Xenophobic racism and class during the Howard years

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Between 1996 and 2007, the Howard Government used racism to sustain its popularity. From the late 1990s, the primary victims of racist campaigns against immigrants were refugees who arrived by boat, without official permission. After 9/11 2001 the focus increasingly shifted to Muslims and Arabs, who were more explicitly targeted from 2005. While the conservative parties' racist policies served electoral purposes, their campaigns were also shaped by a deeper logic: the interests of the capitalist class and its capacity to influence state policies. The declining appeal of racist arguments and policies contributed to the Government’s demise in 2007.

Despite Howard’s humiliating electoral defeat in 2007, Australian capitalism remains fundamentally racist. The Rudd Government has retained the core of its predecessor’s policies towards Aborigines and remains committed to locking up refugees who arrive in Australia by boat. Campaigns and local council decisions against the building of mosques and Muslim schools demonstrate the continuing potential for xenophobic racism to mobilise people. As the Australian segment of the world economy contracts into global recession, the appeal of neo-liberal ideas has declined. Opportunists inside and outside the mainstream parties will try to play the race card to advance their own careers without


addressing the underlying causes of popular discontent. The Howard years, can teach us about the scope and limits of such attempts and the interests they serve.

From the mid 1990s, Australia experienced a cascade of moral panics and racist campaigns against Aborigines, Arabs, refugees and Muslims. The rise of racism in Australia is well documented. But our understanding of the construction and reconstruction of racism under the Howard Government is less satisfactory. We can deepen it by examining the way governments and mainstream political parties have used xenophobic racism, that is racism directed against groups other than Aborigines. The relationships amongst racism, capitalist class interests and the state are at the centre of this analysis. Other important issues are, for reasons of space, confined to the margins of the discussion. They include the potential for racism to have a broad appeal, because it can seem to offer practical responses to real problems faced by ordinary people; the role of the mass media in the reproduction of racism; the dynamics of anti-Aboriginal racism; and the impact of popular mobilisations against racism.

The following inquiry begins with a survey of the Coalition parties’ role in the resurgence of xenophobic racism. The next two sections look at the Howard Government’s racist campaigns, initially directed against refugees but later against Arabs and Muslims. In 2005, the targeting of Muslims became much more explicit. An analysis of this move and its logic is the subject of the fourth section. The argument turns, in the fifth section, to the relationship between capitalist class interests and the Coalition’s racism. The final section sketches the Howard Government’s last racist spasms and considers the reasons for its defeat in the election of 24 November 2007.

**Rollback**

The Howard government made it a priority to roll back gains made by struggles from the 1960s through to the 1990s. Decades of campaigning by Aborigines and white supporters had eroded genocidal and paternalistic policies that denied civil rights and decent living standards to Aborigines, and stole their children. Only in 1965 could all Aborigines finally vote in every State and Territory election. The 1967 referendum removed provisions in the Australian constitution which discriminated against Aborigines. Through legislation, court decisions, pressure and purchases a few Aboriginal groups were able to regain a degree of control over some traditional lands. Much wider layers of people recognised that Aboriginal disadvantage was created by white society and Australian governments at all levels, and the need for change.

In relation to immigration, conservative governments diluted and then the Whitlam Labor Government in 1973 abolished the White Australia Policy. In addition to the decline in the flow of suitable ‘white’ immigrant labour for Australian industry and the growing importance of trade with Asian countries, anti-racist campaigning played a role in this

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shift. Particularly from the 1970s, migrants from areas outside North-western Europe and North America faced less prejudice and discrimination. At an official level, tolerance of non-Anglo cultures was embodied in multiculturalism which became a system of government patronage through ethnic community leaders.4

It was not mainstream politicians but a prominent ‘traditional’ intellectual and a business leader who started rehabilitating racism from the mid 1980s, in the guise of defending mainstream culture in Australia.5 Geoffrey Blainey, a conservative historian who made his name writing corporate histories, attacked the migration of east Asians to Australia. Hugh Morgan, as the chief executive officer of a mining corporation and former president of the Mining Industry Council, had material interests threatened by Aboriginal land rights. Morgan, a senior member of the Liberal Party, played an organising role in two rightwing think-tanks and was later, between 2003 and 2005, president of the Business Council of Australia, which brings together the CEOs of the largest public and private corporations in Australia. He demigrated Aboriginal culture, arguing that land rights would promote cannibalism and infanticide.6

In the racism of Morgan and Blainey, opposition leader John Howard saw a formula for political success. He ‘understood that economic liberalism on its own would not win elections’ and complemented the politics of privatisations, cutting the welfare state and deregulating markets, especially the labour market, with ‘a conservative social politics focused on the traditional nuclear family, individual responsibility and chauvinistic nationalism.’7 In 1988, when he first tried to serve up this dish of profit-boosting economic policy and racism, it was not received well. He retreated from his initial position and, in May 1989 lost the leadership of the Liberal Party. But Howard continued to criticise the


5 Here racism is understood as activity which constitutes or reinforces the oppression of a population defined in terms of its alleged essential biological or cultural characteristics. For a discussion of the use of cultural differences to justify racism see Paul Gilroy ‘One nation under a groove: the cultural politics of “race” and racism in Britain’ in David Theo Goldberg (ed.) Anatomy of racism University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1990, pp. 263-82; also Pierre-André Taguieff ‘The new cultural racism in France’ Telos 83 Spring 1990, pp. 109-122; Kenan Malik The meaning of race Verso, London 1996, pp. 143-144, 184-188, 193-198; Satnam Virdee ‘Race, class and the dialectics of social transformation’ in Patricia Hill Collins and John Solomos (eds.) International handbook of race and ethnic studies Sage, London, forthcoming 2009.

6 Markus Race, pp. 57-72.

level of immigration and endorsed Blainey’s denunciation of a ‘black armband view of history’, as presenting too ‘gloomy’ an account of Australia’s past.8

After campaigning on a neo-liberal platform and, under John Hewson, losing the ‘unlosable’ 1993 federal election, the Liberals restored Howard to the leadership.9 By then he had fine-tuned his racist policies. He no longer emphasised the limited ‘capacity of the community to absorb’10 people from east Asia and, in the context of the first stages of recovery from the recession of the early 1990s, his reservations about levels of immigration in general did not threaten to impose constraints on short term economic growth. The intensification of racism in Australia that Howard promoted became an aspect of a ruling class agenda, the core of which remained neo-liberal economic policies designed to restore profit rates. In this way, he provided a distinctive answer to an important question: how do politicians and parties attract or maintain mass support, even though their policies do not serve the interests of most of the middle class, let alone the working class people (a large majority of the population) who vote for them?11

Throughout the Howard era, racism played a role analogous to the previous ‘Accord’ between Labor governments and the union movement, from 1983 until 1996. Both secured support for governments pursuing neo-liberal economic policies—including privatisations, corporatisations, contracting out and marketisation of public services; reduction of tariff and quota protection for domestic industry; reform of labour and financial markets—that were not themselves popular. The Accord and racism have, of course, operated in very different ways. The Accord was a set of formal and informal arrangements that delivered notable benefits for the bureaucracy of the trade union movement—influence over policy, closeness to ministers and therefore an improved profile with members, positions on advisory and statutory bodies, and limited public funding for some union activities—while promising, but not delivering sustained living standards and job security for workers.12 Racist rhetoric and policies, on the other hand, could draw on and reinforce long and deeply entrenched feelings of racial superiority and traditions of attributing people’s problems to racial scapegoats.13

9 Griffiths ‘Racism’ p. 170.
11 I am grateful to Scott MacWilliam for a discussion which helped me formulate this question more clearly.
13 See Virdee ‘Race, class’ for a discussion of Marxist approaches to the psychology of racism.
During the 1996 election campaign, immigration was not an issue, but the conservatives claimed that there was an ‘Aboriginal industry’, that Aboriginal land rights were a threat to ordinary Australians and that the Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Commission (ATSIC), a government agency providing policy advice on and services for Indigenous people, was corrupt. Widespread disillusionment with the Labor government’s neo-liberal economic policies, and the appeal of the Howard’s contrasting claim that he would make Australian’s ‘comfortable and relaxed’ were crucial factors in the conservatives’ victory, but their racist tactics also played a role.14

The new conservative administration curtailed ATSIC’s activities and, in 2004, finally abolished the Commission. Separate programs for Aboriginal health, education and welfare were ‘mainstreamed’ away from organisations controlled by Aborigines into government departments. In the area of education, a consequence of this transition was that $181 million allocated to Aboriginal education in 2004-2005 was not spent.15 The Government’s attacks on Indigenous people are a significant context of its promotion of xenophobic racism but are too complex to deal with here.16

On coming to office, Howard expressed ‘understanding’ for the right-wing populist Pauline Hanson and her supporters, as her following grew between 1996 and 1998. She railed against immigration and allegedly preferential treatment given to Aborigines and Asians, rejecting neo-liberal policies shared by the Labor governments and their Coalition successor.17 By identifying widespread problems, particularly the decline in services, facilities and employment opportunities in rural and regional areas, created by government policy and the process of capital accumulation, she attracted considerable support. Her popularity demonstrated that there was a substantial constituency that could be tapped by the kind of racist messages that the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s had, for a period, pushed to the edges of political common sense. Hanson’s racism appealed to and reinforced prejudices and diverted attention away from the fundamental processes that had given rise to neo-liberalism and stressed many small businesses and workers. Although she was critical of the new Coalition government, for a period Howard used Hanson as a proxy to tap racist sentiments for his own purposes, learning from and legitimising her views. His pronouncements on Hanson were a ‘dog-whistle’, they conveyed his own very lightly

coded racist views to a target audience without being explicit and thus alienating those who might be disturbed by more overtly racist statements. This tactic intersected with the Government’s campaign against ‘political correctness’, a concerted effort to make racism and sexism respectable again by trivialising and demonising anti-racist arguments, verbal conventions and behaviour.

**Xenophobic racism**

The Coalition Government initially cut back Australia’s migrant intake. The Keating Government had introduced a six months waiting period before the majority of migrants could access most welfare services. The new conservative regime increased this to two years. After 1997-1998, however, the Howard Government raised levels of migration every year. Twenty nine per cent of migrants were admitted on strictly economic (as opposed to family reunion or humanitarian) grounds in 1995-96 but 69 per cent in 2005-06. Over the same period there was a rapid expansion of the number of Business Long Stay Visa holders, who were essentially guest workers.

Primarily for economic reasons, the conservatives did not concentrate on mobilising racist support around the issue of the scale of immigration or the number of migrants coming from east Asia. But the Coalition built on their Labor predecessor’s policy of locking up asylum seekers who had arrived in Australia by boat in concentration camps. Particularly from 1999, the Howard Government demonised such refugees, including children; generated a moral panic about them; and reduced their rights. Where previously they could immediately apply for Permanent Residence Visas, under new rules they were only eligible for three-year Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs). A TPV holder could not legally leave and then re-enter Australia. Marr and Wilkinson noted that the Liberal Party’s own polling identified the appeal of racism in Australia. The Party used this knowledge by

18 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for the insight that howard used Hanson as a proxy. On the concept of the political dog-whistle see Josh Fear ‘Under the radar: dog-whistle politics in Australia’ Australia Institute Discussion Paper 96, September 2007.

19 Markus Race pp. 97-103.


23 Scott Poynting “‘Bin Laden in the suburbs”: attacks on Arab and Muslim Australians before and after 11 September’ Current issues in Criminal Justice 14 (1) July 2002, pp. 46-49.
employing racist themes to increase its own popularity. ‘In his first term [Howard] targeted voters resentful of Aborigines. As his second term ended, he was pursuing voters who feared their country was being invaded by Muslim boat people’. In the process, his Government was also convincing voters to fear such an invasion. In 1999-2000, the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat in Australia peaked at only 4,175 people.

The *Tampa* and ‘children overboard’ affairs were key episodes in the Coalition’s strategy for the 2001 election. The government prevented refugees, picked up from a small boat sinking in the Indian Ocean by the Norwegian freighter *Tampa*, from reaching Australian territory. Instead they were sent to an Australian-funded concentration camp on the impoverish Pacific island of Nauru. Shortly before the election, Howard and his ministers falsely claimed that refugees on another boat had threatened to throw their children into the sea if a nearby Australian naval vessel didn’t pick them up. In fact they were signalling for help because their boat was sinking.

Attacking refugees, who arrived by sea and mainly came from the Middle East and Afghanistan, tapped into and reinforced anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism. ‘I certainly don’t want people of that type in Australia’ John Howard said during the ‘children overboard’ affair, leaving Australians to draw their own conclusions about the ‘type’ he was referring to. Commentators in the mass media joined the dots, for those slow on the uptake. The government encouraged racism towards Arabs and Muslims, without being explicit, and even denied any racist intent. Meanwhile, One Nation had, in late 1998, begun an uneven terminal decline, ultimately as steep as its rise. The party was undermined by vicious internal, personal and political conflicts; its parliamentary representatives’ lack of experience, discipline and shared, coherent views; tactical errors and administrative blunders; and a campaign of persecution through the courts, orchestrated by Liberal Minister Tony Abbott. Once One Nation had faded, there was no serious competition to the conservatives’ right. They broadened their electoral appeal by playing the anti-Muslim and anti-Arab tune louder on their racist dog-whistle.

Despite internal conflicts over the issue, the Labor Party joined the racist campaign by voting for the Government’s measures to remove the right to claim asylum from people

26 For an excellent, brief account of these developments see Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason ‘The resistible rise of Islamophobia: anti-Muslim racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001’ *Journal of sociology* 43 (1) 2007, pp. 78-81. For a detailed study of the 2001 election campaign see Marr and Wilkinson *Dark victory*.
who arrived in some off-shore Australian territories. The Government had wedged Labor: dividing sections of its base from the Party.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks took place in the lead-up to the election. The Government used them to intensify public anxiety and promote its own ability to defend the country. It fuelled discussion of terrorism in the mass media that invoked anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hysteria. Ministers identified refugees as potential terrorist threats.\textsuperscript{28} Even before the 1991 Gulf War, research in 1988 had found that racial prejudice in Australia was strongest against Muslims and very high against Lebanese.\textsuperscript{29} A survey conducted during October-December 2001 found ‘an expanding Islamophobia [sic]’.\textsuperscript{30} An upsurge in attacks against Muslims and Arabs followed. Poynting and Noble’s survey of Muslims and people with Middle Eastern backgrounds found that two thirds had experienced more racism after the terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{31}

The moral panics about refugees and terrorism, which the Government initiated or encouraged and regarded as its best assets, had frightening consequences for Arabs and Muslims in Australia. But they served the conservatives’ purpose; despite sluggish economic growth, the Coalition won the election on 10 November 2001.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{(Re)defining the enemy}

Howard positioned himself carefully, using formulations such as ‘I think the most special of all measures is for me to use the authority of my office to remind all Australians that our quarrel is not with people of Arab descent, our quarrel is not with people of the Islamic faith.’\textsuperscript{33} His Government was very careful not to overtly identify all Muslims and especially Muslims in Australia—about 1.5 per cent of the population, roughly 300,000 people—as a problem. However, in concrete, practical ways, notably in its refugee policies and its wars against Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Government promoted anti-Muslim racism, while condemning it in the abstract.

\textsuperscript{28} Scott Poynting, Greg Noble, Paul Tabar and Jock Collins \textit{Bin Laden in the suburbs: criminalising the Arab other} Institute of Criminology, Sydney 2004 p. 60.

\textsuperscript{29} Ian McAllister and Rhonda Moore \textit{Ethnic prejudice in Australian society: patterns, intensity and explanations} Office of Multicultural Affairs, Barton 1989 pp. 7-8 cf p. 10.

\textsuperscript{30} Kevin M. Dunn, James Forrest, Ian Burnley and Amy McDonald ‘Constructing racism in Australia’ \textit{Australian journal of social issues} 39 (4) November 2004, p. 416.


\textsuperscript{32} Marr and Wilkinson \textit{Dark victory} pp. 277-278.

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The Coalition stewed together a paranoid response to 9/11 and vilification of refugees in the electoral casserole that was the main course in its 2001 election campaign. This dish used ingredients of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab racism manufactured by politicians and the mass media in earlier periods. After the events of 9/11, John Howard warned of a ‘terrorist threat from bin Laden cells in Australia’. Although no arrests or charges resulted, raids by Federal Police and ASIO, sometimes with the media in tow, drove home the message. So did the restriction of civil liberties through legislation passed in 2003 and 2005, in the name of combating terrorism. State Labor governments enacted complementary or even more extreme measures.

The practical implication of Australian preparations for and participation in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003 was that Afghans and Iraqis did not have the right to themselves settle accounts with their oppressive rulers. These incompetent (largely Muslim) people needed the strongest state in the world and its allies to impose new rulers and institutions on them.

After the Bali bombings, the Government signalled that it was in control of the situation through ASIO and Federal Police raids which targeted Muslims with Indonesian backgrounds. While the raids never led to any charges for terrorist offences, they created

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38 For the realities of strategic power and oil behind the rhetoric of the US and Australian governments, see Chris Harman ‘Analysing imperialism’ International socialism 99, Summer 2003, pp. 3-81.
the impression that the kind of people through whose doors the police came crashing were a threat.\textsuperscript{39}

Conservative governments in France and Germany had politicised Muslim women’s clothing. Far right member of the NSW upper house Fred Nile suggested that the chador be banned in public places. Howard seemed to toy with the idea before rejecting it.\textsuperscript{40} For almost four years after 9/11, his Government refrained from explicitly identifying Australian Muslims in general as a problem. It did not, however, publicly criticise those elements in the mainstream media which argued differently. Such elements were, in fact, dominant. Peter Manning has demonstrated that, overall, the Sydney daily press portrayed Arabs and Muslims negatively both before and after September 2001.\textsuperscript{41} The events in New York and Washington were, moreover, followed by a dramatic increase in hostility and violence directed against Muslims and Arabs, especially women, in Australia.\textsuperscript{42}

The Coalition Government knew that questions of race, especially when tied to supposed physical threats to Australians, provided good electoral ground for it, compared with industrial relations reform, privatisations and cuts in social welfare. But from 2004 the Howard Government’s ability to mobilise support using its accustomed racist focus on refugees and implicit attacks on Arabs and Muslims declined dramatically.

A prolonged campaign by activist groups against the harsh treatment of refugees and their imprisonment was turning public opinion around, to the extent that even a few Liberal parliamentarians started raising public criticisms. Then the scandals of the detention as an illegal immigrant of Australian permanent resident Cornelia Rau and the deportation of Australian citizen Vivienne Alvarez Solon to the Philippines erupted.\textsuperscript{43}


\textsuperscript{41} Manning \textit{Dog whistle politics and journalism}.

\textsuperscript{42} Poynting and Noble \textit{Living with racism} pp. 17-19.

These events and inquiries into them thoroughly discredited Australia’s immigration detention policy and administration. The Government initiated reforms and released a large proportion of the imprisoned refugees.

It was now much harder to generate fear of desperate and destitute people arriving in boats. This became particularly apparent in 2006. Forty three West Papuans fleeing Indonesian repression arrived in north Queensland in January. All of them were eventually granted refugee status, despite pressure from the Indonesian government. Australian efforts to maintain hegemony in southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific are made easier by supporting friendly regimes, no matter how repressive they are. The Coalition was worried that a continuous stream of West Papuan refugees claiming asylum in Australia would highlight human rights violations by the Indonesian authorities, undermining cooperation with the Indonesian government and its stability.

The Howard administration then attempted a final solution to the problem of refugees arriving by sea. Previously some off-shore islands had been ‘excised from the migration zone’ to prevent such people claiming political asylum; now the entire continent was to be excised. But a revolt on the Coalition backbench forced Howard to withdraw his Immigration Bill from the Senate on 14 August 2006.

Picking on Muslims

John Howard used the London bombings of 7 July 2005 to recast his use of racism. His government began a campaign that attacked Australian Muslims explicitly for the first time, claiming that some mainstream Islamic leaders in Australia were not ‘as strong in denouncing these acts as they should have been’.

A summit with Australian Muslim leaders on 23 August 2005 was modelled on a similar gathering in Britain. Howard’s event demonstrated to the public that the Government...
regarded Muslims as a problem and security threat. To make this message absolutely clear, Treasurer Peter Costello arranged for his comments calling on radical Muslim clerics to leave Australia to be published on the day of the meeting. ‘Foreign Minister Alexander Downer compared fundamentalist Muslims to Nazis as he defended the decision not to invite radical clerics to the summit.’

Taking up a theme Costello had linked to the oath of citizenship, Education Minister Brendan Nelson, said that special steps were being taken to teach Muslim children about ‘Australian values’. People who did not ‘want to live by Australian values’ could ‘clear off’. ‘John Howard warned that the Government was prepared to “get inside” mosques and schools to ensure they’re not supporting terrorism.’ It is worth contrasting the response to this campaign with that to a similar concern Nelson had expressed during the 2003 invasion of Iraq in a letter ‘to State education ministers raising concerns that Islamic schools may be encouraging anti-Christian and anti-Western feelings in students’. The Queensland Labor Government had made the letter public and denounced it, and Nelson backed away from the issue. Deputy Leader of the Opposition Jenny Macklin embraced the values agenda, reverting to Labor’s response to the Tampa affair: condoning and thus encouraging the Government’s racism, in the forlorn hope that going soft on the Government’s racist agenda would neutralise its electoral appeal. She stated that, ‘In this environment it’s extremely important that we have all students in all schools studying and understanding the importance of tolerance, understanding the importance of our civic and legal responsibilities as Australian citizens.’

Although he had moved from implicit to explicit targetting of Muslims, John Howard regarded some potential policy reversals as too embarrassing. A few days after Nelson’s reflections on Australian values, Liberal members of the House of Representatives Bronwyn Bishop and Sophie Panopoulos joined in, by demanding that headscarves be banned in schools. But Bishop had failed to consult the script and forgot that Howard had already pronounced on the issue of how Muslim women dressed. He quickly ruled the proposal out. Official discrimination against Muslims on the basis of their clothing was

51 ‘Concerns over Islamic schools’ 28 March 2003 Daily Telegraph p. 8; Scott Emerson and Sascha Hutchinson ‘Nelson’s Islamic school “slur” Australian 28 March 2003 p. 5; Ashleigh Wilson ‘Nelson bid to reassure Islamic schools’ Australian March 2003 p. 6.
52 ‘Teach Australian values or “clear off”’.
not on the agenda, but during the Gulf War and after 9/11 others acted on official cues rather than policies by attacking women wearing the headscarf.

Just before mass rallies against WorkChoices on 15 November 2005, the Government invoked the racial demon again: ASIO and the Federal Police staged raids on Muslims allegedly plotting terrorist acts; and the Coalition scheduled parliamentary debates on anti-terrorist legislation.

The intensification of the Coalition’s manipulation of racism helped to create the political climate that led to mob violence against Muslims and Arabs in the Sydney beach-side suburb of Cronulla, on 11 December. Just as John Howard had always said that his own policies had nothing to do with racism, in commenting on the Cronulla pogrom he denied that there is ‘underlying racism in this country’. This echoed Bob Carr’s response to the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board’s account of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim coverage in the mass media: ‘I treat with contempt any report that brands Australians as racists.’

But by February 2006, the Coalition was in a sticky situation. Evidence presented to the inquiry into bribes paid by AWB, the monopoly marketer of Australian wheat, to secure sales to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq became very embarrassing. In this context, the Prime Minister and Treasurer again criticised Muslims. According to Howard, ‘there is a small section of the Islamic population in Australia that, because of its remarks about jihad, remarks which indicate an extremist view, that is a problem… It is not a problem that we have ever faced with other immigrant communities who become easily absorbed by Australia’s mainstream’.

statement ‘that you can’t in a democratic society pass laws telling people how to dress’ would be quoted back at him, Howard interview, 22 November 2002.


To maintain the momentum, the Government linked fear of Muslims to the tightening of citizenship laws. This was the particular task of parliamentary secretary Andrew Robb. His consultations with Muslims were part of the Coalition’s victim blaming strategy.

[A]fter months of discussions with Muslim communities I believe that [their] unfair stigmatisation will not change materially until all Australian Muslims take responsibility for addressing the situation they find themselves in.

Each Australian Muslim in their own way and in their own circumstance should seek to address the fears and misunderstandings of the broader community.57

Robb tied the integration issue to the Government’s decision to introduce a test of fluency in English and adherence to Australian values before applicants could become Australian citizens.

The campaign against Australian Muslims entered top gear in August 2006, while the Government was finding the going heavy because of a jump in petrol prices, higher interest rates, the unpopular privatisations Telstra and Medibank, slower growth, and the collapse of its plans to prevent any refugees arriving by boat in Australia from claiming political asylum.

John Howard asserted that ‘a small section of the Islamic population… is very resistant to integration’. There was, he said, a ‘need for everybody who comes to this country to fully integrate and fully integrating means accepting Australian values, it means learning as rapidly as you can the English language… [and that] men and women do have equality’. The Prime Minister had, however, appointed Tony Abbott, whose opposition to women being able to decide to terminate their pregnancies was public knowledge, to the post of Health Minister.58 To coincide with the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, he again raised concerns about the integration of Muslims in Australia.59 Not to be outdone on Australian values, Labor leader Kim Beazley demanded that all applicants for visas to visit Australia


should ‘sign off on those values’. His own colleagues soon repudiated this bizarre suggestion. But he helped maintain the issue’s currency. The citizenship test, introduced in September 2007, turned out to be a multiple choice quiz on the contents of a conservative booklet about Australian history and society. As Josh Fear has pointed out

It is doubtful whether the Australian Citizenship Test will result in more harmonious relations between recent migrants and native-born Australians. However, this initiative functions very well as a dog whistle to those Australians who believe that people of other language and cultural backgrounds are not integrated into ‘mainstream’ culture to a sufficient degree.

From late 2006, the Government used commentary on current events to help keep the issue of anti-Muslim racism alive, ably assisted by the mainstream media. Howard defended the Pope against criticism of his association of Islam with violence. Sexist comments and remarks critical of the White House by the Mufti of Australia, Taj al-Din al-Hilali, provided an opportunity to implicate Muslims in general.

The Coalition also promoted the idea that Islam was a problem in Australia while bolstering its superficially anti-racist credentials through several initiatives which also provided access or resources for Muslim groups. In publicising collaboration between Muslim communities and police, the priority of governments and police was control over young Muslims rather than measures to prevent racist attacks. Funding a new, conservative, Melbourne University-based National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies, to the tune of eight million dollars was state intervention into theology, designed to counteract fundamentalism. Publicity for worthwhile programs for Muslim kids and support for some community initiatives reinforced concerns that ‘integration’ into Australian culture is necessarily desirable and that those who believe in Islam are worryingly alien.

In the lead up to the 2007 NSW State election there was ‘a bidding war between Labor and the Opposition about who [could] sound tougher on Muslims’, in relation to Australian values, terrorism and crime. The abandonment of multiculturalism and stress on

62 ‘Under the radar’ p. 10.
63 For example, Russell Skelton ‘Hilali fans fires of furore with defiant declaration on White House’ Age 28 October 2006, p. 3; Danielle Cronin ‘Muslims move to end Hilali crisis’ Canberra times 30 October 2006, p. 1.
65 Tom Allard ‘Iemma, Ruddock disagree on Muslim ban’ Sydney morning herald 29 January 2007, p. 3.
integration was underlined in the ministerial reshuffle of January 2007 at the national level. The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was rechristened Immigration and Citizenship, and handed over to a devout Catholic. Kevin Andrews had demonstrated his capacity to kick heads as Minister for Workplace Relations, responsible for the implementation of the Government’s far-reaching anti-union legislation. He played an important role in the ‘Haneef affair’, discussed below.

Class and race—who benefits?

A series of impressive studies—by Poynting, Noble, Tabar, Collins, Dunn, Hage and Manning—drawn on in previous sections, have demonstrated the rise of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism in Australia. They offered a variety of partial explanations for this phenomenon, but did not explicitly get to its roots in the capitalist structures of Australian society. In Australia, racism has served capitalist class interests in several ways. From the very start of the colonial period, racism justified the appropriation of Indigenous land. This key ideological basis for the Australian state became a major public issue when land rights legislation and court decisions threatened to restore to Aborigines ownership over relatively small areas, often in a very limited form. Anti-Aboriginal racism also divided the working class and justified the super-exploitation of Indigenous labour, which remained crucial for the profitability of the pastoral industry well after World War II. Discrimination against the Irish and Catholics (overwhelmingly of Irish background until after World War II) reproduced in Australia a division Marx had observed in the British working class. The hold of sectarianism on Australian workers, notably public servants, remained an obstacle to solidarity against employers into the 1960s. Prejudices against non-Anglo immigrants were already present during the 19th century, and became more widespread with the mass migration program from the 1940s.

If the ideology of ‘white Australia’ divided white workers from black and Asian workers, both locally and internationally, it also asserted that white workers and their white employers had common interests and consequently helped sustain white capitalist class control against threats from the local working class and rival ruling classes. White Australia was a key feature of Australian national identity. Into the second half of the 20th century.

66 Mick Armstrong ‘Aborigines: problems of race and class’ in Kuhn Class and struggle in Australia, pp. 143-146.
70 Griffiths ‘Racism’ pp. 162-166.
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century, the dominant discourse of Australian nationalism constituted Australians not only as white but also as British. National/racial unity was also unity with the Empire or at least with its white components. But whiteness was already used to justify friendly though essentially casual relations with the United States from the late 19th century. The visit of the ‘Great White Fleet’ of the US Navy in 1908 was cause for the greatest public celebrations since Federation in all the Australian ports it visited. After World War II, the US alliance was formalised and eventually became the cornerstone of Australian ‘defence’ policy.

Racism can also fulfil a red herring function not only for particular politicians and parties, but also for the capitalist class as a whole. For example, employers benefited from the Coalition’s diversion of public attention from its new industrial relations legislation to the alleged threat of Muslim terrorism in November 2005. This was also the case with racist ‘penal populism’—blaming oppressed racial groups rather than poverty for crime and promising to ‘get tough’—that was a feature of NSW politics for over a decade from the 1990s, as governments cut public services. More generally, if racial issues are occupying headlines then there is less space for articles that have greater potential to raise doubts about the wonders of capitalism, like unemployment, wages and conditions, profit rates, executive salaries, or the profits versus the wages share of national income.

A policy or stance that benefits the ruling class does not, however, automatically come into existence (the functionalist fallacy). Nor is the pursuit of capitalist class interests by governments often the consequence of conspiracy. We have to identify the mechanisms that bring such policies about.

Sometimes, the capitalist class mobilises directly in its own interests. Ultimately, when united, it can veto or at least dramatically undermine policies or governments that it regards as damaging to its vital interests. In the 1940s, for example, a ‘ruling class offensive’, triggered by its attempts to nationalise the banks, brought down the Chifley Labor Government. As the recession of the mid 1970s scuttled the Whitlam Government’s policy agenda and sense of direction, there was a similarly successful ruling class mobilisation. The mainstream media and Coalition mounted a political campaign while the wider capitalist class engaged in an investment strike, prompted by its pessimism about profitability under Labor, otherwise known as ‘a collapse in business confidence’.

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71 Poynting Bin Laden pp. 250, 253-254.
72 Alex Callinicos Making history: agency, structure and change in social theory Polity, Cambridge 1987 p. 82.
74 Tom O’Lincoln Years of rage: social conflicts in the Fraser era Bookmarks Australia, Melbourne 1993, pp. 32-50; Sam Pietsch ‘To have and to hold on to: wealth, power and the capitalist class’ in Kuhn Class and struggle in Australia, pp. 29-31.
On other occasions, a section of the class acts to shift public policy in a way that particularly serves its own interests, and the rest goes passively along with its initiative. That has been an aspect of the increase in anti-Aboriginal racism, sponsored by a mining industry worried about land rights. Hugh Morgan helped make anti-Aboriginal racism respectable in the mid 1980s. The Mining Industry Council mounted campaigns against land rights legislation in 1983-84 and over the 1992 Mabo decision of the High Court which expanded Indigenous land rights. 75 ‘Thirty of Australia’s most respected business leaders’, including the president of the Business Council signed a statement supporting the Government’s 1997 legislation that restricted the impact of the High Court’s 1996 Wik ruling that pastoral leases did not extinguish native title. 76

Politicians and senior public officials who manage the state are influenced by the structure of the capitalist mode of production: the reliance they share with private capitalists on economic prosperity and profitability, common ideas and roles as managers of large hierarchical institutions. They have, however, specific interests of their own. So do private capitalists with distinct concerns related, for example, to the sector of the economy in which they operate. A passive response by private capitalists to a public policy indicates they are either happy with it or don’t care. But if capital or sections of the capitalist class don’t like what the state is doing, they are not shy about letting parties and governments know. Far from being counterposed, there is overlap between explanations of the relationship between the state and capitalist production that emphasise social structures and those that focus on the selfish decisions of individuals and groups. The two mechanisms reinforce each other, as the capitalist class works out and pursues its own interests. 77

The revival of racism in Australia and its anti-Muslim inflection were mediated by the specific interests of sections of the capitalist class. As Poynting et al. pointed out, private media proprietors gain audiences through sensationalist racist headlines or at least through enthusiastic reporting of government policy. Top management of the state owned Australian Broadcasting Corporation is less preoccupied with ratings than with appearing to maintain a ‘balance’, whose pivot is the conservative point between Coalition and Labor, and the desire to avoid pissing off the government which funds it. Politicians use racism to mobilise support around issues that advantage their own parties or capitulate to it in order to neutralise issues which they think will damage them. Those at the top of the police, armed forces and judiciary who are sensitive to politicians and the media use similar language and take complementary actions. 78 We can extend this argument: by playing up racist threats, the senior officers of various police forces and military units

75 Markus Race pp. 54-55; Frank Brennan ‘Undermining Mabo’ Age 4 October 1993, p. 13.
77 For classic expressions of the ‘structuralist’ and ‘instrumentalist’ arguments, see , for example, Nicos Poulantzas’s and Ralph Miliband’s contributions in Robin Blackburn (ed.) Ideology in social science, Fontana, London 1972.
78 Poynting Bin Laden pp. 177-178, 237-238.
justify their existence, the expansion of their organisations and the extension of their own power.

The wider capitalist class did not initiate the shift toward anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism but it was a major beneficiary. This racist campaign and its predecessors helped maintain the popularity and electoral viability of a government that acted in capitalist interests by privatising, restricting Aboriginal land rights, narrowing welfare eligibility, introducing the Goods and Services Tax and attacking trade unionism. The campaign against Arabs and Muslims was reinforced by and added to the legitimacy of Australian participation in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which in turn consolidated the alliance with the United States that served the interests of Australian capital.79

If sections of the Australian capitalist class have actively promoted certain forms of racism and the class as a whole has passively accepted others, in recent decades capitalists have also actively reshaped racism in Australia through initiatives against forms of prejudice they regarded as a threat to their interests. These were, however, very modest in comparison with the offensives against the Chifley and Whitlam governments.

When John Howard started to do the dance of the seven veils around anti-Asian racism in 1988, it seemed that the capitalist class might find it enticing. In early 1988, the Business Council of Australia called for a fifty per cent increase in immigration, to 180,000 settlers a year. However, the Council made concessions to Blainey’s views, affirming that “The migration program has not been “open door” and control of the mix of migrants has so far been relatively successful. That balance must be maintained. If we increase the immigration program we must be sure that we are able to cope with the influx and that our program of cultural diversity does not become one of cultural division.”80

The Liberal Party was internally divided over Howard’s criticism of migration from Asia. While hostile to multiculturalism, other sections of the right in Australia regarded immigration as important for economic development, were favourably disposed to Vietnamese immigrants81 (presumed to be an anti-communist constituency), and worried about antagonising important trade partners.

Howard’s statements about immigration in August were opposed by ‘wets’ in the Liberal Party, and important sections of the capitalist class; not only individuals in private but also the Confederation of Australian Industry, publicly. Economists, professionally concerned

79 Tom O’Lincoln ‘The neighbour from hell: Australian imperialism’ in Kuhn Class and struggle in Australia, pp. 181-185.
81 Castles Mistaken identity p. 132 and 134.
about the health of Australian capitalism, rebutted Blainey’s and Howard’s approach to immigration policy at the Australian Economists Association conference.  

Howard retreated quickly. The episode counted against him in his ongoing tussle with Andrew Peacock over the Party leadership. Key Liberal parliamentary, extra-parliamentary and business leaders (notably Party President and CEO of Elders IXL John Elliott, Party Treasurer and big businessman Ron Walker, and Hugh Morgan of Western Mining Corporation) engineered Peacock’s successful leadership challenge in May 1989. Howard subsequently distanced himself even further from his earlier position and particularly from anti-Asian racism.

In the context of slow growth in 1992, the Labor Government and the ACTU proposed cuts in the level of immigration and the conservative opposition outbid them. The Business Council responded by stressing the economic benefits of a stable, long-term migration program, rather than using immigration as a short term, counter cyclical, economic policy instrument. The Council asserted that ‘[t]here should be no racial bias in Australia’s immigration policy’. While favouring greater emphasis on selecting migrants who could contribute to the economy, the Council opposed putting more weight on English language skills.

The Business Council continued to make a case for expanded immigration, particularly from Asia, in the lead-up to the 1996 election. After taking office in March, however, the new conservative Government in July cut back the inflow of migrants. John Howard said ‘you do have to understand the legitimate concerns’ of those fearful about immigration. When there were further cuts the following year, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (the peak business body) was very critical. By February 1998 the Business Council was again, very publicly, calling for a higher intake, especially of skilled workers. In 1999, the Government started to expand the overall immigration program and the intake more than doubled from 70,200 in 1999-2000 to 142,933 in 2005-2006.


83 On the mechanics of the coup against Howard see Kelly *The end of certainty* pp. 467-486, especially 476. Also see Geoff Kitney and Robert Reid ‘Howard faces renewed leadership pressure’ *Australian financial review* 16 August 1988, p. 1.


85 Ian Salmon ‘Immigration works’ *Age* 8 January 1996, p. 11; Michael Millett ‘PM denies bowing to Hanson on migrant cuts’ *Sydney morning herald* 23 May 1997, p. 1; Gabrielle Chan ‘We are not racist
When Pauline Hanson vilified Aborigines and Asian immigrants John Howard let her rip, defending her right to attack them. In response, the president of the Business Council ‘warned that continued misconceptions among regional neighbours concerning Australia’s commitment to Asia would reflect poorly on the Prime Minister’.\(^{86}\) This was code for ‘Howard’s implicit endorsement of anti-Asian racism will undermine profitable economic relations with Asia, in the form of trade, investment, immigration and tourism: he should bloody stop it’.

Hanson’s One Nation Party won a quarter of the votes in the June 1998 elections in Queensland. In the run up to the October 1998 federal elections, concerned about rising support for One Nation’s anti-Asian policies, important sections of the capitalist class intervened. The Business Council joined the ACTU, the Council of Social Services and Christian and Jewish religious leaders to attack One Nation over the issue of Asian immigration. Although Hanson and her Party were at least as venomous about Aborigines, Indigenous Australians were not mentioned in the joint statement.\(^ {87}\) Berri also paid for television commercials that attacked racism while promoting its fruit juice. At the time the company was also trying to open up new markets in Asia.\(^ {88}\)

While a few individual business people have sometimes spoken out, we have seen no such mobilisations by capital or its organisations against further targeting of Aborigines or the promotion of racism against refugees, Muslims and Arabs.\(^ {89}\) When the conservative foreign editor of the *Australian* took exception to the Coalition’s racist campaign for the 2001 elections, he could quote former public servants, former senior Liberal MPs and academics, but no business people. Members of the private capitalist class were similarly absent from the *Sydney morning herald’s* list of prominent critics of the Government’s and opposition’s refugee policies.\(^ {90}\) Not only Governments and sections of the mass media but the capitalist class as a whole, although sensitive about the economic implications of anti-

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89 Mining millionaire Joe Gutnick was an exception in his criticisms of the Government’s 1997 land rights legislation, Barry FitzGerald ‘Gutnick refuses to join Wik push’ *Age* 26 November 1997, p. 3. Stan Wallis, president of the Business Council, was critical of Howard’s tactic of threatening a double dissolution election if the Senate did not pass his new land rights legislation. But the Business Council did not actually oppose the legislation and asserted that it was not racist, Lenore Taylor ‘Wallis calls for calm on Wik’ *Australian financial review* 12 November 1997, p. 4.
Asian xenophobia, benefited from and was complicit in the campaigns against refugees, Arabs and Muslims.

**Resisting racism**

Years of campaigning by imprisoned refugees and the sustained solidarity movement on the outside eventually led to very widespread opposition to the Government’s policies of locking up ‘asylum seekers’. The Howard Government had to water down its own policies.

A week after the Cronulla riot, between one and two thousand people protested ‘United against racism’ in Sydney. During August 2006, demonstrations of up to 50,000 people protested against Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the Howard government’s support for it. These effective mobilisations and Hezbollah’s defeat of the Israeli army helped rebuild the self-confidence of Australian Muslims and Arabs.

In January 2007, 56 per cent ‘opposed the Government’s treatment’ of Australian Muslim convert David Hicks, captured in Afghanistan with Taliban forces in 2001 and held, with the agreement of the Australian Government, in the US prison at Guantanamo Bay. This was not a spontaneous shift in public opinion, from majority support for Hicks’ incarceration. It was the result of a campaign from below. Given the link to Australian foreign policy and overseas developments, scepticism about Australian participation in the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq raised questions about the plausibility of anti-Muslim racism. A majority of people in Australia and the largest demonstrations in the country’s history had opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003. While support for the Government grew during the invasion, Iraqi and Afghan resistance to the occupations meant that by July 2007 64 per cent of those surveyed opposed Australian involvement in Iraq. Sixty two per cent opposed US involvement there. Australian involvement in Afghanistan was opposed by 51 per cent and US involvement by 50 per cent. The Labor Party was critical of

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92 Maley ‘PM suddenly finds a heart’.
93 Wendy Frew ‘Out in force to foster harmony’ *Sydney morning herald* 19 December 2005 p. 4; Diane Fieldes personal communication, press estimates of Sydney rallies were lower e.g. 15,000 Alyssa Braithwaite ‘Marchers around world plead for peace to be given a chance’ *Sydney morning herald* 24 July 2006, p. 9; although the *Canberra times* called one ‘massive’, ‘Fury as Israel steps up war in Lebanon’ 23 July 2006, p. 6.
Australian participation in the occupation of Iraq, but supported Australia’s role in the war in Afghanistan.\footnote{United States Study Centre, University of Sydney ‘Australian attitudes towards the United States: foreign policy, security, economics and trade, 2007 United States Studies Centre National Survey Results, Part 1, presentation by Professor Murray Goot’ 3 October 2007 http://sydney.edu.au/us-studies/docs/Survey%20Presentation-3%20Oct%2007-Part%201.pdf, accessed 19 January 2008.}

A decline in the appeal of xenophobic racism in Australia was an important element in the outcome of the November 2007 federal election.

As we have seen, the Government had been forced, in 2005, to back away from its harsh treatment of refugees arriving by boat. In the run up to the 2007 elections, efforts to revive fear of terrorism and Muslims were relatively unsuccessful. Australian security forces and the Government targeted Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor working in Australia, because he was the cousin of one of the people involved in the terrorist attacks in the UK at the end of June. His arrest was used to whip up paranoia and to justify the introduction of legislation to expand police powers. When a magistrate released Haneef on bail, Immigration Minister Andrews prevented him from leaving the country by revoking his visa on ‘character grounds’ and throwing him into immigration detention, until his court hearing. This move was supported by the Labor Party. It subsequently emerged that false information had been used to justify the prosecution of Haneef and the charges were dropped.\footnote{Alexandra Symonds and John Kerin ‘Haneef visa revoked after bail shock’ \textit{Australian financial review} 17 July 2007, pp. 1, 4; David Marr ‘Just an ordinary life’ \textit{Sydney morning herald} 21-22 July 2007 pp. 28, 28; John Kerin ‘Haneef freed as case collapses’ \textit{Australian financial review} 28-29 July 2007, p. 5; Tom Allard ‘New secret search powers’ \textit{Sydney morning herald} 1 August 2007 p. 1. John Clarke, who conducted an inquiry for the Rudd Government into the affair drew attention to the political motives behind the cancellation of Haneef’s visa in understated language: ‘although I found no evidence of conspiracy or an improper purpose, I do find the cancellation—and particularly its timing—mystifying’, M. J. Clarke \textit{Report of the inquiry into the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef}, Volume One Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 2008, p. viii.}

The Haneef debacle did not prevent Andrews from dealing another racist card, this time from the anti-black rather than anti-Muslim suit. On 1 October, he cut the intake of Sudanese refugees because ‘some groups don’t seem to be settling and adjusting into the Australian way of life.’ This revelation came in the course of an interview prompted by the racist murder of a Sudanese refugee in Melbourne. Andrews added that the Sudanese came from ‘a vastly different culture’ and formed ‘race based’ African gangs.\footnote{Farah Farouque, Andrea Petrie and Daniella Miletic ‘Minister speaks on Africans’ \textit{Age} 2 October 2007, p. 2; Kevin Andrews ‘Refugee and Humanitarian Intake 2007-08’, 4 October 2007 media release http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2007/ka07104.htm, accessed 5 October 2007.}

During the 2007 election campaign, a member of the NSW State Executive of the Liberal Party and the husbands of the retiring Liberal member and the new Liberal candidate for the marginal Sydney seat of Lindsay were discovered distributing a fake leaflet. It was
supposedly issued by a (non-existent) Muslim organization and endorsed the Labor Party because it supposedly forgave the Islamist bombers who killed many Australians visiting Bali in 2003 and supported the construction of a new mosque. The outgoing MP tried to dismiss the leaflet as a joke. But the joke was on Howard: race was far less important to voters than recent rises in interest rates and the class question of industrial relations, around which unions had mobilised. Labor won in a landslide while John Howard lost his own seat.

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