THE NEUTRALIST POLICY OF THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY

by

J.A.A. Stockwin

SUMMARY

The Japanese socialist movement since World War II has been largely dominated by leaders schooled in the embryo socialist organisations of the 1920's, and the effect on their thinking of prewar experiences has been very strong. Some - mainly the left wing of the movement - resolutely opposed the militarist trend of Japanese government in the 1930's. Others, who preferred to compromise with militarism, were discredited after the war, thus leaving the way open for the ascendency of the left wing. It was a left wing faction which took the initiative in introducing neutralism to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in the early 1950's. This faction was distinct from the other factions by its consistent opposition to Japanese militarism, but shared with them a 'nationalist' sense of the international significance of Japan. This was indeed inherent in its own form of Marxist ideology which placed Japan in the category of an advanced capitalist nation.
Despite the wave of pacifism following the defeat and implementation of the 'Pacifist Clause' of the Constitution, the JSP did not put forward a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs until the end of 1949. The introduction of such a policy was a reaction to the advent of the Cold War and was also probably connected with a shift to the left in the leadership of the Party. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the JSP expressed cautious support for the United Nations action, but this issue and the concurrent question of rearmament caused a widening gulf between left and right wings of the Party, which split into two separate parties in October 1951. The Left Socialist Party (LSP) advocated 'third force' neutralism, which took on an increasingly anti-American and pro-Asian colouring after Japan regained independence in 1952. The Party was, however, able to resist the temptations of a pro-Communist 'peace forces' argument which gained temporary dominance in the trade unions in 1953. It was able to do so because of the appeal of its own non-Communist brand of Marxism, because of the discrediting of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and because of relative factional harmony between its leaders. The Right Socialist Party (RSP), rejected the 'third force' neutralism of the LSP, chiefly owing to its own strong fear of communism, but it developed an analogous theory on the basis of worldwide
'democratic-socialism'. The RSP was less successful than was the LSP in maintaining its cohesion and unity, both because of the somewhat equivocal nature of its foreign policy and because of longstanding factional and ideological differences between its left and right wings, which were brought into the open with the relaxation of international tension following the death of Stalin.

Negotiations for unification of the two socialist parties took place in 1954 and 1955. Despite favourable conditions in both the international and domestic scenes for unification, the negotiations proved very difficult, especially in their foreign policy aspects. The idea of a four-power treaty of guarantee for the security of a neutral Japan was introduced, largely as a device to facilitate agreement between the two sides. Success was achieved by the initiative of the moderate factions of each party but only because circumstances at the time happened to permit the conciliation of the extreme factions on each side. Although the term 'neutralism' was not used in the unified platform, the Right conceded to the Left the substance of its foreign policy. In 1959, however, the term was reintroduced, and the content of JSP foreign policy became more anti-American. This was in part associated with an increased sensitivity to the dangers of nuclear war, in
part to domestic and foreign developments, and in part to a drift of Party leadership to the left since 1955. This caused the extreme right wing of the Party, together with some right wing moderates, to break away and found a new party in 1959.

After the failure of the campaign to prevent revision of the Japan–United States Security Treaty in 1960, a more moderate neutralism was introduced, but the Party, experiencing radical changes in the character of its leadership, failed to maintain this moderation with consistency over the next three years.

Neutralism has often been distinguished from neutrality by its 'positive' nature. What really distinguishes it, however, is the existence of the Cold War and the possession of nuclear weapons by a very few super-powers with which small nations cannot hope to compete. Increasing international pluralism and the spread of nuclear weapons could make it possible for Japan to develop an independent 'neutralist' foreign policy backed up by her own nuclear strike force. It could be argued that the nationalism which is an integral part of Japanese left wing neutralism might tempt some neutralists to advocate such a course. Their pacifism and distrust of the concept of nuclear deterrence, however, made this development unlikely.
The work for this thesis was conducted entirely by the candidate.

(J.A.A. Stockwin)
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JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY

by

J.A.A. Stockwin

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University
VOLUME I

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This thesis was written in the Department of International Relations of the School of Pacific Studies in the Australian National University between 1960 and 1964. Of this time the period from February 1962 to April 1963 was spent on field work in Tokyo, where I was attached to the Institute of Social Science of Tokyo University. My principal thanks go to my supervisor, Mr D.C.S. Sissons, for his unfailing advice and criticism, and I wish also to express gratitude to Professor J.D.B. Miller and Mr A.L. Burns, who at various times also shared the supervision of the thesis.

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CONVENTIONS

The following conventions have been observed in the course of this thesis:

1) Japanese names are written in the original order, that is, with the surname first and the personal name second.

2) The Japanese language normally does not distinguish between 'neutrality' and 'neutralism'. Therefore in quotations I have used one or other according to the context. The exception, however, is the term 'positive neutrality' (sekkyoku chūritsu). Here, since the term as a whole represents an attempt to translate 'neutralism', it would have been redundant to talk of 'positive neutralism'.

3) The English language title of *Nihon Shakaitō* has been given as 'Japan Socialist Party' (JSP). This is now the official English name of the Party, although the mistranslation 'Social-Democratic Party of Japan' (SPDJ) was its official name between 1945 and 1962.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>Asian Socialist Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Central Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGIL</td>
<td>Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of Labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINCOM</td>
<td>China Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCOMO</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMISCO</td>
<td>Committee for the International Socialist Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>European Payments Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
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<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>Left Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mutual Security Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>PGI</td>
<td>Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSP</td>
<td>Right Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander, Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
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<td>WFTU</td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
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</table>
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1. Terms relating to neutrality and neutralism

Chūritsu
中立
Neutrality, neutralism

Chūritsushugi
中立主義
Neutrality, neutralism

Eisei chūritsu
永世中立
Permanent neutrality

Daisan seiryoku
第三勢力
Third force

Jishu chūritsu
自主中立
Self-reliant neutralism

Jishu dokuritsu
自主独立
Self-reliant independence

Sekkyoku chūritsu
積極中立
Positive Neutrality

2. Names of factions, parties, trade union federations and other organisations

Chūkanha
中間派
Centre faction

Chung-hua Chu'an-kuo Tsung-kung hui (Chūka Zenkoku Sōkōkai)
All-China Federation of Trade Unions
ジェシクヨウ (ジェシクばく)
原水協 (原水爆
禁き 日本協議会)
平和同志会
Heiwa Mondai Danwakai
平和問題談話会
Kokka Shakaito
国家社会党
Kokumin Shakaishugi-ha
国民社会主義派
Koryo Kenkyu Gurupu
楠領研究グループ
Koya-ha
講座派
Kyodototo
協同党
Minroren (Minshushugi Rodo
民労連 (民主主義 労働
Undo Renraku Kyogikai)
連労連格協議会)
Minsharen (Minshushakaishugi
民社連 (民主社会主義
Remmei)
連盟)
Minshushakaito
民主社会党
Musan Seitou Toitsu Zenkoku
藤屋政党統一全国
Kyogikai
協議会
Japan Council against Atomic
and Hydrogen Weapons
Peace Comrades Association
Discussion Circle on Problems
of Peace
State Socialist Party
National Socialist Faction
Platform Study Group
'Koza' faction
Cooperative Party
Liaison Council of Democratic
Trade Unions
Democratic Socialist League
Democratic Socialist Party
All-Nation Congress for
Unification of Proletarian
Parties
Musan Taishütō
日本大衆党

Nihon Musantō
日本無産党

Nihon Nōmintonō
日本農民党

Nihon Rōnōtō
日本労農党

Nihon Shakaishugi Seinen
日本社会主義青年

Dōmei
同盟

Nihon Shakaitō
日本社会党

Nihon Taishütō
日本大衆党

Nōkyōtō
農協党

Nōmin Rōdōtō
農民労働党

Rōdō Nōmintonō
労働農民党

Rōdōsha Dōshikai
労働者同志会

Rōdōsha Nōmintonō
労働者農民党

Rōnō-ha
労農派

Proletarian Masses Party
Japan Proletarian Party
Japan Peasants Party
Japan Labour-Farmer Party
Japan Socialist Youth League
Japan Socialist Party
Japan Masses Party
Farmers Cooperative Party
Farmer-Labour Party
Labour-Farmer Party
Workers Comrades Association
Labourers and Farmers Party
'Rōnō' faction
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<td>Rōnō Taishūtō</td>
<td>労農大衆党</td>
<td>Labour-Farmer Masses Party</td>
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<td>Rōnō (1929)</td>
<td>労農党</td>
<td>Labour-Farmer Party</td>
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<td>労農党</td>
<td>Labour-Farmer Party</td>
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<td>Sambetsu (Zen Nihon Kaigi)</td>
<td>産別（全日本産業別労働組合会議）</td>
<td>National Congress of Industrial Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
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<td>Shakai Kakushintō</td>
<td>社会革新党</td>
<td>Socialist Progressive Party</td>
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<td>社会クラブ</td>
<td>Socialist Club</td>
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<td>Shakai Minshūtō</td>
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<td>Socialist Masses Party</td>
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<td>Shakaishugi Seisaku Kenkyūkai</td>
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<td>Socialist Policy Study Association</td>
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<td>社会主義協会</td>
<td>Socialist Association</td>
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Shinjinkai
新人会

Shinsambetsu
新産別

Sōdōmei (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai)
総同盟（日本労働組合
Sōdōmei）
総同盟

Sōhyō (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai)
総評（日本労働組合
Sōhyōgikai）
総評議会

Zenkoku Minshūtō
全国民衆党

Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō
全国労農大衆党

Zenkoku Taishūtō
全国大衆党

Zenrō (Zen Nihon Rōdō
Kumiai Kaigi)
全労（全日本労働
組合議会）

Zenrōren (Zenkoku Rōdō
全労連（全国労働
Kumiai Renraku Kyōgikai）
組合連絡協議会)

New Man Society

New Sambetsu (see Sambetsu)

Japanese Federation of Labour

General Council of Trade Unions of Japan

All-Nation Democratic Masses Party

All-Nation Labour-Farmer Masses Party

All-Nation Masses Party

All-Japan Trade Union Congress

National Liaison Council of Trade Unions
INTRODUCTION

The word 'neutralism' is a blanket term often used in order to generalise about strikingly different political situations in various parts of the world. In so far as the term denotes a common response to certain aspects of the total international situation since World War II (notably the Cold War and the development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery), it is justifiable to regard it as referring to a single phenomenon. It is notorious, however, that neutralist countries (and neutralist political parties) are not solely influenced by these broad facts of international life. They are also affected by the local regional balance of power and relations with their immediate neighbours, and by the military strength (potential or actual) of their own nation compared with that of its neighbours and that of the Great Powers. The motives for and nature of a neutralist foreign policy are also determined by the domestic political situation in the country concerned, and the neutralism of a political party may be significantly affected by intra-party ideological and factional differences.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the neutralist policy of a particular political party in a particular country - the Socialist Party in Japan. The interest of the subject lies in the nature of neutralism when translated into Japanese terms, and in the opportunity it gives for a case study of Japanese left wing political processes of assimilation and adaptation of foreign policy ideas.

Three elements have notably contributed to the neutralism of the Japanese Socialists: socialism, pacifism and nationalism. The socialism of the Party has had a predominantly Marxist flavour so that one strong objection to alignment with the United States has been ideological antipathy. Pacifism has been a dynamic force in Japan since her total defeat in 1945, and Japanese public opinion is perhaps more sensitive than that of any other country to the dangers of nuclear warfare. Japan is the only country to have received what one Socialist described as 'nuclear baptism'. Nationalism, though much softened among Japanese Socialists by their pacifist convictions, nevertheless remains an important force shaping their foreign policies. If nationalism in one form or another is a factor common to neutralists in many countries, in Japan it has the distinguishing characteristic of being the
nationalism of citizens of an industrially advanced nation of increasing international importance, whereas most neutralist nations are in some sense 'underdeveloped' and weak. The result of this mixture of motivations is a form of neutralism whose supporters stipulate that Japan should be unarmed but at the same time emphasise the 'positive' nature of their policy as a way of solving international problems, especially those directly concerning Japan.

The political process described in this thesis is that of a party reft by almost perpetual divisions on ideological and personal grounds. The alternative of alignment or neutralism which faced the Party was frequently the occasion for these divisions though not their sole cause. It was partly responsible for most of the greatest traumas experienced by the whole socialist movement in Japan from about 1950. This was the issue which split the Party down the middle in 1951. It deeply divided the Left Socialist Party and the main trade union federation associated with it in 1953, and the Right Socialist Party in 1954. The negotiators for socialist unity found it the most intractable of their problems in 1954 and 1955, and it was an important source of conflict in the united Party leading to its further split in 1959.
The same issue in various forms brought about rioting and violence in 1960 and rent the peace movement from 1961 to 1963.

The reasons for this apparently endemic inability of Japanese Socialists to unite on vital matters of policy and to pursue a policy, once decided on, with determination and vigour, go much deeper than the question of their arguments over the merits or demerits of neutralism itself, and require an analysis of the relationship between ideology and faction within the Party.

One Western writer, analysing the neutralist policy of the Party, has distinguished the 'pseudo-neutralism' of those who aim at eventually aligning Japan with Communist countries from the 'sentimental neutralism' advocated by those who would have Japan neutralist for honourable reasons, but unwittingly play into Communist hands. This division, however, scarcely does justice to the complexity of Socialist thought and motivation on the subject, or its development over the postwar period. Firstly, it would be extremely hard to determine precisely which Socialists should be classified in which category. Many have been

extremely anti-American and have aimed at a much closer relationship with Communist countries than with the Western world. To this extent their neutralism (in so far as this word is interpreted in terms of impartiality between two sides) is false. Nevertheless, they are not pro-Communist in the full sense of the word and there are important ideological differences among them. Even Heiwa Dōshikai, the Socialist faction widely regarded as more pro-Communist than any other, seems also to be strongly nationalist and would reject any suggestion that Japan should in any sense be subordinate to Communist powers. Secondly, the above-mentioned analysis ignores the dynamics of the political process within the Party whereby foreign policy positions of factions have shifted over time in response to considerations of factional advantage.

The outline of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 traces the historical background and collective experiences of the socialist movement as a whole and of groups within it. (Such a study is justified by the great continuity of personnel within the movement, the unbroken character of factional identification, and the identification of factions with ideology).
Chapters 2-8 comprise a chronological narrative in which the development of the policy of neutralism on the Japanese Left is related to developments in the international scene, in Japanese politics as a whole and within the Party.

Chapters 9-11 analyse the content of the Party's policy of neutralism.

Chapter 12 analyses (in part by comparison with the somewhat similar Italian Socialist Party), the sociological, organisational and ideological factors which have made the history of Japanese Socialist neutralism one of discord and division.
The adoption of neutralist policies by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) after World War II did not have any precedent in the prewar period. Nevertheless, the prewar socialist movement accumulated experience which had profound and diverse effects on the postwar party, and gave an important dimension to the formulation of its foreign policy. The prewar movement was deeply split into a number of factions, the personnel and doctrines of which in most cases remained as powerful and divisive influences in the postwar party. The persistence of these factional divisions was partly an effect of fundamental ideological differences, but was strongly reinforced by the tendency of Japanese political organisations to subdivide into the personal followings of individual leaders.¹

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the record of prewar socialism in Japan, and of its various factions, on the broad questions of war and militarism - prewar questions which above all shape postwar socialist thinking on foreign policy.

Socialist leadership after World War II is easily divided into three 'generations', the first consisting of those concerned in the movements of the turn of the twentieth
century, the second being the leaders of socialist groups in the 1920's, and the third, leaders whose minds were formed after World War II. In the decade of Japanese socialism from 1950 to 1960, by far the most important of these 'generations' was the second.

The Japan Socialist Party, founded after World War II, consisted of three main factions, whose leaders were nearly all of the second 'generation'. Each of these factions took a different view of the problems of Japan's foreign policy which arose in the decade of the 1950's. A right wing faction, though critical of certain aspects of Japan's alliance with the United States, generally supported the principle behind it, that of security against communism through American military help. At the other extreme, a left wing faction was the chief sponsor of the policy of neutralism, the immediate aims of which were the renunciation of all military ties with the United States, the abolition of indigenous armed forces and the cultivation of closer relations with (though not, it hoped, dependence upon) the Soviet Union and Communist China. Thirdly, there was a centre faction, which in certain periods leaned towards the foreign policy of the right wing faction and in other periods
towards that of the left wing faction, maintaining in general
less internal cohesion and intellectual consistency than
either of the other two.

These three factions were, both in personnel and
ideology, a continuation of three separate political parties
into which the Japanese socialist movement split in 1926. The reader is referred to the chart of prewar and postwar
Socialist parties and factions in Appendix D.

Although neutralism was essentially a new phenomenon of
the 1950's, it was discussed by Japanese Socialists to a
surprising extent in terms of the Japanese experience as
seen through their own eyes as members of the second
'generation' between the two world wars. Their views of this
experience may be divided into two main categories, which
bring out the diametrically opposed paths taken by different
sections of the socialist movement before World War II. The
first was the resolute opposition, chiefly confined to
Socialists of the left wing faction, against the militaristic
course taken by Japan up to her defeat in 1945. The second
was the attempted compromise with this militarism made by the
centre faction and part of the right wing faction.

The fact that resistance to Japanese militarism by the
left wing faction never wavered stood it in good stead after
World War II. The predominance of a neutralist foreign policy in the JSP may be explained to a large extent by the fact that the left wing faction, whose policy neutralism had become, was able, in part because of its 'unblemished' prewar record, to gain ascendancy over the JSP during the 1950's. This does not, of course, explain the nature of the neutralist policy itself, nor why it should have become the property of the left wing faction. This is a point to which we shall return. First, however, we shall examine in further detail the nature of the anti-militarist protest on the part of the left wing faction.

The refusal of this faction to compromise with the militarists of the 1930's sprang from a revolutionary view of its own role and from a Marxist analysis of the strategy of revolution. Although there were profound differences of interpretation among left wing Socialists about the nature of the strategy to be pursued, all solutions had a Marxist revolutionary premise.

Opposition to the militarist outlook of the Japanese State had behind it a tradition which went back to the protest of some radicals and Socialists against the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-06. This opposition derived from three sources:
Christian pacifism, the Marxist view that war was a product of imperialism, and theories of 'proletarian internationalism' current at the time.

When the German Social-Democratic Party in 1914 led the German working class into whole-hearted support for the Kaiser's war, the concept of 'proletarian internationalism' was dealt a shattering blow. The failure of social-democracy to unite in opposition to a nationalist war paved the way for the split in the Second International. In Japan, as elsewhere, the differences between left wing Socialists (including Communists) and moderate and right wing Socialists, was consequently profound. The Leninist opposition to 'imperialism' was one attitude which left wing Socialists eagerly assimilated. For the Marxist Left in Japan between the two world wars there could be no doubt that war was the product of the 'imperialism' of capitalist governments, and that if Japan engaged in war, Socialists should implacably oppose the action of their government. (Right wing and moderate Socialists, on the other hand, were in a more equivocal position. Since their attitude was not purely Marxist, they did not find it easy to decide how to treat Japan's aggressive actions during the 1930's. To some extent the appeal of nationalism, and of the slogan 'foreign
imperialism', affected them as it had affected the German Social-Democratic Party in 1914.)

The platforms of the various socialist parties formed from 1925 showed only a limited preoccupation with war, armaments and militarism, and it is scarcely possible to distinguish Left from Right by the degree of emphasis or trenchancy of expression with which these problems were treated. No doubt the necessity of caution in the face of Government persecution was the cause. After the Manchurian 'Incident' of 1931, however, it was the left wing faction which alone took a consistently hostile attitude to the militarists and their overseas exploits. In July 1932, under the pressure of international events, all the various socialist parties (except one splinter group which had embraced national socialism after the example of Hitler) combined into one party, Shakai Taishūtō. The fact that this party moved progressively closer to the militarists will be discussed later. The only really active opposition to this trend came from the left wing faction, which broke away to form its own party, opposed to militarism and war, in 1937. This initiative, which was inspired by the current Communist orthodoxy of a 'Popular Front' against Nazism and fascism, ended in the arrest of four hundred participants.
Another source of protest against war and imperialism came from Communists. Japan's Communists, however, laboured under peculiar difficulties. Communist parties had twice been constituted (in 1922 and 1926) and on each occasion quickly suppressed. The mass arrests of Communists which took place, especially during 1929, robbed communism of most of its leaders, and disastrously reduced its strength, so that during the 1930's it was a negligible force. Nevertheless, it was extremely important for the socialist movement after World War II that the Marxist revolutionary tradition which preceded the war had been divided between Communists and left wing Socialists. These two groups had conducted a prolonged and bitter debate about the strategy of revolution, which profoundly influenced their respective views on revolutionary strategy and hence foreign policy in the postwar period. In 1926 an intellectual study group (Rōnō-ha) within the left wing faction was formed by Yamakawa Hitoshi (who had participated in the founding of the Communist Party of 1922, but later disagreed with his Communist colleagues.)\textsuperscript{10} This group remained virtually the only source of doctrinal inspiration for the left wing faction until about 1960.\textsuperscript{11}

The Rōnō-ha dispute with the Communists in the late 1920's brings us back to our earlier question: why did the left wing
faction, whose prewar anti-militarist record enabled it to attain a dominant position in the JSP after World War II, come to pioneer a neutralist foreign policy?

It is a contention of this thesis that the nature of the neutralism adopted by the left wing faction in the 1950's was influenced by the particular theory of revolutionary strategy evolved by Rōnō-ha during the 1920's. This theory depended upon an analysis - opposed to that made by the Comintern for its Japanese disciples at the occasion of the founding of the Communist Party in 1922 - of the level of social development attained by Japan. Rōnō-ha argued that Japan was at an 'advanced' capitalist stage of development. From this it followed, in Marxist thinking, that a certain revolutionary strategy - that ordained for societies at a similar 'advanced' level - should be pursued. The strategy was, in this case, a direct transition to socialism by proletarian revolution, omitting the stage (which the original Comintern analysis necessitated) of a prior 'bourgeois-democratic' revolution.

The fact that the left wing faction in the 1950's called Japan an 'advanced' capitalist country (with all that implied in terms of revolutionary strategy) entailed (as will be suggested in greater detail in Chapter 4) a view of her
relationship to the United States distinct from the view taken by the Japan Communist Party (JCP). While the JCP often held that Japan was a 'colony' of the United States, (a status reminiscent for Marxists of China before 1949) the left wing faction of the JSP thought essentially that Japan was able to stand on her own feet in relations with the United States.

Two characteristics of its neutralist policy may be traced to this left wing Socialist attitude. On the one hand, the policy was less nationalistic than that of the Communists. For the strident anti-American nationalism of the JCP was substituted an approach which sought, while loosening existing ties with the United States, to maintain relations with that country 'on the basis of equality', and which did not propose to enter the camp of her 'enemies'. On the other hand, (as we shall discuss in detail in later chapters) JSP neutralism was in a sense more nationalistic than that of the JCP. The fact that the JSP designated Japan a society at an 'advanced' level of development led left wing Socialists after World War II increasingly to see her foreign policy role as that appropriate to a 'Great Power', rather than to a backward country.

We must now turn to the compromise with militarism made by many Socialists (other than those of the left wing) during the 1930's.
The evidence suggests that Socialist collusion with the militarists, although to some extent the unwilling product of necessity, sprang partly from a genuine sympathy with nationalism, and also from a certain attraction exercised by 'direct' rather than parliamentary method. Again, such attitudes influenced the approach to neutralism made by these same Socialists after World War II.

The group most implicated in the trend of the 1930's towards militarism (as the 'main stream' of Shakai Taishūto) was the centre faction. The right wing faction—a consistent champion of parliamentarism and opponent of extreme solutions—came into conflict with the nationalist policies of the centre faction during the late 1930's. After World War II the right wing faction generally opposed neutralism and advocated a pro-Western foreign policy, while the centre faction was equivocal on foreign policy, hovering between pro-Western and neutralist. The centre faction's uncertainty is explicable by weakness resulting from its having been discredited as a result of its prewar policies. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that in so far as it accepted a foreign policy based on neutralism, this reflected the sense of national identification to which it had laid
claim in the 1930's. It is therefore necessary to analyse briefly the nature of nationalism as it affected Socialists before World War II.

In Japan the roots of nationalism were deep, and from the Meiji period the mechanism of nationalist appeal had both disciplined and galvanised the energies of the people. With the great depression of the 1930's, nationalism became an essentially revolutionary creed, led by young military officers and supported by a depressed peasantry.

In the general election of 1932 the socialist parties between them only elected five members to the Diet. This was a clear sign that they had lost the initiative in a potentially revolutionary situation. As a consequence some Socialists were persuaded that by jumping onto the militarist bandwagon they might be able to capture a revolutionary movement which looked like being successful. This trend was reinforced by governmental pressure on the socialist movement during the 1930's.

An important long-standing division among Socialists was one between those who wished to attain socialism within the legal confines of the parliamentary system, and those who believed that revolution could not be achieved without 'direct action' on the part of the masses leading to the violent overthrow of the Government.
This conflict was evident even in the first 'generation' of Japanese Socialists. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War the parliamentary and reformist wing of the movement, dedicated among other things to the achievement of universal suffrage, was predominant. In 1906, however, a leading radical, Kōtoku Denjirō, returned from the United States imbued with anarchist ideas, and a controversy ensued within the radical movement between his followers, advocating 'direct action', and those who supported parliamentarism and legality.

The extremist approach to 'direct action' which gained ground among Socialists and radicals between 1906 and the trial and execution of Kōtoku for his alleged part in an anarchist plot, in 1910, to assassinate the Emperor, shows a similarity in method to that of extremist right wing malcontents who supported nationalist causes by resort to violence. That there was some overlap between the extreme Left and the extreme Right in method if not in ultimate aims is shown by the brief existence of a State Socialist Party, (Kokka Shakaitō) dedicated to Japan's 'national polity' (a powerful nationalist slogan) and also to social betterment.

The second 'generation' leaders of socialism in Japan began their careers at the height of the period known as
'Taishō Democracy', when democratic and parliamentary forms were able to possess some genuine strength. These same leaders, however, soon had to enter a period in which they faced a formidable challenge from the totalitarian ideology of militarism. In order to gain some appreciation of their response to the challenge, we shall treat as case studies two key leaders who made a response favouring the militarists. The first, Akamatsu Katsumaro, was responsible for the foundation of an actual national socialist party; the second, Asō Hisashi, led Shakai Taishūtō into the arms of the militarists.

Between 1922 and 1932 Akamatsu Katsumaro progressed from communism, through right wing social-democracy to national socialism.

Having graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1919, where he was a leading member of a formative socialist study group, Shinjinkai, he entered labour politics and in 1922 joined the first Japanese Communist Party. In response to arrests of Communists during 1923, the party debated whether to dissolve. Akamatsu led the advocates of dissolution, and the party decided to dissolve in February 1924. At the same time Akamatsu announced that he had changed his ideas towards greater cooperation with the Government, which currently was
implementing relatively liberal policies (culminating in the grant of manhood suffrage in 1925). He gave three 'objective social conditions' as reasons for his change of course: the current stabilization of capitalism, the low ebb in the fortunes of the Third International, and the progress of democracy in Japan.

Consequently, in 1926, when the socialist movement split into left, centre and right wings, Akamatsu entered the right wing party.

After leaving the Communist Party he laid emphasis on the possibility of different ways of attaining socialism, and this may have foreshadowed his later development as a nationalist. He adumbrated a theory which he called 'scientific Japanism' (kagakuteki Nihonshugi). The following is a quotation from an article published in 1924:

Each country has different conditions, leading to different ways of getting to socialism. Besides the universal rules of social progress, we must also know the Japanese nation. A true scientific proletarian class leadership policy for Japan must be contrived.

Akamatsu remained a right wing Socialist until the 1931 Japanese army coup in Manchuria, (known as the Manchurian 'Incident') which induced a swift change in his way of thought.
At the January 1932 Congress of the right-wing party, the first after the Manchurian 'Incident', Akamatsu sponsored a controversial statement of basic policy which ran as follows:

(1) We proclaim our spirit of respect for Japan's national polity.

(2) In recognition of the essence of the State, we reject the Marxist view of the State as an oppressor, and proclaim that we support a view of the State as an organ of true controlling capacity, and we aim at giving this controlling capacity a mass character.

(3) In a world situation of bitter national struggle, we proclaim that Marxist internationalism, which ignores national interests and upholds only the joint interests of the proletariat as a whole, and aims at a single mechanical international struggle, is empty and mistaken, and we accept a more realistic internationalism which proclaims the national position of the proletariat.

(4) Hitherto we have not thought that parliamentarism was the solution for everything, but we have opposed the Communist Party which totally rejected parliamentarism, and our Action Policy has gradually come to give the impression that we did see parliamentarism as the solution to all problems. We now think that it is necessary to get rid of this impression, and facing the present objective situation, we recognise that alongside parliamentary policies, it is necessary to develop a lively mass movement outside the Diet.

This statement precipitated a split in the right-wing party and the founding of Akamatsu's own party of National Socialists. Throughout the 1930's he became increasingly committed to the militarists.
Like Akamatsu, Aso Hisashi was a leading member of Shinjinkai at the end of World War I, and was similarly influenced by its vague romanticism derived from the Russian Populists whose ideal was for intellectuals to plunge into the sordid life of the masses.23

Shinjinkai fostered a wide cross-section of the leaders of the proletarian movements which organised political parties after 1926, and among these were some24 who later became Marxists dedicated in theory and action.

Aso, on the other hand, though much influenced by Marxism and by the Russian revolution, did not become a dedicated Marxist in the same sense. According to one informant, he held a deviant view of the significance of the Russian revolution, believing that Lenin's thought derived more from motherland Russia than from Marxism; in other words that Lenin fundamentally understood the Russian people. He therefore held that Socialists in Japan must in a similar way understand the Japanese.25

In the three-way socialist split of 1926, Aso led the centre party. His principal aim between 1926 and 1932 was to unite the fissiparous socialist movement into one party, which
should be capable of revolution. Although he was not of the Marxist Left, his earnest belief in revolution distinguished him less from the Left than from the Right.

Asō's conversion to support for the militarists took place later than that of Akamatsu. His immediate reaction to the Manchurian 'Incident' was to condemn the Japanese action:

The imperialist policy taken towards our neighbour China by the Government and the military could well lead to a world war, and we therefore oppose it resolutely.  

We may date his conversion from October 1934, in his reaction to a series of pamphlets prepared by the Army Ministry, calling for increased armaments spending. The following quotation from his statement on the pamphlets is particularly revealing:

The pamphlets clearly recognise the capitalism, which sacrifices the whole proletariat for its own selfish interest, and which amidst all misunderstanding we shall fight to the death, does not contribute to true national development. They see in Japan's national situation, and the social reformation required to overthrow capitalism, the necessity for rational unity between the armed forces and the proletariat. The only way to achieve this aim is strictly to implement this unity. These pamphlets have officially laid open this way. Just to fear military uniforms is a delusion of a liberalist age.

As this statement shows, Asō was concerned to join forces with the militarists if possible. He almost certainly wished thus to borrow the strength of a powerful, and in his opinion
potentially revolutionary force, the military, and thus to reinforce the weakness of existing socialism. Doubts have been expressed by those with the advantage of hindsight about the sanity of such an enterprise, but the explanation is probably that given by the above-mentioned informant, whose opinion can be summarised as follows: that after World War II Aso was posthumously criticised as having betrayed socialism, which was indeed true, but he had not betrayed his own beliefs. His guiding principle (retained from the Shinjinkai period) was his desire to see a revolution in his lifetime. After the 1929 crash and consequent depression, he believed that the catastrophic fall of capitalism was at hand; socialism in Japan, however, was still weak, and therefore he thought that an effort should be made to split the ruling class by alliance with the militarists. Undoubtedly another reason, as argued by a writer who was closely associated with Aso, was that Shakai Taishūtō was forced to take increasingly nationalistic positions during the 1930's for the sake of self-preservation. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the adjustment was not made entirely unwillingly.

Our comparison of Akamatsu and Aso suggests two important factors possessed in common by prewar Socialists
attracted to ultra-nationalism: firstly, a conviction that the uniqueness of Japan must in some sense modify the universal character of Marxist doctrine; and secondly, a penchant for 'direct action' as a means to goal-attainment, and a consequent rejection of parliamentarism as the sole channel for reform.

We may indeed say that these factors in varying measure were shared by an even wider range of Socialists than those who made overtures to the militarists. The sense of the uniqueness of Japan did not necessarily lead Socialists to embrace nationalism in the aggressively chauvinistic sense manifested by the militarists.

The relevance of prewar Socialist experience to postwar JSP foreign policy lies in the persistence of these factors despite the intervention of revolutionary changes in Japan, and to some extent new aims for the socialist movement itself. An important effect of Japan's defeat in World War II was a reaction against aggressive nationalism and the rise in popularity of pacifism. Those socialist factions whose desire for revolution had led them to support the militarists were consequently discredited and their influence reduced. On the other hand the strand of socialist tradition which had opposed militaristic nationalism survived the war with its
reputation greatly enhanced. Nevertheless, the American presence in the postwar period provided scope for the reemergence of a kind of nationalism, and to some extent of the 'direct action' that had traditionally accompanied it. The result, which we discuss in subsequent chapters, was a pacifist, but revolutionary and anti-foreign, neutralism.
CHAPTER 2 THE SOCIALIST ADOPTION OF NEUTRALITY

In December 1949, the JSP officially adopted a foreign policy of neutrality. Its policy was stated in the following terms:

Japan ought in no circumstances to contemplate the possibility of a peace treaty with less than all the powers that fought against Japan... Our Party, having regard to the neutral status established by the Constitution, opposes the conclusion of any military or political agreement with a particular country or a particular group of countries.¹

This was the first official commitment of the JSP to neutrality in foreign affairs. Its essence was later embodied in a slogan called the 'Three Peace Principles'.² These were: i) A peace treaty with all the belligerent powers;³ ii) Permanent neutrality; iii) No military bases to be given to a foreign power.⁴

The fact that neutrality was not adopted earlier by the JSP may be explained on a superficial level by its preoccupation with questions other than foreign policy. Japan was engaged in postwar reconstruction and was implementing the democratic reforms of the Occupation. The Socialists were building up a labour movement with their newly found freedom of organisation, and were struggling to keep control of the trade unions out of the hands of the Communists. Moreover,
Japan, under the Occupation, was not in a position to conduct her own foreign policy, and her security was guaranteed, at any rate for the time being, by the presence of Allied forces. Thus Socialists had little reason to discuss at length questions of future Japanese external relations, and indeed few references were made to such questions in Socialist publications before 1949.

Nevertheless, the adoption of neutrality did not mean the resumption of a previous policy that had lain dormant during a period when foreign affairs did not seem to matter. It will be the contention of this chapter that it marked a significant new departure in Socialist thinking on foreign affairs, the motives for which, however, were not entirely unrelated to previous socialist foreign policy attitudes. What brought the change in thinking was a transformation of the international scene as it affected (and was seen to affect) Japan, and a shift in the balance of power between factions in the JSP itself.

For several months preceding the JSP policy statement referred to above, neutrality was publicly discussed in a number of quarters. In April 1949 it received some support (though not from the JSP) in an Upper House Diet debate. In the academic world neutrality was aired in a lengthy
published debate between two eminent international lawyers, one of whom advocated permanent neutrality, while the other rejected it as incompatible with 'collective security' under the United Nations. The details of this argument will be discussed in a later chapter. Some measure of agreement on the desirability of neutrality was reached by a brilliant and well-publicised university group, Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (The Discussion Circle on Problems of Peace). The common factor in these discussions was a realisation that Japan in the foreseeable future would have to choose the method by which her national security should be defended, and that her security might well be imperilled by international events. This caused in many cases a strong anti-war reaction.

Public debate on these problems was prompted, not so much by increasing Soviet-American tension in Europe as by a number of statements by American authorities about the future status of Japan. The first of these statements was that made in February 1949 by the United States Secretary for War, K.C. Royall. An indiscretion by Royall during a visit to Japan led to a press report that he considered Japan's strategic position secondary to that of Europe, so that in case of large-scale war the United States might abandon the attempt to defend her. Although this report was officially
denied, it caused wide suspicion that a change had taken place in American policy, perhaps heralding an imminent withdrawal of Allied forces. At least one leading newspaper commented editorially that since apparently it was no longer possible to rely on American protection, Japan should seek an early peace treaty at which she should obtain an international guarantee of neutrality.9

This argument gained support from an interview given by General MacArthur to a British correspondent in March 1949. MacArthur was reported as saying that the United States never intended to use Japan as an ally and did not want her to fight. She should remain neutral, and her role was to become the Switzerland of the Pacific.10 These words also produced a press reaction in favour of neutrality.11

American support for Japanese neutrality did not, however, long outlast the victory of the Communist revolution in China. On 5 November 1949 a report was 'leaked' from Occupation Headquarters that General MacArthur hoped for an early peace treaty to end the Occupation and give Japan independence. He was said to want a peace conference, at which the Soviet Union and Communist China might participate but without a veto, and was reported as thinking that the security of
Japan would probably require the continued presence of American forces, with their existing bases. 12

The adoption of neutrality by the JSP (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) took place shortly after this report. Before analysing the connection between American policy and the new JSP line the immediate postwar socialist attitude to foreign policy must be examined. This will indicate how far the new line differed from previous socialist thinking.

The JSP, from the time of its foundation in November 1945, had turned its back on the nationalism to which the socialist movement had increasingly succumbed during the 1930's. In this it shared a common revulsion, caused by the shock of defeat, against the militarism which had led Japan into war. The Foundation Congress of the JSP (November 1945) agreed without difficulty on three principles to guide the Party. The third of these (the first two expressed the aims of democracy and socialism respectively) read as follows:

Our Party opposes all militaristic thought and action, and aims at the realisation of perpetual peace through the cooperation of the peoples of the world. 13

In the 1946 Lower House Diet debates on the new Constitution containing the 'Pacifist Clause', 14 the JSP voted unanimously in favour of the final draft, thus
distinguishing itself from six Communists and two independents who alone voted against it. In the course of debate the JSP Chairman, Katayama Tetsu, spoke in favour of the Pacifist Clause and said that it should also contain a declaration in which Japan should state her devotion to the cause of perpetual world peace. Subsequent JSP policy statements called, in the same vein, for a new and peace-loving Japan, and attacked Japan's imperialist past. These statements, although calling for independence and an early peace treaty, said little about national security against aggression after independence. In so far as they touched on the subject at all, they referred to the United Nations as the guarantee of 'worldwide' collective security.

There is thus no evidence that before 1949 neutrality was ever seriously considered within the JSP as a post-independence policy for Japan. Moreover, during the Diet debates on the Constitution referred to above, one JSP member specifically rejected as anachronistic the 'Swiss' neutrality proposed by a member of the Liberal Party. He warned that Japan could become a battleground in a war between foreign nations, and held that this could only be prevented by her entry into the United Nations and by the conclusion of security treaties.
The differences between these views and the policy adopted by the JSP at the end of 1949 were partly the result of a changed international perspective. 'Progressive' opinion on international affairs in 1946 was influenced by the still recent experience of a world war which had paid scant respect to the territorial integrity of neutrals. Since, moreover, East-West tension had not reached the intensity which it soon was to attain, the ideal of a United Nations as an all-powerful international peacekeeper was still strong. By late 1949, on the other hand, a state of 'Cold War' existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the former was seeking allies in order to prevent further gains by the latter. The victory of the Communists in China brought this confrontation to the Far East. The contrast between the statements of American authorities in early and in late 1949 (mentioned above) laid American policy open to the accusation that her only interest in Japan was as an ally to be used as a base against the further spread of Communism in the Far East. The fear, expressed by a Socialist in 1946, that Japan might be turned into a 'battleground in a war between foreign nations', thus became a fear that the same might happen if she entered an anti-Communist pact with the United States.²¹
A defence of Japanese neutrality along these lines was expressed by a leading Socialist, Suzuki Mosaburō, in the JSP official organ in October 1949. Suzuki said that although the United States had put a very low strategic value on Japan while the Chinese Communist revolution was taking place, the Americans now appreciated that the revolution had increased Japan's strategic importance to them. They were therefore trying to build up Japan (and India) as anti-Communist strongholds. He concluded from this that Japan should not become dependent on the United States and oppose China, but should seek to 'consolidate Japan's economic self-reliance and independence within world peace and friendship, in the same way as Nehru is doing in India'. Japan, he argued, would not have anything to fear from Communist China, since Chinese industrialisation would be impossible without Japanese help, and China would doubtless wish to trade with Japan.²²

The guiding sentiments of this analysis (as of much later Japanese neutralist thought) were i) a fear that the United States intended to use Japan to stem communism irrespective of the cost in independence and possible destruction to Japan herself; ii) minimisation of the danger of a Communist regime in China and assertion of the
interdependence of the economies of Japan and China. As will be discussed in a later chapter, the contemporaneous resuscitation, in India and elsewhere, of neutrality in a new and in some ways quite novel form, (under the name 'neutralism') had a similar motivation. Its principal aim (outweighing any apprehension about communism) was to escape involvement in the American power bloc.

Thus a major reason for the adoption of neutrality by the JSP in 1949 was that radical changes in world politics had occurred since 1946.

A further factor, however, was that a shift had occurred, during the same period, in the balance of factions in the Party. The JSP at its foundation in November 1945 was composed of four factions. One of these seceded from the Party in 1948, leaving three factions which in personnel and ideology were the continuation of the prewar factions referred to in Chapter 1 as 'right wing', 'centre' and 'left wing'. Henceforward, since other less easily classifiable factions later made their appearance, the normal Japanese usage will be followed of referring to the faction by the name of its leader. Thus the postwar titles of the 'prewar' factions are as follows:
Right wing faction -- -- -- -- Nishio faction.
Centre faction -- -- -- -- Kawakami faction.
Left wing faction -- -- -- -- Suzuki faction.  

In the immediate postwar period the most powerful faction in the Party was the Nishio faction, which dominated the Katayama coalition cabinet (composed of the JSP and two other parties) of 1947 - 1948. As a condition of the agreement between the two parties for forming the coalition, members of the left wing Suzuki faction were excluded from the Cabinet, and it was as a result of opposition from this faction that the Government fell in February 1948. The ineffectiveness of the Katayama Government, and the demise in October 1948 of its successor - a coalition of the same parties under a non-Socialist Prime Minister - because of a financial scandal, 26 discredited the JSP in the eyes of the electorate. The Party was routed in the Lower House general election of January 1949, in which its share of Diet seats fell from 143 to 48. This marked the end of right wing dominance of the JSP. At the Party Congress of April 1949 the Suzuki faction achieved a victory by winning for the first time the position of Secretary-General for its leader, Suzuki Mosaburō. From this Congress may be dated a period of left wing dominance, which was, however, resolutely contested by the other factions. 27
An important reason why the JSP officially endorsed neutrality in December 1949 was that the leadership of the Party had passed to the Suzuki faction. Although no evidence is available whether any division of opinion occurred during the Central Executive Committee (CEC) discussions preceding its policy statement of 10 December 1949, (quoted at the beginning of the chapter) it is clear that the main advocates of neutrality were from the Suzuki faction. Among the few references to the problem of post-independence security carried in the JSP official organ at this period, the only articles in support of neutrality were by members of the Suzuki faction (including the article by Suzuki himself, quoted above). Conversely the only member of the Nishio faction quoted on the subject in the official organ implicitly rejected neutrality.

In view of the fact that from the outbreak of the Korean War neutralist thought became a left wing preserve usually rejected by the right wing, it is scarcely surprising that the left should have been primarily associated with its introduction in 1949. That this is hard to establish with absolute certainty merely indicates the continued preoccupation of the JSP with domestic issues and factional rivalry at the expense of foreign affairs.
If the Suzuki faction was responsible for introducing neutrality into the JSP, the reason for this should be sought in the nature of its ideological beliefs. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the faction was closely connected with the type of Marxism professed by the Rōnō-ha. The essence of Rōnō-ha doctrine was that Japan was at a level of 'advanced' capitalism, and therefore ready for a proletarian 'one-stage' revolution. Psychologically this produced a kind of 'nationalist' self-confidence in the believer, or a conviction that Japan must not and should not subordinate herself to any foreign power whether capitalist or Communist. On the one hand, any kind of dependence for protection on capitalist powers was rejected on ideological grounds; for instance in August 1949 Sakisaka Itsurō, a close associate of Yamakawa in the Rōnō-ha during the 1920's, wrote in the JSP organ as follows:

Everyone wants, or at least says he wants, peace. But capitalists are different. They need foreign markets. The establishment of socialism would eliminate the need for colonies and semi-colonies. The defeat of capitalism would remove the main cause of war. If the whole world became socialist, and the whole world economy were planned, the cause of today's wars would disappear. The achievement of socialism and the banishment of war from the world are tasks inextricably linked. Socialism can unite the different sorts of people working for peace.
On the other hand, dependence on the Communist powers was implicitly rejected on the grounds that Japan was an 'advanced' society. Suzuki, in his defence of neutrality, (quoted above) openly denied that the new Communist China — whose advent, as we have seen, caused a significant shift in American policy toward Japan — presented any kind of threat to Japanese security. The terms in which Suzuki denied the existence of a potential Chinese Communist threat are significant. Rather than asserting socialist solidarity with the new regime, he put forward purely non-ideological grounds for believing that Japan had nothing to fear. Japan, he argued, need not worry about China since the Chinese would need Japanese help in the development of their country. The implication of this argument was that Japan, as a nation of stature in the Far East, would be able to assert her independence without the need for entangling military alliances with capitalist powers against Communist neighbours. In this, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, lay a vital part of the JSP neutralist argument.

It may be concluded that the policy of neutrality, as introduced into the JSP in 1949, was the result of two types of motivation: on the one hand, a desire to immunise Japan against the possibility of involvement in another war; on
the other, a belief that she could reasonably hope to be able to stand aloof and unharmed from international feuds. The first was already present in Socialist thinking in 1946 (and led to a rejection of neutrality at that period). The second sprang from fear of Japan's becoming an American satellite in the Cold War, and was fed by the 'national Marxism' of the now dominant Suzuki faction.
CHAPTER 3 NEUTRALITY AND DIVISION - 1950 - 1951

This chapter traces the neutrality argument in the JSP and the closely related trade union movement from their reaction to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 to its split into left and right wings over the issue of the peace settlement in October 1951.

Despite initial indications of a united approach to foreign policy, the hectic tide of events in 1950 and 1951 made compromise between the views of the Suzuki faction and those of the Nishio faction impossible, and made the task of mediation by the centre Kawakami faction hopeless. Dissension centred on the future alignment and security arrangements of Japan. It will be the contention of the chapter that these issues - and especially the related question of rearmament with its overtones of prewar militarism - served to exacerbate existing ideological and factional divisions in both the trade unions and the party. A number of events moreover, not all connected with foreign policy, accelerated the trend towards the left within the socialist movement, and resulted in the increasing isolation of the once dominant right wing Nishio faction and its supporting trade unions.
The outbreak of the Korean War - a mere six months after the JSP had adopted a foreign policy of neutrality - put the Party in a dilemma. Its support for the United Nations, which had taken prompt action against the North Korean forces, was not easily squared with the idea of a neutral Japan. The Party's first official reaction was expressed in a CEC resolution dated 5 July 1950.\(^5\)

On the cause of the war the resolution was uncompromising:

> The immediate cause of the Korean War was the resort to force by the People's Republic of North Korea in an attempt to unify Korea. This must be seen in some sense as an aggressive development of Communist revolution.

The resolution then went on to state two scarcely compatible propositions: on the one hand, it maintained that the Party wished, as the foundation of its policy '... to preserve international peace based on justice, to reject military aggression and morally to support preservation of law and order by the United Nations'; on the other hand, it noted that India had remained neutral, and emphasised that since Japan was under the authority of the Occupation, she was not under an obligation to assist the United Nations' action in Korea on her own initiative. It therefore urged de facto neutrality.\(^6\) Finally, the resolution again stated...
the JSP argument that a peace treaty should be concluded with all the belligerents, although it admitted that with the outbreak of the Korean War the prospects for such a treaty had 'somewhat receded'.

Shortly afterwards, a national newspaper addressed a questionnaire to the Party about its attitudes to a peace settlement and to security. The official reply admitted that the security of Japan depended to some extent on the United Nations action in Korea, but stated that Japan's attitude should be one of 'moral condemnation' of the North Korean aggression, combined with non-interference in the actual struggle. The United Nations should guarantee the security of Japan, but Japan was not in a position (because of the Pacifist Clause of the Constitution) to cooperate in any positive fashion. 7

In the trade union movement, as in the JSP, comparatively little public mention had been made of foreign policy until the outbreak of the Korean War. The beginning of hostilities only shortly preceded the inauguration of a new national trade union federation, Sōhyō. 8 This federation, the culmination of a campaign within the trade union movement, (encouraged by the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP 9 ) to combine its warring factions into a solid
bastion against communism, contained much the same factional elements as the JSP.\textsuperscript{10} The inaugural Congress of Sōhyō in July 1950 issued a statement on the Korean War similar in content to that of the JSP. The war was blamed on North Korean aggression, moral support was expressed for the United Nations force, but for practical purposes Japanese neutrality was enjoined. An appendix to the statement called for a peace treaty between Japan and all nations which had fought against her in World War II.\textsuperscript{11}

A further issue which caused difficulty in the JSP was the question of rearmament. Shortly after the beginning of the war in Korea General MacArthur authorised the formation of a 'Police Reserve' of 75,000 men, in addition to an increase in the size of the Maritime Safety Force by 8,000 men. This move was prompted by a current wave of violence attributed to Communists, (The Cominform had criticised the Communist Party in January 1950 for its previous moderation) and by the withdrawal of most of the American troops in Japan for service in Korea.

Although the 'Police Reserve' was only designed to maintain internal order, and was clearly inadequate to defend Japan against external aggression, its inauguration precipitated a nationwide discussion of the merits of
rearmament. The issue sharply divided the left and right wings of the JSP. An attempt was, however, made at first to find a compromise formula. The Party's first official statement on the question was made on 18 July.¹² The statement supported the establishment of a 'Police Reserve' provided that its purpose was to combat domestic subversion only. Conditions were, however, attached: it was to be formed 'in a democratic manner' and was not to be given a militaristic training such as might further the reactionary ends of the Government. Its equipment was to be strictly limited, since a heavily armed force would impose an intolerable strain on the economy, and so on the people's standard of living.

This statement did not satisfy the left wing, however, and the intra-party dispute came to a head at the JSP Congress of January 1951. This Congress took place shortly after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and at a time of extreme international tension in which Japanese rearmament had become a pressing issue.¹³ In his New Year message to the Japanese people on 1 January 1951, General MacArthur suggested that the Japanese might, in view of the international situation, consider some measure of rearmament.¹⁴
In an atmosphere of intense national debate, the right wing Nishio faction presented a resolution to the January Congress, whose main points were the following:

1) A peace treaty with all the belligerents is an ideal, but because of present circumstances a peace treaty exclusive of some of these powers is inevitable.

2) Since there is no freedom unless we join the Western camp centred on the United States, we cannot be neutral.

3) We must establish the right of self-defence against Communist aggression.

This uncompromising call to join the Western camp was rejected by the Congress by 342 votes to 81, and a left wing resolution, sponsored by the Suzuki faction, endorsed the 'Three Peace Principles'. A further left-sponsored resolution endorsed by the Congress attacked the idea of rearmament.

This latter resolution maintained that Japanese rearmament would hardly have as its purpose the defence of Japan alone; it would be geared to the defence of American interests in the Cold War, and thus, besides offending Japanese self-respect, would probably drag her into a third world war. Rearmament, it argued, would overtax the economy and was unnecessary since there was no danger of an invasion of Japan. It would be unacceptable to some of her
former enemies, and would thus prejudice the chances of a peace treaty with all the former belligerents. Finally, the resolution warned of the political and social implications of rearmament, particularly of putting power once more into the hands of 'military leaders, rightists and purges'.

On a wave of pacifist sentiment, the resolution carried the day, and a fourth 'peace principle' - 'opposition to rearmament' - was added to the previous three.

The second Congress of Sohyo, held in March 1951, endorsed a policy closely reflecting that of the successful left wing resolution at the JSP Congress in January. The Sohyo Congress did not issue any statement on the Korean War, but included in its 'Action Platform' an undiluted statement of the Four Peace Principles. The contrast with its resolutions of the previous year was striking, and was further confirmed by a change in its attitude to the question of membership of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). While the Congress of 1950 had expressed the intention to seek membership of ICFTU for Sohyo as a body, a resolution to this effect at the 1951 Congress was defeated. ICFTU was a body set up in 1949 as an international trade union organisation to combat the influence of the Communist-dominated World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU). Therefore the rejection of proposed membership of ICFTU by the 1951 Congress clearly indicated a shift to the left and away from the 'Free World'.

In part, this change was a result of the fact that in December 1950 the left wing Shinsambetsu federation had joined Sōhyō, and thus increased the number of neutralists at the 1951 Congress. More important, however, was the isolation of the right wing which had taken place within Sōhyō. This trend was closely connected with the polarisation of opinion about foreign policy in late 1950 between right and left wing factions of the JSP. In November 1950, at about the same time that Shinsambetsu joined Sōhyō, the most important constituent unit of Sōhyō, Sōdōmei, split into left and right wings. The left wing faction, led by Takano Minoru, wished Sōdōmei to dissolve and the trade unions of which it was formed to affiliate only with Sōhyō. The right wing faction wished Sōdōmei to continue as an independent federation within Sōhyō. Sōdōmei thus continued its existence as the exclusive preserve of the right wing faction based principally on the textile workers' and seamen's unions, which were also the basis of support for the Nishio faction of the JSP.
Thus within Sohyō, as in the JSP, the right wing faction was, by early 1951, both sharply differentiated from the left and in a minority position. The combined forces of the Takano faction and Shinsambetsu at the March 1951 Congress ensured the passage of left wing foreign policy resolutions. No doubt the vote at the congresses of both the JSP and Sohyō reflected the steady gain in support for the left wing which had been taking place since the fall of the coalition Government and the disastrous election of 1949.

Whereas, however, Shinsambetsu advocated a pure 'third force' neutralism, and opposed affiliation with ICFTU as an organisation aligned with the 'Free World', the views of Takano were apparently not so clear-cut. According to one report, although he supported a de facto neutrality for Japan, thus coming close to the 'Four Peace Principles' of the JSP left wing, he still looked with favour on the 'Free World' — at least its 'progressive elements' — and would have preferred the adherence of Sohyō to ICFTU. The surprising fact about Takano's policy is that from this position he turned, after two years, to advocacy of ideological alignment with the 'peace forces', meaning by this the Communist camp (see Chapter 4). Some explanation is therefore required for
his comparatively pro-Western stand at the 1950 Sōhyō Congress, and (somewhat less so) at the 1951 Congress.

There is prima facie reason to suppose that Takano used the support given by SCAP to the formation of an anti-Communist trade union federation in order to consolidate his own position at the head of it. Although he remained a power behind the scenes at the Sōhyō inaugural Congress, he was elected Secretary-General at the second Congress and continued to control the federation until ousted from the leadership in 1954. It seems likely that the pro-Western position which he initially adopted was related to the backing which SCAP had given him, but that with the ending of the Occupation in April 1952 he was no longer influenced by this consideration. Support for this analysis can be found in the fact that a purge of Communists was carried out on SCAP orders in the middle of 1950, and the Japanese Government, with SCAP approval, banned the already much weakened Communist-dominated Zenrōren trade union federation. Both Zenrōren and its Communist ally Sambetsu (also much weakened by 1950) had adopted militantly anti-American programmes after the Cominform criticism of the Communist Party for its previous 'soft' line in January 1950. The banning of Zenrōren removed the last significant rival
of the emergent Sohyo, and one of the criticisms levelled at the leadership of Sohyo by Shinsambetsu was that it had permitted the purge of Communist unionists with minimal protest. By this hypothesis, the need for Takano to rely on SCAP backing was already much reduced by the end of 1950.

In the JSP, between its January 1951 Congress and the San Francisco Peace Conference in September of the same year, there was little change in the attitudes of left and right wings. The balance of factions was, however, altered with the lifting from the leaders of the Kawakami faction of the Occupation's purge regulations. The return of these leaders to public life increased the influence within the JSP of their faction, which had not flourished without them. It was therefore in a stronger position to fulfil its traditional role of mediator between left wing and right wing factions.

In some respects, the views of the Kawakami faction on the peace settlement tended towards the right, and in some respects towards the left. On the question of the peace treaty, it supported the position of the Nishio faction that a treaty with those nations alone who were willing to sign was an unfortunate necessity which the Party should face. On the other hand, over the question of a security treaty
the faction approximated to the standpoint of the Suzuki faction that a security treaty with the United States should be opposed. On the problem of rearmament it equivocated, stating merely that although this should not be ruled out in principle, a decision should be postponed.

From June 1951 the Kawakami faction, although continuing its efforts to avoid a complete split in the Party, made clear that in the event of a split it would join the Nishio faction in a right wing alliance. The only real difference between the two factions lay in their views on the Security Treaty. At a meeting between them in July a compromise was said to have been devised on this issue, whereby the treaty was supported, but conditionally upon the rapid withdrawal of foreign troops after independence.

After the signature of the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty in September, no further compromise between the opposing views of left and right wings of the JSP was possible. At its Congress held shortly afterwards the Party finally split, and the Japanese socialist movement began four years during which it was represented by two separate parties.

Since the attitudes taken by the JSP factions at this Congress were crucial for the future development of the
movement, a brief summary of their respective views will be
given here. 37

The basic arguments of the Nishio and Suzuki factions
about Japan's position in international relations were as
follows:

The Nishio faction rejected neutrality and accepted the
principle of alliance with the 'Free World'. It argued that
neutrality, to be effective, required the consent of the
Great Powers. This was unlikely to be given, since
Communist ideology did not respect neutrality in others, and
Japan's geographical position and industrial potential made
her a prize even more tempting in that she was unarmed.
Neutrality was also incompatible with the duty of furnishing
sanctions if ordered to do so by the United Nations.

The Suzuki faction, on the contrary, accepted
neutrality and rejected alliance with the 'Free World'. It
maintained that alliance with the West was likely to provoke
Communist aggression and to make more difficult a solution
of Asian conflicts, including the Korean War. Such an
alliance might involve Japan in the duty of participating in
these struggles, and thus in a world war also. Since
alliance with the West meant subservience to the United States
and the resurgence of militarism in Japan, this threatened Asian countries (particularly China) which had suffered at Japanese hands. Therefore a third road should be taken, neither capitalist nor Communist, but that of social-democracy and emergent Asian nationalism.

The application of these arguments to the problem of the Peace Treaty gave divergent results.

The Nishio faction held that the opportunity should be taken to conclude a peace treaty, even if certain nations that had fought against Japan did not sign it. (The alternative would mean indefinite postponement of independence). It denied that an 'incomplete' peace treaty would revive militarism, or that it was a threat to China.

The Suzuki faction believed that it was an illusion to support an 'incomplete' peace treaty on the grounds that it would bring independence. Such a settlement limited Japanese sovereignty, (especially since foreign troops were to be stationed for an indefinite period) and threatened her economic and political independence.

On the problem of the Security Treaty and of rearmament, the two factions argued as follows:

The Nishio faction argued that Japan, as an independent nation, had the right of self-defence which should be limited
to the defence Japanese territory. In the long run Japan should be defensible by her own self-defence forces, but in the short run she would need 'collective security', on a provisional basis, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. This should mean the stationing of American troops, preferably, but not necessarily, in the capacity of United Nations forces.\(^38\)

The Suzuki faction held that the decision of self-defence should be left until after the achievement of a peace treaty with all the former belligerents, and then be decided by the free will of the people on the basis of the 'Pacifist Clause' of the Constitution. Until the achievement of such a peace treaty, Japan's security should be guaranteed by treaties of non-aggression with her neighbours. In this way it should be possible to secure the abolition of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, which specifically cited Japan as a potential aggressor. The ideal of security, which need not be remote, was universal 'collective security' by the United Nations.

Between these positions adopted by the Nishio and Suzuki factions the Kawakami faction advanced arguments similar to those of the Nishio faction except on the question of the
Security Treaty, to which it objected on the grounds that the stationing of foreign troops was a limitation of sovereignty and national independence.

Thus while the Nishio faction supported both treaties and the Suzuki faction opposed both treaties, the Kawakami faction supported the Peace Treaty and opposed the Security Treaty.

Of the conclusions which may be drawn from this account of the development of Socialist attitudes to foreign and defence policy in 1950 - 51, perhaps the most important is the great significance which came to be attached to the question of rearmament. It was this problem rather than any other which dominated discussions at the January 1951 Congress, and the enunciation of a fourth 'Peace Principle' - opposition to rearmament - was a major achievement for the Suzuki faction.

This controversy touched on a basic ideological difference between the left and right wings of the party. Essentially the Suzuki faction believed that domestic and international conflict could be resolved into a struggle between socialism and capitalism, while the Nishio faction maintained that the struggle fundamental to the contemporary world was that between democracy and communism. Thus in the
famous Morito - Inamura ideological dispute in the JSP in 1949, Inamura Junzo, for the left, had argued that the party should be composed of the working class alone, that only the working class, as a disciplined force, was capable of carrying out a revolution, and that in order to conduct a revolution it was necessary to fight capitalism on all fronts with the same ruthlessness that could be expected from it. The argument rested on the premise that capitalism would not easily surrender, but would take any opportunity of reasserting the dictatorial position which it had lost at the defeat. Armed forces, as a potential weapon for the oppression of the working class, should therefore not in any circumstances be put in the hands of the capitalists.

Morito Tatsuo, for the right, had argued that socialism should be achieved gradually, by parliamentary means, and the JSP should be a 'people's party', not the exclusive preserve of the working class in a narrow sense. This was a view which found communism its worst enemy, and thus it is not difficult to explain why the Nishio faction should have been willing to accept some measure of rearmament as a deterrent against communism.

It is interesting to compare the attitudes of the factions to rearmament and security in 1951 with their
prewar record in relation to militarism. The Nishio faction, because of its consistent support for parliamentary democracy and its opposition to extremism, had shown some resistance to the excesses of the militarists in the late 1930's. By the 1950's, however, it was more concerned with the Communist threat than with a revival of militarism. The Suzuki faction, which had the cleanest prewar anti-militarist record of any group, (with the exception of the Communists) now made much of the danger of putting arms into the hands of those who had previously misused them. The Kawakami faction, having been temporarily weakened by SCAP's purge of its leaders, was more reticent and equivocal. This was probably indicative of a desire not to draw attention to its prewar near-fascist record, although in its attitude to the Security Treaty in 1951 may perhaps be detected a hint of its past militant nationalism.

The previously noted trend to the left in the JSP was continued throughout 1950-51. The position of the Suzuki faction had been enhanced by the discrediting of the right wing for its participation in the coalition governments of 1947-48; it was now further strengthened in the trade unions and in the electorate by the sudden loss of support for the Communists following the Cominform criticism of the Communist Party of January 1950, by a generalised reaction
against the United States in the last years of the Occupation, and by the wave of pacifism following the outbreak of the Korean War. Paradoxically, as we have seen, SCAP also played its part in consolidating the non-Communist left wing factions in the trade unions. The relationship between the leadership of the trade union movement and that of the JSP was, as always, extremely close. The right wing of Sōdōmei, for instance, had the very closest ties with the Nishio faction of the JSP. Certain rivalries, however, such as that between Shinsambetsu and the Takano faction, did not have their counterpart in the JSP, and Takano's peculiar relationship with SCAP was something whose immediate influence was confined to Sohyō. It is scarcely possible to conclude that the growing neutralist atmosphere in the JSP and the trade unions was something which entered the JSP by way of the trade unions, or vice versa. Both organisations, in their own roughly parallel ways, were influenced by the same events and issues. In both, the questions of independence, security and rearmament served to divide right from left, and increasingly to isolate the right. Thus in both, although the timing was somewhat different, a right-left split could not be avoided.
In this chapter we shall analyse the trends in the foreign policy of the Left Socialist Party (LSP) between its split with the Right Socialists in 1951, and the beginning of serious negotiations for reunification in 1954.

The most striking feature of the policy was that it became more anti-American and anti-European over the period, but that, despite leftist trends in the trade unions, the LSP as a party did not at any stage stray from neutralism to pro-communism. The argument to be developed in this chapter is that although certain factors external to the Party tended to direct its foreign policy to the left and away from the West, the situation within the Party stemmed that tendency after a certain point. This was because of two principal features of that situation: firstly, the Rōnō-ha tradition, which the LSP leaders inherited, created a wide ideological gulf (despite similarity of ultimate aims) between them and the Communists. Secondly, the main factions of the Party succeeded in creating conditions of comparative factional harmony, so that they were able to present a united front against an ideological challenge.
When the left and right wings of the Socialist movement finally found themselves as separate parties after the October 1951 Congress, each was faced with the task of formulating policies relevant both to their separate existence and to an independent Japan. No longer was it necessary to seek painful compromises between fundamentally opposed views within an all-embracing Socialist Party. No longer, also, could a Peace Treaty and Security Treaty linking Japan with the 'Free World' be prevented or postponed. The simultaneous signature of both treaties at San Francisco on 8 September 1951, presented the Socialist movement with an accomplished fact, to which it had to adjust.

The Left Socialist Party formulated a policy which it called 'third force' neutralism. ¹

The Action Policy adopted by the LSP Congress of January 1952 defined this policy as follows:

What we call a third force consists of all forces which are working to avoid the occurrence of a third world war. Third forces in this sense exist in America and the Soviet Union, but generally speaking it is safe to designate as the sphere of a third force the whole world outside these two countries.
The centre of the third force is the working class Socialist forces in advanced capitalist countries. Compared with the Soviet Union they represent the forces of democracy, and compared with America they represent the forces of socialism, so that they are the main strength of the third force in the world. They are concentrated in the Socialist International, and form its main body.

As a result of World War II, many countries won their independence. Their sense of national independence is strong, and their ruling classes are not ultra-reactionary. Thus these countries as a whole have become part of the third force. They include India, Burma, Indonesia, and some Arab regions.

Genuine democrats and peace-lovers in any area are elements in the third force.

The third force includes many kinds of trend and interest, and is composed of diverse elements. It is, however, founded upon a strong tradition, and although it is not strong enough to take positive action, it reveals exceptional strength for the task of preventing war.

As significant examples of actions taken by the 'third force' in the interests of world peace, the Action Policy listed a number of recent events and trends. These were the intercession of the British Labour Government to prevent the use of atomic weapons after Chinese entry into the Korean War, the dismissal of General MacArthur from his post of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, left wing opposition to rearmament in West Germany and Japan, refusal of Arab countries to grant military bases to the major
powers, efforts of 'small' members of the United Nations to bring about a disarmament conference, worldwide opposition to both treaties with Japan as increasing the danger of world war, and British opposition to American efforts to persuade Japan to recognise the Chiang Kai-shek regime.\(^3\)

It will be noted that of the three constituent elements of the 'third force', pride of place was given to the 'working class and socialist forces in advanced capitalist countries'. The Action Policy categorically stated that this was the most important part of it. The list of recent actions taken by the 'third force' was also somewhat weighted in favour of actions taken in 'advanced capitalist countries'. Both the Action Policy and the Foreign Policy documents accepted by the Congress laid stress on support for the Socialist International as a vital factor in the 'third force'. At least one commentator noted that this emphasis on the Socialist International contrasted with previous left Socialist attitudes.\(^5\) The united Socialist Party had sent a predominantly left wing delegation, led by the Party Chairman, Suzuki Mosaburo,\(^6\) to the Frankfurt Conference of the Socialist International of June - July 1951. The resolutions carried by the Conference, and
especially the peace resolution, which called uncompromisingly for measures of defense against Communist aggression, differed markedly from the proposals which the Japanese Socialists put to the Congress. While the Socialist International stressed the need for measures of defence against Communist aggression, the Japanese delegation claimed that it was necessary for Japan to remain unarmed and neutral. 7

If the 1952 LSP Action Policy emphasised the European Socialist element in the 'third force', the 1953 Action Policy equally definitely stressed the role played in it by the newly-independent Asian states, 8 and in particular the socialist movements within those states. 9 Furthermore, in explanatory comments leading Party members made remarks highly critical of the Socialist International 10

Probably the most important reason for this change in the emphasis of LSP neutralist policy from Europe to Asia between the 1952 and 1953 Congresses, was the formation of the Asian Socialist Conference (ASC) which held its first plenary session in Rangoon in January 1953, just before the LSP Congress took place.
Although the establishment of a Conference of purely Asian Socialists was first discussed as early as 1947,\(^1\) no concrete steps were taken until March 1952, when a Preliminary Meeting was held between representatives of the Socialist Parties of India, Burma and Indonesia, with representatives of Japanese socialism attending as observers.\(^2\)

At the Preliminary Meeting the Japanese Left Socialists found themselves — in contrast to the Right Socialists — in sympathy with the aspirations of the other delegations. In particular they agreed with Lohia, the Indian delegate, who had explicit views on the necessity for a primarily Asian 'third force' — not tied to European socialism — as a guarantee of world peace.\(^3\)

The first plenary session of the ASC (January 1953) included a much larger number of delegations.\(^4\) Two main issues divided the delegates — relations with the Socialist International, and neutralism.

On the first, Clement Attlee, representing the Socialist International, strongly opposed the establishment of a separate Asian organisation, and called for the cooperation of all socialist parties in one united body.\(^5\) The LSP delegates, on the other hand, disagreed with this
on the grounds that the Socialist International was divorced from Asian aspirations, especially on questions of defence.  

On the second question, that of neutralism, the diverse nature of the parties represented meant that a unanimous resolution could only be passed at the cost of diluting its contents. The efforts of the Japanese Right Socialists and also of the Israeli Socialists ensured the rejection of a strong statement of 'third force' neutralism. In the final resolution the term 'third force' was not used, while 'neutralism' was used only once, and that in a critical sense.  

The result of the first plenary session of the ASC was a body considerably closer to the Socialist International in stated aims and in organisation than had been envisaged by the participants in the Preliminary Meeting (with the exception of the Japanese Right Socialists). Nevertheless, the LSP seems to have regarded the ASC as a qualified victory for its own point of view.  

The concept of Japanese socialism closely allied with that of the developing and newly-independent nations of Southern Asia, appealed to the Left Socialists for a number of reasons: firstly, these countries represented an area in
which the prospects for socialism, directed to the needs of economic planning, were apparently bright. The example of the achievements of 'socialist planning' in Communist China sometimes tempted Left Socialists to place China also within the sphere of the 'third force'. Secondly, the neutralism of the 'third force' countries seems to have appealed to the LSP both intrinsically and because it gave the Party international allies at a time when the European socialist parties which made up the greater part of the Socialist International, were committed more or less to the American alliance against communism. Thirdly, the anti-colonialism which was strongly voiced by politicians in the newly-independent countries found a common factor in the 'anti-imperialism' expressed by the LSP. Although Japan was not a country which had newly won its independence from colonial rule, she had only just obtained her freedom from the alien rule of the Allied Occupation. Among Left Socialists Marxist opposition to capitalism was combined with pacifist dislike of rearmament and nationalist antipathy to the continued American presence after the Occupation had ended. These factors together created 'anti-imperialism'.
Independence brought with it a renewal of ties with the United States in the form of the Mutual Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement (the latter governing the terms under which American forces should be stationed in Japan).  

Certain aspects of the Security Treaty carried the germ of later friction, notably the absence of a specific time limit to the Treaty, the absence of provisions for consultation (except on action against domestic disturbance) and the provision that American forces stationed in Japan might be used for operations in other parts of the Far East. Two articles of the Administrative Agreement caused widespread resentment among Japanese. One (Article XXV) was that under the terms of the Agreement Japan had to provide free facilities and a 'defence contribution' of $155 million per year towards American military costs. Another (Article XVII) was that American service personnel stationed in Japan were not placed under the jurisdiction of the Japanese courts. This latter provision especially - reminiscent as it was of the 'extraterritoriality' which foreign powers enjoyed during the early period of Japan's modernisation - gave credibility to left wing charges of American 'imperialism'. 
From the evidence of public opinion polls it seems that opposition to American military bases in Japan increased between 1950 and 1953 (it was to increase considerably more in later years). This swing of opinion, if genuine, presents us with the apparent paradox that the American military presence in independent Japan caused more widespread resentment than had the existence of an American force of occupation.

Comparing the policies of the 1952 and 1953 LSP Congresses, we find a marked difference in the terms in which the United States' global policy was described. Thus the 1952 Action Policy spoke of it in fairly mild words. This was also true of the 1952 Foreign Policy resolution, which concentrated on the international inflationary trends to which American defence policy was allegedly giving rise. It did not use the term 'American imperialism'.

The 1953 Action Policy, however, spoke of a dangerous reactionary trend in United States foreign policy under the new Eisenhower administration, and designated Japan a 'political dependency' and 'military colony' of the United States. The whole tone of the document was much sharper towards the United States than that of the previous year.
Despite this, the principles of the 'third force' were maintained, and the Party still kept its distance from the chief rivals of the United States, - the Soviet Union and Communist China. The 1953 Action Policy specifically declared that the Party would not participate in the peace movement run by the Communist camp, since this was 'one-sided'.

The exact designation of Japan's status in relation to the United States was the subject of an important controversy within the Party, which reflected an ideological division between the Executive and some Party members who had taken up a more pro-Soviet and pro-Communist Chinese position. The Party Executive was largely composed of Socialists who had been closely connected with the ideological struggles of Rōnō-ha from 1926, and was backed by the Shakaishugi Kyōkai, (Socialist Association) an ideological group dominated by the original founder of Rōnō-ha, Yamakawa Hitoshi. As in the 1920's, the Rōnō-ha emphasised the strength of Japanese 'monopoly capital' and therefore advocated a 'one-stage' revolution to set up a socialist state. The Communist Party (JCP), on the other hand, true to the doctrine of a 'two-stage' revolution,
spoke of the necessity of 'national liberation', preliminary to any attempt to establish socialism. 'National liberation', however, had a meaning much more easily comprehensible in a period when Japan had a security agreement and other close ties with the United States, than it had had during the 1920's when Japan herself controlled a number of colonies. Communists maintained that the elements which made up the prewar feudalistic domination of Japan had been modified by the experience of domination by 'international monopoly capital' under the Allied Occupation, and that it was this domination which must be broken as the first essential step in revolution.\textsuperscript{31}

The fact that the 1953 LSP Action Policy called Japan a 'political dependency' and a 'military colony' of the United States, and specifically distinguished this from 'a true colony, as it is called by the Communist Party',\textsuperscript{32} was a manifestation of this continuing ideological rift in the Marxist Left. The intensified anti-American feeling of the Party as a whole, which was shown in the sharper references to the United States in the 1953 Action Policy, also influenced some LSP members to wish to give first
priority to a 'revolution of national liberation', on the pattern of JCP ideological beliefs.\textsuperscript{33}

The corollary in foreign policy of the Rōnō-ha view of revolution, accepted by the LSP Executive, was that while Japanese Socialists should fight American influence and should seek to bring about true independence for Japan, they should not advocate alliance with the countries of the Communist bloc, or with organisations (such as the Peace Movement) dominated by the Communist bloc. Doctrines of neutralism and of a 'third force', therefore were easily acceptable.

Those, however, who believed that the necessary first step to revolution was the successful accomplishment of 'national liberation', were prepared to accept allies from the Communist countries, since these were the most powerful allies to be found.

In January 1953, the foreign policy aspects of these ideological differences had not yet been fully realised. Nevertheless, the decision taken at the Congress to form a committee to prepare a Party platform, ensured that in the discussion of the ideological basis for the Party's policy fundamental cleavages would become evident.\textsuperscript{34}
Sōhyō, under the leadership of Takano Minoru, had moved considerably to the left since its inauguration as an anti-Communist labour federation during the purge of Communists of 1950. It showed great intransigence during a series of bitterly fought strikes during 1952 against the Yoshida Government's labour legislation, and at its Congress of July, 1952, passed a resolution to support only the LSP in the elections to be held in the autumn of the same year. It also supported the LSP policy of 'third force' neutralism.

This support by the leadership of Sōhyō for the Left Socialists and their policies was not to the liking of the textile and seamen's unions, who combined in February, 1953, to form a separate organisation within Sōhyō, Minrōren, committed to more moderate policies. The leftist leadership, on the other hand, formed a faction known as Rōdōsha Dōshikai.

At the Sōhyō annual Congress of July 1953, it became clear that the movement had shifted, under Takano's leadership, even further to the left. The Action Policy, long fought over in committee before the Congress, was presented to the Congress by Takano. Three main controversial points were involved: - the so-called
'peace forces' argument, relations with the ICFTU, and relations with the Communist Chinese All-China Federation of Trade Unions. What exactly was meant by the 'peace forces' was left obscure in the Action Policy, and not clearly elucidated during the Congress by Takano, who avoided identifying them with the Soviet Union and Communist China, or any other country or group. Nevertheless, the fact that the 'third force' did not figure in the Action Policy, together with Takano's criticism of the United States and favourable references to the Soviet Union and Communist China, indicated clearly enough the political direction in which he was leading Sōhyō.

In a leading article in Sōhyō's weekly newspaper, Takano explained the omission of reference to the 'third force' by the argument that merely to support the 'third force' would impose undue restrictions on the socialist movement in its struggle for peace.

On relations with the ICFTU, membership for Sōhyō itself was rejected, but individual unions were left free to join if they so wished. This was no change from the previous year, but a decision to seek friendly relations
with the Communist Chinese federation was a new departure, further signalling the move to the left which the Sohyō leadership had taken.\(^4^2\)

At least three factors entered into the introduction of the 'peace forces' argument into Sohyō. The first was the world situation, and especially the Soviet 'peace offensive', and diplomatic moves following the death of Stalin in February 1953. Takano made clear that he regarded this as of major importance and as a vital new initiative for world peace which should be fully supported, and that he regarded the settlement of the Korean War as having been effected in spite of the United States.\(^4^3\)

Secondly, there was little in recent American foreign policy which indicated to Japanese Socialists a relaxation in her attitudes towards the Soviet camp, or a softening of her determination to turn Japan into an armed bastion against the Soviet Union and Communist China.\(^4^4\)

Negotiations for the application of American Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) to Japan began in June 1953. The condition of such assistance - that Japan should prepare herself for defence, not only against domestic disorder, but also against external aggression - naturally caused
intensified opposition to American policies on the part of the left wing.\textsuperscript{45}

Although these international events merely served to strengthen the insistence on 'third force' neutralism of the majority of the leaders of the LSP, the situation made it easier for those in whom anti-American feeling was strongest, to adopt the 'pro-Communist' neutralism embodied in the 'peace forces' argument.\textsuperscript{46} Takano was reported to have summed up his view of how the international situation had changed as follows:

We have confidence in the peace forces, because they take a strictly critical attitude to the disturbers of world peace. The main difference between the situation last year and the situation this year is the increase in the world peace forces, the isolation of the United States, and the increase of American pressure upon Japan. The reason why we advocate a people's foreign policy is that American strategy aims to push Japan into isolation. At least in the Far East, it is the American side which is contriving war.\textsuperscript{47}

A third factor of great importance in the introduction of the 'peace forces' argument was the question of the motives of Takano himself. On two points the fact that Takano sponsored the 'peace forces' argument in mid-1953 is at first sight surprising. Firstly, it would appear that he had changed his view with remarkable suddenness.
Discussions did not take place on the subject until after the general election of April 1953, and Takano went himself in January as a representative of the LSP to the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon. At this time, moreover, relations between the LSP and Sōhyō (apart from the right wing Minrōren) were amicable. Secondly Takano, like the leadership of the LSP, had been a member of the Rōnō-ha since its inception, and, as has been pointed out, the ideological beliefs of this group were strongly opposed to those of the Communists, who emphasised the necessity for a 'revolution of national liberation' as the first step towards socialism. The 'peace forces' argument, on the other hand, was ideologically much closer to the Communist position. It appears, however, that these two points may not be so surprising. Takano, while supporting the LSP's stand at the Asian Socialist Conference, seems to have held a conception of the third force somewhat more pro-Communist than views prevalent in the LSP, vague and subject to variation as the latter were. Matsuta, President of Shinsambetsu, interviewed by the writer, said that Takano was preparing the 'peace forces'
argument during 1952, and at best only ever gave negative support to the idea of a 'third force'.

The importance of Takano's connection with the Rōnō-ha may also have been less than it would be natural to suppose. Two leading Socialists, interviewed by the writer, who were intimately involved with the left wing of the prewar socialist movement, held that Takano had had connections with the banned Communist Party during the 1930's. Another leading Left Wing Socialist pointed out that Takano's friend and mentor in the Rōnō-ha had been Inomata Tsunao, probably the most radical of its leaders.

Whatever the individual motives of Takano in taking the left wing course which he decided upon in 1953, his action had a profound effect not only upon Sōhyō, (where the right wing unions shortly afterwards seceded and formed their own organisation, and opposition to Takano crystallised in the left wing unions themselves) but also in the LSP. It is to the effect of the 'peace forces' argument on the LSP that we now turn.

The first official reaction of LSP was the claim, on 19 July 1953, that there was no substantial difference between its policy of 'third force' and the 'peace forces' policy of Sōhyō.
This statement, however, merely served to conceal a fundamental ideological division within the LSP itself, a division which had become evident in the discussions of the Party Platform Committee, which had been deliberating since it was set up at the Party Congress in January. In November, the draft Platform was announced, together with a dissenting draft prepared by the only Sohyō representative on the committee, Shimizu Shinzō. (see Appendices A and B)

The majority draft stuck closely to the Rōnō-ha position that the main 'enemy' was Japanese monopoly capital, whose ties with American monopoly capital were secondary. Although the element of struggle against 'monopoly capital connected with America' was said to enter into the struggle against Japanese monopoly capital, the draft warned against 'a simple national liberation movement', which would be either ineffectual or turn to fascism. The Party's neutralist position was directed both against American imperialism and against 'control by Japan's monopoly finance capital'. In the exposition of the draft Platform, the current situation in Japan was compared to and contrasted with that in Korea under Japanese
rule. It was explained that there was so little native capitalist enterprise of any consequence in Korea, that although there was a complex sort of class struggle, this did not take the form of a struggle between Korean capital and Korean labour. Since the majority of capital was foreign (i.e. Japanese), any attempt at revolutionary organisation would have to take the form of a 'national liberation struggle'. In Japan, on the other hand, foreign (i.e. American) capital was only an ally, not the ruler, of domestic monopoly capital. 57

Shimizu Shinzō, on the other hand, said that the main focus of the Party Platform ought to be a 'national struggle against imperialist control', 58 and he maintained that the control of Japan by American imperialism was absolute. His statement of the course which revolution should take 59 was quite clearly in the ideological tradition of the Communist opponents of the prewar Rōnō-ha.

The publication of the draft Platform, and the dissenting voice of Shimizu, coming soon after the closely related question of the 'peace forces' had been fought over at the Sōhyō Congress, precipitated a conflict in the LSP which came near to splitting that Party. 60
Although the Party Executive had decided to minimize differences between itself and ソヒョ after the ソヒョ Congress, with the publication of the draft Platform in November it turned to the offensive. It issued a directive to Party members which prohibited them from participating in joint struggles with the JCP, insisted on 'third force' neutralism as the basis of the Party's foreign policy, and called for closer relations with ソヒョ. 61

Shortly afterwards, in a meeting with LSP leaders, Takano was reported to have protested especially against the prohibition on joint struggles with the JCP, and was reported to have claimed that this prohibition was aimed at 'suppressing the ソヒョ "peace forces" argument and undermining my position in the name of Party regulations'. 62

Nevertheless, according to the same source, rumours of the formation of a new party were denied after a meeting between Suzuki and Takano.

The controversy was, however, sufficiently fierce to bring about a split in two groups associated with the Party. Shakaishugi Kyōkai, the ideological fountainhead of the Rōnō-ha, to which a large number of leading members of the LSP and ソヒョ belonged, contained within its ranks
Takano, Shimizu, and others of Takano's group in Sōhyō. The ideological differences which had arisen proved too great for the cohesion of Shakaishugi Kyōkai, and Takano and his followers seceded. According to a press report, the immediate cause for the secession was an article written by Takano in Shakaishugi, organ of Shakaishugi Kyōkai, in November 1953. This article called for a 'united front' (i.e. with the JCP), and attacked the 'four peace principles'. These principles - 'a total peace, defence of the Peace Constitution, opposition to rearmament and maintenance of neutralism' - were strongly supported by Left Socialists after their adoption at the united JSP Congress of January 1951, and for Takano to attack the LSP for what he called 'slavish adherence' to the 'four peace principles', meant a frontal attack on the leadership of the Party itself.

The ideological conflict also created a serious crisis in the Party's Youth Group, whose Action Policy for the 1954 Congress was being prepared at this time. The Secretary of the Youth Group was expelled from his position for putting forward a draft Action Policy based on the 'peace forces', and for circulating copies of the Shimizu
This draft Action Policy was attacked by the leadership of the Party and by the pro-Executive faction of the Youth Group, on the grounds that it did not mention 'neutralism' or 'third force', and that the 'struggle for national independence against American imperialism', proposed instead, failed to comprehend the substance of the theory of the 'third force'. It was also attacked because it advocated a 'united front'.

Takano, in spite of the acute embarrassment which he caused the leadership of LSP, had little hope of carrying away a substantial part of the Party with him to form a new party of his own. Even within Sōhyō his position had become precarious. Within the left wing of Sōhyō, upon which his support rested, a group opposed to Takano's leadership had formed, which took its stand upon the ideology of the leadership group of LSP. This was led by Ōta Kaoru, who was to wrest the leadership of Sōhyō from Takano at its 1954 Congress.

Takano's support in the LSP itself was small and concentrated in the small Matsumoto faction. It was this faction which, in order to propagate its views in opposition to the official line of the Party Platform,
formed the 'Platform Study Group' (Kōryō Kenkyū Gurūpu) at the 1954 Congress. (This group renamed itself Heiwa Dōshikai when the Right and Left Socialist Parties united in 1955, and it remained a group ideologically distinct from the rest of the Party). The splits which occurred in Shakaishugi Kyōkai and the Youth Group involved a minority of Takano supporters against a majority supporting the Party leadership. 71

The success of the leadership of the LSP in maintaining its position against the challenge of Takano was partly due, as has been seen, to the strength of the Rōnō-ha ideology and its tradition among the Left Socialists. Another reason was undoubtedly the discrediting of the JCP because of its violent tactics after the Cominform criticism of 1950, and the corresponding flight of votes to the LSP. 72

Another important factor was the factional situation within LSP. The Party consisted of four factions - all subdivisions of the Left faction from before the 1951 split - two (Suzuki and Wada) which between them accounted for most of the Diet members, and two (Nomizo and Matsumoto) which had each only a handful of adherents and were influential only to the extent that they could influence the main factions.
Over the period the leaders of three of the factions (Suzuki, Nomizo and Wada) occupied respectively the Chairmanship, the Secretaryship, and the Chairmanship of the Policy Committee, in other words, the most important positions in the Party. Commentators noted that Suzuki had support not only from his own 'main-stream' faction, but also from the Wada and Nomizo factions, and that these three factions were able to work, at least during 1952 and 1953, in great harmony. It seems that the ability of the Party to work out a division of the chief Party posts to mutual advantage made it more easy to withstand ideological quarrels. Had this not been so, a particular faction might well have been tempted to take advantage of ideological division in order to improve its position in relation to the other factions.

In conclusion we may sum up the course of LSP foreign policy over the period 1951-54 in the following way:

A European emphasis in the LSP 'third force' policy as first formulated in January 1952 gave way to a discernible Asian slant in the 1953 Action Policy. At the same time the anti-American content of the policy became more marked. A parallel trend in Sohyō went to greater extremes, and the Sohyō leadership adopted a pro-Communist position from
mid-1953. This produced division and strain in the LSP, but attempts by a pro-Communist group within the LSP, allied with the Sohyo leaders, to subvert the LSP 'third force' policy, were unsuccessful.

These changes in policy may be explained in terms of a variety of factors, political, ideological and factional. The emphasis on Asia as the most vital element in the 'third force', which characterised the 1953 LSP Action Policy, was influenced by enthusiasm for the ASC, a body whose aspirations, as interpreted by the LSP, nearly coincided with its own emergent 'anti-imperialism'. The increased hostility to the United States shown in the 1953 Action Policy is explicable as a reaction to the continued American presence in independent Japan and to American global policy. The drift of Sohyo into pro-communism was connected with Takano's response to the Soviet peace offensive, his reaction against the United States, and perhaps most importantly, his own character and ideological background.

The ultimate triumph of the 'third force' over the 'peace forces' argument in the LSP itself is to be explained by reference to ideology and factionalism. The polarisation of the Left Socialists from the Right Socialists after the
1951 split placed the former in the position of being able freely to stress their differences from the latter. At the same time their policies were substantially different - a difference sanctioned by long ideological tradition - from the Communists and pro-Communists on their left flank. Thus although a pro-Communist foreign policy made some headway in the Party, it was not able to attract the allegiance of more than a small minority group. Because of the ideological strength of the Rōnō-ha tradition, and because of factional harmony, the LSP was able to reassert strongly its 'third force' neutralism.

Nevertheless, later developments were to show that an impartial attitude of neutrality was difficult to maintain in the face of continuing leftward trends.
CHAPTER 5 A 'DEMOCRATIC-SOCIALIST' FOREIGN POLICY - RIGHT SOCIALIST PARTY 1951 - 1954

We have observed how the Left Socialist Party, although it had to meet a serious challenge to its 'third force' neutralism from the extreme left, emerged from the struggle with the policy intact and its leading factions still largely united.

The Right Socialists, in their own way, sought to present what they called 'democratic socialism' as a third road in world affairs, although they repudiated the idea that this meant neutrality towards communism or Communist states. For the first two years of its existence the Right Socialist Party (RSP) remained at least superficially united about this policy, but towards the end of 1953 the official attitude on defence and security met a challenge from the right wing of the Party. This precipitated a major rift.

This chapter will attempt to analyse the RSP version of a 'democratic socialist' foreign policy, and identify the reasons why the Party was not as successful as the Left Socialists in maintaining unity in its support.
The distinction made by the Right Socialists after the 1951 split, between their own attitude to world affairs and that of the LSP, lay in their distinguishing (as they claimed the LSP failed to do), between an ideological third force and a neutralist bloc avoiding all military alliances with either of the other two world camps. Thus an RSP statement on foreign policy in 1952, in examining the two main components of the Left Socialist Party's 'third force' - European socialism and the newly independent nations of Asia - agreed that the former was ideologically a third road between capitalism and communism; it denied, however, that it was a 'third force' in the sense that it could act independently of alliances against aggression.

On the second component, Asian nationalism, the statement said that the idea of an Asian 'third force' was understandable in terms of the aspirations of countries long oppressed by colonialism, strongly anti-European in sentiment, yet opposed to communism. Although, however, it was possible to sympathise with these aspirations, the necessity for collective security against aggression remained, especially, indeed, for an unarmed Japan. It also pointed out that European socialist parties, faced
with a difficult problem of security, rejected the idea of a European 'third force' as a dangerous illusion.¹

While rejecting 'third force' neutralism in the sense in which it was understood in the LSP, the Right Socialists gave their full support to the Socialist International, which, while it advocated defensive preparedness against Communist aggression, was ideologically distinct from conservatism. What the RSP saw as valuable in the Socialist International was its 'democratic socialism'.²

This ideology, as interpreted by the Party, went as follows: socialism should be brought about by democratic means; it is opposed to communism for its violent revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, but also opposed to conservatism which aims to preserve the existing capitalist organisation of society; democratic methods mean forming a government by parliamentary majority, and enacting socialist policies with the consent of the people; opposition parties are to be permitted, and power is to be handed back to them if the electorate demands it at the polls; the political revolution must be gradual; democratic socialism, however, is not merely 'reformist capitalism': It aims at the socialisation of basic
industry and at social welfare; in foreign policy it is strongly opposed to Communist world revolution, and seeks disarmament, common prosperity and the prevention of war through international cooperation.  

The RSP, however, did not give its support to moderate European socialism merely because of ideological affinity. Despite the protestation, quoted above, that democratic socialism could not be a force in international politics, there are indications in the writings of Right Socialists that they did so consider it, although in a vague fashion. 

This was shown in two notions, frequently expressed by Party spokesmen: one was that democratic socialism could contribute to the prevention of war, in a way that both capitalism and communism, committed as they were to rival military camps, could not; the other was that it could help liberate Asian countries from the vestiges of colonial rule, and thus fulfil one of the prerequisites of peace in Asia. In this task Japan was not infrequently spoken of by Right Socialists as a 'bridge', either between 'free Asia' and the 'progressive elements of Western Europe', or, more specifically, between the Socialist International and the Asian Socialist Conference.
At the Preliminary Meeting of the Asian Socialist Conference (March 1952) the chief RSP spokesman on foreign policy, Sone Eki, rejected 'third force' neutralism, advocated support for the United Nations and 'collective security', and called for close cooperation on the part of the Socialists of the ASC with the Socialist International. He argued in the same vein at the first plenary session of the ASC in January 1953, and, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, the final resolution of the Conference was a substantial concession to the Right Socialist point of view.

The RSP clearly regarded the ASC as an event of the first importance, opening vistas of a progressive international movement in which a democratic socialist Japan could perhaps play a leading part. The 1953 RSP Action Policy (endorsed by the Party's annual Congress just before the first plenary session of the ASC), spoke enthusiastically of the possibilities of an international Socialist movement, with European and Asian Socialists advancing together in harmony. The fact (it argued) that the Socialist International was the target for the criticism of both blocs, and supported the United Nations, total
disarmament and social security, made it 'a force for the establishment of peace'. Since, moreover, the ASC was correcting its European bias, it would, as a platform for colonial nationalist movements, 'develop into a big organisation for world peace in opposition to communism'.

The foreign policy of the Right Socialists thus developed in a way not entirely dissimilar from the Left Socialist 'third force' argument. On the other hand it firmly rejected any form of neutrality or neutralism as a means of national security. While admitting that in some cases, such as those of India, Indonesia and Burma, (the standard 'neutralist' nations) conditions might be favourable for neutralism, the RSP held that this was definitely not the case for Japan, which required 'collective security'.

Both 1952 and 1953 Action Policies with equal firmness committed the RSP to the ideal of 'collective security through the United Nations'. It was admitted, however, that this ideal was far from realisation, and that Japan was not yet herself a member of the United Nations; therefore Japan's participation in 'regional collective security' had to be accepted as a second best. Unlike the Left Socialists, the
RSP accepted the United States promotion of regional security arrangements (and especially her firm stand in Korea) as within the spirit of the United Nations and contributory to world peace. Neither 1952 nor 1953 Action Policy was, however, explicit on the question whether participation in 'regional collective security' entailed approval of the stationing of United States forces on Japanese soil. The Party had taken a stand in opposition to the Japan-United States Security Treaty on the grounds that it had been concluded at a time when Japan was not independent; it could not therefore be considered a treaty between equal sovereign nations. The Party thus called for the renegotiation of a treaty on equal terms.

The Right Socialists left no doubt that they considered communism to be the source from which any threat to the security of Japan might be expected to come. A policy statement issued soon after the split with the Left Socialists, said:

We criticise the authoritarianism of the Communist Party, the expansionism of the Soviet Union, and the role of Communist China in the Korean War, and we emphasise the danger posed by international communism to Japan.
Although the danger from communism was held to be one of internal subversion rather than outright aggression, it was held to require counter-measures excluding the possibility of an isolationist solution. The Party judged that the Soviet Union lacked the confidence to unleash a third world war, but that it would continue to promote world revolution by peace offensives and local wars.\textsuperscript{17}

In the 1952 Action Policy, it was stated that the Party's anti-communism did not preclude an effort to establish improved relations with Communist Bloc countries. The policy, however, warned against an overestimation of the trade possibilities which might accrue from such an improvement, and against the 'illusion' of a treaty of non-aggression with Communist Bloc countries.\textsuperscript{18} The 1953 Action Policy, moreover, played down the Soviet peace offensive (which immediately preceded the death of Stalin), holding that 'the division of the world into two blocs has not in the least been reduced, either politically or militarily'.\textsuperscript{19}

The Party exercised similar caution with regard to Communist China, maintaining that with a settlement of the Korean War not in prospect, Japan should withhold recognition from the Communist Chinese regime, since the
the United Nations had condemned Chinese action in Korea. It also recommended, however, that recognition should be withheld (contrary to the policy of the Japanese Government) from the Nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan until the settlement of the Korean War, when a decision should be made on recognition.\textsuperscript{20} The 1953 Action Policy, however, said that recognition of Communist China should be made after the conclusion of the Korean War.\textsuperscript{21}

The RSP policy on collective security was thus founded in undisguised opposition to communism and in a pessimistic assessment of its world policies. Consequently, alliance with the international opponents of communism was accepted as a necessity. Since this was so, it may seem surprising that only grudging and qualified approval was given to a security arrangement with the United States (the policy was, for instance, noncommittal about whether American troops should be stationed in Japan). The reason for this may be seen in the attempt, outlined above, to define a species of 'third force' (though the term was rejected) in world affairs. The emphasis on the United Nations and 'United Nations collective security' which was seen in RSP policy statements, may be seen as a symptom of
this attempt. The Party frequently connected the United Nations with the Socialist International and the ICFTU, as a body capable, if given the chance, of standing between the two conflicting world blocs.²²

A further problem connected with security was that of defence. Here the difficulty of finding a policy distinct from those of the parties flanking it to right and left, and yet something other than a mere compromise between them, seems to have been considerable. The Party acknowledged that Japan had the right to her own defence, and held that this entailed the right to maintain defence forces in some form.²³ It however made a distinction between defence forces and rearmament, opposing the latter. The distinction was between full-scale armed forces to cope with direct aggression and internal security forces to combat attempts at subversion. Defence forces only up to the scale of the latter were held to be necessary or desirable. The Party maintained, however, that armed forces were not the only requirements for a nation to be able to defend itself. According to the 1953 Action Policy, 'the basis of self-defence is the desire for national independence, economic strength and a secure
It therefore concluded that defence forces in excess of a strength that the economy could stand would themselves be prejudicial to security, and made use of the slogan 'Fight for stable living standards rather than rearmament'.

It is obvious that this policy was a much more complicated one (and perhaps less easy to comprehend by the electorate) than a policy of rearmament within the American alliance, or a policy of unarmed neutralism. Its complexity, and appearance of illogicality, seems to have derived from the fact that at least three separate motivations inspired the policy. On the one hand, the Party's resolute opposition to communism as a creed and conviction of its potential danger for the peace and freedom of the world, indicated the desirability of defence, whether by entering into an alliance with the United States, or arming Japan, or both. The RSP here greatly differed from the LSP, which saw a rather greater danger to world peace from the United States than from the Communist Bloc, and was ideologically closer to communism. The RSP was, because of its tradition and beliefs, aligned with the western camp.
On the other hand, two motives which may be called 'radical' seem to have made it difficult for the Party to advocate unreservedly rearmament within the western alliance. One was opposition to armaments on the grounds that they were themselves a cause of war. This was a sentiment encouraged by the 'Pacifist Clause' of the Constitution and by the experience of Japanese militarism up to 1945. The other was concern for economic stability and social welfare, which they feared would be adversely affected by a heavy burden of armaments.

These conflicting motivations have been to a considerable extent a problem common to Socialist parties faced with the necessity of considering national defence. Nevertheless, since the RSP contained within it diverse elements, it is necessary to examine how these differed in their attitudes to foreign policy. A compromise between conflicting motivations was in part a compromise between different factions. The process whereby the harmony achieved between these factions in 1952 broke down over the formulation of the RSP Action Policy for 1954 will be discussed in the following pages. This breakdown was of particular importance because it was the
prelude to factional policy alignments taken up in the unity negotiations which finally led to a united Socialist Party in 1955.

Members of the RSP were divided over the question of rearmament during the first few months of the existence of the RSP as a separate party in 1952. The division came into the open in an intellectual group supporting the RSP, Minsharen. In March 1952, Minsharen issued a declaration supporting rearmament and calling for revision of the Constitution so that rearmament could be conducted in a legal manner. This called forth a sharp reaction from RSP leaders associated with the Kawakami faction, which formed the left wing of the RSP, but was supported by leaders of the Nishio faction which formed the Party's right wing.

At the 1952 Congress, failure to agree on a candidate for the post of Party Chairman meant that the post was left vacant. This too was an indication of factional conflict. Before the Congress the Central Executive Committee had informally chosen Katayama Tetsu—probably hoping that he would prove acceptable because in a sense he transcended factional loyalties—but the Congress
rejected him because of his leadership of the discredited Socialist coalition Government of 1947-48. The other two candidates suggested, Kawakami Jōtarō (Kawakami faction) and Matsuoka Komakichi (Nishio faction), were closely identified with their respective factions, and rather than attempt to force the issue between them, the Congress decided to leave the position vacant for the time being.  

It was decided, however, to hold an Extraordinary Congress in August, at which the Party's course would be more clearly charted, and the Party's attitude to other socialist groups would be clarified. While reunification with the LSP was obviously out of the question for a period, the question whether to readmit certain individuals whose political position would be on the Party's right wing fringe, was a vital problem because of its likely effect on the factional balance. The most important of these individuals was Nishio Suehiro, acknowledged leader of the Nishio faction, who had been deprived of membership of the then united Socialist Party after his alleged part in the financial scandal which brought down the coalition Cabinet in 1948.
At the Extraordinary Congress a compromise solution was reached between the Nishio and Kawakami factions, whereby in exchange for Nishio's readmission to the Party, Kawakami was elected to the Chairmanship. Kawakami, moreover, pledged himself on appointment to three items of policy which were opposed, more or less, to the aspirations of the Nishio faction. The most important of these was to defend the Constitution and to oppose rearmament. Although the readmission of Nishio and others clearly strengthened the right wing of the RSP, the fact that the two principal posts were in the hands of the Kawakami faction was a signal victory for it.

The policy decided on the basis of this compromise remained basically unchallenged until late in 1953.

The discussions of policy preparatory for the 1954 Congress brought to the surface the latent divisions on foreign policy between its left and right wings.

In October 1953 Sone Eki, who was Chairman of the International Bureau of the RSP, produced his own version of a foreign policy for the Party. This was said to contain three controversial points, which departed significantly from official Party policy hitherto.
The first was that the gradual increase in armaments being conducted by the Yoshida Government should be supported. Whereas previous RSP policy had rejected anything more than internal security forces, Sone proposed support for a Government policy of rearmament which, as an RSP statement pointed out, had now progressed to the stage of preparations against external attack. 38

Sone's second innovation was that the Japan-United States Security Treaty should be replaced by another Security Treaty, temporary in nature, and negotiated 'from an equal standpoint', thus eliminating the clauses in the existing treaty considered humiliating to Japan. 39 This was subsequently revised to read: 'The Japan-United States Security Treaty should be fundamentally revised in its unequal form and contents, and temporarily be recognised as a regional collective security system between the two nations'. 40 In other words, not a new treaty, but a revision of the existing one, should be negotiated - a change said to have been made because of fears in the Party that a totally new treaty would involve Japan in new commitments, such as a commitment to send troops abroad. 41 The statement was still, nevertheless, an
innovation on existing policy, since it explicitly recognised the necessity for a security treaty with the United States after the alleged injustices of the existing treaty had been removed.\footnote{42}

Sone's third important change from previous policy was to advocate that, if a United Nations police force were formed, Japan should be prepared to participate in it. The controversial nature of this proposal derived from the fact that, although it was a logical extension of the Party's enthusiasm for the United Nations and its hypothetical 'collective security', it ran foul of the strong anti-rearmament sentiment within the Party and the desire not to be involved in any kind of military commitment abroad.

Discussion of Sone's draft quickly revealed the extent to which the Party was divided. On the right, the Nishio faction wholeheartedly supported Sone's draft. Within this faction the most positive supporter of rearmament remained Nishimura Eiichi, whose proposed 'armed neutrality' has been previously mentioned.\footnote{43} Nishimura now distinguished the conservative programme for rearmament, which he thought would encourage the revival of prewar-style militarism,
from the rearmament which a Socialist Government might undertake. He maintained that the defeat and consequent discrediting of the 'old order' was an excellent opportunity to build up a 'democratic' defence force devoid of fascist overtones. It seems, however, that Nishimura's shade of opinion represented little more than himself. Sone, in defending his draft in committee, was more circumspect, merely submitting that the necessity of armed forces for self-defence should be clearly stated.

The Kawakami faction and its sympathisers opposed hints of rearmament in the Sone draft. At the Central Executive Committee at the end of November, Asanuma was reported to have objected to the reference to the Security Treaty, and to participation in a United Nations police force. His reasons were that if the RSP supported any revised form of Japan - United States Security Treaty, it would be lending its support to what might develop into a 'military alliance'. If, he maintained, the Party agreed in principle to Japanese participation in United Nations peace-keeping activities, it would be merely adumbrating a utopian idea, and indirectly mislead the electorate into thinking that it advocated rearmament.
On the left of the Party a group had formed to promote unification negotiations with the LSP which will be described in the next chapter. This group, known as Chūkanha, (centre faction) countered Sone’s attempt to move the Party’s policy in the direction of rearmament by an attempt to revise the policy so as to bring it closer to that of the LSP. Aspects of the international situation during 1953, which were used by extreme leftists in the LSP and Sohyō in support of alignment with the Communist Bloc, were also brought into service by the Chūkanha. It was reported as criticising the draft Foreign Policy drawn up by Sone, on the grounds that it closely followed that of 1953, when the isolation of the United States, the increase in influence of small nations at the United Nations, and the international situation since Malenkov’s peace declaration allegedly made nonsense of the 1953 Foreign Policy. It further criticised the Sone draft for not abandoning the theory that the United States was the mainstay of the United Nations, and for continuing to insist on the possibility of aggression from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The group therefore called for efforts towards a peace treaty with those ex-belligerents
who had not signed at San Francisco, and for total abolition of the Security Treaty.  

The intra-Party debate on foreign policy and defence continued until the Congress of January 1954. The Nishio faction and the Chūkanha continued to press their respective cases. The issue was essentially decided by the Kawakami faction, whose success in achieving a dominant position over Party posts since 1952 made it the most vital factor in the situation. The leader of the faction and Chairman of the Party, Kawakami Jōtarō, made a major policy speech shortly before the Congress, in which he opposed the current Government policy of expanding the National Safety Force (hoantai) and renaming it a Self-Defence Force (Jieitai), in terms stronger than had been used officially by the Party before. He was also reported as stating categorically that there was now no need for Japan to defend herself against direct aggression, and that since the international situation was moving in the direction of peace, the United States would have to switch from military alliances to economic aid if she were to be able to compete with the Soviet peace offensive.
The foreign policy resolution finally agreed upon by the Congress was a compromise in which concessions were made to the point of view of the Nishio faction, but the general policy line was rather closer to that of the Party's left wing.

On the question of the Security Treaty, it differed little from the 1953 Action Policy, starting from the ideal of United Nations 'collective security', but admitting, in default of this, the necessity of regional security arrangements. It advocated revision of the 'inequalities' of the Japan - United States Security Treaty, without making any statement about either the status of the Treaty after revision or about the stationing of American troops. The setting up of a United Nations police force was also suggested, but the question of Japan's participation in it was not mentioned. 50

On the question of defence, the 1954 Policy was more specific than that of 1953, although a similar line was followed. What had been defined and approved as an 'internal security force for use against subversion' in 1953, was now specified as being no bigger than the Police Reserve Force which was set up in 1950 (This force reached
70,000 men). A small concession was made to the views of the Nishio faction, in that a 'defence force against direct aggression' was stated to be 'theoretically' possible. On the other hand the current build-up of forces being conducted by the Yoshida Government was roundly condemned as a violation of the Constitution, destructive of democracy and destructive also of that economic stability which the Party considered to be the real basis of defence. The point that economic stability would take away the danger of subversion and that an arms build up should at least be postponed until a strong economy and a fair division of its products had been brought about, was stressed at length.  

This resolution, in view of the fierce controversy over it between right and left at the 1954 Congress, was only an interim statement of what could be agreed, masking points of controversy with obscurity or silence. The controversy still continued, and was focussed on the process of reunification negotiation which will be the subject of the next chapter.

The contrast is quite striking between the LSP success in projecting a coherent foreign policy, and the RSP
inability to agree on a foreign policy which would be more than a compromise between incompatibles. The reasons must be sought in factional history and ideological background.

The two factions with historical roots (which between them dominated the RSP), those of Kawakami and Nishio, had a long history of rivalry. The *Shakai Taishūtō*, from 1932-40, was dominated by this same Kawakami faction which under its then leader, Asō Hisashi, led the Party into close cooperation with the militarists. The death of Asō in 1940 removed the chief architect of this policy, but the other leading members of the faction, including Kawakami Jōtarō, Kōno Mitsu, and Miwa Jusō, were considered by the American Occupation authorities to have been sufficiently implicated to warrant their removal from public life. With the Kawakami faction gravely weakened by the absence of its leaders, the Nishio faction was able to dominate the Japan Socialist Party in the early postwar years. With the fall of the Katayama Cabinet and the severe defeat suffered by the Party at the 1949 general election, the Marxist left wing of the Party began to get the upper hand. It was not until the depurging of the Kawakami faction leaders by SCAP in mid 1951, that it once
more presented itself as a serious rival to the Nishio faction. When the 1951 split removed the Marxist left, the Kawakami faction quickly reestablished the dominant position that it had had during the period of *Shakai Taishūtō*. In spite of the fact that its leaders had repudiated their past association with the militarists, the rivalry of the prewar years, when the Nishio faction, more reluctant to follow the militarists, had been in a subordinate position, soon reasserted itself.

After their readmission to public life, Kawakami and the other leaders of his faction, probably anxious, in the pacifist atmosphere of postwar Japan, to erase the 'taint' of their prewar militarist associations, stressed their opposition to rearmament and their support for the Constitution. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the Nishio faction did not feel the constraint of such inhibitions, and thus felt free to advocate some measure of rearmament.

The task of creating a foreign policy that would satisfy both these groups was obviously difficult, and in at least two ways the Right Socialists were faced with difficulties greater than those facing the Left Socialists.
Firstly, the Rōnō-ha tradition with its deep historical roots and capacity for uniting most sections of the Party, did not have its counterpart in the RSP. 'Democratic Socialism' had much shallower roots and concealed differences dating from before World War II. Secondly, one of the advantages of 'third force' neutralism for the LSP was that it was an easily identifiable position. It could be seen as a central position between the two poles of a pro-communist and a pro-western foreign policy. The RSP, on the other hand, was faced with the more difficult problem of finding a foreign policy between that of the Conservatives and the LSP. If such a policy did not exist, it had to be invented; but the task of invention was hard, and involved a number of delicate compromises and evasions. When the policy itself was evolved, it proved insufficiently attractive to prevent the rival groups within the Party finding more attraction in the policies of parties flanking them to the right and left than in their own.

As with the LSP, an important factor was the relaxation of international tension following the death of Stalin in February 1953. Since the 1951 split in the Japan
Socialist Party had as its immediate cause a disagreement about the necessity for collective and individual defence against communism, a relaxation of tension strengthened the hand of those who said that Japan need not rearm and did not need a defensive alliance. It thus brightened the prospects for reunification, if Right Wing Socialists were willing to accept this. It was this path that the Kawakami faction, spearheaded by the Chūkanha, determined to take.
Left and Right Socialist Parties united in October 1945, under their old name, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). This was the culmination of difficult policy adjustments extending over two years. A clash of opinion over the Peace Settlement and over its provisions for the security of Japan had been the occasion for the 1951 split. The fundamental differences in outlook between Left and Right in the Socialist movement were sharply defined in the clash of 1951, and similarly it was differences in attitude to defence and security which proved the most intractable problems in 1955. The result was a painful compromise between conflicting views.

The purpose of this chapter is to see why the foreign policy items of this compromise proved so difficult to achieve, and at the same time, why they were possible at all. In other words it is necessary to ask how the overall situation of 1955 differed from that of 1951, and what, if anything, prevented the parties from easily responding to such changes as there were.
Serious and hopeful discussions between the two parties did not begin until April 1954, when two top officials from each party met to work out a basis for reunification. These talks were preceded by several months of factional and ideological struggle within both parties (as described in the two previous chapters), connected with which there was a tentative exploration of the possibilities for reunification on the part of the 'moderate' factions on each side. The first indication of new thinking came in a speech by Suzuki Mosaburō, the LSP Chairman, in July 1953, in which he spoke encouragingly of the prospects for reunification. 1 Shortly afterwards the CEC of the LSP decided to set up a committee to report on the subject. 2 At about the same time the most left wing of the RSP factions, the Chūkanha, began active campaigning for unity. 3

A pamphlet written by a member of the Chūkanha (and issued under its auspices) in the same month, 4 approached the LSP position on three contentious issues dividing the two parties, namely defence, neutralism and the 'third force'. The writer advocated opposition to rearmament at all costs, called for 'self-reliant neutralism' (a term normally confined to LSP policy statements), and agreed
that the RSP had much to learn from the 'third force' idea put forward by the LSP. Although, however, earnest discussion of the question of unification began at this time within the RSP, neither of the other more powerful factions accepted the positive approach advocated by the Chūkanha.  

The Left Socialists also discussed the possibility of making concessions to the Right Socialists in order to bring the two parties together. A foreign policy statement issued in September 1953 marked two significant changes from previous policy. The first was that the LSP, while as in the past continuing to demand the outright abolition of the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement, was now content to require only the deletion of the military clauses from the Peace Treaty. The second change was of great potential importance. One of the main objections continually levelled by the RSP against the LSP policy of neutralism was that it neglected security and provided no guarantee against aggression. The RSP therefore had always proposed that Japan should rely upon United Nations 'collective security', or failing that, some sort of 'regional collective security'. The LSP now brought forward
the suggestion that the security of a neutral, unarmed Japan, should be guaranteed by a treaty of non-aggression between Japan and 'countries concerned, in the area of Japan'.

This idea was inspired by Churchill's speech to the British House of Commons of 11 May 1953, in which he called for a treaty to guarantee the eastern frontiers of Germany and the western frontiers of the Soviet Union, on the model of the Locarno Treaty of 1925. (The Locarno Treaty had included as its main item a mutual guarantee of the frontiers of France and Belgium by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy).

The application of the 'Locarno' idea to Japan, as to postwar Germany, meant a treaty of non-aggression between nations of both sides in the East-West struggle.

Although this idea was to prove the basis for the final reconciliation between Left and Right Socialists, the initial reaction of the RSP was unfavourable. An RSP committee set up in September 1953 to consider problems of reunification (the initiative seems to have come from the Chūkanha but representatives of all factions participated) criticised the LSP for bringing in the Soviet Union and
Communist China as guarantors of Japan's security. The committee connected this apparent change from 'self-reliant neutralism' to 'guaranteed neutralism' with the 'peace forces' controversy currently raging among the Left Socialists, and alleged that the LSP had in effect capitulated to the advocates of the 'peace forces'.

By the time, however, of the four-man discussions beginning in April 1954, the Right Socialist objections to a 'Locarno' solution had been more or less assuaged. The most important achievement of these talks was that the representatives of each side were able to agree, at least in principle, to this plan. The fact that the idea of a joint guarantee of the security of Japan by the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China was accepted in principle by both sides meant that for the first time a means had been found of bringing the gap between LSP neutralism and RSP collective security. Nevertheless, the two sides differed widely in their interpretation of the way such a treaty should be brought about. The LSP negotiators thought that separate mutual non-aggression treaties should be concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States, Japan and Communist
China. At some time after such a network of treaties had been concluded, it should be capped with an overall treaty embracing all four Powers. They considered these treaties to be replacements for the existing Security Treaty between Japan and the United States and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. The RSP negotiators, on the other hand, held that a Four Power treaty should, not replace, but supplement, the existing security arrangements which each bloc had in the Far East.11

This difference in interpretation reflected the fundamentally different stands of the two parties, since if the Japan – United States Security Treaty were abolished as a precondition of a Four Power treaty, the LSP aim of neutralism for Japan would by this have been fulfilled. If, on the other hand, a Four Power treaty were achieved between the four countries concerned without the prior nullification of the Security Treaty, then the RSP desideratum of 'collective security' would have been met.12

Another important task for the four-man Committee was to reconcile the views of the two parties on defence. Some compromise had to be found between the LSP insistence on total abolition of the Self-Defence Forces, and the RSP
policy that an internal security force for use against subversion, and not exceeding in size the Police Reserve Force of 1950, must be maintained. Some progress was apparently made in the four-man Committee towards a settlement of this issue. It was reported that the LSP negotiators had agreed to the possibility of a settlement based on the RSP position.⁰¹³

In spite of these advances, the factional situation in each party prevented further progress for the time being. Among the Right Socialists the Nishio faction maintained its hostility to all attempts at unification. In May 1954 Nishio published a pamphlet for distribution among his supporters, in which he was said to have warned strongly against 'unprincipled' unification with the LSP, and hinted at the necessity for revision of the Constitution to permit rearmament.⁰¹⁴ This statement drew a sharp reaction from Kōno Mitsu, of the Kawakami faction, a strong advocate of unity.⁰¹⁵ It may be reasonably supposed that the difference between these two men was not one related solely to the merits of the case being discussed. Nishio and Kōno were, indeed, old rivals within the socialist movement. This was partly because of membership of factions which had
been rivals since 1926, and partly because of a personal incident in the Imperial Diet in 1938, when Kono was instrumental in having Nishio expelled from the Diet for making a speech in which he criticised the current trend towards militarism.

In the LSP the Suzuki faction (which was the 'leading' faction in the Party in the sense of controlling the post of Party Chairman and other key positions), formed the spearhead of the unity group, although according to press reports there were divisions within the faction itself about the conditions on which unification should be accepted. The Suzuki faction was said to have been backed by the small Nomizo faction. On the other hand the factional harmony which was remarked in Chapter 4 between the Suzuki and Wada factions had not apparently survived the initiative of the Suzuki faction in pursuing the goal of unity. Wada himself, who replaced Nomizo as Secretary-General of the Party at the 1954 Congress, was reported as making a number of statements sceptical of the prospects for, or desirability of unification under such terms as were likely to be attained.
It is probable that this reluctance on the part of the Wada faction to back the Suzuki faction in pursuit of unification was motivated, less by ideological differences, which were slight or non-existent, than by the logic of the factional relationships within the socialist movement. Unification as it finally took place had a character dominated by an alliance of the 'unity' factions of the LSP (Suzuki faction) and the RSP (Kawakami faction), and it is possible that the Wada faction in 1954 feared a plot to exclude it from a fair share of power in the unified Party. The only faction in the LSP which directly opposed unification with the RSP on ideological grounds was the Matsumoto faction (heavily committed against the LSP leadership in favour of the Takano faction within Sōhyō). This faction, however, enjoyed much less backing within the LSP than did the Nishio faction within the RSP.

In spite of the fact, however, that there was less outright opposition to unification in the LSP than in the RSP, it was in the LSP that the result of the four-man negotiations met a hostile reaction.

One of the LSP negotiators, Itō Kōdō, of the unity group, had stated in a newspaper interview: 'If the RSP
understands by "defence forces", forces not designed to repel direct aggression, then we should prefer to call them "police forces". Such compromise of principles was not universally welcomed, and in anticipation of the final report of the four-man Committee, the Chairman of the LSP Education and Propaganda Bureau, Okada Soji, issued a statement laying out the differences of policy between the two parties, and calling for unity on LSP terms. Okada made an uncompromising statement of LSP policy for the abolition of the Self-Defence Forces, and denied, for theoretical, historical and practical reasons, that there was any possibility of aggression against Japan by the Soviet Union or Communist China.

Thus in spite of the fact that the opponents of unity within the LSP were neither so strong nor so determined as those in the RSP, pressure for unity on LSP terms was great. LSP election successes in comparison with the poorer showing of the RSP, and the relaxation of world tension, whereby security against Communist aggression apparently became less urgent, seem to have been the motives for this strong statement of policy.
In October 1954 a delegation from both Socialist Parties visited Communist China. The RSP side of the delegation included both Kono Mitsu, who championed the cause of unification, and Sone Eki, who hitherto had opposed it. The report which these members presented to the RSP Central Executive Committee on their return differed in its emphasis from the Party line as expressed before. Previously, the Party had supported the United Nations condemnation of Chinese aggression in Korea and had said that recognition of both Chinas should be withheld. With the settlement of the Korean War the Party advocated recognition of Communist China, provided that she agree to the unification of Korea through democratic elections and her neutralisation.

The report of the 1954 delegation, however took a much more favourable view of China. It stressed awakened nationalism, rather than Marx–Leninism, as a motivating force in China. It emphasised the peaceful nature of the Chinese people, and accepted 'peaceful coexistence' as a sincerely intended programme for the related aims of achieving greater harmony with the outside world, and enabling China to devote herself to peaceful construction. Thus it supported the Chinese policy of promoting
neutralism among her smaller and weaker neighbours, and hinted that China, as now the equal of the Soviet Union, was an important countervailing force against possible Soviet pretensions in Asia.\(^{27}\)

Arguing from these premises, the report advocated a number of concrete policies for Japan: the Taiwan question should be settled on the principle that the island should return to China (a notable departure from previous policy),\(^{28}\) restrictions on trade with China should be abolished, and a pact of non-aggression and non-interference should be concluded between Japan and China (this if possible to be part of a Four Power Treaty system between China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States).\(^{29}\)

That a member of the Chūkanha or Kawakami factions should have written a report of this nature in a year when the Geneva Conference had ended the Indochina War, and Communist China was trying to convince the uncommitted Asian nations of the sincerity of her 'peaceful coexistence', would hardly have been surprising. The fact, however, that Sone, the foreign affairs 'expert' of the Nishio faction, should have lent his name to the report, was of great importance for the future of the unification negotiations.
The report excited heated debate in the RSP Central Executive Committee. It was welcomed by the 'unity' factions, but opposed by the leaders of the Nishio faction, Nishio and Nishimura. In deference to these views the report was not formally adopted by the Committee, but apparently put aside as 'reference material for the formulation of the next Party foreign policy statement'.

At the same time, Left and Right Socialists were trying to create a joint platform on which to fight the 1955 general election, which was to be used as a test of the feasibility of unification. A common platform was drawn up in November 1954, which papered over certain existing division, and also included the following substantial concessions by the LSP.

Vital to the interpretation of a Four Power Treaty was the policy of each party on what should be done about the existing Security Treaty. The RSP, because of its interest in 'collective security', insisted that the Security Treaty should be retained, pending the establishment either of 'United Nations collective security' or a Four Power Treaty, but that its 'inequalities' should be revised. The LSP, on the other hand, said simply that the Security Treaty should be abolished. This difference was bridged by a mere verbal
trick. The first character of the word for 'revise' (改訂 kaitei) was combined with the first character of the word for 'abolish' (廃止 haishi) to form a word which might be rendered 'revise-abolish' (改廃 kaihai), so that the policy read 'revise-abolish unequal treaties'.

On defence, the LSP made an important concession by toning down its insistence on immediate demobilisation of the Self-Defence Forces. It agreed to the gradual decrease in the Self-Defence Forces, as was expressed in the following clause of the agreed joint election platform: 'For the present, halt the increase in the size of the Self-Defence Forces and gradually reduce them.' It also accepted the following clause, which apparently endorsed at least the principle of self-defence:

We aim to guarantee the standard of living of the people, the realisation of a just society, and the establishment of a peaceful independent economy, in order thus to build the basis of defence.

After the general election of February 1955, the Parties showed greater confidence in unification, and negotiations between them began in May and lasted until September. As a result of the election, both Socialist Parties gained seats and achieved for the first time the one third of Lower House seats necessary to block
constitutional revision while the LSP still further increased its lead over RSP.36 Probably as a result of this, the Wada faction, hitherto cautious about unity, and the Matsumoto faction, which had been directly opposed to it, were reported to have moved in favour.37 All factions of the LSP had increased their Diet representation at the election (especially the Matsumoto faction), and the confidence of being able to dominate a unified party presumably increased, as did their determination to make their policy predominate in the unified platform.

Soon after the beginning of the negotiations, Suzuki, Chairman of the LSP, was reported to have made a speech in which he criticised the draft platform for the unified Party, recently drawn up by the RSP.38 His main objection was to a statement in the Right Socialist draft that Japan, despite the Security Treaty, was 'independent' of the United States. Suzuki's objection to this formulation followed the LSP line that Japan was a 'subordinate country', controlled by the Japanese bourgeoisie and American imperialism, and he held therefore that it was impermissible to state that Japan had 'become independent'.39 The LSP official organ subsequently carried a denial by the Chairman of the LSP unification committee that Suzuki actually gave the speech,
the text of which, according to him, was given to the press owing to a misunderstanding. He nevertheless went on to criticize the draft in similar terms. It is reasonable to suppose that this episode, which caused considerable ill-feeling in the Joint Committee and outside, was part of an LSP campaign to drive a hard bargain.

In the course of negotiations on security and defence, the LSP made the concession that:

If in the future the establishment of military forces were recognised to be necessary, we should consider it afresh.

Even this reluctant concession to rearmament was, however, recognised to be unpalatable to the Party, and the following reassurance was issued shortly afterwards by the LSP unification committee:

If in the future the aims of LSP foreign policy are realised, international tension is relaxed and Japan achieves total independence, then if these conditions are not sufficient, the question of rearmament theoretically could be discussed. If, however, in the future, international tension becomes more relaxed, the Party does not expect that rearmament will be necessary.

Moreover Katsumata Seiichi, of the Wada faction, was quoted as saying categorically that there would be no possibility of examining the rearmament question again in the future.

The Right Socialists did not withdraw from their position that some minimal Self-Defence Forces were
necessary, and continued to emphasise that a healthy economy and a rising standard of living was the best guarantee of security, a position which the LSP had agreed to for the purposes of the joint election platform. At the same time the unity group in the RSP swung closer to the principle of neutralism as upheld by the LSP, although differentiating its own position by using different language. Thus Kono Mitsu of the Kawakami faction, who of the RSP leaders was one of active promoters of unification, was reported as saying:

I oppose neutralism, but support a foreign policy of self-reliant independence, that is, of non-involvement. In Europe Yugoslavia, Austria, and in the future Germany, in Asia India, are creating a sort of peace bloc, and can be expected to be a force to relax international tension.

The platform for the unified Party finally arrived at by the joint Unification Committee was a hard won compromise between the views of the two sides. The terms 'neutralism' and 'third force', favoured by the LSP were not used in the unified platform. Instead, the term previously used by the RSP, 'self-reliant independence', was made the keystone of the unified Party's foreign policy. The fundamental aims of the Party's foreign policy were stated as follows:

The aims of foreign policy are to achieve Japan's total independence, to preserve international peace and security in the area around
Japan, establish Japan's economic independence, and thus build friendly relations with all countries from a position of self-reliant independence with regard to either camp.50

It was arguable nevertheless (and indeed argued at the LSP Congress of September 1955 by defenders of the new platform)51 that the platform gave to the LSP the substance of its original neutralist policy while taking away the name. Although the platform did not mention neutralism, its articles on security and defence were capable of wide interpretation. In particular they included the aim of a 'Locarno' treaty upon which the security compromise between the two parties was founded:

1) Security: The security envisaged for Japan shall be as follows:

a) We shall attempt to obtain non-aggression agreements with all the countries concerned in the area around Japan, especially Communist China and the Soviet Union, and to conclude a collective treaty of non-aggression and security, in which the main participants will be the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

b) In consideration of a collective security treaty in which both camps would participate, the Japan – United States Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement should be dissolved, and simultaneously the Sino-Soviet Friendship Agreement should be dissolved.

2) Defence:

a) Opposition to present rearmament.

b) Attempt to prevent the increase in the Self-Defence Forces and gradually to reduce them.

c) Ultimate support for the United Nations and a United Nations police force, after international disarmament is implemented.

d) Organise a democratic and mobile police system to maintain internal security.52
The significant ambiguity in the policy of a 'Locarno' treaty was that it was not stated at what stage the existing security arrangements should be 'dissolved'. Thus Left Socialists could interpret it with the emphasis on the abolition of the Japan – United States Security Treaty, while the Right Socialists could interpret the 'Locarno' treaty as only a possible condition for the dissolution of the Security Treaty.

In defence policy the basic question whether Self-Defence Forces should or should not be maintained was glossed over. This was recognised by opponents of unification at the LSP Congress of September 1955. One delegate was reported as suggesting that the words 'Opposition to present rearmament' meant a compromise with what he called the 'rearmament' policy of the Right Socialists. Itō Kōdō, defending the platform, replied that the word 'present' was inserted at RSP insistence, but that there was no change from the existing LSP opposition to rearmament, and that he did not think that the anti-rearmament struggle would be in any way blunted by this. For the Right Socialists, on the other hand, an interpretation was left open which did not rule out rearmament at some time in the future.

The LSP Congress, which was held despite an RSP appeal not to take any action that would prejudice the hard-won
unity agreement, evidenced wide dissatisfaction among the delegates with the agreement itself. Opposition centred on the extreme left Matsumoto faction, which had earlier been converted to support for unification in principle, but which now attacked the unified platform for its concessions to the Right Socialist point of view. In particular they attacked concessions on the Security Treaty and defence. Somewhat more surprisingly, the Matsumoto faction was joined in its opposition to the platform by the leaders of Shakaishugi Kyōkai, the ideological body derived from the Rōnō-ha. Shakaishugi Kyōkai had been closely associated with the drawing up of the LSP platform in 1953, and was the source of the LSP doctrine of a 'third force'. In 1953, as already related, the pro-Communist supporters of the 'peace forces' argument, split away from Shakaishugi Kyōkai and formed a 'Platform Study Group' dedicated to the pursuit of Japan's 'national liberation'. Since the Matsumoto faction was synonymous with this latter group, the alliance with it now of the Shakaishugi Kyōkai, was calculated to have a great effect at the LSP Congress. A resolution, presented to the Congress, calling for the complete abandonment of the unified platform as a basis for unification, was defeated, but its supporters mustered approximately one third of the total votes cast.
This result caused shock and surprise among the LSP leadership, and also in the RSP, whose Central Committee responded with a resolution, saying that the platform must be passed unanimously at the unification Congress due in October. 58

Recriminations continued between the two parties right up till the unification Congress itself, and the opening of this Congress was delayed twelve hours because of differences over the distribution of Party posts. Once the Congress had begun, however, the platform was passed without opposition.

The extreme difficulty which was encountered by the Socialists in reconciling their policy on these matters is remarkable in view of the international and domestic situation and the state of public opinion during 1954 and 1955. A series of international events following the death of Stalin in 1953 led to a belief, widespread in Japan and elsewhere, that Cold War tensions were relaxing. These events included the Bandung Conference, the Geneva Conference and settlement of the Indochina War, and the Austrian Peace Treaty. Thus the situation differed greatly from that when the Socialist Party split in 1951. In these
circumstances the electoral attractions of something approaching a neutralist foreign policy were considerable. The Communist bogey, on the other hand, was somewhat less of a rallying cry.\textsuperscript{59}

On the domestic scene the so-called 'reverse course' pursued by the Yoshida Government since Independence had brought about an intense reaction among 'progressive' opinion. The attempt to undo certain of the Occupation reforms in such spheres as education and labour relations, and especially the creation of Self-Defence Forces with American aid under the MSA Agreement, led to the belief among progressives that the Government intended to revise the Constitution, as a prelude to the reassertion of 'feudalistic' rule. This also somewhat weakened the appeal of collective defence as a member of the 'Free World', since the United States was obviously backing up the Japanese conservative Government. It should be noted that even the right wing Nishio faction did not advocate more than token rearmament, and did not call for unconditional support for the Peace Treaty settlement.

A further motive for unification, absent in 1951, existed in 1954 and 1955. Divisions among the conservative parties, the refusal of Yoshida to resign as Prime Minister throughout 1954 despite pressure upon him to do so, the
eventual collapse of his Government, continued division under
the Hatoyama Government in 1955, and Socialist gains at
successive elections, made it seem not impossible that a
united Socialist Party might soon be in a position to form
a majority Government. Parallel moves in the conservative
camp to unite its various factions (which led to the
formation of the Liberal-Democratic Party in December 1955)
made the problem of Socialist unity seem doubly urgent.

In these circumstances the length and difficulty of
the negotiations, especially over security and defence,
requires an explanation.

The reason lies mainly in the ideological and factional
nature of the debate. The Nishio faction in the RSP and the
Matsumoto faction in the LSP both had definite ideologies and
stood their ground. The Nishio faction was strongly anti-
Communist - an attitude probably derived from its
experiences as the non-Marxist wing of the Japanese
Socialist Movement in the late 1920's - and thus was
sharply suspicious of any pro-Communist tendency in the
LSP. It is reasonable to suppose that this was the main
reason for the initial RSP hostility to a 'Locarno' treaty,
when first proposed by the LSP in 1953. At this period the
LSP and its ally, Sohyō, were involved in an internal
struggle with a group which wished to push the Party into
much closer alignment with the Communist bloc. The Nishio faction found it easy to deduce from this that the whole LSP was going pro-Communist, and that one manifestation of this was its proposal for a 'Locarno' treaty.

At the other extreme the Matsumoto faction was extremely suspicious of any proposal made by Right Socialists which could be interpreted as a move towards rearmament or a closer alignment with the United States. Its main objective, as has been seen, was 'national liberation'.

The 'unity group' within the LSP also had a clearly defined ideological position, from which it was reluctant to move. During the 1955 negotiations, its concessions on defence seem to have been tactical, and each concession had to be followed up with an elaborate explanation to the Party. It seems to have been because it thought that the essence of its neutralist policy had been retained in the unified platform that it was prepared to make the concessions that it did. In the end, however, the compromise did not prove acceptable to its own ideological purists in Shakaishugi Kyōkai.

The unity group of the RSP was in a position permitting of greater flexibility than any other group. Its leaders agreed with some measure of support for the 'Free World' and accepted the necessity in principle of 'collective security',
and yet maintained that Japan's independence was far from complete and that a substantial loosening of ties with the United States was necessary. In response to the pressure of negotiations, and because they were polarised within the RSP from the Nishio faction, they made real, non-tactical moves towards the neutralism of the LSP.

It is reasonable to infer that unification including both extremists and moderates on each side could only have taken place provided that the anti-communism of the Nishio faction and the opposition of the Matsumoto faction to rearmament and 'pro-American' policies were satisfied. The dominance of the moderate factions on each side finally achieved a solution on this basis for two reasons: the 'third force' neutralism of the LSP 'unity group' had proved itself to be opposed to alliance with communism; and the 'self-reliant independence' of the RSP 'unity group' was basically opposed to rearmament and a consolidation of the American alliance.

It required, however, a combination of favourable circumstances to bring the long drawn out negotiations to a successful conclusion.
For the first three years after unification, left and right in the united Socialist Party coexisted on the basis of the unified platform. This platform, as we have seen, made no mention of neutralism, but used instead the term 'self-reliant independence'. Although this was a considerable verbal concession to the Right Wing, the Left had made few concessions of substance in foreign policy and defence.\(^1\) In January 1959, however, the Party's Central Committee adopted the phrase 'positive neutrality' as the basis of its foreign policy.\(^2\) The actual content of 'positive neutrality' did not represent a radical break with the policies which had immediately preceded it (although the name was new), or indeed with the neutralist theories of the former Left Socialists. In so far as it did differ from the latter, the difference was clearly explicable as a reaction to intervening changes in the international situation: for instance, 'positive neutrality' included a programme of unilateral nuclear disarmament, which was obviously introduced because of the increased number and refinement of nuclear weapons (and their means of delivery)
in the hands of the two major powers. Nevertheless, the change in name from 'self-reliant independence' to 'positive neutrality' was symbolic and significant in that it meant a return to a concept which had been associated with the Left rather than with the Right and had been excluded, at the insistence of the Right, from the unified platform.

It will be the contention of this chapter that the new policy was in part a response to currents in international and domestic politics, and in part a reflection of a leftward drift in the JSP itself.

At a time, such as prevailed immediately after the reunification of the Japanese Socialists, when Stalinist attitudes in the world Communist camp had been relaxed, even the right wing of the united Socialist Party became willing to concede that a 'Locarno' arrangement, permitting the dissolution of Japan's exclusive security ties with the United States, might well be practicable in the not distant future, and that Japan could do much, as an uncommitted power, to relax tension in the Far East. Despite the stiffening of Cold War antagonisms which followed the Suez and Hungary crises of October – November 1956, Japan's admission to membership of the United Nations in December 1956 encouraged Socialists to think that Japan (presumably under a Socialist government) could have an
important platform for the expression of an independent voice in world affairs - the voice of a 'member of the Asian and African group, working for the peace of Asia and the world'.

At this period Socialists of all shades in Japan tended to agree that the Asian and African countries were so placed that they had a most effective part to play in the relaxation of international tension. The Bandung Conference of April 1955 was felt to have done much to increase their weight in world affairs. The role of both the United Nations and the Afro-Asian group was emphasised as of especial importance in bringing the Suez affair to a conclusion.

As we have argued, the former Right Socialists as well as their Left Wing rivals to a greater or lesser extent wanted a kind of 'third force' role for Japan. Where they differed was that the Left was more anti-American than anti-Communist and the Right was more anti-Communist than anti-American. The two had a reasonable chance of agreeing when there seemed some genuine hope for at least limited international détente by mediation. Nevertheless, in questions closer to home than, say, Suez, there remained substantial divergences of opinion between right and left wings of the united party. With more tense international,
domestic and intra-party circumstances in 1959 these were brought to the point of an open break. Even in 1956 considerable differences were expressed on certain questions.

The most important political task of the Hatoyama Government (1955-56) was to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In this aim Hatoyama had the backing of the Socialists, who had long deplored the fact that the two countries had been estranged following Japan's independence, and that the Peace Treaty had been of such a nature that the Soviet Union had refused to sign it. The settlement which Hatoyama finally concluded in November 1956 after long negotiations stopped short of a peace treaty but included the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. The most intractable problem which the negotiators had to face was the question of sovereignty over certain territories to the north of Japan currently in Japanese hands (especially the South Kurile islands and some small islands off the coast of Hokkaidō, called Habomai and Shikotan). By the terms of the settlement the Soviet Union promised to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan on the eventual conclusion of a peace treaty, but no agreement was reached on the question of the South Kuriles. Although a settlement with the Soviet Union was a main plank of Socialist policy, the newly united JSP found itself divided
on the territorial issue. Former Left Socialists were generally prepared to accept territorial concessions for the sake of a peace treaty, and maintained that Japan should be prepared to relinquish her claim to the South Kuriles if it were necessary for this end. Former Right Socialists, on the other hand, were less prepared to concede 'Japanese territory'.

Similar differences within the Party also existed on the question of relations with China. The 1955 reunification agreement called for the restoration of relations with Communist China (as well as the Soviet Union). On the most difficult part of the China problem - the status of Taiwan - the agreement merely said that a peaceful settlement of international tension over Taiwan should be negotiated. This was a compromise formula: during the negotiations the Left had held that the Nationalist Chinese Government should no longer be recognised, and that a decision on the return of Taiwan to China should be made at a referendum of all Chinese inhabitants of both the mainland and Taiwan; the Right, on the other hand, had supported a 'two Chinas' formula as a provisional solution, while admitting that Taiwan should eventually return to China; meanwhile, it argued, a referendum of the inhabitants of Taiwan only should be held on this question.
In May 1956, however, the JSP Central Committee adopted (against the opposition of the right wing Nishio faction) a resolution on China in which proposals for United Nations control of Taiwan or for a referendum of the people of Taiwan, were opposed as interference in the internal affairs of China, and Taiwan was declared to be an integral part of China. 13

After the settlement with the Soviet Union in November 1956, the JSP began its attention to a wholehearted campaign to restore relations with Communist China. The 1957 Action Policy, drawn up during a period of intensive Chinese efforts for recognition, and during the existence of the short-lived Ishibashi Government which favoured closer relations with Communist China, called for a broad popular movement, inclusive of the business interests contemplating China trade but led by the JSP, for the restoration of relations. 14 At the same time the JSP made a slight break with previous policy by announcing that it would be prepared to cooperate with the Communist Party in mass campaigns for specific aims (such as that for the restoration of relations with Communist China), while still refraining from entering a general alliance or united front. This change in Socialist policy was related to the more flexible line being pursued by the JCP since its sixth
National Congress in July 1956. At this congress the Communists formally abandoned the 'ultra-leftist adventurism' (characterised by underground activity and violence) of their party since 1950. Instead they advocated cooperation with 'all progressive forces' (i.e. including the Socialists) in the fight against 'American imperialism'.

As part of its campaign for closer relations with Communist China the JSP sent a delegation (the first sent by the united party) to Peking in April 1957. A policy statement adopted on the eve of the delegation's departure confirmed in stronger language the leftward trend evident in the previous declaration of May 1956. The new statement categorically maintained that 'China is one and Taiwan is part of China. We do not recognise the existence of two Chinas'. The joint declaration of the JSP delegation and its Chinese hosts confirmed this stand, and called for restoration of relations between Japan and Communist China.

Meanwhile, considerable progress had been made towards closer trading links between the two countries. The third unofficial trade agreement, negotiated in May 1955 between the Chinese Communists and an unofficial Japanese trade delegation (which had tacit Government backing), had
been renewed for a further year in October 1956. The Hatoyama and Ishibashi Governments had adopted a fairly favourable attitude to non-governmental efforts being made to open up relations with Communist China. The Kishi Administration, however, which replaced that of Ishibashi in February 1957, while willingly consenting to an easing of the trade embargo against Communist China imposed by COCOM (Coordinating Committee) and CHINCOM (China Committee) - trade regulation committees consisting of representatives of Japan and all NATO countries except Iceland - otherwise showed itself more pro-American and anti-Chinese than its predecessors. In particular, a visit made by Kishi to Taiwan in July 1957 angered the Communist Chinese leadership.

After long and difficult negotiations a fourth unofficial trade agreement was concluded between Japan and Communist China in March 1958, including a provision for the exchange of permanent trade missions. The Nationalist Chinese Government, however, tried to put pressure on Japan and a dispute developed on whether the Communist Chinese trade mission in Japan should be allowed to fly its national flag. In May 1958 Peking used an incident in which its flag was hauled down by a Japanese youth in Nagasaki, as a pretext for the suspension of all trade with
Japan. Faced with this blow to its hopes of closer relations with Communist China, the JSP attacked the Kishi Government and called for direct government to government talks. 19

The JSP thus confronted a marked deterioration in the prospects for a permanent settlement with China. The responsibility for this could be laid, in part at least, upon Kishi and his 'tough' international line. The Socialists indeed now had to deal with a prime minister whose foreign policy was opposed to theirs at almost every point, and this naturally inclined them to greater intransigence.

Shortly after the Chinese cut off trade with Japan, formal negotiations began (in October 1958) between the Japanese and American Governments with the purpose of revising the Security Treaty between the two countries. While the Japanese Government, in revising the Security Treaty, was motivated by the desire to renegotiate a mutual treaty between equal and sovereign nations, 20 the JSP strongly opposed it, for the following reasons: 21 the Americans, the Socialist argued, wished to use Japan
as a nuclear base, and to bring her into a de facto 'North-East Asian Treaty Organisation' (embracing also the Phillipines, Taiwan and South Korea), thus strengthening the American strategic position in the Far East; Japan would have to give military assistance to the United States in contravention of the Constitution; the proposed provision for 'prior consultation' between the two Governments in case of a threat to the security of Japan or the Far East, was of little value to Japan unless she could veto American plans; the provision also provided a basis for the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, since the present Government at least was subservient to American wishes; the treaty would be considered provocative by the Soviet Union and Communist China, thus increasing the danger of world war and alienating Afro-Asian sentiment. With nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, she would be the likely target for a preemptive attack; finally, Japan would be required to increase her armed forces, thus increasing the burden of armaments to be borne by her people and imperilling democratic government.

There was nothing in these arguments indicating that the Socialists had much changed their ground from their
stand hitherto against the existing security treaty. The new initiative which the Kishi Government had taken, however, presented the prospect of a renewed and reinvigorated alliance with the United States. This, and the unfavourable turn in Japan – China relations, gave added urgency to Socialist campaigns for a foreign policy of 'self-reliant independence'.

Simultaneously, Communist China, following its severance of trade with Japan (which may well have been partially designed to influence the Japanese Lower House election of 22 May 1958 against Kishi), adopted other tactics. On 19 November 1958, Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, made a statement calling for an end to the Japanese – American alliance, saying:

The Chinese people unanimously support the fight of the Japanese people for independence, peace and democracy, and hope from the heart that Japan will become a country of peaceful neutrality.

This was followed by a similar statement from the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, on 2 December 1958. The call to neutrality in these statements struck a receptive chord in the JSP, whose Central Committee adopted 'positive neutralism' as the basis of the Party's foreign policy in January 1959.
'Positive neutrality' meant, according to the JSP's 1959 Action Policy (published later in the year), four things: non-participation in military blocs, non-interference in the Cold War, positive efforts to relax international tension and peaceful coexistence with all countries. It was argued that the implementation of such a policy could be expected to bring about true independence, peace and security for Japan and the relaxation of tension in Asia. Japan's international prestige would rise accordingly. Essentially, this policy differed little from the type of neutralism propounded by the Left Socialists between 1952 and 1955. A similar contrast was made between neutralism and the 'old-fashioned', 'negative' neutrality of countries such as Switzerland. A similar stress was laid on the importance of maximizing the number of neutralist nations in order to relax the international tensions of the Cold War, and on the necessity of creating a viable alternative foreign policy to a security treaty with the United States. The JSP (or sections of it) did not attempt to conceal the connection between its new policy and the Chinese and Soviet statements mentioned above. An article in a newspaper associated with the leftist Wada faction stated that the announcements of Chinese and Soviet support for Japan's neutralism, and the simultaneous negotiations by the Kishi Government for the
revision of the Security Treaty, had aroused interest once more within the JSP in neutralist ideas. The article also, by recalling the history of conflict within the Socialist movement between the time of the enunciation of the 'Four Peace Principles' and reunification, left little doubt that the new policy was a leftist deviation from the previous position of the united party. 26

Two specific items in the new policy, however, were of recent origin and reflected a changed international and domestic situation. One was that Japan should make a unilateral declaration banning nuclear weapons from Japanese soil. The other was the related idea that Japan should work for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East. According to the 1959 Action Policy, the nuclear-free zone was to cover an area of Asia and the northern Pacific including territory belonging to the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Korea. 27 The origin of these proposals was the 1957 Rapacki Plan for the nuclear disengagement of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces from a zone comprising most of the countries of central Europe, 28 and reflected an increased concern about the dangers of the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. In part, this derived from the wave of anti-nuclear feeling which had swept Japan following the showering of a fishing boat with
with radioactive ash from an American nuclear test in the Pacific in March 1954. In the following year Gensuikyō (The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons) was founded, initially as a non-partisan body (from about 1958 it began to acquire an increasingly left wing colouring), and allegedly collected during 1955 and 1956 nearly forty million signatures to a petition calling for a ban on nuclear weapons. The possible introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan either for use by the American forces or the Japanese Self-Defence Forces became an important issue between the Government and the Socialists between 1955 and 1959. The introduction of Honest-John missiles into Japan in August 1955 for the American forces caused widespread misgivings, since it was known that these missiles were able to be equipped with nuclear warheads. The issue arose again in January 1958 when the Japan–United States Security Committee decided that American Sidewinder missiles, without nuclear warheads, should be provided for the use of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces. Although no nuclear weapons of any kind were known to have been brought into Japan, the suspicion that they would be was frequently expressed by Socialists and others who opposed the Government. Socialist publications sometimes quoted examples of statements allegedly made by Americans in
leading Government positions to the effect that the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles carrying nuclear warheads was under active consideration.30 Another factor which tended to contribute towards greater Socialist concentration on the issue of nuclear weapons was that all American land combat troops were withdrawn from Japan by the end of 1957. This considerably reduced the amount of land requisitioned for American bases, and thus removed some of the point from the Party's campaign against American bases, which had occupied much of its energies during 1956.31

Despite the novelty of the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Socialist thinking in 1958-59, it bore certain similarities to the 'third force' aspect of LSP neutralism between 1952 and 1955. One exposition of the policy, for instance, saw a non-nuclear zone as an extension of the 'central belt' of neutralist 'Arab and Asian countries' into the Far East; if disengagement were also to be accomplished in Europe, there would be a neutral (or at least nuclear-free) zone extending through all the major areas of Cold War tension, with a resultant lessening of the risk of nuclear war (especially from local provocation).32

A possible further indication of the 'leftist' character of positive neutrality in the context of what had preceded it was that the Central Committee of the JCP also
adopted 'neutralism' as a plank of its policy shortly before the JSP did so. As has been indicated above, a rapprochement (limited to cooperation in mass movements) had taken place between the two parties since 1957. The Chinese Communists, in calling for a neutral Japan may have calculated that they could bring Japanese Socialists and Communists still closer together in a united front against the anti-Chinese policies of the Kishi Government. In the event most Socialists rejected the JCP's conversion to neutralism as insincere, but nevertheless cooperated with Communists in the subsequent campaign against the Security Treaty. The Communist policy left no doubt about the aim of its 'neutralism', specifically stating that it was directed against the United States and the Security Treaty.  

An opportunity was shortly to be given for the orientation of the Socialist 'positive neutrality' to be subjected to a practical test. In March 1959 a second JSP delegation visited Communist China. The communique which resulted from the visit was much more forthright and uncompromising than that of April 1957. It called for immediate restoration of diplomatic relations, the conclusion of a peace treaty and abolition of the Peace Treaty signed in 1952 between Japan and Nationalist China.
(This latter item had been implied in the previous JSP rejection of the 'two Chinas' theory, but not specifically stated in the 1957 joint statement).35

As a result of the 1959 delegation to China, moreover, the JSP found itself committed to an even more anti-American and pro-Chinese position than was implied in its joint communique. This was because of a remark allegedly made in a speech by the leader of the delegation and Secretary-General of the Party, Asanuma Inejirō, that 'American imperialism is the common enemy of the peoples of Japan and China'. This statement caused much hostile comment in the Japanese press.36

The circumstances in which the 'Asanuma statement' was made remain obscure, but it seems probable that clever exploitation by the Chinese once the statement had been made effectively committed the JSP delegation to a more radical position than it had planned to adopt. According to a critical member of the 1962 JSP delegation to China, which unexpectedly confirmed the 'Asanuma statement' (see below, Chapter 8), the cause of the trouble was that the Chinese press seized upon Asanuma's remarks and quoted them out of context; what he had in fact said included what could be taken as a qualification of the 'statement' as subsequently relayed to Japan:
In so far as it has occupied and equipped with nuclear weapons both Taiwan, which is Chinese soil, and Okinawa, which is Japanese soil, and has turned them into Far Eastern bases, American imperialism must be harmful to, and the common enemy of, the peoples of Japan and China.  

Even if 'in so far as' is to be construed as a qualification of what follows, however, the sentiment of these words was sufficiently radical to cause dissension within the 1959 delegation. According to one of its leading members, the following was the course of events: When the delegation arrived, Asanuma made a speech in which the phrase 'American imperialism is the common enemy of the peoples of Japan and China' occurred. At a later exchange of speeches Asanuma again made a speech in which he included the same words. This time, however, other members of the delegation had seen the manuscript in advance, and agreed that the phrase did not occur in it. In the opinion of the informant, it was inserted soon before delivery at the instigation of a North Korean official who was a friend of Asanuma. The Chinese side strongly urged that the phrase be inserted into the joint communique, but the members of the Japanese delegation discussed this and decided that it was impossible. They made, however, one concession, namely that in the reference in the joint communique to the Japan – Nationalist China Peace Treaty, the word kaishō
(dissolution) should be changed to the stronger haiki (abolition). According to the informant, the phrase about American imperialism could not be inserted into the joint communique because of the current crisis over the offshore islands, in which Communist China desired JSP support; if the delegation agreed to insert the phrase, the JSP would be committed to support of Communist China in the event of a Chinese attack on American armed forces, and this seemed excessively dangerous. 39

The above discussion of trends in JSP thinking on foreign policy from 1955 to 1959 makes it clear that the policy had, for one reason or another, come to take on a more left wing colouring over the period. It remains to be shown that there was a connection between this trend and a general leftward drift which had taken place in the party. 40

The 1955 unification agreement was promoted by a coalition of the Suzuki and Kawakami factions - the leading factions of the former Left and Right Socialists respectively. The Suzuki faction attained increasing dominance in this partnership, retaining the Party Chairmanship in the hands of its leader, Suzuki Mosaburō, until 1960. At the 1958 Congress the faction consolidated its hold on the Executive, gaining seven of the leading party posts, as against the following scores for the other
factions: Kawakami - 5, Nishio - 3, Wada - 1, Matsumoto - 1, Nomizo - 0. The Suzuki and Kawakami factions thus together held a substantial majority over all other factions combined. The fact, moreover, that the Kawakami faction was very weakly based in the trade unions, gave it less weight in the councils of the party than the Suzuki faction, which had strong backing from Sohyō.

Certain events in 1958, however, exacerbated the fissiparous tendencies which had been temporarily overcome in the unification agreement of 1955. In particular the disappointing result of the 1958 Lower House election gave rise to mutual recrimination between different factions on the reasons why the successes registered by the Party in elections between 1950 and 1956 had apparently come to a halt.41

On the left, an article by Professor Sakisaka of Shakaishugi Kyōkai became the rallying point for the extreme left. In his article Sakisaka criticised the 1955 unification agreement for diluting the true revolutionary doctrine according to which the organised mass of workers must be prepared to seize power from the capitalists by force if necessary. He therefore advocated mass action by the working class.42 The three left wing factions of the JSP (Wada, Nomizo and Matsumoto) also backed this line, as
did the leadership of Sohō. The fact that the Sohō leaders had come to support Sakisaka's version of revolutionary organisation was of especial significance. At the Sohō Congress of July 1955 Takano had been voted out of control of Sohō and replaced by the leadership of Ōta Kaoru and Iwai Akira, who had been mounting a challenge to Takano since 1953. By this change, Takano's emphasis on mass movements for extremist political ends gave way to a more sober concentration on ad hoc economic objectives. One writer sums up the guiding philosophy of Ōta as a compound of five principles, viz: 1) not to underestimate the power of the capitalists; 2) not to overestimate the power of labour; 3) to avoid campaigns for purely political ends; 4) to aim at trade union unity on an industry basis by concentrating on ad hoc struggles for better conditions; 5) to support the concept of a 'class party'.

The backing given by Sohō for the 'Sakisaka Thesis', however, marked a departure from these principles. The success of the tactics used by the JSP against the Police Duties Bill in November 1958 increased the popularity of direct action and mass movements on the left of the JSP and in Sohō. The mass movement against the Police Duties Bill was of unprecedented size, and for the first time Zenrō, (a federation of right wing unions which had broken with
Sōhyō in 1954) which supported the staunchly gradualist Nishio faction of the JSP, participated alongside the more militant Sōhyō. The reasons for the leftward trend of Sōhyō must be sought in long-term organisational and economic changes within the trade union structure, and in the stronger resistance of employers to union demands since the advent of the Kishi Administration. Meanwhile, the influence of Sōhyō over the left wing factions of the JSP had significantly increased since the early 1950's. Its dominance was demonstrated by the compliance of the Suzuki faction (despite its predominant position on the Executive) with an appeal by Sōhyō in December 1958 for the Socialist Party to adopt a more revolutionary approach to the question of power.

On the right, the Nishio faction forcefully attacked the leftist trends visible in the Party, and began openly to spread its own doctrine of a 'People's Party', not exclusively dependent upon organised labour, and of scrupulous adherence to parliamentary principles. In foreign policy the faction alleged that the Party leadership had become virulently pro-Communist and anti-American; it also called for something more constructive than mere outright opposition to revision of the Security Treaty. Although the introduction of 'positive neutrality' in
January 1959 must be seen as part of a drift to the left and away from the policy decided on in 1955, it also gave a weapon to the Nishio faction with which it could oppose what it saw as a trend towards a pro-Communist alignment. Thus Sone Eki, its chief spokesman on foreign affairs, in a published debate with a member of extreme left wing Heiwa Dōshikai in March 1959, spoke as follows:

The basis of our policy is to be critical of all imperialism, war forces and struggles for power, and in this sense we take a position of self-reliant independence and positive coexistence.51

Sone thus specifically disagreed with his Marxist opponent, who saw 'capitalist imperialism' as the unique cause of war and thought that Communist countries were by definition incapable of aggression. (Neutralism was therefore possible only because the Communist powers were stronger).52

During 1959 the dispute between the left wing factions and the Nishio faction became more and more acrimonious, and finally led to a complete break in October. Following a censure motion at the September Congress against Nishio, his faction, followed by some members of the Kawakami faction, seceded and formed the Socialist Club (later the Democratic Socialist Party, or DSP). The new party came to take a more pro-Western view of foreign policy than had the Nishio
faction between 1955 and 1959 when, presumably, its stand was affected by the need to compromise. The DSP called for Japan to support the Western camp while maintaining wide freedom of action for her own diplomacy. 53

The leftward drift of the JSP in foreign policy was one manifestation of the trend to the left in general policy. Both were influenced by what was considered to be the ultra-reactionary nature of the Kishi Government, which assumed office in 1957. 54 Kishi's foreign policy aims (including revision of the Security Treaty, strengthening of the Self-Defence Forces, revision of the Constitution to emasculate the pacifist clause, and coolness towards Communist China) gave rise to mounting resentment, as did some of his domestic policies. This resentment showed itself in more radical forms of anti-Government campaign, such as that against the Police Duties bill, and later, against revision of the Security Treaty.

Apart from this external influence, however, the balance of factions within the Party strongly affected its policy as a whole. The unification compromise had been organised for their mutual benefit by the moderate left and the moderate right, in circumstances which permitted moderation in policy. From 1958 electoral and organisational stagnation, as well as the policies of the Kishi Government, tended to polarize
the extreme right and the extreme left. The ideological struggle centred on two uncompromising figures, Sakisaka and Nishio, and the centre factions were forced to commit themselves to one side or the other. Because of its strong Sōhyō connections, it is not surprising that the Suzuki faction swung from its centre position to an alliance with the extreme left, after the Sōhyō leadership had done the same. It is more surprising, however, that Asanuma, long associated with the Kawakami faction, should have maintained his alliance with Suzuki by following him along extremist paths which alienated the Kawakami faction itself.\textsuperscript{55} One informant suggested that Asanuma, after an almost uninterrupted tenure of the top posts in the postwar Socialist movement, was reluctant to break with Suzuki and thus jeopardise his position.\textsuperscript{56}

However this may be,\textsuperscript{57} Asanuma, by shifting his loyalty to the extreme left, weakened such cohesion as the moderate centre, represented by the Kawakami faction, might have had in the ensuing crisis over the Security Treaty. The 'Asanuma statement', whatever its original motivations, became symbolic of an extremist anti-Americanism associated with the Suzuki - Asanuma leadership. 'Positive neutrality', as introduced into the JSP in January 1959 and as interpreted
by much of the left, was an 'anti-American' weapon, and it was only after the replacement of the Suzuki - Asanuma partnership in 1960 that the way was open for the introduction of a more moderate form of neutralism.
Between 1960 and 1963 the JSP proved unable to maintain either outward consistency or internal agreement about the interpretation of its foreign policy of 'positive neutrality'. In the immediate aftermath of the mass campaign against revision of the Security Treaty in May and June 1960, the Party subjected its foreign policy to a reappraisal which resulted in a line more moderate (at least in emphasis) than that which had prevailed over the previous months. In January 1962, however, an official Socialist delegation to Peking reaffirmed the 'Asanuma statement' of March 1959 that 'American imperialism is the common enemy of the peoples of Japan and China' (with its implication that Japan should adhere closely to the Communist bloc). This in turn contrasted with Socialist struggles to save the peace movement from Communist domination (foreign and domestic), and to assert the principle of opposition to nuclear testing by Communist as well as by capitalist powers.

It is the contention of this chapter that while international events and domestic politics indeed helped to shape JSP foreign policy over this period, much of the inconsistency which that policy showed should be attributed
to the vagaries of factional manoeuvre at a time when the location of leadership was in transition and fundamental ideological questions were being reassessed. For much of the postwar period it was possible to range the seven or eight factions of the JSP along an ideological spectrum, according to which alliances and hostilities were formed. This was particularly so in the case of foreign policy, where factions could be placed on a stable continuum from pro-Communism at the extreme left through gradations of neutralism incorporating greater or lesser degrees of anti-Americanism, to an anti-Communist alignment with the 'Free World' on the far right. An example of this is to be found in the positions of the various factions during negotiations for unification in 1955. After about 1960, however, the factional situation became more fluid, with a resultant partial breakdown in the relationship between a faction's ideology and its motivations for alliance with other factions. The development of the attitudes of the JSP factions to neutralism in foreign policy gives a clear example of this trend.

On 24 June 1960, shortly after the ratification of the revised Security Treaty and the consequent ending of the campaign against it, the CEC of the JSP endorsed a statement of aims, which were summarised as '... the establishment of
a Government for the protection of the Constitution, of democracy and of neutralism'. The policy of neutralism was described in the Party's official newspaper in much the same terms as had been customary since the Socialist adoption of 'positive neutrality' in January 1959. Non-alignment with any military bloc, an international guarantee for Japan, friendly relations with all countries, total world disarmament, had all figured in the former statements of policy, and appeared again in the new. In the months following the campaign against the Security Treaty, however, the gloss put upon the policy in Party expositions significantly changed. Instead of the exclusive anti-Americanism of the 'Asanuma statement', it was now stressed that since the Soviet bloc countries represented one side of the Cold War, neutralism implied that Japan should preserve her independence as much from them as from the United States. Part of the explanation for the change of emphasis seems to be that the association of Socialists with Communists in the mass demonstrations was followed by a reaction against this association within the JSP. Thus the Party now once more roundly denounced Communist 'neutralism' as a sham. It also countered DSP criticism of a pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese bias in JSP neutralism hitherto by insisting that although Socialists had perhaps given the impression of
one-sided anti-Americanism in the campaign against the Security Treaty, they were equally opposed to the anti-Japanese clause in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1950 (the only difference being that they were in a position to do something about the former but not about the latter).  

As an earnest of its intention to deepen relations with the United States as well as with the Soviet Union and Communist China, the JSP proposed to send delegations to all three countries to explain its policies. The plan to send a delegation to the United States was strongly criticised by the JCP, but the Socialists replied that the election of President Kennedy heralded a period of greater flexibility in American policy. It soon became evident, however, that this idea did not command the unanimous approval of the Party. The dissenting voices were led by the pro-Communist faction Heiwa Dōshikai. Internal division as well as disillusion with the Kennedy administration's foreign policy, and especially the confirmation of American-Japanese solidarity under the revised Security Treaty at the Ikeda-Kennedy conference of June 1961, led the JSP to shelve its plan.

The delegation to the Soviet Union took place as planned, but the question of sending a third delegation to Communist China raised the difficult question whether the
Party should reaffirm the 'Asanuma statement' of 1959. After repeated delays, a delegation, under the chairmanship of Suzuki Mosaburō, left for Peking in January 1962. The resultant joint communique agreed by the delegation and its Chinese hosts, contained the following words:

The statement made by the head of the second JSP delegation to China, Asanuma Inejirō, that 'American imperialism is the common enemy of the peoples of Japan and China'... is totally consistent with the objective facts. Both sides agreed that the spirit bequeathed by Asanuma Inejirō should be exalted, and the struggle of the Japanese and Chinese peoples against American imperialism should be further encouraged.11

No agreed view was issued about the JSP policy of 'positive neutrality', which the Chinese side was reported to regard as 'Titoist' and a 'third force argument'.12 Instead, in the joint communique, the views of each side on the subject were placed consecutively as an 'exchange of views'. The Chinese expressed support for the neutralisation of Japan, but specifically interpreted this in the negative sense of an end to Japan's American connection; in this case it would be up to the Japanese to choose their social system, and China would not force a military alliance upon Japan.13 The JSP delegates, on the other hand, declared enthusiastically that if Japan became an unarmed neutral state, this would be the greatest possible guarantee of peace in Asia.14 According to one member of the delegation,
the Japanese found themselves in sharp disagreement with their Chinese hosts, particularly on the question of reaffirming the 'Asanuma statement', and on the emphasis which should be placed on general disarmament and peaceful means of settling international disputes; according to this delegate, the talks were nearly broken off on two or three occasions.¹⁵

Although the delegation was clearly under great pressure from the Chinese side to express support for a militantly anti-American line, it seems that the Chinese were abetted by JSP delegates who belonged to the pro-Communist Heiwa Dōshikai. The membership of the delegation was more heavily weighted in favour of this faction than was warranted by its strength within the Party, and was weighted in favour of the current group of left wing anti-leadership factions by a proportion of two to one.¹⁶ The leader of the delegation, Suzuki Mosaburo, whose faction had, as has been seen in previous chapters,¹⁷ a significantly different ideological background from that of Heiwa Dōshikai (though both were Marxists), was clearly placed in an embarrassing position. After the return of the delegation to Japan, Suzuki, who as its leader bore the main responsibility for the joint communique, justified the position he had taken in an article which analysed the controversy over the 'Asanuma
statement'. He maintained that the statement had first been made (in 1959) as a slogan or catchword, and not included in the joint communique of the 1959 delegation; it was, however, subsequently taken up and used for the purposes of hostile propaganda by the conservatives. He then attempted to reconcile the 1962 joint communique with Party policy and with his own ideology:

The policy of the delegation was to talk with China in such a way as not to harm the prestige of Asanuma, who was murdered by fascism. While for China American imperialism is the only enemy, this is not so for the JSP. For the JSP the basic aim is to achieve peace and democracy through democratic means, against the conservative reactionaries — the monopoly capitalists — who control all classes of the people. Thus I think that the JSP can use the word 'enemy' against American imperialism and against Japanese monopoly capital. In any case, the JSP differs from China in having its own opponents at home, and the struggle against American imperialism is fought independently within this basic domestic struggle. We must not, however, be blind to the fact that Japan is enveloped in the atmosphere of American imperialism, and that the people are suffocated. I believe that this is the true significance of the 'Asanuma statement'.

The tension between Suzuki's own faction and Heiwa Dōshikai came to the surface shortly after the Upper House elections of 1 July 1962, when Suzuki formally retracted his reaffirmation of the 'Asanuma statement', stating that he had been forced to lend his name to the joint communique by members of the delegation affiliated with Heiwa Dōshikai. The motives for this retraction remain obscure, but it is
probable that it reflected a desire on the part of Suzuki to assert the independence of his faction in the face of ideologically militant and embarrassing factional allies. Heiwa Dōshikai, as was seen in previous chapters, only paid lip service to the concept of neutralism, and although it received some support or acquiescence from the Suzuki faction, there was a most fundamental difference between its views on foreign policy and those of other factions of the Party.

The history of the peace movement between 1960 and 1963 showed that this difference was one of great and increasing ideological moment. Gensuikyō (The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons), founded in 1955 in the aftermath of the 'Bikini Incident' (when Japanese fishermen were caught in the fallout of an American hydrogen bomb test), had come under increasing Communist domination. At its congress of August 1961, Socialists and Communists clashed on the question of nuclear testing. The final resolution of the congress declared that the government which first broke the current nuclear test moratorium should be censured as the enemy of peace and humanity. It went on, however, to criticise American imperialism as the main cause of international tension. The JSP, Sohyō, and two other organisations affiliated with Gensuikyō issued a dissenting
resolution attacking the Gensuikyō Executive for its autocratic method and extreme objectives. At the same time the JSP Party organ criticised the leaders of the peace movement for minimizing the danger of East-West conflict and the considerable responsibility of the Soviet Union for current hardening of international tension. The fact that it was the Soviet Union that broke the test moratorium shortly afterwards greatly exacerbated the differences between the JSP and the JCP. The Communist organ, Akahata, reacted immediately to the Soviet announcement with a statement that 'since the Soviet Union is a peace force, nuclear tests are a natural defensive measure'. Rejecting Socialist criticism of the Soviet action for increasing world levels of radio-activity, Akahata stressed that 'the main danger is not fallout, but that nuclear war will be unleashed by American imperialism'.

One Socialist leader, in a trenchant article, sharply attacked the Communist idea that Soviet tests had a beneficial nature which could not be attributed to those of the United States. He called for a peace movement based on 'positive neutrality':

There is no real way of distinguishing the different sides which manufacture nuclear weapons. Whichever side starts a war, it will result in the death of humanity. Fallout falls on both sides alike. Of course the Soviet Union does restrict...
the power of imperialism, but if we were to support
the idea that peace should be preserved by a
balance of power situation, no movement to preserve
peace would come into existence... We want to
change the present world situation of the balance of
terror, and, by abolishing nuclear weapons and by
bringing about total disarmament, to root out power
politics as such.26

This firm attitude against the Communists by the Socialist
leadership placed the pro-Communist Heiwa Dōshikai in a
difficult position. In these circumstances it was not easy
for the faction to voice opinions identical with those of
the JCP. Instead, it compromised, and held that although
American and Soviet nuclear tests were 'qualitatively
different', it was important to try to stop both because of
nuclear fallout.27

Gensuikyō, torn between Socialists and Communists,
passed a resolution condemning the Soviet breaking of the
test moratorium, but attributing its cause to the previous
series of French tests and to recent alleged aggressive
actions on the part of NATO.28

At the Gensuikyō Congress one year later (August 1962)
the two sides made no attempt to compromise. Instead the
Socialists spared no means, including physical force, in an
attempt to gain control of the Communist dominated platform,
and when they failed, walked out of the Congress. The
coincidence of another series of Soviet tests with the
Congress gave added point to the controversy. A new significance was given to the dispute between Communists and Socialists in the peace movement by the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict early in 1963. The Gensuikyō Congress of August 1963 coincided with the signing of a partial nuclear test ban treaty, of which the principal signatories were the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, but which was denounced by Communist China. The Socialists, consistent with their opposition to nuclear testing by any power, welcomed the treaty, while the Communists, who had tended to side with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute, championed the Chinese rejection. In these circumstances Gensuikyō finally and apparently irrevocably split.

The issue of nuclear testing, and finally the Sino-Soviet dispute, served, by the measure of disagreement with the JCP, to confirm the leadership of the JSP in its policy of 'positive neutrality'. In recent years its most leftist and intransigent statements had been made at least partly at the instigation of Peking. The Socialists had made consistent efforts to improve Japan's relations with Communist China, and on occasion these efforts had put weapons into the hands of the extreme leftists within the JSP. Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet dispute changed this situation. China's pronouncements on the inevitability of
war with 'imperialism', her attack on India in late 1962, her declared aim of becoming a nuclear power, and her denunciation of the test ban treaty, alienated many Socialists in Japan. Relations between the JSP and Communist China became increasingly cool, although there was a small 'pro-Chinese' wing of the JSP in Heiwa Dōshikai.

Despite, however, the importance of external issues such as nuclear testing and the Sino-Soviet dispute, the determination of foreign policy was also strongly affected by a power struggle within the JSP. This power struggle was itself concerned with the introduction into the Party of a new ideological approach to revolution and to the establishment of socialism, called 'Structural Reform'. The introduction of this theory had two important effects on foreign policy: Firstly, it somewhat strengthened the hand of Heiwa Dōshikai (which opposed Structural Reform wholeheartedly on ideological grounds) within a group of anti-leadership factions whose opposition to Structural Reform was rather based on the fact that the factions supporting it dominated executive positions in the Party. Heiwa Dōshikai was thus able on occasion to gain wider support for aspects of its foreign policy views than would have otherwise have been possible. Secondly, although those factions which formed the leadership group agreed in
supporting Structural Reform. (at least for tactical purposes), they came to differ on the nature of 'positive neutrality'. It will be argued that this was partly because of the ideological nature of Structural Reform itself and partly because of latent power rivalries among the leadership factions themselves.

'Structural Reform' was first discussed by a small group within the Suzuki faction towards the end of 1958. It did not, however, become an issue in the dispute then raging between the Nishio faction and the factions of the left. A radical change in ideology was not to be expected under the combined Suzuki-Asanuma leadership, which had dominated the Party since 1955. In late 1960, however, the theory was introduced into the Party (after a period of discussion within the Executive) as its official policy. The JSP official organ explained its basic principles as follows:

The daily activities of the JSP, whose aim is the achievement of socialism, comprise a struggle to defend the everyday demands and interests of the working people, and through this to promote concrete social reform. The important thing, however, is that the Party does not make social reform an end in itself, but defines it as the road leading to socialism. It involves the concentration of the working masses in order to lessen and finally break the present control by monopolies, and in order to approach the attainment of power. This entails two methods of action. One is to effect a change in the nation's policies, in other words to convert a policy based on profit for the monopolies into a
policy based on profit for the people. The other is for the workers to intervene in the structure (relations of production) of capitalism, and thus to gain partial reform. These two methods are mutually related.

The implications of Structural Reform were that, by slow and steady pressure, involving compromise where necessary, the policies toward labour pursued by Government and business might be expected to change to such an extent as to create an atmosphere favourable to labour, at which time a socialist revolution could take place. The immediate electoral aim of the Party should be to elicit the cooperation of broad class interests in the formation of the previously mentioned 'Government for the protection of the Constitution, for democracy and neutralism'.

The theory of Structural Reform contrasted with left wing theories hitherto that all efforts should be concentrated on the achievement of a socialist revolution, since partial reform was largely futile. The difference lay in the greater flexibility of method which Structural Reform implied, combined with inflexibility in the final aim of socialist revolution.

If we ask to what extent personal ambitions and rivalries came into the argument over Structural Reform, we
enter a realm of speculation about inner motivations. Nevertheless an analysis may be attempted which gives due but not excessive weight to personal factors.

Firstly, by the end of 1960 it had become commonplace to deplore the failure of the Party to advance at successive elections. This, as we have seen, was an important reason for factional strife in 1958 and 1959. By 1960 it seemed that, if the Party were to appeal to a wider electorate, some new image of itself must be created.

Secondly, after the fall of the discredited Kishi Cabinet in June 1960, the appearance of a new Prime Minister emphasising parliamentary moderation and saying, plausibly, that he would double incomes within ten years, showed that the Socialists needed an alternative programme capable of competing with that of the Government in its attractiveness to an electorate already geared to a rapidly rising standard of living.

Thirdly, the experience of struggles not confined to the Diet, particularly the struggle against the Police Duties Bill and the struggle against revision of the Security Treaty, as well as a prolonged and bitter strike at the Miike coal field, while indicating the potentialities of such
struggles, suggested that intransigence and refusal to compromise at any point with Government or capital, could be detrimental to the Socialist cause. 35

These factors show that by the end of 1960 there was a favourable atmosphere for the introduction of Structural Reform.

Eda Saburō, provisional Chairman of the JSP after the death of Asanuma, and the chief advocate of Structural Reform, expressed this as follows:

The activities of the year (1960) revealed an unprecedented explosion of popular energy, but the problem was that the Party leadership was weak and there was a lack of vision. The Ikeda Government's policy of strengthening the military alliance on the one hand and doubling the national income on the other, needed urgently to be answered... We have failed to adapt the Party to the modern world and to give an image of the future to release the latent energies of the people. 36

At least equally important, however, were the profound changes which were overtaking the balance of leadership by 1960.

Since 1955 the Suzuki and Kawakami factions had jointly formed the leadership group, and the Party was led by Suzuki and Asanuma from these two factions respectively. With the defection of the Nishio faction at the end of 1959, followed by a considerable part of the Kawakami faction, the Suzuki faction was left in the most powerful position in the Party.
Between the Congresses of October 1959 and March 1960, the JSP was ruled by an Executive consisting almost entirely of Suzuki faction members, and although this was a provisional arrangement, the faction secured as many executive posts as the other factions combined at the March 1960 Congress.

Prior to the March 1960 Congress Suzuki himself resigned from the Chairmanship, supporting Asanuma as his successor. The remnant of the Kawakami faction, however, put up Kawakami himself as a rival candidate, who received a considerable number of votes from delegates anxious to stem further secessions from his faction, and thus further weakening of the JSP. He was defeated by Asanuma, but only narrowly (by 228 votes to 209). As Secretary-General the Suzuki faction sponsored Eda Saburō. Later in the year Asanuma was killed by a youth associated with ultra-Right Wing organisations, and Eda became de facto leader of the Party, although the post of Chairman was left vacant.

The circumstances in which Eda attained the Secretary-Generalship were unusual, in that he was previously a politician little known outside the Party, and regarded mainly as the expert within the Suzuki faction on agricultural matters. The man in line for the leadership of the faction upon the retirement of Suzuki, was Sasaki Kōzō, who for reasons of his own allowed Eda to be preferred to
himself for high office in March 1960. Eda could not, however, rely on the Suzuki faction for indefinite support, and therefore attempted to consolidate his position by other means.

In this aim he had two assets: firstly, the immediate aftermath of the anti-Security Treaty struggle, which resulted in the fall of the Kishi Government, produced an atmosphere favourable to a new theory which would tackle the repeatedly debated problems facing the Party. Secondly, on purely factional calculations, it was a good time to attempt the destruction of the factional basis of Party leadership which had existed since 1955, and to consolidate his own power on the basis of a new alignment of factions under his own leadership. This Eda proceeded to do without (initially at least) attempting to create a faction of his own.

The destruction of the old Party alignments was facilitated by the fact that, in contrast to the clear left-right divisions in the Party over most of the postwar period, opinions at first differed whether Structural Reform was a right wing or a left wing deviation. Tactically, it could be interpreted as to the right of the predominant left wing ideology which had been championed especially by the Suzuki and Wada factions. On the other hand, it differed from
'People's Party' theory of the Nishio faction, which repudiated the class-based Marxism of the left. The aim of Structural Reform was still a socialist revolution in favour of the working class. The methods of achieving it were to be flexible, and to take advantage of changed circumstances in capitalist society.

Another reason why the initial division over Structural Reform was not clearly a left-right schism, lay in the origin of the theory. Structural Reform originated in the Italian Communist Party in 1956, as a reaction to Khrushchov's speech at the CPSU 20th Congress, and as part of the process of destalinisation. In Japan it was in the Communist Party that interest in Structural Reform originated, among a group which was dissatisfied with the prevailing Chinese-influenced Party orthodoxy of 'a revolution of national liberation in collaboration with the national bourgeoisie'. The dissident group in the JCP adopted Structural Reform as a theory of revolution suitable for the advanced Japanese economy. Connections between the Structural Reform groups in the Communist and Socialist Parties existed from 1958, and after the Communist group was expelled from its own party in 1961, some of its members joined the JSP and became influential exponents of Structural Reform.
The reaction of the JSP to Structural Reform was complex, since on the factional level it was difficult to predict what alignments would take place, and on the ideological level the picture was also confused.

In 1960, the Suzuki faction was much the most powerful faction in the JSP. Sasaki, as Suzuki's heir-apparent and associate from the prewar period, had the reputation of a politician skilled in factional manoeuvre but lacking in popularity. He was, moreover, a poor speaker, impeded by a strong rural accent. Eda, on the other hand, received much attention in the mass-communication media after he had shown talent as a television personality during the party leader debates preceding the general election of November 1960.

When Structural Reform was first officially introduced to the Party in its election statement for the 1960 election, it was without delay subjected to criticism from various quarters. The initial reactions of Sasaki were guarded, but the differences between Eda (and his close associate Narita Tomomi) and the rest of the faction gradually hardened, until towards the end of 1961 these two proponents of Structural Reform, together with one or two sympathisers, dissociated themselves from the faction.
In the consequent Party division the Sasaki group (which, since Suzuki supported Sasaki, we shall now call the 'Suzuki-Sasaki faction') sought allies among those who also opposed Structural Reform. The result was a left wing combination similar in composition to that which in 1959 had forced the Nishio faction out of the Party. In 1961 the faction which came out most strongly against Structural Reform was Heiwa Došikai, but the theory was also opposed by Shakaishugi Kyōkai, led by Sakisaka, by the small and insignificant Nomizo faction, and by the top leadership of Sōhyō, especially Ōta. As in the case of its alliance against Nishio with the extreme left, the alliance of the Suzuki-Sasaki faction with Heiwa Došikai against Structural Reform was an alliance of groups having behind them a long history of ideological conflict. The Suzuki faction had long maintained that socialism could only be achieved by a revolution against Japanese monopoly capital, and its disavowal of communism was sanctioned by many years of bitter polemic. The Heiwa Došikai group, on the other hand, was both pro-Communist and believed that precedence should be given to a 'revolution of national liberation', thus supporting an ideological position which the Suzuki faction had long attacked.
On the other side those factions which came to support Structural Reform were the Kawakami and Wada factions and Eda's own 'faction' (of two or three members).

Of these the Kawakami faction was in a weak position after it split in 1959. In return for support by the Wada and Eda factions for the Party Chairmanship of Kawakami, the faction backed Eda, but was not regarded as having real pretensions to permanent leadership of the Party.

The role played, on the other hand, by the Wada faction indicated a complex relationship between factional manoeuvre and ideology. Its previous alliance with the extreme left wing had given it the reputation of being more leftist than the Suzuki faction. With the advent of Structural Reform, however, the faction was faced by a new balance of forces, and opportunities which were denied to it before. Members of the faction were initially reported to be opposed to Structural Reform, although Wada himself was careful not to reveal his own attitude. At the beginning of 1961 it appeared likely that the Wada faction would finally commit itself to the anti-Structural Reform camp, and rivalry developed between Wada and Eda. The widening split in the Suzuki-Sasaki faction, however, apparently gave an opportunity to the Wada faction to jockey itself into a position for future leadership. Thus
the faction's initial opposition to Eda and Structural Reform changed into opposition to Sasaki and identification with the Structural Reform group. 49

From the course of factional manoeuvre between 1960 and 1962 it seems reasonable to infer that rather than being treated as a purely ideological question, the theory was a counter in a factional struggle for control of the Party. The alliance of the Suzuki-Sasaki faction with Heiwa Dōshikai ran against the grain of long ideological conflict, and the alliance of the Wada faction with the supporters of Structural Reform was decided at a late stage on grounds of factional advantage.

Therefore it is possible to approach one conclusion, namely that ultra-left wing interpretations of (or deviations from) neutralism on the part of the Suzuki-Sasaki faction were (as in the reaffirmation of the 'Asanuma statement' of January 1962) dictated in large part by its 'alliance of convenience' with Heiwa Dōshikai. The traditional ideological basis for factional alliance had become less important than the exigencies of a power struggle.

It remains to examine the different interpretations of neutralism existing within the leadership group of factions.
Here again the conclusion will be reached that the factional struggle for power was at least as important as fundamental ideological or political differences in determining the positions taken by the faction leaders.

Neutralism was indeed a concept whose ambiguity led to divergences in interpretation. For a party strongly influenced by Marxism, neutralism as between the 'Socialist camp' and the 'capitalist camp' was hardly easy to rationalize. Nor was it made any easier by the fact that the foreign policy of the existing Japanese Government was fundamentally pro-American, and Japan had a mutual security treaty and economic links with the United States, which Socialists interpreted as prejudicial to Japanese independence. The fact, however, that 'neutralism' was an ambiguous term pointed the way to a method of rationalisation. The ambiguity lay in the difference between ideological and political neutralism. Neutralism in the sense of having (or expressing) no preference as between two rival concepts of the organisation of society, differed from neutralism in the sense of refusing to enter into military alliances with the nations constituting either of the rival blocs, even though the rivalry of these blocs derived in part at least from their contrasting ideologies. Since a refusal to enter into military alliances exclusively with either bloc
meant in practice an end to the existing security treaty with the United States, the latent ideological anti-Americanism of many Socialists was satisfied by what was formally a purely political neutralism.

Among the factions supporting Eda's Structural Reform group against the rival candidacy of Sasaki, a difference in interpretation of neutralism became apparent towards the end of 1961. The views of Eda and his immediate followers contrasted with those expressed by leading members of the Wada and Kawakami factions.

An article by Satō Noboru, an influential theorist of Structural Reform, who joined the JSP after seceding from the Communist Party with the dissident Kasuga faction in July 1961 and became the 'brains' behind Eda, had a clear and concise argument which was closely followed by Eda in subsequent foreign policy pronouncements. Satō argued that it was necessary to distinguish three aspects to the East-West struggle: firstly, the difference between the American and Soviet systems, defined respectively as 'imperialist' and 'socialist'. Secondly, a difference at the level of policy - between the peaceful policies of socialism and the warlike policies of capitalism. He argued that at these two levels, there was no possibility of neutrality for a Socialist. The East-West struggle was,
however, also an armed struggle between military blocs, and pregnant with the possibility of nuclear war. At this third level, he insisted, there must be neutralism in order to save the human race from nuclear destruction. It was, moreover, the 'peace policies' and the overall strength of the Soviet camp which rendered neutralism practical and desirable for a country such as Japan. The neutralism of Yugoslavia, on the other hand, should be criticised because 'it is demonstrably designed to expand Yugoslav influence' and 'in present international politics, and especially in the Cold War conflict, despite the fact that (Yugoslavia) is geographically and historically connected with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, she neglects her special duties of solidarity, and particularly those of collective defence'.

The paradoxical message of this article, that in order to get rid of the Cold War between rival military blocs, a country not in the 'front line' should be neutral, but that this neutralism was only made possible by the relative strength and 'peace policies' of the Soviet bloc, was not acceptable to all elements in the Party.

In particular Wada Hiroo, important in the Party both as faction leader and as Chairman of the Party International Bureau, interpreted 'positive neutrality' in a number of
articles\textsuperscript{52} in a much less pro-Soviet way. His argument coincided with that of Satō in that he placed the justification of neutralism in the prevention of war, especially between East and West, but he did not endorse (while not actually rejecting) the argument that for a Socialist ideological neutralism was impossible. Instead he stressed the efficacy of the non-aligned nations as a force for peace, irrespective of the type of political system which each nation might possess. He maintained that the adjective 'positive' employed in recent Socialist policy statements served to distinguish them from the 'third force' concepts of the former Left Socialist Party in that non-aligned countries now (as shown by the 1961 Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations) had much more sense of unity and strength than they had at that time. (Takano's argument at the Sōhyō Congress of 1953 that in order to preserve peace the 'forces of peace' - i.e. the Soviet bloc - should supported, had, he argued, though mistaken, some substance at the time because of the comparative weakness of the non-aligned countries).

The difference between Wada's approach and that of Satō was shown especially in that Wada stressed the role of mediation in international disputes as a function unconnected with the question whether the mediator was a
'Socialist' or a 'Capitalist'. Thus he showed favourable interest in the role, actual or potential, of the EEC countries and Britain as intermediate forces in the East West struggle, and to make his point completely clear, praised the mediation of the United States in the West Irian dispute of 1962.

The development of differences between Eda and Wada over the nature of neutrality was revealed in the formulation, at the end of 1961, of the JSP Action Policy for 1962. In November 1961 Eda issued a 'political report', which stated clearly that American 'imperialism' was a 'war force' and the Soviet Union a 'peace force' (The argument of the report was virtually identical with the above-cited article by Satō Noboru). Some parts of the report - notably a phrase ascribing the chief cause of East–West tension to American 'imperialism' - were amended at the insistence of other members of the Executive. According to press reports, Wada was chiefly instrumental in obtaining these amendments.

There were also two subsidiary issues on which Wada's views were pitted against those of Eda. The first related to a statement in the 'political report' that '... what is giving rise to ... tension in Asia is American imperialist
policies and the independent imperialist policies of the Ikeda Cabinet in alliance with them.\textsuperscript{57} The significance of this phrase was further explained as meaning that the United States (especially since the Ikeda - Kennedy conference of June 1961) was seeking to promote Japanese expansion in Korea\textsuperscript{58} and Taiwan as a bastion against Communism. Wada was reported to be opposed to this statement\textsuperscript{59} and the Executive withheld judgment on it for the next Party Congress.

The second question on which the two Party leaders differed was in their analysis of the power balance between Eastern and Western power blocs. Eda's 'Political Report' maintained that the balance was in the process of shifting decisively in the favour of the Communist bloc:

The difference between the Korean War crisis and the present crisis is that now capitalism is in the process of collapse. The bankruptcy of U.S. world policy, the change in U.S.-Soviet power relations in terms of military and economic strength, the collapse of the colonial system, the increase in the numbers of neutralist countries, unequal development within imperialism, bring deepening crisis to the imperialist system, and the imperialist countries, led by the United States, adopt the policy of increasing tension.\textsuperscript{60}

It should be noted that this view coincided with the position of Satō that it was the overall strength of the Soviet camp which permitted neutralism for a country like Japan. Wada, on the other hand, as has been mentioned, held
that the potential power of the non-aligned countries had much increased, but did not commit himself to a similar view about the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, he reportedly objected to the above-quoted passage in the 'Political Report', and held that capitalism was far from collapse.61

From this description of the different attitudes of neutralism of the factions supporting Structural Reform, it is evident that Wada and his faction had adopted a more right wing position than had Eda, Narita, and the hard core proponents of Structural Reform. This situation may be contrasted with that obtaining among the factions ranged against Structural Reform. Whereas Heiwa Dōshikai and the Suzuki-Sasaki faction, sharply divided on long-standing ideological issues, had partly merged their differences, Wada and Eda, long associated with almost identical ideological positions, had taken divergent paths on foreign policy.

It seems reasonable to suppose that, as in the case of the rapprochement of the Suzuki-Sasaki faction with Heiwa Dōshikai, foreign policy differences among the backers of Structural Reform were motivated by strategic considerations connected with the struggle for eventual leadership of the Party. The demise of the Suzuki - Asanuma leadership had left the field open for the rival claims of a number of
leaders, of whom Wada and Eda were obvious contenders. Eda, by the exploitation of Structural Reform, achieved and retained the Secretary-Generalship with the aid of the Wada and Kawakami factions, but an independent bid for the Chairmanship by Wada remained a strong possibility.

Since the reunification of the JSP in 1955 the Wada faction had, as it were, made a speciality of foreign affairs, and the Chairmanship of the JSP International Affairs Bureau had been in the hands of the faction for the majority of the period from 1955 to 1962. This contrasted with its relatively weak position in the Party for most of the same period. It may be argued that the faction's expertise on foreign affairs resulted in a more flexible approach to problems which other factions regarded as closely associated with ideology. This in turn enabled it to appear to lead the moderate wing of the Party in foreign affairs against the extremism associated with Heiwa Dōshikai. This paralleled the initiative that Eda had assumed in the field of domestic politics with the 'moderate' theory of Structural Reform - a theory which he developed in an even more 'moderate' direction between August and November 1962. The more equivocal position which Eda and Narita adopted in foreign affairs under the influence of ex-Communists such as
Sato made it more difficult for them to be the leaders of 'moderation'.

The vicissitudes of the neutralist argument in the JSP throughout the postwar era clearly indicates the importance of an ideologically oriented factionalism in the shaping of the Party's foreign policy in the context of domestic and international trends. The period following ratification of the revised Security Treaty, however, was characterised by a blurring of traditional ideological positions within the Party. In terms of these positions as they had divided the factions from each other hitherto, the Party should have been comparatively united following the secession of the Nishio faction in 1959. The factional struggle for power, however, possessed its own dynamism, in which foreign policy attitudes had come to be treated as matters subordinate to personal factional manoeuvre in a constant battle for control of the Party.
CHAPTER 9 THE NEUTRALIST CONTROVERSY AS A DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE PREVENTION OF WAR

In previous chapters, the course of the neutralist argument in the JSP has been traced. In this and the following two chapters the characteristics of that argument in the context of the international scene after World War II will be examined. This chapter will focus upon those aspects of neutralism concerned with problems of national security and the prevention of war. After a brief analysis of the nature of neutralism in the postwar world (in comparison with traditional neutrality), attention will be centred on the neutralist argument of the JSP, and an attempt will be made to relate the pacifist elements in the Party's neutralist policy to its analysis of Japan's position in changing international conditions.

According to Japanese Socialists in common with other supporters of neutralism, postwar neutralism differs fundamentally from prewar neutrality. The main alleged differences are two: firstly that neutralism is 'positive', while neutrality is 'negative'; secondly,
that neutrality means a policy essentially relevant to a
time of war, while neutralism comes into its own primarily
in time of peace, or rather, of Cold War.²

Let us examine these distinctions:

The idea that neutrality in its classic, European
ccontext, was a 'negative' concept - that it had no
constructive purpose in international relations, that its
effects could even be harmful and that it was at best an
instrument of national selfishness - was the result of an
analysis of neutrality made during a particular
historical period.³ The concept of neutrality evolved
through several centuries of European history, and it did
not always have the same connotations. The period during
which neutrality gradually developed its 'modern'
characteristics was the classic period of the European
balance of power, from the Treaty of Westphalia to World
War I. This period was characterised by local wars, in
which neutrals could hope for relative security. As pointed
out by Morgenthau, the concept of neutrality as it had
evolved during this period assumed that war was a legal
instrument of policy, and that any nation therefore had the
right to intervene on one side or the other as it saw fit.⁴

In the nineteenth century a whole series of obligations had
come to be placed on the neutral - obligations of a
stringency much in contrast with the easier neutrality of the eighteenth century and earlier - not to assist belligerents with manpower and arms, not to allow forces of a belligerent nation to use neutral territory for their operations, etc. Under the League, however, neutrality had come to be regarded with disfavour, because a fundamental principle of the League was a distinction between lawful and unlawful war, and because it laid a duty upon its members to assist a nation waging lawful war against unlawful aggression. The widespread unpopularity of neutrality between the wars was because it was thought to be incompatible with such duties.

Even between the wars, however, opinions were not lacking from representatives of the neutral nations themselves, challenging this interpretation. One such representative, writing in 1939, attacked existing definitions of neutrality in terms of 'impartiality' and 'non-participation', and criticised the current doctrine that the right of nations to be neutral was merely a minor qualification of the right of nations to wage war. He proposed instead that it was more in keeping with the historical aspirations of neutrality to stress the positive aims of keeping nations out of war, 'with all the moral and economic decay which accompanies it', and of
increasing the area of the world's surface which should be free from war. He cited among other examples the Armed Neutrality League of 1780, which established the Baltic as an unarmed zone where ships belonging to belligerent nations could not sail with intent to commit hostile acts. Here the neutral nations thought it their right and duty to enforce mediation between, and put pressure upon, belligerents. He maintained that this showed the true, positive, nature of neutrality, and that the 'passivity' and 'impartiality' thought of as characteristic of neutrality, were products of late nineteenth century European history.  

Neutralism originated in the expressed aims of foreign policy of Nehru and certain other Asian and Arab leaders in the late 1940's and early 1950's. One of their most distinctive ideas was that as a consequence of refusing to take sides in major international confrontations, and especially by refusing to join military alliances, it would be possible to exert positive efforts in the direction of peace. A typical example of such thinking was embodied in a speech by Nehru delivered in March 1949:

I feel that India can play a big part, and maybe an effective part, in helping to avoid war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined up with any group of Powers which for
various reasons are full of fear of war and preparing for war. That is the main approach of our foreign policy and I am glad to say that I believe that it is more and more appreciated.¹⁰

These sentiments were echoed on numerous occasions in subsequent years by Japanese Socialists.¹¹

There is no need to doubt the sincerity of these sentiments, nor the fact that neutralist nations in the postwar period sometimes fulfil a mediating and pacific role in particular disputes which they might not have found possible had they been 'aligned'. The success of neutralist nations acting together in the United Nations is also not to be denied.

It is not, however, possible to sustain the absolute contrast between postwar neutralism as something entirely positive and altruistic, and prewar neutrality as something negative and selfish. As we have seen, there was an element of altruism among traditional neutrals. Postwar neutralism, moreover, was not free from a number of 'negative' characteristics. If we examine either the speeches of Nehru, or the writings of the Japanese Socialists, or of many other neutralist leaders, we find an emphasis on certain aspects of purely national interest. Typically these might be grouped under the following headings: 1) Avoidance of excessive military
expenditure in order to concentrate on domestic economic development. 2) Avoidance of feared exploitation by foreign powers, and desire to assert national independence to the full. 3) The desire to avoid restrictions on trade. 4) The desire to obtain aid from both sides, if necessary by playing one off against the other. 5) The desire for national self-assertion, or leadership of other nations. While not all these motives apply to the neutralist policies of the JSP, some of them do, as will be seen in a later chapter.

The second alleged difference between neutrality and neutralism is that neutrality had reference to a time of war, while neutralism has reference primarily to a time of peace, or 'Cold War'.

The conditions which served to protect the neutrality in war of certain fortunately placed small countries against involvement in a large-scale war up to and including World War II, were obsolescent in the early 1940's and do not apply at all in a nuclear age. The method used by traditional neutrals to protect their neutrality was to ensure that in a war the gains that would accrue to a belligerent which committed aggression against them would not more than outweigh resultant disadvantages for the belligerent. This entailed military preparedness up to a
level greater than that normally contemplated by a nation of comparable size. In some cases, especially that of Switzerland, special geographical features facilitated the task of defence.\textsuperscript{13}

With the invention of nuclear weapons, the possibility of a neutral deterring the aggression of a nuclear power by conventional means virtually disappeared. The only guarantee of security in a nuclear war for a neutral relying on conventional weapons would be geographical remoteness from the scene of conflict, but in a world war this possibility no longer exists. The likelihood of a neutral escaping conquest or destruction in a world war is thus reduced to a question of chance, and has little to do with neutrality or non-neutrality.

That in spite of this the postwar world did not witness the demise, but rather the rebirth, of neutrality, was because of two factors, firstly, (and paradoxically) the invention of nuclear weapons, and secondly, the Cold War. The effect of these two factors was to make it possible to rationalise a policy of neutralism in time of peace. We shall discuss each in turn:

Firstly, the invention of nuclear weapons and technological innovations in their means of delivery has the effect of making it more difficult for a small power without
nuclear weapons to conduct its own defence against countries possessing nuclear weapons, except as part of an alliance with other nations possessing them. The forces able to be deployed by a small nation have never been so inferior in efficacy to those of the 'Great' powers. While this very fact removes the justification for a neutrality relying upon its own resources for defence in a major conflict, it provides a powerful argument for small nations to opt out of commitment to alliances with 'Great' powers when these alliances deterred by threatening total or near-total destruction, which is likely to prove mutual. Since there is little sense in trying to compete with the 'Great' powers in preparing the means of independent defence against increasingly impossible odds, it seems better to many leaders of underdeveloped countries to divert scarce resources from military commitment to a 'Great' power alliance, to the needs of development.

Secondly, neutralism developed in the early 1950's at a time when almost every issue of world politics was subordinated to the Cold War. This had the effect of reducing the apparent possibility of the traditional 'local war', since every border dispute and every revolutionary change of government in a small country, especially in more sensitive areas, was considered by the Governments of the
United States and the Soviet Union in terms of its significance for global strategy. By rival security pacts and multilateral military alliances each side sought to prevent the other from expanding its sphere of influence.

Neutralism sprang from the unprecedentedly global character of the Cold War confrontation in the early 1950's, and from the total ideological commitment of each side against the other. It is a challenge to the claims of both East and West that 'he who is not for me is against me'. In its more extreme form it was expressed as a 'third force' or 'third bloc', as by the Indian Socialist Party. Those who held this view minimized the 'real' difference between the United States and the Soviet Union, saying that there were grounds for opposing both more or less equally; They then put forward the 'third force' as an instrument for racial and regional solidarity (with strongly Marxist overtones) against 'white imperialism'. The doctrine was repudiated by Nehru, who denied that underdeveloped countries, with their diverse interests, could or should form a bloc. The fact, however, that leaders of underdeveloped nations were in many cases nationalist leaders who had fought against their former colonial masters predisposed them to reject a firm commitment to the Western camp.
Thus the crucial difference between traditional neutrality and postwar neutralism may be expressed as follows:

The aim of a traditional neutral nation was to escape involvement in war. Its method was to deter aggression, in the last resort by its own unaided effort. It succeeded (except by chance) only if it possessed a credible deterrent.

The aim of a postwar neutralist nation is to escape involvement in rival blocs, but it does not seriously expect to escape involvement in a world war (except by chance), should one break out. Its method is to keep out of military alliances with either bloc, but not to develop a deterrent power (which it could not do except in a 'bloc' alliance) except for the needs of the local power situation. It succeeds only provided there is no world war (an end which it could help to promote in a limited way by U.N. pressure, mediation in disputes etc.) and if it is not itself subject to 'Great' power aggression.

If, as we have argued, neutralism was a condition typical of the Cold War of the 1950's, when nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union gave them an overwhelming lead over nearly all other
powers in the field of defence, then changes in this situation might be expected to affect the nature of neutralism.

From about 1960 the pattern of international relations of the 1950's was beginning to change in two respects: firstly, there was a trend towards pluralism, signalled by the Sino-Soviet dispute and rifts in the Western alliance. This tended to reinstate the possibility of 'local' war, in which the issues of the Cold War between two monolithic world camps were no longer involved. Secondly, the explosion of the first French nuclear weapon in early 1960 heralded an age in which a nuclear deterrent might be in the hands of a number of countries.

The possibility of 'local war' was demonstrated in the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962. This was a limited war fought on conventional lines between two countries neither of which possessed nuclear weapons, and without committed backing from the Cold War 'leaders'. The fact that India was one side in a war of this nature, on the one hand did not necessarily affect the Cold War logic of her neutralism since the war could be rationalised as a 'local war'; on the other hand the scale of the dispute, the formidable nature of China, and the fact that India was directly involved and inadequately able to defend herself without
outside help, - which induced her to come closer to the
United States - indicated that the original premises of her
neutralism were crumbling round her. She had to contemplate
the possibility of long-term involvement in a war fought
with conventional weapons, in which neither prewar
justifications for neutrality nor postwar justifications for
neutralism really applied.

The development of a French nuclear deterrent is based
on a fact of nuclear strategy, namely, that even a nuclear
force that is many times outnumbered by the nuclear force
of an opponent could in certain circumstances be effective
as a deterrent to that opponent. A nation possessing only
a few nuclear weapons together with the means of delivering
them can inflict damage on a far better-equipped nation
which that nation would consider unacceptable. Such was
not the case with conventional weapons, where the ratio
between the size and effectiveness of a given force was far
smaller. Economic factors have prevented any nation except
the United States and Soviet Union (and Britain, which had
the advantage of having been concerned in the development of
atomic energy in the pioneer stage) from developing a nuclear
force earlier. By the early 1960's, however, a number of
nations round the world have sufficient economic potential
to be able, if they so wish, to carry out such a programme.
These nations are all economically what might be defined as 'second-class powers', that is, nations with an economic capacity and with reserves of skilled manpower roughly equivalent to that of the more advanced nations of Western Europe.¹⁸

Among 'second-class powers' which, by 1960, were debating whether to manufacture an independent nuclear deterrent, were two European 'traditional' neutrals, Switzerland and Sweden. Especially in the case of Switzerland, the argument for an independent nuclear deterrent follows logically from the nation's long-standing reliance on the highest degree of armed preparedness as the best guarantee of its neutrality. One writer has called this 'belligerent neutrality'.¹⁹

The reinstatement of local war and the possibility of independent nuclear deterrents is modifying the rationale of neutralism in the early 1960's. If there can be local wars on a considerable scale to which the Cold War is wholly or partially irrelevant, then deterrence assumes greater significance for a neutralist power than it had in the 1950's. If the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent is feasible, then deterrence even of first class powers (The United States or the Soviet Union) can be
contemplated. In this case a far more active and independent foreign policy would be possible for neutralist nations whose initiatives in foreign policy have previously been restricted.

If plans for a nuclear deterrent can be discussed with complete seriousness in a country with the population and resources of Switzerland, there can be no doubt that Japan, if she chose, could embark upon a nuclear deterrent programme with a realistic expectation of achieving the desired result in a manageable period of time. Since Japan would find it easier to carry out her own nuclear weapons programme than any neutralist nation of the underdeveloped world, it might a priori be expected that the concept of independent nuclear deterrence would have appealed to (or at least been discussed by) neutralist circles in Japan. Since, moreover, local war can now be discussed without the overriding fear of its escalation into a world conflict (as demonstrated by the failure of the Soviet Union to back Communist China in her dispute with India), some of the neutralist arguments against active involvement in power politics can be said to have become less convincing.

Among Japanese neutralists no such shift of viewpoint has been detectable, and this very fact throws an interesting light upon the nature of Japanese neutralism.
In certain respects, the arguments of Japanese neutralists approximate to those used to justify a more independent foreign policy, and especially an independent nuclear deterrent, by its European advocates. European supporters of such a deterrent (most conspicuously De Gaulle) make two main points in support of their position: firstly, that in a nuclear age one cannot rely on the leader of a bloc (e.g. the United States) defending a second-class power in the bloc at the expense of its own nuclear destruction. Therefore, they argue, in order to obtain effective security a second-class power must maintain an independent nuclear armoury which would enable it to deter an attack against itself by the threat of either independent retaliation or the 'triggering' of the strike force of the alliance as a whole. Secondly, they argue (at least by the implication of their actions) that the cohesion of the bloc would not be unduly affected by the independent activities of one 'second-class' member of it.

The first of these arguments matches the view of Japanese neutralists: that the Japan - United States Security Treaty does not give to Japan an effective safeguard of her security because there is no reason for
confidence that the defence of Japan is uppermost in the minds of American leaders responsible for implementing the Treaty.

This argument was used by Socialists as early as 1952, as can be seen from the following quotation from the LSP Action Policy for that year:

An important characteristic of the third force countries is that they all occupy territory outside the United States. American commentators such as Lippmann, and military specialists, say that the fact that American forces are using their bases in countries sandwiched between America and the Soviet Union for military exercise in time of peace has not aroused strong protest in these countries; nevertheless, in time of war these countries would probably refuse to lend their bases. Now that the nuclear monopoly has been broken, if the United States launches nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would certainly take reprisals and the United States would suffer. The British nuclear physicist Blackett says that forward bases are like pawns protecting the King on a chessboard. Thus England, France and Scandinavia are not happy in their role of protecting the American 'King'. Japan is no exception. So long as the danger of war is increasing, countries occupying the central region between the United States and the Soviet Union are increasingly likely to turn to a neutral policy to protect themselves. Thus the third force holds the key to the question of war and peace.23

The refusal to believe that the Mutual Security Treaty would be used for the defence of Japan, but rather for the furtherance of the United States' alleged aims of military aggrandisement and economic exploitation, has been at the core of left wing neutralist thought throughout the period.
The second argument - that the cohesion of the Western bloc would not be dangerously affected by the departure from it of one member - was the almost unanimous view of Socialist Diet Members who responded to a questionnaire distributed by the writer. 24

Japanese neutralism has thus rested on a thorough distrust of American motives in her alliance with Japan, and on a refusal to believe that Japan's contribution to the alliance was a contribution to regional stability.

The view is not indeed unknown in Japan that the principle of her foreign policy should be armed neutrality. This 'school', reminiscent of Swiss advocates of 'belligerent neutrality', is fortified by the arguments discussed above. It has had little appeal on the Left. Although the Socialist Party split in 1951 was over the issue of the Security Treaty and rearmament, only one of the members of the RSP (and noone from the LSP) openly advocated the combination of armed force with neutrality. This was Nishimura Eiichi, who expressed his views in party publications and documents in 1951. He believed that a Security Treaty should be accepted and the United States should bear the financial burden required to establish Japanese forces. After three years American troops should be withdrawn and should hand over their equipment and
facilities to the new, independent Japanese defence forces. This period should be used by Japan for rearmament so that she could deter aggression without entering a mutual security arrangement.  

A better known advocate of armed neutrality was an extreme rightist member of the Upper House of the Diet, Tsuji Masanobu, who in 1952 first elaborated a theory of armed neutrality. While Tsuji was an advocate of a kind of anti-Western nationalism more influential in the prewar than the postwar period, his views paralleled in certain ways those of neutralists on the left wing. Thus he doubted whether, in case of war, the United States would defend Japan, since, he argued, a war would probably promote isolationist tendencies in the United States. (It should be noted that this view was put forward before the ICBM made American cities subject to the threat of nuclear attack - a factor which might be held to reinforce his argument.) He cited doubts prevalent at the time about American intentions - doubts prompted by the 'indiscretion' of the United States Secretary for War, K.C. Royall, in 1949, who hinted that the American commitment to Japan might be withdrawn - and concluded that the United States could not be relied upon to defend Japan.  

He also noted that it was
Soviet policy to 'use Asians to make Asian revolutions', and that the Soviet Union had neither directly participated in the Korean War nor given significant aid to Communist China.27

These arguments were similar, as were the views of some Europeans, to those of Japanese left wing advocates of neutralism. Why then, do Japanese neutralists not draw conclusions from their arguments similar to those of Tsuji, De Gaulle or the Swiss?

The answer lies in the pacifist philosophy championed by most sections of the JSP. Given this philosophy, it follows that the concept of deterrence cannot seriously be entertained, and alleged dangers inherent in national weakness have to be denied. Conversely, it follows that the alleged danger of 'provoking' other nations by a show of armed force should be stressed. In the circumstances of the 1950's these arguments were used principally against the Mutual Security Treaty, but they apply equally strongly to the hypothetical case of an armed but independent Japan, especially if she were armed with nuclear weapons.

Whereas, in the West, many thinkers have stressed the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence,28 neutralists in Japan generally emphasise its instability and the dangers therefrom. They believe that it would be virtually impossible for a local war in which Japan was involved to be confined to
the limits of a local struggle. Few neutralists have analysed in detail the likely consequences of war fought under existing conditions, but of those who have, two accounts are worth noting for the light they throw on the Japanese neutralist approach to deterrence.

One writer in 1959 distinguished three types of situation in which the Mutual Security Treaty could come into force: total war, limited war and 'indirect aggression'. He considered that if the Government thought it necessary to prepare against 'indirect aggression' (a Communist-inspired rising with foreign backing), this meant that it did not have the confidence of the people. Total war, he argued, was the most likely contingency of all, and even limited war, as envisaged by Japan's defence planners, would have disastrous consequences for Japan. He doubted whether an American nuclear deterrent would be credible, since it could not be used in limited war, and therefore any war in which the deterrent were used would inevitably take the character of total war. In this case the Soviet Union would certainly destroy Japan for her own protection.

Reporting accounts of long-term plans of the Self-Defence Agency, he isolated for criticism the following two assumptions: firstly, that an enemy attack on Japan called for the use of nuclear or non-nuclear missiles, the warheads
for which would have to be acquired from the United States in case of need (although no immediate plans existed for acquiring them); secondly, that these missiles would not be long-range, but short-range 'defensive' missiles, and that the ground Self-Defence Forces would also require tactical nuclear weapons.

Of the first alleged assumption he maintained that it was not the actual absence of nuclear warheads in Japan that was important, but the possibility of the Soviet Union suspecting their presence, in which case she would be unlikely to hesitate to launch a nuclear attack in the case of an emergency. As for the second assumption, he held that short-range missiles would not be sufficient for protection or deterrence, and that tactical nuclear weapons exploding over Japanese airspace could be almost as destructive as an all-out nuclear attack. He concluded that 'limited war' would probably 'escalate' into total war, but that even if it did not, the use of nuclear weapons would make it unacceptable.

Another analysis, carried anonymously in a JSP newspaper in 1960, was a reconstruction of events in a total war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The writer predicted that after initial attempts by conventional means to destroy Soviet missile submarines and coastal radar and missile sites, stores of nuclear warheads
located on Guam would be despatched to Japan (which could, he argued, be effected very quickly), and ICBM's with these warheads attached would be launched against enemy bases. These would be reinforced by long-range bombers and by the missile fleet of the United States navy.

Meanwhile, he argued, the Soviet Union would launch a large-scale attack, mainly against Japanese signal and supply bases, in which Soviet superiority in rocketry would ensure great if not total destruction in Japan. He dwelt at some length on Soviet superiority in missiles, and concluded that the present 'half-hearted' measures of defence would be useless (and therefore worse than useless, since they would invite destruction) to protect Japan from annihilation.

The writer thus had two arguments against the thesis that because the Mutual Security Treaty did not provide for nuclear weapons to be introduced into Japan, it would not provoke Soviet nuclear attack: one was that nuclear warheads could speedily be brought in from Guam; the other was that signal and supply bases were becoming progressively more important and if war began would be the first objects of attack. In other words, one did not have to have nuclear-armed rockets on one's own territory to be the object of a nuclear attack.
The common factor in these accounts is a distrust of the concept of deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence. For 'deterrence' is substituted 'provocation', and unilateral disarmament is given as the only solution for Japan. Although immediate 'provocation' is said by neutralists to come from the Security Treaty, fears of the effect on her neighbours of a resurgent militarist Japan are often expressed.

This, however is only one half of the Japanese neutralist argument for unarmed neutralism. The other half is that deterrence is unnecessary. When critics accuse the JSP of wanting to leave Japan defenceless, its spokesmen ask against what potential enemies it is desired to defend her. The idea of a threat to an unarmed, neutralist Japan has not been seriously entertained. It is occasionally argued that some threat might come from the Republic of Korea - an argument usually advanced to indicate the absurdity of the idea of a local threat, or from 'indirect aggression' - an equally unlikely contingency since the early 1950's - and neutralists are normally at pains to refute any suggestion that aggression against Japan might come from Communist China, or the Soviet Union, except as part of a general conflagration in which the United States was also involved.
By 1963, however, the prospect of Communist China having nuclear arms provided an additional weapon against the 'no danger' thesis. Socialists interviewed in 1962 did not think that the announcement of a Chinese bomb would radically affect JSP neutralist thinking. Nevertheless, one Socialist writing in 1963 (at the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute), said that if China produced a nuclear weapon this would create a shock in Japan quite out of proportion to that caused by the resumption of Soviet testing in 1961. It would, he argued, probably give rise to powerful demands for Japan to have nuclear weapons, and deal a savage blow to the current pacifism based on the security of having weaker neighbours. In order to forestall this danger, he put forward a variant of previous Socialist ideas of establishing a non-nuclear zone embracing China and Japan and surrounding areas, to be achieved before China should test her first nuclear weapon.

Whatever the eventual effect upon JSP thinking of a Chinese nuclear arsenal, by 1963 the Party had not modified its views on unarmed neutralism. While the immediate aim is to scrap the Mutual Security Treaty, no foreign policy dependent upon armed strength is contemplated for Japan when
she becomes neutral. Pacifism is thus an important motivating force in JSP neutralism, sufficient to ensure that a neutral status is not to be combined with armed strength.

It may be concluded that neutralism, rather than simply representing a change of heart towards a greater altruism in international affairs, is primarily a defensive reaction to the postwar world of nuclear weapons and the Cold War; despite the fact that increasing international pluralism and the spread of nuclear weapons to second-class powers might theoretically enable a nation of the economic power of Japan to assert a foreign policy of 'nuclear neutralism', the JSP, though strongly influenced by considerations of national advantage, is too much imbued with pacifist notions and too unsympathetic with the concept of deterrence to contemplate such a course.
In this chapter the defence aspect of the Japanese neutralist argument is pursued in greater detail. Attention is centred upon discussions of the problems of guaranteeing and protecting a neutral status for Japan and of reconciling it with her duties as a member of the international community. It is the contention of the chapter that these questions, though seen by Socialists as of some importance in the early 1950's, were pushed into the background by them during the late 1950's and early 1960's. A contrast is drawn between the much greater concern with these questions shown by non-Socialists who thought of neutrality in its traditional sense (these were an important element in the neutralist controversy in its early stages) and Socialists, who became relatively indifferent. The conclusion is reached that Socialist neutralism, in the course of its evolution, came to be considered by Socialists primarily as a means to the achievement of certain ends (notably removal of the American presence from Japan and establishment of closer relations with Communist nations). These ends were considered to be beneficial per se and not to depend for their fulfilment upon the prior establishment
of international guarantees. Since, moreover, neutralism arose in part because of the demise of early postwar hopes for a foolproof system of United Nations 'collective security', the question whether neutralism was incompatible with Japan's duties towards the United Nations became (with one interesting exception) quite unimportant in Socialist eyes.

The present chapter seeks to demonstrate these conclusions by examining, firstly, discussions of the relationship between a neutralist policy and the United Nations, and secondly, discussions of methods of guaranteeing or protecting Japan's neutrality including that of a four-power treaty of non-aggression.

A. Permanent Neutrality or Collective Security through the United Nations?¹

In 1949 and 1950 the argument about neutrality for Japan centred on the assertion of Yokota Kisaburō (a non-Socialist academic lawyer) that in an age of international cooperation and collective sanction by the United Nations, neutrality was out of date, and should be equated with egoistic nationalism.² The fact that Switzerland, the classic example of a neutral nation, had not joined the U.N., was adduced by Yokota to show that Japan too should not be able to square neutrality with membership of the World Body.
Since a regional security arrangement involving Japan was also incompatible with her neutrality (especially unarmed neutrality), the implication was that exclusion from the U.N. would leave Japan in selfish, and helpless, isolation.

This argument was probably astute in the postwar intellectual atmosphere. The claims of unarmed neutrality could most persuasively be refuted, not by advocating military alliance with the West, but by demon rating that it could not be reconciled with the idealistic aims of the United Nations. Apart from the prohibition on military forces contained in Article IX of the Constitution, the Preamble contained a passage which could be interpreted to mean that Japan should entrust her security to the United Nations.\(^3\) The attractiveness of both neutrality and U.N. security was shown in a poll, conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in December 1949. Respondents were asked to state what was their preferred method of security from a given list. The results were as follows:

a) Permanent neutrality — — — — — — 39%

b) Membership of the United Nations — — 36%

c) Regional collective security — — — 7%

d) Military agreement with a particular country, or security by a particular country — — 8%

e) Cannot say simply — — — — — — 10%\(^4\)
Yokota himself, immediately after the war, had been an ardent advocate of Japan's participation in the United Nations as a means of achieving both security and independence, and also of rescuing Japan's international standing from the depths to which it had fallen. In an article written in 1946 he apparently saw no contradiction between the total pacifism of the Constitution and Japan's potential duties as a member of the United Nations. Indeed, he cited the examples of Swiss and Belgian neutrality as analogous to the position of Japan, and drew the lesson from this that it was not necessarily sufficient as a protection for an unarmed Japan to have a local treaty of guarantee; the only safe solution was world-wide collective security through the United Nations. By 1949 Yokota was still championing collective security in a United Nations framework, but rejecting neutrality, or pacifism, which in his earlier thought it was designed to protect. He still spoke of the necessity for defence against possible aggression, but now said less about convincing the world that Japan was peace-loving by securing her strict adherence to total pacifism (although he still paid lip-service to this concept). This was because he now realised that strict pacifism and collective security could well be incompatible.
Supporters of neutrality defended themselves in two ways, which were mutually exclusive. They either accepted the challenge on its own terms and sought to show that neutrality and membership of the United Nations were not necessarily incompatible aims; or they argued that it would not be necessary, or even that it might be potentially dangerous, for an unarmed, neutral and independent Japan to join the organisation. (Yet others either ignored or obscured the problem). 8

Arguments of the latter type contained a number of different nuances: firstly, there were those who used the same arguments as Yokota, that duties likely to be required from member nations of the U.N. could not be reconciled easily with unarmed neutrality. For instance the left wing Socialist Mutō Unjūrō, writing in a Party journal in July 1950, said that although such a reconciliation might be effected if special provision were made that Japan be not required to participate in military sanctions, the example of Switzerland showed how unlikely it would be that such a provision could be secured. 9 That this was so was apparently an assumption of Socialist foreign policy during the initial controversy about neutrality in 1949 and 1950. 10 These objections were not, of course, based merely on the legal aspects of Japan's constitutional position. They
represented certain assumptions about the desiderata of her security, and used the Constitution as a weapon. Thus a leader-writer of the Asahi Shimbun put forward the view that if the United Nations had developed into the 'perfect' system of collective security that it had set out to be, it would have been permissible for Japan to abandon her neutrality and to join. Without this condition being fulfilled, however, membership of the U.N. would involve the danger of Japan being caught in a war should one break out.  

Ryū Shintarō, editor of the Asahi, maintained that even if Japan were admitted to membership (which in Cold War conditions was most unlikely since the protagonists had the veto in the Security Council) her position would become extremely dangerous. Japan could have no military forces of her own to take sanctions against aggressors, and therefore her cooperation with U.N. sanctions would have to take the form of economic assistance, or the presentation of military bases. This would mean that Japan would be obviously aligned with one side in the Cold War and would have to fight against the other although she were completely disarmed.

In spite of these arguments the supporters of neutrality came increasingly to argue that membership of the United Nations was not incompatible with a neutral Japan. The
influential intellectual study group *Heiwa Mondai Danwakai* (The Discussion Circle on Problems of Peace), although not specifically treating the question of compatibility, in its third statement of December 1950 gave high praise to the United Nations as the 'crystallisation of all the sacrifices and efforts of mankind for the peaceful disposition of international problems', and argued realistically that while the veto power in the Security Council (a device that had at least succeeded in keeping the United States and the Soviet Union together in one international organisation) should not be tampered with, the say of the smaller nations in the U.N. (many of which leaned towards neutrality) should be gradually increased.  

Supporters of neutrality generally saw in the 'imperfection' of the United Nations the opening which would let Japan into the World Organisation on conditions not prejudicial to the maintenance of her neutrality. One veteran Socialist went so far as to argue that the Charter of the United Nations was not unalterable, and that it could be amended in order to admit a nation that had adopted 'permanent neutrality' as advocated for Japan, since such a nation would be most suited to participate in an international organisation devoted to solving the problem of peace.  

Most, however, took the view that the
world situation departed to such an extent from that envisaged by the creators of the Charter, that there would now be no de facto bar to the entry of a neutral.

The most significant example of this kind of argument was that of Taoka Ryōichi (another non-Socialist academic lawyer), who entered into a published controversy with Yokota in 1949 and 1950. The position first developed by Taoka in 1949 revealed a strand of thinking that reappeared not infrequently in later Socialist writings and policy statements. This was that Japan should join the U.N. on the understanding that her constitutional position, and her position as a neutral, absolved her from the duty of participating in any way in military operations conducted by the U.N., or of granting portions of her territory for the purpose of military bases.

This argument, however, had to contend with the fact, adduced against it by Yokota and others, that Switzerland had not joined the United Nations in 1945 or since.

In order to refute the alleged implications of the Swiss precedent for a neutral Japan, Taoka concentrated his attention on the actual provisions of the Charter, and on the way that these had worked out in practice. He argued that although it was set out in Chapter VII of the Charter
that members of the United Nations must be bound by
decisions of the Security Council, Article 27 built the
veto into the structure of the Security Council and no
resolution could be passed without the consent of seven
members including all the permanent members. It was thus
in practice impossible for the United Nations to take
sanctions against any of the permanent members of the
Security Council, or against their satellites, because of
the veto. For these reasons alone the obligation upon
members stated in Article 43, Sections 1 and 2, and in
Article 48, Section 1, to contribute in various ways to
United Nations operations was little more than a dead
letter.  

Another point which Taoka used related to Article 43
of the Charter. According to this article, United Nations
members grant military forces, aid and facilities to the
Security Council by the conclusion of a special agreement.
Since no such agreement had ever been concluded, he
argued, cooperation with the United Nations had not become
a duty of its members. He maintained that, even if an
agreement were concluded, it would not become effective if
it were not accepted by members, since Article 43
indicated that its acceptance depended on the free will of
members. He disagreed with the view that Article 2, Section 5 of the Charter represented the views of the framers of the Charter, and therefore imposed an obligation to make such a special agreement, and held instead that it was rather an expression of general principles. He maintained that his general viewpoint was strengthened when Austria, declared a neutral under the terms of the Peace Treaty with her signed in 1955, was admitted to the United Nations.

Taoka later argued that Switzerland's failure to participate in the United Nations was the result of the belief among the delegates at San Francisco in universal 'collective security'. This he argued, had been shortlived. The fact that only sixteen out of the total United Nations membership had participated in the Korean War, and the fact that Switzerland, though not a U.N. member, was invited to sit on the two Neutral Nations Commissions in Korea, showed the extent to which the attitude of the United Nations towards neutrals had changed by the early 1950's. He concluded that Switzerland, which already cooperated with the United Nations in this kind of way, and had been a member of such extra-United Nations bodies as OEEC and EPU, might eventually even join the United Nations itself.
Despite the fact that neutralists in Japan generally came to accept that neutralism was not incompatible with membership of the United Nations, the ideal of a United Nations with 'teeth' was still entertained, although there was disagreement on whether Japan, with her pacifist Constitution, should help to sharpen the 'teeth'. In the recognised absence of conditions for United Nations 'collective security', most Socialists concerned with the problem of how to protect an unarmed Japan put their faith in bilateral or multilateral treaties including Communist as well as 'Free World' nations. Security by the United Nations still played a part in JSP policy statements, but was relegated to the position of an ideal. For instance the agreed platform of the JSP at the time of its reunification in 1955 was prefaced by a statement of ultimate aims:

The peace and security of Japan and the world demands:
(a) Relaxation of international tension by negotiation.
(b) General world disarmament and banning of nuclear weapons under an effective international control system.
(c) Consummation of the United Nations as the organisation of one world and perfection of its collective security.22

The fact that United Nations 'collective security' found a place in the agreed platform along what was in
fact (if not in name) neutralism, seems surprising in so far as neutralism was incompatible with 'collective security'. The element of compromise was strong in the agreed platform, and that this was the reason for the apparent inconsistency was argued by at least one writer. Yamaguchi Fusao, however, writing in 1959, while confessing to some vagueness in the agreement, gives the following explanation of how neutralism was reconcileable with the ideal of United Nations security in JSP policy:

He argued that there were only two alternatives facing Japan's leaders, those of neutralism and of alliance with the 'Free World'. (He was, of course, omitting the possible third alternative of alliance with the Communist Bloc). Since the reunification of both Socialist and Conservative Parties at the end of 1955, the electorate had been faced with a clear choice between a party with a policy favouring the 'Free World' and a party which was uncompromisingly neutralist. He continued as follows:-

In order to understand correctly the neutralist argument at this level, two senses of 'neutralism' must be distinguished, namely neutralisation and neutralist policy. Failure to distinguish these two senses has been common among both its attackers and its supporters, since the outset of the neutralist controversy. There has been frequent confusion between the notions of whether we should become a
permanently neutral country by international guarantee, like Switzerland, or whether, like Sweden or India, we should conduct a neutralist foreign policy. The neutralist argument as formulated at the time of the unification of the JSP may be summarised in a word as 'United Nations for security, neutralism for foreign policy'.

By this contrast between the total, internationally guaranteed, neutrality ('neutralisation') of Switzerland and the 'neutralist foreign policies' of other countries, Yamaguchi was leaving a logical loophole for Socialists who considered that it was undesirable to exclude the United Nations entirely from their policies. From the above statement he went on to argue that in order to attain the ideal of security under the United Nations, it was first necessary to set up a regional security system in the true meaning of the term (i.e. 'Locarno'). In order to bring about 'Locarno', the first step was a neutralist foreign policy. The realisation of United Nations security was postponed to a more or less remote future, and neutralism seen as contributing towards it, but at two stages removed. The apparent contradiction between the two aims was thus removed by relegating a United Nations system of universal security under which Japan would be protected to a distant, but noble position.
One proposal, however, was put forward by an academic student of international relations close to the JSP, which merits attention as being the only original attempt made to solve the question of security for Japan in a way consistent with the original aims of the United Nations, without seriously prejudicing Japan's unarmed neutralism. This was the suggestion made in 1959, by an academic close to the JSP, Sakamoto Yoshikazu, that a permanent United Nations force, similar to that sent to Egypt after the Suez crisis, and excluding contingents from any of the Great Powers, should be stationed in Japan, at Japanese expense, and that a reduced Self-Defence Force should be merged with this force under United Nations command.27

Other neutralists, as we have seen, when discussing the United Nations, held either that its collective security provisions were incompatible with neutralism, or that they were impracticable and that therefore neutralism did not conflict with the United Nations. In case of difficulty Japan would be able to opt out of all commitments by special agreement.

Sakamoto's proposal, on the other hand, purported to take a strict interpretation of obligations under the United Nations, and also to be fully compatible with Japan's unarmed neutralism. It may be seen as an attempt to assault,
without straying from the implications of neutralist thought, the impregnable position of the 'Pacifist Clause' of the Constitution in left wing minds, with a view to a more flexible approach to international relations.

We will describe in turn the beliefs which he sought to modify and the arguments he used to this end:

Firstly, he argued that his scheme did not conflict with the plan, advocated by the JSP, for a treaty, guaranteeing Japan's security, to be concluded between Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China. Since, however, he admitted that the JSP plan was the subject of widespread scepticism, his scheme for a United Nations force in Japan was represented as a way of supplementing 'Locarno'.

Secondly, he maintained that the force must be modelled, not on the United Nations operation in Korea, but on that in Egypt. Exclusion of units from the 'Great Powers' would be essential for two reasons, that the people would suspect indirect aggression from the 'Great Powers' if their forces were stationed in Japan, and that if the international situation were to deteriorate and the Soviet Union and China were to withdraw their forces, the American forces that were left would be forces of the United Nations in name only, and this would defeat the original purpose.
The United Nations force in the Korean War was really an American-centred anti-Communist coalition, as shown by the refusal of the neutrals to cooperate.

This argument was in line with neutralist thinking at the time of the Korean War, which refused to see the United Nations operation as other than an exercise in power politics indistinguishable from the American position in the Cold War. It reflected an awareness in Japanese neutralist thought of the late 1950's and early 1960's of the greatly increased say within the United Nations of 'non-aligned' nations, and of the changed nature of the World Body from an instrument of American collective security (admittedly one blunted by the countervailing power of the Soviet Union) to a force where neutrals could potentially impose and police impartial solutions to international disputes where these did not immediately conflict with the vital interests of the Great Powers.

Thirdly, the commander of the United Nations force would be an international civil servant, and owe loyalty to the United Nations Organisation, rather than to his own country. Although the troops which made up the force would retain the citizenship of their country, the fact that their
commander was of the United Nations would mean that they owed prime loyalty to the United Nations.

This argument was certainly designed to counter nationalist objections, which might be expected, to having foreign troops stationed on Japanese soil. The slogan 'No military bases for a foreign power', had been included, with minor changes in wording, in Socialist policy statements since the formulation of the 'Three Peace Principles' in 1949. Although this had been aimed against the existence of American bases, the assumption could probably be made that the importation of foreign troops of any nationality would not necessarily recommend itself as an ideal solution to many Socialists.

Sakamoto's fourth condition for an international force was that it should not be armed with nuclear weapons, a proviso obviously indispensable in any discussion of a scheme which had to convince Japanese intellectuals.

The novel proposals in Sakamoto's plan were those designed to put an element of 'United Nations-centred responsibility' into thinking about Japan's role in international relations. He proposed that the present Self-Defence Forces of 260,000 men be cut back to the level of the original Police Reserve set up in 1950 (75,000 men), and that this body be put under United Nations direction as
part of a United Nations force. This may be seen as an attempted compromise between various Socialist views, past and present, about the degree to which Self-Defence Forces were admissible under the 'Pacifist Clause' of the Constitution. The reduction in the Self-Defence Forces to the level of the original Police Reserve was close to the official policy position of the RSP between 1951 and 1955, while the fact that they were to be put under United Nations control could be interpreted, if one so wished, as fulfilling to the letter the provisions of the 'Pacifist Clause'. The intention of the proposal, however, seems to have gone beyond the aim of mere conformity with the Constitution.

Sakamoto cited the case of the Lebanon crisis of 1958, when the Japanese Government was asked by the United Nations for some officers to take part in an inspection team to investigate whether any kind of indirect aggression had been committed. The Government, however, refused on the grounds that the Constitution prevented the despatch of troops abroad. This, however, Sakamoto argued, would have been constitutionally possible under the type of the scheme that he proposed. Since the (reduced strength) Japanese Self-
Defence Force would be merely a constituent part of a contingent under United Nations control, there could be no such objection to sending personnel abroad.

The other original point in the proposal was that the United Nations forces should be paid for in their entirety out of Japanese taxes. Although Sakamoto held that the cost would turn out to be less than the current cost to Japan of her defence, this came closer to legitimizing the idea of a positive contribution by Japan to her own defence than any previous neutralist proposal by left wing politicians or academics.

Perhaps the most significant thing about Sakamoto's proposal was that, although it excited some favourable comment, it did not command any measure of general support among neutralists. This is further confirmation of our argument that neutralism was not primarily a discussion of the means of defence, but a discussion of the means of avoiding identification with one or other of the contending superpowers. In the case of Japan, it was primarily designed as a weapon for ridding the country of the American alliance, and our analysis indicates that questions of United Nations security, or of any other kind of security, were at best treated as secondary to this main aim.
We have noted that the most acrid debate about the United Nations and Japan took place in 1949 and 1950, when the 'neutrality' being discussed still antedated neutralism. With traditional neutrality, as we have argued, the problem of defence was of the very greatest importance.

We turn now to discussions of the defence of a neutralist Japan other than those related to the question of the United Nations.

B. The Defence of an Unarmed Neutral

Since those who supported neutrality for Japan in the early postwar period were also committed to an unarmed Japan, the opinion was occasionally heard that resistance to an invading army could be effected in ways other than military. The 'Gandhi solution' of large-scale organised sabotage and civil disobedience was mentioned as a means of checking an aggressor.29

Such methods appealed to some of those left wing Socialists who were most insistent on the power of organised labour. Sakisaka Itsurō, writing in 1951, showed how unarmed resistance could be made to work from the passive resistance movement of German workers after World War I (when French troops invaded the Ruhr), and from the general strike against the counter-revolutionary Kapp Putsch.30 Sakisaka's argument was directed against dissidents in
Shakaishugi Kyōkai who advocated a 'people's militia'. He opposed a 'people's militia' because he thought that the Japanese working class would be unlikely to be able to control it, or to maintain a force sufficient in equipment to be viable in modern conditions of warfare. He argued that armed forces could only become the instrument of capitalist oppression, and conversely that a no-war movement was a golden opportunity for the establishment of socialism.

'Gandhi solutions' for the defence of an unarmed Japan, though occasionally suggested on pacifist or Marxist grounds, were only seldom propounded or their logical consequences developed, and they never figured in JSP policy on neutralism.

A more frequent argument was that the people's will to resist was the most important factor in defence, and that armed forces would be useless without the existence of such a will. In March 1951, for instance, one writer, in discussing the problems of rearmament, held that the most serious problem was not economic, but that of the morale of the human resources that would have to make up an army. He maintained that revision of the Constitution to permit rearmament would not automatically produce an 'army'.

This argument was characteristic of the immediate postwar years, when the contrast was still apparent between current demoralisation and prewar discipline and subordination of the individual to the State. The idea, however, that it required an effort of national will to defend neutrality, later recurred in Socialist writings. For instance, Yamaguchi Fusao, in an attempt to defend neutralism against the charge that Belgian neutrality had in 1914 proved neither defence against nor deterrence of aggression, contrasted Belgian neutrality, which had been forced on an unwilling government as the price of independence from Holland by Great Power agreement in 1831, with the successfully maintained neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland, which had been worked out purposefully through the long experience of the peoples themselves. He concluded that whereas the Belgian people did not have the will to defend their neutrality, the Swiss had a long history with neutrality as its central theme. 34 Now, to say that a nation's neutrality was violated because of a lack of 'will' on the part of its people to defend that neutrality apparently implies the acceptance of the means wherewith to repel an aggressor. Since national armed forces in disguised or open form, and facilities for the armed forces of another power, were
rejected outright by Japanese neutralists, some means was required, at least in theory, whereby Japan could hope that her security would be defended. This was most likely to depend on the 'will' of other states.

C. The Defence of Unarmed Neutrality by Non-Aggression Pact

In the absence of armed forces with which Japan could defend herself, the method of security most commonly proposed was that of a treaty of non-aggression to be concluded between Japan and a combination of powers having some relation to Japan, and necessarily including nations on both sides in the Cold War. At first the actual number of nations proposed varied. Later it came to include only the United States, Soviet Union and Communist China, as in the JSP 'Locarno' policy.

In order to show that such a scheme was practicable, two things had to be demonstrated with some plausibility. Firstly, that members of the conflicting power blocs would have some interest in combining to guarantee the security of a neutral Japan. Secondly that such a guarantee, if implemented, had a good chance of proving effective.

Neutralists, therefore, sought to show that it was in the interests of Japan's neighbours to have Japan neutral and disarmed, and that capitalist and Communist nations
might be willing to merge their differences and agree in guaranteeing Japan's security for the sake of preventing her resurgence as a military power.

This was sometimes based on the attitudes of the Allied Powers as expressed to Japan in the Potsdam Declaration; thus Ryū Shintarō in January 1950, in comparing the treaty guarantee given to Switzerland, an armed neutral, with what was needed in the case of an unarmed neutral Japan, said that an even stronger guarantee was clearly required, and there was some prospect of getting it since the decision of Japan to remain disarmed, though formally a decision of the Japanese people, was also based on the intention of the Allied Powers at Potsdam.

Another writer at the same period maintained that although it was the established theory in international law for special treaties to be an essential prerequisite of permanent neutrality, as in the Swiss case, yet the Potsdam Declaration, which was not an international treaty, was nevertheless even more binding in the case of Japan than a formal treaty would have been. The reasons he adduced to show that this was so were that by ensuring that Japan were disarmed it had made her incapable of making war, that it promised that Japan's neutrality would not be violated and that the invasion of Japan by another nation
would not be overlooked. Since the United States and the
Soviet Union were included among the signatories of the
Potsdam Declaration, Japan's permanent neutrality and
independence was clearly guaranteed by 'almost all the
countries in the world'.

Most supporters of neutrality, however, while seeing
the Potsdam Declaration as a statement of Allied intention
favourable to permanent neutrality, held that a formal
treaty of guarantee was essential.

In the immediate postwar period, up to 1952, when
Japan regained her independence, this argument was backed
up by objections voiced by certain of the former Allied
Powers to the American proposals for a peace treaty.
Initial Socialist reaction to the Sino-Soviet pact of
January 1950, which named Japanese aggression as one object
which it was designed to prevent, was cautious, and argued
that its object, among other things, was to detach Japan
from American control and effect her adherence to the
Soviet camp. This view was, however, probably that of
elements of the right wing of the Party at a time when it
was temporarily split, and later Socialist orthodoxy held
that one of the realisable goals of a neutralist policy was
to persuade China and the Soviet Union to rescind at least
the anti-Japanese clause in the Sino-Soviet pact of 1950.
In the period after Japan had regained her independence, it was widely argued by Socialists that the Soviet Union and China would be prepared to enter into some kind of guarantee of Japan's security as the price of ending the Japan - United States Security Treaty and of the withdrawal of American bases.\footnote{40}

On the second question - whether an international guarantee, if implemented, would be likely to prove effective, there was a certain difference of approach between the academic international lawyers who argued for such a guarantee before the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and later Socialist policy.

Taoka, who argued for such a treaty from 1949, based his advocacy on historical precedent, and in particular on the international treaties which had guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland through her recent history. The two types of provision which he saw as essential in such a treaty were: 1) that the allies must not attack the permanently neutral nation. 2) that they would use force against an invader, if the neutral nation were invaded.\footnote{41}

He held that criticisms levelled against neutrality for Japan in 1949 (especially that of Yokota) confused 'permanent neutrality' - the institutionalised neutrality held over long periods of time by nations such as
Switzerland, with 'temporary neutrality', that is, the kind of declaration of neutrality made by a nation which does not want to be involved in a particular war because of 'its own selfish interests'. The main distinguishing characteristic, he maintained, of 'permanent neutrality' was the fact of a collective guarantee by its neighbours to one weak nation. This accorded exactly with the definition of permanent neutrality as established by international lawyers before World War II. For instance 'permanent neutrality' was defined by one authority as follows:- Perpetual or permanent neutrality is the neutrality of States which are neutralised by special treaties of the members of the Family of Nations, as at the present time is Switzerland.

Now the Swiss have generally (but not unanimously) argued that the relevant treaties with Switzerland constitute actual guarantees as well as mere recognition of Swiss neutrality. Few, however, have been prepared to consider it likely that all the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles would have been prepared to guarantee Swiss neutrality if it had been actually threatened, the more so as Switzerland was relieved of the duty of participating in sanctions under the League.
Japanese Socialists, on the other hand, paid less attention to the Swiss precedent for an international treaty of guarantee. The idea of a 'Locarno-type' treaty was a constituent element of JSP policy after it was introduced into LSP policy in 1953, but while it played a political role in facilitating the achievement of unification in 1955, it was removed from the realm of immediate aims by a reasoning which went some way towards recognising the difficulties likely to be involved in its fulfilment. This reasoning sharply distinguished neutralism from the 'permanent neutrality' which was modelled on Switzerland.

Thus Yamaguchi spoke as follows about a 'Locarno' policy:

Neutralism as described above differs from 'permanent neutrality'. The model at first was Switzerland. After Japan joined the United Nations, however, neutralists in Japan acknowledged that the ideal was collective security under the United Nations; at the same time, since the positive nature of neutral policy came to be stressed, the chief emphasis came to be laid, less upon neutralisation formalised by treaty with other powers than upon Japan's own neutralist policies. Thus LDP criticism of 'Locarno' as absolutely unrealisable is wide of the mark... The foreign policy which is urgently required for Japan at present is a positive neutral foreign policy to accomplish what is possible in the situation in which Japan is placed and at the time concerned, and gradually to widen its scope... This is the correct way of achieving neutralism, since neutralism is not something that will be brought about suddenly by treaty or declaration.45
It will be observed that in Yamaguchi's thought the same was true of 'Locarno' as was true of 'security under the United Nations' - both were somewhat distant aims to which neutralism might eventually be expected to lead.

In conclusion it may be noted that the formal preoccupation with the duties and with guarantees of neutrality - particularly interesting to international lawyers such as Taoka, but also reflected in the writings of Socialists in the early period from 1949 - appeared little in later Socialist thought on neutralism. Instead, it was the concrete and pressing aims of neutralism which were always stressed in Socialist policy statements. Neutralism was considered a policy sufficient unto itself and requiring neither to be carefully hedged round with guarantees nor to be unduly concerned with international duties.
In Chapter 9 it was argued that the strong pacifism of the left in postwar Japan precluded advocacy of a more adventurous, or 'belligerent' neutralist solution which could have been possible given Japan's potential capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the grounds for JSP neutralism could in large measure be interpreted in nationalist terms. It was seen in Chapter 10 that Socialists were concerned less with theoretical means of guaranteeing Japan's security than with an active policy for the pursuit of immediate political ends. Some of these ends (such as the ending of the Japan - United States Security Treaty), could be interpreted (and were often expressed) in terms of national advantage. In this chapter the character of this nationalism will be analysed in historical and ideological terms, and it will be related to the socialism and pacifism which the Party perhaps more obviously professed.

Neutralism was an attitude to foreign relations typical of ex-colonial nations of the underdeveloped world, and was a policy which came fairly naturally to leaders of
a national liberation movement once that movement had achieved its goal of independence from its colonial master. One writer goes so far as to say: 'Indeed, the whole of neutralist doctrine could be described as a quest for distinctive, intellectual expression of independence, and starts from the assumption of a given independent statehood.' The leaders of newly-independent countries, unless they were Communists, did not wish to submit their country to Soviet domination, but they wished even more strongly to assert their independence from 'the West'. Where, as often, the leaders of the independence movement were socialist in outlook, their rejection of military or other ties with 'the West' was frequently reinforced by an implicitly or explicitly Leninist interpretation of Western (especially American) 'imperialism' and 'exploitation'.

Japan was never a full colony of any Western power, but was not free from the national complexes associated with feelings of inferiority to 'more advanced' Western powers. The conscious motive which prompted Japanese leaders after the Meiji Restoration to embark upon rapid industrialisation was to extricate Japan from a semi-colonial position which Western countries had forced upon her. As a result of World War II Japan suffered for the
first time in her history defeat and a protracted period of occupation. The reaction against the American Occupation, however, was expressed not by the ultra-right (the spearhead of prewar nationalism), but by the left. This was primarily because of American anti-labour policies in the later part of the Occupation, and American support for a strong Japan under conservative administration as an anti-Communist bastion in the Cold War. Thus a situation arose in which socialist and pacifist aims coincided with a potent nationalist warcry of anti-Americanism. The appeal of this slogan is amply demonstrated by the space devoted to denunciation of American 'imperialist' policies by the left and its corresponding gain in electoral strength in immediate post-Occupation years. It is obvious enough that the slogans of 'third force neutrality' of the LSP, and, less stridently, the 'self-reliant independence' of the RSP between 1951 and 1955, were predominantly expressions of an anti-American nationalism.

If, however, the postwar left wing had 'captured' the nationalist movement, its form and content were very different from the nationalism that had flourished as a right wing protest movement in the 1930's. As one writer puts it: '... a Suzuki Mosaburō cannot intone the slogans of 'racial' or 'national' unity with the same
conviction as an old-style fire-eating nationalist of prewar days. Nevertheless, where the nationalist aim of independence and self-assertion coincided with leftist ideological dictates, the result was a forceful and revolutionary doctrine. This was so in issues which directly affected the position of the United States in Japan. Where Socialists were campaigning against revision of the Security Treaty, or against the presence of American bases in Japan, or the continued American occupation of Okinawa, then both the convinced Marxist and the Japanese chauvinist could respond to the cry of 'American imperialism'. Pacifism, a doctrine which was the very antithesis of the views of nationalists of the 1930's, was put forward by the left as a way of preventing 'rearmament for the United States', and also as an unique contribution of Japan to the world.

On certain issues, notably territorial and other issues between Japan and the Soviet Union, nationalist and ideological aims conflicted. This was reflected in divisions on policy between left and right in the JSP. That this was not so in the case of relations with Communist China was merely an indication of a lack of territorial or other obviously conflicting interests between Japan and China.
The territorial question over the possession of the 'Northern Territories' occupied by Soviet forces in the last days of the war, merits discussion as it throws light on the nature of JSP nationalism, and the relation of this nationalism to its neutralist policy.

During the 1954 - 1956 negotiations for a settlement with the Soviet Union, the Japanese Government concentrated on its claim to the Southern Kurile islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri, which had never in recent times been other than Japanese territory, and the small islands off Hokkaidō of Habomai and Shikotan. These latter had traditionally been part of Hokkaidō, and had never been administered as part of the Kuriles. The territorial issue proved the most intractable of all in the negotiations, and when settlement was finally reached in 1956, the problem of Etorofu and Kunashiri was not resolved. The Soviet Union, however, undertook to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan on the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the two countries.

After this arrangement was reached, the Soviet Union continued to use the issue of territorial concessions as a bargaining counter against other policies of the Japanese Government. Immediately after the signing of the Japan - United States revised Security Treaty in January
1960, the Soviet Foreign Minister announced that Habomai and Shikotan would only be returned on condition that the Security Treaty be revoked. This statement in effect that its promise of 1956 was to be made subject to a condition totally unacceptable to the Japanese Government, remained the basis of subsequent Soviet policy.

The JSP, as we have seen, was divided between left and right over the importance to be attached to Soviet territorial concessions during the negotiations of 1956. Roughly speaking, the right rated the return of territory higher than the achievement of a peace treaty, whereas the left was prepared to concede territory if a peace treaty could thereby be obtained. Subsequent policy statements called for the return of the Kuriles as a whole from the Soviet Union and for the conclusion of a peace treaty, without making the one depend on the other.

A JSP policy statement of October 1961, however, marked a new departure:

The only policy to stabilize Japan-Soviet relations, and thus to relax tension in the Far East, is to work first of all for the conclusion of a Japan-Soviet peace treaty conditional upon the return of Habomai and Shikotan, and subsequently to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the return of the Kuriles... in the midst of continuing efforts to abolish the Japan - United States Security Treaty.
This statement was widely criticised in the press as indicating that the JSP, ideologically biased towards the Soviet Union, was prepared to sacrifice Japan's territorial interests and was therefore anti-patriotic. Nevertheless, the logic behind this new policy seems to have been that since the Soviet Union would never return the Kuriles while Japan had a military alliance with the United States, the only way to break the stalemate in Japan-Soviet relations would be to cease making impossible conditions.

Moreover a significant phrase in the above-quoted statement is the last: 'in the midst of continuing efforts to abolish the Japan–United States Security Treaty.' The abolition of the Security Treaty was the principal aim of the JSP neutralist policy, and the objections to Japan's American connection were expressed not only as a question of security, but also of the limitation of national sovereignty and independence allegedly involved. The limitation of Japanese sovereignty entailed by Soviet occupation of the Kuriles was also considered objectionable (as instanced by successive JSP policy statements from 1956–1961 calling for their return), but since there was good reason for supposing that they would never be returned
while the Security Treaty was in existence, their return, it was argued, should be connected with its abolition.

This is an indication that neutralism, as conceived and argued by the JSP, was designed to serve aims, if not of 'nationalism' in the prewar sense, at least of national advantage. The JSP was genuinely interested in securing the return of the Kuriles, as former Japanese territory, but optimistically thought that this would be possible as a result of a general Far Eastern detente brought about by Japan becoming neutral.

The most obvious areas of national advantage to which the JSP neutralist policy was supposed to contribute were those of sovereignty, territories and trade. By terminating the Security Treaty and establishing neutralism it was hoped that Japan would throw off the alleged restrictions on her sovereignty imposed by the presence of American military bases, obtain the return of alienated northern (and possibly southern) territories, and open up trade with the Communist bloc (especially Communist China). 13

On a less obvious and more fundamental level, it is possible to isolate a gradual change over the postwar period in the international position which Japanese neutralists foresaw for Japan if she were to join the neutralist ranks. This change parallels the economic and
political development of Japan in the postwar period from a defeated enemy power dependent for much of her food supplies on the United States and with her own industries in ruins, to a nation of high industrial efficiency and rising standard of living, accounting for a substantial proportion of world trade and accepted more and more as an equal in the counsels of the advanced industrial nations of North America and Western Europe.

The 'third force' neutralism adopted by Left Socialists in the early 1950's and inspired by India and other Asian countries, was premised on the belief that Japan was of comparable world stature to these, and that if she became neutralist she would merely swell, but not dominate, their ranks. This was partly connected with the fact that Japan was under unabated suspicion from certain Asian countries and also possibly with the fact that she was not accepted as a member of the United Nations until 1957.

In the more recent period, however, Socialists laid more stress on Japan's ability to act as a strong power, thus maintaining that she would be better able to further the cause of neutralism in her position of economic strength than were the underdeveloped countries of South East Asia and elsewhere.
This change in emphasis had certain ideological overtones and did not represent a simple shift in viewpoint. At least three separate elements within it may be distinguished: disillusion with the state of socialism in Asian countries, an increasing tendency to take ideological lessons from elements in the European Left, and the realisation that Japan's increasing economic strength gave her potentially a political position of power in Asia and the world.

The first of these elements - disillusion with the state of socialism in Asian countries - expressed itself particularly in regret over the failure of the Asian Socialist Congress after the high hopes with which it had been invested by both Japanese socialist parties at the time of its foundation in 1953. Socialists commenting on the process of which 'democratic' independence movements, after achieving power in Asian countries, had failed to cope with their problems and had been replaced by dictatorships, frequently blamed economic exploitation by Western powers (and 'neo-colonialism'), but nevertheless deplored it as showing how far socialism in these nations had declined in comparison with the earlier period when such high hopes had been placed upon them.
The second element (the converse of the first) was the tendency to take lessons from the European Left. The most obvious example of this was the importation of 'Structural Reform' from the Italian Communist Party. In foreign policy the influence of Yugoslav theories on JSP neutralist thinking became increasingly important, a point to which we shall return.

The third element was the consciousness of the international political implications of Japan's growing economic and trading strength. By the early 1960's Japan's position as a major industrial and trading nation, treated with respect and virtually as an equal by the advanced nations of Western Europe and elsewhere, had been established by assiduous diplomacy and careful restraint in trading practices. Some of the confidence and national self-respect which this engendered affected Socialists, some of whom came to see Japan as neutralist leader of Asia and a powerful spokesman for the neutralist group in the United Nations. It was argued that once Japan were effectively neutral, and American influence were thus eliminated from the area of North East Asia, she should be able among other things to promote the peaceful unification of Korea, secure the return of Taiwan to China and help other Asian nations to achieve independence.
In addition to the political implications of a strong neutralist Japan, some Socialists implied that economic strength would make Japan able to stand on her own feet as a neutralist nation. One Socialist, for instance, attributed India's difficulties in remaining 'neutralist' during her border war with Communist China (which resulted, at the end of 1962, in a partial reassessment of her position in favour of the West) to her economic backwardness. Since unarmed neutralism was being preached for Japan, it is difficult to see in what way economic strength was, for this Socialist, connected with the protection of an unarmed neutral. Nevertheless the remark is a further indication of the self-confidence with which Japanese Socialists had come to treat the increasing power and prestige of their country.

An example of the confusion of these three elements was shown in Socialist treatment of the policies of Yugoslavia, the only 'neutralist' nation in Europe. Given the propensity to take 'advanced' European countries as models after Japan had recovered her economic strength, it was perhaps embarrassing to Japanese Socialists that no European nation, with the sole exception of Yugoslavia, was 'neutralist'. ('Traditional' neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland were not taken as models). The fact that
Yugoslavia was European but less advanced economically than the majority of the countries of Western Europe made her a somewhat equivocal 'model' for Japanese Socialists.

One Socialist (who also thought that current wavering in India's position of neutralism was caused by her economic backwardness) thought that although Yugoslavia was interesting to Socialists as an independent, Socialist country, her comparative economic backwardness enabled her to wield a significant influence only upon neutralist nations in underdeveloped areas.  

Within the JSP interest in Yugoslavia increased remarkably during the late 1950's and early 1960's, largely owing to the initiatives of the Wada faction. Interest centred especially on the person of Yamaguchi Fusao, who kept up close relations with the Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo from the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations or soon after. Largely because of the prominent position played by the Wada faction in the International Bureau of the JSP, emphasis on Yugoslavia as a model tended to increase at the expense of that of India, and substantial contacts were fostered between the JSP and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

Although it cannot be said that the Yugoslav model commands universal respect among Party officials and Diet
members articulate in foreign affairs, its appeal seems to lie in the Marxist nature of the regime and its success in maintaining a type of national independence that is alleged to have facilitated its progress as a Socialist state. A leading member of the Wada faction told the writer that the 'Yugoslav model' became important in JSP thinking because the regime started from Communism and moved to democracy, so that now Yugoslavia had a domestic political system based on slow and steady progress.²¹

It is significant that this explanation of the appeal of Yugoslavia makes no reference to any contribution in theory or practice which she might have made in regard to neutralism as a method of security. Conversely the criticism, expressed by one Socialist, that Yugoslav neutralism was a product of a local complex of circumstances, that her social structure was unimportant in regard to her neutralism, and that consequently the 'model' had little to teach, referred only to the security aspects of neutralism, to which matters of ideology and nationalism were felt to be irrelevant.²²

Yamaguchi Fusao, the chief 'publicist' of Yugoslavia within the JSP, was most impressed with the 'positive' aspects of Tito's policies, in other words his policy of actively working for world peace, and contrasted this
favourably with the more 'passive' nature of Nehru's policies. He emphasised also, however, the role which Yugoslavia was able, because of her neutralism, to play in world politics, a role which, he maintained, would not have been possible for her had she remained a member of the Communist bloc.

We have shown that the JSP policy of neutralism had certain 'nationalist' overtones which manifested themselves in a number of ways. It is necessary, however, to qualify the word 'nationalist'. Neutralists were, for instance, though strongly critical of the United States' presence in Japan, at variance with the strident anti-Americanism of the JCP and Heiwa Dōshikai.

The reasons for this may be traced back to the fundamental ideological dispute which divided the Marxist Left in the prewar period, that between the Rōnō-ha and the Köza-ha. The split was perpetuated after World War II, with the Rōnō-ha the most important influence in the left wing of the socialist movement, and the principal force behind neutralism. Postwar Communism derived from the Köza-ha.

Before World War II both these groups were anti-nationalist in the sense that they both with equal fanaticism opposed the Japanese militarist programme of war
and foreign expansion. In the postwar period, however, while both the Rōnō-ha and the Communists (with their sympathisers) continued to oppose 'imperialism', they differed in their respective analyses of its origin. The Communists designated Japan a 'colony' of the United States and maintained that the Japanese Government was merely the tool of American 'imperialism'. The Rōnō-ha, on the other hand, called Japan merely a nation 'subordinate to' American 'imperialism', with considerable initiative left to Japanese 'monopoly capital' to pursue its own 'imperialist' course.\(^2\)

The Rōnō-ha believed that Japan was at a stage of advanced capitalism and that 'feudalism' had been passed. In this sense Socialists influenced by the Rōnō-ha were geared to the image of Japan as an advanced country. Thus the fact, which we have discussed, that JSP neutralists were coming to seek 'models' for their neutralism in advanced countries clearly fitted the Rōnō-ha outlook.

We may seek, moreover, in the prewar experiences and arguments of the Rōnō-ha a partial reason for the left Socialist attachment to neutralism in the postwar period. Both before and after World War II, the policy of orthodox Communists was that directed by international Communist organs. Thus in the Comintern Thesis of (for
instance) 1932, opposition to Japanese imperialism was dictated by the needs of Soviet defence. Equally, during the 1950's, the policy of alignment with the Communist bloc advocated by the JCP was vulnerable to the charge of subordination to a foreign power.

The Rōnō-ha, on the other hand, despite its similarity to the Communists in real and ultimate goals, did not have the same history of dependence on the dictates of the Comintern. The experience of protracted disputation with the Communists, and the attempt to fashion a strategy of revolution more consonant with the peculiar features of the Japanese power structure, helped to produce in Rōnō-ha a greater independence of outlook, a more national (though not strictly nationalist) version of Marxism.

One historian writing after World War II remarked that:

The fact that Yamakawa and the Rōnō-ha were, as a popular front, the last group to oppose Japanese imperialism, shows that they had a liberal attitude of thought, strange in a socialist body which served Marxism. This was partly because of the group's youthful baptism in liberalism.

The same author ascribed this 'liberalism' partly to a nationalist approach latent in those who were brought up in the Meiji era.
If this is correct, it may be concluded with confidence that the JSP policy of neutralism, in the formulation of which Socialists influenced by the ideology and experience of Rōnō-ha played so considerable a part, partook of the nationalism which was a feature of Japanese politics since the Meiji Restoration.
In the previous two chapters we have analysed the meanings which neutrality has taken historically in international relations, and in particular the meanings which it has had for the JSP (and its articulate supporters) in relation to foreign policy problems facing Japan over the postwar period. In other words we have discussed it as a view of foreign policy, abstracting it from its domestic political context, to which, in considerable measure, it was a reaction.

It is now, however, necessary to turn to the political context. The JSP was a specifically socialist party, functioning as an element in the Japanese political system. Therefore the connection of socialism with neutralism, and the functioning of the JSP as a political party in a Japanese context, are matters of importance in an analysis of the neutralist policy of the JSP.

Seen in the context of worldwide socialism, the foreign policy of the JSP was atypical. During the postwar period, nearly all the socialist parties of Western Europe, although sometimes prepared to explore further than
their Conservative opponents schemes for limited neutrality of disengagement, were unequivocally committed to the Western alliance.

A. Italian and Japanese Socialism, a Comparison

One Socialist party in Europe, however, formed an exception to this rule, and pursued policies reminiscent of those pursued by the JSP. This was the Nenni Socialist Party of Italy, or PSI. No other European socialist party in the postwar period adopted positions so far to the left as the PSI, both in its relations with communism and in its attitudes toward the Western alliance.

The existence of two 'ultra-leftist' socialist parties outside the predominant pattern of postwar 'moderate' socialism prompts a comparison between them.

The character of the Japanese and Italian socialist movements was similar not only in their general orientation, but also in the issues which divided them and in the differences between factions within each party. While it is not to be suggested that these differences were exactly the same, the degree of similarity which existed points to common conditions.

We shall attempt a comparison between them by taking three sets of conditions which might reasonably be expected to influence the nature of each party, and examining the
extent to which they were similar or contrasted. The first set of conditions is the broad political context in which each party operated. This will be found to be similar at a number of significant points. Secondly, the issues facing each party, and the response of each to these issues, will be treated. Here also, notable similarities will be found, especially in the way the party divided into different groups or factions on the same issues. Thirdly, we shall discuss the character and rationale of factionalism in the two parties, and here it will be found that, despite their apparent similarity there were marked divergences between them, and that JSP factions have evolved in certain interesting directions.

Our first sphere of comparison is the broad political context in which each party operated.

In both Japan and Italy a competitive party political system was resumed at the end of World War II after a period of totalitarian rule, during which, in each case, the socialist movement did not legally exist. In Italy the movement was suppressed in 1926, soon after the establishment of one-party rule by the Fascists, and most of its leaders spent the next twenty years in exile or in inactivity. In Japan the period of one-party rule was much shorter (1940-45), but in the twenty years before 1940
socialism had an extremely difficult time, subject as it was
to crippling legal restrictions and coming under increasing
nationalist influence and control.

Certainly before 1923 the history of socialism in the
two countries was strikingly different. Whereas in Japan
the socialist movement of the late Meiji and early
Taishō eras was confined to small numbers of individuals,
mostly intellectuals, socialism in Italy was a strong and
deeply rooted mass movement. In a potentially revolutionary
situation following World War I, for instance, the Italian
Socialist Party emerged from the 1919 general election as
the largest parliamentary party, securing 156 seats as
against 352 seats shared between nine other groups. This
was at a time when, in Japan, despite disturbed conditions
which gave rise to spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction
on the part of the working class, no socialist party had yet
been formed.

Nevertheless, the common history of suppression to
which each movement had been subjected had two effects:
firstly, to take from them the possibility of large-scale
organisation or participation in government, and thus
perpetuate ideological differences between the leaders, who
worked, as it were, in a vacuum; secondly, to enhance the prestige of the revolutionary and dynamic left against the reformist and democratic right.

Another point at which similarities may be observed is in the colour of the respective governments of the two countries after World War II. The near-monopoly of power by conservative administrations in Japan was matched by the virtual monopoly of power by governments of the centre and right in Italy. After the period of postwar reconstruction Socialist parties were in neither country participants in government. The experience of Italy and Japan together here contrasts with that of other European countries: Great Britain, which enjoyed a Labour Government from 1945-51, France, where the Socialist Party took part in a number of administrations of the Fourth Republic, and some Scandinavian countries, where administrations of the Left predominated.

Similarities between Italy and Japan also existed in the field of economics. Both, after the period of recovery from World War II, had a lower standard of living than most other countries of Europe. In both, industrialisation had come comparatively late, but postwar economic growth progressed rapidly, and the economies of each were becoming
rapidly more diversified. In both, average per capita income, and especially incomes of industrial workers, was rising fast. 7

Summing up the common political conditions faced by socialist parties in the two countries, we may say that both the PSI and the JSP had faced impotence and persecution at the hands of dictatorial and anti-democratic governments before World War II. They had been condemned in the postwar period to a position of perpetual opposition, facing conservative governments which they considered reactionary. Both Socialist parties had behind them a proletariat at a relatively early and turbulent stage of its development, which was, however, rapidly coming to assimilate the wealth and attitudes of a mature industrial society. It is reasonable to suppose that these factors, taken together, contributed to the formation of a more radical socialist movement than developed in other countries whose socialist parties were fully legal before the war, participated in government after the war, and had enjoyed for some years the fruits of advanced industrialisation.

The second area in which comparison is possible is the nature of certain vital issues facing both parties in the postwar period and their response to these issues. Both parties were divided among themselves about the desired
international alignment of their respective countries, and their relations with international socialist movements. In both cases this was related not only to foreign policy as such, but also to fundamental ideological divisions deriving from the early days of the respective movements. On the extreme right of both Japanese and Italian Socialist movements there was a faction which advocated reformist 'Fabian' socialism, was intransigently opposed to Communism and was prepared, in certain circumstances, to enter into coalition governments with conservative parties. The position of the Nishio faction of the JSP which took the party into the coalition of 1947-48 (the failure of which led to the ascendancy of the left wing in the party) has already been described. In 1947 the Saragat faction broke away from the main stream of the Italian socialist movement and formed a separate party, based on very similar principles, which subsequently participated in conservative-dominated administrations. On the extreme left of both parties there were factions advocating a close alliance with the Communists. Because of the greater strength of the Communist Party (PCI) in Italy, the view that proletarian unity should prevail over differences with the Communists was stronger among Italian than Japanese Socialists; the PSI formed a united front with the Communist Party in order
to fight the 1948 general election, and retained close ties with it until about 1956. After 1953, when the PSI was already moving away from the Communist alliance, the extreme left of the party was occupied by a group of "Fusionists," whose position was closely similar to that of the extreme left factions of the JSP.

The extent of ideological division within both parties was shown in their relations with the Socialist International. COMISCO (the predecessor of the Socialist International) expelled the PSI in March 1949 for its pact with the Communists. Shortly before this the party debated the issue of its relations with COMISCO and views were significantly split between three main factions. On the right a faction advocating reunion with the Saragat Socialists and a final break with the Communists supported close relations with COMISCO in much the same terms as were used by the Japanese Right Socialist Party between 1951 and 1955 (See Chapter 5).

The faction expressed its views in the following terms:

In the international field, while adopting positions neither sympathetic to capitalism nor to the foreign policies of states or groupings of states which bear the seed of a third war, the Italian Socialist Party must act within COMISCO for the affirmation of principles which can lead to the consolidation of socialism in Europe... The PSI, in order to assume more the exalted mission assigned
to it by history, must be able to count on all those forces which are authentically socialist, reunited under the banner of the old glorious Party.\textsuperscript{12}

These remarks contain the hint of a 'third force' of socialist parties, or preferably socialist states, although the faction rejected the idea of a neutralist Italy outside the Western military alliance.

On the left of the PSI the faction which had led the party into its electoral alliance with the Communists rejected COMISCO and directed its sympathies towards the Soviet bloc.

In between left and right a centre faction adopted a position not unlike that of the 'neutralist' Left Socialist Party in Japan between 1951 and 1955. The following quotation from a spokesman of the faction illustrates its views:

Western socialist parties are tied to the anti-Soviet policies of their governments, and are therefore blackmailing Italian socialism; the policy of our party however must not be one of binding ourselves to the interests of either the Western bloc or the Eastern bloc, and in order to maintain neutrality even to its ultimate consequences, we must neither accept the anti-Soviet blackmail of COMISCO, nor break off relations with COMISCO, but must rather remain within it in a position of a critical minority.\textsuperscript{13}

This position of the centre faction of the PSI closely corresponds to views frequently expressed by the left wing factions of the JSP in relation to the Socialist International.
At periods when these factions were dominant (especially in the Left Socialist Party 1951-55, and the JSP after the secession of the Democratic Socialist Party in 1959), the Party was outspokenly critical of the Socialist International, while not actually renouncing its membership. The grounds for JSP criticism, as for that of the PSI, were largely ideological: It maintained that the International, by advocating reformism in domestic politics and anti-Communism in foreign policy, misunderstood the needs of Japan, where a more intransigent struggle was required against domination by Japanese and American 'monopoly capital'.

The resilience of a Marxist tradition in the two parties was shown in the predominance of a left wing which firmly rejected gradualism or 'reformism', shunned any compromise or coalition with 'bourgeois' parties, depending instead upon the might of the proletariat to produce revolution, and was strongly influenced by pacifism. In foreign policy this had its effect in producing a sympathy for the Communist bloc and a tendency to ignore or play down the totalitarian nature of Communist regimes, despite an official attachment which these Socialists had to 'democratic' ideals. On the other hand an ideological anti-Americanism led them into a rejection of military
agreements with the United States, and the advocacy of either neutrality or a close association with the Communist countries. A fundamental similarity in the foreign policy issues facing the two parties was thus matched by a parallel ideological approach.

The third sphere of comparison is the character of factionalism within the two parties. Both parties were composed of a number of discrete factions possessing a considerable degree of separate organisation and strongly competitive with rival factions. In the PSI, as in the JSP, a number of 'left' factions of divergent origin combined against an equally diverse group of 'right' factions, so that a factional struggle was carried on at two levels: that between individual factions and that between broad coalitions of factions.

On the other hand, deeper analysis shows that these similarities mask important differences. If we replace the static comparison of the factional components of the PSI and the JSP with a dynamic comparison of the factional balance in the two parties over the postwar period, it will be seen that the long-term trends of each differed significantly. The JSP, as has been described, moved from right wing dominance in the immediate postwar period,
through a time of increasing left wing dominance (1949-60), into a period of factional recasting, with a 'neo-right wing' ascendant but by no means unchallenged (1960-63).

The PSI, on the other hand, after the Saragat secession of 1947, entered a phase of extreme leftist dominance, during which the party was closely allied with the Communist Party (1949-56). From 1953, however, the 'Autonomist' factions, devoted to the aim of severing the alliance with the Communists, were gaining strength at the expense of those who wished to continue the close association with the Communists. The Hungarian revolt in 1956 gave added impetus to the Autonomist ascendancy, whose leadership worked patiently for the formation of a coalition government of the Christian Democrats, the Saragat Socialists and the PSI. This aim, after many setbacks, was finally accomplished in 1963.

It is difficult to overestimate the distance which the PSI had travelled from its close alliance with the Communists in the early 1950's to its alliance with the Christian Democrats in the early 1960's. In comparison the path trodden by the JSP seems one of failure to take bold initiatives to shape its policies according to the rapidly
changing conditions brought about by increasing economic prosperity, or to consider itself seriously as a viable alternative government.

We wish to advance the hypothesis that this important discrepancy in the long term trends manifested by two otherwise remarkable similar parties is to be explained in terms less of underlying ideological divergence or divergent political conditions, than of differences in the character of factions and their leadership in the two parties.

It must be admitted that the political conditions facing the JSP and the PSI differed in one important respect, namely the existence of a far stronger Communist Party in Italy than in Japan, a Communist Party, moreover, which dominated the main trade union federation. It is true that the reasons why the PSI leaders led their party into alliance with the Communist Party were at least partly the desire on the part of the weaker of two 'mass parties' not to lose support from the charge of splitting the proletarian front. The Japan Communist Party, on the other hand, received for most of the postwar period such a small vote that pressure from the extreme left wing of the
much more powerful JSP for closer relations with the Communists could be safely ignored by the rest of the party.

The fact, however, that the PSI was initially tied to the Communist Party and yet broke away from it in such a decisive fashion, does not diminish the strength of leadership which was necessary to guide the party along such a path.

A comparison of the leadership of the PSI and the JSP indicates one important element lacking in the latter which was present in the former. The PSI possessed a 'charismatic leader', in the person of Nenni. The importance in party councils of a 'charismatic leader', able to prevail over entrenched party bureaucrats by his appeal to the mass of party adherents, was pointed out by Michels.  

The career of Nenni illustrates his dictum. Although leader of the Left faction in the immediate postwar period, and one of the most important initiators of the pact with the Communists, after 1953 he lent the weight of his authority to the 'Autonomist' cause and successfully (though not without a hard struggle) confronted the powerful bureaucratic apparatus which during the heyday of left wing ascendancy had imitated the Communists to the extent of stifling free intra-party discussion and debate.
The JSP did not at any stage possess a 'charismatic leader' of the standing of Nenni. Although the mass popularity of Asanuma was sometimes remarked, it is probably fair to say that he only assumed 'charismatic' value after his assassination in 1960. It is, however, possible to make a significant comparison between Nenni and Eda. As we have seen, the latter used techniques of popular appeal through the media of mass communication which consolidated his position despite his lack of a personal faction - a technique new to the party. The struggle for party leadership between Eda and Sasaki during 1961 and 1962 assumed the character of a struggle between a 'popular' leader and a faction leader with little popular appeal. Eda made appeal to a 'new' theory of socialism (Structural Reform) and an emotive 'Vision' of the future, while Sasaki carefully organised his immediate followers.

Eda, however, after his success at the Congress of January 1962, was defeated in a motion which he chose to regard as one of confidence at the Congress of November 1962. Although this did not result in a 'victory' of Sasaki's faction in the sense that it did not gain control of the party, it represented a personal defeat for Eda, whose influence within the party was much diminished.
Eda's attempt to gain personal ascendancy of the JSP upon a programme of reform was thus less impressive and less successful than the transformation of the PSI accomplished over ten years by Nenni. The reasons for this must be sought in the nature of Nenni's appeal, and in a comparison of factionalism in the two parties.

Nenni exercised his hold over the mass following of the PSI not only because of his long association with Italian socialism including long periods as its leader, but also for his reputation as a hero of the anti-fascist resistance during World War II. The importance of the wartime resistance movement for the subsequent history of the Italian Left is hard to overestimate. In contrast, the Japanese Left did not have a similar 'heroic' experience to which it could make reference. Large sections of the movement had, passively or actively, cooperated with the militarists, and those who had not (including especially the Communists) had spent the war in prison or in exile, without being able to influence in any way the course of events. Eda was an unknown politician when circumstances thrust him to leadership of the party in 1960, and his temporary success was due to his ability to seize the opportunities presented to him by the realignment of factions currently taking place.
The fact that a 'charismatic leader' was so important for the PSI depended upon the organisation of the party itself. Conversely the lack of success of a similar technique in the JSP depended upon that party's organisation. One obvious difference in the nature of the two parties lay in their membership figures. Personal membership of the JSP never exceeded 60,000. In the PSI membership reached 500,000, or nearly ten times as many. Both parties, moreover, exclusively used a system of individual membership, and not the system of indirect trade union membership whereby a member of a trade union affiliated to the party would automatically be a member of the party unless he specifically chose to 'contract out' (the system used together with individual affiliation in the British Labour Party between 1913 and 1927, and from 1945). In the PSI an individual could be a member either of a territorial unit of the party, according to where he lived, or of a unit of the party organised in the factory in which he worked. The latter, however, were not particularly significant, and the large majority of members were organised territorially according to their place of residence. Since the situation was similar in the JSP, it seems legitimate to compare the membership figures of the two parties without apology.
Mass membership does not necessarily mean mass participation in the decision-making processes of a party. One writer, analysing trends in the PSI, stresses the oligarchic nature of these processes in the party even after the return to 'intra-party democracy' when the 'Autonomist' factions got the upper hand and connections with the Communists were loosened in 1956. He argues that because of the high proportion of 'sleeping members' who do not actively participate in the work of the party, democracy is lost and factions gain control, while national congresses of the party are merely 'a discourse between the leaders'. He admits, however, that in certain circumstances, notably during election campaigns, and during congresses of branches, there is wide participation and substantive political issues are discussed.

In the JSP, on the other hand, it would seem far more pertinent than in the PSI to speak of an oligarchic structure. Not only has membership not exceeded 60,000, but it is claimed that active members have been no more than 5,000 to 10,000. Moreover, whereas the PSI was well entrenched in local administration in many areas of Italy, the JSP was always conspicuously less successful in local elections (and especially in elections for city,
town and village councils) than in the national elections. Here we come upon a fundamental difference between the organisation of the JSP and that of our Italian model: However oligarchic the structure of the PSI might be (especially during periods when it modelled itself upon the vertical linkage without horizontal intercommunication of the Italian Communist Party), it possessed (as did the Communist Party) a dedicated grass-roots following among the working class, prepared to identify itself with the party as well as to vote for it. If, however, we compare the number of active members of the JSP with the number of those who voted for it at national elections, we see that the proportion is infinitessimal.

There seem to be two main reasons for this difference. Firstly, the roots of socialism in Japan were principally intellectual. Because of persecution and generally unfavourable political conditions, those leaders who tried to organise socialist movements with a mass backing before World War II had little success, and the socialist parties which proliferated after 1925 remained little more than intellectual discussion groups, or personal support groups of a particular leader, or both. Michels, however,
writing of the European scene (his examples were mostly taken from the recent experience of France, Germany and Italy) in 1915, thus described the 'grass roots' of European socialist:

In the countries where capitalist development is of long standing, there exists in certain working-class milieux and even in entire categories of worker a genuine socialist tradition. The son inherits the class spirit of the father, and he doubtless from the grandfather. With them, socialism is 'in the blood'.

In Italy, working class socialist traditions were easily translated once more into a mass movement by Socialist (and Communist) leaders after the fascist suppression ended.

Secondly, the Japanese sociological structure of hierarchy and paternalism, inherited from the Tokugawa period and deliberately perpetuated by the prewar Japanese rulers in order to mobilize the resources of the nation, did not encourage the development of mass movements with active mass participation. The tradition of elitist leadership with a small number of immediate supporters working for the advancement of a particular leader (or election candidate) encouraged the fragmentation of political parties into factions, which worked to a great extent independently of any central party organisation that might exist. In the case of the JSP, as also in the
conservative parties, many of the faction leaders from the prewar period resumed their positions after the war or after the end of the Occupation, and continued their prewar tradition of personal leadership.

Our comparison of the JSP with an important European socialist party has indicated some of the important differences of substance underlying apparent similarities of form. Duverger maintained that the 'branch' was the typical unit of organisation of (European) socialist parties and parties modelling themselves on socialist forms of organisation. He further held that, despite appearances to the contrary, parties founded upon branches were more centralised and oligarchic than parties founded upon what he considered to be the typical unit of 'bourgeois' organisation, the 'caucus'.\(^{38}\) If we attempt to fit the JSP into Duverger's scheme, we strike the paradox that although the party is founded on branches, they are not the units of mass organisation of the PSI, but more akin to the candidate-support groups typical, according to Duverger, of 'caucus' parties. The comparative 'centralisation' of branch parties, mentioned by Duverger, refers to the greater ease (in the European context) for central leadership of the party to control a mass of affiliated supporters, who are susceptible both to
'charismatic' appeal, rather than to control a relatively small number of individuals, having interests and patronage of their own. 39

Both the JSP and the PSI were reft by factionalism. Whereas, however, the mass organisation of PSI permitted one group of leaders not only to gain control, but also to change the direction of the party in a radical and purposeful manner, attempts to do the same in the JSP met with at best limited success. JSP leadership is best described in terms of weakness and its policies in terms of inconsistency, bred of the necessity of constant compromise between the party's loosely coherent parts.

B. Factions and Policy

As one writer has pointed out, studies of the organisation and composition of parties tend to stop short of analysis of intra-party procedures leading to the making of policy. 40 In our study, however, it is desirable to attack this problem, since as we have indicated in general terms, and as must have become evident from our chronological analysis of the development of the policy of neutralism, the particular type of factionalism operating in the JSP led to an intricate process of bargaining over policy and policy nuances.
In order to analyse this process, descriptions of the factions and their differences in terms of 'pressure groups' and socio-economic composition seem insufficient and indeed secondary.

It has, for instance, been correctly argued that because of the weakness of JSP organisation, the party is driven to depend on the trade union federations, which provide the majority of funds and general facilities for candidates at elections. One scholar has demonstrated that in the 1958 Lower House general election the showing of candidates sponsored by trade unions was very much better than of those who were not. He therefore argues that the influence of trade union federations upon the factions within the JSP must be considerable. This inference is correct in the sense that the JSP is virtually a one-pressure-group party, representing organised labour and working closely with the trade unions, and that there have been links between factions in the trade unions and factions in the JSP. Nevertheless, although such links are not to be ignored, with certain exceptions it is difficult to say that a given group within the trade union movement is the real force behind the policies or the manoeuvres of a given faction in the JSP. One exception relates to the period before the foundation of the DSP, when there were
clear and consistent divisions of policy between those right wing Socialists sponsored by Zenrō (membership approximately 1,200,000) and other minor federations, and left wing Socialists sponsored by Sōhyō (membership approximately 4,000,000). After the secession, however, the influence exercised by groups within Sōhyō upon factions in the JSP seems less important than factors internal to the party itself.

Secondly, analyses have been made of the social and professional background of faction members, showing that certain very broad distinctions may be made, particularly in terms of closeness of association with the trade union movement as a whole. It would seem, however, that the general similarity in background extending over the members of nearly all the factions is more significant than the differences which do appear. In any case, the picture is far too confused for it to be possible to make simple correlations between a faction's socio-economic background and its policies and actions.

In order to explain the party's internal policy-making processes as a whole, it is necessary to take into account the complex pattern of factional manoeuvre in its ideological and political setting.
The following factors have to be taken into consideration:

a) The nature of the ideological beliefs with which a faction is associated, and the strength and unanimity with which they are held.

b) The personal loyalties and mutual obligations which typically characterise Japanese political organisation, reinforced by factional rivalry in the allotment of party posts.

c) The actual process of manoeuvring between the factions, with its various imponderables.

d) The position of a faction over periods of time in relation to the other factions on the ideological continuum 'Left-Centre-Right', which influence the degree to which ideological positions can be firmly and uncompromisingly held.

The factors may be considered distinct, but there is some interrelation between a) and b), since, in a party as ideologically inclined as the JSP, personal loyalty to a faction leader has reinforced and been reinforced by the ideology which he champions and symbolises.

Over the postwar period, each of the factors mentioned above operated to a very different extent in each faction. The reasons for the differences lay in the origin of each
faction, the nature of its leadership, and the role it played in the postwar party. In order to appreciate this more exactly, we shall briefly analyse each faction as it appeared to the observer up to the realignment of factions which began in 1960.

a) Factions with direct prewar lineage

i) Nishio faction.

The Nishio faction showed great consistency in adherence to its principles, which can roughly be summarised as democratic gradualism and unbending opposition to Communism. Two other factors apparently contributed to its ideological consistency: firstly, Nishio himself, a powerful leader of long standing, created a very active group with strong personal loyalty to him. Secondly, the faction's position on the extreme right of the postwar party deprived it of leadership after the immediate postwar period (when the faction took a leading role in the coalition governments of 1947-48), and thus it did not have the motivations for compromise of principles which a share in party leadership gave to other factions.

ii) Kawakami faction

The Kawakami faction, despite its moderate right wing ideology which enabled it to form a right wing alliance with the Nishio faction from 1951-55, pursued a
course of weak cohesion and relatively inconsistent treatment of principle, in marked contrast to that of its ally. There seem to be three main reasons for this: firstly, it contained a number of leaders of comparable stature, active since the foundation of Nihon Rōnōtō in 1926. Secondly, the ideological background of its members is said to be intellectually broad, and to derive partly from Marxist and partly from democratic-socialist roots. Thirdly, and probably the most important, is the position which the faction occupied on the ideological spectrum of the party. During 1954 and 1955 the Kawakami faction, as the leadership faction of the Right Socialist Party, took the initiative, against the determined opposition of the Nishio faction, in negotiating for reunification with the Left Socialist Party. Thus it secured for itself a position within the leadership group of the united Socialist Party born towards the end of 1955. The weakness of the faction's cohesion was, however, demonstrated, when part of its membership split to join the Nishio faction in founding the DSP in 1959.

iii) Suzuki faction

The Suzuki faction held over a long period a consistent ideology, based on Rōnō-ha Marxism. It was thus clearly distinguished from the Communist Party which gave precedence to a revolution of national liberation, instead
of a proletarian socialist revolution, as advocated by Rōnō-ha. The faction was loyal to an established leadership, which was able to reward its members by clever manoeuvre, and to establish a dominant position within the party. Although the 1955 reunification agreement included substantial concessions by the Left Wing, this was done in clear consciousness of its increasing strength relative to the Right Wing, and in the belief that it would be able to establish dominance over a united party. The Suzuki-Asanuma leadership, which lasted from 1955-60, symbolised this dominance, since the right wing partner increasingly adopted policies associated with the left wing over the period.

b) Factions without direct prewar lineage

i) Wada faction

Of the factions formed after the war, the Wada faction was the most influential. Excluded from the position of leading faction by the dominant Suzuki faction, it generally sought allies on the far left, although ideologically there was little to choose between it and the Suzuki faction. During the first two or three years of the Left Socialist Party (1951-55) there was little indication of either ideological or factional differences between the two. When, however, the Suzuki faction began to organise its future leadership alliance with the
Kawakami faction of the Right Socialist Party, both Wada and the extreme left opposed, and the Wada faction moved left in terms of its factional allies. This was in contrast to its post-1961 position on the right of the party, and this shows the importance of factional balance on policy determination. 51

ii) Nomizo faction

The Nomizo faction was the only example within the Party of a group representing a non-labour interest, that of Nihon Nōmin Kumiai (Japan Farmers Union). The lack of importance attached by the Party as a whole to agriculture was reflected in the weakness and ineffectiveness of this faction, whose ideological position, while of the left, changed in accordance with the dictates of factional alliance, rather than with considerations of principle, its main 'principle' being the promotion of agricultural interests within the party. 52

iii) Heiwa Dōshikai

At the extreme left of the JSP were two factions which were closely allied and frequently grouped as one. These were Heiwa Dōshikai, formerly the Matsumoto faction, and the Kuroda faction (which formed a separate party, Rōnōtō, close to the Communist Party, between 1948 and 1957). Heiwa Dōshikai may be considered primarily
ideological, devoted to promoting a party line distinct from the predominant moderate leftist ideology. This line, which had much in common with that of the Communist Party, was that a true socialist revolution must be preceded by a revolution of liberation from American 'monopoly capital'. Since the extreme left was consistent in its ideological aims, and never formed part of the leadership group, even of the former Left Socialist Party, it may be considered to have played a similar role on the far left to that which the Nishio faction played on the far right.\(^{53}\)

The interplay of faction of ideology in the JSP resulted, after the 1955 reunification agreement, in a factional balance resting on the leadership of two factions whose views on ideological issues covered a moderate field of opinion. Because of the factors mentioned above, these two factions were prepared to compromise their views in the interest of their joint position, but because of the greater strength and cohesion of the Suzuki faction, its views tended to predominate. At the right extreme was the Nishio faction, noted for its ideological consistency and thus coexisting with difficulty with the rest of the party. At the other extreme were the far leftist groups, similarly adamant in the pursuit of their
beliefs. The Nomizo faction had little significance. The Wada faction, excluded from power, opposed the leadership from the left, less from ideological conviction than from personal rivalry.

The characteristics of this balance lay thus in the ability to cooperate in leadership of groups sufficiently similar in ideology for factional advantage to be able to transcend ideology. Between the 'leadership' and 'anti-leadership' groups, however, there were clearly defined differences of view, with the 'anti-leadership' groups weakened by being composed of extremes of right and left instead of being a homogeneous body, able in itself to marshall a unified body of doctrine.

Thus it cannot be said that JSP factions as a whole were either primarily ideological groups or primarily groups based on personal loyalties and mutual obligations. Both these characteristics were involved to a varying degree. Factional manoeuvre did not take place in a completely different sphere from ideological conflict. It is seen, however, from a comparison of the various factions and their relative behaviour, that provided ideological differences were not too great, factional manoeuvres might take place independently of ideological differences. Alliance, on the other hand, was not able to
take place between the left and the Nishio faction, because their aims were too different, and indeed, opposition from the Nishio faction was the greatest obstacle to unification in 1955.

The secession of the Nishio faction 1959 was therefore an event of major importance. Since the rest of the party was ideologically more unified as a result of the secession, it might have been expected that this would result in greater unity of leadership. This, however, did not prove to be the case.

Whereas a potent source of ideological discord had been removed with the departure of Nishio and his faction, personal loyalties and mutual obligations continued to divide the party into a number of factions, each competing for positions on the party Executive. We have already noted that after 1960 factions previously associated with a particular viewpoint shifted their positions according to the necessities of power struggle. It seems to be the case that fundamental policy issues relating more or less directly to ideology (especially Structural Reform and the 'alignment' of foreign policy) became counters in the power struggle.

Prewar Socialist factions were small groups, consisting in most cases of the close personal following
of a single leader, whose ideological teachings they existed to implement. The JSP as formed immediately after World War II was an uneasy coalition of these elements, which retained their strong separate beliefs, together with much of their original membership. If we look, however, at the Party as it functioned from 1960, we may distinguish two types of faction, those whose membership was stable and small, and those where it was fluid and large. In various lists of faction members in the Diet, it is seen that there is little variation in the number of members ascribed to the Nomizo faction (closely associated with agriculture) and to Heiwa Dōshikai and the Kuroda faction both distinguished from the rest of the Party by their pro-Communist outlook). These small, stable groups had clearly defined aims. They were not in a position seriously to contemplate control of the Party.

On the other hand the main contenders for party leadership were three factions (Kawakami, Wada and Suzuki-Sasaki) with a large but most ill-defined membership, and one (the Eda 'faction') so small that it could hardly be called a 'faction' at all.

The striking characteristic of this latter group of factions was that each possessed a 'hard core' or closely coherent leadership group, competing for
effective control of the Party with 'hard cores' of other factions. The uniqueness of the Eda faction was that it consisted of nothing but a 'hard core'. The absence of genuine deep seated ideological differences between the main contenders for party leadership did not reduce factional strife. It did, however, loosen the cohesion of the main factions as ideologically oriented units.

Ideology and factionalism have been principal determinants of JSP foreign policy, and in particular, of its policy of neutralism in foreign relations. If the above analysis of trends in factionalism is correct, the identification of faction with ideology, evident up to about 1960, was breaking down after 1960. As in other socialist parties, a 'socialist' ideology distinguished the party from other parties, but within its context there was ample room for sharply opposed views on a number of sensitive ideological matters. Ideology, however, while continuing to shape the broad lines of foreign policy, played a decreasing role in the formation of intra-party foreign policy differences among the main factions. The trend was towards a struggle for power between rival leadership groups, or 'hard cores', with foreign policy issues as counters in these struggles.
CONCLUSION

Most countries adopting a neutralist foreign policy, or with strong political parties advocating such a policy, have been underdeveloped ex-colonies with huge problems of development and little possibility of being influential partners in the Western military bloc. Japan, however, stands out among countries where neutralism has been popular, as an advanced and rapidly developing industrial nation – herself an ex-colonial power with a recent militarist tradition – potentially capable of playing a major role in world affairs.

Neutralism in such a country is clearly the product of a set of conditions somewhat different from those producing neutralism elsewhere. One obvious reason for its popularity in postwar Japan has been a strong pacifist feeling and antipathy to nuclear weapons (and consequent distrust of the concept of nuclear deterrence). The unique nature of the neutralism put forward – that it should be unarmed neutralism – can only be adequately explained (despite the rationalisations normally given) as the product of a fervent emotional pacifism. A second reason for neutralism was that it was the expression of the anti-
Americanism which gathered force in Japan towards the end of the Occupation and in its aftermath. The spectre of the United States backing up 'reactionary' Japanese Governments composed in part of politicians who were thought to have shared responsibility for the war was genuinely frightening to left wing Socialists and others who had suffered restriction and persecution before 1945. Thirdly, the dominance within the JSP of Socialists imbued with the Rōnō-ha ideology of what we have called 'national Marxism' contributed to the triumph of the neutralist argument within the Party. Two relevant beliefs characterised the Rōnō-ha ideology: firstly that the most important struggle in the world was that between socialism and capitalism (not, as the Nishio faction would have it, between democracy and communism); secondly that Japan was (in Marxist terms) a country at the stage of advanced capitalism, ripe for a one-stage proletarian-socialist revolution. The first tenet put left wing Socialists strongly against the existing form of relations with the United States on the grounds that that nation was the arch-exponent of 'imperialism'; the second distinguished theirs from the Communist view of Japan as a more retarded country awaiting deliverance from its 'semi-colonial' status; left-wing Socialists tended to think that Japan was able to wield the influence in
international affairs concomitant with the advanced 'stage' she had reached. Thus what they required of a foreign policy was that it should combine opposition to the American alliance with the assertion of Japan's national independence.

The fact that neutralism has not become the foreign policy of the Government of Japan is a direct result of Socialist failure to form a government, and this in turn may be attributed to a number of factors, including the entrenched nature of the conservative rural vote, weak and elitist leadership in the JSP and Socialist inability to put forward consistent or persuasive policies. It is, moreover, doubtful whether the kind of neutralism advocated by the JSP during the 1950's and early 1960's still corresponds to anything which could be called a 'mood' in the electorate. The policy used to be the expression of an urgent sense of the fear of nuclear war and of a desire to assert Japanese independence from the United States. However, the ever-increasing distance in time from 1945 and the currently less tense nature of the East-West confrontation could substantially reduce the urgency of purely pacifist feeling. Moreover, the recent successes of Japan in her aim of becoming accepted as an equal in the
councils of the advanced industrial nations, and increasing national self-confidence accompanying rising prosperity, may reduce the appeal of anti-Americanism.

The trend of foreign policy under successive conservative governments has been a gradual and cautious assertion of greater independence in dealings with the rest of the world. In this way there has been a certain unacknowledged drawing together of the views on foreign policy of conservatives and Socialists; a more 'independent' foreign policy on the part of the Government has approached in content a more 'realistic' neutralism on the part of the JSP.

On the other hand the elitist and factional nature of the JSP, compounded by its non-participation in power over a long period, has placed grave difficulties in the way of a 'rational' reassessment of policy in the light of objective circumstances. While policy fluctuates widely as a by-product of the factional struggle for control of the Party, there is little evidence that a concerted attempt to remould the policy would meet with success.