THE POLITICS OF A PERMEABLE COALITION:

THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY 1955-1972

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This thesis is my own original work

..........................

David Stephens
Abstract

An examination of the structure of the Australian Labor Party, a general view of its history and a knowledge of what others have written about organisations yields hypotheses about the likely influences on decisionmaking by the Federal bodies of the ALP in three specific areas. The thirteen hypotheses relate to various strivings within the party and to a number of possible external influences upon it. The hypotheses are tested in three case studies which concern unity tickets in trade union elections, 1955-61, state aid to non-state schools, 1963-66, and foreign and defence policy, especially in relation to Vietnam, 1966-67. The case studies yield three more hypotheses about how the party makes decisions. These further hypotheses incorporate concepts which have been found useful in studies by others of decisionmaking in other organisations but which rarely have been applied to political parties, as they are here. As well as testing the hypotheses, the thesis draws general conclusions about the effects both of the party's structure and conventions and of its susceptibility to external influences upon its ability to make decisions. It also suggests how the way the party made decisions affected its ability to survive as an organisation. The central argument of the thesis is that, during the period under consideration, 1955 to 1972, and perhaps always, the need to keep the coalition together by making concessions to sub-coalitions is just as important a consideration for decisionmakers as is the need to produce electoral policy and that the former need will affect all the party's important decisionmaking. Finally, the thesis examines a number of attempts at organisational reform which attempted to by-pass the parts of the structure mainly concerned with coalition-maintenance,
in order to make electoral policies on their merits as vote winners and as solutions to problems in the community. It is argued that by-passing was based on a particular political strategy which became associated with E.G. Whitlam, that this strategy incorporated an incomplete view of the nature of politics and that the party's future development requires the closer identification of electoral policy with the internal politics of the party.
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This thesis grew out of my awareness that most students of political parties had failed to confront the important question of how parties make the decisions which bear the party name. While there had been a number of constitutional histories of parties and many discussions of whether particular parties were oligarchies in the sense meant by Robert Michels, few writers had tried to describe the internal politics of party organisations.

The possibility of attempting such a task in relation to the Australian Labor Party was first opened up for me by the publication of Ken Turner's detailed guide to the records of the party's New South Wales Branch and by the lodging of similar sets of records by the Victorian Branch and by the Federal Secretariat. ¹ Secondly, I felt that many protagonists in Labor Party history of the 1950s and 1960s might be willing, some years having elapsed, to be interviewed about their experiences. Thirdly, discussions with colleagues at the Australian National University during the early stages of my research suggested to me that some of the literature on public and organisational decisionmaking might provide a useful framework for my analysis.

¹Ken Turner, Guide to the Records of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Labor Party 1956–1969, Sydney, 1973. There is as yet no equivalent guide to the Federal and Victorian records, though the holding libraries have at least a skeleton guide to the collections. Permission of the party was required before access was given to the New South Wales and Federal collections and to the more recent records of the Victorian Branch. A smaller collection of South Australian Branch records was consulted (again by permission) in the party offices in Adelaide. The Federal and New South Wales records are being sorted and are identified in my footnotes in the standard form for manuscript collections (collection/box/folder/folio). The Victorian and South Australian collections are unsorted and are identified here by folder labels only.
These three bodies of material, party records (about two thousand boxes of them), interviews (fifty) and writings on decisionmaking in organisations, were augmented by the newscarpet files of the Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, other newspapers, pamphlets, party publications, secondary works and other sources. I have been unable to draw upon the collection of Calwell Papers (about sixty boxes awaiting sorting in the National Library of Australia), a collection of papers of A.D. Fraser, former member of Parliament, which are soon to be donated to the same Library, James Walter's forthcoming doctoral thesis on E.G. Whitlam and, despite my efforts to obtain access to them, the Minutes of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. I do not feel the omission of these materials has seriously affected the argument of the thesis.

The thesis was commenced in the Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, in February 1976 and was in its final stages when I left the Department three years later to enter the Australian Public Service. Needless to say, the opinions expressed in it are mine alone, not those of the Service nor of any of the people who assisted me in various ways during my research and writing.

The postgraduate student accumulates many debts. Mine are owed to my supervisor, Don Rawson, to Colin Hughes, who acted as supervisor for a time, to colleagues in the Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, to many librarians throughout Australia, to party officials and others who helped me gain access to documents, to those party activists and former activists who consented to be interviewed or who wrote to me. In
particular, I thank the New South Wales, South Australian and Victorian Branches and the National Executive of the ALP for giving me access to party records, the manuscript sections of the La Trobe, Mitchell and National Libraries, especially Cathy Santamaria of the National Library, and Colin Hughes, Maggie Indian, Peter Loveday, Don Rawson, Helen South, John Warhurst, Pat Weller and Gough Whitlam, who read drafts of part or all of the thesis.
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<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>AFR</td>
<td>Australian Financial Review</td>
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<td>AJPH</td>
<td>Australian Journal of Politics and History</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>Australian Outlook</td>
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<td>Australasian Political Studies Association</td>
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<td>Sydney Morning Herald</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLP</td>
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Introduction

The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is a study of decisionmaking in the Australian Labor Party during the years 1955 to 1972. It is not a constitutional history, a narrative which tries to include everything that happened or a series of biographies of important people. Instead it attempts to test certain hypotheses about how organisations both make decisions and sustain themselves. In doing so, it also pursues an argument about the development of the ALP, especially in the late 1960s, and suggests how the party should develop in the future.

Chapter 1 sets out what observers and protagonists have said about the ALP, introduces some of the protagonists, gives a general description of the structure and some of the conventions of the party and provides an inventory of some possible external influences on its activities. It makes use also of what others have written about other organisations. It provides the context for the following chapters.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine how the party made decisions on three different subjects, unity tickets in trade union elections, state aid for non-state schools and foreign and defence policy, especially regarding Vietnam. While each case study is arranged chronologically, none claims to be a full history of the matters to which it refers. I have concentrated upon those parts of the party and those incidents where organisational politics was most intense.

The concluding pages of chapter 4 and the early pages of chapter 5 draw some conclusions, first, about the relative importance of the influences encapsulated in the hypotheses upon decisionmaking in the cases studied and, secondly, about the way the party made decisions in
these cases. The gist of the second set of conclusions is the effect of the structure and conventions of the party as an organisation upon its decisionmaking ability. The central argument of the thesis is that the need to keep a coalition structure together and to make concessions to many internal and external influences is just as important a consideration when making decisions as is the need to produce electoral policy, that is, proposals which can be offered to the voters as solutions to problems in the community. To some party decisionmakers at some times the first need easily over-rider the second.

The balance of chapter 5 describes three partly successful attempts to by-pass the problems of the party structure in order to make electoral policy on its merits in winning votes and solving problems. These attempts were the party reform of 1967, the system of Standing Policy Committees and the informal network of policy advice headed by E.G. Whitlam.

The final chapter discusses the Whitlam strategy of party-electorate relations and the incomplete conception of politics which underlay it. The chapter suggests the future of the party lies in a synthesis of the better parts of the Whitlam approach and redirected internal politics. Electoral policy which lacks a base in the life of the party which advocates it is destined to leave little mark on the party or on the electorate.

The Hypotheses

The recurring theme of this thesis is the multiple influences on decisionmaking in the ALP during the period covered. Chapter 1 attempts to encapsulate these influences in thirteen hypotheses. It does not
suggest that only these influences will affect the decisions which are studied in chapters 2, 3 and 4 or that other influences will not be important in the decisions the party makes at other times. The thirteen hypotheses are those derived from the information about the party presented in chapter 1 and from what others have written about other organisations.

Five of the thirteen hypotheses relate to 'internal strivings', activity within the party in pursuit of the goals of individuals or of groups within the party. It is suggested that the search for party unity and for compromise decisions which will ensure unity is a constant preoccupation of some party decisionmakers which tends to over-ride even their desire to achieve their own goals or those of their group.

These five hypotheses relate to the nature of the party as a coalition. THIS IS THE FIRST SET OF HYPOTHESES.

There are eight hypotheses relating to 'external pressures' on party decisionmakers. These hypotheses provide an inventory of possible influences from other parts of the political system and from the environment upon decisions made in the party's name.

These eight hypotheses relate to the permeability of the party. THIS IS THE SECOND SET OF HYPOTHESES.

Three more hypotheses emerge from the case studies. They concern how the party makes decisions. While the inclination of party decisionmakers to seek unity and compromise was described in chapter 1, the details of these hypotheses and the similarity of the processes they encapsulate to those detected in other organisations could not emerge until we actually studied a case of decisionmaking. These three hypotheses, thus, refer not to influences upon decisionmakers but to methods decisionmakers use, partly consciously, partly unconsciously, to
reconcile conflicting influences in order to produce decisions in the name of the organisation. The hypotheses are derived from the information provided by the case studies and from the writings of others on how decisionmakers in other organisations make decisions.

These three hypotheses relate to *how the party makes decisions*. 

**THIS IS THE THIRD SET OF HYPOTHESES.** They are not hypotheses about influences on decisionmakers but about ways in which decisionmakers react to these influences. Thus, if the need for compromise decisions is an influence on decisionmakers, the method of 'partisan mutual adjustment', the subject of one of the third set of hypotheses, produces compromise decisions. Similarly, if decisionmakers have to react to a continually changing environment, the method of 'incrementalism' allows them to make a series of short-run decisions, to continually adjust and tinker to take account of changing circumstances. Finally, if the multiple pressures upon them involve decisionmakers in many subjects at once, the method of the 'garbage can' may allow one decision to solve many problems.

To summarise. There are three sets of hypotheses. The first set, **HYPOTHESES I to V**, relate to internal strivings. The second set, **HYPOTHESES VI to XIII**, relate to external pressures. These thirteen hypotheses are introduced in chapter 1. The third set of hypotheses, **HYPOTHESES XIV to XVI**, encapsulate methods of reconciling the subjects of the first two sets, internal strivings and external pressures. These hypotheses are introduced at the end of chapter 2 (**HYPOTHESES XIV and XV**) and at the end of chapter 3 (**HYPOTHESIS XVI**). They are tested against the facts of chapters 3 and 4.

Here is the complete list of hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS I: Decisionmakers on Federal Conference and Executive will pursue the goals of the controllers of State Branches whom they represent.

HYPOTHESIS II: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their own personal histories and relationships.

HYPOTHESIS III: Decisionmakers will seek different balances between 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' approaches to the electorate.

HYPOTHESIS IV: Decisionmakers will try to keep the coalition together.

HYPOTHESIS V: Decisionmakers consciously seek compromise between the goals of sub-coalitions.

HYPOTHESIS VI: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to the goals of affiliated trade unions.

HYPOTHESIS VII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by changes in the environment.

HYPOTHESIS VIII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with Communists.

HYPOTHESIS IX: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with Catholics.

HYPOTHESIS X: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with the Democratic Labor Party.

HYPOTHESIS XI: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with 'friendly advisers'.

HYPOTHESIS XII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with the media.

HYPOTHESIS XIII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by the actions of the Federal Liberal-Country Party Government.

HYPOTHESIS XIV: Decisionmakers will practise partisan mutual adjustment.

HYPOTHESIS XV: Decisionmakers will practise disjointed incrementalism.

HYPOTHESIS XVI: Decisionmaking will show evidence of 'garbage can characteristics'.

Definitions

It is necessary to clarify how the words 'decision', 'policy', and 'politics' are used in the thesis. 'Decision' is the crucial word. A decision is a set of words that bears the name of the party or of a unit of it. A decision could be a Federal Conference resolution, a motion passed by a Federal Executive meeting or an agenda item produced by a State Branch for a Federal meeting. It might also be a form of words agreed on by an informal group of party members as representing their collective view. 'Decisionmaking' is the process of producing a decision. This process might involve activity ranging from a paid official deliberating alone for five minutes over whether or not to send a letter advising other officials of a coming meeting, to lengthy and complex bargaining between many individuals and groups who have diverse and only partly common goals in relation to the issue to be decided. In the first case, while there is an identifiable process, it is not helpful to say that there is a range of conflicting desires to be reconciled. The decision to send a letter is routine, like dozens of others taken by the official during a day, any questions surrounding it being resolved quickly by the official himself in the light of how he dealt with similar situations in the past.

In the second case, the conflicting goals will be resolved (in the absence of the ability of one group within the organisation to impose its will by force) by a political process, involving the reconciling of conflicting goals to produce decisions in the name of the organisation as a whole.

Thus, not all decisions emerge from 'politics'. Politics attends the making only of those decisions which require the reconciling of the conflicting goals of members of the organisation.
What then is 'policy'? Hugh Heclo gives a clue. Policy, he says, is 'a course of action or inaction pursued under the authority of government'. It is made up of 'decisions', but also of indecision and of acceptance of circumstances produced by chance happenings and by actions of other organisations over whom the organisation in question has no control. Strictly speaking, although the words 'decisionmaking' and 'policymaking' are often used interchangeably, policy is discovered after the event. Here is an example of this view, in a study of decisionmaking in a college:

Indeed, the term policy is probably somewhat misleading if it conveys a notion of systematic collective decision-making .... Academic 'policy' is the accretion of hundreds of largely autonomous actions taken for different reasons, at different times, under different conditions, by different people in the college. This collection of actions is periodically codified into what is presented as an educational program by the college catalog or a student or faculty handbook.

Heclo agrees:

The point of distinguishing policies from programs, decisions, social movements, and intentions is to suggest that policy is not a self-evident, independent behavior fact. Policy acquires meaning because an observer perceives and interprets a course of action amid the confusions of a complex world. Policy exists by interrogating rather than by intuiting political phenomena.

It follows from this that policy, too, need not emerge from 'politics'. The decisions of our lone administrator could, under this definition, be as important in the long term as the decisions emerging

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1 Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven & London, 1974, 4. 'Government' can be taken to apply to the government of an organisation as well as of a state.


3 Heclo, Modern Social Politics ..., 4.
from complex political activity. In fact, in the period of Labor
Party history covered in this thesis complex political activity did
attend many important decisions. To show why this occurred - and why
it did not occur in some instances - is part of the task of the
thesis.
Politics is about reconciling conflicting goals to produce decisions in the name of a collective. When it is said that 'the Australian Labor Party believes' or 'the government decision is' or 'this is the firm's policy', the process by which the organisation has produced the decision is left unstated. We may not be told whether party factions have wrangled bitterly, whether Cabinet ministers and their departments have reached agreement in a few moments or only after many hours debate, whether and how far different branches of the firm are pleased with the policy they must implement. While disgruntled sections of the organisation may ensure that their own version of how the decision was reached becomes public knowledge, party discipline, Cabinet solidarity, or loyalty to the firm will often mean that the organisation presents a solid front to the outside world. The process of decisionmaking may remain murky.

Yet the decision could not have emerged from the organisation without some activity. What James Q. Wilson says of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People applies to any organisation, large or small.

[A] fairly complex social structure - the NAACP - has produced a statement that, whatever else it represents, must at a minimum be responsive to the internal dynamics of that organization, coming to terms somehow with the needs of and conflicts within, the NAACP.1

Nevertheless, complex organisations, comprising people and groups with different backgrounds and goals, need not harbour conflict, need

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1James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations, New York, 1973, 8-9. Nation-states are organisations, too: 'It is ... realistic to regard law as a reflection of the desires of those who win out in the political struggle; it is an instrument through which they express and give effect to their will. It thus registers the score in the game' (Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science, London, 1960, 140).
not always engage in politics. If there is total agreement there is no need for politics. For there to be politics there must be issues, that is, there must be conflict over decisions that have to be made in the name of the collective. Even where disagreement exists, if there is no attempt to reconcile it through the organisation's decisionmaking machinery, there is no politics. Politics is

(1) activity occurring within and among groups
(2) which operate on the basis of desires that are to some extent shared, (3) an essential feature of the activity being a struggle of actors (4) to achieve their desires (5) on questions of group policy, group organization, group leadership, or the regulation of intergroup relationships (6) against the opposition of others with conflicting desires.

It follows from this emphasis on the conflict of goals that a study of the internal politics of an organisation is not concerned with 'organisational decisionmaking' as such. Organisations may make decisions without politics. To adapt the words of Philip Selznick, 'decisions are with us always', but politics is present only in 'critical decisions', those which involve 'the dynamic adaptation of the total organization to internal strivings and external pressures'.

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3 Van Dyke, Political Science, 134. My emphasised words cf. F.G. Bailey, Stratagem and Spoils, Oxford, 1969, ix, who seeks a concept of politics applicable alike to gangsters, villagers, facultymen, generals and statesmen, and Martin Meyerson & Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, Glencoe, Ill., 1955, 303, who want one to 'apply as well to office politics as to national politics'.
The classification of internal and external influences on critical decisions and on those who make them is a basic one for this thesis. Let us therefore clarify it at once. Strivings arise because organisations comprise disparate elements with only partially common goals. Individuals with goals (or 'desires' or 'interests') combine with other individuals to produce decisions bearing the name of the larger group. Organisations are coalitions comprising sub-coalitions. They are all permeable by influences from other organisations and from the broader setting or 'environment' in which they operate. Political parties are organisations and, as such, they are permeable coalitions. This thesis shows the Australian Labor Party producing collective decisions out of the strivings of its parts and the influences of the world outside the organisation.

Some decisions could be labelled, in Van Dyke's terms, 'group policy', others 'group organization', still others 'group leadership' or 'the regulation of intergroup relationships'. The balance of this chapter will suggest, first, which parts of the coalition make the decisions, then delineate the parts of the coalition and outline possible ways in which it could be permeated. Finally, it will consider what others have written about decisionmaking in organisations.

The ALP Coalition: Five Hypotheses about 'Internal Strivings'

THE INEVITABILITY OF CONFLICT

James Q. Wilson includes political parties among 'formal voluntary associations', a sub-classification of organisations.

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[B]y 'formal' is meant that class of association [organisation] with a clearly definable membership (thus excluding loose social movements) and a consciously adopted name (thus excluding many short-lived or casual associations and kinship networks); by 'voluntary' is meant associations whose members are generally not full-time employees and do not earn their livelihood as a result of their membership (thus excluding firms and government agencies).

The ALP had a definable membership which was part of, but distinguishable from the larger 'labour movement'; it adopted the name 'Australian Labor Party' in 1908; only a tiny proportion of its members were full-time employees.

By definition, members of voluntary associations cannot be coerced into joining or remaining. They become or remain members because they expect to achieve through collective decisions some of their goals as individuals or as members of sub-coalitions within the coalition. In the case of the ALP, rank and file members had the constitutional right, either as members of affiliated unions or of district based local branches, to make authoritative decisions. Policy 'is not framed by directives from the leadership' but by resolutions from the mass.

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6 Wilson, Political Organizations, 31. See also: Cameron v Hogan, 51 CLR (1934) 358, where, in a case involving the ALP, the High Court reviewed the law on voluntary associations (those 'established upon a consensual basis'); Weber's definition of parties as 'an associative type of social relationship, membership in which rests on formally free recruitment' (Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York & London, 1964, 407).

7 Almost all of these were in the State Branch offices of the party, except that between 1963 and 1969 and after 1971 a full-time Federal Secretary and a staff of two or three occupied a Canberra office. The largest single establishment was probably the New South Wales Branch office (about fourteen in 1962) and full-time staff throughout Australia would have numbered less than fifty during our period. Most of these would have been party members.

8 Drawing on earlier work by himself, Peter Clark, Barnard and Simon, Wilson Political Organizations, 30-51, elaborates a classification of 'incentives' by which the organisation attracts contributions of effort from its members in order to maintain itself. The idea of 'system-maintenance' as a goal of organisations is a useful one for our present purposes and will be taken up later. The incentives classification as such is less convincing because it is hard to see the ALP - or any organisation? - as an entity separate from its constituent parts.
membership. All members, 'through the constituted channels, have equal opportunity in formulating, and equal voice in determining the Platform and Objects, Constitutions, Laws and course of action of the Movement'.

However, the record of rank and file participation in the ALP shows this ideal was not achieved. Members of local branches and affiliated unions discussed many subjects amongst themselves but a study of rank and file opinion in the party is not the concern of this thesis. Unless resolutions resulting from these discussions are forwarded to the party's central organs, they will have little or no impact beyond the participants. A study of the agenda of ALP State Conferences, the supreme bodies within the State Branches, shows that only a minority of branches and unions provided items for discussion. For example, in New South Wales in 1960, when there were about five hundred local branches, only ninety-six contributed items as branches and only twenty-nine sent five or more items (a modest level of activity when the total number of branch items was 385). In South Australia in the same year twenty out of forty-seven branches sent items but only three sent more than two items (the agenda was much shorter than in New South Wales so a different measure is necessary). In Victoria in 1963 only eighty out of '306 effective branches' contributed and only thirty branches sent four or more items. Similar figures can be compiled for unions. Seldom did more than three out of ten affiliated unions in the States of New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria contribute agenda items to an Annual Conference. The proportions of fourteen contributing out of about ninety affiliated

in New South Wales in 1960, sixteen out of seventy-four (Victoria, 1965) and fourteen out of forty (South Australia, 1967) provide a fair sample. Again, a small number contributed disproportionately, with two unions providing nearly half the union items in New South Wales in 1960, six supplying almost two-thirds in Victoria in 1965 and three sending half of all union items to the South Australian ALP Convention in 1967.\textsuperscript{10}

It is unnecessary here either to discuss the reasons for the low level of participation or to investigate mass performance in other areas such as political education or assistance at election campaigns.\textsuperscript{11} But if the rank and file abdicate, who then makes the collective decisions that bear the party name? Studies of other parties direct us to a characteristic of the ALP which probably would have militated against concerted rank and file initiative even if the mass had not excluded itself. Robert Michels suggested long ago that parties, to achieve their goals, require hierarchical, almost military organisation. 'Democracy is utterly incompatible with strategic promptness, and the

\textsuperscript{10}These figures are based on a comprehensive study of State Conference (Convention in South Australia) agenda over the period 1956–69. There are some complications involved in such calculations, for instance, the practice of sending joint items (more than one branch, branch and union, union and union) and the right of groupings of branches, such as State Electorate Councils, to send items. Joint items are not common enough to upset the overall picture and the SEC and equivalent contribution figures confirm it. The quotation about Victorian branches is from ALP (Victorian Branch), 1963 Central Executive Report, 11, and other branch and union figures all come from similar documents or party records. Figures for number of branches are notoriously unreliable since some branches, especially rural ones, were dormant except at election times. Union affiliations remained fairly constant throughout the period.

forces of democracy do not lend themselves to the rapid opening of a campaign'. Technical considerations, like the impossibility of fitting the whole membership into one room to make decisions, plus the unwillingness of the mass to take initiatives, create a need for delegation, leadership and organisation. The desire for political office accentuates these tendencies towards concentration of important decisionmaking in a relatively small group. In the State Labor Branches in our period every local branch constitutionally could make decisions applicable to its own members, as could every affiliated union. But the 'critical' decisions for the State Branches, those that involved, in Selznick's words, its adapting to internal strivings and external pressures, were made by State Executives. Since their decisions had a great bearing on those at the Federal level of the party, which are our main concern, we must examine the role of State Executives.

Supreme power within State Branches rested formally with their Conferences. However, Conferences elected Executives to run the Branches between Conferences and State Branch Constitutions gave Executives wide powers, subject only to appeal to Conferences. For example, the Victorian Central Executive established and maintained party organisation in the electorates, conferred with the State Parliamentary Party, proposed rules amendments and other resolutions to Conference, applied the rules, managed finances and made statements in the party's name on matters that arose between Conferences. It heard and sometimes laid charges against members, adjudicated disputes between them and could suspend or expel them as punishment. It held ultimate control over who stood as Labor candidates in all elections

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for public office, Federal, State and local.\textsuperscript{13}

To these formal powers the VCE and its equivalents in other States added the advantages of regular (weekly or fortnightly) meetings, an \textit{esprit de corps} and familiarity with the issues confronting the party and with its machinery. Moreover, the Executives broadly reflected the composition of Conferences, since the main consideration in forming a 'ticket' for the election of the Executive was which combination of names, representing unions and branches, could win the support of a majority of Conference delegates. Thirdly, Executives could control the business of Conferences through Agenda Committees, dominated by their nominees, which determined the order of business and ensured that items regarded by Executives as important would receive priority. The complete agenda was rarely covered, even with the use of devices like grouping items of similar import or Committee reports which made general recommendations to cover a collection of items.\textsuperscript{14} If all else

\textsuperscript{13}Branch structures and Executive powers differed in detail from State to State. In South Australia a State Council, meeting monthly or thereabouts, was placed between Annual Convention and Executive, without detracting greatly from the latter's importance. In Queensland, the Executive was larger than in other States and the equivalent body in many respects was the small 'inner Executive'. In Queensland and Western Australia, Conferences were held only every three years. In each State, bodies based on electorates but bearing various titles had limited functions, subject to Conferences. Pre-selection of Labor candidates rested with local branches, Executives, electoral colleges or special conventions, depending on the State and the office, but ultimate endorsement as the ALP candidate rested in every case with Executives, subject to an almost never used appeal to the Federal Executive. See the various State Branch rule books for the period, for example ALP (Victorian Branch), Constitution and Platform, 1962, and the general survey in Nelson & Watson, 'Party Organisation', 270-5.

\textsuperscript{14}The claim that the 1963 NSW Branch Conference had 'completed all its business' \textit{A.L.P. Journal}, July 1963, 28) was only possible because Policy Committees comprising Executive members had used these devices more efficiently than usual. This is not to say, of course, that some pre-Conference organisation was not legitimate. But those who objected had little recourse.
failed or as additional insurance, the Conference Chairman, usually the President or a Vice President, could manipulate meeting procedures to favour the Executive view.15

Procedural barriers curbed the mass role in decisionmaking even if the mass had wished to play a role. The barriers did not stifle influence broadly in line with the views of the Executive majority but they enabled the Executive to choose whether it could be so 'influenced'.16

Some Executive members were more active and effective than others. The party officers, President, Vice Presidents, Secretary (and Assistant Secretary in some States) possessed in enhanced form the resources of the Executive itself - access to party records, frequency of meeting and superior knowledge.17 In some Branches, especially where Labor was in power, State Parliamentarians allied with party officers and Executive activists. These politicians may not have been members of State Executives but shared their power. Federal politicians, too, were sometimes part of this inner group.

Critical decisions for State Branches, then, were made by the most active and effective members of State Executives, by party officers and

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15 This was by no means confined to the NSW Branch, but see: [Tom Burns], The New South Wales A.L.P.: Report by the Federal President of the Australian Labor Party, 1970, presented by order to the Federal Executive, Sydney, November 23, 1970, 6-7. The South Australian Branch Convention of 1965 failed to adopt a branch item that a microphone be provided for delegates! (ALP [SA Branch], Official Report, Sixty-second Annual State Convention, 1965; Canberra Times [CT] 11 June 1965.)

16 We shall take up later in the chapter the point about sub-coalitional representation on Executives. On the general point, individual Executive members would often feel obliged to put forward their union's or branch's view but need not then have sought support for it.

17 Executive officers in Victoria and New South Wales, for example, met about half as many times again as did their Executives.
by their allies. We may call this group, the 'controllers' of State Branches. But why did the pattern of control of State Branches affect Federal decisionmaking? This occurred, first, because the 'tickets' of delegates elected to Federal Conference and Federal Executive by State Conferences were determined by State Executives and, secondly, because State Branches had equal representation on Federal Conference and Federal Executive. Until 1967, Federal Conference comprised six delegates from each State, Federal Executive two from each State. Thirdly, all State Branches, except Queensland, could instruct their delegates to support State Branch decisions. Even when free of explicit Branch instructions, State delegates would establish a consensus view on important issues or caucus and vote according to the majority view of the delegation.

State Branches thus provided the 'decisionmakers' for the Federal party, those who occupied seats on its formally supreme bodies, the Federal Conference and Federal Executive. By this series of steps critical Federal decisions could emerge from the reconciliation of the

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18 The two bodies we are concerned with here are the Federal Conference, 'the supreme governing authority and policy-making body [whose] decisions shall be binding upon every member and every section of the Party', and the Federal Executive, the administrative body between Conferences: ALP, Federal Platform 1965, 40.

19 J.B. Keeffe, Federal President, 1962-70, remembered that Western Australian, New South Wales and Victorian delegates normally would caucus on major issues. Queensland and South Australia preferred to seek a consensus. A South Australian delegate, G.T. Virgo, remembers that his State's delegates did caucus and vote as a block on important issues. W.W.C. Brown from Victoria remembers organising caucusing. He was State President and delegation leader and this was part of his Conference responsibility. However, Queensland delegates at one Conference were marshalled behind one resolution by Branch President, B.R. Milliner, not a delegate at the Conference (interviews). Even where delegates lacked a prior instruction, Branch views would influence the decision reached by caucus or consensus. Queenslanders, while constitutionally unable to be bound by the State, often were constrained to follow the known Branch view for the sake of harmonious relations between themselves and the Branch controllers.
goals of a small group within each State Branch. The goals of the six
groups often conflicted fundamentally and were never identical. If
all six delegations were caucused or bound, crucial votes were likely
to be decided 36-0, 30-6, 24-12 or deadlocked 18-18, unless individuals,
risking the wrath of their Branch's controllers, could be 'peeled off'
to support an alternative view.20

We can now state our first hypothesis. Its nub is that internal
ALP politics at the Federal level can be seen in terms of State
Branches pursuing State Branch interests which do not coincide and
which must be reconciled.

HYPOTHESIS I: DECISIONMAKERS ON FEDERAL CONFERENCE AND EXECUTIVE WILL
PURSUE THE GOALS OF THE CONTROLLERS OF STATE BRANCHES WHOM THEY REPRESENT.

Let us consider now the members of the Federal Conference and
Executive.

A basic dichotomy of organisation theory is that between formal
structure and informal process. Formal structures are the frameworks
of rules of organisations. A formal organisation for Chester Barnard
was 'a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or
more persons'. Within such organisations develop informal processes,
'the aggregate of the personal contacts and interactions and associated
groupings', which also influence the decisions the organisation makes.
Organisations, including political parties, do not involve merely
interactions between offices according to a set of rules, but between
people who fill offices, who have personal histories, qualities and
prejudices and the capacity to make alliances and enmities accordingly.
The approach of office holders, such as members of the Federal Executive
of the ALP, to issues is deeply affected by their past and present.

20'Peeling off' was especially important to avoid tied votes, since
18-18 meant defeat of a resolution.
Graham Allison writes vividly that 'each person comes to his position with baggage in tow. His bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to various projects, and personal standing with and debts to groups in the society'.

Some delegates to the Federal Executive and Conference stood out from their fellows. Francis Edward ('Joe') Chamberlain was born in London in 1900. He came gradually to prominence in union politics in Perth, Western Australia, during the 1930s and 1940s, was full-time Secretary of the Tramways union by 1944 and by 1949, Secretary of the Trades and Labour Council and of the ALP, Western Australian Branch. (The unions and party had a combined structure until 1963). Although he had been a Federal ALP delegate since 1948, Chamberlain did not become nationally significant until the Hobart Federal Conference of 1955. He became Federal President of the party in the same year, holding that position until 1960 and that of Federal Secretary from 1961-63. He remained Western Australian Secretary and Federal Executive delegate throughout the period.

Chamberlain's importance rested on a number of bases. First, as Federal Vice President and Acting President he showed chairmanship skills at crucial meetings in the months preceding the Hobart Conference. He was a natural choice for Federal President after this Conference, especially because, as a Western Australian, he was free of the factional

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identifications of the Branches more deeply affected by the Split. In the two or three years after Hobart, Chamberlain consolidated his own position and cemented party unity by skilful balancing between factions and the Federal Parliamentary Leader, H.V. Evatt. Evatt came to rely heavily on him. Moreover, the ill-health of J. Schmella, the part-time Federal Secretary, meant Chamberlain carried much of the secretarial as well as the Presidential work. His position established, Chamberlain built upon it. As President, and then as Secretary, he was spokesman of the Executive. A persuasive and subtle speaker, he could place his own interpretation on Executive or Conference decisions.

Meetings were closed to the press and public until 1965 when the Federal Conference was opened, so the media relied on Chamberlain (and on unauthorised 'leaks' from other members) for their stories. Thirdly, Chamberlain built up a reputation as an ideologue and guardian of the party conscience, by stressing the need to place socialist principles above political expediency, to defend Labor against its enemies and to remember the lessons of the Split.

We must not depart from the course that was charted at Hobart. The target must not be Parliamentary seats at any price, but Parliamentary seats to be

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24 Chamberlain recalls that he remained spokesman as Secretary on the insistence of the new President, J.V. Stout, who said, 'I'm always satisfied with what you say'. Chamberlain had doubts (and the arrangement caused some adverse press comments at the time: Advertiser [Adelaide], 18 February 1961; Sydney Morning Herald [SMH], 10 April 1961) but agreed. He consulted Stout before making statements but he does not mention whether this consultation continued under later Presidents, Colbourne and Keeffe (F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcript, 3:1/11). The Secretary has remained the Executive spokesman ever since.
occupied by members of this Party who will go fearlessly into the electorates of this country and expound the cause of Democratic Socialism.\textsuperscript{25}

The significance of speeches like this was not their literary merit, which was limited, nor even their eloquence, although Chamberlain was a forceful speaker. Their concept of socialism was neither specific nor radical.\textsuperscript{26} Instead, the speeches expressed the inchoate feelings of a section of the party which sought a principled, even moralistic, approach to politics, which saw the Labor platform as a citadel to be defended and from which to launch attacks against exploitative capitalism. When such feelings were aroused in Chamberlain by particular issues there was a corps of purists within the party ready to support him. For the Federal Executive itself, since Chamberlain was a central figure, such feelings in his breast were likely to be important in its critical decisions.

The final basis of Chamberlain's power was his skill in the meetings of the Federal Executive. From his days as a union official, Chamberlain had brought a fondness for advocacy: 'I used to love preparing cases and

\textsuperscript{25}This paragraph is from Chamberlain's Presidential Address to the 1957 Federal Conference, often quoted as an example of his outlook: F.E. Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles on Australian Labor Party Principles, Perth, 1964: 17-18. See also: foreword, 5, 9-11, 18, 21. What 'Labor Principles' actually were was a lot vaguer than the exhortations that they should be followed. Essentially they were what the majority at ALP Conferences had decided. Chamberlain's discussions of principles as against expediency are linked closely with strictures about obeying majority decisions and with his feeling that politicians as a class were primarily interested in office as such rather than how they got it or what they would do with it (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 49-50; F.E. Chamberlain, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcript, 2:1/32-3.

\textsuperscript{26}Murray, The Split, 332-3; J.D. Playford, Doctrinal and Strategic Problems of the Communist Party of Australia, 1945-62, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1962, 324. Chamberlain did indeed talk vaguely of security, the right to work and a fair wage, application of science to reduce the drudgery of housework, education for all children and other unremarkable goals. But intimates had no doubt he believed in 'traditional socialist' aims like nationalisation of basic industries (J.M. Wheeldon, interview).
By 1955 he was, writes Murray, 'a superb committee politician'. Freudenberg, biographer of E.G. Whitlam and a close observer of Labor politics as press secretary to A.A. Calwell during Chamberlain's years of power, wrote from intimate acquaintance:

His personal strength sprang from a singleness, even narrowness of mind, a terrier grip on the essential point of an argument, and a steely eye for the weaknesses of an opponent's case .... He came to a committee thoroughly prepared, knowing exactly what he wanted and how to argue for it.28

Chamberlain's colleagues confirm both his importance and the reasons for it. He had a clarity of purpose, fluency of speech and coolness of mind matched by few of his fellows.29

To call someone a master of committee politics implies that there are differing goals which politics must reconcile. Whose views were likely to diverge from Chamberlain's? Asked who dominated the Executive, W.R. Colbourne, Secretary of the New South Wales Branch and Federal delegate until 1969, replied carefully: 'Oh, I don't think you'd have to judge it. Joe Chamberlain dominated the majority of seven votes to five. It would be equally right to say that probably Charlie Oliver and myself dominated the other five. Not dominated but certainly influenced'.30 Leaving Colbourne aside for the present, let us introduce Oliver, whom most members and observers of the Executive would agree was

27F.E. Chamberlain, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcript, 1:2/17. Note also the praise from the President of the Western Australian State Arbitration Court, E.A. Dunphy, after Chamberlain won a case in 1947: 'He did a splendid job ... [The case] could not have been bettered by any other advocate': Western Australian Industrial Gazette, 27 (1947), 522, 524, quoted, Mitchell, 'The Trade Unionist ...', 4.
30W.R. Colbourne, interview.
almost as influential as Chamberlain in the period after 1960 when they faced each other as Executive delegates.  

Cecil Thompson ("Charlie") Oliver came to Western Australia from North Wales in the early 1920s and by the 1940s was an official of the Australian Workers' Union and State member of Parliament. Apart from the last his career thus paralleled closely Chamberlain's and, in fact, the two were acquaintances in Perth in the 1940s. (During our period, Oliver remembers, they tended to be 'friends socially, while disagreeing on everything politically'). Oliver came to Sydney in 1951 to become State Secretary of the AWU and he held this position throughout our period. He favoured Federal intervention during the New South Wales Split and was elected a Vice President of the ALP, New South Wales Branch, in 1956 and President in 1960. The latter office carried with it that of delegate to Federal Executive and Conference. Oliver lacked Chamberlain's philosophic pretensions but possessed negotiating skill, a bluff, direct manner and a disinclination to decentralise power. Moreover, he saw the main purpose of politics as winning benefits for one's members and supporters through Labor Governments. When he came to Sydney, Oliver became an admirer of J.J. Cahill, Premier of New South Wales from 1953-59. In reminiscing about Cahill, Oliver summarised the style of politics he admired, a combination of persuasion and authority:

He was one of those persuasive blokes. He was a bit like Jack Curtin. He knew how to work the party. He had blokes scattered around whom he could ring up to find out what was going on. Yet he had the essence of leadership: to do things but let it appear everyone else was doing it along with him.33

31 J.B. Keeffe, interview; SMH, 18 August, 4 September 1964; G.T. Virgo, interview.
33 C.T. Oliver, interview. Also: J.L. Armitage, interview.
Part of the reason for Oliver's importance was that he represented New South Wales, the largest Labor Branch, with the most Federal seats, the most money and (apart from Tasmania) the best electoral record. Yet on the Federal Executive during our period, as the excerpt from the Colbourne interview suggests, New South Wales was often in the minority on crucial issues. On some issues New South Wales might have been in the majority; certainly the breakdown (seven-five) was not as rigid as Colbourne implies. But it was still possible to identify through much of our period a basic alignment on many issues, with Chamberlain and two Victorians on one side, Oliver and Colbourne from New South Wales, plus one or two Tasmanian delegates on the other, and South Australia and Queensland in the centre. Oliver, as a New South Welshman, a strong personality and a good negotiator, tended to be the pole of the minority on the Executive. As part of the minority he was less important than Chamberlain, the centre of the majority, but his attributes were comparable. Jim Keeffe, Federal President, 1962-70, made use of both of them: 'As Chairman, I had a technique, if we were having trouble, of adjourning early and telling Charlie and Joe to go and work something out. They were both very skilled negotiators. Between the twelve of us we worked out a lot of good compromises'.

Chamberlain and Oliver, the polar figures, were men of superficially similar background who developed differently: both English migrants, itinerant workers and union officials. But one did not become a politician and was suspicious that politicians would betray Labor principles, the other gave up a safe seat to become a senior union official, admired politicians and offered them room to

\[\textit{34} J.B. Keeffe, interview. Oliver recalls many a 'rezzo' (resolution) worked out in this way between himself and Chamberlain (interview).\]
manoeuvre in government. One was in 1955 the leader of the forces of reconstruction and intervention in New South Wales, who remembered the enmities built up then and warned about the resurgence of the temporarily defeated opponent; the other, part of a group aiming to overthrow existing control for fairly limited ends and able soon to work comfortably with the remnants of the old Executive. One a minor ideologue, the other a pragmatist. Nevertheless, despite these differences of character and personality, both men were skilled politicians within a party where intense political activity was never long absent.

Who were the other members of the Executive, who tended to congregate around Chamberlain and Oliver? From New South Wales came Colbourne, Federal President 1961-62 and Senior Vice President thereafter. He had crossed swords with Chamberlain during the Split, when he was New South Wales Secretary and Chamberlain Federal President and leader of the Federal forces of intervention in the State Branch. Colbourne held his position but the mutual irritants implanted in 1955 flared intermittently in subsequent years. Looking back in 1978, Colbourne felt that 'the predominant issue' on the Federal Executive in the years after the Split 'was to do New South Wales over. Never mind what the reasons or causes were, the Federal Executive's got to assert itself in New South Wales'. The anecdotes Colbourne used to illustrate this assertion came primarily from the years 1956 and 1957.

35 Murray, The Split, 199, and others tentatively link Chamberlain's antipathy to politicians to his failure to become one himself. He made three attempts to enter politics, in 1930 (Labor candidate in a rural seat), 1957 (rumours he would seek preselection in Kalgoorlie), 1964 (withdrawal of his nomination for Senate preselection on grounds of other work, although some said because he lacked the numbers): _CT_, 7 April 1964; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcript, 1: 1/31-40; _SMH_, 3 August 1964; _West Australian_, 9 April, 4 May 1957.
when the Federal forces, led by Chamberlain, were active in New South Wales. Colbourne's remarks suggest his relations with Chamberlain were not harmonious: 'You couldn't do anything with Joe in those days. He was the top dog .... I'm Joe Chamberlain, I'm not going to miss out'. Press reports in the late 1950s and the 1960s occasionally referred to a 'feud' between Colbourne and Chamberlain; it seems to have commenced at this time. Looking back in 1978, Colbourne said emphatically: 'I've never known the Federal Executive coming to New South Wales and do a good job. When they get in there and they do interfere they make things worse ...'.36 His contacts with Chamberlain in 1955-57 coloured this judgment; his relationship with Chamberlain on the Executive in the years after the Split was likely to be influenced by their contacts during it.

Chamberlain often allied himself with the delegates of the Victorian Branch, which had been just as strongly influenced by the Split as had New South Wales, but in a rather different direction. The Split carved off part of the party, mainly in local branches and the State and Federal Parliamentary wing, eventually to form the Democratic Labor Party, and left a rump in which participation in the Split was an important credential for office after it. Thus J.V. Stout, Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, was a leading opponent of the Grouper dominated Victorian Central Executive during the Split, was President of the new VCE 1955-58, and remained a Federal Executive delegate until 1962, serving as Federal President for six months in 1961. Venerable rather than venomous (he died at 78 in 1964) Stout's influence also suffered because he had been an early ally of the Groups. This handicap notwithstanding, the Victorians drew strength

36 W.R. Colbourne, interview.
from the Branch's martyrdom during the Split. The Victorian Labor
Government had been a victim of Grouper perfidy and the Branch
delegates often referred to the continuing need for vigilance against
the Grouper threat.\textsuperscript{37} Another elderly union official involved in the
Split was Albert McNolty, State Secretary of the Sheetmetal Workers'
union, President of the VCE 1959-61, Chairman of the Trade Unionists'
Defence Committee (established in 1961 to wage propaganda war on the
remaining Industrial Groups) and a Federal Executive delegate from
Victoria, 1964-66. McNolty was a Vice President in the first post
Split VCE but something of an ideological socialist in contrast to the
more opportunist Stout.\textsuperscript{38} Different again was J.P. 'Bob' Brebner,
Federal and State Secretary of the small Pulp and Paperworkers' union,
who is described by Murray as 'bitterly anti-Grouper' and a 'left
winger', but was primarily a machine politician, who needed quick
footwork to compensate for his lack of a large union power base.
Brebner held senior offices in the Victorian Branch for a decade after
the Split and was Federal Executive delegate 1958-64.\textsuperscript{39}

Stout, McNolty and Brebner were above all union officials,
creatures of the ancient corridors and murky politics of the Melbourne
Trades Hall. Their careers show that the Federal Executive included
members whose main interests and expertise lay outside Federal politics

\textsuperscript{37}For Stout, see: Tom Sheehy, 'The Attitudes of J.V. (Vic) Stout',
Recorder, 3, 8 (February 1969), 2-7; David Stephens, 'Some Notes on
position, see Chamberlain's remark to the 1959 State Conference that
the Branch had 'borne the brunt of the attack upon us over the past
four years' (Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 39).

\textsuperscript{38}Murray, The Split, 222. The unsympathetic Bulletin ridiculed
McNolty's beliefs in world brotherhood by giving him the nick-name
'Peace-medal' McNolty.

\textsuperscript{39}Murray, The Split, 103, 184. These three pen-pictures and those that
follow draw generally on Murray and on interviews with Victorian Branch
and Federal Executive members.
but whose political skills, honed in one arena, could be applied in another. From a different background came R.W. Holt, VCE President 1962-65 and Federal Executive delegate 1963-65. Holt was Minister for Lands in the Cain Labor Government and his action in 1953 in tearing up an amendment he regarded as influenced by B.A. Santamaria's National Catholic Rural Movement made him a symbolic figure for the Victorian Branch after the Split. He held official positions from 1959, even though his ideas differed considerably from those of his VCE colleagues who considered themselves socialists. Holt's period as Federal delegate served as a bridge between Stout, McNolty and Brebner and two younger men. These were W.H. Hartley, a protege of Chamberlain, who succeeded C.S. Wyndham as State Secretary late in 1963 and became a Federal Executive delegate two years later, and W.W.C. Brown, elected to the VCE in 1959, State Secretary of the Furnishing Trades Society and State President of the ALP from 1965-69. Brown joined Hartley on the Federal Executive in June 1966.

We have dwelt at some length on the New South Welshmen, the Victorians and Chamberlain since, both to observers at the time and to members of the Executive, these were the 'poles' of that body around which majorities and minorities formed. But what of the other States' delegates? The least significant may be disposed of first. Throughout this period Tasmania provided no delegates who could be seen as leaders rather than followers. Small States often lack politically experienced individuals, membership numbers and financial resources. Tasmania was so weak financially that the New South Wales

40 Holt may have been more than a symbol during his period as President. W.H. Hartley, who admits he and Holt were often opponents within the party, suggests Holt manipulated the elderly McNolty rather than the reverse, which tends to be the received view (W.H. Hartley, interview). Bulletin, 10 August 1963 suggests Holt and Wyndham were fairly firmly in control of the Branch.
Branch, according to Oliver in an interview in 1978, helped it pay its Federal affiliation fees during the 1960s. The Tasmanians' inclination to follow the New South Wales delegates on many issues was influenced in any case by the similar composition of the union movement in Tasmania, with moderate unions predominating, and most of all because Tasmania, like New South Wales until 1965, had a Labor Government which its Federal delegates sought to protect. While the Victorians, lacking a Labor administration since 1955, often felt they had little to lose by a militant approach, the Branches where Labor governed were more circumspect.  

The Tasmanians did not always vote as a bloc, which tended to make them less important as State delegates and more important as individuals. A comment by the Victorian, Brebner, brings this out:

The only change in State representation was in that of Tasmania where Mr V.S.C. 'Paddy' Williams replaced Mr J. Miley. Due to previous evenly divided Executive there was much speculation as to which side Paddy Williams would support. He was certainly the most 'met' delegate at the Essendon Airport, no less than three separate persons were there to welcome him.  

As it turned out, Williams often voted with Chamberlain and the Victorians against his fellow Tasmanians, R.H. Lacey or L.H. Barnard, MP. But this group just as frequently lost the support of the other

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41 One Victorian contrasted the Victorian unions' - and therefore the union dominated Victorian ALP - need to be militant because they could not rely on cooperation with a State Labor Government as in New South Wales (W.W.C. Brown, interview). Regarding Tasmania's financial straits, Oliver's remark is partially confirmed by Australian, 25 July 1969, which retails an allegation that Tasmania has been 'unfinancial' in four recent years and should thus have lost its right to vote.

West Australian delegate, C.H. Webb, a Federal MP from 1954-58 and again from 1961, who often opposed Chamberlain during their fifteen years on the Executive together. Webb and Barnard, as Federal politicians, helped to bring a broader perspective to Executive meetings. The New South Wales Branch excluded politicians from its Federal delegations until 1965; the Victorian delegates, as we have seen, were usually union or party officials, or both.

South Australian Federal Executive delegations from the early 1950s included politicians: Senator J.P. Toohey, an Executive delegate from before the Split to 1960, J.C. Sexton (1957-60), who was elected to Federal Parliament in 1958, M.H. Nicholls (1960-63, 1964-69) elected to Federal Parliament in 1963, D.A. Dunstan, (1960-64) member of the South Australian House of Assembly, and G.T. Virgo, (1963-70) who entered the same House in 1968. All served also as State Branch officers, Toohey, Sexton, Nicholls and Virgo successively filling the office of State Secretary from 1946-68, and Dunstan being Junior Vice President, Senior Vice President and President over the years 1958 to 1961. The four Secretaries moved straight from administration to Parliament and Virgo's successor as State Secretary, M.J. Young, served as part-time Federal Secretary while a Federal Executive delegate, became full-time Federal Secretary and entered the Federal Parliament in 1974. The smoothness of transition and the close interlocking of machine and politicians was a South Australian characteristic. It was accompanied by a tendency to bloc voting, either as a result of State instructions or working out a consensus as issues arose. Partly because the politicians tended to avoid extreme positions, partly because of the consensus method and partly because South Australia had escaped the worst effects of the Split - which tended to produce extreme views - its delegates often found themselves in the middle between the
Victoria-Chamberlain and New South Wales 'poles'. While over the long term the South Australians probably lined up more frequently on important issues with the former than the latter it is still possible, as a general rule of thumb, to see South Australia - and Queensland - filling a middle position. Virgo, a delegate during the 1960s, remembered that South Australia, voting as a bloc on important issues, could often say to other States 'South Australia and Queensland support Western Australia' or 'South Australia and Queensland support New South Wales'.

South Australia's ability to shift blocs of votes did not suppress the personal attributes and friendships of individual delegates. Only Dunstan among all Executive delegates, according to Colbourne, approached Chamberlain in thoroughness of preparation and skill of presentation. Toohey had been closely involved in the Split and was a skilled negotiator of Chamberlain's calibre but without his zealotry - which meant he was probably more widely liked among his colleagues. Virgo remembers having good personal relations both with Colbourne of New South Wales, more often than not a voting opponent, and with Keeffe of Queensland, a regular ally. Personal relations could both reinforce and counter political alignments. Brown of Victoria co-existed well with Colbourne and Oliver of New South Wales; McNolty of Victoria was widely liked, Stout less so; Wyndham, when Federal Secretary, maintained his Victorian connections with Holt; Hartley was a protege and friend of Chamberlain; personal friendships as well as shared interests as smaller States may have underlaid the links Virgo remembers existing between South Australia and Tasmania; Keeffe remained President from

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43 G.T. Virgo, interview.
1962 to 1970, usually unopposed at elections, because he was personally acceptable to both sides as well as because he was a competent chairman. 45

Finally, we should mention those participants in Federal Executive meetings who did not represent States. As Federal Secretary, 1963-69, C.S. Wyndham could speak but not vote. Cyril Stanley Wyndham came to Australia from England in 1957 as press secretary to the Leader of the Federal Opposition, Dr.H.V. Evatt. Although still in his twenties he already had solid credentials in party administration in the British Labour Party and in 1960 became Secretary of the Victorian Branch of the ALP. Australian Labor was primitively organised in contrast with the British party and Wyndham sought to improve it. But both as Victorian Secretary and Federal Secretary from 1963 to 1969 he was a better administrator than a publicist of his reform plans or a politician within the party. He was more often prickly and irascible than diplomatic. The contrast between the state of party records during his terms and those of other administrators attests to his bureaucratic skills but the infrequency of his appearance in the recollections of other protagonists suggests the relatively small part he played in the negotiation and politicking at which the Chamberlains, Olivers, Tooheys and Dunstans excelled. 46


46 Bulletin, 10 August 1963; F.E. Chamberlain, W.R. Colbourne, interviews; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 90-1; W.H. Hartley, interview; Nation, 18 May 1963; Alan Reid, The Gorton Experiment, Sydney, 1971, 260; SMH, 29 May 1964; Kylie Tennant, Evatt - Politics and Justice, Sydney, 1970, 244-5; G.T. Virgo, interview; E.G. Whitlam, interview. Wyndham was born 'Isaacs' but changed his name at about the time he came to Australia.
The politicians who came onto the Executive in 1967 as ex officio members also brought with them distinctive personal histories. All were between forty-five and fifty years of age when they became Parliamentary leaders. All were young enough to have escaped the moulding experiences of the Depression. All had grown up in or grown into reasonably comfortable circumstances. Three, E.G. Whitlam, the Parliamentary Leader, L.K. Murphy and S.H. Cohen, the Senate Leaders, were lawyers. The fourth, L.H. Barnard, Whitlam's deputy, had been a school-teacher. Whitlam had entered Federal Parliament in 1952 before he had established a substantial legal practice but he showed the lawyer's characteristics of meticulous research, capacity to learn a brief and skill in advocacy. Murphy and Cohen, who were both Queen's Counsel before entering Parliament in 1962, possessed similar skills. None of the three had the ideological pretensions of a Chamberlain nor the religious devotion of the Catholic Colbourne, nor the worries about Asian Communism of Oliver. None were leading players in the drama of the Split. Whitlam had tended to avoid close contact with his State machine but Murphy was an intimate of the group which opposed the New South Wales Central Executive and Cohen became a member of the VCE in the 1960s. Barnard came from an old Tasmanian Labor family (his father had been in Chifley's ministry), had a strong grasp of the intricacies of Labor's internal politics, and had been a solid, if not distinguished, member of the Federal Caucus. While the Parliamentary Leaders came to the Executive as ex officio representatives, their actions there would be influenced by these and other individual characteristics, as well as by alliances and enmities previously built up with their Executive colleagues, either as fellow members of State Branches, as fellow members of Federal Caucus (for instance, C.H. Webb of Western Australia had first entered Parliament
in 1954 and Keeffe entered the Senate in 1965) or as politicians seeking to influence the Executive's deliberations before they became members themselves.\textsuperscript{47}

HYPOTHESIS II: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR OWN PERSONAL HISTORIES AND RELATIONSHIPS

We do not claim that these brief biographies include all possible personal influences on incumbents of offices in Labor's Federal machinery. Other influences may be invoked by particular cases. But we have given enough details to show the need to consider their effects in the case study chapters. We have said enough to suggest also that those chapters may show the intertwined effects on critical decisions of personal backgrounds and the goals of State Branches. If, for instance, the events of the Split established personal enmities, such as that between Colbourne and Chamberlain, they also directed collective preferences - in Victoria, continuing opposition to the Industrial Groups within the unions, in New South Wales, cementing further the determination to protect the existence of the State Labor Government. Similarly, if Chamberlain and Oliver differed personally over foreign policy their respective Branches were also likely to differ, since both were influential in their States. Again, those who were politicians as well as Executive delegates were likely to be influenced not only by their personal histories and preferences but by the demands of their dual offices.

Let us say more about politicians. Nearly seventy years ago, Michels explored the reasons for what he called 'the great authority exercised by the socialist parliamentarian'.

\textsuperscript{47}Cohen died in 1969 and was replaced by D.R. Willesee of Western Australia, who had been elected to the Senate in 1949. Barnard had been a Tasmanian delegate to the Executive, 1965-67.
He owes his comparative independence to the fact that the parliamentary representative is elected for a considerable term of years, and can be dispossessed by no one so long as he retains the confidence of the electors. In the second place, and even at the moment of his election, his dependence on the party is but indirect, for his power is derived from the electoral masses.48

Where "the confidence of the electors" depends greatly, as it does in Australia, on whether candidates bear party labels, politicians are constrained to a considerable extent. However, parties usually recognise that politicians will often have to act in the legislature with no more than a general reference to the goals of the party. Parties, including the ALP, cannot foresee all the circumstances likely to confront their representatives in a term nor can they presume to direct them regarding the intricacies of legislation. Parties recognise the importance of expertise. Despite the party rhetoric that politicians were "the servants of the movement", Labor's rules provided remarkable leeway for them.

The Federal Parliamentary Labor Party shall have authority in properly constituted Caucus meetings to make decisions directed towards establishing the collective attitude of the Parliamentary Party to any question or matter in the Federal Parliament, subject to - (i) At all times taking such action which may be possible to implement the Party's Platform and Conference decisions; (ii) on questions or matters which are not subject to Federal Platform or Conference or Executive decisions, the majority decision of Caucus being binding upon all members in the Parliament; (iii) no attitude being expressed which is contrary to the provisions of the Party Platform or any other decision of Federal Conference or Federal Executive.49

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48Michels, Political Parties, 136. My emphasis.
49ALP, Federal Platform 1965, 40 (rule 5[d]). My emphasis. This wording was officially adopted by the 1963 Federal Conference. Chamberlain, as Federal President, had presented to the Federal Executive in 1960 drafts for revised rules and these were approved with minimal alterations. The previous rule relating to Caucus had read simply: 'On all questions affecting members of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, the decisions of the Federal Conference shall be final. Pending consideration by the Federal Conference, the ruling of the Federal
The rule is permissive rather than mandatory; it is up to the politicians to decide when action is possible; they have to keep within Federal decisions rather than speak only to express them; there will be issues on which Caucus members have to commit themselves where the party has provided no guide to action; there will always be a question of interpretation as to whether a particular action is within Federal policy. The rule establishes the authority of the Caucus to make decisions as a separate body, 'subject to' certain limitations. It recognises Caucus has a different constituency to these bodies. Members of the party bodies can lose their positions only by votes of party members but politicians fear the electors, only a few of whom are party members. Since Labor wished to retain elected representation and because it recognised that its politicians would have superior knowledge of Parliamentary issues and often should act before extra-Parliamentary machinery could be assembled, it avoided detailed supervision in favour of more generalised control.\(^{50}\)

\(^{49}\) (continued)

Executive shall be binding'. The 1961 Federal Conference did not reach the item although the new draft appeared at the end of the official Conference report. Conference referred the remaining agenda to the Executive which sent this part back. The 1963 Federal Conference finally passed the new draft, again with minimal debate. If delegates had felt the Caucus rule was unacceptable or a new departure they had plenty of opportunities to say so. That they did not suggests it was unexceptionable and a fair statement of the party's attitude to its politicians - as the previous shorter formulation had been. The new formulation merely stated the convention in more detail: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 67; 1961, 49, 68-71; 1963, 13; Federal Executive Minutes (FX), 5-8 September 1960, 3-7 July 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/18-20, 118.

Our cases may show that, in practice, Federal Caucus made critical decisions for the party while acting within party rules or even outside them. Constitutionally at least, Caucus controlled only its own destiny. But Federal politicians also sought to make critical decisions in Caucus, as members of Federal Executive or Conference, or as non-members seeking to influence these bodies. Within Caucus itself, as in the extra-Parliamentary machinery, there were conflicts between individuals and sub-coalitions with differing goals. Since Caucus' power was limited constitutionally the decisions which emerged from the reconciliation of these goals could be of less formal importance for the party, although they could be just as 'critical' in the sense we have defined that word - defining the character of the organisation. They could make it a winner or loser of elections, effectively destroy a long-held party principle or create a new one, nullify or implement a party policy and, by reacting to circumstances unforeseen by the most recent Federal Conference, commit the whole party to a course of action in a matter on which its supreme body had expressed no opinion.

Caucus decisions might be different from those which would have been made by Labor's extra-Parliamentary bodies faced with the same circumstances. This difference might arise partly because politicians and non-politicians served different constituencies. The first appealed ultimately to the electors, the other to the party. The first looked, to put it crudely, at winning votes and holding seats; the second at serving the interests of party supporters and strengthening the party itself.

Let us look more closely at this simplification. There had always been a crusading element in the Labor Party, usually expressed in talk of Labor's 'message of reform' and of convincing the electorate of the
correctness of Labor's view of how the world needed to be changed. Thus Calwell complained in 1955 that 'we do practically nothing in the way of educating the people to understand our ideals ... the great principles for which we stand'. Four years later, Chamberlain insisted: 'There is nothing outmoded in the policy of the Australian Labor Party. Our real trouble is getting it understood so that conservative editorials and propaganda will cease to scare people'. Such views implied there was something immutable about Labor principles, that it was unnecessary to sway with the wind, that the search for electoral success should not mean the abandonment of basic beliefs. It also implied that the first goal of the ALP was to look after its 'core' supporters, those who saw the world similarly to the party's ideologues, those who saw themselves as 'workers', those who always voted Labor. These were the people who suffered when capitalism stumbled, as it did during the Depression of the 1930s, to help whom should be the first duty of Labor Governments and who should not be deserted by Labor Oppositions in search of votes. Political power was not worth betraying a party's most faithful supporters, nor its principles. Power would come as conservatives foundered and the pendulum swung back to a still 'pure' Labor Party. Such a view, which combined an attitude to the electorate and to the sort of policies Labor should pursue, could be A.A. Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, Hawthorn, Vic., 1972, 191; Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 14, 35. My emphasis. See also Dr (later Senator) F. Dittmer, first President of Queensland Labor College: 'If Labor is to succeed it must tell its story to everyone' (Labor, June 1959, 7); C.R. Cameron, MP, President, SA Branch: 'I will rather see Labor in opposition for another ten years than see us abandon a correct policy just because the electorate failed to understand it': ALP (SA Branch), Official Report, State Convention, 1959, 3. My emphasis in both cases. When H.F. Jensen, Labor Lord Mayor of Sydney, submitted a proposal for improved research facilities the Federal Executive referred him to the new National Publicity Committee whose aim was 'informing the public mind both on Labor's basic policies and its attitude towards current topical questions' (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 14-15, 44; FX 11-14 August 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55; H.F. Jensen, interview).
called an 'exclusive' view. Against it can be placed the 'inclusive' view, implied in Michels' remarks about the consequences for political parties of the search for electoral success. While parties draw their direct membership from only a part of society, they seek votes, says Michels, from all parts of it. "Parliamentarism" signifies the aspiration for the greatest number of votes'. The modern party is 'the methodical organization of the electoral masses .... In democracy every one appeals to the people, to every one of the people, without discrimination'. This 'omnibus tendency' is a logical consequence of the search for an electoral majority, it is 'the integrative tendency of the numerical maximum, mortal enemy to all freedom of program and thought'. It kills a party's distinctiveness, it destroys radicalism in reforming parties. From a more favourable perspective, on the other hand, the inclusive approach requires a party to remain modern, to keep up with changes in society, to continually re-examine principles and policies.

The exclusive-inclusive dichotomy is not an absolute one. It is perhaps better seen as a continuum, from extreme exclusivists to extreme inclusivists, with individual decisionmakers starting at different points on the continuum at different times. For instance, Labor politicians had never appealed entirely to a union or working class 'core', although some were more willing than others to go far beyond this - to seek the support of professional and manufacturing classes, say, as well as the small farmers and skilled non-union workers, who

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52 Roberto Michels, First Lectures in Political Sociology, Minneapolis, 1949, 134, 144-7; Michels, Political Parties, 3-8, 16-18, 268, 367. Note the passing use of the exclusive-inclusive idea, with reference to groups generally, in Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, 40-2, especially: 'When there is organized or coordinated effort in an inclusive group, as many as can be persuaded to help will be included in the effort.'
were early supporters of political labour. Nor is the distinction synonymous with that between non-politicians and politicians. We have quoted the politician Calwell as an example of the exclusive approach. His colleague J.F. Cairns expressed similar sentiments. On the other side, Chamberlain, in the speech quoted, admitted the need to adapt policies, if not principles, to changing circumstances. Oliver went further, questioning principles as well. Dual office-holding broke down rigid distinctions, too. Some politicians occupied machine positions; Executive members entered Parliament. Then, even the most doctrinaire Executive members agreed there could be benefits in electoral success; even they weighed up appeals to swinging voters. Fourthly, neither Executive nor Caucus was monolithic. We have said something of State and personal differences on the former; Federal Parliamentarians also differed ideologically and personally, formed cliques around rival leaders, owed allegiances to different States, made individual and group judgments of principle against pragmatism.


54 Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 34. Oliver: ALP (NSW Branch), Presidential Address by C.T. Oliver, State President, to 1967 Annual Conference held at Sydney Town Hall on June 10, 11 and 12, 1967, 4 ('Are we prepared to accept that the function of a political Party is to win Government even at the sacrifice of some often meaningless ideals?') While Chamberlain distrusted politicians because they too easily followed the inclusivist line, Oliver was much more willing to concede them independence, quoting with approval the belief of Morgan Phillips of the British Labor Party that Executives and Conferences should not have the right to direct Parliamentary parties but should always be able to have their advice considered: ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report of Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Conference, 3-4. While Chamberlain would have found it harder to admit this, Labor's practice was closer to Phillips' prescription for Britain than to its own rhetoric. Oliver found it much easier than did Chamberlain to say 'our appeal must be made to all age groups, to all sections of the community': ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1969 Annual Conference, 6.
benefit for the solid Labor classes as against the less reliable.

Finally, rhetoric and practice often differ. Those who spoke of principles and benefits for the workers, or even of socialism, might at times offer the crudest of inducements to normally non-Labor voters. Those who were normally inclusivists might occasionally take a principled stand which could appeal only to committed Labor supporters.

To summarise: we can posit a continuum between, on the one side, pursuit of Labor principles and an appeal to the Labor 'core' who identify with them and will benefit from policies pursuing them and, on the other side, pragmatism, a search for votes from all sections by presenting a wide range of policies not easily linked to a set of unchanging Labor principles and not intended to be. The first, exclusive, approach tends towards protection of a citadel of immutable precepts, the second, inclusive, approach towards walking in the market place of ideas and absorbing myriad influences, to the extent that nothing is sacred or free from the possibility of change. The two tendencies will often conflict.

Crotty provides a useful classification of approaches to the electorate: Strains generated by the organization's will to survive and its corresponding response to pluralistic social forces can be resolved through: (1) a coalitional attempt to put forward priority items of meaning to the greatest number of electors, the American experience; (2) an accommodation designed to advance in diluted form a group's welfare or a particular strain of ideology, yet in combination with other policy interests directed at sufficient numbers of voters to enable the party to exercise substantial influence upon policy making - a constraint upon the operations of European socialist parties that Michels recognized but whose resolution he deplored; and (3) a failure to compromise with other social groupings, in other words, an explicit unwillingness to change. In the last situation, the party retains its original identity, its goals intact, and its limited electoral support, and hopes for factors beyond its control to rearrange electoral forces in its favour.

HYPOTHESIS III: DECISIONMAKERS WILL SEEK DIFFERENT BALANCES BETWEEN 'EXCLUSIVE' AND 'INCLUSIVE' APPROACHES TO THE ELECTORATE

The possibility of conflict over a particular issue or issues between those who want more exclusivism and those who want more inclusivism will always be present in the ALP. Conflict will be most likely when the party faces its closest contact with the community — when it seeks votes at periodic elections. The number of elections during our period suggests that such conflicts — and the need to find a balance between the two tendencies that is acceptable to the party's sub-coalitions — could have occurred frequently. For instance, the New South Wales Branch of the ALP fought sixteen State and Federal elections between 1955 and 1972 and was free of an election in only two years. In Victoria in the same period there were also sixteen campaigns and State and Federal campaigns fell in the same year six times. Other Branches bore similar loads. There were nine Federal elections, six of them between 1963 and 1972.

The exclusivist suggested only that the primary responsibility, not the sole responsibility, of Labor should be to its core supporters. Votes could be sought more widely but not at the expense of Labor principles. If potential voters, once apprised of Labor's advantages, did not then vote for the party, it was to their misfortune. The inclusivist, on the other hand, was more prepared to ask the electorate what it wanted, to respond to trends among many groups within the community. To the exclusivist, politics was action to popularise and implement the Labor platform of specific policies based on immutable principles; to the inclusivist, it was a combination of action and reaction with policies and principles continually evolving. The future existence of the whole party depended on its ability not only to respond to electors' demands but also to balance the differing views within
itself over how to respond to these demands. Frequent elections heightened the urgency of both imperatives.

THE SEARCH FOR UNITY

HYPOTHESES I, II and III encapsulate three phenomena, derived from a 'static' study of the ALP and from relevant literature, which we hope to find influencing decisions in later chapters. All three refer to characteristics of individuals and sub-coalitions within the party: they pursue State Branch goals, they follow personal inclinations, they approach the electorate in a more exclusive or more inclusive way. In all three cases the stress of our approach has been on the possibility of conflict: between State Branches, between individuals and between approaches. At the same time we have referred to Federal decisions emerging from the reconciliation of State goals, to alliances between individuals and to balancing exclusiveness and inclusiveness. In each case we may suspect that individuals and sub-coalitions have to make concessions - forego some of their goals - in order to accommodate those of others. Let us now construct two hypotheses which recognise more explicitly that makers of critical decisions may often pursue goals that have only an indirect connection to their own goals as State Branch representatives, individuals or vote and benefit seekers.

We began by describing all organisations, including parties, as coalitions. We placed parties within a sub-classification of voluntary associations. Now we shall examine the evidence that the Labor Party is a coalition, that this fact is widely recognised and that it imposes - along with associational voluntariness, the status of being part of a voluntary association - certain constraints on those who make critical decisions at the Federal level of the ALP.
Roy Forward is one of the few writers to provide any extended consideration of the ALP as a coalition, 'a collection of heterogeneous elements'. Forward enumerates these elements as union officials, union rank and file, branch members, big financial donors, public relations firms, voters, party officials, members of Parliaments, Parliamentary Leaders and their staffs, and the media if it is favourable to Labor. Cutting across these divisions are those between State Branches, between different age groups or 'generations', between the party at Federal, State and local levels of government, between religious allegiances, sexes, classes, status groups and ideological tendencies.

Forward goes further than some would want to in his list of elements. Since his approach dissolves boundaries between the party and the world, he includes non-members of the party, such as voters and communicators, whom others might prefer to classify as 'supporters'. (In this thesis I, too, have preferred to retain the boundary between members and non-members, while recognising that the boundary is permeable. My concept of 'coalition' differs from Forward's to that extent.) But Forward does reveal the multitude of possible divisions. Parties, like all organisations, are composed of a number of parts; coalitions comprise sub-coalitions. Other observers of the ALP and of organisations generally suggest other ways of dividing the ALP: those who seek power within the party for its own sake or for the control of patronage and wealth at the party's disposal against those who seek to implement policies; union against union; the following of one leader against that of another; 'networks' of friends against other networks; ideological divisions (socialists of various kinds, private enterprisers, 56

liberals, conservatives; strategic differences (exclusivists, inclusivists).57

But ways of dividing are also ways of uniting. To form majorities sub-coalitions must unite. Dual allegiances facilitate this process. Take a group of socially conservative Catholic union officials from New South Wales, who seek to preserve the State Labor Government but dislike the Australian Workers' Union, support overseas military involvement against Communism but seek limited nationalisation of industries at home, support Whitlam's attempt to win the party Leadership but have close personal connections with other union officials who would prefer a different Leader. These men have a number of potential bases for alliance with other sub-coalitions. But multiple allegiances seldom push individuals in the same direction. How sub-coalitions unite and divide will depend to a large extent upon the issue. Issues provide cues for sub-coalitions. How does this issue affect our interests? How do other sub-coalitions feel about it? Is it possible to form a larger sub-coalition to make the decision that emerges serve the interests of our small sub-coalition?

The existence of sub-coalitions affects the coalition as a whole. Every sub-coalition within the ALP, whether it is a State Branch, a union or a group of unions, the supporters of a potential Leader or the

proponents of a certain policy, if it wishes to remain together, must
develop a process for resolving the collective attitude of the sub-
coalition. For example, what decisions are to bear the label 'State
Branch policy', what proposals on industrial matters are to be put up
to the party, how is the new Leader's candidacy to be promoted or the
policy pursued? The content of the outcome - policy, mode of
organisation, set of leaders or other decision or decisions - and the
shape of the sub-coalition's organisation, are both less important than
the processes by which it pursues the twin courses of making decisions
and keeping the sub-coalition together. The same applies to the
coalition itself, the sum of the sub-coalitions, the Australian Labor
Party. Inherent in the ALP, writes Forward, are 'processes of
adjustment' between its various elements; 'when disunity occurs it is
merely a sign that the processes of adjustment within the coalition
are not working well'. When in 1974 the party's life ran relatively
smoothly it showed 'that a sufficient number of compromises have been
made to keep a sufficient number of the contributing elements sufficiently
happy, at least for the time being', to keep them contributing to the
coalition. 'The party as a whole is ... rarely, if ever, completely
satisfactory from anyone's point of view since it is always in a state
of compromise or internal contradiction'. 58

Associational voluntariness, the ability of members to join or
leave at will, encourages compromise. Sub-coalitions aggrieved by a
decision can leave the coalition. Whether they do will depend on the
existence of alternative associations - presumably a disgruntled ALP
union, for instance, could affiliate with the Democratic Labor Party or
pursue its members' interests without party affiliation - on what value

they placed on a favourable decision and whether they thought they
could reverse the decision. Labor rhetoric includes the injunction to
obey decisions made constitutionally, even if they are unpalatable,
while at the same time, working to change them through the proper party
channels. There is little point in the proponents of one view having
it adopted as party policy if, meanwhile, the proponents of all other
views have left the party in disgust. At the very least such decisions
may reduce the cooperation decisionmakers receive from some sub­
coalitions in the future. Sub-coalitions may, in a common Labor term,
'run dead'.

The effect of decisions on a voluntary association constrains
decisionmakers. They must consider other things than how best to
reconcile their own personal and State Branch views. Is there a
possibility that this concern for the unity of the organisation will
prevail over the function of decisionmaking? Duane Lockard has defined
an 'issue' as 'something that cannot readily be avoided'. Lockard was
referring specifically to American political parties in their relations
with interest groups, but a similar tendency has been attributed to all
organisations. The most frequent 'decision' may be one not to decide,
to avoid issues, to accommodate divergent views to avoid conflict
between sub-coalitions whose goals differ to the extent that full
pursuit of them might threaten the unity of the coalition.

59 Wilson, Political Organizations, 52, 114, 215-6, 235-6. Avery
Leiserson, Parties and Politics, New York, 1958, 182, provides an
inventory of how disgruntled members may react to such actions: 'counter­
political activity (organization) within the group purposes and norms
(politics), appealing to established practices (law), passive non­
cooperation [run dead!], criminal disobedience, joining in revolutionary
displacement of the authority system by conspiracy and violence,
withdrawal, or secession'. See also: Eldersveld, Political Parties, 97;
Medding, 'A Framework for the Analysis of Power ...', 2.
60 Duane Lockard, The Perverted Priorities of American Politics, New York,
1971, 80.
61 Barnard, Functions of the Executive, 189-90, 225-6; Richard M. Cyert
& Kenneth R. MacCrimmon, 'Organizations', Gardner Lindzey & Elliot
Aronson, ed., The Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume One, Reading,
have concluded that the search for coalition unity is a dominant characteristic of all organisations. 'If there is a distinctive motivation and attitude characteristic of political parties', writes Avery Leiserson, 'it is the survival and the power of the organization, but in this the party is no worse than the church, the army, the corporation, or the trade union'. Similarly, March and Olsen, after studying school boards and university faculties, concluded that 'the formal decision-making process sometimes is directly connected to the maintenance or change of the organization as a social unit as well as to the accomplishment of making collective decisions and producing substantive results'. Finally, James Q. Wilson writes that 'the behavior of persons occupying organizational roles (leader, spokesman, executive, representative) is principally, though not uniquely, determined by the requirements of organizational maintenance and enhancement ...'. Maintenance does not mean mere survival but 'securing essential contributions of effort and resources from members, managing an effective system of communications, and helping formulate purposes: in short, producing and sustaining cooperative effort'.

HYPOTHESIS IV: DECISIONMAKERS WILL TRY TO KEEP THE COALITION TOGETHER

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63 Wilson, Political Organizations, 13, 30-2. My emphasis. Wilson attempts to show how organisations use 'incentives' to maintain themselves. I am not convinced by the incentives concept as he presents it (see above, note 8). The idea of system-maintenance itself is more acceptable - and more widely accepted, as the preceding quotations suggest.
There is considerable evidence that this hypothesis could be supported in the ALP, even without studying specific decisions. Party rhetoric stresses 'unity', 'solidarity', 'loyalty', avoidance of 'disruption'. The veteran Labor publicist, Henry Boote, said: 'Give us Labor unity and the attainment of our objectives is as certain as the sunrise'. Similar exhortations were a staple of Conference addresses by party Presidents and others throughout our period. Both the debilitating effects of past schisms and the achievements of Labor when united were used to rally the party.

The Fishers, Curtins, Chifleys, Ryans, and many others had one idea always in mind ... to uplift the living standards of the great masses of Australians. They had one other great attribute too, and that was a deep sense of internal loyalty and mateship within the Party machine. These great men respected majority decisions, and never attempted to impose personal views contrary to established policy.64

Of course, rhetoric is not action. Talk of unity behind the majority decision can mask a bludgeoning use of numbers. "Solidarity" is invoked in the name of every contending faction at once'.65 Punishment for 'disruption' may be a convenient way of getting rid of opponents whose views are unpalatable. Still, there is concrete evidence that such talk stood for something. The Labor newspapers of the period are notable for

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64 J.B. Keeffe, Federal President, ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 7. My emphasis. The Boote quotation (1939) is at L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley, Croydon, Vic., 1963, 108. See also: ALP, Official Reports, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 7 (Stout); 1967, 33 (Keeffe); ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1969 Annual Conference, 5-6 (Oliver); A.L.P. News, 24 June 1967 (Wyndham). On the historical references: Age, 19 January 1959 (Calwell claims ALP, not DLP, is the heir of Scullin); Circular 59/258, Central Executive 30/10/59, ALP (NSW Branch) Records held in the Mitchell Library, Sydney (hereafter cited as 'NSW Rec.') ML MSS 2083/454/1181 (resolution on the death of Premier Cahill puts him in the tradition of Curtin and Chifley); commemorations of Chifley's death appearing in various party newspapers in June for at least a decade after his death in 1951; quotations from Chifley as frontispiece to conference reports.

their blandness and failure to pursue internal controversies. While there were occasional complaints, especially in Victoria in the 1960s, of suppression of articles expressing a different view to that of the State Executive, a more supportable criticism was of the papers' dullness. They reported decisions of party meetings but any reader wishing to discover the details of the process of reconciling conflict, had to go to the daily press or read between the lines with the aid of his own knowledge. The blood of battle could not appear often in publications designed to reinforce party brotherhood.  

Secondly, there is clear evidence that State Branch Executives were constructed to represent the various elements of the ALP coalition within the State. Let us admit at once that the extent of this practice varied, that the degree of representativeness was determined by the controllers of the Branch and that, at least in the three States we shall consider, the controlling group remained basically similar in orientation, if not in personnel, throughout the period from the Split to the late 1960s. Given these caveats, it is still possible to see a strategy which took account of divisions and sought united action in spite of them.

The strategy was expressed in a compromise ticket presented by the Executive to the electors at each Annual Conference.

The ticket will comprise representatives of the dominant trade unions, plus other members of the party who are of the same line of thought, and

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The newspapers looked at were: A.L.P. Journal (1960-69), A.L.P. News (1961-67), A.L.P. Newsletter (1962-63), all published by the NSW Branch, Fact (Victorian Branch, 1961-70), Herald (SA Branch, 1957-67), Labor (Victoria, 1953-61), New Age (Queensland Branch, 1961-64) and Western Sun (WA Branch, 1966-67). The journals of sections within the party, on the other hand, were much more opinionated - not surprisingly, since their purpose was to attack State Executives or promote sectional viewpoints. The most important were Labor Comment (anti-VCE), Scope (anti-Industrial Groups and defender of the VCE) and Socialist and Industrial Labor (anti-NSWCE and favouring militant unionism).
other prominent members, who, while not closely identified with the dominant union group, help to give the ticket a universality which will attract stray votes to it at the conference. In this fashion the State executive gives a rough proportional representation to a variety of elements within the party - although it may squeeze out altogether certain factions opposed to the dominant group.67

Miller, writing in 1953, described what seemed to him then a universal practice in the ALP. During our period the practice applied most clearly in New South Wales and South Australia. Numerous interviewees in both States have described the process of calculating the numbers required for majorities, of assessing the stance of possible members, of occasionally rejecting a union nominee because of his unacceptable outlook, of deciding that some unions were of such a size or some individuals of such reputation that they could not feasibly be left off the ticket, of including individuals of promising ability, of preserving the existing balance on the retirement or death of an Executive member by seeking another representative of similar views from the same union, of giving representation to organised minorities within the party, such as the Steering Committee in New South Wales, on the grounds that they represented a viewpoint in the party which had a right to be represented, of some attempt to give geographical representation to parts of the State.68

From the idea of the 'balanced' or 'representative' Executive other things followed. The controllers of the New South Wales Branch believed

68 NSW: J.L. Armitage, F.H. Campbell, W.R. Colbourne, J.D. Garland, interviews. See also: Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, April 1960 (letter from J.A. Mulvihill); D.C. Howitt, Secretary, Miscellaneous Workers' Union, NSW Branch, to Colbourne, 8 June 1964, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/380/969; Overacker, Australian Parties ..., 58; SMH, 17 June 1958, 5 June 1969 and other press comments on annual Executive elections. South Australia: C.R. Cameron, J.L. Cavanagh, J.F. Toohey, interviews. See also the references in note 70.
their Executive should keep the middle course between extremes of right and left, to act, in the words of one of them, like the stabilisers on an ocean liner, not impairing forward movement but providing any necessary slight deviations to either side. The South Australians hoped to identify all elements of the party with the Executive and with the decisions that emerged, so that all possible opposition could be thwarted at the source, since all parts of the coalition could see something of themselves in the decisions that bore the party label.

Representation of a wide range of sub-coalitions never meant loss of control for those most closely allied to the people who composed the Executive ticket, whether the latter were the party officers, as in New South Wales, the delegates of a group of unions, as in Victoria, or a handful of significant individuals, as in South Australia. Abdication of power, of course, was never the intention of those who made up the ticket.

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69 J.L. Armitage, F.H. Campbell, W.R. Colbourne, R.R. Downing, J.A. Mulvihill, interviews. See also: Bulletin, 10 January 1978 (Oliver); Mulvihill to Miss M.S. Johnston, United States Embassy, 14 April 1960, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/35/72/553; Observer, 23 July 1960 (Mulvihill).

70 C.R. Cameron, J.P. Toohey, G.T. Virgo, interviews. For discussions which emphasise the 'smoothness' of the internal politics of South Australian Labor and point to some of the factors that made it possible, including the 'card vote' (which gave voting strength at Annual Conventions to the larger trade unions), the skill of significant individuals and the close cooperation between industrial and political wings, see: Neal Blewett & Dean Jaensch, Playford to Dunstan: The Politics of Transition, Melbourne, 1971, 86-7; R. Hetherington & R.L. Reid, The South Australian Elections, 1959, Adelaide, 1962, 39-47; Nation, 18 November 1961; Overacker, Australian Parties ..., 74-80; Robert Smith, 'Organisation Party', Dissent, 16 (Summer 1966), 36-8.

71 For instance, Colbourne: 'There was a left wing and they were entitled to some representation on the Executive, although not, of course, to majority representation' (interview). Left or militant unions were a minority of affiliated unions in NSW - and in South Australia - so the ticket roughly reflected the balance of forces. But the minority argued, especially in NSW, that Executive decisions did not. Note a feature of the Federal interventions in the NSW and Victorian Branches in 1970-71: 'what might be termed the 'rhetoric of intervention' - greater rank and file participation, lessening of executive authority and greater representation for differing points of view within the party': Judith Walker, 'Restructuring the A.L.P. - NSW and Victoria', AQ, 43, 4 (December 1971), 33. Thus the new structures in both States incorporated proportional representation to try to ensure, by an organisational device, the sort of consensus decisions that the South Australians claimed were achieved there without such a device.
The controlling group retained the whip hand and recalcitrant members often disappeared from the Executive.\(^7^2\) If one were to paint a general picture of the control of the New South Wales and South Australian Branches in the period from the Split to 1970, one would depict, firstly, concentration of power in a State Executive majority drawn from a fairly constant set of unions and from individuals of broadly similar persuasion and status - or at least able to bury minor differences - but with gradual changes in personnel; secondly, limited influence from the rank and file but an opportunity for those in it who supported, or enjoyed access to members of the Executive majority, to have some influence; but, thirdly, the opportunity for other sub-coalitions within the party to have at least a voice on issues if not an influence on decisions. Even in Victoria, where it was possible, because of the decimation of the Branch in the Split, to form majorities on Conference and Executive from a group of unions of broadly similar outlook, without having to worry about minority representation, there was serious discussion on at least one occasion of including minority representatives on the ticket. Even without conscious representation of minorities in Victoria, those interviewed could distinguish shades of difference between members of a far from monolithic body.\(^7^3\)

\(^7^2\) The representativeness of the NSWCE declined gradually over a decade after about 1958: J.L. Armitage, interview; Australian, 4 June 1969; [Tom Burns], The New South Wales A.L.P. Report by the Federal President ...; J.D. Garland, A.T. Gietzelt, J.A. Mulvihill, interviews. See also the June and July issues of Socialist and Industrial Labor, the anti-NSWCE organ, for the years 1965-70, containing 'out-group' complaints.

\(^7^3\) W.W.C. Brown, J.N. Button, M.H. Cass, G. Crawford, interviews; Fact, 8 February 1965 (X. Connor); W.H. Hartley, S. Merrifield, G. Poyser, interviews. Brown, Branch President 1965-69, suggests that a reason for not taking stronger action against the VCE's internal critics who, he says, were often quite outrageous, was that he believed in the representation of all shades of opinion, 'though, of course, I wanted the Left view, the progressive view, to prevail. But you could count on the fingers of two hands those we actually expelled during those years' (interview). Incidentally, compare Brown's remark with Colbourne's in note 71 above.
Through balancing sub-coalitions, the concentration of power at State Executive level was at least marginally modified. Hearing the views of minorities at least gave a wider selection of information on which the controllers could base their decisions. What about at the Federal level, where equality of representation between States provided a built-in inducement towards reconciling conflicting interests? Further evidence of the political processes of Labor's coalition comes from the remarks of delegates to the Federal Executive and their political colleagues. We have seen earlier in this chapter that much of the importance of Oliver and Chamberlain on the Federal Executive rested on their skill as negotiators, on helping to achieve what Keeffe, their President, described as 'a lot of good compromises'.

Oliver's predecessor as New South Wales President and Federal delegate, F.H. Campbell, provides this description of the Executive's work:

There was always lobbying. You'd sit late into the evening, bogged down on something, and some of the log rollers would get to work after the adjournment and generally somebody convinced somebody else they ought to change their view to get a decision.

All members contributed to this process at some time, some with more skill than others. Toohey was a 'very diplomatic sort of a fellow', Chamberlain 'could sit down quietly without getting emotional and talk to people, point out the error of their ways'. When Chamberlain retired as Federal Secretary, his colleagues recalled 'many times when the quick and incisive mind of Joe Chamberlain put diversive thoughts into a compromise motion which the Executive or Conference had been able to carry'.

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74See above, pp.14-17.
75F.H. Campbell, interview. The importance of adjournments as times for 'log rolling' and of bars, bathrooms, bedrooms, Chinese cafes, corridors, street corners, strolls and other reasonably private locations as places for it, is a staple of such interviews: J.L. Armitage, W.W.C. Brown, C.R. Cameron, J.B. Keeffe, C.T. Oliver, J.B. Renshaw, interviews.
The nub of such remarks is not the skill of individuals but the process described.

You'd debate a question on the Federal Executive and you'd know the numbers were against you and you had no chance of getting what you wanted through. So you'd look for the second best, so you'd get some sort of a compromise, fifty per cent of what you wanted, sometimes more. Now when we got to that position I'd have a talk to Charlie Oliver or Jim Blackburn, who was there before him, possibly sometimes it was to Arthur Calwell or Nick McKenna ..., and I'd say, 'we're getting nowhere where we're going. What about if we change our course?' Well, we'd come to an agreement and I'd drop that into Joe's lap. Well, Joe would be wise enough to say, 'well, we can get a unanimous decision out of this'.

In similar vein, the Victorian, Brown:

The usual form was for a couple from each delegation, say, the President and the Secretary, to meet in someone's room until someone might break off, saying, 'No, we can't accept that' and the others would carry on to try to work something out. Or perhaps one might say, 'we can accept some of this, but not all of it'.

Thirdly, Brown's colleague, Hartley, after reading a foreign affairs resolution which had emerged from an Executive committee remarked to the interviewer, 'that's fairly close to the Victorian position at that time, except that we would have included a reference to American imperialism'. Finally, Oliver remembers agreeing with a fellow delegate at a crucial Conference that 'this resolution will do us'.

This evidence suggests that critical decisions at Federal Conferences and Executive meetings involved sub-coalitions seeking to match their goals against proposals emerging from a political process in which at least some representatives of each sub-coalition

77 W.R. Colbourne, interview. My emphasis.
78 W.W.C. Brown, interview. My emphasis.
79 W.H. Hartley, C.T. Oliver, interviews. My emphasis.
participated. The references to falling short of all that the sub-coalition sought, to 'accepting', to formulations being satisfactory rather than perfect, show that sub-coalitions have sets of goals, some more important than others. Some goals can remain unfulfilled by some decisions and the decisions still be satisfactory to the sub-coalition. Other goals will rarely if ever be allowed to slide. Where a decision can be formulated that infringes none of the latter, non-negotiable goals for any sub-coalition, the decision can be supported unanimously. All sub-coalitions can be said to have identified with it; to have formed one coalition on that issue. Where a decision is opposed, some sub-coalitions have withdrawn from the attempt to produce a result satisfactory to all sub-coalitions. Majority and minority sub-coalitions will persist down to the final vote which 'registers' their persistence.

All politics seeks to reconcile conflicting goals to produce decisions in the name of a collective. If the collective is a nation-state compromise decisions may be enforced by machinery wielded by the government elected by the majority. Disobedient citizens suffer the consequences. If dissatisfaction takes the form of departure from the state, the state is little affected. It is unlikely to disintegrate as the result of individual reactions to isolated decisions, since citizens place a higher value on remaining part of the collective than on one

80 Brown's remarks show that at a Conference of thirty-six delegates, spokesmen did most of the work. But at both Conferences and Executives the freedom of so-called lobbying sessions would be restricted by how many delegations felt themselves bound by State Branch instructions. Brown says that Victorian delegations always felt they had room to manoeuvre within the specific terms of State resolutions but K.E. Beazley recalls Chamberlain's view that if WA delegates could not get support for the exact terms of a binding State resolution they could support only the status quo (K.E. Beazley, W.W.C. Brown, interviews). Whether Chamberlain always followed this precept would have to be examined but, of course, if all six delegations were solid, either as a result of State instructions or Conference caucusing, only six views needed to be reconciled. This often occurred at Conferences, somewhat less often at Executive. On caucusing and binding, see above, pp. 10-11.
decision. In any case, they may have no real alternative to remaining. On the other hand, members of voluntary associations can leave them more easily or, remaining, can cause disruption with more impunity than they can as citizens. The voluntary association, relying for its existence on the voluntary contributions of its members, suffers more from disruption than does the state. Decisionmakers cannot afford to let compromise occur by chance. They seek it actively. Compromise decisions help 'keep the coalition together'.

HYPOTHESIS V: DECISIONMAKERS CONSCIOUSLY SEEK COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE GOALS OF SUB-COALITIONS

The search for compromise will be influenced by the factors we have summarised under the previous hypothesis: if some account is not taken of the views of all sub-coalitions the coalition may come apart. The desire to compromise and the urge to survive may work side by side. Both Campbell and Colbourne, for example, link descriptions of decisionmaking with the responsibility delegates felt 'to keep the ship afloat' or the 'trouble' that might follow an attempt to force all parts of the party to accept an unacceptable decision. Calwell believed a Federal Conference which failed to represent all viewpoints in the party had lost 'the very basis on which it makes progress' and could not produce consensus decisions which could command the loyalty of the whole party.

However, diverse views were important not only because of the internal consequences of neglecting them but because of the external forces which they represented. Each sub-coalition of the party had connections with the world outside it, and a view of that world, both of which influenced its approach to decisionmaking within the party. We

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81 These seem to me more plausible cement than Wilson's 'incentives' (see notes 8, 63, above).
have described the ALP as 'a permeable coalition'. Having discussed its nature as a coalition, let us turn to its permeability.

The ALP, the Political System and the Environment: Eight Hypotheses about 'External Pressures'

Political parties, as office-seeking organisations, have a closer relationship with the world outside than do most other organisations. Winning office in a democratic society depends on winning the votes of electors, almost all of whom are not party members, so, by definition, parties have to take account of forces outside their own boundaries. More than most organisations, they are 'not closed but permeable, subject to infiltration, influence, and control at all levels from other social structures and hierarchies'.

Let us examine in more detail the likely external influences on ALP decisionmakers. Labor rests on the twin bases of affiliated trade unions and local branches. Affiliated unions stand in a unique relationship to the ALP since they are both constituent parts of the party and pressure groups, trying to influence it. They were and are an institutionalised source of external influence on ALP decisions and they provided decisionmakers. Affiliated union items, provided they gained the support of the controllers of State Branches, themselves

83 Leiserson, Parties and Politics, 177.
84 'Trade unions', writes Rawson, 'are the essential features of Labor parties. The only satisfactory definition of a Labor party is a party to which trade unions belong' (D.W. Rawson, Labor Parties and Trade Unions, Melbourne, 1964, 3). Non-affiliated unions stand in the same relationship to the ALP as to other pressure groups. Individual members of affiliated unions are not renowned for joining local branches of the ALP. McNolty painted a fairly typical picture when he told the 1963 Conference of the Victorian Branch that only about 200 of the 9,000 members of his Sheetmetal Workers Union, Victorian Branch, were individual members of the ALP. (The union had eleven Conference delegates): Labor Comment, May 1969, 4. For an interesting and little-known American doctoral thesis on the party-union relationship, see Gerald Laverne Houseman, Trade Unions and the Australian Labor Party, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1976.
drawn heavily from unions, were far more likely to be adopted by the party than were those promoted by any other 'external' group. Party decisionmakers drawn from unions assumed other responsibilities and became subject to new influences but to some extent they remained dedicated to the interests of the members of their own union and of unionists generally. This dedication could be aroused by issues where union interests seemed at stake and even decisionmakers who lacked such commitment to union interests could not ignore the demands of unionists. **HYPOTHESIS VI: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO THE GOALS OF AFFILIATED TRADE UNIONS**

Trade unions, affiliated and non-affiliated, are pressure groups. With other pressure groups, such as business organisations, charitable associations and churches, they form part of a political system. Parties, the institutions of government, the media and the electorate are also parts of this system. Since, in a 'system' a change in one part leads to changes in others, the ALP, as one part of the Australian political system, will be influenced by the activities of other parts. But political systems exist within and are influenced by a wider world, generally called the 'environment', which comprises ecological, biological, psychological, social, cultural, demographic, economic and international systems. Before turning to the influences of other parts of the political system on ALP decisionmakers, we shall examine their environment.

Australia after the Second World War saw rapid social changes. High export prices, tariff protection, capital inflow, immigration, full employment and high wages contributed to growing prosperity, which the occasional economic slump could not long dampen. Increased prosperity

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was channeled towards material comfort and security - private expenditure on dwellings increased four-fold in the decade from 1948-49, on automobiles five-fold - and towards the education of children born in the early post war years. Out of depression and war Australia was producing a materialistic, well educated society, disproportionately young, living in new outer suburbs and making new types of demands on political parties. Outside Australia, prosperity was unevenly distributed and stability fleeting. Cold War tensions impinged on Australians as on the rest of the Western World. World economic movements, reflected in export price fluctuations and consequent changes in the material welfare of Australians were felt strongly; poverty and hunger overseas aroused rather less interest in Australian breasts and required less action from Australian politicians.

Some environmental influences will affect the party's decisions via the sub-coalitions we have discussed: politicians will respond to demographic changes, such as an increased proportion of children in the population, by seeking from the party a commitment to increased child care; trade unions seek protection for their members against the social change of automation; Catholics in the ALP seek state aid for a Church education system suffering the effect of a decline in recruitment to teaching orders. The goals of State Branches and of individual decisionmakers have always been broader than the winning of benefits for party sub-coalitions. Decisionmakers have always recognised that the interests of members of the party and many non-members will coincide. Granting benefits to Catholics, families or trade unionists will assist both ALP members and non-members. Meanwhile, electors respond to environmental changes by seeking different sorts of goods from parties -

schools rather than aged pensions, roads rather than housing, guns instead of butter. Many such influences gain easy access to party decisionmakers, are often sought out or promoted from within the party. Other influences infiltrate gradually, without being consciously promoted by anyone. The idea of 'full employment', for example, becomes accepted wisdom. Still other influences, like war, sudden depression, epidemic or flood, hardly need advertising, but impinge with as much force on Labor decisionmakers as on anyone else. In some cases, decisionmakers have a range of possible reactions; put another way, they can choose which goals of what external pressure groups they will adopt as their own. In other cases they may see very little room to manoeuvre. 87

HYPOTHESIS VII: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY CHANGES IN THE ENVIRONMENT

Other influences are less likely to be sought out but just as likely to be unavoidable. These are influences from other parts of the political system. Affiliated trade unions have been considered separately because of their unique position in relation to the Labor Party. Let us turn to some political organisations whose relationship with the party is more equivocal.

'From its earliest days the A.L.P. has been affected by two international forces of very different character and Australian significance - Marxism and Roman Catholicism'. 88 Marxism impinged

87 The interesting question is not why men act as they do but 'why men in certain circumstances must act the way they do' (Selznick, 'Foundations of the Theory of Organization', 31); 'Sometimes decision making proves to be no more than the painful process of discovering that there is only one thing to do or even "nothing to be done"' (Vickers, The Art of Judgement, 14).

88 L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, Camberwell, Vic., 1970, 205. See also: Oliver's way of putting the New South Wales - and his own - strategy of balance. 'For everyone that's dedicated to Moscow, there's one dedicated to the Vatican. So I go straight up the middle' (Bulletin, 10 January 1978); Rawson, Australia Votes, 5-7.
because affiliated unions included members of the Communist Party of Australia (which began to split into competing parties after 1963). Since the establishment of an Australian Communist Party in the early 1920s a series of Labor Conference decisions had proscribed cooperation with Communists. But Labor Party members and Communists (as well as members of other parties or of none) worked side by side in affiliated unions and some unions elected mixed ALP-Communist executives. Critics of Labor argued that thereby Communists exerted direct influence over Labor policies, since some affiliated union delegations to ALP Conferences, while ALP members, were chosen and controlled by Communist-dominated executives and were pledged to promote Communist policies. Other observers found little evidence of distinctively Communist policies in Labor platforms. There was often little difference in outlook between Communists and militant Labor people. While most ALP decisionmakers would have rejected the revolutionary methods espoused by the Communists, many would have agreed with J.F. Cairns that Labor and Communist goals

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often were very similar and they would often advocate the same industrial and social causes.  

HYPOTHESIS VIII: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH COMMUNISTS

Labor's relations with Roman Catholics had an even longer history than those with Communists. They involved relations with the Catholic rank and file, with the Catholic hierarchy and with Catholic political organisations. As late as 1958, J.D. Pringle could write that Labor 'has always been a party of which about one-fifth of its voters, one-quarter of its members and perhaps one-third to one-half of its leaders were Catholics, a party which, for this reason, enjoyed the sympathy, guidance and sometimes the support of the Catholic Hierarchy in Australia'. Catholics had been associated with Labor from the earliest days, partly because it lacked the anti-Catholic tendencies of some of its rivals, partly because it tended to support Irish independence and most of all because Labor's egalitarian philosophy and welfare policies appealed to people drawn predominantly from the working class.

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92 Cairns: 'Defending Liberties', 34; letter to editor, Age, 10 December 1964. One cause where ALP members associating with Communists drew criticism from inside and outside the party was the peace movement. Federal Labor bodies regularly warned members to beware of such organisations being used for Communist purposes but the critics were not satisfied: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 14, 45; 1963, 96; Anonymous, The Peace Movement, Melbourne, 1964; FX 26-28 October 1959, 24-27 June 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55; 125/57/58-9; J.P. Forrester, Fifteen Years of Peace Fronts, Sydney, 1964.


Accordingly, in the years 1946-54 about seventy per cent of Catholics said they would vote Labor at Federal elections, compared with about forty per cent of members of other churches.  

The Catholic hierarchy reflected the Labor allegiance of its followers and reinforced it in the hope that the ability to ensure a fairly solid Catholic Labor vote would extract from Labor Governments assistance to causes dear to Catholics, notably aid for the Catholic education system and for Catholic social welfare activities. The closeness of the relationship varied over time and according to the diocese and the incumbent. Cardinal Moran, Archbishop of Sydney 1884-1911, is described by Crisp as 'often a sympathetic friend of organised Labour', while in Melbourne, Archbishop Mannix (1917-63) enjoyed close relations with many Labor leaders. But it was in New South Wales under Archbishop, later Cardinal, Gilroy that Church-party relations are reputed to have been closest. Gilroy became Archbishop in 1940, a year before Labor's quarter century of government began. A large proportion of the Labor ministries during that period was Catholic and there was regular speculation about the closeness of the relationship between politicians and hierarchy. Gilroy himself was cautious about promoting Catholic claims and the Labor Governments seem to have found it a congenial relationship. Fear of arousing sectarianism inhibited both sides, although the Governments concerned were not renowned even for spectacular concessions to trade unions, let alone to Catholics. The state aid issue will be discussed in chapter 3.

consequence of moderation on both sides was that New South Wales Catholics fared similarly to their co-religionists in other States. Certainly there was no sign of New South Wales Labor rushing to grant state aid, the key Catholic goal, even after it became possible to do so under Labor policy between 1953 and 1957. 98

As well as direct contact with governments the Catholic hierarchy fostered various political or quasi-political organisations. 99 This type of link became most important in Victoria from the 1940s with the support and encouragement given by Mannix and most of his bishops to the National Catholic Rural Movement and the Catholic Social Studies Movement, led by B.A. Santamaria and known generally as 'the Movement' (replaced by the National Civic Council in 1957). One of the aims of the Movement came to be to purge the ALP of alleged Communist and pro-Communist influences by taking control of local branches and of the ALP Industrial Groups, which had been formed in the 1940s to fight Communism in affiliated unions. 100 The Movement's excesses in pursuit of this aim helped cause the Labor Split of 1955, which involved the abolition of the Industrial Groups and the departure from the party, especially in

98 Note the comments of Professor Patrick O'Farrell, interviewed by Malcolm Long,'Broadband', ABC Radio 2, 25 October 1977, 10.15 p.m. (after Gilroy's death): Gilroy had an 'exaggerated need for acceptance' for himself and for Catholics, feeling 'we should fit in'. He became a political figure (at the time of the Split) in spite of himself and 'the only single end, I think, he had in politics was to secure state aid', although he probably saw this as a religious rather than a political aim. See also: Graham Williams, Cardinal Sir Norman Gilroy, Sydney, 1971, 8-9.


Victoria, of many of those most amenable to the influences of political Catholicism. In New South Wales, the lack of sympathy for the Movement felt by Gilroy and his Coadjutor, Bishop Carroll, a firm Labor supporter, protected much of the old undemanding relationship between Church and Labor. In Victoria, the situation was rather different. Besides the continuing pressure of the Industrial Groups and the National Civic Council over the issue of ALP-Communist relations in the affiliated unions, Labor confronted Mannix and the majority of his episcopal colleagues, who supported the new Democratic Labor Party. Labor's relationship with Catholics came to turn on whether Catholics could vote Labor—because of its Communist connections—and remain good Catholics, whether they would vote Labor or DLP and how non-Catholic Labor people would treat Catholics and their political demands. Some Catholics might reject Labor but some Labor decisionmakers might abhor Catholics.

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101 W.R. Colbourne, interview; Nation, 24 October 1959; Ormonde, The Movement, 97–104. For a tongue-in-cheek or exasperated DLP view: Frank McManus, The Tumult and the Shouting, Adelaide, 1977, 131 ('Before every State election the Catholic Weekly [Sydney diocesan newspaper] would show on page 1 Joe Cahill with a Convent Reverend Mother, on page 3 Joe Cahill with the Cardinal, and on page 5 Joe Cahill with a bevy of priests').

102 One estimate, early in 1959, was that twelve out of thirty-four Australian bishops supported the DLP (Observer, 10 January 1959). This was based on the ten who had supported Mannix's intervention in the 1958 election (note 103) plus Mannix himself and his auxiliary, Fox. The ten included the bishops of Ballarat, Sale and Sandhurst in Victoria, but not Simonds, Coadjutor Archbishop of Melbourne, who dissociated himself from Mannix's intervention. The ten: Daily Telegraph (DT), 25 November 1958. Simonds and Knox, Mannix's successors, were much more neutral in politics.

103 Mannix tried to influence Catholics not to vote Labor at the 1958 election. Gilroy's spokesman denied that the Church could give such advice and Labor sought to salvage the Catholic vote: Anonymous [Brian Fitzpatrick], ALP, DLP: What Cardinal Gilroy Says—Facts for Catholic Voters; ALP (Victorian Branch), The Truth about the DLP and its False Claims (election pamphlets); Rawson, Australia Votes, 134-8. On divisions in the Catholic hierarchy at this time: Brennan, Dr. Mannix, 277-8, 283-8; Murray, The Split, 335-7; Observer, 25 June 1960.
Spann shows that the Catholic intended vote for Labor fell from nearly three-quarters before the Split to about half in 1955 and 1958. The slump, and the broadly corresponding shift to the DLP, was by no means uniform across States. While the DLP vote seemed to be predominantly Catholic, its composition varied, depending on the strength of DLP organisation, the proportion of Catholics in the population, the attitude of the hierarchy and the stance of the ALP in the State, especially its apparent attitude to Communism. Thus in the first few Federal elections after the Split, the DLP vote was highest in Victoria, lowest in New South Wales and fluctuated in the other States. The DLP's importance lay, however, in directing its preferences to assist the Liberal and Country parties retain government in Canberra. This practice probably lost the 1961 and 1969 Federal elections for Labor and the knowledge of its effects led to periodic attempts by some Labor decisionmakers to channel DLP preferences to the ALP or even to reunite the two parties. Nevertheless, the DLP's demands that Labor modify its policies helped prevent any

104 Charles A. McCoy, 'Australian Democratic Labor Party Support: An Analysis of Two States', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 3 (1965), 199-208; Malcolm Mackerras, Australian General Elections, Sydney, 1972, 220-1; Spann, 'The Catholic Vote in Australia', 115-16. Mackerras shows a range from 15.1 per cent (Victoria 1961) to 4.4 per cent (NSW 1963). The then Anti-Communist Labor Party polled 15.8 per cent (House) and 17.8 per cent (Senate) in Victoria in the 1955 Federal election (Murray, The Split, 279).

105 The most notable instances were during the 1958 Federal election campaign, when Evatt offered to resign as Federal Leader in return for DLP preferences, late in 1960, when much of the initiative seems to have come from the DLP, and in February 1965, when the prime mover was Labor's Deputy Senate Leader, P.J. Kennelly. It has been estimated that 81.5 per cent of all DLP preferences at Federal elections 1958-69 went to anti-Labor parties: P.L. Reynolds, The Democratic Labor Party, Milton, Qld, 1974, 49-50.
compromise. The chance of a reconciliation was already remote because a majority on Labor's Federal bodies, carrying bitter memories of the Split, exacerbated by the continuing activities of the Industrial Groups, opposed reconciliation on almost any terms. In summary, the electoral significance of DLP preferences and the attractions of the party for the ALP's traditional Catholic supporters gave it the potential to influence Labor decisionmakers, even against their will. We may postulate two hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS IX: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH CATHOLICS

HYPOTHESIS X: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY

A reasonably complete inventory of DLP demands would read: reduction of power of unions in the party, purging of Communist influence, support for secret ballots in union elections, rank and file ALP preselection, rejection of pro-Communist foreign, defence and disarmament policies, support for social welfare policies that favoured the family, less machine control of MPs, dropping the socialist objective and replacement of the current ALP Leader (whoever he was): Age, 12 December 1960, 12 August 1961; Courier-Mail (C-M), 18 December 1961; DT, 17 August 1965; Frank McManus, 'DLP Deal Terms', Dissent, 11 (Autumn 1964), 10-12; SMH, 25 November 1960. The terms actually stated varied considerably from time to time.

Critics inside and outside the ALP occasionally felt elements of the party were more interested in attacking the DLP than the Liberal and Country parties: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1967, 53 (Whitlam); Age, 11 May 1966 (Barry Jones, Victorian anti-VCE activist); CT, 13, 15 January 1965 (ALP Senator Cohen, QC, represents Liberal Senator Hannan in disputed returns case against DLP's McManus). The Victorian Branch Secretary, J. Tripovich, put the VCE's official attitude to the DLP as at 1960: 'We have declared this party right at the outset to be a Santamaria Party representing the viewpoint of a section of the Catholic Church and have treated it ... as just another Anti-Labor Party .... We have always favoured the attitude of forgetting about the D.L.P. and concentrating our attack where it should be logically centred in the interests of the workers, and that is against the Liberal Party' (Tripovich to Norm Kirkwood, Bendigo Federal Campaign Committee, 1 September 1960, Vic. Rec., 1960 Campaign Committees, Federal Municipal State).
The influence of both Communism and political Catholicism could be channeled into the party via the affiliations, through formal membership or informal 'networks', of ALP decisionmakers with Communists as members of unions or of 'peace committees', with Catholics as fellow worshippers and with DLP men as former members of the same party. Similar connections existed with other inhabitants of the world outside the party. (Some of these people may have been members of local branches but their importance derived from other attributes.) One such was Brian Fitzpatrick, historian and publicist, who had been expelled from the ALP in 1944, but tried through personal contacts and through his Labor News Letter, published from 1958 until his death in 1965, to point the party in a radical direction, especially in foreign and defence policy. Another sympathetic individual was J.W. Burton, once Evatt's private secretary, later Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, who influenced new directions in Labor's approach to foreign policy and socialism. E.L. Wheelwright and H.W. Arndt, economists, were party members who provided public and private advice on economic policy and general philosophy. The head of the party's advertising agency, S. Rubensohn, enjoyed a close relationship with leading party decisionmakers over two decades. Wyndham thanked a group of media and advertising people for assisting the party at the 1966 election. Finally, members of Fabian Societies, especially that in

108 (1) Arndt says he was rarely consulted on economic matters by Evatt or his successors, although he remembers an occasion 'when I was one of several whose ideas on the budget became part of Dr. Evatt's scissors-and-paste exercise in speechwriting': H.W. Arndt, 'Three Times 18: An Essay in Political Autobiography', Quadrant, 13, 3 (May-June 1969), 33. Earlier, Arndt had suggested a reworking of the socialist objective and had engaged in a controversy with Santamaria over the Movement. (2) J.W. (John) Burton, The Alternative, Sydney, 1954; Labour in Transition, Kingston, ACT, 1957; The Light Glows Brighter, Sydney, 1956; The Nature and Significance of Labor, Melbourne, 1958; DT,
Victoria, as well as contributors to the 'little magazines', Dissent, Outlook, Quadrant, Arena, Meanjin and Overland, tried to criticise constructively. They wrote not only for lay readers but also for ALP decisionmakers.

Whether decisionmakers heeded sympathetic advice depended as much on their attitude to the advisers as on the content of the messages. Evatt had a circle of literary and artistic friends, Chifley had enjoyed close connections with the wartime public service elite in Canberra and later Whitlam built up networks connecting him with Australia's educated strata. Generally, those decisionmakers who adopted an inclusive approach were more amenable to the opinions of people not necessarily hard-core Labor supporters. But Calwell more than once seemed to identify himself with that exclusivist strand of Labor thinking which suspected such advice would divorce the party from its central ideals and its union base. Those who advised the ALP to drop its socialist objective included, Calwell noted, 'one university

108 (continued)
professor, [Arndt] one doctor of philosophy [possibly Burton] and several other people who have been through universities .... We're not going to be taken over by the intellectuals or the pseudo-intellectuals any more than ... by the Communist Party, the D.L.P. or anyone else who does not belong to the movement'. Like that of other inhabitants of the world outside the party the advice of sympathetic individuals of expertise and judgment was unlikely to be accepted without question. Still, a hypothesis can be constructed.

HYPOTHESIS XI: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH 'FRIENDLY ADVISERS'

109 SMH, 13 June 1960. Calwell was speaking to the NSW Branch of the party and some commentators suggested the attack was a pose and for internal consumption. Later, Calwell denied he was anti-intellectual but insisted 'there is some feeling that university men - as distinct from university-trained men - sometimes prefer theories to practical policies, and do not always understand the need for compromise so often required in the day-to-day political and industrial battle' (Arthur Calwell, Labor's Role in Modern Society, Melbourne, 1963, 61). For discussion: Arthur Burns, 'Intellectuals and the A.L.P.', Meanjin Quarterly, 24 (September 1965), 347-8; J.F. Cairns, 'Intellectuals and the A.L.P.', Meanjin Quarterly, 25 (March 1966), 112-14; Miriam Dixson, 'Intellectuals and the ALP: The Case for ALP Radicalism', Mayer, ed., Australian Politics: A Second Reader, 374-9; Brian Fitzpatrick, 'The Intelligentsia and the Labor Movement', Arena, 5 (Spring 1964), 13-15; James Jupp, 'The Political Situation in Australia', Twentieth Century, 15 (Winter 1961), 332; Race Mathews, 'Fabians and the A.L.P.', Fabian Newsletter, August-September 1964, 1-2. Some of these commentators admitted intellectuals were often not willing to engage in routine political work, while ever ready to criticise. Note also the remarks of one of Calwell's Caucus colleagues after attending a Balwyn, Vic., discussion group on the Common Market: '[T]here were fifteen people in attendance, mostly of the type which could be classified as intellectuals. I would think that most of them were not members of the Australian Labor Party. However a good discussion ensued and I feel that the night was not completely wasted. I would hesitate, however, to suggest that a great deal, if anything, was achieved from the point of view of Party organization. I suggested to the Group in a friendly way that I have never been enamoured of discussion groups as in my opinion they seldom shine out brightly when it comes to real Party activity' (F. Courtnay, MP, to Wyndham, 18 September 1962, Vic. Rec., Parliamentarians A to D 1962. My emphasis).
Labor decisionmakers also enjoyed a complex relationship with the press, radio and television. First, the media (especially the metropolitan daily press) were the most frequent critics of Labor's decisions and of how it made them and the quickest to provide advice on how the party should change its 'image' to improve its appeal. Many Labor decisionmakers resented what they saw as biased reporting and interference in the party's affairs.

The press, by and large, is controlled by the conservative elements in the community, and therefore one would not expect them to look kindly upon a Party with an avowed socialistic objective which, in their opinion, contained a threat to their well-being ....

The press is only concerned with the establishment of policy on the part of the Australian Labor Party which will fit the conservative thinking and interests of the people it represents. Exclusivists like Chamberlain might be expected to be hostile to the diluting influences of the press but even they relied on it to give a version of public opinion, to convey news of the outside world, the demands of pressure groups and details of events overseas. The danger, which some Labor decisionmakers recognised, was that their view of the world would be excessively coloured by the biases of the media. This applied as much to their view of their own party. No matter how staunch the resistance, a party which lacks significant support in the media is in danger of hearing and heeding only its critics. Thirdly, 

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nevertheless, Labor decisionmakers used the media to communicate with the electors and to promote their own version of activities inside the party. Calwell's alliance with the Sydney Morning Herald during the 1961 election and his use of a journalist, Maxwell Newton, as a speech writer is well documented. It is equally clear from the detailed press reports of supposedly private ALP meetings that sub-coalitions and individuals 'leaked' assiduously to journalists. 'All the reputations in commentary in Australian journalism over the years', one Labor politician complained, 'have been made out of the Labour Party'. Alan Reid of the Daily Telegraph, the journalist who most exasperated Labor decisionmakers, could say: 'As a press-man, I can find out virtually anything I like about the Labor Party'. In the complex relationship between Labor and the press, the raw material for a story that one decisionmaker saw as 'anti-Labor' often came from the lips of a colleague or rival.

**HYPOTHESIS XII: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MEDIA**

The rhetoric of Labor's exclusivists included a warning against becoming an 'alternative Liberal Party' by slavish imitation of government policies. But any party in opposition, as Labor was

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112 Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 204-6; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 16; Laurie Oakes, Whittam PM, Sydney, 1973, 95.
114 ALP (SA Branch), Official Report, State Convention, 1967 (Presidential address, M.H. Nicholls, MP); Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 261; Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 55.
between 1949 and 1972, often has to fight on issues not of its own choosing and to react to government initiatives over which it has no control. Frequently laying aside their chagrin at such decisions, opposition parties may have to manoeuvre on fairly narrow ground. Furthermore, a government long in office, winning election after election, may come to be accepted by the electors as the 'natural' government, making an Opposition's task much more difficult.

An entrenched government also can mould public opinion in its favour. For instance, in an era of Cold War and anti-Communism, a reservoir of opinion could be channeled against a domestic opponent whose affiliated unions included members of the Communist Party. Similarly, a government which guided prosperity rather than took fundamental initiatives could paint Labor election promises as unnecessary and extravagant. 'In most countries a Government is on trial at elections', wrote Kim Beazley in 1966. 'At least from the time of Evatt's assumption of leadership and onwards (except in 1961) it has been the special feature of Australia that the Government is never on trial, the Opposition is'.

HYPOTHESIS XIII: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE FEDERAL LIBERAL-COUNTRY PARTY GOVERNMENT

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Beazley, 'Labor and Foreign Policy', 132. Note also: 'Without doubt in many people's minds there is a stigma attached to the ALP. By voting for "Mr Menzies" they feel they are doing the "right" thing & in this one instance they can rub shoulders with the great. If they vote ALP they always appear as though they have to justify their action. Undoubtedly the tag of Communism attached so unfairly to us by so many has contributed to the production of this stigma' (L.J. Romey, [Report on Corio electorate, 1963], Vic. Rec., Hon. R.W.Holt, Federal Election Survey Committee 1964). On the use of the Communist issue by the Liberals and on the issue in general, see: Reid, The Gorton Experiment, 131-55; John Lewis Warhurst, The 'Communist Bogey': Communism as an Election Issue in Australian Federal Politics, 1949 to 1964, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Flinders University of South Australia, 1977. For a good summary of the advantages of office see: Laurie Oakes & David Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, Melbourne, 1973, 318.
We have looked at a number of ways in which the ALP coalition may be permeated and have produced eight hypotheses. Not all influences will be evident in every case since, for example, Communist officials in affiliated unions may not be interested in party policy on child care, nor the press in the size of the Federal Executive, nor intellectuals in worker control of industry. Some decisions may be made without much external influence at all; in others the ALP may seem like an empty shell blown this way and that by competing forces. Often the party may seem so subject to permeation as to reduce the concept of a boundary between it and the world outside to the most formal of analytical distinctions, especially because there are multiple points of access to the Labor coalition. Those rejected at one gate can knock on the next. Every influence will confront resistance of some sort, for there are people in the party who always suspect those not unequivocally pro-Labor and who will always warn that Labor decisions and the methods of reaching them should not 'be altered capriciously or because people opposed to the Party have said [they] should be, but only after very careful, objective and detailed consideration'.

The Literature of Decisionmaking in Permeable Coalitions

In this chapter we have tried to establish who made critical decisions for the ALP at the Federal level in the years 1955 to 1972; we have depicted the party as a coalition comprising sub-coalitions whose conflicting goals need to be reconciled, and we have examined the possible external influences on its critical decisions. Thirteen hypotheses have been constructed for testing in later chapters. Although we began by

placing political parties within a sub-class of organisations - voluntary associations - we have gone only rarely beyond data drawn from the ALP. Our hypotheses have been drawn from a static picture of the ALP, its structure, personnel and decision 'style', combined with some basic organisation and functionalist theory. Is it possible to use, in a more detailed way, some of the literature on decisionmaking in organisations of the type of the ALP as we have described it, that is, 'permeable coalitions', to construct more hypotheses? Can what has been written about other organisations, some of them not voluntary associations, appropriately be applied to political parties?

Although political parties appear in standard lists of formal organisations there is very little evidence that their workings have been studied. A possible reason for this lack of interest has been suggested by Neil McDonald. Formal organisation theory requires the student to look for 'formality, definition, explicitness, efficiency, determinateness of authority, and like qualities'. If most parties are as affected as the ALP seems to have been by associational voluntariness and diffusion of power between sub-coalitions, by the personal histories and informal connections of office holders and by the


influences of the world outside, it is not surprising that those who stress the bureaucratic qualities of authority, hierarchy and predictability steer away from parties as objects of study. Not only are parties often loosely connected and apparently disorganised; they also provide examples of only rudimentary bureaucracies, often lacking task specialisation, clearly defined responsibilities or an identifiable 'pyramid' of inferiors and superiors. The ALP during the period of our interest had a bureaucracy of about fifty full-time officers, supplemented by volunteers or by elected politicians, both part-time. Responsibilities overlapped, politicians did the work of party organisers, party officials wrote policies, press statements and publicity came as much from Parliament House as from party headquarters. Even within the extra-Parliamentary organisation the jobs which within a business firm (a favourite of the formal organisation theorists) might be performed by marketing, publicity, sales (equivalent to electoral organising), accounting and personnel (equivalent to membership recruitment) departments, fell to a handful of employees able to turn their hands to a variety of tasks.

Nevertheless, the characteristics of political parties - and of the ALP in particular - which make them less amenable to the formal organisation theorists may make more relevant the work of those who start by emphasising informal connections, associational voluntariness and the coalitional nature of organisations. These writers go on to elaborate how such organisations will make decisions bearing the label of the organisation.

Cyert and March saw some similarity between phenomena in the business firms that they studied and those in hospitals, a voluntary charitable association and the British National Health Service. Further, regarding political organisations, while differences in their
traditions, operating procedures and external relations will 'probably lead to important differences in the detailed process' of decisionmaking in them, '[o]ur reading of the literature on political institutions suggests that the concepts needed for a theory of decision making by political organizations are not strikingly different from those needed in dealing with the firm'.119 Much of Cyert and March's book is about the process of resolving goal conflicts within a business firm to produce a collective goal. A similar process occurs in parties. Samuel Eldersveld, whose work on party activists in the Detroit area starts from the idea of a party as a coalition, specifically recognises the usefulness of earlier work by Cyert and March, while warning of the danger of uncritical use of a model developed in another context.

The chief value of the model is that it begins to operationalize insights about the structural properties of parties which have remained vague and unresearchable for many years. If clarified and systematically utilized, it is a construct which will prove useful in explaining internal organizational relationships as well as leadership perspectives.120

Another concept that seems at first glance useful for our purposes is 'partisan mutual adjustment', where decisionmakers formulate decisions that will at least partly achieve the goals of each decisionmaker. Labor men like Brown, Colbourne and Hartley, described seeking 'some sort of a compromise, fifty per cent of what you wanted, sometimes more' and the theorist Lindblom, who developed the concept, explicitly recognised the relevance of mutual adjustment, earlier simply called 'bargaining', to political

parties. 'In Britain most bargaining over policy takes place among an essentially unified group of leaders of a single party operating within a very broad context of agreement.' In all democratic systems 'a party platform ... is worked out in partisan mutual adjustment among interest-group leaders and party leaders'.

The work of March, Lindblom and others has been used by students of public policy, of administrative behaviour and of the politics of bureaucracies. Nevertheless:

It might be advantageous to apply to the study of parties the active body of knowledge about large-scale organizations which has been developed in recent years .... Particularly disappointing has been the failure to produce some sort of 'breakthrough' in the development of middle-range theory concerning parties, including the function of public policy analysis.

Whether knowledge of other organisations assists understanding the internal politics of one political party is a question this thesis will try to answer. Since the knowledge relates to how such organisations make decisions its usefulness can only be judged by studies of how decisions were made in the ALP during our period. The next three chapters of this thesis will attempt to make such a judgment. These chapters will also test the thirteen hypotheses constructed in this chapter. They are reproduced below.

There are five hypotheses regarding the types of 'internal strivings' likely to influence critical decisions.

HYPOTHESIS I: Decisionmakers on Federal Conference and Executive will pursue the goals of the controllers of State Branches whom they represent.

HYPOTHESIS II: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their own personal histories and relationships.

HYPOTHESIS III: Decisionmakers will seek different balances between 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' approaches to the electorate.

HYPOTHESIS IV: Decisionmakers will try to keep the coalition together.

HYPOTHESIS V: Decisionmakers consciously seek compromise between the goals of sub-coalitions.

There are eight hypotheses regarding the types of 'external pressures' which could influence critical decisions.

HYPOTHESIS VI: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to the goals of affiliated trade unions.

HYPOTHESIS VII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by changes in the environment.

HYPOTHESIS VIII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with Communists.

HYPOTHESIS IX: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with Catholics.

HYPOTHESIS X: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with the Democratic Labor Party.

HYPOTHESIS XI: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with 'friendly advisers'.

HYPOTHESIS XII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to and relationships with the media.

HYPOTHESIS XIII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by the actions of the Federal Liberal-Country Party Government.
Chapter 2: Unity Tickets 1955-1961

While critical decisions are those which show evidence of internal striving and external pressure, they do not necessarily occupy much space in documents bearing the organisation's name - the platform of a political party, the articles of a firm or the constitution of a nation-state. Nor does their making take as much time as does routine 'administrative' decisionmaking. But critical decisions shape the basic lines of the 'face' the organisation turns both to its members and the rest of the world. A study of how an organisation makes critical decisions should tell us much about the organisation itself.

Decisions, or series of them, are usually labelled according to their content, which is ascertained from the wording of the resolution or other document which emerges bearing the organisation's name. Thus, a political party might make decisions able to be labelled 'internal organisation', 'party leadership' and 'election strategy' or 'foreign affairs', 'social welfare' and 'education' or 'preference distribution in elections', 'relations with Indonesia', 'pensions' and 'secondary scholarships'. One series of decisions by the ALP during our period of interest related to unity tickets.

The phenomenon of unity tickets arose from the organic relationship of the ALP with its affiliated unions. While such unions were an essential feature of the party, no party rule required that all individual members of affiliated unions be individual members of the party, let alone supporters of it. Affiliated unions, therefore, contained members and supporters of other parties or of none, as well as of the ALP. This case study examines how the party coped with the jumbling together in ALP unions of people of diverse political allegiances.
The Nature and Incidence of Unity Tickets

Unity tickets in union elections may be defined as how-to-vote advice or other material wherein members of the ALP are coupled with non-members so that they do not oppose each other for individual positions.\(^1\) While some unity tickets involved ALP members collaborating with DLP or non-party candidates, most involved ALP-Communist collaboration. Although they were not new in the 1950s unity tickets proliferated in that decade, first, because of the tactics and strategy of Australian Communists and, secondly, because of the Labor Party's internal struggles culminating in the Split of 1955.

Communist influence in Australian trade unions reached its peak about 1945, but it was dissipated over the next few years by excessive use of strikes and other forms of confrontation.\(^2\) The Communist leadership then turned to the concept of the 'united front', which was an agreement on specific issues of struggle with those whom on most general issues, we are in disagreement with. It is an agreement whereby workers supporting the Communist Party and the Labour Party, who politically are opposed, agree on common action for the defence of the interests of the working class.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Cf. the definition in the resolution of the 1965 Federal Conference, which seems to be the only official and explicit Federal definition: '(2) A Unity Ticket shall mean a How-to-Vote guide or other election material in an election for Trade Union office where A.L.P. members appear with members of another Political Party for the purpose of securing a common result' (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 35). The definition followed argument over whether a newspaper advertisement came within the ban on unity tickets.


The immediate aim of this policy was to regain Communist union positions lost to the ALP Industrial Groups in the years 1950-52.\(^4\) ALP allies emerged as the Groupers turned to unions where other ALP members, rather than Communists, held office. The consequent ALP resentment provided fertile ground for the united front advocates. The new moderation of the Communist union officials and their qualities as unionists were also important in gaining allies, while on the non-Communist side increased militancy in 1952-53 facilitated convergence. Many ALP union leaders allied with Communists in preference to Groupers and the alliance was expressed in a 'unity ticket'.\(^5\)

In which unions did unity tickets occur? One anti-unity ticket publication found documentary proof of unity tickets in the following unions: Australian Railways Union (New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia), Watersiders (Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia), Meatworkers (Queensland and Victoria), Tramways (Victoria), Amalgamated Engineering Union, Ironworkers (New South Wales), Postal Workers (New South Wales) and Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen (New South Wales) and party records indicate this list is not exhaustive.\(^6\) Since this chapter is not a study of unity tickets but of ALP decisionmaking, the question does not require a definite answer, although it is clear that tickets occurred in a minority of affiliated unions. Once the unity


\(^5\)As Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, 142-3, points out, for the Communists to control a union they required the support of the moderate majority. There were occasional allegations during our period that Communists always won the choice positions in unions, especially that of Secretary, sometimes by duping ALP candidates and voters. The allegations were based on the reports of a former Communist member of the Waterside Workers' Federation. See: Bernard Barrett, 'Unity Tickets: How Good?', Outlook, 3, 3 (May 1959), 16.

\(^6\)John Williams, Collaboration with Communism, Melbourne, 1960? 10-12.
ticket ban was established tickets only became an issue for the party when someone (often a defeated candidate) laid a charge or when the ticket's existence came to light in some other way. They were likely to appear when union factions had to combine, since they were unsure of winning elections on their own, or because a ticket containing members of a number of factions had other advantages, for example, including potential contacts with other organisations, such as the ALP in the case of Communist-dominated union executives.

There were a variety of factional patterns evident in our period. Continuing battles against Grouper executives in the New South Wales ARU and Ironworkers led to unity tickets there, while in the Victorian ARU the Communist J.J. Brown was re-elected Secretary on a unity ticket in 1955 to break the short-lived Grouper control of the branch. The ARU Industrial Group continued to harass the unity executive and run tickets against it, while some ALP members tried to organise tickets of ALP members and supporters. Three-way battles became common and allegations of unity tickets accompanied every biennial Victorian ARU election from 1959 at least until 1969, with the same names involved again and again. In the Postal Workers multi-sided battles occurred in New South Wales, Victoria and Federally, as the descendants of the formerly dominant Communist faction tried to return to office on unity tickets against the new administration, originally Grouper but later bitterly divided by personal animosity and disputes over union administration. In a number of unions, rival teams claimed they were 'genuine Labor' or 'genuine ALP' candidates, whether or not they had tacit or semi-official blessing from the party. In the Watersiders, elections after 1961 were complicated by the consequences of the support by some ALP politicians for C.H. Fitzgibbon in an election for Federal Secretary of the union. A Fitzgibbon-supporting faction became a strong
contestant against unity ticket executives and Industrial Groupers in Sydney and Melbourne. In other unions, for instance, the New South Wales Electrical Trades and Builders Laborers, factions were partly based on disputes over whether Federal or State rules should apply to the unions. Generally, while the most ubiquitous bases of faction were attitudes to the Groupers, the significant point was the variety of possible bases and combinations of bases – political differences, differences over industrial claims, over union administration, between 'ins' and 'outs' and personality differences. The crux of the problem of unity tickets was the many bases of union factionalism beside political party membership.

1955-1959
BANNING UNITY TICKETS 1955-1957

Like much of the post Split history of the ALP, its attitudes towards unity tickets can be traced to the resolutions of the Hobart Federal Conference in March 1955, though the roots went much further back. The resolution withdrawing party recognition from the Industrial Groups included the paragraph:

We are of the opinion that any form of industrial organisation designed to combat Communist activity in the unions should be a matter for the sole determination of the members of the union concerned.7

In this resolution and at other stages of the Conference, the Conference reaffirmed the party's traditional opposition to Communism.8 But the Split and the removal of recognition from the Groups in fact provided an opportunity for Communists and their allies in the militant and anti-

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Grouper sections of the ALP to make further gains in the unions. This development was acceptable to most of the new controllers of the ALP in Victoria, who represented its more militant elements there, but not to the New South Wales Executive, still with a Grouper element and now engaged in a struggle against supporters of the Federal Executive for control of the Branch and its affiliated unions.

The differing situations in the two largest State Branches produced differing interpretations of the Hobart resolution. The Victorian Central Executive (VCE) declared that it had no authority 'to direct members of the ALP in activities within the confines of Union membership' except that the principles in previous Conference decisions repudiating the Communist Party, prohibiting officers of affiliated unions from opposing endorsed ALP candidates at public elections and prohibiting opposition to union affiliation with the ALP should have full effect. The resolution concluded:

2. That direction on any matters other than those in the preceding clause constitutes undue interference in the domestic rights of Trade Unionists in the internal affairs of their Unions, and is therefore in conflict with the Federal Conference [i.e. Hobart] policy, and

3. That this declaration shall provide a basis of relationship between the ALP and affiliated Unions and/or their members.

The resolution, said J. Tripovich, State Secretary of the Victorian Branch, restored the union-party relationship 'in keeping with the true

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9 Robert Murray, The Split, Melbourne, 1972, 255, 331; Playford, Doctrinal and Strategic Problems ..., 273-9. It is over-dramatic to say, as Murray does, that the result 'was to remove the effective barrier to communist penetration of the Trade Union Movement'—the roll-back of Grouper power had begun at least two years earlier as a result of Communist tactical revision and the Groupers' own excesses.

10 Both unity tickets and charges concerning them became weapons in this struggle and the most notable cases were in the Ironworkers and the Operative Painters (SMH, 3–5 September, 4 October, 18, 21 November, 7, 14 December 1955; 10 January, 11, 12 April 1956). The bases for charges were various NSW Branch resolutions.
spirit of Labor', that is, of non-interference by the party in the affairs of the union movement.¹¹

The Victorian resolution left the way often for Communist-ALP alliances against the Industrial Groups. (The Groups continued to operate without ALP endorsement but became allied with what was to become the Democratic Labor Party.) The New South Wales Executive, however, declared that the Hobart resolution 'means that members of the Australian Labor Party shall not collaborate with members of the Communist Party or any other Party in any way which would assist such political Parties to establish or strengthen their influence in the Unions'. ALP members knowingly included on unity tickets against other ALP members would be expelled upon being found guilty.¹²

From the beginning then, the two largest Branches had different attitudes to unity tickets. The Hobart resolution contained two strands: affirmation of the ALP's long-standing opposition to Communism, on the one hand, and, on the other, rejection of interference of the type engaged in by the Groups. The New South Wales Branch, while accepting that the Groups' days were over, produced an interpretation which continued to pursue the goal of an anti-Communist Labor Party with such rhetorical vigour that its critics could claim the Branch supported other types of interference against Communists in unions. To the Victorians, it was more important to defeat Groupers than to win points for 'bashing the Communists'.

¹¹Circular G13, Tripovich to all Affiliates and MPs, 10 October 1955, Vic. Rec., Circulars. Extra Copies 1955. The formulation came from an amendment moved by A.E. Monk, President, Australian Council of Trade Unions, seconded by Senator Kennelly and accepted by the movers, J. Wood, Assistant Secretary, and McNolty, so it had wide support across the shades of opinion in the Executive. However, it was opposed by J. Cain, State Parliamentary Leader: VCE 7 October 1955, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G 8738.

The two interpretations came before the September 1956 meeting of the ALP Federal Executive which resolved

that any member of the Labor Party who agrees to join with members of the Communist Party and/or any other Party opposed to Labor on any How-to-Vote ticket commits an offence against this Party. We therefore direct State Branches to protect the policy of the Party by taking action against any member who so offends.

This decision was close to the New South Wales Branch interpretation, shorn of its rhetoric. But only H.O. Davis of Victoria and Toohey and Sexton of South Australia spoke against it and the motion passed on the voices. At the Brisbane Federal Conference, where the Executive decision was confirmed, South Australia and Victoria again fought doggedly to prevent what they saw as interference in the affairs of unions. C.R. Cameron of South Australia moved an amendment opposing the new policy and a lengthy and heated debate followed with New South Wales, Tasmanian and Queensland delegates supporting the policy and four Victorians and one South Australian opposing it. Cameron's amendment was eventually lost by ten votes to twenty-five and another amendment, which sought to appoint a committee to draft a clarifying resolution was defeated nine to twenty-five.

The decision was formally a clarification of past decisions about Labor's relations with Communists. It was based on 'an interpretation of the decision of the 1948 Federal Conference' proscribing cooperation with the Communist Party or its auxiliaries. Moreover, compared with the New South Wales formulation, the Federal resolution was in the lowest possible key and narrowly defined. The full recommendation

15 Delegates F.H. Campbell (NSW) and J.P. Toohey (SA) both stressed the decision was primarily a clarification of past policies of dissociation from Communists (interviews).
commenced specifically: 'Does a member of the Labor Party commit an
offence against the Party if he permits his name to appear on a How-to-
Vote ticket with a member of the Communist Party or any other Party
opposed to the Labor Party?' Then, by leaving enforcement to the State
Branches (mainly because the Federal party lacked the machinery) the
Executive left the way open for State Branch attitudes to unity tickets
to influence their implementation of the Federal decision. The
resolution also contained at least three opportunities for the exercise
of judicial discretion: it referred to 'any member ... who agrees' to
appearing on a unity ticket; then, membership of the ALP man's allies
in a rival political party had to be proven and, thirdly, the
determination of guilt might be influenced by extraneous factors such
as where accuser and accused stood in the State Branch factional structure.

Already there is some evidence to support the hypotheses set up in
the first chapter. The decision approximated the goals of the controllers
of the New South Wales Branch, yet its enforcement provisions allowed the
controllers of the other Branches to pursue their differing goals if they
wished (HYPOTHESIS I). The decision tried to steer between a tradition
of opposition to Communism (HYPOTHESIS VIII) and another tradition that
the party should not interfere in the affairs of its affiliated unions,
part of the party-union relationship (HYPOTHESIS VI), which was expressed
by the Victorians and South Australians. Cognisant of the bitterness of
the Split, which had affected each personality (HYPOTHESIS II), and of
the need to avoid dissension in some States over an unpopular decision

16 The resolution concluded: 'We therefore direct State Branches to
protect the policy of the Party by taking action against any member who
My emphasis). Chamberlain, Federal President, said the Federal
Executive would 'expect' expulsion in proven cases (SMH, 12 September
1956).
(HYPOTHESIS IV), the Federal bodies sought a compromise (HYPOTHESIS V) which reiterated and clarified past decisions about relations with Communists while providing room for manoeuvre in enforcement. Clearly, the party could not expel unionists without a trial or an admission of guilt - the New South Wales Branch resolution itself had referred to numbers who 'knowingly', appeared on unity tickets - but the decision faced the probability of varying standards of proof from State to State.

The influences summarised in these hypotheses affected Labor's approach to the unity ticket problem over the three years after the decision of September 1956. External pressure can also be detected at this early stage. One reason for caution in 1956 had been that the most strident voices against unity tickets came from the expelled Labor members, rapidly transforming themselves into the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), from their allies in the Industrial Groups and the Movement, the associations which carried the message of political Catholicism, from the more extreme anti-Communist Liberal and Country Party Parliamentarians and, increasingly, from the metropolitan press (HYPOTHESES X, IX, XIII and XII). Those who began to move in the direction suggested by these external influences were members of Labor's Federal Caucus, who feared loss of votes if Labor did not cleave more determinedly to the principle of anti-Communism rather than to that of non-interference in unions (HYPOTHESIS III). The Cold War seemed to make anti-Communism electorally advisable (HYPOTHESIS VII).

The Parliamentary representatives of those who were to become the DLP helped ensure that the first important unity ticket after the Labor Split did not go unnoticed. The election, in the Victorian Branch of the Australian Railways Union in July 1955, saw the Communist J.J. Brown win back the Secretary's position after a period of Industrial Group control. The representatives of the Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist) - as they were then known - believed the new VCE, with Evatt's
support, was using unity tickets to benefit Communists who threatened industrial peace and Australia's security.\(^\text{17}\) Liberals took up the refrain: Prime Minister R.G. Menzies alleged Labor was helping to promote a resurgence of Communist control in the unions, while his External Affairs Minister, R.G. Casey, linked Evatt's alleged support for neutralist or even pro-Communist foreign policies with his opposition at home to the Industrial Groups and his alleged support for unity tickets.\(^\text{18}\)

Labor politicians at first did not respond to such taunts. The party wanted and expected its members in unions to support ALP members who stood for union positions, said Evatt in mid 1955, 'but we cannot ensure that that shall be done'. The party would not 'interfere in any way with the complete right of self-government of trade-unionists to elect officers in the way in which it is most advantageous to trade unionism'. Senator Kennelly disagreed with the Federal Executive decision, saying he had no right to interfere in the elections of a union, 'a body with which I have no connection'. Years later, Kennelly remembered: 'Of course, Communists are a nuisance but you don't have to sink all your

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\(^\text{17}\) *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) (CPD) H. of R., 6, 24 May 1955, 991-3 (S.M. Keon), 997-9 (J.M. Mullens); 9 June 1955, 1583-6 (W.M. Bourke), 1593-6 (Keon). The burden of the argument is clear in the terms of the motions: 'The renewed drive of the Communist party to recapture control of key trade unions following the attempted disbandment of and attacks upon Australian Labour party industrial groups' (985). 'The alliance between the Communist party and the Evatt-Stout-Cain Labour party in running a joint unity ticket ... to re-establish control of the railways industry by the Communist party under the leadership of J.J. Brown' (1578).

\(^\text{18}\) CPD H. of R., 14, 11 April 1957, 832 (Casey); SMH, 27 July 1955. (Menzies. See also the editorial, for an early example of post Split press criticism of unity tickets). All except Senators Cole and McManus of the ALP (Anti-Communist) representatives lost their seats at the Federal elections late in 1955. Cole, McManus and Government members continued to nag at the ALP on the unity ticket question, especially by drawing attention to unity ticket elections as they occurred: CPD H. of R., 15, 1 May 1957, 975 (W. Aston); 8 May 1957, 1206 (W.C. Wentworth); (Senate) S.8, 29 May 1956, 1042 (D. Henty), 1047-8 (J. Gorton); S.11, 16 October 1957, 624 (Cole); S.13, 20 August 1958, 131-2 (Cole); 16 September 1958, 331-6 (McManus).
principles to beat them. Anyway, after 1955, after the Groupers had split the party we weren't going to bend over backwards to please them'.

By the late 1950s many of the same politicians not only supported the ban but favoured its vigorous enforcement, mainly to prevent the loss of the votes of those Australians who feared that Labor was aligned too closely with Communism. Kennelly himself was a member of a committee which wrote early in 1961:

The Unity Ticket issue is a factor of considerable significance in a political election and the view was put [by those the committee interviewed] that either an explanation that the public regarded as satisfactory would have to be found or an effective ban would have to be imposed if support lost was to be regained.

The apparent electoral effect of unity tickets was first noticed in Victoria, the State where the tickets had become most common. In the campaign for the State election of June 1958, 'DLP canvassers revealed a greater degree of rank-and-file dissatisfaction in the A.L.P. - over such issues as unity tickets - than expected'. Far from convincing the Victorians that the policy should be enforced more strongly, DLP activities helped persuade the Branch's Federal delegates, Stout and Brebner, to move that the matter be referred to the 1959 Federal Conference ' for the purpose of reviewing the 1957 decision'. Instead,

19 CPD H. of R., 6, 9 June 1955, 1588-9 (Evatt); S.9, 17 October 1956, 668 (Kennelly); P.J. Kennelly, interview; SMH, 27 July 1955 (Evatt). Kennelly had seconded the original VCE interpretation (note 11 above).
20 Second Report of the National Organising Committee to Federal Executive, 30 June 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F13. The other members of the committee were Senators Dittmer (Queensland) and Ormonde (NSW).
21 SMH, 10 June 1958. For examples of DLP campaign references to unity tickets: Age, 13, 16 May 1958. For alleged unity tickets in the Australian Railways Union and the Waterside Workers' Federation, on which the VCE took no action: Age, 6, 7, 22, 25 June, 4, 5, 9 July 1957, 24, 28 June, 14 July 1958; SMH, 6 June 1957.
the Executive carried an amendment, moved by Colbourne, drawing attention to the existing policy. The Executive further resolved, against Victorian opposition, to recommend that, in view of the assaults by the DLP, Queensland Labor Party (a child of the Split in that State and later merged in the DLP) and Communist Party on the traditional relationship between the ALP and the unions, Federal Conference should 'consider the practicability of taking appropriate steps - with adequate safeguards - to ensure that the influence of the Australian Labor Party is maintained and expanded in the Trade Union movement'. While the resolution suggested no practical steps for achieving this goal its sentiments seemed opposed to the idea that the ALP should not interfere in union affairs, an idea which the Victorians at least still supported strongly, although they differed over its implementation.

Evatt realised that, had the DLP preferences at the Victorian election been directed to Labor rather than the Liberals, Labor could

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22 FX 30 June-2 July 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55. The second resolution was moved by the Queensland delegates, J. Schmella and J. Bukowski, and reflected a Queensland Central Executive decision of 22 May which blamed the Communists and QLP for unity tickets while reaffirming the Federal prohibition (Queensland Branch Circular 13/58, 30 May 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/1957 Correspondence [misfiled]). The Executive discussion followed receipt from all States of requested letters outlining the practice in their States regarding union ballots and their attitude thereto.

23 The VCE officers (VCEO) had discussed attacks on unity tickets, especially in News Weekly, the organ of the National Civic Council, and suggestions for answering the allegations. The officers recommended a strong statement reaffirming the independence of unions. After a series of inconclusive meetings, including a threat by one member, F. Courtnay, to walk out because of the contents of this recommendation (which was apparently intended as defiance of Federal policy) the matter was dropped. Stout and Brebner, as stated above, tried instead to have the policy reconsidered at Federal Conference (VCEO 22 April, VCE 23 April, VCEO 6 May, VCE 9 May 1958, Vic. Rec., Minutes June 1957 to June 1958). That the VCE took eight months to reply to the Federal request referred to in note 22 (made in October 1957) is further evidence of its unease (Schmella to Tripovich, 29 May 1958; Tripovich to Schmella, 6 June 1958, Vic. Rec., Central Executive, Federal Executive 1958).
well have won. Realising that his opponents hoped to make Labor's relations with Communism an issue at the Federal elections later in the year, Evatt sought stronger action on unity tickets. He gave the Federal Executive meeting of August 1958 a list of at least eight names for expulsion and pleaded for a decisive gesture. The delegates instead settled for a lengthy manifesto which, first, attacked Menzies for introducing the Communist bogey to distract attention from his economic mismanagement, secondly, noted that State Branches had enforced the policy when guilt was established but not when ALP members 'have been victims of Communist tactics which have resulted in their names being placed upon so-called Unity Tickets without their consent', and, thirdly, reaffirmed the unity ticket ban but called upon all ALP members to preserve party integrity against attacks by anti-Labor forces.

This resolution was seen by some observers as a victory for the Victorians and a rebuff for Evatt but it was actually a careful compromise which reflected the multiple forces acting upon the Executive at the time. First, Evatt, as Parliamentary Leader, wanted drastic action against unity tickets before the Federal election. The Executive, on the other hand, aware of rumours that militant affiliated unions in Queensland and Victoria would react unfavourably to such action, saw the impending election rather as a reason to avoid action which would divide the party. The Federal Caucus was divided on the issue, the

24FX 11-14 August 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55; SMH, 14-16 August 1958. Unity tickets were not on the agenda of the meeting, but the President (Chamberlain) introduced the discussion by referring to Liberal attacks in Federal Parliament the previous night. See CPD H. of R., 20, 13-14 August 1958, 343-60, an earlier radio broadcast by Menzies (SMH, 17 July 1958) and a press series on the issue (SMH, 31 July, 2, 4 August 1958) as indications of interest from what Labor men liked to see as the anti-Labor alliance. The SMH articles bore the by-line 'a special correspondent', usually an indication that the writer was other than normal reporting or editorial staff.
majority, led by Evatt and his Deputy A.A. Calwell, supporting some stronger action and the minority, led by Cameron and E.J. Ward, opposed to it, along with the Victorian and South Australian Executives, although the Victorian body was divided, with some politicians seeking action and union officials resisting it.\textsuperscript{25} Even the New South Wales Executive, the one most opposed to unity tickets on principle, was taking a judicious rather than draconian attitude to enforcement.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25}DT, 1 October 1958; VCE 5, 12, 19 September, VCEO 7 October 1958, Vic. Rec., Minutes 24 June 1958 to 22 April 1959. Brebner and Holt, the latter a Federal MP, were most outspoken against interference in unions but P.J. Clarey, also a Federal politician, sought to uphold the August decision. Again, the discussion was inconclusive, but Holt restated the defence in Parliament, accentuating the party tradition of non-interference rather than the unity ticket ban and describing the ALP's Catholic critics as 'clerical fascists' (CPD H. of R., 20, 14, 21 August 1958, 354-6, 652-7).

\textsuperscript{26}NSW Branch officers saw enforcement of the unity ticket policy as part of their strategy of steering a middle course between extremes of right and left. They claimed to be even-handed in their treatment of those who appeared on unity tickets with the DLP and with Communists: FX 11-14 August 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55 (Campbell); J.A. Mulvihill, interview; Mulvihill to W.R. Smirl, Secretary, Randwick West Branch, 12 August 1958, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/210/521; Observer, 23 July, 20 August 1960 (Mulvihill). In other letters, Mulvihill described the process followed: no pre-publicity of charges to avoid prejudicing the case, ensuring the punishment (suspension or expulsion) fitted the degree of guilt, avoiding 'smears', avoiding assisting one union faction against another and exonerating where 'we were satisfied that the people involved were actually victims of circumstances beyond their control': Mulvihill to W.J. McCarthy, Secretary, Armidale Branch, 10 October 1961; Mulvihill to E. Ramsay, President, Balgownie Branch, 25 November 1964, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/165/405; 175/432. The result was the expulsion of approximately thirty ALP members for unity tickets in NSW in the ten years to 1965: Colbourne to I. Swords, Secretary, Caringbah Branch, 9 November 1965; Expelled for Unity tickets 11 November 1963, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/240/603/175-7; 469/1213; Executive Reports to Annual Conferences during this period. While most of those expelled were for ALP-Communist tickets, this was because there were many more of these than ALP-DLP tickets. But representatives of militant unions still complained to Chamberlain in September 1958, of the harshness of enforcement and one militant union official remembers 'quite determined application' of the policy, even in cases where people had not consented to their names appearing: J.D. Garland, interview; SMH, 23 September 1958; Socialist and Industrial Labor, October 1958, 3. Critics on the other side alleged the NSW Executive was too lenient and the policy half-heartedly applied: DT, 1 October 1958; Observer, 25 June 1960; SMH, 5 January 1960 (Santamaria).
Secondly, the essence of the approach to unity tickets, in view of the conflicting attitudes within the party, was its declaratory nature. In words at least, Labor was firmly against unity tickets. Words alone did not prevent action contrary to the ban but enforcement risked re-opening divisions in the party, especially since many of the sternest critics of unity tickets were Labor's bitter opponents. 'We reject with the contempt it deserves', ran the Federal Executive resolution, 'the suggestion that we should take action as a consequence of the politically motivated and distorted statements made by members of the Liberal and other Parties'. In Victoria, and to a lesser extent in other States, harsh action would have been seen as a betrayal of those who still fought the Industrial Groups, the enemies of 1955. In such circumstances the best approach was to re-affirm and embellish the declaration of 1956-57 and leave enforcement to the States. The Executive's most noticeable concession to Evatt's plea was to remind the Branches, in view of 'the deliberate campaign that is being organised to damage electorally the Australian Labor Party ... to guard the decision of Conference ... with the utmost vigilance' or the Executive would take 'appropriate Federal action' where the States did not.  

The viability of the policy, then, depended on allowing the Branches flexibility in enforcement. This is reflected in Chamberlain's approach to unity tickets. He had supported the policy from the beginning. He had opposed Communists in the unions in Western Australia and argued that only Labor could remove the social and economic conditions in which Communism thrived.  

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27 This was the part of the decision upon which Evatt laid particular emphasis: CPD H. of R., 20, 14 August 1958, 449.

secretary, Lyla Elliott, but rejected interference in unions 'as was the case during the days of the industrial groups'. After the Split, because of the witch-hunting activities of the Groupers and the DLP, he was careful, she added, to ensure that a unity ticket defendant had consented to his name appearing. The reference to the external pressures and the stress on consent were representative of the attitudes of most of Labor's decisionmakers in the late 1950s. But Miss Elliott's statement that Chamberlain was opposed both to unity tickets and to interference in unions encapsulates the party's dilemma. While it was easy enough to set these two principles side by side, the problem was to strike a satisfactory balance between them. Flexibility of enforcement provided the means.

CHAMBERLAIN'S RESIGNATION AND THE FEDERAL CONFERENCE APRIL-MAY 1959

The year 1959 saw an attempt to achieve a rather different balance. Labor's Federal election prospects in 1958 seemed to have been affected adversely by unity tickets and the apparent lack of enforcement of the ban. The DLP publicised the issue stridently and on the eve of the poll Archbishop Mannix of Melbourne advised his followers that no good Catholic could vote Labor because of its associations with Communists.

29 L. Elliott to the author, 14 August 1978.
Whether or not unity tickets were an important contributor to Labor's disappointing performance the result probably confirmed Evatt's resolve to do something about them. But Evatt was not in a strong position within the party. Challenged for the Parliamentary Leadership by E.J. Ward, Evatt won by forty-six votes to thirty-two, but some observers felt the result was because of the lack of an acceptable successor rather than warm support for the incumbent. Ward and his supporters were disturbed by, among other things, Evatt's arguments in the press with the DLP and the Catholic hierarchy, by press advertisements appealing to DLP rank and file voters to support Labor and especially by Evatt's offer to resign as Leader in return for DLP preferences in the election. Those who had fought the Movement and the Industrial Groups in 1955 looked unkindly at Evatt's actions. Chamberlain's first reaction was to say that the issue was closed as soon as the DLP replied to it with unacceptable conditions. (These included an effective ban on unity tickets and reintroduction of ALP endorsement of candidates in union elections as had been the practice with the Industrial Groups.) The Evatt offer, while sensational, had little effect and some commentators expressed doubts as to its sincerity. But given that the DLP had frequently made clear the nature of its differences with the ALP Evatt's closest allies in the party, including Chamberlain, must have

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31 At the election on 22 November, Labor's House of Representatives vote fell by 1.8 per cent and it lost two seats (Murray, The Split, 279, 348-9).


harboured serious doubts of his judgment and his loyalty to the spirit of Hobart, 1955.34

If this was so, the decision in April 1959 of Evatt and a majority of his Caucus colleagues (the vote was forty-one to twenty-three) to support rises in Parliamentary salaries provided further fuel. Such increases always provoked some hostility in a party inclined to disparage its politicians. The difference on this occasion was that Chamberlain resigned as Federal President.

The details of Chamberlain's reasons, the reactions to his resignation and the manoeuvres surrounding his return to the position concern us only in relation to the decision on unity tickets taken at the Federal Conference of May 1959.35 Evatt, Calwell and the Senate Leader, N. McKenna, asked the Federal Executive and then the Conference

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34 Age, 24, 25 October 1958; DT, 23, 29 October 1958; Murray, The Split, 346-7. These differences, over ALP-Communist links, secret ballots in unions, the role of the Industrial Groups and foreign and defence policy, would have been raised in any reconciliation negotiations. Chamberlain and others feared Labor would be asked to modify what they regarded as vital principles.

35 Chamberlain saw his resignation as a matter of principle, a protest against Caucus supporting a salary increase so soon after a Federal election at which the increase had not been mentioned and when people on fixed incomes, especially pensioners, were living close to poverty. He consulted few, if any, colleagues before resigning. There is a suggestion in remarks like the following (in his National Library interview) that his views about Parliamentarians (see chapter 1 above) affected his decision. 'I suppose I was making a comparison between people who were working hard for a living and what they were getting and what they had to do, as against that of a Parliamentarian.' Apart from the possible connection with unity ticket policy, to be discussed in a moment, speculation touched on Chamberlain's alleged desires for a Federal seat, even the Leadership, for the full-time Federal Secretarship or to cement a temporarily weak position in the WA Branch or even on the Federal Executive. There is very little evidence for any of these latter suggested reasons for his resignation: Advertiser (Adelaide), 25 April 1959; Age, 21 April 1959; C.R. Cameron, F.H. Campbell, F.E. Chamberlain, interviews; F.E. Chamberlain, Interview transcript, Oral History Project, Manuscripts Section, National Library, 1:2/35-6, 3:1/1-3; Nation, 25 April, 23 May 1959; SMH, 17, 21, 22 April, 21 July 1959; J.M. Wheeldon, interview.
itself to excise what Evatt called the 'running sore' of unity tickets.  

A South Australian Conference delegate then replied by moving:

That the Federal Conference be asked to declare that the ALP is fundamentally opposed to any interference in the fundamental right of a trade unionist to nominate for any position in his Union or to vote and work for the person whom he considers most suited for any industrial position to be filled in his particular Union, providing that the name of the ALP is not used in such a way as to create political unity with any other political party.

This formulation was almost identical to an item from Victoria, was seconded by Brebner and can be seen as the culmination of an approach developed by the VCE by 1959. At least as early as June 1957, the Victorian Secretary, Tripovich, said that any ALP member who knowingly used the party's name on a union election ticket which included Communists would automatically forfeit his party membership. 'Labor would not tolerate any Union members who used the name of Labor to win a union election to a post to which perhaps his personal qualifications did not entitle him.' Twice in 1958 Brebner tried unsuccessfully to have the VCE adopt resolutions merely prohibiting ALP members from using their membership to win votes at union elections where they stood in alliance with non-ALP members. Such an approach clearly recognised that unity tickets were permissible provided they did not implicate the ALP.

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36 The details in the following paragraphs are drawn from: Age, 11-16 May 1959; ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 4-8, 46-8; DT, 6-9, 11, 15, 16 May 1959; FX 5-8, 10, 15 May 1959, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55; SMH, 6-9, 11, 16 May 1959; Sun-Herald, 10 May 1959.

37 My emphasis.

38 Age, 6, 7 June 1957; attachment to Tripovich to Schmella, 22 August 1957, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/1957 Correspondence. Tripovich pointed out: 'Labor does not advocate support for, or itself support, Communists or members of any other political party opposed to Labor' (my emphasis) and to Schmella he insisted there was no collusion between ALP and non-ALP members on a political basis in unions to the detriment of the ALP.
It was avoided at first by Brebner's more cautious colleagues, who would have seen it as too close to defiance of Federal policy. However, by early 1960, one observer concluded that the 'official' Victorian definition of a unity ticket required the party affiliations of both ALP and Communist candidates to be stated. 'Where individual members of the ALP stand as individuals, without party designation, they are not involving the ALP in a unity ticket, the argument goes.'

There were two main reasons behind the development of the Victorian 'interpretation' of the Federal resolution. First, laying stress on the use of the ALP name enabled the Federal policy to be widened into a

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39 VCE 23 April, 19 September 1958, Vic. Rec., Minutes June 1957 to June 1958, 24 June 1958 to 22 April 1959. The first motion was lost although discussion on unity tickets continued (notes 23 and 25 above) and the second lapsed for want of a seconder. Tripovich, too, was somewhat more decisive than the Executive as a whole. When sent finally, the long-delayed letter referred to in note 23 concluded: 'The Victorian Branch has adopted the attitude that Australian Labor Party members should be given every freedom to engage fully in Union activities, but any member who adopts or espouses political policy in opposition to the Australian Labor Party will not be allowed to continue his membership of this Party' (Tripovich to Schmella, 13 June 1958, Vic. Rec., Central Executive, Federal Executive, 1958. My emphasis). This letter does not seem to have been discussed by the VCE. Secondly, Tripovich had drafted a reply to questions from Redcliffe, Queensland, branch, about elections in the WWF. The draft included a paragraph that the VCE had no need to act because there was 'no evidence of any association between members of this Party and any other political party ... to the detriment of the Australian Labor Party'. Following the inconclusive discussions referred to in note 25 these sentences were not included in the letter (Schmella to Tripovich, 30 September 1958; Tripovich to Schmella, 9 October 1958; draft letter to be submitted to E.O's Tuesday, 7 October 1958, Vic. Rec., Accounts, Equal Pay, Insurance, Interstate Branches, Industrial Printing, 1958).

40 Creighton Burns, Parties and People, Melbourne, 1961, 39, n.43. Evatt himself once had taken just this position, before the Groups and other pressures had converted him: CPD H. of R., 6, 9 June 1955, 1588. Sections of the NSW Branch also supported it: R.B. Bowman, Secretary, Reid F.E.C. to Colbourne, 16 February 1959, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/308/774; SMH, 24 March 1958 (report of southern suburbs regional conference). Reid had recently become the seat of T. Uren, a supporter of the Steering Committee (anti-NSWCE) which included militant unions.
statement prohibiting interference in unions by the ALP and especially by the Industrial Groups, who continued to use labels like 'ALP', 'ALP Group', 'ALP Industrial Group', 'Labour' or 'Labor' long after the 1955 Federal Conference had withdrawn recognition from the Groups. In October 1955, before the unity ticket ban, Tripovich had contrasted the new VCE's scrupulous prohibition of the use of the party name with the practice in the Grouper era. This approach continued after the unity ticket ban, which was seen as subsidiary to the more important principle of non-interference. Secondly, the VCE was trying to solve the problem of the 'split personality' of ALP members in unions. By joining the party as an individual the unionist made himself subject to its rules, including the ones on unity tickets, but he remained a member of a union in whose affairs the party traditionally did not interfere. The New South Wales Branch tried to solve the problem simply by describing the unity ticket policy and its enforcement as a matter between the individual member and the party rather than the union and the party. The Victorians instead, by making use of the ALP name the criterion for 'political collusion', put the onus on individuals to forfeit their rights as unionists to freedom from interference. Very few unionists in the past had used the ALP name in this way, so the passage of the new formulation effectively would have nullified the unity ticket ban.

Chamberlain left his Presidential chair at the Federal Conference to support the South Australia-Victoria resolution. Previously a supporter,

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41 Labor, October 1955, 1. See also the VCE decision of that month interpreting the Hobart resolution (above note 11) and the letter in note 38 which has such tickets attached as well as an anti-Group ticket which shows no party affiliation and, says Tripovich, 'in our minds ... is not what is claimed a unity ticket'.

if not a vocal one, of the 1956-57 decision, he now argued that the new formulation was within the spirit of the Hobart Conference decision and warned of the dangers of returning to the 'bad old days' of political interference in unions in the style of the Groups. Why did Chamberlain shift his ground in this way? One explanation was that he needed Victorian support to regain the Presidency, after his resignation had encountered an unfavourable reaction among Labor decisionmakers. There is certainly evidence of a search for the right balance between attitudes to Chamberlain and to the Caucus. But this argument has the flaws, first, that dissatisfaction with Caucus was so widespread in the party that an attempt to punish Chamberlain by denying him re-election would have been unpopular and, secondly, that it is hard to see who, other than Chamberlain, the Victorians could have supported for the Presidency. Campbell, who was mentioned as a candidate, would hardly have been acceptable to them, given the Victorian attitude to New South Wales. In any case, the VCE had been so hostile to the Caucus action that Chamberlain would have received Victorian support in any contest, regardless of his attitude to unity tickets.

A more plausible explanation is that Chamberlain resented Evatt's search for strong enforcement of the unity ticket policy. The decision

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43 The Federal Executive requested Chamberlain to reconsider his resignation and urged him to withdraw it but defeated an amendment that he be requested to withdraw it and an election be deferred until after his decision. The Conference then produced four formulations of a resolution before adopting (by twenty votes to sixteen) one containing a mild reproof for Caucus, satisfaction at the withdrawal of Chamberlain's resignation and the opinion that his resignation had represented rank and file attitudes. At the Executive meeting after the Conference, Chamberlain was re-elected unopposed.

44 The Victorian amendment at Conference (eventually lost 8-28) followed closely a VCE resolution of 17 April, the day after Chamberlain resigned, but hostile discussions had commenced a fortnight earlier, before the Caucus decided to support the recommended rises (VCE 3, 13, 14, 17 April 1959, VCEO 17 April 1959, Vic. Rec., Minutes 24 June to 22 April 1959).
could be accepted by the parts of Labor's coalition as long as enforcement remained flexible. But Evatt's actions allied him with external forces seeking to destroy one of Labor's principles, non-interference in unions. Evatt had already sought DLP preferences and rank and file DLP support, wooed the Bishops and produced a domestic policy closely akin to that of the DLP. Further dilution might follow and, in the process, the unity of Labor's coalition might be threatened by union dissatisfaction over harsh enforcement. Chamberlain had worked since 1955 to maintain this unity and may have been dismayed at the prospect of its destruction. Yet, years later, Chamberlain remembered the incident in personal rather than party terms. He described it as 'my quarrel with Dr. Evatt' and recalled telling his Leader that he (Chamberlain) could not 'back down'. He related the events as an example of how he had applied principle in politics and he insisted they had nothing to do with unity ticket policy. Others interviewed by the author also failed to remember any connection between Chamberlain's resignation and his attitude to unity tickets. But his change on unity tickets could have been connected with his attitude to Evatt. His resignation and his support for the South Australian motion both arose from his belief that Evatt was betraying Labor principles by conniving at a salary rise and by persecuting his own members at the behest of anti-Labor outsiders.

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45 DT, 20 November 1958 describes Evatt's election policy in this light.

46 F.E. Chamberlain, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcript, 1: 2/35-6, 3:1/1-3. Chamberlain seems to have suffered some anguish from his resignation: 'And this upset me more than anything, you know, because I couldn't back down'. Age, 11 May 1959 also saw the issue as a personal one between Evatt and Chamberlain.

47 At the Victorian Branch Conference a month later, Chamberlain complained of the effects of steady anti-Labor propaganda on 'men and women who can justifiably claim to be loyal workers of the Labor Movement' (Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 34). Did he mean Evatt?
Despite Chamberlain's advocacy the South Australian motion failed. A Queensland delegate, J. Egerton, seconded by Oliver, produced an amendment which, in effect, combined the Hobart 1955 and the Executive-Brisbane 1956-57 resolutions and included all the major existing attitudes to unity tickets except the change sought in the defeated motion. The first paragraph of the amendment set out the tradition of non-interference in the affairs of unions in much the same terms as the first part of the original motion. The second and third paragraphs, however, restated the resolution of June 1958, referring to the interference in unions by other parties and declaring the responsibility of all ALP members 'to ensure that the Trade Unions remain in control of Executives sympathetic to and supporting A.L.P. policy'. The final paragraphs reaffirmed 'previous decisions of the Hobart and Brisbane Conferences in respect to Unity Tickets', directed that offenders be brought before State Executives and, 'failing a satisfactory explanation, dealt with in accordance with the Rules'.

By reaffirming in one motion both the unity ticket ban and that 'there should be no interference with the internal affairs of the Trade Unions', including the freedom to nominate for union office, the Federal Conference implied that two apparently contradictory principles could be balanced by the States determining, in each case, whether a 'satisfactory explanation' — in most cases, the defence of non-consent — had been given. Further, since the resolution incorporated a range of sentiments about Labor's relations with unions, State Branches could seize upon whichever parts they chose in order to support their own preferences. Unity tickets, condemned by the fourth paragraph, could be justified by the third, since most Labor people, in Victoria at least, would have regarded Communists as more 'sympathetic' to Labor than were Groupers. The third paragraph, however, also seemed to justify use of the ALP name
in union elections - or how would electors know which candidates were 'sympathetic to and supporting A.L.P. policy'? Yet, at what point occurred interference in unions, proscribed by the first paragraph? These were questions for each State Branch to answer for itself.

The Egerton-Oliver amendment was adopted, put as the motion and carried by twenty votes to sixteen. The importance attached to the vote was indicated in that a division was requested and the names recorded, an extremely rare occurrence at Federal Conferences of the period. Those supporting the Egerton-Oliver formulation comprised six each from New South Wales, Tasmania and Queensland and two from Western Australia, while the minority comprised four from Western Australia, six from Victoria and six from South Australia. Given that the original motion had the support of South Australia and Victoria and that two Western Australians who opposed the Egerton amendment (J. Wheeldon and K. Dowding) spoke in favour of the motion, it seems likely that a vote on the original motion would have been lost by the same margin, four votes, as the eventual vote was won. If so, we can see the 1959 Conference as the closest the party came to ending the 1956-57 ban. The new motion from South Australia and Victoria was not merely a better statement of the 'spirit of Hobart'. Though presented as a modification of the existing policy, the motion, if passed, would have destroyed this policy, since those few ALP unity ticketers who previously had included their party affiliation on tickets would certainly have omitted it as the price of freedom from harassment by the party. The crucial shift was

48 Standing Order no.11, in operation at the Conference, stated: 'Any member not satisfied with the result of voting, as declared from the Chair, may demand a division; but names of members voting in such division shall not be minuted unless demanded by at least five members rising in their places, when the division shall be recorded in the Official Report' (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 90). At four Federal Conferences, 1955-61, there were only three divisions with names minuted, all of them at the 1959 Conference, the other two being on the parliamentary salaries issue.
in the West Australian delegation, which provided the four extra votes against the ban. Although Chamberlain, as President, lacked a vote at Conference, it was alleged by at least one commentator that he had hand-picked the Branch delegation to support his position on Parliamentary salaries if not on the unity tickets issue itself. If this was so, the attempt failed, for two delegates, A. Moir and H. May, both State members of Parliament, supported Egerton and Oliver, rather than Chamberlain. Even if the West Australian delegation had all supported the South Australia-Victoria motion, the vote would have been deadlocked eighteen all.49 An end to the unity ticket ban in 1959 would still have required 'peeling off' at least one Queensland, Tasmanian or New South Welsh delegate, all of whose Branches would have looked unkindly on such a defection.

Let us return to our initial set of hypotheses in the light of the events just described. The catalyst for the 1959 Conference decision was the deteriorating relationship between Chamberlain and Evatt. To that extent, there is support here for our HYPOTHESIS II. Other hypotheses also seem relevant. The 1959 decision synthesised decisions going back to at least 1948 concerning Labor's relations with unions and with Communists. These relationships were always at the root of the unity ticket problem (HYPOTHESES VI, VIII). Since attempts to reconcile these two relationships could take different forms in different States, the resolution, like its predecessors, was one in which all parts of Labor's coalition could find some satisfaction, if not in the actual words then in the opportunity provided for enforcement according to the views of

49 See Nation, 23 May 1959 for the comment about Western Australia. Dowding, Wheeldon and E. Ellis, were all new delegates in 1959 and all supported Chamberlain's position, as did C. Jamieson, State Branch President, who had been a delegate previously. Both Moir and May had been delegates previously.
each State Branch. The resolution was 'both-ways worded', wrote the journalist, Brian Fitzpatrick, who supported Labor but was quick to point to its paradoxes. 'Paraphrased: the unions' business is their own — except that it is the A.L.P.'s.' A less sympathetic observer, Alan Reid, concluded that the majority of the Federal Executive opposed unity tickets but was not prepared to bring the issue to a head. On the eve of the Conference debate, Reid predicted that the Victorians would 'agree to a motion affirming the present policy provided it is agreed tacitly that it is not enforced'. While his prediction of the Victorian vote was wrong his characterisation of the decision was reasonably accurate, especially as it applied to Victoria. The resolution and its enforcement were both designed to maintain unity between sub-coalitions based on State Branches whose goals differed according to the nature of their controlling groups and the differing industrial and political situations they faced (HYPOTHESES I, IV). The ingredients of the final resolution depended upon the balance of votes between the States at the Federal Conference. For the moment, those prevailed who placed more store on anti-Communism than on non-interference in unions but even they did not yet see any need to change the terms of the compromise, whereby the minority States, especially Victoria, were allowed some leeway in

50 Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, July 1959, 4–6; DT, 8, 15 May 1959. See also SMH, 16, 19 May 1959. For an earlier comment, similar to Reid's: Age, 26 January 1959: 'Federal executive did its electoral duty and banned unity tickets, but it was a ban applied only for the benefit of the public. It certainly was not intended to apply in Victoria and the Victorian A.L.P. knew it. The alternative would have been a wider party breach than ever'. While probably understating the ideological opposition to unity tickets of some on the Executive, notably the NSW delegates, Colbourne and Campbell, the comment is generally valid, especially in its context, a discussion of the ALP as a collection of State parties only theoretically subject to Federal authority. Campbell's opposition to unity tickets allowed him to support the 1959 decision (and solve the personality-splitting problem) thus: 'If a member of the A.L.P. wants to run on a unity ticket it is his business as far as Union membership is concerned, but it is our business as far as A.L.P. membership is concerned': ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1959 Annual Conference, 2.
enforcement (HYPOTHESES I, V). This situation would continue as long as the Federal party could resist the pressure from some of its own politicians seeking votes from sections of the community conditioned to anti-Communism (HYPOTHESES III, VII, VIII). The most vocal publicisers of unity tickets remained the Groups, the DLP, the Movement and the Liberals. Whether they were genuine supporters of an effective ban may be doubted, since this would have deprived them of an effective stick with which to beat Labor, but their clamour reached the ears of voters whom Labor was trying to attract (HYPOTHESES III, IX, X, XIII).51

Finally, the media reported unity tickets and their consequences both to ALP decisionmakers and the voters. Even if voters did not read the occasional editorials on the subject, which usually attacked Labor for giving comfort to Communists or for equivocation or both, politicians knew that they read and heard about the problem itself (HYPOTHESIS XII).52

1959-1961
ENFORCEMENT IN VICTORIA

After the 1959 decision one observer wrote that 'the closeness of the vote - 20 to 16 - and the apparent bitterness with which the issue was met convinced me that condemnation of the Labor-Movement compact was no mere reaction to the loss of a few votes. The Liberals, too, gained from keeping the unity ticket issue alive but also complained that unity ticket control of unions led to increased industrial unrest. On the validity of this last connection, see: Phillip R. Bentley, 'Communist Trade Union Leadership and Strike Incidence - with Specific Reference to the Waterside Workers' Federation', Journal of Industrial Relations, 12 (March 1970), 88-97; R.J. May, Determinants of the Industrial Relations Pattern in the Australian Stevedoring Industry', Journal of Industrial Relations, 3 (October 1961), 157-65; D.W. Rawson, 'Trade Union Politics 2 - Self-Assertion', Current Affairs Bulletin, 48, 1 (June 1971), 25-6.

51 All three of these had conflicting interests: an end to unity tickets could have assisted the Groups to win control of some unions and affiliate them to the DLP. But, to the extent that both DLP and Groups wished to cleanse the ALP of its Communist influences, this might come more quickly by publicity of existing unity tickets to influence electors and thus to influence politicians who reacted to the loss of votes. The Liberals, too, gained from keeping the unity ticket issue alive but also complained that unity ticket control of unions led to increased industrial unrest. On the validity of this last connection, see: Phillip R. Bentley, 'Communist Trade Union Leadership and Strike Incidence - with Specific Reference to the Waterside Workers' Federation', Journal of Industrial Relations, 12 (March 1970), 88-97; R.J. May, Determinants of the Industrial Relations Pattern in the Australian Stevedoring Industry', Journal of Industrial Relations, 3 (October 1961), 157-65; D.W. Rawson, 'Trade Union Politics 2 - Self-Assertion', Current Affairs Bulletin, 48, 1 (June 1971), 25-6.

52 Editorials during Conference: Advertiser, 12 May 1959; Age, 8, 11 May 1959.
has been fought since the Federal executive met a fortnight ago indicate that there is much yet to be done to achieve unity'. The majority at the 1959 Conference compromised by proscribing unity tickets but leaving enforcement to the States. The minority, beneath the obscuring formula of the unsuccessful motion, wanted to nullify enforcement even further. A common reason underlay both attitudes: because the strongest pressure for enforcement came from outside the party, no one wished to appear the dupes of anti-Labor forces. Many would have agreed with Brebner's bitter remark that Evatt should have paid more attention to the members of his own party than to the Grouper, Gould.

The majority's leniency became less marked over the next two or three years. While outside pressure continued to provoke resentment, elements of the party itself became more willing to enforce the policy of 1956-57. The object of most attention was the Victorian Branch. Under

53 *Age*, 18 May 1959.

54 This may need some qualification as regards South Australia. Here unity tickets had been much less frequent than in Victoria, mainly because the unions were less factionalised due to the weakness of Industrial Groups, whose recognition had been withdrawn by the State ALP Branch as early as 1951. In 1958, the Branch was able to advise the Federal Secretary 'that no problem exists here' although a press article in the same year claimed there had been a unity ticket in the Australian Railways Union: ALP (South Australian Branch), State Executive (SASE) 8 September 1958, unlabelled book containing typed Minutes, 1953-64, ALP (SA Branch) Headquarters, Adelaide (hereafter cited as 'SA Rec.'); *SMH*, 2 August 1958. The lack of cases meant less pressure on the Branch's controllers than in Victoria to produce a formula such as that contained in the item eventually sent to the Conference, but impetus would have come instead from the strength in the Branch, as in Victoria, of relatively militant unions who rejected, on principle, party interference in union affairs.

55 *Age*, 16 May 1959. Evatt had stated explicitly to the Conference his preference for the views of Gould over those of R. Pauline, an ALP member and Victorian President (on a unity ticket) of the ARU, who had asked the party to confirm the policy of non-interference but clarify its interpretation (*SMH*, 8 May 1959). Gould had circularised every Caucus member with details of the alleged unity ticket: Gould to Evatt, 28 April 1959, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/18/ALP - Unity Tickets (copy of the original circular with unity tickets attached).
pressure, the Victorians relied more on evasion of the policy than trying to change it. The Federal Executive, on the other hand, was led almost to the point of intervention in Victoria to ensure enforcement of its policy in an election year.

This change occurred gradually. There were indications soon after the 1959 Federal Conference that the Victorians resented the decision. VCE representatives insisted the Branch had been loyal to Labor principles and some complained that Evatt did not understand the special difficulties of the continuing struggle against the Groups. Evatt retorted that Federal rules must be obeyed. Chamberlain suggested, however, that if Victoria found the decision unworkable it should seek a special Federal Conference to review it. Meanwhile, it should abide by the majority decision. At the Victorian Branch Conference delegates decided by 286 votes to thirty-one to follow Chamberlain's advice and seek a special Federal Conference to reconsider the May decision on, as the motion (moved by Brebner) described it, 'interference by the Australian Labor Party in the affairs of Trade Unions'. Chamberlain, addressing the Conference, was loudly applauded as he thanked the Conference for the privilege of addressing 'a Branch which has borne the brunt of the attack upon us over the past four years'.

56 Age, 20 May, 4 June 1959; Sun (Melbourne) 4 June 1959; VCEO 19 May, VCE 3 June 1959, Vic. Rec., 20 March 1959 to 15 June 1959 [Minutes]. The Federal representatives were Evatt, Chamberlain, McKenna and Wyndham, then Evatt's press secretary. The Minutes show that the others had to leave early to catch a plane but that Chamberlain stayed for further discussions. While the others were merely thanked by the VCE President, R. Cameron, Chamberlain received a vote of thanks, carried by acclamation.

57 Age, 15 June 1959; ALP (Victorian Branch), Annual Conference, 6th & 7th Sessions, Vic. Rec., Annual Conf.1959 [Minutes]; Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 39. One of Brebner's arguments was that legal opinion had suggested the Federal policy was illegal under section 171(2) of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, dealing with union elections. This opinion had come from barristers S. Cohen and R.M. Eggleston. Evatt and McKenna, also lawyers, replied with a conflicting opinion and the two opinions were tossed around by the opposing sides for some years: Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, September 1959, 4-5, November 1959, 3; W.W.C. Brown, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, Unity Tickets - Two Points of View, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/93/210.
Not surprisingly, given the vote in May, there was no special Conference. Federal Executive rule 9(b) required a majority of Executive members to accede to Victoria's request but only Chamberlain supported the two Victorian delegates. There is some evidence that the request for a special Conference was made, not in the hope of success, but rather to gain time for the Victorian Branch to work out its position, which was still oscillating between defiance and evasion. Victorian spokesmen like Brebner and the Branch Treasurer, H.O. Davis of the AWU, were careful to say that the Branch would not defy the Federal decision, but a number of meetings between August and October 1959 showed that the VCE was deeply divided over strategy. In August the VCE accepted, with only Kennelly speaking in opposition, explanations from four ARU members of how their name appeared on tickets with Communists. It is clear from an earlier remark by Tripovich in reply to a DLP challenge and from two alternative motions at the Executive meeting that the explanations turned on the lack of 'political collusion', which probably meant that no political affiliation appeared on the ticket. If adopted, either motion would

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58 Schmella to Chamberlain, 9 September 1959, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/12/F28 Unity Tickets.

59 Age, 18 May, 15 June 1959; Nation, 20 June 1959. The Victorian resolution had not denied the Federal authority but concentrated on technicalities (like the alleged lack of sufficient time to digest and discuss the successful amendment at the 1959 Conference) and the Eggleston-Cohen legal opinion. Tripovich's letter conveying the request argued that agreement to a special Conference would say nothing about the merits of the issue but merely concede the Victorians' right to present more evidence (Tripovich to Schmella, 30 July 1959, Vic. Rec., Federal Executive File 2, 1959).

60 Age, 17 July 1959 (Tripovich tells K. Gregson, Victorian Secretary, Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, that the VCE is quite satisfied its members in the ARU had not supported Communist policy to the detriment of the ALP); VCEO 16, 28, 31 July 1959, VCE 31 July, 14 August 1959, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8738. The motion read that the VCE was 'of the opinion that there was no political collusion between the A.L.P. members seeking election in A.R.U. ballots and any other political Party' and the amendment that there was no political collusion 'between members of the A.L.P.' in the ballot.
have indicated the VCE was applying an interpretation rejected at the
Federal Conference only weeks before. Instead of taking this explicitly
defiant position, the Victorians adjourned discussion to await the
outcome of the application for a special Federal Conference. As in
1958, when defiance, in the form of a reaffirmation of the independence
of unions, had been avoided by seeking a review of the Federal policy
at the next ordinary Federal Conference, the VCE again avoided both
confronting the Federal Executive and provoking division in its own
ranks between compromisers and defiers. While the terms of the Federal
compromise allowed leeway in enforcement, they precluded a criterion
designed to destroy the policy.

The VCE discussion continued after the refusal of the request for a
special Conference. At the meeting of 23 October, Kennelly moved, as a
further amendment to the 'political collusion' motion of August, that,
because of the conflicting interpretations of the Federal policy, no
action be taken against past offenders but that future offenders be dealt
with. After further discussion the Executive appointed a sub-committee,
including Kennelly, which produced a 'composite resolution' recommending

60 (continued)
the latter is correctly recorded it means, presumably, that political
considerations were irrelevant in the making-up of the ticket, but I
suspect, rather, that words about collusion with other parties have been
left out. The main distinction between the two formulations is that the
amendment accepts explicitly the explanations offered, while the motion
implies this [DS]).

61 See notes 22 and 23 above. The Victorian reply to the Federal letter
advising of the failure of the special Conference request was ambiguous
as to which parts of past Victorian practice would continue - further
evidence of the fine line the Branch was treading: 'I wish to advise,
on behalf of the Victorian Executive, that there has never been any
political collusion between Union members of the Victorian Branch of the
A.L.P. and members of any other political parties. The good name of the
A.L.P. has been upheld on this point and we will continue to do so':
Tripovich to Schmella, 16 September 1959, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/
[1959 Correspondence]. My emphasis.
that no action be taken against the ARU members, since they had not infringed the rules 'as then interpreted' (that is, presumably, they had not colluded politically) but, secondly, that ALP members were bound by the Federal decision until it was changed by a later Conference.

Neither this nor any other formula attracted majority support. Successively, a motion that 'the question be not put', an amendment which introduced a new undefined criterion of 'active association' between ALP members and members of other parties, a further amendment that reproduced the first 'political collusion' formulation and, finally, the composite resolution itself were all defeated. Such a circumstance is rare enough in the ALP to be remarkable and it indicates the growing division in the Victorian Executive, just as the Federal decision of May had shown the division at that level. At least the Federal Conference had produced a majority for one formula. No formula in the VCE meeting, no matter how it made concessions to both sides or

62VCE 23 October 1959, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8738. (The amendment moved in August - note 60 above - had been withdrawn). It is of interest that the 'active association' amendment implied that the original (1956) Federal Executive decision was intended to apply only where such an association was established. In the context of this VCE meeting the definition of such an association may have been less than political affiliations appearing on ballot papers but elsewhere an unnamed Victorian ALP union official describes as 'the original Chamberlain definition of a unity ticket ... ONLY one' where political affiliations appear after candidates' names (Socialist and Industrial Labor, November 1961, 3). My emphasis. Whether one is to gather from this that Chamberlain, at least privately, gave such an interpretation in 1956 and thus that his shift in 1959 was less significant - is unclear. There seems no evidence that Chamberlain said this publicly before 1959, although it is noteworthy that neither Cameron nor Wheeldon, both fairly close to Chamberlain and the latter a WA delegate at the 1959 Conference, remembered a change in his views at this time. Both had only a limited recollection of the Conference, however (C.R. Cameron, J.M. Wheeldon, interviews). However, if one argues this was the 'real' interpretation of the 1956 decision one has to ask why NSW was able to expel unity ticketers between 1956 and 1959 without reference to whether the ALP name appeared on the ticket and why the NSW unions who complained to Chamberlain in 1958 (SMH, 23 September 1958, Socialist and Industrial Labor, October 1958, 3) about these expulsions did not refer to such an interpretation.
left leeway in enforcement, could bridge the gap between those like Kennelly, and his Federal Caucus colleague, P.J. Clarey, who were sympathetic to those who had fought the Groups but wanted to win political elections, those like Brebner, who knew the Federal Conference majority would not brook open defiance, and the more militant unionist members who stood firm for the 'political collusion' formula. As a result, the VCE failed to support either compromise or defiance.63

The Federal compromise gave the State Branches judicial discretion in establishing consent. Since the ALP was not a court with recognised standards of proof, the existence of consent could be determined by, for instance, the attitudes of the State Branch to the 'law' being applied, to the accuser and the accused and to the likely effect of the verdict. Thus, the Victorian Branch disliked the unity ticket ban for reasons of principle and because it was forced to act by people outside the party or by ALP unionists opposed to the VCE majority. This majority, further, was drawn from unions sometimes controlled by officials elected on unity tickets or, more often, sympathetic to their use. Finally, the VCE majority could argue that discouraging unity tickets might lead to Industrial Group victories against fragmented ALP and Communist tickets and, consequently, affiliation of the unions with the DLP.

63Another example to show the rarity of this incident. During a similar period of turmoil in the New South Wales Executive a motion and two amendments, regarding the attitude to be taken to a Federal report on the Branch, were all defeated. E.J. Ward, MP, wrote to a friend that this was a 'remarkable result': Ward to F.A. McCauley, The Hague, 2 July 1956, Edward John Ward, Papers, held in the Manuscript collection, National Library of Australia (hereafter cited as 'Ward Papers') NLA MS 2396/1/255 (Box 1). For an incomplete description of meeting to which Ward refers, see Murray, The Split, 300.
For these reasons, the establishing of consent was always a conditional exercise. Principles of justice, in any case, would have required some attempt to prove intention and this might prove difficult in some cases. Occasionally the ALP unionist might claim that he did not know his ally was a Communist and in that sense could not be said to have consented. Popular or unbeatable candidates might appear on a number of tickets without consenting in every case. As a general rule, remarked Brown, a former VCE member and President, 'if someone said he didn't know, you'd think it was possible he didn't know, but I'd put it no higher than that. You could never prove he did know'. 'You knew they were lying', said Kennelly, 'but you couldn't prove it and there was no point laying a charge unless you could make it stick'.

As Stout, Brebner and McNolty told Evatt and Chamberlain: Sun (Melbourne), 4 June 1959. One later observer (Observer, 4 March 1961) claimed that Chamberlain had suggested the non-consent defence to the VCE, but there is evidence of at least one occasion before 1958 where, in an alleged unity ticket in the Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemen's Association (FEDFA), the defendants disclaimed any knowledge and responsibility for their names appearing on the ticket (L.F. Cummins to Tripovich, 7 December 1958; S.J. Williams to Tripovich, 28 November 1958, Vic. Rec., Unions A - H, 1959). Kennelly remembers non-consent was the 'time-honoured' excuse, even before the Split, when members were charged under earlier resolutions about collaboration with Communists (P.J. Kennelly, interview).

These denials were sometimes reported as rather disingenuous. For example, R. Hunter, charged in a case in the Federated Ironworkers' Association in Wollongong, NSW: 'One hears rumours, but I know nothing ...' (DT, 23 November 1964). Hunter was expelled.

A point made by Whitlam: CPD H. of R. 32, 30 August 1961, 667-9. For some years in the Melbourne Branch of the WWF one ticket sought support for a popular Grouper, J. Cummins, as President, and for ALP and Communist candidates for other positions. Cummins always denied his consent to this unity ticket.

W.W.C. Brown, P.J. Kennelly, interviews. Also J.B. Keeffe, A.G. Poyser, interviews. The stress on consent led some ALP members to define unity tickets as those where consent was established rather than see non-consent as a defence to a unity ticket charge: Age, 24 August 1960 (Tripovich), 24 April 1961 (Cairns); SMH, 13, 20 June 1960 (Calwell denies unity tickets exist, presumably as defined in this way), 19 April 1961 (Chamberlain in similar vein). For a later official definition, which encapsulated the more common version, see note 1 above.
Kennelly's position in the VCE discussions of 1959 indicates he would have liked more charges to have 'stuck' than would Brown, both recognised the nature of this part of the Federal compromise.

The consent clause could only be used in this way if pressure for strong enforcement remained below a certain intensity. But the VCE's dislike for the Federal policy still provided evidence for Labor's opponents. In two cases in 1960, in the Meatworkers and the Waterside Workers, the VCE, while using perfunctory procedures to establish non-consent, continued to use the political collusion test as well. Thus it was announced that the nine accused WWF members would be asked if they consented and if they had not no action would follow 'as trade unionists were free to nominate for official positions provided they did so as an individual unionist and not as a member of the ALP'. The Meatworkers were exonerated because they had not authorised or seen the ticket nor consented to their names appearing nor 'collaborated politically with members of any other political party to achieve any objectives within our Union which would be opposed to the policy of the Australian Labor Party'.

Age, 16, 17, 29 June, 2 July, 24 August, 3 September 1960; W.J. Curran, D.C. Rountree, G. Wood to Tripovich, 23 August 1960; Report to Central Executive Meeting, Friday, 2 September 1960, re 'How to Vote' Cards in the Meat Industry Employees Union Annual Elections 1960, Vic. Rec., Unions C to S 1960; Report to be made to Full Executive meeting at 7.30 p.m. on Friday, 1 July 1960. Re: Waterside Workers' Federation Elections; VCEO 28 June, 23 August 1960, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740. Tripovich said before the WWF investigation, that while the ALP 'anticipated' there had been no consent there would still be an investigation to comply with the Federal rules. At the investigations each accused replied in the negative to the questions 'Did you allow your name to be placed on this ticket?' and 'Did you see this ticket before it was distributed?'. The Meatworkers signed statements to the same effect. At the WWF investigation the ALP President (McNolty) spoke 'at length' about the consent issue 'and advised regarding the care necessary in any statements made'. The WWF members then signed a statement which stressed, rather than non-consent, the lack of political collusion and reaffirmed the principle of non-interference in union affairs. One might add that in both these cases (and in most others) the accused were members or supporters of the incumbent union executive. One assumes that executive members would not be uninterested in producing a ticket designed to maintain them in their positions. The defence of non-consent becomes ludicrous in some circumstances.
The VCE and its affiliated unions thus combined evasion - through the Federally sanctioned consent loophole - and defiance - by employing the unsanctioned political collusion formula. To comply with the Federal rule it was enough to show non-consent; the other criterion satisfied the militant unions and saved the 'face' of the VCE yet would not upset the Federal party providing its own rule was also satisfied.

The VCE's critics were not content with such technical enforcement. The accuser in the Meatworkers claimed the party knew of the unity ticket before the election but delayed action until after the ticket had won. An anti-unity ticket publication alleged one of the non-consenters in this election had actually signed a letter supporting the unity ticket, while J. Cummins, the Grouper President of the WWF, offered to provide evidence of ALP men and Communists speaking on the same platform and collecting donations in support of the unity ticket. Publicity such as this, as well as the efforts of Liberal Parliamentarians, made unity tickets at least a minor issue at the Latrobe Federal by-election in April 1960, and somewhat more than that at the Bendigo Federal by-election in July. In Bendigo, DLP complaints were supported strongly by Santamaria and by Catholic Bishops Fox, Mannix and Stewart, who revived the idea that Catholics could not support Labor because of its connections with Communists, especially through unity tickets. This was done to such apparent effect that Calwell, now Labor's Federal Leader, told Federal Labor politicians canvassing the area that they must unequivocally support the Federal ban if the question was raised. This instruction may have


70Age, 6, 19, 20 June, 14 July 1960; CPD H. of R. 26, 7 April 1960, 1078-83; 27, 12 May 1960, 1659-65; S. 17, 4 May 1960, 748-54; SMH, 16 May, 2, 10, 14, 20, 27 June, 9 July 1960; West Australian, 20 June 1960. See also note 20 above - much of the evidence for that conclusion would have been drawn from the Bendigo by-election in which many Federal politicians campaigned.
helped Labor to hold Bendigo with only a slight reduction in votes. In any case, swings to Labor in Latrobe and at two other by-elections in Victoria in 1960 seemed to undermine temporarily the argument that unity tickets lost Labor votes. 71

THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE MEETING OF AUGUST 1961

The Victorian State elections of July 1961 revived interest in the electoral effects of unity tickets. Six weeks before the elections, an ALP survey of five marginal electorates had shown unity tickets falling well behind social and economic issues in the eyes of voters. 72 With unemployment rising due to the Federal Government's 'credit squeeze', Victorian Labor expected to benefit electorally. Yet at the poll on 15 July the party barely improved its Legislative Assembly vote, lost one seat to a Liberal and saw the DLP vote increase by 2.6 per cent overall and rather more than that in some city seats. 73 The party sought reasons

71 Malcolm Mackerras, Australian General Elections, Sydney, 1972, 283, calculates per cent 'swings' as follows: to the ALP in Latrobe (April), 7.5, Balaclava (July), 4.4, Higinbotham (December), 9.2; to Liberals in Bendigo, 0.1. Balaclava and Bendigo both voted on 16 July but Balaclava and, to a lesser extent, Latrobe, remained safe Liberal seats, despite the swing to the ALP, while Bendigo was and remained marginal Labor. In Higinbotham, after the stringent Federal Budget of 1960, Labor came within three hundred votes of victory. Finally, regarding Bendigo, one should note that the advice to Catholics again conflicted, with the Sydney diocesan spokesman saying Catholics could support any party other than the Communists and, secondly, that the Catholic hierarchy, especially Stewart, the local Bishop, criticised Labor also for its attitude to state aid to church schools. See note 30 above and chapter 3 below.

72 Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, July 1961, 3; Survey of Opinions obtained prior to Victorian State Elections - 1961. Co-ordinated by A.M. Menere, Vic. Rec., Election Comments (Completed) 1961. Six hundred electors were asked to choose from a list and rank three issues they felt deserved top priority by governments. Replies were allocated points according to ranking and unemployment (698 points), housing finance (492) and credit squeeze (468) topped the ballot. Unity tickets scored 56 points to finish last of twelve issues.

73 Age, 17, 18 July 1961; James Jupp, Victoria Votes, Sydney, 1961, 27-8; SMH, 17 July 1961. In the southern and eastern suburbs of Melbourne, the DLP vote increased by almost five per cent.
for this disappointing result. They knew that DLP spokesmen in the campaign had made well-publicised allegations of unity tickets in the ARU and WWF and the Central Gippsland Trades Hall Council. Lurid television advertisements suggested that 'Khrushchev must be pleased with the Victorian ALP'. Bishop Fox repeated his previous warnings to Catholics about supporting Labor. The effect of this barrage was felt in varying ways in the ALP. Many activists, from the State Parliamentary Labor Party down, admitted freely that the 'Communist smear' had hurt Labor but they differed over the solution. The SPLP report referred to '[t]he continued failure to deny effectively allegations about the breaking of the Federal conference decision on unity tickets' but many candidates, campaign directors and branch officials, surveyed by Wyndham, seem to have regarded the result as an indication not that the ban should be enforced more strongly but that the VCE should take the fight to its critics, if necessary by careful explanations of the aim of unity tickets, the 'real' (that is, conservative Catholic) nature of the DLP and of the rights of the unions to independence. For these people, Victorian Labor had fared badly not because of unity tickets but because of equivocation.74

74 _Age_, 17 May, 19, 30 June, 11 July 1961; _Jupp, Victoria Votes_, 6-12; _Nation_, 29 July 1961. The DLP tried to link a current electricity strike to the unity control of the Central Gippsland unions. The Bolte Government stood mainly on its record but occasionally joined the DLP attack. 75 The SPLP report was quoted _SMH_, 22 August 1961. For the Victorian activists' reports see: _Vic. Rec., C.S. Wyndham Personal File 1961 and Election Comments (Completed) 1961_. The letters cite, inter alia, deficiencies of organisation and presentation, press bias, local issues, doubts about the cost of Labor promises and about party unity. But the unity ticket-Communist link issue, especially as used by the DLP, is mentioned in two-thirds of the forty-five letters and most of these advocated an aggressive reply. Only three letters argued unequivocally for enforcement of the unity ticket ban. Six letters suggested that many voters had little idea of what a unity ticket was except that it somehow connected the ALP with Communists. On this point note Warhurst, _The 'Communist Bogey' ..., 276_: The DLP and Industrial Groups' knowledge of the workings of unions 'did not prevent the vagueness prevalent also in the L.C.P.'s explication of the communism issue, which suggests that the demands of campaign rhetoric overcame scruples about an accurate representation of the relationship between the A.L.P. and communism.'
The VCE President, F. Carey, first blamed the defeat on 'clerical fascists', which suggested that the Executive's official attitude of ignoring the DLP weakened in the first flush of defeat. Over the longer term the VCE asked a private firm 'to ascertain reasons for loss of election at a cost not exceeding £250' but when the results showed the importance of the unity ticket-Communist link issue to the swinging voter, the Executive seems to have taken little notice. Labor's Victorian controllers, remembering the battles of the Split and still fighting them in some unions, were likely to respond rather differently to evidence of the effectiveness of the DLP and its clerical supporters than were Federal politicians and Executive members from other States, who reacted to other pressures.

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76 Jupp, Victoria Votes, 25. The VCE attitude (not always observed, even before the elections) was expressed in reply to a query after the Bendigo election: 'We have always favoured the attitude of forgetting about the DLP and concentrating our attack ... against the Liberal Party' (Tripovich to Norm Kirkwood, Bendigo Federal Campaign Committee, 1 September 1960, Vic. Rec., 1960 Campaign Committees, Federal Municipal State). Thus the general theme of the 1961 State policy speech, as agreed by the VCE and the Leader, C.P. Stoneham, was 'to closely associate the Bolte regime with the economic crisis created by the policies of the Menzies government': VCE 26 May 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740.

77 The survey covered three hundred voters in areas where Labor lost votes to the DLP. Of the 150 who changed their votes, swingers from the ALP to the Liberals (29.2 per cent) and from the Liberals to the ALP (28.3 per cent) almost cancelled out while a small number of DLP voters swung to the ALP (3.8) and the Liberals (2.8). The significant swings were ALP to DLP (22.7) and Liberal to DLP (13.2). All who swung from the ALP were asked why they had done so and 50.7 per cent replied with answers concerned with Labor-Communist connections ('Don't like unity tickets', 'They're run by Comms', etc). In two other questions similar proportions believed Labor collaborated with the Communists and said allegations about such collaboration had influenced their vote: Confidential Report: Survey of Voters who changed their vote at the Victorian Elections, Vic. Rec., Survey electors Oakleigh, Ringwood, Mitcham, Glenroy 1962 [mislabelled]. The survey took a month and was discussed by the VCE on completion. The formal motion to receive the report was adopted after seven questions had been asked and answered and eleven members had spoken, three to oppose receipt of the report. Brown moved an amendment that the report be destroyed. H. Holgate, the interviewer, was eventually thanked for his efforts: VCE 21 July, 18 August 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740.
While the result of the Victorian election may have helped consolidate the VCE's attitudes, the prospect of a Federal poll before the end of 1961 stiffened the resolve of others to 'do something about Victoria'. The Federal Conference of April 1961 had managed to avoid the issue, discharging both a Victorian item identical to the political collusion motion of 1959 and a Queensland item allowing ALP members and supporters in unions to use the party's name. However, after the Victorian election, the Federal Executive meeting commencing on 21 August 1961 heard three out of four Federal Parliamentary Leaders urge strong action against unity tickets.

The loudest voice was Kennelly's. He had argued in the VCE for a middle course on unity tickets. As a politician he suspected the electoral disadvantages of the practice and he had confirmed this as a member of the National Organising Committee (NOC) in the latter months of 1960. As a member of the Committee, too, he had been accused of exceeding his brief in seeking a rapprochement with the DLP, which had always insisted that any such coming together would require action about unity tickets. As in 1958 and 1959, Labor's approach to the unity ticket issue was affected by its relations with the party whose preferences helped to keep it out of Federal office. But any chance of a reconciliation was rejected firmly by the Federal Executive, led by Chamberlain, and by

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79 On the NOC (Kennelly and Senators Dittmer and Toohey) and unity tickets, see note 20 above. As told to the author, Kennelly's views on unity tickets could be summarised as: unionists should vote for the best man since their living standards relied on their union; unity tickets only won when the opposition was weak or incompetent; unity tickets would not have been necessary but for the rabidity of the Groups and would not have been an issue but for the 'hue and cry' by politicians at election times and by defeated candidates at union elections (P.J. Kennelly, interview).
Kennelly's own Victorian Executive. Resentment at Kennelly's activities on the NOC may have contributed to his not standing in 1961 for re-election to the VCE but, in any case, his departure from that body freed him of most of his former inhibitions about taking a firm stand against unity tickets. Successfully persuading the Federal Executive to prosecute the Victorian offenders might yet allow, Kennelly believed, some form of cooperation or even unity between the Labor parties to defeat the Menzies Government. At the least, some DLP voters might switch.

Thus, when he spoke to the Federal Executive in August, Kennelly appealed for enforcement of the unity ticket policy. Probably realising that the VCE would not give in easily, he argued that the Federal Executive

80 The NOC had been established in September 1960, to examine Labor's past electoral performance and make recommendations for the future. The DLP had offered to exchange preferences with Labor at the Higinbotham by-election in December. While the ALP rejected this, Kennelly was accused of having discussions with DLP Senators Cole and McManus. Publicly, he said that any deal which did not involve the ALP giving up fundamental principles should be considered, although he denied he had negotiated with the DLP. The Federal Executive rejected the DLP advances and the NOC was told to keep within its terms of reference. The NOC's work was 'deemed to be concluded' on presentation of its report in July 1961, by which time the DLP was adopting a less conciliatory stance. Throughout, the VCE majority had been strongly opposed to concessions: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 29, 38; correspondence and other material, FX 5-8 December 1960, 3-7 July 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/10/F9; 11/F13; 124/56/36-9, 43-5, 48-52, 115; Nation, 3 December 1960; SMH, 25-30 November, 5-7, 9 December 1960, 28, 30 January, 19-20 April 1961; VCE 3 February 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740.

81 Kennelly's then private secretary recalls that Kennelly's ill-health was a reason for his leaving the VCE but that he had come also to believe the VCE, as presently constructed, was achieving little and had to be reformed by Federal intervention (P. Cullen, interview).

82 The NOC listed twenty-four Federal seats which, on 1958 figures, were Winnable by Labor with a 'moderate' or 'large' swing. Fourteen of these had been won by the Government on DLP preferences and all were in the 'moderate' swing category (Kennelly, Ormonde & Dittmer to Chamberlain, 2 December 1960, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F13).
should dissolve the Victorian Branch and set up a new Executive which would enforce the unity ticket policy. 'You lost the Victorian election', he told the Victorian delegates, 'because people did not trust the Victorian Labor party. How can they trust it when unity tickets are going on despite what you say? ... The way Labor is going, it could be out of [Federal] office for years.' McKenna, Kennelly's Senate colleague, supported him. Whitlam, Deputy Leader in the House of Representatives, stopped short of supporting intervention but insisted that Federal policy must be enforced if Labor was to win the public. 'If we conform with our own policy on this matter, it cannot be said that we are bending to the dictates of the Democratic Labor party.' As a first step the VCE should act against offenders in the ARU where, he was convinced, unity tickets had occurred.\textsuperscript{83}

Kennelly, McKenna and Whitlam probably represented the views of the majority of Federal Caucus.\textsuperscript{84} But what of the fourth and senior Leader,

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Age}, 24 August 1961; \textit{Bulletin}, 13 January 1962; Laurie Oakes, \textit{Whitlam PM}, Sydney, 1973, 94; \textit{SMH}, 24 August 1961; E.G. Whitlam, interview. Earlier in the year Whitlam had written to the VCE asking it to look into the ARU election. He did not assume that the three ALP men concerned had consented but '[i]t would be of great assistance to us all if [they] were to disown this card, or were to issue a card containing their names alone' (\textit{Age}, 25 May 1961). After the Executive meeting he complained that Labor's opponents did not provide evidence for their claims about unity tickets. He had done this in the ARU and he would be surprised if the men concerned could explain the ticket. 'If any other honorable member gives me corresponding information, I will see that it is followed up' (CPD H. of R. 32, 30 August 1961, 669). As fuel for the Victorian allegations that their own politicians were conspiring with outsiders against the independence of unions this was approached only by Evatt's use of the Gould circular in 1959 (note 55 above) and by K.E. Beazley, MP, who wrote to Gould thanking him for his letter and agreeing with his views (\textit{Sunday Telegraph}, 10 May 1959).

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{SMH}, 17, 24 August 1961. Incidentally, the Federal Executive Minutes, in a masterpiece of avoidance of controversy, recorded that the three Leaders spoke only 'in connection with financing Labor's proposals and basic pensions in the Social Services programme'. Later Brebner and Stout successfully requested the Minutes be amended to add the words 'referred to the Victorian elections and matters related thereto' (FX 21-24 August, 26-28 September 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/161, 185.)
Arthur Calwell? Since he became Parliamentary Leader in March 1960, Calwell had shown both notable reluctance to agree with the opinions of Labor's critics on unity tickets and sympathy for the position of his own Victorian Branch. He used the absence from the agenda of the New South Wales, Victorian and South Australian Branch Conferences of 1960 of any items regarding unity tickets to deny that unity tickets were an issue for the party or, indeed, any more than the figments of the imaginations of a discredited, anti-Labor minority. Confronted with evidence, he brushed it aside. He said that the VCE was doing its best in enforcing Federal policy, given the problems it faced with Industrial Groups and the DLP. While he hoped that ALP members would eventually mount and support, on their own initiative, purely ALP teams in union elections, there was a danger, meanwhile, that Grouper wins could take unions into the DLP camp. Calwell feared also that stern action in Victoria could lead to dissension there when a united Labor Party could defeat a Liberal Federal Government whose economic policies were likely to lose it electoral support. For this reason Calwell had helped persuade the Federal Conference in April against debating unity tickets.  

85 Age, 13 June, 1 July 1960, 6 March 1961; CPD H. of R. 30, 8 March 1961, 73; 12-13 April 1961, 773-91; Mercury, 17 April 1961; Nation, 19 December 1959, 7 May 1960; Observer, 2 April 1960; SMH, 13, 20 June, 1 July 1960. When it was suggested it was self-contradictory for him to deny unity tickets were an issue and to defend the VCE's enforcement of the policy, Calwell said his denials were intended to flush out evidence from the critics. When evidence appeared (though not evidence of consent), he rejected it as coming from people outside the ALP. See also note 67 above. Did Calwell mean that consent to appearing on a unity ticket was a figment of the imagination of the critics? Yet Calwell seems to have supported Evatt's approach to unity tickets (see pp. 88, 92 above) and at least as early as May 1958, declared he was 'irrevocably opposed' to them, while aware of the problem of losing unions to the DLP (Age, 22 May 1958).  

As a Victorian in a State where the Executive controlled preselection of Parliamentary candidates, Calwell could not afford, in the interests of his own political future, to head the forces sniping at the VCE. The Branch and most of his Caucus colleagues from Victoria had not supported him for the Federal Leadership nor found him the place he sought on the VCE, so his position was not strong in his home State. 87

Calwell's private views also may have been similar to those of the VCE. His book, Labor's Role in Modern Society, written during 1962, defends the independence of the trade unions and denies the right of the party 'to interfere directly in trade union affairs'. 88 He also echoed the attitudes of the VCE when he boasted after the Victorian election that '[t]he setback will not make us more ready to surrender our ideals for a mess of D.LP. pottage'. His biographer concludes that, while Calwell opposed unity tickets, he opposed the DLP more, partly because of the treatment he had received from his fellow Catholics during the Split. 'His attitude to unity tickets was dictated less by his alliance with

87 The VCE supported R. Pollard against Calwell and F. Crean, MP, gathered support for Pollard (with himself to be deputy and successor) from Victorians before withdrawing from the race in confused circumstances (CT, 26 February 1966; Observer, 23 January 1960; Alan Reid, The Gorton Experiment, Sydney, 1971, 96; SMH, 8, 11, 15 March 1960). Some observers suggested the VCE opposed Calwell because it feared he would act against unity tickets and truckle with the DLP: Advertiser (Adelaide), 27 February 1960; West Australian, 22 February 1960. On Calwell's bid for a VCE seat, see Age, 23 April 1960; Nation, 7 May 1960; SMH, 14 June 1960. The reason given for his eventual non-candidacy (a heavy work-load) may have been the real one, given that Calwell's actions had already begun to indicate the VCE's fears of him were unfounded.

88 Arthur Calwell, Labor's Role in Modern Society, Melbourne, 1963, 62-3. It is clever, but not very relevant, to point out that this book was probably written by G. Freudenberg, Calwell's press secretary: Humphrey McQueen, [Book Note on A.A. Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not], Labour History, 26 (May 1974), 110. Calwell would hardly have let a book appear under his name that did not contain his sentiments, if not his words. More relevant for our present purpose is to point out that the book was written after Calwell had identified himself with the VCE position on union independence.
left-wing elements in the Australian Labor Party than by his opposition
to the Democratic Labor Party.\footnote{Colm Kiernan, Calwell, West Melbourne, 1978, 214. Calwell's reaction to the Victorian election is quoted SMH, 28 July 1961. Calwell wrote that he knew, once the DLP had rejected Evatt's offer to resign in 1958, 'the only way to deal with the DLP was to fight them and try to destroy them as an effective political force' (Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 192) but G. Freudenberg, his press secretary from August 1961, suggests his employer preferred to let the splinter party 'wither on the vine' (National Times, 3-8 January 1977). Calwell's shifting positions regarding the DLP during 1960-61 are suggested by (1) his informing Chamberlain of a move to discuss in Caucus rapprochement with the other party. Calwell agreed with Chamberlain that the matter was entirely one for the Executive (FX 5-8 December 1960, NLA MS 4985/124/56/41-2); (2) his claim that the DLP rank and file were deserting their extremist leaders in favour of the ALP (Age, 15 May 1961); (3) his promise to Caucus, after the DLP effort against Labor in Victoria and despite his initial vehemence, quoted above, that the Federal Executive would have a full enquiry into the election (SMH, 17 August 1961). The effect of the Split on Calwell's relations with his church is described in Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 141-6; Kiernan, Calwell, 218, 238-9, 242.}  

Calwell did not accompany his three colleagues to the Executive meeting and spoke the following day only to express his support for a proposed decision that had been worked out by Executive delegates. He had read the motion, he said, and agreed completely with it.\footnote{Age, SMH, 25 August 1961. Calwell had a plausible excuse for not accompanying his colleagues, since he was to deliver his speech on the Commonwealth Budget later in the evening.} This reaction fitted his conception of his own role. Calwell brought to crises not only his private views of the merits of an issue and his commitments to sub-coalitions of the party (the Victorian Branch and the Federal Caucus) but also a view of the role of a Labor leader. 'The leadership, in the final analysis', he wrote in 1959, 'is more or less collective. There is the Parliamentary Party Executive, the Federal Conference, Federal Executive and the trade unions ...'. The ALP was a democracy, according to Labor's Role in Modern Society, wherein the Parliamentary Leader was both servant of the party and the people it
served and mouthpiece for its collective decisions. 'Calwell stood for the idea', writes his biographer, 'of the leader as the first servant of the cause ...'.

This ideal was close to that of the party's folklore, if not to its practice. But Calwell's critics argued he was too passive, too subservient to forces which he could have tempered. 'He waited upon events', wrote Freudenberg, 'and baulked at that kind of action which creates or changes events'. Throughout his career, while reveling in a fight, he lacked that part of courage which 'involves taking the risk which might win all or lose all'. The Calwell of 1961, wrote the journalist, Alan Reid, was 'diffident, uncertain, almost timid, a drifter on the tide of Labor events'. On many issues 'he gives no lead either way'. Freudenberg portrays Calwell unfavourably to heighten the contrast with his successor Whitlam, the subject of Freudenberg's apologia. Kiernan is just as ham-fisted in the opposite direction. Reid's views of the Labor Party and its politicians were jaundiced as

91 Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 219; Labor's Role in Modern Society, 52-6; Kiernan, Calwell, 4. The original Calwell letter: Calwell to E.J. Ward, 9 February 1959, Ward Papers, NLA MS 2396/15/872 (Box 51).


93 Bulletin, 15 March 1961 (Reid); National Times, 3-8 January 1977 (Freudenberg). See also Nation, 14 December 1963; SMH, 28 July 1961 and contemporary remarks by Freudenberg: 'Labor's Myths and Hopes', Dissent, 19 (Autumn 1967), 47-8; Labor Comment, May 1966, 4-5. Freudenberg resigned from Calwell's staff in February 1966 and joined Whitlam's a year later.
often as they were accurate. Nevertheless, there is evidence from the recollections of Calwell's Caucus colleagues that while Freudenberg and Reid approach the truth, some of Kiernan's sympathy is not misplaced. Frank Crean remembers him as an 'inefficient' leader who tended to 'let things run along too much', while to J.L. Armitage, a backbencher under Calwell from 1961-63, he was a charming individual but a weak leader. Tony Mulvihill, a New South Wales Senator who moved in Caucus in 1966 that all leadership positions be declared vacant - a motion designed to end Calwell's tenure - retails this version of a conversation with Calwell after the meeting:

Calwell: That was a despicable thing you did.
I've done a lot for Labor unity.
Mulvihill: That's not the point, Arthur.
You've fumbled too many balls. I want to see a Labor Government. You should be out the front giving a lead.
Calwell: But I might lose.

Finally, Keeffe, Federal President for most of Calwell's Leadership term and a Senator after 1965, also remembers Calwell's wariness about placing himself at the head of his colleagues, but sees this as a virtue. Calwell's basic aim was party unity. 'He wasn't going to have the party kicked to death over state aid or unity tickets or any other thing'.

The same man, then, as prevaricator or unifier, inefficient fumbler or charming conciliator. Here are the words of Calwell himself, late in his career, when Labor faced the denouement of the 'Victorian problem'
of which the events of 1961 were an early example.

I suggest ... a discussion of all issues in a conciliatory fraternal manner so that compromise settlements can be reached by unanimous agreement .... The penalty of failure will mean the cost of at least two more elections and I want to see another Labour Government before I die .... The workers of Australia believe that the unity of Labour is still the hope of the world and will ultimately destroy our Party if we impair or damage that unity.96

Implicit in such statements is the recognition that Labor is a coalition wherein critical decisions must take account of the views of a number of sub-coalitions if 'the unity of Labour' is to be preserved. Calwell's approach to his party embodied our fourth and fifth hypotheses: he saw the need to keep the coalition together, especially in 1961 with victory in sight, and he knew Labor's critical decisions must compromise between the views of those sub-coalitions which held strong views on the matters in question. While Calwell's character may have been flawed as Freudenberg suggests, it was moulded by an intimate knowledge of the structure of the party, derived from long years as a machine politician in Victoria and from awareness of the consequences of disunity, of which the Split of 1955 was only the most recent in his memory.97 His awareness of the significance of compromise in the ALP may have encouraged him to

96 Telegram, Calwell to T. Burns, Federal President, ALP, 28 August 1970, Fed. Rec., NLA 4985/128/86. The telegram was sent when the Federal Executive was about to intervene in the Victorian Branch. See also Herald (Melbourne) 27 March 1965, where Calwell seeks in his party 'unity in things essential, independence in the things which are not essential and, in all things, tolerance'.

97 In the telegram quoted above, Calwell points out he has lived through three splits in his fifty-four years in the party. Of Calwell's Victorian experience before 1955, Freudenberg writes: 'He knew where all the levers of the Victorian machine were, as well as anybody, with the possible exception of Pat Kennelly' (National Times, 3-8 January 1977). By 1961, Kennelly's power in Victoria was dwindling but Calwell was learning to work with the post Split structure. See also on the early period: Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 38-44; Kiernan, Calwell, 1-6, 34-59.
work 'unobtrusively, obliquely, and inoffensively' in his relations with the Federal Executive knowing, as Evatt did not, that the stability of the party on the unity ticket question depended upon not altering the fundamental terms of the compromise the Executive had evolved. At the most, he could have helped refine these terms by taking part in the negotiations which produced the Executive's new decision. If that was the case, his speech to the delegates was mere advocacy of a formulation he had helped frame. How far he acted in such negotiations as an extension of the Victorian delegation (perhaps fearing loss of his preselection if he did not support Branch goals) and how far as the Leader looking to the Federal election we do not know. It is clear that, as a politician, he felt it was more important to attract votes by an appearance of unity than by an appearance of anti-Communism. Finally, since the unity ticket issue concerned the party's relations with the unions, he may have argued that it was a matter for the machine, where the formal ties with the unions were, not for the Parliamentary Labor Party.

Since Calwell was Leader, his views normally carried greater weight than those of any other politician. His views were influenced by his awareness of the goals of his Victorian Branch (HYPOTHESIS I), by his own personal characteristics (HYPOTHESIS II), by his awareness of the need to keep the coalition together by means of a compromise decision.

98 The quote is from Alan Reid (Bulletin, 15 March 1961) who attributes Calwell's style at this time to his knowledge that Chamberlain controlled the Executive.

99 Presumably, however, it was somewhat more difficult for a State Executive to deny preselection to a Party Leader than a backbencher—and even backbenchers did not often suffer this fate. For an occasion when Calwell did go against his Branch without losing preselection, see chapter 3, below, regarding the July 1966 Special Conference.

100 This is Kiernan's view (Kiernan, Calwell, 213-4, 222, 231-2).
(HYPOTHESES IV, V) and by his appreciation of the relations between the party and the unions (HYPOTHESIS VI). Further, one could argue that he preferred a less 'inclusive' approach to the electorate than did his three colleagues (HYPOTHESIS III). While they sought strong action in the hope of gaining support from voters not then supporting Labor because of its alleged sympathy with Communists, Calwell preferred to seek a decision that would retain the loyalty of those of Labor's core members who placed a higher value on the independence of unions than on anti-Communism, and on retention of union power than on an easier passage for the enemies of 1955.

But Calwell could only persuade the Executive against stronger enforcement and intervention. Where did the Executive itself stand? The Victorians had become increasingly isolated on the unity ticket question. Early in 1961, their allies of 1959, the South Australian Branch, cancelled the party membership of two Meatworkers' Union members found guilty of unity ticket charges. (Membership cancellation was equivalent to expulsion in other States.) This case 'was the first one dealt with by the State Branch of the A.L.P. under the Federal Rules' and it turned on the consent question. The question of political collusion, the crux of the South Australian motion of 1959, was not raised, suggesting that the Branch could now live comfortably with the Federal policy and would provide no further support for Victorian efforts to destroy it.¹⁰¹ At the

¹⁰¹ SASE, 14 October, 7, 10 November, 5 December 1960, 27 January, 1, 7 February 1961; ALP (SA Branch), State Council (SASC), 9 February 1961, SA Rec., unlabelled Minute book, 1953-64; packed labelled 'Minutes of State Council Meetings from 8th October 1953 to 12th December 1963'. The Branch acquitted two other meatworkers. In all four cases the excuse was that the accused had not known there were Communists on the ticket. The Branch also cancelled the membership of two Tramways Union members who had collaborated with Communists in other ways. The 5 December Executive meeting also adopted an approach to the DLP offer (discussed in note 80 above) which was the most receptive put to the Federal Executive. It is worth noting that these events took place in the absence from the Executive for one year of C.R. Cameron, engaged on reforming the AWU. Cameron had been a leading defender of the independence of unions and was very influential in the Executive. The 1960 State Convention also saw the
April 1961 Federal Conference the political collusion item, had it been moved, would have received the support only of the Victorians and, probably, the Western Australians.  

101 (continued)
defeat by D.A. Dunstan of J.C. Sexton as a delegate to Federal Executive, when Sexton had been unopposed for the position since 1953. Toohey, the other Federal delegate, had been ill and did not seek re-election but Sexton, under the normal Branch practice, could have been expected to retain his place while he remained the immediate past State Secretary. Under the same practice, M. Nicholls, who had succeeded Sexton as State Secretary, would normally have become a Federal delegate without opposition. Yet E. O'Connor, an AWU opponent of Cameron's, made a fourth (unsuccessful) candidate for the positions. There are also some indications in the election of the State Executive, especially the success of three newcomers in the last three positions, that the controlling group ticket did not hold as firm as it usually did – probably because of a division in AWU votes between O'Connor's and Cameron's supporters. None of these three was re-elected in 1961. Cameron himself remembers the years 1960-61 as a period of slight instability in the Branch, when 'the wheels wobbled a little bit' (C.R. Cameron, interview. The above sentences are based generally on Advertiser reports of State Conventions, on Convention Minutes, including Returning Officers' reports, held in SA Rec. and on interviews with Cameron, J.L. Cavanagh and J.P. Toohey). But if South Australian activities regarding unity tickets were an outcome of this small upheaval, they did not occur willingly. From complaint to conclusion the Meatworkers' case took four months, including a seven week deferral over Christmas. This length of time suggests the uneasiness among Executive members. Then, before cancelling the two memberships the Executive carried a motion (quoted in the text) moved by Toohey, critical of the delay of the Meatworkers' Secretary, W.W. Pirie, in notifying the case. The Meatworkers were not one of the controlling group of unions in South Australia at the time. Pirie had written earlier to the Federal Secretary of the ALP, complaining on behalf of his union at the use of the card vote in the ALP in South and Western Australia to the advantage of large unions (Pirie, Federal Secretary, Meatworkers' Union, to Schmella, 23 September 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/1958 Correspondence). This union also moved in 1959 an unsuccessful motion to abolish the card vote (Advertiser, 15 June 1959). Indeed, one of the three new SASE members who lasted only one term, R. Husdell of the Ironworkers' Association, was also a long-time opponent of the card vote (Advertiser, 18 June 1957, 4 June 1962). In a 'normal' year such an opponent would not have been elected. But the wheel wobbled to the more militant side, too, since J.L. Cavanagh, never part of the controlling group, won preselection for the Senate at this time (Advertiser, 14 November 1960). On the card vote and the SA Branch, see pp.44-6, above.

102 Bulletin, 19 April 1961; SMH, 10, 11 April 1961. The last reference has it that the South Australians had been 'instructed' by their Branch to vote to retain the ban if the matter was raised. While this is possible, there seems to be no record of it in the Executive Minutes at least. But the trend outlined in the previous note suggests strongly this would have been the delegates' approach. Perhaps there was an informal consensus between the six of them. This was a normal practice for South Australia delegations (J.B. Keeffe, G.T. Virgo, interviews). Certainly the press had no doubt and by August the two Executive delegates, Dunstan and Nicholls, were regarded as 'right wing' on the issue (SMH, 25 August 1961).
On the eve of the August Executive meeting, observers speculated that six of the twelve delegates, those from New South Wales, Tasmania and South Australia, would support drastic action in Victoria. The grounds for action would have reflected the terms of a draft petition being circulated by anti-VCE individuals in Victoria (some centred around Kennelly). This petition referred to deteriorating organisational structure, lack of funds, dwindling branch membership, the selection of VCE members for safe Parliamentary seats and, particularly, the adverse effects of the lax enforcement of the unity ticket ban. The petition concluded with a request for action under Federal rules 9(i) and (k), covering investigation of State Branches and the replacement of their Executives. A motion under these rules required seven supporters.

Chamberlain, Victoria's staunch supporter in 1959, was felt to be wavering. His resentment towards Evatt, crucial in 1959, no longer influenced his approach to unity tickets. Perhaps a strong stand from

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103 Age, 21, 22, 28 August 1961; Bulletin, 2 September 1961; DT, 22–24 August 1961; SMH, 11, 24, 25 August 1961; Sun-Herald, 27 August 1961. See also: Australian Labor Party, Victorian Branch. The Urgent Need for Reform from Within. August 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/59/ALP-Victoria; correspondence from Victorians, especially J. Jupp and W. J. Thomas, seeking NSW support for Federal intervention, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/107/240/313-587. Developments in Victoria included the withdrawal of an endorsed Federal candidate, public criticism by J. Jupp, a Labor-supporting, but anti-VCE academic and growing unrest in State Caucus. Meanwhile, Kennelly and a Federal MP, A. Fraser, were alleged to have raised again the prospect of rapprochement with the DLP: Age, 26, 29 July, 10 August, 14 September 1961; Nation, 29 July 1961; SMH, 17, 26 August 1961; VCE 13, 18 August, 1, 15 September, 20 October 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740. (The later meetings investigated earlier events.) On the possibility of intervention at this time G. Bryant, a Federal MP from Victoria, remembers that 'an innocent afternoon tea in Parliament House with a few right wingers' led, such was the siege mentality of the Victorians at the time, to his having to write, at Wyndham's request, a letter which denied he was involved in 'moves by Inter-State people to remove the Victorian Executive from office' (Bryant to Wyndham, 28 August 1961, Vic. Rec., Parliamentarians A to G 1961; G. M. Bryant, interview).
the new Leader, Calwell, might have influenced Chamberlain to support the six favouring intervention. 104

Chamberlain's strongest loyalty, however, was to the compromise of 1956-57, to the balancing of the conflicting principles of anti-Communism and union independence on the pivot of enforcement by the States. Other delegates were producing a reformulation of just this compromise. While Kennelly and his group laboured in one room in Parliament House to shape a resolution for intervention and investigation of unity ticket offences, Brebner and others met in Calwell's room to produce a resolution which would avoid intervention in Victoria but still obtain the majority support of the Executive. 105 The latter motion began: 'The Federal Executive is determined that the rule banning unity tickets in trade union elections will be carried out'. It continued that any member who discovered that his name appeared on a unity ticket and did not immediately place a press advertisement denying both knowledge of the preparation of, and consent to the ticket and did not provide, if required, a supporting statutory declaration to his State ALP Secretary 'and/or to the Federal Secretary' would be automatically expelled from the party. 106 Exactly who helped produce this motion is unclear. Chamberlain almost certainly did, given his closeness to the Victorians since 1959 and his opposition to Kennelly, the leader of the opposing

104 Chamberlain's usual fellow delegate, Webb, a former MP, who might have been influenced by the three pro-intervention politicians, had been replaced for this meeting by K. Dowding, a close ally of Chamberlain's, although there is no evidence available that this was other than coincidence. Unity tickets were not on the meeting agenda and Chamberlain would not have known of the three leaders' intentions sufficiently early to engineer a substitute - even had he wished to or been able to.

105 Bulletin, 2 September 1961 provides the meeting location (Alan Reid).

forces, because of his flirting with the DLP. (Negotiation with the DLP almost certainly would have followed intervention.)

Keeffe, Secretary of the Queensland Branch, who seconded the motion before the Executive, probably suggested the press repudiation procedure, which had been the practice in his Branch since at least 1958. Calwell told the Executive he had 'read' the motion and he may have done no more (since he was engaged in preparing his speech in the Budget debate) but his views were well-known and overlapped those of the Victorian delegates: retain affiliated unions in the Labor camp and give no comfort to the DLP. These arguments, which Calwell put to the Executive, may have attracted less sympathy than his fears of disunity on the eve of an election.

Chamberlain had shown his closeness to the Victorian Branch by his support for Stout's election to the Federal Presidency in February 1961. This exchange of letters took place: 'I strongly hold the view that the Executive should, for tactical and public reasons, elect as a successor to yourself [as Federal President] a Victorian and, if at all possible, Vic Stout. Such an election would kill any suggestion that the Federal Executive looks unfavourably upon the Victorian Party ... [and] is going to "move in" ... I have already discussed with Albert [McNolty] the idea that we can go very strongly out in support of Victoria' (Wyndham to Chamberlain, 19 January 1961, Vic. Rec., C.S. Wyndham Personal File 1961). 'He [Chamberlain] said to tell you he fully agrees with the sentiments you express in your recent letter to him re the Federal Officers' (L. Elliott, Chamberlain's secretary, to Wyndham, 26 January 1961, Vic. Rec., Federal Executive 1961 File 2). After abortive attempts by Campbell, Kennelly and others to get majority support for H. Jensen, Lord Mayor of Sydney, Dunstan or Toohey, Stout was elected unanimously (Advertiser, 18 February 1961; Campbell to Chamberlain, 17 November 1960; Chamberlain to Campbell, 14 December 1960, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F46; F.H. Campbell, H.F. Jensen, interviews; Nation, 25 February 1961; Observer, 4 March 1961; SMH, 15, 17, 21 February 1961).

The Queensland Central Executive had resolved in May 1958 that any ALP member 'who permits' his name to be used on a unity ticket 'without repudiating same immediately through the press' shall be expelled. The QCE unanimously approved the August 1961 decision as one which resembled their own practice. Keeffe remembered few expulsions for unity tickets in Queensland under this rule but there were a few reprimands. Generally, he recalled, 'it was an acceptable policy but unpleasant to administer': ALP (Queensland Branch), Circular 13/58, 30 May 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/1957 Correspondence [misfiled]; C-N, 29 August 1961; J.B. Keeffe, interview.
Since 1958 there had been veiled threats that the Victorian unions would form a militant, exclusively union Industrial Labor Party should there be drastic 'interference with unions'. Calwell and others would have reminded delegates of this unpleasant prospect and the recent experience of the electoral effects of a split Labor movement would have made them receptive. Alan Reid wrote that Brebner, moving the motion, played on the fears of delegates.\(^\text{109}\) Above all, the fear of a new Split still lingered.

Nevertheless, the successful motion would have failed without concessions from the Victorians. The speculation over Chamberlain's vote underlined how delicately balanced the Executive was on the unity tickets question and on attitudes to Victoria generally. Twice in 1961 elections for Federal officers' positions had been decided on a draw from a hat; twice more the pro-Victorian candidate had been narrowly defeated.\(^\text{110}\)

\(^{109}\)Bulletin, 2 September 1961. For threats and warnings about the possibility of an Industrial Labor Party, see CPD H. of R. 20, 21 August 1958, 654, 656 (R.W. Holt says interference in unions will lead to VCE and unions running industrial candidates in political elections in retaliation); DT, 8, 15 May 1959 (Victorian delegates to Federal Conference); SMH, 6 December 1960 (Stout threatens ILP if any pact with DLP); Sun-Herald, 27 August 1961; Tom Truman, Ideological Groups in the Australian Labor Party and their Attitudes, St Lucia, Qld, 1965, 158 (Calwell to the Executive). It was occasionally suggested that these threats were bluffs and that few unions would have left the party but the threats would have seemed especially salient in an election year.

\(^{110}\)In February 1961, F. Taylor, a Tasmanian delegate, who had supported Stout for the Presidency in return for Victorian support for himself for a Vice Presidency, tied 6-6 with D.A. Dunstan (SA) in the ballot for Junior Vice President. Taylor won on a draw from the hat but later lost his position as a Tasmanian delegate, apparently because his Branch resented his deserting Colbourne in the manoeuvring for the Presidency. (Dunstan was elected unanimously to the Junior Vice Presidency in April.) In July, Colbourne, Senior Vice President, stood against Stout for the Presidency and won on a hat draw after another tied vote. The pro-Victorian (and Victorian-supported) candidates for the Vice Presidencies both then lost, Keeffe by 5-7 to Dunstan for the Senior position and Brebner by 5-6 against R.H. Lacey for the Junior (FX 13-16 February, 6-9 April, 3-7 July 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/80-1, 85, 121-2; Nation, 25 March 1961; SMH, 8 July 1961).
That delegates spent an hour, much longer than usual, in informal discussions over morning tea, between Calwell's speech and Brebner's putting his motion formally before the meeting, suggests that the pro-intervention delegates took some convincing to support the motion and achieve the unanimous decision which emerged.  

What were the concessions which led the pro-intervention delegates to concur so reluctantly? First, the motion itself included the sentence: 'All States will promptly report to the Federal Executive officers action taken under the rule in all instances'. Despite the remarks of some commentators, this was not the first time the Federal Executive had given itself a role regarding unity tickets. For instance, the August 1938 resolution said the Executive would act against offenders if it had reliable evidence that State Branches were not acting. Moreover, there was always the possibility of gaining a majority for Federal action against State Branches by the method Kennelly and his supporters used in 1961, using unity tickets as a ground under rules 9(i) and (k). But the new resolution, by directing Branches to report all action taken, introduced a formal procedure for general supervision. If this

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111 The debate itself took only ten minutes, just long enough for Brebner and Keeffe to present the motion. On the long morning tea, note the remarks of Federal delegates about the importance of such sessions for discussing alternatives and persuading doubters (chapter 1, note 75, above). On this occasion, one observer 'suspects that the compromise resolution ... had been informally accepted by the executive before Mr Calwell spoke' (Age, 28 August 1961), that is, before the tea break. (Remember: the order was Calwell-tea break-debate). In this case, a majority probably had decided to support the motion already and the delegates who 'stood in groups discussing the motion' (SMH, 25 August 1961) would have been ensuring merely that the decision was unanimous. This may have been the time, also, when delegates were advised that Whitlam supported the Brebner formulation. Alan Reid says Whitlam gave such support (DT, 25 August 1961).

112 For the August 1958 resolution see above p. 89. One could also read something into Chamberlain's remark after the original decision of September 1956 that the Federal Executive would 'expect' expulsion in proven cases (note 16 above).
supervision revealed blatant laxity Federal action might follow, if the 'numbers' could be mustered on the basis of the facts revealed in the case or cases under discussion. The motion itself did not make Federal action automatic, merely slightly more possible.\textsuperscript{113}

Secondly, the Victorian Branch, through Brebner and Stout, gave 'an undertaking that they would recommend to the Victorian Executive that action be taken in respect to all current alleged offences against the Party's rules'. Unusually, this part of Brebner's speech was recorded in the Executive Minutes, which suggests that it was seen as a concrete concession in return for which the formal motion was less drastic.\textsuperscript{114}

Given how close the Executive had come to intervention in Victoria such an undertaking is not surprising. It was implemented immediately, with investigations into alleged unity tickets in the ARU and Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union and into allegations of WWF support for a Communist in the Victorian general election and donations to Communist candidates in the Federal general election.\textsuperscript{115} Then, finally, two weeks

\textsuperscript{113}The September 1961 Executive meeting decided further that copies of all reports on unity ticket cases should be sent to the Federal Secretary (this had not been specified in the August resolution) who would supply all Executive members with copies (FX 26-28 September 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/195).

\textsuperscript{114}FX 21-24 August 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/162. This part of the Minutes, along with the motion itself, is included in the compilation of Executive and Conference decisions on trade union elections, included as an appendix to the 1965 Conference report (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 130). Could this have been the crucial concession extracted from Brebner and Stout during the long morning tea? Sun-Herald, 27 August 1961 suggests the Executive's September meeting was a concession to show the pro-intervention forces that enforcement was under way. While progress in enforcement was reported at this meeting it seems just as likely that the extra meeting was held mainly to deal with election policy matters.

before the Federal election, the Victorian Branch made its first expulsions for unity tickets since the Split, when two members of the Building Workers' Industrial Union refused to avail themselves of the repudiation procedures introduced in August and consequently were expelled automatically. This expulsion was hardly an example of rigorous enforcement - the two virtually 'expelled themselves' - and it occurred with little fanfare and too soon before the election to influence voters susceptible to anti-Communist gestures. But, for the watching Federal Executive delegates these activities in Victoria served as the swallows of a Victorian summer of enforcement of Federal policy.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the Federal Executive had laid down a smokescreen. The Communist Federal Secretary of the Waterside Workers' Federation, J. Healy, had died on 13 July and his successor was to be elected in November, only weeks before the general election. The Newcastle Branch President of the WWF, C. Fitzgibbon, a member of the ALP New South Wales Executive, was persuaded by the officers of the latter body to nominate for the vacancy against T. Nelson, a Communist.  

116 There were suggestions from the DLP that one of those expelled, B.H. Workman, had been enrolled in the ALP only weeks before, for the specific purpose of providing a unity ticket scapegoat. The other, R.V. Bradbury, had been an ALP member for about two years: Age, 25, 30 November, 1 December 1961; Bradbury to the author, 11 October 1978; correspondence and other material on BWIU election, Vic. Rec., Letters from Members whose Names were put on Union 'How to Vote' Tickets 1961; A.G. Poyser, interview; SMH, 20, 25, 27 November 1961; VCE 24 November 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8742.  

117 Fitzgibbon said: 'I nominated on my account, and for the good of the union, not for the ALP'. Oliver told the Federal Executive that Fitzgibbon did not want ALP 'endorsement' (which he could not have had under party rules in any case). But Oliver and Colbourne both remember looking around for a suitable candidate and persuading Fitzgibbon, who was reluctant to leave Newcastle, to stand. (A press report stated that ALP Branches throughout Australia were looking for candidates and three had been mentioned: C-M, 15 August 1961). Fitzgibbon was opposed to the NSW Branch controlling group on a number of issues and was a relatively militant unionist, but he had taken stands against Communist tactics in the Newcastle union movement. As early as three weeks before Fitzgibbon announced his candidacy Mulvihill had excused Fitzgibbon from a NSWCE
Calwell reacted enthusiastically. 'Mr Fitzgibbon's victory on this occasion', he said, 'should be the first major breakthrough in a rank-and-file campaign to rid trade unionism of everything alien, un-Australian and anti-democratic'. He wished Fitzgibbon, 'my fellow-Laborite, every success in his campaign and in his attempt to break the stranglehold which the Communist party has had on this important position for nearly a quarter of a century'. Every worker, he concluded, 'should vote to remove Communists from union office when their opponents are members, or supporters of the Australian Labor party'. Colbourne, New South Wales Branch Secretary and Federal President, added that Fitzgibbon 'will carry with him the best wishes and full support of all members of the ALP'.

Five days after Fitzgibbon's announcement the Federal Executive meeting determined the party's official attitude to his candidacy. The

Committee meeting in terms that suggest the possibility of his standing had been canvassed ('Assuming that your Federal Secretary's Ballot is on, it will be fully understood if you cannot attend this meeting'). The best interpretation of why Fitzgibbon stood seems to be: he had been considering standing and was convinced to do so by advance undertakings of ALP tacit support and concrete assistance to make up for his lack of a 'machine' to match those of the Communists and Industrial Groups. The withdrawal of the Grouper, Alford, provided further encouragement (note 124 below): A.L.P. News, 15 October 1961, 3; W.R. Colbourne, interview; Mulvihill to Fitzgibbon, 26 July 1961, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/41/83/221; C.T. Oliver, interview; C.T. Oliver, note on sheets of paper containing drafts of FX motion, inserted in Minute book, FX 21-24 August 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/150; SMH, 17 August, 18 November 1961 (Fitzgibbon interview, quoted).

A.L.P. News, 15 September 1961, 3. See also: Age, SMH, 17 August 1961, which have immaterial differences in wording. Colbourne became President in July 1961 (note 110 above). Note also the discussion at the meeting of the Commonwealth Labor Advisory Council (representatives of FX, FPLP and Australian Council of Trade Unions) on 18 August: Colbourne reported to the Executive that the ACTU officers (Monk, Souter) asked about the effect of the Fitzgibbon candidacy on affiliates. The CLAC Minutes record: 'It was generally felt that there should be an A.L.P. candidate in the ballot. Party Leaders there had expressed support for an A.L.P. candidate. The A.C.T.U. officers were in agreement with the running of a candidate' (CLAC 18 August 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/148-9).
Executive faced considerable constraints. The removal in 1955 of the Industrial Groups' party endorsement had ended what many unionists saw as a denial of the Labor tradition of non-interference in the affairs of unions. Calwell and Colbourne had made clear their positions. Calwell's statement sought votes from Australians who responded to rhetoric about alien philosophies and Communist strangleholds. He disguised his enthusiasm hardly at all. Colbourne came from a Branch which had been relatively severe on unity tickets and correspondingly willing to support ALP candidates in union elections. But the Federal Executive included representatives of five other Branches with differing views about the merits and the importance of the issue of Labor-Communist relations in the unions. Thus a decision emerged only after lengthy discussion. The President, Colbourne, his two Vice Presidents, Dunstan (South Australia) and R.H. Lacey (Tasmania), and Oliver supported a formulation which declared the duty of all ALP members in unions to support competent, Labor-supporting candidates in union elections, welcomed the candidacy of Fitzgibbon by name and expected all ALP members 'to support efforts to break the quarter-century grip of the Communist Party

The help the NSW Branch was to supply Fitzgibbon was only 'the best publicised example' of such support (J.A. Mulvihill, interview). (This was distinct from the widespread phenomenon of tickets which claimed to be ALP-supported but lacked even tacit support. Many of these tickets did comprise solely ALP members and some were successful, even in Victoria). Tacit NSWCE support for tickets always existed (as it did in any other State) but material support, such as the supply of names of ALP members in unions, would have been more judiciously provided, given the Federal prohibition of endorsements. The NSWCE's public stance was that while union candidates could make 'passing reference' to their ALP membership they must not imply they had party endorsement. No one had exclusive right to the ALP name: Mulvihill to E.S. Ryan, Mt. Kembla, 24 October 1956, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/11/24/373 (other similar letters in later years). Both the 1959 and 1961 Federal Conferences discharged Queensland items which would have allowed official ALP tickets, although no specific endorsement procedure was set out in either item (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 48; 1961, 39).
on that position’. This motion resembled closely Calwell’s sentiments and words but it was criticised by Nicholls (South Australia) and Miley (Tasmania) for the specific reference to Fitzgibbon. The party might be embarrassed, they reasoned, if another ALP member should nominate. Brebner and Stout opposed the motion, and Brebner asked Colbourne, the Chairman, to rule that the motion and a Nicholls-Miley amendment which merely omitted Fitzgibbon’s name were against the 1959 Conference decision – or that part of it which referred to interference with unions. Colbourne, who had left the chair earlier to support the original motion, refused Brebner’s request. Chamberlain then spoke, to argue that 'any proposition approved by the Executive should only contain reference to a general principle'. He moved an amendment to omit both the reference to Fitzgibbon and any expression of pleasure connected with the WWF election, leaving only a declaration of the duty of ALP unionists to elect competent, ALP-supporting officers.

Even if both the Queenslanders, Keeffe and Whiteside, had supported the original motion it would have received only six votes. None of the three amendments was likely to receive a majority. While, on this occasion, the South Australian and Tasmanian delegations were both split, the Executive was just as delicately balanced on the Fitzgibbon question as it was to be on unity tickets three days later. In the earlier case, too, a unanimous decision emerged after informal discussion. The resolution agreed to include the general declaration Chamberlain had

121 This declaration also had been expressed in slightly different words in another part of the 1959 Conference resolution.
122 The other amendment (Dowding-Brebner) fell between those of Nicholls and Chamberlain, making the general declaration but authorising the officers 'to make an appropriate statement' after nominations closed. Chamberlain spoke against this (and against the motion and the Nicholls amendment) so the WA delegation also was divided.
sought but gained the support of those who had favoured the original, 'Calwell-line' motion by endorsing 'the statements of the Federal Parliamentary Leader and the Federal President on this issue'. Victorian feelings were smoothed by leaving out the anti-Communist rhetoric and by a reference to 'the two extreme groups' - Communists and Groupers - which ALP unionists fought. The possibility of another ALP candidate was overcome by leaving out Fitzgibbon's name and, indeed, any specific reference to the presence of ALP candidates in the election. Each Executive member contributed to producing the resolution; each saw something in it which took account of his views or at least nothing that condemned his practices. Above all, by endorsing the remarks of Calwell and Colbourne welcoming the candidacy of an individual, the resolution allowed the party - ostensibly through individual members rather than as a body - to apply Calwell's words: 'Anything I can do to help [Fitzgibbon], and any influence I can exercise in support of his candidature, will be freely done and willingly given'.

Nevertheless, while the ALP effort was designed to prove Labor's anti-Communism it also lessened the pressure for stronger enforcement of the unity ticket ban. Perhaps, without the compensations of Fitzgibbon, Calwell might have agreed with his Caucus colleagues about Victoria. Perhaps, without the opportunity to provide Calwell and the politicians with an alternative strategy, Chamberlain might have deserted the Victorians and cast the vital seventh vote for intervention.

Fitzgibbon's candidacy had effects far beyond the Waterside Workers' Federation. It galvanised some of Labor's decisionmakers to become part of 'an alliance of men of all shades of political and religious opinion', including Fitzgibbon campaign committees of ALP rank and file members and supporters in the WWF, Industrial Groupers and press editorialists, 'who for whatever mixed reasons' wanted Fitzgibbon elected.\(^{124}\) It helped other

\(^{124}\)The quotation is from Bulletin, 25 November 1961. The WWF Industrial Group and the DLP claimed credit for Fitzgibbon's win. The Grouper candidate in the election in progress when Healy died, V. Alford, offered to withdraw from the new ballot if the ALP supported a genuinely anti-Communist candidate. When Alford withdrew after the FX meeting he set his machine to work unobtrusively for Fitzgibbon. Oliver remembers that the ALP had 'good relations' with Alford: Age, 21 July 1961; Bulletin, 25 November 1961; C.T. Oliver, interview; SMH, 21 August, 24, 27 November 1961. Some ALP members were less enthusiastic. Nine Federal politicians, T. Uren, E. Ward, L. Haylen, A. James, F. Crean, H. McIvor, C. Cameron, L. Johnson and J. Cairns, were reported to have refused to contribute to a collection sponsored by Calwell, though Ward, at least, agreed to write to a WWF contact in Tasmania in support of Fitzgibbon (note 123 above). An obscure ALP branch member nominated against Fitzgibbon, underlining (probably intentionally) the problems of party support for one candidate, to which critics of the Fitzgibbon 'tacit support' alluded. Militant unions protested at ALP 'interference' and the VCE felt obliged to investigate the statements of three leading WWF members of the ALP who said they would support the Communist Nelson rather than Fitzgibbon. (The explanations of the three, members of the unity ticket executive of the Melbourne WWF, were accepted): Correspondence and other material complaining at ALP interference, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/12/F28 Unity Tickets; SMH, 22, 26 August, 1, 16 September 1961; Socialist and Industrial Labor, November 1961, 3; VCE 1, 15 September 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740.
Labor decisionmakers, especially in Victoria, to breathe rather more easily - for a time at least.

Conclusions and Further Hypotheses

One could tell another story about unity tickets after the 1961 Federal election. The story would show how the Victorian Federal Executive delegates, aware of that body's attitude to unity tickets as an election issue in 1961, tried to persuade the VCE to stronger enforcement early in 1962 and of how the Federal Executive, while not satisfied entirely with Victoria's response, gave the Branch another chance. It would show that, just as a change in the attitude of the South Australian Branch had brought the Federal Executive close to intervention in Victoria in 1961, a change in the composition of the Tasmanian delegation to the Executive in July 1962 helped prevent intervention in that year and after. It would show the development, out of the relatively divided VCE of the late 1950s, of a body much more united against unity ticket enforcement but which, at the same time, provided token enforcement of Federal policy by accepting explanations claiming non-consent. The story would show that complaints about unity tickets in Victoria were combined with charges of unrepresentativeness, administrative incompetence, declining funds and membership, lack of interest in winning elections and sheer bloody-mindedness.

125The next four paragraphs are based on Minutes, party records, interviews with participants and contemporary accounts. They are meant as no more than the most general description. Excessive detail would disturb the structure of the thesis as a whole.

126See chapter 1, p.22, above. The arrival of V. Williams was reflected immediately in the defeat of Colbourne by Keeffe for the Federal Presidency. The vote was 7-5.
Unity tickets with Communists continued to help ensure that the control of a few important trade unions remained out of the hands of the Industrial Groups and, later, of moderate, 'responsible' rather than militant teams of ALP-supporting unionists. Unity tickets with Communists expressed the commonality of industrial and, to some extent, of political views, regardless of party loyalties, in one wing of the ALP's affiliated unions. ALP men often found themselves 'in the same places as communists on some occasions, doing the same things for the same ends'.

A study of unity tickets in the years after 1961 would show also that their importance for the party declined. Given what we have said about attitudes to enforcement within the Victorian Branch, this was not because unity tickets were stamped out. There were only six expulsions for unity tickets in Victoria from 1961 to 1965 and in five of these cases the expelled men had refused to deny consent, ensuring their automatic punishment. The sixth, W. O'Brien of the ARU, was expelled reluctantly by the VCE in 1963, two years after the charge was first laid. Unity tickets in the ARU continued unabated and O'Brien continued to stand on them after his readmission to the ALP. Unity tickets in the Waterside Workers' Federation were similarly unaffected by having to comply at each election with the technicalities of the non-consent clause. 'Enforcement' could have provided little more than a passing irritation in these circumstances. While some people interviewed remember union unrest over the unity ticket policy it is difficult to see how this could have arisen other than from annoyance at this

127 I use the concept of 'responsibility' contained in D.W. Rawson, Politics and "Responsibility" in Australian Trade Unions', AJPH, 4 (November 1958), 224-43.
128 J.F. Cairns, 'Defending Liberties', Dissent, 13 (Spring 1964), 34.
irritation, coupled with a genuine regard for the principle of non-interference in unions. Since the VCE supported this principle and included members of unions with unity ticket executives, the irritations were likely to be slight and the responses from unions proportionate. The lingering possibility of a breakaway Industrial Labor Party based on the union group which controlled the VCE may have restrained the Federal party and Federal politicians from bearing too heavily on Victoria but adverse reaction from Victorian unions to VCE enforcement seems unlikely to have been a reason for the decline of the issue within the party.\textsuperscript{129}

These comments are not meant critically. The unity ticket ban was based on a contradiction. Since the distinction between 'unionist as unionist' and 'unionist as ALP member' was unreal and since the Federal party rejected the 'political collusion' interpretation, reconciling the potentially incompatible principles of anti-Communism and non-interference in unions rested on the enforcement of the policy according to the lights of the State Branch concerned. By making enforcement a State matter the party brought upon itself its problems with unity tickets in Victoria. But it could not have been otherwise in the Federal bodies of the 1950s and 1960s where no Branch, whether plagued by unity tickets or not, wished to allow the Federal party, represented by members from other States, to act as 'first enforcer', to be able to interfere in the most intimate of State Branch affairs, the relationship between the party and its affiliated unions. Having left enforcement to the States, the Federal party and Federal politicians could hardly complain if the ban was enforced in six different ways.

\textsuperscript{129}In New South Wales, where enforcement was stricter, unions protested more often. But party records only disclose one case of a union, the Victorian Branch of the Tramways union, withholding affiliation fees in protest at unity ticket enforcement. Three Tramwaymen were automatically expelled late in 1964 when they refused to deny consent. The union delayed payment for four months.
Moreover, since most Labor decisionmakers, Federal and State, recognised the inherent difficulties of the policy, State enforcement and Federal pressure to enforce greatly depended on pressure from outside the party, where belief in anti-Communism far outweighed belief in the independence of unions. Probably the main reason for the decline of the unity ticket issue through the 1960s was the reduction of this pressure. One of the most committed anti-Communists within the party complained to the author that 'anti-Communism has gone out of fashion in Australia'. Others have traced through the 1960s the loosening of Cold War tensions, the growth of societal divisions over the Vietnam War, the lessening tendency to regard Communists as a danger to national security - and therefore a reduced inclination to condemn those who associated with them - or as alien to Australia. Further, the splintering of the Communist Party of Australia into two, three and more parties not only made union factional structures more fluid, allowing the election of purely ALP teams in some cases, but also made internal bickering rather than disciplined solidarity synonymous with Australian Communism. The connections of Labor men in a minority of unions with fragments of a divided movement probably seemed less dangerous than when Communism had seemed monolithic.

By the mid 1960s then, to the extent that issues connected with Communism had been central to Australian politics, they were giving place to those of foreign and defence policy, education, national development and social welfare. Labor's concern with union elections by no means

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130 'Even Communist unionists were too obviously within a nationalist radical tradition: there were too many of them, and they were too open about their views, to appear genuinely subversive ... and yet not enough of them to appear really threatening': Dennis Altman, 'Australia and Vietnam: Some Preliminary Speculations', AQ, 42, 2 (June 1970), 61.
died, but it was expressed, in New South Wales, in a continuation of the 'Fitzgibbon election' technique of support for favoured ALP candidates in union elections and, more generally, by an expansion of the old practice of ALP members and supporters in unions forming their own tickets to carry out the 1961 Federal Executive injunction 'to elect competent officers in their unions loyal to the principles and policies of the ALP'. The New South Wales Branch tried unsuccessfully in 1964 and 1965 to introduce ALP 'certification' on request of unionists who wished to be identified as party members when contesting union elections. This idea would have produced the same effect as had the official recognition of the Industrial Groups in the 1940s - ALP-endorsed candidates in union elections - and thus was rejected by the Federal party. The unity ticket policy was a compromise whose viability depended on flexibility of enforcement. Perhaps the best compromise between anti-Communism and the independence of affiliated trade unions always had been to leave the election of Labor supporting union executives to committed party members in the unions. But parties subject to the complex of influences that affected the ALP of the 1950s often do not see matters with the clarity of hindsight.

We began this chapter with thirteen hypotheses. Which of them have been supported by our study of critical decisions regarding unity tickets in the years 1955 to 1961? By definition, the unity ticket problem concerns relationships with affiliated trade unions (HYPOTHESIS VI). Yet, unions influenced unity ticket decisions mainly through the presence of

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And earlier, in different forms, in the Federal Executive decisions of June and August 1958 and the Federal Conference decision of May 1959, which all, in turn, found their inspiration in the Hobart Conference's leaving anti-Communist industrial activity in unions to 'the sole determination of the members of the union concerned'.
unionists in the controlling groups of State Branches. In Victoria, where the bulk of unions opposed the unity ticket policy, this was reflected in the approach of the VCE, with politicians like Kennelly and Clarey (but not Holt) in the earlier period and Federal Executive delegates like Brebner and Wyndham in the later period providing moderating influences. To the self-interest or principle of the unionists they added pragmatism based on electoral considerations or on recognition of an occasional dangerous mood on the Federal Executive, which should be appeased by some effort at enforcement. In New South Wales, on the other hand, the dominant unions were less affected directly by enforcement, being themselves free of unity ticket executives. But the knowledge that some of the minority Steering Committee unions might have disaffiliated may have tempered the actions of the New South Wales Executive. Generally, then, the goals of affiliated unions regarding unity ticket policy were reflected in the approaches of the State Branches.  

By definition, also, the unity ticket issue concerned the ALP's relationship with Communists (HYPOTHESIS VIII). Some critics saw this, indeed, as the gist of the issue: Communist officials in affiliated unions could influence union delegates to ALP Conferences to support Communist policies. (This possibility did not depend on unity tickets, of course, since it was a function of affiliated unions largely comprising people who were not individual members of the party.) Whether this happened has been debated. Communist officials, like militant union officials who were members of the ALP, certainly protested about/unity

132 This did not prevent unions reinforcing the point. See Victorian Conference agenda items opposing interference in union affairs e.g. Seamen, Meatworkers and Builders' Laborers in 1961; Blacksmiths, ARU, Plumbers and Painters in 1965.

133 See chapter 1, notes 90, 91.
tickets, but without evidence there seems no reason to attribute these protests solely to support for Communist united front tactics rather than to militancy, anti-Grouperism and a belief in the independence of unions from political interference. As long as the ALP accepted Communists as members of affiliated unions it institutionalised the possibility of influence by Communists on unity ticket policy just as on other decisions. But union militancy would have existed regardless of the presence of Communists in affiliated unions.134

HYPOTHESES VI and VIII are easily confirmed. Parts of the political system and developments in the environment also influenced critical decisions concerning unity tickets. The Liberal Federal Government and its backbenchers raised instances of unity tickets, especially at election times (HYPOTHESIS XIII). Clerics like Fox and Mannix argued that good Catholics could not support a party which consorted with Communists. We have observed the efforts of the DLP and the Industrial Groups to publicise unity tickets. There is ample evidence of the influence of Labor's relations with these various manifestations of the Catholic role in politics (HYPOTHESES IX, X). We could also detect in relevant contributions to Dissent on the one side and Outlook and Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter on the other, some limited scope for our HYPOTHESIS XI, concerning the influence of 'friendly advisers'. Fitzpatrick had a number of subscribers among Labor decisionmakers. Perhaps his opposition to interference with unions influenced them.135

134 For isolated discussions of the possibility of disaffiliating unions with Communist officials see: Arthur Cartwright, 'United We Tumble', Dissent, 15 (Spring 1965), 20; Labor Comment, December 1966, 5; E.G. Whitlam, 'Trade Unionists and Politics', Henry Mayer, ed., Australian Politics: A Reader, Melbourne, 1967, 257-9. The last was a speech given at Newcastle, June 1965. It is unclear from the text whether Whitlam actually advocated disaffiliation.

135 For Fitzpatrick, see chapter 1, note 108 above and for his views on unity tickets: Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, July 1959, 4-6; September 1959, 4-5.
We have suggested the Cold War thaw reduced the importance of the unity ticket issue. At its height it made Australians receptive to anti-Communist 'scares'. Perhaps, also, the growing material prosperity of Australians made them oppose Communists - and their alleged associates - because they threatened private property. The hypothesis about the influence of the environment and of changes in it should not be ignored (HYPOTHESIS VII). Finally, the media, especially the metropolitan press, radio and television, carried details of unity tickets and of criticism of them. When Labor politicians feared the electoral effects of unity tickets they really feared the effect of the media portrayal of them. Most voters did not read editorials or political commentaries, which gave a generally unfavourable view of unity tickets, but these unfavourable opinions were read by Labor decisionmakers who, in the absence of significant extra-party, non-union support for the concept of independent trade unions, may have been made over-conscious of the need to appear anti-Communist. The press opposition to unity tickets never approached in intensity its opposition to, say, the alleged socialist tendencies of the Chifley Government but it served to reinforce a view of 'what the voter would bear' concerning Labor's relations with Communists. To that extent, HYPOTHESIS XII is supported. 136

George Crawford, VCE member, attributed the demands on the Victorian Branch for enforcement to 'pressure from a coalition of the DLP and the Groupers, politicians - who took notice of them out of considerations of political expediency - and the Victorian Right'. His colleague, Bill Brown, insisted unity tickets were 'a clever political gimmick' "dreamed

136 For some press opinions on unity tickets: Age, 19 October 1959, 22 March, 28 August 1961; SMH, 31 July, 2, 4 August 1958, 31 August 1959, 29 August 1961. The articles commonly appeared when a Labor body was meeting to discuss the issue. They were less common in papers outside Melbourne and Sydney. On the press and Chifley, see David Stephens, Political Theory, History and the Australian Labor Governments, 1941-49, unpublished MA thesis, Monash University, 1974, 443-50, 490-2.
up" by enemies of the ALP'. Another former ALP union militant told the author that 'irrespective of what [Labor politicians] thought about people who were on unity tickets they should have told the newspapers and the rest to mind their own business'. Nevertheless, some Labor politicians did react. Evatt possibly saw suppression of unity tickets as his last hope of electoral success. Some Federal Caucus members, like Frank Stewart ('unity tickets - let's say Communism') saw unity tickets as an expression of an alien philosophy which they genuinely abhorred and staunchly opposed. Others, like Frank Crean, broadly agreed with the views at the beginning of this paragraph or at least denied unity tickets were an important issue. Still others, like Kennelly, could see both sides of the question but went where the electoral 'numbers' seemed to be. The application of our HYPOTHESIS III, on the influence of the conflict between 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' approaches, is complicated because both anti-Communism, the motivating force of the pro-enforcement politicians, and union independence, could be seen as party principles. (Exclusivists, remember, set much store on party principles.) But many of the pro-enforcers pursued anti-Communism for pragmatic rather than principled reasons, and their main argument was the inclusivist one that enforcement would win votes.

HYPOTHESIS I suggested that decisionmakers will be influenced by the goals of the controllers of State Branches. Since Federal unity ticket policy emerged from Federal Executive and Conference, which comprised delegates of these Branches, this hypothesis clearly is relevant. But

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137 W.W.C. Brown, G. Crawford, interviews; Fact, 8 February 1965. Similar remarks were made by J.D. Garland and J.B. Keeffe in interviews. Note also the cartoon, Labor, 22 June 1959, where 'Trade Unions' and 'ALP Branches' march together down 'path of principle', avoiding that of 'political expediency' while dogs of 'DLP', 'Lib. Party' and 'Melb. Herald' bark.

138 F. Crean, P.J. Kennelly, F.E. Stewart, interviews.
there are more specific applications. For instance, Calwell's approach to unity tickets may have been influenced by his reliance for preselection on, and his need for support from the Victorian Branch. Then, we saw the importance to the decision of August 1961 of the modification of the goals of the South Australian Branch. Thirdly, the New South Wales delegates throughout reflected the unfavourable view of unity tickets held by the majority of the NSWCE. Indeed, divisions on the Federal Executive over unity tickets tended to form around New South Wales on the one side and Victoria on the other, although delegates from other States, like Chamberlain and Dunstan, were crucial also. Decisions were also influenced by the personalities and personal relationships of delegates (HYPOTHESIS II). We have dwelt on the importance to the 1959 Conference decision of the relationship between Chamberlain and Evatt and to the 1961 Executive decision of the personality of Calwell. Perhaps also the enmity between Chamberlain and Colbourne, established during the Split, may have influenced their approaches to an issue intricately connected with that event. Kennelly's VCE contacts with Brebner and Stout may have affected his attitude. He may have seen action against unity tickets and the VCE as a way of building a new Victorian Branch in which his own influence would be rejuvenated.  

Incidentally, in Kennelly's final year on the VCE, his private secretary, P. Cullen, stood for the Branch Secretaryship. This may have been an attempt by Kennelly to extend his influence. Cullen, for his part, did not stand with this intention. He also remembers that Kennelly's ill-health in 1960 influenced his departure from the VCE (P. Cullen, interview). The voting (Wyndham twelve, R. Balcombe, incumbent Assistant Secretary, six, Cullen five) also shows the extent of divisions on the VCE at the time. Wyndham was the choice of McNoltby, Stout and the controlling group, but Balcombe, who became a supporter of the anti-VCE group later in the 1960s, and Cullen polled well: VCE 21 October 1960, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740.
HYPOTHESIS IV saw the perceived need to keep the coalition together as a possible influence on decisionmakers. We have doubted the likelihood of a party split over unity ticket enforcement, although we have noted evidence of threats to set up an Industrial Labor Party. (There seems to have been no real suggestion of splits or union disaffiliations among those who believed the party was too lenient.\textsuperscript{140}) Such threats may have influenced the Federal Executive not to force State Branches into stronger enforcement but the atmosphere of many of the party discussions and the attacks on the Industrial Groups and other external forces trying to influence party policy suggest that a desire not to bow too readily to 'anti-Labor' influences was just as salient. To the extent that HYPOTHESIS IV applied, however, it helped produce compromise decisions which made concessions alike to those who opposed interference in unions and even threatened to disaffiliate or form a splinter party and those who wanted the party to prove its anti-Communism.

The search for compromise (HYPOTHESIS V) is shown, for example, in the alternative formulations of one critical decision concerning unity tickets, the Federal Executive resolution of August 1958. Evatt had failed to get stern action against unity ticketers but in deference to the approaching Federal election, the Victorian and South Australian delegates did not oppose the paragraph informing the Branches 'that it is imperative for them to guard the decision of 1957 Conference on unity tickets with the utmost vigilance'. The mere rhetoric of strong enforcement was unobjectionable. Debate focussed instead on the party's

\textsuperscript{140}One commentator claimed at one stage that the AWU was threatening to disaffiliate in States which winked at unity tickets (SMH, 12 April 1961).
general attitude to ALP candidates in unions. The relevant parts of each formulation are set out in the table:

**TABLE 2.1 Contending Formulations, August 1958: ALP and Affiliated Unions**

**Officers' recommendation (Chamberlain, Schmella, Toohey, Colbourne):** this Executive calls upon ALP members in the Unions concerned to stand as ALP candidates in complete opposition to the forces of the extreme left and the extreme right.

**Amendment I (Davis [Vic.] - Lacey [Tas.]):** we call upon the traditional Labor Party support in the unions to do everything possible to preserve the integrity of the ALP against the continuing attacks from all Anti-Labor forces.

**Amendment II (Webb [WA] - Stout [Vic.]):** delete the whole paragraph. (This amendment was carried and the motion stood without the paragraph).

**Amendment III (Campbell [NSW]):** this Executive ... calls upon ALP members in Unions to resist the forces of the extreme left and extreme right and in Union Elections to stand independently of members of all other political Parties. (This was ruled out of order).

**Amendment IV (Colbourne [NSW] - Dittmer [Qld]):** this Executive calls upon ALP members to preserve the integrity of the ALP against continued attacks from all Anti-Labor forces. (This was carried as an amendment and then reinserted in the motion which was then carried as a whole.141

These clauses can be broken down into three questions and answers provided as follows:

**TABLE 2.2 Analysis of Contending Formulations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec'dn I (successful)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who is called upon?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trad. ALP support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.a. ALP members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To do what?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stand as ALP candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>preserve ALP integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.a. independently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stand ALP integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>preserve ALP integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against whom?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extreme left and right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all Anti-Labor forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.a. left and right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all Anti-Labor forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note, first, that Amendment II can be regarded as opposition to any statement on the subject, on the grounds that the party should not interfere at all in unions. Secondly, Amendment III was effectively the same as the original recommendation, since there is no real difference between standing 'as ALP candidates' and 'independently'. Since Amendment II had deleted the original recommendation Amendment III was ruled out of order. Thus, thirdly, the alternative answers to the first question were 'ALP members' or 'traditional ALP support'. The latter answer was unsatisfactory to some since it could have included Communists who allied with Labor members on unity tickets and supported affiliation with the ALP. Coupled with Amendment I's equally vague second answer it may have seemed to facilitate unity tickets provided unions continued to support Labor. Fourthly, however, the alternative answer - 'ALP candidates' - seemed too much like the condemned practices of the Industrial Groups. Not for three years would the Executive give even tacit support to an ALP member in a union election. Fifthly, the alternative answers to the final question, 'extreme left and right' and 'all anti-Labor forces' were not very different except that one was more comprehensive. Sixthly, since there is no real choice between the first pair of answers if the unity ticket policy is to be preserved, nor between the second pair if the party is not to seem to emulate the Groups, and since the third pair are semantically virtually interchangeable, the fourth amendment succeeds. It is a reasonable assumption that those who opposed unity tickets settled for a resolution which 'called upon' ALP members only and were also prepared to make the concession of leaving out 'ALP candidates', while those who hated the methods of the Groups agreed to the words 'preserve ALP integrity' while foregoing an

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142 See above pp.133-9 regarding the 'Fitzgibbon election'.
appeal to the type of 'traditional Labor Party support' which joined in unity tickets against the Groups.

Other decisions could be analysed in a similar way. The December 1960 Executive resolution on the question of negotiations with the DLP, far from being a simple endorsement of Chamberlain's rejection of the approach, as the press suggested, emerged from a lengthy debate involving a motion, five amendments and an adjournment for lobbying. The Minutes of the August 1961 Federal Executive meeting show that the unanimous resolution concerning the WWF election emerged out of a motion and three amendments. The unity ticket motion at the same meeting was passed without amendment but emerged out of informal negotiations where other delegates were seeking support for Federal action against Victoria. Both sides made concessions. Thirdly, in July 1962, when the Federal Executive considered the Victorian investigations of the ARU elections, harsh and moderate formulations were withdrawn in favour of one expressing relatively mild disquiet at the actions of Brebner but welcoming Victorian undertakings to adhere to unity ticket policy in future. In each case, the differences between alternative formulations can be analysed and reasons suggested. This is no mere semantic exercise, for a Branch's approach to crucial phrases reflected its goals regarding the issue. Labor, wrote Graham Freudenberg, was 'a Party which had become obsessed with the nuances of the wording of policy declarations, a Party which had conceived a passion for textual analysis worthy of medieval scholars'. An understandable obsession when the turn of a

143 See above note 80.
144 See above pp. 131-3.
146 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 27-8. Note also: 'These people, some of them come along to Conferences and don't know the meanings of words. They don't understand semantics' (C.R. Cameron, interview); 'There is an old saying that "the ALP is a revolutionary movement, not a revolutionary movement"' (Lloyd Ross, interview).
word could align a Federal resolution with a State's dearest goals or make it unacceptable, could ensure or avoid a stalemate. Nuances helped build compromise decisions. From the beginning in 1956-57, through the important reaffirmation of 1959 to a further reaffirmation at the Federal Conference in 1965, via all the decisions in between, tinkering with words helped refine the terms of the basic compromise between the independence of unions and opposition to Communism. 147

It is relatively simple to show that a decision is a compromise, that it is less than what any single sub-coalition would have liked. It is more difficult to show how the decision emerged. Writers in the field of public policy have recognised this problem. 'A policy', writes Charles Lindblom, 'is sometimes the outcome of a political compromise among policy makers' but the whole process is a complex and uncertain one. 'Somehow a complex of forces that we call "policy making", all taken together, produces effects called "policies".' 148 Graham Allison recognises that the aim is to discover 'who did what to whom that yielded the action in question', that enabled collective decisions to emerge out of 'the pulling and hauling that is politics'. The analyst tries to identify 'not simply the reasons that support a course of action, or the routines of organizations that enact an alternative, but the power and skill' of decisionmakers. 149 We have discussed the arguments for and against alternative approaches to unity tickets. We have recognised structural characteristics of the ALP such as federalism and the division between, and respective formal powers of politicians and party office holders.

147 For the 1965 resolution, see below p.160.
We have discussed the role of individual decisionmakers. But how did this combination of factors produce decisions?

Where power in an organisation is diffused, Lindblom and Allison agree, decisions tend to emerge from a process of 'bargaining'. All organisations, by definition, are coalitions comprising sub-coalitions whose goals conflict. Where it is not possible for one sub-coalition to have the whole coalition adopt, by fiat or naked force, the goals of the sub-coalition, there must be bargaining to arrive at a decision which is a compromise between sub-coalitional goals, 'a mixture of conflicting preferences and unequal power ... distinct from what any person or group intended'. Lindblom attempts both to classify types of bargaining or 'mutual adjustment', as he calls it, and to expound the virtues of one special type. Superficially, it seems possible to lump many examples of unity ticket decisionmaking under what Lindblom calls 'exchange of threats and promises', which is almost a 'lay' definition of bargaining.  

"Unless you undertake to enforce the unity ticket policy', Chamberlain might have said to Brebner in August 1961, 'I shall vote for intervention in Victoria'. 'If you want us to make a show of enforcing that disagreeable policy', Brebner might have retorted, 'you can't expect us to enthusiastically support Fitzgibbon'. The New South Wales Branch may have said to the Federal Executive, 'unless you protect Labor's relationship with the unions by effectively banning unity tickets we shall seek the same end by running ALP candidates'.

This type of bargaining and the others which Lindblom lists are subsumed, in a way which he does not appear to recognise, by his concept of 'mutual adjustment by partisan analysis' or 'partisan mutual

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150 Allison, Essence of Decision, 145.
Partisan mutual adjustment is decisionmakers (policy-makers) simultaneously trying to persuade each other that 'a policy [one] desires can serve the values of [the] policy maker to whom the persuasion is directed'. Since it tries to identify one decision or policy with differing values it is not frustrated by the variations in goals which occur in all organisations. Decisionmakers seek not the 'best' policy for achieving a unitary set of goals, but only a policy acceptable to all decisionmakers. This process, settling for an acceptable or satisfactory, rather than a perfect decision, had been christened 'satisficing' by the earlier writers, March and Simon. The total process of partisan mutual adjustment, as the name implies, involves continual 'adjustment' of goals to decisions. Decisionmakers match ends to means, asking questions like 'is it worth it?' and 'can we (they, you) accept this or are concessions required (goals needing to be foregone)?' and 'what will be the costs of this policy in terms of these conflicting goals?' Partisan mutual adjustment is an overarching concept because it is directed towards a satisficing decision. It continually has in mind the need to find something acceptable to the participants. It continues until a formula is found which can become, by means of the formal processes of the organisation, the decision which bears the organisation's name.

154 The phrase 'formal processes' inspires the question: Is there any difference between a decision that is supported by a majority (all that is required formally) and a unanimous decision? Unanimity could occur in a number of ways. First, all concerned might be totally 'of one mind' (cf. the Latin derivation) in support of a decision without needing to discuss its wording. Second, delegates might be asked 'is that unanimous?' as distinct from 'nem. con.' (no one opposing) because of a special need to show a united front. Third, where opponents of the majority formulation are persuaded, for the same reasons of unity, to give formal support rather than vote against when they have no chance of
The other types of bargaining or mutual adjustment which Lindblom summarises are better seen as techniques or tactics to serve the basic aim of achieving a compromise decision. 155

There is a link between our HYPOTHESIS V, that decisionmakers will seek compromise between the goals of sub-coalitions; and the concept of partisan mutual adjustment. Partisan mutual adjustment describes the methods or techniques of searching for a compromise decision, a decision that satisfies participants because it achieves at least some of their goals. Individuals and sub-coalitions know their sets of goals conflict with those of other individuals and sub-coalitions in the party and they seek a method of decisionmaking that will produce a decision in the name

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154 (continued)

success. Fourth, what Eulau calls 'bargained unanimity', where bargaining has continued beyond the achievement of a majority in order to produce a compromise satisfactory to all. The main effect of this probably would be to produce a very vague decision. We shall accept that unanimous decisions differ from majority decisions only in the numbers who are party to the compromise. The process is the same regardless of the numbers for or against. See: Heinz Eulau, 'Logics of Rationality in Unanimous Decision-Making', Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Nomos VII: Rational Decision, New York, 1964, 26-54.

155 Lindblom's list, apart from partisan mutual adjustment, comprises exchange of threats and promises, creation and discharge of obligations (IOUs), manipulation of the environment to close off options, use of third persons, mutual deference in areas of expertise, use of brokers: Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 95-9, which is based on the longer exposition in Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, New York, 1965. These, it seems to me, are techniques of persuasion which are meaningful only if the persuader has certain formulations at hand to present to the person(s) persuaded after the latter has recognised the weight of the threat or promise, the existence of an obligation, the lack of options, the persuader's superior knowledge — or any of these as conveyed by a third person. (A broker, the last in the list, as described by Lindblom, merely brings mutual persuaders together.) The formulation could be presented in conjunction with one or more of these devices of persuasion but in either case the desired reaction is: 'OK, I see your point. Now, what's your plan ...'. The decisionmakers then settle down to a process of mutual persuasion where each will put forward alternative formulations designed to meet some of his own goals but presented to show how they can meet the other's goals as well. Eventually an acceptable formulation emerges or the relationship ceases because common ground cannot be found.
of the party) which represents the common ground between the participants. If one sub-coalition tries instead to force its views on others without making concessions, it risks internal dissension, even splitting, since the party is a voluntary association whose members can choose to stay or go.

It is time to introduce a new hypothesis, one that refers to the methods decisionmakers use to reconcile their own conflicting goals and to take account of other internal strivings and external pressures. HYPOTHESES I, II and III referred to strivings by individuals and sub-coalitions in conflict. HYPOTHESES IV and V introduced strivings in concert, towards unity. HYPOTHESES VI to XIII encapsulated the external pressures decisionmakers might feel. Three further hypotheses will be advanced regarding methods of decisionmaking. Here is the first of them. HYPOTHESIS XIV: DECISIONMAKERS WILL PRACTISE PARTISAN MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT

Lindblom also uses the concept of 'disjointed incrementalism'. Decisionmakers, singly and in groups dispersed through the organisation, start from their appreciation of existing conditions, policies and objectives and judge alternative proposals according to how much change they will produce from the present rather than towards an ideal future state. They 'are less concerned with pursuing a better world than with avoiding a worse'. They seek 'incremental alteration of existing social states'. The choice is 'how much change in A' (say, interference in trade unions) against 'how much change in B' (say, party unity). Appreciation is imperfect and changes are likely to produce unintended consequences requiring rectification. The result is 'a never-ending series of attacks on more or less permanent, though perhaps slowly changing, problems'. It is decisionmaking by 'continual nibbling'
rather than 'a good bite'. Looked at from this point of view, Labor's approach changed as the problem changed - depending on one's point of view - from how to destroy the Groups to how to preserve militant unionism or from how to disown fellow travellers with Communists to how to salvage political elections. Labor's problem of relations with Communists had been 'permanent' since the founding of Australian Communism in 1920. Unity tickets, one aspect of the relationship, still exist in 1979. After one attack on the problem, the Federal Executive decision of August 1961, Alan Reid wrote that the issue was 'still unresolved'. Four years later, Bill Hartley, Secretary of the VCE, looked at the Federal decisions on unity tickets and the related question of the party's role in union elections and complained: 'There are no less than 23 separate and distinct entries in this confused hotch-potch of decisions and rules which, according to the convenience of the moment, are sometimes read separately, sometimes together - in part or in full, and sometimes in juxtaposition to one another'. Table 2.3 analyses Federal decisions relevant to unity tickets during the years 1948-65.


157 The 1924 Federal Conference forbade both affiliation by the Communist Party with the ALP and membership of the ALP by avowed Communists. The first unity tickets probably occurred in the 1930s (Rawson, Labor in Vain? 86, 89). After the 1965 reaffirmation of the 1957 ban there were allegations of unity tickets in, at least, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1977. While old 'offenders' like the Victorian ARU and WWF predominated there were others. The lack of evidence for the 1970s attests, as countless interviewees confirmed, not that unity tickets have died out but that few people care. In the national headquarters of Australia's largest union, the Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union, the commemorative plaque lists the union's officers and it is a classic unity ticket.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Body</th>
<th>Relation to Previous Decision(s)</th>
<th>Increment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1948</td>
<td>Conf.</td>
<td>Reaffirms decisions since 1924 repudiating Communist Party and proscribing cooperation with it.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Sept.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Communist activity in unions is matter for unionists only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mar.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bans unity tickets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sept.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Directs States to enforce ban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1957</td>
<td>Conf.</td>
<td>Approved 3., which thus became decision of Conf.</td>
<td>Ask States for information on practice within State and for their views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mar.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure ALP influence in unions is maintained and expanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Aug.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition of the consent problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1958</td>
<td>Exec.</td>
<td>Draws attention to 4.</td>
<td>Declares responsibility of all ALP members to ensure that unions remain controlled by executives sympathetic to ALP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(June)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Automatic expulsion for those who do not produce statutory declaration and press advertisement denying consent. States to report all action to Fed. Exec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 1958</td>
<td>Exec.</td>
<td>States directed to enforce 'the decision of Conference on Unity Tickets'. ALP members called upon to preserve party's integrity against anti-Labor attacks.</td>
<td>Automatic expulsion for those who do not produce statutory declaration and press advertisement denying consent. States to report all action to Fed. Exec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(May)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Copies of reports to be sent to all Fed. Exec. members. Reimbursement for press adverts. Accuser and accused in all cases to appear before State Exec. and give evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 1961</td>
<td>Exec.</td>
<td>Exec. is determined rule 'banning unity tickets in trade union elections' will be enforced.</td>
<td>Copies of reports to be sent to all Fed. Exec. members. Reimbursement for press adverts. Accuser and accused in all cases to appear before State Exec. and give evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Aug.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Copies of reports to be sent to all Fed. Exec. members. Reimbursement for press adverts. Accuser and accused in all cases to appear before State Exec. and give evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sept.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Copies of reports to be sent to all Fed. Exec. members. Reimbursement for press adverts. Accuser and accused in all cases to appear before State Exec. and give evidence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

159 Decisions are consolidated in ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 35-6, 125-34.
Like its predecessors, the 1965 decision emerged, as Calwell said, because sub-coalitions 'were prepared to make concessions so that we would all arrive at a commonly acceptable result on a difficult and complex subject'. Afterwards, as before, 'the issue was left unresolved'. This was not merely because the policy was enforced badly, but because while the party was subject to complex influences, its approach to unity tickets would itself be complex, internally inconsistent and unsatisfactory as a whole to any single source of influence. Yet each influence over the years had helped effect changes in the policy and its enforcement. Labor's approach to unity tickets had changed as it tried to cope with the basic contradiction between anti-Communism and the independence of unions.

Calwell: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 253. Calwell was referring specifically to the Victorians, who had come to the Conference with an item seeking rescission of all existing Federal resolutions on union elections in favour of a restatement of the old political collusion formula plus an absolute prohibition of the use of the party name in union elections, even by individuals. NSW, on the other hand, sought ALP certification (effectively, endorsement) on request of party members contesting union elections. Both items were withdrawn after pre-session lobbying.

DT, 4 August 1965. In this article, Alan Reid showed the antecedents in earlier resolutions of each paragraph of the resolution, which was really a consolidation of earlier enforcement resolutions, with minor additions. See also: Nation, 7 August 1965.
Use of the concept of incrementalism is not without its problems. First, in compiling a list such as Table 2.3 there is always the question 'which decisions are relevant?' The dozen decisions listed include neither some in the early 1960s, concerning particular cases and concerning Victoria's enforcement performance, nor decisions more directly connected with the ALP's role in union elections such as the 'Fitzgibbon election'. Yet the approach to individual cases and to Victoria guided both ALP members in unions and the Victorians themselves regarding the likely Federal reaction to future unity tickets. Further, ALP tickets, endorsed or tacitly supported, could be seen as the other side of the unity ticket coin. Banning unity tickets, winking at them, supporting ALP tickets and outlawing them were all ways of approaching Labor's relations with the union movement. The party traced an even more tortuous path than that outlined in the Table. On the other hand, such a Table may read too much into nuances. For instance, did the recognition in August 1958 that some ALP members had been placed on unity tickets without their consent add anything to the September 1956 formulation which referred only to an ALP member 'who agrees' to appear on such a ticket? The consent loophole was always there in some form. Then, was there any real difference between the four formulations of the duty of ALP members in unions (June and August 1958, May 1959 and August 1961 - Fitzgibbon resolution)? At what point does refinement become change, however incremental? The answer seems to be that even the smallest refinement is relevant. New formulations did not emerge without a reason. They indicated and registered changing relationships within the organisation and changing external pressures. The strengthening of the expression of the role of ALP members in unions from asking 'that Conference consider the practicability of taking appropriate steps - with
adequate safeguards - to ensure that the influence of the Australian Labor Party is maintained and expanded' (June 1958) to declaring 'it is the duty of all A.L.P. members of trade unions to seek to elect competent officers in their unions loyal to the principles and policies of the A.L.P.' (August 1961) occurred because the party needed to counter the impression created by publicity of unity tickets and because of the relative decline of extreme anti-Grouperism within the Executive. Simultaneously, the consent clause saved the party the embarrassment of wholesale expulsion, the financial loss of union affiliation fees and the trauma of intervention in Victoria. Some influences were present in 1955 and waned later, others emerged after the Split. Out of flux, decisions emerged, pursuing an uncertain course across the history of the post Split years. Federal enforcement decisions (elaboration of the consent clause, provision for statutory declarations and advertisements), their application by States to cases, the formulae that States developed for themselves (political collusion, ALP name) as well as the refinements of the basic compromise between anti-Communism and non-interference, all emerged from a similar set of circumstances inside and outside the party, although different influences were more salient in different Branches and Federally and at different times. In each State, the Executive pursued incrementalism - remember Victoria's oscillations between defiance, turning a blind eye, use of the political collusion formula and acceptance of the consent loophole - and the results regarding unity tickets were by no means alike. Theoretically, Federal Conference and Executive were supreme. In practice, the compromise decisions these bodies produced rested on leaving enforcement to the States, with Federal action only as a last resort. This gave the State Branches as significant a role as the Federal party in making decisions about unity
tickets. ALP policy regarding unity tickets was produced by the action and inaction of State and Federal parties in combination but not in cooperation, by a process of disjointed incrementalism, a series of decisions emanating from a number of points within the organisation and reflecting the organisation's continually changing 'nature and nurture' - its internal structure and the influences upon it. The party made decisions by a process of 'moving compromise - ... a never-ending sequence of compromises, each successive one responding to a new alignment of preferences or interests'.

HYPOTHESIS XV: DECISIONMAKERS WILL PRACTISE DISJOINTED INCREMENTALISM.

This is the second of three hypotheses concerning methods of decisionmaking.

Chapter 3: State Aid 1963-1966

On 9 June 1963 the Annual Conference of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Labor Party adopted an Education Committee report which included this paragraph:

The Committee recommends, so that a continuous supply of students in this field be maintained at secondary school level, that the N.S.W. Labor Government be requested to provide or assist in the provision of science laboratories and teaching facilities in all schools where the Government is satisfied that laboratories and teaching facilities are either non-existent or inadequate for the proper training of children in this specialised field of education.1

When Conference delegates asked if the decision should not refer only to state schools, the Chairman, C.T. Oliver, replied firmly that there had been no mistake and that the recommendation covered 'all schools'. Despite vocal opposition and cries of 'state aid by the back door' and 'the thin end of the wedge' the report was adopted overwhelmingly.2

This decision serves as the beginning of a case study of Labor's approach to the issue of state aid to denominational schools. This chapter takes a slice of history and analyses the political 'pulling and hauling' that produced ALP decisions regarding state aid during that period.

To place the study in context it is necessary to refer briefly to the background to this first decision. The Australian colonies had

1 ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1963 Annual Conference, 70. My emphasis.
abolished state aid to religious education systems in the last decades of the nineteenth century but the Roman Catholics retained and expanded a system of primary or parish schools. This system formed the largest and most needy section of the private education sector. Intermittent requests for state aid came from the Catholic church and were directed especially towards State Labor Governments which were believed most favourable to Catholic demands because of the Catholic component of the ALP. But fear of arousing again the sectarian bitterness which had accompanied the nineteenth century debates over state aid meant that governments of all colours thereafter avoided 'direct' aid, that is, aid to the non-state systems, while gradually developing an array of measures which eased the burden of parents who chose to use these systems. State governments did not ignore the educational needs of Catholics and others outside the state systems but their efforts were piecemeal and circumspect.³

Hogan traces the history of these measures under the New South Wales Labor Government between 1950 and 1963. By the earlier date, New South Wales non-state school students benefitted, for example, from secondary

³Usage has 'state aid' as the term for what could perhaps be termed direct state aid' (see below). 'Indirect state aid' came to be used for assistance to the parents of students at non-state schools. State aid is one of the most written about topics in Australian history and politics. Two general accounts which give considerable space to the early period are A.G. Austin, Australian Education 1788-1900, Melbourne, 1961 and Ronald Fogarty, Catholic Education in Australia 1806-1950, Carlton, Vic., 1959. The range of the writing, including that in theses, is shown in bibliographies like those in G.S. Harman, The Politics of Education, St Lucia, Qld, 1974, 102-6, and Michael Charles Hogan, The Catholic Campaign for State Aid, Sydney, 1978, 280-302. Harman (102) describes state aid as '[t]he most controversial issue related to education in recent years in Australia', yet the most detailed account of the ALP's approach to it (Henry S. Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, University Park, Pa., 1966) is based mainly on press reports and intuition.
bursaries (awarded to a few hundred students on the results of competitive examinations), medical and dental inspections, vocational guidance and free school bus travel in rural areas. Over the next dozen years travel concessions were gradually extended and the number of bursaries increased. Other measures, such as making the government stores available to Catholic schools and ensuring that lotteries legislation did not affect 'housie' games and other methods of gambling used by the Catholics to finance parish schools, could be described as 'disguised' state aid since, while not contributing directly to the coffers of the Catholic education system, they enabled diversion or accumulation of funds. A similar end was served by exempting Catholic and other non-state schools, like state schools, from the payment of rates. Finally, the Commonwealth government provided such benefits as free radio licenses, Australian flags, free milk and subsidies for cadet corps.

While Labor in New South Wales had provided less indirect and disguised aid than had some other States (for example, Queensland, where scholarships had been non-competitive and virtually universal since 1914) it was bound by three constraints. The first constraint was the feeling that the voters, three out of four non-Catholic, would not countenance measures of direct state aid which would benefit mainly the Catholic parish schools. However, there were distinct signs in the 1950s that this public feeling was changing and public opinion polls  

4 Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 1-17 passim. Of such disguised aid, Hogan writes: 'Every major party, at State and Commonwealth level, was prepared to give considerable aid to Catholic parents and to Catholic schools in ways which were administrative, incremental, and not perceived by the electorate as state aid' (27).  

5 Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 3.
showed a clear, perhaps even gradually increasing majority in favour of some form of direct aid.⁶

New South Wales Labor politicians had always recognised the educational contribution of non-state, especially Catholic, schools. They knew that the Catholic parish system, drawing its pupils from a section of the community with a higher than average birth rate, had been disproportionately affected by the post war 'baby boom' and that the influx of Catholic migrant families and the declining number of teaching nuns and brothers added to its problems.⁷

The New South Wales Government's awareness of Catholic difficulties was heightened by the contacts between the Government, senior members of the party organisation and the Catholic hierarchy of the Sydney archdiocese.⁸ On the church side, Bishop James Carroll, Auxiliary to Cardinal Gilroy since 1954, was the main contact. He took charge of a Catholic campaign commenced in September 1961 to win some form of direct aid from the Government.⁹ This campaign was to be moderate,

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⁷ Gill, 'The Federal Science Grant', 275-6; Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 4. Hogan (14) quotes Premier Cahill in 1954 wishing 'we were able to do more than pay a verbal tribute to their [Catholic schools'] work. Education is something that causes concern financially to this State. How much more concern it must be for the Catholic community'.

⁸ See chapter 1, pp. 57-8.

⁹ Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 29-77, is the definitive account of the events described in the following sentences. I have relied upon it. Bishop James Carroll, Independent Schools in a Free Society [n.p., Sydney, 1962], and James M. Kelleher, Roman Fever, Surry Hills, NSW, 1962, were representative of moderate arguments while John P. Kelly, 'Catholic Schools and Catholic Education 1962', Twentieth Century, 16 (Winter 1962), 307-19, put a more militant or direct action line.
unpublicised and based on patient persuasion of those senior ALP men to whom Carroll and a few lay colleagues had access. At the same time, a more militant Catholic section sought quicker success through such shock tactics as the Goulburn school boycott of July 1962, where Catholic parents withdrew their children from parish schools as a protest against the failure of governments of all complexions to provide direct aid. The Goulburn action helped encourage Gilroy to make a well-publicised call on Premier Heffron in September 1962. He carried a petition which requested of the Government, among other things, assistance for science laboratories and equipment.  

In responding to changing community attitudes and the arguments of Carroll and Gilroy, the Heffron Government faced a second constraint, Federal ALP policy. In a series of steps between 1951 and 1953 the Federal party had committed itself to the principle of direct aid.  But in the aftermath of the Split and before any State Labor Government had implemented this principle, the 1957 Federal Conference in Brisbane had removed it from the platform, replacing it with the words 'the promotion of secondary and higher education by way of Bursaries, Scholarships, Exhibitions and Benefits of a like nature, payable direct to students'. The words here emphasised were chosen deliberately to exclude pupils of the Catholic primary schools. The unity ticket compromise, discussed in

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10 The other items sought were secondary scholarships, teacher training assistance, capital and loan interest repayment assistance and subsidies for teachers' salaries. The first was already in existence in the form of the bursaries but these were not yet universal, as the petition sought.

11 The 1951 Federal Conference had resolved 'That financial aid be granted for the purpose of assisting all forms of education'. The Federal Executive had interpreted this to include, inter alia, 'education conducted by ... private authorities' and the 1953 Federal Conference had adopted this interpretation (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1951, 20-1; 1953, 17).
the previous chapter, was influenced by the desire not to bow to the pressure of political Catholicism. The scholarships resolution discriminated against the Catholic education system and the pupils of its parish schools. The Brisbane Conference majority believed state aid was a cherished goal of the hated Groupers and supported a resolution which denied everything but the possibility — since no concrete scheme was yet suggested — of scholarships for Catholic secondary students. The 1957 policy came to be summarised as 'aid to the scholar' — except the Catholic primary scholar — 'but not the school'. This did not seem to exclude the forms of disguised aid developed in New South Wales and elsewhere, but it apparently excluded such forms of direct aid as payment of teachers' salaries, capital grants and maintenance subsidies. Federal policy, as decided by the Federal Conference and interpreted by the Federal Executive, bound the New South Wales Labor Government.

12 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 75. My emphasis. Brebner, moving the resolution on behalf of the Social Services Committee, referred to the exclusion of 'students of primary schools' but, since State primary students had the equivalent of 'direct aid' already, non-state students were the sufferers and, specifically, those who used the vast Catholic parish school system. On the 'anti-Grouper' aspects of the change, see Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 11-12; S. Encel, 'Australian Political Chronicle, January-June 1957: The Commonwealth', AJPH, 3 (November 1957), 98-9; Nation, 10 September 1960. Although the Victorian, Brebner, had the carriage of the motion, Chamberlain was believed to have influenced it.

13 During the 1961 Federal election campaign Calwell circulated to his fellow candidates an interpretation — apparently his own — that the 1957 Brisbane decision meant '[t]he Australian Labor Party is opposed to the payment of salaries or capital grants or maintenance charges for non-State Schools' (Calwell to fellow candidates, 7 November 1961, and attachment: Aid to Denominational Schools and Education, Vic. Rec., Parliamentarians A to G 1961). At the 1957 Conference itself, when moving a motion deploring the Commonwealth's failure to provide the States with adequate funds for 'their educational facilities', Brebner had said that his Social Services Committee had used this formulation deliberately to exclude non-state schools (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 75. My emphasis).
The third constraint affecting the New South Wales Labor Government was the fear of internal dissension within the State ALP Branch. There were increasing grass roots pressures for some measure of direct aid and at the 1963 State Conference there were eleven agenda items supporting the concept. The ALP Youth Council, while small in numbers, was a strong supporter of direct aid and vocal enough to provoke resentment among the group, centred in the militant unionists and branch members of the minority Steering Committee, who were staunch supporters of the Federal policy of 1957. Thus, while community opposition to direct aid seemed to be declining, any concessions to Catholic requests ran the risk both of contravening Federal policy and of disturbing the balance and unity developed in the New South Wales ALP since the Split.

1963-1964

A full account of state aid and the ALP before 1963 would be much more detailed than that given above. It would show the reasons leading to the decisions of the early 1950s, the reaction in the Catholic church to the 1957 decision and the reaction in the ALP to Catholic criticism. Our main concern, however, is the political activity which followed the New South Wales Conference decision of 1963, which was the first to accept the concept of direct aid. In studying this activity, we shall concentrate upon events within the party, while recognising that external pressures were also present. Case studies of politics can highlight

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14 ALP (NSW Branch), Annual General Conference 1963 Agenda, 13-14; Nation, 15 December 1962. For an example of minority reaction to the Youth Council, see Labor Forward, August-September 1962, 6-8. (This was a small magazine produced by I. Wyner, a leading anti-NSWCE figure.)

15 Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 9-17, provides a summary.
different aspects of a period of history. This one will study state aid in terms of constraints similar to those which influenced the New South Wales Branch in 1963. These constraints were: the effect of changes in community attitudes as perceived by decisionmakers in the party, the conflict between the desires of State ALP Governments, especially in New South Wales, and Federal policy, as expressed by the Federal Executive and Conference, and the possibility of awakening unrest within the party. The recurrence of these factors during the case study will provide support for our HYPOTHESIS VII about the environment and changes within it and - if it can be shown that the New South Wales Executive and the Branch's Federal representatives stood alongside the State Labor Government - for HYPOTHESIS I about the goals of the controllers of State Branches. Further, if decisions reveal an attempt to prevent dissension between sub-coalitions (within State Branches and elsewhere) HYPOTHESES IV and V about keeping the coalition together and the search for compromise may be relevant. The two hypotheses about how the party makes decisions, by partisan mutual adjustment and incrementally or by 'moving compromise' (HYPOTHESES XIV and XV) can then be tested. Other hypotheses may also be supported.

THE 1963 FEDERAL CONFERENCE

The 1963 Federal Conference, commencing in Perth on 29 July, was confronted with the New South Wales Conference decision. Developments prior to the Perth Conference showed that the Federal party was becoming aware of the education issue and of the likely pressure to alter the 1957 policy of 'aid to the scholar but not the school'. The enemies of 1955, now congregated in the Democratic Labor Party, had retained the pre-1957 ALP plank of aid for all forms of education and had made state
aid an election promise. There were isolated signs that this innovation was electorally significant and some uneasiness developed in Federal Caucus after the Bendigo by-election of July 1960, where the Catholic Bishops Fox and Stewart had criticised Labor's Federal policy and Labor politicians canvassing the area had detected dissatisfaction among Catholic voters. Some members supported state aid in a Caucus debate and details of the debate appeared in the press. Only a small minority of both Federal Executive and Conference would have favoured state aid in 1961 and few more would have welcomed such discussion. The main concession to state aid demands was a backhanded one in a 1961 Federal Conference resolution, where Labor urged the Federal Government to provide funds 'to establish a system of secondary school scholarships similar to the Commonwealth University Scholarships'. Since the university scheme discriminated only on merit, there was a clear implication here that secondary scholarships would be awarded to state and non-state students alike, but it was left to Calwell, in his 1961 policy speech, to specify this. The wariness continued through 1962,

17 Age, 14 July, 25 August, 9 September 1960; FX 5-8 September 1960, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/26-9; Nation, 10 September 1960; SMH, 16 May, 11 July, 25, 30 August, 1, 13 September 1960. The Caucus debate began when D. Minogue, a NSW Catholic, asked Calwell if he (Minogue) could lead a delegation of Catholic constituents petitioning the Prime Minister for state aid. Another NSW Catholic, F. Stewart had suggested a Caucus committee should recommend to the next Federal Conference methods of aiding private schools.
18 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 18; Arthur Calwell, Labor's Policy - Blueprint for a Government, Canberra, 1961, 16. Some reporters were advised at the Conference that this was the 'interpretation' (Advertiser, SMH, 13 April 1961) but Calwell's policy speech seems to have been the first explicit reference to it. The Federal Executive during 1961 discussed a large number of draft policy statements (see chapter 5, below) but there is no record of a discussion of education policy and education policy does not appear in a collection of policies adopted at
when Chamberlain refused permission to hold a national conference of Labor people interested in education since it 'could lead to difficulties and Party embarrassment'. Since ALP representatives long had been vocal supporters of improved education in general, Chamberlain's fear must have been that such a meeting would lead to a public party squabble over the narrower issue of state aid.

While avoiding the topic of direct aid, the Federal bodies of the party had not shirked producing a general education policy. The key to this policy was increased Commonwealth aid and, under the 1961 Federal Conference resolution, this aid was to be spent in a variety of ways. Like other interested in Australian education since the Second World War, the Conference believed the States could not cope with the educational needs of the booming youth population without funds from the Commonwealth. Federal Labor also supported establishing a Commonwealth Ministry of Education and Science and a Commonwealth inquiry into all

18 (continued) these meetings. The only mention of education policy appears to be in a discussion at the July meeting of the unauthorised distribution of an education document written by Whitlam, but there is no indication of its contents. (Copies of policies inserted in Minute book; FX 3-7 July 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/106-7, 129-44, 168-76, 198-214).


forms of education, primary, secondary and technical. Federal Caucus members were also increasingly interested in education, and by 1962 two of them, G. Bryant from Victoria and L. Barnard from Tasmania, were members of the Federal Executive's Education Committee.

During the Goulburn school boycott of July 1962, A. Fraser, Federal Labor member for the local seat of Eden-Monaro, publicly had expressed his support for state aid and said that the ALP was not opposed to state aid as such. While present policy advocated a scholarship scheme, \textit{other methods are not ruled out}'. Technically, Fraser was correct, since the 1957 decision had said merely that Labor supported 'aid to the scholar'. The addition of 'and not the school' was an interpretation based on the remarks of Brebner and on the mood of the Brisbane Conference. The Federal Executive moved to clarify matters. In March 1963, after reprimanding Fraser for his public statement, the Executive resolved to refer to the Education Committee

\begin{itemize}
\item the question of the Party policy of opposition to church aid, having particular regard for the decisions reached by Federal Conferences in 1957 and 1961, which will enable it to be stated in clear unequivocal terms.
\end{itemize}

Responding to this instruction, the Committee first provided an interpretation that the secondary scholarships referred to in the 1961

\begin{itemize}
\item SMH, 16 July 1962. My emphasis. See also script of the broadcast, correspondence relating to the episode: Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F17.
\item FX 21 March 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/25; SMH, 22 March 1963. The Executive had studied the 1961 Conference report. Repeating this exercise, one can find at least four equivocal formulations: What was meant by 'other purposes' in the recommendation of areas requiring funds from the Commonwealth? Apart from the specific areas (listed in note 20 above) this inclusive phrase was added. Was the inquiry into secondary, technical and primary education to include non-state efforts in these fields? Were these intended as loopholes for a Federal Labor Government to assist non-state schools? For the other two, see below.
\end{itemize}
Conference decision should be awarded 'to all children, regardless of school', 'direct to the scholar' and 'on equal terms, regardless of the school which the student attends'. This formulation was the most explicit expression so far of the 'aid to the scholar, not the school', concept. It represented a further step in a process of 'disjointed incrementalism' which began in 1957 (HYPOTHESIS XV). The Federal Conference of that year supported the principle of promoting secondary and higher education by bursaries, scholarships, exhibitions and like benefits, all payable direct to the scholar. It made no concrete proposal for implementing this principle. Four years later, the Federal Conference endorsed a scheme of secondary scholarships 'similar to the Commonwealth University Scholarships', but did not specify who could receive them. Calwell's 1961 policy speech then promised the scholarships would be available to non-state and state students alike. Now the Education Committee wanted the 1963 Federal Conference in Perth to indicate in a Conference resolution Labor's support for this form of indirect aid. According to Bryant, its Secretary, the Committee had tried 'to place a positive statement in the Platform as to what the Party would do to help the scholar in the non-State school by way of bursary or scholarship'. The Executive accepted Bryant's explanation and allowed this formulation to go before the Conference as an 'immediate objective' of Labor's education policy:

15(e) The establishment of a system of secondary school scholarships similar to the Commonwealth University scholarships. This to be consistent with the general principle of promoting secondary and higher education by way of bursaries, scholarships, exhibitions and benefits of a like nature, payable direct to the student, and

available on equal terms to all students whether attending State or non-State schools.25

However, the Federal Conference unanimously supported an amendment to remove the words underlined in the above formulation. The 'incremental alteration' thus combined merely the principle of 1957 and the positive proposal of 1961. There was a change in Federal policy in recognition of the growing electoral significance of education, both state and non-state, but the Conference avoided written commitment to something which could have been seen as a concession to Catholic pressures. It remained for Calwell to make clear in his 1963 policy speech, as he had in 1961, that the scholarships would be provided for both state and non-state pupils.26 In the unity ticket case, the contradiction between anti-Communism and non-interference in unions and the near deadlock by 1961 between the supporters of these two principles was resolved, after a fashion, by leaving enforcement to the State Branches. In the state aid case, the need to seek votes on the education issue confronted the bitterness of 1955 against Catholics and the causes they cherished. The compromise solution adopted in 1957 was to continue to support only secondary scholarships. As electoral pressure increased, so did pressure to make this support concrete. But the offer to implement the policy in the area - the non-state sector - which would still arouse controversy in the Federal ALP bodies was left to Calwell. At various times between 1957 and 1963 the 'attacks on ... [the] slowly changing problems' of education came from the Federal Conference and the Federal Executive, from the Education Committees which reported to the Federal Conferences of 1961 and 1963, from the Federal Caucus and from Calwell as Federal

26 SMH, 19 November 1963.
Leader and presenter of the policy speech. These activities were less 'disjointed' or uncoordinated than in the unity ticket case, where the party's approach rested on a lack of coordination between Federal and State levels. Nevertheless, the essence of incrementalism's 'disjointedness', the contributions from dispersed parts of the organisation, is present. Formally, all the participants were subject to Federal Conference. In practice, the Conference facilitated the expression of the varying views of the State Branches regarding the balance between concessions to political Catholicism and assistance to education, the Committees provided a measure of expertise and Calwell, free of the need to avoid a Conference squabble, produced the specific vote-attracting promise. 'What one center ignores', Lindblom suggests, 'another does not'.

Described thus, the 1963 Federal Conference's attitude to secondary scholarships is an example of a desire to avoid dissension in a probable election year. But the picture was more complex than that. The reluctant support for scholarships must be balanced against the

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27 David Braybrooke & Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, Glencoe & London, 1963, 100, 128, provide the quotations. Regarding some of the policy 'contributors' mentioned, the 1961 Education Committee comprised Conference delegates appointed at the commencement of the Conference, including M. Poulter, a university lecturer, and L. Barnard, MP (see below). By 1963, the Federal Executive had appointed a Standing Committee, whose members were R.H. Lacey, a former (until 1962) Executive member (Chairman); G. Bryant (Secretary) and L. Barnard, both Federal Members of Parliament, former school teachers and interested in education; J. Wood, a former union official and Assistant Secretary of the ALP (Victorian Branch) in 1955-56, office holder in state school organisations; M. McCarney, a NSW union official; S. Encel, a university lecturer. Secondly, eight Federal Caucus Executive members discussed the draft policy speech with Calwell, before leaving him to produce the final version (SMH, 2 November 1963). Presumably, education was one topic discussed.

28 After the 1961 Federal election the position in the House of Representatives was: Government 62; ALP 60. Many Labor people were confident of victory at an early election. 'One delegate said the conference had leaned over backwards to see that it did nothing that would damage Mr Calwell's prospects at the next Federal elections' (Sun-Herald, 4 August 1963).
Conference's clarification of the party's attitude to direct state aid. At the August 1961 meeting the Federal Executive balanced its approach to unity tickets, which had made concessions to Victoria, with a concession to the 'New South Wales' view on the Fitzgibbon candidature. In 1963 the Conference laid more firmly the ground for Calwell to promise indirect aid while it also tried to close the door on the party offering direct aid. Taken together, the August 1961 decisions represent a compromise on the issue of Labor's relations with the unions; taken together, the decisions of August 1963 were a compromise on the issue of Labor's attitudes to non-state, especially Catholic education. We shall examine now the formulation and significance of the second part of the latter compromise, in order to provide support for HYPOTHESIS V.

While the 1963 Education Committee wanted to produce a positive statement on aid to the scholar it was, Bryant told the Federal Executive, 'unanimously opposed to any aid to non-State schools'.

Yet the only explicit reference to state aid in its first report, apart from the recommendation about scholarships, was a recommendation that science and other specialised facilities in state schools should be available to classes from non-state schools. The Committee, Bryant remembers, had

29 FX 7-9 May 1963, Red. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/44.
30 Remember that this recommendation was formulated at a meeting on 24 April 1963, nearly seven weeks before the NSW decision about provision of science facilities (Bryant to Chamberlain, 3 May 1963 and enclosure, Australian Labor Party Standing Committee on Education: Recommendations to Federal Conference, adopted at Committee Meeting, 24 April 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F43). It is possible that the Committee could have known of the NSW manoeuvres prior to the Conference, although these were secretive. (The NSW Education Committee was not to meet the Minister for Education, E. Wetherell, 'until other activities of which the Party Officers are aware have been developed to a further stage': Mulvihill to J. Bale, Senior Vice President, NSWCE, 11 April 1963, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/52/110/53-7). It is probable that part of the impetus for both the NSW 'provision' resolution and the Federal 'use' recommendation came from publicity surrounding Wetherell's refusal of a Catholic parents' group's request for use of state school science and other facilities (SMH, 26, 28 January 1963). Science education was a priority of education pressure groups after the Second World War (Smart, Federal Aid to Australian Schools ..., 41-71, 86-97).
regarded state aid in April 1963 as a peripheral issue for education policy. The Executive disagreed. The Minutes record that Chamberlain advised Bryant that the Executive felt some recommendations in the report were ambiguous and required clarifying. Bryant simply recalls that Chamberlain told the Committee to say the party was opposed to state aid. We may surmise that Chamberlain and the majority of the Executive were dissatisfied with a report which recommended concessions on scholarships and use of science facilities but did not reiterate the basic principle of 1957. In any case, the Committee looked again at the state aid question. Meanwhile, the New South Wales Branch adopted the recommendations of its Education Committee for state assistance for the provision of science laboratories in all schools.

Paragraph 10 of the Federal Committee's next report, presented to the Federal Executive meeting, commencing 24 June 1963, gave citizens choosing not to use the state systems the 'absolute right' to develop their own systems within recognised standards but said that 'the financial responsibility of the State shall be limited to the State's services'. A supplementary statement, written by Bryant, served as an amplification of the earlier recommendation about use of science laboratories, adding the use of playing fields, gymasia and bus services, all subject to the arrangements of the host state school, as well as scholarships, bursaries, travel allowances and text books. Probably the only one of these benefits not already provided somewhere in Australia.

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31 Bryant was asked to attend the Executive after the Education Committee Chairman, Lacey, when submitting the report, had complained it was not specific enough. Lacey probably played only a small part in its formulation, as he was occupied by duties as Secretary of the Tasmanian Branch of the party. Bryant himself provided the structure of the report and Encel the philosophy (G.M. Bryant, interview; FX 7-9 May 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/31, 44). For a sample of Encel's views on education: Nation, 27 January, 11 August 1962.
was the use of facilities in the state schools, and even this could be seen as an increment of the type of 'disguised' aid that had been given during the 1950s and earlier.

Chamberlain was not satisfied. He moved to confine the state's responsibility under paragraph 10 to the provision of scholarships as outlined in the Committee's suggested paragraph 15(e). He also gave notice he would seek to discharge Bryant's supplementary statement. Disguised assistance, he argued, merely allowed direct state aid to enter 'by the back door'. Votes should be sought instead by implementing the concept of 1957. Brebner, however, argued that the party would be accused of bigotry if it failed to make further concessions and J. Wood, a member of the Federal Education Committee, addressed the Executive in terms similar to Bryant's. Finally, Chamberlain's motion was lost by five votes to seven. At the Conference five weeks later he tried again:

Citizens [he moved] who do not choose to use the school facilities provided by the State, whether for conscientious or other reasons, shall have the absolute right to develop an independent system of schools of recognised standard, provided they do so at their own cost.

This formulation was put and adopted unanimously as part of the party's Federal education policy. As clause 4 of that policy it was to become the centre of ALP political activity regarding state aid over the next three years.

Bryant remembers seeking information about what assistance of this type was being given by the State and Commonwealth governments. 'It was difficult to find out but it was things like Australian flags, free milk, travel arrangements and so on' (G.M. Bryant, interview).

33 For paragraph 15(e) at this stage, see pp.175-6, above. For the debate: Age, 9 July 1963; DT, 2 August 1963; FX 24-27 June 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/69. Wood's views were contained in: Supplementary Statement of Policy on Aid to Non-State Schools, Attachment F/I to Business Sheet, VCE 19 July 1963, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8742.

Why was this formulation adopted so easily and what was its immediate significance? The desire to avoid controversy in a probable election year may have encouraged opponents of the formulation to hold their peace. Recalling the events of 1963, Bryant concluded that 'Conferences are often attempts to avoid scars'. Secondly, the numbers had changed since Chamberlain's earlier attempt in the Executive. While the Victorians, Brebner and Wyndham, had supported the Committee's approach at the Executive, they accepted the broad lines of the 1957 policy, as did the Victorian Conference delegation. Dunstan and Nicholls from South Australia had diverged from Chamberlain's line at the Executive but their Branch, as a whole, also accepted the concept of aid to the scholar but not the school. The Conference delegation also included C.R. Cameron, whose attitude to state aid was close to Chamberlain's. Thirdly, and more importantly, those who sought concessions to state aid demands could rest their hopes of winning votes on the scholarship scheme. Even with the removal of the clause about equal availability to state and non-state students, they could argue that the intention of paragraph 15(e) was clear and that the policy could be promoted during an election campaign. This group received a further bonus when the words 'benefits of a like nature' in this paragraph were interpreted by Chamberlain to mean that Labor permitted 'fringe benefits' such as use of state school

35G.M. Bryant, interview.

The Conference numbers were discussed in Age, 9 July 1963. The VCE had shown its support for the 'no direct aid' line in March 1963 by suspending for twelve months four ALP members of Oakleigh City Council for supporting the payment direct to schools, state and non-state, of money to be awarded to students as Council bursaries: ALP (Victorian Branch), 1963 Central Executive Report, 21-7. Dunstan had opposed Chamberlain's motion at the Executive meeting while Nicholls had sought to permit at least travel allowances and textbook issue. For Cameron and Chamberlain, see below.
science laboratories. Fourthly, this group could point out that a vague and negative item from Western Australia ('That the ALP should oppose any State aid to private schools'), which could have been interpreted to exclude even scholarships, had been discharged by the Conference without debate. Labor's 1963 education policy did not reject the claims of those who did not use the state systems; it merely preferred indirect and disguised, rather than direct means of assistance.

The 1963 state aid decisions provide strong support for HYPOTHESIS V. They were an elaborate compromise: concessions in indirect and disguised state aid in return for a restatement of opposition to direct aid. There is another aspect of the decisions. Here, according to one writer,

the A.L.P. became the first Australian political party to adopt a constructive education policy, which went beyond the usual election promises of more schools and more funds to basic social issues such as equality of education.

The Education Committee asked the Conference to recognise 'that education is a National responsibility which demands the enunciation of a National Policy'. The policy adopted by the Conference contained nineteen paragraphs covering all areas of education, primary, secondary, technical, tertiary and special, teacher training, educational research and cooperation between the Commonwealth and the States. But the key to

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37 SMH, 3 August 1963. Chamberlain merely read this vague phrase to cover a benefit which had been at the centre of recent party discussion (see above) and had not been rejected.


the proposals was the condemnation of the Federal government 'for its persistent refusal to recognise its obligations in the field of Education'. The report which Bryant presented was a charter for a massive Commonwealth role in education. The Commonwealth, through a new Commonwealth Department of Education, should 'administer educational grants' under Section 96 of the Commonwealth Constitution for the wide range of purposes the report set out.  

Commonwealth aid to education was seen differently by different people. To Bryant, looking back in 1978, 'the issue was Federal aid to education to get equality between States, regions, races and social groups'. Five paragraphs of the Committee's report elaborated on 'the application to Education of the democratic principles of freedom and equality'. These principles led Bryant, Wood and others to reject direct state aid because it fostered religious differences. State aid also reduced the funds available for the state's own system. Massive Commonwealth assistance to state education could make it 'so overwhelmingly superior to the others, that they could not possibly compete'. Such an argument would have appealed to Chamberlain, who wrote privately after the Conference:

I believe ... that a free State secular system of education is the only one that should be accepted ... [T]he establishment and maintenance of church schools does, in fact, segregate the children of our community.... I shall always be strongly

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^41 Bryant to Chamberlain, 15 July 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F43. Also: Age, 27 April 1960, 26 September, 10 December 1962 (statements by Wood as President of Victorian Council of State Schools Organisations); G.M. Bryant, interview; Fact, 20 May 1966 (Bryant and Wood); J.W. Wood, interview.
opposed to moneys being paid from the public purse to perpetuate [the non-state system]. It is likely, however, that Chamberlain would have preferred not to offer even the indirect and disguised aid permitted under the 1957 principle. Both C.R. Cameron and J.M. Wheeldon, who were close to Chamberlain in many attitudes, took this approach. They believed the state's first and exclusive responsibility was to its own system. The crux of the issue was whether the Roman Catholic system should be assisted. It was immoral, said Cameron, to use state funds to subsidise the teaching of the Catholic catechism at the expense of the students of state schools. If Catholic schools could not survive without money from the state they should close. Bryant and Wood, on the other hand, were less concerned

42 Chamberlain to J.V. Dolahenty, Drummoyne, NSW, 15 August 1963; Chamberlain to S.T. Herriot, Mascot, NSW, 14 August 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F14. Religious bigotry would be avoided, Chamberlain added, if all children received their secular education at state schools which allowed denominational religious instruction classes where desired. 43 C.R. Cameron, J.M. Wheeldon, interviews. Cameron believed also that state aid was unconstitutional. Wheeldon believed that the responsibility to the state systems was unlimited, since there was always something to be done. The argument against a rival education system was the same as against a rival railway system. Chamberlain was a delegate at the 1963 Conference, Wheeldon was not. Wheeldon was often regarded as a protege of Chamberlain. Chamberlain's own recollections are affected by time and his own reticence but he did summarise his own approach to the question as 'opposition to people for religious motives trying to influence the ALP's attitude on state aid' (F.E. Chamberlain, interview). Chamberlain was accused occasionally of bigotry or anti-Catholicism but K.E. Beazley, often his opponent, says he showed no sign of opposition to the direct aid concept when it was part of Labor's Federal platform before the Split. Beazley attributed Chamberlain's later position to the traumas of the Split (K.E. Beazley, interview). See also: Nation, 19 February 1966 and note 12 above. Pro-state aid groups in the years after the Split pointed out that Chamberlain had not opposed the adoption of the 1951 plank ('financial aid ... for the purpose of assisting all forms of education') nor the adoption in 1953 of the Federal Executive interpretation that this included aid to non-state systems. But majority opinion in the Western Australian Branch at this time favoured such aid and Chamberlain would have been constrained by this fact. Moreover, the 1951 plank was adopted on a Western Australian amendment. Chamberlain may have been bound to support it. The previous item from the Victorian Branch (item 39) favoured direct aid more explicitly and Chamberlain supported the Committee recommendation to discharge it (that is, he opposed the item) while Beazley and Senator Nash, the leading WA pro-aiders, opposed the
with the moral aspects than with those of wasteful duplication and accountability for public money. These were at the same time arguments which supported Commonwealth government aid to education and denied state aid. Bryant was less concerned with forcing the private systems out of existence than was Cameron. Being for or against state aid was less important to him than being for the state systems. 44

There were other participants to be considered. Keeffe, Federal President of the party, was a Catholic who sent his children to Catholic schools but did not believe the state should subsidise him to do so. 'It's my business and I'm prepared to pay for it'. Calwell, who had the additional goal of an attractive, comprehensive education policy to present to the voters, agreed with Keeffe on the importance of Commonwealth aid but was more prepared to concede that it could be spent on scholarships for non-state students. 'If the parents wish their children to have, in addition to a sound, secular education, a particular form of spiritual upbringing, there can be no valid objection to the scholarship being taken out at a school which provides it'. 45 Among the recommendation (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1951, 20; 1953, 17). The best interpretation seems to be that Chamberlain, like half his countrymen in the early 1950s, opposed direct aid but was in a minority in the WA State Executive on this question. His opposition was hardened by the events of the Split which also helped alter the numbers on the issue at the State and Federal levels of the ALP. 44

G.M. Bryant, J.W. Wood, interviews. Bryant believed that granting direct aid would itself break down the autonomy of the private systems — that they were probably signing their own warrant for a gradual death or absorption — since governments would have to exert control over the expenditure of the money provided and, secondly, since the private systems would be asked to accept, as the price of aid, pupils from overcrowded state schools. 45

J.B. Keeffe, interview; Sun (Melbourne), 8 August 1963 (Calwell). Neither Calwell nor Keeffe were Conference delegates but Keeffe was a member of the Federal Executive and had been involved in the discussions of the Education Committee report there. Calwell's role, as we have shown, was as interpreter and presenter of policy at election times. He would have been seeking to make this policy as attractive as possible and was present at the Conference venue in Perth to do just that. Keeffe's main direct contribution to the Conference education debate will be mentioned shortly.
State delegations to the Conference, individuals like J. Duggan of Queensland, Lacey of Tasmania and Dunstan of South Australia were generally favourable to direct aid. Some of their colleagues would go no further than scholarships or travel concessions. The Tasmanians knew their State Labor Government was favourable to direct aid and that it had introduced a wide range of disguised aid measures. The South Australians knew the State ALP Branch had long supported free text books and school requisites for all children. Both delegations were aware that State Premiers were straining to find funds to fulfil existing commitments, let alone new ones. Labor's Deputy Federal Leader, Whitlam, had recently remarked that no State could afford to assist church schools without Commonwealth funds.

Many goals, then, could be fulfilled through Commonwealth finance for education. Labor people could support this proposal who wanted handouts to Catholic parish schools or a many-faceted education programme, who wanted to satisfy the demands of Catholic pressure groups or to evolve a universal education system which dissolved sectarian lines and made men equal, who wanted to augment State coffers or promote centralised government based on Canberra. There is in ALP support in 1963 for greater Commonwealth finance for education much of Lindblom's

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47 DT, 4, 8 July 1963; Mercury, 8 July 1963; SMH, 8 July 1963. Whitlam had based a speech on the need for greater Commonwealth initiatives in education but had pointed out that Canberra could not be expected to subsidise inefficiency and wasteful duplication of systems. Archbishop Mannix took offence at what he understood to be a gibe at the Catholic system but Whitlam insisted he had been referring to the lack of uniformity in syllabuses between the States.
concept of 'partisan mutual adjustment' upon which we based our
HYPOTHESIS XIV. The one proposal is matched to multiple goals; money
from Canberra is at the root of the solution of all problems. While
almost every plank of the programme was carried unanimously, we have
little evidence of what, if any, 'adjusting' occurred to produce these
votes. It is probable that little face-to-face lobbying was needed;
all delegates knew the States were chronically short of money; since
1957 all State Branches except Tasmania had supported Commonwealth
finance for education in Conference agenda items and the 1957 and 1961
Federal Conferences had endorsed the idea.\footnote{ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 75-6; 1961, 18-21. Evidence of decisionmakers 'partisan mutual adjusting' would be evidence of them actually seeking 'a way in which a policy [they desire] can serve the values of another ... to whom the persuasion is directed' (Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968, 33. See above, chapter 2, pp.153-7). But the existence of a decision which seems to satisfy multiple goals also serves as evidence that at least some partisan mutual adjustment has occurred.} But Commonwealth finance
and Commonwealth initiatives were more than panaceas for multiple ills.
In the context of 1963 unanimous support for an alternative education
policy enabled delegates to avoid confrontation over direct state aid.
It was true that the reaffirmation in paragraph 10 of 'no direct aid'
narrowed the intended scope of Commonwealth assistance but the intention
was to channel the energies of the direct aiders into support for massive
funds for education, including indirect aid. The brewing differences
within the party over state aid could be sunk in support for a
constructive and comprehensive education policy.\footnote{Bryant remembers that some of those who sought Commonwealth finance for education always had the nagging worry that it would lead to state aid (G.M. Bryant, interview). The adoption of paragraph 10 would have precluded this for a Labor Federal Government, at least. Note that L. Haylen, former MP, attributes to Calwell a fear similar to Bryant's. 'Calwell's instinct was right here', said Haylen. 'The great new deal for education became a new deal for Catholic education'. (Australian, 11 January 1965).}
Yet agreement did not mean that the direct aiders had forgotten their cause. The New South Wales Conference decision of 1963 asked the State Government to provide direct aid in the form of science laboratories. How did this decision affect the Federal Conference? Obviously, the delegates could not ignore it. Anti-direct aid pressure groups sought to influence the Conference not to follow New South Wales; journalists speculated about the Conference's reaction to the changed circumstances. While in the decision which eventually emerged the panacea of Commonwealth assistance was meant to satisfy the direct aiders from New South Wales as much as the centralisers and the educational reformers, avoiding the battle did not solve the problem. Instead, the Conference majority tried to solve the problem by a combination of concession and threat. We have seen that the implicit promise of scholarships was repeated in return for the reaffirmation of 'no direct aid'. Commonwealth finance was to ensure the scholarships were adequately funded. Thirdly, since the Committee suggestion of use of science laboratories was a concession to the special needs of science education in the non-state schools, its adoption by the Conference (by way of Chamberlain's interpretation) could be seen as a 'face saver' for the New South Wales Branch. Fourthly, Keeffe ruled that Bryant's supplementary 'Suggested Statement on Aid to Private Schools' was 'out of order, as it did not represent part of the Committee's report'. This ruling may have been based on a judgment of the statement's relevance but there is evidence

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51 Bulletin, 20 July 1963 gave this interpretation after the suggestion had passed the Executive. A Conference delegate remembered it as a concession to NSW (J.P. Toohey, interview).
that more than this consideration was involved. Chamberlain had told
the June Executive meeting that he would seek at the Conference to
discharge the supplementary statement, apparently because of its
amplification of fringe benefit concessions. By the end of the Conference,
Chamberlain and others had conceded the plank of fringe benefits, but
the supplementary statement was still objectionable to other people for
other reasons: it supported too positively Bryant's idea of a universal
state education system. Bryant regarded the statement as one of the few
attempts made by the party to work out an honest, coherent attitude to
state aid in its proper context, 'but the issue was dodged'. He heard
another delegate mutter, 'they've sold the pass'. The reason for
discretion was exemplified in the final paragraph of the statement which
asserted that, since 'many non-State schools foster privilege and social
inequality', the goal of 'a society of free and equal citizens' could be
achieved 'only in the full development of a national system of
Education ...'.

There was no question of suppressing the statement,
since it had already appeared in the press, but not discussing or
endorsing it avoided needlessly antagonising potential Labor voters or
provoking Conference delegates who favoured direct aid or at least
resented slurs on the non-state schools.

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52 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 36; G.M. Bryant,
interview; Suggested Statement on Aid to Private Schools, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/13/F43. For Chamberlain at the Federal Executive, see above.
53 In the press: Age, 1 August 1963; SMH, 25 July 1963. Other parts of
the statement argued that direct aid 'would tend to widen the gap in
society' and resented imputations of the 'moral and ethical insufficiency'
of state schools. Bryant saw the statement as a battle cry for the
state system. He regretted the Committee had lacked the time 'to put
more teeth into the proposals' and hoped the statement or something like
it could be publicised, 'perhaps as a direct answer to Dr Mannix, who is
on the rampage again' (Bryant to Chamberlain, 15 July 1963, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/13/F43). On Mannix' recent remarks, see note 47 above.
These concessions were accompanied by a veiled threat which led to the only lengthy debate on the Education Committee report. The Committee had recommended, as early as April 1963, that 'all State Branches ... should re-examine their policies on Education, in order to harmonize them with Federal Policy'. The Conference, aware of the New South Wales resolution supporting direct aid for science facilities, changed 'should' to 'shall'. This change was not made without a struggle, for it was rightly regarded by New South Wales delegates as an indication that the Branch's approach was unsatisfactory to the Federal Conference majority. Still, the majority resisted any temptation to make an example of New South Wales, giving it instead the opportunity to rest on the concessions gained. Fulfilment of the veiled threat would depend on how the Branch reacted to the Federal decisions.54

NEW SOUTH WALES, THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AND MENZIES 1963-1964

The implementation of the New South Wales Conference science blocks decision depended first on the New South Wales Labor Government. Financial considerations seemed to influence its first reaction. Wetherell, the Education minister, wrote to Colbourne on 8 August that science facilities in state schools were inadequate, let alone those elsewhere.

Nevertheless, a cryptic sentence suggested that the Cabinet was not deterred by the Federal Conference decision: 'The question of state aid to non-departmental schools is entirely in the field of Government policy'.55 If this was defiance of the Perth Conference it was supported

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54 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 32-3. Two NSW amendments were defeated 8-28 and 15-21. The pro-direct aid strength at the Conference was somewhere between these two losing votes, comprising probably the NSW delegation, all or most of the Tasmanians and individual delegates from other States.

55 Wetherell to Colbourne, 8 August 1963, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/123/133-5.
by the attitudes of the returning New South Wales delegates who claimed, according to one report, that the paragraph 10 formulation, 'provided they do so at their own cost', was a mere platitude and not meant to restrict State Labor Governments. This interpretation was followed by a unanimous State Executive resolution that the science laboratories resolution 'in no way conflicts with Federal Policy'. The Premier, Heffron, was advised accordingly. Matters then developed rapidly. Chamberlain repeated his interpretation that the Federal decision allowed only use, not provision of science facilities; the New South Wales Executive officers accused him of misinterpreting the decision; Calwell and Whitlam, fearing a public battle between New South Wales and the Federal Executive, conferred with State Cabinet ministers to find a formula to satisfy both the State Executive officers urging a measure of direct aid and the Federal Executive opposing it; the Cabinet, claiming it was short of money and of time before the State Budget to introduce a costly laboratory building programme, provided willing listeners although Heffron assured the NSWCE officers that science laboratories for all schools remained part of State party policy.

The formula appeared in the State Budget of 25 September: means-tested allowances of £21 per annum to twenty thousand senior secondary

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56 DT, 2 August 1963. Chamberlain's interpretation about fringe benefits was provoked by such comments but press observers noted that the party still did not say 'no Labor Government may offer direct state aid'. 'The motions ... are so ambiguous', wrote Alan Reid (DT, 2 August 1963) 'that the Right and Left wings are interpreting them as endorsing both their opposed policies'. Similarly: Age, 5, 6 August 1963; Bulletin, 10 August 1963; West Australian, 2, 5 August 1963.

57 Circular 63/135, 30/8/63 Officers Report 'A', enclosure, J.D. Garland to Chamberlain, 6 September 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F14 (Garland, a minority representative on the NSWCE, was complaining of developments in NSW regarding state aid); SMH, 31 August 1963.

students, provided they lived away from home if they attended state schools, but with no such proviso if they attended non-state schools. The Budget did not mention science laboratories but the Federal Executive, meeting a few days later, resolved by eight votes to four, with Oliver speaking in opposition, that the allowances scheme, too, was against Federal policy, that the NSWCE deserved great censure for its contrary advice, which had 'grossly misled' the Government, and that future initiatives in this area by State Branches must be submitted for Federal Executive consideration. What led to this decision? Commentators pointed out that while the allowances scheme was technically indirect aid, in that it was paid to the parent rather than the school, it was available to all non-state students who passed the means test but only to those state students who lived away from home. This element of discrimination may have annoyed some Federal Executive delegates. Further, while not direct aid in the strict sense, the allowances scheme was much more comprehensive than the existing bursaries scheme and was thus worth far more to non-state education. Executive delegates knew that a type of allowance scheme had been one of Cardinal Gilroy's requests of September 1962 and they may have been aware of the hierarchy's argument that the form of aid was less important than the amount. Since Catholic spokesmen

59 New South Wales Parliamentary Debates (NSWPD), Third series, 47, Assembly, 25 September 1963, 5300-01 (J.B. Renshaw, Treasurer). Incidentally, the estimated cost of the allowances in a full year, £400,000, casts doubt on the argument that the State lacked money for science blocks. According to one report the NSWCE officers were seeking for the latter scheme an initial outlay of £100,000 or less (SMH, 24 September 1963). The Electoral effects of a fight between the State Branch and the Federal Executive over science blocks may have been important for the Government, too. 60 C-M, 5 October 1963; DT, 4, 7 October 1963; FX 30 September-3 October 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/188-91; Nation, 5 October 1953; SMH, 3-5 October 1963. The meeting was in Adelaide and press reports had the final vote as 7-4 with Dunstan absent in Parliament. However, the Minutes show that G.T. Virgo replaced Dunstan and the final vote was 8-4. The minority was Colbourne, Oliver, Lacey and C.H. Webb, MP, of Western Australia.
welcomed the Budget some Federal delegates could have seen the scheme as an outcome of religious pressure. New South Wales Cabinet members and State Executive officers, recalling the events of 1963, drew little distinction between direct and indirect aid, defining the issue rather as the needs of non-state, especially Catholic education and the need to win Catholic votes. Perhaps this attitude came through to the Federal Executive majority which felt that, somehow, the spirit of the Brisbane Conference decision, which could be distilled as 'opposition to subsidies for religion', if not the letter of Federal policy had been flouted.  

Those who opposed the Federal Executive leaned towards other explanations. There was some suggestion that heated arguments at the Federal Executive and Conference between Chamberlain and Colbourne and, to a lesser extent, Oliver, had aroused old enmities bred at the time of the Split. From this viewpoint, the Federal censure of New South Wales was a personal vendetta by Chamberlain.  

More broadly, according to New South Wales sources, the Federal action arose from a desire to 'get' or 'score against' New South Wales, whatever the ostensible cause. The desire of the New South Wales Branch and Government to provide direct

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61 By 1963 less than a thousand non-state students received bursaries. Gilroy had suggested 'scholarship allowances' of £30 per annum available to all students. On the 'amount versus type' argument, see Hogan, *The Catholic Campaign ...*, 247. For the Catholic reaction: *SMH*, 26 September 1963. ALP views: W.R. Colbourne, R.R. Downing, C.T. Oliver, J.B. Renshaw, interviews.

62 *DT*, 4 October 1963; *SMH*, 2 August, 4 October 1963. At the Executive meeting Chamberlain presented a report on the New South Wales position and suggested it should be investigated in relation to Federal policy. The successful motion was moved as an amendment by Brebner and Virgo but allegedly drafted by Chamberlain. Earlier Chamberlain had seconded a rather milder motion. Chamberlain was thus involved in three approaches to the problem, suggesting his close personal interest.
state aid may have been seen by the 'principled' Chamberlain and his supporters as mere vote-seeking, especially since the issue was so redolent of the Split. But the New South Welshmen denied it was reprehensible either to seek to maintain power or to benefit a deserving and Labor-supporting element of the electorate. Some of them also reciprocated the personal bitterness of Chamberlain.63

The Federal Executive had directed its President, Keeffe, and outgoing and incoming Secretaries, Chamberlain and Wyndham, to confer with NSWCE officers and Government ministers 'to ensure the Federal policy will be rigidly adhered to'. The outcome of the Federal officers' visit to Sydney was a finding that the allowances scheme 'was not in keeping with Federal policy' but had been proposed in the 'firm belief' that it was. No action was taken but the whole state aid issue was referred to the 1965 Federal Conference. Meanwhile, the allowances scheme could go ahead. State Branches were reminded, nevertheless, that under the Federal Executive decision, any future proposals to introduce or support new legislation or to extend existing 'aid to private schools' must be referred to the Executive for 'consideration and advice'.64

63The 'get NSW' motive was suggested by Colbourne, Oliver and Renshaw (interviews). Chamberlain's memory of events is clouded but Keeffe genuinely believed the allowances scheme was 'dicey' in relation to Federal policy (interview). Colbourne took little part in the discussions (below) with the Federal representatives because, as he recalled (with some passion) telling Oliver after the October Federal Executive meeting, 'they've painted me as being a vindictive state aider and sectarianist'. He remembers being disappointed at the outcome of the Federal visit to Sydney because Chamberlain had been 'let off' too easily. Renshaw, on the other hand, recalls Chamberlain was 'not as unreasonable as people thought' over this issue and generally.

The details of this visit are ignored in the present study. It is necessary, instead, to give a brief account of subsequent events to provide a link to the events of 1965-66.

We have concentrated so far on the formulation of the education decisions at the 1963 Perth Federal Conference, finding support there for our HYPOTHESES V (the search for compromise) and XIV (the process of partisan mutual adjustment). Labor's state aid decisions over the period 1957 to 1963 exemplify also the phenomenon of 'disjointed incrementalism' (HYPOTHESIS XV). Throughout these years the party sought a balance between the potentially conflicting considerations of preserving the principle of 'no direct aid' and winning Catholic votes. HYPOTHESIS III, the conflict between exclusive and inclusive approaches to the electorate, seems central. HYPOTHESIS IX (relations with Catholics) is also relevant since the strongest demands for state aid came from Catholics and one of the strongest reasons for resisting direct aid was the memory of the activities of Catholics in the ALP prior to the Split of 1955. Catholic votes were apparently at risk and the Catholic hierarchy had access to the New South Wales Branch, which by 1963 was assuming the leadership of the pro-aid forces within the party. Federal Conference and Executive decisions on state aid emerged out of the conflicting views of the New South Wales Branch and other Branches (HYPOTHESIS I). For the moment, New South Wales was in the minority.

We have said little yet about the ALP's relationship with the Federal Liberal-Country Party Government (HYPOTHESIS XIII). This relationship

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65 The details are covered in Age, 4, 9, 10 October 1963; DT, 5, 12 October 1963; Nation, 19 October 1963; SMH, 9, 12 October 1963; Sunday Telegraph, 6 October 1963. These versions are remarkably accurate, to judge by the document in note 64 and the recollections of participants. The brief account of Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, South Melbourne, 1977, 28-9, is inaccurate in details and unfair in interpretation.
was to lie at the base of Labor's approach to state aid after late 1963. Ten days after the Federal visit to New South Wales, Prime Minister Menzies announced that an election for the House of Representatives would be held on 30 November. In his policy speech for that election Menzies promised to provide, if re-elected, £5 million per annum for science buildings and facilities in secondary schools. The money was to be distributed, on the basis of the overall populations in the different systems, 'to all secondary schools, Government or independent, without discrimination'. Although modest, this proposal was clearly direct aid and was, equally clearly, exactly what the New South Wales Conference of the ALP had sought five months earlier. The innovation was not trumpeted, perhaps because of the danger of arousing dissension within the Liberal Party, but it was a new direction for the Liberals for all that. Against it, Calwell set Labor's education policy, far more


67 Federal Liberals had been even more wary of state aid than was the ALP. When asked in August 1960 if his Government favoured state aid, Menzies replied that 'the honourable member puts to me a question that is outside the jurisdiction of this Government'. When the Anglican Bishop Loane claimed late in 1962 that the Cabinet was considering direct aid the Prime Minister replied scathingly. The New South Wales Branch of the Country Party had decided in favour of state aid in 1961 and some elements of the Liberal Party wished to follow suit. These non-Labor moves probably encouraged the State Labor Government to become more amenable to Catholic requests. But the internal unrest they provoked within the Liberal and Country Parties as well as their apparent failure to attract votes at the 1962 New South Wales election seemed to have set back state aid in these parties. The main exception was in the Australian Capital Territory, where since 1956 the Government had provided some direct aid. But this was seen as a special case because the non-state schools were providing a 'public service' in helping to absorb the rapid growth of Canberra's school age population. There were also subventions to mission schools in the Northern Territory and Papua New Guinea, again in a special category, and to some denominational colleges at universities. These developments are summarised in: Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 5-9; Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 20-6.
comprehensive but lacking any direct state aid. When the results were posted, Menzies' majority had grown from two to twenty-two and Labor had lost ten seats, seven of them in New South Wales, where its vote slumped by five per cent.

This defeat had at least four consequences for the ALP. First, it added to pressures already existing within the party for some organisational reform which would reduce the relative influence of the Federal machine in making and protecting decisions with electoral consequences. The image of the Federal 'enforcers' intimidating the New South Wales Government over state aid may have helped reinforce the bogey of outside control of the ALP. The fact that the 'intimidation' was less than completely successful was relatively unimportant.

Secondly, the 1963 election marked an important change in the relationship between Calwell and his Deputy Leader, Whitlam. In a report to the New South Wales Executive after the election Whitlam

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68 SMH, 19 November 1963. Based on the 1963 Conference decisions, the promises included: 500,000 secondary scholarships for state and non-state pupils, emergency educational grant to the States, Commonwealth Education ministry, extended child endowment, Commonwealth education inquiry, use of science and other facilities at state schools by non-state pupils.


70 This issue will be discussed further in chapter 5 of the thesis. It is worth noting here that there was possibly more scope for the intimidation argument in the events (largely behind the scenes) which led to the change from science blocks to allowances than in the Federal visit. But the latter was public and thus provided more electoral kudos for the Liberals. It may also have provided the occasion for the election itself. Menzies may have hoped to capitalise on Labor's discomfiture. For discussion of why the election came when it did and, more importantly, of the complex of reasons which may have lain behind Menzies' direct aid offer, see: Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 22-3; Gill, 'The Federal Science Grant', 275-86; Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 83-91; Smart, Federal Aid to Australian Schools ..., 72-118.
mentioned, among many factors which might have contributed to Labor's performance, that Calwell, after the near victory in 1961, 'did not speak or act as impressively as Sir Robert Menzies'. The report became public and was interpreted by Calwell as evidence that Whitlam sought to replace him as Leader. Other Caucus members also discussed the possibility of Calwell stepping down. It was not unreasonable for his colleagues to assume that Calwell would soon retire gracefully, since he was almost sixty-eight years old, but Calwell resolved to remain in his position. Some observers saw Calwell's election to the Victorian Central Executive in June 1964 as part of an attempt to establish a power base against Whitlam's challenge in return for Calwell giving his support to the Victorian Branch on issues such as unity tickets. While Whitlam preferred to wait for the Leadership rather

71 Age, DT, SMH, 14 April 1964.  
72 The two main protagonists' versions are given in A.A. Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, Hawthorn, Vic., 1972, 226-7; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 21-3. There was considerable speculation as to how the report became public. Some suspected Calwell, others Whitlam. The report was one of about seventy requested by the NSWCE from Federal candidates and local party organisations. (There was a similar fact-finding exercise in Victoria and probably in other States as well.) Calwell and seventeen branches in Whitlam's electorate, as well as the NSWCE, apparently received copies of the Whitlam document, so it is not surprising that it 'leaked'. But if it had remained private, there may have been less pressure on Calwell to guard his flank, already vulnerable in view of press speculation about his future: Age, 18 February, 21 April 1964; CT, 3 March 1964; DT, 30 January 1964; Nation, 18 April 1964.  
73 Australian, DT, 23 July 1964; S. Encel, 'The Labor Party and the Future', AQ, 36, 3 (September 1964), 21-3; James Jupp, 'Victoriania', Dissent, 13 (Spring 1964), 37; SMH, 23, 28 July 1964. The initiative for Calwell standing seems to have come from J. Cairns, MP, and it serves as a minor example of partisan mutual adjustment: Cairns argued to the controllers of the Victorian Branch that the possibility of Federal intervention, then rumoured, could be forestalled by introducing an element of balance or representativeness to the VCE. To Calwell, the proposal seemed attractive for the power base reasons although his publicly expressed reasons included improving the ALP vote in Victoria and opposing those who wished to truckle with the DLP. (Cairns drafted the press release.) Cairns himself was elected with Calwell: J.F. Cairns, F. Crean, interviews; Hartley to Calwell, 16 July 1964, enclosing draft press release, Vic. Rec., Parliamentarians A - C 1964.
than press Calwell in 1964, the relationship between the two men became increasingly strained. At crucial points in the next two years the issue of who would lead the party, Calwell, a successor bearing his imprimatur, Whitlam or someone else, became entangled with Labor's approach to state aid.

Thirdly, the New South Wales Labor Government, perceiving the apparent electoral effects of state aid, became more eager allies of the controlling group in the NSWCE in seeking a change in Federal Labor policy or at least in extending the boundaries of the existing policy as far as they could stretch. When the New South Wales Branch Annual Conference met in June 1964, J.B. Renshaw, the new Premier, told delegates that education policy should be the concern of State Branches alone, since it involved expenditure of State government funds. Both he and Oliver criticised the Federal visit to New South Wales.  

The Conference itself endorsed an Education Committee recommendation for subsidies towards the purchase by secondary schools, both state and non-state, of text books for hiring out to pupils. This decision provoked the Federal Executive, by a vote of seven to five, with Oliver and Colbourne opposed, to remind New South Wales that any extension of state aid had to be submitted to it for approval. The New South Wales Committee had denied

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75 ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1964 Annual Conference, 27-8; FX 4-6 August 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35; SMH, 16 June, 7 August 1964. After the passage of the FX motion, Oliver and Colbourne moved: 'That the Federal Executive convene a Conference of Federal Party officers, Federal Parliamentary Labor Party Leaders and the Leaders of all State Parliamentary Labor Parties for the purpose of defining the rights and authority of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party and the State Parliamentary Labor Parties under the Federal [ALP] Constitution and State Constitutions'. This was an expression of New South Wales distaste at recent Federal activities. But Cameron, a proxy delegate from South Australia, pointed out that the words "defining the rights and authority" give a body other than the Federal Executive or Federal Conference a power not provided for in the Constitution'. Cameron's point of order was upheld and the motion ruled out of order.
they intended aid to the school, since they envisaged the school acting merely as administrator of a scheme designed for the benefit of pupils and the financial relief of their parents. In any event, after a discussion between Keeffe, Wyndham and the NSWCE officers the scheme was allowed to proceed. Nevertheless, there remained the resentment of the New South Wales Branch and Government at their inability to offer clearcut direct aid.

Fourthly, the 1963 election left among many Federal Labor politicians, as well as in New South Wales, a feeling that the ALP must make an attractive counter offer if it were not to lose Catholic votes to the Liberals — or the DLP, which assiduously claimed the credit for Menzies' reversal. Many Labor men, from Calwell down, believed that state aid had won the Liberals many votes. 'I have no doubt', the Leader wrote, 'that the State Aid issue did weigh heavily against us, particularly in New South Wales'. While it is notoriously difficult

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77 Australian, 17, 18, 31 August 1964; correspondence and reports of discussion between NSWCE and FX representatives, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/112/256/441-77; CT, 26-29 August 1964; SMH, 3, 18, 26-28 August 1964; Sun-Herald, 16 August 1964.
79 Calwell to [addressee unknown], 4 February 1964, Vic. Rec., packet of letters, 1964-67, 'Mr Calwell — Personal'. Also: J.L. Armitage, F. Crean, interviews; Maurice Isaacs, 'Federal Election Report — North Sydney Electorate, 1963', A.F.S.A. News, 9, 1 (March 1964), 12-13. Mulvihill to James Callaghan, MP, London, 14 January 1964, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/58/125/433; post mortems from campaign workers, etc., Vic. Rec., Hon. R.W. Holt, Federal Election Survey Committee 1964. Such evidence shows that state aid was by no means the only factor seen to have contributed. Others were Labor's foreign policy, the 'Communist scare', doubts about the independence of ALP politicians from outside control, the assassination of President Kennedy and so on. Chagrin in NSW over science blocks was increased because the Branch had 'thought of it first', while general disappointment at the result was enhanced because many in the ALP were extremely confident of victory.
to discover voters' motives, a politician's perception of reasons provides just as good a determinant of his future actions as do objective data. In which direction his actions are bent is quite another matter. For some Caucus members evidence of state aid's electoral significance was a message to Labor to follow the Liberals, for others a spur to promote a comprehensive alternative policy, for others an occasion to cry a plague on aggressive pressure groups and turncoat Liberal governments. When Menzies' science block legislation came before Parliament, therefore, a Caucus meeting divided forty-four votes to twenty-eight in deciding not to oppose the legislation while moving an amendment to it. Speakers on both sides admitted that the legislation was against existing Labor policy but those Caucus members prevailed who believed it political folly to oppose the bill.

1965-1966

All four resultants of the 1963 election, the controversies over the Leadership and organisation of the party, the exasperation of the New South Wales Branch at its inability to offer direct aid and the feeling in Caucus that Labor was being left behind on the education issue, underlay events in the ALP concerning state aid during 1965 and 1966. Indeed, these issues and others were inextricably intertwined with Labor's approach to the state aid question.

The minority believed the fact that the legislation was against ALP policy required Caucus to oppose it automatically but the Federal Executive, despite Western Australian attempts to convene a Special Federal Conference to determine the party's approach, had allowed Caucus to determine its own attitude to the legislation. The amendment incorporated parts of ALP education policy as adopted at the 1963 Conference: CPD H. of R. 42, 14, 19 May 1964, 1929, 2030-2; DT, 5, 12 March, 14 May 1964; FX 3-5 March, 4-6 August 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35; SMH, 4-6 March, 14 May 1964.
THE 1965 FEDERAL CONFERENCE

The Federal Executive had referred state aid to the 1965 Federal Conference, due to meet in Sydney on 2 August. Meanwhile, Labor in New South Wales suffered further electoral setbacks. In December 1964 Labor's vote in New South Wales in the Senate election fell again and to a greater extent than in any other State. Then, on 1 May 1965, Labor lost power in New South Wales after twenty-four years. State aid was not a conspicuous issue during the Senate campaign and even in the case of the State poll one should be wary of attributing the loss of power 'principally to State aid'. As in all elections, multiple issues may have assisted to swing votes. Voters may have been influenced, too, by the feeling that Labor had grown tired in office and lost touch with the electorate. Nevertheless, state aid was a conspicuous issue in this campaign, especially in its closing stages, and conspicuous issues tend to be remembered in party post mortems. The Liberal Opposition promised direct aid in the form of loan interest subsidies for non-state school building programmes. The DLP, itself offering direct aid, urged Catholic parents and clerics to give their preferences to the Liberals. To counter the Liberal plan, Renshaw promised the text book hiring subsidy

81 The Labor vote declined by 5 per cent and the party lost nine of the fifty-four seats it held in the old Legislative Assembly. The Senate figures showed the Labor vote in NSW had declined 1.6 per cent on the 1961 figures while the Labor vote throughout Australia remained stable. The Liberal-Country Party vote rose 7.0 per cent in NSW against 3.6 per cent nationally. But Labor still performed better for the Senate in NSW than in the nation as a whole (46.0 to 44.7 per cent): Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1965-1974, Canberra, 1977, 105-6; Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1890-1964, Canberra, 1968, 410, 416, 419-20, 459-60.

82 Colin A. Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 37, 3 (September 1965), 109.

scheme and an expanded secondary bursary scheme. Anything further, he said, was precluded by financial considerations. Privately, he might have blamed Federal Labor policy. 84

The New South Wales election provoked some Labor men into action on the education question. Two days after the election, when the result was still uncertain, the Federal Education Committee, with Deputy Leader Whitlam in attendance, resolved to ask the State Committees 'to examine the position of non-State schools in order to determine the size of the problem' and to seek for itself information on the subject 'from all possible sources'. The Committee also decided to recommend the deletion of the words 'at their own cost' from clause 4 of the Education platform, which had been paragraph 10 when adopted at the 1963 Federal Conference. 85

A week later, with the election clearly lost, Whitlam told the Queensland Branch that state aid had come to stay. It was 'ironical', he said, that Labor 'should now repeatedly be defeated on a policy which it initiated at the 1951 Federal Conference'. 86 The following week, Whitlam, supported by McKenna and Kennelly, the two Senate Leaders, challenged Calwell's attempt to have Labor oppose the second reading of

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84 Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 29-32; Trevor Matthews, 'The Campaign in the State', John Power, ed., Politics in a Suburban Community, Sydney, 1968, 5-31 (Matthews' account underlines the many other issues beside state aid); J.B. Renshaw, Labor - 24 Years Trusted Leadership, [Sydney, 1965], 112-17; SMH, 9-30 April 1965. As in 1963, there is some doubt about the financial argument: Labor's text book scheme alone was costed at £1 million while the Liberals only felt it necessary to offer £200,000 worth of direct aid. Would Labor have offered more than the Liberals if it had been able to under Federal policy?

85 Education Standing Committee, Minutes, 3 May 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/2 envelope labelled 'Education Committee Minutes, 3rd May 1965'. The Federal Leader and his Deputy had the right to attend all Federal Committee meetings.

86 SMH, 11 May 1965. Whitlam also circulated to the Western Australian Fabian Society a pamphlet in similar vein but written before the election (West Australian, 15 May 1965).
a bill to extend the Commonwealth science laboratories scheme. Calwell argued that, regardless of its action in 1964 (when he had agreed Labor should move an amendment rather than oppose the second reading) Caucus should now oppose legislation so clearly against ALP policy. Whitlam replied that, just as in 1964, opposition was electoral madness. Calwell's motion was lost 32-34 and Labor did not oppose the second reading, moving instead, as in 1964, an amendment incorporating parts of ALP education policy. The Parliamentary tactic had not changed in twelve months but the relative position of Calwell and his Deputy had changed: Calwell had joined the anti-aid side led by Chamberlain and the Victorian Central Executive; Whitlam, convinced of the need for direct aid, was becoming a central participant in the manoeuvres to change Labor's policy.87

When the Federal Conference met in August, Wyndham moved the Education Committee's recommendation that clause 4 of the existing policy be amended by deleting the words 'provided they do so at their own cost'.88 The

87 Bulletin, 29 May 1965; CPD H. of R. 46, 20 May 1965, 1732-61; SMH, 20 May 1965. The only difference of substance in the 1965 motion was to say explicitly that Labor did not oppose the second reading of the bill. As in 1964, the amendment was moved on the second reading, the second reading was not opposed and there was no attempt to move the amendment in the committee stage. Despite the disclaimer in 1965, the effect of passing the Labor amendment would have been to defeat the bill, but on both occasions this was glossed over. In 1964, Whitlam and a handful of others had sought not to oppose the legislation at any stage (even by an amendment) but this group had then supported the tactical move (DT, SMH, 14 May 1964). The account of the 1965 skirmish in Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 35, is inaccurate.

88 Wyndham had replaced Encel on the Committee. For the report and the debate, see ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 87-8, 96-7, 231-3. The Committee also recommended guidelines on use of state school facilities by non-state students and on provision of indirect and disguised aid. These were based on Bryant's supplementary statement of 1963. Like it, they were not put to the Conference.
Federal Executive had asked the Conference to reject the new recommendation since, according to Chamberlain, it would leave 'loopholes' for direct state aid. Without the proviso, clause 4 would merely affirm citizens' rights to establish their own education systems and some Labor people could interpret it as an invitation for subsidies to these systems. Bryant, on the other hand, recalls the Committee sought only to remove part of the clause which could have been seen as offensive. The original intent of the clause had been to assure the private systems there was no intention to destroy them and this intention had been weakened by the final few words. 'This [the proviso] is the sort of thing you have in the secret treaty', Bryant concluded.

Put immediately, the Committee recommendation received the support only of the six New South Wales delegates. Senator McKenna and G. Duthie, MP, delegates from Tasmania, then sought to protect existing direct and indirect aid in the States. Three amendments followed. First, E. Adsett and F. Nolan from Queensland wished the Conference to state that Labor 'is unequivocally opposed to State Aid in any form' and that all reference to it be removed from party platforms. Secondly, Chamberlain and Senator Cant (Western Australia) urged, on behalf of their Branch, the holding of a referendum on state aid. Labor should campaign for 'no State Aid' but would adopt the people's verdict as its own policy. Thirdly, Calwell, a delegate from Victoria, and Cameron (South Australia) supported a rather less definite commitment to a referendum in which Labor members were not bound to campaign or vote in

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89 G.M. Bryant, interview. Bryant had seconded the change at the Education Committee in May 1965. It will be remembered that he was not responsible for this wording in 1963 (above pp.178-80). For the FX debate: FX 28-30 July 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38.
a particular way. Calwell's speech revealed his own and the party's dilemma. State aid, even of an indirect kind, had made too many inroads in fifty years to reverse the process in one stroke, as Adsett's amendment envisaged. Even a referendum where Labor opposed direct aid, as Chamberlain suggested, would be 'electoral dynamite' when Liberal direct aid initiatives seemed to be gaining community acceptance. While Calwell himself believed Labor's total education policy was more beneficial to the community he agreed Labor had lost votes in the last two years over the issue. 'On this issue', he concluded,'I am carrying more lead in the saddle than any jockey has carried in any race in Australia, including bush meetings'.

Calwell's solution was not to lend his influence to help change policy but to avoid the issue by seeking a referendum. In 1963 he had supported Commonwealth aid for education to avoid having to choose on state aid. Now he left the choice to the people at some vague time in the future. Calwell's personal attitudes probably were genuinely divided. One commentator saw the 'lead in the saddle' remarks as a private plea to the delegates for a measure of direct aid. Others, taking a longer view, believed Calwell was opposed to aid to the Catholic system because of the personal hurts he had suffered from his Church during the Split.

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DT, 7 August 1965. This was the first Federal Conference open to the press and some newspapers had detailed reports of the debates. I have drawn on these reports in what follows. See also: Age, SMH, 7 August 1965.

CT, 9 August 1965 (J. Jupp). Another report said Calwell's amendment had disappointed some associates, who believed he privately favoured direct aid (Australian, 11 August 1965).

Colm Kiernan, Calwell, West Melbourne, 1978, 218, 238-9, 242. Kiernan admits, however, that this influence on Calwell was accompanied during the 1960s by a firming of his alliance with the VCE. Oliver, too, while agreeing that Calwell was influenced by his experiences during the Split, added that Calwell on this issue 'was basically following the left line in Victoria'. Oliver could not see how Calwell, as a Catholic, could not have supported state aid in his heart of hearts (C.T. Oliver, interview). While Oliver is not a witness sympathetic to Calwell, it is interesting to note with Kiernan that L. Haylen, later a close colleague of Calwell, did
Occasionally he had argued that direct state aid was unconstitutional under Section 116 of the Commonwealth Constitution (prohibiting laws establishing a religion) but most of his public remarks about education were in support of the positive parts of Labor education policy. When faced with Caucus unrest in 1960 after the Bendigo by-election he admonished members who sought policy revision to 'accept the rough with the smooth'. Any private feelings he may have harboured on the subject were overshadowed by his desire to protect Federal policy until it might be altered by a later Conference. At the Federal elections of 1961, 1963 and 1964 he had stood on Labor's alternative policy, which was also the substance of his amendments to the bills of 1964 and 1965. That he would have preferred on the second occasion to oppose the bill outright could be attributed to his need to maintain his support in Victoria, a centre of opposition to state aid. His wistful remarks at the 1965 Conference recognised that Labor's comprehensive education policy was not preventing loss of votes. His idea of a referendum in which Labor would not take a side showed his own inability, buffeted by his own past, his own limited conception of leadership and the demands of his ties with the Victorian Branch, to make a clear choice between the status quo and a revised policy. The referendum idea was an attempt,

92 (continued)
not support him for the Leadership in 1960 partly because he believed Calwell, as a Catholic, would favour state aid. Either Calwell changed his views in the 1960s or, more likely, his conflicting emotions on the subject led him to keep his own counsels - leading to misconceptions among his colleagues. Calwell himself remembered voting with a small minority at his first Victorian Conference in 1917 in favour of state aid for primary schools (Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 38).

93 Age, 21 November 1961, Fact, 10 October 1963, SMH, 8 July 1963 provide evidence of Calwell and Section 116.

94 SMH, 25, 30 August 1960.

95 The most recent Victorian Branch attitude to state aid was 'unequivocal opposition': ALP (Victorian Branch), Record of Annual Conference, June 1965, 4.
said W. Hayden, MP, a Queensland delegate, 'to evade our responsibility as a Party and the alternative Government'.

Yet the other amendments were equally unsatisfactory. The Adsett amendment carried the same difficulties that attended the Western Australian item two years earlier: it could be interpreted to mean either no aid at all or merely no direct aid. In either case the clock had gone too far to be wound back. Further, the amendment was purely negative and Labor had never had nothing to say about this section of the electorate. Chamberlain's referendum amendment, while more definite than Calwell's, committed Labor to public support of 'no direct aid' in a context where it might be difficult to promote at the same time Labor's attractive alternative policy.

The immediate question for the Conference, however, was the status of existing forms of aid, the nub of the Tasmanian motion. McKenna had tried to ensure that State Labor Governments in Tasmania and elsewhere would be able to continue existing indirect and disguised aid and fulfil promises of future aid of these types. The South Australian Branch had recently come to power on a platform of free text books and school requisites for all children. Other State Branches might be forced to dismantle direct aid schemes implemented by their opponents. Menzies had already argued that a Labor Senate majority would be obliged to curtail science blocks assistance under Federal legislation. The McKenna

96 Press reports of the debate suggest the amendment was moved by Adsett in anger and to cut the knot of state aid in decisive fashion. It did not reflect the Queensland Branch position (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 232-3) which was the same as the Federal policy of 1957.

97 For Menzies at the 1964 Senate election: Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 28-9. Gill, 'The Federal Science Grant', 310-49, shows, moreover, that this type of direct aid was so well-established even by late 1964 that any attempt to remove it would have upset church education authorities as well as parents.
argument ran: if voters were attracted by assistance promised they would be enraged by assistance removed.

After a luncheon adjournment spent fruitlessly discussing alternatives, delegates agreed to a suggestion from Keeffe that an ad hoc committee of one representative from each State should work out a compromise decision. The committee returned after eighty-five minutes and Chamberlain and Calwell moved on its behalf:

In view of the decision of Conference to re-affirm policy of State Aid under Clause 4, the question of new benefits which may conflict with this basic principle shall be referred to the Federal Executive for examination. No benefit which is currently established shall be disturbed. State representatives shall be invited to make their submissions to the Federal Executive on such new matters and the Executive shall have authority to approve any benefit in this category, and further that the motion of Senator McKenna and all amendments thereto be discharged.98

Chamberlain had reported that Downing, the New South Wales member of the committee, had 'reservations' about this recommendation. Oliver and Downing now moved to delete all words in the recommendation after 'disturbed' but only their New South Wales colleagues supported them. The original motion was carried by thirty votes to six.

A number of points emerge from this debate and the lobbying which surrounded it. First, it produced a further increment in the process of disjointed incrementalism (HYPOTHESIS XV) which can be traced in Labor's state aid decisions. The first participants, the Education Committee, hoped to remove the 'at own cost' proviso from clause 4 and to include explicit provision for the 'co-operation' between the state and

98 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 96-7. My emphasis. The committee's members were Calwell, Chamberlain, McKenna, R. Downing, MLC, former Attorney-General of New South Wales, C. Jones (Queensland) and G. Virgo (South Australia).
non-state systems and for the indirect and disguised aid which Labor supported. For Bryant, this change would have removed offensive words and accentuated the positive aspects of the education policy. For his Committee colleague, Wyndham, removal of the proviso was a bridgehead for revision of the 1957 policy and provision of direct aid. The Federal Executive then participated by recommending that the Conference reject the Education Committee's first recommendation and by sending on the second recommendation (the suggested statement about indirect and disguised aid) without decision. Thirdly, the Conference participated in two distinct stages. It rejected the Education Committee recommendation for deletion of the proviso. Then, it recognised the problem of existing benefits, which the first Conference decision had disclosed, by adopting the ad hoc committee resolution. This was seen by some observers as a concession and an innovation. It was another increment in Labor's policy on state aid. How the new sentence should be interpreted was left for the future.

This concession was not extracted without a price. Under the Federal Executive decision of October 1963, State Parliamentary Labor Parties were

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99 This is another example of a partisan mutually adjusted decision on a small scale: Bryant and Wyndham supported the Committee proposal for different reasons. The Committee meeting would have involved Bryant and Wyndham working out a resolution which matched their differing goals.

100 For example, SMH, 7 August 1965. Alan Reid, in a not uncharacteristic lapse, failed to mention the crucial sentence (DT, 7 August 1965; Sunday Telegraph, 8 August 1965).

101 See below pp.218 ff. McKenna's original motion, later discharged, had included existing travel allowances and text book supply, the Labor promise of secondary scholarships (the Menzies Government had commenced such a scheme in 1964), government assistance existing at 6 August 1965 and 'commitments already made [by non-Labor Governments] to meet interest charges or the provision of science facilities' (both forms of direct aid) as assistance that should be protected.
told that

prior to the introduction and/or support of legislation or any decision to extend aid to private schools, they shall submit such proposals to the Federal Secretary for consideration and advice.

The Federal Conference now adopted the ad hoc committee resolution that 'the question of new benefits which may conflict with [clause 4] shall be referred to the Federal Executive for examination'. The Conference also agreed that the Executive 'shall have authority to approve any benefit in this category'. The increment regarding existing benefits was thus balanced by increments regarding the powers of the Executive.

The Executive's review function became more explicit ('authority to approve' rather than consider and advise) and, secondly, the proposals which had to be referred were those which 'may' conflict with clause 4. This was a wider category than the 'aid to private schools' of 1963, since the earlier category had been shown by the Federal-New South Wales discussions of 1963-64 to exclude both allowances to parents and subsidies for text books. These discussions had occurred because the Federal Executive believed New South Wales had breached Federal policy; they had turned on whether aid to the non-state system was intended. The new decision gave the Federal Executive a watching brief not only to prevent aid to schools but to study 'new benefits which may conflict' with the principle of clause 4 that citizens wishing to establish and maintain private education systems should do so at their own cost. Chamberlain had reminded the Conference of previous disputes over interpretation.

This increment reveals he was able to persuade the ad hoc committee and the Conference that the Executive, rather than 'members of the higher

\[102\] See above p.209.
echelons of the party' in the States, should have the effective, as well as formal power of interpretation. 103

The decisions regarding the protection of clause 4 can thus be seen as part of a compromise (HYPOTHESIS V): delegates seeking to protect the concept of aid to the scholar but not the school were prepared to concede to the State parties, led by Tasmania, the stability of existing benefits. The Federal Executive, in return, was conceded a stronger right of oversight. The 1963 expression of the 1957 principle, clause 4 itself, remained unaltered. We know insufficient details of the lobbying process to ascertain if this was how the issues were put by delegates to each other. That compromise was the outcome can be seen from the decisions themselves. Is the concept of partisan mutual adjustment (HYPOTHESIS XIV) then relevant? The different delegations had different goals which only partly overlapped. Chamberlain's referendum amendment had been sent to the Conference as an agenda item from Western Australia. Although it was expressed in terms unfavourable to direct aid and it required Labor to campaign for 'no State Aid', it at least suggested the party should abide by the people's decision, whatever it was. A

103 Alan Reid, Sunday Telegraph, 8 August 1965, believed Chamberlain was 'setting a score' with New South Wales. Reid also believed that the new formulation required 'fringe benefits' (disguised aid) to be referred. This interpretation is further supported by the use of the same word, 'benefit', to apply to aid 'currently established' (which included direct, indirect and disguised aid) and new aid. Chamberlain and his supporters had tried to exercise a general supervision under the October 1963 resolution and been criticised for their intervention because the aid was shown to be not for schools (although the Federal Executive did not admit this in the 1963 case). The new resolution allowed a Federal role in virtually any case of aid. Further, the failure once again of the Conference to adopt an explicit statement of what disguised and indirect aid the party supported (see note 88), meant the Federal platform still did not admit the party allowed such assistance. This fact gave further interpretative power to the Federal Executive.
Victorian item, on the other hand, expressed 'unequivocal opposition' to state aid and a reference to Commonwealth scholarship payments discriminating against state school students suggested the Branch might be wary even of indirect aid. Queensland sent an item supporting 'aid to the parent rather than the school' but its delegates Adsett and Nolan seemed to wish to concede even less than this. Tasmania, through McKenna, sought to protect its system of disguised aid and might have assumed that South Australia might take a similar attitude given its support for universal free text books. Yet Cameron of South Australia supported Calwell's referendum amendment rather than McKenna's motion. Another South Australian, M. Nicholls, MP, had supported Chamberlain in the Executive. The South Australian Branch had recommended that its delegates support existing state aid policy.

Despite these differing goals, some expressing the views of the controllers of State Branches (HYPOTHESIS I), some the opinions of individual delegates (HYPOTHESIS II), each part of the compromise, the protection of existing benefits and the new provision for Executive oversight, was able to be supported by thirty votes to six. During the eighty-five minutes of the ad hoc committee's deliberations, five representatives of thirty delegates had been able to persuade each

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other that the formulation which eventually evolved could meet some goals of each of them. Partisan mutual adjustment had occurred. 106

But what of the other six delegates? The New South Wales delegation had been the only ones to support Wyndham's motion from the Committee that the clause 4 proviso be deleted. (Wyndham himself, as Secretary, had no vote.) Colbourne, in seconding the motion, had spoken with conviction of the injustice to Catholic parents and the contribution of the Catholic system to education. 107 There was no need for any adjusting process to defeat this motion, since only New South Wales was prepared to overturn the basic principle of 1957. Only Wyndham and Colbourne spoke to the motion. All delegates, including those from New South Wales, seemed to be saving themselves for the later debate. Yet the merits of state aid as a method of education finance came to be overshadowed in that debate by questions of the electoral significance of aid and of the proper relationship between the Federal Executive and State Labor Governments. For there was more involved for New South Wales - and thus for the Conference - than the justice of the Catholic case or even the status of assistance already given. After the defeat of the Education Committee's recommendation, Downing, for New South Wales, acknowledged the need to protect existing benefits. 'The parents of half a million children are

106 The only evidence we have of how the adjusting was done is Virgo's memory of a bitter argument between Calwell and McKenna. Virgo saw the ad hoc committee as broadly divided between Calwell, Chamberlain and himself, opposed to direct aid, and McKenna, Jones and Downing, favouring some concessions (G.T. Virgo, interview). Yet McKenna was committed by the Tasmanian Branch to oppose direct aid and Jones' Queensland Branch supported only aid to the scholar.

107 Whitlam remembers trying to persuade Colbourne at one time that the state aid argument should be couched in terms of the impending collapse of the Catholic system and the consequent pressure on state schools. But Colbourne's main argument was always from justice (W.R. Colbourne, E.G. Whitlam, interviews).
getting state aid in some form or other', he said. If this had been the only consideration in the subsequent debate, the New South Welshmen might have been satisfied with a resolution protecting existing benefits. However, they believed their recent electoral setbacks had shown the need to overturn the principle of 1957. Tasmania and South Australia, rather differently, were prepared to strike a balance between principle and pragmatism, between catering for Labor's core supporters and seeking votes more widely (HYPOTHESIS III), merely by offering indirect and disguised aid and protecting existing benefits. New South Wales instead believed an 'inclusive' approach required an offer of direct aid. To do otherwise, said Downing, was 'political suicide'. For years the New South Wales Branch and Labor Caucus had conceived its main task to be the retention of an ALP Government. 108 Removed from office it sought to return as quickly as possible since, said Oliver sarcastically, the party in New South Wales, unlike other Branches, was not indifferent to political power.

The 1965 defeat was doubly bitter for New South Wales because of the apparent contribution to it of the Federal 'interference' in the State over state aid policy in 1963 and 1964. Renshaw developed consequently the idea of State Branch autonomy in policy areas financed by State governments. He put this view again in his address to Federal Conference delegates. 109 Oliver and Downing tried vainly to remove from the ad hoc committee recommendation the provisions for Federal oversight,

108 This emerged clearly in the author's interviews with Colbourne, Oliver and Mulvihill. For evidence of the close relationship between Executive and Government, see the litany of Government achievements in the Executive's reports to State Annual Conferences and in the party publications A.L.P. Journal, A.L.P. News and A.L.P. Newsletter.
109 Age, 6 August 1965; Bulletin, 14 August 1965. See also: ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1965 Annual Conference, 12 and above, notes 74 and 75.
knowing that the best hope for New South Wales, in the face of continuing Federal support for the principle of 1957, was to manoeuvre within clause 4. The apparent confusion in the Conference, confronted with a motion and three amendments, as well as the failure to reach agreement during the lunchtime discussions, perhaps gave the New South Welshmen some hope that the delegates would be content with the status quo. The appointment of a committee had been itself an indication of the extent of disagreement among the six delegations.  Oliver pleaded with the Conference to 'leave the thing alone', to retain existing policy without such oversight provisions. Downing agreed that the provisions would make State Labor Governments a laughing stock.

These faceless men - everyone realises they lost the State elections and Federal elections but that will be nothing to the effect they will have in the elections in the other States .... Whenever a matter of this character is introduced our opponents will say "You had better run away and see your masters to find out where you stand. Run away and see Mr Chamberlain in Western Australia to find out what your policy is".

Chamberlain retorted that New South Wales 'apparently finds extreme difficulty in observing the decision of the national body'. Colbourne insisted that New South Wales had no intention of defying Federal policy but, privately, he and his colleagues saw the adoption of the ad hoc committee recommendation as another example of the desire of the Federal bodies, led by Chamberlain, to 'get New South Wales' over the state aid issue.

On the other hand, the appointment of the committee may have been influenced by the lateness of the hour. This was the last session of the Conference and some delegates were anxious to get away (DT, 7 August 1965; G.T. Virgo, interview).

Note Downing's remark to the Conference: 'go ahead and rub our noses in the dirt' (SMH, 7 August 1965).
A Victorian delegate to Federal ALP meetings remarked to the author that 'the usual form' in formulating a resolution involved delegation representatives meeting privately to try to reconcile their disagreements. Sometimes 'someone might break off, saying "No, we can't accept that" and the others would carry on to try to work something out'. Downing's failure to agree in the ad hoc committee was an example of such an occurrence. It represented, as did the subsequent vote, the unacceptability of the Federal supervision procedures to New South Wales. New South Wales could not reconcile its goal of autonomy with the decision taken. The process of partisan mutual adjustment had stopped short of unanimity.

Delegates had expected and endured a bitter debate on state aid. It was a measure of the depth of feeling that the bitterness was shown even in a public Conference - the first in Federal Labor's history.

112 W.W.C. Brown, interview.
113 Rules providing for voting on decisions, together with the criteria of majority rule, act as devices to halt the process of partisan mutual adjustment at any point beyond 50 per cent plus one vote. The more participants to whose goals the decision is adjusted, the more vague or self-contradictory the decision. But there may be considerations, such as the need to show a united front to the world and the need to keep the coalition together, which require adjustment beyond a bare majority. For an excellent discussion of the latter point, see: Heinz Eulau, 'Logics of Rationality in Unanimous Decision-Making', Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Nomos VII: Rational Decision, New York, 1964, 26-54.
114 Virgo, attending his first Federal Conference remembered the 'bitterness' above all. He suggested that the education debate was left till the last session because of fears of a public battle over state aid (G.T. Virgo, interview). Press reports concentrated mainly on the exchanges between Calwell and Oliver and Chamberlain and Downing as evidence of this bitterness. Toohey, an experienced delegate, suggested the bitterness at least of the New South Welshmen may have been superficial (J.P. Toohey, interview). There may have been an element of 'playing to the gallery' for some delegates. The best evidence of the irreconcilability of New South Wales remains its voting behaviour on the two crucial decisions. In this connection one can draw a contrast between the ability of the Conference to reach a unanimous decision on unity tickets, after negotiations between Calwell, Chamberlain and delegates from New South Wales and Victoria, and their efforts regarding state aid: Bulletin, 7, 16 August 1965; CT, 9 August 1965; Nation, 7 August 1965; SMH, 13 August 1965. The unity ticket decision, codifying and slightly augmenting enforcement procedures, followed the withdrawal of two drastically diverging resolutions from New South Wales and Victoria. See above p.160.
THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE MEETING OF FEBRUARY 1966 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The 1965 Federal Conference provides evidence of an attempt to reach a compromise decision by partisan mutual adjustment (protection of clause 4), the lack of an attempt at partisan mutual adjustment regarding another decision (clause 4 itself), the importance of factors (electoral success and failure and the relative roles of State and Federal parties) not connected with the merits of state aid as a purely educational policy and, finally, the continuation of a process of disjointed incrementalism. The incremental process continued. In September 1965, the Victorian Central Executive faced a change in the nature of the state aid problem in its State and reacted accordingly.

The Victorian Liberal Government budgeted for a small (£25,000) allocation of direct aid in the form of interest subsidies for capital works. Under the surveillance of the VCE, the State Parliamentary Labor Party opposed the legislation at all stages. The VCE then asked the Federal Executive if a reference to the latter, under the clause 4

\[115\] Age, 16 September 1965; VCE 24 September 1965, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142. In 1964, the VCE had prevented the State Leader, C.P. Stoneham, from promising that a Labor Government would build schools for the private systems, even if buildings and land remained the property of the State. (The proposal came from J. Galbally, Leader in the Legislative Council, but had been discussed by the SPLP Executive). Instead, the VCE officers recommended Stoneham promise 'free text books and exercise books for all students, irrespective of attendance at State or independent schools', and science facilities, to be built by the State for the use of all children. The second recommendation was later withdrawn and another, free uniforms, also disappeared during the discussions. Finally, reminiscent of examples of coyness at the Federal level, the underlined words (my emphasis) in the quotation from Stoneham's printed policy speech were left out of the television version: ALP (Victoria), Victorian Conjoint State Elections 1964 Labor Party Policy Speech delivered by the Honourable C.P. Stoneham, M.L.A., Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party at the Town Hall, Richmond, Thursday, 11th June, 1964, 19; Television and Radio, 8; VCEO 26 May 1964, VCE 5 June 1964, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8742; VCEO 5 June 1964, Vic. Rec., unlabelled folder of Minutes, 1964.
protection decision of the Federal Conference, was necessary if the proposed benefit was already given in another State or Territory, as it was in this case. The VCE also asked if the Federal decision applied both to benefits introduced by Labor and by non-Labor governments. 'Specifically, is there an obligation on Labor Oppositions to OPPOSE new benefits unless a clearance is obtained from the Federal Executive which would make it possible to support them?',\(^\text{116}\) While this question awaited an answer, the Federal Liberal Government further altered the nature of the problem by deciding to subsidise capital borrowings for building by non-state schools in the Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory.\(^\text{117}\) The innovation provoked the Western Australian Branch of the ALP to ask the Federal Executive whether capital assistance infringed Section 116 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which prohibited the establishment of a religion.\(^\text{118}\)

The Victorian and Western Australian resolutions came before the Federal Executive meeting of 9-11 February 1966. Wyndham's remarks in support of the Victorian approach provide further evidence that Labor decisions on state aid never finalised the party's position. 'The adoption of the 1965 Federal Conference decision did not clarify the situation, in my opinion at least', wrote Wyndham. 'If anything it has created new problems ...'. In particular, did the sentence

\(^\text{116}\) Agenda Attachment J: State Aid to Private Schools, Victorian State Executive Request for an Interpretation, FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/43; VCE 22 October 1965, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8742.

\(^\text{117}\) Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 45.

\(^\text{118}\) Agenda Attachment K: State Aid - Commonwealth Constitution West Australian Item, FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/43. Direct aid had been given in the Territories for nearly a decade in the form of interest subsidies but this was the first Commonwealth aid for capital borrowings.
'No benefit which is currently established shall be disturbed' mean a benefit should remain undisturbed only in the State or Territory where it existed or elsewhere as well? The Executive answered that the benefits not to be disturbed were 'those benefits in each of the respective States or Territories currently applying at the time of the carriage of the 1965 Federal Conference decision'. Further, answering the second Victorian question, the Executive confirmed that Labor Oppositions were obliged to oppose new benefits (that is, those introduced after the 1965 decision) unless they received Federal Executive clearance. Thirdly, the Executive resolved that, in view of this interpretation, Calwell should be advised 'that future extensions of the Science Laboratory Grants by the Commonwealth Government be opposed by all Federal Labor members'. Fourthly, the Executive advised the Federal Parliamentary Party that Labor politicians should campaign on the basis of aid to the student, utilising a schedule of proposed payments to show how scholars and their parents would benefit. Finally, the Executive endorsed the Western Australian request to examine the constitutionality of state aid and asked its Legal Advisory Committee to undertake the task.

All five decisions, except the first, became the subject of argument in subsequent weeks. It was reasonable of Victoria to ask for

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119 Agenda Attachment L: State Aid to Private Schools. Memorandum by the General Secretary, FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/43.

120 FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40. The decision on the Western Australian request actually came before the two decisions directed towards the Federal Caucus. My arrangement sacrifices evidence of incrementalism—the implications of the first two decisions were not immediately recognised and acted upon—for ease of presentation. Discussion of all five matters followed a general discussion to which eight Executive members contributed, as well as Calwell and Whitlam. Pres reports: Australian, CT, 11 February 1966; DT, SMH, 10, 11 February 1966.
an interpretation of the crucial sentence. The interpretation provided apparently meant - though this was not stated explicitly - that the existence of a benefit in one State or Territory did not sanction it in another. 'Border hopping' was barred. Even the idea of an examination of the constitutional status of direct aid was not new. But it was the decisions taken about the attitudes of Parliamentary Labor Parties to new benefits and the beginning of an actual process of legal scrutiny which not only indicated a hardening of mood on the Executive but also provoked other party members.

The most senior party member provoked was Whitlam, the Deputy Federal Leader. He was present during the Executive's discussions of the Western Australian item and had said he did not believe the High Court would invalidate direct aid. Writing to Wyndham, Whitlam went on to assert his conviction that

there will never be enough trained teachers and facilities and equipment in State or private schools in this country until the Commonwealth does the same and as much for teacher training and technical and secondary and even primary education as it does for universities and until

121 There are four pieces of evidence for this conclusion: first, McKenna's original motion at the 1965 Conference, which mentioned existing benefits 'in a particular State or Territory' (my emphasis) rather than any State or Territory. This motion was later discharged by the Conference but the ad hoc committee would have had it in mind when producing the resolution. Secondly, the question from Victoria was phrased in a particular way (above p. 219). Thirdly, an amendment at the Executive meeting from Webb (WA) which conceded the 'border hopping' point, was ruled out of order as a direct negative to the motion finally adopted. Fourthly, at least two commentators saw the decision as a rebuff to Whitlam, who had interpreted the 1965 decision to allow border hopping (DT, SMH, 10 February 1966).

122 See Gill, 'The Federal Science Grant', 338-41, for suggestions in 1964 that a High Court challenge might be mounted by anti-state aid groups. VCE President R.W. Holt advised his fellow officers that donations to this end would be welcome (VCEO 29 September 1964, Vic. Rec., E.O's & C.E. Minutes & Agenda 1964). Calwell occasionally doubted the legality of aid (note 93 above) but had not suggested a challenge.
it does so irrespective of whether the teachers and pupils are at State or private institutions.\textsuperscript{123}

This paragraph confirmed the fears of Bryant and others that Commonwealth aid to education would come to mean state aid. Whitlam himself believed the former was the issue and what followed regarding state aid was enjoined by principles of equality between children. Others wondered if his motives were more expedient.\textsuperscript{124} Whatever the truth, Whitlam in this statement in effect supported direct aid when the party did not. To show why that point tended to be overlooked we must place the February Executive meeting in context.

Since the 1963 election, Whitlam's status as heir apparent to Calwell had become a growing source of frustration in the former and resentment in the latter. Whitlam knew that the party had never removed an incumbent Leader and, thus, that his accession depended upon Calwell leaving voluntarily. But Calwell clung to office, enjoying the status

\textsuperscript{123} Whitlam to Wyndham, 11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/31/F.P.L.P. - Deputy Leader Correspondence - F.P.L.P./2 1964, 1965, 1966. The full text of the letter was released by Whitlam to appear in most metropolitan newspapers on 12 February. It also appears in ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 58-9 and Laurie Oakes, Whitlam PM, Sydney, 1973, 131-2. There is a division of opinion over whether the referral to the Legal Committee would have been followed by a High Court challenge. Cameron believed the referral amounted to an instruction to organise a challenge unless it had no chance of success but Calwell (at the time), Keeffe and the VCE unions were more circumspect about the possibility of an actual challenge: C.R. Cameron, interview; Fact, 25 February 1966 (Calwell); J.B. Keeffe, interview; Scope, 23 February 1966.

\textsuperscript{124} The best interpretation of Whitlam's approach to state aid is that he at first was little interested in it as an issue separate from Commonwealth aid to education, that when the latter issue became increasingly important, Whitlam saw no reason why Catholic children were not entitled to equality of opportunity but that aid should be dispensed at all times on the basis of need. The apparent evidence of the electoral significance of direct aid by 1963 made the 'aid to Catholics' part of the issue more urgent but did not separate it from the more fundamental goal of quality education, universally available and funded by the Commonwealth. This interpretation is based on evidence from C.R. Cameron, W.R. Colbourne, F. Crean, interviews; Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 15; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 125; F.E. Stewart, E.G. Whitlam, interviews.
that came with the post of Leader of the Opposition and hopeful of
besting any successor to Menzies or, at least, of ensuring that his
own successor would not be Whitlam. Increasingly, both men were on
opposite sides in important questions in the party. Thus, when the
1963 election provoked party debate between those who sought a greater
role for Parliamentarians in party decisionmaking and those who feared
sundering the links between party and unions, 'to a considerable extent
Mr. Whitlam appeared the champion of the first school and Mr. Calwell the
leading spokesman of the second'. Fifteen months later, the same
writer suggested observation of Labor affairs 'is today a matter of
scoring points for and against Mr. Whitlam, against and for Mr. Calwell.

The Federal Caucus meeting of May 1965, where Whitlam led the
narrow majority in favour of mere token opposition to the science
laboratories legislation, stood out as an occasion when the Deputy had
successfully opposed the Leader. Some of his supporters previously had
complained that Whitlam was unwilling to fight; his success encouraged
outside observers at least, and possibly some Caucus colleagues, to hope

The most notable incident in this connection was in January 1965, when
Whitlam's private comments to a New Zealand reporter became public.
Whitlam said that the Australian people were unlikely to elect Calwell
Prime Minister at the age of seventy and that Calwell had on occasion
shown a lack of leadership. In subsequent months Whitlam, while not
challenging Calwell directly, began to establish more forcefully his
credentials as a modern, radical Labor Leader of the near future. There
were suggestions that Calwell was starting to promote Cairns, or perhaps
Crean, as his successor although he, too, did not publicly confront his
rival. For some of these events, including F. Daly, MP's, suggestion
that Calwell enjoyed being Opposition Leader for status reasons: Agenda

Colin A. Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 36, 2 (June 1964), 89; 37, 3 (September 1965), 104.
that he could win other battles. At the 1965 Federal Conference, while the two Leaders found common ground on many issues and while they avoided confrontation on state aid, they were on opposite sides in the manoeuvring regarding unity tickets. Whitlam sought, by walking out of the Executive meeting before the Conference, to force the party to stronger enforcement of the unity ticket ban. One of the considerations behind the search by others for a compromise on this issue was to save Calwell from having to support, as a Victorian delegate, the Victorian item which sought removal of the ban. At this Conference, too, the two men revealed their different views of the nature and role of the Labor Party. Calwell attacked the press and dedicated the party to the construction of a democratic socialist and nationalist Australia; Whitlam praised the Conference for revising and expanding party policy and called for a more broadly representative party. Calwell defended the performance of the Victorian Branch while Whitlam advised he would continue to investigate the election tickets of the Victorian Branch of the Australian Railways Union, which had provoked his anger at the Executive meeting. Calwell insisted also that he would lead Labor at the next elections. Calwell's failure to provide positive leadership at the Conference in issues such as unity tickets and state aid again brought press speculation that his position might be insecure. But an attempt by two Whitlam supporters to mount a challenge to the

128 Age, 4, 9 August 1965; Bulletin, 7, 14 August 1965; Nation, 24 July, 7 August 1965; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 125-7; SMH, 13 August 1965.
Leader failed, as much because of lack of support for Whitlam as because of support for Calwell. 130

It is difficult to establish how well the press speculation reflected unease in the party over Calwell's leadership. To the extent that the press provided information for party decisionmakers it may have helped create a mood of 'we can't win with Calwell', without necessarily establishing that Whitlam must succeed him. 131 In any event, Calwell felt other intimations of his insecurity. While Calwell had received after the 1964 Senate elections expressions of confidence in his leadership from each State Branch, Cairns recalls his Leader was shaken to find that some of his oldest Caucus friends agreed with Whitlam in early 1965 that Calwell should give up the Leadership. Uncertain of his  

130 Bulletin, 11 December 1965 and Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 86, refer to this attempt. The former says one of the instigators was a left­ winger and the latter names the two as L. Barnard and R. Davies, both Tasmanian members. For press speculation at the time of the Conference that Whitlam would seek to challenge Calwell for the Leadership, probably on the issue of unity tickets and the Victorian Branch, see: Age, 2, 7, 9 August 1965; Australian, 2 August 1965, Bulletin, 14 August 1965; CT, 7, 9 August 1965; DT, 1 August 1965; SMH, 2 August 1965.

131 An impression - no more than that - gained from interviews is that the 1965 increment in unity ticket policy (and thus presumably its ramifications regarding the party Leadership) was accorded less significance by the participants than by the press. In this connection note the speculation in Victoria that Whitlam had 'leaked' details and interpretations of events to the press: Agenda Attachment B: Leakages of Confidential Information; FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40, 43; correspondence between Calwell and Hartley, October- November 1965, Vic. Rec., packet of letters, labelled 'Mr Calwell - Personal', 1964-67. As early as 1961 T. Uren, MP, had accused Whitlam of leaking details regarding party affairs (SMH, 31 August 1961). Cairns believed Whitlam's remarks in New Zealand regarding Calwell (above note 125) were 'carefully leaked' (J.F. Cairns interview). Whitlam denied this but there is considerable evidence around early 1965 of an orchestrated press campaign, especially in the Australian and SMH, to promote Whitlam as an alternative to Calwell. Throughout his career, Whitlam used public platforms, including the press, in combination with or in preference to the councils of the party, to the extent that one can often see a 'Whitlam-press alliance' at work to bring about changes in the party. Whitlam was by no means unique in the ALP in using the press in this way but he was better at it than most. His skill makes one cautious in accepting press versions of events like those of August 1965 as accurate depictions of the state of the ALP.
support in this section of Caucus, Calwell increasingly sought Caucus allies in the Victorian group and among opponents of the New South Wales Executive. Partly in return for their support, partly to deny Whitlam the succession, Calwell began quietly to promote Cairns or Crean as future Leaders. Still, his efforts could not prevent his narrow loss (two votes) over state aid in May. By August, observers at the Federal Conference described him as surviving rather than dominating, forced to accept unpalatable positions, notably over state aid, to preserve support in the machine to counter his shaky hold on the Caucus, his role in back room negotiations overshadowed by Whitlam's confident presence on the Conference floor.

The Federal Executive faced just as much pressure as Calwell. The Caucus decision of May 1965 seemed to show that those who broadly agreed with the 1957 principle regarding state aid were in a minority in the Parliamentary party. In 1964, the Caucus decision regarding Menzies' legislation might have seemed tactically wise to the majority of the Federal Executive. In 1965, Calwell's failure to carry the Caucus

132 For the State Branch expressions of support: Agenda Appendix D: Hon. Arthur Calwell, M.H.R.; FX 24-27 May 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38, 39. Cairns says that Calwell canvassed 'his old friends on the Right', such as Kennelly and the New South Welshmen, D. Minogue and W. O'Connor, who always voted for him, and found they agreed with Whitlam. This forced him to the 'Left' of Caucus seeking support. Stewart, while not as close to Calwell, believed 'he resolved to placate his enemies and insult his friends' while Toohey, somewhere near the 'Centre' of Caucus detected a decline in the Leader's conciliatory style after 1963 as he sought support from a particular section of his colleagues (J.F. Cairns, F.E. Stewart, J.P. Toohey, interviews). While not all Caucus members believed, with Daly (From Curtin to Kerr, 165) that Calwell was 'finished' after 1963, far fewer were prepared to support him on grounds other than their rejection of Whitlam as an alternative.

133 Australian, 26 November 1965; Daly, From Curtin to Kerr, 168.

134 This loss was despite assiduous telephone canvassing of Caucus colleagues (Bulletin, 11 December 1965).

135 Age, 4, 9 August 1965; Bulletin, 14 August 1965; CT, 7 9 August 1965.
showed the Executive that the politicians' motives were more than tactical. The Executive's own Education Committee, led by Wyndham but influenced by Whitlam, had agreed effectively with the Caucus majority. Whitlam had allied himself with the New South Wales Branch against existing state aid policy.\textsuperscript{136} By the August Conference, the principle of 1957, as expressed at the 1963 Conference, had become 'non-negotiable', not subject to partisan mutual adjustment. Debate centred on how to protect the status quo; pressure led to consolidation of defences rather than a mood for concessions. Whitlam's interest in organisational reform and enforcement of the unity ticket policy, both unpopular with the Federal machine controllers, probably reduced further the chances of other concessions regarding state aid, also identified as a 'Whitlam issue'. The threat Whitlam seemed to pose to Calwell, the ally of the machine, cemented the desire to avoid decisions which could benefit Whitlam. The anti-direct aid front was consolidating.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{136} Thus he brought upon himself the anti-New South Wales feelings of Chamberlain and others. We shall concentrate in the following pages on aspects other than State Branch rivalries but one suspects that the strong inter-State feelings evident at the 1965 Federal Conference added a further dimension to the grounds for conflict outlined. Whitlam and the NSW Branch led a sub-coalition seeking change in party education policy. Whitlam sought change on the grounds of equality and votes; the State Branch sought the same goal for reasons of justice and votes. This contrast is, of course, simplified, but it shows again how the same goal can be sought for different reasons. Calwell, the VCE and Chamberlain led the opposing sub-coalition. Calwell may have been more concerned to retain his position than thwart a new policy. The difference in the two coalitions was that Whitlam was able to maintain more independence on issues other than state aid than was Calwell. Whitlam's alliance with New South Wales was governed by geography (it was his Branch) and some common interests in winning votes and promoting policies; Calwell's with Victoria rather by geography, his desire for survival and a common dislike of the DLP.

\textsuperscript{137} One observer believed most delegates were 'past the stage of considering fresh Labor approaches' and that the ALP 'is irrevocably set on a positively anti-Catholic course': \textit{Bulletin}, 14 August 1965 (B. Johns). For organisational reform, see chapter 5, below.
Consolidation might have satisfied the defenders of the 1957 line but for the actions of Whitlam's Caucus colleague, Allan Fraser, MP. In television and radio broadcasts in mid November 1965, Fraser expressed his agreement with the Federal Government's direct aid initiatives in the Territories and argued that what was 'just and fair' there was the same elsewhere. He congratulated those who had worked to achieve this concession from the Government. Keeffe then moved in Caucus that Fraser's statements be investigated but Fraser convinced Caucus that his remarks did not contravene party policy. Caucus members were already anxious about state aid's electoral effects and possibly resentful at Keeffe's attempt to enforce Federal policy. The easy defeat of Keeffe's motion suggested this anxiety was increasing and that pressure on the Federal Executive would continue.\(^{138}\) 'The proponents of State Aid', wrote Hartley of Victoria, now a Federal Executive member, 'have forced the Party into a corner on the question with the result that a number of individual members, particularly Parliamentarians, are showing signs of weakening and are not even prepared' — he added with some understatement — 'to advocate the policy of the Party as determined by Federal Conferences'.\(^{139}\)

\(^{138}\) Advertiser, 20 November 1965; Age, 22, 23 November 1965; Australian, 19, 22, 25 November 1965; DT, 15 November 1965; SMH, 18, 19, 23, 25 November 1965. Whitlam played little or no part in the Caucus debate, although he had made remarks similar to Fraser's in Parliament some weeks earlier (CPD H. of R. 48, 14 October 1965, 1848).

\(^{139}\) Hartley to E. Chick, President, Maribyrnong Federal Electorate Assembly, 29 November 1965, Vic. Rec., Central Executive 1966-1967. Hartley advised that he broadly agreed with the sentiments in Chick's letter to him. Chick had blamed the press for pressure on Labor, praised the state education system, argued that ALP resistance to state aid demands would force out of the party its lingering DLP elements and insisted that Labor should not forsake its principles for 'dangerous expediency'. 
Frustrated in Caucus, Keeffe took the Fraser case to the February meeting of the Federal Executive which decided to take no further action.\textsuperscript{140} The issue was too important to be resolved by disciplining an individual member. Fraser was only the most vocal member of a Caucus whose majority sought to overturn existing policy because they believed in state aid, because they \textit{yearned} for electoral success or for both or other reasons. The majority of the Federal Executive - at least eight of its twelve members at the February meeting - also had different sets of reasons for supporting its decisions.\textsuperscript{141} The party sub-coalition supporting the principle of 1957 rested on a number of bases, not all of them held in common. Chamberlain possessed probably the strongest ideological and personal feelings against state aid; Keeffe's opposition to state aid may have been less important to him in February 1966 than his desire to retaliate against his Caucus colleagues; the two South Australian delegates, Nicholls and Virgo, had suffered less at the hands of Catholics during the Split than had Chamberlain, but both opposed state aid for other reasons. The Victorians, McNolty and Hartley, resented Whitlam's pursuit of unity tickets in the Victorian Branch. Delegates had worked hard in August to achieve a compromise based on flexible enforcement, yet Whitlam persisted in seeking harsh enforcement. Now the Executive, while taking minimal action in response to Whitlam's complaint in one area, unity tickets, tightened its defence against his

\textsuperscript{140} Australian, CT, 8 February 1966; FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40.

\textsuperscript{141} The only decision showing voting figures was that for the legal examination. The vote in favour of this decision was 8-4. This debate also drew the most speakers and amendments (nine and three respectively) of all those on state aid at the meeting. The brief survey of delegates' goals is based on press reports, especially Nation, 19 February 1966, earlier sections of this chapter and interviews with participants.
demands in another. Some delegates may have been influenced by the connection between the two issues. The Victorian delegates, furthermore, represented the State with the greatest commitment to an alternative education policy. Their support for consolidating opposition to direct aid may have been influenced by a desire to clear the field for a new approach.

Most delegates' attitudes were fairly well established by February 1966, yet partisan mutual adjustment could have helped convince waverers that their differing sets of goals were still served by protection of the 1957 principle. Calwell was also wavering. He was not a delegate but had he expressed more forcefully to delegates his doubts about existing policy some aspects of the decisions might have differed. In December 1965, Calwell told Caucus that he 'would examine the possibility of finding a new formula for assistance to scholars in accordance with existing Labour policy'. Some reports, which he denied, claimed he had admitted that Labor must offer direct aid. When he arrived at the February Executive meeting, Calwell bore a submission based on a letter from Bishop Carroll setting out Carroll's idea of the

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142 Details regarding unity tickets at this meeting: Agenda Attachments D, E & F; FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40, 43. One of four cases was referred back to the VCE on the technical ground that a statutory declaration had not been provided as required; another ARU member was advised that future offences (he had signed a letter supporting the unity ticket) 'would be treated much more seriously'.

143 The Victorian delegates had been directed to support existing policy and the Federal decision directing Caucus members to campaign on the basis of aid to the scholar originated in the VCE and was moved at the Federal Executive by Hartley: VCE 28 January 1966, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142. The Victorian Branch had produced the most comprehensive education policy document of any Branch, without calling for direct aid, in Looking to the Future: Labor's Plan for Education.

144 CPD H. of R. 49, 10 December 1965, 3919 (Calwell's personal explanation, denying some press reports - quoted); CT, 10 December 1965, 11 February 1966.
minimum state aid demands Labor could concede to Catholics if it were to hold the Catholic vote. Given Carroll's personal views, this letter certainly requested a measure of direct aid. But Calwell, detecting the mood of the Executive, withheld his submission and lent himself instead to a scheme to make the most of indirect aid. The Executive had directed Labor politicians to campaign on the basis of aid to the scholar. Two days later, Calwell outlined 'an educational endowment scheme ... [which would] give a direct benefit of £26 ($52) a year to every child in a primary school everywhere'. The scheme would be worth £40 million per annum, far more than the Liberals' science blocks scheme and would benefit all primary school children, instead of a select few secondary students at wealthy schools. The money could pay for 'school fees or anything of a like kind'.

The authorship of this scheme is less important than its significance. First, it confirmed that Calwell stood with the sub-coalition led by Chamberlain and the Victorians, which wished to resist demands for direct aid. Like the concession in 1963 regarding use of facilities, like the progressive elaborations of scholarship schemes for secondary students, the scheme was an attempt to balance a reaffirmation of the 1957 principle with an increment of indirect aid. Chamberlain was always more interested in denying aid to Catholics than in positive}

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145 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 30-1; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 130-1; SMH, 24 February 1966. For Carroll's views, see the first section of this chapter.
147 The scheme appeared at the VCE in January but there is no indication of its authorship (note 143). Calwell had given indications that he would seek new methods (note 144). Calwell's broadcast used the costing Hartley had given the Federal Executive and Freudenberg says Hartley drafted Calwell's broadcast as a whole (Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 32). However, another source gives Cairns the credit for the idea (Alan Reid, Bulletin, 26 February 1966).
alternatives; the Victorian Branch, influenced by Bryant and Wood and an active Education Committee, had worked on schemes to replace direct aid; Calwell hoped to compensate for the electoral 'lead' in his saddle, without giving ground to the Church from which he had grown estranged. The 'dollar a week' scheme was meant as part of a compromise: reaffirmation and consolidation balanced by concession. Instead, it provided fuel for the opposing intra-party sub-coalition, led by Whitlam.

Whitlam's letter of 11 February had concentrated upon the substance of one of the Executive's decisions. It supported, in fairly guarded terms, direct aid to non-state schools within the context of Commonwealth aid to education. It contained only a veiled reference to the party's internal differences, to personalities and to the validity of the Executive's decision. It was primarily an expression of exasperation at the decision to examine the legality of state aid. It was written after

But there were indications in Calwell's broadcast that he was appealing particularly to Catholics. First, he emphasised that 'not one single child in any Catholic primary school' had benefited from the science blocks legislation. Second, Calwell's only indication of the meaning of 'a like kind' was his last sentence, which was ambiguous and had little relation to the sentences preceding it: 'I believe our proposals are the best and soundest for helping those who need help most in the payment of teachers' salaries'. In a later television broadcast, Calwell said again: 'The intention is to assist in the payment of teachers ...' and said there was nothing in the scheme to prevent Catholic schools refusing admission to children not accompanied by their educational endowment money (Fact, 25 February 1966. My emphasis. See also: Age, 21 February 1966). Assistance for teachers' salaries was a longtime Catholic direct aid demand ('I understand [from Carroll's letter?] ... this is the main problem', said Calwell) and Calwell was permitting a clear administrative role to the schools to ensure endowments could be used for this purpose. Here was a clear loophole for aid to the Catholic system, but no one seems to have noticed in the rush of events. Many critics of the direct-indirect distinction argued that the latter category always carried this loophole. Calwell certainly knew the implication of this category.
the other state aid decisions but did not refer to them. After Calwell's broadcast Whitlam made further statements which canvassed a far wider range of issues. First, he alleged that the Executive's decisions instituting the legal examination and directing politicians to oppose future direct aid, especially extensions of the Commonwealth science block scheme, breached the Federal Conference decision protecting existing benefits. A legal challenge could overturn all benefits, he argued, and it was politically absurd, as well as a usurpation of the role of Caucus to force Parliamentarians to oppose benefits they had previously supported. The 1965 Conference had recognised the latter point; the Executive had ignored it and was attempting to change, rather than interpret policy. Secondly, Whitlam suggested that the Executive had sought to further humiliate Federal Caucus by replacing independent minded Parliamentarians on the Executive's Policy Committees with more pliable politicians. Nor were Caucus members properly consulted over the 'dollar a week' scheme. Thirdly, Whitlam argued that the issue was 'between those who want a broadly based socialist and radical party and petty men who want to reduce it to their personal plaything'. The Executive was dominated by an 'extremist ...

See above note 123. The decisions were made on 9 and 10 February. The letter was drafted in the morning of 11 February and arrived just after the Executive meeting concluded (SMH, 12 February 1966, Sun-Herald, 13 February 1966. The veiled reference: 'The Federal conference would have given as short shrift to this proposal and related interpretations as it gave to the referendum proposal which emanated from the same source' (i.e. Chamberlain and the Western Australian Branch). Whitlam also said later he meant the 'accumulated deadwood' (preventing the Chifley Government's education legislation from bearing fruit and needing to be cleared away) in the letter to refer to 'policy decisions, as well as some of the people that don't seem to be able to understand policy such as the people on the Federal Executive': ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March 1966, 66 (ATN-7 interview, 15 February 1966). But this elaboration came after the further developments referred to in the following paragraphs.
factional and unrepresentative' group. The party should be reorganised on the basis of a Federal Conference drawn from the party in Federal electorates and from Federal unions. Finally, without explicitly linking Calwell with the controlling group on the Executive, Whitlam suggested his Leader's views on education were vague and that Calwell should 'be the champion of his [Caucus] colleagues, who up to this stage have elected him to his present high post'. While Whitlam scrupulously avoided attacking Calwell directly there was enough implied in his public remarks for observers to interpret them as a challenge to Calwell's Leadership. 150

A number of reasons may be suggested for Whitlam's activities in the second half of February. His sympathetic biographer, Graham Freudenberg, uses Whitlam's conduct in these weeks as an example of the style of political work or leadership that came to be known, following Whitlam's own description, as 'crash through or crash'. The ingredients of this style were, firstly, careful definition and extension of the issue. (Note the contrast between Whitlam's first and subsequent statements, extending the issue from education policy - not state aid as such, given Whitlam's priorities - to broader considerations.) Secondly, 'he deliberately provoked his opponents' and took enormous risks. Thirdly, he secured support from rank and file party members and supporters and from decisionmakers, the latter 'not necessarily in basic sympathy with him or [his] views, but who accepted his value to the

150 All the relevant documents are printed in ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 58-108. Whitlam's letters and statements were as follows (58-77): letter to Wyndham (11 February); ATN-7 (Sydney) interview recorded 14 February and shown 15 February; statement 14 February; telegram to Queensland State Secretary (14 February); telegram to NSW Branch officers (22 February); letters to Queensland Federal members and candidates and to Tasmanian members (17 and 23 February). Apart from the first, the documents all make similar points.
Party'. Fourthly, he benefited from the powers and status of his position and from his reputation as a vote winner, from his own mental and physical efforts and from strokes of fortune.\textsuperscript{151}

There are great elements of truth in this analysis but also elements of \textit{post hoc} glamourisation. Freudenberg makes Whitlam far more the calculating, initiating actor than close analysis of the events of 1966 suggest he was. Whitlam's extension of the issue, for instance, was influenced by the activities of others. Whitlam made no published statements on the Executive decisions between 11 and 14 February 1966. In the closing hours of the Executive meeting on Friday, 11 February, telegrams arrived from party members protesting at the decisions regarding state aid and from Caucus members protesting against the restrictions the Executive had placed upon them. Whitlam's letter, arriving at much the same time, referred to the Caucus only to state the writer's belief that his Parliamentary colleagues 'would not approve my aiding or condoning' a legal challenge.\textsuperscript{152} On 11 February, also, before Whitlam's letter became public, Allan Fraser recorded a talk for broadcast on 13 February, which made the 'extension' which Whitlam did not make publicly until 14 February. Both the broadcast and a signed article in similar terms appeared in the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} on 14 February.

'I have', said Fraser, 'always rejected as fatal to the parliamentary system that the outside organisation should be able to direct the parliamentarian in detail on how he should vote in particular parliamentary divisions .... The issue is that the executive shall be

\textsuperscript{151} Freudenberg, \textit{A Certain Grandeur}, 36-8. I have compressed and re-arranged the original without destroying its sense.

\textsuperscript{152} There were reports that Caucus members were seeking a special Caucus meeting; \textit{SMH}, 12 February 1966; \textit{Sun-Herald}, 13 February 1966.
the servant and not the master of the membership'. Policy should be made by Federal Conference, not 'by the edicts of a handful of officials'. It is making Whitlam appear obtuse to say that he did not see these implications of the Executive decisions. It is true nevertheless that Fraser was the first publicly to extend the issue and turn it in the direction Whitlam was to follow. Whitlam did not immediately 'stake all', as Freudenberg puts it. He 'provoked his opponents' after Fraser had tested the water. Once he had taken the plunge on 14-15 February he gathered more media attention, as the heir

153 SMH, 14 February 1966; also reproduced in ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 83-7, 94-8. The article for the SMH, as distinct from the broadcast, spent much space to show that the party's written policy was open as to whether direct aid could be offered: there was no explicit prohibition of direct aid. This had been Fraser's argument to the Caucus in November 1965.
154 Alan Reid, Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 1966 and later in Bulletin, 26 February 1966 suggests Whitlam did not grasp the significance of the Executive's decisions until Fraser had acted. But note the veiled reference in Whitlam's 11 February letter (note 149) as evidence that Whitlam was well aware of the implications, even if he was more prudent than Fraser. Whitlam had only to read Reid's article in DT, 11 February 1966 to discover that the Executive had asserted 'complete authority' over the Caucus - but Whitlam's letter was drafted before the DT hit the streets. SMH, 12 February 1966 and Sun-Herald, 13 February 1966 (Peter Bowers) drew similar lessons from the decisions but by then Whitlam had flown to Rockhampton to campaign in the Dawson by-election and might have missed the Sydney press. Generally, to suggest that the implications dawned on Whitlam after Fraser had spoken is about as plausible as to suggest that Whitlam needed to read it in the press. Fraser was merely more forthright. Finally, there is evidence of rival politician-press alliances in these parallel reports. Bowers tends to see the weekend's events in terms of Whitlam and his Caucus supporters and attempts to paint Whitlam as the leading actor. Reid says Caucus members were awaiting a lead from Fraser and that Calwell had pleaded with Fraser not to make his broadcast (Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 1966). Reid was a confidant of Fraser (conversation with Fraser's niece, Helen Fraser, who is researching a biography of him) and his article shows obvious prior knowledge of the contents of Fraser's broadcast. In subsequent weeks Reid's accounts consistently played down Whitlam's role.
apparent to the party Leadership, than did Fraser.155 Because of his position he assumed the leadership of a sub-coalition of forces, some seeking state aid, others a change in Leadership, others diminution of the power of the Executive, others more private goals.

Most overt support came from New South Wales, still smarting over the events of 1965. Renshaw repeated his argument that State Branches should control State policies. His Caucus supported him but avoided mentioning the Federal Leadership issue. New South Wales Federal Caucus members overwhelmingly opposed the Executive's decision, although some were critical of the personal attacks contained in Whitlam's television broadcast and most refused to commit themselves to support Whitlam in any Leadership contest. The New South Wales Branch Executive rejected coercion of the Federal Caucus by 'outside bodies' and appealed against the Federal Executive interpretation of policy, 'which was not a correct interpretation and is in fact a change of policy'. The Queensland Caucus Executive supported direct aid, as did A. Hawke, Leader of the party in Western Australia. Individual members and local branches sent Whitlam telegrams of support. Significant individuals like Senator Kennelly, J.R. Fraser, MP (Allan's brother), G.W.A. Duthie, MP, R. Patterson, the campaigning candidate for the Dawson by-election, Freudenberg, who resigned as Calwell's press secretary, and G. Walsh, who resigned from the Victorian Central Executive, were counted in the anti-Federal Executive camp. Fraser continued his broadcasts, stressing not state aid, nor the Leadership, but 'membership control' of ALP policy. The South Australian Labor

155To the extent that Whitlam hoped to use the crisis to mount a Leadership challenge, there may have been an element of calculation in his statements in this way: Fraser was a possible Leadership contender, at least in the first few days after the Executive meeting, and may have been more popular in Caucus than Whitlam. Whitlam may have feared that Fraser would come to be seen as an alternative Leader to Calwell. For speculation about Fraser and the Leadership: Australian, 18 February 1966; CT, 21 February 1966; SMH, 17 February 1966.
Cabinet said its Attorney-General, Dunstan, would initiate no High Court challenge against state aid. But it did not dispute the Executive's decisions as such. Press commentators and Catholic spokesmen criticised the Executive and praised Whitlam and Fraser.

Whitlam did not direct these diverse forces, although obviously he had contacts with some of them. Rather he fed off and fuelled them. The reaction gave him the public platform upon which he performed best. He did not wish to come to the Leadership on the back of a faction, nor did he possess the tactical skills to build up and maintain a sub-coalition of forces within the party. The wave of press and party resentment provided an alternative power base. There may have been, too, an element of temper in Whitlam's initial reaction: the Executive had shown scant interest in his efforts regarding unity tickets and

Freudenberg writes that Whitlam was 'outraged' by the 'vindictiveness,'

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158 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 33-4 and Oakes, Whitlam PM, 133-4, give an impression of Whitlam's highly charged mood and the relationship between him and other elements of his sub-coalition, the media and rank and file party members. Note particularly how, according to Freudenberg, Whitlam's 'fighting mood had been given a sharp boost by a demonstration by party supporters at Brisbane airport' on 13 February. Whitlam himself said: 'I didn't realise until I went to Brisbane ... that there were so many hundreds of people strongly feeling resentment and contempt for our Federal executive'.

159 Caucus colleagues contrasted this characteristic of Whitlam with Calwell's style of leadership (C.R. Cameron, F. Crean, F.E. Stewart, J.M. Wheeldon, interviews). Note also: 'The essence of [Whitlam's] style and technique is openness; in the game of back-room intrigue, he is not a good politician at all' (Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 291). On Whitlam's lack of a solid power base within Caucus at this time, see Bulletin, 11 December 1965 (Brian Johns); Nation, 1 May 1965 (Maxwell Newton); SMH, 22 February 1966 (Ian Fitchett).
recklessness and prejudice accompanying the state aid decisions. Whitlam himself has suggested there may be too much determinism in the analyses of his style of political work; there is ample evidence of the rashness in his temperament. But skill in using and manipulating situations can be just as effective in politics as facility in creating them. Whitlam was to show this amply.

The activities of the sub-coalition headed by Whitlam produced an immediate reaction from those who sought to protect the principle of 1957, the power of the Federal Executive in relation to Caucus, the Leadership of Calwell, or all of these. While the South Australian Branch initiated the special Federal Executive meeting held early in March, the Western Australian, Victorian and parts of the Queensland Branch, as well as militant unions in New South Wales, were also restless, especially over the activities of Whitlam. Calwell, while

161 Asked by David Frost whether instances of his 'crashing through' were deliberate or out of temper, Whitlam replied: 'I suppose it was a bit of both': Anonymous, Whitlam and Frost, London, 1974, 42 (Television interview, August 1972). All the biographical studies of Whitlam mention examples of his impetuosity in small matters and large.
162 Age, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24 February 1966: C-M, DT, 23 February 1966; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 135-6; SMH, 16, 17, 23 February 1966. Three pieces of evidence show how the three most committed 'anti-aid' States saw the issue. The South Australian Executive directed its Federal delegates 'to ensure that no Member shall be permitted to violate his pledge or the rules of the Party'; Chamberlain told the Western Australian Executive that the ALP faced a grave situation due to 'the public attacks on constituted authority by Mr. E.G. Whitlam .... What the Party is fundamentally confronted with ... is not whether the interpretation [by the Executive of party policy] is sound or not, but with the vicious public attack on, and repudiation of, the Federal Executive of the Party'; the VCE asked the Federal Executive to ensure Federal authority was upheld: Agenda Attachment, FX 2-4 March 1966: Convening of Special Meeting, Report of the General Secretary, 1 March 1966; Report of F.E. Chamberlain to W.A. State Executive on the Proceedings of the Federal Executive meeting 9th-11th February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/41; VCE 25 February 1966, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142.
trying publicly to confine the issue to state aid, privately hoped that Whitlam might be expelled. When the Federal Executive met on 2 March, it agreed by seven votes to five that Whitlam's reported statements, 'if true, constitute gross disloyalty and a very serious threat to the general welfare of the Australian Labor Party'. Answering the allegations, Whitlam repeated that the Executive had purported to make new policy in its decisions about the legal challenge and the attitude Parliamentary parties should take to extensions of direct aid. He denied that it could be disruptive to draw attention to breaches of policy. Most of the questions asked of Whitlam avoided both the educational merits of state aid and the issues of party organisation. The issue was the propriety of his public criticism of the Executive and the possible outcome was his expulsion.

This outcome was avoided, first, by members of the inner Executive of the Queensland Branch advising their Federal delegates, Keeffe and Whitby, not to support expulsion and, secondly, by Whitlam's agreement to abide by the rules of the party. The Executive referred the

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163 Asked if the controversy had gone beyond state aid, Calwell replied: 'No, not for me'. He also believed that the Executive had correctly interpreted the party's policy (Age, SMH, 21 February 1966). However, both Whitlam's biographers suggest that Calwell was eager for Whitlam's expulsion and a party rally at Broadmeadows on 27 February was clearly designed to confirm Calwell in the Leadership, and, probably, to promote Cairns as his chosen successor. This event shows how the Victorians and Calwell saw the issue in late February-early March: Age, 23, 26 February, 1 March 1966; CT, 26 February 1966; Fact, 11 March 1966; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 35; Nation, 19 February 1966; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 139.

164 Age, 1-4 March 1966; ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 36, 54-7; Australian, 1-4 March 1966; Bulletin, 12, 19 March 1966; CT, 1-4 March 1966; FX 2-4 March 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40, 41 (the meeting considered virtually all the public statements by senior party members in the previous three weeks, noting some, referring some back to State Branches and most of the others, including those by Fraser, to the Special Conference); J.B. Keeffe, interview; Nation, 19 March 1966; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 138-42; Laurie Oakes, 'The Years of Preparation', Anon., Whitlam and Frost, 22-4; SASE 7, 10 March 1966, SA Rec., Minute Book 1964-69; SMH, 1-4, 11 March 1966. Whitlam's
transgressions of Whitlam and other party members to a Special Federal Conference late in March but this meeting merely reprimanded the Deputy Leader and imposed minor punishments on other critics of the Executive. It also decided not to proceed further with the investigation of the constitutionality of state aid. Instead, all matters regarding state aid were referred to the National Advisory Committee on Education, a committee of the Executive, chaired by Chamberlain.

The Leadership issue was settled for the time being when Calwell survived easily a motion in Caucus on 27 April to declare all Leadership positions vacant. Yet, after this meeting one observer wrote:

164 (continued)
campaigning in the Dawson, Queensland, by-election, which Labor won with a 12 per cent swing, probably helped persuade the Queensland Branch controllers that he should be protected. Note Freudenberg's remark (A Certain Grandeur, 37) that Whitlam was able to use an electoral success and a reputation as a vote winner as resources. This election was held on 26 February and while Calwell and Keeffe avoided praising Whitlam for Labor's success, others took notice. For this election, see: Colin A. Hughes, 'The Dawson By-election, 1966', AJPH, 12 (April 1966), 12-23.

165 ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966; Australian, CT, 24-28 March 1966; Richard Hall, 'How Labor Confers', Dissent, 17 (Winter 1966), 28-33; SMH, 24-28 March 1966. The establishment of the National Advisory Committee on Education (NACE) had been recommended by the old Education Committee in 1963 'to provide a more representative body' and one better qualified to advise the party's policymaking bodies on a wide range of educational matters: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 32; 1965, 97; G.M. Bryant, interview; FX 21-23 October 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35. While the party concentrated on the state aid question there was little interest in a committee of this type and there was even some uncertainty as to whether the NACE was intended to replace the existing Committee. One could argue also that the NACE finally came into existence as a means of protecting the 1957 line, rather than of producing broad education policy, since its membership was not settled until the February 1966 Executive meeting. The election of Chamberlain as Chairman also can be seen as part of the anti-state aid mood of that meeting. The Executive was allowed four nominees beside Chamberlain. Virgo, Mrs J. Guyatt, a university librarian from Queensland, W. Neilson, Tasmanian Education minister and Wood, of the old Committee, were elected. Bryant, however, received only three votes, perhaps because the anti-aid group on the Executive believed he could no longer be trusted after the old Committee's recommendation to the 1965 Conference.

166 J.B. Keeffe, interview; Kiernan, Calwell, 259; J.A. Mulvihill, interview; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 144-6. The 'spill' motion, moved by Mulvihill, was lost 24-49. Calwell announced after the meeting that he would not stand for re-election should Labor lose the 1966 Federal election.
Internal strife within the A.L.P. is rarely about any one thing: it is a peculiar amalgam of passion, principle and personality .... Meshed together were a contest for the leadership, a disputation about state aid, and a test of strength between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organs of the party. Mr. Calwell's retention of the leadership has not resolved the other disputes, which remain ready to provide the occasion for further trouble in this the most long-lived and factious of Australian coalitions.167

That the state aid issue was not solved for Labor in February-April 1966 can be attributed largely to the efforts of the sub-coalition of which Whitlam was the most conspicuous member. Like the Victorian Branch when confronted by pressure to enforce unity ticket rules, the Federal Executive majority in February, under pressure to change state aid policy, consolidated the defence of the 1957 line as it had been expressed in the Conference of 1963. The weeks after the February meeting produced, first, the nullifying of the most objectionable of the February decisions, the legal examination of state aid, and, secondly, the referral of the whole state aid question to the NACE. The February Executive tried to close the door to Labor offering direct aid. The anti-Executive, pro-aid group forced the door open again and returned the party approximately to the position at the 1965 Federal Conference. The February Executive produced anti-aid increments in Labor's state aid policy. The reaction to that meeting's efforts produced further increments which at least revived the possibility of the party's accepting state aid.

167 Don Aitkin, 'Political Review', AQ, 38, 2 (June 1966), 101. There had been similar comments after the March Conference, when even the Leadership remained unsettled: Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 28; SMH, 26 March 1966. Even earlier, after the Caucus debate between Fraser and Keeffe, one journalist wrote: 'The party has such a flair for quick compromise that almost inevitably the solution it produces for one crisis paves the way for another' (M.C. Uren, West Australian, 27 November 1965).
How much did Whitlam contribute to this result? Hypothesis II, concerning the effect of individual goals and personalities on decisions, clearly is relevant when examining the events of early 1966. Whitlam was not bound by the goals of a particular Branch or sub-coalition within the party, other than the sub-coalition which formed in his wake over the complex of issues in question at this time. The controlling group of the New South Wales Branch formed part of that sub-coalition but Whitlam did not act primarily as a representative of his Branch. Nor did Caucus give him the support which would have made plausible his pretensions to be acting as their representative against a predatory Federal Executive. Whitlam acted essentially as an individual. While he overstates Whitlam's centrality, Freudenberg's summary is essentially accurate: 'Whitlam's response determined the shape and pace of the crisis. Essentially, his actions gave form and coherence to what otherwise would have been incoherent'.

Freudenberg goes on to suggest that 'Whitlam ensured that the issues were clearly defined, and by doing that he helped control and contain the crisis'. Whitlam was not the first to extend the issue and even if we agree with Whitlam that the issue involved the Executive's attempt to make new state aid policy, the humiliation of Caucus, the unrepresentative nature of the Executive and Calwell's failure to protect the Caucus, there is considerable evidence that this definition was not accepted by his allies. The centre of Whitlam's sub-coalition, the New South Wales Branch, had reason enough to act in the humiliation suffered in recent months on the state aid question. They supported the reasonable independence of Federal Caucus but had little reason to be satisfied with even the decisions of the 1965

168 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 36.
169 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 37.
170 See above p.237, and below, pp.244-6.
Conference, which Whitlam sought to defend. Other supporters, like Kennelly, Duthie and Hawke, extracted different significances from the meeting. 'It appears', said Kennelly, 'that the Federal Executive wants to become a policy-making body and decide policy instead of being the administrative authority which carries out conference decisions as the Rules lay down'. Duthie made similar comments publicly but recognised privately that the Leadership was at stake. Hawke, the Opposition Leader in Western Australia, suggested Labor had to choose 'whether it will stick to its policy of no State aid to church schools and thereby make a gift of most elections in future to the Liberal Party'.

These examples show the different reactions to the decisions of February. Many wanted those decisions to be changed. Most of the people probably saw Whitlam as the spearhead of change. But reasons for wanting such a change differed. In other words, people saw the issue in different ways. Some would have agreed with all that was stated or implied in Whitlam's remarks of 14 and 15 February, containing his definition of the issue; others would have rejected parts of it. The least acceptable part was that which Whitlam had stated least explicitly: the need for a change of leadership. For instance, only eleven of the twenty-two New South Wales members of Federal Caucus supported the Caucus spill in April - that is, effectively supported Whitlam - although eighteen of them had given broad support to Whitlam's criticisms of the Federal Executive in February. Fraser, while opposed to the Executive and in

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172 *Australian*, SMH, 28 April 1966 provide State-by-State breakdowns of voting at the Caucus meeting. Whitlam's supporters had tried unsuccessfully for a secret ballot on the assumption that this would increase the numbers voting in favour, free of retaliation from their
favour of state aid, did little to prevent the Deputy Leader's expulsion.  

If Whitlam hoped to use the events of early 1966 to win the Leadership he failed notably. If he hoped to encourage party thinking about the unrepresentative nature of the Federal Executive he also failed, at least in the short term. If one agrees with Oakes that Whitlam's critics, by painting his efforts as a bid purely for the Leadership, ignored the principles of party policy and organisation he espoused, one must reiterate that even his allies within the party were not eager to define the issues as he desired.

Some press observers

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State Executives. But the New South Wales Branch was in favour of the spill motion, so this consideration would not have applied to the New South Welshmen. Some Caucus members may have been deterred from supporting Whitlam by his intemperate remarks over previous weeks. He had referred, inter alia, to the 'witless men' of the Federal Executive, 'Chamberlain's champions', and Executive members who battened on the party as paid officials or were unknown outside their own States. He apologised for these and other remarks at the March Conference.

Oakes, Whitlam PM, 139, notes that Fraser mentioned to R. Patterson, the new member for Dawson, that Calwell believed he had 'the numbers' to expel Whitlam. Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 35, describes Fraser as 'privy to the plot'. These pieces of evidence do not necessarily mean that Fraser supported Calwell's desire to remove Whitlam, but it was Patterson, not Fraser, who made use of Calwell's indiscretion to protect Whitlam. Fraser certainly did not support the April spill.

In his statement of 14 February, for instance, Whitlam had referred to the 'factional and unrepresentative controlling group' on the Federal Executive and called for a 'widely representative' party based on a Federal Conference of delegates from Federal electorates and unions (ALP, Report of Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 70). This point rarely taken up in the following weeks by Whitlam or anyone else, although the issue of reform of the party had been discussed in the party for two years and the Executive had deferred action on it at the February meeting. See chapter 5, below. Note, too, the remark of one observer at the March special Conference: 'There was not one single reference, direct or indirect, to the General Secretary's plans for re-organising the structure of the Party' (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 33).

Oakes, Whitlam PM, 137-8, writes: 'It was Whitlam's basic problem that wide sections of the Labor Party were prepared to believe he had been motivated simply by a frantic ambition to overthrow Calwell and grab the leadership; the principle he was espousing was ignored'.

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were more willing to make the connections he urged than were his party colleagues. Thus, after receiving Whitlam's letter agreeing to work within party rules, the South Australian Executive settled for reprimanding, rather than expelling him. In the circumstances this was a concession to Whitlam. Yet the Executive insisted the February decisions were 'properly made and strictly in accordance with the Rules of the Party'. South Australia supported Whitlam on strictly limited terms. Even New South Wales, through Oliver, told the Special Conference that the Branch did not dispute the right of the Federal Executive to interpret. 'If we do not agree with its interpretations, we have the machinery to dispute them' - that is, through an appeal to Federal Conference - not, he implied, the methods Whitlam had used.

Although they differed on other matters, the Whitlam sub-coalition agreed that Whitlam should not be expelled or suspended. On the other side, Calwell, Chamberlain, the Victorians and, possibly, Cairns and Allan Fraser, while they differed over state aid - the Victorians believing it was a minor issue, Calwell looking for an alternative,

176 It is a question of who is going to control the party': SMH, 12 February 1966. See also: Age, 15 February, 2 March 1966; CT, 2 March 1966; Nation, 19 February 1966; SMH, 19, 22 February, 2 March 1966 and especially Brian Johns' remark about the meeting of New South Wales Federal Caucus members (SMH, 18 February 1966): '[T]he two issues - opposition to the executive's ruling junta and the A.L.P. leadership - still failed to coalesce' (my emphasis).


178 CT, 26 March 1966. Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 28, misses the point: Oliver's remark did not destroy Whitlam's 'fundamental criticism', since the latter had not disputed the right to interpret, but the right to make policy under the guise of interpretation. Oliver's remarks, I suggest, touched Whitlam in the way outlined in the text, rather than as Hall has it. Another Executive delegate says his own approach was influenced by Whitlam's offensive and public attacks on the members of the Executive. The February Executive meeting, which Whitlam attended, had seemed harmonious and most delegates had agreed with Oliver's remark afterwards about the 'good atmosphere' at the meeting (G.T. Virgo, interview).
Chamberlain implacably opposed, Cairns indifferent, Fraser supporting it - and over the relative roles of Caucus and the Executive, at least agreed that Whitlam should be punished. Further, just as the Whitlam sub-coalition differed over whether Whitlam should lead the party, so the opposing sub-coalition had mixed feelings about Calwell.

Theoretically, the Special Conference of March met to consider 'the actions taken by the Federal Executive [at the meeting of 2-4 March] to protect the Federal authority of the Party following upon the public statements attributed to the Deputy Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, Mr E.G. Whitlam, which followed upon the meeting of the Federal Executive in February, 1966'. In fact, Whitlam and the other transgressors were not dealt with until the Conference, having heard Wyndham's report on the February Executive meeting, and having discussed the issues over a long luncheon adjournment, had decided to refer 'all the issues involved in State Aid' to the NACE. The NACE was to report to the Executive, which would circulate the report to State Branches, prior to a further Special Conference in July 1966 to deal with the report. For the price of a reprimand or two, Whitlam and his allies had ensured the door to state aid remained open.

But how firmly closed had the door been? Only the Victorians voted against the referral motion. One could argue that Chamberlain and

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179 The view of Cairns is based on Bulletin, 12 March 1966, J.F. Cairns, interview, and Nation, 19 February 1966; Hartley told the Special Conference that state aid was a 'relatively minor' issue (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 29). Of course, the Victorians still opposed direct aid but were more likely to place this opposition in the context of a general education policy than was, say, Chamberlain. The above brief summary is to show points of difference, not common ground.


181 Some reports (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 30; SMH, 26 March 1966) give the vote as 29-7, with Wheeldon (WA) joining the Victorians, but the Report says 30-6.
others who supported the motion hoped that the NACE could do what the Executive had failed to do in February. Was this so?

There is evidence, instead, that the cracks that had begun to appear in the defences of the 1957 principle by the 1965 Education Committee report were beginning to spread through the party. Both South Australian and Queensland spokesmen seemed to accept that Labor might soon change its stance. Virgo, the South Australian Branch Secretary, supporting the referral motion, averred that it was 'no good adopting the attitude that State Aid can be wiped out'. His colleague, Dunstan, was hopeful that a South Australian State Council meeting later in the year would reverse that Branch's opposition to direct aid. The Queensland Opposition Leader, J. Duggan, asked if anyone would deny him the right to offer free text books to all children in his policy speech for the imminent Queensland election. This was just the category of aid that the Federal Executive majority believed should be referred to it, but no one contested Duggan's point. The Queensland Central Executive itself believed 'all school children' were entitled to the best possible education and that the Federal Government 'must contribute towards providing facilities to realise this objective'.\(^{182}\) That this avenue, renowned in anti-aid mythology as a roundabout route to direct aid, could still be pursued, despite the Federal Executive's attempts to consolidate, suggests that doubts were growing in sections of the party which had previously helped defend the principle of 1957. Some Conference delegates disowned the methods the Executive had used to

\(^{182}\)Age, 29 March 1966; CT, 26 March 1966; Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 28-30; SMH, 26, 29 March 1966. The QCE resolution (28 February 1966) was one of the documents before the Federal Executive meeting of 2-4 March and formed the substance of an unsuccessful amendment moved by Duggan at the Conference. Chamberlain argued that the words quoted in the text would commit Labor to direct state aid.
defend that principle. Others wished to overturn the principle. Others defended it. All were prepared to commence yet another attempt to solve the ALP's state aid problem.

A FURTHER HYPOTHESIS

The events of February to April 1966 provide evidence for a number of our hypotheses. We have said enough to suggest the relevance of our HYPOTHESIS II. We have dwelt on the activities of Whitlam, as one individual who seemed to influence outcomes. We could have said more about Calwell, Chamberlain, Fraser and others who pursued personal convictions through the party machinery. We have noted also the interest taken by the metropolitan press. It is not too fanciful to see the journalists and leader writers who gave generally favourable coverage to the activities of Whitlam as part of an alliance to alter Labor policy. There is certainly more than an inkling here of the relevance of our HYPOTHESIS XII regarding the media. The events of late 1965 and early 1966 were triggered by a decision of the Liberal Federal Government to provide new direct aid, showing again the relevance of another of our hypotheses about external influences on the ALP (HYPOTHESIS XIII). In Labor's reaction to this pressure there was still evident the divergence

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183 One observer saw an 'important, but subtle, implication ... that the Federal Executive ... has been rebuffed by the conference' (Harold Cox, Sunday Mail, 27 March 1966). Another detected an elaborate attempt to 'save face' (of the Executive) in the passage of the motion rejecting a legal challenge: 'it had to be pretended that no legal appeal was ever intended' (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 31. But see note 123 above).

184 Victoria voted against the motion but a Victorian amendment (unsuccessful) had not opposed the referral as such but the circulation of the NACE report to the States and the holding thereafter of a Special Conference. Victoria was not opposed to 'another look' but to the possibility of change in basic policy. The latter was more likely to follow a Special Conference than to follow another Executive meeting.

185 See above, note 154.
between those who wished to seek votes by offering direct aid and those who believed any response should follow the principle of 1957. Labor should not accept, the latter group argued, the votes of those who would not accept Labor principles. The 'inclusivists' replied that society was changing and Labor could ill afford to lose the votes of those whose new outlooks caused them to reject such outdated ideas as 'aid to the scholar but not the school' (HYPOTHESIS III).

We have said little explicitly about the differing goals of State Branches (HYPOTHESIS I), although the New South Wales Branch was especially favourable to Whitlam's activities, perhaps partly because the Branch goal of direct state aid would thus be served. We noted the suggestion that the Queensland and South Australian Branches might soon change their attitudes to direct aid. We could have discussed all the events of February-April in terms of the goals of State Branches but this approach would have concealed the important role of Whitlam. At the last, in the decision to refer the state aid issue to the NACE, the differing goals of the Branches were submerged in a common desire for 'another look'. This decision ensured that the incremental process continued (HYPOTHESIS XV). Whitlam, Calwell, Fraser, the Caucus, the Federal Executive, the Federal Conference, all made their 'disjointed' contributions to this process in February, March and April. Now it was the NACE's turn.

In earlier parts of this case study we have looked for evidence of compromise decisions by partisan mutual adjustment and for decisions which sought to keep the Labor coalition in one piece (HYPOTHESES V, XIV and IV). We could see the events of early 1966 as a search for compromise. For example, perhaps, Whitlam withdrawing his personally offensive remarks in exchange for the anti-state aiders agreeing to stop
the legal examination. We have seen that members of the Whitlam sub-coalition had differing goals and we can imagine that a process of compromise was necessary to keep this sub-coalition together. Perhaps Whitlam played down his interest in the Leadership and reform of the party organisation as the price of alliance with those more interested in changing state aid policy. On the other side, some observers believed one of the main aims of the Calwell-Chamberlain sub-coalition was to ensure that Cairns, rather than Whitlam, succeeded Calwell. 186

'The possibility of joining the opposition to Gough Whitlam with a ban on State Aid was the essence of Joe Chamberlain's plan.' 187 Within this sub-coalition Calwell led those most interested in destroying Whitlam, Chamberlain those who wished to close finally the door on direct state aid.

These themes could be drawn out of the events we have considered. We have concentrated instead on how state aid became entangled with other issues, the meshing together, as Aitkin puts it, of 'a contest for the leadership, a disputation about state aid, and a test of strength between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organs of the party'. 188 Our description provides the justification for a further hypothesis which can be tested in the remaining chapters of the thesis.

188 Aitkin, 'Political Review' (June 1966), 101. See also, Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 49: 'not just a problem in substance, but a problem in party organization, in decision-making, and in leadership'; Graham Freudenberg, Labor Comment, May 1966, 4: while the ultimate outcome was Calwell's re-election the crisis 'did not begin as a leadership contest .... The leadership became the direct issue only because the public stance of the Leader and his Deputy had become so diametrically opposed'; Louise Overacker, Australian Parties in a Changing Society, 1945-67, Melbourne, 1968, 112: 'State aid was the catalyst which brought to a head basic disagreements over policy and leadership'. 
and which indicates how decisionmaking in the ALP can be similar to that in other organisations.

In their book *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*, a group of writers led by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen set out and apply a model of 'garbage can decision processes'. One further hypothesis derives from a combination of insights in this book and what we have learnt from the events just described. March and Olsen argue that standard conceptions of organisational choice posit 'a closed cycle of connections' between individual goals, individual behaviour, organisational decisions, effects on the world outside the organisation and outside effects on individual goals. On the second page of the first chapter of this thesis appears a version of this cycle:

Individuals with goals (or 'desires' or interests') combine with other individuals to produce a group decision. Groups combine with other groups to produce decisions bearing the name of the larger group. Organisations are coalitions comprising sub-coalitions. They are all permeable by influences from other organisations and from the broader setting or 'environment' in which they operate. Political parties are organisations and, as such, they are permeable coalitions.

March and Olsen show how this cycle is modified in practice. The evidence of this thesis confirms the importance of these modifications. For instance, we have seen and March and Olsen suggest that individuals act in organisations both as holders of offices in the organisation and as individuals affected by other influences than the positions they hold. We have seen Calwell as party leader and aged stalwart resentful of criticism; Chamberlain as committee chairman and anti-Catholic; Whitlam

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189 James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*, Bergen, 1976. The summary in the following paragraphs is drawn mainly from pp.10-19, 26-37, 243-6. The main contributing author is Michael D. Cohen. The organisations studied are school boards, universities and other organisations connected with education.
as New South Wales member of Federal Caucus and ambitious individual; all of them and others acting from a combination of their goals as individuals and their roles as office holders. Then, suggest March and Olsen, individual attitudes may develop out of action as part of a group. Attitudes may change as action continues. Thus Oakes writes of Whitlam's developing attitudes to state aid:

In his first ten years in Parliament Whitlam, in private conversation, had been ... against the State aid concept .... The events of 1963 changed Whitlam's mind .... Once he had become interested in the issue, Whitlam convinced himself that there was justice in the case .... When he took up the cause he believed in it, and - along with the NSW ALP branch - he was convinced it was essential for the 1965 Federal Conference to alter the party policy.190

The development of Whitlam's attitudes was part cause, part effect of his action within the party, of his alliance with different sub-coalitions: first, the anti-aid majority, then those who sought Commonwealth assistance to education, then those who believed this assistance should not discriminate between state and non-state students, then the New South Wales Branch, which wanted the narrow innovation of direct aid, then, finally, those who saw the state aid struggle as a lever for changing the party Leadership. Each alliance affected Whitlam's views.

Secondly, March and Olsen suggest there is only a loose connection between the reconciling of individual and sub-coalitional goals and outcomes. Often the outcome is directed towards 'the maintenance or change of the organization as a social unit', that is, towards the aim we have encapsulated in our fourth hypothesis, 'keeping the coalition together'. Events like those of early 1966 were not uncommon in ALP history. The Sydney Morning Herald's editorialist suggested before the

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190 Oakes, Whitlam PM, 125.
March Special Conference that many Labor decisionmakers would be content if 'the party does not further lacerate itself in public view'. The emotion was probably widely held at the time but it was not new.

Thirdly, the link between organisational decision and the response in the world outside clearly is absent in many circumstances: consumers buy even if the firm does not seek their custom; voters vote other than in response to party action; Catholics deserted Labor for other reasons, say, upward social mobility, than because Labor failed to offer state aid. Activity outside a political party must often 'be understood in terms of relationships among events, actors and structures' outside the party but it affects the party nevertheless. Finally, if individuals in organisations form goals in response to external events, much depends 'upon the efficiency of the channels through which interpretations are transmitted'. Information is imperfect and interpretations of it (of the interpretations) differ. Some sections of the press had 'barrows to push' in support of Whitlam early in 1966; their interpretations were influenced accordingly. At other times, almost as many Labor decisionmakers interpreted the same voting figures as evidence that Labor was suffering for the attempts of sections of the party to have it support direct aid as detected in the figures condemnation of existing policy. This phenomenon March and Olsen describe as 'ambiguity' in the understanding of the world outside the organisation.

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191 SMH, 23 March 1966.

192 The authors actually refer to ambiguity of the 'environment'. I have preferred to use this term to apply to the locus of the political system as a whole: the party is part of a 'political system' located in an environment comprising economic, social, cultural, religious and other systems. The loose term 'the world outside the party' includes both the other parts of the political system and what I call 'the environment'. It is equivalent to what March and Olsen call 'the environment'. See chapter 1, above.
March, Olsen and their associates were not the first to recognise the limitations of the 'cycle of choice'. But they make complexity and 'ambiguity' the base for a model of how organisations often make decisions. While decision situations or 'choice opportunities' are, in theory, occasions for producing a decision out of a 'decisionmaking process' and, again in theory, the decision produced bears a 'label' describing its content, in practice, decision situations may involve other activities that 'are neither mutually exclusive nor mutually inconsistent'.... Decisions are a stage for many dramas'.

February, March and April 1966 witnessed simultaneous dramas entitled 'Labor and State Aid', 'Calwell and Whitlam', and 'Caucus, Conference and the Executive'.

To make sense of such periods of the history of organisations, March and Olsen provide the concept of 'garbage can decision processes'. In this concept, choice opportunities, or decision opportunities, 'are occasions when an organization is expected to produce behavior that can be called a decision'. But they also can be 'garbage can[s] into which various problems and solutions are dumped by participants'. Problems concern people inside and outside the organisation, they have myriad

March & Olsen overstate the extent to which the cycle of choice still dominates the theories they criticise, which include 'theories of negotiation and bargaining', (10). They acknowledge their debt to a long list of previous writers in the field, including March himself, Cyert, Simon, Lindblom and Allison, all of whom we have referred to in this thesis. For instance, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston, 1971, 145-6, 167-8, 171, notes that decision makers may be involved simultaneously in many decisions and that attitudes to some issues may affect attitudes to others. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 4, observes: 'A policy is sometimes the outcome of a political compromise among policy makers, none of whom had in mind [as a result of his own goals and the effect upon him of the world outside] quite the problem to which the agreed policy is the solution. Sometimes policies spring from new opportunities, not from "problems" at all'.

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contents reflecting the varying goals of individuals and they are dumped in decision garbage cans partly, but only partly, on the basis of what the decision is supposed to be 'about'. They are not the same as decisions or choices and decisions may not resolve them. Solutions are produced by individuals and groups independently of problems; they are answers seeking questions. Organisations try to regulate the flow of problems and solutions (carried by participants) into garbage cans by imposing rules for participation and access, by selecting information and by setting priorities.

Let us look at the ALP in early 1966 in terms of the garbage can concept. The reference to organisational regulation of flow need not detail us long. The authors' explication shows it is another way of saying organisations have rules and procedures, formal structures and informal relationships, and means of providing and denying access to the decisionmaking process. 194 The 'choice opportunities' were, at least, the February Executive meeting, the two March Executive meetings (one immediately before the Special Conference), the Special Conference and the 27 April Caucus meeting. Other possible 'garbage cans' were meetings of State Executives during this period, other Federal Caucus meetings and, since individual and group decisionmaking may also show garbage can characteristics, the making of the decisions by Whitlam to criticise the Executive, by some members of the Queensland Central Executive to save Whitlam from expulsion and by Calwell, Hartley and Cairns to produce the 'dollar a week' scheme could also be examined in this light. The 'participants' in decisions, in theory, could be all to whom the structure and the informal ways of operating the party give access, but our story has focussed on senior office holders in the ALP,

on the Liberal Government and on the press, because these seem to have been important contributors to the decisions that emerged. 195

What 'problems' did participants carry to the garbage cans? Let us take a few participants as examples. Calwell had the problems, inter alia, of retaining the Leadership and of evolving an aid policy which would be acceptable to the party but still win votes. Whitlam those of winning the Leadership, protecting Caucus against the Executive, re-organising the structure of the party, ending the party's opposition to direct aid and promoting the concept of Commonwealth finance for education controlled by the States. Chamberlain's main problem may have been the protection of the 1957 line but he also carried the problem of the authority of the Executive in the party, especially over politicians, and, perhaps, the problem of a decline in his personal influence in the party since he ceased to be Federal Secretary. 196 The main problem of the New South Wales Branch was its inability to offer direct aid, of the Victorian Branch its inability to divert the party from the obsession with state aid to a comprehensive, alternative education policy; The Tasmanian and South Australian Branch delegates carried the problems of Branches hopeful of, or ensconced in power and committed to modest forms of indirect or disguised aid whose future

195 Whitlam, it was said, sought to set against the Federal Executive a groundswell of opinion aroused by his media appearances. If this groundswell emerged (and evidence is difficult to find, although it may exist) it had no existence for the decisionmakers other than as the media presented it. A press coverage was more important than a few dozen telegrams.

196 Cf. the comment of one journalist on the February Executive meeting: 'Mr Chamberlain splashed and revelled in his comeback to power' (Nation, 19 February 1966). The following month, another observer noted that Chamberlain's view prevailed rarely at the Special Conference (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 33). If Chamberlain carried a problem of how to maintain his personal influence, it was attached to a solution at the first meeting but not at the second.
seemed threatened by the Federal Executive. Problems such as these were not emptied into every decision opportunity or garbage can. March and Olsen suggest that problems differ in their 'latency'. 'A problem may be active but not attached to any choice. It may be recognized and accepted by some part of the organization but may not be considered germane to any available choice opportunity.' Thus Whitlam urged the February Executive meeting not to disturb the Conference decision, which he believed could be interpreted to give the party a satisfactory state aid policy, that is, solve the problem he carried to the Executive. There is considerable evidence that Whitlam at this time was worried about (carried problems concerning) the decisionmaking structure of the party, especially the balance between Caucus and the Executive, and that he was ambitious for the Leadership. Yet he did not attempt to find solutions for these problems until after the February Executive meeting, until other garbage cans appeared.

What were some of the 'solutions' to which participants tried to attach their problems? 'A solution is somebody's product', produced not necessarily with all the possible questions in mind to which it might provide an answer. In political parties rules provide answers and some Labor rules dealt with expulsion of party members judged to have infringed other rules. Expulsion of Whitlam was one solution which participants, aware of party rules, dumped in decision opportunity garbage cans early in 1966. Many participants sought to link their problems (some jointly carried) to this solution. Freudenberg describes graphically how Calwell put aside Bishop Carroll's assessment of Catholic educational

197March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 33-4.
198The garbage can concept allows participants to carry the same problem, although each participant perceives the problem differently.
needs: 'Suddenly, bigger, better game was afoot - not State aid, not education, not the next election, but Gough Whitlam'. Early in March, Calwell and others carried both the problem of protecting his Leadership and the solution of expelling the main threat to it. But the activities of the Queensland Central Executive meant Calwell's Leadership protection problem could find no solution in March 1966. The meetings of March attached to the problem of curbing Whitlam's attacks on the Executive the solution of a reprimand, rather than expulsion, as Calwell hoped, and to the problem of changing the February state aid decisions the solutions of prevention of a High Court challenge and, secondly, referral to the NACE, rather than the alternative solutions of immediate direct aid or the 'dollar a week' proposal. (There are always a number of alternative solutions in garbage cans.) For March and Olsen, the reprimand of Whitlam would be a decision made by 'resolution'; it resolved the Executive's problem of Whitlam's attacks on them. But it did not resolve Calwell's Leadership problem, which found another decision opportunity garbage can, in the Caucus meeting of 27 April where the problem was resolved by attachment to the solution provided in the rules, an unsuccessful spill motion. Decisions are often made, say March and Olsen, by 'flight', where 'choices are associated with problems (unsuccessfully) for some time until a choice "more attractive" to the problems comes along. The problems leave the choice, and thereby make it possible to make the decision' - in this case, the decision to reprimand Whitlam. Similarly, the problem of finding a state aid policy fled the garbage can of the March Special Conference. That garbage can produced decisions changing the decisions of February, solving that problem but not the problem of finding a

Solutions are not always contained in the rules. To its problem of how to close the door on state aid, the Federal Executive tried to attach, according to Whitlam, the solution of 'making new policy', which was outside its constitutional power. The Executive insisted its solution was merely the constitutional one of 'interpretation'. The pressure of the Queensland Central Executive on its Federal delegates provided the solution for the problem of preventing Whitlam's expulsion. Calwell, Cairns and Hartley provided the 'dollar a week' solution to attach to the problems of finding an alternative to direct aid and of countering adverse publicity over the legal examination decision. (The garbage can allows one stone to kill two problem birds.) Finally, some observers saw the decision of the Federal Liberal Government to send conscript troops to Vietnam (8 March 1966) as a diversion from Labor's state aid troubles. Calwell could have used this to help resolve his

200 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 33, suggest there are three 'styles' of decisionmaking: by 'oversight', when a decision arises out of the 'dumping' of problems in other choice opportunities (i.e. garbage cans 'spin off' decisions), by flight and by resolution. The authors admit that some decisions involved both flight and resolution '(i.e. some problems leave, the remainder are solved)' and they define these as decisions by resolution, which allows the three styles to be 'mutually exclusive and exhaustive with respect to any one choice'. This rather unsatisfactory device can be avoided but the mutually exclusive aspect retained in the following way: a garbage can or decision opportunity is an opportunity for a number of decisions; a decision is defined as the removal of a problem or problems from the garbage can in one of three ways, oversight, flight or resolution; in the case of decision by oversight or resolution, the departing problem or problems is attached to a solution or solutions. In the case of decision by flight, the departing problem or problems is not attached to a solution or solutions (note that one problem can be attached to a number of partial solutions making up a total solution and that a number of problems may be attached to the one solution or an amalgam of solutions); thus, the correct description is not 'some decisions involve both flight and resolution' but 'the output of decision opportunity garbage cans comprises decisions made either by flight or resolution - or oversight'.
Leadership protection problem - by leading a crusade he made up for his failure to assist changes in state aid policy. He showed that problems may be solved in garbage cans by means of a number of solutions (here, by a combination of forcing Whitlam to the unsuccessful Caucus motion and, secondly, by the Vietnam diversion).  

The concept of the garbage can turns on the relationship between decision opportunities, participants, problems and solutions. There is a lot more to it than these four 'streams' and some aspects of it are unclear even in the original formulation. But since we have found evidence in the events of early 1966, where garbage cans were labelled 'state aid', that important characteristics of the garbage can were present, it is reasonable to assume that the concept will be relevant at other points of our study. To give two brief examples: in the study of unity tickets in the previous chapter some problems were Evatt's Prime Ministerial ambitions, the unrepresentativeness of the

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201 Cf. Brian Johns, SMH, 29 March 1966: 'perhaps the major obstacle which has arisen since Mr. Whitlam made his forward run for leadership is the rising confidence in the Federal Labor Party over Vietnam and conscription'. Another writer (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 33) was less convinced of the existence of this confidence but believed that the Vietnam crusade might strengthen party unity - which, in practice, meant unity behind Calwell. Note also Hartley's radio attack on Whitlam (before the Leadership problem was solved) for his disruptive tactics when Labor was taking a courageous stand on conscription: Age, 4 April 1966. Victoria opposed holding the July Special Conference because it would be a distraction from the Vietnam issue: Fact, 22 April, 15 July 1966.

202 See the generally favourable review by Lawrence B. Mohr, APSR, 72 (September 1978), 1033-4. One obscurity is whether participants enter garbage cans, that is, assist to link problems and solutions. March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 26-7, say participants dump problems and solutions into garbage cans and that 'organizational choice [linking of problems and solutions] is a somewhat fortuitous confluence' but then one has to ask in what do participants participate? The answer is, presumably, decision opportunities, that is, garbage cans, and it seems to be leaving too much to 'fortune' to limit their participation to dumping.
Victorian Branch and Labor's loss of votes; some solutions were enforcement of unity tickets policy, intervention in Victoria and support for Fitzgibbon and ALP-endorsed tickets. In state aid matters in 1963, some problems, on one hand, were the plight of Catholic schools and Labor's need for votes and, on the other, the desire for revenge against Catholics and to 'get New South Wales'; some solutions were direct aid, scholarships, Commonwealth finance, intervention in New South Wales and increasing the power of the Federal Executive against State Labor Governments. Let us then state another hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS XVI: DECISIONMAKING WILL SHOW EVIDENCE OF 'GARBAGE CAN CHARACTERISTICS'

THE INCREMENTAL PROCESS CONTINUES

Our detailed study of state aid is almost complete. We looked first at how the ALP made compromise decisions, sometimes through a process of partisan mutual adjustment, and then at how state aid decisions became entangled with many other issues. Throughout we found evidence in support of other hypotheses set up in the first two chapters. HYPOTHESIS XV, that decisionmakers will practice disjointed incrementalism, has underpinned the whole chapter. From 1957 state aid decisions were small bites at the problem rather than sweeping changes. The bites involved interpretation, clarification and modification, but never an attempt to put state aid policy in the context of desirable education goals. The decisionmakers sought to move away from short term evils, in particular, electoral unpopularity for Labor and educational injustice for Catholics, rather than towards an educational utopia upon whose features all decisionmakers could agree. When comprehensive education programmes were adopted, as at the 1963 Federal Conference, they hedged on the aspects likely to provoke dissension in the party. All delegates could
accept that more Commonwealth money was required for education; they
differed over whether that money should be spent on non-state education.
The 1963 programme for many delegates was a means of avoiding a decision
on state aid, not a picture of a desirable future.

The nature of the state aid problem changed with successive Federal
Government initiatives. We have suggested the importance in Labor state
aid decisionmaking of HYPOTHESIS XIII, Labor's relationship with the
Federal Government. Some analysts would class this as the most important
influence on Labor's approach.

After 1964 many in the Labor Party accepted as a
fait accompli that state aid was here to stay.
This situation shaped the changes in Labor's
attitudes towards the private schools, despite
the veneer of arguments about needs and educational
opportunity.203

Was Labor approval of state aid then inevitable? Labor decisionmakers
certainly recognised the existence of external pressures for direct
state aid, but as late as March 1966 a majority of the party's supreme
body would concede only measures of indirect and disguised aid and the
protection of existing aid. The report of the NACE majority provided
further increments by tinkering with clause 4 of the existing education
platform, the 'at their own cost' clause. Firstly, the majority
recommended that the private systems should still be responsible for
their capital, maintenance and salary costs 'subject to review by the
Federal Conference following a full enquiry by the Commonwealth into
primary, secondary and technical education into both government and non-
government schools, and the appointment of an appropriate body to
determine conditions under which assistance should be provided in meeting

203 A.D. Spaull, 'Educational Policies of Australian Political Parties',
this responsibility'. This formulation was to replace the 'at own cost' proviso. It was a slight advance in that it linked the long-standing Labor promise of an inquiry into education and the needs of non-state schools more specifically than previously. But the timing of the review was vague and there was no undertaking that direct aid would ever be provided.

Secondly, the Committee recommended that, pending the review by Federal Conference, 'any forms of benefit existing in a State or Territory at the time of this [July Special] Conference may be supported in that State or Territory'. This formulation was to replace the part of the existing platform (Section XXVII) produced by the 1965 ad hoc committee. It was a reformulation of the concept that 'no benefit which is currently established shall be disturbed' but it made a further concession by removing the requirement for Federal Executive approval of new benefits. The decision was to be one for State Labor Oppositions themselves.

These increments did not occur without a struggle. The first NACE meeting, after lengthy debate and informal discussion, had agreed that 'Existing or incoming Labor Governments may continue forms of assistance to non-government schools currently applying in that State or Territory' (my emphasis shows one point of difference from the motion eventually adopted. The other was the non-deletion of Section XXVII, which overlapped this formulation.) This motion was rescinded at the second meeting and the formulation in the text adopted instead. Presumably private discussion between meetings had revealed the difficulties of the first formulation.
Thirdly, while State Labor Governments still could not offer direct aid, the Committee recommended that their ability to dispense Commonwealth direct aid should be stated explicitly. Fourthly, the NACE majority supported Commonwealth aid to the States for teacher training facilities, including for non-state trainees, a long-standing request of Catholic education authorities.

The NACE majority report bore the names of Nicholls (Acting Chairman), Virgo, Wood, Bryant, Mrs. J. Guyatt, B. Lourigan (both from Queensland) and R. Loveday, MHA, the South Australian Minister for Education. It was intended, remembers Virgo, 'to pour oil on the troubled waters' of the state aid question.\(^{207}\) The NACE minority, on the other hand, believed the majority's desire to soften the policy without conceding direct aid merely led it into contradictions. The minority, Whitlam, Barnard, L. Reynolds, a Federal member from New South Wales, J. Tonkin, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in Western Australia, and W. Neilson, MHA, Tasmanian Minister for Education, argued religious prejudice was preventing a positive, uniform Labor education policy.

The new formulation of clause 4, by allowing interim support for existing benefits ('Pending review by Federal Conference' following the Commonwealth inquiry) contradicted the 1957 principle and allowed those State Branches where direct aid already existed to support it. They could already support something which the first majority recommendation suggested they might be able to do after the Commonwealth inquiry and Conference review.\(^{208}\) Labor in States where direct aid was not already provided could not support it in the future. Further, Labor Oppositions could support non-Labor initiatives but Labor Governments could not

\(^{207}\) G.T. Virgo, interview.

\(^{208}\) Australian, 2 June 1966; CT, 8 June 1966; SMH, 2, 7 June 1966.
introduce identical direct aid schemes. These consequences of Labor's policy made laughable its aim of equality in education and made fools of the politicians who had to sell the policy to voters.

The NACE minority argued that Labor should cut the tangle produced by years of small changes by clearly and consistently rejecting direct aid or by positively accepting it and setting out a plan for its implementation. The latter alternative was ultimately that chosen by Labor but not before 'chance' had taken a hand. March and Olsen suggest that decisionmaking 'is often the almost fortuitous result of the intermeshing of loosely-coupled processes .... Substantial differences in final outcomes are sometimes produced by small (and essentially unpredictable) differences in intermediate events leading to the outcomes. Lawful processes operate subject to essentially chance variation.' In other words, chance and unpredictability are characteristics of garbage can processes of decisionmaking, the subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI.

Three instances of chance affected Labor's approach to state aid between April and July 1966. First, Chamberlain, elected Chairman of the NACE, became seriously ill in April 1966 and took no part in the deliberations of this Committee or the Special Federal Conference at Surfers Paradise in July. More importantly, his absence from the scene in Western Australia helped others in that Branch, led by Tonkin, J. Berinson, a protege of Whitlam, and J. Coleman, Secretary of the Trades and Labour Council, to change the Branch's position regarding

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209 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 20, 26. See also 132-4. My emphasis.
direct aid from opposition to support. The Western Australian reversal meant New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia would provide eighteen votes in favour of direct aid, that is, against the NACE majority report's combination of confirmation and concession. Since Victoria, South Australia and Queensland seemed likely to vote solidly the other way, the Special Conference would deadlock eighteen votes all on crucial recommendations. Chance intervened again. The Conference began with Nicholls moving the NACE majority's first recommendation, to replace the old proviso in clause 4 with the formulation outlined above. Tonkin, who had replaced Chamberlain as delegate, moved the Western Australian resolution as an amendment, using arguments based on those in the NACE minority report. The Victorian delegates,

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210 Specifically, the decision of a Special Conference of the Branch bound its Federal delegates to support an amendment to clause 4 which allowed State and Federal Labor Governments to aid non-state schools 'insofar as is compatible with due efficiency in education and the avoidance of unreasonable expenditure'. Further, until conditions for such aid were determined, 'any forms of benefit existing in a State or Territory at the time of this [July Special Federal] Conference may be supported in any State or Territory'. For details of this decision and the events behind it: K.E. Beazley, interview; Calwell to Hartley, 18 October 1967, Vic. Rec., 1966, 1967, 1968 Members Personal A to C; F.E. Chamberlain, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcripts, 2:1/32; SMH, West Australian, 27 June 1966; Western Sun, July 1966, 1; J.M. Wheeldon, interview. Nicholls acted as Temporary Chairman of the NAGE in Chamberlain's absence.

211 The State Branch positions are summarised in ALP, Special Commonwealth Conference, July 1966 ..., 18-20. The two States which showed signs of wavering in March were now solid for the main recommendations, South Australia as the result of a vote at the State Convention which bound delegates, Queensland after a caucus at the Conference had agreed to follow the Queensland Central Executive's support for the NACE recommendations: Advertiser, 13 June 1966; Don Aitkin, 'Political Review', AQ, 38, 3 (September 1966), 108; ALP (SA Branch), Official Report, Sixty-third Annual State Convention, 1966, 16-17; C-M, 25, 29 July 1966; J.B. Keeffe, interview; SMH, 28 June 1966; Socialist and Industrial Labor, July 1966, 5.

212 For this recommendation see p.263 above. The main debate is in ALP, Special Commonwealth Conference, July 1966 ..., 32-40, 43-4. There were nine NACE recommendations but we are concerned only with the first two.
Hartley and Brebner, then moved an amendment which altered the 'at own cost' proviso to read 'provided that the cost of the capital development of this system is not a charge on any government'. The Victorians believed the NACE recommendation could be interpreted to allow capital payments and wished to prevent this possibility. Keeffe, the Chairman, had privately advised he would disallow this amendment since it was a direct negative to the NACE motion and the Victorians had been forced to compose another version. In their haste they omitted to specify that other costs, for instance, 'maintenance of buildings and salaries of staff' - which the NACE recommendation had excluded - also should not be charged against governments. Others were quicker to see the implications of the amendment and the Victorians, to their surprise, received the support of New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia. By twenty-four votes to twelve the Conference had supported, not the NACE's first recommendation, but a formulation which deleted the old proviso and explicitly excluded only one form of direct aid from being a charge on governments. 213

But where did this new permissive clause apply? Again chance, or at least unpredictability, intervened. The second NACE recommendation

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213 This version of events is based upon: W.W.C. Brown, C.R. Cameron, W.H. Hartley, interviews; Hartley to D.R. MacSween, Secretary, Clothing Trades Union, 10 October 1966, Vic. Rec., Unions A-C 1966; J.B. Keeffe, C.T. Oliver, interviews; press reports, especially Age, DT, SMH, 30 July-1 August 1966; Special Federal Conference held at Surfers Paradise, 29 and 30 July 1966. Reports by J.P. Brebner, Victorian Delegate, Vic. Rec., E.O's Minutes & Business Sheets, 1966-1967. Two minor questions on which evidence differs are whether Keeffe made the ruling referred to (Brown and Hartley recall it; Keeffe did not mention it; Oliver did not recall it but said it might have been private; it does not appear in the Conference report) and, secondly, whether the Victorians realised their mistake afterwards (they were reluctant to do so at the time but are less so now, while insisting that the Calwell vote - to be discussed next - was more important than their mistake in changing Labor policy).
was a reformulation of the 1965 Conference resolution that currently established benefits should not be disturbed. Tonkin now moved as an amendment the Western Australian proposal that the existence of a benefit in one State or Territory justified it being granted in others. Since the 1965 Conference 'border hopping' of this type had been recognised as one way of breaking down Labor's opposition to direct aid. The NACE minority had pointed up the absurdity of the party offering different policies in different States. Tonkin, by providing evidence to the present Conference that every type of benefit existed somewhere in Australia, showed that passage of his amendment would remove the barriers to Labor's offering all types of direct aid, except capital aid, which the earlier motion had excluded. But rather than the logic of Tonkin's case, it was the solitary vote of Calwell, deserting his fellow Victorians, much to their surprise, which gave Tonkin's amendment its nineteen-seventeen majority. Considerable debate followed outside the Conference over whether Calwell knew what he was doing when he cast the crucial vote.

For this recommendation, see above p.264.

For example, Whitlam had interpreted the 1965 Conference decision in this way (CPD H. of R. 48, 14 October 1965, 1848) and Webb had moved unsuccessfully for such a policy at the February 1966, Federal Executive meeting (FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40).

The debate was much more complex than this brief account reveals: there were five competing formulations, five points of order and four procedural motions: ALP, Special Commonwealth Conference July 1966 ..., 37-40.

There are two related issues: whether Calwell knew that the motion meant direct aid could be offered all over Australia and whether he knew which motion he was voting for. Brown, Cameron, Downing, Hartley and Keeffe, all of whom were present, were all fairly sure that Calwell was clear on both points although Cameron and Keeffe suggested he 'feigned ignorance' (interviews). Press reports show that Calwell disputed Cameron's claim in later debate that the Tonkin motion allowed direct aid everywhere. One journalist suggested that any later claims by Calwell to have misunderstood the motion were to protect himself against revenge from Victoria (Alan Ramsey, Australian, 5 August 1966). Brown,
this question, the important point is that an 'essentially unpredictable' act by Calwell provided the vital vote. For the third time, chance or unpredictability, a characteristic of garbage can decision processes, the subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI, had jolted the incremental process along.

Did chance merely hasten the inevitable? The 'border hopping' approach might have prevailed eventually without the assistance of Chamberlain's illness, Hartley's drafting or Calwell's desertion. Commonwealth financial aid to ensure educational 'equality' was an umbrella to spread over all children, regardless of school. Perhaps this approach would have led to direct aid eventually. Speaking to the Conference, Calwell had suggested distinctions between direct and indirect aid were part of the 'hair-splitting past'. Labor politicians had consistently offered more in money terms in indirect aid than their opponents had in direct aid. Memories of the Split were the strongest

217 (continued)
leader of the Victorian delegation, pointed out that Calwell had asked to sit at the officers' table rather than with the State delegation. He took no part in the Victorian discussions during the debate although he had told Brown he was well aware of the Victorian attitude (W.W.C. Brown, interview). On the other hand, Virgo believed Calwell had become very confused by the end and did not know what he was doing (G.T. Virgo, interview). Freudenberg records that Wyndham, counting the votes, had to ask Calwell if his hand was up or down (A Certain Grandeur, 36). Freudenberg uses this as evidence that Calwell was voting hesitantly but knowingly, but it may have signified uncertainty as to the motion before the Conference. Nicholls had withdrawn the NACE recommendation in favour of an amendment from Queensland which was basically similar to the recommendation. Tonkin's amendment thus became the motion and it is possible that Calwell became confused. However, the hands were counted only after a voice vote had been declared carried and Brown had called for a show of hands (W.W.C. Brown, interview). Calwell had time to correct his mistake when he saw the other Victorians were not supporting the motion. Finally, although the Victorians were surprised at Calwell's vote, some of the New South Welshmen were not. One recalls that New South Wales delegates had put pressure on Calwell before the Conference, while another says Calwell told him in advance of his intention.
force against offering aid to the Catholic church as such. As these memories faded the feeling against direct aid may have dissipated. After all, as many people pointed out, the school received the money eventually. The 'dollar a week' scheme recognised this fact. Perhaps, in time, a modus operandi would have emerged. But chance helped cut the knot in 1966 rather earlier than most people had expected.

One final slash remained to be made. On the second day of the Special Conference, C.R. Cameron pointed out that the first, Hartley, motion excluded capital aid from the permissible types of direct aid, while the second, Tonkin, motion in effect allowed every type of aid everywhere, since every type existed somewhere. 'It is better to have clarification', Cameron said, 'even if you are on the losing end, as I am, than to have a muddled situation'. The Conference then agreed, by twenty-nine votes to seven, to Cameron's motion:

Pending determination of conditions under which assistance may be given the prohibition against providing the cost of capital development to private schools as contained in Clause 4(a) shall not operate if in fact capital grants are being made to private schools in any State or Territory at this date.

My added emphasis shows how the losers like Cameron were still reluctant to admit defeat in print: everyone knew capital aid was being given in some States. But the winners did not press the point.

Labor had 'stumbled incoherently into acceptance of State Aid'. The party's six months of state aid activity in 1966, which began with

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218 Oakes, Whitlam PM, 144.

219 Nation, 6 August 1966. Many observers referred not only to the contradictory motions but to the air of confusion at the Conference: see the details in notes 216, 217 (the plethora of motions added to this confusion); Bulletin, 6 August 1966; Labor Comment, August-September 1966, 3; letter, J. Guyatt to the author, 24 November 1978; the references in note 213 above.
the bang of February, ended with the whimper of July. The July Special Conference did not mark the end of Labor's attacks on the problem of state aid. The decisions removed the barriers to the ALP offering direct aid but said nothing about what aid should be offered and how. Not until the 1969 Federal Conference and after did the party evolve the concept of an Australian Schools Commission dispensing aid to all schools, state and non-state, on the basis of need. In the Schools Commission those whose main concern was aid to fellow Catholics, those who wished to extend the role of the Commonwealth by means of largesse from Canberra, those who sought educational equality and quality and those who admitted the justice of the state aid case but did not wish to exacerbate sectarianism, all found common ground. Only the few bitter anti-state aiders resented the scheme. But they had long since lost their chance to close the state aid door. In Victoria, the State most opposed to state aid, elements of the party after 1966 still insisted the Special Conference decisions allowed the Branch to oppose state aid and even phase it out. This recalcitrance eventually provided a pretext for the Federal party to intervene and reconstruct the Branch. But that is another story.

Labor's debates over state aid never reached quite the same intensity after July 1966 as before that date but these few details illustrate, in a conclusion that is not really a conclusion, the relevance of Lindblom's remark that disjointed incrementalism involves

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220 These developments are summarised in Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 200-2.
'a never-ending series of attacks on more or less permanent, though perhaps slowly changing, problems ...'.
Of their nature, the foreign and defence policies of a political party will be influenced as much by events in the world outside the party as by the preferences of individual decisionmakers or the goals of party sub-coalitions. In particular, changes in the 'international political environment' and — if the party is in opposition — in government policy, are likely to affect the decisions made. The Australian Labor Party in 1966 and 1967 reacted to changes in South East Asia and the world beyond and to the actions of Liberal-Country Party Governments — which also were influenced by environmental changes. Much of this case study should provide support for HYPOTHESES VII and XIII. Influences summarised in other hypotheses may also be important.

Background

The detailed study covers the period from March 1966 until late 1967. To place that period in context it is necessary to trace developments from August 1964. In the reactions of Labor decisionmakers to successive events in this period can be seen tendencies which became more pronounced in the heightened atmosphere of 1966 and 1967.

In August 1964, the United States reacted to alleged North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin by bombing the North. Australia's military commitment to South Vietnam then stood at one hundred advisers but Labor criticism of successive small increases in assistance had been muted. Labor had been painted by its opponents during the 1963 election campaign as irresponsible in defence matters and most of its Parliamentary spokesmen were wary of criticising aid to a small Asian state, especially when Indonesian posturing closer to home made the electorate defence-
conscious. Thus, in August 1964, Calwell agreed it was impossible to abandon military methods but he also called for political, economic and social solutions, recognition that the war was a civil one and recourse to the United Nations and the Geneva Conference to procure a settlement. This would have represented the majority view of Caucus at the time.

Three months after the Tonkin Gulf incident, on 10 November 1964, Menzies announced 'selective compulsory service' for twenty-year old men at the rate of 6,900 men in a full year. Conscripts would be integrated with regular units and 'under an obligation to serve overseas as necessary'. The Labor Caucus immediately resolved unanimously against conscription for overseas service in peacetime but most Labor critics of the Menzies scheme concentrated upon the Government's inadequate defence planning, the economics of conscription and the unfairness of the selective method, rather than the possible use of conscripts in specific theatres.

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1 For Calwell's comments, especially his complaint that Australia was acquiring a policy 'in a fit of absence of mind': Arthur Calwell, The Challenge Before Us, Canberra, 1964, 10–11 (speech at ALP, NSW Branch Conference in June); CPD H. of R. 41, 19 March 1964, 678–9. The Vietnam intervention commenced in 1962 with thirty advisers: CPD H. of R. 45, 29 April 1965, 1060–1.


3 CPD H. of R. 44, 10 November 1964, 2715–24. See also Menzies' Senate election policy speech: CT, SMH, 20 November 1964. For the conscription issue generally, see: Roy Forward & Bob Reece, ed., Conscription in Australia, St Lucia, Qld, 1968.

4 Those who did cover the point assumed the most likely destinations were Vietnam and Malaysia, where small contingents of regulars were then serving. For references to the Parliamentary debate and the subsequent Senate election campaign: Age, 9, 23, 24, 28 November, 2, 3 December 1964; Australian, 30 November 1964; [A.A. Calwell], Protest! 'The Australian Labor Party asks the People to Elect a Watchdog Senate ...' Labor's Leader (Hon. A.A. Calwell, M.H.R.) Opening Speech, Senate Elections, 1964, Canberra, 1964, 4–9; CPD H. of R. 44, 12, 16, 17 November 1964, 2920–8, 2932–4, 2946–8, 3012–4, 3022, 3097–9; DT, 12 November 1964; SMH, 12, 13, 26 November 1964; J.M. Wheeldon, Interview.
The juxtaposition of conscription and Vietnam came a step closer on 29 April 1965 when Menzies announced that Australia's Vietnam commitment would be expanded from the adviser group to eight hundred regular infantry with support units and equipment. This Government decision produced, according to J.F. Cairns, 'the deepest and strongest unity in the Labor movement in living memory'. To analyse the nature of this unity it is necessary first to outline ten years of history.

The 1955 Federal Conference had opposed the despatch of troops to the then Malaya and had resolved instead that Australia's defence should be confined to 'the northern areas of the continent and the territories'. By 1963, the issue had become not Communist insurgency in Malaya but Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia, which was established on 31 August of that year. After an inconclusive vote at the March 1963 Special Conference, the Federal Conference of July 1963 resolved:

Labor does not believe that Australian forces should be committed overseas, except subject to a clear and public Treaty, which accords with the principles of the declaration which gives Australia an effective voice in the common decision of the Treaty Powers.

No such treaty then covered the Australian troops in Malaysia but Calwell made clear after the Conference that this would not make a Labor Government withdraw the troops nor fail to defend Malaysia in an emergency. Clear and public treaties would be necessary only for new

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5 CPD H. of R. 45, 29 April 1965, 1060-1.
6 CT, 24 May 1965.
8 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 7; 23-4. The resolution is badly transcribed. When moved unsuccessfully at the March 1963 Special Conference, it read '... the principles of this declaration, and which gives ...' (ALP, Official Report, Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1963, 12-13). The declaration referred to is the general foreign affairs and defence resolution adopted at the Hobart Conference of 1955 and reaffirmed since.
troop commitments to countries other than Malaysia. Twelve months later, however, after Labor's general election defeat of 1963 and before the Senate election of 1964, Calwell sought from the Federal Executive a clearer interpretation of Labor's policy on expeditionary forces. Accordingly, Wyndham recommended, in effect, that the Executive support Calwell's interpretation of the previous year regarding the Malaysia force and, secondly, that the despatch of troops to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was in accordance with Labor policy, since these were protocol States of the clear and public SEATO treaty, of which Australia was a signatory. Instead, the Executive adopted a Victorian item which mentioned, inter alia,

the principles inherent in Labor policy that clear and public treaties should cover the presence and operation of Australian troops overseas, and deprecates the lack of any formal agreement to cover the presence of the Australian contingent in South Vietnam.

This resolution, it should be noted, was adopted six months before the April 1965 decision to greatly enlarge the contingent. It may have reflected uneasiness among Executive members at developments in Vietnam since the Tonkin incident. There were signs of unrest, too, in the Federal Caucus although, here, views more favourable to American intentions prevailed. In February 1965, the Caucus endorsed, by majority vote, a Caucus Executive statement which argued that American

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9 C-M, 9 August 1963; CPD H. of R. 40, 25 September 1963, 1367-8; SMH, 1 August, 10 September, 21 October 1963. A Labor Government would seek such a treaty with Malaysia to cover the troops already there.


11 FX 21-23 October 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35. My emphasis. The Wyndham formulation was not considered by the Executive because Calwell was influenced by Caucus members (described in the press as 'left wing') to have it passed over. Wyndham complained that the document was leaked to the press: Australian, 22, 26 October 1964.
bombed of North Vietnam 'deserves sympathetic Australian understanding'.
Caucus rejected arguments for the withdrawal of all foreign troops.
Withdrawal would mean 'a Communist take-over of South Vietnam ... and extending the area of Communist control closer to this country. The presence of these troops is justified as a holding operation provided that all efforts are bent towards [a peaceful settlement']'. Yet Caucus members Crean, Pollard and Cameron complained of the statement's leniency towards the United States and Caucus misgivings grew as American operations intensified. Calwell and the Caucus Executive were criticised for releasing the statement before its endorsement by the full Caucus, but the February resolution was eventually reaffirmed overwhelmingly in March.

The Government decision of April 1965 may have prevented a dispute within the Labor Party over American actions in Vietnam and the presence of Australian advisers there. The sending of combat troops changed the nature of Labor's internal debate. It had been one between critics of American bombing and of the presence of Australian advisers without treaty

12 *Age*, SMH, 17-19 February 1965. Another resolution referred to the Malaysia crisis. According to Kim C. Beazley, son of Kim E. Beazley, the resolutions were drafted by A.D. Fraser and J.F. Cairns. While Fraser opposed the American escalation he drafted the resolution in these terms because otherwise American resolve to remain in South East Asia and her diplomatic efforts to end the war would be weakened. Cairns suffered some criticisms from the Caucus 'Left' - in this context those less disposed to be sympathetic to the United States - for his drafting role. Beazley gives an interview with Fraser in February 1973 as his source: Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, unpublished MA thesis, University of Western Australia, 1974, 121, 167, 319. Graham Freudenberg, Calwell's press secretary at the time, suggests instead that Beazley (senior) drafted the statement and the Caucus Foreign Affairs Committee, of which Beazley and Cairns were members and Fraser Chairman, passed it on to the Executive: Graham Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur*, South Melbourne, 1977, 55.

justification - this broad position was represented by the Federal Executive majority and the Federal Caucus minority - and those who gave qualified support to the Americans and avoided the issue of the advisers - the Caucus majority. The debate now came to turn, instead, on differing emphases beneath a broad umbrella of opposition to the decision of April. This opposition, in fact, was the only common element across the ranks of Labor's Parliamentarians.

Calwell's speech in the House on 6 May set the tone. Labor's opposition to the decision was clearly stated: 'we oppose the Government's decision to send 800 men to fight in Vietnam. We oppose it firmly and completely.' What followed from that fact was rather more obscure. Calwell carefully avoided attacking the United States as such, while allowing himself misgivings about its military tactics. 'We believe that America must not be humiliated and must not be forced to withdraw.' Calwell opposed the Australian decision but not basic American war aims. The expeditionary force would do little to oppose Communism, contain China, help South Vietnam or defend Australia. Similarly, Whitlam said Australia's presence would make little military difference while lowering Australia's reputation in Asia. However, he added, '[w]e badly need the American alliance'. Beazley was content to deplore the imposition of

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14 At the 25 March Caucus meeting, Whitlam and Calwell had supported an unsuccessful amendment to have 'consultation' between the Caucus Executive, the officers of the Caucus Foreign Affairs Committee and of the Federal Executive. They knew that the Federal Executive had adopted the Victorian position on the Vietnam contingent in October 1964, and might take a similar line again. There was a need to harmonise the Caucus and Executive views. The problem was underlined on 26 March, when the VCE asked the Federal Executive to rule if the Caucus statements of February regarding Malaysia and Vietnam were consistent with Federal policy: VCE 26 March 1965, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142.
Western solutions on Asia and to complain of the low standard of foreign affairs debates.\footnote{CPD H. of R. 46, 4, 6 May 1965, 1102-7 (Calwell), 1251-5 (Whitlam), 1284-7 (Beazley); CT, 24 May 1965. Since the content of Calwell's speech is important for the argument of the following pages, here is a summary of its main points: Labor opposes the decision to send troops; the decision will not help the fight against Communism nor contain China, nor help South Vietnam; it is not in Australia's strategic interest, since it divides already weak forces between home defence, Malaysia and Vietnam; it will harm Australia's reputation in Asia; it is based on refusal to accept this is a civil war with one side aided by the North, rather than mere outside aggression; based on a misconception of Chinese intentions; it commits Australia to supporting unpopular regimes; the West has failed to support genuine nationalism, except when it supported the West, and has thus pushed nationalism and Communism closer together; collapse of the nationalist Communist regime in the North would leave a vacuum which China would fill; Australia has done nothing to promote negotiations to end the war and has now deprived itself of the chance to do so; Australia continues to trade with China, allegedly the main threat; how long before conscripts will be sent to Vietnam?; America must not be humiliated or forced to withdraw; an Australian Labor Government would participate in a United Nations force; Labor will not desert the fighting man in the field though it opposes the decision to send him and will work to reverse it; Labor is patriotic but does not expect popularity from its 'stand'.}

Some Caucus members since 1965 have questioned how intense was their Leader's and colleagues' opposition to the decision of April 1965. Cairns insists that Calwell's speech of 6 May included the words 'we shall do our best to have that decision reversed' only on Cairns' own urging. Wheeldon wondered if Whitlam might privately have supported Menzies' decision. Beazley's measured speech and his opposition in Caucus to radical stances on the war itself may suggest his uneasiness about opposing the enlarged Australian commitment to it.\footnote{J.F. Cairns, T. Uren, J.M. Wheeldon, interviews. The words Cairns referred to came in the midst of paragraphs which assured fighting men of Labor prayers and protested Labor's patriotism. The complete sentence ran: 'Our minds and reason cannot support those who have made the decision to send you to this war, and we shall do our best to have that decision reversed' (CPD H. of R. 46, 4 May 1965, 1107. My emphasis). Cairns recalled the details of the speech's composition to the present author. The speech, he said, had everything in it but lacked anything definite. He told Calwell, 'we should say something definite. We should say we'll pull the troops out'. Calwell replied: 'No. If we say that we'll offend too many people'. Cairns countered: 'Well, at least say}
remarks that there was never the 'slightest doubt' of Labor opposition and no 'significant member' of the party ever suggested any other stand are true literally but there is evidence of great caution and careful choice of words in many Labor contributions to the Parliamentary debate. The feelings of February did not evaporate overnight, despite Caucus' unanimous advance endorsement of Calwell's position. Conference decisions precluded support for the decision in the absence of a 'clear and public treaty'; they did not require each Caucus member to oppose the decision with the same intensity. The rhetoric of Freudenberg, delivered by Calwell, served not only as a catalogue of reasons for opposition to the decision but also to disguise the uneasiness felt by many Caucus members, Calwell included, at opposing it at all. Freudenberg writes that Calwell provided a preliminary statement calling for a Caucus meeting to be followed by a Parliamentary debate on Menzies' announcement. 'The effect and the intended purpose of this [Calwell's] statement was to

16 (continued)
"we'll work to reverse". According to Cairns, Calwell accepted this formula easily because there was room for manoeuvre within it. Whitlam, too, according to Cairns and Uren, was fearful of offending voters by seeming anti-American. Another comment critical of Whitlam at this time: 'Mr Whitlam seems to be trying to talk the problem out of existence. The meeting in the Sydney Domain (23 May) ... was treated to some amusing and satirical comment on the Prime Minister, plenty of criticism of the Government's procedures, but very little criticism of its policies. Whitlam's is a dangerous course which must cast doubt on the genuineness of whatever Labor opposition to Government policy he represents': Anonymous, 'The War Nobody Wants', Outlook, 9, 3 (June 1965), 5. Beazley confirmed that the danger of appearing anti-American was a consideration for the cautious ones in Caucus (K.E. Beazley, interview).

17 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 50-1. Freudenberg confirms that Cairns and John Menadue, Whitlam's private secretary, were consulted.

18 Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ... , 170-1, quoting Caucus Minutes, says the endorsing motion was moved by J. Cope (NSW) and Senator Cavanagh (SA) and discussed by Pollard, Beazley, Cairns, Calwell and A.S. Luchetti and F.M. Daly (both NSW). This represented a reasonable cross-section of Caucus opinion on the Vietnam conflict.
preclude any meaningful discussion within the Party about its attitude. For there was no need for discussion. The only question was how Labor's opposition should be expressed.\textsuperscript{19} But 'opposition' was so expressed that all who read might/run or 'run dead' on the issue. Beyond bare opposition there were countless nuances and emphases for Caucus members to develop: for the Whitlams and Beazleys who feared the anti-American label, the Stewarts and Luchettis, who suggested a reference in Calwell's speech to Labor's support for Australian participation in any United Nations contingent, the Cairns and Haydens, who felt the evidence of Northern incursions had been greatly exaggerated, to the McIvors and Pollards who muttered that the Australian commitment was in exchange for a dollar loan.\textsuperscript{20}

Calwell's speech was similarly received in the extra-Parliamentary party. The Federal Executive, meeting late in May, gave it 'complete support', after minimal discussion. Brown remembered seizing on the 'do

\textsuperscript{19} Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 50.

\textsuperscript{20} CPD H. of R. 46, 4, 6 May 1965, 1112-5 (Cairns), 1230-1 (McIvor), 1261-2 (Pollard); Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 51. Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 171, agrees with this conclusion: opposition did not imply anything else, such as support for withdrawal or using the commitment as a bargaining weapon with the Americans. The Cope-Cavanagh motion was deliberately vague. 'What the decision did make difficult was the continuation of the type of support given the American involvement by some members of the A.L.P. right.' It was difficult to appear convinced of the need for an increasing American military effort, while at the same time opposing an increased Australian commitment.' It remains a matter for opinion how close the stances of some Caucus members after 29 April came to support for the increased Australian commitment. See again note 15, above, for the scope Freudenberg, Calwell and the Caucus endorsement provided. Inconsistency between its February and April positions remained a problem for the party as a whole. According to one observer, encapsulating the Government's main attack, Labor could not 'explain why, if it supported the presence of American troops in Viet Nam, it objected to the principle of Australian troops serving there also': T.B. Millar, 'Problems of Australian Foreign Policy January-June 1965', AJPH, 11 (December 1965), 274.
our best to have that decision reversed' clause as support for troop withdrawal; others took comfort in the relatively pro-American passages. By supporting Calwell's grab-bag speech, the Executive - and later the Conference - enshrined as official party policy a document whose meaning rested entirely on the interpretation placed upon it by its readers.\footnote{W.W.C. Brown, T. Uren, interviews. For the Executive discussions: FX 24-27 May 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38.}

The divergence of view between party sub-coalitions was underlined by the attitudes of delegates to the 1965 Federal Conference. Ultimately the Conference supported and applauded the Caucus' opposition to the expeditionary force 'in accordance with the principles stated by the Federal Leader in the House of Representatives on 4th May, 1965'.\footnote{ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 81-2.} The importance of not saying what these principles were or, at least, which were more important than others, is shown in two comparisons. 'The committal of Australian troops ...', said Keeffe, Federal President and now a Senator, 'has done tremendous damage to the prestige of this country .... The decent people in the community ... expect us to condemn Australia's participation in the Vietnam conflict with all its side effects.' On the other hand, Oliver, Chairman of the Federal Foreign Affairs Committee, claimed in June:

We are preoccupied with the military threat of Chinese Communism.... I know [the United States'] motive is resistance to the spread of Communism and resistance to Communist aggression in any form ....China has a plan for every country in Asia. Vietnam is on her doorstep.\footnote{ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 24; ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1965 Annual Conference, 5-6.}

Secondly, the resolution of the Annual Conference of Oliver's New South Wales Branch may be compared with its Victorian equivalent. The
former resolution said nothing at all about opposing the decision of 29 April.

There is a crisis in Vietnam [it ran in part] and Australia is involved .... Recriminations on past policies, for which Labor was not responsible, are of no assistance in formulating a constructive approach toward a solution to the South-East Asia crisis based on non-military motives and with priority to the welfare of the people living in that region .... Australian Labor, whether in or out of Government, must work to this end .... On the Vietnam crisis, Labor's policy - strongly presented by the Federal Labor Leader, Mr Calwell - is to seek mediation by the United Nations for a permanent settlement ....

This resolution may have been written before 29 April. But there was no attempt at the Branch Conference in June to alter its terms to take account of recent developments. The Victorian Branch, on the other hand, condemned the Australian Government for 'continually involving Australia in military action in South-East Asia', called for withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases from all countries, opposed all expeditionary forces and interference in the internal affairs of other countries and called for an end to all hostilities in South Vietnam.

Individuals of such divergent opinions as Keeffe and Oliver and delegates from Branches whose priorities differed as radically as did Victoria and New South Wales could agree to the Conference endorsing Calwell's Parliamentary remarks because each saw different meanings in them. Graham Allison, extrapolating from his study of the Cuban missile

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24 ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1965 Annual Conference, 20. The Committee report covered twenty-eight relevant items from unions and branches, some of which specifically demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Vietnam: ALP (NSW Branch), Annual General Conference 1965 Agenda, 12-16. Of course, most of these items would have been adopted before the 29 April announcement, but presumably those who opposed the presence of advisers would also have opposed the larger force.

25 ALP (Victorian Branch), Record of Annual Conference, June, 1965, 7-8.
crisis of 1962, has suggested this is a characteristic of organisational decisionmaking. Decisionmakers see issues differently because of their own personal backgrounds, their own goals and their positions in organisations. Furthermore, each decisionmaker reads different meanings into decisions.

Considerable misperception is a standard part of the functioning of each government. Any proposal that is widely accepted is perceived by different men to do quite different things and to meet quite different needs. Misperception is in a sense the grease that allows cooperation among people whose differences otherwise would hardly allow them to co-exist.

In terms of our hypotheses, both the New South Wales and Victorian Branches could see their goals as State Branches (HYPOTHESIS I), as expressed in their Branch Conference decisions of June 1965, served by the Federal Conference decision of August 1965. Similarly, both Keeffe and Oliver could find in the August decision something to satisfy their own personal preferences (HYPOTHESIS II). Both Branches and individuals pursued their own goals in the decisionmaking process; both Branches and individuals had their goals at least partly satisfied by the decision which emerged. The intended purpose of Calwell's speech was not to prevent discussion by laying down a definite policy but to accommodate the various party views about the war and the nature of Australian involvement in it. As Allison suggests, the capacity for interpretation was deliberately provided.

27 Allison, Essence of Decision, 178. Reticence may also assist in this regard: 'Reticence permits other players to interpret an outcome in the way in which the shoe pinches least' (Allison, Essence of Decision, 179).
March and Olsen's book, titled *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*, expands on the role of interpretation. Ambiguity, indeed, is at the base of decisions in what they call 'organized anarchies'; the production of ambiguous decisions is one of the characteristics of 'garbage can decision processes', the subject of our Hypothesis XVI.

March and Olsen commence from a depiction of the complexity of decision situations. Associated with this complexity is 'ambiguity'. Decisions, the authors believe, are fundamentally ambiguous. An organization is a set of procedures for argumentation and interpretation as well as for solving problems and making decisions. A [decision] situation is a meeting place for issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they may be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they may be an answer, and participants looking for problems or pleasure.

Here are the four components - decision situations or opportunities, issues (problems), solutions and participants - of the garbage can model. The suggestion is that the 'something which can be called a "decision"' which emerges from the garbage can bears that indeterminate title because it is ambiguous. It follows that '[w]hat is being decided is itself to be determined through the course of deciding it'. Decision-makers commence with different goals and different views of the issue and both goals and perceptions change during the decisionmaking process. At any time, decisionmakers differ over what they are doing. These differences do not disappear once decision has been reached. Indeed, the decision itself may be less important than the process and the varied

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opportunities it provides. Here is Kare Rommetveit, one of the contributors to *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*, applying the garbage can concept to a study of politics of locating a new university in Norway:

Consider the decision ambiguity, the partial irrelevance of the immediate substantive outcome of the process for many central participants, and the competitive activation of participants. The content of the decision was not always clear. The interpretation changed over time and from one set of participants to another. Different participants emphasized different aspects of a specific decision - depending on which aspects were relevant for the respective areas of primary interest .... For at least some (perhaps most) of the key groups the explicit decision seemed to be of little importance "per se". While interested in certain aspects of the decision, the relevance of the decision otherwise largely disappeared once the decision was made. The outcome of the battle was important less for the immediate outcome that resulted than for the implications this outcome had for contemporary battles within other arenas or future battles involving the same participants.

The decision in Rommetveit's case was important for battles on other issues. If we regard these battles as garbage cans, the decision in question becomes a solution to be dumped in the garbage cans by participants. For example, the 1965 Federal Conference decision on the expeditionary force could have been dumped in a state aid garbage can (a decision opportunity which had to produce 'something which could be called a decision' on state aid) and become attached to such problems as the need for a Federal Leadership change or the need to discipline the New South Wales Branch. Whether foreign policy decisions were used in this way is one question for this chapter. Another question is whether foreign policy decisions themselves emerged from garbage cans full of

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problems and solutions concerned with matters other than foreign affairs. The 'dumping' into decision opportunity garbage cans of strictly 'irrelevant' problems and solutions is one characteristic of the garbage can model; ambiguity is another. Thirdly, and most importantly, this chapter will look for evidence of ambiguity.

Ambiguity seems particularly likely to occur in foreign policy decisions made by a party in opposition: 'it seems to characterize a wide variety of organizations when they are young or when their environments are changing'. Change in the international political environment, part of the subject of our HYPOTHESIS VII, is a crucial dynamic of foreign policy decisions. Most decisions involve reactions to changes over which the party can exercise little control. Opposition parties react to the reactions of governments to environmental changes (HYPOTHESIS XIII). The Vietnam War passed through a number of stages between 1964 and 1968 - and afterwards. Setbacks for the Western allies followed victories. There were rapid build-ups of troop strengths, halts and resumptions of bombing, diplomatic initiatives and hopeful claims. Uncertainty about the future often provides an incentive to hedging and opacity in decisions. Prima facie, Labor's approach to the Vietnam issue in 1966 and 1967 seems a fruitful field for evidence of ambiguity and interpretation.

We may expect to find a particular type of ambiguity, that of organisation. 'At any point in time, individuals vary in the attention

March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 12. My emphasis. The authors detect four types of ambiguity: of intention, where goals are unclear; of understanding of the environment and of the technology of action; of history, of what has happened in the past, including in the organisation's past, that is, the decisions it has made; of organisation, for which see below. In practice, as the quotations on the previous pages suggest, different types of ambiguity are likely to occur at different times during the making of any one decision.
they provide to different decisions; they vary from one time to another. As a result, the pattern of participation is uncertain and changing.\(^{33}\)

The main arena for Federal ALP foreign policy statements in 1964-65 was the Federal Parliament and the forums outside it addressed by Caucus members. While the Federal Conference of 1965 made a number of decisions on foreign policy, on the main current issue, the despatch of eight hundred Australian troops to Vietnam, delegates endorsed Calwell's speech. They made no attempt to clarify the party's attitude or arrange in order of priority the multiple arguments in Calwell's speech. In other areas they confirmed previous stances.\(^{34}\) Endorsing Calwell's remarks

\(^{33}\) March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 12.

\(^{34}\) Relevant decisions were (1) condemnation of the Government decision of November 1964, introducing conscription for overseas service in peacetime; (2) discharge of the Victorian Branch resolution of June 1965; (3) adoption of parts of the New South Wales Branch resolution of June 1965; (4) clarification of the wording of the clear and public treaty clause relating to expeditionary forces; (5) adoption of a new preamble: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 74-86. The second and third decisions provide evidence of the willingness of the extreme Branches, Victoria and New South Wales, to compromise. Victoria did not oppose the Committee recommendation to discharge the resolution, which embodied the Branch's approach to a wide range of foreign policy issues, since it knew its most important goals, opposition to conscription and to the expeditionary force, were covered by other decisions. New South Wales, through Oliver as Chairman of the Federal Comitéé, put up only some relatively innocuous paragraphs of the State policy and forgot about the paragraphs which seemed to recognise the fact of Australian involvement in Vietnam and could have been interpreted as critical of those who opposed that involvement. However, the fourth and fifth decisions saw unsuccessful attempts to change policy in ways not acceptable to a majority of delegates. The Foreign Affairs Committee tried to include in the preamble a clause that Australia 'cannot be neutral in the face of aggression' against other countries. The Conference rejected this by twenty-three votes to thirteen, apparently because it could have been used to justify the Vietnam force. On the other hand, the Conference rejected by twenty-one votes to fifteen an amendment that Australian forces should not be sent overseas except in a United Nations force or subject to a clear and public treaty approved by Parliament and that Labor would 'work to reverse' any non-Labor decision that contravened this principle. Both these proposals, one cautious, the other radical, laid too much emphasis on specific parts of Calwell's grab-bag speech and gained the support only of the partisans of the specific viewpoint they emphasised. A process of mutual adjustment between partisans stopped
was in itself a decision but it was one where the delegates deprived themselves of the possibility of an independent position on the issue and to which they devoted little time. They were, in effect, subsidiary participants to Calwell and his speech writer in a way that did not occur with, say, state aid at the same Conference, where the delegates were the leading actors. Participants carry problems and solutions to garbage cans differentially; the main actors in one drama are often supporting players in another.

Participation is often fluid. Participants vary in the amount of time and effort they devote to different domains; involvement varies from one time to another .... Since every entrance is an exit somewhere else, the distribution of 'entrances' depends on the attributes of the new choice. Substantial variation in participation stems from other demands on the participants' time (rather than from features of the decision under study).35

We shall find further support for HYPOTHESIS XVI if we find evidence of variable participation and if we confirm that participation varies for the reasons suggested.

1966

THE GOVERNMENT DECISION OF MARCH 1966 AND LABOR'S REACTION

During the Vietnam debate of 1965, the possibility that conscripts might be sent there was an undertone rather than a central issue for

34 (continued)
short of a majority. On the other hand, partisan mutual adjustment produced the second and third of the five decisions listed and the endorsement of Calwell's speech on Vietnam. In these cases, discharge, endorsement of the need for a United Nations role and endorsement of Calwell's grab-bag speech were courses which no one could oppose, despite their differing goals and priorities. There is evidence in these five decisions not only of a search for compromise (HYPOTHESIS V) but also of partisan mutual adjustment to achieve it (HYPOTHESIS XIV).

35 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 25, 27.
Labor. Generally, the different attitudes to the war itself within the party seemed to produce unwillingness to draw any more attention to it than necessary to distinguish Labor's broad approach from that of the Government. When Cairns spoke at Ballarat in February 1966, one journalist described the speech as 'the first broadly definitive outline of Labor foreign policy' since the Federal Conference six months earlier. Cairns pointed out that while ALP policy did not require immediate Australian withdrawal, there was nothing in it to say the party would not withdraw immediately on taking office. Labor's view had never been 'dogmatic or inflexible'. Calwell, too, argued in February that a Labor Government would decide in accordance with then existing circumstances, although all troops would be withdrawn 'after a peaceful settlement'. Meanwhile, the Victorian Central Executive instructed its Federal delegates, Brown and Hartley, to 'fully support a complete withdrawal of troops from Vietnam'. Each of these interpretations of existing policy, that is, of the resolutions of the 1965 Federal Conference, was hypothetical, depending on a Labor Government coming to power at the end of 1966. However, as in 1964 and 1965, Labor's next action would be a reaction to a decision of the Federal Liberal Government, itself responding to its perceptions of progress in the war in Vietnam (HYPOTHESES XIII, VII).

36 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 23 (Keeffe); CPD H. of R. 4 May 1965, 1098 (A.J. Forbes, Minister for the Army), 1107 (Calwell), 1121 (Galvin).
37 SMH, 7 February 1966.
On 8 March 1966, the new Prime Minister, H.E. Holt, announced that Australia's Vietnam force would be trebled and would include conscripts. How did Labor react? In 1965 Labor men had buried their differences over the nature of the war, the threat of Communism and the importance of the American alliance, in opposition to the despatch of the expeditionary force. In 1966, differences over the war and over the presence of Australian troops were buried in opposition to conscripts being part of the force. There was no public party disagreement on this question; disagreement within the party arose over what followed from opposition to the original decision. Should Labor withdraw the force? Which parts of it, conscripts or the lot? How soon after the accession of a Labor Government and by what procedure? As during 1965, the manner of answering these questions reflected the strength of the opposition to the original decision and led to doubts about the sincerity of the opposition of some Labor spokesmen.

Speeches in March and April reveal the shades of Labor opinion. Declaring Labor's opposition to the decision, Calwell said: 'We will never support the use of conscripts in overseas wars for the defence of any part of Asia'. Supporting him, some Labor men pointed to the injustice of conscription, which fell most heavily on the less privileged, which depended on the luck of the ballot, and which meant 'voteless boys' could be 'dragged from their homes under the lash of conscription and forced to die in a war that has not yet been declared'. Holt's

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41 CPD H. of R. 50, 16, 17 March 1966, 287-8 (Coutts), 293 (Webb), 312 (Galvin), 334 (Cameron - quoted), 378 (Reynolds), 399 (Daly). See also Calwell's opening speech at the Kooyong by-election: Age, CT, 22 March 1966. Speech delivered at Launceston on Wednesday, 13 April, by the Leader of the Opposition, Hon. Arthur A. Calwell to the Annual Conference of the Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Labor Party, Vic. Rec., packet 'Mr. Calwell - Personal'. For the Kooyong by-election: Michelle Grattan, 'The Kooyong By-election', Politics, 1 (November 1966), supplement, 3-18.
announcement revived for many Labor men, including Calwell, memories of previous Labor battles over conscription for overseas service, in 1916-17 and 1942-43. The particular nature of the Vietnam war, apparently even more 'unwinnable, filthy and cruel' than most, heightened these feelings. But others took a narrower view, confining their arguments to the specific circumstances, criticising the government for its bungling of voluntary recruitment and arguing that a real threat to Australia would not find its young men slow to volunteer. Some Caucus members suggested or implied that the original commitment was no longer a central question. Australia should seek negotiations to end the war, argued Whitlam, 'now that we are a belligerent - whether we should have been or not'. Barnard, while pointing out that events had vindicated Labor's opposition to the original decision to send troops and its continued opposition to Australian participation, avoided saying that the troops should be withdrawn. A few speakers demanded that the Government should hold a referendum on whether conscripts should be sent overseas. Yet others had no doubt that what was wrong in 1965 was still wrong in 1966 and should be remedied. They were 'intent on seeing that Australia withdraw from its military commitment in Vietnam'.

42 CPD H. of R., 50, 17, 22 March 1966, 326 (Devine), 442 (Stewart), 447-8 (Whitlam); H. of R. 51, 19 April 1966, 923 (Hayden); Speech delivered by the Leader of the Opposition (Hon. Arthur A. Calwell) at an A.L.P. Rally on Vietnam and Conscription, Adelaide, April 17, 1966, Vic. Rec., packet, 'Mr. Calwell - Personal'.

43 CPD H. of R. 50, 24 March 1966, 632, 635 (Barnard); H. of R. 51, 10 May 1966, 1645 (Whitlam - my emphasis). See also: H. of R. 50, 22, 31 March 1966, 440-1 (Stewart: 'Australians generally appreciate the importance of our active participation in assisting South Vietnam to defeat the Communist plan to take over that country'); 851 (E.W. Harding: 'I have said before that if the Government was determined to send troops to Vietnam it should have sent regulars').

44 CPD H. of R. 50, 15, 16, 22 March 1966, 240 (Calwell), 334 (Cameron), 620 (Sexton).

45 CPD H. of R. 50, 16, 22, 29 March 1966, 302 (Johnson), 432, 435 (Uren), 468-9 (Bryant - quoted), 710 (Uren).
In their initial reactions, then, members of Caucus stressed different things although all expressed generalised opposition to the new decision. In the weeks after the initial debate they tried to determine what a Federal Labor Government would do instead. By mid April, Calwell was promising that Labor would bring home immediately all conscripts in Vietnam, Malaysia and elsewhere overseas. Regulars would be regrouped without endangering Australian lives. The Government and the press retorted that withdrawal of conscripts would cripple the Vietnam force. Some Caucus members were said to be alarmed that Calwell unilaterally had changed Labor policy from the flexible position enunciated in February. Whitlam, pressed, gave another interpretation. A Labor Government, 'if the facts were the same as now', would give conscripts in Vietnam 'a free opportunity of withdrawing from active service' and would send no more conscripts there. Calwell then said a Labor administration would work for a peaceful solution to the war so that the troops of all nations could come home. Meanwhile, Labor would not desert the Americans. By early May, Calwell was claiming that his first speech (Launceston, 13 April) had been malevolently misquoted. His language became even more circumspect: Labor would work to reverse the expeditionary force decision of April 1965, would examine the position in the light of the circumstances existing when Labor came to power and would not endanger soldiers' lives. Australian troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible after Labor took office, but not without consultation with her allies. With cooperation

46 Age, 14, 16 April 1966; Australian, 25 April 1966; SMH, 14, 16, 18, 19, 25 April 1966; Speech delivered at Launceston on Wednesday, 13 April [Calwell] ...
from the Americans, all Australian troops could be withdrawn in six to nine months.  

What occurred in the two months after the announcement of 8 March was a process of partisan mutual adjustment, whereby Calwell's first statements (most notably in Launceston on 13 April but, before that, in the campaign for the Kooyong by-election of 2 April) were modified and qualified in response to pressures from Caucus members, Whitlam, the leading party proponent of caution over withdrawal, and the press, whose main complaint was the difference between the Calwell and Whitlam versions and between successive Calwell versions. Calwell's response to these pressures was to seek a complex formula which would partly satisfy everyone, while leaving some leeway for a Labor Government. Calwell, according to one observer employing only a slight amount of hyperbole, 'spells out new variations in his particular brand of Labor policy in such a way that a Labor Government could in all conscience take any action it considered expedient'.

Labor lacked a formal policy made by Federal Conference to apply to the circumstances after 8 March 1966. In interpreting decisions of the 1965 Federal Conference, Calwell was making new policies, making critical decisions which, unless a new Conference was held, would be carried into the Federal elections at the end of the year. His action

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47 Age, 10 May 1966; CPD H. of R. 51, 10 May 1966, 1637; CT, 2, 3 May 1966; SMH, 3, 10 May 1966. Calwell's complaints brought forth transcripts of the speech and extracts were published. Meanwhile, party Branches, like Western Australia and Victoria, who supported a radical line on the troop decisions, had also published the Launceston speech: Fact, 22 April 1966; Western Sun, April 1966, 1. If misquotation had occurred, they, too, were guilty.

48 Age, 11 May 1966. Other press reports and comments: Advertiser, 3 May 1966; Age, 10 May 1966; C-M, 26 April 1966; CT, 2 May 1966; DT, 3 May 1966; SMH, 26 April, 10 May 1966.
was perfectly within Federal rule 5(d) in all but one regard, the lack of a Caucus decision supporting him. Calwell used the 'work to reverse' formula of his speech of May 1965, which had been endorsed by the Federal Conference of that year. His attack on conscription for overseas service could be justified by the Conference decision condemning the Liberals for introducing the scheme itself. If Conference condemned conscription for overseas service it seemed to Calwell a reasonable extrapolation that conscripts now overseas should be withdrawn. Saying this and setting a time-table for withdrawal could certainly not be 'contrary to the provisions of the Party Platform or any other decision of Federal Conference or Federal Executive'. Without a Caucus decision, however, Calwell could be accused of making policy unilaterally. More accurately, one could say that Calwell was making policy in reaction to newspaper and Government criticism. There is considerable evidence in these few weeks to support our HYPOTHESES XII and XIII. The mutual adjustment which produced the Calwell position of May involved partisans in the press as much as in the ALP.

The Caucus resolution of 12 May 1966 confirmed the position Calwell had reached by that date:

The Australian Labor Party opposes the sending of Australian troops to Vietnam and is especially opposed to the sending of conscript troops. An

50Calwell showed his awareness of the press reaction: 'If all the newspaper offices which get all these documents cannot make up their minds on what I said, I am not going to help them' (Age, 10 May 1966). Note also, in rather different vein, the Tasmanian Executive's concern at the apparent ambiguity in Labor policy, giving as evidence 'the attached leading article from the Mercury 3.5.66' which criticised Labor's policymaking efforts (Agenda, FX 27-31 July 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/42.
Australian Labor Government will direct the Army to bring home without delay the conscripted men who are already there, acting with full regard to the safety and security of the Australian forces .... For all other Australian forces in Vietnam the Government will have regard to the situation in Vietnam as it exists at the time and to the importance of maintaining future co-operation with the United States. Whilst it will take no action without consultation with the United States it will work for, and insist upon, the return of all Australian forces from Vietnam as soon as practicable.

The resolution went on that the United States should cease bombing, the war should become a holding operation, Australia should seek a negotiated settlement to which the National Liberation Front should be a party and should support the Geneva accords for withdrawal of all foreign forces, contribute to a United Nations or other peace keeping force and support self-determination in Vietnam and social and economic development in South East Asia. The resolution was seen by observers as an attempt to quell the confusion surrounding Calwell's earlier remarks. It did so by gathering in one statement the gist of all his statements of the previous month and so expressing them as to allow room for continuing interpretation. By including references to a negotiated settlement and a role for the United Nations it also recognised the most widely held goals of those who were more cautious of advocating withdrawal of Australian troops.

The Caucus resolution registered the public (and presumably private) discussion over Labor policy in the preceding weeks without establishing priorities or closing loopholes. Debate could still ensue, should a Labor Government take office, over the meaning of 'without delay', 'consultation' and 'as soon as practicable'. When Calwell said, 'this is A.L.P. policy for the next Federal election', he left unstated the interpretative process that would precede and follow the election of an

51 SMH, 13 May 1966.
ALP Government. We already knew, wrote one observer, that Labor opposed conscription for service overseas. 'All that has happened [in the resolution] is that ambiguities in policy, that previously were found by industrious searching through a number of documents, have been brought together in one document.'

Labor statements on Vietnam and conscription between 12 May and the election of 26 November were all based technically on the Caucus resolution. Some spokesmen concentrated upon Labor's objections to the war and expounded the resolution's procedures for disengagement of Australian troops. On the other hand, apparent evidence in public opinion polls and State elections in Queensland that these aspects of the policy were unpopular, because they seemed anti-American and likely, if implemented, to deprive Australia of American protection, encouraged some Caucus members to seek a change in the May decision. Further, Caucus members who had been to Vietnam argued that it could be militarily impossible to extract conscripts from the forces there. Calwell himself insisted that Labor was loyal to the American alliance without being uncritical of every American policy.

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52 SMH, 13 May 1966.
54 Age, 25 July 1966 (Senator Cohen); ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1966 Annual Conference, 9-10; ALP (SA Branch), Official Report, Annual State Convention, 1966, 8-9 (Calwell); CPD H. of R. 52, 18, 23, 30 August 1966, 233-5 (A.D. Fraser), 305-6 (Calwell), 545-50 (Cairns); H. of R. 53, 28 October 1966, 2381-3, 2387 (Calwell), 2397-9 (Uren); SMH, 23 May 1966 (Whitlam); Sunday Telegraph, 14 August 1966 (Fraser).
Despite these misgivings the May resolution was easily reaffirmed at the Caucus meeting of 31 August. Meanwhile, Whitlam, the Deputy Leader of the party, tried a different approach. First, he tried to broaden Labor's attack by emphasising the need for civil aid and, secondly, he tried to modify the troop withdrawal programme. In both cases, if pressed, he could claim to be interpreting the May resolution. Thus he took up the reference in that resolution to social and economic aid, arguing that Australia should increase its civil aid to Vietnam, provided only that military security had been established in the area receiving aid. When Calwell expressed reservations about such activity while the war continued, Whitlam insisted that it could not wait. Whitlam's remarks implied, writes Henry Albinski, 'that an armed presence would need to be maintained in the area if civil reconstruction were to make sense in the face of Viet Cong operations'. In Saigon on 14 August,

55 (continued)
56 Age, 15 August 1966; Australian, 25 August 1966; CT, 15 August 1966; SMH, 15, 18, 25 August, 1, 2 September 1966; Socialist and Industrial Labor, October 1966, 2. Due to the efforts of Beazley and C. Jones (NSW), Caucus heard the reports of all its members who had visited Vietnam recently (Cairns, Bryant, M. Cross, Senator Fitzgerald, L. Reynolds and Whitlam), who gave varying opinions on the possibility of withdrawing conscripts. Jones then moved to refer the whole question back to the Caucus Foreign Affairs Committee for report. The Committee Chairman, A.D. Fraser, agreed, provided there was no attempt to alter the May decision. Jones' motion was defeated heavily and the May resolution reaffirmed.
58 Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 80.
Whitlam 'avoided direct answers to questions as to whether the presence of Australian troops was right or wrong in the present circumstances'\(^5^9\) and, on his return to Australia he agreed with those members of Caucus who advised against splitting the Vietnam force by withdrawing conscripts. This advice, too, could have been justified by the May references to the security of Australian forces and to the status of the American alliance.

Whitlam was not a leading figure among those in Caucus who tried to reverse the May resolution as it related to the Australian force. He recognised instead that, just as the resolution could be interpreted to place more emphasis on civil matters and to prevent force-splitting, it allowed scope for interpretation on the far more volatile issue of the expeditionary force. In the 'military' clauses of the resolution, as one journalist pointed out, 'without delay', 'acting with full regard to the safety and security of the Australian forces' and 'as soon as practicable' left considerable room for taking account of public opinion, military advice and American requests.\(^6^0\) The statement tried to lay down limits within which individual members may speak according to their personal views and to discourage extreme divergences of opinion on the side of pacifism or wholehearted support of the American war effort. It is broad enough to accommodate many bedfellows and is clearly designed to discourage public dispute between members of the party.\(^6^1\)

\(^5^9\) Age, SMH, 15 August 1966.

\(^6^0\) Australian, 13 May 1966 (Alan Ramsey).

Given this, it was possible for Whitlam in September to develop the resolution's themes of a ceasefire, a negotiated settlement, withdrawal of all foreign forces and the initiation of a role for the United Nations. He said:

[T]he central issue in Vietnam today - How do we stop the war? Compared to that, other issues ... [are] secondary .... What is urgently required is that the West must state its terms for a ceasefire, political solution and military withdrawal with some particularity. Without this there can be no hope of negotiations .... No country has a better opportunity to influence United States decisions in Vietnam than Australia. It is essential that we counsel restraint and de-escalation as a preliminary to negotiations with a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the implementation of free elections by the United Nations.

Whitlam's references to the Australian force in Vietnam were muted in contrast.

The circumstances leading up to this war, the mistakes by Australian and Western Governments since Geneva and the present conduct of the war in both Saigon and Washington lead the Labor Party to the certain conclusion that Australian troops should not have been sent to Vietnam .... The two [Australian] battalions are due to be withdrawn between March and June next. The debate will rage around programs for the size, composition and duration of their replacements.62

The careful reader could judge from this that Whitlam, at least, did not necessarily believe Australian troops should be withdrawn, although they should not have been sent in the first place. Secondly, the future commitment was left vague in size, composition and duration. Whitlam, at least, was not committing a possible Labor Government. But then neither was the May resolution.

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62 Whitlam, 'Australia - Base or Bridge?', 1, 8. My emphasis.
Calwell's interpretation of the resolution, as presented in his election policy speech of 10 November, was somewhat more definite. Commencing his speech with the assertion that '[t]he most important issue in this campaign is conscription', he promised that a Labor Government would immediately act in consultation with the Americans to withdraw all conscripts in Vietnam and would bring home the rest of the force 'at the earliest practicable moment' after consulting the allies and without endangering any Australian or allied soldiers. Conscription would be abolished. Later, Calwell emphasised that consultation applied only to the details of withdrawal, not withdrawal itself. 'I didn't say that after consultation we would withdraw them. We would withdraw them. We will not be taking part in a dialogue with the Americans as to whether we should or should not withdraw.'

Against this interpretation, Whitlam set an article under his own name in the Daily Mirror of 17 November. The article said, in part:

The Labor Party opposes the sending of conscripts to Vietnam. It will recall the conscripts from Vietnam as soon as possible. It will send no more conscripts to Vietnam. If, after consultation with the American and Vietnamese governments or after the reconvening of the Geneva Conference or after a resolution by the United Nations the Labor Government judges that there should be Australian troops in Vietnam, it would send regular troops.

Four days later in Adelaide Whitlam repeated the Daily Mirror interpretation and the press took it up, contrasting it with Calwell's

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64 Age, 18 November 1966. Twelve months later, Calwell said that, had he won, all Australian troops would have been home by Easter 1967 (Age, 2 January 1968).
version. Calwell's policy might be unrealistic and naive but it was reasonably clear, wrote the *Age* editorialist. On the other hand, '[n]o cheque could be blanker and no promise emptier' than Whitlam's.\(^6\)

During the campaign Calwell dismissed the difference between his own and Whitlam's interpretations as a matter of detail.\(^6\) However, some years later, he wrote that some Caucus members had tried to distort the May resolution almost as soon as it was made, 'to soft-pedal on one point, to alter the emphasis on others, and to equivocate when they thought this to be desirable'. Whitlam's version, Calwell insisted, 'was not the policy decided upon'.\(^6\)

Had Whitlam kept within the May resolution? Was Calwell merely condemning an interpretation which he personally disliked? When Whitlam's private secretary, P. Cullen, had feared that the Whitlam interpretation might be seen as unacceptable in the party, Whitlam had written the *Daily Mirror* piece himself. The lack of immediate reaction, Oakes suggests, convinced Whitlam there was no problem in his version.\(^6\) When the reaction came, Whitlam said only that his version 'was completely in accord with Mr Calwell's policy speech'.\(^7\) One presumes he meant the flexible phrase 'at the earliest practicable moment', which could have allowed for an intervening period when regulars might remain.

\(^6\) *Age*, 22 November 1966; CT, DT, 23 November 1966; Herald, 22 November 1966; Mercury, 23 November 1966; SMH, 22, 23 November 1966; West Australian, 22 November 1966. The *Daily Mirror* article was not taken up by journalists following the campaign. There is also one report of Whitlam making remarks in Sydney the previous day similar to those made in Adelaide (CT, 21 November 1966).

\(^7\) CT, SMH, 24 November 1966.


\(^70\) West Australian, 23 November 1966.
Oakes and Cullen both refer to Whitlam's desire for flexibility and his
distaste for sloganeering in foreign policy. Cullen recalls that 'he
didn't want to be locked into an impossible position'. Others have
suggested that Whitlam saw votes slipping away and made a last minute
effort to retrieve them. The implausibility of the last explanation,

at least, is shown by the evidence of Whitlam's earlier efforts to
interpret the May resolution. His stress on civil aid and his
evasiveness about troop withdrawal and replacement had been evident well
before the election campaign but, as Calwell pointed out later, the
press had not emphasised them until the hectic days of the campaign,
when such nuances became the subject of microscopic examination.

But were Whitlam's emphases mere nuances? On a number of occasions
before the election campaign, Whitlam pointed out that all troops at
present in Vietnam would be out by June, that is, their tours of duty
would end. The only difference between the government parties and
Labor was whether these troops would be replaced. The government wanted
a blank cheque to send as many conscripts as it liked; Labor would send
no conscripts but might send regulars. This was the gist of Whitlam's
remarks during the campaign. They redefined the issue to cause least
electoral offence (the only issue being troop replacement rather than

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71 Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 91; P. Cullen, interview; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 168.
72 Age, 22 November 1966; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 148; SMH, 23 November 1966.
73 Of course, the press had reported and often commented upon remarks by
Whitlam and Calwell and others on these subjects but had never had such
an apparently clear contrast of views expressed in such a highly charged
atmosphere.
74 Age, 14 November 1966; CPD H. of R. 53, 27 September, 12 October 1966,
1255-8, 1607-8; CT, 21 November 1966; Whitlam, 'Australia - Base or
Bridge?', 1.
presence or withdrawal) and to imply that the circumstances surrounding a decision to replace troops fighting in a war might be different from those surrounding the original decision. But if Labor was opposed to the original commitment of regulars it was hardly likely to commit regulars itself as a government, unless the war situation changed drastically. Probably the only relevant change would have been a direct threat to Australia, which never seemed likely. Labor had always been prepared to send regulars to a United Nations peace keeping force after a cease fire but Whitlam, in his campaign remarks, expanded the circumstances where regulars could be sent to include 'after consultation with the allies' (the main point of difference with Calwell) and 'after reconvening of the Geneva Conference'. This expansion could not be supported by the May resolution or by any party decision since the beginning of the Vietnam War. It was an individual, unauthorised undertaking by Whitlam, although it was put forward as an interpretation of the May resolution. Then, to underline the image of caution he was projecting, Whitlam substituted the words 'as soon as possible' for the

75 The relevant paragraphs of the May resolution were: 'Whilst it will take no action without consultation with the United States, it will work for, and insist upon the return of all Australian forces from Vietnam as soon as practicable .... The Australian Government should support the Geneva accords for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and non-intervention in the affairs of the area as a basis for peace. Upon the cessation of hostilities the Australian Government would stand ready to provide forces for peace-keeping operations in South Vietnam under the auspices of the United Nations or such other agency as is established for this purpose' (SMH, 13 May 1966. My emphasis). A future presence under the United Nations is clearly possible. The last clause, further, could justify a presence under a Geneva agreement, although the only explicit reference to Geneva concerns troop withdrawal. But the reference to consultation with the United States, the chief ally, is clearly subsidiary to the insistence on the return of troops, which is the subject, too, of the resolution's first sentence: 'The Australian Labor Party opposes the sending of Australian troops to Vietnam ...'. 
timing of conscript withdrawal, where Calwell's speech had said 'immediately we become the Government' and the May resolution 'without delay'.\textsuperscript{76} In May 'as soon as practicable' had been deliberately chosen for regulars' withdrawal to allow for some leeway for consultation with allies. Whitlam's use of a similar formula for conscripts' withdrawal - always the most urgent issue for most of his colleagues - along with his references to tours of duty ending in June 1967, suggests that Whitlam's 'most favoured interpretation', if he had made it explicit, would have been: conscripts out in June and no more to be sent; regulars to stay on, augmented by fresh regulars depending on the state of the war and the outcome of consultations with the Americans.\textsuperscript{77}

Whitlam's interpretation of the May resolution in the succeeding months to the election defeat of 26 November involved, first, broadening the issue by stressing civil aid, in order to deaden the impact of what seemed the most electorally unpopular aspect of Labor's policy - 'leaving the Americans in the lurch' by withdrawing the Vietnam force. The logistic problems of extracting only conscripts led to the emphasis on the date for the end of the tour of duty, when such a change would be less upsetting. Secondly, the obfuscation about the future presence of regulars served the same basic purpose of proving Labor's - and Whitlam's - pro-American credentials where Calwell's version risked being branded anti-American. In the second area Whitlam transgressed at least the spirit of the May resolution and probably its letter ('The Australian Labor Party opposes the sending of Australian troops to Vietnam ...'), according to the resolution; '[i]f ... the Labor

\textsuperscript{76} Age, 14 November 1966; DM, 17 November 1966.

\textsuperscript{77} Of course, had the Calwell version been implemented, it might have taken this long after the elections to arrange withdrawal of conscripts in any case. Though cf. note 64 above.
Government judges that there should be Australian troops in Vietnam, it would send regular troops', according to Whitlam.\(^78\)

The New South Wales Branch Conference of 1966 endorsed a Committee report which, in the view of the Branch Assistant Secretary, J.L. Armitage - who opposed its general tenor - in effect sanctioned a continuing role for Australia in the Vietnam conflict.\(^79\) The lengthy report endorsed 'the principles contained in' the Caucus resolution of May but the closest it came to taking a position on conscription was to 'point to the hypocrisy of the Holt Government ... in that they send troops, including conscripts, to Vietnam, warn against the danger of China to Australia's security and yet continue to trade with North Vietnam and China and supports [sic] the exclusion of Mainland China from recognised international discussions'. Elsewhere, the resolution suggested the need for 'a neutralist bloc facing the outer perimeter of mainland China', suggesting that protection against Australia's largest neighbour was a higher priority for this Branch than the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam. Like Whitlam's interpretations of the May resolution this resolution infringed the spirit of the May resolution, 'interpreting' out of existence even its few definite statements.\(^80\)

Others continued to interpret the May resolution to their own ends. The VCE had applauded the resolution but then advised its public relations

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\(^79\) J.L. Armitage, interview.

\(^80\) ALP (NSW Branch), *Official Report, 1966 Annual Conference*, 20-1. Oliver, as Branch President, would probably have taken part in the deliberations of a Committee whose Federal equivalent he chaired. He expressed his own views about China - and Vietnam - early in 1967: 'I believe it is quite wrong to bomb any people. But what are you going to do when people who want freedom and people who love freedom need your help to defend themselves'. Why have people got to be communised; why have they got to accept that form of life?': *Australian Worker*, 22 March 1967. See also above p.283.
consultants that the party's overall Vietnam policy would be played down during the campaign. Instead, it pointed to demographic figures showing the high proportion of young voters and of women, both groups to whom conscription was the key issue. Hence, the anti-conscription aspects of party policy should be emphasised. Cairns believed instead that the strength of the May resolution was its comprehensiveness and the possibilities it provided at crucial points for manoeuvre by a Labor Government. Calwell, he said later, went much further than was necessary. He was goaded into specific undertakings and he 'became more and more left, while Whitlam became more and more technical'. Whitlam, rather than Calwell, was Labor's chief television personality during the campaign and he concentrated on the need for civil aid in Vietnam and for better defence planning at home. He hardly mentioned conscription. Calwell's television advertisements, though fewer in number, stressed opposition to conscription, while insisting on Labor's loyalty to the American alliance as a bulwark against Asian Communism.

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81 Resolutions from the Branches were contained in Agenda, FX 27-31 July 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/42. The VCE interpretation was contained in Hartley's brief to a committee of public relations advisers, preparing a report on Labor's election prospects, based on an opinion survey (Australian, 10 October 1966).

82 J.F. Cairns, interview.

83 On Whitlam's prominence see CT, 25 November 1966 (J. Gaul) and material containing records of discussions between Wyndham and the ALP advertising agency, Hansen Rubensohn-McCann Erickson: Confidential Federal A.L.P. 28.9.66 Discussions with Messrs. Wyndham & Courtenay, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/60/Radio/T.V. A.B.C.: 'Documentaries to ... feature Whitlam (preferably on location) ...'. These notes also suggest that those present hoped to suggest that conscription was not too bad since only twelve per cent of those eligible were called up. The scripts, draft and final, show that the approach to conscription finally adopted was a little more positive than this (Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/60/Scripts). During the election campaign, apart from these advertisements, Whitlam tried to avoid the Vietnam issue. 'In Western Australia ... Whitlam concentrated on local issues such as the government's failure to press on with the Ord River project. He tried to stay away from the Vietnam issue as much as possible ...' (Laurie Oakes, 'The Years of Preparation', Anonymous, ed.,
In each case, if necessary, the May resolution could have been quoted as authority. The Caucus resolution was designed to be interpreted. It set out a comprehensive set of attitudes to the Vietnam War and Australian participation in it and virtually invited Labor decisionmakers and spokesmen to extract from it the parts which they preferred. Selective interpretation was not in itself contravention of the resolution although its effect could be the same. When did stressing the importance of the American alliance become support for a military commitment in association with the Americans? When did emphasis on civil aid and ignoring the issue of conscript soldiers become tacit support for conscripts remaining in Vietnam? On the other hand, did imposing unacceptable conditions on the Americans deny the spirit of the Australian-American alliance, despite protestations to the contrary? Did rejection of conscription for overseas service undercut Labor's alleged concern for better defence planning? Such questions could have been asked of any of the interpreters of the May resolution.

But a concern for consistency misses the point of processes like the making of Labor foreign policy during the latter months of 1966. March and Olsen and other observers of 'garbage can' decisionmaking processes in organisations have suggested that decisions are fundamentally ambiguous since, among other things, different participants see decisions differently.

Different participants emphasized different aspects of a specific decision - depending on which aspects were relevant for the respective areas of primary

83 (continued)
Whitlam and Frost, London, 1974, 25). Wheeldon remembers the resentment at a West Australian meeting when Whitlam chose to talk about sewerage rather than the war (J.M. Wheeldon, interview). Whitlam also avoided committing himself against the presence in Australia in January 1967 of Prime Minister Ky of South Vietnam. Calwell led demonstrations against Ky (Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 80-2).
interest .... For at least some (perhaps most) of the key groups the explicit decision seemed to be of little importance 'per se'. While interested in certain aspects of the decision, the relevance of the decision otherwise largely disappeared once the decision was made.84

The May decision registered the balance then obtaining between a number of influences on ALP policy - Calwell, Whitlam, other members of Caucus, State Branches, led by Victoria on one side and New South Wales on the other, media commentators, the Federal Liberal Government and its backbenchers, the changes in the international environment centred on Vietnam. The decision reconciled the conflicting influences by partly satisfying all of them; it was a compromise decision containing a number of parts. Once the decision was made the process of politicians and others saying what Labor policy was continued, with each spokesman - and critic - emphasising what he liked and glossing over what he disliked. This process would have occurred even if the May decision had not been made. That decision served two limited purposes. First, it could be shown to those who said 'Labor has no policy on this crucial issue'. Second, it allowed the many interpreters to justify their interpretations, if need be, by selective reference to an authoritative decision of the party. It curbed neither criticism nor internal anomalies. Critics extrapolated from parts of the resolution which they disliked in order to show that Labor was cowardly, anti-American or irresponsible. Party members continued to speak with different voices, and made little attempt to reconcile their differing views into an internally consistent defence and foreign policy.

84March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice .... 150.
1967 and After

WHITLAM AND VIETNAM

Ambiguity and the prevalence of interpretation are characteristics of the garbage can concept, the subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI. The study of the ALP, Vietnam and conscription during 1966 has provided evidence to support this hypothesis. Is there in the events of 1967 further support for it?

Federal Labor suffered one of its worst defeats in 1966. After the election, on 8 February 1967, Whitlam was elected Federal Leader of the party. Once elected Leader, Whitlam hoped for more scope to mould Labor's foreign policy into a more electorally acceptable, internally consistent and responsible form. The scene for this remoulding, he hoped, would be the Federal Conference to be held late in July 1967.

Meanwhile, Whitlam began to prepare the ground. In a Four Corners interview two weeks after becoming Leader, he suggested reasons for the 1966 election debacle.

Whitlam: I think our trouble was, putting it briefly, that we highlighted too few issues, and in too negative and narrow a way ....
Moore: Will the Labor Party advocate the recalling of Australian troops from Vietnam?
Whitlam: Now, the only way troops can come back now is if there's a settlement, if there's an armistice. Now, one would hope that by the time the next House of Representatives elections come around, there will certainly have been that. If there's not ....
Moore: Could I ask you what you think now? Are you in favour of Australian troops being in Vietnam now?

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85 Labor's share of first preference votes for the House of Representatives fell from 45.5 per cent to 40 per cent and the anti-Labor majority grew from twenty-two to forty-one seats: Malcolm Mackerras, Australian General Elections, Sydney, 1972, 220-1, 230-1.
Whitlam: They are now committed - there's no question about this, but what we'll ...
Moore: But you don't want to bring them back?
Whitlam: What we'll press to get is a settlement ...87

Troop withdrawal, Whitlam argued, was an academic question for Labor at that time.

Q. Mr. Whitlam, will you campaign for a return of Australian troops from Vietnam?
A. This is something that we could determine closer to the next elections. I would hope that the war there would be over within three years.88

Whitlam argued that changing circumstances in Vietnam might make irrelevant any specific policy and that any future Labor Government should have maximum room to manoeuvre. More importantly, he believed Labor's existing policy emphases provided a distorted and inadequate approach to Australia's environment. Withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam would not end war and suffering there nor assist the development of Asia. When Whitlam produced in 1968 a comprehensive statement of his own foreign policy preferences, the section headed 'Labor's Policy on Vietnam' occupied less than one-sixth of the text, which was crowded instead with suggestions about international aid schemes and a non-military role for Australia in Asia. Under the heading 'The Distraction of Vietnam', Whitlam wrote: 'The decade of development and all its hopes are the most serious casualty of the war in Vietnam. Tens of thousands have died in Vietnam; millions are dying and millions unborn may die because of our failures in development in this decade.'89

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89 E.G. Whitlam, Beyond Vietnam, Melbourne, 1968, 40. This pamphlet also includes references to the need for flexibility in foreign policy resolutions (3, 13, 20).
Was Whitlam's redefinition of the Vietnam issue in these terms mere 'debating club stuff' to distract attention from Labor's divisions over withdrawal?\textsuperscript{90} 'It made political sense', writes Whitlam's sympathetic biographer, 'while the Vietnam controversy remained an albatross around the neck of the Labor Party, to play down foreign affairs as a political issue, and Whitlam disciplined himself to do so'.\textsuperscript{91} The 1966 election result had shown, Whitlam believed, the dangers of going out on a limb unnecessarily in support of an electorally unpopular – and logically insupportable – policy.

The Liberals were always throwing dead cats into the ring for Labor to jump on. In March 1966 it was conscription for overseas service and Arthur seized on it. But I wasn't going to play the game by their rules or stick within their parameters.\textsuperscript{92}

The proportions of \textit{Beyond Vietnam} devoted to various aspects of foreign and defence policy reflected Whitlam's success in the first eighteen months of his Leadership in changing the emphases of Labor's policy. This shift of emphases reflected not only changes in the environment but also changes in the locus of foreign policymaking in the

\textsuperscript{90} This was the label given and the conclusion drawn by J.M. Wheeldon (interview).

\textsuperscript{91} Oakes, Whitlam PM, 207. See also: Australian, 9 May, Examiner, 9 May 1967 (J. Allsopp: 'Mr Whitlam is gradually removing foreign affairs from the list of Labour's vulnerable points ...'); Michelle Grattan, 'The Australian Labor Party', Henry Mayer & Helen Nelson, ed., Australian Politics: A Third Reader, Melbourne, 1973, 389 ('Whitlam had never been happy with Vietnam as an electoral issue ...'). J.L. Armitage, J.B. Keeffe, and A.G. Poyser all supported this conclusion (interviews).

\textsuperscript{92} E.G. Whitlam, interview. Note also Oliver's contemporary comment: 'Mr. Holt invited us to take him on on Vietnam, and our leader did take him on on Vietnam and your great social programme of progress was forgotten. You got the results and you got slaughtered ...' (Australian Worker, 22 March 1967). Finally, see Defence minister Fairhall's reply to Calwell's challenge to fight the Kooyong by-election and the Federal election on the issue of conscripts for Vietnam: 'We will be delighted to see the Labor Party once again tilt at a windmill' (CPD H. of R. 50, 15 March 1966, 245).
ALP. Some of these changes built on earlier developments. First, given that under Calwell politicians already enjoyed a fairly independent role in foreign and defence policy, more of this independent role devolved on the two leaders, Whitlam and Barnard. Secondly, this devolution was accompanied by the broadening of policy concerns already mentioned. Thirdly, Whitlam's attempts to rewrite policy on Vietnam were resisted by Federal bodies more than had been the case under Calwell, whose desires on this issue closely approximated those of the Federal Executive majority. Fourthly, conflict was largely avoided by compromise decisions capable of varying interpretation. Whitlam could still 'interpret' Vietnam policy fairly much as he liked because it was reasonably flexibly formulated. So could those who resisted him. These points will be taken up in turn.

First, the devolution of responsibility to Whitlam and Barnard. Writing of this period, Kim C. Beazley, son of a Caucus member, detects 'a desire in the F.P.L.P. to leave Whitlam free to deal with the foreign policy matters which had been electorally damaging to the Party'. My own Caucus interviewees recognised the size of the defeat in 1966 and sympathised with Whitlam's desire to 'defuse' the Vietnam issue. Whitlam himself showed his intention to oversee foreign and defence policy by appointing himself shadow spokesman on foreign affairs and allocating defence to Barnard. Caucus supported Whitlam. When Wheeldon moved on 1 March 1967 that the Caucus Executive provide Caucus with a

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recommendation defining party policy on Australian troops in Vietnam, Whitlam was confident enough of his own support to push the matter to a vote and defeat with only a handful of dissenting voices. The vote was seen as an endorsement of his recent interpretations of policy. Then, in April 1967, Caucus elected to its Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee a solid majority of members who would have been expected to support Whitlam's interpretations or, at least, oppose perpetuation of Calwell's. Then, soon after, Caucus voted thirty-six to twenty-two to end its sixteen year boycott of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, a symbol of bipartisanship in foreign policy. Labor's criticism of the Committee's methods and powerlessness could not disguise the search for a 'responsible' image that this act indicated. Finally, when university students' attempts to send money to the Vietnamese National Liberation Front were met in August 1967 with the Defence Forces Protection Bill, Caucus members confirmed their respectability by

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95 Australian, 2 March 1967; Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 189, referring to FPLP Minutes, 1 March 1967; Mercury, 2 March 1967; SMH, 2, 3 March 1967; West Australian, 4 March 1967. Bryant, who supported Wheeldon in Caucus, had written to Caucus members criticising Whitlam's Four Corners broadcast (DT, 1 March 1967). 96 SMH, 7 April 1967. Elected: Beazley (appointed Chairman), Senators Drury and Willesee, R. Davies, Cross, Cairns, Bryant, Senator Mulvihill, polling votes in that order. Appointed by Caucus Executive: Barnard. Of those elected only Cairns and Bryant were identified as opponents of the Whitlam-Barnard line and others of this ilk (Uren, Keeffe, Cavanagh, O'Byrne and James) failed to be elected. None of these five losers had been members of the equivalent Committees in the previous Parliament. Comparing the Committee lists over the two Parliaments the factional balance alters very little; the point of the April 1967 election is that it shows Whitlam's obvious attempts to change the line of policy emphasis did not lead to a reaction. Lists: Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 348. 97 Australian, 21 April 1967; CT, SMH, 12, 20-22 April, 4, 11 May 1967. Labor nominees were Drury, Mulvihill, Willesee, Barnard, Beazley, Cross, Costa, Davies. Bryant, Uren and others boycotted the nominations but observers suggested they would have suffered the same failure as in the elections for the Caucus committee anyway.
deploring this action and supporting the Bill, merely criticising the governnent for over-reacting.\(^98\)

Secondly, the shift to Whitlam and Barnard also meant a shift to a broader view of policy, to lengthy statements of desirable futures rather than ad hoc reactions to crises, to comprehensive plans which recognised realities rather than slogans which ignored them. To Whitlam's Beyond Vietnam can be added the 1969 pamphlet bearing Barnard's name, Australian Defence - Policy and Programmes.\(^99\) Calwell had enjoyed considerable independence in foreign and defence policy but he exercised it in narrow ways. When Caucus came to rely on Whitlam and Barnard - and their staffs\(^100\) - it facilitated a more rounded foreign and defence policy.

\(^98\) Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 72-6; CPD H. of R. 56, 31 August 1967, 673-80 (Whitlam), 699-700 (Connor), 708 (Hayden). From the beginning Calwell had said Labor would do nothing to endanger Australian troops in the field and in 1966 had dissociated Labor from union boycotts on Vietnam supply ships. Whitlam confirmed the line on supply ships when the issue arose again early in 1967 (Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 84-5; CPD H. of R. 46, 4 May 1965, 11 (Calwell); CT, 19 May 1966 (Calwell).

\(^99\) L.H. Barnard, Australian Defence - Policy and Programmes, Melbourne, 1969. Written by C.J. Lloyd, Barnard's private secretary (C.J. Lloyd, interview). For the early development of Whitlam's views on foreign policy see Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 56-8; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 111-14. Whitlam and Barnard were not alone. Cairns, too, had a comprehensive approach to foreign policy, with ideas on defence reorganisation similar to those provided for Barnard; J.F. Cairns, Economics and Foreign Policy, Melbourne, 1966; 'Foreign Policy after Vietnam', Anonymous, ed., The Asian Revolution and Australia, Sydney, 1969, 175-89, especially 183 on defence matters; Living with Asia, Melbourne, 1965, especially 100-3 on defence. Finally, we have remarked in the text on the broad view taken by Beazley, another foreign policy specialist, in his Parliamentary speeches on the subject.

\(^100\) Cf. Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 47, based on an interview with C.J. Lloyd of Barnard's staff: 'A major preoccupation of the staff [Whitlam's, Barnard's and later Willesee's] was devising policies which, whilst not offending electoral opinion - perceived as highly favourable to the American alliance - at the same time attempted a justification of such policies within a traditional framework of Party principles'.
But Whitlam and Barnard also sought a Vietnam policy different from that espoused by Calwell in 1966. Did they find it? The Federal Executive had left foreign policy largely to Calwell and his Caucus colleagues during 1966. Much of its time—and that of the two Special Conferences during early 1966—was occupied with other matters, state aid and related issues, party reform and other internal matters. The States sent up items on foreign affairs but the Federal bodies passed over them. Thus a substantial motion from Chamberlain and Hartley at the February meeting was superseded by an amendment to refer the matter to the Federal Leader 'with a view to his making a statement along the lines proposed'. Then, at the July 1966 meeting, although the public debate over Vietnam was at its height, the Executive referred to Caucus nine State Branch items regarding the war and conscription. Did this tendency to avoid discussion arise from the nature of the issues involved, from trust in Calwell, from lack of interest or simply from lack of time? 'Time for decision activity is a scarce resource', write March and Olsen. 'Potential participants face a continuous and heterogeneous stream of demands for their attention.' They move from choice to choice depending on the competing claims upon their attention. But participation depends also on interest in a subject or on a belief that one's participation can make a difference. March and Olsen suggest that participants will mostly be those ' (a) for whom the outcome makes a difference, (b) who anticipate that their attention will make a

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102 FX 27-31 July 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40, 42. Note also Oliver early in 1967: the Vietnam question 'has never been an issue discussed by any A.L.P. Conference at which I have attended in recent years' (Australian Worker, 22 March 1967). Compared to the deep and lengthy discussions on, say, state aid, this was true and it applied to the Executive during 1966 as well.
103 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 45-7.
difference'. If Executive members during 1966 did place a high value on particular outcomes in Labor's internal foreign policy discussions, a majority of them also believed that Calwell, the most authoritative 'interpreter' of party policy, broadly agreed with them in this area. They did not see that their intervention would make a difference to the policies being put forward in Labor's name by Calwell. What would happen in 1967, when the Executive had less competing demands on its time and when there was a greater gap between the views of the Executive majority and the new Leader on foreign policy? An answer to this question may also show how deep was the interest in foreign and defence policy among Executive members.

The recently retired Federal Leader, Arthur Calwell, wrote to Hartley on 20 February 1967, complaining of an Australian Workers' Union convention resolution condemning conscription alone, leaving the implication that volunteers for Vietnam might be acceptable.

This issue [warned Calwell] will have to be watched very closely and carefully, because I would not be surprised if certain reactionary elements in our Party were not already trying to lay the ground for some new look version of what was, after all, a policy that was unanimously supported by the Federal Conference.

Given the context of his letter, Calwell probably referred to Oliver and the AWU. However, within two weeks Hartley himself was writing about

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104 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 46.
105 Calwell to Hartley, 20 February 1967, Vic. Rec., 1966, 1967, 1968 Members Personal A to C. The AWU Australian convention adopted by thirty-two votes to six a New South Wales amendment to a South Australian motion. Oliver supported the New South Wales amendment, saying it had never been ALP policy to do all the things set out in the South Australian motion (a bombing halt, withdrawing conscripts, total withdrawal as soon as possible) (Australian Worker, 22 March 1967). Yet both the motion and the amendment claimed to be supporting ALP policy, showing yet again the capacity of the May resolution for interpretation.
Whitlam's early foreign policy statements. 'While it could not be fairly said that he [Whitlam] has as yet somersaulted on Vietnam policy, I think that there is a very considerable danger that such a somersault will be attempted in the near future'. By April, Whitlam's plans to revise policy were well under way. Wyndham wrote advising him:

Last night we discussed whether or not it was a Conference decision which determined our policy of withdrawing troops from Vietnam. You will recall that the 1965 Conference adopted a resolution applauding the stand taken by the F.P.L.P. in opposing the sending of troops to Vietnam 'in accordance with the principles stated by [Calwell]' in his speech of 4th May, 1965. In that speech A.A.C. said: 'Our minds and reason cannot support those who have made the decision to send you to this war, and we shall do our best to have that decision reversed'. Does not the question hinge on the interpretation of the phrase underlined?

Both Whitlam and Wyndham knew that the succession of decisions by Conference and Caucus over nearly two years had provided room for manoeuvre, but often manoeuvre with some difficulty. Now Whitlam hoped to establish by a new Conference decision a new, more congenial policy.

THE 1967 FEDERAL CONFERENCE

The Federal Conference was to meet late in July 1967. Late in May, Barnard, visiting South Vietnam, said that, in view of the clear evidence

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106 Hartley to D. MacSween, 3 March 1967, Vic. Rec., Unions A–S, S continued 1967. MacSween, Secretary of the Clothing Trades Union and a leader of the Trade Unionists' Defence Committee, had urged the Federal Executive to announce that ALP policy did not mean leaving Australian troops in Vietnam until after a settlement, as Whitlam seemed to imply. Keeffe spoke to Hartley by telephone and told MacSween that, although action in Caucus had failed (above note 95) 'you may be assured that our policies on Vietnam will be closely watched' (Telegram MacSween to Hartley, 1 March 1967; MacSween to Hartley, 3 April 1967, Vic. Rec., Unions A–S, S continued 1967).

of a Northern invasion, 'the inevitable influence of the United States in this area' and the certain British withdrawal east of Suez, Labor might need to take 'a hard look at its defence and foreign policies'.

While Barnard insisted he referred to Labor's South East Asian policy as a whole, his remarks provoked much discussion inside and outside the party. Calwell and Chamberlain sprang to defend the radical line of May 1966, which, said Calwell, 'is still valid and needs no change'. (Barnard could have said that he was also defending the May resolution, as he interpreted it.) Chamberlain said, if there was to be a reassessment of policy it should produce 'a more determined attitude ... a policy which expresses complete opposition to the presence of any foreign troops in Vietnam'.

Repyling to Calwell and Chamberlain, Whitlam quoted a telecast by Calwell on 23 February 1966, before the conscripts decision had drastically altered the issue for the then Leader, where Calwell said Labor did not believe in unilateral troop withdrawal by Australia or anyone else on either side.

The defence and diplomatic shortcomings of the Holt Government sent Australian conscripts to Vietnam. The rancorous ramblings of men like Mr Chamberlain have kept them there. The Australian Government should be striving for

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108 Australian, 2 June 1967; CT, 27 May, 8 June 1967; Mercury, 10 June 1967; SMH, 27 May, 8 June 1967.

109 Calwell and other Victorians: Age, Australian, 29 May 1967; Calwell to Hartley, 31 May 1967, Hartley to Calwell, 7 June 1967, Vic. Rec., 1966, 1967, 1968 Members Personal A to C; SMH, 29 May, 16 June 1967; VCE 30 June 1967, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142. Chamberlain: SMH, West Australian, 3 June 1967. Ten years later Chamberlain remembered that he had written to Barnard before making the public criticism. He also remembered his own view at the time: 'Oh well the Party attitude was my attitude, one of complete opposition to our troops being in Vietnam, and that they should be brought out immediately' (F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcripts, 3: 1/26-27). Again, policy was interpreted according to individual preference.
an armistice and amnesty in Vietnam. While I lead it, the A.L.P. will strive for those objectives.110

But there were men of narrow vision on the other side of the ALP, too. Whitlam sought also to dampen the anti-Communist fires in New South Wales. Oliver, President of this Branch, had read Mao on the extent of the old Chinese Empire and modern China's right to a sphere of influence at least as large. Oliver thus could justify the Vietnam intervention as holding the line against Communism and as insurance on the United States alliance. While he opposed conscription for overseas service, he believed that 'the defence of Australia might be anywhere'.111 As Branch President, Oliver could attend all New South Wales ALP Committees and he took special interest in that on Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Since the Committee's report was invariably adopted by the Conference, any influence Oliver exerted on the Committee was reflected in the New South Wales foreign and defence policy items sent to the Federal party.

110 Australian, SMH, 9 June 1967. My emphasis. Barnard, too, while especially stressing the need to end bombing and to reduce the scale of the war, echoed Whitlam's call for negotiations and increased civil aid. Labor 'was opposed to the sending of Australian troops. The policy had been and still was that conscripts should not be sent' (Barnard, West Australian, 24 June 1967. My emphasis). The careful stress on past and future seems important: Labor opposed the original expeditionary force; it still opposed sending conscripts to be part of it, but not its presence there? In Bangkok, Barnard had said Labor 'continued to oppose the sending of Australian troops to Vietnam' (Age, 22 May 1967). Adding 'and presence in' before 'Vietnam' would have strengthened the statement. Finally, on the intended application of Barnard's remarks about a 'hard look', note the slip in Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 93: 'Returning from a tour of South Vietnam, Barnard stated that Labor policy on troop withdrawal should be reviewed' (my emphasis). Publicly, Barnard denied he meant this narrow focus but private conversations at the time probably influenced Freudenberg's recollection.

111 C.T. Oliver, interview. See also: ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report of Proceedings, 1964 Annual Conference, 6; 1966 Annual Conference, 7. Note also the views of Oliver's union journal that Labor's defeat in 1966 could be attributed to the voters' reaction to the pro-Communist tinge of a section of the ALP or their refusal 'to sanction the endangering of our strong alliance with America; they could not support the Labor Party's unrealistic and dangerous policy of isolationism' (Australian Worker, 30 November 1966).
Nevertheless, those in New South Wales who supported Whitlam's approach to the Vietnam issue were able in 1967, with his support, to move the Branch closer to his view, ending the last remnants of support for the war in party resolutions. The Assistant Secretary of the Branch, J.L. Armitage, piloted through the New South Wales Committee and Conference a policy whose essential parts were extracts from Whitlam's Parliamentary speeches, especially that of 28 February 1967:

How can we assist in stopping the war and opening negotiations as soon as possible? We should never have made the commitment in the form the Government made it. The Labor Party opposed that commitment. We particularly oppose the use of conscription to make up the numbers in the expeditionary force .... It is the government's responsibility to strive to end the fighting so that all foreign troops can be withdrawn.112

Whitlam had seen the draft report before its presentation and made only minor suggestions. It may be taken therefore as a summary of his preferred policy of early to mid 1967. Its keynote, says Armitage, was gradualism, a steady move toward withdrawal. Beside endorsing Whitlam's remarks, which implied that total withdrawal of Australian troops would not occur until the fighting ended, the report said that 'an Australian Labor Government would instruct R.A.A.F. and R.A.N. forces not to take part in any bombing or shelling of North Vietnam, and would inform its Allies that no more National Servicemen would be sent to Vietnam'. This, Armitage suggests, was as far as the report could go and still get through a New South Wales Conference where views like Oliver's were influential. Anything more than the Whitlam formula on troop withdrawal would not have been accepted. The outcome was not greatly dissimilar to Oliver's views,

for he disliked conscription and had admitted bombing was unpleasant.
But the difference was that the 1965 and 1966 Branch statements had
eschewed virtually all specific statements. The 1967 version made
specific statements in two areas, which Oliver perhaps could have
accepted, and made a less specific statement about troop withdrawal.
The question remained whether the Federal Conference would adopt it or
whether Whitlam would have to continue to interpret a policy which was
not really what he wanted.

The Federal Executive Foreign Policy Committee in 1967 comprised
Oliver (Chairman), Cairns, Beazley, Uren, Wheeldon, Cohen, Mulvihill,
Cavanagh and Whitlam with Wyndham as Secretary. It thus contained five
members (Cairns, Uren, Wheeldon, Cohen and Cavanagh) who had tended to
follow closely the Calwell line on foreign policy. But the Committee
contained a range of views and alliances. Mulvihill had had close
contacts with Whitlam in foreign policy matters and Beazley was probably
closer in his views to Whitlam than to anyone else on the Committee. In
general, Oliver said his idea as Chairman was to take a line from
Beazley and one from Cairns on the other side and aim for something in
between which would get unanimous support. Because of the Committee's
diversity, Oliver probably realised a unanimous decision would not be
obtained easily. As early as 24 February, when Whitlam had already
shown his desire for a new direction, Wyndham wrote to Oliver, the

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113 Wheeldon possibly was the most radical. He told the author he
favoured immediate withdrawal, presumably even without consultation. He
believed his views were more extreme than, say, Uren's (interview).
114 Oliver remembers that he used to rely on Beazley for a balanced view.
He was more 'realistic' than Whitlam though Whitlam made important
contributions, as did Wheeldon (C.T. Oliver, interview). Uren also
remembered that Cairns and Beazley, rather than Whitlam, played key
roles in drafting Committee recommendations (interview).
Committee Chairman, asking when a meeting might be arranged. 'We cannot put it off forever, and I am sure pressure will call for a meeting. Perhaps you would like to discuss it with Gough.'\textsuperscript{115} Oliver possibly hoped that stalling would give Whitlam time to prepare the ground, by public speeches and private lobbying, for a change in policy. While Oliver would not have been completely pleased with Whitlam's version, he certainly preferred it to Calwell's. The delay gave Whitlam three months' grace.\textsuperscript{116}

When the Foreign Affairs Committee eventually met on 26 May, observers and members detected in its deliberations a moderation and willingness to compromise which augured well both for a revision of policy in the direction favoured by Whitlam and Barnard and for party satisfaction with such a revision. The recommendations on Vietnam were framed to allow a Labor Government maximum freedom to manoeuvre, while satisfying those who wanted a radical and distinctive approach. The draft policy, wrote a journalist who saw a leaked copy, 'can mean all things to all points of view. It simply depends on individual interpretation of the fine print.'\textsuperscript{117} But while admitting that the draft


\textsuperscript{116} Delay might have had other reasons. Committees often did not meet until the last weeks before a Conference, especially when there was little to discuss. But it seems unlikely in the circumstances that this Committee was surrounded by apathy.

\textsuperscript{117} Alan Ramsey, Australian, 19 June 1967. Ramsey's comments were based on the Minutes of the first meeting including the draft statement on Vietnam to be circulated to Committee members for consideration at the next meeting. This differed in some respects from the version which went to Conference, although its general tenor was similar. For other press comments arising out of this leaked document, see: Australian, 17 June 1967; Bulletin, 5 August 1967; CT, 22 June 1967; Mercury,
gave leeway to both sides, resisters of the Whitlam approach feared that
the new formulation too easily relieved a future Labor Government of the
need to take immediate positive action. Uren believed Cairns compromised
too much while Wheeldon felt inclined to wash his hands of a Committee
which so prevaricated. But, neither on the Committee nor at the Federal
Executive could the resisters stiffen the document. 118

What did the Committee present to the Federal Conference? The
crucial part was the policy declaration headed 'Vietnam'. Its key
sentences ran:

The Labor Party is opposed to the continuation of the war in Vietnam, and to Australian participation
in it. The Party will work to end the war and to end Australian participation in it .... With the
cessation of bombing of the north, with an end to the use of horror weapons which must alienate the
people of Vietnam, and with recognition of those actually involved in the conflict as parties to
negotiations Labor believes an atmosphere could develop in which conferences to end the war could
take place.

While this statement had a tenuous link with Calwell's 'do our best
to reverse' clause of 1965 and while it set out ways in which the war's
conduct should be changed to lead to negotiations, it made no attempt to

117 (continued)
20 June 1967; SMH, 17, 19 June 1967. For the original, see: Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/126/68. It was suggested the draft had been leaked to allow
the resisters to organise, but it is just as plausible to suggest the other side benefited by building up press support for the new line - or at least for the increased realism or flexibility. The leak may have encouraged the Victorian Branch Conference on 12 June, on Calwell's
motion, to adopt a radical motion on Vietnam which included the significant lines that Labor should clearly state its troop withdrawal policy and should not emphasise the technicalities of withdrawal 'to such an extent that it casts doubt ... as to our intentions': ALP, Official Reports, Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 1967 and Commonwealth
Conference, 1969, 74.

118 The Executive adjourned to discuss the report informally, then passed
it to the Conference without amendment: Advertiser, 28 July 1967; Age,
28, 29 July 1967; Australian, 29 July 1967; CT, 30 July 1967; DT,
28 July 1967; FX 26–29 July 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/44; T. Uren,
J.M. Wheeldon, interviews.
link changes in the conduct of the war to Australia's future participation. Ramsey had commented that the earlier draft's phrasing 'the war ... should be brought to an end so that Australian and other troops can be withdrawn' (my emphasis) clearly inferred troops would remain until the war ended. This connection was obscured somewhat in the final version but the removal in the final version also of this passing reference to withdrawal underlined the Committee's wariness about following the Calwell line and its inclination to seek decisions which all viewpoints in the party could accept and, especially, within which Labor Governments could manoeuvre.

The statement said much about the war but little about Australia's participation in it. It claimed that no ANZUS or SEATO obligations were involved, so those inclined could invoke Labor's plank about not committing forces overseas unless subject to clear and public treaties. Others could reply that opposition to the commitment in Vietnam had never been questioned in the ALP; the problem was how to disengage. On this the statement was open-ended. Whitlam's views clearly influenced the Committee. The section in the first draft on ending the war before withdrawing Australian troops was almost identical to his House speech of 28 February. The first draft reflected Whitlam's desire to shift the focus from Labor's vulnerable areas to civil aid programmes and the logistical aspects of troop withdrawal. Even the final draft enshrined Whitlam's goal of flexibility for governments to manoeuvre. The whole Committee process reflected Whitlam's attempt to avoid the electorally disastrous consequences of Calwell's line by changing the issue to one of ending the war. If pressed, Whitlam admitted that a Labor Government would send no more conscripts to Vietnam. But it was politically even safer to be 'against war'. That Whitlam's new line on Vietnam came to
be encased in a more comprehensive, intellectually consistent foreign and defence policy was far less significant in the short term than that it lacked the electorally offensive appearance of the Calwell formulation of 1966.

What was the reaction of Conference? Oliver was to move for the adoption of the report section by section. He remembers Cairns approaching him before the report came on to say his position had changed. This was much to Oliver's chagrin, since Cairns had seemed content with the formulation in the Committee and had helped produce the desired unanimous decision. But those who believed the Committee formulation was not strong enough had since persuaded Cairns to help them strengthen it from the floor of the Conference. Closely involved in drafting the Committee recommendation, Cairns now drafted an amendment to it. Neil Batt of Tasmania moved the amendment, seconded by Brown and supported by Cairns.119

119 ALP, Official Reports, Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 1967 and Commonwealth Conference, 1969, 72; Australian, 19 June 1967; Fact, 11 August 1967; C.T. Oliver, interview. Colbourne also criticised Cairns, saying he should have produced a minority report expressing his real feelings. Some press reports referred to Cairns as the architect of the Committee report, though Lloyd, a close observer, says Cohen was crucial, Dixson refers to Uren and Cairns himself remembers Beazley and Whitlam brought drafts to the Committee. Cairns referred publicly to the Committee draft before the debate without expressing opposition to it. 'The aim', he said, 'is to change [Australia's] role from one of increasing military involvement to one of even more increasing trade aid and cultural associations with a reduction of the military involvement' (Herald, 31 July 1967). There is evidence that the Victorian Branch and other party radicals, in Hartley's words, 'saw red' when they knew the contents of the Committee report and made sure that Cairns became a Victorian delegate to the Conference (ostensibly due to Brebner's illness) to ensure the passage of the amendment. Cairns had written most of the Victorian Branch Federal Conference item, which was much closer to the Batt amendment than to the Committee recommendation. References to a bombing halt, recognition of the NLF and conversion to a holding operation had also appeared in the May 1966 Caucus resolution but in a less definite context than in the Batt amendment (Advertiser, 3 August 1967; Age, 29 July, 3 August 1967; Australian, 3 August 1967; K.E. Beazley, W.W.C. Brown, J.F. Cairns, interviews; CT, 3 August 1967; Miriam Dixson, draft article, c. April 1968, Vic. Rec., Fabian Society, Country Party, DLP, Consumers' Protection Council, Internal Controversy Replies 1966-1968; W.H. Hartley, part of reply to Dixson, c. April 1968, Vic. Rec., Cent. Exec. 1965-1968; W.H. Hartley, interview; Herald, 29 July 1967; C.J. Lloyd, interview; VCE 28 July 1967, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142).
The amendment was in the form of an addition to the Committee recommendation. 'T[he A.L.P.'], it ran,

seeks primarily to bring the war to a conclusion.
To do so, the A.L.P. on achieving office, will submit to our allies that they should immediately
(a) cease bombing North Vietnam
(b) recognise the National Liberation Front as a principal party to negotiations
(c) transform operations in South Vietnam into holding operations ....
Should our allies fail to take this action, the Australian Government would then consider that it had no alternative other than to withdraw our armed forces ....

Another amendment, from Chamberlain, called for the unconditional withdrawal of all Australian troops and supported the Geneva accord for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. After only three speakers beside the movers and seconders the time for debate expired, the Batt amendment was put and carried, the Chamberlain amendment put and lost and the Committee recommendation was adopted with the addition of the Batt amendment.120

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The intention of the Batt amendment seems to have been to add positive undertakings to the vague Committee declaration, printed as one resolution the two make an untidy document. References in the amendment to the lack of Australian obligations in Vietnam under ANZUS, SEATO or the United Nations, to the lack of a threat from China and to the need for civil aid overlap parts of the recommendation, making the complete document repetitive and loose. The first two of the amendment's conditions concerning the presence or withdrawal of Australian troops appear also in the recommendation, but as preconditions

to creating 'an atmosphere ... in which conferences to end the war can take place'. There was no attempt to resolve this potential contradiction. 121

More importantly, however, the complete resolution, like the Calwell speech of May 1965 and the Caucus resolution of May 1966, contained shades of emphasis and scope for interpretation which was to be fully exploited in the coming months. Interpretation commenced almost immediately, inside and outside the party. Cairns, who had seen the decisionmaking process from both 'sides' of the fence believed the new policy had three main essentials: that the war was wrong and unnecessary, that it should be ended and that Labor should fully support the search for negotiations. This was the Cairns of the Foreign Affairs Committee speaking. But Cairns' Victorian colleague, Bill Brown, believed the existing policy had been strengthened, since an ALP Government would not allow troops to remain in Vietnam. 122 Hartley tried to link an end to the war with the removal of troops, but in a rather different way from that earlier attempted by Whitlam:

121 Neither the Conference report nor the successful amendment actually say the amendment is an addition but the press reports show it as such, as does ALP, Platform, Constitution and Rules as approved by the 27th Commonwealth Conference, Adelaide, 1967, 32-3. However, the unsuccessful amendment, Chamberlain's, exactly duplicated in its first sentence the first sentence of the Committee recommendation, suggesting that this amendment, at least, was to substitute, rather than add. Of course, substituting, rather than adding, would have lacked majority support.

122 Age, 14 August 1967. Later comments by Cairns also stressed the need to end the war, to influence the Americans to negotiations to this end and only then to seek withdrawal of Australian troops. 'No one says we should immediately withdraw' - but nor did Cairns stress the three Adelaide conditions (Australian, 12 September 1967; J.F. Cairns, 'Foreign Policy after Vietnam', 183; SMH, 2 February 1968). Cairns' heart may not have been in such remarks. He told the author that about 1967 he began to feel the ALP could do little worthwhile on controversial issues like Vietnam. He moved outside the ALP on this issue and held one thousand public meetings in three years (J.F. Cairns, interview).
Basically, the new policy underpends [sic] the 'troops out' position which we took beforehand and also attaches a set of meaningful foreign policy objectives to that statement. It cannot be argued other than to accept that, if the conditions contained in A.L.P. policy were fulfilled, the war would be at an end.123

The three conditions - a bombing halt, recognition of the NLF, conversion to holding operations - had all appeared in the May 1966 Caucus resolution as preconditions to ending the war. Now they appeared also as conditions for the continuing presence of Australian troops. They were parts of the May resolution that Calwell had not stressed in the election campaign. Yet participants and party observers were acutely aware of the events of 1966. Even Armitage, then New South Wales Assistant Secretary, regarded the new policy as merely less extravagantly expressed than the Calwell line.124 Keeffe believed the main concern had been to distinguish Labor from Government policy, to make clear that Labor opposed the war, but to avoid losing votes by seeming anti-American, especially through imposing impossible conditions on the presence of Australian troops in Vietnam.125 The Western Sun, edited by Chamberlain, was less circumspect, printing the Batt amendment, including the conditions, ahead of the Committee recommendation and printing the Chamberlain amendment without making clear that it had failed.126 Calwell believed, on the other hand, that the conditions were of only academic interest since the Americans would withdraw within two years anyway - or escalate the conflict into a nuclear war. The policy showed, Calwell

124 J.L. Armitage, interview.
125 J.B. Keeffe, interview.
126 Western Sun, August 1967, 1, 2.
believed, 'no weakening of Labor opposition to the continuation of the war and Australia's participation in it'.

Outsiders and more recent observers tended to stress the new aspects of the resolution rather than its elements of continuity. There was, according to Albinski, 'some dilution of established practice and policy, but less than Whitlam had sought' during his pre-Conference manoeuvres'. The conditions, according to Millar, 'represent a substantial move away from Labor's previous policy'. But these observers and some of the participants when reminiscing, point also to the flexibility of a resolution which, rather than trying to choose between two alternative approaches to the Vietnam issue, adopted both. 'It was still too inflexible a policy for Whitlam's liking', writes Oakes, 'but it was one he could live with'. He could live with it simply because he could interpret it as he preferred while occasionally cocking an anxious eye at those whose interpretations differed. 'Throughout the rest of the year [1967], the leader emphasized this decision's novelty, and the ALP traditionalists its continuity with the policy of Mr Calwell's days of leadership.'

Whitlam continued to concentrate on the need to end the war and when pressed on what Labor would do in office, he emphasised, in the words of one young critic, 'the conditions rather than the withdrawal'.

128 Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 93; T.B. Millar, Australia's Foreign Policy, Sydney, 1968, 248-9.
129 Oakes, Whitlam PM, 168.
He was far less willing to make the connection between failure to fulfil these conditions (bombing halt, NLF at negotiations, holding operation) and troop withdrawal than were Barnard and others.\(^{132}\) During the 1967 Senate campaign Whitlam's main planks were domestic rather than to do with Vietnam. The latter was not ignored, but Whitlam tried to turn the argument into one about the Government's militarism rather than Labor's policy. He stressed Labor's loyalty to the American alliance and its willingness to influence America to negotiate. He used the Adelaide conditions as ways in which the war's conduct might be changed and the war ended rather than as conditions for withdrawal. In other words, he stressed the first, general part of the Adelaide declaration, the part he preferred, rather than the second, restrictive part. He agreed the war was 'the most agonising of all the problems we face' but he said nothing at all about withdrawal of Australian troops. That was 'not relevant to this election', where Labor could not win office.\(^{133}\)

\(^{132}\) Age, 11 September 1967 (A.D. Fraser); CPD H. of R. 56, 17, 31 August 1967, 246, 684 (Barnard); 57, 2 November 1967, 2689-90 (Barnard), 2703-4 (M.D. Cross). DT, 23 November 1967 (Daly urges Whitlam in Caucus to tell people where Labor stood and not to be evasive).

\(^{133}\) E.G. Whitlam, Opening Address, 1967 Senate Election (Blacktown address), 7-9; (media address), 6-8. Original emphasis. For short summaries of this election campaign: Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 94-5; Robert Cooksey, 'Foreign Policy Review, October-December, 1967', AQ, 40, 2 (June 1968), 108; Colin A. Hughes, 'Australian Political Chronicle: September-December 1967 ...', 104. Other elements of the party, notably the VCE, were less circumspect than Whitlam. The VCE organised a 'Vietnam mobilisation' (Fact, 6 September, 3 November 1967) and Whitlam complained that the initial VCE arrangements for his Victorian campaign concentrated upon Vietnam as a campaign issue (Whitlam to Hartley, 20 September 1967, Vic. Rec., loose in bundle of Minutes, VCEO meetings 1967). In Parliament on the eve of the election, Whitlam had been reluctant to take up the challenge to debate the Government decision to increase the Australian force in Vietnam. He produced a press statement critical of the Liberals for intensifying a war to which they saw no end, but he persuaded Caucus not to oppose the troop increase as such (Australian, 18, 19 October 1967; C-M, 21 October 1967; CPD H. of R. 57, 17, 18 October 1967, 1855-8, 1938-40; DT, 19 October 1967; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 168-9; SMH, 18 October 1967). For press remarks on Labor's campaign evasiveness on Vietnam policy: Age, 23, 27 November 1967; Australian, 24, 27 November 1967; CT, 24, 27 November 1967; DT, 19 November 1967.
'As you feared', wrote Hartley to Calwell, 'during the Senate campaign we suffered further attempts to qualify our Vietnam policy out of existence'.\(^{134}\) Despite such comments, the parts which Whitlam stressed were just as much part of policy as those which hardliners like Hartley and Calwell cherished. Some Conference delegates had tried to ensure, within the limits of electoral realism (which precluded the unvarnished formulation of Calwell), that Whitlam would be controlled, but by making withdrawal of troops conditional on changes in the conduct of the war, they allowed Whitlam to concentrate on the wider question of the future of the war. Whitlam failed to defuse Labor's Vietnam policy at Adelaide in the way he had hoped - the adoption of the flexible and relatively innocuous Committee recommendation alone - but defused it instead by making use of the potential for interpretation of the combined recommendation and amendment.\(^{135}\)

Whitlam's ability to do this depended partly on his own skill as an interpreter, which he had displayed and perfected over two years of coping with policies he disliked. It partly depended also on changes in the environment and in the political system which on balance were favourable to Labor rather than its opponents because they shifted Vietnam from the centre of the political stage. These changes were under way in 1967 and gathered strength in subsequent years. First was the British announcement in July 1967 that it would gradually withdraw its forces in South East Asia. Indications of this change had influenced Barnard's

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\(^{135}\) Liberals still attempted to paint Whitlam as 'the artful dodger' and to point out Labor's alleged confusion over Vietnam: Age, 17, 23 November 1967; CPD H. of R. 56, 17, 22 August 1967, 233-6, 289-91; 57, 18 October, 2 November 1967, 1925-6, 2683-7; CT, 21 November 1967.
remarks that Labor should review its Asian policies. Then, the Tet Offensive in Vietnam early in 1968 encouraged the United States to gradually disengage. Australian decisionmakers, Labor and Liberal, had little choice but to follow, but Labor found the change easier to make and could even claim some moral vindication. While its defence policies were still vulnerable for their vagueness, Labor's opponents generally matched Whitlam's inclination to concentrate on domestic issues. Free of much pressure, Whitlam and Barnard were able to continue the defusing operation begun in 1967. The 1969 Federal election, where Labor increased its share of the vote (two party preferred) by 7 per cent, saw mainly domestic issues aired. Opinion polls showed continuing and increasing public concern with domestic issues and growing disillusionment with the war. Both trends favoured Labor. With the development of the moratorium movement and the


Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 190-5, says that the dominance of Whitlam and Barnard over foreign policy 1967-72 was assisted by the lack of discussion of the subject in Caucus. Criticisms of government policies were general or on specific points of detail. The lack of authoritative statements by Caucus gave the leaders the opportunity to make pronouncements of their own. Other politicians made statements which might have taken a different tack but Whitlam's and Barnard's bore more weight because they were made by the Leaders. They also continued to reflect majority opinion in Caucus.


Aitkin, Stability and Change ..., 231-5; Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 194-209; Cooksey, 'Australian Public Opinion and Vietnam Policy', 5-11.
publicity given to individual cases of resistance to conscription, the focus of activity relevant to Vietnam shifted away from conventional politics, a development probably welcomed by Labor, which took little or no official part in these activities. Labor hoped to compensate for its irrelevance to many of those who demonstrated over Vietnam and conscription by making itself attractive to the suburban middle classes who sought social and economic goods from governments.  

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to show the importance in the making of Australian Labor Party foreign and defence policy in the years 1966 and 1967 of ambiguity and interpretation. These are both characteristic of what March and Olsen call 'garbage can' processes of decisionmaking, the subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI. Decisions, these authors believe, 'are fundamentally ambiguous' since participants have differing goals, see issues differently and have differing conceptions of the task in which they are jointly engaged. Thus, one could argue that Calwell in May 1966 wanted to destroy conscription for overseas service, believed that was the main issue and committed himself to a crusade to achieve his goal. Whitlam, on the other hand, may have been most concerned with preserving the American alliance and protecting Labor from the consequences of

140 Whitlam's views about official ALP participation in demonstrations were contained in a letter to Chamberlain written on 18 December 1969 (Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 168-9: 'As Leader, I have not thought it proper or prudent to sign statements or to appear with persons expressing a less complete view than our Caucus or Conference or presenting a different emphasis .... Members of the Party should not give the false and damaging impression that under a Labor Government foreign policy would be determined at mass meetings or by public petitions. For this reason I concentrate my own actions in party and parliamentary channels'.

141 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 25-6, 84-5.
policies which voters might think threatened the alliance. He also recognised the uncertainties and complexity of Vietnam and sought, above all, flexibility for a future Labor Government. Someone like Beazley may have seen anti-Communism as the dominant consideration while others leaned towards anti-Americanism. Yet these men of diverse outlooks could join together to produce the Caucus resolution of May. Similarly, twelve months later, Cairns, Cohen and Uren joined Beazley, Oliver and Whitlam to produce a Committee recommendation which partially satisfied all of their differing goals. The recommendation was unfavourably received by elements of the party whose more radical goals then had to be partially accommodated by the stiffening provided in the Batt amendment.

This ambiguity and scope for interpretation does not occur primarily by chance or because of incompetent drafting. It is deliberate and governed by the nature of the party as a coalition and by other related and independent factors. Cairns said in 1966:

To discuss A.L.P. foreign policy, it had to be stated what was written in the Platform, and borne in mind that policy was being applied by the Parliamentary Party and changed and formed all the time. It was impossible to avoid selection and varying emphasis in any discussion of policy. In order to state written policy, selection and emphasis had to be used. Different people would be entitled to use different emphasis and selection.142

From one point of view, Cairns was merely stating the constitutional position: under rule 5(d) the Parliamentary Party implemented party policy and established its own collective attitude on matters before

142 Fact, 11 February 1966. My emphasis; original expression.
the Parliament, within the guidelines of the party platform. Cairns does not say what criteria should govern selection and emphasis. Presumably, convenience is one criterion: a crisis in Malaysia did not require recitation of the party's complete foreign policy; when Labor's faith in the United Nations looked misplaced it could emphasise instead its belief in alliances with large powers; when no threat seemed imminent Labor spokesmen spoke more about civil aid than defence preparedness. But there is a further implication in Cairns' remarks: that, except perhaps in times of deepest peril, individual Labor politicians and other spokesmen are entitled to express their personal interpretations of party resolutions. In so doing, they will be motivated by the same sets of influences as worked upon them when they tried to influence the making of the resolution itself: the goals of the controllers of State Branches to which they owe loyalties, their own personal inclinations, their 'exclusive-' or 'inclusiveness', their desires for compromise decisions and party unity and their links with forces and influences outside the party machinery.

143 ALP, Federal Platform 1965, 40. There is some confusion as to whether in following this rule Caucus can make new policy. Cairns says above that policy was being 'changed and formed all the time' and it is certainly possible for 'critical decisions', as we defined them in chapter 1, to be thus made. Yet, further on in the same speech, Cairns said 'there could be no new formation of policy because there was no Federal Conference until next year'. Whitlam said: 'The relevant documents [on ALP foreign policy] are those issued by the body which determines general policy, the Federal Conference of the A.L.P. and the body which advocates and effectuates the policy, the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party' (Whitlam, Beyond Vietnam, 14. My emphasis).

144 There is perhaps some comparison with (1) Chifley's statements as Labor Prime Minister that 'Ministers speak not on behalf of the Government but to express their personal views. The views of the Government are expressed by its Leader'; (2) the Federal Executive's letter to Caucus members in March 1963, 'that authority to make public statements on party policy is the prerogative of the Party Leader and/or his Deputy and the appointed spokesman of the Federal Executive ...' (L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, Camberwell, Vic., 1970, 193n. My emphasis). This would mean that some interpretations carried more weight than others.
What is loosely called 'the decisionmaking process' actually involves at least five processes, all of which may occur simultaneously:

- **expression** of the goals of sub-coalitions in relation to the issue;
- **adjustment** of the conflicting goals;
- **registration** of the temporary balance of forces in the form of a 'decision';
- **interpretation** of the decision by the various sub-coalitions in accordance with their own goals;
- **implementation** of the decision, again in accordance with their own goals. Although sub-coalitions will still pursue their own goals, it is not true to say that the decision 'means nothing'. Some of their own goals will be goals applicable to the whole organisation. They believe the goals they pursue for their sub-coalition will also benefit the coalition as a whole and the world outside it. Often they are right. The most important thing to note about these processes is that they are rarely, if ever, sequential. Lindblom points out that goals are continually modified during the process of adjustment. Allison reminds us that participants are both encumbered and assisted by their differing interpretations of events during the decisionmaking process and of the decision itself. Rommetveit and March and Olsen suggest that the registration of decisions provides only a temporary respite from the political process in organisations.\(^{145}\)

We have been unable to say much about implementation of either state aid or Vietnam policy since Labor remained in opposition in Canberra for much of the period studied. Implementation of decisions, of course, requires interpretation of them. Yet, the unity ticket case study provided a good example of how the implementation process, enforcement of the unity ticket ban, was influenced by the same sets of factors as influenced the making of decisions: the goals of State Branches, the

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\(^{145}\) See above pp.284-9.
fear of splitting the party, the resentment of outside pressure and the ambivalent relationship with the DLP, to name just a few. In the state aid case study, too, there was much conflicting interpretation. What did 'fringe benefits' mean? Did the Surfers Paradise decision of July 1966 merely remove prohibitions against granting direct aid, specify a particular type of direct aid and preclude others or prevent further action without another Conference decision? To whom in the party did it apply? Could State Branches phase out direct aid?

The proportions of expression, adjustment, registration, interpretation and implementation will vary from issue to issue. Where an issue has been well-traversed in the past and positions are little altered and well enough known, there will be less expression of the goals of sub-coalitions. There will always be some adjustment to modify conflicting goals (without conflicting goals there is no politics) and achieve a majority or unanimous decision. But the intensity of the adjusting process will depend on the importance of the issue to the participants, the width of the differences between them and the sheer numbers of participants to be reconciled. Three decisionmakers will obviously spend less time quibbling over one minor word in a press release than will six State Branches, a Parliamentary Caucus, the Federal Executive, proud individuals and powerful outsiders over a party policy which has caused great bitterness in the past and involves the disbursement of great amounts of money in the future - unless the three have become so embittered by past encounters that even the smallest skirmishes become battles. Most decisions in most organisations are routine, the application to cases of general decisions. Few of these will involve registration of a political struggle, except where the issue remains controversial in the organisation. Thus, the many unity ticket
decisions applying the ban in individual cases registered the current state of the internal debate on unity tickets as well as deciding upon the facts of the cases. While unity tickets remained of deep interest to many sub-coalitions it could not be otherwise. Similarly, the state of the complex battle over state aid was registered many times between 1957 and 1966, the decisions interpreted, goals modified and new periods of adjustment commenced.

In the light of these general considerations the ambiguity and interpretation prevalent in our study of foreign policy may be further examined. Ambiguity has been highlighted at the expense of other characteristics which have been covered in other chapters. Although there are less decisions on Vietnam policy than there were on state aid and unity tickets, it is still possible to identify elements of incrementalism (HYPOTHESIS XV) in the Vietnam resolutions of 1965, 1966 and 1967. References to the need for a negotiated settlement, for a United Nations role, for civil aid, for free elections in South Vietnam were common to all of them. There were no sudden changes of policy or wholesale jettisoning of planks while they still carried some members of the party coalition. Solutions became attached to different problems as the balance of forces in the party and the conditions of the war changed. Three pieces of advice to the United States on how to conduct the war and seek peace (cease bombing, convert to a holding operation, admit the NLF to peace negotiations), became also conditions governing the presence of Australian troops in Vietnam. The July 1967 Federal Conference resolution was another incrementalist bite at the problem, as had been the May 1966 Caucus resolution and Calwell's speech of May 1965, as endorsed by the 1965 Federal Conference.
Similarly, we could have searched for more evidence of a process of partisan mutual adjustment (HYPOTHESIS XIV). The party was united behind opposition to the decision of April 1965 to send troops to Vietnam. The diverse sub-coalitions could agree on this if on little else. In 1966, opposition to conscripts being part of the force was the common ground. In both cases, the common ground was provided as much by Labor traditions as by an identifiable process, but we know that the details of Calwell's speech of May 1965 and of the Caucus resolution underwent some process. Cairns ensured that the speech contained the formula 'we shall do our best to have that decision reversed' and more radical elements of the party seized upon these words. Without that formula, Calwell's speech would not have received Federal Executive and Conference endorsement. The following year, Calwell, members of Caucus and the influence of the metropolitan press, helped produce a Caucus resolution which made concessions to all major viewpoints within the party and which, consequently, was supported by all parts of the party. In 1967, the Foreign Affairs Committee recommendation received the support of all members of the Committee, at least for the time being. Yet, by itself, it was unsatisfactory to a section of the Federal Conference, although probably not to a majority of delegates. Since it was more important to present a united front than to adopt the Committee recommendation against vocal opposition, the amendment was added. Chamberlain's alternative was unable even to attract Victorian support. Once the Committee recommendation, plus Batt's amendment, was adopted the interpretation process continued. Adopting both recommendation and amendment, rather than one or the other, merely provided more

146 See above, note 34.
interpretative by-ways for Labor spokesmen to wander into in the coming months. Interpretation would have occurred in any case, because it was inseparable from the decisionmaking processes of the party.

All these details serve to support HYPOTHESIS XVI: ambiguity of decisions is a characteristic of decisions made through the process of the garbage can. Ambiguity provides scope for interpretation and we have traced a process of interpretation of foreign policy decisions over two years of Labor's history. What of the other characteristics included by March and Olsen? They refer, for instance, to 'ambiguity of organisation', the variable participation of individuals in the organisation from decision opportunity to decision opportunity and from time to time during the making of any one decision. Time is scarce and decisionmakers have many responsibilities, both inside the party and outside it. They move from decision opportunity to decision opportunity depending partly upon the claims on their time and, secondly, partly on the features of each decision opportunity, that is, what the decision, when it is made, is supposed to be 'about'. In this case, decisions were supposed to be about foreign and defence policy. March and Olsen, indeed, suggest that the first factor will be more important than the second. 'Substantial variation in attention stems from other demands on the participants' time (rather than from features of the decision under study).'

There are reasons to believe, nevertheless, that the content of the decisions in the case, at least, strongly influenced patterns of participation. Foreign and defence policy was not a major interest of most Federal Executive and Federal Conference members. While most

147 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 47.
delegates possessed generalised opinions about issues in this area, even if they lacked detailed knowledge, translating these preferences into party policy was less important for most of them than were domestic matters. The union officials and State Branch office holders who made up the bulk of non-politician delegates had always been more interested in industrial, social and economic matters. Even Federal politicians who became Conference delegates enjoyed relatively few opportunities for Parliamentary debate on non-domestic matters. To a large extent, this lack of interest in the world outside Australia reflected community feeling in the 1950s and early 1960s.\footnote{Calwell said in 1959 that 'the result of elections will continue to be decided in this country on the state of the economy and other domestic issues', unless the voters feared war was imminent (Arthur Calwell, The Australian Labor Party and Foreign Policy, Melbourne, 1959, 20). See also: Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 3-11, 27-30; Australian, 30 April 1966; Colin A. Hughes & John S. Western, The Prime Minister's Policy Speech, Canberra, 1966, 166, 169.}

At times of crisis, however, such as the Vietnam War, community and party interest in Australia's environment grew. Although domestic issues were still important to more voters, Labor could not avoid interest in the world outside. Its Federal bodies had to produce, in March and Olsen's words, 'something that could be called a decision'. In foreign policy matters, these decisions were often made without the lengthy debates and intense lobbying sessions which preceded those on, say, state aid and unity tickets. There were differences over foreign policy. Oliver was preoccupied with China. Chamberlain was appalled by all war, even against Communists, and by militarism.\footnote{F.E. Chamberlain, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcripts, 1:1/11-15, 2/9-11; Western Sun, August 1967, 4. Chamberlain was court-martialled in 1919 for overstaying leave after the war had ended. He was gaolied for two months. Later, he had qualms about joining the Tramways in Perth because it required wearing a uniform.} McNoltly was deeply committed
to the peace movement long before Vietnam. There were great differences over Vietnam between State Branches, especially Victoria and New South Wales. If a battle had been joined it might have been bitter. Some have suggested or implied these differences were part of the reason for avoiding the issue within the party. Greenwood suggests that divisions in the Labour movement were heightened 'not because of any unwillingness to oppose Australian intervention but because of disagreement about the tactics to be pursued, the forms of protest to be adopted, and the likely impact of these upon the American relationship'. Whitlam himself is said to have remarked to the Caucus late in 1968: 'If we can survive an issue like this, it is difficult to see how any other issue could divide the party during the next 12 months'.

Different interpretations of decisions allowed battle not to be joined. As long as resolutions were broad enough or contained enough parts and as long as no one tried to impose his own interpretation exclusively, the parts of the party could co-exist. Since politicians were more interested in foreign policy than were non-politicians they did most of the interpreting. Yet even among politicians, while differences may have been wide, they were often not intensely felt. If they had been, interpretation could not have been so flexible. If foreign policy had been a 'prize' of internal political battles as state aid policy had been, the winners of the battle would have been far less inclined to allow the losers leeway.

March and Olsen also suggest that individuals will tend not to participate in decisions if they believe their participation will make

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little difference to the outcome.\textsuperscript{151} This has some relevance to foreign policy, where many of the causal factors are outside the control of Opposition party decisionmakers. The environment changes largely without their intervention. Federal delegates could recognise the need for flexibility in foreign policy. In practice, this meant leaving scope in resolutions for future Labor Governments to interpret policy in accord with changes in circumstances between Federal Conferences. Calwell's interpretations were probably more congenial to the majority of the Federal Executive than were Whitlam's, but once Whitlam became Leader, the curbs on his ability to interpret came not so much from Federal Executive as such as from a combination of his opponents in Caucus, individual members of Executive and Conference, the residual influence of Calwell and the influences of other strands of Labor tradition than the ones he was trying to emphasise (independence rather than alliances, support for nationalist movements rather than defence preparedness). His opponents felt the pressures of the electorate, especially the continuing loyalty to the American link, almost as much as did Whitlam. While welcoming the vindication they saw in the United States' turning towards peace and Vietnamisation, they also might have recognised the correctness of Whitlam's warnings about closing off options.

The above points lead us to consider, finally, whether decisions in this case study became garbage cans in the same sense as in the previous chapter. Did decisions ostensibly about 'Vietnam' and 'conscription' see the linking together of problems and solutions extraneous to these two issues? Will allowing real responsibility

\textsuperscript{151} March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 46.
in a policy area to shift to 'interpreting' politicians prevent extraneous matters in the internal party battle attaching themselves?

The evidence in this study suggests foreign policy garbage cans, that is, decision opportunities regarding foreign policy, attracted less extraneous matter than did decision opportunities in other areas. While some garbage can processes, notably the production of ambiguities, did occur, others did not - at least, not frequently. This may have occurred in this case, first, because there was little room for disagreement over these decisions within the party. Once the minimal united oppositions to conscription and expeditionary forces had been established, differences turned on details. As long as these differences were not pursued so as to threaten the basic policy (qualifying it out of existence) and thus involve the mass of Caucus who had supported it, key participants were few. Interpretation was the focus of activity, not decisionmaking itself. The great mass of Caucus repeated formulae established by those of the foreign policy opinion leaders whose interpretations they preferred. Executives and Conferences concurred. Where a broad policy was relatively settled and the party was basically united, there was less scope for extraneities to intrude.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there were relatively few garbage cans or opportunities for attaching problems and solutions to decisions. Throughout this chapter we have tried to stress that the crucial point in policymaking on foreign and defence policy from 1964 on was the interpretation by relatively few actors, mostly Caucus leaders, of Caucus and Conference statements made at infrequent intervals. If, for example, the Federal Executive at its seven meetings (an unusually
high number) during 1966 had taken time from its discussion of other matters to make decisions on foreign policy, one might reasonably assume that the way members decided on foreign policy matters would have been influenced by their feelings on the subjects they had just put down. Problems arising in connection with state aid might have found solutions in decisions on foreign policy. Calwell's desire to prevent Whitlam succeeding him, which had left the state aid garbage can, might have attached itself to the solution of expulsion of the Deputy Leader via a foreign policy which disallowed the sort of interpretation Whitlam was trying to place on the May Caucus resolution. This did not occur. Even after the Adelaide Conference, when delegates had had plenty of time to see the trouble interpretation was causing Labor, they still passed a resolution which provided rich ground for interpretation.

To summarise: we have been concerned with two characteristics of a garbage can model of organisational decisionmaking. Much of the chapter has provided support for the existence of one characteristic, namely, the ambiguity of decisions and their capacity for interpretation. But the last few paragraphs have advanced reasons why another garbage can characteristic, the tendency for decision opportunities to attract problems and solutions related to subjects other than the ostensible subject of the decision, is less likely to be present in foreign policy case studies than, say, in chapter 3. Most problems and solutions dumped in 1966 and 1967 in garbage cans labelled 'foreign policy' were related to foreign policy.

There were a number of reasons why Vietnam and conscription decisions did not become garbage cans in this second sense. To put these reasons in context we can suggest that differences over foreign and defence policy have not tended to be a basis for factional division in the ALP. The
most notable exceptions were the conscription split of 1916-17 and perhaps the divisions over the same subject in 1942-43. We have already suggested that most Labor decisionmakers in our period were not very interested, in normal circumstances, in foreign affairs. When required to be by pressures of the environment, they reacted according to a combination of innate general feelings (the threat from the North, opposition to conscription and expeditionary forces, disarmament, peace, the American alliance - in combination or separately, depending on the person and the situation) and deference to individual opinion leaders in the party, who seemed to know something about the details of the issue.

Rawson has written:

Foreign policy for the A.L.P. often has a symbolic rather than a substantive importance. Foreign policy serves to rationalise the divisions of the party into conflicting groups which may in fact not be very interested in the issues as such, or, more likely still, regard the amount of freedom to manoeuvre open to any Australian Government in a crisis as very limited indeed .... Consequently they debate foreign policy questions quite genuinely but without really feeling great commitment to the results. Any real change in external circumstances is likely to see one or both sides modify their policies without much ceremony.\(^{152}\)

Foreign policy stances were often not deeply thought out. They followed the general orientation of the sub-coalition which produced them. For instance, State Branches like New South Wales, which saw the winning and retaining of government as the highest goal, preferred a policy which would lead to electoral success and was flexibly designed for the benefit of the politicians who would have to administer it. A Branch like Victoria, which saw itself as protecting certain principles against siege, was worried less about votes and more about foreign

\(^{152}\) D.W. Rawson, 'Foreign Policy and the Political Parties', 34.
policies which were an expression of its principles. While differences over foreign policy did lead to formations differing in significant ways from those over other policy issues or those formed by State or personal loyalties, they were less fundamental than these. Further, because foreign policy interest was intermittent, attitudes to foreign policy were less central than other policy attitudes. For most policymakers in the ALP during this time, foreign policy views derived from previously existing stances and loyalties. Real consideration of the merits of alternative foreign policy was reflected in differences in interpretation between a small number of relatively well-informed or committed activists and in infrequent and short-term jousts at Committees and Conferences, notably in 1967. It is possible to say that there was consistency of positions over a number of issues, that there were individuals who could be classified, for example, as at once Whitlam supporters, from New South Wales, pro-state aid, in favour of reform of the organisation and moderate in foreign policy. But it is also true that the foreign policy attitude would usually be last in the queue.

J.M. Wheeldon, interview. Note also Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 69: 'If a member [of Caucus] supported reform [of the party] he tended also to support Whitlam's bid for Leadership, his attitudes on foreign policy and aid to independent schools'. But note elsewhere (79-80) that Beazley points out that the majority of Caucus voted against Whitlam in the Leadership spill of April 1966 while it probably supported his attacks on the Federal Executive. Incidentally, if one extended the idea of the garbage can beyond the four components of decision opportunities, participants, problems and solutions to include influence by general orientations (as described above), the case of ALP foreign policy could be covered: participants would be influenced by the attitudes they carried to the garbage can. Writers like Allison point out that participants are influenced regarding issues by orientations derived from participation in other decisions, but March and Olsen are less explicit on this point. Obviously, participants will be influenced by their pre-existing attitudes but since March and Olsen see participants primarily as bearers of problems and solutions, the evidence here goes to suggest a possible addition to the concept rather than to support it in its present form. See also the following note.
the one dormant for the longest periods, the one least thought out and most easily modified.

Finally, if foreign policy was like this for most actors did it sometimes tend to be decided by default, to be thrown into garbage cans with other labels? If a policy area is not central for most actors will it sometimes, rather than being the outcome of pulling and hauling between those who are interested, become the by-product of decisions on more important areas? To a large extent, the same negative answers apply. To take again the Executive meetings in 1966, during the height of the Vietnam issue in Australia and the middle of the period in Labor history in the 1950s and 1960s when more major issues were in flux than at any other, the substance of foreign policy was not drawn into the happenings on the Federal bodies. The undoubted ability of these bodies to impose restraints on politicians regarding policy was not invoked against Whitlam, the centre of these complex events, as he ranged more and more widely in his efforts to interpret policy on Vietnam. The Federal bodies did not put foreign policy labels on garbage cans (nor did the Caucus on the central foreign policy issues after May 1966 except to reaffirm the decision of that month) nor did they attempt to place foreign policy problems and solutions in cans with other labels. Policy over Vietnam and conscription was made and interpreted in a largely separate channel.  

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154 Kim C. Beazley's thesis promises to consider the effects on foreign policy of 'intra-party factional disputes and concerns for the Party's electoral success [and] it is argued that these ... considerations were as significant an influence on determining A.L.P. policy on the American alliance, as perceived threats to Australian security and the requisite means of dealing with them' (Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt, Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., abstract. My emphasis). The thesis is stronger on showing the differing attitudes to foreign policy matters between the 'Left' and the 'Right' in Caucus than it is on the connections between these and 'factional disputes'. Beazley's analysis is consistent with the idea that attitudes to foreign policy matters follow alignments based on domestic and non-policy considerations, although most of his thesis
is about the factional opinion formers on foreign policy, the Whitlams, Calwells, Barnards and Beazleys, rather than the followers. It is possible to argue, as I do, that general approaches to foreign policy are established in this way but that decisions on foreign policy do not attract extraneous problems and solutions and, vice versa, that major foreign policy problems and solutions are not attached to non-foreign policy decisions. Beazley does not devote enough consideration to the connection, if any, between factional disputes (state aid? Victoria versus NSW? Caucus versus Federal Executive? Whitlamites versus Calwellites?) and foreign policy for us to establish if he would wish to argue a different line to that above. He does point out, rightly, (22): 'Victory on a particular policy matter carried with it evidence of factional dominance of an aspect of Party activity', but the factions he refers to are defined in terms of attitudes to foreign policy alone.
Chapter 5: By-passing

This chapter generalises about how the Australian Labor Party made critical decisions during the years after 1955. It extracts three related types of problems which the case studies reveal and then shows a number of attempts to solve these problems. The final chapter will suggest that, while some of these solutions enjoyed fair success in their own terms, none of them provided a long term solution to the problems revealed. They showed, instead, that the party required a new synthesis in its approach to decisionmaking.

How Labor Made Decisions

In the first chapter of this thesis thirteen hypotheses were presented. Five (HYPOTHESES I-V) related to internal strivings in pursuit of State Branch goals, personal preferences, exclusive or inclusive approaches, coalition unity and compromise decisions. Eight (HYPOTHESES VI-XIII) referred to the influence of external forces - affiliated unions, environmental changes and the actions of other parts of the political system. There has been no attempt in subsequent chapters to find support for every hypothesis in every decision made. If the thirteen hypotheses provided an inventory of likely influences on decisions, each decision has been studied in terms of which influences seemed to have been most important on it. In most cases multiple influences have been discernible, so that one decision could have provided support for a number of hypotheses, but limitations of space have compelled sketchy presentation of some less important influences for the sake of expanding upon those that seemed more crucial. There was little point, for example, in delving in the history of Labor and state aid for support for
HYPOTHESIS VIII about relations with Communists, when the history provided ample support instead for hypotheses about State Branch goals, personal preferences of decisionmakers, the balance between inclusive and exclusive approaches, the influence of the Catholic church and the actions of the Federal Liberal Government. On the other hand, the unity ticket issue yielded, with very little delving, evidence to support almost all of the thirteen hypotheses. Again, the foreign policy case study could be told in terms of relations between environmental changes, government action, electoral response and the response, in turn, of Labor decisionmakers.

Given the limitations of the case study approach, it is still possible to make some generalisations about the way in which influences like those summarised in HYPOTHESES I to XIII are likely to affect organisational decisionmaking. There seem to be two ways in which sources of potential influence differ in relation to decisions on particular issues. They differ in their interest in the issue and thus in their interest in the decision upon it and they differ, secondly, in their access to the decisionmaking machinery. In chapter 4 it was suggested that participation in decisionmaking on foreign affairs issues depended partly on interest in the issues and the value placed by potential participants on a decision which accorded with their goals. Members of Parliament seeking a realistic and electorally popular policy played more part than did trade union officials pursuing the interests of their members in economic security and industrial conditions. Interest in the issue seems generally relevant, however, to all the external pressures enumerated in HYPOTHESES VI to XIII. The contents of issues activated pressure from some of these sources in some cases but not in others. Many trade union officials, not themselves party officials, were deeply interested in the party's attitude to unity tickets involving their own
members but they cared little about state aid. The Catholic church's interest in issues involving Communism was maintained throughout the period (although more intensely in Victoria than in New South Wales) though its desire to pressure the ALP declined somewhat after the Liberals began providing state aid. The media was always interested in Labor activities, partly because the desire of party participants to disseminate their own version of events provided journalists with easy copy. But media coverage varied according to the news value of different issues and the compatibility of Labor decisionmakers with the news source. Whitlam's activities received more favourable coverage than Calwell's because he seemed more acceptable to the 'modern' society Australia had become, to its newspaper readers and television watchers and to the younger and better-educated journalists who gathered the news. Calwell's attractive qualities belonged to a past age. A party dominated by Parliamentarians like Whitlam was more attractive than one which made deals in back rooms and used people like Calwell as mouth-pieces. Finally, the non-Labor parties found different amounts of political profit in pursuit of Labor on different issues. Unity tickets and foreign policy provided opportunity to attack Labor for Communist influence; in state aid there came to be more profit in the non-Labor parties offering aid themselves than in attacking Labor. HYPOTHESIS XIII, about the influence of the non-Labor forces on Labor decisions, is relevant to Chapter 4 because the ALP often felt constrained to match Liberal offers, not because the Liberals spent an inordinate amount of time attacking Labor for failing to offer direct aid.

Interest seems a less relevant concept when looking at the internal strivings encapsulated in HYPOTHESES I to V. In a sense, some of these strivings are 'givens' or 'constants'. Delegates elected to Federal
Executive and Conference from State Branches will always tend to see things in terms of State Branch interests unless other interests intervene. In practice, the subjects of the hypotheses to do with strivings as individuals or groups, in pursuit of personal goals, principles or votes, party unity and compromise decisions, will be mixed with the goals predicated by delegates' formal status as Branch representatives. In the case of politicians like Whitlam, Bryant, Calwell, Cairns, Beazley and others, State Branch loyalties were less important, other influences correspondingly stronger. It is difficult to distinguish between the first, 'internal' set of hypotheses and the second, 'external' set in terms of which is most likely to be supported by any case study. All of our case studies provided evidence for the first five hypotheses: delegates pursued different State Branch goals; they were influenced by their personal preferences and relationships; they made different judgments of the desirable balance between inclusive and exclusive approaches; they tried to maintain the unity of the party and they sought compromise. The second set of hypotheses, on the other hand, are best seen as an inventory of possible external influences likely to be triggered by the content of the issue at hand. They may not be supported by every case study but they provide a reasonably comprehensive list of influences which might figure in a number of case studies. Each finds some support in at least one of the case studies in the previous three chapters. It is hard to imagine a decision which could be made without at least some external influences; indeed, we have defined 'critical decisions', the object of our interest, as those which show evidence of both internal strivings and external pressures.

From one point of view, the 'external pressures' encapsulated in Hypotheses VI to XIII might seem assured of influence over party decisions
only if they could impress their case on the individuals who had formal power to make the party's decisions, that is, in these cases, the members of Federal Conference, Executive and Caucus. In a formal sense this is true. Viewed narrowly, the 'life' of a political party is the interaction of individuals in positions. Taking a broader view, we have tried to discover some of the external influences which might have affected office holders, whether they liked it or not. The factor which determines whether external influences will affect decisions is access, the ability of influences to gain entry to the decisionmaking process in relation to a particular decision. In chapter 4, it was observed that certain decisionmakers, notably members of the Federal Executive, who had access, who, indeed, were in the most central of all decisionmaking positions, tended to forego direct participation in foreign policy decisions, partly because of lack of interest, partly because of lack of time and partly, at least in 1966, because they felt that the political leader to whom they had ceded power was making much the same decisions as they would have made themselves. The State Branches, too, also had automatic access because they were formally represented on Federal bodies. How well they used it depended on the resources they brought with them. Most Federal and many State politicians, even if not formally represented, could also expect to be listened to. The desire for unity and the search for compromise decisions, while not concrete entities like politicians or Branches, seemed to be ubiquitous and in that sense, they, too, had 'access' to the making of critical decisions.

External influences were in a different position. The affiliated trade unions, because of the party's financial dependence upon them, were most assured of access. When they spoke, party decisionmakers
tried to listen and found their voices difficult to ignore. Party
decisionmakers always took notice of what the media said about them,
even if they did so with a bad grace, because they knew voters were
influenced by the media. Media access was assured if not welcomed.
Similarly, the actions of the Liberal Government. Oppositions spend
a lot of time reacting to governments and know from experience the
extent to which governments set the tone of political debate. Events
in the environment, too, can often be little affected by oppositions
but their effects are felt, nevertheless. Catholics and the DLP found
access more difficult. When the Catholic vote seemed to be drifting
away or when DLP preferences were keeping Labor out of office, Catholic
views and activities could not be ignored. But the lingering memories
of the Split made it difficult, if not painful, for many to woo these
sources of pressure and support. As time passed, resistance to these
influences lessened; they were given access in the sense that their
demands, notably for state aid and for a more pro-Western foreign
policy, were catered for and their votes generally sought, even if
their influences as blocs had tended to decline in any case. Of those
influences summarised in the second set of hypotheses, only the Communists
still failed to be wooed by any significant part of the ALP. While they
had access in the sense of belonging to affiliated unions and through
personal associations with ALP decisionmakers in peace movements and
other bodies, even in 1972 the anti-Communist environment of Australia
made it dangerous for a moderate party to be seen to be consciously
attracting Communist allies.

These, then, were the first two sets of hypotheses, differing in
interest and access according to the issue, the time and the attitudes
of decisionmakers. A third set of hypotheses (HYPOTHESES XIV-XVI),
drawn from the study of organisations other than political parties, brought together a number of ways in which the combined influences in the earlier hypotheses might affect 'how Labor made decisions'. The third set of hypotheses introduced the concepts of partisan mutual adjustment and disjointed incrementalism and the set of characteristics labelled 'garbage can processes'. We saw these three concepts as referring to ways in which party decisionmakers tried to reconcile the conflicting external and internal influences in a decision-situation in order to produce a decision bearing the name of the organisation. Again, space and simplicity of presentation has meant that not every example in support of each hypothesis has been treated in detail but chapters 2, 3 and 4 have provided instances of all three ways of making decisions. Let us now make some general conclusions about these decisionmaking 'methods' in the light of the case study evidence.

THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE THROUGH A PROCESS OF PARTISAN MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT

HYPOTHESIS V suggested, on the basis of the stress on 'unity' and 'solidarity' in party rhetoric, the attempts at balanced State Executives and, especially, the remarks of decisionmakers themselves, that critical decisions would reveal a search for a compromise between the goals of sub-coalitions. Decisionmakers would strive for an outcome that made concessions to a number of sub-coalitions, with the knowledge that failure to do so might threaten the unity of the coalition (HYPOTHESIS IV). Partisan mutual adjustment requires that one proposal should satisfice the goals of a number of decisionmakers. The foreign policy chapter provided a number of instances of interpretation of ambiguous decisions according to diverse goals. The unity ticket chapter showed how the Victorians were allowed to 'enforce' the unity ticket policy so as to
nullify it. The approach to Commonwealth finance for education in 1963 allowed the sinking of differences between state aiders, anti-state aiders and those who wanted a completely new approach to education. In these and other cases decisionmakers sought to encompass diverse goals, even if this required that some sub-coalitional goals should be foregone. Partisan mutual adjustment facilitates compromise decisions.

Nevertheless, a problem arises in the search for compromise by partisan mutual adjustment. 'The Labour Movement', wrote a Federal Caucus member in 1966, 'is to a strange degree, not pre-occupied with votes, but largely with formulae to resolve differences'. Beazley complained that the party was so concerned with looking for compromises to ensure its survival more or less in one piece that it neglected to produce vote-winning policies.\(^1\) 'Whatever else organizations seek, they seek to survive'.\(^2\) Unless they maintain themselves, organisations, including political parties, will not achieve the goals of their members. 'This strain toward survival may even on occasion lead to the neglect or distortion of the organization's goals' as it is reduced to 'cumulative, unplanned adaptive responses to threats to the equilibrium of the system as a whole'.\(^3\) In other words, a political party facing successive crises will often seek first to minimise the effect of these crises on its internal stability. Other goals, especially the policies which the party hopes to implement in government, are not ignored but suffer an

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\(^1\) Kim E. Beazley, 'Labour and Foreign Policy', AO, 20 (August 1966), 132.


Voters search vainly in party pronouncements for a guide to its likely actions in government. The party rank and file lack the rallying point of coherent policies. Party decisionmakers may be able to co-exist with ambiguous decisions (designed for that very purpose) but must suffer external criticism of Labor's equivocations and internal contradictions. Decisions register the state of play between sub-coalitions searching for common ground more than they express the collective wisdom of the party.

This tendency affects the ability of the ALP to present policies to the voters at periodic elections. But there are some qualifications to the relevance of the partisan mutual adjustment concept and to the ubiquity of the search for compromise. The possibility of compromise depends on some goals being negotiable. 'If leaders agreed on everything they would have no need to bargain, if on nothing, they could not bargain. Leaders bargain because they disagree and expect that further agreement is possible and will be profitable .....' Decisionmakers have sets of goals which are ranked roughly in order of priority, from those which can be foregone completely, through those that can be modified (partisan mutual adjustment involves the adjustment of goals during the process) to those that will be defended at all costs. Disagreement on the third set of goals will persist through the process, as one sub-coalition

4Gouldner points out that parts of the organisation may concentrate on survival while other parts pursue other goals. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, Bergen, 1976, 16, provide the best short summary: '[T]he formal decision-making process sometimes is directly connected to the maintenance or change of the organization as a social unit as well as to the accomplishment of making collective decisions and producing substantive results'. (My emphasis).

5Robert A. Dahl & Charles A. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, New York, 1953, 326. For the relationship between the term 'bargaining' and 'partisan mutual adjustment', see my chapter 2, pp.154-7. Lindblom developed the latter from the former and we have argued in chapter 2 that the latter comprehends the former.
resists persuasion from other sub-coalitions. Brown, the Victorian Federal delegate, remembered: 'if you got to a position that was fairly near to your own State position you'd tend to settle for it, provided the basic principles of the State line were protected'.

This qualification is inherent in the idea of compromise, but it appears from the cases that pressure on a sub-coalition to compromise, to adjust its goals to achieve a mutually acceptable decision, may actually lead it to take other means to protect its basic goals. Pressure may ultimately reduce the area where compromise is possible. Three examples will suffice. First, the Victorian Branch, party to the unity ticket compromise of rhetorical opposition to unity tickets but flexible enforcement, had come under the control by 1962 of a group of militant unions, who did not look unkindly on unity tickets and defended the independence of unions, especially militant ones. Strong Victorian enforcement of unity ticket policy was less likely after 1962, even in the absence then of significant Federal pressure, partly because of the consolidation of Victorian resistance under earlier Federal pressure. Secondly, in the state aid case studies, the defenders of the principle of 1957 twice consolidated their defence in the face of pressure for Labor to concede direct aid. The 1963 Federal Conference, while making concessions in related fields, restated the 1957 principle in a way intended by the defenders to strengthen it. Then, in February 1966, the

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6W.W.C. Brown, interview. Brown reminds us that some delegates had binding instructions from their State Branch not to concede more than a certain amount, i.e. they were bound to a certain line if not to a certain specific decision of their own Branch. The strictness of this binding may have depended on individual delegates. K.E. Beazley (interview) recalls that Chamberlain sometimes argued that bound delegates had the authority to support only the State Branch resolution exactly as it had been passed at State level. If they could not achieve all that the State wanted, they could not support any amendments (proposed during a process of partisan mutual adjustment).
Federal Executive majority tried, most notably through the legal examination resolution, to halt Labor's hesitant movement towards granting direct aid. Thirdly, those who favoured state aid, centred in the New South Wales Branch, reacted to pressure to desist, especially after the loss of power in New South Wales in May 1965, with more strident demands for direct aid. Their aim was as much to promote the long-term, fundamental goal of establishing and maintaining Labor Governments in Sydney as it was justice for non-state education. Again, pressure led to consolidation.

In all three cases, consolidation of one goal still was accompanied by concessions affecting other goals (for example, defence of 'no direct aid' but concessions in indirect aid). Moreover, consolidation at one point in one policy area might be followed on the next occasion by concession. Incrementalism, 'moving compromise' did not proceed in the one direction; it involved 'more' or 'less' of particular goods, depending on the combination of influences working to produce decisions. Pressures to consolidate and to concede operated simultaneously, both were part of the search for compromise, the most common characteristic of ALP decisionmaking during the period of our interest. Medding's remarks apply to Labor:

In general, the more diverse the party and the more aggregative it is, the greater the likelihood that it will fit the [pattern of consensual decisionmaking]. Bargaining will be the key mechanism of decision making. In a diverse organization there are few alternatives to a bargaining process occurring at many levels within the organization ....7

7Peter Y. Medding, 'A Framework for the Analysis of Power in Political Parties', Political Studies, 18 (March 1970), 12. Medding's aim is to oppose the Michelsian picture of oligarchy with one where organisational decisionmakers seek consensus. 'Aggregative' means channeling external influences.
Concessions will be sought and made not only because the organisation's unity and survival would otherwise suffer. There may not be a connection between HYPOTHESIS V and HYPOTHESIS IV. One can detect among Labor decisionmakers the view that the diverse parts of the coalition were entitled to have their views considered in any or most cases. Representation of a number of views usually carried a higher value than domination by one view. This may be merely the other side of the coin of 'compromise to survive' but it often seems to appear as a separate consideration. What appears as total victory for one side, in the sense that its formulation regarding an issue is adopted unaltered, is not conclusive evidence of that side's domination.

The formulation itself may be a compromise, since the apparently victorious group is aware of the views of other groups and makes such concessions as do not disturb its own central goals. There may be a compromise decision even without a physical meeting involving bargaining.

8 For discussion of the importance of this idea, see chapter 1, pp.42-6. Note that an argument of those who sought reconstruction of the Victorian and NSW Branches in 1970 was the decline in representation of viewpoints within the party.

9 Similar phenomena have been noted by observers of the politics of states: '[A] policy can last only if it does not long divide the community into winners and losers, if it embodies a standard of justice acknowledged by all sides' (Dankwart A. Rustow, The Politics of Compromise, Princeton, N.J., 1955, 232). Note, especially, the idea of a game in which 'all entitled to play ... should get a fair deal' (Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968, 64).

10 As for the role of partisan mutual adjustment internally in the party, party discipline does not prove internal centrality [domination or oligarchy]. The disciplined support of a line of decisions by party leaders may be the result of a bargain struck internally or a result of any of the other methods of partisan mutual adjustment within the party' (Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, New York & London, 1965, 119). Note that in this book Lindblom uses partisan mutual adjustment as the comprehensive term. By the 1968 version (The Policy-Making Process, 95-8) 'mutual adjustment' has been substituted. For my justification for preferring the former usage, see chapter 2, pp.154-7 above.
or adjustment between decisionmakers with differing goals. An allegedly 'dominant' group can consider other goals than its own. The 'winner's' prize is often a compromise. 'Winning' a battle often means merely achieving more of a set of goals than must be foregone.

DISJOINTED INCREMENTALISM REVISITED

Disjointed incrementalism has characterised each case study; in each study there has been a series of attacks on gradually changing problems by unco-ordinated bodies and individuals. Some increments were more important than others. For instance, the Federal Conference decisions on state aid in 1957 and July 1966 produced larger increments (explicit support for aid to the scholar rather than implicit support for aid in general and, in 1966, removal of all barriers to direct aid rather than exclusion of it) than, say, the decision of the 1963 Federal Conference, which confirmed and strengthened existing policy. There was never a complete reversal of policy or even a change of policy as great as Menzies' decision to provide science laboratories.\(^{11}\) The ubiquity of incrementalism follows from the nature of the organisation and the need to compromise. Incrementalism is a process of moving compromise, where decisionmakers seek, not a final solution bringing in utopia, but a formula upon which all, or at least a majority, can agree. They settle for, are satisfied by, the minimum which achieves this goal. They need go no further. Sub-coalitions come together behind a resolution, drift apart and come together again behind a new resolution to cope with a change in the problem. To the extent that each sub-coalition's

\(^{11}\) Even some of Menzies' Liberals had shown some signs of rethinking attitudes towards state aid. See chapter 3, note 67. Moreover, the change was rather from ignoring the issue than from explicit rejection of the policy.
attitude changes other sub-coalitions must adjust their positions again to achieve common ground.

Lindblom developed the concept of disjointed incrementalism out of his criticism of concepts of rational decisionmaking in organisations. Decisionmakers demonstrably did not act from perfect information in pursuit of a course of action chosen from among a set of alternative courses to maximise the goals of the organisation. Incrementalism described more realistically how organisations worked. Whether it was inevitable was rather less certain.

If disjointed incrementalism is viewed as the sole alternative to [rational] decision-making, a model that is 'merely impossible', the former becomes by default a description of governing under all circumstances. Like any residual category, it is indiscriminate. We are not given criteria showing how this universal model can be made into a variable. When is governing not in accord with disjointed incrementalism?12

The constant presence of incrementalism in our case studies suggests that incrementalism is a characteristic of the government of permeable coalitions like the ALP. But why should this be so? The need for compromise and the need for incrementalism, a series of compromises, both arise from the same causes in the structure of the organisation and the influences upon the organisation. To borrow Medding's words, 'the more diverse the party and the more aggregative it is, the greater the likelihood that' it will reveal disjointed incrementalism, as well as bargaining or partisan mutual adjustment.13

13 Medding, 'A Framework for the Analysis ...', 12. Rose, 'Models of Governing', 480-2, suggests decisions for long-term capital investment, catalytic decisions like declarations of war (catalytic for the whole government of a society, e.g. because they bring in a war economy), decisions not easily reversible and (by implication) decisions during revolutions do not fit the incrementalist pattern. Rose has not noticed
Despots, philosopher kings and purely oligarchical political parties (if such exist) are unlikely often to reveal disjointed incrementalism; parties like the ALP have to learn to live with it.

Is disjointed incrementalism then undesirable? Lindblom says no. His prescription of the method is clear from his title for its fullest exposition, *The Intelligence of Democracy*. Lindblom argues that incremental decisionmaking by partisan mutual adjustment is both easier, because it is frustrated neither by differing goals of decisionmakers, by imperfect information, nor by complexity of issues and alternative policies, and because it is more able to cope with rapidly changing circumstances. What appears as indecisiveness is actually the most sophisticated form of decisionmaking. 'The piecemealing, remedial incrementalist or satisficer may not look like an heroic figure. He is nevertheless a shrewd, resourceful problem-solver who is wrestling bravely with a universe that he is wise enough to know is too big for him.'\(^{14}\) The incrementalist 'strategy' recognises also that only small changes are politically feasible. 'Drastically different policies fall beyond the pale' of community acceptance.\(^{15}\) Incrementalism is not 'pathological' but 'the core of the basis for effective social governance and the system of trust on which such governance lies'.\(^{16}\)

\(^{13}\) (continued) that these are the very types of decisions Lindblom himself excludes (David Braybrooke & Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision*, London, 1963, 61-82). Disjointed incrementalism, according to this book, is only one of a number of alternatives to rational or 'synoptic' decisionmaking but Rose and others have tended to assume it is the only alternative. Lindblom (*A Strategy of Decision*, 71) says incrementalism occurs especially in decisions 'made day by day in ordinary political circumstances by congressmen, executives, administrators, and party leaders'\(^{14}\). Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process*, 27.


\(^{16}\) March & Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice* ..., 271.
Lindblom defends the incrementalist strategy against charges of conservatism, claiming it reacts quickly to societal changes and makes no assumptions about final social states (radical or conservative) or speed of change. More important than its possible conservative implications are the entangling effects of the incrementalist technique. Continuing compromise may mire an organisation in self-contradiction.

Most incremental decisions, except where the external environment is stable, might be argued to promote internal adjustment and consensus to the detriment of long-term stability. It might be argued that this is, indeed, the process by means of which most civilizations collapse. Most political parties, too? Partisan mutual adjustment seeks agreement between participants, not final solutions to problems. It does not require that one view should prevail but that all participants can identify something of their own goals in the outcomes of the process.

A series of such decisions, taken in response to changes in 'the external environment' and reflecting changes in the configuration of forces within the party, risks piling confusion upon confusion. Since each decision involves only an increment of the status quo, much of the previous compromise will remain part of the new policy. Once interpretation of the new form of words commences, contradictions may emerge between the expressions of the present and previous positions of each participant as well as between the present positions of all participants. The


latter set of contradictions may be resolved by partisan mutual
adjustment but the policy will still contain many parts to be
extrapolated and interpreted by those who wish to do so. Hartley's
remarks about the state of incrementalism regarding unity ticket policy
by 1965 could be applied more widely:

There are no less than 23 separate and distinct
entries in this confused hotch-potch of decisions
and rules which, according to the convenience of
the moment, are sometimes read separately,
sometimes together - in part or in full, and
sometimes in juxtaposition to one another.19

Similarly, C. Fitzgibbon told the 1966 New South Wales Branch Conference:

I would defy anybody to say that our State-aid
policy is a policy which most of us in the A.L.P.
can understand or interpret and it is a policy
very few of the public could understand or
interpret. If the public cannot do this how in
the dickens are we going to win?20

The entangling characteristics of incrementalism have implications
for our HYPOTHESIS III, that decisionmakers will prefer different
balances between 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' approaches to the electorate.
Some participants believed the party's first duty was to serve those who
supported a relatively immutable core of 'Labor principles'. Others were
more prepared to believe that Labor principles as well as policy would
change continually as the party sought votes from diverse sections of
the community. We suggested this hypothesis might not be consistently
supported by the case study evidence, if individual decisionmakers
shifted stance from issue to issue. At points in the case studies we
have seen self-proclaimed 'men of principle' like Calwell and Chamberlain

19 Socialist and Industrial Labor, July 1965, 5. For the list of
resolutions, see: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965,
125-33.
20 SMH, 13 June 1966. See also: Richard Hall, 'How Labor Confers',
Dissent, 17 (Winter 1966), 28-9; SMH, 2, 7 June 1966 (NACE minority
report and Whitlam's explanatory letter).
temporise and appeal nakedly for votes, a pragmatist like Oliver take
a stand on his interpretation of Labor principles in foreign policy,
union officials seeking benefits for their members, regardless of their
political persuasions, yet supporting the Labor 'principle' of non-
interference in union affairs. Some of those who spoke loudest about
Labor principle produced only the puniest statements of what it
comprised, falling back on the formula 'Labor principle is found in the
majority decisions of Labor Conferences'.

Incrementalism, the process of moving compromise, made the
exclusivists' task more difficult still. While they spoke of principle
their own efforts at compromise whittled principle away. Did 'aid to
the scholar not the school' become meaningless when the party conceded
that non-state schools could use science and other facilities at state
schools? Had it always been meaningless, since the 1957 decision did

21 Crisp argues that the principle of majority rule does not give
'absolute rightness' to constitutionally arrived at majority decisions
but merely 'the highest practicable moral authority until and unless
equally freely and fairly reversed in the light of experience'
4). The difference, if any, between 'absolute rightness' and 'highest
practicable moral authority' would often be blurred in practice and
majority rule thus attain the status of an ideology rather than a method
of choice. Chamberlain said 'Labor principles were the decisions of the
Federal Conference at the time and they had to be put up with even if
you didn't agree with them' (F.E. Chamberlain, interview). Chamberlain's
own attempts to develop a set of principles met only limited success, the
result lacking coherence or comprehensiveness, just as the Objective and
Preamble of Labor's Federal platform were criticised for their vagueness.
For Chamberlain, see: F.E. Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles
on Australian Labor Party Principles, Perth? 1964. For criticism of
the lack of substance of Labor 'principles', see the anti-VCE journal
Labor Comment. The hollowness of principle is not, of course, unique to
the ALP: 'Policy indeed is often nothing but "the product of political
compromise dressed in the language of justification by the philosophers
of the winning side"' (Rustow, The Politics of Compromise, 232, quoting
In coalitional parties, 'principles' often provide a cloak for outcomes
of sub-coalitional battles, rather than a basis for policy.
not affect aid in the form of scholarships and other benefits 'to students', which one could argue went to the school eventually to pay fees? When Federal Labor, at Conferences and election campaigns between 1957 and 1965, offered comprehensive schemes of disguised and indirect aid, the claims of defending the principle of 1957, however restated, seemed hollow indeed to those who stopped to analyse Labor's decisions. One rank and filer's remark that state aid as a governmental policy 'has been gradually extended over the years without any one decision being obvious or vital enough for the opponents of State Aid to challenge' applied just as well to Labor's own approach - except that in the party the potential challengers were also the extenders. In unity ticket policy, the compromise of 1956-57 arose, not from one Labor principle, but from a balance between two principles, the independence of unions and anti-Communism. Those who spoke of 'the foreign policy principles of Hobart, 1955' referred to a ragbag, not a cohesive body. Different 'principles' had been produced by different sets of circumstances in the past and would become appropriate to various participants at different times in the present and future. HYPOTHESIS III, especially in its references to principles and its assumptions of immutability, emerges shaky indeed from our examination.

22 E. Chick, President, Maribyrnong Electorate Assembly (writing privately) to Hartley, 24 November 1965, Vic. Rec., Central Executive 1966-1967. For the ALP itself, note the verdict on the NSW Government's parental allowances innovation (a 1963 example of 'indirect' aid) of a then member of the Branch Education Committee: 'Whilst I do not think it was intentional that decision ... had the effect of further breaking down opposition to state aid and thus made it easier to get major proposals through the 1966 [July Special] Conference' (J.B. Holmes to the author, 14 November 1978). The significance of individual decisions, as this remark suggests, is often not realised until later: 'Policy acquires meaning because an observer perceives and interprets a course of action amid the confusions of a complex world' (Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven & London, 1974, 4). Observation and interpretation is usually very much post hoc.
The entangling possibilities of Labor's incrementalism cast doubt on its desirability without detracting from its inevitability. We have seen in previous chapters that ambiguity has its uses in satisfying participants with diverse goals. As long as there is no need for interpretation of an ambiguous policy and for action upon an interpretation, a form of words may serve either purpose quite satisfactorily. But interpretation and action, forced by crisis, electoral pressure or even the preference of Labor politicians, threatens to reveal all the inherent contradictions in forms of words designed as much for keeping a coalition together as for utility of implementation. Others say: 'The words do not mean that' and battle for the success of their own interpretation, for which the text provides support as well. Opponents of the party say: 'Labor is divided again' and have concrete evidence to present to voters.

Yet the confusion which arises from incrementalism is only greater in degree from that which can arise from one decision. Incrementalism can pile confusion upon confusion, but confusion exists in individual decisions. It is necessary to place the possible consequences of the process of moving compromise within a more general context: the characteristic tendency of Labor decisions during our period to arise out of internal strivings and external pressures, rather than be made on their 'merits' as coherent proposals for the government of country or party.

POLICIES AND THEIR MERITS: THE PARTY'S ELECTORAL FACE

The Australian Labor Party has always sought to win government. The strength of this desire has varied from time to time and from section to section of the party but has never been absent entirely. Like other political parties, Labor hopes to win government by presenting policies
to the voters at periodic elections. These policies, what the party proposes to do if elected to government, form part of the 'face' it presents to the electorate, part of the criteria upon which it hopes it will be judged. Its success in producing these policies will be crucial to its success as a party. True, other policies, such as unity ticket policy, which relate to its own internal organisation (what the party is doing and proposes to do about itself) will affect its electoral success, but if the conventional idea of democratic parties is correct its electoral policies or promises should be central. The following paragraphs concern the effect of the relationship between internal strivings and external pressures, as mediated by the decision techniques of partisan mutual adjustment, disjointed incrementalism and the processes of the 'garbage can', upon Labor's ability during our period to produce what we shall call 'electoral policies'.

Earlier in the thesis we introduced the idea of 'garbage can processes' as a common characteristic of organisational decisionmaking. We have detected instances of such processes in some of the decisions studied. Despite its unattractive label this concept does not describe a pathological condition but one that occurs frequently in many organisations and occasionally in all. Decision-opportunities tend to become garbage cans, into which participants dump problems and solutions,

\[23\] Whether this conventional idea is accurate will be taken up later in the thesis.

\[24\] This term is chosen for the following reasons: 'electoral' because directed primarily towards the electors (in the sense of an offer of future government action in return for their votes) as distinct from decisions, e.g. on unity tickets, which may have electoral effects but do not involve government actions; 'electoral' rather than 'election' because the relationship exists between, as well as during election campaigns; 'electoral policies' rather than 'platform' because the latter in the ALP refers to a printed document as well as to something a candidate stands on ('platform-making' in the ALP is best confined to those decisions which affect the printed platform). See Introduction, above.
when the organisation's goals are unclear, when its members flounder amid its procedures and when participation fluctuates, with no group dominating the decision at all phases. Garbage can characteristics are only an extreme example of tendencies recognised by other students of organisations. In our first chapter we noted the ancestry of March and Olsen's work in the earlier work of March, Simon, Cyert and others and its overlap with the writings of Allison and Lindblom. Allison, for instance, detects imperfect information and communication, deliberate ambiguity, fluctuating participation and participants whose approach to one issue is affected by their attitudes to another. The result which emerges from 'bargaining games' frequently does not match exactly the views of any one participant or group of participants, for 'what moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons that support a course of action, or the routines of organizations [but] the pulling and hauling that is politics'. March and Olsen recognise more explicitly the complexity and confusion of organisations. 'An organization', they suggest, 'is a set of procedures for argumentation and interpretation as well as for solving problems and making decisions'. As chapter 4 showed, sometimes the process, the opportunity for argumentation and subsequent differing interpretation by participants, is more important to participants than the outcome, the 'something that can be called a decision'. Decisions may be made, interpreted and implemented or 'forgotten', in isolated steps by different sets of participants, subject to different influences.  

Lindblom, while again less prepared to decouple the 'cycle of choice' (individual beliefs - individual actions - organisational

26 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 25. See chapter 4, above.
actions - environmental responses) than are March and Olsen, recognises the inherent complexity of much organisational decisionmaking.

A policy is sometimes the outcome of a political compromise among policy makers, none of whom had in mind quite the problem to which the agreed policy is the solution .... [Policy making is] an extremely complex analytical and political process to which there is no beginning and no end, and the boundaries of which are most uncertain.27

The 'ideal way' of what is variously called rational decisionmaking, policy analysis or, by Lindblom, 'the synoptic conception of problem solving',

is to choose among alternatives after careful and complete study of all possible courses of action and all their possible consequences and after an evaluation of those consequences in the light of one's values. That is to say, ideally one treats the policy question as an intellectual problem; one does not look upon a policy question as calling for the exercise of something called 'political' forces.28

In reality, while such a process does sometimes occur, many organisations make many decisions by a process where analysis and politics are inextricably combined. Partisan mutual adjustment, Lindblom's key concept, is itself defined as 'policy analysis by one policy maker to find a way in which a policy he desires can serve the values of another policy maker to whom the persuasion is directed'. It is by no means 'intellectual' or neutral, since each participant is committed, with varying degrees of passion, to goals which conflict with those of others. He hopes not for the objectively 'best' solution, but for adoption of as many as possible of his own goals. Partisan mutual adjustment incorporates policy analysis 'as an instrument or

weapon into the play of power .... It does not avoid fighting over policy; it is a method of fighting". Like Allison's 'bargaining' and March and Olsen's 'decoupling' and 'garbage can', Lindblom's concept recognises the effects of the multiple goals of the diverse parts of organisations upon the decisions which emerge. The goals which one partisan mutually adjusted decision serves may range as widely as the survival of a State Labor Government, improving the condition of playgrounds in Catholic schools, promoting the centralisation of government in Canberra, securing revenge for personal injury suffered during the Split and curbing or promoting the ambitions of a politician.

The difficulty of decisionmaking which allows for the effects of internal strivings and external pressures to be registered in outcomes is that the desire to balance these conflicting forces may prevail over that to produce a coherent, practicable policy. Participants seek agreement, 'something which can be called a "decision"'. They stop searching when they succeed in this quest, even if an outside observer could say that the decision produced is objectively, 'on its merits', not the best solution to the problems under consideration or that it has left many problems without solutions. To participants who say 'our processes ensure that our party survives united', observers reply 'it is a poor thing indeed that survives'; when participants insist 'the people will call us to govern when the conservative parties are proved wanting', observers retort 'if Labor cannot make decisions in opposition, how can it make them in government?'


30 Some writers on organisations suggest decisionmakers avoid making decisions wherever possible and that it is hard to point to something that can be called a 'Decision'. See, for example: Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, 189-90; Cyert & MacCrimmon, 'Organizations', 580-1; Warner R. Schilling, 'The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide without Actually Choosing', Political Science Quarterly, 76 (March 1961), 24-46. But these writers are searching for evidence of rational decisionmaking and decisions which 'settle' issues. They are really using the word 'decision' in a different way from our present usage.
It is too sweeping to say that ALP electoral policy was merely a 'by-product' of internal strivings and external pressures mediated through the three decisionmaking techniques outlined. Participants have differing sets of goals. People like Bryant, Wood, Whitlam and Tonkin, to name a few, had deep convictions and knowledge about desirable education policy. Beazley, Whitlam again, Fraser and others were interested in cohesive foreign policy alternatives designed to respond to external problems facing Australia and sought to promote them through the machinery of the party. The merits of policies were an ingredient in the mixture from which outcomes emerged. Even so, one critic could correctly refer to the Federal and State platforms of the early 1960s as 'fragmented compromise[s] of pressure group interests' and a decade later an observer of the reconstructed Victorian Branch concluded that 'in the struggle for position within the party, it is paradoxical that policies received only intermittent and scanty attention at State Council meetings'. In times of crisis for the party, as in the 1960s, or times of factional realignment, such as after Federal intervention in Victoria, the party machinery, occupied with ensuring unity, will be even less able than normally to produce coherent electoral policies unless the problem-ridden machinery can be by-passed by an alternative structure dedicated to this task alone.

The first quotation is from Ian Turner, 'The Future of the ALP: Socialists and the ALP', Outlook, 6, 3 (May-June 1962), 10, and the second from R.F.I. Smith, 'Victorian Labor since Intervention', Labour History, 27 (November 1974), 52, who reveals, incidentally, that features of the second period were 'consensus motions' produced 'with the aid of ingenious drafting by [the same] Ian Turner'. For similar general remarks: Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 269; D.A. Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', Outlook, 6, 5 (October 1962), 3.
The party Leader's policy speech had always been a method of advising voters what Labor would do for them in the three years after an election. But during the Evatt and Calwell years, this speech grew not from the party, whose activities were directed primarily towards coping with threats to its stability, but from the Leader's preferences and ad hoc reactions to current pressures.

The leader held a sparsely attended caucus meeting [1954] at which numbers of members threw in bright ideas. None of these were contrary to party policy, but the priorities had never received any mature consideration. The resultant pastiche announced by the Doc [Evatt] surprised not only the rank and file but a great many of those who would have had to form the ministry in any Labor government. It was completely novel to the Federal Executive.

Both Evatt and Calwell were criticised for policy speeches containing dozens of unco-ordinated promises, thrown together at the last moment, without overall philosophy or financial responsibility, a response to ephemeral rather than long-term considerations. 'In every Federal election since 1949', lamented Whitlam in 1969, 'the Liberals and the press have had one line of attack on Labor's policies - "Where's the money coming from?"' Moreover, Wyndham added: 'As your list of

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32 James Jupp, Australian Party Politics, Carlton, Vic., 1968, 210, suggests such speeches 'alone ... provide a clearly worded statement of the party's intentions'. But, given that many of the same influences towards ambiguity will affect the speech as affect the platform, clarity will not always be present.

33 Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 3. A number of interviewees referred to Evatt taking down suggestions on the back of an envelope but Crean remembers that Evatt left the envelope behind (F. Crean, interview). The main surprise was Evatt's promise to abolish the means test. For subsequent developments, see later in this chapter.
promises gets longer, the ordinary voter doesn't believe them any longer'.

This explosion of promises stemmed from the absence of a comprehensive platform to guide potential Labor ministers. The platform's clear prohibitions and explicit rejection of alternative schemes defined broad parameters of acceptability rather than ways of proceeding. In the early 1950s Crisp had written that the platform 'is not sufficiently close-knit, penetrating and rounded to pass creditably as an up-to-date statement of Labour's faith and aims'.

To the extent that the platform was a guide to action in government it was often vague, reflecting the circumstances of its genesis. This might be to the advantage of future Labor ministers, who could justify their actions within vague guidelines, but could mean that a government in name Labor had no relation to the wishes and traditions of its extra-Parliamentary machine. If Labor's pretensions to internal democracy were to be balanced against its ambition to govern, it needed a procedure which not only produced good electoral policy but which also rooted the machinery firmly in Labor aspirations without suffering the


defects of decisionmaking processes which sought compromise rather than coherence. 36

How Labor Sought to By-pass the Problems of its Coalition Structure

Partisan mutual adjustment, disjointed incrementalism and the methods of the garbage can were all techniques to resolve the conflicts between those internal strivings and external pressures which were relevant to particular issues. They were used to produce something which could be called a 'decision' bearing the party's name. Their use led to the types of problems we have outlined. But they were used because they seemed most fitted to the type of organisation that the ALP was, a permeable coalition. Indeed, their use was to a great extent determined by the nature of the organisation itself. If the coalition was to remain in existence it had to mutually adjust, proceed by small steps and recognise that its members would approach many decision-situations bearing problems and solutions unconnected with the subject ostensibly at hand.

36 Richard Rose states the general problem thus: 'The intentions that a party offers may be relatively vague. A vague policy has the tactical advantage of allowing a party to justify, post hoc, almost anything done as consistent with its intent. But it has the disadvantage of leaving ministers uncertain or confused about what it is that they ought to do' (Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government, Harmondsworth, 1976, 373). In the absence of guidance from party sources, Labor Governments could be reduced to ad hoc responses to pressure groups or, especially, subservience to the public service. Rose quotes a British Labour minister: 'The point of the manifesto is not to persuade the voter. The point of the manifesto is to give yourself an anchor when the civil service tries to go back on your word. If a politician enters Whitehall without a manifesto, without a programme, he is lost .... Your only hope then is to work in opposition. So what Labour should be thinking about in opposition is not slogans which will sell us to the electorate but policies which, when we have got to office, will hold us steady next time' (R.H.S. Crossman, The Politics of Pensions, Liverpool, 1972, 24, quoted, Rose, The Problem of Party Government, 378-9).
Yet it was still possible for some reformers to hope that the party could make more decisions, especially on electoral policy, on considerations of the merits of alternatives as solutions to problems and as vote winners. To these reformers, Labor's coalitional structure and the type of decisionmaking it engendered militated against producing good electoral policy.

There were three related attacks upon the problems caused by Labor's structure for its electoral policy. Each attack involved 'by-passing' the problems seen by the by-passers as inherent in the existing structure, in favour of a structure which could consider electoral policy on its merits as solutions to problems and on its capacity to win votes from electors, rather than on how it could be reconciled to the conflicting goals of party sub-coalitions. All hoped, too, by removing the detailed consideration of electoral policy from Federal Conference and Executive, to enable lengthier consideration than could be given by these infrequently meeting bodies. The lack of time to consider electoral policy and the lack of interest in it could both be overcome. A by-passing strategy would allow careful consideration of a programme for Labor, hampered neither by the demands of party administration, of papering over cracks in party unity, nor by the pursuit of personal and sub-coalitional goals unrelated to electoral policy. These activities would certainly continue but in a separate channel from the work of producing the policies by which Labor would return to power in Canberra. Conference and Executive's role in electoral policymaking would be confined to endorsing the proposals produced in other forums. The structure as such would not be by-passed; it would instead be deprived of the opportunity of introducing 'extraneous' matters into the making of electoral policy.
The first attempt was the reform of Federal Conference and Executive, the second the development of Federal Policy Committees and the third the establishment of a network of policy advisers centred on E.G. Whitlam as Leader after 1967.

THE REFORM OF PARTY STRUCTURE 1964-1967

Since its inception, Labor's Federal structure had rested on the equal representation of State Branches. There were no other categories of representation. In particular, there were no ex-officio Parliamentary representatives, although some politicians had always been elected as ordinary State representatives.\(^37\)

The disappointing Labor result in the 1963 Federal election encouraged many party members to re-examine the traditional structure. During the campaign Menzies had warned voters of the ALP's 'outside back-seat drivers - the 36 men' who would, he alleged, control a Labor Government.\(^38\) Searching for reasons for the defeat, elements of the party seized on the 'faceless men' issue. They believed the party urgently should increase the proportion of politicians, its publicly known representatives, on its Federal bodies to remove the

\(^{37}\) In 1957 there were fourteen State and Federal politicians, in 1961 ten and in 1965 thirteen, including Calwell, Federal Leader of the party.

Whitlam, the Deputy Federal Leader, reported to the New South Wales Central Executive that '[t]he party's deliberations and image will be impaired unless and until the Federal Parliamentarians play, and are seen to play, a full part in formulating and interpreting Federal policy'. Politicians were best equipped to express policy to the electors and in Parliament and, on many issues, particularly foreign affairs and defence, best informed and best able to contribute to policymaking. Increased representation of Parliamentarians on Federal bodies, Whitlam argued, would both improve the party's public image and recognise that '[t]he core of any political party consists of its members in parliament'. As a first step, the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Federal party should be ex-officio members of both Federal Conference and Executive.

Superficially, the reforming impulse after 1963 was an attempt to reduce the power of the extra-Parliamentary machine in party decisions.

39 The Federal Caucus overwhelmingly resolved that Caucus members submit reform proposals to Calwell and speakers urged direct Caucus representation on Federal bodies. The New South Wales Conference of 1964 said that the two Federal Leaders should be full delegates to both Federal bodies and that Federal Caucus should elect three of its number to them as well: ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1964 Annual Conference, 9; SMH, 19 March 1964; F.E. Stewart, interview. For other party views on the salience of the faceless men issue: Maurice Isaacs, 'Federal Election Report - North Sydney Electorate, 1963', A.P.S.A. News, 9, 1 (March 1964), 10; SMH, 2,7 December 1963 (Alderman C. Wallace, Wyndham); Noel B. Ward, Secretary, Phillip FEC, to Colbourne, 13 April 1964, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/317/797.

40 DT, 14 April 1964.

41 Whitlam himself complained that the Federal bodies had not been 'self-efficient and discreet' while Oliver criticised the Federal officers' visit to Sydney as a blatant example of illegitimate intimidation of a State Government: ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report 1964 Annual Conference, 1-4 (Oliver's Presidential address); DT, 14 April 1964. Press comments also pursued this line: Age, 9 December 1963; C-M, 7 December 1963; SMH, 3 December 1963. Menzies argued that a party controlled from outside and subject to Communist influence could not be trusted with the sensitive areas of foreign policy and defence. The
Some participants over the next three years rarely saw the issue as more than the distribution of power within the party. But to Whitlam, who was to become the most forthright of the reformers, it was more than that. He believed Labor's decisionmaking processes, particularly when making electoral policy, should be both more representative and more responsive - representative of the various sub-coalitions in the party and responsive to them and to people outside the party whose votes Labor sought. The main barrier to these related aims was Labor's Federal structure. Delegates who formally represented a clear majority of Australians or a clear majority of party members could be frustrated by three States voting en bloc. If this happened frequently on important issues, Labor would seem irrelevant to the bulk of Australians. Further, since State Branches typically suffered 'locked

41 (continued)
most celebrated incident regarding the faceless men had been Calwell and Whitlam's wait outside the Special Conference in March 1963, while delegates discussed the North West Cape base. Yet Labor men had been confident for most of the year of victory at the election, whenever it was held. Whitlam was of this view (Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, South Melbourne, 1977, 21; Laurie Oakes & David Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, Melbourne, 1973, 111). Menzies called the poll soon after the Federal officers' state aid visit to Sydney, suggesting that, for him at least, this incident was more crucial. For this incident and its consequences, see chapter 3, pp.191-5 and chapter 3 generally. The Federal Executive was certainly in no hurry in mid 1963 to tackle the issue. It referred to the not yet operational Federal Secretariat an item from Western Australia requesting publicity for the ALP's internal democracy to counter attacks 'that a group of irresponsible individuals formulate Labor policy' (FX 24-25 July 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/154-5). The 1963 Federal Conference did resolve to admit journalists, presumably as an answer to the 'faceless men' allegation, but the journalists refused to accept the terms of the offer and did not attend after the first day (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 4-5, 10-12). Labor's confidence made defeat in 1963 the more galling and encouraged the search for reasons. One journalist commented that Labor 'has at no time in its history been more shocked by an election failure' (S.W. Stephens, Advertiser, 7 December 1963) and the NSW Executive spoke of 'the unexpected result of the Federal election ... at a time when it was confidently expected that sufficient seats would be won to ensure the election of a Labor Government ...': ALP (NSW Branch), 1964 Annual Conference, Executive Report, 14.
in' control by one sub-coalition, their Federal delegates were often unrepresentative even of party members in the State. The Federal Conference was too small, too dominated by paid party officials, too secret and met too infrequently. The party's union base, too, was increasingly unrepresentative of union members because large white-collar unions were not affiliated.\textsuperscript{42}

Whitlam's solution by-passed the State Branches altogether. Federal Conference, he believed, 'should not be constituted on the archaic and non-Labor Federal basis, but it should comprise representatives from Federal electorates and Federal unions and ... endorsed candidates for the next national election ...'.\textsuperscript{43} Whitlam argued that the modern ALP should represent not workers but 'employees', not merely the traditional blue collar affiliates but white collar unionists and those ineligible to join unions. In 1960, he had written:

\begin{quote}
More and more men and women with professional training are employed on salaries rather than self-employed. All teachers, scientists and journalists, most economists and engineers, and many lawyers and doctors, are in employment .... They can be expected in increasing degree to vote for Labor in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{42}E.G. Whitlam, 'Trade Unionists and Politics', Henry Mayer, ed., Australian Politics: A Reader, Melbourne, 1967, 252-3. This was a paper delivered in Newcastle in June 1965.

\textsuperscript{43}DT, 14 April 1964. From the earliest days there had been intermittent pressure, mainly from the larger States, for a population basis for representation, which would have produced a Conference of similar composition to the Whitlam version (Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, ch.II, passim; D.W. Rawson, Labor in Vain?, Croydon, Vic., 1966, 26). For earlier examples of the National Conference concept: ALP (NSW Branch), Annual General Conference 1958, Agenda, 33, 64 (Parkhill Branch; Shop Assistants' union); 1961, Agenda, 59 (Zone 9 Regional Conference); C. Gardner, Secretary, Hawthorn Branch, to Hartley, 17 April 1964, Vic. Rec., Federal Conference 1965.

\textsuperscript{44}Laurie Oakes, Whitlam PM, Sydney, 1973, 86. See also: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 256; C-M, 2 May 1964; DT, 14 April 1964.
As the newly elected Leader in 1967, Whitlam envisaged Labor as a democratic socialist party putting forward candidates for election before it was a party in close association with unions. The union-party relationship should be preserved but people should see Labor as a more comprehensive party. While Whitlam did not stress the point, a 'National' Conference based on Federal electorates would not be controlled by union dominated State Branches. Its delegates, in theory at least, would be representative of the ALP members in each electorate - boilermakers, carpenters, watersiders and unionists in working class areas and teachers, economists, lawyers, public servants and members of employee associations in middle class areas. Thus they would represent not only party members but the whole population.

This was the theory. In practice, greater representativeness probably would have been achieved through politicians being elected to the new National Conference. Whitlam hoped, said Robert Murray, 'to recreate an electorally successful left of centre party dominated by its Parliamentarians'. But the domination by politicians during the Curtin and Chifley years had been achieved by negotiation with and manipulation of a potentially powerful machine. Rather than recreating this style, the new Conference could easily have been dominated by politicians elected as representatives of Federal electorates or of unions. Sitting politicians, enjoying free travel, would have made attractive delegates for party units chronically short of funds. Politicians were also the

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45 Four Corners - 25th February 1967. Interview with the Hon.E.G. Whitlam, Leader of the Opposition, Vic. Rec., M.P. S to W 1965-1968. Whitlam once confided to a colleague that he would have liked the ALP to be more like the American Democratic Party which, of course, represents employees of all types but has no affiliated unions (Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, 57).  
most visible and well known of the potential delegates in local areas and the most familiar with the questions likely to be discussed at a National Conference. Whitlam, supported by Wyndham's experience of the British Labour Party, believed that party's greater electoral success could be traced to the higher proportion of politicians in its mass Conference. Australian Labor's rank and file would have ensured that her new, Whitlam-style Conference had a similar composition. Furthermore, much of the policy produced by the Conference would have been based upon proposals derived by politicians during their Parliamentary and other work between Conferences. The National Conference would have by-passed the deficiencies of the State Branch, union dominated structures and their reflection at Federal level, by constructing a new structure, dominated by politicians and responding to grass roots movements as politicians interpreted them. The Conference would have been weakened as a means of ironing out differences between State Branches and would have become instead a forum for, and tool of politicians. 47

47 The likelihood of domination by politicians was recognised by observers at the time, as were the points about the high cost of transporting delegates and (by the small States) domination by large States (since they had more Federal electorates): C.R. Cameron, interview; Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 53-4; CT, 3 August 1967; J. Jupp, F.E. Stewart, J.P. Toohey, interviews; Ken Turner, 'Who, Whom? "Outside Control" in the ALP', Dissent, 21 (Spring 1967), 24; G.T. Virgo, interview. Electorates without a Federal Labor member could still have elected Senators or State politicians. Whitlam said little publicly about how delegates should be elected. A more recent party inquiry has canvassed the possibility of their election by State Conferences (Committee of Inquiry, 1978). In general, while State Branches continued to exist so would the possibility of delegates being forced to vote in State blocs. Incidentally, regarding the British precedent, writers on the subject have pointed out that the balance of power between politicians and non-politicians at the British Labour Party Conference is not static but shifts constantly: Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, New York, 1967, 294-305; Rose, The Problem of Party Government, 261-8, 333-7, 348-9.
Whitlam became the most vehement and articulate proponent of party reform. But his arguments attracted varying degrees of enthusiasm. On one hand, the New South Wales Executive recommended to the 1964 Branch Conference that the Federal Leader and his Deputy become members of both Federal extra-Parliamentary bodies. Its other recommendations also reflected Whitlam's ideas: there should be a review of Federal policy 'to bring same more in line with changing methods of Education, Industry, Transport and the Scientific Age', greater attention to interesting youth in the party and closer contact with white-collar organisations. This was refurbishing designed to make Labor more relevant to the trends from which Whitlam and others believed it had become detached. On the other hand, R.W. Holt, the Victorian Branch President, believed that if Federal Conference was to be enlarged there was 'no reason to expect any superior contributions from M.P.'s. Moreover, the imposition of policy from the top echelon is in fact the reverse of the democratic process'.

The Federal Executive itself recognised the need for some answer at least to the faceless men charge. It announced in March 1964 that the Leader or any other Caucus member was welcome to attend Conference, as a matter of course, even when they were not delegates, and that the Leader or his Deputy could attend Executive


Then, in August, the Executive decided to meet outside Federal Parliamentary sessions wherever possible, to facilitate the Leaders' attendance. Even with this further concession the innovation was a strictly limited reply to the post election agitation.

Wyndham, the new Federal Secretary, agreed with Whitlam that more fundamental changes were required. He presented his views to the August 1964 Federal Executive meeting, which authorised him to review party structure and report back. Wyndham's recommendations were less than Calwell had asked for and came too late to help counter the faceless men charge at the 1963 election. Before the election, Calwell asked that all four Federal Leaders be made ex-officio members of both Federal bodies with the right to attend and speak but not vote. That, in the event, there was no ex-officio membership made very little difference, as the practical results of both Calwell and Executive proposals were the same, except that only two Leaders benefited from the latter. That there was some resentment in the Executive, to assuage which required the reduction from four to two, was seen in its first reaction to Calwell's request: a suggestion that Calwell be allowed to attend the Executive in exchange for the Federal Secretary attending Caucus meetings. The eventual plan for attendance by two Leaders was an amendment to this proposal. This resolution was adopted before the election but the change was not announced till after it, because of the need to await Calwell's reply: Advertiser, 7 March 1964; FX 30 September-3 October 1963, 3-5 March 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/202-3; 119/35; SMH, 4 March 1964. By July 1964, Calwell was opposing the attendance of all four Leaders at the Executive although he was not averse to a greater representation of politicians as ordinary delegates. He remained opposed throughout to ex-officio voting membership for party Leaders: Australian, 16 July 1964; CT, 5 August 1964; SMH, 6 August 1964.

Federal Leaders, their Deputies and other politicians had regularly addressed Federal machine meetings by invitation and often assisted in their deliberations in other ways; now no specific invitation was required in the case of the two Leaders. Note that, although the October resolution said the Leader or his Deputy, in practice both seem to have been able to attend simultaneously. ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 102, reports the decision as 'and/or' and there seems to have been no trouble over the point.

Wyndham's recommendations were Agenda Appendix R: Establishment of a Northern Territory Central Executive; FX 4-6 August 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35, 37; Australian, SMH, 6 August 1964.
(May 1965) reflected much of Whitlam's thinking on representativeness and responsiveness but recognised the difficulty of persuading the party to make the large change to a National Conference in one step. 54

'Although personally favouring a Federal Conference comprising direct representation from Federal electorates and Federal unions', Wyndham was content, ostensibly because of the unwillingness of State Branches to supply necessary information about finance and membership, to recommend an inquiry by the National Organising and Planning Committee (comprising himself, the Federal Leader and the State Secretaries) into the feasibility of such a Conference. Meanwhile, Wyndham proposed an expanded Federal Conference of ten delegates from each State, plus the four Federal Leaders, all six State Leaders, two representatives of the party women's organisation and one each from autonomous Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory Branches, making a total of seventy-four delegates. Federal Executive would comprise three delegates per State plus the Federal Leader and his Deputy, the President ex-officio if he was not a delegate and the General Secretary, the last without voting rights. The new Federal

54 [ALP, Commonwealth Conference, 1965?] Document 7: Party Re-Organisation. Recommendations of the General Secretary. Although the document is signed by Wyndham as General Secretary, Federal Executive members at the time believed that Whitlam and/or his staff had contributed to it (J.B. Keeffe, G.T. Virgo, interviews). Wyndham was familiar with mass Conferences in Britain and may have discussed their advantages with Whitlam even before 1964. Whitlam himself says that Wyndham kept his re-organisation plans 'fairly close to his chest, although he wanted something like the British arrangement'. Whitlam agreed with him on this point - the mass conference - although says he [Whitlam] was against direct representation of unions (E.G. Whitlam, interview). Direct union representation does appear in Whitlam's National Conference idea at the time, so perhaps it represents a concession to Wyndham. Finally, Cameron suggested Whitlam received the National Conference idea from Austrian Socialist practice, via his friend, Chancellor Kreisky (C.R. Cameron, interview).
Conference should meet annually, instead of bi-ennially, and the new Executive at least once every two months.\(^55\)

Wyndham's proposals involved less by-passing than the National Conference would have. The expanded Conference still had a solid Federal core, and small States were still over-represented. State machines would still have great influence on Federal deliberations. Wyndham believed the ten-person delegations would enable the Conference to cover more work in the time available and provide Conference places for more State personnel including, he suggested, 'at least one Federal Parliamentarian, one State Parliamentarian and one representative of the Party Federal electorate councils'.\(^56\) Wyndham probably believed that, given the arguments over cost and large State domination in a National Conference, as well as the need to work out such details as how delegates would be elected - details which Whitlam himself had not addressed - such an expansion was a reasonable first step to a mass conference. At the same time, explicit provision for representation of politicians would counter the 'faceless men' criticism.\(^57\)

\(^55\) Other areas of the lengthy document do not concern us here. They covered, inter alia, policy review, uniform methods of preselection, new fund-raising schemes, a membership drive, refurbished local organisation, improved electoral organisation and standardisation of State rules.

\(^56\) Document 7: Party Re-Organisation, 2. One observer also suggested that the expanded numbers would 'tend to lessen the possibility that one or two individuals can hold the national party to ransom. Decisions may still be narrow, but they will be less likely to depend on such factors as who drinks with whom shortly before a vote is taken': CT, 1 June 1965 (J. Jupp). Although harsh, this comment had a grain of truth: Federal Conference had always been less influenced by personal relationships than had the Federal Executive, partly because it was larger. The new Conference would have been larger still.

\(^57\) Wyndham's proposals were rather modest, since his suggested constitutional minimal representation for politicians (ten on Conference, two on Executive) was lower than the existing proportion.
The acceptance of Wyndham's plans depended formally on the attitudes of the State Branches, directly and through their delegates to the National Organising and Planning Committee (NOPC) and the Federal Executive. Almost from the beginning a majority of States were unfavourable. When the scheme was sent to the States for comment, Victoria, for example, attacked Wyndham for trying to boost New South Wales and to reduce the role of unions in the party.\textsuperscript{58} The Western Australian Executive denied the need for basic change, drawing attention instead to the assistance rendered at the existing Conference by the Standing Policy Committees and the Federal Secretariat.\textsuperscript{59} This reflected Chamberlain's view that Federal Conference should protect Labor's mass supporters against politicians straying from Labour principle. 'I believe that you've got to have a strong organisational set-up to give effect to the requirements of the people that have supported you at an election.' Chamberlain opposed any broadening of Federal machinery that would increase the influence of politicians, while he was quite willing to draw on sources of advice tapped by the

\textsuperscript{58} These criticisms were made despite the Secretary's explicit retention of the equal representation of States and his specific proposal that Federal unions could send agenda items direct to the new Conference (FX 28-30 July 1965; Wyndham to McNolty, 9 July 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38; 47/Outwards Correspondence 1/7/65-28/8/65; VCE 9 July 1965, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142). Eventually, Victoria did support the proposal for ten-person Conference delegations: ALP (Victorian Branch), Record of the 75th Anniversary Conference, June 10-13, 1966, 4.

Policy Committees. Brown had always been concerned at the danger of overshadowing 'the machine, the representative of the rank and file. Parliamentarians as a whole are too sensitive to things other than the principles which are supposed to guide our actions. '61

Others opposed the concept of ex-officio representation of politicians because it implied that politicians had a community of interest requiring them to vote en bloc. These critics argued that when politicians voted on opposite sides in the Federal bodies the press would seize on the fact to Labor's detriment.62 Still others, especially those from smaller States, were unconvinced by Wyndham's arguments for an expansion of State delegations. While he favoured a National Conference, which would disadvantage the smaller States, be costly and probably dominated by politicians, and while he recommended an inquiry into its feasibility, delegation expansion could be seen only as 'a foot in the door' to the more fundamental change. Thus, relatively small, isolated and union dominated States, like South

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60 F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcripts 3:1/22-3. In March 1967, Chamberlain was to repeat this argument in reply to Whitlam's advocacy of the National Conference concept (Age, SMH, 18 March 1967; Western Sun, March 1967, 2). Chamberlain and the Policy Committees will be discussed later in the chapter. It is sufficient to suggest here that Chamberlain might have seen the Policy Committee-Federal Conference relationship as analogous to that between the House of Representatives and Senate, with the Conference helping protect the rights of small States like Western Australia. In a 1964 speech, he likened the equal representation in Conference to that in the Senate, without drawing any clear conclusion (Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 54).

61 W.W.C. Brown, interview. My emphasis.

62 W.W.C. Brown, F. Crean, interviews. Whitlam's resignation as Federal Leader in April 1968, after he had been opposed on crucial votes by other politicians on the Federal Executive (some elected as delegates and some ex-officio after the 1967 reform), revealed clearly that politicians did not vote en bloc: Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 129-37; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 170-83; Maximilian Walsh, 'The Harradine Affair', AQ, 40, 2 (June 1968), 31-9.
Australia and Queensland, opposed most of Wyndham's limited proposals. Tasmania, isolated and impecunious but more favourable to politicians, supported most of the Secretary's main recommendations, as did New South Wales, the strongest and most pro-politician Branch, which also endorsed the National Conference concept.

The clear majority of States against the Wyndham proposals was reflected in the NOPC decisions. On the eve of the 1965 Federal Conference this Committee referred back to the States the crucial question of delegation expansion, ignored the recommendation to investigate a National Conference and rejected or shelved other minor proposals. It did recommend that the party write into its rules the existing rights of the Federal Leader and his Deputy to attend and speak at, but not vote in, Federal meetings. This was the most limited reform possible.

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64 ALP (NSW Branch), Circular 65/95: Annual Conference 1965, Federal Executive and Conference Structure; Minutes of the Annual General Conference (1965) NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/432/1118/1; 1116 part 5/19; FX 8-11 May 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/44. Given the small States' fears of being dominated, it is interesting that the NSW officers' first National Conference recommendation (108 delegates comprising six State Leaders, two Federal Leaders and one hundred State representatives to be determined on the basis of party membership) would have favoured NSW, which had far the largest membership, even against Victoria. The officers accepted an amendment for a 132 member Conference, based on a representative from each Federal electorate, plus the eight politicians. This scheme, which NSW put up at the Executive meeting of May 1967, was slightly less favourable to herself.

Almost two years later, the Federal Executive, over the opposition of New South Wales and Tasmanian delegates, Wyndham and Whitlam, again declined to support more than minimal changes. The Executive agreed to recommend to a Special Federal Conference that the Federal Leader and his Deputy be given the constitutional right to attend and speak at Federal Executive and Conference. Other minor changes were endorsed but the crucial recommendations for delegation expansion and for an inquiry into the National Conference idea were rejected.

The two year delay between first presentation of Wyndham's recommendations (May 1965) and the Federal Executive's final pronouncement upon them (May 1967) reflected the unwillingness of the majority of States, in their various guises (directly, NOPC and Federal Executive) to countenance major organisational changes. Most State representatives saw the strength of the faceless men argument but saw little need for reform other than that required to pull this argument's teeth. 'As far as the majority were concerned', Virgo recalled, 'the only real problem was overcoming the faceless men idea as seen at the Hotel Kingston' (as Calwell and Whitlam awaited the North West Cape decision). Making Federal Conferences public was part of the answer (the first public Conference was in 1965); writing the two Leaders' rights into the rules formalised the recognition that the Executive had been quick to give the problem early in 1964. While some delegates wished to keep politicians off Federal bodies, while others feared swamping in a National Conference, while others knew their Branches lacked money, while still others refused to share their power with

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67 G.T. Virgo, interview. For the 1964 invitation, see note 50 above. Even Oliver saw this as the main problem and lacked enthusiasm for the National Conference concept (C.T. Oliver, interview).
newcomers, all could agree that the presence of non-voting politicians would benefit the party without altering the balance of the Federal bodies. If it took so long for the Executive to come to even this limited conclusion it was because the States did not place a high priority on a decision and because the Executive was occupied with other matters during 1966.\(^68\)

But would others be satisfied with this small change? Whitlam became Federal Leader in February 1967 and indicated at once that his interest in a new structure which avoided the deficiencies of federalism had not waned. Labor was still a coalition of State Branches when it should be a national party. He told his first press conference as Leader that he preferred a new-style Conference of delegates from 'the members of the party who live in each federal electorate, and ... from affiliated bodies like the trade unions ...'.\(^69\) In the months before the 1967 Special Conference, Whitlam and his Deputy, Barnard, spoke continually of the need for 'a democratic and representative structure'.

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\(^{68}\) The reluctance to move quickly had been shown as far back as August 1964, when the Executive deleted or made redundant all specific dates in Wyndham's proposed timetable for investigation and report. Not until December 1966 was it announced that all States had completed their review of Wyndham's recommendations, which had been supplied to them in May 1965. Finally, the May 1967 Executive noted the NOPC's failure to report to the Executive on its further deliberations after the Conference and resolved to consider its report forthwith. Meanwhile, the NOPC had enquired when the Executive would consider its report: (FX 4-6 August 1964, 7 December 1966, 8-11 May 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35; 120/40, 44). Given that most of the NOPC were also Executive members and all were State representatives (except Wyndham and Calwell) there is no point apportioning blame, except to note how difficult it is for organisations to reform themselves. For the Executive's other occupations in 1966, see earlier chapters.

suitable for responsive national policymaking and government rather than an extension of the collective deficiencies of the State Branches. Labor would not gain power in Canberra, they argued, unless its organisation could produce and promote modern and relevant electoral policies. It could survive indefinitely as a pressure group; its success as a party depended upon fundamental organisational reform.  

'There was little hope', Freudenberg recalled, 'that the Federal Conference would reform itself without pressure from outside'. Given that Federal Caucus, one source of pressure, was not especially interested and that the States, another source, had a vested interest in the status quo, Whitlam sought to stir the rank and file.

Freudenberg says Whitlam 'took every opportunity - branch meetings, union meetings and party conferences - to hammer the theme of reform'.


71 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 91-2. Freudenberg suggests that Whitlam's campaign began after the May Executive meeting but the dates in note 70 show it was well advanced before this. (The effect of the May meeting on Whitlam is suggested in the next paragraph.) Whitlam circulated at the three June State Conferences a pamphlet summarising the arguments for reform and including extracts from his earlier speeches: APR, 9 June 1967; Australian Labor Party: A National Party with a National Purpose, Vic. Rec., State Annual Conference 1967. The effect of Whitlam's speeches on local branches is difficult to assess. The New South Wales and Victorian Conferences of 1967 received between them about fifty items supporting some type of reform. Some of these would have been prompted by Whitlam's activities since February. Yet the South Australian Convention on the same weekend received a solitary item on the subject and one delegate told the Convention there was little interest in the branches in organisational reform: Advertiser, 14 June 1967; ALP (NSW Branch), Annual General Conference 1967 Agenda, 13-15; (SA Branch), Official Agenda, Sixty-Fourth Annual Convention, 1967, item 64; (Victorian Branch), Annual Conference: Agenda Paper 1967, 56-61.
The aim was not to convert the oligarchs but to build up a ground swell of opinion which the oligarchs could not ignore and which would force them to make concessions in spite of themselves. Whitlam was assisted by the media coverage afforded him. Most notably at the Victorian Conference, where Whitlam combined a call for Federal reform with an attack on the unrepresentative control of the State Branch, his forthrightness attracted media interest. Similarly, Whitlam's frequent expositions fuelled the issue in a way impossible before he became Leader, when his speeches on the subject were more occasional and circumspect. The press and Whitlam joined forces to carry to the Federal party decisionmakers the banner of reform.

Whitlam must have realised the strength of the opposition. While his vehemence suggested a man bent on winning the main prize - a National Conference - he hinted in some speeches that the Wyndham plan would be an acceptable first step. When the Federal Executive in May seemed to close the door on the Wyndham plan, Whitlam tried a new entry. 'I do not expect', he said to the South Australian Convention in June, 'a brand new organisation to emerge fully fledged from next month's Federal Conference'. He proposed instead a Commission of one representative from each State, himself, Barnard and Wyndham, to report to a later Special Conference on the feasibility of a National Conference. The Special Commission would have had a majority in favour of the National Conference (Whitlam, Barnard, Wyndham and the New South Wales and, probably, Tasmanian representatives) but the

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suggestion for its establishment recognised the need to proceed slowly, to gather support, to work out details and to assuage fears in the party. The activities of the Commission would assure the electors that Labor was serious about organisational reform without provoking, as a precipitate change might have, party discord to worry the same electors. 74

Not surprisingly, given Whitlam's clear preference for a National Conference, the inquiry proposal was regarded suspiciously by some States. Like Wyndham's delegation expansion proposal it seemed 'a foot in the door' to more fundamental reform. The publicity which surely would accompany, and the hopes which would be aroused by such an inquiry would make it difficult to reject a proposal for a mass Conference. Thus Victoria, South Australia and Queensland stood firm against an inquiry. 75 However, Western Australia provided an unexpected break. Addressing the Branch Conference on 7 July, Whitlam urged delegates to support the inquiry plan and the immediate seating of himself and Barnard as full Federal Conference and Executive members. Against Chamberlain's opposition, the Conference supported both propositions. 76 Nevertheless,

74 Whitlam himself set much store on a University of Melbourne survey in September 1966, which showed that 42 per cent of respondents regarded the ALP's organisation as its most important or second most important weakness (Whitlam, Let Us Now Begin! ..., 5).

75 Advertiser, 13, 14 June, 12 July 1967; Australian, 15 July 1967; C-M, 17 July 1967; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 158; SMH, 17, 31 July 1967. There were suggestions that South Australian delegates en bloc and/or individual Queenslanders might support an inquiry but, after lobbying from both sides, neither possibility eventuated.

76 K.E. Beazley, interview; CT, 10 July 1967; SMH, 8, 10 July 1967; West Australian, 8, 10, 12 July 1967; Western Sun, July 1967, 1-2; J.M. Wheeldon, interview. Chamberlain, convenor of the Branch committee on Federal matters, had recommended the Branch endorse only the limited Federal Executive proposals. J.M. Berinson, Senior Vice President of the Branch, moved an amendment from the floor supporting the inquiry and Beazley and Webb supported him. Whitlam had spoken earlier and, according to Chamberlain (in an unusually informative article in his normally taciturn Western Sun) lobbied extensively before the vote. A second motion endorsed the immediate seating of the two Leaders.
even with Western Australia's six delegates added to those from New South Wales and Tasmania, Whitlam still lacked a majority for his inquiry. On the eve of the Special Conference, to be held in conjunction with the Adelaide Commonwealth Conference, the possibility of a first step towards replacing the State based structure seemed remote.

Conference delegates met in Adelaide on 31 July in the aftermath of Labor's triumph at the Corio by-election nine days earlier. As with the Dawson by-election in the previous year, Whitlam hoped to use an election success for which he believed himself largely responsible as a lever to win internal changes. Nevertheless, the National Conference inquiry proposal dropped from most delegates' view fairly early in the intensive and confused lobbying which surrounded the public sessions of the Adelaide Conference. Only Whitlam and perhaps Wyndham seemed very interested. Eventually, in a little over three minutes on the morning of 1 August 1967, delegates unanimously agreed that all four Federal and six State Leaders should become full members of Conference and that the four Federal Leaders should become full members of the Executive. Some of the most heated private discussions had

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77 One anti-reform delegate recalled: 'Whitlam had sold to the media the myth that his win at Corio was a justification and a mandate for party re-organisation. The Conference met in this atmosphere' (W.H. Hartley, interview). For the media view of Corio, see: Age, Australian, CT, SMH, 24 July 1967. Labor won the seat with a swing of 10.7 per cent (Malcolm Mackerras, Australian General Elections, Sydney, 1972, 99).

78 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 1967, 111. A new delegate from the Northern Territory to each body gave the new Conference forty-seven delegates, the Executive seventeen delegates. Details of the lobbying contained in press reports and the author's interviews suggest it was unusually complex, although it is of the nature of such processes that different participants perceive them differently. The main points of difference concerned: (1) Who were the most important individuals? Barnard, Cairns, Cameron, Chamberlain, Dunstan, Oliver and Toohey were mentioned as key actors. One delegate
concerned not the desirability of fundamental, long-term reform but the short-term question of whether four or two of the present set of Federal Leaders would join the Executive and who, consequently, would command a majority there. 79

'Some commentators saw the result as a victory for Whitlam, while others called it a defeat.' 80 To Whitlam afterwards, the seating of the Parliamentary Leaders in their own right was the 'irreducible minimum'

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78 (continued)
provided the wisest answer, however: 'everyone is involved, there are no most important people' (2) Whence came the final solution? Chamberlain says he thought of it and argued for it throughout. Oliver says Chamberlain was adamant against places for politicians until the last and the idea came from New South Wales — as the 1967 Branch Conference Minutes show. (But Oliver himself was never strong for the National Conference and believed the 'faceless men' image was the main problem.) (3) Who held out? Some say Chamberlain resisted the concession to politicians, others that Whitlam hoped till the last for an inquiry, haranguing delegates, even threatening resignation, only giving in when his own supporters began to desert him. Details: ALP (NSW Branch), Minutes of the Annual General Conference (1967), NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/438/1135/45-7; interviews with W.W.C. Brown, C.R.Cameron, F.E. Chamberlain, W.R. Colbourne, W.H. Hartley, C.T. Oliver, E.G. Whitlam; press reports in seven newspapers and Nation, 12 August 1967.

79 Cameron argued that conceding only two Leaders (then Whitlam and Barnard) would give Whitlam a majority on the Executive on most issues of 8-7 (since the likely Northern Territory representative, J. Nelson, would support Whitlam). Adding four Leaders by including the Senate Leaders, Cohen and Murphy, both regular opponents of Whitlam, would reverse the general balance to 8-9 and retain the status quo, measured on the existing Executive as 5-7. On both sides the participants thought first of the factional colour of the current Leaders: Whitlam and his supporters' goal was two only, although the argument about representation of politicians should not have depended on factional considerations; Cameron, Chamberlain and others realised they had to concede something, regardless of principles, and balanced Whitlam and Barnard with two of their own. The short-term thinking of both sides was underlined when Cohen's replacement in 1969 by Willesee reversed the notional balance. This balance, in any case, only held for some issues. Organisational reform was one of these but by 1969, when the balance changed, this was a dead issue. Incidentally, the inclusion of six State Leaders on the Conference caused few difficulties for any Adelaide participant. For all these points: Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100; Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, 15; the references in the preceding footnote.

80 Oakes, Whitlam PM, 159.
for which he had struggled. His vehemence of the preceding months would have been pointless, however, if he had not hoped for more than this minimum. But his very vehemence and the ground swell he seemed to have created forced the Conference majority to concede more than the Executive's maximum concession desired in May - the non-voting presence by right of two Federal Leaders. 'The idea of getting two Federal Leaders on had got too much of a start for nothing to be done', said Cameron in an interview with the author. Another delegate remembered the fear of a damaging deadlock, eighteen votes all, when hopes of some reform had been raised. A third delegate summarised the views of most of his fellows as 'what is the furthest we can go in this change?' From at least 1964 members of the Federal Executive and Conference had been looking desultorily for a compromise that was acceptable to the party's sub-coalitions. All recognised the problem of the faceless men; a majority hoped that the cosmetic change suggested by the Executive would solve it; Whitlam and his allies helped ensure that more was conceded. If there had been a Federal majority against reform of any sort, there had been plenty of opportunities to close the door upon it. Yet in August 1964, when Wyndham was commissioned, in May 1965, when his report went to the Branches, at the 1965 Federal Conference, when the NOPC's report was received and its work continued, and in May 1967, when the Special Conference was arranged, the Federal bodies made no final decision. While they whittled away the more extreme proposals, their failure to

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81E.G. Whitlam, interview. See also: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 1967, 51-3 (Whitlam's address); Australian, 7 August 1967 (Whitlam interviewed); Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 91, 100.
settle the issue left the way open for Whitlam, working outside the formal machinery, to influence the terms of the compromise which finally emerged.82

Whitlam believed that Labor's commitment to reform through a national government compelled it to have an organisation based on its national rank and file rather than one concerned primarily with reconciling differences between States. A National Conference would by-pass the State Branches and replace the archaic Federal structure. Rank and file and community opinion would be interpreted and articulated by politicians. Whitlam knew this prospect alarmed the States, for he

82 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to test further our HYPOTHESES XIV, XV and XVI. Nevertheless, there is evidence in this narrative of incrementalism, partisan mutual adjustment and garbage can characteristics. Labor decisionmakers nibbled at the problem over nearly four years, they looked for mutually acceptable decisions - even if, as often happened, these were decisions to defer - and they were affected by their time commitments to other matters, their other problems (bring Whitlam down a peg by defeating him over re-organisation; help Labor back into government in New South Wales by refurbishing Labor's Federal image) and their different goals, which made them perceive decisions differently. They were continually expected to produce 'something which can be called a "decision"'. Given Labor's coalitional nature and its permeability by multiple outside influences it is likely to make decisions in similar ways whether the outcomes are a preselected candidate, an election campaign strategy, a re-organised party, a revised policy or a combination of all these. Four further comments may be added:

(1) 'Organisational changes cannot be seen in isolation. They are always associated, even if unintentionally, with particular tendencies in policy and in factional control; and this, of course, is what largely explains resistance to them': D.W. Rawson, 'The A.L.P. Federal Machine', AQ, 37, 3 (September 1965), 26. (2) An article which describes the role of misinformation and ambiguity (cf Allison, March and Olsen) in a party Leadership crisis: Australian, 29 April 1968 (Alan Ramsey). (3) The ALP often elects as leaders or candidates individuals described as 'compromises'. This usually means that more talented contenders have been too extreme to win a majority of votes and sub-coalitions have been satisfied by a candidate against whom a majority have no strong objections. As with policies produced in the same way the 'winner' cannot be opposed publicly. (4) Finally, on how re-organisations may become garbage cans, see March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 314-37.
quoted to the Victorian Branch Conference their own press spokesman:
'These [National Conference] delegates would be responsible to nobody except their own Federal campaign committees. Consequently they could well pursue policies which were in conflict with those of their own State Executive or Annual Conference.' Whitlam retailed the Branch hierarchy's fears with relish: 'Herein lies the value and necessity of a change from the present system. Our present Federal structure is not geared to win elections for the House of Representatives, where all the great initiatives and responsibilities now lie.' The extent to which Branch fears - and Whitlam's hopes - would have been confirmed would have depended on the detailed arrangements worked out for a National Conference. It may have been, in Crisp's words, that 'so long as governmental federalism lasts, Party federalism will continue to be appropriate and, indeed, indispensable'. The need to run candidates at both State and Federal levels may have worked against any significant separation of structures. The party could not afford two separate structures and while State organisations continued they would seek to exert control over all classes of candidates and delegates, who would be unwilling to risk the displeasure of the State side of the structure for the sake of supporting particular national policies. Further, while the possibility of State control of national delegations remained, so did the possibilities of bloc voting and of resentment by the outnumbered smaller States.

83 Whitlam, Let Us Now Begin! ..., 10, quoting Sun, 7 June 1967.
84 Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 13. At the time of writing this thesis, the party's Committee of Inquiry was trying to solve just the problems outlined above. Moreover, its new media director, describing how he would keep Federal politicians in touch with feeling in the electorate, said he 'would draw on advice from the ALP's Federal electorate councils particularly, but he denied that this was a ploy to bypass the ALP's State machines' (CT, 16 January 1979).
None of these problems had to be faced in 1967, because the inquiry proposal failed. With hindsight one can argue that the ex-officio representation of politicians blurred the division into Branch blocs, since politicians often looked at a different set of considerations than did Branch delegates and were not so tied by State instructions. The level of interest and expertise in electoral policy also was enhanced. Ex-officio representation may have encouraged the election of more politicians as Branch delegates, which further changed the outlook of the Federal bodies. But the change of 1967 was not as much augmenting or reforming as by-passing. It drew the teeth of the unattractive bogey of external control of members of Parliament. It 'should destroy for all time', said Keeffe, 'the claim of our political enemies that Labor policy is formulated by so-called "faceless men"'.

Whitlam agreed:

Before 1967 it could have legitimately been said that the Federal Executive of the Labor Party could treat Labor Members of Parliament as puppets. It can't be said now. And in fact half the people on the Federal Executive are members of the Federal Parliament.86

85 Some reports had it that, in return for the limited reforms at Adelaide, Whitlam agreed to cease the struggle for more fundamental changes (Age, 2 August 1967; DT, 1 August 1967; Socialist and Industrial Labor, August 1967, 1). Although Whitlam told the Conference after the decision that '[i]t's true that there can be, I would hope in due course there will be, still further changes' (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 1967, 53), he seems to have made little public attempt to promote them.

THE POLICY COMMITTEES

Until the late 1950s almost the first act of any Federal ALP Conference had been to divide into Conference Committees based on broad subject areas and comprising one representative from each delegation. Each Committee considered agenda items from the States and reported back to the full Conference, which usually adopted most of the Committee's recommendations to discharge, adopt or amend and adopt items. Meanwhile, quite independently, Federal and State Parliamentarians became specialists in electoral policy areas because of knowledge gained in Parliament or as ministers. Occasionally, politicians would assist Conference Committees (when they were not themselves members of them as Conference delegates) or delegations from their State. Non-politicians with an interest in particular subjects, such as J.W. Wood and S. Encel in education, also contributed desultorily. Rarely, such help from non-delegates was formalised. Thus, the 1957 Conference appointed a committee, eight out of ten of whose members were Federal politicians, to examine the possibility of a national health scheme. The 1959 Conference adopted the findings of this committee without demur and itself appointed committees to revise the social services and economic sections of the Federal platforms.

86 (continued)
delegates. See also note 37 above. Finally, it is worth noting that the introduction of proportional representation to the reconstructed New South Wales and Victorian Branches in 1970-71 introduced sub-coalitional divisions to their State delegations and further blurred State blocs.

Both committees were two-thirds politicians. These ad hoc decisions helped the party produce some well-rounded, internally consistent policy statements which rose above mere piecemeal reactions to State Branch items or attempts to reconcile differences between party sub-coalitions.

In early 1961, the three existing 'Standing Committees' - as they had come to be called - on social services, health and economic planning began work on detailed proposals for the Federal elections due in that year. Much of the credit for this innovation was Chamberlain's. He had become Acting Federal Secretary in September 1960 and Secretary in February 1961 and he sought the cooperation of the new Federal Parliamentary Leader, Calwell (elected March 1960) in devising improved methods of composing Labor's electoral promises. Evatt, Calwell's predecessor, had been notorious for trying to write election policy alone and at the last moment. After his unexpected promise in 1954 to abolish the means test, the machine had tried to supervise more closely but its attempts had been too belated to permit much more than revision of an existing draft. Chamberlain hoped to introduce more

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88 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 64-5; 1959, 33, 36, 40-2; 1961, 74, 81; FX 30 June-2 July 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55. Theoretically, all three committees comprised a representative from each Branch and representatives of the Federal Caucus, but about half the Branches appointed Federal Parliamentarians as their representatives in any case. The first two committees were chaired by Fraser, the third by Crean. Both met at least seven times, sometimes over two or three days. Finally, it is worth noting that the ordinary Conference Committees had the power to co-opt non-delegates to assist them (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 7; 1959, 4) but there is no evidence of how often this power was used.

89 See note 33 above. The 1955 Federal Conference had decided such consultations should be held and, indeed, the Executive used this resolution as the basis of its activities during 1961 (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1955, 51; 1961, 66). For pre-election consultations under Evatt: FX 31 October-3 November 1955; 11-14 August 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55. The respective election dates were 10 December and 22 November.
comprehensive cooperation between organisation, Caucus and sympathetic advisers. The aim was not so much by-passing the Federal bodies as joint production of more thoughtful policy well before polling day. Politicians and experts provided most of the ideas, the Executive reviewed progress, made some alterations and produced occasional policy documents for the press in the months before the election.90

Despite the instruction from the 1959 Conference, there was no attempt during 1960-61 to revise comprehensively Labor's Federal platform. The Executive postponed consideration of the unsatisfactory platform and its lack of relevance for elections, in order to give detailed consideration to the policy speech itself and to make much of its contents public well in advance of polling day.91 The April 1961.


91 Although the 1959 Conference had instructed the Economic Planning and Social Services Committees to review the relevant policy entirely, the Executive agreed, in Chamberlain's words, 'that attention should be given to the question of the Australian economy [then in the midst of the 'credit squeeze'] in the light of what the Party could go to the electorate on': Minutes of meeting between Federal Executive Officers, Federal Parliamentary Labor Party Leaders and Members of A.L.P. Economic Committee (Melbourne, 10-12 January 1961), FX Minute Book, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/56. This became the goal of the whole exercise and, indeed, as the list in the previous note shows, all the documents had a connection with the economy.
Federal Conference, impressed with the work of the three existing committees and the likely results of the work begun by Chamberlain, resolved to expand the system. It directed the Executive to establish Standing Committees (later often called 'Standing Policy Committees' or simply 'Policy Committees') on Economic Planning, Social Services, Health (these three already existed under the previous arrangements), Education, Foreign Affairs, Rural Policy and any others which the Executive might determine. The Committees were to continually review party policy in the light of modern trends and to consider specific questions referred to them by the Executive. They began meeting after the 1961 Federal election and most of them reported to the Federal Executive before the 1963 Federal Conference.

The deliberations of this Conference showed the new system had far more capacity to consider policy at length than had the old Conference Committee system. Moreover, almost all parts of the Standing Committee reports were adopted, new planks being incorporated into the Federal platform or Committee recommendations on Branch items being accepted almost invariably. For the first time, Federal Conference no longer appointed its own Committees. In future, State Branch items would be referred to the Standing Committees. If any further proof were required of the new system's acceptability, Chamberlain's letter to Standing Committee Chairmen provided it:

The new methods of formulating policy are now meeting with general approval, and this is due in no mean measure to the diligent manner in which

Committees have applied themselves to the task of providing the fullest possible information in respect to their subjects for the benefit of Conference.93

Chamberlain's remark overstated Conference's role if it implied that delegates used the new Committees' work as raw material for detailed discussions on the Conference floor. Even under the Conference Committee system detailed discussion, such as it was, took place outside Conference sessions.94 The old system was designed to overcome the difficulties of detailed consideration by a Conference of thirty-six members but, by comprising one member from each State, these Committees ensured that their recommendations were based on the same need to reconcile State Branch goals that motivated the Conference as a whole. The new system rested on a different base. We saw that the first three Committees comprised a Federal element (one representative from each State) and a Parliamentary element (Caucus representatives). State Branches further recognised the potential contributions of politicians by appointing them as State Branch representatives.95 The Federal element of these pioneering Committees was thus further broken down. Politicians brought to the discussions, in theory, at least, a desire

94For one Conference delegate's view, see Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 3. The author refers to the lack of background information, either from the States sending the items or from other sources, the adoption of half-baked and badly expressed ideas and the shelving of other matters without adequate consideration. That sensible decisions emerged 'was often more surprising than otherwise'.
95See above, note 88.
for electoral and administrative feasibility, cohesiveness and clarity and, above all, a knowledge of the issues.  

The system which developed by 1963 sought also to tap a wider range of expertise. Since his first Federal Conference in 1948, Chamberlain had been shocked by the perfunctory consideration of policies, by the lack of information on the merits of policies, and, especially, by Labor's failure to seek the help of sympathetic experts in time for Conference delegates to be well-advised well before Conferences. 'Labor has in its ranks the specialist in many fields of human endeavour. Our only trouble is that we are not availing ourselves of their services.' The new system sought to remedy this deficiency. Simultaneously, it bypassed the State-based machine. 'No longer are these [Committees] to be representative of branch organisation', wrote Dunstan after the 1961 Conference. 'They are to be small groups of people knowledgeable in the particular field of the committee's work and empowered to co-opt assistance.' True, the Federal Executive still supplied a member of

96 This may not have worked in practice: 'Several State branches appointed delegates who had little qualification as experts ... but who, since they were Federal Parliamentarians, could travel to committee meetings without cost to the Branch' (Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 3). Politicians appointed to these first Committees did include well-qualified men: Crean, whose economic expertise would have been useful to the National Health Committee, McKenna, a former Social Services Minister, Tasmanian representative on the Committee in that area, and Senator Dittmer, a doctor on the same Committee. Still, free travel was always a consideration in appointing politicians.

97 Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 10 (written 1956); F.E. Chamberlain, interview.  
98 Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 4. Dunstan was a member of both Federal Executive and Conference at the time, as well as of Standing and other Committees. According to the Executive itself, committee members, both politician and non-politician, were selected for their 'specialised knowledge', (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 94). On co-opting, see note 125, below.
each Committee as liaison and Chairman, but otherwise expertise should be the criterion. The very method of filling Committee places by Executive appointment was designed to allow this criterion to operate.  

Chamberlain remained Federal Secretary until late 1963. Under his leadership the Committees remained small and the few documents available do not suggest Committee members drew upon a wide range of community sources for information and ideas. Fourteen of the twenty-six Committee places early in 1963 were occupied by Parliamentarians and the evidence suggests that the Committees relied mainly on information gleaned by these men in the course of their political work. The few non-politicians, such as Encel and Wood in the Education Committee, brought some outside expertise. Most of the six Executive members acting as Chairmen lacked detailed knowledge of their Committee's subject.  

Chamberlain's successor, Wyndham, came from Victoria, which already had a tradition of seeking policy contributions from a wide range of people. Wyndham had sought to encourage this tendency and believed the same methods could be followed in Canberra. What Chamberlain had

99FX 3-7 July 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/114-18, shows that the first places were filled on the basis of a mandatory place in each for an Executive member, then appointment of all individuals whom Executive members nominated. This method meant Committees ranged in size from three to seven.

100ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 8, shows this breakdown of Committee places: Executive members as Chairmen: 6; Federal politicians: 12; State politicians: 2; Others: 6 (including a State Branch President, State Branch Assistant Secretary, and four senior party members with expertise). But the Committees did receive some help, at least from Deputy Leader Whitlam. (See note 125, below).

101In 1959-60, 102 branch members comprised fifteen Victorian Branch 'policy propaganda committees' working to produce short pamphlets to publicise Labor policy to various groups in the community (pensioners, widows, farmers, teachers, public servants, etc.). The scheme seems to have faded away after only limited success: Age, 16 March 1960; Circular B. 7: R. Balcombe, Assistant Secretary, VCE, to all branch
commenced, Wyndham continued. Standing Policy Committees were not the only participants in electoral policymaking during Wyndham's term (1963-69) but they were important. We shall examine their role in terms of the extent to which they by-passed the party's existing Federal machine.

The ability to by-pass turned on the Committees' relations with both Federal Executive and Federal Conference. The Committees and the Executive were connected formally through the Executive providing the Committee Chairmen and by the Federal Secretary, who normally convened the Committees. 102 Secondly, the Executive developed rules covering

101 (continued)
Secretaries, 11 May 1959, Vic. Rec., Circulars 1959; Propaganda Committee, 26 August, 16 October 1959; VCE 6 November 1959, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740. The 1962 Branch Conference then adopted Wyndham's recommendations for a system of policy committees to review - rather than publicise - policy. Four were established initially (Health, Disarmament, Trade and Industrial) to add to five others already existing under earlier Conference decisions. A further VCE decision in August 1964 took the number of committees to fifteen and 150 members answered a call for volunteers to man them: ALP (Victorian Branch), Central Executive Report 1962-63, 1-2; 1964-65, 19-23. By late 1964 one academic and party member could see the committees as an opportunity for Labor's professional component to assert its influence (James Jupp, 'Victoriana', Dissent, 13 (Spring 1964), 37) and from 1964 to 1967 Victoria produced the best discussion pamphlets on party policy of any Branch of the party in the Looking to the Future pamphlets on education, town planning and science and a pamphlet on reform of the law relating to insanity and criminal responsibility.

102 The 1965 Federal Executive report described the practice of appointing an Executive member as 'an effective link between the two bodies'. Wyndham convened and was ex-officio member of all Committees but Secretary only to some (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 108). Had the Federal Secretariat been provided with sufficient funds by the State Branches it could have provided the research facilities which early plans had envisaged. As it was, its research activities (carried out by Wyndham in spare moments between administrative and publicity work) went little beyond provision of speaker's notes and information releases. Wyndham expanded the party's library and subscribed to overseas journals but there is little evidence in the party's published and private documents that the Secretariat's limited work was much availed of by party units. The Secretariat's history from conception till temporary closure can be traced through Federal Conference Reports from 1959 to 1969. Not until 1979 did a small research unit begin work in the Secretariat. One of its tasks was servicing Policy Committees (CT, 16 January 1979).
Committee reports. The original terms of reference, adopted in July 1961, stated merely that Committees 'shall report, either by way of interim or finally to the Federal Executive' and not until May 1963 were more detailed arrangements formulated. The new rules formalised the practice of the previous two years. 'Whenever possible, all reports of Standing Committees shall firstly [that is, before going to Conference] be submitted to the Federal Executive for examination, who shall have authority to amend.' Even by 1963 the Executive recognised that it could not always consider Committee reports before they reached Conference. While retaining a reserve power for the Executive, the rules allowed by-passing of at least the Executive part of the Federal machine. The Executive had not altered many reports in the past, except those relating to state aid, but the 1963 rules recognised the opportunity for Executive alteration was not necessary. 'Shall report' in 1961 became, in effect, 'may report' in 1963.\textsuperscript{103} By 1965, delegate Virgo of South Australia could ask if it was possible for the Executive, in any circumstances, to give the Committee reports the consideration they deserved. Although the Executive defeated a motion (Nicholls-Virgo) that all Committee reports should be sent direct to Conference

\textsuperscript{103}FX 3-7 July 1961, 7-9 May 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/115; 125/57/35-6, 40. My emphasis. The procedures were adopted, with inconsequential changes in wording, by Federal Conference: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 9. 'Whenever' became 'wherever'. The Executive debate began with a motion from Dunstan which proposed rules which, on balance, would have given the Committees rather more freedom in relation to the Executive than they eventually received. For instance, while the Dunstan version allowed the Executive to send reports or parts of them back to the Committees, it could not 'itself alter the report of a Committee unless with the agreement of the Committee'. The procedures as eventually adopted included provision that the Chairman, when presenting the report to Conference, should inform the Conference of any differences between the Committee majority view and the Executive majority view.
in the form received by the Executive, it was clear that some delegates increasingly were prepared to forego examination of such documents. At most the Executive could give informed consideration only to controversial issues where State Branch attitudes were already well defined. Thus the 1965 pre-Conference Executive meeting covered a dozen reports in less than eight hours and only the Foreign Affairs and Defence and Education Committee reports received detailed consideration. Delegates could have argued that their Branches had no interests in those documents dismissed more perfunctorily, but the limited time available meant that any discussion on merits as well as out of self-interest was curtailed. 104

The Executive's tendency to pass Committee reports to Conference almost unaltered continued in 1967, 1969 and 1971. In 1967, it sent nineteen reports up with only a cursory glance and two years later the extent of the withdrawal of the Executive from the policymaking field - as well as the extent of the decline of the issue itself - was reflected when it handed over without comment the report of the National Advisory Committee on Education. This report contained the proposal for a Schools Commission, which would distribute funds to all schools, state and non-state. While Labor had removed in 1966 the barriers to its offering aid to non-state schools, it had yet no positive policy on the distribution of aid. There were anti-state aiders on the Executive who could have renewed the fight, had they chose. Instead, they left the final skirmish

104 FX 28-30 July 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38. The Science, Economic Planning and Broadcasting Committee reports were all approved without debate, all others after short discussion and with between none and three amendments each. In the 1965 Conference report, the Committee reports cover ninety-seven pages, the consolidated Federal Executive amendments to them three pages.
It could be argued that the Conference reflected the composition of the Executive and that the Executive's withdrawal represented a reasonable division of labour: while the Executive looked after organisation, the Conference considered policy. The goals of Branches and of ex-officio Parliamentarians still could be served. Yet the Executive of the early 1960s had been careful to reserve a role for itself should the need arise, that is, in controversial matters. As late as 1966, Conference confirmed the 1963 formula that the Executive '[w]herever possible' should examine and, if necessary, amend Committee reports. The Executive found time then to look at controversial matters; by the late 1960s it was less concerned to do so. In February 1970, on the motion of Chamberlain and with little opposition, the Executive agreed to delete even the permissive requirement of the existing rules. While the rules still did not deny the Executive the right to a role in policymaking, this change formalised what had become increasingly clear since the establishment of the Policy Committees: that they meant the effective by-passing of the Federal Executive in the making of Labor's platform.

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107 FX 25–26 February 1970, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/121/48. The Executive also removed the requirement that Conference shall be informed of any differences between the views of the Committee majority and the Executive. Given the Executive's inactivity this provision had long been redundant. Following the 1970 change, the pre-Conference Executive meetings of 1971 were concerned only with recommendations on rules and miscellaneous policy items (FX 13–15 April, 16–17 June 1971, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/121/49). For the 1972 policy speech and the Executive, see below p.447.
The implication of the preceding paragraphs is that one reason for the Executive's withdrawal from an electoral policymaking role was the Executive's trust in the Committees' ability to do the job. The very expansion of the Committee system through the 1960s provides further evidence for this conclusion. The Executive itself was charged with setting up Committees as it thought fit. It would have hardly expanded a system to which it objected. By 1965, there were thirteen Committees. In April 1968, there were sixteen, until a re-organisation reduced the number to twelve, plus two other Committees, set up under different rules, covering Women's Affairs and Youth matters. By December 1971, the number of Policy Committees proper had grown again to fourteen. They covered the whole range of a Federal Labor Government's likely activities. For example, the list at December 1971: Aboriginal Affairs, Arts and Media, Economic, Education, Electoral, Foreign Affairs and Defence, Health (which included social welfare matters generally), Immigration, Industrial, Industry (including national development), Legal and Constitutional, Resources and Rural, Transport and Urban Development (including housing). On paper, at least, the party had developed a formidable system.

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108 See above p.408.
109 Agenda Document One: Appointment of Committees. Memorandum by the General Secretary; FX 17-20 April 1968, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/46, 45; ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 143; Names and Addresses of Policy Committee Members, Dec. [sic] 1971, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/127/76. The 1968 re-organisation aligned the Committee subject areas with those of the Federal Caucus Committees and tried to demarcate more clearly the areas of Committee responsibilities to avoid overlapping. The Women and Youth Committees, like the National Advisory Committee on Education, a Legal Advisory, an Immigration Review and other committees set up at various times, were not strictly Standing Policy Committees, although some, like the NACE, existed for some years. They bore the same relationship to Conference as did Standing Committees. The NACE declined in importance once the needs concept of educational finance had been adopted. It reverted to a conventional Policy Committee.
If the Federal Executive increasingly refrained from a significant policymaking role and constructed an alternative system, what of the Federal Conference? If Federal Conference duplicated the detailed discussions which the Policy Committees had been established to undertake then the whole point of the Committees would have been destroyed. By-passing would have been hollow indeed. An examination of Conference reports from 1963 to 1971 suggests, however, that Conferences were prepared to limit their role to one of general oversight and, sometimes, not even that. In a real sense, by-passing occurred and Labor's supreme body became primarily an endorser of policy proposals discussed elsewhere.

Three related sets of reasons may be suggested for the ease of acceptance of Committee reports by Conferences. First, there were reasons in the Committees themselves. Clyde Cameron, a politician, State machine man, Federal delegate and Committee member provided this summary:

The Policy Committees came to be so efficient and this was recognised by the affiliates, who trusted in the Policy Committees. People felt any good ideas around would be picked up by these Committees, since they were composed of experts. They knew there was a wide range of contributions - even from judges under the lap - from a very knowledgeable group of people.

Toohey and Chamberlain agreed. There had long been a suspicion of 'experts' in parts of the ALP, but these comments suggest this suspicion could be overcome. Cameron recalled that unanimity in the Committee usually meant Conference adopted the report rapidly. On reports, or parts of them, where the Committee had disagreed the Committee minority might encourage their allies in the Conference to a floor debate. On the other hand, Committee members could often
persuade delegates on the basis of superior knowledge gleaned from Committee duties. 110

Secondly, as both Crean and Cairns pointed out, there often was little in the Committee reports that could be objected to. If the reports emerged from a process of compromise on a Committee whose composition resembled that of the Conference, most delegates could identify with the recommendations. 111 Long before the Committees were established Conferences made many more decisions easily than with difficulty. Few delegates could object, for instance, to a recommendation that pensions be increased or taxes reduced. Controversy in any organisation attends only a minority of proposals, whatever their source.

The third pair of reasons concerns the Federal Conference itself. First, the Conference during the 1960s came to resemble the Committees. We have noted earlier that the proportion of politicians on the Conference rose during the 1960s. There were ten Federal and State Parliamentarians at the 1961 Conference; by the 1969 Conference there were twenty-five, C.R. Cameron, F.E. Chamberlain, J.P. Toohey, interviews. Interestingly, all three related their support of the Committees, especially of the scope they provided for non-politician, non-machine contributions, to attitudes to other possible contributors. Thus Cameron believed the Committees produced a far greater aggregation of wisdom than could have been produced by the National Conference proposal, while Toohey praised the system especially because it 'brought in the contributions of people outside the Parliamentary party'. Thirdly, Chamberlain, in interview and in 1967, used the success of the Committees as an argument against the Whitlam plan for a National Conference. 'If the policy was good', as both he and Whitlam agreed, 'then the machinery that produced it [the Federal Conference and the Committees] could not be out of date' (West Australian, 10 July 1967; Western Sun, March 1967, 2; July 1967, 1-2). On the question of deferral to experts note the remark of one commentator about the easy passage of the 1965 Science Committee report: A delegate would not risk 'making an ass of himself in public by arguing about science with a professional scientist' (Nation, 16 October 1965). Still, the opinion of education experts often seemed to have little effect on attitudes to state aid as the commentator, S. Encel, himself an expert and former Education Committee member, well knew! Obviously delegates' attitudes to the issue were important as well as their attitudes to experts. 111 J.F. Cairns, F. Crean, interviews.
a majority of the new forty-seven member body. Politicians did not vote en bloc but they tended to bring a different outlook, more electorally oriented, more acquainted with the details of policy, from that of many of the non-politicians whom they replaced. Further, since a solid proportion of the Conference came to be Federal politicians (thirteen out of forty-seven in 1969, including the four Leaders ex-officio) the Conference's familiarity with Federal issues was enhanced. Most importantly, as proposals came to the Conference from Committees comprised heavily of politicians (in 1969 Federal politicians occupied thirty-nine Committee places, State politicians eight, out of seventy-three places in ten Committees) Conferences were likely to consider views which closely resembled their own. To the extent that Labor's electoral policy emerged out of the mingling of views of politicians and non-politicians, the mix of views on Committees and Conference became increasingly alike.\(^{112}\)

Moreover, as Crean reminded the author, Conferences were often more concerned with 'crisis-management' than with detailed discussion.\(^{113}\) Even with a thirty-six member Conference, often aligned in tight State blocs, opportunities for debate were limited; a forty-seven member Conference further reduced them. In any case, there was little point having Committees if delegates did not concede responsibility to them.

\(^{112}\)I have been unable to obtain a complete list of Committees reporting to the 1969 Conference and this list also excludes the NACE, technically not a Standing Policy Committee. But the proportions in this incomplete list of places filled by Federal, State and all politicians broadly reflect the full lists of 1965 and 1967. These lists reveal another fact that helped to influence Committees and Conference along similar paths: in 1969, twenty-two Conference delegates had been members of the Committees whose reports they considered.

\(^{113}\)F. Crean, interview.
Conferences, with limited time to spare, dealt first with any matters where party sub-coalitions were opposed, where bitterness threatened or already existed, where unity was threatened. Where no such clouds loomed, Conferences often sought to conserve peace. 'Conferences are often attempts to avoid scars.'\textsuperscript{114} If there was little to object to in the recommendations of a respected, knowledgeable and hard-working Committee, delegates adopted its recommendations and turned to other matters.

The tendency to perfunctory consideration was accentuated by the nature of the policies the Committee presented. So often they involved elaboration of policies long accepted by the ALP, new expressions of old principles or even entry into policy areas which, while new for Labor and often for Australian Federal politics, did not conflict with the basic goals of delegates and the Branches they represented. Thus the 1963 Federal Conference found little difficulty in passing unanimously a series of Education Committee recommendations which provided the basis of a Federal Labor education policy. Most delegates agreed that the Commonwealth's responsibilities should expand, especially in education, an area which the Liberals were believed to have ignored. Even those who guarded the interests of State Labor Governments believed that Commonwealth-State co-operation could be preserved under the scheme. Thus Labor moved decisively into a new area of responsibility.\textsuperscript{115} The same Federal Conference unanimously adopted a series of 'alterations and additions to policy progressive reforms' presented by the Economic Planning Committee. These items included,

\textsuperscript{114} G.M. Bryant, interview.

\textsuperscript{115} ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 34–6. For the details of Labor's growing interest in a Federal role in education, see the early pages of chapter 3, above.
inter alia, 'immediate increases in social services', increased funds for housing, regulation of fringe banking institutions and hire purchase, prevention of inflation, reduction of taxation on lower incomes, investigation of monopolies and extension of public enterprises. Every proposal would have been unexceptionable in Chifley's or even Fisher's day. Politicians could see such proposals as vote winners or responses to short-term trends in the community; the most 'principled' non-politicians, who looked askance at plans which sought more electoral popularity, could accept many schemes as new ways of achieving the same ends. The National Superannuation scheme of 1969 attacked the same problems for which pension increases had been the panacea in the past; policies for new cities in the late 1960s found precedents in the 'regional development authorities' endorsed at the 1963 Conference; abolition of fees at universities served the same goal of equality in education as had tertiary scholarship schemes.

The acceptance of the Policy Committees and their success in changing the party platform can be traced through the 1960s. Dunstan could say even of the work of the two Policy Committees reporting to the 1961 Conference that they enabled delegates to produce 'constructive and radical re-thinking over a large area of policy and of a kind that had not taken place since Chifley's plans for post-war reconstruction'. The Sydney Morning Herald's correspondent attributed the 'outstanding success' of the 1963 Conference to the Committees' work. 'These reports were the basis of all the decisions made last week and deviations from their recommendations were the exception, not the rule.' During the

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117 Some of these proposals will be referred to later in this chapter.
119 SMH, 6 August 1963.
1965 Conference, which revised two-thirds of the existing platform, delegate J. Berinson (Western Australia) moved:

That all Committee reports be dealt with seriatim and except in those instances where opposition or amendment is indicated each item to be considered as carried unanimously without the necessity for motion or vote.

Although the motion was ruled out of order on procedural grounds delegates next adopted the Science Committee report, item by item, without debate, with one inconsequential amendment and by thirty-four, thirty-five or thirty-six votes to nil. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of the published Conference reports of 1963, 1965, 1967 and 1969 and the unpublished Minutes of the 1971 Conference is the frequency with which the word 'Carried' appears opposite a motion to adopt a Policy Committee recommendation. In June 1967, Chamberlain estimated that ninety to ninety-five per cent of Committee recommendations were accepted. This estimate applies just as well to those Conferences after as to those before it was made; the ease of passage of the great bulk of Committee recommendations was all the more remarkable in view of the tangles the party involved itself in over other matters being discussed simultaneously, such as state aid.

120 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 30-4. The two-thirds estimate was widely used and based on Whitlam's remark to the Conference: 'When Conference met the Platform consisted of fourteen closely printed pages. If the Conference reports are adopted, nine of those pages will have been rewritten' (Official Report, 258). In 1969, Wyndham estimated that 75 per cent of the platform had been revised in the last five years (Australian, 17 February 1969).

121 For Chamberlain's estimate: Western Sun, June 1967, 1-2. This estimate was used by Turner, 'Who, whom? ...', 23-4. Some examples from the unpublished Minutes of the 1971 Conference underline the phenomenon:
(1) All except two of eighty Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee recommendations or platform alterations and agenda items adopted; the other two adopted as amended (these were on the controversial issues of conscription and the American base at Pine Gap); all other proposed amendments defeated easily; almost without exception, successful platform amendments carried to nil; (2) Ten votes on the Fuel and Energy Committee
Who were the Standing Policy Committees? From the gradual beginnings of the system in the late 1950s, politicians had been important members of them. The table shows the position between 1963 and 1973:

Table 5.1: Composition of ALP Standing Policy Committees, 1963-1973, by Committee Places held by Various Categories of Committee Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Committees</th>
<th>Federal MPs</th>
<th>State MPs</th>
<th>Total MPs</th>
<th>FX Members</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total No. of Places</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12 (48%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>14 (56%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43 (57%)</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
<td>48 (64%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62 (58%)</td>
<td>9 (8%)</td>
<td>71 (66%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39 (53%)</td>
<td>8 (11%)</td>
<td>47 (64%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incomplete)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53 (63%)</td>
<td>14 (17%)</td>
<td>67 (80%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>209 (57%)</td>
<td>38 (10%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>247 (67%)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Official Reports of Conferences, except 1971 (see below).

121 (continued) report carried by 31-44 votes to 6-0; (3) Five votes on the Transport Committee recommendations carried by 44-45 to 2-0; (4) Even where solid debates occurred, such as on Industry (over socialism), Resources and Rural (on rural subsidies) and industrial (over penal clauses) the great majority of Committee recommendations went through, although in the last two cases the recommendations modified were the more important and controversial ones: Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/116/13. For comparisons between the ease of passage of most Committee recommendations in 1965 and the simultaneous struggles over state aid: CT, 9 August 1965; Nation, 16 October 1965; West Australian, 7 August 1965.


123 (a) These are the memberships of Committees as they appear on their reports to the Conference in the year given. There were occasional changes of Committee membership in the years between Conferences. The 1971 Conference Committee list could not be obtained and the figures are derived from a list of names and addresses dated December 1971, i.e. after the Conference. The 1969 list is incomplete because not all Committees reported to the Conference and a complete membership list was unavailable. (b) This excludes the Immigration Review and Legal Advisory Committees in 1965 and the NACE in 1969 (the latter did not report in 1967) which were technically not Standing Committees. (c) Excludes Federal Executive members who were also politicians. (d) Does not include the Federal Secretary acting as Committee Secretary, as Wyndham did for fourteen Committees in 1967.
Once the structure was established politicians dominated it. They did so for the same reasons as they were drawn upon in earlier times for policy advice: expertise, interest in policy, willingness to do the job and ability to travel without cost to the party. Their presence meant that the 'working material' of Conferences, the reports Conferences considered, came from bodies more informed by judgments of merits and electoral acceptability than were the old-style Conference committees.

Who were the politicians? The 247 places were occupied by ninety politicians, sixty-eight from the Federal Parliament, twenty from the State Parliaments and two who occupied places as both State and Federal politicians. Thirty of the ninety occupied three or more places, as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Places</th>
<th>Politician</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>J. Keeffe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>G. Whitlam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>G. Bryant, S. Cohen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>J. Cairns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>F. Crean, L. Murphy, H. Webb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>L. Barnard, C. Cameron, D. Dunstan (S), G. Duthie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>K. Beazley, F. Collard, M. Cross, F. Dittmer, H. Jenkins (S/F), A. Luchetti, M. Nicholls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A. Fraser, J. Harrison, H. Hudson (S), A. Mulvihill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>N. Beaton, J. Cavanagh, K. Enderby, W. Hayden, D. McClelland, T. Uren, D. Willesee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = State Parliamentarian; S/F = Held places as both State and Federal Parliamentarian.
Three important caveats should be entered regarding this table. First, some of the politicians held places as Federal Executive members serving as Chairmen. While this did not necessarily mean they contributed any less to the Committee, such positions were sometimes allocated on availability rather than ability and knowledge. Taking account of such Chairmanships alters the picture in the table. Thus, ten of Keeffe's places were held in this fashion, against only two of Whitlam's; Cohen held two positions as Federal Executive member - Chairman, Murphy, four, Webb, five and Nicholls, three. Secondly, the range of interests differs widely. The method of construction of the table does not distinguish between membership of one Committee over a number of years and membership of different Committees. Whitlam, for instance, was a member thrice of Economic Planning Committees, twice of Foreign Affairs Committees and once each of Papua New Guinea, Civil Liberties, Aboriginals, Industrial and Automation and Urban Development Committees. In contrast, Cairns' eight places comprised Economic Planning, five, and Foreign Affairs, three, and Crean's seven, Economic Planning, four, and Social Services, three. Thirdly, and most importantly, the Federal Leader and his Deputy occupied a special position. Since early 1963 they had been invited to attend all Policy Committee meetings. While Calwell was usually too busy as Leader to take great advantage of this, Whitlam revelled

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Two minor caveats may be added: (1) Some politicians also filled places before and/or after they were politicians. These places have been excluded. (2) Names of some Committees and distribution of responsibilities between them changed over time. These changes affect neither the table nor the supplementary information.
in it. By late 1965, a journalist concluded, after a long interview with Whitlam, that he was 'indefatigable in, and in some, indispensable to' the Committees which reported to the 1965 Federal Conference. Yet Whitlam was appointed only to one 1965 Committee. Similarly, after a change in the rules for Committees in 1966 made the Leader and his Deputy ex-officio members of each Committee, Whitlam contributed to Committees other than those to which he was elected by the Federal Executive or the Federal Caucus.

We shall return shortly to the relative contributions of different people and groups to the Policy Committees and to electoral policy generally. First, we must look at the other categories in Table 5.1. 'Federal Executive members' covers places occupied by members of that

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126 Bulletin, 11 December 1965 (Brian Johns). In March 1965, Whitlam had told a television audience that the Parliamentary Leaders had much influence, usually the determining influence, on policy, although this was not obvious to the public. To make it so, the Federal Leaders should become full members of the Federal Executive and Conference (Oakes, Whitlam PM, 123).

127 The 1966 rule changes provided for nine-member Committees comprising a Chairman elected by and from the Federal Executive, one member elected by the Federal Caucus, five members elected by the Federal Executive and the Leader and his Deputy ex-officio. A meeting in 1970 removed the stipulation of nine members but did not alter the other rules: ALP, Special Commonwealth Conference, July 1966; Report, Findings and Documents, 60; FX 25-26 February 1970, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/121/48.
body (other than members who were also politicians) appointed as Committee Chairmen or elected by the Executive as ordinary members. Thus Oliver chaired Foreign Affairs Committees, Hartley, a Northern Development Committee, and Colbourne, Economic Planning Committees, while Holt, Hartley and T. Burns of Queensland were ordinary members of Foreign Affairs, Repatriation and Communications and the Arts Committees, respectively. 128

Who, then, were 'Others'? All were elected by the Federal Executive but none were members of it. Some were senior members of the party or the Labour movement, such as M. McCarney, New South Wales Central Executive member and Secretary of the Vehicle Builders' union (Education Committee, 1963-65), J.A. Mulvihill, Assistant Secretary, New South Wales Branch (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1963, remained a member as a Senator), J.A. Bale, C.H. Fitzgibbon and T.J. Doyle, State Executive members and transport union officials (Transport Committee, 1965) and R.J. Hawke, Australian Council of Trade Unions (Economic Planning and Industrial Committees after 1965). Others less senior in the party but possessing particular expertise included J.W. Wood, a former Assistant Secretary of the Victorian Branch, but closely acquainted with education during his Presidency of the Victorian Council of State Schools' Organisations (Education Committee, 1963-65 and later a member of the NACE), K. Crook, unsuccessful candidate for an unwinnable Federal seat in 1966, academic geologist, member of Committees on Science and Resources, K. Inall, member of similar Committees, a scientist and ALP branch President, and P. Young, unsuccessful candidate in 1969, a former Army officer, who became a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee.

128 Table 5.1, by including among 'politicians' Federal Executive members who were also politicians, understates the 'Federal Executive members' category.
The party credentials of people in this category, especially those not senior members of affiliated trade unions or Branch officials, were usually not the main reason for their being invited to join Policy Committees. The group of 'others' are best seen as the tip of an 'iceberg' of potential policy advisers whose common characteristics were their sympathy to the party and their expertise. The appearance of such people as formal members of Policy Committees was only a symptom of a movement which some party decisionmakers hoped would contribute greatly to Labor's electoral policy. 'There has never been a time in the history of the Labor Party', said Whitlam in February 1967, 'in which so many people of such diverse experience and expertise were ready and available to assist the party'. Some of these 'friendly advisers' became members of Policy Committees, others contributed through contacts who were members of Committees, others found points of access through individual politicians or machine members. Thus, economist A.R. Hall provided Calwell with assistance on housing policy while his colleagues H. Arndt, K. Hancock and R.I. Downing may have been suggested as contributors by Professor G. Firth, a member of the Economic Planning Committee. When Downing set out a proposed national superannuation scheme, Wyndham sent it for comments to T.M. Fitzgerald of the Sydney Australian, 18 February 1967. See also an earlier remark in similar vein: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 256. Regarding the partisanship of policy contributors in general, the remarks of two of them may be quoted: 'I had been active in the ALP locally but this didn't have much bearing for Whitlam or Mathews' (his private secretary) (P.N. Troy, interview). J.S. Deeble and his collaborator on proposals for a national health scheme, R.B. Scotton, were not ALP members. Scotton had actually been President of the Liberal Club at Sydney University while Deeble had been a Fabian. 'Like thousands of others at this time', both became sympathetic to Labor during the 1960s. Deeble had the impression that a fellow worker on Labor's health policy was hampered by active party membership, tending to push too hard within the party for her favoured plans (J.S. Deeble, interview).
Morning Herald and C.J. Lloyd, a journalist on Barnard's staff. F.M. Daly, MP, suggested that G.A. Lonsdale, a dentist and veteran party member, be asked for a submission on health policy and Wyndham later asked Lonsdale to join the Health Committee. When he wanted some information on Indonesian nuclear capabilities for use by the Foreign Affairs Committee, Wyndham sought it from E.K. Inall, a physicist and party member, known to him from Inall's work on the Science Committee. When N.W.F. Fisher, an economist and party member, wrote to Wyndham offering assistance, he was asked 'to put your views down on paper in a form which would be suitable for inclusion in the Party's Platform'.

This chapter is constructed around the idea of 'by-passing' the deficiencies of the coalitional and Federal structure. By-passing was attempted in a number of ways. Whitlam and Wyndham tried unsuccessfully to replace the Federal Conference. The introduction of ex-officio politicians to the Federal bodies achieved results of a different kind. The development of Policy Committees reduced the Federal Executive's role in electoral policymaking almost to nil and the role of the Federal Conference to the passage almost unaltered of Committee reports. Under the party rules, the Conference, the supreme policymaker, still had to endorse Committee reports, but Conference delegates as such or as members

130 These details are based on: Hall to Calwell, attached to Minutes, Housing Committee, 29 June 1965; correspondence between Wyndham and Arndt, Downing, Firth and Hancock, c.1968-69; Wyndham to Fitzgerald, Wyndham to Lloyd, 24 June 1968; Wyndham to Daly, 5 January, Wyndham to Lonsdale, 18 February 1965; Wyndham to Inall, 4 February 1965; Fisher to Wyndham, 7 July 1966; Wyndham to Fisher, 15 February 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/2/envelope 'Housing Committee Minutes 29 June 1965, 1st Meeting'; 126/65-7; 29/Economic Planning & Trade Committee FXC/9; 46/Outwards Correspondence 16/11/64-31/3/65/125, 342; 46/Outwards Correspondence 16/11/64-31/3/65/212; 30/Federal Executive Committees - National Fuel Policy FXC/19.
of Conference Committees were relieved of the detailed consideration of electoral policy proposals. Labor's platform and policy speech were to be constructed elsewhere.

WHITLAM AND NETWORKS OF ADVISERS

The establishment of Policy Committees and the influx of Parliamentarians to the Federal bodies institutionalised the influence of politicians, those Labor men with a broader constituency than the party alone and, consequently, a broader outlook. The presence of politicians, especially in the Federal Conference and Executive, drew the teeth of the harmful 'faceless men' image, while the inclusion in Committees of friendly advisers gave the party access to a wider range of thought than previously. Together the changes diluted or by-passed some of the defects of the old Federal machinery as a maker of electoral policy.

However, the Policy Committees were not free of problems. First, the Committees' success depended to some extent upon how often they met. Conferences had suffered from lack of time for discussion; the Committees were to be more leisurely. Yet the evidence available suggests many Committees met infrequently. Meeting schedules had to suit politicians with myriad other duties, party administrators coping with routine work and frequent elections, and private citizens who had competing priorities. The evidence suggests most Committees met from one to three times between biennial Federal Conferences, with meetings covering one or two days each. Before the 1965 Conference a number of Committees met only once and that in the last few weeks before the Conference. The seven meetings of the Economic Planning Committee which reported to the 1963 Conference were probably not typical of Committees...
reporting to that Conference and became even less typical of Committees during the 1960s. By 1969, the Resources Development Committee could dispose of its commitments in less than six hours and even the National Advisory Committee on Education (technically not a Standing Committee but standing to Conference in the same relationship as they did) found that the remnants of the state aid issue did not detain it longer than a weekend. 131

The lack of meetings may have meant that discussion was skimped or that there was little to discuss. Construction of a new channel to bypass a faulty one does not mean necessarily that there will be water to flow along it. The Committees were not only supposed to recommend on State Branch items but also to produce and develop comprehensive and modern policies able to be implemented by a Federal Labor Government.

To some observers, the 'hey day' of the Committees was from 1963 to 1965, after which they ran out of ideas or could do little but tinker with fairly comprehensive and settled policies which lay awaiting Labor's accession to power. Thus when Wyndham wrote to his new Leader in 1967 he suggested that, after the work done in 1965, not all Committees need meet or do more than make any necessary slight changes by correspondence. The transport, industrial, social services, health, housing and science sections of the platform, he suggested, needed little change. Other sections needed work, either because the existing version was weak,

131 These estimates are derived from interviews with Committee members and Minutes and reports of nine separate Committees over the years 1963-69, found in party records and published Conference Reports. A factor militating against more frequent meetings was their cost. The 1969 Federal Conference was told that the total cost of the system in 1968 was $7,800, mainly for members' fares. One Committee met once at a cost of $1,100, another twice for $1,300 — and produced no recommendations! (Australian, 29 July 1969).
because key members had been absent or because the Committee had not met at all. Wyndham was encouraging individual Committee members and sympathetic experts to provide ideas. He wrote to one member of the Northern Development Committee:

I am sure you will agree that it is one of the weakest parts of the Platform. Unfortunately, the previous Committee gave very little attention to the platform and with a normal Federal Conference being held next year, I think it is time for people like yourself, who have an expert knowledge of the problem, to consider re-writing that particular section of the platform.

Irregular attendance or insignificant contributions by Committee members meant much work devolved on a few members. Thus Crean complained that two fellow Committee members had been given the credit for an Economic Planning Committee report to which they had hardly contributed. Gaps could be filled by contributions from sympathetic experts with access to the Committee but there is some evidence that Committee 'networks' were rather incomplete and incapable of providing a wide range of expert contributions. We have seen that whether a sympathetic

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132 Wyndham to Whitlam, 15 February 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/31/Federal Parliamentary Labor Party - Leader (E.G. Whitlam) Correspondence 1967 - FPLP/4. Writing to the Chairman of the Legal and Constitutional Committee, Wyndham told of the consequences of infrequent meeting in one case: 'The work of this committee has been inhibited in the past because of the inability to get members together, and for that reason some of the items which appear in the Platform have not been reviewed' (Wyndham to Murphy, 10 March 1969, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Legal & Constitutional Committee).

133 Wyndham to F. Sweeney, 23 June 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Committees - Development - FXC/17. Since the 1965 Committee comprised seven politicians (and Chamberlain as Chairman) its lack of work may have been a function of the politicians' lack of time. But the new Committee seems to have met only once and suggested few alterations to the 1967 Conference, suggesting instead that a more detailed statement be prepared for the 1969 Conference and the elections in that year (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1967, 12, 56). The 1969 Conference received no such report.

134 F. Crean, interview.
expert became a Committee member often depended on his work becoming known to individual decisionmakers, on links with professional networks or on chance. The limited evidence available suggests that similar factors influenced the information available to Committees. While the Secretary of the Science Committee, K. Crook, wrote to a cross section of Australian scientists in 1965 seeking contributions to Labor's policymaking process in that area, the party's records contain little evidence of other attempts to establish comprehensive networks to service Committees. After the Federal Secretariat closed in April 1969, there disappeared even the rudimentary co-ordination Wyndham provided in the intervals between his other duties. The new part-time Secretary, M.J. Young, had even less time to spare.

135 The most detailed evidence of recruitment of advice relates not to a Policy Committee but to the setting up of a committee to inquire into medical benefits funds. It may be indicative of the methods by which experts became Committee members or contributors. Letters were sent to likely prospects, one of whom declined since it was not his field and another of whom had gone overseas. A third, M. Everett, Minister for Health in Tasmania, accepted. Wyndham then asked M. Cass, a doctor and member of the VCE, for suitable names or 'we will end with somebody like Arthur Clarey!! [a Victorian MLA and accountant]'. Cass suggested J. Paterson, a union research officer, who accepted, while admitting he lacked specific knowledge of the field and asking if Wyndham knew of anyone who had such knowledge for him to contact. Meanwhile, J. Pomroy, a Treasury statistician, had accepted the third position and commenced researching and talking 'with a few well-informed people' (Correspondence, October 1964-February 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Health Funds Committee; 46/Outwards Corresp. 1/9/64-31/10/64).

136 Draft letter, c. early 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Northern Development Committee. The letter included the words: 'One of the main functions of the Committee will be to act as a clearing house for the views of the scientific community in Australia and the transmittal of these views to the Leadership of the A.L.P.' Crook received about one hundred replies, containing many complaints about the state of relations between science and government, as well as many useful comments. Although to some extent the addressees were selected because of their known ALP sympathies there was some concern among other scientists about being seen to be partisan. Crook later visited many of the respondents to follow up their comments. He retains complete files from the period (K.A.W. Crook, interview).
If the party failed to tap all available services and relied instead on familiar ones soon exhausted, the Committees risked losing inspiration and policies faced stagnation. Like the party of earlier years, Labor of the Committee era could have become the advocate of an immutable set of precepts rather than a seeker of relevant and modern policies. The success of by-passing channels thus depended on the quality and quantity of what flowed through them. From the beginning of the system, not long after he became Deputy Federal Leader, Whitlam had done much to ensure both criteria were maintained. Not only did he sit upon or attend more Committees than anyone else, but also did he provide data and, often, well-worked proposals. Thus the 1969 Conference adopted Committee recommendations for a national superannuation scheme and abolition of the means test over six years, for a national health scheme financed from a specified portion of

137C.J. Lloyd, interview, made the point about the effect of the Secretariat's closure. Because of their small size, infrequency of meeting, lack of staff and the competing responsibilities of their members, Committees relied on inputs from politicians, experts and State Branches rather than what they could do themselves. Some party officials had hoped for more. As Wyndham reminded the Legal and Constitutional Committee, a Committee 'not only attends to matters specifically referred to it but also has the right to initiate consideration of any matter which it thinks should be deleted from, included in or altered in the Platform of the Party'. He set out legal matters on which the Platform was silent: Legal and Constitutional Committee: Memorandum for the attention of the Committee prepared by the General Secretary, 2 September 1968, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Legal & Constitutional Committee. This may have been merely a reminder to an idle Committee (see note 132 above) but another piece of evidence suggests that few Committees took such initiatives: Clyde Cameron suggested that the Industrial Committee, under his Chairmanship, was the first to take such initiatives when it took a comprehensive policy to the 1971 Conference. Other Committees followed suit and agenda items from the Branches declined in importance (C.R. Cameron, interview). Some Committees before 1971 had done more than just recommend on agenda items and platform changes but most lacked the time or facilities for their own research. Individual members may have done research and communicated the results to their Committee but generally the Committees seem to have been reactive rather than initiating.
taxation revenue and for an Australian Schools Commission to dispense Commonwealth funds to all schools on the basis of need. While the health scheme at least existed in some form in the platform already, Whitlam was given credit for its latest formulation and for the other two innovations. He had certainly promoted them publicly and in the Policy Committees. For some observers the 1969 Conference was primarily a process of endorsing policies devised by Whitlam.138

Whitlam's contributions to party policy can be traced from the early years of his political career. Freudenberg implies that Whitlam was largely responsible for the earlier version of a national health scheme, adopted by the Federal Conference of 1959.139 By 1961, Whitlam was contributing papers on national development, an Australian newspaper commission and housing. The report to Conference of the Economic Planning Committee, of which he was a member, outlined methods by which the Commonwealth could play a constructive role in the national economy within the existing Constitution.140 This was the argument Whitlam had put in his Chifley Memorial Lecture of 1957, had developed

138 ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1969, 139-40, 143, 177-9, 197; Read, The 1969 Federal Conference .... While some later went as far as describing the Conference as 'in effect, a showcase for Whitlam's policies' (Laurie Oakes, 'The Years of Preparation', Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, 32), most contemporary accounts stressed rather the smoothness of the Conference, its amicability, the lack of bloc voting, and the rise of new, younger Parliamentary and party figures, rather than the sources of the important innovations (Age, 4 August 1969; Australian, 2, 7 August 1969; Bulletin, 9 August 1969). This confirms the view of seven politician-delegates interviewed by Read in 1970 (Read, The 1969 Federal Conference ..., 26-7) and the general tenor of her thesis that the Conference was important especially in a public relations sense. Still, it was well known that Whitlam had publicly espoused the named policies and his centrality may have been assumed.

139 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100.

during his membership of the Constitutional Review Committee (1956-59) established by the Menzies Government and had expounded to the members of the Economic Planning Committee and the officers of the party in January 1961. The 1963 Economic Planning Committee report benefited even more from Whitlam's activities and other Committee reports on rural policy, foreign affairs and defence and the 'methods' section of the Federal platform all bore the marks of his work.

Whence did Whitlam draw his inspiration? Three sources may be distinguished: his own experience and career; his Parliamentary work and his accompanying research; his contacts with friendly advisers. This thesis is neither a biography of Whitlam nor a study of the development of his political philosophy, but each source can be elaborated insofar as it relates to the general theme of 'by-passing'.

Much of Whitlam's policy initiative was directed to the suburban dweller, a role he knew well. 'I am the first Labor leader who has ever represented the urban sprawl, who has represented the outer suburbs. I have lived in these areas [in 1968] for twenty-one years.' He had

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On the Foreign Affairs and Economic Committees, see notes 125, 126 above. Whitlam was a member of the committee on clause 3(b) (i) of 'Methods' ('To clothe the Commonwealth Parliament with unlimited powers and with the duty and authority to create States possessing delegated Constitutional powers'), which suggested to the Conference such measures as reviving the Interstate Commission as provided in the Commonwealth Constitution, transfer of State powers to the Commonwealth, use of section 96 grants and legislation extending Federal responsibilities - all of which could be traced to the recommendations of the Constitutional Review Committee and to Whitlam's preferences. The Rural Committee provided a document 'for information' which referred to Constitutional Review Committee recommendations regarding organised marketing. Whitlam may have provided help here. The Conference took no action on these parts of both Committee reports (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 47-8, 58, 83, 90-3).
experienced their inadequate sewerage, transport, health, educational, recreation and cultural facilities. The solution to these problems also was rooted deep in his own background. Brought up in a public service family in Canberra, inspired by the unsuccessful attempt of the Curtin Government in 1944 to transfer to the Commonwealth by referendum increased powers over post war reconstruction and made aware by his work on the Constitutional Review Committee of the possibilities of shifting the constitutional balance, he sought alleviation of suburban and other problems by an expanded role for the central government. Looking back in 1975 to his Chifley Memorial Lecture of 1957, delivered in the midst of his work on the Constitutional Review Committee, Whitlam could see in that early exposition the basis of his later work. 'The themes foreshadowed in that lecture became the basis for the substantial rewriting of the Platform at subsequent Federal Conferences of the Australian Labor Party, particularly the great reform Conferences of 1967, 1969 and 1971.'

Secondly, from the time he took his place in the House of Representatives in February 1953 Whitlam used Parliamentary forms and his own skills to amass information upon which to base arguments for the

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143 Oakes, Whitlam PM, 183-4.
best solutions to the problems of Australian post war society as he perceived them. His research files dwarfed those of his fellow back-benchers. He indexed Hansards. He asked ministers thousands of questions on notice, revising the information with further questions on the same topics. 'His speeches were well-argued, and backed by reams of facts and figures - a testimony', writes Oakes, 'to his general knowledge, his work in the Parliamentary library, and the efficiency of his comprehensive filing system'. Others attest to his prodigious memory, to his ability to make an informed contribution on a wide range of subjects. From these activities grew his ability to make a larger contribution than any other individual to the platform revisions of the 1960s and to the Labor Government of 1972-75. 'To find the sources of his ideas', concluded Race Mathews, one of his private secretaries in Opposition, 'one has to look back through his Parliamentary questions and speeches over the years'.

Nevertheless, perhaps Whitlam's greatest strength was his ability to enlist the aid of what we have called 'friendly advisers' - people with a general commitment to Labor and the goals it espoused, often party members, always with some form of expert knowledge. He sought information also on the solutions developed by 'comparable countries' to the problems Australia faced. His skill in tapping and utilising such advisers and information was recognised almost as soon as was the extent of his contribution to electoral policy.

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147 R. Mathews, interview.
Ideas are his accessories. He uses them. Whitlam may not be original but he has an uncommon regard for the importance of seizing on the best ideas that are available. He plays the entrepreneur well — once taken he works hard to assimilate the ideas unto himself .... Mr. Whitlam has made enthusiastic and intelligent use of outside advisers, extending well beyond his home State .... Almost invariably the Deputy's schemes will be the expression of the ideas of experts, usually academic, in the various fields, with whom he keeps in frequent contact.

Such advice had always been available to Labor but Whitlam drew upon it more widely than anyone else in the party. He was the entrepreneur and interpreter (into a form saleable to the electorate) of the schemes of specialists. 'He drew on a wide variety of sources, to be sure, academics, interest groups and so on, but he provided the conceptual integration and very often the minutiae.' He mixed the raw material others provided with the fruits of his own research in Parliament and placed the whole within the broad framework of an increased role for the Commonwealth government. He then put the mixture before the electorate as programmes that Labor would undertake. He stood at the centre of a network of policy advisers but saw himself — especially once elected Leader — as the network's mouthpiece and most important component.


149 See chapter 1, pp.62-4 for the earlier sources of some of this advice, this chapter, note 90, for the use made of it during the preparation of policies for the 1961 campaign and Whitlam's speech to the 1965 Conference for a reference to the advisers 'on tap' at the Australian National University for Labor politicians during Parliamentary sittings (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 256). While Whitlam himself may have drawn on the last-named source, other evidence suggests use of the ANU by other MPs circa 1965, especially by Calwell, was haphazard: H.W. Arndt, 'Three Times 18: An Essay in Political Autobiography', Quadrant, 13, 3 (May-June 1969) 33; C.J. Lloyd, interview. 150 R. Mathews, interview.
There's no scheme anywhere that will make any progress unless it can be hitched to a politician. You have to interest a politician. And I was a pretty aggressive sort of politician.\textsuperscript{151}

Whitlam, pursuing goals he had long held, gleaned ideas and information from his own research, Parliamentary work and experience and from a network of policy advisers, interpreted them into an electorally presentable form and advocated them aggressively. The Federal Conference's role was confined to endorsing proposals put to it, formally by Policy Committees, informally by Whitlam and his alternative policymaking process. This allowed that by-passing of the machine's drawbacks which the changes to the Federal bodies had only partially achieved and which the Policy Committee system had developed before it threatened to lose inspiration. In combination with the changes the new Conference and the Committee\textsuperscript{152} had achieved, the 'Whitlam network' produced an important restructuring of the electoral policy or platform making processes of the ALP in the five years between Whitlam's accession to the Leadership in 1967 and the Labor victory in 1972. Since it was so important in by-passing the old Conference and Executive based structure, we shall examine this network in more detail.\textsuperscript{152}

'Whitlam might have been the chief policy maker and the sales director but he certainly had a large staff under him.'\textsuperscript{153} The co-ordination of the network and, increasingly, many of its substantial products came from the small private staff of Whitlam and his Deputy,

\textsuperscript{151}E.G. Whitlam, interview.

\textsuperscript{152}Some overlap with earlier pages in this chapter is inevitable since the same people often were involved in both Committees and network.

\textsuperscript{153}Richard Farmer, 'The Victory Period', Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, 72. In another business analogy, which makes Whitlam somewhat more central, Cairns described him as 'the managing director who wanted to keep control of things' (J.F. Cairns, interview).
Barnard. Thus John Menadue, Whitlam's private secretary since 1960, early in 1967 asked a number of contacts in Australian universities to act as continuing policy advisory groups. When Mathews replaced Menadue in August 1967, he maintained the contacts, seeking their advice on new developments and monitoring the flow of information they provided for Whitlam's speeches in Parliament and in public. Contributors like J.S. Deeble (national health) and P.N. Troy (transport and urban planning) recall that they saw Whitlam himself infrequently, dealing instead, by telephone or in person, with Mathews. Most sources suggest that Mathews was the central co-ordinator of the network, but Peter Cullen (1966-69) and Richard Hall (after 1970) were responsible for contacts with specialised contributors such as public servants and airlines regarding aviation matters (Cullen) and trade unions and the Catholic Church (Hall). Freudenberg, Whitlam's press secretary from 1967, shaped the disparate information into the distinctive literary style which marked Whitlam's main speeches. Mathews and later Hall produced more routine speeches. The two Leaders' staffs also channeled material to party Policy Committees and produced almost daily press releases on current issues. Finally, the staffs themselves researched

The following paragraphs are based on: J.F. Cairns, M.H. Cass, K.A.W. Crook, P. Cullen, J.S. Deeble, interviews; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100-5; C.J. Lloyd, R. Mathews, R. Murray, interviews; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 89-90, 183; Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, 60-1; P.N. Troy, E.G. Whitlam, Interviews.

There is some disagreement about these university contacts. Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100-1, suggests that, apart from the advisers on a national health scheme, the advisory groups faded away. Troy, a major contributor to policy himself, and Mathews support this view partially, at least regarding continuing sustained contributions as against ad hoc answers to questions. But Cullen (who resigned in 1969) is more generous to the universities while Lloyd feels that the intention was perhaps not as elaborate in conception as Freudenberg says (interviews).
material for their employers' speeches. Menadue, following Whitlam's
custom, had collected large masses of material for the Leader's
speeches, especially on rural matters and the national health scheme.
Mathews became expert in social welfare and education. Hall
contributed material on aboriginal affairs, Cullen on aviation and
Papua New Guinea. James Spigelman, a private secretary to Whitlam
during the final months of Opposition, produced material on government
secrecy. Clem Lloyd, Barnard's private secretary from 1967, much of
the revised defence policy of 1967 and 1969. By about 1970, all could
draw on the developing Legislative Research Service of the Commonwealth
Parliament for research papers and information. 156

The private staff of the two Leaders never numbered more than
four or five during the period 1967-72. 157 The contributions they
co-ordinated, apart from those they, Whitlam and Barnard provided
themselves from their own experience and from 'comparable countries
overseas', came from a group which overlapped the non-politician
membership of, and contributors to, the Policy Committees. Thus Keith

156 Menadue became Labor's candidate in the rural seat of Hume in 1966;
Mathews had been Secretary of the Victorian Fabian Society and of the
VCE's Education Committee, largely writing the latter's Looking to the
Future pamphlets on education policy (1964 and 1967); Hall specialised
in industrial journalism; Cullen had developed an interest in transport
while private secretary to Senator Kennelly; Spigelman wrote Secrecy,
Sydney, 1972; Lloyd wrote L.H. Barnard, Australian Defence-Policy and
Programmes, Melbourne, 1969. Lloyd and Cullen both mentioned the role
of the Legislative Research Service in providing information,
especially on education, welfare and defence matters (interviews).
The author was a member of this Service, an arm of the public service,
during 1975 and formed the impression that some of its members regarded
the work for the Labor Opposition during 1970-72 as its finest
achievement. On the Service, see: A.L. Moore, E.J.G. Prince &
Oliver Mendelssohn, 'Parliament and Research', Politics, 9 (May 1974)
83-6.

157 The success of Labor's small staff provoked Prime Minister Gorton to
complain during the 1969 election campaign that he himself lacked
'Mr Whitlam's large [sic] staff' - which was actually smaller than his
Crook, a Policy Committee member, assisted with science and energy matters. Dr. Moss Cass, who became a member of Parliament in 1969, had contributed from at least 1964 his professionally based ideas on health and welfare matters to State and Federal committees. He introduced Whitlam and others to sympathetic academic and practising doctors. Other contributors were unearthed by Menadue and Mathews. Ruth Inall, a health economist and honorary Hospital Board member, assisted with health policy. Health economists, J.S. Deeble and R.B. Scotton of the Melbourne University Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, provided detailed and continuing assistance in forming a scheme for a national health service based on a taxation contribution. Dr. Rex Patterson, a public servant concerned with northern development, enhanced Whitlam's own knowledge of this subject, while winning and holding the Dawson seat for Labor in 1966. Patrick Troy and John Paterson, urban planners, assisted in an area where Whitlam had a special interest. Economists at Flinders University advised on the car industry, Professor Richard Downing discussed the implications of his national superannuation concept, Professor Keith Hancock journeyed to Canberra to assist with Labor's attack on the 1968 and 1969 Budgets, Professor G. Firth contributed both to the Economic Policy Committee and the Whitlam network, Professor Zelman Cowen was invited to assist the Legal and Constitutional Committee, whose leading spirits were the Senate Leaders, Murphy and Cohen. 158

The Whitlam network neither provided all policy inputs nor worked completely independently of other channels. By-passing the Federal bodies and their defects did not mean the whole electoral policymaking process was shifted to one alternative structure. Nevertheless, Whitlam's influence pervaded structures other than the one he headed and his office co-ordinated. Thus Crean believed that the Caucus Committees were probably more significant than the Policy Committees of the Executive, whom they often provided with ideas which were adopted, partly through the influence of the Caucus representatives on the Policy Committees. Yet Whitlam himself was the most significant contributor of policies in Caucus, its Committees and the Executive's Committees. Whitlam's dominance over platform making was never seriously challenged in Caucus, according to Lloyd:

You have to remember there were two Caucuses: the first, after the defeat of 1966, had a lot of the old 'dinosaurs' who could contribute little. This put a big burden on Whitlam but one which he was not unhappy to carry. Caucus was a void and he filled it. By the time the second Caucus arrived after 1969, Whitlam was entrenched and even most of his traditional opponents were prepared to follow his lead.

Most of the Executive's Policy Committees, too, found that Whitlam's network provided their most fruitful sources. 'In no field did Whitlam contribute less than half', concluded Mathews with only moderate hyperbole. 'In those policy fields that mattered, the focus of the

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159 F. Crean, interview. On the other hand, Troy, the outsider who dealt mainly with Whitlam's and Uren's offices, believed the Caucus Committees were 'insignificant. They only had a limited idea of policymaking: what can we dangle before the electorate?' (P.N. Troy, interview). The worth of Caucus Committees probably varied from Committee to Committee.
160 C.J. Lloyd, interview.
1972 policy speech, the input was overwhelmingly Whitlam's.' Cairns and Lloyd confirm the thrust of Mathews' remark. 161

Whitlam also provided the opportunity for the most important source of policy production and presentation apart from his own network, the system of 'shadow ministers'. In March 1967, Whitlam asked the Caucus to elect fourteen of its members to monitor the activities of Liberal ministers and, more importantly, to prepare for a future Labor Government. 162 Part of Whitlam's strategy as Opposition Leader was 'to build up people as "shadow ministers" so they'd [the public] be able to identify who would be in primary charge of various things if we are elected ...'. 163 While performance varied considerably, a number of

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161 J.F. Cairns, C.J. Lloyd, R. Mathews, interviews. Another aspect of Whitlam's relations with the Committees is suggested in Wyndham's letter to him as the new Leader. Not only did Wyndham ask Whitlam what policies could be presented by Committees dealing with economic planning, overseas investment, aborigines and New Guinea, but he also revealed his willingness to tailor the work of the Committees, especially those dealing with more controversial subjects, to Whitlam's strategic and policy preferences: 'As you know, I have held off convening them until you were safely installed and [sic] you would not find yourself restricted .... Foreign Affairs and Defence. This is a problem, as well you know. It is useless stalling the Committee, as Charlie [Oliver, its Chairman] intends. What we do with it, is the question: ... Education [The platform is too long]. But do we at this stage want to review State Aid because this will surely happen?': Wyndham to Whitlam, 15 February 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/31/Federal Parliamentary Labor Party - Leader (E.G. Whitlam) Correspondence 1967-FPLP/4.

162 SMH, 23 February, 2 March 1967. One observer pointed out that the shadow portfolios were arranged according to the structure of a future ALP Government (AFR, 2 March 1967).

163 Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, 45 (interview with Whitlam, August 1972); C.J. Lloyd, interview. Before 1967, despite an attempt to develop a shadow system in 1965, the Caucus had elected a fourteen member Executive, without designated responsibilities, and separate Caucus Committees. Whitlam described the old system thus: 'The Caucus Executive would meet for an hour a week, mainly to discuss "Who's going to take the Bill" [i.e. lead the Opposition in Parliamentary debate on the legislation] (E.G. Whitlam, interview).
shadows and other senior Caucus members, who became ministers in 1972, made notable contributions, not only to the 'selling' of policy and of themselves as future ministers, but to the making of policy as well. Thus, Cameron, shadow Minister for Labour, was largely responsible for the comprehensive industrial policy adopted by the 1971 Federal Conference. Murphy, shadow Attorney General, worked on civil liberties and law reform. Beazley, who became Education minister, contributed to aboriginal affairs, foreign affairs and education. Daly worked on immigration, Cass and Hayden on health and welfare, Patterson and A.J. Grassby on agriculture, Crean, shadow Treasurer, on economic policy, R.F.X. Connor on fuel and energy matters and Uren on urban and regional development.

On the eve of the 1972 Federal election shadow ministers, future ministers and senior Caucus members contributed to a book, *Towards a New Australia*, 'to identify the particular problems which would face an incoming Labor government, to explain how Labor would set up various structures to meet these problems, and to indicate the goals towards

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164. The following sentences are based on interviews with Beazley, Cameron, Cass, Crean, Crook, Cullen, Deeble, Lloyd, Mathews, Oliver, Troy and Whitlam.

165. Mathews described Cameron's contribution 'as the one big exception [to Whitlam's dominance]. He made it almost as much his own personal fief as Whitlam did the rest' (interview). Since this contribution was made through the Industrial Committee of the Executive, it enabled Cameron himself to provide the most enthusiastic verdict on the Committees as a whole: 'They prospered in spite of Whitlam' (C.R. Cameron, interview).

166. On Beazley in the Foreign Affairs Committee, see chapter 4, note 114.

167. Troy recalls that Uren's presentation of urban policy was often better received by non-specialists, including journalists, because it was not obscured by Freudenberg's 'literary' style as Whitlam's speeches on the same subject had been (interview).
which this planning would aspire'. At the same time, the Federal Executive was listening to the chief policy contributor, Whitlam, explaining the outline of the policy speech and listing the priorities for a Labor Government. When he had finished, the Executive resolved 'that the Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party be commended for the work that he has done in preparing the outline of the speech which recommends itself unanimously and enthusiastically to the Executive'.

The book, an exposition of their ideas and intended actions by a group of Federal Parliamentarians, bore neither the explicit imprimatur of, nor more than a passing reference to the party machine. The resolution was an effusive endorsement of a policy speech which owed little to the machine as such. The book and the resolution emphasised how far and how effectively the problems of the State-based machine had been by-passed in the making of Labor's electoral policy.

Conclusion

The previous three chapters showed how, in varying degrees, decisionmaking by the Federal Conference and Executive was influenced by the pursuit of State Branch goals, by personal factors, by various external pressures and by the search for system-maintenance (keeping the coalition together) and compromise decisions. The conflicting external and internal pressures were mediated through disjointed

168John McLaren, ed., Towards a New Australia, Melbourne, 1972, viii. The contributors were given as Whitlam (foreign affairs), Barnard (defence), C.J. Hurford (planning), Crean (economics), Cairns (tariffs), Murphy (science), Grassby (rural), Uren (urban), Wheeldon (civil liberties), D. McClelland (arts and media), D. Kennedy (education), Cass and Hayden (aspects of health and welfare). All except Kennedy (defeated), Hurford and Wheeldon became ministers later in the year.

incrementalism, partisan mutual adjustment and the processes of the garbage can. Hence, policies which Labor presented to the electors, such as its education policy in 1963 and its Vietnam policy in 1966, as well as decisions with less direct electoral impact, like those on unity tickets, were intricately connected with the party's internal politics. Thus they contained ambiguities, internal inconsistencies and curious concessions. At the same time, party Leaders made policy speeches containing many items on which the party as such had said nothing. There was an incomplete, scrappy platform and a series of lengthy, diffuse speeches.\\(^{170}\)

We have traced in this chapter three attempts to by-pass the deficiencies of the coalitional structure which led to the haphazard consideration of electoral policy. All three attempts contributed something not only to by-passing but also to the construction of a new, less rigid, structure for the making of electoral policy. The Federal machinery did not disappear. The Federal Leader's role changed. Formal changes involved grafting pieces onto the old structure, rather than wholesale replacement, but new types of people became important and the focus of the media's continuing fascination with the Labor Party shifted from the Federal Executive and Federal Conference.\\(^{171}\)

\\(^{170}\)See above, pp. 406-7.
\\(^{171}\)A relationship between the Federal policymaking machinery of the ALP and an outside structure was not unique: some writers have suggested that the main impetus of the wartime Labor Governments came not from the party machinery but from the public service. The Curtin and Chifley administrations, by this account, merely attached themselves to a burgeoning, confident public service and shared the credit for post war reconstruction. The Federal party machinery protected the Governments from radical rank and filers who believed the party-public servant tandem was moving too slowly. Deprived of bureaucratic inspiration by the defeat of 1949, Labor, in the eyes of many, lived on its memories, drew desultorily on the ideas of isolated Parliamentarians, allowed an already dated and incomplete platform to
Commencing in 1961, the Policy Committee system and the overlapping
Whitlam network drew on the services of politicians and friendly
advisers to expand and modernise Labor's platform with an eye to
solving problems perceived to exist in the community and to winning
votes from the community. The Federal Conference and Executive were
prepared to concede that the new structure and its incumbents were
performing tolerably well a task that the machinery had done badly or
not at all. Most Policy Committee reports were adopted by Conferences
with little change, the Federal Executive withdrew fairly easily from a
supervisory role, Whitlam as Leader was able to exert great personal
influence on electoral policy.

Two questions remain. First, did by-passing lead to changes in
Labor's relationship with the electors? Secondly, were the products of
by-passing, the policies produced, significantly different, in quantity
or nature, from what previously carried the label 'ALP'?

To answer the second question first. One measure of difference is
the size of the party's printed platform: in 1959, the platform covered
6\(\frac{1}{2}\) pages, by 1965 it had grown to 22\(\frac{1}{2}\) pages and by 1971 to 29\(\frac{1}{4}\) pages.
At the same time, the number of Conference resolutions, not part of the
platform but still formally binding on the whole party, grew from two
in 1959 to 42 in 1965 and 31 in 1971. Many of the resolutions and some
of the platform planks came from the Conference floor but, even allowing

171 (continued)
stagnate further and then turned inwards to its own factional battles
while hoping that the voters would ignore Labor disunity if bribed by
attractive, ad hoc election promises. For the 1940s: L.F. Crisp,
Ben Chifley, Croydon, Vic., 1963, especially chapters 14 and 17;
R.I.P.A. Study Group, 'Commonwealth Policy Co-ordination', Henry
Mayer, ed., Australian Politics: A Reader, 513-26; S. Encel, Cabinet
Government in Australia, Melbourne, 1962, 195; W.J. Waters, 'Labor,
Socialism and World War II', Labour History, 16 (May 1969), 14-19.
for these, Labor's electoral policy greatly expanded in conjunction with the establishment and expansion of methods of by-passing.

One can also measure the changes in the content of the policies through the 1960s by measuring the proportions of the platform under different headings. The measure is crude at best, since both the headings and the placement of planks under them change and the method makes no distinction between important and less important planks. However, the following table indicates general trends:

Table 5.3: Content of ALP Federal Platforms, 1959, 1965, 1971 (%).172

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective, Interpretation, Principles of Action</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Matters</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Planning</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Development</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Relations</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

172The headings used in the table are those in the 1971 platform. This has required, for instance, that 'Banking and Finance' and 'Taxation' of 1959 are lumped together under 'Economic Planning', the housing planks under 'Social' in 1959 and under 'Housing' in 1965 are included under 'Cities', which included housing planks in 1971, and 'Aid to Private Schools' of 1965 appears under 'Education'. The titling of platform sections is, of course, significant of the changing priorities of the platform and the different ways in which problems are seen.
### Table: Policy Planks (Proportional Change)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Development</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aborigines</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Reform</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Insurance Office</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Media</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table shows that, just as the by-passing structures were grafted onto, rather than replaced the existing structure, so too were the new policy planks added to the old. The platform sections which decline as a proportion of the whole, notably the Objective, Economic Planning and Health, change little in length. The expansion is in areas where nothing or almost nothing existed before (Education, Science, Industrial Development, Cities and Arts and Media) or where an area traditionally important is expanded still further after a temporary slump (Industrial Relations). Nor did the expansion into new areas mean that more

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173 The Objective section in 1959 covered 1½ pages, in 1965, 1½, and in 1971, just over half a page. Economic Planning was 1¼ in 1959 (as Banking and Finance and Taxation'), slightly less than 1½ in 1965 and just under one in 1971. Health was 1½ in 1959, 2 in 1965 and 2 in 1971. The fall in the Foreign Affairs proportion in 1971 is largely due to the deletion of one page written on the assumption that Papua New Guinea would remain an Australian Territory.
traditional concerns were neglected when elections loomed or the Leader presented his policy speech. Thus, Whitlam's radio broadcasts between May and October 1972 bore such titles as 'A Better Army', 'A New Deal for Health', 'A New Deal in Welfare', 'What the Budget did Not Do' and "Full Employment" Means Just That' as well as 'Equality in Education', 'Cities are the Nation's Problem' and 'Secrecy versus the People'. When he addressed the Federal Executive in September 1972, Whitlam listed Labor's priorities, if elected, as employment, prices, overseas economic control and economic growth, ahead of cities, education and health. The campaign advertisements covered inflation, prices, unemployment, national planning and foreign investment, education, health, rural matters and social welfare - a list that reflected as much the longer term concerns of Labor as the new or expanded planks of the platform.

A brief outline of 'differences' begs at least three questions. If old problems (economic planning, defence, welfare) were still recognised, were there new suggested solutions to these problems, reflecting the influence of policy produced by by-passing just as much as in the 'new' areas of education, cities and science? Although traditional Labor goals like full employment and control of inflation, social security and strong defence were still mentioned, were these references responses to short-term considerations, such as the economic instability of 1972, while the main interest of the party had shifted to other areas? If this interest had shifted were the new priority

policies meant to serve the same groups in the community as in the past or groups in whose welfare Labor traditionally had been less interested? These questions can only be approached via a complex analysis of the relationship between the sources of the new policies, their content and their perceived 'target areas' in the electorate. This will be one of the tasks of the final chapter.

There were two other implications of by-passing. Both involved a noticeable change from the picture of the Labor Party painted in chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis. Both were inseparable from Whitlam's style of Labor Leadership. First, by-passing helped link the platform and the policy speech as they had not been under Evatt and Calwell.

The chief fault of the platform [Whitlam believed] was not that it was electorally unattractive. Its fault lay in its irrelevance. It had become irrelevant to winning, or losing, elections. More importantly, it had become irrelevant as a plan of action for any Labor Government. In framing their election policy speeches, Evatt in 1954, 1955 and 1958 and Calwell in 1961 and 1963 largely ignored the printed platform. They were forced to do this because the printed platform was quite unhelpful as a guide to action. It had become a mass of unrelated proposals, reflecting the interests, concerns or whims of Labor conferences going back to the 1920s and beyond. In matters like education, health and foreign policy, it was far clearer on what should not be done than on what should be done.176

Instead, Whitlam hoped to make the policy speech grow out of the policymaking processes of the party and form a link between the party's conception of community needs and what it would do in government. 'The policies I outline tonight are not my policies alone; they are the

176 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 74.
policies of a united and determined Labor Party.' A policy speech:

is not an occasion for pulling rabbits out of the hat or producing last minute half-baked proposals and promises. Labor's program ... has been carefully developed over the last six years. It has been subject to the most searching scrutiny by friendly experts as well as hostile critics.

According to Freudenberg, who wrote it, the 1972 policy speech was 'simply a summary of the work of the previous six years' and his own task 'one of organizing a mass of material worked over for years past into a coherent framework'. Whitlam was annoyed that anyone should think it could be anything else. He had worked to 'marshal the examples in other countries' to show their feasibility in Australia, to cost them fully to avoid the old charge of financial recklessness, to keep himself and his senior colleagues before the voters as competent and responsible future ministers. The policy speeches of 1969 and 1972, more than any of their precursors, were rehearsed, honed and predictable. Whitlam, as the most indefatigable worker and as the mouthpiece at the campaign opening, provided a living link between the platform and the policy speech. When Labor came to power, he insisted on its 'mandate' to implement its programme, as set out in the policy speech.

177 Whitlam, Into the Seventies with Labor ..., 2.
179 For material on the connection between platform, policy speech and government activity, as seen by Whitlam: Age, 13 September 1967; A.L.P. Journal, May 1969, 15; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 226-8, 244, 257; C.J. Lloyd, interview; C.J. Lloyd & G.S. Reid, Out of the Wilderness, North Melbourne, 1974, 197-210, 225; Whitlam, Into the Seventies with Labor ..., 1, 2; The Road to Reform ..., 4; (interviewed), Whitlam and Frost, 44, 45, 57, 141. As the living link and interpreter Whitlam enjoyed independent power, especially in 1972. Lloyd and Reid deny that Whitlam's speech followed the wording of the platform in every respect. 'The policy speech is highly selective and dominated by the interpretation of the Party Leader who draws up the document' (Lloyd & Reid, Out of the Wilderness, 207). But there were few complaints that the platform had been blatantly flouted.
We shall return in the final chapter to some of the implications of the above paragraph. Meanwhile, the other indirect result of the by-passing procedure was its tendency to shift the focus of activity in the party — and thus of external interest in it — away from the machine to the Parliamentary party and especially to Whitlam as Parliamentary Leader. In chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis and to a much lesser extent in chapter 4, politicians tried primarily to influence Federal Conference and Federal Executive in certain directions. In chapter 4 and to a lesser extent in the two preceding chapters, politicians tried to manoeuvre within the decisions of these Federal bodies. In this chapter, politicians, led by Whitlam, became much more catalysts and contributors, with the Federal bodies the reactors. To some extent, this had always been true regarding electoral policy but it had been less important for the character of the party and less noticeable for those who observed it, simply because the party, as such, had produced much less electoral policy. The expansion and changing emphasis of electoral policy in the mid to late 1960s resulted from an identifiable party process in which politicians played a central role. At the same time politicians came to centre stage in a party where they had tended to recede, paradoxically, behind the 'faceless men' of the machine in the decade before 1965.

The revived importance of politicians became obvious at Conferences. Once an arena for sub-coalitions, Conference became rather a stage for members of Parliament. Thus, in 1965 observers contrasted the eclipse of Calwell, negotiating in back-rooms with his Executive allies, by the confident Whitlam, the thoughtful Dunstan, the sincere Hayden.\(^{180}\)

\[^{180}\text{Age, C-M, CT, 9 August 1965.}\]
By 1969, while Whitlam himself rationed his contributions, Parliamentary colleagues like Beazley, Cameron, Dunstan, Hayden, Holding and Murphy dominated the discussions. Simultaneously, observers of Conferences remarked upon their smoothness and the absence of much of the personal enmity that had often marked past meetings. In the few months between the 1969 Federal Conference and the Federal election of that year and, with some notable exceptions, for most of the years 1970 to 1972, Federal Labor conveyed the image to the public, through the media, of a reasonably united, responsible alternative government, led by its politicians. Sub-coalitional dissension did not disappear but, for the most part, it became less obvious. The party re-organisation in New South Wales and Victoria in 1970-71 certainly re-awakened memories of the old, squabbling Labor Party but, even then, the intervention forces were led as much by politicians as by machine men. Perhaps, too, the startling innovation of Whitlam, while still Leader of the Opposition, seizing the initiative to act as world statesman in China balanced these episodes so characteristic of a Labor Party doomed to opposition. Finally, the Federal Executive, so often in the 1950s and 1960s the source of unfavourable publicity for Labor, in that it was portrayed both as the continuing arena of Labor disunity and the ugly watchdog over Labor politicians, became a much more quiescent body. This was partly due to the presence thereon of politicians,

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182 Age, 29 July, 4 August 1969; Australian, 2, 4 August 1969; CT, 2 August 1969; Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, 26; R.F.I. Smith, 'Political Review', AQ, 43, 3 (September 1971), 95-6.
partly to the belief that could not have helped but infect it that Labor was at last destined to govern. 183

183 Federal Executive meetings during 1969 to 1972 were pre-occupied with internal party matters, such as finance, the fate of the Federal Secretariat, the Victorian and New South Wales reconstructions, autonomy for the ACT Branch, the Harradine case and a preselection dispute in Shortland, New South Wales: FX 1969-72, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/121/47-50. But observers of these meetings noted that, as the 1972 elections approached, delegates avoided some questions directly related to Labor's electoral face, such as the endorsement of a draft resister to stand for a Victorian seat and the possibility of tax increases to pay for Labor's promises: Age, 18 March 1972; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 227; Colin A. Hughes, 'Australian Political Chronicle: The Commonwealth January-April 1972', AJPH, 18 (August 1972), 269-70.
Chapter 6: A New Synthesis?

Provided they survive the strains produced by internal strivings and external pressures the ability of political parties to implement electoral policies depends upon their gaining access to governmental power. In Labor's case, since it rejects formal and informal coalitions with other parties, this depends on its winning a majority of seats in its own right at Federal elections. But to win a majority different strategies could be employed. This chapter will set out what can be called 'the Whitlam strategy' - since he was its leading proponent and most identified with it - then it will suggest weaknesses in the strategy and, thirdly, it will suggest another strategy, a 'new synthesis' of some aspects of the Whitlam strategy and some other strategies which were overshadowed during the years of Whitlam's dominance.

The Whitlam Strategy and Whitlam's Concept of Politics

This thesis began with Philip Selznick's idea of 'critical decisions', decisions which affect the development of an organisation, which alter its 'character', which involve 'the dynamic adaptation of the total organization to internal strivings and external pressures'.¹ Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the thesis found plenty of evidence of internal strivings and external pressures. It is more difficult to discover if the character of the organisation has been changed. Selznick's main concern is the institutionalisation of organisations, their transformation into 'social organisms', and he sees character formation

as a phase of this process. He mentions parties in passing as institutions whose character may change, for example, 'from a majority-forming agency ... into a more narrowly ideological instrument'.

(In the terms introduced early in this thesis, this would be a change from an 'inclusive' to an 'exclusive' party.) However, we have suggested that parties have an intense internal life of their own, such that it is impossible to characterise them so crudely: they comprise members who can be placed at various points on an inclusive-exclusive continuum at various times. They also evolve processes for reconciling differences between decisionmakers in order to present policies to the electorate under the party label. Again, policies change over time. Selznick says 'the emergence of organizational character reflects the irreversible element in experience and choice .... The acceptance of irreversible commitments is the process by which the character of an organisation is set.'

Yet, if Selznick's concept is to fit political parties, which seek control of the government of a state by offering policies at elections in return for electoral support, the number of critical decisions made by the party will be severely limited, since very few of these commitments or 'promises' are incapable of reversal. A promise to cut taxes may become a tax increase just as rapidly as economic conditions change; a promise not to send troops to foreign wars may be ignored as soon as the election has been won.

The problem is that a political party in its relationship with the electorate is defined just as much by what it offers as by the extent of its institutionalisation. It is a set of attitudes, a list


of promises, as much as it is a self-sustaining organism. More generally, the decisions it makes regarding electoral policy or its own internal organisation, even if they are later reversed, help determine its institutionalisation. They help determine whether and in what form it survives. At the most, 'irreversible commitments' are 'commitments that seem irreversible at the time they are made'.

In political parties most, if not all, commitments are reversible no matter how immutable they seem when first made. An individual may bear the marks of a childhood experience for the rest of his life. A party's structure may, in Duverger's words, bear 'the mark of its origin' (for example, as one based on trade unions) or of traumatic experiences (such as the battle between Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary wings in Australian Labour in the 1890s, which produced the candidates' pledge). But parties can always reverse decisions previously made or excise features of their own bodies. They are freer than Selznick's individual to rewrite their own history. This is especially so with decisions directed towards the electorate, where the aim is always as much to win votes as to express character.

Given the problems of the idea of character changing as part of the concept of critical decisions, must this concept refer only to those decisions which show evidence of internal strivings and external pressures? In chapters 2, 3 and 4, the evidence of strivings and pressures is clear. These case studies were chosen since they were

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4Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London, 1954, xxxv. The full quotation is: 'It is the whole life of the party which bears the mark of its origin ...' Duverger concentrates upon party structure. The argument of the above paragraph is that the internal politics of a party cannot be so neatly characterised. Many decisions - part of party 'life' - do not bear these marks.
areas in which the ALP expended much time and energy. Those who observed the party believed decisions in these areas were important because of the value party decisionmakers attached to a favourable decision, because of the intensity of feeling decisions engendered among participants and because of the intensity of the efforts made by external pressure centres to influence the decisions made. Certainly, the participants believed that Labor would be a different party if it granted state aid or gave only scholarships to non-state students, if it ignored unity tickets or prosecuted them, if it supported the commitment to Vietnam or opposed it. To a large extent, critical decisions in these three chapters were those which participants believed were critical.  

Chapter 5 shows, however, that there is no necessary connection between the amount of striving and pressure and the effect of the decisions, as measured in this case by the changes they wrought in the ALP Federal platform. Chance remarks associated with the subject matter of earlier chapters raised this possibility. For example, Wheeldon complained that the party had spent far too long on the 'trash' of state aid, a relatively minor part of any education programme or budget, while Whitlam lamented in Beyond Vietnam that the Vietnam obsession was precluding consideration of a more comprehensive foreign policy for Australia and Labor. Writers on organisations and their

5 Cf the discussion in David Braybrooke & Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, Glencoe & London, 1963, 62-4, of decisions effecting 'large' and 'small' changes. Categorisation depends greatly on the values people attach to the changes and these values differ. But there is a tendency to a common view and people tend to make issues of the same decisions.

6 Note a comment on the 1965 Federal Conference: 'The course of intra-party debate in the preceding three months made it certain that the most controversial (if not necessarily the most important) issues facing the conference would be unity tickets ... state aid ... and reform of the party': L.J. Hume, 'Australian Political Chronicle May-August 1965: The Commonwealth', AJPH, 11 (December 1965), 368. My emphasis.
internal processes have recognised the phenomenon, too. 'Low salience in decisions does not necessarily mean that the process will be calm or free of conflict.' On the other hand, organisations may 'make apparently major decisions with only minor participation by key administrators and significant constituents'. Similarly, the history of Labor's Federal Policy Committees and the 'Whitlam network' during the 1960s and early 1970s shows that the Federal platform was substantially expanded with little resistance from the Federal Conference and Executive. As a result, the face which Labor presented to the electorate was altered, even though the basic structure of the party was augmented rather than overturned. Some aspects of character change more than others.

It could be argued that this augmentation merely shifted the focus of striving and pressure to the Committees and the Whitlam network. The evidence relating to this point is limited and conflicting, but on balance it suggests that conflict in these areas was desultory at the most. Cairns suggests that many Committee recommendations were compromises between opposed views and Cameron adds that the full Conference occasionally saw conflict between members of the majority and minority on Policy Committees. Then, in chapter 4, we examined the

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8 March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 10.
9 J.F. Cairns, C.R. Cameron, interviews. For two specific examples, note the report of the 1965 Social Services Committee ('we readily admit that there were honest differences of opinion as to the order of priority which should be given to the various benefits') and the disagreement in the 1969 Rural Committee between Pollard, a Committee member, and Rex Patterson, who advised the Committee, over wheat marketing: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 189; Susan C. Read, The 1969 Federal Conference of the Australian Labor Party: Its Impact on the Shape of the Election Campaign and the Outcome of the Election, unpublished thesis [MA Qualifying?] Department of Political Science, School of General Studies, Australian National University, Canberra [1971?], 22.
efforts of the Foreign Policy Committee in 1967 to evolve a Vietnam resolution to satisfy the differing views of its members. The National Advisory Committee on Education, while technically not a Standing Committee, failed to reach agreement over state aid in 1966, showing that a controversial issue could not be defused by being sent to a committee. But few matters were as controversial as state aid and many were either unexceptionable new ways of solving old problems or suggestions for extending the role of the Commonwealth government. They found few opponents in a party which had long possessed a strong centralising inclination. In these instances, those Policy Committee members who knew what they wanted usually had their ideas endorsed. 'Ninety per cent of the time', said Whitlam, 'if you know what you want it gets through. Those who come to Policy Committees unprepared and not knowing how to argue don't succeed.' In any case, the composition of the Committees encouraged agreement: their politician members owed more loyalty to electoral success than to party sub-coalitions and could agree easily to schemes which seemed likely to enhance it; their expert members could see the technical merits of schemes even if they were not personally responsible for them.

To summarise, although by-passing structures like Committees and the Whitlam network were unlikely to be free of conflict and of the need for compromise, they were less dominated by these characteristics than were the Federal Conference and Executive. There was more consideration of proposals on their merits as solutions to problems and as vote winners. What, then, is the significance of by-passing in

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10 E.G. Whitlam, interview.
11 To the extent that there was politics within the Committees there may be scope for the concepts of partisan mutual adjustment, disjointed incrementalism and the garbage can. But a detailed analysis of the life of the Committees is beyond the scope of this thesis.
relation to the hypotheses tested in this thesis? Simply that there was a change in balance between internal strivings and external pressures in the making of electoral policy, with the latter influences becoming more important and, secondly, some external pressures becoming more important while others declined. Thus, in chapter 5, we noted the importance of 'friendly advisers'. These were the subject of our original HYPOTHESIS XI, which was able to be constructed on what was known of the influence of people like Brian Fitzpatrick, E.L. Wheelwright and J.W. Burton, of Fabian Societies and subscribers to small radical journals. But even in the early 1950s, these were isolated individuals rather than the more articulate representatives of a stratum in society. One could argue, on the other hand, that the experts in the universities and elsewhere who advised Labor in the 1960s and 1970s were the leading edge of a growing tertiary educated, professional, well-paid, middle class, suburban dwelling, politically interested wave of post war Australian society. Many of these people were sympathetic to ideals which they believed Labor represented and some of them were willing to put their expertise at the party's disposal. They provide evidence for HYPOTHESIS XI (friendly advisers), but also for HYPOTHESIS VII (environmental changes), since they were symptomatic of a change in the social, economic and cultural environments of the Australian political system. New groups with new interests became important and placed demands on the components of the system, including the ALP.

The 'Whitlam strategy' was to by-pass the Federal Conference and Executive structure for the making of electoral policy, using instead a structure of Policy Committees and informal networks with Whitlam as the main participant and chief articulator of the electoral policies produced. The most important external contributors were members of
the new educated stratum described above. The politicians who dominated Committee memberships or became shadow ministers realised that Labor must appeal beyond its core supporters to the emerging groups. Policies in education, housing, transport, health and the development of cities were designed to appeal to people who lived in badly serviced suburbs, who protected their children's health, who wished their children to have a substantial education, whose homes were unsewered or far from transport and community facilities. Rather than the educated middle class, the policies were directed at a certain region, the outer suburbs and their citizens, who possessed varying levels of education and political awareness. Labor had always been prepared to seek support from new groups which had not previously supported it, to be 'inclusive'. But in the Australia of the 1960s the political demands of the suburban dwellers had been only haphazardly catered for by both sides.  

The external pressures these new groups imposed on the ALP were welcomed, their demands sought out. Labor's electoral strategists believed outer suburban votes would bring victory.  

The party adjusted fairly easily to these changes in the social and economic environment (HYPOTHESIS VII). Simultaneously, other external pressures became less salient. Except where the interests of unionists were directly affected, 

12 For remarks about the emergence of 'new issues', broadly classified as 'quality of life', associated with the political recognition of these groups, by Whitlam Labor and then by its opponents, see: R.W. Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture, Cambridge, 1977, 115-16; John Edwards, 'What Future for Whitlamism?', Quadrant, 20, 2 (February 1976), 10; Alan Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 41, 3 (September 1969), 88; R.F.I. Smith, 'Political Review', AQ, 43, 3 (September 1971), 86. For a sample of Whitlam's main policy concerns, see the titles of his speeches in the Bibliography below.  

13 'Labor won the [1972] election ... in Sydney and Melbourne. More particularly it won, as Whitlam had planned, in the outer suburban electorates of Sydney and Melbourne' (Laurie Oakes & David Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, Melbourne, 1973, 303).
as in the industrial relations issue of penal clauses, which provoked debate at the 1971 Conference, the relationship with affiliated unions never reached the important position it held during the unity ticket years (HYPOTHESIS VI). As the cold war receded and Vietnam turned sour, the international political environment exerted less pressure (HYPOTHESIS VII). Parties and voters turned inward to domestic issues. Here Labor, rather than the Government, set the pace and Liberals had to match Labor proposals without being able to fall back on the bogeys of Communism and Labor's unreliability. 14 HYPOTHESIS XIII, which underlined the way Labor in opposition might have to react to government actions, draws less support from the evidence of these years. Labor's relationship with Communists became less important, in election rhetoric and in reality, as Communist schisms made disunity rather than threat a synonym for that party (HYPOTHESIS VIII). This affected Labor's relations with the Catholic church and its followers (HYPOTHESIS IX) which improved also with the removal of Labor's barriers to state aid. 15

Finally, as Labor moved towards victory, the Democratic Labor Party came to look increasingly irrelevant. Many of its followers drifted to the Liberals, others back to a Labor Party which had lost its threatening aspects (HYPOTHESIS X).

We can state the Whitlam strategy in terms of the rise and fall of our three sets of hypotheses. It involved, first, by-passing the internal

14 Note, firstly, the comment about the close resemblance between the domestic policies of Gorton and Whitlam in 1969 and, secondly, McMahon's search for a telling anti-Labor issue: Alan Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 41, 4 (December 1969), 22; Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, 249-74.

15 But note that, if Labor won back Catholic rank and filers because of its state aid policy it did so against the views of most of the Bishops, who preferred the Liberal per capita grants to Labor's needs policy: Michael Charles Hogan, The Catholic Campaign for State Aid, Sydney, 1978, 199-216.
strivings of the traditional structure, as encapsulated in HYPOTHESES I-V. (HYPOTHESIS II receives support in the sense that Whitlam as an individual was more important in the party he led than was Calwell in the party he led. He dominated the electoral policymaking structure he led where Calwell had not dominated the coalition structure which Whitlam's strategy now by-passed. Yet Whitlam's battles with other strong individuals like Cairns and Murphy took place largely divorced from electoral policymaking. The details of the electoral policy bore the stamp of Whitlam's personal preferences, not of his battles with other powerful individuals.)

Secondly, the strategy involved encouraging the influences of some external pressures, especially those covered by HYPOTHESES VII (the domestic part) and XI, and taking advantage of the declining potential for influence of others - HYPOTHESES VII (the international part), VIII, IX, X and XIII - and the limited policy interests of affiliated unions (HYPOTHESIS VI). It meant that electoral policy decisions were made much more on the merits of alternatives as vote winners and as responses to problems in the community. It meant that the party came to be seen as dominated by its politicians, who, for the most part, were inclusivists. By the late 1960s there were far fewer Labor decisionmakers taking an extreme exclusivist stance than there had been ten years earlier.

Did the Whitlam strategy then lead to mere crude pragmatism, swaying to the winds of the electorate? Did Whitlam's redefinitions of Labor principles in such terms as 'positive equality' mask a tendency to respond '[l]ike the brolga ... to the loudest noise in society ...'?16

16 Leslie Haylen, Twenty Years Hard Labor, South Melbourne, 1969, 177. Haylen's description is of Whitlam in his early days in the Caucus.
His critics attributed this motive too easily to Whitlam and his followers. For Whitlam was a teacher of the electorate as well as a student of its whims. He saw himself as an advocate of professionally produced, cohesive, radical proposals to an electorate which was only gradually becoming aware of the possibilities for political action and of the acceptability of a Federal Labor Government. Asked in 1972 to describe his own best quality, Whitlam replied:

I think it's probably that I will try to work out means of achieving of what I would think are my Party's objectives - how to marshal the advisers in this country and then try to work how to explain it to people. I think that's probably what I've done best .... It's what I tried to do.\(^\text{17}\)

In 1973, speaking of the ALP and ACTU President, R.J.L. Hawke, Whitlam summarised the central idea of his own conception of politics:

I think he [Hawke] has an immense number of the gifts which are required in a politician, who has to explain and sell political policies. He is a very attractive campaigner. People like his aggressive presentation of issues.\(^\text{18}\)

Those who observed Whitlam noted his obsession with finding the best way of conveying his message. 'The essence of his method', Freudenberg wrote, 'lies in a continuing search for a formula, the form of words which will say exactly what he means and which embodies a plan for practical action'. Interviewed by the present author, Whitlam described his approach to one area of policy: 'I refined it a number of times until eventually I found the form of words I wanted'. He defended his approach to the Vietnam issue as not shifty but showing his desire for 'precision'. His Caucus colleague, Haylen, complained: 'He tried to prove everything with a set of figures or a quote .... Whitlam has an

\(^{18}\) Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, 176.
agonizing trick of harping on a theme until it is threadbare. It seems
good to him and he flogs it into near madness for his supporters.'\textsuperscript{19}

Whitlam's speeches reveal clearly the amassing of statistics and the
reiteration of themes and formulae of words.\textsuperscript{20}

Those who seek to educate electors need a platform. Whitlam found
his in public meetings, in the media and in Parliament. 'A public

\textsuperscript{19}Graham Freudenberg, \textit{A Certain Grandeur}, South Melbourne, 1977, 70; Haylen, \textit{Twenty Years Hard Labor}, 179; E.G. Whitlam, interview.

\textsuperscript{20}Two typical Parliamentary speeches, on education and pollution
respectively, include statistics on the job intentions of scholarship
winners, university enrolments and scholarship holders, Higher School
Certificate examinees, Australian education expenditure as a proportion
of Gross National Product in comparison with other countries, the
proportion of young Australians in full-time education and who complete
secondary school and the number of Australian geologists and \textit{veter-
arians} and - in the second example - fish catches off Western
Australia, refuse outfall of Kwinana refinery, oyster production in
Botany Bay, levels of contamination in Sydney oysters and the emission
contents of Australian cars in comparison with other countries: \textit{CPD}
some examples of reiteration, sometimes word for word: E.G. Whitlam,
On Australia's Constitution, Camberwell, Vic., 1977, 62-3 (delivered
by Mr E.G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., at the University of Queensland,
28 August 1968, 22-3; 'The Alternate National Health Program': Address
by Mr E.G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., to the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital
Post-Graduate Seminar, 5/7/1968 cf. Labor's Role Today ..., 9-12; On
Australia's Constitution, 60-1 (1961) cf. 'The Alternate National Health
Program'; Planning for Clean Cities: Address by Mr E.G. Whitlam to
52nd Annual Meeting of the Town and Country Planning Association of
Victoria in Melbourne at 1.00 p.m. on Friday, 20 February 1970 cf
On Australia's Constitution, 125-39 (August 1970). My emphasis on
dates. Note, too, that Whitlam said he gave a basically similar speech
on education to five gatherings of Catholic parents over six months in
1968-69: Commonwealth Aid to Schools: Address by Mr E.G. Whitlam, Q.C.,
M.P. to Northern Suburbs Combined Parents and Friends Association at
Odeon Theatre, Eastwood, Sunday Night, 20 April 1960. Finally, an
appendix to a famous 1968 lecture by Whitlam lists eleven of his speeches
delivered 1962-68 on urban and regional development. Eight of them
were delivered in 1967 or 1968 (to September). The list comprised only
'major addresses, on which numbers of subsequent statements and press
releases have been based' (my emphasis). It includes none of Whitlam's
numerous Parliamentary speeches on this topic. (Responsibilities for
Urban and Regional Development: Walter Burley Griffin Memorial Lecture,
Canberra, 25 September 1968.)
meeting', he said in 1973, 'is part of a continuous educative process that politicians have to engage in'. Further, '[o]nly at public meetings can the people assess the stamina, concentration and grasp of the leaders' and the leaders the reaction of the people to them and their proposals. The politician convinced the electors and refined his plans, the electors judged the politician under pressure. To illustrate the point, the table sets out Whitlam's speeches and press statements over six days in the middle of 1969.

Table 6.1: Speeches and Statements, E.G. Whitlam, 27 June–2 July 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>- (statement)</td>
<td>Federal Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>Mt.Gambier</td>
<td>Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Wool and Wheat Marketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Housing and Land Costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>- (statement)</td>
<td>Public Servants and Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Sydney?</td>
<td>Urban Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Whitlam to the Editor, Australian Financial Review, 8 July 1969

Whitlam's liking for public meetings maintained and enhanced them as a feature of election campaigns when observers predicted confidently that televised contact would replace them. Yet Whitlam was also a

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21Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 71.

22Australian, 23 October 1969. An observer of Whitlam as Deputy Leader noted his liking for weekend conferences and seminars which seemed to serve as contacts with experts and a safety valve for a politician frustrated in opposition, as well as keeping Whitlam's name before the public - or at least that part of it which attended such gatherings: Bulletin, 11 December 1965.

polished television performer and prided himself upon his ability. As
Deputy Leader, he had waved unity tickets at television cameras and
baited the Federal Executive over state aid. As Leader, he used the
medium to put Labor's position on current events and its future plans
and to establish his credentials as a future Prime Minister. Survey
evidence suggests his television 'image' was relatively favourable and
became more so.  

He also devoted more attention than most of his
predecessors to maintaining friendly contacts with the printed media,
especially with working journalists, on whose reporting depended much
public knowledge of his ability and proposals.  

Finally, Whitlam
believed, according to Freudenberg, in the 'teaching and informing
functions' of Parliament.  

He had used the questions on notice
procedure to gather masses of information. He used his speeches to
expound his conception of Australia's problems and their solutions.
Given that Hansard is not widely read, nor Federal Parliament attended
by more than a fraction of Australians here, too, media reports of the
sittings enhanced the relationship between Whitlam, the party he led and
voters. Labor's relationship with the media, the subject of our

24 Don Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics, Canberra,
1977, 253, shows that favourable references to Whitlam's television
abilities outnumbered unfavourable references by about 5 to 1 in 1967
and 7 to 1 in 1969. Total references to his personal qualities ran
at just under 4 favourable to 1 unfavourable in 1967 and 2½ to 1 in
1969. Most of these impressions would have been formed from Whitlam's
television appearances.

25 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 143-4, points out that the Canberra
Press Gallery saw an influx of younger journalists around the time
Whitlam became Leader. One of Whitlam's sympathetic chroniclers, who
arrived at this time, writes: 'The politics of the gallery change
rapidly. From being predominantly Liberal in the mid-1960s it became
pro-Labor (or at least pro-Whitlam) in the late 1960s and early 1970s':
David Solomon, Inside the Australian Parliament, Sydney, 1978, 156. My
emphasis.

HYPOTHESIS XII, became rather more cooperative than in the days when most coverage of the party was critical.

Whitlam attempted to link the policies made by the by-passing processes he headed, the policy speeches which expressed them, and the actions of the Labor Government he led between 1972 and 1975. The link was his version of the doctrine of the 'mandate'.

I interpret the mandate as being both general and specific - a general mandate to govern for the term for which we were elected and a specific mandate to implement the undertakings we made, within that term. But even when I speak of a general mandate I cannot accept the conservative definition of a mere mandate to govern, a permit to preside over the administration of government and, hopefully, to administer the existing system in a sufficiently acceptable way to give reasonable prospects of re-election for a further renewal of the mere mandate to preside. The mandate as I interpret it is to move by specific programmes toward the general goals and the general objectives accepted by the people at the elections.27

Whitlam's mandate doctrine provided the philosophic basis for the strategy he believed Labor should employ in relation to the electorate. It implied that the voters were aware of the content of the policy speech and expected it to be implemented. As the promises in one policy speech were implemented, a Labor Government would seek from the people 'a new mandate on new issues'.28 To Whitlam, 'politics' was, above all, convincing a rational electorate to entrust Labor with the task of reforming Australia along the lines contained in his policy speeches, which were based on a Federal Labor platform to which he had been the most important contributor.

An Incomplete Concept

'A biography of Whitlam must, almost inevitably, become the story of the Labor Party in the last decade.' Conversely, it could be argued that the Labor Party at Federal level between, say, 1967 and 1975, ran largely according to the strategy that Whitlam devised. It will be argued now that the conception of politics underlying this strategy was incomplete and, thus, that the strategy bore the seeds of its failure. It will be suggested, instead, that the remedy for the deficiencies disclosed in chapters 2, 3 and 4 in the making of policy directed towards the electorate lies in a synthesis of some elements of the Whitlam strategy and other elements which that strategy tried to discount or do without or which it employed inadequately.

Whitlam's conception of politics emphasised the relationship with the people, with the voters, few of whom were members of the ALP. His emphasis on modernity and relevance was highly commendable. Labor under Calwell had increasingly seemed old-fashioned, obsessed with depressions when Australia was mostly prosperous, emphasising its traditions when the culture was changing rapidly, dominated by an ageing elite when the population was youthful. Labor under Whitlam apparently

30 These aspects of Labor before 1967 were commented upon incessantly: Anonymous, 'Australia: The Labor Party', Round Table, 51, 201 (December 1960), 92-3; Anonymous, 'Labor in Search of an Identity', Outlook, 10, 2 (April 1966), 3-4; Australian, 9 February 1967 (John Paterson); Creighton Burns, 'Labor Traumas', Dissent, 11 (Autumn 1964), 7-8; John W. Burton, The Nature and Significance of Labor, Carlton, Vic., 1958, 13; James Jupp, Australian Labour and the World, London, 1965, 30; Ted Wheelwright, 'The Future of the Labor Party', Bridge, 1, 3 (January 1965), 24-5. At the 1966 election, Calwell, seventy years old, was Labor's oldest ever Leader and probably its most old-fashioned in relation to those from whom he sought votes. One could well argue that he was for many voters the symbol of an archaic party. A survey of four hundred people commissioned just before the 1966 election by the Victorian Central
overcame much of this unfavourable feeling, to strike a chord with emerging groups in the society without ignoring its traditional supporters. The party seemed to have caught up with its environment.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to question the depth of this relationship. How closely did Australians identify with Labor under Whitlam? Whitlam's former private secretary, Race Mathews, remarked to the author that the Leader was always overly sanguine about the rationality of people. Freudenberg borrows Bagehot's description of Gladstone to describe Whitlam:

He has the didactic impulse. He has the courage of his ideas. He will convince the audience. He knows an argument which will be effective, he has an enthusiasm which he feels will rouse the apathetic, a demonstration which he thinks must convert the incredulous, an illustration which he hopes will drive his meaning even into the heads of the stolid. At any rate, he will try. He is

Executive showed that 75 per cent of respondents were critical of the ALP; 22 per cent believed it was 'old-fashioned' and 24 per cent 'small-minded', against only 11 per cent calling it 'too socialist', an old catch-cry; 49 per cent believed Calwell was 'weak' or 'behind the times', 18 per cent 'too emotional' and only 9 per cent 'progressive'. The younger the respondent, the worse the result for Labor: among 16-24 year-olds the proportions believing the ALP 'old-fashioned' or 'small-minded' doubled (Australian, 10 October 1966). Almost a year after his retirement as Leader, Calwell was responsible for 10 per cent of all unfavourable responses to the ALP from 1668 people surveyed. This was as many as those who said Labor was 'too far to the left' (10 per cent) and 'split, disunited' (10 per cent) and twice as many as referred to 'union influence' (5 per cent) and 'Vietnam' (5 per cent). In the television age, references to a party Leader and main spokesman might be expected to dominate but surely not this long after his retirement unless he had been particularly distasteful?: Aitkin, Stability and Change ..., 64-5 (survey September-November 1967). Donald Horne, not at that time a Whitlamophile, encapsulates: '[Whitlam's] greatest advantage [was that] he was not Arthur Augustus Calwell. For one thing Whitlam was couth, a characteristic Australians now seem to look for in a politician: and whatever else might be said about Mr. Calwell, he did not look like the world of today' (Bulletin, 11 May 1968).

31 R. Mathews, interview.
sure, if they only knew what he knows, they would feel as he feels, and believe as he believes.32

He treated the voters as rational men and women, asking them to commit themselves to Labor after considering his arguments and matching his proposals to their private goals. But were the mass of voters so involved? To Freudenberg, the audiences at Labor meetings in 1969 were 'younger than usual, apparently more thoughtful, much quieter than in 1966, and giving some sign of coming to be convinced rather than stirred'.33 In 1972, the audiences applauded dutifully promises that had become familiar with repetition.

But most voters do not come to political meetings. If meetings are educative, only a small proportion of people give themselves the opportunity of education. Even before the great Federal policy revision, Clyde Holding, MLA, and later Labor Leader in Victoria, wrote: 'because we presume we have a good policy, we make the mistake of assuming a political enlightenment amongst the general public which does not in fact exist'.34 Four years later, R.W. Connell, an academic and party member, answered the question 'how can Labor win?':

How? One thing we can be sure of: it can't be done by modifying the Labor Party's formal policy. Over the last eight years or so the federal platform has been progressively reconstructed by

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32 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 71. Note also Whitlam's remark in 1973 that Labor in the 1960s had been wrong '[t]o be irrationally left. I don't think there is any electoral liability in being rationally left' (Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, 173. My emphasis). Finally, the words of Wyndham, often Whitlam's ally: 'I know that if our policies are right, the people of Australia will support us. I believe the Australian elector is an intelligent elector [not] apathetic and disinterested .... As socialists, we must believe he is an intelligent voter, that he can be reached, or everything we are doing means nothing' (Australian, 24 May 1967).

33 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 161.

parliamentarians, officials, and specialists (many from the universities); it is now an excellent, sophisticated, modern document. It's a pity so few party members know about it. It is streets ahead of any programme put up by other parties. But the electorate couldn't be less impressed: it doesn't know about the platform and wouldn't care to if it had the choice.35

Alan Barnes, not an anti-Labor journalist, wrote in February 1969 that Whitlam's 'brilliant expositions of what was needed of Government in the 1960's failed to create the enthusiastic response they should have'.36 In mid 1969, despite the policy revision of 1965 and 1967, Labor's opinion poll support stood at barely 40 per cent. At the State level, there was not one Labor Government. The party was 'at the nadir of its fortunes'.37 Its revived position in the second half of 1969, its near win at the Federal election of 25 October 1969 and its win in 1972 could be attributed to reasons other than the attractiveness of Labor's policies to the electorate. Despite flurries in Victoria and New South Wales and arguments between Federal shadow ministers in 1971, the party looked more united than before. It projected an image of competence - part of which derived from its performance at policymaking - and of reasonably attractive and authoritative leadership. Most of all, perhaps, the disarray of the Liberals encouraged many voters to 'give Labor a go'.

36 Age, 17 February 1969.
Survey evidence gathered just after the 1969 election (October 1969-February 1970) indicates the unimportance of policy - especially policy areas particularly stressed by Whitlam - in favourable responses to the ALP and its Leader. While domestic policy items had become more important than in 1967, when they comprised only 10 per cent of all favourable references, in late 1969 they still contributed only 30 per cent of such references. (The feeling that Labor made too many promises - a criticism of the Evatt-Calwell era ALP - remained a cause of some unfavourable references to the party.) Further, when asked about Whitlam as party Leader, respondents stressed his 'personal qualities' (78 per cent of all favourable and unfavourable responses in 1969) rather than 'ideology and policy interests' (14 per cent). References to Whitlam in the latter connection were hardly more frequent than for his Coalition opponents and, when made, 'they were usually of the most general kind'. Discouraging indeed for a Leader who hoped to make the voters see the merits of his schemes. Finally, when respondents referred to 'the most important problems facing the federal government', the issues most often nominated - with the major exception of education (mentioned by 16 per cent of respondents in 1969) - were not especially those upon which Whitlam had concentrated since he became Leader. Thus 13 per cent mentioned pensions, a traditional Labor concern, but not one of Whitlam's top priorities between elections, against 5 per cent nominating housing and the price of land. Taxation, the cost of living, employment and assistance to primary industry, long-standing economic issues, accounted for 11 per cent of answers between them, but foreign investment and Federal-State financial relations, both 'Whitlam issues', garnered only 3 per cent. Aborigines were mentioned by only 1 per cent of respondents, northern development, decentralisation...
and resources by only 6 per cent, roads and transport by 3 per cent and all three issues had declined since the equivalent 1967 survey, despite the number of Whitlam's speeches on these topics.  

This evidence, while crude, casts some doubt on the success of Whitlam's educative programme as Opposition Leader. The three marked improvers among issues seen as important by voters - hospitals and medical benefits (mentioned by 5 per cent in 1967 and 9 per cent two years later), defence, including national service (5 per cent to 8 per cent) and education (11 per cent up to 16 per cent) - were all issues upon which Whitlam had concentrated. They helped boost the proportion of responses favourable to Labor which mentioned its policies. Yet, their increased salience to electors is not, in itself, evidence of the success of Whitlam's proselytising. In any case, 3 out of 10 respondents in a national survey showing a generalised response to domestic policies intensely promoted over three years of Whitlam Leadership is still a poor return for 'the didactic impulse'.

No similar survey was conducted in 1972 but a much smaller one covering 345 voters leaving polling booths in six Sydney marginal electorates revealed the following results:

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38 Aitkin, Stability and Change ..., 227, 244-5, 250. On the reasons for liking and disliking leaders, the proportions of references to 'ideology and policy' in both surveys were: 1967: Holt 18 per cent; McEwen 17 per cent; Whitlam 10 per cent; 1969: Gorton 8 per cent; McEwen 9 per cent; Whitlam 14 per cent.

39 Favourable references to Labor's domestic policies concentrated upon education, health and social services (especially pensions). These, in turn, boosted the favourable proportion of references to Labor's domestic policies (i.e. a different measure) from 60 per cent in 1967 to 75 per cent in 1969 (Aitkin, Stability and Change ..., 243-4).
Table 6.2: Proportion of Voters mentioning Different Reasons for Voting Labor, 1972 Federal Election (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Habit</th>
<th>It's Time</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Labor Voters (n = 184)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not Vote Labor in 1969 (were non-voters or anti-Labor voters [n = 76])</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The survey is very small but some conclusions can be drawn. Reasons to do with the length of time in office of the Liberals (it's time for a change, give Labor a go, sick of the Liberals, Liberals arrogant, etc.) are more important than those to do with Labor's policies, especially among those who had previously voted against Labor (or had not voted at all) whom Whitlam sought to 'include' among its supporters. Secondly, two out of three of the policy references by all Labor voters and half the policy references by those who did not vote Labor in 1969 are vague and generalised. Labor 'will do us a good turn', is 'better for the family man' or 'the working person', 'has the best policies', is 'fair'. Some of these generalisations may conceal a sophisticated knowledge of and regard for the policies Whitlam enunciated but the survey as a whole does not suggest that Whitlam's appeal to the policy-oriented voter had startling success.  

40The second category compresses three in the original, the third two (pro-Whitlam and anti-McMahon), the fourth twelve - in the 1969 voters table, eleven, but I suspect one small category has been left out by mistake in the original. For a partial report, see also: Ian McNair, 'Three Years of Labor - Some Reasons why Labor was Elected and Defeated', AQ, 49, 3 (September 1977), 97.  

41In any case, the policies of Government and Opposition had many similarities, especially in domestic areas, at both elections, 1969 and 1972: David Butler, The Canberra Model, Melbourne, 1973, 120, 123-4, 133; Alan Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 41, 4 (December 1969), 22.
It is a platitude of political science to say that voters are moved by other things than the merits of party policies. But evidence to support this platitude is of some significance when a politician seems to have based his approach to the voters on the assumption that they can be so moved. Whitlam may have succeeded more than others could have in educating the voter and making him identify with Labor policies but why was his success not more marked? Two reasons may be suggested. First, his relationship with the electorate may not have extended far beyond the experts whose ideas he sought and the journalists whose attention he attracted. No politician can relate closely to more than a fraction of the voters he seeks to govern but Whitlam stressed his connections with experts and the media more than most and his predilections coloured his approach to the electorate as a whole. He liked to speak to professionals and they liked to listen to him; he envisaged a partnership between enlightened politicians, especially himself, and humanistic experts; the professionals, in the words of one of them, 'understood what he was saying. He made them feel wanted'.

P.N. Troy, interview. Three examples from Whitlam speeches: 'The pollution problem is appreciated only by a minority. As members of that minority, we have a threefold responsibility' (Planning for Clean Cities ..., 14); 'I invite members of the medical profession ... to join me in devising programmes to ensure that Australians enjoy the health services which are their birthright' ('The Alternate National Health Program', 30); 'I invite you to participate in this great undertaking [of urban development]. I ask you to join in transforming the issues so that in due course we may together plan the transformation of Australia itself .... Increasingly throughout the world ... it is the planner who makes the decisions on which man's survival as a species will depend' (The Political Powers and Policies Needed for Effective Planning – Paper by Mr. E.G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., Leader of the Opposition, to Royal Australian Institute of Architects Centenary Convention at Wentworth Hotel, Sydney, Thursday afternoon 27 May 1971, 3, 9). My emphasis in each case. Incidentally, the reference to urban planners is interesting, given Whitlam's penchant for examples from 'comparable countries'. By 1971, the year of this speech, some architects in the United States were coming to question the whole concept of urban planning as it had then developed. See, for example, Robert Goodman, After the Planners, New York, 1971.
The journalists, professionals also, saw in Whitlam an educated, efficient, professional advocate, a relief from the bumbledom of post Menzies Liberalism and the crassness of Calwell.\textsuperscript{43}

Secondly, one could argue that, even more than that of teacher, Whitlam's role was that of actor, the electorate the audience. He observed his effect on audiences at public meetings, watched and praised his television appearances, seeking to hone not only the word but the gesture, the attitude. Many observers noted his histrionic skill, his narcissism.\textsuperscript{44} Some were too inclined to use this as evidence that the man lacked substance. His dedicated work in the defining of problems and the formulation of solutions, as well as his forensic skill, should have belied that suggestion. Whitlam as actor is better evidence of his incompleteness as a politician. Those who seek to change the agenda of politics and who propose new solutions - as Whitlam did - labour in vain if they only declaim and harangue. Only those of the audience in whom the seed has been sown by prior inclination or personal experience are likely to be inspired in new directions. Persuasion that policies match goals is a more subtle art than can be pursued before hundreds of people by an hour's speech or millions by a few minutes' interview. A more solid link with electors, a deeper identification by electors with the party's policies requires a different approach. The doctrine of the mandate, as enunciated by Whitlam, \hspace{1cm}

\textsuperscript{43}See above, note 25. Many of these new journalists were graduates, most were middle class suburbanites in their values. Whitlam's appeal extended to them as much as to others of this type. When Whitlam spoke at the National Press Club, Canberra, in February 1979, the President advised members it was the eleventh such occasion, more than any other guest and far more than any other politician.

extrapolating from one vote decisions on as many parts of the policy speech as the extrapolator desires, is a way of avoiding forging this more solid link.

A New Synthesis?

How could the party-electorate link be strengthened? More generally, what is required for a more complete conception of politics than that which underlay the Whitlam strategy? Assistance in answering these questions comes from James Q. Wilson's book, The Amateur Democrat, first published in 1962. The book concerns the Democratic clubs, local organisations of the Democratic Party in large cities of the United States in the 1950s. Parts of the book are too closely tied to the American milieu to be of use to us; other parts of his descriptions of preferred party organisations, such as the desire of the 'amateur Democrat' for internal party democracy, do not always fit those in the ALP to whom we attempt to apply Wilson's concepts. However, his basic classification of political activists into two ideal types, 'amateurs' and 'professionals', is useful and enlightening. These labels are not synonyms for 'incompetent' and 'competent' or 'voluntary' and 'paid' but refer to distinct ways of relating the internal politics of the party, the formulation and importance of policy and the party's link with the electorate.

An amateur [writes Wilson] is one who finds politics intrinsically interesting because it expresses a conception of the public interest. The amateur politician sees the political world more in terms of ideas and principles than in terms of persons. Politics is the determination of public policy, and public policy ought to be set deliberately rather than as the by-product of a struggle for personal and party advantage. Issues ought to be settled on their merits; compromises by which one issue is settled other
than on its merits are sometimes necessary, but they are never desirable .... Politicians ought to work for certain ends, not because such action is expedient or self-serving, but because they are convinced of the intrinsic worth of those ends.45

In the Labor context, to set public policy 'deliberately' meant by-passing the traditional decisionmaking structure, where decisions emerged through partisan mutual adjustment between sub-coalitions, ad hoc responses to external influences and the occasional garbage can. Whitlam was the leading by-passer. He was also the leading 'amateur'.46

The professional, on the other hand ... is preoccupied with the outcome of politics in terms of winning and losing. Politics, to him, consists of concrete questions and specific persons who must be dealt with in a manner that will 'keep everybody happy' and thus minimize the possibility of defeat at the next election .... Although he is not oblivious to the ends implied by political outcomes, he sees (or, since he is rarely given to theorizing, acts as if he sees) the good of society as the by-product of efforts that are aimed, not at producing the good society, but at gaining power and place for one's self and one's party.47

This approximates a description of some decisionmakers in the ALP during our period of interest. For example, we have seen that an important consideration underlying many of the actions of New South Wales Federal

46 In life-styles, outlook and occupation Wilson's amateurs resemble many Australians attracted to Labor under Whitlam. They are 'young, well-educated professional people, including a large number of women. In style of life, they are distinctly upper and upper-middle class ....' They are lawyers, public relations people, journalists, doctors, teachers and clerks, predominantly White Anglo-Saxon Protestant and Jewish but not Catholic (Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat*, 11-16). Their hero was Adlai Stevenson and there is a passage on page 52 of the book about their relationship with him which, mutatis mutandis, could be applied to Whitlam and his amateurs.
delegates like Oliver, Colbourne and Mulvihill, was the need to maintain and regain Government in New South Wales. Calwell's style of leadership could well be characterised as 'keeping everybody in the party happy'. Every pre-election Federal Conference in our period devoted as much or more effort to maintaining an appearance of party unity for electoral purposes as it did to examining policy proposals for a Labor Government after the election. Sometimes, indeed, as Wilson says, 'electoral victory must be subordinated to maintaining the party organization', at least in the short term, in the hope of victory in the longer haul.  

Every politician has a stronger commitment to winning and keeping his seat than to any amateur's scheme.

Nevertheless, the effect of professionalism of Wilson's type on Federal Labor in our period was nullified in a number of ways. First, the pseudo-ideological overlay and the downright bitterness engendered by the Split often clouded the judgment of men who were otherwise 'professionals' in Wilson's terms. Men like Chamberlain, possessed of the negotiating and manipulative skills which are the essence of professionalism, often used them in the service of an ill-defined 'spirit of Hobart', which sometimes rose little above bigotry and doing down old enemies. Calwell, who slithered away from so many other firm stands, stood firm against the DLP, which often meant standing against policies which could have been adopted by the ALP without betraying any principle.

On the other hand, the professionals of New South Wales devoted much of their efforts to the State level, depriving the Federal party of the skills of election-winning and coalition-maintenance perfected in that State over two decades. Given their minority position on many Federal

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48 Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, 17.
issues and the persecution they believed they suffered because of the events of the Split, their attitude was perhaps not surprising.

Thirdly, many Federal representatives who were skilled union politicians remained much more interested in extracting concessions from State or Federal Liberal Governments or in the politics of their own unions than in applying their professionalism to a party which seemed doomed to perpetual opposition. Even if they had been more interested, the lack of resources at the Federal level would have thwarted them.

Professionalism depends on having a machine and time, money and human manipulative and administrative skills to use in the specialised task of winning elections and sustaining the party organisation. Fifthly and finally, too many of the professionals devoted too much of their skills to retaining power within the organisation rather than to winning office. It is always difficult to discover motives and to distinguish between the organisation-maintenance necessary to win elections and that which preserves oligarchy, but Whitlam's remarks in 1967 have considerable point.

There is nothing more disloyal to the traditions of Labor than the new heresy that power is not important, or that the attainment of political power is not fundamental to our purposes .... We can survive indefinitely as a pressure group .... We can exist indefinitely with all the apparatus of a Party electing each other to positions, meeting with all the formality of conferences and executives, framing policy decisions, making speeches, and even having them reported in the press .... [But it] was not for this that most of us joined the Labor Party or believe in it .... For too long, too much available energy has been concentrated more on gaining support within the A.L.P. than support for the A.L.P.49

Whitlam the 'amateur' knew the value of political power as the means to implement his solutions to problems. If 'politics is the determination of public policy' capturing office is essential. But winning office is hollow if the relationship with the electorate is as incomplete as that sought by Whitlam. A new synthesis is needed, which recognises that winning office must have a purpose but that the party winning office is more than an articulate Leader and a collection of policies. Let us turn, then, to prescription. What would a new synthesis comprise?

A LARGER, STRONGER FEDERAL ORGANISATION CONTAINING MORE 'PROFESSIONALS'

There are two aspects to be considered under this heading. First, there is the administrative side. Criticism of the lack of administrative and organisational capacity of Labor's Federal structure, especially in the making of electoral policy, was a feature of our period. The Federal Secretariat existed as a full-time office in Canberra from late 1963 to early 1969, was resurrected in 1971, mainly for the purpose of winning the 1972 Federal election, and continued after Labor won in 1972. In 1974 it moved from rented premises to a new national headquarters called John Curtin House. By early 1979, with the establishment of policy co-ordination and media units, the Federal Secretariat had a paid staff of about a dozen (National Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Research Director and Assistant, Media Director, plus typists and stenographers and other support staff), still less than that of the Liberal Party of Australia and far less than that of the British Labour Party. The Secretariat enjoyed an occasionally uneasy relationship with State Branches, which feared loss of power, and with Parliamentarians, who feared interference, but there were signs that it could perform a useful
role in co-ordinating Policy Committees and other research organisations connected with the party, such as the Labor Resource Centre (an information and research centre established by the party and unions in Melbourne), Fabian Societies and other study groups. Lack of time, money and knowledge of the existence of willing and able research workers remained problems, as they had always been. If the problems could be alleviated by more staff, larger contributions from State Branches and greater willingness in other arms of the party to allow the Secretariat an important role, this aspect of professionalism – the existence of a skilled, full-time staff – would be further enhanced.  

Secondly, who should fill the party's important positions? Who should be its delegates to Federal Conference and Executive? None of our criticisms of the Whitlam strategy are meant to deny the importance of ideas and ideals in politics. They imply instead that ideas should be subjected to rigorous tests of political practicality and partisan suitability. Whitlam's significance for Australia has been compared to that of John F. Kennedy for the United States. But Whitlam's strategy, in American terms, accentuated the 'Ivy League', the academic adviser, while doing little to improve Labor's stock of 'professionals', people skilled in the arts of manipulation and persuasion for the twin goals of coalition-maintenance and winning elections. In America this job was often performed by the 'Irish Mafia' produced by the Democratic large city machines. When one of the few ALP men who fits this description, M.J. Young, Federal Secretary from 1969 to 1973, entered Parliament in 1974, the Federal machine lost the major part of his skills. 

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50 These sentences based on conversations with party officials.
51 On Young, see: National Times, 4–9 July 1977 (Craig McGregor); Oakes, Whitlam PM, 184–6; Don Whitington, 'The Witless Men', South Melbourne, 1975, 182–90.
willing to help the party. Their actual contribution depends on the party's ability to tap them and this ability has gradually been improved. The level of 'professionalism' has received less attention.

The party has done little to ensure that occupants of key Federal positions, in Conferences, Executive and Policy Committees, have the skills necessary to work out politically feasible policies in the Federal sphere. There are 'numbers men' and men skilled at working out compromises between sub-coalitions at the State level but not all can transfer their skills readily to different issues and different configurations of sub-coalitions when six State Branches, a Federal Caucus and a more complex set of external pressures have to be reconciled to produce decisions. Skilled individuals have emerged, like Chamberlain, Dunstan, Oliver and Toohey and, later, Burns, Hawke and Young, but the line of succession is not assured. The composition of Federal Labor's supreme policymaking bodies still depends far more on who can get the numbers in State Branches than on who is best able to contribute to Federal policymaking.

The contributions desired are not only ones of content but also of skills. An ideal Federal party structure would balance representation roughly evenly between politicians, policy experts and 'professionals'. The first group would provide the link between party machine and electorate, the second the ideas, the third the reconciling and stabilising skills and the link with the party structure. Each group would have different primary loyalties - to the electorate, to policy proposals and to the party, respectively. While it goes almost without saying that divisions between the three 'groups' would never be hard and fast, nor their loyalties undivided, the need to reconcile conflicting views on electoral policy would be more clearly recognised in such a
structure than in one dominated by only one of the groups. Further, by the inclusion in policymaking bodies of people whose main concern was the promotion of policies, rather than the retention of a Parliamentary seat or of power within a party, the place of the problem-solving merits of policies in party discussions might be more firmly assured.

INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLICIES IN THE PARTY

The second area for prescription follows naturally from the first.

If purposive organizations [including political parties like the ALP] become more important ... [writes Wilson] then leaders capable of producing concerted action on the basis of ideas become more influential. But only a few such leaders will succeed in institutionalizing their influence, because only a few will be able to create an enduring organizational base for their claims. Their importance in politics will be episodic and limited to those few policy areas that can be made the target of aroused passion.52

This danger applies as much to the policies a leader espouses as to his personal influence. Indeed, it applies to any decisionmaker and the decisions that bear the party's name. If the relationship between a party and its policies is to be more than formal the party itself must be indoctrinated. 'Policymakers must take account of the capacity of a given organization to absorb a point of view', especially if the policies are new or likely to be resisted in the organisation.53 Even Freudenberg, not normally critical of Whitlam, admits that some of Labor's problems in government arose because the policies the Leader promoted in the party 'were not fully absorbed by the Party as a whole, often not fully understood and rarely deeply felt'.54 The doctrine of the

53 Selznick, Leadership in Administration, 58.
mandate, drawing justification from a vote of the people, not only protected the government from the party, as Michels knew, but also avoided the need to proselytise the party machinery. Since we have suggested the mandate doctrine is shaky even as the expression of a relationship with the electorate, the foundations of Labor's policy house of 1972 become sandy indeed. Whitlam used the party as a vehicle for certain desirable public policies and he saw politics as advocacy to groups and the mass outside the party. He devoted insufficient attention to convincing his own party or convincing other decisionmakers who, possessed of more party-manipulating skills than he was, could convince lower levels of the structure. One suspects that surveys of Labor party members during 1972-75 would have shown only marginally less bemusement about the details and worth of innovatory Government policies than among non-members. Yet the structure for indoctrination existed and if it had been better used the policy contributions dormant among rank and file might also have been tapped. Commonsense and the experience of users of community services have just as much role to play as have expertise. For a party to act effectively as a vehicle for public policy it must convince its own members first, for they are its partisans in the community, who can communicate its message with more discrimination than the party Leader can achieve in addressing the mass


56 Alternative sources become especially important if the sources the party is relying on show signs of drying up. We have suggested this was a danger in the Policy Committee system and that Whitlam was the most important single source. But here, too, one observer asked if Whitlam's dull performance at the 1970 Senate election 'raises the possibility that he has exhausted his creative capacity and will be sustained in future only by his ardent desire to be Prime Minister': R.F.I. Smith, 'Political Review', AQ, 43, 1 (March 1971), 105.
and more fervour than the mass media allows in describing party proposals and government initiatives.

A MORE COMPLETE POLITICAL STRATEGY

'Even a Party leader who becomes a Prime Minister must still concern himself with the manipulation of [Labor's] clumsy and sometimes rusty apparatus.' Whitlam, as Freudenberg and others point out, was not good at manipulation. He often attempted to 'crash through or crash' in his relations with the party. This is not a method of manipulation but rather an attempt to win all or lose all. In a sense, it is not politics at all. Losses are sustained by bumping against barriers unable to be crashed through; winning less than what was desired does not arise from a willingly engaged in process of reconciling conflicting goals. Yet the process of reconciling conflicts, rather than the advocacy at which Whitlam excelled, is the crux of politics. Politics involves persuading the voters, en masse and in groups, that their interests can be served by a government programme. They must be shown there is no conflict between their interests and those of the government. Politics involves persuading a party that its various interests can be served by following leaders committed to certain policies. This process embeds more firmly in the life of the party the policies which it tries to implement in government. In government, too, the party must engage in politics, reconciling the interests of pressure groups and various sections of the

57 Bulletin, 11 May 1968 (Donald Horne).
58 Bulletin, 11 December 1965 (Brian Johns); C.R. Cameron, interview; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 291; Labor Comment, November 1968, 3, 7.
59 Indeed, Selznick writes: '[C]reative men are needed ... who know how to transform a neutral body of men into a committed polity. These men are called leaders; their profession is politics' (Selznick, Leadership in Administration, 61). My emphasis.
public service as well as of the voters and the party. A set of policies embedded in a party may sustain the party's leaders in office. 'The point of the manifesto [party platform and policy speech]', wrote Richard Crossman from British Labour's experience, 'is to give yourself an anchor when the civil service tries to go back on your word'.60 The party organisation provides the only bed for this anchor. 'If the Government is tough and persistent enough, of course it will get its way in the end' in the new political battle that begins after the election.61 The toughness and persistence required in government can be nurtured in opposition; both contexts require manipulative and persuasive skills.

A complete political strategy would have the party's policymaking machinery acting as a partisan filter on the various flows of influence from outside the party. A party is supposed to be partisan, to express a distinctive view of the world and promote policies which, while they seek support from all parts of the community, favour some parts at the expense of others. There will be some consistency in these favouritisms, whether they can be characterised as 'for the working class', 'for the suburban middle class' or 'for employees', but the most important basis for their distinctiveness is their relation to the preferences of the members of the party as they are reconciled by the party's internal politics. A party becomes a mere opinion polling organisation if it accepts all external demands without discrimination and without regard for the commitment of the proponents of the demands to the party as an

organisation rather than to the schemes they hope the party will adopt. The party should give the highest priority to those schemes which accord most closely to the needs and desires of its 'core' members and supporters, as these emerge through the internal politics of the party.

It is not the party's role to reflect faithfully every demand in the community; there are other organisations, other parties, pressure groups, even talk-back radio, not to mention government bureaucracies, which relay community demands to governments. Demands given a low priority by a single political party could be given a high priority by another organisation seeking goods from governments. The role of an individual political party is to give highest priority to the demands of those who have committed themselves to the party by joining it, or affiliating with it or voting regularly for it. It certainly should try to convince a majority of voters that their demands, too, can thus be served, but not at the cost of giving its 'core' less than the highest priority. The decisions bearing the party name must above all be related, as we have said already, to the life of the party itself. In this life, external influences come and go, but the activities and demands of the core remain.

The experience of the Whitlam Government of 1972-75 led some party decisionmakers to look critically at Labor's attitudes to external pressures. In December 1977 the newly elected Deputy Senate Leader, John Button, said of his party:

I think we have developed too much of a tendency to listen to the strident voices of articulate minorities. Too much time is spent offering something to everybody. There are a lot of

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people in the party who think it's all about women's issues or conservation or civil liberties or law reform or all of those things.\textsuperscript{63}

Earlier, Kim Beazley, Whitlam's Education Minister, had put it more succinctly: 'I am sick and tired of the Labor Party becoming the spittoon for every special interest group in the community'.\textsuperscript{64} A more complete approach to politics would differentiate between external pressures in terms both of what was of the highest priority to members and core supporters of the ALP, as expressed in the decisions of its Conferences, and of what seemed politically feasible in relation to the electorate. The ability of a scheme to win support within the party after rigorous examination and subjection to the party's internal political processes would indicate its chances of winning support outside the party. The intellectual attractiveness of the scheme to its expert proponents and to their political supporters would be insufficient for it to bear the party name. Its alleged merits as a vote winner would be taken with a pinch of salt, given what professionals would or should know about the limited connections between policy preferences and voting behaviour. Above all, professionals, pursuing a more complete political strategy, would recognise their different interest in a scheme. Unlike those who wish to use the party as a vehicle for pet projects,

\textsuperscript{63} Nation Review, 22-28 December 1977.
\textsuperscript{64} Conversation with a delegate to a Western Australian Branch Conference which Beazley addressed. For similar remarks regarding Labor under Whitlam, see: Ashbolt, 'Why Whitlam Should Go Too', 106 ('freeloaders and bandwagon-jumpers'); Graeme Duncan, 'The ALP: Socialism in a Bourgeois Society?', Duncan, ed., Critical Essays ..., 93; Robert Murray, 'Labor: a Bubble Pricked', Politics, 10 (May 1976), 36 (the Whitlam Government being 'taken in by a range of hustlers who descended on it in the euphoric days of 1972'). For the same phenomenon in other reformist parties, see: Samuel Eldersveld, Political Parties, Chicago, 1964, 329-30; Michels, Political Parties; 94-5; Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, 22.
the professional knows he has to gain real support for it within the party, has to convince the bureaucracy of its worth, has to communicate its good points to the people and even, perhaps, ensure that the party and its government gain some credit for it. Unlike the amateur, the professional realises the party has to live with the policy and its consequences.

RECOGNITION OF THE LIMITED POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

A party which synthesised the best of the Whitlam strategy and of the professional approach would concentrate also on doing a less grandiose job better. While it would be pleasant for a party to come to office with a parcel of highly detailed policies and the informal support of a party organisation and a majority of the electorate, in practice this will never happen. Clem Lloyd, closely involved in the working out of policies in opposition, underlined the haphazardness of the process. Day-to-day political work, especially responding to Government actions or organising Parliamentary tactics, always took up the greater part of Opposition staff time. While the staffs of the Opposition Leader and his Deputy were perhaps the single most important source of ideas and co-ordination, apart from Whitlam himself, their contacts with outside experts were discontinuous, problems of implementation could only be guessed at and few schemes were worked out in sufficient detail to enable implementation without massive amounts of work by public servants after the change of government. 65 Lack of information will always bedevil oppositions. Crossman's exhortation about the programme as an anchor is easier to make than fulfil. Perhaps

65 C.J. Lloyd, interview.
the best parties can do is develop broad lines of acceptable action, a set of core goals from which they will not be swayed by pressures from interest groups or public servants. The main sources of detailed policy for a Labor Government, as for any other, will be elsewhere than its own ranks, but the life of the party, its internal reconciliation of the goals of its members and its closest electoral supporters, should define the general direction of the party's years in office.66

A party should not try to by-pass its internal life, but to channel it to better ends than mere coalition-maintenance and satisficing of conflicting sub-coalitions. By ensuring that a supply of relevant electoral policies is continually channeled into this internal political process, that proposals for public policy are well-politicised and tested before becoming the subject of the Leader's advocacy, a party can combine the best of the Whitlam strategy and of the politics of coalitions. It must be able to respond to external pressures of the type encapsulated in our HYPOTHESES VI to XIII, without being so infatuated with pleasing outsiders that it ignores the preferences emerging from its own internal strivings, strivings which were exemplified in HYPOTHESES I to V. But, if a party is a coalition, comprising sub-coalitions with many conflicting goals, if the influences upon it are myriad and complex, if it enjoys only imperfect information and faces problems which are hard to define and continually changing, it is still likely to make many decisions by partisan mutual adjustment, by

incremental steps and by the processes of the garbage can (HYPOTHESES XIV, XV and XVI). The goal of party reformers should be not to cauterise or work outside these processes but to turn them to better ends. The party can act as a partisan filter for community demands, an institutional bedrock for certain policy preferences, a source of competent political leaders, a repository of professionalism in politics and an organisation that can undertake and endure lengthy battles. It is rarely possible, inside or outside parties, to continually 'crash through'. Proposals must be subjected to a political process, which involves the often difficult and lengthy reconciling of conflicting goals, which often loses the 'merits' of issues in a whirlpool of 'extraneous' matters, which often produces frustrations and dead ends. It is, in fact, as Weber said, 'a strong and slow boring of hard boards'.

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