THE STRUCTURE AND LEADING PERSONNEL
OF THE CHINESE STATE COUNCIL SINCE

by

Malcolm Leslie Lamb

This thesis is submitted for the degree of
Master of Arts (Asian Studies)
in the Australian National University.

This thesis was written by the undersigned as a research scholar in the Department of Asian Civilizations at the Australian National University.
Acknowledgements

This project was undertaken while at the Australian National University for two years from 1972 to 1973. I am very grateful to all who have assisted me in the preparation of this thesis, but especially to Mr I.F.H. Wilson who assisted me in the early periods of research, and Dr F.C. Teiwes who has painstakingly vetted and corrected the manuscript while suggesting valuable structural alterations. I am equally grateful to Dr Julia Ching and Dr R.R.C. de Crespigny for their helpful comments and criticisms. Thanks also are due to the staff of the University Library for help in obtaining important reference material for my use.
Contents

Acknowledgements 1

Introduction 1

CHAPTER 1: The Situation in 1965, and the Cultural Revolution 6

CHAPTER 2: Bureaucracy: the Need for Reform and the Methods Adopted 20

CHAPTER 3: The State Council: Overall Organisation and Top Leaders 30

CHAPTER 4: The International Ministries 45

CHAPTER 5: The Military Ministries 70

CHAPTER 6: The Economic Ministries 82

CHAPTER 7: The Industrial Ministries 101

CHAPTER 8: The Social Ministries 140

CHAPTER 9: Bureaux Subordinate to the State Council 153

Conclusions 163

Appendix 180

Glossary of Persons' Names 205

Bibliography 218
Introduction

Aims

The aim of this thesis is to examine the State structure which has evolved in the wake of the Cultural Revolution; and the personnel involved. It will be restricted to an analysis of the central apparatus in Peking. The starting date for systematic data collection is October 1, 1968, the National Day following the establishment of the last provincial revolutionary committee, and the cut off date is May 1, 1973, a time when many new cadres were rehabilitated.

The approach adopted is a twofold one. Firstly to examine in depth the reforms executed on the state structure after the Cultural Revolution; and also to systematically analyse the cadre who staff it at the higher levels.

In defining 'state structure', we mean the State Council, its ministries,¹ and directly affiliated subordinate bureaux. The Chairmanship of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), National People's Congress (NPC), and its Standing Committee, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and its Standing Committee, the National Defence Council (NDC), the Supreme People's Court and Procuracy, the Academy of Sciences, and the various mass organisations that proliferate below, which can be linked indirectly to the State Council will receive less exhaustive treatment.

Mao Tse-tung's distrust of the enormous bureaucracy was one of the factors which precipitated the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, in turn, disrupted the State Council, causing many ministries and bureaux to cease effective operations for a time. One of the aims of this study is to see which of the organisations have been re-activated,

¹ For simplification, Ministries include Commissions of the State Council; Ministers and Vice Ministers include Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of Commissions.
in what priority, and why. It asks what measures, if any, have been introduced into the system which may prevent the bureaucracy and its bureaucrats from returning to their former condition.  

We shall also be looking at the types of cadres now staffing leading positions. Of particular concern is how much continuity there is between the 1965 and 1973 elites, and how far the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has intruded into the system. The political background of cadres, their ages, administrative expertise, and their relationships with the PLA, Party and Red Guards will be examined. Also of interest are their careers since 1968; in the cases of the senior echelon, these will be accounted for.

Also under examination will be the nature of the reformed bureaucracies; how extensive it has been in the internal structuring of organisations, and the extent of amalgamation. The role of the May 7th Cadre Schools, a major infra-bureaucratic innovation of the Cultural Revolution, their effect on cadres and, where possible, bureaucratic units, and the place they have in Chinese society.

While the role of the Party and PLA elites will not be neglected, there will be no attempt to analyse in depth members of these elites. However the first three chapters will be concerned with the relationships between the three bureaucracies, and later chapters will refer to them when relevant.

We shall also examine the validity of analysing, in the Chinese context, elites through conventional institutional models. It may prove

2 In this connection, it has been attributed to Mao that he sees the need for further Cultural Revolutions. Who will have the power to mastermind and successfully conclude them is not clear.

I.F.H. Wilson comments, "... a number of the Central Committee members were there for reasons quite apart from their proximity to power. Old revolutionary leaders ... tended to be retained rather than pensioned off ..." Wilson, I.F.H., Decision Making in China (I) Joint Work-In-Progress Seminars. Research School of Social Science ANU. June 29, 1971, p.3.
that one of the legacies of the Cultural Revolution has been to minimise the institutional role of the State Council, NPC and even the Central Committee of the CCP. Rather it may be that ad hoc bodies consisting of those expert in specific areas function as the need arises. The NPC is yet to conduct a fourth session, the Central Committee has not officially met in plenary session since September 1970, and there is no record of State Council meetings since 1966. Replacements have yet to be found for Lin Piao and his associates on the Politburo. Vacancies continue to exist for at least six ministerial posts, several bureau directorships and in the upper echelon of the PLA. Vacancies in the top echelon of the elites has been a feature of the Chinese system since the Cultural Revolution.

Data Analysis

To analyse the system's operation since the Cultural Revolution, the public appearances and other activities of leading government cadres have been recorded. There are approximately 2,000 such cadres. Although not all have been identified in specific positions, those that haven't can be reasonably supposed in the context of their appearances to be leading members of a state organ. In ministries, the lowest ranking figure included in the analysis is the deputy division chief of a bureau; while in the bureaux subordinate to the State Council, the lowest is a deputy director of a department.

It should be pointed out that the number of cadres on file has constantly expanded during the 1968-73 period, particularly since 1971, as individuals were rehabilitated or promoted from the mass of 'staff

---

4 Data concerning party and military personnel has been gathered too, but our attention will be focussed on state cadres.

5 For example, the Deputy Director of the Commanding Department of China Aviation Administration Corporation (CAAC).
members', who, for the purpose of this study are omitted. The numbers identified in specific positions continue to expand. On the other hand, many of the 2,000 are not currently politically active, some have since died, others have been purged, and more are members of honorific, politically meaningless organisations.

Until the Cultural Revolution, China-watchers possessed a reasonable knowledge of the state structure at the national level, and its leading personnel. There were, to be sure, blanks in the picture, but such were the exception. However the opposite has been the case during the period of this study. There remain many empty spaces on the political map, and the current fluidity of China's body politic is serving to hinder our quest for a better understanding of the Chinese bureaucracy.

The task of examining the elite is made still more difficult by the unconventional method of announcing changes in the hierarchy. New appointments are filtered into recognition by way of the namelists that appear in Jenmin Jihpao (JMJP) of cadres attending functions. This makes it all the more difficult to pin point the actual date of appointment, and impossible to ascertain who made the decision.6

Because JMJP habitually prints namelists of officials attending banquets, talking with foreign delegations, attending rallies and funerals, we can develop a picture, admittedly not complete, of their activities, and through their titles, of the administrative machine. Yet if an official makes only rare appearances, it does not follow that he is unimportant. By extension, infrequent mention of an organisation does not necessarily indicate that it has an unimportant role to play. Experience shows that

6 Before the Cultural Revolution, Government appointments were made by the State Council, ratified by the NPC Standing Committee and published by NCNA.
officials from the outward oriented ministries dominate the lists because they have more contact with visitors from abroad. Unfortunately JMJP rarely gives full reports of national conferences, although local radio reports on provincial conferences sometimes identify officials from the centre.

There are significant problems associated with elite studies that need to be considered. That of relating the theory of bureaucratic relationships to practice, and of changes of structure to policy differences are both relevant in the Chinese context. The position of the Chinese Communist Party, theoretically and, for most of the post 1949 period, actually the leading institution of the CPR, complicates the matter, and its unique influence will be treated in this light.

Chapter Organisation

The first chapter examines the state hierarchy in 1965 on a structural-functional basis, and ascertains the overall effects of the Cultural Revolution on it. The next chapter discusses the ideological reasons behind the reform of the bureaucracy. The next series of chapters systematically analyses the State Council, its ministries and bureaux. A concluding chapter provides an overall assessment of the changes which have taken place in the state structure from the latter days of the Cultural Revolution to May 1973.

Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, National Defence and the Physical Culture and Sports Commission.
Chapter 1. The Situation in 1965, and the Cultural Revolution.

So that we may be able to examine the 1968-73 period in historical perspective, it is necessary to briefly consider the situation in 1965 and make preliminary judgements of the effects of the Cultural Revolution.

1965 has been chosen for three reasons. First, the system operated at a 'constitutional' level in that year: the NPC and CPPCC had concluded their 3rd and 4th sessions respectively, the State Council and the NPC Standing Committee were meeting regularly, and most other organisations were performing their allotted functions. Second, most of the old elite in the State apparatus had been re-appointed to their positions at the NPC meeting, perpetuating the continuity evident since 1949. Donald Klein summed up the situation:

"Of the initial 76 Ministers and Vice Ministers, nine have died, thirteen were still serving in the identical positions they held in 1949, and another sixteen were Ministers or Vice Ministers in another Ministry."²

Thus although storm clouds were brewing, especially in cultural and educational fields, the elite seemed safely in power. Third, 1965 is convenient because the closing months of the year would witness the opening volleys of the Cultural Revolution with its attendant destruction of the old order.

The NPC, CPPCC, NDC, and PRC Chairmanship

The first two of these august sounding bodies held their 3rd and 4th Congresses in December-January 1964-65.

¹ The purges of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih (1954), and P'eng Teh-huai (1959), did not involve major shake-ups.

The NPC is described by the Constitution as being the only legislative body in the country and that it is the highest organ of state authority. According to its role explicitly set down by the Constitution, it elected a Standing Committee to conduct the affairs of the NPC when it was not meeting in full session. It also appointed the Chairman of the PRC, and upon his recommendation, the Premier, Vice Premiers and leading officers of the NPC. Finally the NPC appointed the 46 ministers upon the recommendation of the Premier. The Congress also accepted unanimously the major work report of the Government delivered by Chou En-lai, and those delivered by the Presidents of the Supreme People's Court and Procuracy. By mid January 1965, the 3,000 odd deputies having completed their constitutional duties dispersed to various parts of the country to resume their posts.

The NPC does not function as a Parliament in the Westminster sense. Only a small minority of the deputies made speeches, and these invariably supported the Government. There was no cut and thrust in debate. In fairness, the NPC is too large a body to allow meaningful discussion of policy in detail, and it meets too rarely. Under the Constitution it is obliged to meet once a year. The NPC Standing Committee more nearly approaches the Westminster model, but in reality it affirms State Council decisions without alteration. It is possible that group meetings held during NPC sessions to discuss policy or other matters may have more significance, especially in more relaxed periods.

As it turns out, the NPC is a sounding board upon which existing policies can be affirmed, and the elite legitimised in power. The deputies unanimously accepted the work report, and elected the appropriate councils with no dissent. It served, however, as a point of contact

---

3 The CPR Constitution promulgated in September 1954.
between the leadership and the masses, however superficial; while at the same time, affording the masses a sense of participation in state affairs.

The NPC Standing Committee has played a more demanding and decisive role. It is required to meet at least twice a month. In 1965 it met 27 times. Until 1966, despite the fact that it invariably ratified State Council decisions, its legal functions were carefully observed in the interests of 'socialist legality'.

The CPPCC, a consultative body only, whose membership is drawn chiefly from the mass organisations, and serves as a united front mechanism met concurrently with the NPC. In practice its influence on the political scene is nil, despite its august title.

The CPPCC is not a legislative body. Its most active and important period was 1949-54 when its chief pre-occupation was drafting the CPR Constitution. Since then, however it has atrophied, although its Standing Committee had met nearly 50 times. Its main task is to keep alive the existence of a United Front, linking all organisations and political parties to a common goal.

The role of the Chairman of the PRC is largely ceremonial, although he can convene a Supreme State Conference when he feels it is warranted.

---

4 NPC Organic Law, Article 20.
6 Such as the Academy of Sciences, Writers Federation, Revolutionary KMT and many others.
7 Minor political parties continued to exist after 1949 in addition to the CCP. They included the Revolutionary KMT, China Democratic League, Workers and Peasants Party and several others.
8 Consists of the Chairman PRC, the Vice Chairmen, Chairman NPC, Premier, and 'other persons concerned'.
His power is derived from his party post, in Liu Shao-ch'i's case, the ranking Vice Chairman.

The NDC was the preserve of retired army generals, and although as individuals many in 1965 enjoyed positions of power, this was not derived from their membership of the NDC. As a body it has met only four times, and can be said to have no importance in the military arena.

It would be pointless reiterating the roles of these bodies in detail, for they are clearly ascribed in the CPR Constitution.

Structure of the State Council

The State Council consists of a Premier, Vice Premiers, Ministers, and the Secretary-General. Its purpose is to administer the affairs of state, formulate and execute policy. The NPC session appointed 46 ministers, although three more ministries were subsequently created prior to the Cultural Revolution.

The State Council had six functional staff offices which were generally headed by Vice Premiers. These offices were designed to co-ordinate the work of the ministries which were grouped under them according to their functional area. Each office had several Deputy Directors many of whom were ministers themselves, while others did not hold ministerial rank but were acknowledged experts in their fields.

In most cases the Vice Premiers held ministerial posts, usually in key ministries:


10 Foreign Affairs - Ch'en Yi, Internal Affairs - Hsieh Fu-chih, Agriculture & Forestry - T'an Chen-lin, Industry & Communications - Po Yi-po, Finance & Trade - Li Hsien-nien, Culture & Education - Chang Chü-chun. It should be noted that the last named was not a Vice Premier.
TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vice Premier</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lin Piao</td>
<td>National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Lung</td>
<td>Physical Culture and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Yi</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulanfu</td>
<td>Nationalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Fu-ch'unch</td>
<td>State Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Hsien-nien</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nieh Jung-chen</td>
<td>Scientific and Technological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po Yi-po</td>
<td>State Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Ting-yi</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Fu-chih</td>
<td>Public Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Others held no ministerial posts due to pressure of activity in other areas, while Ch'en Yün, the last remaining Vice Premier was a former minister.

A Secretary-General and several deputies organised the work of the State Council.

Each of the 49 ministers had several vice ministers under him who would assist in the operation of the ministry. In the cases of ageing or ill ministers, the first Vice Minister would act for him, assuming a more critical role. The most Vice Ministers in a single Ministry at one time was 17 in the State Planning Commission. The average, however, was just under 7, while two ministries, the 2nd and 7th Machine Building Ministries had just one each. Below the vice ministerial level would proliferate numerous bureaux and institutes responsible for administering policy.

Some ministries were of superior importance to others, especially the top economic ministries, Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and Public Security. The industrial and economic ministries generally

---

11 Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Secretary-General of the CCP, and T'ao Chu and K'eh Ch'ing-shih as important leaders of CCP Regional Bureaux.

12 It is possible that in some ministries, especially the military-industrial group, not all vice ministers were identified.

13 Such as the Coal and Light Industry Ministries.
depended on the more important planning ministries for guidance and initiative.

The 49 ministries embraced most spheres of government activity, and the areas not covered were administered by 24 bureaux subordinate, but directly affiliated to the State Council. Each normally had a director, and in most cases, several deputies, and like the ministries, the bureaux held important administrative roles.

In 1965 all the ministries appeared to be functioning normally, the State Council was meeting regularly hearing reports from ministries and other organisations, and submitting legislation, appointments, dismissals and promotions to the NPC Standing Committee for ratification.

The mass organisations engaged in quasi government work, such as the Academy of Sciences, professional bodies, trading organisations and others were also seen to be operating effectively, with few exceptions, in 1965.

It was against this seemingly stable background that the cataclysmic events of the Cultural Revolution took place. The stability (administrative at least) of 1965 was by the start of 1967 shattered.

Analysis of Leading Personnel in State Organs

There is insufficient space to discuss in detail many aspects of the personnel involved in the 1965 organisation. However, we shall look at their ages and party affiliations.

Broadly speaking, the membership of the NPC Standing Committee could be divided into three groups: minor party personnel, pensioned off CCP members, and those still politically active. Similarly the NDC and CPPCC could have been divided into the three groups. Old revolutionaries of

---

14. See Who's Who in Communist China, Union Research Institute (Hong Kong 1967), for a near complete list of the ministries and their incumbents.

15. For instance, Statistics, Religious Affairs, Seas and State Arrangements.
advancing age or ill health could be retired to such quiet, undemanding surroundings.  

As might have been expected, long continuity of personnel at the highest levels of administration carries with it certain disadvantages. First, the trend towards unrevolutionary life styles, so deplored by Mao, caused by long periods divorced from revolutionary hardship and toil. The other, perhaps more tangible problem was that of advancing age, so that by 1965, the hierarchies in China, were dominated by people of advanced age. Table 2 illustrates this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Av. Age (1965)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politburo (Full)</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politburo (Alt.)</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &amp; VP's State Council</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C &amp; VC's NPC</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C &amp; VC's CPPCC</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C &amp; VC's NDC</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above illustrates that in the less important bodies (NPC, NDC, CPPCC), the average ages were, excepting the Politburo, significantly higher than the others composed of younger, presumably more vigorous men.

The eldest of the Vice Premiers was Ho Lung, born in 1896. The youngest were all born in 1907. Only three of the 17 were born before

---

16 Membership of the NDC and CPPCC was largely a reward for distinguished service. See fn.3 of the Introduction p.2 for an expansion of this theme. It should also be noted that many of the members of these bodies were engaged in heavy protocol duties.

17 It must be pointed out that estimates of age vary from source to source, usually by small margins. Of the data worked with, most has come from the Union Research Institute and Taiwan files, while some from NCNA death notices.


19 They were Hsieh Fu-chih, Lin Piao and Po Yi-po.
1900. The relative youth of the Vice Premier body indicated the more active role they were supposed to play in politics and administration.

Of the 49 ministers, we have age data for 41, and the accuracy of some of the data is open to question. However, from the information available, the eldest of the ministers, Li Chu-ch'en was born in 1881. Altogether 10 ministers were born before 1900, four of whom were born before 1890. The youngest, Yu Chiu-li, was born in 1914.

Seven of the ministers were not members of the CCP, and of these, six were born before 1900 [the exception being Sha Ch'ien-li who was born in 1903]. This meant that this was an ageing group whose political influence and administrative activity was in decline; moreover old minor party ministers were being replaced by CCP members. On the whole, the minor party ministers held non-political, technical portfolios where their expertise could be most usefully exploited. In the cases of the more elderly ministers, they would have senior vice ministers on the staff who would, in effect, operate the ministry. The decline in the percentage of non-CCP ministers has matched the waning of minor party influence on the political scene.

It is not practical to discuss the ages of the bureaux directors as data is available for only four of them. All four, with the exception of Wu Yu-chang, were born this century, the youngest being Mei Yi, born in 1915.

20 For example, Union Research Institute and Taiwan authorities both computed former Education Minister Ho Wei to be born in 1908, but on his death, NCNA revealed he was born in 1910. For Hsieh Fu-chih NCNA gave 1907 as his birth, whereas others claimed he was born in 1898.

21 In 1965, non CCP Health Minister Li Teh-ch'uan was replaced by Ch'ien Hsin-chung.

22 In 1949, 42 per cent of the ministers and vice ministers were non CCP, whereas in 1966 only 13 per cent were. From Klein, D.W., op.cit., p.362.
A final point to note about the State Council bureaucrats is that although many were of peasant or military origin, long years of administration in their fields meant that by 1965, ministers and vice ministers, with the lower ranking cadres had developed a considerable body of expertise. This had been supplemented by post 1949 graduates, and others who had been professionally active in the relevant fields before 1949.

Role of the CCP

Only the preamble of the CPR Constitution mentions the existence of the CCP, and then in the vaguest terms as the leading group of the united front aimed at transforming the State. The first sentence of the preamble also makes mention of the CCP as being the leader of the peoples' struggle to overthrow the old order.

No institutional connection is stipulated between Party and state, however the two are intimately connected. Hsiung Hsi-yuan has summed up the role of the Party in state affairs,

"The leading role of the Party finds its expression in:

1) that the Party gives the organs of state power exact directives.
2) that the Party enforces Party policies through the organs of state power ... and exercises supervision over their activities.
3) that the Party selects and promotes loyal cadres (Party and non Party) to work in the organs of state power."

He continues,

"... the role of the Party in leading the state organs finds its highest expression in the fact that the state organs solve all important problems according to the initiation and direction of the Party."


24 Ibid.
The Party has backed up its authority over the state organs through four connected, yet different channels.

The Central Committee maintained an extensive bureaucracy which covered most fields of activity. While being separate from the State in organisational terms, there was, especially at the higher levels, interlocking membership. Through its powerful organisation the Party was able to maintain close scrutiny over the affairs of state, while being professionally competent to initiate policy.

By holding posts in the government, members of the CCP (especially of Central Committee rank) could dominate state proceedings. Table 3 illustrates the predominance of Party members in organs of state power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>PB</th>
<th>PB(A)</th>
<th>CC</th>
<th>CC (A)</th>
<th>NonCC</th>
<th>NonCCP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premier and VP's</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Directors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC C and VC's</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPCC C and VC's</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC C and VC's</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, 10 of 19 NPC Chairmen and Vice Chairmen were alternate members of the Central Committee and above, 12 of 24 CPPCC, 10 of 14 NDC, all of the Premier/Vice Premier group were, 23 of 49 ministers, and just one of the 22 bureau directors.

The Party also enjoyed the controlling hand of the propaganda machine which it wielded through its Central Committee Propaganda Department under Lu Ting-yi, also a Vice Premier and Minister of Culture. It controlled the *JMJP*, and other newspapers were increasingly dependent on it for layout and articles. Therefore the news pages of other newspapers became more like *JMJP* as the years passed. The Party also produced a monthly theoretical journal, *Hung-ch'i*, Red Flag, for the edification of members.

25 The director was Wu Yu-chang, head of the Bureau of Language Reform. He died later in 1966, aged 87.
Finally, the Party maintained a system of committees and fractions throughout the state organs at each level. These bodies directed the work of state organs, and made sure the directives from the Party were thoroughly implemented.

The Party therefore was in a strong position, although under State Law, it had no precisely defined role. However its 1956 Constitution, and writings of its leaders and propaganda chiefs leave no doubt where it really stood. In the succeeding chapters, we will attempt to see whether or not the Party has maintained its superior position in the new organs of state power.

The Cultural Revolution

In terms of size and influence, the State Council was functioning at a high level in 1965, however as the months wore on, it came under repeated attacks from various sources as the Cultural Revolution got under way. During the three years of turmoil, hardly a minister or vice minister escaped attack. Only the minor party representatives were more or less protected, because of their advanced age, and their reputed lack of political ambition.26

Again there is not space here to discuss the complicated, and still mysterious events of the Cultural Revolution.27 It is worthwhile, however, to reflect for a moment on Chou En-lai's attempts to shield his State Council from attack and collapse, and to see how successful he was. It was in his interests politically, and for the country in general, to protect as many of his subordinates as he possibly could, to maintain his

26 Klein, writing in late 1968 says that only 2 of the 38 ministers and vice ministers concerned were attacked, one of whom was rehabilitated. See Klein, D.W., op.cit., p.362.

own position, and keep production going, while retaining expertise in
the administration, and chaos to a minimum. Of his methods, Thomas
Robinson wrote,

"The first line of defence was to let the minister ... defend himself and to offer self criticism. If this
did not suffice, Chou authorised criticism sessions,
keeping tight rein on the proceeding. If this did not
mollify the red guards he would authorise further
sessions, meeting preferably in small groups only, and
insisting that he himself chair each session. Finally
if the red guards were still not satisfied, he would
forbid further sessions, relying on his own authority,
and, if necessary, appealing to that of Mao and Lin.
If this did not work, Chou's devices were exhausted
and he either submitted to the red guards (by dismissing
the minister in question) or he stepped aside while they
took over the ministry (this only happened in the case
of the Foreign Ministry)."^{28}

As minister after minister was ousted, and cadres of lower rank
dismissed, administrative chaos worsened, and most ministries found it
difficult to function at all. The Foreign Ministry was sacked in mid
1967, and for a time taken over by radicals lead by the former diplomat,
Yao Teng-shan.

In January 1967, Mao called upon Lin Piao to intervene in the
struggle with the PLA. However it was not until September of that year
that the PLA was really able to restore order, which in fact meant that
the PLA took over themselves the administration of the revolutionary
committees in the provinces, which, despite the 'three in one'
combination of old cadres, red guards, and PLA, were increasingly
dominated by the last named.

The PLA also moved into the ministries to restore order, especially
in fields which were vital to national security, such as the Ministries
of Public Security, Railways, Communications, and Internal Affairs. The

---
^{28} Robinson, T.W., "Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution in China", in
Robinson, T.W., op.cit., p.263. Another relevant article in the same
book is Gurtov, Melvin, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the
Chinese Cultural Revolution".
PLA also took over the operations of the CAAC. In all other ministries and bureaux, from the centre to the local levels, PLA representatives were installed. Of interest is that a revolutionary committee was known to be set up in only one ministry, that being Nieh Jung-chen's Scientific and Technical Commission. The Academy of Sciences also had a revolutionary committee established within it, as indeed did most of Peking's universities.

Chou would, on occasion, risk his own revolutionary reputation by appealing for order in certain areas to ensure production, or the careers of valued subordinates. For example in the case of Yu Ch'iu-li, who was accused by red guards in March 1967 of excluding proletarian revolutionaries from his ministry, and of thwarting the Cultural Revolution, Chou was reported to have said,

"The work of the State Planning Commission [of which Yu was a Vice Chairman] cannot be stopped for a single day."

He further disclosed in the same speech that Yu Ch'iu-li was working on the 1968 annual plan at the time, and could not be disturbed.

Chou actively attempted to protect five of his Vice Premiers, while leaving the rest to fend for themselves. In this he was partially successful, for only one of the five, T'an Chen-lin, was dismissed.

Many of those severely criticised in the Cultural Revolution have since returned to power, but there are many yet to re-appear. The dismissals were so wide ranging that on National Day 1967, only seven premiers, three directors and five deputy directors of staff offices,

29 China Aviation Administration Corporation.


31 They were Ch'en Yi, Li Fu-ch'un, Li Hsien-nien, Nieh Jung-chen, and T'an Chen-lin.
nineteen ministers and forty-two vice ministers appeared on the T'ien An Men rostrum. 32

By National Day 1968, the trend had worsened with only seven vice premiers, three ministers and eleven vice ministers appearing. Six of the vice premiers present were also ministers. Of the three ministers present, two were members of minor parties, 33 the other being Li Ssu-kuang. It should be noted that with the exception of the Premier, none appeared with state council titles. It should also be noted that 'leading members of departments concerned' were also present, but the article did not elaborate. 34

The prestige and effectiveness of the state administration had reached its lowest ebb. Of the ministries, only Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, National Defence and the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries were seen to be functioning at anything like the normal level. There were signs of re-activation among some of the economic and industrial ministries. By the end of 1968, of the 49 ministers, only four were still actively associated with their ministries. 35

In general, the State Council's structure and personnel was shattered and dismissed: the ministries were either not functioning or doing so at a reduced pace, and most of the ranking cadres were out of office. Even by National Day 1972, 21 of the 49 ministers were unaccounted for, and 219 of the 339 vice ministers were similarly unaccounted for.

The reconstruction of the State Council was to begin during 1969 as gradually cadres were rehabilitated and organisations resumed operations.

33 They were Fu Tso- yi and Hsû Teh-heng.
34 NCNA 1/10/68.
35 They were Fang Yi, Lai Chi-fa, Lin Piao and Tseng Shan. Ch'en Yi ceased ministerial operations during October 1968.

The Cultural Revolution was unique among revolutions because its leaders turned upon the institutions they themselves had created. Mao might have argued that the system in 1965 had developed in a way contrary to his wishes, but the point is that he himself set the foundations of the CCP.

Mao believed that there were persons in the highest echelons of the Party and state administration who were leading China down the road to revisionism towards an eventual restoration of capitalism: the road, in Mao's view, being followed by the Soviet Union. Some might argue that Mao used this as a convenient excuse for toppling his rival, Liu Shao-ch'i, and that the Cultural Revolution was merely a power struggle. Yet after Liu fell with relative ease in 1966, the Cultural Revolution raged on.

The Cultural Revolution can be seen, therefore, as a crusade against the Party, and the bureaucracies. Part of the decision concerning the Cultural Revolution reads,

At present, our aim is to knock down those power holders who take the capitalist road, criticise the bourgeois reactionary academic 'authorities', criticise the ideologies of the bourgeois and all exploiting classes, reform education, literature and the arts, and reform all superstructure which is incompatible with the socialist economic base ....

Mao and his erstwhile associates believed that certain leaders had 'wormed their way' into the Party, and had directed it away from the correct lines; the same applied to the State.

Throughout most of China's long history, particularly since the Ch'in Dynasty, there has been a powerful bureaucratic machine. From time to time it has been subjected to attack from below, among the peasantry, or above from either the Emperor, his family, or the eunuchs. In the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion for example, the slogan 'smash the officials' was influential among the rebels. Since 1949 bureaucracy has been periodically maligned and retrenched, although this did not prevent a general tendency to expand.

During the Cultural Revolution, bureaucrats were pictured as men cut off from the people, living a privileged existence of great villas, sumptuous banquets, bourgeoise games and chauffered cars.

While the bureaucrats themselves were being attacked for leading such indolent lives, the system they operated in was being condemned as well. It was regarded as being too big, with too much duplication and red tape, and being inefficient despite (or because of) its size.

Throughout its history, the CCP has made attempts to cut down the size of its bureaucracy. A campaign in 1942 while in Yenan aimed at reducing the cadre population to 6,300 actually increased their numbers to 8,200 by the end of the year.

Jaques Marcuse relates a conversation he had with a Chinese official while in Peking. The official opened,

"'Again you are thinking of old China. In those days the people were oppressed by the bureaucrats. Now they are no longer oppressed. It shows there are no more bureaucrats.'

'Still', I objected, 'I have never had to fill quite so many forms or write quite so many letters about quite so many trivial matters as now. Nor have I seen so many officials engaged in so much paperwork as anywhere else."... 'That is not bureaucracy. It is efficient administration'.


The hsiafang movement of 1957-58 was a means of punishing dissident rightist intellectuals and others, but it was also an attempt to reduce the size of the central bureaucracy. Millions of cadres were sent down to work at the basic levels. This was accompanied by some rationalisation of the ministries in the Centre, and a subsequent transfer of authority to the provinces. The number of ministries in 1959 totalled 31, compared with 41 in 1956, yet just prior to the Cultural Revolution in 1965 the total had risen to 49.

Having destroyed the Party and state bureaucracies to at least county level, an alternate administrative structure had to be created to take their place. Although 'bureaucracy' was a dirty word, even the most radical leaders of the Cultural Revolution recognized the need for a power structure of some kind, but one which would best suit the aspirations of the Cultural Revolution.

At the provincial and lower levels the model adopted was the revolutionary committee. Its membership was to consist of three groups: 'revolutionary' cadres, red guards and other mass representatives, and the representatives of the PLA in the area. Each group was to have roughly equal numbers of representatives, but in practise, the PLA dominated the key positions and was clearly the most powerful element. The committees at first were to be temporary arrangements, but since have been granted permanent status.

Just as the provincial bureaucracies needed reforming, so too did the central bureaucracies. It is significant, however, that mainly through

---


the intercession of Chou En-lai that most of the State Council organisations did not form revolutionary committees.

The leaders of the Cultural Revolution were faced with the twin problems of reforming the bureaucracy, and revitalising the thinking of the cadres. Therefore a simpler, more efficient administration was required, and the cadres would need to be re-educated so that they might fit into the system.

With these two problems in mind, we shall now see what solutions were arrived at.

'Better Troops and Simpler Administration'

A JMJP editorial of July 1968 brought to public attention for the first time the revolution committee of Lingpao hsien, Honan Province, which had taken the road of 'better troops and simpler administration' in response to Mao Tse-tung's call which had read in part,

"The Revolutionary Committee should exercise unified leadership in the administrative structure, follow the policy of 'better troops and simpler administration' and organise a revolutionised leading group which links itself with the masses."  

This hsien's experience along these lines was given front page headlines in JMJP and was clearly a course of action to be followed by the rest of the provincial, county and unit revolutionary committees across the land, and to be extended to Party and state agencies.

The article in question relates that the Lingpao Revolutionary Committee came into being in early 1968 but, even after much discussion, its administrative structure was found to be quite unwieldy, being made up of ten offices with 'about' 100 personnel. It was said that with so large

6 JMJP, July 11, 1968.
7 Mao Tse-tung, Directive, 30/3/68 (NCNA trans.).
8 Amalgamation of the ministries and bureaux started in 1969 and was largely finished by late 1970.
a structure, efficiency was low and many problems were not solved quickly,

"thus adversely affecting both revolution and production and also evoking much criticism from the masses".9

The leading personnel of the revolutionary committee set about to solve the problem, and having studied Chairman Mao's instructions on revolutionary committees and reviewed their own experience, the new structure was set up which had only four offices with thirty personnel (of whom twelve were PLA representatives). Similar amalgamations were carried out throughout the country. For instance, in October 1969, the Commerce Department under the former Tibet People's Council was amalgamated with a Finance and Trade Group.10

The State Council was heavily involved in the moves towards simplification and amalgamation. Before the Cultural Revolution it had 49 ministries and 24 subordinate bureaux. Following amalgamation it now has 20 to 22 ministries11 and two groups12 under it, with some 16 bureaux subordinate.13 Reductions in the numbers of ministries and bureaux have lead to a severe decline in the numbers of cadres. In 1970 Chou En-lai told Edgar Snow that the cadre population at the Centre had been reduced from 60,000 to 10,000.14 Allowing for some distortion, the proportionate

9 'A County Revolutionary Committee Takes the Road of Having "Better Troops and Simpler Administration"', Peking Review, No 32, 9/8/68, p.17.
11 The status of the 4th and 6th Ministries of Machine Building is uncertain and will be treated in a later chapter.
12 The status of the 'groups' will be treated later.
13 It is possible that NCNA and the Broadcasting Administrative Bureau have been transferred to the Central Committee. Here they are under the State Council.
14 Epoca, February 1971, p.23.
fall is very large indeed. Before the Cultural Revolution there were 339 vice ministers; by comparison, on May 1, 1973 there were only 65 active, known vice ministers. The proportionate reduction therefore, is roughly the same as that recorded in the case of the cadres quoted above.

Since the Lingpao article has continued to stress the importance of 'better troops...' and its corollary that cadres should participate in manual labour. A late 1969 editorial elaborated two important systems of cadre labour, the 'three thirds' and the 'two group rotation'. In the former, one third of the cadres does manual labour, another makes investigations and 'studies the situation', while the final third looks after routine office work. The groups rotate at what are called 'fixed intervals'. In the second system half do manual labour, and the others look after the office. There are a number of variations tolerated. This is designed to keep the cadres close to the masses and not divorced from production.

The May 7th Cadre Schools

As indicated above, the notion of getting the cadres into the countryside to engage in manual labour is not new. However, in 1968 it was institutionalised in the form of the 'May 7th' Cadre Schools. They were set up in response to Mao Tse-tung's May 7, 1966 directive which called on the cadres to 'learn other things' and to 'learn industrial production, agricultural production and military affairs' and study 'politics and raise their educational level'.

---

15 This may explain frequent disappearances of cadres in the centre for brief periods, up to six months at times.

16 Ministerial 'writing groups' make 'investigation reports' of factories, and matters under their control.
The first such cadre school, the Liuho in Heilungkiang, was established on May 7, 1968. Following Mao Tse-tung's October 1968 directive, hundreds were set up throughout the country.

An editor's note in JMJP described the aims of the cadre schools,

"The sending down of cadres to do manual work in the May 7th Cadre School ... provides excellent experience. We suggest that comrades of the revolutionary committees at all levels and the broad masses of cadres and intellectuals ... study it. We already have experience in simplifying administrative structures. This, plus the experience of sending cadres to do manual labour will provide a more comprehensive understanding of how to bring about the revolutionisation of organisations and of cadres."

Mao Tse-tung in his directive footnoted above made it quite clear that the cadres must consider it their duty to go down and do manual labour and actively participate in the class struggle. It was seen by him as a means to overcome bureaucracy, oppose revisionism and combat dogmatism. To enable the cadres to get into the countryside, it was found desirable to cut down on the number and length of meetings, reduce paperwork, eliminate redundancy and the duplication of posts. In this light, therefore, the concept of the cadre school, manual labour and the return to the countryside cannot be separated from the simplification of administrative structures.

While at the school, cadres receive their regular salaries and welfare facilities. The terms were initially somewhat open ended, but now vary in general from six months to two or three years, with the majority, especially since 1971 purported to be of six month duration.

17 The directive read,

"Going down to do manual labour gives vast numbers of cadres an excellent opportunity to study once again; this should be done by all cadres except those who are old, weak, ill or disabled. Cadres at their posts should also go down in turn to do manual labour".

Regardless of seniority, all students are said to be treated the same way, and all engage in manual labour. Not all the time, however, is devoted to manual labour; cadres,

"... criticise the bourgeoise, and do mass work. The schools also organise militia training and cultural and sports activities. Some schools set aside time for students to study their vocations or raise their general educational level".  

As a rule, cadres spend half the day doing manual labour and half studying. The routine would vary from season to season, and school to school.  

At the schools, the cadres study the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao and 'participate in the class struggle'. While all engage in agricultural labour, some schools also have manufacturing industries to increase self sufficiency. Because the motto of the schools is 'plain living and hard struggle' and 'self reliance', many schools start from scratch rather than occupy a piece of developed land.  

Students are sent out from the schools at intervals to live with the peasants and help them with their tasks, be they agricultural, party rectification or education, they also learn from the peasants.  

One can read many stories of individuals who had forsaken the revolutionary life and the way of hardship, and who in their jobs had become indolent, bourgeoise and revisionist. However a period at the relevant cadre school invariably has transformed their outlook and

---

20 Ibid., p.5.  
21 For example 250 students of the Ministry of Public Security's school were sent out to accept education from the poor and lower middle peasants. NCNA 15/2/70.
revitalised their revolutionary vigour. Obviously the total approval by the cadres of the schools, particularly 1968-71, noted by the press cannot be taken literally. There have been hints of opposition to the schools,

"After ten years of hard study we now merely wear working clothes; if we had known we would become workers, why would we have studied?"\(^{23}\)

In contrast there are indications that subsequently the schools were looked upon as a welcome break from the trauma of decision making in a system where it is easy to make the wrong decision or be identified with the wrong faction. A *Newsweek* commentator reported a recent visit to a school near Kwangchow,

"No longer are they [the cadre schools] harsh correctional institutes for China's political deviates. Instead they have slowly mellowed into spiritual retreats for hard-working urban cadres who want to take a few weeks off ... with only light work and plenty of time to think. Indeed far from being a dreaded assignment, attendance at a May 7 school has become such a status symbol for ambitious cadres that some schools have long waiting lists".\(^{24}\)

He continued that the peasants were doing the heavier work while many of the student cadres, were loafing under trees or leaning on their hoes.\(^{25}\)

Thus it appears that cadres on long term stays in the schools accept them, having the knowledge that after 'graduation' they will be assigned

---

22 For example, "Lin Hsiang-wei, vice director and chief engineer at a designing institute in Hunan had designed a highway bridge which wasted tons of bricks because he wanted it fancy .... After going to the Kuanting Cadre School he happened to be working at a brick kiln .... Only then did he fully realise what it meant to make one brick ... he often expressed his determination to continue to make revolution and ... transform his old ideas". *Peking Review*, No.19, 12/5/72, pp.6-7.

23 NCNA 8/10/68.

24 Loren Jenkins, 'Esalen East?', *Newsweek*, 4/6/73, p.20.

25 Ibid., p.21.
their old posts or transferred elsewhere. For many that might seem cold comfort. However with a more relaxed atmosphere and shorter terms, the cadres have probably found it easier to come to terms with the May 7th Schools.

A conference on the subject of cadre schools was held in Peking in late January 1971 which announced that some 90,000 cadres from departments under the Central Committee and the State Council had been sent in rotation to over 100 cadre schools since October 1968.²⁶ This indicates the highly significant position the schools have held in the central administration. Later chapters on the ministries and bureaux will provide material on their own schools where possible.

When asking how far the schools have reformed the outlook of the cadres, it is hard to unravel facts from the propaganda. It is possible that they are looked upon as a sort of penance that is difficult to avoid. It is also possible that they have a disruptive effect on the affairs of organisations and continuity of service. What the future of the schools is, cannot be predicted.

²⁶ NCNA 3/2/71.
Chapter 3. The State Council: Overall Organisation and Top Leaders

Three major political incidents have punctuated the period under discussion in this thesis: the 9th Congress of the CCP held in April 1969, the 2nd Plenary Session of the Central Committee of August-September 1970, and finally the removal of Lin Piao from office in September 1971. During this and the following chapters we will attempt to see what bearing these events have had, if any, on the State Council's structure and personnel.

State Council Personnel and the 9th Congress

Near the end of reportage on the 1968 National Day parade it was said that representatives of the 'various departments of the State Council' were present. Apart from this, there was no further reference to the State Council. The State Council was so reduced in operating strength that by the end of 1968 only four vice premiers, one minister and twelve vice ministers were still known to be in their positions.

This does not mean that the State Council and its leading functionaries had ceased to operate, but it does suggest they had been relegated to positions of lesser importance. In the Party hierarchy this was quite evident. In terms of status, the Politburo had been divided into two groups.¹ In the first and higher echelon, only three members of the State Council were so placed: Lin Piao, Chou En-lai and Hsieh Fu-chih; while the second included Vice Premiers Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Yün, Li Pu-ch'un, Li Hsien-nien, and Nieh Jung-chen. Of these, only Li Hsien-nien was to be elected to the Politburo following the 9th Congress.

¹ At rallies and ceremonial functions, some members of the Politburo (together with others who were not actually Politburo members but were close to Mao and Lin) were mentioned at the beginning of reports, while the rest of the Politburo still active were noted after the body of the report of the function. This is especially the case in 1968-69.
Amid considerable fanfare, the 9th Congress was declared open by Mao Tse-tung on April 1, 1969, with some 1,512 delegates in attendance drawn from all walks of life. Although exact figures are not available, it would seem that a great proportion of the delegates were drawn from the PLA.²

There were only three items on the agenda: to adopt Lin Piao's political report, to approve the new Party Constitution and to elect the Central Committee.

Lin's report was divided into eight sections which discussed the Cultural Revolution, its preparations and what was to be learned from it. Lin foreshadowed the need to consolidate the Party, dwelt on foreign relations, and finished with a call to win still greater victories. However what concerns this study appeared in section three.³ Here Lin reiterated the established policy on the cadre question,

"A duplicate administrative structure divorced from the masses, scholasticism which suppresses and binds their revolutionary outlook, and a landlord and bourgeoisie style of formality and ostentation - all these are destructive to the socialist economic base, advantageous to capitalism and disadvantageous to socialism. In accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, organs of state power at all levels must keep close ties with the masses ...".⁴

The cadres, Lin went on, must continue to take part in productive labour, must sweep away the 'dust of bureaucracy', must live frugally, be concerned with the masses' well being, and oppose extravagance and waste. Such sentiments applied to both Party and state cadres. It is important

² A commentator having seen the film of the 9th Congress wrote, "There are great numbers of uniforms all around the place ...", China News Analysis, No. 763, 4/7/69, p.6.

³ "On Carrying out the Tasks of Struggle-Criticism-Transformation Conscientiously". Report to 9th Congress, Peking Review, No.18, 30/4/69, pp.16-35.

⁴ Ibid., p.25.
to note that the State Council began, following the Congress, to amalgamate ministries and bureaux which, up until that time remained unchanged, although many were not operating or had been abolished during the Cultural Revolution.

Some 279 people were elected to the Central Committee as full and alternate members. Its first plenum held immediately after the Congress elected a Politburo consisting of twenty-five full and alternate members. Of these, only six had any connection with the State Council.

As Donald Klein and Lois Hager have pointed out, while 25 per cent of the membership of the 8th Central Committee was drawn from the minister/vice minister category, only 10 per cent of the 9th Central Committee were from this group. Of those who were serving as vice premiers, ministers or vice ministers immediately prior to the Cultural Revolution, only thirty were appointed to the Central Committee. Two former vice ministers of senior ambassadorial rank were also elected. The considerable drop of this group's representation was more than matched by a rise in the percentage representation of PLA personnel.

The number of leading State Council figures on the new Central Committee is even less significant when it is considered that many of

---

5 Such ministries as Coal, Agriculture, Railways and others continued to operate independently.

6 Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, Hsieh Fu-chih, Ch'en Po-ta, Hsü Shih-yu and Wang Tung-hsing.


9 Huang Chen and Keng Piao.
those have not enjoyed great political significance since 1968, and six have since died. Of the fourteen ministers under the pre Cultural Revolution State Council elected to the Central Committee, only seven have at some time been identified in ministerial positions since and, of those, four have died. Of the sixteen vice ministers of the former State Council only five have been identified since 1968 while two have been promoted to minister and one has died.

The prestige of the State Council was therefore at a low ebb in 1969 and its political influence in the highest circles of the Party sharply reduced. In addition, the 9th Congress foreshadowed that amalgamation of ministries would go ahead, thus bringing the policy of 'better troops ...' right up to the highest levels of state administration. With the consequent reduction of the cadre population, the importance of the State Council, barring unforeseen circumstances, would presumably decline.

Organisation of the State Council

The formal activity of the State Council was well recorded until March 1966. Since that date, however, there has been no record of the State Council having met at all.

Since 1968 none of the State Council's functional staff offices have been mentioned in the press, leaving their current status in doubt. While no mention of them has been made since 1968 at least, there is still a need for some co-ordination between the ministries, bureaux and other organisations. It is possible that in the future the long awaited NPC

10 Ch'en Yi, Hsieh Fu-chih, Tseng Shan. The fourth was Lin Piao, assuming that he has died.

11 The two promoted were Ch'ien Chih-kuang and Li Chen. Teng Tzu-hui died in December 1972.
session will clarify the situation. The problem of the vice premiers which is relevant in this context will be discussed later.

A General Office of the State Council has been mentioned on occasion, and at the end of 1972 a 'leading member' of this office was identified. In May 1973, a former Deputy Secretary-General of the office, Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang was identified holding the same position. The re-appearance of Lo indicates the possibility that that State Council as a collective body will come together again in session since a major function of the General Office is to prepare the agendas for State Council meetings.

Under the State Council there are presently known to be 20-22 ministries, two 'groups', and 16 bureaux. Quite clearly there has been considerable simplification in accordance with the policy established earlier and affirmed at the 9th Congress. The process of simplification was carried out in 1969-70, with the reformed ministries being first identified towards the end of the latter year. While the current number of known ministries has been static since 1971, the number of bureaux is still rising in 1973.

The following tables summarise the ministries and bureaux under the State Council. They are grouped under my own categories, not official 'systems'. The column 'first noted' is only for the ministries which are products of amalgamations and not for those which have continued to function unchanged. The 'last noted' column is for ministries which seem to have been abolished or where current status is uncertain. In ascertaining which ministries have been amalgamated, two methods were used. First, a functional method by which one can see in terms of functions which ministries logically would have been included in the

12 Wu Ch'ing-t'ung. NCNA 31/12/72.
13 When meeting a Chinese-American scientist. NCNA 17/5/73.
amalgamated product. Second a personnel basis by which one plots the movement of relevant cadres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINISTRY</th>
<th>FIRST NOTED</th>
<th>LAST NOTED</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Possibly incorporated some Internal Affairs functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; Forestry</td>
<td>28/11/70</td>
<td></td>
<td>Combines Agriculture, Forestry, State Farms &amp; Land Reclamation, Aquatic Products, and part 8th Machine Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel &amp; Chemicals</td>
<td>7/1/71</td>
<td></td>
<td>Combines Coal, Chemicals and Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Industry</td>
<td>11/7/70</td>
<td></td>
<td>Combines 1st Light Industry, 2nd Light Industry, and Textile Industry Incorporates part of 8th Machine Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Machine Bdg.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Machine Bdg.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Machine Bdg.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Current status uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Conservancy &amp; Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Possibly incorporates Food Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>24/10/70</td>
<td></td>
<td>Combines Communications and Railways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorporates Geology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINISTRY</th>
<th>FIRST NOTED</th>
<th>LAST NOTED</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Group</td>
<td>3/8/71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational &amp; Scientific Group</td>
<td>2/5/71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Culture &amp; Sports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolished Ministries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2/11/70</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into Agriculture &amp; Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Ind.</td>
<td>8/2/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into Fuel and Chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Ind.</td>
<td>18/8/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into Fuel and Chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>22/4/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into enlarged Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>22/5/70</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably incorp. into Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Affairs</td>
<td>11/10/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Functions probably incorp. by Public Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Light Industry</td>
<td>6/10/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into Light Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Light Industry</td>
<td>1/11/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into Light Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Machine Bdg.</td>
<td>25/1/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Status unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Machine Bdg.</td>
<td>27/4/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into Agriculture &amp; Forestry, and 1st Machine Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>9/12/70</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into Fuel and Chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>5/10/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into enlarged Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile Ind.</td>
<td>27/9/69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorp. into Light Industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the dates given provide a general idea of when the ministries concerned may have been abolished or amalgamated, in the absence of official confirmation.

On the whole ministries which have undergone most amalgamation fall into the industrial group, probably a move designed to increase efficiency in that sector. Ministries which frequently deal with foreign countries have undergone little or no amalgamation. Some ministries appear to have been abolished outright: State Economic Commission, Nationalities Affairs Commission, Allocation of Materials, Labour and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission. The status of the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Machine
Building ministries is uncertain. The functions of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications have been taken over by two directorates. The roles of the Ministries of Culture, Education, Higher Education and the Scientific/Technological Commission have been taken over by the relevant 'groups' under the State Council. These changes will be discussed in greater detail in succeeding chapters.

Since the Cultural Revolution, sixteen bureaux under the State Council have been identified, as indicated in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Experts Affairs</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Offices Administration</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Affairs</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveying and Cartography</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting Administrative</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Meteorological</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Seismological Bureau</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Aviation Administration</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Travel and Tourist Administration</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate of Posts</td>
<td>From Ministry Posts &amp; Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate of Telecommunications</td>
<td>From Ministry Posts &amp; Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New China News Agency</td>
<td>Probably now under the Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Bank of China</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing Department under the State Council</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Administrative Bureau of Museums and Archaeological Data</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Cultural Relics Administration</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Oceanography Bureau</td>
<td>Name change from State Bureau of Seas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is probable that NCNA and the Broadcasting Administrative Bureau have been transferred to the Central Committee as its leading cadres appear in namelists under the Central Committee. Since 1968 nothing has been heard from the following bureaux: Secretaries, Statistics, Agricultural  

14 See namelist of those who attended May Day 1973 functions.
Bank of China, Industry and Commerce, Price Control, Housing, Foreign Languages Publishing, Language Reform, State Archives, Scientific/Technological Cadres Administration, State Arrangements, Counsellors and the Premier's Office. Since the number of bureaux has increased recently and areas previously covered by bureaux remain unaccounted for, it is possible that there will be further additions to the numbers of bureaux in the near future.

Activities of the State Council

The press has been sparing in its reportage of State Council activities since the Cultural Revolution. This leads one to two possible conclusions: either as a collective body it has done little that bears reporting, or it has altered its previous practice of making public its meetings and most of its major decisions. Although individual ministries have been active, it is probable that the State Council as a corporate body has not met since 1966 although ad hoc groups may have met and made certain decisions when called for.

On only four occasions since 1968 have conferences convened by the State Council been reported. The first was a cotton conference in 1970 which discussed that year's plan. Second, a national planning conference was held in that year and the State Council presented a report of the proceedings to the Central Committee plenum in August 1970. Third was a 1971 conference held in conjunction with the Central Committee on cadre schools. Finally, the State Council convened another cotton

---

15 For example, the Religious Affairs Bureau was mentioned for the first time on 14/5/73 when a leading member of it met some Japanese religious believers. NCNA 14/5/73.

16 NCNA 8/3/70.


18 NCNA 3/2/71.
conference in 1973. Given the sparse publicity for even these important conferences it is probable that the State Council convened or was represented at many more conferences.

Directives have been issued in the State Council's name on a number of occasions. It issued a set of physical exercise instructions together with the Military Commission in August 1971. At the end of 1972 it issued, again with the Military Commission, a directive calling for closer army-government, and army-people unity. In March 1973 it sent instructions on grain and sugar beet production to a meeting held on the subject in Inner Mongolia. Precisely which organs of the State Council have been responsible for these directives is not clear. It should be noted that attaching the State Council's name to a directive does not mean that it had met as a body to issue it.

The State Council has sent messages of congratulation or condolence to various people and countries. More often, Chou En-lai as Premier of the State Council has sent such messages.

Personnel

In this section we shall be concentrating on the Premier/Vice Premier group, and the few officials who have been identified with the General Office. There will also be reference to officials formerly under the Staff Offices who have reappeared.

---

19 NCNA 10/2/73.
20 NCNA 31/8/71.
21 NCNA 31/12/72.
23 For example the State Council sent a message of condolence on the occasion of Ho Chi Minh's death.
Until the 4th NPC meets, the membership of the vice premier group will continue to be something of a rump elite. Few of them are still active, and most seem to hold no administrative function any longer. Formerly vice premiers, in addition to assisting the premier, usually held important administrative positions as ministers, or in other organisations. Only two of those still alive can be said to be active in the truest sense: Li Hsien-nien and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The active careers of the others seem to be at an end. The average age of the six vice premiers still alive who have been identified since 1968 is 71.3 years, ranging from 68 to 75. It is probable, therefore, that within the next ten years there will be a 100 per cent turnover of this group. If the NPC should meet and create new vice premiers, it is possible that some of the old guard vice premiers will be retained for honorific purposes without specific administrative functions.

Table 6 shows the number of times these men have appeared according to NCNA information which is not necessarily complete but adequate for comparative purposes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chou En-lai</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Yi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Yün</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Fu-chih</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Fu-ch'un</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Hsien-nien</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nieh Jung-chen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teng Hsiao-p'ing</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) indicates person has died

Lin Piao was not considered because he dropped the title of Vice Premier in 1969.24

---

24 In a December 1969 message to North Vietnam, Lin no longer used his title of Vice Premier as he had previously. As a vice premier, it would be inferred that he was subordinate to Chou En-lai.
The most striking aspect of the table is the number of appearances made by Chou and Li Hsien-nien when compared with the others. Both have undertaken enormous amounts of protocol work, have conducted talks with hundreds of foreign delegations and attended numerous other functions. Li because of his Politburo rank can be regarded, if unofficially, as the 'first' Vice Premier; even after the return of Teng Hsiao-p'ing Li has enjoyed precedence at state occasions. Li Hsien-nien does not restrict his functions to commercial and economic matters, the area of his pre-Cultural Revolution expertise, and it is not clear whether he still holds his formal economic jobs. It appears that he is second in command to Chou En-lai, giving him assistance whenever it is needed. Chou and Li through 1970 and 1971 maintained the executive operation of the State Council with some help from Hsieh Fu-chih in 1969. Hsieh's illness and subsequent retirement meant that Li was the sole active vice premier in 1970-71.

Ch'en Yi appeared ten times in October 1968 seeing delegations and attending talks but thereafter he appeared only on ceremonial occasions and was demoted from the Politburo. At his funeral in January 1972 he was accorded all his titles and it was revealed that he had been on 'sick leave'.

Ch'en Yun has only been seen in public since 1968 on ceremonial occasions and like Ch'en Yi, was dropped from the Politburo. He did not appear at all in 1970-71 and his return in August 1972 was probably an attempt to bolster the thinning ranks of dignitaries at the highest levels following the removal of Lin Piao and his associates.

Hsieh Fu-chih was comparatively active through 1969, and was elected to the Politburo in that year. He disappeared in March 1970 and although

---

25 See report of his funeral. NCNA 10/1/72.
he was elected to the position of 1st Secretary Peking MPC in April 1971, he did not appear at the Municipal Congress. His death in March 1972 confirmed speculation that he had been ill for some time.

During the Cultural Revolution, at least until the end of 1967, Li Fu-ch'un enjoyed high party status but in the bargaining for positions at the 9th Congress he was demoted from the Politburo. He made occasional ceremonial appearances until 1971, and became more active following the removal of Lin Piao, but still did not assume a vigorous role.

Nieh Jung-ch'en was also dropped from the Politburo and has made relatively few public appearances since 1968. However he too became more active during 1972 and even met two scientific delegations, although it is doubtful that this signalled a return to scientific administration as he has not done it again, nor has he been given any formal responsibility in this area.

Perhaps the most surprising rehabilitation was that of Teng Hsiao-p'ing who re-appeared for the first time in seven years in April 1972. He appeared ten times that month, apparently assuming a more active part in state affairs than most of the other vice premiers.

None of the other pre Cultural Revolution vice premiers has re-appeared, although at the May Day celebrations in 1973, Tseng Chih, the wife of T'ao Chu appeared. It is possible, therefore, that T'ao himself is in favour once again, as the activity of a spouse generally indicates that the other is in political good health.

---

26 Wu Teh, then 2nd Secretary delivered the work report.
27 See report of his funeral. NCNA 29/3/72.
29 In her capacity as a Standing Committee member of the NPC.
The premier/vice premier group has not travelled widely since 1968. Chou has made three trips abroad, once to North Korea, and twice to North Vietnam. He has not travelled since March 1971 and has been out of the country for only five days in the five years. The only other vice premier to have been abroad is Li Hsien-nien who has been twice to North Vietnam, and once each to North Korea and Albania. He has spent twenty-one days out of the country, but has not travelled since 1971. This group has severely restricted its travel, and then they have only visited fraternal socialist countries. The reason is plain: the restricted number of them active at the highest levels have been fully engaged in managing China's internal affairs. Before the Cultural Revolution, the premier and vice premiers travelled much more widely.

Three officials have been noted as belonging to the General Office of the State Council. Ting Chiang, a leading member and concurrently a member of the Central Committee's United Front Work Department, has not appeared in public since May 1972. Another 'leading member', Wu Ch'ing-t'ung, has been present at State Council banquets and has participated in meetings with foreign dignitaries. The third, Deputy Secretary-General Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang, is also concurrently a member of the Central Committee's United Front Work Department. In her united front capacity she has attended many funerals of members of minor parties and 'patriotic personages', and as a State Council official she has entertained foreign guests of a minor nature. Such appearances have given little indication of her State Council function.

30 For example from March to December 1965, Chou En-lai visited Albania, Algeria, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, Rumania, Nepal, U.A.R., Sudan, Syria, Tanzania and U.A.R. again. Ch'en Yi visited many countries with and separate from Chou, while Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Lu Ting-yi also made trips abroad in that year.
Several officials of the State Council's pre Cultural Revolution staff offices have re-appeared, but in different capacities. Wang Kuan-lan was said to be 'of the State Council' when he addressed an agricultural conference in Hopei. One of his former colleagues in the Office of Agriculture and Forestry, Hao Chung-chih, has been identified as a 'leading member' of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. A Deputy Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs, Hao Te-ch'ing was appointed Ambassador to Norway in 1971, and later to the Netherlands. Another former Deputy Director of the same office, Liao Ch'eng-chih has been active since September 1971 as the President of the China-Japan Friendship Association, a position he held before the Cultural Revolution. A former Deputy Director of the Office of Finance and Trade, Tuan Yûn, has been engaged in trade work.

Other former officials of the State Council staff offices who have re-appeared seem to have no specific tasks. Chou Jung-hsin, the former Secretary-General has appeared only once, at a funeral. Some of his deputies, T'ung Hsiao-p'eng, Yang Tung-ch'ûn and Cheng Ssu-yûn have also appeared, on rare occasions. Two former Deputy Directors of the Office of Agriculture and Forestry, Chang Hsiu-chu and Chiang Ch'i-hsien have each appeared only once at the funeral of a former colleague, Ch'en Cheng-jen.

It is evident that the re-organisation of the State Council's Staff Offices has yet to be completed, or even begun. Should the Staff Offices function again, even if in an amalgamated form, they would probably be

---

31 Radio Hopei, 3/3/73.
32 He paid homage to Ho Hsiang-ning's remains. NCNA 6/9/72.
staffed by serving ministers or vice ministers, which would mean that many former staff office officials would not be included.

The position of the vice premiers who have been identified since the Cultural Revolution remains unclear. It seems evident that Li Hsien-nien and Teng Hsiao-p'ing are exercising some kind of administrative authority. On the other hand, Li Fu-ch'un and Nieh Jung-chen no longer appear to hold formal administrative duties. Before the Cultural Revolution, the vice premiers were often concurrently heads of Central Committee departments, directors of State Council offices, ministers, or chiefs of CCP regional bureaux. At the present time the vice premiers no longer appear to hold these kinds of executive positions.

With the advent of the long promised Fourth NPC, the new State Council structure and personnel will have to be legitimised. It is probable that new vice premiers who more adequately reflect the existing power structure will be appointed, thus ensuring that there will be many new faces at the highest levels of the state administration.

34 Yu Ch'iu-li is now Minister of the State Planning Commission; and Liu Hsi-yao is Head of the Scientific and Educational Group under the State Council.

35 For example T'an Chen-lin was Head of the Central Committee's Rural Work Department, Director of the Office Agriculture and Forestry, as well as Vice Premier.

36 First promised at the Second Plenum of the Central Committee, August 1970.
Chapter 4. The International Ministries
- Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of Foreign Trade

In the next series of chapters we will be considering the Ministries identified since the Cultural Revolution. They have been grouped into our own categories\(^1\) which do not necessarily correspond to the official hsì-t'ung into which they were grouped before the Cultural Revolution.

Each Ministry will be examined in terms of its internal organisation, activities, and personnel. Comparisons will be made where possible with the pre Cultural Revolution situation and any effects of the Lin Piao incident will be noted.

This chapter examines three Ministries closely connected with foreign countries. For convenience, they are dealt with in alphabetical order.

Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries

This Ministry was a bureau subordinate to the State Council until it was raised to the status of a Commission in June 1964.\(^2\) The term 'commission' was dropped at the end of 1970 when its head, Fang Yi, was identified as the 'Minister of Economic Relations ...'.\(^3\) Its elevation from bureau to ministry probably reflects the increasing importance placed by the Chinese Government on her foreign aid programmes.

(i) Organisation

Little is known of the Ministry's internal organisation. Two bureaux have been identified since 1968 although because at least three bureau directors have been identified there are probably several others.

---
\(^1\) See page 35 above.
\(^3\) NCNA 23/12/70.
The bureaux can be divided into two groups: geographic and service. Judging from the situation in other international ministries, there are probably up to five geographic bureaux. The Second Bureau was identified in April 1973, and from the activities of its deputy director, it appears that it is responsible for Africa. It should be noted that before the Cultural Revolution a First Bureau was identified which dealt with East European countries. However its existence has not been confirmed since 1968.

Among the service bureaux, one has been identified, the Liaison Bureau, which is responsible for handling contacts with foreign countries. Experience has shown that most ministries possess a comparable bureau which presumably has the same function.

As only two bureaux have been identified since the Cultural Revolution, it is difficult to gauge the extent internal organisation has changed since 1968. However, in the years immediately preceding the Cultural Revolution two additional bureaux were identified: the General Office and the Bureau of Equipment and Materials. It is probable that they are still in existence although no concrete evidence is available.

Diplomatic missions abroad are staffed with personnel from the Ministry in addition to others from Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and National Defence. Such personnel are called economic attaches, or counsellors if they have the seniority. Economic attaches are mostly stationed in embassies in countries which are recipients of Chinese foreign aid.

(ii) Activities

The function of this Ministry has remained unchanged since before the Cultural Revolution: the administration of China's foreign aid.

\[ ^4 \text{NCNA 12/4/73.} \]
programmes. It does not conduct trade. Although Chinese leaders frequently admit their aid must be limited, the PRC has undertaken many large developmental projects overseas. Despite charges to the contrary from some African states, the Chinese insist that their aid is given freely with no political obligations.5

Many agreements covering a wide range of purposes have been signed with foreign countries. Perhaps the most ambitious has been the agreement with Tanzania and Zambia to construct the railway designed to eliminate Zambia's economic dependence on white regime countries. Sometimes cash loan agreements have been signed instead of agreements for specific projects. Although specifications of the agreements are rarely published at the time of signing, upon the conclusion of the project the nature of the agreement is often revealed.

Officials of the Ministry have been very active in Peking conducting talks with foreign delegations, often not specifically on aid subjects and attending numerous related functions. Since China's entry into the United Nations officials have attended several international conferences.6

5 See Wang Yëh-yë's speech to the Seventh Session of the UN Industrial Development Board in Vienna on May 8, 1973. He emphasised that aid must be given with no strings attached and must not impair the recipient's sovereignty. For the text of his speech see Peking Review, No.20, 18/5/73, pp.4-6.

6 For instance a bureau director, Pu Ming, attended the Industrial Development Conference in Austria, April 1973.
The table below indicates the political fortunes of the pre Cultural Revolution Minister and vice ministers of the Economic Relations Ministry.\(^8\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in Disapp.</th>
<th>Role Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fang Yi</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Tao-han</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Huai-teh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ying-chi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ch'iang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Lin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the fact that Fang Yi continued to act as the Minister, it is surprising that three of his former vice ministers have failed to appear since the Cultural Revolution, while a fourth is active in another ministry. The fifth, Hsieh Huai-teh has not appeared since January 1971, and so of the six, only Fang Yi is still publicly active in the Ministry.

The following table indicates the level of activity of the Minister and Vice Ministers since October 1968 according to NCNA information. It should be noted that information for post 1968 officials has only been provided after their identification in that position.

---

\(^7\) This question will be examined from several angles. The survival rate and current roles of former officials, the appearance regularity of current officials, the backgrounds of the officials, their party affiliations, percentage of women, ages, any family connections. Comparisons will be made with the pre 1966 situation and the effect, if any, of the fall of Lin Piao.

\(^8\) The information cut-off date is, in general, May 1973, though this may be extended in exceptional circumstances.

\(^9\) For this and future tables, 'disapp.' means disappeared; 'Same Min.' means same Ministry.
TABLE 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fang Yi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Mu-hua</td>
<td></td>
<td>118</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chung Yu-yi</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Tsung-cheng</td>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Huai-te</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li K'e</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shih Lin</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen from the 'total' figures that the group has been appearing with increasing frequency, especially since 1970. Given the same rate, it would appear that there will be a significant fall in the total 1973 figure. With the increased work load in 1971, two additional vice ministers were appointed, although one dropped out. However, until 1971 only one vice minister was active, besides the Minister. It would seem that with four active vice ministers, it is now at about the same level of activity as before the Cultural Revolution, when there were five active vice ministers. The disappearance of Hsieh Huai-te remains a mystery though it is very possible that he was sent to a May 7th Cadre School.

Table 9 below indicates the career backgrounds of the Ministry's officials at various levels.

---

10 It should be noted that it is not possible to compare the number of appearances of officials in one ministry with those of another. The figures are meaningless in this light since some ministries' activities are not frequently reported by NCNA which concentrates on contacts with foreign countries. Given this, one can expect officials from this Ministry to have high appearance figures. Naturally even in this context the figures cannot adequately represent the sum total of an official's work.

11 There is no concrete evidence to support this, although two vice ministers from other ministries disappeared for long periods, and recently both re-emerged. Circumstantial evidence would suggest that both have done terms at Cadre Schools.
TABLE 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same Ministry</th>
<th>Oth Gov</th>
<th>CCP</th>
<th>Prov</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
<td>2 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Directors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Deputy Directors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Members</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table indicates that of the seventeen officials identified as belonging to this Ministry, eight have served in it previously. None have been positively identified as coming from the PLA, although two vice ministers may possibly have come from this source. Three have come from other government agencies, two from provincial governments, while for five backgrounds are not known. Two PLA representatives who were active in the Ministry have not appeared for some time.  

It would seem that at the vice minister level, the former cadres have been replaced almost entirely by new blood. Two of the new vice ministers have risen through the Ministry, and were holding positions in it before the Cultural Revolution. Another was identified as a bureau deputy director as late as 1970, being appointed a vice minister the following year. A third was the Director of the Fukien People's Council

---

12 In general, 'previous occupation' means that position held immediately before the Cultural Revolution, or earlier in the 1960's. In this and other tables, M, VM BD BDD means Minister, Vice Minister; BD Bureau Director; BDD Bureau Deputy Director; Oth Gov Other Government Agency; CCP Party Bureaucracy; Prov Provincial; Unk Unknown. From time to time, some of these will be omitted when they are not required.

13 Neither has appeared since September 1971 and 1972 respectively.

14 Han Tsung-cheng was appointed in June 1971. (NCNA 11/6/71).
Planning Committee in 1960, while the origin of the fifth is totally unknown, though possibly he is from the PLA. On the whole, this group has long experience in administering economic affairs. Similarly at the lower levels of the administration the officials, where their backgrounds are known, seem to come from the ranks of veteran professional cadres.

Table 10 indicates the Party affiliation of the pre and post Cultural Revolution Minister and Vice Ministers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Central C'itee</th>
<th>CCP</th>
<th>Minor Party</th>
<th>Non-Party</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre Cultural Rev.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cultural Rev.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only official to have served on either the 8th or 9th Central Committee was the Minister, Fang Yi, on both occasions an alternate member. It is possible that the six 'unknowns' were all members of the CCP. Information for lower ranking officials is too sparse to come to any definite conclusions.

Very little can be said about the ages of the group. All than can be positively recorded is that the Minister was born in 1909. Little is known of the six 1966 vice ministers, except for one born in 1915. Judging by the careers of some of the vice ministers it is probable that their ages vary between 50 and 60 years.

---

15 Shih Lin. He was appointed in May 1973. (NCNA 4/5/73).
16 Chung Yi-yi. He disappeared in May 1972. His disappearance could be linked either to a possible connection with Lin Piao, if in the PLA; or a term in a May 7th Cadre School. One cannot discount illness, or some more secret reason connected with work.
17 Union Research Service suggests he was born in 1902.
18 For instance, Hsieh Huai-Te, Shih Lin and Li K'e whose careers can be traced back at least twenty years.
The Minister and all of the pre Cultural Revolution vice ministers were men. Out of the six post Cultural Revolution vice ministers, one, Ch'en Mu-hua is a woman. It would seem in this Ministry at any rate, the call to incorporate more women into the highest levels of the administration has not been adhered to.

There do not appear to be any husband and wife teams in the Ministry. Fang Yi's wife (the only spouse known of) has appeared only twice since 1968, and then in her capacity as the wife of the host.

Since the Cultural Revolution the Ministry's functions have remained unaltered and it has been one of the few ministries which have retained the same Minister. The turnover of vice ministers, despite this, has been surprisingly high although at lower levels officials appear to have had more continuity. The PLA representatives have not maintained a hold on the administration, and movements have been characterised by a fast rate of upward mobility.19

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Because NCNA broadcasts of the activities of CPR leaders concentrate on contact with foreign delegations, the activities of the officials in this Ministry have been well reported since 1968. NCNA has revealed more of the internal organisation of this Ministry than any other in the CPR and we are able to construct a good picture of its organisation.

(i) Organisation

The Foreign Ministry is at the centre of a group of agencies connected with the task of making and implementing foreign policy. Its chief 'rival' in terms of policy making is the Central Committee's International Liaison Department which has been very active since 1968,

19 For instance Han Tsung-cheng.
and especially since Keng Piao was installed as its head in February 1971. The Foreign Ministry probably has to look to this department for policy guidance, particularly in the field of relations with communist countries and parties.

Two other organisations are involved: the Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the People's Institute for International Affairs. The former until recently was headed by Wang Kuo-ch'uan and essentially has replaced the former Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The People's Institute for International Affairs performs similar functions and is staffed mainly by officials from the Foreign Ministry.

The Foreign Ministry's internal organisation consists of several bureaux which can be divided into the service and geographic groups. There has been little change in the number of service bureaux since the year before the Cultural Revolution. However among the geographic bureaux, this has not been the case.

Before the Cultural Revolution the following geographic bureaux were in evidence: Asian Affairs No. 1, Asian Affairs No. 2, African Affairs, West Asian and North African Affairs, American and Oceanian Affairs, West European Affairs and Soviet Union and East European Affairs; totalling seven in number.

---

20 NCNA 2/2/71. Keng was Ambassador to Albania, and a former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was elected to the Central Committee in April 1969.

21 He is now Ambassador to Australia. He was appointed President of the Association on June 6, 1972. Formerly he was Ambassador to Poland and East Germany.

22 For instance one of its Vice Presidents, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, is a Vice Foreign Minister, while two others are former ambassadors.
When the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution had finally settled it was possible by 1971 to identify the following bureaux: Asian Affairs, West Asian and African Affairs, Soviet Union and East European Affairs, and West European, American and Oceanian Affairs; totalling only four in number. Two reasons could explain this. One, the policy of simpler administration had demanded that ministries cut down on the number of bureaux. The second, and related issue, was that there were fewer cadres operating which meant that the Ministry had to construct a less elaborate administrative structure.

As the number of countries recognising China increased after 1970, and as China's contacts abroad in other areas expanded, it was found necessary to split some of the geographic bureaux. As a result it created the following: Asian Affairs, West European Affairs, American and Oceanian Affairs, and West Asian and North African Affairs. The others remained unchanged. This brought the number of geographic bureaux to six.  

The following service departments have been identified since 1968: Consular Affairs, General, Information, and International Organisations, Treaties, Conferences and Law. Since 1968 nothing has been heard of the General Services and Personnel Bureaux. It is possible that their functions have been taken over by the General Office.

Since 1968, therefore, the geographic bureaux have undergone a contraction and expansion process, first in response to domestic

---

23 From 1968 until at least May 1969, Asian Affairs was still divided into 1st and 2nd Bureaux. See NCNA 11/5/69. They were later amalgamated.

24 The four new departments were all identified in August-September 1972.

25 The last named was identified for the first time since 1968 in August 1972.
considerations, and second in response to the broadening of China's international contacts.

The Ministry maintains at least one cadre school located in Kiangsi. At a banquet given for Prince Sihanouk in March 1971 the Ambassador to Cambodia revealed its presence and added that he would like to go there as a student one day.  

(ii) Activities

China's Foreign Ministry has been involved in the type of work one would expect: maintaining embassies abroad, conducting political relations with foreign countries, sending delegates to United Nations and international conferences, and related functions. We have outlined earlier, however, the restrictions within which the Ministry operates, and something of the other organisations which complement the Ministry's work.

The number of embassies maintained abroad has expanded very rapidly since 1970 when Canada recognised China. This means that China has had to accredit more ambassadors and lesser personnel than ever before, placing great strain on her manpower resources. Such a strain has been aggravated by the ideological necessity of officials to attend the Cadre Schools from time to time, and also by the fact that many have not been rehabilitated following the Cultural Revolution. The table below shows the number of ambassadors at their posts at the end of the given year.

TABLE 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the end of May 1973 there were three countries which had opened diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level where China had yet to send

---

26 The Ambassador was K'ang Mao-chao and up till the time of writing he still has not gone. See Menhert, Klaus, China Today, Thames and Hudson (London 1972), p.34.

27 13/10/70.
ambassadors. In addition China maintained three embassies at chargé level in May 1973. Table 11 shows that the number of ambassadors abroad nearly trebled between 1970 and May 1973. In the same period the number of embassies abroad doubled. The Ministry also maintains consulates in a number of countries.

(iii) Personnel

Table 12 indicates the post Cultural Revolution fortunes of the minister and former vice ministers of Foreign Affairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in Disapp.</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role in Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Yi</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi P'eng-fei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Hsiao</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Han-fu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo Kuei-po</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tseng Yung-ch'uan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Ping-nan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'iao Kuan-hua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Nien-lung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Hsin-ch'uan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsu Yi-hsin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Chia-keng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows a quite high survival rate (seven out of twelve officials). However, of the seven, two have subsequently disappeared, and one was posted as an ambassador. Another was promoted to minister after Ch'en Yi's death; thus in May 1973 only two pre Cultural Revolution vice ministers were still known to be at their posts. The five vice ministers

---

28 In May 1973 they were India, Kenya and Laos.

29 Hsu Yi-hsin and Lo Kuei-po have not been seen since November and December of 1970 respectively.

30 Liu Hsin-ch'uan was sent as Ambassador to the Soviet Union in November 1970 (NCNA 22/11/70).

31 Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Han Nien-lung.
surviving by the end of 1968\textsuperscript{32} operated more or less unimpaired throughout the Cultural Revolution.

J.D. Simmonds has observed that some of the vice ministers before the Cultural Revolution were allotted specific areas of geographic responsibility.\textsuperscript{33} This system has continued to operate since then, though by 1972 some individual roles were switched. By looking at the appearances of vice ministers one can conclude the following:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{TABLE 13} &  \\
\hline
\textbf{Work distribution in 1970} &  \\
Chi P'eng-fei & West Asia and Africa  \\
Ch'iao Kuan-hua & Soviet Union and East Europe  \\
Han Nien-lung & Asia  \\
Lo Kuei-po & West Europe, America, Oceania  \\
Hsü Yi-hsin & Unknown  \\
\hline
\textbf{Work distribution in 1972} &  \\
Ch'iao Kuan-hua & West Europe, America, Oceania  \\
Han Nien-lung & Asia  \\
Ho Ying & West Asia and Africa  \\
Yü Chan & Soviet Union and East Europe  \\
Chung Hsi-tung & Unknown  \\
Fu Hao & Unknown  \\
Ma Wen-po & Unknown  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

It should be noted that Ho and Yü were before their promotions directors of the West Asia and African Department, and the Soviet Union and East Europe Department. This means that the vice ministers can acquire considerable expertise in their own regions.

The following table based on NCNA information enables us to compare the level of activity of the vice ministers.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{TABLE 14} &  \\
\textbf{Comparison of vice ministers' activities} &  \\
\hline
Chi &  \\
Ch'iao &  \\
Han &  \\
Lo &  \\
Hsü &  \\
\hline
Activity &  \\
Work &  \\
Travel &  \\
Meetings &  \\
Publications &  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{32} That is Chi, Ch'iao, Han, Lo and Hsü.

TABLE 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chi P'eng-fei</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'iao Kuan-hua</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chung Hsi-tung</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu Hao</td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Nien-lung</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Ying</td>
<td></td>
<td>232</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsū Yi-hsin</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yao-wen</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo Kuei-po</td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Wen-po</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yū Chan</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table indicates that those vice ministers who appear to have a regional responsibility appear far more frequently than those who have not. 34

Vice ministers have been appearing far more frequently, especially since 1970, and this reflects China's more active role in world affairs and the increasing current of visitors to China. Two vice ministers dropped from view in 1970, while a replacement appointed in 1971 was posted overseas the following year. 35 Five additional vice ministers were appointed in May 1972 which means that at the present time, May 1973, there are seven active vice ministers as against eleven at the beginning of 1966. The various bureau directors and their deputies maintain busy schedules but there are too many of them to list in detail here.

Table 15 indicates the career backgrounds of the leading officials of the Ministry.

34  Yū Chan appears to be an exception probably because his region is one with which the Chinese have relatively little contact.

35  Li Yao-wen. It is interesting that he should have been sent overseas just five months after Lin Piao's fall. Li was a former military figure in the Tsinan Military Region.
TABLE 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry and Vice Ministers</th>
<th>Couns</th>
<th>Oth</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>CCP</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M, VM BD BDD Amb</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau Directors and Assistant Ministers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau Deputy Directors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, most of the officials seem to come from the Foreign Ministry, with negligible imports from other ministries, bureaucracies or the PLA. Second, in many cases there has been rapid upward mobility of personnel. In this connection it is worthwhile noting that based on the evidence of higher appointees, the large number of 'unknowns' among the bureau deputy directors probably indicates that most came from lower staff levels of the Ministry.

An analysis of ambassadorial rank confirms that the Ministry has drawn on veteran professional personnel in the filling of its vacant posts. Most appointments have been made since 1970. For instance, since January 1970 52 were made, whereas before that date, only 10 were

36 Where 'Couns' is counsellor, and '1st S' 1st Secretary.

37 Excludes Ch'en Yi.

38 Includes Ch'en Te-ho, a 'mass' representative; and Wang Chen, Han Hien-lung's wife.


40 Of the 84 who have been posted since 1968, 69 have been from the Ministry, six from other government sources, two from the CCP, one from the PLA and six unknown.
announced. The cadre population at lower levels has probably expanded considerably, reflecting increased numbers at higher levels.

There has been a large measure of horizontal mobility\(^{41}\) within the Ministry. For instance Liu Ch'un, formerly Director of the Asian Affairs Department was appointed Ambassador to Turkey.\(^{42}\) In another instance, Ts'ao K'e-ch'iang was moved from his position of Deputy Director of the Asian Affairs Department to head the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs.\(^{43}\) On the other hand, some cadres have retained regional specialisation to a certain degree.\(^{44}\)

Table 16 indicates the party affiliations of the minister and vice ministers, compared with the situation before the Cultural Revolution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Central C'ttee</th>
<th>CCP</th>
<th>Minor Party</th>
<th>Non Party</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre Cultural Rev.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cultural Rev.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there are no officials at the minister/vice minister level on the 9th Central Committee, a former ambassador and two current ambassadors are so represented. Another vice minister, Lo Kuei-po, was an alternate member of the 8th Central Committee, but was not re-elected to the 9th. Although the Ministry's representation on the Central Committee is at present very low, it is possible that in the future more will be elected reflecting the improved status of the State Council in the current political environment.

\(^{41}\) That is from one area of responsibility to another without promotion.

\(^{42}\) NCNA 9/5/72. A survey of the 84 ambassadors shows that 34 per cent were above the rank of Bureau Deputy Director.

\(^{43}\) Ts'ao's case is more properly 'diagonal' mobility.

\(^{44}\) See Footnote 39, p.59.
Little is known of the ages of the minister and his ten vice ministers. Data is available for four, all former vice ministers whose birth dates range from 1906 to 1911. This is a similar age range for the pre Cultural Revolution group for whom data was available for eight. As most of the other vice ministers' careers can be traced back to the early nineteen-fifties, one can conject that they are not much younger than those about whom information is available. There is almost no age data for the lesser officials, but at least one bureau deputy director was born in the nineteen-twenties.\textsuperscript{45}

None of the vice ministers is a woman, although one of the assistant ministers is.\textsuperscript{46} As far as is known, only two of the bureau deputy/director group are women.\textsuperscript{47} Another is an advisor to a department.\textsuperscript{48} One ambassador is known to be a woman.\textsuperscript{49} Thus the Foreign Ministry is dominated by males.

The wives of most of the vice ministers and minister frequently appear when protocol demands. However, only one vice ministerial wife is known to be holding a specific position in the Ministry.\textsuperscript{50} Ch'iao Kuan-hua's late wife was an Assistant Minister,\textsuperscript{51} while it has been reported but not officially confirmed that Chi P'eng-fei's wife is a

\textsuperscript{45} Chu Ch'i-chen was born in 1926.  
\textsuperscript{46} Wang Hai-jung. Formerly a Deputy Director of Protocol and rumoured to be Mao's niece. Another woman, Kung P'eng was an Assistant Minister until her death in 1970.  
\textsuperscript{47} Both are in the Information Department.  
\textsuperscript{48} Kung P'u-sheng, the wife of a former vice minister, Chang Han-fu.  
\textsuperscript{49} Wang Tse, the Ambassador to Mauritius.  
\textsuperscript{50} Wang Chen is a Deputy Director of the Information Department.  
\textsuperscript{51} Kung P'eng died in September 1970. Her sister is Kung P'u-sheng. See Footnotes 46 and 48.
'responsible person' of the Ministry. Frequently diplomats' wives hold positions in embassies with their husbands. Generally, however, from the evidence available, it seems that wives of high officials do not hold important positions in the Ministry though they may do so in other areas.

In conclusion, the Ministry is staffed by veteran officials from bureau deputy director upwards. The PLA has made only marginal inroads into the system and maintains very few officials at senior levels. Since August 1972 the Ministry has undergone considerable expansion to cope with increased activity, and many positions remain unfilled despite the continued rehabilitation of errant cadres and the promotion of more junior officials.

Ministry of Foreign Trade

Considerable information is available on the many activities of the officials in this Ministry, but comparatively little is known of its internal organisation and how it might have changed since the Cultural Revolution.

(i) Organisation

The Foreign Trade Ministry is at the centre of a large network of organisations involved in trade. On the one hand there is the Ministry's staff and mechanisms for the conduct of trade; but there is also the

52 Hsü Han-ping, Chi's wife, often appears among 'leading members of departments concerned'. See US Government Publications, Directory of Chinese Officials, A 72-21, August 1972, p.325.

53 For instance, Ho Li-liang and Ch'ang Yü-lin, the wives of Huang Hua and Wang Kuo-ch'uan, are both counsellors in their respective missions.

54 For example, the Women's Federation, and others.

55 For example, the posts of Director of the General Office, Director of the Soviet Union and East Europe Department have been vacant since May 1972. No Director of the American and Oceanian Department has been identified.
Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the various trading corporations, trade offices in a number of countries, and the biennial Kwangchow Trade Fair. It is probable that the latter organisations are all responsible to the Trade Ministry for guidance and leadership, while it, in turn, is responsible to the State Council and CCP. The Trade Council and the corporations seem to deal with lower level officials and are responsible for presenting trade and industrial exhibitions abroad and hosting others at home.

Like the two other ministries in this chapter, the Trade Ministry's departments can be classified into the geographic and service groups.

Of the former, only one department has been identified since 1968, the Third, which is responsible for European, American and Oceanian affairs. Before the Cultural Revolution it dealt only with European matters. Four other geographic departments were identified before the Cultural Revolution: First (Soviet Union), Second (East Europe), Fourth (Afro-Asia) and Fifth (Latin America). It would seem that the Fifth has now been amalgamated with the Third. It is also probable that the other regional departments continue to function, although there may have been an amalgamation of the First and Second, and a splitting of the Fourth, given the realities of the political situation and trends observed in the Foreign Ministry.

Two other departments have been identified. One, the Import Bureau which was mentioned when its deputy director left for a trip to Finland. The other is the International Trade Institute which has been described as 'under the Foreign Trade Ministry'. Nothing has been heard of the other departments previously described as being under this Ministry —

56 NCNA 13/1/71.

57 NCNA 29/4/73.
Export, General Customs, Merchandise Survey and Inspection, Planning, Personnel, and Accounting. It is of interest that at present there are six active bureau directors.

The Ministry maintains representatives in embassies: commercial counsellors (or attaches depending on their rank).

(ii) Activities

The Trade Ministry conducts China's trading relations in co-operation with the other organisations mentioned above. Officials of the Ministry have signed at least 54 trading agreements with foreign countries while in Peking since October 1968. This figure does not include those signed outside China by visiting delegations or commercial representatives.

A large percentage of China's trade is carried out at the fair in Kwangchow. Representatives of the Ministry are present, as are others from trading corporations. The fair is organised, however, by a committee dominated by members of the Kwangtung provincial administrations. Since 1968, the director of the fair has been Ch'en Yi. It is hard to ascertain how much power is in the hands of the Ministry. However Sir John Keswick of the Sino-British Trade Council was most impressed with the acumen of the officials he met in Peking,

"he found the Foreign Trade Ministry to be a very powerful organisation in China and the senior officials with whom he had discussions are in a position to say what will be done and not done".


59 See page 63.

60 A vice minister, for instance, has always been in attendance throughout the fair. Higher officials have also paid visits to it.

61 A Vice Chairman of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, a Provincial Party Secretary, and until 1958 the Minister of the Coal Industry.

Despite this, the Ministry is dependent on political guidance from the CCP, particularly in connection with whom to trade and not to trade.

(iii) Personnel

The table below indicates the post Cultural Revolution fortunes of the high officials serving in the Foreign Trade Ministry until 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp.</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status Uncertain</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yeh Chi-chuang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lei Jen-min</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ch'iang</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Hai-yun</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Ming</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Hsü-chang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Hao-lu</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu Sheng-lin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou Hua-min</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chia Shih</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table indicates that five of the nine vice ministers have not appeared since the Cultural Revolution while the Minister died in 1967. Of the four surviving, one has not appeared since late 1969 while another has appeared infrequently since February 1971. This indicates that there has been a substantial turnover of personnel at the highest levels of the Ministry.

This table compares the public appearances of the minister and vice ministers since 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pai Hsiang-kuo</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ai Shu-fan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Chieh</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Shu-fu</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chia Shih</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou Hua-min</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ch'iang</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Hai-yun</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63 Lin was the Acting Minister until Pai's appointment in December 1970. Since then, he has appeared infrequently.
As in the case of the Foreign Ministry, the increased number of public appearances reflects the rising activity of the Ministry and broadened trading contacts. Since 1968, three additional vice ministers have been appointed while on the other one has dropped out. It can be seen that the number of active vice ministers in May 1973 is considerably fewer than in 1966. Unlike the Foreign Ministry there is no evidence suggesting the specific areas of responsibility of various vice ministers. An exception seems to be Ch'en Shu-fu, who since October 1971 has been the senior official at the Kwangchow Fair.

Table 19 indicates the career backgrounds of the leading officials of the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 19(^{67})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M, VM AM BD BDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Ministers and Bureau Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Deputy Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again this table indicates that the majority of high officials are veteran cadres from the Ministry. The one Vice Minister to have been transferred was a former Vice Minister of the State Planning Commission. The backgrounds of two are not known although it has been suggested that

---

\(^{64}\) Six as against nine.  
\(^{65}\) The approximate date of his appointment as a vice minister.  
\(^{66}\) At other fairs, Chia Shih, Chou Hua-min and Li Ch'iang attended.  
\(^{67}\) When 'AM' is Assistant Minister, 'ROC' is Republic of China, and 'Comm Couns' is Commercial Counsellor.  
\(^{68}\) Ch'ai Shu-fan.
Ch'en Chieh was an accountant. The Minister, Pai Hsiang-kuo was formerly the Commander of the Swatow Garrison and a Vice Chairman of the Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee under Huang Yung-sheng. His appointment seems to have been based on some sort of patronage, however it is possible that since his appointment, Pai has loosened his connections with the PLA, as evidenced by his continued occupancy of the ministerial chair following the fall of Lin and Huang. Apart from Pai, none of the senior officials are known to be from the PLA while two PLA representatives, Sung Chen-hsien and Wang Hsiao-han have not appeared since March 1971 and March 1970 respectively.

Table 20 illustrates the known party affiliations of the ministerial personnel of 1973 compared with the situation in 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Central C'ttee</th>
<th>CCP</th>
<th>Minor Party</th>
<th>Non Party</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre Cultural Rev.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cultural Rev.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been little change except that the minister is no longer on the Central Committee, nor are there any representatives of minor parties.

Once again there is a dearth of age data available for most of the officials. One source described Pai Hsiang-kuo as being, "middle aged but looking younger than his years". It is possible that the two Ch'en's are significantly younger (say mid forties). Ch'ai Shu-fan is approaching 70 (born 1905). Probably the

---

69 See China Trade Report, March 1972, p.8. Another source suggests that Ch'en was formerly a Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Commerce Ministry (in 1964). I have not found evidence to support this. See Union Research Service, Biographical Service, No.1710, 5/5/72.

70 China Trade Report, 21, 1/1971.
group would be roughly the same average age as the 1966 group of high officials.

All known ministerial personnel are men, and probably a majority of the junior officials are too. This confirms the trend set in the previous two ministries.

There is no evidence that wives of the senior officials are active in the Ministry. Pai's wife and the wife of one vice minister have appeared at social functions, but do not appear to have a role in the Ministry.

Following the Cultural Revolution, therefore, the Foreign Trade Ministry seems to have quickly settled down to the business of supplying China's needs according to the limits set down by higher authorities and the dictates of foreign exchange availability. The Ministry is largely staffed by veteran cadres long associated with trading affairs, and its structure seems little different from before.

Conclusions

Taken together the three Ministries discussed in this chapter have many features in common. Their organisational structures are similar in that they all have bureaux with geographic responsibilities and additional service bureaux. In general they are all staffed by veteran cadres, with significant upward mobility, while PLA influence in all three has been relatively lower than what one might have expected. In all three, there is only one woman vice minister, while there are very few senior officials below that rank who are women. Representation on the Central Committee among ministerial personnel has fallen from six to two. The total number of known ministerial personnel has, at the same time, fallen from 28 to 26.71

---

71 Not a large fall when compared with other Ministerial groups; especially economic and industrial.
All three Ministries have remained unchanged despite the amalgamations that have taken place in many other Ministries. All three have maintained regular activity since October 1968.
Chapter 5. The Military Ministries
- Ministry of National Defence
- Ministry of Public Security

The two ministries to be considered in this chapter have military or para military roles in Chinese society. The Defence Ministry's is self evident, while the Security Ministry's task of maintaining public order gives it a para military role. In this respect, therefore, the two ministries are linked in that the former is responsible for external security, as well as internal if the situation warrants it; while the latter is responsible for internal security, intelligence, and other related functions.

Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, neither ministry has in the course of the past five years revealed much of its internal organisation, and very few of their officials have been identified. This has hindered attempts at detailed analysis.

Ministry of National Defence
(i) Organisation

Broadly speaking the Ministry is at the centre of an enormous defence network: the General Staff and the various service arms at the Centre extending into regional, provincial and county commands throughout the country. In the past the Ministry has been formally responsible to the NPC and the PRC Chairman who is theoretically commander-in-chief. The other state body involved in the defence structure is the National Defence Council which has never been more than an honorific organisation mainly for retired military luminaries. The Ministry in the past owed its greatest allegiance to the Central Committee's powerful Military Affairs Commission of which the former minister, Lin Piao was the leading Vice Chairman. It is probable that this dependence still holds although little has been heard of the Commission's activities since 1968.

As indicated above, very little information is available concerning the internal structure of this Ministry. Since the Cultural Revolution
two internal departments have been identified: the General Office and the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Nothing has been heard of the former since March 1969 when the official attached to it left to become, among other posts, the Deputy Political Commisar of the Wuhan Military Region.¹

The Foreign Affairs Bureau has been mentioned by NCNA on many occasions. It is staffed by a director and at least five deputies and conducts the Ministry's contacts with foreign countries as well as supervising its military attaches in embassies overseas. Its members frequently guide military delegations around China and participate in talks with them.

The dearth of information about the Ministry's internal departments is not new. The United States Government's Directory of Communist Officials in its May 1963 edition² could only identify the two departments mentioned above. However, a Taiwan publication³ has identified four additional departments under the Ministry: the Military Engineering College, Revolutionary Military Museum, National Defence Sports Association and the Military Court. Only the Military Museum has been mentioned since 1968, although some of the officials linked with the other three have appeared, but not in these capacities.⁴

The Defence Ministry has links with the PLA service wings, while being theoretically separate. It is probably a correct assessment, especially since the fall of Lin Piao, to say that the General Staff and

¹ P'an Chen-wu.
⁴ Ibid., pp.542-543. I would be inclined to view that these four areas were not necessarily subordinate to the Ministry, and in any case, only one has been identified since 1968.
leaders of other sections\(^5\) are more important than the vice ministers in the Ministry. Certainly the organisation of the General Staff is closer to the activities of the PLA. This may change with the future appointment of a Defence Minister who may well be drawn from this latter group.

(ii) Activities

Apart from obvious military activities, especially administration, very little in specific terms is known of the Ministry's activities. It has probably, in addition to its former tasks, taken over some of the national defence Machine Building Ministries' functions, notably the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th and 7th, although this has not been officially confirmed.\(^6\)

The Ministry hosts visiting delegations, and is especially concerned with the war effort in Vietnam and many aid agreements have been signed with visiting Vietnamese military delegations since 1968. Occasionally officials at vice minister level have lead or been members of military delegations abroad.

(iii) Personnel

The table below indicates the political careers of the 1966 Minister and Vice Ministers of Defence.

---

\(^5\) Especially the General Political Department, the Air Force, Navy and Logistics Corps.

\(^6\) Their responsibilities were: 2nd, atomic; 3rd, light conventional weapons; 5th, heavy weapons and artillery; 6th, shipbuilding; 7th, aircraft and missiles. See Cheng Chu-yuan, Growth and Structural Change in the Chinese Machine Building Industry, China Quarterly, Jan-Mar 1970, No.41, p.27.
TABLE 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp.</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lin Piao</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo Jui-ch'ing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao Ching-kuang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Yü</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Shu-sheng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Kuang-ta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Shih-yu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liao Han-sheng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the eight, only two have failed to appear since 1968, while two of the others have not been identified in their vice ministerial positions, though for different reasons. Three most commonly involved in Defence Ministry business are Hsiao, Su and Wang; while the fate of Lin Piao is still unclear and that he is probably dead, although the circumstances are not known.

Table 22 indicates the number of public appearances made according to NCNA information.

TABLE 22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>1-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lin Piao</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao Ching-kuang</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Yü</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Shu-sheng</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the Cultural Revolution, Lin appeared on rare occasions, and not at the Ministry functions, or even the annual Army Day celebrations. From 1969-71 the keynote speech at this function was made by Huang Yung-sheng. It should be remembered that even before the Cultural Revolution, Lin made only rare appearances due probably to indifferent health and a reticence to appear in public. Since October 1968 he appeared only 26 times and then usually in the company of Mao Tse-tung. His political demise in September 1971 has left the Ministry bereft of a Minister.
Since Lin's fall the role of Yeh Chien-ying has been of interest. He is now the senior military figure on the Politburo and appears to be the government's main spokesman on military matters yet he still has not been appointed Defence Minister, as one might have expected. It is possible that competition for the position from other senior military figures may be delaying an appointment.\(^7\)

No new vice ministers have been appointed since 1968 while it seems that Su Yu has a declining role in political and military affairs.

Table 23 indicates the backgrounds of the cadres at various levels in the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Director and Deputies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the backgrounds of three are not known, it is evident that most of the officials have been in the Ministry over a long period. One of these has become prominent in a Military Region, while one former Vice Minister commands the Nanking Military Region. There are connections between the ministry and regional commands and with service commands.\(^9\)

\(^7\) Competition conceivably might be coming from Hsu Shih-yu and Ch'en Hsi-lien both on the Politburo and respectively commanders of the Nanking and Shenyang Military Regions. Li Teh-sheng an alternate member of the Politburo and head of the PLA Political Department is another possible contender. Unlike Yeh, these three have significant military power bases. Yeh given this may be an interim 'minister' while the others gather forces for a possible political showdown.

\(^8\) Where 'MA' is Military Attache.

\(^9\) P'an Chen-wu.

\(^10\) For instance, Hsiao Ching-kuang is Commander of the Navy.
Leaving aside Lin Piao, all three vice ministers are members of the Central Committee, and the seven pre Cultural Revolution vice ministers were at least alternate members of the 8th Central Committee.

Age data is available for all three vice ministers, the average in 1973 being 67, compared with 59 for the seven in 1966. The increased age of members of the group may be the reason for the decline of Su Yü's activity, and for the sudden cessation of Wang Shu-sheng's activities.

The only case of a wife being active in the Ministry is that of Yeh Ch'üan, Lin's wife who was said to be the director of his office. In any case, since Lin's demise Yeh has not been seen in public. The wives of the vice ministers have not appeared since 1968, while the wife of a director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau has appeared on rare occasions when protocol demanded.

In conclusion the few officials thus far identified are in the main veteran cadres, while the structure of the Ministry would appear to be unchanged. The vice ministers represent an ageing, though expert body well experienced in military affairs.

Ministry of Public Security

(i) Organisation

Little is known of this Ministry's internal departments. Since 1968 only the Foreign Dignitaries Department has been identified. Before the Cultural Revolution, two others had been identified: Organisation and

11 Su was born in 1909.
12 Wang, born 1905 last appeared 29/3/73.
13 Yeh was said to have been killed with Lin in a plane crash over Mongolia in September 1971. She last appeared in public 11/7/71.
Education as well as the Political Department. There has been no mention of these two by NCNA since the Cultural Revolution.

The Ministry has probably taken over the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Three reasons support this contention. First, the former Minister of Internal Affairs, Tseng Shan, when he died in April 1972 was identified as a former Minister of Internal Affairs; he was last identified as Minister in October 1969. As no further mention had been made of this Ministry since that date it is probably too simplistic to suggest that Tseng had been eased out. Second, a former PLA representative in the Internal Affairs Ministry was recently appointed a Vice Minister of Public Security. Finally it seems that a former Vice Minister of Internal Affairs has been transferred to the Public Security Ministry. If the merger has taken place, the new ministry probably has taken over the conduct of rural relief work, the only department identified before the Cultural Revolution under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The Public Security Ministry like many other State Council organs has a cadre school, though more precise details are not known.

(ii) Activities

The Ministry's basic responsibility is the maintenance of public order which it exercises through its police forces both public and secret.

---

15 NCNA 6/10/69.
16 NCNA 20/4/72.
17 Shih Yi-chih was appointed in May 1973. NCNA 24/5/73.
18 Huang Ch'ing-hsi has been listed with Vice Ministers of Public Security. See for instance the report of Hsieh Fu-chih's funeral. NCNA 29/3/72.
19 NCNA 15/2/70. 'Go out from the School and Temper Yourselves in the Class Struggle'.
In this responsibility, it is linked with the Supreme People's Court, the Military Court (which has not been mentioned since 1968), and the Procuracy. The operations of these last three organisations have probably been severely curtailed since 1968, as their officials make rare appearances and nothing of their activities are made public through official sources. It is probable that the military and this Ministry have taken over the lower level courts.\(^{20}\)

Articles and broadcasts at times have devoted space to lauding the exemplary conduct of provincial and county public security bureaux and their officers, though nothing has been said of their relationship to the Centre,\(^{21}\) or its influence over lower levels of police administration.

(iii) Personnel

The table below indicates the political fortunes of the ministerial personnel of the pre Cultural Revolution regime after 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in Disapp.</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role in Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status Uncertain</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Fu-chih</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Tzu-jung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Ch'i-ching</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Chin-hsiang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Tung-hsing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Fu-chih</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ling Yun</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yen Yu-min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yü Sang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only two of the eight 1966 vice ministers are still at their posts at the time of writing, possibly as many of them were protégés of a former minister, Lo Jui-ch'ing, who was disgraced during the Cultural Revolution.


\(^{21}\) See for instance, "Policewomen", *Peking Review*, No.1, 5/1/73, p.31.
Another former vice minister has been given more important responsibilities. The whereabouts of the remaining five are unknown.

The table below indicates the appearances made by high officials of the Ministry since October 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Fu-chih</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Chen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Fu-chih</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shih Yi-chih</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu Sang</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Members of the Ministry have appeared infrequently and rarely do their appearances indicate their real function. Usually they appear to bolster the numbers at National Day receptions or other ceremonial occasions. Li Chen was identified as minister in October 1972, while Liu and Yu were confirmed in their positions during 1972. The number of known vice ministers has been reduced from eight in 1966 to only three, with the possibility that it might be increased to four in the near future.

The table below illustrates the political backgrounds of the officials so far identified in the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same Ministry</th>
<th>Oth</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>VM</th>
<th>BD</th>
<th>BDD</th>
<th>Gov</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers and Vice Ministers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 Wang Tung-hsing is now an alternate member of the Politburo and the Director of the Central Committee's General Office.

23 NCNA 5/10/72.

24 See the case of Huang Ch'ing-hsi on page 76.
The appointment of a new vice minister whose immediate origins were the PLA is not surprising since the Ministry was completely taken over in the Cultural Revolution by the PLA. Li Chen, the new Minister, was a Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Ministry of Railways before the Cultural Revolution. Before this appointment he was of the PLA.\(^\text{25}\)

There is not sufficient data to make more concrete judgements of the type of cadres staffing the Ministry.

Before the Cultural Revolution the minister and two of the eight vice ministers were on the Central Committee. Among the five ministerial officials identified since, three are members of the 9th Central Committee.\(^\text{26}\)

There is little age data available, except that Hsieh Fu-chih was three years younger than his successor.\(^\text{27}\) The ages of the officials is probably higher if we extend the 1966 ages of the vice ministers.

There is no record of any women being employed at high levels of the Ministry. Hsieh Fu-chih's wife, Liu Hsiang-p'ing, is a minister in another ministry.\(^\text{28}\)

Lack of data inhibits our study of this Ministry, but from the meagre information available it would seem that PLA inroads have been kept to a minimum despite the fact that this Ministry was taken over by that organisation during the Cultural Revolution. The Ministry probably is organised along similar lines to the pre 1966 establishment, with additional responsibilities accruing from the probable amalgamation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

\(^{25}\) Li was appointed to his position in the Railways Ministry in 1963.

\(^{26}\) Hsieh Fu-chih, Li Chen and Yü Sang.

\(^{27}\) Hsieh was born in 1908.

\(^{28}\) NCNA 16/7/73. NCNA 8/3/73 identified her as being a 'woman vice minister'.

Conclusions

Our study of these two ministries is made more difficult because of the lack of data. In neither case have we much knowledge of their internal organisations, which is not a new phenomenon, nor have many officials been identified in either ministry.

At top levels, the number of new appointees has been very small: no new vice ministers in National Defence, and just one minister and a new vice minister in Public Security. Presumably deliberations on a possible successor to Lin Piao have taken place, but to date there has been no hint of an appointment.

In the Defence Ministry, the fall of Lin Piao was not accompanied by the disappearances of key officials. All the vice ministers remained at their posts, and the bureau officials retained their jobs. This contrasts with some of the PLA Service Arms where the disappearance rate was much higher. The three vice ministers do not appear to have had close links with Lin Piao who seemed to rely on certain service arms for his chief support. This probably accounts for the survival of top ministerial officials following Lin's demise. By contrast it appears that Lin's fall has signalled a revival of the fortunes of the Public Security Ministry, which had remained very subdued from 1968. Following his fall a new minister and three vice ministers have been identified and indications are that the ministry is operating normally.

Unlike the ministries already discussed and some of those to be considered in future chapters, the two ministries under discussion for security reasons have revealed little of their organisation and personnel.

---

29 Especially the General Staff, Air Force and Logistics Corps. Most of the purged military staff came from these areas.

30 The Public Security Ministry was not mentioned until Hsieh Fu-chih's death in March 1972. NCNA 29/3/72.
Yet despite this we can conclude that direct PLA involvement has been confined, especially since 1971, while at the same time, little new blood has been introduced at top levels. Age levels have therefore risen, and there are still no females at high levels. On the other hand, the representation of Central Committee members has increased. Out of eight ministerial officials, six are members of the 9th Central Committee. This is the highest proportion of any group of ministries and indicates the prestige and political standing of the officials involved in these areas.
Chapter 6. The Economic Ministries
- Ministry of Commerce
- Ministry of Communications
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
- State Planning Commission

The ministries included for consideration in this chapter are generally concerned with financing and planning China's economy. Two others play vital roles in co-ordinating economic activity in the communications field.

For four of these ministries very little information is available on their personnel and internal structure, while in the case of the Ministry of Communications rather more is known. In the cases of the two ministries considered in the previous chapter, a similar dearth of information was probably caused by security reasons. In these instances, the paucity of data is probably due to the fact that three of them have only recently been re-organised, while in the case of the fourth, political sensitivity about national economic planning may be inhibiting fuller publication of information.

Ministry of Commerce

No officials of this Ministry were identified until November/December 1972, and prior to that date this Ministry received only incidental reference in the press and other sources of information.

---


2 Ministries of Commerce, Finance, and Posts and Telecommunications.

3 During these two months, the new Minister and three of his vice ministers were identified. Since then, no further officials have been identified, with the exception of the former Minister who re-appeared at the May Day celebrations: in 1973.

4 It was first mentioned by NCNA on 17/2/70 in an article by the writing group of the Ministry.
(i) **Organisation**

No internal departments have been identified in this Ministry since 1968. Presumably similar departments to the pre Cultural Revolution ones continue to function.

Because one of the current vice ministers was a former Vice Minister of Food, it is possible that the Commerce Ministry has taken over the former's functions. Evidence would suggest that the Food Ministry was abolished between May and October of 1970.

(ii) **Activities**

Apart from appearances at ceremonial functions and visits of foreigners concerned with commerce, there is evidence that the Ministry has been quite active since 1968.

Several authoritative articles published by the Ministry's 'writing group' have appeared in the Press, while it is possible that more such articles have escaped attention. It is not known who comprises such writing groups; however, the trend towards the use of pseudonyms and other forms of anonymity in authoritative articles is very much in evidence today.

The Ministry has also been involved in several conferences since 1968. These have included a fuel savings conference jointly convened with the State Planning Commission, an 'on the spot' conference convened with other ministries to improve gasolene engines, and another conference

---

5 At May Day 1970, the former Food Minister, Sha Ch'ien-li and his deputy, Chao Fa-sheng, appeared as 'leading members of the State Council', while that National Day 1970, Sha was relegated to 'patriotic personage'.

6 See NCNA 17/2/70, 9/10/70, 6/10/71, 31/3/71. The second last article would indicate the Ministry's interest in food production.

7 Radio Hopei 28/12/70.

8 Radio Shihchiachuang 30/8/71.
jointly convened with interested ministries on powdered milk production. These conferences probably do not complete the picture of the Ministry's activities, but they do give an idea of the type of matters the Ministry has been involved in since 1968.

(iii) Personnel

Table 27 illustrates the career fortunes of the officials attached to the former Ministries of Commerce and Food.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ministry of Commerce</th>
<th>Ministry of Food</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yao Yi-lin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Lei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Hsüeh-chih</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Yung-li</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Tzu-ying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niu Yin-kuan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Hua-min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jen Ch'üan-sheng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Hsiu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yao Yi-lin</td>
<td>Disapp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Lei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Hsüeh-chih</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Yung-li</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Tzu-ying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niu Yin-kuan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Hua-min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jen Ch'üan-sheng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Hsiu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is seen that while only six out of fifteen have not reappeared, only three of the others have been given jobs in the new Commerce Ministry. Another is a Vice Chairman of Peking's Revolutionary Committee. It is possible that in the future the former Minister, Yao Yi-lin, will be transferred to another field of work.10


10 Wang Lei. He has on occasion met people with commercial interests. Yao Yi-lin appeared at May Day 1973 as a 'well known personage'.
The following table based on NCNA information indicates the number of public appearances made by the leading officials of the Ministry.

**TABLE 28**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fan Tzu-yü</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Yung-li</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao Fa-sheng11</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Hsiu</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table illustrates how few are the appearances of members of this Ministry but belies its importance, for these officials undoubtedly play a key role in the management of the economy.

The three vice ministers are all veteran officials, two were Vice Ministers of Commerce before the Cultural Revolution, while the third, Chao Fa-sheng was formerly a Vice Minister of Food. The Minister before his appointment was in the PLA Logistics Corps.

Among the ministerial officials before the Cultural Revolution, one was an alternate member of the Central Committee, one was from a minor party, and the rest were members of the CCP. Of the current officials, none are on the Central Committee, and none are from the minor parties. It is probable that all four are members of the CCP. This further illustrates the weakening of the minor parties and the current poor state of State Council representation on the Central Committee.

The age of only one official is known, Chao Fa-sheng, who was born in 1905. One would guess that Fan Tzu-yü is quite young for in 1960 he won a PLA Generals swimming contest in Peking. On the whole, however, as there is apart from Fan no new blood, the officials are considerably older than before.

---

11 Note that the appearances of Chao Fa-sheng before he was identified as a vice minister are not included. Similarly Fan's appearances before his official identification are omitted.
In conclusion, therefore, it is evident that while vice ministerial officials are drawn from civilian ranks, the Minister is from the PLA, and is one of the few cases where the PLA representative has become a Minister.\(^{12}\)

**Ministry of Communications**

(i) **Organisation**

Before 1966 this Ministry dealt with shipping and road transport. However since 1968, in accordance with the policy calling for simpler administration, it amalgamated with the Ministry of Railways.\(^{13}\) Officials have been drawn from these two sources as well.

Several departments under the new Ministry have been identified including Water Transport, Harbour Superintendent, Registry of Shipping, Foreign Aid,\(^{14}\) and a Scientific Research Institute.\(^{15}\) Several joint shipping companies as well as the China Ocean Shipping Company are also subordinate to the Ministry.\(^{16}\) As yet no departments connected with road and rail transport have been identified.

(ii) **Activities**

This Ministry now administers all transport with the exception of air transport. It is probable, however, that a certain amount of autonomy

\(^{12}\) Of interest is that the PLA representative in the Food Ministry last appeared in March 1972. Note that Fan was appointed Minister after the fall of Lin Piao: a trend that was repeated in other instances.

\(^{13}\) Until late 1970 the Ministry of Railways continued to operate independently: it participated in conferences and sent delegations abroad. Until October 1970, Kuo Lu continued to be identified Vice Minister of Railways.

\(^{14}\) This office's main responsibility has been the construction of the Tan/Zamb railway.

\(^{15}\) Headed by Mao Yi-sheng, a civil engineer.

\(^{16}\) See BBC SWB (Weekly Economic Report), FE W501 A/18 which indicates that the shipping companies are under the Ministry.
is afforded in rail and road administrations in the various provinces and regions. On the other hand, sea travel is probably under more central control. This is shown by the proliferation of departments in the Ministry connected with water transport, while for road and rail, none have been identified so far.

Another matter which has caused some confusion is precisely which organisation is the postage stamp issuing authority. Before the Cultural Revolution, this responsibility was in the hands of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Stamps themselves were then abolished during the Cultural Revolution. However from 1971 they were issued again, by the Ministry of Communications. Meanwhile a Directorate of Posts was created independent from the Ministry. However, it did not issue stamps for that responsibility was passed onto a General Posts and Telecommunications Office at the end of 1972. The Ministry of Communications subsequently issued another set, until finally the confusion cleared up in June 1973 when the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications was re-created and issued a set of stamps.

The Ministry, therefore, co-ordinates the construction and administration of China's road, rail and canal transport and exercises a more direct control over shipping. It does not, in mid 1973, have any authority over posts and telecommunications.

(iii) Personnel

Table 29 gives the post Cultural Revolution careers of officials from the Ministries of Communications and Railways.

---

18 First identified November 1972.
19 NCNA 25/12/72, 30/12/72, 15/1/73.
20 NCNA 1/6/73.
### TABLE 29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in Ministry of Communications</th>
<th>Role in Ministry of Railways</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sun Ta-kuang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Hui-chih</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'an Chen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yü Mei</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao Min</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K'e Chen</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu T'ien-shun</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ao Ch'i</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'eng Teh-ch'ing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Yao-chi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lü Cheng-ts'ao</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Ching-t'ien</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shih Chih-jen</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Chien-chang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yü Kuang-sheng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuo Lu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Ch'ien-ch'i</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ien Ying-lin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Chieh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two Ministries are characterised by a very high disappearance rate (twelve out of nineteen) probably because none had protection from their ministers, both of whom were disgraced during the Cultural Revolution and have not re-appeared since. Two others re-appeared recently and have no apparent roles, while five have been appointed Vice Ministers of Communications.

Table 30 based on NCNA information provides the number of public appearances made by the ministerial and vice ministerial officials.

---

21 Where 'Comm.Min.' is Communications Ministry.
TABLE 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yang Chieh</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuo Lu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Yao-chi</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'an Yu-hung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'eng Min</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Chieh</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ao Ch'i</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yii Mei</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table includes all appearances of officials who were formerly identified with the two ministries. Kuo Lu has been the most consistently active, and was for a time the only official, apart from PLA representatives, to appear. Worthy of note is that T'ao Ch'i was out of view for over two years, and it is possible that in that time he was at a May 7th Cadre School. On return, he resumed his normal activity.

Table 31 illustrates the career backgrounds of the leading officials.

TABLE 31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Min. Comm.</th>
<th>Min. Rail.</th>
<th>Oth</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M, VM</td>
<td>M, VM</td>
<td>BDD</td>
<td>M, VM</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Directors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Deputy Director</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Minister, Yang Chieh, was first identified as such in February 1971 (23) had previously been a PLA representative in the Ministry of Railways, and

(22) He did not appear between 27/11/70 and 22/5/73.

(23) NCNA 12/2/71.
before that a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armoured Corps. Another PLA
Vice Minister, P'an Yu-hung was the PLA representative in the
unamalgamated Communications Ministry. It is of interest that he has
not appeared since October 1972. A third new appointment was P'eng Min
who was until 1966 a Vice Minister of the Scientific/Technological
Commission and whose specific expertise is bridge building. The
backgrounds of eight sub vice ministerial officials are not known and it
is possible that some of these had immediate origins in the PLA. PLA
representatives have retained strong influence in this Ministry probably
because the operations of the transport systems were taken over by that
organisation during the Cultural Revolution. This especially applies to
railways. Nonetheless there is a high proportion of experienced civilian
cadres among the ministerial officials.

Of the 1966 officials, one was a member of the Central Committee,
while none were from minor parties. Of the present group, none are on
the Central Committee, and again none are from the minor parties.

As the officials are mostly veteran cadres, one can assume that in
general the officials are much older, although Yang, P'an and possibly
P'eng Min may reduce the average age. It is of interest that the
youngest known vice minister appointed since 1968 is attached to the
Ministry of Communications. 24

No female cadres seem to be employed in the upper levels of the
administration.

At the most senior levels of the hierarchy experienced officials
seem to occupy the positions, although Yang's pre 1966 experience in this
field must have been limited. The PLA still retains a strong influence
which is probably more marked in the provinces where rail and road transport

24 He is Yii Mei, born in 1922.
is important. At the same time, shipping seems to be safely in the hands of civilian cadres, and that P'an Yu-hung, the PLA representative/Vice Minister formerly attached to the Communications Ministry seems to have been dispensed with.

**Ministry of Finance**

(i) **Organisation**

Nothing is known of this Ministry's internal organisation. Before the Cultural Revolution it was known to possess a General Office and an Office for financing Economic Construction. There is no reason to suggest that these offices no longer exist.

(ii) **Activities**

Few details of the Ministry's activities since 1968 are known. Before the Cultural Revolution officials from the Ministry were known to prepare financial reports, regulations were promulgated by the Ministry, and there was obvious evidence that the Ministry was actively organising the country's fiscal matters.

Since the Cultural Revolution, the only reference to the Ministry, apart from ceremonial activities of some of its officials, was an article by a 'red financial fighter' of the Ministry. Of late, however, officials from the Ministry have been more active, and one vice minister has participated in talks with a foreign delegation.

(iii) **Personnel**

The following table indicates the careers of the pre Cultural Revolution ministerial officials.

---

25 JMJP 29/1/69. (trans. Current Background, No.873, pp.5-8).

The table indicates that the survival rate has been very low (one out of five). The Ministry came under heavy attack at the same time Li Hsien-nien was strongly attacked by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. This probably accounts for the disappearance of all the vice ministers. Li has not been identified as Minister of Finance since 1968, and therefore his current status in this area is not certain. He remains, however, a key figure in the State Council as Vice Premier, and a high ranking figure in the Politburo. No doubt he is responsible still for economic affairs.

Two vice ministers were identified in June 1973, and both have appeared on a few occasions since then in consultations with foreign delegations.

Table 33 illustrates the career backgrounds of those identified in the Ministry since 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Hsien-nien</td>
<td>Disapp.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Po</td>
<td>Same Min.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Hsüeh-ming</td>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tseng Chih</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu Hsiang-kuang</td>
<td>Died</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the two vice ministers, Wang Ping-chien had long been identified as a 'leading member' of the Ministry and his appointment came as no surprise.
The other appointment was more surprising, although his career credentials are sound. Ch'en Hsi-yü had been Vice President of the Peoples Bank of China until his dismissal early in 1965. He was born in 1899 making him one of the oldest vice ministers. The origins and qualifications of three of the four leading members are not known. Two of them have not appeared in public in 1973. Of interest is that recently one of the 'leading members' was listed ahead of a vice minister.27

None of the current officials are members of the Central Committee though all are probably in the CCP. Previously, one was in the Central Committee while another was a non-party cadre. Again, one can see the decline of the non-party or minor party personnel in the State Council. No women are among the officials so far identified since October 1968. This confirms the trend that women, despite propaganda that leads us to believe they are assuming positions of responsibility en masse in the administration, have yet to penetrate the most senior echelon of State Council leadership in any significant way.

Once again the paucity of data inhibits the study; however, that in itself is worthwhile. It illustrates the contention that there is still much organising to do in many of the ministries, especially Finance, a key part of the economic administration. Because an appointment has not been announced, it does not mean that it has not taken place, however usually appointments are made known within a reasonable space of time. However, the process of reconstruction in the Finance Ministry has been a long one, and it will be most interesting to see what role the 'leading members', themselves thrown

27 NCNA 9/7/73.
up by the Cultural Revolution, will eventually play, and just how many of the former officials will be rehabilitated.\(^28\)

**Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications**

It has been mentioned earlier that this Ministry was very recently re-activated. It ceased to be mentioned from 1968 and in its stead two directorates, presumably similar in status to bureaux subordinate to the State Council, were created.\(^29\) Three vice ministers of the old ministry were appointed to positions in one of the directorates. However, in June 1973 the ministry was mentioned again when it issued a set of stamps. \(^30\)

(i) **Organisation**

It is probable that the new ministry will incorporate the two directorates mentioned above. Already the former Director of Posts, Chu Ch'un-ho, has been mentioned as a 'leading member' of the Ministry.

(ii) **Activities**

The only activity so far mentioned by official sources has been the issue of the stamps in June 1973. Obviously, however, the Ministry will administer the nation's postal, telegraph and other electronic communications systems.

(iii) **Personnel**

The table below lists the careers of the ministerial officials since the Cultural Revolution.

---

\(^28\) So far at any rate, the 'leadership' has been content to defer this question by appointing people from other sources (for instance Ch'en Hsi-yü) while the 'leading members' jostle among themselves for supremacy. It is probably doubtful that Li Hsien-nien will assume the Ministership again, as he is heavily burdened with other responsibilities. He will probably retain his overall control of economic affairs.

\(^29\) Directorates of Posts and of Telecommunications.

\(^30\) See *Peking Review*, No.23, 8/6/73, p.23.
TABLE 34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role Disapp.</th>
<th>Role Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status Uncertain</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chu Hsiieh-fan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Tzu-kang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chung Fu-hsiang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen Kuang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao Chih-kang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku Ch'un-fan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yu-k'uei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'eng An-yu</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Former vice ministers Chung, Shen and Li were all appointed to the Directorate of Telecommunications, the first mentioned as its director, and the others as deputies. The whereabouts of the remaining five are still unknown.

It is impossible to analyse further the officials as only one has been identified. It is possible that the Director of Telecommunications will become the new Minister and some of the others involved in the directorates vice ministers; however it is unwise to speculate further.

The restoration of this Ministry would seem logical. The splitting of the ministry into two directorates quite independent of each other during 1971 was contrary to the spirit of the policy which called for amalgamations. In this light, therefore, the re-activation of this Ministry is in step with the established policy on administrative structures.

State Planning Commission

(i) Organisation

Little information is available of the internal structure of this important Ministry. Two departments have been identified: the Geology Bureau, which would suggest that this Ministry has incorporated the Geology Ministry, and the so called Office for Making Inventory and Practising Economy. This office is responsible for making sure industrial waste is kept to a minimum; this has been a significant
propaganda theme in recent years. This office has also been involved in several conferences throughout the country since about 1970.

Before the Cultural Revolution the Ministry also possessed a General Office, Fuels Bureau, and a Foreign Economy Bureau. However, none of these has been mentioned since 1968, although there is a strong possibility that they continue to function.

(ii) Activities

This Ministry is responsible for overall long term planning of the economy, and as such holds a very important place in the Chinese scheme of things. The now defunct State Economic Commission was responsible for short term planning, and it is therefore possible that the Planning Commission has incorporated these responsibilities also.

The communique of the second plenary session of the 9th Central Committee reported that it had accepted the State Council's report on the National Planning Conference. No mention was made of the State Planning Commission, which was not mentioned until September of 1970 in another context. It is probable, therefore, that the SPC was not re-activated until after the National Planning Conference which must have been held earlier in 1970. However, it is probable that officials who were later to be identified with the SPC attended the conference. It is presumed that the SPC has subsequently been involved in economic planning and administering the Fourth Five Year Plan now in progress. Unfortunately no details of this plan have been made public, and so our knowledge of the SPC's role is limited in this respect.

The Ministry's writing group has been very active. It has contributed over five articles since September 1970 to the press on a

31 The SPC was first mentioned in NCNA 6/9/70, when an article by its 'writing group' was published.
wide range of economic subjects. It would seem to be a common feature of industrial and economic ministries to possess a writing group. However in no case has the membership of these groups been revealed.

The Ministry has also convened, or convened jointly, several conferences on economic matters throughout the country.

(iii) Personnel

The table below indicates the political fortunes of the pre-Cultural Revolution ministerial officials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Fu-ch'un</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Hsien-nien</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'an Chen-lin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po Yi-po</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Po-ta</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teng Tzu-hui</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'eng Tzu-hua</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Yi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsüeh Mu-ch'iao</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Chih-wen</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Kuang-wei</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ai Shu-fan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Ming-fu</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Tso-ts'ai</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Yün-p'ing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan Mu-han</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sung Shao-wen</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Ting-chieh</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu Ch'i'u-li</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the overwhelming majority have disappeared altogether, many of whom were key economic officials in the administration. Of the others with 'roles elsewhere', one is a minister, another a vice minister, while two others are vice premiers. Only one, the most junior vice...

---

32 For instance NCNA 23/7/71, 'Continue Revolution or Restore Capitalism?'. This article repudiates Liu Shao-ch'i's economic fallacies.

33 For instance a National fuel savings conference which was jointly convened with the Commerce Ministry. Radio Hopei 28/12/70.
minister has been re-identified with the Ministry, and promoted to be its new minister, replacing Li Fu-ch'un.

The table below indicates the number of public appearances made by senior officials of the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yü Ch'iu-li</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku Ming</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rare appearances do not mean inactivity, and in this case it probably means the opposite in that these officials have been so busy that they have not had time for onerous protocol duties.

It has already been said that Yü Ch'iu-li was a former Vice Minister of the SPC. He was concurrently the Minister of Petroleum. However, with his elevation in the SPC, it is probable that he has relinquished the other portfolio, although no successor has been named. Ku Ming was a Vice Minister of the State Capital Construction Commission before the Cultural Revolution. The origins of a 'leading member', Ch'en Hsien, are not known. What is striking is the overall reduction in the numbers of vice ministers, from seventeen to one. No doubt more will be appointed.

As many as nine of the eighteen ministerial officials in 1966 were members of the Central Committee, and another was a non party member. At the present time, only Yü Ch'iu-li is a member of the Central Committee.\(^{34}\)

\(^{34}\) First elected April 1969.
Yu was born in 1914, and is therefore one of the younger ministers in the PRC today. The ages of the others are not known, except for Hsü Chieh, a member of the Geological Bureau, and former Vice Minister of Geology, who was born in 1900.

Once again a paucity of data prevents us from drawing satisfactory conclusions. As in the case of the Ministry of Finance, many officials have been removed from power. Like the Finance Ministry, it is evident that re-organisation is not yet complete, and it is probable that more vice ministers will have to be appointed. Of the former officials, only Yu Ch'iu-li remains. Influence from PLA quarters has been limited, and Su Ching, the senior PLA representative identified during the Cultural Revolution, has not been given any formal position in the hierarchy that we know of. Given the notion that the State Planning Commission played little part in the current five year plan, it is more likely to be engaged in forward planning for the sixth, due to start in 1976.

Conclusions

Four of these five ministries have been very tardy in re-organising themselves, and one of these, Posts and Telecommunications is a very recent addition. Probably the chief difficulty has been to reconcile the need for expertise in these areas, with ideological pressures. Where such pressures would be less important, in the Ministry of Communications for instance, re-organisation has been more rapid. Strategic pressures in this Ministry did not prevent rapid re-organisation. The three that have been hardest hit in this way were the Ministries of Commerce, Finance and the State Planning Commission. The lack of suitable replacements, or a reticence to recall disgraced senior cadres have prevented early re-organisation of these vital ministries.35

35 Such cadres were prime targets in the Cultural Revolution like Po Yi-po, An Tzu-wen and others.
In recent months there have been indications that these ministries (especially Commerce and Finance) are resuming more vigorous activity with more appointments and more outward signs of activity.

The fall of Lin Piao has meant little in real terms, although it may have paved the way for more rapid organisation of these ministries. Two of the three ministers identified have immediate links with the PLA, and one of these was appointed after Lin's fall. Despite, therefore, Lin's demise, PLA officials continue to be identified anew in positions of authority in the State Council. Many of these PLA officers come, however, from areas dominated by PLA officers who did not suffer from Lin's fall.37

A high preponderance of vice ministers are veteran officials, many with long records of service.38 Party Central representation and female cadres remain low, as is the case of many other ministries.

36 Although Commerce was finally reorganised in late 1972, and Finance even later.
37 For instance Fan Tzu-yü served in Yunnan in the early sixties.
38 Ten out of twelve vice ministers are veteran civilian cadres.
Chapter 7. The Industrial Ministries
- Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
- Ministry of Building Construction
- Ministry of Building Materials
- Ministry of Fuel and Chemicals Industries
- Ministry of Light Industry
- First Ministry of Machine Building
- Fourth Ministry of Machine Building
- Sixth Ministry of Machine Building
- Seventh Ministry of Machine Building
- Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry
- State Capital Construction Commission
- Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power

As in the previous chapter, some of the ministries listed above are lacking in data,¹ with the result that the list is not as formidable as it appears. No officials at all have been identified for two of these ministries² but they are included because the evidence would suggest that they continue to exist. The status of two other ministries has been questioned recently,³ but they existed as separate entities until at least December 1972.

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

(i) Organisation

This Ministry represents an amalgam of four ministries and part of a fifth. It was first noted as an amalgamated whole at the end of 1970,⁴ a time when many new ministries of this type were first identified. The five comprising the new Ministry are those of Agriculture, Aquatic Products, Forestry, State Farms and Land Reclamation and part of the 8th Ministry of Machine Building.

---

1 Especially the two Building Ministries, 4th and 6th Machine Building, and the Capital Construction Commission. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is regarded as a primary industry ministry.
2 4th and 6th Machine Building.
3 That of the Ministries of Building Materials and Building Construction.
4 NCNA 28/11/70. On this date, Sha Feng was identified Minister for the first time.
Officials of the former Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry and Aquatic Products are found working in the new Ministry, while it is assumed that the State Farms Ministry is now under Agriculture and Forestry by virtue of its functional responsibilities. The 8th Ministry of Machine Building was formerly engaged in the manufacture of agricultural machinery, and a former vice minister is now a vice minister of Agriculture and Forestry.\(^5\)

One bureau, the Aquatic Products Bureau has been identified so far. Given this, it is possible to assume that there are similar bureaux covering the fields formerly administered by the comprising ministries.\(^6\) If this is the case, and if there has been some amalgamation at this level, then former bureaux under the old ministries would be reduced in status to divisions under the larger bureaux.\(^7\)

The philosophy behind the amalgamations has probably been, apart from the overall ideological necessity, the desire to co-ordinate more satisfactorily agricultural development and production at this level.

(ii) Activities

With the large scale amalgamations, and the dismissal of many senior cadres, it is possible that the role of this Ministry has changed. It could be now that the Ministry simply co-ordinates production and some planning, while conducting negotiations and talks with foreign delegations on behalf of the industries involved. On the other hand,\(^5\)

Yet another former vice minister is now in a similar position in the First Ministry of Machine Building, which suggests that the responsibilities of the Eighth may have been divided between the two. The Eighth manufactured agricultural machinery.

For instance, an agriculture bureau, forestry bureau, etc.

The aquatic products bureau would have the following divisions: fisheries administration, fresh water hatcheries, purchases and sales. This is based on the known bureaux that formerly made up the Ministry of Aquatic Products.
the Ministry seems quite active in two important areas. One the authoritative nature of the articles produced by the Ministry's 'writing group'. Articles have called for self reliance in production without calling for outside help; another exhorted communes to learn from the example of the Tachai Production Brigade; while a third called for the promotion of the mass movement towards farmland capital construction. In a speech at a conference convened by the Ministry, Hao Chung-shih gave a speech which set down certain policy guidelines which the Ministry expected to be followed. Second, a large number of national conferences have been convened, or jointly convened, by the Ministry over a wide range of subjects, especially agricultural mechanisation, where the Ministry might be expected to play a leading part in financing and research.

While a certain amount of power may have been transferred downwards to the provincial, or even the county level, the Ministry at the Centre probably still retains overall co-ordinative and planning power, and over large projects and certain important fiscal responsibilities.

(iii) Personnel

Table 37 indicates the post 1968 careers of the officials associated with the four Ministries now amalgamated with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

---

8 A 'leading member' of the Ministry and formerly Deputy Director of the Staff Office of Agriculture and Forestry.

9 At a conference held in Kiangsi 21/7/71, for the mechanisation of paddy fields. The Ministry's officials have attended many other such meetings, often convened jointly with the First Ministry of Machine Building.

10 Especially land reclamation, state farms and large farming projects.

11 The Eighth Ministry of Machine Building will be considered later with the First Ministry.
**TABLE 37**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ministry of Agriculture</th>
<th>Role in</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liao Lu-yen</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yi-chen</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Hsien-tung</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ts'ai Tzu-wei</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku Ta-ch'uan</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Chi-feng</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'eng Chao-hsüan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Chen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ung Jung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Yi-chen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Chen</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Man-yuan</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Lin-chih</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao K'e</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Chung-han</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Ch'i-hsien</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Hsing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Sheng-san</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Forestry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Wen-hui</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo Yü-ch'uan</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui Chung-ch'uan</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang K'e-hsia</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Li</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ang Tzu-ch'i</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Chao</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang Ch'ang-wu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang T'ien-fang</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsun Ch'ang-wu</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Shih-chün</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Aquatic Products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Teh-heng</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Wen-hua</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yüan Yeh-chieh</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Fu-ch'ing</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shih Min</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao P'eng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that of the thirty-five officials listed from the four ministries, only eleven have been mentioned since October 1968, and of those eleven, only two have found places in the new Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry. Two of those eleven have appeared on just one occasion. Liu Wen-hui and Hsü Teh-heng appear in capacities connected with the CPPCC, while a third Minister, Wang Chen is a member of the Central Committee, with no defined State Council role. Liao Lu-yen, the former Minister of Agriculture, has not appeared at all since the Cultural Revolution. The extremely high attrition rate reflects the severe nature of the controversy raging within the agricultural sector of the economy during the Cultural Revolution, especially in agricultural priorities, communes, and incentive payments, and the consequent vilification of the Red Guards.

Table 38 indicates the number of appearances made by leading officials since October 1968, according to NCNA information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sha Feng</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao P'eng</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Shu-jung</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang Ch'ang-wu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Li-kung</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From a total of four ministers and thirty-one vice ministers, the number of personnel has been drastically reduced to one minister and only four vice ministers. The table shows, however, that one of those four has not appeared since 1971, leaving three active vice ministers. Two other officials are known to be working at a high level within the Ministry who

12 Chiang Ch'i-hsien and Liu Hsing both appeared at the funeral of the former Minister of the 8th Ministry of Machine Building, Ch'en Cheng-jen. NCNA 13/4/72.

13 He was a member of the 8th Central Committee, and an associate of the disgraced head of the Central Committee's Rural Work Department, T'an Chen-lin, who was also the Director of the State Council of Agriculture and Forestry.
may be vice ministers. From the public appearances of the vice ministers, little can be seen of the work they do, although Hsiao P'eng regularly deals with fisheries matters, and Liang Ch'ang-wu concentrates on forestry business. By inference, it is possible that Yang Li-kung is concerned mainly with agricultural machinery.

Table 39 illustrates the backgrounds of officials in the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 39</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M, VM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Director and Deputy Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sha Peng, the Minister, is from the PLA. His previous position was Director of its School of Armoured Corps. However three of his four vice ministers were drawn from civilian ranks, while the origin of a fourth is not known. Some of the lesser officials are also from the PLA, while a substantial percentage are from sources closely connected with agricultural affairs.

Five identifiable PLA representatives have not appeared in positions connected with the Ministry since 1971, the latest in December of that

---

14 Hao Chung-shih and Wang Kuan-lan, both former Deputy Directors of the Staff Office of Agriculture and Forestry.

15 He is Acting President of the Fisheries Association.

16 Liang attended the World Forestry Congress in Argentina, September 1972.

17 This leaves Hao and Wang (see footnote 14) for agricultural matters.

18 This incorporates all four former ministries.
year. One has returned to the Navy, where he is Deputy Chief of Staff. Following the demise of Lin Piao, therefore, the PLA influence in the Ministry appears to have been sharply reduced, except for the continuing presence of a Minister with a close military background.\(^\text{19}\)

While four of the thirty-five were members of the Central Committee elected in 1956, none of the current ministerial personnel were elected to the 9th in 1969. Three minor party representatives have been dropped.\(^\text{20}\) It is probable that all five of the current ministerial personnel are members of the CCP, although this cannot be confirmed.

None of their ages are known, however as many officials are veteran cadres it would seem that the ministerial officials are an older group in 1973 than they were in 1966.\(^\text{21}\)

None of the officials are known to be women, which confirms the trend established in other ministries that the proportion of women remains low. Sha Feng’s wife, Chou Chin makes occasional appearances at dinners and receptions, but it is not known whether she occupies a formal position within the Ministry.

It would seem that the Ministry’s function is mainly co-ordinative. This is because of the massive amalgamation which has taken place in a sector regarded as being highly important, and one which employs most of the Chinese people. It is re-inforced because at the centre very few officials have been appointed when compared with the pre 1966 situation.

\(^\text{19}\) Sha may have had limited political connections with Lin, and could have been influenced following his appointment by other political forces. The hand of the civilian wing was strengthened by the appointment of Hsiao P’eng in April 1972, and the re-activation of Wang Kuan-lan in agricultural affairs. Despite this, rehabilitation of cadres in this area has been very limited to date.

\(^\text{20}\) Two of whom were ministers.

\(^\text{21}\) This is especially re-inforced if we include Wang Kuan-lan who was born in 1895.
Probably the provincial level is more closely concerned with administration while at the Centre officials concentrate on general policy while retaining overall supervision over agricultural mechanisation, produce priorities, foreign contacts and research.

Ministry of Building Construction

(i) Organisation

The organisation of this Ministry has remained unchanged after the Cultural Revolution, although a possible amalgamation with the Ministry of Building Materials has been foreshadowed by some authorities.22

One internal department has been identified, that is the Building Research Institute. It was known to have at least ten internal departments before 1966, and while it is possible that some of these may have been amalgamated, it is probable that most continue to function.

(ii) Activities

Although the Ministry is probably concerned with the overall co-ordination and supervision of building activity throughout China, the only reported activity since 1968 was in November 1969 when it called a meeting to discuss the revolutionary emulation movement.23 However the fact that it has an active Building Research Institute would suggest that it continues to be involved in building techniques and takes part in devising innovations in the field.

(iii) Personnel

The table below indicates the political fortunes of the pre Cultural Revolution ministerial officials.

---

22 This will be discussed in the section under the Ministry of Building Materials. A further amalgamation with the State Capital Construction Commission is also possible as two officials identified in the Ministry have also been identified as 'leading members' of the Commission in recent months.

23 Radio Ninghsia 11/11/69. Officials of the Ministry attended, but the announcement did not elaborate.
TABLE 40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp</th>
<th>Role in Same Min</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liu Yu-min</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Ch'un-mao</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsu Shih-p'ing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sung Yu-ho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Shao-ch'uan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of the former ministerial cadres are known to be serving in similar areas, although it is possible that Wang and Yang are doing so. Liu Yu-min was relieved of his post by order of the State Council in March 1965, and as far as is known, no replacement was appointed.

The following table indicates the number of public appearances made by ministerial officials since October 1968, according to NCNA announcements.

TABLE 41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lai Chi-fa</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jen Pu-ch'ai</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that Lai, before he was appointed Minister in December 1972, had made many appearances as Minister of Building Materials before this date. Although few appearances have been made, this is not to say that officials of this Ministry are inactive.

Only three officials have been identified. Lai it has been noted was formerly Minister of Building Materials. Jen in 1960 was Director of the Construction Bureau of the same Ministry. The Chief Architect of the Building Research Institute, Tai Nien-tzu, is also a member of the Architecture Society.

24 NCNA 28/12/72.
25 Jen Pu-ch'ai is at present serving as its Acting President.
Lai Chi-fa, born 1906, is a member of the 9th Central Committee, while previously none of the officials were members of the 8th. Only the age of Lai is known, and none are thought to be women.

Again a paucity of data hampers our study, though on this occasion the paucity is probably due to rare reportage of the Ministry's activities rather than tardy organisation or for security reasons. It is somewhat surprising that in the wake of the Cultural Revolution three ministries concerned with construction should have continued to have existed. Some attempts to rationalise this are possibly in process at this time. It does however reflect the inconsistencies of the period 1969-71 that three ministries continued to operate in so similar areas. Finally one should note that the PLA representative attached to the Ministry has since been described as a 'leading member' of the State Capital Construction Commission; but otherwise little PLA influence has been noted.

Ministry of Building Materials

(i) Organisation

This Ministry has continued to function unchanged since October 1968, until at least December 1972. At this date, the former Minister, Lai Chi-fa, was transferred to head the Building Ministry. From this it has been inferred that the Ministry of Building Materials has been abolished.26 One source supports this by citing that Pai Hsiang-yin was mentioned for the last time as Vice Minister of Building Materials in July 1972.27 However this is not true, for he was again identified as


holding this position in December 1972. This raises serious doubts as to whether the two ministries have in fact been amalgamated. Unfortunately Pai has not appeared during 1973, so the matter remains unresolved.

No internal departments have been identified since October 1968. Before the Cultural Revolution several departments associated with cement and other building materials had been identified.

(ii) Activities

The only activity that has been noted since 1968 has been the Ministry's operation of a May 7th Cadre School in Yingte hsien, Kwangtung Province.

(iii) Personnel

Table 42 indicates the careers of the ministerial personnel following the Cultural Revolution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lai Chi-fa</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertain Died</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Yun-t'ao</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Ti-sheng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pai Hsiang-yin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two of the three vice ministers have disappeared while the minister continued to serve in this post until his transfer to the Building Construction Ministry.

Table 43 enumerates the number of public appearances made by officials of this Ministry.

---

28 NCNA 8/12/72.

29 See JMJP 22/8/69. English translation in Current Background, No.899, 19/1/70.

30 Lai Chi-fa has also been referred to as a 'leading member' of the State Capital Construction Commission. NCNA 15/5/73.
Like the previous Ministry, the two officials identified make rare public appearances. This makes it more difficult to ascertain whether or not this Ministry has been amalgamated with the Building Ministry.

Both officials identified so far were serving in exactly the same positions immediately before the Cultural Revolution.

Little more can be said about this Ministry, but in conclusion it is clear that the Ministry was still a separate entity until December 1972 at least. It is not so certain that it continues to remain so, given Lai's transfer and Pai's subsequent non-appearance. The PLA representative, Li Ta-t'ung has continued to make occasional appearances, the last being in January 1973.

Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries

(i) Organisation

This large and important Ministry was formed from three: the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, Ministry of Coal Industry and the Ministry of Petroleum. The amalgamation of the three can be seen as a logical step to streamline the vital areas concerned and to exploit more fully exploration and production of much needed fuel supplies. The Ministry in its amalgamated form was first noted in January 1971 when one of its vice ministers was identified.

31 If this Ministry has been amalgamated, it will be another step in its rather chequered career. It was re-created as recently as March 1965 when it split from the Ministry of Building Construction. Before that, until 1962, it had existed as a separate entity.
Only one internal department has been identified so far, the Petroleum Exploitation and Exploration Corporation which has for its Head a former Vice Minister of Petroleum. Like the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry, there probably exists large bureaux to cope with the administration of petroleum, chemical and coal matters.

(ii) Activities

Activities of the three component ministries were noted until 1969 at least. They called conferences, its officials conducted talks with foreign delegations, and articles appeared about their cadre schools.

Since amalgamation, the Ministry's writing group has produced at least three important articles. In addition, the Ministry has convened several conferences at the national level. The Ministry also has on occasion released reports on industrial progress.

Officials of the Ministry continue to hold talks with visiting delegations and go abroad themselves. Often they sign scientific and technical agreements with countries on a year to year basis. The Ministry has also sent study groups abroad to investigate techniques used in other countries and to purchase specialised machinery for use in China.

(iii) Personnel

Table 44 indicates the careers of former ministerial personnel following the Cultural Revolution.

---

32 Chang Wen-pin. This raises the possibility that the Corporation is a separate, though related body.

33 For instance the Coal Ministry's. See an article by Chao Lien-sheng of the 'Office for the Despatch of Cadres to Lower Levels, Coal Mining Ministry' which says the Ministry set up a cadre school in Heilungkiang in October 1968. See Current Background, No.899, 19/1/70.

34 For instance one such article refutes the claim that there is no coal south of the Yangtze. See Red Flag, No.5, 1/5/71.

35 See for instance a ministerial report that the gas industries through repairs and use of waste saved, in the first ten months of 1972, an incredible 80,000,000 Yuan. NCNA Bulletin, No.49, 6/11/72, p.28.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in Role Status</th>
<th>Disapp</th>
<th>F/C Min</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of the Chemical Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Yang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang Ying-yung</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hou Teh-pang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao Kuei-ch'ang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Chen</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Su</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Liang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yi-lin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Teh-p'eng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of the Coal Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Lin-chih</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chung Tzu-yün</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Chien-p'ing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chia Lin-feng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Chin-lin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan Wen-ts'ai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsou T'ung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of the Petroleum Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yü Ch'iu-li</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Fan-yi</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou Wen-lung</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Ching-wen</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K'ang Shih-en</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Chin-ch'iang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ang K'e</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Hsiao-feng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Ting-yi</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Wen-pin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table indicates quite plainly that where the minister has suffered disgrace in the Cultural Revolution, namely the first two, the overwhelming majority of the vice ministers have disappeared. In the Chemical Ministry six out of eight have disappeared, and in the Coal Ministry four out of six have. While in the Petroleum Ministry with Yü Ch'iu-li eventually emerged with an enhanced reputation, only four out

---

36 Yü was elected to the 9th Central Committee. He has not been identified as Minister of Petroleum since October 1968. To date no one has been appointed Minister of Fuel and Chemicals.
of nine have disappeared; Chang Lin-chih, the Coal Minister, who was severely criticised, died during the Cultural Revolution. Of those in the 'role elsewhere' column, one, Hou Teh-pang does so as a member of the CPPCC. Yu Ch'iu-li was promoted to Minister of the State Planning Commission. Of those in the 'status uncertain' column, Pan Wen-ts'ai appeared only once in October 1969, while K'ang Shih-en is probably a Vice Minister.

Table 45 indicates the number of public appearances made by vice ministerial cadres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Chin-ch'iang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K'ang Shih-en</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yi-lin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Hsiao-feng</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ang K'e</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsou T'ung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Officials have appeared infrequently including one who has appeared on just one occasion. A peak in the numbers in 1971 indicates that in this year many foreign delegations in the field were visiting China. On the other hand, rehabilitations have been slow, with two not appearing until 1972.

Table 46 indicates the political backgrounds of the officials connected with the Ministry.

---

37 Hou was born in 1892 and is no longer serving in a vice ministerial capacity.

38 K'ang has appeared fairly regularly among other Fuel and Chemicals Vice Ministers, and although he has not been officially identified as such, is probably also a Vice Minister.
TABLE 46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>Oth Gov</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministerial</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M, VM BD BDD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vice Ministers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureau Director</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureau Deputy Director</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leading Members</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the vice ministers came from one of the three ministries, four from the Petroleum Ministry. The two leading members are PLA representatives. Wang Hsing was formerly attached to the Petroleum Ministry, whereas the former representative in the Chemical Ministry has returned to the PLA itself. A fourth (in the Coal Ministry) has not appeared since October 1970. In general, therefore, PLA influence has declined since Lin Piao's fall, although two remained involved in ministerial work. A minister has yet to be found, and this could fall to Wang Hsing who seems to be the more senior of the two. This need not be interpreted as a 'victory' for the PLA, but rather the PLA representatives have become so involved in the civilian administration that they may prefer to forsake their PLA positions.

None of the vice ministers is on the Central Committee, while one of the pre 1966 officials was. Of the pre 1966 ministerial officials, one belonged to a minor party, and another was a non party person.

---

39 The NCNA identification of Hsu Chin-ch'iang as Minister in November 1971 was apparently a false alarm, for subsequently he was referred to as vice minister. See NCNA 22/11/71.

40 Minister of Coal Industry, Chang Lin-chih.
Probably all the current vice ministers are members of the CCP as they have long backgrounds in high administrative levels and have no record of minor party affiliation.

The number of women in the Ministry is not known, however there are no women at the vice ministerial level. Among the pre 1966 vice ministers, again none were women.

The need to retain people of expertise in this area has been seen as important, with the result that all the incumbent vice ministers are veterans in their fields. Because no new blood has been introduced, they are, however, an ageing group. PLA influence has been kept to a minimum although a PLA representative could take the ministerial position, or it could quite possibly go to one of the vice ministers or even an outsider. Because fuel and chemicals is a capital high cost venture, and because of the need for many foreign contacts for equipment and marketing, there seems to be a high element of central control although provinces have fuel and chemical bureaux for administration at that level.

Ministry of Light Industry

(i) Organisation

As in the case of the previous Ministry, the Light Industry Ministry represents an amalgam of others. Three Ministries have made up the new Ministry: First Light Industry, Second Light Industry and the Textile Industry.

The Ministry was first identified in July 1970 when the Minister was identified by NCNA. Until this time, the former ministries were operating.

No internal departments have been identified as yet, although there are two known departmental directors. The wide scope of enterprises

41 Ch'ien Chih-kuang. First identified by NCNA 11/7/70.
covered would suggest that there would be a large number of departments. Before the Cultural Revolution, there were at least seventeen departments for the three ministries. Probably, however, there are somewhat fewer for the amalgamated Ministry, as some would have been duplicated.

(ii) Activities

The Ministry co-ordinates and administers facets of China's light industry. This covers such widely diverse goods as paper manufacturing, clothing, food processing, handicrafts and many others.

An article suggests that the Light Industry Ministry in co-operation with the State Planning Commission co-ordinates and plans production. An article talked of China's light industry growing under unified state planning. However like many of the other manufacturing ministries, it is probable that certain administrative functions have been transferred to the provincial and even county governments.

The Ministry possesses an active writing group which has published at least five articles and investigation reports. All of these, particularly the investigation reports, bear a highly authoritative stamp.

The Ministry is responsible for cotton production, and especially cotton processing and two investigation reports have been concerned with state owned cotton mills.

The Ministry has also participated or sent representatives to conferences in fields with which it is concerned.

42 'China's Light Industry Grows Steadily', NCNA 2/10/71.

43 For instance JMJP 5/6/72. The report of an investigation into the Peking No.3 cotton mill.

44 For instance the powdered milk conference in Inner Mongolia. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Weekly Economic Report, FE W688 A/10, Radio Inner Mongolia, 21/8/72.
(iii) Personnel

Table 47 indicates the political careers of those ministerial officials connected with the three pre Cultural Revolution ministries which have made up the new Ministry.

TABLE 47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp.</th>
<th>Role in Light Ind.M.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Ministry of Light Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Chu-ch'cen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K'ungh Hsiang-ch'en</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Tao-wu</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Hsin-yüan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsia Chih-hsü</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yi-chih</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ts'ao Lu</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Ministry of Light Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Yün-pei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Hsin-ho</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teng Chieh</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo Jih-yün</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Yi-fan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tien P'ing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Textile Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Kuang-nai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ien Chih-kuang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Wei-chi</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Ch'in-ch'iu</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Ta-ch'eng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jung Yi-jen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Yung-ch'ing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Chu-p'ing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yü-lo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiao Shan-min</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two of the three Ministers have died, while the third has recently been appointed a Vice Chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee. Of the twenty vice ministers, eleven have yet to make an appearance, while seven have been appointed to the new Ministry. Another vice minister

45 Ch'ien Chih-kuang was of course promoted to Minister.
is acting in CPPCC circles, and the final official appeared for a time during 1970, and then disappeared. The attrition rate is lowest in the Textile Ministry, from which the new Minister was drawn, while it was very high in the 2nd Ministry of Light Industry, whose Minister was for a long time under a political cloud and who has only recently re-appeared.

Table 48 provides the number of public appearances made by the seven identified ministerial cadres, according to NONA information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ien Chih-kuang</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Wei-chi</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiao Shan-min</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsia Chih-hsü</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Hsin-ho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ts'ao Lu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yi-chih</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All vice ministers have appeared consistently since they first re-appeared. The Minister, however, has not appeared since April 1972 and there is some doubt as to whether he retains his position. What factors may have caused his political demise are not known, though possibly a conflict between industrial and agricultural interests may have enforced his disappearance. Articles have appeared of late urging agricultural priorities over industrial. At any event, no successor has been named, and it may be merely for health reasons that he has disappeared. His membership of the Central Committee would exclude him from having to attend a May 7th Cadre School, another possible explanation for his non-appearance. As in the cases of other industrial ministries, the cadres of the Light Industry Ministry have been spared onerous protocol duties, and they continue to make only occasional appearances when necessary.
Table 49 indicates the political backgrounds of the officials so far identified with the Ministry.

TABLE 49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministerial</th>
<th>Oth</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Directors and Deputy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The desire to retain men of expertise and long experience in light industrial administration has been noted, and to this end all the ministerial members are drawn from one or other of the three ministries, the Second Light Industry faring the worst with only one representative. One of the bureau directors was the former director of the Bureau of Handicraft Co-operative which was abolished in March 1965 with the creation of the Second Ministry of Light Industry. The two PLA representatives are leading members, and they continue to make public appearances in this field. This would suggest that PLA influence is still marked in this Ministry. A third representative last appeared in November 1972.

The Minister, as mentioned previously, is a member of the Central Committee, while all the others are probably members of the CCP.

Previously, several ministerial officials were members of minor parties, totalling five in number. None continue in their ministerial capacities. However, they include two former Ministers, Chiang Kuang-nai and Li Chu-ch'en, both of whom have since died.
As there is no new blood at ministerial level, the group at that level is ageing. Ch'ien Chih-kuang himself was born in 1908, while two of his vice ministers were born in 1906 and 1907.

In 1966 there were three women among the seventeen vice ministers. In 1973, one of those three remained, among six vice ministers.

Although considerable amalgamation has taken place, and the offices have probably been somewhat streamlined, a large measure of authority probably remains at the Centre in the interests of unified planning and co-ordination. At the same time, the operation of many enterprises probably rests at the lower levels of the state administration. There has been considerable continuity of personnel which maintains significant, though ageing expertise at the Centre.

First Ministry of Machine Building

(i) Organisation

This Ministry has incorporated part of the functions of the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building which was concerned with the manufacture of agricultural machinery. In essence, however, its functions and internal organisation probably have remained unchanged except for the important addition of agricultural machinery production in which it seems to closely co-operate with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

As is the case with most of the industrial ministries, no internal departments have been identified. Before the Cultural Revolution, the Ministry possessed at least five bureaux devoted to various facets of machinery enterprise. This has probably remained much the same with the possible introduction of another for agricultural machinery.

(ii) Activities

The Ministry has continued to supervise the production of many different types of machinery ranging from any number of household
machines, cars, tractors, harvesters, railway rolling stock, and many
types of engines. The goods concerned are primarily for civilian useage.

The Ministry has taken part in and organised many conferences.
Subjects involved have ranged from rice planters and their uses, power
generation machinery, and general agricultural mechanisation.

The writing group within the Ministry has published at least five
articles and probably more on various topics. Again the tone of the
articles is highly authoritative and the implication is that they
establish certain policies to be adopted by lower levels.

(iii) Personnel

Table 50 indicates the post Cultural Revolution political careers
of those formerly associated with the First and Eighth Ministries of
Machine Building.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp.</th>
<th>Role in Ministry</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Ministry of Machine Building</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuan Chùn-yì</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Tao-han</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pai Chien</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou Tzu-chien</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Shou-shan</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou Chien-nan</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen Hung</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Tien-k'uei</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuo Li</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Yu-yü</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Mu-han</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eighth Ministry of Machine Building</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Cheng-jen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yü</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Pin-chou</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Li-kung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Chi-huan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Ta-pen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 For instance see NCNA 20/12/70, 'Vigorously Make Technical Innovations - Economise in the Use of Metals', or NCNA 17/9/71, 'Advance Along Chairman Mao's Line in Agricultural Mechanisation'.


Tuan Chūn-yī, the former Minister of the First Ministry has been transferred to Szuch'uan where he is a Provincial Party Secretary. Ch'en Cheng-jen, the other Minister involved, died in April 1972, but he had not made a public appearance between October 1968 and then. Only five of the fifteen vice ministers have yet to make an appearance, while six others are operating in a vice ministerial capacity. Another is a Vice Chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee. The respective status of the others is not known, although two have made only one appearance so far and probably have no regular job. On the whole, however, the survival rate has been quite high probably because the talents of those involved need to be exploited, the survival of Tuan Chūn-yī and the high turnout of officials to the funeral of the rehabilitated Ch'en Cheng-jen.

Table 51 indicates the number of appearances made by officials at ministerial level within the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Shui-ch'ing</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou Tzu-chien</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Pin-chou</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Yi</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen Hung</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Yu-yű</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although not frequent, the appearances of most of the cadres involved is fairly consistent. All but two of the vice ministers were rehabilitated before 1970, with the new Minister being appointed in March 1971.

---

48 Either in the Ministries of First Machine Building, Agriculture and Forestry or Metallurgy.

49 They appeared at Ch'en Cheng-jen's funeral only.

50 NCNA 22/3/71.
With some five vice ministers operating at present, it is seen that the Ministry, although enlarged, is operated with a much reduced number of senior staff. This confirms the trends set in the other industrial ministries: far fewer cadres with greater responsibility.

The backgrounds of the officials at various levels in the Ministry is provided in Table 52.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 52</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Oth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M, VM BD BDD Gov PLA Unk Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The new Minister was formerly a senior officer of the Tsinan Military region and before 1949 he was serving in Yang Ch'eng-wu's army. His pre-eminence within the Ministry was not affected by the demise of Lin Piao and he has continued to be most active in ministerial affairs. Ma Yi, another PLA Vice Minister, was identified as such in April 1973, and was formerly a PLA representative in the Ministry. The four other vice ministers either served in a similar capacity in the First or the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building. The two 'leading members', both from the PLA, have not appeared since April and September of 1972. They are probably a spent force as far as ministerial affairs are concerned.

In 1966 one of the seventeen ministerial officials was on the Central Committee, while in 1973, the Minister is on the Central

51 NCNA 14/4/73.

52 Ch'en Cheng-jen was an Alternate Member.
Committee. Representation at that level has not changed, if anything it has improved. In neither case have there been representatives of minor parties.

In 1973, as in 1966, no women have been represented at the highest levels in the administrations, again confirming the lack of involvement of females in this area.

Probably the average age of the officials has remained static or even risen. Li Shui-ch'ing was born in 1920, and Ma Yi may possibly be about the same age. Ages of the others, all veterans, are not known.

Although the minister and one of his deputies have immediate origins in the PLA, the emphasis has been to retain men of long standing expertise in the field in top positions. Probably the overall structure of the Ministry has changed little, although once again, some further autonomy may have been granted to provincial administrations.

Fourth Ministry of Machine Building

The status of most of the machine building ministries is highly questionable. However, as the one just discussed is the First ministry, then it is logical to expect that there are others.

One reference to the Fourth Ministry, which makes electronic equipment, has been found. At a meeting on electronics convened by the Hopei Revolutionary Committee, representatives of the Fourth Ministry attended. If the Ministry is fully operative, it is most odd indeed that no officials have been identified since October 1968. This leads one to speculate that the Ministry is either not fully autonomous or organised at this stage.

---

53 Li Shui-ch'ing was elected to full membership in April 1969, while still attached to the Tsinan Military Region.

Several former officials have been identified as 'leading members of the State Council'. They include the former minister, Wang Cheng, and three of his former deputies: Ch'i Yi-ting, Kao Chun and Liu Yin.

Sixth Ministry of Machine Building

One reference has been made to this Ministry, an earlier one than the Fourth. At a ship launching (the Ministry is for shipbuilding), the Chairman of the Ministry's Military Control Committee attended and made a speech. No reference has been made to this Ministry after this date.

Former officials have appeared: Fang Ch'iang, the former Minister, attended Teng Tzu-hui's funeral in a private capacity, while two of his deputies are 'leading members of the State Council'. Another is Secretary of the Sinkiang Regional Party Committee. It is evident that this Ministry is not yet re-organised, if ever it will be on a civilian basis again.

Seventh Ministry of Machine Building

This Ministry which is responsible for aircraft production has been mentioned twice, but not after January 1969 before the ministerial reshuffles. Its status is quite questionable and it has probably been wholly taken over by the Ministry of Defence as indicated in Chapter Three. Its former Minister, Wang Ping-chang disappeared at the time of Lin Piao's demise. He was possibly implicated in the so-called scheme to murder Mao, as he had links with the PLA Air Force which was heavily implicated.

56 NCNA 10/12/72.
57 Pien Chiang and Huang Chung-hsueh.
58 Liu Hsing.
Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry

(i) Organisation

This Ministry is one of the few in this chapter which has not undergone any form of amalgamation that we know of. In essence and composition, therefore, it remains unchanged.

Only one subordinate organ has been identified: the Metals Institute. This organ has a revolutionary committee along with many other institutes of higher learning, though it is most unusual for an institute attached to a Ministry to have a revolutionary committee.

Other departments involved with mining, foreign liaison, capital construction and iron and steel probably continue to exist as before the Cultural Revolution, although they are yet to be identified.

(ii) Activities

This Ministry supervises and funds mining and metal processing industries throughout China, and as such has a highly significant role in the development of the industrial economy.

It has an active 'writing group' which has written at least three important articles in recent years establishing certain policies or criticising former policies held by followers of Liu Shao-ch'i in particular.  

The Ministry has also taken part in, and convened conferences associated with mining and steel industries especially. The Ministry at the Centre remains closely involved with capital construction in the

59 See for instance NCNA 16/1/70 article entitled, "China's Metallurgical Workers Repudiate Renegade Liu Shao-ch'i's Slavish Comprador Policy and Invent New Process for Making Acid", or another article, NCNA 13/5/71, which calls on the country to develop iron and steel industries under the guidance of Mao Tsetung Thought.

60 For instance BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Weekly Economic Report, FE W526 A/5, NCNA 20/6/69; when the Ministry convened a meeting at Wuhan to develop low alloy steel.
provinces, as illustrated by the arrival of a vice minister at the opening of a new steel plant in Ch'angsha. On behalf of the Ministry he congratulated all those involved in its construction, with funds made available by both the Centre and local resources.  

Representatives of the Ministry occasionally host foreign delegations and conduct talks with them. The Ministry has also sent study groups abroad, groups to supervise foreign aid programmes, and some to attend academic conferences overseas.

(iii) Personnel

Table 53 indicates the political careers of the ministerial officials attached to the pre Cultural Revolution Ministry after October 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp</th>
<th>Role in</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lu Tung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsia Yün</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Yang-wen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Pin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Ch'ih</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Tse-sheng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yü-ch'ing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou Ch'ih-p'ing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ch'ao</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teh Chih-ch'iang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lu Tung, the former Minister, recently re-appeared at May Day 1973 celebrations in the capacity of a 'well known personage'. It seems unlikely that he has a specific position in any field at the present time. Only two of the nine former vice ministers have remained in the same job, while two others were given important provincial positions.  

61 Radio Hunan 2/7/70.

62 Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, Second Secretary Fukien Party Committee and Hsü Ch'ih, Secretary Szuch'uan Party Committee. Chou disappeared shortly after Lin Piao fell.
The disgrace of Liù in the Cultural Revolution meant that his protective presence could not aid some five vice ministers, all of whom have disappeared.

The following table notes the public appearances made by ministerial officials since October 1968.

**TABLE 54**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Shao-k'un</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Tse-sheng</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Tien-k'uei</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeh Chih-ch'iang</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the infrequency of their appearances, the most striking aspect is the long disappearance of the third vice minister, Yeh Chih-ch'iang who in his long absence was probably at a Cadre School, although this has not been officially confirmed. When he re—appeared, he resumed his former position. In 1969, there were no ministerial officials publicly active although the Ministry itself was active.

Table 55 indicates the background of officials connected with the Ministry.

**TABLE 55**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same Ministry</th>
<th>Other Ministry</th>
<th>Oth M, VM BD BDD</th>
<th>M, VM BD BDD</th>
<th>Gov PLA Unk Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Members</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The new Minister, Ch'en Shao-k'un was formerly Director of the Shenyang Military Region's Political Department and may be a protégé of Ch'en Hsi-lien, his former Commander. Liaoning, of course, has a highly important industrial base which would be of considerable significance for the Ministry and may account for certain autonomy granted to the Liaoning
administration in the operation of the Anshan Steelworks. Two vice ministers are veterans from pre 1966 days, while a third was formerly attached to the First Ministry of Machine Building as a vice minister. One leading member, Chu Hu-ning is a PLA representative who has not appeared since 1971, another PLA representative was transferred from the Ministry of Light Industry near the end of 1972. With the exception of Chu, the officials have been unaffected by the fall of Lin Piao.

None of the current officials are members of the Central Committee, as was the case in 1966. In both cases there were no representatives of minor parties at the ministerial level.

In both cases also, none of the high officials were women, and in neither instances are the ages of the cadres known. However, because most of the officials are the same, one concludes that the average age of them must be rising, unless Ch'en be extremely youthful.

As is typical with the industrial ministries, officials with this Ministry are well experienced in the field. The number of vice ministers compares poorly with the 1966 figure (three as against nine) which might suggest that considerable autonomy in administration has been handed down to lower levels. On the other hand the cost of capital construction and the need to adhere to a central plan of some kind has probably left considerable co-ordinative and fiscal power in the hands of the Centre.

63 See Audrey Donnithorne, Economic Factors and Central Power in China, ANU, April 1973, p.23, in which the author maintains control of this plant has passed into the hands of the Liaoning administration.

64 Yang Wei-ch'ün.
(i) Organisations

The possibility exists that this Ministry has merged with the two Building Ministries. Two officials of the Building Ministry are 'leading members' of the Commission, and building companies have been noted to be under the Commission.

However, set against this are two points. One, it is not unusual for a cadre to concurrently hold two ministerial positions. Second, it is probable that building companies are attached to both the Building Ministry and the Capital Construction Commission. Therefore the evidence that a merger has taken place is not conclusive and it is probable that the Capital Construction Commission remains a separate entity.

No internal departments have as yet been identified although there are known to be at least two departmental directors.

(ii) Activities

The Ministry supervises design work and construction of large scale enterprises and even of smaller ones. However, little of its activity in this regard has been publicly disclosed.

Like many other ministries, it has a writing group and two of its articles have been noted. One calls for the need to develop large scale, medium and small scale enterprises simultaneously; while the other emphasises the need to carry on the revolution in design work while declaiming the tendency to divorce theory from practice.

---

65 Jen Pu-ch'ai and Lai Chi-fa.

66 NCNA 15/5/73. Hsü K'ang was identified as the Managing Director of a Building Company under the Commission.

67 There were many cases of this before 1966.

68 NCNA 17/8/70.

69 NCNA 19/4/71.
The Ministry has become noticeably more active in 1973, especially with the confirmation of the former Minister, Ku Mu, in his old position. Contacts with foreign delegations have increased in frequency.

(iii) Personnel

Table 56 indicates the political fortunes of the pre Cultural Revolution ministerial officials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in Disapp.</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status Uncertain</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ku Mu</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Ching-wen</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sung T'ang-ch'u</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Yu-min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Pei-yi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lü K'e-p'ai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao Pei-k'e</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku Ming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Hsü</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The disappearance rate of vice ministers has been high (five out of eight). Ku Mu himself was brought back into public view as late as December 1972. Ku Ming has been transferred to the State Planning Commission as a Vice Minister.

The following table indicates the number of public appearances made according to NCNA information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ku Mu</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Pei-yi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sung Yang-ch'u</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70 NCNA 20/6/73.

71 When he attended the funeral of Teng Tzu-hui. It should be noted that he was referred to as a 'leading member of the State Council'. 
The low rate of appearances does not mean that the cadres have been inactive, but rather their duties do not require frequent protocol appearances. The absence from view of the two vice ministers during 1973 must raise doubts as to whether they continue to function.

The political backgrounds of the officials of various levels are noted in Table 58.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 58</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same Ministry</th>
<th>Oth</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M, VM</td>
<td>BD</td>
<td>BDD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Directors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Deputy Directors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Members</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aside from the bureau directors and deputies whose origins are not known, a high proportion (five out of six) are experienced cadres in the building area. The remaining official, a 'leading minister', is the PLA representative in the Building Ministry who was first noted as a leading member in the Commission in 1972. He has continued to make regular public appearances and it is possible he will be identified as a vice minister in the future. The former PLA representative, Li Liang-han, has not appeared since March 1972.

As in 1966, none of the officials are members of the Central Committee, and none are from the minor parties, which was also the case in 1966.

---

72 Formerly a Deputy Political Commissar of the PLA Engineering Corps.
None of their ages are known, although the average is obviously higher now. Again, no women are serving in a ministerial capacity, as was the case in 1966.

Following the established pattern for the industrial ministries, expertise has been the all important consideration in the appointment of officials, Civilian dominance was strengthened with the re-appointment of Ku Mu as Minister.

Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power

(i) Organisation

This Ministry has remained unaltered from pre Cultural Revolution days as it has not been amalgamated with any other Ministry.

Four internal departments have been identified since October 1968: the Second Engineering, whose precise functions, or area of concern is not known; the Foreign Liaison Department which supervises contacts with foreign countries; the Hydraulic Power Designing Institute, and the Yellow River Conservancy Commission. It is not certain whether the Yangtze River Commission continues to function, as well as a number of other departments that were formerly identified with the Ministry. These included Capital Construction, various power institutes, and Technical Promotion.

(ii) Activities

Reports of the Ministry's activities have been restricted to its attendance at conferences on various aspects of water conservancy and power production. The Ministry has also conducted investigation surveys into aspects of flood control and the harnessing of water resources.

---

73 Audrey Donnithorne, Economic Factors and Central Power in China, ANU, April 1973, p.16, suggests that it no longer functions.

74 For instance, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Weekly Economic Report, FE W500 A/11, Peking 13/12/68, reports a conference in Shihchiachuang to exchange experience in conserving coal and electricity.
Officials of the Ministry have visited overseas to study techniques used abroad. Special agreements have to be ratified in talks which necessitate regular trips abroad.

(iii) Personnel

Table 59 indicates the political fortunes of the pre Cultural Revolution officials after 1968.

TABLE 59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fu Tso-yi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Lan-po</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Han-ying</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peng Chung-yüan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’ien Cheng-yüng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’eng Ming-sheng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Tai-keng</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hao Chih-chai</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu Hsing-yuan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo Wen-fang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Pin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Ying-hsien</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pu Tso-yi, like other non communist Ministers has been phased out, although he is still prominent in other fields. Four former vice ministers have been identified as continuing in their positions, while a fifth has re-appeared. Nonetheless, a high proportion of the vice ministers have failed to re-appear (six out of eleven).

Table 60 indicates the number of public appearances made by ministerial officials since October 1968, according to NCNA information.

---

75 For instance the agreement with Korea on the hydro-electric scheme on the Yalu River. Negotiations are held each year on its operation.
TABLE 60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chang Wen-pi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Pin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ien Cheng-ying</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu Hsing-yuan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Ying-hsien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Officials have made fairly regular appearances, although Wang Ying-hsien seems to have dropped from sight. It is possible that he, like so many others, has gone to a Cadre School for re-education.

The following table indicates the political backgrounds of the Ministry's officials.

TABLE 61

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same Ministry</th>
<th>Oth</th>
<th>M, VM</th>
<th>BD</th>
<th>BDD</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Ministers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Deputy Director</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Members</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chang Wen-pi, the new Minister identified for the first time in October 1972, is from the PLA and was attached to the Anhui Military District, and probably has close ties with Li Teh-sheng, Director of the PLA Political Department and Anhui First Party Secretary. This would help to explain his appointment and the fact that he was unaffected by the fall of Lin Piao. The four vice ministers are all veteran officials. Liang Ch'i-chou, a PLA representative continues to make scattered appearances, while another PLA representative has not appeared since 1969.76

76 Ch'en Teh-san.
None of the current officials are members of the Central Committee. Among the 1966 ministerial officials, one was an alternate member of the Central Committee, while two were non party cadres. At the present time, there are no such representatives in the Ministry.

The average age has probably fallen because of the removal of the elderly Fu Tso-yi. The age of the new minister is not known, but he is undoubtedly significantly younger. The birth date of one vice minister is reputed to be 1922, one of the youngest ages available.

Among the 1966 officials there was one woman vice minister, Ch'ien Cheng-ying, and she continues to be active.

At the top levels, most of the officials are experts in their field, although the Minister's experience in water conservancy and power is probably limited. Trends established in other ministries are followed in this one: very little new blood among the vice ministers, emphasis on expertise, far fewer vice ministers than previously, and only a small female component.

Conclusions

Most of the ministerial amalgamations have occurred in this group of ministries: Agriculture and Forestry, possibly Building, Fuel and Chemical Industries, Light Industry, and the First Machine Building. This has probably helped to streamline administration and it may have reduced jurisdictional conflicts and red tape: all important improvements. However the extreme bulkiness of some of the ministries, may prove to be a long term disadvantage.

77 Liu Lan-po.
78 Born 1893.
79 Especially Agriculture and Forestry, and Light Industry.
Although many of the ministers are drawn from the PLA ranks (four out of seven), the majority of the vice ministers are drawn from veteran professional ranks of cadres. Most of them are former vice ministers themselves, which would indicate that in this area, long periods of expertise has been vital in recruiting vice ministers. This is the case for each of the industrial ministries, and has prevented significant upward mobility, only one vice minister having been a lower ranking official in the State Council immediately before the Cultural Revolution.

Non CCP ministerial and vice ministerial officials have been virtually eliminated, while the proportion of those holding Central Committee rank has not risen. On the whole the officials are older, and so the problem of advancing age remains. Women continue to be under represented.

Although there are several PLA ministers, none of them appear to owe allegiance to Lin Piao; some were appointed after his fall, and none fell with him. PLA representation at vice ministerial level remains insignificant; many other PLA representatives in the ministries have dropped from sight while others have rejoined PLA commands in Peking.

Organisation of these vital ministries was completed relatively early, although some ministerial chairs remain vacant. In general, their re-organisation came soon after the international, although amalgamations did not take place until 1970.

80 Jen Pu-ch'ai, of the Ministry of Building Construction.
Chapter 8. The Social Ministries
- Ministry of Public Health
- Physical Culture and Sports Commission
- Cultural Group Under the State Council
- Scientific and Educational Group Under the State Council

These four organisations have been classified under 'social' ministries because they administer directly to the needs of the Chinese people: their health, culture, education. The status of the two groups will be discussed later in the chapter after the two formal ministries have been considered.

**Ministry of Public Health**

(i) **Organisation**

No internal departments have as yet been identified despite the fact that officials of the Ministry have been making regular appearances since 1970. It is probable that there has been little change in overall administrative structure with departments devoted to epidemic prevention, medical education, treatment and prevention, and several others continuing to exist. Some officials connected with some of these departments have been noted to be still working in undefined departments under the Ministry.

(ii) **Activities**

Newspaper and radio reports often carry long stories concerned with barefoot doctors, medical procedures, health campaigns, people's sanatoria and other health matters. However, the reports do not mention the Ministry as being responsible for their development. Rather, local hospitals, doctors, and lower level organisations have been credited with their promotion. This should not imply, however, that the Ministry is idle in such fields. The Ministry was badly shaken up during the Cultural Revolution, and for a long time, none of its senior officials appeared in

---

1 Barefoot doctors recently concluded a conference in Peking.
public at all. Probably it is only very recently that its organisation has recovered from the effects of the Cultural Revolution.

'Leading members' of the Ministry since 1970 have hosted numerous health and medical delegations from all parts of the world, and many leading medical scientists in China have been very active: promoting new surgical methods, acupuncture, writing books and articles, and going overseas attending medical congresses or study tours. More recently a Vice Minister of Public Health attended the World Health Organisation Conference in Geneva.

The Ministry, therefore, seems to be for the moment concentrating on foreign liaison and inspiring local medical developments. Where the responsibility lies for hospital administration, health campaigns and the like, at the present time, is unclear.

(iii) Personnel

Table 62 indicates the post Cultural Revolution fortunes of the pre 1966 ministerial officials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Disapp.</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ien Hsin-chung</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang K'ai</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Piao</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ts'ui Yi-t'ien</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuo Tzu-hua</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shih Shu-han</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Shu-ts'e</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 See for example articles by Lin Ch'iao-chih, a pediatrician, China Pictorial, No.5, 1972, pp.40-41; and also another by Hsin Yü-ling, Head of Surgical Department, Peking Tuberculosis Institute, China Reconstructs, No.3, March 1973. Note also that the China Medical Journal has resumed publication.

3 For instance a delegation to Ethiopia which left 15/6/73.

4 Huang Shu-ts'e lead the delegation.
The table illustrates the high attrition rate in this Ministry. Five out of six vice ministers have not appeared, and the former minister only recently appeared at funerals of old associates. People in the Public Health Ministry were accused of developing good health facilities in the main cities while neglecting the countryside and poorer areas. This and other reasons probably account for such a high drop out rate.

Only one vice minister, Huang, has been identified in May 1973. He first appeared in January 1973, and did not appear again until his identification in May. Since then, he has been fairly active at protocol functions. It has been reported that the new Minister of Public Health is none other than Liu Hsiang-p'ing.

Table 63 indicates the political backgrounds of officials who have been identified with the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 63</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M, VM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Vice Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Leading Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental Leading Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Barefoot doctors were seen as a partial solution to this problem.

6 NCNA 1/5/73.

7 At the funeral of Hsiung Chin-ting, former Vice President of the Red Cross Society. NCNA 28/1/73.

8 See Current Scene, Vol.XI, No.7, July 1973, p.22. NCNA identified her as a 'woman vice minister' on 8/3/73. Now that she has been promoted to minister, she is the first female minister since Li Te-ch'uan, also Minister of Public Health, was removed in 1962. Her promotion to Minister was confirmed by NCNA on 16/7/73.
While the origins for four of the leading members at ministerial level are not known, it is possible that some at least are PLA members. Their status within the Ministry is yet to be formalised, and it remains to be seen whether they are appointed vice ministers or whether a return of former officials at this level is continued.9

There are so few officials at ministerial level it is not meaningful to compare ages and party affiliations. It should be repeated, however, that Liu Hsiang-p'ing is the only woman minister among the post Cultural Revolution group.

Although organisation seems to be far from complete, it would appear that obscure figures thrown up by the Cultural Revolution maintain their grip on ministerial affairs. For while one vice minister has been identified, and possibly the minister has been appointed, they have so far made little obvious impact on ministerial operations.

Physical Culture and Sports Commission

(i) Organisation

Only one internal department, the Foreign Affairs office, has been identified. However several departmental 'leading members' have been noted which would indicate a number of internal departments do exist. Judging by pre Cultural Revolution departments, such might be Games, Cadres, Mountaineering, Sports Competition and others.

The Ministry seems to depend also on ad hoc committees formed for specific purposes. For instance for the Asian Table Tennis Championships and the coming Afro-Asian Table Tennis Championships committees were formed to organise the events.10

---

9 Following Huang's appointment. Several of the 'leading members' are also 'leading members' of the China Medical Association.

10 On both occasions chaired by a Vice Minister, Yu Pu-hsueh.
The Ministry at the centre has close liaison with the All China Sports Federation, provincial sports commissions and the Physical Culture Institutes which exist in both Peking and Shanghai. Through these organisations, sporting activity in China is supervised and regulated.

(ii) Activities

The Ministry has been extremely active since the re-introduction of sport into Chinese life after 1970. It has promoted sport and physical culture in three different ways.

Firstly, together with related sporting federations, it has sent teams overseas to participate in either world competition or play sport with countries on a bi-lateral basis. The sports involved include table tennis, badminton, volleyball, football (soccer), track and field, ice hockey, ice skating, basketball, swimming, tennis, and gymnastics. Probably other sporting contacts will be opened up, particularly if China participates in the 1976 Montreal Olympics, which she probably will.

Secondly, the Ministry has promoted national sporting competitions throughout the country in a wide variety of sports. Although the emphasis ostensibly is to place 'friendship first and competition second', it seems more and more evident that increased emphasis is placed on winning: records are noted more often, results are now announced where previously this was not the case. National sporting activity has become more widespread than ever before with more and more people taking part and enjoying it. Little wonder that the Ministry is seen to be extremely active.

Senior Ministry officials are concurrently members of the All China Sports Federation. Therefore, while the organisations are theoretically separate, the two are intimately connected.
In conjunction with the Military Commission of the Central Committee, and more recently with the Scientific and Educational Group under the State Council, the Ministry has issued sets of physical exercises to be performed by the people in the mornings, or whenever the radio plays them.12

(iii) Personnel

Table 64 indicates the political fortunes of the officials formerly linked with the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role in Same Min.</th>
<th>Role Elsewhere</th>
<th>Status Uncertain</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ho Lung</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ta</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Han</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jung Kao-t'ang</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Chung</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Meng-hua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao Cheng-hung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only two of the seven vice ministers have continued with the Ministry, while the Minister and two vice ministers continue to remain out of the public eye. Li Ta has the important new job of PLA Deputy Chief of Staff, while Lu Han continues in the honorific post of NDC member and a Standing Committee member of the NPC. Ts'ai died in the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution.

Public appearances of the ministerial officials are noted in Table 65.

12 NCNA 31/8/71, and NCNA 1/6/73.
TABLE 65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wang Meng</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao Cheng-hung</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ch'ing-ch'uan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Meng-hua</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao Hsiao-ch'eng</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu Pu-hsueh</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A glance at the table will tell the reader that officials appear very frequently, but that there was no appearance before 1970, and that subsequently, they became increasingly frequent. This rise reflects the growing importance of sport in the lives of the people since the Cultural Revolution and increased contact with foreign countries who sent teams to China, and Chinese teams which travelled abroad.

Table 66 indicates the political backgrounds of officials at various levels in the Ministry.

TABLE 66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same Ministry</th>
<th>Oth</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>Unk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M, VM BD BDD</td>
<td>Gov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Minister and Vice Ministers**

|              | 2   | 1   | 2   | 1   | 6   |

**Ministerial Leading Member**

|                      | 1   |     |     | 1   |

**Departmental Leading Members**

|                     | 1   | 6   | 7   |

The new Minister, Wang Meng, was a PLA officer in the Hopei Military District. It is probable that one of his deputies is a PLA man, and a

---

13 NCNA 13/8/70 was the first time an official in the Ministry was identified.

14 First identified NCNA 12/9/71.

15 Yu Pu-hsueh. Yu was formerly listed among PLA personnel.
third possible is also. A fourth vice minister is a former Ambassador to Switzerland. The 'ministerial leading member' noted was also a PLA man but he disappeared soon after Wang Meng was transferred to Peking. The origins of most of the others are not known. The marked involvement of the PLA in the Ministry is not surprising for it always had a close interest in sporting activities.

The ages of the officials are not known, though it is possible that they have declined somewhat. Ho Lung himself was born in 1899, and Wang is probably significantly younger. In addition older vice ministers like Lu Han (born 1895) have also been phased out.

None of the current ministerial officials are Central Committee members, while Ho Lung was. Two of his deputies were members of minor parties, while at present none are.

In 1973, as in 1966, none of the ministerial officials are women, again confirming the tendency not to place females in high administrative positions.

It can be seen that the Physical Culture and Sports Commission is a very active organisation geared to sending abroad large numbers of sporting teams, administering local and national sporting competitions, and providing an increasing number of sporting facilities in order to meet rising demand. Officials have come from a wide variety of sources, although it should be noted that in the All-China Sports Federation, and

---

16 Yao Hsiao-ch'eng.
17 Li Ch'ing-ch'uan.
18 Ts'ao Ch'eng.
19 He last appeared 12/7/71.
20 Especially through the National Defence Sporting Association which has not been heard of since 1968.
affiliated Sporting Federations, the majority of officials are long serving veterans in the sport field.

Groups under the State Council

Technically the two 'groups' under the State Council cannot be considered Ministries. Their chiefs are not Ministers, but 'heads'. Each group has a deputy head, and the Cultural Group possesses a Secretary-General and several members.

However, what is clear is that they are intended as replacements, whether temporary or permanent for several State Council ministries: Culture, Education, Higher Education and the Scientific/Technological Commission. However only one official attached to any of these ministries in 1966 is associated with the new groups.21

The heads of the groups enjoy a status as high as those of Ministers. However, this may be because of their senior status in the CCP rather than their State Council position.22 On the other hand, the members of the Cultural Group are always listed well down on state occasions, usually among the officials of the bureaux subordinate to the State Council.

As the fields of culture, education and science were so heavily attacked in the Cultural Revolution, it apparently was thought more appropriate to administer these fields in a 'revolutionary' way after the Cultural Revolution, and to eliminate the kind of bureaucracy that characterised the old ministries, and make them more receptive to the current propaganda. Just how this works out in the long term remains to be seen.

21 Liu Ai-feng, a former Vice Minister of Education.

22 One is an alternate member of the Central Committee, while the other is a full member as well as First Secretary of the Peking Municipal Party Committee, and the Chairman of its Revolutionary Committee.
Cultural Group under the State Council

This group was first identified in August 1971.\(^\text{23}\) No internal organisation has been identified, apart from the fact that it has a Secretary-General who presumably has the backing of some kind of bureaucratic staff. It is possible that there are bureaux dealing with appropriate cultural activities, but these have not been identified, nor have their officials.

Although the Group is supposed to administer cultural life in China, however its activities are probably well checked by the 'cultural Czars' in the Politburo.\(^\text{24}\) It is unknown just how much control the group does in fact exercise.

Apart from the Head, the Deputy Head, and the Secretary-General, there are seven members of the group, one of whom has not appeared since early 1972.

The Head, Wu Teh, has no links with culture in his long career. He has been a Party Secretary in Kirin, an army Political Commissar, and even a Vice Minister of the Fuel Industry. His deputy, Liu Hsien-ch'uan, a PLA officer, similarly has no obvious cultural links. He is, however, rumoured to be a close associate of Chiang Ch'ing's,\(^\text{25}\) which might explain his presence in the Group. The Secretary-General, Shih Shao-hua,\(^\text{26}\) has been a long time Deputy Director of NCNA. At one time he was Chairman of the Union of Chinese Photographers. Some of his recent photographic work has been published in magazines.\(^\text{27}\)

\(^{23}\) NCNA 3/8/71.

\(^{24}\) Namely Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan.

\(^{25}\) See China News Analysis, No.927, 20/7/73, p.2.

\(^{26}\) He is also an Alternate Member of the Central Committee. Liu Hsien-ch'uan is a full member.

\(^{27}\) See for instance China Pictorial, No.4, 1972. A picture entitled 'Wheat Harvest in a People's Commune'. 
Concerning the seven members, the following information is available. One was a Peking Opera singer and also a member of the Presidium of the Ninth Party Congress. Another was a well known dancer, while a third was a musician. A fourth was a photographer also. The cultural backgrounds of the remaining three are unknown, although one of these, Wang Man-t'ien, is a Secretary of the T'ientsin Municipal Party Committee.

Of the ten officials, therefore, three are members of the Central Committee, three were members of the Ninth Presidium. Two of them are women.

They represent a rather odd collection of individuals none of whom are established names in the cultural world in China. As far as is known, none of them can speak for art, literature of any kind, handicrafts or motion pictures. In other words, they are not a particularly representative group and most are probably easily dominated by outside forces.

Scientific and Educational Group under the State Council

This group was first identified in May 1971 when it was noted in the funeral eulogy of Li Ssu-kuang that he was its 'leader'. No further

---

28 Hao Liang. He was not elected to the Central Committee.

29 Liu Ch'ing-t'ang, also on the Presidium of the Ninth Party Congress, and not elected to the Central Committee.

30 Yu Hui-yung. He was also a member of the Ninth Party Congress Presidium, but was not elected to the Central Committee.

31 Wu Yin-hsien. See his work, also in China Pictorial, No.4, 1972. His picture of a goods marshalling yard is entitled 'Freight'.

32 Liu Ch'ing-t'ang and Wang Man-t'ien.

33 NCNA 2/5/71.
mention was made of it until July 1972 when its Head was first identified.\(^{34}\)

Slightly more is known of its organisation than that of the Cultural Group. It possesses a Foreign Affairs section which supervises contacts with visiting delegations and arranges its own visits overseas. Nothing else is known but it is presumed to have sections which attend to various education and scientific needs.

Apart from the deceased Li Ssu-kuang, a Head and a Deputy Head have been identified, as well as two 'leading members' of the Group who probably head internal departments. No 'members' comparable to the Cultural Group have been noted. The Head, Liu Hsi-yao, is a former Vice Minister of the Scientific/Technological Commission,\(^ {35}\) and is therefore well suited to this position. The Deputy Head, Ch'ih Ch'\hulln, is concurrently Chairman of the Tsinghua University Revolutionary Committee.

Nothing more is known of the composition or organisation of this Group. Its only reported activity has been the issuing of physical exercises in conjunction with the Physical Culture and Sports Commission.\(^ {36}\)

Conclusions

There are no real similarities between the four organisations discussed in this chapter with the exception that little is known of their internal organisations. The two ministries are dissimilar in that the Physical Culture and Sports Commission appears to have completed its re-organisation earlier than the Health Ministry. In fact soon after the decision had been taken to re-introduce sport into the lives of the people the Ministry quickly re-activated. Very few officials and no internal departments have been identified in the Health Ministry to date.

\(^{34}\) NCNA 1/7/72.

\(^{35}\) He was its Vice Minister until 1962.

\(^{36}\) NCNA 1/6/73. See page 145.
The Groups can be seen as examples of attempts to administer politically sensitive fields in a different way. There appears to be little formalised structure and to what extent their autonomy is guaranteed is not clear. The fields of education and culture were severely attacked from 1965 on although the build-up had been going on since the early nineteen sixties. Leading figures had been vilified most severely during the Cultural Revolution and many prominent writers were purged with their works being denounced as 'poisonous weeds'. The education system was denounced as breeding people divorced from the masses not applying the theory learned in schools and universities. As these areas were prime targets of the Cultural Revolution it is not surprising that they are now being administered in an unorthodox way.

37 One writer, Lao She, is rumoured to have committed suicide.
Chapter 9. Bureaux Subordinate to the State Council

- Broadcasting Administrative Bureau
- Bureau of Foreign Experts Affairs
- Bureau of Government Offices Administration
- Bureau of Religious Affairs
- Bureau of Surveying and Cartography
- Central Meteorological Bureau
- China Civil Aviation Administration
- Directorate of Posts
- Directorate of Telecommunications
- National Seismological Bureau
- New China News Agency
- People's Bank of China
- Publishing Department under the State Council
- State Administrative Bureau of Museums and Archaeological Data
- State Cultural Relics Administration
- State Oceanography Bureau
- Travel and Tourist Administration

Some seventeen bureaux are listed here, all of which used to be 'subordinate to the State Council'. It is possible, however, that some of these listed organisations are no longer part of the State Council as will be subsequently discussed. Due to their lesser importance, each bureau will receive shorter treatment than ministries have received. In addition, less information is available for the bureaux than most of the ministries.

Broadcasting Administrative Bureau

Until September 1972 most of the officials identified as 'leading members' of this Bureau had unknown backgrounds, possibly some were PLA, others may have been 'mass representatives', or very obscure officials. One former Deputy Director, Tung Lin, had been identified in the same position since 1971.

However, in September 1972 three additional former Deputy Directors re-appeared and resumed their posts.¹ Only the former Director and two

¹ This mass rehabilitation probably can be connected with a call at this time to improve the standard of articles and reporting on press, radio and television. See Hsinhua Bulletin, 24/7/72. A return of professionals in this area would presumably help towards achieving the desired effect.
deputies remain out of public view. The new Director, Liu Chien-kung, is a PLA representative.

Administratively, the Bureau appears now to be under the Central Committee rather than the State Council. On important occasions its members are listed as being 'leading members' of the Central Committee departments rather than of the State Council. This move was probably designed to strengthen the Party's control over propaganda and ideological work. It may be that when the State Council itself has more fully recovered from the Cultural Revolution it will resume responsibility for this Bureau.

**Bureau of Foreign Experts Affairs**

As the number of foreign experts in China has been so drastically reduced since the heyday of Sino-Soviet co-operation one might have expected this Bureau to have been abolished.

Few references have been made to it; however, its former Director, Mi Yung, is a 'leading member' of this Bureau, and in all probability remains its director.

**Bureau of Government Offices Administration**

While ministries have been amalgamated and some abolished, the bureaux have been less affected. This Bureau continues to exist with a former Deputy Director continuing in that position. The Director and seven other Deputy Directors remain unaccounted for. Two further Deputy Directors may remain with the Bureau, but have not been identified as such.

---


3 The first such in December 1971 (NCNA 31/12/71).

4 Kao Fu-yu.
Bureau of Religious Affairs

In the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution places of worship for all religions were closed, used as barracks, or destroyed. However, not long after the start of 1970, there was evidence that the Islamic Association had been re-formed. Later, 'leading members' of the Association began to appear in public and religious festivals were observed. Still later the Buddhist Association experienced a similar revival and services were held again in Christian churches, albeit on a smaller scale.

In order to administer the religions, the Bureau was re-established and was first officially mentioned in May 1973 when its former Director re-appeared and was described as its 'leading member'.

Bureau of Surveying and Cartography

The Director and a Deputy Director of this Bureau have been identified and both are former PLA representatives. Between them they have only made nine public appearances. No pre Cultural Revolution officials of this Bureau have made public appearances since 1968.

Central Meteorological Bureau

There is no question that meteorological observations kept going while the Bureau at the Centre was being re-organised. However, it was mentioned in public again only in March 1972 when a new Director and a

---

5 The Association gave a chandelier to hang in Pakistan's Jinnah Mausoleum. NCNA 29/1/70.

6 'Leading Members' have appeared frequently, especially on the visits of officials from the Moslem countries. Officials of the Buddhist Association have appeared on the occasion of visits from Buddhist countries. Chinese Moslems were first reported to have participated in the Corban Festival in February 1971.

7 Hsiao Hsien-fa. NCNA 13/5/73. He met a group of Japanese religious believers.

8 Meng P'ing, a PLA man.
former Deputy Director were identified. Since then an additional Deputy Director has been noted.

Frequent references have been made in the press and radio to the activities of the meteorological network which seems to be controlled from the Centre through regional headquarters. References to typhoon warnings are aplenty, and occasional reports of 'timely' rain, as well as laudatory articles praising local weather stations for providing more accurate forecasts for the peasants also appear.

China Civil Aviation Administration

Of all the seventeen bureaux more is known of this one than any other. Structurally it is operated from the Centre through provincial headquarters, thus creating a vast national network.

In Peking, its centre, four departments have been identified: Logistics, Commanding, Engineering and International. Presumably, logistics looks after equipment of all kinds while commanding directs traffic and movements. The International Department is most responsible for arranging contacts and negotiating air agreements with other countries. In provincial headquarters the types of departments identified have been Flight Operations, Traffic and Services, and Communications.

Despite the fact that the PLA took over air communications during the Cultural Revolution, the Corporation has since assumed a more civilian character. K'uang Jen-nung was until July 1973 its Director, and had been since 1954. Two of the Deputy Directors had previously

9 With those at Kwangchow, Shanghai and Shenyang appearing to be the most important.

10 K'uang has since relinquished the directorship. He is concurrently Deputy Commander of the Air Force, and it is possible that he is to be promoted to Commander replacing Wu Fa-hsien. K'uang continues to regularly appear among PLA personnel.
headed regional headquarters. The origins of a third Deputy Director are not known. None of the four pre Cultural Revolution Deputy Directors have appeared since the Cultural Revolution.

**Directorate of Posts**

This was one of the two directorates designed to take over from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. It was first noted in November 1972 when its Director and a Deputy were identified.\(^{11}\) Subsequently a second Deputy was noted. The origins of all three are unknown, and therefore cannot be determined to have been former officials in the Ministry from which the Directorate was created.

It has been mentioned earlier that the Ministry has been re-established and the Director of Posts identified as one of its 'leading members'. It is probable that the entire Directorate has been absorbed into the new Ministry.

**Directorate of Telecommunications**

This organisation was the other created out of the former Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Among its staff,\(^{12}\) three were former vice ministers of this Ministry. Four other Deputy Directors were appointed whose origins are not known.

Like the Directorate of Posts, it has probably been wholly absorbed into the new Ministry. There is, however, a Peking Long Distance Telecommunications Administration which may well exist independently of both.

\(^{11}\) NCNA 4/11/72.

\(^{12}\) The Director and two Deputies.
National Seismological Bureau

This Bureau was first mentioned by NCNA on the return of one of its Deputy Directors from Sweden. It is a newly created Bureau and not one of the twenty-four formerly attached to the State Council.

New China News Agency

NCNA remains the most obviously active Bureau of this type in China. It continued to operate throughout the Cultural Revolution although not without considerable internal disruption.

Something is known of its internal organisation. It possesses an international news department. According to an investigation made by Roderick MacFarquhar, there are 4,000 staff members lead by a top group of fourteen, one of whom is a woman. The PLA was said to have been in residence from 1967 until July 1972.

Like the Broadcasting Administrative Bureau, most of the pre 1966 officials are back at their desks in NCNA. A former Deputy Director is now the Director while all but two of the five Deputy Directors are former Deputies, while one of the two being a journalist by profession. The former Director is now a 'leading member' of JMJP. This means that all the former high officials of NCNA have been rehabilitated. Like the Broadcasting Administrative Bureau, many of them re-appeared in September 1972, and probably for similar reasons.

13 NCNA 27/6/73.
15 One such representative is still in residence as NCNA's First Deputy Director.
NCNA, it would seem, has been placed directly under Central Committee, and it is thus possible that JMJP has been placed directly under its control or vice versa. This has not been officially confirmed.

People's Bank of China

It has been suggested that the People's Bank is now directly under the Ministry of Finance. However, there is no official evidence to confirm this and it will be treated as a Bureau under the State Council. Only two former Vice Presidents survive and it is possible that the more senior will be promoted to President in the future.

The General Manager and several Deputy General Managers of the Bank of China have also been identified and are active in banking affairs. The Peoples Insurance Company of China has recently been identified together with its General Manager. No PLA representatives appear to be involved in banking and insurance at the top levels.

Publishing Department under the State Council

Two leading members of this new organ have been identified. It is, however, very rarely mentioned by NCNA. Two publishing houses, presumably subordinate to the Department have been identified: the People's Publishing House, and the Foreign Languages Publishing and Distribution Administration. Officials of other publishing houses that are known to exist have not been identified by NCNA.

---

16 Again at the May Day celebrations in 1973, its officials were listed as 'leading members' of Central Committee organs.

17 JMJP has always been a Central Committee newspaper.

18 See the editorial of the China Trade Report, 11/70. The writer also claimed that the People's Bank can be regarded as a Ministry, which is, in itself, quite inaccurate as well as inconsistent.

19 Namely Ch'iao P'ei-hsin, also Acting Chairman of the Bank of China.

20 NCNA 6/1/72.
State Administrative Bureau of Museums and Archaeological Data

This is a new Bureau and was first identified in May 1973. Its functions were performed by the Ministry of Culture, abolished after the Cultural Revolution. At the present time, the PRC is devoting much finance and energy to archaeological and historical research, so the creation of this Bureau is a logical step so that funds may be more effectively channelled to the right sources. It may also be a way of getting this area out of the control of the zealots who dominate the State Council's Cultural Group.

The Director, Wang Yeh-ch'iu, is a former Director of the Culture Ministry's Cultural Relics Administration. A 'leading member' is a former Vice Minister of Higher Education.

State Cultural Relics Administration

This organisation was first identified by NCNA in April 1973. It would seem most odd that two bureaux should exist in areas which almost totally overlap. It is probable, therefore, that NCNA had made mistakes with the title of the new Bureau, and in fact this latter one is really the former.

State Oceanography Bureau

This Bureau was formerly known as the State Bureau of Seas, but although the name has changed, the functions are much the same. It has been active recently in sending delegates to the United Nations Sea Bed Conferences, in fishing negotiations with Japan, and with future disputes.

---

21 NCNA 4/5/73.
22 Liu Yang-ch'iao.
23 NCNA 11/4/73.
24 This is reinforced by the fact that Wang Yeh-ch'iu also directs this 'bureau'. Of interest also is that this particular bureau has not been mentioned since April 1973.
with Japan and Korea over offshore oil drilling rights in the Yellow Sea.

The only official identified so far, its Deputy Director, was holding the identical post before the Cultural Revolution.

Travel and Tourist Administration

Under this important organisation are two affiliated companies: the International Travel Service and the China Travel Service.

Its Director is a former diplomat and one of the current Deputies is a former Deputy Director. Two others are civilians with unknown origins. A PLA representative last appeared in June 1972.

Its activities including approval of visitors and regulating their trips in China are well known to all who have visited that country. It also plays a part in sending visiting groups out of China to visit other countries.

Conclusions

It has been mentioned in Chapter Three that not all areas covered by the bureaux before 1966 are covered in 1973. Two answers to this are possible: either they will be when eventually they are re-organised, or that their functions have been dispersed to the provincial level. This seems likely in cases like Housing. However for others like Statistics, Price Control and the Agricultural Bank, this would not be so logical. Probably these bureaux could have been absorbed into other areas. Others like State Arrangements may well have been abolished altogether.

What is similar among most of the bureaux is the low percentage of PLA representatives while at the same time only 34 of the 108 pre Cultural Revolution directors and deputies appeared after the Cultural Revolution.26

25 For instance the Agricultural Bank into the People's Bank; the Statistics Bureau into the Ministry of Finance.

26 Of those 34, only 18 have found jobs in the bureaux structure.
Also clear is that the number of officials at this top level has been reduced drastically. The two broadcasting bureaux are striking exceptions to this.

Unlike most of the ministries which appear to have completed re-organisation, it would seem that the bureaux have some way to go in this respect. However it is increasingly probable that future recruitment will favour 'old' cadres and others who have been professionally associated with appropriate occupations for some time.

Although some PLA representatives have been appointed to top positions, their precise PLA origins are unclear. What is clear is that they seem to have survived Lin's purge which may indicate they have not had close ties with him. Too many positions at director level remain vacant for us to finally determine total PLA representation.

27 From 108 to only 43.
Conclusions

The Cultural Revolution has had a far reaching impact on the organisation and personnel of the State Council. In our concluding chapter, this impact will be examined. In addition overall assessments of the existing State Council organisation will be made, contrasting it with the pre Cultural Revolution structure. The role of the PLA, the effect of the Lin Piao incident, and the types of senior cadres recruited or rehabilitated since 1968 will also be considered.

Organisation

With regard to ministerial reorganisation which largely seems to have taken place during or after 1970, the following approaches seem to have been used by the Chinese. One, to leave ministries unchanged; two, to abolish altogether certain ministries and transfer their functions to another, to a lower level of administration, or seemingly dispense with them; three, to amalgamate ministries with related interests.

Some twenty-two ministries are thought to exist at the present time. This is less than half the number in existence immediately before the Cultural Revolution. Of the twenty-two, thirteen seem to have come through the process unchanged, while the rest seem to have arisen from amalgamations or have incorporated the functions of other ministries. It should be noted that ministries in this category are almost entirely

---

1 In March 1966 there were forty-nine ministries.


3 Amalgamated ministries include Communications, Agriculture and Forestry, Fuel and Chemicals and Light Industry. The ministries which have incorporated others include Commerce, First Machine Building, and State Planning.
restricted to the economic and industrial sectors, while those in the international, military and social sectors have not been amalgamated or incorporated. The ministries in the latter category represent units which are not easily amalgamated or incorporated as their functions are more diverse.

Certain ministries appear to have been abolished altogether: Scientific and Technological, Nationalities Affairs, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh Machine Building, Allocation of Materials, Labour, Culture, Higher Education, Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and Overseas Chinese Affairs. The functions of the Science, Culture and Education Ministries are obviously handled by the two 'groups' under the State Council which will be discussed later. The machine building ministries have possibly been transferred to the PLA or National Defence as they are engaged in the manufacture of various types of weaponry. Cultural Relations is probably handled by both the Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, the Cultural Group and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Who has responsibility for the remaining sectors is not clear.

The two Groups represent an attempt to administer the highly sensitive areas of culture and education in a revolutionary way. It is possible that in the future these two groups will be converted into more conventional ministries.

Lack of data about organisation within the ministries themselves prevents us from making judgements as to whether 'simpler administration' has affected this area too. The only ministry about which judgement can be made is the Foreign Ministry. In 1973 there are six geographic departments as against seven in 1966, and five service departments as against six in 1966. In other words, taking the seven years as a whole, there has been no dramatic reduction in the numbers of internal departments. It is possible that this generally applies across the board,
although in the case of amalgamated and incorporated ministries, the numbers of internal departments may have increased.

In 1966 there were some twenty-four bureaux subordinate to the State Council, while in mid 1973 seventeen were identified. It appears that none have been amalgamated or incorporated into others, but that several have been abolished. Those that have not been mentioned by NCNA since October 1968 include Secretaries, Statistics, Agricultural Bank, Administration of Industry and Commerce, Price Control, Housing, Foreign Languages Publishing, Language Reform, Archives, Scientific/Technological Cadres Administration, State Arrangements, Counsellors and the Premier's Office. Some of these may have been abolished, while others' functions could have been transferred to others.\(^4\)

Eleven bureaux appear to have survived the Cultural Revolution unchanged in form although two of these may have been transferred to Central Committee control.\(^5\) A further six bureaux are new creations although two of these have probably been abolished following the recent reorganisation of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.\(^6\) Another was formerly a bureau within the Ministry of Culture while the remainder have no obvious parents. While the number of bureaux have been reduced somewhat,\(^7\) areas formerly covered by the bureaux have yet to be, and this makes it possible for further bureaux to be established.\(^8\)

\(^4\) For instance the Agricultural Bank could have been transferred to the People's Bank of China.

\(^5\) NCNA and the Broadcasting Administrative Bureau.

\(^6\) The Directorates of Posts and Telecommunications.

\(^7\) From twenty-four to seventeen, not nearly as large a reduction as the ministries.

\(^8\) Some have been established as recently as June and July 1973.
The process of reorganisation continues into late 1973 as disgraced former officials continue to re-appear and organisations are mentioned again. It is evident that the international ministries recovered most quickly followed by the industrial and communications ministries. The cultural, social and economic ministries followed last. Those ministries which recovered most quickly were involved with foreign contacts more than others, or they administered industry or communications vital to the well being of the economy. The areas hardest hit in the Cultural Revolution: namely education, culture, finance and planning, were the slowest to recover even though they were early targets. An exception to this is the Physical Culture and Sports Commission which was reorganised when the leadership felt it was time to actively promote sporting activities once again.

Personnel

(i) Attrition of Pre Cultural Revolution Personnel

By June 1973 only the Premier and five of his vice premiers were active in any sense of the word. One other died before the Cultural Revolution, and since then three more have died. This has left seven vice premiers who have yet to re-appear. Furthermore, no new vice premiers have been appointed since the conclusion of the Third NPC in January 1965. At the highest level of the State Council, therefore, the membership has been severely depleted and this is aggravated as three of the 'active' vice premiers appear to do little real work.

---

9 Especially in the non State Council areas of the Youth League and Trade Unions where there is much activity at present (though not yet at the national level).

10 Around August 1970.

11 K'e Ch'ing-shih (1965), Ch'en Yi (1972), Hsieh Fu-chih (1972) and Lin Piao (1971).

12 The Fourth NPC will probably rectify this.

13 Especially Ch'en Yün, Li Fu-ch'un and Nieh Jung-ch'en.
Thirteen of China's forty-nine ministers active in the closing months of 1965 have still not appeared. Table 67 illustrates the activities of the former Ministers.

**TABLE 67**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Still not appeared</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Died during or after the Cultural Revolution</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Occupying NPC, CPPCC or CC positions only</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Uncertain status</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Continuing to occupy Ministerial positions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Vice Premiers only</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) In Provincial administrations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those ministers in category (1) come from a wide range of ministries but disproportionately from the culture, education and economic areas. The number in category (2) is quite high, but the majority of those ministers who have died were born before 1900. Two of these were rehabilitated at death and were given large funerals attended by many senior dignitaries.¹⁴ The seven in category (3) are mainly former minor party ministers while two of them are important Central Committee people who may be given ministerial portfolios in the future.¹⁵ Category (4) includes recently rehabilitated ministers who will probably not be granted ministries again as their positions have already been filled, as well as others who have been appearing for some time 'under the State Council' yet have not been identified in a formal responsibility. Category (5) emphasises the high turnover of ministerial personnel: only four of the current sixteen ministers remain in their positions.

¹⁴ These two are Ho Wei and Ch'en Cheng-jen.

¹⁵ Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng and Wang Chen.
ministers were previously ministers. Category (6) includes two vice premiers who do little work and another who is very active but has not been identified in his ministerial position since October 1968. Category (7) includes two former ministers now active in Szuchuan and Peking local administrations.

In general it appears that the attrition rate of ministers has been very high with only four continuing to be identified as ministers. Nonetheless talents of several others have been put to different uses while several old ministers have died and others have been honourably retired.

Table 68 shows the activities of the former vice ministers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Still not appeared</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Ministerial roles</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain status</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other occupations</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC, CPPCC, CC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial administrations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died during or after the Cultural Revolution</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoted to Minister</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>329</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A much higher number of vice ministers have not appeared compared with the same figure for ministers. The reason for this is probably that with ministerial retrenchments the vice ministers suffered heavily because fewer would be needed and many were not of sufficient stature to be

---

16 Pang Yi, Ku Mu, Lai Chi-fa and Yü Ch'iu-li.

17 Tuan Chün-yi and Hsü Yun-pei.
employed in honorific jobs which occupy the time of many former ministers. However, a much higher percentage have been re-identified as vice ministers than the ministers. This suggests that they were less politically vulnerable than the ministers. Smaller percentages have found work in the NPC, CPPCC or CC, and provincial administrations and a much smaller percentage of vice ministers have died as they were probably a much younger group.

This table indicates the survival rates from the Ministries, according to the broad groupings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survival Rate</th>
<th>Number of Vice Ministers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Cultural</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that some Ministries were not dealt with.

The survival rates of vice ministers have tended to be rather higher in industrial ministries, especially in those whose ministerial head has survived. For instance in the Ministry of Petroleum 55.5 per cent of vice ministers have re-appeared, while in the Chemical Ministry where the Minister is yet to re-appear only 25 per cent of the vice ministers have re-appeared. Similarly, in the First Machine Building Ministry where the Minister narrowly survived 60 per cent of the vice ministers have re-appeared, while in the Ministry of Agriculture where the Minister was dismissed, only 11.1 per cent of the vice ministers have re-appeared. The culture/education/health group was hardest hit. In the Ministry of Culture only 30 per cent survived, Higher Education:
40 per cent, Public Health: 16.6 per cent. The highest percentage of any ministry was 80 per cent in the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building. The lowest percentage was the Ministry of Finance with 0.0 per cent.

Table 70 categorizes the former bureau directors and their deputies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Still not appeared</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau roles</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain status</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other positions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Ministerial positions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An even higher percentage in this group have yet to make appearances. Hardest hit are the Statistics, Cartography, Agricultural Bank, Industry and Commerce Administration, Price Control, Housing, Publishing, Archives and Counsellors where none of the former officials have appeared. The highest re-appearance rate is in NCNA with 100 per cent and the Broadcasting Administrative Bureau with 55.5 per cent. The sixteen per cent figure of those with roles in the bureaux is similar to the figure of those with continued roles in vice ministerial positions.

From the above it seems obvious that despite some spectacular rehabilitations the survival rate remains low. Rehabilitation has been

18 The figure was inflated by the high turnout of former Vice Ministers at the funeral of the former Minister.

19 This remarkable figure is a striking exception to the hypothesis that the survival of a Minister will probably ensure the survival of a larger number of vice ministers for the given ministry.
a slow process although it seems to be increasing very slightly. Table 71 indicates the number of vice premiers, ministers and vice ministers who appeared for the first time in each year.

### TABLE 71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (to June)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the high number of officials in 1968 and 1969 includes many who were not disgraced during the Cultural Revolution and did not disappear. Lin Piao's fall in September 1971 has probably had a marginal effect on rehabilitation rates. There was an increase of 50 per cent in 1972, and 1973 on current figures will be double the 1971 total.

(ii) **Career Backgrounds**

In this section we shall examine the career backgrounds of the ministers, vice ministers, bureau directors and deputy directors. Information on departmental heads within ministries and bureaux is too scanty for us to arrive at definite conclusions.

Table 72 indicates the career backgrounds of the sixteen ministers identified since October 1968. For instance Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, Lin Piao and many others. In this survey, Ch'en Yi, Hsieh Fu-chih, Lin Piao and Tseng Shan, all of whom were identified as ministers after October 1968, are omitted.

---

20 For instance Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, Lin Piao and many others.

21 In this survey, Ch'en Yi, Hsieh Fu-chih, Lin Piao and Tseng Shan, all of whom were identified as ministers after October 1968, are omitted.
TABLE 72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA Origin</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was Minister in same Ministry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was Minister in another Ministry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was a Vice Minister</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Government Source</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table clearly demonstrates that half the ministers are drawn directly from PLA sources. However, when looking at the military background of these eight ministers, one finds that few of them have had direct professional links with Lin Piao. Two methods can be used to support this: first according to what revolution field army they were in, and second by examining their post 1949 military careers. In the cases of these conceivably younger men the latter is far more important. Time has blunted the importance of relationships established by field army networks. Four of the eight were linked with PLA officers who, if anything, have enjoyed enhanced stature since Lin's fall. Two others were members of the PLA Armoured Corps which was not closely implicated with the Lin Piao coup. Pai Hsiang-kuo is the only minister who has obvious links with the Lin group; however, as said earlier, he appeared to have effectively played down those early in his ministerial career. Thus the appointment of further PLA officers after Lin's fall can be explained: if anything they bolster the anti-Lin ranks in Peking by favouring other military leaders.

22 They were linked with Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Teh-sheng, Liu Chien-hsün and Yang Te-chih.

23 The Political Commissar of this Corp was elevated to Deputy Chief of the General Staff in 1972.
The rest of the ministers' origins are evenly divided among the other four groups. Only two have been promoted from vice ministerial rank, while a further two come from sources unrelated to their ministry while not being directly from the PLA.\textsuperscript{24}

On the whole, therefore, the PLA has made extensive inroads into the ministerial positions but the sources of the PLA recruitment need to be examined before blanket judgements are made. In general, PLA ministers come from areas which were not closely linked to the Lin Piao cause.

The two Group Heads are civilians, one with long experience in CCP affairs,\textsuperscript{25} and seemingly few cultural links. The other, appropriately enough, served as a vice minister of the Scientific/Technological Commission until 1962.\textsuperscript{26}

Table 73 indicates the career backgrounds of the vice ministers identified since October 1968.

\textbf{TABLE 73}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Inter-National</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VM in Same or Related Ministry 27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VM from another Ministry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA Origin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower rank in Same Ministry</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{24} One being the wife of a former minister.

\textsuperscript{25} Wu Te.

\textsuperscript{26} Liu Hsi-yao.

\textsuperscript{27} This denotes amalgamated or incorporated ministries.
TABLE 73 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Inter-National</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Govt. Sources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Source</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Source</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken as a whole, the percentages from each category are:

1. Vice Minister same or related Ministry 66.6%
2. Lower Rank of same Ministry 10.0%
3. PLA Origin 8.6%
4. Unknown 6.2%
5. Vice Minister from another Ministry 5.0%
6. Other Government 2.4%
7. Provinces 1.2%

In key industrial ministries it is clear that expertise has been a vital factor in the recruitment of vice ministers, 87.6 per cent of them being former vice ministers in the same Ministry. The percentages are lower in the social and economic ministries where ideological problems are more important. The lowest percentage is in the international ministries but this is offset by a very significant promotion rate which maintains expertise in the top levels. There has been very little movement from one group to another and none at all in some categories, and apart from the international ministries virtually no promotion from lower levels. Provincial and other government sources have not been drawn upon very heavily. Overall, the PLA contribution varies, but nowhere is it over 16.7 per cent: much lower than among the ministers. In many ministries
there are no PLA vice ministers and in none is the number high. Even in
the Ministry of Communications, entirely taken over by the PLA during
the Cultural Revolution, surprisingly there is only one PLA vice minister
among six veteran vice ministers.

The role of the PLA representatives in ministries has been declining
since 1968 when their presence at State Council gatherings, talks and
banquets was all pervasive. Most of them have not appeared in 1973, and
only seven have been made vice ministers. Many PLA representatives
disappeared during 1970, which probably means that their decline cannot
be directly linked with Lin's fall though possibly can be to the Second
Plenum in September 1970. Several are still active in Ministries, while
some have returned to PLA ranks.

Table 74 indicates the career backgrounds of the bureau directors
and deputy directors.

**TABLE 74**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director or deputy of same bureau</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown origin</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA Origin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Government source</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower rank in same bureau</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PLA has made slightly more significant inroads in this area although
again it is not great. Rather fewer, only thirty-nine per cent are
continuing to serve in the same bureau at director or deputy level.

Only two have been promoted from lower rank, both in the CAAC, and one

---

28 Of the seven PLA vice ministers, two have not appeared since May and
August 1972; while a third has been posted Ambassador to Tanzania.
Therefore PLA influence at this level is even weaker.
of these has subsequently become its director. One can sum up by saying that PLA influence has been limited but a large number of officials coming from unknown sources inhibits definitive analysis. As might be expected, PLA influence is strongest in such bureaux as Surveying and Cartography although they are mainly scattered throughout the whole spectrum fairly evenly.

(iii) Party Affiliation

While twenty of the forty-nine 1966 ministers were members or alternates of the Eighth Central Committee (thirty-nine per cent), six of the sixteen current ministers are members of the Ninth Central Committee, or thirty-seven point five per cent. The percentage has only slightly fallen but it must be remembered that the number of ministers has fallen by two thirds, making the sample for the 1973 ministers much smaller and less amenable to comparison. In 1966 some seven ministers were members or alternates of the Politburo while in 1973 none are. While seven of the 1966 ministers were not members of the CCP, in 1973 all appear to be members of the CCP. In sum, we see a decline in the representation of ministers on the Central Committee reflecting the reduced status of the State Council in 1969 and the disappearance of the non CCP minister.

Again a decline of Central Committee representation is evident among the vice ministers, with five out of eighty-one being members of the Central Committee, six per cent. Four of those five, significantly, are from the military ministries. None are known to be members of the minor parties while in 1966 at least twenty-one were.

29 Hsiao Ching-kuang, Su Yu, Wang Shu-sheng, and Yu Sang. The other is Li Ch'iang from the Trade Ministry.
One of the forty-one bureau directors and deputies is a member of the Central Committee, while one in 1966 was also. While several were formerly from minor parties, none remain in 1973.

(iv) Ages

There is insufficient data for us to arrive at definite conclusions about age. However, it is safe to say that none of the Ministers was born before 1900 while eleven of the 1966 ministers were. Given the large number of new ministers, it is possible that their average age has fallen slightly although the average of those known is a high 62.8.

However as there are comparatively few new vice ministers, their average age has undoubtedly risen even though many of the more elderly have not been re-identified and some have died.

(v) Women

There is one woman minister and three female vice ministers. In 1966 there were no female ministers, and a proportionately lower number of women vice ministers. However their proportion is still very low when compared with the number of women recently being elected to provincial Youth and Trade Union federations. Women, therefore, remain grossly under represented in the State Council.

(vi) Number of Vice Ministers

While many officials at this level have been removed from office they have not been replaced by others to nearly the same extent. As at June 1973 there are eighty-one vice ministers. This means an average of 3.5 vice ministers to each ministry compared with an average of 7 in

30 The official in question, K'uang Jen-nung, has since relinquished his position as Director of CAAC, which means that none are now members of the Central Committee.

31 Figures of up to fifty per cent at times have been recorded. See NCNA reports of recent congresses.
1966. This is a clear example of 'better troops ...' being put into effect. At the present time the ministry with the largest number of vice ministers is Foreign Affairs with seven active compared with eleven in 1966. Other ministries' low figures is probably due to the fact that their reorganisation has been slower.

**Summary**

In general, therefore, while the numbers of senior cadres have been drastically reduced there remains a surprisingly high continuity especially among the vice ministers. The PLA and other sources have made minor inroads below the level of minister (itself not a new phenomenon), while among the ministers its impact has been more pronounced. Many of them have now served in the civil administration for more than four years, and with Lin's fall have probably found it judicious to play down their PLA origins. Their new occupations and new professional relationships would probably have encouraged this anyway. As many of them were probably unfamiliar with their new work they have had to surround themselves with highly competent professional advisors which probably explains the high continuity among the vice ministers.

The State Council suffered severe dislocation during the Cultural Revolution and it was found ideologically and physically necessary to renovate its structure. It has been reorganised before but this was the most radical alteration since 1954. Certain ministries and bureaux have been abolished, and others amalgamated or incorporated into others. This process is still going on. A more permanent stabilisation will probably be achieved when the Fourth NPC is finally called together.

---

32 This is especially so in the industrial ministries and to a lesser extent the economic.

33 Rumours circulating at present suggest August or September 1973.
Probably much autonomy has been passed on to the provincial and county administrations, firstly as an administrative experiment but also because the Centre was from 1968 until at least 1970 unable to administer the economy because of continued bureaucratic dislocation. However, after that date when ministries found their feet again, the Centre intervened more regularly in economic affairs. It is possible that it will re-assert more direct control in this field in the future.

Of vital interest also is that while the State Council was evidently of reduced stature at the time of the Ninth Congress, by 1972 after Lin's fall it began to assume far greater importance because of the weakened prestige of the PLA and the increase of vacancies in the Politburo and Central Committee.

Since 1971 many disgraced leaders of considerable importance have been rehabilitated to fill the gaps in the State Council. The danger for Mao is that conditions which necessitated the Cultural Revolution will arise again. He has partially combatted this with the cadre school system which continues to occupy a major part of the bureaucrat's life. But when Mao eventually passes from the scene, as he is bound to do, it would not be at all surprising if his heirs perpetrate an expansion of the bureaucracy to something approaching its former size and restore more fully the status quo disrupted by the ravages of the Cultural Revolution. Lin Piao's fall has cleared the way for continued development of this trend.

---

34 The Five Year Plan which started in 1971 could be seen as an example of this.

35 Recently a Cadre School Conference was held in Peking: See JMJP 11/7/73, news report and editorial.
Appendix

This appendix lists those who have been identified in the ministries, groups or bureaux under the State Council since October 1, 1968. The cut off date for such information is July 17, 1973.

Notes

The letter 'd' after a person's name indicates that that person has died.

(f) after a person's name indicates that that person is female.

A name in brackets indicates that that person has been transferred or replaced. In general brackets are not applied to someone who has not appeared for a length of time. An exception to this is Lin Piao.

A date after the person's name indicates the time the official was first identified in that position. No date indicates that the official held the post before October 1, 1968. Note that the dates beside ambassadors' names indicate the time the official left China to take up his post. Note also that dates are not provided for 'leading members' first identification.
STATE COUNCIL

Premier
Chou En-lai

Vice Premiers
Ch'en Yi d
Ch'en Yünn
Hsieh Fu-chih d
Li Fu-ch'un
Li Hsien-nien
Lin Piao d
Nieh Jung-chen
Teng Hsiao-p'ing

Deputy Secretary-General
Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang (f)

Leading Members
Ting Chiang
Wu Ch'ing-t'ung

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

Minister
Sha Feng 28/11/70

Vice Ministers
Hsiao P'eng 13/4/72
Li Shu-jung 14/10/71
Liang Ch'ang-wu 13/11/71
Yang Li-kung 29/6/71

Aquatic Products Bureau

Deputy Director
Pao Kuang-tsung 17/6/73

Bureau Director
Tsang Cheng-yi 2/7/73

Bureau Deputy Director
Li Yung-k'ai 14/10/71

Ministerial Leading Members
Chao Kang
Chiang Hsüeh-pin
Hao Chien-kang
Hao Chung-shih
Li Kuang-hsun
Li Tzu-liang
Tiao Ping-chang
MINISTRY OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION

Minister
Lai Chi-fa 28/12/72

Vice Minister
Jen Pu-ch'ai 24/8/71

Building Research Institute
Chief Architect
Tai Nien-tzu 15/5/73

MINISTRY OF BUILDING MATERIALS

Minister
(Lai Chi-fa)

Vice Minister
Pai Hsiang-yin

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

Minister
Fan Tzu-yl 26/12/72

Vice Ministers
Chang Yung-li
Chao Fa-sheng 26/12/72
Kao Hsiu

MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS

Minister
Yang Chieh 12/2/71

Vice Ministers
Kuo Lu 24/10/70
Mao Yao-chi 8/4/72
P'an Yu-hung 12/5/72
P'eng Min 3/4/72
Su Chieh 21/10/71
T'ao Ch'i 21/9/70
Yü Mei 29/3/72

Harbour Superintendent Bureau
Director
Hsieh Chung-feng 23/5/72
MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS (cont.)

Office for Aid to Foreign Countries

Director  
Li Hsian  
12/4/73

Register of Shipping

Director  
Li Ch'ing  
12/5/73

Scientific Research Institute

Director  
Mao Yi-sheng  
23/5/73

Water Transport Bureau

Director  
(Pai Ch'un-ch'ing)  
Wang Pao-shan  
29/10/71  
23/5/73

Bureau Deputy Director  
Wang Chin-ch'ien

China Ocean Shipping Company

General Manager  
(Pai Ch'un-ch'ing)  
Chang Kung-chen  
17/7/71

Acting General Manager  
(Chou Ch'iu-yen)

Deputy General Managers  
Chou Ch'iu-yen  
Shao Yi-li  
Yuan Chih-p'ing  
22/10/70  
17/7/71  
4/7/73

China-Poland Shipping Company

Director  
Tung Hua-min

China-Tanzania Shipping Company

General Manager  
(Tung Hua-min)  
Keng Ch'üan-ssu  
3/7/70  
8/8/72

Ministerial Leading Members  
Chang Teh-wen  
Han Li-p'ing
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Minister
Fang Yi

Vice Ministers
Ch'en Mu-hua (f) 30/4/71
Chung Yü-yi 4/1/72
Han Tsung-cheng 11/6/71
Hsieh Huai-teh
Li K'e 20/5/73
Shih Lin 4/5/73

Liaison Department
Deputy Director
Wang Tzu-ch'uan 19/1/72

Second Bureau
Deputy Director
Hsü Li-chin 12/4/73
Deputy Division Chief
Ch'en Chin-lung 12/8/72

Bureau Directors
Ch'eng Fei
Pu Ming 20/3/73
Wei Yü-ming 18/10/71

Bureau Deputy Directors
(Ch'eng Fei) 8/10/71
Chou P'ing 17/11/68
(Han Tsung-cheng) 13/8/70
Hu Wei-hsin 4/4/73
Yang Jung-chieh 10/6/73

Leading Members
Chang Yün-chih
Ch'en Chen-ch'í
Chiang P'ing
Lü Hsüeh-chien
### MINISTRY OF FINANCE

**Vice Ministers**
- Ch'en Hsi-yl
- Wang Ping-chien

**Leading Members**
- Fan Chiu-ssu
- Liu Hung-chang
- Yao Chin
- Yin Ch'eng-chen

### MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**Minister**
- (Ch'en Yi)
  - Chi P'eng-fei

**Acting Minister**
- (Chi P'eng-fei)

**Vice Ministers**
- (Chi P'eng-fei)
- Ch'iao Kuan-hua
- Chung Hsi-tung
- Fu Hao
- Han Nien-lung
- Ho Ying
- Hsü Yi-hsin
  - (Li Yao-wen)
  - (Liu Hsin-ch'uan)
- Lo Kuei-po
- Ma Wen-po
- Yü Chan

**Assistant Ministers**
- Chang Wen-chin
- Kung P'eng (f)
- Wang Hai-jung (f)

**Consular Affairs Department**

**Leading Member**
- T'ien P'ing

**General Office**

**Director**
- (Fu Hao)
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (cont.)

Information Department

Director
(Ch'en Ch'u) 30/4/71
P'eng Hua 17/8/72

Deputy Directors
Chang Ying (f) 26/11/71
Hsiao T'e 6/8/71
(P'eng Hua) 25/11/71
Wang Chen (f) 26/9/69
(Yüan Lu-lin)

International Organisations, Treaties, Conferences and Law

Director
An Chih-yuan 12/8/72

Deputy Directors
Ling Ch'ing 12/8/72
Shen Wei-liang 21/4/72

Advisor
Kung P'u-sheng (f) 5/3/73

Protocol Department

Director
(Han Hsu) 26/11/71

Acting Director
(Han Hsu) 29/10/71

Deputy Directors
Chu Ch'uan-hsien 27/11/71
(Han Hsu) 19/10/69
Kao Chien-chung 20/7/72
(Wang Hai-jung) (f) 6/8/71

Division Chiefs
Liu Hua 31/8/72
Ts'ao Yüan-hsin 22/12/72

African Affairs Department

Director
Ho Kung-k'ai 14/8/72

Deputy Directors
Chao Yüan 1/5/73
Hsüeh Kung-cho 13/6/73
Wen Yeh-chan 31/12/72
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (cont.)

American and Oceanian Affairs Department

Director
Lin P'ing 4/7/73

Deputy Directors
Ch'en Te-ho 15/11/72
Wu Pan-wu 17/8/72

Asian Affairs Department

Director
(Liu Ch'un) 6/8/71
Lu Wei-chao 6/8/72

Deputy Directors
Liang Feng 23/5/72
(Lu Wei-chao) 20/6/71
(Ts'ao K'e-ch'iang) 5/4/70
Wang Hsiao-yün 25/9/72
(Yang Kung-su) 31/1/72
Yeh Ch'eng-chang

Division Chief
Ch'en K'ang 25/9/72

Deputy Division Chief
Chang Jui-chieh 22/12/72

Soviet Union and East European Department

Director
(Yü Chan)

Acting Director
Li T'ing-ch'udan 6/11/72

Deputy Directors
(Li Lien-ch'ing) 19/10/69
(Li T'ing-ch'udan) 3/6/71
(P'eng Kuang-wei) 24/5/72
Wang Ming-hsiu 24/5/72
Yü Hung-liang 31/3/73
West Asian and North African Department

Director
Ts'ao K'e-ch'iang 24/8/72

Deputy Directors
Chou Chueh 16/8/72
(Chu Ch'i-chen) 13/1/73

Division Chief
Lin Ai-li 22/9/72

Deputy Division Chief
Li Sung-ling 12/3/73

West European Department

Director
Wang Tung 29/10/72

Deputy Director
Wang Pen-tso 19/9/72

Note: The following two departments were abolished around July 1972. Bracketed names indicate that the cadre was transferred before the department was abolished. Other positions and titles automatically terminated with the abolition.

West Asian and African Department

Director
(Ho Ying) 29/9/70

Deputy Directors
Chang Shu 1/1/72
Chou Chueh 9/12/71
Ho Kung-k'ai 17/9/70
(K'ung Ta-fei) 17/2/70
(Ts'ui Chien) 19/5/72

Division Chiefs
(Chou Chueh) 28/11/70
Chu Ch'i-chen 14/10/71

Deputy Division Chiefs
Chao Wei 6/8/71
Chu Hsien-sung 16/11/71
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (cont.)

West European, American and Oceanian Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Director</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Chang Wen-chin)</td>
<td>9/12/71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputy Directors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Te-ho</td>
<td>27/9/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ling Ch'ing)</td>
<td>23/4/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ang Hai-kuang</td>
<td>7/7/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Tung</td>
<td>16/4/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Fan-wu</td>
<td>23/1/72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Member</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hu Shu-tu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambassadors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>(Hsieh Pang-chih) 17/7/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kan Teh-t'ao 25/2/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>(Keng Piao) 15/5/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liu Chen-hua 17/2/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>(Yang Ch'i-liang) 19/7/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lin Chung 8/8/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Cheng Wei-chih 12/9/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Wang Kuo-ch'uan 3/5/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Wang Yüeh-yi 8/9/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Li Lien-pi 23/5/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Sung Chih-kuang 28/6/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Chao Chin 25/3/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>(Ch'en Chao-yüan) 21/3/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Ch'en Feng 25/4/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (RGNU)</td>
<td>K'ang Mao-chao 6/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Chao Hsing-chih 24/8/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>(Huang Hua) 19/7/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yao Kuo 7/3/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Wang Jen-san 28/4/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>(Lin P'ing) 5/6/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hsü Chung-fu 23/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>(Wang Yü-t'ien) 9/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lü Chih-hsien 3/4/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Chang Te-ch'üan 5/12/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Tai Lu 15/8/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Tsung K'e-wen 1/6/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>Ku Hsiao-po 12/6/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Y'leh Liang 6/2/71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Ambassadors (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Accreditation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ch'ai Tse-min</td>
<td>25/6/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Ch'en Tan</td>
<td>6/3/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Yu P'e-i-wen</td>
<td>3/5/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Shih Tzu-ming</td>
<td>9/4/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>(Huang Chen)</td>
<td>20/5/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tseng T'ao</td>
<td>31/5/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, East</td>
<td>(Sung Chih-kuang)</td>
<td>20/9/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P'eng Kuang-wei</td>
<td>24/6/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, West</td>
<td>Wang Yu-t'ien</td>
<td>8/6/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>K'e Hua</td>
<td>15/9/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Chou Po-p'ing</td>
<td>13/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Han K'e-hua</td>
<td>12/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Wang Ch'an-yüan</td>
<td>23/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>(Lü Chih-hsien)</td>
<td>15/8/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Li Tse-wang</td>
<td>1/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Ch'en Tung</td>
<td>30/8/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Ch'en Hsin-jen</td>
<td>5/3/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>(K'ung Ta-fei)</td>
<td>15/12/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hu Ch'eng-fang</td>
<td>24/2/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Shen P'ing</td>
<td>10/4/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Li Ch'ao</td>
<td>3/7/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Ch'en Ch'u</td>
<td>26/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>Li Yün-ch'uan</td>
<td>23/3/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Sun Sheng-wei</td>
<td>3/8/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Hsü Ming</td>
<td>14/3/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy</td>
<td>Li Yao-wen</td>
<td>18/1/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Huang Ming-ta</td>
<td>22/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Meng Yüeh</td>
<td>16/4/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Liu P'u</td>
<td>8/6/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>(Feng Yü-chiu)</td>
<td>15/7/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wang P'eng</td>
<td>20/5/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Wang Tse (f)</td>
<td>23/9/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Hsiung Hsiang-hui</td>
<td>28/7/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Hsü Wen-yi</td>
<td>19/8/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Chang Wei-lieh</td>
<td>15/2/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>(Wang Tse) (f)</td>
<td>12/7/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ts'ao Chih</td>
<td>17/9/72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Li presented his credentials on this date.
### Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cont.)

#### Ambassadors (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ambassador</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Hao Te-ch'ing</td>
<td>31/10/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>P'ei Chien-chang</td>
<td>3/5/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Yang Ch'i-liang</td>
<td>31/7/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Hao Te-ch'ing</td>
<td>6/2/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ts'ao Ch'un-keng</td>
<td>13/9/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Chiao Jo-yü</td>
<td>25/1/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>(Yao Kuang)</td>
<td>23/8/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liu Shu-ch'ing</td>
<td>16/4/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>(Chang Hai-feng)</td>
<td>17/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Huang Shih-hsieh</td>
<td>21/6/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Wang Chin-ch'uan</td>
<td>27/6/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Chao Cheng-yi</td>
<td>7/3/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Pan Ts'o-k'ai</td>
<td>20/9/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Liu Hsin-ch'uan</td>
<td>28/11/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>(Ma Tzu-ch'ing) d</td>
<td>11/8/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huang Ming-ta</td>
<td>22/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Yang Shou-cheng</td>
<td>23/4/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>(Wang Tung)</td>
<td>17/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wang Lu-ming</td>
<td>19/2/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Ch'en Chih-fang</td>
<td>9/12/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Ch'in Chia-lin</td>
<td>19/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>(Chung Hsi-tung)</td>
<td>14/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Li Yao-wen</td>
<td>21/4/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Wei Pao-shan</td>
<td>23/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Hou Teh-feng</td>
<td>8/2/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Liu Ch'un</td>
<td>9/5/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Ke Pu-hai</td>
<td>7/4/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Huang Hua</td>
<td>11/11/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Ch'en Ch'u)</td>
<td>11/11/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chuang Yen</td>
<td>July 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam, North</td>
<td>Wang Yu-p'ing</td>
<td>5/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam, South PRG</td>
<td>Wang Jo-chieh</td>
<td>3/6/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen, AR</td>
<td>(Wang Jo-chieh)</td>
<td>19/7/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chang Ts'an-ming</td>
<td>24/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen, PDR</td>
<td>(Li Ch'iang-fen)</td>
<td>17/7/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ts'ui Chien</td>
<td>11/8/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>(Tseng T'ao)</td>
<td>15/8/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>K'ung Ta-fei</td>
<td>26/1/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>(Ch'in Li-chen)</td>
<td>14/6/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Li Ch'iang-fen</td>
<td>21/8/72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (cont.)

Liaison Officers

Japan
( Hsiao Hsiang-ch'ien) 1/7/72
United States
Huang Chen 25/5/73
Han Hsü 15/4/73

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE

Minister
Pai Hsiang-kuo 22/12/70

Acting Minister
(Lin Hai-yun)

Vice Ministers
Ch'ai Shu-fan 12/1/73
Ch'en Chieh 7/9/71
Ch'en Shu-fu 7/9/71
Chia Shih
Chou Hua-min
Li Ch'iang
Lin Hai-yün

Assistant Ministers
Liu Hsi-wen
Tu Yü-yün

Import Bureau
Deputy Director
Sun Ch'ünn

Third Bureau
Director
Cheng To-pin 5/7/73
Deputy Director
(Sun So-ch'ang) 3/11/71

International Trade Institute
Deputy Director
Sung Wei-pin 29/4/73

Bureau Directors
Chao Chung-teh 28/11/71
Hsi Yeh-sheng 29/4/73
Sun So-ch'ang 31/3/73
Wang Ming-ch'ünn 20/1/73
Wang Pin 3/3/73
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE (cont.)

Bureau Deputy Directors

Chu Chien-pai
(Hsi Yeh-sheng) 30/3/71
P'eng Chin-po 15/4/72
(Wang Ming-ch'üen)
(Wang Pin) 24/9/71
Wu Shu-tung 20/1/73
Yeh Ching-hao 3/11/72

Leading Members

Li Shu-teh
Shan Yi
Tu Yung-hsi
Wang An-chü
(Wang Jun-sheng)
Yüan Chia-keng

MINISTRY OF FUEL AND CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES

Vice Ministers

Hsu Chin-ch'iang 4/6/71
Li Yi-lin 17/4/72
Sun Hsiao-feng 7/1/71
T'ang K'e 28/11/71
Tsou T'ung 8/12/72

Petroleum Exploitation and Exploration Corporation

Manager
Chang Wen-pin 5/4/72

Bureau Deputy Director

Tou Ping-wen 5/5/73

Leading Members

Wang Hsing
Yü Kung-ting

MINISTRY OF LIGHT INDUSTRY

Minister
Ch'ien Chih-kuang 11/7/70

Vice Ministers

Ch'en Wei-chi 28/2/71
Chiao Shan-min 17/8/72
Hsia Chih-hsü (f) 16/11/71
Hsieh Hsin-ho 17/9/70
Ts'ao Lu 4/7/71
Wang Yi-chih 16/6/72
MINISTRY OF LIGHT INDUSTRY (cont.)

Bureau Directors
Li Chien-min 6/5/72
T'ien Jen-chieh 2/5/73

Bureau Deputy Director
Shih Min-yün 11/12/72

Leading Members
Li Hsüeh-shih
Mao Hung-hsiang

FIRST MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING

Minister
Li Shui-ch'ing 22/3/71

Vice Ministers
Chou Tzu-chien 3/2/72
Hsü Pin-ch'ou
Ma Yi 14/4/73
Shen Hung
Sun Yu-yrh
(Yang Tien-k'uei)

Bureau Deputy Director
Chang Chien-fei 13/1/73

Leading Members
Yen Ch'ing-ti
Yi Wen

FOURTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING

No officials identified to date.

SIXTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING

Chairman of Military Committee
Liu Shih-hsiung 29/6/70
MINISTRY OF THE METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY

Minister
Ch'en Shao-k'yun 13/11/71

Vice Ministers
Lin Tse-sheng
Yang Tien-k'uei 12/12/72
Yeh Chih-ch'iang

Metals Institute
Vice Chairman Revolutionary Committee
Li Hsün

Leading Members
Chang Chen-chiang
Chu Hu-ning
Yang Wei-ch'ün

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Minister
(Lin Piao)

Vice Ministers
Hsiao Ching-kuang
Su Yë
Wang Shu-sheng

General Office
Deputy Director
(P'an Chen-wu)

Foreign Affairs Bureau

Director
Ch'ai Ch'eng-wen 9/8/70

Deputy Directors
Chao Ch'un-cheng 4/2/71
Chu K'ai-yin
Kan Mai 20/9/71
Wang Yüeh-hsi 19/10/69
Yin Tso-chen 30/6/71

Political Commissar
Chang Chung-ju
PHYSICAL CULTURE AND SPORTS COMMISSION

Minister
Wang Meng 12/9/71

Vice Ministers
Chao Cheng-hung
Li Ch'ing-ch'uan 29/4/72
Li Meng-hua
Yao Hsiao-ch'eng 7/9/72
Yü Pu-hsdeh 22/4/72

Foreign Affairs Group
Leading Member
Tsou Po-hsien

Commission Leading Member
Ts'ao Ch'eng

Departmental Leading Members
Ch'en P'ei-min
Chiang Wen-ch'ai
Chou Cheng
Chu Tse
Mou Tso-yün
Wang Fu-yung
Wang Wen-chung

MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Leading Member
Chu Ch'un-ho

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH

Minister
Liu Hsiang-p'ing 16/7/73

Vice Minister
Huang Shu-ts'e

Ministerial Leading Members
Ch'en Jen-hung
Chou Fa-yen
Hsieh Hua
Hsing Ch'eng-chin
Yen Ch'ünn

Departmental Leading Member
Liu Mei-t'ing
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY

Minister
(Hsieh Fu-chih) d Li Chen 5/10/72

Vice Ministers
Liu Fu-chih
Shih Yi-chih 24/5/73
Yü Sang

Foreign Dignitaries Department
Leading Member
Yang Teh-chung

STATE CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION

Minister
Ku Mu

Vice Ministers
Hsieh Pei-yi
Sung Yang-ch'u

Bureau Directors
Ch'iao Kuei-ydan 17/5/72
Tu Ch'un-yung 15/5/73

Bureau Deputy Directors
Wang T'ing 15/5/73
Wu Tzu-wen 15/5/72

Commission Leading Members
Chang Kuo-ch'uan
Jen Pu-ch'ai
Lai Chi-fa

STATE PLANNING COMMISSION

Minister
Yü Ch'iu-li 18/10/72

Vice Minister
Ku Ming 30/5/72
STATE PLANNING COMMISSION (cont.)

Geological Bureau

Leading Members
Hsü Chieh
Wang Le-t'ien
Yü Chien-t'ing

Office for Taking Inventory and Practising Economy

Commission Leading Member
Ch'en Hsien

MINISTRY OF WATER CONSERVANCY AND POWER

Minister
Chang Wen-pi 17/10/72

Vice Ministers
Chang Pin
Ch'ien Cheng-yung (f)
Tu Hsing-yuan
Wang Ying-hsien

Department of Foreign Liaison

Leading Member
Liu Ai-juan

Hydraulic Design Institute

Deputy Director
Huang Yih-cheng 17/5/73

Yellow River Water Conservancy Commission

Chairman
Chou Chuan

Ministerial Leading Member
Liang Ch'i-chou
Wu Chih-tzu
CULTURAL GROUP UNDER THE STATE COUNCIL

Head
Wu Teh 1/10/71

Deputy Head
Liu Hsien-ch'uan 18/10/71

Secretary-General
Shih Shao-hua 11/3/73

Members
Hao Liang 3/8/71
Huang Hou-min 3/8/71
Liu Ch'ing-t'ang (f) 3/8/71
(Liu Hsien-ch'uan) 3/8/71
(Shih Shao-hua) 3/8/71
Ti Fu-ts'ai 3/8/71
Wang Man-t'ien (f) 3/8/71
(Wu Teh) 3/8/71
Wu Yin-hsien 3/8/71
Yü Hui-yung 3/8/71

SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL GROUP UNDER THE STATE COUNCIL

Head
Liu Hsi-yao 1/7/72

Leader
(Li Ssu-kuang) d 2/5/71

Deputy Head
Ch'ih Ch'un 2/3/73

Foreign Affairs Section
Leading Member
Hu Shou-hsin 17/4/73

Group Leading Members
Hu Sha
Li Ch'i
Liu Ai-feng
BROADCASTING ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAU

**Director**
Liu Chien-kung 4/5/73

**Deputy Directors**
Chin Chao
Ku Wen-hua
Li Che-fu
Tai Cheng-yuan 12/4/73
Tung Lin
Wang Shou-jen

**Leading Members**
Chang Shih-ch'eng
Chang Tzu-liang

BUREAU OF FOREIGN EXPERTS AFFAIRS

**Leading Members**
Li Po-shih
Mi Yung

BUREAU OF GOVERNMENT OFFICES ADMINISTRATION

**Deputy Director**
Kao Fu-yu

BUREAU OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

**Leading Member**
Hsiao Hsien-fa

BUREAU OF SURVEYING AND CARTOGRAPHY

**Director**
Chang Ch'ing-hua 2/5/72

**Deputy Director**
Yang Teh-jung 2/5/72
CENTRAL METEOROLOGICAL BUREAU

Director
Meng P'ing 20/3/72

Deputy Directors
Chang Nai-chao 7/9/72
Chang Wen-hsuan

CHINA CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION CORPORATION

Director
(K'uang Jen-nung) 13/7/73
Ma Jen-hui

Deputy Directors
(Ma Jen-hui) 7/11/69
Wang Shih-yen 22/2/73
Wang Yü-ch'ing 28/4/69

Commanding Department

Director
Wang Chien-kung 2/9/72

Deputy Director
Han Hsing-hua 31/3/73

Engineering Department

Director
Yü Hsin

International Department

Deputy Directors
Hsiao Peng-p'u 31/3/73
Liu Ming 19/4/73
Liu Yüan-hsiung 26/6/71
Wang Ping-yü 16/8/72

Logistics Department

Director
Tuan Chien-ch'un 28/1/72

Corporation Leading Member
Wang Shih-yen
DIRECTORATE OF POSTS

Director
Chu Ch'un-ho 4/11/72

Deputy Directors
Ch'iao Wei-chung 4/11/72
Tu Ch'ing-yün 24/4/73

DIRECTORATE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Director
Chung Fu-hsiang 8/8/71

Deputy Directors
Li Yü-k'uei 14/1/73
Liu Cheng-ch'ing 7/11/72
Ma K'e-shao 19/3/73
P'eng Hung-chih 19/3/73
Shen Kuang 8/8/71
Tseng Ch'ing-liang 19/3/73

International Department
Deputy Director
Liu Yüan 28/3/73

NATIONAL SEISMOLOGICAL BUREAU

Director
Liu Ying-yung 27/6/73

Deputy Director
Wei Yi-ch'ing 27/6/73

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY

Director
Chu Mu-chih 27/9/72

First Deputy Director
Chang Chi-chih 3/10/72

Deputy Directors
Hsieh Li-fu 27/10/72
Miao Hai-ling
Mu Ch'ing
Shih Shao-hua
Teng Kang (f)
NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY (cont.)

International News Department

Leading Member
Li Yen-nien

Agency Leading Members
Chen Wen-ch'ên
Hsieh Wen-ch'ing
P'eng Ti

PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA

Vice Presidents
Ch'iao P'ei-hsin
Fang Kao

Bank of China

Acting President
Ch'iao P'ei-hsin

General Manager
Keng Tao-ming

Deputy General Managers
Ch'en Shu-tzu
Hsieh Shou-t'ien
(Keng Tao-ming)
Lin Ch'i-hsin
Sung Kuo-hua
Ts'ui P'ing
Wang Yu-ch'eng

Permanent Member of Board
Cheng Tieh-ju

Peoples Insurance Company

General Manager
Keng Tao-ming

PUBLISHING DEPARTMENT UNDER STATE COUNCIL

Leading Members
Liu Mei
Wang Chi-sheng
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAU OF MUSEUMS AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL DATA

Director
Wang Yeh-ch'iu

Leading Member
Liu Yang-ch'iao

STATE OCEANOGRAPHY BUREAU

Deputy Director
Chou Shao-t'ang

TRAVEL AND TOURIST ADMINISTRATION

Director
Yang Kung-su

Deputy Directors
Chang Yü
K'ung Hsiao (f)
Li Ch'uan-chung

China Travel Service
Leading Member
Ch'en Po-yülan

International Travel Service
Leading Members
Yang Kung-su
Yüeh Tai-heng

Administration Leading Member
Ch'eng Chih-p'ing
| An Chih-wen         | 蔣至文                         | Chang Lin-ch'ih         | 張林池                       |
| An Chih-yulan      | 安致遠                         | Chang Lin-chih          | 張霖之                        |
| An Fa-ch'ien       | 安法乾                         | Chang Nai-chao          | 張導彬                       |
| An Tzu-wen         | 安子文                         | Chang Pin               | 張省三                       |
| Ch'ai Ch'eng-wen   | 蔣樹藩                         | Chang Sheng-san         | 張士誠                       |
| Ch'ai Shu-fan      | 蔣澄民                         | Chang Shih-ch'eng       | 張軍道                       |
| Ch'ai Tse-min      | 張昭                          | Chang Shih-ch'un        | 張世德                       |
| Chang Chao         | 張震                          | Chang Tao-wu            | 張武德                       |
| Chang Chen         | 張振江                         | Chang Te-ch'üan        | 張定明                       |
| Chang Chen-chiang  | 張紀乙                         | Chang Te-wen            | 張定邦                       |
| Chang Chi-chih     | 張除春                         | Chang Ting-yi           | 張子良                       |
| Chang Chi-ch'un    | 張建築                         | Chang Ts'an-ming        | 張烈                        |
| Chang Chien-fei    | 張建秋                         | Chang T'ung             | 張煊                        |
| Chang Ch'in-ch'iu  | 張耀秋                         | Chang Tzu-liang         | 張文文                       |
| Chang Ch'ing-hua   | 張化喬                         | Chang Wei-lieh          | 張文煙                       |
| Chang Ch'un-ch'iao | 張紹翰                         | Chang Wen-chin          | 張雨                        |
| Chang Chung-han    | 張仲春                         | Chang Wen-hsüan         | 秦樞                        |
| Chang Chung-ju     | 張帷幕                         | Chang Wen-pin           | 張玉貞                       |
| Chang Hai-feng     | 張章龍                         | Chang Ying              | 張永貴                       |
| Chang Han-fu       | 張含笑                         | Chang Yü               | 張永正                       |
| Chang Han-ying     | 張顯林                         | Ch'ang Yü-lin           | 張永剛                       |
| Chang Hsi-jo       | 張顯新                         | Chang Yün-chih          | 永清                        |
| Chang Hsiu-chu     | 張鳴鶴                         | Chang Yung-ch'ing       | 勳洪                        |
| Chang Jui-chieh    | 張新建                         | Chang Yung-li           | 一剛                        |
| Chang K'ai         | 張新開                         | Chao Cheng-hung         | 秦江                        |
| Chang K'e-hsia     | 張新奇                         | Chao Cheng-yi           | 趙正志                       |
| Chang Kuo-ch'uan   | 張國傳                         | Chao Chih-kang          | 趙正志                       |
| Chang Liang        | 張常亮                         | Chao Chin              | 鄭正志                       |
Chiang Ch'ing
Chiang Hsi-de-hsin
Chiang Kuang-nai
Chiang Ming
Chiang P'ing
Chiang Wen-ch'ai
Chiang Yi-chen
Chiao Jo-yü
Ch'iao Kuan-hua
Ch'iao Ku-i-yü Lan
Ch'iao P'i-eh-hsin
Chiao Shan-min
Ch'iao Wei-chung
Ch'i'en Cheng-yüng
Ch'i'en Chih-kuang
Ch'i'en Hsin-chung
Ch'i'en Ying-lin
Ch'i'h Ch'üan
Chin Chao
Ch'in Chia-lin
Ch'in Li-chen
Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng
Chou Cheng
Chou Chien-nan
Chou Ch'i-h ' p' ing
Chou Chin
Chou Ch'i-ü-yeh
Chou Ch'i-ü-yen
Chou Chueh

Chiang En-lai
Chou Fa-yen
Chou Hua-min
Chou Jung-hsin
Chou P'ing
Chou Po-p'ing
Chou Shao-t'ang
Chou Tzu-chien
Chou Wen-lung
Chu Ch'i-chen
Chu Chien-pai
Chu Ch'uan-hsien
Chu Ch'un-ho
Chu Hsüeh-fan
Chu Hu-ning
Chu Jung
Chu K'ai-yin
Chu Mu-chih
Chu Te
Chu T'ien-hsüan
Chu Tse
Chuang Yen
Chung Fu-hsiang
Chung Hsi-t'ung
Chung Tzu-yüan
Chung Yu-yi
Fan Chiu-ssu
Fan Mu-han
Fan Tso-k'ai
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>李蘇</th>
<th>李松齋</th>
<th>李海雲</th>
<th>林海雲</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>李遠</td>
<td>李大同</td>
<td>李平生</td>
<td>林平生</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李代耕</td>
<td>李德全</td>
<td>李澤生</td>
<td>林澤生</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李達</td>
<td>李德生</td>
<td>李隆生</td>
<td>林隆生</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李慶全</td>
<td>李慶望</td>
<td>李慶望</td>
<td>林慶望</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李子良</td>
<td>李雄文</td>
<td>李雄文</td>
<td>林雄文</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李文</td>
<td>李言年</td>
<td>李言年</td>
<td>林言年</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李應吉</td>
<td>李雲川</td>
<td>李雲川</td>
<td>林雲川</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李玉奎</td>
<td>李凱武</td>
<td>李凱武</td>
<td>林凱武</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李梁</td>
<td>李基舟</td>
<td>李基舟</td>
<td>林基舟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李梁</td>
<td>李果堂</td>
<td>李果堂</td>
<td>林果堂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李梁</td>
<td>李承志</td>
<td>李承志</td>
<td>林承志</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李梁</td>
<td>李生言</td>
<td>李生言</td>
<td>林生言</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李梁</td>
<td>李錦鑫</td>
<td>李錦鑫</td>
<td>林錦鑫</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李梁</td>
<td>李巧維</td>
<td>李巧維</td>
<td>林巧維</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李梁</td>
<td>李中</td>
<td>李中</td>
<td>林中</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
<td>李松齋</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
T'ang Hai-kuang
T'ang K'e
T'ang Tzu-ch'i
T'ao Ch'i
T'ao Chu
Teng Chieh
Teng Fei
Teng Hsiao-p'ing
Teng Kang
Teng Tzu-hui
Teng Ying-ch'ao
Ti Fu-ts'ai
Ti Wen'ai
Tiao Ping-chang
T'ien Jen-chih
T'ien P'ing
T'ien P'ing
Ting Chiang
Ting Hsi-lin
Tou Ping-wen
Ts'ai Ch'ang
Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai
Ts'ai Tzu-wei
Tsang Cheng-yi
Ts'ao Ch'eng
Ts'ao Chih
Ts'ao Ch'un-keng
Ts'ao K'e-ch'iang
Ts'ao Lu
Ts'ao Yhan-hsin
Tseng Chih
Tseng Chih
Tseng Ch'ing-liang
Tseng Shan
Tseng T'ao
Tseng Yung-ch'uan
Tsou Po-hsien
Tsou T'ung
Ts'ui Chien
Ts'ui P'ing
Ts'ui Yi-t'ien
Tsung K'e-wen
Tu Ch'ing-yun
Tu Ch'un-yung
Tu Hsiang-kuang
Tu Hsing-ydan
Tu Yü-yûn
Tu Yung-hsi
Tuan Ch'ien-ch'üen
Tuan Chûn-yi
Tuan Yûn
T'ung Hsiao-p'eng
Tung Hua-min
Tung Lin
Tung Pi-wu
Ulanfu
Wang An-ch'üf
Wang Ch'an-yuan
Wang Po-yü
Bibliography

1. Major books and papers consulted


Li Tien-min, Chou En-lai, Institute of International Relations (Taipei 1970).


Menhert, Klaus, China Today, Thames and Hudson (London 1972).


Simmonds, J.D., China's World, ANU Press (Canberra 1970).


Terrill, Ross, 800,000,000: The Real China, Heinemann (London 1971).

Union Research Institute, Communist China 1968 (Hong Kong 1969).

Union Research Institute, Communist China 1969 (Hong Kong 1970).

Union Research Institute, Communist China 1970 (Hong Kong 1971).


Wilson, I.F.H., Bureaucratic Politics in the CPR, Australian National University, September 1972.

Wilson, I.F.H., Decision Making in China (I) & (II), Joint Work-in-Progress Seminars, Australian National University, Canberra (June and October 1971).

2. Major articles consulted


3. Documents Consulted


"Chungfa No.4", Issues and Studies, May 1972, pp.77-83.


"Mao Tsetung's Talks to Responsible Comrades in Nanking and Shanghai During his Inspection of the Troops", Issues and Studies, July 1972, pp.95-97.


China Literature (Peking).

China Pictorial (Peking).

China Reconstructs (Peking).

Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong).

Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), (Peking).


Peking Review (Peking).

5. Newspapers

Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), Peking.

Kuang-ming Jih-pao (Light Daily), Peking.
Ta Kung Pao (Impartial Daily), Hong Kong.

Ta Kung Pao Weekly Supplement, English language, Hong Kong.

6. Directories


7. Periodicals consulted

Asian Survey, University of California.

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East, Caversham Park.

Current Background, US Consulate, Hong Kong.

China Mainland Review, Hong Kong Contemporary China Institute.

China Notes, New York.

China News Analysis, Hong Kong.

China Quarterly, London.

China Trade Report, Hong Kong.

Current Scene, Hong Kong.

Economist, London.

Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report - China, Hong Kong.

Issues and Studies, Taipei.

Newsweek, New York.

Problems of Communism, Washington.

Survey of China Mainland Press, US Consulate General, Hong Kong.
Selections from China Mainland Magazines, US Consulate General, Hong Kong.

Union Research Service Bulletin, Hong Kong.