

Perceptions of Electoral Fairness

Public Behaviour and Institutional Design Compared across 80 Countries

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Preface

Andrew James Klassen wrote this PhD thesis in the School of Politics and International Relations at the Australian National University. It is his original work and was not written by any other authors. The supervisory committee consisted of Professor Keith Dowding as chair, with Doctor Juliet Pietsch and Doctor Sean Burges as advisors. Andrew James Klassen identified the research problem and designed the research project with the help of Professor Keith Dowding. Additional advice was provided by Doctor Michael Miller, Professor Ian McAllister and Professor Jeffry Karp. However, Andrew James Klassen performed all data management, analysis of results, and manuscript preparation.

This PhD thesis is the source material for a conference paper and four drafted journal articles. The conference paper, entitled *Electoral Management Body Design and Clean Elections: A Cross-National Analysis from Latin America*, was presented at the annual Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) conference 24-26 September 2012 in Hobart, Tasmania. Four other papers have been drafted from this thesis project and are currently at different stages of completion, with the intention of submitting them to peer-reviewed journals during 2014 and 2015.

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Abstract

This thesis conducts a cross-national analysis of perceived electoral fairness across 80 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The main research question is focused on uncovering the determinants of perceived electoral fairness. The thesis analyses two broad groups of variables, with the chapter structures following from this distinction. The first set of variables arises from a meta-analysis of previous studies to ascertain the strongest determinants of electoral fairness. This entails testing as many individual and national level variables as possible across as many countries as possible to reveal any global trends or regional differences. The second set of variables arise from two theoretical models of electoral management body (EMB) design, both of which focus on evaluating the merits of EMB independence or autonomy from the ruling government. Once again, the approach is to examine as many electoral management design variables as possible across as many regions as possible. Results unexpectedly indicate frequent negative associations between EMB independence and perceived electoral fairness. The thesis considers different possibilities for these unexpected negative results, with the most probable cause being the many independent EMBs in authoritarian democracies included in this study. The thesis uses multivariate ordered probit and multilevel mixed-effects regression models to conduct analyses at the national, regional, and global levels. Public survey data comes from the AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, AmericasBarometer, AsianBarometer, and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. National level indicators come from the Quality of Government, Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Electoral Knowledge Network, and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

Keywords: electoral management, electoral fairness, institutional design, elections, public opinion

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List of Abbreviations

ACE	(Administration and Cost of Elections) Network
COMELEC	The Philippine Commission on Elections
COPA	Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CSES	The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
EMB	Electoral Management Body
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PR	Proportional Representation
QoG	Quality of Government
UN	United Nations

Chapter 1. Introduction

This thesis analyses why public perceptions of electoral fairness differ between individuals across a wide selection of countries. It examines a wide range of psychological, political, economic and other factors that could affect public perceptions. Special attention is placed on the electoral commissions, courts, and government departments running elections. These electoral management bodies (EMBs) play a substantial role in determining how free and fair elections are perceived. Ask two people in the same country about the fairness of the most recent national election and you often get two very different answers. One may think it was completely free and fair, while the other may think it was not at all free or fair. They are talking about the same election and answering the same survey question, but differing attitudes arise in almost every democracy after almost every election. One could argue that the objective fairness of elections matters more than subjective attitudes, but aggregated public perceptions closely parallel expert assessments of electoral fairness or integrity (Norris, Frank, & Martinez i Coma, 2013: 133; Rosas, 2010: 76). It is arguably more important to understand variation between individual perceptions, since disgruntled members of the public, most of who are not experts, are the people who demonstrate, protest, and even riot following a questionable election. In extreme cases, this can lead to violent regime change (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013). Elections perceived as unfair by large numbers of citizens are thus potential triggers for political instability. Perceptions of electoral fairness are especially relevant in transitional democracies, where individuals may lose confidence in democratic governance if elections are perceived as pervasively fraudulent or corrupt.

The broad objective of this research is to understand what general features of individuals and electoral management bodies influence perceptions of electoral fairness. While a great deal of literature analyses electoral fairness and case studies of electoral misconduct (Albaugh, 2011; Alston & Gallo, 2010; Birch, 2007; Bratton, 2008; Callahan, 2005; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq & Molina, 2002; Ziblatt, 2009), relatively few empirical cross-national studies focus on the general features included in this thesis (Birch, 2010; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Lindberg, 2005; Norris, 2013a) or on the bodies running elections (Birch, 2008; Elklit & Reynolds, 2005b; Hartlyn, McCoy, &

Mustillo, 2008; Rosas, 2010). Determinants of perceived electoral fairness include individual level factors, which come from public surveys, and national level indicators, which describe country conditions and how EMBs are designed. Some of the strongest individual level findings suggest partisanship and participation play an important role. For example, people who support winners of the most recent elections tend to make more positive assessments of electoral fairness than those who support losing parties or candidates (Birch, 2008; Craig, Martinez, Jason, & Kane, 2006; Moehler, 2009). In addition, simply voting in an election, regardless of for which party or candidate, is associated with more positive attitudes (McAllister & White, 2011: 676-677), but those who voted for winners obviously express greater levels of satisfaction (Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 562). The current study confirms these relationships, finding that both voting for and identifying with election winners are strong predictors of perceived electoral fairness, and that this relationship holds whether supporting winning coalitions or majorities. It also confirms that people who express no political affiliations or do not participate in elections tend to have negative attitudes towards electoral fairness. Examples of previous national level findings are that better-established political rights and electoral systems using proportional representation are associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch, 2007; 2008: 312-313; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 739-740). Proportional systems are better at achieving representation, especially for minorities and election losers because they produce more inclusive elections outcomes (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1984, 1999; Lindberg, 2005: 61-62), while political rights include freedoms that facilitate electoral participation, such as those for association, assembly and petition. The current research supports the positive relationship for proportional representation systems, but found that civil liberties, such as freedoms of expression and movement, are more important than political rights. This thesis examines many more factors, indicators and EMB design elements to see which determine perceptions of electoral fairness.

Many proposed determinants included in this thesis either have only been researched across a limited selection of countries, or have not yet been examined with perceptions of electoral fairness. Most studies cover one or a few countries, a single region or use only one dataset. For example, McAllister and White (2011) examine

perceived electoral fairness in Russia, Rosas (2010) analyses electoral trust in Latin America, while Birch (2008) looks at perceptions of the electoral process using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset, which is dominated by European countries. This thesis extends this work by taking a broader approach using five datasets to examine perceived electoral fairness in eighty countries, allowing comparisons between Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas.

To compensate for the overall lack of research on electoral fairness, the current study looks to related topics such as democratic satisfaction, electoral participation, and institutional trust. While the correlations between these subjects and electoral fairness are usually positive, they are not strong enough to assume identical relationships. We need to confirm these relationships empirically because not all factors are likely to have the same relationship with perceived electoral fairness. For instance, Rahn and Rudolph (2005: 546-548) demonstrate a negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and trust in local government, while Alesina et al. (2003: 158) find that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are both negatively associated with the quality of government. The current study analyses the effects of different types of cultural fractionalization and demonstrates that religious fractionalization has the strongest and more consistently negative relationship with electoral fairness. Due to the wide geographic scope and numerous variables included in this study, it adds many new findings that help us understand perceptions of electoral fairness.

A limitation of many existing electoral fairness studies is that they often only include 'established' or 'liberal' democracies, but not as many 'transitional' or 'authoritarian' democracies. This attention imbalance omits large areas of the world and means that some trends are not fully explained. For example, most previous research uses liberal democracies and find that people with higher education, greater political knowledge and who read newspapers tend to make more positive assessments of electoral fairness and democratic satisfaction (Banducci & Karp, 2003: 463; Birch, 2008: 312-315; Dennis, 1970: 833; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740). However, Moehler (2009) finds a negative relationship between higher education and perceived electoral fairness in Africa. The present research concurs with these past studies, finding that

people with higher education tend to have positive attitudes towards electoral fairness in 'liberal' democracies, but negative attitudes in most 'authoritarian' democracies. The same flipped relationships exist for political knowledge and newspaper attention as well. The obvious explanation is that educated people have a better understanding of the objective realities of electoral fairness and so education and political knowledge reflects in their attitudes to the reality of what is happening in their respective nations.

Perhaps the least researched yet potentially most important determinant of electoral fairness is the design of electoral management bodies (EMBs). These institutions are responsible for running elections and have a great deal of control over electoral fairness. EMBs can be independent agencies or commissions, relatively free from control by the incumbent government, or government departments under the direct control of incumbent officials. An extensive body of literature advocates independent EMBs because they increase electoral integrity by increasing professionalism and reducing conflicts of interest arising from political parties and officials seeking to stay in power (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006). However, despite the many proponents of independent EMBs, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Two cross-national studies that examined EMB independence revealed a strong negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness (Birch, 2008; Rosas, 2010). This is problematic because many newer democracies have established independent EMBs (Elklit, 1999; Elklit & Reynolds, 2002; Pastor, 1999b) and many international organizations continue to advocate the independent model (EC, 2006; Hounkpe & Fall, 2011; López-Pintor, 2000; OAS, 2009; Wall et al., 2006). The current research analyses EMB independence in more detail across more countries than previous studies, but most findings for EMBs are either negative or insignificant. In other words, evidence suggests relationships in the opposite direction than the theories predict. Most independent EMBs are established in transitional democracies and countries with histories of unfair elections (Birch, 2008: 313). Perceived unfairness probably leads to the establishment of independent EMBs rather than independent EMBs leading to perceived unfairness. One of the few positive findings in the present

research is that older independent EMBs are associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness. Future research may therefore produce positive results.

The remainder of this chapter covers background topics relating to electoral fairness and electoral management before previewing subsequent chapters. The next sections provide a better understanding of what is meant by electoral fairness and why this topic is under-researched. This includes some contextual background surrounding electoral institutions and a more detailed description of the main thesis research objectives. Each chapter, except the introduction and conclusion, is then outlined previewed.

1.1. Understanding Electoral Fairness

This thesis uses the term 'electoral fairness' to refer to the degree to which structures, systems and outcomes of electoral governance are equitable, impartial, and universal. A variety of terms have however been used interchangeably to refer to electoral fairness, which could result in some confusion. Rosas (2010) used surveys that ask about clean versus rigged or fraudulent elections, but construed this question in a variety of ways. He argued that it tapped into the 'credibility of elections' and elicited responses regarding 'trust in the electoral process' (Rosas, 2010: 75). This mixing of terms is prevalent throughout the literature. Phrases like 'electoral credibility' (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002), 'electoral integrity' (Birch, 2008; Norris, 2013a, 2013b), 'electoral quality', 'electoral trust' (Rosas, 2010) and 'electoral fairness' (Birch, 2010) are often used interchangeably when referring to assessments of elections. Electoral processes are similarly evaluated according to their freeness, fairness, impartiality, honesty, credibility, trustworthiness, cleanliness, or quality. This miscellany of terms occurs on the negative side of evaluations as well, with words such as fraudulent, flawed, rigged and unfair all describing unacceptable elections. Different interpretations of survey questions are clearly plausible for both negative and positive public opinions. Ultimately, survey respondents are indicating their acceptance, satisfaction, approval, or support for elections or the electoral process. The use of the phrase 'perceived electoral fairness' in this thesis comes from a desire for a broadly understood term that captures the essence of the topic, while also specifying that the

data arises from public opinion and refers to perceptions. The analysis does not examine objective levels of electoral fairness, since actors behind electoral misconduct will usually seek to keep their activities out of public view. However, aggregate public perceptions of electoral fairness usually parallel expert and elite assessments surprisingly accurately (Norris et al., 2013: 133; Rosas, 2010: 76).

Perceptions of electoral fairness depend on processes and outcomes (Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Wilking, 2011), which includes elements of both procedural and substantive fairness. Procedural fairness generally focuses on practices and processes, or procedures. It exists when electoral regulations, laws, and policies are created and implemented impartially. This entails applying the same rules and standards to different actors and not having anything to gain by treating one actor favourably or discriminating against another (Chambers, 1996: 139; Gert, 1995: 104). People who perceive greater degrees of procedural fairness are more likely to trust political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997; 2001: 52), vote in elections (Birch, 2010), comply with laws (Tyler, 1990) and refrain from protesting (Pastor, 1999b; Schedler, 2002b). Substantive fairness on the other hand generally focuses on arrangements and structures, or the substantive outcomes. It is achieved by creating a 'level playing field' where the values of neutrality and equality can reinforce free and fair elections (Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002). Perceptions of substantive fairness depend on more permanent conditions and circumstances than on procedures. For example, a law can be followed impartially and achieve procedural fairness, but still be a substantively unfair law that results in unjust outcomes. Substantive electoral fairness is realized when electoral structures are impartial and the circumstances surrounding elections are equitable. Electoral governance structures that bestow disproportionate power to some actors while systematically marginalizing others will minimize substantive fairness. Underprivileged or discriminated groups are not likely to view the system as fair and are therefore less inclined to cooperate and comply with governing actors. Both substantive and procedural fairness are essential for perceptions of electoral fairness, and deficiencies in either can be associated with accusations of injustice or electoral malfeasance.

1.2. Political Systems and Electoral Management

Most democracies are broadly based on either a parliamentary or presidential model, often following the paradigmatic examples set by the United Kingdom or United States. Achieving impartial electoral management can be problematic in both systems because they were not designed with modern political parties in mind, but the tripartite separation of powers in presidential systems can obscure conflicts of interest. Designers of the American Constitution “put no faith in party competition” as a means of balancing power and ensuring impartiality (Hofstadter, 1969: 50). When the tripartite separation of powers was created, political and legal theorists had little experience with anything resembling modern, organized, and enduring political parties:

No place was made for the parties in the system, party government was not clearly foreseen or well understood, government by parties was thought to be impossible or impracticable and was feared and regarded as something to be avoided. The Founding Fathers knew intuitively that party competition, if given a chance, would upset their calculations (Schattschneider, 1942: 6-7).

Most constitutions written before the emergence of modern political parties are not designed to contend with their effects on the political system. Under a ‘classical’ model of electoral governance, the executive branch manages elections and the legislative branch approves their results. This arrangement relies upon inter-branch competition and an assumption that each branch guards its responsibility to prevent fraudulent elections (Lehoucq, 2002: 30). The model works reasonably well as long as opposed political parties control the executive and legislative branches. However, this classical model is disabled when one party or coalition controls both the executive and legislative branches (Lehoucq, 2002: 42). This is particularly problematic for presidential systems, but parties also upset the balance between the more fused executive and legislative branches in parliamentary systems. The classical model of electoral governance therefore became anachronistic after the emergence of modern political parties. However, approximately three-quarters of advanced industrialized

countries still divide electoral governance between the executive and legislative branches (Pastor, 1999b: 7).

A solution to the emergence of political parties, one that many newer democracies have adopted, is to isolate the 'electoral function' as separate from the executive and legislative functions. The result is often a fourth branch of government or a permanent and constitutionally protected independent body. Austria (1920), Czechoslovakia (1920) and Greece (1927) were among the first countries to give constitutional status to their electoral institutions (Lehoucq, 2002: 30). Electoral bodies established and protected by a constitution are harder to change or manipulate, since requirements for constitutional amendments are usually more stringent than for regular legislation. This practice is most widespread in Latin America, where Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela have constitutionally independent electoral management bodies or additional branches of government dedicated to overseeing electoral affairs (Blaustein, 1993; Maddex, 2007; Pastor, 2004; Taylor, 1955). Most third-wave democracies around the world have adopted the model of an independent and usually permanent electoral management body (Elklit, 1999; Elklit & Reynolds, 2002; Pastor, 1999b). The independent model has been successful at supporting electoral integrity and scholars have argued for its adoption in older democracies. Tugwell (1974: 599-601) advocated the establishment of an independent electoral branch in the United States to help ensure fair and impartial electoral governance. Ackerman (2000: 718) likewise recommended a 'democracy branch' to impartially manage electoral affairs, emphasizing the importance of constitutional protections against "the predictable efforts by reigning politicians to entrench themselves". Most arguments and theories regarding electoral governance advocate the independent model.

Electoral management bodies are the institutions responsible for the essential tasks of running elections and conducting most associated tasks. They can exist at any level of government that holds elections, but this thesis focuses on the national level, and there are many types of electoral management body. The term 'Electoral Management Body' (EMB) is a catchall phrase that refers to all these different bodies

and institutions (See Appendix D for a full list).¹ The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) handbook provides a general definition:

An EMB is an organization or body which has the sole purpose of, and is legally responsible for, managing some or all of the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections and of direct democracy instruments – such as referendums, citizens’ initiatives and recall votes – if those are part of the legal framework (Wall et al., 2006: 5).

While differing in their specific mandates, responsibility for a core set of tasks defines whether an institution is considered an EMB. These include determining voter eligibility, receiving and validating electoral participant nominations, conducting polling, counting votes and tabulating results (Wall et al., 2006: 5). Any institution that performs one of these core tasks can qualify, meaning multiple EMBs may exist within one country. In addition to these core tasks, EMBs may also be responsible for voter registration, boundary delineation, voter education, media monitoring, political party regulation, political finance regulation, and electoral dispute resolution (López-Pintor, 2000; Pastor, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006: 63). The responsibilities on this second list are not core tasks, so other government agencies or independent bodies may perform them without being called EMBs.

Strong, professional and impartial electoral management bodies can make a substantial contribution to building public trust in elections. To do so, an EMB must impartially apply the same rules to different political actors, which necessitates not having anything to gain by treating two other actors differently (Gert, 1995). This does not necessarily require all parties be treated equally, but rather that all parties be treated as equal (Dworkin, 1977), holding them to the same standards (Chambers,

¹ They frequently have names composed of the words ‘election’ or ‘electoral’ combined with ‘commission’, ‘department’, ‘committee’, ‘board’, ‘council’, ‘tribunal’, or ‘court’ (ACE, 2012). National institution names usually include the words ‘central’, ‘national’, ‘supreme’ or the name of the country. For example, the ‘Central Election Commission’ in Russia and the ‘Election Commission of India’.

1996). Flawed or unfair electoral management can forestall nascent democratic transitions, provoke violent protests or, under exceptional circumstances, lead to revolutions and civil war (Pastor, 1999b).

While EMBs play a critical role in ensuring free and fair elections, relatively little was known about them until recently. Researchers have largely overlooked or ignored these institutions (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002: 5; Pastor, 1999a: 80) and there are only a handful of empirical cross-national studies examining the relationship between EMB design and public perceptions of electoral integrity (Birch, 2008; 2011: 109-132; Rosas, 2010). This kind of study has been difficult for two pragmatic reasons: a lack of properly encoded datasets relating to EMB design, and the fact that multilevel regression methods require substantial computing power. Consequently, most research used smaller samples, qualitative case study methods, and anecdotal evidence or adopted an overly simplistic view of EMB design. Previous quantitative research reduced numerous aspects of institutional configuration into one dichotomous variable, limiting the usefulness of any findings. Research into EMB design has increased slightly in the last decade, but most aspects of electoral management remain empirically unexamined and under-specified. The current project seeks to rectify this situation by researching EMB design in considerable detail.

1.3. Researching Electoral Fairness

Until recently, we did not know much about the details and dynamics of electoral misconduct. Thanks to collaborative research efforts and election observer missions, we are now aware of the wide range of activities that undermine electoral integrity (Lehoucq, 2003; Lehoucq & Molina, 2002; Molina & Lehoucq, 1999). We know it is problematic in both competitive races, where it can decide outcomes and lead to political instability, as well as less competitive races, where it can damage electoral credibility and prevent the consolidation of democracy and electoral institutions (Lehoucq, 2003: 21). Similar problems can arise no matter how competitive the election. Voters can face unfair disenfranchisement, intimidation, misinformation, or misleading ballots. Problems in electoral governance can arise from partisan patronage, cronyism, nepotism, bribery or kickbacks. Balloting can be corrupted

through miscounting votes, vote buying, absentee vote abuse, ballot destruction, vote invalidation, noncitizen voting, or ballot stuffing. Many of these problems arise from corrupted electoral management, but this is an under-research topic.

The lack of research into electoral fairness is unfortunate because electoral malfeasance is a continuing problem in both established and transitional democracies. Electoral fraud may occur more frequently in transitional or authoritarian democracies, but political elites in established liberal democracies also engage in corrupt practices to gain control of electoral management and win elections (James, 2011: 235). After the 1996 general election in the United States, both major parties accused each other of voter fraud, with misused absentee ballots in Louisiana and noncitizen voting in California (Pastor, 1999a: 75). Controversy struck again surrounding vote counting during the 2000 Florida election in the United States (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002: 9-10). Local 2004 elections in the United Kingdom were voided for two districts by the High Court because of corrupt and illegal practices made possible by insufficient safeguards (Stewart, 2006: 660-662). In Canada, the 2011 federal elections witnessed illegal fundraising, spending limit abuses, and deceptive communications with voters (Elections Canada, 2013). Transitional democracies are more susceptible to electoral fraud because they often have to contend with the additional challenge of insufficient technical expertise or resources required for the complexities of running elections (Pastor, 1999a: 77-78). Electoral fairness is not guaranteed, even in established democracies, and impartial electoral management remains important for all types of democracy.

Pastor (1999a: 75-77) has speculated that researchers in industrialized nations have not examined electoral fraud within their countries because it is assumed to be minimal. The problem is somewhat mitigated in established democracies by two factors that are less applicable in newer and developing democracies. First, a political culture of impartiality and professionalism tends to exist within the electoral institutions of established democracies. These values are usually more entrenched in older democracies, but may not have had a chance to take hold in newer democracies. Corruption and bribery may be endemic, nepotism and cronyism may be the norm, and free and fair elections can be much harder to achieve as a result. Second, a

government or incumbent caught meddling in advanced democracies stands a greater chance of being caught and losing legitimacy and support. It is less likely that governments in developing countries are caught committing electoral fraud, giving them less of an incentive to refrain from electoral misconduct. This is often because informal and less visible channels of manipulation are more pervasive or the media is not as free from control by the incumbent government. Even if it is free from government interference, mass media channels may not reach the entire population because of limited infrastructure, lower ownership rates of radios and televisions or low literacy rates. This is not to say advanced democracies are entirely free electoral fraud, just that the problem appears more prevalent in newer democracies. These democracies may also be more fragile, which means unsatisfactory perceptions of electoral fairness could hinder democratic consolidation and push countries into becoming a more autocratic. Unfair elections in established democracies are less likely to undermine public confidence in the system of government, since people will recognise them as aberrations rather than the norm, but they may have more detrimental effects amongst populations new to democratic governance.

In summary, this thesis looks at why perceptions of electoral fairness differ and which variables have the greatest effects on those perceptions. The dependent variable is therefore perceived electoral fairness and there are two types of independent variables: individual level factors from public surveys and national level indicators from institutional datasets. National level variables include the different variables used to measure EMB design elements. The remainder of this chapter provides a structural overview of the thesis.

1.4. Structural Outline of Thesis


There are six chapters in this thesis besides the introduction and conclusion. There are two literature chapters, two methods chapters, and two results chapters. These follow the dual objectives of this thesis: examining determinants and analysing electoral management bodies for their effects on perceptions of electoral fairness. Chapters 2, 4 and 6 focus on individual and national level factors, while chapters 3, 5 and 7 focus

on the design of electoral management bodies. The following sections preview each of these chapters.

Chapter 2: Conventional Explanations of Electoral Fairness

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on factors that have demonstrated effects on perceived electoral fairness, or related types of political trust. The chapter is split based on a distinction between individual and national level variables. Section 2.1 explains all individual level factors, such as age and gender, which come from cross-national public surveys. Section 2.2 covers national level indicators that are not related to electoral management, which are reviewed in Chapter 3, such as GDP per capita and media freedom scores. The chapter examines over twenty individual level factors and almost twenty national level indicators. The purpose of examining so many variables is to determine the strongest predictors of electoral fairness. Sets of variables are structured around thematic groupings to make them more accessible. The following paragraphs outline the main parts of the chapter, starting with individual level factors, which are displayed in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: Summary of Individual Level Groupings




Both the individual and national level variables included in this study were selected based on one or more of three broad justifications. First, some are included to account for their known effects because they have demonstrated consistent associations with electoral fairness. For instance, people with high incomes and electoral systems using proportional representation have both revealed positive relationships with perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch, 2007, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740). High-income individuals express positive attitudes because this classification defines a group that benefits and prospers in the current system. Proportional representation systems are favoured because they produce election results that more closely represent voter preferences. The second justification for including variables is that many have only been analysed using a limited set of countries or produced mixed results. For example, higher education has demonstrated a negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness in Africa, a weak positive relationship in Latin America, but insignificant results in Russia (McAllister & White,

2011; Moehler, 2009; Rosas, 2010). Examining mixed and under-researched variables across more countries, regions, and datasets should provide a better understanding of their relationships with perceived electoral fairness. The third justification for including variables is that they have not been analysed with perceived electoral fairness but are likely to demonstrate effects. For example, individual assessments of the economy and national level economic indicators have shown strong associations with other kinds of political support, such as democratic satisfaction and institutional trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Kotzian, 2011; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Lühiste, 2006; Wong, Wan, & Hsiao, 2011). However, previous cross-national studies on electoral fairness have not included these variables. They are incorporated within the present study because they are likely to have effects.

Figure 1.2 outlines how national level indicators are thematically grouped throughout this thesis. The groupings have similarities with the individual level groupings, but differ because national level factors usually come from institutional sources and apply to entire countries. The literature explaining these indicators is included in section 2.2.

Figure 1.2: Summary of National Level Groupings



To summarize, this chapter provides an overview of the individual level factors and national level indicators in this study. It explains the theoretical justifications for selecting variables and their expected relationship with perceived electoral fairness. Variables are included to control for known effects, examine them for clearer trends, or because they have not been examined with electoral fairness. The next chapter reviews the literature on electoral management body design.

Chapter 3: The Role of Electoral Management Bodies


Chapter 3 reviews two electoral management body models that supposed to enhance electoral integrity and fairness. The first is the conventional independent model, explained in section 3.1, which is when the body running elections is separate from government. The independent model is promoted by most scholars because it

separates electoral management from the incumbent government, which may seek to manipulate the electoral process to maintain power (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006). The model is one broad type in a threefold typology that also includes the governmental model, when the executive government runs elections, and the mixed model, when elections are run by a combination of independent and governmental bodies (Wall et al., 2006).

Despite its numerous supporters, relatively few cross-national studies have empirically analysed how EMB design affects perceptions of electoral fairness. Research by Birch (2008) and Rosas (2010) unexpectedly revealed a negative or muted relationship between EMB independence and perceived electoral fairness. The variable usually used to represent independence conflates all aspects of EMB design into one dichotomous value, making it insufficiently detailed to be useful. This thesis separates EMB design into its component parts to gain a better understanding of which features have the strongest association with perceptions of electoral fairness. Those with positive effects could be incorporated within national EMBs, while those with negative effects can be avoided or reformed. This approach has already demonstrated that shielding EMB appointments from partisan control and selecting members based on their expertise has a positive effect on the quality of elections (Hartlyn et al., 2008). Reforming electoral institutions can increase political trust and evaluations of democracy (Cho & Bratton, 2006), but we need more research to make better decisions based on empirical evidence.


This chapter seeks to layout two EMB models in as much detail as possible, with each element discussed separately. Designing better EMBs is important for increasing electoral fairness, voter participation, democratic legitimacy and political trust. This research will therefore be of interest to constitution writers, legislators, policy makers, governments, election observers, academics, non-governmental organisations and anyone interested in enhancing electoral integrity. The design elements summarised in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 are briefly introduced in subsequent paragraphs.

Figure 1.3: Summary of Conventional Independent Model



The conventional independent model is composed of seven criteria, but data is only available for six of these: implementation of core election tasks, powers to propose electoral reforms and settle electoral disputes, budgetary and expenditure discretion, formal accountability to legislature, member selection by non-executive actors, and fixed terms of office. Figure 1.3 summarises these six criteria and the available variables used to measure them. Section 3.1 explains the criteria and their constituent elements as well as their anticipated relationships with perceived electoral fairness. In general, greater independence from the incumbent government is expected to increase perceptions of electoral fairness.

Figure 1.4: Summary of Categorized Autonomy Model



The second model of electoral management design, summarised in Figure 1.4 and further explained in section 3.2, is the categorised autonomy model. This fourfold framework of EMB design was developed by Van Aaken (2009), but has not yet been empirically investigated. The framework unpacks the conventional independent model by distinguishing between types of autonomy: institutional, financial, personnel and functional. Institutional autonomy refers to whether EMBs are separate institutions with their own legal personality and not part of a government department or under the supervisions of a minister. Financial autonomy refers to how much budgetary and expenditure discretion an EMB enjoys free from governmental control. Personnel autonomy refers to whether EMB staff appointment processes and employment tenures are insulated from government interference. The fourth category, functional autonomy, is increased if an EMB with institutional, financial and personnel autonomy

performs more tasks related to electoral management. This covers the most topics and is the biggest category of autonomy. The purpose of each type of autonomy is to restrict the influence of incumbent officials who may seek to maintain power by manipulating the electoral process. All four types of autonomy are vital, but functional autonomy is arguably more important because it includes electoral tasks more likely to receive public attention, such as voter registration and ballot counting.

It is important to note the different terminology used throughout this thesis to help distinguish between the two models. The first model refers to 'independence' while the second uses 'autonomy'. Both models focus on separating electoral management from government interference and the different terms could be used interchangeably as synonyms. The linguistic distinction between independence and autonomy is used merely for clarifying between the two models so that mentions of independence and autonomy refer to their respective models.

In summary, Chapter 3 outlines the literature for two models of electoral management design. They have received very little comparative research attention, but the few studies that that looked at the independent model found negative or insignificant relationships with perceived electoral fairness. These findings go against the theoretical assumptions and the dichotomous measures of independence they used do not provide sufficiently detailed information. The approach taken in this thesis is to examine as many design elements as possible for their effects on perceived electoral fairness.

Chapter 4: Measuring the Effects of Established Factors

Chapter 4 outlines variables that have demonstrated associations with perceived electoral fairness or other areas of political support. It covers the individual and national level variables, regression methods, data sources, case selection, and data management procedures. However, the primary purpose of the chapter is to outline the individual and national level variables to be analysed with perceived electoral fairness. All individual level variables come from five cross-national surveys: rounds three and four of the AfroBarometer, years 2006 to 2010 of the AmericasBarometer, wave one of the ArabBarometer, wave two of the AsianBarometer and module one of

the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Countries were selected from these datasets based on the requirement that the surveys be conducted as soon as possible after national elections. This approach resulted in selecting eighty countries across six continents, which includes over one hundred and twenty thousand individual surveys. The chapter explains the mundane but necessary tasks of managing multiple dataset and recoding items to create common variables.

The most important common variable is the one measuring perceived electoral fairness. Section 4.1 explains how a common dependent variable was created and describes levels of perceived fairness across the selected countries. The AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, and AsianBarometer use the same four-point electoral fairness question. The AmericasBarometer uses a seven-point electoral trust question, while the CSES uses a five-point question about fairness in the electoral process. The common dependent variable for electoral fairness uses a four-point scale. Levels of perceived electoral fairness are then contrasted to provide a comparative overview.

Section 4.2 focuses on how individual level variables were recoded to facilitate regional comparisons between different datasets. Although the surveys ask many of the same questions, they do not always provide the same possible answers. For example, questions about income sometimes provide answers in quintiles, dollar amounts, or subjective assessments. A solution for income was to create a dichotomous variable representing high-income individuals. This section explains the different techniques employed for creating new individual level variables from the different versions of survey questions. The section also provides key descriptive statistics of most variables to provide a better understanding of their value distributions.

All national level variables are described in section 4.3, except those for electoral management, which are outlined in the next chapter. Most come from the Quality of Government (QoG) dataset (Teorell, Charron, Samanni, Holmberg, & Rothstein, 2011), which combines many other sources. These national level indicators, such as electoral system type or economic growth rate, apply to entire countries rather than individual

survey respondents. This section provides details about how variables were changed in magnitude or recoded so larger values indicated more of the measured concept. For example, values of the Corruptions Perceptions Index were reversed so that larger numbers meant more corruption rather than less.

Section 4.4 explains the multivariate and multilevel regression methodologies used to analyse variables with perceived electoral fairness. Individual level factors are investigated using both ordered probit models and multilevel mixed-effects models, while national level indicators are only measured using multilevel mixed-effects models. Individual level factors are examined using separate country regressions, aggregated regional models, and combined global models. National level variables cannot be tested using separate country models because they apply to the entire nation and there is no variation. The limited numbers of countries in regional datasets means that not very many national level variables can be included in multilevel models. This limitation necessitates using multiple models to test all the national level indicators. All models use the same dependent variable for perceived electoral fairness and standardized beta coefficients. Betas provide a way of analysing which variables have the most explanatory power or strength.

In summary, Chapter 4 focuses on how individual and national level variables were measured and generated. This includes the methods used for creating common variables, including the common dependent variable. The chapter also explains data sources, data management procedures, and country selection requirements.

Chapter 5: Exploring the Effects of Electoral Management Design

Chapter 5 describes the variables for the two electoral management models and the methods used to analyse their associations with perceived electoral fairness. The chapter is divided into four main parts, two for each of the EMB models. Section 5.1 outlines the conventional independent model and section 5.2 explains the methods for analysing its effects on perceived electoral fairness. Similarly, sections 5.3 and 5.4 do the same for the categorised autonomy model. Both EMB models are analysed using multilevel mixed-effects regressions. Multiple regression models are necessary for analysing each EMB design because the datasets do not include sufficient numbers of

countries to test many national level variables. Data for measuring the two EMB designs comes from ACE (Administration and Cost of Elections) Electoral Knowledge Network and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

Section 5.1 outlines the variables for the conventional independent model. Its subsections describe the available data for the six independent EMB model criteria: implementation, powers, budget, accountability, member selection, and terms of office. These criteria were originally laid out by Wall et al. (2006) in *Electoral Management Design*, but they have been modified slightly based on available data. The intention motivating independent EMB model criteria is to limit executive government control over electoral management and increase the integrity of elections. For example, the accountability criterion specifies that EMBs report to the legislature rather than the executive, while the budget criterion requires that EMB budgets be separate from executive departments or ministries. Section 5.2 then explains how the different independent model criteria are analysed with perceived electoral fairness. It also lays out the logical structure of data and the necessary conditions for constructing the criteria variables.

Categorised autonomy model data and variables are explained in section 5.3, which is structured around the different categories of autonomy. The original fourfold framework was outlined by Van Aaken (2009), and differentiates between institutional, financial, personnel and functional autonomy. Institutional autonomy considers the legal personality, accountability, permanence, and constitutional status of EMBs. Financial autonomy depends upon which actors determine EMB budgets control expenditures. Personnel autonomy takes into account member appointments, selection criteria, and security of tenure. Functional autonomy is the most important category and includes eight different electoral management tasks. Counting an EMB as having functional autonomy requires a minimal level of autonomy across the other three categories. The assumption is that electoral fairness will be enhanced if *autonomous* EMBs perform more core electoral functions (van Aaken, 2009: 313). The multiple variables composing the autonomy categories are tested separately before analysing additive indices for each category. Section 5.4 outlines how the variables and indices are created as well as the regression models used to analyse them.

In summary, Chapter 5 describes the variables and indices needed for examining the two EMB models with perceived electoral fairness. It explains the six criteria for the conventional independent model and the four categories for the categorised autonomy model. The chapter outlines how available data was adapted to fit the theoretical models as closely as possible and how additive index variables were created. The chapter also explains the multilevel mixed-effects regression models used to analyse the EMB designs and their respective variables.

Chapter 6: Results for Established Factors Reveal Trends

This chapter provides the results for all variables except those pertaining to electoral management design, which are presented in the next chapter. Chapter 6 is split between results for individual level variables in section 6.1 and national level results in section 6.2. Subsections follow the same thematic groupings used in previous chapters. All variables are analysed using regional and global models, but individual level variables are additionally analysed using individual country models. These are displayed in Appendix E and summarised in the body of this chapter. The following paragraphs briefly outline the findings of this research project, with detailed discussions in Chapter 6.

Socio-demographic results indicate that older, male, or higher income individuals tend to view elections positively. Relationships are weak for gender or income, making age the strongest socio-demographic predictor. The consistency of this relationship is surprising because previous studies have produced mixed results for age, both with electoral fairness and other types of political support (Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Kotzian, 2011: 34; Moehler, 2009: 362; Rosas, 2010: 85). Tertiary education also shows mixed results between regions and countries, but there appears to be a trend. Higher education in 'authoritarian' democracies tends to be associated with negative assessments, while it shows positive associations in 'liberal' democracies. Higher education may therefore act as a proxy for being informed about the electoral system, meaning the attitudes of higher education individuals more accurately reflect realities of electoral integrity.

The second grouping for participation and engagement variables reveal two strong global trends. Both electoral participation and supporting election winners have strong positive associations with perceived electoral fairness. This matches previous findings of a positive relationship with electoral fairness and political trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101-102; McAllister & White, 2011: 676-677; Moehler, 2009: 359-362) and parallels literature on the positive effects of identifying with or voting for election winners (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Birch, 2008; Chang & Chu, 2006; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Craig et al., 2006; Singh, Karakoç, & Blais, 2012). Other variables in the model, such as political interest and left/right ideology, often demonstrate regional differences rather than global trends. Living in urban areas displayed consistently negative relationships, but these often failed to obtain significance.

Media attention variables reveal trends that provide additional insights. Prior research suggests that watching television decreases political trust and reading newspapers increases it (Hart, 1994; Hetherington, 1998; Karp, Banducci, & Bowler, 2003; McLeod & McDonald, 1985; Miller, Goldenberg, & Erbring, 1979). This study conversely finds newspaper attention has a negative association with perceived electoral fairness, while watching television has a weakly positive effect. Political knowledge also demonstrated a weak negative relationship, where previous research indicated positive associations (Birch, 2008: 315; 2010: 1610; Carpini & Keeter, 1996: 221-227). The reason is likely to be the fundamental differences in the electoral processes that better educated and politically aware people notice. These variables therefore could define groups of individuals that have more objectively accurate perceptions of electoral fairness.

Two trends arose from the economic performance grouping of variables. First, people who view the economy as improving tend to perceive elections as fairer. This trend was most apparent for attitudes regarding the present state of the national economy, but comparisons with past and future economic conditions provide additional evidence. The positive results match findings for other types of political support (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Chang & Chu, 2006; Chappell, 1990; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Hibbs, Rivers, & Vasilatos, 1982; Lühiste, 2006;

Mishler & Rose, 2001; Moehler, 2009; Wong et al., 2011). A second trend was that personal finances matter less than the national economy, but the same positive relationship is evident. This weaker association is new for perceived electoral fairness and agrees with findings for other areas of political support as well (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 75; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Lühiste, 2006: 487-488). The last variable in this grouping is having paid employment, which did not obtain significance.

Measures of political performance demonstrated strong global trends with perceived electoral fairness. People who think government corruption is high are less likely to perceive elections as fair. This corresponds with research in other areas of political trust (Chang & Chu, 2006: 265; Lühiste, 2006: 489-490; Mishler & Rose, 2001: 52; Singer, 2011: 301) and prior findings with electoral fairness (McAllister & White, 2011: 676). Trust in the executive, legislature, judiciary, police, and political parties all showed strong positive associations with perceived electoral fairness, but the trend is strongest for executive and legislature trust. These are new findings with electoral fairness and strongly suggest institutional trust has a positive effect globally. Results for crime victimization support the negative relationships found for other kinds of political support (Ceobanu, Wood, & Ribeiro, 2011: 66-69; Pérez, 2003: 642-644), implying victims of physical crime tend to trust elections less.

The sixth model evaluates group memberships and related variables for their effects on perceptions of electoral fairness. The strongest trend to emerge from this grouping is that people who generally trust others tend to view elections as fairer. This is another new finding with perceived electoral fairness and positive relationship matches findings for other types of political trust (Dowley & Silver, 2002; Kaase, 1999; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Zmerli & Newton, 2008). Having no political affiliation or being non-partisan has a significant negative association with perceived electoral fairness, which expands upon similar findings (Birch, 2008: 312). One possible reason why non-partisan individuals have negative attitudes is that they may not be satisfied with any of the political parties in an election. Being non-religious did not obtain significance, and there are no consistent results for being in religious or ethnic majorities.

National level variables are combined in another six thematic groupings. The first is democratic performance, which reveals that civil liberties matter more than political rights for perceptions of electoral fairness. Prior research indicated a positive relationship for political rights (Birch, 2008: 313-314), but including civil liberties reveals its comparatively stronger association with perceived electoral fairness. Democratic experience, measured in years since national suffrage, did not obtain significance, probably because the other included variables had more explanatory power.

Electoral context variables revealed an overall positive trend for electoral systems using proportional representation, which coincides with prior findings (Birch, 2007; 2008: 312-313; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 739-740). Proportional representation systems are often favoured because they facilitate the inclusion of minority groups and more closely represent public preferences (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 747; Lindberg, 2005: 61-62). The size of election victory margins was expected to be positive, but the only significant result was negative. This agrees with previous unexpected findings of a negative relationship (Hartlyn et al., 2008), but not with other research indicating a positive relationship (Birch, 2008). The size of victory margins thus does not present any global trends. The last electoral context variable is public funding of political parties, which did not achieve significance despite previous research indicating a positive relationship (Birch, 2008: 306, 313).

The only trend amongst parliamentary composition variables was that having more women in parliament is associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness, coinciding with findings using related types of political support (Karp & Banducci, 2008: 112; Lawless, 2004). The current study finds some evidence of a negative relationship between lower legislature sizes and perceived electoral fairness, but previous research conversely indicated a positive association (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 739-740). Evidence for the effects of legislature size does not indicate a global trend, but instead suggests regional or contextual differences. Finally, population per MP did not achieve significance in any regional model, despite previous research indicating a mild negative relationship (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 736, 740).

Two trends emerged from the political performance set of variables. First, greater media freedom is correlated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness. This is an important finding because the relationship is strong and it has not been demonstrated with perceived electoral fairness before. Second, higher levels of public sector corruption were negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness, paralleling the effect of corruption on other types of political trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Gilley, 2006; Kotzian, 2011; Seligson, 2002). Income inequality produced mixed results not suggestive of any global trends, but previous research has demonstrated negative effects with other types of political support (Anderson & Singer, 2008; Kotzian, 2011).

The fifth grouping for economic performance variables does not reveal any trends, or any significant coefficients. The models included measures for human development, GNI per capita, and GDP growth per capita. The insignificant results for these objective measures stand in stark contrast to subjective measures for economic performance, which achieved robust and consistently positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness. The findings suggest that objective national level economic performance may not affect perceptions of electoral fairness, despite having strong and significant effects on other types of political support (Birch, 2008: 313-314; Gilley, 2006: 57; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).

From the cultural fractionalization variables, religious fractionalization demonstrates the strongest consistent negative trend, suggesting that people are less likely to view elections as fair in countries with greater religious diversity. Linguistic fractionalization showed a strongly negative relationship in the global model, while results for ethnic fractionalization were mixed and insignificant. Previous research had indicated negative effects for ethnic and linguistic fractionalization using different measures of political approval (Alesina et al., 2003: 158; Rahn & Rudolph, 2005: 546-548). The strong negative relationship between religious fractionalization and perceived electoral fairness suggests it is more important for electoral fairness than the other cultural fractionalization variables.

To summarise, Chapter 6 presents the results for individual and national level variables with perceived electoral fairness. The chapter makes comparisons with prior findings

and discusses trends, highlighting strong relationships. Results indicate that that older, male or higher income individuals who vote, support elections winners, trust the executive and legislature, view the economy as improving, corruption as decreasing and live in religiously homogeneous societies are more likely to view elections as fair. National level findings reveal that civil liberties matter more than political rights, proportional representation systems may help, having more women in parliament is positive, more religious fractionalization is negative, media freedom is probably beneficial, public sector corruption matters and national economic indicators are not very important.

Chapter 7: Unexpected Results for EMB Models

Almost all literature on electoral management bodies advocate an independent model because it is expected to increase electoral integrity and enhance public attitudes (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006). The likelihood of free and fair elections is expected to increase when electoral bodies are independent of the executive branch (López-Pintor, 2000: 140). This is because electoral legitimacy is enhanced when independent EMBs are perceived as impartial and not subject to political control, but legitimacy is undermined when EMBs are perceived to be aligned with the incumbent government or partisan interests (Wall et al., 2006: 21). Lehoucq (2002: 31) therefore argues that independent EMBs are one of the central reasons why democratization is sustained in some countries and not others.

Despite the arguments in favour of independent EMBs, the results in Chapter 7 do not support the assumption that independent or autonomous EMBs increase perceptions of electoral fairness. Most significant findings for both models show negative relationships with perceived electoral fairness. This research project finds little empirical evidence to support the theoretically derived criteria and recommendations of the two EMB models. The implications are somewhat alarming given that many international organizations involved in electoral reform actively promote the adoption of an unproven independent model (EC, 2006; Hounkpe & Fall, 2011; López-Pintor, 2000; OAS, 2009; Wall et al., 2006).

The predominance of significant negative results probably reflects that independent EMBs are established in response to unfair elections. Birch (2008: 313) similarly suggested the negative relationship for independent EMBs could be result from their establishment in response to problematic electoral integrity. This would explain the negative correlations between EMB independence and perceived electoral fairness. The causal direction is thus not that independent EMBs produce unfair elections, but that unfair elections trigger reform towards more independent electoral bodies. Election observers and non-governmental organizations often encourage transitional democracies to establish independent EMBs as a way to reduce electoral malfeasance (EC, 2006; Hounkpe & Fall, 2011; López-Pintor, 2000; OAS, 2009; Wall et al., 2006). Consequently, most transitional democracies have independent EMBs that were established more recently, while most established democracies have governmental EMBs that were established much earlier (Elklit, 1999; Elklit & Reynolds, 2002; Pastor, 1999b). Established democracies are known for having higher levels of electoral integrity, while transitional democracies are known for more frequently having problems with electoral fraud. Including different types of democracies in the same regression models produces negative results because countries with lower levels electoral fairness are more likely to have independent EMBs.

The independent EMB model produced mostly negative or insignificant results with perceived electoral fairness. The strongest negative trend is for EMB members having fixed terms, which produced significant negative coefficients in most models. EMB accountability to and member selections by the legislature or judiciary are both negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness. Significant findings are also negative for important core implementation tasks of voter registration, sorting and counting votes and consolidating results are negative. Many other criteria did not obtain any significant relationships with perceived electoral fairness. For example, there were no significant results for EMBs proposing electoral reform or having the legislature or judiciary determine EMB budgets and control expenditures. There are a few positive results in some regional models, but these are usually overshadowed by additional negative results in other regional models. For example, making EMBs responsible for settling electoral disputes demonstrated a weak positive relationship in

one regional model, but a strongly negative relationship in another. While the criteria were expected to have positive effects on perceived electoral fairness, most significant relationships were negative.

Findings for the categorised autonomy model are also mostly negative or insignificant with perceived electoral fairness. All significant associations are negative for having electoral law in the constitution as well as making autonomous EMBs responsible for approving boundary changes and monitoring media coverage of elections. No significant results were produced for any element of personnel or financial autonomy. This means that non-partisan membership requirements, members appointed by the legislature or judiciary, fixed members terms and terms longer than the election cycle have no significant effect on perceived electoral fairness. It also means there are no significant effects for having legislatures or EMBs determine budgets or control expenditures. Aspects of other autonomy categories also produce only insignificant results. For example, both the institutional autonomy requirement that EMBs report to the legislature and the functional autonomy requirement that EMBs be responsible for settling electoral disputes produced no significant results. Many elements of the categorised autonomy model produced mixed results, but there were still more negative than positive results. For example, delegating boundary delimitation tasks to autonomous EMBs was expected to increase integrity, since government gerrymandering of districts remains a problem in most democracies (Albaugh, 2011; Carson & Crespin, 2004; Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004). However, the one positive relationship for this task was overshadowed by three significant negative coefficients. Results were also mixed for autonomous EMBs receiving and reviewing financial reports of political parties or candidates, providing voter information, running voter registration, sorting and counting votes, and consolidating election results. Additive autonomy category indices are also mostly mixed or insignificant. The institutional autonomy index is negative in the Africa model. The financial autonomy index has positive coefficients in the Africa and Europe models, but this is undermined by a negatively significant relationship in the Americas model. The personnel autonomy index does not obtain significance in any model. Finally, the functional autonomy index demonstrates strong negative coefficients in the Africa and Europe models, but a

positive coefficient for the Americas model. There is weak evidence in favour of autonomous EMBs being responsible for proposing electoral reforms, but no clear significant trend. One of the only variables to produce consistently positive results was EMB longevity, measured in years since first established. This finding suggests that it may take time for independent EMBs to improve electoral integrity, meaning future studies may reveal positive trends. Overall, evidence for categorised autonomy model is mostly insignificant or negative.

Chapter 2. Conventional Explanations of Electoral Fairness

The main goal of this chapter is to review available literature on individual level factors and national level indicators that are expected to have effects with perceived electoral fairness. To address the overarching research question of why perceptions of electoral fairness differ, we need to analyse any factors and indicators that could justifiably be expected to have effects. This includes both individual level factors such as demographics and public attitudes, as well as national level indicators such as economic growth and the type of electoral system. This chapter reviews over twenty individual level explanatory factors and almost twenty national level indicators. The explanatory variables outlined in this chapter were selected based on three broad justifications: to analyse potential new relationships, to confirm the results of previous smaller studies, and to account for known effects.

First, existing research on electoral fairness is relatively limited, so the chapter extrapolates theoretical and empirical findings from similar types of political support. What little research has been conducted on electoral fairness suggests it may be similar to other types of political trust. There are strong correlations between different types of political support, such as democratic satisfaction and institutional trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003), and perceived electoral fairness demonstrates similarly strong and consistently positive correlations with these different types of political support. This suggests that attitudes towards democracy and institutions share significant similarities with attitudes towards elections. Factors and indicators that have demonstrated consistent relationships with correlated types of political support are likely to reveal similar trends with perceived electoral fairness. They are also likely to do so for the same theoretical reasons, which is one reason for including variables in this study.

A second justification for including variables is that they have only been analysed with electoral fairness across a limited set of countries or have demonstrated mixed results between studies. For example, higher education revealed a negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness in Africa, a weak positive relationship in Latin America, but insignificant results in Russia (McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 2009; Rosas, 2010).

Other variables, such as direct public funding of political parties (Birch, 2008: 306, 313), have only been examined using one dataset. Relationships that have only been demonstrated once or twice with perceived electoral fairness require replication studies before they can be considered robust and reliable. This will confirm relationships across more countries and provide empirical support for these under-researched relationships.

Finally, some factors and indicators have repeatedly demonstrated consistent relationships with perceived electoral fairness across multiple studies. For example, people who support elections winners have consistently positive attitudes electoral fairness (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Birch, 2008; Chang & Chu, 2006; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Craig et al., 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 2009; Singh et al., 2012). Any factors or indicators that have established strong and consistent associations with perceived electoral fairness are included in this study to account for their known effects.

In summary, the primary research question seeks explanations for differences in perceptions of electoral fairness. The limited available research motivates a desire to expand the literature and our understanding of this important topic. The analysis and inclusion of different variables is therefore not driven by an overarching theory. Expected relationships are each derived from separate theoretical backgrounds and previous empirical findings. This gives rise to numerous secondary research questions. How do socio-demographic factors, such as age and gender, effect perceptions of electoral fairness? Which type of cultural fractionalization has the strongest negative effect on public attitudes? Do subjective or objective measures of economic performance have more explanatory power? There are more secondary questions than could be concisely or helpfully listed here, but each main section of Chapter 2 is summarised with a list of expected relationships based on theoretical and empirical findings.

The remainder of this chapter is divided based on a distinction between individual level factors. Section 2.1 covers all the individual level factors and is structured around six

thematic groupings. These are socio-demographics, participation and engagement, media attention, economic performance, political performance, and group membership. Section 2.2 outlines all national level indicators, except those for electoral management design, which are covered in Chapter 3. These are again combined into six different thematic groupings: democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, political performance, economic conditions, and cultural fractionalisation. The individual and national level thematic groupings are used to structure later chapters and as a guide for constructing regression models.

2.1. Individual Level Factors

The starting point for this research is relationships between individual level factors, such as majority group memberships or interest in politics, and public attitudes regarding electoral fairness. It could be argued that subjective individual level perceptions are not as reliable as more objective measures of electoral malfeasance and fraud, but aggregated public perceptions are strongly correlated with expert and elite assessments (Norris et al., 2013; Rosas, 2010: 76). The numerous individual level factors covered in this section are included for different reasons. Many have not been examined with electoral fairness, but are expected to demonstrate associations based on relationships with similar types of political support. Others have demonstrated mixed results or only been examined across a limited selection of countries, but there are good theoretical justifications or preliminary evidence to merit their inclusion. Some better research factors are included to control for their known effects on perceived electoral fairness. The following subsections outline the different individual level thematic groupings, starting with socio-demographic factors.

2.1.1. Socio-Demographics

Previous research indicates that socioeconomic status and demographic characteristics affect attitudes towards the government, public administration, political system, and elections (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101; Birch, 2008; Norris, 2002, 2004; Rosas, 2010). The socio-demographic factors included here are age, gender, income, and education.

Gender

Females are consistently less politically trusting and satisfied using different measures of political support. Women are less likely to be happy with the political system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101), view the state as legitimate (Seligson, 2002: 424), be satisfied with democracy (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74; Singh et al., 2012: 206), or extend trust to political institutions (Anderson & Singer, 2008: 581-582; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Moehler, 2009: 359). These findings demonstrate a significant and consistent negative association between females and a wide range of political support, but they do not tell us the reason for this relationship. The most probable explanation is that women often have less influence in politics and political institutions, and may therefore feel more systematically discriminated. Women are underrepresented in most political bodies, especially when considering higher positions of authority and power. This is gradually changing, but women are still the minority gender in political institutions and positions around the world. The same negative relationship holds when it comes to perceptions of electoral fairness, probably for similar reasons. Men are consistently more likely to trust elections and feel they are conducted fairly, although the substantive impact is usually mild compared with other factors (Birch, 2008: 312; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740; Rosas, 2010: 85).

Age

Age is related to many kinds of political and institutional trust, but the substantive size of significant relationships is usually small and inconsistent. A common finding links younger respondents with greater democratic satisfaction, support for state legitimacy and trust in political institutions and government (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002: 342; Anderson & Singer, 2008: 581-582; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Moehler, 2009: 359; Seligson, 2002: 424). Conversely, other studies have found older respondents more trusting of civil servants (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 102), more satisfied with and supportive of democracy (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74; Kotzian, 2011: 34) and more likely to vote (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1414-1415; Birch, 2010: 1610). Empirical studies are also inconclusive regarding the relationship between age and perceptions of electoral fairness. Older respondents tend to be more cynical about electoral fairness in Africa (Moehler, 2009: 362) and the United States (Dennis, 1970: 833), but

show positive attitudes towards electoral trust in Latin America (Rosas, 2010: 85) and across a selection of mostly European countries (Birch, 2008: 312; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740).

It is unclear why age shows mixed results across with perceived electoral fairness and other types of political support. One explanation is that age increases cynicism while younger respondents are more willing to extend political support. The logic behind this line of reasoning is that older generations may have experienced more electoral fraud and scandals, resulting in more pessimistic attitudes towards political actors, institutions, and systems. Alternatively, one could anticipate that repeated elections might allow the public to remove corrupt politicians and gradually increase the quality of elections. Whichever direction the respondent age relationship leans, effect sizes are small compared with other factors, meaning its impact on perceptions of electoral fairness is probably mild if it exists. Based on the broadest set of countries in the most similar recent research (Birch, 2008; Rosas, 2010), it is assumed that older respondents will tend to view elections as fairer.

Income

Income generally has a positive effect on political attitudes. People with higher incomes tend to be more satisfied with the way democracy works (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74), have higher levels of political participation (Birch, 2010: 1610; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999: 1102), and view the electoral process as fairer (Birch, 2008: 312; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740). Some research finds inconclusive associations between income and political legitimacy (Seligson, 2002: 424), or that the relationship may have more to do with factors associated with higher income brackets than directly with all income levels (Gilley, 2006: 56). However, the general trend is that a higher income level usually means a person is broadly benefiting from the current system and is thus more likely to be supportive of political institutions, actors, and processes.

Education

Higher education levels are expected to develop analytical skills that help people understand public affairs and discuss the political world, but the relationship between education and perceptions of electoral fairness is complex and contradictory. For

example, higher education has been positively related to satisfaction with democracy in some countries (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74), not significantly related to satisfaction with democracy at all in others (Singh et al., 2012: 206), and is sometimes negatively associated with support for political legitimacy (Seligson, 2002). People with higher education levels often make more positive evaluations of the political system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101) and are generally more supportive of democracy (Kotzian, 2011: 34). Higher levels of education have also been associated with critical opinions regarding the incumbent government (Kotzian, 2011: 34), lower institutional trust (Chang & Chu, 2006: 265; Lühiste, 2006: 485, 493) and reduced consent to authority (Moehler, 2009: 359).

The same inconsistent findings exist for the relationship between education and elections. Higher education levels are usually associated with greater levels of political participation (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1415; Birch, 2010: 1610; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999: 1102), but the results are mixed with regard to perceptions of electoral fairness. Moehler (2009: 362) found a negative relationship between higher levels of education and perceptions of electoral fairness in AfroBarometer counties, while McAllister and White (2011: 677) found no significant relationship in Russia and Rosas (2010: 85) found a mild positive relationship in Latin American countries. Using a larger international cross-section of countries reveals a positive relationship between education levels and perceived electoral fairness (Birch, 2008: 312; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740). Prior research by Dennis (1970: 833) also suggests that respondents with higher educational levels are more likely to approve of electoral processes, but less likely to believe that elections are effective. Research by Birch (2008), which is the most pertinent to the current research, found a positive relationship using a large international cross-section of countries.

Education levels usually have significant associations with political attitudes, but the directions of these relationships vary or are inconsistent between studies and countries. Highly educated people are in a better position to evaluate political processes and therefore may recognise ballot recount discrepancies as inevitable human counting errors rather malicious acts of fraud. On the other hand, an educated person may be able to detect more nuanced manipulation involving the complexities

of processes such as boundary demarcation. The correlations between higher education and perceived electoral fairness are more frequently positive. Therefore, while the outcome is not entirely certain, we can assume that higher levels of education will lead to increased perceptions of electoral fairness.

2.1.2. Participation and Engagement

Levels of political participation and engagement are associated with many aspects of political support and institutional trust. The following sections outline literature on supporting election winners, voting in the last election, interest in politics, living in an urban or rural area, and having a liberal or conservative political ideology. Most of these factors have demonstrated relationships with perceived electoral fairness, but they have not been analysed across as many countries before.

Electoral Participation

The causal direction of any relationship between electoral participation and perceived electoral fairness is unclear and difficult to verify, but probably goes in both directions. For example, people who think elections are fair are more likely to vote (Birch, 2010: 1615), since they are more likely to believe the process works and their ballot will be properly counted. Conversely, people who vote are more likely to believe elections are fair (McAllister & White, 2011: 676-677), perhaps to justify their participation and commitment of time and effort. The positive relationship nevertheless holds for supporters of both election winners and losers, though winners naturally express greater satisfaction (Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 562). The positive relationship maintains across other types of political support. People who vote are more likely to support the political system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101), express confidence in civil servants (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 102) and trust institutions such as the courts, army and police (Moehler, 2009: 359). It is thus unsurprising to find a positive relationship between electoral participation and viewing elections as fair (McAllister & White, 2011: 676-677; Moehler, 2009: 362).

Political Interest

Expressed interest in politics, like other elements of participation and engagement, is associated with different aspects of support. Politically interested people are likely to know more about political and the electoral system. They may be better able to discern between technical irregularities and electoral fraud, and may therefore tend to have positive views regarding elections. Increased interest in politics and public affairs has been linked to positive attitudes towards political system performance (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101) and the way democracy works (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74), but the relationships are not always as reliable or consistent as other factors such as supporting electoral winners. For example, political interest is negatively associated with support for democracy in some contexts such as post-communist European countries (Dowley & Silver, 2002: 522-523). Nevertheless, individuals with greater political interest are usually more likely to trust a wide range of political actors and institutions (Anderson & Singer, 2008: 582; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 102; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 741; Moehler, 2009: 359). They tend to defend democracy, consent to authority, believe the government is responsive to their needs (Moehler, 2009: 359), and have higher levels of political participation (Birch, 2010: 1613; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999: 1102). Most importantly, higher political interest is associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness (Moehler, 2009: 362).

Winner Status

An extensive empirical literature clearly and consistently demonstrates that being on the winning side of an election leads to positive assessments of political actors, institutions, systems and processes (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Birch, 2008; Chang & Chu, 2006; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Craig et al., 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 2009; Singh et al., 2012). This should be no surprise as people who supported election winners are more likely to be satisfied with the outcome. Winners have more positive attitudes towards the political system in general (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 99) and are more satisfied with the way democracy works (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 78; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 743). Winners are also more trusting of the incumbent government (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002: 343; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001: 333), civil servants

(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 102), government officials (Chang & Chu, 2006: 269), and even institutions such as courts of law, the army and the police (Moehler, 2009: 352). These examples demonstrate that winning has a positive impact on many different types of political support. This could be because winners tend to believe the current government is concerned about and responsive to their needs (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). The literature on supporting election winners includes large international cross-sectional analyses as well as time-series studies and numerous statistical techniques. The relationship has been tested under different political systems and cultures at different times against a wide array of control variables, making it one of the more robust findings in political science.

Identifying with or voting for winning candidates, parties or coalitions are all positively associated with increased trust in elections (Birch, 2008; Craig et al., 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 2009). This finding arises from both international comparative analyses covering most areas of the world as well as smaller studies encompassing one or a few countries, and the results maintain statistical significance despite the inclusion of multiple national and individual level control variables. The studies have focused on different aspects of elections, including the conduct of elections (Birch, 2008: 312), the broader electoral process (Craig et al., 2006: 589) and election outcomes (McAllister & White, 2011: 676). Some studies use party identification, where surveys ask which candidate or party people identify with, while other use voting choices (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Singer, 2008). In both cases, supporting election winners is significant and strongly related to positive assessments of political institutions and electoral fairness. The relationship is also maintained whether counting only a single winning candidate or party, or counting all members of a winning coalition (Banducci & Karp, 2003: 463-464). What matters for public satisfaction is getting preferred candidates or parties into government and their ability to enact desired policies (Singh et al., 2012: 206). Of all the variables examined, supporting the winner is often the most powerful reason for consenting to an election outcome and perceiving it as fair (Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 562). This holds across presidential and parliamentary systems and for both executive and legislative elections. Supporting election winners is expected to have a strong positive relationship with perceived electoral fairness.

Urban/Rural Status

It is anticipated that rural status will tend to be associated with positive attitudes towards electoral fairness. Populations in rural areas are often more homogeneous than the more heterogeneous demographics found in cities and urban areas. This increases the chances for a candidate to represent a bigger proportion of voter preferences and thus increase satisfaction with elections when they win. The lower population densities in rural areas also tend to decrease the ratio of representative to voters, making it easier for people to reach out to representatives and have their voices heard. Research into the relationship between rural status and political trust is limited, but existing studies indicate a positive relationship. People who live in smaller towns and villages are more likely to trust political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997: 439-440; 2001: 50) and elections (Rosas, 2010: 87). Previous studies included post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and democracies in Latin America. The current research will expand upon this to include countries from more regions of the world.

Political Ideology

Political ideology is determined via self-placement on a spectrum from left to right, or liberal to conservative. This spectrum is inapplicable in large parts of the world, particularly those parts that have not yet industrialised, but remains a useable concept in some countries. This mixed applicability is reflected in the empirical literature, with political ideology often not achieving statistical significance. However, two recent studies indicate significant findings in the same direction. In Latin America, Rosas (2010: 85) found that both political elites and citizens who identify as right-wing tend to have greater levels of trust in elections. Birch (2008: 313) also found perceptions of electoral fairness to be negative for people on the left and positive for people on the right. Although the substantive effect was moderate in both cases, people who lean to the right may tend to perceive elections as fairer than left leaning people. Political parties often seek to win-over the median voter, which in most cases means appealing to conservative mainstream preferences. People on the left are generally more progressive and seek changes that take longer to materialize with demographic changes. This could be one reason for positive attitudes amongst people on the right and negative attitudes amongst people on the left.

2.1.3. Media Attention

Media attention has not been studied extensively with perceived electoral fairness, but previous findings have produced significant relationships (Banducci & Karp, 2003; Hart, 1994; Hetherington, 1998; McLeod & McDonald, 1985; Miller et al., 1979). The following sections outline prior research regarding attention to different sources of political news and levels of political knowledge.

Television/Newspaper/Radio Attention

Media attention is sometimes measured in aggregate, treating all sources of media as equal, but dissimilar sources may generate different relationships with perceived electoral fairness. Newspapers are less likely to be a source of entertainment and are usually more focused on news, which makes the frequency of newspaper reading a better proxy for attention to political and electoral news. Consistent findings indicate that watching television news tends to reduce political trust while reading newspapers tends to be associated with increased political trust and participation, even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic factors (Hart, 1994; Hetherington, 1998: 800; McLeod & McDonald, 1985: 26-27; Miller et al., 1979). The aggregative approach of combining attention to all news sources has delivered statistically insignificant findings or significant but mixed results (Moehler, 2009: 359, 362; Rosas, 2010: 84). The more useful approach is to analyse each source of election media coverage separately to see if there are differences.

According to Banducci and Karp (2003: 461), media attention during election campaigns is generally positively related to increased levels of trust, system support and satisfaction with democracy. However, they found that more serious and labour intensive news outlets such as newspapers tend to generate more consistently positive political attitudes, while television may not do so as reliably or may even have a negative impact on political attitudes (Banducci & Karp, 2003: 463). This could be why studies that treat all media coverage as equal and aggregate them into an index produce mixed findings. If the different sources of media generate relationships in different directions, combining them into a single index will obscure the nature of the separate relationships. The current research will test the assumption that more

frequent newspaper reading will be associated with greater perceptions of electoral fairness.

Political Knowledge

Political knowledge represents greater political awareness and the ability to make more nuanced assessments of the political world. For example, Europeans with more political knowledge express greater degrees of national political trust, but are less likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works at the level of the European Union (Karp et al., 2003: 287). We can expect interactions between electoral fairness and political knowledge because informed citizens will be better able to assess the quality of elections. If an election is fair, a politically knowledgeable person is more likely to perceive this, but they will also be more aware of any electoral malfeasance. Political knowledge is measured using factual questions about political actors, institutions, or structures. People who get these questions correct tend to be more supportive of democracy, more likely to participate in elections (Birch, 2010: 1610; Carpini & Keeter, 1996: 221-227) and more likely to have confidence in the electoral process (Birch, 2008: 315). However, political knowledge is also associated with increased scepticism regarding political institutions and democratic performance, especially when there are acknowledged legitimacy problems (Karp et al., 2003: 285). Based on the generally more positive trend in previous findings, political knowledge is expected to be more frequently associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness. One reason for this is that people with political knowledge are likely to be more forgiving of technical errors and administrative blunders because they understand the complexities and challenges of running elections.

2.1.4. Economic Performance

One of the most consistent findings with regard to political support is that good economic performance increases trust in a wide range of political actors and institutions (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Bratton, 2008; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994; Wong et al., 2011). The research into links between economic performance and perceptions of electoral fairness is more limited however (Moehler, 2009), which is something the current

research aims to rectify. Most survey research distinguishes between perceptions of the national economy, or 'sociotropic' economic performance, and perceptions of personal economic situations, or 'egocentric' political performance. The following sections outline the perceived past, present, and future conditions both for the national economy and for respondents' personal finances. An additional individual factor related to economic performance is whether respondents have paid employment.

National Economy

National economic performance is one of the most important factors affecting political attitudes and one of the most frequently cited policy issues across a broad range of countries (Singer, 2011: 303). Economic performance even rivals winner status in terms of its substantive positive effects on institutional trust and perceptions of electoral fairness (Moehler, 2009: 358-360, 362). The evidence linking economic performance to different forms of political support is voluminous, with good reviews of this literature available from Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000). Very robust and consistent findings show that when national economic performance is good, people are more likely to be satisfied with democracy (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74-75), trust government (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002: 341-343) and express confidence in institutions (Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Lühiste, 2006: 487-488; Wong et al., 2011: 270).

Most research evaluates national economic conditions, looking at inflation or employment rates and GDP growth. When inflation and unemployment rates are low, and GDP growth rates are high, people are more likely to support political officials and institutions (Chappell, 1990; Hibbs et al., 1982; Wong et al., 2011). A good overall current national economic situation is therefore expected to produce positive correlations with perceived electoral fairness. However, we must also consider both the past national economic situation and the expected future economic condition. Looking to the future, people who are optimistic about improving economic conditions have higher levels of political trust and confidence in institutions (Chang & Chu, 2006: 265; Mishler & Rose, 2001: 52). The belief that future national economic conditions

will improve is also expected to show positive relationships with perceptions of fairer elections. Considering the past, Monroe (1978) argues that economic performance is cumulative and there is a time lag before economic changes effect public evaluations. This suggests that people who think the current national economic situation has improved when compared with the past are more likely to view elections as fair. In summary, people who think the past economic situation was worse, the present economy is good, and the future situation will be better are expected to have positive attitudes towards the fairness of elections.

Personal Finances

Economic performance can also refer to perceptions of personal or egocentric financial performance. People who think their personal financial situation or their individual living conditions are good are more satisfied with democracy and political institutions, but this does not have as strong an impact as thinking the national economy is doing well (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 75; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Lühiste, 2006: 487-488). The relationship between personal financial situations and political trust has received less attention, and the results are not as consistent. Statistically significant results are not as frequent and when they are the effect sizes are usually smaller, but the relationships are usually in the same direction. The same assumption regarding national economy can therefore be adjusted for personal financial conditions. People who think that their present financial situation is good, things have improved compared with the past and their finances are expected to continue improving are more likely to view elections as fairer.

Paid Employment

Employment status is linked with political attitudes, although this factor sometimes does not produce significant results. Nevertheless, people with paid jobs are more likely to positively evaluate the political system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101), trust political institutions, express satisfaction with democracy (Anderson & Singer, 2008), vote in elections (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1414-1415; Grönlund & Setälä, 2007: 413, 415) and perceive elections as fair (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740). The retired, unemployed, and students are not as likely to express their support, or the

relationships are not statistically significant. The positive relationship between paid employment and political support makes sense, especially when considering that widespread unemployment often undermines confidence in governments. A similarly positive relationship is expected between paid employment and perceptions of electoral fairness.

2.1.5. Political Performance

Opinions regarding political performance are strongly related to multiple aspects of political support. The following sections discuss effects of perceived levels of political corruption, institutional trust and being or knowing a victim of physical crime.

Government Corruption

Perceived government corruption is related to a range of negative public assessments and holds across different political and cultural contexts. Combatting corruption is often as important as economic performance in determining political trust (Wong et al., 2011: 270) and can even trump the importance of economic performance if it is perceived as pervasive (Singer, 2011: 301). Low levels of government corruption are expected to be associated with positive attitudes towards electoral fairness. This follows from previous research indicating that people who think corruption is decreasing are more likely to have a positive view of elections (McAllister & White, 2011: 676). This matches the consistent finding that higher levels of perceived government corruption lead to lower levels of other kinds of political and institutional trust (Chang & Chu, 2006: 265; Lühiste, 2006: 489-490; Mishler & Rose, 2001: 52). Perceived government corruption differs from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which is based on expert assessments, because it depends upon public attitudes. Publicly perceived corruption is often considered a more subjective indicator than the CPI, but there is likely to be a high degree of correlation between the two.

Institutional Trust

Institutions and actors such as the executive, parliament, judiciary, political parties, and police are important because they play pivotal roles in electoral governance. The executive government is often the primary actor for electoral tasks ranging from

logistical organization to selection of electoral management body (EMB) members. Political parties are often involved in electoral management, for example through member selection processes or via partisan membership requirements. Parliaments usually have substantial influence over EMBs through accountability and appointment mechanisms, controlling budgets or expenditures, or via their control of the electoral legislative framework. The judiciary is less directly involved in electoral management, but often adjudicates electoral disputes or conducts ballot recounts. Police are included because they provide security during elections and are usually the institution tasked with investigating allegations of electoral fraud and enforcing electoral laws. Greater levels of public confidence in these institutions may also reflect that they are less corrupt and more effective at performing their roles. For example, confidence in the executive and legislative acts as a proxy for measuring how well these institutions represent public interests, while confidence in the police may reflect public confidence that political corruption and electoral fraud will be addressed. People with greater confidence in these institutions are therefore expected to view elections as fairer.

The causal links between trust in political institutions and trust in elections is likely to travel in both directions. Hetherington (1998: 799) found that institutional trust to be a strong and significant cause of dissatisfaction with political leaders, and that political trust simultaneously affects and is affected by different forms of political support. Brehm and Rahn (1997: 1012-1015) similarly found stronger evidence that confidence in political institutions causes increased interpersonal trust rather than the other way around. Institutional trust is commonly the dependent variable, probably because this is of interest to political scientists, but will be employed as an independent variable in this study to investigate the effects of institutional trust on perceived electoral fairness.

Crime Victimization

Being a victim of crime usually has a negative impact on political attitudes, with previous research finding clear and significant connections between crime victimization and democracy (Ceobanu et al., 2011; Pérez, 2003). People who have experienced crime or feel insecure are less likely to be satisfied with and support

democracy (Ceobanu et al., 2011: 66-69; Pérez, 2003: 642-644). Political legitimacy is also negatively associated with higher homicide rates (Nivette & Eisner, 2013: 13). Crime may affect political support indirectly through approval of police and thus the incumbent government. Regimes where the police fail to protect the public are seen as less effective and public anger is directed at the incumbent government, which accordingly loses political support. The implication is that people who have experienced crime are more likely to question the government's ability to protect citizens or implement successful policies, which reduces perceived political legitimacy. Research on the relationship between crime and political attitudes is limited, while research into the relationship between crime victimisation and perceptions of electoral fairness is essentially non-existent. Crime victimisation is included in this study to test whether the negative relationship between crime victimisation and support for democracy is also present for perceptions of electoral fairness. Being, or personally knowing, a victim of a crime is expected to reduce perceptions of electoral fairness.

2.1.6. Group Memberships

Previous research has found relationships between different aspects of political support and group membership. The groups included here are religious, ethnic, and linguistic. Additional factors include being non-religious, non-partisan and generally trusting other members of society.

Cultural Groups

The cultural factors of ethnicity, language, and religion often affect political attitudes and engagement. Members of cultural majority groups tend to have greater levels of support for democracy, political systems, governments, and political institutions (Dowley & Silver, 2002: 524; Lühiste, 2006: 491; Norris, 2004: 221-226). Minority groups often have less confidence in political institutions (Kelleher & Wolak, 2007: 714, 716-717), are less likely to vote in elections (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999: 1111) and tend to perceive electoral processes as less fair (Birch, 2008: 318; Norris, 2004: 224). Respondents who are part of an ethnic, linguistic or religious minority tend to have more negative attitudes than those in the cultural majority.

The relationships between cultural factors and perceived electoral fairness may not always be consistent, since group membership and political attitudes depends upon complex interactions. Members of minority groups that recently migrated sometimes have more optimistic attitudes towards the political system and institutions (Maxwell, 2010). In addition, some countries may do very well at promoting multiculturalism and including minority groups within government, which reduces the negative impact of being a member of a minority group. In Canada, the French minority is well incorporated and votes more frequently, whereas the newer Chinese minority has not been as well incorporated and votes less frequently (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1420). Another cause for mixed results regarding the attitudes of minorities is their political power. If a minority cultural group captures the national political structures and derives advantages from this position, they could view the political system, institutions and elections more positively. In new democracies that were previously communist, minorities that politically benefitted from the collapse of the Soviet Union tend to view democracy and political institutions more favourably than Russian minorities that remain behind (Dowley & Silver, 2002: 522-524). The Russian ethnic groups lost political power and influence when the new democracies splintered off from the Soviet Union, and consequently have more strongly negative political attitudes than other minorities. The effects of majority versus minority status may not be universal, but depend on wider cultural and political contexts. However, most democracies are based around principles of majority rule, which helps ensure the majority's needs are met and the preferences of the majority are prioritised. Members of majority groups are thus expected to view elections as fairer.

Non-Religious

An argument could be made that religious respondents are less likely to support democracy, since the preference for authoritarianism in spiritual matters may transfer to a preference for authoritarianism in political matters (Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 557-558). However, empirical research into associations between religiousness and political attitudes often uncovers a relationship in the opposite direction. People who are religious are more likely to support government, democracy and society across a wide selection of countries, although the effect is often mild (Kotzian, 2011: 32). More

specifically, attending religious services is often associated with positive attitudes rather than religious beliefs. The mechanism of the relationship adheres to the social capital premise that more community involvement translates into higher levels of societal and political trust. Studies using religious attendance demonstrate stronger positive correlations with institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 1997: 439-440) and electoral participation (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1416; Birch, 2010: 1610). A negative relationship is therefore expected between being non-religious and perceptions of electoral fairness.

Non-Partisan

Winners are expected to view elections as fair and losers to view them as unfair, but a large segment of respondents have no candidate or party preferences. These people have a non-partisan status, which means they do not feel close to or identify with a particular political party or candidate. They often do not vote either, and may be equally disillusioned with existing electoral candidates or the political system in general, viewing political participation as futile. For whatever reasons, people lacking party identification tend to be less likely to believe elections were conducted fairly (Birch, 2008: 312). Cho and Bratton (2006: 741) found non-partisans to be situated between winners and losers, being more satisfied than losers and less satisfied than winners. We can thus expect the relationship between non-partisan status and perceptions of electoral fairness to be negative, but not as strongly negative as for losers of an election.

Social Trust

Social trust is sometimes called 'interpersonal trust' or 'generalised social trust' and deals with how much a person generally trusts other people in their society. People who are generally trusting of others are theoretically more likely to extend this trust to political actors and institutions. However, previous research has uncovered mixed results when examining the relationships between social trust and political attitudes. The associations are sometimes non-existent or weak, with many studies not finding any significant results (Kotzian, 2011: 34). The lack of reliability may be due to difficulties in establishing causal direction of relationship (Mishler & Rose, 2001), or

because uncovering relationships necessitates large cross-national studies and many studies look at a limited set of countries (Zmerli & Newton, 2008: 717). This is reasonable because the generalised nature of social trust means it should be more prominent through comparisons with other countries. It is rare for social trust to be negatively related with political attitudes in cross-national studies. When results are significant, they are usually positive. Indeed studies with significant results show that social trust is positively correlated with support for democracy, political institutions and government performance (Dowley & Silver, 2002: 522-523; Kaase, 1999: 13-14; Lühiste, 2006: 485; Mishler & Rose, 2001). The current research is cross-national and thus expects to uncover a positive association between social trust and perceptions of electoral fairness.

Table 2.1 summarizes the expected relationships based on previous findings and theoretical assumptions. They are combined within the same thematic groupings presented in the preceding sections. These include socio-demographics, participation, media attention, economic performance, political performance, and group membership. For clarity, these same groupings are used throughout the thesis.

Table 2.1: Summary of Expected Individual Level Relationships

Public perceptions of elections will tend to be positive if people...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are older, male, have higher incomes or are more educated;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support electoral winners, participate in elections, express higher political interest, live in rural areas or have a conservative (right-wing) political ideology;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • read newspapers more frequently or have greater political knowledge;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • think the national economy is performing well, think their personal financial situation is improving or have paid employment;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • perceive public sector corruption as low, political institutions as trustworthy, or are not victims of physical crimes;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are members of ethnic, linguistic and/or religious majority groups, are religious, are partisan or generally trust other people.

2.2. National Level Indicators

The second focus of this research project is national level indicators, which previous research indicates have considerable explanatory power regarding political support and trust (Kotzian, 2011: 35). Gilley identified three areas that determine state legitimacy: democratic rights, overall welfare gains, and general governance (Gilley,

2006). Many of the indicators composing these three broad areas are included in the current research. Other indicators are included based on the same broad reasons used for individual level factors. Some are included based on theoretical and empirical extrapolations from similar types of political support. Many have only been analysed across a few countries or demonstrated mixed results and are included so clarify their relationship with perceived electoral fairness. Other indicators are included to account for their known effects because they have demonstrated consistent relationships with perceived electoral fairness. The many national level indicators included in this research are grouped into six thematic areas to make them more accessible: democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, political performance, economic performance, and cultural fractionalisation. These same groups are used throughout the thesis, forming the basis of regression models, and are discussed in the following sections.

2.2.1. Democratic Performance

A country's degree of democratic performance has considerable effect levels of political support and public confidence in political institutions. Indicators included in this thesis are the number of years since universal suffrage, political rights, and civil liberties. The latter two are indices from Freedom House that combine a range of national issues. Together these indices act as proxies for the level of democratic achievement, which is an important determinant for political attitudes. Further information is provided in the following paragraphs.

Democratic Experience

The longer a country has had universal suffrage, the greater the likely level of democratic achievement. Year of universal suffrage was chosen instead of years of democracy because this research is about electoral fairness and electoral systems that prevent half the population from voting, in the case of women's suffrage, are less likely to be perceived as fair. The assumption is that the longer a system has had universal suffrage the more likely perceptions of electoral fairness will improve. There will be exceptions, but a longer period of universal suffrage should be associated with a stronger democratic culture, a fairer political playing field, and more stable

institutions. Treisman (2000: 433-435) found that longer exposure to democracy has a small but significant association with lower levels of perceived corruption. Democratic age does not always significantly affect political attitudes, such as evaluations of the political system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101), but democratic satisfaction generally increases alongside accumulated democratic experience (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 736-737, 739-741).

Political Rights

One way of measuring the level of democracy is using political rights. These include procedural fairness under the law as well as rights of civil and political participation. When the legal system functions impartially, accusations of electoral fraud are more likely to be addressed and those making the accusations are less likely to be unjustly punished. When people are granted freedoms of association, assembly, and petition, their political engagement unhindered and their vote is more likely to be free. It is therefore not surprising that Birch (2008: 313-314) found a positive relationship between political rights and higher perceptions of electoral fairness. The same positive relationship between political rights and perceptions of electoral fairness is anticipated in this research.

Civil Liberties

Civil liberties are related to political rights and include assurances of personal safety and privacy, freedom from discrimination, and individual rights such as freedoms of expression, thought, religion and movement. This usually includes freedom of the media and human rights such as gender equality and civic freedoms, which are consistently powerful determinants of political legitimacy (Gilley, 2006: 57). Countries that protect civil liberties are more likely to have fair elections because citizens can more safely criticize the government and form opposition movements. Incumbents may face increased public accountability and scrutiny, making the potential costs of committing electoral fraud much higher. The current research therefore expects to find a positive relationship between civil liberties and perceptions of electoral fairness.

2.2.2. Electoral Context

The electoral context refers to conditions surrounding elections and the electoral system. Different aspects of the electoral context have been shown to affect public perceptions of electoral fairness. These include whether the electoral system uses proportional representation, whether parties have direct public funding and the victory margin of elections.

Proportional Representation

Electoral systems that incorporate elements of proportional representation (PR) have demonstrated positive effects on public attitudes. The more proportional a system, the less prone it is to functioning only for the benefit of the majority. In majoritarian systems, the majority can more easily have its interests represented while minorities are less likely to have effective representation. Minority groups are often excluded from power and those with periphery preferences are discouraged from participating (Lijphart, 1984, 1999). There is however evidence that people may have to experience the two systems in order to fully appreciate the difference (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 78-79). Other contrary empirical findings indicate that PR in conjunction with presidential systems may be associated with higher levels of political corruption (Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005), and hence the possibility of decreased perceptions of electoral fairness. Nevertheless, most studies find a positive relationship between proportional representation and political attitudes. Proportional systems have been associated with greater consolidation of democracy than majoritarian systems (Birch, 2005). They are often better at achieving representation, accountability and governing capacity (Lindberg, 2005: 61-62). Proportionality also boosts support for the political system amongst minority groups, who have a greater chance of getting their representatives into parliament and getting public attention for their particular issues (Cho & Bratton, 2006: 747). The greater representation extends beyond minority groups to society in general, with increased opportunities for a more politically diverse parliament and the representation of a wider range of interests and issues. This could be why election losers are generally more satisfied in proportional systems than in majoritarian ones (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). People in countries that have proportional electoral systems are more likely to feel government is responsive to their

needs. Proportional representation is therefore associated with increased levels of political support, reduced levels of electoral fraud and increased perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch, 2007; 2008: 312-313; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 739-740). The relationship between proportional representation and perceptions of electoral fairness is therefore expected to be positive.

Direct Public Funding

Direct public funding of political parties is one way of levelling the playing field, helping to make electoral competition more equitable by giving all parties a fairer chance to win elections. Public funds can provide support for newer political parties that might otherwise be poorly funded, which often helps make electoral competition more equitable (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 227). Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of public funding is that it alleviates parties from incurring debts to wealthy private donors and facing pressure to align their priorities accordingly (Scarrow, 2007b: 203).

However, the provision of public funding may fail to curb political finance corruption because politicians still seek additional private funding to gain a campaigning advantage over their competition (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 225; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002: 78). The public may not always like the idea of subsidising parties with taxpayer money, and the practice is generally unpopular with electors (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002: 78). Direct public funding may also freeze existing party systems because payment criteria usually favour incumbents, helping protect them from newer competitors (Katz & Mair, 1995). Yet evidence either does not support this contention (Scarrow, 2007a), or points in the opposite direction. There is empirical support for a strong positive relationship between direct public funding of parties and increased public confidence in elections (Birch, 2008: 306, 313). Given the theoretical reasoning and previous findings, this current research expects to find a positive relationship between direct public funding of political parties and perceptions of electoral fairness.

Victory Margin

The margin of victory, or closeness of the electoral race, is often postulated to affect political attitudes, but supporting evidence is sparse and inconclusive. A bigger victory margin might be expected to increase the acceptance of election outcomes, since a

larger margin should mean that more people support the elections winners and be satisfied with the outcome. However, the opposite relationship has been found. As the margin increases, the likelihood of an acceptable election outcome decreases (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 87). Similarly unexpected results have been found with rates of voter turnout (Birch, 2010: 1611). Other studies have found a positive relationship between margin of victory and perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch, 2008: 313), but some findings indicate no statistically significant relationship (Rosas, 2010: 85). Victory margin will be included here to determine whether there is a relationship, or whether this factor can be overlooked in future research. Following from the most similar research by Birch (2008), victory margin is expected to be positively related to perceptions of electoral fairness.

2.2.3. Parliamentary Composition

The composition of the national parliament is highly relevant for perceptions of electoral fairness, especially when survey questions ask specifically about legislative elections. The three aspects of parliamentary composition covered in this research include the size of the lower legislature, total population per parliamentary member and the percentage of women in the national legislature.

Legislature Size

Larger lower legislatures usually mean smaller electoral districts and more seats. Having smaller constituencies increases the likelihood of diversity within the legislature, while also decreasing the ratio of voters to representatives. The additional seats in larger legislatures provide more chances for different parties or groups to get their representatives elected. Farrell and McAllister (2006: 739-740) found that larger legislatures are significantly associated with positive perceptions of electoral fairness. The same assumption of a positive relationship is used the current research, but will be tested for confirmation across many more countries.

Population per MP

A smaller ratio of voters to Members of Parliament (MPs) should increase responsiveness and voter satisfaction, but the empirical results have so far been mixed

or contradictory. Voters per MP has demonstrated a mild negative relationship with electoral fairness (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 736, 740). Data for total population is used instead of for total eligible voters because it is more widely available. The ratios should be similar however, as total population and total eligible voters will roughly parallel each other. The effects of population per MP will be analysed using a wide selection of countries to verify previous findings and determine if there are any broad trends in its relationship with perceived electoral fairness. As with the previous study, the association is expected to be positive.

Women in Parliament

A higher percentage of women in parliament may be positively associated with political attitudes, but the topic needs more cross-national empirical research (Wangnerud, 2009: 65-66). Having more women in parliament is likely to increase perceptions that the political system is more equitable. Karp and Banducci (2008: 112) found more women in parliament to be substantially and significantly correlated with greater democratic satisfaction and increased likelihood of elections reflecting voter preferences. Having more women in parliament is also associated with lower levels of corruption (Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001). Moreover, the effects of more equitable descriptive representation of women in parliament boosts the political evaluations of both males and females (Karp & Banducci, 2008: 113-114). Lawless (2004: 89-90) also failed to find any interaction effects between gender and the percentage of women in the US Congress. If there is a relationship between women in parliament and political attitudes, it appears unrelated to gender. Based on previous research, the relationship between women in parliament and perceptions of electoral fairness is anticipated to be positive.

2.2.4. Political Performance

The performance of government obviously affects public confidence in political actors and institutions, but it also affects other aspects of governance such as the perceived fairness of elections. The aspects of political performance with demonstrated relationships in this area include public sector corruption, national income inequality and media freedom. Income inequality is included within the political rather economic

performance grouping because the market by itself does not produce a fair distribution of income, and redistributive policies are generally needed to reduce income inequality.

Public Sector Corruption

This national level indicator differs from the previous measure of public attitudes towards corruption because it is an expert-created index: Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. People in countries with higher levels of corruption tend to have negative attitudes towards political actors and institutions. Higher corruption is associated with dissatisfaction regarding democracy, decreased support for the political system, and distrust of the government and civil servants (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 99; Kotzian, 2011: 32-33). Corruption is often correlated with support for the incumbent government, meaning people hold the current government responsible for the level of corruption rather than the political system or democracy. The ability of government to fight corruption is a substantial determinate of state legitimacy (Gilley, 2006: 57; Seligson, 2002: 424). Elections also display the same negative relationship with higher levels of corruption (Birch, 2008: 313; Hartlyn et al., 2008: 88). Following this previous cross-national research, the relationship between a corruption and fairer elections is expected to be negative.

Income Inequality

Countries with very unequal income distributions are more likely to have citizens with differing interests, which could carry over into electoral politics and increase pressure to capture the electoral process. Income inequality usually is negatively correlated with political support. People in countries with high levels of income inequality are more likely to evaluate the performance of the political system negatively and to distrust political institutions (Anderson & Singer, 2008: 583-585). Higher levels of income inequality correlate with lower levels of support for democracy, although the effect size is small (Kotzian, 2011: 32). Interestingly, ideologically left-wing respondents are more likely to express negative political evaluations when income inequality is high, but this interaction effect is not significant in countries with more

equal incomes (Anderson & Singer, 2008: 585). The relationship between income inequality and perception of fair elections is expected to be negative.

Media Freedom

Freedom of the media is a foundational element of an open and functioning democracy. Freedom of the media entails independent stations, channels, and news outlets free from government intervention or interests. Media controlled by the state are particularly susceptible to biased electoral coverage and favouring the incumbent party or candidate. Increased media freedom and independence therefore acts to level the playing field by giving opposition parties a better chance of getting their message heard. It enables the press to act as a check on government abuses of power, in this case with regard to elections. Greater media freedom tends to be associated with reduced levels of public sector corruption (Chowdhury, 2004). Free media increases the risk of getting caught committing electoral fraud, thereby providing good incentive against malfeasance. The relationship between media freedom and perceived electoral fairness is therefore expected to be positive.

2.2.5. Economic Performance

Economic performance is one of the most consistently important determinants of political attitudes, affecting government support, political legitimacy, and electoral fairness (Birch, 2008: 313-314; Gilley, 2006: 57; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). Some studies have even found that economic development is more important than democratic achievement for political support (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101). Three economic indicators are used in this research: the Human Development Index (HDI), Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth per capita.

Human Development Index

The Human Development Index combines life expectancy, education level and income indices. Relationships with political attitudes are not always statistically significant (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 88), but higher levels of development tend to be associated with positive evaluations of systemic performance (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101). Birch

(2008: 313-314) found a very strong positive relationship between the Human Development Index (HDI) and perceptions of fair electoral processes. A positive relationship between the HDI and perceived electoral fairness is expected because socioeconomically developed countries are usually the more established democracies.

GNI Per Capita

Gross National Income (GNI) per capita measures the overall level of economic development. Per capita measurements of economic development are positively associated with evaluations of democracy (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 100-103). This could be because perceived corruption decreases as GDP per capita increases (Treisman, 2000: 415; 429-430). The frequency of acceptable elections tends to increase with greater GNI per capita (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 88). Perceptions of electoral fairness should therefore be positively associated with GNI per capita because officials in richer countries may be less likely to risk accepting bribes, and officials in richer countries usually have better technical capacities for detecting fraud. However, higher per capita GNI can be associated with negative attitudes towards government and people in higher income countries may be more critical of democracy. Economic growth rates may therefore act as a more important determinant of political attitudes (Kotzian, 2011: 31-33), which is the third economic performance indicator.

GDP Growth Per Capita

Using economic growth rates rather than per capita GDP has the added benefit of being a performance measure that countries at different stages of development can all aspire to achieve (Gilley, 2006: 57). Comparative research occasionally reveals a weak relationship between economic growth and support for democracy or the government, citing political rather than economic factors as more important (Powell & Whitten, 1993). However, the more frequent and robust finding is that economic factors, particularly growth, are more important (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). Growth rates are especially important for democratic support in established democracies compared with transitional democracies (Kotzian, 2011: 31-33). Economic growth also has a positive impact on attitudes towards the political system and trust in civil servants

(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101-102). It is therefore expected to have a positive relationship with perceived electoral fairness.

2.2.6. Cultural Fractionalization

Cultural fractionalization refers to the degree of ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity. Very little empirical cross-national research exists on the relationship between cultural fractionalization and perceived electoral fairness. Previous studies on related topics suggest the relationship will be negative however. Ethnic fractionalization is negatively related to trust in local government, meaning that living in a city with higher ethnic diversity decreases political trust (Rahn & Rudolph, 2005: 546-548). Greater ethnic diversity also has a strong negative relationship with economic growth in Africa (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Posner, 2004), and may affect political support indirectly through reduced economic performance. Alesina et al. (2003: 158) similarly find that both ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are negatively associated with the quality of government. Linguistic diversity can also be a source of political conflict (Keech, 1972). The overall expectation therefore is that greater levels of diversity in these cultural dimensions will increase the likelihood of inter-group electoral competition and decrease perceptions of electoral fairness.

Table 2.2 summarizes the assumptions for national level indicators not related to EMB design. For clarity, they are listed according to their thematic groupings in preceding sections. These were democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, political performance, economic conditions, and cultural fractionalization.

Table 2.2: Summary of Expected National Level Relationships

Public perceptions of elections will tend to be positive where ...

- universal suffrage has lasted longer, political rights are well established or civil liberties are protected;
- the electoral system uses proportional representation, parties receive direct public funding or the victory margin is larger;
- legislatures are larger, the ration of population per MP is lower, or parliament has higher percentages of women;
- public sector corruption is lower, income inequality is lower or there is freedom of the media;
- human development, per capita GNI or per capita GDP growth is higher;
- religious, ethnic or linguistic fractionalization is lower.

Chapter 3. The Role of Electoral Management Bodies

This chapter outlines two models of EMB design and their component parts, explaining how they are expected to affect perceptions of electoral fairness. These expectations are informed by theoretical frameworks more than previous findings, since there is a notable lack of research on EMB design, but empirical findings are incorporated and discussed if they are available. The first EMB design is the conventional independent model, when a body separate from the executive government runs elections, which is one of three broad types. The other types are the governmental model, when the executive runs elections, and the mixed model, when an independent body and the executive share electoral management responsibilities. EMBs are determined to be one of these three broad types based on a common set of criteria. The second EMB design analysed in this theses is the categorised autonomy model, which distinguishes between four types of autonomy: institutional, financial, personnel and functional. These categories focus on separating the EMB, its finances, staff, and responsibilities from direct executive government control. The functional category requires autonomy in the other categories, helping to ensure electoral management tasks are carried out independently of the executive government. The categorised autonomy model can be thought of as an extension to the conventional independent model, since it adds further details and specifications. This thesis uses the terms ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’ to distinguish between the two EMB design models, but both terms refer to separation from the executive government.

Research into both new and old democracies suggests that the likelihood of free and fair elections increases ‘when an electoral body is independent from a country’s executive branch’ (López-Pintor, 2000: 140). Despite its apparent merits, an independent EMB may be less necessary in established democracies with advanced economies. Many established democracies maintain a broadly governmental model of electoral management, but also have publics that view elections as generally free and fair. Administrative competence is relatively high in established democracies and the tasks associated with electoral management are less challenging compared to other more complex aspects of governance. Most citizens in developed countries thus take

for granted that electoral processes are impartial, and generally have more confidence in the conduct of elections (Pastor, 1999a: 77-78). There are exceptions however, and the advantages of independent electoral governance are becoming more apparent.

EMB independence may be more important in new and transitional democracies where administrative capacities are often underdeveloped, impartiality and professionalism are often not yet embedded within the political culture, and important resources are scarcer. Under these circumstances, opposition parties and candidates may interpret technical irregularities as political fraud and malfeasance by the incumbent government. This can be socially divisive and politically destabilising at a crucial point in the establishment and consolidation of democracy. An independent EMB separates electoral governance from incumbent interests in maintaining power and thereby reduces opportunities for electoral malfeasance. Independent and permanent EMBs can provide opportunities for career advancement and the development of professional electoral officers. These EMBs often support the ongoing training of their staff, cooperate with other EMBs or international organizations, and help educate citizens about democratic processes. This helps reduce technical irregularities and establish public trust in democracy and electoral governance.

The following sections are divided between the two EMB models. Subsections within 3.1 explain the conventional independent model criteria. These include implementation, powers, budget, accountability, member selection, and term of office. Subsections within 3.2 describe the categorised autonomy model and constituent features of institutional, financial, personnel and functional autonomy.

3.1. Conventional Independent Model

The conventional independent model is one of three broad types in a widely used framework for studying and understanding electoral management, which identifies EMBs as governmental, independent, or mixed. The United Nations Development Program (López-Pintor, 2000), European Commission (EC, 2006), Economic Community of West African States (Hounkpe & Fall, 2011), Organisation of American States (OAS, 2009) and International IDEA (Wall et al., 2006) all categorise EMBs using this model. A

governmental model exists when elections are organized by the executive branch and EMBs are overseen by a minister or civil servant (Wall et al., 2006: 7, 9). This model gives the executive control of most aspects of electoral governance, which opens opportunities for corruption and electoral malfeasance, making governmental theoretically EMBs more susceptible to electoral fraud. Examples of the governmental electoral management bodies include the Elections Department within the Prime Minister's Office in Singapore and the Election Unit within the Ministry of Interior in Denmark. The independent model of electoral management makes a separate body, not part of any executive ministry or department, responsible for electoral management. Examples include the Electoral Council in Uruguay and the Independent Electoral Commission in South African. The third broad type is the mixed model of electoral management, which usually composed of two, but sometimes more, bodies responsible for electoral governance – one institutionally independent of the executive and the other located within a government department (Wall et al., 2006: 8). France follows this model, with the Ministry of Interior implementing elections and the Constitutional Court responsible for oversight and monitoring. Japan also follows a mixed model, with the Ministry of Interior and Central Election Management Council sharing electoral responsibilities.

The focus for this research project is on the conventional independent model, rather than the governmental or mixed models. It was developed in response to the shortcomings of having the incumbent government running elections. Electoral legitimacy is enhanced when independent EMBs are perceived as impartial and not subject to political control, whereas electoral legitimacy may be compromised if EMBs are perceived to be aligned with the incumbent government or subject to partisan interests (Wall et al., 2006: 21). The independent model depoliticizes election governance by removing most conflicts of interest arising from having elected officials control the agencies responsible for their own re-election. Lehoucq (2002: 31) goes as far as arguing that independent EMBs are one of the 'central institutional developments that made democratisation stick in some places, but not in others'. This is one reason why the conventional independent model is frequently advocated as a way to increase electoral integrity (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006;

Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006). Most independent EMBs are permanent rather than temporary bodies established only during election time. This enables staff training and citizen education, while also providing career opportunities that help retain professional, knowledgeable, and experienced staff. Independent EMB members tend to have the specialized knowledge required for election management, experience at detecting electoral fraud, and an interest in maintaining their professional impartiality. The independent EMB model is therefore viewed as superior to both the mixed and governmental models of electoral management.

Despite its theoretical merits, empirical evidence for the independent EMB model is inadequate and inconsistent. Studies research by Birch (2008) and Rosas (2010) has demonstrated that the relationship between the independent model and public confidence in elections is negative or muted. Birch (2008) found a strong and significant negative relationship between the conventional independent model and perceptions of electoral fairness. This is counterintuitive because the normative assumption is that independent EMBs should increase the fairness and quality of elections. The only speculative explanation Birch offers is that independent EMBs are introduced in response to electoral fraud, but public perceptions remain biased because they remember past electoral conditions (Birch, 2008: 313). However, the previous studies by Birch (2008) and Rosas (2010) used a variable that conflates all independent EMB design features into a single dichotomous value. An alternative method of separately analysing the component criteria of EMB independence might prove more enlightening. The current research takes this approach, following the original framework outlined by Wall et al. (2006). There are six criteria with available data: implementation, accountability, powers, term of office, budget, and staff. The following sections explain these criteria.

3.1.1. Implementation

The first and possibly most important of criteria for distinguishing between the three different EMB models is implementation of elections or the electoral process. This refers to which body has responsibility for running elections, particularly core election

tasks such as voter registration, operating polling stations and tabulating election results. Under an independent model, a separate body such as an electoral commission organizes and runs elections (Wall et al., 2006: 7, 9). This is in opposition to the governmental model, when the logistics of organizing elections is the responsibility of an executive body such as the ministry of interior. Under a mixed model, the independent component often monitors or supervises the implementation of elections, while the governmental component often organizes and runs elections under the direction of the executive (Wall et al., 2006: 8-9). The fully independent model provides less opportunities for government corruption of the electoral process than the other models.

3.1.2. Accountability

The second criterion for differentiating EMB types is their accountability. Independent EMBs are not directly accountable to the executive branch, but usually report to the legislature, head of state or judiciary (IDEA, 2006: 9). Accountability to these actors is intended to enhance transparency and integrity, which should increase public trust and confidence in EMB operations (Wall et al., 2006: 223). The independent model insulates electoral management from executive control if the legislature includes opposition members, the head of state is not part of the executive government, or the judiciary is independent. Conversely, governmental EMBs are fully accountable to the executive branch and subject to ministerial direction. Under a mixed model, the independent component is not accountable to the executive, while the governmental component is fully accountable to the executive. The independent model of accountability to non-executive actors is expected to have the strongest positive effects on perceived electoral fairness.

3.1.3. Powers

The powers criteria is assessed based on whether an EMB can develop the electoral regulatory framework (Wall et al., 2006: 9). The essential attribute for an independent model is this ability to make policy decisions without executive control. At a minimum, this means the power to make formal recommendations to the legislative branch

regarding electoral regulations, but it may also entail the power to settle electoral disputes. This provides an impartial way of adapting the legislative framework and settling disputes rather than having the government implement reforms and arbitrate in their own favour. The powers of governmental EMBs are more limited and usually restricted to implementing elections, sometimes sharing this responsibility with other government departments (Wall et al., 2006: 13). Under a mixed EMB model, the independent component is usually responsible for supervising the administration of elections, while the governmental model is limited to powers necessary for administering the election (Wall et al., 2006: 14). The focus of this research is on the independent model power criteria, since granting an independent body the power to alter the electoral regulatory framework and set policies free from government control is expected to maximize impartiality.

3.1.4. Composition

Composition refers to the makeup and selection of EMB staff or members. Independent EMBs are composed of members that are outside other branches of government, and therefore not under the direct supervision of the chief executive or any individual Cabinet minister (Wall et al., 2006: 12). Independent EMBs usually have a permanent core of members that maintain their positions between elections, enabling specialized technical training for staff and educational programs to enhance citizen engagement. Governmental EMBs, on the other hand, are composed of and led by public servants who are part of the executive branch (Wall et al., 2006: 13). This means there are no EMB 'members' since there are employees of the government and thus selected exclusively by the executive. Governmental EMB staff is often temporarily assigned during election periods and then return to their main job after elections, providing less opportunities for skills development and specialized training. For the mixed model, independent component members are usually outside the executive government while in office, often with security of tenure, while the staff of the governmental component are led by a public servant or minister and are often recruited temporarily for the election period. The independent model limits

government interference in staffing and allows opportunities for specialized training to increase electoral integrity.

3.1.5. Term of Office

The term of office criteria depends upon the job security of EMB staff. Independent EMB members have more security of tenure and often, although not always, a fixed term of office (Wall et al., 2006: 12). This is usually accompanied by restrictions regarding dismissing EMB members to provide more freedom to make impartial decisions. Governmental EMBs do not have members in the same way and the staff do not usually have fixed terms, since they are hired and fired according to the same rules as public servants (Wall et al., 2006: 13). The lack of fixed terms combined with full accountability to a Cabinet minister makes employment tenures less secure and induces loyalty towards the executive. Mixed EMBs are more diverse, but usually the independent component has members with some degree of job security while staff in the governmental component is part of the public service. The more secure terms of office afforded independent EMB members makes it harder for the executive to terminate employment as a means of coercion.

3.1.6. Budget

The budget criterion for independent EMBs specifies that they have their own budgets separate from any ministry or department and manage their own expenses (Wall et al., 2006: 9). Budgetary independence is achieved when EMBs determine their own budget needs or have a separate budget allocated by the legislature, while a non-executive actor audits their expenditures. Conversely, governmental EMB budgets are included within government ministry or local authority budgets (Wall et al., 2006: 7, 9). In most cases, this means governmental EMBs do not have their own separate bank accounts, determine their own budget nor control over their own expenditures. Having the budget determined by the government makes an EMB financially dependent and vulnerable to insufficient funding if it goes against executive wishes. Under a mixed EMB model, the independent component often has separate budget and the governmental component usually shares its budget with a ministry or

department. The independent model of having budgets and expenditures separate from the executive government provides the freedom to make independent staffing, funding and procurement decisions. This reduces opportunities for financial coercion from the executive government, which should have a positive effect on perceptions of electoral fairness.

Table 3.1: Summary of Conventional Independent Model Hypotheses

Public perceptions of elections will tend to be positive if an EMB has ...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • responsibility for more core electoral implementation tasks;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • formal accountability to the judiciary or legislature;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the power to propose electoral reforms and settle electoral disputes;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • members appointed by the legislature or judiciary;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • members with fixed terms;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • its budget and expenditures determined by the legislature or EMB itself.

3.2. Categorized Autonomy Model

The categorized autonomy model is based on a fourfold framework of EMB design developed by Van Aaken (2009). It separates independence into four categories: institutional, personnel, financial and functional autonomy. This framework has not been empirically tested in comparative studies so far. Institutional autonomy refers to the degree of legal separation from government and where the EMB is accountable. Personnel autonomy refers to the staff or members of the EMB, how they are appointed, who appoints them, and the security of their tenures. Financial autonomy refers to whether EMBs have their own separate budgets, non-executive budget approval, and non-executive daily expenditures monitoring. Functional autonomy refers to the competencies and tasks delegated to EMBs, as well as the level of discretion EMBs have in setting and pursuing their own goals. The more tasks assigned to an EMB and the more discretion it has in performing them, the greater the potential functional autonomy.

All aspects of autonomy are arguably important, however the functional category is perhaps more essential to public perceptions of electoral fairness. This category encompass functions and responsibilities that are more likely to receive media and public attention, such as running polling stations, counting votes, settling electoral

disputes, and monitoring election participants. Moreover, functional autonomy depends upon the autonomy in other categories. The assumption regarding functional autonomy is that delegating tasks only increases electoral fairness if the EMB is “personally, financially as well as institutionally independent” (van Aaken, 2009: 313). This means that functional autonomy is dependent on the other three types of autonomy, and assigning more tasks to an EMB will not increase electoral fairness if it lacks these other types of autonomy.

The fourfold autonomy specifically states design elements as testable postulates and does not aggregate all features into a single dichotomous variable. This approach facilitates more detailed analysis than the conventional independent model. It also includes more aspects of EMB design, enabling the investigation of more features of electoral governance and their effect on public perceptions of elections. As with the conventional model, available data does not perfectly match the original design assumptions and some modifications are necessary. Some aspects of the framework cannot be empirically investigated, while similar proxies are used for other aspects. The model refers to ‘autonomy’ rather than ‘independence’ even though two models encompass many of the same aspects of EMB design. The different terms simply provide a linguistic clarification for distinguishing between the categorized autonomy and conventional independent models. The following sections outline the four categories of autonomy in more detail, focusing their component parts.

3.2.1. Institutional Autonomy

Institutional autonomy refers to the legal independence of an EMB. This category embodies the idea that an EMB should be a distinct legal entity that is, for example, capable of being sued independently of any other body. This institutional separation helps limit opportunities for executive control over electoral management and should be associated with fairer elections (van Aaken, 2009: 306). The original institutional autonomy framework prescribes making an EMB a separate legal entity, removing the possibility the executive giving directions to EMB members, setting up independent EMBs within the constitution and establishing permanent EMBs (van Aaken, 2009: 313-315). However, not all of these expectations can be directly tested using available

data. They have been modified with the aim of staying as close as possible to the original framework. The following sections summarise the expectations regarding institutional autonomy than can be analysed using existing data.

Accountability

Accountability, or who an EMB reports to, is of paramount importance for ensuring institutional autonomy. The potential conflicts of interest mean that putting the executive in charge of the EMB is like “putting the fox in charge of the henhouse” (van Aaken, 2009: 309). The independent model makes EMBs accountable to the legislature, judiciary, or head of state. The legislature is a larger and more politically diverse body than the executive and usually includes some members of the opposition. This provides some transparency by giving opposition parties a chance to monitor EMB activities. Accountability to the legislature therefore expected to enhance institutional autonomy (van Aaken, 2009: 306), but not as much as reporting to an independent judiciary. Accountability to judicial review impinges least upon EMB autonomy, as long as the judiciary itself is adequately independent. Reporting to an independent judiciary will generally reduce opportunities for direct executive control, or at least provide a degree of separation from the executive. The head of state is likewise often more impartial than the executive government. Reporting to the head of state, an independent judiciary or legislature limits the ability of the executive to issue commands that could unfairly advantage the party in power and help it secure elections.

Longevity

Permanent EMBs are better able to retain expertise by providing careers, and have more time for training staff to detect and prevent electoral malpractice. Permanent bodies also have a chance to develop public legitimacy over time, if they are seen as competent and impartial, which will positively affect attitudes towards elections. Temporary EMBs assembled for each election can be more easily staffed with personnel loyal to incumbents or less willing to resist their influence. Provisional staff may also lack the necessary competencies for ensuring full electoral integrity. Temporary EMBs are more likely to depend upon government resources and linked to

regular administrative structures, making them easier for the executive to influence. Van Aaken (2009: 314) therefore conjectured that permanent EMBs should increase electoral fairness. Developing countries are often urged by international organisations to establish permanent electoral commissions because they help ensure honest and impartial elections (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 78). Unfortunately, not data is available to measure whether EMBs are established as permanent institutions. Longevity is used as a proxy because data for when EMBs are first established is more readily available.

Longer lasting EMBs gain more institutional experience, which increases their capacity for ensuring fair elections. Older EMBs will have overseen more turnovers of power, which have been found to help consolidate democracy and increase confidence in electoral institutions (Moehler & Lindberg, 2009). Additionally, if an EMB is established in response to widespread electoral fraud, a longer existence could allow public opinion to change to reflect the impact of new electoral management practices. Furthermore, a longer separate institutional existence allows an identity to develop independently of any other body. Although not part of Van Aaken's (2009) original categorised autonomy framework, EMB longevity supplements the permanence aspect of original framework and should have a positive association with perceptions of electoral fairness.

Constitutional Status

When an EMB is established within the constitution, it is harder for incumbent officials or parties to modify the institutions for their benefit. This more stable institutional structure provides all parties and candidates a better guarantee that they may compete fairly and have a chance to win in the next election. Easily alterable EMBs setup conditions where opposition parties may not feel there is a level playing field, since incumbent parties or governments can use regular legislation to give themselves an advantage. Van Aaken (2009: 314) thus argued that establishing EMBs as independent bodies within the constitution should be associated with fairer elections.

Available datasets unfortunately do not indicate whether an EMB is established within the constitution, so the closest proxy variable is the status of electoral law. When electoral law is defined in separate legislation, it is easier to change through normal

legislative processes. If an opposition party does win an election, they may find it beneficial to alter electoral law to secure their hold on power. Altering electoral law is much harder if it is embedded within the constitution, which may dictate voting procedures, EMB structures, member selection criteria, and prescribes check and balance mechanisms in relation to other branches of government. The more aspects of electoral law included within constitutions, the less aspects of electoral management incumbent politicians and political parties can easily modify. Elklit and Reynolds (2005a: 152) thus argue that the constitutional status of electoral law is important for assessing the quality of elections. Having electoral law in the constitution should therefore show a positive association with perceived electoral fairness.

3.2.2. Financial Autonomy

Financial autonomy is when EMB budgets and expenditures are not subject to executive government interference. Van Aaken (2009: 308) specifies that this refers to EMBs having their own bank accounts and budgets that are separate from any other governmental body, such as a ministry of interior. Another aspect of financial autonomy is control over daily expenditures. This allows more operational freedom in pursuing the objective of free and fair elections. The financial autonomy elements parallel the budget criteria of the conventional independent model (Wall et al., 2006: 7, 9, 12) and the same logic applies. Controlling finances or denying funding is one of the surest ways of influencing electoral management and limiting de facto autonomy. A degree of budgetary and expenditure independence limits two key avenues of executive government control.

Budget Determination

Van Aaken (2009: 317, 308) argues that budgets determined by legislatures could increase EMB financial autonomy and produce fairer elections. Parliaments are generally more diverse and representative than the executive, so having budgets determined by the legislature is expected to decrease the likelihood financial control being used for partisan purposes. Alternatively, the EMB itself may play a role in determining its own budget. This can sometimes entail developing its entire budget

independently, in conjunction with another body, or simply with the ratification of a body such as the legislature. Having the power to develop and determine budgeting needs independently is expected to enhance financial autonomy.

Expenditure Control

A second aspect to financial autonomy is control over expenditures, or the monitoring of operational expenses. Van Aaken (2009: 317) does not provide a separate prediction regarding expenditures, but they are a key aspect of financial autonomy. Having a separately determined budget will not sufficiently prevent government interference if the executive can control daily expenses. Expenditure control provides an additional avenue for financial coercion through withholding approval of necessary EMB operational funds. Electoral management is more impartial when the legislature or EMB itself, rather than the executive, controls EMB expenditures. The original budget assumption has been separated into two parts: one for budget determination and another for expenditure control. Van Aaken (2009: 317) makes an additional assumption regarding EMBs receiving funds from international donors, but there is insufficient data for testing this assumption so it has been omitted. This thesis will analyse whether expenditure control by the legislature or EMB is associated with perceived electoral fairness.

3.2.3. Personnel Autonomy

Personnel autonomy, which Van Aaken calls 'personal independence', refers to how insulated the main EMB members are from government control. Personnel autonomy encompasses member selection procedures, membership criteria, and security of tenure. Ensuring personnel autonomy helps reduce the number of ways an incumbent government can act dishonestly to secure an election. Members of EMBs that lack personnel autonomy are usually more dependent on the good will of the executive government for their appointment and job security, making them vulnerable to partisan pressures. The following paragraphs outline the major aspects of personnel autonomy.

Member Selection

The first decisive factor in determining personnel autonomy is who selects the EMB members (and chairperson). This is an essential component to consider when measuring the quality of electoral administration (Bland, Green, & Moore, 2012: 11). Hartlyn et al (2008: 88) demonstrate that sheltering EMB appointment processes from partisan control has strong and significant positive effects on the quality of elections. Expanding on this, Van Aaken (2009: 315-316) outlines three basic methods of appointing the members and chairperson: appointment by the executive, appointment by the legislature, and appointment by the judiciary. Appointment by the executive, which usually corresponds with the party in power, provides the least amount of personnel autonomy for EMB members. Appointment by the legislature is better because it increases impartiality through greater transparency and public debate. Appointment by the judiciary, provided it is independent, is expected to have the strongest positive relationship with fair elections.

Membership Criteria

The second aspect of personnel autonomy is the selection criteria for members, which is often characterised as based on expertise, partisanship, or a combination of both. A 'partisan representation' model selects individuals specifically for their political party affiliation to achieve a balanced representation of the major parties (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 79). A 'professional autonomy' model stipulates that member selection be based on credentials or expertise to increase impartiality and independence (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 79). Personnel autonomy is expected to be strongest when member selection is based on expertise, and weakest when based on partisanship.

Research on Latin American democracies finds that professionally staffed EMBs are "much more likely to oversee acceptable elections" and support a fair democratic process (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 89). Hartlyn et al (2008: 90) argue that a partisan-expertise balanced EMB can succeed in providing fair electoral governance. However, Rosas (2010) examined professional versus partisan electoral management and found muted or inconclusive relationships using LatinoBarometer public survey data, but positive relationships when using political elite opinion data. Further interpretation of

the results suggest partisan electoral organisation erodes public confidence in less democratic countries, but raises public confidence in fully democratic countries (Rosas, 2010: 86). This supports what Van Aaken (2009: 315) argues, which is that that member selection based on expertise should be associated with fair elections in established democracies, but that this may not be true in transitional democracies. The argument is that opposition parties in transitional democracies may need to be involved electoral administration before trusting the process and participating in elections. The effects of partisan versus expertise membership criteria are therefore potentially contentious and deserve further investigation. The current study contains both transitional and established democracies, which will enable clarifying investigations into the relationship between membership criteria and electoral fairness. For the sake of having a clear proposition that adheres to Van Aaken's original framework, mix of partisanship and expertise criteria is expected to produce fairer perceptions of elections in transitional democracies, while a purely expertise-based membership is expected to produce fairer elections in established democracies.

Security of Tenure

The security of EMB member positions is important because the impartiality of electoral governance can be undermined if members are easily removed from office. This aspect of personnel autonomy parallels an essential criteria for the conventional independent model, which is that members should have 'security of tenure', which this does not necessarily mean a fixed term (IDEA, 2006: 6). Life tenure is expected to have the greatest positive relationship with clean elections, but fixed or specified terms longer than the election cycle should also correlate positively with more impartial electoral governance (van Aaken, 2009: 315). In other words, greater autonomy is expected when EMB member tenures are longer than the tenures of elected representative who appoint them (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 80). Member terms longer than the election period should enhance the fairness of elections. Most election cycles are five years or less, so six years or more makes most member terms greater than the election cycle.

3.2.4. Functional Autonomy

Functional autonomy refers to the competencies, tasks, responsibilities or functions that are delegated to an autonomous EMB (van Aaken, 2009: 308). The more functions an autonomous EMB performs the more functional autonomy it has. The key word is 'autonomous' however, because the performance of different functions only leads to fairer elections if the EMB performing them is sufficiently autonomous in the other three categories. Functional autonomy therefore depends firstly upon achieving the other types of autonomy, and secondly on performing more tasks. The main original conjecture states:

The more tasks which involve potential conflict of interests of legislators or government are outsourced to an EMB, the fairer the electoral process will be, given that the EMB is personally, financially as well as institutionally independent. But if the EMB is personally, financially as well as institutionally dependent, no degree of functional independence is expected to have an effect on the dependent variable. (van Aaken, 2009: 313)

An EMB must have institutional, financial and personnel autonomy before functional autonomy contributes to the quality of electoral management. Additionally, the more tasks assigned to an EMB that introduce conflicts of interest, the more essential the other types of autonomy become. This is because delegating a broad range of functions to a government-controlled EMB maintains the possibility of executive control over those functions. Van Aaken (2009: 308-309, 312) mentions a wide range of tasks or functions that can be delegated to an EMB, but does not explain how to measure them. Many of these tasks parallel the seven criteria and associated tasks used in the conventional independent model. For example, both models consider who determines voter eligibility, conducts polling, counts and sorts votes, and proposes electoral reforms (van Aaken, 2009: 308-309; Wall et al., 2006: 5-9). The categorised autonomy model additionally includes the functions of electoral boundary delimitation, electoral dispute resolution, political finance oversight, and voter education or information campaigns. The categorised autonomy model therefore covers more aspects of electoral management and provides a broader perspective of

electoral governance. However, some of the tasks outlined by Van Aaken (2009), such as allocating media time to political parties and candidates or receiving and validating their nominations, cannot be analysed due to this data being unavailable. The following paragraphs outline functions with available data and their expected effects on public perceptions of electoral fairness.

Boundary Delimitation

The first function Van Aaken (2009: 308) mentions is 'the alignment of electoral districts', which refers to both the demarcation of constituency boundaries and their final approval. These are separate tasks not necessarily performed by the same body. The body that approves boundary demarcation can veto any district modifications and only approve changes that prove advantageous. It is important for both tasks to be delegated to an impartial body to avoid demarcations that intentionally benefit partisan actors. Allowing a partisan body, such as the executive or one political party, to alter or approve electoral district boundaries presents opportunities for gerrymandering. This entails changing electoral boundaries to provide political advantages to a particular candidate or party, or to unfairly disadvantage a particular demographic such as an ethnic group (Lublin, 1995). Gerrymandering remains a frequent method for altering electoral landscapes to advantage particular parties or candidates in both established and transitional democracies (Albaugh, 2011; Carson & Crespin, 2004; Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004). This is problematic for perceptions of electoral fairness because a partisan process is procedurally biased while the resulting uneven districts are substantively unfair. The quality of elections therefore depends in part upon the impartiality, transparency and acceptability of constituency area demarcation (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005a: 152). Assigning both boundary demarcation and approval to an impartial actor such as an autonomous EMB decreases opportunities for partisan gerrymandering. This should have a positive effect on perceived electoral fairness.

Electoral Reform

Giving an EMB responsibility for electoral laws and regulation enhances its competency (van Aaken, 2009: 308). Incumbent governments could disadvantage

opposition parties by passing restrictive laws or preventing participation based on invented legal technicalities. Delegating electoral reform to an autonomous EMB insulates this task from partisan manipulation, but also raises legitimacy problems regarding accountability to the public. Elmendorf (2005: 1447-1448) argues that delegating regulation of electoral law to politically independent bodies is democratically illegitimate, and suggests that they should be advisory rather than regulatory. This means they should have the power to propose electoral reforms and initiate votes on the proposed legislation, but not to have the final say on what becomes law. This would give EMBs a quasi-legislative role because they would be able to draft electoral law reforms, but these proposals would require ratification by the legislature. The expectation is that elections will be perceived fairer if autonomous EMBs can propose reforms to the electoral legislative framework.

Financial Oversight

Delegating political party and candidate financial oversight to an autonomous EMB enhances its functional autonomy and limits executive control over electoral management (van Aaken, 2009: 308, 313). This task includes both monitoring and sanctioning, which different bodies may perform. The job of financial monitoring often entails receiving and examining the financial reports of political candidates and parties. However, simply submitting financial reports does not guarantee honest financing practices of candidates and parties. Parties and candidates must also be sanctioned for infractions, which can range from imposing fines or loss of office to prison sentences or the suspension of political parties. Allowing a partisan or partisan controlled body to perform these functions provides opportunities for conflicts of interest, corruption, and electoral misconduct. A neutral body, such as an autonomous EMB, is better able to uphold the integrity of the electoral process when performing financial oversight tasks. Public perceptions regarding the fairness of elections are therefore expected to improve if candidates and parties submit their finance reports to an autonomous EMB for auditing.

Core Election Tasks

Van Aaken (2009:308-309) includes the core tasks of conducting elections from the conventional model. These include determining voter eligibility, receiving and validating candidate and party nominations, conducting polling, and counting and tabulating votes (Wall et al., 2006: 5). Although they are included within both models, the categorised autonomy model uses a different approach when counting them. This topic is covered in-depth within sections 5.3 and 5.4 when discussing data and methods, so the difference is only sketched briefly here. The conventional independent model simply determines whether an EMB performs each of these tasks, whereas the categorised autonomy model only counts them if performed by an EMB with institutional, financial and personnel autonomy. Given the potential conflicts of interest when partisan bodies perform essential electoral tasks, we can presume that electoral integrity will increase when these tasks are the responsibility of an autonomous EMB.

Voter Information

Voter information can be subject to manipulation and malfeasance in an effort to secure elections. For example, voters in opposition strongholds may receive false information about voting times, locations or procedures to reduce their turnout. This kind of electoral fraud, which often focuses on suppressing certain demographics of voters, includes a diverse range of tactics and occurs in all types of democracies. Stringer (2007-2008: 1012) outlines numerous ways in which American politicians “now often rely upon disinformation campaigns” instead of more overt tactics such as physical violence, discrimination or legalistic barriers. The recent 2011 Canadian federal election ‘robocall’ scandal, in which voters received false information about polling station changes, provides another example of an electoral disinformation campaign (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Making an autonomous EMB responsible for providing voter information should tend to reduce the potential biased misinformation and pre-election manipulation (van Aaken, 2009: 309).

Media Monitoring

Public attention to news media is related to political attitudes (Banducci & Karp, 2003: 461), making the task of media monitoring relevant to perceptions of electoral fairness. Having a partisan body perform this function increases opportunities for conflicts of interest and the likelihood of biased news coverage. Van Aaken (2009: 302) does not provide a specific expectation regarding media monitoring, but does suggest that delegating this task to an EMB would enhance electoral fairness. This is because an autonomous EMB is more likely to treat all parties and candidates impartially by enforcing media regulations according to the law rather than partisan interests.

Dispute Resolution

An impartial electoral dispute resolution process is important for maintaining the fairness, legitimacy and quality of elections (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005a: 154). Van Aaken (2009: 309) lists electoral dispute resolution as one of the important tasks to include within the functional autonomy category. The nature of an electoral court of last resort, where participants can appeal their electoral grievances, may impact electoral credibility (T. A. Eisenstadt, 2004). Institutional structures will be especially important for election losers and opposition parties. If the dispute resolution body lacks autonomy from the executive or incumbent political parties, it is easier to shut out opposition parties or otherwise manipulate the appeals process. Making an autonomous EMB responsible for dispute resolution is expected to increase impartiality and perceived electoral fairness.

In summary, the categorised autonomy model expands upon the conventional independent model by looking at more aspects of electoral management. It examines similar topics, but does so using different approaches. The biggest difference is that functional autonomy requires EMBs to have institutional, financial and personnel autonomy. Table 3.2 summarizes all assumptions for the four autonomy categories in the order they were presented.

Table 3.2: Summary of Categorised Autonomy Model Hypotheses

Public perceptions of elections will tend to be positive if ...
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• EMBs report to the legislature and not the executive, have existed for longer or electoral law is established in the constitution
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• the legislature or EMB, without executive involvement, determine the budget or control expenditures;
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• EMB members are selected based on expertise in established democracies and a combination of expertise and partisanship in transitional democracies, by the judiciary or legislature, or member terms are unspecified or at least six years;
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>autonomous</i> EMBs are responsible for boundary demarcation and approval, electoral reform proposals, receiving financial reports from political parties or candidates, conventional core tasks of election implementation, voter information campaigns, monitoring media coverage of elections, or electoral dispute resolution.

Chapter 4. Measuring the Effects of Established Factors

Chapter 4 focuses on individual and national level variables, but also introduces the datasets and explains data management practices, which additionally apply to EMB data and models. The most important individual level item is the dependent electoral fairness variable, which is outlined in section 4.1. This section explains how different versions of the survey question on electoral fairness were transformed into a common dependent variable. The next two sections, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively outline the individual level and national level variables. Individual level data, such as age and education, comes from cross-national public surveys like the AfroBarometer and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. National level data, such as annual GDP growth and national legislature size, comes from institutional datasets sources like the World Development Indicators and PARLINE database on national parliaments. Each variable is examined separately, with tables and figures usually included to facilitate comparisons between datasets and regions. Individual level data comes from five cross-national survey datasets, while national level data comes from dozens of sources. In total, this thesis includes 121,437 survey respondents from eighty countries. The next section, 4.4, describes methodologies used to analyse the effects of individual and national level variables with perceived electoral fairness. These include both ordered probit multivariate regressions and multilevel mixed-effects regressions. The final section, 4.5, outlines the data sources, data management procedures, and case study country selection. The large amount of data from multiple sources meant it was necessary to create common variables and consistently organize the data before making meaningful analyses and comparisons.

4.1. Perceived Electoral Fairness

The dependent variable measures subjective perceptions of electoral fairness rather than objective realities, but there are three forms of this variable. Depending on the dataset, it refers to the perceived freeness and fairness, or trustworthiness, of either elections or the electoral process. Survey questions have different answer ranges that must be recoded into a common variable before making comparisons. The AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, and AsianBarometer use a four-point response scale,

the CSES has a five-point scale, and the AmericasBarometer uses a seven-point scale. All dependent variables were recoded to have integer values from 0 to 3, the lowest common range. This option was chosen over creating a dichotomous dependent variable to help minimize the loss of data. Dichotomisation also presents the problem of where to divide between fair and unfair when dealing with answer scales containing midpoints. Four-point scales are easily divided in two, but it is unclear whether midpoints in the five and seven point scales should be coded as fair or unfair. Recoding to a common four-point scale necessitated some decisions on which values to group together, but this option remains superior to the loss of detail that would result from dichotomization. Invalid responses, such as *Don't Know* or *Refused to Answer*, were recoded either as missing data or as null but valid answers depending on what was most appropriate for each survey item.

The next three sections outline the three different version of the dependent variable. Tables display two bars for each country, one for perceptions of completely fair elections and a second for broadly fair elections. The broadly fair category includes completely fair as well as partially fair elections. Detailed explanations of how this is calculated are included within the descriptions under each figure. These distinctions are only used for simplifying the display of data, while the aforementioned recoded common four-point variables are used when running regression models.

4.1.1. Free and Fair Elections

The most common question is about the freeness and fairness of elections, which contains answers that refers to particular electoral conditions. The AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, and AsianBarometer all use this same survey item, including the same possible answers. This makes these three surveys more comparable with each other than with the AmericasBarometer and CSES, which use different answer response categories. Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 outline perceptions of elections in selected African, Arab, and Asian countries. Countries are ordered according to the highest category of completely free and fair elections.




Figure 4.1: Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in Africa. Survey Question: *On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held on [date]?* Possible answers: (0) *Not free and fair*; (1) *Free and fair, with major problems*; (2) *Free and fair, but with minor problems*; and (3) *Completely free and fair*. Dark grey shows percentages of respondents who rate elections as (3) completely free and fair. Light grey shows percentages who rate elections broadly free and fair, which includes responses (1), (2) and (3). Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q45) and Round 4 (q71).

As shown in Figure 4.1, perceived electoral fairness varies considerably between AfroBarometer countries. Kenya has the lowest rated electoral fairness, with only 7% viewing the elections as completely free and fair, while Madagascar has the highest at 68%. This vast difference in public opinion parallels findings from electoral observer

missions in each country. The elections prior to the Kenyan survey were reportedly marred by widespread mistrust of results which, together with ethnic tensions, sparked political violence resulting in deaths and destruction of property (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008: 28). Conversely, the elections prior to the Madagascar survey were generally peaceful and largely conducted in a manner that enabled citizens to freely express their democratic choices (EISA, 2007). The same parallels between subjective public attitudes and more objective observer reports existed for most countries where election observer reports are available. Aggregated public attitudes towards elections thus parallel expert assessments reasonably well, a finding that has been empirically validated elsewhere (Norris et al., 2013: 133; Rosas, 2010: 76).




Figure 4.2: Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in the Arab World. Survey Question: *On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held on [date]?* Possible answers: (0) *Not free and fair*; (1) *Free and fair, with major problems*; (2) *Free and fair, but with minor problems*; and (3) *Completely free and fair*. Dark grey shows percentages of respondents who rate elections as (3) completely free and fair. Light grey shows percentages who rate elections broadly free and fair, which includes responses (1), (2) and (3). Source: ArabBarometer Wave 1 (q211).

Public opinion parallels election observer reports in the Arab world as well. The reason for the low levels of public confidence in Morocco, where Figure 4.2 shows that only 18% of respondents say elections are completely free and fair, arises from “the lack of legitimacy in the entire electoral process, given the overarching powers of the

monarchy” (Sater, 2009: 382). King Mohammed VI’s control over key government appointments and decisions render public elections somewhat futile, which curtails the perceived freeness and fairness of the electoral process. Palestine, where 71% of respondents said elections were completely free and fair, is very different. Election observer reports regarding the election reflect this mostly positive assessment. Despite some discrepancies, the Palestinian election was reported to be mostly peaceful, EMB staff acted impartially, the overall process compared well with international standards, and the outcome reflected the public will (NDI, 2006: 2-3).




Figure 4.3: Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in Asia. Survey Question: *On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held on [date]?* Possible answers: (0) *Not free and fair*; (1) *Free and fair, with major problems*; (2) *Free and fair, but with minor problems*; and (3) *Completely free and fair*. Dark grey shows percentages of respondents who rate elections as (3) completely free and fair. Light grey shows percentages who rate elections broadly free and fair, which includes responses (1), (2) and (3). Source: AsianBarometer Wave 2 (qii43).

Public attitudes in AsianBarometer countries, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, do not match expert opinions as closely for some countries, such as Vietnam. The high public approval of elections in Vietnam is confounding because Freedom House has said the country “is one of the most tightly controlled societies in the world” and reported that the incumbent Communist party did not ensure the freeness or fairness of the 2002 election cycle (FH, 2003). The government controls all media, prevents the promotion of democracy, harasses and imprisons political dissidents, and employs an extensive system of neighbourhood informers to track citizen activities (FH, 2003). The 69% of

survey respondents who said the most recent Vietnamese election was ‘completely free and fair’ may therefore have provided this answer out of fear, but this is speculation. However Indonesia, with the second highest completely free and fair response rate of 56%, was reported to be the country’s most democratic elections up to that point, reflected the will of the people and generally conducted in a calm and orderly fashion (The Carter Center, 2005: 10, 13, 75). It appears that Vietnam may be an exceptional case regarding the dissimilarity between public attitudes and expert assessments.

Public opinion regarding elections in the Philippines, where approval ratings are the lowest amongst AsianBarometer countries, generally corresponds with election observer reports. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) reported numerous problems with the 2004 election. Its observer mission noted critical deficiencies within The Philippine Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and considered the election predominantly flawed, with numerous problems covering most areas of electoral administration before, during and after election day (Erben, Thakur, Jenness, & Smith, 2004). The public seems to have been aware of the flawed process, with only 15% of respondents in the 2005 survey considering the most recent election completely free and fair. The original survey question for the AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, and AsianBarometer all used a four-point answer scale and therefore did not require recoding. The next section discusses the seven-point electoral trust question, which does require recoding to a common four-point answer scale.

4.1.2. Electoral Trust

The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about their trust in elections, although the original Spanish can also be interpreted as asking about the confidence in elections. The question uses a seven-point scale, recoded to range from 0 for no trust at all to 3 for a lot of trust. The original seven-point scale was recoded to start at 0, with subsequently higher values combined in successive pairs to produce a four-point scale.




Figure 4.4: Perceptions of Elections in the Americas. Survey Question: *To what extent do you trust elections?* Possible answers range from (0) *Not at all* to (6) *A lot*. Dark grey sections show percentages of respondents who rate elections using the highest two values (5, 6) to represent a lot of trust. Light grey sections show percentages of respondents who selected the top four values (3, 4, 5, 6) to represent broad trust in elections. Source: AmericasBarometer Merged Datasets (b47).

Figure 4.4 shows considerable variation between countries in the AmericasBarometer using this common recoded scale. The lowest rate of complete electoral approval is 14.3% in Argentina, while the highest is 71.3% in Uruguay. The reports of electoral observers and experts again parallel aggregated public attitudes across

AmericasBarometer countries. During elections In Argentina, observers witnessed disorganized balloting and noted that it would have been easy for anyone to remove ballot papers of parties they disliked (COPA, 2007: 18). Their observations seemed accurate, since the day after elections seven opposition parties collectively lodged a formal complaint with Argentina’s National Electoral Chamber condemning the “systematic and massive theft” of ballot papers across the country (COPA, 2007: 18). Uruguay has the highest rate of perceived public trust, which accords with assessments of scholars and experts who consider it the most democratic country in Latin America (Fitzgibbon, 1951: 518-521; K. Johnson, 1988: 198).

4.1.3. Fair Electoral Process

The CSES differs slightly from previously discussed surveys in that it specifically asks about the fairness of the electoral process, rather than elections. The five values for the original CSES question were recoded to range from 0 for an unfair electoral process to 3 for a fair process. The highest two original values were combined, with all other values recoded without being combined to produce the common four-point dependent variable. Public opinion again parallels the assessments of experts, observers, and scholars across CSES countries. Using the highest two values to represent elections conducted fairly, Ukraine scores lowest with 23.8% public approval as shown in Figure 4.5. This is roughly in line with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report, which notes the election was “marred by incidents of violence, arrests and actions against candidates and abuse of public office” (OSCE, 1998: 3). Denmark is on the opposite end of the spectrum, with an 89.7% electoral approval rating, which is unsurprising since Denmark has a worldwide reputation amongst experts and scholars for outstanding electoral fairness.




Figure 4.5: Perceptions of Elections in Europe. Survey Question: *Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election was conducted unfairly?* Dark grey shows percentages of respondents who rate elections using the highest two values (4, 5) to represent elections conducted fairly. Light grey sections show percentages of respondents who selected the top three values (3, 4, 5) to represent election broadly conducted fairly. Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 (A3002).

4.2. Individual Level Variables

The following sections explain all Individual level variables using the same thematic groupings from Chapter 2. The sections explain how the different original survey items were transformed and recoded into common variables. This is necessary before making comparisons across the regional datasets. All missing or invalid values, such as 'don't know' or 'refused to answer' were either recoded as missing data (.) or null values (0), depending on what was appropriate for each variable.

4.2.1. Socio-Demographics

Gender

Gender is a very simple dichotomous variable in each survey dataset. However, values for the original variables² were not always the same and had to be recodes. The common variable has values of 0 to represent female and 1 to represent male. Male and female percentages are each close to 50% in every dataset except ArabBarometer, which is 53.4% male.

Age

Original age variables³ are mostly in years, but the new variable divides age into eight categories. The first includes respondents under 25, with each successive category including the next ten years and the final age category combining all respondents over 65. The percentages of people in each age category are similar across the different datasets. Grouping age in in this way produces groups with sufficient numbers of respondents in each category, which reduces regression errors and outlier biases. Recoding age into six categories also gives it a scale similar in magnitude to most other variables, making its regression coefficients easier to interpret and compare.

² Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q101); AmericasBarometer Merged (q1); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q702); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se002); CSES Module 1 (A2002)

³ Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q1); AmericasBarometer Merged (q2); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q701); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se003a); CSES Module 1 (A2001).

Income

Original income variables differ between survey datasets, necessitating the creation of two new dichotomous variables for more meaningful comparisons. The first is for low income while the second is for high income; however, the definition of low and high income differs depending on the dataset they come from. AfroBarometer uses a five-point scale to assess how often respondents or their family members went without income over the previous year. AmericasBarometer asks respondents which of eleven ranges their total household income fits within, as well as a four-point scale to assess the sufficiency of total household income for meeting needs and saving. ArabBarometer asks respondents for their monthly family income and recodes this to form a ten-point scale of income deciles. AsianBarometer uses a five-point scale for total household income quintiles, as well as a four-point scale assessing the sufficiency of income for covering needs. Finally, the CSES uses a five-point scale for income quintiles. The values representing the highest and lowest income levels of the original four-point and five-point variable are recoded into new dichotomous variables for high and low income. For example, the highest value on a four-point income scale would be recoded 1 to represent high income, while the remaining three values would be recoded to 0 to represent the absence of a high income. For ten-point decile scales, the top three values are recoded to 1 to represent a high income, while the lower seven values are coded to 0. AmericasBarometer does not use deciles for its eleven-point scale, so the top three and bottom three values are used to represent high and low income. Figure 4.6 shows the results of recoding income variables, with percentages of low-income respondents on the left and high income on the right. The middle section includes all other income level responses.




Figure 4.6: Income Levels across Surveys. This shows percentages of respondents with low, middle, and high household income. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q8e); AmericasBarometer Merged (q10, q10d); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q716incomedeciles); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se009, seii9a); CSES Module 1 (A2012).

Education

Different public surveys use different questions to determine the education levels of respondents. For example, the AmericasBarometer asks about the last year of education respondents completed and places responses into nineteen possible categories, while the CSES asks for the highest completed education level using eight categories. All datasets do however include categories that allow for the creation of two common dichotomous variables for education levels. The first indicates whether respondents have some university education, or completed any university degree. The second designates respondents with a primary school level of education or lower, which includes respondents with no formal schooling or who are illiterate. This provides a measurement for university education versus low education that is comparable across all public surveys. As shown in Figure 4.7, university education levels are similar across most datasets except AfroBarometer, where university education is considerably lower and the majority of respondents have primary school education or lower.




Figure 4.7: Education Levels across Surveys. This shows percentages of respondents with different education levels. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q90) and Round 4 (q89); AmericasBarometer Merged (ed); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q703); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se005, se005a); CSES Module 1 (A2003).

Two original variables in the AsianBarometer Wave 2 were combined to minimising missing data. The first asked respondents for their highest level of education using ten categories. Its bottom three categories represent primary education or lower, while the top three represent different levels of university education. These values were recoded to form the two aforementioned common dichotomous variables. These were subsequently supplemented using a second education variable, which asked respondents their number of years of formal education. Seven years or less was adopted to represent a primary school education or less, while fourteen years or more was used to represent university education. Supplementing the new education variable using this method only affected about 1.7% of cases, but increased the number of respondents that can be included in regression models.

4.2.2. Participation and Engagement

Electoral Participation

Survey questions with different wording and differing sets of possible answers are used to determine whether respondents voted in the most recent election. Some questions specified the type of election, for example whether presidential or legislative, while others simply asked if respondents had voted in the last election. If past elections were specified, they were confirmed to be the same elections identified in the dependent variable question about electoral fairness, as outlined in section 4.5.3 below. Appropriate secondary questions were sometimes used to supplement the data and reduce missing cases, but only replaced a small percentage of the missing data. To contend with differences between the original electoral participation variables and enable meaningful comparisons across the datasets, responses were recoded into a new dichotomous variable coded yes (1) if respondents cast a ballot in the most recent election and no (0) to signify not having voted. The rate of electoral participation ranges from 67.5% in the ArabBarometer to 86.0% in the CSES (Europe).

Political Interest

The original questions⁴ about interest in politics are very similar and all use four-point scales. The following is a typical question: *How interested would you say you are in politics?* A frequent alternate version of the question asks *how much* interest respondents have. No political interest question was asked in the CSES survey. The different questions were recoded to a four-point answer scale, with the highest value representing high interest. The biggest difference between surveys is that AfroBarometer asks about interest in *public affairs* rather than in *politics*. This may explain the slightly larger response rate for high interest in AfroBarometer countries, since public affairs conceivably encompass more issues than politics. With the exception of AfroBarometer, interest in politics occurs at similar rates across surveys.

⁴ Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q16) and Round 4 (q13); AmericasBarometer Merged (pol1); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q215); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q056).

Supports Winner

Two questions measure the effect of supporting election winners. First is party identification, which arises from questions about which party or candidate respondents feel closest to or identify with. The second asks about which party or candidate respondents voted for in the most recent election. Original survey questions use long lists of candidates and parties, but the new variables are dichotomous and coded 1 if respondents identify with or voted the winners and 0 otherwise. If no single party received an absolute majority and a coalition was necessary to form government, then all members of the coalition were coded as winners. Winners of elections were determined by election outcomes as recorded by Election Guide (IFES, 2012) or official national EMB archives.




Figure 4.8: Support for Election Winners across Surveys. This shows percentages of respondents who identified with or voted for the winning candidate, party, or coalition in the most recent election. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q86, q99) and Round 4 (q86, q97); AmericasBarometer Merged (vb11_06, vb11_08, vb11_10, vb3_06 vb3_08 vb3_10); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q062, qii39a); CSES (A3005_3, A3011, A3009, A2029, A2030, A2031).

As we might expect, percentages that voted for winners are usually higher than percentages for respondents that identify with winners, as illustrated by Figure 4.8. This is because respondents may feel closest to a smaller party, but these smaller parties may not run candidates in all electorates or respondents may vote strategically for another larger party. The common variable used in regressions uses party

identification as the primary variable and supplements this with voting choice to minimise missing data. The two variables are highly correlated and both independently show consistent strong positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness. Supplementing party identification with voting choices therefore does not substantially change results, but minimising missing data allows more cases to be included in the analysis.

Urban/Rural Status

Urban versus rural status refers to where survey respondents live, but the criteria for making this distinction are unclear. This variable is unavailable for the ArabBarometer. Interviewers entered data to determine urban/rural status in most surveys, which could imply some subjectivity in making urban versus rural distinctions. The CSES uses a four-point scale, which was recoded so that anything larger than a 'rural area or village' is considered urban. These issues of subjectivity and recoding could prove problematic for comparisons, especially between datasets, but the indicator can still be used as a general metric for relative urbanization of where surveys were conducted. Figure 4.9 shows the percentages of respondents living in the respective areas, illustrating that the AfroBarometer includes more respondents living in rural areas.




Figure 4.9: Urban/Rural Status of Respondents across Surveys. Bars show percentages of respondents living in rural versus urban settings. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q91, q3, q79) and Round 4 (q90, q3, q79); AmericasBarometer Merged (q3c, q3_08, q3_0406, leng1, etid); CSES (A2022); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (level3).

Political Ideology

A political spectrum question is only included in two of the public surveys. The AmericasBarometer uses a ten-point scale, while the CSES uses an eleven-point scale. The AmericasBarometer asks about liberal versus conservative alignment in some countries, but this uses the same scale. Both logically start with left for the lowest values and right for the highest values, but these scales were recoded into two common variables. For both surveys, the lowest three and highest three values were grouped together to create dichotomous variables representing far-left and far-right viewpoints. This allows for comparisons between opposing views without multicollinearity problems because the middle values are not included as their own variable. This approach reveals that 24.1% of AmericasBarometer respondents self-identify as being right wing, while 18.4% identify as left wing. For CSES respondents in Europe, 17.0% identify as right wing and 13.6% as left wing.

4.2.3. Media Attention

Television/Newspaper/Radio

Three variables measure the frequency of attention to different sources of political news: television, newspapers, and radio. Radio dominates as the main source of political news in Africa, while television is the most common source in other parts of the world. However, questions regarding news sources was not consistent across all datasets, necessitating recoding to a common scale and using proxy variables to create approximately comparable variables. The AsianBarometer and ArabBarometer both lack questions about particular media sources, but include questions about attention to political news in general and the most important news source. Combining these two variables provides approximations for how frequently respondents pay attention to the news source they consider most important. Comparisons between regions using these variables should be approached cautiously. Three common news source variables were created, each using a common four-point scale where 0 represents 'never' and 3 represents 'daily' attention to that source. Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show the frequency people get political news from television, newspapers, and radio.




Figure 4.10: Television Attention Frequency across Surveys. Bars show frequency that respondents get news about politics and government from television. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q15b) and Round 4 (q12b); AmericasBarometer Merged (a2); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q216, q217); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q057, qii51_1).




Figure 4.11: Newspaper Attention Frequency across Surveys. Bars show frequency that respondents get news about politics and government from newspapers. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q15c) and Round 4 (q12c); AmericasBarometer Merged (a3); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q216, q217); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q057, qii51_2).




Figure 4.12: Radio Attention Frequency across Surveys. Bars show frequency that respondents get news about politics and government from radio. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q15a) and Round 4 (q12a); AmericasBarometer Merged (a1); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q216, q217); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q057, qii51a).

Political Knowledge

This variable is operationalized as the number of factual political knowledge questions the respondent answered correctly. Comparisons between datasets are problematic

however, because each survey asks different questions. For example, the AfroBarometer asks for the name of the respondent's Member of Parliament and the national Minister of Finance, while the AmericasBarometer asks about the number of provinces in the country and length of the executive term of office. The CSES survey asks very different questions in every country, but this has not prevented its political information variables from being used in comparative regression models. Having different questions is not ideal because it makes comparisons less reliable, but the variable remains useful as an indicator of general knowledge. Two political knowledge questions were used from each dataset, so the variables share a common three-point scale with 0 representing no correct answers and 2 representing both questions answered correctly.

4.2.4. Economic Performance

National Economy

Perceptions of the national economy are assessed with three survey questions regarding past, present and future conditions. These questions usually started with the current situation by asking respondents to describe the present economic situation in their country. This was usually followed with a question comparing the current situation with the economic situation 12 months ago. Respondents were lastly asked about their thoughts regarding the likely future situation. The exact wording differs slightly for some years and between surveys, but differences are not substantial enough to alter interpretations or hinder meaningful comparisons. Answers do however use different scales and had to be recoded to be comparable across datasets. Some used three-point answer scales, while others have five point scales. The implemented solution was to create common dichotomous variables for each of the three questions. For example, the highest value on three-point scales and the highest two values on five-point scales were recoded to indicate a good or improving economic situation. The lowest value or two values were similarly recoded to represent a bad or deteriorating economic situation. Using the six common recoded variables, Figure 4.13 shows percentages of respondents with different perspectives about the national economy. The question regarding the future economic situation

was not asked in the CSES survey, and the question asking about the past was not asked in the ArabBarometer.




Figure 4.13: Perceptions of National Economy across Surveys. Bars represent the percentages of respondents with different perceptions about the past, present and future national economic situation. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q4a, q6a, q7a); AmericasBarometer Merged (soct1, soct2, soct3); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q101, q102); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q001, q002, q003); CSES (A3022, A3023).

Personal Finances

In addition to questions about the national economic situation, surveys also ask about personal or family financial situations. These questions parallel those for the national economy by also asking about the past, present and future. The wording of the questions is again sufficiently similar to provide meaningful comparisons. The three-point and five-point answer scales were once more recoded to dichotomous variables to facilitate comparisons. The CSES does not ask any of the personal finance questions, while the ArabBarometer does not ask about the past or future personal finances. A noticeable trend in Figure 4.14 is that most respondents are optimistic about their future finances.




Figure 4.14: Perceptions of Personal Finances across Surveys. Bars Represent the percentages of respondents with different perceptions about their past, present and future personal finances. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q4b, q6b, q7b); AmericasBarometer Merged (idio1, idio2, idio3); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q103); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q004, q005, q006).

Paid Employment

Questions about jobs and employment vary considerably across the different public surveys, but one consistent element is whether respondents had paid employment. The newly created dichotomous variable simply measures whether or not respondents have a paid job of some kind. It is usually derived from one primary survey question, but sometimes supplemented with related questions to minimise missing data. For example, the main CSES question asks about respondents' current employment status, with missing values supplemented using variables for respondents' main occupation and employment type. These supplementary variables include response options indicating a lack of occupation or employment and only supplement 1.3% of the primary variable's answers. Figure 4.15 compares the rates of paid employment across surveys using the new common dichotomous variable. It clearly shows very low levels of paid employment amongst AfroBarometer respondents and conversely high employment in AsianBarometer countries.




Figure 4.15: Paid Employment Rates across Surveys. Bars show percentages of respondents that have some form of paid employment. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q94); AmericasBarometer Merged (ocup1a, ocup4, ocup4a); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q704, q705); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se012a, seii12b); CSES Module 1 (A2007, A2008, A2009).

4.2.5. Political Performance

Government Corruption

Survey questions about government corruption differ slightly, but remain sufficiently similar for broad comparisons. They ask respondents how many officials or how widespread corruption and bribery is in the government, the public sector or amongst public officials. To reduce missing values, multiple government corruption variables are combined for some datasets. For example, the primary AfroBarometer variable measures perceived corruption amongst national government officials, with missing values supplemented first with corruption amongst members of the national parliament and then with national executive officials, local government officials, and finally local councillors. The AsianBarometer combines a primary variable measuring corruption and bribery in the national government, with missing values supplemented using a parallel question about local government corruption. For AfroBarometer, over 90% of the values come from the primary variable measuring corruption amongst national public officials, with the other variables supplementing decreasing numbers of

missing values. The figure is slightly lower for AsianBarometer, with about 85% of values coming from the first variable. Combining multiple corruption variables should therefore not substantially alter estimate outcomes, but doing so allows corruption to be included in more regression models and compared with a wider set of observations.

All original corruption variables⁵ across all datasets use four-point scales, adding to their comparability. Values were recoded to range from 0, for very low corruption, to 3, for very high corruption. No corruption question was asked in the CSES. Relatively few respondents in the AmericasBarometer report low levels of corruption, revealing a distribution skewed towards higher perceived levels of corruption. The relevant AmericasBarometer survey question is not sufficiently different from other datasets to explain this difference, implying that perceived corruption in the Americas is much higher.

Institutional Trust

Institutional trust represents trust or confidence in the legislature, executive, judiciary, police, and political parties. However, the CSES does not include institutional trust questions and is thus not included in Figure 4.16. The wording of institutional trust questions differs between surveys, but not enough to change the meaning or preclude meaningful comparisons between surveys. The most important difference is that the AmericasBarometer uses a seven-point scale while the other barometers use a four-point scale. The implemented solution was dichotomization, with 1 representing trust in an institution and 0 a lack of trust. The 4 point scales were split down the middle, while the seven-point AmericasBarometer scale was recoded so the lowest four values represent a lack of trust and the highest three values indicating trust in an institution. This is why institutional trust appears consistently lower for the AmericasBarometer in Figure 4.16. This conservative approach helps ensure respondents truly do trust the indicated institution and produced rates of trust more similar to the other regional surveys.

⁵ Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q56a q56b q56c q56d q56e) and Round 4 (q50a q50b q50c q50d); AmericasBarometer Merged (exc7); ArabBarometer (q253); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q114, q114).




Figure 4.16: Institutional Trust across Surveys. Bars represent the percentages of respondents in each dataset that trust the respective institution. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q55a, q55b, q55c, q55f, q55h, q55i) and Round 4 (q49a, q49b, q49c, q49e, q49f, q49g, q49h); AmericasBarometer Merged (b11, b13, b18, b21, b21a, b10a); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q2011, q2012, q2013, q2014, q2015); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (qii07, q010, q007, q009, q013, q017).

Crime Victimization

Not all types of crimes are included within this variable and, wherever possible, crimes are limited to those with a physical nature. This includes physical attacks, armed robberies, sexual assaults, and other forms of crime that include an element of physical violence. There are differences between the survey questions, but all share this common underlying aspect of being physical crimes. In most cases, the questions ask about respondents and members of their family. Perceived safety is used as a proxy variable in ArabBarometer, with the value of feeling ‘very unsafe’ substituting for crime victimization. The newly created crime victimization variable is a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating respondents or their family members have been victim of at least one physical crime in the last year or, in the case of the ArabBarometer, feel that where they live is very unsafe. Figure 4.17 clearly illustrates that a higher proportion of respondents in the AfroBarometer countries have experiences physical crimes than in other regional surveys.




Figure 4.17: Physical Crime Victimization Rates across Surveys. Bars show percentages of respondents who have been, or who know a family member who has been, the victim of a crime involving some form of physical assault or threat, or feel very unsafe for the ArabBarometer. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q9c); AmericasBarometer Merged (vic2_0406, vic2_1012, vic20, vic20); ArabBarometer (q205); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (qii37, qii32).

4.2.6. Group Memberships

Cultural Groups

Most datasets have questions asking respondents about their religion or religious affiliation, their home or native language, and race or ethnic group. The original questions⁶ have long lists of possible answers, but the new common dichotomous variables simply represent whether respondents are members of the majority group within each category. Since a majority means more than all other groups combined, or over 50%, multiple categories were sometimes combined to achieve a majority. If this was necessary, the approach was to start with the largest group in a country and add the next largest group(s) until including 50% of respondents. For accuracy and consistency, the relative sizes of groups were determined using the survey datasets rather than external sources. This may not be as suitable as using other data sources,

⁶ Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q91, q3, q79) and Round 4 (q90, q3, q79); AmericasBarometer Merged (q3c, q3_08, q3_0406, leng1, etid); CSES (A2017, A2021, A2018); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se006, se014); ArabBarometer (q711).

but it was the most consistent because data is not available for all countries. Since there are three categories, each respondent could be a majority or minority member within each category. Unfortunately, data is not available for all categories in all countries. For example, many countries in the CSES do not include data on language and ethnicity. The ArabBarometer is omitted because it only has data on religious affiliation, but the AsianBarometer is included despite lacking data on ethnicity.

Non-Religious

Being non-religious is measured a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents are atheist, agnostic or have no religion. The original questions asked respondents about their religion, religious denomination, or religiosity. Long lists of possible answers were usually provided, but this study is only concerned with individuals who identify as having no religion. As shown by Figure 4.18, non-religiousness ranges from a low of 5.3% in the AfroBarometer to 27.3% in the European countries of the CSES.




Figure 4.18: Non-Religious Respondents across Surveys. Vertical bars represent the percentage of respondents that answered atheist, agnostic, no religion, or not at all religious. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q91) and Round 4 (q90); AmericasBarometer Merged (q3); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q711); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se006); CSES Module 1 (A2017).

Non-Partisan

Being non-partisan means that respondents do not feel close to nor identify with any political party. The original questions provide long lists of political parties as potential answers, but also include options indicating a lack of political affiliation. Slightly different questions are asked in each survey, but they are sufficiently similar for making comparisons. The new common dichotomous variable ignores particular political parties and simply represents respondents that do not feel close to or identify with any political party.




Figure 4.19: Non-partisanship across Surveys. This shows percentages of respondents that do not identify with or feel close to any political party. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q85) and Round 4 (q85), AmericasBarometer Merged Years 2006-2010 (vb10), AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q062)⁷, and CSES Module 1 (A3004).

Additional related variables supplement the common non-partisan variable to reduce missing data. For AmericasBarometer, the supplementary question asked which political party respondents identified with.⁸ All responses that identified a particular political party or ‘other’ political party were coded as partisan, while those that said they did not identify with any party were coded non-partisan. This replaces only 1.7% of the missing pre-supplementation cases. The CSES similarly supplements the non-partisan variable with questions regarding the parties respondents feel closest to. Both variables supplement the new nonpartisan variable in the same way, with affiliation with any party recoded to 0 and 1 if a lack of affiliation is indicated. This provides valid data for 1448 missing cases, or about 3.1% of the original pre-supplementation cases. Figure 4.19 shows the percentages of respondents who feel close to or identify with a political party. The percentages refer to the newly created non-partisan variable with all supplementations included. As the figure shows, a

⁷ There is a discrepancy between the dataset and questionnaire for this variable in AsianBarometer Wave 2. The dataset variable is **q062**, but the questionnaire lists it as question **54**.

⁸ A separate variable is used for each year of the AmericasBarometer, so *vb11* refers to *vb11_06*, *vb11_08*, *vb11_10*, and *vb11_12*. Each variable has a different set of values and was recoded separately.

majority of respondents in AmericasBarometer and CSES do not identify with any political party, while the majorities are flipped for the AfroBarometer and AsianBarometer. ArabBarometer is missing because it does not ask a partisanship question.

Social Trust

The social trust variable indicates whether respondents generally trust other people in society. The most frequent question asks the following: *Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?* Wording does not differ much between surveys, however this question is not asked in the CSES. The new common variable is dichotomous, with 1 representing trust in others and 0 for indicating the need to be careful when dealing with others. Figure 4.20 shows levels of social trust range from about 27% to 37% across the datasets.




Figure 4.20: Rates of Social Trust across Surveys. Bars show percentages of respondents that generally trust others. Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q83) and Round 4 (q84c); AmericasBarometer Merged (it1, it1b); ArabBarometer (q204); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q024).

4.3. National Level Variables

National level variables apply to entire countries rather than individual survey respondents. The variables outlined in the following sections primarily come from the Quality of Government (QoG) Dataset (Teorell et al., 2011), unless otherwise noted, but citations are provided for the original data sources wherever possible. The QoG dataset is a large collection of cross-national comparative data drawn from freely

available sources. Additional national level variables outlining different EMB design features come from ACE & IDEA datasets, but these are discussed in Chapter 5. The following sections outline the national level variables for the year each individual level survey was conducted. They are grouped according to the same thematic groupings found in Chapter 3. These include democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, political performance, economic conditions, and cultural fractionalization.

4.3.1. Democratic Performance

Democratic Experience

Democratic experience measures the age of democracy in years since women's suffrage was granted. In some cases, this does not coincide with universal suffrage for all groups, which can come later. Gaining full universal suffrage can be an incremental process and the choice of women's suffrage as a cut-off point means that at least a majority of the population can vote in national elections. As Figure 4.21 illustrates, a large number of countries granted voting rights to women in the two decades following the Second World War. Democratic experience thus represents the cumulative experience with voting for both sexes. This makes it fairer than measuring the democratic experience of men only. This important because the main dependent variable of interest is perceived electoral fairness. Measuring democratic experience in this way reveals the following averages (in years) for each survey: AfroBarometer (41.4), AmericasBarometer (60.1), ArabBarometer (48.6), AsianBarometer (57.2) and CSES Europe (70.6).




Figure 4.21: Women's Suffrage Year for 188 Countries. Bars show the number of countries that achieved full women's suffrage each year. Dark grey bars show countries included in this research, while light grey bars show all others. Source: Strong-Boag et al.(2013).

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

The level of democracy is measured using two separate indices from Freedom House's Freedom in the World reports: the Political Rights Rating and the Civil Liberties Rating. The scores for both these indices have been reversed to facilitate a more intuitive understanding, ranging from 1 to represent the least rights and liberties to 7 for the most. The political rights index covers electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government (Puddington, 2012: 33-34). It measures the extent to which people can freely vote, compete for public office, join or form political organisations, and elect accountable and effective representatives. The political rights index takes into consideration wider issues such as corruption, government accountability, electoral frameworks, and the rights and opportunities of minority groups. The civil liberties index measures freedoms of expression, belief, association and organization as well as the rule of law and personal autonomy from the state (Puddington, 2012: 33, 35). It takes into consideration the freedom and independence of the media, religious institutions, academia, judiciary, nongovernmental organisations, and a wide range of factors relating to personal liberties from state interference. Combining these two indices together produces a

democratic freedom rating for each country. The freedom ratings have also been reversed so that *Not Free* is the lowest value and *Free* is the highest. Figure 4.22 summarizes the ratings of countries across the different datasets. Europe (CSES) clearly has more free countries, while there are many more partly free countries in the other datasets.




Figure 4.22: Freedom Status for 79 Countries. Bars represent the percentages of respondents in each regional dataset living in each type of country, with the actual numbers of countries listed above the bars. Sources: Freedom House Freedom in the World, Freedom Rating (multiple years); Quality of Government Standard Dataset (fh_pr, fh_cl).

4.3.2. Electoral Context

Proportional Representation

Proportional representation focuses on the electoral system of the lower legislature and does not consider the electoral system of upper legislatures. This makes comparisons more meaningful because not all countries have upper legislatures. Countries that elect representatives using majoritarian or plurality electoral systems are coded 0, while .5 indicates mixed systems and 1 indicates completely proportional representation systems. Data comes from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001) variable on lower legislature electoral system,

but this has been supplemented with data from the Institutions and Elections Project (Regan & Clark, 2013) variable on electoral system type for legislative elections.

Direct Public Funding

Direct public funding refers to whether political parties are subsidised by direct public funding. This dichotomous variable comes from the ACE Electoral Project (ACE, 2012), but is supplemented with International IDEA Political Finance Database (IDEA, 2012). Direct public funding refers to any type of monetary assistance paid to political parties, either on a regular basis or for election campaigns. It does not include indirect public funding such as tax relief, free transportation or subsidised media access for political parties. The variable does not take into consideration how funds amounts are calculated.

Victory Margin

The victory margin is operationalized as the difference in percentage points between the party or candidate with the largest share of the vote compared with the party or candidate with the second largest share of the vote. Data comes from the PARLINE database on national parliaments (IPU, 2013), which was supplemented with information from official national EMB websites. If presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently, the victory margin is the average of all concurrent national level elections. Information about the popular vote percentages is missing in a few instances, so case victory margins are sometimes calculated using the proportion of parliamentary seats awarded to the different political parties. Victory margins can differ considerably between countries.

4.3.3. Parliamentary Composition

Legislature Size

This variable is limited to the lower legislature and does not account for the size of the upper legislature. Data comes from the Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote (J. W. Johnson & Wallack, 2012) database, which is supplemented with data from the election archives of the PARLINE database (IPU, 2013). Values correspond to the number of coded seats in the lower house, which may not correspond precisely with

actual number of sitting members of parliament. Small discrepancies may exist due to unforeseen vacancies or the existence of appointed legislators for which there are no electoral rules.

Population per MP

The population per legislator is calculated by dividing the total population by the number of members of parliament in the lower house. The resulting value is an average of the number of people that each legislator represents, in millions. Farrell and McAllister (2006: 735) use population in thousands, but using millions keeps the magnitude of this variable closer to other variables in the current research.

Women in Parliament

All values represent the percentage of women in the lower parliament. Not all countries have upper legislatures, so it is not included to make comparisons more meaningful. Data for this variable comes from the PARLINE (IPU, 2013) election archives. The percentage of women in the lower parliament ranges from 0% in Belize to 40% in Sweden and Argentina.

4.3.4. Political Performance

Public Sector Corruption

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International is used to measure public sector corruption. The index uses expert assessments and opinion surveys to estimate the perceived level of public sector corruption in a country. The CPI does not specifically measure electoral fraud, but considers corruption broadly in government and the public sector generally. The index is therefore a proxy for estimating EMB corruption, but is more accurately interpreted as a metric of the overall level of corruption in a country. Values have been inverted so that higher values represent higher levels of corruption. This keeps the variable consistent with other variables and facilitates interpretation of results.

Income Inequality

Income inequality is measured using the Gini index from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) as the primary source, with the Gini index from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2011) used to supplement this data. The Gini index measures the extent to which income distribution in a country deviates from being equal. Values range from 0 for perfect equality to 100 for perfect inequality.

Media Freedom

Media freedom is measured using the Freedom of the Press score (Freedom House, 2013). This index encompasses laws or regulations, political pressures or controls, economic influences and repressive actions as they relate to freedom of the press. The index has been inverted so that a value of 100 indicates the complete press freedom while 0 indicates no freedom.

4.3.5. Economic Conditions

Human Development Index

Levels of development are measured using the Human Development Index (HDI). The index combines life expectancy at birth, GDP per capita, adult literacy rates, and gross enrolment ratio for all educational levels (UNDP, 2013: 144-147). It uses these metrics as proxies for overall levels of development. HDI values range from 0 for the least human development to 1 the highest level of development.

GNI Per Capita

Data for Gross National Income (GNI) per capita comes from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). GNI combines the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with any income from abroad such as dividends, interest earnings, and profits. The World Bank uses the Atlas method to account for changes in prices and exchanges rates and different inflation rates. Original GNI per capita values, which were in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) current US dollars, have been divided by 1000 to make the values more comparable in magnitude to other variables. Figure 4.23 uses values before changing their magnitude, illustrating the wide gaps in GNI per capita between the

countries included in this research. Liberia scores lowest with a per capita GNI of only \$190, while Switzerland has the highest at \$40,920.




Figure 4.23: GNI per Capita in 76 Countries. This shows Gross National Income per capita in Purchasing Power Parity US dollars. Source: Quality of Government Standard Dataset (Teorell et al., 2011).

GDP Growth Per Capita

This variable uses GDP growth per capita as an indicator of economic performance. This data comes from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) and is valued in percentages. The annual growth rate of GDP per capita is based on constant local currency. GDP per capita values are calculated by dividing annual GDP divided by midyear population.

4.3.6. Cultural Fractionalization

Cultural fractionalisation is measured using three separate variables for religious, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003). These variables reflect the probability that two randomly selected people do not share the same cultural characteristic, meaning the same religion, ethnicity, and language. Values for each fractionalisation variable range from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate a higher probability the individuals have different cultural characteristics. In other words, the higher the value the more fractionalization there is in that dimension.

4.4. Methodology: Individual and National Variables

The methodology for individual and national level variables is aimed at determining how they are related to perceived electoral fairness and the strength of those relationships. The variables that prove to be significant and strongly related to electoral fairness can then be included within the EMB design models to control for their effects. Existing published research has not tested many of the included independent variables with electoral fairness as the dependent variable, nor has any published research examined perceived electoral fairness in as many countries. The methodology and any results it produces are therefore valuable independently of determining which variable to include when analysing EMB design variables.

Dataset limitations prevent some combinations of variables and necessitate the construction of multiple regression models. In total, this thesis includes 34 individual level variables and 18 national level variables. However, the regional datasets do not contain sufficient numbers of countries to include many variables. Moreover, some

countries are missing variables, which is problematic because all observations are automatically omitted if data is missing for any variable in the model. This is especially important for multilevel models because entire countries could be omitted if they are missing a variable. The missing data and large number of variables meant it was necessary to construct multiple models that separately test different sets of relationships. At the same time, it is desirable to create models that are understandable and unified around a common theme to facilitate interpretation. The result of balancing these considerations and limitations was to construct six individual level models and six national level models. These are the thematic groupings of variables used throughout the different chapters.

Two types of regressions are used to analyse individual and national level variables: multivariate order probit models and multilevel mixed-effects models. All multivariate and multilevel models use the same rescaled dependent variable for perceived electoral fairness. The **estadd beta** command was run after all regressions to add standardized beta coefficients to saved estimates. Although beta coefficients abstract the variable scales and are not in the original variable units, using them enables meaningful comparisons regarding the relative strength of different independent variables. They are therefore more useful for answering the research question of which factors and indicators have the strongest effects on perceived electoral fairness. The following sections explain the main two regression types used in this thesis.

Individual level variables are analysed at three levels. The first is by separate countries, providing insight into how relationships differ between countries. This affords a level of detail that cannot be obtained when running regressions on entire regional datasets. The process of setting up these models also clarifies which variables are missing in which countries. The second type of regression was whole-dataset regional regressions that included the countries within a particular survey. For example, all countries in the AfroBarometer and AsianBarometer were run in regressions to compare results between Africa and Asia. The third type of regression uses a global dataset of all regional datasets appended together. This approach is somewhat methodologically problematic because the different regional datasets do not all use the same sampling methodologies and survey questions sometimes differ.

However, the global models complement the more methodologically reliable national and regional models. Trends that emerge as consistent and significant at all three levels of analysis are likely to be stronger and more reliable. The inclusion of a global model also provides a level of generalization not available from the regional datasets. National level variables are only analysed at two levels, national and global, because these variables do not vary within countries and therefore cannot be included within separate country regressions.

4.4.1. Multivariate Regression Models

Ordered probit regression is the most appropriate method at the individual level because the dependent variable is a four-point ordered variable ranging from a lack of electoral fairness to completely fair elections. The **oprobit** Stata command was used to fit ordered probit models of ordinal dependent variables with the independent variables. Standard errors were clustered by country using the **vce(cluster *clustvar*)** option, with a numerical country variable used to identify the clusters. Estimating the variance-covariance matrix using country clusters helps to account for potentially correlated observations within countries. Using this cluster option does not change the coefficient sizes or directions, but it usually widens the range of standard errors and therefore affects significance levels. Clustering makes relationships less precise because the standard error range is usually wider, but it helps make overall findings more reliable. It sets a higher threshold for achieving significant results and thus increases confidence in the findings.

Experimenting with different combinations of variables with the triple aims of maximizing the number of included countries, testing all individual level variables and combining them is a coherent way led to six multivariate models. These are based around the broad themes of socio-demographics, participation and engagement, media attention, economic performance, political performance and group memberships. These models are designed to maximize overlapping missing variables and thereby minimize overall data omission. Finally, a summative model combines the strongest and most consistent significant variables from these six preliminary models. An important requirement for inclusion within the summative model is that variables

cannot be missing from any country, since this would remove the country from multilevel models.

4.4.2. Multilevel Regression Models

Multilevel models are more accurate when data has a hierarchical structure, meaning lower levels nested within higher levels (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). For this research, individual level survey data is the lower level because it is nested within countries, which are the higher level. People within the same country are often more similar to each other than they are to people in other countries. Failing to account for this in regression models violates the assumption of independent standard errors, meaning resulting standard errors would be inaccurately smaller, which increases the risk of achieving false significant results. Using multilevel models helps avoid this problem by accounting for the possibility of non-constant variance across different countries (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). A multilevel approach does this by simultaneously estimating the model at all levels. In other words, the effects of both the individual level and national level variables are estimated at the same time.

The **xtmixed** Stata command is used to run multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models. This is an appropriate method when data is nested within multiple levels and we want to allow for both random and fixed effects. Fixed effects are derived from the national level variables, since they do not change for each country, but change between countries. Random effects are at the individual level because these variables change both within and between countries. All regressions are reported using standardized regression coefficients to facilitate meaningful comparisons between the separate regional datasets. The **estadd beta** command is run after each multilevel regression to add the standardized beta coefficients to regression estimates, since they are not added by default.

Proven individual level variables from the summative multivariate models are used as control variables in multilevel models. The same set of proven variables is used to provide consistency when comparing the relative strength of national level variables.

These variables are also suitable because they contain minimal missing data, which ensures no countries are omitted because of insufficient individual level data. This is important because the limited number of countries in the datasets precludes combining too many national variables in one model. Running multilevel regressions with too few countries, or too few higher-level clusters, either introduces multicollinearity or convergence errors when trying to calculate variance matrices.

The 18 national level variables are tested using six separate multilevel models. Three national level variables are grouped in each model, which are based around common themes: democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, political performance, economic conditions, and cultural fractionalization. These multilevel models are only run using the three datasets with the most countries: AfroBarometer, AmericasBarometer and European countries of the CSES. The same multilevel models are also run using the combined Global dataset, which includes the AsianBarometer, ArabBarometer, and non-European countries of the CSES. The different dataset regressions are combined vertically in the same output tables to facilitate side-by-side comparisons between the different regional and global models.

4.5. Datasets and Data Management

The use of multiple datasets and data sources necessitates extensive data management, while the inclusion of a broad selection of countries required new identification variables. The following sections describe where individual level national level data comes from, how case study countries were selected, the new variables for identifying data, rules for creating common variables and how different data sources were combined.

4.5.1. Individual Level Public Surveys

Public survey data comes from AmericasBarometer, AsianBarometer, AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). These surveys are the source of dependent variables and all independent individual level variables. These include items such as individual demographics, public opinions or attitudes, and political participation. The following list outlines the included cross-national surveys

and relevant years in brackets. The actual years used for each country depend on when national elections were held in that country.

More information about the country and year selection procedure is available in section 4.5.3. The survey barometers use a common core set of items with very similar or identical wording across both questions and possible responses. The main difference is with the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems because it does not draw from the same models of survey questions. It does however include many useful and similar variables.

- AmericasBarometer Merged (2006–2010)
- ArabBarometer Wave One (2006–2007)
- AsianBarometer Wave Two (2005–2007)
- AfroBarometer Round Three and Four (2004–2009)
- Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 (1996–2001)

The number of countries included in regressions differs depending on the availability of data for particular variables. Not all survey questions were asked in every country and only countries with valid data can be included in regression models. The most important limitation is whether survey respondents gave their opinion about electoral fairness. In total, 80 countries contain valid data on perceptions of electoral fairness at the individual level, which represents the maximum number of countries that can be included within a global analysis. The actual number of countries in any regression model will depend upon the availability of data for the included variables.

4.5.2. National Level Institutional Datasets

National indicators come from many separate sources. The primary EMB design variables come from the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Electoral Knowledge Network and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Political Finance Database. These datasets were supplemented using data from official electoral management body websites, national constitutions, electoral legislation, and personal communication with EMB and government officials. Other national level data comes from the Quality of Government (QoG) Standard Dataset,

which includes a wide range of variables drawn from other freely available data sources (Teorell et al., 2011). These sources include the United Nations, World Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International, and many others. Missing QoG variables were supplemented by gathering data from the organisation that originally created or gathered the data. The following is a list of the main national level data sources used in this thesis and the years for data availability:

- ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data (1987–2012)
- International IDEA, Political Finance Database (1987–2012)
- QoG, Standard Dataset (1946–2010)
- Official EMB websites, national constitutions and electoral laws (1980-2013)

Comparative Data from the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE, 2012) and the International IDEA Political Finance Database (IDEA, 2012) is combined into one dataset. This combined dataset is referred to as the ACE & IDEA data. Important supplementary data includes when EMBs were first established and when the last major institutional change occurred. This enables calculating how long EMBs have existed and how long they have been structured in their current form.

4.5.3. Country Case Selection Methodology

Only one survey was needed per country, but there are often multiple rounds, years or waves of public surveys to choose from for each country. Which survey year was used depended on three considerations. The first and necessary consideration was to select surveys based on the inclusion of a question about perceptions of electoral fairness. The second was to minimize the time between elections and survey dates. Although Anderson and LoTempio (2002: 347) found political trust levels unaffected after three months, it is unclear what effect longer durations might have. Minimising the time between elections and surveys helps reduce response inaccuracies due to memory errors, as recollections about electoral fairness are expected to be more accurate closer to the date of the election. The third consideration was to ensure the same individual level items were present across the different survey years. This was necessary for making comparisons between countries, as well as across the different

regional surveys. In summary, surveys were selected that asked about electoral fairness, minimized the time elapsed since the election and included as many of the same relevant questions as possible.

The following paragraphs outline the countries selected based on these considerations. Tables list the most recent legislative and presidential election dates alongside the dates national surveys were completed. Presidential election dates are missing for countries that did not have elected presidents for the selected year. A brief discussion of three key survey questions pertaining to elections follows each table. Of particular importance is the survey item pertaining to electoral fairness, since dependent variables arise from this question.

Table 4.1: Elections and Survey Dates for AfroBarometer Rounds 3 and 4

	Legislative	Presidential	Survey
Benin	31 March 2007	19 March 2006	July 2008
Botswana	30 October 2004	8 November 2004	June 2005
Burkina Faso	6 May 2007	13 November 2005	October 2008
Cape Verde	22 January 2006	12 February 2006	May 2008
Ghana	7 December 2004	7 December 2004	March 2005
Kenya	27 December 2007	27 December 2007	December 2008
Lesotho	17 February 2007	.	October 2008
Liberia	11 October 2005	8 November 2005	December 2008
Madagascar	15 December 2002	3 December 2006	June 2008
Malawi	20 May 2004	20 May 2004	June 2005
Mali	22 July 2007	29 April 2007	December 2008
Mozambique	2 December 2004	2 December 2004	December 2008
Namibia	15 November 2004	15 November 2004	February 2006
Nigeria	21 April 2007	21 April 2007	May 2008
Senegal	3 June 2007	25 February 2007	May 2008
South Africa	14 April 2004	.	February 2006
Tanzania	14 December 2005	14 December 2005	July 2008
Uganda	23 February 2006	23 February 2006	July 2008
Zambia	26 September 2006	30 October 2008	June 2009
Zimbabwe	29 March 2008	27 June 2008	May 2009

Table 4.1 lists the countries and elections selected from the AfroBarometer Round 3 and 4 surveys. Three questions refer to elections, with similar wording for both survey rounds. The first asks whether respondents voted in “the most recent, [year] national elections”, the second inquires about “the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [year]”, and the third asks which candidate respondents would vote

for if “a presidential election were held tomorrow” (Carter, 2008: 13, 22, 49; 2010: 15, 43, 52). The third question asks about general or national elections and prime ministers in countries without presidents (Carter, 2008: 50-51; 2010: 53). From the wording of the question about electoral fairness, national elections are taken to mean the most recent legislative elections, which made them the most important for deciding which survey years to select. It also made sense to select survey years based on the national legislative elections to ensure a consistent practice between countries.

Table 4.2: Elections and Survey Dates for AmericasBarometer Merged 2006-2010

	Legislative	Presidential	Survey
Argentina	28 October 2007	28 October 2007	February 2008
Belize	7 February 2008	.	October 2008
Bolivia	18 December 2005	18 December 2005	March 2008
Brazil	1 October 2006	29 October 2006	May 2008
Chile	11 December 2005	15 January 2006	February 2008
Colombia	12 March 2006	28 May 2006	February 2008
Costa Rica	5 February 2006	5 February 2006	July 2006
Dominican Republic	16 May 2006	16 May 2008	March 2010
Ecuador	26 April 2009	26 April 2009	March 2010
El Salvador	18 January 2009	15 March 2009	March 2010
Guatemala	9 September 2007	9 September 2007	March 2008
Guyana	28 August 2006	.	October 2006
Honduras	29 November 2009	29 November 2009	March 2010
Jamaica	3 September 2007	.	March 2008
Mexico	2 July 2006	2 July 2006	February 2008
Nicaragua	5 November 2006	5 November 2006	February 2008
Panama	3 May 2009	3 May 2009	February 2010
Paraguay	20 April 2008	20 April 2008	February 2010
Peru	9 April 2006	4 June 2006	July 2006
Uruguay	29 November 2009	25 October 2009	March 2010
Venezuela	4 December 2005	3 December 2006	September 2007

The multiple years for each country in the merged AmericasBarometer dataset enabled selecting survey years to reduce time elapsed since elections. Table 4.2 displays election and survey dates for AmericasBarometer countries. The same three previously outlined questions about elections have slightly different phrasing. The first asks whether respondents voted “in the last presidential elections”, the second inquires which candidates respondents voted for “in the last presidential elections”, while a third asks about the extent to which respondents “trust elections” (LAPOP, 2006: 15, 8; 2008: 13, 8; 2010: 13-14, 8). The electoral trust question does not specify

a type of election, but the other two questions ask specifically about presidential elections. Presidential elections were therefore prioritized when deciding which survey years to select, unless the country did not have a president in which case legislative elections were used. In most cases, presidential elections are held either simultaneously or very close to legislative election dates.

Table 4.3: Elections and Survey Dates for ArabBarometer Wave 1

	Legislative	Presidential	Survey
Algeria	30 May 2002	8 April 2004	2006
Jordan	17 June 2003	.	2006
Lebanon	20 June 2005	.	2006
Morocco	27 September 2002	.	2006
Palestine	25 January 2006	9 January 2005	2007

Table 4.3 outlines the five countries in the first wave of the ArabBarometer. Only two of the three relevant elections questions are asked in this survey. The first asks if respondents participated “in the most recent elections”, while the second inquires about “the freeness and fairness of the last national election” (ADB, 2007: 5). Both mentions of elections are interpreted to ask about national legislative elections, and only two of the countries had presidential systems. However, selection of the best survey year is immaterial because there is only one wave of data currently available.

Table 4.4: Elections and Survey Dates for AsianBarometer Wave 2

	Legislative	Presidential	Survey
Hong Kong	12 September 2004	.	December 2007
Indonesia	5 April 2004	20 September 2004	November 2006
Japan	11 September 2005	.	February 2007
Malaysia	21 March 2004	.	July 2007
Mongolia	27 June 2004	22 May 2005	May 2006
Philippines	10 May 2004	10 May 2004	January 2005
Singapore	3 November 2001	19 March 2000	January 2005
South Korea	15 April 2004	19 December 2002	January 2006
Taiwan	1 December 2001	20 March 2004	March 2006
Thailand	6 February 2005	.	2005
Vietnam	19 May 2002	.	June 2006

All countries in Table 4.4 come from the second wave of AsianBarometer surveys. Three relevant questions ask about elections. The first enquires if respondents voted “in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held

in [year]”, the second asks which “parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race)” respondents voted for, while the third asks respondents to “rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [year]” (ABS, 2007: 4-5). This question is interpreted to ask about the last national legislative elections. There were too many differences between relevant questions in other waves of the survey, so only the second wave of the AsianBarometer is used.

Table 4.5: Election and Survey Dates for CSES Module 1 (Europe Only)

	Legislative	Presidential	Survey
Belarus	15 October 2000	9 September 2001	September 2001**
Czech Republic	1 June 1996	.	June 1996
Denmark	11 March 1998	.	April 1998**
Germany	27 September 1998	.	October 1998
Hungary	10 May 1998	.	May 1998*
Iceland	18 May 1999	29 June 1996	June 1999
Lithuania	10 November 1996	4 January 1998	January 1998*
Netherlands	6 May 1998	.	August 1998
Norway	14/15 September 1997	.	November 1997
Poland	21 September 1997	19 November 1995	October 1997
Portugal	17 March 2002	14 January 2001	March 2002
Romania	3 November 1996	17 November 1996	December 1996
Russia	19 December 1999	26 March 2000	April 2000**
Slovenia	10 December 1996	6 December 1992	November 1997
Spain	12 March 2000	.	March 2000
Sweden	20 September 1998	.	November 1998
Switzerland	24 October 1999	.	November 1999
Ukraine	29 March 1998	.	April 1998
United Kingdom	1 May 1997	.	July 1997

Only the European countries of the CSES survey are displayed in Table 4.5, since these are of primary interest for making regional comparisons. However, the other non-European countries are included in global models if they have valid data. The same three questions about elections are included within the CSES survey. The first question about electoral participation asks if respondents voted in “the elections”, although the wording in some countries specifies “the general election” (Sapiro, Shively, & CSES, 2003: see notes for A2028). There are multiple versions of the second question asking about which candidate respondents voted for, which differ between countries depending on the national political circumstances and configurations (Sapiro et al., 2003: see notes for A2029, A2030 and A2031). The third electoral fairness question

asks how fairly “the last election in [country]” was conducted (Sapiro et al., 2003: see notes for A3002). Unfortunately, the three relevant election questions do not provided sufficient information regarding election type. For consistency between countries and other datasets, national legislative elections were used as the basis for reducing time before survey dates.

4.5.4. Geographic and Date Identification

It was necessary to create a common coding scheme for geographic and date variables before appending and merging the different datasets. Geographical identifiers come from two sources: three-letter alphabetical codes from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO, 2006), and three-digit numerical codes from United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). The ISO alphabetical codes, which only apply to countries, were combined with survey years to identify the country and year using one variable. This unique identifying variable was used when combining datasets. UNSD numerical codes include three levels ranging from macro geographical (continental) regions, to geographical subregions and finally countries (UNSD, 2012). The numerical codes were given labels based on the English short forms, following the practice of both the UNSD and ISO.

Date variables were recoded to be consistent across all datasets and comprised of three variables: day, month, and year. The year was essential for ensuring valid matches between national indicators and individual survey data. Years were available for all datasets, but some corrections were necessary. For example, the AmericasBarometer and CSES datasets had some problems with their years. All fixes were conducted with reference to original data sources and survey field reports. Days and months of surveys were used to ensure surveys were conducted after elections finished. This date information was not available for all datasets, but was again fixed in most cases by referring to original sources. Some data for days was still missing despite these efforts, in which case surveys were only used if elections occurred at least one month before the surveys were conducted. This provided a sufficient margin of error to ensure respondents had the most recent election in mind when answering relevant survey questions.

4.5.5. Variable Recoding Rules

In addition to recoding identifying variables, several steps of general data management were applied consistently to the selected variables across all datasets. Different regional surveys use different variable names, while some surveys change their variable names before each round or wave. Furthermore, the values and answer scales for similar questions often differed between datasets and surveys. Considerable variable recoding and data management was therefore necessary before combining datasets and running comparative regressions. This required applying a consistent set of rules for cleaning up the data, which are outlined in the following paragraphs.

First, new variable names used common prefixes for similar types of variables. For example, common identification variables outlined in section 4.5.4 above all start with **id_** while variables relating to survey respondents' political views or attitudes all start with a **pv_** prefix. All national level indicators start with a **nat_** prefix. These prefixes make it easier to write common regression and other Stata scripts, while also making it possible to keep variables in the same alphabetical order across all datasets.

Second, a suffix for the number of possible responses was added to the end of common variable names to indicate this information. For example, the common perceived electoral fairness variable with four response categories is called '*pv_elections4*'. Numbers are not added to the end of dichotomous variable names.

Third, dichotomous variables were coded so that a value of 1 represents the measurement item is present, while 0 represents its absence. In general, these variables are usually assigned a simple no or yes label, where 1 represents 'yes' and 0 represents 'no'. For example, the variable for whether respondents are non-partisan is coded 1 if they do not identify with any political party and 0 otherwise.

Fourth, all response values were recoded so that larger numbers meant more of the item being measured. Moreover, variables that logically included the possibility of having a null value were recoded to start at zero. For example, perceived government corruption on a four-point scale was recoded so that 0 means respondents think there are no corrupt officials, while 4 represents all officials are believed to be corrupt.

Consistently coding variables according to this rule makes it easier to interpret the positive or negative sign of regression coefficients.

Fifth, all non-valid and unusable responses were recoded to periods (.) because different datasets used different values for missing data. Stata uses a period to represent missing data and does not include these cases in regressions or other calculations. Some datasets use the code 98 for unknown, -1 for missing data or 999 for refused to answer. These values would substantially affect almost all forms of output from simple descriptive statistics such as averages to the size of regression coefficients. It was therefore very important to change all invalid responses to periods.

Sixth, notes with the original wording of survey questions or any coding changes are attached to variables if applicable. For example, the variable for non-partisanship in AmericasBarometer has two attached notes: (1) *Do you currently identify with a political party?* (2) *Recoded to yes if respondent does not identify with any political party.* These notes enable better interpretation of variables and their values without referring back to original codebooks or questionnaires.

The following list summarises the data recoding rules, which were applied to all variables across both individual and national level datasets. These data management steps are necessary before conducting comparative analyses between regional datasets and before combining the datasets.

- **Rule 1:** Variable name prefixes show similarities between types of variable
- **Rule 2:** Variables name suffixes show number of possible answers
- **Rule 3:** Code dichotomous variables so 1 represents presence of item and 0 represents its absence
- **Rule 4:** Recode so larger values represent more of item being measured
- **Rule 5:** Recode non-valid and missing data to periods (.)
- **Rule 6:** Add note containing original wording of survey question

4.5.6. Appending and Merging Datasets

The terminology used here follows from the way the Stata software package discusses terms. Stata refers to it as *appending* when adding observations from another dataset to the dataset in memory. This is appropriate when both datasets represent the same thing and have the same variables. For example, AfroBarometer Round 3 was appended to AfroBarometer Round 4. Both of these datasets represent individual surveys, and all questions and possible responses had previously been recoded for consistency. Stata refers to *merging* when combining datasets representing different things. A many-to-one method was appropriate for combining the datasets used in this research. This approach is suitable when the many public surveys in each country have to be matched with one national level variable for each country. For example, the many individual level respondents in the AfroBarometer countries had to be matched with single national level variables from the ACE & IDEA datasets that applied to each country. Creating usable multilevel regional datasets entailed first appending similar public surveys, such as the two waves of the AfroBarometer, and then merging these with national level datasets. Both append and merge processes used the same unique identifying variable that combines the three-letter country code and survey year.

Chapter 5. Exploring the Effects of Electoral Management Design

This chapter outlines the data and methodologies used to test two models of electoral management body design. The first is the conventional independent model, outlined in section 5.1, which has been broken down into the six criteria that have available data. These include implementation, accountability, powers, composition, term of office and budget. Some of these criteria are composed of multiple tasks while others comprise single tasks. Section 5.2 explains the methodology for analysing the conventional independent model using multilevel mixed-effects regression models. The second model of electoral management is the categorised autonomy model, covered in section 5.3, which is structured around four types of autonomy. The institutional, financial and personnel categories are outlined first, since a minimal level of autonomy across these three categories is required to fulfil the functional autonomy variable requirements. There are also more functional variables than there are for other types of autonomy. However, the four types of autonomy all include multiple variables that are aggregated into autonomy indices. The methodology outlined in section 5.4 thus entails multiple models to first test each variable separately, and then as combined additive indices.

5.1. Conventional Independent Model

The original conventional independent model conflates its different criteria into a single dichotomous variable. According to the ACE Project Comparative Data (2012), approximately 63% of all EMBs meet most of these criteria and are therefore categorised as independent. However, this approach is rather simple and discards valuable information, preventing analysis of the different criteria. An alternative approach is to test each criterion separately, which is the method used for this thesis. The criteria of an independent EMB with available data include that it is responsible for core aspects of election implementation, not accountable to the executive branch, able to develop the electoral regulatory framework, composed of members who are outside the executive who have security of tenure, and free from daily governmental financial control (Wall et al., 2006: 9, 12). Missing data and multicollinearity errors prevent testing all seven criteria, but most can be separately analysed using available

variables. For example, institutional separation from the executive government is not examined due to intra-regional multicollinearity. Most countries in Latin America have institutionally separate EMBs, while most countries in Europe have EMBs that are part of a government department. The result is insufficient variation within each regional dataset, which produces too much multicollinearity between countries to test for the effects of different institutional or structural arrangements. This first of the seven criteria is therefore not included in the current research. Larger and more diverse datasets are required before the merits of institutional separation can be empirically verified.

Before continuing, it is important to distinguish between 'criteria' and 'tasks' as these terms are used to operationalize the conventional independent model. Some criteria include multiple tasks. For example, the implementation criterion includes multiple core tasks required for running elections. These tasks are analysed separately as well as combined into an aggregated index variable. The following sections outline the criteria data and variables, along with their respective tasks, if applicable.

5.1.1. Implementation

The first criterion with available data is that an independent EMB is responsible for the implementation of elections. This refers to the responsibility for performing core tasks of electoral governance. Implementation tasks in this research include determining voter eligibility, conducting polling, and counting and tabulating the votes (Wall et al., 2006: 5). Variables are not available for all tasks and proxy variables provide suitable substitutes for some. For example, there is no data for the core implementation task of receiving and validating nominations for electoral political parties and candidates. Unfortunately, ACE Comparative Data does not include a variable that represents this task or anything similar, so it is not included in this research.

Voter registration is used as a proxy variable for determining voter eligibility. This is based on the assumption that being responsible for voter registration usually includes determining voter eligibility. Data for this variable was obtained by asking country experts the following question: *Which is the authority responsible for the registration*

of voters for national elections? Available options include *Central Government Department, Regional Government Authority, Local Government Authority, EMB, and Other* (ACE, 2012). No countries included in this research have regional voter registration authorities. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, the task of voter registration is the responsibility of EMBs in most countries.




Figure 5.1: Voter Registration Authorities across 80 Countries. Pie chart sections show percentages of each type of voter registration authority, with numbers of countries listed in the legend. No study countries have regional voter registration authorities. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Voter Registration (vr004).

The third core implementation task is conducting polling, which includes running voting booths and polling stations. This is represented by the variable for EMB responsibility for elections. The following question is asked of country experts: *Does the national electoral body have the responsibility for elections at: National Level, Regional Level, Local Level, Other Kinds of Elections and Not Applicable*. Figure 5.2 shows that all EMBs are responsible for national level elections,⁹ meaning that this level cannot be included in test methodologies because of insufficient variation. In

⁹ The *Electoral Affairs Commission* of Hong Kong was listed by ACE data as only responsible for local elections because Hong Kong is a pseudo city-state and considered part of China. However, it was modified to 'national' responsibility to reflect the reality of how this variable is used in other countries.

addition, since not all countries have regional levels of government, it would be inappropriate to make comparisons using this level of electoral responsibility. Therefore, only local level electoral responsibility is used as a proxy for conducting polling.




Figure 5.2: Responsibility of National EMBs across 80 Countries. The column chart shows the numbers and percentages of countries where national EMBs have responsibility for each type or level of election. This item allows multiple selections so percentages total more than 100%. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em002).

The fourth core task is sorting and counting votes, which is calculated indirectly using a combination of two variables: EMB responsibility level and initial vote counting location. If vote counting occurs at local polling stations and the national EMB is responsible for running elections at the local level, vote counting is considered the responsibility of the EMB. Figure 5.3 shows where votes are initially sorted and counted. The question for country experts asks: *Following the close of voting, where are the votes first sorted and counted?* Available options include: *The polling stations, The polling centre, Special counting centres, and Other.* Most countries count votes at the polling stations, which is at the local level.




Figure 5.3: Vote Counting and Sorting across 80 Countries. Pie chart sections show percentages for each of these locations, while the legend includes the number of countries. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Vote Counting (vc004).

The final core task with available data, consolidating election results, is calculated using a combination of variables for where they are consolidated and the levels of EMBs responsibility. If votes are consolidated at a level the EMB has responsibility for, then the EMB is assumed to perform this task. For example, Argentina consolidates results at the regional level and its EMB has responsibility for running elections at this level, so it meets these conditions. Figure 5.4 only includes 74 countries because of missing data in some AsianBarometer and ArabBarometer countries. The question for country experts asks: *Following the sorting and counting, to where are the results first transmitted for consolidation?* Possible answers include *National Level, Regional Level, District Level, Sub-district level, Polling centre and Other*. Most countries consolidate elections at the district, sub-district, or a lower level. These are usually considered to be at the local level.




Figure 5.4: Vote Consolidation Levels across 74 Countries. The column chart shows the numbers and percentages of countries where national EMBs consolidate polling results. This item allows multiple selections so percentages total more than 100%. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Vote Counting (vc006).

5.1.2. Accountability

This independent EMB model criterion specifies that formal EMB accountability be to the legislature, judiciary or head of state and not the executive branch (Wall et al., 2006: 9). ACE Comparative Data does not include all these categories unfortunately, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. The prompt for country experts is as follows: *The national electoral management body reports to: The President, The Prime Minister, The legislature, A national government department, Another organ within the national government, or Other.* Presidents, prime ministers, and government departments are normally considered part of the executive, meaning EMBs cannot report to these actors to meet the accountability criterion. The formal accountability variable is measured using only accountability to the legislature, which is also the largest category.




Figure 5.5: EMB Formal Accountability across 72 Countries.: The column chart shows numbers and percentages of countries where national EMBs report to each type of actor. This item allows multiple selections, so percentages total more than 100%. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em003).

5.1.3. Powers

The criterion regarding powers is slightly ambiguous in the *IDEA Handbook* of electoral design. It allows for the possibility of independent EMBs having powers to (1) develop the electoral regulatory framework, (2) make policy decisions independently, (3) hire and manage their own staff, or (4) manage their own procurement and accounting (Wall et al., 2006: 9,12). The power to settle electoral disputes is also mentioned. Variables are not available to test all these powers, but proposing legislative reforms and settling electoral disputes are represented by suitable variables. Figure 5.6 displays which bodies can propose electoral reforms, while Figure 5.7 presents data on the first level of electoral dispute settlement. The question for reforming electoral legislation asks: *Which body(ies) propose(s) electoral reforms?* Possible response categories include *Legislative Committee, Legislature, Specially Appointed Committee, Election Management Body, Government, and Other*. This item allows for multiple types of bodies to propose reforms, so percentages total more than 100%. The question regarding dispute settlement asks the following: *What is/are the agency(ies)*

responsible for the first level of formal electoral disputes? Possible answers include Judiciary, EMB, Specially Appointed/Elected Electoral Tribunal, Other. The most common bodies to be delegated the responsibility for settling electoral disputes are EMBs and the judiciary.




Figure 5.6: Bodies that Propose Electoral Reforms in 80 Countries. The column chart shows the numbers and percentages of countries that formally allow each type of body to propose electoral reforms. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Legal Framework (If011).




Figure 5.7: Responsibility for First Level of Electoral Disputes across 80 Countries. The stacked bar chart shows the numbers and percentages of countries that formally allow each type of body to propose electoral reforms. This item allows for multiple types of bodies to propose reforms, so percentages total more than 100%. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Legal Framework (If007).

5.1.4. Composition

This criterion states that members of an independent EMB should be outside the executive branch (Wall et al., 2006: 9), but no available variable measures this fifth criterion directly. The responsibility for selecting EMB members acts as an alternative proxy variable. Members selected by the head of state, legislature, or judiciary substitutes for having members being independent of the executive branch. Using these three actors follows the precedent from the formal EMB accountability, which mentions reporting to them as a criterion for independence (Wall et al., 2006: 9). On the other hand, member selection by the head of government or executive is likely to increase substantive executive control over EMB members, which the independent model is designed to avoid. This proxy variable therefore achieves a similar goal of measuring whether or not EMB members are directly under the control of the executive. The data for this variable comes from the following question asked of country experts: *The EMB members/commissioners are selected by: Head of State, Head of Government, Executive, Opposition, Legislature, Judiciary, Political parties, Civil society, Other, or Not Applicable.*

5.1.5. Term of Office

The next criterion of an independent EMB is that the members have some security of tenure so they can resist political pressures from executive government authorities (Wall et al., 2006: 12, 99). The IDEA handbook specifically mentions a fixed term as one way of providing this security of tenure, but also notes that it is not a necessary precondition. Data comes from country experts prompted with the following: *The term of the members of the national electoral management body is: For the election period only, For a specified number of years, For an unspecified period, Other, or Not applicable.* The available data, displayed in Figure 5.8, reveals that most countries have specified or fixed terms of office.




Figure 5.8: EMB Member Term of Office across 80 Countries. Pie chart sections show percentages for each of these member terms, while the legend includes the number of countries or territories that use each type member term. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em006).

5.1.6. Budget

The final criterion is that independent EMBs have and manage their own budgets separately from any government ministry or department (Wall et al., 2006: 9, 12). The data does not indicate whether EMBs have separate bank accounts, but two proxy variables are suitable for measuring budgetary independence. The first variable comes from the following question: *The budget of the national electoral management body is*

determined by: After recoding the original variable and gathering supplementary data, possible answers include: *President, Prime Minister, Legislature, National government department, Donors, EMB, Judiciary, Other* and *Not applicable*. Figure 5.9 shows which bodies determine EMB budgets using the supplemented dataset. The second budget task is that an independent EMB manages its own expenses, or control its own expenditures. Country experts are asked the following: *The expenditures of the national electoral management body are controlled by:* After recoding and supplementing the original data, possible answers include: *President, Prime Minister, Legislature, National government department, Auditing Agency, Donors, EMB, Judiciary, Other* and *Not applicable*. Figure 5.10 shows which bodies are responsible for auditing or controlling EMB expenditures. The legislature, EMB, and donors are possibly the most removed from executive control and these actors are therefore used to construct this second budget variable. Both budget questions allow multiple actors to be involved, so percentages total more than 100%.




Figure 5.9: EMB Budget Determination Actors across 79 Countries. The bar chart shows numbers and percentages of countries where each actor is involved in determining the EMB budget. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em004).




Figure 5.10: EMB Expenditure Control Actors across 78 Countries. The bar chart shows numbers and percentages of countries where each actor is involved in controlling EMB expenditures. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em005).

5.2. Methodology: Conventional Independent Model

Analysing the conventional independent model involves six multilevel regression models. The first three examine the separate tasks of the implementation, powers, and budget criteria. This helps determine which tasks have the most explanatory power. The fourth model includes *aggregated* criteria variables, while the fifth model includes *fulfilled* criteria variables. Aggregated criteria variables count *how many* requirements are satisfied, whereas the fulfilled criteria variables indicate whether *all* requirements are satisfied. The final sixth model includes a standardized, weighted, and additive index of conventional EMB independence, which combines all tasks and criteria. The models are tested using regional datasets and a combined global dataset. The regional datasets include the AfroBarometer, AmericasBarometer, and CSES (Europe only). The ArabBarometer and AsianBarometer have two few countries as separate datasets, but they are included within the combined global dataset. The next section explains how tasks and criteria are measured, as well as their weighting scores for creating the conventional independence index.

5.2.1. Measuring Tasks and Criteria

Table 5.1 outlines the fulfilment requirements for all tasks and criteria. The table presents tasks and criteria in the first column using terminology from section 4.1 rather than the original framework. This keeps discussions closer to the available data and thus more accurate and meaningful. The second column outlines the requirements for fulfilling each task and criteria. Requirements are based on the original conventional independent model, but have been adapted based the availability of ACE & IDEA variables. Variable names are in italics and the numerical values refer to the dichotomous value, where 0 means the item is absent, and 1 means it is present. The logical operator '**AND**' indicates a required variable combination, while a forward slash '/' indicates that multiple variables or combinations can fulfil a requirement. The third column of Table 5.1 provides the scores used when aggregating all tasks and criteria into the weighted conventional independence index. A standardized version of this index is used in the sixth regression model. Each of these implementation tasks receives a score of 0.5, resulting in a maximum contribution of 2.0 for the implementation criteria. The two powers tasks receive 1.0 each, totalling 2.0 for the powers criteria. The two budget tasks also receive 1.0 each, totalling 2.0 for the budget criteria as well. Finally, the accountability, member selection, and member term criteria each contribute 1.5 to the index. The conventional independence index therefore increases in value based on the number of fulfilled tasks and criteria, with a maximum value of 10.5 if all requirements are fulfilled.

The implementation, powers, and budget criteria are composed of multiple tasks, while the other criteria are each represented by single dichotomous variables. Creating the aggregated criteria indices involves adding the scores from the third column within each criteria and then dividing this by the number of tasks. For example, adding the two powers tasks (proposing electoral reforms and settling electoral disputes) results in a maximum potential score of 2 if an EMB is responsible for both of these tasks. Dividing this by 0, 1, or 2 produces a variable with values of 0, .5, and 1. All aggregated variables therefore range from 0 to 1.

Table 5.1: Fulfilment Requirements and Weightings for Tasks and Criteria

Implementation		
Voter Registration	EMB responsible for voter registration (<i>vr004d = 1</i>)	0.5
Responsibility Level	EMB responsible for local level (<i>em002c = 1</i>)	0.5
Sorting and Counting Votes	Votes counted at polling stations/polling centres AND EMB responsible for local level (<i>vc004a/b = 1 AND em002c = 1</i>)	0.5
Consolidating Results	Results consolidated at national/regional/local level AND EMB responsible for national/regional/local level (<i>vc006a/b/c = 1 AND em002a/b/c = 1</i>)	0.5
Accountability		
EMB Accountability	EMB reports to legislature AND not to president/PM/government (<i>em003c = 1 AND em003a/b/d = 0</i>)	1.5
Powers		
Electoral Reform Proposals	EMB proposes electoral reforms AND government does not (<i>lf011d = 1 AND lf011e = 0</i>)	1.0
Electoral Disputes	EMB adjudicates electoral disputes (<i>lf007b = 1</i>)	1.0
Composition		
Member Selection	Members selected by legislature/judiciary AND not the PM/President/Government/Cabinet (<i>em015e/f = 1 AND em015b/c/i/j = 0</i>)	1.5
Term of Office		
EMB Member Terms	Members have fixed terms (<i>em006b = 1</i>)	1.5
Budget		
Budget Determination	EMB budget determined by the legislature/EMB/donors AND not the President/PM/Government (<i>em004c/e/f = 1 AND em005a/b/d = 0</i>)	1.0
Expenditure Control	EMB expenditures audited by legislature/EMB/donors AND not the President/PM/Government (<i>em005c/g/f = 1 AND em005a/b/d = 0</i>)	1.0

5.3. Categoricalised Autonomy Model

The categorised autonomy model is similar to the conventional independent model, but it takes a different approach to measuring autonomy and analyses more elements of EMB design. The model distinguishes between four types of autonomy: institutional, financial, personnel and functional (van Aaken, 2009). The original model

has been modified to accommodate available data and its assumptions expanded to increase specification. The biggest increase in detail is to the main functional autonomy postulation, which stated that electoral fairness would be bolstered if an autonomous EMB performs more electoral tasks (van Aaken, 2009: 313). This one statement has been disambiguated into multiple statements regarding each separate task. Some proxy variables are used because available data does not perfectly match the original framework specifications. Proxy variables are only used if they are suitable and closely follow the original framework. The following sections outline the data for the four categories of autonomy and their constituent elements.

5.3.1. Institutional Autonomy

Institutional autonomy is the degree of separation an EMB has from the executive government. The original assumptions for institutional autonomy have been adapted based on available data. Accountability to non-executive actors is measured by whether EMBs report to the legislature. A permanent institutional status is measured by the duration of EMB existence. Having EMBs established in the constitution is measured by whether electoral law is established in the constitution. The next sections discuss these aspects of institutional autonomy and the variables used for measuring them.

Accountability

Van Aaken (2009: 306) specifies that accountability to the judiciary, head of state or legislature to provide some separation from the executive. Unfortunately, the available data does not measure accountability to the judiciary or head of state, but it does include several executive and government options. The dichotomous variable for accountability measures whether EMBs report to the legislature and not the president, prime minister or a government department. The conventional independence model and categorised autonomy models both measure accountability to the legislature.

Longevity

The global trend is increasingly to establish permanent EMBs rather than temporary bodies. Consequently, almost all EMBs in the countries included within this study are

permanent. This does not provide sufficient variation for comparison, as it introduces multicollinearity errors. Testing for the effects of permanence requires larger databases that include at least a minimal number of temporary EMBs. Longevity therefore serves as an alternative for permanence, but additionally tests for the effects of institutional culture. The longer an EMB has existed the greater its chances of gaining technical experience and developing a separate institutional identity, including a culture that distinguishes it from other institutions. The ACE & IDEA dataset unfortunately does not have a variable for when EMBs were first founded, so data had to be independently gathered. The variable was constructed by subtracting the year established from the public survey year to determine how old EMBs were when respondents were asked about electoral fairness. Figure 5.11 shows the years that EMBs in this study were first established. It spans 1915 to 2005 and omits three countries before this period: Australia (1902), Norway (1814), and Switzerland (1848). The figure illustrates that many EMBs are relatively recent developments, often coinciding with the independence of nations after the Cold War.




Figure 5.11: Year EMBs Established across 74 Countries. Bars represent number of EMBs established in each year. Sources: ACE & IDEA Data, EMB websites, electoral legislation, constitutions, and electoral observation reports.

Constitutional Status

The ACE & IDEA dataset does not include a variable measuring whether EMBs are established in the constitution, however it does measure whether electoral law is part

of the constitution. The expert survey question asks: *What is the status of the electoral law governing national elections?* Valid answers include *Part of Constitution, Separate legislation, Decree, Regulations or administrative rules, Other, and Not applicable*. Figure 5.12 shows the results for these sources of electoral law, as coded in the ACE and IDEA dataset. Constitutional electoral law is harder to change and thus insulates it from executive and legislative conflicts of interest, which is the same justification for establishing EMBs in constitutions. Having electoral law as part the constitution thus acts as a proxy for EMBs being established in the constitution. Future research projects with more time for gathering original data could test whether establishing an EMB within the constitution contributes to the integrity of electoral governance.




Figure 5.12: Electoral Law Status across 80 Countries. Stacked bars show the number of countries where electoral law has the respective status, while percentages represent the proportion of countries where each is present. Percentages total more than 100% because electoral law can have multiple statuses within each country. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Legislative Framework (lf001).

5.3.2. Financial Autonomy

Both budget determination and expenditure control are measured in the same way and using the same data as the conventional independent model. The discussion in section 5.1.6 above will therefore only be summarised here. As with the conventional

model, the categorised autonomy model assumes that financial autonomy will be upheld best if the legislature, EMB, or donors determine EMB budgets and control their expenditures. See Figure 5.9 for which bodies determine EMB budgets and Figure 5.10 for which bodies control EMB expenses.

5.3.3. Personnel Autonomy

Personnel autonomy measures the extent to which the higher-level members of the EMBs are free from partisan and executive interference. This depends upon which actors select EMB members, the criteria used to select them, and their security of tenure. Personnel autonomy is increased when non-executive actors select EMB members for fixed tenure terms and selections are based, at least in part, on EMB member expertise.

Member Selection

The categorised autonomy model approach to measuring the selection of EMB members is similar to the composition criteria for the conventional independent model. Both models consider the legislature and judiciary sufficiently insulated from the executive to grant EMB autonomy, but the conventional independent model also includes the head of state. The categorised autonomy model omits this actor and member selection therefore only contributes to personnel autonomy when the legislature or judiciary select EMB members. This variable has been previously covered on page 147 when discussing which actors are involved in selecting EMB members.

Membership Criteria

EMB members can be selected based on their expertise or partisanship. Data for this variable comes from the following prompt for country experts: *The EMB members/commissioners are selected on the basis of their: Partisanship, Expertise, Combination of partisanship and expertise.* Expertise is expected to yield impartial electoral governance, except in transitional democracies where political party involvement may enhance trust in electoral management. Testing for this aspect of personnel autonomy therefore requires parallel conditional requirements: one for established democracies and another for transitional democracies. Expertise is

expected to generate trust in established democracies, while a mix of expertise and partisanship is expected to be more desirable in newer democracies. The democratic status of countries is determined using Freedom in the World scores, which distinguish between *free*, *party free* and *not free* countries. A 'free' status is used to represent established democracies, while party or not free countries are considered transitional democracies. Figure 5.13 shows the data for membership selection criteria before controlling for democracy status.




Figure 5.13: Basis of EMB Memberships across 80 Countries. Bars show the percentages and absolute number of countries with each membership basis. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em014).

Security of Tenure

Security of tenure can be measured using two approaches, both of which relate to the length of EMB member terms. The first approach uses member terms coded as an unspecified period. This assumes that a term with an unspecified period is an appointment for an indefinite period, which is one of the originally postulated ways of enhancing personnel autonomy. The assumption seems relatively safe given that other available options include *the election period only*, *a specified number of years*, *other* and *not applicable*. The second approach uses the notes for specified terms in the original dataset, with a new variable created to indicate the number of years for member terms, as shown in Figure 5.14. Most election cycles are five years or less, so

fixed terms of six years or more are taken to represent a degree of insulation from political cycles.




Figure 5.14: Years of Fixed Terms across 80 Countries. Bars show the number of countries and percentage of countries that appoint EMB members for the indicated number of years. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em006).

5.3.4. Functional Autonomy

Functional autonomy measures the number of tasks performed by an EMB that also has a minimal degree of institutional, financial and personnel autonomy. This additional requirement that tasks be performed by an *autonomous* EMB distinguishes functional autonomy from the other categories. Minimal autonomy levels are determined by combining the institutional, personnel and financial index scores. If the resulting standardized score is positive, then an EMB is deemed to have passed the minimal autonomy threshold and measured as performed by an autonomous EMB. Electoral management functions also only contribute to the functional autonomy index if they are performed by an EMB that achieves this autonomy threshold. The positive score used as a threshold cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary, but it identifies EMBs that have above average institutional, personnel, and/or financial autonomy. IN addition, experimenting with different threshold cut-off points did not substantially alter results. The method for creating this threshold is further explained in section

5.4.2, but a brief introduction was necessary here because all functional autonomy variables include this threshold requirement. The following sections outline the elements of functional autonomy.

Boundary Delimitation

Maintaining electorate boundaries requires at least two key tasks: drawing boundaries and approving boundary changes. The ACE dataset includes variables for the bodies responsible for each of these tasks. The first prompt for country experts says: *The body responsible for drawing the boundaries is: Legislature (1st chamber), Legislature (2nd chamber), Executive, Boundary Commission, Electoral Management Body (EMB), A government department or agency, Other, or Not applicable.* The second boundary function is the approval of any changes, which is often performed by a different body or actor. The raw data comes from the following question: *The authority responsible for final approval of the constituency boundaries is: The legislature (national/subnational), The Boundaries Commission, The Electoral Management Body, A government department or agency, Other, or Not applicable.* The responsibility for approval is important because it can influence how boundaries are drawn. EMBs are responsible for drawing electorate boundaries in about a third of countries. The two tasks must meet the autonomy threshold before they can contribute to the functional autonomy index.

Electoral Reform

The task of proposing electoral legislation reforms is measured in the same way as the 'powers' criteria for the conventional independent model, but with the additional EMB autonomy threshold. For brevity, the discussion and figures will not be repeated here. Figure 5.6 on page 146 shows that 34.1% of EMBs perform this task, but this percentage is reduced once the autonomy threshold is applied. Consequently, the conventional independent model and categorized autonomy model include a different set of EMBs despite using the same variable to indicate which body proposes legislation reforms.

Financial Oversight

There are two financial oversight variables in the ACE dataset. The first measures which body receives the financial reports of parties and candidates, while the second measures which body investigates these reports. The first set of data comes from the following question: *What institution(s) receives financial reports from political parties and/or candidates?* Answers include *EMB, Ministry, Auditing agency, Special institution, Court, Not applicable, and Other*. The second financial oversight task follows logically from the first, and involves auditing the reports submitted by political parties and candidates. This data comes from the following question: *Is it specified that a particular institution(s) is responsible for examining financial reports and/or investigating violations?* Available responses include *EMB, ministry, institution for this purpose, auditing agency, court, other* and *No* if not applicable, meaning the reports are not audited by any actor. The largest category for both financial oversight tasks indicate that EMBs commonly receive and investigate political finance reports, as shown in Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16. The autonomy threshold is applied to both financial oversight functions, so the newly constructed variables will only measure autonomous EMBs that perform these two tasks.




Figure 5.15: Political Finance Reporting across 78 Countries. Bars show numbers of countries or territories where each institution receives financial reports from political candidates or candidates, with percentages totalling more than 100% because multiple institutions receive the reports in some countries. Source: International IDEA, Political Finance Database (pf040).




Figure 5.16: Political Finance Investigation across 78 Countries. Bars show the numbers of countries where each institution is responsible for examining financial reports or investigating infractions. Percentages total more than 100% because multiple institutions can be responsible for this task. Source: International IDEA, Political Finance Database (pf041).

Core Election Tasks

The core election tasks parallel the ‘implementation’ tasks of the conventional independent model, so they will not be explained in depth here. The core tasks include voter registration (Figure 5.1), conducting polling (Figure 5.2), sorting and counting ballots (Figure 5.3), and tabulating the results (Figure 5.4). All tasks have been modified based on available data, as discussed in section 5.1.1. As with all functional variables, the autonomy threshold requirement restricts measuring the tasks to cases where they are performed by an autonomous EMB. The set of EMBs that perform these tasks thus differs from those measured using the conventional independent model.

Voter Information

The task of providing voter information about political parties and candidates is open to conflicts of interest and thus best performed by a neutral body such as an autonomous EMB. As Figure 5.17 shows, national EMBs provide voter information in

most cases, while the regional and local EMBs perform this responsibility in some cases. However, the voter education conditions are only fulfilled when an EMB has responsibility for elections at the same level as the EMB that conducts voter education campaigns. This means that three variables are used to measure whether voter education is performed by an autonomous EMB: the body responsible for voter education, which level of elections EMBs are responsible for, and the autonomy threshold. The expert survey question asks the following: *Who conducts information campaigns for national elections (informing where, when and how to register and/or vote)?* Figure 5.17 shows the available answers and original raw data for this variable before applying the autonomy threshold.




Figure 5.17: Information Campaign Bodies across 80 Countries. Bars show numbers of countries where the respective actor conducts election information campaigns, with percentages totalling more than 100% because multiple actors conduct information campaigns in some countries. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Voter Education (ve001).

Media Monitoring

Impartial monitoring of campaign advertising and election news coverage is important for ensuring a level pre-election playing field. The original variable measuring which body performs this task comes from the following question: *Which of the following bodies or agencies has a responsibility in the regulation of media coverage of elections?* Possible answers are shown in Figure 5.18. The newly constructed variable does not differentiate between the two EMB options, meaning that this task is considered performed by an EMB if either variation is true, so long as the autonomy threshold is also obtained. This means a coding of 1 represents that an autonomous EMB performs the media monitoring function, regardless of whether it does so by convention or by law.




Figure 5.18: Media Regulation Bodies across 40 Countries. Bars show numbers of countries where the respective body is responsible for regulation of media coverage. Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Media and Elections (me025).

Dispute Resolution

Electoral dispute resolution is part of the conventional independent model, so the discussion explaining this variable will not be repeated here. See section 5.1.3 above for the details. The judiciary is most often responsible for electoral dispute resolution, but EMBs are the second most common body that performs this function. This important task contributes to functional autonomy if EMBs settle disputes and they meet the autonomy requirement.

5.4. Methodology: Categorised Autonomy Model

The fourfold categorised autonomy framework is tested using multiple separate regression models to analyse each variable individually as well as the aggregated autonomy indices. This provides both a detailed look at the individual effects of each variable as well as a broader look at the effects of different autonomy types. The following subsections outline how variable conditions are fulfilled, the different

autonomy indices are created and the eleven regression models are constructed. The first eight regression models include separated variables, while the last three include indices created from aggregating these separate variables.

5.4.1. Variable Construction

Each of the four autonomy categories includes newly constructed variables, which are measured using one or more original ACE & IDEA variables. The requirements for creating new variables are outlined in Table 5.2. The conditions follow the categorised autonomy model outlined in section 3.2, with modification to accommodate available data where necessary. The first column lists elements of the four autonomy categories using terminology from the data sources to ensure accurate descriptions. The second column contains descriptions of the logic used to fulfil variable requirements, with italicised variable names and value descriptions in brackets. All variables are dichotomous and values of 1 represent the presence of an indicated design feature, while 0 represents its absence. The logical operator '**AND**' indicates necessary combinations, while the '**OR**' indicates the possibility of alternative fulfilment conditions.

Table 5.2: Autonomy Variable Construction Requirements

Institutional Autonomy	
Accountability	EMB reports to legislature AND not to president/PM/government (<i>em003c = 1 AND em003a/b/d = 0</i>)
Electoral Law in Constitution	Electoral law is part of constitution (<i>lf001a = 1</i>)
Longevity	Decades since EMB established (nat_embexpC, recoded to range from 0 to 1)
Financial Autonomy	
Budget Determination	EMB budget determined by legislature/EMB AND not by president/PM/government (<i>em004c/e = 1 AND em004a/b/d = 0</i>)
Expenditures Control	EMB expenditures audited by Legislature/EMB AND not by president/PM/government (<i>em005c/g = 1 AND em004a/b/d</i>)
Personnel Autonomy	
Membership Criteria	EMB membership based on expertise in older democracies or a combination of partisanship and expertise in newer democracies (<i>em014b/c = 1 AND nat_fstatus = free/partly free or not free</i>)
Legislature or Judiciary Appointment	EMB members selected by legislature/judiciary AND not president/PM/government/Cabinet (<i>em015e/f = 1 AND em015b/c/i/j = 0</i>)
Unspecified Member Terms	EMB member terms unspecified (<i>em006c = 1</i>)
6+ Year Member Terms	EMB members terms are 6 years or more (<i>em006g, recoded to 0 or 1</i>)
Functional Autonomy	
Boundary Demarcation	Autonomous EMB draws boundaries AND not executive/government (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND bd005e = 1 AND bd005c/f = 0</i>)
Boundary Approval	Autonomous EMB approves boundaries AND not government (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND bd005c = 1 AND bd002d = 0</i>)
Proposing Electoral Reforms	Autonomous EMB proposes electoral reforms AND not government (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND lf011d = 1 AND lf011e = 0</i>)
Receiving Financial Reports	Autonomous EMB receives financial reports AND not government ministry (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND pf040a = 1 AND pf040b = 0</i>)
Examining Financial Reports	Autonomous EMB examines financial reports AND not government ministry (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND pf041a = 1 AND pf041b = 0</i>)

Voter Registration	Autonomous EMB responsible for voter registration (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND vr004d = 1</i>)
Responsibility for Local Level	Autonomous EMB responsible for local level (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND em002c = 1</i>)
Sorting and Counting Votes	Autonomous EMB responsible for local level AND votes sorted and counted at polling stations/polling centres (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND em002c = 1 AND vc004a/b = 1</i>)
Consolidating Results	Autonomous EMB responsible for national/regional/local level AND votes consolidated at national/regional/district or sub-district level (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND em002a/b/c = 1 AND vc006a/b/c or d = 1</i>)
Voter Information Campaigns	Autonomous national/regional/local EMB conducts voter information campaigns AND not national/regional/local government (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND vc001a/b/c = 1 AND vc001d/e/f</i>)
Media Regulation	Autonomous EMB regulates election media by law/custom AND not government (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND me025a/b = 1 AND me025g = 0</i>)
Electoral Dispute Agency	Autonomous EMB adjudicates electoral disputes (<i>aut_threshold = 1 AND lf007b = 1</i>)

5.4.2. Creating Autonomy Indices

Aggregated indices were created for each of the four autonomy indices as well as three thematic functional sub-indices. A simple additive index was created for the first three autonomy types, starting at 0 with 1 added each time variable requirements were fulfilled. The total scores were then divided by the number of variables within each category to arrive at autonomy indices ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 representing all variable conditions fulfilled. The values of the institutional, financial, and personnel autonomy indices were combined and then standardised to calculate the autonomy threshold. If the standardized total was greater than 0, the EMB was considered to have met the minimum threshold for autonomy. The threshold variable is dichotomous, with 1 indicating an EMB satisfies the autonomy requirement. This is the variable referred to repeatedly for the conditional requirements outlined in Table 5.2. The functional variables differ because they are only added to this index if this threshold requirement is fulfilled.

Additive indices are created for the different autonomy categories, with sub-indices for functional autonomy because it includes more tasks. Three thematic functional sub-

indices were created because there are many tasks within this category. The functional sub-indices cover three thematic areas of electoral governance: elections and electoral processes, candidates and political parties, and structures and governance. The first sub-index includes voter registration, conducting polling, counting votes, and consolidating results. The second comprises receiving and examining the financial reports of candidates and parties, providing voter information, and regulating media coverage of elections. The third sub-index encompasses boundary demarcation and approval, proposing electoral reforms and the first level of electoral dispute resolution. Each of these sub-indices contains four variables, so when the total scores are divided by four the values ultimately range from 0 to 1. The final step was to create aggregated indices from the institutional, financial, personnel, and functional variables. The number of variables used to create the totals subsequently divides these values. This produces variables with values that range from 0 to 1. The next section discusses the regression models used to analyse the separate variables and aggregated indices.

5.4.3. Constructing Regression Models

The categorised autonomy model is analysed using multilevel mixed-effects regression models. These use the **xtmixed** command in Stata along with the option to cluster standard errors within country groups. The clustered standard errors do not change regression coefficient values, but they do apply a more stringent significance requirement. This helps avoid Type 1 false positive errors of assuming a significant relationship exists when it is actually not present. It was necessary to use multiple regression models because regional datasets contain a limited number of countries, which results in problems of multicollinearity if there is insufficient variation between countries. Some of this multicollinearity results from applying the autonomy threshold, which limits the number of EMBs that meet functional variable requirements. However, the threshold requirement is theory-driven and therefore cannot be omitted. Another problem arose from using the robust clustered standard errors option. Wald's Chi2 scores were not output if there was only one different country between two variables in a model. The solution to these problems was to

construct multiple regression models with a limited number of variables in each. The practical limits of the datasets resulted in a limit of about four variables per regional dataset, although the global model could of course accommodate more. The lower number of variables was used to enable meaningful side-by-side comparisons between the regional and global models. The first regression models test individual variables from each autonomy category. Subsequent models include the three functional sub-indices and the four autonomy indices.

Chapter 6. Results for Established Factors Reveal Trends

This chapter presents the results for all individual level variables and all national level variables except those for electoral management design. It focuses on highlighting trends and regional differences, discussing reasons for unexpected findings, to provide a broader understanding of what determines perceptions of electoral fairness. There are two main sections, based on the distinction between the individual and national level, which follow the same subsections used in earlier chapters. Section 6.1 thus presents and discusses the regression models for socio-demographics, participation and engagement, media attention, economic performance, political performance and group memberships. These models are analysed using multivariate ordered probit regression models. Separate country models are summarised here and presented in Appendix E. Any mention of country coefficients, results, models, or regressions refers to the tables in this appendix. Regional and global models are presented here side-by-side for easy comparison. In addition to the main thematic models, the last section presents a summative model that combines the most reliable, robust, and widely available individual level variables. There are no separate country regressions for this summative model as it includes variables from the first six models. Section 6.2 examines national level variables using the same thematic groups used in earlier chapters: democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, political performance, economic performance, and cultural fractionalisation. The models are analysed using multilevel mixed-effects regressions, which include a selection of the most reliable and robust individual level control variables. These will not be discussed here because they maintain similar coefficient sizes and significance levels as they did in the previous individual level regressions. However, unlike the individual level data there are no summative models because the regional datasets do not contain sufficient countries to include many national level variables in multilevel models.

6.1. Individual Level Variables

There are numerous trends regarding individual level factors with effects on perceived electoral fairness. These include new findings, validation of more tentative

relationships and confirmation of previous research. For the socio-demographic grouping, people who are older, male or have higher incomes tend to view elections positively, but tertiary education is less consistent. There appears to be a relationship between higher education and the level of democracy, with educated people making assessments of electoral fairness that are more accurate. Regarding participation and engagement, people who vote or support election winners make consistently more positive assessments of electoral fairness, while those interested in politics, living in rural areas or identifying as conservative only sometimes make more positive assessments. For media attention, getting political news from newspapers is negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness and watching television has a positive association, but the results for listening to radio news are mixed and having greater political knowledge has a mild negative relationship with electoral fairness. It is possible that newspaper attention and political knowledge are similar to higher education in that they act as proxies for how informed respondents are about the fairness of elections. Regarding economic performance, perceiving the national economy and personal finances as improving are good predictors of perceived electoral fairness, but the national economy presents a stronger and more consistent relationship while having paid employment is not a significant factor. For the political performance grouping, trusting institutions is consistently linked with increased perceptions of electoral fairness, while perceiving high levels of public sector corruption has a negative effect. The strongest positive relationships are for political institutions such as the national legislature and executive. Being the victim of a physical crime also shows a weak negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness. Finally, being a member of the religious or ethnic majority does not show consistent results and being non-religious is insignificant, but being non-partisan is negatively associated with electoral fairness and generally trusting others is strongly related to improved perceptions. Overall, the strongest findings are that those who vote, support election winners, think the national economy as improving, perceive low levels of corruption, generally trust others and trust political institutions are more likely to view elections as fair. The following sections present the evidence for and subsequently discuss the results for each individual level variable within their thematic

groupings. The regional models used in each thematic grouping differ based on the availability of data for each set of included variables.

6.1.1. Socio-Demographics

Previous studies found factors such as age, gender, income and education to be related to different aspects of political trust and support (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Birch, 2008; Norris, 2002, 2004; Rosas, 2010). Table 6.1 shows the results for socio-demographic variables for the regional and global models, with separate country coefficients summarized in Table 6.2. The results support previous findings that older males with higher incomes are more likely to trust elections (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Rosas, 2010). This is probably due to their increased likelihood of life satisfaction and benefiting from the status quo.

Table 6.1: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Socio-Demographics

	Africa	Americas	Arab	Asia	Europe	Global
Female Gender	0.015 (0.022)	-0.021* (0.019)	0.060 (0.09)	-0.004 (0.039)	-0.087*** (0.031)	-0.016* (0.013)
Age (Decades)	0.107*** (0.017)	0.063* (0.018)	0.055* (0.017)	0.008 (0.011)	0.134*** (0.013)	0.071** (0.010)
High Income	-0.003 (0.066)	0.066* (0.099)	-0.054 (0.105)	0.079* (0.119)	0.038* (0.036)	0.038** (0.034)
Low Income	-0.004 (0.081)	-0.011 (0.03)	0.012 (0.088)	-0.015 (0.105)	-0.034* (0.032)	-0.006 (0.025)
Tertiary Education	-0.045* (0.084)	0.003 (0.028)	-0.017 (0.199)	-0.161*** (0.105)	0.071** (0.065)	-0.008 (0.037)
N: Respondents	24992	33053	4150	11711	25022	106412
N: Countries	20	21	5	11	19	80
Degrees of	5	5	1	5	5	5
Pseudo R-Squared	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.010	0.008	0.001

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Age has the strongest and most reliable relationship with electoral fairness, income shows a moderately weaker relationship, while female gender and tertiary education have the weakest relationships. Most interesting however are the negative relationships for tertiary education. This variable may function as a proxy for being better informed about the political situation, which could lead to negative views of electoral fairness in many of the hybrid regimes included within this study. Separate

exploratory analysis supports this contention, indicating that higher education in authoritarian democracies is negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness, which the relationships switches to positive in liberal democracies. The following sections discuss these socioeconomic and demographic factors in more depth.

Gender

Gender presents a somewhat weaker relationship with perceived electoral fairness, although the trend is negative as anticipated. Only two regions and the Global model obtain significance, while 60.5% of separate country regressions are insignificant. However, the regional and global coefficients are negative, while 27.6% of the country coefficients are negative and only 11.8% are positive. This provides some evidence of a weak negative trend, indicating that females tend to perceive elections less fairly, however this trend is strongest in the Americas and Europe models. The Africa, Arab and Asia models do not obtain significance, with their significant separate country coefficients split between positive and negative. This shows no clear trends in these regions. If there are any trends, women in the included Americas and European countries tend to make more negative assessments of electoral fairness than women do across the included African, Asian and Arab countries. This may have something to do with the feminist movement having made more progress in the Americas and Europe, whereas women in less developed regions may be less aware of the inequity of gender imbalances in politics. Nevertheless, globally males more frequently make positive assessments of electoral fairness, which provides limited support for the original proposition that males would tend to view elections as fairer than females.

The finding that being female is negatively associated with perceptions of electoral fairness parallels the weak negative relationship found for other types of political support (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Rosas, 2010). Women are often less satisfied with political systems, state legitimacy, democracy and political institutions (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Singer, 2008; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Moehler, 2009; Seligson, 2002; Singh et al., 2012). We can now add electoral fairness to the list, since men have more trust in elections compared with women. There are many possible reasons for the genders disparities, but the main

reason is probably that both political systems and institutions remain dominated by men. This is especially true at the higher levels, and women are likely to perceive this underlying structural bias negatively, especially in the Americas and Europe. Candidates in elections and members of parliament are more frequently men, even in the oldest and most established democracies. Women thus face a structural and systematic bias that is reflected in their negative assessments of electoral fairness.

Age

The coefficient for age is consistently positive across all regional models except Asia, which is not exceptional because all four of the significant separate Asian country coefficients are positive. Table 6.2 shows that across all country regressions, including Asia, 56.6% have positively significant relationships for age while only 3.9% are negatively significant, with the remaining coefficients insignificant. Together with the regional and global results, this provides considerable empirical that older individuals tend to have more positive attitudes towards electoral fairness than younger individuals do.

While the current study found older respondents place more trust in elections, younger individuals often show more positive attitudes in other areas of political support (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Singer, 2008; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Moehler, 2009; Seligson, 2002). The difference could arise from younger voters not having learned how to vote strategically, for example by choosing fringe candidates rather than viable candidates, and subsequently perceiving elections as unfair when their choices appear futile. Conversely, older voters may vote more realistically and not be as disillusioned by election results (Tavits & Annus, 2006). A second explanation for the difference between younger and older respondents is that democratic satisfaction tends to increase as countries learn from successive electoral experiences and develop their electoral institutions and technical expertise (Farrell & McAllister, 2006). This means that recent elections are likely to have been conducted more fairly compared with earlier elections. Older people are thus more likely to have experienced more unfair elections and electoral scandals, and thus tend to make favourable comparative assessments regarding recent elections, while younger

individuals have experienced fewer elections and may therefore be less forgiving of any problems, even if improvements have been made. Electoral integrity tends to increase with time so older individuals are likely to be more aware of the improvements, which might be why they express more positive attitudes when asked about the fairness of recent elections.

Table 6.2: Summary of Socio-Demographics for Separate Country Results

	Significant (+)	Significant (-)	Insignificant	Missing Data
Age (Decades)	56.6%	3.9%	39.5%	0.0%
Female	11.8%	27.6%	60.5%	0.0%
High Income	28.9%	7.9%	63.2%	0.0%
Low Income	21.1%	19.7%	59.2%	0.0%
Tertiary Income	17.1%	28.9%	53.9%	0.0%

Income

The predictions regarding income levels found substantial support. People in the highest income brackets tended to perceive electoral fairness more positively, while those in the lowest income brackets tended to have negative perceptions. For the high-income variable, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Global coefficients are significant and positive. The relationship with low income is not as reliable, with only the Europe model showing a significant negative coefficient. It therefore seems that high income is a better predictor than low income. The country level regressions summarised in Table 6.2 further support this proposition, with 28.9% of countries showing positive relationships for high income and only 7.9% showing negative. The results clearly support previous findings that people with higher incomes tend to view elections as fairer (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006) and parallel other forms of political trust and support. Higher income individuals are generally more satisfied with democracy and vote more frequently (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74; Birch, 2010; Gilley, 2006; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999), so it is unsurprising that they also have more positive attitudes towards electoral fairness. People with higher incomes generally benefit from the status quo and are more likely to vote for one of the major political parties, which usually have better chances of winning. In addition, politicians are more likely to cater to the interests of higher income individuals because they can both provide campaign donations and apply pressure against politicians. Lower incomes

individuals are less likely to view the current situation favourably, engage politically or have as much money for donations and are thus in a weaker position to lobby politicians. This sets up a structural situation where higher income individuals are more likely to be satisfied with elections and their outcomes, while lower income individuals do not experience the same level of satisfaction or trust in elections.

Education

Unlike the other socio-demographic variables, results for tertiary education go against the predicted positive relationship direction. Two regional models and 28.9% of country coefficients show negative relationships, while only one regional model and 17.1% of national models are positive. Two regional models, the Global model, and 53.9% of country models failed to achieve significance. Tertiary education therefore does not present an exceptionally strong relationship, but the evidence points more towards a slightly negative relationship, meaning that globally people with university education are less likely to view elections as fair. The Europe model is an exception, with a positive regional coefficient and more positive country coefficients than negative. However, with the exception of Europe, the overall trend goes against the presumed positive relationship between tertiary education and perceptions of electoral fairness.

The mixed results could be a result of education interacting with the electoral context or type of democracy. Assuming a higher education generally makes one more knowledgeable about political circumstances and the wider world; we can expect educated opinions to track reality more frequently and to make comparisons with the electoral experiences of other countries. It is therefore possible that the differences for tertiary education between regions are due to the quality of elections in those regions. Previous findings also indicated a negative relationship in AfroBarometer countries (Moehler, 2009) and a positive relationship using mostly European countries (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006). University educated individuals in Africa, where electoral problems abound, are more likely to have negative views of electoral fairness. However, educated individuals in Europe, where free and fair elections are common, are more likely to have positive attitudes towards electoral fairness. This

could explain why tertiary education coefficient is negative across AfroBarometer countries and positive in CSES European countries. This raises an interesting dissimilarity between education and income. There are often high levels of correlation between these two factors for other types of political trust, but the results here suggest differences when it comes to perceptions of electoral fairness.

6.1.2. Participation and Engagement

Participation and engagement variables include electoral participation, supporting electoral winners, interest in politics, living in urban versus areas and liberal versus conservative political ideology. Analysing the results included in Table 6.3 confirms that people who support election winners and voted in the most recent elections are more likely to view elections as fair. Those who are interested in politics, live in rural areas and have conservative ideologies are slightly more likely to view elections as fair, but these factors were only significant in some regions. The following sections outline the results and discuss these findings in more detail.

Table 6.3: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Participation and Engagement

	Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Global
Electoral Participation	0.101*** (0.053)	0.049** (0.041)	0.084** (0.082)	0.105*** (0.077)	0.087*** -0.034
Supports Winner	0.180** (0.114)	0.146*** (0.078)	0.284*** (0.173)	0.158*** (0.061)	0.163*** -0.052
Political Interest	-0.004 (0.028)	0.131*** (0.022)	0.018 (0.052)	.	.
Urban Status	-0.033 (0.075)	-0.007 (0.062)	-0.201*** (0.088)	-0.011 (0.047)	-0.021 (0.049)
Left-Wing	.	0.015 (0.059)	.	-0.066* (0.075)	.
Right-Wing	.	0.052** (0.037)	.	0.004 (0.044)	.
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	24635	26519	10826	30533	100959
N: Countries	20	21	10	26	73
Degrees of Freedom	4	6	4	5	3
Pseudo R-Squared	0.012	0.013	0.048	0.011	0.006

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Electoral Participation

Electoral participation, or voting, is consistently associated with perceived electoral fairness. It demonstrates significant positive relationships for all regional models and the Global model, as shown in Table 6.3. Separate country regressions are similarly consistent, as shown in Table 6.4, with 64.5% positively significant and not a single significant negative relationship, but the remaining country models are either insignificant or missing data. These very robust findings allow us to predict with confidence that voting, for any candidate or party, is associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness. The anticipated positive relationship therefore finds strong support, which is consistent with other findings (McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 2009). However, this electoral participation relationship may be endogenous or the result of a post-voting rationalization bias. In other words, the causal mechanism between voting and perceived electoral fairness may go both ways. People could be more likely to vote because they perceive elections to be fair, or they may rationalise a belief that elections are fair afterwards to justify their vote as meaningful. Alternatively, voting as an act of civic engagement could increase interpersonal trust and thus confidence in election officials or elected representatives

(Brehm & Rahn, 1997: 1017; Lanning, 2008: 445). The current study was designed to find correlations and not causal links, so the direction of relationships was not investigated.

Another factor to consider is that electoral participation likely interacts with whether a person voted for the election winner or loser. However, this possibility was partially controlled for by the inclusion of a variable measuring whether respondents supported election winners. Those who voted for the winners are likely to have more positive attitudes than those who voted for the losers (Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 562). This was partially verified because supporting the winner was measured using voting choices as well as party identification, and both of these demonstrated positive associations with electoral fairness in separate exploratory regressions.

Table 6.4: Summary of Participation and Engagement for Separate Country Results

	Significant (+)	Significant (-)	Insignificant	Missing Data
Electoral Participation	64.5%	0.0%	34.2%	1.3%
Supports Winner	61.8%	3.9%	26.3%	7.9%
Political Interest	34.2%	11.8%	28.9%	25.0%
Urban Status	9.2%	38.2%	43.4%	9.2%
Left-Wing	5.3%	18.4%	28.9%	47.4%
Right-Wing	21.1%	7.9%	23.7%	47.4%

Supports Winner

Supporting electoral winners is also strongly associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness, with significantly positive relationships in every available regional model as well as the global model. A strong positive relationships exists whether supporting winners is measured via party identification or voting choice, although these exploratory regressions are not shown here. Separate country regressions, summarized in Table 6.4, also reveal that supporting election winners is associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness, with 61.8% significantly positive relationships, only 3.9% significantly negative and the remainder either insignificant or missing data. These results provide strong support for the prediction that people who support election winners tend to make positive assessments regarding electoral fairness. It does not take an extensive understanding of cognitive biases to acknowledge that this relationship makes sense. It is clearly understandable and

supported by extensive research (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Birch, 2008; Chang & Chu, 2006; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Craig et al., 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 2009; Singh et al., 2012).

The current study confirmed that we can measure winner support via voting choices or political affiliations and get similar results, as was suggested by previous research (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Singer, 2008). In other words, the same tendency towards positive assessments of electoral fairness emerges whether people voted for winners or simply identified with a winning political party. Moreover, this study confirmed that the positive relationship maintains whether people voted for a single party that forms a majority or any member of a winning coalition (Banducci & Karp, 2003). The nature of the current data and research design does not enable measuring the relative size of the relationships for supporting majority versus coalition winners, but both clearly have positive relationship with perceived electoral fairness. We could postulate that people who vote for winning coalition members may have less positive attitudes than people who voted for a single party winning a majority. This would be because they might not see their preferences materialize as readily as someone who voted for a majority winning party that does not need to compromise on policy or legislation.

Political Interest

Political interest shows a significant positive relationship only in the Americas model, but this variable was missing for the Europe model and was therefore not included in the Global model. Separate country regressions are 34.2% positively significant and 11.8% negatively significant, with the remaining relationships either insignificant or missing data. There may be regional differences with this variable because all significant country coefficients are positive in the Americas, while the country coefficients for other regions show no clear trends. The Americas model therefore supports the prediction that political interest is positively related to electoral fairness, but findings are less conclusive for other regional models. The regional differences reflect other research that finds a mix of relationships, but a general positive tendency

(Anderson & Singer, 2008; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Birch, 2010; Dowley & Silver, 2002; Moehler, 2009: 362). Although available results support the original political interest assumption, it is surprising the relationship was so unreliable given the wide range of other positive correlations with similar aspects of political trust (Anderson & Singer, 2008; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Moehler, 2009). One possible explanation is that winner status and electoral participation were included in the same model, which both demonstrated consistent and strong positive relationships. These variables may have overshadowed the strength and significance of the political interest relationship.

Urban/Rural Status

Results for urban status are not as consistent or reliable as the other variables in this model, but significant coefficients tend to support the expected negative relationship. Living in an urban area is negatively significant in the Asia model and 38.2% of all country models, but positively significant in only 9.2% of country models. All other regional and country models as well as the Global model are either insignificant or missing data. There is therefore a slightly negative trend indicating people in urban areas are less likely to view elections as fair, which supports the original assumption, but the relationship appears strongest in AsianBarometer countries. This negative relationship between urban status and electoral fairness confirms previous findings (Mishler & Rose, 1997, 2001; Rosas, 2010).

There are at least two possible reasons for the higher levels of electoral trust in rural areas. First, the negative association might be due to unequal vote weighting between rural and urban areas. Lower population densities in rural areas reduce the ratio of voters to elected representatives. This means the votes of people in rural areas sometimes receive heavier weighting than the votes of people in urban areas, so individual voters in urban areas can be under-represented compared with their rural counterparts. A second reason rural voters may have positive attitudes is that these areas are often more homogeneous compared with more heterogeneous urban areas. This increases the likelihood of rural voters electing someone who represents them either descriptively or substantively.

Left/Right Wing

Results for the two political ideology variables are not as consistent or reliable, but significant coefficients tend to support the expected relationship directions. The variables obtain significance in only one regional model each, but are not significant in the Global model. Political ideology was only available for the Americas and Europe, but expected relationships find some limited support. Although only two models in Table 6.3 show significant results, separate country regressions confirm the direction of these relationships: 80% of the significant right wing coefficients are positively significant, while 77.8% of the significant left wing coefficients are negative. This means that people who identify as right wing are more likely to view elections as fair, while left wing individuals are less likely to hold this view. Although some political ideology variables obtained conventional levels of significance, their coefficients are very small. This indicates an extremely weak relationship, and it is unlikely that it would be much stronger if data were available for the other regional barometers. The divisions of left versus right arises from the capitalist industrial revolutions that other parts of the world have either not experienced or developed without because of alternative political and economic structures. The distinction is thus less meaningful in some parts of the world, but in the Americas and Europe it appears to still make a significant but weak difference. People who identify as more right wing or conservative tend to have slightly more positive attitudes towards electoral fairness, while left wing or liberal people tend to have slightly more negative attitudes. This supports previous research that found the same relationship (Birch, 2008; Rosas, 2010). We could speculate that this is because right wing individuals tend to be older and wealthier, and therefore likely benefit from the usually conservative status quo than the more progressive political and economic situations left wing people might prefer.

6.1.3. Media Attention

Variables relating to media attention were missing for many countries and differed between regional datasets. We must therefore interpret any results using these variables with caution. The findings, presented in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, suggest that

getting political news from the newspaper is negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness. Results for television and radio attention are not as reliable, but there may be a slightly positive relationship between watching television and viewing elections as fair. The CSES survey did not have any media attention questions, so a Europe model is not included. Political knowledge is only significant in one regional model and presents mixed results at the country level. The following paragraphs discuss these results in more detail.

Table 6.5: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Media Attention

	Africa	Americas	Arab	Asia	Global
Newspaper Attention	-0.124*** (0.025)	-0.020 (0.022)	0.006 (0.037)	-0.112* (0.049)	-0.044* (0.019)
Television Attention	0.003 (0.04)	0.013 (0.018)	0.182* (0.089)	-0.011 (0.071)	0.061* (0.020)
Radio Attention	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.017)	0.162** (0.106)	0.008 (0.029)	-0.069* (0.032)
Political Knowledge	-0.092* (0.067)	-0.004 (0.031)	0.036 (0.086)	.	.
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	25279	20207	4775	9952	62367
N: Countries	20	14	5	9	50
Degrees of Freedom	4	4	1	3	3
Pseudo R-Squared	0.007	0.000	0.013	0.005	0.002

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Television/Newspaper/Radio Attention

Television attention has positive coefficients for the Asia and Global models in Table 6.5, but is insignificant in the other regions. Significant country level results are almost evenly split between negative and positive. Results therefore provide inadequate support for the proposition that watching television is negatively associated with electoral fairness. Newspaper reading is significantly negative in the Africa, Asia and Global models, but insignificant for the other regional models. Separate country regressions summarised in Table 6.6 confirm this negative relationship, with 33.3% of the county coefficients significantly negative and only 8.8% positively significant. This means that people who more frequently read newspapers are less likely to view elections as fair, although the trend is strongest in AfroBarometer and AsianBarometer countries. Radio attention results are mixed, with a positive result in the Arab model,

a negative result in the Global model and insignificant results for the other regions. Separate country regressions show a slightly positive relationship for radio attention, with 19.3% positively significant versus only 8.8% negatively significant. Table 6.6 shows that insignificant results are the largest category for media attention coefficients in separate country models, which further reinforces the finding that these relationships are neither reliable nor strong.

The relationships for newspaper and television attention are in the opposite direction than has been found in previous research, which suggests that watching television decreases political trust while reading newspapers increases it (Hart, 1994; Hetherington, 1998; Karp et al., 2003; McLeod & McDonald, 1985; Miller et al., 1979). However, the current study found positive relationships for television attention and negative relationships for newspapers. Newspaper reading is a better proxy for attention to political news since newspapers are less likely to be read for entertainment compared to watching television. Newspaper attention is thus more likely to be associated with being politically informed, implying that people who read newspapers more frequently are in a better position to judge electoral fairness. The negative direction of the newspaper attention relationship could be due to the types of countries included in previous research, which were often liberal democracies. Conversely, the current study involves many authoritarian democracies. Liberal democracies generally have fairer elections, while authoritarian democracies are associated with weaker electoral integrity. People who read newspapers in liberal democracies are thus more likely to make positive assessments of electoral fairness, while those who read newspapers in authoritarian democracies are more likely to view electoral fairness negatively. The inclusion of numerous authoritarian hybrid regimes in the current study could explain why relationships are in different directions.

Another explanation for the regional differences in media attention is the correlations between media type and socioeconomic status. Almost half the population in AfroBarometer countries get their political news from the radio, with television and newspaper attention rates far lower. People with televisions in Africa are likely to be wealthier, and higher income is associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness. In addition, literacy rates are relatively low in many African countries so the

small fraction of the population that reads newspapers are more likely to have higher education, which is negatively associated with perceptions of electoral fairness in Africa. This could explain why newspaper attention has a negative coefficient in most AfroBarometer countries. Media attention models do not control for socioeconomic factors because including more variables would reduce the number of cases in the models, which were already minimal due to missing data for media attention variables. This topic deserves further attention when later rounds of the regional surveys are released.

Table 6.6: Summary of Media Attention for Separate Country Results

	Significant (+)	Significant (-)	Insignificant	Missing Data
Newspaper Attention	33.3%	8.8%	42.1%	15.8%
Television Attention	14.0%	17.5%	52.6%	15.8%
Radio Attention	19.3%	8.8%	56.1%	15.8%
Political Knowledge	12.3%	10.5%	57.9%	19.3%

Political Knowledge

Political knowledge only obtains negative significance in the Africa model in Table 6.5, but three of the four significant separate AfroBarometer country results are positive. These results do not reveal a clear trend. The other regional models are insignificant and other separate country regressions do not reveal any trends. Europe is not included in Table 6.5 because of missing data for most other variables in the model, but other regressions (not shown here) revealed a positive relationship for European countries. This is consistent with findings using all countries in the CSES dataset (Birch, 2008), most of which are in Europe. How political knowledge and perceived fairness interact will be affected by the actual fairness of political processes. Positive relationships found in most European countries reflect the general conduct of elections in these politically developed countries. In other regions, having increased political knowledge is likely to make citizens more sceptical about fairness. As informed citizens are better able to assess the quality of elections, we should expect regional differences between the Africa and Europe models. Elections in Africa are more likely to be unfair, while Europe is more likely to have fair elections. People with higher levels of political knowledge simply reflect this more closely in their attitudes towards elections.

6.1.4. Economic Performance

Economic performance variables include perceptions regarding past, present, and future conditions of both the national economy and personal finances, as well as whether respondents have paid employment. Not all regional datasets in Table 6.7 have every variable, which is why there are missing coefficients.

Table 6.7: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Economic Performance

	Africa	Americas	Arab	Asia	Europe	Global
Paid Employment	-0.052 (0.086)	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.061 (0.099)	0.008 (0.043)	-0.018 (0.03)	-0.006 (0.028)
Past Economy Worse	0.026 (0.066)	0.089*** (0.038)	.	0.110* (0.091)	0.124*** (0.058)	0.080*** (0.035)
Present Economy Good	0.080** (0.067)	0.113*** (0.078)	-0.017 (0.213)	0.204*** (0.074)	0.328*** (0.105)	0.139*** (0.032)
Future Economy Better	0.097** (0.062)	.	0.090** (0.06)	.	.	.
Past Finances Worse	-0.033 (0.055)	0.040*** (0.027)	.	0.124*** (0.068)	.	.
Present Finances Good	-0.062* (0.071)	0.044*** (0.03)	0.073* (0.083)	-0.038 (0.076)	.	.
Future Finances Better	0.021 (0.058)
<i>Model Parameters</i>						
N: Respondents	20664	30284	4521	11624	27758	102527
N: Countries	20	21	5	11	19	75
Degrees of Freedom	7	5	1	5	3	3
Pseudo R-Squared	0.006	0.009	0.005	0.033	0.035	0.005

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Subjective evaluations of national economic performance were consistently significant and strong across the different regions, suggesting that perceptions of the economy are strongly correlated with perceptions of electoral fairness. Personal finances similarly showed positive relationships, but they were usually smaller and less consistent. This confirms the expected findings for national economy and personal finance, suggesting that people tend to assess electoral fairness more positively if they think the past economic or financial situation was worse, the present is good and the future will be better. The lack of significant coefficients for paid employment could be because it is subsumed within perceptions regarding personal finances or the national

economy. The following sections discuss these economic performance variables in more depth.

National Economy

Coefficients for the relationships between national economy variables and perceived electoral fairness are overwhelmingly positive, as shown in Table 6.8. Perceiving the past national economy as having been improved upon is positively associated with electoral fairness in every region except Africa, but the Arab model is missing this variable. Evidence from all models except the Arab model indicates that people who think the present national economy is good tend to make positive assessments of electoral fairness. Optimism regarding the future national economy is only available for Africa the Arab models, but shows a positively significant relationship for both these models. We can therefore infer that perceiving the national economy as improving is strongly and significantly associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness. This conclusion finds further supported in separate country regressions, which are summarised in Table 6.8. Perceiving the past national economy as worse has positively significant coefficients in 43.4% of country results and only 2.6% are negatively significant. Coefficients are even more decisive for viewing the present economy as good, with 65.8% positively significant and only 2.6% negatively significant. Not as many coefficients obtained significance for optimism regarding the future national economy, but 32.9% are positively significant and there are no negatively significant coefficients. Unmentioned percentages are either insignificant or missing data, as shown in Table 6.8. The strength of relationships vary, but taken together the regional and country findings provide robust support for the expectation that people who believe the national economy is improving are more likely to view elections as fair. The positive associations maintained whether considering the present situation or comparing it with past and future situations. This confirms previous findings and parallels the positive relationships between national economic conditions and many other types of political support (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Chang & Chu, 2006; Chappell, 1990; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Hibbs et al., 1982; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Moehler, 2009; Wong et al., 2011). The explanation for such a consistent relationship is that the optimism

regarding the economy spills over into other areas of political trust. It is perhaps surprising to find that this includes elections, given the tenuous link between national economic performance and electoral fairness.

Table 6.8: Summary of Economic Performance for Separate Country Results

	Significant (+)	Significant (-)	Insignificant	Missing Data
Paid Employment	9.2%	17.1%	73.7%	0.0%
Past Economy Worse	43.4%	2.6%	47.4%	6.6%
Present Economy Good	65.8%	2.6%	31.6%	0.0%
Future Economy Better	32.9%	0.0%	23.7%	43.4%
Past Finances Worse	13.2%	2.6%	52.6%	31.6%
Present Finances Good	19.7%	3.9%	51.3%	25.0%
Future Finances Better	7.9%	0.0%	42.1%	50.0%

Personal Finances

The same positive trends are evident with personal finances in Table 6.7, but with fewer significant coefficients and more missing data. These questions are asked in fewer survey, but the variables cover perceptions of past, present and future personal finances. Two of three regional coefficients and 13.2% of separate country coefficients are negatively significant, while the other regional coefficient is insignificant and only 2.6% of separate country models show negative relationships. Other models are either insignificant or missing data. Perceiving a good present financial situation is positively significant in four of the five regional results, with the only negatively significant coefficient in the Africa model. This coefficient is small and minimally significant, so it could have occurred by chance. Having good present finances shows a positive trend with country coefficients, with 19.7% positively significant versus only 3.9% negatively significant. Finally, being optimistic about future personal finances did not obtain significance in the Africa model, which was the only model that included this variable. Only 7.9% of the coefficients for better future finances are positively significant, but there are no negatively significant results. Most surveys do not ask about expected future personal finances.

The overall trend for personal finances is positive as anticipated, meaning that people who perceive their personal financial situations to be improving are more likely to view elections as fair. However, the relationships are not as strong as for perceptions of the

national economy, which may be partly due to more missing data. An explanation for the weaker relationships is that people do not see the government as responsible for their personal financial situation, but they do hold the government responsible for performance of the national economy. People likely perceive elections to be run by the government, even in countries with a highly independent electoral management body (EMB), so the link between elections and national economic conditions is therefore stronger than the link with personal finances. Nevertheless, personal finances coefficients are highly significant even if small, suggesting a weak but consistently positive relationship between improving personal finances and perceived electoral fairness.

Paid Employment

The variable for having paid employment does not achieve significance in any of the regional models, suggesting there may be no relationship between paid employment and electoral fairness. This lack of significant results suggests that there is no link, positive or negative, between having paid employment and perceived electoral fairness. Separate country coefficients however show a weak negative relationship, with 17.1% negatively significant versus only 9.2% positively significant, but it is difficult to argue the trend is relevant given the absence of any significant regional results. The lack of significant regional models could suggest that perceptions of the national economy or personal finances have more explanatory power than paid employment. People with paid employment are more likely to have better personal finances and view the national economy favourably than people who are unemployed. This means the positive effects of paid employment could be captured by variables for personal finances or the perceptions of the national economy.

6.1.5. Political Performance

Political performance variables have some of the strongest and most consistently significant relationships with perceived electoral fairness, as displayed Table 6.9 and Table 6.10. Trust in institutions is positively associated with trust in elections, higher government corruption is associated with lower perceptions of electoral fairness, and being the victim of physical crime has a negative relationship with electoral fairness.

The relative size of significant coefficients suggest that perceived corruption and institutional trust, especially in the executive and legislature, explain more variation in electoral fairness than many other variables included in this study. However, this could also be due to the strong correlations between different types of political trust and perceived electoral fairness. Public sector corruption is strongly related to electoral fraud, while crime victimization likely affects trust and support in many areas and for many institutions. Unfortunately, the political performance variables are not available for CSES data, which means we cannot make comparisons with a European model. It also means these variables are unsuitable for inclusion in a summative model or multilevel models despite their explanatory strength.

Table 6.9: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Political Performance

	Africa	Americas	Arab	Asia	Global
Govt. Corruption	-0.141*** (0.033)	-0.070*** (0.021)	-0.258*** (0.061)	-0.187*** (0.048)	-0.053* (0.022)
Trust Executive	0.202*** (0.053)	0.247*** (0.034)	0.186*** (0.087)	0.258*** (0.104)	0.121*** (0.022)
Trust Judiciary	-0.020 (0.044)	0.134*** (0.022)	0.021 (0.071)	0.022 (0.056)	0.055*** (0.031)
Trust Legislature	0.096*** (0.045)	0.213*** (0.036)	0.179** (0.125)	0.096*** (0.047)	0.179*** (0.031)
Trust Parties	-0.009 (0.058)	0.173*** (0.036)	0.128*** (0.07)	0.079* (0.07)	0.115*** (0.037)
Trust Police	0.085* (0.071)	0.129*** (0.036)	-0.009 (0.098)	0.066*** (0.033)	0.111*** (0.038)
Crime Victimization	-0.063*** (0.051)	-0.020* (0.029)	-0.039* (0.113)	0.007 (0.11)	-0.056*** (0.047)
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	20699	23998	4189	10016	58902
N: Countries	20	17	5	11	53
Degrees of Freedom	7	7	1	7	7
Pseudo R-Squared	0.032	0.075	0.078	0.081	0.024

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Institutional Trust

Relationships between electoral fairness and trust in institutions are consistently positive for the executive, legislature, judiciary, political parties, and police. Table 6.10 shows that more than half of all country level relationships for each of these institutions are positively significant, while only tiny fractions are negatively significant.

The strongest relationships are for the executive and legislature, with 77.2% and 61.4% of coefficients positively significant and only 1.8% and 3.5% negatively significant, respectively. Many coefficients are large as well as highly significant, indicating strong relationships between perceived electoral fairness and trust in the executive and legislature. Together with the regional results, this provides exceptionally strong support for a positive association between perceived electoral fairness and trust in the executive and legislature. Trust in the judiciary, political parties and police is positively related to perceived electoral fairness, but not as consistently or reliably. Trust in the judiciary is only significant in the Americas and Global models, while political party trust is not significant in the Africa model and police trust is not significant in the Arab model. Yet, all significant regional results for these three institutions show positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness and there are no significant negative coefficients. Table 6.10 shows that separate country coefficients for judiciary, political party and police trust are mostly positively significant and only small fractions are significantly negative. The overarching trends are clearly positive, which confirms the prediction that trust in institutions is associated with perceptions of greater electoral fairness.

Trust in different national institutions is highly inter-correlated, meaning that people who trust one institution are more likely to trust others. For instance, people who trust the legislature are more likely to trust the executive and judiciary or courts. This is probably because good governance in one area of government influences the quality of governance in other areas. For example, good executive actors are more likely to create good police forces, which are in turn more likely to catch corrupt actors in other institutions. Similarly, a good judiciary is more likely to pass impartial sentences to members of other political institutions and thereby help thwart political malfeasance. Trust in institutions therefore frequently applies to entire national political systems, which results in high levels of positive correlation between institutions. There is also a high degree of correlation between institutional trust and electoral fairness, but it is unclear which direction causal relationships may travel. On one hand, we could assume that trusting the executive, legislature, political parties, and other institutions causes people to trust elections. The reasoning would be that these institutions are

often involved in running elections and trusting them should lead to trusting the electoral process. Trust in the executive and legislature show the strongest positive relationships with electoral fairness, probably because these two institutions are more linked with elections than are the others. On the other hand, trusting in elections may increase public trust in elected officials and representatives because they are more likely to be perceived as democratically legitimate for having won in a fair election. There may also be some interaction with the variable for supporting election winners. People who identified with or voted for the incumbent executive and legislative actors are more likely to both trust them and have positive attitudes towards electoral fairness.

Table 6.10: Summary of Political Performance for Separate Country Results

	Significant (+)	Significant (-)	Insignificant	Missing Data
Corruption Level	0.0%	75.4%	24.6%	0.0%
Trust Executive	77.2%	1.8%	14.0%	7.0%
Trust Judiciary	61.4%	3.5%	35.1%	0.0%
Trust Legislature	59.6%	1.8%	38.6%	0.0%
Trust Parties	56.1%	8.8%	35.1%	0.0%
Trust Police	59.6%	0.0%	40.4%	0.0%
Crime Victimization	0.0%	21.1%	77.2%	1.8%

Government Corruption

Government corruption is negatively related to perceptions of electoral fairness in every available regional model. The separate country regressions summarised in Table 6.10 also support this relationship, with 75.4% significantly negative and no significantly positive results. Both regional and country coefficients are strong and highly significant. Support is therefore very robust for higher levels of perceived corruption being associated with reduced perceptions of electoral fairness. Given the links between government corruption and political trust (Chang & Chu, 2006; Kotzian, 2011; Lühiste, 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Mishler & Rose, 2001), it is unsurprising to find a similar relationship for electoral trust. People who perceive higher levels of overall government corruption are predictably less likely to perceive elections as conducted fairly. This is probably because questions about corruption refer to government officials or the public sector, so survey respondents conceivably include EMBs within this category. Corruption is also positively correlated between

institutions in each country, so countries with higher levels of corruption are likely to have more corruption across all institutions. This means that countries with higher levels of government corruption are more likely to have corrupt EMBs and thus less electoral integrity.

Crime Victimization

Being the victim of a physical crime is negatively correlated with perceptions of electoral fairness. This relationship is negatively significant in the Africa, Americas, Arab, and Global models. There are no positively significant separate country coefficients, but 21.1% are negatively significant. There is therefore support at the country, regional and global levels that being a victim of physical crimes is negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness. Although regional and country coefficients are consistently negative, they are quite small. This confirms previous findings of weak negative relationships with other aspects of political support (Ceobanu et al., 2011; Pérez, 2003). The variable was limited to only physical crimes such as sexual assaults, physical muggings, and armed robberies. The percentage of survey respondents who have suffered this kind of crime is quite small, which might be why the relationship with electoral fairness is weak yet significant. People who are victims of crime probably have a sense that the government or society has failed to protect them. This sense of disappointment could carry over into assessments of electoral fairness, and it probably also carries over into trust in other institutions and satisfaction with democracy. The logical inference is that people who have been the victim of physical crimes are less likely to be trusting.

6.1.6. Group Memberships

Group membership variables include being part of an ethnic or religious majority, non-religious, non-partisan and generally trusting other people. Regional and global model results for these variables are included in Table 6.11, while separate country-level results are summarised in Table 6.12. The findings for religious and ethnic majority group membership are mixed with not clear trends, but probably should not be considered definitive because variables were missing for many countries. Linguistic group membership was not included due to extensive missing data. Cultural group

membership variables therefore provide little evidence of any consistent relationships. Overall, the social trust relationship is the strongest variable in Table 6.11, suggesting either that people who generally trust others are willing to extend their trust to officials running elections or that fair elections increase social trust. There is a weak negative relationship for non-partisanship, probably because these individuals are not satisfied with any of the political parties or perhaps the political system in general. However, non-partisanship variables are not available in every dataset or every country and are therefore not suitable for inclusion within summative or multilevel models. Being a non-religious person is not significant in any regional model. The following paragraphs discuss the group membership results in more detail.

Table 6.11: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Group Memberships

	Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Global
Religious Majority	-0.004 (0.076)	0.051* (0.042)	0.055 (0.082)	0.027 (0.043)	-0.013** (0.000)
Social Trust	0.154*** (0.084)	0.115** (0.076)	0.127* (0.172)	.	.
Non-Religious	0.020 (0.106)	0.034 (0.123)	-0.045 (0.138)	0.026 (0.084)	0.024 (0.060)
Non-Partisan	-0.052 (0.079)	-0.139*** (0.065)	.	-0.093*** (0.052)	-0.087*** (0.044)
Ethnic Majority	0.035 (0.056)	-0.042* (0.038)	.	.	.
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	24451	31426	11606	34492	97705
N: Countries	20	21	11	23	69
Degrees of Freedom	5	5	3	3	6
Pseudo R-Squared	0.007	0.009	0.007	0.003	0.002

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Cultural Groups

Regional results for religious majority membership are inconclusive, with a negative coefficient for the Global model, but a positive result for the Americas model. Separate country regressions suggest a slightly positive trend, with 12.7% positively significant and 4.2% negatively significant, but 73.2% of results are insignificant so it is probably more accurate to say there is no reliable relationship. The mild positive country level trend could have occurred by chance. The results for being in the ethnic majority are also inconclusive, but the variable is only available in the Americas and

Africa models. The Americas model has a small and minimally significant negative coefficient, while the relationship is insignificant in the Africa model. Significant country regressions are almost evenly split between positive and negative, providing no evidence of a trend. Overall, there is almost no support for the assumption that being in the religious or ethnic majority is associated with improved perceptions of electoral fairness. The variable for being non-religious does not obtain significance in any regional model, but with 19.7% negatively significantly versus 9.9% positively significant there might be some support for a very weak negative association. However, with 62.0% of country coefficients and all regional models as well as the global model showing insignificant results, this relationship is not well supported.

Previous research found a positive link between belonging to cultural majority groups and different aspects of political trust, including electoral fairness (Birch, 2008; Dowley & Silver, 2002; Kelleher & Wolak, 2007; Lühiste, 2006; Norris, 2004). However, the current study provides only weak support for being in the religious majority and no support for being in the ethnic majority. Moreover, this lack of support does not change even if we modify the conditions to test plurality rather than majority group membership (exploratory regressions not shown). Upon reflection, there may be very good reasons for this. Some majority groups do not actually control the national government because a minority group is in power, which is likely to produce negative attitudes towards the government amongst majority group members. A group might also be a numerical majority across the national population, but be a minority in the legislature. Alternatively, people in majority groups may feel like the system is pandering to minority group interests. It is therefore more likely that links between cultural group membership and perceived electoral fairness is contingent upon the unique conditions within each country.

Different reasons for the unexpected results were not tested or controlled for in this study, since the aim was to find general global trends. However, the topic may be worth studying to improve understanding of the roots of cultural political tensions. Such an investigation would be greatly aided by more data regarding religious, ethnic, and linguistic group membership. These variables had the greatest amount of missing data in this study, which resulted in many omitted countries. When more data is

available, future studies could look at relationships between the proportion of different groups represented in the legislature and the public perceptions of members of those groups. One would expect to find that people who are members of groups with greater descriptive representation in the legislature would have more positive political attitudes as well as higher levels of political support and trust.

Table 6.12: Summary of Group Memberships for Separate Country Results

	Significant (+)	Significant (-)	Insignificant	Missing Data
Religious Majority	12.7%	4.2%	73.2%	9.9%
Social Trust	57.7%	0.0%	15.5%	26.8%
Non-Religious	9.9%	19.7%	62.0%	8.5%
Non-Partisan	7.0%	66.2%	25.4%	1.4%
Ethnic Majority	14.1%	16.9%	39.4%	29.6%

Social Trust

Clearer trends are evident for generalized social trust, which obtains a significant and positive result in every region the variable is available. Separate country regressions are similarly conclusive, with 57.7% positively significant and no negatively significant results. The results provide strong support for a positive relationship between generally trusting other people and perceiving elections to be fair. These results support the mostly positive findings for social trust in previous research (Dowley & Silver, 2002; Kaase, 1999; Lüthiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Zmerli & Newton, 2008). Someone who generally trusts other people is more likely to trust the officials in political institutions. The logic is that people who say they trust other people are more likely to believe that the officials running elections are trustworthy, and by extension that the election itself is trustworthy. A more optimistic outlook regarding fellow citizens could therefore translate into an increased trust in the conduct of elections. Alternatively, the causal mechanism could work in the opposite direction. Rothstein and Stolle (2008: 451-457) found associations between generalized social trust and trust in government institutions, but argued that the casual link flowed from impartial institutions to increased generalized trust. A similar causal mechanism may exist for electoral fairness, with free and fair electoral management causing increased social trust amongst citizens. This hypothesis is plausible, but requires different research designs to test.

Non-Religious

The lack of significant coefficients for non-religious respondents is probably due to mixed correlations with other factors. Non-religious people often have higher socioeconomic statuses, which are usually positively associated with most aspects of political trust. Conversely, non-religious people are a minority in most countries and being a minority group membership of is anticipated to have a negative effect on political attitudes. The separate country regressions in Table 6.12 do show a more negative trend, but this is inadequate evidence without significant regional coefficients. There may therefore not be any consistent global relationships between political trust and being non-religious, as suggested by the lack of any significant regional coefficients.

Non-Partisan

Non-partisanship is negatively associated with electoral fairness in three regional models. The trend is supported by separate country results, with 66.2% of relationships negatively significant and only 7.0% positively significant. Many of the country, regional and global level coefficients for non-partisanship are relatively strong and achieve high levels of statistical significance, meaning the predicted relationship finds consistent and reliable support. The results therefore support the proposition that not identifying with any political party is negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness, which confirms Birch's (2008) earlier finding. One plausible reason for the negative views of non-partisan individuals is that they are not satisfied with any of the available electoral choices. This rejection of existing candidates and parties is reflected in a general sense of dissatisfaction regarding elections. Cho and Bratton (2006: 741) found non-partisans be more satisfied than people who supported electoral losers, but less satisfied than those who supported the winners. The current study was not setup to test gradients of dissatisfaction between different groups, but it would not be surprising to find. Moreover, the negative political attitudes of non-partisan individuals probably carries over into other areas of political trust, such as satisfaction with democracy or the political system and perceptions of state legitimacy. People who are non-partisan are less likely to have their preferences represented and are therefore less satisfied with current political circumstances.

Table 6.13 includes a final summative model combining the variables that achieved consistent, strong, and significant relationships in as many countries as possible. The primary goal is to justify which variables to include in multilevel models. The ArabBarometer is not included because many important variables are missing and there are too few countries in this dataset to run multilevel models. The AsianBarometer also has too few countries for multilevel models, but it is included here for comparative purposes and ensuring consistency across more regions.

Table 6.13: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Proven Variables

	Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Globa
Age (Decades)	0.076** (0.017)	0.040 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.106** (0.012)	0.049** (0.009)
Female	0.014 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.021)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.048** (0.027)	-0.007 (0.012)
High Income	-0.011 (0.065)	0.053* (0.078)	0.053* (0.067)	0.028 (0.038)	0.020 (0.035)
Tertiary Education	-0.036** (0.062)	-0.005 (0.029)	-0.095** (0.076)	0.039* (0.049)	-0.009 (0.028)
Supports Winner	0.243*** (0.135)	0.116*** (0.053)	0.376*** (0.200)	0.124** (0.070)	0.164** (0.057)
Electoral Participation	0.094*** (0.055)	0.045** (0.033)	0.091** (0.077)	0.093** (0.068)	0.075** (0.031)
Urban Status	-0.027 (0.066)	-0.022 (0.047)	-0.149*** (0.074)	-0.047 (0.073)	-0.037 (0.045)
Past Economy Worse	0.028 (0.049)	0.095*** (0.042)	0.097** (0.066)	0.124** (0.066)	0.064** (0.031)
Present Economy Good	0.055* (0.063)	0.113*** (0.063)	0.141*** (0.038)	0.339** (0.115)	0.113** (0.031)
Non-Partisan	0.114** (0.091)	-0.050* (0.052)	0.216* (0.178)	0.016 (0.057)	0.043* (0.043)
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	23737	31726	10596	20137	92922
N: Countries	20	21	10	18	73
Degrees of Freedom	10	10	6	10	10
Pseudo R-Squared	0.017	0.016	0.076	0.050	0.010

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, ***

Overall, most coefficients maintain the same direction and approximate size as in previous models. However, some variables lose their consistent significance because of the inclusion of stronger explanatory variables. Female gender for instance only achieves significance in the Europe model and living in an urban location is only

significant in the Asia model. These variables will therefore not be included in multilevel models. Perceiving the past national economy to be worse will not be included in future models because it is somewhat redundant given the more widely available variable for a good present economy. Therefore, the final selection of variables to be included within multilevel models is as follows: Age (Decades), High Income, Tertiary Education, Supports Winner, Electoral Participation, and Present Economy Good. These variables are the most commonly available across the different datasets, which prevents countries being dropped from multilevel models because of insufficient individual level data.

The next section analyses results for national level variables, except those measuring electoral management body design, which are presented in Chapter 7. National level variables differ because they come from institutional sources, such as Freedom House or Transparency International, rather than cross-national public surveys.

6.2. National Level Variables

Overall, the most reliable national level variables indicate that societal factors and the electoral system matter for perceived electoral fairness. The strongest relationships are for civil liberties, freedom of the press, percentage of women in parliament and degree of religious fractionalisation. These variables demonstrated strong and consistent correlations with electoral fairness across multiple regions as well as the global models. There were also moderately strong and consistent relationships for proportional representation and lower levels of corruption. Some national level determinants achieved significance in only one region, suggesting no global trends or the possibility of regional differences. These include election victory margins, lower parliament size, income inequality, and linguistic fractionalization. Other variables did not obtain significance in any of the models and therefore do not appear to determine perceived electoral fairness. Insignificant factors include years since universal suffrage, political rights, direct public funding of political parties, total population per MP, ethnic fractionalization, human development index, GNI per capita, and GDP growth per capita. The following sections provide results for variables within each thematic grouping.

6.2.1. Democratic Performance

Of the variables included in Table 6.14, only the civil liberties index achieves significance. Its coefficient is strongly and positively significant in two regional models as well as the Global model, with only the Americas model not achieving conventional significance. This provides good support for the notion that people in countries with stronger civil liberties protections are more likely to view their elections as fair. The political rights index does not obtain significance in any of the models, which suggests that the level of political rights in a country is not significantly related to perceived electoral fairness. Democratic experience fails to achieve significance in any of the regional models or the Global model. This means that the number of years since universal suffrage is unrelated to perceptions of electoral fairness. Overall, civil liberties is clearly the strongest national level predictor of perceived electoral fairness in this model, while democratic experience and political rights may not be related to electoral fairness, or that their explanatory power is eclipsed by the other variables in the model, such as civil liberties. The results disagree with previous research that included democratic age (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Farrell & McAllister, 2006), but parallels prior findings of a positive relationship between civil liberties and political legitimacy (Gilley, 2006: 57). However, democratic experience was measured in years since universal suffrage, but a better measure to use in the future would be total cumulative years of democracy. The aforementioned previous studies used a variable for accumulated democratic experience rather than years since universal suffrage. Political rights were probably overshadowed in importance either by the strongly positive civil rights variable or by individual level control variables. The liberties and rights indices are strongly correlated, but since they were included in the same model and political rights failed to achieve significance it appears that civil liberties are the stronger determinant of perceived electoral fairness.

Table 6.14: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Democratic Performance

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Democratic Experience	-0.022 (0.131)	0.064 (0.099)	-0.024 (0.09)	-0.032 (0.047)
Political Rights	-0.014 (0.197)	0.052 (0.155)	-0.088 (0.3)	0.002 (0.141)
Civil Liberties	0.283* (0.216)	-0.028 (0.129)	0.452* (0.271)	0.165* (0.137)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034** (0.029)	0.021*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.019* (0.026)	-0.011 (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.128*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.062*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.022)	0.091*** (0.039)	0.065*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.107*** (0.019)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	97280
N: Countries	20	21	19	74
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	9	9
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	254.167	195.958	142.206	405.511

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Democratic Experience

The year of achieving woman's suffrage was the starting point for calculating the total number of years of democratic experience. The justification for doing so was that universal voting rights mark the start of more equitable democracy, which is important because the dependent variable is perceived electoral fairness. However, this variable produced no significant results. An alternative method would be to calculate democratic experience based on the total number of years of democracy, regardless of whether women or minorities could vote, but would not include any time spend under authoritarian rule. The longer a country has been a democracy, the more elections it will have held. With each electoral cycle come opportunities for electoral fraud problems and subsequent corrections and solutions. Moreover, expertise and logistical resources generally improve over time so there would be less problems

arising from administrative or technical limitations. Selecting female suffrage as the starting point did not allow for all these factors, since many countries did not allow women to vote until relatively recently.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Political rights did not obtain significance in any of the models, which is surprising because Birch (2008) previously found a positive relationship between political rights and perceived electoral fairness. Her study did not however include a civil liberties index. With separate variables for both political rights and civil liberties included in the same models, political rights failed to achieve significance while civil liberties was significant in three of the models. This suggests that civil liberties matter more for perceived electoral fairness than political rights, implying that freedoms of expression, belief, association and organization, as well as the rule of law and autonomy from state interference are strongly related to electoral fairness. The lack of results for political rights is nevertheless surprising because they seem more topically related to elections. For example, political rights include procedural fairness under the law, rights political participation, as well as freedoms of association, assembly, and petition. Nevertheless, the insignificance of political rights and significance of civil liberties maintained across many regressions models (not shown) with many different variables included. It is therefore appears that civil liberties have a stronger and more consistent positive relationship with perceived electoral fairness than political rights.

6.2.2. Electoral Context

The wider electoral context can have important ramifications for perceived electoral fairness. The variables included in these models included proportional representation, direct public funding of political parties, and the size of election victory margins. Table 6.15 shows that proportional representation finds the most support, with strong significant positive coefficients for the Africa and Global models but not the Americas and Europe models. The most likely reason for the positive relationship is that proportional representation systems are more reflective of public preferences and produce more politically inclusive parliaments. Direct public funding of political parties does not find support in any of the models, suggesting that this aspect of electoral

systems is not associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness. This could be because public funding increases electoral competition and perceptions of fairness, but spending tax money to fund political parties is likely to have a negative effect on public attitudes.

Table 6.15: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Electoral Context

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Proportional Representation	0.214* (0.174)	-0.018 (0.061)	0.090 (0.269)	0.129** (0.100)
Direct Public Funding	-0.012 (0.221)	0.054 (0.147)	-0.004 (0.201)	0.025 (0.133)
Victory Margin	0.023 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.207* (0.036)	0.005 (0.010)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.037*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.029)	0.022*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.020* (0.026)	-0.010 (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.125*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.063*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.090*** (0.039)	0.064*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.107*** (0.019)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	96244
N: Countries	20	21	19	73
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	9	9
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	226.078	197.574	334.123	467.837

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Victory margin is negatively significant only in Europe, not obtaining significance in any other model. The proposition that larger victory margins are associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness therefore does not find support. Bigger victory margins could be negatively associated with electoral fairness because this may as a proxy for transitional democracies, where margins are often higher. In summary, proportional representation appears to have a positive relationship with electoral

fairness, while direct public funding fails to achieve significance and victory margin was significant in only one regional model but displayed a negative coefficient.

Proportional Representation

Results for proportional representation support previous research indicating that people perceive elections as more fair if the electoral system uses an element of proportional representation (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006). The significant positive relationship was expected, but was not present in the Europe model. The lack of significant findings for the Europe model is surprising because Birch (2008) previously found a positive relationship using the full set of CSES countries, a substantial majority of which are in Europe. The current study used the same dataset but limited countries to only those in Europe. The lack of a significant Europe model result therefore suggests that either proportional representation does not affect electoral fairness within Europe or that the relationship with electoral fairness may be quite weak.

The current study simply created a dichotomous variable representing the presence or absence of any type or amount of proportional representation. However, at least two additional factors related to proportional representation may have an effect. First, different types of proportional representation may produce dissimilar outcomes. Gingerich (2009: 538-539) for example finds that closed-list proportional representation is associated with more corrupt political financing practices within the bureaucracy than preferential-list proportional representation systems. Second, not all members of a legislature or both national legislatures may be subject to election by proportional representation. Some countries have unelected members of parliament where another actor, such as a council of ministers or an unelected body, may appoint some members of parliament. In addition, only one of the national parliaments may use proportional representation. Given the usually increased levels of political support associated with proportional representation, we could test the assumption that perceived electoral fairness would increase as more seats of all parliaments are subject to election using proportional representation. A new variable could be operationalized to represent the total percentage of all parliamentary seats elected using proportional

representation. This would be superior to a dichotomized variable that simply represents the presence of some elements of proportional representation.

Public Funding

Direct public funding of political parties did not obtain significance in any of the models despite previous research indicating a positive relationship (Birch, 2008). This may be due to countervailing trends, one with a positive effect on electoral fairness and the other negative. From one side, public funding of political parties is supposed to level the playing field and make it easier for smaller parties to compete in elections. This could increase perceptions of electoral fairness as smaller parties have a better chance of obtaining seats. On the other side, public opinion is often against tax money going towards financing political parties. This could have a negative effect on perceived electoral fairness. The insignificant results for direct public funding could be a consequence of these two opposing trends cancelling each other. Another reason for the lack of significant results for public funding is that countries have different national restrictions and requirements for public funding. For example, the provision of public funding often does not preclude candidates and parties from seeking private funding and therefore may not stop the perceived corruption associated with private political finance practices (Casas-Zamora, 2005; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002: 78). More data about the provision of public funding, the provision of other private sources and regulations regarding political finances would allow more detailed analysis and might uncover significant relationships. Data regarding bans on types of donations, maximum amount limits and other political finance conditions is already available, (IDEA, 2012), but requires supplementation with original data gathering efforts to minimise missing data. A fruitful line of research could be to gather this data to dig deeper into the controversial world of political finance and its effects on perceived electoral fairness and political trust.

Victory Margin

Results for victory margin accord with previous research findings of a negative relationship (Hartlyn et al., 2008), but provides evidence against other research and the predicted positive relationship (Birch, 2008). The original victory margin

assumption was that larger margins would increase the legitimacy of election winners because it indicates that more of the population supported the winners. The negative result for victory margin in the Europe model did not support this, instead suggesting that perceived electoral fairness decreases as victory margins increase. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine have some of the highest victory margins amongst included European countries, but also have some of the lowest perceptions of electoral fairness and are often considered electoral authoritarian or hybrid regimes. Large victories can indicate an unfair electoral context in hybrid regimes. Incumbents may exclude competing candidates or parties, intimidate opposition voters, or commit outright fraud by stuffing ballot boxes in an attempt to gain legitimacy with the appearance of an overwhelming victory. Large margins may reflect electoral fraud as corrupt officials overzealously attempt to legitimize their authoritarian political masters, swinging victory margins too far away from reality. Many of the more established democracies in the Europe model tend to have elections perceived as mostly fair with slimmer victory margins. Older democracies may also have smaller margins because the different political parties gradually moved towards an ideological centre to appeal to median voters over time (Downs, 1957; Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997). These factors could help explain the strong negative correlation between larger victory margins and electoral fairness in the Europe model. Alternatively, the negative result may be due to the effects of majoritarian political systems, which usually grant larger majorities to election winners than what is present in the population, leading to perceptions of unfairness.

6.2.3. Parliamentary Composition

Elections and parliaments are closely related, so it is reasonable to expect some significant correlations. Parliamentary composition variables include the size of the lower legislature, ratios of population per Member of Parliament (MP) and percentage of women in parliament. Results presented in Table 6.16 show that the percentage of women in parliament has the strongest positive relationship with electoral fairness. This variable obtains positive significance in three models, with strong relationships in the Africa and Europe models and a weaker association in the Global model. Only the

Americas model does not achieve conventional levels of significance for the women in parliament variable. However, these results do not indicate a causal direction. It remains unclear whether fair electoral systems facilitate more women entering politics or whether having more women in parliament increases perceptions of fairness. Next, lower legislature size only obtains significance in the Africa model, where its coefficient is strong but negative and only minimally significant. This suggests that larger legislatures are not associated with fairer perceptions of elections. However, with only one minimally significant region, this result could have occurred by chance.

Table 6.16: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Parliamentary Composition

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Lower Parliament Size	-0.350* (0.36)	-0.031 (0.12)	0.194 (0.148)	-0.004 (0.076)
Population per MP	0.115 (0.251)	0.002 (0.111)	-0.141 (0.233)	-0.028 (0.072)
Women in Parliament	0.241* (0.139)	-0.049 (0.037)	0.285** (0.081)	0.096* (0.045)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.059*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.029)	0.021*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.019* (0.026)	-0.011 (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.128*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.063*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.090*** (0.038)	0.065*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.107*** (0.019)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	97280
N: Countries	20	21	19	74
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	9	9
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	207.62	165.913	102.992	427.211

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Finally, the ratio of MPs per population does not achieve significance in any of the regional models or the Global model. It therefore appears unrelated to electoral fairness, perhaps because there are too many other parliamentary design factors that

affect representation and perceived electoral fairness. Overall, having more women in parliament is the strongest determinant of increased perceptions of electoral fairness, while having larger parliaments and lower ratios of population to MP are not positively related to perceptions of electoral fairness.

Legislature Size

Larger legislatures were expected to be associated with positive attitudes towards elections because having more seats should translate into greater diversity in the legislature and an increased chance of representing citizens' preferences. However, the strong and negatively significant results suggest that having larger legislatures is not associated with increased electoral fairness, as was indicated by prior research (Farrell & McAllister, 2006). This could be because large legislatures dilute specific issues within an ocean of other priorities, which leaves voters feeling like their local representatives are relatively powerless. Alternatively, large legislatures may require compromise with other factions to pass legislation and thus individual citizen preferences are seldom fully realized. Further research could test for correlations between legislature size and other factors, such as party discipline and majority versus minority governments, to account for these interactions.

Population per MP

Population per MP is obviously related to legislature size, but controls for population size as well. This was intended to investigate if the number of citizens represented by each MP affects public perceptions of electoral fairness. The logic was that smaller ratios might allow for better quality representation, which would be evident in attitudes towards elections. Despite previous research finding a relationship between population per MP and electoral fairness (Farrell & McAllister, 2006), the lack of significant results in the current study suggests there is no substantial relationship between these variables. The most likely reason is that many other factors affect perceptions of electoral fairness and the ratio of population to MP is not a sufficiently strong explanatory variable to obtain significance.

Women in Parliament

The finding that higher percentages of women in parliament are associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness confirms the original assumption and prior research (Karp & Banducci, 2008). However, the current study did not investigate causal mechanisms or account for any gender quotas. It is thus unclear whether more women in parliament causes increased perceptions of electoral fairness, or whether fairer electoral and political systems facilitate more women entering politics. Moreover, the current study did not account for the impact of different types of gender quotas, which can substantially increase the percentage of female representatives (Paxton, Hughes, & Painter, 2010: 31-33; Tripp & Kang, 2008; Yoon, 2001: 182-183). It would be interesting to research whether gender quotas had any effect on public perceptions of electoral fairness. On one hand, they could be perceived as unfair because they might be criticized for removing an element of meritocracy. On the other hand, they could be viewed as positive discrimination attempting to offset systematic gender inequality. It currently remains unclear whether gender quotas affect electoral fairness, but it is reasonable to expect a positive relationship.

6.2.4. Political Performance

Perceptions of electoral fairness were expected to increase with lower public sector corruption, less income inequality and greater freedom of the press. Table 6.17 shows the results. The reversed Corruption Perceptions Index shows significant coefficients in the Africa and Americas models, but not in the Europe or Global models. Nevertheless, the two coefficients are strong and achieve moderately high levels of significance, which support the assumption that greater levels of corruption are negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness. The income inequality Gini Index is negatively significant in the Africa model, positively significant in the Americas model, and not significant in the Europe and Global models. These mixed results provide no clear evidence regarding the direction of any relationship between income inequality and electoral fairness. Freedom of the press shows large positive and significant coefficients for the Africa, Europe and Global models, but not the Americas

model. This evidence therefore supports the common assumption that press freedom is positively associated with perceived electoral fairness. Overall, press freedom has the strongest consistently positive relationship, while greater levels of corruption are negatively related to electoral fairness and results of income inequality are inconclusive. This suggests that the wider political and social context affects perceptions of elections.

Table 6.17: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Political Performance

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Public Sector Corruption	-0.199** (0.168)	-0.124** (0.084)	-0.076 (0.147)	-0.033 (0.065)
Income Inequality	-0.149* (0.07)	0.064* (0.079)	-0.076 (0.184)	0.075 (0.046)
Media Freedom	0.158* (0.114)	-0.031 (0.058)	0.265* (0.18)	0.127* (0.091)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.059*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.02)	0.034* (0.029)	0.021*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.019* (0.026)	-0.011 (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.128*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.062*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.039)	0.065*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.107*** (0.019)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	97280
N: Countries	20	21	19	74
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	9	9
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	452.701	190.575	226.689	406.393

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Public Sector Corruption

The correlations between public sector corruption and electoral fraud are obvious, so it is no revelation that people in countries with higher corruption have lower perceptions of electoral fairness. The results parallel similar findings for the effect of corruption on other types of political trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Gilley, 2006;

Kotzian, 2011; Seligson, 2002) and supports past research indicating the same relationship between corruption and electoral fairness (Birch, 2008; Hartlyn et al., 2008). The same negative relationship between corruption and public trust is anticipated with a wide range of political institutions and different types of support.

Income Inequality

Societies with higher levels of income inequality experience a range of social problems such as poorer health, shorter lifespans, lower trust and increased violence (Wilkinson, 1996; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2006). We can now add lower levels of electoral trust to the list. Findings for the Africa model indicate that people in countries with larger differences between the rich and poor are less likely to say their elections are fair. However, the coefficient shows a weak positive relationship in the Americas model. The results are therefore inconclusive, but could provide limited support for the weak negative relationships found in previous research (Anderson & Singer, 2008; Kotzian, 2011). Income differences indicate how fairly the wealth of a country is distributed. Hierarchical societies with higher income inequalities are more likely to be politically polarised. The usual trend in countries with high levels of income inequality is for a small minority of the population to be exceptionally rich and have disproportionate control over the national political structures. It is understandable why a representative random sample of the population in such countries, most of who will not be members of the rich minority, might tend to have negative attitudes towards electoral fairness.

Media Freedom

The relationship between media freedom and perceived electoral fairness is not well researched using comparative cross-sectional studies. Freedom of the press is usually assumed to be a crucial element for a free and fair democracy because it can hold politicians accountable and keep the public informed. The current study provides empirical support for this long-held belief and the strong positive relationship is not surprising. Countries that uphold principles of media freedom are more likely to see political corruption exposed and thus electoral fraud gradually reduced. Catching and publicising others committing fraud serves as a warning sign to those thinking about

their own attempts. Each reported case of electoral malfeasance teaches candidates, political parties, and governments that engaging in electoral malfeasance increases the risk losing public support. It is therefore a reasonably safe assumption that a causal relationship exists and that increased press freedom gradually helps encourage fairer elections.

6.2.5. Economic Performance

Economic performance variables include the Human Development Index, GNI per capita, and GDP growth per capita. However, none of these variables achieves significance in any regional model or the Global model in Table 6.18. These results therefore provide no support for the proposition that the national economy affects perceived electoral fairness. This is surprising given the extensive research indicating links between similar economic performance indicators and a range of political and institutional trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Chappell, 1990; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Gilley, 2006; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994; Wong et al., 2011) as well as electoral fairness (Birch, 2008; Hartlyn et al., 2008). The lack of significant coefficients for economic performance variables has at least two possible explanations. First, it may reflect that people are able to separate economic performance and electoral fairness. There is a clearer link between economic performance and trust in government actors, since governments regulate business and industry or otherwise try to influence economic conditions through policies or programs. However, the link between economic conditions and electoral fairness is more indirect, so the lack of significant results may simply reflect the reality that people do not make this connection. A second explanation is that perceived economic conditions outweigh actual economic indicators in explanatory importance. The variable for subjective opinions regarding the present economic situation obtains high levels of significance in every regional model, while none of the national level economic indicators obtains significance. It is therefore possible that subjective perceptions of the economy matter more than objective economic indicators, which makes sense because the dependent variable measures subjective perceptions of electoral fairness. This explanation is more supported by the data, since subjective

evaluations of economic performance were significant and consistently strong across the different regions. Perceived economic performance therefore seems to matter more for perceptions of electoral fairness than national economic performance indicators.

Table 6.18: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Economic Performance

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Human Development Index	0.017 (1.729)	0.055 (1.336)	0.304 (2.711)	0.024 (0.415)
GNI per Capita	0.111 (1.649)	-0.014 (0.514)	0.068 (0.149)	0.059 (0.091)
GDP Growth per Capita	0.038 (0.304)	-0.020 (0.096)	0.030 (0.153)	-0.010 (0.113)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.059*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.029)	0.021*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.019* (0.026)	-0.012* (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.128*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.063*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.090*** (0.038)	0.064*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.106*** (0.019)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	95729
N: Countries	20	21	19	73
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	9	9
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	205.935	184.825	243.326	406.527

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

6.2.6. Cultural Fractionalization

Lower religious, ethnic, or linguistic fractionalization was presumed to be positively associated with perceived electoral fairness. Table 6.19 provides strong support for the religious fractionalization assumption, with negatively significant relationships for the Africa, Americas, and Global models. This relationship is strongest and achieves the highest level of significance in the Global model, which together with regional results suggests that greater national religious diversity decreases the likelihood of

perceived electoral fairness. Ethnic fractionalization does not achieve significance in any model, indicating a lack of any relationship between the degree of ethnic diversity and perceived electoral fairness. Linguistic fractionalization is negatively significant in the Global model, but not in any of the regional models. The coefficient for the Global model is moderately strong and significant, which provides some support for the assumption that increasing linguistic diversity decreases the likelihood of perceived electoral fairness. Overall, religious fractionalization shows the strongest negative association with electoral fairness, linguistic fractionalization shows a weak negative association, while ethnic fractionalization appears unrelated to perceptions of electoral fairness.

Table 6.19: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Cultural Fractionalization

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Religious Fractionalization	-0.130* (0.278)	-0.068* (0.207)	-0.056 (0.355)	-0.124*** (0.143)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.018 (0.527)	0.024 (0.288)	-0.153 (1.103)	0.063 (0.175)
Linguistic Fractionalization	-0.079 (0.299)	0.008 (0.283)	-0.079 (0.839)	-0.133** (0.148)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.029)	0.021*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.019* (0.026)	-0.011 (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.128*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.063*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.089*** (0.038)	0.065*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.107*** (0.019)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	97280
N: Countries	20	21	19	74
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	9	9
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	199.884	146.676	130.147	432.764

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The finding of a negative relationship between religious fractionalisation and perceived electoral fairness is relatively new. Other studies have found negative correlations between ethnic diversity and political trust (Rahn & Rudolph, 2005: 546-548), economic growth (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Posner, 2004), and the quality of government (Alesina et al., 2003). However, the present study found no relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and perceived electoral fairness. This could be due to religious fractionalisation having more explanatory power and overshadowing ethnic diversity. This means that any relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and electoral fairness is relatively weak. Keech (1972) found that linguistic diversity could increase the likelihood of political conflict. The only significant result in the present study was a negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness in the Global model, which is not reliable without significant regional results.

Chapter 7. Unexpected Results for EMB Models

This chapter provides results for the two models of electoral management body (EMB) design. Overall, both models unexpectedly demonstrate strong and significant negative relationship with public perceptions of fair elections, with very few coefficients demonstrating the anticipated positive relationships. The predominantly negative correlations uncovered in this study go against the extensive literature advocating an independent electoral management body model (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006). The negative results may reflect the fact that formally independent institutions are subject to informal manipulation. Many newer democracies have recently established formal representative institutions and hold multiparty elections, but are effectively authoritarian regimes in many ways. These are often called *competitive authoritarian*, *electoral authoritarian* or *hybrid* regimes and are identified by their mix of authoritarian and democratic elements (Bogaards, 2009; Case, 2011; Ekman, 2009; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Koehler, 2008; Schedler, 2010; Wigell, 2008). Institutional arrangements in these regimes may appear formally independent, but the reality of the political situation often differs substantively from what constitutions or legislation prescribes. Authoritarian or semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes have many options for manipulating democracy and holding onto power despite formally independent EMBs (Schedler, 2002a: 41-46). As the case of Mexico's democratic transition illustrates, political circumstances often matter more than the formal institutional independence of EMBs (Todd A. Eisenstadt, 2004). The Mexican Federal Electoral Institute only fully applied its formal independence after the ruling party accepted an electoral loss and the political conditions changed. Many countries have formally independent EMBs that exist in current hybrid regimes or have a recent past of authoritarian rule.¹⁰ Belarus, Burkina Faso, Russia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe are examples of hybrid regimes included in this study that have formally independent EMBs. There are enough of these countries in each regional dataset to sway the

¹⁰ Benin, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Tanzania, Ukraine and Zambia are all listed as having independent EMBs.

results, which could explain the strong negative correlations between independent EMBs and perceptions of electoral fairness. People in hybrid regimes probably take into consideration the wider authoritarian context rather than the formal institutional arrangements when answering survey questions about electoral fairness. This will be especially true if the formal arrangements are routinely circumvented or ignored. Birch (2008: 313) suggested this negative relationship could be a result of independent EMBs being introduced in response to problematic electoral impartiality. If this is true, then people in countries with newly independent EMBS may be remembering the earlier more corrupt elections when answering survey questions about electoral fairness. This could explain the predominance of negative results for the two EMB models, However, constitutional arrangements and formal structures are capable of democratising the wider political context despite informal manipulations (Hale, 2011), so future research should start to show more positive relationships. If it does not, then the alleged positive effects of independent electoral management will remain unsupported by empirical evidence.

The structure of this chapter is divided between the two models of EMB design. Two main sections provide the results for the separate parts of the two models as well as their composite indices. Section 7.1 examines results for the conventional independent model, while section 7.2 analyses the findings for the categorised autonomy model. For consistency, these are divided into the same subsections used in earlier chapters.

7.1. Conventional Independent Model

The conventional independent model has available data for six criteria: implementation, accountability, powers, composition, term of office and budget. Results for the implementation tasks show either negative or insignificant relationships with perceived electoral fairness. The only significant results for accountability to the legislature or judiciary are negative. Making EMBs responsible for settling electoral disputes or proposing electoral reforms produce mixed or insignificant results. Having members selected by the judiciary or legislature reveals have a weak negative relationship with electoral fairness, while having fixed member terms is strongly and

negatively associated with electoral fairness. There are no significant results for EMB budgetary variables. Analysing the separate criteria therefore produces substantively more negative than positive relationships. This approach does not account for the possibility that the different criteria matter in a holistic way, perhaps by reinforcing each other. However, the additive index of conventional independence is strongly negative in the Europe model, but insignificant in all other regions and the Global model. Overall, there are few positively significant results and the evidence generally does not support claims that independent EMBs increase electoral fairness.

The following sections outline results for the different criteria of the conventional independent model. These include EMB responsibility for the implementation of core election tasks, formal accountability to the legislature or judiciary, powers to propose electoral legislation or settle electoral disputes, member composition measured with selection by the legislature or judiciary, fixed terms of office and budgets and expenditures overseen by non-executive actors.

7.1.1. Implementation

Implementation refers to core tasks related to running elections, of which there are four with available data: voter registration, running the local level of elections, sorting and counting votes, and consolidating results. The overall assumption is that assigning more of these tasks to an EMB is associated with increased electoral fairness, but findings are not supportive of this postulation. However, there should also be some positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness for separate tasks. Table 7.1 presents the results for having EMBs perform the four core implementation tasks. The missing coefficients for the Africa and Americas models are omitted due to multicollinearity. Voter registration was omitted in the Americas model because all national EMBs are responsible for voter registration. Consolidating results was omitted from the African model because all but one national EMB is responsible for this task, which conflicts with the requirement for more variation when using robust standard errors clustered by country.

Table 7.1: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Implementation Tasks

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Voter Registration	-0.119* (0.147)	.	0.201 (0.269)	0.045 (0.115)
Local Elections	0.319*** (0.110)	-0.039* (0.062)	-0.219*** (0.045)	0.017 (0.151)
Sort and Count Votes	-0.190** (0.156)	0.031 (0.071)	-0.016 (0.114)	-0.049 (0.120)
Consolidate Votes	.	-0.028 (0.071)	-0.135* (0.132)	-0.029 (0.128)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.030)	0.024*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.020* (0.026)	-0.008 (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.128*** (0.032)
Electoral Participation	0.063*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.089*** (0.038)	0.063*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.129*** (0.041)	0.106*** (0.020)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	92533
N: Countries	20	21	19	69
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	10	10
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	860.722	211.044	949.954	376.055

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

We can see that most significant results in Table 7.1 are negative and thus do not support the assumptions of the conventional independent model. Voter registration is negative in the Africa model, suggesting that making EMBs responsible for this task is actually associated with decreased perceptions of electoral fairness. EMB responsibility for local level elections has a strong and significant positive relationship in the Africa model, but a negative relationship in the Americas and Europe models. The mixed results are therefore inconclusive. Sorting and counting votes has a significant negative coefficient in the Africa model, again suggesting that assigning this task to an EMB decreases perceived electoral fairness. Finally, the task of consolidating results shows a negative result in the Europe model. Most significant coefficients are moderate to relatively large, suggesting strong relationships.

Therefore, the overall trend for core implementations tasks is that assigning them to EMBs produces more negative relationships than positive, which suggests that making EMBs responsible for these tasks does not necessarily lead to improved perceptions of electoral fairness. However, there may be some hope for making EMBs responsible for local elections, since this was the only variable positively associated with electoral fairness, even if it was only in one region. This could indicate that making a national body responsible for the local level of elections removes some conflicts of interest. Having local government officials run local elections is more likely to provide opportunities to act on incentives to maintain power.

Given the essential nature of implementation tasks for democracy and the assumption that autonomy reduces conflicts of interest, it is somewhat alarming that so many relationships are negative rather than positive. The negative coefficients occur across multiple regions, which reduce the likelihood that the relationships are due to chance. However, one of the problems with the implementation task results is that they are mostly based on proxy variables and do not directly test the intended design features. For example, the task of vote counting is measured by combining where votes are counted with the level of elections for which EMBs are responsible. If EMBs are responsible for the local level and votes are counted at polling stations, then it was assumed the EMB was responsible for counting the votes. This seems a reasonable assumption, but a variable that expressly identified which body was responsible for sorting and counting votes would have been superior. Other implementation tasks are not very useful to measure because there is insufficient variation between countries. For example, all EMBs are responsible for voter registration in the Americas countries. This problem could be minimized by gathering original data regarding the procedures for voter registration. Multicollinearity problems could also be mitigated by the release of future datasets that include more countries, with the hope that this increases cross-national variation.

Additional aspects of election implementation need researching in more depth across wider sets of countries. Restrictions on registering, updating of the voter registry, identification requirements and ballot chains of custody can be sources of electoral fraud or voter disenfranchisement (Albaugh, 2011; J. E. Alvarez, 1996; R. M. Alvarez &

Hall, 2008). Registration requirements or voting restrictions based on age, gender, ethnicity, mental disability, criminal incarceration, previous conviction, military or judicial service, multiple citizenships, and other factors can disenfranchise potential voters. Further requirements such as periods of residence, citizenship, or naturalization provide additional ways of limiting who can vote. These factors can affect substantial portions of the population and could be perceived as unfair or abused for partisan advantage. Prior research suggests that more permissive voter registration practices increases voter turnout without substantially changing the overall composition of electorates (Mitchell & Wlezien, 1995; Powell, 1986; Rosenstone & Wolfinger, 1978). Relationships between registration restrictions and perceived electoral fairness remain inadequately investigated, but they are expected to reveal positive relationships. ACE data has variables on voting restrictions and registration requirements, but many of the countries included in the present research have missing data. If the relevant data were gathered, it would be possible to research the relationships between these requirements or restrictions and electoral fairness or other aspects of political support. There are at least two expectations related to registration requirements or voting restrictions that could be tested, each of which required different variables. First, that perceived electoral fairness would decrease as the number of restrictions increases. This would entail the creation of an additive index variable that measured the total number of different types of voting restrictions in each country. A second expectation is that perceived electoral fairness would decrease as the percentage of the population restricted from voting increases. The variable required for testing this expectation is more complex to construct because it would require cross-referencing other data sources to calculate the percentage of a population affected by different voting restrictions. They are nevertheless important avenues of research as they have real-world policy implications and could provide information on how to increase political support for democracy.

7.1.2. Accountability

The results for formal accountability to the legislature or judiciary are negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness. It is therefore apparent that reporting to

either of these actors is not sufficient for enhancing perceived electoral fairness. It is possible that reporting to particular sets of multiple actors produces the most positive results. For example, reporting to the judiciary *and* legislature rather than to the judiciary *or* legislature might have a positive effect. Moreover, where EMBs report to is a very shallow definition of accountability. There are many additional factors of EMB accountability that are considered important (Wall et al., 2006: 223-227), but no variables available to measure them. A more meaningful measure of accountability would measure the performance standards to which EMB members are accountable and the mechanisms by which other government branches or agencies hold them responsible. The ACE & IDEA data unfortunately does not include these variables, and independently gathering and coding those variables is beyond the scope of this thesis.

7.1.3. Powers

Two tasks with valid data are included within the powers criteria: proposing electoral reforms and settling electoral disputes. Table 7.2 shows that there is little support for the predicted positive relationships. First, making EMBs responsible for the first level of electoral disputes has a strong negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness in the Europe model, but a weak positive association in the Americas model. The results are thus mixed and inconclusive. Slightly more than half the EMBs in the Americas model are responsible for dispute resolution, and many of these are strong independent EMBs that follow an electoral branch model designed to perform the 'electoral function'. Poland has the only EMB in the Europe model that settles electoral disputes, providing insufficient variation to make any reliable assertions. The relationship regarding EMB responsibility for dispute settling powers is therefore unclear. As with many of the other variables, more detailed datasets across a wider selection of countries is required before it is possible to make any confident assertions. Second, making EMBs responsible for proposing electoral reforms is not significant in any regional model. The null results could arise because the power to propose electoral reforms can be performed by multiple actors in most countries. This usually includes the legislature or a legislative committee, but it often also includes other actors that the theory does not mention. Moreover, the variable measures who can

propose electoral reforms, but not who can actually enact electoral legislation. EMBs have competence for this task in some countries, but the cross-national data needed to analyse its relationship with perceived electoral fairness is missing. The relatively weak power of proposing reforms is unlikely to have much effect if the legislature routinely ignores the suggested changes. This 'power' is therefore not very powerful and can often be ignored without consequence. The powers variables present mixed and insignificant relationships with perceived electoral fairness.

Table 7.2: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Powers Tasks

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Electoral Reforms	0.023 (0.201)	0.031 (0.100)	0.059 (0.190)	0.027 (0.115)
Electoral Disputes	-0.075 (0.206)	0.098* (0.100)	-0.221* (0.202)	-0.029 (0.113)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.03)	0.025*** (0.012)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.019* (0.026)	-0.006 (0.018)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.128*** (0.032)
Electoral Participation	0.063*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.089*** (0.038)	0.064*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.129*** (0.041)	0.106*** (0.020)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	92506
N: Countries	20	21	19	69
Degrees of Freedom	8	8	8	8
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	141.340	198.676	307.224	388.620

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

While making EMBs responsible for electoral reforms or electoral disputes does not appear to be associated with improved perceptions of electoral fairness, combining these variables into a simple additive index produces a strongly positive and highly significant association in the Americas model. This result is presented in Table 7.4, together with other additive total indices for the other criteria. The coefficient for the powers index maintains its strength and high significance even when controlling for all

these other tasks, but only in the Americas. This is interesting because EMBs in the Americas are some of the most independent and powerful in the world. They more frequently have exclusive power to alter electoral legislation, separate from the legislature. However, this strong positive relationship only presents itself in the Americas model. It could be that the power to change legislation is more important than simply proposing those changes, but more data is needed to have any confidence in this conjecture.

7.1.4. Composition

Composition refers to how EMB members are selected, and the theory says independence and electoral integrity is enhanced when the task is performed by the legislature or judiciary rather than the executive. However, the only significant result is negative for the Americas model, as shown in Table 7.4. It is not very strong and only minimally significant. Other results for the composition criteria are insignificant, possibly because all other criteria are included in the model. Other variations of composition or member selection requirements may yield results that are more promising. For example, we could alter the variable conditions so that appointment procedures require at least two actors from different branches of government. The current requirement is an either/or condition, whereas perhaps a more stringent combined requirement would help eliminate appointments entailing conflicts of interest. Having only the legislature appoint EMB members gives rise to conflicts of interest because it places elected representatives in charge of appointing the people who will manage their election. This could be especially problematic where a single party dominates the legislature and there are no restrictions against having partisan EMB members. Under these conditions, there will be incentives to appoint EMB members sympathetic to the party controlling the legislature so that the favour can be returned during elections. For future research, it might be insightful to gather additional data regarding the roles of different actors involved in making EMB member appointments. There are at least three tasks associated with appointment: nominating, selecting, and approving member selections. Having one actor perform all three tasks provides that actor with considerable influence over the composition of

EMBs. An alternative method would be to have different actors perform the three tasks. For example, the EMB could nominate a list of candidates, the judiciary could select the most suitable candidate, and the legislature could approve that selection. Such a setup provides additional check and balances that help mitigate abuses of power. Unfortunately, current data does not code for the tasks performed by each actor involved in selecting EMB members.

7.1.5. Term of Office

The consistently negative relationships for fixed member terms suggest they may actually decrease perceived electoral fairness. The main issue of concern is that having security of tenure is important for electoral integrity because it helps protect EMB members from pressure from politicians who depended on elections to achieve or maintain power. Wall et al (2006: 9, 12) specifically mention fixed terms as one of the ways of ensuring security of tenure within the independent EMB model. The results of this current study suggest that fixed terms are not a good design feature for increasing perceptions of electoral fairness. An alternative possibility, one that current data does not adequately or clearly measure, is that life-long appointments may be superior at enhancing electoral fairness. This would be similar to judicial appointments that make someone a high court judge until retirement age. In addition to the other aspects of judicial independence, such as making the positions well paid and separating them from the more partisan branches of government, lifelong appointments help insulate judges from political pressure. The same style of appointment may work to isolate EMB members from partisan politics and concomitant pressures to corrupt elections.

7.1.6. Budget

Neither of the two budgetary variables obtains significance. The first was that having EMB budgets determined by the legislature or EMB would be associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness. The second was that having EMB expenditures controlled by the legislature or EMB would be positively related to electoral fairness. There are no significant coefficients in either model however, which provides no support for these assumptions. According to these results, perceived

electoral fairness is not related to the roles legislatures or EMBs play in determining budgets or controlling expenditures. As with other variables, alternative tests could be conducted, but further data would need to be gathered. For example, requiring that a combination of actors determine EMB budgets may have more positive effects than testing for one from a set of actors. The budget determination requirements were fulfilled if the EMB or legislature and not the executive performed this task. This followed from the prescribed theory, but perhaps a combination of both the legislature and an independent auditing agency is most associated with electoral fairness. The same could be true for controlling or auditing EMB expenditures. The original theory states that EMBs should have their own bank accounts separate from any other government department or ministry. This data also needs to be gathered before analysing whether it may have a positive effect on electoral integrity.

Table 7.3: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Budget Tasks

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Budget Determination	0.120	0.026	-0.005	0.017
	(0.228)	(0.096)	(0.147)	(0.088)
Expenditure Control	-0.097	-0.039	-0.060	-0.063
	(0.181)	(0.096)	(0.214)	(0.091)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041***	0.016	0.058***	0.037***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.004)
High Income	0.023***	0.029***	0.034*	0.023***
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030***	-0.001	0.019*	-0.009
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Supports Winner	0.143***	0.116***	0.090***	0.121***
	(0.073)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.029)
Electoral Participation	0.063***	0.042***	0.089***	0.066***
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.015)
Present Economy Good	0.075***	0.103***	0.128***	0.106***
	(0.024)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.019)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	94866
N: Countries	20	21	19	72
Degrees of Freedom	8	8	8	8
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	219.868	163.392	180.667	380.837

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The conventional independent model results presented thus far have included dichotomous national level variables that analyse separate criteria and their constituent tasks. The tables presented alongside the following paragraphs contain additive indices that measure different ways of combining the tasks and criteria. The models in Table 7.4 include aggregated totals for the three criteria composed of multiple tasks: implementation, powers, and budget. Dichotomous variables are included to control for the other three criteria: accountability, composition, and term of office. The 'total' variables have values that increase as more of their respective tasks are performed by the national EMB. This follows from the assumption that having more task requirements fulfilled should increase perceptions of electoral fairness. The coefficients for these totals variables indicate that only implementation and powers criteria are significant, while the budget criterion has no significant coefficients. The implementation criterion is negative and significant for the Americas

model, but the relationship is relatively weak, and negative but insignificant in the other models. This unexpected result means that assigning more implementation tasks to an EMB appears to have a mild negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness. The total powers criterion is strongly positive and highly significant in the Americas model, which suggests that making EMBs responsible for proposing electoral reforms and/or settling electoral disputes is positively associated with perceived electoral fairness. This accords with the original prediction, but the relationship is only significant in the Americas. For the budget totals variable, the lack of significant coefficients is not surprising given the similar lack of significance for its separate tasks. The logical conclusion is that having finances determined and controlled by the legislature or EMB has no significant relationship with perceived electoral fairness.

The other three criteria based on single tasks also provide no support for their respective assumptions. Their relationships with perceived electoral fairness are usually similar to earlier regressions, despite controlling for other conventional independent model criteria. The accountability variable is negative and significant in the Africa and Global models, with a stronger relationship in the former. This suggests that having EMBs report to the legislature or judiciary, and not the executive, is negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness. The terms of office variable presents the strongest evidence against its original assumption, with significant negative coefficients in the Africa, Europe and Global models. The consistency of the relationships indicates that fixed member terms probably have a negative association with perceived electoral fairness. Overall, the results in Table 7.4 provide more evidence against than in favour of the conventional independent model. Assigning more implementation tasks to an EMB, making it accountable to the legislature or judiciary, having members appointed by the legislature or judiciary, and having fixed term tenures for EMB members are all negatively associated with electoral fairness in at least one regional model. The only significant positive finding is for assigning electoral reform and/or dispute settling powers to EMBs in AmericasBarometer countries.

Table 7.4: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Total Criteria Variables

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Implementation (Total)	-0.129 (0.957)	-0.065* (0.184)	-0.088 (0.243)	-0.016 (0.116)
Accountability	-0.191* (0.184)	-0.009 (0.072)	-0.091 (0.25)	-0.096* (0.092)
Powers (Total)	-0.022 (0.216)	0.211*** (0.118)	-0.071 (0.211)	0.012 (0.111)
Composition	0.099 (0.217)	-0.116* (0.111)	0.124 (0.272)	0.067 (0.097)
Term of Office	-0.123** (0.167)	-0.014 (0.151)	-0.202* (0.174)	-0.096* (0.091)
Budget (Total)	0.012 (0.244)	-0.017 (0.13)	-0.083 (0.312)	-0.045 (0.13)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.059*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.03)	0.027*** (0.012)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.020* (0.026)	-0.003 (0.018)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.122*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.062*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.089*** (0.038)	0.067*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.104*** (0.02)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	88974
N: Countries	20	21	19	66
Degrees of Freedom	12	12	12	12
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	199.501	457.621	164.759	397.059

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 7.5 includes fulfilled rather than totalled variables. These are all dichotomous rather than ordinal variables, representing whether all task requirements are met rather than how many task requirements are met. Overall, the results are very similar, but there are a few minor differences. The implementation criterion is still negative in only one model, but this has changed from the Americas to the Africa model and the coefficient is now larger. This means having EMBs perform *all* implementation tasks is negatively associated with electoral fairness in the Africa model, whereas having EMBs perform *more* of the tasks has a negative relationship in the Americas model. Either

way, both relationships are negative and provide no support for the implementation assumption.

Table 7.5: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Fulfilled Criteria Variables

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Implementation	-0.237* (0.216)	-0.052 (0.086)	0.145 (0.283)	0.011 (0.096)
Accountability	-0.219* (0.195)	0.003 (0.082)	-0.237 (0.303)	-0.088* (0.092)
Powers	0.030 (0.153)	0.132** (0.099)	-0.086* (0.131)	0.026 (0.097)
Composition	0.079 (0.201)	-0.047 (0.092)	0.108 (0.244)	0.060 (0.093)
Terms of Office	-0.133** (0.168)	0.020 (0.125)	-0.176 (0.212)	-0.099* (0.091)
Budget	0.042 (0.178)	0.018 (0.124)	-0.096 (0.178)	-0.048 (0.100)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.023*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.033* (0.03)	0.027*** (0.012)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.020* (0.026)	-0.003 (0.018)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.122*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.062*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.089*** (0.038)	0.067*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.104*** (0.020)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	88974
N: Countries	20	21	19	66
Degrees of Freedom	12	12	12	12
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	215.285	395.243	341.661	378.739

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Delegating more core tasks to EMBs therefore does not appear to increase perceptions of electoral fairness. Formal accountability remains unchanged with significant negative coefficients in the Africa and Global models again. The powers criterion is still positive in the Americas model, but showing a weaker relationship and now a weak negative coefficient in the Europe model. This negative finding undermines support for the assumption that making EMBs responsible for reform proposals and dispute

resolution has a positive relationship with electoral fairness. A positive relationship does however appear consistently for the Americas model. The composition results have changed and no longer show any significant coefficients, providing no support for any positive effects associated with having the legislature or judiciary select EMB members. Term of office remains negative in the Africa and Global models, but is no longer significant in the Europe model. This provides consistent evidence against having fixed EMB member terms. The budget criterion remains unchanged with no significant coefficients. Once again, there is little evidence to support most of the assumptions derived from the conventional independent EMB model.

It should come as no surprise that the conventional independent model appears negatively associated with public perceptions of electoral fairness. All criteria and their tasks were combined to create the aggregated EMB independence index found in Table 7.6. This index has higher values the more tasks and criteria requirements are fulfilled. However, the only significant coefficient in Table 7.6 is for the Europe model and it is negative. This implies that perceptions of electoral fairness decrease as more of the conventional independent EMB variable conditions are met. This counterintuitive finding suggests that the conventional independent model may not be the best way to design electoral institutions.

Table 7.6: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Conventional Independence

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
EMB Independence	-0.127 (0.169)	0.059 (0.050)	-0.243* (0.110)	-0.065 (0.052)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.008)	0.059*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.004)
High Income	0.024*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.029)	0.027*** (0.012)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.019* (0.026)	-0.003 (0.018)
Supports Winner	0.143*** (0.073)	0.116*** (0.046)	0.090*** (0.043)	0.122*** (0.031)
Electoral Participation	0.062*** (0.026)	0.042*** (0.023)	0.089*** (0.038)	0.067*** (0.016)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.128*** (0.041)	0.104*** (0.020)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24020	32337	23136	88974
N: Countries	20	21	19	66
Degrees of Freedom	7	7	7	7
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	140.284	143.698	98.659	346.342

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

7.2. Categoricalised Autonomy Model

Like the conventional independent model, the categorised autonomy model advocates separation from the executive. However, it is constructed around four categories of autonomy rather than seven criteria of independence. Although both models use similar variables, measurement and testing methodologies differ. For example, a major dissimilarity is that a minimal threshold of combined institutional, personnel and financial autonomy is required for fulfilling the functional autonomy variable conditions. This arises from the assumption that the performance of electoral governance functions will increase perceptions of fairness if EMBs are separate from executive control (2009). Despite this more stringent autonomy requirement, most assumptions for the categorised autonomy model receive little empirical support. Findings frequently show negative associations with perceived electoral fairness, but many simply fail to achieve significance. The most likely reason for the negative results

is again the inclusion of many hybrid regimes with formally independent electoral management bodies that may be subject to informal manipulation.

A preview of findings indicates the extent to which results do not achieve their expected positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness. This brief introduction to the findings is presented in the same order as subsequent sections, starting with institutional autonomy. Formal accountability to the legislature, and not to the executive, shows no significant results. Having electoral law be part of the constitution produces one negative and an otherwise insignificant association with perceived electoral fairness. One of the few positive results is that longer lasting EMBs are significantly associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness. None of the personnel autonomy or financial autonomy variables achieves significance in any regional models or the Global model. The remainder of the findings refer to tasks in the functional autonomy category. Most significant boundary demarcation and approval coefficients are negative, although there is one positive result in the Americas model for autonomous EMBs being responsible for boundary demarcation. There may be a positive effect on electoral fairness when autonomous EMBs receive political party and candidate financial reports. However, delegating most other functions to autonomous EMBs either has a negatively significant association with electoral fairness or shows no clear trend because the results are only significant in one region. Overall, the categorised autonomy model does not appear to have many positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness. The following four main sections outline and discuss the results for the four categories of autonomy in more detail.

7.2.1. Institutional Autonomy

Institutional variables test EMB accountability, the constitutional status of electoral law, and EMB longevity for their association with electoral fairness. EMBs that have existed for longer do seem to have a positive association with perceived electoral fairness. Table 7.7 presents these results, which shows the EMB longevity variable is positively significant in the Europe model and Global model, which provides some support for the prediction that perceptions of elections would improve the longer an EMB has existed. Other findings do not provide much support for the argument that

institutional separation from the executive government increases electoral fairness (van Aaken, 2009: 306). Accountability does not achieve significance in any of the regional models, providing no support for the assumption that formally reporting to the legislature and not to the executive increases perceptions of electoral fairness. Constitutional status is negative in the Africa model at a minimal level of significance, but is not significant in any other model, suggesting a very weak or coincidental relationship. The negative finding runs counter to the expected positive relationship however, which does not support the idea that having electoral law established in the constitution increases perceived electoral fairness. Overall, the assumptions regarding formal accountability to the legislature and constitutional status of electoral law find no support, but longer durations of EMB existence are positively associated with perceived electoral fairness.

Table 7.7: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Institutional Autonomy

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Formal Accountability	-0.145 (0.195)	0.006 (0.100)	-0.102 (0.159)	-0.058 (0.087)
Constitutional Status	-0.134* (0.171)	0.033 (0.092)	-0.027 (0.177)	-0.037 (0.080)
EMB Longevity	-0.075 (1.586)	0.059 (0.266)	0.158* (0.168)	0.093** (0.137)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.024* (0.008)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.004)
High Income	0.022** (0.017)	0.030*** (0.022)	0.036** (0.028)	0.027*** (0.012)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.036)	0.003 (0.031)	0.025* (0.029)	0.000 (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.150*** (0.074)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.102*** (0.044)	0.129*** (0.031)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.104*** (0.046)	0.133*** (0.046)	0.105*** (0.021)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	90103
N: Countries	20	21	19	67
Degrees of Freedom	8	8	8	8
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	170.961	139.177	340.133	298.128

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The formal accountability variable did not obtain significance despite being constructed very similarly to the formal accountability criteria of the conventional independence model, which was negative and significant. The most reasonable explanation is that the other variables included in the model have more explanatory power. It is possible that accountability to the legislature is not a good way of ensuring electoral integrity. Elected officials populate legislatures, so there are potential conflicts of interest when they oversee their own election. A legislature dominated by one political party may use this position to manipulate the EMB configurations or activities to ensure electoral advantages for themselves. An alternative accountability model might include a requirement for reporting to multiple actors, at least one of which is hopefully not subject to similar conflicts of interest.

Although the constitutional status of electoral law only produced a single negative result, it was a proxy variable for the constitutional status of EMBs themselves. The original expectations were that establishing EMBs as separate institutions within the constitution, and granting them a legal personality, would increase electoral fairness. These conditions would make EMBs harder to modify by partisan actors within the legislature, executive, or elsewhere. Data was not available to test either the constitutional status of EMBs or whether they have their own legal personalities. Due to data limitations, the current study could only analyse whether electoral legislation within the constitution was associated with electoral fairness. This factor is important because it also hinders the ability of partisan interests to change the constitutionally established electoral legislation. However, this variable could be improved by indicating the amount of electoral law contained within the constitution. This could be measured by word count or number of constitutional articles and could be represented as a percentage of the total amount of electoral law. The expectation is that having a higher proportion of electoral legislation in the constitution would be associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness.

The positive results for the longevity variable suggest that experience may be an important factor for enhancing electoral integrity. This variable was a proxy for permanent EMBs, which are supposed to be superior to temporary EMBs because they facilitate ongoing training, career advancement and separate institutional cultures.

Nevertheless, the fact that longer lasting EMBs are associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness provides support for related findings using democratic experience. As Farrell and McAllister (2006) have pointed out, democratic satisfaction increases with accumulated democratic experience. The finding in this study suggests that perceived electoral fairness increases with EMB experience.

7.2.2. Financial Autonomy

Financial autonomy variables do not achieve significance in any of the regional models. The expectation was that perceived electoral fairness would improve if the legislature or EMB, without executive involvement, determined EMB budgets or audited EMB expenditures. However, the results in Table 7.8 provide no support for the expected relationships. The lack of results for expenditure control suggests that having the EMB or legislature audit EMB expenses or spending does not correlate positively or negatively with perceived electoral fairness, but other untested features of financial autonomy may still be important.

Table 7.8: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Financial Autonomy

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Budget	0.103 (0.238)	0.030 (0.096)	0.015 (0.127)	0.024 (0.086)
Expenditures	-0.094 (0.185)	-0.043 (0.096)	-0.020 (0.185)	-0.055 (0.087)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.024* (0.008)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.004)
High Income	0.022** (0.017)	0.030*** (0.022)	0.036** (0.028)	0.024*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.036)	0.003 (0.031)	0.025* (0.029)	-0.006 (0.020)
Supports Winner	0.150*** (0.074)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.102*** (0.045)	0.128*** (0.029)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.108*** (0.020)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	95711
N: Countries	20	21	19	72
Degrees of Freedom	7	7	7	7
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	198.838	163.589	136.136	323.164

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Van Aaken (2009: 308) specified that electoral fairness would be enhanced if EMBs had their own bank accounts and could manage their daily expenses free from executive government control. This could be important for ensuring electoral integrity, since it restricts executive control over EMB operations, but no data is available to test the assumption. Yet even if EMBs have their own bank accounts, the possibility of corruption and reduced electoral integrity remains. With access to and control over their own finances, EMB members could fraudulently divert funds into their own pockets without adequate oversight. Clearly, some form of financial oversight is needed. It was not mentioned by Wall (2006) or Van Aaken (2009), but it is possible that delegating responsibility for expenditure control to an independent auditing agency might be the best option. Such agencies are more likely to have specialized technical expertise in forensic accounting and financial investigation, which are helpful when auditing to counter financial fraud and corruption. In addition, audits performed by a professional and independent agency are less likely to serve executive or partisan interests.

7.2.3. Personnel Autonomy

No models achieve significance for any of the personnel autonomy variables in Table 7.9. The membership criteria assumption was that perceptions of elections would improve if EMB members were selected based on expertise in established democracies, or a combination of expertise and partisanship in transitional democracies. The member appointment assumption was that perceived electoral fairness would increase if either the judiciary or legislature appointed EMB members. The unspecified membership tenure assumption was that elections would tend to be fairer if EMB member tenures were for an unspecified period. The other expectation regarding membership tenure was that fixed terms of longer than six years would improve perceptions of electoral fairness. However, the results indicated that none of these personnel autonomy conditions has any positive or negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness.

Table 7.9: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Personnel Autonomy

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Membership Criteria	0.031	0.018	-0.034	0.027
	(0.202)	(0.092)	(0.181)	(0.083)
Legislature or Judiciary	0.012	0.037	0.026	0.039
	(0.237)	(0.101)	(0.178)	(0.085)
Unspecified Tenure	0.012	-0.018	0.096	0.039
	(0.229)	(0.154)	(0.197)	(0.105)
6+ Year Tenure	-0.087	0.007	-0.095	-0.063
	(0.203)	(0.096)	(0.349)	(0.096)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057***	0.025*	0.068***	0.049**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)
High Income	0.022**	0.030***	0.036**	0.022**
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030***	0.003	0.025*	-0.007
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.020)
Supports Winner	0.150***	0.121***	0.102***	0.135**
	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.031)
Present Economy Good	0.075***	0.104***	0.134***	0.109**
	(0.024)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.019)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	98125
N: Countries	20	21	19	74
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	9	9
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	132.687	141.456	124.309	340.576

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Although personnel autonomy is undoubtedly important, the variables analysed in this study provided no evidence of significant relationships with perceived electoral fairness. This is unexpected considering the theoretical argument in favour of personnel autonomy and prior research indicating positive relationships for similar variables (Bland et al., 2012; Hartlyn et al., 2008; Rosas, 2010; van Aaken, 2009). It could be that the membership criteria, appointment procedures, and tenure types for EMB members are too far removed from public knowledge to affect perceptions of electoral fairness. There may also be very weak relationships that do not manifest in the presented models, or perhaps the variables are inadequate for measuring the intended design factors. Future research using different variables may yet uncover useful results. For example, one of the exploratory models not shown in this study revealed a positive effect with perceived electoral fairness if both the legislature and

judiciary appointed EMB members. This small difference from legislature *or* judiciary made a large difference, and these kinds of details need investigating. However, the theoretical models analysed in this research project do not drive these exploratory relationships.

7.2.4. Functional Autonomy

Functional autonomy variables differ from previous categories because they include the autonomy threshold requirement based on the combined scores of institutional, financial and personnel autonomy. This autonomy threshold is included within every functional variable and means that the analysis only measures whether an autonomous EMB performs each task or function. Rather than refer to this requirement for every functional assumption or variable, the term ‘autonomous EMB’ indicates an EMB that has achieved this threshold. Most functional autonomy variables also include the requirement that executive government actors not be involved in performing each task. These include presidents, prime ministers, cabinets and government ministries or departments. Overall, the results provide very little support for the included aspects of Van Aaken’s (2009) framework.

There are too many functional variables to include within one model, so testing them all requires four separate sets of regressions. The first set, shown in Table 7.10, covers boundary demarcation and approval as well as proposing electoral reforms. The strong and highly significant negative results for boundary demarcation are most evident in the Africa and Europe models, while weaker but still negative in the Global model. The positive finding in the Americas model could also be due to the very strong autonomous EMBs in Latin America, which are often established as fourth branches of government. However, the predominantly negative results globally provide little generalized support for the assumption that making autonomous EMBs responsible for drawing electoral district boundaries is associated with fairer elections. The similar assumption regarding boundary approval has strong and highly significant negative coefficients in the Africa and Europe models, but fails to achieve significance in the Americas and Global models. These findings provide no support for the predicted positive relationship with perceived electoral fairness for boundary approval by

autonomous EMBs. Finally, the variable for proposing electoral reforms is strongly positive and highly significant in the Africa model. All other coefficients are positive, but do not obtain conventional levels of significance. The Africa model provides some support for a positive relationship between autonomous EMBs proposing electoral reforms and increased perceptions of electoral fairness. However, the results may indicate a regional rather than global trend, since this variable does not achieve significance in the other models. The Europe model is missing a coefficient because none of the included European EMBs meets the variable requirements. Many European EMBs still follow a governmental model of electoral management.

Table 7.10: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Autonomy, Set 1

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Boundary Demarcation	-0.249*** (0.084)	0.108* (0.143)	-0.053* (0.078)	-0.083* (0.115)
Boundary Approval	-0.143*** (0.084)	-0.107 (0.22)	-0.247*** (0.015)	-0.096 (0.168)
Electoral Reforms	0.225*** (0.149)	0.099 (0.203)	.	0.077 (0.183)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.024* (0.008)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.004)
High Income	0.022** (0.017)	0.030*** (0.022)	0.036** (0.027)	0.026*** (0.012)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.036)	0.003 (0.031)	0.025* (0.029)	-0.002 (0.019)
Supports Winner	0.151*** (0.074)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.102*** (0.045)	0.137*** (0.033)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.107*** (0.021)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	92190
N: Countries	20	21	19	68
Degrees of Freedom	8	8	7	8
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	410.072	179.325	8782.573	320.483

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Delegating the responsibilities of boundary demarcation or the final approval of boundary changes to autonomous EMBs does not have the anticipated positive relationship with electoral fairness. The negative relationships maintain under differing conditions of economic development and democratic experience, since the

included African countries are developing or underdeveloped transitional democracies, while most of the included European countries are developed liberal democracies. Although gerrymandering remains a problem and boundary demarcation and approval needs to be impartial (Carson & Crespin, 2004; Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004), the evidence suggests that assigning this task to autonomous EMBs may not be the best approach.

When partisan interests control electoral redistricting they consistently create maps that favour their interests (Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004). Divided state governments and bipartisan commissions produce more equitable electoral maps (McDonald, 2004: 388-390). Since legislatures are often dominated by a single political party, a logical policy recommendation is to take redistricting away from these potentially self-interested actors and delegate this function to impartial commissions or courts (Carson & Crespin, 2004). An alternative possibility is that electoral fairness would be increased if specialized non-partisan boundary commissions were responsible for electoral demarcation. The non-partisan requirement prevents incumbents and political parties from using the redistricting process to maintain power, while the specialization requirement helps reduce administrative or technical errors by putting knowledgeable professionals in charge of the process. Many of the same concerns regarding the structural arrangements of EMBs also apply to boundary commissions, such as how budgets are determined and how members are appointed. As with autonomous EMBs, the objective of an autonomous boundary commission is to reduce conflicts of interest in electoral district demarcation by insulating commissioners from the self-interests of executive and legislative actors.

The IDEA and ACE datasets already include some additional boundary demarcation variables such as redraw triggers and criteria used to redraw boundaries. Other variables, such as which actors appoint commission members the criteria for their appointment, are not available and are likely to be important. Alternatively, not regularly redrawing electoral districts could also have a positive effect on electoral integrity, since it would remove opportunities for gerrymandering. Defining electoral boundaries within constitutions or aligning them with administrative districts reduces the likelihood that electoral constituencies are created to create safe seats for a

particular political party or candidate. Since population demographics change, occasional redistricting will probably be necessary periodically, but we currently have little empirical evidence suggesting the optimal design features of boundary commissions.

Another area that requires additional data for comparative investigation is the area electoral legislation reform. Given the effect and scope of electoral legislation, this is perhaps one of the most important areas to investigate. At present, there is only one variable in the ACE and IDEA data to indicate which body can propose changes to the regulatory framework. Electoral reform differs between countries and often involves multiple actors, but there are no variables to indicate the roles of these different actors. Most importantly, it would be helpful to know which actor has the final say on turning proposals into legislation. The actor responsible for final approval has a great deal more power than any actor that only has powers of proposal. We could assume that it would usually be the legislature, but some EMBs are established as fourth branches of government and have complete jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to elections, including electoral legislation. Without a variable that specifically identifies the actor responsible for final approval, this design factor is difficult to analyse.

Results for the second set of functional variables are displayed in Table 7.11. Variables cover autonomous EMB oversight of political party and candidate finances, as well as responsibility for voter registration. The financial oversight assumption was that electoral fairness would tend to increase if autonomous EMBs were responsible for receiving financial reports from political parties and candidates. This has highly significant and strong positive coefficients in the Africa and Americas models, but a strong and significant negative relationship in the Europe model. The two positive results provide support for the assumption, but the strong negative result in the Europe model undermines this finding. The most likely reason for a negative coefficient in the Europe model is that many of the established liberal democracies in this region follow the governmental model of electoral management. These democracies usually hold free and fair elections, whereas many of the newer transitional democracies in the Europe model are transitional democracies with less electoral integrity. The financial control variable is similar, but measures the effects

for having autonomous EMBs audit the submitted financial reports of parties and candidates. The significant but weak negative coefficient in the Americas model and lack of significant coefficients in the other models do not provide any support for the expected positive relationship.

Table 7.11: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Autonomy, Set 2

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Financial Oversight	0.291*** (0.191)	0.162*** (0.035)	-0.323*** (0.085)	-0.011 (0.239)
Financial Control	-0.093* (0.196)	-0.044 (0.121)	0.136 (0.348)	-0.007 (0.212)
Voter Registration	-0.284*** (0.140)	-0.037 (0.057)	0.061 (0.123)	0.021 (0.158)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.025* (0.008)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.004)
High Income	0.022** (0.017)	0.030*** (0.022)	0.036** (0.028)	0.023*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.036)	0.003 (0.031)	0.025* (0.029)	-0.007 (0.020)
Supports Winner	0.150*** (0.074)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.102*** (0.045)	0.133*** (0.031)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.104*** (0.046)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.108*** (0.020)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	96762
N: Countries	20	21	19	72
Degrees of Freedom	8	8	8	8
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	334.932	339.118	1429.117	422.771

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Overall, there is some evidence for a positive relationship between electoral fairness and making autonomous EMBs responsible for receiving political party and candidate financial reports. However, making autonomous EMBs responsible for examining those reports and for maintaining the voter registry do not appear to increase perceived electoral fairness. The negative result for financial control in the Africa model does not tell us much, because only autonomous EMBs in Cape Verde and Liberia examine financial reports. This provides insufficient variation to make any conclusive statements regarding the effect of examining financial reports. Finally, the voter registration variable has a strong and highly significant negative coefficient in the

Africa model, but fails to achieve significance in any other models. This provides limited evidence against the expectation that making an autonomous EMB responsible for voter registration would be positively associated with perceived electoral fairness.

While the Africa and Americas models show strong and highly significant positive coefficients for having autonomous EMBs receive financial reports, both regions showed negative significant coefficients before applying the autonomy threshold. This provides support for the idea that autonomy matters when EMBs are responsible for financial oversight. EMBs controlled by the incumbent government are unlikely to be as impartial when scrutinizing political finances. For example, government controlled EMBs are more likely to scrutinize the finances of opposition parties and candidates for errors, while any problems with the reports of candidates or parties aligned with the incumbent government are less likely to be investigated. The Europe model conversely has a strong and highly significant negative coefficient for reporting political finances to an autonomous EMB. This result likely arises because most established European democracies follow a governmental model of electoral management, while newer democracies such as Belarus and Ukraine have autonomous EMBs. The strong negative results probably reflect the fact that older democracies in Europe generally run fairer elections, despite being less likely to have autonomous EMBs.

The ability to analyse the effects of different political finance regulations has been facilitated by increasing amount of data on the subject (Sorrow, 2007b), but the institutional contexts remain relatively unexplored. It is likely that there are interaction effects between political finance laws and the autonomy of institutions tasked with enforcing those laws. For example, disclosure of political finances and limits on some types of donations have positive effects on perceptions of efficacy and the emergence of electoral challengers (Hamm & Hogan, 2008; Primo & Milyo, 2006: 33-35), but the nature of the body overseeing disclosures and enforcing contribution limits is also important. A body controlled by partisan actors is unlikely to perform these functions as impartially as a bipartisan or autonomous institution. Additionally, a weak impartial institution that only receives financial reports is unlikely to be as effective at ensuring fair political finances as actors with the power to sanction infringements.

Table 7.12: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Autonomy, Set 3

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Local Elections	0.211*** (0.125)	0.037 (0.090)	-0.052 (0.175)	-0.037 (0.278)
Sort and Count Votes	-0.349*** (0.134)	.	.	-0.045 (0.293)
Consolidate Results	.	0.042 (0.057)	-0.035 (0.107)	0.055* (0.060)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.025* (0.008)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.004)
High Income	0.022** (0.017)	0.030*** (0.022)	0.036** (0.028)	0.025*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.036)	0.003 (0.031)	0.025* (0.029)	-0.004 (0.020)
Supports Winner	0.150*** (0.074)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.102*** (0.045)	0.136*** (0.032)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.104*** (0.046)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.108*** (0.021)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	93335
N: Countries	20	21	19	69
Degrees of Freedom	7	7	7	8
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	190.77	206.6	335.808	346.616

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The third set of functional autonomy results are displayed in Table 7.12. These cover autonomous EMB responsibility for local level elections, sorting and counting votes, and consolidating the results. Missing coefficients are omitted due to perfect multicollinearity between variables in some regional models. Responsibility for local elections has a positive coefficient in the Africa model, but is insignificant in all other models. However, the strong and highly significant Africa result provides some evidence of a positive association between electoral fairness and making autonomous EMBs responsible for the local level of elections. The variable for sorting and counting votes is strongly negative and highly significant in the Africa model, but omitted in the other regions and insignificant in the Global model. The result however suggests that making autonomous EMBs responsible for sorting and counting votes does not increase electoral fairness, at least across the included African countries. The variable for consolidating election results is significant and positive in the Global model, but it is

small and minimally significant. The finding may have occurred by chance or may indicate limited support for making autonomous EMBs responsible for consolidating election results.

While the current study looked whether EMBs were responsible for voter registration, many additional related factors are important. Voting restrictions, registration requirements and enrolment practices can be abused to influence election results. Albaugh (2011: 399-402) for example points out that restricting voter registration to citizens likely to vote for the opposition have been commonplace in Cameroon. Another core task related to voter registration is voter identification. Poorly defined voter identification laws in the United States have resulted in racial profiling and discriminatory practices that could affect election results and reduce public trust in electoral administration (Atkeson, Bryant, Hall, Saunders, & Alvarez, 2010: 70-72). Universally applying clear and specific voter enrolment and identification rules would reduce perceptions of bias and increase perceptions of electoral fairness. The data to test this assumption either has many missing variables or is not readily available for large cross-national comparisons, but would be valuable for future research.

Due to a lack of cross-national data, the current research did not account for other electoral conditions such as requirements regarding party and candidate registration or disqualification. Prior research suggests that more permissive ballot access requirements raise the number of independent and smaller party candidates, thereby increasing electoral competitiveness (Drometer & Rincke, 2009). When electoral laws restrict entry through more stringent petition or nomination requirements, the inevitable result is fewer candidates. Incumbent governments may use legislation to ban, disqualify or otherwise exclude opposition parties and candidates based on nationality, ethnicity, religious or other requirements (Bogaards, Basedau, & Hartmann, 2010; Schedler, 2002a: 42-43). Granting incumbent governments control over candidate or party registration produces conflicts of interest, since there will be an incentive to use the process to exclude electoral competitors. This is a particularly insidious tactic because it hides behind a guise of legality. An assumption that deserves testing is that delegating the function of party and candidate registration to an autonomous EMB increases electoral integrity.

Table 7.13: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Autonomy, Set 4

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Voter Information	-0.088 (0.271)	0.042 (0.115)	-0.005 (0.195)	-0.016 (0.135)
Media Regulation	-0.162* (0.207)	0.000 (0.118)	-0.096 (0.216)	-0.076* (0.113)
Dispute Resolution	0.091 (0.171)	0.037 (0.113)	-0.116 (0.222)	0.020 (0.136)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.025* (0.008)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.004)
High Income	0.022** (0.017)	0.030*** (0.022)	0.036** (0.028)	0.025*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.036)	0.003 (0.031)	0.025* (0.029)	-0.005 (0.020)
Supports Winner	0.151*** (0.074)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.102*** (0.045)	0.141*** (0.033)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.104*** (0.046)	0.134*** (0.047)	0.108*** (0.021)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	91403
N: Countries	20	21	19	67
Degrees of Freedom	8	8	8	8
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	273.663	220.458	112.431	401.455

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Results for the fourth set of functional variables are provided in Table 7.13. The variables for conducting voter information campaigns and settling the first level of electoral disputes do not obtain significance in any of the models, indicating that delegating these functions to autonomous EMBs does not increase perceptions of electoral fairness. The variable for media regulation is negatively significant in the Africa and Global models, but not significant in the Americas and Europe models. These findings fail to support the assumption that making autonomous EMBs responsible for regulating mass media coverage of elections has a positive association with perceived electoral fairness. Overall, the results suggest that making autonomous EMBs responsible for conducting voter information campaigns and settling electoral disputes are not related to perceived electoral fairness, while making them responsible for media regulation might be associated with decreased perceptions of electoral fairness.

Political parties and candidates can engage in disinformation campaigns, but there is no evidence of a systematic relationship when autonomous EMBs perform this function. However, the variable only analysed whether autonomous EMBs conducted voter information campaigns without government actors performing the same function. Most countries allow multiple actors to provide voter information, so who performs this function may be less important than the regulations regarding the provision of voter information. For example, restrictions against providing false and misleading information or punishments for violating voter education regulations, if enforced impartially, are likely to be more important than regulating which actors can provide voter information. It is similarly important to understand where actors engaged in public information campaigns get their funding and whether they have ideological or partisan affiliations. However, the current research project is focused on electoral management rather than primarily on political finance.

Closely connected to providing voter information is the function of monitoring and regulating political news coverage. Most people learn a great deal about candidates and political parties from the mass media, whether that is television, newspapers and magazines, radio or the internet. The current study only investigated the effects of having autonomous EMBs perform a media oversight role, and found a negative association with perceived electoral fairness in the Africa and Global models. As with boundary demarcation and financial auditing, specialized agencies may be the best actors for performing this function. In the case of media monitoring, the most appropriate actor is likely to be an independent statutory media regulation body. While EMBs specialize at running and managing elections, media regulatory bodies are specialists at overseeing and monitoring the media. Their job is to ensure media channels follow the laws regarding advertising and content requirements, which is not substantially different from ensuring media coverage of elections follows prescribed regulations and requirements. Media regulation agencies are also likely to be better equipped, in terms of access to technology and expertise, to undertake the complex tasks involved in monitoring and regulating multiple media channels. They may therefore be much more effective than EMBs at performing this function.

Making autonomous EMBs responsible for settling the first level of electoral disputes may not be the best approach. Given the nature of the task, courts or the judiciary may be better suited to perform this function. Independent judicial actors have the experience, knowledge, and resources to settle electoral disputes. Most electoral disputes are similar to other types of legal disputes because they usually involve one actor accusing another of breaking a law or violating a regulation pertaining to elections. Judicial actors are experienced with settling this form of dispute and have the specialized expertise necessary for performing adjudicative functions. National EMBs in Latin America are often tribunals that resemble judiciary bodies, which may help explain why there is a positive relationship for having them settle electoral disputes in the Americas model. The arrangement of EMBs as autonomous quasi-judiciary actors probably makes them more competent at impartially settling electoral disputes than EMBs in other parts of the world.

The following paragraphs analyse results for aggregated autonomy indices rather than separate variables. These indices are composed of the previously outlined variables. Table 7.14 provides the results for three indices created from functional variables, while Table 7.15 provides indices for the four autonomy categories.

Functional autonomy variables were combined into three thematic sub-indices for the election process, candidates and parties, and structures and governance. First, the election process sub-index aggregates variables for autonomous EMBs being responsible for voter registration, the local level of electoral governance, counting and sorting votes, and consolidating the results. It is strongly negative for the Africa model in Table 7.14, but moderately positive in the Europe model, while the other models are insignificant. These mixed results provide no consistent support for the proposition that delegating core election processes to autonomous EMBs is associated with increased electoral fairness. Second, the candidates and parties sub-index aggregates variables for receiving and examining political financial reports, conducting voter information campaigns and regulating media coverage of elections. Here the results are again mixed, with a significant positive coefficient for the Africa model, a significant negative coefficient for the Europe model and no significant results in the other models. Consequently, there is inadequate support for the idea that delegating

autonomous EMBs more functions related to political parties and candidates will increase perceptions of electoral fairness. Third, the sub-index for structures and governance aggregates variables pertaining to boundary demarcation and approval, electoral reform proposals, and electoral dispute resolution. The variable is strong and negatively significant in the Europe and Global models, but not significant in the other two models. This provides some evidence that assigning electoral governance and structure functions to autonomous EMBs may be associated with decreased perceptions of electoral fairness. Overall, the sub-indices indicate mostly negative or insignificant relationships, suggesting that assigning most functions to autonomous EMBs is either negatively associated with, or unrelated to, perceived electoral fairness.

Table 7.14: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Sub-Indices

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Election Process	-0.378* (0.426)	0.030 (0.209)	0.127* (0.152)	0.067 (0.138)
Candidates and Parties	0.325** (0.383)	0.040 (0.184)	-0.120* (0.167)	0.008 (0.186)
Structures and Governance	-0.077 (0.450)	0.012 (0.304)	-0.229** (0.318)	-0.133* (0.203)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.025* (0.008)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.004)
High Income	0.022** (0.017)	0.030*** (0.022)	0.036** (0.028)	0.027*** (0.013)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.036)	0.003 (0.031)	0.025* (0.029)	-0.002 (0.020)
Supports Winner	0.150*** (0.074)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.102*** (0.045)	0.135*** (0.034)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.104*** (0.046)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.107*** (0.022)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	89304
N: Countries	20	21	19	65
Degrees of Freedom	8	8	8	8
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	341.253	146.282	285.516	375.438

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Combining all the variables within each autonomy category produces an aggregated index for each of the institutional, financial, personnel and functional autonomy categories. The institutional index is negatively significant in the Africa model, but not

significant for any other model in Table 7.15. This does not support the expected positive relationship with electoral fairness.

Table 7.15: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Autonomy Indices

	Africa	Americas	Europe	Global
<i>National Level</i>				
Institutional Index	-0.206* (0.382)	-0.025 (0.252)	0.016 (0.356)	-0.031 (0.190)
Financial Index	0.227* (0.309)	-0.143* (0.151)	0.240** (0.247)	0.028 (0.160)
Personnel Index	0.176 (0.525)	-0.033 (0.137)	0.037 (0.561)	0.031 (0.215)
Functional Index	-0.251* (0.304)	0.192*** (0.143)	-0.303** (0.418)	-0.075 (0.207)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Age (Decades)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.024* (0.008)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.004)
High Income	0.022** (0.017)	0.030*** (0.022)	0.036** (0.028)	0.029*** (0.012)
Tertiary Education	-0.030*** (0.036)	0.003 (0.031)	0.025* (0.029)	0.000 (0.020)
Supports Winner	0.150*** (0.074)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.102*** (0.044)	0.130*** (0.032)
Present Economy Good	0.075*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.046)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.107*** (0.022)
<i>Model Parameters</i>				
N: Respondents	24142	32437	23669	87926
N: Countries	20	21	19	64
Degrees of Freedom	9	9	9	9
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects)	292.035	226.794	152.562	346.041

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The financial index has strong significant positive coefficients in the Africa and Europe models, which supports the expectation that financial autonomy is positively associated with electoral fairness. However, a weaker negative coefficient in the Americas model and the lack of a significant coefficient for the Global model somewhat undermines the strength of this relationship. There does however seem to be some regional support for the assumption that financial autonomy is positively associated with perceived electoral fairness. The personnel autonomy index is not significant in any regional model, suggesting that this category of autonomy is not associated with perceptions of electoral fairness. Finally, the functional autonomy

index is strongly and significantly negative in the Africa and Europe models. This counters the anticipated positive relationship and suggests that delegating more tasks and functions to autonomous EMBs reduces perceived electoral fairness. However, the functional index coefficient is positive in the Americas model, which provides regional support for the expected relationship. Nevertheless, with two negative, one positive, and one insignificant coefficient, the findings are more strongly against a generalized assumption of a positive relationship between functional autonomy and perceived electoral fairness. The overall results in Table 7.15 again suggest that autonomous EMBs may have a negative rather than positive association with perceived electoral fairness.

Chapter 8. Conclusion

The overarching research question of this thesis was to explain why perceptions of electoral fairness differ between individuals and countries. The approach analysed a wide selection of factors across a diverse selection of countries to uncover generalizable patterns and uncover regional differences. The structure of chapters and their sections followed a division between individual and national level variables on one hand, and electoral management body (EMB) design variables on the other. Chapters 2, 4, and 6 covered the literature, data, and results for the individual and national level variables, while chapters 3, 5, and 7 did the same for EMB design variables. The thematic groupings outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 were used throughout the thesis and formed the basis for constructing regression models. Most individual and national level variables produced the predicted relationships with perceived electoral fairness, but the two EMB models produced mostly insignificant or unexpectedly negative relationships. The following paragraphs briefly summarize the content of each main chapter before subsequent sections discuss key findings, acknowledge the limitations of this project, and outline future research opportunities.

Chapter 2 presented theoretical underpinning and previous findings regarding conventional explanations of perceived electoral fairness, additionally introducing new explanations from related areas of political support. Independent variables were included based on three broad justifications. Firstly, some had not been analysed for their effects on perceived electoral fairness, but findings from other areas of political support suggested that relationships were likely. Examples of these variables include crime victimization and cultural group memberships. Secondly, many variables were included in this research because they had only been analysed with electoral fairness across a limited set of countries or demonstrated mixed results. These variables were included because they showed promise, but previous results were not very robust. Thirdly, some variables were included to account for their strong and consistent associations with perceived electoral fairness. They were included as control variables because previous research has demonstrated their strong effects with electoral fairness.

Chapter 3 outlined two models of electoral management body (EMB) design and their component parts. First was the conventional independent model, which was disaggregated into six criteria with available data. These included the implementation of core electoral tasks, accountability to non-executive actors, powers to settle electoral disputes and propose electoral reforms, members selected by non-executive actors, fixed terms of office for members, and budgetary oversight by non-executive actors. Secondly was the categorized autonomy model, which separates EMB independence into four categories: institutional, financial, personnel, and functional autonomy. Each of these categories included multiple elements, some of which are similar to the conventional independent model. However, the categorized autonomy model included more aspects of electoral management and a different analytical approach. For example, achieving functional autonomy required meeting a minimal threshold, which was based on a combination of the other three autonomy categories.

Chapter 4 covered data and methods used throughout the thesis, but focused mostly on describing the common individual and national level variables. Included sections covered the dependent variable of perceived electoral fairness, data sources, country case selection, and data management procedures. The dependent variable used an ordered four-point scale with higher values representing greater perceived electoral fairness. This chapter clarified the difference between individual level variables, which come from cross-national public surveys, and national level variables, which come from institutional datasets applying to entire countries. The chapter explained how individual level variables would be analysed using order probit regression models, while national level variables would be analysed using multilevel mixed-effects regressions models. It also discussed how national level variables would be analysed using regional and global models, while individual level models would be additionally analysed using separate country models. This approach allowed for greater insight regarding national, regional, and global trends.

Chapter 5 also covered data and methods, but for the two electoral management models. It outlined the available data for measuring the component parts of these models and the proxy variables that could be used if data was missing. The chapter outlined the logic and requirements for creating new variables, which followed the

theoretical models as closely as possible. The chapter also described how the different independence and autonomy indices were created and measured. The chapter explained that multilevel mixed-effects models were appropriate because dependent EMB design variables were at the national level and the dependent perceived electoral fairness variable was at the individual level. All electoral management variables were analysed using the same set of robust individual level control variables.

Chapter 6 was the first of two results chapters, and included findings for all individual level variables and national level variables that did not measure electoral management design. In general, most individual level relationships were consistently in the expected directions, but many national level variables failed to achieve significance. Results are summarised here according to decreasing strength and robustness. The strongest individual level findings were that people who voted, supported election winners, believed the national economy was improving, perceived low levels of corruption, trusted others and institutions were more likely to perceive elections as fair. The strongest national level results indicated that civil liberties, women in parliament, freedom of the press and less religious fractionalization were positively associated with perceived electoral fairness. Moderately strong individual level findings suggest that older individuals, males, higher income individuals, and those who view their personal finances as improving tended to make positive assessments of perceived electoral fairness, while being or knowing victims of physical crime was associated with moderately strong negative assessments. Moderately strong and positive national level relationships were found for proportional representation, lower public sector corruption and less income inequality. Weak positive individual level correlations indicated that people interested in politics, with partisan affiliations, living in rural areas or identifying as conservative tended to view elections as fairer. Findings for tertiary education, political knowledge, and newspaper attention tended to produce positive relationships in liberal democracies and negative relationships in authoritarian democracies. These are interesting albeit unsurprising findings because they suggest that more educated, knowledgeable, and informed respondents tend to make accurate assessments of electoral fairness. The results for other individual level variables are mixed, inconclusive, or insignificant. For example, having paid

employment, radio attention, being in the religious or ethnic majority and being non-religious failed to attain consistent relationships. Many national level variables also failed to achieve significant or consistent relationships with perceived electoral fairness. For example, the variables for political rights, democratic experience, direct public funding of political parties, election victory margins, lower parliament size, population per MP, linguistic fractionalization and ethnic fractionalization did not reveal any trends. None of the national level economic performance variables achieved significance in any model, which included GNI per capita, GDP growth per capita, and the Human Development Index.

Chapter 7 presented results for the second main topic of this thesis, EMB design, which included analyses for the conventional independent model and the categorised autonomy model. The overall assumption of the conventional independent model was that separating electoral management from the executive would reduce chances for government interference and thereby enhance perceptions of electoral fairness. The categorised autonomy model was based on a similar assumption, but more explicitly specified that functional autonomy depended upon EMB institutional, personnel and financial autonomy. However, most findings for these two models either provided no support for their respective assumptions or produced mixed and inconclusive results. In other words, there is very little empirical evidence that independent EMBs are associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness. Results for the conventional independent model suggested that delegating election implementation tasks to EMBs had either negatively significant or insignificant relationships with perceived electoral fairness. Findings were similarly mixed or inconclusive regarding EMBs being responsible for settling electoral disputes and proposing electoral reforms. Variables for EMB budgetary independence did not obtain significance in any of the models. Fixed EMB member terms had strong negative correlations with perceived electoral fairness, while EMB member selection by the judiciary or legislature suggested a weak negative correlation. The additive conventional independence index was strongly negative in the Europe model, but insignificant in all other models. Taken together, these results generally fail to support the assumption that independent EMBs increase electoral fairness. Next, results for the categorised autonomy model

also produced mixed, insignificant, or negative relationships with perceived electoral fairness. EMB accountability to the legislature showed no significant results and none of the personnel or financial variables achieved significance in any model. The variable for making electoral law part of the constitution and most EMB boundary demarcation and boundary approval variables showed negatively significant relationships with perceived electoral fairness. The results were not consistent however, since there was a significant positive relationship for boundary demarcation in the Americas model. There was some evidence of a positive relationship between electoral fairness and autonomous EMBs receiving political party and candidate financial reports. However, this was undermined by a negative coefficient for the Europe model and a significantly negative coefficient for examining financial reports in the Africa model. Results for the additive autonomy category indices were also mixed. The institutional autonomy index was negative in the Africa model. The financial autonomy index was positive in the Africa and Europe models, but negative in the Americas. The functional autonomy index was negative in the Africa and Europe models, but positive in the Americas model. The personnel autonomy index did not obtain significance in any model and all other unmentioned models were insignificant. Overall, the categorised autonomy model produced a greater number of negative rather than positive relationships. However, there were some positive associations with perceived electoral fairness. EMBs that have existed for longer, have financial oversight of political parties or candidates, propose electoral reforms, and have financial autonomy from the executive all demonstrated significantly positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness.

Having briefly summarised each chapter, the next sections highlight some key findings. The first section emphasizes new findings for perceived electoral fairness, the second explains findings that have been strengthened by this research, the third indicates results that conflict with prior findings, while the fourth discusses possible reasons for some of the unexpected findings. The final sections then acknowledge several limitations of this study and possible future research directions.

8.1. New Findings for Electoral Fairness

The results of this project, combined with its broad scope, increase our understanding of perceived electoral fairness. Many of the findings are new for perceived electoral fairness and future research on this topic would benefit from considering them. Looking first at individual level variables, institutional trust had a globally positive association with perceived electoral fairness, although relationships with the legislature and executive are strongest. It is however likely that the causal direction of this relationship goes both ways, meaning that institutional trust and perceived electoral fairness are interrelated, as well as being highly correlated with other types of political support. Likewise, people who generally trust others tend to view elections as fairer, which is new a finding that parallels other areas of political support (Dowley & Silver, 2002; Kaase, 1999; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Zmerli & Newton, 2008). Correspondingly, having social trust broken due to physical crime victimization is associated with decreased perceptions of electoral fairness, which is also true for related kinds of political support (Ceobanu et al., 2011: 66-69; Pérez, 2003: 642-644). Another new finding with perceived electoral fairness is that subjective attitudes towards the national economy matter more than objective indicators of the national economy. This differs from findings for other areas of political support, which have consistently found strong relationships for national economic indicators (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Chang & Chu, 2006; Chappell, 1990; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Hibbs et al., 1982; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Moehler, 2009; Wong et al., 2011). Subjective attitudes regarding personal finances appear to matter more than objective economic indicators, which may parallel other areas of political support (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 75; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Lühiste, 2006: 487-488). Several national level variables also presented new findings with perceived electoral fairness. For example, having more women in parliament is associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness, coinciding with findings on related topics (Karp & Banducci, 2008: 112; Lawless, 2004). Greater media freedom is strongly correlated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness, which accords with most theories of democracy. Finally, there is a strong negative relationship between religious fractionalization and perceived electoral fairness, suggesting it is

more important than ethnic or linguistic fractionalization. The new individual and national level findings are unsurprising when considered together, although having the empirical support is valuable. People are more likely to view elections favourably if they trust government institutions and their fellow citizens, have not been the victim of physical crimes, and think the national economy is improving.

8.2. Strengthening Prior Findings

Some variables produced mixed results in previous studies or were analysed across a limited set of countries. The scope of this current research project enabled variables to be analysed across five datasets and up to eighty countries. This means we can be more confident about many previously uncertain findings. For example, previous studies have produced mixed results for age with electoral fairness and other types of political support (Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Kotzian, 2011: 34; Moehler, 2009: 362; Rosas, 2010: 85), but the current research revealed it was one of the strongest and most robust predictors of perceived electoral fairness. Likewise, people who think government corruption is high are globally less likely to perceive elections as fair, which strengthens the relationship found by a more limited electoral fairness study (McAllister & White, 2011: 676). Another example is having no political affiliation or being non-partisan, which has a significant negative association with perceived electoral fairness, expanding upon similar findings (Birch, 2008: 312). However, not all findings support previous research.

8.3. Contradictions and Regional Differences

The bulk of existing electoral fairness research concentrates on Europe or liberal democracies, often using datasets such as the CSES that are dominated by these countries. As a result, previous findings sometimes do not accord with the findings of this broader research project. It includes a greater number of authoritarian democracies across Africa, Asia, and the Americas than liberal democracies in Europe or elsewhere. The most frequent regional differences found in this research were between Europe, with its mostly established or liberal democracies, and Africa, with its mostly transitional or authoritarian democracies. Variables that showed particularly

notable differences include those that act as proxies for being informed, such as higher education, political knowledge, and newspaper attention. People who read political news more frequently, have higher levels of political knowledge, and are university educated share the common trait of being better able to discern when authoritarian regimes use their power to manipulate elections. Liberal democracies are notable for usually having fairer elections, which parallels the generally more positive associations for informed respondents in these countries.

Overall, this research includes more authoritarian than liberal democracies, which could be why newspaper attention, political knowledge, and higher education produced more negative results than positive. This evidence is inconsistent with some previous findings or reveals important regional differences. For example, prior research suggests that reading newspapers increases political trust (Hart, 1994; Hetherington, 1998; Karp et al., 2003; McLeod & McDonald, 1985; Miller et al., 1979), but this study finds newspaper attention has a negative association with perceived electoral fairness. Similarly, political knowledge demonstrated a weak negative association, where previous research indicated positive associations (Birch, 2008: 315; 2010: 1610; Carpini & Keeter, 1996: 221-227). Other findings reveal dissimilarities from prior studies. For example, the current study finds some evidence of a negative relationship between lower legislature sizes and perceived electoral fairness, but previous research conversely indicated a positive association (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 739-740). Prior research also indicated a positive relationship for the Freedom House political rights index (Birch, 2008: 313-314), but the current research instead reveals that the civil liberties index is a far stronger predictor of perceived electoral fairness. Finally, current findings suggest that objective national level economic performance may not affect perceptions of electoral fairness despite having strong and significant effects on other types of political support (Birch, 2008: 313-314; Gilley, 2006: 57; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). These contradictory findings suggest the need for further research into these relationships to confirm their relationships with perceived electoral fairness and other public attitudes.

8.4. Negative Results for EMBs

The predominance of negative coefficients for the EMB models may also be due to the presence of so many authoritarian democracies in this research. Overall, results for the two EMB models went against expected positive relationships and provided no support for the respective EMB design assumptions. The implications are somewhat alarming given the extensive literature advocating independent or autonomous EMBs (Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006). Election observers and non-governmental organizations often encouraged new democracies to establish independent EMBs as a way to reduce electoral malfeasance, but authoritarian rulers often circumvent these formal arrangements. The overwhelmingly negative results suggest that survey respondents may have been recalling earlier elections that were more problematic, or the realities of electoral management may not parallel the formal legislative directives. Many of the democracies included in this study had democratically representative institutions and held multiparty elections, but were effectively authoritarian regimes. For example, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Russia, Venezuela and Zimbabwe are included in this study and often labelled *competitive authoritarian*, *electoral authoritarian* or *hybrid regimes* (Bogaards, 2009; Case, 2011; Ekman, 2009; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Koehler, 2008; Schedler, 2010; Wigell, 2008). The institutional arrangements of EMBs in authoritarian democracies may appear independent on paper, but their members often face substantively different political realities. The leaders or ruling parties in authoritarian democracies often manipulate elections to maintain power despite having formally independent EMBs (Schedler, 2002a: 41-46). These informal realities of democratic manipulation are more likely to influence public opinion than formal institutional arrangements. Alternatively, the negative relationships for EMB independence could result for independent EMBs being established in response to problematic electoral management. Increasingly positive assessments may lag behind institutional changes, in which case future research may yet find empirical support for independent EMBs.

8.5. Project Limitations

Not many comparative research projects have looked at causes of electoral fairness or used perceptions of electoral fairness as the dependent variable. This meant that the variables tested in this project were often derived from research in related areas, such as institutional trust, democratic satisfaction, and political legitimacy. These different types of political trust are strongly inter-correlated and have produced consistent relationships with a range of individual and national level variables (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). Since electoral fairness was strongly correlated with these other types of political trust, it was reasonable to expect similar relationships for electoral fairness. This reliance on previous findings in related areas may not have been the best way of forming research questions, but it was somewhat necessary given the relative lack of cross-regional findings regarding determinants of electoral fairness.

An important problem was that there were too few countries in the regional datasets to include many national level variables. This also meant that there was often insufficient variation between countries for some national level variables, which gave rise to multicollinearity problems and caused them to be omitted from the regressions. Some aspects of EMB design, such as responsibility for voter registration, were thus not included in every regional model. This is a weakness in the current study because some relationships could not be compared between all regions to uncover global trends or regional differences.

Another recurring problem with this research was that many variables were unavailable or had large amounts of missing data. Proxy variables were used if possible, but these were not as suitable as having variables that more accurately measured the particular EMB design feature of interest. This was a particularly important problem with implementation tasks of the conventional independent model, such as responsibility for counting and tabulating the votes. Multiple variables had to be combined, relying on multiple assumptions. Functional autonomy assumptions relied on similarly imprecise proxy variables in some areas as well. The use of these proxy variables meant that some aspects of electoral management body

design were not measured or tested accurately. Consequently, the resulting findings may not be very reliable because they do not measure what they are supposed to analyse. A related problem was that some aspects of EMB design simply did not have available data. This was a shortcoming of the ACE & IDEA dataset, but it would have required many months of additional research to find the necessary information and there was not enough time to gather these details. Future research projects could gather the required data to test a wider range of EMB design features more accurately.

8.6. Further Research

Scholars in developed countries, where most research of this kind occurs, have taken electoral fairness for granted. Electoral management bodies are a relatively new phenomena and have received even less attention. However, successive waves of democratisation across the developing world have helped motivate research on the determinants of democratic consolidation, and electoral fairness has consequently received increased attention. This is fortunate, because even the oldest democracies remain vulnerable to electoral fraud and could benefit from continued institutional innovation to ensure the integrity of their elections. The recent 'robocall' scandal for the 2011 Canadian national elections is a pertinent reminder of this fact. Moreover, existing studies usually examine only one or two datasets or regions at a time, while the current broader research project uncovered numerous regional differences, ironically by looking for global trends. This approach, while more laborious to setup, has the potential to yield far more useful and generalizable results.

Research using only one regional dataset risks making generalisations to the rest of the world, which can be problematic if the findings have policy implications. The risk is especially dangerous with datasets such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which has been used by many studies related to elections and electoral fairness. The CSES dataset includes thirty countries from five regions of the world, which sounds like a good global comparison at first. However, nineteen (63%) of its countries are in Europe, which means results using this dataset will be substantially influenced by European trends. Furthermore, many other countries in this dataset are liberal democracies outside Europe. This is important because policies and

institutional arrangements that might work well in liberal democracies may not work as well authoritarian democracies.

Some additional aspects of this study could be improved upon in future research, especially regarding the variables used. For example, variables such as democratic experience and proportional representation were not optimal. Democratic experience was based on years since women's suffrage, but a better measure would have been years of uninterrupted democracy. This would more fully capture the cumulative effects of democratic consolidation, since many liberal democracies did not allow women to vote until surprisingly recently. Proportional representation was represented by a dichotomous variable that only measured whether any proportionality was present in the electoral system. This is a suboptimal coding scheme because it does not account for different types of proportional representation or what percentages of parliamentary seats are subject to proportional representation. For example, countries may have two national legislatures, but only one may use proportional representation or some seats may be appointed and unelected. Based on the positive relationship found for proportional representation in this study, we could anticipate political support to increase as more seats of all parliaments are subject to election via proportional representation. It would also not be surprising to find negative relationships for appointed parliamentary seats.

Many of the variables available from ACE & IDEA did not capture important aspects of electoral management design. For example, the greatest oversight concerning the design of EMBs does not recognise these bodies can be separate branches of government, equivalent in status to the legislature, judiciary, or executive. The branch model has increased in popularity and been implemented in dozens of countries globally, especially in Latin America. However, it has been mostly overlooked and cannot be evaluated using the existing data. This oversight is probably because the tripartite separation of powers into legislature, judiciary, and executive is so well established that few people are aware of alternative configurations. Data on financial autonomy was similarly limited. For instance, there was no variable to measure whether EMBs had separate bank accounts. Moreover, some EMB budgets are constitutionally determined as percentages of the national budget, for which there

was no variable. This could prove to be a superior budgetary model because it makes EMB finances especially well protected from political manipulation. Additional factors may affect perceptions of electoral fairness, but there was no available comparative data. A particularly fascinating example, although probably not a good explanatory variable, is the prohibition of alcohol sales before elections in some countries. For example, Uruguay prohibits the sale of alcohol at 7:30pm night before elections until the next day at 8:30pm after voting has ended, to ensure voters have clear minds when voting (Young, 2013). Uruguay holds some of the most consistently free and fair elections in Latin America. Similar laws preventing the sale of alcoholic beverages exist in Guatemala and El Salvador, which are not known for their fair elections. This particular variable is not expected to have an effect of perceptions of electoral fairness and was mentioned because it was interesting, but it does illustrate that many factors of electoral management and electoral system design remain to be investigated.

There are many research opportunities related to perceived electoral fairness. For example, the dependent variable could be changed from public opinions to expert assessments. This would enable large comparative cross-national studies by coding the assessments of electoral observer reports, which are now available for hundreds of elections in every region of the world. Furthermore, examples of presidents corrupting elections abound (Albaugh, 2011; Koehler, 2008), but legislatures dominated by one party also often seek to unfairly maintain their dominance (McDonald, 2004). The purpose of autonomous EMBs is usually to separate electoral management from the executive branch, but electoral integrity can also suffer if one political party dominates the legislature. The focus in this thesis has been on testing for separation from the executive, but perhaps separation from the legislature is just as important. Further studies could test this assumption, perhaps in conjunction with evaluations of the branch model of electoral management.

The most surprising outcome of this research project was the numerous negative relationships for two EMB design models. These findings suggest that people in countries with independent or autonomous EMBs are more likely to have negative attitudes towards electoral fairness, which is the opposite of what theory suggests. The most likely reason for these negative relationships is the numerous authoritarian

regimes included in the different regional datasets. However, one promising result of this research suggests that the longer an EMB has existed, the greater the perceptions of electoral fairness. This suggests that as EMBs gain experience with running elections, they get better at resisting government interferences and the electoral process gains integrity. However, there is probably a lag period between EMBs organizing objectively fairer elections and public perceptions of elections reflecting those improvements. People probably remember electoral fraud scandals longer than the relatively mundane event of a well-managed election. There is consequently hope for the independent or autonomous model of electoral management. Future studies may therefore reveal positive associations between EMB independence and perceived electoral fairness.

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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics

The following tables provide descriptive statistics for the variables used in different regional models. The first column lists variables as they appear in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 regressions, with the common dataset variables names in brackets. Remaining columns provide the number of observations, mean and standard deviation values as well as the minimum and maximum values for each variable.

Table 8.1: AfroBarometer Descriptive Statistics

Individual Level Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age (<i>s_agecat8</i>)	25155	3.0546	1.4622	1	8
Corruption Level (<i>pv_corruption4</i>)	22715	2.3856	0.8243	1	4
Crime Victim (<i>s_victim</i>)	25357	0.1381	0.3450	0	1
Electoral Fairness (<i>pv_elections4</i>)	25415	1.9652	1.1170	0	3
Electoral Participation (<i>pp_voted</i>)	25283	0.7573	0.4287	0	1
Ethnic Majority (<i>s_majethnic</i>)	24963	0.5541	0.4971	0	1
Female (<i>s_gender</i>)	25415	0.4900	0.4999	0	1
Future Economy Better (<i>pv_econ3g</i>)	21800	0.6068	0.4885	0	1
Future Finances Good (<i>pv_fina3g</i>)	21926	0.6274	0.4835	0	1
High Income (<i>s_incomehigh</i>)	25294	0.2201	0.4143	0	1
Low Income (<i>s_incomelow</i>)	25294	0.1634	0.3697	0	1
Newspaper Attention (<i>pp_newspaper4</i>)	25305	0.7718	1.0454	0	3
Non-Partisan (<i>pv_nonpartisan</i>)	25411	0.3790	0.4852	0	1
Non-Religious (<i>s_nonreligious</i>)	25413	0.0530	0.2240	0	1
Paid Employment (<i>s_employed</i>)	25349	0.3362	0.4724	0	1
Past Economy Worse (<i>pv_econ1b</i>)	24925	0.3655	0.4816	0	1
Past Finances Worse (<i>pv_fina1b</i>)	25217	0.3595	0.4799	0	1
Political Interest (<i>pp_interest4</i>)	25222	1.8780	1.0786	0	3
Political Knowledge (<i>pp_knowledge3</i>)	25409	0.6524	0.7175	0	2
Present Economy Good (<i>pv_econ2g</i>)	24992	0.2917	0.4546	0	1
Present Finances Good (<i>pv_fina2g</i>)	25314	0.2826	0.4503	0	1
Radio Attention (<i>pp_radio4</i>)	25400	2.2502	1.0291	0	3
Religious Majority (<i>s_majreligious</i>)	25280	0.5780	0.4939	0	1
Social Trust (<i>s_soctrust</i>)	25023	0.3454	0.4755	0	1
Supports Winner (<i>pv_winner</i>)	24948	0.3851	0.4866	0	1
Television Attention (<i>pp_television4</i>)	25351	1.2481	1.2893	0	3
Tertiary Education (<i>s_educationuni</i>)	25372	0.0469	0.2115	0	1
Trust Executive (<i>pv_trustexec</i>)	24653	0.6363	0.4811	0	1
Trust Judiciary (<i>pv_trustjudi</i>)	24248	0.6083	0.4882	0	1
Trust Legislature (<i>pv_trustlegis</i>)	23939	0.5826	0.4931	0	1
Trust Parties (<i>pv_trustparties</i>)	24370	0.3386	0.4732	0	1
Trust Police (<i>pv_trustpolice</i>)	24791	0.5318	0.4990	0	1
Urban Status (<i>s_urban</i>)	25415	0.3760	0.4844	0	1
National Level Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Civil Liberties (<i>nat_liberties</i>)	25415	4.903	1.064	2	7
Corruption Perceptions Index (<i>nat_cpi</i>)	25415	6.690	0.939	4.1	7.9

Democratic Experience (<i>nat_demoexp</i>)	25415	39.813	14.833	12	63
Direct Public Funding (<i>nat_funding</i>)	25415	0.736	0.441	0	1
Ethnic Fractionalization (<i>nat_ethnic</i>)	25415	0.709	0.180	0.255	0.930
GDP Growth per capita (<i>nat_growthpc</i>)	25415	3.402	1.842	-1.034	5.794
GNI per capita (<i>nat_gnipc</i>)	25415	1.476	1.713	0.19	5.48
Human Development Index (<i>nat_hdi</i>)	25415	0.451	0.091	0.304	0.601
Income Inequality (<i>nat_gini</i>)	25415	47.668	9.199	35.931	67.4
Linguistic Fractionalization (<i>nat_linguistic</i>)	25415	0.689	0.270	0	0.923
Lower Parliament Size (<i>nat_parlsize</i>)	25415	207.014	114.409	40	400
Political Rights (<i>nat_rights</i>)	25415	4.738	1.423	2	7
Population per MP (<i>nat_ppmp</i>)	25415	0.115	0.100	0.007	0.412
Press Freedom (<i>nat_press</i>)	25415	53.913	14.858	16	74
Proportional Representation (<i>nat_pr</i>)	25415	0.590	0.912	0	2
Religious Fractionalization (<i>nat_religious</i>)	25415	0.618	0.209	0.077	0.860
Victory Margin (<i>nat_vicmargin</i>)	25415	37.611	23.163	1.96	76.2
Women in Parliament (<i>nat_wip</i>)	25415	18.583	9.367	7	34.8

Table 8.2: AmericasBarometer Descriptive Statistics

Individual Level Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age (<i>s_agecat8</i>)	33668	3.2855	1.6055	1	8
Corruption Level (<i>pv_corruption4</i>)	31943	3.2433	0.8323	1	4
Crime Victim (<i>s_victim</i>)	33156	0.0614	0.2401	0	1
Electoral Fairness (<i>pv_elections4</i>)	33707	1.7270	0.9831	0	3
Electoral Participation (<i>pp_voted</i>)	33588	0.7698	0.4209	0	1
Ethnic Majority (<i>s_majethnic</i>)	32961	0.6763	0.4679	0	1
Female (<i>s_gender</i>)	33707	0.5054	0.5000	0	1
Future Economy Better (<i>pv_econ3g</i>)	10110	0.3930	0.4884	0	1
Future Finances Good (<i>pv_fina3g</i>)	10175	0.5069	0.5000	0	1
High Income (<i>s_incomehigh</i>)	33313	0.0947	0.2929	0	1
Left-Wing (<i>pv_left</i>)	27002	0.1838	0.3873	0	1
Low Income (<i>s_incomelow</i>)	33313	0.2501	0.4331	0	1
Newspaper Attention (<i>pp_newspaper4</i>)	21747	1.3143	1.0763	0	3
Non-Partisan (<i>pv_nonpartisan</i>)	33650	0.6783	0.4671	0	1
Non-Religious (<i>s_nonreligious</i>)	33694	0.1174	0.3219	0	1
Paid Employment (<i>s_employed</i>)	31479	0.5554	0.4969	0	1
Past Economy Worse (<i>pv_econ1b</i>)	32937	0.1931	0.3947	0	1
Past Finances Worse (<i>pv_fina1b</i>)	33281	0.2148	0.4107	0	1
Political Interest (<i>pp_interest4</i>)	33496	1.0682	0.9648	0	3
Political Knowledge (<i>pp_knowledge3</i>)	31609	0.3509	0.5568	0	2
Present Economy Good (<i>pv_econ2g</i>)	33399	0.1667	0.3727	0	1
Present Finances Good (<i>pv_fina2g</i>)	33540	0.2353	0.4242	0	1
Radio Attention (<i>pp_radio4</i>)	21792	1.7852	1.1455	0	3
Religious Majority (<i>s_majreligious</i>)	32555	0.6936	0.4610	0	1
Right-Wing (<i>pv_right</i>)	27002	0.2401	0.4272	0	1
Social Trust (<i>s_soctrust</i>)	33321	0.3741	0.4839	0	1
Supports Winner (<i>pv_winner</i>)	33356	0.1731	0.3783	0	1
Television Attention (<i>pp_television4</i>)	21787	2.4170	0.9151	0	3
Tertiary Education (<i>s_educationuni</i>)	33463	0.1954	0.3965	0	1
Trust Executive (<i>pv_trustexec</i>)	27352	1.1707	1.3047	0	4

Trust Judiciary (<i>pv_trustjudi</i>)	32925	0.3643	0.4813	0	1
Trust Legislature (<i>pv_trustlegis</i>)	32404	0.3817	0.4858	0	1
Trust Parties (<i>pv_trustparties</i>)	33114	0.2413	0.4279	0	1
Trust Police (<i>pv_trustpolice</i>)	33416	0.3774	0.4847	0	1
Urban Status (<i>s_urban</i>)	33707	0.6550	0.4754	0	1
National Level Variables					
Civil Liberties (<i>nat_liberties</i>)	33707	5.3021	0.9083	4	7
Corruption Perceptions Index (<i>nat_cpi</i>)	33707	6.6502	1.2202	3.1	8
Democratic Experience (<i>nat_demoexp</i>)	33707	59.2228	10.8054	43	93
Direct Public Funding (<i>nat_funding</i>)	33707	0.9173	0.2755	0	1
Ethnic Fractionalization (<i>nat_ethnic</i>)	33707	0.4681	0.1913	0.1689	0.7396
GDP Growth per capita (<i>nat_growthpc</i>)	33707	3.8216	3.2495	-2.12	12.2497
GNI per capita (<i>nat_gnipc</i>)	33707	4.7797	2.7911	1.33	10.29
Human Development Index (<i>nat_hdi</i>)	33707	0.6958	0.0608	0.568	0.796
Income Inequality (<i>nat_gini</i>)	33707	50.2476	4.2647	39.9089	57.23
Linguistic Fractionalization (<i>nat_linguistic</i>)	33707	0.1754	0.1758	0	0.6303
Lower Parliament Size (<i>nat_parlsize</i>)	33707	150.6099	120.2863	32	513
Political Rights (<i>nat_rights</i>)	33707	5.6503	0.9639	4	7
Population per MP (<i>nat_ppmp</i>)	33707	0.1123	0.0878	0.0096	0.3781
Press Freedom (<i>nat_press</i>)	33707	56.4456	14.6815	26	85
Proportional Representation (<i>nat_pr</i>)	33707	1.1851	0.9596	0	2
Religious Fractionalization (<i>nat_religious</i>)	33707	0.3212	0.1736	0.1350	0.7876
Victory Margin (<i>nat_vicmargin</i>)	33707	15.8853	10.4912	0.63	40.31
Women in Parliament (<i>nat_wip</i>)	33707	19.5136	9.7976	0	40

Table 8.3: ArabBarometer Descriptive Statistics

Individual Level Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age (<i>s_agecat8</i>)	5032	3.0491	1.4034	1	8
Corruption Level (<i>pv_corruption4</i>)	4815	2.6739	0.8397	1	4
Crime Victim (<i>s_victim</i>)	5009	0.0389	0.1934	0	1
Electoral Fairness (<i>pv_elections4</i>)	5047	1.7751	1.1826	0	3
Electoral Participation (<i>pp_voted</i>)	4791	0.6746	0.4686	0	1
Female (<i>s_gender</i>)	5044	0.4657	0.4989	0	1
Future Economy Better (<i>pv_econ3g</i>)	4638	0.5006	0.5001	0	1
High Income (<i>s_incomehigh</i>)	4167	0.1884	0.3911	0	1
Low Income (<i>s_incomelow</i>)	4167	0.2004	0.4003	0	1
Newspaper Attention (<i>pp_newspaper4</i>)	4881	0.1965	0.6403	0	3
Non-Religious (<i>s_nonreligious</i>)	5047	0.1224	0.3278	0	1
Paid Employment (<i>s_employed</i>)	5028	0.4688	0.4991	0	1
Political Interest (<i>pp_interest4</i>)	4966	1.3607	1.0420	0	3
Political Knowledge (<i>pp_knowledge3</i>)	4953	1.0596	0.8844	0	2
Present Economy Good (<i>pv_econ2g</i>)	4974	0.3104	0.4627	0	1
Present Finances Good (<i>pv_fina2g</i>)	4949	0.5553	0.4970	0	1
Radio Attention (<i>pp_radio4</i>)	4883	0.1317	0.5503	0	3
Religious Majority (<i>s_majreligious</i>)	3106	0.6587	0.4742	0	1
Social Trust (<i>s_soctrust</i>)	4924	0.2656	0.4417	0	1
Television Attention (<i>pp_television4</i>)	4863	1.4092	1.1500	0	3
Tertiary Education (<i>s_educationuni</i>)	5036	0.2357	0.4245	0	1

Trust Executive (<i>pv_trustexec</i>)	4898	0.5182	0.4997	0	1
Trust Judiciary (<i>pv_trustjudi</i>)	4815	0.5030	0.5000	0	1
Trust Legislature (<i>pv_trustlegis</i>)	4848	0.4620	0.4986	0	1
Trust Parties (<i>pv_trustparties</i>)	4702	0.2988	0.4578	0	1
Trust Police (<i>pv_trustpolice</i>)	4901	0.6072	0.4884	0	1
National Level Variables					
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Civil Liberties (<i>nat_liberties</i>)	3823	3.7434	0.4368	3	4
Corruption Perceptions Index (<i>nat_cpi</i>)	5047	6.6450	0.9111	4.7	7.4
Democratic Experience (<i>nat_demoexp</i>)	5047	49.6739	11.6472	32	64
Direct Public Funding (<i>nat_funding</i>)	5047	0.5554	0.4970	0	1
Ethnic Fractionalization (<i>nat_ethnic</i>)	3823	0.3774	0.1728	0.1314	0.5926
GDP Growth per capita (<i>nat_growthpc</i>)	5047	5.4601	2.5278	0.4620	7.5332
GNI per capita (<i>nat_gnipc</i>)	5047	3.1135	1.6671	1.5493	6.24
Human Development Index (<i>nat_hdi</i>)	5047	0.6343	0.0677	0.559	0.721
Income Inequality (<i>nat_gini</i>)	5047	39.6201	3.3160	35.5045	45.3752
Linguistic Fractionalization (<i>nat_linguistic</i>)	3823	0.2747	0.1861	0.0396	0.4683
Lower Parliament Size (<i>nat_parlsize</i>)	5047	213.9285	115.1975	110	389
Political Rights (<i>nat_rights</i>)	3823	2.7434	0.4368	2	3
Population per MP (<i>nat_ppmp</i>)	5047	0.0574	0.0274	0.0306	0.0961
Press Freedom (<i>nat_press</i>)	3823	40.0942	2.9861	38	45
Proportional Representation (<i>nat_pr</i>)	5047	1.0101	0.8704	0	2
Religious Fractionalization (<i>nat_religious</i>)	3823	0.2286	0.3387	0.0035	0.7886
Victory Margin (<i>nat_vicmargin</i>)	5047	29.2603	33.1828	0.61	78.6
Women in Parliament (<i>nat_wip</i>)	5047	8.2730	3.3375	4.7	12.9

Table 8.4: AsianBarometer Descriptive Statistics

Individual Level Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age (<i>s_agecat8</i>)	11901	3.7404	1.5336	1	8
Corruption Level (<i>pv_corruption4</i>)	11149	2.4562	0.8416	1	4
Crime Victim (<i>s_victim</i>)	11887	0.0436	0.2042	0	1
Electoral Fairness (<i>pv_elections4</i>)	11915	1.9758	0.9267	0	3
Electoral Participation (<i>pp_voted</i>)	11881	0.8215	0.3830	0	1
Female (<i>s_gender</i>)	11912	0.4934	0.5000	0	1
Future Economy Better (<i>pv_econ3g</i>)	10831	0.5072	0.5000	0	1
Future Finances Good (<i>pv_fina3g</i>)	10914	0.5462	0.4979	0	1
High Income (<i>s_incomehigh</i>)	11721	0.1618	0.3683	0	1
Low Income (<i>s_incomelow</i>)	11721	0.2503	0.4332	0	1
Newspaper Attention (<i>pp_newspaper4</i>)	10531	0.3358	0.8733	0	3
Non-Partisan (<i>pv_nonpartisan</i>)	10933	0.3927	0.4884	0	1
Non-Religious (<i>s_nonreligious</i>)	11913	0.1995	0.3997	0	1
Paid Employment (<i>s_employed</i>)	11870	0.6500	0.4770	0	1
Past Economy Worse (<i>pv_econ1b</i>)	11800	0.4516	0.4977	0	1
Past Finances Worse (<i>pv_fina1b</i>)	11860	0.3953	0.4889	0	1
Political Interest (<i>pp_interest4</i>)	11814	1.4829	0.8857	0	3
Present Economy Good (<i>pv_econ2g</i>)	11822	0.3114	0.4631	0	1
Present Finances Good (<i>pv_fina2g</i>)	11877	0.2988	0.4578	0	1
Radio Attention (<i>pp_radio4</i>)	10528	0.1295	0.5555	0	3
Religious Majority (<i>s_majreligious</i>)	11882	0.7179	0.4500	0	1

Social Trust (<i>s_soctrust</i>)	11638	0.2670	0.4424	0	1
Supports Winner (<i>pv_winner</i>)	10933	0.3727	0.4836	0	1
Television Attention (<i>pp_television4</i>)	10521	1.6662	1.2349	0	3
Tertiary Education (<i>s_educationuni</i>)	11915	0.2229	0.4162	0	1
Trust Executive (<i>pv_trustexec</i>)	11588	0.6065	0.4885	0	1
Trust Judiciary (<i>pv_trustjudi</i>)	11342	0.5826	0.4931	0	1
Trust Legislature (<i>pv_trustlegis</i>)	11452	0.5327	0.4989	0	1
Trust Parties (<i>pv_trustparties</i>)	11288	0.4291	0.4950	0	1
Trust Police (<i>pv_trustpolice</i>)	11706	0.6297	0.4829	0	1
Urban Status (<i>s_urban</i>)	11911	0.6307	0.4826	0	1

National Level Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Civil Liberties (<i>nat_liberties</i>)	11915	5.1719	1.1224	3	7
Corruption Perceptions Index (<i>nat_cpi</i>)	11915	5.3864	2.2112	0.6	7.6
Democratic Experience (<i>nat_demoexp</i>)	11915	60.1544	13.0142	10	82
Direct Public Funding (<i>nat_funding</i>)	10832	0.6746	0.4686	0	1
Ethnic Fractionalization (<i>nat_ethnic</i>)	11915	0.3636	0.2402	0.001998	0.735134
GDP Growth per capita (<i>nat_growthpc</i>)	11915	4.9513	1.8874	2.180389	8.34
GNI per capita (<i>nat_gnipc</i>)	11915	11.8897	12.9934	0.7	37.65
Human Development Index (<i>nat_hdi</i>)	11915	0.7294	0.1357	0.568	0.938
Income Inequality (<i>nat_gini</i>)	11915	38.4177	5.5631	30.71483	53.3
Linguistic Fractionalization (<i>nat_linguistic</i>)	11915	0.4579	0.2667	0.0021132	0.8359525
Lower Parliament Size (<i>nat_parlsize</i>)	11915	316.5416	175.0443	30	550
Political Rights (<i>nat_rights</i>)	11915	4.9876	1.7227	1	7
Population per MP (<i>nat_ppmp</i>)	11915	0.1901	0.1258	0.0361352	0.4151795
Press Freedom (<i>nat_press</i>)	11915	54.7383	18.1535	23	80
Proportional Representation (<i>nat_pr</i>)	11915	0.2903	0.6815	0	2
Religious Fractionalization (<i>nat_religious</i>)	11915	0.4261	0.2301	0.0798612	0.6844943
Victory Margin (<i>nat_vicmargin</i>)	11915	27.9574	24.0970	0.22	79.52
Women in Parliament (<i>nat_wip</i>)	11915	14.3184	5.8444	6.6	27.3

Table 8.5: CSES (Europe) Descriptive Statistics

Individual Level Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Electoral Fairness (<i>pv_elections4</i>)	29117	2.0919	1.0793	0	3
Age (<i>s_agecat8</i>)	29069	4.0158	1.7053	1	8
Female (<i>s_gender</i>)	29116	0.5212	0.4996	0	1
High Income (<i>s_incomehigh</i>)	25115	0.1869	0.3898	0	1
Low Income (<i>s_incomelow</i>)	25115	0.1981	0.3986	0	1
Tertiary Education (<i>s_educationuni</i>)	29008	0.1606	0.3672	0	1
Supports Winner (<i>pv_winner</i>)	27852	0.2969	0.4569	0	1
Electoral Participation (<i>pp_voted</i>)	28063	0.8457	0.3613	0	1
Urban Status (<i>s_urban</i>)	26228	0.7027	0.4571	0	1
Left-Wing (<i>pv_left</i>)	24667	0.1318	0.3382	0	1
Right-Wing (<i>pv_right</i>)	24667	0.1803	0.3844	0	1
Political Knowledge (<i>pp_knowledge3</i>)	19994	1.3851	0.7202	0	2
Past Economy Worse (<i>pv_econ1b</i>)	27997	0.3099	0.4624	0	1
Present Economy Good (<i>pv_econ2g</i>)	28671	0.3758	0.4843	0	1
Paid Employment (<i>s_employed</i>)	29071	0.4355	0.4958	0	1
Religious Majority (<i>s_majreligious</i>)	20932	0.8003	0.3998	0	1

Ethnic Majority (<i>s_majethnic</i>)	13361	0.8716	0.3346	0	1
Non-Religious (<i>s_nonreligious</i>)	24464	0.2726	0.4453	0	1
Non-Partisan (<i>pv_nonpartisan</i>)	29117	0.5609	0.4963	0	1

National Level Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Democratic Experience (<i>nat_demoexp</i>)	29117	70.2715	17.6103	28	84
Corruption Perceptions Index (<i>nat_cpi</i>)	29117	3.1020	2.3430	0	7.9
Ethnic Fractionalization (<i>nat_ethnic</i>)	29117	0.2024	0.1429	0.0468	0.5314
Income Inequality (<i>nat_gini</i>)	29117	28.6804	5.4082	22.16239	43.4
GNI per capita (<i>nat_gnipc</i>)	29117	18.6362	13.4427	0.85	40.92
GDP Growth per capita (<i>nat_growthpc</i>)	29117	3.8157	2.4863	-1.0193	10.0045
Human Development Index (<i>nat_hdi</i>)	29117	0.8046	0.0667	0.667	0.895
Civil Liberties (<i>nat_liberties</i>)	29117	6.0188	1.2287	2	7
Direct Public Funding (<i>nat_funding</i>)	29117	0.9024	0.2968	0	1
Linguistic Fractionalization (<i>nat_linguistic</i>)	29117	0.2165	0.1744	0.0198	0.5441
Lower Parliament Size (<i>nat_parlsize</i>)	29117	313.1779	196.0438	63	669
Political Rights (<i>nat_rights</i>)	29117	6.5388	1.2366	2	7
Population per MP (<i>nat_ppmp</i>)	29117	0.0736	0.0695	0.0044	0.3255
Press Freedom (<i>nat_press</i>)	29117	77.3868	17.4062	18	95
Proportional Representation (<i>nat_pr</i>)	29117	1.5934	0.7497	0	2
Religious Fractionalization (<i>nat_religious</i>)	29117	0.4362	0.2073	0.1438	0.7222
Victory Margin (<i>nat_vicmargin</i>)	29117	10.8024	10.8154	0.1	61.4
Women in Parliament (<i>nat_wip</i>)	29117	21.6591	11.2760	7.3	40.4

Appendix B. Original Variables and Questions

Electoral Fairness

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q45) and Round 4 (q71); ArabBarometer (q211); AsianBarometer (qii43):

On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [year]? Was it: completely free and fair; free and fair, but with minor problems; free and fair, with major problems; not free and fair?

AmericasBarometer Merged (b47):

To what extent do you trust elections? (Seven-point scale ranging from 'Not at all' to 'A lot')

CSES (A3002):

In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election was conducted unfairly?

Tertiary Education

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q90) and Round 4 (q89):

What is the highest level of education you have completed? No formal schooling; Informal schooling (including Koranic schooling); Some primary schooling; Primary school completed; Some secondary school/ High school; Secondary school completed/High school; Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a technical/polytechnic/college; Some university; University completed, Post-graduate

AmericasBarometer Merged (ed):

*How many years of schooling have you completed? _____ Year
_____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not
university) = _____ total number of years (Uses table to derive code)*

ArabBarometer (q703):

*Level of education: Illiterate; Elementary; Primary; Secondary; College
Diploma – two years; BA; MA or higher*

AsianBarometer (se005a):

How many years of formal education you have received? _____

AsianBarometer (se005):

*What is your highest level of education? No formal education; Incomplete
primary/elementary; Complete primary/elementary; Incomplete
secondary/high school: technical/vocational type; Complete
secondary/high school: technical/vocational type; Incomplete
secondary/high school; Complete secondary/high school; Some university
education; University education completed; Post-graduate degree*

High/Low Income

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q8e) and Round 4 (q8e):

*Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family
gone without: A cash income? Never; Just once or twice; Several times;
Many times; Always*

AmericasBarometer Merged (q10):

*Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of
this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all
the working adults and children? Which is the total monthly income in your
household? (list of 10 deciles based on currency and distribution in country)*

AmericasBarometer Merged (q10d):

The salary that you receive and total family income: Is good enough for you, you can save from it; Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems; Is not enough for you, you are stretched; Is not enough for you, you are having a hard time

ArabBarometer (q716incomedeciles):

Monthly income of family in [local currency]_____ (recoded to family monthly income by approximated deciles)

AsianBarometer (se009):

Here is a scale of household [annual/monthly] incomes. We would like to know in what group your household on average is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, dividends and other incomes that come in before taxes and other deduction. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into. (scale of quintiles differs for each country)

AsianBarometer (se009a):

Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? I will read out few statements about your income. Please tell me, which of the following statement is closest to your situation? Our income covers the needs well, we can save; Our income covers the needs all right, without much difficulty; Our income does not cover the needs, there are difficulties; Our income does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties

Religious and Religious Majority

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q91) and Round 4 (q90), AmericasBarometer Merged (q3_08, q3_0406, q3c); AsianBarometer (se006):

What is your religion (, if any)? (List of religions to select from)

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q28a) and Round 4 (q22a):

Let's turn to your role in the community. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A religious group (e.g. church, mosque)?

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q92):

Excluding weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? Never; About once a year or less; About once every several months; About once a month; About once a week; More than once a week

AfroBarometer Round 4 (q91); AmericasBarometer Merged (q5b); ArabBarometer (q2564):

How important is religion in your life? Not at all important; Not very important; Somewhat important; Very important

AmericasBarometer Merged (q5a):

How often do you attend religious services? More than once per week; Once per week; Once a month; Once or twice a year; Never or almost never

AmericasBarometer Merged (cp6):

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never: Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them... once a week; once or twice a month; once or twice a year; never

ArabBarometer (q714a):

In general, would you describe yourself as: Religious; In between; Not religious; Other

ArabBarometer (q711):

Religion: Muslim; Christian; Other

AsianBarometer (se007):

*About how often do you practice religious services or rituals these days?
Several times a day; Once a day; Several times a week; Once a week; Once
a month; Only during festivals (or several times a year); Less often;
Practically never*

AsianBarometer (seii7a):

*Would you describe yourself as very religious, moderately religious, lightly
religious, not religious at all? Very religious; Moderately religious; Lightly
religious; Not religious at all*

Linguistic Majority

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q3) and Round 4 (q3):

*Which Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.: language is your home language? (List of
languages to select from)*

AmericasBarometer Merged (leng1):

*What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home
when you were a child? (List of languages to select from)*

AsianBarometer (se014):

*What language do you speak the most in the home? Only local language;
Mostly local language; A mixture of local and official language; Mostly
official language; Only official language*

Ethnic Majority

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q79) and Round 4 (q79):

*What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group. (List of tribes
and groups to select from)*

AmericasBarometer Merged (etid):

Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of

another race? White; Mestizo; Indigenous; Black; Mulatto; Other

Political Interest

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q16) and Round 4(q13); ArabBarometer (q215); AsianBarometer (q056):

How interested would you say you are in public affairs/politics? Not at all interested; Not very interested; Somewhat interested; Very interested

AmericasBarometer Merged (pol1):

How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? A lot; Some; Little; None

Political Knowledge

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q43a2) and Round 4(q41a2):

Can you tell me the name of: Your Member of Parliament/National Assembly Representative? Know but can't remember; Incorrect guess; Correct name; Don't Know

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q43b2):

Can you tell me the name of: Your Local Government Councillor? Know but can't remember; Incorrect guess; Correct name; Don't Know

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q43c2):

Can you tell me the name of: The Deputy President/Vice President? Know but can't remember; Incorrect guess; Correct name; Don't Know

AfroBarometer Round 4 (q41b2):

Can you tell me the name of: Your country's Minister of Finance and Economic Planning? Know but can't remember; Incorrect guess; Correct name; Don't Know

AmericasBarometer Merged (gi3):

How many provinces/departments/states does the country have? Correct;

Incorrect

AmericasBarometer Merged (gi4):

How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country?

Correct; Incorrect

ArabBarometer (q2571, q2572):

Can you remember the name of: Foreign Minister; Speaker/Leader of Parliament. Correct answer; Incorrect answer

Non-Partisanship and Supports Winner (through identification)

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q85) and Round 4(q85):

Do you feel close to any particular political party? No (not close to any party); Yes (feels close to a party)

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q86) and Round 4(q86):

Which party is that? (List of political parties to select from)

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q87):

Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close? Not very close; Somewhat close; Very close; Not Applicable

AmericasBarometer Merged (vb10):

Do you currently identify with a political party? Yes; No

AmericasBarometer Merged (vb11_06, vb11_08, vb11_10, vb11_12):

Which political party do you identify with? (List of political parties to choose from)

AmericasBarometer Merged (vb12):

Would you say that your identification with that party the party mentioned in VB11: is very weak, weak, not weak or strong, strong, very strong? Very

weak; Weak; Not weak, or strong; Strong; Very strong

AsianBarometer (q062):

Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to? (List of political parties to choose from)

AsianBarometer (q063):

How close do you feel to (answer in q062)? Very close; Somewhat close; Just a little close

Left/Right Wing

AmericasBarometer Merged (l1, l1b):

On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left/liberal to right/conservative. One means left/liberal and 10 means right/conservative. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left/liberals and those on the right/conservatives. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left/liberals and others with the right/conservatives. According to the meaning that the terms "left/liberal" and "right/conservative" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? (Scale from 1 to 10)

Electoral Participation

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q30) and Round 4(q23d):

With regard to the most recent, year: national elections, which statement is true for you? You voted in the elections; You decided not to vote; You could not find the polling station; You were prevented from voting; You did not have time to vote; Did not vote for some other reason; You were not registered or were too young to vote; You could not find your name in the voter's register; Don't Know/Can't remember

AmericasBarometer Merged (vb2):

Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)? Voted; Did not vote

AmericasBarometer Merged (vb1):

Are you registered to vote? / Do you have an Identity Card? Yes; No

AmericasBarometer Merged (vb6):

Did you vote for a deputy in the last elections? Yes; No

ArabBarometer (q207):

Did you participate in the most recent elections on [date]? Yes; No

AsianBarometer (q027):

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]?

AsianBarometer (q028):

Which parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race) did you vote for? (List of political parties to choose from)

Supports (Voted for) Winner

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q99) and Round 4(q97):

If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for? (List of political parties to select from)

AmericasBarometer Merged (vb3_06, vb3_08, vb3_10, vb3_12):

Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of (year)? (List of candidates or political parties)

AsianBarometer (q028):

Which parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race) did you vote for? (List of political parties to choose from)

AsianBarometer (qii39a):

Based on the answer to q028, please construct a new variable indicating if the respondent voted for the winning camp or losing camp. 1: Voted for the winning camp; 2: voted for the losing camp

Corruption Level

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q56a, q56b, q56c, q56d, q56e) and Round 4(q50a, q50b, q50c, q50d):

How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The President/Prime Minister and Officials in his Office; Members of Parliament/National Assembly Representatives; local government councillors/Elected Assembly men/women; National government officials; Local government officials? None; Some of them; Most of them; All of them

AmericasBarometer Merged (exc7):

Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: Very common; Common; Uncommon; Very uncommon

ArabBarometer (q253):

Here are some statements that describe how widespread corruption and bribe taking are in all sectors in [respondent's country]. Which of the following statements reflects your own opinion the best? Hardly anyone is involved in corruption and bribery; Not a lot of officials are corrupt; Most officials are corrupt; Almost everyone is corrupt

AsianBarometer (q114, q115):

How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your

*local/municipal government; the national government? Would you say:
Hardly anyone is involved; Not a lot of officials are corrupt; Most officials
are corrupt; Almost everyone is corrupt*

Crime Victimization

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q9c) and Round 4(q9c):

*Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family:
Been physically attacked? Never; Just once or twice; Several times; Many
times; Always*

AmericasBarometer Merged (vic2_0406, vic2_1012):

*Thinking of that the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am
going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? Unarmed robbery, no
assault or physical threats; Unarmed robbery with assault or physical
threats; Armed robbery; Assault but not robbery; Rape or sexual assault;
Kidnapping; Vandalism; Burglary of your home; Extortion; Other; N/A (was
not a victim)*

AmericasBarometer Merged (vic1ext):

*Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in
the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary,
assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of
crime in the past 12 months? Yes; No*

AmericasBarometer Merged (vic20):

*You were a victim of an armed robbery of property not including your car in
the past 12 months? How many times? (Number provided by respondent)*

ArabBarometer (q205); AsianBarometer (qii32):

*Generally speaking, how safe is living in this (city/town/village)? Very safe;
Safe; Unsafe; Very unsafe*

AsianBarometer (qii37):

In the past 12 months, have you or any member of your family been a victim of physical violence? Yes; No

Social Trust

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q83), AmericasBarometer Merged (it1b); ArabBarometer (q204); AsianBarometer (q024):

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people? You must be very careful; Most people can be trusted

AfroBarometer Round 4(q84c):

How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other Ghanaians/Kenyans/etc.? Not at all; Just a little; I trust them somewhat; I trust them a lot.

AmericasBarometer Merged (it1):

Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy? Very trustworthy; Somewhat trustworthy; Not very trustworthy; Untrustworthy

Paid Employment

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q94) and Round 4 (q94):

Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)? No (not looking); No (looking); Yes, part time (not looking); Yes, part time (looking); Yes, full time (not looking); Yes, full time (looking)

AmericasBarometer Merged (ocup4):

Are you currently working? Yes; No

AmericasBarometer Merged (ocup1a):

In this job are you: A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise; A salaried employee in the private sector; Owner or partner in a business; Self-employed; Unpaid worker

AmericasBarometer Merged (ocup4a):

How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently: Working; Not working, but have a job; Actively looking for a job; A student; Taking care of the home; Retired, a pensioner or permanently disable to work; Not working and not looking for a job

ArabBarometer (q704):

Employment status: Employed; Not employed

AsianBarometer (se012a):

Main occupation: Hired Workers (Excluding unpaid family workers); Employers and Self-Employed; Purely Property Owner; Unpaid family workers; Presently unemployed but LOOKING for Work; Presently unemployed and NOT LOOKING for Work; Never worked before; No answer; Decline to answer; Others

AsianBarometer (se012b):

Respondent is also the Chief Wage Earner? Yes; No

Television/Newspaper/Radio Attention

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q15a, q15b, q15c) and Round 4(q12a, q12b, q12c):

How often do you get news from the following sources: Radio/Television/Newspapers? Never; Less than once a month; A few times a month; A few times a week; Every day

AmericasBarometer Merged (a1, a2, a3):

How frequently do you listen to/watch/read the news on the radio/TV/ in newspapers? Every day/almost every day; Once or twice a week; Rarely;

Never

ArabBarometer (q216):

How often do you follow news about politics and government in [country]?

Very often; Often; Sometimes/ rarely; Never

ArabBarometer (q216):

What are your first and second most important sources of information about local politics and government in [country]? Television; Radio; Local newspaper; Weekly magazines and papers; Internet; SMS Messages; Other

AsianBarometer (q057):

How often do you follow news about politics and government? Practically never; Not even once a week; Once or twice a week; Several times a week; Everyday

AsianBarometer (qii51_1, qii51_2, qii51_3):

Main source of information: Television/Newspaper/Radio

AsianBarometer (q057):

From qii51 Which is most important? Television; Newspaper; Radio (lists additional sources)

Past National Economy

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q6a) and Round 4(q6a):

Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Economic conditions in this country? Much worse; Worse; Same; Better; Much better

AmericasBarometer Merged (soct2):

Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? Better; Same; Worse

AsianBarometer (q002):

How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? Is it: Much better; A little better; About the same; A little worse; Much worse

Present National Economy

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q4a) and Round 4(q4a):

In general, how would you describe: The present economic condition of this country? Very bad; Fairly bad; Neither good nor bad; Fairly good; Very good

AmericasBarometer Merged (soct1):

How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? Very good; Good; Neither good nor bad (fair); Bad; Very bad

ArabBarometer (q101):

How would you rate the current overall economic condition of [respondent's country] today? Very good; Good; Bad; Very bad

AsianBarometer (q001):

How would you rate the overall economic condition of your country today? Very bad; Bad; So so (not good nor bad); Good; Very good

Future National Economy

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q7a) and Round 4(q7a):

Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time? Much worse; Worse; Same; Better; Much better

AmericasBarometer Merged (soct3):

Do you think that in 12 months the economic situation of the country will

be better, the same or worse than it is now? Better; Same; Worse

ArabBarometer (q102):

What do you think will be the state of [country's] economic condition a few years (3-5 years) from now? Much better; A little better; About the same; A little worse; Much worse

AsianBarometer (q003):

What do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition a few years from now? Will it be: Much better; A little better; About the same; A little worse; Much worse

Past Personal Finances

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q6b) and Round 4(q6b):

Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Your living conditions? Much worse; Worse; Same; Better; Much better

AmericasBarometer Merged (idio2):

Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? Better; Same; Worse

AsianBarometer (q005):

How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago? A little worse now; About the same; A little better now; Much better now

Present Personal Finances

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q4b) and Round 4(q4b):

In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions? Very bad; Fairly bad; Neither good nor bad; Fairly good; Very good

AmericasBarometer Merged (idio1):

How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? Very good; Good; Neither good nor bad (fair); Bad; Very bad

ArabBarometer (q103):

How would you rate the economic situation of your family today? Very Good; Good; Bad; Very Bad

AsianBarometer (q004):

As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today? Very bad; Bad; So so (not good nor bad); Good; Very good

Future Personal Finances

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q7b) and Round 4(q7b):

Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Your living conditions in twelve months time? Much worse; Worse; Same; Better; Much better

AmericasBarometer Merged (idio3):

Do you think that in 12 months your economic situation will be better than, the same as, or worse than it is now? Better; Same; Worse

AsianBarometer (q006):

What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now? Much worse; A little worse; About the same; A little better; Much better

Trust Executive/Legislature/Judiciary/Political Parties/Police

AfroBarometer Round 3 (q55a, q55b, q55i, q55e, q55f; q55h) and Round 4(q49a, q49b, q49h, v q49e, q49f, q49g):

How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The President/Prime Minister; The Parliament/National

Assembly; Courts of Law; The Ruling Party; Opposition Political Parties; The Police? Not at all; Just a little; Somewhat; A lot; Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough

AmericasBarometer Merged (b21a; b13, b10a, b21, b18):

To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister; national parliament; justice system; national police? (Seven-point scale ranging from 'Not at all' to 'A lot')

ArabBarometer (q2011, q2012, q2013, q2014, q2015); AsianBarometer (qii07, q010, q007, q009, q013):

I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them. Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?

Appendix C. Variable Coding Values

Individual Level Variables	Values
Age (<i>s_agecat8</i>)	1=11-20; 2=21-30; 3=31-40; 4=41-50; 5=51-60; 6=61-70; 7=71-80; 8=81+
Corruption Level (<i>pv_corruption4</i>)	0=Almost none, 1=Some officials, 2=Most officials, 3=Almost all officials
Crime Victim (<i>s_victim</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Electoral Fairness (<i>pv_elections4</i>)	Ranges from 0=Not at all fair to 3=Completely Fair
Electoral Participation (<i>pp_voted</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Ethnic Majority (<i>s_majethnic</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Female (<i>s_gender</i>)	0=Female; 1=Male
Future Economy Better (<i>pv_econ3g</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Future Finances Good (<i>pv_fina3g</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
High Income (<i>s_incomehigh</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Left-Wing (<i>pv_left</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Low Income (<i>s_incomelow</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Newspaper Attention (<i>pp_newspaper4</i>)	0=Never, 1=Monthly, 2=Weekly, 3=Daily
Non-Partisan (<i>pv_nonpartisan</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Non-Religious (<i>s_nonreligious</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Paid Employment (<i>s_employed</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Past Economy Worse (<i>pv_econ1b</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Past Finances Worse (<i>pv_fina1b</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Political Interest (<i>pp_interest4</i>)	0=None; 1=A Little; 2=Fairly; 3=Very
Political Knowledge (<i>pp_knowledge3</i>)	0=Zero Correct; 1=One Correct; 2=Two Correct
Present Economy Good (<i>pv_econ2g</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Present Finances Good (<i>pv_fina2g</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Radio Attention (<i>pp_radio4</i>)	0=Never, 1=Monthly, 2=Weekly, 3=Daily
Religious Majority (<i>s_majreligious</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Right-Wing (<i>pv_right</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Social Trust (<i>s_socitrust</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Supports Winner (<i>pv_winner</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Television Attention (<i>pp_television4</i>)	0=Never, 1=Monthly, 2=Weekly, 3=Daily
Tertiary Education (<i>s_educationuni</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Trust Executive (<i>pv_trustexec</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Trust Judiciary (<i>pv_trustjudi</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Trust Legislature (<i>pv_trustlegis</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Trust Parties (<i>pv_trustparties</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Trust Police (<i>pv_trustpolice</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Urban Status (<i>s_urban</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
National Level Variables	Values
Civil Liberties (<i>nat_libertiesZ</i>)	Standardized values of inverted Civil Liberties Index
Corruption Perceptions Index (<i>nat_cpiZ</i>)	Standardized values of inverted Corruptions Perceptions Index

Democratic Experience (<i>nat_demoexpZ</i>)	Standardized values for years since universal suffrage
Direct Public Funding (<i>nat_funding</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Ethnic Fractionalization (<i>nat_ethnic</i>)	Ethnic Fractionalization scores
GDP Growth per capita (<i>nat_growthpcZ</i>)	Standardized values of annual GDP growth rate
GNI per capita (<i>nat_gnipcZ</i>)	Standardized values of GNI per capita (thousands)
Human Development Index (<i>nat_hdi</i>)	Human Development Index scores
Income Inequality (<i>nat_giniZ</i>)	Standardized values of Gini income inequality coefficients
Linguistic Fractionalization (<i>nat_linguistic</i>)	Linguistic Fractionalization scores
Lower Parliament Size (<i>nat_parlsizeZ</i>)	Standardized values for number of seats in lower parliament
Political Rights (<i>nat_rightsZ</i>)	Standardized values of inverted Political Rights Index
Population per MP (<i>nat_ppmpZ</i>)	Standardized values for population (millions) divided by seats in lower parliament
Press Freedom (<i>nat_pressZ</i>)	Standardized values of inverted Freedom of the Press scores
Proportional Representation (<i>nat_pr</i>)	0=No; 1=Yes
Religious Fractionalization (<i>nat_religious</i>)	Religious Fractionalization scores
Victory Margin (<i>nat_vicmarginZ</i>)	Standardized values of victory margin percentages
Women in Parliament (<i>nat_wipZ</i>)	Standardized values of percentage of women in (both) parliament(s)

Appendix D. Electoral Management Bodies

Algeria	Ministry of Interior
Argentina	National Electoral Chamber
Belarus	Central Commission on Elections
Belize	Elections and Boundaries Commission
Benin	Permanent Administrative Secretariat, National Autonomous Electoral Commission
Bolivia	National Electoral Court
Botswana	Independent Electoral Commission
Brazil	Superior Electoral Court
Burkina Faso	Independent National Electoral Commission
Canada	Chief Electoral Officer
Cape Verde	Ministry of Internal Administration, Directorate-General for Electoral Process Support; National Elections Commission
Chile	Electoral Service
Colombia	National Electoral Council
Costa Rica	Supreme Electoral Tribunal
Czech Republic	State Electoral Commission
Denmark	Ministry of Interior - Election Unit
Dominican Republic	National Board of Elections
Ecuador	Supreme Electoral Tribunal
El Salvador	Supreme Electoral Tribunal
Germany	Ministry of Interior
Ghana	Electoral Commission of Ghana
Guatemala	Supreme Electoral Tribunal
Guyana	Guyana Elections Commission
Honduras	Supreme Electoral Tribunal
Hong Kong	Electoral Affairs Commission
Hungary	Ministry of Interior, National Election Office; National Electoral Committee
Iceland	Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs; National Electoral Board
Indonesia	General Election Commission
Israel	Central Elections Committee
Jamaica	Electoral Commission of Jamaica
Japan	Central Election Management Council; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications - Election Division
Jordan	Independent Election Commission
Kenya	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
Lebanon	Ministry of Interior
Lesotho	Independent Electoral Commission
Liberia	National Elections Commission
Lithuania	Central Elections Committee
Madagascar	Ministry of Interior and of Administrative Reform; National Advisory Electoral Commission
Malawi	Malawi Electoral Commission

Malaysia	Electoral Commission
Mali	Ministry of Territorial Administration; Independent National Electoral Commission; Constitutional Court
Mexico	Federal Electoral Institute
Mongolia	The General Election Commission of Mongolia
Morocco	Ministry of Interior
Mozambique	Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE), National Electoral Commission
Namibia	Electoral Commission
Netherlands	Electoral Council; Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
New Zealand	The Electoral Enrolment Centre
Nicaragua	Supreme Electoral Council
Nigeria	Independent National Electoral Commission
Norway	Ministry for Local Government and Regional Development
Palestine	Central Elections Commission
Panama	Electoral Tribunal
Paraguay	Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice
Peru	National Jury of Elections
Philippines	Commission on Elections
Poland	National Electoral Commission
Portugal	Ministry of Internal Administration, Directorate General for Internal Administration; National Electoral Commission
Romania	Permanent Electoral Authority Central Election Bureau
Russia	Central Election Commission
Senegal	Directorate General of Elections (DGE), Ministry of the Interior; Autonomous National Electoral Commission
Singapore	Elections Department, Prime Minister's Office
Slovenia	Central Election Commission
South Africa	Independent Electoral Commission
South Korea	National Election Commission
Spain	Central Electoral Board
Sweden	The Swedish Election Authority
Switzerland	Swiss Federal Chancellery - Section of Political Rights
Taiwan	Central Election Commission
Tanzania	National Election Commission
Thailand	Election Commission of Thailand
Uganda	The Electoral Commission
Ukraine	Central Election Commission
United Kingdom	Electoral Commission
United States	Federal Election Commission
Uruguay	Electoral Court
Venezuela	National Electoral Council
Vietnam	Election Council; The Standing Committee of the National Assembly
Zambia	Electoral Commission
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

Appendix E. Individual Level Regressions by Country

Table 8.6: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Africa

	Botswana	Cape Verde	Benin	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Zimbabwe	Uganda	Tanzania	Burkina Faso	Zambia
Age (Decades)	0.02	0.08	0.21	0.03	0.12	0.16	0.15	0.06	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.03	0.00	0.12	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.24	0.15
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
		*	***		**	***	***		***	***	*			***		**	***	*	***	***
Female	0.05	0.03	-0.06	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.10	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.05	0.09	0.17	0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
					*						*				*	***	***			
High Income	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.14	-0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.05	-0.04	0.18	0.05	0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)
				***								***	*							
Low Income	0.04	-0.09	-0.11	0.00	0.01	-0.03	0.04	-0.12	-0.05	-0.01	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.08	0.04	-0.14	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.11)
		*	*					**	*				*				***		**	**
Tertiary Education	-0.10	0.02	-0.09	-0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.05	-0.14	-0.03	-0.10	-0.11	0.01	-0.04	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	-0.05	-0.19	-0.02
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.57)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.36)	(0.19)	(0.22)
	*		*					**		**	*			*			**		***	
<i>Model Parameters</i>																				
N: Respondents	1111	1034	1151	1086	1071	1090	1138	1092	1074	1139	886	1110	2148	1023	2200	1131	2256	1156	979	1117
Deg. of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Pseudo R2	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.7: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Americas

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Belize	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Rep.	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Guyana	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
Age (Decades)	0.09 (0.02) **	-0.05 (0.01) *	0.01 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02) ***	0.19 (0.02) ***	0.02 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02) ***	0.06 (0.02) *	-0.05 (0.01) *	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.13 (0.02) ***	0.00 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02) *	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02) **	0.41 (0.02) ***	0.06 (0.02) *
Female	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.04) ***	-0.06 (0.06) *	-0.05 (0.06) *	0.00 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.04) ***	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06) *	0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
High Income	0.06 (0.09) *	0.04 (0.13) *	0.04 (0.28)	0.00 (0.10)	0.09 (0.11) *	0.09 (0.19) **	0.09 (0.07) **	0.03 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	0.04 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.15) *	-0.03 (0.14)	0.09 (0.13) **	0.05 (0.12) *	-0.06 (0.18) *	-0.01 (0.16)	0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.10)	0.10 (0.07) *	0.03 (0.06) *
Low Income	0.01 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06) **	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.08) **	-0.05 (0.10) *
Tertiary Education	0.03 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.04) *	0.08 (0.10) **	0.05 (0.09) *	0.12 (0.07) ***	-0.06 (0.07) *	0.09 (0.08) **	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.07) **	0.01 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.12)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.08) **	0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.10 (0.08) *	-0.06 (0.07) *
<i>Model Parameters</i>																					
N: Respondents	1358	2828	1397	1264	1462	1454	1482	1458	2877	1542	1374	1390	1557	1313	1523	1454	1511	1413	1475	1464	1457
Deg. of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Pseudo R2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.8: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Arab World

	Algeria	Palestine	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco
Age (Decades)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.19 (0.03) ***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
Female	0.22 (0.09) ***	-0.09 (0.08) *	0.04 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.10) **	0.15 (0.07) ***
High Income	0.00 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.11) *	-0.04 (0.10)	0.04 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.09) *
Low Income	-0.12 (0.12) *	-0.08 (0.10)	0.15 (0.10) **	0.05 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.10)
Tertiary Education	0.01 (0.09)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.04 (0.13)
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	618	1088	858	652	934
Deg. of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.9: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Asia

	Taiwan	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Japan	South Korea	Malaysia	Mongolia	Philippines	Singapore	Viet Nam	Thailand
Age (Decades)	0.04	0.01	0.22	-0.08	0.14	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.12	-0.04	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
			***		***			*	*		
Female	-0.06	-0.15	0.01	0.00	-0.07	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.16	0.03	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)
	**	*			*	***			**		
High Income	-0.03	-0.09	-0.11	0.01	-0.02	-0.11	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(-0.30)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.13)
			**			**					
Low Income	-0.01	-0.01	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.08	-0.13	-0.10	0.13
	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.07)
			*			*		*	*	*	***
Tertiary Education	-0.07	-0.01	-0.15	0.02	0.01	-0.16	-0.05	-0.07	0.00	-0.17	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)
	*		***			***		*		**	**
<i>Model Parameters</i>											
N: Respondents	1383	339	1538	847	1008	1073	1130	1133	903	1082	1275
Deg. of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Pseudo R2	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.10: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Europe

	Belarus	Czech Republic	Denmark	Germany	Hungary	Iceland	Lithuania	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Romania	Russia	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Ukraine	United Kingdom
Age (Decades)	0.28	0.09	0.35	0.30	0.12	0.16	0.06	0.10	0.33	0.08	0.14	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.10	0.22	0.07	0.34
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
	***	*	***	***	**	***	*	*	***	*	*			*			***	*	***
Female	0.04	-0.01	-0.12	-0.09	0.07	-0.13	0.00	-0.25	-0.16	-0.10	-0.19	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.10	-0.08	-0.17	0.02	-0.17
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)
				*	*	**		***	**	**	***				*		***		***
High Income	-0.05	0.03	0.14	0.14	0.01	0.09	0.10	0.17	0.05	0.06	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.01	0.06	0.13	0.01	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)
			*	*		*	**	**		*				***			**		**
Low Income	0.10	-0.02	-0.24	-0.16	-0.05	-0.07	-0.03	-0.11	-0.16	-0.07	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.11	-0.03	-0.14	-0.09	0.08	-0.11
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)
	**		**	**				*	**	*				***		*	*	*	***
Tertiary Education	-0.08	0.07	-0.01	0.15	0.14	0.01	0.05	0.16	0.09	0.12	0.04	-0.06	-0.05	0.12	0.06	0.18	0.14	0.02	0.08
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.07)
	*			*	**			**		***			*	**		**	**		*
<i>Model Parameters</i>																			
N: Respondents	800	1112	1728	1717	1319	1201	907	1619	1927	1476	748	1046	1306	1142	820	1004	1735	897	2518
Deg. of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Pseudo R2	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.03

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.11: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Africa

	Botswana	Cape Verde	Benin	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Zimbabwe	Uganda	Tanzania	Burkina Faso	Zambia
Supports Winner	0.16	0.16	-0.09	0.35	-0.07	0.24	0.30	0.28	-0.20	0.07	0.30	0.21	0.12	0.40	0.31	0.15	0.41	0.44	0.16	0.35
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
	***	***		***		***	***	***	***	*	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
Electoral Participation	0.00	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.03	0.10	0.18	0.05	-0.03	0.10	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.07)
		*			*	**	*	***	*	***	***	***	***		***	***	*		*	
Political Interest	-0.01	-0.04	0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.03	-0.05	0.06	-0.01	0.12	0.07	-0.10	0.17	-0.09	0.01	-0.16	0.13	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
												**	*	**	***	**		**	**	
Urban	0.05	0.09	0.01	0.06	-0.08	0.00	-0.07	0.01	-0.04	-0.20	-0.15	0.14	0.03	-0.07	0.01	-0.06	-0.06	-0.17	-0.17	-0.26
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
		*			*		*			***	**	**		*		*	*	***	***	***
<i>Model Parameters</i>																				
N: Respondents	1105	987	1147	1104	1066	1051	1131	1045	1099	1116	896	1101	2152	1026	2112	1037	2223	1145	1006	1086
Degrees of Freedom	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Pseudo R-Squared	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.07

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.12: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Americas

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Belize	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Rep.	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Guyana	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
Supports Winner	0.15	0.12	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.13	0.17	0.17	0.05	0.05	0.21	0.19	0.11	0.14	0.19	0.06	0.01	-0.08	0.20	0.15
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)
	***	***	**	*			***	***	***			***	***	**	***	***			*	***	***
Electoral Participation	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.00	-0.02	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.01	-0.04	0.08	0.03	-0.04	0.10	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.07)
					*	**	***			*	*	*	*	*		*				**	
Political Interest	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.06	0.16	0.16	0.19	0.11	0.13	0.26	0.13	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.19	0.04	0.14	0.08	0.38	0.21
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	***	***	***		***	***	***	***	***	***	***				*	***		***	*	***	***
Religious Attendance	0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.08	-0.06	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.13	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
				*	*			*				*					**	**		**	
Urban	-0.04	-0.10	-0.15	-0.05	0.01	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.15	-0.12	-0.21	-0.08	0.15	-0.07	0.00	0.01	-0.05	0.03	-0.07	-0.04
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.14)
		***	***							***	***	***	*	***	*					*	
Left-Wing	-0.07	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	0.04	-0.09	-0.05	-0.10	0.03	-0.11	0.00	-0.07	-0.02	0.05	-0.05	0.08	0.01	0.03	-0.09	-0.10	0.20
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
	*					**		**		**		*			*	*			**	*	***
Right-Wing	-0.04	0.06	-0.01	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.11	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.11	0.06	0.25	0.01	0.12	0.05	0.14	0.10	0.06	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)
		*			*		***	*	*	***	*	***	***	***	***	***	**	*	*	*	**
<i>Model Parameters</i>																					
N: Respondents	1199	2221	1089	791	1175	1220	1132	1167	1969	1442	1063	982	1359	1173	1292	1056	1163	1059	1351	1328	1271
Degrees of Freedom	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Pseudo R-Squared	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.13: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Arab World

	Algeria	Palestine	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco
Electoral Participation	0.38	0.24	0.20	0.19	0.32
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
	***	***	***	***	***
Political Interest	-0.02	0.21	-0.17	0.06	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
		***	***	*	*
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	883	1209	841	992	807.00
Degrees of Freedom	2	2	2	2	2.00
Pseudo R-Squared	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.14: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Asia

	Taiwan	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Japan	South Korea	Malaysia	Mongolia	Philippines	Singapore	Viet Nam	Thailand
Supports Winner	0.44	0.06	0.04	0.23	0.04	0.33	0.40	0.06	.	0.48	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	.	(0.11)	(0.08)
	***			***		***	***	*		***	
Electoral Participation	0.00	0.11	0.14	0.10	0.19	0.09	0.10	0.01	0.09	0.24	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)
			***	*	***	*	**			***	*
Political Interest	-0.07	0.02	0.03	-0.08	0.07	0.02	-0.07	0.10	-0.11	-0.12	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
	**			*	*		*	**	*	*	**
Urban	-0.07	.	-0.24	0.01	-0.05	-0.11	-0.10	-0.16	.	-0.19	-0.06
	(0.08)	.	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	.	(0.09)	(0.08)
	**		***			**	**	***		**	*
<i>Model Parameters</i>											
N: Respondents	1393	349	1509	877	1017	1069	1139	1121	906	1037	1315
Degrees of Freedom	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	4	4
Pseudo R-Squared	0.08	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.01

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.15: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Europe

	Belarus	Czech Rep.	Denmark	Germany	Hungary	Iceland	Lithuania	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Romania	Russia	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Ukraine	United Kingdom
Supports Winner	0.11 (0.22) *	0.49 (0.08) ***	0.11 (0.09)	0.15 (0.07) **	-0.14 (0.08) **	0.03 (0.08)	0.12 (0.14) **	0.29 (0.06) ***	0.08 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.21 (0.10) ***	0.04 (0.1)	0.26 (0.09) ***	0.10 (0.12) **	0.23 (0.10) ***	0.00 (0.10)	0.02 (0.07)	0.11 (0.11) **	0.05 (0.05)
Electoral Participation	0.10 (0.21) *	0.26 (0.11) ***	0.15 (0.20) **	0.18 (0.12) ***	0.21 (0.09) ***	0.01 (0.16)	0.04 (0.22)	0.15 (0.11) **	0.15 (0.10) **	0.21 (0.07) ***	0.11 (0.11) *	0.00 (0.18)	. (0.09)	0.18 (0.12) ***	0.05 (0.12)	0.12 (0.16) *	0.31 (0.07) ***	0.07 (0.14) *	0.13 (0.08) ***
Urban	-0.08 (0.14)	0.13 (0.07) **	-0.15 (0.09) *	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.1)	0.21 (0.1) ***	0.02 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.07) *	0.10 (0.07) **	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09) **	0.12 (0.07) ***	0.00 (0.08)	0.03 (0.11)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.10) ***	. (0.10)
Left-Wing	-0.01 (0.23) **	-0.12 (0.11) **	-0.13 (0.13) *	-0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.11) ***	-0.23 (0.12) ***	0.07 (0.13)	0.09 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.02 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.09) ***	0.10 (0.11) *	-0.09 (0.12) *	0.13 (0.13) *	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.02 (0.08)
Right-Wing	-0.04 (0.14) *	0.11 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.12) **	-0.13 (0.11) **	0.11 (0.09) *	0.33 (0.10) ***	0.02 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.11 (0.09) **	-0.09 (0.11) *	0.07 (0.16)	0.07 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.12) *	0.03 (0.07)
<i>Model Parameters</i>																			
N: Respondents	337	1167	1870	1774	1096	1323	641	1666	1945	1319	936	708	1019	1019	839	935	1731	562	2257
Degrees of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	4
Pseudo R-Squared	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.16: Multivariate Models of Media Attention in Africa

	Botswana	Cape Verde	Benin	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Zimbabwe	Uganda	Tanzania	Burkina Faso	Zambia
Newspaper Attn.	-0.17 (0.04) **	0.05 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.06) *	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05) *	-0.12 (0.05) **	-0.19 (0.05) ***	-0.08 (0.05) *	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.05) *	0.01 (0.04)	-0.14 (0.03) ***	-0.10 (0.04) **	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.10 (0.04) **	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.21 (0.05) ***	-0.09 (0.05) *
Television Attn.	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.14 (0.03) ***	-0.11 (0.04) *	0.08 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.03) *	0.09 (0.03) **	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.13 (0.03) ***	-0.13 (0.04) *	-0.11 (0.04) *	-0.07 (0.04) *
Radio Attn.	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04) *	-0.08 (0.04) *	0.00 (0.03)	0.13 (0.03) ***	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.03) *	0.01 (0.05)	0.08 (0.03) *	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.13 (0.04) *	0.05 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Political Knowl.	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06) *	-0.05 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04) *	0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06) *	0.09 (0.05) **	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.00 (0.08)	0.04 (0.05)
<i>Model Parameters</i>																				
N: Respondents	1127	1035	1157	1106	1078	1102	1146	1089	1120	1142	934	1116	2171	1043	2203	1136	2262	1174	1021	1117
Deg. of Freedom	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Pseudo R2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.17: Multivariate Models of Media Attention in Americas

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Belize	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Rep.	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Guyana	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
Newspaper Attn.	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.06	-0.05	0.12	.	.	.	0.03	-0.06	-0.09	-0.06	0.01	.	.	0.05	-0.05		
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	.	.	.	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	.	.	(0.03)	(0.03)		
					*	*	***				*			**	*						*
Television Attn.	0.05	0.07	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.12	-0.01	.	.	.	-0.07	-0.08	0.01	0.03	0.01	.	.	0.04	-0.01		
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	.	.	.	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	.	.	(0.03)	(0.04)		
		*				***					*	**									
Radio Attn.	0.09	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.05	.	.	.	0.06	-0.05	0.04	-0.05	0.06	.	.	-0.05	0.04		
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	.	.	.	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	.	.	(0.03)	(0.03)		
	**				*						*	*			*						
Political Knowl.	-0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.10	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.09	-0.02	0.02	-0.12	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.04)
								*		**			*				**			**	*
<i>Model Parameters</i>																					
N: Respondents	1348	2745	1293	1146	1383	1466	1472	1323	2677	1515	1263	1403	1529	1314	1438	1214	1503	1294	1423	1455	1299
Deg. of Freedom	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	1	1	1	4	4	1	4	4	4	1	1	4	1	4
Pseudo R2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.18: Multivariate Models of Media Attention in Arab World

	Algeria	Palestine	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco
Newspaper Attn.	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06) *	0.04 (0.08)
Television Attn.	0.28 (0.05) ***	0.22 (0.04) ***	-0.03 (0.04)	0.12 (0.04) **	0.01 (0.04)
Radio Attn.	0.20 (0.08) ***	0.23 (0.06) ***	-0.07 (0.10) *	0.04 (0.09)	0.05 (0.11)
Political Knowl.	-0.05 (0.05)	0.25 (0.04) ***	-0.13 (0.05) **	0.00 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.05) **
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	811	1209	841	988	926
Deg. of Freedom	4	4	4	4	4
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.19: Multivariate Models of Media Attention in Asia

	Taiwan	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Japan	South Korea	Malaysia	Mongolia	Philippines	Singapore	Viet Nam	Thailand
Newspaper Attn.	-0.02	.	-0.16	-0.11	.	0.03	0.03	-0.05	0.03	-0.05	-0.14
	(0.03)	.	(0.03)	(0.04)	.	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
			***	*							***
Television Attn.	-0.02	.	-0.19	0.06	.	-0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.14	0.13
	(0.04)	.	(0.03)	(0.06)	.	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
			***							*	***
Radio Attn.	-0.05	.	0.03	-0.06	.	0.03	0.07	-0.01	-0.04	0.07	0.02
	(0.03)	.	(0.03)	(0.03)	.	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
	*						*				
<i>Model Parameters</i>											
N: Respondents	1207	381	1539	868	1023	961	1097	1074	861	1045	1300
Deg. of Freedom	3	0	3	3	0	3	3	3	3	3	3
Pseudo R2	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.20: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Africa

	Botswana	Cape Verde	Benin	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Zimbabwe	Uganda	Tanzania	Burkina Faso	Zambia
Paid Employment	-0.12	0.04	0.04	0.06	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.09	-0.03	-0.22	0.00	0.20	-0.03	0.03	-0.08	0.06	-0.13	0.03	-0.22	-0.10
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.09)
	*									***		***			*	*	***		***	**
Past Econ. Worse	0.17	0.04	-0.07	0.12	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.09	-0.05	0.00	0.19	0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.11	-0.17	0.09	-0.20	0.06	0.00
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.10)
	*									*		*		**	**	**	**	**		
Past Fina. Worse	0.01	0.00	0.18	-0.05	-0.01	-0.07	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05	-0.08	-0.07	-0.06	-0.05	-0.01	0.14	0.04	0.11	0.05	-0.07
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.10)
			*										*			*				
Pres. Econ. Good	-0.13	0.15	0.03	0.04	-0.12	0.07	0.10	0.21	0.05	0.12	0.10	0.06	0.15	0.04	0.24	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.12	0.25
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
	*	**			*		*	**		*		***		***		*		*	*	***
Pres. Fina. Good	0.09	-0.01	0.11	0.02	0.13	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.03	-0.11	-0.01	0.19	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.09	-0.03	-0.07
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.10)
				*					*	***										*
Fut. Econ. Better	-0.05	0.10	-0.02	-0.06	0.26	0.03	0.17	0.27	0.02	0.02	0.16	-0.05	0.10	0.17	0.16	0.00	0.17	0.15	0.20	0.07
	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.11)
				***		**	**			*		**	*	***		***	*	**	**	
Fut. Fina. Better	0.19	-0.05	0.01	0.18	-0.06	-0.09	-0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.07	0.04	0.04	-0.02	0.00	-0.04	0.03	-0.09	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.11)
	*			*		*														
<i>Model Parameters</i>																				
N: Respondents	883	952	902	884	944	967	1034	679	810	928	662	1003	2054	779	1934	950	1873	866	732	828
Deg. of Freedom	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.02

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.21: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Americas

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Belize	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Rep.	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Guyana	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
Paid Employment	-0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.09)
													*						*	*	
Past Econ. Worse	0.13 (0.08)	0.18 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	0.04 (0.10)	0.06 (0.08)	0.11 (0.07)	0.05 (0.14)	0.06 (0.09)	0.09 (0.06)	0.08 (0.09)	0.05 (0.17)	0.08 (0.11)	0.02 (0.12)	0.04 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.05 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)	0.00 (0.07)	0.23 (0.10)
	***	***	*		*	**			**	*	*	*			*	*			*		***
Past Fina. Worse	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.10)	0.05 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)	0.08 (0.09)	0.04 (0.11)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.12 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.13 (0.10)
						*				*					*	*	*	*	**	**	**
Pres. Econ. Good	0.09 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.02 (0.12)	0.11 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.14)	0.10 (0.11)	0.07 (0.06)	0.10 (0.10)	0.01 (0.14)	0.25 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.01 (0.12)	0.14 (0.09)	0.11 (0.15)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	0.09 (0.16)	0.24 (0.07)	0.15 (0.10)
	*	*	**		**	*	*	**	*	**		***			***	***			*	***	***
Pres. Fina. Good	0.11 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.14 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)	0.07 (0.07)	0.05 (0.10)	0.17 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.03 (0.15)	0.06 (0.07)	0.07 (0.10)
	***						***		**					*	*	*	***	***			*
Fut. Econ. Better	0.12 (0.07)	0.12 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)	.	.	0.04 (0.07)	.	.	.	0.10 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	.	0.13 (0.08)	.
								***	***	*							*	***		**	
Fut. Fina. Better	0.09 (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	.	.	-0.03 (0.07)	.	.	.	0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	.	0.00 (0.08)	.
								**	**												
<i>Model Parameters</i>																					
N: Respondents	1347	2763	1369	1215	1461	1419	812	1057	1995	1342	1326	1015	1206	1339	1485	1461	1204	1168	896	1155	890
Deg. of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	7	5	5	7	5	5	5	7	7	5	7	5
Pseudo R2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.05

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.22: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Arab World

	Algeria	Palestine	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco
Paid Employment	0.03 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08) *	-0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)
Pres. Econ. Good	0.17 (0.09) ***	-0.01 (0.12)	0.13 (0.09) **	0.04 (0.21)	0.31 (0.09) ***
Pres. Fina. Good	0.22 (0.09) ***	0.00 (0.08)	0.04 (0.09)	0.13 (0.08) **	0.15 (0.09) ***
Fut. Econ. Better	0.29 (0.09) ***	0.30 (0.08) ***	0.04 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08) *	0.16 (0.09) ***
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	828	1152	824	868	849
Deg. of Freedom	4	4	4	4	4
Pseudo R2	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.06

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.23: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Asia

	Taiwan	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Japan	South Korea	Malaysia	Mongolia	Philippines	Singapore	Viet Nam	Thailand
Paid Employment	-0.01	0.08	0.13	0.01	0.00	-0.08	-0.03	0.00	-0.15	0.08	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
			***			*			*		
Past Econ. Worse	0.05	0.15	0.07	-0.03	-0.02	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.03	-0.05	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.24)	(0.09)
	*						*				*
Past Fina. Worse	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.12
	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.09)
											*
Pres. Econ. Good	0.25	0.16	0.12	0.10	0.05	0.16	0.12	0.15	0.21	0.27	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
	***		**	*		***	***	***	**	***	
Pres. Fina. Good	-0.05	-0.16	-0.05	0.10	0.03	-0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	-0.02	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)
	*			*							
Fut. Econ. Better	0.04	0.16	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.14	0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.07	0.16
	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.29)	(0.09)
		*	*	*		**					***
Fut. Fina. Better	-0.01	-0.14	-0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.03	0.05	-0.02	0.06	0.06	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)
											*
<i>Model Parameters</i>											
N: Respondents	1169	306	1310	811	976	921	1098	954	827	1020	812
Deg. of Freedom	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Pseudo R2	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.05

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.24: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Europe

	Belarus	Czech Republic	Denmark	Germany	Hungary	Iceland	Lithuania	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Romania	Russia	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Ukraine	United Kingdom
Paid Employment	0.07	0.08	-0.08	0.03	0.02	-0.06	-0.03	-0.05	-0.18	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.03	-0.12	0.01	0.02	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)
	*	*							***							*			*
Past Econ. Worse	0.28	0.30	-0.02	0.14	0.32	0.14	0.18	0.03	0.10	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.06	0.23	0.07	0.16	-0.03	0.11
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.05)
	***	***		**	***	***	***		*				***	*	***		***		**
Pres. Econ. Good	0.30	0.27	0.25	0.23	0.15	0.20	0.03	0.27	0.17	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.24	0.07	0.24
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.47)	(0.05)
	***	***	***	***	**	***		***	***	***				**	*	*	***	*	***
<i>Model Parameters</i>																			
N: Respondents	746	1140	1833	1910	1392	1479	925	1728	2024	1516	1112	1068	1440	1740	1096	946	1929	909	2825
Deg. of Freedom	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Pseudo R2	0.08	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.25: Multivariate Models of Political Performance in Africa

	Botswana	Cape Verde	Benin	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Zimbabwe	Uganda	Tanzania	Burkina Faso	Zambia
Corruption Level	-0.04	-0.03	-0.18	-0.08	-0.09	-0.08	-0.09	-0.06	-0.06	-0.21	-0.23	-0.45	-0.20	-0.12	-0.09	-0.08	-0.14	-0.28	-0.13	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
			**	*	*	*	**		*	***	***	***	***	**	**	*	***	***	*	*
Trust Executive	0.15	0.25	0.07	0.29	0.26	0.17	0.16	0.40	0.11	0.08	0.27	-0.14	0.21	0.45	0.38	0.05	0.29	0.25	0.21	0.34
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)
	*	***		***	***	**	***	***	**	*	***	*	***	***	***		***	***	***	***
Trust Judiciary	0.12	-0.06	-0.07	-0.01	0.14	0.04	0.03	0.23	0.05	0.01	-0.13	0.16	0.00	-0.05	0.06	0.07	0.00	0.14	0.01	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)
	*				**			**			*	**			*	*		*		
Trust Legislature	-0.02	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.18	0.01	0.05	0.09	0.14	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.15	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)
							*	*				*			*	***	***			
Trust Parties	-0.16	0.11	0.27	-0.16	-0.07	0.02	0.10	-0.13	0.04	0.14	-0.05	-0.15	0.07	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.09	-0.03	0.01	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)
	**		***	***			*	*		**	**	*				**				
Trust Police	0.05	-0.08	0.17	0.21	0.06	0.00	0.03	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.24	0.25	0.10	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.07
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)
			*	***					*	*	***	***	**		*					
Crime Victim	-0.12	0.03	-0.10	-0.05	0.04	-0.06	-0.12	0.08	-0.08	-0.05	-0.09	-0.01	-0.10	-0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.05	0.00	0.02	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.11)
	*		*		*	***		*				***				*				
<i>Model Parameters</i>																				
N: Respondents	925	580	941	891	987	940	1097	589	810	1008	714	1004	1976	693	1816	913	2027	1041	771	976
Deg. of Freedom	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.10	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.10	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.06

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.26: Multivariate Models of Political Performance in Americas

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Belize	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Rep.	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Guyana	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
Corruption Level	-0.10 (0.05) **	-0.07 (0.03) *	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.13 (0.03) ***	-0.08 (0.03) *	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.02) ***	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04) **	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.04) ***	-0.05 (0.03) *	0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04) *	-0.10 (0.04) ***
Trust Executive	0.14 (0.07) ***	0.22 (0.04) ***	0.20 (0.07) ***	0.19 (0.08) ***	0.26 (0.06) ***	0.19 (0.07) ***	.	0.29 (0.07) ***	0.35 (0.05) ***	0.23 (0.07) ***	0.32 (0.07) ***	.	0.28 (0.06) ***	0.21 (0.07) ***	0.32 (0.07) ***	0.25 (0.07) ***	0.20 (0.06) ***	0.19 (0.06) ***	.	0.28 (0.08) ***	.
Trust Judiciary	0.14 (0.08) ***	0.12 (0.05) ***	0.11 (0.07) ***	0.12 (0.08) ***	0.19 (0.07) ***	0.19 (0.07) ***	0.19 (0.06) ***	0.06 (0.07) *	0.05 (0.05) *	0.07 (0.07) *	0.24 (0.07) ***	0.20 (0.07) ***	0.28 (0.06) ***	0.14 (0.07) ***	0.16 (0.07) ***	0.08 (0.07) *	0.15 (0.07) ***	0.09 (0.08) **	0.07 (0.08) *	0.26 (0.08) ***	0.16 (0.07) ***
Trust Legislature	0.28 (0.08) ***	0.25 (0.05) ***	0.13 (0.08) ***	0.20 (0.08) ***	0.21 (0.07) ***	0.12 (0.07) **	0.18 (0.06) ***	0.18 (0.07) ***	0.24 (0.05) ***	0.26 (0.07) ***	0.15 (0.08) ***	0.29 (0.07) ***	0.21 (0.06) ***	0.19 (0.07) ***	0.22 (0.07) ***	0.19 (0.07) ***	0.16 (0.07) ***	0.14 (0.08) ***	0.10 (0.08) **	0.26 (0.08) ***	0.55 (0.07) ***
Trust Parties	0.15 (0.09) ***	0.15 (0.06) ***	0.13 (0.10) ***	0.20 (0.08) ***	0.10 (0.07) *	0.24 (0.07) ***	0.21 (0.07) ***	0.23 (0.08) ***	0.11 (0.06) ***	0.32 (0.07) ***	0.07 (0.08) *	0.22 (0.07) ***	0.27 (0.06) ***	0.28 (0.08) ***	0.10 (0.07) **	0.11 (0.09) ***	0.19 (0.07) ***	0.19 (0.09) ***	0.23 (0.08) ***	0.28 (0.08) ***	0.21 (0.08) ***
Trust Police	0.10 (0.09) **	0.17 (0.05) ***	0.11 (0.07) **	0.11 (0.08) **	0.24 (0.07) ***	0.16 (0.06) ***	0.11 (0.06) ***	0.10 (0.08) **	0.20 (0.05) ***	0.20 (0.06) ***	0.11 (0.08) **	0.12 (0.07) ***	0.09 (0.06) *	0.05 (0.08)	0.18 (0.07) ***	0.16 (0.06) ***	0.10 (0.06) *	0.01 (0.07)	0.29 (0.07) ***	0.09 (0.08) *	0.06 (0.09) *
Crime Victim	-0.08 (0.09) *	0.01 (0.09)	0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.31)	-0.01 (0.14)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.25) *	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.12)	0.00 (-0.30)	0.04 (-0.20)	-0.04 (0.29)
<i>Model Parameters</i>																					
N: Respondents	1220	2504	1168	988	1365	1311	1426	1276	2583	1396	1155	1229	1417	1148	1365	1339	1400	1191	1398	1172	1354
Deg. of Freedom	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	6
Pseudo R2	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.14

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.27: Multivariate Models of Political Performance in Arab World

	Algeria	Palestine	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco
Corruption Level	-0.14	-0.12	-0.18	-0.22	-0.22
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
	**	*	***	***	***
Trust Executive	0.26	0.18	0.02	0.30	0.19
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)
	***	**		***	***
Trust Judiciary	0.11	-0.05	0.03	0.11	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)
	*			*	
Trust Legislature	0.06	0.18	0.24	0.03	0.04
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.12)
		**	***		
Trust Parties	0.14	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.16
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)
	**				***
Trust Police	0.17	0.02	0.11	-0.01	0.06
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.09)
	***		*		
Crime Victim	-0.07	-0.07	-0.02	-0.08	-0.04
	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.42)	(0.27)	(0.16)
				*	
<i>Model Parameters</i>					
N: Respondents	754	1015	656	937	827
Deg. of Freedom	7	7	7	7	7
Pseudo R2	0.09	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.05

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.28: Multivariate Models of Political Performance in Asia

	Taiwan	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Japan	South Korea	Malaysia	Mongolia	Philippines	Singapore	Viet Nam	Thailand
Corruption Level	-0.21	-0.28	-0.23	-0.16	-0.16	-0.15	-0.11	-0.23	-0.21	-0.44	-0.25
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)
	***	*	***	**	***	***	**	***	***	***	***
Trust Executive	0.37	0.05	0.05	0.14	0.06	0.16	0.25	0.16	0.03	-0.11	0.17
	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.39)	(0.11)
	***			*		**	***	***			***
Trust Judiciary	0.06	0.03	0.15	-0.03	-0.08	0.16	0.04	-0.01	0.31	0.38	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.10)
	*		***		*	**			***	***	
Trust Legislature	-0.07	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.01	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.22	0.07	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.09)
	*			*			**	*	**		**
Trust Parties	0.00	0.18	0.16	0.08	0.11	0.08	-0.06	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.13
	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)
			***		*	*	*				*
Trust Police	0.01	0.05	0.12	0.16	0.08	0.10	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.19	0.06
	(0.07)	(-0.30)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.08)
			**	**	*	*				**	
Crime Victim	-0.04	.	-0.03	0.06	-0.10	-0.06	-0.07	0.04	-0.07	0.03	0.02
	(0.19)	.	(-0.20)	(0.81)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.64)	(0.14)	(0.17)
					**		*				
<i>Model Parameters</i>											
N: Respondents	1149	251	1298	735	926	888	1047	1016	779	923	1004
Deg. of Freedom	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Pseudo R2	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.10	0.08

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors)

Table 8.29: Multivariate Models of Group Memberships in Africa

	Botswana	Cape Verde	Benin	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Zimbabwe	Uganda	Tanzania	Burkina Faso	Zambia
Social Trust	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.06	0.20	0.08	0.06	0.34	0.08	0.12	0.15	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.14	0.06	0.12	0.02	0.12	0.14
	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
	*	*	*		***	*	*	***	**	***	*	*		*	***	*	***		**	***
Non-Partisan	0.03	0.07	0.14	-0.06	0.02	-0.12	-0.11	-0.07	-0.11	-0.07	-0.22	-0.10	-0.19	-0.06	-0.22	-0.03	-0.07	-0.14	-0.03	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
			*			***	**		***	*	***	*	***	*	***		**	**		*
Non-Religious	0.07	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.00	-0.06	-0.03	0.02	-0.11	-0.06	-0.04	0.12	-0.02	-0.05	.	0.06	-0.08	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.74)	(85.73)	(0.08)	(0.13)	.	(0.20)	(0.40)	(0.24)
					*	*					*					*			*	*
Ethnic Majority	0.07	0.09	-0.24	0.33	0.09	0.04	-0.02	0.03	-0.12	0.00	-0.01	0.14	0.10	0.04	0.13	-0.14	-0.13	0.10	0.08	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
		*	***	***	*				***			**	***		***	***	***	*	*	*
Religious Majority	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.09	0.02	-0.05	-0.04	0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.16	0.07	-0.02	-0.08	-0.03	0.06	0.05	-0.07	-0.05	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.00)
				*							*			*	*	*	*			
<i>Model Parameters</i>																				
N: Respondents	1119	783	1136	1102	1044	1095	1133	1008	1112	1137	779	1070	2164	1011	2125	1120	2254	1158	988	1113
Degrees of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5
Pseudo R-Squared	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.30: Multivariate Models of Group Memberships in Americas

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Belize	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Rep.	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Guyana	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
Social Trust	0.12	0.03	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.13	0.10	0.09	0.02	0.19	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.04	0.12	0.07	0.09	0.15	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
	***		***	**	*		***	***	***	**		***	*	**	***		***	*	**	***	*
Non-Partisan	-0.13	-0.15	-0.12	-0.11	-0.12	-0.09	-0.19	-0.17	-0.11	-0.11	-0.09	-0.02	-0.21	0.01	-0.14	-0.19	0.00	-0.09	-0.03	-0.30	-0.27
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
	***	***	***	***	***	**	***	***	***	***	***		***		***	***		**		***	***
Non-Religious	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.09	-0.06	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.09	0.10	0.01	-0.02	0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.08	-0.14	0.04
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)
						*	*					**	*						*	***	*
Ethnic Majority	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.11	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.05	-0.31	-0.05	-0.06	0.00	-0.04	-0.04	-0.11	0.05	0.04	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)
		*				***					*	***		*				***			*
Religious Majority	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.08	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.03	-0.05	.
	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	.
							*						*		*	**					
<i>Model Parameters</i>																					
N: Respondents	1364	2746	1410	1301	1449	1415	1451	1373	2752	1445	1370	1373	1514	1394	1435	1402	1475	1346	1406	1373	1398
Degrees of Freedom	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
Pseudo R-Squared	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.31: Multivariate Models of Group Memberships in Asia

	Taiwan	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Japan	South Korea	Malaysia	Mongolia	Philippines	Singapore	Viet Nam	Thailand
Social Trust	0.01	0.10	0.17	0.10	0.13	0.03	0.01	0.16	0.20	0.38	0.26
	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)
			***	*	***			***	***	***	***
Non-Partisan	0.09	-0.08	0.06	-0.18	-0.11	-0.11	-0.07	0.01	.	-0.46	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.07)	.	(0.11)	(0.07)
	***		*	***	**	**	*			***	*
Non-Religious	-0.05	.	-0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.04	-0.12	-0.05	-0.19	0.06	-0.03
	(0.09)	.	(1.03)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.17)
	*						*		**		
Religious Majority	0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.07	-0.04	0.00	-0.09		-0.08	-0.10	0.16
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.11)	.	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.12)
							*				***
<i>Model Parameters</i>											
N: Respondents	1339	345	1529	858	976	1049	1125	1093	918	1027	1306
Degrees of Freedom	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	4	4
Pseudo R-Squared	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.04

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.32: Multivariate Models of Group Memberships in Europe

	Belarus	Czech Republic	Denmark	Germany	Hungary	Iceland	Lithuania	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Romania	Russia	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Ukraine	United Kingdom
Non-Partisan	0.07	-0.06	-0.30	-0.28	-0.13	-0.08	-0.07	-0.18	-0.07	-0.15	-0.12	-0.03	0.04	-0.14	-0.04	-0.20	-0.25	-0.05	-0.14
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)
	*		***	***	***	*	*	***		***	**			***		***	***	*	***
Non-Religious	-0.03	-0.07	.	-0.14	-0.04	.	.	0.13	-0.12	0.03	0.00	.	-0.01	0.17	0.06	0.08	-0.10	0.08	-0.09
	(0.17)	(0.07)	.	(0.07)	(0.07)	.	.	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.35)	(0.60)	.	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.05)
				*				*	*					**					**
Ethnic Majority	0.04	0.06	0.13	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	.	.	0.18	0.05	0.00
	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.11)	.	.	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.12)
							***										***		
Religious Majority	0.10	-0.02	.	0.03	0.03	.	.	-0.08	.	0.00	-0.05	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.15	.	-0.09	0.09	0.00
	(0.13)	(0.13)	.	(0.08)	(0.09)	.	.	(0.08)	.	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.24)	.	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.05)
	*																		
<i>Model Parameters</i>																			
N: Respondents	832	1038	1988	1931	1427	1564	965	1790	2039	1607	1106	1114	1517	1779	1112	993	1987	842	2845
Degrees of Freedom	4	4	1	3	3	1	2	3	2	3	3	3	4	4	3	2	4	4	4
Pseudo R-Squared	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01

Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001