PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE INFLUENCE ON
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF
CASE STUDIES FROM WEST GERMANY, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA

by

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This thesis is my own original work.

[Signature]

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SYNOPSIS

Leading analysts in the field of foreign policy in a parliamentary democracy have long argued that Parliament can have no significant impact on foreign policy.

This thesis, through case studies of one part of the parliamentary system - the Foreign Affairs Committees - argues the contrary view that legislatures have actually exerted important influence on external policies, albeit in exceptional cases.

The thesis further seeks to derive some empirically valid generalisations concerning the circumstances and conditions under which the possibilities for such influence are greatest. In deriving these generalisations I have undertaken case studies of three parliamentary systems with significantly different traditions - the Australian, Canadian and West German - in order to determine the extent to which key variables are system bound or whether and to what degree they are valid beyond national boundaries.
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INTRODUCTION

Parliament's participation in the area of foreign policy has remained a source of conflict and confusion since de Tocqueville's suggestion that the natures of democracy and foreign policy are not easily reconciled. While parliamentary Committee influence on foreign policy decisions has to be seen in this wider context, I have not tried to discuss this complex issue in terms of political philosophy. However, an attempt has been made to describe an important aspect of the relationship between Parliament and foreign policy. Even here I have confined myself to a discussion of the influence of parliamentary Committees on foreign policy decisions. It is true, of course, that while Parliament's actions embrace those of its Committees, its overall activities span a wider range. These non-Committee activities, such as 'question time', debates on foreign policy issues and individual influence on the Government's foreign policy exercised by non-Committee members, consequently will not be extensively discussed. In any case, as will be demonstrated, nearly all parliamentary foreign policy activities normally almost inevitably involve Committee members. Moreover, while it is acknowledged that there can be parliamentary influences outside of the Committees, it is argued that the Committee's activity represents one of the most important forces. This, of course, does not imply that Parliament has any automatic significance in formulating Government policy.

Once the parliamentary influences on a Government's foreign policy have been delineated, the means whereby such influence can be exerted should next be examined.

One tactic which conceivably influences the Government's foreign policy decisions is that of public accusation. Its aim

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1 De Tocqueville, of course, was referring to the American presidential system but the point is equally, if not more valid for a parliamentary system.
is to discredit the Government within and particularly outside Parliament. The effect of this tactic is mainly to unite Government supporters, polarise public opinion and, more importantly, divide further Government and Opposition supporters rather than directly influence foreign policy decisions. From this stage onwards there no longer exist supporters and opponents of a particular issue but only supporters and opponents of the Government. Because of the divisive effect I call this 'divisive politics'. Aspects of divisive influence have been described by both Government and Opposition Committee members in terms of, for example, 'Opposition blackmail, vote hunting or ideological hoo-haa'. This characterises the overwhelmingly emotional nature of divisive influence.

An alternative way to influence Government decisions I shall call 'integrative politics'. This strategy intends to persuade and convince the executive rather than directly oppose it. It is often necessary to pursue this in a non-public, quasi-confidential manner. While the motives of seeking to influence a decision may vary, the aim is to change a planned course of action without subjecting the Government to embarrassing criticism. Another aim of 'integrative politics' is to require the executive to defend its planned actions rationally, to respond unemotionally to sincere and serious arguments and to supply further information. The effect of 'integrative politics' is to open up channels of communication with the executive and to create a cooperative atmosphere and a notion of mutual respect among backbenchers of different persuasion as well as between Committee members and the executive. Aspects of integrative politics have been described by interested parliamentarians in the following manner: 'We put the country first', or, more ironically 'Those Committee-statesmen ...'. Other parliamentary comments include: 'It's normal to want influence, but one has to be able to keep one's mouth shut', or 'We know how to handle the executive, but we need even more information'. And an Opposition member, reflecting the tension between integrative and divisive politics,
complained: 'The External Affairs Committee members have now gained some prestige and influence, but what about our party's interest?'

So far I have not clearly stated what I understand by 'influence'. While this term is to some extent self-evident I have not quantified the amount and extent of it. I intend to deal with some areas of influence lying between total or final control and any sort of impact, however small. I believe that parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees, although hardly infallible, provide inputs into the foreign policy decision-making process, which on balance result in improved decisions. This belief illustrates some of my normative values or prejudices which have led to the selection of this topic. These normative values also help to explain what I regard as the difference between influence and control. Here I am not referring to control in its absolute sense but rather to a series of checks and balances. In this context being in favour of more control represents a desire to increase the limits on the free reign of power by the executive. This type of control has been defined by Gordon Reid as a

periodic check on the executive government ... a periodic oversight, or the maintenance of a parliamentary audit - taking the analogy to call for random checks by parliamentarians. The purpose of control in these terms is to engender an attitude of responsiveness and accountability to the public, of prudence, rectitude and circumspection in official affairs - from the highest employee to the lowest.  

Consequently Reid's description of control can be seen to be influence on a higher moral plain. Idealistic elements of democratic purity appear to be overlaid on influence, and despite the apparent conflict with political reality, the moral qualities of control deserve consideration. While the considerable influence of these views in the selection of the

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topic must be acknowledged it was also recognised that an analysis of foreign policy decision-making was first required.

Reid himself acknowledges the immense difficulties in carrying out what he suggests and proposes that 'if the legislative function is weak ... the ability of the Houses to control the bureaucracy is also weak ...'.

Be that as it may in the area of domestic policy, in the area of foreign policy there can be no doubt that the legislative function is most severely limited. While constitutions in most parliamentary democracies have bestowed upon national Parliaments the power to make laws with respect to foreign affairs, defence and external trade in practice the legislators have, in Peter R. Baehr's words, found it 'hard to exercise their controlling function because of the following factors:

- secrecy on account of vital matters, concerning national interests;
- the resulting lack of sufficient information;
- limited applicability of legislative and budgetary powers to foreign policy'.

For different reasons and sometimes with regret, more often with satisfaction and most frequently with disinterest or indifference many contributors to this field have come to the conclusion that Parliament's role in formulating foreign policy is not a substantial one.

This verdict has been presented in such a convincing and comprehensive manner that, at least in the field of foreign

3 Ibid., p.5.
policy, very little consideration has been given to possible changes. However in the nineteen sixties H. Kopf, West Germany's Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, was one of the few who stated flatly that foreign affairs was a 'combined power', shared jointly between Parliament and Government. His statement was ignored and dismissed by theoreticians and constitutional lawyers as wishful thinking.

Nevertheless Kopf and his Committee sought and occasionally found 'power via the backdoor', despite former rulings of the highest court, thus establishing precedents for parliamentary influence in foreign affairs. This sort of parliamentary power 'via the backdoor' appears to have added a new dimension to the relationship of Parliament and foreign policy.

This is in seeming contradiction to the views of J.D.B. Miller describing the Australian Committee influence:

The role of the Australian Parliament in foreign policy is the same as that of any other Parliament working to the rules of responsible government. It cannot make foreign policy; this is the task of the executive.

While Miller's statement does not preclude parliamentary influence over foreign policy, he goes on to list specific functions which in practice add up to extremely limited influence indeed:

[Parliament can be] ... a sounding board, from which the Government and Opposition can project their views on what should be done, and partly that of a self-educating device whereby Members, whether previously specializing in foreign affairs or not, can enlarge their knowledge by service on the Foreign Affairs Committee, by trips abroad, and by participation in the rough-and-tumble of parliamentary discussion. It is not a substantial role. But, short of an adoption of the system of separation of powers, I do not see how it could be.

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7 J.D.B. Miller, op. cit., p.6.
8 Ibid.
J.D.B. Miller's description of the existing Australian situation in this area appears to have a broad base of empirical support, but exceptions exist where the Committee role did have significant substance. Furthermore, H. Kopf's experience suggests, even without adopting a system of separation of powers, the possibility of securing parliamentary Committee influence in the field of foreign policy. Indeed, I shall argue it is not the principle of the division of powers that is the decisive factor which determines whether Parliament (or its Committee) exercises influence on foreign policy decisions. I believe it depends more on the capability and keenness of one side in pursuing influence and of the other in opposing this.

Having already distinguished two types of politics, namely divisive and integrative, the nature of the two 'sides' mentioned above should be outlined. Political theorists have considered this problem in terms of a conflict between executive and legislature and/or between Government and Opposition.

Most academics nowadays consider that the former (executive versus legislature) has become outmoded and that the latter is more appropriate in describing the political realities of the present system. Hardly anyone today believes that Parliament as such opposes the Government: Party loyalties within the governing group will normally prevent it from strong and public criticism of the Government, let alone force a change of action upon the executive, especially in the field of foreign policy. Very rarely will a Government backbencher feel he can accept the odium of a traitor; he might however try to achieve a compromise in the party room with various degrees of success.

Public and severe criticism of the Government's decisions or intentions has become the domain of the parliamentary Opposition. This Opposition is not only expected to articulate justifiable criticisms, but may also indulge itself in political hyperbole. This self-assigned role, often supported by political theoreticians, appears to require what has previously been described as divisive politics.
While in general the relationship between the Government and its backbenchers can best be described in terms of integrative politics, and that between Government and Opposition in terms of divisive politics, the relationship between the Government's foreign policy decision-maker and the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee is more subtle and requires a more complex description. It first appears necessary to elucidate the composition of the Committee and the executive grouping with which the Committee has to deal.

The Chairman of a Foreign Affairs Committee normally belongs to the Government party or parties; in Germany he can also be a member of the Opposition. Chairmen of the Committee are usually members with a specially keen interest in foreign affairs and include an ex-foreign affairs minister and MPs who looked to the Chairmanship of the Committee in terms of a lifetime career.

Members of the Committee often include future Cabinet members and sometimes Prime Ministers or Chancellors. Even in Australia H. Turner has pointed to the large number of ex-Committee members achieving ministerial positions. Most members of the Committee are also members of their party's and their parliamentary party's foreign affairs committees.

On the other side the executive grouping dealing with the Committee normally consists of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers, sometimes the Prime Minister or Cabinet, in Canada and Germany the respective Parliamentary Secretaries of State, the head of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Departments, other top bureaucrats and occasionally other lower-ranking officers from these Departments.

Introducing the composition of the parliamentary Committee and the executive grouping as above does not necessarily delineate the nature and dividing line between opposing factions. A description of the nature of the workings of a parliamentary

Foreign Affairs Committee cannot always be given in terms of Parliament versus executive, Opposition versus Government or even parliamentary Committee versus parts of the executive. While elements of these theoretical confrontations will always be present, I will suggest that influential Committee operation demands abandonment of any rigid structure of confrontation, in favour of ad hoc alliances across party and bureaucratic lines. I call these loose alliances 'fluid coalitions' since in practice they represent the contending factions in any foreign policy decision. While these fluid coalitions may be composed of exactly the above theoretical groupings (Government versus Opposition etc.), very often they transcend party interest and departmental or other loyalties. A formation of such coalition is only possible when interest in and concern for a specific foreign policy issue overrides the prescribed positions or conversely where it does not threaten those positions. It is, of course, very difficult for an Opposition Committee member to abandon the idea that one of his main roles should be to expose the Government's faults and for Government Committee members to criticise their Government. It is also very hard for a Foreign Affairs or Defence Minister to concede changes and it needs an outstanding bureaucrat to admit that good judgement can occasionally also be found outside his department. From this it appears clear that integrative politics is the only means by which fluid coalitions can operate. As we shall see in the case studies there is no reason to believe that power politics has been naively abandoned, merely that the means by which power is exercised have been changed. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that parliamentarians in general and Opposition members in particular cannot achieve their objectives because the representatives of the executive are more familiar with the system and the use of integrative politics.

Political 'realists', especially in Australia, will nevertheless argue that the above set-up is strongly influenced by idealism or elitism, by wishful thinking or even ideology. Normativists who show a great concern over parliamentary
influence in terms of parliamentary control will argue that the means by which I suggest control shall be exercised run contrary to the aims and purposes of control itself. Of course, classical forms of divisive politics can contribute to control. Thus Opposition attacks on a particularly vulnerable matter can cause the Government embarrassment and force a change in policy or administration. However, I shall argue that apart from exceptional cases, in dealing with matters of foreign policy substance over the long run the parliamentary Committee will be most able to secure responsiveness to its initiatives from the executive by means of integrative politics.

While conceding that a system of integrated politics cannot guarantee parliamentary control in the above sense, it represents a step forward in its achievement and most definitely does not exclude it. What it does often exclude, however, is direct accountability to the public. Nonetheless, public accountability is only one step removed since it occurs through the public's representatives in Parliament. While some people may regard this as having removed the decisive element in control, I pose the question, what are the alternatives?

While I have indicated my sympathy for increasing parliamentary control or influence on foreign policy decision-making this is not one of the main topics of my thesis. The views of J.D.B. Miller and the rulings of the highest German Constitutional Court are typical of all those who either maintain that there should not be or that there cannot be any considerable parliamentary influence or control on the formulation of a Government's foreign policy under a parliamentary system. An investigation into the practical possibilities of parliamentary Committee influence could therefore create the framework for a serious discussion upon pros and cons of parliamentary control in the field of foreign policy. So far such a debate has not eventuated because the existence of parliamentary influence has not been demonstrated. Such a demonstration would remove the problem of desirability of Committee influence from the problem of its possible and effective implementation.
For this reason I have concentrated on the following question:

- Are there or have there been Foreign Affairs Committees which exert or exerted an influence, whether large or small, on foreign policy decisions under a parliamentary system?

Furthermore a cautious attempt has been made to formulate tentative propositions dealing with the following questions:

- If influence exists, what circumstances contributed towards its effective achievement?
- Was this influence unique to specific situations or are recurring patterns observable?
- To the extent that patterns exist, are they limited to single political cultures or do they operate in all parliamentary democracies under analysis?

For these purposes I have selected several case studies from West Germany, Canada and Australia. I chose these countries because of what I believed to be their differing experiences with influence exercised by parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees. From previous research I felt justified in assuming that West Germany exemplified a relatively high degree of Committee influence; Australia is generally considered as having a singularly weak parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. I expected Canada to occupy an intermediate position, because although operating under the Westminster system the Canadian parliamentary Committees are relatively well developed.

Despite the fact that there are similarities between the three countries\(^{10}\) I have chosen these parliamentary systems because of their differences. There are differences in political culture and political tradition; their constitutions and standing orders of Parliament are also greatly different.

\(^{10}\) Basically, West Germany, Canada and Australia have two-party systems; in each case smaller parties exist which often have an important impact on the forming of a Government. All three countries are federations. All three states have been confronted with the problem of parliamentary influence in foreign policy decisions only after World War II.
While it is acknowledged that all these factors can have and have had some bearing on foreign policy decisions and perhaps on the workings of the Committees I have concentrated my analysis on the political behaviour of the Committee members and members of the executive grouping.

Generalisations from such an analysis promise to have some broader validity if based on a diversity of case studies selected from such different national systems.

Since the main aim of the thesis is to establish whether parliamentary Committee influence in the field of foreign policy is in practice possible or not it is necessary to examine case studies which are likely to yield a positive result. Consequently no attempt has been made to present a balanced comparison of the case studies from different countries. Naturally, because of West Germany's suspected inclination to allow some degree of parliamentary Committee influence on foreign policy decisions a preponderance of case studies have been selected from this country.

While I have selected, at least in the case of West Germany and Canada, some of the most important foreign policy decisions in these states I cannot claim that these case studies are representative of the Committees' general importance in the foreign policy decision-making process. Even if these case studies indicate that considerable Committee influence in the field of foreign policy is possible I am not going to argue that in Canada or even in West Germany the Committee always represents a major foreign policy decision-maker. What can be argued, however, in this eventuality, is that the Committee is sometimes a potentially important force in the foreign policy decision-making process, and while I do not believe that the Committee is or always should become involved in all decisions, I do believe that its potential influence can contribute to fulfil the function of parliamentary control.

In the event that parliamentary Committee influence or foreign policy decisions can as a practical possibility be
established I shall attempt to formulate propositions which can be thought of as the necessary but not sufficient conditions for this influence to be exercised.

The reason for the different proportion of case studies selected from Australia, Canada and West Germany has already been given. The amount of attention allotted to each of the case studies however also requires some explanation. There are several reasons. The amount of material available was a major factor. Within this limitation the degree of detail devoted to the individual studies was partly determined by what was regarded as necessary to illustrate the importance or otherwise of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee in the decision-making process. Furthermore, previous contributions to a specific subject have affected the extent of its consideration. Finally, in some cases I regarded a detailed historical description of extremely important foreign policy events, which had not yet come under close investigation, as having a value sui generis.

A brief introduction to the selected case studies can now be presented. Following the advice of German parliamentarians I examined three of the most important instances of parliamentary influence in the history of the Federal Republic.

Chapter One examines the Jaksch-Report, which can be seen as the forerunner in the early 1960s of the West German Ostpolitik in the seventies. This report has only recently been discovered by academics. It is hard to imagine the degree of co-operation between the various participants during the discussions which led to the Jaksch-Report, since ironically, at the present time there is a considerable divergence in the views of the different parties on exactly this topic. Even in the sixties, however, everything was not plain sailing and the chapter analysis shows an integrative approach developed gradually over time.

In the eyes of many German parliamentarians, influence of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the so-called Franco-German Friendship Treaty stands out as an example of Parliament's
capacity to affect foreign policy decisions. The second chapter examines this assertion. The outcome of this analysis assumes a high degree of significance since this treaty touched upon foreign policy problems of the greatest importance for West Germany.

The third chapter, an analysis of a treaty between France and West Germany about the Mundat Forest, deals with a conflict between Parliament and Government or, more accurately, between the political elite and the majority of the backbenchers of all parties. The motives of those MPs who effectively blocked ratification of that treaty were widely different, and for some readers this case will not be more than, perhaps, an amusing anecdote to West Germany's history. Like the first case, however, the Mundat Forest Treaty supports the thesis in that a formal legislative function will render it easier for Parliament to exert influence on a Government decision. In other words when it is formally necessary for Parliament to give its consent the Committee members need not rely solely on integrative politics.

The selection of a case study dealing with the influence of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on the formulation of Australia's foreign policy was particularly difficult. On the one hand there was no clear-cut case in which considerable influence could be easily identified. On the other hand, however, there were a few cases where the Committee was not as unimportant as a reading of Miller's article would suggest. While by international standards the Committee's influence on Australia's foreign policy decision-making must be regarded as low, it appears that nearly all Committee reports had a certain effect on Australia's foreign policy. Even Australian parliamentarians when asked could not agree in which case the Committee's influence was strongest. In Chapter Four I have chosen an analysis of the Committee's Aid Report, because this report had been completed and its effects were already evident, whereas the other alternatives such as the Omega issue or the Russian threat in the Indian Ocean were issues that were unresolved. This analysis deals
not only with the manner in which a Committee in Australia attempts to exert influence but it also throws some light on the reaction of the Department of Foreign Affairs to an issue which impinges on a particular departmental interest.

Difficulties arose also with the analysis of the most suitable case study in Canada. These difficulties, however, did not refer to the selection of the case study. Here there were no alternatives. Canada's 1969 decision to remain in NATO under certain conditions has therefore been chosen for analysis in Chapter Five. This is probably the most important foreign policy decision in the history of post-war Canada. It was part of the only comprehensive review of the nation's foreign policy. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House was explicitly invited by the Government to participate in this review, and although this is still a matter of dispute some analysts argue that the Committee exerted a significant influence on this case. Not the influence as such but the determination of the degree of influence produced the above-mentioned difficulties. A multiplicity of competing factors were involved in this decision and nowhere else was their entanglement of the competing factors so complicated.

After analysis of these five case studies which have been selected principally to establish the possibility of parliamentary Committee influence on the foreign policy decision-making process, it became clear that further case studies were required in order to elucidate some general principles involved in such influence.

To this end I have selected three further case studies, one from Canada and two from West Germany. These three cases also provided a test of some of the underlying assumptions which have characterised the presentation of the earlier case studies. The question is whether it was a valid approach to assume that an analysis of the political behaviour of foreign policy actors in three different parliamentary systems would supply sufficient data and insights, not only to establish the possibility of Committee influence but also to formulate some general principles. Alternatively, does the difficulty of
A note on sources and methodology is now in order. The unusual feature of this thesis is its heavy reliance on interviews. This was made necessary by the nature of the inquiry, i.e., the behaviour of politicians in situations where written documentation was frequently unavailable.

In the German case, procedures of strict confidentiality of Committee documents made recourse to interviews the only possible way to provide a detailed reconstruction of events. In the Canadian and Australian cases, while such strict confidentiality did not always exist, nevertheless there were frequently gaps in the written documentation which could only be filled by interviews. In the Australian case, moreover, I was able to gain access to some documents which could not be cited; therefore it was necessary to confirm the information by use of interviews.

Naturally, rules of evidence are necessary for evaluating and using such material. At the outset it must be stated clearly that every interview source must be taken for what it is: the statements of politicians who are not above consciously or unconsciously distorting reality to enhance their own roles and positions. In addition, quite apart from the question of motives, the human memory is fallible and human errors are inevitable. Accepting these limitations, however, I have applied the following rules in order to ensure, as far as possible, the accuracy of the statements used in this thesis.

First, no statement has been used when clearly conflicting evidence is available from the sources, whether these sources be written or additional interviews. Second, a systematic effort was made to crosscheck data provided in interviews by pursuing the same points in interviews with other politicians as well as by reference to available written documentation. Third, a consistent effort was made to ascertain that each specific piece of factual information was consistent with the larger political context.

More narrowly, I have generally identified my informants but in some cases this was not possible because the individual concerned required anonymity. In these cases the reader can only accept the descriptions of the individuals concerned at face value and rest assured that the same rules of evidence have been applied as in those cases where the interviewees are identified by name.

Finally I can only again stress the need for circumspection in evaluating information drawn from interview sources given the inherent problem which also arises concerning written documents. The fact that the information is oral rather than written may create specific methodological problem but it does not make the evidence cited necessarily more suspect than that from documentary sources provided rigorous standards are applied.

10a) Of course, certain dubious statements have been included in the thesis to indicate the perspectives of the individuals concerned. But these have been clearly identified as personal opinions and contrary evidence has been cited.
transferring across national boundaries a specific nation's historic experience, political culture, international environment or constitutional framework render invalid any general conclusions?

The way in which a normally powerless Canadian Senate Foreign Affairs Committee 'persuaded' the Government to change its attitudes towards sugar rebates to the West Indies (Chapter Six), a case study of one of West Germany's first attempts to integrate itself into Western Europe (Chapter Seven) and an analysis of the parliamentary treatment of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik (Chapter Eight) have been selected to assist in the assessment of the relevance of these points.

The aim here has never been to provide a definitive answer to such fundamental questions. Rather, an attempt has been made merely to outline the means by which Committee influence has been effective in the selected cases. However, as a consequence some conditions have been tentatively proposed under which Committee influence on foreign policy decisions may re-occur in future. (Continued on page 14a)

Although this work should not be regarded as defining a general rigid principle, the establishment of the existence of Committee influence, the partial identification of the mechanism involved in its effective use and the proposal of conditions required for its future occurrence should be seen in the light of a stimulus for further detailed research.
CHAPTER ONE

THE ORIGINS OF OSTPOLITIK: THE JAKSCH-REPORT

This chapter analyses the emergence of the so-called Jaksch-Report which provided the basis for German Ostpolitik for more than a decade. As already mentioned this case encompasses examples of both divisive and integrative influence as it covers a transitional period in the strategies of the social democratic opposition. Initially, as analysed at greater length in Chapter Six, the Opposition adopted confrontational tactics whose fundamental aim was to appeal to the German public over the head of the Federal Government. In 1960 the Opposition publicly embraced a new approach aimed primarily at the parliamentary parties and particularly the Adenauer Government. In practice, however, this approach has been tested in the area of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee since the late 1950s.

A major, if at the time unrecognised, turning point in this transition process occurred in late 1957 with the Opposition's demand for the diplomatic recognition of Poland. As in previous years the SPD's intention was to rally public support against the Government's pro-Western foreign policy which implied in the eyes of the Opposition the permanent division of Germany. Also as in previous years the Government's reaction was to refer the matter to the Foreign Affairs Committee with the expectation that it would be buried there. Contrary to this expectation, over the next four years during the process of Committee consideration of the issue the Opposition reoriented its strategy to one of direct influence on the Government.

The crucial issue examined in this case study is the proper diplomatic posture of the Federal Republic towards the East European communist nations. In 1957-58 when the Committee initially became involved German policy towards the East was marked by considerable rigidity. The most prominent feature of this rigidity was the so-called Hallstein-Doctrine which prohibited diplomatic links with any country recognising East
Germany except for the Soviet Union. A small but significant change in this policy occurred shortly after the adoption of the Jaksch-Report when, in 1961, Bonn sent a senior diplomat to Poland for trade talks.

As the following analysis will argue the Jaksch-Report played a crucial role in facilitating the new, albeit tentative posture towards the East. The significance of the report was recognised by MPs of all parties, several of whom mentioned in interviews that they regarded it as the most important work done by the Committee up to that time. This report formed the theoretical basis for the joint eastern policy of the Government and Opposition during the 1960s up to the forming of the SPD/FDP coalition in 1969.¹ In the mid-sixties Foreign Minister Schröder regarded the report as a parliamentary instruction and justification for establishment of trade commissions in East Europe.² The report marked the first time that the Bundestag, which acted unanimously, "looked towards the East" and, in the words of former Committee Chairman and CDU-MP H. Kopf, that West German politicians "talked no more of enslaved nations but of communist governed states".³

The evolution in attitudes towards the East as reflected in the Jaksch-Report and the decision to send ambassadorial rank personnel to Warsaw was paralleled by changes in the attitudes of the SPD-Opposition. For most of the 1950s the SPD argued against a firm military alliance with the Western powers on the grounds that it froze the division of Europe into two camps and therefore prevented the re-unification of the German

¹ See Chapter Eight for post-1969 developments.

² Interview with the former CDU-MP and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, H. Kopf, Bonn,2 July 1973 (hereafter cited as 'Interview Kopf'); interview with the former CDU-MP and Chairman of the CDU/CSU Working Group on Foreign Affairs, E. Majonica, Bonn,6 July 1973 (hereafter cited as 'Interview Majonica').

³ Interview Kopf.
state. The SPD had also attempted to use this position for electoral advantage against the Government but the results had not been auspicious. To the contrary, in the 1957 Federal elections when the Government utilised the Hungarian revolt to call into question the SPD line the CDU/CSU won for the first and still only time an absolute majority. In the late 1950s SPD-strategists, recognising this fact, began to shift the party's foreign policy stance in a more pro-Western direction, a shift which culminated in the party's 1961 public endorsement of NATO.

A number of political forces which played critical roles in the unfolding of West Germany's new Eastern policy must be enumerated. For most of the 1950s the strongest opposition to any flexibility to the east came from the organizations of Germans who had been expelled from the former German territories taken over by the Eastern bloc countries. The expellees did not form one monolithic grouping; although there was an expellee political party, the BHE, the expellees also organised themselves within all major political parties. Despite the generally rigid position of the expellees in the 1950s their diverse organisational connections were also reflected in a variety of viewpoints, some of which were sensitive to the changing climate of the beginnings of detente. Nevertheless from the perspective of leading politicians of both major parties the expellees were a group whose position had to be modified if any changes in Eastern policy were to be politically feasible.

Another crucial factor was the division within the ruling CDU/CSU itself. Germany's foremost maker of foreign policy, Chancellor Adenauer, adopted as usual a pragmatic stance. Eager to maintain the expanded parliamentary majority of 1957 Adenauer's public stance was one of firm support for State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, i.e. the permanent departmental head, W. Hallstein. The Chancellor, however, was mindful of new developments - particularly those emanating from Washington - and he therefore allowed Foreign Minister von Brentano to explore new initiatives towards the East.
There were also latent divisions within the SPD as a result of the party's developing foreign policy reorientation. Some left-wing SPD parliamentarians were suspicious of any steps to embrace the Western alliance. Nevertheless this was a distinct minority view within the party and one of the former leaders of the left, Party Vice-Chairman Herbert Wehner, became one of the strongest proponents of a new Eastern policy.

Finally an introduction to role and composition of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee is in order. Under the Standing Orders of Parliament the Committee was empowered to discuss all matters referred to it by Parliament and to recommend appropriate action to the Government. More importantly, the Committee's consideration of all treaties was required before they could be dealt with by the Bundestag. In practice the activities of the Committee were extremely wide-ranging given the breadth of the terms of parliamentary referral. The actual status of the Committee was reflected in its membership which included leading politicians of both parties, such as the SPD-Chairman and Vice-Chairman and CDU/CSU party whips. This status was further reflected in the behaviour of leading Foreign Ministry personnel who always kept close tabs on Committee proceedings. Thus by the late 1950s the Committee consisted of key politicians who were sensitive to maintaining and expanding the importance of that body.

**EVENTS PRECEDING THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY**

Three developments preceding the Committee deliberations which eventuated in the Jaksch-Report must be elaborated.

First, the 1956 attack by Foreign Minister von Brentano on the expellees' influence over Eastern policy is a case illustrating the role of the group as a perceived impediment to policy adjustments.

The Reasons for the Strained Relationship Between the Foreign Minister and the MPs of the 'Expellees'

As early as 1956, Heinrich von Brentano had assessed the situation in foreign policy and had come to similar conclusions as the majority of the SPD. Immediately after the failure of
the Hungarian revolt a strictly confidential meeting was held by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Here, in the face of both the strong resistance of his own Secretary of State, Hallstein, and the MPs representing the expellees, the Minister had outlined the attitude the Federal Government would have subscribed to if the Hungarian Nagy Government had remained in power. Dr von Brentano had expressed the opinion to the Committee that, even if Hungary had maintained diplomatic relations with Ulbricht, the Nagy Government would have had to be supported and recognised by West Germany. On this occasion he asked the Committee to take up again and discuss the problem of diplomatic relations with the Eastern Bloc States. Probably Poland would succeed in breaking away from Moscow. In this event, recognition should not be delayed.

However, convinced of the necessity to improve relations between West Germany and Poland, the Foreign Minister also said that he would need the "backing of all parties" if there should be a diplomatic exchange between West Germany and Poland. This would only be possible, he maintained, if the "touchy business of the Oder-Neisse border" could be dealt with to the satisfaction of all concerned. The Department of Foreign Affairs would prepare an analysis of the general problems of a new Ostpolitik and present this study to the parliamentary Committee in due course.

The Foreign Minister's frankness not only indicated that a turning point in German foreign policy was envisaged, it also presented an explosive matter in the field of domestic policy: it was a barely disguised challenge to the expellees' MPs. At least the expellees' MPs did not regard von Brentano's foreign policy as anything else but an attempt to convince the majority in all parties about the necessity of a supra-partisan and flexible Ostpolitik. This would inevitably bring about a drastic curtailment of the power basis and influence of the expellees' organisations and their representatives in Parliament. If all parties, Government and Opposition together, would agree on a flexible Eastern policy, the expellees would not be able to play the parties off against each other on a problem which was of vital concern for them.\(^3a\) See note 41 p. 21 and note 211 p. 28; ibid.
However, von Brentano's attempt failed. Three weeks after his daring appearance in the Foreign Affairs Committee, after the Hungarian revolt had failed totally and the Soviet Union had completely reinstated its influence in Eastern Europe, decisive parts of the Brentano statement were leaked to the Spiegel and published on 5 December 1956. The Spiegel was able to supplement its report with the statement that after a change in the international situation the "group of refusers in the Foreign Ministry, led by the Chancellor's governor in this department", Secretary of State Professor Hallstein, had won the battle at present.  

There are two possible interpretations about which side could have informed the Spiegel about the confidential Committee meeting and for what motive. One possibility is that supporters of a flexible Eastern policy, particularly members of the Opposition, leaked this material to the press either out of frustration about the retention of the 'old' Eastern policy or, for party tactical reasons, to deepen the conflict within the CDU. The other likely possibility is that expellees' MPs committed this indiscretion on purpose to isolate von Brentano from his parliamentary party.  

Whichever interpretation one might prefer, it is certain that from this time onwards the expellees' MPs within the CDU/CSU held a suspicion for the CDU Foreign Minister which could only be surpassed by that harboured by the right-wing CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg. The bitterness of the expellees was so strong that - five years later - expellees' MPs of the CDU urged Wenzel Jaksch to include a paragraph in his preface to the Jaksch-Report which could be regarded as a direct reply to von Brentano's speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1956:

4 Der Spiegel, 5 December 1956.
Anyone, who regarded the 'Polish October' of 1956 as the beginning of Poland's breaking away from the Eastern Bloc, might have had the impression that the way towards German reunification had to lead via Warsaw. Such considerations supported the well-known proposals that reunification would have to be paid for with abandonment of the East German territories. These were illusions.

Second, the drafting in 1957 of the Paul-Report, which may be regarded as a precursor of the Jaksch-Report, illustrates the potential of the expellees to engage in integrative politics despite their perceived hard-line position.

**The Forerunner of the Jaksch-Report: The Paul-Report**

The representatives of the expellees had never been idle. The party which already indicated by its name that it had to be understood as an expellee pressure group, the Gesamtdeutsche Block/BHE, tried in the Foreign Affairs Committee to make the Federal Government commit itself in its Eastern policy to the interests of the expellees. The debates on the motion by the parliamentary party GB/BHE regarding the legal claim for the homelands of the German expellees led to the formation of a sub-committee within the Foreign Affairs Committee. The expellees' MP of the Social Democratic Opposition Ernst Paul was elected spokesman of the Committee in order to lend more weight to the concepts of the Committee and the plenum. (A similar step was taken later on with regard to the Jaksch-Report.)

The report by the SPD-MP Paul requested of the Federal Government that the "right of all expellees to their ancestral homeland should be expressed unequivocally". The Committee had also been of the unanimous opinion that "the right of all

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6 Deutscher Bundestag, II. Wahlperiode (hereafter cited as BT, II.WP), Drucksache 2406.

expellees to their ancestral homeland includes all political rights in their native country". Furthermore the Committee regarded 'as necessary' that the Federal Republic should "very strongly express this opinion" towards all foreign diplomatic representatives at any future ambassadorial conferences. The Committee further addressed a 'strong appeal' to the German public "not to jeopardize the pleading of the cause of the expellees' right to their homeland through statements which could be interpreted as willingness to forego German rights". 8

In paragraph V the report requested explicitly of the Federal Government that 'concrete measures' should be taken "to prepare and secure the pleading of the cause of the right to the German Eastern regions which are under foreign control". 9

These perceptions concerning the Ostpolitik did not create any problems during the fifties for either the Federal Government or the Social Democratic Opposition. Even if there had been any criticism of this stance, everyone agreed that it would have been impossible for domestic policy reasons not to support these foreign policy principles. Nevertheless, there did arise some conflict during the discussions on the Paul-Report. The BHE-MP Linus Kather and his deputy Gille tried to make the Committee and the plenum commit themselves to the German borders of 1938 - including the Sudeten regions - as the official borders of pre-war Germany. However, this attempt failed - partly because of the objections of some expellees' representatives which were not members of the GB/BHE. 10

The compromise which was reached included the "right to a homeland" of the Sudeten-Germans. However, at the same time it expressed quite clearly that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Lower House regarded the borders of the German Reich

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p.37.
10 Interview with the former SPD-member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Ernst Paul, Esslingen, 12th July 1973. (Hereafter cited as Interview Paul.)
of 31 December 1937 as the basis for a solution of the border question: "The Foreign Affairs Committee is of the opinion that the right to a homeland of expellees coming from regions outside the borders of the German Reich of 31 December 1937 must not leave the Federal Government unconcerned." 11

However, the search for a compromise of this kind had lasted a long time. When the Paul-Bericht was accepted unanimously on 24 June 1954 during the last meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee before the federal elections, everyone knew that for the time being this effort by the Committee would have no influence on foreign policy decisions in the Federal Republic. A debate and vote on this report in Parliament had become impossible because of lack of time. Thus, legally seen, this report turned out to be futile.

However, it was less the contents of what had been agreed on that gave this report its importance; more decisive for future debates of the Foreign Affairs Committee was the fact that an agreement on a significant question in German Ostpolitik had been reached at all and that apart from the BHE representatives the expellees' politicians had played the part of an integrating power. This was even more surprising as the following election campaign revealed an undiminished policy of confrontation between Government and Opposition in the field of foreign policy. However, the conciliatory atmosphere which had become apparent during the debates in the Foreign Affairs Committee already pointed towards possible changes in the relationship between Government and Opposition in the field of foreign policy. At any rate, there was still a long way to go to reach these changes.

Third, the question of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Poland in the context of Belgrade's recognition of East Germany in 1957 demonstrates differences over Eastern policy both within the Foreign Ministry and the CDU/CSU parties.

The Question of Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia and Poland

In 1957 the question of the West German posture towards the East became a live issue as it became apparent that Yugoslavia would shortly recognise the communist government in East Germany. Rifts in the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy became obvious when press reports indicated that the West German ambassador to Yugoslavia was ready to abandon important parts of the Hallstein-doctrine. Ambassador Pfleiderer had proposed to recognise the People's Republic of Poland as this was the only way in which Bonn could prevent Belgrade from recognising East Germany. 12

When Belgrade finally announced the recognition of the German Democratic Republic in mid-October the ambivalence of the CDU/CSU became evident.

At a meeting of the CDU in Berlin immediately following this event, the MP-Majonica wanted the Government to respond without delay to the steps taken by the Belgrade Government. Majonica endorsed the arguments of the Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, Professor Hallstein, who had predicted that the recognition of Poland by the West German Government would cause a chain reaction; numerous African and Asian states would be inclined to recognise East Germany as well. Similar consequences had to be expected if Yugoslavia was allowed to set up diplomatic relations with East Germany. Accordingly there would be only one option for the Federal Government: immediately recall the German ambassador from Belgrade and break off diplomatic relations to Yugoslavia. The majority of the CDU parliamentary party did not want to make any hasty decisions and refused to adopt a definite stand on this question at this moment. 13

12 *Die Welt*, 15 October 1957; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 October 1957.

13 *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 October; Interview Majonica.
On 16 October the CDU President of the *Bundestag*, Gerstenmaier, warned against an 'emotional decision'. However, two days later the Federal Cabinet decided to break off relations with Yugoslavia. The irresolution and ambivalence which the CDU had displayed in dealing with this problem must have been reason enough for the Opposition parties in the new Parliament to embark on new foreign policy initiatives. The joint action by the Opposition parties SPD and FDP with respect to a more flexible Eastern treaty also fulfilled the function of testing the solidarity within the Federal Government in general and the political stability of Foreign Minister Dr von Brentano in particular.

DIVISIVE POLITICS IN 1958-59: NO MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN POLICIES

In January 1958 the Committee took up the Opposition's motion concerning the diplomatic recognition of Communist Poland. The subsequent period lasting into 1959 was predominantly one of divisive politics although an abortive attempt to introduce integrative politics was made by the Opposition. Initially both sides presented sharply conflicting views within the Committee. Thus on 12 June 1958 CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg and SPD-MP Meyer argued their respective official party's position. Von und zu Guttenberg expressed doubts mainly concerning the consequences of recognising Poland for the Hallstein Doctrine. He feared that "two German embassies in the East European capitals would encourage non-aligned countries to recognize the GDR. This also would favour the Soviet theory of the existence of two German Governments".  

In contrast to this SPD-MP Meyer declared that "the influence of the GDR would increase, when there were no West German representatives in the most important East European capitals".

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14 *Die Welt*, 17 October 1957.
15 Jaksch-Report, p.11.
For a brief period in the middle of 1958 the Opposition tentatively attempted integrative politics. Opposition members sought to divert its activities away from rhetorical statements aimed at the public. They argued that general statements by party spokesmen should be replaced by detailed discussion under Committee confidentiality and requested that the Committee meet more frequently to deal with the Opposition motions. This approach, however, did not bear fruit, for, as in the words of SPD Committee member Paul, the CDU/CSU-members were unable to agree to such a procedure because they themselves were divided on the issue.17

Given this rebuff the Social Democrats then turned again to divisive politics and addressed the German public directly. In autumn 1958 Die Welt published an article by SPD-MP Professor Meyer advocating diplomatic relations with the East European countries.18 The Government parties also joined in the public commentary and in October von Guttenberg, answering as CSU-Foreign Affairs spokesman, declared "no ambassador to East Europe".19 Von Guttenberg's unequivocal statement, however, could not cover up divisions within the governing parties. These divisions were reflected in postponements of meetings to discuss the Eastern question by both the Cabinet and the Foreign Affairs working group of the CDU/CSU. As Die Welt commented with regard to the working group, "the second postponement of a discussion about this question reveals how there are apposite views even within the Christian Democrats".20

When the Foreign Affairs Committee again formally took up the Eastern question in April 1959 after a lapse of nearly eleven months, divisive politics were more stridently in evidence than ever. In Committee debates expellees of the CDU,

17 Interview Paul.
19 Die Welt, 18 October 1958.
CSU-MP von Guttenberg and CDU-MP Majonica not only strongly opposed any change in the official Eastern policy - a position also expounded by Secretary of State Hallstein before the Committee - they also launched strong partisan attacks against the SPD/FDP position. As von Guttenberg revealed in an interview, these partisan attacks were at least partly designed to polarise the issue along party lines with a view to undercutting the manoeuvrability available to Foreign Minister von Brentano who favoured a more flexible approach. Although the SPD leadership had probably already decided to modify its Eastern policy in the partisan atmosphere created by some CDU/CSU-MPs, most SPD- and FDP-MPs took up the challenge and responded in kind. They demanded that the Government take steps to prepare for the end of the rigid Eastern policy which, they charged, was only able to react to actions by the communist governments but which did not have any influence in these countries because of the absence of diplomatic representation. Full polarisation was not achieved, however, as Foreign Minister von Brentano and CDU-MPs Furler and Kopf - together with expellee leader and SPD-MP Wenzel Jaksch - according to Paul remained reluctant to embrace the hard line.21 Thus in the spring of 1959 discussion of the Eastern question was still dominated by sharply conflicting partisan views. However, there was already present in the views of von Brentano and the SPD leadership the basis for a compromise across partisan lines. What remained to be done was to gain new adherence to such a compromise particularly among the ranks of the expellees themselves.


Before any movement occurred in the expellees' position, the Foreign Minister made a new attempt to alter German Eastern policy which produced a strong reaction from the expellees.

21 Interview with the former CSU Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, K.T. Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Bonn, 4 December 1968 (cited hereafter as Interview Guttenberg); Interview Paul.
On 26 July 1959, during the conference at Geneva, *Die Welt* reported:

In order to find a new basis for the relationship between Poland and the CSSR, the Government is considering making the following proposal to these countries:

1. a non-aggression pact in the form of a treaty,
2. mutual renunciation of force,
3. discussion of a normalisation of relations.\(^{22}\)

It is unclear how far the Cabinet had been informed about this plan; however, the CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg was convinced that at least the Federal Chancellor had been told.\(^{23}\) The CDU-MP Rasner had been advised of the plans of the Foreign Affairs Minister.\(^{24}\) The SPD parliamentary party, too, had learned in advance about details of von Brentano's plan.\(^{25}\) However, the foreign expert of the CSU, von Guttenberg, and the chairman of the CDU working group for foreign affairs, Majonica, had not been informed.\(^{26}\)

After strong protests by the expellees' organizations, an interview with the Federal Chancellor was granted to their leaders. After additional protests by the CSU and parts of the CDU led by MP Majonica, the Federal Chancellor declared publicly that he disagreed with the offer to the East European states made by his Foreign Minister.\(^{27}\)

The decisive influence of the expellees was so evident that even the *FAZ*, a government-supporting paper, wrote:

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\(^{22}\) *Die Welt*, 27 July 1959.

\(^{23}\) Interview von Guttenberg.

\(^{24}\) *Die Welt*, 30 July 1959.

\(^{25}\) Interview with the adviser to the SPD parliamentary party working group on foreign affairs, Eugen Selbmann, Bonn, January 1969 (hereafter cited as Interview Selbmann I).

\(^{26}\) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, 30 July 1959; *Die Welt*, 30 July 1959.

\(^{27}\) *Die Welt*, 1 August 1959; *FAZ*, 31 July 1959; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28 July 1959.
But it is a different matter, whether we should allow the Eastern policy of the government to submit to the pressure of the expellees' organisations. We strictly oppose this.28

The political significance which the expellees organizations had gained with regard to the formulation of West German foreign policy was also reflected in the fact that foreign newspapers as well reported on this topic, e.g. the 
Guardian
provided an analysis of the relationship between the German Foreign Minister and the expellees' organizations.29

On 7 August the Foreign Minister reported the results of the Geneva Conference to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Here he stressed that the idea of the non-aggression pact was valid in principle. The world had to realise that West Germany was offering constructive suggestions. But, he admitted, the timing had not been right.30

However, these apologetic explanations by the Minister were not sufficient for the expellees' organizations. The president of the Union of Expelled Germans, the CDU-MP and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Hans Krueger, talked of the 'surrender politicians of the Foreign Ministry'.31 Thereupon the chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, Dr Krone, participated in a congress held by the expellees' committee of the CDU/CSU and the Exil-Landesverband Oder-Neisse (Exiles Association of Oder-Neisse, CDU).

Following this congress, Dr Krone declared to the press that the expellees' committee of the party agreed completely with the policy of the Government. Subsequently, the chairman of the Committee, von Keudell, specified, "We completely support the policy of the Federal Chancellor".32

28 FAZ, 31 July 1959.
30 Interview von Guttenberg; Die Welt, 8 August 1959.
31 Koelnische Rundschau, 12 September 1959.
32 Koelnische Rundschau, 30 September 1959.
THE BASIC CHANGE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SPD AND THE CHANGE IN THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

From 1959 to 1961 neither party was forthcoming in public concerning Eastern policy. An attempt to reconstruct the change in the foreign policy concept of the SPD from the notes of the discussions on the Jaksch-Report as contained in the papers of the SPD working committee on foreign affairs failed. Eugen Selbmann, as secretary of the party working committee on foreign policy, is astonished about the lack of records of those months:

I cannot understand this: normally I write everything down, but I have no records for this period. I always think I will remember the important points, however in the course of time one forgets a lot. I only remember that the meetings of the Party Working Committee were the best attended I had ever experienced.\(^3^3\)

However, some impression of the party working committee debates of 1959 concerned with the Ostpolitik concept of the SPD can be gained from interviews.\(^3^4\) Within the SPD working committee a majority prevailed, which decided not to force a decision within the parliamentary Foreign Committee. The SPD leaders argued that the CDU/CSU was united on at least one point; the CDU/CSU would vote unanimously if a division were forced by the SPD. What appeared to be decisive now was to arrive at a compromise in the Foreign Affairs Committee which would be acceptable for all parties, but which would still be so flexible as to allow for possible and desirable changes in the West German Ostpolitik. During meetings of the SPD Working Committee the expellees' representative, Paul, reminded members of the valuable experience which the Social Democrats had gathered during the last legislative period in discussions with several MPs on the BHE motion. Not only at meetings of the CDU

\(^3^3\) Interview Selbmann I.

\(^3^4\) The following is based on interviews with the SPD-MP and Chairman of the SPD working group on foreign affairs, Kurt Mattick, Bonn, June 1973 (hereafter, Interview Mattick); Interview with the former SPD-MP and ex-Ambassador to Belgrade, Peter Blachstein, Hamburg, December 1968 (hereafter, Interview Blachstein); Interview Paul; Interview Selbmann I.
working Committee, but the SPD working Committee too reported in detail in their meetings on informal talks between West German parliamentarians and communist East European politicians. Already in mid-1959 Herbert Wehner declared in one of the Party Working Committee meetings that West German politicians should muster their courage much more often to "get on the plane to the East". The Social Democratic MPs Erler, Ludwig Metzger, Mattick, Mommer, Paul and Wehner reported in detail to the Party Working Committee on their travels to Prague, Belgrade and Warsaw. Great importance was attributed to a talk between SPD parliamentarians and President Tito. Tito attached great significance to this meeting by inviting the Social Democrats to Brioni to participate in a more than two hour discussion. The SPD working group on foreign policy recognised this importance: the "East-Europe travellers" repeatedly stressed the significance of diplomatic and political contacts between East European states (particularly Yugoslavia) and West Germany.

However, it also became more and more evident that what the Social Democrats regarded as necessary in foreign policy was also useful in domestic policy. In autumn 1959 Herbert Wehner said in a discussion with SPD leaders: "Foreign policy must be scrapped as an election issue. It does not help us, it can only do damage to us". Kurt Mattick, the now chairman of the SPD working Committee remembered: "We had learned from experience. Soon after the 1957 elections our perceptions began to change". At what time this change in thoughts was completed and at what date exactly it was transformed into political actions would be hard to determine, even if more detailed material were available.

Abraham Ashkenasi writes, "Between November 1959 and June 1960 the SPD executed a political turn-about in foreign policy".\(^{35}\) Ashkenasi concedes that the SPD did not come to an apocalyptic realisation that their official concept of foreign

policy was hopelessly unrealistic. However, it seems that he dates the decision to change too late. This assumption is not only supported by the debates in the SPD working committee on foreign policy; it is also backed up by a press statement by the CDU-MP Professor Furler. Already in October 1959 the then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee told the press that a committee of eleven politicians had been created to "discuss openly in a small circle" the question of relations with the Eastern bloc countries and "to state frankly existing common views of the parties".\footnote{Koelnische Rundschau, 23 October 1959.}

The new SPD foreign policy posture had clear implications for the role of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. As we shall see shortly, in October 1959 the leaders of the major parties on the Committee agreed to a sub-committee on the Eastern question to be headed by the SPD-expellee leader W. Jaksch. In proposing this sub-committee with the influential role for Jaksch and non-SPD expellees, the SPD leadership tacitly accepted the desirability of a compromise on the Eastern question. The very presence of the expellees clearly meant that any change in Eastern policy to emerge from the sub-committee would be a limited one. But since any change in Eastern policy requested the assent of at least a substantial portion of the expellee leadership this was an eminently practical objective.

The search for a compromise involved additional actors as well. For quite some time, but particularly in late 1959, numerous opportunities occurred to determine a common ground for all parties. Frequently meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee acting officially and members of the Committee meeting informally took place in the dining room of Foreign Minister von Brentano's residence instead of being held in the dull conference rooms of the Bundestag building.
In some of the informal meetings von Brentano met with the SPD leaders and Foreign Affairs officers to discuss overall problems of German foreign policy while excluding other leaders of the CDU/CSU.\textsuperscript{37}

By these means von Brentano was able to determine the degree of flexibility in the SPD's position without involving those members of his own party who were likely to provide obstacles to change. Thus the Foreign Minister and SPD leaders could arrive at a good understanding of each other's position which could be of considerable utility when a compromise was hammered out within the forum of the sub-committee.

The SPD leaders, together with most parliamentary party leaders of the CDU, did not participate directly in the sub-committee. Instead they co-ordinated policy with those parliamentarians of their respective parties chosen for the sub-committee through their party's foreign affairs working groups.\textsuperscript{38} This had the advantage of shielding the party leaders from personal involvement in any partisan differences which might emerge during sub-committee discussions, while at the same time providing in the party working groups an effective mechanism for keeping tabs on developments.

The change in climate in the political relationship between the parliamentary parties of Government and Opposition with regard to foreign policy was preceded by the social democratic discernment that any speculation on disunity among CDU/CSU committee members had to remain illusionary as long as the SPD expected short term party political advantages from a disunity within the CDU/CSU. Doubts harboured by some government representatives in how far the change in the SPD's perception was of a purely tactical nature were possibly not diminished until Herbert Wehner's speech in the Bundestag on 30 June 1960.

\textsuperscript{37} Interviews Mattick, Paul, Kopf, von Guttenberg.

\textsuperscript{38} Interview Paul.
From this time onwards the SPD leadership made it quite clear not only towards certain members of the government but also publicly towards the voter that they recognised the practical realities and their implications for German foreign policy. The new assessment of the situation was based on three considerations:

1. It is an illusion to believe the Social Democrats' main aim, German reunification, can be gained in the foreseeable future, because neither the West nor the East shows a great interest in a neutral reunified Germany.

2. The West German population has accepted this situation and its consequences.

3. In the face of present Soviet policy, NATO represents the only security guarantee for the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

These considerations conditioned the aims of the future foreign policy of the SPD, which were:

1. The SPD will have to win as much power and influence in Germany as possible. In the past this had failed mainly because the voter had rejected the SPD's foreign and security policy, but the SPD had been reluctant to adjust its perceptions to the voters' requests.

2. There is a need for any Federal Government to gain as much influence as possible within the Western alliance, which would also increase the Federal Government's political value in the eyes of the Soviet Government.

This rationale implied for the parliamentary leaders of the SPD that both the internal and external situation of the Federal Republic demanded a common political response of the two major parties concerning essential questions of foreign policy.

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Consequently, the function of the Foreign Affairs Committee changed. So far the SPD had used the Committee, at least partially and temporarily, as an instrument to carry insecurity and unrest into the ranks of the majority; now the Committee was used for a different function: the Committee, or, more precisely, the Sub-Committee, became the battleground for a test of the possibilities of a new joint foreign policy between the Government and the SPD.

To summarise, the following conditions favoured a compromise:

1. An institutional framework had been created, in which the Opposition and the majority party could come together.

2. The strict observation of confidentiality helped to enable the two groups to negotiate without being forced to give up former battle lines at this stage.

3. The 'refugees' of both parties represented in the Sub-Committee were to function as 'amalgamating' connecting links between opposing views - as Mattick's and von Guttenberg's were.

4. The simple fact that none of the floor leaders was a member of the Sub-Committee strengthened the chances of achieving a compromise. If the negotiations were to be deadlocked, neither party group leader would be involved and therefore kept his freedom of action.

From this time the full Foreign Committee was no longer involved as an institution in the process of decision making. However, this did not necessarily mean that the Sub-Committee hammered out the compromise in total isolation, as the following discussion demonstrates.
Late in October 1959 the then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee told the press that a committee of eleven politicians had been created, to 'discuss openly in a small circle' the question of relations with the Eastern Bloc countries and to state 'existing common views of the parties'.

On 14 January 1960, it was announced that a special working party had been formed in order to 'investigate the question of political, economic and cultural relations with the Eastern European countries'.

The CDU/CSU deputies Guttenberg, Kraft, Majonica and von Manteuffel-Szoege; the SPD deputies Jaksch, Paul, Mattick; the FDP deputy Achenbach; and the DP deputy Schneider (Lollar) were members of this working group. Kraft, Manteuffel, Jaksch and Paul were members of the expellees' organizations.

From this date we do not find any press references to the work of this group. It is only on 14 June 1960 in the House that we learn from Dr Kopf (CDU) that the membership of the group had been further reduced. Dr Kopf praised the work of the group and named Jaksch, Manteuffel, von Guttenberg, Paul and Mattick.

Right from the initial meetings of the sub-Committee, it became clear that it would be advantageous to remain a closed group, a major party caucus in which there would be no room for the minor parties. The representatives of the minor parties, Achenbach (FDP) and Schneider (DP), had not participated in the work of the Committee.

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40 Koelnische Rundschau, 23 October 1959.
42 BT, III.WP, 162. Sitzung, p.9365D.
The Common Area of Interest Between SPD Opposition, the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and German Industries

In examining the origins of the compromise contained in the Jaksch-Report, one must keep in mind the initial point of departure. On 12 February 1960, when the Sub-Committee met for the first of the nineteen sessions, there were the following opposing opinions. On one side, von Guttenberg and Ernst Majonica strongly opposed any change of the then official Eastern policy; on the other side, SPD member Kurt Mattick advocated the official SPD demand for an exchange of Ambassadors with the East European states. The expellees' representatives marked time during the first meeting. Right at the beginning the SPD expellees' politician Wenzel Jaksch had been nominated as chairman by the CDU expellees' politicians. This nomination won wide support. When the negotiations in even this committee appeared to be deadlocked on the dispute over the Hallstein Doctrine, the expellees' deputies 'rescued the fat from the fire', according to Wenzel Jaksch. However, this action was by no means an independent action of the expellees' politicians. It appeared to be only part of a new overall strategy of the SPD parliamentary party leadership. It may be assumed that the compromise which was presented to the Sub-Committee in May 1961 had already been designed as a realistic aim by the party leadership in late 1959, i.e. before the establishment of the Sub-Committee. At this time, Herbert Wehner had developed his ideas before a group of party colleagues. He assumed that there was only one way to realise a new Eastern policy. Because of the strength of the refugees in all parties, which had made it possible to destroy the already published German plan for the Geneva Conference, a new Eastern policy had to be supported by the expellees.

The compromise which Herbert Wehner outlined in late 1959 and which was adopted in 1961 implied:

43 Jaksch-Report, p.7; Interview Mattick.
45 Interview Mattick.
1. the first important foreign policy decision taken together with the majority party, and therefore a clear proof for the public of the sincerity of the new social democratic foreign policy;

2. a strengthening of Wenzel Jaksch's position within the refugee organizations, implying a gain for the SPD; and

3. the exclusion of this issue, which was widely disputed by the German public, from the electoral campaign in 1961.

However, this compromise also gave significant advantages to the Foreign Ministry - and here mainly the Minister - as well as to the German industrial world.

After the proposals of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs for a reorientation of the Eastern policy had been blocked by the refugees, von Brentano aspired to win back the lost freedom in decision-making. The Sub-Committee asked the Government 'to grasp any potential possibility', 'to achieve normalisation between the Federal Republic and the East European states without sacrificing essential German interests'. This request and the possibility of various interpretations of the wording extended the freedom of action of the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, especially in the light of the restriction of his activities imposed by the expellees' organizations and their political representatives. The interests of German industries were mainly concerned with increasing their share of the East European market for investment goods by normalising diplomatic relations. Their immediate aim was to get the Government to abandon the Hallstein doctrine to the extent that permanent trade missions in the East European countries could be established.

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The Political Personality of the Expellee Deputy Wenzel Jaksch as an Integrating Factor

However, in spite of these allies - the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ostausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft - the SPD leaders had to face serious problems with regard to their new policy. Three obstacles had to be considered:

1. the SPD refugees;
2. the SPD parliamentary working committee on foreign policy; and
3. the Sub-Committee itself.

The CSU-MP von Guttenberg claimed in an interview that Federal Chancellor Adenauer avoided influencing the deliberations of the Sub-Committee.\(^{48}\) In addition to Adenauer’s assumed neutrality, the SPD parliamentary leaders expected that the Foreign Affairs Committee, the CDU parliamentary party, and the SPD parliamentary party would follow the lead of the majority of the Sub-Committee. This corresponded to experiences of the past. It also could be expected of the membership of the Sub-Committee which represented the two extremes in opinions thus including those of the other representatives. Therefore, everything was centred on the decisive question: Would the SPD leadership succeed in separating the expellees’ politicians from their coalition with the chairman of the CDU working committee on foreign policy, Majonica? The only personality suitable for such a task, with any hope of success, was Wenzel Jaksch. Jaksch had often been reprimanded by the SPD parliamentary party with a view to the policy of the expellees’ organizations. He had answered these attacks on his affiliation by explaining that only collaboration with these organizations could make sense politically. Failing this, the expellees would turn to radicalism. Causing such a development would be an irresponsible act with regard to internal politics, and a catastrophe in foreign policy. Wenzel Jaksch gained a great deal of respect and even admiration from his friends. As his

\(^{48}\) Interview von Guttenberg.
former SPD-colleague Ernst Paul described it: "Jaksch was a good speaker and was able to convince people";\(^49\) and the former CDU Committee Chairman Dr Kopf argued that Wenzel Jaksch was particularly useful for the SPD because "quite often he would go his own ways".\(^50\) On the other hand, the former SPD-MP and Ambassador to Belgrade, Peter Blachstein, regarded Jaksch as "always deeply rooted in the way of thinking of the refugees";\(^51\) and even his friend Ernst Paul admits that Wenzel Jaksch's diction was often "too flowery to find general support among the comrades".\(^52\)

This judgement coincides with the party political power constellation within the SPD as reflected in the results of party internal elections. In the elections for party Vorstand on 4 November 1958 Wenzel Jaksch received the smallest number of votes. MP Rehs, who had been running as the only other expellees' representative, got only three votes more.\(^53\) However, the increasing isolation of the expellees' politicians within the Social Democratic parliamentary party did not diminish the significant role which Wenzel Jaksch was to play in the parliamentary sub-committee during the drafting of the compromise. On the contrary, his position in the sub-committee and particularly within the expellees' organizations had to become stronger the more his position differed from the official policies of the SPD.

On 5 November 1959 the SPD re-introduced a motion demanding "a resumption of diplomatic relations with the East European States as early as possible".\(^54\) Whatever might have been the tactical motives for this move, which appeared to be quite

\(^49\) Interview Paul.

\(^50\) Interview Kopf.

\(^51\) Interview Blachstein.

\(^52\) Interview Paul.


\(^54\) BT, III.WP, 87 Sitzg., Umdruck 403.
extreme under the circumstances, it must certainly have strengthened Wenzel Jaksch's position for the impending debates in the sub-committee. It could be expected that SPD-MP Mattick would support the official SPD motion for diplomatic recognition. In that case Wenzel Jaksch could speak against the official views of his party and support a political move somewhere in between the Hallstein doctrine and diplomatic recognition. In this atmosphere in the Sub-Committee it would appear possible that the 'CDU/CSU right wing' would make concessions for the benefit of a generally-agreed compromise.

The Estimation of the International Situation: the Foreign Affairs Department Informs the Party Working Committees

Immediately before the Sub-Committee met for the first time in February 1960, the SPD and CDU working committees on foreign policy repeatedly held detailed discussions on West German Eastern policy. Two studies by the Foreign Ministry, dealing with foreign policy perceptions of American politicians and the danger that West Germany might find itself isolated within the Western alliance, had been tabled in the working committees. Furthermore, representatives of both parties reported on talks with foreign politicians.

Neither party's working committee arrived at any formal decisions with regard to the impending debates in the Sub-Committee. However, both working committees discussed the same problems, although emphasising different details. Those in favour of a more flexible Eastern policy (which included parts of the Foreign Ministry) no longer argued predominantly that a change in German Eastern policy implied advantages for West German foreign policy. They rather maintained that the Western allies would find it hard to accept that West Germany did not join their attempts at *detente*. German Eastern policy could not be treated in isolation. The NATO partners and in particular the new Kennedy administration had repeatedly expressed their

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55 The following is based on Interviews Blachstein, Selbmann I (I and II), Mattick, Majonica and Paul and Interview with Eugen Selbmann, Bonn, 16 March 1972 (Hereafter Selbmann II)
wish that West Germany should undertake active steps towards *detente*. The USA particularly pressed for an improved relationship between West Germany and Poland, possibly because a number of Polish migrants had entered influential positions in the United States. If the Federal Republic did not comply with these demands, there would be an acute danger of her being isolated within the Western alliance.

Those in favour of the *status quo* conceded with regard to the study by the Foreign Ministry that there was a certain danger in this respect. However, they pointed out that this policy would reveal more dangers for the Federal Republic than for the Western allies. This did not only apply in the field of security policy; 'detente policies' could quite easily revert into 'renunciation policies', and no West German Government should ever abandon German territory. In addition it had to be considered that a potential loss of face was involved in modifying the Hallstein doctrine from one day to the next. With these considerations in mind and the feeling that 'something had to be done', the parliamentary parties met for the first time in the Sub-Committee.

THE DISCUSSION ON GERMAN *OSTPOLITIK* WITHIN THE SUB-COMMITTEE

The First Objections on the Part of the Majonica-Guttenberg Group and the Hearing of the Experts of the Eastern Committee of German Industries

After the first meeting of the Sub-Committee on 12 February 1960 the Chairman, Wenzel Jaksch, reported to the SPD working group on foreign policy on 21 February 1960. The Sub-Committee had agreed on the basic questions. The report was almost completed. It was to be written up and put before the House as soon as possible. Ernst Paul remembers that the Social Democrats were under the impression that even CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg had been convinced *about* a more flexible Eastern policy. However, during the second meeting the first

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56 Interview Paul.
impression proved to be too optimistic. Majonica and Guttenberg suspected the unusual alliance between the expellees of the CDU and SPD and the Foreign Ministry as well as the increasing caution of Kurt Mattick. They feared that a general and unanimously supported statement by the Committee and Parliament would grant the Foreign Ministry in future unrestricted freedom of action with regard to foreign policy decisions. Von Guttenberg and Majonica even more insisted on going into more detail. SPD expellees' politicians were rather annoyed with Majonica's 'vigorous proceedings', which they did not attribute to reservations based on his principles but rather to career-oriented calculations. "Majonica always wanted to become Foreign Minister. Since von Brentano was regarded as left in the CDU, Majonica, as the parliamentary party working committee chairman, had to seek coalition with the CSU and the CDU expellees".58

Majonica's and von Guttenberg's objections were followed by a further move by the Foreign Ministry. They proposed hearing the experts of the Eastern Committee of German Industries at the third meeting of the Sub-Committee. The Ostauschuss had been founded in 1952 on the proposal of the Federal Government in order to determine trade agreements with East Europe on a semi-official basis. In actual fact this body had assumed the function of official broker for all trade contacts between German trade and industry and the communist states. On the basis of agreements between government delegations, the Ostauschuss settled questions of delivery and payment conditions, problems of arbitrage and conditions for technological and scientific exchanges. Furthermore, this body served as a consultant to trade associations on all questions concerning trade with eastern countries. The Ostauschuss was supported by the Bund der deutschen Industrie, the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag, the Zentralverband des Banken- und Bankiergewerbes, the Gesamtverband des Deutschen Gross- und Ausenhandels as well as by the Importverband. Thus it

57 Interview von Guttenberg.
58 Interview Paul.
represented a power potential which particularly the bourgeois parties were unable to disregard.

The east-west experts in German trade and industry refrained from referring directly to the question of taking up diplomatic relations with communist states at the Sub-Committee meeting on 24 March 1960. However, their opinion that the existing situation had to be regarded as "unsatisfactory and obstructive from purely trade technical points of view"\(^59\) supplied the supporters of a more flexible Eastern policy with new arguments.

**Guttenberg's and Majonica's Delaying Tactics and New Initiatives on the Part of the Foreign Ministry**

After hearing the experts of the *Ostauschuss*, it was no longer possible to finish the deliberations as speedily as had been intended. Majonica and von Guttenberg advocated having an in-depth discussion of the whole problem of a new Eastern policy. They hoped for a return of the expellees to their former attitude and opposition to any change in present principles.\(^60\) However, their expectations were not met.

When the Sub-Committee discussed the problem of the emigrants from Eastern Europe and their importance concerning German foreign policy,\(^61\) von Guttenberg noted that particularly the USA voiced an increasing request for diplomatic relations between Poland and West Germany. He stressed, however, the necessity for an independent German Eastern policy which should not yield to the pressure of East European emigrants. Kurt Mattick and Wenzel Jaksch advocated the contrary; since such groups had great influence, the Federal Republic needed to do everything possible to demonstrate that the Federal Republic was not opposing a policy leading to *detente*.\(^62\)

When nothing decisive had happened by January 1961 the Foreign Ministry made another attempt to lead the deputies

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\(^59\) Jaksch-Report, p.29.

\(^60\) Interview von Guttenberg.

\(^61\) See Jaksch-Report, pp.32-33.

\(^62\) Interviews von Guttenberg and Mattick.
towards a decision. Early in January 1961, the General Manager of the Krupp Company, Beitz, recommended, following two trips to Warsaw, that it would be only reasonable to open a Trade Mission in Poland. The Press and Information Office of the Government announced "further talks through official channels". 63

A Last Attempt: An Appeal to the German Public

Ten days later, on 23 January 1961, both Majonica and Guttenberg warned the public of the dangers inherent in the resumption of diplomatic relations with Poland. Majonica, meeting the Westphalian press, emphasized that it would be wrong "to give up the Hallstein doctrine at a time when such an important power as India was approaching the German point of view concerning the 'Soviet Occupation Zone'". In addition, the German legal position regarding the German Eastern Territories under Polish administration would be 'undermined' 64 by sending an ambassador to Warsaw.

However, this appeal was not only directed towards the German public but also to the expellees' organizations. It could be regarded as a hint to the expellees to carefully control their top representatives in the House and in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Furthermore, this appeal helped to demonstrate to the other Sub-Committee members that Majonica and von Guttenberg and their political groups would find a formal end to the Hallstein Doctrine unacceptable. Under no circumstances would they agree to diplomatic relations, for instance with Poland, at the present time. 65

The Decision of the Expellees in Favour of a More Active Eastern Policy

On 9 February 1961, in the eighth meeting of the Sub-Committee the final decision was made. Representatives of twenty expellees' organizations were heard on the problem of

65 Interview von Guttenberg.
legal reservations and aspects of territorial birthrights. According to a leading SPD-MP, Wenzel Jaksch "had done an excellent job". In long sittings, the humanitarian, social and international legal problems of the expellees were investigated. The secretary of the Missing Persons Service of the German Red Cross was asked about questions concerning the reuniting of separated families and the welfare of German citizens. During the deliberations it was indicated that the sub-committee intended to prepare a special report on 'the fate of the German population in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after 1939', which was to be presented to the House. The Sub-Committee fulfilled this promise and presented an additional motion to the House, asking the Government "while establishing relations with East Europe and the Soviet Union, to draw special attention to the important human needs still existing among the German citizens and ethnic Germans...".

Some organizations, e.g. the Germans from Rumania, even demanded the resumption of diplomatic relations in order to counter the situation whereby German nationals who stayed in these countries were "exposed to the biased cultural influence of the SBZ regime".

Finally, Guttenberg and Majonica agreed to the compromise which had been drafted a full year earlier. They agreed because their own isolation as politicians was becoming apparent and because the danger of the Federal Republic being isolated seemed to be a very real one.

During a further eleven laborious sittings within the following few weeks, with the assistance of Fritz Erler, SPD

66 Jaksch-Report, pp.35 and 44.
67 Interview Mattick.
68 Jaksch-Report, p.35.
69 BT, III.WP, 162. Sitzg., Drucksache 2807.
70 Jaksch-Report, p.63.
71 Ibid., pp.37-38.
floor leader, and Dr Baptist Gradl, CDU, the Sub-Committee prepared the final draft of the report.\footnote{Ibid., p.8.}

A few days after the so-called Jaksch-Report had been adopted by the House, the new foreign policy principles were applied for the first time at the expense of an Assistant Secretary.

For the trade negotiations between Poland and the Federal Republic which started on 19 June 1961, Ambassador Dr Allard was sent to Warsaw instead of the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, Assistant Secretary Dr Otto Stallmann. The Foreign Ministry justified this step by pointing to the investigation of the public prosecutor into charges of corruption - Stallmann had been charged with receiving large sums from foreign sources - a charge which all knew to be without substance.\footnote{Der Spiegel, 14 June 1961.} In fact, the Foreign Ministry quietly abolished one of the principles of the Hallstein Doctrine. It had been stipulated that only representatives of specialist ministries should lead delegations to Eastern European countries. Diplomats from the Foreign Ministry were excluded. Thus all contacts with the East Europeans were intended to be technical and non-political. The Foreign Ministry discarded this principle, but, after the concessions made by the expellees' representatives on the Committee, no one was able to interpret this step as 'an abandonment of vital German interests'.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

This case study details a small but significant shift in German foreign policy. Before Committee deliberations began in 1958 German Eastern policy as most notably reflected in the Hallstein Doctrine precluded significant diplomatic moves towards the communist bloc. Shortly after the Jaksch-Report was adopted in 1961, however, the decision to send an
ambassadorial-level official to Poland marked a significant wedge in this doctrine. The doctrine was later further eroded with the establishment of trade missions in East Europe.

What forces brought about this shift in German foreign policy? What role did the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee play in this confluence of forces? Was the Committee influential in and of itself or did it reflect a more complex set of forces?

There are *a priori* reasons for concluding that the Foreign Affairs Committee played an influential role in the development of the new German Eastern policy. The timing of the first breach of the Hallstein Doctrine - the despatch of the trade delegation and Ambassador Allardt to Warsaw - coming as it did so shortly after the Jaksch-Report suggests a strong link between the two, especially given the unsuccessful efforts by von Brentano to modify the policy earlier. Moreover, this linkage was supported by the observations of politicians which tied even the later trade missions with the ground layed by the Jaksch-Report.

While it is clear that the Committee played an important role in the adoption of a new Eastern policy, this role must be seen in terms of the total configuration of forces. It is not simply a question of the Committee as an entity influencing the policy of the Government as an entity. Indeed, the Committee can be best seen as a convenient forum through which outside forces could, in combination with the Committee actors, reach a necessary compromise. Thus there were forces within the Government, most notably von Brentano, who desired movement on Eastern policy. Perhaps more significantly leading figures in the SPD-Opposition, most notably Herbert Wehner, also sought new initiatives towards the East. These politicians then worked through the Committee to advance their ends. But, in terms of the political realities of the new situation, movement on the Eastern question could only be achieved if the expellee representatives modified their stance. Here again the Committee played a crucial role. Particularly in the Sub-Committee the expellee leaders were drawn into the unfolding developments.
These leaders - particularly the skilful and strong-minded Jaksch - were not simply manipulated by outside forces but were seeking to advance their own political aims in what they perceived as a changing international situation. With all of these forces, for their own reasons, seeking a compromise it was possible to lay down broad principles providing the Government with diplomatic flexibility. The crucial point was that by representing a broad consensus on this matter the Jaksch-Report defused the issue politically so that the Government could undertake new initiatives. In this sense the Committee was influential.

What factors facilitated the ability of the Committee to reach a compromise, a compromise which in turn facilitated the Government's decision? A number of factors can be mentioned.

First is the constitutional role of the Committee. As we have seen the standing orders of Parliament provided the Committee with powers of recommendation in the foreign policy sphere. These powers, however, should not be overemphasised in assessing the Committee's role in this case. Indeed, when the Government initially agreed to referring the matter to the Committee it was in expectation that the issue would be buried there. It was only the political circumstances which maximised the utility of the Committee as a forum for compromise.

A second factor is the international situation. Clearly there were some international developments - particularly the first moves towards East-West detente - which argued for flexibility in German Eastern policy. However, the importance of such developments must be considered small in this case. There was in fact no evidence of foreign pressure being brought to bear on the decision-makers.

The relative strength of the major parties in German Parliament has a somewhat more important influence on the decision-making process. The dominance gained by the CDU/CSU at the 1957 elections provided a degree of self-confidence for the Government which allowed for tentative initiatives which probably would not have been countenanced in a more evenly-divided Parliament.
From the point of view of the SPD-Opposition the electoral setbacks of 1957 argued for a change in foreign policy posture and thus allowed the movement towards a position of compromise with the Government. Another factor facilitating a viable compromise was the close exchange of views between Committee members and Foreign Affairs officers during the Committee deliberations. By virtue of frank and detailed exchange of views Foreign Affairs was able to determine the political limits on its flexibility while the Committee politicians could appreciate international complexities.

The viability of the Committee's compromise was also enhanced by the fact that leading Committee members also held important positions within their respective parties and these men further had considerable prestige derived from their experience in dealing with foreign policy matters on the Committee in the past.

One of the most important factors aiding the compromise was the absence of polarisation along partisan lines or according to bureaucratic or other roles. Thus the diversity of views within the CDU/CSU inhibited the development of a monolithic partisan position. As a result important segments of the governing parties were available for compromise with the Opposition. Similarly conflicting views existed within the Foreign Ministry - as represented by the Minister and his Secretary of State - and this also provided potential for the formation of a fluid coalition for modification of Eastern policy.

Finally, a compromise solution depended upon the willingness of the major parties to pursue integrative politics. Neither party, at least after the initial stage, used the issue to appeal to the electorate or to undermine the position of the other in the House. Instead the emphasis was on reaching a solution which would not significantly favour one side or another in the short term, whatever the motives for the long run.
CHAPTER TWO

THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY:

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ASSERTS ITS AUTHORITY

The signing of the Treaty on Franco-German Co-Operation on 22 February 1963 thrust the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee into a central role in the shaping of West German foreign policy. This was partially due to the Standing Orders of the Bundestag which required Committee deliberation before the treaty could be ratified by the full House. However, the political difficulties facing the Committee in any effort to play a constructive role were underlined by the fact that the chances of an agreement between the governing parties and the Opposition were far less than in the Jaksch-Report. Although the general climate between the two major parties had improved further, a possible political agreement on any foreign policy issue no longer depended solely on the Social and Christian Democrats. The CDU/CSU lost their absolute majority in the September elections of 1961. They now formed a coalition government with the FDP who could no longer be disregarded as a political factor as had been mostly the case during the preparation of the 'Jaksch-Report'.

The political climate within the CDU/CSU had changed as well. Having lost the absolute majority and being frequently divided on foreign policy issues, the CDU/CSU had lost a great deal of the self-confidence which usually seems to be a prerequisite for the acceptance of compromise. The new internal disputes about foreign policy issues had had their origin in 1960 when Chancellor Adenauer had met President de Gaulle in Rambouillet. It was rumoured that Bonn and Paris might intend a political, economic and military unification - and this at the cost of other West European states and particularly the USA.

The discussions concerning this possibility extended to the Government quarter. Although externally the Government concerned itself with its image of solidarity (albeit unsuccessfully), there existed nevertheless the following configurations: the
Bavarian CSU and a group of CDU politicians around Adenauer opposed, as 'Gaullists', the Atlantic group, SPD, FDP and sections of the CDU. This confrontation was based primarily on suspicion and speculation. Neither side had ever articulated in precise terms its position on policy ideas. Generally one can say, however, that the Gaullists wanted to work as closely as possible with France and pretended that this need not involve damaging relations with the US. From the German Government's side, the Atlantic group advocated a more pronounced criticism of de Gaulle on account of his hostility towards Britain and the US. The differences were perhaps only gradations; the atmosphere, however, was such that both sides at any time suspected the other of secretly intending the opposite to what was said in public. The Gaullists feared a slavish dependency of Germany on the USA; the Atlantic group feared being involved in de Gaulle's anti-American policy and that this might endanger West Berlin's security. As the former CDU representative and chairman of the parliamentary working group on foreign affairs, Ernst Majonica, remembers: "Discord within the party was immense, no dispute has ever been carried out in such a heated manner within the party as that one between 'Gaullists' and 'Atlantics'".¹ It was in this atmosphere that the Foreign Affairs Committee had to approach the Franco-German Treaty.

There were, however, further factors which seemed to indicate that one could not hope for a bi-partisan solution similar to the recommendations in the 'Jaksch-Report'.

While the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs had been concerned mainly with general principles in preparing the 'Jaksch-Report', it was now required to make a practical decision on its attitude towards a treaty which had already been signed by the Federal Government. This left the majority party's representatives on the Committee little room for compromise, as they could not run the risk of laying their own Government open to the danger of censure.

¹ Interview Majonica.
Moreover, since the Federal Government insisted on rapid ratification of the agreement, the Committee on Foreign Affairs had little time at its disposal to reach unanimity. An attempt to refer the treaty to a special sub-committee failed owing to the indifference of the CDU, and the Social Democrats were forced to create a sub-committee of the party working committee on foreign affairs, whose special concern was to be the Franco-German treaty.

In the deliberations on the treaty the most important question was whether this treaty could be accommodated (and if so, in what way) to the obligations of the Federal Republic concerning the European Economic Community and the North Atlantic Defence Organization.

Despite all the difficulties mentioned above which had rendered agreement unlikely, on 8 May 1963 the Foreign Affairs Committee succeeded in presenting a compromise. It suggested unanimously in a written report to German Parliament that a preamble should be added to the Federal Government's draft treaty. In this preamble Parliament demanded that the West German Government, in the execution of the Franco-German treaty, must abstain from any action which would conflict with the terms of earlier treaties, especially those concerning the EEC and NATO.

DISAGREEMENTS ON THE ORDER OF PRIORITIES IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Two phases are apparent in the political process which led to agreement on the preamble. The first phase, covering the plenary debate of the German Parliament on 7 February 1963, may be seen as a grappling with the order of priorities in the Federal Republic's foreign policies. The second phase consists of the concrete application of the general decisions made in

2 BT, IV.WP, Drucksache 1252.

3 Ibid., Chapter VII.
that debate. The best point of departure for a discussion of both phases is an examination of the ideas on foreign policy current in the Opposition Social Democratic Party, which feared a change in the existing priorities and attempted to use the parliamentary debate to force the Government into an unambiguous articulation of its ideas and goals.

When the first reservations about the treaty had been articulated, Herbert Wehner had explained to the SPD party working committee on foreign affairs: "We cannot simply say 'no' to this treaty". Fritz Erler, too, had explained that it would be impossible to reject the treaty *in toto* after the bipartisan display of enthusiasm which had so recently greeted de Gaulle's visit to the Federal Republic. However, what had to be prevented at all costs was the possibility that the treaty could be interpreted by the German Government or foreign states as implying notions of German-French hegemony.

The reservations within the SPD centred primarily on two points dealt with by the treaty:

1. the relationship with the United States,
2. the relationship to the EEC and West European Union.

Further criticism, of a purely tactical nature, was forthcoming because the complex question of German reunification was not referred to by the treaty.\(^4\)

But apart from issues of this nature, the treaty placed the German Social Democrats in a position peculiar to their own party, as the socialist parties of Western Europe (and to a lesser extent of Great Britain) were energetically concerned to dissuade their German sister party from supporting the Franco-German Treaty.\(^5\)

Other external influences affected the attitude of all the German political parties, including the SPD. Adenauer's meeting

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4 Interview Selbmann I.

5 This aspect will be dealt with in more detail at a later stage.
with de Gaulle at Rambouillet in July 1960 and the plans aired there concerning European federation had already given rise to fears of a German-French combination if the other members of the EEC were unwilling to extend their political co-operation along similar lines.

More than two years later, the explosive potential of the treaty suddenly became only too clear, when de Gaulle exercised his veto against the entrance of Great Britain to the EEC. This French action sharpened the suspicions of other West European countries and the United States about the Franco-German treaty and caused them to intensify their criticism. It also affected the nature of the discussions within the Federal Republic itself. As the former CDU representative Birrenbach commented later: "The ink on the Franco-German Treaty had not dried before de Gaulle said 'no' to Britain's entry into the EEC. That was too much".

Some West German politicians immediately thought about the international repercussions for the West German foreign policy following de Gaulle's veto and they acted accordingly. When Federal Chancellor Adenauer planned a trip to Paris in January 1963, the President of the Bundestag and three parliamentary party chairmen issued a joint communique exhorting the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister "to secure the removal of obstacles impeding British entry into the European Common Market while at the same time satisfying all contingencies for the further development of German-French friendship". Furthermore, Social Democrats Fritz Erler and Karl Mommer asked the Federal

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7 Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 3 August 1960.
8 Deutsche Zeitung, 1 August 1960.
10 Interview Birrenbach, Düsseldorf, 8 July 1973 (Hereafter Interview Birrenbach).
Chancellor - in accordance with their party's unanimous resolution - to postpone his Paris journey until the time "when no more danger exists that the visit might be misinterpreted by other EEC partners and Great Britain with regard to the French attitude [to British entry] at Brussels".  

The Clarification of American Foreign Policy Interests with Regard to the Federal Republic

Immediately before the commencement of talks between the French President and the German Federal Chancellor, the American Government made use of a means which "is not unusual for Anglo-American diplomacy" whereby "certain journalists are given indications..." and "the President and his closest collaborators are ... at the disposal of some of their friends of the press for background talks".

Up to this time the Kennedy Government had exercised restraint in its public comments on the treaty. James Reston, Washington political correspondent for The New York Times, left no doubt, however, as to the opinion of the American Government on de Gaulle's policy. Under the unambiguous title 'What Do They Think We Are?' and the sub-title 'De Gaulle Asks Adenauer to Base His Policy on Suspicion of US', Reston communicated the implications of the difficulties between Paris and London to the German Federal Government, clarified the American point of view, and placed before the Germans the stark alternative: Paris or Washington. His influential article culminated with the words:

If de Gaulle and Adenauer are asking us ... to defend a Europe which questions America's good faith; to co-operate in the spread of national nuclear weapons first to France and inevitably, on the de Gaulle thesis, to Germany; if they expect that we will co-operate with a Gaullist Europe that rejects and humiliates Britain ... if they believe we will

12 Ibid.

co-operate with a protectionist, inward-looking Europe which puts the continent before the Atlantic - then they are asking and expecting things that never have been and never will be. For the choice before Adenauer is not merely between France and Britain, but in the end between France and the United States.\textsuperscript{14}

Reston's article caused strong reactions in the Foreign Ministry, the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and the SPD working committee on foreign policy. \textsuperscript{15} In a confidential memorandum (the contents of which were, according to a foreign affairs official, communicated to the SPD leadership) the Foreign Ministry linked US objections to de Gaulle's press conference of 14 January and the prospect of the Franco-German treaty with the US President's internal and external political difficulties.

The Kennedy government had not previously been able to exhibit in the arena of foreign relations any decisive successes. De Gaulle's veto on the entry of Great Britain to the EEC likewise weakened the internal political position of the American President and this at a time in which opinion polls had shown that Kennedy's popularity was in decline.

The Franco-German treaty would also have external consequences for the United States; on the international level France, one of the sharpest critics of US policy, would be strengthened, and this would necessarily weaken the position of the United States.

Germany would be in a special situation. In particular the position of Berlin would make the presence of the Americans in the future absolutely necessary. But that would have as a consequence the Federal Republic's subjection to the elementary requirements of American policy, and there was much to be said in favour of the view that the Americans regarded the entry of Great Britain to the EEC as one such elementary requirement of their own policy.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} New York Times, 21 March 1961.

\textsuperscript{15} Interview with a Washington Foreign Affairs official, Bonn, February 1969.
The First Reactions of the CDU to the Objections to the German-French Treaty and Further Criticism from Foreign Countries

Immediately after the publication of the Reston article Gerhard Schroeder is said to have commented on the Treaty towards friends in the CDU and the Foreign Affairs Department. He is supposed to have said that he regarded the German-French treaty as 'superfluous, senseless and dangerous' but that he was not able to persuade Adenauer in this respect and that therefore it would be best to ratify the treaty as soon as possible.16

In 1961 Gerhard Schroeder had endorsed in public the Franco-German treaty whole-heartedly;17 and in a meeting of the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs about two years later he again defended the Federal Chancellor's strong stand in favour of the treaty, while on the other hand making it clear that the Government would strongly support the erection of a Multilateral Atomic Force for NATO. "Schroeder restrained himself as far as possible in this matter in order not to ruin his chances as Adenauer's successor", commented CSU-MP Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg.18 At the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 24 January, CDU-MPs Birrenbach and Furler argued that the policy of the Federal Government was liable to become subject to misinterpretation. A ratification of the German-French treaty would be possible only if it were to be unambiguously explained that this did not represent any special relationship between Germany and France in the form of separate alliances. Both CDU politicians stated that the Government should make a declaration to this effect before the German Parliament in order to counter all speculation that German foreign policy was changing its course. In effect, they were asking for a plenary debate in order to clarify German foreign policy.19

16 Interview with a CDU-MP.
18 Interview von Guttenberg.
19 While other explanations of Schroeder's role can be offered, this interpretation was also given by Birrenbach and Committee-Chairman Kopf, politicians normally sympathetic to the Foreign Minister. The same opinion was also widely held in SPD and journalistic circles.
In the meantime the reservation against the treaty by the member countries of the EEC and the USA had increased. The Vice President of the European Economic Community, Mansholt, described the rejection of the British entry as 'threatening' the future of the community. The Franco-German Treaty would be acceptable only if France was prepared to grant membership to Britain and other countries wishing to enter the EEC. He insisted:

If this route, however, is cut off then the treaty does not represent any addition but rather a dissolution of European integration through a coalition of two countries. Such a policy is backward-looking and not future orientated.20

The Netherlands, Italy21 and the US22 expressed similar reservations.

Increased Opposition Within the CDU Towards the Existing Form of the Treaty as a Result of de Gaulle's Final Veto of British Entry to the EEC

American Government circles now made it clear that they were prepared to initiate the construction of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. A nuclear force would be able to operate well within two years23 if all European nations who were willing to enter made a binding decision in favour of the project.24

These proposals gave the 'Atlantics' within the CDU the chance to emphasise the importance of American support for the security of the Federal Republic and West Berlin. At a joint meeting of the presidium and the executive of the CDU at the end of January, Vice Chancellor Erhard reproached the Federal Chancellor for, in particular, the security aspects of his

23 It should be noted, however, that training alone of mixed NATO-crews for Polaris submarines would have taken two years.
policy; he maintained it would be reckless if the German Federal Chancellor were to be suspected of being a follower of de Gaulle. Erhard, therefore, considered it sensible to postpone the ratification of the treaty since de Gaulle could hardly be expected to change his opinion on Britain's entry to the EEC by January. "I think that Erhard did not want the treaty at all", commented the former CDU-MP and chairman of the parliamentary working group on foreign affairs, Ernst Majonica.25

During the following debates on the treaty within the CDU/CSU Vice Chancellor Professor Erhard was supported by MP Birrenbach, who came forward as the strongest critic of the German-French treaty in its existing form. According to a Government official Birrenbach had 'right from the beginning' demanded a preamble to the German-French treaty in order to integrate the treaty into the multilateral treaties and to diminish the general doubts expressed within and outside Germany on the motives and goals of the treaty. At first Birrenbach is said to have found only few supporters for his plan. However, he remained so determined in this matter that unusually heated disputes between him and Chancellor Adenauer had taken place. CSU representative von Guttenberg said in 1968 that "without Birrenbach a preamble would probably not have been included".26 The former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee described the disputes within the party as follows: "A minority within the CDU seemed to be determined not to accept the treaty in this form".27 Birrenbach himself did not want to comment on his role in the CDU internal alterations to the treaty. However, as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee who had repeatedly been sent abroad by the Federal Government on diplomatic missions of various kinds, he did not leave any doubt that, 'right from

25 Interview Majonica; see also SPD-Pressedienst (P/XVIII 19), 28 January 1963.
26 Interview von Guttenberg.
27 Interview Kopf.
the beginning', he had been of the opinion that the Franco-German treaty would be of value only if supported unanimously by Parliament.28

The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, H. Kopf, saw the danger of the treaty as follows. On the one side, the treaty could not be rejected by Parliament because this would have amounted to an extraordinary affront to the French partner. On the other side, it seemed politically impossible, in view of the general efforts to form a unified Europe, that two states, the two largest and economically most powerful at that, decided to join forces, thus indirectly stating a claim for hegemony. In interviews CDU politicians Kopf and Birrenbach agreed that in their view only a bi-partisan declaration of the German Parliament could have convinced the allied West European states and the USA that the German-French agreement's sole aim was to improve German-French relations and to manifest this intention in the form of a treaty.

In order to achieve unanimity in Parliament it was necessary to gain the approval of the 'Gaullists' - or at least to isolate them totally within their party - and the co-operation of the Social Democratic Opposition. The CDU politician who had the best chances in succeeding with the latter was Birrenbach. Not only was he a diplomatically-skilful negotiator but, more importantly, he also had an excellent personal relationship to the former Foreign Minister and at that time CDU/CSU caucus chairman, Heinrich von Brentano. Moreover, he was on very good terms with SPD top politicians Herbert Wehner and, in particular, Fritz Erler.

Birrenbach, von Brentano, Kopf and, later on and to a lesser extent, Majonica as well laid the foundations within the CDU/CSU for a preamble to the treaty. The concept of a preamble, i.e. that Parliament had to unanimously comment on the German-French treaty, had two distinct advantages for these CDU politicians.

28 Interview Birrenbach.
Firstly, it would lead to that clarification of West Germany's foreign policy priorities which these politicians desired and, secondly, it would diminish the domestic problems of the CDU/CSU. The chairman of the CDU/CSU working group on foreign policy, Majonica, had already declared in the party room that the Government probably would have to resign if it could not muster a majority in Parliament on such a decisive issue. This possibility did exist indeed. Both the SPD Opposition and the coalition partner of the CDU/CSU, the FDP, rejected to a man the treaty in its existing form. Furthermore, there was the real danger for the CDU/CSU that some 'Atlantic' CDU-MPs might - if not cross the floor - at least abstain from the decisive vote in Parliament. "We had no choice but to agree to the compromise after we had split the party on this issue", one of the 'representatives' of the 'Gaullists', the CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg, later commented.

As a first step towards this compromise members of the CDU/CSU Foreign Affairs Committee renewed contacts with the Social Democratic Party leaders, and both sides agreed to determine the position of the Federal Republic within the Western alliance in the foreign policy debate of the German Parliament planned for 7 February. Worried CDU/CSU politicians agreed with the SPD that an unambiguous determination and confirmation of the order of priorities in the policy of the Federal Republic was necessary, if only for the reason that the ill will incurred by France as a result of the Brussels decision threatened to carry over to the Federal Republic.

The Final Decision on the Order of Priorities in German Foreign Policy in the Plenary Debate of the Federal Parliament on 7 February 1963

The foreign affairs debate on 7 February thus took place in the spirit of the 'Atlantics'. The plenum unanimously supported the following foreign policy principles:

29 Interview Majonica.
30 Interview von Guttenberg.
31 Interview Selbmann I.
1. The basis of the security of the Federal Republic is and remains its relationship with the USA;

2. The decisive guiding principle in German 'Westpolitik' is the unification of Europe, including Great Britain.

ad 1: European, especially German, security rests, because of the East-West conflict, on the unlimited military presence of the United States in Europe and especially in the Federal Republic. The security of a country deserves absolute priority over all other considerations of foreign policy. These priorities find their affirmation in the German support for the plans of a NATO based Multilateral Nuclear Force.

ad 2: The second foreign policy goal of the Federal Republic is the creation of a unified Europe including Great Britain. Reconciliation between France and Germany is a precondition of European union and in addition represents the basis of German European policy.32

This order of priorities declared by the Bundestag defined at once three essential conditions for German-French co-operation which formed the basis for further parliamentary treatment of the treaty.

1. German-French co-operation must not - in the military and political area - be in contradiction to the obligations of the Federal Republic under NATO.

2. It must not hinder the further development of European institutions in the sense of the Treaties of Rome.

3. It must not stand in the way of the inclusion of Great Britain into the Common Market.

After this debate there existed unequivocal clarity on the basic aims of German foreign policy, at least concerning the aims of the Bundestag.

It remains to be considered what means the foreign policy decision-makers employed in giving practical form to these goals, and what role the Committee on Foreign Affairs played in this process.

32 See BT, IV.WP, 58. Sitzg.
Influence from Outside the National System in the Area of Secret Diplomacy

From 7 February foreign countries refrained from public criticism of the Franco-German treaty. It is true that the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul Henri Spaak, expressed reservations which caused some concern in the SPD working committee and also in the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee; and it is also true that concern was caused by the views of the American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who stated in Bonn that he thought the German Parliament would be well advised to give further clarification and explanation of the Franco-German treaty. However, attempts at influence by foreign countries had essentially retreated to the level of secret diplomacy.

In this connection an extensive and secret expression of opinion by the Soviet Government is not without significance, but probably more decisive for the actual course of events was the journey of the parliamentary leader of the CDU/CSU, von Brentano, to Washington at the end of March. After his return von Brentano explained that his conversations with President Kennedy and Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had allayed some of the American Government's fears and some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee explained to the author that the result of von Brentano's journey to America had been "of some moment for the continuance of discussions in the Committee". However, this aspect of the decision-making process evades a

33 P.-H. Spaak in Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 8 March 1963.
36 Interview Kopf.
more precise analysis for the time being, as its very nature limits the amount of material available and the interviews were comparatively unproductive.

The Influence of the Federal Upper House

In this case study some additional 'institutional factors' emerge. However, the actual importance of the Federal Upper House in its role as an institutional obstacle for treaties in need of ratification should not be overrated. On 21 February 1963 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Upper House — in charge of steering the treaty through the Upper House — and the Defence Committee recommended a decision on the Franco-German treaty. The decision took into account the deliberations of the Economics Committee of the Upper House. It recommended to the Federal Government a resolution preceding the actual text of the treaty which had the effect of encouraging the following goals through the application of the treaty:

1. close partnership between Europe and the US;
2. restoration of German unity;
3. the common defence in the framework of NATO and the integration of the military forces of the states bound together in this pact;
4. the unity of Europe and the inclusion of Great Britain and other states into the European Economic Community; and
5. the gradual dissolution of trade barriers between the EEC, Great Britain and the USA as well as other states within the framework of GATT.37

The 'Indicatory' Function of the Federal Upper House in the Area of Foreign Policy

The attention which discussions in the plenum of the Federal Upper House on the German-French treaty found in the

37 Bundesratsdrucksache, 58/1/63, 21 February 1963.

36a Members of the West German Bundesrat and its Committees are not elected by the people. They are appointed by the State Governments and act solely according to the instructions of their respective State Prime Ministers.

Consequently, there is no flexibility of action for members of
of the Bundesrat and Bundesrats-Committees can only agree to compromise if the individual State Governments give their approval to do so.
press\textsuperscript{38} did not indicate the actual significance which this institution possesses in the area of foreign policy.

So that decisions of the Federal Lower House were not unnecessarily prejudiced, the Federal Upper House voted for a relatively unbinding resolution. However, where possible, reservations were articulated in detail. A justification along these lines was given by the Federal Upper House Vice President and Prime Minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen (Dr Meyers) before the Federal Upper House:

... imagine the case that in both the Upper and the Lower House a majority would like to accept the treaty, but the Federal Upper House ... includes its motives on the bill. The majority of the Lower House, however, possessing different motives, ... may well refuse reception thereof because of the motives of the Federal Upper House even though both houses agree on the substance of the treaty ... For this reason I am of the opinion that the process which we have suggested in the Committee is the correct one.\textsuperscript{39}

The further motions from Hessen - addendum to the text of the Law\textsuperscript{40} - and Hamburg - the inclusion of a preamble\textsuperscript{41} - were not accepted by the majority in the Federal Upper House, but they indicated the further course of discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House.

Despite the fact that strong reservations which had been expressed in the Upper House were later on included in the preamble, it still applies that the Upper House is not a decision-maker in the field of foreign policy but rather fulfils


\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Stenographische Berichte}, 254. Bundesratssitzung, 1 March 1963, p.34B.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Bundesratsdrucksache}, 58/2/63, 27 February 1963.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Bundesratsdrucksache}, 58/3/63, 27 February 1963.
the function of a demonstrator. According to this role on 1 March 1963 Secretary of State Dr Carstens for the first time mentioned one of the main problems in the parliamentary treatment of the Franco-German treaty. He pointed out the constitutional aspects of the treaty: "It is against the practical use of the German constitution to include preambles into treaties of the nature of 59 GG. Whenever a preamble is included the question arises whether the preamble is legally binding or not".42

Before this question can be dealt with in detail in one of the following paragraphs, a further factor needs to be mentioned, i.e. the existing supranational institutions, particularly the deliberations in the European Parliament.

The Significance of the Supranational European Institutions for Decisions within the CDU/CSU

The President of the EEC Commission, Professor Hallstein, explained on 27 March 1963 before the European Parliament that the Franco-German Treaty would introduce into the EEC 'a foreign influence', and that the danger would thus exist of weakening the community through the voting block Germany/France. Hallstein requested that in order to avoid this danger some form of guarantee would have to be given so that the precedence of EEC obligations could be secured in any ratification of the treaty.43 The EEC Commission explained, in an official press release of the speech of the President, that the point of view maintained by Professor Hallstein could be termed "an urgent appeal to the legal bodies responsible for the ratification and the participating government" and that the ratification of the treaty "should determine as clearly and in as binding a way as possible that the interpretation or fulfillment of the treaty would not distract from the permanence, functioning and dynamics of our community".44

42 Stenographische Berichte, 254. Bundesratssitzung, 1 March 1963, p.40B.


The chairman of the working committee on foreign affairs in the CDU/CSU party, Majonica, had explained immediately after the release of the Hallstein speech: "These are the serious words of a responsible European".45

The debates in European Parliament, especially Professor Hallstein's speech, did have some significance for the discussion on the Franco-German treaty within the CDU/CSU, but the indirect influence of European Parliament proved, however, to be at least similarly effective. Thus in the CDU/CSU Party and working committee meetings members of European Parliament had given especially vigorous support for the clearing up of all reservations in the ratification of the treaty.46

Within the Social Democrats, however, it was not only the Socialist Party of European Parliament which accentuated reservations over the Franco-German treaty, but rather the socialist parties of Western Europe which exerted strong pressure on the German Social Democrats.

The Impact of the European Socialist Parties on the Consideration of the German-French Treaty

Already on 29 January 1963 the office of the Socialist International in London had reacted sharply against the declaration of de Gaulle on 14 January and had requested anew an "intensification of European co-operation and integration".47 On 14 March 1963 the joint office of the social democratic parties of the EEC made a statement after a special meeting in Brussels - at which, among others, the chairman of the SPD, Ollenhauer, and his deputy, Wehner, participated as did General Secretary Mollet of the French Socialist Party. The office decidedly came out against the present form of the Franco-German treaty. If the treaty could not be accommodated "in legally

46 Interviews von Guttenberg and Birrenbach.
binding form" to the existing multilateral treaties, "then the Social Democrats of the EEC could not support the Franco-German treaty under any circumstances". 48

While the SPD in its internal SOPADE speech-copying service printed the original text of the declaration, which expressed tranchant criticism of the treaty, there appeared on 15 March 1963 in the official SPD press service a small section dealing with the special meeting in Brussels in a careful and significant way. A special treaty between Paris and Bonn could only be agreed to if juridically it could be maintained, without reservation, that such a treaty "did not run counter to obligations already entered into under already existing treaties". 49

These points of departure are indications of the further behaviour of the SPD and the European socialist parties. While the other social democratic parties, including the French, proceeded from a dismissal of the treaty in its present form, the SPD mentions agreement with the treaty if reservations could be cleared up. The discussion of this problem, however, was not held at common special meetings of all the socialist parties but, instead, took place in individual conversations between the leadership of the SPD and its sister parties. "Erich Ollenhauer and Herbert Wehner were at this time mostly somewhere in Europe trying to calm down other comrades". 50

Information on the contents of these talks rarely reached the public. However, as was confirmed by several SPD-MPs

there was a great deal of trouble especially with the French and the Belgians. The British Labour comrades were quite reasonable, even though it vitally concerned them. But Mollet did not care so much for the treaty, he was much more concerned with his opposition to de Gaulle. 51


49 SPD-Pressedienst (P/XVIII/52), 15 March 1963.

50 Interview Selbmann I.

51 Interview with an SPD-MP who asked to remain anonymous.
That the objections of the other Social Democratic parties were taken seriously by the SPD is shown by a press release from Herbert Wehner on the occasion of the parliamentary discussion of the German-French Chamber of Deputies:

The SPD can understand the decision of the French Socialists who believed they were not able to agree to the treaty because the legal situation in France, unlike the Federal Republic, does not permit the creation of a preamble which clearly assimilates the treaty into the multilateral treaties.52

The so-called Agreement of Cadenabbia

The previous history of the preamble to the German-French Treaty has remained, even until today, relatively unknown. The preamble was officially presented to the public as the so-called agreement formula of Cadenabbia. In fact, however, Federal Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schroeder had up to that point expressed their opposition to any change in the text of the treaty, in the Foreign Affairs Committee, the presidium of the CDU/CSU as well as in the CDU working group on foreign affairs.52a

On 3 April, a few hours before internal coalition talks between the CDU/CSU and the FDP and one day before the agreement in Cadenabbia, CDU/CSU members explained that they wished to clear up the reservations which had been expressed in foreign countries and within Germany against the treaties. This was to be accomplished by a resolution in which the Federal Government and the Federal Parliament should recognise the opinion that the multilateral treaties should have precedence over the friendship treaty.53 Such a resolution would have been less legally binding than a preamble to the treaty. However, 24 hours later leading politicians of both coalition parties met at Adenauer's holiday residence in Cadenabbia and it was unanimously agreed to:


52a Interview Kopf and Majonica
1. ratify in the near future the Franco-German Treaty; and
2. to introduce a preamble to the treaty.

The principles of the preamble, whose final formulation was to remain a matter for Parliament, effectively the Foreign Affairs Committee, included:

1. emphasis of German-French friendship;
2. an agreement on the goal of reunification; and
3. an expression of faith in the European Community and the extension of European unity as well as the North Atlantic Treaty.  

Those participating in the discussions in Cadenabbia were Federal Chancellor Adenauer and Federal Ministers Schroeder, Krone and Scheel; CDU/CSU members Schmoecker, Lemmer, Majonica, Gradl, Jaeger and Stiller; and FDP party chairman Mende, deputy chairman von Kuehlmann-Stumm and FDP members Schultz, Zoglmann and Achenbach. All the non-ministerial participants in the discussions at Cadenabbia were members of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and the working committee on foreign affairs of their respective parties.

According to a CDU-MP, Birrenbach did not participate in the Cadenabbia discussions by his own choice. Birrenbach, whose relationship to Adenauer had deteriorated considerably because of his outspokenness on this issue, later on confirmed this version: "I had been invited, but I did not want to unnecessarily provoke the Chancellor by my presence".

Political observers at that time agreed that the solution of Cadenabbia was arrived at "amazingly rapidly and smoothly".

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54 Veroeffentlichungen des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, No. 376/63, 4 April 1963.
56 Interview Birrenbach.
57 Interview with E. Majonica in Sueddeutschen Rundfunk, 5 April 1963; Erich Mende in Sender Freies Berlin, 5 April 1963.
Even the chairman of the CDU working group on foreign affairs, Majonica, was surprised how easily an agreement was reached with the Chancellor: "Der alte Herr greeted us with the words: 'Well, why shouldn't we have a preamble'".\(^{58}\)

The Influence of the Social Democratic Opposition on the Compromise

The agreement to a preamble, however, was not primarily the result of coalition discussions in Cadenabbia; it was the outcome of a chain of discussions in which at an earlier stage the Social Democrats had taken part.

What were the individual steps which had smoothed the path towards a preamble and what was the role of the Social Democratic Opposition in this process?

It was already mentioned that the parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs had not formed a sub-committee for the discussion on the German-French Treaty. The Social Democrats had, in early 1963 - immediately after knowledge of the text of the treaty - created a sub-committee of their party working group on foreign affairs. Members of this sub-committee were: Herbert Wehner as chairman and MPs Birkelbach, Erler, Mattick, Metzger, Mommer and Carlo Schmid.

The sub-committee discussed in the beginning of February a total of 26 alternatives to the existing form of the Franco-German Treaty. These extended from a refusal of the treaty, the postponement of ratification, the inclusion of a new text, the decision that the treaty should remain open for other countries, and the addition of special protocols to a completely new treaty. Most suggestions were intended to demonstrate the fact that in principle one would agree to the treaty but had reservations with regard to the present form.\(^{59}\)

There is no direct evidence that there had been arrangements with the FDP. An SPD-MP, however, seems to

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\(^{58}\) Interview Majonica.

\(^{59}\) Interview Selbmann I.
remember that the FDP had been assured that the Social Democrats "would not participate in any coalition directed against the FDP" in case the existing coalition should break up because of controversies on the Franco-German Treaty. However, this SPD-politician insisted on not being quoted as his memory had let him down before.

With or without assurances the Social Democrats and the FDP at the end of March agreed to proceed jointly. In a meeting of the Council of Elders of the German Parliament the deputy of the Federal Government requested that the first reading of the Franco-German Treaty be placed on the agenda of the Federal parliamentary meetings from 24-26 April. The FDP and the SPD, however, objected to such an 'over-hasty treatment of the agreement' and refused the suggestion which was supported by the CDU/CSU. Nevertheless, the first discussion in Parliament on the Franco-German Treaty did take place in those days; however, only after agreement in general had been reached in Cadenabbia.

The Effect of the Strong Disagreement Within the CDU/CSU on the Political Climate in the Foreign Affairs Committee

Since the end of February, the SPD had maintained intensive contacts with the CDU. Its relationship with the Foreign Affairs Minister was of a dual nature. One aspect was that the SPD knew that Schroeder personally regarded the Franco-German Treaty as superfluous. Secondly, all were in agreement with the Foreign Minister that friendship with France should not occur at the cost of friendship with the USA. In the practical treatment of the Treaty, however, different opinions became evident. The Foreign Affairs Minister represented the opinion that the treaty should be ratified in the form in which it was proposed by the Government. He as Foreign Affairs Minister would then insure that the treaty was applied only in the sense which corresponded to the ideas of the SPD. However, the Opposition requested to lay down in the form of a binding preamble the notions of Parliament on the Franco-German treaty. Although in the Foreign

Affairs Committee all agreed with the principles and goals of the undertaking, the question caused differences of opinion between the Opposition and the Foreign Minister. These differences of opinion, however, took place - as the SPD-MP Kurt Mattick formulated it - "in an atmosphere of mutual good will".  

As opposed to this 'good will' between Schroeder and the Opposition, disagreement occurred in the Committee between the CDU-Foreign Affairs Minister and the CSU spokesman on foreign affairs, von Guttenberg. Guttenberg accused Schroeder of directly provoking bad relations with the French Government through his 'indifferent attitude' towards the treaty.

These sharp disagreements within the CDU/CSU were an important factor in forming, within the Committee, a "coalition of the prudent ones" who sought "to find a unified opinion of the Parliament on this important question". At the beginning of the discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee, individual CDU members "on the basis of pressure from our Western friends" had supported the ratification of the treaty only if Parliament would clear up all reservations which had arisen over the Franco-German Treaty.

In this context Committee members conceived of the Committee as having a virtual executive function in making foreign policy. The reasons for this were given by Committee Chairman H. Kopf, who argued that the Committee had to assume a direct role given, on the one hand, the overriding importance of the Western alliance to Germany and, on the other, the inability of the bureaucracy of Foreign Minister Schroeder (who was inhibited by his ambition for the Chancellorship) to impress upon Adenauer the need for modification of the treaty.

61 Interview Mattick.
62 Interview von Guttenberg.
63 Interviews Kopf and Birrenbach.
64 Interview Kopf. Cf. Note 18, p. 59.
In the justification of the parliamentary Committee's behaviour there were only minor differences of opinion between the Committee members of the Opposition and those of the majority party. While CSU-MP von Guttenberg spoke of 'means of explanatory interpretation', the secretary of the SPD working group on foreign policy defined the decision as 'parliamentary rectification'.

The Origin of the Preamble

Whatever one may term the decision on the preamble, in practice it was a compromise between the CDU party working committee and the SPD party working committee, negotiated by two of their leading representatives, namely Birrenbach (CDU) and Erler (SPD).

However, there is no hard evidence for the supposition that Birrenbach and Erler were the initiators of the compromise between the two major parties. Social Democrats, who had been informed by Fritz Erler about his negotiations with Birrenbach, were not prepared to convey any details. Birrenbach himself did not want to comment either; he said, however: "None of those who had been to Cadenabbia were present at the hour of birth of the preamble".

Thus it has to remain unknown who acted where and under what circumstances as 'midwife' to the preamble. Possibly von Brentano and Birrenbach had agreed on a preamble before Birrenbach began discussions with the SPD-politician. However, it is also possible that Erler and Birrenbach had been the first to decide on the realisation of a preamble.

Whatever might have been the case, it is certain that those who made the decision were members of the legislative body, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. It has already been

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65 Interview von Guttenberg.
66 Interview Selbmann I.
67 Interview Birrenbach.
67a) Interview von Guttenberg, Selbmann I and Interview with E. Selbmann, Bonn, 7 July 1973 (Selbmann III), Interview Kopf.
shown how supporters of the preamble had created such favourable preconditions within the CDU/CSU that Federal Chancellor Adenauer was led to accept this.

The political actions of the FDP were hampered by the threat of a large coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU in case the FDP would insist on too high demands; and at this stage a coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU could have brought about the introduction of a new electoral system which would have meant the political end of this 'third power'.

The Social Democratic Opposition did not find it hard to accept the proposal which had possibly been devised by Birrenbach and Erler, because all realistic demands by the SPD had in fact been met. Furthermore, the legal status of the text had made the preamble more easily acceptable in the party. It is possible that those results which, according to the previous case study, had been arrived at by means of a sub-committee could in this case be achieved because of the fact that the majority of MPs were not experts in legal matters.

The Legal Preconditions of the SPD Demands and the Possible Foreign Policy Consequences

Because of its significance in the effecting of the compromise, a more detailed analysis of the constitutional and international legal aspects of the treaty will be added at this point. The enumeration of all the constitutional and international legal possibilities with regard to the objections of Parliament to the treaty in its original form makes clear the substance of the decision which was in fact made.

Thoughts and arguments in this chapter are based on material which had been prepared in the SPD working group on foreign policy.

The legal basis of the Social Democratic demands was repeated by various SPD spokesmen:

Before ratification of the treaty the Opposition was concerned that the parliamentary clarifications should be incorporated into the treaty
(a) "in a legally unambiguous language" and
(b) "in a binding form with regard to international law". 68

Such clarifications would overcome their reservations to the treaty in its original form. However, the terms 'legally unambiguous' and 'binding with regard to international law' require some analysis. 69

The dual formula 'legally incontestable' and 'binding with regard to international law' can only be understood - unless the statement is tautologous - in the sense that the Social Democrats were concerned that the preamble should be binding on both the German and the French Governments. It is already contestable whether such a preamble has legal binding force internally. Thus in v. Mangold-Klein it is stated that a preamble contains

no legally binding prescriptions, it is only enunciative or declamatory in nature ... Seen in its legal significance even the preamble of the German Constitution is only an article of faith, a statement of a general character but has no legal relevance ... 70

Doubt concerning the legal obligation imposed by a preamble was also expressed by the State Secretary, Dr Carstens, on the occasion of the previously mentioned Federal Upper House debate. 70a)

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70a) See footnote 39, p. 67
However, in 1956 a majority of legal opinion had accepted the principle of legally binding clauses on the basis of the KPD-judgement of the Federal High Court. There the highest German court had to concern itself with the objection of the Communist Party (KPD) that the outlawing of its activities was in contradiction with the expressed aim of reunification as it had been stated in the preamble of the Constitution. Inter alia the High Court was forced to investigate the binding nature of a preamble.

The conclusion of the report stated:

The preamble of the German Constitution is primarily of a political nature ... apart from this, however, the preamble is also legal in content.71

However, the internal legal binding force of the preamble to the German-French Treaty was only a partial request of the SPD. To establish the maximum demand - its internationally binding nature - there were several possible complicated legal arrangements. Hessian Prime Minister Zinn referred to one of these possibilities in the above mentioned debate of the Federal Upper House on 1 March 1963.72 This was concerned with a reservation or clarification in the so-called ratification in the international sense. This work cannot deal with the comprehensive legal preconditions of the possibility referred to in detail. However, due to the significance of the problem in effecting the compromise between the SPD and the CDU it is referred to briefly.

A ratification of bilateral treaties through an exchange of notes has not only some affirmative or declaratory significance; it also has substantial legal importance. It is permissible in international law in the ratification, or more precisely in the so-called ratification document, to express

70b See notes 69, 70, page 78
reservations, interpretational points or clarifications, which then - if they are accepted by the treaty partner - take international effect.

The political consequences of this legal construction would have meant massive pressure on the French treaty partner; for France would have been forced - expressly or implicitly - to respond to the clarifications of these reservations. In this three possibilities were feasible:

1. France respects the clarification expressively; then the treaty may only be applied and interpreted in the sense of this clarification;
2. France ignores the clarification: then the clarification likewise is assumed to be accepted;
3. France contradicts the clarification: then it is considered as not accepted; however, the German treaty partner would then know - as well as the foreign community - what France had in fact intended with the Franco-German Treaty.

The SPD demand for France being bound legally to a Bundestag interpretation of the Franco-German Treaty would have amounted to an affront to France, since in international affairs it would have signified, firstly, an additional demonstration of blame with regard to French EEC policy and, secondly, an additional demonstration of good will towards the United States.

The significance of the legal issues can be summarised as follows:

An internationally binding preamble would have been a total victory for the SPD position, but such a victory would have jeopardised not only the treaty through possible, if not likely, French rejection but also the likelihood of compromise on the CDU/CSU side. A non-binding declaration, on the other hand, would have met with considerable resistance within the rank-and-file of the SPD. Thus a middle way which reflected the
intensity of the SPD's concern and which allowed the Government to avoid a confrontation with France was necessary - and this was found in the form of the internally binding preamble.

Drafting the Final Compromise

As we have seen the initial contacts resulting in a virtual agreement on the principle of a preamble were between leading Committee members CDU-MP Birrenbach, a frequent diplomatic emissary of the Government, and SPD Party Vice-leader Erler. Following their contacts both leaders discussed the possible concepts of a preamble with their respective foreign policy working groups. While these discussions were going on, Birrenbach and Erler engaged in further consultations to inform each other about the thinking in their respective parties.73

While admittedly their earlier discussions were of considerable influence, the ultimate form of the preamble, the actual hammering out of the document, was done by the Committee itself. Indeed, it took two full working days for the Committee to finally produce an agreed-upon draft.74

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this case the Committee not only influenced German foreign policy, but through the device of the preamble directly formulated a key aspect of that policy. Beyond this, influence was exercised vis-à-vis the Government in that the Federal Chancellor was forced to accept modification of his treaty with de Gaulle. It is important to emphasise that while pressures had been building against Adenauer - such as the 7 February declaration of the full House - it was only the Committee which provided the specific vehicle for the modification of the Chancellor's position. The line-up of forces in this case was strongly against Adenauer. The Federal Chancellor had the backing of 'Gaullist' members of his own party and especially the CSU. This was a minority position within the Government

73 Interviews Selbmann and Kopf.
74 Interview Kopf.
parties. On the other side of the issue stood not only 'Atlanticists' within the CDU/CSU but Adenauer's coalition partner, the FDP, as well as the social democratic Opposition. In the middle there was Foreign Minister Schroeder, who, on the one hand, shared the concern of the 'Atlanticists' but, on the other hand, with a view to his possible ascent to the Chancellorship, refused to be drawn into opposition to Adenauer.

In comparison to our first case study the Committee itself played a much more central role in the configuration of forces. Not only was the Committee the forum for the working out of an agreement between the Government and Opposition parties, the Committee leaders themselves were the critical actors behind that agreement. Thus Erler and Birrenbach played vital roles, both in their private discussions within the working groups of their respective parties which were themselves composed entirely of Committee members, and in the deliberations of the Committee itself. Indeed, we can see in this case study manifestation of a self-conscious assertion by the Committee of its right to participate in foreign policy formulation. As Committee Chairman Kopf put it six years later, foreign policy is a "combined power" shared jointly between Government and Parliament. In this case the political realities support Kopf's assertion.

In considering the factors contributing to the Committee's influence on this case, we shall look at those examined in the preceding case study. This will show that, while many of the same factors remain influential, there are significant variations in their degree of importance.

The situation with regard to party strength in Parliament had changed considerably since the time of the Jaksch-Report. In 1961 the CDU/CSU lost its absolute majority and entered into a governing coalition with the FDP. This coalition provided a safe overall majority for the Government but it was, of course,

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74a This was widely believed in political and journalistic circles. Cf. note 18, p. 59
dependant upon the continued adherence of the FDP. The FDP, however, was handicapped in its room to manoeuvre by the threat of the introduction of a first-past-the-post electoral system which would have totally destroyed the party. This possibility was very much in the forefront of the minds of the FDP leaders, since a betrayed CDU/CSU could have been expected to make a temporary alliance with the SPD on this question. In the previous chapter it appeared that the overall CDU/CSU majority created a sense of confidence which ostensibly facilitated compromise; on that we could speculate that in a situation where a less-secure majority existed there would be less readiness to compromise. This was not borne out in this case study. But this does not cover all cases since the Government coalition still had a safe majority at the time of the Franco-German Treaty. In Chapter Eight we shall examine the extreme of a razor-thin parliamentary majority.

The importance of the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy is decidedly secondary. Although bureaucrats were consulted for technical advice by the Committee they were kept out of crucial decision-making discussions. Thus, in contrast to the presence of Foreign Affairs officers in von Brentano's dining room discussions in the previous case study, in this case the crucial consultations centering on the preamble consisted solely of parliamentarians. This difference must be related to the constitutional role of the Committee.

In this case the Standing Orders of Parliament placed the Committee in a more central position than was the case with the Jaksch-Report. While the Standing Orders allowed the Committee to take up the Eastern question or virtually any other foreign policy matter, this was still a matter for the Committee's discretion. Furthermore, in that case the report was simply a factor influencing a subsequent Government decision. In contrast, in the case of the Franco-German Treaty, the Committee was required to act before the treaty could be ratified. Thus an explicit responsibility - and power - was vested in this institution. While in many cases this power would not be used to modify a treaty agreed to by the Government, the fact that
the responsibility existed meant that a conscious decision would have to be taken by the Committee. This in turn led to a deepening of the perception of Committee members that they had clear rights and responsibilities to participate in the shaping of the nation's treaty obligations.

As indicated, even with these constitutional powers Committees do not necessarily assert them. Strong motives are required to modify the treaty commitment of one's own Government. In the case of the Franco-German Treaty these motives were provided by international pressures. In sharp contrast to the previous case study where no direct foreign pressures were brought to bear, here influence was exerted by the American Government, by the West European allies of Germany, by leading figures within the EEC bureaucracy and by the socialist parties of Western Europe. These pressures created widespread concern among key actors on the West German political scene that the treaty as drafted would be grossly detrimental to West Germany's interest. This perception was so widespread that a powerful coalition was formed which not only drafted the modifying preamble to the treaty but 'persuaded' Adenauer to assent.

Even with strong motives and clear constitutional authority, in the final analysis the Committee was only able to reach agreement and thereby successfully modify the treaty through the use of integrative politics. Even though a majority of the CDU/CSU saw the need for modification of the treaty, this would have been unacceptable if the Opposition had made a partisan issue of the matter. Thus from the point of view of the 'Atlanticists' within the governing parties, it was important to gain the co-operation of the Opposition in order to prevent polarisation which CDU/CSU 'Gaullists' and probably Adenauer himself could have used as an argument against change. From the point of view of the Opposition, although undoubtedly temptations existed to play the issue to electoral advantage, there were several reasons arguing for an integrative approach. One was the feeling (a feeling shared by CDU-'Atlanticists') that a chance existed for a rare victory over the Chancellor as

74b. This opinion was expressed by Committee-Chairman Kopf.

Interview Kopf.
long as the goal was relatively limited. Having been outmanoeuvred consistently by 'the old fox' these leaders were unwilling to see their advantage squandered by seeking Adenauer's humiliation. A more long-range consideration in the minds of Opposition leaders was the effort to build the party's public image as a statesman-like and constructive force in the foreign policy area - an image designed to undercut that of 'socialist irresponsibility' which the Chancellor had done so much to create. This, of course, enhanced the SPD's long term chances for forming a Government after a period of continuous opposition since the founding of the Federal Republic. These considerations provided the political circumstances which, together with the constitutional powers and policy motives derived from foreign pressures, facilitated the Committee's decisive role in modifying the Franco-German Treaty.
CHAPTER THREE
THE MUNDAT FOREST TREATY: A TREATY FRUSTRATED

On 31 July 1962 Couve de Murville and Herbert Blankenhorn signed the "Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic concerning various border regulations".\(^1\) After the Bundesrat had decided on 4 March 1966 not to raise any objections against this bill,\(^2\) Federal Chancellor Ludwig Erhard on 9 March asked Parliament to ratify it.

The German Bundestag, however, despite the fact that the French Parliament had already ratified the treaty,\(^3\) refused to consider the bill. This is the situation as it exists in 1976. To my knowledge this is the first time that a bilateral treaty foundered because one of the Parliaments refused its consent.\(^4\)

This curiosity is the result of deliberations in the Foreign Affairs Committee. In Germany this Committee must reach a final conclusion and give a recommendation before the issue can proceed to Parliament. Since the Committee decided not to complete this undertaking, Parliament was unable to proceed to ratification. Furthermore, this proved to be the first time in West German history that the Committee, representing Parliament, unanimously opposed the executive without at any stage offering to compromise.

Contents, History and Problems of the Mundat Forest Treaty

This treaty is divided into two parts.\(^5\) In the first part the French Government agrees to return border areas to the former German owners; in the second part the West German

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\(^1\) BT, V.WP, Bundestagsdrucksache No. 405.

\(^2\) Ibid., p.1.

\(^3\) BT, V.WP, 101 Sitzg , p.4683B.

\(^4\) However, the Parliament of the Netherlands only ratified a Dutch-German border treaty which had already been agreed to by the Bundestag, after both Government's had been forced to renegotiate details of the treaty. See H. Kopf, op.cit., p.310.

\(^5\) BT, V.WP, Bundestagsdrucksache No. 405.
Government, in return, legally recognises the post-April 1949 de facto Rhenish-Palatinate borderline. Additionally, in this treaty the two Governments regulate the crossing rights for the border populations and tourists in the area of the Mundat Forest. Also, on the occasion of signing the treaty in July 1962 the two Governments exchanged letters in which the French Government promised to return the German Christchurch in Paris to the German Lutheran Community in the French capital. Taking the ratification for granted the French Government later carried out this part of the agreement.

The real bone of contention eventually proved to be Article 8 of the treaty which reads:

To make allowance for the local needs, particularly for the drinking water supply of the town of Weissenburg the French Republic and Federal Republic of Germany recognise as the definite borderline in the area of Weissenburg that described in Appendix A of the treaty.

This borderline in the neighbourhood of Weissenburg running through the Mundat Forest has the following post-war history. After it had become clear that as a result of the emerging East-West conflict a general agreement upon a German peace treaty between the Russian and Western victory powers would not be forthcoming, the Western powers and the Benelux countries met in London at the beginning of 1948 to discuss minor adjustments to Germany's Western borders. The above six powers created a working committee to deal with these problems in detail.

As a result Germany lost 135 sq. kilometres. The population of this area was approximately 13,500. At the German-French border in the region of Weissenburg, however, only

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6 Ibid., p.5.
7 BT, V.WP, Bundestagsdrucksache No. 405, Anhang 1 und 2 des Abkommens, pp.16-17.
8 Ibid., p.5.
6.9 sq. kilometres were ceded. This area was unpopulated. In a so-called 'Ueberleitung' Treaty, Germany had to accept that these border adjustments could in future only be revised with the consent of the three Western powers.

This point seemed to be particularly relevant in the Mundat Forest Treaty. The West German Government argued that because of this clause it had proved impossible to recover all of the Mundat Forest territory. However, the West German Government presented the case that substantial improvements could have been obtained compared with the original borderline. These improvements amounted to the reclamation of one hectare of private agricultural land and one hectare of common forest. On the debit side the West German Government relinquished a claim on 696 hectares of forest land of which 684 hectares originally belonged to the Federal and State Government and the remainder to private individuals.

The West German Government in its memorandum to the treaty showed itself aware of possible objections, on the basis that this could be interpreted as a precedent concerning Germany's Eastern borders, by emphasising that the French-German agreement did not represent a border change but rather a border adjustment.

The Discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Mundat Forest Agreement

The Foreign Affairs Committee analysed with extreme care the background, motives and possible consequences of the treaty. Members of the Committee even travelled into the Mundat Forest area in order to consider the treaty's pros and cons on the spot. Some members while in Paris discussed aspects of the treaty with French colleagues, civil servants and private citizens.

For varied reasons the members of the Committee came to similar conclusions. Some CDU and CSU members were opposed to the treaty on principle because border corrections could be

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10 Bundesgesetzblatt 1955, Teil 2, pp.405-06.
interpreted as border changes. SPD-MP Mueller-Emmert seemed to have in mind possible electoral repercussions; others were of the opinion that the Foreign Affairs Department had not been skilful enough in their negotiations; others again were worried about the lack of information. MP von Meerkatz was supposed to have explained his specific affection towards the Mundat Forest as a sentimental consequence of a Ph.D. thesis by a friend of his on the history of the area. Finally, one has to mention that the hunting passion of the French military and their predilection for this region lent more scepticism to the views of the German MPs upon this treaty. Because of these various views it is difficult to isolate any single motive for the practical rejection of the treaty. Furthermore, bureaucrats and MPs are still reluctant to give quotable commentaries.

Nevertheless, the main arguments against the ratification of the Mundat Forest Treaty can be demonstrably summarised in the following way. Most of the Government members of the Committee were of the opinion that border corrections were obviously border changes; and border changes at the expense of West German territory could be interpreted as border concessions and precisely this could act as a precedent for a solution to border problems with East European countries.11

The Committee members were convinced that alternative solutions existed to the problem of water supply for Weissenburg without involving border adjustments. These members were sure that, for example, a financial solution could have been found amenable to both sides, an alternative which the German Government appeared not to have pursued.

While the value of the territory returned to Germany in the treaty was given as 6 million DM the West German Government failed to give any estimate for the value of the area to be ceded.12 The Committee members also received the impression that many local French officials would have been quite happy with a possible financial agreement.

11 Interviews von Guttenberg and Kopf.
12 BT, V.WP, Bundestagsdrucksache No. 405, p.13.
Those French diplomats, however, who were in favour of a solution on the lines of the Mundat Forest Treaty, were in the view of the West German Committee members more swayed by the hunting interests of the Corps diplomatique and military than the water supply for Weissenburg. This suspicion by the Committee members is supported by the fact that, because of the liberal hunting habits and ubiquitous hunting zeal in France, there was hardly any desirable game left - except in those border regions such as the Mundat Forest, in which the well-protected German game strayed occasionally across the border.

All this was too much for the West German Committee members. While not rejecting the treaty they refused to reach a conclusion, thus effectively blocking ratification through the German Parliament.

Later on further attempts were made to ratify the treaty. When in 1967 the Foreign Affairs Committee dealt again with this issue the Committee's view had become even more inflexible. Particularly within the CDU/CSU the opposition against the treaty had become stronger. This meant that the 'Gaullists' found themselves in an extremely difficult position. On the one hand, they tried to improve West Germany's relations with Gaullist France; on the other, they wanted to prevent at all costs border concessions towards France being seen as a precedent for future border regulations with the Communist Eastern European countries. This was precisely the reason why there was not even a minority within the Committee in favour of ratification of this treaty.

Reactions of Both Governments Towards the Attitude of the Bundestag Committee

After returning the Lutheran Christchurch in Paris in the spirit of the treaty, the French Government did not hide their displeasure about the attitude of the West German Parliament. The French pressed on different levels for a ratification of the

13 Interviews von Guttenberg and Kopf.
14 Interview Kopf.
Mundat Forest Treaty. Consequently it was pointed out to the German Foreign Office that this treaty had been ratified in France and become law. Such a treatment, particularly by a German Parliament, had been so far unimaginable by the French Government.  

On a lighter note, French Ambassador Seydoux, at a diplomatic function in Bonn, was supposed to have greeted the Chairman of the West German Foreign Affairs Committee, Dr Hermann Kopf, and CDU-MP von Meerkatz with the jocular words: "You Germans think you have come so far that you can break treaties in the same way as you did in the past". At least this is the way a foreign affairs officer remembered it. Dr Kopf, however, cannot recall this incident and does not believe that the French Government had taken umbrage over this issue. Even in 1973 the former Committee Chairman thought it necessary to emphasise that the Committee's decision should in no way be regarded as an affront to France.

Meanwhile back in 1967 MPs Leicht and Becher asked in Parliament whether there was any possibility of retaining the Mundat Forest and regaining the agricultural land, which was so necessary to the local German farmers, offered in exchange by the French. In reply, State Secretary Schuetz from the Foreign Office said that both aspects are part and parcel of the same treaty and that the advantages for Germany would disappear if the treaty was not ratified by the Bundestag. He argued that continued deferral of the treaty would result in the possible loss of former German agricultural land. The German parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs still held to its course and refused to change its mind.

The Discussions Within the SPD Working Group on Foreign Policy About the Mundat Forest Treaty

It was the parliamentary Social Democratic party who decided at a poorly attended meeting in West Berlin to block any

15 Interview with a West German Foreign Affairs official.
16 Interview Kopf.
17 BT, V.WP, 101 Sitzg., p.4683B.
attempt to renew discussion in the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee about the treaty. This was done despite the fact that the SPD had formed a coalition Government with their Chairman Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister. Some leading SPD members ceased, on the French Government's annoyance, to argue in favour of a ratification of the treaty. Nevertheless, a majority stuck to their previous decision.

Mueller-Emmert had argued that it could not be the task of the SPD to carry out controversial decisions of the former Erhard Government. The parliamentary party leadership, however, opposed Mueller-Emmert and pointed out that the German farmers whose land would not be returned would be disadvantaged and quite correctly annoyed. But Mueller-Emmert was much less concerned with a few annoyed farmers than with the remainder of his electorate who would understand the Mundat Forest Treaty as giving away German territory.

Eugen Selbmann, the Secretary of the SPD working group on foreign policy, explained the defeat of the SPD leadership on this issue in the following way:

Nobody realised that the treaty would be discussed. Otherwise the parliamentary party leadership would not have allowed a vote to be taken upon this problem in such an 'off the cuff' manner. But in Berlin all the work which had banked up over the year automatically comes up for discussion and thus this topic appeared all of a sudden on the agenda.18

The SPD working group on foreign affairs later on returned to this and again it was the local member Mueller-Emmert who forced the issue. The Secretary of the SPD working group sent the following letter to all SPD members of the Foreign Affairs Committee:

Adolf Mueller-Emmert brought to our attention the European Water-Charter which was passed by the Ministerial Committee of the European Council in Strassburg on 6 May 1968. In clause 7 the following principle is established: 'Water knows no borders. It demands international co-operation. The

18 Interview Selbmann I.
17a Interview Selbmann II.
international problems arising from the usage of water shall be solved jointly by all neighbouring states in the interest of preserving the quality and quantity of water'. The principles of this Water-Charter are recognised by both France and West Germany. Therefore a border concession, as in the Mundat Forest Treaty, is in no way necessary. Adolf Mueller-Emmert conveyed this in a letter to (Foreign Minister) Willy Brandt and requested that this aspect should receive consideration in new negotiations with France in such a way that the Mundat Forest Treaty should be regarded as superfluous.19

The French Government, however, indicated that the European Water-Charter was in no way a substitute for the ratification of the treaty by the German Bundestag. /9a) /

Asked about the future chances of a ratification of the treaty a West German Foreign Affairs official replied in an interview with the author in December 1968: "It looks rather grim. The 'Gaullists' within the CDU/CSU are touchy about the French flirtation with Moscow - the other MPs are rather sensitive over the Gaullist treatment of England and the USA". Hence, even in 1976 the treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic concerning various border regulations theoretically remains on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the West German Bundestag.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As in the last case study here the Committee's significance was a direct outgrowth of its powers vis-a-vis treaties. While in the case of the Franco-German Treaty the Committee forced a modification, in this case it went even further and took the unusual stage of rejecting outright the Mundat Forest Treaty. The lines were sharply drawn between a unanimous Committee and the Foreign Ministry under successive Governments. Foreign Ministry officials had an obvious interest in the ratification of an agreement they had worked out with France. Because of the relative insignificance of the issue, however, the Ministry was

19 Letter from the Secretary of the SPD working group on foreign affairs to the SPD members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 October 1968.
19a) Interview Selbmann I
unable to gain *sufficient* support from its own Minister. When the question first arose under the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition Foreign Minister Schroeder, although formally calling for approval of the treaty, exerted no political muscle to achieve that end. Later under the Grand Coalition, when SPD-leader Brandt had taken over the Foreign Ministry, there was apparently a greater effort to gain support for the treaty at the Berlin meeting of the SPD foreign affairs working group. This, however, was badly organised and, partially due to chance, failed. But this failure was clearly related to the low priority the SPD leadership placed on the issue.

In opposition to the treaty was a diverse collection of politicians on the Committee from all parties. In some instances this was based on highly parochial considerations, such as the electoral concerns of SPD-MP Mueller-Emmert. In others, it concerned the more important consideration of the possible implications of the treaty for former German territory in the East. Particularly important was the feeling of many Committee members, across party lines, that the Committee had been inadequately informed concerning the treaty and that this represented an unacceptable infringement of their rights. For all these reasons the Committee was able to manifest unanimous opposition to the treaty.

In turning to the factors contributing to Committee solidarity and therefore its ability to reject the treaty, we find, in contrast to the previous case study, a very small role played by international pressures. While there was some French diplomatic pressure brought to bear to gain approval of the treaty, this was a long way from the mass of international forces which galvanised Committee members to insist upon a preamble.

As in the Franco-German Treaty the constitutional role of the Committee was a central factor. The very fact that Committee action was required before a treaty could be dealt with in the full House placed in the hands of Committee members a power over the treaty which was potentially absolute. In this case the Committee exercised its power.
While this was clearly an unusual case of outright Committee rejection of the Government's decision, elements of integrative politics can, as in the previous cases, be seen within the Committee. Committee members joined across party lines to rebuff the Government's treaty but this was made possible because the SPD-Opposition (and subsequently junior coalition partner) did not make this an issue for attacking the Government per se. Several reasons can be offered for the SPD's position. First, it might be argued that the treaty involved an issue which was not significant enough to promise partisan advantage. There are, however, reasons to believe that some political gains could have been made had the SPD pursued divisive politics. During the initial stages the SPD in theory could have belaboured the Government for the obvious defects of the treaty. Ironically, once Willy Brandt had assumed control of the Foreign Ministry, within the context of the Committee and German politics more broadly, divisive politics - i.e. the pursuit of short-term partisan advantage - would have argued for ratification of the treaty. One aspect of this would have been simply to demonstrate Brandt's effectiveness as Foreign Minister in contrast to Schroeder. Indeed, this might have been behind the abortive effort to revive the treaty at the Berlin meeting of the working committee. But the very laxness suggests that this was not a major partisan goal. A second possible partisan reason for supporting the treaty would have been to advance the course of a new Ostpolitik - which later became a major SPD programme - by creating a precedent for border revisions. The failure to aggressively push for ratification suggests that on this ground the SPD-leaders either consciously or unconsciously decided to forego making the matter a major issue. Finally, within the context of the Committee itself SPD members might have been tempted to deal a rebuff to those CDU/CSU members opposed to new initiatives to the East. That this was not done suggests that the SPD Committee members were, in this case, more concerned with the role of the Committee as a whole than with any transitory gains.
As we have seen in the previous case study the conception of the Committee's role by its members was linked to its constitutional prerogatives in the area of treaties. This led to a particular attitude towards the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy which indeed was probably the most significant reason for the position which the Committee eventually took. In the case of the Jaksch-Report we saw that consultation with the bureaucracy enhanced the Committee's task. In the Franco-German Treaty - a case where Parliament's ratifying powers were also at issue - the bureaucracy was less involved in the process of Committee decision as the Committee members emphasised their own role. In this case the Committee's attitude towards the bureaucracy was even more sharply drawn. While, as in the previous case, Foreign Affairs officials acted as technical advisers to the Committee, here Committee members felt early on that the bureaucracy was not adequately performing its duty of informing and consulting them. Moreover Committee members also felt the Foreign Ministry had done a poor job of pursuing German interests in the negotiations with France. Thus rather than the consultative relationship of the Jaksch-Report deliberations, or the more distant advisory role performed with regard to the Franco-German Treaty, in this case the Committee took a sceptical and critical role of the Foreign Affairs bureaucrats. While this partially flowed from the specific responsibilities placed on the Committee relative to treaties by the Standing Orders, the lacklustre performance of the bureaucracy itself was clearly a key factor.
CHAPTER FOUR
AUSTRALIA'S JOINT PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND AID POLICY, 1971-75

Academic analysts have consistently downgraded the influence of Australia's Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs on decision-making. In comparison to the German situation there is an obvious factor supporting such a view. While the German Foreign Affairs Committee has both broad terms of reference and, more importantly, its action is required before a treaty can be ratified, in Australia the Committee's scope is limited to questions approved by the Foreign Minister, it plays no necessary role in treaty ratification and it can report only to the Foreign Minister and not to Parliament as a whole. These legal considerations are reinforced by political factors which we analyse below. But while the sum of legal and political factors clearly weakened the role of the Australian Committee in comparison to the German case it would nevertheless be wrong to conclude that the Committee has been without any influence. The ability of the Committee to exert influence - albeit limited influence - over policy is illustrated by the development of Australia's foreign aid policy after 1971. Ironically, our examination of the specific factors allowing for Committee's influence in this case will reveal systematic factors which have sharply limited the Committee's role overall.

From March to October 1972 the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs considered the effectiveness of Australia's foreign aid policies. I shall argue that the Committee's

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2 Later, under the Whitlam Government this obvious anomaly has been changed. Since 1973 the Committee can report directly to Parliament.
deliberations, conclusions and recommendations, as well as their repercussions, were in this case more influential than any previous activity in the history of the Committee. This is not saying much, however, since the Committee's political muscle had never been properly developed. Be this as it may, most of the Committee's recommendations became official policy under the Whitlam Labor Government.

Committee Recommendations and Government Policy

The most essential recommendations of the Committee's report can be summarised in the following five points:

1. Against the wishes of the Department of Foreign Affairs the Committee recommended more emphasis on multilateral opposed to bilateral aid.

2. It further advocated that more stress be put on social and developmental aspects of foreign aid and projects be selected accordingly.

3. Australia's representative to the World Bank should not be appointed by Treasury.

4. The Committee, having found out that the Aid Branch in Foreign Affairs had never undertaken an evaluation of the effectiveness of any aid project, called for such evaluations in the future.

5. The Committee recommended emphasis on the development of educational institutions within the recipient countries in place of programmes facilitating the education of foreign elites in Australia.

All of the above Committee demands as well as others had, by October 1975, been implemented. They have been implemented for the Labor Government by the Australian Development Assistance Agency (ADAA). Ironically the Committee report was equivocal in its attitude towards an aid agency. While Committee Vice Chairman W. Morrison and other Labor members did press for such an agency with the result that it appeared in
the first draft of the Committee's report, one Liberal member, Sir John Cramer, realised that this merely reproduced Labor's Launceston platform and was unwilling to see his party so committed.

The result was that the final Committee report contained the contradictory recommendation that either the foreign aid branch in Foreign Affairs be strengthened or that a separate foreign aid agency be established. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the overall direction of the report's policy recommendations supported an independent agency, a point which had particular impact on Sir John Crawford's influential recommendations to the Prime Minister. Thus when ADAA was established in 1973-74 the decision can at least partially be traced to the Committee report. ADAA, as an independent agency, however, was not to survive the Labor Government and in 1976 was placed under the authority of Foreign Affairs.

Before describing the process leading to these recommendations, and how these recommendations were transformed into Government policy, it is desirable to first introduce the general framework within which contemporaneous debate on foreign aid was conducted.

The thrust of the Committee's recommendations reflected the world-wide change of emphasis in developmental philosophies and particularly the disillusionment with purely GNP growth-oriented concepts. While many academics and politicians were not demanding the complete discarding of traditional growth concepts, the demand for encompassing the principle of economic justice and income distribution was increasingly heard. In particular growing attention was given to the plight of the rural poor which made up the great majority of the Third World population in Asia. Thus new development strategies, in no small measure influenced by the Chinese model, shifted emphasis from often prestigious heavy industry to agricultural and light industry.

While aspects of these new strategies had by 1975 been acknowledged by even such traditionally efficiency-oriented
institutions as the World Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and while by this time even the Liberal Party Opposition included concentration on the rural sector in its aid policy statement, before 1972 in Australia it remained for academics and particularly voluntary aid organisations to articulate the inadequacies of the growth-oriented strategies in presenting and emphasising the new approach. It is not my task here to evaluate whether these new aid strategies have been or can be successful nor the extent to which they have been implemented by the Australian Government. In short, I am not asking to what extent the changes in aid policy carried out by the Labor policy have been changes of rhetoric rather than substance. The analysis here is restricted to the question of the Committee's role in the changes which were publicly announced.

To summarise at the outset, in terms of foreign aid policy, the Labor Government achieved a shift in emphasis from diplomatic and strategic objectives to developmental and humanitarian goals. Ironically most members of the Liberal Country Party Opposition supported the measures which


4 In this context my interviews indicate that at least one recipient nation and some senior officials in the Australian Aid Agency have demonstrated less than total enthusiasm for the new approaches.
accomplished this shift while not perceiving the implications of those measures. Parts of the conservative bureaucracy, however, did perceive these implications and fought fiercely but unsuccessfully to block the steps in question.

To return to the change in foreign aid objectives we must first look to the history of foreign aid from 1950 to the early seventies. Alan Wilkinson's analysis of the 'higher objectives and underlying considerations' (diplomatic and strategic as well as economic and humanitarian) came to the conclusion:

1. that the history of foreign aid in Australia (up to 1972) was very much conditioned by diplomatic, strategic and, to a lesser extent, ideological considerations;

2. that economic advantages for Australia were, for the most part, only of secondary importance; and

3. that there was usually an altruistic expression of concern for others which was not altogether rhetorical.5

It also showed, as Wilkinson concluded, that the primacy of political (diplomatic and strategic) considerations was due to the Department of Foreign Affairs which was in control of the more important bilateral aspects of Australia's aid programme.6 Wilkinson's study ends with the MacMahon Government.

But if we examine the policies of the Whitlam Government we find a change, or at least a shift of emphasis, in the objectives of aid and a revolutionary change in the administration of aid. The change can be seen on the one hand as reflecting a new strategic outlook. On the other hand, this change ostensibly meant a shift from foreign policy and strategic objectives to social and economic development aspects. Aid was now primarily supposed to improve the rate of development in the developing countries. But not only was the

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6 Ibid.
new Government more concerned about the quality and actual effectiveness of aid; it was as well sensitive to the impact of aid on social values, that is what effect aid had on the distribution of wealth within the developing countries.

Since former Governments had paid considerable lip-service to at least the developmental aspects of aid, many Liberal backbenchers accepted most aspects of the Labor philosophy on aid as not too controversial. Indeed, that Liberal and Country Party members - especially the Liberal Foreign Minister, Sir Nigel Bowen - went along with the Labor outlook was as surprising as were the events which led to the first critical review of Australian Aid policy by the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.

I do not intend to argue that there would have been no change in Australia's Foreign Aid policy without the deliberations and the report of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, but what I am arguing is that the Committee's actions greatly facilitated change by (1) criticising the then current administration of aid, (2) compiling detailed administrative information and sketching out an alternative administrative system, and (3) placing developmental and humanitarian rationales in the foreground. These considerations inhibited obstructive tactics by the bureaucracy and by the Liberal/Country Party Opposition after 1972. Furthermore, the detailed data compiled by the Committee supplied ammunition to all those inside and outside Parliament seeking change.

A Combination of Different Interests: Committee Rights and the Aid Issue

The reason why the parliamentary Committee took up the foreign aid issue, however, was definitely not purely a question of dealing with a subject close to the Committee's heart. In fact, one can argue that, to a certain extent, the Committee's report was partially the product of a series of accidents. This applies both to the selection of foreign aid as a topic to be examined by the Committee and, because of the ignorance and apathy of some Committee members, to the substance of some of the recommendations.
There were three distinct reasons why the foreign aid question was raised within the framework of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

1. The members of the Foreign Affairs Committee were seeking a means to extend the Committee's powers at a time when the aid issue fortuitously came along.

2. W. Morrison, Committee Vice Chairman and Labor spokesman, who believed he could control the Committee despite Labor's minority position, developed a plan for using the aid issue to bolster the Committee - and his chances of being elected by Labor Caucus into the shadow ministry.

3. The Liberal Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Bowen, being unaware of the existing problems with the aid programme agreed to a review on the assumption that aid was an uncontroversial matter.

However, all was not smooth sailing. It is necessary to review events by stages in order to understand the enfolding of Morrison's plan and the chance occurrences which furthered it.

**A New Liberal Committee Chairman and Labor's New Aid Policy: The Ingredients for W. Morrison's Strategy**

It is further necessary to look very closely at the various attempts of the Joint Committee to extend its powers, especially the right to hold meetings in public. These attempts began in early 1971 when the Committee decided to establish a Sub-Committee consisting of its Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Senator Sir Magnus Cormack. This Sub-Committee had the task of formulating guidelines for public sessions of the Committee and consulting with the Minister, whose approval was required.  

Later in March the then Committee Chairman, David Fairbairn, was appointed to the Cabinet and the Joint Committee

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7 Minutes of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 16 March 1971 (hereafter Committee Minutes).
decided to postpone further action until a new Chairman was appointed. This happened at the end of April when Harry Turner was unanimously elected Committee head.\(^8\)

Since Turner had been a strong proponent of parliamentary rights for over 30 years, this suggested that in the future the Liberal members of the Committee would be less subservient to the Ministry. However, the political circumstances of the time blunted the impulse to expand the Committee's authority.

In June 1971 the release of the Pentagon Papers raised questions about the Australian role in the Vietnam War. Deputy Chairman and Labor member Morrison attempted to obtain information on the Australian role but was blocked by the MacMahon Government.\(^9\) The majority Committee members then had no choice but to oppose Morrison. The Labor Committee leader in turn utilised this turn of events to publicise both the Committee's importance and his own position on the eve of Labor's 1971 Launceston Conference.\(^9\)

It was in Launceston that Labor's policy was formulated and that Morrison developed his plan to utilise the Committee to further that policy.\(^10\) Labor's policy, although not very specific, did indicate a clear desire for change. It read:

In accepting the United Nations programme to work towards a national contribution of 1% of gross national product, the Labor Party recognises that the quantity of aid is not the full measure of its effectiveness. In pursuit of a more meaningful aid programme the Labor Party proposes:

(a) to establish an Institute of Development Studies for the overall examination of the problem of social and economic development;

(b) to reorganise the administration of the various Australian aid programmes and to establish a mutual co-operation agency; and

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\(^8\) Committee Minutes, 27 April 1971.


\(^10\) Interview with W. Morrison, Canberra, September 1974.
(c) to support an increase in the opportunities for less developed countries to sell their goods.

A Labor Government will be sensitive to the quality of aid and the impact on social values.\(^\text{11}\)

The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Labor Party formulated these proposals\(^\text{12}\) which the Launceston Conference adopted unanimously.\(^\text{13}\) The members of the Committee were E.G. Whitlam, J.F. Cairns, M.D. Cross, P.R. Young, K.E. Beasley, J.L. Cavanagh and W.L. Morrison. According to an interview with M.D. Cross, Whitlam and Morrison were the most influential figures in the Committee's deliberations.\(^\text{14}\) The crucial elements of Labor's new proposals were the intention not only to reorganise and centralise the aid administration but to do so via a foreign aid agency independent of Foreign Affairs. This would have denied Foreign Affairs an important tool in obtaining diplomatic influence in foreign countries. Of course, Foreign Affairs had never been so crude as to attempt to trade foreign aid grants for diplomatic advantage, but it was an undeniable fact that aid programmes facilitate access to the recipient Governments. The implications of an independent aid agency presumably staffed by former External Territories officers who had a history of conflict with Foreign Affairs plus idealistically orientated public servants and outsiders serving under a Labor Minister committed to change, might have facilitated the achievement of what the Launceston Conference called as 'sensitivity to the quality of aid and its impact on social and economic development'. Although most Liberal members of Parliament were unaware of this, the Foreign Affairs

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\(^{13}\) Australian Labor Party, Minutes of the 29th Commonwealth Conference, Launceston, 20 June 1971, p.35.

\(^{14}\) Interview with Labor MP M.D. Cross, Canberra, March 1973.
bureaucracy understood it fully. The former permanent Head of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, said in an interview that after the Launceston Conference he knew that there "would be problems". But "we hoped that our better arguments would prevail and we were confident, would Labor come to office, Mr Whitlam could be convinced that aid policy is part of foreign policy and that thus the permanent Head would still remain responsible for the whole area of foreign affairs".  

While the Foreign Affairs Department focused on the alternative Prime Minister, Mr Morrison was active within the Committee. Morrison's tactics were a curious blend of integrative and divisive politics. On the one hand, he sought to build up support from Liberal members of the Committee. In this he emphasised the rights of the Committee, an issue of particular importance to the Chairman, Turner. On the other hand, he was quick to seek partisan and personal political advantage. Thus at the end of June 1971 he led a walk-out of Labor members from the Committee both to protest against the Government's referral to discuss its participation in the Vietnam War following the publication of the Pentagon Papers and also to emphasise the party's unwillingness to take part in Committee work unless the Committee's authority was strengthened. This pattern of action was typical of Morrison throughout Committee consideration of the aid question.

A September Committee Meeting with Foreign Minister N. Bowen: The Origin of the Parliamentary Aid Investigation

By mid-September 1971 both the Government and Opposition believed some compromise was possible. The Foreign Affairs Minister, Bowen, appeared at the Committee's 28th meeting to

15 Interview with Sir Keith Waller, Canberra, July 1975.
16 Committee Minutes, 27 June 1971; and Interview with W. Morrison, Canberra, 2 April 1975.
demonstrate his and his department's willingness to co-operate. Indeed, a compromise seemed in the air; after the establishment of a Senate Foreign Affairs Committee with significant powers, it was hardly politically possible to have a Joint Foreign Affairs Committee with much more limited authority, particularly since many members of the Senate Committee also sat on the Joint Committee.

The rights conferred on the Senate Committee were: to hold public or private meetings; to determine the agenda without restriction; to utilise adequate staff facilities and resources; and to have automatic access to the full Senate for its recommendations.

By contrast, the Joint Committee was not empowered to meet in public without ministerial consent, could only discuss issues with the prior agreement of the Minister, and the conclusions and recommendations were placed before the Minister upon whose discretion subsequent submission to Parliament depended.

At this point Morrison, aware of the political anomaly of the Joint Committee's lesser powers and of the support of the Liberal members for redressing this situation and having the Minister present at the Committee's meeting, seized the opportunity to not only press for enhanced Committee authority but also to further Labor's new aid proposals.

On the matter of Committee rights Morrison received a mixed but on the whole positive response. According to the Committee Minutes, Chairman Harry Turner said that the fundamental issues were whether the Joint Committee was to continue and if so, whether it should operate with no less authority than that of the Senate. Although the Minister admitted that he personally

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17 Sir Keith Waller, the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, declared in an interview in Canberra, 26 June 1975, that he had never been in favour of an 'extremely docile Committee' and that although in the field of foreign policy a lot was to be said in favour of dictatorship, he personally always preferred to inform parliamentarians in advance about complicated issues, not only for getting further advice but also to avoid 'awkward questions' in public by politicians. (Hereafter Interview Sir Keith Waller).
did not favour a change of the existing Terms of Reference, he conceded that the Committee had a point and would consider possible changes.\(^\text{18}\)

Morrison then raised the problem of securing expert advice for the Committee and proposed that this expert advice could be drawn from the Legislative Research Section of the Parliamentary Library, the secondment of an officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs or from a member of the Senate Staff with previous experience in the field of foreign policy.

Surprisingly Minister Bowen not only promised to look at these proposals sympathetically, he also suggested that on occasion an outside expert could be used to the Committee's advantage.\(^\text{19}\)

It was at this moment that Morrison attempted to realise his plan to reform Australia's aid policy. Bowen, assuming aid policy was non-controversial, gave his tacit approval by saying that an aid investigation would "not frighten"\(^\text{20}\) him.

Thus seven months before the aid investigation started Morrison had already laid the basis for a change in aid policy through focusing on the question of the Committee's rights rather than on the substance of the issue.

The above interpretation is based on the recently released Committee Minutes. A somewhat different interpretation, but one not incompatible with the foregoing, appeared in an article by Eric Walsh in the *National Times* shortly after the Committee meeting:

The Committee, Government and Opposition, spoke mainly through Labor member and former diplomat Mr Bill Morrison. But he ran into a singularly unco-operative Foreign Affairs Minister in stocky, taciturn Nigel Bowen.

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\(^{18}\) Committee Minutes, 14 September 1971.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
The Committee was becoming redundant, Mr Morrison reportedly argued. Mr Bowen replied that he could give no instant decision increasing its powers.

The Committee was misnamed, Mr Morrison said. It should not be a parliamentary committee but a 'Minister's Committee'. Again Mr Bowen replied he would not become a kerbside decision-maker.

Mr Bowen appeared to have won the day. He showed little sign of capitulating. The informal meeting however did leave him with what might be described as a test case. It concerns foreign aid, a seemingly innocuous subject on which there is no major difference between policies.

And Eric Walsh concluded: "If ever they are to get [expanded powers] it will be on an issue like this". 21

Delays and a Difficult Start

Angered by the obvious fact that some Committee members had broken the confidentiality stipulated by Committee regulations, Chairman Turner, at the following Committee meeting, warned against any repetition of the indiscretions. 22

At the same meeting Vice Chairman Morrison circulated a resolution to the Foreign Affairs Minister. The 'philosophical approach' of this proposal was generally supported and, after revisions, the resolution was unanimously accepted. 23 Minister Bowen, however, possibly upset by the critical newspaper report, was in no hurry to accommodate the Committee. Thus at the beginning of December the Committee had to remind Mr Bowen "that a reply had not yet been received to the Committee's submission on open hearings". 24 At the end of February 1972 Mr Turner and Mr Bowen finally discussed the problem again. 25 Moreover, at

21 Eric Walsh, 'A new Committee highlights a Senate-House power struggle' in National Times, 27 September-2 October 1971. (Emphasis added.)
22 Committee Minutes, 28 September 1971.
23 Ibid.
24 Committee Minutes, 7 December 1971.
25 Committee Minutes, 22 February 1972.
the beginning of March the Committee received a letter from the Minister which was circulated to all members with an explicit note that this was to be handled according to strict confidentiality. Nothing of Bowen's letter was included in the Committee minutes. From Turner's response, the contents of which were found in the Committee's minutes, one can conclude that the Minister did not meet all of the Committee's requests. Although Turner indicated general concurrence with the Minister he made specific points concerning the planned aid inquiry and declared that he

would make points that the subject matter of the inquiry should not be interpreted too narrowly, that on the question of the public appearance of officers it should be emphasised that evidence would not necessarily in all cases and at all times have to be heard in camera, and raising with the Minister the possible desirability of employing outside consultants with specialised knowledge to assist the Committee. Without waiting for an answer from the Minister the Committee decided to ask the Parliamentary Library and the Department of Foreign Affairs to commence gathering background material on aid.

A month later a sub-committee consisting only of House members was established and at the end of April this sub-committee elected Harry Turner as Chairman.

As one can see from the preface to the Parliamentary Aid Report Mr Bowen agreed to public inquiries by the Committee under certain conditions. However, he only agreed to an

26 Committee Minutes, 7 March 1972.
27 Committee Minutes, 21 March 1972.
28 Ibid.
29 Committee Minutes, 28 March and 11 April 1972.
investigation of one specific area of aid - the question of "what is the most effective form of aid - bilateral or multilateral?"  

The Committee would not settle for this. At an early stage and in order "to fulfil adequately the task imposed upon it" the Committee approached the Minister and both sides agreed to broaden the scope of the inquiry which now encompassed the following:

1. The historical background and emergence of foreign aid programmes
2. The international setting for foreign aid programmes
3. The forms of aid -
   (i) Bilateral Government aid;
   (ii) Multilateral Government aid; and
   (iii) Other forms of non-Government aid.

The Vice Chairman Establishes His Influence and Most Members' Motives for the Aid Deliberations

Soon after the start of Committee deliberations, the Minister probably regretted his commitment because Committee members interpreted the above terms of reference so broadly as to publicly criticise a wide spectrum of aid-related matters:
1) Prime Minister McMahon's A$69 million aid promise to Indonesia; 2) the contentions devisea credit system of aid between Australia and Indonesia; 3) the possible exploitation by Australian business of low tariff rates for some goods imported into Australia from less-developed countries; 4) the fact that the Government paid marked prices to the Australian Wheat Board for up to 250,000 tons of wheat given as overseas aid.

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30 Report on Australia's Foreign Aid, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs (hereafter Parliamentary Aid Report), p.I.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p.II.
aid without demanding quantity discounts and even 5) the unavailability of RAAF aircraft to ferry emergency aid to Bangladesh in 1971.\footnote{National Times, 10-15 July 1972, p.8.}

The familiarity of Labor’s Committee Vice Chairman and former diplomat W. Morrison, with the detailed workings of aid administrations can be perceived in the dialogue between him and Alf Parsons, a First Assistant Secretary with Foreign Affairs, a dialogue which also reveals Morrison’s political shrewdness. Parsons had earlier told the Committee that all aid to Indonesia was in response to Indonesian requests for specific purposes. When Morrison asked for what specific purposes McMahon’s $69 million dollar promise would be spent, Parsons replied that this was still being worked out.

Mr Morrison: If aid is given only for specific purposes what requests were made for this aid?

Mr Parsons: The use of the $69 million is still being studied.

Mr Morrison: Did the Prime Minister just pluck this figure from the air?

Mr Parsons: No, the Foreign Minister was there, too.

Mr Morrison: Did the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister then just pluck that figure from the air?

Mr Parsons made no reply.\footnote{Cited in National Times, 10-15 July 1972, p.8.}

Eric Walsh commented on the first meetings of the Committee in the \textit{National Times} (10-15 July 1972):

Around Canberra, which is bristling with high-powered and much publicised Senate committees, not many had heard of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on Overseas Aid. The way things are shaping a good deal is likely to be heard of the committee in the future.

And:

The Departments of Trade and Foreign Affairs are at present doing some unanticipated homework which could
lead eventually to a total review of the operations of Australian aid programs in South-East Asian countries.

Top men from both departments spent a considerable part of last week under concentrated grilling by members of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on Overseas Aid.

Walsh also discovered who was the most driving and influential force behind the Committee's operations.

Mr Morrison made most of the running at the hearings of the little-known aid committee, which looks like being far-reaching and effective.

W. Morrison's prominence, however, was not only due to his scathing polemical attacks on the McMahon Government which were avidly gathered by some members of the Canberra press corps. In addition, concerning the substantive and often highly technical issues, which made the great bulk of the Committee's work, it was also Morrison who criticised old concepts and presented new ideas. Alan Wilkinson later on commented in a Ph.D. thesis:

Morrison, with a background of diplomatic service and involvement with aid administration in the Department of Foreign Affairs while on overseas postings and while based in Canberra, was the only member of the Sub-Committee who brought to the inquiry a detailed knowledge of aspects of the Australian aid programme. Consequently, in spite of the early availability of written submissions, most other members did not know what questions to ask of those who, after making submissions, appeared as witnesses before the Sub-Committee.35

Alan Wilkinson also discovered that the Liberal Chairman of the Committee, Harry Turner, "like most other members ... appeared to have a relatively limited knowledge of the subject matter"36 and occasionally demonstrated an inadequate grasp of the


36 See, for example, Turner's question on the possibility of local procurement of capital equipment in recipient countries. 'Parliamentary Transcripts on Aid', p.315.
submissions”. Wilkinson also pointed out the important role played by Nancy Viviani, a Ph.D. scholar in International Relations at the Australian National University, who was temporarily assigned to the Committee as a research officer. Viviani prepared the "precis of many submissions as well as lists of suggested questions which the Chairman put before the various witnesses". A considerable impact was also provided by witnesses from universities, business and voluntary aid agencies as indicated by the fact that much of the testimony of these witnesses was reflected in the Committee's report. Wilkinson further investigated the motives of the Committee in dealing with the aid problem. He was right in questioning whether the aid matter as such was the main cause in inquiring into the issue; he was wrong, however, in insisting that the Committee members were doing it "to create a precedent for members of the House of Representatives to undertake public inquiries into foreign affairs issues, in competition with the expanding Senate inquiry system". The Committee Minutes from 28 March and 11 April 1972, which were not available to Wilkinson, explicitly reveal that the intent was to expand the Committee's powers in addition to those of the Senate's Committee. While it is true that Senator McManus foresaw an independent House Committee developing, it is equally true that most members were keen to keep the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs as an umbrella institution.

Apart from the genuine interest of a few members in the substantive issues, the overriding motive for the Committee's action was to create a precedent for increased rights for the

37 See, for example, Turner's question concerning Australian reservations on acceding to UNCTAD resolutions on the lowering of tariff barriers, ibid., p.604.
39 This is treated in detail in A. Wilkinson, op.cit., p.286.
Joint Committee, particularly the right to hold public hearings, and *not* to compete with the Senate's new Committee on Foreign Affairs. Thus, the Preface to the Aid Report deliberately ignored the fact that the Sub-Committee had solely consisted of members of the House of Representatives:

Apart from the historical importance of the inquiry, in that it is the first public inquiry held by a Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee believes that the inquiry has indicated that a public inquiry by a Parliamentary Committee into matters which relate to foreign affairs are a valuable and natural extension of Parliamentary activity.\(^{41}\)

Wilkinson, however, is totally correct in stressing the very limited nature of the Government members' knowledge of and interest in foreign aid matters. It was one man, Vice Committee Chairman W. Morrison, who suggested the topic (albeit not only due to his concern with aid) and who made most of the running on the issue. It is clear, moreover, that Committee staff - in this case Nancy Viviani - have their own predilections which predate Committee deliberations and thus can significantly influence Committee procedures and recommendations, particularly in the absence of a determined and knowledgeable Committee Chairman. In this particular case where an active Vice Chairman and an energetic research officer shared the same basic outlook, then their view could be advanced given the apathy of the Committee majority. Liberal Committee Chairman Turner later admitted quite frankly in an interview that his main interest had been to widen the role of the Committee in the decision-making process and not in the actual substance of the report. The minimal interest of the Committee majority in the aid question is suggested by the fact that in 1975 interviews both Turner and former Liberal Committee member Sir John Cramer expressed surprise and dismay when told that the Whitlam Government had established an independent aid agency.\(^{42}\)

\(^{41}\) Parliamentary Aid Report, p.III.

\(^{42}\) Interview with H. Turner in Sydney, October 1975; interview with Sir John Cramer, Noosa Heads, October 1975.
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Parliamentary Aid Report and Some Reflections on their Importance

The question of whether to establish an independent aid agency had been one of the central issues of the Committee's deliberations. According to Morrison the Committee's first draft report contained precisely authorisation for an independent aid agency.\(^{42a}\) When the final draft was considered, however, Sir John Cramer raised objections.\(^{43}\) He realised the report actually endorsed Labor's Launceston platform and was unwilling to lend the Committee's stamp of approval.

It speaks well of the skill and determination of those supporting a change in aid policy that not only did the thrust of the Committee's recommendations favour such a change but also, despite Sir John's objections, the report kept open the option of an independent aid agency. The relevant paragraph of the Committee report reads as follows:

The Committee concluded that the organisational structure of Australian aid administration has developed in a largely ad hoc fashion over the last quarter of a century. The existing structure involving dispersal of aid functions among several departments needs to be substantially reviewed in the light of the increased complexities and sophistication of development assistance and to accommodate the administration of aid to an independent Papua New Guinea.

RECOMMENDATION: The Committee recommends that consideration be given either to the strengthening of the Aid Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs to administer all aid including multilateral aid and aid to an independent Papua New Guinea, or to the establishment of an authority responsible to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Consideration must be given to the establishment of an aid consultative committee.\(^{44}\)

Before dealing with this crucial recommendation, I shall first examine other major conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.

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42a Interview Morrison

This account was subsequently confirmed by Nancy Viviani and Sir John Cramer.

44 Parliamentary Aid Report, p.VI.
Although it is impossible to prove that the Committee report brought about the change in Government policy following the 1972 election, the following is nevertheless clear: nearly all policies proposed in the parliamentary report had been adopted by 1975.*  *  *  4^  

The report stated: although bilateral aid had certain advantages in terms of trade and goodwill from the recipient countries, multilateral aid was less open to allegations that 'narrow national interests determined the allocation of aid'. Moreover, under multilateral programmes less aid would be 'tied'. These multilateral programmes in any case were better suited to supporting expensive infrastructure projects because of their greater resources. The Committee, therefore, without downgrading bilateral aid, recommended increased disbursements to international bodies concerned with aid, especially the Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank. The Committee further recommended that 'greater emphasis be placed on aid projects in the agricultural, social welfare and educational fields'. 46  

All of the foregoing became official policy under Whitlam. The change in policy was not only (at least in this case) limited to rhetoric. 47 In the 1975-76 Hayden Budget, for the first time in Australian history, multilateral aid expenditures increased significantly while funds for bilateral programmes declined marginally. 48  

Another major recommendation was that "more emphasis be placed on the social aspects of development in the criteria on which projects are selected". 49 As former Foreign Minister

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46 Parliamentary Aid Report, pp.IV-V.


48 Parliamentary Aid Report, p.V.
Willesee pointed out in his speech to the Australian Institute of International Affairs in 1975, this had become a guiding principle of foreign aid policy.\(^{50}\)

The next Committee recommendation which called for more attention to "the quality of aid, including terms of aid and the contribution to development" has, as one ADAA official put it "dropped a bit out of sight". This was not because "we don't share that philosophy" but because "in practice it proved hard to supervise". This vague recommendation, however, was, as well as the preceding recommendation, noteworthy not because of its practicability but precisely because it represented an expanded version of Labor's general aid philosophies expressed in the 1971 Launceston platform. The Liberal Country Party members as well as DLP Senator McManus again failed to raise any objections.

Other Committee recommendations accepted as policy by the Labor Government include:

1. that Australia's representatives at the World Bank meetings should be officials from the Aid branch of Foreign Affairs rather than from Treasury;\(^{51}\)

2. that greater emphasis be placed on educating Third World students in their home countries instead of Australia;

3. that aid contributions to multilateral agencies and institutions be progressively 'untied';

4. that the tariff preference scheme be reviewed; and

5. that in place of tax deductions to private individuals for contributions to private aid agencies, the Government should adopt a system of pro rata grants to supplement the funds spent by these private agencies.

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\(^{50}\) This was confirmed by interviews with senior ADAA officials.

\(^{51}\) At present (October 1975) ADAA officials are representing Australia at World Bank meetings.
The Committee discovered that the Aid branch of Foreign Affairs had never systematically evaluated Australian-sponsored aid projects. The three-member Appraisal Section in Foreign Affairs, as one senior official conceded, had been 'hopelessly overworked' and had only finished one evaluation report in the entire period of its existence. Although other Foreign Affairs officials claimed that this section had been somewhat more productive, all agreed that due to staff shortages in the Aid Section as a whole the three members of the Appraisal Section were mostly used for other tasks.

Apparently, however, this was not the only reason for the small amount of evaluation work carried out by this section. This difficult task of evaluation is only now being confronted by ADAA officials. These officials concede that many problems remain in this regard and that it will be a matter of time before it can be determined whether successful solutions can be devised. Some are more hopeful than others. All ADAA officials, however, agreed that it was the parliamentary Committee's report which sensitised them to the problems involved and caused them to be particularly careful in the selection of aid projects.52

So much for the most important conclusions, recommendations and achievements of the Committee report. As I have already pointed out, it is difficult to 'prove' that it was the Committee's influence which made the Government adopt most of the Committee's recommendations as Government policy. Given the Launceston platform, it is safe to assume that the changes introduced by the Whitlam Government in aid policy might have occurred, although perhaps not exactly in the same fashion, even if the parliamentary report had been quite different.

Nevertheless, the influence of the report can be seen in a number of respects. Wilkinson noted the following significance in the Aid report:

52 Interviews with several ADAA officials between April and September 1975.
1. Connections ... were established between Members of Parliament and non-governmental interest groups.

2. The foreign aid inquiry was of greatest importance for the extent to which public service participation was required. This was the first occasion on which a large volume of departmental information was made publicly available. The Departments of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, the Treasury, Education and Science, Immigration, External Territories and Primary Industry supplied written and oral evidence which ran to 1080 of the 1606 pages of transcript. This evidence was largely descriptive but many aid policy issues did emerge. For the first time in two decades of aid-giving, the departments primarily responsible for foreign aid were subjected to public scrutiny, albeit limited, across the whole range of activities encompassed by the aid programme.

The public release of this mass of departmental information through the medium of a parliamentary sub-committee may well have had some impact on the Minister for Foreign Affairs. While the aid Sub-Committee was still deliberating, he delivered a major statement on 'Australian Foreign Aid' in the House, and for the first time appended details of specific 'Country Programmes' in the form of statistical and descriptive material covering Australia's past and current aid projects in most recipient countries. 53

Since Wilkinson did not deal with the Whitlam Government, his analysis could not gauge the longer term effects of the Committee's report. Nevertheless, Wilkinson does hint that the report was "a valuable reference document" 54 in the establishment of an independent Aid agency.

Aid Decision-Making, Parliamentary Committee Influence and the Establishment of ADAA

As already demonstrated, the Committee recommendations concerning a new aid administration were by no means clear. While Morrison and the Labor Committee members were in favour of an independent Aid agency the Liberal members and especially Sir John Cramer preferred an expansion of the existing Aid branch in Foreign Affairs. Cramer's intervention which

54 A. Wilkinson, op.cit., p.287.
prevented full Committee approval of Labor's Launceston platform on this particular point, according to one high ranking public servant, originated with Sir Keith Waller, former Head of Foreign Affairs. Both Waller and Cramer dispute this. In a lengthy interview, Sir John Cramer referred to Sir Keith Waller as a 'friend' with whom he might have discussed things like this, but he emphasised that "nobody put anything in my head". Indeed it became quite clear during the interview that Cramer's objections to an independent aid agency had their root in his perception of aid policy as a part of foreign policy and his aversion to new bureaucratic empires. In any case, the Committee compromised and explicitly proposed the alternatives of an independent aid agency or an expansion of the Foreign Affairs Aid branch for the Minister's decision. Subsequently those arguing diametrically opposed views had recourse to citing the Committee's report. Thus, on the first glance, one would assume that the Committee could have hardly played a significant role in the establishment of the Australian Development Assistance Agency.

Those with a detailed grasp of aid policy, and a belief in the need for change, however, recognised a central problem was the domination of Foreign Affairs over the aid administration and that the Committee report pointed the way to the breaking of that domination. While the Committee report straddled the question of an independent aid agency the thrust of the remaining Committee recommendations all argued for changes on a scale which could not be accomplished by a mere expansion of the Foreign Affairs aid branch. This was exactly the way in which Sir John Crawford read and interpreted the Committee report. Together with the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, Peter Wilenski, it was Crawford who made the decisive proposals to Whitlam, and as Crawford admitted in an interview

55 Interview with Sir John Cramer, Noosa Heads, October 1975.
56 Interview with Sir John Crawford, Canberra, 7 July 1975.
it was the Report of the Task Force for a unified aid administration and particularly the Parliamentary Committee report which shaped his recommendations to the Prime Minister.\(^57\)

But before dealing with this aspect it is necessary to place it in broader perspective.

After the 1972 elections had created a favourable climate for implementing the Committee's recommendations, the new Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Whitlam created an interdepartmental task force to examine all options for a unified administration of aid, including bilateral, multilateral aid and aid to an independent Papua New Guinea. The task force was headed by Mr L.M. Border, Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and included three First Assistant Secretaries from External Territories, the Treasury and the Department of Education. The Task Force made it clear that it was relying primarily on the submissions to, deliberations of, and conclusions drawn by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, but that it had also taken into account Labor's 1971 Launceston Platform:

The Task Force had the benefit of the Report on 'Australia's Foreign Aid' of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, together with the transcript of evidence and departmental depositions before the Committee. The conclusions and recommendations, which have not yet been formally considered by the Government, are attached. As the Committee had recorded the opinions of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Community Aid Abroad, and various others interested in the administration of Australia's aid program, the Task Force felt, in view of the early date on which this report was due, that it was not essential to call further such evidence.

The Task Force took into account the aid aspects in The Australian Labor Party's 1971 Platform. Although the Government has not made a formal statement on the objectives of overseas aid, the Task Force noted that the Platform expresses a desire for a more meaningful aid program, one of high quality and one which would have some impact on social values. To this end, the

\(^{57}\) Ibid.
Platform foreshadows the re-organisation of the various Australian aid programs and the establishment of a mutual co-operation agency.\textsuperscript{58}

The two most important chapters of this report were Chapter II, which examined the concept of unification, and Chapter III, which set out the options for implementing this concept. The most significant aspect of the Task Force's Commission, however, was that it was only supposed to set out options rather than making recommendations. The Task Force offered three options concerning unification of aid. They were:

1. to amalgamate the External Territories existing aid functions with those of foreign affairs;

2. to centralise financial, personnel, review and evaluation powers while leaving policy implementation in the hands of the several concerned departments; and

3. to establish a completely unified aid administration.\textsuperscript{59}

Thus while the Task Force was in effect compelled to consider the option of complete unification, it nevertheless stressed the administrative and personnel disruption of such a change as well as the fact that it would cause a re-arrangement of ministerial responsibilities.\textsuperscript{60}

There was an additional choice to be made: Where should a new aid organization be located, what authority should it have and to whom should it be responsible? The Task Force offered five options:

Option 1: To expand the present Aid Branch within the Department of Foreign Affairs.


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p.27.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., pp.8-11.
Option 2: To create an 'Office of International Aid' headed by a Director-General with direct responsibility to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Option 3: To create an aid agency as under Option 2 where the Director-General would have to report not directly to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs but to an advisory committee which would become the main articulator of foreign aid policy to the Government. This advisory committee, however, was supposed to chaired by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, thus ensuring considerable departmental influence.

Option 4: Establishing a separate department or a statutory body responsible directly to the Minister but not to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Option 5: To create a separate department with its own minister.61

All these options were presented to the Prime Minister on 31 May 1973.

These options did not surprise either Mr Whitlam or the Foreign Affairs Department. Already at the beginning of 1973, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, outlined similar options of those of the Task Force but gave advice as well. Concerning unification he declared that it was long overdue, while subtly indicating that after the independence of Papua New Guinea Foreign Affairs should take over responsibility for aid to that country. 61a

Concerning the location of a totally unified Agency, Waller emphasised the dangers of a completely independent body - its

61 Ibid., pp.22-26, 30-35.
61a Interview Sir Keith Waller. Sir Keith Waller confirmed the above, but could not 'remember' the account given in the following four pages. These pages are based on documents p.t.a.
and interviews which must not be cited. After the author had confronted Peter Wilenski (then Secretary of the Immigration Department) with the contents of these documents, Wilenski conceded in an interview (Canberra, 18 March 1975) that my account of the events was "probably correct."
presumed tendency to organizational aggrandisement and the likelihood that it would follow a policy at variance with that of Foreign Affairs. Waller stressed that Foreign Affairs was an important and integral part of Australian foreign policy and argued that responsibility of this area should naturally rest with the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In an interview more than two years after his retirement Waller was even more outspoken. He gave three reasons why his department had never been keen on an independent aid agency:

1. Duplication and waste of energy.

2. The difficulty of controlling the enthusiasm of more idealistically orientated aid agencies, which could lead to aid projects inconsistent with Australia's long-term national interest.

3. Aid was one of the most useful weapons in Australia's foreign policy arsenal.

After the Task Force had submitted its report suddenly matters came to a head. Top Foreign Affairs officials organised their opposition around four points:

1. Aid is one of the most important tools of foreign policy and must remain under the control of the Foreign Minister.

2. Since the Permanent Head is responsible for advising the Minister, foreign aid matters should also come under his purview.

3. The first three options laid out by the Task Force, particularly Nos. 1 and 2, were, as an internal document reveals, regarded as 'acceptable'. (By implication one could argue the others were not.)

4. There should be an interchange of personnel between the Aid Agency and other Foreign Affairs divisions to prevent the stultification of aid experts.

Meanwhile, outside advisors had direct contact to the Prime Minister.
Sir John Crawford, on an official trip with the Prime Minister to India, was asked by Whitlam to comment on the Task Force's report. Crawford chose option 4 and added that it was not merely a matter of administration but that all policy matters should be vested in the agency. He criticised, furthermore, what Foreign Affairs had regarded as essential - that there was a continual change in middle-ranking and senior personnel in Foreign Affairs - on the grounds that this prevented the necessary build-up of expertise. Back in Canberra, after talks with top Foreign Affairs officers Border and Shann, Crawford reformulated his advice to the Prime Minister. He now chose a course somewhere between options 3 and 4. But the substance of his advice still stood. He suggested a statutory body with direct responsibility to the Foreign Affairs Minister and without being responsible to the Permanent Head.

So deep were the passions aroused that one of Crawford's friends and senior Foreign Affairs official accused Crawford of performing a 'disservice' to his country. Crawford was ready, however, to take into consideration the fact that a completely independent Director-General might formulate a different foreign policy than Foreign Affairs. Therefore, he suggested a consultation process between the Director-General and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs through an additional Advisory Board which should also include businessmen, private groups, academics and trade unionists.

On the basic point of the desirability of an independent aid agency Crawford gave three reasons.

1. An independent agency would have a clear public identity.
2. Staffing power would rest with the agency.
3. The influence of Foreign Affairs and Treasury on foreign aid policy would not be any more dominant.

In an interview in 1975 Sir John Crawford stressed that the report of the Task Force for a unified Aid Administration had
been the basis for his advice. However, he had also studied the Parliamentary Aid Report:

I was very much stimulated by the Parliamentary Aid Report. The Report deserves quite a lot of credit, probably primary credit.62

A few days after Crawford had handed his advice to Mr Whitlam, the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, Peter Wilenski, summarised his view of the problems involved in the establishment of a unified aid agency under two headings.

1. Aid professionalism versus foreign policy input
2. Unification versus departmentalisation.

Wilenski came down strongly on the side of the principles of Aid professionalism and unification. But his advice included policy matters as well. Aid policy in the future had to be more flexible and innovative, more orientated towards socio-economic development. In his opinion foreign aid was at best a very imperfect and short-term instrument of foreign policy but he agreed Foreign Affairs had a point. In line with Crawford, Wilenski suggested an independent aid agency and argued that the Foreign Affairs Minister himself could reconcile different policy proposals from Foreign Affairs and the Aid agency. Wilenski, again like Crawford, suggested a Development Assistance Advisory Board. Furthermore, Wilenski argued that what was needed was not Foreign Affairs or Treasury or Education expertise but aid expertise, and this could only be achieved by a unified independent Aid agency. In the middle of June 1973, Whitlam approved Wilenski's and Crawford's proposals. Foreign Affairs ironically drafted the submission, which - after some minor alterations - became Cabinet Submission No. 634, and after Cabinet's approval, Cabinet decision No. 1290. Earlier on the morning of 17 September 1973, immediately before Cabinet sat to decide this issue, the Economic Cabinet Committee approved the submission. However, the Economic Committee said as well that the new Agency should not result in net increases in public

62 Interview with Sir John Crawford, Canberra, 7 July 1975.
employment but should draw staff from those departments now already concerned with aid. This was to be the first issue of contention arising out of the establishment of the Aid Agency. Another problem arose out of the decision to establish the agency by 1 December 1973. This proved to be impossible. Consequently the bureaucracy decided to create an interim office of the Australian Development Assistance Agency under the control of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the absence of legislation. Furthermore, the Public Service Board staffed the Interim Office overwhelmingly with former External Territories officers and not with 'new blood' as had been hoped for by those advocating change.

It appears that the Foreign Minister gave his consent to this procedure. However, the Minister was not offered an alternative, i.e. postponing the establishment of the new agency for a few months. Later, Whitlam was reported to be unhappy with this decision. There were more points of contention between the Head designate of the Agency, Mr Johnson, and the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy. One such issue was whether the Aid Head could be required by the Foreign Minister to see the Secretary of Foreign Affairs before reporting directly to the Minister.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister's Office and reportedly the Prime Minister himself were concerned about selective quoting, such as that by Sir Keith Waller in his advice to new Foreign Minister Willesee concerning the establishment of an interim office. There Waller attempted to keep aid as an integral part of foreign policy and wanted to restrict the 'new look of aid' to the establishment of a unified aid agency and an advisory board - as he saw it, a purely administrative operation.

Interviews and other information indicate that it is fair to say that the bureaucracy did try to argue legalistically and selectively, without always offering alternative possibilities; that Foreign Affairs did try to prevent a change of policy; and that the bureaucracy was keen to see members of the former External Territories Department staff the interim office and thus effectively prevent the introduction of new blood. It is
probably also fair to say that the Public Service Board did try to interpret the Cabinet Economic Committee's desire to prevent a net increase of staff too narrowly; and that Foreign Affairs did not see, or did not want to see, that the Government wanted to change policy as well as administrative arrangements. On the one hand, it is clear that public servants had many resources at their disposal which they did use in their efforts to thwart Government's desires. On the other hand, one must recognise that there were divisions within the bureaucracy, at least between Foreign Affairs and External Territories, concerning the establishment of an independent Aid agency.

In larger perspective it must be recognised that public service opposition was only possible because of the imprecise terms and definitions in the Government's instructions, which gave some scope to the bureaucracy to raise objections. Furthermore, certain public service manoeuvres were only possible because Senator Willesee, at the very beginning of his term as Foreign Minister, seemed not to have shown the same determination in curbing Foreign Affairs' role in the field of aid policy as Foreign Minister Whitlam and his office had at the beginning of his term. That the bureaucracy used these opportunities to pursue its own interests should not be a surprise. Given the advantages of the bureaucracy in expertise and experience, it is perhaps more surprising that the Government prevailed in the end. The Government prevailed for two reasons: (1) the Prime Minister had both a clear concept of what he wanted and an understanding of how to control bureaucrats. (2) Whitlam utilised outside advisers: one, Sir John Crawford, had a comprehensive grasp of aid policy and another, Peter Wilenski, had been a skilled and experienced, but critical, bureaucrat himself.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Two issues are intertwined in this case study. One concerns the powers of the Committee while the second concerns the substance and administration of foreign policy. The success of Morrison's efforts to produce a report favourable to a new
aid policy to a large extent reflected his ability to link these two questions. The line-up of forces on these two issues, however, was different. On the question of Committee rights, Morrison and his Labor followers found allies among the Government members of the Committee, most notably Committee Chairman Turner. Opposing an expansion of the Committee's role, although giving the Committee free reign on the foreign aid issue, was Foreign Minister Bowen and Cabinet generally.

Concerning the substance of foreign aid policy, Morrison and his Labor colleagues were again the major proponents of change. On this question, however, Morrison did not have the unequivocal backing of the Government party members on the Committee. Although this report was unanimous this seems to reflect a disinterest by most Government party members. On the substance of aid policy, moreover, the bureaucracy was deeply interested and also divided. Foreign Affairs wished not only to keep aid policy under its administrative control but also to retain the traditional emphasis on political and strategic goals. Other bureaucrats, particularly from External Territories, supported initiatives for an integrated agency and developmentally-oriented aid policies. Morrison's success in gaining unanimous Committee support for the report can be viewed in terms of building a consensus for enhanced Committee powers while potential differences on substantive issues remained latent.

How did the Committee's report, once drafted, influence policy? As in the case of the Jaksch-Report, there is a *prima facie* case for Committee influence in that most of the Committee's substantive policy recommendations as well as the implied advocacy of an independent aid agency subsequently became official policy. In this case, however, the link may be to a certain extent illusory. Was it the Committee's report which influenced the Government or was it Labor party policy, as embodied in the Launceston platform, which led to the Whitlam initiatives on aid policy?
Given the new Government's penchant for new foreign policy initiatives - real or cosmetic - it is reasonable to conclude that the impetus for changes in aid policy predated the Committee's report. But even though the Labor Government may have been predisposed to aid initiatives, this does not negate the significance of the Committee's report in giving shape to the concrete policies which emerged. The Committee's report in fact was the most extensive and detailed examination of the question going far beyond the Launceston platform. Moreover, the report had a direct influence on the recommendations of Sir John Crawford which formed the basis for the establishment of ADAA. Thus, although the political forces leading to the new aid policy may have basically originated outside the Committee, the expert advice reflected in the Committee's recommendations did have an impact in shaping the details of policy. The limits of such technical influence are suggested by the failure of the independent agency to persevere under the post-1975 Coalition Government.

Turning to the factors contributing to, first, the conclusion of a unanimous Committee report and, then, to the adoption of the policy suggested by that report, we can see some of the paradoxes suggested above.

The extremely limited constitutional powers of the Committee obviously limit its influence. Nevertheless, the very perception of this situation by Committee members of all parties was crucial in obtaining unanimous support for the report as a means of asserting Committee rights.

The constitutional weaknesses were mirrored by political shortcomings. The members of the Committee were on the whole not leading members of the Government or Opposition parties. Only ALP Committee Vice Chairman Morrison can be regarded as a major parliamentary figure. It was Morrison's drive and ambition, as well as his knowledge of the subject, which allowed him to manipulate the acquiescence of the Coalition party members of the Committee - members whose attitudes were marked by disinterest and ignorance of the question at hand. While these attitudes facilitated the successful adoption of the
Committee's report in this case, they are clearly not the materials from which ongoing influence on Governments are constructed. This situation, moreover, is not the product of chance but reflects fundamental facts of Australian parliamentary life. First, the very smallness of the Australian Parliament limits the number of skilled and energetic politicians available for various committees. This is particularly the case for governing parties since the cream of their membership is drawn off into the Ministry. Thus Governments perceiving an inherent disadvantage within the Committee are reluctant to cede power to that body and attempt to control the Committee's actions through the Minister of Foreign Affairs.63

Another consequence of the structural weakness of the Committee manifested in this case was the important role of the Committee staff. With most of the Committee disinterested, the Committee staff was able to draft a strong report for aid innovations in conjunction with Morrison. Indeed, it was only because Liberal MP Sir John Cramer woke up after the initial drafting of the request that an explicit recommendation of an independent aid agency was deleted. Another factor enhancing the staff's influence, one also flowing from the perceived weakness of the Committee, was the lack of effective action by the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy to argue a countercase before the Committee. Believing that the Committee would have no influence, the Foreign Affairs Ministry chose not to intervene.64

The situation was drastically altered under the Labor Government, however, when the issues raised by the report came under active Governmental consideration. At this point Foreign Affairs launched a strong campaign against changes in aid policy, but was unsuccessful. The fact of the limitations of the Committee

63 Interview Morrison.

64 The low regard Foreign Affairs held for the Committee and Parliament as a whole can be seen in the remarks of a senior Foreign Affairs official, who did not mention Parliament at all when delineating non-Government influence in Australian foreign policy. See: Richard Woolcott, 'The Formulation of Australian Foreign Policy' (paper delivered to the Victorian Association of Social Studies Teachers, Melbourne, 26 February 1972), pp.15-16. 64a See note 61a, page 124
is indicated precisely by the fact that it was only at this later stage that Foreign Affairs intervened. In Germany and, as we shall see, in Canada Foreign Affairs officials were concerned with Committee deliberations from the outset because of their awareness of the possible influence of Committee decisions. The same point is reinforced by the failure of the Foreign Minister and the leadership of the parliamentary parties to concern themselves with the Committee's activities.

Finally, the paradox of Committee influence is indicated by the role of integrative politics. In this case integrative politics was crucial in winning unanimous Committee support for the report. Morrison was able to appeal across partisan lines on the question of the rights of the Committee. But can Morrison's actions be termed 'true' integrative politics? In fact Morrison pushed repeatedly for partisan advantage going so far as to virtually adopt the Labor party's Launceston platform as the Committee's position. That he could get away with as much as he did is partially further testimony to the disinterest and ignorance noted above. But it is also testimony to Morrison's skill in creating the atmospherics of integrative politics even while at the same time pushing partisan advantage.

The limits of pseudo-integrative politics in this case can be seen in subsequent developments. The adoption of policies recommended by the Committee was not due to any political influence created by the bipartisan nature of the report but rather precisely because the substance of those recommendations reflected the partisan position of the Labor Party. Given the weakness of real bipartisan support behind the new aid policies it is not surprising that they had been challenged following the defeat of the Whitlam Government.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND CANADA'S 1969 NATO DECISIONS

Having examined both examples of a strong degree of Committee influence in Germany and quite limited influence in Australia, we now turn to Canada which generally occupies an intermediate position. As in previous chapters our first aim is to demonstrate the exertion of influence by the Committee and then to determine the factors contributing to that influence.

In legal terms the Canadian Standing Committee of External Affairs and National Defence of the House of Commons shared with their German and Australian counterparts the right to recommend foreign policy positions to the Government under the concept of ministerial responsibility. In the Canadian case, however, the concept of ministerial responsibility was not carried to its logical extreme as had been the case in Australia before 1973; the Committee could investigate any subject and had the right to report to Parliament rather than only to the Foreign Affairs Minister. But the Committee lacked crucial powers in comparison to the German case in that its assent was not required before action could be taken on treaties.

Politically, Canada can also be seen as occupying the middle ground between Germany and Australia in terms of Committee influence. The parliamentary Committee in Canada had neither the tradition of assertiveness nor the high-powered membership of the German Committee. In fact, before the late 1960s the Canadian body, and Parliament as a whole, was insignificantly as insignificant as its Australian counterpart. In 1968, however, the situation changed significantly as a result of the upgrading of parliamentary committees generally. This decision was taken by the Liberal minority Government of Lester Pearson as a quid pro quo for Opposition assurances that filibustering tactics in the Commons would cease. Under the slogan of streamlining parliamentary activities, it was agreed
to increase the number of matters referred to committees and thus enhance their role in the decision-making process. From this point onwards members of parliamentary committees, including members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence began to assume - and assert - their influence over policy.

One of the earliest and most significant demonstrations of this new role occurred in 1969 as the Canadian Government made major decisions concerning Canada's participation in NATO.

On 3 April 1969 the Canadian Government rejected any suggestion "that Canada assume a non-aligned or neutral role in world affairs". It intended, however, "in consultation with Canada's allies, to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe".\(^1\) In June 1969 it became clear that this change would be achieved "barring unexpected international developments, within a defence budget which will be maintained for the next three years at its current dollar level ...".\(^2\) On 19 September 1969 the then Defence Minister Leo Cadieux announced that Canada's forces in Europe would be reduced by half: the 10,000 strong motorised brigade and air division in Germany was to be phased out by the end of 1970 and replaced by interim land and air forces with a total strength of 5,000.\(^3\)

The Decision: Some Interpretations and Commentaries

Cadieux's statement ended one of the most fascinating struggles about foreign policy issues in the history of parliamentary democracies.\(^4\) However, even at that stage (and

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1 Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 3 April 1969. (Hereafter all sources, unless otherwise stated, refer to Canadian sources.)

2 House of Commons, Debates, 2 June 1969, p.9306. (Hereafter cited as Debates.)

3 Department of National Defence, Statement by Leo Cadieux, 19 September 1969.

4 This case study deals with Canada's NATO policy which is only part of Canada's official foreign policy review in 1968-1970.
possibly even today) it was still not certain who had actually
won the battle, nor was it quite clear who had been on whose
side. Consequently politicians, journalists, and academics
differ considerably in their assessment of the NATO decision.
Bruce Thordarson concluded:

While tactical decisions might still originate in
the civil service, it was in the Prime Minister's
Office that the overall strategic decisions were
being made.5

As a consequence of the NATO decision Peyton V. Lyon
forecast already the retreat from Europe - and more:

The retreat from Europe, it appears, is but part
of a larger retreat from the world.6

Denis Stairs, however, claimed that the Government's
decision
could hardly be described as radical shifts of
policy .... They suggested little more than a
compromise between the major opposing positions,
governed as much by considerations relating to the
drive for economy in government spending as by new
principles of foreign policy behaviour.7

Peter Dobell saw the NATO decision as a dramatic
demonstration of Trudeau's special position:

On a major matter of policy, with the two ministers
principally responsible, most of the civil service,
the House Committee, an important segment of caucus
and public opinion ... all against him, he still
went ahead and prevailed.8

The Prime Minister himself had similar feelings - at least on
10 November 1971 when he stated:

5 Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, Toronto, 1972,
p.163.
6 Peyton V. Lyon, 'A Review of the Review', Journal of Canadian
Studies, May 1970, p.34.
7 Denis Stairs, 'Pierre Trudeau and the Politics of the Canadian
Foreign Policy Review' in Australian Outlook, December 1972,
8 Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, Toronto, 1972,
p.15.
Look when we decided to pull half our troops out of NATO. We went against the advice of the parliamentary committee. We went against the advice, I believe, even of the Liberal Party itself. And we went against the Gallup Polls at the time - I'm not sure about the Liberal Party, but certainly the Gallup Polls.9

Nine months earlier Trudeau had reflected on the substance of the NATO decision:

Perhaps we got the worst of both worlds. But in fact what our reasoning was is quite simple: it is that we are over-committed in NATO, it's an important alliance, we don't believe Canada should be a non-aligned or neutralist country, because it would cost too much amongst others. If we would try and defend our own territory alone as the Swedes do, we would be spending much more in military expenditures as the Swedes do, therefore we decided we wanted to be an aligned country.10

Only a few days after the April 1969 statement the Cape Breton Post suggested that Trudeau might not have been completely happy with the Government's decision:

He started his reign with neatly turned bon mots questioning the validity of foreign and domestic assumptions. The questions themselves clearly implied that many of the assumptions were probably false .... A sadder and probably disappointed Prime Minister has said that we will stay in NATO.11

The Globe and Mail came to a similar conclusion:

By all accounts, Prime Minister Trudeau took office with at least a strong inclination to take Canada entirely out of NATO. Those who know something of his thinking believe he would really like to put Canada in some kind of non-aligned position internationally. To stand virtuously apart from

9 Transcript of the Prime Minister's remarks at meeting with students, Lambton Central Collegiate, Petrolia, Ontario, 10 November 1971, p.14.

10 Transcript of question and answer period for programme 'Under Attack' recorded at Carleton University, Ottawa, 24 February 1970, p.16.

11 Cape Breton Post, 7 April 1969.
all manifestations of power politics. Mr Trudeau was persuaded that Canada should stay with NATO, and indeed, with all the other military commitments of the existing foreign policy - more or less. So why all the fuss over the few thousand men and machines ... that Canada proposed to remove from Europe?¹²

But it was because of this 'fuss' that even several years later the Foreign Minister could not resist the temptation to look back and express second thoughts on the handling of the NATO decision, indirectly criticising his own Prime Minister:

In retrospect it would have been preferable, to have given an early indication of the Government's thinking - a sense of direction - and to have avoided the impression of division and inactivity .... Looking back five years I am free to admit that we in the Government were a bit ham-handed in the way we handled the NATO issue ....¹³

The way the Canadian Government dealt with the NATO issue has also determined my approach in this case study. A chronological discussion best captures the division within the Government, the periods of inactivity, the confusion of some of the decision-makers (and the public), the contradictory statements by the Prime Minister and the Government's last minute rush to decision. The appearance of confusion in the following account can also be attributed to the extraordinary circumstances in which the decision-makers operated. Since the goals of some of the key participants both shifted from time to time and lacked clarity, an approach analysing well-defined objectives and means to secure those objectives is of limited utility in this case. This is not only because of the difficulties posed for the analyst in distinguishing 'real objectives' from 'tactical goals', but because the participants themselves, one is tempted to say, were often unsure of this distinction. As a result, I have not tried to rationalise the ambiguity and vagueness which appears in the behaviour of the


critical actors, especially Prime Minister Trudeau. Nowhere has the complex and multifaceted political personality of Pierre Trudeau been better illuminated than in B. Thordarson's analysis of the Prime Minister's perceptions. Indeed it is difficult to overestimate Trudeau's importance in the NATO decision. This importance is reflected in the extensive treatment of the Prime Minister's actions and possible motivations which follow.

Nevertheless I shall argue economic constraints and the unwillingness of the Liberal caucus to countenance a withdrawal from Europe were in their conflicting ways as significant as the Prime Minister in arriving at the eventual compromise.

Each of these three factors must be understood in terms of their interrelatedness and concrete political environment in order to appreciate my hesitation to assign objectives to Trudeau and his External Affairs Minister.

The NATO decision, of course, did not take place in a static international context. Denis Stairs has pointed to three critical changes in the external environment which created pressures for a policy review: the revival of West Europe, the emergence of new states in the Third World, and East-West detente. These changes in turn led to new Canadian perceptions of the international order and Canada's role in it.

The first two developments resulted in a shrinkage of Canadian pretensions as an important middle power in major areas of traditional concern: in the NATO alliance as European economic and military power increasingly outstripped Canada's contributions; and in the United Nations where the new nations focused on issues and behaved in a style alien to Canadians. The third development called into question the underlying rationale of Canadian defence policy; with the Soviet threat

14 Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy*, op.cit.

15 Denis Stairs, 'Pierre Trudeau and the Politics of the Canadian Foreign Policy Review', *op.cit.*
appearing less imminent, the need for force deployments and co-operative military arrangements designed to deter that threat were more open to challenge. Finally, still another development, the increasing American penetration of the Canadian economy and society and the resultant perception of 'independence' as a political issue, raised far-reaching questions for the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy - alignment with the US.

Anti-American sentiment also played a significant role during the hearings and deliberations of the parliamentary Committee on External Affairs. This became particularly noticeable when the Committee heard testimony from academics. B. Thordarson has already pointed out the counter-productive nature of the academics' activities. Since Thordarson has dealt extensively with this question, and with the hearings in general, my analysis will not focus on these matters.16

The Origin of the Policy Revision: Pierre Elliot Trudeau

Doubts about Canada's NATO policy predated Trudeau. In circumstances where even conservative circles were questioning basic assumptions, Prime Minister Lester Pearson initiated a re-evaluation of Canada's role in NATO in 1967.17 Pearson and his reluctant Minister for External Affairs, Paul Martin, agreed to ask Norman Robertson, Director of the Institute of International Affairs, and a former Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to head a small task force reviewing Canada's foreign and defence policy.

The task force was not alone in its concern over Canada's role in NATO; while it carried out its review politicians and journalists criticised Canadian policies. For example, Mr Schreyer, Member for Springfield and Member of the Canadian Delegation to the 1967 NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels, writing in the Winnipeg Free Press came to the conclusion that what was required in Europe was only


17 See Bruce Thordarson, op.cit., p.38.
political and diplomatic initiatives so that the costly military arrangements of the past 20 years need not be carried into the future for generations to come.\textsuperscript{18}

The Vancouver \textit{Sun} stated flatly: "NATO is no longer useful".\textsuperscript{19}

However, after three months of study the Robertson Report\textsuperscript{20} reached the same conclusion as the editorial writer of the Edmonton \textit{Journal}: "The savings, if any, of withdrawing from NATO are not worth the gamble at this point".\textsuperscript{21} Normally that would have been the end of foreign policy reviews for some time to come.

But at the end of 1967 Pierre Trudeau's analysis of Canadian constitutional problems and the alternatives open to the French-speaking Province of Quebec lifted the then Justice Minister into contention for the soon to be vacant Prime Ministership due to Pearson's retirement. August Choquette, Member for Lotbinière, commented afterwards: "This morning he [Trudeau] graduated from a College Professor to a political leader".\textsuperscript{22}

On 6 April 1968 Pierre Trudeau won the leadership of the Liberal Party on the fourth ballot. At a press conference following his victory the following dialogue developed.

Q. Sir, I think you have suggested during your campaign that it might be time to bring the boys home from Europe. I was wondering if you might move in that direction now?

A. Most of our foreign policy today is based on either pre-war premises or immediate post-war premises, when Canada was a very important country in relative terms ... we had the strongest currency

\textsuperscript{18} Winnipeg \textit{Free Press}, 16-17 January 1968.

\textsuperscript{19} Vancouver \textit{Sun}, 27 January 1968.


\textsuperscript{21} Edmonton \textit{Journal}, 16 March 1968.

\textsuperscript{22} Cited in W.A. Wilson, \textit{The Trudeau Question}, Montreal, 1972, p.5.
in the world .... We had the fourth largest navy
and air force. We have a strong voice in Europe in
those days and in world affairs and in the United
Nations. I think now our voice is somewhat reduced
in tone .... Therefore, complete re-assessment is
needed and our participation in NATO is one aspect
of it.\textsuperscript{23}

Some commentators took this to mean that Trudeau wished to
withdraw Canadian forces attached to NATO from Europe. The \textit{News
Chronicle} in an ironic allusion to Trudeau's statement as
Justice Minister that he had not been long enough in Cabinet to
change his mind said:

Mr Trudeau has not been Prime Minister long enough
to change his mind, but when he has been thoroughly
briefed by his own experts in the External Affairs
Department perhaps he will.\textsuperscript{24}

Meanwhile Defence Minister Leo Cadieux and Chief of the Defence
Staff General J.V. Allard attempted to reassure Canada's allies,
who had become concerned over the escalating debate. At the
meeting of the NATO nuclear planning group at The Hague on 18
and 19 April 1968 they made it clear that no cuts in Canada's
troop commitment to NATO in 1968 were expected.

On the contrary they announced the following improvements
for the Canadian troops in West Germany: the introduction of
self-propelled artillery, the delivery of CF-5 aircraft and the
construction of new naval vessels.\textsuperscript{25}

Hardly had the Defence Minister managed to calm the fears
of the allies when the debate flared anew in Canada. Prime
Minister Trudeau did nothing to discourage the revived
speculation. And there were no domestic political reasons for
curbing discussion; even Opposition Leader Robert Stanfield
joined in the chorus of doubters questioning Canada's role in

\textsuperscript{23} Transcript of Press Conference with Pierre E. Trudeau,
National Press Building, Ottawa, 7 April 1968.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{News Chronicle}, 16 April 1968.
\textsuperscript{25} J.L. Granatstein, 'External Affairs and Defence' in John
Saywell (Ed.), \textit{Canadian Annual Review for 1968}, Toronto, 1969,
p.243. (Hereafter cited as Granatstein, \textit{Canadian Annual Review
for 1968}.)
NATO. Stanfield not only supported a new review of Canadian foreign and defence policy but even envisaged a new role for Canada in NATO based on a mobile home force which could be rapidly transported to Europe in an emergency. And Stanfield concluded:

I still believe NATO has an essential role in world peace - we should review our role perhaps but only after the Commons' Defence Committee and others studied it.26

This was the first statement by a leading Canadian politician linking the Commons' Committee to the envisaged new review.

Stanfield's tactic was clear: The minority Liberal Government did not control the Commons' Committee. Thus the further Parliament became involved in foreign policy decision-making the greater the chance of Opposition influence.

Pierre Trudeau, however, dissolved Parliament in April and called elections for late June.

Meanwhile just as he was stepping down as Prime Minister Lester Pearson suggested that it was no longer necessary for Canada to keep an army brigade and an air division in the NATO defence line in Europe.27 The pro-Liberal Kingston Whig-Standard took up Pearson's suggestion and went a step further to define defence in broader terms including the fight against hunger and poverty:

Mr Trudeau is obviously looking at the question in this way. He is trying to find new and significant, humanitarian ways of using Canadian resources. NATO is surely no longer one of those ways.28

Trudeau, however, could not afford to treat NATO so lightly. At a press conference in Winnipeg at the end of May 1968 he said that a "total withdrawal overnight [sic] from NATO

26 Toronto Telegram, 11 April 1968.

27 Toronto Star, 23 April 1968. Later on, however, while teaching at Ottawa's Carleton University, Pearson revealed privately that he was unhappy over the way the Trudeau Government handled the NATO review.

28 Kingston Whig-Standard, 8 May 1968.
would be a bad thing". Trudeau gave three reasons: Firstly, Canada's withdrawal might lead to the dissolution of NATO at a time when NATO is still needed; secondly, it could be interpreted as Canadian isolationism; and, thirdly, contact with Europe was needed to offset Canada's overwhelming contacts with the United States of America. However, Trudeau again pointed out that

so far as the military involvement in NATO is concerned, this does need a very strong and perhaps drastic reassessment.29

Two days after Trudeau's press conference the Ottawa Citizen argued that concern about Canada's membership in NATO was growing and that it could well become an element in the coming election.30 This was proved to be an exaggeration. The NATO problem was mentioned a few times but never became an important issue during the campaign.31

The election campaign, however, did reveal something about Trudeau's thinking on NATO. On 29 May 1968 Trudeau stated again that he intended to "take a hard look, in consultation with our allies, at our military role in NATO", and again he advocated the strengthening of the political and social ties with Europe.32

A week later Trudeau anew emphasised the importance of political, social and cultural relations with Europe while downgrading the significance of the military aspects of the alliance.33

The Prime Minister, however, was not the only member of Cabinet who dealt with the NATO problem at that time. External

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29 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Press Conference, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 23 May 1968, p.16.
30 Ottawa Citizen, 25 May 1968.
32 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 29 May 1968.
33 Transcript of Remarks by the Prime Minister, Edmonton City Hall, Edmonton, Alberta, 4 June 1968.
Affairs Minister Sharp speculated even on the possible outcome of a new foreign policy review: this review might result in a compromise; Canada would not cancel the NATO commitments, but withdraw militarily from Europe and keep those troops in combat-readiness at home for immediate despatch.34

Such speculation by Cabinet members was probably the reason for a formal representation by the British Government emphasising the advisability of maintaining strong NATO forces in Europe.35 But Prime Minister Trudeau was not deterred from reiterating his view that emphasis should be shifted from the military to the economic, political, social and cultural aspects of the alliance. He furthermore stressed that Canada's defence potential would be needed at home, pointing out that "if there is going to be a major conflict, it will happen over our sky".36 He did not, however, provide any concrete indication of what response these transferred forces could or should take against hostile forces, presumably on their way to Canada's southern neighbour.

At the same time as the conclusion of the election campaign in Ottawa, the NATO members including Canada decided in Reykjavik to press for mutual and balanced force reductions with the Warsaw Pact countries.37

It is unlikely that this decision was directed solely at Moscow; the logic of NATO's position went against any unilateral force reductions by any NATO member which would have weakened the alliance's bargaining positions vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact.

Whatever constraints the NATO decision might have placed on the Canadian Government, the strong-willed Trudeau, bolstered

34 Montreal Gazette, 5 June 1968.
36 Transcript of the Prime Minister's remarks at Confederation Park, Toronto, 19 June 1968, p.4.
by an overwhelming electoral victory, which gave the Liberals an absolute parliamentary majority for the first time in many years, was now in an extremely good position to push his ideas for a re-structuring of Canada's role in NATO. The Prime Minister now needed only the support of his own party, but this would prove a difficult task indeed.

In summary, developments up to the 1968 elections had the following key features, which should be borne in mind when we discuss subsequent stages.

1. Trudeau repeatedly declared the need for a new foreign policy review centering on Canada's military commitment to NATO. His personal preference was made clear: reduction, if not total withdrawal, of Canada's forces from Europe.

2. All parties agreed that a new review was necessary. The Opposition, however, demanded the participation of the parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

3. Opposition leader Stanfield and External Affairs Minister Sharp even agreed that a home-based highly mobile force which could be rapidly transported to Europe might become the basis of Canada's new posture.

4. Even the election campaign did not cause a polarisation of views concerning NATO. Such polarisation would appear shortly in a situation marked by Trudeau's overwhelming victory, his specific style and external events.

Following the election Trudeau immediately moved to implement his ideas. A 35-man strong inter-departmental Special Task Force on Relations with Europe (later known as STAFEUR) was formed. Although External Affairs was formally in charge the committee included several other departments - thus indicating an attempt by Trudeau to weaken the influence of External Affairs which presumably was wedded to its recently completed review. But External Affairs was still not easily downgraded. Together with the Department of National Defence, External
Affairs created a second task force. While the STAFEUR group dealt with the overall relationship with Europe, the External Affairs/Defence Committee specialised particularly on the military relationship with Europe - since it was here that the major danger to the conservative ideas of the bureaucracy lay.\textsuperscript{38}

On 28 July 1968 the Prime Minister again indicated his preferred role for Canada in NATO:

\begin{quote}
We are taking a serious look at NATO .... What we said during the election still stands ... that we weren't contemplating pulling out of NATO politically or economically or socially. But that our military involvement in it was still under consideration.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

\section*{A Temporary Setback for Trudeau: the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia}

With the invasion of Czechoslovakia confusion reigned in Ottawa. For at least nine months no one inside let alone outside Canada could decipher the Government's NATO policy. Those who wanted to have a clear picture of Canada's NATO policy had to wait considerably longer. Economic difficulties, the search for logical conceptions of Canada's foreign policy, pressure from Canada's NATO allies, Trudeau's distrust of the bureaucracy, the difficulties securing adequate support in Cabinet and in the governing Liberal Party, Trudeau's determination to get it his way (whatever that was), and Trudeau's idiosyncratic style - all these factors resulted in a form of policy making probably unique in the history of foreign policy in parliamentary democracies.

Trudeau only once conceded the relevance of the invasion of Czechoslovakia to Canada's NATO policy, and that came at the climax of the crisis immediately after the Warsaw Pact action:

\begin{quote}
The way in which NATO develops may be conditioned by this happening within the Warsaw Pact countries .... This new fact will no doubt condition one element of our thinking on the peace and stability
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} Thordarson, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.135-36; see also pp.146-47, 149.

\textsuperscript{39} Transcript of Prime Minister's remarks upon arrival at Uplands Airport, Ottawa, 28 July 1968, p.3.
of Europe. It's obvious that the Soviet Union is still basing itself on that kind of partition which was set up back in Teheran and Cairo after the Second World War.\textsuperscript{40}

But even then he argued there were no necessary military implications for Canada: "I don't think any specific military course follows obviously from this action in Czechoslovakia on our side ...".\textsuperscript{41}

Trudeau's assessment of the military implications was not based merely on a reading of the post-invasion situation; it reflected attitudes he had expressed before the invasion concerning possible changes in Europe as a result of detente. At the end of July he responded to former Prime Minister Diefenbaker's assertion that any pull out of NATO at that stage would be 'a retreat from reality' with the following analysis of Warsaw Pact and Soviet intentions:

What's happening in Czechoslovakia could be interpreted to indicate that certain countries, members of the Warsaw Pact, would be prepared to pull out of that if the other members of NATO were prepared to pull out of NATO. Or you could argue to the contrary that USSR's new show of strength should be an incentive to us not to pull out of NATO.\textsuperscript{42}

The Canadian public, however, did not look upon the invasion itself as 'that sort of thing you can argue both ways'. The overwhelming majority of Canadian newspapers now opposed any change of Canada's NATO policy. "... It is now plain that there is no way out of our domestic difficulties in cutting off our obligations to our allies", the Vancouver \textit{Sun} editorialised on 22 August 1968. The Toronto \textit{Telegram} agreed a day later: "There can be no withdrawal right now from our current commitments in NATO". The Edmonton \textit{Journal} demanded on 27 August 1968: "Mr Trudeau should abandon any talk of

\textsuperscript{40} Transcript of the Prime Minister's remarks, Uplands Airport, 22 August 1968, p.1.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.3.
reassessing NATO out of existence until the Soviet Union better learns to face up to the contradictions in its own system". J.L. Granatstein subsequently summed up the general mood of the mass media:

Significantly, even the Toronto Star which had long called for a 'new foreign policy' was shaken by the events of August, stating on 20 September that 'it's time to put aside thoughts of recalling the Canadian army brigade and air squadrons from Germany, and of letting NATO wind down to its close next year'.

The most interesting debate, however, was in the Globe and Mail because it was directly relevant to the discussions in the Trudeau Cabinet. John Gellner claimed on 3 September 1968 that the speed and precision of the invasion had made any speculation concerning a Canadian mobile force at home illusory. George Bain disputed Gellner's argument in the same paper two days later:

If the idea that aggression may occur quickly and without warning were accepted as the sole basis for determining if NATO were to remain unchanged, then it would remain unchanged forever. The question that must be decided is whether that quick and unheralded aggression which is always possible, is also likely.

The question now was which view External Affairs Minister Sharp would support. Both Sharp and Opposition Leader Stanfield had been in the past prepared to look for new approaches to Canada's foreign policy. Both, however, were willing to agree to troop withdrawal from Europe only if troops could be transported back to Europe in emergency. But the proficiency of the Warsaw Pact forces had made it doubtful that any significant numbers of troops could be returned in time to be of any real use.

Prior to the invasion nobody in Canada objected to a foreign policy review, but after 20 August both public opinion and the conservative Opposition sharply opposed any change in NATO policy.

43 Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.245.
The end of the bipartisan policy concerning NATO, however, did not unduly restrict Trudeau. He not only had a large parliamentary majority, which would not have to face the electorate for several years, but in addition he probably could rely on the support of the socialist New Democratic Party and the Creditiste Party. Thus Trudeau's major task was to unify Cabinet and the Liberal Party behind a new NATO policy.

On 30 August 1968 the Prime Minister confirmed publicly for the first time that the foreign policy review within Cabinet had already begun and would continue despite Czechoslovakia:

... Our position is that we are not changing my expressed desire to review our NATO commitments in the light of European and other developments in the past 20 years when NATO was brought in.44

To what extent the reference to "my ... desire" indicates that not all Cabinet Ministers shared Trudeau's enthusiasm for a new foreign policy review is a matter of speculation. However, it is clear that for many months to come Cabinet could not agree on Canada's NATO policy.

Hoping for decisive action on the issue the Edmonton Journal, a fortnight before Trudeau's speech opening the new Parliament, asked for an early decision but not without consulting Parliament:

The new Parliament should be given a realistic statement setting forth our defence responsibilities and our capacity to meet them. When the policy has been outlined in the House it should be sent to the Commons' Defence Committee, which has been an effective body.45

Trudeau saw things differently. Concerning NATO policy his speech from the Throne did not produce anything new:

44 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Press Conference, Norlile Building, 30 August 1968.
45 Edmonton Journal, 29 August 1968.
The Government has undertaken and is pursuing a thorough review of our external and defence policies ... and, as conclusions are reached Parliament will be invited to consider them.46

Asked a week later in the House whether he could give "a positive assurance ... that there will be no change in either Canada's commitment or Canada's position in NATO without prior disclosure and the opportunity for debate in this house", he flatly answered: "No, Mr Speaker".47

The tactical position was considerably different five months later when the Prime Minister declared in Parliament:

With the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister for National Defence we are considering ... whether we bring down our policy later than we had wanted. Our view was that we should make the announcement as soon as possible, so that the NATO meetings in Washington would be fully informed of Canada's position; that we tell our allies in advance what our decision was. However, we realise the importance of waiting for the report of the house committee and this may make us reconsider the date.48

Trudeau's Main Ally: the Constraints of the 1968-69 Budget

If the House Committee was more important than the allies in February 1969, in September 1968 one thing took priority over the CSSR crisis: the budget situation in general and defence spending in particular. There was hardly any room for manoeuvre in the September 1968 budget under existing economic circumstances. The dominating themes were fiscal conservatism: the need to limit Government expenditures, the necessity to curtail wage and price increases and to improve productivity. In the Government's own words it wanted to

47 Debates, 19 September 1968, p.195.
continue to work towards all the broad goals which are widely accepted in western industrial countries — full employment, economic growth, price stability, balance in external payments and equitable sharing of rising incomes.49

The problem with this Government statement was that it was in considerable contradiction to the Government's action.

Within a year, most of these goals had been abandoned, the balanced approach which they imply scrapped in the pursuit of one overriding objective: price stability.50

Although this development was unknown in September 1968, the Defence Department was already in deep trouble. It had just formally unified the Air Force, Army and Navy into the Canadian Armed Forces. Although this meant some financial savings it also involved many problems. Concerning the savings the Globe and Mail reported that Defence Minister Cadieux and his military staff had made it "painfully plain to the Cabinet that the budget had been trimmed as far as possible and that further economies could be obtained only by reducing commitments".51

As J.L. Granatstein correctly pointed out, the core problems of the Defence Department had already been explicitly described in a little noted 9 May statement by G.R. Lindsey, the Head of the Defense Operational Research Establishment. Lindsey had indicated that budgetary considerations would require some alterations in Canada's defence posture and that the withdrawal from Europe was at least a possible measure but one which raised other problems:

However, the consequences of withdrawal will extend well beyond the military sphere, and must be assessed in terms of international relations, foreign trade, effects on the internal economy, and several other factors.52


50 Ibid.

51 Globe and Mail, 4 October 1968.

52 Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.278.
Whereas Lindsey in May had only referred to the problems created for a constant defence budget, in September 1968 the defence budget was cut to 1.8 billion dollars. Even according to conservative Defence Department estimates it would still be necessary to spend at least 2.5 billion dollars if all existing military commitments were met. Others did not even attempt to put a dollar figure on current military programs. J.L. Granatstein, summarising what was regarded as necessary by the Armed Forces, commented simply:

What the cost for this staggering list of requirements would be was unknown, but the figure was certain to be astronomical.

And:

The root of the matter, simply put, was that Ottawa was being priced out of the defence business. The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt. General F.P. Sharp, however, admitted that the Department's predicament was not only due to budget cuts and rising inflation but also to inadequate planning in the past.

I don't know how we got into this box. It's not right to have everything running out at the same time. But there we are. We will have to set priorities. We can't get in all at once.

For the Trudeau Cabinet, however, the problem was totally different. The question was not when the generals would get all they desired but what they would be denied.

The first issue with relevance to Canada's role in NATO was the question of whether Canada should participate in a multi-billion dollar project for a new general purpose fighter bomber. The fact that Canada twice within one month asked for an extension of the deadline for a decision on this matter could

55 Ibid., p.279.
56 Globe and Mail, 21 September 1968.
suggest division within Cabinet. When Defence Minister Cadieux announced in Parliament the first request for an extension he admitted that the decision on the multi-billion dollar project had to be seen in the light of the general foreign policy review. On 23 October 1968 the Defence Minister announced in Parliament:

> With the current budgetary restraints and the high risk factor of this venture we have concluded that it would be inadvisable for Canada to participate.

Although Canada had been in the forefront of those advocating the multi-role war plane project, she was now the first to withdraw her participation. This decision possibly had some implications for the nuclear strike role of Canada's air force in Germany. Canada's part enthusiasm for the multi-billion dollar project was due to two factors: Canada's Starfighter CF-104 was regarded by some as doubtful of value, both because it was 'soft' on the ground and had a short loitering time - factors which increased the likelihood of its being prematurely used in an attacking role. Furthermore since the Starfighter was not used at home it was necessary to run a special school in Canada solely to train air crews in the operation of the CF-104 for the Air Division in Europe.

Thus as a result of the decision the pro-NATO forces had to be content with a nuclear strike capacity whose value was questionable - a development which would prove a handicap for the status quo advocates in the future. To what an extent the participants were aware of this disadvantage at this stage is hard to say. It is clear that Cabinet was not publicly polarised on the NATO issue in October 1968. It is also clear that the Opposition refrained from criticising the Government's decision not to participate in the multi-billion dollar project. What

57 Debates, 1 October 1968, pp.624-25.

58 Debates, 23 October 1968, p.1941.

did divide Cabinet and antagonised the Opposition was of a more
general nature concerning both broad philosophies and Trudeau's
idiosyncratic style.

Confusion Reigns: A Journalist Explains

A series of contradictory and ambiguous statements by
Trudeau began on 18 September 1968. A conservative member of
the External Affairs and National Defence Committee had asked
the Prime Minister:

In view of the statement by the United States State
Department to the effect that Soviet military
intervention in West Germany would lead to an immediate
allied response in accordance with the NATO treaty,
was the Canadian government consulted about this
statement and asked to associate itself with it?60

Most political commentators61 interpreted the Prime Minister's
answer as virtually disavowing the NATO treaty:

... when the United States government speaks through
one of its ministers it speaks in its own name, and
it does not engage any other country. Its opinion
of what is needed would be the opinion of a sovereign
state, but NATO decides according to its own treaty
arrangements.62

The 'treaty arrangements', however, clearly stated in Article 5
"that an armed attack against one or more of them [the NATO
countries] in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all ...".63

Thus the US did speak 'through one of its ministers' but
what that minister had said was agreed NATO policy, and the
'opinion' stated by the US Secretary of State was not only 'the
opinion of a sovereign state', but also the heart of the NATO
treaty which, of course, did bind the Canadian Government as
well.

60 Debates, 18 September 1968, pp.163-64.
61 See, for example: Montreal Gazette, 19 September 1968;
63 North Atlantic Treaty - Provision and text quoted in:
The next day under pressure from conservative members, particularly of the External Affairs and Defence Committee, the Prime Minister corrected his ambiguous statement. "... [W]e would be bound by the terms of the NATO treaty, and we would act accordingly". And despite the Speaker ruling out additional questions on the subject Trudeau insisted on a further clarification: "I think perhaps there was a bit of confusion .... I do want to state quite clearly that there is no ground for believing Canada would fail in any way to discharge its obligation under the NATO treaty".

Trudeau, however, refused to answer directly the question of the Conservative Member, Mr Hees, as to whether Canada was "committed ... to go to the aid of West Germany if she is attacked by the Soviet Union". The Prime Minister finished his statement on NATO in making clear that Canada would decrease or increase its NATO force in Europe according to the findings of the foreign and defence policy review.

The confusion continued when on the one hand Canada's NATO allies urged her to maintain her troops in Europe and on the other hand press reports appeared claiming that the Czech invasion had merely postponed - not cancelled - Canada's plans for a troop reduction.

For the Toronto Globe and Mail this confusion was too much. The editorial writer on 21 September 1968, although normally balanced in his views, now bluntly commented:

With all this uncertainty immediately ahead it is no time now for any unilateral and dramatic gesture by Canada over our NATO commitments. It would simply add to present unease.

The NATO Secretary-General, Mr Brosio, in Canada on his customary visit to make contacts with the new Government, had

64 Debates, 19 September 1968, p.197.
65 Debates, 19 September 1968, p.198.
66 Ibid.
a similar opinion. After talks with the Prime Minister and several Cabinet members he gave at a press conference his 'personal opinion': any reduction of NATO forces at this time would be "detrimental to Western security, both militarily and politically". Although he conceded that some differences of detail had developed between Canada and other members, Brosio concluded:

I think after all that the Canadian Government will not think differently, because the Canadian Government has the same serious consideration for the necessity of the alliance.68

'Diplomats' and 'informed sources' said two days after Brosio had left Ottawa that they believed that "there now is a swing away from any immediate military withdrawal from Europe".69

The same sources revealed to the Edmonton Journal the arguments the External Affairs and Defence Departments had been placed before Mr Trudeau. These arguments also replied to previous NATO statements by the External Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister:

1. Trudeau's tendency to concentrate on continental defence in order to become less dependent on the US was countered by arguing that it was highly unlikely that a war would take place in North America and, if it did, it meant nuclear Armageddon anyway. Furthermore, Europe might not be interested in political, cultural and economic ties if Canada 'left Europe in the lurch militarily' - thus implying increased US-domination of Canada's cultural and economic life.

2. Canada's troops would have to be 'on the trouble spot in Europe' - thus ruling out any possibility of a mobile force stationed in Canada.

69 Edmonton Journal, 26 September 1968.
3. Canada's withdrawal might trigger a US withdrawal and thus undermine European security. NATO not only deters Soviet military action but also prevents West Germany from becoming an independent military power, thereby lowering the possibility of an East German/West German border incident which could escalate to nuclear warfare.

And "at such a critical time", anyway, it would be "irresponsible for Canada to leave Europe".70

The Government could not have been very impressed with these arguments, since at this time External Affairs Minister Sharp for the first time sought advice outside the bureaucracy, particularly from academics.71

Without being asked the US made clear its opinion about Canada's NATO policy. Following Canadian press reports72 Sharp admitted indirectly in Parliament that the US had asked Canada to increase its defence budget. The External Affairs Minister, however, rebuked the Americans:

There was also a comment in particular about the kind of response they [the US] would like Canada to make. No reply has yet been made. I doubt very much whether a reply will be formally made.73

Indeed, the Trudeau Government at this stage hardly attached a high priority to communications with its major allies. When the US State Department arranged a meeting of all NATO Foreign Ministers attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Sharp could not participate ostensibly because of lack of time:

Unfortunately the invitation I received was for a day for which I had made a prior engagement some months

70 See: Edmonton Journal, 26 September 1968.
71 Globe and Mail, 4 October 1968; Toronto Star, 3 December 1968.
72 Montreal Gazette, 30 September 1968.
73 Debates, 30 September 1968, p.557.
ago. I felt that I could not break this engagement because of the inconvenience I would thus cause to a great many people.

Asked whether he would be represented (and by whom) at that meeting, Sharp replied:

... I am not certain this will be necessary. This is not a meeting of NATO; it is a dinner being put on by Dean Rusk of the United States to which he had invited the foreign ministers who happen to be there, but not all of us will be there.74

Problems of communication, concerning Canada's NATO policy, however, did not seem to exist between the Trudeau Government and NATO's enfant terrible, France. Asked in Parliament whether he had talked about NATO with Premier Couve de Murville in Quebec City at the beginning of October and whether he would indicate the nature of the discussions, Mr Trudeau answered in unusual frankness and usual cockiness:

Yes, Mr Speaker. In our review of international affairs we did discuss the problem of NATO, France's relation to it, and the view of the French government on the happenings in Europe which have some bearing on NATO.75

On the same day Trudeau stressed France's importance for NATO and Anthony Westall predicted in the Globe and Mail:

The outcome of the present policy review ... is likely to be a decision to muddle along as Canada has been doing for several years.76

Westall, probably the leading Canadian political journalist and visiting Associate Professor at Carleton University, gave his explanation why the Government had asked academics to take part in the foreign policy review, why other independent auditors would participate and why - as Westall correctly predicted - the parliamentary Committee on External Affairs and National Defence would become involved.

74 Debates, 30 September 1968, p.558.
75 Debates, 4 October 1968, p.791.
76 Globe and Mail, 4 October 1968.
Great expectations have been aroused by Mr Trudeau's promise to re-examine fundamentals which implied for many people new departures, fresh initiatives and bold adventures in foreign policy. The review in fact is not likely to produce any dramatic changes in policy. As far as it has gone, it has tended to confirm the wisdom of present policies, and the difficulties of taking new directions. To make these findings credible to the public, to let down expectations gently with the minimum of disillusion, the review must be endorsed by judgements other than those of officials and ministers. 

This strategy explained not only the expansion of the ranks of the foreign policy advisers but explained as well why both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister rebuffed in public the United States. If the existing policy had to be retained, then it should appear that this decision was a Canadian one and not influenced by the United States. Westall, who probably accurately summed up Sharp's and his department's reasoning, also pointed to the reason why Trudeau allegedly abandoned the simple solution of solving all budgetary problems via military withdrawal from Europe.

If Canada withdrew from NATO, the smaller European countries might follow, and isolationist forces in the United States would be strengthened. The alliance might be seriously weakened; at worst, it could break up. Stability in Europe - and, therefore, in the world - would be threatened. The chance of negotiating a detente in Europe would be reduced.

On 4 October Westall was convinced that the External Affairs Department had won the battle:

Mr Trudeau, no doubt, was persuasively briefed on the official case for Canada's continued commitment to NATO when he became Prime Minister. In any event, he rapidly modified his views, backing away from the easy suggestion that Canada should reduce its military forces in Europe ....

77 Ibid.
Trudeau backed down - according to Westéll - because in face of the invasion of Czechoslovakia "powerful political arguments" spoke against withdrawal. "Indeed, it might be a gamble with the peace of the world". 78

The Prime Minister Shocks the NATO Allies and Canada's Pro-NATO Lobby

Trudeau's answer to Westéll's article and, of course, to the External Affairs Department came at the beginning of November:

On NATO for instance I happen to believe that in a very real sense civilization and culture in North America are more menaced, more strongly menaced, more strongly threatened, by internal disorders than by external pressing. 79

And then Mr Trudeau elaborated in detail. Disorder in the US caused by racial problems, by the problem of urbanisation, by the underprivileged, by the young, by the trade unions and also by the new elites "may quite seriously lead to large rebellions and large disturbances of civil order and of social stability" and the Canadian Prime Minister was "quite certain" that this would overflow to Canada, where the Indian, the Metis and "a lot of underprivileged" would join the "great riots and beginnings of civil war". 80 And then the Prime Minister stated what he 'personally' happened to believe that it was these sources of disturbance that the Canadians "should fear and seek to correct with as great urgency as perhaps anything that is happening in Europe". He specified further in declaring that Canada was "not so much threatened by the ideologies of Communism or of Fascism or by atomic bombs or ICBM's as Canada was by two-thirds of the world's population that 'goes to bed hungry' and by those large fractions within Canada 'which do not find fulfilment in this

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78 Ibid.

79 Prime Minister's Transcript of Questions and Answer Period, Queen's University, Kingston, 8 November 1968, p.6.

80 Ibid. - Trudeau added: "I don't think it would be the separatists but this is another argument".
society". Mr Trudeau then explained what this all had to do with Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

... this is the background of these [foreign policy] reviews in which we are embarked. I am not predicting what the outcome will be but I am saying that in my scale of values I am perhaps less worried now about what might happen over the Berlin Wall than what might happen in Chicago, New York, and perhaps our own great cities in Canada.81

This was an extraordinary statement for a Canadian Prime Minister. It was even more extraordinary since Canadian parliamentarians at the time were attending meetings of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and since the NATO Ministerial Conference would soon open in Brussels. Journalists and politicians interpreted the Trudeau speech differently. Some called it "apparent off-the-top-of-his-head musings",82 the Conservative Leader of the House, G.W. Baldwin, talked about "a tendency to make hasty and off the cuff remarks";83 Government Senators and co-ordinator for the Canadians on the NATO Parliamentarians' Military Committee complained that the Trudeau statement "couldn't have come at a more inopportune time".84 George Bain from the Globe and Mail commented:

There is another view on that, of course and one which is more appealing to me, namely that the Prime Minister said what he did, when he did, precisely because he thought it was the opportune time to do so.85

It had been George Bain as well who pointed out that it had not been "the first time that Mr Trudeau had mentioned the danger of growing civil disorders in the United States in the same

81 Ibid., p.6.
82 Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.246.
83 Debates, 12 November 1968, p.2627.
84 Globe and Mail, 14 November 1968.
85 Globe and Mail, 15 November 1968.
breath with Canada's still uncompleted review of its foreign and defence policy". The Prime Minister was supposed to have done the same at an off-the-record dinner with journalists at the beginning of November.86

Although the Canadian Defence Minister and Minister for External Affairs had already departed for the NATO meeting in Brussels, Trudeau did not leave the initiative with his two responsible Ministers but stirred things up even more. In Parliament the social democratic NDP, wanting to spend more money for domestic and social purposes, tried to get assurance from the Prime Minister "that at this Conference in Brussels there will be no commitment to increase Canada's military part in NATO".87 Trudeau's answer did not satisfy the NATO supporters at all:

We are not led to the immediate reaction, after the Czechoslovakian events, to conclude that we should necessarily escalate in NATO. This is our position. I repeat, however, that we will listen to the position of the other members of NATO and make up our minds then.

And he repeated again:

... our reaction is that the Czechoslovakian events do not necessarily call for an escalation of forces and therefore - (some Hon. Members: Hear, hear) - our delegation to NATO is not going in there in order to achieve escalation, but on the contrary [!] to argue as much as possible that we in Canada are embarked upon a review of our NATO policy ....88

The Prime Minister's performance on the Canadian NATO policy the week before the Ministerial NATO meeting caused disturbance, 'considerable eyebrow-lifting', embarrassment and anger not only on the part of the parliamentary Opposition but on the part of the NATO allies, the Canadian diplomats and even on the part of Liberal parliamentarians.

86 Globe and Mail, 14 November 1968.
87 Debates, 12 November 1968, p.262.
88 Ibid.
For the first time Liberal caucus members attacked their own Government publicly over its NATO policy. Senator Lang complained:

The equivocation of the Canadian Government in connection with our position in Europe already has discredited us in the eyes of our allies. Any continuance of this equivocation through a limited future commitment will increase the distrust of our allies. \(^{89}\)

A. Gillespie flatly stated that a pull-out from Europe would endanger Canada's relations with the US and threaten Canada's whole foreign policy. Other Canadian parliamentarians attending the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meetings told newsmen they found the Canadian position 'embarrassing' in discussions with their European colleagues.

There were some reports of 'considerable eyebrow-lifting among the NATO delegates' about Trudeau's Berlin Wall comments and some NATO countries were reported 'to be disturbed over uncertainty about the future of Canadian armed strength in Europe'; but NATO Secretary-General Mr Brosio 'stepped nimbly around' suggestions that other NATO countries might put pressure on Canada at least not to reduce its forces in Europe. \(^{90}\)

One of the Canadian diplomats behaved less diplomatically - if press reports were correct. Canada's ambassador to NATO was supposed to have said that the prolonged uncertainty about Ottawa's attitude towards NATO was 'disgraceful' and that he had thought about resigning. \(^{91}\) Prime Minister Trudeau refused in Parliament to comment on these press reports: "I take the position that in this particular Government, policy is decided by the Cabinet and not by the press". \(^{92}\) Parts of Cabinet, however, Defence Minister Cadieux and Foreign Minister Sharp,

\(^{89}\) *Globe and Mail*, 14 November 1968.


\(^{92}\) Cited in *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 November 1968.
were in Brussels and had "in the face of strong American pressures"93 practically to decide, what Canada's contribution to NATO for 1969 was to be.

An Interim Decision and More Confusion

Although the Trudeau Government had been unable to conclude the foreign policy review, Cadieux and Sharp skilfully handled matters in Brussels. Trudeau revealed what his ministers had achieved in Brussels through a press release:

1. Canada would maintain its forces in Europe and at home at their present 'high level of training, equipment and operational readiness'.

2. Because of the Canadian Government's decision to close one of the three air bases in Germany, Canada had planned to reduce the aircraft of the air division by about 20%. In face of the Czech crisis and in the light of the foreign policy review this planned reduction was cancelled and the final decision postponed.94

What Trudeau did not reveal in this press release, however, was that 'maintaining the professional forces at their present level' included the following: An additional assignment of four modern anti-submarine destroyers equipped with helicopters and two support ships. NATO officials in Brussels and Britain's Minister for Defence, Dennis Healy, took this to mean an increase in Canada's contribution to NATO. Trudeau later on denied this in Parliament and gave his interpretation: Dennis Healy was wrong in saying that all but France and Iceland had strengthened their forces. Canada had made no new commitments.95

Both Healy and Trudeau were both partially right and partially wrong. The anti-submarine destroyers on the one hand

94 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 18 November 1968; see also, Globe and Mail, 15 November 1968.
fulfilled an old commitment but on the other hand represented an increased contribution to NATO, although an admittedly theoretical one at this time. The four destroyers would not be finished for another three years and, moreover, the orders placed with a Quebec shipyard could still be cancelled, if Canada should withdraw from NATO - a step which Trudeau acknowledged was not then contemplated.  

While the parliamentary Opposition sought more clarity on this issue, Trudeau confused Parliament all the more. Postmaster-General Kierans had indicated that Canada's foreign aid ought to be at least equal to Canada's defence expenditure. 

Asked in Parliament whether the problem of increasing foreign aid and decreasing defence expenditure was among those issues contemporary under review, the Prime Minister replied: "Yes, very definitely". And "… we are looking very actively at the alternative ways of spending our money usefully in our foreign relations".

Trudeau 'Accepts' the Committee as a Recognised Actor

Perturbed by the possibility of a total reversal of Canada's foreign policy priorities the Opposition tried anew to include Parliament in the foreign policy process. Former Prime Minister Diefenbaker asked whether the Prime Minister "will give this house an opportunity at an early date to discuss this matter and make known the views of the Canadian people as represented by members here, so that at least Parliament will not be a one-man show determining the future of this country". Diefenbaker did not get an answer. Following continuing questions on this subject and specifically on the role of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence,  


97 Debates, 18 November 1968, p.2842.

98 Debates, 19 November 1968, p.2905.
Trudeau replied three days later: "I do want to assure members of this house, however, that we will not reach any policy through a device which has bypassed Parliament or indeed public opinion". 99

The Conservative MP, J.A. Maclean, seized on this vague assurance to secure a commitment for technical and financial support for the Committee's operations:

... with regard to the examination in depth of external affairs and defence policy, will the Prime Minister assure the house that every facility will be given so that evidence before this committee can be taken into account and taken advantage of by the government in arriving at a policy in these very important matters which will have such a bearing on the future of our country? (Emphasis added)

Trudeau answered: "Indeed I can give that assurance". 100

The Constellation of Contending Forces Crystallises: Sharp Seeks Committee Involvement

In the meantime not only NATO supporters but even critics of the alliance became concerned about Trudeau's ambiguous statements on NATO. Eric Kierans, Postmaster-General and a personal friend of Trudeau's, was concerned that so far no minister had publicly demanded total withdrawal from NATO and NORAD. He therefore became the first to do so. He furthermore suggested that Canada could send her NATO troops to Vietnam as peace-keeping forces when they were needed there. 101 Kierans' colleague, Defence Minister Cadieux, disagreed strongly and replied angrily: "I don't really know why this should be brought up at this time. Why talk about peace-keeping in Vietnam when the war is still on". 102

With this dialogue it became clear to the public that Trudeau's Cabinet was split on the NATO question. When Leo

100 Debates, 22 November 1968, p.3068.
102 Toronto Star, 26 November 1968.
Cadieux was asked whether he would resign from Cabinet if Canada withdrew from NATO, the Defence Minister replied that he would 'not like to answer' that question 'at this time'. The Toronto Star commented: "He did nothing to squelch the situation and by refusing to deny it, in fact fed more fuel to it".  

The apparent uncertainty about NATO in Cabinet proved too much even for professional diplomats. The West German Ambassador, Ritter, commented angrily that Canada's NATO policy frustrated its allies and that it represented an 'enigmatic sphinx'. Ritter taking the unusual course of publicly commenting on an ally's domestic politics praised Cadieux and Sharp for their co-operativeness in Brussels and criticised Trudeau's suggestion that Canada's security was more threatened by racial turmoil in the US than by the situation in Berlin. Criticism also came from official and unofficial sources in other NATO countries, as was admitted by the Defence Minister in Parliament.

Trudeau, however, was not deterred by unfavourable comment. In an interview with the New York Times he argued that invasion of Czechoslovakia had actually weakened Moscow since the CSSR was no longer a reliable ally for the Soviet Union. He further commented if East European countries were 'genuine' in their desire "to be less part of the monolith ... I think we should also do so in NATO".

The Prime Minister, however, did not discuss whether the East European countries would be allowed to pursue their presumed genuine desire for greater autonomy from Moscow. But one thing which definitely was genuine was Kierans' desire that Canada should pull out of NATO and NORAD - and this desire

103 Ibid.
104 Toronto Star, 28 November 1968.
Trudeau allowed to be again publicly expressed. Other key ministers reacted to the escalating confusion over Canada's foreign policy. In front of the parliamentary Committee on External Affairs and National Defence they contradicted on 3 December 1968 the Prime Minister's opinion that Canada's security must not be defended in Europe. Leo Cadieux:

The forum where superpowers' interest most closely impinge on each other is Europe and hence Europe is the geographical region where Canada's security is most in jeopardy. Thus Canada's security is very closely interlocked with the security of Europe.

These are inescapable facts of the world we live in.108

And External Affairs Minister Sharp added:

It is a misapprehension to think we are in Europe to defend Europe. We are there to defend ourselves.109

Trudeau the next day in Parliament was not prepared to declare his ministers' statements to be 'Government policy'. He merely acknowledged that it was "a very important point of view".110 Earlier through skilful questioning the Opposition led Cadieux to correct his Prime Minister: Canada could not withdraw from NATO in 1969, but only in 1970 at the earliest.111 Some newspapers interpreted this as a serious split between the Prime Minister and his two ministers, especially since there had been 'persistent reports' about disunity within Cabinet on the NATO question.112 Whatever the situation in Cabinet, it at last

107 Globe and Mail, 30 November 1968.
108 Globe and Mail, 4 December 1968.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111Debates, 4 December 1968, p.3486.
112 Toronto Star, 5 December 1968; Montreal Gazette, 5 December 1968.
became clear during that question period in Parliament on 4 December that Sharp and Cadieux co-operated effectively with Parliament in order to create a new institutional battleground, where the dispute over the NATO policy could be continued. Sharp emphasised that his statement before the parliamentary Committee the day before still stood:

... it would be very agreeable to the Government if the Committee were to invite the views of members of Parliament and others who might like to appear before the Committee to express their views before the Government has completed this review.113

With this invitation for Committee participation in foreign policy decision making it also became clear that Cabinet was unable to reach a decision quickly. The apparent split which developed in Cabinet in November/December 1968 was not susceptible to rapid solution. The two responsible ministers indicated they did not want any basic change in policy; the Prime Minister seemed to be keeping his options open while pushing his personal preferences; and at least one member of Cabinet was publicly advocating total reversal of policy.

Preparation for the Decisive Battle

While the parliamentary foreign Affairs Committee was preparing itself for its new task the above pattern of behaviour by Government members changed little. The Prime Minister continued to confuse the public concerning NATO and while journalists and academics were astonished at Trudeau's friendly words for NATO and some improbable comments on military technology during a question and answer session in Winnipeg in the middle of December,114 they overlooked the Prime Minister's stress on that occasion on the importance of fiscal

113 Debates, 4 December 1968, p.3485.

114 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Question and Answer Period, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 13 December 1968; Globe and Mail, 14 December 1968; Bruce Thordarson, op.cit., p.73; J. Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.248.
considerations. And although Trudeau engaged in some theoretical gamesmanship, he did note that most Canadians believed in collective security. The Prime Minister concluded:

... If we believe in collective security, we must remind ourselves that we are pretty much at a minimum now. We can't go very much lower only Denmark and Iceland spend less than we do.115

Indeed, most of the public believed in collective security. In the middle of December 1968 a public survey revealed that only 23% were in favour of withdrawal from Europe. In the Prime Minister's native Quebec one third demanded bringing the troops home for reasons which were more financial than philosophical - "the money can be used for better causes".116 And on New Year's Eve the Prime Minister declared why he thought that a lot of money could be saved in the Defence Department:

Canada is in the extraordinarily fortunate position of not having to defend itself because we know darn well that the United States will defend us, they won't let hostile nations take over Canada to wage war in the United States. So in a sense we're much freer than other nations and I believe we should use this freedom to explore the ways in which middle sized nations can move the world towards peace in a way which many European countries cannot. What it will end up in I don't know.117

What it might lead to had just been explained by Roy Matthews, Director of Research for the Canadian-American Committee and a member of Prime Minister Trudeau's special task force reviewing Canada's foreign policy. Matthews' arguments in the Toronto Star may be summarised as follows:

In the third world the United States is mistrusted. Europe and Japan are suspect because of their imperial or neo-imperial behaviour in the past.

115 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Question and Answer Period, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 13 December 1968, p.16.
117 Transcript of the interview with the Prime Minister and Ron Callister and Normal Depoe, CBC-TV, 1 January 1969.
As a result Canada would have an advantage in these countries and should try to restructure its trade accordingly. To keep and increase this advantage Canada should concentrate on a peace-keeping role and gradually abandon existing defence commitments and postures. This would not and need not upset the United States. The advantages of such a policy were not only of an economic and foreign policy nature, they would also foster a feeling of national purpose in Canada. The greater independence from the U.S. which a withdrawal from NATO would involve would permit Canada to shift its military investment into peace-keeping activities of a kind that would give Canadians a sense of adequate national involvement in the world's problems - as their present major defence functions do not. 118

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, however, gave quite a different interpretation of Trudeau's ambiguous statements on NATO. He commented ironically:

The Prime Minister is a great teacher and he is leading a public debate at the present time, and he is trying to get the people of Canada to think about the problem. This is a process of involvement, so he is saying some very stimulating things .... 119

At the beginning of January 1969 Trudeau tried not only to get the people of Canada to think about the NATO problem. During his European trip the Prime Minister met Harold Wilson and the Socialist Italian Foreign Minister, Pietro Nenni, and, according to Thordarson, Nenni especially seemed to have had more success in influencing Trudeau's thinking than some of his Cabinet colleagues. The Italian Foreign Minister skilfully appealed to the Prime Minister's biases by playing down the military aspects of the alliance and stressing the political role it could have in furthering arms control and détente - a role which would be weakened by a Canadian withdrawal and that actually would have the effect of strengthening the alliances' hawks. 120

118 Roy Matthews, 'We'll be out of NATO by 1970, Trudeau aide says', Toronto Star, 24 December 1968.
120 B. Thordarson, op.cit., p.145.
While Trudeau's perceptions of the usefulness of NATO might have been moderated during his trip to Europe, in Canada, Cabinet was still bitterly divided and its divisions were increasingly obvious to the public. Since Cabinet members thought it necessary to prepare themselves for the NATO decision in Cabinet by stating diametrically opposed opinions in public the parliamentary Opposition was quick to underline the conflict in parliamentary Question time:

Following ... [the Prime Minister's] Marxist dialectical process of reasoning, would it be reasonable now for us to infer that the government's synthesis would be for Canada to remain half in and half out of NATO.

And Mr Baldwin, referring to a planned trip by Trudeau to see President Nixon, asked in the House:

If the Prime Minister does in fact arrange discussions with the President of the United States regarding Canada's position in respect to NATO, will the Postmaster-General and the Minister of National Defence accompany the Prime Minister, so that Canada's position can be placed before the President in all its clarity and simplicity?

Inputs and Timing: Trudeau and the Committee

Greater clarity and simplicity can be brought to the events of the January/April 1969 period by an analysis on three levels:

1. the struggle for public opinion;
2. conflict over the substance of the various reports; and
3. manoeuvering to determine the timing of the final Cabinet decision.

Although the three aspects are interrelated, my analysis will focus on the question of timing. Since others deal

123 Debates, 7 February 1969, p.5264.
extensively with the first two questions I shall refer to them in detail only where I have additional information or different interpretations. This restriction applies also to the deliberations of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.

Bruce Thordarson has already enumerated the different inputs for the Government's NATO review together with an attempted evaluation of the significance of each: the consultations between academics and Government, the departmental and inter-departmental reports, the 'non-group report' from Trudeau's adviser, Ivan Head, Donald Macdonald's paper and the parliamentary Committee's report. These reports, however, did not merely play a role during the actual decision on NATO in Cabinet on 3 April 1969.

A close examination of the decision-making process from January to April 1969 leads to the conclusion that control of timing was crucial. Several key events of this period did not involve substantive aspects of NATO policy but instead centered on tactical ploys as well as timing. Leo Cadieux, for example, attempted to predetermine the outcome without directly dealing with NATO policy. He tried to secure a commitment for defence spending as a fixed percentage of the GNP; he disclosed at the beginning of February that he had had informal talks with the Treasury Board about a formula fixing defence expenditures at 3% of GNP annually - the effect of which would have been a more than 15% increase of defence expenditures. According to Cadieux this formula was appealing to the Treasury Board, but he admitted he was not yet ready to submit a formal proposal.  

However, this scheme was still-borne. Trudeau abruptly referred to it as "purely an exploratory idea which he [Cadieux] wants to have discussed. It is not government policy". Then, what was the Government's NATO policy to be? One thing was


clear: a decision on NATO would have to be taken by April 1969. This was partially due to budget considerations, but most importantly the need to formulate NATO policy for the following year: the NATO Council Meeting was to be held in Washington in early April.

By the middle of February Cabinet had in its hands the report of the inter-departmental Special Task Force on Relations with Europe (known by the code name STAFFEUR). The 400-page report came to the conclusion Canada should continue to keep its present troops in Europe. The External-Defence Report was finished at about the same time. Thordarson describes the conclusions of these reports as follows:

The External-Defence Report consisted mainly of little more than a set of options while STAFFEUR adopted a more descriptive approach and made definite policy recommendations. Nevertheless, since neither External Affairs nor National Defence were prepared to see their traditional policy of support for NATO rejected, the External-Defence Report clearly implied in its listing of options that a continuation of military activities in Europe was desirable.

Even the External-Defence Report, however, caused some headaches for NATO supporters, because it dealt with the problems and costs of maintaining and replacing military equipment in Europe. So far no exact data concerning costs had reached the public. However, it was clear that Canada, if she kept existing defence programs, would have had to spend $Can. 2.5 billion per year. Leo Cadieux's efforts at that time to ensure slightly more than two billion from the Treasury Board made clear the desperate situation of NATO supporters solely for financial reasons. In

a subsequent interview External Affairs Minister Sharp underlined this by declaring: "Budgetary considerations were our greatest problems".\textsuperscript{129}

Nevertheless, it is not surprising that in 1969 both sides played down the financial aspect of the NATO decision, at least in public. Hardly anyone likes to admit that national security policy is determined by the Treasury's purse strings.

Although the External-Defence Report had revealed the Achilles-heel of the NATO supporters, the thrust of both reports was unequivocal in favour of the \textit{status quo}. So unequivocal were these reports that External Affairs Minister Sharp urged for a quick decision in Cabinet without waiting for the report of the parliamentary Committee.\textsuperscript{130} Defence Minister Cadieux, although unwilling to be pinned down on an exact date for reaching a decision, did not seem at all worried in his remarks to the House on 21 February as to whether the Committee report would be finished before Cabinet should act.

I think both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs have indicated that a decision on this particular problem is going to be made in the very near future - if indeed it is not imminent.\textsuperscript{131}

Without being asked, seconds later Trudeau seized the floor and in front of his speechless Defence Minister declared that the Government was contemplating whether the decision should be postponed:

With the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence we are considering -

Mr Stanfield: And the Postmaster-General.

Mr Trudeau: And the Postmaster-General, as the Hon. Gentleman says - we are considering whether we will bring down our policy later than we had

\textsuperscript{129} Interview with External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.

\textsuperscript{130} See transcript of the press interview with the Prime Minister, 21 February 1969, p.1; Debates, 21 February 1969, p.5801.

\textsuperscript{131} Debates, 21 February 1969, p.5801.
wanted. Our view was that we should make the announcement as soon as possible, so that the NATO meetings in Washington would be fully informed of Canada's position; that we tell our allies in advance what our decision was. However, we realize the importance of waiting for the report of the House Committee, and this may make us reconsider the date.132

On the same day at the press conference Trudeau was again asked when the decision would be made and whether it would be before his planned talks with President Nixon in Washington. The Prime Minister's answer was once again extraordinary:

It depends on the date on which the Parliamentary Committee brings down its report into Parliament [sic]. We will not make our decision before this Committee reports, either in a final way or on the specific issues concerning our study of NATO, and I don't know when that report will be. We had assumed it would be before the middle of March, and we had assumed that we would be able to announce our NATO policy by the middle of March and if those assumptions are fulfilled then the announcement will be made before seeing President Nixon, but if the Parliamentary Committee only brings down its report later, then it will have to be later.133

Further remarks of the Prime Minister in the same interview were equally significant for purpose of analysis:

The input is just about ready now. Its various papers from the military, the international, the commercial, all the points of view, are going to be given to the Ministers over the next weeks.134

Apart from the parliamentary Committee report, however, there was another report which was still unfinished - that of Trudeau's top adviser, Ivan Head, whose report later proved vitally important for the outcome of the NATO decision. Head, on 21 February, however, had not even started his report! Moreover, despite Trudeau's public assurances that Cabinet would have access to all points of view, Head's report was withheld from the relevant ministers.

132 Ibid.

133 Transcript of the press interview with the Prime Minister, 21 February 1969.

134 Ibid.
The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and the NATO Review

Before dealing with this aspect in detail, however, it is useful to analyse the deliberations of the parliamentary Committee of External Affairs and National Defence which the Prime Minister ostensibly attached such great significance. Hopes that the Committee actually would exert influence on the decision were not only based on the Prime Minister's remarks.

The Committee recommends staying in NATO

Bruce Thordarson observed that the changes of the rules made in December 1968, which were meant to increase the participation of parliamentary committees in the decision-making process in Canada contributed to the unprecedented atmosphere of optimism among MP's on both sides of the House. Many felt that the Committee, formerly considered to be an investigative but not a policy-forming body, would be able to influence the government's eventual decision.135

Thus it was not surprising at the start of the proceedings that Committee Chairman Ian Wahn announced that he hoped to participate in the Government's decision.136

Accordingly the Committee made thorough preparations to ensure that all view points were presented. Furthermore, in order to obtain all possible information the Committee went to Europe to obtain the opinion of the allies on the spot. Bruce Thordarson has dealt extensively with the Committee's role in the decision-making process.137 His conclusions were largely confirmed by my interviews. The overall majority of the Committee members favoured the status quo for the following reasons:

1. The alternative proposed by most academics would have been more expensive than existing defence programs.

2. Hardly anyone shared the anti-Americanism of most NATO critics.

3. Many MPs "became 'rather fed up' with these academics because of their apparent self-righteousness, arrogance, and ivory-tower idealism". 138

4. Most parliamentarians were impressed by their talks with NATO allies and with the Swedish Committee on Foreign Affairs. European politicians of nearly all ideological persuasions urged the Canadian parliamentarians to remain in NATO. The only exception was French General Gallois who argued that NATO was useless since its strategy was not sufficiently based on nuclear weapons; this argument had the effect of making the Canadians even more in favour of NATO.

As a result the Committee's recommendations were clear cut:

1. Canada should remain in NATO;

2. Canada should keep its troops in Europe;

3. Canada's brigade group and air force should remain as part of her contribution in Europe at least until the equipment would become obsolete in 1972;

4. The Government should begin a review of possible alternative military roles in Europe immediately so that new equipment could be secured;

5. Canada should use its influence for achieving a greater degree of detente and a balanced reduction of forces of both NATO and Warsaw Pact's forces. 139

138 Ibid., p.129.

Wahn manoeuvres to influence the Committee decision

Equally important especially with reference to intra-party discussions was the way in which the report was produced. The Committee set 26 March, a few days before the Cabinet decision on NATO was due, as a deadline for at least an interim report. This meant that the drafting of the report, as Chairman Wahn had already pointed out,\textsuperscript{140} would have to begin while the Committee was still in Europe. The Chairman of the Committee had summarised the aims of the trip as follows:

The visit to Europe is an integral part of the Committee's current consideration of Canada's defence policy, and concludes the first phase of its overall review of defence policy that began in January. The itinerary of the visit has been arranged to give the thirty members of the Committee an opportunity to explore at first hand the following issues:

1. How important is NATO and what does it achieve;
2. How do European political leaders regard NATO;
3. The effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations and U.N. collective security arrangements;
4. What are the possibilities in the field of civil defence;
5. The neutrality and non-alignment options;
6. The prospects for disarmament.

The Committee will visit Cyprus, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, Sweden, France and Belgium. Members will meet and hold discussions with political leaders of all parties, officials, non-government experts and journalists from those countries. They will also have the opportunity to meet Canadian diplomatic and military representatives in the countries visited and to see in the field Canadian military forces in Europe.\textsuperscript{141}

At least one Liberal parliamentarian, N. Cafik, suspected that Wahn's known anti-NATO sentiments were shaping the scope of the Committee's enquiry; he noted that only the first two of the issues noted by Wahn dealt directly with NATO while the remaining

\textsuperscript{140} Press Release of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 7 March 1969.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
questions concerned alternatives to NATO. Thordarson's subsequent analyses and my own interviews tend to confirm Cafik's view. Thordarson argued that Wahn in utilising the Chairman's prerogative of drafting the Committee's preliminary report, solely emphasised his own anti-NATO views. This draft in Thordarson's version, was shown 'for the first time' to the other members of the Committee during the weekend plane trip from Geneva to Ottawa on 23 March. Interviews with major participants, including the Committee's adviser, Peter Dobell, and Ian Wahn himself as well as evidence found in the so far unpublished 'Wahn Papers', indicate that Thordarson's version 'based on interviews with a senior official' was not totally correct.

According to Peter Dobell, Wahn did show his drafts to the Steering Committee during his visit to Europe on three occasions, each time in a revised form. In the 'Wahn Papers' there are remnants from several drafts and the complete draft of '5+' in which it simply says that the "Committee recommends that Canada continue in NATO". Wahn himself said that he prepared drafts "nearly ten times to persuade my colleagues" and he flatly admitted that he tried "everything to get a better report". Wahn further admitted that he wanted Canada to withdraw completely from NATO. When he failed to secure the support of even the Social Democratic NDP his new aim became the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe.

143 B. Thordarson, op.cit., p.134.
144 Ibid., p.164, footnote 26.
145 Peter Dobell is Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Trade, an institution partly financed by Parliament, private enterprise and other bodies, which was specifically established to advise parliamentarians about foreign policy matters.
146 Interview with P. Dobell, Ottawa, 14 May 1973.
co-operated with the three NDP members, David Lewis, Harold Winch and Andrew Brewin, is illustrated by the fact that substantial parts of the first Wahn drafts were based upon notes of the NDP politicians.149 Ironically, a reading of the 'Wahn Papers' reveals that Wahn was isolated within the Committee, but at the same time he had the effect of welding together the NDP politicians.

The NDP in its opposition to NATO had been a classic example of individual viewpoints preventing a common stand: three members, three opinions, one party.

Bruce Thordarson describes the opinion of the NDP politicians as follows: "Although David Lewis's inclination was toward a complete withdrawal from NATO, the party's defence spokesman, Andrew Brewin, wanted only a military withdrawal from Europe, while Harold Winch believed that some Canadian troops should be left in Europe".150 At the end of March, however, the NDP had worked out a compromise, which explicitly approved the Committee's proposal for staying in NATO, but which criticised the majority report "on the ground that it failed to spell out clearly what Canada's future role in NATO should be".151

The NDP politicians suggested that

while remaining a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, Canada should withdraw the Air Division and Brigade Group now in Europe and develop an air transportable, conventionally armed, highly mobile force available for peace-keeping under the United Nations and as a mobile reserve for use in Europe under NATO when necessary.152

The Liberal Member Warran Allmond disagreed with the majority view as well and issued a minority report on similar lines as the NDP compromise statement. Ian Wahn told me that he had

149 These notes were included in the 'Wahn Papers', op.cit.
150 Thordarson, op.cit., pp.133-34.
152 Ibid.
considered issuing a joint minority report in order to increase the impact of the opposition to the majority report. However, he decided against this move and drafted another report (Draft No. 5) in which he simply stated that Canada would stay in NATO.

I decided against issuing a minority report because I tried up to the end to influence the majority report. I hoped to prevent the majority from stating all their reasons for staying in NATO. That's why I drafted a report saying we simply should stay in NATO. But earlier, I tried to get a more radical report. But it didn't work either.

Indeed, neither approach worked. It didn't work at all. As Thordarson pointed out, Ian Wahn's persistent attempts to issue a radical report against the wishes of the majority might have had the opposite effect:

... members who had favoured a modest military cutback in Europe became proponents of maintaining the status quo until 1972, in reaction against Wahn's proposal for a complete withdrawal.

Although Wahn's tactics seemed to become more flexible when he realised the determination of the majority, he had undermined his credibility through at least five fruitless attempts to draft the Committee report. And what Thordarson did not mention was that it was now possible for other forces to step in and exert decisive influence on the Committee.

The Chairman departs and the vacuum is filled

After all of Wahn's drafts had been rejected, Peter Dobell, who had closely observed the Committee's deliberations as a permanent advisor, on 24 March at 9 p.m. started to work out a plan whereby a report and recommendations could be completed and reach Cabinet as soon as possible. This was done within eleven

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154 'Wahn Papers', op.cit.
156 Thordarson, op.cit., p.153.
Committee Chairman Ian Wahn later on commented that it was "not only a bad, a very bad report, but a Dobell-report too". Dobell denied this and maintained that he acted basically "more as an arbitrator than an advocate". Most Committee members agreed with Dobell. Dobell, however, admitted that he kept close contact with the Department of External Affairs, especially with the Head of its European Division, John Holstead. Although External Affairs Minister Sharp did not remember Holstead or any other member of his department having any 'significant influence' on the final draft of the Committee report, he remembered quite well that his colleague in the Defence Department, Leo Cadieux, was always extensively informed about the different stages of the Committee's operations: "Cadieux's secretary was the real go-between". What Sharp meant was that David Groos, the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence had been present 'by traditional arrangement' quite regularly when the Committee met, and that he had been present on that night when the final report was drafted, too. The Liberal MP Norman Cafik claimed that Groos had been 'quite influential' and Peter Dobell conceded that Groos presented quite a few formulas which were used prominently in the report's conclusion. Thus

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159 Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 14 May 1973.
160 Based on interviews with members of the Committee for External Affairs and National Defence in Ottawa in May and June 1973.
161 Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
163 Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
165 Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
Wahn's desperate attempts to determine the Committee's report against the wishes of the majority produced precisely the opposite effect. But Wahn did not give up yet!

I was appalled by the fact that the Committees' report would be used in Caucus and in Cabinet as ammunition for the status quo. After all, it was the Committee which I was the Chairman of.¹⁶⁶

Wahn manoeuvres to minimise the Committee's decision and the Ontario Liberal Party meeting

Wahn told me in May 1973, "I decided to write a letter to the Prime Minister, in which I tried to twist the interpretation of the report in order to put more emphasis on my own views".¹⁶⁷ This is quite an extraordinary admission by a Chairman of a Committee. His actual letter, however, was considerably more subtle than Wahn's ex-post explanation of his tactical approach. In his letter to the Prime Minister of 27 March 1969 ('Private and Confidential') Wahn admitted that the Committee's report recommended that Canada should remain in NATO "until the main items of equipment for our Air Division and Mechanized Brigade in Europe require replacement - the mid 1970's".¹⁶⁸

A further recommendation urges that our review of our long term roles commence now so that decisions can be arrived at in sufficient time to negotiate changes (if any) without allies, to acquire new equipment and to retrain our forces.

This recommendation in paragraph 4 (which appears in Part III of the report) must be read in conjunction with the paragraph which appears immediately preceding Part III. This paragraph points out that the future role of the Canadian forces now in Europe is one of the most important questions facing the Committee, that the Committee has not received sufficient evidence on this point but that it intends to pursue the matter with a view to making definite recommendations in a future report.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.
¹⁶⁸ 'Wahn Papers', op.cit.
The report leaves open the question as to what Canada's defence roles will be after the mid 1970's. Wahn indeed tried to twist the Committee's interpretation. The Committee's report quite clearly stated that Canada should stay in NATO, that Canada's troops should remain in Europe, and the Committee rejected Trudeau's notion of a 'free ride'. The Committee's report did not even see any sense in stationing Canadian forces at home instead of in Europe.

What Wahn deliberately confused was Canada's 'long term roles' with Canada's 'military roles'. At no point did the Committee question Canada's 'long term roles' (Canada should remain in NATO and maintain troops in Europe) but left open Canada's specific military roles after the mid-70's. Wahn subsequently told the Prime Minister his personal opinion: "... I hope we could adopt a more independent and self-reliant foreign policy in the future". The influence of Wahn's letter on the Prime Minister is hard to determine. Wahn himself claimed the letter was discussed in Cabinet and counter-balanced the impact of the Committee's report.

Donald Macdonald, Cabinet member and NATO opponent but no admirer of Wahn's tactical skills, regarded this as 'wishful thinking'. He did not recall that Wahn's letter was mentioned in Cabinet at all. External Affairs Minister Sharp was also uncertain as to whether Wahn's letter was discussed in Cabinet but conceded that he had heard about the letter: "That was another of Ian Wahn's tricks". Wahn himself admitted that


171 'Wahn Papers', *op.cit.*


173 Interview with Donald Macdonald, 3 June 1973.

he was party to another 'trick'. The day after Wahn sent the private letter to the Prime Minister he repeated the same argument to the Annual Meeting of the Liberal Party of Ontario: the Committee report only proposes a continuing Canadian presence in Europe until the mid-1970's when military equipment will have become obsolete. "After that", Wahn argued, "we don't say what our role should be ...".175

In a subsequent interview Wahn claimed that friends of Trudeau and NATO opponents managed to manipulate the Ontario delegates. Wahn asserted that the Chairman of the policy discussion of the Ontario meeting was biased against NATO, and the official discussants all favoured a change in NATO policy and were selected for this reason.176 John Roberts, Liberal Member for York-Simcoe, a panelist at the Liberal meeting and a proponent of withdrawal from Europe, while admitting that none of the discussants was in favour of the status quo disputed Wahn's version and claimed it all happened by accident.177

Wahn, however, argued that anti-NATO Liberals must have carefully selected the panelists: "They even found one or two External Affairs people who were against NATO".178 Dr Roberts, however, replied that the annual event in Ontario was anything but well planned and organised: "It was a piece of splendid disorganization. There was no coordinated approach, no plan, no tactics, however surprising this might seem in retrospect".179

Be this as it may, it is undisputed that all papers being distributed were opposed to the status quo. One of the more powerful papers was delivered by Escott Reid. Reid, a former

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177 Interview with Dr John Roberts, Ottawa, 2 June 1973.
179 Interview with Dr John Roberts, Ottawa, 2 June 1973.
deputy Under-Secretary in the Department of External Affairs during the period of NATO's conception who at that stage "more than any other Canadian official, developed the intellectual framework for NATO",180 was now advocating a dramatic change in Canada's foreign policy. Reid's suggestion was to cut Canada's defence budget in half, withdraw from Europe and spend that money on foreign aid.181 The Globe and Mail asserted that Reid had a decisive influence on the Ontario Liberal delegates.182

While none of the panelists spoke in favour of the status quo, there were a few parliamentarians who came out for NATO: N. Cafik, A. Gillespie and Senator Aird.183

The battle, however, was won by the NATO opponents. And, although John Roberts had disputed that the Ontario panel meeting had been staged, he agreed that "Ontario was one of the few institutional possibilities to exert influence, not directly, but in building up ammunition which could be used by Cabinet members later on".184 The NATO critics had to work hard, however, to achieve this aim at the Liberal Party meeting in March 1969 in Hamilton, Ontario. A general poll conducted among convention delegates showed that the powerful Ontario Liberals were 'cautious',185 about the NATO issue. Of the 256 delegates who filled out a questionnaire circulated by party officials, 41% wanted no change, 31% wanted to phase out Canada's military commitment gradually, 22% wanted an immediate and complete

180 Peter Dobell, 'Canada and NATO' in Orbis Vol. XIII, Spring 1969, No. 1 (Special Issue on NATO and European Security), p.320.
184 Interview with Dr John Roberts, Ottawa, 2 June 1973.
185 Toronto Star, 29 March 1969.
withdrawal from NATO and 4% even wanted to increase Canada's military obligation. In the actual panel meeting on foreign policy the NATO critics were more successful. Forty delegates wanted to stay in NATO but with a reduced military commitment, 20 supported a complete withdrawal and only 15 opted for no reduction in Canada's involvement in the alliance.

Alan Linden, Chairman of the policy discussion, guaranteed that the result of the meeting would be immediately passed on to Prime Minister Trudeau. And Ian Wahn, although not a formal member of the panel, gained the widest news coverage by 'warning' the Ontario delegates that the fight in Ottawa for change would be much harder than in Hamilton: "Powerful forces in the Liberal Party are opposed to any reduction in Canada's commitment in the collective security pact".

The Liberal Caucus Debates NATO Policy

Of all people Wahn should have known that the fight in Caucus would be much harder. Indeed, shortly before the Cabinet decision the conflicting opinions clashed in Caucus. In particular Cabinet members were reportedly so emotional as to provoke further antagonism within the parliamentary Liberal Party at this stage. The sporadically bitter debate, however, supposedly also had the effect of creating among the still undecided Liberals, who valued party unity above all else, a recognition of the necessity of compromise.

There is no evidence for Thordarson's version that many of the same Committee members who shortly before had voted in favour of the parliamentary Committee's report were now pressing in Caucus for a partial reduction similar to that later on announced by the Government.

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186 Ibid.


There is, however, an indication that non-committed or only slightly-committed Caucus members, including Committee members, felt the necessity of a compromise, particularly after some members hinted at the possibility of a party split. There were still strong groups in Caucus led by the powerful Minister Donald Macdonald (who never operated in public) demanding total withdrawal from NATO. Macdonald received support from Ian Wahn. Wahn simply repeated the arguments made in Hamilton.  

N. Cafik, who had been investigating in Halifax what became later known as the Bonaventure affair and who had flown back to the Caucus meeting at the request of Ministers Sharp and Cadieux, became so furious with Wahn that he forecast a split of the party if the Government decided to get all troops out of NATO.  

Others were not as outspoken as Cafik, but Messieurs Proud'homme, Gillespie, Watson and Lang also strongly supported Canada's role in NATO.  

No wonder more and more moderates were looking for a line acceptable to both sides. Although the actual decision was made in Cabinet and although this section is naturally solely based on interviews, I will argue that the most far-reaching alternatives to current policy-increased military involvement in Europe and total withdrawal from NATO and NORAD were precluded by Caucus. But these extreme options, although listed by Trudeau, were not the real political issue as either would have irrevocably split both Caucus and Cabinet.  

The practical alternatives were total military withdrawal from Europe while remaining in NATO, partial military withdrawal

190 Interview with Ian Wahn, Toronto, 17 May 1973; Dr John Roberts, Ottawa, 2 June 1973.

191 Interview with N. Cafik, Ottawa, 31 May 1973; Interview with Ian Wahn, Toronto, 17 May 1973; External Affairs Minister M. Sharp declined to comment on this aspect.

from Europe and the status quo. I shall further argue on the one hand that the views of Trudeau and particularly the hardcore anti-NATO group in Cabinet - using the arguments of financial constraints and detente - prevented the maintenance of the status quo. On the other hand, Caucus - adopting the opinion expressed by Canada's European allies - ruled out a total military withdrawal from NATO. The bitterness of the conflict over the relatively narrow question of how much of a military withdrawal from Europe can be explained by both the vagueness of the 3 April Cabinet decision and Trudeau's violation of proper form in dealing with his Cabinet associates. This violation of form, however, was not merely a gaffe on the part of the Prime Minister but was a direct factor in strengthening his hand within Cabinet. These several factors are discussed in detail below.

Form or Substance: The Nature of the Trudeau/Sharp Clash?

The question of the breach of form concerned a single report. While Cabinet was informed of departmental reports, the parliamentary Committee report and the mood of Caucus, there was one report which was kept under extreme secrecy up to a few hours before the Cabinet meeting on 29 March. Even the responsible Ministers Sharp and Cadieux had not been informed.\textsuperscript{193} Sharp, however, admitted in an interview he had been aware that the Prime Minister's office was working on a paper, but that he had no knowledge of its contents.\textsuperscript{194} Although the Head of the Prime Minister's office, Ivan Head, had told the author in 1973 that the ideas which went into the report were "at least a year old"\textsuperscript{195} it was only in the middle of March 1969 that Trudeau had asked him to prepare these in written form. Concerning the exact contents of the paper and the workings of his small committee which prepared it Head would say nothing. Thordarson's research, however, revealed the following:

\textsuperscript{193} A. Legault, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{194} Interview with Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.

\textsuperscript{195} Telephone interview with Ivan Head, Ottawa, 14 May 1973.
Head chaired a small committee that examined both general and specific questions dealing with military policy. Working with him were senior civil servants who served as 'resource people', answering any detailed questions that he raised in the course of his study. By March 29 Head had completed his special report, entitled 'Canadian Defence Policy - a Study' but referred to by a few knowledgeable insiders as the 'non-group report' (a somewhat caustic allusion to the large bureaucratic and parliamentary committees that had prepared the other NATO studies).

And the document apparently contained the recommendations that Canada remain in NATO, retain in Europe approximately 3,000 men out of its existing 9,800-man contingent, and abandon its nuclear-strike role.196

Thordarson based his account on interviews with 'senior government officials' and on Albert Legault's article in 'Le Devoir'. Legault's article, however, did not cover all the specifics of the proposed forced reduction.197 In a footnote Thordarson conceded that "for the most part, the contents of this document (Head's 'non-group report') are a matter of speculation; some government officials are aware of its general contents, but few appear to have actually seen the report".198 Admitting, as Thordarson does, that the contents of the Head report are a 'matter of speculation'199 is one thing; treating his suppositions as if they were the facts and tempting others, like Denis Stairs, to do the same,200 is another thing. The appeal of Thordarson's account is perhaps explained by the lack of direct evidence concerning the period just before and after the 3 April decision. Now, however, I shall attempt a closer reconstruction of events.

Some political observers believed that the Government's decision on NATO had already been made in March 1969. All the official reports prepared by that time, most of which were made known to the press, supported the *status quo*. As we have seen there was no doubt of Cadieux's views on this score. Moreover, on 1 March 1969 the other relevant Minister, Sharp, in a skilfully worded address to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, was so strongly in favour of NATO\(^\text{201}\) that George Bain from the *Globe and Mail* concluded: "The decision has been made".\(^\text{202}\)

Peter Dobell later asked whether Cadieux and Sharp had been 'perhaps over-confident'\(^\text{203}\) that the Government would follow their lead. It is not only questionable whether Sharp and Cadieux had been 'over-confident', it is even questionable whether Sharp was actually in favour of the *status quo*.

Ivan Head, for example, later commented that Thordarson's most significant misjudgement was to overestimate the differences between Sharp and Trudeau.\(^\text{204}\) The conflict between Sharp and Trudeau can hardly be overestimated. It is necessary, however, to focus on the *nature* of the conflict between the Prime Minister and his External Affairs Minister. Nowhere had Sharp ever demonstrated discontent with the Cabinet decisions of April and September 1969; even before the April decision Sharp had nowhere *rigorously* argued in favour of the *status quo*. "Trudeau and Sharp were in substance much closer than it was reported",\(^\text{205}\) Ivan Head commented. Concerning 'substance' this

\[^{201}\text{M. Sharp, 'NATO in Canadian Perspective', Press Release, Transcript of a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, M. Sharp, to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 7 March 1969.}\]

\[^{202}\text{Globe and Mail, 4 March 1969.}\]

\[^{203}\text{P. Dobell, *Canada's Search for New Policies*, op.cit., p.14.}\]

\[^{204}\text{Telephone interview with Ivan Head, Ottawa, 14 May 1973.}\]

\[^{205}\text{Ibid.}\]
is quite possible, but one has to keep in mind that it was in the interest of both Sharp and Head to downplay any differences in public.

No attempt was made, however, to deny the conflict between Sharp and Trudeau over the manner of handling the NATO decision.

Although Sharp never complained in public, it is clear that the Park Plaza Hotel 'Cabinet meeting' did not accord with generally accepted procedures. Jack Granatstein labelled the meeting of Ministers Macdonald, Kierans, Pepin, Lang, Hellyer, and Richardson with a group of academics at Toronto's Park Plaza Hotel on 16 March 1969 as 'Cabinet decision-making'. It could not have been more appropriate.

Less important was the fact that all ministers of this meeting except for Hellyer were regarded as 'doves', less important was that "the tenor of discussion was dovish although realistic" (sic!); less important were the subsequent disproven prophecies of some participants; more important was Granatstein's conclusion:

The significance of the Park Plaza meeting was this: Cabinet Ministers felt it essential to their understanding of the issue to go outside the establishment for ideas; advice and consultation; the Cabinet was clearly gearing up for a last fight on the issue; and the doves were numerically stronger than had been suspected.

At least one Minister was quite disturbed that a part of Cabinet felt it necessary to meet in a hotel; others pointed out that the function of the meeting was basically to inform those Cabinet colleagues about the views of a number of leading academics. The reason why the two responsible Ministers Sharp and Cadieux were not invited was explained on the grounds that those two Ministers had had previous talks with academics.

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207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
Whatever the motives for the Plaza meeting, it is clear that Macdonald who organised the discussions at the Plaza Hotel presented in Cabinet on 29 March another report. This was supposed to be highly critical of NATO, although nobody seems to (or wants to) remember whether Macdonald recommended total withdrawal from NATO or only total withdrawal from Europe.\footnote{209}

External Affairs Minister Sharp commented in an interview that he could not care less how many reports prepared by how many people were presented to Cabinet, but:

> Things are totally different, when the Prime Minister signs one of them without even consulting his Minister.\footnote{210}

Trudeau did not sign Macdonald's report, but he did sign that prepared by Ivan Head. According to Sharp, the Prime Minister did not attach his signature to the report itself but only to a cover note. This, however, was enough to cause Sharp anxiety.\footnote{211} Legault subsequently wrote that it was the right of the Prime Minister to ask for a report from whomever he wanted to\footnote{212} but what Legault did not say was that Trudeau's signature automatically put additional and outstanding weight to Head's report.

It was this much more than the fact that extracts from Head's report were later found in the Prime Minister's statement on NATO which angered the two ministers.\footnote{213} This plus the fact that Ministers Kierans, Macdonald, Pelletier and Marchand insisted on a radical change in policy on NATO, prevented

\footnote{209}Ibid.; A. Legault, \textit{op.cit.}  
\footnote{210}Interview with Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.  
\footnote{211}Ibid.  
\footnote{212}A. Legault, \textit{op.cit.}  
\footnote{213}Interview with M. Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973. This interview also revealed that Cabinet discussions concerning alleged disadvantages of the Starfighter CF-104 were overrated by A. Legault.
Cabinet making a decision as had been intended before Parliament rose for the Easter holidays.\textsuperscript{214} Sharp's Press Secretary, B. Gorham, later on even thought Head's paper should have only been distributed in Cabinet after the responsible ministers had been consulted. In this case, Gorham argued, the principle of ministerial responsibility had been violated. "Sharp and Cadieux must have been embarrassed".\textsuperscript{215}

Sharp assured himself, in his own words, that "it would not happen again".\textsuperscript{216} He obtained this assurance in a meeting with Trudeau and, again according to Sharp, he made sure the top bureaucrats in his department were informed of this agreement.\textsuperscript{217} In an extensive interview Sharp threw additional light on the decision. (Of course, one must bear in mind that the External Affairs Minister had a vested interest in bolstering the image of his department after Trudeau's belittling of External Affairs.)\textsuperscript{218}

Sharp argued that the Prime Minister's range of options was limited by the need to prevent a party split. Since a Caucus meeting had taken place immediately proceeding the decision Trudeau had to be aware of how strongly some Members of Parliament felt about the NATO issue.\textsuperscript{219} This applied for the Cabinet as well as for the Party in general. Both Cadieux and Sharp never denied that they would resign if Canada left NATO.\textsuperscript{220} The counter argument to the threat of a party split was the stringent budgetary situation:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{214} Ibid. See also A. Legault, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{215} Interview with the Press Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs, B. Gorham, Ottawa, 22 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Interview with M. Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Both before and after 1969 Trudeau frequently denigrated the performance of External Affairs bureaucrats.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Interview with M. Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{220} M. Sharp admitted as much in the interview of 28 May 1973.
\end{itemize}
Cadieux and I accepted that from the beginning. Both of us knew that re-equipment was necessary. Both of us knew that big, big money was involved if we wanted to keep up our strength in Europe. And at least I knew that we wouldn't get away with it.  

What Sharp thought Cadieux and he would not get away with was according to Legault - at least 300-400 million additional Defence dollars. The Toronto Star, however, learned from Cabinet sources that the cost would be as high as 425 million dollars.

To what an extent Sharp believed in 1968-69 that the status quo would be difficult to maintain solely for financial reasons is difficult to determine. This much is clear, however, that Sharp and his department never publicly admitted that they had considered alternatives to the status quo simply for financial reasons. In any case, whatever the motivation of Sharp and his department, a solely financial argument could not have been articulated in Canada (or, for that matter, anywhere else) where no one could afford to admit that defence policy was a function of the budget. At least Sharp's differences between himself and Trudeau reduces the question to a matter of etiquette, an analysis which was shared by the Prime Minister's top adviser Ivan Head. It was not the substance of the issue but rather its handling, according to Sharp, which was the main problem.

Sharp would have been satisfied, he claimed in 1973, with 'a certain troop reduction in Europe'. He felt, however, that the very decision to withdraw any troops from Europe should have been cleared with the allies in advance.

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221 Ibid.
222 A. Legault, op. cit.
223 Toronto Star, 3 April 1969.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
On 3 April, in Sharp's view, it would have been sufficient to announce simply that Canada would remain in NATO. Any decision concerning a reduction of forces in Europe should have been postponed until consultations with the allies and not made during NATO's 20th anniversary "[but] Cadieux and I had to go to our allies and say: 'Sorry we did not consult you'".\(^{228}\)

Trudeau, however, according to his External Affairs Minister, believed in 'shock tactics' and this 'for domestic reasons'. Sharp went on to say that the move was taken for purposes of demonstrating change to the Canadian public and as such it "had to be dramatic".\(^{229}\)

An 'Ambiguous' Decision Further Upsets Some Liberals

For some people Trudeau's 3 April Announcement was dramatic indeed, for others it was an anti-climax. The reason for the wide differences in the interpretation was not simply one of conflicting ideology but also because what actually had been decided was anything but clear. The following decisions were announced on 3 April:

The government has rejected any suggestion that Canada assume a non-aligned or neutral role in world affairs. Such an option would have meant the withdrawal by Canada from its present alliances and the termination of all co-operative military arrangements with other states in the interests of Canada's national security and in defence of the values we share with our friends.\(^{230}\)

But at his press conference the same day Trudeau added:

Canadian forces are now committed to NATO until the end of the present year. The Canadian force commitment for deployment with NATO in Europe beyond this period will be discussed with our allies at the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee of NATO in May. The Canadian government intends, in consultation with Canada's allies, to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe.\(^{231}\)

\(^{228}\) Ibid.

\(^{229}\) Ibid.

\(^{230}\) Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 3 April 1969.

\(^{231}\) Transcript of the Prime Minister's Press Conference, Ottawa, 3 April 1969.
Concluding Trudeau stated:

In summary, Canada will continue to be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to co-operate closely with the United States within NORAD and in other ways in defensive arrangements. We shall maintain appropriate defence forces which will be designed to undertake the following roles:

(a) the surveillance of our own territory and coast lines, i.e., the protection of our sovereignty;
(b) the defence of North America in co-operation with the United States forces;
(c) the fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and
(d) the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may, from time to time, assume. ²³²

The first foreign and domestic reaction to the decision was described extensively by J. Granatstein in the Canadian Annual Review. ²³³

What was immediately apparent in the 3 April decision was that the term 'phazed reduction' was very vague, as probably was the intention. It is hardly imaginable, however, that following extensive emotion-laden deliberations, both sides in Cabinet would have been satisfied with a formulation which could mean the withdrawal of either a handful of troops or all but such a handful. Politically it would have been impossible for the Trudeau Government to start again in Cabinet, Caucus, Parliament and public the tense conflict over Canada's military commitment in Europe - this time concerning the exact number of Canadians overseas. Thus it is likely that an informal agreement had been reached in Cabinet over any probable range of the projected force reduction.

Even without reopening the entire issue the Government had enough problems contending with dissatisfaction within Liberal

²³² *Ibid.* From this and only this Granatstein and others concluded that Trudeau in his 'list of priorities' had placed NATO "in third place behind the protection of Canadian sovereignty and the defence of North America". See J. Granatstein, *op. cit.*, p.234.

Party ranks. The prolonged gestation of the decision-making process which had already made the Opposition furious, albeit only in the plenum, was not without an impact of the Liberal's Party backbench. Pro-NATO backbenchers had been disturbed by rumours that the departure of the Postmaster-General for a vacation in the West Indies marked a victory for the anti-NATO position which was only awaiting final drafting. Norman Cafik remembered that he had expected 'the worst' and that he had made contacts with likeminded colleagues. The party would have split had the Government quit NATO or pulled all our troops out of Europe. But things were bad enough for the Liberals as they stood. When the Toronto Star reported that Trudeau and a sizeable segment of Cabinet had favoured withdrawal rather than a force reduction and when rumours spread that the Prime Minister had deliberately muddled the water to retain the support of pro-NATO ministers like Sharp and Cadieux, Cafik was ready "to organize a backbench revolt. I didn't do it in the end because I heard Sharp saying that he was 'very happy' with the Government's decision - and I trusted his judgment".

Furthermore, in the first Caucus meeting following the 3 April decision, Cafik, according to his own account, made quite clear to the Prime Minister how strong the sentiment in Caucus was for the retention of a substantial military commitment in Europe. Cafik indicated that a total withdrawal from Europe would result in 'a revolution' within the party. "This was probably the first time that the Prime Minister was

236 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
aware of the strength of our feeling", Cafik commented later. "It's one thing to see it in Hansard, it's one thing to see it in the paper, but it's another thing to see it in the members' eyes". Cafik admitted, however, that had it come to a Party split only 'a few' would have actually left the Party. Another Caucus member who felt strongly about the NATO issue was Senator John Aird. Aird was so concerned about the principle involved in a Canadian troop reduction that he phoned the Prime Minister on 4 April to tender his resignation as Chairman of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. The Liberal Senator, who had been extremely successful as the Party's chief fundraiser, told the Toronto Star that he was "in basic disagreement with the government's announced defence policy". What was more important, however, was that he also said that "there were many others" who felt the way he did, in Parliament and in the Government party. It was precisely this impression that key members of the parliamentary External Affairs and Defence Committee had wanted to prevent from spreading. They discounted reports of 'wide discontent' in the Party over the Government's decision. Cafik, however, now in public made it quite clear that some members would only support the Government as long as the troops would not be withdrawn totally and immediately from Europe. Otherwise the decision "would split the Party wide open". On the one hand Cafik thought that Senator Aird's decision "was a little premature, unless he knows more about what the Cabinet has in

240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
242 Toronto Star, 7 April 1969.
243 Corma Brook Western Star, 10 April 1969.
244 Toronto Star, 8 April 1969.
mind than I do"; on the other hand he warned his Government that 'rumblings of discontent' would continue until Cabinet announced what the 3 April decision exactly meant in practice.\textsuperscript{245}

The 19 September Decision: Was It Taken on 3 April?

Cafik's statement indicated that he was unsure whether more was actually decided on 3 April than what had publicly been revealed, but he felt confident that the "real battle was over" and that the fight would then only centre around "not so terribly important details".\textsuperscript{246}

Indeed, that a clearer decision had actually been made on 3 April is suggested by the fact that despite rumblings on the backbench no Cabinet Minister indicated dissatisfaction with the decision. This is further supported by the explicit statements in interviews by two of the leading Cabinet exponents of the conflicting viewpoints - Sharp and Macdonald - that the basic decision had been made on 3 April, although both added that there was still some room to manoeuvre in response to the views of Caucus and the pressure of the allies.\textsuperscript{247}

Exactly how much room for outside influence remained after 3 April is still a matter of dispute which my research has not been able to resolve totally. It was repeatedly pointed out that Ivan Head's report contained a recommendation for a two-thirds reduction of Canadian forces in Europe.\textsuperscript{248} Ivan Head disputed this in an interview.\textsuperscript{249} It has been argued that

\textsuperscript{245} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{246} Interview with N. Cafik, Ottawa, 31 May 1973.

\textsuperscript{247} Interview with M. Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973; Interview with D. Macdonald, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.

\textsuperscript{248} See, for example, B. Thordarson, \textit{op.cit.}; Legault, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{249} Telephone interview with Ivan Head, Ottawa, 14 May 1973.
pressure from the allies and Cadieux's determination to keep as many troops as possible in Europe succeeded in September 1969 in limiting the reduction to one-half.

There is no doubt concerning Leo Cadieux's determination. I would argue against overestimating the influence of the allies' pressure. Not because such pressure was absent but because it was counter productive due to widespread reportage in the press. Moreover, I would suggest that the sharpness of the allies' criticism indicates that the basic decision had been taken in Ottawa prior to any consultation.

For the post-3 April-phase there is an even more radical interpretation, which totally excludes foreign pressure for reasons which are partly different from the above. This view, which was argued by a leading defence official who does not want his identity revealed, asserts that the implementation of the 3 April decision was solely left with Cadieux. Cadieux, however, was limited in turn by the three-year freeze imposed on the defence budget as he revealed in Parliament at the beginning of June 1973.

An alternative explanation to both the above and Cafik's interpretation exists however. The fact that Trudeau and

250 Debates, 8 December 1969, p.1681; B. Thordarson, op.cit.
251 Vancouver Sun, 23 September 1969.
252 See, for example, Ottawa Journal, 27-30 May; J. Granatstein, op.cit., pp.235 and 239; B. Thordarson, op.cit., pp.141-42.
254 Transcript of an address by the Prime Minister to a dinner of the Alberta Liberal Association (normally referred to as "the Calgary speech"), Calgary, 12 April 1969; Toronto Telegram, 30 May 1969; Ottawa Citizen, 30 May 1969.

Many analysts, in my opinion, overestimate the significance of the "Calgary speech" and use it to elaborate Government policy. The Prime Minister's motives after all were unclear and could have reflected a wide range of alternatives continuing to argue the case prior to a final decision, on the one hand, to obfuscating a defeat on the issue, at the other extreme.
Cadieux\textsuperscript{255} continued to make ambiguous statements could indicate that the issue had not yet been finally settled. Furthermore, discontent continued within the ranks of the Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{256} At the beginning of June Liberal Senator Lang announced he would not attend a military committee meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels because he regarded the Government's NATO policy as "childishly petulant, amateurish and, indeed, dangerous".\textsuperscript{257} What made this view particularly significant was that Senator Lang had been the second key Liberal fundraiser and top Party executive to publicly protest against his Government's foreign policy.

Moreover, the Minister for Transport and Housing resigned from Cabinet and rumours spread that this was in part due to his objections to Trudeau's foreign policy.\textsuperscript{258} And later in December 1969 the Liberal backbencher, Perry Ryan, left the Liberal Party - again for foreign policy reasons.\textsuperscript{259}

To what extent these moves indicated a still undecided conflict or to what extent they represented the emotional repercussions of an already made decision could not be conclusively determined. If the latter was the case, it could be explained by the normal political tendency to signal groups on both sides of the issue, both within the Party and the public that their respective positions on balance came out ahead. Moreover, Sharp and Cadieux had an interest in proving to their allied friends how wholeheartedly and successfully they were fighting to uphold Canada's commitment to NATO. In this sense I would partially interpret Cadieux's statement to Parliament in December 1969 in which he declared that the Canadian Government "had modified considerably ... [the] original plan".\textsuperscript{260}

\textsuperscript{255} Montreal Gazette, 24 May 1969.
\textsuperscript{256} Montreal Gazette, 5 June 1969.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{259} Globe and Mail, 5 December 1969.
\textsuperscript{260} Debates, 8 December 1969, p.1681.
More pronounced were the self-congratulatory statements of Trudeau and Sharp concerning the NATO decision-making process. In February 1970 Trudeau indulged indirectly in self-glorification by boasting that the Government's decision was taken against the advice of many including the parliamentary Committee and the public opinion.\textsuperscript{261} In November 1971 Trudeau was still so much infatuated with this line of argument that he repeated and elaborated on it.

\begin{quote}
We went against the advice of the Parliamentary Committee. We went against the advice, I believe, even of the Liberal Party itself. And we went against the Gallup Polls at the time - I'm not sure about the Liberal Party, but certainly the Gallup Polls. We went against public opinion, we did it \ldots.\textsuperscript{262}
\end{quote}

And, Trudeau might have added: "We went against the advice of the responsible Ministers and their departments and against the advice of our allies".

Much later in May 1973 the External Affairs Minister, M. Sharp, retaliated: "Looking back five years I am free to admit that we in the Government were a bit ham-handed in the way we handled the NATO issue but it was fortunate that we made our mistakes early and had time to profit from them". And:

\begin{quote}
In the end we reached a reasonable and acceptable decision to continue in NATO but to reduce the numbers of our troops in Europe.

In retrospect it would have been preferable to have given an early indication of the government's thinking - a sense of direction - and to have avoided the impression of division and inactivity. To put the matter bluntly, we should have reached agreement in Cabinet, at least in principle, before seeking the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{261} Transcript of Question and Answer Period for Programme "Under Attack" recorded at Carleton University, Ottawa, 24 February 1970.

\textsuperscript{262} Transcript of Prime Minister's remarks at meeting with students, Lambton Central Collegiate, Petrolia, Ontario, 10 November 1971, p.14.
reaction of the public. This, I suggest, is basic to our form of responsible government in a parliamentary democracy. 263

When asked directly in an interview whether this 'agreement' had been achieved on 3 April, Sharp answered: "more or less". 264 As already mentioned, NATO opponent and Cabinet member Donald Macdonald was even more specific indicating the affirmative. 265

Concerning the substance of the NATO decision the Canadian Government even to this day is suffering from its repercussions. The question of equipment for the reduced Canadian forces is still undecided; in this the Government failed to follow the advice of the responsible parliamentary Committee which had already argued in 1969, as we have seen, that preparations should be taken in dealing with this question.

Concerning the basic political decision to maintain troops in Europe, however, little can be expected in the foreseeable future. It is ironic that the Trudeau Government now sees a greater link between NATO policy and the problem of foreign trade than it did when the decision was made. Eric Downton from the Far Eastern Economic Review noted that in 1974 Pierre E. Trudeau "... beset by domestic problems of inflation, recession and an election ... made a special effort in Europe. He went on a peace-mending mission to Paris, pushed Canada's case for a more favourable agreement with the European Economic Community and reassured his NATO partners that he had no intention of reducing Canada's contribution to the alliance". 266 And Downton concluded:

263 Statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Notes for an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Press, 2 May 1973, Toronto, p.2.


265 Interview with Donald Macdonald, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.

... Trudeau's well-nigh fruitless visit to Europe ..., a trip intended to obtain more favourable trading terms from the EEC, came as a sharp reminder to Ottawa of how much trade with Japan means to Canada.  

It was also a reminder of the importance, at least economically, of avoiding riding rough shod over allies with long memories.

A year later, again, Trudeau demonstrated that he had learned some diplomatic lessons. In September 1975, when U.S. Secretary of Defence A. Schlesinger requested "a more aggressive [Canadian] role in NATO", the Prime Minister, while avoiding commitments, in Schlesinger's words, reacted "sympathetically".

An Assessment of Influence: A Critique of Thordarson's Argument

It is always difficult to assess influences on a political decision. This NATO decision is no exception. It must first be determined what is the most important aspect of the various decisions relating to NATO. The following should be considered:

1. the decision to alter the status quo;
2. the decision not to become a neutral nation;
3. the decision to remain in NATO;
4. the decision to keep troops in Europe;
5. the vague decision for a planned and phased reduction of Canada's force in Europe;
6. the more concrete decision to reduce the troops by about a half;
7. the decision to give some of the remaining troops different military roles;
8. the decision that defence policy was supposed to flow out of foreign policy;

267 Ibid., p.5.
268 Australian, 18 September 1975.
9. the decision, as some interpreted it, that NATO ranked only third after the protection of Canadian sovereignty and the defence of North America;

10. the decision to freeze for three years the dollar value of the defence budget; and

11. the decision, if indeed there had been an explicit decision, concerning the form in which the above were made known both to the Canadian public and the NATO allies.

The decision or combination of decisions one regards as most significant will necessarily shape one's perception of who exercised the most decisive influence. For example, the decision to keep troops in Europe was probably influenced more by the parliamentary Committee (particularly indirect via Caucus) than by the otherwise powerful and dominating Trudeau. In contrast, the decision not to maintain the status quo can be clearly attributed to the Prime Minister himself. The decision that defence policy should flow from foreign policy and the presumptive decision that NATO only ranks third in Canada's priorities could also be attributed to the academically-minded Trudeau.

Here special attention must be given to the work of Bruce Thordarson, who in his path-breaking work has consistently overestimated the role of the Prime Minister. Thordarson's investigation has hitherto been the definitive study on the NATO decision and as a result any subsequent effort must take his arguments into careful account. Closely linked to Thordarson's overestimation of Trudeau's role is his downplaying of the influence of financial constraints. Even where Thordarson does recognise financial restraints his description of how they work is not bolstered by adequate data.

There is no evidence whatsoever that the "most significant part of the 3 April statement was the announcement of the Government's new defence priorities, based on the concentric-circle principle that money would be provided for low-priority
activities only after those of high priority had been adequately financed". 269 At least not in the sense implied by Thordarson that funds for the fulfilment of the NATO commitments would only be granted if the surveillance of the Canadian territory and the defence of North America had been 'adequately' financed. Thordarson himself declines to footnote his assertions linking Trudeau's theoretical rationalisations concerning foreign and defence policy with concrete budgetary policy. 270

In general, Thordarson's approach which focuses on Trudeau's perceptions and beliefs grossly overstates the importance of the Prime Minister. 271 This critique still stands although Thordarson calls the NATO decision a 'compromise' and although he mentions other factors - for example, the influence of the parliamentary External Affairs and Defence Committee via Caucus. Thordarson's overestimation of Trudeau's role in the NATO decision is furthermore underlined by his failure to point out that a total military withdrawal from Europe would have been a more faithful reflection of Trudeau's idiosyncrasies, perceptions, philosophical beliefs or images if these indeed had been so dominant in the decision.

This concentration on Trudeau's beliefs, in my opinion, leads to Thordarson's major mistake - his underestimation of economic factors. Thordarson notes: "If financial considerations played an important role in the Government's decision, it was not apparent from the Prime Minister's comments". 272 Even if true, the mere failure of Trudeau to cite

269 B. Thordarson, op.cit., p.139.

270 Ironically, although Thordarson generally neglects economic factors, here he seizes upon financial priorities without providing any supporting evidence.

271 In this regard Thordarson is heavily influenced by the theoretical framework of Brecher, Stein and Steinberg, a framework which he used only in a rudimentary fashion. For a systematic critique of the Brecher framework see: G. Patz, Brecher and Beyond, paper presented to the Department of International Relations, A.N.U., Canberra, March 1975.

272 B. Thordarson, op.cit., p.146.
financial reasons would hardly be evidence of their absence. In any case Trudeau does mention financial considerations. Admittedly the Prime Minister never cites budget figures publicly as the dominating factor but, as we have seen, he does note repeatedly that since the founding of NATO Europe's financial condition had considerably strengthened while Canada's had considerably declined.

Sometimes Thordarson himself does not totally overlook economic and budgetary considerations. When he does, however, these are generally counter-balanced by opposing interpretations which are usually dominant. For example, Thordarson states:

One thing is clear, however, the Government did decide to freeze the dollar value of the Canadian defence budget for at least the next few years and those who shaped Canada's defence policy would have to keep this limitation very much in mind.273

But Thordarson then distinguishes between 'in the short run' and 'in the long run', arguing that in the short run financial considerations hardly played any role. Thordarson's definition of the long run, however, where he does admit some influence for financial considerations, is only for a period of three years up to 1972274 - that is the period which was the object of debate in 1968-69.

A similar method of argumentation on a critical point is used by Thordarson in a footnote when he admits that "financial considerations dictated some of the tactical changes associated with the new defence posture".275 But then he concludes:

Once Canada's main national interest was defined as 'national identity and independence' rather than peace and security, it was inevitable that NATO would be accorded a lower priority in Canada's defence policy than formerly. It was this new 'philosophy of defence' (to use Mr Trudeau's expression of 3 April),

273 B. Thordarson, op. cit., p.146.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid.
not financial considerations, that determined the money that would be made available for Canada's various military roles and the priorities given to them.\footnote{Ibid.}

This view, however, ignores the fact that about 400 million dollars over the next few years were at issue and every politician involved in the decision was well aware of this. This is not to argue that Canada would have been incapable of financing an increased defence budget if it had been referred as absolutely essential nor is it to deny that perceptions of the international situation in the era of detente were a strong factor working not only against an increase in defence spending but also against the \textit{status quo} concerning Canada's commitments. This factor is particularly influential in Canada where the general idealism towards foreign policy militates against defence spending. Nevertheless there are a number of reasons why financial constraints were especially important.

At the most general level, budgetary considerations lie at the heart of politics in Western democracies; specifically in Canada, at a time of shrinking resources, defence spending had to be seen in terms of alternative spending on domestic programmes, and politicians feared an electoral backlash if domestic needs were not met. Moreover, from the point of view of individual Cabinet members dramatically increased defence spending, or even increases at the same rate as domestic spending, potentially could have come at the expense of the departments of any minister and therefore at the expense of the minister's power.

Finally, as Trudeau himself noted, Canada's peculiar strategic relationship to the US which virtually guaranteed American defence of her northern neighbour considerably eased security problems and thereby increased the leverage of domestic claimants on the Canadian treasury. Thus even granted that Trudeau's philosophically-based desire for a change on Canada's foreign policy played a significant role, financial
considerations - and also the strategic facts of life - were a major factor in convincing some NATO supporters of the necessity for reaching a compromise with the Prime Minister. Trudeau, for his part, had his philosophical biases reinforced by the financial situation, but he too was forced to compromise - in his case because of a threat of a Cabinet and/or party split.

To argue that Trudeau's role was the decisive factor would require a scenario whereby the Prime Minister all along sought only a withdrawal of one half of Canada's forces from Europe, but in order to achieve this he deliberately 'stimulated' public and party debate by making it appear he favoured total withdrawal. This would have meant not only that Trudeau had conned friends and opponents alike but that he was one of the most successful strategists in the history of Western parliamentary democracies.

Even Thordarson argues that the NATO decision was a compromise undertaken to prevent the fragmentation of Cabinet and party. I would argue that the parliamentary Committee directly and indirectly participated in this compromise.

As Thordarson himself states this influence was primarily exercised via Caucus. In addition, the Committee exercised direct influence by articulating the overwhelming opinion in Parliament that no drastic change of policy was tolerable. It seems unlikely that, after extensive debate had produced a bipartisan consensus in the Committee, Cabinet could totally ignore such a relatively rare consensus. It is undeniable, however, that the indirect role was more significant. Committee members were naturally more familiar with the substance of the issue than other Caucus members and, indeed, than most Cabinet members.

Furthermore, Committee members had particular confidence in their own opinions due to their exposure to the views of

277 B. Thordarson, op. cit., p.150.

278 Representing Parliament.
allied parliamentarians, governments and bureaucracies. This certitude on the part of Committee members undoubtedly influenced wavering Caucus members, as well as other politicians, who were impressed with the authoritative knowledge of the Committee members - the possession of *Herrschaftswissen* which is normally confined to the Government.

Thordarson came to the conclusion that the parliamentary Committee's influence was greater than that of the responsible Government departments, External Affairs and Defence. This is correct, but it does not take into account that, as we have seen, the Committee's views had been heavily influenced by External Affairs and Defence officials. While 15 of 18 politicians interviewed believed that the Committee's influence was overwhelmingly decisive in preventing Trudeau from obtaining more radical measures, three - Ministers Sharp, Macdonald and Trudeau's top adviser Ivan Head - disagreed, but for different reasons. The results of these interviews are supported by Bruce Thordarson who cited a Cabinet member saying that the parliamentary Committee's report tipped in Cabinet "the balance slightly in favour of staying".279 The readiness of some members of Caucus to leave the Liberal Party if a decision to withdraw all troops from Europe had been taken, does seem to have placed definite limits to the options of Cabinet.

The influence of the parliamentary Committee, therefore, did not consist of obtaining Government approval of a Committee report but rather of the determination of Liberal members to prevent a more radical Government decision.

It is not surprising, however, in this case study that the parliamentary Committee exerted some influence. Once the Prime Minister had made it clear that he rejected the advice of External Affairs and Defence, the Prime Minister sought out other advice which he hoped would be more congruent with his preconceptions. Trudeau succeeded with Ivan Head's report but

not with that of the parliamentary Committee. Once the Committee's opinion had been formulated, however, the Prime Minister could not totally neutralise its effect. 280

It is thus more surprising that the Committee did not have even greater influence. Thordarson's short description of the Caucus discussion indicates that "the great weight of opinion in the party was in favour of continuing a strong relationship with NATO". 281 On the one hand this is confirmed by interviews with several Caucus members; on the other hand these interviews revealed that there was some pressure for withdrawal not only from Europe but from NORAD and NATO as well. Furthermore one must recall that Wahn's tactics in producing the report had the actual effect of making the report more conservative than some Liberal members might have wished.

The Chairman's behaviour not only had the effect of unwittingly strengthening the position of NATO supporters however. Within the influential Ontario Liberal branch Wahn was more skilful. Moreover, because of his excellent contacts within the press corps Wahn obtained wide publicity for his views. It is also possible that Wahn's 'confidential and personal' letter to the Prime Minister, whether or not it was discussed in Cabinet, might have limited the impact of the Committee's report, at least with Trudeau.

In conclusion, one can say that from the outset the Committee's potential to influence the decision was quite great, but the fact that the Committee's Chairman was actively opposing the Committee report to a certain extent undermined the Committee's impact.

280 Lest one think that the Committee can have influence only when either External Affairs is weak or the opinions of External Affairs and the Committee coincide I will later argue that under certain circumstances the Committee has a potentially independent influence.

281 B. Thordarson, op. cit., p.151.
Generally, it is accepted that the Committee prevented the total withdrawal from Europe. One has to keep in mind, however, that a strong group in Cabinet also would not have accepted such a withdrawal. In my view, one pays just tribute to Trudeau's tactical skills and his determination by noting that only the combination of a majority of Caucus and a part of Cabinet prevented an even more extensive military withdrawal from Europe.

Paradoxically, the Committee's influence may have been limited precisely because it dealt so extensively with the NATO review. The Prime Minister, by pointing to the thoroughness of the Committee's work, was able to delay the decision when in fact the substance of all other reports clearly favoured the commitment in Europe. Neither Donald Macdonald nor Ivan Head had at that stage even started their report. This generally overlooked factor of timing proved extremely significant. Trudeau could conceivably have found other pretexts for delaying the decision but the Committee's work certainly provided a convenient and effective excuse.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated the parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs was an important factor in shaping the eventual decisions taken by the Canadian Government on NATO in 1969. This does not mean, however, that the Committee functioned as an independent actor isolated from other political forces. Indeed, somewhat similar to the case of the Jaksch-Report, various actors outside the Committee attempted to use it for their own advantage. Thus the Opposition sought reference of the NATO question to the Committee in order to enhance its ability to affect policy. Similarly, when there were divisions within Cabinet, Ministers Sharp and Cadieux used the Committee as a platform to articulate their pro-NATO views. This did not mean, however, undifferentiated support for the Committee as an institution; subsequently when all other signs indicated support for his position Cadieux was quite willing to bypass the Committee.
Trudeau in contrast, who had demonstrated little sympathy for the role of Parliament in decision-making, suddenly discovered the virtue of waiting for the Committee's report — practically declaring the parliamentary report as of greater significance than a NATO meeting — when it suited his purpose to delay a decision. A final indication of the importance attached to the Committee by outsiders was the role of Cadieux's parliamentary secretary and possibly that of John Halstead, Head of External Affairs, European Division, in drafting the final Committee report.

With the adoption of the report by an overwhelming majority of the Committee, the Committee became a force in its own right. By presenting a clear position with a broad basis of support the Committee presented evidence of a strong political configuration in favour of the NATO status quo much as the Jaksch-Report had manifested evidence of political backing for flexibility towards the East. There was a critical difference, however. While the Jaksch-Report served to diffuse the Eastern question politically, thus allowing new diplomatic initiatives, the Standing Committee's Report clashed head on with the strong predispositions of the Prime Minister. Thus the Committee served to mobilise political forces inhibiting Trudeau from attempting a total military withdrawal from Europe. In mobilising political support the key arena was Caucus. Here the political weight of the Committee's position was enhanced not only by the near unanimity of the report but also by expertise and self-assurance which the Committee members had gained during the course of their deliberations.

What factors contributed to the NATO decisions?

As we have seen one parameter was set by the mood of Caucus and the danger of party defections if more drastic changes in Canada's NATO policy had been implemented. This attitude in turn was bolstered by the international environment; particularly that following the invasion of the CSSR in August 1968. In addition, the Committee members were impressed with the views expressed by Canada's NATO allies, especially during their fact-
finding mission in Europe. These considerations, it should be noted, also affected key members of Cabinet - most notably Cadieux and possibly Sharp. Thus the constraint on Trudeau was not simply possible defections within Caucus but also within Cabinet.

While the above considerations served to limit changes in NATO policy two forces can be identified which militated against maintenance of the status quo. First, the strong commitment of the Prime Minister to change; and secondly, financial pressures which argued for reductions in Canadian defence spending in Europe.

Given the weight attached to the Committee's role in the above analyses, it is appropriate to ask what factors apart from the implicit threat of defections within the Liberal Party contributed to the Committee's influence. First, the recent commitment of the Government to enhance the role of parliamentary committees created both a need for responsiveness on the part of the Government and an assertiveness on the part of Committee members. Moreover, the Committee was bolstered by the creation in 1968 of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade which provided the Committee members with information and advice. The role of the Centre was demonstrated by the involvement of the Director, Peter Dobell, in the drafting of the Committee Report. The significance of the Centre was further demonstrated by the enthusiasm and interest with which the Committee members utilised the resources made available to them. In contrast to the Australian case where a lack of interest on the part of most Committee members was striking in this case the intense commitment of the Committee members, especially in Caucus, clearly enhanced their impact on the decision. This impact was all the more striking because the Committee members lacked high-ranking positions in their respective party hierarchies.

As in all previous cases where significant Committee influence was exerted here too a high degree of consensus was developed within the Committee. How did this pro-NATO consensus come about?
This is a particularly interesting question when we realise that initially there was a contrary view shared by leaders of both Government and Opposition that some changes in Canada's NATO role were acceptable. While following the CSSR crisis and persistent provocative remarks by Trudeau this shared view was fractured on the floor of the House, within the Committee a non-partisan atmosphere prevailed. Several reasons can be given for this atmosphere conducive to integrative politics. First, there were no major electoral benefits perceived in the issue. Not only had foreign policy played a minor role in the recent Federal election but new Federal elections were years away. In contrast to the floor of the House where Trudeau's posture virtually forced Opposition attacks, within the Committee the strongest proponent of the anti-NATO position, Committee Chairman Wahn, acted according to the norms of integrative politics in his various unsuccessful attempts to build a consensus for his view. Second, in contrast to the atmosphere on the floor of the House there had been created a sense of special responsibility in the foreign affairs sphere which stood above partisanship. This non-partisan attitude was partially inculcated by the activities of Dobell's Parliamentary Centre, partially by the exceptional working conditions of the Committee, such as the trip to Europe, and partially by the sense of self-importance engendered by the nearly luxurious environment afforded Canadian Members of Parliament. Finally, a crucial support for non-partisanship within the Committee is the larger context of Canadian politics where the major parties are rarely polarised on philosophical issues.
CHAPTER SIX

INFLUENCE WITHOUT POLITICAL POWER:

THE CANADIAN SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

AND THE WEST INDIAN SUGAR REBATE

In January 1970 the Canadian Government decided to rescind the sugar rebate which it had undertaken to pay the West Indian Governments at the Commonwealth-Caribbean Conference in 1966. Within six months Canada backtracked from this position and announced that the rebate would be paid for 1970. In December the Canadian Government retreated even further from this decision and extended the rebate for an additional calendar year. What accounts for this dramatic turnabout?

Many participants in, and close observers of, the decisions have concluded that the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee was as influential in the matter as any Canadian parliamentary Committee had ever been in foreign policy. What is particularly striking is that the influence of the Senate Committee in this case was even more clear-cut than that of the Commons Committee in the NATO decisions. While the Senate Committee shared with the Commons Committee the right to investigate any issue of their choosing and make recommendations to the Government, in political terms the Senate body would be expected to be far weaker. The fundamental reason for this is that the Senate consisted of members appointed by the Government for terms up to the age of 75. As these members were not periodically answerable to the

1 Ottawa Citizen, 6 October 1970; Interview with the Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.

2 'Canadian Government Proposal on Sugar', Annex 'B' in: Canada, Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference, Ottawa, 6-8 July, p.119; see also: 'Report by the Chairman of the Trade Committee', Annex 'A' in: Canada, Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference, Ottawa, 6-8 July 1966, p.115. (Hereafter all sources used in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, refer to Canadian sources.)

people and their party, a strong tradition of a non-assertive Senate developed in Canada. Thus the centre of parliamentary politics was in the elected House of Commons while by convention the Senate's role was, with rare exceptions, limited to one of discussion and minor amendments to legislation. If this situation applied to domestic policy then it is even more surprising that a parliamentary Committee could play a critical role in reversing foreign policy which in theory is the sole prerogative of the Government.

Canadian-West Indian Relations, 1966-1970: Problems, Promises and Frustrations

In 1966 an effort was made to overcome some major problems in Canadian-West Indian relations - most notably that of sugar. The 1966 Conference between the leaders of 13 Caribbean countries and Canada as well as the Minister of Natural Resources and Trade of British Honduras established a trade committee which had paid "considerable attention to the problems faced by the Commonwealth Caribbean sugar producers in their sales of sugar to Canada". The Canadian Government subsequently adopted the report by the Chairman of that Committee and made it the basis for a unilateral proposal on sugar. The Government unilaterally suggested abolishing 29¢ per cwt. tariff for a quantity of raw sugar equal to the average of imports over the previous five years. Furthermore the Canadian Government promised to use its influence with Canadian sugar refiners to see that the amount of the tariff free quota would in fact be taken up.

4 Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyane, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago.


For technical and legal reasons in 1967 the proposal was altered to retain the 29¢ tariff but to rebate the amount collected to the West Indian Governments. The West Indian Governments, however, while appreciating the Canadian gesture of effectively removing the tariff impediment, did not regard this as adequate. The Jamaican Prime Minister, J.L. Shearer, after lengthy talks with Canadian officials, including Prime Minister Lester Pearson, Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp and Industry Minister C.M. Drury, told a press conference in Ottawa in August 1967 that Canada paid $6 million less a year for Jamaican sugar than it costs to produce. In order to offset the situation created by the extremely low world sugar price in 1966-67 the West Indian Governments made two additional requests:

1. Canadian support for West Indian demands for a new international sugar agreement;

2. A doubling of the price which Canada paid for raw sugar to 4 cents a pound.

The Pearson Government promised to fully support the West Indian demand concerning the International Sugar Agreement and, failing such an agreement, it would seek satisfactory bilateral arrangements concerning better sugar prices.

A year earlier, in November 1966, Jamaica had complained that Canada was buying sugar from the West Indies at depressed world market prices while at the same time increasing prices on export goods, such as salted codfish, which is the favourite dish among West Indian lower classes.

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7 Globe and Mail, 3 August 1967.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ottawa Citizen, 6 September 1968.
And a year later, after the new Trudeau Cabinet had come to power, the Jamaican Prime Minister again visited Ottawa and again urged Canada to buy more sugar at better prices. Again after lengthy talks with the new Prime Minister and several Ministers, both sides agreed that Canada as well as the West Indies would press for an international price agreement when the sugar talks would resume at the end of September in Geneva. The Trudeau Government assured the Jamaican Prime Minister that it stood behind the Pearson promise and again promised a bilateral improvement of prices in case no international agreement could be reached. This time, however, Jamaican Prime Minister Shearer was not content with Government promises and forcefully spoke out in public causing the Globe and Mail to comment that the Jamaican leader was "unusually outspoken and blunt ... for a visiting head of government". Shearer warned that Canada's failure to improve prices had a ruinous effect on Jamaica's economy and that this might in future endanger the relations between the two countries.

A week later, Barbados' Prime Minister, Evrol W. Barraw, took the unusual step of criticising Canada while on an official visit to a third country, the United States of America. Canada was 'taking unfair advantage' of his country in the purchase of raw sugar under the Commonwealth preference agreement, whereas the Americans were paying a higher price for sugar than the world price: "Our real problem is Canada". Asked what Barbados was going to do about that situation he laughed and said: "We're arguing".

Another year later, in November 1969, the situation concerning West Indian sugar exports had not improved significantly. Admittedly, an International Sugar Agreement,
for which Canada had worked, had been signed in Geneva in October 1968, and in addition there were Commonwealth trading preferences and tariff rebates, but Canada still paid only $3.60 Canadian per hundred pounds of raw sugar, compared to $5.45 Canadian by Britain and even $7.80 by the US.\textsuperscript{17}

Subsequently, External Affairs Minister Sharp admitted to the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee that progress in the sugar question was considerably less than many had hoped during the Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference three years previously.\textsuperscript{18}

From the above it is clear that sugar was a major stumbling block in Canadian-West Indian relations and that it was one of the key reasons for which the Senate Committee launched an investigation into those relations.\textsuperscript{19} This investigation was launched in 1969 before sugar became an obvious issue of dispute, but by 1970 events had conspired to place the rebate question at the centre of Canadian-West Indian relations. As a result the Committee's deliberations began to focus on sugar but they still maintained a concern with a variety of other problems such as tariff, trade and investment. This type of problem was common to relations between developed and developing countries but in Canada's case it gained a particular poignancy because of the country's self-image concerning foreign relations.

Canada's public opinion leaders, particularly academics and journalists, but also parliamentarians of all parties in both Houses, accepted the proposition that foreign aid could and should deal effectively with the problems of developing countries. These people were also sensitive to charges of colonial and racist attitudes in dealings with such countries.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Globe and Mail}, 24 November 1969.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Globe and Mail}, 20 November 1969.

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Senator Gros\textsuperscript{2}art, Ottawa, 22 May 1973; Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.

\textsuperscript{20} This impression is based on a reading of articles by academics and journalists as well as the Minutes of the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee. See for example the articles and newspapers cited in the following pages.
This sensitivity was heightened when anti-Canadian demonstrations and violence broke out in the West Indies. The press gave considerable attention to both developments, thus publicising the Canadian-West Indian problems and indirectly pressuring the Government for action.

Joint plans for a Canadian/Caribbean shipping line which had been suggested at the 1966 Conference had not gone further than the first report stage. West Indian complaints that Canadian aid projects took too long to be implemented and that communications between the West Indian Governments and the Canadian Government were too complicated began to appear in the press. West Indian requests for projects for example had to be sent via the Canadian trade consulate in Port of Spain - an office that had not been set up to handle such matters and which consequently had no executive authority - acting purely as a post-office. Thus Ottawa repeatedly asked questions concerning planned projects which could easily have been answered if there had been experts stationed in the Islands.

Furthermore, even in the field of education where aid projects were efficiently implemented, the results were often problematical if not counterproductive. West Indians educated in Canada tended to stay there rather than return home, thus contributing to the Islands' 'brain-drain'. William Demas, Trinidad's chief planner, consequently told the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee that stopping that exodus was probably more important than receiving foreign aid.

West Indian requests for tariff cuts and for a greater share in the Canadian market had already been raised in 1967. Furthermore, general problems of Canadian investment in the West

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24 Ottawa Citizen, 26 March 1970.
Indies were highlighted and brought to public attention by the deliberations of the Committee. The profitable bauxite and oil industries were solely controlled by Canadian and American commercial interests, a situation which applied as well for the banks, tourist industry and land development. It was estimated by some academics, for example, that from a dollar's worth of finished aluminium the contribution to the gross domestic product of Guyana and Jamaica was 17¢ whereas the remaining 83¢ went to Canada or the US.26

More generally it became clear that a large portion of profits found their way back to Canada and very little was used for reinvestment in the West Indies. Precisely how much was taken out of the West Indies as profits was never revealed; Senator Gros§art for example claimed the Committee was frustrated for over a year in its efforts to obtain verifiable statistics on the total Canadian investment and the total profits removed. The Committee also heard of gigantic profit margins realised in developing countries such as the West Indies and dealt with complaints of virtual West Indian slavery since the sources of wealth were white and foreign and the sources of labour local, black and cheap.27

The general problems of investment were particularly severe in the fields of tourism and land development. The extent of the problems is indicated by the fact that Canadian tourists and temporary residents imported even their food from North America.

In addition further tensions arose out of the interactions between Canadians and the local population:

1. Patronising and degrading behaviour on the part of Canadians towards West Indians, particularly those hired as cheap domestic labour.

2. Incidents growing out of the development of winter resorts for Canadians - for example, water shortages in mountain villages due to Canadians watering lawns and filling swimming pools.

3. The ramification of 'genital imperialism' resulting from seasonal treks "of white adventurers (not men only) looking for a black experience".28

In short the difference in life styles between the tourists and winter-residents on the one hand and the local people on the other contributed nothing to improve the Canadian/West Indian relationship.29

The anti-white, anti-colonial sentiments engendered by such behaviour were further exacerbated by internal economic problems, particularly bounding birth rates and rising unemployment, inadequate natural resources and trade imbalances.30 These economic problems in turn were intensified by racial problems within West Indian society, i.e. job and social discrimination favouring lighter skinned blacks.31

The racial problem was further complicated by tensions between West Indian blacks in Canada and white Canadian authorities. In 1969 the West Indian students had been involved in a computer-wrecking rampage at Sir George Williams University in Montreal; in March 1970 seven of them were found guilty by a Montreal jury and fined a total of $32,500. This sum was

31 Stuart B. Philpott, op.cit.; James Eayrs, op.cit.
subsequently paid by the Trinidad Government in a successful effort to take the steam out of a series of demonstrations during which three Canadian banks had been fire bombed. The violence had grown out of protests organised by the Black-Power movement not only against Canadian racism, exploitation and foreign ownership but also against the local Government, the church and West Indian social conditions in general.

In particular the Black-Power movement was demanding nationalisation of foreign-owned industry, an objective which ensured wide-spread press coverage in Canada.\(^{32}\) Later in the year cautious steps were undertaken by Commonwealth Caribbean Governments in response to 'popular demand',\(^{33}\) to pursue a policy of quasi-nationalisation of successful foreign businesses which took more out of the West Indies than they put into the local economies.\(^{34}\)

Although the explosiveness was drained from many of these issues within a short period, at least for the Canadians, they nevertheless came to a head at the precise time when the Canadian Government was cancelling the sugar rebate and, moreover, when the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee was embarking on its study on relations to the West Indies.

**The Anatomy of the Sugar Decisions**

Although the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee was examining Canadian/Caribbean relations in 1969, the question of sugar did not figure in initial discussions. This absence was first and foremost the result of the Committee's decision to deal with this subject at the later stage of their deliberations.\(^{35}\) This decision turned out to be convenient because events critical for

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\(^{33}\) Globe and Mail, 5 August 1970.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.; see also Winnipeg Free Press, 27 August 1970.

\(^{35}\) Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
the sugar issue did not develop until 1970. Thus as late as December 1969, when External Affairs Minister Sharp testified before the Committee, this issue was not raised by either the Minister or the Committee. However, the other problems of Canadian/West Indian relations which had been or would be raised by the Committee, although already the subject of some press comment, were to receive much more searching scrutiny once the sugar issue came to a head in 1970. Indeed, nearly all press reports dealing with the problems discussed in the preceding section made specific reference to the Committee's deliberations. Furthermore it is likely that the comprehensive information on these problems of Canadian/Caribbean relations would not have come available to the press in such detail without the Senate Committee's proceedings. Although, as we shall see, the Department of External Affairs held similar views to the Committee on the sugar question it had failed to push those views energetically and successfully until the Senate Committee issued its report. Indeed, it was the sluggish response of External Affairs to the matters raised at the 1966 Commonwealth Caribbean Conference which had significantly contributed to the problems. The Conference undertakings had not been put into effect fully and premonitions that such inaction might even lead to violence in the West Indies were ignored. As a result, several Senators and the Committee's adviser Peter Dobell decided to launch the parliamentary inquiry. This context must be borne in mind when evaluating Foreign Affairs' role in the 1970 decisions and Minister Sharp's account of his actions in Cabinet.


37 Interview with Senator Grosart, Ottawa, 22 May 1973; Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
It was revealed to the public only in October 1970 that the initial decision to cancel the sugar rebate was made in January 1970\textsuperscript{38} "among a 1,000 things"\textsuperscript{39} and caught External Affairs Minister Sharp by surprise.\textsuperscript{40}

Most ministers, probably fearing cuts in their own budgets, agreed that the subsidy should be withdrawn.\textsuperscript{41} "I did protest during that meeting", Sharp commented later on, "but I must admit I wasn't aware of just how explosive the issue would become".\textsuperscript{42} The West Indian Governments, though not consulted before the decision, were informed immediately after it was taken,\textsuperscript{43} and, in the words of Senator Martin, "they raised hell, especially the Jamaicans".\textsuperscript{44} The West Indian Governments not only 'raised hell' within normal inter-Government channels, but once this objection had failed and the Canadian decision had been made public, the West Indians adopted unconventional tactics and indirectly threatened retaliatory action against Canadian investments in the Islands.\textsuperscript{45} Both when Sharp announced the cancellation of the rebate on 17 April 1970 and when he subsequently defended the action in Parliament,\textsuperscript{46} there was no public indication of intra-Governmental differences on this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ottawa \textit{Citizen}, 6 October 1970.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Interview with Senator Paul Martin, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Interview with the Minister for External Affairs M. Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{41} This possibility was mentioned by Senator Paul Martin in an interview, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Interview with the Minister of External Affairs M. Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Ottawa \textit{Citizen}, 6 October 1970.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Interview with Senator Paul Martin, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Ottawa \textit{Journal}, 22 April 1970.
\end{itemize}
question; frictions with the West Indian Governments, however, were revealed to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee only 24 hours after Sharp's April statement.

The April Announcement and Critical Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee

The sugar rebates paid to West Indian Governments amounted to one million Canadian dollars annually and had been in effect for the previous three years. According to Canadian Government plans a five million dollar agricultural development fund would replace the sugar rebate; this fund, however, was little consolation for the Commonwealth Caribbean Governments since the money was to go largely to projects of development and thus to private sources and not to the public treasury. In explaining its decision the Canadian Government argued that the International Sugar Agreement of 1969 had created increased and more stable sugar prices on the world market, thus making the rebate system unnecessary.\(^47\) Sharp, however, not only explained and defended the cancellation of the sugar rebate but denied any link between Canada's policy and the riots which had just broken out in Trinidad. In response to Opposition questions in the House concerning the sugar rebate and the disorders in Trinidad,\(^48\) External Affairs Minister Sharp oversimplified the issue and stated categorically:

... the troubles that are taking place in Trinidad are not related specifically to Canada. There is no evidence of this whatsoever.\(^49\)

The day before, however, Jamaican-born George Eaton, Professor of Economics and Director of the Division of Professional Studies in Atkinson College, York University, testified before the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs: "... At the moment there is stronger resentment and

\(^{47}\) *Globe and Mail*, 23 April 1970.

\(^{48}\) Debates, 22 April 1970, p.6162.

\(^{49}\) *Ibid.*
hostility to Canada as a power than against any other power that I know of in recent years. This is a very recent turn arising out of developments in the sugar industry." Eaton presented to the Committee a resolution passed by the Caribbean Governments a few days earlier which voiced strong disapproval of Canada's action - an action which was taken unilaterally without consultation with the Caribbean Governments. Caribbean reaction so far had not reached the public and particularly the Canadian press. Eaton did not merely publicise the resolution of the West Indian Governments however. He further drew attention to a detailed listing of Canadian investment in the West Indies by the resolution in such a manner as to imply a threat to those investments, thereby guaranteeing all the more publicity in the Canadian press.

Eaton explained the intensity of the West Indian reaction to the cancellation of the sugar rebate in terms of growing resentment over many years concerning the overall Canadian position on sugar. Eaton brought to the attention of the Canadian public that, on the one hand, since the Commonwealth sugar agreement in 1948, the Caribbean producers were obliged to meet a specific Canadian quota for sugar, while on the other hand Canadian sugar importers were never obliged to take up this quota. Indeed, Eaton continued, whenever the world price was relatively high, Canada's sugar importers bought cheaper sugar from South Africa, but they were, however, quite anxious to accept the whole quota whenever the world market price had fallen to very minimal levels - thus forcing the Caribbeans to

50 Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Respecting the Caribbean Area, 21 April 1970, p.11.
sell sugar at prices which did not even cover production cost and preventing the sale of that amount at higher prices to the US.

While Canada could not be blamed for low world sugar prices, nevertheless the Canadian Government did not take measures which had been implemented by other countries to assist the West Indian sugar producers - for example, by creating a central purchasing agency which bought raw sugar at above world market prices in order to further long-term relations with the West Indies. Indeed, not only did Canada not take such measures but also she cancelled, without consultation, the inadequate, in West Indian eyes, rebate arrangements which had existed since 1967.

The Opposition in the House drew on Eaton's testimony before the Committee to attack the Government on two grounds:

1. The cancellation of the sugar rebate occurred without consultation with the West Indian Governments.

2. The West Indian Governments were extremely dissatisfied with Canada's action.

Ironically, the Minister for External Affairs now had to counter the Opposition's attack, although at the beginning of the year


53 Even before Eaton's testimony there was criticism of Government and External Affairs policy with the revelation of a confidential Government report concerning the implications of free trade arrangements with the Commonwealth Caribbean. The report's contents became known when the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee interviewed its author, Roy Mathews of the Private Planning Association of Canada. Although the report came to no clear conclusions it was lukewarm concerning the possible benefits of a tariff revision. (Globe and Mail, 14 March 1970.) The skill of the Committee members in examination, not to mention the weakness of Mathew's argument, can be seen from the fact that Mathews altered his viewpoint during his testimony before the Committee. (Ibid.; see also Ottawa Journal, 6 June 1970.)

it had been him who had used similar arguments in Cabinet to prevent the Minister of Finance from cancelling the rebate system.

The West Indian Visit, the Committee Report, and Subsequent Government Decisions

The visit of representatives from the Commonwealth sugar producing countries, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and Barbados, who held talks with External Affairs Minister Sharp and Trade Minister Pepin, gave the initiative to the Department of External Affairs whose position had been weakened on this issue both because of their inadequate handling of West Indian affairs since 1966 and because the January sugar decision went against the Minister's recommendation. On this occasion the Department proceeded with great care. Their representatives, cautious not to stand in conflict with the Cabinet decision to cancel the rebates declared on 12 May 1970 that the meeting had been for information only and that no decision had been made.

Six weeks after the West Indian visit a new Government decision was made. In the interval the Committee's unanimous report had been issued. To demonstrate the Committee's skill in stating its conclusions and to illuminate some of the reasons for its influence it is appropriate to quote at length from its report.

Serious misunderstandings have recently arisen, due in part to the manner in which the 1966 tariff-rebate assistance scheme for sugar was withdrawn. Full understanding of this step by the sugar-producing countries involved does not appear to have been established. In future, full consultation, on a political level, should precede any major change in Canadian policies involving Caribbean countries.

The agricultural assistance fund, which replaces the rebate scheme, can be of great benefit if it is

55 External Affairs Minister Sharp in an interview, Ottawa, 28 May 1973, agreed with this interpretation, but added that this caution was to be expected in such a situation.

56 Ottawa Citizen, 12 May 1970.
managed on a basis of close co-operation. It is important that there be no net loss of benefit to sugar-producing countries.

Canada should take full account of the dilemma of the sugar-producing countries and recognize the difficulties involved in diversification efforts. Buying Caribbean sugar at prices below the cost of production obviously does not engender good will.57

Under the section dealing with 'Trade' the Committee elaborated on the history of the problem without frontally attacking the Government or directly making demands upon it.

The Committee has devoted considerable attention to the question of sugar imports, which form an important, and often controversial, element in Canada's relations with a number of countries in the Caribbean area. The Canadian programme of tariff-rebates, undertaken after the 1966 Conference, was well received by the governments of the area, although it did not compare with the generosity of British and American subsidies and still meant that Canada was buying Commonwealth Caribbean sugar at a price below the cost of production. For these reasons, the exporting countries filled their other commitments first and never took full advantage of the Canadian tariff-rebate quota.58 The realization of the new International Sugar Agreement in late 1968 resulted in a general price increase beneficial to the Caribbean producers.

The Committee believes that there was probably sound, long-term economic grounds for the recent decision of the Canadian Government to discontinue the rebate scheme and replace it with a direct annual grant of $5 million to an Agricultural Assistance Fund. It remains, then, to ask why the decision was so bitterly protested by the Caribbean governments and 'deprecated' in a resolution passed by the sixth Commonwealth Caribbean Heads of Government Conference in April of this year.

The Committee has concluded that this regrettable misunderstanding resulted from a very serious failure in communication between the Canadian and Caribbean


58 The sugar producers were not required to meet the quota except when explicitly asked to do so.
governments. The Committee believes that more effective consultation and dialogue could have prevented the dispute and its damaging consequences.

The Caribbean governments felt that they were inadequately consulted on the decision and that the new Fund was no substitute for the rebate scheme. They were also apparently concerned by the lack of clear information about the objectives and possible duration of the Fund. The sugar-producing countries, in particular, were alarmed by the fact that the Fund will be under regional rather than national control and that there was no assurance of continuing benefit to the ailing sugar industry.

The Committee hopes that these problems have been resolved in subsequent discussions and that the new Fund will be managed on a basis of close co-operation. In addition to projects aimed at agricultural diversification, the new Fund should extend substantial assistance directly to the sugar industry, which is in a situation comparable in many respects to that of Canadian wheat producers.59

Ten days after the release of the Committee's report a spokesman for the External Affairs Department announced that the Government was ready to reverse the decision to stop the sugar rebates to the Commonwealth Caribbean. This offer was sent to the Council of Ministers of the Caribbean Free Trade Association which was meeting in Guyana.

The Canadian proposal, however, was only to extend the rebates to the end of 1970.60 Furthermore, Canada was to send 'senior Government officials' to the West Indies in order to discuss the whole problem of sugar rebates and the agricultural development fund.61 In September 1970 none other than Senate Leader Paul Martin was the senior official who undertook a goodwill tour through the West Indies. The problem of sugar imports was to be a key topic of discussion on this tour.62

61 Ibid.
Before Senator Martin's visit Robert Lightbourne, Jamaica's Minister of Trade and Industry, announced in Port of Spain that a completely new approach should be worked out between the West Indies and Canada concerning sugar and that until Canada paid the Caribbean sugar producers a fair economic return any cancellation of the sugar rebate system by the Canadian Government would be regarded as "a breach of faith". Concerning the agricultural development fund, which was supposed to have replaced the sugar rebate, Mr Lightbourne argued that they were "two completely separate and distinct matters".

During Senator Martin's visit to the West Indies, the sugar-producing countries reaffirmed their stand on this issue and requested that the Canadian Government again modify its decision and continue paying the rebates for a further year up to the end of 1971.

In December 1970 External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp announced that the Canadian Government had responded positively to the sugar countries' request. He thereby not only satisfied the Caribbean Governments' demands and the wishes of the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee but also re-established in this case his and his Department's role in Cabinet decision-making.

The Decision Evaluated - Assessments of Participant Observers

Most participants who expressed an opinion on the decision shared a common view. Canada's Minister for External Affairs, bureaucrats, parliamentarians and the Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Toronto Telegram, 18 December 1970.
66 Ibid.
unanimously declared that the influence of a parliamentary Committee on foreign policy was never greater than in the decision to reverse the determination of West Indian sugar rebate.

In the words of Minister for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee report had been "of great importance for and had great influence on the Canadian/West Indian relationship". He further noted that concrete Committee suggestions had been adopted by the Government and that these had contributed to an improvement in the relationship to the West Indies. Without the report, he continued, relations with the West Indies might have remained unsatisfactory for a longer period.

Nevertheless, the report was not uniformly influential in all of its aspects. The influence of that section of the report dealing with the problems of sugar imports obviously was very important; it not only affected the Canadian Government's decision but also led to the revision of publicly declared policy. External Affairs Minister Sharp, the Vice-Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator Grospart, and the Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and adviser to the Committee, Peter Dobell, all agreed on this point. Only one major political figure, member of Cabinet and former Minister for External Affairs, Senator Paul Martin, described the Committee's report on the sugar rebate question as 'helpful', rather than 'decisive'.


68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Interview with the Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973; Interview with Senator Grospart, Ottawa, 22 May 1973; Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.

Concerning the Committee report as a whole, however, Senator Martin admitted that nearly all recommendations were subsequently met— for example, the establishment of a High Commission in Barbados and the improvement of governmental machinery dealing with the West Indies in general. Martin further conceded that the report asked for increased aid and that the Government granted this. However, he argued that while nearly everything the Committee wanted to be done was done, this was "because we in Cabinet wanted it to be done and not because the Committee wanted it to be done".

Martin's downplaying of the Committee's role can perhaps be explained by the fact that he, a former Foreign Minister and still member of Cabinet, was convinced that foreign policy was solely the prerogative of the Government, as he himself emphasised in an interview with me. Martin's attitude can be seen, for example, in his failure to inform his Senate colleagues of his planned goodwill tour of the West Indies as a representative of the Canadian Government in October 1970: "I didn't tell the Senate I would go. Of course, that was a matter for the executive".

Another sign of Martin's attitude was the story frequently told in parliamentary circles of his standard response to any questions about foreign policy within Cabinet during his tenure as Minister for External Affairs — "What the hell ...! Do you want to become Minister for External Affairs?"

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72 Ibid.
74 Ibid., pp.23-25.
75 Interview with Senator Paul Martin, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
While the thrust of Martin's position can be viewed in terms of his uncompromising approach to the management of foreign policy, the factual validity of his assertions concerning the limitations of the Committee's influence must be carefully analysed. There is reason to treat the testimony of both Mitchell Sharp and Peter Dobell with some caution as both were interested actors. The External Affairs Minister said that the Committee's report was used regularly within his Department. Peter Dobell went so far as to conclude from this information that the Committee's report was in this decision the "most influential single factor".

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

It is important to place the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee's report in the context of divisions within the Government. The effect of the report was to bolster the eroded position of External Affairs Minister Sharp and his Department. The weakened standing of External Affairs had been due to a variety of factors, not the least was Prime Minister Trudeau's scepticism concerning the Department's performance, particularly in the NATO policy debate, discussed in the previous chapter, and in the sugar question where the Department's advocacy on the sugar rebate had already been overruled, a fact which went unnoted in journalistic and academic comment. But if the Committee's report bolstered the standing of External Affairs, it should also be noted that External Affairs support of the sugar rebate enhanced the impact of the report. It was not simply a case of the Committee influencing or determining Government policy. It was instead a case of a *de facto* alliance between the Committee and a part of the Government which had already adopted a position similar to that of the Senate's Committee.

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80 Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
One must not, however, overestimate the role of External Affairs. It must be emphasised additionally that the Department had been ineffective in dealing both with West Indian matters in general and the sugar issue in particular since 1966.

For all the above reasons it appears that while External Affairs did play an important role in reversing the cancellation of the sugar rebate, it cannot be said to have played the decisive role. Therefore, two other factors remain to be considered: first, the Senate's Committee report and particularly the subtle way in which it was presented; and, second, the vigorous public protest of the West Indian Governments.

This case study has been characterised by the following 'confrontation constellation': on the one side was the majority of Cabinet and especially the Minister of Finance; on the other side was the Minister for External Affairs and his Department, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the West Indian Governments and to a lesser extent the Canadian parliamentary Opposition.

The first group did little to defend the decision to cancel the sugar rebate - in fact, the defence was left to the Minister of External Affairs, who actually had opposed the cancellation. To revise the decision the latter group's primary means were indirect pressure on Cabinet via public opinion. It was precisely the fact that the parliamentary Opposition played only a minor role in the dispute which made it easy for the Department of External Affairs, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and the West Indian Governments to pressure or convince the Canadian Government to reverse its original decision. The abrasive polemic of the West Indian Governments was effectively channelled by the press and the Committee report which brought out the underlying rational justification of this critique. In achieving this reversal the cautious and skilful conclusions of the Committee report played an important role.

How was it then that the Committee was able to play such a significant role?
This was in large measure due to the nature of the topic which the Committee chose to investigate. As Peter Dobell recognised when he, together with Committee members, selected Canadian-West Indian relations, this was an area of some volatility which most likely would require some policy adjustments. At the same time it was not an issue upon which sharp party lines had been drawn, as was witnessed by the relatively restrained comments of the Opposition in Parliament. In this non-divisive atmosphere a Senate Committee of extremely limited political clout could achieve influence by mobilising the resources of expertise, particularly through Dobell's recently formed Parliamentary Centre. Apart from the choice of topic and mobilisation of expertise, the impact of the Committee was enhanced by the unanimous nature of its report. Indeed, of all the cases examined in this thesis, integrative politics are most fully developed in the West Indian sugar rebate case. From start to finish the Committee approached the problem in a constructive, non-partisan manner. This, no doubt, was also made easier by the Committee's lack of power in conventional political terms.
CHAPTER SEVEN

DIVISIVE OPPOSITION TACTICS AND UTILISATION OF THE COMMITTEE BY THE GOVERNMENT: GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE EDC

The previous case studies have all demonstrated the ability of Foreign Affairs Committees to influence in some degree governmental policy. This has ranged from such far-reaching examples of Committee influence as the refusal of the Bundestag Committee to act on the Mundat Forest Treaty to such an indirect and tenuous impact as in the case of Australian Foreign Aid policy. Overall, of the cases examined, it appears that the role of the Committee has been most pronounced in the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus the question naturally arises as to whether Committee influence has unique dimensions in Germany due to such factors as the centrality of foreign policy issues in the politics of the Federal Republic, the particular importance of the question of German re-unification and its ramifications for domestic politics. Furthermore, it could be argued that the experience of the Weimar Republic, the Second World War and the common experience of some socialist and bourgeois politicians in the struggle against fascism might have enhanced the possibilities for integrative politics in the West German context. Finally, others might argue that, despite formal similarities, most notably the principle of ministerial responsibility, the German parliamentary system is substantively different from the Westminster system or its variants in Australia and Canada.

Thus it is particularly appropriate to examine a case in the German context where the Committee not only was unable to influence Government policy but, in fact, was manipulated by the Government for its own ends. This, moreover, will allow us to focus on aspects of the mode of politics adopted - i.e. integrative or divisive politics - which transcend the historical peculiarities of a given system.
The case chosen concerns German foreign policy following the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954.

During the mid-fifties the foreign and security policies of the Federal Republic of Germany focused primarily on the realisation of the European Defence Community (EDC). However, the principal feature of the proposed EDC, the supra-national character of the intended defence community, represented at the same time the major obstacle for speedy ratification by the individual countries. After the EDC treaty had been ratified by the Benelux countries and West Germany, and the Deutschland-Vertrag, too, had been signed in the USA, Great Britain and the Federal Republic, the whole set of agreements depended on agreement by the French Parliament. It was not by chance that the French had hesitated so long. The French Government had believed that they could support the existing draft of the treaty only if EDC's supra-national character was qualified. Therefore, the French began new negotiations with their possible future partners. On 18 August 1954 the countries which had already ratified the treaty sought a compromise with the French in Brussels. On 22 August the conference was terminated without having reached an agreement. On 30 August the French National Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty. Dr Adenauer commented: "This caused an acute crisis throughout the entire Free World".  

On 28 September 1954, following an invitation by the British Government, the six European countries which had intended to form the EDC met with Government representatives of the USA and Canada in order to discuss the new situation which had arisen after the failure of the treaty and to develop alternative possibilities. The results were laid down in the final document of the London Conference which concerned three subjects:

1. the position of the Federal Republic of Germany under international law;

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1 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2228.
2. the European federation on the basis of the Brussels agreement; and

3. the West German defence contribution within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

On the first matter, the USA, Great Britain and France agreed on jointly trying to terminate the occupation of Germany as soon as possible, i.e. cancel the Occupation Statute and abolish the Allied High Commission. Secondly, in order to broaden the Brussels pact, the member countries encouraged West Germany and Italy to adhere to this agreement. The mutual assistance pact was to be extended to the two new member countries. On 5 October 1954 Dr Adenauer commented on this in German Parliament: "This fact, ladies and gentlemen, throws a light on the changed situation like no other incident does". And finally the NATO partners agreed that it was desirable that the Federal Republic of Germany should become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Subsequently all armed forces of the continental member countries of the Brussels Pact were to be placed under the military command of NATO. The size of the German military forces was to be in accord with that projected by the EDC Treaty.

In other words, what had been prevented by the French National Assembly's rejection of the European Defence Community was to be achieved by means of broadening the Brussels Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: the integration of that part of Germany occupied by the Western allies into the western defence system. This was aimed at for two reasons: on the one hand to prevent a resurgence of nationalistic tendencies (or even Communist tendencies) in Germany because of discriminatory treatment by the western victor nations; and on the other hand to use developing West German economic power and possible military potential as a deterrent weapon against communism, without, however, putting West Germany in the position of being able to control her own military potential in an independent manner.

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2 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2231A.
The Positions of Government and Opposition: Priority of Security Policy Versus Precedence of Reunification Policy

On 1 October 1954 the Federal Government announced its new foreign policy line in a cabinet decision:

Consistent with the past course of German foreign policy and with the conviction that only this policy will lead to the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom, the following objectives have been laid down:

1. Continuation of the policy of European unification of all interested countries and in all suitable fields, consultations on military integration with those countries which have already ratified the EDC or are about to ratify it;

2. Restitution of sovereignty;

3. Participation in western defence arrangements without discrimination;

4. Legal agreements on the presence of foreign armed forces in the Federal Republic by means of treaties;

5. Immediate negotiations with the USA and Great Britain.  

The argument that only this policy would lead to the reunification of Germany developed into the central matter in dispute between the Government and the Opposition in Parliament as well as in the Foreign Policy Committee.

On 5 October 1954 the German Lower House opened its 46th session. The only item on the agenda was the hearing of a declaration by the Federal Government on the London Conference. In this declaration the Federal Chancellor, Dr Adenauer, commented on the failure of the European Defence Community:

The fact that our foreign policy was able to withstand a period of heavy blows appears to me to be clear evidence that its basic concepts were correct and still are correct.  

The Social Democratic Opposition firmly rejected the basic concept for the German reunification policy as indicated by the

3 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2228B and C.

4 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2232D.
Federal Chancellor: "Cooperation with our treaty partners will ... also lead to full support by our allies concerning the solution of special German problems, especially our desire for reunification in peace and freedom .... In this community we will be able to pursue our aim of reunification with far greater chances of success".  

Juxtaposed to these ideas was the view presented by the SPD: before ratification of the London agreement the Federal Republic should undertake renewed attempts to arrive at reunification through negotiations with the victor nations. In the Opposition argument, "nobody, especially no one within the German nation, can ... bear the responsibility of refraining from such an attempt before we commit ourselves irrevocably and for a long time to a policy, which is based on the assumption that the division of the world into two blocks, and thus the division of Germany for a long time to come, are unalterable facts". 

The Lack of Basic Concepts in the Opposition Strategy

The balance of power in domestic politics as a possible starting point for social democratic opposition policy

In considering the question of how much importance to attribute to the Foreign Affairs Committee during the conflict between Government and Opposition, we must first look at the domestic political situation at that time. In Parliament the CDU almost held an absolute majority during the summer of 1954. The 'bourgeois' Government coalition included the CDU/CSU, FDP, BHE and DP. Although one coalition partner would have been sufficient for the Christian Democrats to gain an absolute majority, the majority group tried to back up the most important decisions on foreign policy principles with a wide coalition majority. Nationalistically-orientated representatives within

5 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2233D.
6 BT, II.WP, 47 Sitzg., pp.2241D and 2242A.
the three coalition parties gained particular importance with respect to a joint foreign policy, especially as the Social Democratic Opposition presented a nationalistic attitude to the German public.

Controversies over foreign and reunification policy were important factors in the decision of Dr Linus Kather to leave the CDU at the end of June and join the BHE group. Until then Dr Kather had been a regular CDU member of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Lower House. His defection cost the Christian Democrats their absolute majority and also meant a considerable weakening of the CDU/CSU within the coalition Government.

In order to prepare for controversies within the 'bourgeois' camp, CDU representatives urged representative Josef Roesing, a centre politician who so far had not belonged to any party, to join the majority group. By 1 July the Government representatives were successful: Roesing joined the CDU. However, the tension within the coalition not only remained but even increased notably. The tactics of the oppositional Social Democrats seemed to work: BHE and especially FDP stressed the priority of German reunification policy; the FDP incessantly demanded a division of the Federal Chancellor's office and the foreign ministry.  

The First Phase: Opposition Antagonism in the Committee and the Plenum

On 4 September 1954 an interview with Dr Adenauer by the London Times introduced a new crisis into the already tense atmosphere among the coalition parties. In this interview the Federal Chancellor gave the impression that the foundation of a European Defence Community was a higher priority foreign policy goal than reunification. Dr Adenauer declared:

... but of course I raised the strongest objections when he (Mendes-France) demanded, that each partner to the Treaty should have the right to cancel its

7 Die Welt, 9 and 10 September 1954.
membership in the defence community in the case of a reunification of Germany. In my opinion ... this was an invitation to Russia to attempt the reunification of Germany at all costs and thus break up the EDC.  

When the FDP representative Becker demanded an explanation of this remark by the Chancellor in the Foreign Affairs Committee, he was supported by the Social Democratic Opposition. Fierce arguments between Government and Opposition as well as among the coalition parties marked the Committee meeting of 9 September 1954. Again the FDP demanded the division of the Federal Chancellor's office and the foreign ministry as well as the resignation of State Secretary Hallstein who allegedly had failed to inform sufficiently Parliament and the Committee. While members of the BHE and of the Deutsche Partei remained quiet and waited, FDP representative Becker and SPD representative Dr Luetkens tried to force the Federal Chancellor to give an interpretation of his Times interview. A rather vague explanation by Dr Adenauer was interrupted by Herbert Wehner who attacked the entire foreign policy of the Federal Government in scathing terms, thereby causing the coalition members to close ranks.

Only after this antagonistic behaviour by the Opposition did Federal Chancellor Adenauer succeed in closing the discussion by the Committee on points which were controversial within the coalition as well. With a promise to the coalition groups to resolve the impending foreign policy problems in Cabinet, the Federal Chancellor managed to shift the conflict from the Committee to the Government: there it was up to the Chancellor to determine the time and the atmosphere for the discussion and his opponents, restricted by Cabinet discipline and the desire to remain ministers, could not manoeuvre as freely as the more independent members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

8 Cited in: BT, II.WP, 47 Sitzg., p.2240D.

9 Interview Blachstein; Die Welt, 10 September 1954.
Tactical considerations of this nature did not seem to occur to the Social Democratic Opposition at that time: when, on 21 September, the FDP demanded another meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the SPD rejected the motion. The Social Democrats were not interested in a detailed discussion of these matters in the parliamentary Committee, especially not after the BHE had again raised coalition controversies in public only two days before. And indeed, it appeared the SPD had some reason to believe they would gain more politically in keeping the issue out of the Committee and in the public limelight. In the presence of BHE Federal Chairman Oberlaender, the BHE State President of Lower Saxony, von Kessel, declared "the German reunification to be the first and foremost aim". A few days later the FDP representative and State President of Hesse Euler called it a 'scandal' that the leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, von Brentano, had announced reunification was not the most urgent but only one of the most urgent tasks of German politics.

On 27 September, after the failure of the EDC Treaty and immediately before the London Conference, Secretary of State Hallstein granted an interview to the Hamburg paper *Die Welt*. While former governmental declarations had stressed that there was no conceivable alternative concerning the EDC, Professor Hallstein described the situation differently: "For a long time the Federal Government has been prepared for a possible rejection of the EDC. In a small group a total of eleven alternative solutions were developed which turned out to be identical - partly even in the wording - with those plans later presented by the other partners, especially England".

But the SPD still could not resolve to demand the immediate convocation of the Foreign Affairs Committee. SPD representative

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10 *Die Welt*, 22 September 1954.
11 *Die Welt*, 20 September 1954.
12 *Die Welt*, 26 September 1954.
Dr Luetkens pointed towards the possibility that Committee members of the FDP and BHE might join the Opposition and thus possibly provide a means to force Professor Hallstein to resign. However, the SPD party leadership seemed hardly interested in political disputes within the Foreign Affairs Committee. "Wehner said that there [in the Committee] Adenauer would lead us up the garden path", former SPD representative Peter Blachstein recalled.

Again, Opposition policy was not directed at the potentially dissatisfied coalition partners of the Adenauer Government, it was aimed instead at the German public. On 7 October 1954 the Opposition leader Erich Ollenhauer commented in the Lower House on Professor Hallstein's interview: "... it is characteristic of the relationship between Government and Parliament, that even the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee only learn of this astounding activity in the Foreign Ministry through publications by the Secretary of State and there can be no doubt that this method is highly effective in shaking the people's confidence in the reliability of official statements".\(^{15}\)

However, the SPD leadership must have had its doubts as to whether this was really the case: again and again they addressed the German public. During the following plenary debates on reunification and on rearmament Ollenhauer as well as Wehner and Erler appealed to the national conscience of the German people.\(^{16}\)

In this situation, when the entire Government coalition was strongly attacked by the SPD during plenary debates and in press releases, Federal Chancellor Adenauer succeeded in binding at least the majority of each coalition party to his foreign policy.

\(^{14}\) Interview Blachstein.

\(^{15}\) BT, II.WP, 47 Sitzg., p.2241D.

\(^{16}\) See: BT, II.WP, 47, 61, 62, 69, 71 Sitzg.
While the Social Democrats deliberately refrained from using the Foreign Affairs Committee because they regarded it an unsuitable means to reinforce their policy, the Government changed its mind as to what part the Foreign Affairs Committee could play. While the Opposition proved incapable (or unwilling) of using the Committee as a tactical means, the Government parties now used this possibility in a 'classical' way.

At the end of his first speech on the declaration of the Federal Government Opposition leader Erich Ollenhauer put the following motion to the Lower House:

The Federal Government is requested to

1. establish the basis for a common policy in discussions with the three Western Occupying Powers, which is to bring about the reunification of Germany in future four-power conferences; therefore

2. to work for the constitution of a further commission in addition to the special negotiating commissions provided for in the London document to set up common guidelines for the goal stated in No. 4 of the Declaration of the three Western Powers in paragraph V of the document, thus providing for a unified policy; and

3. to influence the Western Occupying Powers to take up negotiations with the Soviet Occupying Power as soon as possible on the reunification of Germany in freedom and the integration of Germany into a European security system within the United Nations; furthermore

4. in the treaties which are provided for in (the effectuation of) the final document of the London Conference, the Federal Government is to consent only to those liabilities and commitments which agree with its basic duty to fulfil its most important obligation: to bring about by peaceful means the reunification of Germany in freedom.17

During the plenary debate the Government used the following tactics:

1. no roll call voting on the SPD motion;

17 BT, II.WP, 47 Sitzg.
2. referral of the Opposition motion to the Foreign Affairs Committee;

3. CDU/CSU, FDP, GB/BHE and DP offer an alternative motion.

Roll call voting on the SPD motion would have made apparent the disunity within the Government coalition. As several representatives of the coalition parties had already publicly advocated the pre-eminence of German reunification, they either would have had to oppose the Government or would have had to do an about face within a very short period of time.

The minutes of the debate on voting procedures which are quoted in detail below elucidate the possibilities (and readiness) of the Government parties to withdraw unwanted plenary motions from political discussion without obligatory voting by means of referring them to the appropriate committee. Vice President of the Lower House, Dr Jaeger (CSU):

There are two motions: the motion by the SPD parliamentary group on document 863 and the motion by the parliamentary groups of the Government coalition on document 864. I proceed to vote on the motions in succession as they have been handed in, first of the motion by the parliamentary group SPD on document 863. (Rep. Dr von Brentano: Referral!) On this motion roll call voting has been proposed. (Opposition from Government MPs) May I ask you to let me finish. I know exactly how to handle this. The motion for roll call voting has sufficient support. However, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group has moved for referral to the Committee. This motion for referral has priority over the factual motion. No roll call voting has been proposed for this motion and would not have been possible anyway according to paragraph 58, letter g of the standing orders. I ask you to vote on the motion by the CDU/CSU to refer the motion by the SPD parliamentary group on document 863 to the Committee. (Call from the SPD: To avoid the issue! - Rep. Dr Gerstenmaier: To refer to the Foreign Affairs Committee!) The Committee on Foreign Affairs. Those who agree to the motion for referral to the Committee, please raise your hand. - Check-test please. - Abstentions? - The ayes are the majority; the motion is referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I proceed to the motion by the parliamentary groups of
the CDU/CSU, FDP, GB/BHE and DP on document 864. Those who agree to the motion, please raise your hand. - Check-test please. - Abstentions? - It has been accepted by the majority against the numbers of the Opposition.\textsuperscript{18}

Second Phase: Adaptations in the Behaviour of the Opposition Within the Foreign Affairs Committee

While prior to the decisions of the London Conference in late September the polemical nature of Committee deliberations had served to unify the Government members and thus facilitate the Government's ability to control Committee proceedings, a new situation arose subsequently. The London Conference had in effect presented the Opposition with a \textit{fait accompli}. In these circumstances the Government majority in the Committee made some conciliatory gestures towards the Opposition which in no way altered the substance of policy. These gestures, which are detailed below, had the effect of both appeasing Government Committee members who felt uneasy with the official policy and it avoided provoking the Opposition. Indeed, this strategy was so successful that the Opposition not only raised no objections within the Committee to the Committee report, but the full House subsequently agreed to the report with only a scattering of abstentions.

On 7 October, the Government and all other parties in the Foreign Affairs Committee "basically agreed on the request in figure 1 of the (SPD) motion. The debate also removed difference of opinion on the nature and tasks of the desired commission".\textsuperscript{19} During this meeting, representatives of the Foreign Affairs Department confronted Social Democratic Opposition representatives with the exact political tasks of the commissions which had been formed in order to carry through the Paris conference. Additionally it became obvious that the Social Democratic

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p.2320B and C.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Schriftlicher Bericht des Ausschusses fuer auswaertige Angelegenheiten ueber den Antrag der SPD betreffend Londoner Abkommen und Aussenpolitik der Bundesregierung in BT, II.WP, 61 Sitzg., Anlage 1.}
request for a 'reunification commission' was already an illusion because of the time factor. Furthermore, the representative of the Foreign Affairs Department argued that the Western victor nations felt no inclination to form this additional commission. That part of the SPD motion, which the Opposition had argued in public, was declared removed from reality and unpracticable. The parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee report passes over this point without actually commenting on it.\(^{20}\)

When the Foreign Affairs Committee met for a second time on 9 November the Paris Conference had already ended; because of lack of time the aim of the motion could not be attained. What the SPD did accomplish in the Foreign Affairs Committee, was a vague (and possibly ironic) appreciation of the significance of their motion. In the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee the Government majority generously conceded: "This formal fate of the motion, however, does not imply anything regarding the significance and value of the political questions contained in it."\(^{21}\)

During the 62nd sitting of the German Lower House the SPD motion discussed above had been termed 'without substance'\(^{22}\) with no adverse vote and only a few abstentions. Already at this time the Social Democrats had to accept the following sentence in the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee which criticised their former tactics: "There also arose the generally accepted necessity of not referring to the three Western Occupying Powers throughout the motion, but to specify clearly that this joint task and all preparatory steps were the responsibility of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany".\(^{23}\) With

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) BT, II.WP, 62 Sitzg., p.3258C.

this report of the Foreign Affairs Committee the Federal Government also succeeded in making the Social Democratic Opposition publicly admit that they had carried their 'nationalistic bravado' too far.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

This case study illustrates the Social Democratic Opposition's lack of a tactical plan during the parliamentary debates as well as in discussions of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The antagonistic behaviour of the Opposition during the first phase could not be maintained consistently by the SPD in the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Government and especially the Federal Chancellor, Dr Adenauer, had always been aware of the dangers but also of the possibilities for foreign and defence policy, which the role of the parliamentary Committee contained. The tactical behaviour of the Government proved to be correspondingly flexible. If Committee discussions became embarrassing for the Government parties and dangerous for the coalition unity, the significance of the Committee would be played down and the level of decision was transferred to Cabinet. But if it appeared to be possible to point out weaknesses in the Opposition's stance, the Government tried to back up and increase the significance of the Committee and use the results of the Committee's work for its own ends: As a working body with a limited and fixed number of members this institution proved to be a most suitable means for the Federal Government to urge a mainly polemical Opposition to co-operate.

In conclusion we can say: the Government and Opposition held diametrically opposed views on the basic concept of West German foreign policy. In the Foreign Affairs Committee the situation was temporarily slightly different: A few FDP and BHE representatives seemed to waver and hold views on foreign policy which could be placed somewhere in between the positions

of Government and Opposition. The Social Democrats' trenchant attacks on the entire Government coalition, however, in effect guaranteed that no support for SPD conceptions could be expected even from those representatives who held a critical opinion on several aspects of Dr Adenauer's policy.

The tactical clumsiness of the Opposition together with Adenauer's skilful tactics do not entirely explain why the Opposition was so clearly defeated in this case. One major factor supporting the Government was the views of the Western powers concerning Germany's role in Europe. As had been graphically demonstrated by France's rejection of the EDC, there was little stomach in Western Europe for an independent West Germany, to say nothing of an independent and re-unified German State. The whole thrust of allied policy was to integrate German military potential in a Western defence system so that German power would only be used against potential communist aggressors. In conjunction with international factors the high priority attached to security by the West German populace argued strongly for integration in the Western defence system. This in turn was reflected in the large majority of the Government coalition, a majority which made divisive attacks from the Opposition particularly futile.

The foregoing analysis argues that the divisive factors of the Opposition played a crucial role not only in its defeat on the issue but also had the effect of preventing any independent Committee influence. This is not to argue, however, that the use of integrative politics would have achieved much in terms of the basic issues at stake between the Government and Opposition. Nevertheless, some gains can be hypothesised for the Opposition if it had adopted an integrative approach: by seeking common ground with Government members of the Committee, they conceivably could have created problems for the Government in keeping its forces in line and perhaps even secure some minor adjustments in official policy. This, of course, would have required substantial modifications of the larger policy goals of the Opposition. Integrative politics within a Committee framework is simply incompatible with diametrically
opposed positions. Only if some room for compromise exists can there be the development of new approaches which the relatively businesslike atmosphere of the Committee's format facilitates. In this case, moreover, the lack of Committee influence was further due to the absence of any tradition of a strong Committee at this stage of the development of the Federal Republic. Such a tradition would only emerge in the early sixties as exemplified in earlier case studies. Only when this tradition and integrative methods had developed side by side would Committee influence have a marked impact on German foreign policy.
In the preceding chapter we demonstrated that even in Germany when inappropriate political methods were used the influence of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee was negligible. It might be argued, however, that the absence of significant Committee influence in the wake of the EDC was actually a function of the circumstances of the 1950s and that subsequently a tradition of Committee involvement in decisions grew within the German system. While it is undeniable that such a growth did take place, this chapter shall argue that even where such a tradition did exist the wider political circumstances of the moment are decisive in determining whether influence can be exerted by the Committee. The case for elaborating this view is the parliamentary manoeuvering surrounding the centrepiece of Brandt's Ostpolitik - the ratification of the Eastern treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland in 1972.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, Germany's relations with the East occupied a key place in both her foreign and domestic politics. In the 1950s the conservative Government led by the CDU/CSU essentially opted for a policy of security based on an alliance with the Western democracies at the expense of exploring avenues for national reunification - although, of course, never publicly renouncing the goal of reunification. The SPD Opposition, on the other hand, was much more reluctant to see Germany join forces with the West on the undoubtedly unrealistic assumption that negotiations with the Soviet Union could result in an acceptable basis for reunification. By the 1970s the international situation had been transformed. The Cold War had given way to the politics of detente, which made approaches to the East a more realistic and acceptable posture for West Germany. In these circumstances the positions of the
major parties, while having some continuity with the 1950s, in the larger sense were reversed. The SPD, in Government as part of the Grand Coalition since 1967 and as a major coalition partner from 1969, as in the 1950s pushed for negotiations with the East. In substance, however, the position of the SPD had changed dramatically. The aim of Ostpolitik, unlike the 1950s reunification efforts, was to establish mutually beneficial relations with the East on the basis of the post-war division of Europe. This, indeed, stood at the heart of the conflict between the Government and the CDU/CSU Opposition in 1972. Beyond the treaties' assurances of bilateral co-operation stood a fundamental point of interpretation. Were the treaties simply a renunciation of the use of force, a position pushed by the CDU/CSU in its newly emphasised, if somewhat fraudulent, posture as the advocate of reunification? Or did the treaties accept the existing division of Germany and the borders with the East European countries as irrevocable political facts, a position which, although never explicitly articulated by the Government, was the underlying rationale for its policy and reflected a deep sense of the need to atone for the transgressions of the war? Thus not only partisan advantage but underlying philosophical differences marked the dispute on Ostpolitik.

This dispute came to a head in 1972 when Parliament considered the treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. These treaties were ratified, but not before a crisis upon which the very fate of the Brandt Government hung. This crisis was a classic instance of divisive politics with each party seeking electoral advantage and, indeed, the defeat of their opponents at the polls on the issue of Ostpolitik. As we shall see in the following analysis, in these circumstances the parliamentary Committee was unable to exert an independent influence in shaping foreign policy. The final result of the parliamentary manoeuvres was the ratification of the treaties together with the adoption of a parliamentary resolution which served to paper over some of the fundamental differences. This, however, as the following analysis will show, was not the product of genuine
compromise but rather the most optimal solution for the dominant forces on each side following both significant international pressures and intensive manoeuverings within both major parties.

The Domestic Political Context of the Ostpolitik Debate

The basic political context for the Ostpolitik debate was set by the 1969 election which resulted for the first time in a Government led by the SPD. The SPD, by forming a coalition with the FDP, was able to obtain a fragile majority of no more than 12 votes in the Bundestag. In fact, the majority was significantly less than the theoretical 12 votes as witnessed by Willy Brandt's secret ballot election to the Chancellorship. This situation had several consequences.

First, after having been in Government throughout the history of the Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU found it extremely difficult to adjust to opposition. Indeed, it would not be too strong to say that "a born to rule syndrome" existed which encouraged the new Opposition to bid for power at every opportunity, a situation intensified by the very narrowness of the Government's majority. Second, much of the CDU/CSU's tactics were directed at the FDP, formerly a member of coalition governments led by the CDU/CSU, but which had now joined the socialist camp. The hostility of the CDU/CSU towards the FDP was manifested in several tactics designed to destroy the FDP. One approach was to appeal to right-wing FDP voters in State elections in an effort to eliminate FDP representatives from State Parliaments - a move which almost succeeded. Another tactic adopted at the Federal level was to win over individual parliamentarians to the ranks of the CDU/CSU in order to gain the votes necessary to overturn the coalition Government. Such approaches were successful in several cases and similar attempts were made with regard to individual right-wing SPD parliamentarians - some of which were prominent members of expellee organizations. As we shall see, these successes resulted finally in producing an evenly divided Parliament which made the political situation even more volatile and thus the need for new Federal elections all the more certain.
The commonly shared expectations of a new election further intensified the political struggle and became a dominant factor in the approach to Ostpolitik by the respective sides. This was at the most basic level because various key political actors saw Ostpolitik as a decisive election issue. Indeed, when the election was held about six months after the ratification of the Eastern treaties, the SPD emerged from a campaign heavily emphasising Ostpolitik with a substantial coalition majority in the Bundestag. At the time of the Ostpolitik debate, however, the way in which the issue would prove to be decisive was subject to varying assessments by different political actors, including those within the same party. Leader of the SPD parliamentary party, Herbert Wehner, saw Ostpolitik as the party's most potent electoral issue, one which could convert popular support for detente into votes for the party at the ballot box. Others on the Government side, such as Chancellor Brandt and Defence Minister Schmidt, were less convinced of the electoral potency of the issue and appeared more concerned with the fate of Ostpolitik as foreign policy than with its possible domestic uses. The junior coalition partner, the FDP, initially had no interest in an election because of internal divisions and the loss of right-wing electoral support to the CDU/CSU at State elections - a situation which threatened the party with falling below the 5% vote required for parliamentary representation if new elections were held.

Ostpolitik presented opportunities for the CDU/CSU Opposition in terms of either parliamentary or electoral action. If significant defections could be won, particularly from the FDP, the CDU/CSU would have been in a position to elect its own Chancellor and subsequently sustain a relatively secure Government with the expected fragmentation of the FDP. In the event of an election CDU/CSU strategists - most notably CSU leader Franz-Josef Strauss - hoped to turn the Ostpolitik issue to their parties' advantage by drawing votes from the more than 4% of the electorate which had voted for the ultra right-wing National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1969. Not all leading members of the CDU/CSU were as sanguine about the appeal to the
right as Strauss, nor were they necessarily totally hostile to the Government's Ostpolitik. Given the need for party unity in either parliamentary manoeuverings or an election campaign, it became imperative for the CDU/CSU leader and alternative Chancellor, Rainer Barzel, to attempt to mediate among the strong demands of Strauss and the reservations of others. The whole situation was further complicated by the ambitions of other leaders, most notably Strauss himself, CDU State Premier of Rheinland Westphalia, Helmut Kohl, and former Foreign Minister and Chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Gerhard Schroeder, who desired the Chancellorship themselves. Thus a loss for the CDU/CSU on Ostpolitik-related matters was not necessarily inimicable to the interests of these powerful leaders if it could be laid at Barzel's doorstep. In short, the stakes were high, the strategies problematic and the motivations of leading actors complex.

The following analysis examines in detail the unfolding of events under the above circumstances. The story begins in early 1972 when the Eastern treaties - which had been concluded in 1971, together with the Berlin treaty negotiated by the four occupying powers - reached the Bundestag for the first reading.

Differing Positions Within the CDU/CSU

During the first weeks of 1972 parts of the Opposition were keen to evoke the general impression that Rainer Barzel wanted to say 'no' to the Ostverträge, but at the same time did not want to jeopardise seriously their coming into effect. This desire was influenced by the considerable international pressure which the Western allies and conservative parties of Europe tried to exert on the CDU/CSU leadership.

All NATO, WEU and EEC partners supported the foreign policy of the Brandt/Scheel Government. Even conservative European party colleagues publicly dissociated themselves from the foreign policy ideas of the CDU/CSU.¹ Rainer Barzel's early

¹ Der Spiegel, No. 6, 31 January 1972.
1972 journey to the US also made quite clear that the CDU could not expect any support from the allies for their foreign policy concept. Furthermore, the CSU must have suspected that Rainer Barzel might yield to pressure from the US: without having informed the Opposition's party chairman, the CSU published their own draft treaty immediately before Barzel's return. However, this was not the first attempt by the CSU and parts of the CDU to counterbalance pressure from abroad on the party chairman.

On 16 January 1972 CSU Chairman Franz-Josef Strauss had declared: "We don't fire blanks". He had emphatically pointed towards the CSU's declared policy of rejecting the treaties and had reminded the candidate for the Chancellorship that precisely this policy had been unanimously agreed upon at a joint meeting of CDU/CSU representatives on 9 December 1970. And, to be on the safe side, he suggested fighting further the Eastern treaties in the Federal Constitutional Court if there really should emerge a parliamentary majority in favour of the treaties. Chairman of the Hessian CDU Dregger, who strongly opposed the treaties, regarded it as a 'catastrophe' for the CDU/CSU if circumstances would force his party to unanimously agree to the treaties. This would also apply if the CDU/CSU members themselves were privately convinced that the treaties' ratification was the proper thing to do. In order to prevent this 'catastrophe' Strauss and Dregger claimed that the passing of the treaties would later result in Moscow's making reparation claims amounting to "thousands of millions". Moreover, in an 'open letter' to Chancellor Brandt, CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg warned of belittling the 'red fascist danger' and explained what was the greatest worry of the strict treaty-opponents in the

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2 FAZ, 2 February 1972.
3 Bild am Sonntag, 16 January 1972.
4 Der Spiegel, No. 4, 17 January 1972.
5 FAZ, 14 February 1972.
6 Der Spiegel, No. 9, 21 February 1972.
CDU/CSU: "Whoever grants equality to the left totalitarianism in East Berlin will - even if he intends the opposite - pave the way for the left extremists' attack on our freedom".  

During the first reading for the treaties in Parliament, representatives of the Opposition's 'right' wing emphasized their objections on principle against the treaties. Rainer Barzel, although he very strongly attacked the Government, carefully avoided finally committing himself. "Not in this way" he paraphrased the Opposition's attitude and suggested that the treaties should be shelved. The 'shadow foreign minister' of the Opposition and Chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, Gerhard Schroeder, explained the CDU/CSU's further dissatisfaction with the treaties. He pointed out that in the case of the ratification it would solely be the Government parties who claimed the laurels. "The Federal Government", he said, "claims any chance of success solely for themselves. They also have to bear the risk of failure. A failure of the treaties would be a disaster only for the Government who negotiated them".

In order to make a failure of the treaties into a disaster also for the Opposition, the Federal Government repeatedly referred to the international repercussions of a rejection. In order to underline the isolation of the Opposition's criticism, the SPD and FDP pressed the Opposition to criticize as well the Berlin Treaty which had been negotiated by the Western allies and had found great public support in West Germany.

Doubts About Party Members Crossing the Floor and Preparations for the State Elections

Inside the German Parliament, however, the Opposition was not isolated at all. Immediately after the plenary debates on

10 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 26 February 1972.
the Eastern Treaties, SPD-MP and expellees' politician Hupka crossed the floor and joined the CDU, returning to the Foreign Affairs Committee as an alternate CDU member. It was also disturbing for the Government that SPD-MP Mueller allegedly intended to deceive his party. Press reports claimed that he wanted to vote in favour of the treaties in the Committee, but reject them later on in the plenum. At the same time FDP-MP von Kuehlmann-Stumm indicated that 'possibly' he, too, would not be able to vote in favour of the treaties. The FAZ, which hitherto had been convinced that "the acceptance of the treaties by the coalition had been secure", now felt that "the Eastern Treaties are endangered". Government Spokesman Conrad Ahlers, however, still did not admit any serious danger for the Government, especially because an actual rejection by the German Parliament would have been followed by international repercussions that could not be calculated. "Mr Chancellor, this is just like a NATO exercise. They always stop short before the detonation of the first atom bomb, because no one knows what would come after that".

SPD-MP Mueller who was suspected of having a closer than just social relationship to CSU Chairman Strauss, however, objected to the NATO exercise metaphor. He maintained that he knew of two further FDP members who would not vote for the Eastern Treaties. Der Spiegel named a few more: Helms, Gallus, Kienbaum, Kuehlmann-Stumm and Wurbs of the FDP and Mueller himself of the SPD. The journal also offered a suggestion on how to save the SPD/FDP Government: in view of the difficulties on the domestic scene, the Government should combine the vote on the treaties with the vote of confidence. If the Opposition should win, new elections would equal a plebiscite on the

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11 FAZ, 27 February and 4 March 1972; Die Welt, 27 February 1972; Der Spiegel, No. 12, 13 March 1972.


13 Cited in: Der Spiegel, No. 11, 6 March 1972.
Eastern treaties,\textsuperscript{14} which seemed to appeal to parts of the SPD parliamentary party. SPD-MP Guenter Wichert realised that "the strategic conflict around the Ostvertraege is better than the controversy on reforms that never eventuated''.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus it was quite clear at the beginning of March that if the SPD - similar to the CDU - should declare ratification of the treaties the basis for a domestic power struggle, the CDU candidate for the Chancellorship, Rainer Barzel, would be under pressure from two sides. If the CSU and parts of his own party pressured him into a definite rejection of the treaties, he not only would have to reckon with foreign political consequences (and even more so if his own chances of becoming Chancellor increased), but also he was threatened with the loss of certain CDU-MPs. This was possible because, in the meantime, the former chairman of the CDU party working group on foreign policy, Ernst Majonica, had pointed out the foreign policy consequences of a rejection of the treaties, and CDU-MP and trade union man Adolf Mueller had voted for a resolution in favour of the treaties during a meeting of West German trade union officials.\textsuperscript{16}

While the press was speculating on further possible turncoats, the head of the CSU-Landesgruppe in the German Bundestag, Leo Wagner, explained that no dramatic developments could be expected before the end of April when State elections were due in Baden-Wuerttemberg.\textsuperscript{17}

However, in the meantime both sides were concerned that the outcome of the State elections should not be influenced merely by chance. The Government used the positive statements foreign politicians had made with regard to the Eastern

\textsuperscript{14} Der Spiegel, No. 11 and No. 12, 6 and 13 March 1972.
\textsuperscript{15} Der Spiegel, No. 11, 6 March 1972.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
Treaties; Herbert Wehner threatened to hold new elections in case "something happened during the vote on the treaties"; Helmut Schmidt predicted the "worst Berlin crisis of all time" if the treaties were rejected; and Erhard Eppler foretold: "A Chancellor Barzel would be stewed on low heat by both East and West".  

The Opposition Leader, on the other hand, held the Federal Government solely responsible for the difficult situation in both the fields of domestic and foreign policy. Even before the signings in Moscow and Warsaw the Government had known, he said, "what the realities in Bonn looked like"; therefore it had been irresponsible to force the foreign policy initiatives concerning the East any further in this form. The Frankfurter Neue Presse formulated this even more clearly: the Government had cheated when they assured the treaty partners and the German public that the treaties would get a parliamentary majority. If there was not "constantly strong pressure from the Soviet side as well as from the West" the rejection of the treaties by Parliament would be certain. The Government had entered the debates on the ratification either "foolhardy or purposely untruthful" and was now playing "a game with new elections" which resembled the "tricks of a gambler".

Foreign Pressure on the Opposition

However, the risks which were connected with this 'game' had to be shared by the Opposition. The Opposition not only had to take its chances on new elections but also had to fear isolation of the Federal Government within the Western alliance which would be likely in the case of a rejection of the treaties and which particularly a CSU/CSU Government would have to face. Following Barzel's visit to the US and the Soviet Union, Gerhard Schroeder tried to decrease this danger by means of a trip to

18 Der Spiegel, No. 12, 13 March 1972.
19 FAZ, 24 March 1972.
20 Frankfurter Neue Presse, 8 March 1972.
Great Britain where he explained his party's stand. Further travels of the CDU's foreign policy experts, Birrenbach and von Weizaecker, to West European partners illustrated the Opposition's concern about the possible isolation of West Germany. Journalists reported that a planned visit to Washington by Gerhard Schroeder did not eventuate because President Nixon had made it known that he was not interested in meeting CDU/CSU politicians. Talks between CDU/CSU candidate Rainer Barzel and the French President also must have brought it home to the Opposition that a rejection of the treaties would result in problems. Barzel himself commented on the talks in Paris: "I don't think that Georges Pompidou will congratulate me if the treaties are rejected". The Opposition Leader tried to appease the foreign countries: "If the treaties will not yet (!) be accepted, the international timetable will be upset but not the running of the trains".

After his return from France, Foreign Affairs officials showed Rainer Barzel a 'strictly confidential' telegram from the German Ambassador to Washington, Rolph Paul - which had also been leaked to the press. In this telegram the West German ambassador had stated:

1. that a rejection of the treaties would endanger the foreign policy unity of Bonn and Washington;
2. that in the event of a new cold war which had already been threatened by Brezhnev, Bonn would not be able to rely on total support from Washington;
3. that the world's recognition of the German Democratic Republic could not be prevented anymore in any event; and

24 FAZ, 24 March 1972.
4. that in the case of a rejection of the Eastern Treaties by the Bundestag the Berlin Treaty would not become valid.

Barzel now accused the Government of being irresponsible "because they used the prestige of foreign countries and friendly states in German domestic politics".  

The Opposition Leader's reaction and his suggestion to wait for the ratification of the treaties until after President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union made it quite clear that because of foreign pressure the CDU/CSU Opposition would indeed run great risks if they rejected the treaties in the Bundestag. The Federal Government and particularly the Social Democratic parliamentary party did not attempt to hide the fact that the foreign pressure was the safest guarantee for ratification of the treaties and the survival of the Federal Government. Not only the Western Allies but also the Soviet treaty partner tried to help the Brandt/Scheel Government.

At the beginning of March Pravda had pointed out the possible consequences of a rejection of the treaties by German Parliament. This was widely criticised by the CDU/CSU, parts of the press and even FDP Minister of the Interior Genscher as meddling with German domestic politics. Later on the Soviet attitude proved more useful for the West German Government. Moscow declared that the treaty would be interpreted by the Soviet side in the same manner as it was interpreted by Bonn; it was also hinted that the Soviet attitude towards the EEC would be revised; the German Government's letter which accompanied the treaty affirming the goal of German unity would not only be officially acknowledged but handed on to the appropriate committees of the Supreme Soviet (when Chancellor

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Adenauer had presented a similar letter in 1955 the receipt was not even acknowledged by the Soviet Union); and, finally, the Soviet Union would sign the trade treaty between the two countries, which included West Berlin. This treaty had been a controversial issue for a number of years and had always failed because of the Berlin clause.27

**Government Attempts and Persuasion Fail in the Committee**

In the above context the Government attempted to argue its case before the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee. Chancellor Brandt himself appeared in extended sessions before the Committee where he both elaborated in detail the Soviet modifications and emphasised the international consequences of a rejection of the treaties by Parliament.28 Rainer Barzel responded outside the Committee. While recognising the Soviet explanations as a step forward, the CDU/CSU leader indicated continuing opposition to the treaties, saying "this is not the way".29

Already at this stage it became apparent that the heavily partisan atmosphere in Parliament at large was preventing the development of integrative politics within the Committee. The Committee Vice-Chairman, SPD-MP Kurt Mattick, later explained

> The attempt to develop common positions apart from the controversy has not yet proceeded very far. This has made it clear to us that the spokesmen of the CDU are determined that an acceptance of the treaties by the CDU should not eventuate.30

Thus it appears that the Opposition within the Committee was unwilling to seek clarifications of specific matters of concern.

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to the conservative parties by working together with the SPD and FDP Committee members. Indeed, CDU Committee member Birrenbach stated flatly that he had never been interested in the details of the treaties but regarded Ostpolitik as wrong in principle. By approaching the question as a matter of principle (or as a means for parliamentary or electoral advantage) the Opposition both prevented the Committee from exerting independent influence on the nuances of Ostpolitik and also did not permit the Government to mobilise bipartisan Committee support for its policies.

A Temporary Lessening of Confrontation: 'The Calm Before the Storm'

Because of the pressure from abroad and the instability of parliamentary majorities, it appeared at the end of March and at the beginning of April as if both sides were now seeking an agreement. Rainer Barzel explained that he "was not in a hurry"; several CDU politicians thought that it would be best not to have new elections before 1973. The CDU's criticism of the treaties became more moderate. CDU Treasurer and Shadow Cabinet member Walther Leisler-Kiep could even imagine that "an agreement will still be reached on the treaties between Government and Opposition". SPD politicians sought out the Premier of Rhineland-Palatinate, Helmut Kohl, to explore possibilities of how the treaties could be passed in the hostile Bundesrat. Even the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, Valentin Falin, asked to hold talks with Helmut Kohl. Supporters of the Eastern Treaties within the SPD and FDP actually seemed to be afraid of further Soviet concessions of a 'cosmetic' nature because this would have backed the accusation by the CDU/CSU that the Government had not negotiated in a sufficiently tough manner. Such a 'gesture of good will' was the GDR declaration that citizens of West Berlin and of the Federal Republic would be allowed to visit the GDR during the Easter holidays. When opinion polls showed that the Baden-Wuerttemberg State elections would not result in a disaster for the Government, even CDU MPs

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31 Interview Birrenbach.
began to backpedal and reject efforts to overthrow the Chancellor "as long as we are not quite certain to win".\textsuperscript{32} FDP-MP Kienbaum informed the chairman of the FDP parliamentary party that he now intended to vote in favour of the treaties.\textsuperscript{33} This increased the chances for the Government to gain an absolute majority in favour of the treaties. However, a foreign policy expert of the SPD commented later: "We knew already that this was only the calm before the storm".\textsuperscript{34}

President of the German Bundestag Kai Uwe von Hassel also prepared himself for a 'storm' in Parliament: he asked public servants to prepare a detailed account of legal difficulties which he might be confronted with in the case of a resignation of the Government, and in the event of a successful vote of no confidence by the Opposition.\textsuperscript{35}

Government Provocation and a Leak Heighten the Dispute

In early April a new and more combative atmosphere appeared between Government and Opposition. Initially it seemed as if the Government parties wanted a confrontation with the Opposition in Parliament or that they regarded such a confrontation with the Opposition as inevitable or even desirable. FDP leaders, now apparently less worried about election prospects, pointed out that all conditions set by the CDU/CSU for possible acceptance of the treaties had been met by the Soviet Union and the GDR, that opinion polls in the Federal Republic had proven the popularity of the Ostpolitik of the Brandt/Scheel Government, and that the CDU/CSU would be entirely isolated within the Federal Republic as well as internationally if they pursued their foreign policy line: "A rejection by the CDU/CSU won't find any supporters within the

\textsuperscript{32} Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 March-12 April 1972; Die Welt, 1 April-13 April 1972; FAZ, 30 March-6 April 1972; Der Spiegel, No. 15 and 16, 3 and 10 April 1972.

\textsuperscript{33} Pressedienst der Bundestagsfraktion der FDP, fdk-tagesdienst (Ed. E. Hoffmann) (hereafter cited fdk), No. 151/72, 13 April 1972; FAZ, 13 April 1972.

\textsuperscript{34} Interview Wischnewski.

\textsuperscript{35} Der Spiegel, No. 16, 10 April 1972.
Federal Republic or the Eastern and Western nations except for two groups: the right wing radical NPD and the Albanian communists".  

Herbert Wehner tried to ridicule the CSU "and besides the CDU as well" because of their claim that the parliamentary ratification of the treaties was up to Moscow and not the West German Government.  

The general secretary of the FDP, Karl-Hermann Flach, encouraged the CDU/CSU to "come to their senses concerning the Ostpolitik".  

The head of the Chancellor's Office, Horst Ehmke, requested "a clear answer at last" from the CDU on two basic questions: "Does the Opposition seriously believe we can depart from the territorial status quo in the future? Is the Opposition in all seriousness against the Berlin Treaty?" Obvously, the Government parties wanted to make use of both the disunity of the Opposition and foreign pressure on the CDU/CSU in order to gain advantages for future disputes on foreign as well as domestic policies.

Rainer Barzel might have hoped to become Chancellor even without new elections and a plebiscite on the Eastern Treaties and then have the treaties ratified - possibly with minor alterations - by his own Government. Franz Josef Strauss, however, was pressing so hard for a 'no' to the treaties that Barzel's room for manoeuver was seriously circumscribed.

Finally, in this atmosphere of heightened conflict the Opposition made use of the minutes of the German/Soviet negotiations which had been leaked by Foreign Affairs to CDU/CSU politicians.

36 fdk, Ausgabe 55, 4 April 1972.
37 Pressemitteilungen und Informationen der SPD (Ed. H. Wehner), No. 78/72, 5 April 1972.
38 fdk, Ausgabe 57, 6 April 1972.
40 fdk, No. 146/72, 11 April 1972.
41 FAZ, 18 and 24 March 1972.
The leaking of strictly confidential Government material was described by *Der Spiegel* as the most serious case of disclosure of confidential material in Germany since Bismarck on 24 October 1896 had released the 'reinsurance treaty' between the German Empire and Russia in order to internationally compromise his successor Caprivi. This latest indiscretion spoiled the last chance that might have existed for the Government and Opposition to reach an agreement on the Eastern Treaties. The embarrassment felt by the Government towards the public and its own backbenchers, not to mention the Soviet Union, left it in no mood to compromise. Barzel, for his part, had he wanted to modify his party's posture on the treaties could no longer do so with his party aroused by the new accusations. The tense atmosphere between the parties was manifested at a summit meeting in mid-April between representatives of the Opposition and the Government, ostensibly to explore possible common aspects with regard to Ostpolitik. This became the scene for Rainer Barzel to produce the minutes from his briefcase and hand them to the Chancellor with a request to check whether these notes were genuine. They were - more or less - genuine. However, as the Government stressed repeatedly, they were taken out of context and were slightly distorted so as to substantiate the suspicion that Bahr and Scheel had been weak and amateurish in their negotiations and Gromyko tough and successful. These notes were politically dangerous particularly as they were aimed at evoking the impression that Bonn had yielded to pressure from Moscow to recognise the German borders in an *Ersatz*-peace treaty - a subterfuge made necessary by German Basic Law which forced the altering of this *de facto* peace treaty into a non-aggression pact.

The publication of these notes offered the CDU/CSU the opportunity to renew their demands for access to all notes on

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42 *Der Spiegel*, No. 18, 24 April 1972.

negotiations and deliberations. The Government was able to refer to the fact that this would be against international practice and that previous CDU Governments had never responded to requests of this nature. Furthermore, the Government parties accused the Opposition, and in particular Rainer Barzel, of basing their arguments on 'criminally obtained material'. The Opposition was accused of "collaborating with forgers and fanatics who endangered the public weal". The foreign policy spokesman of the Opposition, Werner Marx, rejected this accusation and declared that the 'panicky polemics' of the Government could not detract from the fact that the German negotiation partners in Moscow had "grossly acted against German interests and had sought formulations which would deceive the public, parliament, the constitutional court and allies".

The Committee Votes for Ratification by a Partisan Vote

The Standing Orders of the Bundestag requiring Committee action on treaties naturally brought the Ostpolitik issue before the Foreign Affairs Committee. In mid-April the Committee dealt with relevant reports by two other parliamentary committees - the Committee for Intra-German relations, which handled all matters dealing with the two German states, and the legal Committee, which was responsible for examining the constitutionality of the Treaties. In the course of Committee deliberations on these reports intransigent positions were taken by the Government and Opposition parties.

44 For an extensive documentation of the fierce disputes between Government and Opposition on this matter, see: G. Patz, Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Aussenpolitik, Meisenheim, 1976, pp.174-75.

45 FAZ, 21 April 1972.

In this context the Opposition in the Committee adopted delaying tactics since the full Parliament could not act until there had been a Committee vote. These tactics, according to SPD and FDP Committee members, involved "permanently repeating questions which had already been resolved." Moreover, Werner Marx (Chairman of the CDU/CSU party working group on foreign affairs) and Georg Kliesing (CDU/CSU spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Committee) again sought time through a letter to the CDU Committee Chairman Gerhard Schroeder requesting detailed information on the following points before a final Committee vote on the treaties:

1. the remark made on television by Paul Frank, State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, that "for months the Foreign Ministry had been the target of German secret service organizations"; and

2. the published fragments of the Moscow minutes in order to gain "clarity on the true character of the published texts".

Dealing with these requests would have meant altering the timetable which all parties within the Committee had agreed to, a timetable calling for a vote on ratification of the Eastern treaties and any possible additional motions by 25 April. The Government parties refused to play the Opposition's game and would not comment on these questions until after the vote. Thus the vote was taken on schedule and the Committee supported ratification upon strict party lines: 17 SPD and FDP votes against 16 CDU/CSU votes.

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49 Parlaments-Korrespondenz, heute im bundestag, No. 97, 25 April 1972; Interview Mattick.
Even after this failure, however, the CDU/CSU sought further delays in the parliamentary legal committee. Although the legal committee had already issued a final positive statement concerning the treaties, CDU/CSU members tried to force renewed debate on the Eastern treaties during a special meeting of this committee. The publication of the Moscow minutes had posed new questions they argued which were "of greatest importance for the critical examination of the internal implications of the legal commitments entered into and their constitutional assessment". SPD-member of the legal committee Claus Arndt replied that it was not in accordance with the dignity of Parliament to base debates on 'anonymous concoctions' which were derived from 'criminal actions'. In this bitter atmosphere the CDU/CSU motion for re-opening the debate on Ostpolitik in the legal committee was rejected, again on strict party lines.50

The Announcement of the Constructive Vote of No Confidence

The result of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state election on 23 April, which had been eagerly awaited, brought a majority of 52.9% for the CDU. But the SPD and FDP, too, had gained votes in comparison with the federal election of 1969. However, it was not the election result which was decisive, but rather the fact that FDP-MP Helms left his party on the very day of the election. Helms explained in a telegram that he left his party because he had gained the conviction that the "position of unconditional independence of the liberal middle" was not supported anymore by the policy of the FDP parliamentary party. According to Helms, the Baden-Wuerttemberg election result had not influenced his decision.51

After Helms had left his party the Government was left with a majority of 249 to 247 votes in Parliament - and rumours increased that soon a number of additional coalition MPs would

50 FAZ, 26 April 1972; see also: Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 20 April 1972; Die Welt, 26 April 1972.

51 Die Welt, 24 April 1972.
cross the floor. In this situation it became apparent that the emphasis was shifting from foreign to domestic issues. Not only had Helms' concern with "the independence of the liberal middle" been largely over internal matters, but the CDU Premier of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Filbinger, declared after his victory that the Eastern treaties would be decided in Bonn and it had been domestic issues which had decisively influenced the State election result.\textsuperscript{52} Generally one could detect a tendency within the CDU/CSU to seek confrontation with the Government over domestic policy. SPD Committee Vice-Chairman Kurt Mattick stated later:

The change in the direction of Opposition attacks from foreign to domestic policy for the second time within a few weeks supported our view in those days that the CDU/CSU strove for more than just the rejection of the Eastern treaties.\textsuperscript{53}

On 24 April the CDU/CSU announced its strategy: it would seek a constructive vote of no confidence in order to replace Willy Brandt with Rainer Barzel as Chancellor. This device of the German constitution requires that a parliamentary majority nominate an alternative Chancellor when voting a Government out of power. The political tactic behind this move was the Opposition's attempt to decouple the fate of the Government from the fate of Ostpolitik, a tactic reflecting the apparent trend to view domestic rather than foreign issues as the Government's major weakness. If the Government could be brought down on a sweeping range of issues rather than on the single question of Ostpolitik, it would have manifest advantages for the new CDU Chancellor. Domestically, it would decrease the SPD's ability to mobilise opinion on the Ostpolitik question. Internationally, it would allow a new Government to move towards ratification of the treaties - albeit undoubtedly after some face-saving adjustments.

\textsuperscript{52} FAZ, 24 April 1972.

\textsuperscript{53} Interview Mattick.
This strategy required some delicate footwork on the part of Rainer Barzel. When he sought to justify the constructive vote of no confidence, Barzel was forced to devote considerable attention to Ostpolitik, particularly in order to reassure the Western allies. Thus rather than flatly oppose Ostpolitik he claimed that the Brandt Government was not in a position to have the Eastern treaties ratified in the Bundestag. The clear implication of his statement that a Barzel Government could successfully implement Ostpolitik naturally raised questions in the minds of those elements in the CDU/CSU strongly opposed to Ostpolitik.

Nevertheless, Barzel's approach was strategically sound. In terms of the constructive vote of no confidence, Barzel could assume that the anti-Ostpolitik forces within the CDU/CSU would prefer his Eastern policies to those of the socialist Brandt. Moreover, once in power, he would have the full resources of Government at his disposal to win over such doubting colleagues as Strauss. Nothing succeeds in politics so much as success. However, this strategy held grave dangers for the Chancellor candidate. For, if he failed in the crucial vote, he would be open to attack from his party's right wing for having abandoned the agreed-upon position on Ostpolitik.

In the event, in one of the most dramatic votes in the history of the Bundestag, Barzel, on a secret ballot, came up two votes short of the absolute majority required. It appears that at least one Opposition member did not vote for Barzel. The reasons remain obscure despite allegations of bribery on both sides of the House. What did become clear was that neither side could muster a working majority in the Bundestag. For the very day after the no confidence vote, Brandt's budget was not passed when an open vote resulted in a tie.

**After the No Confidence Vote: Common Interest or Confrontation?**

With the rejection of Brandt's budget a so-called week of harmony began. This apparent conciliatory period was an

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outgrowth of disquiet and concern which had been expressed both domestically and internationally following the no confidence and budget votes. The spectacle of an evenly divided Parliament with members crossing the floor, perhaps as a result of bribes, sent ripples of anxiety throughout the German body politic. It seemed to many West German voters that the politicians in Bonn were in danger of approaching a point where the borderline between legal and legitimate political conduct could become blurred in the eyes of at least half of the population.  

The particular issue over which conciliatory efforts seemed appropriate at the time was Ostpolitik. Indeed, with regard to the Eastern treaties which were on the agenda for Bundestag debate in early May, it was generally expected "for the 'yes' of the Christian Democrats only the 'how' was still unclear" and that even some of the 'hawks' within the CDU/CSU agreed with this.  

With regard to Ostpolitik, however, the disquiet and concern shown by Eastern and Western states had at least as much influence in creating 'harmony' in Bonn as did domestic pressure. The implications of this foreign concern were apparent in a New York Times article by W. Averrell Harriman which argued that the CDU/CSU in pursuit of domestic power had upset the progress of reducing tensions in Europe and that the United States should bring strong pressure to bear on the CDU in order to ensure ratification of the Eastern treaties.  

Thus we can see that in the period immediately following the no confidence vote the need to reassure both the German public and foreign leaders created a semblance of bipartisan civility in Bonn.

55 Marion Graefin Doenhoff, Bonn ist doch nicht Weimar, Dieter Buhl, Staatsmann bei Stahlwerkern, both in: Die Zeit, No. 18, 5 May 1972; Der Spiegel, No. 19, 1 May 1972; Ernst Guenter Vetter, Was der 1. Mai nicht sein sollte in FAZ, 29 April 1972.


How deep was this 'week of harmony'? A careful reconstruction of the events suggests that in spite of the above pressures key actors in both major parties - notably Herbert Wehner (SPD) and Franz-Josef Strauss (CSU) - were at no time prepared to look for common ground between Government and Opposition on the question of Ostpolitik.

Immediately after failure of the vote of no confidence, cabinet and chairmen of the Government's parliamentary parties met to decide on future tactics and strategies. Although the Government parties agreed to continue work as normal and to "force the CDU/CSU to a truce with an appeal for unity", this did not mean that Herbert Wehner would make it easy for the CDU/CSU to agree to the treaties. When Erhard Eppler had suggested during the cabinet meeting to seriously try to reach an agreement with the Opposition on Federal elections, Herbert Wehner had replied: "Now is the time to be hard". 58

As indicated before, Herbert Wehner could rely on the attitude of western and eastern foreign countries when using his tactics. 59 According to his view, the "ratification timetable" could not be changed because of "foreign policy necessities". In an interview with the Deutschlandfunk on 29 April he indirectly admitted that the Government had to some extent given in to Rainer Barzel in that they did not insist on holding the ratification debate during the following week, but there was "not much play in this" and this was "no domestic policy ... but a foreign policy question". 60

In actual fact, however, the 'foreign policy necessities' did not prevent the Government from granting the CDU/CSU more time than Herbert Wehner had been prepared to do. On 3 May 1972 Herbert Wehner had succeeded in reaching an agreement with

58 Der Spiegel, No. 19, 1 May 1972.
59 FAZ, 27 April 1972.
60 Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag (Ed. K. Wienand), Tagesdienstausgabe No. 286, 29 April 1972.
Federal Chancellor Brandt that the ratification of the Eastern treaties should be settled by 10 May. The Federal Chancellor admitted that the spirit of the parliamentary party was "quite good" but that "the colleagues ... soon want to have more than just parliamentary party meetings. They want to know when the Bundestag will resume work". In other words, the SPD parliamentary Party members, led by H. Wehner, wanted to force a vote on the Eastern treaties before Rainer Barzel could sort out his internal party problems. Wehner's tactics, however, were limited by both the Government's concern with the passage of the Eastern treaties and public opinion during the period of 'harmony' which would not allow for blatant inter-party conflict.

Franz Josef Strauss, of course, felt similar pressures. On 2 May the Frankfurter Rundschau reported that "a joint resolution was in sight" after the four party chairmen Brandt, Barzel, Scheel and Strauss had met and reached a "rapprochement". It is to be questioned, however, to what degree Strauss was really willing to reach a compromise. His participation in the meeting of the chairmen can be seen as a tactical response to the atmosphere of 'harmony'. Indeed, Strauss was under pressure from the right wing of his own party which argued strongly against an understanding on Ostpolitik. Thus, the CSU party working group on Ostpolitik warned the Federal Opposition:

This Ostpolitik endangers domestic and foreign peace, it acts contrary to unity, disregards justice and jeopardises freedom. These reservations against the treaties cannot be overcome by a resolution by the Bundestag nor by a preamble to the ratification acts. Such one-sided declarations would not make the least difference to the contents of the treaties.

The Rheinische Merkur, a paper supporting the CDU/CSU, explained in detail which consequences would follow a possible agreement

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62 Frankfurter Rundschau, 2 May 1972.

63 Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 May 1972.
by the CDU/CSU to the treaties. This would irritate the conservative voter and possibly cause the foundation of a new party which was more oriented towards the 'right'. "It does not take a computer to work out from which party such a new party would gain its votes". 64

Strauss, however, saw tactical advantages in his apparent conciliatory stance. The working out of a joint resolution allowed the CDU/CSU to present its own draft which caused the Government acute embarrassment by using the Government's own statements for domestic consumption over the preceding years.

As early as 2 May the CDU/CSU had indicated that utterances from Government members made in speeches and statements in the Bundestag and in the respective committees could be used as the basis for a joint draft resolution. On 3 May the Opposition published 'their' draft resolution. 65 Here the Opposition's main concern was that the modus-vivendi character of the German-Soviet treaty was stressed and that the reunification of Germany would not be ruled out; in short, that the treaties would not have the effect of a boundary treaty and thus were not of legal nature. The renunciation of force was thus the 'core' of the treaty and not just a 'substantial part'. Furthermore the Opposition requested that, after an agreement on this question, the Soviet Union should not only accept the parliamentary resolution without objections but also approve it under international law. 66

While attempts were made on different levels to reach an agreement between Government and Opposition, it was of course difficult for the Government to explain that their own statements

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64 Otto R. Roegele, Gemeinsamkeit - aber welche? in Rheinischer Merkur, No. 18, 5 May 1972.
65 FAZ, 3 May 1972; Wortlaut des von der CDU/CSU vorgelegten Entschiessungsentwurfes, in Die Welt, 4 May 1972.
66 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 May 1972; Die Welt, 3 May 1972.
in the *Bundestag* were not necessarily suitable for a parliamentary resolution. The Minister of the Chancellor's Office, Horst Ehmke, tried to solve this problem: "... one cannot accomplish a task like this which is connected with great responsibilities particularly for the Government by simply picking a few sentences out of various documents which were not intended for international use [!] and then somehow putting these sentences together".  

Herbert Wehner evaded such difficulties with great skill. Based on the assumption that the chances for an agreement with the Opposition were in any case 'quite insignificant' he stated: "Foreign policy treaties are not material for games on a domestic policy football field". He warned that the striving for a joint resolution by the *Bundestag* contained the danger of becoming a 'treaty on the treaty'. He told the CSU and "besides the CDU" that it was "a bad joke" that a signed treaty which had already been ratified in Moscow could not be passed by the Parliament in Bonn until the Soviet Union had further bound itself under international law on a resolution of the German *Bundestag* which had not even been completed. "The treaties have been negotiated and are signed. The treaties themselves cannot be altered". If the CSU was of the opinion that these treaties were bad "for domestic and foreign policy" they could vote "no". "... Nobody could deny this right". But "all this" was anyhow only a "screen" behind which the CDU/CSU tried to blame the SPD and FDP for "allegedly not having done enough in order to make the treaties acceptable for the CDU/CSU". As the Opposition could determine the limit of agreement between Government and Opposition, Barzel was only intent on gaining time to hide this fact from the public. In other respects President Nixon's

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visit to Moscow and the planned NATO Council meeting in Bonn did not allow any further delay: "On Tuesday and Wednesday it will have to be decided".  

Generally the leadership of the SPD expressed themselves far more moderately but they went along with Wehner's opinion that "the decision on the Eastern treaties has to be arrived at at last". However, a few hours later this decision was again deferred: Barzel and the CDU/CSU believed that not enough had yet been achieved by way of new agreements. The Government tried to make it easier for the Opposition to approve of the treaties by allowing CDU-MP Birrenbach to have read to him in the Foreign Ministry the minutes of the Moscow treaty negotiations. It was also hoped that talks between US Secretary of State Rogers and Messrs Brandt, Scheel and particularly Barzel would bring new progress. Rainer Barzel declared that on Tuesday, 9 May, the Opposition would decide on their final stand.  

In the period leading up to the Opposition's decision, negotiations were carried on between the Government and Opposition sides through a variety of contacts. The most important, apart from the meetings of the four party leaders, was the drafting committee consisting of Franz Josef Strauss, Chairman of the CDU/CSU working Committee on Foreign Affairs, Werner Marx, the Minister of the Interior, FDP-MP Genscher and Head of the Chancellor's Office, SPD-MP Professor Ehmke. From the perspective of this thesis it is significant to note that these arrangements by and large by-passed the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee.

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69 Herbert Wehner zur Situation um die Ratifizierung der Ostverträge, *Die Woche in Bonn*, Norddeutscher Rundfunk, 6 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang IV.


71 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 6 May 1972.
Not only was the Committee forum ignored at this crucial stage, but of the members of the drafting body only Marx was a full Committee member. Strauss had the status of an alternate Committee member, but it is clear that both Marx and Strauss were chosen in capacities other than those connected with the Foreign Affairs Committee. Strauss, of course, was leader of the CSU, while Marx's position as head of the CDU/CSU working group and as party spokesman on foreign affairs was clearly the reason for his selection. Moreover, both were known as opponents of Ostpolitik and therefore convenient choices for Barzel since they would then be responsible for any compromise. On the Government side both Genscher and Ehmke were selected as Cabinet members and not as representatives of the parliamentary party to say nothing of the Foreign Affairs Committee. In sum, in this situation where the stakes were immense for the power of the Government and Opposition, the vital decision-making functions were assumed by the highest party leaders leaving no role for the Committee to work out a compromise solution oriented towards the substance of policy.

In any case, the deliberations of the party leaders and of the drafting committee had less to do with matters of substance than with face-saving manoeuvres.

During the meetings of the drafting committee efforts focused on how Moscow was supposed to accept a decision of the West German Bundestag and on the question of "self-determination". Parliamentary secretary of the CDU Olaf von Wrangel had publicly admitted that if the CDU/CSU insisted on their goals, this would bring about new negotiations with Moscow. Chairman of the CDU/CSU party working committee on foreign policy Werner Marx had also stated that a parliamentary resolution was only meaningful if it was "interpreted in the

72 Die Welt, 6-7 May 1972; Karl Wienand zur Situation in Bonn, Interview, Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 6 May 1972, in BPA, Abt. N., Anhang VI.

73 Olaf von Wrangel zur Ratifizierung der Ostverträge, Interview, Saarländerischer Rundfunk, 7 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang IX.
same way by the German and by the Soviet side". It was not only unusual in international practice but quite absurd that Moscow should agree to new negotiations and explicitly declare the CDU/CSU's interpretation of the treaty as binding for the Soviet Union. It was always clear that nothing could be factually changed in the treaties and the Soviet interpretation of the treaties. In actual fact they represented a boundary treaty and - if one likes - a confirmation of the fears held by the CDU/CSU. Theoretically it was only a treaty on renunciation of force.

While the Government could refer to one side or the other according to the requirements of the situation, the Opposition had to content themselves with the theoretical aspect of the treaties if they wanted to have even a small influence on the German interpretation of the treaties. This was a difficult task for a party which normally preferred to follow a 'realistic' and practical foreign policy. This 'ambiguity' in the treaties was described by Werner Marx in a very picturesque, if simplified, manner as "politics of winking", the reasons for which were possibly different "within [Germany] and outside".

Herbert Wehner marked the Opposition by saying there was nothing to be decided as some people were only "fumbling with a legend". Marx reacted angrily charging that Wehner had made it quite clear that he did not wish an agreement. He claimed Wehner would feel "the striving for an agreement ... as obstructive", regarded "the whole affair as not serious" and regarded "the treaties actually more ... as a weapon in the domestic policy battle ... than as an element of serious foreign policy".  

74 Werner Marx zur Behandlung der Ostverträge, Bericht aus Bonn, Deutsches Fernsehen, 5 May 1972, in BPA, Abt. N., Anhang X.
75 Ibid.; Werner Marx zu den Bemühungen um die Ostverträge, Mittags-Magazin, Norddeutscher Rundfunk II, 6 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang XII.
76 Ibid.
77 Werner Marx zu Fragen der Ostverträge, Politik der Woche, Süddeutscher Rundfunk, 6 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang XI.
In his anger Marx expressed, on 7 May, why he found the treaties to be disturbing: "One has to look closely at the contents, the implications which they have, the consequences for us. I regard all this as exactly that which Herbert Wehner in his own drastic language once called 'a disaster of policy!'". To prevent Herbert Wehner's policy from becoming a disaster for the CDU/CSU as well, Marx made it quite clear that the CDU/CSU did not feel defenceless in any way: "If there is no agreement ... on a joint resolution we will of course issue our own resolution and present this resolution for a vote in the Bundestag".

Confusion over this situation must have been felt by the CDU/CSU expellees' MPs. Theoretically they could have been indifferent to the efforts for agreement between Government and Opposition; as far as they were concerned the Eastern treaties were out of line with the constitution, with or without a resolution. In practice, however, CSU-MP and expellee representative Czaja pointed out the dangers to which Rainer Barzel had exposed himself within his party: "We observe very closely on whom we can rely in serious difficulties. We are not a sponsoring party for those who want to avoid responsibilities. We are prepared to support those who help us!"

Der Spiegel reported that some groups within the CDU/CSU already backed Gerhard Schroeder as the Opposition's new candidate for the Chancellorship.

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78 Werner Marx zu den Kontroversen um die Ostverträge und über die Situation nach 'stattgehabter' Entscheidung, Interview der Woche, Deutschlandfunk, 7 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang XIII.

79 Werner Marx zu Fragen der Ostverträge, Politik der Woche, Sueddeutscher Rundfunk, 6 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang XI.

80 Rede des Präsidenten Dr. Herbert Czaja MdB auf der Deutschland- Kundgebung des Bundes der Vertriebenen am 7.5.1972 auf dem Bonner Marktplatz, unkorrigiertes Manuskript; see also: Rede des Vizepräsidenten Dr. Herbert Hupka MdB auf der Deutschland-Kundgebung des Bundes der Vertriebenen am 7.5.1972 auf dem Bonner Marktplatz, unkorrigiertes Manuskript.

81 Der Spiegel, No. 20, 8 May 1972.
The so-called 'week of harmony' thus had existed only for Rainer Barzel and a few CDU politicians on the one side and Willy Brandt and some Ministers on the other side. Gerhard Schroeder, in the presence of Government members, had described Barzel's unrelenting efforts for an agreement on a parliamentary resolution as useless: "The treaties interpret themselves". Rainer Barzel himself must have known that. However, he wanted to rid himself of the problems of Ostpolitik which were irksome with respect to new elections and international contacts and was looking for a way to achieve this without any great loss of face for himself and his party. The question was in how far the CSU, parts of the CDU, parts of the SPD around Herbert Wehner and the Soviet Government were prepared to help him in this task.

The Tactics of Franz Josef Strauss in the Drafting Committee

Help alone was not quite enough: in order to prevent a split in his parliamentary party over this question Rainer Barzel also needed time. More time was requested by the CDU the first thing on Monday morning, 8 May. The statement of US Secretary of State Rogers to Barzel that in view of the Vietnam crisis it was not certain whether President Nixon would visit the Soviet Union at the scheduled time was used to justify further delay. Also, CDU-MP and opponent to the treaties Kurt Birrenbach claimed he needed at least 'a fortnight' in order to gain a general view from the minutes of the Moscow meetings. And Franz Josef Strauss declared: "I think ... this haste is wrong". Since the Eastern treaties had been discussed for such a long time, he argued that "a few more weeks would not matter".

Herbert Wehner reacted immediately: the debate on the treaties would commence in the Bundestag as scheduled on Tuesday. An agreement with the Opposition was possible, he

82 Ibid.
stated, but this was now "entirely up to the Opposition". Franz Josef Strauss had seen the possibility of an agreement with the accommodation by the opposite side: the Government and the Soviet Union. "After today's talks" - referring to a meeting of the CSU leadership in Munich - the CSU would insist that the Soviet Union confirm the joint resolution by the Bundestag as the Soviet interpretation of the treaty "through a corresponding announcement under international law". Armed with the decision of the CSU leadership Strauss could risk entering the decisive talks with the Government as the CSU's representative on the drafting committee.

Before the final and decisive meeting of the drafting committee, Ehmke, on 7 May, met with the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn to determine how flexible the Soviet position was. Misunderstandings arising at this meeting would have major repercussions affecting Strauss' tactical position and the mood of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party. According to Ehmke, Falin gave his approval to a draft resolution incorporating the CDU/CSU view that the treaties did not present a legal basis for the existing boundaries - an approval apparently based on the misconception that the draft had been agreed to by Government and Opposition.

On the basis of this Ehmke gained Strauss' approval for an overall resolution in which the CSU leader gave up his earlier demand for a statement advocating the reunification of the nation. Strauss' agreement was contingent upon final Soviet acceptance of the border clause and approval by the CDU/CSU parliamentary party.

There are two alternative ways of judging Strauss' tactics:

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84 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 9 May 1972.

85 Stuttgarter Zeitung, 9 May 1972.

1. Either the leader of the CSU had 'capitulated' and had no more decisive reservations against the Eastern treaties after the agreement on the joint resolution; or

2. he assumed that Ehmke had made a tactical mistake and that either the SPD or the Soviet Government would not go along with a resolution of this nature.

If Strauss indeed was assuming a tactical error on Ehmke's part, he would have achieved the absolute optimum: the treaties could be rejected; the 'fault' would lie with Ehmke and the Government who could not compel the Soviet Union or their own parliamentary party to go along after the drafting committee had agreed on a compromise with the CDU/CSU.

Even according to some public servants in the Foreign Ministry, Ehmke had made 'a mistake' by accepting Strauss' demand concerning borders. Members of the Ministry told the author that they, in contrast to the Federal Chancellor, had warned Horst Ehmke against accepting publicly the so-called 'Strauss paragraph' which had been drafted by the Ministry itself but had only been intended for 'use within Germany'.

Although this would not change anything concerning the rights and duties under the treaties, the Soviet Union might possibly raise objections for 'reasons of prestige'. Furthermore, the 'moral impulse' of the treaties, acknowledging the errors of the past, would be lost to a large extent. Some SPD-MPs, in talks with the author, expressed similar opinions, particularly with regard to the second part of the argument.

Further Confusion Strengthens Confrontation Tactics

With Falin's 'approval' Strauss' hopes for avoiding the opprobrium for rejecting the treaties now rested solely with the SPD parliamentary party led by Herbert Wehner. The problem was that the CDU/CSU had to deal with the issue before the meeting of its Government counterpart. The attitudes of Strauss and Marx are suggested by the fact that during the CDU/CSU parliamentary party meeting neither spoke in favour of the

86a This account was confirmed by E. Sellmann. Interview Sellmann III.
agreement which they had negotiated. Werner Marx even stated that the deliberations in the drafting committee "had not quite finished yet" and that "one point" was still to be agreed upon.

While several MPs had spoken in favour of the treaties, several leading CDU politicians, among them Barzel's competitors Schroeder and Kohl, strongly opposed CDU/CSU support of the Eastern treaties. Furthermore, a number of CSU-MPs announced their strict opposition to the treaties and said that an agreement was 'unthinkable'. Journalist Klaus R. Dreher commented: "It is equally unthinkable that they should have formed this opinion against the opinion of their Chairman".

In this volatile situation the news broke that Moscow had reversed Falin's acceptance of the border clause. The meeting immediately broke up amid expressions of confusion, anger and outrage. Within a few hours, however, the Russian position was again reversed for reasons which remain obscure. Barzel, claiming he was still confused by developments, said he needed sleep and could not be contacted by Foreign Affairs officials, despite repeated efforts during the night.

The next day, when the vote on the Eastern treaties was scheduled, the CDU/CSU unanimously came out in opposition and threatened to reject the treaties if a vote was forced. Herbert

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87 FAZ, 10 May 1972.
89 Ibid.
90 This later assumed significance as Barzel was ridiculed both by the Government and Franz Josef Strauss for his conduct during a period of crisis.
91 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 May 1972; FAZ, 12 May 1972; Der Spiegel, No. 21, 15 May 1972.
Wehner was in no mood to yield to the threats of the Opposition. While he could hardly argue the point in public, Wehner saw the electoral advantage of pushing for a vote on the treaties even if the result was negative. Wehner, however, was finally stopped by the Government which was more concerned over the fate of the treaties and agreed to a further delay of the vote.

Although Barzel and the Government, after new negotiations, agreed to the previous resolution, Wehner and Strauss stuck to their guns. Wehner did his best to provoke the CDU/CSU hardliners by declaring the resolution "legal bullshit", and further claimed that a Bundestag resolution was of no significance in the field of foreign relations which were solely a responsibility of the Government. Rainer Barzel attempted to ignore Wehner's barbs and convince his parliamentary party to accept the resolution. The barbs of Strauss, however, carried greater weight within the CDU/CSU. Strauss declared that he would split the Opposition if there were any 'yes' votes in favour of the treaties from the Opposition. As a result most Opposition members abstained while a few hardliners voted against the treaties.

Franz Josef Strauss had been guided throughout by the view that a 'yes' from the Opposition would have to be paid for by the loss of too many votes from the right. But because he did not succeed in creating a situation where the SPD parliamentary party would provide sufficient excuses for a 'no' from the Opposition, the Ostpolitik issue became a positive factor for the Government in the subsequent Federal election. Wehner and Strauss had both attempted to place the responsibility for

92 Der Spiegel, No. 21, 15 May 1972.
93 Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag (Ed. K. Wienand), Tagesdienstausgabe 305, 10 May 1972.
94 Die Zeit, No. 20 and 22, 19 May and 2 June 1972; Der Spiegel, No. 21 and 22, 15 and 22 May 1972; FAZ, 12 May 1972; Rheinischer Merkur, 12 May 1972; Frankfurter Rundschau, 17 May 1972.
failure - a failure they both had hoped for - in the efforts to reach a bipartisan agreement at each other's doorstep. In the end Strauss completed what Wehner had regarded as his task: to increase the unpopularity of Rainer Barzel and provide the Government with a decisive advantage in the election campaign as a result of the CDU/CSU abstaining on a fundamental foreign policy issue.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, in the mid-1950s the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee exercised little independent influence on German foreign policy. By the 1960s, however, following the adoption of a new foreign policy approach by the SPD, the Foreign Affairs Committee began to exert influence through the use of integrative politics. Thus in such diverse cases as the Jaksch-Report, the Franco-German Treaty and the Mundat Forest Treaty, the Committee had a major influence on foreign policy outcomes. In this period a tradition of Committee involvement in foreign affairs grew within the Federal Republic. Committee members came to jealously guard their perceived rights and responsibilities in the foreign policy sphere. Yet after more than a dozen years of the development of such a tradition, the Foreign Affairs Committee was essentially impotent during the Ostpolitik crisis of 1972 - despite the fact that under the Bundestag standing orders its action was required on the related treaties. How did this state of affairs come to pass?

The impotence of the Committee grew out of the larger situation in German politics. The crucial factor was nearly equal division of the Parliament between Government and Opposition plus the volatility of a handful of key votes. Thus at any moment it was possible to imagine the SPD-FDP coalition being removed from office and replaced by the CDU/CSU and, moreover, to believe that new Federal elections would in any case be imminent. Ironically, this very situation which emasculated the Committee served to greatly enhance the influence of Parliament as a whole. With the very fate of the
Government hanging on a parliamentary vote on Ostpolitik, the need of both sides to gain a majority gave great weight to those wavering elements of Parliament who had to be won over. In this sense the ability of the full Bundestag to modify Government policy was significant.

In these circumstances divisive politics formed a prominent but not the sole feature of political developments. Within the Bundestag MPs on both sides and particularly leaders Wehner and Strauss were constantly conscious of the consequences of their positions on Ostpolitik for both the survival of the Government and the expected elections. This could not be the only factor, however, because the substance of Ostpolitik was a vital concern to both individual politicians and important sections of the German public on policy and ideological grounds. Even Wehner saw important intrinsic value in the success of Ostpolitik as a way of absolving the German nation for the sins of the past. Moreover, the Government itself tended to place at least equal weight on securing the passage of the treaties as on any electoral advantage. Thus in the last stages of the crisis it was willing to yet again postpone a vote on the treaties in hopes of obtaining backing. The Opposition, too, was constrained from taking a totally partisan stance. This was both because there were elements of the CDU who also saw the benefits of Ostpolitik and, more significantly, because of the heavy international pressures from both East and West seeking CDU/CSU approval.

While this mixture of divisive and limited integrative politics enhanced the influence of the full House, it was not conducive to influence by the Foreign Affairs Committee. First of all, the critical nature of the decision for the survival of the Government shifted the focus of political activity to a level above the Foreign Affairs Committee - to the leaders of the parties themselves. Moreover, the heavy intrusion of divisive politics into the unfolding events created an atmosphere of tension, rhetoric and suspicion. This atmosphere
was not suitable for the kind of substantive policy discussions backed by expertise which had been the hallmark of integrative politics within the Committee.

While the elements of integrative politics which did exist could come to the fore at various points in the drama on the floor of the House, these tentative elements lacked the stability required by the working methods of the Committee.
CONCLUSION

The Reality and Limits of Committee Influence

The first aim of this thesis was to demonstrate, in contrast to the assertions of various analysts, that parliamentary Committees can, under certain conditions, exert influence over the conduct of foreign policy. In the first six case studies, varying degrees of influence have been shown.

At an impressionistic level one can see greater or lesser degrees of influence in the various cases. Thus, the successful insistence of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee on a preamble to the Franco-German Treaty clearly reflected greater Committee influence than the Australian Joint Parliamentary Committee's Report on Aid, the recommendations of which became policy less because of the political strength of the Committee than because of similar views within the Whitlam Government.

In other cases, however, it is more difficult to say precisely where the greater influence was exerted. Thus, although in the case of the blockade of the Mundat Forest Treaty, the Committee exerted what is perhaps the ultimate degree of influence, this can be seen as a relatively insignificant issue.

In contrast, in the NATO decision the Committee was unable to secure the policies it desired but it nevertheless played a major role in forcing the Prime Minister to alter significantly his objectives in the most important foreign policy decision taken in post-war Canada.

In which case can the Committee's influence be said to be greater?

It is useful to make another comment concerning influence. Influence can be perceived as being either direct or indirect. Direct influence can be conceived as occurring in cases where the Committee's position is actually realised in the nation's foreign policy as a result of either the constitutional powers or political and/or persuasive force of the Committee.
blockage of the Mundat Forest Treaty and the preamble to the Franco-German Treaty are both cases in which the Bundestag Committee used its constitutional power of acting on treaties to secure or enforce acceptance of its views.

In the case of the West Indian Sugar Agreement, however, the Canadian Senate Committee lacked such legislative powers. Instead, it relied on its expertise and persuasiveness to convince the relevant foreign policy decision-makers of the wisdom of its views.

Indirect influence can be seen in those cases where the Committee either did not secure all of its objectives or only set broad outlines for future Government policy. As indicated above, the NATO decision was a prime example of the first type of situation. The second set of circumstances can be seen in the case of the Jaksch-Report, where the Committee's action served to indicate that a political climate existed in Germany upon which new policy initiatives could be taken.

It is important to re-emphasise that the first six case studies of this thesis were selected with a view to demonstrating the possibility of parliamentary Committee influence on foreign policy. Thus, these cases cannot necessarily be considered as representative of Committee performances in general. Indeed, the studies of the post-EDC period and Ostpolitik demonstrate that even in the German system, where the Committee was most powerful both in terms of legal rights and political tradition, the Committee could be essentially impotent if certain conditions existed. Thus, a major conclusion of this thesis is that in parliamentary systems Foreign Affairs Committees can exert influence - not that they invariably do exert influence.

In the following section we shall attempt to delineate the factors which enable Foreign Affairs Committees to exert influence. The question immediately arises, however, of the extent to which there are common factors transcending individual political systems which determine political influence. Clearly,
the different legal norms of the German, Canadian and Australian systems determine to a significant degree the possibilities for influence.

Gordon Reid has suggested "... that if the legislative function is weak ... the ability of the Houses to control the bureaucracy is also weak ....".¹ To this, I would add 'all other things being equal'. But in politics all other factors are rarely equal. While the above case studies generally support Reid's assertion, their larger contribution is to focus on the other political factors. It is in such political factors that commonalities across systems are revealed — commonalities in the types of political behaviour which are likely to lead or not to lead to political influence.

The Politics of Influence

What then can be identified as possible key factors enhancing Committee influence? As already indicated legal powers have considerable bearing on the influence which Committees can exert.

The provision of the Bundestag standing orders that a treaty must be reviewed by the Committee before it can come before the full House for ratification has significantly contributed to the fact that the German Committee has been the most powerful of the three examples.

While the crucial importance of the Committee's legal powers was evident in the case of the Mundat Forest Treaty, these powers, while significant, are only a partial explanation of the Committee's success in obtaining a preamble to the Franco-German Treaty. The international pressures (see below) brought to bear in this case were, among other factors, needed to galvanise the Committee into making use of its legal powers.

The case of Ostpolitik demonstrated that the mere existence of such legal powers does not guarantee their conversion into political influence if the broader context is unfavourable.²

Perhaps the best summation of the role of legal powers is to say that they provide the German Committee, but far less so the Canadian and least of all the Australian Committee, with tools which skilled politicians can use to enhance Committee influence provided that wider political circumstances do not inhibit such action.

Another factor to be considered is the Committee's relationship with the bureaucracy. It might be hypothesised that the influence of a Committee is enhanced when it develops close co-operative ties with the foreign policy bureaucrats. Indeed, in the case of the Jaksch-Report such co-operation was maintained and it facilitated the education of various political actors on the Committee which, in turn, aided the achievement of the political consensus upon which new initiatives to the East could be based. In other cases, the bureaucracy provided the Committee with information and opinions which contributed to the persuasiveness of the Committee's position. In yet further cases, however, the bureaucracy's position vis-a-vis the Committee was not one of harmonious support. In the Mundat Forest Treaty, for example, the Committee flatly rejected the position of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In the case of post-EDC foreign policy, the bureaucracy's actions served to support the Government's position and not to develop an independent Committee influence.

In the Australian Aid case, the bureaucracy was divided within itself with Foreign Affairs officials resisting the Committee's recommendations while the new Aid Agency co-operated closely with the Australian Government to supplement the policies which the Committee had recommended.

² As indicated in Chapter Eight, legal powers of Parliament under the peculiar circumstances of Ostpolitik did secure some influence for Parliament as a whole, but not for the Committee.
Thus, no clear pattern emerges, but it is very apparent that bureaucratic support is not a necessary consideration for Committee influence.

In contrast, international factors were generally potent weapons in the hands of parliamentary Committees. In most cases examined in this thesis, the influence of the Committee was enhanced by its ability to draw support for its position from the international environment.

In some cases this took the form of palpable pressures from foreign actors. Thus, in the case of the Franco-German Treaty, concern expressed not only by the American and West European Governments, but also by leaders of various European political parties and representatives of European supranational organisations provided political muscle for the Committee in its dealings with Adenauer. Similarly, in Canada's Sugar decision the arguments of the Committee were backed up by the strong protests of the West Indian Governments. In a somewhat different fashion the opinions of West European Governments and party leaders profoundly influenced the Canadian Commons Committee which in turn was able to muster enough support to force a modification in Trudeau's plans for NATO. The international environment, moreover, can be conditioned by forces much less direct than pressures from foreign actors.

Hence, in the case of the Jaksch-Report, perceptions of a changed international environment as a result of the first moves towards détente aided those arguing for a more flexible foreign policy. Even the strongest international pressures, however, do not guarantee Committee influence. The Ostpolitik case demonstrated the ability of German politicians to resist massive pressures from both allies and potential foes. In this case, the Committee was unable to use such pressures to build support for a substantive compromise because of divisions within the wider context of German politics.

This brings us to the main analytic concept of this thesis - that Committee action can be characterised as either
integrative or divisive politics. These contrasting approaches were introduced in general terms in the Introduction and have played prominent roles in the analysis of each case study.

It is now appropriate to look in more detail at the concept of integrative politics.

First, let us look at the aims of integrative politics. The basic aim of integrative politics is to influence the substance of foreign policy. This can be either via actions within the Committee's own powers (e.g. the blockage of the Mundat Forest Treaty) or by influencing Government decisions (e.g. Canada's NATO policy). By focusing on the substance of policy, Committee members, consciously or unconsciously, sacrifice short-term partisan advantage. When divisive politics are pursued, the aim becomes less the substance of policy and more the adjustment of the balance of power between Government and Opposition, either by seeking defections of backbenchers or by enhancing the electoral position of the respective sides. The concern is not with foreign policy per se but with the domestic power implications of alternative foreign policies.

Let us now turn to the environment of integrative politics. Integrative politics cannot function in an atmosphere of diametrically-opposed foreign policies between Government and Opposition (e.g. as at the time of EDC). There must be a degree of commitment to common objectives so that the major parties can compromise and so avoid being forced into a situation of permanent confrontation. Moreover, such an environment requires a sufficient parliamentary majority to guarantee the continued tenure in office of the Government.

When such a majority does not exist (e.g. in the case of the Ostpolitik), then the temptations for deriving a partisan advantage will probably favour the use of divisive politics. A corollary to the above is that the environment for integrative politics is enhanced when the various actors are not bound by rigid conceptions of their roles. Thus Opposition politicians should not regard their function as solely one of
opposing the Government, nor should Government backbenchers regard their jobs as defending the Government under all circumstances, if integrative politics are to have a chance to prevail.

If such flexible attitudes are held then fluid coalitions of Government and Opposition parliamentarians can form and have an impact on policy. The required atmosphere of substantive debate will be supported by the presence of adequate knowledge, interest and information on the part of the parliamentarians concerned.

Such knowledge and interest was clearly present in the Canadian NATO and Sugar cases, but was absent to a significant degree in the Australian Aid case. Indeed, it can be said that only pseudo-integrative politics existed in the Australian case. This in turn is related to the number of qualified parliamentarians available for foreign policy positions, which in turn is a function of the size of Parliament. On the Government's side in particular, in the case of a small Parliament such as Australia's, once the 'brain-drain' into Cabinet has taken place, very little talent is left for service on parliamentary Committees.

This leads us to the incentives favouring the use of integrative politics. The basic incentive for integrative politics is that all sides may gain from a compromise. An Opposition which is unable to force its views on the Government through divisive politics can through integrative politics both obtain some influence over the substance of politics and appear to the electorate as a constructive foreign policy actor (e.g. the shift of SPD foreign policy at the time of the Jaksch-Report). The Government can gain by using the Committee as a sounding board (e.g. the Jaksch-Report), and it can benefit from Committee expertise where its own bureaucracy has failed it (e.g. Canadian Sugar).

Other actors also gain from integrative politics. Backbenchers of all persuasions have a chance to influence
policy, and, in the process, to demonstrate their abilities and enhance their future careers. The bureaucracy gains the advantage of having alternative means of influence, other than their ministers, for furthering their pet projects. Of course, in any given case there will be some losers (e.g. Committee-Chairman Wahn in the NATO case). Moreover, in any given case each actor must make a political assessment as to whether integrative politics is likely to further his interests - and it is always possible that some will opt for divisive politics (e.g. Strauss and Wehner in the Ostpolitik). Even more detrimental to the possibility of integrative politics is a structural situation, such as exists in Australia, where the lack of adequate talent on the Government's side of the Committee diminishes the Government's interest in utilising the Committee because it would be at a permanent disadvantage in that forum.

Finally, let us examine the levels of integrative politics. Integrative politics can operate at both the Committee and full Parliament level. While these levels are obviously interrelated, an atmosphere of integrative politics can be maintained in the Committee even when there are significant elements of divisive politics on the floor of the House. This was demonstrated repeatedly in our case studies - the Jaksch-Report, Franco-German Treaty, NATO and West Indian Sugar cases. Indeed, a study of a Canadian parliamentary Committee dealing with domestic policy strongly supports the view that the Committee forum is more conducive to integrative politics than the floor of the House: "... this case study throws new light on the differences between the behaviour of legislators on the floor of the House as contrasted with the 'small group' situation in committees. It is argued that more flexible relationships among the government, parliament and the bureaucracy are possible [in Committees] than either past practice or a rigid theory of responsible government would suggest". ³

Our case studies not only indicate the validity of this distinction in the field of foreign policy, but also they argue that the Committee is dependent upon integrative politics for its influence. In the six case studies where Committee influence was demonstrated, with qualifications in the Australian case, integrative politics played a central role. This was in cases of both direct and indirect influence. While one can conceive of hypothetical cases where the Committee could exert influence in the absence of integrative politics, and it is even more possible to imagine a Government successfully resisting the views of a Committee practising integrative politics, nevertheless, the cases examined in this thesis suggest a strong link between Committee influence and integrative politics. Indeed, these cases provide sufficient empirical evidence for the proposition that integrative politics is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Committee influence. This conclusion was particularly underlined by our last two case studies where, despite the existence of important legal powers, the Committee failed to exert influence as it was overwhelmed by divisive politics.

For those who adhere to the theory of responsible Government, the above conclusions could raise some concern. Committee influence, it is clear, can be at the expense of the Foreign Minister who is responsible theoretically for foreign policy. Of course, as we have seen in the NATO case, this responsibility can also be under challenge from the head of Government, the Prime Minister.

For those who perceive the danger of Government co-option of the Committee through the pursuit of integrative politics as a reason for restricting the Committee's role, the practical alternative, at least in the field of foreign policy, is free rein for the bureaucracy and the Government. Finally, integrative politics provides an ironic twist to Bernard Crick's
classic definition⁴ of control: Control means influence, but it also can mean direct power; advice, and sometimes command; criticism and upon occasion even obstruction; scrutiny, and sometimes policy initiative; and occasionally publicity but more often discretion.

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The West German and Australian Government documents could not be cited in footnotes for reasons of confidentiality. Rather I have cited particular individuals who gave me the same information in personal interviews. These interviews were conducted over a period of six years. After I had opened up the research via these interviews it became possible in many instances to locate corroborating evidence in newspapers and journals. These references are also cited. (Continued on p. 3069)

The following persons provided substantial assistance through granting interviews:

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M.D. Cross, MP
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Orbis
Parliamentarian
Parliamentary Affairs
Politische Vierteljahresschrift
Saturday Night
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer

Newspapers, Weekly Magazines

Allgemeine Frankfurter Neue Presse
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte
Bayerische Presse
Bild am Sonntag
Canberra Times
Cape Breton Post
Chronicle Herald (Halifax)
Citizen (Ottawa)
Corma Brook Western Star
Das Parlament
Deutsche Zeitung
Der Spiegel
Die Welt
Die Zeit
Far Eastern Economic Review
Financial Post
Financial Review
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Frankfurter Rundschau
Free Press (Winnipeg)
Gazette (Montreal)
Globe and Mail
Handelsblatt
Herald Tribune (New York)
Journal (Edmonton)
Koelnische Rundschau
Le Devoir
Manchester Guardian
Nation Review
National Times
Neue Ruhr Zeitung
Neue Zuercher Zeitung
New York Times
News Chronicle
Rheinische Post
Star (Toronto)
Star (Montreal)
Stuttgarter Zeitung
Sueddeutsche Zeitung
Sun (Vancouver)
Sydney Morning Herald
Telegram (Toronto)
The Age
The Australian
Times
Welt am Sonntag
Whig-Standard (Kingston)

See next page, p.t.o.
The Australian newspapers listed above were consulted for the period January 1971 to October 1975.

As for the newspapers and weekly magazines dealing with the Canadian and West German case studies only topical and relevant paper cuttings have been consulted.

In Canada those cuttings had been prepared by the Ministry of External Affairs and the Parliamentary Library in Ottawa. The cuttings covered the period from January 1967 to June 1973.

In Germany I consulted cuttings of the Staatsbibliothek Hamburg, the Library of the West German Bundestag and the cuttings prepared by the SPD-Arbeitskreis "Außenpolitik". The periods covered are: January to December 1954; December 1956 to August 1963; November 1971 to July 1972.