VOLUME II

END NOTES, APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTES FOR CHAPTER I  THE HISTORICAL LEGACY: SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS BEFORE WORLD WAR II

1. See Chapter 12.


3. The first socialist party formed after universal manhood suffrage in 1925 - a measure which for the first time made possible the organisation of parliamentary political parties dependent on a working class vote - was immediately banned. The reason for its suppression - that it allegedly contained some pro-Communist elements - led to their careful exclusion in later socialist organisational attempts. (See Kōno Mitsu, Nihon shakai seito shi [History of Japanese Socialist Political Parties], Chūō Koronsa, September 1960, pp. 58-60). The result of the second attempt to form a party, Rōdō Nomintō, in 1926, was, for a different reason, scarcely more successful. The party rapidly disintegrated into three irreconcilable groups, all claiming the status of rival socialist parties. (A fourth party that resulted from the split was of little importance). These three parties were Shakai Minshūtō (right wing), Nihon Rōnōtō (centre) and Rōdō Nomintō (left wing). This split began a process of kaleidoscopic sub-division and re-formation of parties within the socialist movement - a process which only ended with the formation of Shakai Taishūtō (embracing nearly all the main groups) in July 1932. Nevertheless, although the three-way split of 1926 was merely the prelude to further splits and re-groupings, the group loyalties of that split persisted until long after the end of World War II.

4. See especially the discussion of neutrality and neutralism contained in Chapter 9.

5. See especially the following condensed quotation from a Socialist newspaper contemporary with the Russo-Japanese War: 'Nationalists think that excess population is the cause of the prevalence of poverty, and that in order to prevent the population from increasing it is necessary to expand colonies and markets. From this viewpoint they think that
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war is both profitable and necessary. In reality, however, a small class of capitalists and politicians are exploiting the greater part of the production of their brothers, keeping down their purchasing power and thus reducing the size of the domestic market, so that they require further markets abroad and thus go out to seize territory. The majority of poor workers, however, have no means of knowing this. If production were to cease to be for the profit of a few capitalists and existed to satisfy the needs of the community as a whole, and if the control of the means of production were to be transferred from the hands of a minority to those of the majority, international conflicts would disappear. The total abolition of war cannot take place without the complete establishment of a socialist system.¹ Hattori Shisō and Konishi Shirō, eds., Shiryō kindai Nihon shi shakaishugi shiryō - Heimin Shimbun (Materials of Modern Japanese History, Socialist Materials - Heimin Shimbun), Vol.1, pp. 8-9.

6. See the following quotation from an open letter to the Russian Social-Democrats, published in the same newspaper: 'Japan and Russia, in order to fulfil their respective imperialist desires, have wilfully started war, but in the eyes of Socialists there is no difference between races or areas or nationalities; we and you are comrades, brothers and sisters, and we have absolutely no reason to fight each other. Your enemies are not the Japanese, but are imperialism and militarism. Our enemies are not Russians, but are imperialism and militarism. Nationalism and militarism are the common enemies of both of us, and are the common enemies of Socialists all over the world. You and we and Socialists all over the world must fight a valiant struggle against the common enemy.' Hayashi Shigeru and Nishida Chōju, eds. Heimin Shimbun ronsetsu shū (Collection of Leading Articles from the Heimin Shimbun), Iwanami Shoten, March 1961, pp. 22-23.


8. The platforms of the various parties are given in Kōno, op. cit., pp. 54-127.
9. At the time of the Manchurian 'Incident' the Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō (an amalgam of centre and left wing factions but as yet excluding the right wing faction, which joined it five months later) officially announced that it 'resolutely opposed' the action of the Japanese army in Manchuria since 'this action could lead to world war'. Quoted in Hanzawa Hiroshi, 'Rōnō-ha to jimmin sensen - Yamakawa Hitoshi wo megutte' (The Rōnō-ha and the Popular Front - Yamakawa Hitoshi), in Shisō no Kagaku Kenkyūkai, Tenkō (Conversion), Heibonsha, 1959-62, Vol. 2, pp. 369-432, at p. 401.

10. For a description of Yamakawa's career, see Ibid.


12. The 1922 'Bukharin Thesis' of the Comintern emphasised the 'feudal elements' ruling Japan: 'Japanese capitalism contains the traces of the feudal relations of a previous age. The majority of the land is in the hands of semi-feudal large landlords, and supreme among these is the Head of the Japanese Government - the Emperor. The vestiges of these feudal relations now have predominance in the organs of State, which have been seized by a combination of large landlords and the commercial bourgeoisie.' The first, 'bourgeois-democratic' stage of revolution, according to the Thesis, should quickly turn into the second, proletarian, stage: 'A bourgeois-democratic revolution in Japan is likely to take place at a time when a sufficiently strong proletariat and revolutionary peasantry are already in existence; thus the completion of the bourgeois revolution must be the direct prelude to a proletarian revolution aiming at the overthrow of bourgeois control and the achievement of dictatorship by the proletariat.' (Quoted in Shakai Keizai Rōdō Kenkyūjo, Nihon minshū kakumei ronsō shi [History of the Dispute over Democratic Revolution for Japan], Itō Shoten, March 1947, pp. 9-10. [Referred to hereafter as Ronsō shi]). The original version of the Thesis was not available.) This Thesis was attacked at the time by some Japanese Communists for using the Russian revolution as a
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model without taking account of Japanese conditions, and
especially for its implicit equation of the Japanese Emperor
with the Russian Tsar. See Hanzawa, loc. cit., p. 383, and
Ronsō shi, p. 21.

13. The Comintern 'Programme' of 1928 divided the world into
societies at three levels of development - 'advanced',
'intermediate' and 'dependent'. Japan was generally agreed
to fit into the 'intermediate' level, but since this
category was capable of further subdivision, and the type
of revolution depended on her position within it, there was
still room for argument. See Ronsō shi, pp. 73-75.

14. Not all later analyses by the Comintern confirmed the
position taken by that of 1922. That of 1931, for instance,
drew close to the position of Rōnō-ha. See Ronsō shi, pp.
88-92.

15. Yamakawa maintained that 'feudal elements' had been
either taken over by or completely subordinated to the
bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie as a whole, he argued, was
steadily increasing its influence, and had enacted manhood
suffrage in 1925 in order more easily to put society under
its control. See Ronsō shi, pp. 22-23.

16. See especially Chapters 9 and 11.

17. A source for the history and ideals of the right wing
faction is the autobiography of its leader, Nishio Suehiro,
Taishū to tomo ni - watakushi no hansei no kiroku (Together
with the Masses - the Record of Half my Life), Sekaisha,
1951.


19. The source which has been mainly followed in this account
of Akamatsu and Asō is Hanzawa Hiroshi and Sanuki Sōetsu,'Zenki Shinjinkai-in, Akamatsu Katsumaro, Asō Hisashi'
(Early Shinjinkai Members, Akamatsu Katsumaro and Asō

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23. At this period Asō wrote a number of novels reminiscent of populism.


28. For instance in Zenki Shinjinkai-in, p. 111.

29. For confirmation, see Zenki Shinjinkai-in, p. 96.


NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2  THE SOCIALIST ADOPTION OF NEUTRALITY

1. Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Shikkō Iinkai, 'Kōwa mondai ni kansuru ippanteki taido' (General Attitude concerning the Question of a Peace Treaty), Shakai Shimbun, 10 December 1949.

2. A more literal translation of 'kōwa' would be 'peace treaty', or 'peace settlement'. Since, however, the connotation of the Principles was wider than the actual treaty, the translation 'peace' is preferred.

3. Literally; 'A total peace treaty' (zemmen kōwa).

4. For an early citation of the Three Peace Principles as such, see Mainichi Shimbun (morning edition), 24 June 1950.

5. The leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, was in the same debate mildly critical of neutrality, and pointed to the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914. He would have preferred, he said, some kind of regional security treaty in the Pacific. Those who supported neutrality included one (Hoashi Kei) who later joined the JSP. See Sangiin kaigiroku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), Kampō (extra edition), 8 April 1949, especially pp. 146-151.

6. Chapter 10, Section A.

7. This group was formed in December 1948 to discuss a UNESCO questionnaire on the problems of world peace. It met monthly from the time of its foundation and published its reports in the intellectual monthly Sekai. The substance of agreement among members of Heiwa Mondai Danwakai was reproduced in three major declarations: 1) 'Sensō to heiwa ni kansuru Nihon no Kagakusha no seimei' (Declaration of Japanese Scientists concerning the Problem of a Peace Settlement), Sekai, March 1949, pp. 6-9. 2) 'Kōwa mondai ni tsuite no Heiwa Mondai Danwakai seimei' (Declaration of Heiwa Mondai Danwakai concerning the Problem of a Peace Settlement), Sekai, March 1950, pp. 60-64.
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3) 'Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite, Heiwa Mondai Danwakai kenkyū hōkoku' (Third Statement on Peace; Study Report of Heiwa Mondai Danwakai), Sekai, December 1950, pp. 21-52. Slightly abridged versions of these three declarations are reproduced in a supplement to Sekai, September 1962, at pp. 10-14, 15-25, 26-60, respectively.


10. Daily Mail (London), 2 March 1949. It should be noted that in the interview MacArthur, while advocating Japanese neutrality, expressly denied that the United States would abandon Japan if she were attacked. He justified his advocacy of neutrality by expressing doubt whether the Soviet Union either had aggressive intentions against Japan or would risk an attack in the knowledge of American deterrent power on Okinawa.


12. For the text of his announcement, see New York Times, 5 November 1949, p. 5. He recommended the continued presence of American forces as the most practicable of three alternative methods of security, the other two being a United Nations guarantee and a British Commonwealth guarantee.


14. Article 9, the 'Pacifist Clause' of the Constitution, reads:

'Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
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potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.'

15. The two independents who opposed the Constitution (Hososako Kanemitsu and Hozumi Shichirō) later joined the JSP, and became leaders of a small group of Communist sympathisers within it. Hososako, interviewed 22 February 1963, said that his opposition was not on account of the 'Pacifist Clause', but because the whole Constitution was an 'American imposition'. Hozumi, on the other hand, spoke during the Diet committee sessions on the Constitution, against the 'Pacifist Clause', claiming that it would merely lull people into thinking that there was no danger to security, whereas the only way to achieve genuine world peace was to make the United States and Soviet Union disarm. See Sangiin Jimukyoku, Teikoku kempō kaisei shingiroku, sensō hoki hen (Records of Deliberations on the Revision of the Imperial Constitution - Abolition of War), October 1952, pp.91-94.

16. Ibid., pp. 9-11


18. That it was not considered was confirmed by a number of Socialists interviewed who had been connected with Party policy formation at that time.


20. Ibid., pp. 50-53.

21. The reaction of the Japanese Government to MacArthur's statement of 5 November 1949 (See note 12 above) was shown in a speech by Yoshida immediately afterwards. Yoshida welcomed the prospect of an early peace treaty, but (without referring to the question of prolonging the
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American military presence in Japan stressed that Japan should remain unarmed as the best guarantee of security after independence. Text given in Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 9 November 1949. It seems probable that the Government had not at this stage finally decided what attitude it should take towards American security proposals. A high official of the Japanese Foreign Office, who was concerned in the Peace Treaty negotiations, later wrote that until November 1950 the Yoshida Government had two alternative proposals for Japan's security after independence. One was a security treaty with the United States, involving the stationing of American troops, and the other a plan for disengagement by the demilitarisation of an area of the north-west Pacific including Japan. Nishimura Kumao, Anzen hoshō jōyaku ron (The Security Treaty Argument), Jiji Shinshō, March 1960, p.24.

22. Suzuki Mosaburō, 'Waga tō no kihon hōshin' (Basic Policy of our Party), Shakai Shimbun, 30 October 1949.


25. The reader curious to trace in detail the 'genealogy' of JSP factions is referred to the chart in Appendix D. It should be noted that Japanese frequently refer also to factions by titles other than the names of the faction leaders.

26. Nishio himself was allegedly involved, and was expelled from the Party.

27. Factional disharmony brought about a complete three-way split between the three factions lasting from January to April 1950. Foreign policy, however, was scarcely, if at all, involved.
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28. No mention of disagreement was carried in the press. For a report of an interim CEC statement, see Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 6 December 1949.


31. Sakisaka Itsurō, 'Heiwa wo habamu mono' (Those Obstructing Peace), Shakai Shimbun, 18 August 1949.

32. See note 22 above.
1. Nishio himself, during the period covered by this chapter, was out of the Party.
2. Kawakami was subject to the Occupation's purge restrictions until 1951.
3. This is in contrast to the successful mediation attempts by the faction in the split which occurred during the first three months of 1950. At this time foreign policy had not been involved.
4. See Chapter 1.
5. [Nihon Shakti Chūō Shikkō Iinkai], 'Chōsen mondai to Shakaitō no taidō' (The Korean Problem and the Attitude of the Socialist Party), in Nihon Rōdō Nenkan (Japan Labour Yearbook), 1952, p.690.
6. On this point the resolution read as follows: 'Since Japan is now under the occupation of the Allied forces, she is not in a position to declare her national will. The Government, therefore, does not have to decide or announce officially its attitude, and need not exceed the orders of the Occupation forces... The attitude of the Government in cooperating positively with the United Nations beyond what is required of it as dependent on Occupation orders, is deliberate interference in an international dispute, and from the point of view of the Constitution and Japan's environment must be called imprudent.' Loc. cit.
7. Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 29 July 1950. One qualification, however, to this attitude of non-cooperation with the United Nations action in Korea was that Japan was permitted, in the JSP reply, to agree to manufacture and transport material for United Nations forces. This, a matter of much disagreement within the Party, was a concession to right wing trade unions.
8. Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan).
9. Supreme Commander Allied Powers - a term used to describe the Occupation authorities as a whole.

10. For an account of the rise and decline of Communist influence in the postwar trade union movement, the measures taken to combat it by means of 'Democratisation Leagues', and the founding, after eighteen months of difficult negotiation, of Sōhyō, see Levine, S.B., Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan (Illinois, 1958), pp. 66-77.

11. The statement read as follows: '1) The Korean incident has taken place because of the planned, aggressive action of the North Korean forces. Believing that the unification of North and South Korea should take place by peaceful and democratic means, we oppose the armed aggression of the North Korean forces. 2) We believe that the fundamental policy of the United Nations - to restore the border at the thirty-eighth parallel and to guarantee its security - is consistent with the maintenance of world peace, and of democracy. 3) Nevertheless, although we, the Japanese people, who by our Constitution have renounced all forms of war, are under the occupation of the Allied forces, we steadfastly maintain our right of independent judgment and action on situations, and therefore oppose intervention in the war.' The appendix to the statement read: 'We adopt the fundamental attitude of opposition to war, the development of a peace movement based on a peace treaty with all the former belligerent powers, and the restoration of Japanese independence.' Quoted in Sōhyō, 5 August 1950 (Shukusatsuban edition, p. 31). The statement was drawn up 'after four hours of careful discussion'. An official Sōhyō pronouncement issued a month later maintained that in its desire to give active cooperation to the United Nations force in Korea, the Government (in alliance with Japanese capitalists) in fact intended to promote inflationary trends in Japan, and thus depress the standard of living of the workers and harm the trade union movement. While supporting the United Nations action and condemning Communist activities in Japan, it claimed that to prepare against a hypothetical Communist invasion could lead to a general war in the Far East. Quoted in Sōhyō, 15 August 1950 (Shukusatsuban edition, p. 76).
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3  NEUTRALITY AND DIVISION - 1950 - 1951


13. The conservative parties were themselves deeply split on the issue, with the Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, opposed to rearmament for the time being and the leader of the Democratic Party urging rearmament as a matter of urgency. Attempts to find common ground between the parties (including the Socialists) and thus to promote a bipartisan foreign policy had been completely unsuccessful.

14. See Nippon Times, 1 January 1951.

15. Quoted in Yanada Kōki, Nihon Shakaitō (Japan Socialist Party), Hōbunsha, November 1956, p. 76.

16. [Nihon Shakaitō], 'Gaikō hōshin ni kansuru ketsugi' (Resolution concerning Foreign Policy), quoted (abridged) in Nihon Rōdō Nenkan, 1953, pp. 544-545.

17. [Nihon Shakaitō], 'Saigumbi ni hantai suru ketsugi' (Resolution Opposing Rearmament), quoted in Nihon Rōdō Nenkan, 1953, pp. 545-549.


20. Shinsambetsu (New Sambetsu) was formed in late 1949 by a breakaway group in the Communist-dominated Sambetsu (Zen Nihon Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi, or National Congress of Industrial Unions) as part of the then current 'democratisation drive'. Its leader was Hosoya Matsuta, an ex-Communist formerly of high standing in the Communist Party. Although Shinsambetsu had supported the first initiatives which led to the foundation of Sōhyō, various disagreements led it to keep aloof. It joined Sōhyō in December 1950 only on condition that it could keep its own organisation within the larger body. See 'Shinsambetsu mo kamei kettei' (Shinsambetsu also Decides to Join), Sōhyō,
5 December 1950 (Shukusatsuban edition, p. 55). The merger was not lasting, and Shinsambetsu withdrew in July 1951. Hosoya, interviewed 22 April 1963, and Ötani Tetsutarō (Director of the Shinsambetsu Research Division as of 1963), interviewed 8 April 1963, both stressed the consistency of Shinsambetsu's support from 1949 onwards for 'neutralism against rival imperialisms'. According to Ötani, the Sōhyō leaders at their first Congress were attacking neutralism as 'mercenary' in the face of the urgent need to support the United Nations in Korea. By 1953 these same leaders were attacking neutralism from a pro-Communist position.

Sōdōmei (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei, or Japanese Federation of Labour), which had prewar roots, had been a stronghold of the right wing Socialists immediately after World War II, and was led by the veteran Socialist from the Nishio faction, Matsuoka Komakichi. The rise in influence, however, of the JSP left wing after the fall of the coalition Government and the Socialist failure at the 1949 election, coincided with the rise of left wing Socialists in Sōdōmei. The Sōdōmei annual Congress held in November 1949 elected a predominantly left wing Executive, and although Matsuoka remained Chairman by a narrow margin of votes, Takano Minoru, leader of the left wing, was elected Secretary-General.

See Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 29 November 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War some right wing unions lobbied the JSP to endorse the de facto cooperation of workers in munitions industries with the United Nations action in Korea. For the views of Mitamura Shirō, a prominent spokesman for this group, see Tōkyō Shimbun (morning edition), 13 August 1950.

See for instance the following statement by Hosoya Matsuta: 'The world conflict is a struggle between two imperialisms. If, however, the present competition turned into war, the world would be threatened instead by two fascisms... Thus if a third world war were to take place, Communist propaganda which speaks of a conflict between communism and fascism, and bourgeois propaganda which speaks of a conflict between the Free World and the non-Free World, would both be incorrect. Recently the loudness of this conflict has
seemed likely to drive the world out of its senses... One side screams "freedom"; the other yells "peace". This makes people lose their sense of direction about freedom and peace, and makes them caged animals, the captives of both worlds. What brings the danger of the two imperialisms being converted into two fascisms is clearly the conflict of the two worlds, since the policies of both of them are clearly leading the world in the direction of fascism.' Quoted in Shakai Shimbun, 25 August 1950.

24. See 'Sōhyō taikai wo meguru rōdō jōsei' (The Labour Situation concerning the Sōhyō Congress), Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 10 and 11 March 1951.

25. Loc. cit.

26. Zenrōren (Zenkoku Rōdō Kumiai Renraku Kyōgikai, or National Liaison Council of Trade Unions), was formed in March 1947, initially as an anti-Communist centre. At the height of its influence it included about 4.5 million members, but soon came under Communist control and many right wing unions withdrew.

27. For the new policy of Sambetsu, see Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 28 January 1950.

28. See 'Shinsambetsu mo kamei kettei' (Shinsambetsu also decides to join), Sōhyō, 5 December 1950 (Shukusatsuban edition, p. 55).

29. It is interesting to note that Takano, rather than the right wing faction of Sōdōmei under Matsuoka Komakichi (a central figure in the JSP Nishio faction) had profited from SCAP support in the formation of Sōhyō. See Sasada Shigeru, Nihon Shakaitō (The Japan Socialist Party), Sanichi Shōbō, November 1960, Vol.1, at p. 168 and p. 185. The view that SCAP favoured the non-Communist left and opposed the right wing trade union leadership was also stated by Hosoya Matsuta, interviewed 22 April 1963. Hosoya stressed, moreover, that the formation of Sōhyō was due in large measure to the encouragement given by SCAP, and that no unification of the trade union movement on this scale would have been possible without Takano. The importance of SCAP
encouragement was also emphasised by Sato Noboru, interviewed 24 November 1962. Okada Sōji, interviewed 18 October 1962, expressed the view that Sōhyō was not 'founded' by SCAP, although SCAP was no doubt gratified by its foundation.

30. Leading members of the Kawakami faction purged by SCAP and released from the purge early in 1951 were Kawakami Jōtarō, Kōno Mitsu, Miwa Jusō, Sugimoto Motojirō.

31. Reference is made in Chapter 1 to the mediating activities of the faction between 1926 and 1932.

32. In the event neither Communist nor Nationalist China were invited to the Peace Conference, and of those invited, the Soviet Union, India and Burma did not sign.


34. This position was somewhat qualified by reference to the stationing of United Nations troops. See Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 11 June 1951.


37. The following account is taken from an official report of discussions in the Central Committee of the JSP immediately preceding the October 1951 Congress. [Wada Hiroo Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Iinchō], 'Chūō iinkai ni teiji sareta kōwa mondai ni taisuru shiryō' (Materials concerning the Peace Treaty Problem Presented to the Central Committee), in Dai 8 kai (rinji) taikai hōkokusho (Report to the 8th [Extraordinary] Congress), 3 October 1951, part 2, pp. 1-22.

38. One member of the Nishio faction, Nishimura Eiichi, argued somewhat differently. He held that it would take about three years to build forces. The United States should bear the financial burden required, but after three years all foreign troops should withdraw, leaving their installations in Japanese hands. A Japan – United States Security Treaty should then be concluded, in which Japan
should be in a position of strict equality. Nishimura also
developed a theory of 'armed neutrality', in which the
United States would help Japan to achieve sufficient
independent military strength to renounce all alliances.
See Nishimura Eiichi, Tai Nichi kōwa to waga tō no
rekishiteki shimei (The Peace Treaty with Japan and the
Historic Destiny of our Party), [mid-1951].
39.

See Yamazaki Hiroshi, Nihon Shakaitō no jūnenshi (Ten Year
History of the Japan Socialist Party), Taibunkan, May 1956,
40.

Within the left wing itself, however, opposition to
rearmament did not go unchallenged. Certain members of the
intellectual Zenshin study group under Yamakawa Hitoshi
(closely connected with the Suzuki faction and devoted to
Marxist doctrine of the Rōnō-ha type - see Chapter 1) said
that the JSP should not oppose rearmament, but should
support the idea of a 'people's militia', pending the
achievement of a United Nations guarantee of Japanese
security. This view apparently only attracted minority
support in the group itself, and had little effect within
the Suzuki faction. The dissidents, however, left the
group, which re-formed under another name, Shakaishugi
Kyōkai (Socialist Association). See Shakai Shimbun, 10
February 1951. For a statement of the view against a
'people's militia' (on the grounds that it could only
become a tool of the capitalists in current circumstances),
see Sakisaka Itsurō, 'Nihon no saigumbi wo megu
shomon'ai' (Some Questions concerning the Rearmament of
Japan), Jōhō Tsushin (special issue on rearment), 15
March 1951, pp. 11-22.
41.

See Chapter 1, note 18.
42.

For instance in the Suzuki faction's resolution on
rearmament at the JSP Congress of January 1951 (See note 17).
43.

Whereas, at the Lower House general election of January
1949, the Communist Party won 35 seats with 9.76 of the
total vote, at the next election, that of October 1952, it
won no seats with 2.54% of the total vote.
44. The Suzuki faction skilfully exploited this mood in the party with a slogan, much used in later propaganda, 'Seinen yo! Jū wo toru na!' (The youth of Japan should not have to take up arms again).

45. In February 1953 the textile and seamen's unions (and others) formed an independent group within Sōhyō, and in April 1954 broke away completely (see Chapter 4).
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4  A 'SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC' FOREIGN POLICY
LEFT SOCIALIST PARTY 1951 - 1954

1. Besides a general debt to Nehru's policy of 'non-alignment', the LSP seems to have owed some aspects of its policy to the Indian Socialist leader Rammanohar Lohia, with whom Japanese Socialist leaders had discussions when he visited Japan in September 1951. Lohia proposed the formation of an actual 'force' or 'bloc', separate from the two already existing. See 'Rohia shi ni kiku' (Interview with Mr Lohia), Shakai Shimbun, 10 September 1951. Lohia's views were expounded in a pamphlet, distributed in Japan during his visit. Lohia, R., The Third Camp in World Affairs (Bombay, Socialist Party, July 1950).


3. Ibid., pp. 679-680.

4. The draft Foreign Policy, under the heading 'Basic Policy', read as follows: 'It is Socialists who are defending peace. In past history Socialists have sought to defend peace through many sacrifices. Socialists can only expand their strength with a world at peace. Especially today, in the sharpening conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is Social-Democrats, marching in the direction of a peaceful third force, who are the sole force defending peace. From this independent standpoint we support the Socialist International.' [Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Shikkō Iinkai], 'Shin gaikō hōshin to heïwa undō an' (New Foreign Policy and Peace Movement Draft), in Nihon Rōdō Nenkan, 1954, pp. 675-677, at p. 677.


6. The delegates consisted of Suzuki Mosaburō, Wada Hiroo, Inamura Junzō, Kawasaki Natsu and Matsumoto Shichirō. The first three were leading members of the left wing.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4  A 'SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC' FOREIGN POLICY —
LEFT SOCIALIST PARTY 1951 - 1954

7. For the text of the Socialist Internation Peace Resolution see Suzuki Mosaburō, et. al., Dai 8 kai Komisuko sōkai
narabini dai 1 kai Shakaishugi Intānasionaru taika ni
kansuru hōkokusho (Report on the 8th General Meeting of
COMISCO and the 1st Congress of the Socialist International),
[August 1951], pp. 15-17. For Japanese Socialist statements
at the Congress, see Ibid., pp. 18-21, and pp. 24-26. For
a brief account of the issues at the Congress by a (Right
Wing) Socialist, see Yamazaki Hiroshi, Nihon Shakaitō no
jūnenshi (Ten Year History of the Japan Socialist Party),
Taibunkan, May 1956, pp. 126-127.

8. The Action Policy, while maintaining that all parts of
the 'third force' had grown in strength, proclaimed that
'the greatest part, one might say the main force, is
definitely in the Asian and Arab nationalist movements'.
Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Shikkō Iinkai, 1953 nendo Nihon
Shakaitō undo hōshin (an) (Draft Action Policy of the Japan
Socialist Party for 1953), January 1953, p. 3.

9. See for instance the following statement from the 1953
Action Policy: 'Asian socialism is the backbone of the
third force, and a vital element in its expansion.' Ibid.,
p. 4.

10. For instance Itō Kōdō, writing in a daily newspaper
closely associated with the LSP, said that 'It is highly
dangerous at present to regard the Socialist International
as a driving part of the third force.' Itō Kōdō, 'Heiwa
wo motomeru issai no seiryoku' (All Forces Demanding Peace),
Shakai Taimusu, 22 January 1953.

11. For an analysis of the Asian Socialist Conference and its
relations with the various Asian socialist parties, see
Rose, S., Socialism in Southern Asia, (London, OUP, 1959),
especially chapters II and XIII.

12. The split in Japanese socialism presented difficulties for
the convenors of the Preliminary Meeting. The Chairman
(from the Burmese Socialist Party) invited the LSP to
attend as observers. The RSP, however, protested at their
exclusion, and therefore representatives of both parties were allowed to attend as observers. See Preparatory Committee, Asian Socialist Conference, Report of Preliminary Meeting for the Asian Socialist Conference, (Rangoon, March 1952), p. 7.


14. Delegations were present from the socialist parties of Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan (Right and Left), Lebanon, Malaya, Nepal, Pakistan. There was also a delegation from Yugoslavia and one representing the Socialist International. Observers were also present from a number of African liberation movements. Japanese delegates who participated on Committee 'A' (foreign affairs) of the ASC were - from the LSP - Araki Shōsaburo, Katsumata Seiichi and Takano Minoru; from the RSP - Matsuoka Komakichi and Sone Eki. See Asian Socialist Conference, Reports of Sub-Committees 'A', 'B' and 'C', Asian Socialist Conference (Rangoon, January 1953), p. 1.

15. For Attlee's views as expressed to the ASC, see Ibid., p. 9 (of afternoon session, 7 January), and p. 6 (of morning session, 10 January). (Pagination separate for each session).

16. The LSP statement at Committee 'A' of ASC read as follows: 'Only Japan and Israel are affiliated to the Socialist International. Therefore it is legally impossible to form a regional organisation of the Socialist International, since it is provided that all members in a region should be affiliated with the Socialist International.

In this respect the new Asian organisation should be one, independent and separate from the Socialist International.

The Socialist International is adopting a policy of rearmament and collective security systems whereas we are opposed to these policies. So far as we are concerned, we
are absolutely against the rearmament of Japan, and the Socialist International, is, as I understand it, not in a position to understand the Japanese Security Pact, concluded at the time of the Peace Treaty of Japan.

'I propose, however, that the new organisation should have close contact with the Socialist International and their means such as despatch of observers or exchange of information, should be written into the statute of the new organisation. I propose further, that it should be left to a decision of each member party whether to join the Socialist International or not. In conclusion I want to propose to this Conference to form an independent organisation from the Socialist International.'

Handwritten corrected version of text, in Ibid., p. 4 (of morning session, 8 January). According to one LSP report, Attlee asked the LSP delegation after its strictures on the Socialist International, whether it intended to withdraw its membership. The LSP reply was that it did not intend to withdraw, but rather hoped to be able to work for closer relations between the ASC and the Socialist International. 'Sekkyokuteki na chūritsu saku wo' (For a Positive Neutral Policy), Shakai Taimusu, 12 January 1953.

17. 'The fact that Asian countries are in an independent position and that they have freedom of action with regard to world peace, does not mean policies sacrificial of other nations or of national freedom for the sake of ideological neutrality or the interests of one's own country.' from 'Ajia to sekai heïwa ni kansuru ketsugi' (Resolution concerning Asia and World Peace), quoted in Shakai Taimusu, 22 January 1953. According to one source, the RSP wanted to delete the word 'ideological' qualifying 'neutrality' in the above, but the LSP succeeded in having it retained. This would mean that the LSP wanted to preserve a loophole whereby it could interpret the phrase to exclude a prohibition of de facto neutrality. See Okakura Koshibō, Dai san seiryoku, chūritsu to heïwa (Third Force, Neutrality and Peace), Kaname Shōbō, April 1953, p. 24.

18. For details of the organisational connection between the Socialist International and the ASC, see Rose, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
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19. For instance Suzuki Mosaburō in Suzuki Mosaburō, et. al., 'Chūritsu mondai ni tsuite' (Concerning the Question of Neutrality), Shakai Taimusu, 1 March 1953. Suzuki also maintained that the 'Resolution on Asia and World Peace' of ASC significantly differed from the Peace Resolution of the Frankfurt Conference of the Socialist International, in that while the latter ascribed the world crisis to the policies of the USSR, the former ascribed it to the American-Soviet rift as such.

20. Committee 'B' of the ASC dealt with the questions of economic planning and cooperation within the area.

21. See for instance a statement made by a member of the LSP delegation to the Preliminary Meeting of the ASC: 'We agree to the establishment of a third camp by the keen cooperation of the Asian Socialists and Red China.' Preparatory Committee, Asian Socialist Conference, Report of Preliminary Meeting for the Asian Socialist Conference (Rangoon, March 1952), p. 83.

22. The British Labour Party was, for instance, committed to the rearming of Germany. Another factor which may be of relevance is that the current lack of success of European Socialists - the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party had fallen from power and the German Social-Democratic Party did not have power in prospect - contrasted with the apparently rising star of socialism in Asia, where although only the Burmese Socialist Party actually formed a government, policies which could be termed 'socialist' were being pursued in a number of fields by the Government of India.


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28. Ibid., p. 5. One Party leader and theorist commented that the 1953 Action Policy had put aside the caution of the previous year's Action Policy, and had clearly shown that the United States was imperialistic. Itō Kōdō, Dai san seiryoku keshū. Undo hōshin ni tsuite' (The consolidation of the Third Force. Concerning the Action Policy), Shakai Taimusu, 21 January 1953.

29. 1953 nendo Nihon Shakaitō undō hōshin (an), pp. 2-3. At the 1953 Congress the question arose whether the Party should send a delegation to a Communist-run peace conference in Peking. The Party endorsed the official view of the Executive, expressed by its Secretary-General in his report to the Congress, that the Party should not participate in this or similar conferences, but that it should nevertheless strive for better relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union. Nomizo Masaru, 'Ippan tōmu hōkoku' (General Party Affairs Report), in Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Shikkō Iinkai, Dai 10 kai (teiki) zenkoku taikai hōkokusho (Reports to the 10th [Regular] National Congress), January 1953, pp. 1-6, at p. 4. The question, however, reportedly caused some controversy in the Party. See Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 24 January 1953. One writer, sympathetic to the Communist Party, later maintained that
the LSP was about to send a delegation to Peking, but that the formulation of its policy of consolidation the 'third force', made it decide against this. Okakura Koshirō, Dai san seiryoku, chūritsu to heiwa (Third Force, Neutrality and Peace), Kaname Shōbō, April 1953.
30. Shakaishugi Kyōkai edited the influential Marxist monthly Shakaishugi (Socialism), which put forward the Rōnō-ha ideological position in frequent articles.
31. For a pro-Communist criticism of neutralism and an appraisal of Japan's 'colonial status' with regard to the United States, see Okakura, op. cit., passim.
32. 1953 nendo Nihon Shakaitō undō hōshin (an), p. 5.
33. For an account of the controversy at the 1953 Congress, see Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 22 January 1953.
34. An account of discussions on the setting up of the committee is given in Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), 22 January 1953.
36. Abbreviations of Minshushugi Rōdō Undō Renraku Kyōgikai (Liaison Council of Democratic Trade Unions).
38. The Action Policy states: 'We, who are ceaselessly demanding peace, take the position of neutrality between the United States and the Soviet Union, have confidence in the most important peace forces in Asia, and have reached the vital stage when, in firm alliance with the peace-loving peoples of the whole world, we must fight against all war provocation.' [Sōhyō Hombu] 'Sōhyō 1953 nendo undō hōshinsho' (Sōhyō 1953 Action Policy), Shakaishugi (extra edition), July 1953, pp. 19-24, at p. 19.
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39. In reply to questions at the Congress, Takano was quoted as saying that even Churchill, in certain circumstances (i.e. when criticising the United States) could be considered a 'peace force' 'Undō hōshin an wo megutte taikai wa ika ni rongi shita ka' (Arguments at the Congress about the Draft Action Policy), Sōhyō, 19 June 1953 (Shukusatsuban edition, Vol.1, p. 310).

40. For instance, loc. cit.

41. Takano wrote as follows: 'If we do not correctly evaluate the characteristics of the political struggle that is ahead of us, because we are in the grip of the expression 'third force', we shall be left behind in the progress of the masses and in the tough labour movement. If we confine ourselves to a rigid ideological argument, we shall not be able to fight at the head of the mass movement, and if we flinch because it is 'pro-Communist', or a change to a more 'political' movement, - if we make too much of these trivial differences, we shall run the risk of splitting both LSP and Sōhyō.' Takano Minoru, 'Sōhyō taikai no seika to igi' (The Results and Significance of the Sōhyō Congress), Sōhyō 17 July 1953 (Shukusatsuban edition, Vol.1, p. 309).

42. According to a newspaper report, Takano replied to a questioner at the Congress that Japanese workers felt more sympathy with the Chinese Federation than with the IGFTU. Whether or not the Chinese Federation was democratic, he argued, Chinese workers should be able to develop a democratic and free workers movement. Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 10 July 1953.

43. In introducing the Action Policy to the 1953 Congress, Takano reportedly spoke as follows: 'Since the spring of last year, the world has been moving clearly in the direction of peace. This has been shown by the Moscow Conference in the summer, the Asian Congress in Peking, Malenkov's speech at Stalin's funeral to the effect that the Soviet Union was newly prepared to maintain peace and to confer about peace, and that capitalism and communism should coexist and compete peacefully, and especially that
there were no issues that could not be settled peacefully between the United States and the Soviet Union.

'... Attlee has frankly recognised the new change in the Kremlin, has said that any country which avoided trade with China was a warlike nation, and has pointed at the promoters of war in the White House.' '1953 nendo undo hōshin wo kettei' (Passing the 1953 Action Policy), Sōhyō, 17 July 1953 (Shukusatsuban edition p. 309). It should be noted that Takano mentioned as one event in the worldwide trend towards peace the 'Asian Congress in Peking' in which the LSP at its 1953 Congress decided specifically not to participate. See footnote 29.


45. See for instance Tsuru Shigeto, 'MSA to Nihon' (MSA and Japan), Sekai, August 1953, pp. 18-27.

46. Contradictory as it may perhaps seem, Takano still referred to 'neutralism' in his exposition to the 1953 Congress of Sōhyō. The difference between his 'neutralism' and that of the exponents of a 'third force', lay in the nature of allies proposed. While supporters of a 'third force' generally excluded the Communist bloc from it (though with some heart-searching about China) Takano was prepared to include even the Government of the Soviet Union as an ally.

47. Reported in Shakai Taimusu, 8 June 1953. An interesting manifestation of the effect on the extreme Left of American policy towards Japan and the apparent willingness of the Yoshida Government to cooperate with it, was the move after the general election of April 1953 (which reduced the absolute majority of Yoshida's Liberal Party to a plurality)
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to rally the masses in support of Shigemitsu, President of 
the Progressive Party, as Prime Minister. This shortlived 
'anti-Yoshida, anti-rearmament' campaign to make Shigemitsu 
Prime Minister, supported by Takano as well as by the JCP 
and Rōnōtō, was an application of the Communist insistence 
on the necessity for a 'national liberation struggle' in 
alliance with elements of the bourgeoisie, to contemporary 
politics. See Sasada Shigeru, Nihon Shakaitō (The Japan 
Socialist Party), Sanichi Shōbō, November 1960, Vol.1, 
p.226.

48. 
See for instance an LSP counter-criticism of criticism 
from the right wing Kainin Kumiai (Seamens Union) of Sōhyō 
leadership policy. This counter-criticism carefully 
distinguished the JCP approval of political strikes 'for 
the sake of the oath of loyalty it has sworn to its 
fatherland the Soviet Union', from the political struggle 
of Sōhyō for 'independent neutrality'. [Nihon Shakaitō], 
Nihon no rōdō kumiai sensen no tōitsu to Sōhyō kyōka no 
tame ni. (Sōhyō ni taishuru hihan ni tsuite no waga tō no 
taido) (For the Sake of a United Front of Japanese Trade 
Unions and the Strengthening of Sōhyō. [Our Party's 
Attitude towards Criticism of Sōhyō]), January 1953, at 
pp. 1-4.

49. 
He spoke as follows: 'Whereas the Socialist International 
blames 'Communist aggression' for threats to peace, we are 
critical of this and support the third force. Our concept 
of neutrality is not merely that of a snail in its shell 
ignoring wind and rain. We are ready to accept good things 
whether they come from USSR, USA, Communist China, France 
or anywhere else, and to cooperate with any of these in 
order to strengthen the basis of peace. The meaning of the 
LSP resolution at the Asian Socialist Conference is that if 
we think Soviet Kolkhoz and planned industry are good, we 
imitate them. We should greatly welcome trade with China, 
and it would be good to organise an Asian Economic 
Conference to include China, inviting representatives from 
industry, governments and labour. On the other hand 
American science and English tradition are largely good...
Thus we advocate a 'Third Asian Political Force' based on these principles.' Takano Minoru, 'Moeru Ajia. Shakaitō Kaigi no oshieru mono' (Asia Aflame. The Lessons of the Socialist Conference), Shakai Taimusu, 22 January 1953.

Interviewed, 22 April 1963.

Okada Sōji, interviewed 18 October 1962, held that Takano had had connections with the prewar Communist Party. Hosoya Matsuta, interviewed 22 April 1963, and himself a JCP member for a short time after the war, said that from Takano himself it was not clear whether he had had relations with the prewar Communist movement or not, but that Tokuda Kyūichi (first postwar Chairman of the JCP) had told Hosoya that this was the case.

Ōuchi Hyōei, interviewed 12 December 1962.

Hosoya Matsuta, interviewed 22 April 1963, maintained that the two most important factors leading Takano to propound the 'peace forces' argument, were a conviction, arrived at after the end of the Occupation, that the United States was on the losing side, and the great impression made upon him by the Soviet peace offensive.  

'At the Party Congress in January, we decided on a peace policy centred on the socialist political forces, and acknowledged the mutual relations and duties of democratic forces and socialist forces. Some rumours have been spread, however, that between the Action Policy presented and carried at this Sōhyō Congress and the Action Policy of our Party at its Congress, a gap has formed, and that there is conflict between our Party and Sōhyō. There is, however, no substantial difference between our action policy and that of Sōhyō. At the Sōhyō Congress, the JCP and Rōnōtō sought to drive a wedge between our Party and Sōhyō, and to lead Sōhyō astray, but although there were some deficiencies in the Party's policy towards the Congress, the schemes of the JCP and the Rōnōtō did not achieve success. Now the Party must come closer to Sōhyō, and cooperate with the healthy development of it, foiling
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attempts at its disruption by the JCP, Rōnōtō and Minrōren.'
Resolution of the LSP CEC, quoted in 'Sasha, Sōhyō no
kimmitsu e' (Towards the close cooperation of LSP and
Sōhyō), Shakai Taimusu, 19 July 1953.

Appendix A, p. 101. The danger of fascism which the
Party saw as inherent in a 'national liberation struggle'
was a reflection of the prewar experience of the socialist
movement. An official Party explanation of the draft
Platform warned of the consequences of nationalist
incitement upon the Japanese masses who had been brought up
on a State ideology. [Nihon Shakaitō], Nihon Shakaitō kōryō
kaisetsu shiryō (Explanatory Materials on the Japan

Appendix A, p. 106.

Nihon Shakaitō kōryō kaisetsu shiryō, pp. 16-19.

Appendix B, p. 110.

The text of the directive is given in Sasada Shigeru,
Nihon Shakaitō (The Japan Socialist Party), Sanichi Shobō,

Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 12 December 1953.

'Sasha, tōnai ni bimyō na tairitsu' (Delicate Conflict
within the Left Socialist Policy), Asahi Shimbun, 12
December 1953.

Takano Minoru, 'Kyūkoku sensen e no hossoku' (Launch a
Front to Save the Nation), Shakaishugi, November 1953,
pp. 2-6, at p.4. It should be noted, however, that the
Shimizu statement upheld the four Peace Principles and maintained that the draft Platform relegated them to a subordinate position. (Appendix B, pp. 107-108) This apparent discrepancy may perhaps be explained as merely an inconsistent use of what had become, in the context of the Party's ideological disputes, an ambiguous slogan.  

For press reports see Asahi Shimbun, 12 December 1953 and Tōkyō Shimbun, 10 December 1953.  

See [Nihon Shakaitō] Seinenbu katsudō hōshin no mondaiten (Problems of the Youth Group Action Policy), [December 1953].  

See Nihon Shakaitō Tōkyō To Rengōkai Bunkyō Shibu Seinenbu, et al., Yamaguchi mondai ni kansuru seimei (Statement Concerning the Yamaguchi Problem), January 1954.  

Ibid., p. 3.  

Seinenbu katsudō hōshin no mondaiten, pp. 1-2.  


A list of the leading members of Shakaishugi Kyōkai, together with those who supported Takano, is given in Sasada, op. cit., Vol.1, pp. 255-256.  

The Communist percentage of votes fell from 9.76% (35 seats) at the 1949 Lower House election to 2.54% (0 seats) at the 1952 election. The LSP, on the other hand, increased its representation from a mere 16 members of the Lower House at the time of the 1951 split to 54 at the October 1952 election and 72 at the April 1953 election (for the first time surpassing the RSP total).  


Okada Sōji, interviewed 18 October 1962, confirmed that until the beginning of 1954 at least, the Suzuki, Wada and Nomizo factions worked in substantial harmony because of a
mutually advantageous division of posts. Nomizo, interviewed 11 October 1962, maintained that at one stage in 1953 there had been signs that Suzuki intended to move towards acceptance of the 'peace forces' argument; no evidence that might confirm this, however, has been found.

Left Socialist exponents of the 'third force' differed in their degree of 'ideological neutrality'. A Marxist analysis made it difficult to accept the idea of Soviet 'imperialism' to balance American 'imperialism'. In one discussion the Party theorist Inamura Junzō proposed to shelve the question of ideological neutrality and only discuss de facto neutrality, i.e. the means of avoiding war. This view was contested by another participant who maintained that the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe had proved unequivocally 'imperialistic'. Nihon Shakaitō Kyōiku Senden Kyoku, Dai 12 kai zenkoku taikai kōryō shōiinkai sokkiroku (Verbatim Report of the 12th National Congress Platform Sub-Committee), March 1954, pp. 120-122, and 160-169.
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1. Sen Tai Tokubetsu I, 'Gaikō mondai taisaku' (Policy on Foreign Problems), Jōhō Tsūshin, 1 July 1952, pp. 1-5. The same statement also maintained that Nehru's position could not be used as a precedent for Japanese neutralism, because his policy was based, not only on neutralism, but also on action through the United Nations.

2. The preamble to a draft of the 1952 RSP Action Policy referred to the Socialist International in the following terms: 'The spirit in which the Party was founded... is that of democracy, socialism and the love of peace, and this completely coincides with the Platform Policy of the Socialist International. It may, in a word, be called 'democratic socialism'.' Undō Hoshin Iinkai, 1952 nendo undō hōshin (an) yokō (Synopsis of Draft Action Policy for 1952), 28 December 1951, p.2.

3. Nihon Shakaitō Hombu, Dokuritsu Nihon no dühyū (Signpost to an Independent Japan), August 1952, pp. 6-7. The characteristics of 'Social-democracy' (i.e. the LSP ideology) were said by the RSP to be the following: 1) The use of parliament simply as a means and not as an end in itself... which would eventually lead to a denial of parliamentarism. 2) Failure to insist on the absolute value of individual freedom, on the grounds that it was a "bourgeois" virtue. 3) Rejection of the Communist Party but failure to reject communism...' [Sen Tai Tokubetsu I], 'Senkyo taisaku an' (Draft Election Policy), Jōhō Tsūshin, 15 July 1952, pp. 3-16, at p.4.

4. For instance Sone Eki, 'Dokuritsu go Nihon no gaikō hōshin' (Japanese Foreign Policy after Independence), Jōhō Tsūshin, 1 January 1952, pp. 4-6, at p. 5. One idea expressed in Party writings was that organised labour as such was a force capable of obstructing a trend towards war. For instance, a series of questions and answers in the Party's official bulletin contained the following exchange: '(Question) Is not the present trend of American policy leading towards war? (Answer) We do not think so. The official Marxist argument that the American economy is
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breaking down, or that capitalist countries must necessarily tend towards rearmament and war, is not correct in principle. The fifteen million organised workers in the United States are a potent force in the avoidance of a preventive war.' (present writer's underlining). Sen Tai Tokubetsu I, 'Gaikō mondai taisaku' (Policy on Foreign Problems), Jōhō Tsūshin, 1 July 1952, pp. 1-5, at p.1.

5. For instance Sone, loc. cit., p. 5. Sone also maintained that 'democratic socialist' forces should play a positive role in the distribution of aid to underdeveloped countries. Such aid should be channeled through such organisations as the ICFTU and the United Nations, rather than flow directly from donor to recipient. Kokkai Nippō, 8 February 1952, p. 1.

6. For instance Sen Tai Tokubetsu I, loc. cit., p. 3.


9. See Chapter 4, note 17. The slight advantage held by the RSP over the LSP at the ASC was attested by the appointment of a Right Socialist, Watanabe Rō, as permanent Japanese member of the secretariat of the Conference. See Nihon Shakaitō Hombu, Dai 3 kai chūō iinkai hōkokusho (Report of the Third Central Committee Meeting), November 1953, p. 020.

10. Even before the ASC was formed, an RSP policy statement spoke as follows: 'We must grasp the right of leadership of progressive internationalism. This internationalism means a truly fair-minded peace movement, working through the United Nations, UNESCO, the Socialist International and
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ICFTU, and it is fighting the JCP policy of subservience to the Soviet Union and reactionary isolationism.' Hombu Tanshin, 14 November 1951, p. 1. Sone equated Japanese influence in such a movement with her possession of self-defence forces, whereby she would become a 'peaceful progressive nation'. Sone, loc. cit., p. 5.


14. One RSP pamphlet, however, stated (without elaboration) that the Party opposed the immediate expulsion of American troops. Nihon Shakaitō Hombu, Dokuritsu Nihon no dōhyō (Signpost to an Independent Japan), August 1962, p. 36.

15. Ibid., p. 24 and p. 27.


17. See for instance the following extract from a foreign policy statement: '... The fact that there is not the danger of a full scale third world war does not mean that there is no danger of indirect aggression and local aggression by Communist forces other than those of the Soviet Union. The danger from the Cold War and the danger of local wars is especially great in Asia.' Sen Tai Tokubetsu I, loc. cit., p. 1.

18. 1952 nendo undo hōshin, p. 671.

19. 1953 nendo undo hōshin, p. 4.
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20.
1952 nendo undō hōshin, p. 671.

21.
1953 nendo undō hōshin, p. 15.

22.
See note 10.

23.
1953 nendo undō hōshin, p. 12.

24.
Loc. cit.

25.
Loc. cit. This argument had its parallel in Government replies to critics of Japan's weak defence commitment, especially during the period of Yoshida's Prime Ministership. See for instance the report of Diet debates in Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 16 October 1951.

26.
Dokuritsu Nihon no dōhyō, p. 37.

27.
See for instance the response of the British Labour Party to defence against Hitler in the 1930's.

28.
Abbreviation of Minshushakaishugi Remmei (Democratic Socialist League). Members of Minsharen included most of the leading members of the RSP, for instance, Asanuma Inejirō, Katayama Tetsu, Kawakami Jōtarō, Miyake Shōichi, Miwa Jusō, Kōno Mitsu, Suzuki Yoshio, Matsuoka Komakichi, Royama Masamichi, Hatano Kanae. It also included two who were famous for their renunciation of the Communist Party in prison in the 1930's, and now associated with extreme anti-communism, - Nabeyama Sadachika and Sano Manabu.

29.
A version of the Minsharen declaration is given in Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition) 9 March 1952.

30.
According to loc. cit., the strongest opposition to the Minsharen declaration came from Mizutani Chōsaburō, who had been associated with the Rōnō-ha in the prewar period, but who was now associated with the Kawakami faction of the RSP.
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32. Another candidate for readmission was a minor party called Kyōdōto, led by Hirano Rikizō. Hirano and his group had seceded from the then united Socialist Party in 1948, and formed his own party, the Shakai Kakushintō (later called Shakai Minshuto). In July 1952, shortly before the RSP Extraordinary Congress, the Shakai Minshuto united with another minor party, the Nōkyōtō, to form the Kyōdōto. Members of Kyōdōto were admitted to membership of the RSP in October 1952, but Hirano himself was expelled from the RSP in 1954 because of a scandal. It should be noted that Hirano was a member of Akamatsu's National Socialist Party in 1932, and had been closely associated with the militarists.

33. According to Sasada, although the Nishio faction agreed to drop their own candidate, Matsuoka Komakichi, Kawakami's candidature received by no means unanimous assent from the Congress. Sasada Shigeru, Nihon Shakaitō (The Japan Socialist Party), Sanichi Shōbō, November 1960, Vol. 1, pp. 204-205.

34. The other two were a promise not to enter into a coalition with any of the conservative parties, and to work to heal the split with the LSP. See Sasada, op. cit., p. 203.

35. The Chairmanship went to Kawakami and the Secretary-Generalship to Asanuma, a close sympathiser of the Kawakami faction.

36. The policy was set out in 'seven principles':
'1) Policy to be based on democratic socialism.
'2) Recognise the Peace Treaty as an accomplished fact, and strive for complete independence.
'3) In foreign policy, support international cooperation and a collective security system, and strengthen the United Nations.
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4) Strengthen cooperation with the Socialist International and the socialist forces of free Asia.
5) On the labour front, promote membership of, and cooperation with, ICFTU.
6) Clearly oppose the forces of communism and right wing totalitarianism, and both in thought and deed reject attitudes sympathetic to them.
7) Protect the Peace Constitution, and fight for stable standards of living rather than rearmament.' Dokuritsu Nihon no dōhyō, p. 5.

A summary of Sone's proposed Foreign Policy is given in Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 21 October 1953. For a Left Socialist criticism of it, see a leading article in Shakai Taimusu, 27 October 1953. For accounts of the subsequent controversy in the Policy Committee, see Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 26, 27 and 28 November 1953. The following document of 26 November (clearly based on Sone's original draft), although containing no reference to the first of his controversial proposals (rearmament), incorporates versions of the other two. In the copy seen by the writer, both the latter proposals had been substantially amended by hand; Nihon Shakaitō Seisaku Shingikai, Gaikō hōshin (Foreign Policy), 26 November 1953.

Nihon Shakaitō Hombu, Dai 3 kai chūō iinkai hōkokusho (Report of Third Central Committee Meeting), November 1953, p. 013.

According to Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 21 October 1953.

Gaikō hōshin, p. 2 (as unamended; see note 37).

Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 26 November 1953.

The 1953 Action Policy had contained a general phrase about the necessity for 'regional collective security' in the absence of 'United Nations collective security', and advocated revision of the existing Security Treaty, but did not specifically commit the Party to a Security Treaty with the United States after revision had been effected. 1953 nendo undō hōshin, p. 12.
See Chapter 3, note 38.

Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 1 December 1953.

Loc. cit.


The members of Chūkanha (also known as Shakaishugi Seisaku Kenkyükai, or Socialist Policy Study Association) were said to number about ten Diet members. Mainichi Shimbun (morning edition), 17 December 1953. Chūkanha appears to have been an ad hoc grouping of those most energetic in pursuit of reunification between Left and Right Socialist Parties, and was without the historical traditions which characterised the other factions.

Mainichi Shimbun (morning edition), 17 December 1953. Similar views were given in an earlier Chūkanha pamphlet advocating reunification; Oka Ryōichi, Tōitsu no suishin ni kansuru teigen (A Proposal for the Furtherance of Unification), Shakaishugi Seisaku Kenkyükai, July 1953.

Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), 10 January 1954.

1953 nendo undo hoshin, p. 12.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN THE REUNIFICATION OF LEFT AND RIGHT SOCIALIST PARTIES

1. Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 24 July 1953. The sets of conditions for reunification put forward respectively by Right and Left Socialists at the time of their greatest estrangement from each other - in 1952 - were as follows:

The Right Socialists held that a unified Socialist Party should:
1) Be based on the ideology of democratic socialism.
2) Recognise the reality of the Peace Treaty and strive for the completion of independence.
3) In foreign policy support international solidarity and collective security.
4) Strengthen its alliance with the Socialist International and with free Asian socialism.
5) In the labour field promote membership of and cooperation with the ICFTU.
6) Emphatically reject the forces of communism and right wing totalitarianism, and in word and deed exclude fellow-travelling attitudes.
7) Protect the Peace Constitution, and fight for a stable standard of living rather than rearmament.

The Left Socialists held that a unified Socialist Party should:
1) Be a class mass party based on social democracy.
2) Confound social fascism and reject unconditional unity.
3) Emphatically oppose the Japan Communist Party and not cooperate with any forces advocating a unified front with it.
4) Affirm the Four Peace Principles of the seventh Congress and struggle against both treaties, against rearmament and for the defence of the Constitution.
5) Firmly support the world third force and cooperate with the Socialist International.

Both sets of conditions as quoted in Oka Ryōichi, Tōitsu no suishin ni kansuru teigen (A Proposal for the Furtherance of Unification), Shakaishugi Seisaku Kenkyūkai, July 1953, pp. 6-7.

2. See [Nihon Shakaitō], Shakai minshushugi seiji seiryoku kesshū ni kansuru tōmen no taisaku (Immediate Policy concerning the Unification of Social Democratic Political
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Forces), 9 August 1953. See also Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Shikkō Tinkai, and Shakai Minshushugi Seiji Seiryoku Kesshū Tinkai, Shakai minshushugi seiji seiryoku kesshū ni kansuru hōkokusho (Report concerning the Unification of Social Democratic Political Forces), 21 January 1954.

3. According to op. cit., it was probably Suzuki's speech which stimulated the Chūkanha to begin its campaign for unity.


6. Shakai Taimusu, 23 September 1953. Although the LSP had flatly opposed recognition of the Peace Treaty at the time of the 1951 split, as an independent party it soon came to modify this position to some extent. At its January 1952 Congress a formula was reached whereby the abolition of both the Security Treaty and the Peace Treaty was advocated for the Party's mass movements, while the Party itself was to aim at a substantial revision of the Peace Treaty as it stood. The 1953 proposal thus represented a further retreat from the originally held position. See Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), 30 January 1952, and Jiji Shimbun (morning edition) 31 January 1952.

7. Shakai Taimusu, 23 September 1953. The 'Locarno' idea was also put forward (according to an RSP pamphlet), in an LSP resolution at the third Congress of the Socialist International in July 1953. Nihon Shakaitō Hombu, Shakaishugi Intānashionaru dai 3 kai takai, Ajia Shakaitō Kaigi dai 2 kai kanjikai, hōkokusho (Reports of the Third Congress of the Socialist International and the Second Executive Congress of the Asian Socialist Conference), October 1953, p. 19.
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8. It also contained arbitration conventions between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France, arbitration conventions between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia, and a Franco-Polish and a Franco-Czechoslovak treaty for mutual assistance in case of aggression by Germany.

9. The committee further expressed the fear that 'Locarno' might be the prelude to a change in LSP policy in the direction of 'armed neutrality'. In justifying this fear it cited two factors: firstly, it maintained, nations which had had a form of guaranteed neutrality, such as Switzerland and Belgium, were themselves heavily armed and it would be unrealistic to suppose that they would have obtained such a guarantee as unarmed powers. Therefore, the committee argued, the LSP must be contemplating a programme of rearmament; secondly, the committee cited a remark said to have been made by Kuo Mo-jo, Chairman of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association, to a Japanese trade delegation visiting Peking, that Japan should sever her ties with the United States and then build up her Self-Defence Forces. [Nihon Shakaitō], Tōitsu mondai chōsa kenkyū iinkai (Committee for the Investigation and Study of the Unification Problem), 27 November 1953, p. 5. The Japanese trade delegation referred to presumably meant the delegation which concluded the second private trade agreement with the Chinese on 29 October 1953, but it has not been possible to locate any press reference to a remark of this nature by Kuo Mo-jo. It seems that the Right Socialist committee may have interpreted the LSP policy as involving a guarantee of Japanese security by the Soviet Union and Communist China only, and excluding the United States.

10. It should be noted that the Right Socialists were already advocating a similar programme in order to guarantee the security of a neutral Korea; the countries proposed as guarantors of Korean neutrality were Communist China, the Soviet Union, Japan, the United States, and (tentatively) India. See Sone Eki in Nihon Shakaitō Hombu, Nihon no kanzen dokuritsu to MSA enjo (Complete Independence for Japan and MSA Aid), July 1953, p. 20.
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15. Loc. cit. The Nishio - Kōno controversy is treated in some detail, and the respective materials quoted at some length, in Nihon Rōdō Nenkan (Japan Labour Yearbook), 1956, pp. 749-750.

16. Yasuhira Kaichi, Chairman of the LSP Special Committee on Unification formed in August 1953, reportedly made much use of his former contacts with Katō Kanjū, of the RSP 'unity' group. Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 20 May 1954, and Jiji Shimbun (morning edition), 25 October 1954. The two men had been closely associated within Nihon Musantō in 1937. Katō had moved to the right after the war and had joined the RSP in 1951. Opposition to reunification from within the Suzuki faction was reported to have come from Inamura Junzō, a leading member of Shakaishugi Kyōkai. Jiji Shimbun (morning edition) 24 October 1954.

17. Loc. cit.


19. Okada Sōji (Suzuki faction), interviewed 18 October 1962, said, however, that the Wada faction felt that unification could be obtained on better terms if further postponed, because of LSP election successes, and that it was only this issue which separated the Wada and Suzuki factions.


22. Loc. cit.
23. Okada Sōji, interviewed 18 October 1962, said that his firm statement of policy at this stage was a tactical manoeuvre, aimed principally against the intransigent Nishio faction in the RSP. Nishio was opposed to unification, Nishimura was especially against concessions on defence, and the problem, according to Okada, was to pull Sone over.

24. Delegates from other parties also participated, since the Japanese Government would not issue visas unless the delegation were on a 'supra-party' basis.


28. Previous RSP policy on Taiwan was that the island should be put provisionally under United Nations control; the United Nations should ensure that Taiwan did not become a strategic threat to either camp and the ownership of the island should be determined by the free will of the Taiwanese themselves. See for instance Nihon Shakaitō Seisaku Shingikai, Gaikō hōshin (Foreign Policy), 26 November 1953, p. 3. The LSP policy on Taiwan was that the fate of the island should be decided by the whole Chinese people, including the Taiwanese. See the LSP statement in Nihon Shakaitō Hombu, Shakaishugi Intānashionaru dai 3 kai taikai, Ajia Shakaitō Kaigi dai 2 kai kanjikai, hōkokusho (Reports of the Third Congress of the Socialist International and the Second Executive Congress of the Asian Socialist Conference), October 1953, p. 19.

29. Jōhō Tsūshin, 1 November 1954, pp. 3-12.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6  FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN THE REUNIFICATION OF LEFT AND RIGHT SOCIALIST PARTIES

30.
Nisho was quoted as saying that the delegation could not understand the significance of a Marxist 'peace offensive', and that in a month's tour it could not really comprehend China. *Jiji Shimbun* (morning edition), 1 November 1954.

31.
Loc. cit.

32.
For an account of the differences between the two sides at this time, see *Asahi Shimbun* (morning edition), 21 November 1954.

33.
The account of the manufacture of the word 'kaihai' is given in *Asahi Shimbun* (morning edition), 21 November 1954. The full text of the joint election Platform is given in *Nihon Rōdō Nenkan*, 1956, p. 761.

34.
Loc. cit.

35.
Loc. cit.

36.
LSP representation increased from 72 to 89 seats. RSP representation increased from 66 seats to 67 seats.

37.
*Asahi Shimbun* (morning edition), 9 March 1955. The Matsumoto faction may also have been influenced by the fact that Takano Minoru, its close associate in Sōhyō, was now advocating a 'united front for peaceful coexistence and against fascism', the centre of which should be a united Socialist Party composed of Right as well as Left Wings. See resumé of an article by Takano, in *Sankei Shimbun* (morning edition), 10 November 1954.

38.

39.

40.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN THE
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41.
Loc. cit.

42.

43.

44.

45.
One RSP member of the joint Unification Committee was
reported as arguing that substantial rearmament was
necessary both for the purposes of the 'Locarno' treaty
and in order to secure the withdrawal of American troops
from Japan. Loc. cit. Although he was not identified in
the source quoted, Fujimaki Shimpei, interviewed 1 March
1963, who was present throughout the negotiations, said
that it was Nishimura Eiichi, whose 'armed neutrality'
argument was mentioned in Chapter 3, note 38.

46.
'Jishu dokuritsu'.

47.
English word used in the text and translated as 'Sensō ni
makikomarena taido' (An attitude of not becoming involved
in war).

48.

49.
The text of the unified platform is given in Nihon
Shakaitō Hombu, Yakushin suru Nihon Shakaitō (The Advancing

50.
Ibid., p. 70.

51.
See the replies of Itō Kōdō to questioners at the final
LSP Congress, quoted in Asahi Shimbun (morning edition),
20 September 1955.

52.
Yakushin suru Nihon Shakaitō, pp. 70-72.

53.

54.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6  FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN THE
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55. 

56. 
Shakaishugi Kyōkai devoted one issue of its magazine to
the expression of criticism, from the Rōnō-ha point of view,
of the unified Platform.

57. 
For details, see Yamazaki Hiroshi, Nihon Shakaitō no
jūnenshi (Ten Year History of the Japan Socialist Party),

58. 
Loc. cit.

59. 
The Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Yearbook), in summing up the
international situation in 1955, struck a typically
optimistic note:
'1955 may be called an epoch-making year in two ways:
1) Culminating in the Geneva Conference of leaders of the
United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union,
the international situation entered a new stage in which
world war was held impossible. 2) A large-scale
consolidation of anti-colonialist and nationalist
movements and an increase in the power of small nations as
a whole was realised at the Bandung Conference of 29 Asian
and Arab nations.' Asahi Nenkan, 1956, p. 31.

60. 
For an optimistic view of the Japan Socialist Party's
prospects of forming a Government, see the introduction to a
short history of the Party written by a sympathetic
journalist: Yanada Kōki, Nihon Shakaitō (The Japan
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7  NEUTRALISM IN THE UNITED SOCIALIST
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1. It does not seem possible to agree with one writer that in this section 'the victory was substantially with the Right'. (Sissons, D.C.S., 'Recent Developments in Japan's Socialist Movement [1], Far Eastern Survey, March 1960, pp. 40-47, at p. 43). The Right had moved further from its position in 1951 than had the Left, and in the united platform the Left remained free to interpret 'self-reliant independence' in the sense of non-alignment with either bloc, abolition of the Security Treaty and a multilateral guarantee of Japan's security. The last was a Left Socialist invention designed to protect the neutrality which it favoured for Japan.

2. See below, note 24.


5. See for instance the following extract from the 1957 Action Policy: 'Since the Bandung Conference... the say of the Asian and African group in the international situation and their capacity to maintain peace has increased. Of course, although they are called a group, they are not internally as one. Even among the Colombo Conference powers, which form their nucleus, and even on the recent Eastern European problem, there have been differences of opinion, as shown in the voting at the United Nations General Assembly. Their basic policy, however, has been to oppose the military bloc policies of American and Soviet camps and to demand peace, independence and equality; here they have become a strong force in relation to both camps. The recent rapprochement of the Eisenhower Government with Nehru must be attributed to this.' Ibid.
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6. Ibid.
7. See Chapter 5.
11. Ibid., p. 86.
12. The positions of the two sides are compared in Nihon Shakaitō Tōitsu Jumbi Iinkai, Toitsu e no ayumi (The Road To Unification), [October 1955], p. 97.
13. Policy quoted in Morishima Morito, 'Chūka Jimmin Kyōwakoku to no kokkō juritsu ni tsuite' (The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Chinese People's Republic), Shakai Tsūshin, 1 July 1956. (Original not available, but article reproduced in materials lent by Uezumi Minoru).
15. Ibid.
17. Text given in Nihon Shakaitō, Nitchū no kokkō kaifukue (Towards Restoring Relations between Japan and China), [April 1957], pp. 143-146.

18. See speech by Chou En-lai, reported in Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 26 July 1957.

19. See for instance the report of a leading member of the Wada faction and previous year's Chairman of the International Bureau of the Party, on his return from a visit to China: [Sata Tadataka], 'Sata hōkokusho' (Sata Report), Gekkan Shakaitō, October 1958, pp. 18-19. (Abridged version).


22. There is little evidence that the Chinese cessation of trade had any effect on the elections, in which the rapid Socialist advance over a number of previous elections was almost halted.

23. Quoted in Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 20 November 1958. For an immediate Socialist reaction to the Chen Yi statement, see Matsumoto Shichirō, 'Chin Ki seimei no igi' (The Significance of the Chen Yi Statement), Shakai Taimusu, 27 November 1958.

25. For an authoritative exposition of the JSP policy of 'positive neutrality', see Yamaguchi Fusao, Chūritsu, kono minzoku no kadai (Neutralism, a Question for this Nation), Shiseidō, June 1959.

26. [Shakai Taimusu henshūbu], 'Futatabi kyakkō wo abiru chūritsu gaikō' (Neutralist Foreign Policy again Spotlighted), Shakai Taimusu, 22 January 1958.

27. Seisaku to hoshin, p. 177.


32. [Shakai Taimusu henshūbu], 'Futatabi kyakkō wo abiru chūritsu gaikō' (Neutralist Foreign Policy again Spotlighted), Shakai Taimusu, 22 January 1958, See also Yamaguchi Fusao, 'Chūritsu chitai no settei e' (Towards the Setting up of a Neutral Zone), Gekkan Shakaitō, February 1959, pp. 58-63.

34. For a statement of the new Communist line on neutralism, see Kamiyama Shigeo, 'Chūritsu wa dokuritsu e no michi de aru' (Neutralism is the Road to Independence), Zenei, February 1959, pp. 9-17.

35. For the text of the 1957 joint statement, see Nihon Shakaitō, Nitchū no kokkō kaifuku e (Towards Restoring Relations between Japan and China), [April 1957], pp. 143-146.


39. Part of this account corresponds to a report in the Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 28 March 1959. Other Socialists interviewed attributed Asanuma's statement to his alleged lack of sophistication in the finer points of doctrine, emotional reaction to situations and susceptibility to manipulation.


41. At the May 1958 Lower House election, the percentage of votes gained by the JSP was an increase of only 2.7% over the combined Socialist total in 1955. The Socialist increment of seats was only six. The 1958 Congress also showed disquiet over the failure of the Party's efforts to expand its organisation and membership. For details, see Sissons, loc. cit., pp. 44-45.

42. In Shakaishugi, December 1958.
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43. For an account of the new policy see Sōhyō, 5 August 1955 (Shukusatsuban edition, Vol. 2, pp. 9-11).

44. Taguchi Fukuji, Nihon no kakushin seiryoku (Japan's Progressive Forces), Kōbundō, November 1961, pp. 171-173.


47. The reasons for increased JSP dependence on the trade unions is to be found in the weakness of the JSP organisation, which drives the Party to seek union funds and general facilities for candidates at elections. It has been pointed out that at the 1958 Lower House election, the showing of candidates sponsored by trade unions, especially Sōhyō, was very much better than of those who were not. Of the 182 candidates sponsored by Sōhyō, 134 (73%) were elected. Of the 127 sponsored by Zenrō, 86 (68%) were elected, while of 68 candidates receiving joint sponsorship by Sōhyō, 50 (84%) were elected. Taguchi, op. cit., p. 19.

48. See Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 25 December 1958. For the reply of the JSP Executive, see Ibid.

49. See especially Nishio Suehiro, 'Tō no shutaisei kakuritsu wa shikkōbu kara' (The Nature of the Party should be Established by the Executive), Gekkan Shakaitō, September 1958, pp. 11-15.
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50. See for instance Sone Eki, 'Tō saiken ni atatte no jakkan
no mondaiten' (Some Questions concerning Party Reconstruction),
Gekkan Shakaitō, August 1959, pp. 38-42.

51. Sone Eki, Okada Haruo, 'Chūritsu mondai wo megutte' (On
the Question of Neutralism), Gekkan Shakaitō, March 1959,
pp. 39-47, at p. 46.

52. Ibid.

53. For the foreign policy of the DSP see, for instance,
Minshushakaitō Seisaku Shingikai, Seisaku mondō (Policy
Questions and Answers), April 1962, pp. 17-20. For policy
on the Security Treaty shortly after its break with the
JSP, see Shakai Kurabu Kokkai Taisaku Iinkai oyobi Seisaku
Shingikai, Mamoraretā gikashugi - dai 33 kai rinji kokkai
katsudō hōkoku (Parliamentarism Defended - Action Report
for the 33rd Extraordinary Diet), December 1959, pp. 28-29.

54. For examples of left wing criticism of the aims, outlook
and policies of the Kishi Government, see Sekai, passim,
and for instance articles in the January issue of 1959.

55. At the JSP Congress of March 1960, Asanuma was
challenged for the Chairmanship (after the retirement of
Suzuki) by his factional colleague Kawakami.


57. For the opinions of other Socialist informants about
Asanuma's activities, see note 39.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8  NEUTRALISM AFTER REVISION OF THE SECURITY TREATY - 1960 - 1963


2. See Chapter 7.


5. 'Goken chūritsu no taisei wo' (A Regime for Defence of the Constitution and for Neutralism), Shakai Shimpō, 31 July 1960.

6. 'Waga to no "seiji hōshin kaisetsu" ni taisuru Kyōsantō no hihan ni kotaeru' (Replying to Communist Criticism of Our Party's 'Political Policy Explanation'), Shakai Shimpō, 14 August 1960.

7. 'Chūritisuron e no hihan ni kotaeru' (Replying to Criticism of the Neutralist Argument), Shakai Shimpō, 28 August 1960.

8. See for instance 'Nihon Shakaitō wa u-keika shita ka. Nihon Kyōsantō no hihan ni kotaeru' (Has the JSP Swung to the Right? Replying to JCP Criticism), Shakai Shimpō, 18 December 1960.


16. The members of the delegation consisted of: Heiwa Dōshikai 2 (Hozumi Shichirō and Hososako Kanemitsu), Suzuki faction 2 (Suzuki Mosaburō and Chiba Makoto), Eda faction 1 (Narita Tomomi), Wada faction 1 (Ishibashi Masashi). Only the latter two factions represented the leadership group in the Party.

17. See especially chapters 1 and 4.


22. Quoted in op. cit., pp. 136-137.


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27. Opinion expressed by Hososako Kanemitsu, interviewed 22 February 1963 together with three other members of Heiwa Dōshikai.
30. For descriptions of the Congress, see Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 6 and 7 August 1963.
32. Nihon Shakaitō, Sōsenkyo kōryō oyobi seisaku (General Election Platform and Policy), October 1960, p. 3.
34. The stagnation in the Party's electoral fortunes first revealed at the Lower House election of May 1958 was still evident in the Lower House election of November 1960. In 1958 the Socialist percentage of total votes was 32.94%. In 1960 it had dropped to 27.56%. If we add, however the 8.77% obtained by the newly formed DSP, we see that the total Socialist vote had risen to 37.33%.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8  NEUTRALISM AFTER REVISION OF THE
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36.

37.
The only Executive members not belonging to the Suzuki faction were Asanuma and two members of the Nomizo faction.

38.
Suzuki 8, Wada 3, Kawakami 2, Heiwa Dōshikai 2, Nomizo 2. In addition Asanuma, elected Chairman in a straight fight with Kawakami, was not a member of the Suzuki faction, but had moved close to it and received the faction's backing in the election.

39.
See 'Bunretsu saketa "ryōshiki"' (Split Avoided by 'Common Sense'), Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), 25 March 1963.

40.
It is stated by one author that the 'rejuvenation movement' which was discussed especially at the 1958 Party Congress, represented a conflict between Diet members and members of the Party Secretariat, with the latter supporting the movement. Taguchi Fukuji, Nihon no kakushin seiryoku (Japan's Progressive Forces), Köbundō, November 1961, at p. 17. In 1958 Eda was connected with the rejuvenation movement, and after his sponsorship of Structural Reform received strong backing in the Secretariat.

41.

42.
See especially Hakamada Satomi, 'Nihon kakumei to minzoku undō' (The Japanese Revolution and the National Movement), Zenei, February 1958, pp. 4-18.

43.
In January 1961 one of the leading members of the Wada faction, Katsumata Seiichi, was reported as having attacked Structural Reform as an import from the JCP. Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition), 11 January 1961. A pamphlet, distributed by Heiwa Dōshikai at the Congress of November 1962, deplored the influence of former members of the dissident Communist group who were now members of the JSP,
and accused them of having a controlling position in various Party organs: Heiwa Doshikai, Henkō wo zesei shi, tatakau tō wo kakuritsu suru tame ni (Correct the Trend and Establish a Fighting Party), 20 November 1962, p. 2.

For a report of the actual split in the faction, see Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 22 November 1961.

See for instance Sakisaka Itsurō, 'Kōzō kaikaku ron no kairyōshugiteki seisaku' (The Revisionist Character of Structural Reform), Shakaishugi, February 1962, pp. 2-10.

See for instance Ōta Kaoru, 'Nihon Shakaitō no zenshin no tame ni' (For the Advancement of the Japan Socialist Party), Shakaishugi, December 1961, pp. 2-4.


Sato Noboru, 'Shakaishugi to chūritsu' (Socialism and Neutralism), Shisō, October 1961, pp. 34-43.

See especially Wada Hiroo, 'Chūritsu seisaku no zenshin no tame ni' (For the Advancement of a Neutralist Policy) Chūō Kōron, June 1962, pp. 98-106. See also Wada Hiroo, 'Sekkyoku chūritsu to daisan seiryoku' (Positive Neutrality and the Third Force), Gekkan Shakaitō, November 1962, pp. 63-68.

See for instance Wada Hiroo, 'Chūritsu seisaku no zenshin no tame ni', loc. cit., p. 68.

Wada Hiroo, 'Sekkyoku chūritsu to daisan seiryoku', loc. cit., pp. 63-64.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8  NEUTRALISM AFTER REVISION OF THE SECURITY TREATY - 1960 - 1963

55. For the text of the report and amendments made at the insistence of other members of the Party Executive, see [Nihon Shakaito] 'Dai 25 kai chūō iinkai ni okeru Eda Shokichō no seiji hōkoku (zem bun)' (Full Text of the Political Report of the Secretary-General, Eda, at the 35th Central Committee), Gekkan Shakaitō, December 1961, pp. 4-28. See especially pp. 4-11. (Subsequently referred to as 'Seiji hōkoku').


57. 'Seiji hōkoku', loc. cit., p. 11.

58. The JSP was strongly opposed to current talks between the Ikeda Government and the new military junta in South Korea. For a statement of official JSP policy on this issue, see Nihon Shakaitō Sōmukyoku Sōmubu, '62 nen no shinro, dai 21 kai tō taikai kettei shū (The Road Ahead for 1962, Collection of Resolutions of the 21st Congress), March 1962, pp. 48-49.


60. 'Seiji hōkoku', loc. cit., p. 10.

61. Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 9 November 1961. In an article, Wada maintained that the relative weakness or strength of the two blocs had nothing to do with neutralism. Wada Hiroo, 'Sekkyoku chūritsu to daisan seiryoku', loc. cit., p. 67.

62. At the JSP Congress of November 1962 Eda relinquished the Secretary-Generalship when a vote on his recent policies went against him, but in a subsequent vote his close associate, Narita Tomomi, was elected Secretary-General by a substantial margin.
63. Except for a period between 1958 and 1960 when the position was in the hands of Okada Sōji, of the Suzuki faction.

64. For a collection of the main articles for and against Eda's views in this period, see Nakajima Iwao (ed.), Shakaishugi no bijiyon ronso (The Argument about the Vision of Socialism), Shinano Shoten, November 1962.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 9 THE NEUTRALIST CONTROVERSY AS A DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE PREVENTION OF WAR

1. For the most comprehensive statement of Japanese Socialist views on neutralism, see Yamaguchi Fusao, Chūritsu, kono minzoku no kadai (Neutralism, A Question for this Nation), Shiseidō, June 1959.

2. In treatments of the subject by leftist politicians and scholars it is usual to contrast neutrality and neutralism by a comparative discussion of Switzerland and Sweden (and sometimes other European neutrals) on the one hand, and on the other India, certain other Asian, Arab and African countries, and sometimes Yugoslavia. See especially Yamaguchi, op.cit., pp. 18-98. See also 'Sekai no chūritsu shokoku kara nani wo manabu ka' (What is to be Learned from Neutral Nations round the World?), in Maeshiba Kakuzō, Yamate Haruyuki (eds.), Chūritsu wa jitsugen dekiru ka (Can Neutralism be Achieved?), Sanichi Shobō, October 1961, pp. 207-252. See also Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, Chūritsushugi no kenkyū (Studies of Neutralism), (2 vols.) 1961, especially Vol. 1, part 3 and Vol. 2, part 2.

3. See for instance Politis, N., La Neutralité et la Paix (Paris, 1935), p. 7: 'La neutralité apparaît aujourd'hui comme un véritable anachronisme; n'étant plus en harmonie avec l'état du droit des gens ni avec les nécessités économiques et les aspirations des peuples, elle est irrémédiablement condamnée comme institution; elle est destinée à disparaître.' A standard prewar authority on neutrality in international law greatly emphasised the selfish economic advantages which had historically accrued to neutrals in time of war, and from which, he alleged, neutrality had derived its main impetus: Jessup, P.C., Neutrality, its History, Economics and Law (New York, 1936). See especially Vol. 4, 'Today and Tomorrow'.

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5. For a discussion of the rights and duties deriving from
neutrality, see Lauterpacht (ed.), Oppenheim's International
pp. 539-551.


7. Cohn, G., Neo-Neutrality (New York, 1939), at p. 2, who
singles out for criticism, among others, the following
definition: 'Neutrality may be defined as the attitude of
impartiality adopted by third states towards belligerents,
such attitude creating rights and duties between the
impartial states and the belligerents.' - from Lauterpacht,


9. Other writers from the 'traditional' neutral nations,
while admitting that their neutrality was basically of an
egoistic, nationalist kind, nevertheless laid stress on its
'positive' characteristics also. See for instance Bonjour,
E., Swiss Neutrality, its History and Meaning (London,

10. 'Emergence of India in World Affairs', (Speech delivered
at the Constituent Assembly [Legislative], New Delhi, 8
March 1949), in The Publications Division, Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, Government of India,
Independence and After, a Collection of the more Important
Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949
(New Delhi, 1949), pp. 229-244, at p. 243. See also 'Our
Policy is Positive' (Speech in Parliament, 17 March 1950),
in The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Government of India, Jawaharlal Nehru's

11. See for instance the following description of the policy
of 'Positive Neutrality' at the JSP Congress of January
1962: 'Positive neutrality is the Party's fundamental
standpoint in its struggle for peace and relaxation of
tension. It means non-alignment, that is, non-participation
in the military blocs of East or West, with the aim of eventually dissolving these blocs'. Nihon Shakaitō Sōmukyoku Sōmubu, '62 nen no shinro, Dai 21 kai tō taikai kettei shū (The Road Ahead for 1962, Collection of the Resolutions of the 21st Congress, March 1962, p. 24.

12. See Scalapino, R.A., "Neutralism" in Asia', American Political Science Review, March 1954, pp. 49-62. It may, indeed, be argued that neutralist nations are in a sense less altruistic and more concerned with national selfishness than were the traditional neutrals. One writer, for instance, points out that 'whereas pre-1939 neutrals were, generally speaking, satisfied states territorially, the present-day neutralist often has a piece of "unfinished business"...' Lyon P., Neutralism (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 71.

13. Bonjour, op. cit., pp. 121-122, describes how during World War II a defence plan was prepared whereby in the event of a Nazi invasion the national frontiers would have been abandoned and the armed forces would have fallen back on a 'réduit national' (national fortress) - an area in the centre of the country where optimum use could be made of natural features for the purposes of defence.

14. It is not desired to suggest that the situation was entirely unprecedented; 'Local' wars before World War II were very much the concern of Great Powers. Nevertheless the swift ideological polarisation of the world into two formidable groups of 'leaders' and 'satellites' had never before been so all-embracing in peacetime.

15. See for instance the following exchange in an interview between Lohia, head of the Indian Socialist Party, and Japanese Socialists:

'Question) What do you think of the East-West conflict?
(Lohia) There are now two kinds of crisis, one of politics, one of civilization. The answer is to make a 'third force', joining neither. The world created by Ford and the world created by Stalin do not much differ. Both have mass production and concentration of industry. Both want to rule the world... The present impression is of six hundred
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million whites ruling one thousand, seven hundred million coloureds. What we must do is create a new order and civilization out of the new and weak nations of Asia. We must in economics not simply imitate the United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the people of Asia are poor and have few means of production. The birth of a new Asia which will have overthrown the great landlords and capitalists is the only way of overcoming the world crisis.' 'Rohia shi ni kiku' (Interview with Lohia), Shakai Shimbun, 10 September 1951.

16. For a discussion of this point, as well as of the dangers for a 'second-class power' of embarking on such a course, see Burns, A.L., Power Politics and the Growing Nuclear Club (Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1959), especially pp. 11-12.

17. For a discussion of the factors involved for a nation to embark upon a programme of nuclear armament, and an estimate of the situations in various countries with regard to such a programme, see Beaton, L., and Maddox, J., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962).

18. According to our definition, a 'first-class power', which would denote only the United States and the Soviet Union during the decade 1950-1960, would be an advanced industrial power able to deploy a world-wide nuclear deterrent. A 'third-class power' would denote nations with retarded industrial development, especially to be found outside Europe and North America. See Boulding's classification of nations into 'superpowers', 'industrial powers', 'agricultural societies' etc.; Boulding, K.E., Conflict and Defense, A General Theory (New York, Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 227-229.

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20. Beaton and Maddox conclude that it would take at least a
decade for Switzerland to equip herself with an adequate
nuclear force, but that the course of the public
debate in that country indicates a considerable

21. The fact that Japan, with an advanced programme for
peaceful atomic power, was ahead of India, where the
decision was taken to create an option by 1963 on
manufacturing nuclear weapons (although the decision to take
up the option had been apparently rejected), is noted by
Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

22. See for instance the following extract from an 'orthodox'
defence of the French position by a group of French
military experts in 1960: 'With American cities threatened
by the Russians, the guarantee which other members draw
from the American atomic arsenal is no longer absolute...
A French nuclear force would... assure national security
if the system of collective security failed and would
increase the global deterrent capacity of the Atlantic
Alliance by increasing the credibility of a nuclear force
based on the Continent.' Quoted in Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., p. 86.

23. [Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Shikkō Iinkai], '1952 nendo undō
hōshinshō an' (Draft Action Policy for 1952), Nihon Rōdō

24. The questionnaire contained the following question: 'If
Japan were to become a neutralist country, do you think that
there would be any fear of upsetting the balance of power
and thus endangering world peace?' 74 out of a total of 84
respondents answered 'no', and no respondent answered 'yes'.
See Appendix C.

25. For Nishimura's views see Nishimura Eiichi, Tai-Nichi kōwa
to waga tō no rekishiteki shimei (The Peace Treaty with
Japan and the Historic Destiny of our Party), [mid - 1951].
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A more detailed exposition is given in [Wada Hiroo Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Ichō] Dai 8 kai (rinji) taikai hōkokusho (Report to the 8th [Extraordinary] Congress), 3 October 1951, at pp. 3-5, 15.

26. Tsuji Masanobu, Jiei chūritsu (Self-Defence Neutrality), Atō Shobō, April 1952. See especially 'Amerika wa Nihon wo mamoriuru ka' (Can America Defend Japan?), pp. 61-68.

27. 'Soren wa Nihon wo ikani shite shinryaku suru ka' (How can the Soviet Union Invade Japan?), op. cit., pp. 58-61.

28. This is, of course, a highly controversial question, in which the problems of accidental war, preemptive attack etc., may be urged on the other side. A good case may, however be made out for the essential stability of the situation which the revolution in military technology has brought about. See for instance Burns, A.L., 'From Balance to Deterrence', World Politics, July 1957, pp. 494-529.

29. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Chūritsu Nihon no bōei kōsō - Nichi-Bei ampo taisei ni kawaru mono -' (Defence Scheme for a Neutral Japan - Something to Replace the Japan - United States Security Treaty), Sekai, August 1959, pp. 31-47.


31. The author cites an American authority to the effect that this would be the most likely pattern in which a modern war would develop.

32. The author cites a Japanese military authority as saying that Self-Defence Forces aircraft were already practicing manoeuvres such as quick turns which would enable them to avoid damage from the blast of a nuclear bomb after it had been dropped.
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33. A literal translation of the Japanese would be 'the creation of imaginary enemies'.

34. For instance Yamaguchi Fusao quoted an account which ascribed to 'armed neutrality' a latent power to appeal to the people generally, especially if there were a resurgence of nationalist sentiment in Japan: Tanaka Naokichi, in Nihon Kokusai Mondaikan Kenkyūjo, Chūritsushugi no kenkyū (Studies of Neutralism), 1961, Vol. 2, pp. 435-457, at p. 449. Yamaguchi argued that to take this view was to condone the bad record of pre-1945 militarism, which still alienated the people of Asia. Yamaguchi Fusao, 'Hibusō chūritsu no genjitsusei - eisei chūritsu e no michi-' (The Practicability of Unarmed Neutralism - The Road to Permanent Neutralism), Jiyū, July 1961, pp. 62-68. The same writer, in another passage, said that if Japan became neutral but retained the Self-Defence Forces, she would still be regarded with suspicion by the Soviet Union and Communist China, which would still consider that these forces were directed against themselves. Yamaguchi Fusao, Chūritsu, kono minzoku no kadai (Neutralism, A Question for this Nation), Shiseidō, June 1949, pp. 209-210.


36. For instance Yamate Haruyuki, in Maeshiba Kakuzō, Yamate Haruyuki (eds.), Chūritsu wa jitsugen dekiru ka (Can Neutrality be Achieved?), Sanichi Shobō, October 1961, p. 72: 'If we think about it, there are hardly any countries in the world which would harm Japan if she were to become neutral. The Soviet Union and China have many times declared that they desire Japan to become neutral, and that if she were to become neutral they would respect her neutrality.'

37. Wada Hiroyo, interviewed 19 July 1962, Yamaguchi Fusao, interviewed 13 June 1962. See also results of questionnaire to Socialist Diet Members, Appendix C. See also Hayashi
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38. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Kaku jidai no Nitchū kaikai' (Japan-China Relations in the Nuclear Age), Sekai, June 1963, pp. 12-27, at pp. 18-22. Satō Noboru, in 'Tōron; Chū - So ronsō to gendai; wareware wa dō uketomeru ka' (Discussion; The Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Present; How are we to take it?), Sekai, March 1963, pp. 36-68, at p. 65, also foresees strong demands for a Japanese nuclear deterrent, and in order to forestall the Chinese bomb, advocates immediate abolition of the Japan - United States Security Treaty.

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1. On this section the reader is referred to a study in English on Japan and the United Nations by a group of Japanese scholars of the Nihon Kokusaihō Kyōkai (Japanese Association of International Law) sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It should be noted that the writers were predominantly (though not entirely) anti-Socialist, and also that the description of the controversy in Japan about the United Nations only reached the beginning of 1953. Little indication is given that the writers appreciated the differences between 'permanent neutrality' and 'neutralism': Japanese Association of International Law, Japan and the United Nations (New York, Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958). See especially Part 1, pp. 12-95.


3. The relevant passage of the Preamble is as follows: 'We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human
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relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.' (My underlining) 4.


5. See Yokota Kisaburō, 'Nihon no kokusai shōrai' (The International Future of Japan), Shakaishugi, November 1946, pp. 33-39, at p.36.

6. Although in 1949 it was neutrality rather than the Pacifist Clause of the Constitution that Yokota was attacking as incompatible with Japan's potential commitments under the United Nations, its further incompatibility with pacifism was of course also recognised by its critics. One Socialist, for instance, said that anyone who held that the permanent neutrality argument was out of date and based merely on national egoism would be saying that the Pacifist Clause of the Constitution was also old-fashioned and egotistic; this, however, would be to fail to comprehend the spirit of the Constitution, whereby Japan had abandoned war as an instrument of policy; Inomata Közō, 'Eisei chūritsu no hōgainen' (The Legal Concept of Permanent Neutrality), Jōhō Tsushin, 1 July 1950, pp. 24-27.


9. Muto Unjūrō, 'Zemmen kōwa no hōritsuteki kiso' (The Legal Basis for a Total Peace), Jōhō Tsushin, 1 July 1950, pp. 6-23, at p.16.
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15. See for instance the following quotation: 'We fundamentally hope for membership of the United Nations, and for its collective security to be recognised, but in any case it goes without saying that special consideration should be given to our position over collective sanctions against an aggressor, since by the neutrality and peaceful nature of our Constitution we are absolved from the duty of defending our neutrality by our own forces.' [Nihon Shakaitō] 'Nihon Shakaitō no kōwa mondai ni taisuru taido' (The Attitude of the Japan Socialist Party to the Question of a Peace Treaty), Jōhō Tsūshin, 1 July 1950, pp. 1-3, at p. 2. For a later statement see Nihon Shakaitō Tōitsu Jumbi Iinkai, Tōitsu e no ayumi (The Road to Unification), [October 1955], p. 102 and p. 105. (Stating the LSP position).

16. See Taoka Ryōichi, 'Nihon no chūritsuka ni tsuite' (Concerning the Neutralisation of Japan), Kōen (Osaka), May 1949, pp. 3-27, at pp. 24-26. See also Taoka Ryōichi,
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17. Article 43, Section 1: 'All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.' Section 2: 'Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.' Article 48, Section 1: 'The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.'

18. See Taoka Ryoichi, 'Eisei chūritsuron no tachiba kara' (From the Standpoint of Permanent Neutrality), Zenshin, September 1949, pp. 38-47, at pp. 44-45. See also Taoka Ryoichi, 'Eisei chūritsu oyobi chūritsu no gendaiteki igi' (The Modern Significance of Permanent Neutrality and Neutrality), Höritsu Taimusu, January 1950, pp. 9-17, at p. 15.

19. Article 2, Section 5: 'All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.'

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23. For the substance of the agreed platform and the nature of the compromise which it embodied, see Chapter 6.


25. Yamaguchi Fusao, Chūritsu, kono minzoku no kadaī (Neutrality, A Question for this Nation), Shiseidō, June 1959, p. 164.

26. Ibid., pp. 164-166.

27. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Chūritsu Nihon no bōei kōsō - Nichi-Bei ampo taisei ni kawaru mono -' (Defence Scheme for a Neutral Japan - Something to Replace the Japan - United States Security Treaty), Sekai, August 1959, pp. 31-47.


29. For instance Tanaka Shinjirō, 'Nihon wa ikani shite sensō no kenga ni tachiuru ka - Nihon no chūritsuron ni kanshite -' (How can Japan stand outside the Sphere of War? - The Argument for the Permanent Neutrality of Japan), Sekai Hyōron, June 1949, pp. 1-13, at p. 4.
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30. Sakisaka Itsurō, 'Nihon no saigumbi wo meguru shomondai' (Some Questions concerning the Rearmament of Japan), Jōhō Tsūshin (special issue on rearmament), 15 March 1951, pp. 11-22.
31. See Chapter 4.
32. Sakisaka, loc. cit.
33. Arisawa Hiromi, 'Nihon ni okeru shihonshugi to saigumbi no mondai' (The Problem of Japanese Capitalism and Rearmament), Sekai, March 1951, quoted with approval in Takeuchi [Takeshi] 'Mi wo toshite mamoru ni ataisuru kuni wo tsukure - sore ga heiwa wo mamoru yuiitsu no michi da -' (Build a Country worth Risking our Lives for - This is the Sole Way of Defending Peace -), Jōhō Tsūshin, March 1951, pp. 1-5, at p.3.
35. Britain was for instance, mentioned in this context by Hanyū Sanshichi, reported in Dai 7 kai Kokkai, Sangiin Honkai (7th Diet, House of Councillors Plenary Session), Kampō (extra edition), 27 April 1950, pp. 901-902. Hanyū, interviewed 16 October, 1962, said that he and Ryū Shintarō were the first to propose (though independently) a 'Locarno-type' treaty, at the beginning of 1950. The idea was not seriously discussed as Socialist Party policy until 1953 (See Chapter 4).
38. For an initial Socialist reaction to the Sino-Soviet Pact, see [Jōhō Tsūshin Henshūbu], 'Chū - So jōyaku teiketsu to tai - Nichi kōwa' (The Conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and a Peace Treaty with Japan) Jōhō Tsūshin, 1 March 1950, pp. 2-14.

39. For a statement of this aim in the agreed platform on reunification in 1955, see 'Gaikō hōshin' (Foreign Policy), in Nihon Shakaitō Hombu, Yakushin suru Nihon Shakaitō (The Advancing Japan Socialist Party), pp. 70-72, at p. 71.

40. See for instance Yamakawa Hitoshi, 'Hibusō chūritsu wa fukanō ka' (Is Unarmed Neutrality Impossible?), Sekai, July 1952, pp. 22-34.

41. Taoka Ryōichi, 'Eisei chūritsuron no tachiba kara' (From the Standpoint of Permanent Neutrality), Zenshin, September 1949, pp. 38-47, at p. 42.

42. Taoka Ryōichi, 'Eisei chūritsu no kiin' (The Origin of Permanent Neutrality), Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi, December 1949, pp. 1-36, at pp. 28-29. See also Taoka Ryōichi, 'Eisei chūritsu oyobi chūritsu no gendaiteki iki' (The Modern Significance of Permanent Neutrality and Neutrality), Hōritsu Taimusu, January 1950, pp. 9-17, at p. 12. See also Taoka Ryōichi, 'Eisei chūritsuron no tachiba kara', loc. cit., at p. 46.


44. Particularly Guggenheim, as quoted in Hofer, W., Neutrality as the Principle of Swiss Foreign Policy (Zürich, Schweitzer Spiegel, 1957), pp. 13-14.

45. Yamaguchi, op. cit., p. 211.
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1. Lyon, P., Neutralism (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 72. For an analysis of the importance of Hobson's and Lenin's theories of imperialism for the leaders of ex-colonial states, see Ibid., pp. 77-78.


3. For instance Sakisaka Itsurō, 'Nihon no saigumbi wo meguru shomondai' (Some Questions concerning the Rearmament of Japan), Jōhō Tsushin (Special issue on rearmament), 15 March 1951, pp. 11-22, at pp. 15-16.


5. Japanese possession of Kunashiri and Etorofu was confirmed by Russia in 1855 by the Treaty of Shimoda; the Northern Kuriles were ceded to Japan by Russia in exchange for South Sakhalin in 1875 by the Treaty of St. Petersburg. Japan regained South Shakhalin after the Russo-Japanese War by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. For a discussion of the historical background of the rival claims to the Northern Territories, see Sutton, J.L., Territorial Claims of Russia and Japan to the Kurile Islands, (Michigan University, Center for Japanese Studies, Occasional Papers, No. 1, 1951), pp. 35-61.

6. For a summary of the agreement, see Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 20 October 1956.


8. See Chapter 6, note 10.
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9. See for instance 'Gaikō hōshin' (Foreign Policy), in Nihon Shakaitō, Sōsenkyo kōryō oyobi seisaku (General Election Platform and Policy), October 1960, pp. 129-132, at p. 131.


12. Krushchov had informed Suzuki Mosaburō, on a visit to Moscow in August 1960, that there was no point in demanding the return of the Kuriles while the Security Treaty was still in force. Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 31 August 1960. For a Socialist account of this visit, see Shakai Shimpō, 9 October 1960.

13. See for instance 'Gaikō hōshin', loc. cit., passim.


15. Sata Tadataka, interviewed 15 March 1963, stressed the point that since the 1953 ASC meeting the Burmese Socialist Government had fallen, socialist parties in India and Indonesia had become negligible, and ASC itself was in abeyance.

16. Socialists did not usually maintain publicly that Japan would lead the neutralist group at the United Nations and elsewhere, but they sometimes hinted that the economic importance of Japan would make her political influence considerable. Satō Noboru, interviewed 4 May 1962, put forward the view that a socialist Japan would have a big part to play in Asia, since there were no important
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 11  NEUTRALIST POLICIES AS AN EXPRESSION OF NATIONALISM

socialist parties outside Japan. He qualified this statement, however, by saying that Communist China would be the natural leader of an Asian bloc.

17. This opinion was expressed by Asukada Ichio (JSP Upper House Diet Member and member of Heiwa Dōshikai), interviewed 29 October 1962.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. The writer was kindly shown by Yamaguchi Fusao a number of Yugoslav Embassy Japanese language publications, containing articles on neutralism by Koča Popović, and others.
22. Interview with Hatsuoka Shōichirō, (Head of the International Bureau of Nihon Shakaishugi Seinen Dōmei), 13 April 1962.
25. See Chapter 1.
26. See especially Chapter 4.
28. For an attack on the Left Socialists for alleged crypto-Communism, see Murao Satsuo, Rōnō-ha Saha Shakaitō no zunō wo bākugeki suru, Hiyorimi Kyōsanha no himitsu (An Attack
on Rōnō-ha, the Brains of the Left Socialist Party. The Secret of the Opportunist Communists), Tōkyō Hambaisho, March 1952.


30. Ibid., p. 404.

31. Ibid., p. 386.
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1. See for instance a Fabian tract written by a Right Wing member of the British Labour Party: Healey, D., *A Neutral Belt in Europe?* (London, The Fabian Society, January 1958). The following passage from this work is significant in this context: 'I have always supported NATO, and I still do. But I believe that it should be the framework in which the allies seek to reconcile their divergent interests and in which they adjust their policies collectively to a changing world situation... Disarmament and disengagement should be seen, not as an alternative to NATO, as incompatible with its existence, but as an alternative policy for NATO, as the necessary condition for its survival as the core of Western solidarity.' *Ibid.*, p. 15. See, on the other hand an earlier attack on 'neutralism' by the same author: Healey, D., *Neutralism* (London, Ampersand, 1955), passim.

2. Partito Socialista Italiano.

3. The opinion of one writer is that in exile between the wars, Italian Socialist leaders had become in fact 'political theorists more than politicians'. Hilton-Young, W, *The Italian Left*, (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1949), p. 159.

4. Coalition governments in which the Christian Democratic Party was overwhelmingly predominant governed Italy from May 1947.

5. The only postwar administrations in which the JSP participated were those of Katayama and Ashida (1947 – 1948). In Italy, after the end of the tripartite government of 1944 – 1947 (Christian Democrats, Communists and Socialists), the Saragat Socialists participated in the government for a time (1948 – 1951).

6. West Germany, however, was in this respect similar to Japan and Italy.
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8. 1948-1951.

9. Partito Comunista Italiano.

10. The difference in the relative electoral strength of Communists and Socialists in Italy and Japan may be seen from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>% of total vote Italy</th>
<th>% of total vote Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>PSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(LSP and RSP combined)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. I.e. those who wanted 'fusion' with the PCI.

12. 'Avanti', 2 July 1948, quoted in Galli, G., La Sinistra italiana nel dopoguerra (The Italian Left in the Postwar Period), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1958, p. 177.
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13. 'Avanti', 29 June 1948, quoted at loc. cit.

14. For a recent criticism of the Socialist International from a representative left wing position, see 'Shin Osuro sengen ni naze hantai ka. Shakaitō Yamaguchi kokusai buchō ni kiku' (Why Oppose the New Oslo Resolution? The Views of Yamaguchi, JSP International Branch Chairman), Shakai Undō Tsūshin, 6-13 June 1962.

15. For an account of the pre - 1926 divisions in the Italian Socialist Movement between 'Maximalists' and Reformists, see Hilton-Young, op. cit., pp. 31-147.


18. The trade union federation CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) was founded in January 1944, after the liberation of southern Italy, embracing Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats. In August 1948 a number of unions, mostly connected with the Christian Democratic Party, broke away and founded their own federation, and in April 1950 the Saragat Socialists founded their own federation. Nevertheless, the bulk of organised labour remained affiliated with the CGIL. The relative positions of the PCI and the PSI in the CGIL is shown by the following figures of the absolute number and percentage of the CGIL officials at various levels:
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Communists 1,387 (75.75%)
Socialists (Left Wing) 254 (13.87%)
Socialists (Autonomist) 155 (8.47%)
Independents 35 (1.91%)

21. See Landolfi, loc. cit.
22. See for instance the creation of an Asanuma 'myth' in the JSP official organ after his assassination: Shakai Shimpō, 23 October 1960.
23. The most important articles in the 'Vision' controversy are reprinted in English translation in Japan Socialist Review, 1 December 1962, pp. 9-40. See also Chapter 8, note 64.
25. For an evaluation, by various authors, of the historical significance of the wartime resistance movement, see Garosci, A., et. al., Il Secondo Risorgimento nel Decennale della Resistenza e Ritorno alla Democrazia (The Second Risorgimento during the Decade of the Resistance and Return to Democracy), Rome, Istituto Poligraphico dello Stato, 1955.
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26. In order to compare the organisational structure of the PSI and the JSP, see the following: 1) 'Partito Socialista italiano' (Italian Socialist Party), in D'Antonio, M., and Negri, G., Raccolta degli Statuti dei Partiti Politici in Italia (Collection of the Statutes of Political Parties in Italy), Milan, 1958, pp. 151-162. 2) 'Nihon Shakaitō kiyaku' (Regulations of the JSP), in Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan Chōsa Rippō Kōsakkyoku, Shuyōkoku no seitō kiyaku, tōsoku shū (Collection of Political Party Regulations and Rules in Major Countries), May 1961, pp. 15-25.

27. For recent official membership figures, see Kokumin Seiji Nenkan (People's Political Yearbook), JSP, 1962, p. 529, and Ibid., 1963, p. 674.

28. For figures, see Landolfi, loc. cit., at p. 13.

29. Ibid., p. 9.

30. Ibid., p. 12.

31. Ibid., pp. 22-23.


33. The PSI percentage of the vote in local elections was approximately the same as its percentage in national elections. In the local elections of 1956, the PSI gained 14.38% of the seats in provincial elections, 14.67% in communal elections for provincial capitals, and 16.55% in communal elections for communes with over 10,000 inhabitants. PCI figures for the same elections were, respectively, 21.76%, 23.15% and 25.88%. Source: 'The Italian Local Elections of May 27, 1956', Italian Affairs, January 1957, pp. 1535-1556.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 12 IDEOLOGY AND PARTY DYNAMICS AS DETERMINANTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY

34. Despite the fact that the JSP attained 33% of the total vote in the Lower House general election of 1958, its results in the 1959 local elections were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural councillors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal district, town and village councillors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal district, town and village heads</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all these categories except the first, the proportion of independents was extremely high, but few of these were of Socialist persuasion. Source: Kokumin Seiji Nenkan (People's Political Yearbook), p. 500. The percentage of votes, was, however, slightly higher. See Ibid., p. 501.


36. If we accept as correct the top figure of 10,000 active members (see note 32), they amounted to less than 0.01% of the total vote polled by the JSP in the 1960 Lower House election.


38. See Duverger, op. cit., pp. 34-45.

39. Another useful tool of analysis here is Neumann's threefold classification of parties into 'parties of individual representation', 'parties of democratic integration' and 'parties of total integration'. According to this scheme, European socialist parties would most typically fit into the category of 'party of democratic integration', in that they have 'generally taken on an ever increasing area of commitments and responsibilities assuring the individual's share in society and incorporating him into the community'. Neumann, loc. cit., p. 405. We should say that the JSP, while aspiring
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 12 IDEOLOGY AND PARTY DYNAMICS AS DETERMINANTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY

to be a 'party of democratic integration', only achieved its aim intermittently and imperfectly, mainly through mass organisations such as the peace movement.

41. Taguchi, op. cit., p. 19.
42. See for instance Scalapino, R.A., and Masumi, J., Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962), Chart 13, pp. 173-174 (Socialist Party Factions and their Socio-Economic Composition). The wide discrepancies between different factional lists (which suggests that there were a considerable number of 'floating voters' among Diet members), and the difference in size between some of the factions (with a range on one list from five to fifty-one!) make it most difficult to differentiate factions significantly by the backgrounds of their members. The one clear exception was the Nomizo faction, whose members were entirely agricultural in origin. The faction's activities were predictably governed by concern for agricultural interests within party policy. The faction was, however, small, and its influence insignificant. In addition, the comparatively small number of trade union leaders and affiliated members in the Kawakami faction was of some significance in that the faction was thereby weakened.
43. It should be noted that Zariski, in the above cited article, comes to a similar conclusion about the study of factionalism in the PSI, and cites Michels as a classic example of a scholar making unwarranted functional or occupational 'explanations' of the actions of intra-party factions. Zariski, loc. cit., pp. 381-382.
44. These categories which we have isolated should be compared with those which Zariski derives as the conclusion to his article on the PSI. It will be noted that whereas
his conclusions mostly refer to regional factions, ours refer to the small leadership group of the party as such, on the grounds that regional differences are not very significant in shaping JSP factions. See Zariski, loc. cit., pp. 389-390.

45. See for instance Nishio's autobiography: Nishio Suehiro, Taishū to tomo ni - watakushi no hansei no kiroku (Together with the Masses - The Record of Half my Life), Sekashya, 1951. The consistency of the faction over the postwar years was pointed out by a number of Socialist informants from other factions in the course of interviews.

46. For this and succeeding factions we quote estimates made by two national newspapers in May 1958. (Further estimates are also given in Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 170 [Chart 11]). Estimates are from the Yomiuri Shimbun (morning edition) 24 May 1958 and the Tōkyō Shimbun (morning edition) 25 May 1958.

The Nishio faction had 12 members (Yomiuri Shimbun) 27 members (Tōkyō Shimbun).

47. See Yanada Kōki, Nihon Shakaitō (The Japan Socialist Party), Hōbunsha, November 1956, p. 88. This view was confirmed in a number of interviews with JSP members.

48. The Kawakami faction had 51 members (Yomiuri Shimbun) 29 members (Tōkyō Shimbun).

49. See Chapter 6.

50. The Suzuki faction had 51 members (Yomiuri Shimbun) 40 members (Tōkyō Shimbun).

51. The Wada faction had 17 members (Yomiuri Shimbun) 29 members (Tōkyō Shimbun).
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 12  IDEOLOGY AND PARTY DYNAMICS AS DETERMINANTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY

52. See Asahi Shimbun (morning edition), 9 November 1961. The Nomizo faction had 5 members (Yomiuri Shimbun) 5 members (Tōkyō Shimbun).

53. Heiwa Dōshikai plus the Kuroda faction had 19 members (Yomiuri Shimbun) 17 members (Tōkyō Shimbun).
APPENDIX A

EXTRACTS FROM PART 1 OF LEFT SOCIALIST PARTY DRAFT PLATFORM

Preamble

The aim of the Japan Socialist Party is the achievement of a socialist society. The contradictions of Japanese capitalism, which were exposed with Japan's defeat, show that the time is already approaching when we shall be able to fulfill our historic task. We do not see this as an objective on the distant horizon, but are resolved to attain it by our own efforts. We believe that the time has come when we should make clear the historical position in which we are placed and the nature of the democratic socialist revolution at which we aim, and that we should demonstrate the vital principles of the JSP as a Socialist Party. In this way the character of the Party will be unshakeably established.

Whether the determination of the Party to bring about a socialist society on the basis of democracy will be fulfilled depends not simply on whether we are correct in
theory, but upon how well we are able to represent the
daily interests of the working masses within capitalist
society.

The principal aim of the Party even under capitalism
is to stabilize and raise the standard of living of the
people against the determined opposition of the
capitalist class. The Party, however, realises that
without a struggle for peace and independence, and without
a struggle for freedom and democracy, the standard of
living of the people will be neither stabilized nor raised.

Exploitation by American imperialism and Japanese
monopoly capital dependent upon it is likely to drive not
only wage labourers but also peasants and others into
opposition to domestic and foreign domination by monopoly
capital. We must therefore realise that the struggle to
defend and raise the standard of living of the working
masses is closely connected with the struggle for peace and
independence and the struggle to preserve freedom and
democracy. Today, therefore, a purely economic struggle is
not possible. All economic struggles are connected with
political struggles. The JSP must always establish moral
leadership at the head of these struggles, among workers,
peasants, those in small and medium industry and all those
who form the working masses. In this way we can strengthen
the organisation of the Party itself, and link it organically with trade unions, peasant unions and other mass organisations. Only in this way will our correct way of thinking become the strength of the masses. It is only with organisational strength that the Party can develop robust mobilizing power.

The JSP wants to bring about a socialist society. In this society, such things as full employment and social security, which have not been able to develop properly under capitalism, will be made permanent. The development of productive power based on a planned economy will raise the standard of living of the people, permit the utmost expression of every person's individual talent, and raise the standard of culture. This planning of society and of the economy is only possible through democratic nationalisation or public ownership of the principal industries.

For the JSP many difficulties lie ahead, but overcoming all difficulties, we shall fulfil our historic task.

1) The Historic Task of the Japan Socialist Party.

Capitalism cannot itself resolve the conflict within it between the capitalist class and the working class. The growth of capitalism entails the development of this conflict. The working class meanwhile becomes the class
entrusted with the task of carrying out a socialist revolution. The JSP is the Party which represents and fulfils the historic task of the working class, and therefore organises the working class as its principal force.

At present the working class is not able to carry out its historic task unaided. The JSP organises the peasant class (especially small peasants), small-scale managers, the class of progressive intellectuals, the class of students and so on, and in order to bring in line such classes as rich peasants and small and medium industrialists, the Party takes their respective policies and champions their struggles against the ruling classes. In this sense the JSP is not simply a Party of the working class, but is broadly the Party of the working masses. In other words, it is the political Party of the working class (the class which aims at the realisation of socialism in Japan) and of various allied classes including the peasants.

Socialist revolution will be brought about by the working class, which is the most militant class under capitalism, and by the classes allied with it. At a fixed stage this struggle necessarily turns into a socialist revolution. The capitalist class, in order to preserve its class domination, amasses and organises all power in its organs of control. This is shown, for instance, in
legislative, judicial and bureaucratic organs, armed police and military forces, places of detention such as prisons, in educational institutions in a broad sense, newspapers, cultural groups, youth and women's organisations, local assemblies and administrative organs, and official and private pressure groups. For this reason the JSP will be able to build a socialist society by taking political power out of the hands of the capitalist class in a socialist revolution and fundamentally altering the character of these organs of control.

2) The Present State of Japanese Capitalism

In 1868 when Japan opened the way to capitalism at the Meiji Restoration Europe was coming to the end of the period of classical capitalism, and was already entering the stage of monopoly capitalism. Capitalism in Japan, possessing powerful armed forces, participated in struggles for markets in backward countries, for raw materials and for colonies; through national capitalism operated by a semi-feudal clan bureaucratic Government, it sought capitalist growth centred on the Zaibatsu. By the end of the Meiji era Japanese capitalism was fully established. The Great War of 1914 caused its further rapid development, and brought about the complete hegemony of monopoly capital.
The rapid advance of Japanese capitalism also increased the numbers of the working class, which is the greatest opponent of the capitalist class, and heightened its class consciousness.

The growth of capitalism increased the exploitation of small agricultural producers through the landlord system, and accelerated the oppression and impoverishment of small and medium industries in the towns. Thus by sacrificing the older classes which had survived the Meiji Restoration, and the various kinds of middle class which had been formed within capitalism itself, it created various types of industrial reserve forces. On the basis of this the capitalist class was able to impose low wage policies on the working class. At the same time in the depths of Japanese society a morass of crimes and prostitution and delinquency was created, and this gave rise to inevitable decadence and degradation among the ruling classes.

At the same time as the establishment of control by monopoly finance capital, Japan entered the arena of the imperialist nations which were struggling to redivide colonies. She thus began to implement a basic policy of 'war abroad and anti-war at home'. The ruling classes took back from the people with the Peace Preservation Law what they had given to them with Manhood Suffrage in 1925; they
heaped extraordinary restraints upon the freedom of speech and action of the ruled, and instead of expanding democracy they devoted themselves to taking it away.

The Japanese emperor system began to change its economic basis with the establishment of industrial capital in the third decade of the Meiji era, and it conspicuously lost its absolutist content when monopoly capital became predominant. Monopoly capital refurbished this absolutist relic as a shrine, and from the Meiji era onwards succeeded through education, journalism and law, in making the 'national polity' (which had been fostered in the hearts of the people), a strong ideological bulwark for its own self-preservation. Thus the democratic demands of all toiling people could only be realised by a revolution in capitalism.

The world depression which began in 1928 hastened the rise of world fascism, but Japanese monopoly capital, hungry for colonies, in order to escape from the crisis of capitalism resorted to the violent methods of fascism centred on the armed forces in order to confront European and American imperialism. By increasing slave labour among

1. I.e. 1897-1906
2. Kokutai
the working class by oppressing advanced elements and by conducting a reckless policy of aggression abroad, monopoly capital was one of the perpetrators of World War II.

The use of all forms of violence to subdue the people could only lead to one end (even through fascism) and this was reached with the defeat. Here too, however, all the sacrifices of the defeat fell onto the shoulders of the working people. The victorious powers, in order to make impotent their warlike competitor, implemented a policy of so-called 'democratisation' in defeated Japan. The dissolution of the armed forces, the purge of politicians, bureaucrats, financiers, teachers, workers, publicists, the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, prohibition of monopolies and cartels, the three labour laws, the land reform, the new Constitution and so on, were the fulfilment of this policy.

After World War II, the division of the world into two parts widened and hardened, and for the capitalist countries this meant a big loss of world markets. American monopoly finance capital, which had brought about a great accumulation of profits and expansion of production, while not suffering any injury at home, felt keenly the restriction of the sphere of influence for its capital and its products; it therefore sharpened its opposition to the world policies of the Soviet Union. At the same time,
various big monopoly finance capitalist countries, thrust into obscurity by the capital and military strength of the United States, were forced to fight for their profits both among themselves and with the United States. Thus unhappily the people of the whole world, after the experience of the tragedy of two world wars, are once more in a situation where the threat of total war is inescapable. Reversing her 'democratisation' policies, the United States turned to using Japan as a military force for aggression against the Soviet Union and Communist China. The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan - United States Security Treaty were the accomplishment of this. By these two treaties not only did the Americans make Japan into a base, and not only did their military forces bring Japan under direct control, but they tried to make the Japanese people rearm for the sake of American military aims.

The Japanese capitalist class, which was reviving on the sacrifices of the working class in the uncertainty and confusion following the defeat, attached itself to the world policies of the United States, became increasingly dependent on the economic strength and political control of American capitalism, and began to burn with enthusiasm for low wages and the lack of popular freedom of the past. Thus they promoted a series of reactionary policies:
the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, the Strike Restriction Law, relaxation of the Monopolies Prevention Law, cancellation of the purges, wide use of former professional soldiers in organs of administration, promotion of reaction in education, reactivation of Emperor-worship and national Shintō sentiments, rearmament, revision of the Constitution etc. Thus rearmament with American help, and the illusion of industrial prosperity based on munitions led the capitalist class to bring Japan once more into imperialist aggression and violent oppression.

In this way the United States, by means of military, economic and technical 'aid', and by directly stationing troops, made Japan, controlled by monopoly finance capital, into a dependent country, promoted the rearmament of Japan as a forward base for aggression against the Soviet Union, and placed over seven hundred military bases on Japanese soil.

The Japanese working class, apart from its fundamental historic task of socialist revolution, has before it the pressing duties of restoring national independence and preserving peace. National feeling is prominent among a wide section of the people. The ruling Japanese capitalist class, however, knows that its true enemy is the working
class. Their experience has already taught them that it is this enemy that really threatens their existence and must be feared. Therefore they are not able, as in true colonies, to conduct a long-term national independence movement as a class in alliance with the working class.

Monopoly finance capital may conflict with American imperialism for its own advantage, but as a partner having common class interests it is more likely to choose American monopoly capital than its own country's working class. Most big capital is entangled in the web of monopoly finance capital, and (leaving aside exceptional instances) its interests are held in common with those of monopoly finance capital and fundamentally conflict with those of the working class.

On the other hand a large part of small and medium capital, small-scale management, farmers, fisherman etc., being under the dual exploitation of American and Japanese monopoly capital, and under a direct threat to their livelihood from military bases, fervently demand national liberation. The majority of small and medium capitalists in Japan are on the one hand opposed to monopoly capital in their economic interests, and on the other hand are most sensitive to pressure by the working class. Therefore the majority of this class may not be expected to fight strongly
against American imperialism together with the working class. Those, however, who have close relations with the working class, and many who have a special interest in trade with Asia and Communist China, together with peasants and fishermen, intellectuals, students etc., may possibly cooperate with a movement led by the working class for independence and peace.

However this may be, the centre of a struggle for the restoration of complete independence and for peace in our country (which is at an advanced stage of capitalist development), will always be the working class. Therefore a struggle for national liberation by the working class must at the same time be understood in the sense of a struggle against control by monopoly capital connected with the United States. A simple national liberation movement, which does not have as its main object the struggle against domination by Japanese monopoly capital, will be quickly neutralised and fall into decay, or will change into a fascist national movement. The moment when we establish Japan's national independence will also be the moment to accomplish a socialist revolution.

3) The Prospects for Peaceful Revolution.

(omitted)
4) **The Conditions for a Socialist Revolution.**

The accumulation of our daily struggles in certain conditions can be turned into a socialist revolution. A socialist revolution of this kind, however, cannot take place at any time and in any place. A socialist revolution will not take place without the organisational growth of workers and peasants, and without the maturing of the Socialist Party which is their leader. The JSP must be adequately armed with the theory of socialist revolution, and must establish intra-party organisation and regulations suitable for the party of a movement democratically formed and led by a united will. Thus the number of Party members must increase in trade unions, peasant unions, and all other organisations of working people, and the Party's moral influence must grow to the extent that it organically links all movements of working people with the Party. Without this it will not be possible by peaceful and democratic methods to win political power from the hands of the ruling class which is in possession of all organs of power.

Also, in order for a new political order to be established, trade unions, peasant unions and all other
mass organisations, must mature and positively support the life of the new Socialist Government, must rule its political and economic organs, and act constructively.

A socialist revolution is not something conducted just as people desire. Capitalism cannot resolve its contradictions within its own limits. A situation will arise in which, in spite of the explosion of these self-contradictions of capitalism, in spite of economic chaos and political disquiet, despite the impoverishment of the labouring class and increasing instability of livelihood for the middle social class, the ruling class and its political leaders will lack the ability to deal with this chaos and instability, and will lose confidence in its own leadership. This takes place for instance, in a situation of social instability brought about by war, or in the chaos of a severe depression. This shows that there is no force other than socialism capable of saving the situation.

These kinds of objective conditions, and our own maturity, will place us face to face with a socialist revolution. In that case, a peaceful transition to a Socialist Government will take place through the following process:

a) The JSP will gain an absolute majority in assemblies in the capital and in the provinces, but
especially in the capital.

b) This absolute majority must be used by the Party to pursue sincerely the interests of the popular masses and to gain their confidence, and to make trade unions, peasant unions and all other mass organisations organically cooperate with the Party, thus stabilizing and perpetuating its majority.

c) On the basis of a stable absolute majority in the National Diet, in accordance with the principles of socialism we should revise the Constitution, nationalise or put under public ownership basic industries, and adapt to socialist paths the organs of administration and justice, and the organs of education, journalism, publishing and broadcasting.

d) Dissolve all violent organisations which harm socialist construction.

5) The Struggle under Capitalism.

The establishment of a Socialist Government aimed at by the JSP will be achieved in the process outlined above, but since we have not yet quite reached this stage, the Party demands of its members patient daily struggles in the framework of capitalism. Without sincerity, orderliness, audacity, endurance and self-sacrifice on the
part of Party members in daily struggles, it will not be possible to obtain the confidence of workers, peasants, small-scale managers, intellectuals, students, women and others. Also it will not be possible to strengthen our influence over and win the sympathy of small capitalists and other wavering social classes. Again, the Party demands of its members that they should not represent the daily interests of the labouring masses in an ideological and mechanical fashion, but realistically and organically, and that they should always lead the struggle realising that this is a process connected with socialist revolution. Therefore Party members are always required to conduct activity within some mass organisation.

Thus the struggle to defend and improve standards of living and the struggle to broaden democracy is connected with power and preparation for socialist revolution. The struggle for independence and peace against the domination of Japan by American imperialism, against the Peace Preservation Forces which are the mercenaries of the United States, against military aid etc., must be developed into a struggle embracing broad social classes (in so far as it is possible to mobilize such a struggle within the framework of capitalism). The Party must always be in the lead and must link this struggle with the struggle against Japanese
monopoly finance capital. We must not forget that our Party's neutralist policy is not simply a negative neutrality, but is a positive struggle to defend the peace of Japan and of the world against the world policies of American imperialism which seeks to make Japan a base for aggression, and that it is linked with the struggle against domination by Japan's monopoly finance capital.

In these struggles within the framework of capitalism, the Party must be tempered and strengthened, and must be drilled in flexible activities accompanying the establishment of its independence; only thus will it be able to grow and mature into a party of socialism fulfilling a historic task.

6) A Government at a Transitional Stage
   (Omitted)
   (Published 8 November 1953)
APPENDIX B

LEFT SOCIALIST PARTY DRAFT PLATFORM; DISSENTING OPINION OF SHIMIZU SHINZO

An Action Platform under Imperialism

Reasons for an Opposing Draft

1) The Draft Platform has been produced as though it were the Party's sacred book, aiming at theoretical goals which were expected to adhere to the tradition of the Second International, and following a previously established doctrinal framework. It therefore very much reads like a textbook or a learned thesis. I doubt the value of a platform whose frame of reference is only the mind. It is the masses and their organisation that will achieve socialism, and therefore the success of a socialist party must depend upon how far the masses are organised and active, and upon the desires and feelings of the unorganised; it must also be adapted concretely to objective conditions. A platform should most of all be fit for the task of organisation. There is no need to concern oneself with the form of the platform of the Second International.

2) The Party has progressed under the banner of the Four Peace Principles. It defended the Four Peace
Principles even at the risk of a split, and thus has increased its strength. The platform which the Party is now formulating should make clear the strategic significance of the Four Peace Principles. They should not merely occupy one corner of the Policy Platform, simply as foreign policy, as in the Headquarters Draft. The fact that many trade unions have had repeated debates about the Four Peace Principles is not a question of being for or against one foreign policy of one political party, but a strategic question which permeates the whole movement, whether Party or trade union.

3) The platform of a political party is written for the sake of its struggle for power. Therefore there is no necessity to make a formal interpretation of the past course of Japanese capitalism from the standpoint of one faction. This merely narrows the entrance to the Party. It would be sufficient if the platform were to start with an analysis of power in postwar Japan, demonstrate the structure of power, and outline a programme of organisational development for the achievement of power.

4) A conspicuous point of difference which I have with the Draft over the contents of the Platform concerns the

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1. **Gakuha**: here is meant the Rōnō-ha.
interpretation of the location of power and the power structure of Japan since the defeat. The Draft says that the political power of Japan is the independent power of Japanese monopoly capital. Against this I think that the most important force controlling Japan since the defeat (irrespective of whether one means before or after the Peace Treaty) is American imperialism; Japanese monopoly capital is aided and its existence is politically and economically guaranteed in order that it may fulfil the role which is placed upon it by American imperialism. Within the limits permitted by American imperialism, Japanese monopoly capital retains and strengthens its exploiting structure and its power organisation, and I believe that the platform of a socialist party at this stage should be an 'Action Platform under American imperialism'. Therefore the keynote of the political situation should not be simply 'conservative versus progressive' (against Japanese monopoly capital) but should be clearly a conflict between 'slavery and independence'.

5) A difference about the interpretation of political power necessarily becomes a basic conflict of opinion about the programme of revolution. The Draft simply makes the division: class struggle \rightarrow socialist revolution; its attitude to American imperialism is that
the links of Japanese monopoly capital with American imperialism are secondary, and that the problem is fundamentally a struggle against monopoly capital. What I propose, on the other hand, is an Action Platform under American imperialism, and believe that the strategic keynote is a national struggle against imperialist control. The opposing argument that because there is no special class of national capitalists, there can be no national struggle, is merely formalistic. Also, in Japan, where no definite class of national capitalists yet exists, the national struggle is naturally borne continuously by the working class fighting under the double exploitation of domestic and foreign monopoly capital. Moreover, Japanese capitalism, whose economic cycle is guaranteed by its slavish dependence on the United States, would undoubtedly be put into great confusion by complete independence, and this fact should be highly evaluated as a condition for socialist revolution. Therefore, as a programme of revolution, I insist on a fundamental strategic course of 'peace → independence → socialist revolution.'

The evaluation of Japanese democracy in the Draft is too optimistic. I admit that in comparison with the prewar period, democracy in the formal sense, even since the 'reverse course', has made great progress. I do not reject
or abandon the concept of peaceful revolution. But at the present rate of permeation of democracy, our praise of it must not be unconditional, nor must we rely upon it. At least for the purpose of a socialist revolution, it is dangerous not to build a powerful organisational base to prevent domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary attempts and to bear the burden of construction; it is dangerous not to have a strategic aim of organisation, and to use the peaceful revolution argument of entrusting everything to elections and merely proclaiming one's sympathy with organised labour which is experiencing undemocratic oppression in its daily life at the factory. It is because I do not believe that the platform is fit for the task of organisation that I have put forward a counter-proposal.

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE TO SOCIALIST DIET MEMBERS

A questionnaire was distributed through Party channels to all members of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Japanese Diet belonging to the JSP. One distribution was made in December 1962, and another (to those who had not replied) in February 1963. Out of a total of 209 Socialist Diet members, 84 replies (i.e. 40 per cent of the total) were received. Completed questionnaire forms were returned to the writer by post.

The main purpose of the questionnaire was to test opinions formed in the course of study of the Party (including personal interviews with its members) about its basic foreign policy orientation. A secondary purpose was to investigate the extent to which foreign policy views corresponded with factional membership. To these ends a series of questions requiring 'check' answers was formulated, followed by a number of 'open-ended' questions permitting the respondent to state his views at length. In order to collate replies with factional allegiance, the respondent's identity was first ascertained by means of a number on each questionnaire form, and a recent factional
membership list of all Diet members (received privately) was then used to ascribe respondents to factions. It is not claimed that the analysis of replies according to factions represents a high degree of accuracy, for two reasons: firstly, as argued in Chapter 12, the factional allegiance of many Diet members is vague and shifting. The factional list employed gave a number of Diet members as strictly belonging to no faction, but with a leaning towards a particular faction. In the tabulation of results these have been ascribed to the faction in question, but enclosed in brackets (see below). The list also represented a few members as belonging to one faction, but as also having a certain leaning towards another faction. These have been ascribed without qualification to the first. Secondly the proportion of replies received per faction to the total number of Diet members said to belong to that faction differed widely; thus the proportion, expressed as a percentage (those with vague ascriptions included), was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Replies Received</th>
<th>Percentage of total membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heiwa Dōshikai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomizo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasaki</td>
<td>19(3)</td>
<td>45 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Replies Received</td>
<td>Percentage of total membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eda</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
<td>26 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wada</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>54 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawakami</td>
<td>12(1)</td>
<td>35 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One striking characteristic of the replies to the questionnaire was the extremely high consensus of opinion among respondents on several questions, contrasted with the wide variety of opinion among them on others (especially those that were 'open-ended').

Respondents were in substantial agreement on the desirability of neutralism and lack of danger associated with it, and in their fear of the nuclear arms race and nuclear testing. (92 per cent thought that the nuclear arms race between Eastern and Western camps was 'a very big threat' [4Aa]; 92 per cent thought Soviet resumption of nuclear testing in 1961 was 'completely impermissible' [5b]; 95 per cent thought that Japan's neutralisation was 'necessary' [8A]; 84 per cent thought that if Japan became neutralist there would be no danger to her security [9A]; [Of the minority which admitted any danger, only two mentioned 'measures of self-defence' as a way of coping with the danger]; 88 per cent thought that if Japan
became neutralist there would be no fear of upsetting the balance of power and thus endangering world peace [10].

On the other hand, when asked about the prospects for a neutralist Japan, and when invited to write down what was the nature and purpose of, and conditions for, neutralism in Japan (8B-E), respondents gave a variety of answers. There was rather more concern with the implications of a neutralist policy for Japan than with its possible contribution to world peace. Abolition of the Security Treaty, removal of military bases and freedom from military alliances (the aims for which the Party had long campaigned) figured largely among the former. Also their relative evaluation of the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China (4Ab-d and 11) was far from unanimous, although American policies were attacked much more readily than Soviet or Chinese.

The replies did not indicate any obvious factional alignments on any of the questions asked, with the exception of Question 6 on Structural Reform. Here of the 'pro-Structural Reform' factions (Eda, Wada and Kawakami) 34 out of 40 respondents (i.e. 85 per cent) supported Structural Reform, while of the 'anti-Structural Reform' factions (Heiwa Dōshikai, Nomizo and Sasaki) 14 out of 23 (61 per cent) opposed Structural Reform. From this it may be
concluded that Structural Reform played a more important part in the factional struggle, so far as Diet members as a whole were concerned, than matters of foreign policy. This would bear out the argument advanced in this thesis (Chapter 12) that at least since the defection of the Nishio faction in 1959 differences of opinion on foreign policy occur to a considerable extent independently of factional membership, although the factional leaders may use foreign policy issues as counters in factional struggles. (The number of replies from Heiwa Dōshikai, whose ideology significantly differed from that of the other factions, was too small to permit generalisation).
Results of Questionnaire

Question 1. From the present standpoint of the JSP, do you think that domestic problems or international problems are the more important?

a. Domestic problems  
   b. International problems  
   c. Cannot say

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nomizo</th>
<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
<th>Kawakami</th>
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Question 2. Are you personally more interested in domestic problems or international problems?

a. Domestic problems  
   b. International problems  
   c. Cannot say

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<tr>
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<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
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<td>c.</td>
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1. Heiwa Dōshikai
**Question 3.** By what means do you usually obtain knowledge about international problems? Of the ways listed below please mark the one(s) you mainly use. If you use any other methods, please mention them under 'others'.

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<tr>
<th>Method</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Party Reports</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Foreign materials collected yourself</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Careful reading of foreign news in Japanese newspapers</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Listening to what people say</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Others</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Those who wrote in a supplementary answer under 'e' claimed to broaden their knowledge of international events from the following sources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>i. English magazines</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Government and Foreign Office Materials</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Japanese magazines</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Materials of the Diet Foreign Policy Committee</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Materials obtained through organisations outside the Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>vi. Materials sent from abroad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii. Meeting foreigners</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii. National Diet Library</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix. Visits abroad</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>
Question 4. A. Do you think that the following things have presented a threat to peace? To what extent do you think that they have presented a threat?

a. The nuclear arms race between Eastern and Western camps

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<th>Option</th>
<th>H.D.</th>
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<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. No threat</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Don't know</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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b. The recent world policies of the United States

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<td>4</td>
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<td>iv. No threat</td>
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<td>v. Don't know</td>
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</table>

*Heiwa Dōshikai*
c. The recent world policies of the Soviet Union

- i. A very big threat
- ii. A considerable threat
- iii. A small threat
- iv. No threat
- v. Don't know

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<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
<th>Kawakami</th>
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d. The recent world policies of the Chinese People's Republic

- i. A very big threat
- ii. A considerable threat
- iii. A small threat
- iv. No threat
- v. Don't know

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<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
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<td>iv.</td>
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**Question 4. B.** Of a., b., c., d., above, which do you think presents the greatest danger to world peace? Please write one only.

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th>Wada</th>
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</table>

**Question 5.** In the international situation of the time, do you think that the following actions of the United States and of the Soviet Union were justified, unavoidable, or completely impermissible?

a. The Soviet resumption of nuclear testing on 1 September 1961

   i. Justified
   ii. Unavoidable
   iii. Completely impermissible

<table>
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<th>H.D.</th>
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---

1. Heiwadōshikai
b. The American resumption of nuclear testing on 15 September 1961

i. Justified
   ii. Unavoidable
   iii. Completely impermissible

<table>
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<tr>
<th>H.D.</th>
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<th>Wada</th>
<th>Kawakami</th>
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**Question 6.** Do you support Structural Reform?

a. Support  b. Not support  c. Not yet decided

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**Question 7.** In the process of revolution envisaged by the JSP, do you attach primary importance to a struggle against Japanese monopoly capital; or do you attach primary importance to liberation from American monopoly capital, and think that only after that will it be possible to achieve a domestic Socialist revolution? Please indicate briefly what you think on this issue.

---

1. *Heiwa Dōshikai*
The replies to this question were classified under the following heads, depending on the relative emphasis given to the 'struggle' against Japanese capitalists and to the anti-American 'struggle':

a. Precedence to former (unqualified)

b. Precedence to former (qualified by some emphasis on latter)

c. Precedence to neither

d. Precedence to latter (qualified by some emphasis on former)

e. Precedence to latter (unqualified)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>H.D.</th>
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<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
<th>Kawakami</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0(1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other replies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0(2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Heiwa Dōshikai
Question 8. A. I should now like to turn to the question of neutralism. Do you think that Japan's neutralisation is necessary or not necessary?

a. Necessary  b. Not necessary  c. Don't know  d. Others (please specify)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nomizo</th>
<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
<th>Kawakami</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19(3)</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 84

Question 8. B. Do you think that there is a prospect of bringing about the neutralisation of Japan in the next few years or not?

a. Yes  b. No  c. Don't know  d. Others (please specify)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nomizo</th>
<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
<th>Kawakami</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10(3)</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0(2)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 84

Those who wrote in supplementary answers made the following points:

1. Heiwa Dōshikai
i. The achievement of neutralism for Japan will be difficult and requires determination 8

ii. Prospects for neutralism in Japan depend on the JSP attaining power 6

iii. Prospects for neutralism in Japan will brighten when the term of the present Security Treaty comes to an end (i.e. 1970) 3

iv. Prospects for neutralism in Japan depend on the relaxation of international tension 2

Question 8. C. If Japan became neutralist, what kind of neutralism would you hope for? Please indicate briefly what you think on this question.

The replies to this section were divided into two categories: those stressing the 'positive' international aspects of the policy, and those concentrating on its implications for Japan - especially in so far as was thought to concern her security, independence and national advantage. In addition to the types of reply listed below, sixteen respondents mentioned the official JSP name of the policy - 'positive neutrality' - in place of or in addition to a description of its content. Most respondents gave more than one facet or implication of the policy.
Replies stressing the 'positive' international aspects of neutralism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Contribution to world disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Strengthening of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Promotion of neutralism abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Contribution to world peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Establishment of a non-nuclear zone in the Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Dissolution of military blocs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Promotion of peaceful coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Contribution to world federation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Replies concentrating on the implications of neutralism for Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. No military alliances with any country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. A 'Locarno-type' treaty of non-aggression between Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Independence (especially from the United States and the Soviet Union) and independent judgment in international affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. Relations (especially economic and cultural) equally with both sides in the Cold War 10

e. Abolition of the Security Treaty and withdrawal of military bases from Japan 8

f. Neutralism as the implementation of the 'Pacifist Clause' of the Constitution 7

g. **Unarmed** neutralism 6

h. A United Nations guarantee of Japanese security 4

i. Peace Treaties with the Soviet Union and China 3

j. Neutralism as a means of protecting Japan from annihilation in war 1

k. Abolition of the Sino-Soviet Treaty 1

l. Neutralism to increase Japan's international standing in the United Nations 1

m. Neutralism to strengthen ties with neutralist nations 1

n. Neutralism as a means of making the United States and Soviet Union recognise Japan economically and politically as an equal 1
**Question 8. D.** If Japan were to become a neutralist country under a Socialist Government, what sort of role do you think she would be able to play in international questions? Please indicate briefly what you think on this question.

Replies to this section were divided into the following categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>a. Relaxation of the East-West conflict and international tension, achievement of peaceful coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>b. World disarmament (including nuclear disarmament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>c. Japan to have the role of a mediator (or 'bridge') in the Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>d. Japan to have a leading role in the development of underdeveloped countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>e. Restoration of diplomatic relations with China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>f. Strengthening of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>g. Contribution to world federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>h. Economic cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>i. The amendment of American policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 8. E. Irrespective of whether you support it or not, what conditions do you consider necessary for the speedy realisation of Japan's neutralism? Please indicate briefly what you think on this question.

Replies to this question were divided into the following categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>a. Abolition of the Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>b. Establishment of a Socialist Government in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>c. Reversion of Okinawa to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>d. Closer relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>e. Affirmation of peaceful coexistence by the United States and the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>f. Abolition of the anti-Japanese clause in the Sino-Soviet Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>g. Reduction of the Self-Defence Forces and defence of the Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>h. Disarmament (including nuclear disarmament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>i. The independence of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>j. Establishment of a non-nuclear zone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
k. Reversion to Japan of Habomai and Shikotan  1  3

l. Establishment of a 'Locarno-type' treaty of non-aggression between Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union and China  3

m. Strengthening of world neutralism  2

n. Closer relations with North Korea and North Vietnam  2

o. Ending of negotiations with South Korea  1

p. Communist China and the Soviet Union to become more powerful  1

q. A United Nations guarantee for Japan's security  1

r. Communist Chinese membership of the United Nations  1

s. Democracy in Japan  1

t. Prosperity in Japan  1

Question 9. A. If Japan became neutralist, do you think there would be a danger of the security of the State being threatened?

1.
These respondents also all wanted the reversion of Okinawa.

2.
These respondents also all wanted closer relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China.
a. There would be a danger b. There would be no danger
c. Don't know e. Others (please specify)

H.D. 1 Nomizo Sasaki Eda Wada Kawakami unclassified Total
a. 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
b. 3 1 18(2) 3(3) 28 9(1) 3 71
c. 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4
d. 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 4
No reply 0 0 0(1) 0(1) 1 0 0 3
Total 84

Of those who wrote supplementary answers to this question, five admitted or implied the existence of some minimal degree of danger if Japan became neutralist, while one said that a policy of alliance was a greater danger, and two denied any danger, mentioning the JSP plan for a 'Locarno' settlement in the Far East as sufficient guarantee of security.

Question 9. B. If there is such a danger, what policies do you think should be undertaken to deal with it?

Number of Respondents
a. No reply 54
b. Replied 30

1. Heiwa Dōshikai
The thirty replies to this question were classified as follows:

a. Replies rejecting the premise of the question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replies</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Aggression not to be expected</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Neutralism essential for security</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Neutralism essential for security, but if there were a war, Japan would be quite impossible to defend</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Replies accepting the premise of the question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replies</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Strengthen the United Nations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. A 'Locarno-type' treaty</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Support (and thus obtain the support of) world opinion (which is naturally pacifist)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Abolish the Security Treaty and withdraw American military bases</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Measures of self-defence</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. Domestic stability, prosperity, democracy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii. Negotiations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii. A non-nuclear zone in the Far East</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix. Disarmament</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
x. Friendly relations with North Korea (since Korea is the only possible source of aggression against Japan) 1

xi. Persuade the United States to recognise Communist China 1

xii. Spread neutralist, pacifist thought 1

xiii. World federation 1

Question 10. If Japan became a neutralist country, do you think that there would be any fear of upsetting the balance of power and thus endangering world peace?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Cannot say
- d. Others (please specify)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>H.D.</th>
<th>Nomizo</th>
<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
<th>Kawakami</th>
<th>Unclassified</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16(2)</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9(1)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of those who wrote supplementary answers to this question, two admitted that there might be some slight danger of upsetting the balance of power, five implied that there was no such danger or that it was less than the
danger to Japan from a policy of alliance, and one denied
the validity of the concept of an East-West power balance
as a factor maintaining peace.

Question 11. Not only from the political aspect, but also
from the point of view of general feeling, do you prefer
the Soviet Union or the United States?

a. Soviet Union  b. United States  c. Cannot say

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nomizo</th>
<th>Sasaki</th>
<th>Eda</th>
<th>Wada</th>
<th>Kawakami</th>
<th>unclassified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
<td>0(1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0(1)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10(1)</td>
<td>3(2)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5(1)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other replies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1(0)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0(1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The supplementary replies to this question were
classified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Like both</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Like neither</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Like neither, but prefer the Soviet Union</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Neither like nor dislike either</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Heiwa Dōshikai
e. Like the people but not the policies of both 2
f. Like the people but not the policies of the United States 4
g. Like the people but not the policies of the Soviet Union 1
h. Like the United States because of personal contacts (no mention of policies) 2
i. Like American democracy 2
j. Dislike Anglo-Saxon racial prejudice and sense of superiority 1
k. Like Soviet social security and governmental initiative 1
l. Like the Soviet Union for cultural reasons (classical Russian literature) 1
m. Like the Soviet Union much better under Khrushchov than under Stalin 4
n. The question of liking or disliking is irrelevant to the problem of peace 1
o. Prefer England to either 1
p. Do not fully understand the question 1
JAPANESE TEXT OF QUESTIONNAIRE

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

(一) 谈国学在国际上的影响

(1) 国学在国际上的地位和影响。

(2) 国学在国际上的传播和交流。

(3) 国学在国际上的研究和发展。

(二) 国学在国际上的影响

(1) 国学在国际上的地位和影响。

(2) 国学在国际上的传播和交流。

(3) 国学在国际上的研究和发展。

(三) 国学在国际上的影响

(1) 国学在国际上的地位和影响。

(2) 国学在国际上的传播和交流。

(3) 国学在国际上的研究和发展。

(四) 国学在国际上的影响

(1) 国学在国际上的地位和影响。

(2) 国学在国际上的传播和交流。

(3) 国学在国际上的研究和发展。
无
5. 伝統的な情報伝達方法における問題

6. 古代の情報伝達方法についての研究

7. 異なる文化における情報伝達方法の比較

8. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持つ特性

9. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の将来の可能性

10. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の重要性

11. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の改良の必要性

12. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の新しい利用方法

13. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の現代への適用性

14. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の歴史的考察

15. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の現状

16. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の問題点

17. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の将来の展望

18. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の評価

19. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の役割

20. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の課題

21. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の改善

22. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の課題解決方法

23. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の効率化

24. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の新たな視点

25. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の効果

26. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性

27. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の今後の課題

28. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の発展の可能性

29. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続的性

30. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題

31. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決

32. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の必要性

33. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の手段

34. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の経済的影響

35. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の社会的影響

36. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の環境的影響

37. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の文化的影響

38. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の政治的影響

39. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の技術的影響

40. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の科学的影響

41. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響

42. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の種類

43. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の実例

44. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の未来

45. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題

46. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決

47. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段

48. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較

49. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果

50. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈

51. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈のアーカイブ

52. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈のアーカイブの利用

53. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈のアーカイブの利用の課題

54. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈のアーカイブの利用の課題の解明

55. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈のアーカイブの利用の課題の解明の手段

56. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈のアーカイブの利用の課題の解明の手段の比較

57. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈のアーカイブの利用の課題の解明の手段の比較の結果

58. 伝統的な情報伝達方法の持続可能性の課題解決の専門的影響の課題の解決の手段の比較の結果の解釈のアーカイブの利用の課題の解明の手段の比較の結果の解釈
10

舆情分析示意图

11

舆情分析示意图
APPENDIX D (2)

TABLE OF FRACTIONAL DIVISION AND PARTY CONTROL (POSTWAR)

LEFT

1945-49 Kuroda (expelled 1948) (Suzuki Kawakami NISHIO)

1950-51 Kuroda

1951-55 Kuroda (Matsumoto Nomizo Wada SUZUKI) (KAWAKAMI Nishio)

1955-57 (H.D. Nomizo Wada SUZUKI KAWAKAMI Nishio)

1957-59 (H.D. Nomizo Wada SUZUKI KAWAKAMI Nishio)

1959-61 (H.D. Nomizo Wada SUZUKI Kawakami)


RIGHT

Hirano (seceded 1948)

Hirano

LSP

JSP

RSP

DSP

Nishio

Nishio

Nishio

Nishio

(Kawakami NISHIO)

(Kawakami NISHIO)

NOTE CAPITALS indicate factions in control of the Party (i.e. the 'main current').

Brackets ( ) indicate discrete parties.

1. Heiwa Dōshikai.
2. Structural Reform.
### POSTWAR SOCIALIST ELECTION SCORES (LOWER HOUSE)

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The distinction between pamphlets, documents and books I have ignored, since the question of definition would in many cases have been very difficult to decide. My basic divisions are therefore as follows: Japanese, English and other language materials have been divided from each other, and English sources are subdivided into primary and secondary materials; I have further
subdivided primary materials into documents, pamphlets or policy statements put out by the Socialist Party (or any of its organs or factions), and materials on which the name of the author (or authors), or an organisation outside the Socialist Party appears or can be inferred. A special problem arose with primary materials of the Right and Left Socialist Parties between 1951 and 1955: because both parties went under the same name of Nihon Shakaitō (Japan Socialist Party), a mere listing of titles would not enable the reader to distinguish the documents of the one party from those of the other. I have therefore placed Party primary materials within chronological divisions, viz:

Most of the newspaper and periodical materials here listed I studied in the Newspaper and Press Cutting sections of the National Diet Library, Tokyo. The many files made by the Press Cutting section on the JSP were especially valuable. Most of the Socialist Party documents and the older pamphlets and other materials were bought by me in Tokyo second-hand bookshops on behalf of the National Library of Australia, where they are now housed. Officials of the JSP headquarters at Miyakezaka in Tokyo also gave me access to, or directed me towards, numbers of pamphlets and documents, and the headquarters of the DSP as well as those of the Sōhyō and Shinsambetsu trade union federations also provided me with useful materials. The library of the Institute of Social Science at Tokyo University was found to contain a number of Socialist materials not available elsewhere, and the library of the Institute of Social Science at Waseda University in Tokyo enabled me to see a collection of documents of the JSP (1945 - 51) and of the RSP (1951 - 55) made by the late Asanuma Inejirō.

In drawing up this bibliography I have followed in the main the conventions used by Uyehara in Leftwing Social Movements in Japan, An Annotated Bibliography. The following supplementary conventions, however, should be noted:
a. square brackets [ ] enclosing the date of publication indicate that the date is missing from the item in question, but is my estimate;

b. n.d. - 'no date' - is used only when it has been difficult even to establish the approximate date;

c. square brackets [ ] enclosing the name of an author (or Party committee etc.) indicate that the authorship is not given on the item itself, but is supplied by inference from the text. Where the item is a Party document, with no indication which Party committee issued it, it is attributed to the Party itself, thus, e.g: [Nihon Shakaitō];

d. All items in Japanese are published in Tokyo, unless otherwise stated.
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