 (cf. B 82-5). 'Abbas' Arab Caliphate activities are not to be atomized as only the instrument of his personal ambition vis-a-vis Istanbul: they accorded with the historical memory and blended Turco-Arab ethnicity of the tri-lingual acculturated elite that had built up around his dynasty.

The Later Kamilists: From the Pro-Ottoman Pan-Islamic Political Community Towards Pan-Arabism

Kamil early knew about 'Abbas' approaches in the 1890s to such Ottoman Arabs as Ibn al-Rashid, and that 'Abdul-Hamid perceived these as challenging his authority. Kamil was financed by, and worked in close conjunction with, the Khedive 'Abbas from around 1892. Ann Elizabeth Mayer fixes 1898 as the year in which the Khedive’s relations with 'Abdul-Hamid took their decisive turn for the worse and 'Abbas became more conciliatory to the British presence. 'Abbas' recurring involvement in Arab affairs was well underway by 1898, the year in which Mustafa Kamil published his al-Mas'alat al-Sharqiyyah (The Eastern Question). In that book Kamil disingenuously referred to an Arab caliphate to be headed by Khedive 'Abbas II as

98. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks p. 139.
100. Ibid p. 89. From 1889 when they accompanied each other to Paris, Ahmad Shafiq Pasha and Zaki often travelled together outside Egypt. Ibid p. 87. Shafiq denied in his memoirs that he was privy to promotion by 'Abbas of any movement for an Arab Caliphate. Mayer, op. cit p. 354. He was, certainly, close to Rashid Rida, the Arab-centric salafist religious revivalist who articulated increasingly anti-Turkish views of Arab history in al-Manar, and came to support secession from the Ottoman Empire.
an idea promoted by the British imperialists to remove the obstruction that the Ottoman Empire constituted to permanent occupation of Egypt. Kamil at least suggested a possibility that 'Abbas was involved with a British imperialist scheme when in his 1906 *Egyptiens et Anglais* he denounced the idea of "an Arab Caliph" as "a tool in the hand of a foreign power". Kamil's successor as leader of al-Hizb al-Watani, Muhammad Farid, in 1912 virulently denounced 'Abbas in a French paper for plotting against the Ottoman Empire in order to establish himself as head of an Arab caliph under British auspices. Farid in 1911 attacked Rashid Rida for working for Arab independence: Rida's British-backed puppet "Arab caliphate" threatened the Ottoman Empire.

The Kamilist movement is argued to have diffused among the Egyptian public a long-term dislike of Asian pan-Arabism that endured into the 1920s. Colombe concluded that "guided by [Mustafa Kamil], Egyptian nationalism remained clearly distinct from Arab nationalism which mounted first as a reaction against Hamidian absolutism and, after the revolution of 1908, against the dictatorship of the Young Turks." Yet the supreme value placed on the Arabic language in Mustafa Kamil's independence movement recurred in later support that his followers gave to the Ottoman Empire's Arabs in conflicts with the ruling Turks.

Muhammad Farid (d. 1919) was elected leader of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) after Kamil's premature death in February 1908. He was an acculturated professional-intellectual who had graduated in Egypt's France-derived secular law; he spoke French well and travelled, orated and lobbied extensively in Europe. His view of the Ottoman Empire's ruling Turks was long tinctured by his consciousness that his family had originally been Turkish, although it had come to Egypt long ago, shortly after the Ottoman conquest; Farid's father had served three Khedives, finally as director of the Khedivial estates, and thus had lived in culturally Turkish milieus. In his early Ta'rikh al-Dawlat al-'Aliyyah (History of...
the Ottoman State, published in 1893) Farid projected the Ottoman Empire sympathetically as the last core for political sovereignty of the world’s Muslims: Egyptians had to strengthen and defend it. After the coup by the Committee of Union and Progress in 1908 ended Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid’s absolutism, the constitutional parliamentarism that developed in the Empire for a while made it a model for political modernization, even to proto-particularist Egyptianists like Lutfi al-Sayyid. As the new leader of al-Hizb al-Watani, Muhammad Farid and other figures in the Party quickly proposed that Egypt send representatives to the new Ottoman parliament (Majlis-i-Mab’uthan). No such reconfederation of Egypt with the Empire materialized because the insecure Young Turks praised Britain’s work in Egypt and denied ties with the Kamilists\(^{108}\).

As the Patriotic Party grew and mobilized a wider and wider range of social classes after 1908, the British progressively drove its leaders into exile: many henceforth had to interact with Turks on a day-to-day basis for months at a time. Farid entered the Turkish milieu innocently vulnerable to culture shock, and consequent reaction against anything Turkish: he combined romantic identification with his family’s ancestral Turkishness with a cultural Arabness profoundly ignorant of the Turkish language and culture\(^{109}\). Farid did not have the same command over the Patriotic Party as its founder Kamil: consequently, at the time of exile to the Ottoman Empire and Europe it also factionalized. Turkish politicians and officials might well attempt to win control over it. 'Abdul Hamid had not allowed coherent Arab ethnic opposition to develop in his Empire; in the more fluid and plural, sometimes genuinely parliamentarist, politics after 1908, ethnic polarization took place between the Ottoman Turks and the elite Arab resident minority that Farid encountered in Istanbul. In the period 1908 - 1914, Farid’s increasing interactions in Constantinople chipped away his party’s traditional reflex to explain away the Ottoman Empire’s structural ethnic discords as subversion from outsiders.

During the transitional period of uncertainty about relations between (a) the CUP/new post-Hamidian order in Constantinople and (b) the Egyptian nationalists, Ottoman-ruled Arab

\(^{108}\) Ibid pp. 324-325.

\(^{109}\) Farid seems to have had no Turkish. In his Arabic diary, he spelt a Turkish journal Tasfir-i-Afkar, his rendition of the sound of the Turks’ pronunciation Tasvir-i-Afkar. Awarq v. 1 p. 190. Had he read the Turkish journal he would have written the Arabic orthography Taswir Afkar. (He did give this correct spelling in ibid p. 345). Farid made no attempt to address Turkish audiences in Istanbul in their language: he delivered a pan-Islamic speech in Arabic and a Hizb al-Watani editor who knew Turkish then read out a translation. Awarq v. 1 p. 190. Javed Bey of the CUP corresponded with Farid in French (facsimile of card, Awarq v. 1 p. 336) which does not indicate that Farid was known as someone who read the (much Arabicized) literary Ottoman Turkish. Farid’s earlier references to his family’s remote Turkishness seem romantic; we ethnically categorize him as Arab Egyptian.
quasi-nationalists made a strong bid to win Farid’s (and his party’s) support for some transfer of power from Turks to Arabs. The Cairo-born Ottoman Army officer, ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Misri (c. 1879 - 1959) put out the feelers during a visit to Cairo soon after the CUP revolt restored the Ottoman Constitution. al-Misri had participated in the CUP’s military revolution from Macedonia, and presented himself to Farid as "still a Unionist" but dedicated "to construct an Arab Caliphate or Sultanate": "the Turkish element has lost all its political and martial qualities and Islam’s only hope to get out of its sorry state lies in the Arab element". al-Misri invited members of the Kamilist Patriotic Party’s Administrative Committee to join his secret "Society of Arab Youth" (Jam’iyat Shubban al-'Arab). 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish was present at the meetings. "After a long discussion" Farid and his colleagues declined because such Arab endeavors could only lead to "division between the two elements/communities of the [Ottoman] State". However, Farid believed that al-Misri had proceeded to found a branch of the secret society in Cairo. Farid’s perception that the movement which al-Misri represented would throw Turks and Arabs into destructive conflict was far-sighted. In 1909 al-Misri with Salim al-Jaza’iri founded the Qahtaniyyah Arab national secret society in Constantinople --- and in 1914 al-’Ahd, the secret society that recruited Arab officers in the Ottoman Army, especially 'Iraqis. Certainly, Farid by July 1913 believed that al-Misri, when prompted by the Khedive 'Abbas, had become ready to proclaim the "independence of Syria", and "the independence of the Arabs”, at the head of Ottoman troops under his command in Bayrut (most Turkish troops in the city had left to fight in the Balkans). Britain and France would support such Arab secession. al-Misri joined the 1916 Arab revolt against the Turks launched by the Sharif Husayn and his sons 'Abdallah, Faysal and 'Ali from the Hijaz.

Personal Antagonisms Retard Pan-Arabization. After the CUP coup in 1908, Lutfi made


111. Farid, Awrag v. 1, pp. 100-101. Farid’s notes about his 1908 encounter with al-Misri in Cairo, however, were written subsequently, from memory.


the significant point that confederation with the Ottoman State would threaten "the interest of [Egypt’s] royal [Khedivial] family"\textsuperscript{114}: and indeed the Khedive 'Abbas henceforth until the Ottoman Empire collapsed was in consistent bitter conflict with the Young Turks: al-Hizb al-Watani, led by 'Abbas’ enemy Farid, was the third party in a tight, tense triangular relationship. That the 'Abbas he loathed continued unceasingly to fan Arab discontent throughout the CUP era for a time made Farid support Turkish authority more strongly. Ethnic division in the Ottoman State would only help the expansionist imperialists to harm and subjugate the Arabs and Egyptians. The Tripolitian War that broke out in 1911 when Italy invaded Ottoman Libya, Egypt’s neighbor, presented a first-hand illustration: Farid believed that, in order to win the Italians’ goodwill, and thus to facilitate sale of his Maryut railway to them, 'Abbas engineered the collapse of the Libyans’ guerrilla resistance in Cyrenaica, by tempting 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri to return with his Ottoman troops to Bayrut to work for Arab independence\textsuperscript{115}. In 1912 in a French newspaper he denounced 'Abbas for plotting against the Ottoman Empire in order to establish himself as head of an Arab Caliphate under British protection\textsuperscript{116}. Similarly, in 1911 he denounced the Egypt-resident Syrian Islamic revivalist Rashid Rida (1865 - 1935) for working in league with the British imperialists to create a puppet Arab mock Caliphate\textsuperscript{117}.

Muhammad Farid’s gradual alienation from the Turks had distinct periods. From July 1908 to August 1914, after difficulties in the first twelve months, Farid built up workable relations with the Young Turks, and won from them considerable aid for the Egyptian independence movement. Many Egyptian Watani, even as early as September 1910\textsuperscript{118}, expected the Turks to liberate Egypt from the British militarily. Farid and other Watani leaders

\textsuperscript{114} Lutfi, Safahat p. 36. Analysis of Lutfi’s vehement particularist ideological response to the proposal of Egyptian deputies for the Istanbul parliament in Hourani, \textit{Arabic Thought} p. 178.

\textsuperscript{115} Farid’s journal of 27 July 1913, \textit{Awraq} v. 1 pp. 99-100. Gershoni and Jankowsky, too, saw 'Abbas as, during the Italo-Ottoman War in Libya in 1911-1912, while verbally supporting the Ottoman cause, "acting in collusion with the Italians in exchange for financial considerations within Egypt": 'Abbas’ urging of the Libyans to capitulate for his own enrichment showed that his activities in the Ottoman Arab provinces was not a genuine "nationalist involvement". Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, \textit{Egypt, Islam and the Arabs} (New York : OUP 1986) p. 19.

\textsuperscript{116} Farid, "La Lutte du Khedive contre le Sultan pour le Khalifa", \textit{La Siecile} (Paris) 14 August 1912; summarized Goldschmidt "Egyptian National Party" p. 328; Safran, \textit{Egypt In Search} p. 292.

\textsuperscript{117} Haim, \textit{Arab Nationalism} p. 47.

\textsuperscript{118} Report in September 1910 from Cheetham to the British Foreign Office quoted 'Isam Diya' al-Din, "al-Hizb al-Watani fi Misr wa 'Alaqatuhu bi-Turkiya l-Fatat" (The Patriotic Party in Egypt and its Relationship with the Young Turks), \textit{Afaf 'Arabiyyah} (Baghdad) v. 2:1 September 1976 p. 19.
in this period condemned unrest among the Empire’s Arabs. The next period, which began virtually with Turkey’s entry into World War I, saw a changed attitude. As early as December 1914, Farid became convinced that "the Turks" intended to annex Egypt, if they could defeat the occupying British. His Party enemy 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish, arguing that Islam should determine the political community, rejected Farid’s motto "Egypt for the Egyptians"119. Farid considered Shawish and his emigre faction eager to collaborate in a Turkish administration of Egypt120.

Farid drew near to an internationally open break with the Ottoman Turks, with which Mustafa Kamil so long associated Egypt when lobbying in the West. In a January 1916 interview with acting German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman, Farid opposed Egypt being placed under the administration of the Turks "in any circumstances": "we are much more developed than they, our country was administratively more organized from before the British conquest", "their ignorance of administration is to be witnessed in the lands of Syria and elsewhere" (socialized quasi-pan-Arabism: cf. the 'Iraqis’ transmission of this motif to al-Zayyat after 1929: B 313-314). Already, Farid --- al-Jaridah-like! --- equated Britain and the Ottoman State as equally intent to "eat up" Egypt121.

Ottoman Arabs increasingly socialized Farid into their view that the Ottoman State was the instrument by which one nation collectively oppressed another. He still intermittently stated that Islam’s nationalities-unifying political ideal should restructure the Ottoman Empire. Emotionally, though, Farid increasingly felt that the Egyptians and the Asian Arabs shared parallel oppression at the hands of two similar imperialist powers. But could he really endorse armed rebellion by Muslim Arabs against Muslim Turks as morally valid like the Muslim Egyptians’ struggle against Christian British occupation?

Jamal Pasha, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Ottoman forces in Syria from the outbreak of World War I, executed eleven prominent Arabs in August 1915 and twenty-one more

119. In December 1914, Shawish already told Farid in Constantinople that wearing of the Patriotic Party pin with the motto by Farid and his colleagues had angered the Turks, as had Farid’s statement at a meeting on anti-British pamphlets that "we must be careful in our writings not to enable our enemies to say that we of the Patriotic Party want to hand Egypt over to the Turks" Awraq v. 1, p. 193. Shawish countered the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" with his slogan "Egypt for the Muslims" which would allow the Turks some permanent role in Egypt’s government. Awraq v. 1, p. 199.

120. Other members of Shawish’s pro-Turkish, pan-Islamic faction among the watani emigres were Muhammad Hilmi Muslim, Ahmad Fu’ad and Fu’ad Salim.

121. Awraq v. 1, p. 280.
the following January¹²². These executions in Damascus, intended to quell unrest in Syria and other Arab provinces, ushered in a new stage of violent hatred. Farid reacted with shock and anger, aware through his constant contact with Arab Ottomans of the long-term Arab-Turkish conflict that the executions would foster.

Farid vented his anger discreetly, in his diaries and in private conversations with Egyptian comrades, with Asian Arabs and even some Turks. In public, his emigre faction of the Kamilist independence movement remained formally allied with the Turks as the shock-waves of the executions spread, yet in June 1916 he saw the Turks’ treatment of the Asian Arabs as worse than the British imperialists’ repression of the Egyptians. The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Archibald Murray, had commuted to life imprisonment the sentences of hanging issued against Muhammad Shams al-Din and Najib al-Halbawi who threw a bomb at Egypt’s puppet sultan Husayn Kamil. Farid believed that the Egyptian ummah (nation) appreciated this British clemency, contrasting as it did to Jamal Pasha’s hanging of twenty-one of the most prominent men of Syria, “from the greatest Islamic families”, among them the Islamic Shaykh ’Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, member of the Ottoman Parliament whom the Turks had arrested in violation of his rights under their Constitution and even martial law. “All these acts make the Egyptians hate the Turks; they make us fear that hanging will be our fate if Jamal Pasha gets into Egypt, as he threatened us more than once in Syria”¹²³. Nothing in his diaries indicates that Farid ever seriously considered arguments or evidence presented by the Turks that the Arabs hung were in treasonous contact with foreign powers; the in places well-documented volume that Jamal Pasha published in Arabic, French and Turkish to justify the executions only inflamed his hatred of the Turks¹²⁴.

Emotionally, then, Farid was well prepared to accept armed Arab insurgency against the Ottoman State by the time that the Amir Husayn proclaimed the Arab Revolt from the Hijaz in June 1916. He told the German Foreign Ministry Arabist, Baron Oppenheim, that Jamal Pasha’s executions and oppression in Syria "were one cause of the Sharif of Mecca’s uprising": the Sharif had now called himself King of the Arabs and gained British and French recognition¹²⁵.

¹²³. Awraq v. 1, pp. 308-309.  
¹²⁴. The Arabic version, published in Istanbul, was titled Idahat 'an al-Masa'il al-Siyasiyyah; the French version La Verite sur la Question Syrienne. Haim, Arab Nationalism p. 47.  
¹²⁵. Awraq v. 1 p. 344.
Despite this continuing encouragement from the British imperialists, Egypt's enemy, Farid clearly by 1917 was sympathetic to the Arab movements whereas he had denounced them as a British instrument in 1912. A residue of Islamic ideology's commitment to a unitary Ottoman State was that he described the family of the Sharif Husayn as loyally and scrupulously discharging their duties to it until the Turks' murderous oppression forced them to revolt. He wrote down the account of a Watani Egyptian just come from Istanbul that the Amir Faysal had creditably fought at the head of 2,000 Hijazi tribal volunteers in Jamal Pasha's expedition against the British in Egypt; but when Faysal had interceded for some of the Syrian notables about to be executed, Jamal only insulted him. This harshness motivated Faysal to return to the Hijaz. The Turks were preparing to arrest Husayn and his whole family when he proclaimed the revolt shortly after Faysal's return. Farid's limited perception of Arab nationality as in its own right a motive of Arab rebellion against the Turks, also underlay his discussion of the Sharif's motives with the German Foreign Secretary, Zimmerman, in February 1917. Farid stressed the background of Turkish oppression and violence but did not mention any ideological Arab nationalism that would inherently have opposed Husayn to the multi-national Ottoman State, had the CUP remained true to the State's integrative Islamic principle. Husayn had asked the Turks to grant his posterity hereditary title to his position as Amir of Mecca: the harsh CUP had refused and provoked him into avoidable rebellion. Even after he proclaimed the rebellion, Husayn (Farid stressed to Zimmerman) had not rejected the Ottoman Sultan's title to the Islamic Caliphate nor declared his secession. Like Lutfi's attunedness to Ottoman Arab grievances (Ch. 6), Farid was accurate: even Husayn's more Arabist son 'Abdallah, too, had long been held back from insurrection by the Islamic elements shared between Arabs and Turks that the CUP chipped down.

126. Ibid p. 358.  
128. Dawn's judgement is that from 1912 to the beginning of 1914 the Sharif Husayn was generally regarded by the Turks and Arabs alike as a supporter of the Ottoman State and not as an Arab nationalist. C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973) p. 15. Dawn reconstructed that although Husayn's son 'Abdallah became a convert to Arabism and armed revolt well before his father, even his conversion took to July 1914. Ibid p. 69. A side of Sharif Husayn accepted that as long as the Ottoman government maintained the shari'ah, it was the Islamic state for all Muslims. Ibid p. 82. In his Revolt proclamations, Husayn charged the secularoid CUP with being "heretical conquerors" and having lost territory from "the state of Islam". Ibid pp. 80-82. Dawn stresses stubborn shari'ah-centric, Caliphal elements in even 'Abdallah's cooling to the Turks: he interestingly believed that the Unionists "did not understand" the alien Western forms with which they downgraded the Qur'an and Sunnah. Ibid p. 72.
From mid-1916 the emigre Watani milieu in both Constantinople and Europe was in close contact and accord with disaffected Ottoman Arabs and there were signs at points that the two Arab movements, the Egyptian and the West Asian, might merge. Farid now let even Christian Ottoman Arabs bend his enfeebled pan-Islamic ideology so that it validated the political expression of ethnic-national communities. Sulayman al-Bustani, Christian Syrian deputy in the Ottoman parliament, was one of the high Arab officials in the CUP administration who helped radically to ethnicize Farid’s view of the Ottoman Empire. When discontented Arab leaders held the Arab Conference in Paris in June 1913 al-Bustani (Farid credited) played the main part in negotiating a temporary reconciliation between the Turks and the Arabs in the CUP. When Farid met him in Switzerland in June 1916, they discussed Turkish “atrocities” in Syria and al-Bustani expressed his deep regret about the bad policy that the Turks followed towards us Egyptians ... [He] said that this was the view of many Unionists, that he often had demonstrated the unsoundness of their policy to them, the policy of the old-style Turkish conquest, and that the [Ottoman State] could revive again only through agreement with the other Islamic nationalities (ajnas) with maintenance of the independence of each in its internal government.

By June 1916, then, Farid the Egyptian nationalist was developing views about the Ottoman Turks that paralleled those of ethnically militant Ottoman Arabs. He and the Asian Arab Sulayman al-Bustani still verbally reiterated --- and he clearly retained residual commitment to --- the ideals of united Ottoman and wide pan-Islamic communities, which the CUP-led Ottoman Turks, too, officially were pledged to promote. By mid-1916, however, neither Farid nor al-Bustani believed that these theories determined the Turks’ treatment of Arabic-speakers. Farid now readily accepted al-Bustani’s anti-Turkish historical view: the Turks

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129. Sulayman al-Bustani (1856-1925) became member for Bayrut in the post-Hamidian second Ottoman Parliament. He was originally educated in the secularish "Patriotic School" (al-Madrasat al-Wataniyyah), established in Bayrut in 1863 by Butrus al-Bustani to integrate the sects. He served as Minister of Commerce and Agriculture from 1913, but resigned when the CUP-dominated Ottoman Government entered World War 1, in protest at its alliance with Germany. He drifted into self-exile in Switzerland later moved to Egypt where he had resided several times before the War and published anti-Hamidian works on Ottoman politics. He was well-known to Egyptians as the translator of the Iliad. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 189-192. The al-Jaridah intellectuals were well aware that al-Bustani was protesting CUP foreign policy in resigning, as had Muhammad Pasha, Minister for Public Works, and Jamal Pasha the Minister for the Navy. "al-Wizarat al-'Uthmaniyyah Ba’da l’lan al-Harb" (The Ottoman Ministry after the Declaration of War), al-Jaridah 7 November 1914. al-Jaridah was hardly correct to categorize Jamal Pasha among the malcontents: as the senior member of the CUP triumvirate with Enver and Talat, Jamal went on to become Governor of Syria and Commander of the Fourth Army there.

were originally, and remained, intrusive conquerors in the Arab regions.

Pan-Turkish Excoriated

Between 1914 and 1918 both (a) Ottoman Arabs and (b) some Watani Egyptians exiled among them, came to see Turks as national enemies whom it was right to resist with counter-violence. However, Farid’s habitual pan-Islamic formal conceptual categories shifted more slowly than his more and more ethnicized emotions and stances. The accelerating shift from Islamic to pan-Turkic attitudes among Ottoman Turks helped him to depict them as the rebels against his ongoing pan-Islamic political ideal, legitimizing his own --- and the Ottoman Arabs’ --- national resistance. Farid several times encountered the Tatar Yusuf Akcuraoglu (1876 - 1939), editor of the journal Turk Yurdu, founded a few years after the CUP coup. Around the end of 1915 Farid already perceived Akcuraoglu’s group to stand for "the supremacy of the Turkish element, construction of a pan-Turkic community to be made up of the Turks of the Ottoman Empire and those outside under Russian rule, the basis to be jinsiyah (racial/ethnic nationality), not religion" 131. It angered Farid that Mehmet Ali Tevfik, the youthful Turkist editor of the CUP’s French journal Hilal "mentioned nothing about the [classical] Arabs at all" in mid-1918 lectures in Berlin that extolled the origin, history, conquests and civilization of the Turks. Yet "the Turks" could have weight as an ally for the Germans only if they represented all Islam 132. Despite Akcuraoglu’s extra-Ottoman origin 133, Farid soon considered that his

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131. Ibid v. 1 pp. 277-278. Farid’s evaluation that Akcuraoglu’s pan-Turkic nationalism ruled out union with non-Turkic Muslim peoples was correct. Akcuraoglu explicitly rejected pan-Islamism and Ottomanism in his famous essay "Three Kinds of Policy" published in the Cairo magazine Turk in 1904. Instead the Ottoman Turks should base their struggle to survive on "the Turkish race" in the Ottoman Empire and beyond in regions occupied by Russia. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: OUP 1968, 2nd ed) pp. 326-327.


133. Yusuf Akcuraoglu (1876-1933) was born a Tatar in Simbirsk on the Volga, but came to Istanbul in his youth and was educated in 'Abdul-Hamid’s military schools. He popularized Turkic populations under Tsarist Russian rule, and in reaction to the Ottomanism of Young Turk fellow-emigres published his Uc Tarz-i-Sivyet (Three Kinds of Policy) stressing the national unity of all Turkic peoples, as distinct from other Muslim peoples. After 1908, he returned to Istanbul to become a CUP politician and editor of Turk Yurdu (1911) and Turk Ocagi (1912) and professor of history of Dar al-Funun. Stanford J. & Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey v. 2 (New York: CUP 1977) pp. 263, 289, 301; Lewis, Emergence pp. 320-321, 345-346. Akcuraoglu was heading a delegation of Russian Tatars come to lobby the Central Powers to deliver the Tatars in Russia from Russian rule when Farid encountered him in Berlin around the close of 1915. Farid might have questioned how representative he was of Ottoman Turks: his origin structured his thought to meet the needs of Turkics under Russian rule. Yet pan-Turkism was being accepted by the Ottoman elite: the heir apparent Prince Yusuf 'Izz al-Din was president of the scholarly and cultural Turk Derneği founded in Istanbul in December 1908. Lewis, Emergence p. 349.
pan-Turkic doctrines had become the ideology that motivated the Empire’s ruling Turks. In March 1916, just three months before the Sharif Husayn proclaimed the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, Farid in Constantinople denounced the Turk Yurdu movement for preferring Magyars to Arabs "on the grounds that the Magyars are of Turkish origin although they are Christians". To the argument that the Arabs had provoked the Turk Yurdu’s extremism in the first place by maintaining their clubs and racial nationality (jinsiyah) in Constantinople, Farid replied that "they are right to do so because you want to Turkicize them and you despise their language and customs and treat them no better than dogs". By mid-March 1917, Farid believed that the Ottoman Turks, having psychologically withdrawn from Islamic community loyalty, did not care about the Empire’s Arab provinces and therefore were not seriously defending them from conquest by the British and French. Just after the British conquered Baghdad, Akcuraoglu delivered a lecture at the Ottomans’ club in Berlin: it was all about the Turks’ ancient history, the Turks under Russian rule, and pan-Turkism but did not even mention the fall of Baghdad. This indicated for Farid that the Turks had no serious will to wrest back the "lands of the Arabs" that had fallen to the Europeans; they rather directed their military resources north to liberate "their [Turkic] brothers" under Russian rule. Their "mad" policy of "pan-Turquisme" had lost them their kingdom; the Ottoman State would become "confined to the authentically Turkish provinces in Anatolia". The Turks "shall emerge from this war as a small state like Persia or the Afghans and all the Arab lands will have come into the hands of the English and the French." For Muhammad Farid by the end of World War I, then, the new Turkism, and ill-treatment and murder by Turkish officials and soldiers, released the Ottoman Empire’s Arabs from any community obligation towards Turks. Turkist chauvinism, the cause of earlier cultural

134. Farid’s Constantinople journal entry for 16 March 1916, Awraq v. 1, pp. 300-301. The form of his language in the entry is that he was addressing the Turks. He was directly arguing, though, with an Egyptian, Jalal al-Din ’Arif, a lecturer in the Istanbul Law School. However, Farid despised him as a collaborator of the Turks, and denounced the Turks’ attitudes towards the Arabs to him so that it would finally be reported to the Sadri-A’zam Sa’id Halim. Ibid, p. 301. By 1913, the CUP-led government was unpopular in the Arab provinces in comparison to Kamil Pasha and his decentralizing Ottoman Liberal Union. Having lost huge territories in the Balkans with their Christian populations, though, the CUP could now turn to a policy of Islamization to hold the Empire’s Arabs and Turks together. Ahmad assessed that from early March 1913 the Unionists had a sincere Islam-inspired drive to foster an Arabic-Turkish bilingualization of Ottoman life not just in the Arab provinces (some use of Arabic in education and administration) but in the Turkish heartland, also. Citation from Isma’il Hakki in Tanin 12 April 1913 in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks p. 136; pp. 133-135. 135. Awraq p. 353.
separatism by Ottoman Arabs, extenuated even the Hashimite rebellion that could only help Egypt’s enemy Britain to expand. Some of Farid’s "Islamic" critique of the Turanian identification was deeply felt but he also structured it to accommodate his and the Ottoman Arabs’ anti-Turkish ethnicity to the maximum. Pan-Turkism was not as neo-pagan in the late Ottoman Empire as he imagined. His view of the Ottoman State’s thrust into --- extensively Muslim-populated --- territories that Russia had ruled was a failure of pan-Islamic sympathy. Farid showed no pan-Islamic sympathy for the past sufferings of Muslims in Russian-occupied Adharbayjan and the Caucasus.

From Territorial to Linguistic Nation

Farid’s anger when the pan-Turanists cut out the classical Arabs was natural in his Party: Kamil and his followers had for decades projected Baghdad and Muslim Andalusia as definitive for Egyptian identity. The classicist cultural symbols that solidified the Asian Arabs’ resistance resonated as much in the Watani Egyptian psyche. In Berlin in March 1917, Farid chatted with Ahmad Mukhtar and Muhammad 'Ali, two grandsons of the Algerian Amir 'Abd al-Qadir who had led resistance to French conquest from 1832 to 1847. Muhammad 'Ali told Farid that "Jamal Pasha is determined to obliterate everything that is Arab, even in names": he ordered removal of the tablet inscribed "Muhyid-Din Ibn al-'Arabi" over the grave of that Andalusian-born mystic-philosopher (1165 - 1240 AD), and replaced it with another inscribed "Muhyid-Din Effendi". Farid then fumed in his diary that Jamal destroyed the grave of the Amir 'Abd al-Qadir because it was situated on the course of a road under construction: Jamal could not be bothered to change the road’s course slightly to show respect. Farid headed this paragraph of his diary "the hatred towards Jamal Pasha in Syria"136.

Ottoman Arabs, then, helped culturize Farid’s perceptions of the conflict into which the Ottoman Turks slipped with both the Egyptians and the Asian Arabs. Turkish attacks on Arab

culture had forced the Ottoman Arabs to fight them in its defence. The common classicist Arab identity and the exiled Egyptians' empathy for the Ottoman Arabs were welding the two groups into some new community. The Kamilists' decades-old pan-Islamic association with the Turks --- and the delimitation of the innermost political unit by the territorial homeland, Egypt --- slowed Farid's pushing out of the boundaries of intimate nation. He and other Egyptians, nonetheless, moved towards a linguistic pan-Arab political nation in conflict with a Turkish nation. Farid had the sense that Egyptians (plus North Africa?) and the Asian Arab territories constituted one emotional community when he told Zimmerman in early 1917 that Jamal Pasha's atrocities had "tremendously harmed the Ottoman State in Egypt and all Arab lands (jami'-

al-bilad al-'Arabiyyah)". The sentence left ambiguous whether he included Egypt fully in the category "the Arab lands". In February 1918 Farid learned that the Ottoman Prime Minister Tala'at refused to raise navigation through the Suez Canal (and thus Egypt's political status) at the Brest Litovsk negotiations in order not to "complicate" achievement of peace with Russia: discussion of the Egyptian problem should be left with Britain. This only confirmed for Farid that "the Turks" in general did not care about, or feared, Egypt. If Egypt became independent, the initiative and education of its population might endanger the Ottoman State's control over its Arab provinces; on the other hand, were it incorporated in an expanded Ottoman State like the union of the German States headed by Prussia, Arab Egypt's demographic weight would transform the Empire's ethnic politics: "the Egyptian [deputies] and [the deputies representing] the remainder of the Arab[ic] lands (baqil-mamlak al-'Arabiyyah)" in the expanded Ottoman parliament would "outnumber the deputies of the Turks and win control over the Ottoman State, with the Turks falling into second position". Thus, Farid now envisaged that the Arab lands, Egypt one unit, could come to constitute an explicitly political quasi-national national entity and had a vague vision that Egypt might lead the other Arab lands in certain circumstances.

AWARENESS OF ARAB RACE IN CONTEXTS OF MUSLIM-COPTIC SECTARIAN TENSIONS

This section sets out weaker identification with Arabness among Copts, compared to

Muslim Egyptians, prior to 1919.

Kamilist statements about human Arab virtues or blood and descent as a link of modern Egyptians to classical Islam’s Arabs had a secular ring. Linguistically, Copts were as Arabized as Egypt’s Muslims. Perhaps like Sanu’ in defining Egyptians of all sects against Westerners, Nimr Efendi, spokesman of a predominantly Coptic group, may have categorized Egyptians as "Arabs" in appealing for French aid to establish independence from Turkey in 1801. Coptic intellectuals in the late nineteenth century were well aware of the 'Urabi movement’s evocation of ethnicist Arab identity at home --- and its despatch of emissaries to the Hijazi and Libyan Arabs, which Mikha’il Sharubim (like Kamil) saw as the Turcophile Wilfrid Scawen Blunt manipulating 'Urabi into an "Arab Caliphate" clash with the Porte, probably to serve official British designs. For all his political quietism and caution, though, Sharubim made no particularist Coptic objection to a wider Arab entity.

Language was a strong bond, but religion sectionalized racial Arabization in Egypt within the Arabic-speaking Muslims’ community. Islam permitted marriages by incoming Arab Muslims with local Egyptian converts to Islam, male or female, and with local Christian women, but forbade Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men, thus barring the entry of Arab blood into Egypt’s continuing Christian and Jewish communities. Because Arab blood was perceived as confined to Muslims, the motif further differentiated the sects.

Both Egypt’s Muslims and Copts --- and the British --- maintained awareness under British colonial rule that the element of Arab blood was distinctive of the Muslims among the

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139. Nimr Efendi’s possible formulation, in an 1801 letter to Tallyrand requesting French aid to realize Egypt’s independence, was: “Arabs like us speak as much as you want but they write little”. Unselfconscious use of the term "Arab" for a critical image of self in this sentence would be like Ya’qub Sanu’s. The ambiguity is whether the term "Arab" was Nimr’s usage or that of Theodore Lascarus, Piedmontese visionary and ex-Knight of Malta who drafted the letter for him in French. George A. Haddad, "A Project for the Independence of Egypt, 1801", American Oriental Society Journal v. 90, 1970, p. 176.

140. Mikha’il Sharubim, al-Kafi fi Ta’rikh Misr al-Oadim wal-Hadith (Cairo: 4 vols Bulaq 1898 - 1900) v. 4 pp. 268 - 269. Sharubim’s suspicion that Blunt’s interest in Arabic was a feigned cover badly misread the anti-imperialist aristocrat: yet Blunt’s attempts to maintain a link between the ‘Urabists and Gladstone may have misled some Egyptians in 1881-2 about the extent of his influence and about what Britain was likely to do. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 111. Blunt, in his 1882 book Future of Islam, proposed an Arab Caliphate independent of the Ottoman Empire: Kamil in 1898 denounced this as an official British strategy to destroy the Ottoman Empire and replace it with a puppet Arab mock-Caliph so as to annex Egypt and the region permanently. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittiyhat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu’asir (Bayrut: 2 vols Dar al-Irshad 1970) v. 2 pp. 24 - 25. Yet, when they met years later on English soil, Blunt and Kamil realized they were two brothers in anti-Imperialism. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 202.
Arabic-speaking religious communities in Egypt. S.H. Leeder, a mildly pro-Coptic British observer with some knowledge of Arabic, who set out to mix with the native populations during pre-World War I travels in Egypt, thought that gins far'uni (Pharaonic race) was (still) a common nickname for the Copts by Muslims "who themselves boast of being Arabs and the sons of Arabs". Coptic-Muslim differences in 1910-1912 bear out that extensively Westernizing-educated Muslim and Coptic intellectuals still often assumed that the Copts could claim purer indigenous Pharaonic blood. Conversely, Arab blood was still felt to be important in Egyptian Muslim identity.

Both Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid formulated ideological responses to the problem posed for national integration. Kamil's response was the more post-traditional. He sought to refute the thesis of Coptic militants that their community alone was truly Egyptian, and that Arabic-speaking Muslims were racial aliens (ghuraba') in Egypt, by countering that "the greater part of the Muslims of Egypt are of antique Pharaonic stock". Kamil's formulation did not deny that Muslim Egyptians had a component of Arab race.

Later, affirming Egypt's unitary nationhood during sharp 1911 controversies between Coptic and Muslim pan-Islamist communalists, Lutfi argued that there was no difference between the Muslim and the Christian and no inherent superiority of the son of Isma'il [progenitor of the Arabians] over the son of Ramses except through greater self-sacrifice in serving the homeland. True, territoriality (homeland) and shared socio-economic life within it were here more powerful a community-builder than racial connections or differences for Lutfi. Although more often subordinated to his quasi-particularist theses, Lutfi's traditional habit of thought racially linking Egyptian Muslims to Arab populations beyond Egypt, while distinguishing Egypt's Muslims from their Coptic compatriots, did recur in his Occupation-period writings. An instance was his observation that Egyptians would never be hostile to foreign European migrants who helped Egypt progress because love of peace "distinguishes us from all our neighbors who are of our race (jins) and of our blood".

At a time of the 1911-1913 communal tensions over jobs between the Coptic and Muslim

143. Lutfi in al-Jaridah 6 May 1911 quoted Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 239.
144. Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah p. 46.
acculturateds, the poet 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri, who was a Jaridist but favorably disposed to the Kamilist independence movement, wrote a conciliatory poem which he titled "An Egyptian Arab Addresses his Coptic Brother". Shukri's title instances how "Arab" was often synonymous with Muslim in Egypt under the British Occupation: although, while complimenting the Copts' stronger racial link to Pharaonic glories, he did assume that their Muslim compatriots had some diluted Pharaonic blood of their own.\footnote{Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri p. 39. The poem, composed out of 'Abbasoid classical poetical vocabulary, addressed the Copts as "sons of fine chieftains ... [with] the lineage of princes that can never be questioned. If descent [somewhat] removes you from our glory, you yet are very Arabs in the heights of glory to which you soared. Familiar acquaintanceship has left lineages unable to turn either of us away from the other ... Devoted though I am to my kin (ahl), I feel delight that I can claim blood relatedness to you when I have to boast. If I must boast, what better than in those princes who captured Time's events, and never lacked victories? ... [In your] resplendent [Pharaonic] State ... you looked proudly down over the stars you had soared beyond, making the heart of Canopus palpitate/sink". Text, "Misri 'Arabi Y ukhatibu Akhahu al-Qibti" (An Arab Egyptian Addresses His Coptic Brother), in Niqula Yusuf (ed), Diwan 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri (Alexandria: al-Ma'arif 1960) p. 50.}

The Coptic communalist publicists in English, and their British Christian allies, intensified the Copts' sense of their own pure Pharaonic blood, as against their Muslim neighbors' racial Arabness. The Copts were depicted as simultaneously (a) Christians persecuted for a millennium by Muslims and (b) the indigenous "remnant" of the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians amid Egyptian Muslims largely descended from Arab and other subsequent Muslim invaders. In his introduction to Kyriakos Mikhail's 1911 English polemic, Professor A.H. Sayce applied this racial contrast, beyond the specific grievances of Copts, to deny acculturated elite Muslims independence. The "young Mohammedan Effendi" who would "expel the English infidel" with the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" was "generally not an Egyptian at all. Until very recently his boast was that he was an Arab, or of Arab descent."\footnote{Kyriakos Mikha'il, Copts and Moslems Under British Control: A Collection of Facts and a Resume of Authoritative Opinions on the Coptic Question (London: Smith Elder & Co 1911) p. vii. Mikhail reprinted statements presenting the modern Copts as the indigenous descendants of ancient Pharaonic Egyptians and often the Muslims as Arab intruders from the Times, the Yorkshire Daily Observer, the Commonwealth, the Church Times, the Globe, and the Manchester Guardian (ibid pp. 104-110).}

Egyptian-Muslim acculturated intellectuals maintained identification with Arab race in face of its use by British authors to delegitimize Egyptian independence. The highly Westernized Egyptian nationalist Duse Mohamed, an older admirer of Mustafa Kamil, replying in 1911 to arguments by "European writers" that only the Copts --- and not the Muslim nationalist leaders --- were true Egyptians, granted that "the Copts are the legitimate descendants of the subjects of the Pharaohs, and that the fellaheen for the most part migrated from the..."
Arabian country”. Duse Mohamed elsewhere, however, referred to intermarriage between Arabs who came to Egypt and local women.\(^\text{147}\)

Beliefs of descent from Arabs from outside Egypt were important for Arabic-speaking elite Muslims in the period of British colonial rule. Then Arab race faded out in the ultra-linguistic acculturated pan-Arab nationalism that was to evolve after 1922. This section has not denied the early capacity of standard Arabic and its high literature to make Copts such as Wasif Ghali, within active French or English bilingualism, identify themselves and Muslim Egyptians, together, as Arab before Westerners (Wafdist Makram 'Ubayd also).\(^\text{148}\) Still, Muslim Egyptians showed some readiness to maintain self-identification as Arab in areas such as race images where it made Coptic compatriots’ feel less like them and thus did not help the movement for independence.

Book 2 of this thesis will present development by Muslim particularist intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s of Kamil’s tentative conciliatory formula about common Pharaonic blood of Egypt’s Muslims and Christians, for example by Zaki Abu Shadi (1926) and Young Egypt’s Ahmad Husayn (1938). Ahmad Husayn’s argumentation that Egypt’s Muslims were racially as Pharaonic as its Copts was to betray awareness that some Copts were increasingly rejecting Egyptian Muslims as racial Arab aliens (B 218 - 220).

Assessment

By 1918, the Kamilists, the Jaridists and other dual-cultured Muslim Egyptians had assembled most of the historical data and continuity of language with the classical Arabs that

\(^{147}\) Duse Mohamed, *In the Land of the Pharaohs* pp. 274-275. Duse defined himself (ibid p. 274 fn. 2) as “a cross between Arab and Ethiopian, my mother being a Nubian or full-blooded Negress”. It is to be borne in mind in assessing his views on race and community that he began his education in England in 1876 and practically resided there from 1884 (ibid p. 2). Duse Mohamed, in some aspects, may thus represent the community assumptions of a Muslim Egyptian generation earlier than Kamil’s and Lutfi’s. His national thought developed to prefigure pan-Africanism and US Black Nationalism, and he varied somewhat from younger nationalists more continuously rooted in Egypt’s environment. Still, he often addressed Watani Egyptians in London: Farid, Awrag pp. 140-141. Duse Mohamed’s book frequently expresses admiration for Mustafa Kamil. Duse edited the *African Times and Orient Review*, published in London, July 1912-August 1914, January 1917-October 1918.

became a basis for the more political "Eastern" pan-Arabism of the 1920s. Ancient Arab virtues and idioms were already applied to the current (still Egyptian) nation to (a) prescribe its literate discourse and some behavior within modernization and (b) focus very novel conflicts of Egyptian and other Arabs with imperialists ( politicization). Concepts of territorial Egyptianism unfolded among the same Muslim writers, before 1918: but incoming dribbles of translated Pharaonic data could not match the floods of classical Arab materials (eg. poetry), already in Arabic. On the plane of the joint restoration of the classical Arabs' language, the cultural pan-Arab successor-community was already reality, interlocking a chain of Muslim and Christian literary elites: Kamilists readily accepted recreations of classical Arabs from SCS whose anti-Turkism offended for a time. al-Hizb al-Watani already felt special affinities with West Asian Arabs within pro-Ottoman pan-Islam; they abhorred SC ethnicist criticism of the Ottoman State but its detailed data prepared them and the Jaridists to support Arab nationalist protest there later (Farid).

Overall, the period 1892 - 1922 laid the cultural bases (including historical consciousness of the classical Arabs) for a modern pan-Arab nation to be centered in Egypt. True, there was a gap between (a) the cultural and (b) uneven political integration of the elites involved. Apart from political and economic sources of conflict with Syrian, and to limited extent Coptic, Christians, Kamilist Arabism in itself, though it highlighted a joint language, was too blended with Islam to draw Christian and Muslim Arabs together.
CHAPTER 6: ARABIST AND MUSLIM FACETS OF AL-JARIDAH PARTICULAROIDS

The West-centric scholarly literature has unusually one-dimensionalized Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and the al-Jaridah intellectuals down into simple isolationist particularists and Westernizers, highlighting their rejection of pan-Islamism. (C.D. Smith did pay some attention to their reservations towards sectors of the West that might threaten their ascendancy over wider classes). There were already significant proto-particularist motifs among the al-Jaridah school prior to 1915: this corrective Chapter, though, traces how supra-Egyptian Islamic and Arab cultural elements and community drives already alternated or blended with these. Our diverser, more life-like --- much more Arab --- portrait of the Jaridists will make the al-Siyasah successor-group’s development of pan-Easternist, pan-Arab and ideological-Islamist activity from the 1920s more intelligible as a progression that was decidedly non-sudden.

PROTO-PARTICULARISM

The Rural Land of Egypt: Loved Mother

Acculturated quasi-particularism. The recurring anti-emotionist stance of al-Jaridah particularoids, their cold-blooded refusals to pursue community with extra-Egyptians lest that not

1. Nadav Safran assessed Lutfi’s pre-1914 particularoidism and repudiation of pan-Islam as "the highest point of emancipation reached by any Egyptian from the obsession with the problem of power as a religious issue". Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1961) p. 95. A late, unusually bald, instance is Gershoni and Jankowski’s 1986 treatment of Lutfi al-Sayyid’s pre-World War I writings as "the first formulation of an exclusively Egyptian and thoroughly modern territorial nationalism unencumbered by residual Ottoman-Islamic overtones". Their work gave obsessive weight to recycled statements in which Lutfi defined Egyptians as one "blood", spoke of the historical continuity of their development of a national "character", rebuked Egyptians who affiliated with Turkdom or Arabdom and rebuffed Ottoman Arabs who came with complaints of bullying by Turks. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: the Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900 - 1930 (New York: OUP 1986) pp. 13 - 14, 18. Their analysis drew heavily on communications by Lutfi in Wendell’s 1972 The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From Its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972). This work already had been ideological enough but fourteen years later Gershoni and Jankowski only particularized Lutfi even more relentlessly --- ignoring Araboid statements by him in at least Wendell’s appendices that had pointed out of the paradigm. Describing the features of Arabic in Egyptian identity, Lutfi in 1909 characterized Egyptians as "an Arab people who feel joy and sorrow keenly, for the noble are so moved". He considered Egypt’s indigenous music "Arab music" derived from "the [Iraq-based] ’Abbasid dynasty ten centuries ago", and desired patronage for it so as to lift it out of its decline: Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 306-9. Orientalism has been persistently unwilling to incorporate how Arab Lutfi often formulated Egyptian "personality" to be.

pay off, most struck their contemporaries. Their spasmodic Egyptianism cited the land and a
much thinner Pharaonic past but also drew (Lutfi) on the British Utilitarians and such more
sociological French thinkers as Montesquieu --- whose anti-Muslim facets nonetheless Islamized
and Arabized. Montesquieu’s 1734 Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et
de leur decadence had characterized the Romans as happy to sacrifice their lives for their
republic so long as it was confined to Rome’s environs, but progressively less and less as its
borders expanded over most of the known world. Such European thought legitimized or
deepened insularist Egyptianism. Concern and effort from individuals increases as the circle of
personality narrows: any person is more eager to serve his homeland than humanity, his family
more than the homeland and his own self more than his family. To Western and pragmatic
motifs, this Jaridist attached a rudimentary particularist vision of Egyptian history: since a
(Pharaonic?) sovereign age, the Egyptian personality had had somehow to survive a succession
of "conquering nations": so abraded, it now needed a novel systematic "strengthening"
(=particularization). (Pharaonic and non-sovereign post-Pharaonic history was to be similarly
dichotomized seventeen years later by the Coptic Pharaonist Marqus Sumaykah in 1926: B 478 -
481).

The author cited narrower self-interests and pragmatism when those marginalized Turks

3. In a context of Kamil-like characterization of Gladstone and Cromer as anti-Muslims, Lutfi in a 1908
article depicted such classical French writers as the Baron de Montesquieu as an ultimate source of the anti-Islamic
venom of French colonialism in Algeria. Lutfi ridiculed the statement of Montesquieu that "the Christian religion
strengthens just government" while "the Mohamened religion strengthens despotism". He fired back an overview of the
Catholic Church’s persistent advocacy of the divine right of kings, instancing arguments by Bishop Boussuet ---
whose claim, though, to derive his monarchist ideology from the Gospels was spurious. Lutfi, Safahat Matsiyyah
min Ta’rikh al-Harakaat al-Istidaliyyah fi Misr (ed. Isma’il Mazhar) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946)
pp. 110 - 112. It is true that the Jesuit-educated Jaques-Benigne Boussuet (1627 - 1704) argued the divine right of
Kings in his Politique tirée de l'ecriture sainte, although also their duties to their subjects. Boussuet labored to
inculcate his ideas into the Dauphin as his tutor from 1670 - 1680 but met mainly "incuriosity". Paul Harvey and

4. ”Ibn Mukhlis” (pseud), "al-Shakhsiyyat al-Misriyyah" (The Egyptian Personality), al-Jaridah 11
September 1909 p. 5. Lutfi, too, often described the nation as an extension or magnification of the family unit,
being influenced by Rousseau and Aristotle. Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 270-1. S. Haykal shared this
1909 item’s sense that Egypt lost national sovereignty with the end of the Pharaohs thirteen centuries before:
thereafter it was ruled by a succession of conquerors --- Greeks, Romans, Arabs, (Muslim) North Africans
(=Fatimids), Tatars, Mamluks, Turks, the French and the British who had all wiped out Egypt’s original
"civilization" and "nationality". S. Haykal, "A Turidunaha Hazimat al-Abad?” (Do You Want This Defeat to be
Eternal?), al-Jaridah 30 October 1911 p. 5. This view of history was directed against non-autochthonous Muslims
--- Turco-Circassian, Turkish and immigrant Ottoman Arab (Syrian = Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i? Rashid Rida?) ---
who were using religious appeals to involve Egyptians in the Italian-Libyan-Ottoman War and other Ottoman or
Arab issues, just to "fill their pockets". Ibid. Cf idem "al-Wadi al-Qadim" (The Old Valley), al-Jaridah 1 November
1911 p. 5.
or other Arabs, but mystic self-sacrifice of the individual also motivated. Only tenacious "attachment to this Compassionate Mother, the land of the Nile Valley" had preserved the Egyptian Nation’s personality through the ages of catastrophes: as re-articulated by editor Lutfi it now was igniting a qualitatively new resistance to "all who work to annihilate it within some larger personality". The writer had previously rebuked Kamilist pan-Islamism by guarded innuendo but, heartened by Lutfi, would henceforth assail it comprehensively.

Clearly, alongside flat utilitarianism and materialism, the Jaridists had some intense emotions. To the Kamilist opponents’ "love" of other Muslims and Arabs they retorted a holy devotion to the land of Egypt, on which they now claimed a patent. Hourani stressed the original vividness of Lutfi’s "physical consciousness of Egypt and its countryside" before 1914: his youthful disciples Muhammad Husayn Haykal (B 397-8) and Taha Husayn were after World War I to publish much creative literature describing the Egyptian countryside and its peasantry’s harsh life. Lutfi’s al-Jaridah followers, however, politicized the new feeling for physical Egypt to batter those elements of the independence movement that called for some political alliance or unity with Turkey on the basis of shared Islam. A 1914 late al-Jaridah article published shortly before Turkey declared war upon Britain and France, described "love of the homeland" as "a variant of intense passion" (al-'ishq) inculcated by the unique (rural-sedentary Nilotic) environment in which one grows up, and which binds together "people of the one country". Outside this ecologic innocence stand Egypt’s pan-Islamists who "almost tremble with joy at ... good won by others among those termed 'her female relatives' even though it work to Egypt’s loss". In relations between nations "it is Egypt that merits love --- others sympathy".

The physical, objectively existing, secular entity of the homeland thus determines the

5. Ibid.
7. Anon., "Fil-Wataniyyah Aydan: A Tanjim hadha am Mudi’ah lil-Waqt?" (On Patriotism Once More: is this Astrology or a Squanderer of Precious Time?), al-Jaridah 7 October 1914. The article’s beautiful, if politically tendentious, evocation of the Egyptian countryside ran: "For, he who remembers a moonlit night which he spent on the bank of the Nile: he who has grown up through childhood running after moths in [his village’s] golden fields: he who has tramped along the long road ... on which the young maidens, after ending their cotton-picking, have passed singing songs of homecoming behind the loaded camels: he who has gone to take shade from the sun’s heat in a clump of trees and began to eat of the cucumbers and vegetables of the earth, milking its beasts as he looks over the plain ... he who has cultivated and tended grain with his own hands ... all these undoubtedly feel between their souls and the environment a golden bond". Ibid.
units of human solidarity. All beyond Egypt's boundaries are political strangers even if sharing Islam or Arabic with Egyptians --- for at least this spasm in Jaridism.

**Anti-Ottoman Particularism**

The Arab-Muslim landowning class from which the Ummah Party and many Jaridists stemmed, had had to overcome and supplant the old Turcophone absentee aristocracy in its rise. Some particularoid stances by al-Jaridah intellectuals when solidarity with Turks or outside Arabs came up had starting-points in parochial communalism --- as against Lutfi's more generous, if fragile, drive to integrate all Turks in Egypt, if they only wanted. One 1911 item defined "the original Egyptian" in Egypt as "the Muslim sons of the land and the Copts and some of the Jewish families which settled in this country centuries back". This excluded Syrian immigrants, more of whom were Christian, but also --- explicitly --- Muslim North African (Maghribi) immigrants, making those Arabs as foreign as the resident Europeans. The article lashed out at Turkish emigres who made Egypt the base for their vocal opposition to their regime, justifying the wish among the Egyptians that "some" Turkish emigres repatriate to Constantinople, now that the Ottoman Constitution had been restored. West-patterned illiberalism: some Britishers told Anglo-Jewish politicians and publicists during a recent contretemps in parliamentarism to go back where they came from: "authentic" Egyptians had title to marginalize immigrant Muslims and Arabs.

However, this writer did not see either the anti-Semitism in England or his own irritation at non-native Arabs or Turks as systems. al-Jaridah often carried the extra-Egyptian statements.

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8. See B 304 - 306.
9. As a territorialist nationalist, Lutfi was ready to enrol immigrants from the Ottoman Empire into the Egyptian nation after a mere fifteen years residence. Some residual emotions of wider multi-lingual Muslim ummah and even of Ottomanism may have influenced him here, since in the same speech he warily only courted a neutral extravertorality from resident Europeans, whose press he knew tended to align against Egyptian nationalism with the British. Lutfi’s territorial or geographic determinism was a bit naïve about the persistence of linguistic and racial ethnicity; he was surprised and upset that Turkish-speaking anti-Hamidian liberal refugees who had come to Egypt with their families, abruptly returned to their lands of birth after the end of 'Abdul-Hamid’s despotism. "It grieves us that some Egyptian nationals who still have some connection with the other Ottoman homelands, are intending to return to their original lands. That offends us because they are the sons of Egypt whom we expect to have the patience to stay in Egypt and serve it, until Egypt, too, win her hoped-for independence". Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah p. 32. On the incorporativeness that Lutfi’s Egyptianism could voice towards resident Europeans as well as immigrant Ottoman Turks and Arabs, Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs pp. 13 - 14; Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 8 - 12.
10. Anon, "al-Asil wal-Dakhil" (Natives and Interlopers), al-Jaridah 20 August 1911 p. 5.
activities and interests of the Ottoman Arab and Turkish groups conducting politics from Egypt, including the League of Ottoman Decentralization that Muslim and Christian Syrians had organized in Cairo in 1912.

The controversies between al-Jaridah and the pro-Kamilist press sharpened and systematized both their Egyptianity and pan-Islamist stances --- polarization that obscured the extent to which each shared in a different mix features it now had to denounce in the opponent. al-Jaridah:

The [Kamilist] newspaper al-'Alam presumes to impose some principle that every Muslim is to be considered an Egyptian whoever he is and from wherever he came. In contrast, our journal states that, while we have to respect our religion, Egypt must be for the Egyptians spanning their different sects, and that Egypt should have a particularistic personality (shakhsiyah khususiyyah) entailed by international conditions, and by the supreme interest of the Homeland.

The Kamilists increasingly worried that Lutfi’s much more particularist, anti-Turkish articulation of the Egyptian Personality was gradually winning at least a hearing from some educated Muslims. One 1914 attack in the pro-Hizb al-Watani al-Afkar retorted to Lutfi’s calls for “independence” from Turkey and “Egyptian Personality” that the European States would not sincerely support Egyptian independence from Britain --- while the Ottoman State would help Egypt realize “true patriotism”. Repeated acts of aggression by the European powers against Muslim peoples, in particular the Italian invasion of Ottoman Libya, had made the Kamilists (a) close ranks more with the Ottoman Turks and (b) wind down their previous drive to court the aid of the good Europeans against the aberrantly non-liberal British ones. Yet pooled

11. Some resident Syrian/Arab emigre communications that al-Jaridah published, at least initially voiced loyalty to the post-Hamidian --- more secular --- Ottoman central government, on which hopes for economic modernization depended, as against Arab protest nationalism. An early 1909 Cairo meeting by the Ottoman Brotherhood Society in Egypt, chaired by al-Mugattam’s SC editor Dr Faris Nimr, condemned “some Ottomans in Paris who were working to set up a Syrian League to seek autonomy for Syria. ...This endeavor is not in the interests of the Syrians in particular or the Ottomans in general given that, coming at the inception of the constitutional era, it might tend to weaken the Ottoman community and the Ottoman State that now so sorely needs the unity of all elements of its ummah, religions and provinces”. “Jam’iyyat al-Ikha’ al-Uthmani bi-Misr” (The Society of Ottoman Brotherhood in Egypt), al-Jaridah 4 February 1909. For Nimr’s Arab nationalist youth and the Arabizing influence of the SC publications in which he took part in Egypt, B 336 fn.


counter-strength against imperialism still did not usually quite amount to the "treasonous" unitary neo-Ottomanism that al-Jaridah polemicized. In their endeavors to incrementally restructure the relationship with Britain and Europe the Jaridists might indeed compromise Egypt’s independence for a time as the Kamilists charged (the Australia- or Canada-like imperial dominion road to more independence)\textsuperscript{14}. Yet the Jaridists discreetly shared much of their opponents’ angry pessimism about Westerners.

**Neo-Pharaonism**

The neo-Pharaonism developed in the 1920s by al-Siyasah intellectuals who had been formed before 1918 in the al-Jaridah milieu strove unprecedently to trace or restore legacies of ancient Egypt in Islamic and twentieth-century Egypt. Yet some elements for it had already been pioneered in al-Jaridah before 1914.

Lutfi wanted Egyptology to be taught in Egypt as in England, and pride in the supra-Egyptian Pharaonic Empires\textsuperscript{15}. (Ancient Pharaonic empires and exchanges, though, could foster pan-Arabization over the long term: B 425 - 432). The Egyptology of Westerners, via multi-lingualization, fed the neo-Pharaonism of al-Jaridah: its swift Arabic versions of items in the French and European press kept the general readership abreast of issues of Pharaonic antiquities\textsuperscript{16}. In rare cases, Egyptology flowed over into propagation of real data from Pharaonic antiquities.

\textsuperscript{14} Lutfi repeatedly argued that Egyptians should achieve independence in stages by building up its preconditions: education, an indigenous modern private enterprise comparable to that of the resident Europeans, greater efficiency by Egyptian ministries, the effectiveness of the advisory parliament Britain allowed, by winning a Constitution etc. After the Egyptians had achieved all that, the British would be unable before International Law and the other Western states, to refuse self-government. (=It might all put off a showdown for decades!) Lutfi, "Nazariyyatuna fil-littil 'wa fil-Jala" (Our Theory on the Occupation and Withdrawal) al-Jaridah 20 September 1911 pp. 1-2. "Y.B." (= Syrian Christian sub-editor Yusuf al-Bustani) in "Ma'nal-Himayah" (The Meaning of the [just declared British] Protectorate), al-Jaridah, voiced the hope that it would be the first step in Egypt’s evolution to autonomous Dominion status, already incrementally achieved by Canada, Australia and New Zealand --- not the other possibility, annexation. As ever with al-Jaridah, al-Bustani’s modest accommodationism throbbed with repressed acculturated antipathy to European tormentors: now that Britain had set the scene for Egyptian juridical independence, the extra-territorial mixed courts could be abolished, there need only be Egyptian courts before which the Egyptian, the Englishman, the Italian "and every European" would plead as equals under one law: no more could any "oaf" from the resident foreigners’ "rabble" injure an Egyptian, then decamp across the Mediterranean to a lenient court in his own land. Ibid. The Protectorate was also hailed in "Misriyyatuna" (Our Egyptianism), al-Jaridah 27 December 1914, welcoming the end of the Ottoman connection: the conditional collaboration offered by all these items, though, perhaps strove to preempt the British repression that followed. Cf fn 63.

\textsuperscript{15} Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 236 - 238.

\textsuperscript{16} For example, the translation of a Figaro item "Haykal al-Karnak: Hadith lil-Monsieur Maspero" (al-Karnak Temple: An Interview with M. Maspero), al-Jaridah 14 October 1909 p. 5. This was part of an argument among the Egyptological establishment in Egypt as to whether water leaching threatened that temple.
Egypt among the new secular-educated classes. Once, *al-Jaridah* even connected its readers aesthetically to well-chosen extracts from the Pharaohites’ religious and erotic poetry. The item took these from *A History of the Beaux Arts among the Ancient Egyptians* by Shukri Sadiq: it had illustrations depicting the social classes and religious, sporting and cultural life of ancient Egypt --- “every Egyptian” should buy that book. *al-Jaridah* may have been wary of how conceptually remote or contentious “the beneficent gods” of “the pious forefathers” might prove for its readers: it excerpted a rather proto-monotheistic hymn to Ra17.

The durable stereotypes and aesthetic of the classical Arab Muslims continued to fog Reconnection. The 1909 poem “Pharaoh and his People” by Isma’il Sabri softened the immemorial Coptic and Muslim images of despotism to depict Pharaoh as able to fire his colleagues and subjects to a sincere proto-constitutionalist activism: “unless other Pharaohs from among you support me, I cannot myself be a Pharaoh of so elevated a throne... Draw not near the Nile if you lack the will to carry through great tasks”. The Egyptians proceeded to "fly as swiftly as the jinn at the command of the Prophet Solomon out of devotion to he who commanded, not in either fear or greed". The huge pyramids they hewed thenceforth "mocked" as the millennia levelled all other "soaring edifices and palaces" of the whole Earth’s subsequent kingdoms and rulers18.

This hybrid poem’s aesthetic continuities with the classical Arabs were obvious. From far-off upper Egypt, one "Writer" compared Sabri to Arabist poet Hafiz Ibrahim as both pioneer builders of a "renaissance" and "independence" of the Egyptian nation to be animated by a constitutionalist anti-despotism parallel to that Hugo inculcated in France. This Egyptianism was (a) in political ideologies West-patterned and (b) implicitly flayed the "despot" Khedive 'Abbas, *al-Jaridah*’s bugbear19. But he was well aware that the aesthetically equally classicist-Arabist Sabri in evoking the bygone Pharaonic Egyptians instead of the classical Arabs somewhat followed the 'Abbasid poet al-Buhturi (826-897), whose *siniyyah* lamented the departed glory of

17. "Ta’rikh al-Funun al-Jamilah ‘inda Qudama’ al-Misriyyin" (History of the Beaux Arts Among the Ancient Egyptians), *al-Jaridah* 27 September 1909 p. 5. This item’s reference to the Pharaonic Egyptians as "the Pious Forefathers" (al-salaf al-salih) in their pagan religious aspect was either joking or daringly unconventional given that, from al-Afghani, pan-Islamists had for decades applied al-salaf al-salih to the first model generation of (mainly Arab) Muslims. The item respectfully introduced Sadiq as "Secretary of the Egyptian Beaux Arts’ Club", and cited a platitudeous motto from Emerson that he appropriated for his own book --- the bellettristic tincture from Anglo-Saxon culture recurrent in *al-Jaridah* and the elite modern Muslim strata it expressed. *Ibid.*
Iran as symbolized in the ruined palace of Kosroes (Kisra) at al-Mada'in. During the Arab-Islamic reaction of the 1930s, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat would argue that the inherent, homogenizing contents of literary pan-Arabic pre-doomed all neo-Pharaonism in it only to transmit the unitary Arab culture and identity that it protested (B 436).

The same number of al-Jaridah printed an appeal from Homs by anti-Hamidian Syrian 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, for a time an al-Jaridah editor, for Egyptians to contribute to the relief of mostly poor residents of his city made homeless by recent floods. The more real pan-Arab community was tightening at the very side of neo-Pharaonism.

Could Pharaonic religion and divine monarchy be fitted into the acculturation-diluted Islam and European liberal parliamentarism of the modern-educated classes? Deep acculturation made Egyptian intellectuals prefer "democratic" classical Greece to Pharaonic Egypt: Western high cultures, superficial hyper-modernism and persistent Islam all helped maintain casual but recurring disdain for Pharaonic despotism, religion and priesthoods, in Lutfi and such disciples.

20. al-Buhturi kept up the poetic idiom of pre-Islamic Arabia, but, as the Turkish soldiery assassinated the Caliph al-Mutawakkil, he saw Arabs and Persians as having been collaborators in the threatened 'Abbasid venture. Made aware of mortality by the crisis, al-Buhturi paid tribute at the ruins of the al-Mada'in palace (iwān) to Sasanid Persia's "high endeavors which, but for partiality on my part, that of 'Ans and 'Abs could not match": line 17 of his sīniyāḥ in A.J. Arberry Arabic Poetry (Cambridge University Press 1965) pp. 72-81. "Adīb" (loc. cit) exaggerated Sabri's transcendence of "the limits of most ancient poets [of Arabic] and [their modern] imitators in interrogating ruined abodes and weeping for camel-litters [or women borne on such litters: az'ān; sing. zu'ūnāh] and addressing she-camels and other things that, present in the first ages, poets could never avoid". Sabri's tribute to Pharaoh had made Egyptians forget al-Buhturi and his sīniyāḥ. al-Jaridah kept its readers informed of the editing and publishing of al-Buhturi's complete diwan from two manuscripts by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Barquqi, editor of the stylistically neo-classical al-Bayan. "Diwan al-Buhturi", al-Jaridah 21 November 1911 p. 5. The persistence of classical Arab aesthetic elements in the most particulistic or West-patterned endeavors of Egyptian intellectuals would be hard to exaggerate. Wendell cited 1908 excitement of Lutfi when Constitutionalists in Iran resisted the Shah's cossacks: "the Persian Nation" would never yield up her sovereignty over the freedom of the press and of speech within her borders or her immemorial "national character": it never accepted "any rulers not of her own stock". For Wendell, this attack on the Shah (and Britain and Russia?) instanced that "Lutfi unreservedly threw in his lot with local nationalism and against Islamic internationalism ... painted by al-Afghani". Yet Lutfi's "memorialization of the pre-Islamic greatness of the Persians" here was culturistically Arabo-Islamic in a pre-modern and conventional way: he quoted a verse that Persians conquered Time when it was young actually penned by the 'Abbásid shu'ubi poet Mihyar al-Daylāmi (d. 1037). Cf fn 25, and for the post-1922 recurrence of al-Daylāmi in neo-Pharaonism and pan-Arabism B 278, 432-4.

21. "Saylu Hims" (The Floods in Homs), statement from 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, al-Jaridah 14 October 1909. 440 houses had been destroyed and al-Zahrawi urged the readers to donate for the construction of new houses for those made homeless, before winter deepened. "Humanity" and a shared (pan-Ottoman?) "Patriotism" should make al-Jaridah's readers donate. Ibid. It is unclear if al-Zahrawi addressed this communication to al-Jaridah only or if it was a standard appeal that he also sent to variety of papers.

22. Lutfi's acculturating drive ranged out over unusually diverse sectors: as well as French and British authors and thinkers better known in his clime, he became interested in classical Greek philosophy, even translating Aristotle into Arabic, although from French versions, since unlike Taha Husayn he did not learn Greek: for their Arabic translations of classical Greek works B 390 - 393 inc fns. In one 1907 evocation of a perpetual alienation of
as Husayn Haykal and Taha Husayn\textsuperscript{23}. The dislike was to resurface with venom after 1930 in the
acculturated Arabo-Islamic assault on Pharaonic particularism. Yet the pre-World War 1
al-Jaridah had already carried one or two affirmations of joint Pharaonic racial origin to bring
together disputing Copts and Muslims\textsuperscript{24}. That was to be an integrative function of the future

ordinary Egyptians from their ever-despotic rulers, Lutfi imagined that from the earliest periods these were all foreign
in race or religion or language or customs. Pharaonic Egypt, in this spasm of Lutfi, never experienced anything of
"the scientific government" that generally characterized Greece in "pre-Christian" antiquity. More than the
stereotypes about "democratic" Greece of the French and British in his day, Lutfi's scholarly experience of Aristotle
and other classical Greek writers oriented him to "the laws of the science of politics" that, he believed, had
effectively restricted individual dictatorship in Athens etc. Article, "al-Jafa' u Bayn al-Ummah wal-Hukumah: Ababahu wa Nata 'ijuju" (The Coldness between the Nation and the Government: Its Causes and Effects),
al-Jaridah 2 April 1907; Lutfi, Safahat p. 175. In a 1916 assessment of the pioneer of women's emancipation Qasim
Amin, Lutfi's disciple Haykal depicted Egyptians as fatally submissive to the autocratic rule of monarchs or other
despots from the time of the Pharaohs, who had not included a single indigenous Egyptian. The youth
Haykal's Westernizing geographical determinism was hostile to Egypt's supposed specific features, not Islam: he
saw al-Afghani and 'Abduh's salafiyyah as really purging Islam of local environmental accretions -- a crucial ally in
achieving change for the tiny, vulnerable modernist minority. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Fi Aweqat al-Fanagh
(Cairo: al-'Asriyyah 1925) pp. 104 - 117. Cf B 415 inc fn 23. Particularoids in the 1920s were still struggling to
dislodge from Egyptian thinking the motif that ancient Egypt had been despotist, arguing in reverse that it had
prefigured or originated Greece's rather derivative democracy (eg. Ahmad Lutfi Jum 'ah B 56).

23. Hostility to Pharaonic religion or Indefinite Propagation of the Acculturated Constituency's Cliches
About It. As a new law on al-Azhari was rammed through by "Abbas" supporters in the Advisory Council, Ahmad
Lutfi al-Sayyid charged "autocracy" while the very young Taha Husayn tried to block it with ill-digested cliches
from a French anti-clericalism that had been directed against Christianity: the threat of a "Papacy of the Middle Ages"
in Islam. He was manoeuvring around Egyptian Muslims who might accept that 'Abbas as head of the al-Azhari
Council might promote Islam, yet his connection of the compliant 'ulama' to ancient Middle Eastern paganisms was
also his own --- only thinning --- Islam-centrism, ('Abbas) elaboration of a religious hierarchy "takes Islam
backwards not merely to the era of Christianity but to those of paganism when the direction of knowledge and
religion was a monopoly of the priests of Amun, Marduk and Baal, the idols of Egypt, Babylonia and Syria". 'Abbas' caricature of Islam was meant to foster "polytheism ... the worship of human beings at the expense of Allah" as in ancient Egypt. Taha, "al-Ri'asat al-Diniyyah" (Authority Over/Through Religion), al-Jaridah 6 April
1911 p. 1. Antiquities that particularisms of the 1920s made into national golden ages, were before 1914 disliked as
opposed to Islam, even among al-Jaridah's secular-educated readership. In al-Jaridah in 1913, Lutfi characterized
ultra-classicists who would accept no deviation of style from the old Arab works as like the ancient Egyptian
priesthood that monopolized "the secrets of religion and its authority in the times of our Pharaonic ancestors".
Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 278. In 1938, Taha similarly denounced classicists who resisted simplified
curricula pragmatically designed to propagate classical Arabic more widely: they sought to monopolize Arabic as
"the ancient Egyptian priests maintained exclusive control over the various branches of learning and religion". Taha
89. In 1911, Taha also tried to turn against 'Abbas the reverence even secular-educated Muslim Egyptians had for
the Ottoman Sultan: he had no title "to reconnect government with religion because there was no Constitution" to
make it the representative of "the nation": it violated the prerogative of the Ottoman Caliph as the Guardian of
Islam's overall religious community (millah), protector of the shari'ah (Islamic religious law) and inheritor of the
Prophet chosen by the Muslims. "al-Ri'asat...".

24. See the Italo-Egyptian Abata Pasha's "Anasir al-Jins al-Misri Kulluha min Jinsin Wahid" (The
Elements [=sects] of the Egyptian People Are All from One Race) al-Jaridah 30 April 1911 pp. 1 - 2. Abata argued the
indivisibility of Egyptian nationalism to accord with the confessions-blind incorporative nationalism imagined by
Britain, France, Italy and other Western nation-states. He however recognized that Semitic immigrants from Arabia,
Negroes from the South and Hamites from Libya had migrated into Egypt to form the Egyptian people long before
dynastic times: this might prefigure a pan-Arabizing dysfunction of post-1922 neo-Pharaonist particularism (B 441 -
Acculturation-Globalized Muslim Community

The Islamic, Ottoman and Arab communities imaged from al-Jaridah were filled out and solidified by Islamophobic communications and data from Britain and France. In contrast to the simpler French-Arabic acculturation of Kamil and his colleagues earlier, al-Jaridah’s younger contributors were increasingly trilingual as a result of Dunlop’s Anglicization campaigns. The Jaridists willingly drank from nineteenth century British social and political thought and British and American belles-lettres and poetry. Like so many contributors, the romantic poet ’Abd al-Rahman Shukri relaxedly wove together motifs from the literatures and pasts of English and Arabic. Yet English and French only spurred them to artistic mastery of classical Arabic.

Moreover, Syrian Christian sub-editor Yusuf al-Bustani objected from the paper to Coptic evocation of a Pharaonic descent that would exclude his group: Egyptologists Champollion and Maspero had shown that race-mixing had already began in antiquity: today, the Egyptian is whoever serves Egypt. al-Jaridah 20 March 1911 p. 1.


26. Lutfi was a trenchant critic of the immemorial despotic and absolutist drivers of government and monarchs in Egypt, and of the population’s alienated submission to them. Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 175 - 176. While Aristotle as well as Mill and other Western liberals patterned such critiques by Jaridists, they could simultaneously draw on classical Arab situations and writings, too. ’Abd al-Rahman Shukri in a 1911 essay on “The Worship of Strength” wave together superficial references to Muhammad’s prohibitions of idolatry, Emerson, Shakespeare and Muhammad ’Abdul’s salafist condemnations of saint worship. He dismissed despotic monarchs as only heightening the undesirable authoritarianism of tribal leaders. Like much published in al-Jaridah, this article, too, may therefore have been directed against the Khedive ’Abbas, but the literary and rhetorical --- ultra-belletristic --- nature of such discursive al-Jaridah essays must be stressed: he alternated Western and old Arab literary motifs against his palate as a relaxed minor artist more than a social critic. Shukri, “’Ibadat al-Quwwah” (The Worship of Strength), al-Jaridah 10 August 1911 pp. 1 - 2. Shukri had a good, if romantic and dilettantish, knowledge of ancient Arabic poetry: eg, his pleasant retelling of the pre-Islamic Lakhmi king al-Nu’man’s murder of two.
literature and of Islam --- which they could restructure to echo such facets of Anglosaxon liberal ideology as free-mixing, courtships and life-long monogamous love-marriages. Although such amateurs as regarded Arabic, Cromer and his colleagues were master psychologists in demoralizing Egyptians within very narrow, hierarchical interactions: yet, the language barrier gone, the Jaridists could pin him and his self-serving laissez-faire mouthings down under a detailed perspective of decades while still liking some people and institutions (eg. parliament) in Britain itself.

Whenever the Jaridists were on the point of forgetting Islam, British imperial discourse applied it against Egypt’s aspirations. After a British statement that self-government for Egypt was not on their program, Lutfi ignited when a "foul-mouthed" Daily Telegraph article


27. Aesthetically and in social patterns --- for example by adopting the allocations of roles between men and women that industrial societies developed in West Europe --- Jaridists like Shukri strove for substantial Westernization. At the same time, they transmitted to the modern Muslim Egyptian educated classes a sea of materials from pre-Islamic Arabia, early Islam and ‘Abbasid Iraq. Shukri argued that the face-veil --- and Muslim polygamy --- should be ended. It was a major cause of the high rate of divorce in Egypt that the husband and wife could not get to know each other before marriage. "The Prophet had permitted a Muslim more than one woman" because endless pre-Islamic tribal fighting had left an excess of marriageable females. While Shukri cited ancient pre-Islamic Arab poetry in support of an apologetical Westernizing argument he had also retained such verse for its aesthetic appeal. ’Abd al-Rahman Shukri, "al-Hijab wal-Surur" (The Veil and Uncoveredness), al-Jaridah 9 August 1911 pp. 1-2. Shukri’s naturalization of the Anglo-Saxon pattern of life-long monogamous marriage had sanction from a hadith: “with Allah, the most detestable of all things permitted is divorce”. Maulana Muhammad Ali, A Manual of Hadith (Lahore: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat-i-Islam ni: 1945?) p. 284.

28. For cool, calculated British psychological debilitation of even --- or especially --- very high Egyptian government officials, Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882 - 1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966) pp. 193-4. The al-Jaridah intellectuals were furious as both Cromer and Gorst progressively tightened the colonial relationship, brushing aside all overtures for a parliamentarist partnership. Dunlopian immersion in English equipped the Jaridists to dissect local imperial discourse --- yet they were seeing through the British of Egypt to a Britain whose liberal democracy they respected. One al-Jaridah essay sniped "despot" Cromer’s efforts in retirement in the House of Lords to transfer powers to it from the Commons. The hopes of "the intelligent ones" in Egypt for constitutional advance under Cromer had indeed been misplaced, given his aristocratist contempt for the capacity for self-rule of even the English, "who are more advanced than us in civilization and... pioneered the way for parliamentary governments throughout the world". The item was intimately aware of such life-long hobby-horses of Cromer as free trade. Anon, "al-Ma’u min al-Sakhar wal-Istibdad al-Jamil" (Water From a Rock and that Most Benign of Despotisms), al-Jaridah 27 August 1911 pp. 4 - 5. One declared representative of "Youth" mocked the terminology with which Cromer had wanted to reserve political participation for "those with real interests" in Egypt --- disproportionately, wealthy resident Europeans. Yet his fury at disempowerment passed beyond his elite which would grow on. Such as he could purchase exemption from a conscription which, given that male peasants married well before they were twenty, destroyed their families: they were dispatched off to the lethal Sudan to establish British rule. "Ana" (=1), "al-Tajridu fi Misr" (Conscription in Egypt), al-Jaridah 27 August 1911 p. 5.
denounced Islam. Such ravings of British journalism could in no wise detract from a religion (he echoed Carlyle --- who often firmed up the Islam of more Angloid Jaridist acculturateds) that had "met all the needs of hundreds of millions of people for over a millennium": "the Christian Rousseau" had ranked Islam's institutions over those of other faiths. The item made Lutfi view "the Egyptians" as "the Muslims" but, given figures like Rousseau in French culture, he here hoped that growing anti-British forces in France would get the Entente Cordiale abrogated as an error, and, with rising Germany, help dislodge Britain from the Nile Valley.

Their minds pervaded by the language and communications of the British occupiers, the Jaridists dialogued back to them in English. Thus, the journal praised an English book The Truth About Islam, elegantly printed in a Cairo publishing-firm, by Muhammad Badr, one-time President of the Islamic Society in Edinburgh, and who had studied at London and Edinburgh universities. The rather political introduction mentioned the tide of anti-English feelings that had been rising among all Muslim populations in Britain's possessions goaded by decades of British misrepresentation of Islam (=pan-Islamism). The book had the same ambiguity to colonialism as al-Jaridah (and after 1922 the successor intellectuals around al-Siyasah and the Liberal Constitutionalists' Party). Badr saw Egyptian-British conflict in terms of a failure in communication of the respective religions of the two sides --- rather than the drive for power and economic profit with which radical Kamilists further explicated colonialism. With his book,

29. One thin form of Islamism in al-Jaridah, given that its decultured youth audience was internalizing Anglo-Saxon values, had to take its starting-point from within English belles-lettres. To save them from English Protestant stereotypes about Islam, al-Jaridah published Carlyle's long-winded argumentation (reprinted in On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History) that Muhammad could not have been an imposter as Britshers thought in 1840 because the great religion he had founded retained 200 million adherents, meeting their needs. "al-Abtal" (Heroes), al-Jaridah 16 December 1911 p. 6: an excerpt from the translation of Carlyle's work made by Muhammad al-Siba'i, an editor of al-Bavan --- one more indication of Lutfi's and al-Jaridah's close association with that stylistically neo-classicist journal. Carlyle's work entered the traditional Ottoman-establishment Sunni ethos around the same time, to resurface decades later as the Ataturkist order crumbled: Husayn Hilmi Isik (='Ishq), Seaded-i Ebediyye: Endless Bliss fascicle 2 (Istanbul: Hakikat Kitabevi 1989) p. 281. Cf W. Montgomery Watt, "Carlyle on Muhammad", Hibbert Journal v. 53 (1954 - 1955) pp. 247-254; and Muhammad 'Abd al-Husayn al-Da'mi, "On Carlyle's Concept of the Arab-Islamic Orient: A Study in "The Hero as Prophet"", Orientalism: Comparative Culture Book Series v. 2 (Baghdad: Cultural Affairs and Afaq 'Arabiyyah 1987) pp. 62-86. Charles D. Smith argues that Carlyle's theme of the Prophet's greatness encouraged the very young Haykal to view the prophets as receiving revelations from their own subconsciouses rather than God, as leaders of a specific stage of human development: the acculturated intellectual successors would now guide Egypt along West-patterned secular lines. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 41 - 43. Haykal had first been given Carlyle's Heroes and Hero Worship (and works by Mill and Spencer) in the al-Jaridah office. Smith, ibid. p. 38. al-Siba'i's translation of Shakespeare's Coriolanus: al-Jaridah 14 May 1911.

Badr hoped to reach those already more "tolerant" Englishmen --- freemasons, theosophists, agnostics? --- who might be persuaded to accept ("uncivilized"?) Muslims who entered Britain for long-term professional residence, as equals of "the white population". As with most Jaridists, Badr responded not just to British dislike of Islam but to "the ignorance of the residents of Europe" in general. He credited that communicating "the truth" about Islam to establishment Europeans would change their colonial policies and put off a showdown\footnote{31. "al-Haqiqah ‘an al-Islam" (The Truth About Islam), al-Jaridah 25 July 1910 p. 5.}.

\textit{al-Jaridah} contributors were extensively formed amid residence or summer-vacations or lobbying in Europe: European cultures in the age of imperialism helped widen out and globalized Muslim community for them. Apologetics in Western languages connected the Jaridists to at least elite Indian Muslims far beyond the Middle East and Egypt’s traditional Ottoman world. \textit{al-Jaridah} noted an exchange between the Indian Muslim jurist and politician Amir ‘Ali and an English novelist-publicist about divorce among Muslims, ascribed to Islam’s lack of motivation to achieve those loving stable families so characteristic of Christian Anglo-Saxon societies. In reply, ‘Ali simultaneously (a) defended Muhammad as the embodiment of community and (b) pervasively adapted Islam to Anglo norms. On one hand, he stressed that the Prophet had hated divorce --- connecting him to Victorian British values. But a recent "custom" of gratuitous divorce in some Muslim countries should be ended by some institute of ‘ulama’\footnote{32. "Bayn al-Sayyid Amir ‘Ali wa Hall Caine" (An Exchange Between Sayyid Amir ‘Ali and [Thomas Henry] Hall Caine), al-Jaridah 4 September 1909 p. 5. See fn 73 for Lutfi’s awareness of British courtesy towards India’s Muslims as compared to Cromer’s hostile stance to Islam in Egypt.}. ‘Ali’s apologetical books were long highly regarded by dual-cultured intellectuals such as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat\footnote{33. al-Zayyat, "Bayn al-Din wal-Hubb", written for al-Risalah 16 October 1939; Wahy al-Risalah (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr 1953-1966) v. 2 pp. 94-97. This item was representative of the ultra-acculturated strata in which the former Jaridist Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat moved. The father of the woman was an eminent physician who never ventured inside a mosque and married a post-Christian English woman who nominally converted. The young Egypto-Lebanese, himself rather Anglicized, had been al-Zayyat’s student at the American University of Cairo. He was "expounding the principles of Islam" to his fiancée "as well as any Muslim who graduated at the American University could". Ibid pp. 94-97.} and by Haykal who in the 1930s drew from them to preempt any claim by Egypt’s Islamic ‘ulama’ to control his West-tinted, if now Islamizing, elite\footnote{34. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 105-106; influence of Spirit on Haykal’s 1933 biography of Muhammad pp. 115, 123.}.

Discourses in such metropolises as Paris occasioned by Europe’s discovery and colonization of Black Africa made the Jaridists aware of expanding Muslim African populations.
al-Jaridah noted the concern of the British and French that where they conquered in Black Africa, Muslim merchants and missionaries followed and by converting the animists robbed the fruits of conquest. It should therefore be colonial policy to Christianize strategically-sited African populations to block the spread of Islam. Like the Kamilists, the Jaridists reacted sharply to the roles of Christianity in the imperialism of states now substantially secularizing: why did the missionaries not stay in France to stem the rejection by youth of all the religions, instead of proselytizing Africans? Attuned to French and British fears of "explosions of [Muslim] religious fanaticism", the item applauded defeats Islam-inspired "Negroes" had inflicted on the French around Lake Chad. But their Westernization (and salafism?) could also alienate the Jaridists, like the Kamilists, from other Muslims: the writer distinguished (a) between Islam, whose "renaissance" Egypt represented and (b) ordinary Muslims in Algeria, Morocco and Senegal whose "superstitions" and "ignorance" the Western travellers so tendentiously misrepresented as Islam35.

Although its focus was self-modernization and reform, not pan-Islam, al-Jaridah’s ambivalent coverage familiarized elite Egyptians with distant Muslim populations in the Tsarist Empire (Westerner-aborted Duma parliamentarism) and Iran36. The exclusionist themes of other

35. Ahmad Abul-Nasr Balyun, "al-Islamfu Ifriqiyya" (Islam in Africa), al-Muqattam 1 March 1910 p. 5. In its more deeply anti-imperialist mode, this item dismissed as tendentiously functional Western stereotypes about the "backward" peoples they colonized: if "the Muslim, or the Easterner in general, reacts peaceably and quiescently ... the Westerner condemns him as lazy, passive and unqualified for self-government. If, on the other hand, he ... throws off defeatism, and moves to defend his violated rights, he is defamed as religiously fanatical and savage". Ibid. Here, Egyptians and Maghribi and Black African Muslims were equated. The sense of Egypt as a marginal link between Europe and Africa are recurrent at a 1909 conference of Egyptian youth receiving Western education in Europe, organized by Muhammad Farid and al-Hizb al-Watani but with friendly participation by Lutfi and sympathisers. Egypt was envisioned there as charged with a civilizing mission in the other regions of Africa. "A`mal Mu`tamar al-Shabibat al-Misriyya fi Jan al-Falaq Min Khitab Hamid al-· Alayili" (Proceedings of the Conference of Egyptian Youth in Geneva: the Speech of Hamid al-· Alayili), al-Jaridah 4 October 1909 pp. 1-2.

36. al-Jaridah in mid-1907 translated an editorial from the `Abduh-like Isma'il Gaspirali’s modernist-Islamic Tatar journal Vakit (Vaqt) on national antagonisms in the Duma (Tsarist parliament). It urged all non-Russian nationalities --- Poles, Tatars, Kirgiz, Turkistanis, Caucasians, Armenians and Jews --- to form an Autonomist Party to counter the chauvinist front from the Russian government and all Russian parties, right or left, were forming. The Ittifaq Muslimin Party was going to press the religious needs and "the national rights" of the Muslims in the Duma. The Vakit editorial excerpted a racist article from the semi-official Novoe Vremia: this condemned the principle of secret, universal franchise that the Democratic Constitutionalists demanded for the Tsarist Empire. Such electoral rights could only apply in civilized countries of a single race and religion such as Britain: whereas Poland, the Caucasus, Turkistan, the Baltic Coasts, the Crimea, Bessarabia and Siberia --- in fact, 3/4 of the Tsarist Empire --- were inhabited by peoples hostile to the Russians. Just as Britain could not grant the vote to "the bedouins of Africa" and the Indians whom she ruled, the Russians "cannot share the affairs of government with these enemies". Instead, they had to expel the non-Russian deputies from the Duma. "Zilzal al-Duma" (The Earthquake in the Duma), al-Jaridah 3 June 1907 and 5 June 1907. Yet in the same year, 1907,
imperialist peoples against Muslims they ruled paralleled Britain's --- eg, the denial of
parliamentarism to the Muslims --- involving the Jaridists more in the fates of those populations
than they otherwise might have liked. al-Jaridah carried communications that prefigured the
efforts by such acculturated intellectuals as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s to
unify, standardize and fundamentalize the Egypto-Arab Sunni clergy so that it would then
transform and lead non-Arab Muslim populations around the world.

One such 1910 appeal for "reform of the affairs of the Muslims", issued by the Cairo
Literary Society blended salafist and acculturated antipathy to the 'ulama for not even attempting
novel modern tasks of the religion. This, though, was to justify the new elite directing the
'ulama in order to install Islam within modern West-originated processes and structures around
the world, rather than to substitute such modernity for it. The scholars and men of religion ---
the 'ulama, the teachers in Islamic schools, the [mosque] sermon-readers and the preachers ---
were the ones responsible for the rigidity and retrogression into which the Muslims had sunk.
Typical of acculturated Egyptian Islamism's global sweep and instant seizure of all multiplying
possible connections that modern communications offered was its far-flung conception of "the
Muslims". The writers were sending their note to "all of the Islamic societies and newspapers in
all regions of the world, to the parliaments of the Islamic governments and the Muslim members
of the Duma in Russia, to the office of the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul, to all the 'ulama' of the
noble al-Azhar and its attached religious institutions, to all headmasters of the [secular] schools
of Egypt and elsewhere, imploring them all to make Reform of the affairs of the Muslims their
urgent goal". The memorandum's hope that (Egyptian and, probably, Ottoman) preachers would
"fan out across the distant lands to purify the religion of those heretical innovations and
falsehoods" was to be heightened by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat --- and put into practice by Kings
Fu'ad and Faruq but, above all, by Nasser, in outreach to non-Arab Muslim populations37. Like

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al-Jaridah also ascribed the failure of parliamentarism in Russia as well as Iran to the fact that "the Slavs... have been
neighbors of the Turks for long ages and thus acquired their ethics": St. Petersburg and Moscow were developed but
most Slavs in the countryside were as illiterate and backward as most Iranians. Yet, this writer was resentfully
aware of the exclusionism of the Westerners whose modernity he pursued: "enemies of the Easterners, who
propagate the West's inherent superiority over the East" would seize on the failure of parliaments in oriental Iran
and semi-oriental Russia as confirmation. "Khulasah Usub'iyah --- Huna wa Hunak" (Weekly Survey --- Here and
There), al-Jaridah 30 May 1907 p. 1. But cf the completely sympathetic "Dawlatu Iran Bayn al-Asad al-Baritani
wal-Dubb al-Rusi" (The State of Iran Between the British Lion and the Russian Bear), al-Jaridah 30 November 1911
p. 1.

the Kamilists’ misgivings that unreconstituted Arab ‘ulama’ could not convert receptive Japanese, the Jaridists here prefigured a modernist, activist, Arab-centric Islamism that surgically slims down and fundamentalizes the Egyptian ‘ulama’, then fires them off as much more destructive Arabizing purifiers of Indian, Indonesian, or Black African Islam (al-Zayyat: B 300-302).

In accordance with the Jaridists’ more secular accommodation of both local and Western non-Muslims, the appeal called for the promotion of “peace, love and goodwill between the Islamic peoples and nearby Christian” ones38. The conflicts of Christian nationalities with the Ottoman Turks were in the European psyche. But the Jaridists’ wide modern awareness of Muslims in such Christian polities as Czarist Russia was also as liable to collect injustice, exclusion and massacres as the Kamilists’.

Both al-Jaridah and the al-Siyasah writers after 1922 offered nexi for sectionally modernist Muslim intellectuals to continue to exchange motifs and vocabulary with purely Islamically-educated clergy: the two intellectual elites keep some sort of communication and novel collaborations always going even when they snap or shout.

Coptic-Muslim Relations

Coptic secularists in later periods highlighted the territorialist-Egyptianist and anti-pan-Islamic stances of Lutfi in al-Jaridah as crucial for drawing the Copts into Egyptian nationalism, given that the pan-Islamic tint of Kamilism had long turned them off39. Lutfi and

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38. Ibid.
39. Salamah Musa. The Education of Salama Musa tisd L.O. Schuman (Leiden: F.J. Brill 1961) pp. 42 - 44. Musa retained no memory of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s partisan arguments for at least some sectional Muslim interests or elements of identity during the 1911 Asyut and Heliopolis conferences. The latter “Egyptian Conference”, while overwhelmingly Muslim, did, as its name indicated, try to mute sects as bases for public identity more than the overly “Coptic Conference”. In one 1911 item, Lutfi did argue that all reports and speeches presented at the Heliopolis conference had been free of any suggestion of “pan-Islamism”. By reaffirming the “Egyptian patriotism” previously territorially defined by Egyptian law, and political rights and duties, the Conference had reestablished the basis for workable community of Muslims and Copts. Lutfi’s main concern in this item, though, was, again, but how Egyptian nationalism might be damaged by British/Western ascription of pan-Islamism to it. Lutfi, “Nata’ij al-Mu’tamar al-Misri” (The Results of the Egyptian Conference), al-Jaridah 10 May 1911 p. 1. al-Jaridah’s claim that it was Egyptianist and conciliating the two elements of the Egyptian people was accepted, and the Coptist communialists denounced, by Ya’qub Miyadi, a Coptic merchant at Samalut. “Kalimatut Qibtiyyin Hurr” (The Opinion of A Liberal/Independent Copt), al-Jaridah 3 March 1910 p. 5. Lutfi also printed a Christian reply to Riyad Pasha, arguing that all appointments now had to be opened to the Copts. Nasif al-Miqbadi, “Jawab Maflih Ilu Dawlat al-Wazar Riyad Pasha” (An Open Letter to HE the Minister Riyad Pasha), al-Jaridah 13 April 1911 pp. 4 - 5.
al-Jaridah did intermittently restate unitary Egyptian nationhood during the 1910-1913 tension between the Coptic modernizing-professional communalists and the modern Muslim elite. Yet the Jaridists, untraditional social Muslims, got too drawn into all the polarization to win much response from the Copts as defenders of an Egyptianism that did have potential to bridge the sects. al-Hizb al-Watani leader Muhammad Farid boycotted as divisive the (moderate) 1911 "Egyptian Conference" held in reply to the Coptic one: but old-time Turco-Circassian and al-Ummah Party leaders including Lutfi figured prominently. The literature has underestimated the long-standing relationship of reciprocal needling and mean-spirited obstructionism between Lutfi’s modernizing Arab-Egyptian rural landowning class and its successful Coptic rural equivalent, the Upper Egypt component of which organized the 1911 Asyut Conference. His party leader Mahmud Sulayman was intent at the Heliopolis counter-conference to block the Copts’ assault on the last positions reserved for Muslims.

40. Lutfi declaimed Egyptianist principles in reply to the Coptic ultras but they were deformed by the Islamic energies throbbing under their secular surface. The hyper-Coptists had demanded not just time off for mass on Sunday but that it be made the rest day of Coptic employees, with Friday to remain that of the Muslim officials. (This would have been workable in offices where Copts were a majority). Lutfi responded that the minority employees always had to take their day of rest on "the day of the majority, the day of the nation", although he admitted that Friday had not always had this status, unrequired by Islam. For a sect of officials to get a different day off must amount to "an annihilation of the personality of the nation ummah". "al-Harakat al-Qibtiyyah --- 2: Ta'assub al-Aqalliyyah" (The Coptic Movement --- 2: The Fanaticism of the Minority), al-Jaridah 11 March 1911 p. 1.


41. Lynn Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics, 1918 - 1952 (London: Croom Helm 1985) pp. 14-15. The Heliopolis counter-conference presented itself, in name at least, as "Egyptian" to underscore the Asyut ultras' explicit communalism. A few Corts did attend on that basis. Lutfi read out the Report of the Organizing Committee which was substantially a Muslim communalist document: the Coptic activists were fabricating grievances to win British help to gain precedence over the majority. In an acculturated twist, the Report noted that the common practice of states established that "every country should have an established Church" (sic), that no state could have more than one officially-recognised religion. Ibid.

42. The Coptic-Muslim communalism in which al-Jaridah took part was no polarization between traditional clerical elites, but more between two modernizing ones competing to enter or erect West-patterned structures. When the (Muslim) governor and property men and notables of Jarra mudiriyah collected money in 1911 to establish an ophthalmic hospital there, the Coptic mouthpiece al-Watan publicized claims of a local Muslim that pressure was used to make him shell out. In a telegram, the Muslim notables denounced "the contemptible aim" of that paper dedicated "to destroy and crush the Muslims". "A'yan Jarja wa Jaridat al-Watan" (The Notables of Jarja and the Newspaper al-Watan), al-Jaridah 3 August 1911 p. 6. In its patriotic-integrative mode, al-Jaridah did, in a friendly tone, publicize Coptic educational endeavors: "Madrasat al-Aqbat bil-Manṣūrah" (The Coptic School at al-Manṣūrah) al-Jaridah 15 August 1911 p. 3. As ill-feeling rose, al-Jaridah dismissed with brusque unconcern fears voiced by Coptic leaders, and somewhat supported by the Ministry of the Interior, that it might be unsafe for them to hold their forthcoming conference in Asyut. "Mu'tamar al-Aqbat" (The Conference of the Copts), al-Jaridah 2 March 1911 p. 4.

43. See B 41. Such Coptic polemicists as the journalist Kyriakos Mikhail protested in Britain that Copts remained informally excluded from the highest administrative position of mudir (province governor): Lutfi charged
whereas Lutfi presciently objected to their proto-micro-nationalist terminology that failed to meet the criteria of real nationalism.

**Acculturation and the Metropolis.** For Lutfi, made anti-British by Sir Eldon Gorst's refusal to make accommodatory Muslim Egyptians around *al-Jaridah* and the Umma Party partners, what enraged most in the Coptic communalists was their lobbying in Britain. As a (lukewarm) Muslim, Lutfi in this alarming context saw "the Copts" and the British as both Christian, over-unitarizing that religion. He rebuffed nervous signals from one Coptic activist that both sects now break off the cycle of exchanges, out of fury that, for two years, that man had lobbied English officials and the English press to support "the people of God in Egypt, namely the Copts" --- collaboration for supremacy to "divide in two" "the national community" so that "the common homeland" would never become independent.

The young Muhammad Husayn Haykal, a Jaridist, before 1914 had a similar acculturated sense that the French as well as the British seized on Coptic-Muslim conflict to reject Egyptian nationalism as "fanatical" (B 492 fn).

In this variation of article in 1911, Lutfi was writing as a spokesmen for "the Muslims", not a bisectarian Egyptian nation, with "the Copts" as a whole the opponent --- here, the Coptic communalists did speak for "the minority". Sharp acculturated differentiation between various groups in European societies: "the minority" was courting backing from diverse English forces --- "some of them liberal, some of them imperialist that want to break the links between the elements [=sects] of the Egyptians".

44. The universal criterion that only a socially independent community within a discrete homeland could constitute a nation denied any validity to the ultras' repetition of the term "the Coptic Nation (Ummah)." Lutfi, "al-Harakat al-Qibtiyyah --- 2: Ta'assub al-Aqalliyyah", *al-Jaridah* 11 March 1911. This surely is already very like Haykal's paranoia in 1929 that, under the Wafd, "fanatical" Copts were taking over ministries, thinning out Muslim recruits to the civil service. B 38-39.

45. Lutfi, "Shay'un Jadid" (Something New), *al-Jaridah* 23 March 1911 p. 1. The campaign of the Coptic communalists' English supporters in the British press was also publicized in "Shakawi al-Aqbat" (The Grievances of the Copts), *al-Jaridah* 2 March 1911 p. 4; the campaign assailed proconsul Gorst and such top collaborators as PM Muhammad Sa'id --- "Misru wal-islam: Maqalat al-Morning Post (Egypt and Islam: the Article of the Morning Post)." *al-Jaridah* 14 May 1911 p. 4.

46. Lutfi, "Shay'un Jadid". Ignoring the sectional Upper Egypt, landed background of most of the organizers, Lutfi accepted the procedure under which eighteen thousand Coptic heads of family had authorized in writing the holding of a general conference as proof that the Asyut gathering "articulated the will of the whole
intellectuals, Lutfi was hyper-alert to persisting pan-Christian susceptibilities in the psyches of modern Europeans: these, more than such Coptic communalists as Kyriakos Mikhail, now made him toy with Islam as a modern community basis within Egypt.

The tension between the parallel Coptic and Muslim modern professional elites in 1911 summoned up one or two wild sectarian outbursts at odds with the Jaridists’ usual particularoidism. These blended (a) pan-Muslim macro-history with (b) prizes in modern West-patterned professions and (c) the West’s own systematization and politicization of enclave sectarianisms.

The important point is that, more than traditional Islam, acculturated knowledge of such transferism-prone Western ideologies as anti-Semitism, Zionism, and Irish sectarian enclave-nationalisms, pushed one or two modern Muslim Egyptians towards no-holds-barred responses against Coptist-communalist elite peers. It is true that the West’s secularism simultaneously desectarianized: “Ba’duhum” in another spasm saw such a European ideology as anti-Semitism as a “darkness of barbarism” --- “modern civilization” had, by and large, contracted such “religious fanaticism” to Russia. Yet migration of the Muslim minority from Crete and the annexation of the island to Greece was the solution that ruthless European public opinion wanted there: again, acculturation --- Westerners picked up loud and clear --- suggested a radical solution to the Coptic acculturateds’ militancy. The writer ideologically oscillated. In one impulse, he agreed with the disaffected Syrian Christians that the Ottoman Empire to the fall of ’Abdul-Hamid had been a despotism-ridden economic backwater. Elsewhere, he saw the unsatisfactory lives of Syrian Christians there as inherent in being a minority: inability of the ultra-parliamentarist English to contain Ireland’s sectarian divisions showed that, regardless of the recent Ottoman constitution, Syria’s Christians had to transfer themselves wholesale to the West, and --- or was this just verbally violent teasing? --- the Copts to Coptic Ethiopia, as their own orators imaged.47

Coptic sect or at least that of the sect’s majority”. "The rational Copts" would have to bear the responsibility of the Congress’ resolutions. "al-Harakat al-Qibriyyah --- I: Nazrāt 'Am'mah’.

47. "Ba’duhum" (pseud.). "Hall :11-Mas'alat al-Misriyyah al-ljtima'iyyah" (The Solution for the Egyptian Social Problem), al-Jaridah 30 May 1911 p. 1. Autonomy for Ireland was perpetually blocked by the Protestant minority centered in Ulster: it owned more factories and shops than the Catholic majority from which it feared ill-treatment in the event of Home Rule. Ireland was one case where conflict between enclave sects in the West (he also mentioned the increasingly Zionist Jewish enclaves in Russia) showed that "religion is the greatest social bond for nations and difference in religion the greatest cause of conflict between them" --- and transfer of minority
Although this writer objected to Lutfi’s (as he saw it, utopian) drive to fuse Copts and Muslims, and indeed to standard Egyptian nationalist discourse, he rather had a different mix of Lutfi’s own duality of West-heightened elements, Egyptianist and pan-Muslim. Editor Lutfi was angry enough with the Copts to print the item.

The West’s anti-Semitism would refigure as a catalyst justifying political differentiation of Copts and Muslims in the successor al-Siyasah-Ahrar milieu in the late 1920s and early 1930s, too, amid a repudiation of neo-Pharaonist particularism that opened into an Islam-tinted pan-Arab linguistic nationalism (B 36-42; B 491-495). In 1911, Haykal, al-Siyasah’s future editor, saw Coptic-Muslim arguments as secondary compared to the violence into which Christians and Jews could now explode in France, for all Voltaire’s legacy, over a mere play (Bernstein’s *Apres Moi*). For him, Egypt as a land, and advanced Western thought, together ruled out politicized communalization: yet he was already confused by the contrary patterns coming from the West.

The wider secularizing-educated Muslim readership of al-Jaridah was competing for jobs with their Coptic peers. All self-interest was needed to make the Jaridists define themselves as a populations the only solution. British administrators themselves, whether Conservative or Liberal, would soon work to transfer the Ulster Protestants to England or one of Britain’s numerous colonies. He noted that the early Zionist movement had been negotiating with the Egyptian government through its British overlord to colonize an area on the margin of Sinai near al-’Arish (cf. B 132 for the development of this in pan-Arabizing Egyptian consciousness in the 1920s). The item proposed a parallel solution to "the Egyptian social problem" by transferring the Coptic minority to their own “promised land” when the Ethiopian emissary bestowed a decoration upon the editor of the Coptic communalist al-Watan, "one of the Coptic orators advised his people to migrate to that salubrious land". Perhaps this flight of Coptic rhetoric could now be implemented, since it was unreasonable to expect Egypt’s Muslim majority, besieged though it was, to migrate. Ibid. Western racist ideologies repeatedly patterned transferrist resolutions to Egyptians. Al-Jaridah noted that at the general Race Congress held in London in 1911, British Zionist Israel Zangwill extolled the migration of Jews from Russia to Palestine --- and that the Austrian delegate applauded this decisive solution to Europe’s problem. "Mu’tamar al-Ajnas al-‘Amm" (The General Race Congress), al-Jaridah 7 August 1911 p. 4. Text of Zangwill’s speech: "The Jewish Race", *Selected Articles and Letters of Israel Zangwill* ed. Maurice Safron (London: the Soncino Press 1937) pp. 82 - 97. At one point Zangwill wondered if the world’s "hotch-potch" Jews were a coherent race: ibid p. 93. For bigotry in official and royal life in Britain and the Catholic Continent, (SC) Salim Sarkis, "Diyanat al-Duwal: Ghara’ib al-Ta’assub al-Dini al-‘Asri" (State Religions: Quaint Instances or Contemporary Religious Fanaticism), al-Jaridah 8 June 1911 p. 2.

48. As an alternative to the communal politics of 1911, Haykal restated Lutfi’s aim of a sects-neutral Egyptian nation integrated by "material, moral and economic" constituents or preconditions (mukawwinat) --- still "theory" given Egypt’s all-round backwardness that had to be removed before independence (cf. fn 14). Haykal in 1911 disdainfully saw through the individuals and cliques who incited Coptic-Muslim polarization as "one means of livelihood and to win attention". Voltaire, René, Rousseau and other French "champions of freedom of thought" accorded with the "theory" of Egyptian community that he offered, but riotous anti-Semitism in Paris fed his uncertainty about what the West meant for Egypt. Haykal, "Wujhatuna fil-Siyasah: al-Wahdat al-Qawmiyyah --- I" (Our Orientation in Politics: National Unity --- I), al-Jaridah 29 October 1911 p. 1. Bernstein had tried in his 1908 play *Israel* to deal with the Dreyfus affair. His play *Apres Moi* assailed anti-Semitism in France: riots in the wake of the premiere forced its closing. Art. "Henri-Leon Bernstein", *EB* 15 ed (mic).
Muslim group against the Coptic ultras. They were involved much more by their acculturated awareness of the effects on European perceptions of, and drives to control, Muslim Egyptians. However, Coptism’s characterization of all Egypt’s history after ‘Amr Ibn al-‘As as one long Golgotha drew ethnicized defences of wide classical Arab history from al-Jaridah. ’Ali Yusuf argued that the Rashidun Caliphs had checked their governors from overtaxing Egypt, fostering Coptic compliance; he was defending the record of not just Arabs in Egypt but of the whole wide Arabo-Muslim empire to the decline of the ‘Abbasids. Educationally and scientifically at the head of the world, it was the connection with this advanced wide State that gave all Egyptians prosperity. Ill-treatment came from later only superficially Islamized non-Arab rulers.

**JARIDIST ATTITUDES TO THE OTTOMAN STATE**

The Young Turks’ 1908 restoration of the Constitution and parliaments transformed the Ottoman State for Lutfi from an ethnically unpleasant stronghold of retrogression into the main "Eastern" model of Progress --- British discourses greatly fuelling his identification with Turkish constitutionalism. For the time, al-Jaridah now favorably covered Ottoman personalities and

49. ‘Ali Yusuf (editor of al-Mu‘ayyad). "al-Ta‘limu fi Misra wa Hazz al-Muslimina wal-Aqbat minhu" (Education in Egypt: Access of Muslims and Copts Compared). al-Jaridah 2 May 1911. Yusuf’s counter-portrait of Coptic prosperity and contentment under the classical Arabs was tendentious, but he showed himself well-read in such classical histories as those of al-Tahari and al-Maqrizi, from which he drew statements ascribed to Arab Caliphs and their governors: his argument that the Arabs long held taxes well below what the Byzantines had levied upon Egypt was documented rather judiciously. The later had experiences that the Copts did undergo were at the hands of "rulers newly entered into [or: alien to --- dukhala’] Islam to which they adhered solely in name so that they did not carry out either the Book of God or the shari‘ah of Muhammad". Ibid. Cf the observation of a Pakistani scholar that "leaders of contemporary [Egyptian Arabo-Islamic] thought repeatedly stress that non-Muslims share equal rights and responsibilities with their Muslim compatriots. Certain aspects of inequality and discrimination with regard to non-Muslims which have been an integral part of the classical Islamic attitude and were embodied in the pre-modern Muslim socio-political institutions, are either connived at, or regarded as a real misunderstanding of the real purport of Islam on the part of the Muslims of the past". Zafar Ishaq Ansari. "Contemporary Islam and Nationalism: A Case Study of Egypt". Die Welt des Islams v. 7: 1 (1961) pp. 3 - 4. In his above-cited article, though, Yusuf defined Copts and Muslims as "a single nation" in "national customs", and to some extent racially, with an Egyptianism that equalled or surpassed particularist motifs achieved by al-Jaridah.

50. For Lutfi in 1908, imperial discourse about "the Easterners" (he avoided the term "Muslims" and did indeed register Japan: fn 72) was a unity; the British tried to devalue Egyptians and Turks together with the same stereotypes. They had denied that either the Turks or the Egyptians wanted or were capable of constitutional government. Gladstone had dismissed the Constitution of Midhat Pasha as "the most insolent of the frauds by which the Turks have attempted to deceive Europe". Lords Milner and Cromer had similarly argued that the Egyptians, so representative of Easterners in this, understood and wanted only authoritarian government. Lutfi seized on a recent article in the Daily Telegraph that admitted the British had been wrong to dismiss "Young Turkey" anti-Hamidian exiles in Europe when they spoke of Midhat Pasha’s Constitution and their struggle to restore it; their overthrow of
institutions in Egypt: both Turks and resident SCs whose dual identity an Ottoman link legitimized, used these skillfully to interest modern Egyptians. Jaridist engagement with post-Hamidian Turkey was delicately balanced between (a) satisfaction that its Constitution was sparking attempts by ordinary Egyptians to wrest one from 'Abbas and (b) the need to dampen impulses in the public to win parliamentarism or independence by reincorporating Egypt into the Ottoman State.

Islam and Non-Muslims

al-Jaridah opinion-leaders stressed that the new (still Muslim-led) Turkey patterned a secularoid West-like political order intent to integrate the sects: this could draw Copts and

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'Abdul-Hamid's despotism showed that they had been serious in their parliamentarist cause. Lutfi, Safahat pp. 244-245.

51. Ottomanoid activities in Egypt after 1908 had a progressive flavor at once cosmopolitan and modern. The 1910 celebrations of the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution, held under the patronage of the Ottoman High Commission one balmy night in Cairo's al-Azbakiyyah Gardens, included a play on the struggle of Enver and Niyazi against the Hamidian despotism, and brought together a good cross-section of resident Turks, Christian Egypto-Syrian writers and Muslim Egyptians (including the Chief Qadi and high army officers). An Arabic poem of Salutations to the Ottoman flag by SC al-Zuhur editor Antun al-Jumayyil (1887 - 1949) --- later a friend of Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat (B 334) --- was vividly recited. Both English and completely "Eastern" Egyptian music were played: women as well as men attended. al-Jaridah voiced the hope that Egyptians would soon have such a constitution of their own: for the Jaridists, the post-Hamidian Ottoman political order lent new hope that they could similarly get rid of that other despot 'Abbas. "Haflat al-Dustur al-'Uthmani" (The Celebration Marking the Ottoman Constitution), al-Jaridah 24 July 1910 p. 4. Cf fn 58.

52. In January 1909, Lutfi noted that the "contagion" of the Ottoman Constitution of 1877 had prompted the Egyptians to struggle for, and achieve, their own Constitution and parliament, aborted by the British in 1882. When the overthrow of 'Abdul-Hamid's despotism in 1908 restored constitutional government in the Ottoman State, the contagion "flowed on the pens of our writers and from the mouths of our orators, passing beyond them to pervade all classes of the Nation". At the ceremony of the departure of the mahmal (litter) of Egypt's black brocade covering for the Ka'bah, youths had shouted "long live the Khedive! long live the Constitution!": the troops were ordered to truncheon the crowd, as also when the same cry was raised at the Friday congregational prayers at al-Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque. Lutfi, Safahat pp. 41 - 51. For Lutfi in 1909, given the connections the Ottoman Empire maintained with ordinary Egyptians through religious life, the rebirth of parliamentarism there might help amplify the demands for a Constitution by his elite in the feeble advisory council into something more like a popular movement. The Ottoman example helped even the odds of his clique's conflict with the Khedive and the British, formidably allied under Gorst. Note, too, acerbic, only thinly disguised, hopes that Egyptians could rid themselves of 'Abbas as the Turks had deposed 'Abdul-Hamid. in al-Jaridah's responsiveness to the 1910 Cairo celebrations of the Ottoman Constitution day, in 51.

53. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 178; Lutfi, Safahat pp. 37 - 38. Lutfi in later 1908 dismissed the call by some associated with the Khedive --- al-Mu'ayyad --- that Egypt send deputies to the Ottoman parliament to advocate her rights there: 'Abbas knew in advance that his British allies would never allow it, it was just one of a range of time-buying ploys with which he maintained his anachronistic personal despotism in the face of the Egyptian public's growing wish for a Constitution. Lutfi, Safahat p. 151. Lutfi mainly critiqued the demand for representation in the new Ottoman parliament to block those Kamilists who did mean it.
Muslims together in Egypt⁵⁴. Argumentation for the new constitutionalist parliamentarism by Muhammad Sahib, Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam, ran parallel to the Islamic reformism of 'Abduh, still so accepted among the secular-educated Muslim Egyptian students and professionals, not just in seeing modern Western institutions as fulfilment of Islam but in echoing the salafist Arab-centrizing periodization of classical Islam that Lutfi also voiced⁵⁵. The Rightly-Guided Rashidi Caliphs, the Turkish cleric imaged, had ruled by consultation (al-shura), but clashes of personal aims and the mixing of Arab peoples/tribes (aqwam) with non-Arab groups after them usually substituted compulsion for the free Islamic oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to heads of government. Few Caliphs were selected/elected (lam yuntakhab) in accordance with the shari’ah until the Ottoman Sultans, who destroyed injustice like the Rashidun Caliphs, and built a huge Islamic judiciary and religious institutes of learning⁵⁶. Now, the Ottoman Sultans were being controlled by parliaments: "let there be among you a group who call to good, command right conduct and forbid wickedness" (Qur’an 3: 104), now elected by the nation including its non-Muslim elements. Citing the Qur’an (5: 82), the Shaykh al-Islam warned the religious Ottomans that they would violate Islam if they let reactionaries incite them into communal ill-treatment of their Christian compatriots⁵⁷.

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⁵⁴. To achieve fusion and then move to take control of the homeland, the Egyptians had to overcome "all impediments thrown up in their path from the direction of religion". Noting the CUP regime's replacement of diverse public titles of respect that had distinguished sects with a new common application of "efendi", "Murad" (Copt?) in 1911 exalted the Ottoman State as more evolved (arqa) than Egypt: "we follow the Empire as our model in religion but not in the public courtesies/decencies (adabuha) it is now developing which can in no wise harm Islam... since religion maintains its soundness by not harming others". The Ottoman State was following with resolve the same path earlier taken by every country that had achieved Progress/evolved (taraqqat). "Murad", "Harb al-Watan" (The War for the Homeland), al-Jaridah 25 September 1911, p. 1. Cf. In 61 for al-Jaridah's engaged coverage of the CUP's unitarist gesture of conscripting Christian and Jewish Ottomans into the armed forces, hitherto overwhelmingly Muslim.

⁵⁵. In reply to British denigration, Lutfi ascribed the growth of despotism after the Rashidun Caliphs --- implementers of the Qur'an and Sunnah that had fostered "Islamic fraternity" --- to "mimicking the kings of the Persians and the princes of the Berbers". Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 226.

⁵⁶. Bernard Lewis (1961) speculated Byzantine influence in the appearance under Turkish Ottoman rule, of "an [official] ecclesiastical hierarchy, with muftis presiding over territorial jurisdictions, under the supreme authority of the Shaykh al-Islam, the Chief Mufti of the capital" --- "the Archbishop-Primate of the Ottoman Empire". "Here for the first time in Islamic history [was] created an institutional structure --- a graded hierarchy of professional men of religion, with recognized functions and powers, worthy of comparison with the Christian priesthoods ... The origins of the great Ottoman religious institutions can no doubt be traced back to the Sultanate of the Great Saljuks, when schools and schoolmen were organized to counter the threat of revolutionary heresy". Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: OUP 1961) pp. 6, 16.

⁵⁷. Muhammad Sahib (Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam), "Mashyakhat al-Islam wal-Ummat al-Uthmaniyyah" (The Institution of Shaykh al-Islam and the Ottoman Nation), al-Jaridah 6 September 1909 pp. 1-2. This declaration was issued in a situation in which counter-revolution threatened the CUP. To depict the fragile West-European style
The Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam helped al-Jaridah Islamically legitimze to its constituency its own problematical drive to integrate Coptic and Syrian Christians into a parallel Egyptian patriotic community. Yet a diluted continuity of terminology with classical Arab Islam could also be a conduit for future re-Islamization and Arabization of the implanted institutions and patterns, for Young Turks and Jaridists.

Contributing Egypto-Syrian journalists chimed in with Lutfi that effects on Egyptian “interests” of the foreign policies of post-1908 Istanbul governments, not “emotions”, had to have priority. Yet the SC Jaridists --- after the interactions that their foreign-language missionary educations had run them through back in "Syria" --- had their special hope that the Ottomans in the Empire, the Hamidian despotism ended, would now win through to more equal, positive interaction with Westerners. "Y.B" (= al-Jaridah’s Syrian Christian sub-editor Yusuf al-Bustani) in later 1909 remained angry not just at delays and incompetence in foreign policy under 'Abdul-Hamid but at how the Russians, French and British exploited it to bully and

58. "Y.B.", "al-Siyasat al- 'Uthmaniyyat al-Qudiyyah: 'Alaqatuha bi-Misr --- Inqilab Khatir" (Ottoman Foreign Policy: Its Bearing On Egypt --- A Serious Change), al-Jaridah 8 September 1909 p. 1. Jaridist Egypt-firstism: the more respectful treatment that the revitalized Ottoman State was now winning from Britain, France and the Russians pleased SC Yusuf al-Bustani’s extra-Egyptian origins, but "the Egyptian zealously devoted to his country might rightly ask now" if greater closeness to the Triple Entente might encourage the Ottoman suzerain to give Britain a freer hand in Egypt. Ibid. Lutfi noted with interest that the press enthusiasm and heavy turn-out of crowds to welcome Prince Diya' al-Din, son of the Ottoman Sultan, when he toured lower Egypt in 1911, amounted to a protest against the Occupation --- specifically against Britain’s attempt to destroy Ottoman suzerainty by denying Turkish troops passage over Egypt to Libya, and by refusing to allow the Egyptian government to cut diplomatic ties with Italy. Here, Lutfi toyed with the idea that Egyptians should encourage the Turks to maintain Egypt’s traditional connection with an Ottoman suzerain because it internationally denied legality to Britain’s presence. In the other direction, he also apprised Egyptians that Diya’ al-Din initiated his tour as a courtesy call, in company with the Khedive, on the King of England in Port Sa’id: were the Ottoman suzerains now accepting Britain’s control over Egypt? Lutfi was calculating what “benefit” (fa‘idah) the Turkish move might bring Egypt and genuinely undecided. "Ziyarat al-Amir Diya’ al-Din: I’tibaratun Siyasiyyah" (The Visit of Prince Diya’ al-Din: Political Considerations), al-Jaridah 27 November 1911 p. 1. Lutfi left it up in the air if cancellation of the Prince’s contact with the masses in the latter part of the tour had been because of Britain’s or the Khedive ‘Abbas’ alarm; cf fn 51 for how ‘Abbas-Ottoman conflict might alter Jaridist stances. Yusuf al-Bustani stressed that the former Ottoman High Commissioner Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha had obstructed Britain’s stabilization of her rule in Egypt: "al-Qumsir al-‘Uthmani al-Jadid: Muhimmatuha wa Siyasatuh" (The New Ottoman Commissioner: His Mission and his Policy), al-Jaridah 22 September 1909 p. 1.
degrade "the Ottoman Nation" (al-Ummat al-'Uthmaniyyah) with their sadistic gun-boat
diplomacies, and with ever-widened extraterritorial capitulations for their residents. al-Bustani
hoped that the post-Hamidian Empire was now modernizing economically, administratively and
as a parliamentary democracy and that that "liberty, equality and fraternity" would now lead the
Powers to let "the Ottoman Nation" keep its territories in Europe (= political integration of
Slavic, Greek, Armenian and Arab Christians). This hard-nosed sectionally-Westernizing SC
writer was apprehensive of Arab-Turkish ethnic conflict. He would, though, accept the Ottoman
State, with Turkish Muslim leadership and considerable disabilities for (Arab) Christians, if it
even gradually moved towards economic development and a West-patterned liberalish polity ---
against impatient SC factions in Egypt.59

Post-Hamidian governments were attractive to the Jaridists in both (a) discouraging
Egyptian anti-imperialists who wanted to tighten confederal relationship with the Ottoman State
in part to evacuate the British and (b) because they bidded for acceptance as equal from the
European powers on the basis that Turkey was now implementing their civilization internally.
al-Jaridah not only carried the (non-CUP) Prime Minister Husayn Hilmi's denial to Le Temps
that his government had any contact with radical "Egyptian youth" or the Kamilist Hizb
al-Watani, but, in full, his appeal through that French newspaper that the European powers now
accept the progressive abolition of their capitulations in Ottoman lands. When the Le Temps
correspondent objected that European citizens needed extraterritorial status to avoid a legal
system based on Islamic shari'ah, Hilmi replied that Ottoman commercial, and many penal, laws
were "taken from their equivalents in the foreign nations". As the Ottoman State upgraded

59. "Y.B.", "al-Siyasat al-'Uthmaniyyat..." SC al-Bustani in part was contributing to an internal argument
amongst a cluster of emigre Ottoman factions in Egypt, including embittered Arab Christian residents who "hated
the Unionists" (CUP) when they governed as automatically as they had 'Abdul-Hamid; and perhaps some Turkish
groups that had chosen to stay on in Egypt. The instructions from Russia, France and Britain to their consular staff
to accommodate more to Ottoman officials and laws should be a sign of Ottoman revival "for those Ottomans who
can make out no difference between this and the bygone era and who want to reform such a Sultanate as the
Ottoman within a single year". Ibid, Cf fn 11. The following year, al-Bustani dutifully commemorated the day of
enthronement of "the first constitutional Sultan" Muhammad V, yet his morale, too, was starting to crumble before
the endless brawling of the Istanbul political parties, feral infighting within the regime, implacable insurrection from
the Bulgars and Yemenis and mounting despair among non-Muslim and Arab Ottomans that the Turks ever would
accord them real equality. However, his acculturated antipathy that Western powers were fanning those national and
sectarian conflicts in the Ottoman State under their veeners of goodwill, and the completion of some effective
reforms in its armed forces and finances, made him rally to it. "'Ala Dhikra al-Julus al-Sultanii" (Commemorating
The Sultan’s Accession), al-Jaridah 27 April 1910 p. 1.
its courts and judges, Europe should allow it to abolish the capitulations.\(^6^0\)

In floods of such items, \textit{al-Jaridah} was fascinated by the post-Hamidian Ottoman State as a more advanced, developing, model for the West-patterned, liberal, sectional reforms it wanted to effect in Egypt. These tense Turkish and Egyptian modernists wanted their people to become more like imperial Europeans loth to reward them with equality: would rejections ignite them? \textit{al-Jaridah} was eager to swallow whole the rationalizations or propaganda of post-Hamidian Ottoman governments that they stood for secularism and such sect-neutral institutions as parliament, and as such were the hope of the Empire's Christian ethnic groups, whom Christian religious hierarchies should not be allowed to embroil in politicized communalism.\(^6^1\) The Jaridists were ultra-sensitive to European support for Christian nationalities.

The particularist and cold-bloodedly pragmatic aspects of Lutfi usually subordinated his Muslim and Arab identifications. The class-interest of the rising rural Arab-Egyptian landowners who sustained Hizb al-Ummah and \textit{al-Jaridah}, and cultural affinity, both pushed him to moderately negotiate more self-government by stages out of the British --- yet would accommodationism ever pay off? The obdurate, skilful obstruction by the British of any expansion of parliamentarism inclined him to view the Turks more as co-victims of the discriminatory Western powers. When the already autonomous --- and prosperous --- Christian

\(^6^0\) "Hadith al-Sadr al-'Azam ma 'а Murasil al-Temps" (The [Ottoman] Prime Minister's Interview to \textit{Le Temps}), \textit{al-Jaridah} 11 October 1909 p. 4. \textit{al-Jaridah} was sensitive to European accusations against post-Hamidian Turkey given affinities to those made against Egypt's aspirations. It carried a reply by former Ottoman Education Minister Isma'il Haqqi Babanzadeh made in the French press to charges by a former French Minister for the Navy: that the CUP was controlling Ottoman governments, establishing a regime that murdered critical journalists, and that Turkey was anti-France. Haqqi replied that the new Turkey was a true pluralist constitutionalist polity (although it had lost one journalist who went too far beyond what Turks were accustomed), and it was culturally and intellectually bound to France as shown by its expansion of French education and by sending hundreds to study in France. "Bayna Wazirin 'Uthmani wa Wazirin Faransawi --- Hal Hunaka Dustur 'Uthmani?" (An Exchange Between an Ottoman and a French Minister --- Is There an Ottoman Constitution?), \textit{al-Jaridah} 22 August 1911 p. 1.

\(^6^1\) al-Jaridah carried Sadr-i-'Azam Hilmi's validation of he and his colleagues as West European-type positivist or liberal secularists upholding the new sects-integrating parliament: he had the right to bar internal and foreign clergy (here, the Patriarch of Moscow) from taking up the grievances of, for instance, Greeks injured by "men of a different sect" in Macedonia: only the (neutral, Ottoman) "civil administration" was entitled to handle complaints from communities, all Ottoman clergy, too, had to confine their statements to purely religious matters. "Hadith al-Sadr..." Before the CUP, Christian Ottomans had not been recruited into the Army, a Muslim preserve, but, exulted \textit{al-Jaridah}, "the world must always advance": "al-Jaysh al-'Uthmani wa Tajnid al-Arwan" (The Ottoman Army and Conscription of The Greeks), \textit{al-Jaridah} 26 September 1909 p. 5. Dawud 'Ammun and Edward Bistiris, "al-Nasara wal-Yahud fil-Jaysh al-'Uthmani" (The Christians and the Jews in the Ottoman Army), \textit{al-Jaridah} 2 October 1909 p. 5. Cf fn 54 for a desectarianizing application to Egypt. \textit{al-Jaridah} stressed reconciliation between Armenians, and the Turks represented by Ottoman deputy Riza Tawfiq, at the 1911 Races Congress in London, "Mu'tamar al-Ajnas al- 'Amm" (The General Races Congress), \textit{al-Jaridah} 13 August 1911 p. 4 cf fn 47 for Zionism there.
majority in Ottoman Crete on 27 July 1909 raised the Greek flag, it ignited all his frustration against the whole West (cf. Kamil vis-a-vis Gladstone and his Armenians!). It was discrimination that the Powers intervened so systematically to grant the violent Cretan government independence and union with Greece without bothering to consider how far accommodatory Egypt under Britain lagged behind the other “Eastern” governments [=Turkey] in the implementation of Constitutional principles62.

Sometimes the gradualist Jaridists sought to somehow incorporate Egyptian local nationalism into some humanized imperial order63; yet the post-Hamidian Ottoman State still figured as an intermediate and perhaps more relevant model for West-patterned Progress from 1908. The Ottoman State came much closer when he despaired that he and his colleagues would ever be able to install Egypt’s political progress within the interlocking discourses of any of the European states. Even when triggered off by Crete, though, Lutfi maintained significant duality towards the Turks. Feeling that the callousness or enmity of Westerners lumped all Muslims together, he recalled common nineteenth century actions of Egyptians and “the Turks” against the imperialist Napoleon or the similar British --- or under Muhammad ’Ali against the early insurgent Greek nationalists, including those in Crete. But Lutfi also re-evoked the conquests of "the hero" Ibrahim Pasha in Ottoman Asia "to the gates of Istanbul" --- a memory that the

62. Just as she now justified intervening to stop the Ottoman army moving against turbulent elements in Crete, Britain had claimed in 1882 to be entering Egypt only to prevent bloodshed. Yet “their first measure of reform” was to abolish Egypt’s Constitution, plunging Egypt into the despotism it still suffered at the hands of the Khedive ’Abbas. Considering “the Egyptian Question” now as only one component in “the Eastern question in general” made Lutfi wonder if his group’s incrementalism ever would win any response from any European power. In contrast to Egypt, “the Cretans enjoy autonomous self-government [so that] Ottoman suzerainty in no wise harms them”. Egyptians of all political groups had so long and so fruitlessly with meek "legalistic" diplomacy courted intervention from European powers to make Britain withdraw: in contrast, when the Cretan Orthodox used “violent means” to incorporate their island in Greece, the Powers intervened at once. Yet, Egypt was more important for “international balance and the Eastern Question”. Lutfi, "Bayn al-Madi wal-Hadir" (Between the Past and the Present), al-Jaridah 1 September 1909 p. 1. al-Jaridah excerpted materials from the Times and a letter from an Orthodox Cretan merchant describing Ottoman Crete as a paradise in which anyone could trade freely until they got rich, to justify the status quo. al-Jaridah 2 September 1909 p. 5.

63. As Cromer left the stage, Lutfi reflected that he could have won still more gains for his country had he tried to win the loyalty and friendship of the Egyptians, for example by giving their competent individuals that margin for initiative essential for the British to truly teach the Egyptians how to administer themselves. That would have won the friendship of those liberal Egyptians who praise his work to expand “personal freedom, respect for law and equality between the classes of the nation” (= fostering growth of Arab-Muslim landowners vis-a-vis declining Turco-Circassians?). Lutfi, Safihat p. 74. Lutfi resentfully noted the refusal of the British to associate with any but toadyng officials or those seeking favors: they excluded the enlightened intelligentsia for whom he spoke --- and who he implied would have welcomed more humane or pragmatic interaction with a ruling group from which they wanted to learn. Ibid p. 245. Cf fn 14.
Khedive 'Abbas already used to encourage anti-Turkish unrest among the Ottoman Arabs, and which was to justify Egyptian pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s (B 49 - 50). Ibrahim Pasha could represent historical separateness and competitiveness of Turks and Egyptians, whom Lutfi nonetheless here saw as close associates in Muslim-regional joint enterprises. Nonetheless, Lutfi did not apply any Ottomanist vocabulary to "the Egyptian nation" in the item: it did not fuse the Egyptians and Turks it bracketed64.

In 1911-1913, then, the Jaridists set their face against the drive of the Orthodox Greek politicians on Crete, supported by Greece’s Cretan Prime Minister Venizelos, to shake off the last vestiges of Ottoman suzerainty and join Greece. The Jaridists’ concern for the Ottoman presence and Muslim minority on the island opened into a clash with mainstream Greek nationalism and the anti-Muslim European powers it tried to manipulate through culture --- not always with as much success as Egyptian acculturateds supposed65. The joint history Egypt under its autonomous (but Turcophone) 'Alids always kept up with the Ottoman Turks resurfaced: but the post-1882 multi-culturization of Egypt’s Arab Muslim elite clinched the response. The newspapers of local Francophone Greeks and of Britain and France all in unison made the Cretan and other Greeks as detailed as the Muslim Turks. Jaridists such as Lutfi and Taha were to translate classical Greek philosophy and high literature. The very specialized, diverse sectors of acculturation in Egypt made specific Western nations speaking those languages intimately vivid as joint enemies of Muslims (for Egyptian blending in 1934 of both classical Greek civilization and Egypt’s nineteenth century participation in the ‘Turks’ war against nascent Greek nationalism: B 169 - 170).

64. Lutfi, "Bayn al-Madi wal-Hadir".

65. Prior to 1909, and although the Ottoman flag still fluttered, the Orthodox Cretans had already been somewhat woven into the Greek polity: after the Greco-Turkish war of 1896-7, the Powers had imposed not just autonomy for Crete but also Prince George --- of Greece’s royal family --- as the island’s nominal head. British politicians cultivated in Britain by Cretan-born pan-Hellenic Venizelos included Lloyd George and Winston Churchill. Like the Kamilists from the earlier 1890s, the Jaridists now in 1909 exaggerated emotional cultural "favoritism" of the Western powers which had not backed Venizelos in his 1908 enosis protest from the Cretan parliament. As Greek Prime Minister from 1910, though, he skilfully courted British and other Western politicians who in 1913 transferred Crete from the Ottomans to Greece. Data supplied by Professor John Burke, Senior Lecturer in Modern Greek at Melbourne University, 27 June 1991. For background, "Ikritis" E12 and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (v. 2): Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808 - 1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press 1977) (esp. the 1866 - 1869 revolt pp. 151-2 and bibliography of Greek, Turkish and Western sources and scholarship pp. 451-2)
PROTO-EASTERNISM

Pan-Easternism by Lutfi's al-Siyasah disciples in the 1920s has been viewed in the literature as a later deviation from his Egyptianist thought, one of which he was to disapprove (Pan-Arabism crystallized within Easternism towards the end of the 1920s). In reality, the Jaridists' pre-1914 Easternist anti-imperialism already extended and deepened (a) the unassured feelers of the Kamilists and al-Afghani much earlier, towards some coordination with non-Muslim Afro-Asian independence movements into (b) widened (still ultra-political) religious and aesthetic conjunction with those non-Muslim peoples.

Lutfi kept his Easternist rage against Europeans more controlled: his colleagues, though, distilled it into a fuel for their most parochial Egyptianist ventures. An instance was reflections of S. Haykal around a drive to establish an Egyptian National Bank: the financial independence of Egyptians would help achieve (a) ultimate independence and (b) help smaller Egyptian peasants keep their small landholdings out of the hands of usurers. Smith argued from al-Jaridah materials that Muhammad Husayn Haykal wanted to maintain "Such transfer of land through debt and usury from the small peasants ('fools') to the expanding holdings of his class of Arab-Egyptian large landowners". S. Haykal was wary lest some "defect" (sha'ibah) be perceived in the response of the rural (Arab-Egyptian) land-owning notables (a'yan: his class?) to this threat to small peasant proprietors: he sought to motivate them to subscribe shares for the coming bank not just by appeals to their Egyptianist patriotism but much more to "the Eastern sincerity/devotion" that had enabled the Japanese to sink all their internal divisions and achieve the globally-respected might by which they broke Russia in the Far East. Some al-Liwa' journalistic intellectuals had wanted the Japanese to convert to Islam as a further precondition for a modern international alliance against the imperialists. But S. Haykal by 1911 could incorporate and cherish all the religions of the peoples of the East, not just their "patriotisms".

66. Jankowski characterized that Liberal Constitutionalists/al-Siyasah intellectuals were at the fore of the propagation of pan-Eastern (Arabism-fostering) ideas in the 1920s and early 1930s in comparison to the Wafd. However, "the intellectual mentor of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, differed sharply from many of his disciples in regard to Easternism's refusal to lend support to an "Eastern Student Conference" being organized by Fathi Ridwan on the grounds that "your country is more suited to your activity". James Jankowski, "The Eastern Idea and the Eastern Union in Interwar Egypt", The International Journal of African Historical Studies v. 14:4 (1981) pp. 648-649.

67. Haykal's opposition to the Five Faddan law, designed to aid peasant landownership, from al-Jaridah in 1912 as analysed by Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 45-46.
that harmed Westerners. The Westerners could not understand the Easternist motive that fueled Japan's will to victory, but also aesthetic and religious aspects of resistance by other Easterners. The tendency of various European elite groups to lump a range of sometimes disparate high literatures in the non-Western world together as "Eastern poetry", a common Eastern literary sensibility, stimulated his search now for cultural as well as political pan-Eastern common ground on which to rally. In the 1920s, al-Siyasah, al-Jaridah's successor, was to project both classical Sanskritic (Kalidas) and modern Bengali Indian literature (Tagore) --- and also a somewhat theosophical respect for Hindu "spirituality" which Husayn Haykal was even to install in his Islamic apologetics of the 1930s and 1940s (B 61-2; B 91-2). Some classical Arab writings mutedly, reinforced by the Asian (especially Indian), rather than Western, theosophy al-Jaridah extended, respected Hinduism but Sadiq Haykal's article was new in equalizing a range of literate but pagan Asian religions and Islam in one new imperialism-repelling community. As well as the resistance of Shintoism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Eastern devotion was also what had sustained "the [first] conquests of the [classical] Arabs... [so that] their state incorporated within eighty years what the Roman state did not attain within eight centuries" (cf Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah B 57). Acculturation --- the Victorian classicism of the British that they had recycled in Egypt's schools, the cult of Latinism by the French in their literature, public life and imperialism --- often highlighted the classical Arabs. British communications that the

68. Eastern devotion/self-sacrifice was "a forgetfulness of self ... like the incandescent Eastern sun and clear blue Eastern skies and the Eastern poetry ... clothes ... emotions that, given their extreme extravagance, only Easterners can ever understand. This [Eastern commitment]... inherited by the sons from the fathers [in every generation]... is the secret of the tenacious adhesion --- so baffling to the Westerners --- of people of Islam to their religion, just as it has constantly renewed the religions of India, China and Japan in the souls of their adherents over thousands of years". This 1911 item was certainly very acculturated and non-traditional. The tendency of various European elite groups to lump a range of sometimes disparate high literatures in the non-Western world together as "Eastern poetry", a common Eastern literary sensibility, encountered by S. Haykal in Western languages, stimulated his search now for cultural as well as political pan-Eastern common ground on which to rally. S. Haykal, "al-Ikhlas al-Sharqi" (Eastern Devotion/Self-Sacrifice), al-Jaridah 7 May 1911 p. 1. To be sure, the classical Arabs' writings had also revered India's sciences and learning.

69. Extracts from a Hindu Maharaja's speech, in which he equated Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism and Christianity as all sources of the same, or complementary, benevolent human virtues for inter-personal relations were translated by "F.B." in "Wahdat al-Adyan fil-Jawhar" (The Essential Unity of All Religions), al-Jaridah 23 October 1909 p. 2. C.D. Smith's impression was that theosophism first impinged on Haykal's consciousness after World War 1, and as an expression of a now demoralized Western intellectualism's loss of faith in science --- and that Haykal implicitly disapproved. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 99 - 103. The presence of theosophical materials in al-Jaridah well before the War shows that the net of Eastern religious cultures as a sanctuary or rallying-point against the West was not introduced into Haykal's consciousness after 1922, although Western sources had also contributed to it from the inception.

70. S. Haykal, "al-Ikhlas al-Sharqi".
Jaridists picked up stressed Egypt’s connectedness to India as regarded imperial power, which establishment Britshers feared could face concerted resistance from a range of Afro-Asian nationalist movements and states (Japan-prefigured). Such data implanted awareness among Jaridist (Siyasahist) intellectuals of both particularoid Muslim and --- perceivedly more anti-British --- Hindu-led Congressite nationalist currents in British India.

Militarily mighty but parliamentarizing Japan was a reassuring Jaridist reply to imperialist discourses about Easterners. Lutfi, himself, sometimes almost fused the "spiritual Easterners" in dichotomization against the materialist Westerners. Syrian Christians who had known Westerners at over-close quarters also called for non-Western values. Vague protest Easternism put space between our intellectuals and the pervasive West until they decided how Islamic they would make their coming reaction against it.

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71. In 1910, al-Jaridah copiously excerpted a long London Times editorial that juxtaposed the growing independence movements in India and Egypt as both influenced by the Ottoman constitutionalist movement --- which had also stimulated both Egyptian press criticism of Britain and political assassination [Butrus Ghali]. The Times, however, also lumped in Japan’s expulsion of Russia from Southern Manchuria, the constitutionalist movement in Iran that attacked foreigners, the development of violent resistance in Bengal and recent fierce resistance by hitherto despised Tibetans to British troops. All manifested one growing will of "the East" to resist such kindred European states as Britain and Russia politically, militarily and through economic self-modernization (Japan, China). Excerpted London Times editorial, "Ikhtimar al-Sharq" (The Ferment in the East), al-Jaridah 17 May 1910 pp. 4 - 5. Thus, the assumption of the British that, for instance, Japanese defeats of the Russians could weaken them, too, made the Jaridists more likely to become supra-Muslim pan-Easternists.

72. Although with limitations on voting, Japan had inaugurated its Diet (Parliament) in November 1890: for Egyptians faced with Cramer’s stereotypes about the congenital incapacity of Easterners, Japan’s constitutional politics were as heartening as her defeat of Russia in 1904-1905. In early 1909, Lutfi cited a range of parallel Eastern constitutionalist politics or movements (and Herbert Spencer against Aristotle) to refute the arguments of the British and the Khedive that the passive Egyptians preferred autocratic government. "It is truly bizarre that after the [1889] Japanese Constitution and the Ottoman Constitution and the Iranian [Constitutionalist] movement, they continue ... to claim that the East was created to obey and can appreciate only personal rule, as a preliminary for proving that the Egyptian Nation ... will never unitedly demand the Constitution". Lutfi, Safahat pp. 49, 45. For another instance where pagan Japan inspires as Easternist model of modernization for a less successful Egypt see 'Abd al-Qadir Hamzah "Inna fi Dhalika la-’Ibrah: Misru wal-Yaban" (Verily in that is a Lesson: Egypt and Japan) al-Jaridah 28 August 1910.

73. Taking up musings about Easterners and Westerners by British writers, Lutfi in 1907 (somewhat prefiguring S. Haykal’s 1911 pan-Easternism) contrasted that "the Easterner" gave priority to such "moral virtues as charity, generosity, loyalty and religious devotion" as against the Westerner’s pursuit of "material benefit". This was still much more traditionally Araboid and Islamic than S. Haykal’s 1911 theosophist pan-Easternism. Lutfi in 1907 stressed as the determinants of the Eastern personality geographical conditioning from the calm air common in all the Eastern homelands, the ultra-metaphoricism of Eastern languages, and the religious customs so immemorially central in the Easterner’s soul. Writing in the context of the British constriction of education, denial of a political life, and Cromer’s charges of pan-Islamism and "religious fanaticism" when Egyptians objected, Lutfi in 1907 was very aware of Curzon and the British in India but mainly for their contrasting courtesy to modern Muslims there (Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan). He did not discuss Hindus in the item, although he mentioned Japanese and Chinese "Easterners" whom Cromer evoked in passing. Lutfi, Safahat pp. 96 - 97, 100 - 101.
Arabism did come after pro-Ottomanism or supra-Arab pan-Islamism among pre-1919 community identifications in Egypt, as the literature has exaggerated. The CUP's 1908 overthrow of 'Abdul-Hamid and the party politics that ensued in Istanbul riveted the attention of al-Jaridah, like all Egyptian newspapers, for years, somewhat distracting even SC contributors from the Arab provinces. The Jaridists often perceived West Asian or Libyan Arabs as a component in an Ottoman community whose modernization was led by Turks. Yet Libyans fighting invading Italy in partnership with Turks were sharply seen as Arab and hence closer.

74. Yusuf al-Bustani in 1910 voiced a tone of reserve about Egypt's wholesale borrowing of Western customs, dress and political institutions. As a corrective to such openness, he cited the regulations of the Mikado for Japanese nationals visiting Europe or America. The Japanese adopted the West's commercial and industrial methods in order to "benefit" but were very cautious about its political and social institutions. This dual approach had enabled them to keep their Eastern, Japanese characteristics. "Y.B.", "Ma Na'khudhuhu min Urubba wa Ma Yanfa'u Misr" (The Things we Take from Europe and What Benefits Egypt). al-Jaridah 1 March 1910 p. 1. Cf fn 113 for his conservatism about women.

75. "Of the three alternative buscs for political identity which competed for the loyalties of Arabs in the 'liberal age' (religious; territorial; ethnic-linguistic) by far the weakest in Egypt was the third". The ensuing discussion exaggerates gaps between (a) the Ottoman Arabists and (b) the Kamilists and Jaridists out of any proportion or perspective, ignoring almost all the many more positive interactions and exchanges. James Jankowski. "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914". The Muslim World v. 70:3-4 (1980) p. 245 et seq.

76. As other Ch. 6 fns document (eg. fn 60), al-Jaridah published copious Arabic translations of the greater number of Western Press interviews with post-Hamidian Turkish leaders. It supplemented these with SC interviews and studies on the Istanbul political scene: these showed deep blow-for-blow psychological involvement in the ongoing struggle between reactionary members of the royal family who wanted to turn back the clock and the new parliamentary politicians. Interview by Yusuf al-Bustani of anonymous Ottoman deputy. "al-Dustur al-'Uthmani wa Markazuhu al-Hali" (The Ottoman Constitution and its Current Standing/Situation). al-Jaridah 6 March 1910 p. 5. Like most Egyptian newspapers in the years following 'Abdul-Hamid's overthrow, al-Jaridah also had an (anonymous) correspondent of its own in Istanbul, apparently a Turk, who relayed minutes of parliamentary debates and manoeuvres and the interactions between all the factions in post-Hamidian Istanbul politics. Eg.: "al-Astanat al-'Aliyyah li-Murasilina al-Khussi fi 27 Fibrayir --- Majlis al-Mab'uthin" (Elevated Istanbul From Our Own Correspondent, 23 February --- The Parliamentary Session). al-Jaridah 5 March 1911 p. 1; cf similar report datelined 12 March 1911 in al-Jaridah 19 March 1911 pp. 1 - 2. For political gossip about the motives of ministers from a previous ministry of Haqqi Pasha joining that of Sa'id Halim Pasha, and speculation about a coming parliamentary session, "al-Astanat al-'Aliyyah fi 25 Uktubir --- li-Murasilina al-Fadil", 1 November 1911 pp. 5 - 6.

77. An accurate account of the Sanusi mystic order leading the Cyrenaicans was given in "al-Sanusiyyun", reprinted from SC Antun al-Jumayyil's al-Zuhur. al-Jaridah 9 November 1911. Phrases used by Turks additionally pushed the Jaridists to perceive the Libyans as "Arabs". A despatch from Istanbul spoke of large-scale Italian massacres of women and children, of "the Arab-Turkish force" resisting, and of "volunteers of the hero Arabs". "al-Astanat al-'Aliyyah fi 8 Nufimbar --- li-Murasilina al-Khuss" (Sublime Istanbul on 8 November --- Our Special Correspondent). al-Jaridah 15 November 1911 p. 1. The same term "the Arabs" was again used by the same Istanbul Ottoman correspondent; Ottoman regular "officers are organizing the Arabs" for a long war of resistance, to the consternation of Italian forces afraid to venture beyond their fortified positions and artillery. "al-Astanat al-'Aliyyah: li-Mukatibina al-Khususi --- fi 16 Nufimbar", al-Jaridah 23 November 1911. The despatch ironized that Italy was mistaken if it was banking that Turks and Arabs were "enemies" in the Ottoman State, which in reality would continue to fight until a substantial portion of its forces in Libya were destroyed. Ibid.
This section traces the Jaridists' special relationship with the Ottoman Arabs that shared literary language automatically imposed, drawing them into their anti-Turkish protest ethnicity --- a conflict that the focus on tense multi-cultural Istanbul itself could only underscore.

**Jaridist Reactions to Italy’s 1911-1912 Invasion of Libya**

Libya had been part of the Ottoman Empire, and the invasion confronted the Jaridists with the legal and international complexities and contradictions of Egypt's attenuating community with that suzerain. The lives of fellow-Arabs --- much closer neighbors --- were also at stake. The Italians responded to resistance with massacres of populations: these traumatized Egyptians conditioned by their duality of culture to hope that Westerners were evolving towards a respect for a neutral body of international laws or even liberal pacifism --- a shift needed for Egypt to become independent through secular gradualism. With all its rural and provincial connections, *al-Jaridah* covered and gave direction to the drive to organize material aid to the Libyans from those areas of Western Egypt with most trading and marriage links with them. Given that the Italian fleet was starving "the Tripolitani" by stopping any food coming by sea, "the Muslims in Egypt" had to send grain. The people of Bani Suwayf were urging the provincial aid committee there to collect that grain. One mill-owner offered to grind flour free of charge out of all grain donated. The Egyptian bedouin Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali Bayyah of al-Fayyum, visited the *al-Jaridah* office and undertook to carry aid by camels to Bani Ghazi, the.

78. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, "Markaz Misr fil-Waqi’ wal-Qanun" (Egypt's Position in Reality and in Law), *al-Jaridah* 9 October 1911 p. 1. took Egyptians over the anomalies. Legally, the Ottoman State had the right after a declaration of war on Italy to demand passage of its troops over Egypt to Tripolitania. Knowing that Britain might further curtail its suzerain rights in Egypt if it did so, Istanbul had taken care not to declare war even while waging it. **Ibid.** The Ottoman State had been consolidating its hold over its faraway Libyan province for decades with various administrative and educational reforms. For Libyan participation in these up to the invasion, L. Anderson, "Nineteenth Century Reform in Ottoman Libya" *IJMES* v. 16:3 (August 1984) pp. 325-348. See also Michel Le Gall, "Ottoman Reaction to the European 'Scramble for Africa': The Defence of the Hinterland of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica", *Asian and African Studies* (Haifa) v. 24:2 1990 pp. 109-136.

79. "An Egyptian" responded with shock to the discrepancy between mainstream West European discourse, which Italy mouthed like the others, and her violence to Egypt’s West: "the whole world today is witnessing the most hideous of scenes of savagery to be carried out by sons of a country purported to be ancient in civilization". Italy’s treacherous war against the Ottoman State had cost it its faint tint of the twentieth century but did not shatter his belief that a new humane community was possible with liberal Europeans: "in every country there are men who have lately come to feel that all who are slaughtered for no sin are their brothers in humanity". "Misri", "Wuhush al-Madaniyyah" (The Beasts of Civilization), *al-Jaridah* 16 November 1911. For vivid excerpts from a British account of mass murders by Italians, “A’mal Tushib al-Wildan --- Risalat Mushahid ‘Iyan” (Actions Which Would Make The Hair of Children Grey --- Account of an Eye Witness), *al-Jaridah* 12 November 1911 p. 1. Colored by European pacifism was ‘Aziz Khalqi’s "Hawl al-Harb" (The Terror of War), *al-Jaridah* 18 November 1911 p. 1.
nearest war front in Libya. A group of Ottomans (resident Syrian Christians?) and Egyptians in Cairo set up a committee to organize the boycott of the numerous Italian stores and enterprises in Egypt. This item mentioned a telegram by the Committee of Union and Progress prohibiting physical reprisals against Italian subjects in the Ottoman Empire proper. The upshot, though, was much unpleasantness for Italians with business or even academic roles in Egypt.

Lutfi was undoubtedly ambivalent to the collection of such (proto-pan-Arab, ethnically pluralizing) aid to "our Tripoli cousins and the Ottomans". He did fear that it could deplete resources and energies that the Egyptians badly needed for their own long-term decolonization. He feared how readily Italy might retaliate against Muslim Egypt and that Britain was liable to do harm of its own if internationally inconvenienced.

Material aid from the Egyptian provinces to the Libyans, already highlighted and fanned by al-Jaridah in 1911, swelled to an unbroken stream of foodstuffs and weapons that continued for the next two decades until Graziani finally crushed the Libyan resistance. Periods in which the Liberal Constitutionalists, successors of Hizb al-Ummah, led or served in cabinets after 1922 were particularly indulgent to the traffic.

Lutfi's insularoid responses to Italy's invasion of Ottoman Libya have been stressed by the West's scholarly literature as an early rigorous particularist repudiation of Egyptian pan-Islamism (and, objectively, future pan-Arabism). This paradigm misses not just nuances

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81. "A group of Ottomans and their Egyptian brothers decided yesterday in Cairo to form a committee for the boycott of Italian stores, and that they will publish a list of the names of those businesses". "Hawadith al-Harb" (Developments in the War). al-Jaridah 4 October 1911 p. 4. Students at the fledgling Egyptian University walked out of the class of the Italian orientalist Professor Carlo Nallino. James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism", p. 244. al-Jaridah had insularistically ridiculed that while (Khedive-supported) al-Mu'ayyad and the Kamilist al-'Alam and al-Liwa', all ceaselessly called on Egyptians to boycott Italians, they continued to buy the paper on which they were printed from Italian merchants. "al-Qawlu wal-'Amal" (Words and Deeds), al-Jaridah 25 August 1911 p. 5. The students had to drive Nallino out for their pan-Islam and Arabism to mean anything: after he lost his Egyptian University post over the invasion of Libya, the imperial Nallino was the Italian government's natural choice to survey captured Turkish documents and set up a translation bureau in the new colony. Donald M. Reid, "Cairo University and the Orientalists", JIMES v. 19 (February 1987) p. 57.

82. Rejecting the practicality of aid by Egyptians to the Ottoman (and local Arab) resistance in Libya, Lutfi himself allowed that "kinship" (qarabah) raised some obligation to convey food-relief to the drought-stricken "cousins" there. Lutfi, "al-Gharat al-Talyaniyyah 'ala lkhwanina al-'Uthmaniyyin" (The Italian Invasion/Onslaught Against Our Ottoman Brethren). al-Jaridah 1 October 1911 p. 1.

83. See Wendell's characterization of Lutfi as a simple, rigorous particularist, cold-bloodedly determined to keep Egypt outside the 1911-1912 Italo-Ottoman War because he equated the Turks as imperialists with the British. Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 233 - 235. Lutfi was an even more total particularist for Gershoni and Jankowski since he was prepared to be forced to step down for a time, for that insularist stance, by the other staff of
and half-tones in Lutfi’s stances to Turks and Libyan Arabs but also his accompanying alienation from Westerners.

Libya again drew from Lutfi a denial that pan-Islamism had any reality in Egypt. European journalists had misrepresented: none but a handful of journalists in Egypt had even thought of amalgamating Egypt into the wide Islamic world in the sense of ending its political distinctness. Since 1841, Egypt had been consolidating its specific political personality vis-a-vis other Islamic homelands, Lutfi stressed. Yet Egypt was treated before international law and the whole world as the Bulgars had been prior to their declaration of complete independence from the Ottoman State three years before --- he, too, followed the unfolding of Christian nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, for all his anti-pan-Islamism.84

In minimizing the place of pan-Islamism in the Egyptian psyche, Lutfi stressed British manipulation of it: this, though, suggested both (a) its potency for Egyptians as an emotionalism of vicarious sovereignty and (b) how much Muslimness influenced the way Europeans saw and treated Egyptians and other Muslims. Lutfi noted that Egypt’s Supreme Committee for Donations had asked the British Foreign Office to put pressure upon Italy to halt its attacks on a province of the Islamic Caliphate and upon international law. Europeans would interpret that the Egyptians and Indian Muslims were content to be ruled by Britain so long as she aided the Islamic Ottoman State. Britain was manipulating the Islamic emotions of, for instance, the Indian Muslims in order to set them against the Hindus who more militantly sought independence. Yet Lutfi’s gradualism, too, would blatantly accommodate the colonial presence for a long time to come. ”Most of our methods for achieving independence have to be through peaceful civic activity ... preconditions ... developing our economic, educational-intellectual (al-‘ilmiyah), ethical and political capacities”. The avoidance of any near clash would certainly not harm the growth of the rural propertied Arab-Muslim elite --- it already had ”economic” capitalist ambitions --- that financed al-Jaridah and ran the Ummah Party.85

Lutfi also perceived that serious pan-Islamism by Egyptians could ignite pan-religious

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85. Ibid. Cf ”Igharat al-Talyan Ala Tarabulas wa Nasibu Misra min Dhalik” (The Italian Invasion of Tripolitania and Its Bearing for Egypt), al-Jaridah 26 October 1911 p. 1.
passions always present in the make-up of the European powers. Some Egyptian newspapers had frankly called for holy war (jihad) against Italy. Such association of Egypt with "pan-Islamism or fanaticism" (he used the French words) could be used by Britain to discredit demands for Egyptian independence in Europe: Europe might permanently legalize Britain's occupation of Egypt. Thus, Lutfi saw pan-Christian, anti-Muslim emotions as easily-ignited determinants of the international policies of European states. Despite shaky liberal and secularoid elements in European life, Europeans too, in politics and other sectors, likewise lived in an ongoing religious age.

Despite their stress that "interests" should determine Egyptian responses as they did the policies of Western states, Lutfi, and other Jaridists more, had invested hopes in the West's consolidation of international law, for Egypt's liberation. Italy's violence in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica shattered such culture-nourished images of Westerners in general. Approaching militant-Kamilist campist views of international relations, Lutfi described "surprise attack [as] not a characteristic of pre-Islamic Arabia ... savage tribes". "Preservation of the general peace" and "the international balance", "international law", "the traditions of modern civilization" were turning out to be just "phantoms". The other Westerners were not so different to Italy. Excerpting the French, German and Austrian Press, Lutfi characterized Western states as nonchalantly viewing from their balconies "a terrible war that will ... inflame hatred between millions of human beings". The English state refused to share the outrage of liberal writers and parliamentarians, instead recalling English sailors serving with the Ottoman fleet.

Some of the most vivid accounts that al-Jaridah printed of Italian atrocities in Libya came from British correspondents, and liberal denunciations in the British parliament. Lutfi's young

86. Lutfi, "al-Gharat al-Talyaniyyah 'ala Ikhwanina al-'Uthmaniyyin", al-Jaridah 1 October 1911 p. 1. Against this editorial's overall sense of Europe as a general camp coordinating the Ottoman Empire's destruction, ran his motif that some European powers chose not to oppose Italy's expansion in Libya lest they themselves fall victim to its drive to restore "the Roman glory". Ibid. The classics among Egypt's British --- Cromer had a penchant for Latin saws and allusions in his stuffy prose --- fed the acculturateds' awareness of ancient Rome. As well as Arabic articles, there was at least one book in Arabic, Ta'rikh al-Ruman (The History of the Romans) by Mustafa Sabri: notice, al-Jaridah 16 April 1911 p. 5. The Jaridists were thus quite well-equipped to understand the expansionist ancient neo-Latin motifs that fueled Italian as well as French imperialism in North Africa.
87. Ibid.
88. For accounts of indignation in Britain at Italy's invasion, "al-Inkiliz wa Faza'i' al-Talyan" (The English and the Atrocities of the Italians), al-Jaridah 16 November 1911 p. 4. Discussion in the British press and parliament stressed that a solution had to be fair to Turkey and the Libyan Arabs in the face of Italy's insistence on total annexation. Ibid.
disciple, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, too, sidestepped European reactions that could suggest Italy’s aggression did not represent Europe in general: "our present age is a vile materialist era in which man eats the flesh of man with a hearty appetite for all that the writers and philosophers may say". Italy’s violence vibrated Haykal’s liberal European library; but he had as shrewd a grasp of the realities developing on the ground of Libya. Italy might be able to break the regular Turkish forces in Tripolitania, but she would not be able to "swallow" Libya’s war-like Arab nomads, who would conduct a protracted partisan war. Italy’s drive to carve out a new Roman Empire was grandiosity given the poverty that made hundreds of thousands of Italians migrate, determined never to return. Haykal hoped that weak Italy would now negotiate a compromise with the Ottoman State.

Communications from many parties worked to engage the Jaridists in the Libya mayhem: Istanbul voices, the British press, French despatches from very Rome, the culturally intimate anti-imperialism of SC Yusuf al-Bustani--- who commemorated in al-Jaridah Italy’s unification and subsequent national advances --- and Ottoman Arabs. Primarily, the Egyptians


90. With great feeling, al-Bustani identified “vengeance” as, alongside religion and the homeland, factors firing Libyan resistance: the Italians had butchered so many Arabs, but "for every one killed two [rise] to win vengeance". “Y. B.”, "al-Duwal wal-Harb: Mas’alat al-Muwafaqat al-Rasmiyyah ‘ala Damm Tarabulus" (The Powers and the War: The Question of Formal Agreement to An Annexation of Tripolitania), al-Jaridah 14 November 1911 p. 1. To further involve the Egyptians, the Latinoid, well-informed al-Bustani skilfully fueled their fears that expansionist Italy might one day turn her violence against them: "Italiya wa Siyasat al-Tawassu’ --- Matami’uha fi Misra wal-Jazir wa Corsica wa Ghayriha" (Italy and the Policy of Expansionism --- Her Designs on Egypt, Algeria, Corsica and Other [Countries]), al-Jaridah 18 December 1911 p. 1. He gave some close accounts, drawing on the European papers and knowledgeable Egyptians, of the fighting in Libya: "Ma’rakat ‘Ayn Zarah wa Hal Hiya al-Hasimah Kama Yadda’un?" (The Battle of ‘Ayn Zarah, and Will It Be the Decisive One As They Claim?), al-Jaridah 7 December 1911 p. 1.

91. Analysis from the West has dichotomized Lutfi and pre-1918 non-Egyptian Arab nationalists, but the latter tried to contain his isolationist spasms over eg. Libya, conciliating Lutfi and his colleagues as, overall, very Arabist. The Muslim Syrian Rafiq al-Azm was in 1912 to join with Rashid Rida in founding the very autonomist Party of Ottoman Decentralization, and had long had use of al-Jaridah to propagandize for Ottoman protest Arabism even being allowed to promote the subversion of the Khedive ‘Abbas, whom Lutfi and Hizb al-Ummah detested (cf fn 101). Perceived inadequate Turkish assistance to the Libyan Arabs greatly helped radicalize Ottoman Muslim
did, as Arabs, feel with neighbors facing a Darwinian destruction so hard to fit into any pragmatism.

Jaridist Reactions to France’s Conquest of Morocco

Reactions by Lutfi and other al-Jaridah intellectuals to the final French conquest of Morocco in 1911 again coldly dissected the full ferocity of Westerners. The successor al-Siyasah intellectuals after 1922 would similarly side-step conditioning from the French culture in their psyche to denounce France’s actions in Morocco, Lebanon and Syria (B 95-97). Yet the Jaridists in 1911 also felt significantly different from the traditional Moroccans, unchanged by the West.

The multi-lingual SC Yusuf al-Bustani offered an informed account of France’s use of her institutionalized high finance to hold off Germany during this lunge. “The fittest and strongest win”: Darwinism to which “the last [independent] Arab State” Morocco had opened itself through the Sultan’s failure to eliminate pre-modern “ignorance”92. Lutfi was a Francophone and had been educated in a secular law mainly derived from that of France. However, her occupation of Morocco again brought home a grim international order based not on the most solemn international covenants but on the right strong European powers gave each other to conquer non-Europeans, each within a roughly allocated sphere. Unlike al-Jaridah SC sub-editor Yusuf al-Bustani, Lutfi did not apply Arab terminology to the conquered Moroccan state.

Neither the French nor other Europeans, harmonious among each other, were inhibited by their laws or contracts in their treatment of non-Europeans. “The [1906] Algeciras Conference guaranteed the integrity of the Kingdom of Morocco, just as the treaty of Berlin has guaranteed that of the Ottoman Sultanate. But these are purely written guarantees that can hold off the strong only so long as the interest of the stronger requires”. Drawing on the Spanish press, Lutfi was acidic about the combination of force and legalisms with which France was reducing the Sultan of Morocco to its figurehead. The international debt of the Moroccan central government Arabs of al-‘Azm’s kind. In 1911 he published a friendly response to “my friend Lutfi”, still cast in pan-Islamic language, over his Egyptianist resistance to involvement in Libya. al-‘Azm, “Siyasat al-‘Awatif ma’a Siyasat al-Manafi” (Conducting A Policy of Emotions Alongside One of Benefits), al-Jaridah 23 October 1911 p. 5. 92. al-Bustani, “Akhir Dawlah *Arabiyyah Yun’a Istiqalaluha Rasmiyyan” (The Last Arab State’s Independence Proclaimed Dead), al-Jaridah 6 November 1911 p. 1.
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--- Lutfi, here, paralleled the grounds Britain cited to occupy Egypt --- was a pretext France could mouth to "supervise" that government, its treasury and its new French-commanded army: while debt repayments continued all European states would accept that as scrupulous observance of the Act of Algeciras.

As was the case with Britain in Egypt, France was thus careful to present itself as intent to take over and adapt --- rather than destroy or dismantle --- the pre-existing central governmental system headed by the Sultan. France was establishing a Cromer-like "veiled protectorate" over the old Muslim ruling class. Lutfi predicted how the French could transform the Sultans into puppets dependent upon them for military protection from their own people. Yet he left Egyptians in no doubt that Moroccan society had been perpetually wracked by conflict between the sphere of central government (he gave the Moroccan term al-makhzan) and wider populations that resisted it: "if the Moroccans remain violently divided against each other... and if some of them, including their Sultan, continue to rely on those who seek to usurp their independence", then Morocco would never again govern itself.

In their parochializing, Britain-appeasing aspect, Lutfi and his colleagues did seek to reap political profit for the incrementalist al-Ummah Party out of one more discomfiture of the Kamilists: if the France they had so long courted to dislodge Britain "sees it as in her interest to expand the rights she gave Britain [in Egypt] under the 1904 agreement, she will do so at once". The final death of the culture-fanned French option could push Egyptian nationalists to coax independence from Britain by stages. Conversely, Lutfi’s characterization of all Europeans as predatory might leave no other path to independence than organized mass movements that could risk class interests of his land-holding elite (the 1919 Uprising). al-Hizb al-Watani members in this period shared his perceptions of all Europeans as feral, and desperately tightened an Ottomar pan-Muslim counter-bloc that al-Jaridah both resisted and fed. Like the non-Muslim al-Bustani, Lutfi kept the phrasing of his obvious supra-Egyptian emotions Easternist, and thus sects-neutral. in regard to Morocco: France’s occupation was a matter for urgent consideration by "the [establishment] leaders of the East" (umara' al-Sharq).

Alongside their concerns about Europe’s imperialisms, the Jaridists, then, could perceive

94. Ibid.
other Arab and Muslim peoples, such as the Moroccans and Libyans, with a detailed realism. This blended data from Arabic and several European languages to make a range of European predator-societies as vivid as their Arab and Muslim victims.

Interactions With West Asian Arabs

Cultural Elites. *al-Jaridah* was an important nexus for literary and intellectual exchange between West Asian Arabs and Egyptians. It not only had on its staff, or as contributors, Syrian Christians who blended West-conscious modernism with old Arab elements, but also emigre Ottoman Muslim Syrians such as 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi: his quasi-national critique of Turkish groups fitted well with *al-Jaridah*'s Egyptianist anti-pan-Islamism. *al-Jaridah* relayed the resisted, ethnicizing drive of such Syrian Arabs as al-Zahrawi and Rashid Rida' to restore Arabic as a modern educational and governmental language from apex institutions in the Turcophone capital. While the Jaridists gave territory priority before 1914, Arabic also defined their nationality. France propagated French far abroad: that encouraged the Jaridists to abrasively back the language struggle of the Ottoman Arabs against the CUP's stepped-up imposition of Turkish.


96. Back in the Ottoman State following 'Abdul-Hamid's fall, al-Zahrawi became Ottoman MP for Hamah, editing from Istanbul the newspaper *al-Hadarah*, a mouthpiece of Arabist ethnicism. In it, he vigorously publicized Rashid Rida's plan to open an Islamic seminary in Istanbul that would have Arabic as its medium of instruction: *al-Jaridah* relayed al-Zahrawi's PR build-up to Egyptians. "Dar al-'Ilm wal-Irshad fil-Astanah" (The College of the [Religious] Sciences and Instruction in Istanbul), *al-Jaridah* 22 June 1910 pp. 1 - 2. The CUP's refusal to support his seminary was one of the factors that pushed Rida' to evolve into an Arab nationalist secessionist by 1914. Hourani, *Arabic Thought* pp. 302 - 303.

97. Speaking for "we Egyptians", the group at the fore of promoting "our noble language", *al-Jaridah* noted with snapping patience that "we have been hearing for a long time that the Arabic language, the language of the noble Qur'an, and of almost half the Sultanate's population, would be the official language alongside the language of the Turks" --- but entrenched Istanbul officials had sabotaged all steps. Relaying its West Asian Arab friends,
Nomads. The literature got dislike or incomprehension towards nomad Arabs among sedentary Egyptians out of proportion. Haim (1962) misrepresented Lutfi al-Sayyid as in 1911 "contemptuously" advising those who politicized Arab grievances to explain the Ottoman Constitution to the bedouins. Orientalist dichotomization ignored the capacity of Lutfi, the Jaridists, the Ummah Party and wider connected Muslim Egyptian strata to conduct sympathetic relationships with nomadic as well as intellectual West Asian Arabs. al-Jaridah-linked acculturated urban elites or associations, but also rural Egyptians, maintained relations with the autonomist Hashimite-led Hijazi establishment. The people of Mit Ghamr and the surrounding countryside collected for the relief of the drought-afflicted Hijazis of 'Ayn Zubaydah, "the neighbors of Allah’s Sacred House", leading to an exchange of letters between the Amir of Mecca Husayn and the organizer al-Shaykh Ahmad al-Ghamrawi, a merchant. al-Jaridah covered the Khedive 'Abbas' fanning of restive Ottoman Arabs including the Hijaz Hashimites. A writer in Suez in correspondence with the Hijaz informed its readers that

al-Jaridah hoped that "the rational supreme leaders of the Sultanate" would finally overcome "the enemies of the Arabic language", given that the empire so badly needed its ultra-"loyal" Arabs to fight in its defence. This Egyptian Jaridist's angry conviction that "the life of the language is life for its nation" was very acculturation-heightened, being conditioned to extend beyond the inner territorial unit in part by contemporary Western nations, notably the French and English, that allocated millions of francs to spread their languages abroad. "If we examine the moral influence of France in the different parts of the world we see that most of it derives from her language". "al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah fil-Astanah" (The Arabic Language in Istanbul), al-Jaridah 9 March 1910 p. 4.

98. Specifically seen as alienating Egyptians from Hijazis in Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism" p. 251.


100. "Kitab min Amir Makkah --- Iktitab li-'Ayn Zubaydah" (A Letter from the Amir of Makkah --- A Collection for 'Ayn Zubaydah), al-Jaridah 14 September 1905 p. 5. The item was a report from Mit Ghamr --- self promotion from al-Ghamrawi himself? --- and was published in the section "Ottoman News", the perspective to which al-Jaridah subordinated Egyptian special relationship with Arabs in West Asia.

101. al-Jaridah kept Egyptians abreast of 'Abbas' fanning of Ottoman Arab dissidence, such as the rebellion against Istanbul in the Yemen, "al-Janab al-'Ali wal-Yaman" (His Highness and the Yemen), al-Jaridah 15 September 1909 p. 4. al-Jaridah, hostile to the Khedive, charged that he shipped guns and ammunition to the Yemenis. "al-Mu'ayyad wa Masa'ib al-Dawlah" (al-Mu'anad and the Catastrophes of the [Ottoman] State), al-Jaridah 25 August 1911. For al-Mu'ayyad's amplification of Yemeni complaints against Istanbul cf A XXX fn 94. al-Jaridah itself got sucked into the protest quasi-pan-Arabism that 'Abbas focused: during Prince Muhammad 'Ali's 1910 subversive tour of Lebanon and Syria, it carried the Arabist greetings of the Homs Orthodox (al-Jaridah 16 April 1910 p. 5). Also the protest of Lebano-Syrian Muslim Arabist militant Rafiq al-'Azm that when the Prince arrived, the Turkish governor of Syria Isma'il Pasha had only sent his director of foreign relations to meet him at the station --- brusque marginalization of a still formally Ottoman Egypt. "Ihtijajun 'Ala Wali Suriya" (A Protest Against the Governor of Syria), al-Jaridah 12 April 1910 p. 4. These Syrian and Egyptian Arabs keep journalizing to each other over decades: in 1923, Rafiq al-'Azm argued in al-Siyasah with Taha Husayn over his largely de-Islamized, secularish recreation of 'Abbasid 'Iraq that alternated aestheticism with raunchiness: Taha, Hadith al-Arbi'a' (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1960 - 1962) pp. 58 - 70.
al-'Arab (here: the nomads or, just possibly, Arabians) had gathered at the gates of al-Madinah "with the intention to clash with/confront the Ottoman State": but this stemmed from famine caused by "the failure of the rains". The group of nomads had even brought their daughters, offering them in marriage to the townspeople for five riyals each to stave off starvation --- suffering that "makes the hearts bleed". The minutaes from al-Jaridah’s Hijaz correspondents did show anachronistic motives --- the Hijazis’ reluctance to let the CUP abolish slavery --- in the Sharif Husayn’s conflicts with Istanbul.

al-Jaridah followed Arab-Turkish ethnic polarization in the new parliamentary politics that succeeded 'Abdul-Hamid’s autocracy. Drawing on private information from Constantinople, it equated "disagreement" between Arab and Turkish members of parliament with Armenian and Greek deputies angry at communal bloodshed at Adana and the crisis between Orthodox Greeks and Muslims on Crete (=potentiality for secession). But al-Jaridah praised those Arab deputies who were trying to reconcile Arab and Turkish deputies: one had turned down an ambassadorship in London. Even Le Temps credited the CUP’s intent to offer equality to all ethnic and religious groups in the Empire: Javed Bey had convinced the Dashnak Armenian deputies to rally with the CUP to defend the Constitution, heading off Armenian demands for independence.

The persistence of old classicist Arab grammatical norms and literary motifs in al-Jaridah intellectuals, for all their utilitarianism, and the new special community that they were forging...
with (Ottoman) West Asian Arabs in general, were brought out by Lutfi’s 1911 pilgrimage to Mecca and al-Madinah.

Lutfi’s responses expressed both his persisting Islamic religious faith and the extent to which the West’s modernity and his elite’s pragmatic common sense made it modest and historicist. When he saw the green dome over the grave of Muhammad he recalled "those noble principles of which these sacred precincts were the matrix and from which they radiated out through all corners of the world". With an elitism of which al-Afghani and 'Abduh had not been free, though, Lutfi was cherishingly skeptical of the light that the strenuously-prostrating "common people" (awamm) descried around the dome. The classical works had familiarized Lutfi in advance with the Hijaz' awesomely bare landscape, which reminded him of "the difficulties faced by the Arab Prophet Muhammad Ibn 'Abdallah in communicating his message throughout these far-flung, waterless, mountainous regions". On the outskirts of Mecca, Lutfi noted the house of the third Rightly-Guided Caliph 'Uthman Ibn 'Affan. He was, though, aware of bedouins with guns there105.

Encounter with the more nomadic Hijaz put Lutfi in touch with Islamic and Arab elements that his dual-cultured elite regretted Western influence was eroding in Egypt. He was alert to the railway station of al-Madinah (Progress) and regretted that modern education was not reaching more females. As Hijazi women still did, previous generations of (upper-class) Egyptian woman had sat in on mosque lessons for males, and then applied those religious injunctions in household life: now, elite urban Egyptian women frittered away their time reading linguistically and morally sub-standard translations of European cheap fiction. "Arabian women" (al-mar'at al-'Arabiyah) were, Lutfi allowed, in general backward in comparison to their peers in Egypt and "the country of the Turks". But this had not cost Arabian Woman her independence or strong character: "she remains worthy to be a spouse to a proud, strong-willed, chivalrous, brave, generous Arab male". Worried about Egyptian women, Lutfi approved that the wives of at least powerful Arabians, the umara', themselves built up a stock of ancient Arab poetry and hadiths that they carefully taught their children so that they would make "the proud feats" of the classical Arabs their model in life106.

106. Lutfi, "Usbu' fil-Madinat al-Munawwarah; al-Mar'ah fi Bilad al-‘Arab" (A Week... Women in the
Lutfi went to Arabia with the literature-conditioned expectation that the spoken Arabic there would be close to the ancient classical: he was disconcerted to find that it had no declensions: Meccans paid no heed at all to his remonstances. He was sensitive to errors of language in Hijazis, "especially if he belonged in lineage to [Prophet Muhammad's clan] Quraysh, the most eloquent of the Arabs, and especially when this language is the language of the Qur'an". In contact with the Hijazi desert, Lutfi idealized semi-nomadic tribes that, he perceived, still maintained the language more than urban Hijazis: in his travels, he had evidently interacted with Syrian bedouin Arabs, regretting their more decayed case endings. The peninsular matrix of high Arabic activated the Jaridists' restorationist linguistic aspect that, when they were not being pragmatic, matched the Kamilists' all-encompassing Arabic. For Lutfi "to preserve ... serve, propagate and update a language so that it keeps pace with novel modern terms and methods [maintain] personality and self-respect for both individuals and nations" (=towards linguistic nationalism). Lutfi worried, like the Kamilists, that in Egypt many elite "youth, scholars and ministers cannot read or write Arabic correctly and see that as no shortcoming": however, "leading men" responded with rigorous correctness of language. Even "journalists who must relinquish many features of high style to enable the common people to read them still take care to maintain the constructions of [high classical] Arabic". The adaptable pragmatism of the al-Jaridah school, Lutfi's insistence that the literary and spoken languages had to move closer, the readiness to experiment with the written medium, could work in two ways. In holy Arabia, Lutfi proposed that the system of writing be improved so that the common people could learn the case endings of the integral classical Arabic.107.

Land of the Arabs [Peninsular Arabia], al-Jaridah 28 August 1911 p. 1. Earlier in the same year, he had voiced from al-Jaridah reservations not just about contamination from cheap Western love fiction, but about young writers deriving patterns from heroes and heroines in Shakespeare. This drew a retort from 23-year-old disciple Haykal that love between the two sexes had to be frankly celebrated as the motive-force of Humanity's progress and happiness: Lutfi had aligned himself with those in Egypt who forbade Arabic authors to explore love and benefit from Western masterpieces about it. Haykal specified Dante, Shakespeare, Rousseau and Goethe among authors whom Egyptian writers should read for guidance --- juxtaposing his master Lutfi with misogynist Schopenhauer. Haykal, "al-Hubb" (Love), al-Jaridah 4 March 1911 pp. 1 - 2. The popularity of slim novellas or story booklets translated from (or inspired by) Western fiction alarmed neo-classicist Mustafa Wahbi: he objected to their "Christian" indecency, their impoverished Europe-patterned Arabic that would leave the Easterners unable to read the Qur'an (=apostacy), and because the pulp fiction stopped people reading al-Hariri, al-Mutanabbi and Abul-'Ala' al-Ma'arri. Wahbi, "al-Riwayat" (Fiction), al-Jaridah 26 March 1911 p. 1. The Jaridist/Siyasahist fiction-writers, though, were to attune Egyptians to those classical writers: B 109 - 110.

Lutfi’s 1911 romanticization of fleetingly-encountered Arabians was linked to his year-round high literary relationship with modern intellectual peers in or from Arab West Asia. His set of Hijaz articles were fueled by exchanges with “my friend” the Syrian pan-Islamist Shakib Arslan (1870-1946), who likewise imaged Arabian adherence to such stereotyped Arab virtues as protecting anyone who seeks refuge. He and Lutfi turned a blind eye to the under-government, insecurity and tribal feuds of, for instance, the Najd nomads --- chaos for which most of the Arab virtues had functions.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{Arab anti-Turkism}. In 1912, Lutfi sharply picked up the discontent against the centralizing CUP spreading among Hijazis. As they saw it, those now ruling from Istanbul were taking away control over their lives and making government remote in comparison to the defunct Hamidian regime, less “despotic” to them than for the Jaridists. Matters once settled on the spot in the governor’s office now required long and expensive cases in the Court of Cassation in far-away Constantinople. Lutfi in 1911 correctly saw Islam as, more than Arabness, the focus for Hijazi resistance: the common people misperceived the new Constitution as opposed to Islamic shari‘ah. Yet he saw how local Islamoid discontent in the Hijaz connected out into the much more ethnic, Arabist protest politics conducted by more modern Syrian and ‘Iraqi politicians against “the Turks”, although still in large part from metropolitan Ottoman institutions (notably parliament). Although he rejected the evolution of Arab discontent into nationalism, Lutfi agreed with those ethnicist politicians that electoral rolls favored Turks, and that the Ottoman Arabs were under-represented in the Ottoman parliament and civil service. The CUP had to stop favoring “the Turkish element” against “the Arab element” and give Arabic its due position in such provinces as Syria, Arabia and ‘Iraq. Lutfi noted with wry respect hard-hitting ethnic militancy in the Ottoman parliament by deputy Shukri al-‘Asali, but rejected “divisive verbalization” (al-qawl al-mufarrik) and long-term “unvarying theories” (al-nazariyyat al-da‘imah).\textsuperscript{109}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{108.} Ibid. Echoing Mustafa Kamil’s sense of superior Arabian virtues, Lutfi downplayed banditry in the Hijaz as rare or unrepresentative of “the Arabian nation (al-ummat al-‘Arabiyyah) which has been famous in ancient and modern times for chivalry, and love of good reputation, ... and kindness to guests and readiness to take the part of the weak and love of justice ... Such exalted characteristics are still more marked in the Arabs than among other nations”. Ibid.

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Despite some culturist blind spots, Lutfi’s Arabia articles show his ability to empathize and communicate with other Arabs across gulfs of life-styles and dialects. A sedentary city-based Egyptian, he was able to ascertain the viewpoints of nomadic as well as urban Hijazis. The literature has viewed his preference in 1911 for Ottoman modernization over the Empire-wide Arab protest nationalism as indifference to fellow-Arabs when it was really his vision of the likeliest way to realize their interests.

Pre-1918 exchanges and interactions between elite Muslim Egyptians and West Asian (Ottoman) Arabs were multi-dimensional --- and much closer to the core of Egyptian identity than al-Jaridah’s links to the Turks. The shared print-language brought aesthetic self-expression from other Arabs to al-Jaridah’s Egyptian readers with a speed and immediacy that literature in Western languages could not match. In the joint pan-Arab high literature before 1914, Egyptian and other Muslim clerics --- and also Catholic Lebanese clergy repropagating ancient Arab texts and language forms --- together with Egyptian acculturateds idealized archetypal Arabian language norms and virtues. On the other hand, such an Egypt-resident Lebanese Christian writer as Ilya Abu Madi already in 1909 radically dislocated the elements wrenched out of the classical Arabs’ literature to convey the most recent break-throughs of the West’s modernity such as aviation. The irritation as well as appreciation with which Muslim Egyptian and Christian Lebano-Syrian al-Jaridah contributors reacted to each others’ writings decades later (Taha and Abu Madi B 112) shows the intimacy of the literary community that the journal got underway in their youth. Egyptian contributors to al-Jaridah also published in ethnicist Arab publications in the Ottoman Empire, such as al-Zahrawi’s al-Hadarah.

Above all, al-Jaridah was in itself the nexus or institution in which the different categories of Arabs met on a routinized day-to-day basis.

al-Jaridah’s blended Ottomanist-Arabist outreach already in a crude way anticipated the

110. Ilya Abu Madi, “al-Tayaran” (Aviation), al-Jaridah 4 October 1909 p. 5. Another contribution was item, “al-Tiflatu wal-Qamar” (A Child and the Moon) 21 March 1910 p. 6. The strain of Christian Egypto-SC and Syro-American diaspora modernism was quite strong in al-Jaridah: it published a tribute to former President Theodore Roosevelt from "the half-American" Farah Antun, editor of al-Jami’ah, who had moved to the US after his controversy with ’Abduh around Ibn Rushd. Antun, “Ilal-Mistar Ruzifalt” (To Mr Roosevelt), al-Jaridah 24 March 1910 p. 5. al-Jaridah (7 March 1910 p. 5) also publicized al-Zuhur magazine of future al-Ahram editor SC Antun al-Jumayyil, who also wrote high literature set in pre-Islamic Arabia: cf fn 51.

111. “Bahithat al-Badiyah” (Egyptian feminist), “Wasf al-Bahr” (Description of the Sea), al-Jaridah 23 July 1911 pp. 5 - 6. This is a pleasant long purple pastiche-Byronic evocation of the ocean.
Egyptian economic pan-Arabism of the 1920s with still half-baked attempts to duplicate new Western technology as tools to integrate the wider community. Muhammad Rushdi, a legal expert in the French-modelled Egyptian courts, in 1909 drew up a map for possible future railways in the Ottoman Empire and gave it to the Ottoman High Commissioner in Egypt. He very much meant to put Egypt into that grid, through a line from Egypt to Bayrut that he projected would cost 1 1/2 million pounds, and which would bind Egyptians to Syria and, hopefully, the Persian Gulf. Rushdi claimed to have discovered many minerals in Ottoman West Asia and he offered his services as a consultant to any trading or agricultural company that might be set up. He had inspected the potential of the cotton cultivation developing in Palestine.\textsuperscript{112}

The modern Muslim Egyptian classes had traditionally sought careers in the civil service or such professions as the secular law, whereas Syrian Christians had cultivated an entrepreneurial ethic. But al-Jaridah shows how SC-fanned acculturateds before 1914 were also planning a Muslim Egyptian neo-capitalism more viable if region-wide (later = pan-Arabism).

**JARIDIST STANCES TO THE LANGUAGE FORMS AND PAST OF THE CLASSICAL ARABS**

**Egyptian Women's Emancipation and Language**

Early Egyptian feminists were struggling to awaken women whose daily spoken Arabic was much simplified grammatically from the Qur’an-patterned classical. Illiterate or semi-literate Egyptian men at least heard literary Arabic when they attended mosques. It would be harder to awaken and mobilize more under-privileged Egyptian women using high Arabic as the medium of speeches, newspapers and pamphlets.

al-Liwa' under British colonial rule insisted that the Qur’an’s extended neo-classical Arabic had to be made the medium of teaching modern knowledge and sciences, and of administration and public life. In contrast, in al-Jaridah, the feminist Labibah Hashim in 1910, upon hearing a classical speech at a conference of Egyptian women, wished that "the eloquent lady had replaced this language --- ... beautifully cast as it may be --- with a simple colloquial

\textsuperscript{112} "al-Khutut al-Hadidiyyah Bayna Misr wal-Dawlat al-'Aliyyah" (Railways Between Egypt and the Ottoman State), al-Jaridah 25 September 1909 p. 5.
that all could understand because the important thing for our women at the present time is to comprehend meaning and benefit from it". She compared in her mind the difference between (a) Arabic's literary and colloquial forms, and (b) the European languages whose writing and speech are similar. This was "among the leading causes [both] of our backwardness" and the swift advance of Western nations. Whereas "common people among the Easterners hate reading (study) because [literary language] is diametrically opposed to their conversational speech, we find that the least knowledgeable of Westerners flock to read newspapers with the same eagerness as their scholars and writers".  

Without particularist animus against standard Arabic in itself, such writers associated with al-Jaridah wondered if pragmatism might not dictate using something more like colloquial Egyptian for modernization.

**Reform or Extension of Arabic**

Given their connections with the rural landowning or gentry classes, the al-Jaridah publicists lacked the populist outlook for linguistic revolutionaries. Though steeped in Western cultures, most were formed by the writings of the classical Arabs to some extent: Lutfi had much jahili Arabian poetry off by heart. Lutfi articulated some pragmatic and even odd particularist

113. Labibah Hashim in al-Jaridah 18 April 1910 p. 5. Hashim at the time was editor of Majallat Fatat al-Sharq (The Magazine of the Young Woman of the East); the woman whose antique neo-classical Arabic she criticized was "Bahithat al-Badiyah" (The Woman Scholar of the Desert) the pen-name of Malak Hifni Hasif (1886-1918) a teacher, and wife of a bedouin shaykh of a tribe in the Fayyum province, who in 1911 fought the Italians in the Libyan war: Bahithat poured out articles on women’s conditions for publication in al-Jaridah. al-Jaridah carried Labibah Hashim’s 1911 lectures to elite women at the Egyptian University: eg. "al-Muhadarat al-Thalithah lil-Sayyidat fil-Jami’at al-Misriyyah" (The Third Lecture for Ladies in the Egyptian University), al-Jaridah 2 March 1911 p. 1. The last was mainly on child-rearing and other domestic matters, but cautiously more radical was her later talk there, "al-Raju! wal-Mm·’ah wa Ihtiyajuhuma ilal-’Amal" (Man and Woman and the Need of Both for Work), al-Jaridah 20 and 22 March 1910. al-Jaridah (28 May 1907 pp 1-2) noted female suffrage and the election of the world’s first woman MP in Finland. But even SC Yusuf al-Bustani countenanced women working in the professions only as a last resort to sustain the household: as with the Kamilists, education had to prepare (neo-bourgeois) women for home-centred nurturing roles --- although a remark of Bismarck from Le Temps bore out this "Easternist" view. al-Bustani, "Kalimatun ‘an al-Mar’ah wal-Shughl" (A Word on Women and Jobs which peasant women had), al-Jaridah 9 May 1910 p. 1. Labibah Hashim herself explicitly spoke for women of "the Middle Class" in "al-Rajuwal-Mar’ah": daughters of poor families were unable to read: her class should take them as servant girls instead of leaving them to be employed by foreigners --- overlooking the Arab Muslim elite’s sexual abuse of servant girls. This Jaridist women’s movement was rather hostile to popular women’s culture: it denounced the release of the zaar --- spirit exorcism ritual --- as "an evil custom that education has virtually eliminated from the developed/elevated (taniyah) classes of the Egyptian Nation so that only the women of the lowest class continue to tenaciously practise it". Nabawiyyah Musa, "al-Zar", al-Jaridah 18 April 1911 pp. 1-2.  

114. An al-Siyasah columnist after World War 1 described Lutfi as "a perfect litterateur who has
ideas for language development. He discussed naturalization of some Western terms for modern inventions and objects instead of losing time on coining and popularizing equivalents from classical Arabic roots --- although this was in a context of joint efforts with Islamic clergy to modernize Arabic\textsuperscript{115}. His acceptance of "automobile" in Arabic ran against pan-Arab Ahmad Zaki Pasha’s purist insistence on "sayyarah" (B 83-4). Lutfi wrote of the need to narrow the gulf between written and spoken Arabic: language is the property of the nation and ordinary Egyptians could reject coinings that the scholars made from ancient Arab books\textsuperscript{116}.

Yet a neo-classicizing atmosphere persisted in the \textit{al-Jaridah} milieu, marking contributors from the Westernized as well as Arabo-Islamic-educated cultural elites. In 1911, Ahmad Ibrahim al-Basilah used the same terms as al-Nadim two decades earlier. The language of the Arabs had been untainted by solecisms (\textit{al-lahn}) or hackneyed feebleness (\textit{al-rikkah}) but when "mixing" with non-Arabs (\textit{`Ajam}) took place "the Arabic language started to gradually fade away until, by our own age, it had virtually gone out of existence". Despite his rather clerical education, Basilah was in the line of \textit{al-Jaridah} and later \textit{al-Siyasah} intellectuals in the resolute drive to make standard Arabic cover all West-derived modernity: translations of "books of industries and crafts ... agriculture and mathematics". More common ground with Westernizing-educated Lutfi, Haykal etc was his functionalist demand that pseudo-classicist rhetoric be pruned from such forthcoming publications. Like Haykal and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s (B 106-8; B 266-9), Basilah evoked al-Ma’mun and other classical Arab caliphs who patronized translations from foreign languages. However, his barring of any colloquialisms of "the common people" from written language contrasted to Lutfi’s, Haykal’s and even al-Zayyat’s pragmatic or particularoid admission of some spoken syntax or words\textsuperscript{117}.

\textsuperscript{115} Wendell, \textit{Egyptian National Image} p. 277. About 1916, Lutfi and a group of friends had drawn up a constitution for an Academy of the Arabic Language: it was duly launched, with the Rector of al-Azhar, Shaykh Muhammad Abul-Fadl al-Jizawi, as its President and Lutfi as its Secretary. It spent an entire year discussing nothing but the legitimacy of Arabicizing foreign loan-words. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 221-222 fn.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Ibid.} pp. 276 - 280.

\textsuperscript{117} Ahmad Ibrahim Basilah, "Ruqiyy al-Lughat al-`Arabiyyah: al-Asbab al-Muwassilah ilayhi" (The Development of the Arabic Language: the Means to Achieve it), \textit{al-Jaridah} 11 September 1911 pp. 1-2. Basilah was a student at Cairo’s Shari‘ah Law College.
The shari‘ah court judge ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, along with some relatives, was to be at the cutting edge of al-Siyasah-Liberal Constitutionalist radicalism, denying in 1925 that Islam prescribed any Caliphate or form of government (B 20 - 29). In 1911 he voiced from al-Jaridah a liberal, acculturated neo-classicism: his interest in classical Arab works had been stimulated as much by texts edited and analyzed by orientalists as by his readings of local manuscripts in the Khedivial Library. (Western scholars had restored aspects of the ancient Arab intellectualism, notably in philosophy, abhorrent to Egyptian Sunni traditionalism). ‘Abd al-Raziq was urging "the sons of the Arab tongue" to help restore books that had appealed equally to "Easterners" and "the Westerners". The "glorious relics" continued to "benefit" in modern times (=but did not require Islam in their readers?). Despite al-Jaridah’s occasional pragmatism, ‘Ali here hoped that the densely neo-classicist al-Bayan would "at last" offer "the scholars of the Arabs... the effective [specialist] forum by which they can convey to the Nation (ummah) their views and [Arab and Islamic] researches". Thus, the old literature suggested a contemporary successor community defined by the current area of learned language: "the sons of the [classical] Arabs". ‘Abd al-Raziq’s lack of awareness of any distinct Egyptian race here would have disconcerted future neo-Pharaonist particularists of the 1920s in the al-Siyasah milieu that was to succeed al-Jaridah. However, the item made no contemporary political application of this narrowly historical-academic 1911 community.

‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq in 1911 thus evinced a post-traditional, somewhat West-accepting attitude: Egyptians had to keep linguistically and aesthetically linked to the literature of the classical Arabs as the core component of self --- without having to view the heritage of those


119. Haykal, "Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i: Ta’rikh Adab al-‘Arab", al-Jaridah 28, 29 April 1912 pp.202-220; "Jurji Zaydan: Tarikh Adab al-Lughat al-‘Arabiyyah", al-Jaridah 11, 14, 15, 16 July 1912; Awqat, pp. 221-246. In 1910, the infant Egyptian University had invited Zaydan to prepare a history course on Islamic literature, but then cancelled it, apparently out of worry at possible adverse reaction from "the uneducated Muslim common people" if a non-Muslim taught such a subject. Reid, "Cairo University" pp. 62 - 64. Muslim opinion inevitably objected to Zaydan’s not-too-competent attempts to characterize Sumerians, Assyrians and other pagan peoples as Arab and to depict Hammurabi’s law --- rather than God --- as the source of Moses’s law. "Ibn Hatim", "Ta’rikh Adab al-Lughat al-‘Arabiyyah li-Hadrati Mu’allifih Jurji Afandi Zaydan", al-Jaridah 17 July 1911 p. 5 (review of Zaydan’s book). Zaydan dashed his books and novels on classical Arab history off at a break-neck speed: it was not hard for "Ibn Hatim" to spot misinterpretations of classical Arab sources in them. Ibid. For the progress of al-Rafi’i’s insertion of himself into the Egyptian University and the modernizing Muslim Egyptian elite as an authority on Arabic and its literature, by the time Haykal wrote, see fn 130.
relics any more as self-sufficient universal perfection.

**Haykal’s Pre-Independence Stances Towards the Classical Arabs**

The usually sectionalized rebellion against the classical Arabs by some Jaridists was voiced in early articles of Haykal. In two 1912 pieces, reviews in form, he blasted the Muslim Egyptian Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i’s *Ta’rikh Adab al-’Arab* (History of the Literature of the Arabs) and the resident Christian Syrian Jurji Zaydan’s *Tarikh Adab al-Lughat al-’Arabiyyah* (History of the Literature of the Arabic Language)\(^{119}\).

al-Rafi’i (1880-1937) abidingly captured the Egyptian popular imagination as a defender and restorer of the past, literature and styles of the classical Arabs in Egypt: a 1935 advertisement for Phosferine tonic termed him "the genius of literature and the argument of the Arabs"\(^{120}\). A deliberately archaist poet, he from 1911 defended traditional Arab philology and culture against young Jaridist and al-Siyasah modernists: "in social and political questions [he]... stood for the revival of the old Islamic values"\(^{121}\). He was to write a polemical work alternately titled *The Battle Between New and Old* or *Under the Banner of the Qur’an* to refute Taha Husayn’s claim in his 1926 *On Pre-Islamic Poetry* that most such poetry was forged for politico-sectarian reasons in the Islamic period. al-Rafi’i later charged the Westernizing left-wing Copt Salamah Musa --- who condemned the classical Arabs’ literature for de-Egyptianizing writers --- with "hostility to Islam and attacks against everything that is Arab"\(^{122}\). al-Rafi’i, then, intertwined the classical Arabs and their literature and culture, even

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\(^{120}\) al-Mugattam. 26 February 1935, p. 3.

\(^{121}\) Biographical note on al-Rafi’i by L.O. Schumann in his translation of *The Education of Salamah Musa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), p. 259. The young modernist authors with whom Schumann mentions al-Rafi’i to have conducted controversies over classical Arabic language and heritage are Taha Husayn, Mahmud 'Abbas al-'Aqqad and Salamah Musa. Like Haykal, Taha and al-'Aqqad published extensively in al-Jaridah; Haykal’s hostile "review" of al-Rafi’i’s book published in al-Jaridah might be viewed in this context. The vendetta continued over decades. When Taha Husayn published his 1926 *Fil-Shi'r al-Jahili*, Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i collected his articles of refutation, and other radical-restorationist writings on Arabic, as *al-Ma’rakah Bayn al-Qadim wal-Jadid*: this volume reprinted some of his pre-World War 1 polemics and depicted Taha Husayn and Muhammad Husayn Haykal as "youth" who had briefly studied in Europe and on their return waged war against "the whole Arab heritage", which al-Rafi’i depicted as an indivisible unity of the language, its most ancient styles --- and Islam, the real target of Taha’s and Haykal’s assaults on his stylistic positions. Husayn, *Ittijahat* v. 2 pp. 242-247, 301-302. From 1922, al-Rafi’i was to argue (from SC al-Hilal!) that an Islam he saw as social ethics had to be a basis in coming pan-Arab nationalism. *Ibid* v. 2, 118-119.

\(^{122}\) Ghal Shukri, *Salamah Musa wa Azmat al-Damir al-’Arabi* (Sayda: al-Maktabat al-’Asriyyah 1965) p. 58.
when pre-Islamic, with revealed Islam. Before 1915 --- from al-Jaridah! --- he flexibly popularized the West Asian classical Arab past and offered straight forward, topical verse as well as his integralist restoration of the classical Arabs’ style: he somewhat related his ethos to Lutfi’s. He was trying to convert al-Jaridah’s modern Muslim elite constituency to his totalistic neo-classical style.

Haykal’s two essays

1. denied that the early --- especially the pre-Islamic "nomadic" peninsular --- Arabs should be the behavioral model for modern sedentary Egyptians (al-Rafi’i and Zaydan).

2. denied that the language and idioms of at least desert pre-Islamic ancient Arabs had to prescribe style and sensibility for writing by modern Egyptians (al-Rafi’i’s enterprise).

Haykal in 1912 appealed simultaneously to (a) things indigenous, Egyptian and (b) West-derived contemporaneity, "the twentieth century", to marginalize some classical Arab language and literary patterns. In the al-Rafi’i item, Haykal reproofed Egyptian writers who, in expounding to their twentieth-century readers the psychology (saha’if nafs) of the earlier classical Arabs affected "the latter’s [antique] way of understanding, thought and expression”.

123. The virtually monolingual al-Rafi’i could lucidly evoke overall societies, although with sectors missing. One of his essays reflected that "the first degree in the upward development of nations is that love of wider identity termed ‘Patriotism’": a patch of common ground with Lutfi (cf Eliraz, “Conception” pp. 118-9). al-Rafi’i held up as the model of selfless dedication to nation, the British in India as they cornered trade --- thereby laying the foundations for seizing political power --- in the reign of Emperor Shah Jahan. The essay simultaneously saw the British as lethal and was prepared to adopt attitudes to community from which they had derived their strength.

Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i, “al-Fard al-Wahid fi Wujudin min al-Ummah” (The Individual Derives [real] Existence from the Nation), al-Jaridah 28 May 1907. Among al-Rafi’i’s moral-cum-psychological essays was his "Darsun fi Tabi’at al-Mukabarah" (A Study on the Nature of Arrogance), al-Jaridah 22 May 1910 p. 2. Topical and accessible was his poem "Mudhannab Halley" (Halley’s Comet), al-Jaridah 20 April 1910 p. 5. There was some vocabulary from the tribal warfare of pre-Islamic Arabia in al-Rafi’i’s elegy to Egypt’s veteran minister and administrator Mustafa Riyad Pasha, but it was clear on the whole --- and had one or two moving compliments: "Khudhu min Mawtihi Ma’na al-Hayat". al-Jaridah 20 June 1911 p. 1. In regard to a sense of Arab macro-history, the pioneer pan-Arab Ahmad Zaki compared him to Yahya al-Ghazzal, the multi-lingual minister of several "Amirs of the Muslims" in Andalusia, who acted as their plenipotentiary to the Norman and Byzantine kings. Zaki also stressed Riyad’s services to the Arabic language. "Ta’binu Riyad Bashah" (In Tribute to Riyad Pasha), al-Jaridah 2 August 1911 pp. 1-2. Mustafa Riyad Pasha (1834-1911) served as a provincial governor and as director of the departments of Education, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Justice and the Interior. His first language was Turkish, and he was ethnically a conservative Muslim Turco-Circassian. But Riyad may have originally been a Sephardi Jew from Smyrna married to the daughter of a Balkan Turk who came to Egypt with Muhammad ‘Ali. He began his career as a copyist of Arabic documents in the Department of Finance, and came to speak and write the language remarkably well for a TC. F. Robert Hunter, Egypt Under the Khedives, 1805 - 1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy (University of Pittsburg Press 1984) pp. 158 - 165. Riyad had fostered the Arabic encyclopedia of Butrus al-Bustani whose son Najib al-Bustani discussed its completion with Ahmad Zaki following the service. "Da’irat al-Ma’arif al-‘Arabiyyah" (The Arabic Encyclopedia), al-Jaridah 28 December 1911 p. 4.

In this period, the young Haykal admitted the capacity of the classical Arabs' literature to stylistically homogenize at least a cultivated minority of neo-classicist Egyptian writers: he himself somewhat responded even to the peninsular jahili poetry's antique "music" and idioms that he nonetheless associated with an arid Arabian homeland different from Egypt. Writers had to search for some more "easy" or accessible "Egyptian" style to reduce their use of ancient Arab and Western patterns. Yet he ruled out making the colloquial Egypt's literary language and foresaw that 'Abbasid styles (eg. Ibn al-Muqaffa', al-Jahiz) could be run into the future Egyptian one.

For Haykal, al-Rafi'i's use of the earliest classical Arab modes of language and sensibility represented a sort of treason to Egypt and to the "people": "the writer who detaches himself from the environment in which he lives and follows (adopts yantahilu) [other] concepts and images in his style... virtually becomes a rebel against the human community amid which he lives". "A writer who lived in Egypt and among the Egyptians" can only be termed "a denier of Egypt" if he "loves the desert" and "calls on the cloud to give rain". al-Rafi'i's book is a retrogression to "the nomadic encampment traces/ruins [al-atlal] of the population of the Asiatic Peninsula [Arabia]."

125. The young Haykal only qualified the prescriptiveness of the classical Arabs for new literature. In 1911, he wrote of the far-out neo-classicists who wanted all further literature to be in the Arabic of pre-Islamic and early Islamic Arabia. The "magic" of this style "makes you suppose yourself in the Arabian peninsula" but could read a bit as "alien"--- although a more numerous group of neo-classicists had blended clearer ancient vocabulary ("Arab raiment") with new concerns, winning wide approval. And there were pure Westernizers in literature. Haykal belonged to a "reconciling" "third party", aware of Western literatures, who used a smooth, musical, direct style drawing on words of somewhat later --- 'Abbasid --- writers such as Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 757: started secretarial school of letters in Arabic from Sasanian court literature) and the polymath al-Jahiz. Their idioms and vocabulary did not clash with the even Egyptian natural environment, unlike the "frowning" environments evoked by totalistically Westernist works in Arabic or the "barren" Arabia that pervaded way-out neo-classicist writings (al-Rafi'i's ruggedly neo-jahilist style). Selective patriotic rejection of classical literary models in 1911 conveniently defined as alien only those sectors of the classical Arabs' language least intelligible to those educated in English and French, as he had been. Haykal more or less dismissed the possibility of turning the colloquial into a literary medium, only discussed in a theoretical way by a few intellectuals. In this 1911 article, he saw the dynamic neo-classical verse and oratory penned during the 'Urabiist revolution" by such figures as Mahmud Sami al-Barudi as a turning-point in the resuscitation of the "corps" of standard Arabic, given the wide public that these communications activated. Haykal thought that the colloquial had lost a chance for a formal role in mass mobilization "in that age" --- unaware here, of populist writing and oratory in the colloquial by, for instance, al-Nadim. Haykal, "al-Kitabatu wal-Kuttabu fi Misr" (Writing and Writers in Egypt), al-Jaridah 19 April 1911 pp. 1 - 2.

126. Awgat p. 207. Syrian descent: al-Rafi'i was born in one of the villages of the mudiriyyah of Qalyubiyyah in the Nile delta in 1800, but to a family of Syrian origin: the shaykh Muhammad al-Tahir al-Rafi'i was sent by the Sultan to Egypt in the 1820s to take charge of its Hanafi legal system. This family background made al-Rafi'i feel linked both to Islam --- so many of its members served Egypt as qadis and muftis --- but also to
Haykal also appealed to utilitarian considerations of communication with the Egyptian reading public, against al-Rafi’i’s attempts to duplicate the language and idioms of the ancient desert Arabians when describing their literature and history. He wickedly quoted al-Rafi’i’s own Lutfi-like maxim that language has been developed by societies to meet their requirements for communication --- that a language is composed of "words that in reality are the property of the hearer instead of the speaker".  

Islam at Stake? Jahili Arabia might at first sight seem the antithesis of Islam: but the classical Muslims studied the pre-Islamic Arabs and their culture to elucidate the Qur’an. Specific inquiries of al-Rafi’i’s work were at least formally independent of Islam: eg. the "news" of the pre-Islamic Arabs, the "genealogies" of the Arabs, the process of "oral transmission" (riwayah) of jahili verse. However, al-Rafi’i (Haykal?) juxtaposed that transmission of jahili verse with the origin and riwayah of the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad. Several subjects that al-Rafi’i addressed --- for instance dialectical divergence between [pre-Islamic Arabian] tribes, pertinent to readings of the Qur’an --- were central in Islamic religious studies.  

In presenting an idealized picture of the pagan pre-Islamic Arabs, al-Rafi’i demonstrated their worthiness to receive and bear God’s final, culminating revelation (Qur’an). Yet his idealization of them got out of control of Islam’s universalism. al-Rafi’i exalted the Arabian the Syria of his forefathers. Giora Eliraz, "The Social and Cultural Conception of Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i", Asian and African Studies July 1979 p. 102.  al-Rafi’i’s development of a crude pan-Arabism, long debilitated as community under all those layers of archaic culturism and myths, by bracketing Egypt and West Asia legitimized his pride in a non-Egyptian provenance. With a tint of racism, al-Majallat al-Jadidah of the leftoid Copt Salamah Musa in 1930 lumped the Egypt-born al-Rafi’i with the Syria-born Rashid Rida as reactionaries motivated by their origins to draw Egyptians into non-modern relations with backward non-Western outsiders. And of course Syrian Christians had to be eliminated from journalism in Egypt. Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs p. 128. Haykal’s query if al-Rafi’i were a denier of Egypt may, likewise, have resisted his extra-Egyptian ethnicism.  

127. Ibid p. 206. But how far was Haykal prepared to allow his Egyptian audience or community to shape his style or vocabulary? Some of the early stories he published in al-Jaridah were not merely set in the countryside, depicting popular life, but had snatches of dialogue approaching the real colloquial speech of uneducated rural Egyptians: "Fi Intizar al-Faraj" (Waiting for Relief), al-Jaridah 27 April 1911 pp. 1 - 2. al-Rafi’i believed that Islam validated only one form of Arabic --- the dialect of Quraysh. He accordingly opposed attempts to "Egyptianize" literary Arabic by incorporating distinctively colloquial vocabulary, on grounds of pragmatic communication that would view Arabic purely as a social organism. Eliraz, "Conception" pp. 116-117. It is to be noted here, though, that Haykal stayed within sight of al-Rafi’i, seeking to convey rural local color more than rural popular speech patterns. In 1911, he noted that the popular epics around such figures as Abu Zayd al-Hilali had been written in a simple, colloquial-influenced Arabic for recitation to the illiterate masses. He thought some of those epics’ "meanings" beautiful but found the semi-colloquial language in which they were clothed graceless: "I don’t know if that resulted from an inherent incapacity of that language to convey beauty or whether there was not enough time to polish and lift it among the beautiful languages". Haykal, "al-Kitabatu wal-Kuttab fi Misr”. Haykal’s use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic for uneducated peasant characters petered out in his fiction shortly after World War I.
peninsula as "a fragment severed from heaven with the first man": its nomadic Arabs had remained to his day "still those most disposed among all people to natural freedom, and able to rival anyone in endurance in arduous enterprises" (influence from 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi --- or ... Haykal’s mentor Lutfi?). Haykal was biting: al-Rafi’i was out to depict the ancient peninsular Arabs as "a group of angels who descended down to earth and were garbed in human bodies, then took up residence among people to be the model for human perfection". Bursting out of control of Islam’s religious viewpoint, the proto-pan-Arab al-Rafi’i even argued the Arabians’ racial superiority.128

From the most unfamiliar vocabulary and idioms of the classical Arabs, al-Rafi’i forged a unique style most incomprehensible those educated in English and French129. Yet Haykal’s ridicule may have been so sharp because it was this class most conscious of cultures and most at risk of deculturation that al-Rafi’i’s unbroken integralist Arabic could most attract. His slabs of pre-Islamic Arabian materials and vocabulary had pagan features that could rather foster a secular pan-Arab nationalism. Yet al-Rafi’i continually underscored his Islamic motivation as he bided for the support of the ultra-West-dyed modern intelligentsia and professionals who were al-Jaridah’s constituency130.

128. Ibid pp. 214 - 215, 219-220. An inherent link between the pre-Islamic Arabs and the subsequently-revealed Qur’an is language. al-Rafi’i’s exaltation of the pre-Islamic peninsular Arabs was to establish (Awqat p. 219) that "they were the people of this miraculous language" (hadhil-lmi:hat al-mu’jizah). The verbal noun from the active participle “mu’jizah” or miraculous is i’jaz which can mean the Divine Miracle of the Qur’an’s stylistic inimitability. It also may be borne in mind that the second volume of al-Rafi’i’s work on the literature of the classical Arabs was later retitled I’jaz al-Qur’an wal-Balahat al-Nabawiyah (The Inimitability of the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Rhetoric). Elizar, “Social and Cultural Conception” p. 104.

129. For the incomprehension of the Egyptian public, and even such a wide-ranging scholar of classical Arabic literature as Taha Husayn, as to the messages al-Rafi’i was expressing. Ibid pp. 105-6.

130. In 1911, the Tanta Club invited al-Rafi’i to give a lecture "on the history of the literature of the language". Tanta was a country town, but the audience was heavily made up of such acculturated elite elements as "physicians, lawyers, judges of the local civil court, district attorneys" and "the litterateurs of the town". He explained in detail the religious message upon which classical Arabic was founded”. "Ta’rikh al-Adab al-‘Arabiyah" (The History of Arabic Literature), 11 May 1911 p. 5. In regard to al-Rafi’i’s penetration of modern West-inspired structures, he had started his history of the literature of the classical Arabs at the urging of some staff and officials of the fledgeling Egyptian University. Arabic and its literature in their broader sense were taught by Orientalists there because Muslim scholars could only teach ultra-specialized aspects. This al-Jaridah contributor hinted that the University should give al-Rafi’i a teaching position now that the volumes of his pioneer history were appearing, in order to restore Egypt’s “independence” in her language at least. "Ghayur ‘ala-Adab” (“One Zealously Devoted to Literature), "Ta’rikh Adab al-‘Arab wal-Jami’at al-Misriyyah” (al-Rafi’i’s History of the Literature/Manners of the Classical Arabs and the Egyptian University), al-Jaridah 4 May 1911 p. 5. Haykal thus published his 1912 assault-review in the context of readiness in al-Jaridah, modern institutions and in the Westernizing-educated Muslim classes to accept al-Rafi’i as the authority on the past literature and future development of standard Arabic.
Jurji Zaydan, too, highlighted ancient pagan or non-religious Arab national identity elements, but to bring together twentieth-century Christian with Muslim Arabs. He applied the standard Arab past and classical culture to bracket and fuse his immigrant Christian Syrians with their Muslim Egyptian host population, but slimming down and fundamentalizing the language elements of the classical Arabs. Haykal assailed al-Rafi‘i because he used the language of the ancient Arabs he supposedly was explaining to his Egyptian audience rather than the "workaday" or "commonplace" prose style (lughat kitabiyyah muta‘arafah) that Egyptians used in their newspapers or private letters. Reviewing Zaydan’s book, however, Haykal was confronted with a prose style more stripped, functional and popular than his own: Zaydan "writes for the people in their commonplace language by which they make themselves understood to each other in their newspapers and letters" — against which Haykal had judged al-Rafi‘i. However, Haykal spoke in rather scornful terms of Zaydan as a mere popularizer and even observed that no rules could be laid down for valid style because every writer of value shapes his own.

al-Rafi‘i had made the peninsular pagan Arabs the ethical-behavioral (as well as stylistic) model for modern sedentary Arabic-speakers. As a (post?)-Christian, Zaydan sited the formative period, and as many of the achievements of the Arabs as he could, in that sects-neutral section of their history. Those (proto-Waspoid? AUB-enrolled?) pre-Islamic Arabians synthesized free-mixing and chastity between the sexes: suspicion-free social advancedness that "people attain only among the highly developed nations". Zaydan’s suggestion that the pre-Islamic Arabs were "the model of human perfection" in this respect got short shrift from Haykal. Zaydan had quoted the jahili 'Antarah’s verse "I cast down my eye when my (female) neighbor appears to me until she is concealed from sight by her dwelling": a verse by Abu Nuwas that youth was the steed of ignorance and that he often had visited the husband’s wife while people slumbered contrasted later ‘Abbasid-period moral deterioration. Haykal rebutted that the pre-Islamic Arabs were morally exemplary by quoting from Imra‘ al-Qays’ mu‘allaqah (suspended ode): "many like you pregnant have I visited by night or one suckling whom I distracted from her one year-old amuleted infant". Chastity was held a great virtue by the pre-Islamic Arabians because they were divided into tribes founded upon imaged descent from a shared ancestor. Such tribal

public opinion, however, could not suppress human nature and the pre-Islamic Arabs were no better and no worse than other people\textsuperscript{133}.

In combining free-mixing and chastity, Zaydan's pre-Islamic Arabians justified --- or could subtly contain --- Westernization of Arab societies. Haykal ironically observed that the casual reader of Zaydan's work might suppose that the pre-Islamic Arabs "had attained a greatness in knowledge, ethics and politics that would vie with the most advanced twentieth century nations". Haykal applied his critique of Zaydan's idealization to the whole "group of writers" holding up the Arabs as a model of "faultlessness" and "perfection". Haykal charged that the attempts of Zaydan to morally guide his (Egyptian) readers by selecting jahili episodes illustrating virtues, distorted the historian's function to "establish the truth of the events about which he speaks"\textsuperscript{134}.

\textbf{Arab History De-Islamized}. Haykal here revealed his recurrent ambivalence towards Arabic Christians, and also --- at least in that period of his intellectual life --- towards Islam as a revealed religion. He discussed criticism by the Qur'an of the life-style of pagan poets as among factors that dampened poetical activity. He nonetheless rapped Zaydan because he presented no biographical data about the orators of the early, Rashidi period of religious conquests, and especially for his virtual silence about the Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib. "More important than this is his complete silence about the Qur'an and the hadith as though they do not enter into the history of the Arabic language's literature while medicine and sooth-saying (al-kahanah) do".

Haykal was in two minds about the Islamic period of the Arabs. On the one hand, he adopts a European-type post-religious stance: had some apprehension of Zaydan (as a \[post?\]-Christian?) that he might offend "the beliefs" of his audience made him sidestep alleged stylistic and conceptual continuity between (a) the Qur'an and (b) preceding Arabian oral literature stimulated during the latter jahili period by mounting religious dissatisfaction with paganism? Some readers might extend such arguments of Haykal to view the Qur'an as the human product of its Arabian milieu, not revelation\textsuperscript{135}.

In contrast to his own questioning spasms towards the Qur'an, Haykal speculated that Zaydan minimized discussion of Islam, its advent, early Islamic Arabic literature and the period

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid pp. 330-233.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid pp. 228-233.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid pp. 240-244. For the background of criticism of Zaydan from Muslims, see fn 119.
of the Rightly Guided Caliphs because he "considered this short period an interlude (a passing
interruptive period: farah 'ardiyyah) in the life of the Arab nation ... [followed by] the return of
the Arabs ... to the pagan jahili spirit in the era of the Umayyads". Against this sensed thesis of
Zaydan, Haykal argued that "he who wants to study the Arabs of the days of the Umayyads and
the 'Abbasids must refer back to the originating transformations effected by Islam" in Arab
ethics and literature.\[136\]

The young secularoid Haykal was Islamist here in comparison to Zaydan --- whose stress
on the continuity of the Arab nation was to be carried forward by Taha's post-1922
characterizations of 'Abbasid 'Iraq as a secular society and culture (B 113 - 115). al-Rafi'i
agreed with Haykal that the later cosmopolitan, urbanized period of the Islamic empire brought
fundamental changes in the outlook and culture of the Arabs. al-Rafi'i, however, viewed the
change from desert nomadism to world empire as ushering in decay of the eloquence of the
Arabic language and Arab model ethics previously defined in the Arabian peninsula.\[137\]

During his earlier years as a Westernizer and particularoid, Haykal preferred the
Islamic-literate period of the Arabs' history and literature to their pre-Islamic "nomadic"
peninsular pagan period. At ultimate stake in exaltation of the ancient Arabs by writers such as
Zaydan or al-Rafi'i was not only whether modern Arabic-speakers would define themselves as
Arab but also with what classical sectors. "Many of us ... say that they are writing (about)
the literature of the [classical] Arabs ... so that the sons of the Arabs (abna' al-'Arab) may know the
history of their forefathers ... who filled the world with their conquests and poems".\[138\] Haykal's
habit of thought seeing Islamic character in the life of the Arabs after the advent of Muhammad
would provide materials for development of an Islamic pan-Arabism in Egypt.

For Haykal, the revelation of Muhammad was a point of departure that enabled the Arabs
to issue forth from their arid peninsula to establish a much wider universal state of Islam: its
urban literate 'Abbasid civilization offered elements --- eg. the Mu'tazilite rational theology
revived by 'Abduh --- that could aid Egyptian modernity. In a 1925 review of the Twentieth
Century Encyclopedia by Egyptian Islamist Muhammad Farid Wajdi, Haykal shared his
identification of the Arabs with Islam but demanded that attention should be more evenly

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136. Ibid pp. 245-246.
137. Ibid p. 211.
distributed between "the Arab(ic) cities and lands", which included Andalusia and Baghdad. Wajdi’s Encyclopedia ignored Baghdad --- the "capital of Islam for a long time" --- in favor of religiously more central Mecca.\(^\text{139}\)

The young Haykal, then, did not view the classical Arabs only within the temporary Arabian environment that constricted their horizons in the jahili period. Very like the Kamilists earlier, he was more drawn to the subsequent wide-extending area in which Arabic was daily speech in the classical period and which corresponded, excising Arab Andalusia, to the linguistic-geographical entity of "the Arab(ic) lands" (al-bilad al-' Arabiyyah) of his own day.

In 1925, Haykal --- developing his 1911 position --- called on "the Arabic critic" to reconcile (a) the diverse tradition of Arabic and (b) imported Western literary patterns in the East in (c) the synthesis of a living "Arab or Egyptian culture". He only reproached al-Rafi’i for utilizing "the literary relics of the most ancient people" (the jahili nomads’ poetry) when some old Abbasid styles of the Kitab al-Aghani and Ibn al-Muqaffa’s Kalilah wa Dimna have "close affinities to the styles of our age."\(^\text{140}\)

Generally, then, Haykal viewed Umayyad and Abbasid city-based culture as having in some sense expressed Islam. He saw sectors of classical Arab high literature as symbiotic with the West-structured modern thought and literature he and his colleagues were creating in Arabic. His mild, fleeting, assertions of Egyptian particularity in the content and language of literature clashed with but one sector of the classical Arabs’ literature.

Taha Husayn’s Arab Classicism (1911)

Taha and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat studied together at al-Azhar in adolescence; it proved

140. "Khawatir fil-Naqd" (Reflections on Criticism), al-Siyasa 13 March 1925; Awqat, pp. 22-24. The Kitab al-Aghani was a 20-volume collection on Arabian and early Islamic life and manners with biographies of poets and musicians, assembled by Abul-Faraj al-Isfahani (d. 967). This essay of Haykal gives casual details of his dual culture. On a sleepless night, he browsed through Rousseau, the Kitab al-Aghani, Anatole France, Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i etc. Ibid p. 12. For Haykal’s increasing realization of his and his fellow modernists’ (partial) affinities to even the extreme neo-jahilian wing of neo-classicism that al-Rafi’i led, B 101-4. In stressing moral and intellectual self-preparation in prophesy, as well as the ensuing sudden revelation, al-Rafi’i was influenced by the medieval Muslim philosophers. Elizz, "Conception" p. 115. In his 1935 Hayat Muhammad, Haykal imaged Muhammad’s path to prophethood as a prolonged rational observation of Nature, a highly intellectual activity that some more orthodox Muslim reviewers protested was not very religiously conceived. Wessels speculates that Mu’tazilite rationalist theology and tasawwuf, as well as modern Western thought, contributed to Haykal’s anaemic vision of the beginning of Muhammad’s mission. Wessels, A Modern Arabic Biography of Muhammad: A Critical Study of Muhammad Husayn Haykal’s Hayat Muhammad (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1972) pp.86 - 92.
repressive of their aesthetic need of classical Arabic literature and for original analysis in
religion. They turned to West-patterned courses at the fledgling Egyptian University and
started to learn French: B 240-241.

Taha's youthful sniping at al-Azhar and at neo-classicist stylist al-Rafi'i, in al-Jaridah,
sounded radical before 1914. Many of his al-Jaridah articles on language and classical Arabic
literature, though, were a humanist restoration of that heritage. Several key attitudes were to
recur in his maturer development in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s of components for a pan-Arab
linguistic nationalism. These included: (a) a diluted Arab ethnocentrism that under-registers
non-Arabs in the classical culture or brands them its enemy (although Taha did accommodate the
loanwords they gave Arabic); (b) the sense of standard Arabic in peril throughout both classical
and modern times, entailing constant defensive labor and creativity; (c) the Qur'an, Islam and
religious movements figure mainly in the useful succor they give Arabic; (d) the classical Arabs
were akin in their lesser creativity to some very great Western people (Greeks,
Anglo-Americans); (e) Western intellectualism already restructures (rather than supplants)
classicist Arab identity; (f) pan-Arabizing: the continuous language has to resist contemporary
deculturation from alien rulers of Arabs outside Egypt, too (the French, but also the Turks).

Classical Arabs Defended. Already able to read some French, the 22-year old Taha was
aware of Western images that Islam and Arabic had been spread by conquest and "force" in their
heyday. He defended less Islam than the Arabic language's inherent vitality that enabled it to
supplant Persian, Byzantine Greek, Syriac, Coptic and Spanish and to besiege Berber in the
peaks of the Atlas mountains, all within 85 years with little compulsion. Taha's linguistic
apologetics already --- though this also looked back to 'Abdallah al-Nadim's articles in the
earlier 1890s --- offered macro-historical bases for linguistic nations that were to help Egyptian
pan-Arabism vanquish particularism in the 1930s. The immature Taha already had the sense of
some linguistic-cum-national groups as incorporative and fluid in their racial and geographical
borders:

Some nations have natural strength that enables them to triumph materially and morally.
The English in America obliterate the personality and national-racial identity of the other
countries [there] replacing them with their own nationality, language and religion without
any need to resort to force or arms. The classical Arabs were in this category. Had they
not met malevolence from Persians and strength and resistance from their language, they
would have quickly finished off that tongue for good.141.

Clearly, the very young Taha exulted in the scope and sweep of Arabic and the (classical) Arabs in world history. Their past and language were essential for him, but juxtaposed and interwoven with paralleled Western cultures and pasts. Taha would maintain and extend into the 1930s and 1940s many of these 1911 linkages: the classical Arabs as almost as creative as great Western peoples (Americans, ancient Greeks); the capacity of literary Arabic to absorb other cultures and human groups, only somewhat checked by his al-Jaridah-originated particularoid sense of Egyptian place and nuances of sensibility. The classical Arabs’ written language for Taha was already, in 1911, a central element that he or others could later apply in something verging upon a linguistic nationalist option (B 278-282; B 462-5). Already in 1911, Taha defined Islam as "the Arab Religion" that he cherished, because the Arabic worship it imposed spread and maintained the language’s correct form in their empire, checking linguistic corruption from all those non-Arab subjects.142

Classical Muslim History Ethnicized. Taha saw no positive relevance of any classical Muslim sect for his age and its needs: those religio-political factions, though, never-endingly fired at each other propaganda poetry and oratory that extended the gains of style and subjects the Qur’an had bestowed on Arabic.143 Taha would henceforth view the religious ethos in classical Muslim history from the aesthetist perspective of its consequences for language and high literature. In 1911, like al-Nadim in 1892 or 1893, he presented classical Muslim states in ethnicized terms as Arab. "The Arabs feared for the language --- and thus the Qur’an --- from the deterioration and corruption" being caused by all the non-Arabs in their empire. They accordingly moved quickly to draw up rules of grammar, and declension and to collect and record the language. In the ’Abbasid period, "the grammarians of al-Basrah and al-Kufah took the language from tribes of pure Arabs whom they could be certain had not mixed with the Indians, Persians, Byzantines, Ethiopians or Copts". Taha affectionately reviewed the gradual

141. Taha, "Hal Tastaridd al-Lughah Majdaha al-Qadim? --- 6" (Will the Language Recover its Ancient Glory? --- 6), al-Jaridah 31 October 1911 pp. 1-2. Taha adroitly countered Western charges of linguistic duress by noting that "the offices of administration of the Islamic government in Syria, Iraq and Egypt continued to use foreign languages [for records] up to the age of [Umayyad Caliph] ’Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwan: that is, to the point at which people had become Arabized and it would be foolish ... to interact with them in other than the language they understand". Ibid. Taha, here, exaggerated the speed of Arabization.
142. Ibid. p. 2.
143. Ibid. p. 1.
elaboration, for instance, of vowel-signs in the Arabic script to prevent the language getting lost\textsuperscript{144}. Although not always, Taha in \textit{al-Jaridah} could over-ethnicize the classical venture of Arabic and its high literature, almost refusing to register the non-Arab provenance of many of the \textquotesingle Abbasid philologists, phoeneticians and grammarians who labored to fix and save the language for a religious motive.

\textbf{Masses and Language}. Taha was empathic to the common people of \textquotesingle Abbasid \textquotesingle Iraq and modern Egypt. On the forms of written language, though, he stood with elite minorities against such masses. Despite the great success of "the Arabs" in the classical period in preserving and extending a continuous written language, this became confined in the urban centers to the scholars and the elite: "the common people started to speak an ill-pronounced and corruptly-constructed/syntaxed vulgar [lit. "of the market place] language-form". The counter-measures of "the Arabs" (sic) had only "preserved the language and the Holy Book": they had not been able to make people speak in correct Arabic\textsuperscript{145}.

\textbf{1911 alienation from contemporary speech}. The fourth century (of Islam) had began Arabic's "age of degradation" (\textit{\'asr al-inhitat})\textsuperscript{146}. In that age, the Ottomans subordinated it to Turkish in Syria, Iraq and Arabia: however "the common people continued to speak [Arabic] in dialects any Egyptian will hate, although his own dialect, too, has much linguistic corruption"\textsuperscript{147}.

Like Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid in the Hijaz, Taha in 1911 had a sense of a precarious modernist literary elite composed of both Egyptians and Syrians, that was restoring an endangered standard Arabic on behalf of all Arabic-speakers. He voiced contempt for al-Azhar\textquotesingle s traditionalist refusal to teach classical Arab literature, a basis for restoration. The educational missions to Europe, and translations from European languages initiated by Muhammad \textquotesingle Ali were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{144}. "Hal Tastaridd ... --8", \textit{al-Jaridah} 5 November 1911 p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{145}. \textit{Ibid.} In the context of the ferment of ideas about the classical Arabs, their literature, and comparative Semitics at the Egyptian University --- Zaydan, al-Rafi\textquotesingle i, Hifni Nasif and European staff were all writing and lecturing --- Taha had been more appreciative of contributions by non-Arabs, and in particular Persians (although also from Greek grammatical concepts) to classical Arabic grammar. "The outstanding authorities on the language were Persians more than Arabs. We stand in relation to our Arabic language in this era where the Arabs stood in theirs vis-a-vis the sciences of the Greeks and Persians, with the Orientalists succeeding the native custodians of those sciences [in their superior knowledge of] Arabic and its sister languages... They have mastered Arabic, Hebrew and Syriac, deciphered the scripts of Babylonia, read the inscriptions of the Nabateans and excavated the structures of Thamud, while our scholars know of Syriac only that it is the language of those in the graves". "al-\textit{Adab al-\textquotesingle Arabiyyah fil-Jami\textquotesingle ah}" (Arabic Literature at the University), \textit{al-Jaridah} 9 May 1911 p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{146}. \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{147}. "Hal Tastaridd ... --9", \textit{al-Jaridah} 6 November 1911 p. 1.
\end{itemize}
essential --- but stylistically expendable --- steps. Instead of laissez-faire Westernization, Taha wanted 'Abduh’s incorporation of European liberalism and sciences amid restoration of classical Arab texts whose language forms pervade the borrowings.

West-Restructured Arabism. From his adolescence, the Arabo-Islamic heritage was relativized and somewhat seen from the angle of the Western human and linguistic sciences. In 1911, Taha alerted that Western scholars had made fundamental advances in the history of the Arabic language by deciphering other Semitic languages, even Assyrian. The classical Muslim philologists had been in a position to trace Arabic’s connections to Syriac because it was still spoken, but they did not. In this 1911 article, after urging modern Arabic-speakers to adapt Western comparative Semitics approaches for their language, Taha extolled classical Arabic literature as great and essential for him. Still, the youth Taha was already letting the West pervasively tint him, admitting its approaches even into the language at the center of self. This set him, or at least other intellectual leaders who respected his intact classical Arabic, up for a reaction. Comparative Semitics in the hands of such scholars as Ernest Renan were ultra-political, imperial and racist. In the 1920s, Renan’s stereotypes would fuel ravings about the classical Arabs by neo-Pharaonic particularists; Taha later took part in their refutation with Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and other pan-Arabs of the 1930s and 1940s.

Pan-Arabizing Contemporaneity. As Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and other one-time Jaridists were to be in a more politicized way in the pan-Arab 1930s and 1940s, Taha in 1911 had a vivid awareness of the peril facing Arabic among colonized Algerian evolees. Literary Arabic had already been weakened in North Africa by competition from Berber and had now become little understood although it lingered within mosques.

The French have started to teach their language to [Muslim] adolescents while neglecting to teach them the [literary] Arabic language so that one of them can grow up to adulthood.

148. Ibid p. 1. Taha, then only 22, praised ‘Abduh extravagantly as “intelligent, insightful, resolute... He mastered knowledge and achieved what no Egyptian did before or after him... in all history to this day”. In regard to the contribution of Syrians to the revival of Arabic, Taha sidestepped any competitiveness as to whether they or the Egyptians had contributed the most (which in one twinge was argued about in 1928 by Ahmad Zaki Pasha: B 88 fn 80). 

149. Taha, "Hal Tastarid al-Lughah Majdaha al-Qadim?", al-Jaridah 24 October 1911 p. 1. Taha did not want modern Egyptian neo-classicists (such as Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’) to take up the wealth of synonyms in classical Arabic: these were due to collection by the ancient philologists of mutually duplicative vocabulary of Arabian tribes. With its huge vocabulary, Arabic was able to encompass an ever-widening range of genres: “eulogies for goodness and virtue, condemnation of evil and vice, descriptive pieces, elegies, poetry evoking passion for women, poems in which the poet boasted his nobility of lineage and ethics”. Ibid.
knowing of his language only that vulgar market-place jargon that common people use in their conversation, a mixture of Arabic, Berber, French and Spanish that appeared as a result of savage war. The youth of Algeria have come to hate their language so that Islamic religious literature may now have to be composed for them in French. His 1911 sense of France as waging "war" to destroy his literary language, his concern that Algerians and North African Arabs could suffer language death, was to fuel his urging of Egyptian governments in the 1930s to mount ostensibly apolitical educational missions in French North Africa, Lebanon and Syria (B 189 - 190).

Compared to ’Abdallah al-Nadim two decades earlier, Taha’s 1911 classical Arab heritage had been extensively de-Islamized and humanized. Taha’s concerns had shifted to a much more aestheticized language component. This remained inimical to both linguistic expression of watans-particularities and adoption of Western languages for formal modern discourse, although it already accepted the content of Western intellectualism.

**Perspective**

This Chapter could assay only a preliminary Arabist and Islamist revaluation of the complex Jaridists, so long flattened into one-dimensional particularists. Our communications-scan showed that it would be wrong to think even in terms of Arabo-Islamic survivals and thus division in the Jaridists’ psyches: more often, their Arabo-Islamic elements quickly locked into, and were heightened by, motifs from Western cultures, interactions with Westerners, and modern activities patterned by the West. This was so for (a) wider community and (b) language in nationhood. As with the more formally pan-Islamic Kamilists, acculturation to imperial powers multiplied al-Jaridah’s supra-Egyptian community identifications more than it fragmented or particularized.

Monolingual Islamic intellectuals had some access through Arabic to the issues of the wider non-Arab Muslim world: but the Jaridists further encountered French and English-language data --- and involving racist attitudes --- about Turkish, Balkan, Indian, Maghribi, Tsarist and Negro African Muslims that poured in from so many metropolises. Their early drive to express the wider community with economic connection matched (as did Kamilist pan-Islamism) the stress on imperial trade in British discourses: al-Jaridah contributors were

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150. Taha, "Hal Tastariddu ... --- 9". al-Jaridah 6 November 1911 p. 1.
more and more able to read the language of Dunlop. Yet the historical momentum that French retained in Egypt kept them alert to the self-exalting discourses as well as invasions of the "Latin" French and Italians in Arab North Africa, too. Their languages-fostered responses to imperialism as a whole, rather than just the British, sometimes veered towards the Kamilists' sense of international warring camps rather than atomistic nations. However, the Jaridists held back from a comprehensive anti-imperialist activism that might deplete their class' assets and Egypt's energy. Their one-sided cultural bonding to Westerners conditioned them to hope that Western laws could neutrally order a more equal and humane international relations. Repeated rebuffs and nightmare ill-treatment of Egyptians and other Muslims, though, would in the end trigger a supra-Egyptian reaction, the more intense because so long pent up. The successor-group of al-Siyasah intellectuals and politicians after 1922, though, would retain al-Jaridah's pendulum-like duality vis-a-vis Westerners.

Language. Despite mild Egyptianizing impulses, the al-Jaridah intellectuals before 1915 laid many cultural and literary bases for post-1922 liberal ethnò-linguistic pan-Arabism. They were readier to accommodate Western languages in formal education, and Western vocabulary in the written language, than were the Kamilists. Yet, Westernizing-educated as well as Islamic-educated Jaridists --- including, often, Lutfi --- felt Kamilist-like concern at the vulnerability of pan-Arabic under the British: they had compensatory drives not just to save the "relics" of the classical Arabs' literature, but to install recycled language and historical motifs from that past within the most novel activity.

Beyond anything that the Kamilists ever conceived, the Jaridists wanted to draw from Western high literatures as well as thought. Yet accepting these as superior and necessary did not stop them artistically cherishing old Arabic literature no longer seen as unique and universal God-sparked truth. In denying total prescriptiveness to the classical Arabs' idioms --- at least, the jabili verse sector --- for new literature, Haykal spoke for a modern elite whom non-Arabic formal educations had left unequipped to read that oldest Arabian verse. Yet writers of his kind had enough joint activities with more Islamic-educated cultural elites (and Fertile Crescent Christian Arab writers): all recovered the classical Arabs together as an inter-elite enterprise. Even hard pre-Islamic peninsular Arab verse sparked some of the most engaged criticism that Haykal ever wrote. Taha instanced a Jaridist modernism that can accept Western analysis even
for the classical Arabs’ language and past, but pours into the varied Western conceptual systems it naturalizes much more classical Arab language and experience than Western analysts have allowed. This was an Egyptian Arab modernism prepared even before 1915 to stand and fight for its identity on a shaky formal language that mostly extended what Arabs outside Egypt had defined a millenium before.

The teeming diverseness of al-Jaridah items sampled burst through the Anglophone literature’s paradigm that this school kept up any rigorous or determined insular particularism. From the social point of view, al-Jaridah was itself a pan-Arab structure, given Christian and Muslim Syrians in its staff and contributors. Non-Egyptian Arabs were always dropping in to see Lutfi. Their copious contributions dovetailed into various modern Jaridist enterprises, and, as editor, Lutfi did not restrict their articulation of a contemporary Arab identity. By the time it closed down, al-Jaridah had greatly helped connect Egyptians to a variety of Arab literary and economic elites in Ottoman West Asia, and brought home the grievances that fueled Arab-Turkish ethnic conflict over there. The paper had laid bases for the pan-Arabism evolved after 1922 from the al-Siyasah successor-forum, but without yet articulating a formal ideological system for a contemporary pan-Arab nation.
PRE-1919 ACCULTURATED ARAB AND PAN-MUSLIM IDENTIFICATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

In comparison to at least the pre-1882 writings of the older-generation pioneer pan-Islamists, educationally formed in Arabic, both the Kamilists and the Jaridists had incorporated the West much more within their intimate selves. These multi-lingual lawyers' cogent legalistic refutations of British arguments and propaganda offered one ideological preliminary for intimacy between Egyptians and Westerners. These two rival groups had internalized interlocking sectors of the law and historical and political ideologies of, in particular, the French Westerners. It is clear that French motifs of the rights of man and nations were psychologically crucial along with Islam for heartening the very young Kamil to resist an Occupation so contemptuously overwhelming. Indeed, the responses and resistance by both groups were at most points genuinely constructive, not just dampened down by elite self-interest. The Jaridists' incorporation of the poetical romanticism, belles lettres, and liberal political and social thought of the Anglo-Saxon world leaped over the immediate colonial relationship with the occupier. Yet, the more Muslim Egyptian acculturateds opened themselves to the West, the more its traumatizing discourses --- that in so many mutations made religions criteria for international policies --- pan-Islamized them.

Given the dominance of Europeans, politically and in the cities and modern economy, the small modernizing Muslim Egyptian elite had more exposure before 1919 to Western languages than to literary Arabic. Despite resultant gaps in their indigenous formation and real differences between Islam and both Christian and secularoid Western concepts, which the Kamilists had already started to highlight, both the Kamilists and the Jaridists were much less fragmented in their personality than might have been the case. The Egyptian intellectuals often skilfully reconciled, or related in dichotomization, Western and Arab elements that had unfolded in a sort of shared (if often polarized) macro-history. The West, as liberal part-model and as challenge, continued to influence or color the selective Arabo-Islamic reaction by old al-Jaridah intellectuals against it after 1930 (Ch. 9; al-Zayyat Ch. 10).

The First Book has represented two main responses by acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals to the West's imperial power and creativity. The first, to which Mustafa Kamil and
his followers leaned, was supra-Egyptian architecture in international relations: a wide Arabo-Islamic counter-camp with which to roll back the West economically and in joint modern education as well as politically. The second approach, which the Jaridists developed more, to varying extents would distinguish and separate Egyptians, politically in particular, from other Arabs and Muslims, although in part to appease Westerners whom the gradualist Jaridists, too, feared as so ferocious. However, data in Chapter 6 showed that they also --- and only somewhat differently from the Kamilists --- often articulated very strong consciousness of joint linguistic and cultural enterprises to which all current Arabic-speaking populations had to contribute, and of the Turks' post-1908 evolution of liberal parliamentarism as some sort of region-wide venture. It is true that Lutfi made resistance to the impulse of some Kamilists to send deputies to the post-Hamidian Ottoman parliament one of his most dramatic particularist stands. Yet had a new Ottoman liberal-democratic polity evolved and economically modernized, the Jaridists, too, might have considered confederation.

Despite their sense of an Egyptian homeland as a political unit, the Kamilist and Jaridist communications sampled in some respects already had more affinities to linguistic nationalism. They defined as crucial to nationality and national sovereignty a high literary language originated outside Egypt and that worked to homogenize the Egyptian elite with its equivalents in other Arab countries. It is true that al-Jaridah --- in contrast here to al-Liwa and other Kamilist media --- printed some proposals to make formal Arabic approximate more to spoken Egyptian Arabic and represent local life. Book 2 sets out much more radicalized efforts of the successor al-Siyasah intellectuals to develop a localistic "national" literature that would depict (in particular, rural) Egyptian reality in language less totally supplied by the classical Arabs, and which was to evoke a Pharaonic golden age with a much more systematic intent.

Overall, our revaluation of pre-1919 community identifications in Egypt often highlighted common ground between the party of Mustafa Kamil and the writers around al-Jaridah and the Ummah Party. The two groups did differ as political factions, somewhat in the mixes of their memberships and followings, and in particular in their tactics or strategies for getting the British out. Yet, for all their verbalized emotionalism, the lawyers who led al-Hizb al-Watani, too, wanted to leave riots and uprisings to the last resort --- while the impossibility of gradualist engagement with the British pent up dangerous frustration among the Jaridists that,
although dampened by insularist formal ideology, likewise had many Arabo-Islamic drives and motifs parallel to al-Hizb al-Watani's. Our scanning documented little personal interaction by Jaridists with either Turco-Circassians or outside Turks in comparison to the Kamilists' Ottoman and Palace contacts. It cannot be said, though, that al-Jaridah ever managed to become truly Egyptianist or insular in the sense of marginalizing out of thought the Ottoman Empire that always so massively pervaded its pages through all its swings of attitudes to different Turkish regimes.

Survival and Modernization of Arabism

The newspapers and magazines of both the Kamilist independence movement and the al-Ummah Party transmitted Islam and key language traits and memories of the classical Arabs as living culture, amid galvanizing peril from imperialism, foreigners and illiteracy. It has been one precondition for the survival and cohering of nationalities and their national languages in the modern world --- in particular for cultures subordinated within empires or large Western States --- that they have a daily press in the language which in itself functions as another homeland for the linguistic nation. Pre-1919 Arabo-Egyptian culturism and proto-nationalism may be usefully compared here with Celtic languages and protest movements under English domination. In a gloomy 1975 prognosis of the future of Welsh, W.B. Lockwood observed that to survive in the modern world a language has to be "made official in an exclusive sense", in "its own national administration, its own educational system operating through the national language, ...its own mass media... a daily press using that language". It does not matter how many foreign languages individuals learn so long as "the national life is expressed solely in the national language". Clearly, articles in al-Liwa' that not only fused standard Arabic with the survival of Islam, but called for it to cover all modern administration and education alerted Egyptians to these requirements. Irish peasant leaders or nationalists, in contrast, had been content with English as the medium of their protest movements until the foundation of the Gaelic League in 1893 installed the crumbling indigenous language, too late, within Irish nationalism. The case of

Wales shows that even a rich centuries-old high literature --- one supplemented by new poetry, plays and fiction that reformulate the golden age for the needs of modern situations (= the Watanists and Jaridists) --- are not enough, without a daily press, to maintain the speech and nationality in the modern elite without which the non-sovereign nation dissolves. Occasional reading of books and literary recitation rituals are not enough if more evolved or richer colonizers can marginalize that literary language outside of modern institutions and transactions. The British impoverished and wounded classical Arabic by replacing it with English in the modern school system and civil service, yet the modern Egyptian elite refused to let English (or French) become their language of intellectual and apologetical discourse in the way that other --- Indian Muslim or Hindu or Irish Catholic, or Welsh --- modern elites did. The two major nationalist movements had built a daily press that extended the Qur’an’s Arabic into one habitual medium of modernity. They had made educated Egyptians sufficiently conscious on the front of modern education to force the British to somewhat reverse their drive to freeze classical Arabic out of the schools. It remained excluded from the bureaucracy, most modern tertiary education and the modern economic sector.

By 1919, then, by Lockwood’s criteria, the Kamilists and Jaridists --- against all the odds --- had just managed to keep open the possibility of language and nationality survival within modernity, and the political independence to which these could lead. Literary Arabic remained dangerously remote from the daily speech of the mainly illiterate Egyptian masses and forty years of official neglect and marginalization had impoverished and enfeebled it among the modern elite. In the other direction, the perils facing Arabic under the British had had a compensative steeling influence on most intellectuals formed in the period. Now, after the limited independence of 1922, this modern bilingualized Muslim Egyptian elite came to lead and administer Egypt. The new era offered intellectuals like Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Taha Husayn the opportunity to develop into (a) an Egyptianist-cum-Westernizing establishment pragmatically pursuing other goals as Islam’s standard Arabic further crumbled or (b) an elite with more affinities to linguistic nationalism because it subordinates West-patterned tasks to the restoration of standard Arabic or synthesizes the two. Book 2 of this inquiry sets out how the continuing vulnerability of standard Arabic after 1922 propelled the multi-lingual ex-Jaridist and ex-Watani intellectuals in the second --- pan-Arabizing --- direction.
That standard Arabic was defined by a religious scripture constantly heard recited gave it very great coherence and authoritativeness. Breton and Irish and Scots Gaelic in their struggles for survival never had such authoritative standardization and multiple functions as the repository of religious as well as national distinctness. Better motivated than those doomed nations, and more removed from the enemy’s centre, Muslim Egyptians fought with triple, skilled fury to save the language of religion, homeland and Arab community. Yet its connection with Islam obstructed Arabic’s potential as a ready-made basis for a pan-homelands nationality distinct from Turks and other non-Arab Muslim peoples. Some Jaridists did dilute the religious emotionalism around Arabic heightened by the Kamilists --- and the young Taha Husayn even separated the continuous standard from Islam. Jaridist relativization and humanization of the classical Arabs’ Arabic --- now cherished as a worthwhile heritage that did not have to be in all ages the very best that humanity had ever produced --- left them in general quite committed to installing it within modernity, although in language policies they could be more pragmatic than the Kamilists.

When Islam figured less, classical Arabic still retained its aesthetic grip. Although he cut Islam out of the standard language, the young Taha kept up an intolerant drive to make it the medium of all major enterprises, steamrolling particularities of dialect, that could predoom attempts from the successor al-Siyasah intellectuals from 1922 (Book 2) to evolve a particularist Egyptian-national idiom within the neo-classical. Islamic self-definition from al-Jaridah contributors was more on-off, more alternated, but the antipathy of Europeans to Muslims regularly re-activated it among them as well, including in languages. The Kamilists connected Arabic, and the classical Arabs who had defined it, too often to Islam to attract many Christian Arabs to their prototype for a future linguistic nationalism, although the fusion helped mobilize a front of Muslim classes against British policy. Such holy war over languages and cultures, though, may be distinctive to the intersection of languages, and the overall modern situation that faces Westernizing-educated intellectuals. Only the stratum most threatened with deculturization could detail the extensions of standard literary Arabic required, and have the compensating commitment to carry the vast tasks through.

The elements for Arab identity that accumulated over forty years of British rule were diverse. They included odd book studies conducted by a handful of antiquarians (eg al-Rafi’i on pre-Islamic Arabia). More crucial was pre-1919 journalism that --- precisely because it was
scholarly in a disjointed or fragmentary way --- could serve splinters and slabs hooked up from that ancient past to a professionally busy, activist, modern elite. Classical Arab antiquity was planted at the very heart of journalistic political excitement and factional party politics among the acculturated secular stream strata. Yet it had uneven impact. In formal literature and language, the elements bequeathed by the long-dead Arabs had the clear upper hand over such thin elements as had developed for a separate Egyptian identity. In the sphere of political community, in contrast, the habit of thought had taken root that the separate Egyptian homeland framed a discrete "Egyptian people": the wide "Arab nation" --- however linguistically definitive it always had to be for Egyptians --- was the past classical entity that had ceased with the unity of the wide classical Arab empires. There was a definite schizophrenia between, in particular, (a) the Kamilists' vision of the far-extending Arab past and the homogenizing pan-Arabic they propagated and (b) their politically compartmentalized and differentiating vision of Egypt's region in the present. This disparity of orientations was to sharpen among acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals after 1922, to be resolved from 1929 or 1930 in a new systematic pan-Arabism (Book 2).

That both the Kamilists and Jaridists directed so much of their pan-Islamism to non-Arab sectors of the Muslim World showed their failure to carry through the integration of the cultural and political sides of their personality by 1919. The Kamilists' and Jaridists' interactions with the Ottoman Turks and such other non-Arab Muslim peoples as Turkic Central Asians were real multi-dimensional relationships, whereas their cultural and linguistic Arabisms could prescribe that priority rather be given to tightening contemporary community with other Arabs. The separate state entity that had been differentiating since Muhammed 'Ali did work against the pattern set by the often politically unified wide classical Arab Nation. The Jaridists had the better range of elements for a pan-Arab identity: (a) the classical Arabs' language and the past, but also (b) ethnicized topical dislike for the declining Turco-Circassians, (c) a projection of that out over the region in Egyptianist-phrased sourness towards the Ottoman Empire and (d) cultural community with Ottoman Arabs and sympathy for their cultural self-differentiation vis-a-vis the Turks. The Jaridists did not, however, synthesize (a) and (d) with (b) and (c). It was to be an old member of the al-Jaridah milieu, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, who in the 1930s and 1940s tightly wove all these long-standing elements together into a rigorous Egyptian pan-Arabism that finally
broke with the Turks and pan-Islam (Ch. 10: B 302-318). In regard to the Western, Maghrib, wing of the Arab world, though, both the Kamilists and Jaridists had by 1915 articulated an adequate historical vision of French imperialism and the threats it posed to the economic welfare, Islam and literary Arabic of Arabo-Berber Muslims there: the successor Siyasahists after 1922 would tighten the pan-Arab solidarity and modernize Egyptian linguistic-educational competitiveness with France in her colonies (B 9-10, B 96-97; al-Zayyat Ch. 10).

**Pro-Ottoman Pan-Islam**

Cultures, all the sensitivities as they intersected, and visionary designs for Egypt’s long-term welfare, greatly determined this complex of supra-Egyptian identifications. The Kamilists’ relationship with the Turks was more than Egyptianist manoeuvring within the constraints of regional and international legalities and relations. As well, Kamilist pan-Islam had a readiness to gamble on wide enterprises: many Egyptian interests it pursued were only potentialities for the future to decide, and had to be complexly synthesized with those of other Muslims using West-patterned technologies. The connection with Turkey alienated when bidding for the aid or neutrality of various European groups --- although it was precisely the emotional chemistry of cultures-steeped discourses with or about Westerners that often ignited campist pan-Islamism in Kamil and his colleagues, and indeed sometimes in the Jaridists as well. Both Kamil and Lutfi offered their elite --- citing its very real West-steeped multi-lingualism and liberalism --- as equal partners to Western intelligentsias and establishments. The refusal of French or other Europeans to whom appeal was made to concede equal sovereignty amplified their sympathy for Bulgars, Armenians or Greeks fighting the Ottomans. Europe’s disparity of sympathy drove home that religions determine political communities, internally and in international relations --- awarding a nightmare vividness to anti-Turkish Christian nationalisms in the minds of both the Kamilists and Jaridists. European high cultures and journalism affirmed secular laicist --- and even some post-Christian --- principles that drew the Kamilists and Jaridists into the interactions: but then Western animus against the Turks reinflamed the solidarity impulse from Islam.

Pan-Islamism was a modern response to the global power of Western nations that Egyptians actively helped formulate and shape. Even under the British, Egypt was already a
massive and key Muslim and Arab country: Kamil and his colleagues and successors were actively applying its weight to pull the development of the region -- Ottoman "Turkey" its sovereign core -- in a direction they chose. The initiative for much pan-Islamism came less from the Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid who went through the motions needed to conjure a bogey, than from the other colonized Muslims who needed a rallying point of sovereign self-modernization and strength. The religious cult that the Kamilists whipped up around the Sultan-"Caliph" looks precarious, inflated and pre-modern but it was precisely the modern age, with its new communications, economics and technologies brought from the West, that could at last realize the immemorial myth of wide Muslim unity. After 1908, the Ottoman State's restored liberal multi-party parliamentarism gave it credibility as a pace-setter for modernization even for the more Egyptianist al-Jaridah circle. The Ottoman-centred pan-Muslim impulse was so coherent because Western perceptions and enterprises stimulated and fused with classical and traditional Islamic community emotions, even in the al-Jaridah circle.

Book 2 presents post-1918 blending of Islamic community emotions with West-patterned modernization in Egyptian attraction to Ataturkist Turkey. The writings of Haykal show how the images of 'Abdul-Hamid's despotism, West-based resistance from somewhat Westernizing Turkish oppositionists, and the attempted reforms by the CUP -- data he must in large part have come by through al-Jaridah, along with the SC press -- formed the foundation of his responsiveness after 1918 to Ataturk's new Turkey. The Turks had at last found the leadership able to smash back such Christian nationalisms as Greece -- whose classical past was respected.

3. When Haykal in 1927 wrote down his responses while visiting the new Turkey, he was ultra-aware of Ottoman-period radical movements that had prepared the way for its success. "The Turkish renaissance is not the product of today or the creation of Mustafa Kemal: this social rebirth whose manifestations so strike one in Istanbul and other areas of Turkey can be historically traced back to a time that began earlier than 1908 when the Ottoman Constitution was proclaimed [by the CUP]: it goes back to when the Committee of Union and Progress was founded but then even earlier to when Midhat Pasha drafted [= 1876] the preliminary Constitution for the Ottoman State, and when Prince Sabah al-Din started to advocate decentralization. From that long-bygone period of history, Turkey's best minds were thinking through the correct strategy for its rebirth. But the Ottoman Caliph and the reactionary elements around him had at that time enough resources of repression to prevent these first efforts bearing fruit", although they built up in the Turkish people the preparedness to aid Ataturk's finally successful movement when it came. Haykal (1931), Waladi (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1978) p. 136. The blended or alternating Islamic-Westernist duality of Haykal's post-1918 responsiveness must be stressed: he exalted the Ataturkists' transformation of the status and roles of women (p. 134) (which eliminated even Islam's personal or family law): but he was aesthetically responsive to Istanbul's Islamic architecture (pp. 129-132) and also voiced some anti-European motifs in backing changes. For Midhat Pasha's reforms, and the young 'Abdul-Hamid's suspension of the brief parliament and constitution, Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 103-106.
Persistence and Limitations of Homelands

The tensions between (a) immigrant Christian Syrian intellectuals and (b) acculturated Muslim Egyptians whose historical self-definition often turned equally Arab, to some extent followed from such special features as collaboration and divergent Christian backgrounds. Yet the separateness of the region of origin, the divergencies of the sub-cultures that had evolved within each territorial homeland, and differences in the historical experiences and interests of Egyptians and Syrians also contributed without regard to sect. The sense that differences of homeland interests, sub-cultures and heritages were carrying on in the now-shared Egyptian milieu alienated some normally pan-Islamic Egyptians from such Muslim Syrian Arabists as Rashid Rida, before 1919. On this plane, the tension between the mainly Christian Syrian intellectuals and the Kamilists, rather than due to sects, was inherent in relating Egyptians and Syrians of any religion, or Egyptians and any other Arab people. Particular features aside, contentions and conflicts between Egypto-Syrians and modern Muslim Egyptians before 1922, then, raised some issues that would crop up again over the long-term in the new pan-Arabism Egyptians and West Asian Arabs were to evolve together in the 1930s and 1940s. Even Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, the most unitary of the liberal Egyptian pan-Arabs examined in this thesis, had
to note in 1940 how pre-1918 pro-Turkish attitudes by Egyptians made some key figures in 'Iraq's pan-Arab establishment strive to marginalize Egyptians out of 'Iraq's education and development (B 326-7; cf. B 328-9 on the 'Iraqi government's abandonment at the UN) --- in counterpoint to impulses by Egyptians to fuse in an organic way with 'Iraqis (al-Zayyat, 1936: B 336-7; 'Allubah 1933 B 159-160). Most post-1930 Egyptian Arabism was to retain some of the sense of homelands as durable political and cultural units earlier developed in pre-1919 Jaridist and Kamilist nationalism and in the neo-Pharaonic particularism of the 1920s. Much like the Kamilists' bygone pan-Islamism, the future pan-Arabs would seek to integrate the Arabs by up-to-date economic and technical means that would not amalgamate the established homeland state units.

In filling out the geometrical particularist ideology to which Western scholars reduced Lutfi and the Jaridists in particular, then, we have taken care not to substitute an equally exclusive Arabo-Islamic counter-stereotype. To trace the pervasive --- if multi-culturized and hence special --- Arab and Muslim attitudes of the Jaridists and Kamilists before 1919 need not gainsay their simultaneous development of Egypt-first concerns. The two types of community impulses, though, clearly had to clash in the longer term as modernity and the West offered more and more stimuli and facilities for the actualization of supra-Egyptian community. Acceptance of Egypt as a discrete or distinct political unit increased over the forty years of British Occupation surveyed, yet fatally little genuine cultural content had been articulated for that homeland in print or formal oratory by 1919. In cultural and intellectual endeavors, and in many of the supra-Egyptian interactions these entailed with other Arabs, the Kamilists and the Jaridists had journeyed a good deal further towards political as well as cultural pan-Arabism, whose crystallization in the 1920s Book 2 now proceeds to examine.
Muslims in contemporary bi-sectarian Egyptian patriotic community against Britain --- but could contribute over the long term to bi-sectarian pan-Arab nationality (application by 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, future Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, in the 1940s: B 229-230).

**Arab Nation's Pre-Islamic Arabian Origins**, al-Afghani and 'Abdulh in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa (1884) denigrated the pre-Islamic Arabians as cruel and barbarous, an in part religious habit of thought that he never shook off. To beat back the West, the pan-Islamists wanted indigenous military strength, strong states and literate rational civilization, which the pre-Islamic Arabians could not offer. However in 1887 'Abduh urged study of pre-Islamic Arabian culture, on the face of it to understand Islam. The Qur'an is "the source of the successes of the Muslims": modern Muslims therefore now had to study the preceding idioms, history, customs and modes of disputation of the Arabs, so as to respond to the Qur'an as had its first audience of Arabian shepherds and camel-drivers. Review of the Qur'an and earlier Islam for new purposes, and to bypass post-classical Sunni traditionalism and Sufi mysticism, would expose the Egyptian Muslim public to the pre-Islamic and early Arabians' (originally oral) poetry, linguistically so different.

In the school of al-Afghani, al-Nadim was closest to that commitment to the continuous nation (the classical Arabs) in all its periods of religious beliefs that leads to true linguistic nationalism. He had recourse to the pre-Islamic, as well as early Islamic, Arabs to ethically guide contemporary Egyptians, for example interactions between the sexes in new urban conditions of more nuclear families, freer mixing and anonymity. An Arabian "would travel and leave his wife at home; his neighbor would give her provisions and be the last of people to make advances to her ... because she was in his charge until the husband's return". al-Nadim's acceptance of pre-Islamic as well as early Islamic Arabs as still the model in ethics and

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103. al-Afghani kept on calling the pagan Arabians savages to Arab disciples even into the last period of his life in Constantinople after he went to live there in 1892: the Qur'an transformed the Arabs from "a condition of indescribable barbarism" so that within one and a half centuries of its revelation they ruled the world of that time, and politically and in knowledge, philosophy, industry and trade surpassed all the other nations on earth. al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani p. 58.


language suggested Arab identity’s substantial independence of Islam. A non-sectarian Arab successor-nation could have Christian as well as Muslim members. The Christian Syro-Egyptian Jurji Zaydan and the Muslim Egyptian Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i were simultaneously to idealize pre-Islamic Arabian ethics and language (Ch. 5).

One Syrian Christian tried to detach and extend the aspect of Arabism in al-Nadim’s anti-imperialist political nationalism. As he forwarded his subscription, the Syrian, a resident of Saint Petersburg, lauded "your Arab patriotic line [that you help] propagate among the speakers of the dad [Arabic]" because it disregarded "variation of the religions": now Arab unity can advance and withstand the attacks of all the types of enemies. The Christian correspondent undertook to "circulate your [unifying] magazine among both Muslims and Christians" in Russia. al-Nadim used the term al-Ummat al-‘Arabiyyah (the Arab Nation) to evoke a revered bygone classical entity rather than for a tightening contemporary community as the correspondent wanted, yet a shared sense of Arabness was clearly one motive why he published the letter. He also cited it to refute charges from Syrian Christian journalists and government officials collaborating with the British in Egypt that al-Ustadh was promoting "religious fanaticism or splitting the Eastern Word". Yet al-Nadim could not leap with the Syrian correspondent from (a) the unique worth of standard literary Arabic in all periods of history and of the Arab Nation in past history to (b) a contemporary "Arab nation" as the prime loyalty.

If this excellent individual had said that we were calling for the maintenance of the Eastern unity compromising Arabs, Persians, Turks, Circassians, Kurds, Armenians and others regardless of the differences of religion, he would have hit the mark. That is what we advocate, not the Arab league (al-jami'at al-‘Arabiyyah) on its own.

al-Ustadh, then, highlighted a classical Arab nation, Arab qualities and languages as a determinant in political communities and differentiated linguistic communities both within Egypt and in the Middle East. Yet, al-Nadim refused to draw the political conclusion of separate sovereignty-seeking nationalisms in the Middle East. His indigenous classical Arab golden age

106. Many of al-Nadim’s essays (although not his colloquial dramas or dramatic sketches) drew on the mature-classical ‘Abbasid hadī’ style or magamat. However, the much earlier pre-Islamic Arabs could also contribute to the style of modern Egyptians: he printed a prose letter from the pre-Islamic Arabian poet al-Nabighah al-Dhubyani appealing to ‘Amr Ibn Harith, King of Ghassan, to release captives from al-Nabighah’s tribe. al-Nadim glossed archaic words with footnotes. "Ghurar al-Kalam" (Classic Passages from Literature), Ramadan literary supplement to al-Ustadh 13 June 1893, pp. 30-32.

highlighted Islam as a dynamic of international strength; in contemporary history the Muslim East and Christian West were in life-and-death conflict: Turks and Arabs therefore had to unite with each other more in the 1890s. Later during British colonial rule, the party of Mustafa Kamil (initially al-Nadim’s disciple) would long refuse to extend its high culturist and historical Arabism into divisive political support for West Asian Arabs against Ottoman Turks (Chapter 5).

The classical period of the pan-Eastern system fostered Arab ethnic pride because it had been led by "the Arab race/folk" (al-jins al-'Arabi). For the post-classical period, however, the pan-Eastern unity that "the Arab race" originated would run against the crystallization of an Arab political nationality. al-Nadim wrote in a situation in which the Ottoman Turks governed some Arabs in West Asia and claimed authority over others in Egypt, the Sudan, Tunisia and Algeria. It was the disunity of the Easterners, increasing for four centuries past, that enabled Europeans to conquer them. The multiplying divisive "solidarities of race, language, religion and homeland" --- along with "selfish interests and personal power" --- split the pan-Eastern unity which had enabled the classical Arabs to beat Europe back. When his perspective was more international, al-Nadim thus opposed linguistic and geographical solidarities operating in his day that might eventually lead to an Arab political nationalism or political state (or smaller Arabic-speaking sub-nationalisms) within Islam’s belief-community. The integrated "Eastern" system once originated and led by Arabs now would strengthen the authority of non-Arab Turks over Arabs in the Ottoman state and general pan-Islamic political community.108

Ethnicity Within the Egyptian Homeland

al-Nadim in his magazine al-Tankit wal-Tabkit in 1881 depicted a young Egyptian, disembarking after four years study in Paris, who refused to embrace or kiss his father on the quay. "[I] am not the rural person. You sons of the Arabs [abna' al-'Arab] are like animals. Say bon arrive and shake hands". al-Nadim gave this story the title "'Arabi Tafarnaj" ("An Arab who got Europeanized")109. Ordinary Muslim Egyptians did not just speak Arabic but were themselves Arab. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa assailed Nubar Pasha, a non-Arabic-speaking Armenian

who held office as Prime Minister under British rule from 1884 - 1888, as "not a Muslim that he should have zeal to safeguard this religion, nor an Egyptian that he should be fired with regard for his homeland, nor an Arab that pride to protect his race/racial nationality (jins) would seize him" \(^{110}\). Parochial Egyptian ethnicity in that period perceived a combination of geography, religious belief and Arabness (language, descent) as defining Egypt’s majority indigenous ethnic community.

al-Nadim while underground following the British conquest encountered ongoing perception of distinct Arab-Egyptian and Turco-Circassian ethnic groups among Egyptian Muslims. His identity was discovered by a Circassian Army officer who, however, did not arrest him: "although I am Circassian in origin, I am Arab in chivalry (al-muru’ah) and in noble compassion for others (al-shahamah)" \(^{111}\). Prescriptive --- in origin pre-Islamic --- Arab virtues were to figure in the evolution of Arabism in the party of Mustafa Kamil (Ch. 5) and after the limited independence of 1922 (Ahmad Zaki Pasha, Ch. 8). al-Nadim repetitively used the terms "Arabs" and "Turks" in his lists of non-Western ethnic groups in Egypt: these had "the Copts" as another category while not otherwise mentioning Arabic-speaking Egyptians. For him, for his modern parochial Egyptian context, "Arabs" meant Muslim Egyptians whose mother tongue is Arabic. Language, then, profoundly influenced al-Nadim’s perception of the units in the Egyptian community of his time but in combinations with religions. His sense that race also contributed to define the ethnic communities only deepened his perception of Egypt’s Arabic-speaking Muslims as Arab because of the popular belief of some remote racial descent from incoming Arabs. But al-Nadim assumed that the Coptic community that maintained the Christian faith did not receive any Arab blood, and excluded them instinctively from the ethnic

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\(^{110}\) "al-Lurd Nurth Bruk, Hakim Misr al-Jadid" (Lord Northbrook, Egypt’s New Ruler), al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa, p. 375. Cf. "Jaridat al-Ahram" (The Newspaper al-Ahram), ibid p. 389 for a similarly-phrased attack on Nubar: the Muslims are there defined as the millah and the Arabs as the jins (racial nationality or ethnicity) from whose interests Nubar was alienated by his separate identity. Nubar Pasha Nubarian (1825-1899) was born outside Egypt in Smyrna, Izmir, Turkey. When he resigned from his third, last term as Prime Minister in 1895, he went to Paris for his retirement. Tignor sees Nubar as trying to delay the extension of British control after 1882, albeit to maintain his and his Turcophone clique’s authority and interests, not for nationalism. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882 - 1914 (Princeton University Press 1966) pp. 174-175. However, al-Nadim in 1882 placed among "the Egyptian pioneers" (al-Misriyyin al-’uwal) some multi-lingual Armenians such as Hekakyan who served in the earlier nineteenth century modernization initiated by Muhammad ‘Ali. al-Ustadh v. 1 p. 38.

\(^{111}\) Tawfiq, Abdallah al-Nadim p. 66.
category of the Arabs of Egypt\textsuperscript{112}.

al-Nadim in \textit{al-Ustadh}, then, sharply defined a multitude of plural ethnic groups or units in Egypt, even in the ranks of the believers in Islam\textsuperscript{113}. Allying the Egyptian independence movement to the restive Turco-Circassian Khedive 'Abbas, he used a cherishing tone in evoking the "Sons of the Turks" as distinct from "the sons of the Arabs"\textsuperscript{114}. His disciple Mustafa Kamil, long in need of funds, would carry forward this cooperation with parochial Turco-Circassians, checking Arabness. The Ummah Party-\textit{al-Jaridah} milieu would perceive parochial Sons of the Turks and Arabs more sourly (Ch. 6).

\textsuperscript{112} Discussing Muhammad 'Ali's provision of expanded government education to "the sons of Egypt" and that "the spark of love of learning and writing has lodged in the thoughts of the nation (al-ummah)", al-Nadim remarks that "all whom we see in administration nowadays, judges and clerks and ma'murs and mudirs and assistants (al-mu'awinin) be they Arabs, Turks, Circassians, Albanians, Copts, are the product of Egyptian schools and the native teachers from al-Azhar or the government school system". "al-Lughatu wal-Insha" (Language and Literary Composition), \textit{al-Ustadh} 11 October 1892, p. 177. al-Nadim praised Muhammad 'Ali because he "raised armies ... opened schools, taught the ignorant and appointed many Turks, Circassians, Albanians and Copts to the judiciary/administration (litawliyat il-ahkam)". "al-Murafa'atal-Wataniyyah --- Taqrir Ahl al-Khibrah" (The Legal Plea of the Homeland --- the Report of those with Experience) \textit{al-Ustadh} 11 October 1892, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{113} If racial ancestry conjoined with Islam and native speech to determine Arabness in Egypt, it was usually a millennium-old provenance. "We mean by the Egyptians every native, that is Arabs, Turks and Circassians. As regards the Arabs they lived with the Copts from the start of the Islamic conquest until now so that they have gone far into (became largely assimilated to) native [Egyptian] identity (fa tawagh1\textsuperscript{11}:halu fil-wataniyyah) from a remote period". "al-Jami'at al-Wataniyyah wal-Ikhtilat al-'Imrani", \textit{al-Ustadh}, 13 September, 1892, p. 79. Sometimes, "Arab" meant more recently-arrived Arabians when he distinguished the maximum number of micro-races in Egypt: Muhammad 'Ali "gathered many Turks, Circassians, Albanians, Moreans (al-Muraliyyah) and a group (fariqan) of the Arabs and of the Egyptians in the variety of their religions and he made the aggregate a single nation". "Haluna Amsi wal-Yawm" (Our Condition Yesterday and Today) \textit{al-Ustadh} 28 February 1893 pp. 645-7.

\textsuperscript{114} For al-Nadim, rather less than lineage or race, the language of daily speech, in particular in the household, determined the individual's ethnic group within Egypt. Foreign schools inflicted divisive multi-lingualization within elite Muslim families: yet this sharpened his awareness of the division between Turco-Circassian and Arab Egyptians, also. Zakiyyah: "Is not the man you will marry a son of the Arabs or a son of the Turks? ... Then learn the Arabic or Turkish in which the people of our land talk to us. As for the man who would desert his language and speak to his wife in French or English when he is the son of the Arabs or Turks, he shows little taste, knowing that we daughters of the East are not French or English, to address us in their tongue". "Madrasat al-Banat" (A Girls' School), \textit{al-Ustadh} 10 November 1892 p. 246. al-Nadim defined "the Turks" and "the Circassians" as as much Egyptian as "the Arabs" --- ie. Muslim Egyptians who were native Arabic-speakers. "As regards the Turks, although they settled later than the Arabs, they ... have resided [in Egypt] from father to son down successive generations until they forgot their country. If one of them returned to it he would be a foreigner because of all the time that has passed ... The most recently settled would have buried his father in Egypt and himself been born among its natives ... All of this enterprising race of high aspiration are indigenous Egyptians, distinct from the others only in maintaining their language which they take from their parents. The three categories [of Muslim Egyptians: Arabs, Turks and Circassians] are united together by the religious community even more strongly than by the bond of shared homeland". "al-Jami'at al-Wataniyyah...", \textit{al-Ustadh} 13 September 1892 p. 79.
Languages and the Evolution of Nationalities

A dominant, expanding race can absorb other races, itself somewhat changing in the process. A world religion such as Islam can provide a framework within which the dominant race's amalgamation with (but cultural assimilation of) other races takes place. He was conscious that concurrently with the expansions of Islam in Africa and Asia and "parts" of Europe, "the Arabs mixed/intermarried with the Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, Turks, [Byzantine] Greeks, Goths, and some Italians and French, Sudanese, the Abyssinians, the Indians, the Uigurs and others". Strengthened by a unifying religion, a new distinct "Arabized" jins (race/people) resulted, no members of which had any racial loyalty to external entities. Issues of linguistic and social survival once faced by the classical Arabs decisively corroborated for al-Nadim those streams of West European nationalism that identified language, more than static homelands, as the crucial determinant of political communities.

Ancient struggles of the classical Arabs to maintain their integral language in the oceans of non-Arab subjects could offer intense linguistic consciousness with which to resist threats to classical Arabic under the British. al-Nadim now, in the early 1890s, was installing in the confused acculturated youth --- the core now forming for the coming elite --- juxtapositions that were to last. He made Arab leaders of classical Islam, dead for 1000 years, speak in their own words to the issues of language with which colonialism and modern functions confronted youth such as Mustafa Kamil. Mighty classical Caliphs, but also the grammarians they encouraged to codify Arabic against change, now focussed resistance to imperialists in language. al-Nadim's fusion of (a) grammarians and classical written language with (b) political Caliphs with (c) new resistance to imperialism, defined continuity of Arabic as an essence of sovereignty --- to 1918 a stance of both the independence movement launched by his disciple Kamil and, less sustainedly,

in the Ummah-al-Jaridah milieu. Also to last in these and other acculturated-modernist Egyptian groups was al-Nadim’s portrayal of the classical Islamic leaders’ sense of (mainly linguistic but also somewhat physical) difference from non-Arabs (the Caliph ’Ali); classical Islam would henceforth legitimize symbiotic blending of religion and Arab ethnicity for West-modified Egyptians. In al-Nadim’s writings of the early 1890s, classical Arab-Muslim figures already tilted national identity for colonized Egyptians away from territoriality to an ethnic orientation for which the language actually used determines nationality. He cited ’Ali and the more profane (Umayyad-appointed governor) Ziyad Ibn Abihi to guide the Arabic-speaking Egyptians of his day to ward off the influx of “alien” European words into “our written and oral communications ... our formal/official and colloquial speech.”

al-Nadim’s observations of modern European national movements increased his tendency to perceive history (including contemporary Egypt’s) in terms of language conflicts between fluid, incorporative linguistic nationalities. Many nations (umam) temporarily subjected by more powerful nations had yet maintained their separate languages which later resurrected them to independence. Had such nations abandoned their languages for that of the nationality ruling them, they would have merged with it into a single nation. al-Nadim cited as examples “the Turks, the Persians, the Greeks, Spain, Rumania, Portugal, the Bulgars.” Change of languages changes a given population’s nationality. The passing of power from (a) the classical Arabs to (b) Persians and Turks validly expressed the continuing separate nationalities the latter maintained when they refused to adopt alien Arabic. That the Persians and Turks became Muslim following their encounter with the Arabs but still regained “independence” (political

116. al-Nadim affectionately listed classical grammarians who labored to record hitherto orally-transmitted Arabian literature and formulate phonetic and grammatical rules to save pure Arabic from “collapse” in face of the non-Arabian majority’s impact in the Islamic Empire. He associated early religious Arabian leaders with them: the fourth pious or “Rightly Guided” Caliph ’Ali Ibn Abi Talib “the Commander of the Faithful”, in early Islam gave the pioneer grammarian Abul-Aswad al-Du’ili --- putative founder of the Basrah school of Arabic grammarians --- a sheet setting out the rules for pronunciation and grammar of “the first Arabs”. The Caliph ’Ali wanted to reverse a linguistic situation where, he reportedly said, “the speech of the Arabs has become corrupted through mixing with this red-faced multitude” of non-Arabs (al-hamra’). al-Nadim, “al-Lughatu wal-Insha’ al-Ustadh 11October1892 pp. 170-172.

117. Ibid p. 178. ’Abbasid historiography had depicted the Umayyads as secular usurpers after the Rashidi (Rightly Guided) Caliphs. In addition to the Caliph ’Ali, venerated by Sunni as well as Shi’i Muslims, al-Nadim presented Ziyad, governor of al-Basrah under the machiavellian Mu’awiyyah (first Umayyad Caliph, r. 661-680) as also promoting Abul-Aswad’s initiation of the classical grammar and linguistics, as the means to preserve prescriptive standard Arabic. Ibid.

power?) shows the potential in al-Nadim’s writings for more secular political communities constituted on other bases as well as religious belief among the Muslims. al-Nadim was aware of deep conflict between European nationalities such as the British and French, expressed in violence and war\textsuperscript{119}. Some European nationalist movements he knew, however, only bore out his Arabo-Islamic tradition’s association of languages with religious communities. Language forms with religion "the two great fundamentals": by holding fast to both against Turkey during the five centuries of her rule, Serbs, Bulgars, Montenegrins and Rumanians assured their future independence\textsuperscript{120}. al-Nadim was particularly conscious of the role that the Christian religion played as a basis of personality that made possible Greek independence from Turkish rule. Here again, though, the religion and the literary language were one since al-Nadim misconceived the Christians’ "Gospel" (al-Injil) as, parallel with the Arabic Qur’an, "revealed in the Greek language". Although Turkish was not a scriptural language of Islam, al-Nadim thus argued that if the Greeks had abandoned their original (religious) language they would have become not merely "Turks" but "Muslims by virtue of the language", never to recover independence\textsuperscript{121}. al-Nadim thus depicted all languages not as neutral communication instruments but as pervaded by the content of the particular religions predominant among those who spoke them. His theories about languages, religions and national identities paid little regard to Egypt’s great Coptic minority, integration of which required religion-neutral culture or plural cultures in the shared Arabic. al-Nadim’s sense of nationality as something that could change with a change of language, and that religion or the change of religion could reinforce or disrupt such functions of language, offered elements for the racially open-ended, incorporative way that Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam were to characterize the Arab national community in the 1930s and 1940s (Chs. 9 and 10).

120. Wendell, Evolution p. 157. Given Egypt’s historical links to the Turks, al-Nadim was particularly conscious of the development of political nationality among marginal European peoples under Ottoman rule. He also had a broad awareness of the death, through amalgamation, of various nationalities in West Europe where conflict had been linguistic without the religious polarization between Christianity and Islam of the first category. The assimilation of the originally Germanic Normans when they learnt French was one such warning to Egyptians. "Tarbiyat al-Abna’" (Educating New Generations), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 204.
Classical Arabic: Focus for Resistance Against the British

al-Nadim and al-Ustadh were the prototype for the galvanizing psychosis about the survival of classical Arabic to be whipped up by the acculturated independence movement of Mustafa Kamil (1874 - 1908). Kamil in formative first youth was al-Nadim’s disciple.

There was certainly a wide gap between the language of literature that the Arabic Qur’an had defined a thousand years before and the grammatically simplified dialects that al-Nadim’s countrymen spoke in their daily lives. He thought that the British and other imperialistic Christians singled out the vulnerable crucial standard Arabic for attack, in order to destroy the Egyptians’ nationality and religion, and thus incapacitate them from further resistance. The use of French, English etc as mediums of education and government, and the influx of European terms for the objects of modern life into everyday colloquial Arabic, threatened Islam’s survival. Because it was impossible to translate the God-revealed Qur’an, Egyptians could retain access to it only if all areas of their lives maintained their general grasp of classical Arabic. The miraculous Arabic Qur’an was "the target of everyone fighting the language and endeavoring to destroy it". Even if circumstances and the needs of modernization forced them to use European languages widely, Egyptians should still maintain Arabic as the medium of their own dealings.

122. al-Nadim, while striving to politicize the semi-literate urban poor and women with some colloquial dialogues in al-Ustadh, alertly courted the new generation of Muslim Egyptian youth now receiving higher education under the Occupation. al-Ustadh in early 1893 noted Kamil’s editorship of the school magazine al-Madrasah and his production of student plays, mainly on ancient non-Egyptian Arab subjects; al-Nadim became the responsive young nationalist’s mentor and instructor. Tawfiq, ’Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 213, 217; al-Ustadh 28 February 1893 p. 666 and 28 March 1893 pp. 759 - 760. He advised Kamil to avoid conflict with the Khedive, which had so contributed to his own and the ‘Urabists’ downfall and to the post-1882 British rule. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919” in P.M. Holt (ed), Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic, (London, Oxford University press, 1968), pp. 311 - 312. At its inception, Kamil recognized his new movement’s continuity with the preceding generations of West-aware but non-acculturated pan-Islamists. In 1894, while in Paris to activate the Egyptian community and to lobby Europeans to make Britain evacuate the Nile Valley as promised, Kamil telegraphed a report to the now old Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, languishing in forced retirement in Istanbul under ’Abdul-Hamid. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil in Welt des Islams IV, 1956, p. 247 fn. Wendell saw the emotionalist vehemence of Kamil’s denunciations of the British imperialist enemy as a continuation of al-Afghani’s outlook and style. Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 245.

123. Expressed eg. in cautious terms by al-Nadim in an article assailing the proposal by Sir William Willcocks to make colloquial Egyptian Arabic Egypt’s literary language, in place of the classical. This proposal to "achieve the death of the language of the Qur’an" revealed to all Egyptians "a secret of the secrets of Europe" previously known only to "those concerned with the study of Europe’s aims in the East", al-Nadim was concerned in the article to present al-Ustadh as a "scholarly/scientific" (’ilmiyyah) rather than political journal. “Bab al-Lughah” (Language Section), al-Ustadh 30 January 1893 pp. 475-477. Sir William Willcocks (1852-1932), the British civil engineer who designed the first Aswan dam completed in 1902, had come to Egypt from India in 1883 to work in the Egyptian Public Works Department. EB (15 ed) Mic.
and literature --- and restore it as the medium for West-patterned modern education --- "for the survival of the religion and race [or nationality: jins]". The influx of loan-words conveying chemistry and other modern sciences from European languages into Arabic was producing a younger generation, neither Egyptian nor foreigners, who were concocting a bizarre new composite language without grammatical rules. If this became dominant "it would be hard for the future generations of descendants of [today's] Muslims to know their religion or their Scripture because of the need of a translator to translate the Arabic in that case".

al-Nadim proposed that leading Azharite ulama' and teachers conversant with foreign languages form a society to invent Arabic equivalents of the Western medical, chemical and engineering terms entering the elite's spoken Arabic. He conducted an acrimonious controversy with the Syrian-Christian al-Hilal which refused to accept proposed Arabic-Semitic coinings to replace such European loan-words as "advocate", "numero", "telephone" and "balcony".

The monolingual al-Nadim hoped to enlist in the enterprise to extend Arabic out to convey and cover all modern life precisely those educated classes with the best knowledge of the European languages to be replaced.

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124. *Ibid* p. 469-470. Very old Islamic emotions fed al-Nadim's sense that "language is the emblem that makes nationality cohere and preserves it", and that a society accordingly should be established to revive and extend Arabic. But the imposition of totality native languages in European states also fueled his demands that classical Arabic cover all modernity: "they bring out all textbooks in the language used in their homeland: you find no Frenchman who learns through English, or Greek in German or Austrian who learns in Russian". The exception to particularity was certain standard Latin and Greek terms used in all those national languages. *"Tarbiyat al-Abna'"*, al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 pp. 203-204.

125. *"al-Lughatu wal-Insha'"* pp. 182-183. al-Nadim was equally alert to (a) atomized Western linguistic diffusion in broader social interactions and that (b) in a more exclusionist way, the foreign languages were coming to monopolize modern specialized structures and functions: those of theoretical and applied sciences most strikingly. Thus, he objected that all subjects in the School of Agriculture (except Mathematics) were being taught in English. *"al-Zira'ah fi Misr"* (Agriculture in Egypt), al-Ustadh 21 February 1893, p. 628. He listed over three pages of al-Ustadh European loan words for chemical substances: mufin, Oksayd al-Potassium etc. *"al-Lughatu wal-Insha'"* pp. 180-183. On the other hand, he as inventively applied his classicist high culturism to cut out the more casual Western linguistic atoms multiplying in the new acculturated elite's off-duty, colloquial socializations. al-Nadim argued that bakh should replace "bravo" because "the most eloquent of the eloquent" Muhammad exclaimed bakh bakh to express admiration at a Qur'anic verse. He urged Egyptians to replace Bon Jour and Bon Soir with the ancient pre-Islamic 'Im Sabahan and 'Im Mas'an. *"Mujtama' al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah bi-Misr"* (The Society for the Arabic Language in Egypt), al-Ustadh 7 March 1893 p. 678.


127. *"Mujtama'..."* pp. 675-680. al-Nadim wanted the school teachers and members of a forthcoming Egyptian parliament to propagate the neologisms to be coined by the Arabic Language Society. *Ibid*.
Language: al-Nadim’s Attitudes to Ottoman Turks and to Arabs in Ottoman West Asia

As editor of al-Ustadh, al-Nadim was a pan-Islamist intent to strengthen the Ottoman State as a core for political sovereignty and strength of the world’s Muslims. Yet in registering the Turkish language’s development of an official status in Egypt, he was as hostile to the Ottoman State as to Europe’s imperialism. Before Muhammad 'Ali’s seizure of power in Egypt "the use of the Turkish language in official communications" had brought literary Arabic to "its death gasp". By imposing Turkish as the language of administration upon "all the Arab lands", and appointing Turkish officials, the Ottoman State forced "the native population" to learn the Turkish language for dealings with the "rulers". Had it not been for al-Azhar, (literary) Arabic would have totally died out128. (al-Nadim’s complaints that the Ottoman State suppressed Arabic as a medium of even primary school education anticipated similar themes of later, twentieth century, Arab nationalists in Ottoman West Asia, the Araboid Jaridist acculturateds before 1914 [Ch. 6] and the more radical Egyptian pan-Arabs who by the 1940s had led stubbornly pan-Islamic Egyptians to finally support the West Asian Arabs’ revolt against the Turks)129. The 'Alid dynasty’s gradual restoration of Arabic as the medium of administration and modernizing Arabic-medium education remarkably revived the language130. In 1892, al-Nadim appealed to the Ottoman Sultan to open primary schools in villages that would teach through the medium of either Arabic or Turkish --- whichever was the predominant local vernacular. Some Turks, Circassians and Kurds should be taught through Arabic to equip them to communicate with the populations of Arab provinces to which they would be sent as administrators131. al-Nadim in 1891 in exile had interacted with Jaffa’s literati and 'ulama'132: now, in 1892, he depicted Turks

129. For the anger of Muslim Arabs educated in the Ottoman modern-stream schools and colleges of Lebanon-Syria see Amin Sa’id, Thawrat al-'Arab fil-Qarn al-'Ishrin (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal n.d. --- 1960?) p. 7 and Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Falsafat al-Ta’rikh al-'Uthmani: Asbab Inhitat al-Imbiraturiyat al-'Uthmaniyyah wa Zawaliha (Bayrut: Farajallah 1954) p. 188. The Egyptian Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, a pioneer of more unitary Egyptian pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s, in 1953 charged that the Ottoman Turks "expelled the Arabic language from the offices of state, even from the courts of the Islamic law, and used Turkish in education, even in the lessons of [Arabic] grammar". "al-Adab wal-Thawrah" (Literature and [Arab] Revolution), one in a 1953 series of radio talks, in Wahy al-Risalah v. 4 (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr 1966) p. 266.
132. For al-Nadim’s interactions with Islamic 'ulama' and sufi mystics in Jaffa, Nabulus and Jerusalem, and his pilgrimages to shrines associated with prophets in Palestine, see Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 76-77. al-Nadim kept up his links with the scholars of Jaffa after his return to Egypt. He reported to Egyptians the death of al-Sayyid Sa’id al-Dajjani al-Husayni, surveying such works of Sa’id as his diwan of verses and his critical
ruling West Asia’s Arabs disorientedly and not justly promoting Arabic where it was the popular speech. However, he made such critical remarks in order to suggest procedures to strengthen the multi-national Muslim Ottoman state.

The centrality of language in al-Nadim’s understanding of political community could have influenced him to stand with early Arab ethnic dissatisfaction in the Ottoman Empire. However, the powerlessness and colonization Egyptians were suffering as al-Nadim brought out al-Ustadh made him emotionally need to defend any remaining sovereign Muslim state --- and Egypt’s self-interest ran against any weakening of the Ottoman central government that could permit British power to spread out in the region. Resident Europeans were multiplying: he saw waning commitment to the Ottoman State as part of the dangerous Europeanization of the new Muslim-Egyptian elite developing under British rule. He analyzed the challenges facing the Ottoman Empire with empathic realism. It was weak militarily because it lacked rail communications and economically because it lacked perennially-flowing rivers: its agriculture was thus at the mercy of irregular rainfall. Outside Christian powers could exploit the Empire’s religious and linguistic diversity to destroy it. Religion, anti-Islamic Christianity, was the motive of the European states’ drives to dismember it: it is the sole Islamic power among fifteen Christian states. “The men of Europe” unceasingly promoted unrest and revolt among those populations in the Ottoman State with affinity of creed or race to them.

Given the structure of international relations in the early 1890s, then, religious and anti-imperialist solidarity with the Turks overrode al-Nadim’s perceptions that they were linguistically non-Arab and constricted the Arabic language of the West Asian Arabs. And in the 1890s the immemorial identification of Arabic with Islam built an Arabic component into the literary languages of Muslim Persians and Turks. At that stage of the development of Muslim

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134. Examination of hadiths about the \textit{isra} and \textit{mi’raj} (night-ascent of the Prophet Muhammad). al-Nadim, “Ritha’ wa ‘Aza’” (Elegy and Consolation), al-Ustadh 15 November 1892 pp. 311-312.

135. al-Ustadh 17 January 1894, quoted Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu’asir (Bayrut: Dar al-Irshad 1970) pp. 21-22. al-Nadim was alert to signs of modernization under 'Abdul Hamid: in 1893 he hailed the Sultan’s increased provision of modern primary schools in villages as well as towns --- no Caliphs before him had attempted his drive to “universalize compulsory education”, a precondition to develop a modern commerce and agriculture. He also referred to 'Abdul-Hamid's reclamation of long-disused lands, especially in such Arab areas as al-Karak and the Hawran: the Ottoman government resettled Cherkis, Kurds and Arabs in such underpopulated areas, where it provided them with agricultural implements. "Mahasinu Amir al-Mu‘minin, Ayyadullah!” (The Virtues of the Commander of the Faithful, God Strengthen Him!), al-Ustadh 2 May 1893 pp. 866-9. For the resettlement of the Cherkis refugees by 'Abdul-Hamid, see fn 35.
nationalities, commitment to developing Arabic could still seem to Egyptians to be a common enterprise that united Arabs, Turks and Persians. al-Nadim thus had the illusion that the rulers of "the Eastern nations", generally, would promote the coming Arabic language academy of (a) Azhar scholars and (b) educationalists who combined their native Arabic or Turkish with European languages. He thought that its pure Arabic neologisms to replace European engineering, medical and chemical terms would also be adopted in other Muslim languages --- (Cf. Ahmad Zaki Pasha even in 1925: B 82-83)³⁴.

The Turkish language had a real presence in urban Egypt in the 1890s as the minority ethnic culture of the Turco-Circassians. Arab Egyptians had a multiple linguistic, aesthetic, intellectual and religious relationship with Arab elites under Turkish rule that would be the strongest once fully activated. Yet perceived or potential cultural links to Turks, the solidarity of religion, and Egypt’s political interests and anti-imperialism for the time held Arabist Muslim Egyptian political activists in an almost confederal pan-Islamic political community with the Turks of the capital Istanbul more than with the Arabs in the Ottoman provinces. For a long time this pattern was to hold with the pan-Islamic independence movement of Mustafa Kamil that al-Nadim first triggered.

The Syrian Christians

For many Egyptians under British rule, then, Islam and international conflicts interwove and blurred relations with Ottoman Arabs and Ottoman Turks. The Arabic-speaking Syrian Christian minority in Egypt, however, because it was non-Muslim separated Arabic as a determinant of community from Islam, and tested how much strength it could command on its own in the 1890s.

Syrian Christians had been migrating into Egypt from the rule of Muhammad Ali. Many had been educated through Western languages at missionary institutions in Syria --- access to

134. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha’... p. 180. al-Ustadh publicized the Persian magazine Hikmat, edited by Dr Muhammad Mahdi al-Tabrizi on behalf of Irano-Egyptians. al-Ustadh 11 October 1892 p. 191. al-Ustadh was well aware of the earlier writings of Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1860-1934), after 1922 the "Shaykh of Arabism", noting that he had devoted his youth to bringing out beneficial translations from French. Notice on Zaki’s translation Misr wal-Jighrafiyah on geographical activity and works promoted by Egypt’s ’Alid dynasty: "Taqariz" (Eulogies), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 216. Even Zaki’s translations from French were often on classical Arab subjects: list, Daghir Masadir p. 424.
modernity that al-Nadim knew Egypt needed. SC intellectuals played the main role in founding the independent Arabic press in Egypt prior to Britain’s 1882 occupation. al-Afghani inspired his Syrian Christian disciple Adib Ishaq to bring out the key constitutionalist newspapers Misr (from 1877) and al-Tijarah (founded 1878) from Alexandria: al-Nadim in his early nationalist career published in both\textsuperscript{135} Pre-1882 constitutionalism focussed parochial ethnic sourness and conflict between (a) Turco-Circassians and (b) (Arab) "Egyptians", most sharply in the armed forces. Separate languages distinguished the two groups, and common Arabic enabled immigrant Christian Syrians to contribute to the still-fluid Egyptian national concepts: the Syrian writer Salim al-Naqqash first sloganized "Egypt for the Egyptians". The recent collaboration still led al-Afghani and 'Abduh in 1884 to bracket such Syrian and Muslim Egyptians within a contemporary Arab entity. When Ishaq died, al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa lamented that "Time’s inevitable misfortune untimely snatched away the adornment of the Arabs and the flower of literature, our close friend Adib Effendi Ishaq"\textsuperscript{136}. As the British consolidated their rule in Egypt, though, this earlier acceptance came under strain. Some Syrian Christians served the British as petty clerks, intelligence agents --- or in Arabic newspapers that propagandized for the Occupation, notably Faris Nimr and his British-subsidized daily al-Muqattam, launched in 1888\textsuperscript{137}. al-Nadim, in al-Ustadh, wavered between (a) denial that collaborationist Syrian individuals were representative (other SC

\textsuperscript{135} Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 140. Although it was Ishaq who set up Misr in 1877 at al-Afghani’s request, Salim al-Naqqash proceeded to edit it: the two SCs again launched al-Tijarah together. In this pre-British period, Adib Ishaq and ‘Abdallah al-Nadim were both members of the Misr al-Fatat secret society that brought out a paper bearing its name from 1879. Dr ‘Abd al-Latif Hamzah, Adab al-Maqalat al-Suhufiyyah fi Misr v. 2 (Cairo: 2nd ed. Dar al-Fikr al-' Arab 1957) p. 11. al-Nadim’s awarding of status of honorary Egyptian to Ishaq in 1893: fn 81. For an overview of the West-transformed Ishaq’s anti-imperialist and therefore Ottomanist stance, along with the proto-pan-Arabism, Houmani, Arabic Thought pp. 195-6. Thomas Philipp extrapolated sectarian tensions between al-Nadim and other Muslim Egyptian radicals and SC intellectuals like Adib within pre-1882 Araboid Egyptian protest Constitutionalism. Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt, 1725 - 1975 (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag 1985) pp. 102-4.

\textsuperscript{136} al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 240. Adib Ishaq’s adaption of old classical forms of the Arabic language for his very anti-traditional --- and, indeed, sometimes frankly post-religious --- writings also led Christian Lebano-Syrian writers to characterize him and the wider modern community he served in similar Araboid ways. Iskandar al-'Azar (1855-1916) elegized him as "the model that inspired us in mannered rhetoric and ... devotion to Humanity ... He was the flower of literature in Syria and the sweet-basil of the Arabs in Egypt". Daghir, Masadir v. 2 p. 113. al-'Azar was on the fringes of Arab ethnicist dissidence in the Ottoman Empire, including that from the Hijazi sharif Husayn in the lead-up to his 1916 uprising against the Turks.

\textsuperscript{137} al-Nadim in 1893 exploited the post-religious or anti-religious connotations of SC scientism to get at al-Muqattam’s Cromer-subsidised Syrian Christian editors while sidestepping British attempts to make nationalists look anti-Christian: see fn. 81.
intellectuals fostered resistance to the British and recovery of the Arab past\(^{138}\) and (b) rejection of the Syrian Christian immigrant community. In both stances, though, he affirmed that common Arabness prescribed unity between Muslim Egyptians and Syrian Christians\(^{139}\).

Whether or not resident Syrian Christians and Egyptian Muslims united would affect the Egyptian territorial nation's interests (decolonization). Unlike such quasi-particularists as Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid later, however, al-Nadim did not pursue incorporation of Egypt-resident Syrians into an exclusive patriotic Egyptian nation framed by the homeland. For him in 1892 - 1894, more at stake in the tensions was the supra-Egyptian pan-Arab community of common language and race that spanned and could negate the territorial units in the (Middle) "East". The wide unity of "the Easterners" to beat off Europe and coordinate assimilation of its strength-conferring civilization could validate plurality of nations: al-Nadim mentions Indians and Afghans as well as Egyptians, Arabs and Turks all in unison facing the West. To argue away the division between Egyptians and Syrian Christians in Egypt, however, he virtually denied plurality of territorial or racial nationality for the narrower Arabo-Islamic East. "The Egyptians and the Syrians (al-Shamiyyin) and al-'Arab [here = "Arabians"] are united by the community of language and [Ottoman] authority for all of them, of religion" (Islam) "for most of

\(^{138}\) In 1893, al-Nadim counselled Egyptians not to hate this people/race (jins) with which Egyptians had mingled from ancient times because of a few traitors or hypocrites: the SC-edited al-Ahram was as "Eastern" (anti-British) as al-Ustadhahs were the SC al-Ittihad and al-Mahrusah. Ordinary Egyptians should not stop subscribing to such SC-edited newspapers merely because one (al-Mugattam) praised the foreigners and attacked Egypt's aspirations and leaders (=Khedive "Abbas"). "Hanafi wa Nadim", al-Ustahd 28 February 1893 pp. 663-4. al-Ustahd published a tribute on the death of Salim Taqla, one of al-Ahram's editors, describing the paper as "patriotic" (=anti-British) and loved by Egyptians because it had served "the East". "Ritha'" (Elegy), al-Ustahd 23 August 1892 pp. 15 - 16. "Our friend" Bisharah Taqla presented al-Nadim with a volume of elegies to his dead brother Salim. "Hadiyyah" (A Present) al-Ustahd 30 May 1893 pp. 984. al-Nadim publicized the first number of al-Hilal, edited by SC Jurji Zaydan, that was to project the wide classical Arab past and apply pan-Arab identity to bracket and merge Egypt and Syria, legitimizing the presence of non-Muslim Syro-Egyptians. "al-Hilal", al-Ustahd 30 August 1892 pp. 42-43.

\(^{139}\) al-Nadim did not in his tributes to Salim Taqla specify Arabness as the connection. He did, though, when the resident Syrian Christian Shibli Shumayyil proposed that the dialects of Arabic be developed into separate literary languages: with deep hurt, al-Nadim reminded him that it was his modernist and literary writings in the classical that had made him popular among "the Sons of the Arabs" in Egypt and Syria, "his people". "Bab al-Lughah" ([Arabic] Language Section), al-Ustahd 3 January 1893 pp. 474. In such transitional passages, the classical Arabs and their language were getting close to entailing a contemporary Arab community that spans plural homelands like Egypt and (Greater) Syria and overrides the Christian-Muslim divide. Even one of al-Nadim's angriest denunciations against SC collaborators described the SC collaborators as tasting a morsel dipped in the blood of their own race (jins) --- very intimate terminology that in that spasm had already "become a kind of pan-Arabism" (Wendell). "Law Kuntum Mithlana...", al-Ustahd 17 January 1893 pp. 530 - 532; Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 157 - 158. Such early Arab bonding is minimized in James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860 - 1914", The Muslim World v. LXX (1980) nos 3-4 pp. 249 - 250.
them and race for the majority of them, and contiguity which in aggregate render them effectively a single homeland". Race could not divide (resident Christian) Syrians and Egyptians because the two groups had mixed and lived together and intermarried following mutual conquests for so long a time as to virtually make the race (jins) of the two areas’ populations one.

al-Nadim in the earlier 1890s, then, articulated elements for pan-Arab identity strong enough to match homeland but which did not yet do so because of situations.

Religion. al-Nadim did not in al-Ustadh identify religion as a factor influencing Muslim Egyptians’ attitudes to Syrian Christians. On the other hand, he showed sensitive awareness of the insecurity that any member of a religious minority feels about the survival of his/her religion, reassuring the resident Syrians that there was no danger to their Christianity from Egypt’s Muslim majority. "The community of religion (jami‘at al-din) compelled" those Syrian Christians who collaborated with the British, although that alliance with the occupiers brings only "humiliation" in contrast to the "dignity" (al-izz) that a common patriotic struggle for independence offers. It could be objected here that the Syrian Christians in standing with their (imperial) British coreligionists only acted rather naturally in terms of al-Nadim’s repeated recognition that religion could sustain wide international political solidarities of linguistically disparate nations against a nation of another religion so long as it threatened one of their number.

al-Nadim had interacted in depth with Christian (and Samaritan) as well as Muslim "Syrians" during his exile in Palestine. Syrian writers blended archaic classicist Arabic

140. "A Tataqallab al-Umam bi-Taqallub al-Ahwal wa Nahnu Nahnu?", al-Ustadh 20 December 1892 p. 420. Although racially fused, contiguous Arabia, Syria and Egypt were not racially homogeneous: al-Nadim referred to some "Arabian lands (al-aradi al-'Arabiyyah) in which racial half-castes have no place". Ibid. The meaning "Arabia" for al-aradi al-'Arabiyyah here would anticipate the usage of the party of Mustafa Kamil, originally al-Nadim’s disciple: cf. "al-Bilad al-'Arabiyyah" (The Arabian Lands) by "Lover of the [Ottoman] State" in al-Liwa’ 10 July 1904 p. 1, denouncing Wahhabis in Najd. Both al-Nadim and the Kamilists later, though, also used such phrases to indicate the wide-extending Arab lands, including Egypt. al-Nadim: the Ottoman State "imposed its authority over all the Arab lands" (al-buldan al-'Arabiyyah). "al-Lughatu wal-Insha’", al-Ustadh 11 October 1892 p. 176.


142. As the relations of Muslim Egyptians and the resident Syrian Christians deteriorated, al-Nadim retained fond memories of the hospitality that Christians as well as Muslims had shown him during his period of exile in Jerusalem and Jaffa. "A’da’ al-Suriyyin" (The Enemies of the Syrians), al-Ustadh 23 May 1893 p. 933. In late 1892, al-Nadim published an encomium to his magazine, written in the pseudo-'Abbasid rhymed prose that he favored, from Jabali al-Samiri ("the Samaritan") of the Palestinian town of Nabulus. The tribute thanked al-Nadim
with rebellion against traditional elites and "ancient customs" in regard, for instance, to the position of women --- with al-Ustadh one of their forums. But a whole complex of political objectives and needs preoccupying Egyptians in that period for the time blocked or subordinated the crude trans-Arab community emotions that al-Nadim and other Egyptians felt towards non-Muslim Fertile Crescent Arabs. al-Nadim’s Arab racial-linguistic nationhood transposed some motifs about wide classical Arabs into his discussion of the contemporary resident Syrians but he usually stopped one step short of terming the latter, or the contemporary Egyptians with whom they should rebuild relationship, "Arabs". Only one or two odd passages in al-Ustadh objected to sniping against the Ottoman Empire from emigre Syrian Christian journalists: this was to alienate acculturated Kamilist pan-Islamists from the minority much more in the twentieth century.

Proto-Particularist Motifs

Twentieth century particularism has stressed the homeland, Egypt, as the secular definant that under Islam continued to separate an Egyptian nation from other Muslims and Arabic-speakers. During the British occupation, in contrast, al-Afghani, 'Abduh and al-Nadim most often solidified the resistance of Egyptians around religious, historic and linguistic themes that would foster Arab or Islamic communities extending far beyond Egypt. Proto-particularist concerns towards which these older pan-Islamists occasionally lurched, however, included: territorial homelands, awareness of the problem of division between the sects in the single homeland, and that the homeland-framed nation’s Muslims have some continuity with a pre-Islamic pagan civilization.

and the magazine for "diffusing his fields of knowledge among the two peoples, the Egyptian and the Syrian, so as to enlighten people’s thoughts and bring people who are far removed from each other together in communication and to reconcile those who are at odds with one another". The letter of this non-Muslim Samaritan mentioned "Eastern Unity", not Arab. al-Nadim noted that he had written an unprecedented book surveying the Samaritans’ religion, customs and history: he had collected the materials from their priests during his recent exile in Ottoman West Asia. The British were not to allow al-Nadim enough time back in Egypt to publish this now lost work, as he promised, in al-Ustadh. "Taqariz" (Tributes), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 216.

143. al-Ustadh published a defence of the Lebanese Sa’id al-Bustani’s novel Samir al-Amir. Set in Mount Lebanon, the melodrama condemned "ancient customs", and demanded free marriages across clan and class lines against the old jabal feudal aristocracy; however, al-Bustani couched his modernist, West-inspired message in archaist, neo-classicist high Arabic. "Riwayat Samir al-Amir" (The Novel Samir al-Amir), al-Ustadh 14 March 1893 pp. 723 - 727.

144. For an example of a crudely stated joint Arab nationhood between Muslim Egyptian Egyptian and SC intellectuals, see fn 139.
In an 1882 Calcutta address to a predominantly Muslim audience, al-Afghani sought to motivate them to acquire modern Western sciences by evoking the ancient (pre-Islamic, Hindu) Indians --- "the inventors of arithmetic and geometry" from whose vedas and shastras Roman and all later Western law derived. Addressing Egyptians in 1878 from the columns of Misr, al-Afghani refuted the arguments of India’s British rulers that the native population could not govern itself by describing the Indians as "the sons of Brahma and Mahadiv" who founded human laws when the British were savages. Continuity of Indians could reinforce for Egyptian audiences odd --- much thinner --- statements by al-Afghani (and the young 'Abduh) that the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians defined modern Egypt’s Muslims. Keddie highlighted an appeal by al-Afghani during unrest that finally culminated in 'Urabi’s revolt, to take inspiration from the ancient Egyptians who built the pyramids, and overthrow tyranny.

al-Afghani and 'Abduh occasionally opposed ill-feeling and disunity between Muslims and non-Muslims in both India and Egypt. In 1884, they tried to dispel in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa reports of tension between Muslims and Copts in the town of Jarja in Upper Egypt: they admitted, here, that communal fighting had occurred during the British conquest. Keddie painted al-Afghani as a precursor of the "composite" Indian nationalism of the early twentieth century, and of Egyptian particularism: both used a pagan antiquity to unite two sects. This is somewhat one-eyed in terms of her own data. al-Afghani made clear to readers of Misr in 1878 that only the extreme rapacity of the British made possible in India the anti-imperialist "alliance of sects ... holding such extremely opposite views that, under other circumstances, they would have gladly drunk one another’s blood". For him, the incompatibility inherent in Islam and Hinduism divided Indians. More than uniting Hindus and Muslim Indians for joint struggle,
al-Afghani’s images of a pagan antiquity adapted motifs about India from classical Arab-Islamic books to give Indian Muslims racial confidence that they could assimilate Western science and modernity to beat back imperialists. In post-1892 discourses in Istanbul, al-Afghani urged Arab Muslims and the Ottoman State to conduct Islamic instruction courses for illiterate syncretist Muslims in India to purge beliefs and practices they had borrowed from their "idolatrous" Hindu neighbors.

Nor did al-Afghani evoke Pharaonic antiquity to integrate Copts and Muslims in joint resistance to Britain. His 1878 denunciations of immemorial governmental oppression and foreign conquerors --- among whom he included the Muslim Arabs --- were meant to incite the masses against the Khedivial house of Muhammad 'Ali and were anti-monarchical or constitutionalist. Although not directed to the Muslim-Coptic division, such statements of al-Afghani --- and by 'Abduh prior to his decision to serve under the British in 1888 --- did suggest that Egyptians were some sort of collectivity continuous since the Pharaohs that had absorbed all conquerors in some sense. Neither offered data of Coptic participation in classical Arabo-Islamic civilization.

Considering their awareness that Coptic-Muslim conflict could help Britain strengthen her grip, it could not be said that al-Afghani and 'Abduh in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa structured their

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152. 'Aziz Ahmad, "Afghani’s Indian Contacts" pp. 476-504. Ahmad suggested as classical Arab sources of al-Afghani’s respect for classical Hindu-Sanskritic civilization al-Biruni’s Tahqiq ma lil-Hind and al-Jahiz’ Fakhr al-Sudan ‘alal-Bidan. Keddie’s own quotations identify archaic, classical Arab images that helped precondition al-Afghani to voice Sanskritophilia in India: "we can say that the Indians were the inventors of arithmetic and geometry", adopted by the Arabs and in turn transferred to Europe (1882 Calcutta speech). Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din p. 160.

153. al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani pp. 72-73. Garcin de Tassy noted in 1831 "numerous pilgrimages" by uneducated Indian Muslims "to the tombs of saintly personages of whom some are not even Muslims". Gustave Le Bon in the late nineteenth century noted that among the Indian Muslim common people "numerous saints are equally deified and confounded with the old divinities of the Brahmanical pantheon... Mahomet and the Musliman saints are deities of the same rank as the other Hindu deities. The ceremonies are mutually borrowed from the rites, and sometimes unite partisans, of diverse creeds." Quoted by Rabindra Narayan Ghose, "The Civilization of Northern India: A Contribution to the Study of Hindu-Muslim Relations --- III", Dawn Magazine (Calcutta) July 1911 pp. 114-115. Unfavorable images of Hindu caste stratification recurred over decades in the circles of al-Afghani’s Arab disciples: 'Abduh as Mufti of Egypt argued that Islam made perfection possible for all: it is not like Brahminism which divides men into castes, the limits of which cannot be overstepped. Adams, Islam and Modernism p. 16.

154. The young Muhammad 'Abduh, al-Afghani’s disciple, wrote that the ancient "Kingdom of Egypt" possessed a "mature civilization when that of others was still in its infancy". Wendell, Egyptian National Image p.186. Subsequently, in an 1888 letter to the Shaykh al-Islam in Constantinople, 'Abduh described "the people of Egypt" as a continuous entity that had racially and culturally absorbed all conquerors over "thousands of years". Ibid p. 188.
imaged territorial homeland (watan) to integrate resistance by the two Egyptian sects. However, al-Nadim did after 1882. He early wrote a play The Homeland (al-Watan) and had it performed by the pupils of his Islamic Charitable School before Khedive Tawfiq in 1879. He addressed the group fighting the invading British in 1881 as "sons of Egypt": al-'Arab were formations in the Egyptian forces recruited from Egypt's nomads although 'Urabi was "the jewel in the Arab necklace". al-Nadim thus made his audiences aware of the homeland, Egypt, and "the Egyptians" as the inner entity for which they were struggling. al-Nadim in the 1890s sometimes betrayed apprehension that the Copts might ally with the British occupier, Christians like them. He therefore structured his Egyptian homeland to give them an inherent place: al-Ustadh was careful to write in a respectful tone of the Coptic Church and the Coptic community. His young Egyptian disciple Mustafa Kamil took up his integrative concept of homeland, extending it in relation to the pan-Islamic and historical Arab identities into which al-Nadim had blurred the Egyptians.

al-Nadim often evoked the current territorial homeland to integrate Copts and Muslims against the British but not Egypt's particular pagan antiquity. al-Ustadh did give some publicity to ancient Egyptian items held in local museums, noting the publication of an early guidebook to the Gizah Museum by Ahmad Kamal Pasha. However, Kamal's Egyptological publications well into the 1940s were to convince many secular-educated Muslim Egyptians that the ancient Egyptians were racially and in their language (and monotheism!) related to the Semitic Arabians.

155. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa in 1884 argued the freedom of conscience of non-Muslims in the classical and post-classical Muslim states and that they rose unimpeded to the highest positions: this was, however, a side-issue in its argument with Europeans as to whether Muslims or Europe had practised "fanaticism". Art. "al-Ta'assub", al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 44.
158. For sympathetic coverage by al-Nadim of the Coptic community, wracked by conflict between (a) the patriarchate and (b) some clergy see "Ghibat Batriyark al-Aqbat" (His Eminence the Patriarch of the Copts), al-Ustadh 7 February 1893 pp. 598-599. In further arguing the oneness of the Egyptian people spanning Copts and Muslims, al-Nadim called for the setting-up of some bisectarian organization to integrate the two sections under the patronage of the Khedive 'Abbas. "al-Muslimuna wal-Aqbat" (The Muslims and Copts) al-Ustadh 21 March 1893 pp. 749-750. He praised the nine years-old Society for the Preservation of Coptic History in Asyut: it had recorded the death of Khedive Tawfiq and the accession of his son 'Abbas II. "Tahni'ah" (Congratulation), al-Ustadh 27 September 1892 p. 143.
The Long-Term Legacy: Overview

al-Afghani, al-Nadim and 'Abduh, then, put into the minds of subsequent generations that the earlier wide Islamic empires centered outside Egypt were the indigenous states that matched the religion-focused international strength exemplified by modern Europe. More than the other two, al-Nadim evoked the territorial homeland but fused it with a delocalizing literary language: Mustafa Kamil and his al-Hizb al-Watani independence movement were to keep the two fused as the basis for political independence. al-Afghani and al-Nadim’s sense of religion as one key instrument with which any society or camp, Muslim or other, integrated itself vis-a-vis rivals politicized and relativized religions in a utilitarian way. This deleted much of late-traditional Islam: but could accommodate a nuanced awareness of new secularoid ideologies in "Europe" as the long-term pan-Christian enemy camp requiring a wide pan-Muslim counter-camp. The perception of international relations in terms of religion-glued conflicting camps, Eastern-Muslim versus Western-Christian, was long to retard Egypt-centric identifications. Particularist publicists in the 1920s were to find it very hard to wrench the minds of modern-educated Egyptian Muslims around to some acceptance that later classical or

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160. In 1892, al-Nadim depicted al-Azhar in al-Ustadh as an institution in which students were debilitated by sickness or skipped most lectures: its courses did not equip its graduates to read classical Arabic high literature. He disliked the unstructured, individualized relationship students had to their shaykh in traditional Sunni Islam and urged Egyptians to transform al-Azhar into a (Western-style?) university that would offer the modern mathematical and other sciences as well as religion and in which the students would read political newspapers. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 130-132. Cf. Delanoue, loc cit p. 112. Prior to the British conquest, al-Nadim was wont to flay traditional Egyptian Islam, categorizing "the charlatans" of the Sufi mystic brotherhoons with such social evils as illiteracy, alcoholism and hashish --- the mystics and divines exploited the peasants just like the magicians and village usurers. Delanoue, op. cit. p. 88. It is to be noted, though, that Sufis gave al-Nadim shelter during his decade underground after the British crushed 'Urabi: he himself belonged to the Khalwatiyyah order. Ibid p. 94.

161. al-Nadim’s alertness to the centrality of Christianity in the life and policies of European states was not unnuanced: his Syrian Christian and European friends had left him well aware of the erosion of traditional religious belief in the secularizing Western societies. Ignoring --- perhaps rightly --- militant anti-clericalism and rationalism in West Europe, al-Nadim portrayed that all "civilized" Europeans had fused religious and secular education: every school had a church in which all pupils were required to pray before, and to close, the school day: the mathematics and physics textbooks were interspersed with religious principles. Educated Europeans who followed "free thought" still, although post-religious (la yadinuna bi-din), participated fully with their families in those Christian rituals that Europeans had made compulsory "for children, women, youths and the aged". The European free-thinker was careful to close his shop on all Christian holy days, however much he disbelieved in them, scrupulously called in the priest as a family member died, and far from criticizing Christianity in any public or elite literary gathering, penned vigorous apologetics to defend it against denigration. The Easterners had to duplicate religion as the tool with which Europe had achieved the "social unity" that sustained its modernity and power. "Tarbiyat al-Abna', al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 203. Cf. fns. 8, 81. al-Nadim advised any Egyptian freethinkers to imitate this participatory respect by their European senior brethren for religion as the great social cement. Delanoue, loc cit p. 102.
post-classical smaller states centered in Egypt were not deviant from Islam or divisive facilitation of Western inroads. In any case, the universalist Arab-led empires of classical Islam resurfaced in the psyches of the liberal opinion-leaders themselves in the 1930s, Haykal re-evoking them in the context of incessant war between Crusaderist-Western and Arab-Muslim camps throughout history, somewhat as al-Afghani and al-Nadim had (Ch. 9: B 153-4; cf. 'Abdallah 'Inan B 55-6).

al-Nadim's drive to generalize supra-Egyptian neo-classical Arabic was to be carried forward more totalistically by Mustafa Kamil's independence movement up to 1914. Some in the more insular circle of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid occasionally voiced pragmatic unenthusiasm. Nonetheless, in the period of the post-1922 Egyptian particularist state such former youthful disciples of Lutfi as Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Taha Husayn would increasingly promote extended, modified classical Arabic in the name of the great classical Arab tradition. For them, the territorial entity of Egypt retained presence in the face of the definitive wide classical Arabs but failed to sustain distinctness on the plane of formal language. The pioneer Islamo-Arab nationalist Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s achieved the apogee of the attitude that the classical Arabs' Arabic must be extended to serve as the medium for all modern (West-derived) life.

al-Nadim's stands on language issues would foster in Egypt the orientation that the classical Arabs' Arabic is the core of the nationhood of Egyptians, that finally led to linguistic pan-Arab nationalism, in place of geography-determined Egyptian particularism.
CHAPTER 3: BRITISH COLONIAL RULE, AND THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FORMATION OF MUSTAFA KAMIL’S INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

This chapter sets out features of British rule (1882 - 1922) that constricted the size, the career and political opportunities, and the Arab culture of (in particular urban) secularizing-educated Muslim Egyptians. It traces the development of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) independence movement of Mustafa Kamil as the instrument to meet the class and cultural needs of that bullied acculturated Muslim bourgeoisie. Splintered cultural resources and connections to other Arabic-educated cultural elites enabled the Kamilists to unevenly develop Arabic culture and Islamic ideology in the face of imperial deculturization. From the outset, the Kamilists lobbied support from the true liberal West to evict Britain. Instead of instrumentalities, this Chapter focuses the acculturation-inculcated emotional needs for humane community with Westerners in such outreach.

The Kamilist independence movement passed through three rough periods:

1. 1893 - 1908: Under Kamil’s direction, the movement concentrated on organizing the acculturating-educated students and professionals, a small but crucial minority in Egypt’s population.

2. 1908 - 1910: Under the leadership of Muhammad Farid, al-Hizb al-Watani, the political party that the late Kamil founded, reached out to the urban proletariat and lumpen proletariat by establishing workers’ night schools, trade unions and to the peasantry through rural cooperatives. The Party was in the process of becoming a mass independence movement, a united front of a range of classes. But the British, by closing its newspapers and waves of arrests, drove al-Hizb al-Watani’s leaders into exile.

3. The period of exile.

COLONIALISM AND THE KAMILIST RESPONSE

The Consolidation of British Rule

In 1882 a British expeditionary force defeated the first Egyptian proto-nationalist movement at Tal al-Kabir. National feeling remained stunned for many years by the shock of defeat and by Britain’s military power: over a decade passed before a new generation began to develop the organizations necessary to lead independence movements. From 1883 to 1907, Egypt was ruled in a "Veiled Protectorate" by Britain’s Consul-General Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer). Cromer left "an appearance of rule" to the Khedives and (mainly Turkish-speaking) Egyptian Government ministers¹ while flanking the latter with British "advisers" who were the administrators in the Ministries.

Britain’s progressive extension of control in the administration threatened the economic livelihood and career prospects of the emerging Muslim student and professional class². Lt.-Colonel P.G. Elgood observed that by the early twentieth century Cromer had
placed Englishmen, Advisers in name, Controllers in fact, at the side of Ministers ... The actual government of the country had passed into the hands of the British Advisers who ruled through an increased British Inspectorate. But ... presently Englishmen in the Ministries in Cairo ruled every Department of State. As the Egyptian head of such a Department died or was pensioned off, his title and pay would be taken by the Englishman, and the latter's place be filled by a newcomer of the same race. This anglicization of the new Central Administration took time to complete ... But ... in 1914 there were few Egyptians controlling any State business of importance. 

Elgood noted the resentment among students and their parents, the overall "professional class", at the influx of British recruits: "no boy attends a Government school in Egypt who is not inspired mainly with the ambition of entering later the Civil Service". No wonder that Mustafa Kamil, from the outset of his career, recruited heavily among city-based students and less established professionals and by his death in 1908 had almost completely mobilized the secular-stream student class.

The Larger West. Important to understand the relationships of Kamil and other Westernizing-educated Muslim intellectuals with the general West is that the main threat to Britain’s rule in Egypt long came from the reluctance of other European states to accord it recognition. France’s economic and educational interests and resident nationals in Egypt had exceeded Britain’s prior to the occupation. An agency representing Egypt’s European creditors, the Caisse de la Dette Publique, had been set up in May 1876 with control of Egyptian finances to ensure payment of Egypt’s debt. This international Commission maintained a considerable

1. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919" in P.M. Holt (ed.) Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt (London: OUP 1968) p. 308. "Understanding their ambivalent position in the Egyptian population, the British chose mostly Turko-Circassian collaborators to sit as figure-heads over the ministries. The exceptions to this rule were three Muslim Egyptians" (ie. Arab-Muslim Egyptians) "and three minority sect officials of the total twenty-five ministers who held office from 1882 to 1908". Jeffrey Collins, The Egyptian Elite Under Cromer 1882 - 1907 (Ann Arbor PhD microfiche nd) p. 223.

2. During the period of British colonial rule, "religion as well as nationality was highly correlated with rank and power within the state apparatus. Non-Muslims were extremely numerous among the government elite, constituting 18.84% of the total although they accounted for only 7.7% of the national population in 1897. Non-Muslims were particularly numerous in the ministries of Finance (56.52%), the Mixed Administrations (44.76%), Health (43.75%) and Justice (23.59%)". Collins, Egyptian Elite p. 243.

say in how Britain directed Egypt’s economy under the Occupation. Through her participation in the Caisse, and the extraterritorial rights of her foreign residents, France could always obstruct Britain’s government of Egypt until the 1904 Entente Cordiale.

In 1892 Britain’s puppet Khedive Tawfiq died. He was succeeded by his seventeen-years old, Austrian-educated son 'Abbas. Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II (reigned 1892-1914) wanted truly to rule in Egypt and thus was in consistent conflict with Egypt’s actual ruler Cromer --- an adversary relationship crucial for development of nationalist organizations during the Veiled Protectorate. In an 1893 ministerial crisis, the Khedive dismissed Mustafa Fahmi, who had Cromer’s confidence, from the Prime Ministry. Cromer forced 'Abbas to appoint Riyad Pasha as a compromise, and make a formal promise to follow the advice of the British in all important matters henceforth^4. In the 1894 "Frontier Incident" Kitchener, Sirdar (Commander) of the Egyptian Army, attempted to resign when the Khedive disparaged British officers in the Army. Cromer maintained Kitchener in his position and forced 'Abbas to express satisfaction with the roles of the British officers in the Egyptian army.

In 1898 a French military expedition, led by Captain Marchand, attempted to establish French predominance in the Upper Nile Valley, bringing France and Britain to the brink of war until he surrendered to British forces at Fashoda. Egyptians opposing British rule had hoped to win the aid of France to dislodge the British from the Nile Valley. The Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 8 April 1904 ended their lingering hopes that France ever would act as such a third force. In return for freedom of action to subjugate Morocco the government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country (Egypt) by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation, or in any other manner^5.

4. Tignor, _op cit_ p. 105. Mustafa Fahmi was perhaps the most compliant of the Turco-Circassian politicians whom Cromer hand-picked for high office. Louis Brehier, a contemporary, described him as "un Algerien des plus dociles" --- while Cromer called him "a weak man" whose docility and "well-known sympathy with English policy" kept him in office as Prime Minister for thirteen unbroken years. Citations Collins, _Egyptian Elite_ pp. 225 - 226; cf. _ibid_ p. 224 for other confidential British assessments of other "dummies". The 1894 clash between 'Abbas and Cromer over Fahrni remained etched for decades in the mind of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid despite his view that the Khedive was despotic. Lutfi (1908: al-Jaridah), _Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta’rikh al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyyah fi Misr_ (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p. 145.

5. Art. "Egypt", _Encyclopaedia Britannica_ (11th ed. 1910-1911) v. ix p. 17. The French recognized Britain’s predominance in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco. Some scope remained to the nationalists, though, to link up with French interests to obstruct British power. As late as 1909, the French dragged their feet in cooperating with Gorst in his enforcement of the 1881 Press Law against nationalist Arabic journals as a tactic to extract more British support in tightening French control over Morocco. Peter Mellini, _Sir Eldon Gorst, the
Cromer retired in May, 1907. His successor, Eldon Gorst (British Consul-General 1907-1911), achieved an alliance with the Khedive against the nationalists. Gorst struggled to check the annual influx into the Egyptian Government departments of British recruits who would take jobs from the educated and professional Egyptians inclined to support nationalism. While conciliating the strata from which the nationalists recruited, Gorst cracked down harder than Cromer on the organized nationalists themselves. He applied the 1881 Press Law, which Cromer had never invoked, to shackle and ban al-Hizb al-Watani’s newspapers, and jailed or drove into exile its spokesmen and leaders. Gorst’s alliance with the Khedive isolated Britain politically by driving the constitutionalist al-Ummah/al-Jaridah group, that had collaborated with Cromer to some extent, towards the radical nationalists.

In November 1908, Gorst appointed the Copt Butrus Ghali Pasha as Prime Minister in succession to Mustafa Pasha Fahmi, who had held the post (with one interruption in 1893-5) under Cromer since 1891. In February 1910, Egypt’s quasi-parliamentary General Assembly overwhelmingly rejected a measure to extend the Suez Canal concession for forty years beyond 1968. A few days later, a Muslim militant nationalist, al-Wardani, assassinated Ghali who advocated the extension. The assassination heightened conflict between Coptic and Muslim

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7. Gorst’s rigid and uncompromising rejection of organized nationalist movements was illustrated by his 1909 advice to the Foreign Office in London not to receive the moderate Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, associated with the Ummah Party, who was warning the British not to apply the Press Law. Lutfi said that he had refused many overtures from the Germans. Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst p. 182.

8. The assassination of Ghali by al-Tadamun al-Akhawi --- the "Fraternal Brotherhood", one of the militant secret societies spun off from the Patriotic Party as its base broadened under Farid --- brought out the (still incomplete) transition of some acculturated Muslim Egyptians in al-Hizb al-Watani from a more traditional sectarian to a secular-territorialist ideology of political community. Ghali’s Muslim assassin Ibrahim al-Wardani, educated as a pharmacist in Switzerland, was no pan-Islamist and regarded multi-sectarian territorial political nations as the norm. In a private letter predating the killing, he had written that “I had opposed the admission of Copts into our [secret] Society, not because they are Copts, the Copts being our brothers and we making up with them the children of a single homeland, but because the Copts are a small sect in the land and experience has shown that a small sect will seek shelter and protection with the government and fanatically take its part. This the Muslims do in India: they align themselves with the English government against the Hindus and sons of their homeland because the Hindus are more than they in number”. al-Muqattam 4 April 1910. Thus, independence movements should not have any sectarian restriction, but temporary sectarianisms in larger society had to so limit them for a time. For the Ghali assassination as another motif in tensions between the Jaridist-Siyasahist stream of acculturated nationalism and Westerners, B 492 fn. In regard to the growing connections of al-Hizb al-Watani to militantly anti-imperialist Hind rather than Muslim Indians, the noted Indian revolutionary Khrishnavarna offered Egyptians a thousand francs prize in memory of “martyr Wardani”. Goldschmidt, "The National Party from Spotlight to Shadow", Asian and African Studies (Haifa) v. 16:1, March 1982 p. 17.
communalists in Egypt. Gorst admitted in his report for 1910 that his policies for containing discontent in Egypt had failed.

Sentences of imprisonment against al-Hizb al-Watani leaders and suppression of its newspapers forced the party to become an exile movement, operating from Europe and the Ottoman State. Kitchener, however, won the landowner-led Ummah party back into collaboration, by reorganizing a new advisory Legislative Assembly with high property qualifications that favored landowners involved in the Ummah. He also, however, made modest efforts to conciliate the peasantry with agricultural and hydraulic projects, distribution of lands, and the first small-scale extension of modern health services to the countryside.

Turco-Circassians. The political and social importance of Egypt-resident Turco-Circassians culturally linked to the Turkish core of the Ottoman State influenced the turns supra-Egyptian identifications took from 1882 to 1922. Until the 1904 Entente Cordiale, the young Turkish-speaking Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II stood at the very head of resistance to Britain's ever-tightening control over Egypt's government and institutions. Even after, 'Abbas fell into intermittent conflicts with the British ending with his deposition in 1914. Abrasive attempts by such British figures as Cromer and Kitchener to subject the Khedive would enhance Muslim Egyptians' identification of him and his Turco-Circassian family and court as heading the Arabic-speaking Egyptian population. The Turkish-speaking 'Abbas declared himself a Turkish national after World War I and, like many Turco-Circassians, usually went annually to Constantinople for the Islamic feast of Bairam. The British exploited the House of Muhammad 'Ali's Ottoman State links to wrest the Ministry of Waqfs from 'Abbas. Overall, Egypt's Turco-Circassian Khedivial royalty and declining landowning aristocracy were one major factor that continually involved Arab Egyptians in the Turkish-speaking (more than the Arabic-speaking sector) of the Ottoman Empire, although 'Abbas did entangle Egyptians in its

9. For British actions under Kitchener against the Watani Party and the latter's drift into exile, see Goldschnidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" pp. 327-329.
10. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 315 - 318. Beaman --- a vitriolic critic of Kitchener familiar with Arabic and Muslims --- had the impression that his 1911 "Five Faddans Law" won the Consul-General wide popularity among the poorer fallahin: Arden G.H. Beaman, The Dethronement of the Khedive (London: n.p. 1929) p. 55. The Law prohibited expropriation for debts of the land, houses or equipment of peasants owning five feddans of land or less. It proved unenforceable and "various devices of the moneylenders, short of outright expropriation, deprived the peasants of real control over their land". Tignor, op. cit pp. 239-240.
12. Ibid p. 72.
early Arab nationalism as well through his fanning of the "Arab Caliphate" idea (Chs. 5 and 6).

The Development of Nationalist Parties

Westernizing-Educated Students. Mustafa Kamil's first major appearance in the history of Egyptian nationalism was at eighteen, when he led a demonstration of students in the higher schools of Cairo, notably the Egyptian government-run School of Law, before the offices of the Syrian-Christian owned pro-British al-Muqattam in 1893. The Khedive subsidized higher law studies abroad through which Kamil obtained the licence in law from the University of Toulouse in 1894.

When Kamil returned to Egypt in that year, the former 'Urabist Latif Salim had founded the secret Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani); Kamil joined and soon was the secret society's leader. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid participated with Mustafa Kamil in 1896 in the secret Society for the Revival of the Nation (al-Jam'iyyah li'Ihya' al-Watan) of which 'Abbas was the head.

Appeals to Europe. Support by the Khedive was critical for enabling Kamil to commence his role as spokesman for Egypt's independence aspirations in Europe. It was with palace funds that he sailed to Paris in May 1895 intending to exploit the world-wide colonial rivalry between Britain and France to persuade French politicians and public to press Britain to carry out her frequently-promised evacuation from the Nile Valley. In Paris, Kamil in "his first international act" presented a petition to the French Chamber of Deputies in the name of the Egyptian people, appealing for help from France which had declared the Rights of Man and liberated so many peoples. Kamil also met in Paris the unusually non-imperial French nationalist Juliette Adam (1836-1936), with whom he maintained a son-like friendship and political collaboration until his death; henceforth her journal La Nouvelle Revue published his articles campaigning for Egypt's independence. According to Robert L. Tignor, "during the 1890s Mustafa Kamil probably

13. Financial dependence of Kamil on the Khedive in regard to his early student magazine al-Madrasah and his legal studies in France speculated by Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 312.
15. Ibid p. 313.
17. Juliette Adam's Anglophobia was of long standing when the precocious young Kamil met her. During Britain's 1881-1882 seizure of Egypt, she had blasted the French minister of Foreign Affairs for recalling France's Consul General when he supported Egyptian independence, although France had had the predominant place in Egypt since the rise of Muhammad 'Ali. Adam was no French jingo, even though she did on the eve of the British conquest stress all the capital that France had sunk into Egypt, that her Suez canal had transformed the country and
spent as much time in Europe trying to propagandize the Egyptian question as he did in Egypt\textsuperscript{18}. However, the failure at Fashoda of Marchand’s 1898 expedition made clear to Kamil and his comrades (and to the Khedive) that France would not risk war to drive Britain from the Nile Valley.

As the Khedive ’Abbas moved in the wake of France’s backdowns to accommodate himself somewhat to the strengthening British presence, his relations with Kamil cooled. Throughout the 1890’s, Kamil and his followers had widened their internal oratory and journalism as a means to expand their following in Egypt, and thus develop a basis for action against British rule independent of either the Khedive or Europe. Kamil had opened his activity as a spellbinding public orator in early 1896 when he addressed two public meetings in Alexandria, at which he called for British evacuation\textsuperscript{19}. He had published extensively in the anti-British al-Ahram (SC) and al-Mu’ayyad from 1894, and on 2 January 1900 he launched his own daily, al-Liwa’. The Khedive "may have subsidized [al-Liwa] for a time to annoy Cromer"\textsuperscript{20}.

An instrument used by Kamil and his colleagues to politicize and organize the strata of students and secularizing-educated professionals was the Nadil-Madaris al-’Ulya (Higher Schools Club) "which brought together the students and graduates of Egypt’s several professional schools in a distinctly nationalist milieu"\textsuperscript{21}. Kamil in 1906, as a development of his mobilization of the student element, "organized a strike at the School of Law which began a long period of student agitation that only came to an end when political activity itself came to an end under the military government of 1952"\textsuperscript{22}. The British authorities obviously found it difficult to counter this new weapon of the independence movement. The

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\textsuperscript{18} Tignor, \textit{British Colonial Rule} p. 268.
\textsuperscript{19} One meeting was in Arabic for Egyptians, the other primarily for European residents, whom Kamil wanted to conciliate so that the British could not coopt them. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 315.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid p. 319.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid p. 319.
\textsuperscript{22} Hourani, \textit{Arabic Thought} p. 208.
striking students ignored an ultimatum by the Director that he would expel every
student who did not return at once, compelling Cromer himself to intervene and mediate before
the students would go back to their studies.23

The Jaridists. While Kamil’s independence movement broadened out, a group of wealthy
Arab-Egyptian landlords, prominent government officials and young intellectuals launched in
March 1907 the daily al-Jaridah around which in September 1907 the Hizb al-Ummah or Party of
the Nation formed. The national issue was important in the birth of this party. Ahmad Lutfi
al-Sayyid had originally called the group’s first meeting following the outbreak in January 1906
of Britain’s territorial dispute with the Ottoman State over Tabah: he accepted Britain’s claim to
be fighting Egypt’s legal battle for her, and was furious that the pan-Islamic solidarity with the
Ottoman State expressed by Kamil’s movement, seemed to weaken commitment to Egyptian
sovereignty in Sinai.24. The class of Arab-Muslim large landowners who sustained al-Jaridah and
the later Party was somewhat bound by economic interest to the British colonial administration.
George Lloyd viewed the Ummah Party as the "result of his [Cromer’s] efforts" to group
"moderate-minded men of influence and standing" into an "active organization" that could
"check the (Kamilist) Nationalist Party’s campaign" to end British rule.25. British officialdom,
near panic before the wide opposition expressed by Egyptians in the wake of the Tabah and
Dinshaway incidents, thus actively stimulated the formation of al-Jaridah and the Ummah party.
Yet Cromer’s, and especially Gorst’s, restrictive stances towards the development of
parliamentary institutions made infuriatingly clear how secondary for British policy at that time
was the possibility of collaboration with this Egyptian group.26

Writers of the al-Jaridah/Hizb al-Ummah group viewed the political scene at their
group’s emergence much as alarmed British officials did --- that Mustafa Kamil, following
Tabah and Dinshaway, was reaching out beyond the student and professional classes to "the
common people" (al-'ammah) and that a destructive mass independence movement might result.

23. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York:
26. In his final report before retiring, all Cromer would hold out in the way of a prospect of constitutional
advance was an international Legislative Council in which resident foreigners would have parity with Egyptians ---
enraging for Hizb al-Ummah and the Jaridists who wanted to become political partners. Mellini, Gorst p. 132. For
bitter 1908 criticisms by Lutfi that the British under Gorst allied with the despotic Khedive to constrict the powers of
the Consultative Assembly to those of a municipal council, see Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyah pp. 122-129.
One al-Jaridah writer admitted in 1914 that when the newspaper was launched in 1907 the masses of Egyptians had, at the incitation of a group of political journalists (=the Kamilists), begun to demand an "unreasonable" independence which they believed within their grasp: limitations of freedom of expression (i.e. a British crackdown) threatened. "A party of the notables of the people" (=Arab-Egyptian large landowners) chose Lutfi al-Sayyid, and launched al-Jaridah as his forum, to "bring the mood of the people to moderation to enable it to obtain its reasonable demands through peaceful ... argument, so that its demands be not discredited before European public opinion". Lutfi, representing Hizb al-Ummah, sought dialogue with the British instead of organizing resistance to them. He could not, the al-Jaridah writer admitted, hope to win to his side the masses, in need of prolonged re-education as preparation for eventual independence:

A nation like the Egyptian, caught in a period of development, still emergent and struggling up the stairs of civilization --- still, indeed, in their first stage --- cannot possibly be fit to turn moderate principles to use save after the passage of long time. That is the reason the common people did not endorse the principles that Lutfi Bey's articles expounded, although they were the most eloquent ever written on their subject, modern in style, their approach logical and oratorical in a way that the intellectual elite of educated people would prefer.\(^2\)

The bond uniting the people of property and position who headed the Ummah Party was that they were all personae non gratae at the Khedive's (Turcophone) palace (al-'Aqqad, 1953)\(^2\). Lutfi in 1907 advocated that Egypt be led by an enlightened elite of "government officials, members of the liberal professions and the a'yan" ([Arab-Egyptian] land-owning gentry/affluent people)\(^2\). The elitist Ummah party proved important for Egypt's long-term twentieth century political development. It provided leaders for the Wafd and leadership and policies for the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists when these formed following World War 1.

Several of the acculturated intellectuals whose post-World War 1 community thought we examine -- e.g. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mahmud 'Azmi, Taha Husayn, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat -- were during the British Occupation youthful disciples of Lutfi or published in

\(^2\)Quoted ibid p. 283.
al-Jaridah.

Hizb al-Ummah was formed in September 1907. In October, Mustafa Kamal returned from Europe and proclaimed the Patriotic Party, which in reality had existed for years, "with the objectives of the immediate evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil and the grant of a constitution by the Khedive". However, Kamal died prematurely on 10 February 1908. The Scots Christian missionary Temple Gairdner, no sympathetic observer of either Islam or the institutions in Muslim lands, made clear the mass, universal character of the mourning among Muslims. In a few hours, by word of mouth alone, all Cairo "had the news even on the night of his death". When Gairdner went to Kamal's house next morning many were already in tears, especially young men of the effendi class. Then the coffin, borne aloft by bearers and covered with the red Egyptian flag, appeared, swaying slightly in the doorway. The whole of the vast assembly in the court beneath burst into tears as by one impulse. Neither on that day nor at subsequent great meetings when thousands of Muslims were gathered together to hear orations to his memory did I hear insulting or revengeful or violent words... The students, the schoolboys, the younger Government officials --- it is they who have made this man their idol and hero, and wept for him as the young weep for their heroes.

Gairdner, then, identified the effendi class, the student youth and the younger government officials as still Kamal's core constituency at his death.

The British-subsidized SC al-Muqattam described organized collective participation by the urban student class in the funeral in the midst of the mourning masses:

At three o'clock in the afternoon the funeral march began to move in a great procession the farthest extent of which the eye could not attain. The march was headed by police mounted and on foot and behind them the most enormous number of school students. The students of every school participated as a body, marching separately from the others, bearing banners draped with black. Marching first were the students of the late leader's school, then the students of the preparatory school, then the students of the Victoria College, then the students of the Agricultural School bearing a tree hung with black, then the students of the Teachers' College, then the Dar al-'Ulum, then those of the Khedivial School, then the Medical College, then the Law School. The bier had been wrapped with the Egyptian flag and above it had been raised a green banner upon which had been written "the proprietor of al-Liwa".

The al-Muqattam correspondent lists as sources of organized groups in Kamal's funeral:

32. al-Muqattam 12 February 1908 p. 5.
the most prominent West-patterned institutions of secondary and tertiary education. Significantly, the only religious Islamic institution mentioned as providing an organized body of mourner-marchers was the post-traditional Dar al-'Ulum founded in 1871 to produce teachers of Islamic subjects and Arabic simultaneously trained in modern secular subjects. al-Muqattam identified elements of the adult professional classes as present in number: notably professional people in the judiciary or law, private or government-employed (rijal al-qada’ wal-niyabah)\textsuperscript{33} for admission to whose ranks Kamil had originally been educated.

At Kamil’s death, then, his movement had organizationally covered the whole of the Muslim secular-stream students and, less completely, the graduate professionals such as civil servants, lawyers and teachers\textsuperscript{34}. al-Hizb al-Watani’s anti-imperialism, patriotism and pan-Islamism spoke to the needs of this core class-constituency, so constricted in employment and culturally assaulted by the British and the resident foreigners.

The Threat of Deculturation Under the British

Linguistic Assaults. British educational policies worked to create a small modern Muslim elite sharply separated in class background and culture from Egyptians in general. In 1902, the British spent on education less than 1% of all Egyptian state expenditure: in response to nationalist criticism, the rate increased between 1907-1912, but never exceeded 3.4% of total budget\textsuperscript{35}. Cromer imposed stiff fees to knock the children of the poor and the petty bourgeoisie out of the government’s secular-stream primary and secondary schools. Such restrictions on popular education shrank the pool of students for tertiary medical, engineering and law colleges, deeply alienating the Jaridist-Ummah paternalists, motivated to collaborate by all that the British had done to foster the growth of their land-holding Arab-Egyptian elite\textsuperscript{36}. By 1900 the British

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} The Jesuit-founded Bayrut Catholic mouthpiece al-Bashir printed a report from Cairo observing that Kamil had been given "a rarely-paralleled funeral in which thousands of the leaders, scholars, headmasters, army officers and students of the country walked... The crowds of people stopped the trams from traveling for about two hours". al-Bashir 17 February 1908 p. 5. Ghali characterizes al-Hizb al-Watani at the death of Mustafa Kamil as "a party of youth, students, civil servants, [secular] lawyers", drawing on Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s contrast of "the youth" in Kamil’s party to the seasoned mature notables in Hizb al-Ummah. Ibrahim Amin Ghali, L’Ef!vpte Nationaliste et Liberale de Moustapha Kamel a Saad Za2loul. 1892-1925 (Hague: Martimus Nijhoff 1969) p. 82. al-Mugattam stressed the wine-like irrational impact of Kamil on "the Egyptian youth" who followed him "refusing to listen to other arguments". al-Muqattam 11 February 1908 p. 6.


\textsuperscript{36} al-Jaridah was concerned at the small numbers of Egyptians enrolling in medicine and engineering in
had imposed English as the main medium of education in government primary and secondary schools, opening teaching positions for despised lower middle class Britishers who might have not found jobs at home. This replacement of classical Arabic by English drew attacks from educated Egyptians and from British liberals. As a concessive gesture, Cromer in 1906 had the former 'Urabist, Sa'd Zaghlul, associated with the group that was to found al-Jaridah and the gradualist nationalist Hizb al-Ummah in 1907, appointed Minister of Education with permission to award more scope to Arabic in the schools. To control Zaghlul, Cromer simultaneously promoted as Adviser to the Ministry of Education the ex-missionary Douglas Dunlop, who had been associated since the late 1890s with linguistic anglicization campaigns in Egypt's schools.

Despite the nationalists' attacks, Dunlop kept control of education until after the First World War. In a poem of farewell to Cromer on his departure from Egypt in May 1907, Hafiz Ibrahim wrote "you destroyed the mother of languages [Arabic] which is our destruction or a

the relevant tertiary colleges in Egypt, and constriction of career opportunities in those professions by British recruits and resident Europeans. "Nazarat al-Mu'arif --- al-Majaniyyah wa Madrasat al-Muhandiskhanah" (The Ministry of Education --- Free Instruction and the School of Engineering), al-Jaridah 23 May 1907 p. 3. This article deftly rebutted the excuses given by the puppet Ministry of Education for abolishing free education at primary and tertiary level, while still allocating P 1,600 to it at the secondary level: "a nation in which no more than 5% can read and write is among the nations in direst need of government assistance for [its] primary education". Ibid. Another item toyed with a remedial etatism from primary to the conclusion of tertiary education: the governments of Muhammad 'Ali and Khedive Isma'il had educated the children of the poor to get a source of recruits for the understaffed bureaucracy. Those regimes used to forcibly place such children in boarding-schools and encouraged enrolments by providing free food, clothing and even stipends --- the interventionist alternative to British tight-fistedness. "al-Ta'lim fi Madaris al-Hukumah" (Education in the Government Schools), al-Jaridah 17 March 1907 p. 1.

38. Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst p. 129. Zaghlul, the third and last Arab Egyptian to get a ministry under Cromer, "was appointed Minister of Public Instruction four months after Dinshaway to deflate the growing nationalism the incident had aroused" (Collins). Writing to the British Foreign Minister at the time, Cromer termed Zaghlul "a competent man from Muhammad 'Abduh’s gradualist school whose members could be safely put into positions of power to replace [Turco-Circassian and Christian Armenian] 'dummies or figureheads'". Collins, Egyptian Elite pp. 223-4. Displaying courtesy and resolve, Zaghlul was able to limit some de-Arabizing excesses of Dunlop and other British "advisors" in his Ministry. Yet, previously a critic of the British imposition of European languages as the core and medium of education, as Minister (October 1906 - February 1910) Zaghlul "became the [policy's] defender, although in a limited way". Lois Aroian, Education, Language and Culture in Modern Egypt: Dar al-Ulum and its Graduates (University of Michigan: PhD 1978) p. 232.

39. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 329. Dunlop’s stultifying school regulations and curricula, uniform down to the minute throughout the length and breadth of Egypt, alienated even some of his better British teachers. Ibid pp. 328 - 329. In contrast to Cromer, Gorst had impulses to remove the rigid bureaucrat Dunlop. Mellini, op. cit pp. 170, 172-3. Contemptuous of literary Arabic, Dunlop assaulted his pupils with immersion in English more, Aroian argued, than with imperial ideology: he did not take up some British Colonial Office proposals to incorporate materials on the British Empire in the curricula of government schools. Aroian, op. cit p. 229. The gaps in basic knowledge of Islam manifested to the late 1920s by such intellectuals as Haykal, products of Dunlop’s schools, do not enhance Aroian’s contention that Dunlop did not restrict Islamic education. For an example, B 400 - 401.
pathway to [encompass] it. Gradually, English became the main second language read and spoken by the younger generation of the Muslim petty bourgeois class "who lacked means for private education and the acquisition of culture" and sought careers in a civil service that the British were changing over from French to English. French held out in the School of Law, Kamil's and Lutfi's Alma Mater, where French lecturers strove to transmit not merely the elements for specialized legal careers but generalist Enlightenment concepts such as the Rights of Man that they relished might destabilize the British in Egypt --- and which had drawn many Muslims such as Kamil to the school. Linguistic Anglicization was meant to provide jobs relief for Britishers and to fit some Muslim Egyptians to serve as docile functionaries, not to open into fundamental encounters with any Western culture: Cromer tried to prevent any Egyptians at all going to study in unsettling Europe, and obstructed the opening of the small-scale (old) Egyptian University, which went ahead only under his successor. This Arabic-medium core for a University was the joint achievement of a decade-long drive by the Kamilists, Muhammad 'Abduh and his disciples, the Jaridists, al-Mu'ayyad and the Khedivial family, and the SC al-Ahram and al-Muqattam. The foundation of the University drew attacks from Le Progres branding such innocuous disciples of 'Abduh as Qasim Amin as Kamil's fellow-"revolutionaries". Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah were drawn into religio-political polarization of (a) resident Europeans and the British against (b) all Egyptian groups and political factions, branded as collectively "fanatical". The French-modelled nature of Egyptian law, some scholarly institutions, and the urban private sector because of the resident Europeans, 

42. Berque correctly notes the purely functional contact with English language and culture to which the British wanted to confine the Egyptian elite. "It proved a disadvantage to English to be thus limited to these practical ends, aiming no higher and no deeper, and thus satisfying neither the Arabs' powerful intellectual aspirations nor their ideological interests, which for a long time found champions in the Ecole de Droit". Ibid. Upon finishing high school, Mustafa Kamil wrote to his brother of his intention to join the Egyptian Law School because it was "the school for writing, oratory and the ascertainment of the rights of individuals and nations". After one year there, he concurrently joined the French Law School, which prepared Cairo students for examinations given in France. Farhat Ziadeh, Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 1968) p. 63. 
43. Lutfi's bitter mid-1907 exchange with Le Progres, Safahat Matwiyyah pp. 170-172. The University opened in 1908 with distinguished European Orientalists among its lecturers, although they taught in Arabic: Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 337-338. "Intellectual members of the Ummah Party were in the lead of those Egyptians who in 1908 successfully realized through general subscription the creation of the Egyptian University". Ziadeh, Lawyers p. 91.
all helped maintain French as an intellectually more prestigious opposition to English and the British: yet the alternation of the two languages also increasingly brought home the shared anti-Muslimism of Europeans in general. Even for the wealthiest Muslim Egyptians, the utmost linguistic Anglicization seldom opened humane interaction: future Liberal Constitutionalist PM Muhammad Mahmud was popular at Oxford but on returning home found himself unwelcome in the clubs and sporting societies within which Egypt’s British had irreversibly segregated themselves. So often, Jaridist-Siyasahist pan-Islamism, pan-Easternism and pan-Arabism had that quasi-intimate fury ignited when an admired group rebuffs and excludes. The Jaridists respected the economic and technical skills of Cromer and his colleagues --- the perennialization of irrigation and the booms enriched their class --- and even the Kamilists paid tribute to Britishers who benefited Egyptians. Yet British linguistic depersonalization in education, their restriction of primary, secondary and tertiary education and their subjection of what Egyptians they recruited into the civil service radicalized the conservative Ummah-Jaridists almost as much as the less-propertied, more urban-bourgeois Kamilists.


45. al-Liwa' approved when a meeting of Egyptian writers decided to send a letter of thanks to the Englishman Ernest Cassel for his work to combat eye diseases in Egypt: the remissness of "our rich ones" in promoting popular health lost them the respect Cassel won. "Shukr al-Muhsin" (Thanking a Benefactor), al-Liwa' 13 January 1903 p. 2. In mid-1908, Lutfi paid tribute to British irrigation works that had restored international financial confidence to Egypt. While assailing the political stagnation, Lutfi categorized Cromer as a great economist and financier who made Egypt solvent again: "how greatly the area of cultivated land has increased from 1883 to today [1908]: how much the value of agricultural land and real estate has been raised due to his policy". Safahat pp. 142, 71. Lutfi believed that Cromer had striven with success to release the peasants from usurers by establishing the Agricultural Bank. Ibid p. 71. In his generally mordant poem farewelling Cromer, Hafiz Ibrahim, too, gave him credit for the hydraulic works that made many Egyptians rich, while denouncing his contraction of education. Shararah, Hafiz p. 110.

46. For typical Kamilist denunciations of the British "advisers" subordination of Egyptian ministers and officials, Sayyid 'Ali, "Hadhihi Natijat al-Istislam Ayyuhul-Wuzara' al-Fikham" (This is the Consequence of Submission, Honorable Ministers), al-Liwa' 8 April 1908 p. 1 and Muhammad Sadiq 'Anbar, "Sawt al-Ummat al-Misriyyiah fi Asma' Nuzzar al-Hukumah" (The Voice of the Nation Resounds in the Ears of the Government Ministers), al-Liwa' 21 April 1908. Lutfi's early al-Jaridah articles and his speeches voiced deep if controlled anger at the extent to which British "advisers" had taken over the governmental apparatus: Egyptian head engineers had to refer technical questions about any given canal to an English "irrigation inspector": Egyptian military officers and judges faced the same subordination as Britain filled the judiciary. Safahat pp. 26 - 7. Egyptian ministers had been made the subordinates of the "advisers". Ibid pp. 16-17. Cf. Ibid pp. 276-277. See also fn 36.
The Cultural Duality of Kamil and His Watani Followers

Both contemporary British observers and subsequent Orientalist analysts were struck by the influence of European concepts, culture and life — in particular their French variants — upon Mustafa Kamil and his colleagues. Nadav Safran (1961) characterized Kamil as "the son of an engineer who had been educated in the schools established by [the Westernizer] Muhammad ’Ali and who had spent all his life in government service. The only traditional [Muslim] education ever received by Mustafa was one year of learning the Qur’an between the ages of five and six. Following that, Mustafa attended secular primary and secondary schools" and tertiary secular law institutions, which made him bilingual in French. "A specimen of the newly arisen modern class with no attachment to previous forms of social organization, Mustafa was instinctively orientated towards the modern [= West European] concept of the nation state as the basic political-social entity".

Lord Lloyd in 1933 described Kamil as "opportunistic" in preaching pan-Islamism. Describing Kamil’s dress and appearance as dandyishly European, he wrote that "his culture was essentially French and as a Moslem he was not devout, not even particularly croyant. Such was the leader who became the pioneer of the young nationalism: the older Moslems looked somewhat askance at him: but the students followed him eagerly, and, when he died, mourned him with real fervor". However, the Turcophile French writer Pierre Loti, a sort of friend of Kamil, came to understand his cultural duality. When the two called together on the Rector of al-Azhar in 1907, Loti was struck when Kamil engaged with the Rector in an intense discussion — "as if it was a matter of present-day interest" — about "events which followed the death of the Prophet, and the part played by ’Ali".

In that moment how my good friend Mustafa, whom I had seen so French in France, appeared all at once a Muslim to the bottom of his soul! The same thing is true, indeed,


of the greater number of these Orientals, who, if we meet them in our own country, seem to be quite parisianized; their modernity is only on the surface; in their inmost souls Islam remains intact.

Loti had grasped a key aspect of acculturation: that modern Muslim Egyptians did not have to have been formally grounded much within educational institutions in the Qur’an, Islam and the literature of the classical Arabs to be influenced by them. The pan-Islamist Kamil’s interaction with the Rector of al-Azhar had its political functions: it still instances how political activism regularly exposed acculturated Muslims to a range of monolingual, non-Westernizing-educated Islamic counter-elites who offered them intact sectors of Islam and the Arab past. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah, and after 1922 the West-steeped Husayn Haykal and al-Siyasah, also kept continual exchanges and personal interaction going with Azharite and other Islamic elites at which their modernist contributors nonetheless sniped.

Kamil and his multilingual colleagues kept up a talking relationship with Muslim learned clerical elites who could give the Islamic and Arab knowledge that Dunlop --- and French lecturers in the School of Law? --- denied them in formal education. Loti was right that nationalist acculturateds of Kamil’s pattern came to hold their own with Azharites, but missed the Kamilists’ sense that al-Azhar’s curricula and learning were not enough on their own --- not restructured enough to function --- in the modern world. Relevant here is a distinction of Tignor between (a) the intellectuals of Khedive Isma’il’s time who "having been trained in [the] institutions" of traditional society "were not ready to admit that the West was superior to the East in anything except naked power" and saw the problem as effective resistance to the West’s expansion, and (b) "the later generation" of students and professional people produced by more modern, Western schools. The latter Egyptian generation (Tignor characterized) came to favor

49. Pierre Loti, *Egypt* tsd. W.P. Baines (London: T. Werner Laurie Ltd., nd ---1909?) p.66. Kamil over the years got himself well and truly associated in the minds of his French sympathisers with Islamic religious revivalism and pan-Islam, as well as the Egyptian cause narrowly considered. For instance, the Turcophile Pierre Loti dedicated *La Mort de Philae* to "the memory of my noble and dear friend Moustapha Kamel Pasha who succumbed on the 10th February 1908 to the admirable task of re-establishing in Egypt the dignity of the Homeland and of Islam". Quoted Ghali, “L’Egypte Nationaliste” p. 43. Cf. fn 89.

50. Lutfi’s relaxed access as editor of al-Jaridah to the al-Azhar hierarchy was shown when an impressive coalition of the mosque-university’s lecturers and students moved to expel Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Mahmud Zanati and Taha Husayn in their iconoclastic late adolescence. Taha might have liked an ultra-public martyrdom, but Lutfi only telephoned al-Azhar Rector Hassanah al-Nawawi that the three young men should not be branded apostates for life because they had been indulgent to an unconventional classical remark about Muhammad’s grave: al-Nawawi at once cancelled their expulsion. Dr Mahdi ’Allam, "Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat", *Majallat Ma’had al-Buhuth wal-Dirasat al-‘Arabiyah* March 1969 p. 156. See B 241.
wholesale adoption from the modern West of a liberal constitutional regime and laissez faire economic system that would assure their own political and economic predominance.\textsuperscript{51} (Certainly, \textit{al-Jaridah}'s interest in private commercial and capitalist possibilities already fostered crude pan-Arab impulses even before 1915: Ch. 6). Passages in \textit{al-Liwa}' by people who obviously know Europe, developed al-Nadim's much earlier recognition of the West's dominance in the modern world and his call for a pupil-like adoption of the techniques and institutions that gave it strength. Such writers in \textit{al-Liwa}' sometimes demonstrated an admiration for the excellence of Western civilization transcending the narrower question of the West's power over the East. One 1903 number of \textit{al-Liwa}', for instance, described European civilization as "a light that could not be resisted with darkness."\textsuperscript{52} Another 1903 article by "Katib Majid" was titled "How Can the Nation Progress/Evolve? How can that Objective be Attained?" "There is no escape from imitating the West whether the soul desire it or hate it". Relentlessly cataloguing the revolution in the environment, in architecture, in clothes, in the forms of life that the advance of Western civilization had produced in the East in the past century, the author warned that "for a man ... to try to side-step or escape it is to cut himself off from life itself ... In short there is no remedy for the sickness of backwardness that backward nations are afflicted with in this age other than skilful self-transformation and imitation of the West, the lord of this age's life". The only alternative to modernization for Egypt was subjugation: there was no longer any refuge to which nations that rejected modernization could flee.

Behold, the flood of civilization's waters have surged out engulfing even the plains and the wilderness. These backward nations with their bare feet run before it as it overtakes them from behind and he whom the waters overtake and engulf is dead.\textsuperscript{53}

In regard to the consistency or inconsistency of Kamil's statements to varied audiences, the section of this chapter examining the international community identifications of his movement during lobbying will show that Kamil from the outset presented himself in France as a pro-Ottoman pan-Islamist. This is despite his statements in later years identifying French people as hostile to Muslims as an international group.

Arabic communications of members of the party of Mustafa Kamil --- intended for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} Tignor, \textit{British Colonial Rule} p. 255-256; more generally, pp. 252-264.
\item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{al-Liwa'}, August 17, 1903
\item \textsuperscript{53} "Katib Majid" (pseud.), "Kayfa Tataraqqa l-Ummah? Kayfa al-Wusul ila dhalik?" (How Can the Nation Progress/Develop? How Can that Objective be Attained?), \textit{al-Liwa'} 9 August 1903.
\end{itemize}
internal Egyptian (not French) audiences where any motive for political manipulation was absent --- corroborate the movement's sincere emotional commitment to Western civilization, strongly identifying the latter with France's specific culture and history, as in Kamil's speeches and writings (Arabic as well as French). An article published in al-Liwa' in May 1908 opposed the teaching of British history at the Egyptian University, opened on a small scale in that year. It cited as grounds that the English had no history, literature or philosophy that merited teaching at a tertiary level, but interestingly proposed the French Revolution as embodying alongside "the exalted Arab civilization" those aspects of humanity's past development that liberal education for Egyptians had to cover. The article, with its gross errors about the details or socio-political issues of the Wars of the Roses, illustrated Britain's continuing low cultural prestige in comparison to France, a much longer-standing collaborator in Egypt's modernization and still revered as the pioneer and enduring model of liberatory Western civilization.

We ask the Committee of the Egyptian University what benefit the Egyptian students could gain from being taught the history of a nation [England] lacking any history in the proper sense of the word? What advantage will the Egyptians get from instruction in the history of a nation that --- until a recent age --- was involved with [primitive] passion in the pursuit of raids and invasions of every kind, a nation devoid of any ancient civilization from which people could learn the process of Man's gradual upward development; devoid, too, of any historical work(s) from which the advancement of mankind's thought can be understood as is the case, for instance, with the history of the great French Revolution and that of the exalted Arab civilization. What have I to gain from learning the judgement of the two roses and the outbreak of war between two kings among Britain's monarchs occasioned by nothing else than the desire of one of them as the bearer of the red rose to gain precedence in functions (hafalat) over the wearer of the yellow rose?54.

The aim that al-Liwa' held up to the Egyptian University was thus a cultivated Egyptian equally well read in (a) the literature and histories produced by the classical Arabs' Islamic civilization and (b) the modern positivist-secular West initiated by France's Enlightenment and Revolution. The concern for a thought and upward development (ruqiy) of mankind extending beyond the Arubo-Islamic heritage (which it relativizes), and the consequent assumption that no Egyptian is truly educated if not equipped to apprehend the literature and history of the modern

54. "'A Misriyah hadhihil-Jami'ah 'am Inkiliziyah?" (Is this University Egyptian or English?), al-Liwa', 9 May 1908, p.5.
secular West, showed how far Kamil's Egyptian quasi-nationalists had moved by 1908 from any insular Egyptian Islamic traditionalism.

This Kamilist formulation that the Arabo-Islamic heritage is an indispensable component of a comprehensive humanism was representative. Kamilist communications often instanced the tenacious appeal of sectors of the classical Arabo-Islamic tradition to Egyptians far removed from it by their formative non-indigenous institutional educations and by prolonged interaction with Europe and Europeans. A few ultra-modernizing al-Liwa' items did envisage further, much more far-reaching, West-modelled repatterning of Egyptian, Arab and Ottoman education, rejected for not having truly duplicated the (lethal) Western dynamism without which the Egyptians and Ottomans could never have a true "Renaissance" --- such discussion, though, solidifying the sense of some supra-Egyptian community, Ottoman, Arab, Muslim, Eastern, facing that West55. Sometimes the Western and high Arabo-Islamic facets alternated in spasms: more often, the two blended in unstandardized but often constructive ways.

The Kamilists' Links to Arabo-Islamic Culture and Thought

al-Hizb al-Watani reconnected Egyptians to the classical Muslim Arabs in two main sectors: (a) aesthetic-literary and (b) ideological: ie. Islam should somewhat prescribe in even modern societies. (The Kamilists thus maintained al-Nadim's two great fundamentals of nationhood --- the continuity of the language and the religion). In contrast, al-Jaridah's narrower Arabist humanism stressed that West-influenced writers had to read the classical Arabs' works and reapply their language patterns within modern literature and discourse (Ch. 6). This relativized aesthetic continuity of the Jaridists did not require the classical Arabs to be superior

55. al-Liwa' s pragmatic correspondent in Istanbul grimly set out "all the eternal means --- commerce, agriculture, industrial, domination, force, enslavement" --- used by "the West" to effect that subjugation of all humanity to which it had dedicated "its whole life". "The East" could examine and strive to duplicate patriotic (secular, anti-clerical-DW) education in France --- it was survival "to imitate the Westerner in everything that has helped him Progress (raqqahu) and made him a man". The item scathingly derided the educational "renaissance of the dead people" brought by the non-religious governmental schools established in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Turkey: these inculcated no motivating values and the only aim of those who attended was to win on graduation modestly-paid careers in the state bureaucracies and some empty titles and ranks. The item was interesting for its proto-pan-Arab perspective within Ottomanism, and probably implied the necessity for a new Muslim modern private enterprise and for constitutional limitations on the Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid and other Muslim rulers (=the Khedive 'Abbas?). Despite its concern to learn from Westerners to become equal with them, the item understood why "Eastern" parents who had to hand their children over to foreign schools in Egypt and the Ottoman State ("hadhihil-bilad" --- in "these lands") felt "heartbreak:"= the irreducible hard Muslim core in Kamilism, "Dar al-Sa'adah --- al-Inqilab fil-Ta'lim" (Istanbul --- the Revolution in Education), al-Liwa'. 17 January 1903 p. 1.
or even quite equal to recent Western creativity --- whereas Kamil and some of his colleagues
sometimes thought that they still had to pattern in a range of fields sometimes, not just language
or literature.

**Classicoid Aestheticism.** The earliest, youthful Kamil, not yet totalistically political, in
an initial period had a sensitive ear for poetic beauty in old Arabic literature, transmuting the
Andalusian style anthologized by Ibn Hazm into the vigorous dialogues of his 1893 play *Fath
al-Andalus* (*The Conquest of Spain*), a triumphalist celebration of the early Arab Muslim
capacity for conquest, therapeutic for the colonized Kamil. International strength and the
al-Nadim-like clashes and warfare of rival religion-focussed far-extending blocs, already the
perspective within which Kamil depicted the struggle for Spain, would henceforth always be
central for the Kamilists. The play was interwoven enough into the parochial ethnic and political
Egyptian realities of the day: its 'Abbad, the Chief Minister who had lived all his life among the
Arabs but was Byzantine-descended, tried to dissuade them from invading Spain: that warned
Egyptians not to trust the resident Christian Syrians and Armenians, liable to collaborate with Cromer. Yet, more than just a political-ethnic barb, *Fath
al-Andalus* also presented 'Abbad, courted by Byzantine emissaries, as an individual wracked
in specific ways by the dual loyalties that can make members of a marginal sect betray a religious
nation to Christian outsiders. Kamil could have become a creative writer with nuanced ad hoc
insights: even as a political organizer and orator, though, he always maintained love for its own
sake of a classical Arabic that subverted his and his audiences’ Egyptian specificities, powerfully
homogenizing them with past and present Arabs outside Egypt.

**Guidance In Modern Society.** The language and poetry of the classical Arabs kept their
sometimes integral grip on Kamil, although he selected and restructured their history and social

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deeply indebted to Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University who took the time to locate,
xerox and airmail this edition to me from Cairo while researching two books of his own there. The play’s original
edition was published in Cairo by al-Adab Press and reprinted by 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, *Mustafa Kamil fi 34 Rabi’ an*
(Cairo: Mitba’at al-Liwa’ 9 vols 1908 - 1911) v. 2 pp. 165ff. Dr Michael Carter, an authority on classical Arabic
literature, assessed that the play’s passages of poetry "do capture the medieval ethos, largely because they are so
entirely within the convention of the love poetry of the period. You can verify this by browsing through Ibn Hazm’s*Tawq al-Hamamah*, which is more or less an anthology of Andalusian love poetry with all the theory added in the
form of commentary". Personal letter from Dr Carter, at that time Lecturer in Arabic at the Department of Semitic
Studies, Sydney University, 2 August 1982. The play’s figure 'Abbad may be meant to cast doubt on the loyalty of
such *dukhalis* (interlopers) as the Egypto-Armenian Nubar Pasha, several times Foreign Minister and Prime
Minister. fn 112.
and political realities to serve the needs of his colonized compatriots. The vehement "superficial religiosity" of his highly political Arabo-Islamic past\(^{57}\) would not make SCs or Copts feel more welcome in Egyptian Arabism but, as much or more than aestheticism, recurred in the responses of Liwa’ists to classical Arab materials. The Azhar-educated 'Abduh might have published the Nahj al-Balaghah (Highroad of Eloquence) ascribed to the fourth Caliph 'Ali, from aestheticism, as beautiful high literature decidedly not by that Caliph, but some al-Liwa’ acculturateds did turn to it for religious-social guidance. A pseudonymous al-Liwa’ writer warned that those who would nominate themselves to tomorrow become the planners and the executors and the spokesmen in the service of this dear homeland EGYPT must give this book the thought it deserves, so that, when they have comprehended its secrets and understood its aims, they can put its incomparable verses into practice ... to help them overcome their illusions and the devils from which they suffer: that it may smash the chains and shackles that the party of greed and imperialism have placed around their necks, hands and feet\(^{58}\).

Like al-Nadim, then, this 1908 al-Liwa’ writer was alert to the political effects of acculturation, which in some respects gave the modern Muslim professional classes more affinity with ascendant aliens than to Egyptians in general. There was the sense in the ranks of the Kamilists that the dual-cultured elite from which they recruited could swing either way politically, as well. Exposure to the primary classical Arab works of, or on, Islam’s first period of greatness was crucial to morally emancipate the educated elite from the “illusions” as well as vested interests that still bound it in collaboration to the masters, hampering it from assuming the leadership role it alone could play in the imminent period of decolonization. The article, however, also conceived both “the Islamic spirit” and the “Muhammadan Civilization” (al-madaniyyat al-Muhammadiyyah) in partially socio-economic terms broader in scope than the moral liberation that the Nahj al-Balaghah’s “wisdom” offered from imperialism and

\(^{57}\) This is a translation of Fritz Steppat’s concept of “oberflächliche Religiosität” in Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil pp. 269 - 271. The simple Islam-fired conquering Arab superhumans that Kamil depicted took scant account of the Prophet Muhammad’s warning to victorious followers that they had returned from the lesser struggle (al-jihad al-asghar) to the greater struggle (al-jihad al-akbar), that to subdue their own passions. The play’s Arabo-Muslim heroes are harmoniously one in their ideological drive to expand the realm of the universal Caliphate centred in Damascus. Kamil did not mention such personality clashes and jealousies as that the Arab governor of North Africa, Musa Ibn Nusayr, at Toledo whipped and put in chains his conquering Berber lieutenant Tariq Ibn Ziyad for refusing to obey orders to halt in the early stage of the campaign. Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, from the Earliest Times to the Present 10 ed. (London: Macmillan 1970) p. 496.

\(^{58}\) "Mufakkir" (pseud.), "Hal Sami’tum bimithli hadha min Qabl?" (Have You Heard Anything Like This Before?), al-Liwa’ 16 May 1908, p.2.
self-interest. Anybody wanting to be well-informed about the Islamic spirit and "the laws/codes/foundations (qawa'id) of Muhammadan civilization cannot confine himself to simple study of the Qur'an and the sunnah (practice) of the Prophet". He must also closely examine, as recorded in the classical works, "the principles and the socio-economic and political regulations and keys to happiness in both this world and the next world" (mafatih al-sa'adatayn) that the Qur'an and the sunnah contained as further implemented in the statements and actions of the first generation of Muslims upon whom the Prophet Muhammad had himself bestowed his personal guidance and instruction. Beyond personal religious beliefs, worship and morality, Islam was thus presented as, in at least its first period of greatness, a comprehensive code impinging in detailed ways upon social, economic and political life.

The impression that a socio-economically prescriptive "Muhammadan Civilization" could be implemented in Egypt’s present, too, was strengthened by an accompanying item that presented a "monumental study on usury" by the Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar. This distinguished Dar al-'Ulum scholar, after World War I, took part in the Young Men’s Muslim Association (Jam’iyyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin) founded by veteran pan-Islamists from Kamil’s movement. al-Najjar was to be active in organizing the YMMA’S solidarity with the Palestinians during their clashes with Jewish settlers in 1929 and well into the 1930s (B 130 fn).

The acculturated Kamilists encouraged Dar al-'Ulum authors to produce new guiding works to the classical Arabs’ complex civilization that were modern in arrangement. Dar al-'Ulum lecturer Hasan Tawfiq al-Adl (1862 - 1904) published the first modern history of Arabic literature in Arabic, Ta’rikh Adab al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah; Mustafa Kamil along with Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh attended al-’Adl’s 1904 funeral in Cairo. The Dar al-'Ulum intellectuals formulated Islam and the old Arab learning in ways that addressed modern Europe-developed knowledge and contemporary situations, thus exactly meeting some very special needs of the modernity-conscious Kamilists. Tantawi Jawhari (1870-1939), an Azhar graduate and Dar al-'Ulum lecturer, in encyclopaedic writings amalgamated Qur’anic motifs and the West’s modern sciences; he voiced activist anti-British nationalism from the pages of

59. Ibid.
61. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum p. 128.
al-Liwa'\textsuperscript{62}. Before Kamil's death in 1908, Dar al-'Ulum intellectuals were influencing al-Liwa' more, for instance through the recruitment of the Tunisian-born 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish (1867-1929) as editor, in which role he intensified the ethno-sectarian conflicts Muslim Egyptians had with Copts and the Syrian Christian residents. Yet as editor of al-Hidayah, Shawish, like Jawhari, was striving to document the harmony of Islam with Europe's modern scientific theories while answering Christian missionary attacks\textsuperscript{63}.

KAMILIST ATTITUDES TO WOMEN

Islam-Qualified Adjustment to the Urban West

Changing relations between the sexes measured (a) how far the Kamilists would adjust to West European norms, and conversely (b) how seriously they wanted to install Islam as social ideology or at least as discourse motifs within the new urban modernity. Some members of the movement and its constituency had, or would have when they launched their careers after their studies, the economic means to maintain households in which the women could be secluded and economically non-productive and perhaps bear the heavy cost of polygamy if they wished.

Among Egyptian historians, Salah 'Isa tried to explain away Kamil and al-Liwa's "savage" and "prolonged" campaign against Qasim Amin's arguments for the abolition of the veil and women's (qualified) right to employment as "political" --- motivated by the intensely conservative attitudes of the Egyptian public, or by enmity between Amin and Kamil's then political patron the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi caused by other issues\textsuperscript{64}. Ibrahim Amin Ghali claimed that Kamil in the controversies that Qasim's writings triggered "became the prisoner of the ideas of his compatriots" --- an argument that maintains intact his presentation of Kamil as "l'homme evolue" who had assimilated, and was committed to implant, the culture of the West. Kamil publicly took sides with "a reactionary conception" because of his political need to stand


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid p. 250. Many of Shawish's al-Liwa' articles were about "Egyptian Woman" and thus contributed to the further Islamization of discussion of that issue in al-Liwa', examined in the next section. Shawish's collection of his al-Liwa' articles titled Abhath 'an al-Mar'at al-Misriyyah wal-Shu'un al-'Ammah noted Daghir, Masadir p. 251.

\textsuperscript{64} Salah 'Isa, "Mustafa Kamil Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" (Mustafa Kamil as a Bourgeois Thinker), Qadaya 'Arabiyyah (Bayrut) March 1976 p. 113.
well with the Khedive and because championing changes to the status of Egyptian women would divide the by and large still conservative society that Kamil before everything was intent to unite in struggle against imperialist rule

Urban students and professionals made up the core following and constituency of Kamil’s movement; yet their secular West-modelled educations did not always preclude conservative stances towards women shared with other strata and classes. Muhammad Husayn Haykal’s memoirs attest that young Egyptians being educated in French or English medium, and who generally supported Mustafa Kamil’s activities to end British rule, overwhelmingly perceived Qasim Amin’s call for the liberation of women as a threat to their religion, Islam. Haykal first became aware of the controversy over Amin’s writings while a student at the Khedivial Secondary School, probably through the pan-Islamic political papers most students read. Around 1906 Haykal entered the School of Law, participating there in the 1906 Law School strike organized by Mustafa Kamil: Amin’s writings and the literature of reply forced "youth" --- he obviously means the acculturated group receiving West-modelled education --- to "think seriously about the issue" of the position of women. "Most of them", though, viewed Qasim’s call as "an apostasy from religion paving the way for atheism".

The stance that Islam should limit or direct change was pronounced in a 1908 al-Liwa’ article assailing increased free mixing between men and women, and titled "Religion Obliges the Giving of Good Counsel". The article quoted the Qur’anic verse "and I did not create jinn or human beings except for them to serve/worship me": worship/service of the Creator had to regulate human relations in detail. To assail the growing freedom of movement and repudiation of the veil by women, the article in addition to Qur’anic verses mustered supporting quotations from genuine and some less assuredly authentic hadiths: "the best mosques for women are the rooms of their houses" and "whoever looks at the attractive features of an unrelated woman out of lust, his eyes will be afflicted on Resurrection Day". But there is also the muddled "quotation"

66. Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (Cairo: 2 vls Mitba’at Misr 1951-3) v. 1, p. 24. Haykal mentions Qasim Amin’s Tahrir al-Mar’ah (The Emancipation of Women), first published too early (1899) for Haykal, born in 1889, to have read an initial serialization in al-Mu’ayyad as an adolescent, as too, perhaps, was Qasim’s 1900 al-Mar’at al-Jadidah. But his interest in Qasim Amin’s writings may well have been first aroused by continuing controversies around his ideas in the political and pan-Islamic papers.
68. "Wa ma khalaqtu l-jinna wal-insa illa liya’buduni”, Qur’an 51:56.
from memory of a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad is supposed to have said "what has the meaning" (ma ma’nahu) "I am a man who feels jealousy and there is no man who does not feel jealousy unless he has lost self-pride". The quality of ghayrah (solicitude, possessiveness, jealousy over a spouse) the article saw as having been lost by "some men" who negligently allowed their wives to leave their chambers at home and go forth unveiled in the full light of day without reason, leading to the corruption of many for "their going forth in this condition is a temptation to those men in whose heart is a sickness, and many are they". The article imaged widespread change in Egyptian society: "the vulgar unveiled costume has spread widely among all the classes, alas!".

Other al-Liwa’ items perceived changes in the life-patterns of women in better-off or educated strata, again implying assent from their menfolk. Sayyid ’Ali interlocked contemporary patriotism with traditional "religious" regulation of human behaviour to resist increased freedom of movement and mixing between them in his May 1908 article titled "Shame and Chastity Cry Out for Rescue Before the Free Movement/Unveiledness of the Fair Young Women". Sayyid ’Ali argued that spreading free movement and disuse of the veil by (urban?) women was an issue in which "every person who is sincerely devoted to homeland (watan), his children and to saving Egypt’s feminine society from pollution is obliged to take an interest". As with most al-Liwa’ articles on the theme, this was no one-sided criticism of the female younger generation. Men

69. "al-Din al-Nasihah" (Religion is Advice) al-Liwa’ in 9 April 1908, p.2. In our examination of this and other al-Liwa’ items we translated the root tabarraja roughly as signifying repudiation of the veil and unregulated movement outside the home on the part of women. al-Liwa’ uses tabarruj which in modern standard Arabic means makeup in a wider, more inclusive, classical Islamic sense. The Qur’an in Surah al-Nur (24:60) permitted women past any prospect of marriage (al-qaw’aid) to take off their outer clothes "ghayra mutabarrijatin bi-zinatin" --- without flaunting or displaying any ornament. al-Baydawi’s interpretation of the “root meaning” of al-tabarruj is “to purposely reveal that which would be hidden”. Safinatun barijah is thus an uncovered ship; al-baraj is expansion of the eyes to show white parts around the iris normally covered. For a woman it thus means “her purposely displaying her ornament (zinah) and her physical charms (mahasinaha) to men”:

al-Baydawi, Anwar al-Tanzil wa Asrar al-Ta’wil (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi. 1955) pt. 2, p. 6. al-Baydawi’s gloss of the use of tabarraja in this verse thus demonstrates that it could have been applied by al-Liwa’ to mean displaying the normally covered face or hands or other parts of the body with sexual appeal rather than, narrowly, using makeup after eliminating the veil. al-Baydawi seems to regard the root as elsewhere also connoting movement by women. The wives of the Prophet are instructed in Surah al-Ahzab (33: v.33) “wa qarna fi buyutikunna wa la tabarrajna tabarruj al-jahiliyyat al-ulal”: "stay in your houses and do not flaunt/display your finery (adornments) or physical charms as was done in the first paganism". al-Baydawi explains that in “the first paganism”, --- the time between Adam and Noah or the period of kufr (unbelief) preceding Islam --- “women used to wear pearls and walk in the road exhibiting themselves to men”. Ibid pt 2, p. 131. Thus the classical Islamic use of the term would cover dispensing by women with the veil and their displaying of their ornaments, makeup, or areas of their body, perhaps while moving outside in public, with the purpose or effect of arousing male sexual feelings.
also must spend more time at home shunning bars, clubs, coffee-shops and houses of ill-fame: "Will they do so, then, to protect their honor and the reputation of their families and to ward off from Egyptian society a danger before which those perils most destructive of societies pale into insignificance?"70. Sayyid 'Ali’s blending of Islamic and Western elements was typical of Kamilist dual-culturedness. In blasting bars, he responded to the effects that European milieus in Egyptian cities had upon post-traditional Muslim men and their family life; their apathy to unveiled movement in public places by their womenfolk had adjusted to Western patterns. 'Ali’s demand for veiling and segregation of women as a precondition for close-knit family units drew on traditionalist religious puritanism. On the other hand, equating coffee houses with infidel bars and brothels criminalized a normal male Muslim form of leisure: his insistence that Muslim Egyptian husbands and wives spend the maximum time together in their homes thus covertly ushered in the Europe-patterned bourgeois monogamous family. Kamilist demands that women be educated to within sight of the level of men --- not for careers but to equip mothers to educate their sons in hyper-patriotism in the home --- further fostered tightened bourgeois soul-mate marriages, although not with Qasim Amin’s less blended Westernism.

Not all items in al-Liwa' identified only changes in the behavior or roles of women as threatening the (Muslim) territorial nation. The past or established situation of Egyptian women was one cause contributing to the Egyptian nation’s backwardness. One 1903 front-page al-Liwa' article "What Must be Done by a Nation that has Lacked the School of the Mother?" blamed the lack of education of many mothers as responsible for their transmission of grotesque superstition, cowardice, servility, cruelty, hatred for education and other anti-social behavior, and moral and intellectual damage to their children71. This article is aware of a new age and that modernization required sharp breaks with features of traditional Egyptian society. The 1903 article carried forward Qasim Amin’s 1899 argument that the relations of mother with child are a main source of the social virtues, that the virtues which exist in the family will exist in the

70. Sayyid 'Ali. "al-Haya'u wal-'Iffah Yastaghithani min Tabarruj al-Ghaniyat" (Shame and Chastity Cry Out for Rescue Before the Unveiledness of the Fair Young Women) in al-Liwa’ 17 May 1908, p. 5. My analysis of this and the other al-Liwa’ articles on women’s issues owes much to two sessions of discussion in 1981 with Ms Pam Doherty, an Arabic graduate of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Melbourne University who has done historical research in Egypt and Jordan. She identified these items’ incorporation of patterns from the West European bourgeois family within assertion of Islamic puritanism, a key aspect I had not noticed.

71. "Madha Yajibu 'ala Ummatin Faqadat Madrasat al-Umm?" (What must be Done by a Nation that has Lacked the School of the Mother?) al-Liwa’, 17 August 1903.
nation, and that Muslim countries are decaying and backward because neither women nor men are educated to create a real family life.\(^{72}\)

Kamil's own pronouncements on women sometimes were like moderately West-influenced liberal writers of the later al-Jaridah or the less post-religious liberal Arab nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s, in adjusting a cherished Islam to the central European patterns. In a second category of communications, though, he evoked incongruent sectors of Islam almost with relish, to contrast the national collectivity against the West. In the first mode, Kamil spoke for his small acculturated Muslim elite, and its adjusted ethos, when he observed that "all the educated people in Egypt hate polygamy": the Qur'an had required husbands to treat any plural wives with complete equality in order to prevent "custom from distorting heavenly religion" --- heading for the standard interpretation of Arab (eg. Jaridist) and Indian acculturated-liberal Islam that Qur'an 4:3 recommended monogamy. (Yet Kamil was as aggressive as defensive towards the Westerners who repatterned him --- the Christians permitted themselves in the name of romantic passion the polygamy that the Muslims permitted with Islam). Was Emancipation of Women so needed in Islamic countries in which the Qur'an urged believers to respect and obey their mothers.\(^{73}\) Women had to be given extensive education so that they could skillfully inculcate nationalism in their children. In his somewhat more integralist Islamic mode, however, Kamil warned that unadapted Western or Western-style education might influence Egyptian women who received it to repudiate the veil etc and therein posed "a great danger to the future of the nation". The significant point, though, is that in affirming the distinctness of Egypt's social patterns in respect to women from the modern West, he closely identifies the authenticity of the Egyptian "nation" with the wider non-Western communities of a general Islamic "civilization", the world's Muslims, "the East". Kamil in 1899 founded the distinct personality of the Egyptian nation threatened by importation of West European female education, upon a separate non-Western civilization (madaniyyah) irreconcilable in areas with the West's:

Every nation has its own civilization. It would not become us to be apes blindly imitating foreigners. We must preserve our good virtues and take from the West only its virtues.

Kamil described the veil as "a protection from sin" (ismah) in the East and advised his

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\(^{72}\) Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age p. 164.

\(^{73}\) 'Isa, "Mustafa Kamil Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" pp. 112-113.
Cairo audience to accordingly maintain their wives and daughters in it.  

The regulation of the relations between the sexes is a singularly sensitive and intimate aspect of any society and in any individual's psyche. This area instanced the deep influence of the modern West on dual-cultured nationalists of Kamil's type, his tenseness towards Westerners as he acknowledged their impact, and his compensating impulse to sectionally differentiate Egypt from them with Islam. He strove to reconstruct and unify Western and Islamic concepts in the context of dialogue with such French friends as Juliette Adam, who came to accept Islamic and Egyptian theory and treatment of women as better than their subordination under French custom and law. The comparative statuses of women in the West and Islam/"the East" continued as a spiritually violent front of reaction by such France-educated Egyptian intellectuals as Tawfiq al-Hakim against the West into the 1950s (B 470 - 471).

In Parochial Partisan Politics

In one (admittedly very factional) context, Kamil in violent language denied the right of a woman to choose a marriage partner against her father's wishes. He took the lead of the hostile campaign that his al-Liwa' waged against the 1904 marriage of al-Mu'ayyad's now pro-British editor Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf to the daughter of the Shaykh al-Sadat (a head of the descendants of the Prophet in Egypt) against her father's wishes. "The Khedive supported the marriage although it scandalized Egyptian Muslim public opinion", Kamil publicly breaking with the Khedive on the issue.

At issue in the savage denunciations by Kamil and colleagues of this marriage is the extent to which traditionalism continued to exert a hold over their emotions, thoughts and actions in despite of their massive exposure to Western-type education. The left-Arabist Salah 'Isa describes the case as presenting two fundamental and far-reaching issues to Egyptian society:

1. Whether an adult sane (rashidah) woman had the right to marry herself under Islamic Law to someone she chose and who chose her regardless of her guardians' opposition.

2. Whether social standing derived from inherited (DW: extra-Egyptian, Arabian) lineage

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74. Ibid
or from an individual’s efforts to raise himself and serve his homeland 77.

Goldschmidt characterized that Kamil’s sensitivity as a politician to public opinion, overwhelmingly hostile to ‘Ali Yusuf’s marriage, decisively led him to oppose the match 78. In trying to explain away the non-modernity of Kamil’s hostile reaction, Salah ‘Isa stresses Kamil’s ideological-political conflict as an anti-imperialist patriot with ‘Ali Yusuf as the latter accommodated himself (with the Khedive) to British power in Egypt following the 1904 Entente Cordiale 79. Another factor was the journalistic-professional rivalry that had gradually developed between the younger Mustafa Kamil and the older Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf. The Shaykh’s al-Mu’ayyad had provided the pan-Islamic forum for Muslim Egyptian aspirations when Kamil launched his nationalist career in the 1890s. Long dependent on al-Mu’ayyad’s columns to reach Egyptians, Kamil in 1900 launched his own al-Liwa’, making himself a newspaper proprietor comparable to Shaykh ‘Ali 80.

We now directly analyze communications from Kamil’s movement on the relationship between the Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf and the Shaykh al-Sadat’s daughter. Mustafa Kamil’s first savage article from Devon titled “From Scandal to Scandal” vented long-standing personal dislike of ‘Ali Yusuf. Yet the denunciation entailed emotionalist exaltation of an independent Islamic social order out of any control from the broader Westernizing outlook and aims some ascribe to Kamil and his acculturated colleagues:

Which of the two is better: a man of us unpredictable in his principles who makes a mockery of Holy Law (yaskharu min al-shari’ah) and customs and ethics and morals and makes a trade of personal abuse or a foreigner to us proclaiming open hostility against us.

80. ‘Ali Yusuf was the pioneer of native Egyptian political journalism and pan-Islamism who founded al-Mu’ayyad in 1889 to voice Egyptian and pan-Islamic views at a time when Syrian Christian editors almost monopolized the Arabic press. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 152 - 153; P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt from Muhammad ‘Ali to Sadat (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1980) pp. 202-204, 228-229. ‘Ali Yusuf was a supporter of the Khedive as was the much younger Kamil for a time: for a jaundiced account of Yusuf’s participation in the Khedive’s promotion of Arab proto-nationalism in Ottoman West Asia, his increased accommodation to the British along with his royal patron, and of the evolution of Kamil’s initially dependent relationship with him see Awraq Muhammad Farid v. 1 (al-Hay’at al-Misriyyat al-‘Anmah lil-Kitab 1978) pp. 122-123. In fairness to Shaykh ‘Ali, he refused to share some of the Khedive’s enemies: “although ... not in sympathy with ‘Abduh’s progressive religious philosophy, he was never the bitter personal enemy of the man that ‘Abbas became. Indeed, he tried to reconcile the two, and remained on good terms with such friends of the Mufti as Hasan ‘Asim and Sa’d Zaghlul”. Aroian, Dar al-Ulum p. 500. The Shaykh ‘Ali of course let ‘Abduh use al-Mu’ayyad as a forum to conduct his fierce 1900 polemic against French Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux.
in weal or woe? .... Should not disobedience by daughters against their fathers be considered destruction for the Family ... and obliteration of the influence that the purified Shari'ah Law has on people's souls?81

At the least, this outburst by Kamil would again constitute his recognition as a peripient politician of the continued attachment felt by his Muslim student and white-collar professional constituency and the press' general literate readership, to Islamic Law (shari’ah) insofar as it would regulate roles and relations of the sexes.

The Kamilists' denunciation of Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf’s match in terms of Islamic religion and law put further strain on relations between Muslims and Copts whom Kamil’s movement was supposed to integrate in a united Egyptian national struggle. The somewhat pro-Occupation Coptic al-Watan felt obliged to defend ‘Ali Yusuf on this occasion also, although with at least verbal expression of diffidence because Islam and Islamic law were supposedly involved. al-Liwa' in reply described the Christian newspaper as disrespectful of Islam, as "wounding the feeling of the masses and elite of the Muslims" and denied al-Watan’s right to examine the testimony of witnesses that preceded the Shar’i Court’s decision against 'Ali Yusuf82. Mustafa Kamil’s followers on al-Liwa’ were thus, even during his lifetime, prepared to pursue and develop the Islamic religious terms of the attack upon Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf where that accentuated the sense of difference between Coptic and Muslim Egyptians, to detriment of multi-sectarian territorial Egyptian nation-building.

The above responses by Kamil and his followers to issues involving male-female relations ran against simple Westernization or a pure secular bi-sectarian territorial nationalism. The input from a spasmodic and politically selective classical Islam, here, again underscores that the Kamilists were not a simple Westernized or Westernizing but dual-cultured decolonization movement. With the blending typical of acculturation, the Kamilists adapted to West Europe’s monogamous ethos but synthesized radical Islamic restorationism with the close-knit West European bourgeois-urban nuclear family. The new family as the basic cell of the territorial nation, and their discussions of inter-sex issues, alike resistantly focused classical Arabic and classical Islam as definants of the political community.


OUTREACH TO EUROPE THEN PAN-ISLAMIC WITHDRAWAL

Acculturation As One Motive in Outreach

In appealing to France, in particular, to eject Britain, Kamil and similar intellectuals were measuring the strength of the international rivalry of these two powers. However, as secular lawyers they had been educated both in Egypt and France in French legal and political concepts, and in book-myths, that were highly formal and theoretical. Kamil mistook the extent to which appeal to these could further draw the French to confront Britain in the Nile Valley. Attaching Egypt's need to the Enlightenment, he compared himself to Benjamin Franklin when he asked Voltaire to urge French aid for American independence. Fueling French rage over British pressure on French personnel and French in the School of Law and other Egyptian institutions, Kamil sometimes rather manipulatively fused France's interests and Egyptian nationalism. Yet these cultural motifs were more than levers for Egypt's interests: Kamil in his precocious, fast-adapting appeals also was testing out French conceptual structures installed by education in his --- and his proto-elite's --- provisional personality. Would the French take back their liberalism and radicalism from Muslims as real coinage for new wider communities? (His elite was sure to swing sharply if the mentors of Progress rebuffed). Outreach was more than cultural naivety: independence via Europe would spare Kamil's still fragile elite from having to ally with popular classes for a devastating direct showdown with Britain. Kamil in France sincerely praised the French as Egypt's most important instructors in "civilization" before 1882 and probably did hope that they could become so again for the long term after evicting Britain. In a

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84. In an early Nouvelle Revue article, Kamil welcomed British description of the Egyptian Nationalists as "the French party" as recognition "by our enemies" themselves that "our cause and that of France form but one". Kamil, "L'Absorption par l'Angleterre" p. 811. Similarly tongue-in-cheek for the long term, greatly though the Caisse hindered Cromer, may have been Kamil's 1895 assurance to the French that Egyptians did not want, and never had, to manage their country's finances other than under the "international institutions" set up by the powers for Egypt's European creditors. Ibid p. 821.
85. Tignor argued that building up an anti-British movement at home would have meant going outside the narrow student and professional sectors supporting Kamil's campaign for independence and that such "broadening of the nationalist movement implied concessions in Mustafa Kamil's political, social and economic program to other groups, such as the urban proletariat". So long as hope of securing Britain's evacuation from Egypt through pressure from (in particular) France remained, the Watani movement "preferred to take a try at the easier way of obtaining independence" by lobbying in Europe. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 268-269.
courteous but firm way, though, he made clear that his movement sought complete independence for Egypt. France had never tried to dominate Egypt before the British conquest. Arabic had been the medium of teaching in the schools and tertiary colleges Frenchmen helped set up under Muhammad 'Ali and Khedive Isma'il and was to become so again after the British. Britain was striving to abolish the mixed courts as a bar to its complete control but Kamil left little doubt that the Egyptian nationalists hoped Europe would dismantle them after independence. Kamil's vulnerability was would the French accept that the cultural affinities of his elite entitled Egypt to an equal alliance and independence?

Pan-Muslim Self-Identification Before West

From his earliest appeals for support to French audiences, Kamil identified himself, his independence movement and Egypt as Muslim and allied to the Ottoman State. He reiterated to his French audiences that the world's Muslims were a loose political community. This, and his constant characterization of Europeans as Christians, harked back to traditional Muslim habits of thought. The very young Kamil, though, wanted to synthesize the traditional wide Muslim community with new associations across religions imposed by the modern age. In 1895, he proposed, to the French public, an alliance of Turkey with Russia and France against England, which would check Britain's alleged encouragement of secessionist Christian movements to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Kamil's proposal amounted to an association of the two European powers with the world's 300,000,000 far-dispersed Muslims against "anti-Muslim" Britain. Support by France and Russia for "weak and humiliated Turkey" and Egypt's freedom from British rule would put the two European powers on "good terms with the Islamic world"

86. Ibid p. 812.
87. Kamil stressed that Arabic, "the national language of the country", was the medium of instruction in the numerous schools that Frenchmen helped establish from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. The British had ended Arabic's role as the language of instruction. Ibid p. 814. Kamil's French audiences would have understood that the nationalists' promotion of Arabic after independence would limit the scope of French while eliminating English.
88. Ibid p. 812.
89. As Wendell observed, "Kamil's annual banquets and speeches, generally given in Paris, on the anniversary of the Sultan's coronation, were ... not likely to convince anyone that he was not a loyal Ottoman subject and a supporter of the pan-Islamic ideology". Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 250. Kamil in 1897 was active in organizing appeals among Egyptians resident in France for the Ottoman war effort against the Greeks. Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kami! Hayatuhu wa Kifahuhu (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Sa'adah 1958) p. 113. This despite Mme Adam's philo-Hellenism! Cf. fn 49.
and further "lasting reconciliation between Muslims and Christians". Addressing the French early in his career, Kamil evoked a new age of open, fluid relations between the Muslim and Christian worlds. He foresaw negative alliances by Muslims with European states against Britain’s imperialism and more long-term associations to realize non-religious "joint interests": yet Christianity and Islam would continue to sustain their two distinct political "worlds". Kamil rather vividly evoked to his French audience the capacity of religious emotions over distant external issues --- not local interests --- to inspire violent action by a Muslim population against Europeans. In Paris in 1895, he depicted India’s Muslims as ready to make the blood of their British masters flow and die themselves because clashes between distant Turks and Armenians seemed to them a British action against "the Caliphate".

Kamil’s consistent affirmation down the years to European and Muslim audiences alike that Muslims were a "world", a far-flung religio-political community, argues that he always sincerely felt some pan-Islamic emotions.

The fortunes of the Ottoman Turks and those of the Egyptians would remain so connected that he had to promote both in Europe, he believed. His French communications sometimes were a thinking-aloud that strove to get an analytical grip on his region, rather than diplomatic images of it modulated to advance Egypt’s interests of that day. Kamil could even analyze the revered Caliphate in an alienated way as an instrument that, misapplied, could harm. The Ottoman Caliphate had on occasion undermined rather than heightened the Muslims’ resistance to British imperialism. Kamil thought that the Sultan 'Abdul-Majid’s disapproval at once quelled all resistance by India’s Muslims during the Rebellion of 1857 to the British, his Crimean allies. Similarly, 'Abdul-Hamid’s declaration that 'Urabi Pasha was a rebel destroyed the will of Egypt’s soldiers to resist the British conquest. Kamil characterized the Turks in unflattering terms as dupes of British diplomacy in the events of 1881 and 1882 through which Britain conquered Egypt. He expressly condemned Turkish foreign policy which since the 1877-1878

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92. Ibid p. 836.
93. Kamil, "Une Alliance qui s’impose" p. 379.
94. Ibid pp. 378-381.
Russo-Turkish war aligned Turkey with Britain while isolating it from other European States. His French audiences must have noted Kamil’s wariness of harm that the Ottoman State’s conduct of its international relations might do to Egypt’s national interests. Yet by already depicting Egypt’s and the Turks’ sovereignties as so interdependent, he could not be pursuing nationalism of an atomistic kind in international relations. Dislike of Turks had deep roots in French high culture. Kamil virulently denounced in La Nouvelle Revue those Christian subjects who challenged the authority of the Muslim Turks. Avoiding serious discussion of intercommunal relations in the Ottoman State or of Armenian nationalism, he instead presented the Armenians as an instrument of the British imperialists. Bearing British arms and the British flag, the Armenians were the aggressors who "provoked" or carried out the massacres throughout the Ottoman Empire. Kamil was aware of the "excited support" that they had won in Europe, he implied somewhat even in France and Russia with which he wanted the Ottoman State allied. He may, to some extent, have been right that Armenian nationalists sometimes did launch attacks against Muslims in the Ottoman

95. Ibid pp. 377, 382. Kamil also had to accommodate to the specificities of the Angophobia of his French supporters. When Kamil Pasha (1832 - 1913: Ottoman Grand Vezir 1885 - 1891, 1895, 1908-9 and 1912 - 1913) was again appointed to the Chief Vezirate in 1895, Juliette Adam described him as "l'homme de l'Angleterre". She depicted England and Germany, both detestable to her, as controlling many prominent Ottoman statesmen. Juliette Adam, "Lettres sur la Politique Extérieure", La Nouvelle Revue, 15 October 1895 p. 833.

96. See Clarence Dana Rouillard, The Turk in French History. Thought and Literature 0520 - 1660 (Paris: Boivin 1940). Mahomet the Conqueror’s career drew from Philippe de Commines an early instance of the Western stereotype of the shrewd, cruel and lascivious rulers of the Turks, dividing their time between wars of conquest and the luxury of the seraglio: p. 27. There was "intense popular concern in France upon occasions of some especial menace of the Turks, as when public rejoicings followed Christian victories over the Turks at the Siege of Malta (1565) and the battle of Lepanto (1571), or when French armies were helping to repulse the Turks in Hungary (1593 - 1601). Ibid p. 357. Francis I took pains to disguise and deny his alliance with Suleyman --- proof enough of strong hostile opinion in France against the Turks. Ibid.

97. In an 1895 letter from Paris, Kamil was inclined to seek lessons and organizational patterns for Egypt’s independence movement from the "Eastern" (sic) Armenians’ activism. But he also described the Armenians as having "no right entitling them to win their demands whereas your [the Egyptians'] rights are the greatest of rights". ‘Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil Pasha fi 34 Rabi’an v. 3. p. 65. However, there was a basis in the demographic realities for the refusal of the acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals to consider the Armenians’ claims for independence. H.G. Hogarth pointed out that there was no "geographical unit of the Ottoman Empire in which Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of Angora, Sivas, Erzeroum, Kharput, and Van, i.e. in easternmost Asia Minor, than elsewhere, ... they are consistently a minority in any large administrative district". Where, then, was it possible to constitute an autonomous Armenia? Quoted Sir J.A.R. Marriott, Europe and Beyond : A Preliminary Survey of World Politics in the Last Half Century, 1870-1920 (London: Methuen 1933) p. 253. Juliette Adam had already forseen the demographic impossibility of an Armenian state: La Nouvelle Revue January-February 1895 p. 413. There were about 1,500,000 Armenians in the Ottoman Empire around the end of the nineteenth century, and 1,000,000 under Russian rule. Art. “Armenia”, ER 10th ed. v. xxxv. p. 637. The populations of Armenians ruled by Tsarist Russia had some importance for Kamilist journalism. These inhabited Karabakh (incorporated from the Ottoman Empire in 1813), Erevan and Nakhichevan (taken from the Ottomans in 1828) and Kars (conquered from the Ottomans in 1878).
Empire in the 1890s, triggering off some bloody reprisals --- although to manipulate the British more often than the other way around99.

The French Anglophobes with whom Kamil had linked had little hostility left over for Muslims and Turks, but this was already a preliminary fault-line between them and the Egyptian nationalists. In remarks preceding Kamil's very first article in La Nouvelle Revue Juliette Adam, while accusing Britain of fostering the Armenians' "Christian fanaticism", warned the Sublime Porte that "the massacres must stop, Muslim fanaticism must be brought under control at all costs"100. Henry Spont observed in La Nouvelle Revue after a 1903 tour of complex, strife-torn Ottoman Macedonia that French public opinion "favors the Bulgars although it knows nothing about them" because "they are Christians and that suffices" --- anti-Muslim phobia throughout Europe of which the Kamilists were ultra-conscious by then101. Kamil's readiness to identify himself and Egypt's independence movement with a not particularly popular Turkey in France/Europe does attest to his pan-Islamic impulse. When discussing the Armenian question to his French (Christian) audience Kamil --- quite oblivious to the Copts' existence, here, --- spoke of Egyptians only as an Islamic community.

98. Kamil's accounts varied somewhat. Armenians, armed with British weapons and bearing the British flag, "provoked" massacres in the Ottoman capital itself. "L'Angleterre et l'Islam", loc. cit. p. 836. Or "Armenians disguised as Muslims, even 'ulama', with arms furnished by the English [committed] all the excesses and massacres, to sow ruin and death in all the Empire, then win as the prize of their misdeeds so much aroused (excited) support! France and Russia themselves had to intervene". "Une Alliance qui s'Impose" pp. 376-377. Cf. findings that Armenian nationalists provoked the communal clashes to involve the Powers, in Jeremy Salt, Britain and the Cause of Ottoman Reform 1876-1896, Australian Middle East Studies Association Working Paper 8 (August 1986) pp. 17-18 and passim.

99. Elie Kedourie argues from official British documents of the time that Armenian nationalists in the 1880s and 1890s mounted armed attacks on Muslims with the deliberate intention to provoke maximum Turkish violence against their own Armenian communities. The "clear" aim of Armenian nationalists in such organizations as the Dashnakzoution (Armenian Revolutionary Federation established in 1890) "was to create 'incidents', provoke the Turks to excesses and thereby bring about the intervention of the Powers" --- who would force the Turks to grant autonomy (ultimately independence) to the Armenians. Armenian committees in Erzerum were procuring arms for revolt as early as 1882. Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Essays (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970) p. 295. Kedourie, a Jewish Iraqi scholar by ethnic origin, opposed all Middle East nationalisms. Cf. Salt, op. cit.


101. Henry Spont, "A Travers La Macedoine", La Nouvelle Revue 1 May 1903 p. 52. An article titled "al-Mas'alat al-Maqduniyyah" (The Macedonian Question), al-Liwa' 16 February 1903, noted that hatred of Turkey had reached a peak in general Europe. Gladstone in 1876 had promoted press campaigns to whip up feeling over Bulgarian massacres as an excuse to dismember the Ottoman Empire. But even if a major European newspaper took Turkey's side now, "the policy of the [European] States toward her would not change for a single instant". Turkey had no one to help her in Europe: she could rely only on the sword she had in her hand and on her brave troops.
Their acquired French culture conditioned the bilingual Kamilists to seek humane relations with a true liberal Europe, against an unrepresentatively predatory Britain. Egyptian interests further fostered selective perception of Europe. Kamil's call that "the Sultan take the hand of Russia and France" ignored --- only for the time --- the fate of extensive Muslim populations in Central Asia under Russian rule\textsuperscript{102} and of the North African and sub-Saharan Muslim populations conquered, or being conquered, by France. Continuous interaction with French culture and France was to confront such anti-imperialist Egyptian intellectuals as Kamil and especially Muhammad Farid with French colonialism in Algeria in particular (Chs. 4 and 5). Seeking France and Russia’s help to dislodge Britain, the anti-colonialist Egyptian intellectuals may even in this initial phase have felt, but repressed, reservations about French and Russian colonization of Muslims.

Kamil’s presentation of himself to the French as the spokesman of a wider pan-Muslim political community as well as of Egypt was consistent throughout his whole nationalist career. In one plain-spoken 1903 \textit{Le Figaro} article, he introduced himself as a link of communication between two civilizations, "the brilliant, immortal [Islamic] civilization" and that of the West: "he who addresses [Frenchmen] now is a Muslim Egyptian who yet received his education from French professors and is inclined with all his soul to promote conjunction and lasting peace between Muslims and Christians". France had not yet signed the Entente Cordiale, but Kamil by 1903 voiced a depressed awareness of how far the educated French public shared a general European distaste for Muslims and of France as a participant in imperialist conquests and colonialism. It was "a false charge" that the Muslims hate "the contemporary sciences" and "modern civilization": "if the Muslims hate Europe and its civilization and everything that comes from it, that is only because it ... robbed them of their independence"\textsuperscript{103}. Kamil was thus consistent over a decade that dual culture emotionally pushed him and his small elite to seek an alliance with Europe: but the colonialist drive of European powers, including France, against

\textsuperscript{102} Russians were engaged in conquering the vast area of the Kazakh steppe from 1730. In the nineteenth century, Russia conquered sedentary peasant or urban Muslims in Central Asia. The Russians attacked the Khanate of Kokand in 1864 - 1865, conquering Tashkent. In 1868 they invaded Bukhara, reducing its Amir to vassal status. The Russians occupied the Turkmen country between 1873 and 1884. Nine million people in the Kazakh steppe and Central Asia were under Russian rule by 1881. Geoffrey Wheeler, \textit{The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia} (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964) p. 65. Captain Alexander de Mayer, a participant narrated Russia's bloody conquest of Turkmen and other Muslims in "Les Memoires d’un Blesse", \textit{La Nouvelle Revue} January-February 1895 pp. 85-97, September-October 1895 pp. 266-280, and November-December 1895 pp. 727-749.

\textsuperscript{103} Mustafa Kamil, "Urubba wal-Islam" (Europe and Islam), \textit{al-Liwa’}, 22 September 1903.
Muslims had ignited a popular fury against everything at all linked to the West that jeopardized even internal modernization by West-orientated Muslim elites like his own. (Haykal and the Liberal Constitutionalists in the 1920s, but especially after 1945 as the West imposed Israel, had some parallel perceptions: Britain and other Western states were not adequately rewarding acculturated incrementalists who wanted to move to equal alliances --- indeed, in inflicting Israel, they ignited fundamentalism likely to destroy the dual-cultured elite: B 133 - 135; B 203 - 209).

Circumstances of international politics and Egypt’s interests cannot wholly explicate the Watani intellectuals’ statements that general Europe did not mean harm to the Ottoman State. Years after hopes for alliance with European states to dislodge Britain from Egypt faded, Kamilist intellectuals occasionally felt an urge to deny that general Europe was hostile against the Ottoman State and the world’s Muslims. As late as April 1908 Sayyid ‘Ali in al-Liwa’ tried to counter the impression that a range of European States were pursuing policies detrimental to “our Ottoman State”. He advised his Egyptian readers “to look for the English hand in the troubles of the Ottoman State”: it was England that incited “the States of Europe to draw the sword of enmity in the Ottoman State’s face”. “Were we to scrutinize every event in which a State among the States has appeared as hostile to the Caliph we would find that it was the English hand which ignited the fire from behind a screen”104. Sayyid ‘Ali’s argument might pragmatically concentrate Egyptians’ hatred of the imperialist, Christian West against the British enemy who had to be dislodged from Egypt’s chest (internal mobilization). But we view his argument that general Europe was fundamentally benign towards the Islamic Ottoman State as also determined by culture. It was Sayyid ‘Ali’s private French self-bilingualization and continuing interactions with France105 that made him psychologically unwilling to credit the reality that most Europeans disliked Muslims and that this had to affect the policies of their governments to the Ottoman State.

105. Sayyid ‘Ali (1880-1932) after secondary school studies worked as a translator in al-Liwa’. He studied at Cairo’s French Law School. When Mustafa Kamil established L’Etendard Egyptien (March 1907) he appointed Sayyid ‘Ali to translate excerpts from the Arabic press into French for publication, and in 1907 sent him as a correspondent of al-Liwa to Paris. I am grateful to Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. of the University of Pennsylvania for supplying me with this biodata on Sayyid ‘Ali.
Early Kamilist outreach to Europe was not too expedient. Kamil's frank discussions to the French were clearly not meant to appease the Ottoman State, which did have legal title to endorse Britain in Egypt: he rather was feeling for a complex, long-term alignment of Egypt, the Ottoman State and France-Europe strenuously built to last. To both French/European and Egyptian audiences, Kamil long presented himself as representing the chain of acculturated elites modernizing the Muslim world. Conditioned by Arabic, he defined the extensively laicist French more as Christian (and Egypt more as Muslim) than he need have. His earlier impression that French culture could tolerate alliance with a Muslim camp and his later one that France was a component in a Christian camp subjugating Muslims both heightened his consciousness of a wide pan-Muslim political community.

**Acculturation Could Also Alienate From Other Muslims**

Kamil's early stress to European audiences on Egypt's achieved or prospective Europeanization was more than manipulation. Connected with self-image in his suggestions that Egypt might become a conduit or intermediary for French/European culture and interests to flow to still-traditional Muslim peoples, this was a cultures-determined identification. It will recur at intervals whether appropriate to the political situations these intellectuals face, or not.

Throughout all the shifts of his attitudes to other Muslims and Westerners, Kamil remained consistent that a Europe-derived facet was central to his elite. Statements by Kamil in 1895 (Paris) and 1906 (to the English) voiced with consistency these intellectuals' acculturation-created marginality between (a) the general xenophobic Islamic and Afro-Asian world and (b) the colonizing West. In 1895, he warned *La Nouvelle Revue's* readers that around half of the world's Muslims believed in the "systematic hostility" of general Europe against Islam: in contrast, he represented that "small minority" of "old students of France" now struggling to draw a xenophobic Muslim world into alliance and collaboration with the European states (minus Britain). In 1906, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey justified the Dinshawai executions as a response to fanaticism spreading along all northern Africa. Denying in a 1906 interview to the *Daily Chronicle* that Egypt's Muslims were "fanatical" against Christians or would politically reamalgamate an independent Egypt in the Islamic Ottoman State,

106. "Un Alliance qui s'Impose" p. 377.
Kamil observed

We have taken great pride in our schools and in our intellectual movement ... since the days of Muhammad 'Ali because the Egyptian nation is the first Islamic nation to embrace the European civilization. However, it seems to us now that the English look upon us as though we were the natives of the Congo! It is well known that our young men used to be sent from a century back to France and Germany and England to receive their education ... in those countries' institutions. The result is that we Egyptians now enjoy a higher education in no wise less than that available in the greatest of the European countries. It is an error, then, that we be compared to Morocco or to the natives of Lake Chad as the majority of the English compare us.107

He was at risk here of internalizing "civilizing mission" motifs, with which France would justify her conquest of Morocco108 and of (partly Muslim) black West African populations (Lake Chad, Zinder), motifs with which the Belgians rationalized their ravaging of the Congo. Unconsciously, Kamil was undermining political solidarity by Egyptians with major Arab and African populations resisting colonization. His humiliation as an acculturated that Britshers should associate Egyptians, perceived by him as widely European-educated, with Morocco voiced scant regard in this particular context for unmixed traditional Arab-Islamic culture, which Morocco had. Indeed, Kamil bracketed traditional-literate Islamic Morocco with the non-literate (if until recently Arab-influenced) animist Congo.

Kamil conceived the black African populations with which he refused to identify Egypt in London in 1906 as to a great extent Muslim. Those around Lake Chad (Central Africa) and in Zinder (West Africa) mentioned by him included many Muslims with some Arabic literacy. Kamil in England specifically connected rejection of sub-Saharan black Africans of Lake Chad and Zinder to his rejection of traditional Islamic "fanaticism" which fostered hostile acts against Europeans merely because they were non-Muslim:

No ... Egypt is not at all fanatical, and it would be truly bad faith to compare it to Chad, to

108. France's conquest of Morocco was progressing when Kamil gave his 1906 London interview. In 1902 the young modernizing Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz was forced to recognize French authority in the Tuat region of the central Sahara. In 1903, the French occupied Colomb, and in 1904 Berguent, on the Algerian frontier. In 1904 England had given France a free hand to conquer Morocco in return for France's recognition of the permanency of British rule in Egypt. In 1912, Sultan 'Abd al-Hafiz signed the Treaty of Fez, establishing a French Protectorate over the whole country. Juliette Adam's own Nouvelle Revue published a racist article by Albert de Pouvourville in 1904 anticipating the extinction of Algeria's Arabs. The article envisaged Morocco as one of the "successive annexes" of future French expansion from Algeria. Albert de Pouvourville, "Peuplement Rationnel de l'Afrique du Nord", La Nouvelle Revue 15 September 1904 pp. 147, 148, 153.
Zinder and to other lands sunk in the worst darkness of ignorance.

Kamil’s 1906 outburst at British application of anti-Islamic stereotypes against Egyptian nationalism brought out that he sometimes somewhat shared their view of the overall Muslim world. He empathized why most Muslims felt as they did about Westerners but Egypt’s Europe-derived facet could never fit into insularist Muslim societies, whether pre-colonial or those reacting against colonial rule. Kamil even implied that the Ottoman state had progressed less on the spectrum away from those purist Muslim societies than Egypt: he felt some alienation in respect to modernization from the Turks, also. In this type of spasm, he wanted to limit Egypt’s reintegration with the Ottoman Turks and certainly with pre-modern Muslim societies whose xenophobia clashed with the acculturative functions of his class. He wanted to direct some time and energy away from other Muslims into building new relationships with Western societies.

Gradual Equation of all Europeans as Fanatical Against Muslims

Not always facile or slick, Kamil made clear to Europeans that he was working for a new extension of relationship not just between Egypt and France but between an array of Muslim and European communities. The compound architecture could fail and could endanger his elite. New secular nexuses between Muslims and Europeans --- common interests, liberal-progressive ideology, French culture --- initially subordinated, but for Kamil never eliminated, Islamic and Christian impulses and identities. There was little reason why he had to raise Armenians and Turks at all in France from the angle of Egypt’s narrow interest: yet Kamil thought the new energies and bases for relationship that had opened in the European mind gave him leeway to address points of Muslim-Christian antagonism. He was banking that most Europeans were unfired by the anti-Islamism that Britain whipped up, that there was religiously neutral liberalism as well as imperialists in Europe.

He early had doubts that the British might not be so unrepresentative. To a French

109. Mustafa Kamil’s press conference on 26 July 1906 at Carlton Hotel, London, in Juliette Adam, L’Angleterre en Egypt p. 161. In denying that Europe-dyed Egypt was “fanatical” like pre-modern Morocco etc, Kamil was refuting British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. In order to justify the executions of peasants at Dinshaway, Grey rambled in Parliament that “all this year a fanatical feeling in Egypt has been on the increase. It has not been confined to Egypt, it has been stretching along the north of Africa generally. It is for that reason a little time ago that the garrison had to be increased”. The Times 6 July 1906 p. 7c.
audience in 1895 Kamil made the barbed observation that "the European powers have seized the
countries of the Orient under the pretext of civilizing them". But "Egypt has been civilized" (had
Europeanized itself of its own will) "without having to be subjected to any power" (force ---
puissance). There was incipient scepticism here about the motives of most Europeans in
international relations. Stronger, though, is Kamil’s hope that Europe will treat Egypt, because it
had modernized itself, differently from non-self-modernizing peoples it colonized. Europe
should free Egypt, given its record of self-modernization, "to prove that Europe works
disinterestedly for the happiness of all men".110.

Differences of religion and race were possible barriers to sympathy from Europeans. Already in 1895 Kamil sensed a racial orientation in the French whom he addressed. Appealing
for Europe's aid to free Egypt from British rule, he rhetorically asked whether the same rights
did not apply to the man of Africa as to the man of Europe111? Kamil ultimately came to
consider Western religious hostility to Islam the reason why Europeans refused to treat the
Muslim Egyptians as they treated other Europeans. In his initial optimistic appeals to Europe,
however, he obviously thought prejudices against Islam secondary in the personality of the
French: he would not otherwise have repeatedly mentioned Egypt’s Muslimness.

He had, of course, been aware that British politicians took account of the Islam of
Egyptians. As Prime Minister, the Liberal leader Gladstone presided over Britain’s conquest of
Egypt in 1882. Yet, as Kamil grew to manhood, Gladstone in violent language demanded
autonomy or independence for Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. Kamil at first
thought in terms of nations forming relations across religious lines as interests dictated, but then
circumstances entangled Egypt’s independence with European pan-Christianism and conflicts
between Muslims and Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire, in his mind. Kamil in
1896, in two letters, asked Gladstone to call for British evacuation from Egypt. But Gladstone,
who had recently championed the rights of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, did not raise
his voice for the liberation of Egypt. Steppat presents this incident as a turning-point in Kamil’s
attitude to the general West, rather than to Britain alone. Gladstone’s contrasting attitudes to

110. "L’Absorption par L’Angleterre" p. 822. Kamil’s choice of words associated British imperialism and
that of the other European countries whose aid he sought (France in the first place). The European countries "se sont
emparees de" (have seized) the countries of the Orient. Britain’s great aim was "s’emparer definitivement de

Christian Armenians and (predominantly) Muslim Egyptians opened up a chasm between the Christian West and the Muslim Orient in the young Kamil’s mind, and he generalized from the individual Gladstone’s inconsistency that a religious fanaticism was the driving force of general European politics.\textsuperscript{112}

Kamil had been already hostile to Gladstone in his communications to the French in the previous year, in which he identified him as incarnating British forces acting from Christian drives against Muslims, especially "les Turcs" and the Egyptians. Kamil vitriolically assailed Gladstone’s pretensions to "have only humanity in view", to "have no bias against the Turks", to be "the liberal man".\textsuperscript{113} The British distorted Europe’s secular humanitarianism to cloak their anti-Muslim expansionist drive. Could they thereby corrupt even the French, whose aid Kamil sought? Even in 1895, he had a stab of apprehension. He characterized Britain as endeavoring to create "a profound abyss between Islam and Christianity in its own interest and only in its own interest".\textsuperscript{114} Kamil defensively mentioned to the French alleged British charges that Egyptians opposed the Occupation out of religious fanaticism\textsuperscript{115}: he probably feared that such British charges might activate Christian anti-Muslim feelings in even the more secularized French and other Europeans --- making them legalize British control. He sometimes revealed considerable apprehension that any incident could involve France in joint political action with Britain against Muslim interests. Thus, he tried to convince French readers that Britain organized "the disturbance at Jeddah in which were wounded the consuls of England (sic) of Russia and of France", to involve the two latter powers more deeply in Ottoman Armenia.\textsuperscript{116}

At the time of the early 1895 appeals to Europe, Kamil wanted to believe that "there is no prejudice against Islam" in general Europe. France and Russia had intervened in the Armenian question as mediators, not like Britain as the Ottoman State’s enemy.\textsuperscript{117} Kamil’s Arabic

\textsuperscript{112} Steppat, Nationalismus p. 307-308. Kamil saw the Armenian Nubar Pasha, at various times Egypt’s Foreign Affairs minister and Prime Minister under the British, as collaborating with them in the expectation that they might help his people carve an independent homeland out in the Ottoman Empire. The young Kamil’s sense that Armenians were collaborative "interlopers" (dukhalā’) comparable to certain subsidized SCs was fueled by praise of Nubar by Colonel Baring, brother of Cromer, with whom Kamil conversed on a steamer en route to Paris for a lobbying session. Letter by Kamil to Khedivial official Ahmad Shafiq Pasha, cited Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu’asir (Bayrut: 2 vols Dar al-Irshad 1970) v. 1 pp. 222 - 223.

\textsuperscript{113} “L’Angleterre et l’Islam” p. 836.

\textsuperscript{114} “Une Alliance que s’impose” p. 377.


\textsuperscript{116} “L’Angleterre et l’Islam” p. 837.

\textsuperscript{117} “Une Alliance qui s’impose” p.377. Yet Russia always was much more manipulative than Britain, and
speeches suggest that his interactions with Europe very quickly convinced him that Europeans in
general were religiously hostile to Ottoman Turks: this sharpening perception worked to alienate
him from non-British Europeans quite independently of their attitudes to Egypt’s independence.
Kamil lost hope that European powers would intervene to expel Britain from the Nile Valley
when Britain intimidated France to back down at Fashoda in 1898. Even in the previous year,
though, he was speaking of the European states in general as hostile to the Ottoman State out of
animosity to Muslims in general. Resident foreigners criticized Egyptians for sending aid to the
Ottoman State in the 1897 - 1898 Greco-Turkish War. In a speech of 7 June 1897, he replied:

> From the religious viewpoint no intelligent person could blame Egypt for the aid she
gives to the Khilafah (Caliphate), for the governments of Europe have openly proclaimed
> that the basis of their policy in the East is to assist Christians by all means. This is a
> principle to which they have clung tenaciously and carried far.\(^{118}\)

Kamil in that speech did not name France, which claimed to protect Ottoman Syria and
'Iraq’s Catholics, and sought a special status in Syria\(^{119}\). Even at that rather early date, however,
he clearly perceived that religious sectarianism determined the foreign policies of the European
states in the Muslim East: they were banding together to harm the Muslims’ interests.
Responding in self-defence, Muslims were banding together on the international stage on a basis
of shared religion as well as shared interests. Two hostile religious international blocs were
forming. The situation is becoming like the classical dar al-Harb vs dar al-Islam paradigm.
Kamil’s recent dream of secular alliances between Muslim nations and Christian European states
was already collapsing.

The most secular Western concepts may have pulled the very young Kamil towards the
attitude that religions need not define either atomistic nations or their international relations at
all. His and his colleagues’ pan-Islamism, though, is not to be viewed narrowly as a resurgence
of Arabo-Islamic cultural survivals (that culture, anyway, always remained vital under pounding
and resource-starvation) when Europe’s anti-Muslimism so strongly worked to pan-Islamize the

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\(^{118}\) Rashad, Mustafa Kami!, p. 116.

\(^{119}\) Steppat, Nationalismus pp. 309-310, cites Kamil’s awareness of competition between the European
powers to take over the Holy Cities of Palestine. This would cover French ambitions in Syria.
Egyptians in most contact. The anti-Muslim texture of French high culture trickled over into the conceptualization of international affairs by the journalistic and political opinion leaders whom Kamil had to draw into support for Egypt's independence. The anti-Islamic phobia many Europeans had against the Turks constantly jarred his nerves as he propagandized for Muslim Egypt, uphill enough a venture in itself. Kamil cited solidarity with Armenians and Bulgars by such British Christianist Turcophobes as Gladstone to bring home to Europeans how normally Europeanoid was his own movement's symmetrical --- but similarly limited --- counter-solidarity with the Turks\textsuperscript{120}. But it was the French to which he opened himself with least reservations, that showed how pervasively Christianity defined European nations both internally and in world affairs. Kamil repeatedly encountered in France anti-Semitism sparked by the drawn-out Dreyfus affair, which dragged on from 1894 through 1906: such mainly French anti-Semitism was one more phenomenon driving home to him that "religious fanaticism" was after all the fundamental force in European politics\textsuperscript{121}. Given their cultural and emotional vulnerability during pre-1919 outreaches to Europeans, the incorrigible Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in all Western states had to bulk somewhat out of perspective for Kamil and other acculturated intellectuals. They did not, though, dream up these lethal heritages that mutated more than they guessed for post-Christian settings. Europe's example could sectarianize as well as secularize the Egyptian polity and its

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\textsuperscript{120} Kamil's London Chronicle interview, tsd "al-Sultan wal-Islam", \textit{al-Liwa'} 28 July 1906 p. 1. If Gladstone could call the Armenians his "Christian Brothers", the Egyptians had the same right to a parallel "inherent natural sympathy" for the Turkish cause. They would not, however, be reincorporating Egypt into the Ottoman Empire. \textit{Ibid}. For the accusations of "fanaticism" that Kamil was answering from Sir Edward Grey, see fn 109.\textsuperscript{121} Steppat, \textit{Nationalism} p. 310. Edouard Drumont, the anti-Semite who edited \textit{La Libre Parole} and wrote \textit{La France Juive} was one of the rightist literati to whom Mme Juliette Adam introduced Kamil and who helped open the pages of leading Paris newspapers to him. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" loc. cit pp. 314-315. Drumont branded French Jews as disloyal in his newspaper following Captain Dreyfus' conviction for treason in 1894. Drumont's paper was among a few far-right organs that kept up attacks on Britain in Egypt after the Entente Cordiale detached mainstream French conservatives from Egyptian nationalism. Arie, "Juliette Adam" pp. 135-6. Kamil, though, at last let slip what he thought of such continental elements at a 1906 press conference in London. Egyptians were not religiously fanatical (as Sir Edward Grey was charging), he told the British --- "it is impossible that there could exist in Egypt parties like the anti-Semitic parties or the extreme political parties or the religious parties found in Europe now". London Daily Chronicle interview translated in "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan and Islam), \textit{al-Liwa'} 28 July, 1906, p. 1. This stance was traditional among Egyptian pan-Islamists; 'Abdallah al-Nadim's paper had argued that eruptions by Russians against Jews showed Europe's Enlightenment and philosophers had not overcome the persecutory fanaticism almost inherent in its brand of Christianity. "La Ikraha fil-Din" (No Compulsion in Religion), \textit{al-Ustaclh} 27 December 1892, pp. 442-443. For European anti-Semitism as: motif in acculturated Muslim Egyptian anti-Coptism at the close of the 1920s B 38-39. Cf. Stephen Wilson, \textit{Ideology and Experience: Anti-Semitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair} (Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1982).
international relations: Haykal was to cite British restrictions on Jews to justify political limitations against Egyptian Christians at the end of the 1920s (B 38 - 39).

Assessment

The Kamilists were much more a movement of youth --- specifically, of that youth minority receiving the most Westernizing educations --- than was any other political current in British-ruled Egypt. The age-category of the bulk of members and followers, and the cultural deprivations amid which they grappled with two civilizations, had to entail some half-baked episodism. Yet, for all the gaps that the British enemies mocked, Kamil and his collaborators got a great body of data about both Islamic and Western civilization and societies across to an emerging, shaky Muslim Egyptian elite --- and were already often able to relate and interweave those two worlds. Egypt between 1882-1922 did not encounter either Britishers or British culture at their best and the Kamilists did not attempt some younger Jaridists’ engagement with the purple poetry as well as thought of Britain and English-speaking America. Nonetheless, they gave at least French liberal secularoidism recurrent hearings and, in their lobbying outreach, recycled and tested it as the basis for a new equalized world order. Kamil and his colleagues could selectively highlight exactly those sectors of the Arabo-Islamic past of most use to focus current resistance to imperialism, but they did not concoct the slabs they presented. For many Muslim teenagers whom Dunlop otherwise could have cut off in his secular-stream schools, al-Liwa’ offered continuous access to Islam and its classical Arab history --- as it did many busy professionals who read and heard mainly French and English in Alexandria and Cairo. Islam and the classical Arabs fitted vividly with the modern West in symbiosis or dichotomized, but the Kamilists need not have kept them that central. The British had phased standard Arabic out of modern institutions but the Kamilists would never leave it alone in the mosques to die. It could have made good sense for instantly mobilizing all classes of Egyptians had they orated or even written in the colloquial. Instead, al-Hizb al-Watani with never-ceasing classical-medium plays, mass oratory, indoor functions, lectures, anti-British poetry --- and an al-Liwa’ each of whose 40,000 copies was read by and intoned to multiple individuals --- obliged at least educated Egyptians to daily follow standardizing pan-Arabic in their most topical concerns.

There were always some tensions between the Kamilists’ Islamic-Arab and Western
components but at all stages they held the two in gradually-changing mixes. It was in regard to
the allocation of roles between the sexes that Islam made Kamil and his colleagues (including
Muhammad Farid\textsuperscript{122}) significantly diverge from even their France, yet we showed that the
Liwa’ists’ ostensible restorationism was really a covert synthesis with West Europe’s urban
bourgeois nuclear family. Outreaches to Europeans engaged the Watanists more deeply with
Western secularoid ideologies. Yet, the very young Kamil made clear from the start to the
French he courted that his aim was a completely independent Egypt with standard Arabic as its
official and educational language: the French would have roles only as allies and advisers. From
the outset, Kamil strove to build a lasting association with European states: accordingly, he
urged, notably, the French to fit an adjusted relationship with the Ottoman Turks into the coming
alliance with Egypt, given that relations with one of these two Muslim peoples entailed a
relationship with the other. He sincerely, not diplomatically, admired a French language and
thought that were a component of his and his colleagues’ psyche, and the early tensions in his
outreach sprang less from Arabo-Islamic incongruence with more secularoid French liberalism
and nationalism than from from his doubts that the French or other Europeans would live up to
the leeway for friendship with Muslims that their formal ideologies offered.

Their earlier exposure to modernist European thought and languages significantly
alienated Kamil and his comrades from monocultural, traditional Muslim populations, Arab or
black African. Later, their progressively heightening sense that Westerners and
Muslims/Easterners were becoming two warring blocs was to make them feel more like Muslim
populations (and Congolese) that had not self-Westernized with the resolve of Egypt since
Muhammad ’Ali. Nonetheless, their initial pursuit of the West permanently marked the
Kamilists. They always kept their sense that Egypt and Muslims had to duplicate not just the
West’s technologies and patterns of strength but its internal liberal-parliamentary order. The firs
thrust for independence of these Francophone secular lawyers had been water-tight legal briefs
presented to the true Europe: and even after Gorst and Kitchener drove them out of Egypt, such
al-Hizb al-Watani leaders as Muhammad Farid would remain very reluctant to take the road of

\textsuperscript{122}. In 1913, Muhammad Farid in his diaries rapped the defeatism of Rifa’at Pasha, Ottoman ambassador
to Geneva, who accepted that “the Muslim Woman” in Turkey would have to give up the veil. Farid in contrast
wanted women to be educated at all levels including the tertiary, but could not but “deeply disapprove any proposal
to make the Muslim woman like the European woman in morals, after the moral corruption we see here [in Europe]
among all classes as a result of free-mixing”. Farid, \textit{Awraq} p. 118.
counter-terrorism. Their liberal Western culture and legal-professional functions and their class interests in tandem long delayed the uprising to which the class-broadening of the Party after Kamil was a preliminary. Yet, in so many ways, it had been the intimacies and broad-scatter courting of such a range of Europeans that pulled together Kamilism’s longer-term image of the West as one enemy entity and fueled its counter-integration of the Arabo-Islamic camp (Ch. 4).

The Europe-bound Kamilists of the 1890s were the archetype for all subsequent doomed, radicalizing outreach by other groups of Muslim Egyptian acculturateds up to the 1952 coup. Despite repeated rebuffs, the later Kamilists, the Jaridists and post-1922 al-Siyasah/Liberal Constitutionalist intellectuals and politicians clung to the cultural illusion that appeals to the West’s formal liberal ideologies --- after 1922 its literary aestheticisms also figure more --- would convince Westerners that they owed Egyptians concessions or aid. The languages and journalistic and intellectual discourses in the West had become a part of their make-up. Through their outreaches, Egyptian intellectuals repeatedly set themselves up for sweeping reaction against Westerners or things Western when too many rebuffs came.
CHAPTER 4: PAN-ISLAMISM AS A MODERN IDEOLOGY IN THE PARTY OF MUSTAFA KAMIL

ATTITUDES TO OTTOMAN TURKS

Egyptianist and Islamic-Campist Dualities in the Kamilists' Relations with the Ottoman State

Mustafa Kamil and his comrades tirelessly strove to achieve Egypt's independence. They also devoted much effort, however, to relating their movement to the Ottoman Empire and its cause. Educated Egyptians have naturally differed about the ultimate meaning of the movement launched by Kamil. Was it primarily Egypt-centred, ushering in a self-contained Egyptian nationalism? Or did Kamil's movement unleash Islamic community emotions of strength that might:

(a) Abort the growing consciousness of an Egyptian territorial nation of Copts and Muslims.

(b) In the long term reamalgamate Egypt as a political entity with another Islamic state (the Ottoman State).

In the period of British colonial rule, Kamil's colleagues put about equal weight upon his promotion of pan-Islamic community and his contribution to the growth of specifically Egyptian national consciousness. Such dual characterization spoke to the pan-Islamic orientation of Kamil's urban efendi constituency. The 1908 evaluation of Kamil published soon after his death by his successor Muhammad Farid balanced in this fashion Kamil's pan-Islamism with his promotion of specific Egyptian interests and identity:

Has he [Kamil] not played the main role in calling on people to adhere to the most illustrious throne of the Caliphate, to be devoted subjects of His Highness our Lord the Commander of the Believers and to ward off the evil designs of the invader authorities from the legal Khedivial authority? Has he not been a long-standing advocate of the Egyptian national university and the strengthening of the Islamic fleet and aid for the project of the Hamidian Hijaz Railway and ... with his two strong hands smashed in the doors of prison, releasing the Dinshawai prisoners?¹

However, in an oration at Kamil's grave, Farid hailed Mustafa Kamil as having by his sacrifice

¹ Farid's tribute was printed in Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil fi Arba'a wa Thalathina Rab'i'an (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa, 1908 -1911) vol. 1. pp. 50-51.
of his youth unified the Egyptian nation in all its elements, Muslim, Christian and Jewish "as one man". In his published tribute, too, Farid credited Kamil with having pioneered a new Egyptian consciousness. It was founded on pride in belonging to the Egyptian homeland and directed to political action to achieve that homeland’s independence.

In contrast, a former member of al-Hizb al-Watani, the historian 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, in 1939 argued that Kamil’s affirmations of a relationship with the Ottoman State were a mere tactic. Kamil limited his patriotic struggle to the British occupation because he "rightly" saw that their withdrawal would in itself give Egypt full independence. With the British gone, getting free from Ottoman suzerainty would be easy, for the Turks’ suzerainty "had long been getting looser and looser, nothing remaining of its visible manifestations save the jizyah" --- which Egypt in any case paid to Turkey’s European creditors until 1935. Kamil’s lip-service to Ottoman suzerainty al-Rafi’i called "a wise national stand" that enabled him to disingenuously ask the British to end their ostensibly "temporary" occupation of Egypt and thereby fulfil the international treaties to which they were signatory: especially the 1840 Treaty of London in which the Great Powers recognized Egypt’s independence under the family of Muhammad Ali, with a nominal Ottoman suzerainty. Kamil was "unable to achieve both the abolition of Ottoman sovereignty and a British evacuation simultaneously".

al-Rafi’i’s thesis that Kamil’s relationship to the Ottoman State was nothing but an international legal expedient to achieve Egypt’s independence has become almost an orthodoxy among secularist Egyptian historians, including pan-Arabist ones. Such post-World War I accounts of Kamil sometimes rather blatantly rewrote history --- including, on occasion, the

3. Farid’s full formulation ran that Kamil "was the first Egyptian whose voice resounded in the East and the West. He was the first Egyptian to firmly and consistently demand evacuation and the end of the occupation. He was the first Egyptian who raised his head with an open pride in declaring that he belonged to the Egyptian homeland and in mounting a public campaign to defend its reputation and dignity; he was the first Egyptian who saw that national anniversaries and indigenous occasions were observed --- using them to remind, alert, and warn and also to give hope of the future". 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
5. Among pan-Arabs, Salah 'Isa in a 1974 seminar on the centenary of Mustafa Kamil’s birth organized by the Egyptian Society for Historical Studies, argued that Kamil only used to "appear an Ottoman sometimes" under compulsion of “alliances”; much the same thesis was argued there by Muhammad 'Imarah in his paper "Mustafa Kamil and Ottoman Community". Salah 'Isa, "Mustafa Kamil Mufakkiran Burujwaziyan" (Mustafa Kamil as a Bourgeois Thinker) Qadaya Arabiyah (Bayrut) March 1976 p. 105.
biographical record of the authors themselves---to make him and his party more attractive in
the era of the Egyptian nation state and Arab nationalism.

The fact remains that the Kamilists did regularly adopt positions liable to motivate a
tightening of Egypt’s bonds with the Ottoman Empire, rather than the steady loosening
visualized by al-Rafi’i in 1939. Under Farid’s leadership, the Hizb al-Watani responded to the
Committee of Union and Progress’ 1908 restoration in Turkey of constitutional politics with the
request that representatives of Egypt be admitted to the new Ottoman parliament. This demand
was also directed against the Khedive ’Abbas, adverse to a constitution for Egypt, and Farid’s
personal enemy. Parochial-factional and adventitious dimensions, though, cannot detract from the avant-garde grip the rebirth of its parliamentarism gave Turkey on the psyche of Egyptians.

Farid, like his predecessor Kamil, had a sense of an (Arab) Egyptian homeland and nation that
was to make trouble for the young Turks later: yet achievement of modernity and strength by the
Ottoman State could downgrade and dilute it. Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah in 1908 feared,
perhaps rightly, that the attraction of an Ottoman State now both modern-parliamentarist and
Muslim could draw Egypt into a federation incompatible with the discrete nationhood Egypt had
been developing since Muhammad ’Ali. By trying to enter the restored Ottoman parliament, the

6. Muhammad Husayn Haykal in his 1951 memoirs remembered "my friend" ’Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i as
in the British-Ottoman period "an enthusiast, since he was a student at the Law School, for the principles of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) ... intense of belief in the Caliphate of the Ottoman ruling family". Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (Cairo : Maktabat Nahdat Misr 1951), v.1, p. 63. If Haykal recalled accurately, al-Rafi’i’s 1939 non-Ottomanist characterization of Kamil’s career was one more adaption by an Egyptian intellectual formed before 1918 to post-World War 1 Egyptianist and Arabist ideological fashions.


8. “Some of us think that it is in Egypt’s interest for us to have deputies in the Majlis al-Mab’uthan
(Parliament in Constantinople)... that will not lose us our right of independence and our internal sovereignty (autonomy). Indeed, they almost say that our Government remains despotic, and that a sovereignty that has no resul
serves no interest of the nation is meaningless and that it is better then for the nation to forego that autonomy and join the Ottoman State so long as it be constitutional ... [They believe] that the privileges given to Egypt [under the rule of Muhammad Ali by the Ottoman Sultan] were given to the royal family alone, not to the whole Egyptian nation as an entity”. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta’rikh al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyyah (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p.37.
Kamilists were attempting a confederal first step. The residual sense that Egypt was a part or extension of the Ottoman State sometimes had consequences for nationalism's educational and cultural policies. Al-Liwa' assailed the British-directed Egyptian Government's Education Department for describing Turkish as optional and failing to allocate it fixed periods in the schools. While Turkish was a prerequisite of any serious relationship with the Ottoman Empire, it was a side issue here to restoration of Islam's classicist Arabic in Egyptian education and life.

That Egyptians and outside Turks should remain politically apart in two separate states, despite shared belief in Islam, was strongly argued by Ahmad Hilmi in al-Liwa' of 19 August 1906. After waging so hard a struggle to wrest independence from Britain, Hilmi argued,

Egyptians would not open the doors of Egypt to the Turks because they are Muslims ... If you have an ornate --- or perhaps a not quite so fancy --- house and someone had usurped it, and you dispute with this usurper until you regain your house, it certainly goes very hard for you to leave it for your brother who is of your mother and father. But this does not exclude your being independent in your house and loving your brother at the same time, simultaneously.

Hilmi's primary political unit is thus Egypt. His affirmation here that the Egyptian independence movement of his party was separate from --- and yet so lovingly related to or aligned with...! ---

9. Mudarris ("Teacher"), "Dusturun am Istibdad?" (Constitution or Despotism?) al-Liwa', 8 January, 1903, p.1. The religious motivations of this article must be stressed, although French and other European linguistic nationalisms structured his detailed programatic vision of the extensions to Arabic and to published works in it, needed to make it cover all modern education and life. Qur'an-defined standard Arabic must be made the standard medium of instruction in Egypt's schools because it is the tongue of the Egyptian's "religion and prophet" --- a formulation that did not much perceive the Copts and Syrian Christians in the Egyptian landscape. Restoration of Arabic is motivated by devotion to Islam and to "your [Ottoman] Sultan" (the pan-Muslim Ottoman link) --- could there be anyone who would deny (=' Abbas? British-fostered SC journalists?) that Egypt was a possession among the possessions of the Ottoman State? This modernity-addressing pan-Muslim, if proto-Arabist, article showed the seriousness of its quest for religious political community by its drive to ground Egyptians in the Turkish of the other party. Ibid.

10. Ahmad Hilmi, "al-Istiqlal! al-Istiqlal!" (Independence! Independence!), al-Liwa 9 August 1906. Ahmad Hilmi (1875-1963) seems to have been senior staff writer for al-Liwa' up to 1908. His articles often had a secularist thrust which he wove into the period’s Islamic community emotions. Hilmi would have absorbed Western nationalism’s secular outlook from the acculturated milieu of the journalistic-oratorical intelligentsia and through self-education. He did not receive acculturating formal education. His father, a Cairo (Khan al-Khalili) bazaar merchant named Hasan 'Ali al-Mahdi, died before he was born. "Hilmi was then raised by his mother's brother, a government clerk in the Irrigation Department, who seems to have expected that Hilmi would follow in his footsteps. Accordingly, he sent the boy to a mukata called Khan Ja'far in the Husayni quarter of Cairo. Hilmi learned French by working for a private company in Alexandria, and gained further knowledge of Islam and Arabic from an Imam in an Alexandria mosque. He became a government clerk. But he never received more than a primary certificate". Private letter from Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr utilizing Ahmad Ahmad Badawi, Ma'a al-Suhufi al-Mukafih, Ahmad Hilmi (Cairo, n.d.)
the Ottoman State may, though, have been partly to fend off Egyptian circles enraged by the Kamilists' support for Turkey's territorial position in Sinai during the May 1906 Tabah crisis. Yet, in November 1907, al-Liwa' voiced apprehension that Turkey, legally Egypt's suzerain, might conclude an agreement with Britain in which it would sacrifice Egypt.11

A discrete Arabo-Egyptianist nationalism had from the outset been solidifying in the movement Kamil launched in 1893. In reply to a foreign journalist who had depicted him as an instrument of Turkish policy, Kamil denied (1907) that "we want freedom for Egypt only to restore it to the rule of the Turks". The aim "Egypt for the Egyptians", "unequivocally stated thousands of times" by the watani movement was the chief principle guiding "our life and actions".12 In a 1906 interview to the London Chronicle he depicted Egypt's national political community and her religion-founded international relationship with the Ottoman State as two separate planes of association. Kamil exalted the papacy-like "religous influence" that the Ottoman State's Sultan exerted as Caliph over all Muslims in the world including the Egyptians regardless of the plural state structures. This in effect whited-out the specific political suzerainty that the Sultan traditionally had over Egypt, once. Kamil denied that a single state would in future unite Egypt and the Ottoman State. The English were wrong to suppose that the Egyptians would again enter under the protection and rule of Turkey upon withdrawal by Britain of her garrison. The Ottoman Sultan as Caliph exerted over the Egyptians as Muslims a religious authority like that which the Papacy exerted over the world's Catholics, but nothing suggested that "Turkey" (sic) intended to intervene politically in Egypt's affairs. "Turkey" had always respected "internal independence" ("autonomy" --- al-istiqlal al-dakhili) which it granted Egypt in 1840 in the Treaty of London, resisting the European States' pressure upon her to send troops to Egypt at the time of 'Urabi's revolt. And Egypt had all the means to defend herself in the twentieth century.13

The role allocated to the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of the world's Muslims, here, kept him at arm's length as far as Egypt's administration was concerned. Kamilist pan-Islamism had made Egyptians like remote Indonesians whom Turkey had never ruled: the Sultan could lead ---

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11. On 14 November 1907, al-Liwa' published an article voicing apprehension that an agreement could be concluded between Turkey and Britain at Egypt's expense. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 31.
12. al-Rafi'i, Mustafa Kamil p. 345.
but had no specific title to govern. Diffusing the Ottoman State’s leadership out over the whole far-flung Muslim world made the Sultan’s traditional claim to administer nearby Egypt fade from mind.

Kamil in Europe may have muted his movement’s real Islamic commitment to the Ottoman State, as by 1906 the Kamilists well understood the antipathy towards the Muslim Turks existing everywhere in Europe\(^\text{14}\). The Egyptians, Kamil told the British, did hope that "Turkey" --- post-Ottomanist terminology! --- would modernize and become an internationally strong state like Japan. He reassured his English audience, however, that neither Egyptians nor "Turks" intended to merge in one state again "because we know very well that that would unite Europe together in opposition against us"\(^\text{15}\). By now, Kamil saw mainstream or official France as having much the same attitudes to Muslims, including Egyptians, as his nation’s British enemy. The interconnected Islamophobic discourses of the British and French spurred him to tighten pan-Islamic relationship with the Ottoman State beyond his common sense about the weakness of all Muslims. In September 1906, Kamil responded with hurt and anger when the establishment \textit{Le Temps} readily echoed a French journalist in Cairo that his movement wanted Turkish troops to invade in order to restore Egypt to administration by Istanbul: Kamil, \textit{Le Temps} soon stereotyped, had made "L’Egypte vilayet turc" his followers’ guiding slogan\(^\text{16}\).

\(^{14}\) Ahmad Hilmi noted that "there exists in England a large party opposed to further colonial expansion. However, this party does not incline to Turkey to the extent that it does not wish to even hear her name, such is its extreme hatred". "Quwwat al-Wataniyyah" (The Power of Patriotism), \textit{al-Liwa’}, 7 August 1906, p. 1.

\(^{15}\) Kamil, "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (1906). Kamil did not dream up --- although he overrated --- the capacity fear of pan-Islam had to bring together European nations that usually loathed each other. French diplomats learned in 1881 that exiles contributed from Istanbul to the Algerian rebellion of 1871, with modest facilities from Ottoman officials, and were fanning preparations for another uprising (shortly to break out in Wahran). The French greatly feared this rising tide of "Muslim fanaticism", and kept the British informed of all they learned about the world-wide agitation --- implying that the two powers, despite their differences, had a common interest in controlling pan-Islamic anti-imperialism together. Kemal H. Karpat, "Pan-Islamism: Imperial Plot or Muslim Popular Resistance to Imperialism?" (preliminary paper prepared for ICOPS conference on Ottoman studies, June 30-July 4 1981, Madrid) pp. 14-15. One French ambassador to Istanbul, though, had enough common sense to assess in 1880 that the pan-Islamic "conspiracy" existed mostly in the minds of the French and English: all the Porte actually wanted in establishing closer relations with far-off Muslim leaders was to strengthen its position at home and to have the help of Muslims in case of a war between the Ottomans and Europe. \textit{Ibid} pp. 16-17.

\(^{16}\) Kamil, "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme", \textit{Le Temps} 8 September 1906 pp. 1-2. Kamil wrote this article to refute a denunciation of him and his movement by an anonymous French journalist resident in, or at least writing from, Cairo: "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte", \textit{Le Temps} 22 August 1906. This writer charged that the \textit{al-Liwa’} nationalists were hostile to all European powers, including to France and her control in North Africa, and that this "fanaticism" had turned all French-language newspapers in Egypt against Kamil. Significantly, Kamil did not in his reply claim to have any friends left in Egypt’s French press, nor did he much localize that press and its criticisms as promoting the communalist self-interest of resident Europeans more Francophone than French. Rather, Kamil accepted its increased support for the British Occupation as a reflection of the convergence of metropolitan
Kamil mocked the joint paranoia of the French and British that "the peoples of Islam" would either want or be able to band together to wage war on Europe. The never-ending uprisings of peninsular Arabian insurgents against the Porte cast doubt on Turkey's capacity, as well as will, to lead other Muslim peoples into any such conflict. "Pan-Islamism as understood in Europe has no existence" because "the Muslims, Turkey at their head, have understood for a long time that no nation can live isolated" --- to be cut off from the West's modernity was to be "condemned to death" for his cultures-incorporating "enlightened" elite. The other side of Kamil, though, ignited that "Europe intervenes in Turkey for the Christians and in the name of humanity" --- "anti-Muslim actions" that made him defiantly defend pan-Islamism as the natural counter-measure. Here, Kamil perceived anti-pan-Islam as a culture-motif with which British leaders like Sir Edward Grey --- reinforcing joint interests from the 1904 Entente --- could well win the assent of France about Egypt.

Discrete "Interest of the Homeland". To Egyptian audiences, Kamil did defend alliance with the Ottoman State as in Egypt's interest. He was Egyptianist enough to carefully try to keep space between the two political units, but failed to award Egypt the self-contained history and freedom of action vis-a-vis the neighboring nation that West European nationalisms stipulated. Thus, in an 1897 speech in Alexandria, Kamil defended his party's support for the Ottoman State in its current war with Greece in terms of Egypt's interests: "what would have been the political fate of Egypt had --- God forbid! --- the Ottoman troops been defeated?" The defeat and partition of the Ottoman State, Egypt's legal suzerain, would have led to "Egypt being lost forever in the hand of the occupiers". To the argument of his critics that Egypt had under Muhammad 'Ali fought the Ottoman State, Kamil rhetorically replied:

France's interests with those of Britain since the Entente Cordiale, "Le Patriotisme..." His opponent was very French in his defence of his British co-imperialists: they had eliminated previous tyranny and almost doubled Egypt's trade: the flaw was their arrogant self-segregation from natives who wanted to self-Europeanize under their direction (= versus France's gregarious missionary assimilationism in Tunisia and Algeria). Le Temps accepted his claim that Kamil wanted the Turks to take Egypt in "Le Pan-Islamisme en Afrique", Le Temps 23 August 1906 p. 1, and in "L'Effervescence Musulman en Asie" ibid 24 August 1906 p. 1.

17. Kamil, "Le Patriotisme..." Despite his clear sense by 1906 that all European powers, including even more laicist France, were very susceptible to pan-Christian anti-Ottoman, anti-Muslim emotions and appeals, Kamil yet again refused to move away from the ideologies of large religious supra-national camps or political communities that turned Frenchmen against Egyptian independence. As he had in 1895, he yet again offered an alliance of pan-Muslim and pan-Christian camps: "as Muslims, we are for an entente between the Islamic World and the Christian World". His reply in Le Temps once more amounted to making Egyptian "patriotism" take responsibility before French opinion for the Ottoman Turks' conflicts with the Christian nationalities they had ruled or continued to govern --- as if winning some sympathy for Egypt was not a big enough task! Ibid, Cf A 171-175.
Yet are Egypt's hostilities with the Ottoman State in 1840 inherently fated to last forever? Are not nations, like individuals, brought together by interest and common benefit? Did France not fight Russia in 1854 yet today they have become united? Did not Germany fight Austria and Austria fight Italy, and yet these three states united and remain united? Was not England a friend of Turkey, yet today has become her greatest enemy? 18

Here Kamil for the while disregarded traditional Islamic political concepts. These had considered the political unity of the Muslims to be prescribed by religion, and disunity as a reproach. Kamil in this passage formally argued that Egypt and the Ottoman State were two discrete political units. These would adopt friendly or hostile relations towards each other, in the same way that independent nation-units in Europe alternately warred and allied as their shifting discrete interests decreed. Moreover, Kamil’s observations about change in relations between England and Turkey implied that the same fluid alliances of interests could also occur between a Muslim and a Christian-European state.

Kamil’s ingrained assumption of the inherent (if non-unitary) political community of all Muslims left him unable to duplicate the atomistic nationalism that Europe patterned, even in the same speech:

Yes, Egypt was against the Ottoman State in 1840 and was in grievous error to be so. Yes, Muhammad 'Ali was wrong and he knew before his death that he had been misled and erred. Politically, Egypt’s hostility with the Ottoman State was a great error; a mistake, too, in terms of Egypt’s and the Ottoman State’s interests alike. 19

Under the surface of the words and arguments exchanged with the European enemies of his movement, Kamil maintained intact key attitudes from traditional Islam. He never genuinely considered the possibility that a clash of fundamental interests between two Muslim political units could lead to a true antagonistic relation, of which war would be the natural resolution. Not that a Muslim population or polity might in pursuit of its interests ally with a European State against a Muslim enemy. For Kamil, Muslim nations had no absolute right to pursue their external interests at the expense of other nations in Islam’s international bloc-community. He could not bring himself to be cold-blooded about the Turks or other Muslim nations in the way that a secular Egyptianist nationalist could be.

al-Rafi‘i and later Egyptian historians were right, then, that Mustafa Kamil wanted to keep Egypt a separate state. Kamil was no reunificatory neo-Ottomanist and, as Steppat

19. Ibid.
assessed, was not striving to construct a unitary universal Islamic theocracy\textsuperscript{20}. On the other hand, his multi-faceted relationships with the Ottoman State cannot be reduced to a legalistic device to obstruct the consolidation of British rule. The Kamilists, repeatedly rebuffed by an expansionist Europe prone to parallel anti-Muslim discourses, came to view international relations as between broad antagonistic blocs or camps (Christian Europe and Islam) rather than atomistic nations. To beat back the West, they wanted to solidify and more tightly integrate the far-flung Muslim world. Most of it was now colonized --- with the enfeebled Ottoman State its residual core for sovereignty. The world’s Muslims had to strengthen it so that one day it could become a strong modern state, and not just militarily --- a rallying-point for Muslims to recover strength against the colonialist Europeans.

Although it was not a drive to reincorporate Egypt into the Ottoman State, West-activated Kamilist pan-Islam so identified the Ottoman "Caliph" with Islam as to irreversibly restrict the policy options that the leaders could consider. The enraging Islamophobe discourses of most Europeans and the slivers from traditional Islam locked together in an almost fated way, here. And in a 1903 \textit{La Figaro} article, Kamil finally almost assented to become something akin to what the French (of whom he had despaired) insisted he and all Muslims could only be:

There is a lot of talk in Europe about Muslims uniting. They consider it a great danger to peace and more evidence of Islam’s mythical fanaticism. We must place everything in its context forcefully to refute this charge, since ... Islam has prescribed mutual assistance by Muslims as a pre-condition for their strength and military preparedness --- although the stupidity of some [local] princes/rulers (\textit{umara'}) and the ignorance of the rabble have undone the bonds of unity between the Islamic nations for past centuries, tempting Europe to enslave them one after the other. But the covert Crusader Wars that Europe wages against Islam have alerted the Muslims to [the necessity for] mutual love and maintaining interest in each other’s affairs and for rallying around the banner of the Sultan, who is at once the Commander of the Faithful (\textit{Amir al-Mu’minin}) and their Khalifah (Caliph), that is to say the religious and political head of the whole Islamic World\textsuperscript{21}.

However uneven his acquaintance with classical Islamic terminology, Kamil’s 1903 cri

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\textsuperscript{20} Fritz Steppat, \textit{Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil} in \textit{Die Welt des Islams} v. iv (1956) pp. 287-289. Kamil once stated that to return Egypt to the status of an ordinary Ottoman province would be at variance with the age of civilization and international law. At most, he was at odd times prepared to include Egypt among the "Ottoman nations" in the plural, but never in a single "Ottoman nation" (\textit{al-Ummat al-Uthmaniyyah}). \textit{Ibid} p. 288.
\textsuperscript{21} Mustafa Kamil, "Uruba wal-Islam" (Europe and Islam), \textit{al-Liwa’} 22 September 1903.
\end{flushright}
de coeur to La Figaro and the French had an unusually vehement and undivided pan-Muslim community impulse. This derived its force from an uncommon conjunction of (a) the most noxious European attitudes --- including unrealistically unitary ways in which Westerners perceived Muslims --- with (b) Arabic’s high cultural memory of earlier grand classical Arabo-Muslim empires (already adapted by al-Afghani and Kamil’s mentor al-Nadim). Conceivably, had enough such Western and Arab culture pressures coincided with masterly Ottoman self-modernization, Kamil might have accepted some kind of reincorporation. As Egypto-Arab history proceeded to develop, though, the communication is most significant as a view of indigenous history that for decades was to sap and obstruct particularist evocation after 1922 of a separate Egyptian history under Islam. Here, early Arabo-Islamic united empire was the golden age and later break-up barbarization. After Egypt obtained independence in 1922, however, secularish writers such as Ahmad Amin, Taha Husayn, Tawfiq al-Hakim and 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad seized on the breakdown of the political unity of the 'Abbasid Muslim empire through the ambition of various usurpers as asserting a discrete Egyptian nation’s will to independence\(^{22}\). From the 1930s, poetry by classical Arabs resident in Egypt was scanned for cultural expression of a separate territorial Egyptian nationality (B 179-184). The more quasi-unitary pan-Muslim statements by Kamil and his colleagues before 1918, prefigured how persistently classical Arab culture would continue to condition Egyptians to lament the later pluralization of power centres and state units in Islam as decline and dangerous weakness before the West --- not the particularoids’ restoration of normality. This negativity would be crucial to the triumph of the pan-Arab ethnic national identification in the 1930s and 1940s. Kamil’s 1903 and 1906 remarks to the two Paris papers, though, show how semi-unitary periodization of Arabo-Muslim history (he just maintained umam, plural Muslim nations) could get heightened through self-definition against the discourses of an imperialist Europe. One needed the foreign languages, though, to hear the Western voices that Islamized.

\(^{22}\) Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1961) p. 143. Ahmad Amin in 1929 and 1945 cited Ibn Tulun’s ninth century secession from the Baghdad-centred 'Abbasid Empire, the establishment of the anti-'Abbasid Fatimid state in Cairo, and the later Mamluks. Amin admitted that the partition of the 'Abbasid Empire weakened Islam internationally, but argued that the multiplication of Muslim political centres improved local administration, kept each country’s wealth at home, and furthered local development of culture. *Ibid* pp. 143-144 and 162.
Modern Pan-Muslim (Post-Ottoman) Relationship with the Ottoman State

This Kamilist enterprise blended pre-1798 non-Western elements with the novel needs of a new age in which the varieties of strength that the imperialists commanded had to be duplicated. Their sense that Egypt could not go it alone, but would have to build joint economic and political as well as military strength with a Muslim bloc centred around the Ottoman State, was structured as a response to the global scope of Western nation-states in the era of imperialism.

Classical and post-classical theories of Islamic Caliphate varied: all preferred one united Islamic state, but some offered leeway for plural Muslim state-units. The journalists and orators of Kamil’s movement synthesized emotional motifs from universal Caliphate with modern technologies and ventures, to put together a quite new relationship with "the Turks". Their pan-Islam did have some nostalgia for early Ottoman prowess against Europe, but usually did not seek to reincorporate Egypt into the Ottoman Empire it helped restrengthen.

The modern West’s own pan-Christianism in international relations fueled and legitimized the symmetrical pan-Islamic community that the Kamilists early constructed around the Ottoman State. Chapter 3 showed that Kamil during the 1897-1898 Greco-Turkish War already defended his movement’s fund-raising for the Ottoman Army --- while "religious" --- as a response to all the aid a range of European states (not just Britain) gave Christian nationalities in "the East" to revolt against, or attack, the Ottoman Empire (A 174). Kamilist writers depicted the drive to strengthen the Ottoman State to the followers as a religious duty imposed by Islam, comparable to the duty to win independence for Egypt. Ahmad al-Badawi in an al-Liwa' article on "Islam and Independence" defined the lifting of the yoke of occupation as "our first demand"

23. According to H.A.R. Gibb, "even in the Sunni community, there was no one universally accepted doctrine of the Caliphate". Gibb, "Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate", Studies on the Civilization of Islam (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962) p. 148. al-Mawardi (d. 1058) denied that there could be two Caliphs at one time --- although 'Abd al-Qahir Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) already accepted the legality of the existence of two Caliphs in widely separate lands. "al-Mawardi’s Theory of the Caliphate", in ibid. p. 153. The Caliph Harun al-Rashid in 800 AD had recognised the hereditary amirate of the Aghlabites (theoretically vassals) over North Africa, although al-Mawardi tried to centralize every function of state upon the 'Abbasid Caliph. Ibid pp. 162, 153. Later theories held that rulers who enforced the shari'ah won title to be termed caliphs in their own domain without any expectation that any would come to rule all Muslims: figures like the Grand Moghul Awrangzeb in India and the Ottoman Sultan were accepted as simultaneous caliphs, although they lacked any blood-link to the Prophet. "...Sunni Theory of the Caliphate", ibid pp. 144-147. It looks a contradiction that Kamil (a) exalted the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of Islam and sought to make and tighten a host of novel linkages with his State, while (b) not raising or sidestepping political reincorporation. Yet he may not have been so unconnected with Muslim tradition given the diversification in Sunni thought that Gibb uncovered.
but "our first duty" as "to hold fast to the Holy Caliphate". By giving material "support for the
Commander of the Believers" in Istanbul, in "expending generously and unstintingly of what the
Khalifah has commanded us to give" "we [Egyptians] would be discharging a religious
obligation". al-Badawi thus readily accepted the title of 'Abdul-Hamid as Caliph to command
outside Muslims to undertake specific international acts designed to help him defend his state.
The colonialist West’s power made al-Badawi think in terms of all Islam, of the early Arab
Caliphs’ Islamic universal empires, of the need of the world’s modern Muslim nations for a
successor international power centre:

Islam was established only through the aid men gave it [the Caliphate], had strength only
through preservation of its [the Caliphate’s] entity ... [and] can have glory only through
the sacrifice of martyrs and property when the time comes to defend it [the Caliphate];
Islam has no boast except through the Caliphate’s independence and repelling all enemies
who try to touch even a span of its [the Caliphate’s] land24.

A 1903 article titled "The Ottoman State’s Need of a Fleet" likewise conveys the
Kamilists’ intense involvement in the survival and strength of the Ottoman State. The Ottoman
Sultan, and the interests of his state, are closely identified with universal Islam. M. 'Izzat
identifies with the Ottoman State from Egypt’s (and the general Islamic world’s) condition of
colonial rule. Powerless, subjugated Muslims desperately yearn for Islam’s world power-centre,
the Ottoman State, to achieve strength on their behalf:

The recent war between the Ottoman State and the Greeks had hardly broken out ...
before all Islamic nations were craning their neck ... to find out how much resistance [the
State] could mount ... The Muslims now, in all areas of the earth are not forgetful of the
promise the Khalifah made to them to continue his efforts to restore Islamic naval
strength to its previous might and past glory, that the [Ottoman] State may gain capacity
to resist all adversities and demonstrate before the European world a might that will win
respect ... Ah, it is as if I can see all the Muslims who have veritably flocked to the
Residence of the Caliphate (Dar al-Khilafah: Constantinople) from every side and corner
and have lined up before the Yildiz palace ... all begging with a single voice 'O
Commander of the Believers... Can you not bestow one piercing glance on the Islamic
fleet and resurrect it anew... that you may revive the hopes of the Muslims ... all devoted
to you, be they your subjects or non-subjects, alike?'25.

This sense of the Ottoman State’s Sultan as international Islam’s "Caliph" perpetuated some

24. Ahmad al-Badawi "al-Islamu wal-Istiqlal" (Islam and Independence) al-Liwa’, 23 August 1903. We did
not find any biodata about Ahmad al-Badawi.

25. M. Izzat, "Hajat al-Dawlah li-Ustul" (The Ottoman State’s Need of a Fleet), al-Liwa’ 8 August 1903
p.1. I found no biodata about M. 'Izzat.
archaic attitudes. The Ottoman bureaucracy and ministers have been slow to effect the reforms and modernization necessary, for instance, to build naval might. M. 'Izzat proposed an illusory solution: direct appeal in spirit by the world’s Muslims to the charismatic individual, the Sultan-Caliph, who heads Islam’s universal faith as well as the Ottoman State. This Leader then activates his semi-magical power to instantaneously make "the broken inert wood" of the Islamic fleet "throb with the blood of new life". This in part late-traditional messianic Muslim outlook could, in spasms, obscure the engineering and detail of administrative institutions and processes. The Sultan-"Caliph" 'Abdul-Hamid’s very religion-justified autocracy might have hampered initiative and increased specialization in the bureaucracy. More complex, diffused government was a prerequisite for constructing modern armed forces, navies and merchant fleets. 'Izzat vividly evoked the military greatness of the Ottoman State’s early past: "that happy age in which the Ottoman family had a fleet that was a byword for invincibility and people titled their Sultan 'Sultan of the two Continents and Emperor of the two Seas'". Pan-Muslim restoration of the Empire as a centre of military and economic strength for the globe’s Muslims had to renew, and was inspired by, the Ottoman Sultans’ early internationally feared might. Only, when the Ottoman Sultans were strongest, their rule over Egypt, then a province of their Empire, was tightest. Working in the other direction, "non-subjects" could be members in the pan-Muslim political community with the "Caliph" along with "the subjects".

'Izzat and al-Badawi pervasively connected the Ottoman State’s Sultan, as "Caliph", to Islam. This religious definition would not orientate the constituency to a pragmatic, reversible alliance with the Ottoman State. Both writers gave the Ottoman State’s Sultan-Caliph an international religio-political standing that would entitle him to command Egyptians to undertake specific measures to strengthen his State. Moreover, 'Izzat’s priority that Muslims achieve international strength, and nostalgia for the might of the Ottoman State (when it firmly ruled Egypt), might have assented to reamalgamation with it had it really managed to modernize itself.

Both, though, knew that any such happy outcome could be in the distant future: like Kamil sometimes, they saw the current Ottoman State as ramshackle and vulnerable, and bound to remain so for some time at the least.

Kamilist pan-Islam ran gripping, vivid, primary motifs from traditional Islam as a

26. Ibid.
motivating fuel into a collective nations-spanning self-modernization frankly out to naturalize sectors of Europe’s civilization in the Islamic world. Incorporative of non-Muslim strength --- but also liberalism ---, Kamil declared to a British audience in 1906 that Egyptians hoped the Ottoman State could become a strong state with developed civilization like Japan\textsuperscript{27}. A 1903 number of \textit{al-Liwa’} carried an account of the Ottoman Imperial factory at Herkeh, so productive that the Sultan ordered installation of electric lighting to make night shifts possible\textsuperscript{28}. But \textit{al-Liwa’s} Istanbul correspondent on the same page saw the lack of practical education in "the East" as the great stumbling-block to the development of indigenous manufactures and commerce that the pan-Muslims craved\textsuperscript{29}. With its usual reflex, acculturation viewed self-Westernization by Turkey as carrying forward the dynamic of classical Arab Islam. In 1893, the youthful Kamil hailed "the Commander of the Faithful" 'Abdul-Hamid’s construction of numerous Europe-modelled government schools throughout his State as restoring to "the Easterners" the educational endeavor of the first Caliphs: that "the quality of education offered" was "no less than in comparable schools in Europe ... promises a bright future" to "us Ottomans"\textsuperscript{30}. If the Ottoman State truly developed modernity able to contend with the West’s, it could build up assent to reincorporation in Egypt --- if the Sultan and then the CUP had enough interest and courage to press for that. Kamil and his colleagues, though, to his death learned from the Ottoman State as another self-modernizing entity comparable with Egypt, rather than a more advanced model. However, collective modernization could unprecedentedly integrate a widening pan-Muslim community extending far beyond any borders the Ottoman Turks had ever governed, making memories of past political unity between Egypt and the Ottoman State less pertinent. The Kamilists sought West-like commercial and economic means --- not an amalgamation of states --- to unprecedentedly integrate the far-flung international Islamic community.

A case in point is a 1903 \textit{al-Liwa’} article titled "A Great Islamic Project" detailing discussion in Constantinople among "the major Muslim traders" of plans to expand trade

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{al-Liwa’} 17 February 1903.
\textsuperscript{29} "al-Hayat al-Wahiyah wal-Hayat al-Mu’abbadah" (Insubstantial Life and Eternal Life), \textit{al-Liwa’} 17 February 1903 p. 2.
\textsuperscript{30} 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, \textit{Mustafa Kamil fi Arba’a wa Thalathina Rabi’an} 10 vls (Cairo: Mitba’at al-Liwa’, 1908-1911) v. 2 p. 9.
between Constantinople and the Far East. A Muslim international trading company was to be established with large capital to "win control over the resources of trade between Islamic lands from the Near East to the Far East". The implicitly anti-Western project would utilize a Muslim-owned fleet of steamers to transport grain from al-Basrah and Baghdad and salt from other Ottoman territories to India; from China the steamers would bring silk and tea; from Java and Sumatra tea and spices and other products from the tropics; from Rangoon rice, from Calcutta jute and indigo, and so forth.

_al-Liwa’_ gave an enthusiastic front-page welcome to this ambitious project to economically integrate geographically very far-flung regions inhabited by Muslims --- in some, such as China, only as a minority. Once more, the desired Muslim political community was being expanded out far beyond Egypt’s historical Ottoman political community. The item instanced how (a) the Kamilists’ Islamic ideology and (b) their perceptions of current international activities and realities still controlled by the West, structured each other and inter-penetrated. The item on the Islamic Fleet is like _al-Liwa’s_ coverage of the Hijaz railway project, discussed below. In both categories, the paper interwove and fused Islam as a ritual religion into modernizing temporal endeavors: religion, geo-political power and economics are synthesized. The ritual of _hajj_ is a common element present in the two ventures that points the Kamilists’ adroit acculturated unification of (a) immemorial religious rituals and (b) the modern and secular sector. During the _hajj_ season, the forthcoming Company’s steamers would transport the pilgrims. Like the Hijaz railway, the project to economically mesh the Ottoman Empire, India and Burma, China and Indonesia would thus "facilitate the _hajj_ for the pilgrims to God’s Sacred House in all the Islamic lands". Somewhat as for the Ottoman Empire’s construction of the network of railroads for heavily military-strategic --- although, to a lesser extent, also economic --- purposes, a connection with the pilgrimage to Mecca thus heightened the description of the economic venture of trade between Constantinople and the Far East as "Islamic". As with communications calling for aid to the Ottoman State itself, including its geo-political Hijaz railway project, vocabulary and assertions were applied to inject Islamic religious content into what would seem to non-Muslims not particularly religious --- economic or military --- phenomena. Constantinople was, in accordance with consistent Kamilist practice,

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termed Dar al-Khilafah ("the Abode of the Caliphate"). The proposed commercial fleet was termed "Islamic" although some places with which it would have dealings --- Rangoon, East and West India, China, and (less markedly because there were Bengali Muslim elements) Calcutta --- could not accurately be described as predominantly Muslim. al-Liwa' still categorized them among "the Islamic lands". However, Sumatra did have solid orthodox Muslim populations. The Ottoman Turks had supplied artillery, munitions and military advisers to Acheh's Muslims during their sixteenth century wars with the Portuguese in Malacca. Acheh appealed to Turkey in 1873 for protection against the invading Dutch; there consequently was consciousness of this past relationship with Sumatra among the Middle East's Turks.

The Islamic fleet project stemmed from some Ottoman Turks' history and interests, but the Egyptian intellectuals' acculturation motivated the enthusiastic welcome they gave this non-Egyptian project. These Western-cultured intellectuals knew too well Europe's modern instruments of military and economic strength --- which they wanted Muslims to duplicate as tools with which to integrate Islam's global sovereign community. The economic scope of British power --- spanning homelands and continents and through trade present in lands Britain did not administer --- imposed the new comprehensive world Muslim counter-community or bloc. Modern imperialism-fostered communications patterned means to pull together the widest Muslim community in new integrations that would not require a single state. Kamilist ideology exalted and applied the Caliphate in new ways that could restore meaningful leadership over the Muslim nations to the Ottoman Sultan: a future strong Ottoman State could help colonized Muslim peoples, near and far, rebuild sovereignty. The Islamic Fleet project made the Kamilists expect that a resurgent Ottoman State would direct economic resources and instruments it achieved out to Islam's most far-scattered peoples, to mutual benefit. With no individual Muslim nation viable alone in the age of global imperialisms, the scope of pan-Islamic community and interactions, cultural, political and economic, had to expand further and further.

32. Ibid.
33. The Ottoman Turks' relationship with the Muslims of Acheh was surveyed by Anthony Reid, "Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia", Journal of Southeast Asian History (Singapore), v. x (1969) pp. 395-414. The Turks mainly supplied arms in the sixteenth century to the Achehnese Sultan 'Ala' al-Din R'i'ayat Shah al-Qahhar (1537-1571). Descendants of Turkish and Syrian advisers and artisans lived in the village of Bitay named after Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem). Ibid p. 398. Dr Reid mentioned a semi-scholarly article on the historical Ottoman relationship with the Achehnese --- a 1912 article by the naval historian Saffet Bey in the historical magazine Tarihi Osmani Encumeni Mecmuasi. However, that was nine years after our al-Liwa' item.
out from the Ottoman State and Arab lands it still ruled or once had. Kamilist ideology
demanded that the Caliph lead Muslims, rather than govern them. With peoples whom the
Ottoman State never governed being integrated into this supra-statal pan-Islamic community,
Egypt's separate statehood would not look un-Islamic.

The Hijaz Railway

Known in Arabic as al-Sikkat al-Hamidiyyah, the Railway of 'Abdul-Hamid, this was to
link Arabia to the main arteries of Turkish railways in Anatolia and 'Iraq. The section from
Damascus to Medinah was completed in 1908 but the extension from Medinah to Mecca never
was. 'Abdul-Hamid adopted a project of a railway to Arabia in response to an 1898 insurrection
headed by the Imam of Yemen and defeats that Wahhabis led by 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Sa’ud
inflicted upon the Turks in Eastern Arabia. “The main reasons for initiating the Hejaz Railway
were ... military and political, to strengthen the Sultan’s authority in the Arabian Peninsula,
chiefly in the Hijaz and Red Sea area”34. However, the Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid stressed
in communications to the world’s Muslims that the railway would facilitate pilgrimage to Mecca.
This religious characterization made outside Muslims generously donate towards its construction
costs. We shall see that the Kamilists were to appeal to Egyptians to contribute towards the
railway on grounds that it would tighten Ottoman control over Arabia, not just facilitate
pilgrimage. The Kamilists also repeated to Egyptian audiences justifications of the railway as a
means to bring economic development to nomadic and semi-nomadic Arabs, made to Arab
populations under Ottoman rule.

The Kamilists had to knit together a range of classes to aid this life-and-death Ottoman
enterprise. Kamil’s, and the other Kamilist leaders’, mobilization propaganda addressed to their
widest Egyptian audiences identified 'Abdul-Hamid as Caliph and therefore entitled by
divine-revealed Islam to command believers resident in any state to contribute. In a 1903 Arabic
article, Kamil wove references to Islamic congregational prayers into his plea for Egyptians,
especially the wealthy, to help finance the railway. Every Friday the Muslims gather in mosques
in the furthermost Eastern and Western reaches of the earth to call for aid to the Commander of

34. Jacob M. Landau, The Hijaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage : A Case of Ottoman Political
the Faithful and the strengthening of his State --- "a call necessitating the uniting of these nations (umam) and peoples (shu’ub) around the banner of the Caliphate"\(^{35}\). The item thus identified political support for the Ottoman Sultan’s cause as a religious duty of Islam, as binding as its prayer-rituals. It inextricably wove Turkey’s Middle East power interests and instruments into the ritual life of the world religion that the Sultan headed. In Kamil’s presentation, Islam is of wider scope than ritual devotions linking the individual believer to God. Islam’s religious rituals galvanize the believers once more into collective participants in contemporary international political history, still controlled by the West:

The whole world has its eyes on the Muslims in these days and is asking: Are they so weak and their resolution so dead that they are incapable of helping the Ottoman State extend a railway when the most insignificant of companies in Europe construct numerous railways on the initiative and efforts of a few individuals?\(^{36}\) Westerners made history at that point of time. Yet this selective ultra-political Islam could motivate the Muslims, including Egyptians, to construct the modern economic and strategic instruments to beat them off. This reformulated Islam, polarized as the antithesis of the West, would build up the will and structures among Muslims to economically as well as militarily become like --- as well as dislodge --- those enemies.

Kamil to Egyptians pervasively alternated, juxtaposed and identified the Ottoman State’s instruments of political power with international Islam and its survival in the world. Egyptians who do not help the Caliph in Constantinople extend the Baghdad railway to Mecca and Medinah, whatever their intentions might be, in reality offer "support for the sentence of eternal death and extinction that Westerners pronounce on Muslims" as a whole. "Muslims in all corners of the world" know that the religion’s and their own survival depends on the survival of the Ottoman state that maintains the Caliphate\(^{37}\).

Islam was a unifying trans-class and trans-elite bond. The Kamilists might materially aid geo-political instruments to integrate and defend the Ottoman State in other provinces. Yet the Hijaz was religiously very special for Muslim Egyptians --- the land into which God sent down his Qur’anic revelation to the last Prophet, Muhammad. Pilgrimage to Mecca was also a central religious obligation prescribed by Islam for every able Muslim: pilgrims to Mecca usually then

\(^{35}\) Mustafa Kamil, "Quwwat al-Khalifah" (The Caliph’s Strength), al-Liwa, 20 August 1903, p. 1.
\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Ibid.
visited Medinah, 225 miles north-west, where Muhammad lived for ten years and was buried, and then often the Masjid al-Aqsa in Jerusalem. Responding to the frustrated religious drives of the bourgeois constituency, some of the first numbers of al-Liwa' attacked the Egyptian ministers for placing restrictions upon the pilgrimage to Mecca. Educated Egyptians' religious needs would strongly motivate the Kamilists to support the new railway, which would offer swift, comfortable transport to Mecca. Egyptian pilgrims had suffered hardships and maltreatment by nomads in journeying on foot and camel to Mecca.

Religion and its shrines were again fused with regional politics in a speech delivered by Mustafa Kamil's brother 'Ali Bey Kamil at an open-air meeting in the provincial township of al-Zaqaziq in 1903. 'Ali Fahmi applied the idiom of religious fervor to raise donations for the Hijaz railway from an audience possibly more popular and less sophisticated or secularizing-educated --- less urban --- than the movement's usual Cairo constituency.

'Ali Kamil was acculturated --- but not the less sensitively attuned for that to the Islamic religious needs of the Egyptians whom he addressed at al-Zaqaziq. He hammered home to them that the railway would make it easy for Egyptians to make combined pilgrimages to Mecca, Medinah and Jerusalem. 'Ali Kamil knew that this religious consideration would win generous donations.

Like Mustafa, he identified the Sultan and his geo-political requirements with Islam and God:

My dear brothers, the person ordering the Railway's construction is His Highness the Commander of the Faithful, the Khalifah (Successor) of the Prophet of the Lord of

40. For al-Zaqaziq ("Zagazig"), capital of al-Sharqiyyah province, see The Statesman's Year Book of 1903 (London: MacMillan & Co 1903) p. 1195 and EB 11th ed 1911. It contained large cotton factories and offices of numerous European merchants: its population in 1907 was 34,999, including 1,355 Greeks. Ibid.
41. 'Ali Fahrni Kamil's career as an officer in the Egyptian army proved abortive. His nationalism brought him into collision with the British, who stripped him of his rank and interned him. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 316. 'Ali Fahmi translated into Arabic (1909) Juliette Adam's collection of letters from the late Mustafa: Lettres Egyptiennes-Francaises adresses a Mme Juliette Adam, 1895-1908; and also her 1922 L'Angleterre en Egypte --- transmuted into Injilitarra fi Misr (Cairo: 1922). Among 'Ali's own French writings that explained Egypt's cause to Europeans was his "La Question d'Egypte", Orient et Occident May 1922 pp. 5-20. Thus, 'Ali Fahmi Kamil was acculturated to a degree with some active bilingualism in French. Data supplied by Dr Arthur Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University, in part drawing on al-Zirikli's al-A'lam.
Worlds, the Sultan our Lord 'Abdul-Hamid Khan, may Allah aid and support him! ... If we want to be Muslims who hold on to our Islam we have no choice but to follow the path of true guidance and to gather around the banner of the Sultan.

'Ali Kamil’s cry was "Come, O Ye Muslims". Certain of his words and phrases suggest that the Sultan’s authority or commands derived from or were the authority or commands of God Himself. For instance, he reproaches the Egyptians because they still lack "the Arab initiative, the religious zeal and the Islamic fervor the bearer of which knows nothing but obedience to the command/authority (amr) of Allah and so obeys him who has charge of authority (waliy al-amr)".43

Pan-Arabism Subsumed Under Ottomanism. The railway would facilitate commerce between regions (aqtar) of the Ottoman Empire. It would also "develop agriculture in those golden lands" (Transjordan and peninsular Arabia). Contribution by Egyptians to the Hijaz railway was "charity" (al-ihsan) that would "bring prosperity to your Arab brothers". It was "the relieving of the sufferings of orphans and the poor, righteousness, commanded by religion".44 Religion in such Egyptian pan-Islamic communications had economic and social life as a sphere.

As ever in Kamilism, religion and political power, too, were closely connected in 'Ali Kamil’s speech, intensified by the religious Hijaz context. 'Ali was well aware that this "purely religious project" of the Hijaz railway was, among other aspects, an instrument to redistribute regional political power. Once completed, it would enable the Ottomans to stop Britain from further expanding her influence among the tribes from the coastal colonies and trucial states that she already held in the peninsula: it would strengthen the Ottoman State’s authority in Arabia. The Railway would make possible swift Ottoman troop movements not just to quell lawlessness by nomads affecting the movement of pilgrims but "to resist the hidden hands that work in the dark to rob this vast glory from the ummah" (= here the Muslim world community or nation).

43. Ibid
44. Ibid. 'Ali Kamil’s justifications of the Hijaz railway to Egyptians recall earlier ones that the Ottoman establishments argued to convince that Empire’s Arabs. Thamarat al-Funun, a Sunni Muslim paper in Bayrut, had predicted in 1900 that the railway would help repopulate southeastern Syria, pacifying the nomadic tribes and halting their raids. It would stimulate agriculture and the exploitation of natural resources, help the Sultan impose his authority and enable Muslims from all over the world to make the pilgrimage. Landau, Hijaz Railway p. 20. Muhammad 'Arif Ibn al-Sayyid al-Munir al-Husayni al-Dimashqi, a Damascus educationalist, wrote a book in Arabic championing the railway. Like 'Ali Fahmi Kamil and Thamarat, he, too, stressed its economic as well as purely religious advantages: for instance, it would facilitate the introduction of civilization among "savage populations" --- Arab desert nomads, towards whom the Kamilists, too, had their ambivalences. Ibid p. 196 (Arabic).
Other al-Liwa' items presented material aid to 'Abdul-Hamid's railway in the Hijaz as a religious test for the Islam of Egyptians. Thus, one al-Liwa' writer, reflecting on the reduction of pilgrim hardships, mused in 1904 that "there cannot exist a single Muslim believing in Allah and the Last Day" who could do anything but respond to the Sultan's call for aid. Calculating that al-Liwa's modern-stream student readers for religious reasons supported the Hijaz railway, this writer tried to discredit al-Mu'ayyad editor 'Ali Yusuf --- = the Khedive 'Abbas who financed the paper and had turned against the increasingly populist Kamil --- by charging that he refused to aid "this great Islamic project" 46. Muhammad Farid in his tributes to Mustafa Kamil upon his death assumed that Kamil's support for the Hijaz railway would seem creditable to the educated followers.

The audiences addressed by Kamil and by coleaders even during his life-time perhaps were already starting to widen out into groups beyond the attached acculturated core-constituency --- reaching urban workers and even some peasants 47. But modernizing-educated Egyptians were as readily mobilized into aiding the Hijaz railway by identification of it with religion as Muslim Egyptians in general. Indeed, the drives to extend ritual religion into contemporary international relations and economics, to make Europe-developed instruments of economic or political power (railways, steamers) serve a religion-founded international political community, were the product of the conjunction of the two traditions, Islamic and Western, through acculturation. It was the religious duty of Egyptians to obey 'Abdul-Hamid's geopolitical commands. The scope that the

45. 'Ali Fahrni Kami! at al-Zaqaziq, loc. cit.
46. "Nahnu wal-Mu'ayyad" (We and al-Mu'ayyad), al-Liwa' 3 August 1904. Yet 'Ali Yusuf's pan-Islamic pro-Ottoman zeal had cooled as the Khedive moved from 1904 towards rapprochement with the British presence in Egypt. Wendell documented from a 1907 al-Mu'ayyad article the convergence of his later positions with the --- at least in formal argumentation --- more systematic and ideologized Egyptianist particularism of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyi and the Jaridists who (at least on the plane of verbalization) called for pan-Islamism and the link with Ottoman Turks to be phased out, ignoring their own deep bonds to that Empire's Turks and Arabs. Lutfi-like, 'Ali Yusuf denied in 1907 piece that al-Jami' at al-Islamiyyah --- ambiguously, either wider Islamic community or pan-Islamism --- ever had had, or ever could have, a political expression. Yusuf now argued that a political pan-Islamism by "the Muslim nations" would band European states together against the Muslims in a countering "Christian league" (jami'ah Masihiyyah). Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From Its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) p. 229.

47. George Young, writing in retrospect after World War I and Egypt's recovery of limited independence, characterized that the pre-1914 nationalist movement's "spokesmen were journalists, its thinkers... lawyers". Yet his impression was that al-Hizb al-Watani at some point came to reach out beyond its urban efendiyyat constituency to rural audiences; nationalism's "main activity became a vituperative anti-British agitation in French and Arabic journals which were discussed in the town cafes and declaimed aloud in the villages". Young, Egypt 2nd ed. (London: Ernest Benn 1930) p. 179. Haykal recalled that the rural population was already being reached by Kamil's death, since even people from far-flung corners of the countryside came to his 1908 funeral in Cairo: B 394-5 fn 57.
Kamilists award him to direct Egyptians is material support to the instruments that strengthen and integrate his Ottoman state: he would not give orders about Egypt’s strictly internal matters.

Despite this restrictedness, the religious rhetoric with which the Kamilists appealed to Egyptians to materially aid the Ottoman State committed them too deeply to leave open a reversible alliance of convenience. Religiosity would not equip any Egyptian group to critically assess the Ottoman State’s policies and needs from the viewpoint of Egypt’s interests. However, the British Arabophile Wilfrid Scawen Blunt in 1906 characterized Kamil as allied with the Ottoman State out of fear lest 'Abdul-Hamid barter away Egypt’s independence to Britain "for some personal interest or fear" --- a perspective perpetuated by such West-resident scholars as Wendell and 'Afa Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot. Aid to the Ottoman Empire’s judicious railway projects would make it less ramshackle before Western powers.

There were individuals or groups in Istanbul, both officials and private merchants, who called for construction of a modern Ottoman navy and also merchant fleet that could command military and economic respect. And the Ottoman Turks had some historical linkages with even such faraway Muslim countries as Indonesia. Nonetheless, M. 'Izzat’s perception that Ottoman officialdom was not getting enough done quickly enough towards making the Islamic fleet a reality, and that pressure to get the project moving came from the Caliph’s non-subject Muslims beyond his Empire as much as from the subjects he administered within it, was lucid. Kemal Karpat’s researches indicate that more ambitious international pan-Islamism to checkmate or sap or confront the expansionist West and centred around the Ottoman core, was not of much interest to the cautious, practical 'Abdul-Hamid II: rather, "the idea belonged to the outside or peripheral Muslims who were seeking a rallying-force" (colonized or threatened Muslims in Egypt and Nort

48. Wilfred Scawen Blunt, My Diaries (London: Martin Secker, 1919-1920) v. 2 p. 156. Blunt wrote this mid-1906 entry immediately after he met Kamil for the first time. He had the impression that Kamil "like all educate Egyptians hates and distrusts 'Abdul-Hamid as a tyrant and a dangerous man": his hope lay in the Sultan’s death and "a liberal and reforming successor to the Caliphate". It is to be noted, though, that Blunt was a Turcophile: Gladstone-like, he penned a pamphlet against 'Abdul-Hamid over the 1894-1896 "Armenian massacres". Ibid p. 455 It is a fact that Kamil’s September 1906 communication on pan-Islamism to Le Temps showed some acquaintance with the writings of liberal-secularoid Young Turkey exiles in Europe opposed to 'Abdul-Hamid. "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme" loc cit; cf. Steppat, Nationalismus pp. 290-291. Karpat assessed Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid II as quite prepared to sacrifice or cede attached lands or peripheral areas of the Ottoman Empire to expansionist Christian powers as part of his strategy to buy peace and time for the Ottoman core that he was intent to preserve. "Pan-Islamism..." pp. 5-6, 27. 'Afaaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, too, assessed nationalists such as Kamil as afraid that a treaty with Turkey might win Britain a legitimate sanction to remain in Egypt permanently. al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: Praeger 1969) pp. 47, 130.
Africa, "Russia" and India). From opposition to revolutionary movements and change, 'Abdul-Hamid shifted to passive acquiescence to rising Muslim resistance to Westerners. "He did not seek leadership of the awakening in the Islamic World but was forced by pressure from both Europeans and Muslims --- who had entirely opposite reasons for wanting him to take part in the movement --- to accept an important role" as Caliph-symbol. The global Pan-Islamic movement needed that central emblemic authority-figure "to achieve the degree of unity necessary for resistance". The Sultan-"Caliph" evoked pan-Islamism in order to manipulate colonial powers fearful of its appeal to their Muslims --- Britain, France and Russia --- into acquiescence with the continued "integrity of his realm, rather than actually to oppose European imperialism". Some "high Ottoman officials such as Sa'id Pasha, Khayruddin Pasha and several generals --- not to speak of religious leaders --- developed elaborate projects for organizing an Islamic Union", but 'Abdul-Hamid adroitly kept them only paper schemes.

'Abdul-Hamid had manipulated the Kamilists, like other colonized Muslim groups, into strengthening his realm by contributing to the Railway. He had met their minimum requirement by not legalizing Britain's Occupation of Egypt, which would have ended his own bargaining-power as well. Yet Kamil and his colleagues --- more modern as well as more religious in their supra-statal concept of sovereignty than either 'Abdul-Hamid or post-World War II orientalists --- wanted much more.

Anti-Turkish Christian Nationalisms

Kamilist solidarity with Turkey against Christian nations she had once ruled, or which were still fighting her for independence, perceived those nationalities vividly from a number of acculturated angles. Like the Jaridists (Ch. 6), the Kamilists imaged Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars etc almost as intimately as they characterized Turks --- making their pan-Islamism very different from the simpler variant of monolingual Egyptians. Kamilist opposition to these Christian nationalisms was diverse and inconsistent, the more emotionally involved because of multiple angles and ambivalences. It was unpredictable and out of control of calculated pursuit of Egypt:

50. Karpat, "Pan-Islamism: Imperial Plot or Muslim Popular Resistance to Imperialism?" pp. 6-7, 28-29.
international interests that required a strong Ottoman State.

Early in the Nasir period, the Egyptian pan-Arab journalist-analyst Ahmad Baha’ al-Din faulted Kamil for identifying his independence movement so closely with the cause of the Ottoman regime: it could only harm his lobbying of European support to evict Britain, given that such “European peoples” as the Greeks were “revolting against Turkish imperialism”\(^5^1\). Although not so much as had been the case had he mainly addressed the British public, Kamil undoubtedly found his support for ‘Abdul-Hamid against Greek, Armenian and other Christian nationalisms a PR problem when appealing to the French. Mme Juliette Adam and associated French nationalists may have sometimes even gone so far as to credit British manipulation of Greek and Armenian insurgencies against the Turks for expansion, but it was delicate chemistry even \*La Nouvelle Revue* might not lapse into Turcophobia when serious blood-letting got underway\(^5^2\). It would be inadequate, though, to view Kamil’s posture of opposition to those insurgent Christian nationalisms only as a residual traditionalist dysfunction in his psyche that resurges against requirements in the Francophone milieus he had to court. Greeks and Armenian

\(^5^1\). Ahmad Baba’ al-Din, under Nasir an incisive pan-Arab columnist in *al-Ahram* and the weekly *al-Musawwar*, felt that the Kamilists’ vocal apologetics for Turkey lost the cause of Egyptian independence support from Europeans sympathetic to the Christian nationalities fighting for independence, and also, to a degree, even to Turks working to replace ‘Abdul-Hamid’s despotism with constitutional government. Bayyumi, *al-Hizb al-Watani* 30. Did Mustafa Kamil know Egypt’s interest, Baha’ al-Din queried, given that the Sultan ‘Abdul-Hamid had issued the famous statement that ‘Urabi was an apostate rebel, as the British attacked? --- to which we saw (Ch. 3) the youthful Kamil’s eyes were well open as he put together his initial Pan-Islamic-Egyptianist position in Europe: A 164.

\(^5^2\). The chemistry of *La Nouvelle Revue* could ignite either way, although it usually scorched Britain around the time of Kamil’s conjunction. The extreme of anti-Britishism was Juliette Adam’s 1895 formulation that “the terrifying [British] octopus is fastening its tentacles around the bodies of all the nations”: it was Britain that was inciting the Cretans as well as Armenians to dismember the Ottoman Empire in order to occupy ‘Iraq and make Armenia its route to India. *La Nouvelle Revue* November-December 1895 pp. 387-389, 166-167. Classicist literary Graecism and their residual but durable identification with all Christians, in combination made *La Nouvelle Revue* contributors open to Hellenic nationalism --- more than to Armenian insurrectionism. The 1897 struggle and war over Crete won ‘Abdul-Hamid and the Turks unfriendly notices in *La Nouvelle Revue*. The Greek nationalists had an op-ed forum, presenting images of “les massacres de nos freres Cretois”, sanitizing out the latter’s pogroms against the Muslim-Cretan minority: “S.L.” (Athens), "La diplomatie Europeane dans le conflit Greco-Ture", *La Nouvelle Revue* July-August 1897 pp. 618-627; cf Jean Pischari, “Les Armeniens, les Cretois et l’Europe”, *La Nouvelle Revue* May-June 1897 pp. 54-70 and Comte de Chalo, "En Yacht au Pays de la Guerre Greco-Turque", *La Nouvelle Revue* September-October 1897 pp. 480-497, 694-713. Juliette Adam, too, responded with comparatively moderate and judicious sympathy for the "wise" Orthodox Cretans --- voicing the hope that they would win from the Powers, without whose duress ‘Abdul-Hamid would not budge, an autonomy that foresaw something very like what they were in fact to be granted. Adam’s item had a sharp, cherishing awareness of contemporaneous Greek royalty. *La Nouvelle Revue* May-June 1896 p. 716. Massacres against Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire and despotic repression by ‘Abdul-Hamid --- although with some sympathy for his constitutionalist Turkish as well as Armenian victims, also --- were flayed by Joseph Denaiss in “Le Sultan”, *La Nouvelle Revue* March-April 1897 and his "Les victimes du Sultan: la demission de Fouad Pacha", *ibid* May-June pp. 71-78.
were salient in the Francophone community of resident Europeans in Egypt: day-to-day bilingualizing interaction in his own country thus had exposed him and his colleagues in advance to themes by those two nationalities in conflict with the Turks. The diluted Christian consciousness with which he had to cope from the French, further irritated and inflamed his sour perceptions of the disparity between (a) Muslim Egyptians and (b) minority Christian Greeks or Armenians in Egypt who linked out into distant anti-Ottoman nationalisms. Kamil voiced considerable awareness to the French of Egyptian PM Nubar’s Christianity and that he was racially non-Egyptian, a member of an Armenian nation centred outside who pursued its interests within Egypt. To dispel impressions in France that (Muslim) Egyptians were religiously fanatical Kamil in 1895 observed that "Nubar Pasha, who is Christian, presided last year in the Khedive’s name over our most important [Islamic] ceremony, the ceremony of the sacred cloth [mahmal], and that to the applause of the crowd”53. Elsewhere, though, Kamil argued to his French readers that Nubar’s non-Egyptian origin made him readier to betray Egypt’s interests than Muslim ministers, themselves often Turco-Circassian, who collaborated with the British occupation. Following the 1882 conquest, the Sudanese revolted, and the British pressed the Egyptian government to renounce its rights over the Sudan. The Prime Minister Sharif Pasha resigned rather than comply. "But Nubar, the Armenian, taking power, accepted that which so outraged his predecessor and renounced the Egyptian Sudan”54. In Kamil’s mind, Nubar sacrificed Egypt’s Sudan because his supreme political loyalty was extraterritorial, to the Armenian nation: Colonel Baring, Cromer’s brother, told him that Nubar had asked the British to work for Armenia’s national independence from the Ottoman State to reward his services to Britain’s policies in Egypt and the Sudan55.

Bad parochial relations with an immigrant Christian minority also fed his solidarity with the Turks before Europeans in regard to Greek nationalism. The Kamilists’ support for the Ottoman State in the 1897 war brought tensions with Egypt’s resident Greeks near flash-point.

Kamil hastily returned to Egypt from Paris in 1897 (as he wrote to Juliette Adam) to head off near-successful attempts by the British to incite resident Greeks to rise up and attack "the Muslims". Kamil's statements in Egypt worsened Greek-Muslim relations. He publicly proposed to the victorious Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid that Turkey not withdraw from Thessaly until Britain withdrew from Egypt. The proposal triggered off an accusation by the Greek-owned *Phare d'Alexandrie* that Kamil was anti-Greek. Kamil's perceptions of Greeks in Egypt were very much religious. In 1895 he told the French that the Greeks living among the non-fanatical fallahs in Egypt's villages "traffic in alcohol and take interest, both prohibited in the Muslim religion".

Although parochial sourness was important, Kamil and fellow acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals had also been exposed from formative adolescence to articulations of Greek nationalist ideology by resident Greek journalists. Those local French newspapers and such Hellenophile metropolitan French organs as *La Nouvelle Revue* built up a substantial feel for the historical view of Greek Nationalism among Kamilists --- who evoked it to mollify Egypt's Greeks to the extent possible while supporting Turkey against Greece. An instance was Mustafa Kamil's reply, published in Alexandria's French-language *La Reforme* in mid-1897, to attacks by the Greek John Haicalis in his *Phare d'Alexandrie* upon Kamil's proposal that the Ottoman State withdraw from Thessaly only when Britain withdrew from Egypt. Kamil urged Egypt's Greeks to respect our views as we respect yours. You see things from the angle of the interest of the Greeks while we see them from the vantage-point of Egypt's interests. It is only just that each of us should be sincere in devotion to his homeland ... Regardless of all these political considerations, and the sensitivities of our ummah (nation), we do appreciate the patriotism of the Greeks, for any Egyptian cannot but respect all who defend their homeland whatever their nationality might be.

It was not only when conducting intercommunal diplomacy for Egypt's independence that Kamil expressed interest in the ideologies motivating the struggles of Christian nationalities against the Islamic Ottoman State. He showed in communications to his Egyptian followers a genuine analytical interest in more secular aspects of these anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim movements. Kamil early recognized that these Christian nationalities had a more advanced stage of

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57. Ibid pp. 113-114.
organization, and held them up as the model according to which Egyptians should organize their own independence movement. A letter by Kamil to his followers from Paris in 1895, widely diffused among the general Egyptian public by its publication after his death in 'Ali Fahmi Kamil’s collection, applied to anti-Ottoman Christian nationalities the very positive Kamilist term "Easterners" (sharqiyyina) and held up their nationalist activism for emulation:

Do you not have in some Eastern races like the Serbs, Bulgarians and others a tremendous lesson? Remember now the Armenians who do not flag one instant in founding societies and delivering speeches although they have never before known the meaning of independence, and who to date have never tasted the sweetness of unity of action and freedom from the dead hand of foreign [rule] over their country in the way that you yourselves tasted their sweetness in the age of the noble Khedivial dynasty. Besides that, they have no right entitling them to win their demands, whereas your rights are the greatest of rights. You have no way to recover them except through publicizing the facts in Europe and seeking her help.

In at least this formulation, Kamil demonstrated some preparedness, then, to view the Ottoman government like the Armenian nationalists, as "foreign" rule by one nation over another in Armenian-populated areas. Kamil did take a stride in this 1895 letter towards a true nationalist world-view, which would accept secession by non-Turkish nationalities from the Ottoman Empire as as natural as Egypt’s --- still much more legalistic --- struggle for independence from British rule.

Contact with anti-Ottoman Greek nationalism helped Ahmad Hilmi to develop towards such an atomistic secular-nationalist world-view. In a 1906 al-Liwa’ article, Hilmi denied the reality of supposed supra-national communities, pan-Christian or pan-Muslim, inspired by emotions. He argued Egyptians would not when they regained independence from Britain reamalgamate Egypt in the Ottoman State merely because Turks were fellow Muslims. Cultural factors, or common European identity, played no role at all in the support that Russia gave to the early struggle of the Greeks for independence from the Turks’ rule. European states were motivated by cold self-interest; they therefore still would give the same support to an effective Egyptian independence movement that Russia gave to the Greeks’ original independence struggle. Hilmi’s latter thesis had an acculturated impulse to keep up the fruitless lobbying of Europe, and to negate the growing sense in the Kamilist movement that European states, as a virtual camp,

60. 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil Basha fi Arba’a wa Thalathina Rabi’an v. 3 p. 65.
discriminated between Muslims and Christians in "the East".

Hilmi’s fair knowledge of Greek nationalism might, as with Kamil, have been picked up from the resident Greek journalists who owned or published in local French papers. His 1906 article was reasonably well-informed on the nature of the Philiki Etaireia ("Friendly Band") "terrorist" organization founded in 1814 at Odessa to launch the liberation of Ottoman-occupied Greece from the sanctuary of Russian soil. The Russian Tsar Alexander I’s patronage of, and material support for, the Greek uprising for independence Hilmi interpreted not as due to the Tsar being "a lover of the ancient Greeks" (or to common Orthodox Christianity?) but a tactic in power-politics --- an attempt by the Russian to weaken his great antagonist, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud. Despite his obvious dislike for the Philiki Etaireia terrorists, Hilmi added that like then the Egyptians could also get the European powers’ support against occupying Britain "if we get up and act." 61

This article was another example of the Kamilists seeking to learn about the ideology and techniques of all nationalist groups, even the most anti-Ottoman and anti-Islamic, with the purpose of adapting their methods where suited to Egypt’s own struggle for independence. Muhammad Farid in late 1908 similarly expressed respect for the energy and skill with which the Bulgarians and their monarch had wrested independence, while voicing al-Hizb al-Watani’s ongoing support for the Ottoman State’s suzerain rights over Bulgaria 62. The Kamilists’ inherent pan-Muslim connection with the Turks, and the genocidal lack of pity with which insurgent Slavs, Bulgaria at Greece slaughtered and drove out Muslim populations resident in Macedonia, assured that


Leadership of the Greek independence movement was taken in 1820 by the Prince Alexandros Ypsilantis. Ypsilantis came of a family of Phanariot Greeks; he became an officer in the Czar’s Imperial Guard and had the Czar’s approval when he crossed the Prut river with an armed band on 6 March 1821: however, Russia disavowed Ypsilantis when he was defeated by the Turks and the native Rumanian population deserted him. On March 25 the sporadic uprisings in the Morea, which Egyptian troops were to fight, broke out. As previously stated (fn 10), Ahmad Hilmi did not receive formal education beyond primary level: his basic grounding in French and in Greek nationalism would thus have come both from Greek colleagues when he worked in a private company in cosmopolitan Alexandria, and from perusing the French newspapers and magazines that Egypt-resident Greeks brought out. While Hilmi’s articles often present secularist analyses of modern Muslim history, like all dual-cultured Muslim Egyptian intellectuals he had non-Western Islamic spasms at least. Thus, he participated in the Kamilists’ denunciation of ‘Ali Yusuf’s elopement (al-Liwa’ 27 July 1904 pp. 1, 2); and Hilmi’s insistence that children not be sent to government or private schools controlled by Britishers or residents --- that the nationalists had to build schools of their own --- may have had an Islamic as well as its "patriotic" motive: "al-Sha’b al-Misri" (The Egyptian People), al-Liwa’ 26 February 1903.

Westernization: the latter item wanted to educate "the Egyptian People" to become a Boer people or a Polish people and if Hilmi was hitting ‘Ali Yusuf to strike Khedive Abbas, his constitutionalist "true patriotism" held up Victor Hugo’s resistance to the Emperor of France who persecuted the liberals --- Hilmi, "Quwwat al-Wataniyah" (1906).

al-Liwa' would vituperatively deny the Christians of that Ottoman province title to secede --- despite their own insistence on British evacuation. al-Liwa's engaged highlighting of Christian-Muslim slaughter in such faraway Ottoman provinces as Macedonia, like its coverage of conversions to, or progress of, Islam in China and India, alienated such more secular and open Copts as Salamah Musa from Kamil's independence movement. Although more diverse than usually imaged in the literature, Kamilist pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottoman Turks did hamper the non-sectarian territorial nationalism Kamil professed, and thus a united independence movement, from getting off the ground. Yet the Karnilists kept it up because they cared about the Turks and Muslims in the Balkans, as well as Coptic fellow-Egyptians.

The ill-controlled and unpredictable character of Kamilist responses to anti-Ottoman

63. Traumatized by the mass killings of Muslims, al-Liwa', in 1903 condemned the refusal of Bulgarian independence fighters to collaborate with the Ottoman reforms conducted by Governor Husayn Hilmi in Macedonia. "Those are the evil souls which blew up houses and castles and assassinated pure men, made orphans of children and devastated their land. They claim that the Ottoman State (may Allah protect it!) treats them with a constant oppression and injustice that are incompatible with any code, so that they have sought independence through threat and menace" "Lima Qataluhum wa Hum Abriya'?” (Why Have They Killed Them When They Are Innocent?), al-Liwa', 15 Aug 1903 p. 1. The complex, bitter, prolonged Macedonian problem, including the religious and ethnic diversity of its population, and the subversion by rivals Bulgaria and Greece that intensified the slaughter, are surveyed by Stanford and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1976-1977) v. 2 pp. 207-211. Macedonia contained Turkish-speaking and Slavic Muslims, slightly outnumbered by Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks and Vlachs. This degree of diversity had no equivalent in Egypt; and Husay Hilmi (to become Ottoman Grand Vezir in 1909) no doubt carried out his reforms in the "excellent" manner al-Liwa' imaged. The fact remains that al-Liwa' advised the Macedonian Orthodox to accept Ottoman status and an Ottoman military presence while denouncing Egyptian Ministers who worked with British "advisers". "Had our ministers shared our nation's patriotic feelings... not a single [British] soldier would remain to... make the hearts [of Egyptians] bleed with his sight". Sayyid 'Ali, "Hadhihi Natijat al-Istislam Ayyuhal-Wuzara' al-Fikham" (This is the Consequence of Surrender Proud Ministers), al-Liwa' 8 April 1908.

64. 'Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot assessed that Kamil's "support for Turkey on religious grounds... frighten away" from his movement many prominent or gifted Copts attracted by its drive for independence and Egypt-centre motifs. al-Sayyid-Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer* p. 160. Salamah Musa's social radicalism, marked even from his youth before World War 1, was rare in his sect, but he did faithfully illustrate some perceptions --- and misunderstandings about --- Muslim Egyptian pro-Ottoman pan-Islam that alienated from Kamil Copts who might otherwise have joined up. In his 1927 *al-Yawm wal-Ghad*, Musa depicted the Khedive 'Abbas, al-Mu'ayyad and Mustafa Kamil as responsible for "an apostasy from the patriotic ideal": all "returned to Islam as the community bond (jami'at al-Islam: saying that Egypt was a possession of the Ottoman State. Musa vehemently assailed al-Mu'ayyad and al-Liwa' for claiming that Egyptians were 'Ottoman [subjects] obliged to fight the Macedonians to defend 'Abdul-Hamid and his subjects, that 'Abdul-Hamid was the Caliph of the Muslims whom every Egyptian was duty-bound to obey. Mustafa Kamil and the editors of his paper almost caused a communal clash among [the Muslims and] Copts through this stupidity and raving". Musa's *al-Yawm wal-Ghad* cited Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, *Ittijahat* v. 2 p. 225. In his 1947 autobiography, Musa again wrote that the collective Coptic minority shunned the nationalism articulated by al-Liwa' and al-Mu'ayyad because it mingled recognition of Ottoman suzerainty with demands for Egypt's independence. *The Education of Salama Musa* ttd L.O. Schuman (Leiden: F.J. Brill 1961) pp. 42-44. Musa took at face value, as a dangerously unitary Ottomanism, al-Mu'ayyad editor 'Ali Yusuf's call for Egyptians to send representatives to the CUP-restored Ottoman Parliament: *ibid* p. 34. This missed Khedive 'Abbas' "Arab Caliphate" undermining of all Istanbul regimes --- and that Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid assessed Yusuf's call as only 'Abbas' ploy to block an Egyptian constitution or parliament: Ch. 6, In 53 (A 304).
Christian nationalisms has to be stressed. The Kamilists were not able to synthesize together the sectors of the world-view they evoked. The availability of multiple perspectives in al-Liwa', some of them relatively open or cold-blooded, fleshed out the Serbs, Greeks, Armenians and Bulgars to Egyptians, making their voices heard with that immediacy enemies have in modern multi-lingual nationalisms. Moreover, as each people in a string of Christian nations is concretized, the oppose Christian camp takes form. French and British publications and politicians had made the threat to the Ottoman Empire of those Christian nationalisms central in the minds of the Kamilists. Kamilist counter-solidarity with the Turks (pan-Islam) --- modern and acculturated --- had many features symmetrically patterned by the pan-Christianism underlaying British and French support for Greeks and Armenians. Kamil was surely correct that Europeans had no right to deny him his mirror-retort as atavistic "fanaticism" --- although it was precisely this charge in Western languages that could spiritually fuse the Kamilists with threatened Turkish and Slavic Muslims.

THE WIDER PAN-MUSLIM WORLD

The present section analyses later, 20th-century communications of the Kamilists denouncing subjugation or mistreatment by Europeans other than the British of Muslim populations outside Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. We choose Kamilist views of European imperialism in the later period in which they reacted against general Europe.

The section will trace the intellectuals' mounting sense, as they reject the West, that religions determined international political actions and associations.

Steppat underscores the campicizing comprehensiveness of Kamil's reaction against Europe when it did not respond to his early appeals on Egypt's behalf. Europe never freed a single Muslim nation. The Dutch tyrannized the Javanese, Austria confiscated the religious properties c the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina (detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878), Russia the wealth of Kazan's Muslims. Europeans oppressed Muslims in the Caucasus, the Crimea, Algeria, Tunisia, India and Zanzibar. In his earlier hopeful approaches to Europe, Kamil's concern was concentrated upon narrower segments of the world's

Muslims: upon his Egyptian nation and the Muslims of the contiguous Ottoman state. He initially pursued in Europe Egypt’s and the Ottoman State’s interests with talk of a vague wide "Muslim world". Smarting from Europe’s indifference to Egypt’s cause, Kamil then developed a sharp Muslim internationalist consciousness. He frequently denounced European governments that had done Egypt no harm, for ill-treating around the globe distant Muslim populations with which Egypt had few contacts or common secular interests. Steppat credits Kamil with popularizing consciousness of a far-flung "Muslim world" in Egypt: al-Liwa had a Muslim correspondent in Calcutta and was distributed as far as Singapore.

The Problem of "Fanaticism"

The Muslim intellectuals’ treatment of European imperialism in the Muslim world was given direction by their acculturation. Thus, they addressed the Europeans’ concept of "religious fanaticism" almost as much as real military, administrative and economic phenomena of imperialism in Muslim lands. The intellectuals’ attempts, even in Arabic, to harmonize their promotion of the causes of Muslim populations with modernist repudiation of religious fanaticism show that they continued to hear the criteria evoked in liberal European intellectualism.

Wendell has outlined the appearance of the problem of "fanaticism" among Muslim intellectuals in the nineteenth century. He argues that pious Muslims, and even the in some respects non-traditional Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, found difficulty in understanding "the nature of the accusation" of fanaticism made against Muslim populations by expansionist Westerners. Wendell shows the affinity of (a) Kamil’s argument that fanaticism in Egypt was due to ignorance of true Islam and would disappear when the Muslims were adequately educated in their religion with (b) similar early argumentation by 'Abduh. The use of the charge to screen Britain’s record in Egypt from scrutiny enraged Egyptians as never before in the wake of Dinshaway. al-Liwa’ in 1906 quoted British Foreign Affairs Secretary Sir Edward Grey’s dismissal of Egyptians’ reactions to Dinshaway as "fanatical". Grey predicted that as their
political thinking advanced they would become disillusioned with pan-Islamism. Kamil, in England around that time, tried hard to refute credence there that Egyptians opposed the Occupation out of atavistic "religious fanaticism" against Christians.

Grey’s argument that the fanaticism of the Egyptians was linked to related Muslim fanaticism against France in North Africa was granted a hearing among colonialist-expansionist circles in France. A Catholic Syrian friend of Kamil, Shukri Ghanim, tried to reassure the French from Eclair that there was no "fanaticism" in Egypt against Christians in general: writing from Cairo, a French journalist replied in Le Temps that Kamil fitted Grey’s analysis, and that his pan-Islamic movement was indeed out to subvert French authority in Tunisia and Algeria. Rising to its imperial responsibilities, Le Temps assessed that elite Algerians and Tunisians were reading Egyptian pan-Islamic journals and that were studying at al-Azhar. But North Africans were necessarily accepting irreversible French settlement and municipal elections, forgetting Islam: it was in French sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Zinder) that pan-Islamic fanaticism fanned from Egypt still might harm. However, the anti-Muslim, imperialistic Louis Bertrand (1866-1941) heightened French fears of the effects that Kamil’s

70. Summary of Sir Edward Grey’s speech and an Egyptian reply in "al-Jami’at al-Islamiyyah wal-Siyasat al-Injiliyyah" (Pan-Islamism and British Policy), al-Liwa’ 8 July 1906. Grey’s bracketing of Egyptian and North African discontent as “fanaticism” caught French attention, and also ignited even the fury of Copts like Salamah Musa when the British-subsidized al-Muqattam used the motif to justify Dinshawai executions. Musa, Education pp. 31-33. "Although Grey defended the policy [of the British in Egypt following Dinshawai] and contended that severe action was warranted in the light of the growing Muslim fanaticism in Egypt, his defence was only lukewarm. The private correspondence of Liberal-imperialists like Grey reveals that they, too, were extremely embarrassed by the harshness of the British policy". Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 283.

71. Andre Servier, Islam and the Psychology of the Muslim (London: Chapman and Hall 1924) p. 260. Servier was a shadowy but spasmodically well-briefed writer who may well have worked in some French agency; his book was in gestation in the pre-War years. He characterized al-Liwa’, al-Mu’ayyad and (sic) al-Jaridah as “tribunes of Islam” that threatened French rule in North Africa. Ibid. Servier’s tenth chapter, “The Nationalist Movement in Egypt”, described Mustafa Kamil Pasha as the "the leading spirit" of a new, more dangerous form of pan-Islamism. Although not as primary as alarmist French operatives feared, Lutfi and the Jaridists did have their pan-Muslim and proto-pan-Arab twinges that made them sympathetic to North African Muslims under French rule: A 259-260.


73. “Le Pan-Islamisme en Afrique”, Le Temps 23 August 1906 p. 1. Although somewhat concerned at the possibility of coordinated resistance by widely separated populations, Le Temps --- and the French ruling class for which it spoke --- could also rein in its fears. An editorial perceiving Muslim ferment throughout the whole of Asia, portrayed Muslims attacking Armenians and Russians in the Caucasus, identified the mullahs as the crucial group responsible for the Shah’s conceding of an Iranian National Assembly, and saw Mustafa Kamil as a sinister agent of Istanbul --- yet, against British paranoia, assessed that few Indian Muslims, whatever their respect for the (Ottoman) "Caliph", wanted to give him any political authority over them. “L’Effervescence Musulman en Asie”, Le Temps 2-8 August 1906 p. 1.
movement might have on Muslim Algeria\textsuperscript{74}.

By 1906, Kamil and his colleagues saw "fanaticism" and linked motifs as a common European imperialist ethos able to band Christian European states together as a broad bloc against the Muslim populations that they colonized. The article of attack from Cairo contemptuously crushed Kamil's claim that he led an enlightened elite intent to bridge Western civilization and Islam: modern-educated Egyptians were an insignificant handful and Islam and the West's humanism irreconcilable\textsuperscript{75}. In reply, Kamil defended al-Liwa's printing of letters from Algerians and Tunisians --- their only way to get their "suffering" and the arbitrary "asphyxiation" and "enslavement of human beings" across to France: "Egypt's Muslim newspapers" were "criticizing" France for her own self-reform, not "attacking". Unlike Muhammad Farid's attacks on France, Kamil did not, at least here, evoke shared Arabness while bracketing (a) Egypt and (b) Algeria and Tunisia as all Muslim. His response was pan-Muslim, rather than Arabist. Kamil retained a residue of his old attitude that France could be better than Britain: al-Liwa' had praised more well-intentioned governors such as Jonnart who honor France in Algeria --- but then he distinguished two Frances, the political and the scientific-literary. France had long before abandoned Egypt, whose nationalists now relied on themselves\textsuperscript{76}.

Kamil, then, kept on addressing the French even after Egypt's short-term interest had less to hope, given that they had become Britain's "best friends and auxiliaries"\textsuperscript{77}. His ultra-acculturated elite retained some emotional cultural bonds with France that kept them talking, and some sense of difference from non-Westernized North Africans whom splendidly-endowed France could have uplifted with a different approach. It showed the widening of the Kamilists' delimitation of inner indigenous community that he tried to get how "the Muslims" of Algeria felt across to a French establishment that drew calm satisfaction from all its achievements there. France, universal as ever, will continue to print your Parisian cadences, Moustafa, although haven't you fully worked out yet that only Gaul-like Aryanoid Berbers who have the blue eyes and renounce Islam can have scope to prosper, in their station, in

\textsuperscript{74} Ghali, L'Egypte Nationaliste p. 43. This, though, would have been mainly in Le Mirage Oriental, published after Kamil's death in 1909. 
\textsuperscript{75} "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte" loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{76} Kamil, "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme", Le Temps 8 September 1906 pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
our new Algeria department --- its Arabs with your olive skin and crimped hair, because their fanaticism refused to fit in, have bound themselves off for extinction. 

On the whole, France’s antipathy to Islam and Muslims, and her colonialism, was fusing her with Britain --- and fusing Algeria with Egypt --- for the now intensely campist Kamilists.

**Crude Secular Explication of Colonialism and Muslim Resistance: Zinder, West Africa.**

The previous Chapter excerpted 1906 London press statements in which Kamil disdained the sub-Saharan Black African Muslims of Zinder as (along with traditional, illiterate Moroccans) a separate category from the sectionally self-Westernizing Egyptians. A side of him was inclined to accept French claims that anachronistic Islamic "religious fanaticism" motivated discontent against colonial rule there.

A few days after its account of Grey’s "fanaticism" speech, al-Liwa’ printed a front page item ironically headlined "Islamic Fanaticism" ("al-Ta’assub al-Islami") on a supposed attempted revolt in what had since 1899 been the French-occupied town of Zinder. Zinder is situated on the northern margin of the West African Soudan and had importance in the early twentieth century as an exporium of the textiles and spices trade across the Sahara between the Hausa...
states of the South and the Tuareg lands and Tripoli in the North\textsuperscript{80}. The city thus had long had economic and ethnic as well as religious bonds with the North African wing of the Arab World. Prior to the 1899 conquest, Zinder had been the capital of a Muslim dynasty established in the eighteenth century\textsuperscript{81}.

\begin{quotation}
\textit{al-Liwa} rejected the claims of \textit{Temps} that the motive of the 1906 unrest in Zinder was religious fanaticism when incidents more violent and terrible than that are undertaken against Christian governments by their Christian subjects seeking freedom, justice and equality. Why do the French say that the motive of the population of Zinder is religious, not political, when the misdeeds that the rulers commit against the subjugated force the latter finally to sacrifice their blood for liberty and independence?\textsuperscript{82}.
\end{quotation}

The formal argument of the \textit{al-Liwa}’ item on Zinder --- as Ahmad Hilmi argued about the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Russia --- thus marginalized religion in international politics. Secular political and socio-economic interests mainly, motivated the French to conquer and fired the (Muslim) West Africans to revolt against them. The item equates violent resistance by Zinder’s Muslims against non-Muslims with social, economic and political uprisings by oppressed Christian social groups and nations against other Christians in Europe. It is strikingly secular to award the same inevitability to both. These sub-Saharan African populations are Muslim. But the political independence or sovereignty for which they revolt is not motivated by either their or their oppressors’ sect. The same violence would automatically break out when any nation deprived another of its natural political sovereignty even if both had one faith.

However, an article’s emotional impact can be different from its formal argument. In answering French arguments, \textit{al-Liwa} took up the Islam-versus-Christianity perspective of France’s colonial Governor-General Roume and of a conservative and sometimes jingoistic French newspaper. \textit{Le Temps}’ perceptions did (qualifiedly) prod the Liwa’ists to connect Muslim discontent in French West Africa, unrest against French rule in North Africa, Egypt’s

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\textsuperscript{80} Art. “Zinder”, \textit{EB} (MCMII) v. 33 p. 927. From the French exploration and geographical literature, especially the 1899 account of Feureau, this article described turn-of-century Zinder as “a large and fine town surrounded with high earthen walls, very thick at the base and pierced with seven gates. It covers a large area, and its houses, in part built of clay, in part of straw, are interspersed with trees, which give the place a pleasing aspect”. \textit{Ibid.} Zinder is today situated in South Central Niger and is the town centre of an important peanut-producing region of Africa. The town served as the capital of French West Africa until 1926: unrest in 1906 could threaten France’s hold over the region.
\textsuperscript{81} “Zinder” \textit{EB} (MCMII).
\textsuperscript{82} “al-Ta’assub al-Islami”, \textit{loc. cit.}
\end{flushleft}
Kamilist pan-Islam that definitely did fuel the latter, and an Ottoman State whose will and capacity to harm the French overrated (Le Temps was chafing at the bit to hit the Ottomans in Libya)\textsuperscript{83}. The French press impressed upon Egyptians the Islamophobia of all European powers, and that Islam was one bond with sub-Saharan Africans under French rule.

**Secular-Islamic Duality.** Robert Tignor has drawn attention to duality in Mustafa Kamil’s accounts of the West’s imperialism. On the one hand there was his neo-traditionalist "emphasis on the anti-Muslim drives in European civilization". On the other hand, notes Tignor, Kamil was indebted to European leftist thinkers for concepts of imperialism as "economically motivated, undertaken for the purpose of exploiting Egypt’s resources"\textsuperscript{84}. This powerfully supra-Egyptianizing synthesis of religious and left-secular perspectives was present in Muhammad Farid’s 1903 account of French rule in Tunisia and Algeria. Before the 1904 Entente ended the last hopes that France might break ranks with England and take Egypt’s side, Farid already in 1903 lamented the "ill-fate" that brought Tunisia and Algeria "under French colonialism". On the one hand Farid stressed agrarian dispossession, "the unjust laws that France issued in Algeria and had others issue in Tunisia to rob the lands of the tribes" and hand them over to French colons. Here, he viewed French colonialism as motivated by material-economic drives to seize property, natural resources and wealth from the indigenous inhabitants. On the other hand, however, Farid described French actions in Algeria and Tunisia as also motivated by religious-confessional fanaticism or \textit{ta'assub}: "the fanaticism of the French against the Arab". Basing himself on Muhammad Abduh’s impressions during a 1902 visit to Algeria, Farid stressed the damage that agrarian dispossession by the French did to the religious-charitable

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\textsuperscript{83} Le Temps had described the Zinder incidents as "of a local nature": it nonetheless related the Zinder unrest to other "sporadic" wider "effervescence" in West Africa "mainly due to religious fanaticism" --- although therefore "devoid of political importance" according to M. Roume, Governor General of French West Africa. Among manifestations of Muslim fanaticism, Roume mentioned the assassination of Lieutenant Fabre at Nyame, and the murder of two guards at Kokobitanda. "Les Incidents de Zinder", \textit{Le Temps} 20 July 1906 p. 1. The "Zinder plot" was one symptom of a "religious fanaticism that is manifesting itself at various points, widely separated from each other, in our African territories". "Le Complot de Zinder", \textit{al-Liwa’} 23 August 1906 p. 2; directly above this appeared the item "Arrestation d'un Agitateur en Algerie". Aware of the volatility of Zinder and other possessions in the Soudan, Le Temps elsewhere advocated that France maintain its prestige by occupying the two oases of Djanet and Bilma, over which the Ottoman State claimed jurisdiction from Tripoli. With insulting ominousness, it warned the Ottoman State not to foolhardily assert any claim. "Djanet et Bilma", \textit{Le Temps} 3 August 1906 p. 1. In November, Le Temps charged that riders driven off with heavy loss of life from a French post at Bilma had come from Tibesti at the instigation of Turkish authorities in the Fezzan. "Affaires Coloniales: un Incident a Bilma", \textit{Le Temps} 10 November 1906 p. 1.

\textsuperscript{84} Tignor, \textit{British Colonial Rule} pp. 264-265.
Islamic awqaf. While Farid perceived economic drives in French colonialism, he thus additionally popularized that anti-Muslim, Christian hostility to Islam also motivated its "oppression" of the Algerians and Tunisians.

More secular analyses of imperialism and resistance from Kamilist acculturateds could draw on those already installed in the Afghanist-'Abduhist classicoid view of overall indigenous history. 'Abduh had earlier alternated non-religious, cold-blooded responses to French imperialism with Islamist ones in various turn-of-century replies to Gabriel Hanotaux, French historian and a former Foreign Minister (1894-1896). From al-Mu’ayyad, 'Abduh described France as cynically manipulating Catholic missionary activity and education abroad to gain control over the Islamic lands, notably the Ottoman Empire --- in particular Lebanon/Syria, which he had viewed as an exile. In France itself, he derided, the very same laicist French governments expelled Jesuits and limited the Church’s authority. 'Abduh characterized that differences of religions did not much motivate either French colonial policies or resistance by the Algerians to the French: "if the entire French nation embraced Islam, with M. Hanotaux at the fore, but still treated non-French people in the fashion familiar in Algeria and Madagascar, could it hope that the populations of its colonies would... not seize any opportunity to revolt?" This is like the Zinder item’s affirmation that the colonized fight imperialists over secular sovereignty, not religion --- and states that a single religion cannot on its own impose or define a humane political community. But could the parallel struggles of Muslim Algerians and non-Muslim Madagascans against the same enemy open into some loose anti-imperialist political community or alliance that would span Afro-Asian sects?

Deep emotional hostility could narrow perceptions of imperialism by acculturated Egyptian writers: yet the 'Abduh-Manarist, Kamilist and Jaridist schools built up a diverse

85. Muhammad Farid, "Halat al-Jaza’ir wa Tunus" (The Condition of Algeria and Tunisia), al-Liwa' 29 September 1903. Farid wrote up his impressions of his repeated journeys to Algeria, Tunisia, (Ottoman) Tripolitania and --- in the best acculturated Arab-ethnicizing pattern --- Andalusia, in his 298-page book Rahalatu Muhammad Farid; Yusuf As’ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyah v. 2 (Bayrut: Matab’ Lubnan 1956) p. 635. 'Abduh had made his visit to Algeria in 1902, the year before Farid’s al-Liwa’ article. Advance notice of the visit in al-Manar had assured 'Abduh a good reception from local followers of his unusually liberal salafi Islamic revivalism, notably Shaykh 'Abd al-Halim Bin Simayah and Muhammad Ibn Mustafa Khojah. Muhammad Burj, "al-Jaza’ir fi Kitabat Muhammad 'Abduh" (Algeria in the Writings of Muhammad 'Abduh), al-Asalah (Algiers) December 1977 p. 23.
86. Burj, "al-Jaza’ir" p. 23.
87. Ibid p. 21.
enough shared stock of angles on Western behavior to discipline their Islamic anger and help them sidestep simplicism. 'Abduh's ability in 1900 to take some of Islam's lenses off and scrutinize the French anew to figure out what really drove them was to persist in Egypt's Arabo-Islamic community tradition. The Young Men's Muslim Association was to ascribe the drive of the French to detach the Berbers from Arabic, Arabs and Islam through the mid-1930 dahir to the secular power drives that 'Abduh had considered thirty years before. Accepting that the French political establishment was truly laicist and anti-clerical, the YMMA analysed that France was trying to break Islam in Morocco for the pragmatic motive that it was an obstacle to the strengthening of her control. The non-Christian French ruling class promoted French missionary activity as a catspaw for its imperial expansion: B 71-72 fn. Condemnations of France in North Africa by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and his journal al-Risalah (from 1933), developed the Kamilists' and Jaridists' interest and concern. However, despite his excellent French and acquaintance with even some classical French works, al-Zayyat --- like Kamil and Farid more than 'Abduh --- was, in his denunciations, fixated on Christian, Islamophobic drives in French misdeeds in the Arab West (B 259, 337).

Remote Muslim Populations Oppressed by Europeans: Russia's Muslims, Indonesia

Other al-Liwa' items lack such quasi-secular explanations of conflicts between Muslims and Westerners in history. The Kamilists sometimes projected their religion-determined Muslim international community identification out onto European colonialists almost mechanically, without seeking the latters' real motives. al-Liwa' conveyed to Egyptians images of violence and murder around the world by the most diverse range of Europeans against Muslims --- explicating the attacks in terms of Christian "religious fanaticism": it was in these terms that it reported such remote massacres as an alleged 1906 Cossack pogrom against Muslim Ingush in the Caucasus88. A failure to have a direct source that could provide facts from the area may be at issue in an item about Indonesia carried by al-Liwa' in August 1904. This consisted of a report from its correspondent in Java ("limukatibina") dated 21 July 1904 claiming a massacre of 100 innocent Muslim villagers by Dutch troops at Surabaya but headlined (as it seems by al-Liwa')

"The Fanaticism of the Europeans against the Muslims". There was much fighting between Dutch colonial armies and Muslims in Sumatra, particularly Acheh, in 1904. But there does not seem to have been any clash at Surabaya comparable to that claimed by al-Liwa. Rashid Rida tried to demonstrate that, despite its dateline, al-Liwa' did not truly have a correspondent in Java --- yet the Kamilists really may have been disinfomed by tawdrier pan-Islamists from there.

The Zinder item dismissed religious antagonisms as a false issue evoked to disguise from French public opinion the sordid politics of the subjugation of a West African population. The Surabaya item presents a more traditional, Islamoid conception of Europeans. Rather than alternation, though, blendings of selected old Islamic motifs with radical-modernist patterns enabled the Kamilists to integrate some unprecedented pan-Muslim relationships. The Kamilists' expanding links with Russia's faraway Muslims were an example. The Kamilists chose to evolve these not with traditionalist Islamic leaderships in Russia and Central Asia but with the opposed jadid movement, launched by the great Tatar educationalist Isma'il Gaspirali (1851-1914). This current wanted to lance out whole sectors of Sunni late-traditionalism and synthesize those heightened Islamic elements maintained with modern Western patterns. In Gaspirali's vision, though, there could be no salvation for individual Muslim nations outside a unified and regenerated world of Islam: he came to Egypt and in 1908 tried to initiate a Universal Islamic Congress to be held in Cairo. Excited by jadid attempts to perpetuate Islam within a modernization of Muslims, al-Liwa' declared in November 1907 that if the Islamic world could achieve a renaissance, this would be due to the efforts of the Russian Muslims so brilliantly represented by Gaspirali. By 1916 the jadidists were to have built 5,000 schools throughout the Tsarist Empire. al-Liwa' publicized, and took sides with, the vulnerable jadidists' efforts for a Reformation of Islam in all the still very medieval Central Asian statelets ruled from Russia: a 1904 item titled "Education in Bukhara" printed an inside jadidist view of the movement's

90. I am indebted to Dr Anthony Reid of the Australian National University for his observations on this matter.
91. Steppat, "Nationalism in" p. 282. Dr Reid has described misleading propaganda diffused over the Middle East, charging Dutch mistreatment of Indonesian Muslims, by Kiamil Bey, Turkish Consul-General in Batavia from 1897-9. There were attempts to define Indonesians, especially those of Arab descent, as Ottoman subjects. Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia", Journal of Asian Studies v. 26:2 (February 1987) pp. 267-283, esp. pp. 280-282.
educational endeavors in that ultra-hostile traditionalist city, a centre of immemorial religious schools and colleges. \(^94\) \textit{al-Liwa}'s coverage of Russia's Muslims placed emphasis upon educational matters.\(^95\)

The Kamilists got material aid through to Russia's Muslims where needed. In 1907, Kamil organized throughout Egypt the collection of a fund for the relief of famine-stricken Muslims in Nukha\(^6\) in Adharbayjan. The money was conveyed to them through the Ramiev brothers, editors of the Ohrenburg Tatar journal \textit{Waqt} (\textit{Vakit}). A letter of thanks to Kamil was published immediately after his death in an Arabic daily \textit{al-Nahdah}, which Gaspirali briefly edited from Cairo in early 1908\(^97\). Pro-jadid Islamic theology students in Egypt were a bridge-elite with active command of classical Arabic. They and Gaspirali could not sustain the Arabic \textit{al-Nahdah}, the hoped-for forum for a much more far-reaching conjunction of the Tsarist Empire's self-Westernizing Reformed \textit{jadid} Islam with the politically more vocal, but likewise acculturation-stimulated, Kamilist pan-Islam. Yet, the Kamilist press published both Arabic and French versions of Gaspirali's addresses in Cairo.\(^98\) Translated extracts from \textit{Waqt} articles also appeared in Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's \textit{al-Jaridah} as well as the Kamilist media: these denounced the drive of Russian chauvinism to stop Muslims from taking part in the Tsarist Empire's abortive post-1905 parliamentary politics (A 296 fn 36) --- also raised by Gaspirali in \textit{al-Nahdah}. In his communications to Egyptians, Gaspirali (like \textit{al-Liwa}') condemned the

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\(^94\) "al-'Ulum fi Bukhara" (Education in Bukhara), \textit{al-Liwa'} 20 August 1904. Gaspirali's account to his Egyptian readers of his 1893 visit to Bukhara, indicated that its Amir received him with official respect and munificent facilities. Gaspirali, though, voiced to Egyptians many criticisms of social decay and ignorance in that traditionalist Amirirate. Kuttner, "Gasprinskii in Cairo" pp. 399-400.

\(^95\) \textit{al-Liwa'} on 11 July 1906 (pp. 1-2) published accounts of the Association of Teachers at Baku, a petition by Crimean (Tatar) Muslims to the Duma, and the foundation by Muslims in Ashkabad of a scientific-industrial school. \textit{al-Liwa'} also carried a lengthy front-page round-up of news about Russian-ruled Muslims in its issue of 1 April 1908.


\(^97\) Kuttner, "Gasprinskii in Cairo" pp. 407-8.

\(^98\) For some examples, \textit{ibid} p. 421 fn 37.
Egyptian ruling classes’ ill-treatment of the peasantry\textsuperscript{99}: like the Kamilists, he sniped at late-Sunni scholastic education as the reason for Muslim backwardness, demanding new education that would incorporate the West’s strength. Paralleling the Kamilists, he argued from \textit{al-Nahdah} that Muslim women had to be almost equally educated so as to effectively rear children in the home: he went beyond Kamil, however, by advocating deviling and the right of women to work, for instance as government-school teachers, as the completely Westernized Polish Muslim women did\textsuperscript{100}.

The encounters and exchanges between (a) Kamilist Egyptian pan-Muslims and (b) Turkic jadidists artistically repressed by the Russians, illustrate that small Muslim elites alienated from late Sunni Islam, rather than traditional clerics, have the strong Islamic community drive to link up across very great distances. The Kamilists and Jadidists both drew energy from combining (a) energetic borrowing of modernity from Westerners with (b) a sense of the same Westerners as malevolent subjugators and excluders of Muslims, with a camp or bloc the retort. Watanist Egyptians and Russia’s Jadid intelligentsia did effectively use their media to exchange thought and experiences. The Kamilists showed that they cared for their distant coreligionists by delivering the aid required for their survival.

**POTENTIALITY FOR SECULAR MULTI-SECTARIAN AFRO-ASIAN COMMUNITY**

The section tests potentiality for multi-sectarian Afro-Asian community in Kamilist communications. The data, though, again underscores Islam’s at least short-term ability to pervasively tint and determine the conceptualization of communities in this acculturated party.

\textsuperscript{99} For a denunciation by Gaspirali from his Arabic \textit{al-Nahdah} of the Egyptian ruling class’ ill-treatment, exploitation and neglect of the ignorant Egyptian peasantry, \textit{ibid} pp. 406-407. The outburst may have been influenced by Russian populism as Kuttner speculates: he is wrong, though, that the Tatar modernist was introducing educated Egyptians to a more radical social consciousness. Kamil’s \textit{al-Liwa’} had, years before in 1903, mordantly advised the Egyptian government and the British “advisers” who directed it to supply hygienic drinking-water to the Egyptian countryside, not just Cairo and Alexandria --- after all, epidemics that broke out in the villages would reach them, too, in the end! “Miyah al-Sharb” (Drinking Water), \textit{al-Liwa’} 7 January 1903. \textit{al-Liwa’} thanked the Anglo-Jewish international financier and philanthropist Ernest Cassel (1852-1921) for his work to combat eye diseases in Egypt, such a contrast to the “remissness” of rich Egyptians. "Shukr al-Muhsin" (Thanking a Benefactor) \textit{al-Liwa’} 13 January 1903 p. 2. Cassel had organized Egypt’s modern banking system and the financing of the construction of the Aswan dam, and was a close collaborator with Cromer. Tignor, \textit{British Colonial Rule} pp. 368-9, 222 and 373.

\textsuperscript{100} Kuttner, "Gasprinskii" p. 392.
1. Kamilist Responses to the Emergence of New Japan

The new self-modernizing, militarily powerful Japan made a more powerful impression upon the Kamilists than any other non-Muslim Afro-Asian group. Her defeat of Russia in the 1904-1905 war came at a time when France was coming to terms with her former enemy England and Egyptian nationalists had lost hope of aid from Europe. In a period when Westerners seemed to be drawing together against the East, Japan’s victory showed that Eastern peoples could achieve sovereignty and strength by their own efforts. Kamil’s reaction against general Europe was clear in a statement to French friends. "Are not the Japanese the only Oriental people which has put Europe in its place? How could I possibly not love them?"^101.

As Kamil responded to Japan’s victory, his sense of a Muslim international community widened out to an Afro-Asian sphere of solidarity. Steppat analyses this as natural: the neo-traditional "Islam-Christianity antithesis" had been dormant at first in the young Kamil’s initially rather secularoid thought. It was the circumstances of the clash with the imperialist West that activated it, so that the dichotomy of Islam versus Christianity now "symbolizes" for Mustafa Kamil the opposition between the Orient and Occident. When Japan’s victory over Russia in the 1904-5 war suggested a new source of hope for Egypt against imperialism, Kamil’s feelings of pan-Islamic solidarity readily got "overlaid" with the broader Oriental solidarity-feeling^102.

Before we analyse Kamilist responses to victorious Japan, it might be noted that Japan’s self-modernization had impressed Middle Eastern Muslims even earlier, in the nineteenth century. Such interest was shown by both Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and by the Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid. 'Abdul-Hamid had in 1890 sent the screw training-ship Ertogrul to Japan: however, that wooden vessel went down within sight of the Japanese coast (25 November 1890)^103. The attempts by pan-Islamic Turkey to link up with the new, militarily self-strengthening Japanese, however, were in conjunction with an impulse to Islamize them.

^101. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283 fn 4. Kamil’s French friends, who had hitherto mainly seen his Francophile motifs, were disconcerted by his exultation at the downfall of Russia, an ally on which France depended. The article "al-Yabaniyyuna fi Biladihim" (The Japanese in their Land), al-Liwa', 24 July 1904, spoke with scathing contempt not merely of Russia, but also of its ally France.


^103. Art. "'Abd al-Hamid II", EI2 v. 1 p. 64.
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, during his second stay in Istanbul (from 1892), advised 'Abdul-Hamid how to achieve it. The Sultan was thinking of sending a delegation of his capital's 'ulama', in accordance with an invitation from the Japanese Emperor, to spread Islam in Japan, but al-Afghani disagreed. "The 'ulama'," he replied, "have alienated the Muslims from Islam so it is most likely that they will turn the unbelievers against it. My view is that you should send some presents to the Emperor with a letter in which you shall promise him to meet his request, and that we then work hard to graduate/produce a group of 'ulama' fit to convey Islam's message and able to approach missionary activity in a rational way".

Jamal al-Din had been alienated by rational sectors in the Islamic heritage, and by contact with the West's thought, from traditional Islam and its clergy. Yet Islam still held as a basis for all positive international communities in his thought.

The Kamilists' responses to the new Japan tested how much connection they kept up with Islamic tradition. Their preparedness to accept non-Muslim Japan, following its victory over Russia, as a model for reorganization and modernization of Muslim countries retreated from Islam as a comprehensive socio-economic order. al-Liwa' in August 1904 advertised Mustafa Kamil's book al-Shams al-Mushriiqah (The Rising Sun) as the source from which Egyptians could understand Japan's progress and development, the secrets of her power and greatness and the devotion that her leaders show in her service ... the most momentous lessons for the nations of the Orient that have been ignorant of patriotic sentiment so that they became disunited ... giving the foreigner sway over them.

The non-Muslim Japanese had found answers to the challenges of life in the modern world that were independent of Islam. They provided an effective model for Muslim Egyptians' own achievement of sovereign nationhood. The advertisement indicated that Kamil meant to provide Egyptians with detailed accounts of Japanese society, politics and geography.

Kamil himself planned to visit Japan. Such direct contact would certainly have been an important step towards establishing a real reciprocal relationship with the "Eastern" Japanese.

105. "al-Shams al-Mushriiqah" (The Rising Sun), al-Liwa' 9 August 1904. "al-Yabaniyyuna fi Biladhihim" (The Japanese in their Land), al-Liwa' 24 July 1904, almost endorsed inhuman fanaticism antithetical to Islam. The article printed the report of a European traveller that a Japanese whose wife had died, and who found no one to care for his two children save himself, killed them in order to serve in the army. "The Homeland is dearer than these two" he cried, as he plunged in the knife.
He was, however, unable to make the visit\(^\text{106}\).

Paradoxically, one *al-Liwa'* writer manifested his alienation from Egyptian traditionalist Islam while anticipating that Islam could be made a common element in relationship through conversion by the Japanese. The 1906 item was occasioned by a conference on world religions in Tokyo. The writer thought that the activity of Chinese, Indian, Tatar and British Muslims attending or in correspondence with the Conference had led the Japanese scholars present to show "some leaning towards us". The Conference had been convened in order to "make an overall review of the beliefs of the human race and choose from among them what would most suit their [Japanese] scientific and social-economic advancement". The Japanese might adopt Islam as they had adopted wholesale the West's scientific and industrial knowledge: hence, *al-Liwa'* alerted, preparations should be made for Egypt, as a centre of Islamic learning, to receive future delegations of Japanese scholars. They would want to join the al-Azhar university for instruction in Islam's traditional sciences (*al-'ulum al-naqliyyah*)\(^\text{107}\), to return back to Japan after graduation to transmit their new knowledge to their people. This article clearly indicated the ambivalence of the modern-educated but believing Kamilists towards Arabo-Egyptian traditionalist Islamic learning. Bitingly, the *al-Liwa'* writer commented that al-Azhar should be radically reformed well in advance if the modern-minded Japanese were to master Arabic and Islam "since the Arab who speaks Arabic cannot after spending twenty years at learning Arabic in the Azharite fashion... correctly understand an eloquent *maqal* (article/essay)\(^\text{108}\).

The writer's contempt for the ineffectiveness of al-Azhar's timeworn methods in transmitting Islam and its "sciences" manifested the European-type education received by many in al-Hizb al-Watani. Maintaining continuity with the traditionally-educated pan-Islamic school of al-Afghani, however, the writer wanted to cull and upgrade the ancient Sunni religious learning, and its clerical elite, and incorporate them in international modernity, not eliminate

\(^{106}\) Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283 fn 4.

\(^{107}\) "al-'ulum al-naqliyyah". Wendell gives a list of these traditional subjects of Sunni scholasticism. They included jurisprudence (*fiqh*), theology (*ta'wil*), traditions of the Prophet (*hadith*), Qur'anic exegesis (*tafsir*), Qur'anic recitation and such "sciences" of language as semantics and expression (*ma'ani*), rhetoric (*bayan*), stylistic embellishment (*badi*), logic (*mantiq*), syntax (*nahw*), and prosody (*qanun*). Wendell, *Egyptian National Image* pp. 205-206. The *al-Liwa'* writer thought the Japanese students and scholars who would come to Egypt should be instructed in the "pith" or "quintessence" (*lubab*) of all these sciences, rather than exhaustively master them.

them. The acculturated Arabo-Islamism of al-Jaridah before 1915 and of Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat after 1930 would develop this impulse to take over and restructure Islamic learning and its clergy elite to then reapply them in Islamizing activity around the globe (A 297–298; B 300-302).

The contraction of the modern world, and the shared interest that far-flung Eastern populations now had unitedly to beat back the West’s power, might bring widely-separated Egyptians and Japanese into relationship. It would be founded upon radically different bases from preceding international communities of Egyptians that had been determined by contiguity and religion. Some Kamilists, however, refused to accept the terms of a novel secular situation. They wanted to make the Japanese "pillars of [the Muslims’] community/league (jami‘atihim) and guardians of their unity". The Japanese would still have leadership as the model for self-strengthening modernization but within the constraints of membership in Islam’s ummah. For attraction to become community, the Japanese would have to embrace Islam.

2. Kamilist Attitudes to Non-Muslim Negroes

As late as 1906, the acculturated Kamil had a reflex when addressing Europeans to dissociate Egypt from black Africans (Muslim as well as pagan) stereotyped as primitive in Europe (along with pre-colonial Moroccans). But as their all-embracing repudiation of the whole West gained momentum, the acculturated intellectuals whom Kamil headed declared their identification with powerless groups that Westerners despised and ill-treated the most. Met are condemnations, for instance, of Belgian atrocities in the Congo, committed to force the Blacks to grow rubber there. al-Liwa’ expressed sympathy for Negroes facing discrimination and violence in the United States in two articles bitingly headlined "Hamajiyyat al-Mutamaddinin" (The Barbarism of the Civilized People). Neither Belgians nor Christian Americans had politically harmed Egypt or the Ottoman

111. One of these articles (al-Liwa’ 8 March 1903, p. 1) assailed bigoted reaction among “both the elite and the masses of Americans” to President Theodore Roosevelt’s gestures of inviting a black lecturer (Booker T. Washington) to dinner, or appointing an American black as head of a post office. The whites’ reactions included threats from the Southern states to have Roosevelt assassinated as Lincoln had been. The other article under this heading (al-Liwa’ 25 July 1904, p. 1) detailed violation by whites of black women in the USA’s Southern states, lynchings and torture of a black man and his wife who fled from Doddsville, Mississippi, after being falsely accused of killing a white farmer.
State or Muslims. Long-standing Islamic hostility to a generalized "Abode" of Unbelief (narrowed to Western Christians by al-Nadim etc) continued in these intellectuals' drive to condemn the whole Christian West. Some very distant Afro-Asian populations of course included Muslim minorities. The Kamilists' channel of communication with such areas would tend to be the Muslim minority: they therefore imbibed and diffused those distant minorities' viewpoints about non-Muslim neighbors. Propagating such viewpoints might hamper Muslim Egyptians' development of a sense of affinity and community with non-Muslim Afro-Asians.

The Kamilists' perceptions of black Africans demonstrate the problem. On one hand, al-Liwa' berated mistreatment by white Belgians and Americans of Negroes. But in 1903 it also diffused in Egypt rejection by Indian Muslims in South Africa of community with the country's Africans. al-Liwa printed an article from its correspondent in Pretoria condemning racist treatment by the British of South Africa's Indians of whom a section was Muslim. However, the Muslim Indian writer did not absolutely oppose British racial segregation of public facilities etc: his objection was rather that the British were treating South Africa's Indians on the same level as the Negroes (al-'abid --- "the slaves") "although we are as the Europeans in education, knowledge and perception". Although he accepted Gandhi as the political leader of all sects of Indians in the country, he manifested the same sense of social distance from Hindu Indians. The British forced the Muslim Indians to use, along with Hindu Indians and the Bantu, segregated post-offices with the sign "Hindu Post Office". This phrase infuriated the (Indian) Muslims "because the Hindus are the idol-worshippong pagans".


(a) Anti-Imperialist Territorial Patriotism. al-Liwa' approved the non-communal nature of mourning in Calcutta and Sylhet where Hindus and Muslims joined to express their sympathy to the Egyptian people at their loss of "Mustafa Kamil Pasha the great leader of the Egyptian patriots". The atmosphere evoked here is of bi-sectarian nations, the Indian and the Egyptian, determined by secular factors of territorial homeland, perhaps race, and history. These factors

112. "Pretoria, fi 15 Shawwal li-Hadrati Mukatibina" (Pretoria, on 15 Shawwal from Our Esteemed Correspondent There), al-Liwa' 16 February 1903 p. 1. Cf. text of petition denouncing residential segregation submitted by Gandhi to Colonial Affairs Secretary Chamberlain during his visit to South Africa. al-Liwa' 1 Marc 1903, pp. 1, 2. Although unfriendly to Hinduism, the correspondent was prepared to accept Gandhi as the representative of Indians as a general entity including Muslims.
would distinguish Egyptian Muslims from Indian Muslims, while uniting Muslim Indians with Hindu Indians, and Muslim Egyptians with Copts. However, Kamil’s followers were made aware of Islam as a bond between Egypt and the Bengal populations in question. By his death, Kamil really had caught the attention of some up-and-coming young nationalist Hindu leaders in Bengal and other areas of India --- his impact was not an illusion of al-Liwa’s Cairo head office. Already, Hindu communalism dogged the Indian nationalism of Sri Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950), editor of the Calcutta Bande Mataram: Ghose was well aware in his 1908 tribute that “the religious solidarity of Islam” had been pursued by Kamil alongside appeals to Europe to advance Egyptian independence --- "but he never suffered it for a moment to interfere with the distinct existence of Egyptian Nationality". Thus, Kamil’s similar territorial-Egyptianist "patriotism" and the harm he did the common occupier outweighed his perhaps instrumental pro-Ottoman pan-Islam for Bengali Hindu Anglophobes.

The relationship with Indian militants deepened after Kamil’s death. In August 1909, al-Liwa even praised Madha Lao Dhingra, a 25 year-old Hindu from the Panjab who on 1 July 1909 had assassinated Lt. Col. Sir W.H. Curzon Whyllie, Political Aide-de-Camp to the Secretary of State for India, in London. Explosive members of al-Hizb al-Watani came to prefer militant nationalist Hindus over Muslim Indians whom --- so Ibrahim al-Wardani, assassin of PM Ghali, perceived --- collaborated with the British out of minority insecurity. The Indian revolutionary Khrishnavarna encouraged the exiled Watanis to proceed along the path of terrorism and insurrection: established lawyer-leaders such as Muhammad Farid were not

113. al-Liwa’ 14 April 1908. The deeply religious --- but bi-sectarian --- character of Bengal society was conveyed to Arab readers by the item. The meeting of mourning in Sylhet consisted of teachers and students: the headmaster chairing the gathering concluded his speech by urging the Muslim and Hindu students to go to their respective houses of worship to pray for God’s mercy for Mustafa Kamil’s spirit. The Calcutta meeting was chaired by Mawlana Sayyid Shams al-Huda "and was attended by a great gathering of leading Hindus and Muslims". Those presiding announced that they would send condolences to Muhammad Farid, the successor as President of al-Hizb al-Watani and to Kamil’s family: the Bengali sympathisers thus had correspondence contact with Egypt’s pan-Islamic independence movement. Ibid.


116. For text A \textit{35} fn 8. The Jaridists, too, tended to image that India’s Muslims were more liable to collaborate with the British than the Hindus, the pace-setters of the movement for Indian independence: eg. Lutfi al-Sayyid, October 1911 A \textit{317}. 
enthusiastic.117

(b) Sectarianizing. Divisive Islamist Drive. The Kamilists’ recognition of bi-sectarian
nationalities such as the Indian or Egyptian, each integrated by its struggle against British rule,
anticipated key assumptions about the national and the Afro-Asian communities later developed
in Nasirism. But al-Liwa’s non-pragmatic commitment to Islam’s propagation as a necessity for
itself ran against such secularization of national and wider community. al-Liwa in 1906 in its
"Barid al-Islam" (Muslim World Reports) section reported that “four virtuous Brahmans have
embraced the upright religion of Islam in the town of Lahore ... This results from India’s ‘Ulama’
carrying out their religious duties as regards the propagation of Islam according to the Quran’s
precepts”. It was time, al-Liwa’ bitingly commented, that “all the ‘ulama’ of Islam fulfil their
religious function” and convey the Quran to those non-Muslims from whom its teachings “are
covered even today”: would al-Liwa’ even support a missionary movement to Islamize
Christians in Egypt, as well?118 al-Liwa’ presented China’s Muslims as prosperous and
flourishing: “as a result, the pagans there incline to them, entering into the religion of Allah in
great multitudes”119. Such Islamist coverage of China and India by al-Liwa’ convinced such
Copts as Salamah Musa that Kamil’s independence movement was not for non-Muslims.120

In covering India and China, then, al-Liwa’ manifested two contradictory attitudes to the
world. On one hand, it viewed multi-sectarian nations, each welded by a territorial homeland
from diverse sects, as humanity’s main community units. Territorial nationalism would direct
energies very much to temporal politics, immediately to achieving the nation’s independence

(Hayfa) v. 16: March 1982 p. 17.

118. “Barid al-Islam” (Muslim World Reports), al-Liwa’ 11 July 1906. It is to be noted that unfulfilled
plans by Kamil to travel to India were specifically to visit “Islamic India”. Steppat, “Nationalismus” p.282 fn 4.
Kamil’s early images of Indian Muslims were --- perhaps quite acutely --- of their pan-Islamism: their preparedness
to almost suicidally attack the British to defend the Ottoman State’s Caliphate, without mentioning Indian
Haphazard pan-Islam: the Francophone Kamil won access to this Indian Muslim mood only because he had recently
met an Englishman who translated for him the substance of an article in a Madras journal. Ibid.

119. “al-Muslimuna fil-Sin” (The Muslims in China), 7 July 1906 p. 1. The phrase "entering into the
religion of Allah in great multitudes" is a quotation from the Qur’an, surah 110 "al-Nasr" (Victory), describing
the mass conversions of Arabia following the Prophet Muhammad’s final triumph.

120. Salamah in his 1927 al-Yawm wal-Ghad: “Mustafa Kamil out of his ignorance of our age’s spirit use
to inform us --- as the remnants of the editorial staffs of al-Mu’ayyad and al-Hizb al-Watani continue to inform us
Egyptians --- about Islam in China under the heading ‘Islamic World News’”. Quoted Muhammad Muhammad
Attitudes of live-and-let-live towards each other’s disparate religious beliefs would be crucial to (a) the viability of individual territorial multi-sectarian nationalities and (b) international alliances between them. But the Kamilists’ religious side wanted Islam to advance sweepingly around the world at the expense of other faiths. Such rapid mass conversions to Islam in countries like India and China could not but activate communal tensions disruptive of territorial political nationalisms. Involvement by the Kamilist movement itself in Islamic missionary activity abroad would rule out alliance on the basis of secular common interests (anti-colonialism, modernization) with predominantly non-Muslim nationalisms, such as the Indian.

The tensions and dilemma about the wide East caused by the Liwa’ists’ mix of elements unfolded over the next few decades in acculturated Egyptian Arabo-Islamism. Joint interests such as achieving independence from the same colonizer, cultural exchanges with Hindu Indians, and acculturated distaste for traditional Islam in India as in Egypt, all tended to facilitate an Egyptian conjunction with Indian nationalism from 1922. Paradoxically, though, the ultra-acculturateds’ very preoccupation with modern international realities and transformations, their Westernized knowledge of new means to connect continents, simultaneously equipped them to become the directors of an international modernist Islamism that disrupts multi-sectarian nationalisms or Afro-Asianism. The balance in these intellectuals between (a) Arab-centric and modernizing dislike of the decidedly non-classical Islam of ordinary Indian Muslims and (b) religious gulf vis-a-vis non-Muslim Afro-Asians whom joint interests link to Egypt, was always very delicate. These Egyptian intellectuals could swing either way in regard to the wide multi-religious "East", in the 1930s and 1940s as in the time of Mustafa Kamil (eg. vis-a-vis Indians: B 60-4, B 90-3; B 170-176).

**KAMILIST PAN-ISLAM: ASSESSMENT**

The literature in Arabic as well as Western languages has tended to view the Ottoman-centred pan-Islamism of the party of Mustafa Kamil in terms of a modest carry-over or
residue from Islam: the Ottoman Empire was dwindling away, Egypt’s links with it progressively attenuating, and even the Kamilists were rigorous about an Egyptian nation and its need for a discrete state. Yet the Islamic Ottoman Empire as so habitual a part of the conceptual universe of Egyptians would continue to bulk large until World War I smashed it.

Our communications sampling highlighted more the experimental potency of Kamilist pan-Islam as a novel synthesis of (a) functional segments selected from Islam with (b) elements and patterns from the West. Scholarly discussion around whether the Kamilists would or would not have reincorporated (or confederated) Egypt into the Ottoman State has overlooked the unprecedented character of pan-Islam as a drive to effect with the West’s technologies a supra-statal camp-community to hold back the West. Kamilist pan-Islam alternated an impressive range of themes --- grippingly simple Islamic rituals, classical Arabs, contemporary holy war against Christian incursions, new crusades, the titanic contest for survival between two wide camps --- to galvanize Egyptians into modernizing behavior and enterprises modelled from the West, internally and regionally. The Kamilist bracketing of old Islamic motifs with even economic modernity today might look half-baked or preposterous or manipulative or transitional --- but may have affinities to some supra-nationalist rightist-Christian or pan-Latin ideas that after 1945 were to foster West European and pan-American counter-integrations against the communist camp.

For a colonized country, the Kamilists often effectively integrated their new, wide Muslim community. Their media did achieve patchy or selective exchanges of ideas and experiences with comparable West-tinged elites in the Ottoman Empire, India and even Muslim populations ruled by Russia. Nor did the exchanges stay cultural: they got not just Arabic books but some food to far-off hungry non-Arab Muslims. In their narrower supra-Arab region, they mobilized diverse Egyptian strata to help the Ottoman State build railways by which it could stop Britain expanding from Egypt. The Hijaz Railway was an effective instrument of regional power that did tighten the Ottoman Empire’s hold on the Arabian peninsula and proved hard for the Britsh to destroy during World War 1. Although Kamilist pan-Islam had rational, instrumental enterprises patterned by the model enemy West’s capitalism, the West’s racist, Islamophobic and high literary discourses also ignited or inflamed other of its more subjective and emotionalist aspects. On the whole, Kamilist pan-Islamism was pervasively tinted and structured by a West
perpetually overheard through acculturation.

The Kamilists’ ideological and political exchanges with Ottoman Turks were not superficial. In aesthetic matters the relationship could not match the knitting of Egyptian with other Arabs that the Kamilists fed by their promotion of a single standard language. Pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism politically retarded the evolution of an Egyptian-led pan-Arabism before 1919 to the extent that it led the Kamilists to stand with the Turks against autonomist or nationalist protests from Ottoman Arabs (Ch. 5). Yet Kamilist pan-Islam left long-term legacies to post-1922 Egyptian political pan-Arabism. Although sometimes only perceiving other Muslims, it increased interest in Algerian and other North African Arabs. It started the flow of Egyptian foodstuffs, guns and fighters to Libyans resisting Italy. And the Kamilists’ attitude that sovereignty was larger than Egypt or any single Muslim state-unit, and their ceaseless discussion of modern economic instruments for integrating that camp, fostered a frame of mind that after 1922 was to try to integrate the Arabs with steamers, cross-investment and regional companies.
CHAPTER 5: ELEMENTS FOR ARAB NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN BRITISH-OCUPIED EGYPT.

Chapter 2 presented ethnicizing stress by traditionally-educated pan-Islamists upon Islam's Arab-led earlier conquests, wide empires and urban intellectual centers. This Chapter traces contemporary applications by the Kamilists of such Arab classicist motifs: to the parochial struggle between Arabic and Western languages, the definition of self in the face of imperialism, in internal Egyptian ethnicities, and to the regional relations with Ottoman Arabs and Turks. Chapter 4 showed that Europe's expansionism made the acculturated Kamilists close ranks with the Ottoman central government: we now see how long they stayed hostile to efforts by Ottoman Arabs to wrest powers or independence from Istanbul's Turks. The pan-Islamic Kamilists urged Egyptians to donate to the Hijaz railway in order to tighten the Turks' hold over their Arabian territories against Britain --- if also to help modernize "Arab brothers". This Chapter sets out countering Arab ethno-linguistic affinities that finally even led some Kamilists to cheer the Sharif Husayn's 1916 Arab Revolt.

Two potential types of Arab identity or community are suggested by formulations to be examined in this Chapter. One is an identity combining Arabic with Islam --- a pan-Arab nation within Islam's belief-community. But the present chapter also examines relations of Muslim Egyptians with resident Syrian Christians and Copts to test if the Arabic language and images of the classical Arabs' past can detach from Islam to thread together divergent Arab sects and homelands of origin.

Accumulating Parochial Arab Ethnicity in Egypt

Nineteenth century Muslim Egyptians were conscious of at least partial descent from Arabians who had moved into Egypt during or following the Islamic conquest. Egyptian peasants expressed their sense of being Arab in distinction from the other Muslim ethnic groups by applying the proverb "the oppression of the Turks rather than the justice of the Arabs" to oppressive Arabic-speaking Egyptians appointed by Muhammad 'Ali as district governors, previously generally appointed from the Turks\(^1\). al-'Arab, however, also meant in spoken Arabic

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the Arab nomads of the desert by this period and Lane referred to a term *awlad al-'Arab* or sons of the Arabs with which Arabs living in houses described themselves. The terms *awlad al-'Arab* and *abnā’ al-'Arab* (sons/children of the Arabs) was applied to Egypt’s general sedentary Arabic-speaking population in the second half of the nineteenth century to mark them off from other ethnic-linguistic groups. The Khedive Sa'id, in trying to replace Turks in (mainly lower ranks of) the administration in the 1850s addressed the Egyptians appointed as *abnā’ al-'Arab* "making them responsible, in case of failure, for perpetuating the rule of *abnā’ al-Turk*”.

**Arabness: Possibility for Christians?**. 'Abdallah al-Nadim and 'Ali Mubarak (Ch. 2) located Egyptians’ "forefathers" in "the Arab Nation" (al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah), viewed as a non-current Islamic ideological community. al-Nadim’s one-time constitutionalist comrade the Jewish Egyptian-nationalist journalist and playwright Ya'qub Sanu’ (1839 - 1912) in his 19th century play al-'Alil applied the term *awlad al-'Arab* to Arabic-speaking non-Muslim Egyptians, also. The true love of the man Mitri is about to be married off by her father against her will to a Monsieur Hunayn: when the beloved protests to Mitri that she will never accept such a match, he observes ruefully that

such talk would be in place with European families, but as regards us, children of the Arabs (awlad al-'Arab), a girl has no say, even though we have started getting civilized [al-tamaddun: wordplay "settling down in towns"] and it is allowed for us to enter and go out among each other.

The term *awlad al-'Arab* is here used by non-Muslim Arabic-speaking Egyptians to distinguish a multi-sectarian ethnic group from the resident Europeans. Arabness was evoked as a means of identifying with Muslim Egyptians by Syrian Christians, also, in the circle of al-Afghani. The Muslim al-Nadim was seen in Chapter 2 to have in 1892 used *ibn 'Arab* and *ibn...".

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2. Ibid, p. 27, fn. 1.
Turk to distinguish native ethnic groups from Europeans in context of the groups’ educated youth adopting European languages in place of indigenous Arabic and Turkish. al-Nadim let Syrian Christians evoke Arabness as a joint community with Egyptians and himself did so even towards SC residents who collaborated with the British occupiers. On the other hand, we encountered no communication in which he termed Copts Arabs. As well as first language, some racial-kinship link with Muslim classical Arab "forefathers" was another determinant of Arabness, leading al-Nadim sometimes to use "Arabs" and Copts as mutually exclusive ethnic categories in the Egyptian context despite the Copts’ Arabic speech.

Multi-Elite Restoration of Classical Arabs

The period of British colonial rule saw an accelerating, increasingly documented and original, restoration of the classical Arabs within intellectual life and high literature. The mutually-reinforcing efforts of a range of culturally divergent elites in Egypt --- but also from other Arab countries --- by 1919 had built up a diverse body of Arabist motifs and elements: acculturated Muslims could pick what met their needs. The power of the West was on the mind of all elites that contributed, even representatives of traditional monolingual Sunni Muslim learning.

'Ali Mubarak published his translation of Sedillot’s 1854 Histoire des Arabes in 1892. In that same year, the rather more acculturated Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1867 - 1934), a graduate in the French-derived secular law (1887), a professional Egyptian government French-Arabic translator and Arabist who extensively interacted with orientalists in Egypt and in European conferences, made his first journey to Spain. Ahmad Zaki viewed himself as "the Arab Muslim" during an audience with the Regent Queen Christina, toured the Arab sites in the main Spanish towns and commenced forthwith in al-Ahram his forty-year-long Egyptian press popularization of Arab Spain as "the Lost Islamic Paradise". Zaki represents tense, ambivalent stances towards the West manifested by some acculturated intellectuals. Colonized, these intellectuals must

simultaneously (a) present past Muslim military prowess to build confidence in Muslim capacity to beat back the West and regain sovereignty and (b) legitimize the Arabs’ present adoption of aspects of the West’s modern culture and sciences by depicting Christian Europeans as past borrowers. Spain hearteningly illustrated Arab contribution to the emergence of modern Europe and "the power attained by Islam ... when its banners fluttered above Andalusia, its peoples spreading ... civilization ... the days when the Western Caliphate surpassed its Eastern rival in luxury, grandeur and intellectual life to the extent that the Kings of Europe curried favor with the Caliphs, seeking their patronage and protection"8. Even more in the twentieth century, acculturated Egyptian intellectuals were apt to connect the modern Egyptians to the Arabs in Spain when arguing the political relationship between Egyptians and the occupying British. The highly acculturated, racially sensitive Duse Mohamed, in 1911 flung back at Britishers who were disdainful of Egypt’s Westernizing-educated intellectuals, the Arab capability witnessed "by those who have visited Spain, gazing admiringly on the Alhambra and other remnants of Moorish architecture wrought by the forebears of that very Arab stock who at present inhabit the [Nile] Delta"9. The anti-Muslim Louis Bertrand observed 19 that it had become the fashion for Egyptian nationalists to go to Spain and meditate in the gardens of the Alcazar of Seville or in the Alhambra of Granada on the defunct splendors of Western Islam. Such Egyptians tended to ascribe to Europe’s modern civilization an Islamic Saracenic origin, "the total annexation of France to Morocco"10.

Contributions from very diverse Arab --- not just Egyptian --- elites fed the rise of acculturated Arab historical consciousness. The Khedive 'Abbas’ mouthpiece al-Mu’ayyad publicized research works on the classical Arabs published by traditional scholars in the whole Arab world. In 1905 it gave a general account of the three-volume work Bulugh al-Arab fi Ma’rifat Ahwal al-'Arab published in 1899 in Baghdad by the 'Iraqi Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi (1857 - 1924), identifying the Cairo bookshop selling it. Most of the work was an account of the peninsular Arabians in their pre-Islamic period. In assessing this work’s potential to promote a non-religious sect-integrative Arab national identity in Egypt, the religious orientation of both

the pan-Islamic al-Mu’ayyad and al-Alusi should be borne in mind. Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi came of a Baghdad family with a tradition of scholarly Islamic writing\textsuperscript{11}, he was basically a latter-day follower of Taqiy al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah and many of his works listed by Daghir were tracts on purely religious controversies\textsuperscript{12}. Study of the pre-Islamic Arabs and their poetry by Muslims was to explicate meanings of the revealed Qur’an and Islam’s initial history. This religious impulse is mentioned by al-Mu’ayyad as inspiring al-Alusi to write his work, but in conjunction with his national identification with even pre-Islamic Arabians. The (1889) International Congress of Orientalists, held in Stockholm, called on the East’s scholars to write about the history of the (classical) "Arab nation". Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi “moved by Arab zeal and the racial link and the religious community” thereupon penned his monumental work on the classical, chiefly pre-Islamic, Arabians. Hailing it, al-Mu’ayyad, saw the early Arabs as providing (a) the model for Arabic language usage and (b) for cultivating such virtues "as magnanimity and courage in battle/readiness to aid the hard-pressed (al-najdah) and chivalry and compulsion to take the side of any in distress (al-hamiyyah) and group spirit and preservation of family honor and attention to the rights of neighbors and honor shown to guests and sacrifice of one’s own life in defence of a stranger". An important point is that the Arabians had already developed their model virtues before --- and independently of --- revealed Islam. al-Alusi’s work, al-Mu’ayyad informed its Egyptian readership, "began from the first [pre-Islamic] emergence of the Arab nation" (al-Ummat al-'Arabiyyah). It gave a detailed account of the customs and tribal genealogies of the Arabian peninsula’s pre-Islamic racially unmixed "authentic Arabs" who spoke the original pure Arabic (al-'Arab al-'Ariba’), "their fine ethics", "their poets, their sages and their religion of worship before Islam and the tactful way in which the Prophet Muhammad changed their inherited mores and the traditions that they had zealously handed down”\textsuperscript{13}. The Prophet Muhammad and Islam modified but harnessed and fulfilled rather than replaced the characteristics that the Arabians had already developed.

al-Mu’ayyad in the al-Alusi item speaks of "the Arab nation" as a bygone entity which on

\textsuperscript{11} Account of the Wahhabi-leaning al-Alusi family in Albert Hourani, Arabian Thought in the Liberal Age 1798 - 1939 (London: OUP paperback 1970) p. 222. The religious works of Mahmud Shihab al-Din al-Alusi and Nu’man al-Alusi were published in Cairo from 1880: ibid p. 375.

\textsuperscript{12} See Yusuf As’ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah pt. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi’ Lubnan 1956) pp. 41-45.

\textsuperscript{13} "Bulugh al-Arab fI Ma’rifat Ahwal al-'Arab", al-Mu’ayyad 23 July 1905.
the strength of its unique virtues gained pre-eminent glory over all other "states and nations" in "the ancient ages". It nonetheless provided the "origin" (uss) in which the contemporary successor entities of "the sons of the Arabs" (abna' al-'Arab) and "the East" can command "honor" before the West. The non-Egyptian al-Asuli's work, through subsequent Cairo editions, conveyed authentic data about the early Arabians to Westernizing-educated Muslim Egyptians in the isolationist-particularist 1920s and during the 1930s (Arabo-Islamic reaction against the West). Its non-Muslim classical Arabs could validate Arab political community with Christians.

al-Mu'ayyad also publicized contributions by local Egyptian authors to the literature about the classical Arabs. In 1905 it hailed the Ta'rikh Duwal al-'Arab wal-Islam (The History of the States of the Arabs and Islam) by Muhammad Tala'at Harb, the pioneering Egyptian businessman, financier and industrialist (d. 1941) who was to be a pioneer of economic pan-Arabism in the 1920s and 1930s (B 45 - 51). Harb had links to Mustafa Kamil's al-Hizb al-Watani but was closer to al-Jaridah and the less anti-British al-Ummah Party. al-Mu'ayyad presented the classical Arabs, conceived as ethically formed before Islam, as a behavioral model to reform contemporary Egyptians. One article ruefully accepted the charge of the English-owned Cairo Morning News that Egyptians were congenital perjurors, made to present them as unfit to rule their own country. Yet "falsehood is not of the inherent nature of either the Arab or the Easterner. Rather truthfulness was the adornment of the Arab, more than with any other race, in a number of ages before Islam and after it". In assessing the secular community potential in this sense of "the Arabs" as independent in origin of Islam sight, once more, must not be lost of the symbiotic Islamic function of the virtue in question, here truthfulness. True testimony is crucial to the functioning of Islamic religious law (shari'ah):

14. Ibid.
15. Details of a 1924 Cairo edition, a 1925 review by SC-owned al-Muqtataf calling the modernist intelligentsia's attention to the work, and of a 1935 abridged Cairo edition in Daghir, op. cit., p. 42.
16. "Ta'rikh Duwal al-'Arab wal-Islam" al-Mu'ayyad 17 July 1905. Harb's Islamic conservation was illustrated when in 1323H (1905 AD) he published a 199 page reply titled Tarbiyyat al-Mar'ah wal-Hijab (The Education of Women and the Veil) to Qasim Amin's call for the emancipation of women.
intentional perjury is in consequence termed *al-yamin al-ghamus*, "the plunger oath", because "it plunges he who commits it into sin or into hell-fire as though complete belief (*iman*) is synonymous with complete truthfulness". Islam deepened the Arabs' innate truthfulness, which made them the most tenaciously truthful of the nations "in the days of their first power/glory".\(^{18}\)

Important is the article's implicit periodization of Islamic history. "Muslims whether in Egypt or elsewhere" are dishonest today because, after the end of the Arabs' "days of first power/glory" long ago, Muslim governments inflicted oppression and ignorance upon "these nations". The periodizing low esteem for post-classical --- largely non-Arab --- Muslim governments is akin to the al-Alusi review's concept that latter day "ages [dahr] of corruption and pressure of the kings of despotism" threatened with extinction the Arabic works that alone can preserve the history, virtues and language of the classical Arabs.\(^{20}\)

All the writers thus far examined were Muslims who always saw the classical Arabs in relation to the entity of Islam. But Syrian Christians resident in Egypt also exalted the prescriptive virtues of the sects-neutral, pagan pre-Islamic Arabians. An instance is the 1909 play *al-Samaw'al aw Wafa' al-Arab* (*al-Samaw'al or the Faithfulness of the Arabs*) by Antun al-Jumayyil (1887 - 1948). Editor of the Catholic-Jesuit *al-Bashir* while in Bayrut, in Egypt he became an editor of the (from 1930 pan-Arab) *al-Ahram* and later a member of the Egyptian parliament. al-Jumayyil's play illustrated the pre-Islamic Arabs' prescriptive faithfulness to trust: it depicted the Jewish pre-Islamic Arabian al-Samaw'al Ibn 'Adiya's choice, rather than hand over to enemies of Imra' al-Qays the daughter whom Qays left in safe-keeping, to see them murder his own captured son before his castle's walls.\(^{21}\) (For al-Jumayyil and al-Ahram and pan-Arab Egyptians 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s: B 229, B 334).

**THE KAMILISTS**

The West's Presence. The modern West's broader creativity as well as might is very

19. Ibid.
often a context of restoration of the classical Arabs. Muslim Spain's past military superiority over Christian Europe perhaps offered hope for future decolonization. That Spanish and other Arab Muslims stimulated the birth of modern European civilization, made borrowing from the latter psychologically tolerable for Egyptian Muslims. The West was present in one or another capacity in the al-Mu'ayyad items on perjury and the book that al-Alusi wrote in response to a scholarly institution in the West.

As a movement dedicated to wresting political sovereignty back from imperialist Christians, the Kamilists identified more with the wide conquests and organized, internationally powerful state empires of the Muslim classical Arabs, than with pre-Islamic Arabia.

Steppat pointed out Kamil's youthful pride in the achievements of the classical Arabs, which he expressed in a vivid play he wrote titled The Conquest of Spain22. Often performed, the verisimilitude of its recreation of the Andalusian Arabs' poetic idiom diffused pan-Arab historical identifications and the ability to read classical Arab sources, over decades, in Morocco as well as Egypt23. Kamil's play celebrated the wide Arabs' demonstration of Muslim capacity to match or surpass Europeans' military strength, an aspect of al-Nadirn's and Ahmad Zaki Pasha's attraction to Muslim Spain in the early 1890s. However, Kamil also was prepared to somewhat identify himself and Egypt with the pre-Islamic pagan Arabians in the eyes of Europe (secular Arab virtues). Thus, he was the one whose urging motivated the Syrian poet Shukri Ghanim to compose his French play 'Antarah in order to acquaint the European public with the


23. Halstead equated Kamil's play and his books on Egyptian and pan-Islamic issues with Jurji Zaydan's magazine al-Hilal and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's al-Risalah as all crucial stimulants of the development of an urban-centered Moroccan nationalism. Kamil's Conquest of Spain was frequently acted in Morocco in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s and thus helped bring the growing urban Muslim middle classes and workers into a form of Moroccan nationalism with significant wider pan-Arab connections and historical consciousness. John P. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation: the Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism. 1912-1944 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1967) pp. 130-131. The odds against standard Arabic becoming the language of a modern successor-collectivity were much more severe in French-occupied Morocco than in British-occupied Egypt. In 1952, while in Marrakish, A.J. Arberry found that even reciters of the Thousand and One Nights were dependent on editions of individual tales imported from distant Tunis: "for in Morocco itself, that ancient Moslem land of once-brilliant culture, no books, or virtually none, are being printed in Arabic". Arberry, Scheherezade: Tales From the Thousand and One Nights (London: Allen & Unwin 1953) pp. 21-22. Moroccan youth were dependent for modern forms of Arabic culture on the dribble of publications that the French could not stop getting through from Egypt. In the Moroccan context, the classical language was becoming confined and moribund within mosques: Kamil's play helped extend it into a new public politicizing sphere, giving wider classes of Moroccans the bases to understand classical Arabic literature.
heroism of the Arabs.24

Ultra-Islamic Classical Arabs. Like his master al-Afghani before him, Kamil defined Arab greatness in history as having been due to "the light of Islam" which had transformed the initially nomadic Arab nation from a state of "total ignorance" into the conquerors and educators of the world: "a degree of knowledge not witnessed [today] and which never will be witnessed".25 In such explications of history, Kamil falls into a traditional commitment to Islam: a divinely-revealed religion is the transforming factor enabling a people incapable in their human resources, not just to conquer but to sustain a long-term literate-intellectual civilization. Kamil stereotyped the Arabs at Islam's revelation as nomadic despite the Qur'an's criticisms of the mercantile urban life of Mecca, immediate milieu of Muhammad's message.

As with al-Afghani earlier, Kamil's movement worked for the construction of modernized Muslim states with the strength to maintain or wrest back political sovereignty in face of the West's dynamism. The classical Arabs became a source of confidence for strength-building, self-Westernizing endeavors in the aspect of the educational dynamic and intellectualism in their organized wide states under the Arab Caliphs. In an early (1893) essay, Kamil attributed the first Arab conquests and the Arab Empire's success in popularizing Arabic and Islam, and thereby maintaining itself, to Islam-prescribed "universalization of education".26 Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid's construction of West-modelled schools in his empire, Kamil thought in 1893, restored this educational dynamic of "the Easterners" under "the first Caliphs".27 The Umayyad and 'Abbasid states presented a prototype of organized Islamic states with interventive

24. According to 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Ghanim was a personal friend of Kamil. Kamil was the one whose urging first prompted Ghanim to write his French play 'Antarah, which was performed in Egypt as well. Kamil paid eloquent tribute to Ghanim's poetry at a Cairo reception held for him in January 1906. al-Rafi'i, Mustafa Kamil: Ba'tih al-Harakat al-Wataniyyah (Cairo: np. 1939) p. 390. Shukri Ghanim in collaboration with Georges Samne, expounded Syrianist rather than Lebanonist national ideas from Paris, although they, too, had some encouragement from the Quai d'Orsay. They were committed to the classical Arabic language and its "memories" as a basis for identity in Syria. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 286. Ghanim's criticisms from Paris triggered a high-point of ethnic tension between Turks and Ottoman Arabs in 1910: fn 77. After the Sharif Husayn launched the 1916 Arab Revolt, Samne called for France to impose a protectorate on a united Syria so that it would not come under the rule of a more nomadic population liable to impose Islamic religious law at the expense of liberal, Europe-oriented Christian minorities in Syria. "Sharif Makkah wal-Wahdat al-Suriyyah" (The Sharif of Mecca and Syrian Unity), Fikr (Bayrut) April 1982, reprinted al-Nahdah (Sydney) 6 January 1983 pp. 5, 7-8.


27. Ibid v. 2, p. 9.
bureaucracies able to direct society’s development. In contrast, pre-Islamic Arabia lacked organized government or educational institutions: it was the Arab period of least use to the Kamilists.

The Kamilists’ preference for wide, at least nominally Islamic, classical Arab states made future Arab nationalism less likely to be secular and worked against the narrower Egyptian homeland framing political community.

It is revealing to compare Kamil’s Arabizing conceptions of the race and culture of Egypt’s peasantry to those of true particularist nationalists. Of course, in certain situations, to make Muslim Egyptians and Copts feel closer during sectarian polemics, Kamil and his followers did evoke the Egyptian population’s partial Pharaonic racial origin across sect differences. Yet they did not on that account develop theories parallel to those tangentially suggested by Lutfi al-Sayyid under the British occupation and elaborated after World War I by Muhammad Husayn Haykal, ’ Abdallah ’ Inan and Tawfiq al-Hakim: that the Egyptian peasantry as a cultural and to some extent racial Pharaonic core had preserved Egypt’s eternal self from the impact of the Arabs and other alien conquerors and immigrants. The peasantry in Kamil’s thought, too, was a repository of Egypt’s authentic identity, but unlike Lutfi al-Sayyid’s or Tawfiq al-Hakim’s Pharaonic core, owed its nobility and the characteristics it prescribed to its Arabization in blood and values:

Arab generosity as still intact in the Egyptian peasant in all its expressions. Wherever you go you will find the doors open to the guest, the tables set up and loaded, and a joy general whenever any stranger comes, without regard to his religion or race. The reason why this custom is so deeply rooted or innate among the Egyptians after they were famed from a thousand years for miserliness and greed for money is that Arab blood mingled with theirs and its nobility of ethics became predominant among them, to the extent that a man will give his own life as ransom for yours if you seek refuge with him or invoke the protection of his standing — and so with other renowned and exalted Arab characteristics.

When comparing this 1898 passage to Kamil’s observations upon the relation between

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28. Excerpts from a study by Kamil on the Egyptian Peasant first published in an Italian agricultural journal on 1 April 1898: excerpts ibid v. 6 pp. 211-212. Sometimes in affirming that the wide classical Arabs are definitive of modern Egyptians, Kamil rather attempted to relate and synthesize the separate Pharaonic and Arab motifs in his nationalist communications. He once argued that Egyptians merited political independence because they were “the heirs to two great civilizations — the Pharaonic and the Arab — and it is our right and our duty to sit among the civilized nations”. Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image, from Its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) p. 248.
the fortunes of the early Arabs and transforming Islam, one is struck by the rather secular nature of the Arab influences and qualities transplanted into the Egyptian environment.

Some Arab qualities such as hospitality that Kamil in 1898 mentioned the classical Arabs as having naturalized overlap with virtues that the 1903 al-Mu’ayyad item on al-Alusi originated in the Arabs’ pre-Islamic period. The pro-Khedive, Islamic al-Mu’ayyad had been one of Kamil’s main forums before he founded his al-Liwa’ in 1900. The Arab readiness of Egyptians to give their lives as ransom for any who seek protection is akin to the hamiyah --- the flaming compulsion to go to the aid of those in trouble ---- ascribed by al-Mu’ayyad to the classical Arabs. Westernizing-educated anti-imperialist intellectuals typified by Kamil, and traditionally-cultured Arab Muslims with Islamic formal education projected from al-Mu’ayyad, were both developing related basic concepts.

Mustafa Kamil in 1898 depicted the incoming Arabs’ blood and social virtues as having transformed Egyptian social mores and behavioral patterns for the better --- running against particularist theses of continuity of Egyptian national personality down the ages. He was prepared to view the Egyptians’ established pre-Islamic ethical norms as incompatible with the incoming Arabs’ ethics, but to opt for the latter. It was left unclear how extensively Kamil rejected the Pharaonic "golden age". His phrase that Egyptians were notorious for miserliness and greed for 1,000 years prior to the Arab advent might rhetorically characterize all Egypt’s pre-Islamic past. If precise, the time-span for which Egyptians were bereft of basic ethics would be mainly covered by foreign Persian, Macedonian, Ptolemaic, Roman and Byzantine rule.

Kamil’s remark ultimately derived from Josephus and possibly other late classical and early post-classical writers in Greek. Josephus (37 AD - c. 93 AD), in a communalist apologetic, ascribed persecution of the prosperous Jews in Egypt following the death of Joseph, to the Egyptians’ "love of lucre". Josephus’ anti-Egyptian stereotypes could have passed into Byzantine and modern Greek Christian literature, and thence into such Greek-edited Egyptian

29. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, tsd by H. St. J. Thackery (London: Heinemann, 1930) v. II, p. 251. Josephus’ most sustained abuse of the Egyptians occurs in his Against Apion: this refuted the anti-Semitism of, among other writers of Greek, Apion, Alexandria-educated grammarian and historian who, however, was born in Upper Egypt, and the Egyptian priest Manetho. A Latin letter of Hadrian in Ammianus Marcellinus described the Egyptians as long-celebrated for their love of money and their hatred of paying taxes. Art. "Kibt", EII p. 999. In regard to Kamil’s image that the pre-Islamic Egyptians were miserly, Smith in A Dictionary of the Bible (London: John Murray, 1863, p. 501) described the ancient Egyptians as "frugal", although without specifying the classical or Christian source.
French-language newspapers as *Le Phare d'Alexandrie*. Kamil in 1897 engaged in polemics in Egypt's French press with John Haicalis, Greek editor of *Le Phare d'Alexandrie*, when he accused Kamil of expressing hostility to Greeks --- including Egypt's Greeks --- over the 1897 war between Greece and Turkey. Kamil's homogenizing Arab-centrism may have made him take up the slur from a Francophone Greek or from classical Arab sources, with their abundant Hellenistic materials.

**Persistent Kamilist Arabism.** Kamil's brother, 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, printed the Arabic translation of the 1898 article, originally published in an Italian journal, in the collection of Kamil's speeches and writings edited by him following Kamil's death in 1908, giving it its widest, most authoritative impact on the mourning secular-educated constituency. Although Egypt's ancient Pharaonic period was also being internalized more, the Arabness of Egyptians recurred in wide circles associated with Kamil's independence movement, up to World War I. Thus, *al-Liwa'*s senior staff writer Ahmad Hilmi in August 1906, still approved when Egyptian secondary school students justified Egypt's independence by simultaneously claiming the supra-Egyptian classical Arabs and the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians as ancestors:

> We have received a letter from the Khedivial School informing us that the teacher of history said that 'the European states were solely inspired to help the Greeks win independence from the Turks because they were the descendants of the heroes of the past ages'. This teacher (I do not know what I should call him) had hardly finished delivering this sentence before the brighter of his students began to ask 'If this is the reason, why, then, does Europe not help us win independence, when we Egyptians are either the descendants of the ancient Egyptians who created sciences and civilizations, or descendants of the Arabs who conquered (all) lands and established justice between (God's) servants (humanity) and were distinguished by the noblest qualities and became the spring from which Europe drank deep of science and philosophy?'. Such comments show that the seeds of the love of independence have begun to grow in the souls of Egyptian students.

Ironically, post-World War I particularists would have condemned this (qualified racial) identification of an Egyptian political nation with the classical Arabs as --- in contrast to the link of descent affirmed with the Pharaonic Egyptians --- more a false than a nationalist.

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consciousness. The school students represented a new politicized, anti-imperialist generation, and yet there had not been much advance towards particularist Egyptian nationality independent of the Arabs from when Kamil and his peers had been in school. Ahmad Hilmi, a member of the older founding generation of acculturated nationalists (he was born in 1875, the year after Kamil), endorsed the adolescent students’ 1906 identification of Egypt’s political nationality with wide classical Arabs centered outside Egypt.

The Khedivial College students in 1906 carried forward al-Alusi’s, al-Mu’ayyad’s, Kamil’s --- and disliked (post?)-Christian Egypto-Syrians’! --- sense that the classical Arabs are the source of prescriptive virtues. They also developed the religion-inspired 1893 motif of the West-steeped educationalist 'Ali Mubarak that the Arabs conquered in order to give humanity justice under law, offering access to Qur’anic divine revelation.

**Arabic and Education**

Islam the religion and the classical Arabs were among the motives of an al-Nadim-level commitment to Arabic in the party of Mustafa Kamil. The Kamilists and the more pragmatic proto-particularists around Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid/al-Jaridah diverged on language issues. al-Jaridah’s coverage showed that public feeling ran with the Kamilists’ vehement drive to establish classical Arabic’s primacy in education and public life. Both (a) some Jaridists’ contrasting pragmatic pursuit of modernization, which subordinated their commitment to Arabic and (b) the depth and extent of the public feeling developing for Arabic, were caught by the tone of an anonymous 1907 writer on the language issue in Lutfi’s al-Jaridah. Moderate, neutral, giving both sides of the argument and disposed to propose two linguistic streams, Arabic and foreign-language, in education, the writer yet found in 1907 "the question of instruction in Arabic medium the talk of the meeting-places". Its supporters, he noted, argued that "rejection of this proposal would pain the whole nation without exception: never in this country has there been such unanimous approval for anything as for this demand". Shortage of Arabic-medium teachers and the inadequacy of Arabic for expressing modern sciences was al-Jaridah’s argument for a linguistic duality in education. This writer apparently viewed the Egyptian education system’s urgent task as to import and diffuse the modern West’s sciences in backward Egypt: promoting Arabic for its own sake was a secondary luxury. Arabic had never been the medium of a true
self-sustaining science, not in its classical heyday, not under Egypt’s 'Alid family in the nineteenth century, he argued. The West’s languages were the media of the true modern science. To give Egyptians the best direct access to that science he would support instruction through the medium of European languages, in higher stages especially.

In contrast to the utilitarian pro-Western stance of a few in Lutfi’s group was the Kamilists’ and al-Liwa’s fierce ideological commitment to (classical) Arabic as the only acceptable medium for all education in Egypt. Mustafa Kamil and his followers manifest an attitude in which promoting standard Arabic for its own sake has priority in nationalist activities of education and political mobilization. Steppat points out that Kamil, while still a student, "in al-Madrasah expressly rejects al-lughat al-darijah (colloquial Egyptian Arabic) on grounds that --- a considerable error --- almost everybody understands al-lughat al-fusha". Kamil’s use of an uncomplicated classical style to mobilize Egyptians is contrasted by Steppat to 'Abdallah al-Nadim’s preparedness to write sometimes in colloquial to reach the widest popular audience. The Kamilists’ tightened-up use of classical Arabic broke with al-Nadim’s practice, but implemented his ideological drive to make the classical Arabs’ tongue again current.

The acculturated, West-obsessed Kamilists wanted to diffuse the West’s modern sciences as important for the nation’s renaissance. Their propagation through education, though, had to be combined with the overriding aim of imparting mastery of classical Arabic by imposing the language as the standard medium of instruction.

al-Liwa’s stance was partly influenced by ethnic-linguistic European nationalisms as well as immemorial identification of Arabic with Islam. One 1902 al-Liwa’ writer thus paid tribute to the struggles of the Maltese, the Bohemians in the Hapsburg empire and the Poles to preserve

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32. Ahad al-Kuttab ("a Writer"), "al-Ta’lim bil-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah" (Education in the Arabic Language), al-Jaridah 11 March 1907, p. 4. The writer tended to identify as model for possible linguistic duality of education in Egypt the experience of Turkey. There the Dar al-Funun (the Muslim’ World’s first indigenous university, opened in Constantinople in 1900) used Turkish in teaching --- while the Maktab-i-Sultani used purely French medium to teach modern subjects.


34. Ibid.

35. al-Nadim masterfully used the colloquial in al-Ustadh’s written dialogues to raise Egyptians’ national and social consciousness. Sight must, however, not be lost of his attitude, resulting from the classical Arabs providing the language norm, that the colloquial was a temporary evil for communicating. al-Ustadh’s short colloquial section was al-Nadim’s means to "lead the ignorant common man from a hatred of hearing books to love of books ... Then there will be no need to write other than correct [language]". "Bab al-Lughah", al-Ustadh, 30 January 1893, p. 468.
their languages. These European nationalisms confirmed that the study of foreign languages in Egypt should be mainly confined to professional translators. These would be trained in all international languages at special institutes, to translate all important books about overseas industries, discoveries and reforms into Arabic in order that "all education be in the official language of the country, of its religion and of the indigenous population that properly possesses it as is the norm in all countries". The article was written, (as it seems by a teacher since the author uses the pseudonym "Mudarris") in context of pressure in the Egyptian parliament that had "sought from the Education Ministry of this Arab(ic) land that its language get its due position" as the medium for teaching "the contemporary sciences". But the Egyptian Ministry of Education "looked with no kindly eye on the proposals of the representatives" of the Egyptians --- as though nothing remained of Arab zeal (al-hamas al-'Arabi) in this Arab(ic) department". Egyptians should take a leaf from the book of the foreigners in Egypt who "faithfully served their land, their nation and their kingdom" by reducing use of Arabic to one fourth of the teaching-time at secondary level. The 1903 al-Liwa' denunciation of education under the Occupation identified the survival of standard Arabic with that of Islam. The "spokesman" of the Ministry is virtually calling upon "the Egyptian nation" to "come ... that I may recite to you sacred foreign languages to make you relinquish your religion, repudiate your language, and forget the feats of your ancient forefathers...". The European languages and Arabic thus additionally represent two warring religions, Christianity and Islam --- developing Abdallah al-Nadim's themes of the early 1890s. To eliminate or disestablish Arabic is to attack the Islam to which the language gives the Egyptian nation (ummah) access. Elsewhere, the writer defines Arabic as "the tongue of the Egyptian's forefathers, of his religion and his prophet". Emotionalistic commitment to Islam and its de-particularizing language could make Egyptians accept as their definitive forefathers the Arabian people who conveyed the Qur'an to the world --- not the Pharaonic Egyptians. In this very much West-stimulated Kamilist vision of history, Arabic had a dual character: it provided the Egyptian nation's means of access to a divine religion, but also to the "feats" of the historical classical Arab human community ("ancestors").

Both Kamilists and Jaridists celebrated the physical land or watan of Egypt, but standard Arabic, too, was crucial and central in nationality for each. Kamilist definitions of what was

"national" language were often incompatible with Egyptian particularity. Mudarris' identification of the student's national language as the classical standardized --- not the spoken Egyptian --- form was categorical and uncompromising: "some sciences such as arithmetic are taught at primary level in Arabic" but "what type of Arabic is that? They are taught in the colloquial Arabic that pupils know from their earliest childhood (leading to) ignorance of their language and the tongue of their forefathers". This position rejects the distinctive everyday usage of contemporary Egyptians as a corruption or deviation from the norm of their linguistic identity established a millennium before by Islam and early Arabs, mainly outside Egypt. Extensions of this attitude long were to inhibit development in creative literature of even a distinctive Egyptian style, let alone literary language.

Many highly Westernizing-educated Egyptians associated with Kamil's independence movement strove like Mudarris to combine (a) maintaining continuity of language with --- and thus access to --- extraterritorial classical Arabs and (b) propagating the West's contemporary sciences in Egypt. An instance is a 1907 article by Dr 'Uthman Ghalib in l'Etendard Egyptien opposing the Occupation-period contraction of government education and imposition of foreign languages. In reply to those who accused Arabic of "sterility" as an instrument to express scientific thought (some Jaridists as well as Britishers?) Ghalib described Arabic as "the scientific language par excellence under the civilizations of Spain and Baghdad". He viewed the development of Arabic as the medium of instruction in the tertiary colleges, many scientific or technical in nature, initiated by Muhammad 'Ali as the achievement of the Egyptian scholars who "recovered from oblivion the scientific nomenclature of the Arab savants of Spain and Baghdad". Pan-Arabizing: Ghalib argued that restoration of the Arabic-medium secular higher education suppressed by the British would serve not Egypt alone "but all the lands of Arabic speech".

Like the Jaridists, Ghalib denounced the occupying British for dismantling previous mass

37. Ibid
38. Dr. Osman Ghalib, "Le Mouvement National et la Question de l'Instruction", l'Etendard Egyptien 5 March 1907; reprinted Juliette Adam, L'Angleterre en Egypte (Paris: Imprimerie du Centre 1922) pp. 101-107. Ghalib was a lecturer in Medicine at the Qasr al-'Ayni Medical College, and an old friend of Muhammad 'Abduh. Ibid p. 168. Duse Muhammad was acculturated beyond most of al-Hizb al-Watani's leadership by continuous residence in the colonizing West's very heart, London. Nonetheless, here again he closely follows the Kamilists' stances. The Arab science and culture in the Middle Ages give the lie to the British administrators' excuse that there were no textbooks with which to teach sciences in Arabic. In The Land of the Pharaohs p. 278.