

THE PRIMARY ORGANISATIONS OF THE
SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY IN
NON-PRODUCTION INSTITUTIONS

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(i)

STATEMENT

I hereby declare that this thesis has not already been accepted in substance for any degree. It is the result of my own independent investigation, and all authorities and sources which have been consulted are acknowledged in the bibliography and notes.

Signed: 

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Naturally neither Dr Rigby nor Dr Miller has ever attempted to exert any more than a supervisory influence on my work. Therefore any opinions expressed in the thesis are entirely my own.

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SYNOPSIS

The thesis examines the powers and tasks of primary party organisations (PPO's) in non-production institutions in terms of a concept I have called "staff generalism". Based on a number of Western line-staff models the concept proposes that a PPO's principal task is to monitor and work for long-term improvement in the performance of its "host" organisation. The closely integrated nature of the PPO's relationship with the "host" organisation provides the setting for the performance of this task, while a limited number of powers, formally summed up in the "right of control" but greatly variable in practice, provide the means.

The empirical evidence presented in the thesis indicates that while "staff generalism" provides a good basic understanding of the intended and actual activities of PPO's, a number of other factors must be considered. They also have extensive and important ideological tasks not fully explained by "staff generalism"; the Soviet authorities appear to expect, and gain, a greater degree of involvement in short-term operations than is allowed for by "staff generalist" principles; and a large amount of illegal and semi-legal PPO-"host" organisation collusion prevents a proper "staff generalist" performance.

These findings are derived from a considerable amount of empirical analysis of PPO ideological and operational activities. (Chapter One examines ideological activities; Chapter Two, PPO powers; and Chapter Three their operational activities.) Other chapters devote specific attention to case studies of PPO behaviour. (Chapter Four describes the activities of ministerial PPO's since 1965 and Appendix B the role of the PPO of the Moscow Union of Writers in the 1962 to 1964 literary debate.) Chapter Six summarises the effectiveness of PPO's.

The thesis presents and analyses a considerable amount of previously unused information on the work of non-production PPO's. In doing so it has developed, applied and attempted to evaluate a concept previously little known to political scientists. It reaches the conclusion that the concept contributes to an understanding of the Soviet system. It also concludes that the leaders of large-scale Western organisations, with the benefit of Soviet experiences, might use the concept as the basis of a new approach to the functioning of staff agencies in their organisations.

INTRODUCTION

STAFF GENERALISM AND THE PRIMARY ORGANISATIONS
OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY

T.H. Rigby has described the Soviet system in the following terms:

The most salient feature of communist systems is the attempt to run the whole society as a single organization, in which almost no socially significant activities are left to autonomously interacting individuals and groups, but instead are managed by centralized hierarchical agencies, themselves subject to close coordination, principally by the apparatus of the party ... Societies with these characteristics might be called mono-organizational.¹

One of the most useful aspects of such a view of the Soviet system is that it allows us to apply Western organisational theory to the Soviet case. If we accept

1 Rigby, T.H.: "'Totalitarianism' and Change in Communist Systems", *Comparative Politics*, vol. 4, no. 3, April, 1972, p. 451.

the *whole* Soviet system as one large bureaucratic organisation, by analogy we can apply to it models and theories which in the Western situation, with its plethora of autonomous organisations interacting largely through market forces, could only be applied to single organisations. Alfred Meyer, although he could be criticised for using it in little more than a metaphorical sense, draws strong attention to this possibility in his article "USSR, Incorporated" and book "The Soviet Political System; an interpretation".¹

I would like to narrow the analogy somewhat and examine one section of the Soviet system, the primary party organisations (PPO's) in non-production institutions, in the light of some Western theories on line-staff relations. This general introduction will show that the line-staff approach could perhaps be most profitably applied to production PPO's. However the lack of specific analyses of non-production PPO's in the Western literature and the interesting and important developments in the powers and functions of these organisations over the last twenty years have prompted me to devote the detailed application of the

1 Meyer, A.G: "USSR Incorporated", in D.W. Treadgold, ed: *The Development of the USSR: an exchange of views*, Uni. of Washington Press, Seattle, 1964; *The Soviet Political System: an interpretation*, Random House, N.Y., 1965.

approach to them rather than production organisations.

Western writers on the Soviet system usually acknowledge the importance of PPO's. However detailed analyses of their activities, particularly within any general framework, are rare.¹ Western books that deal specifically with non-production areas of Soviet society tend similarly to neglect PPO's.² There appears to be a need for a treatment of PPO's within a general theoretical framework. Such a treatment would be of particular

1 Textbooks, such as that by Fainsod, give informative, but brief and essentially descriptive accounts of PPO activities. See Fainsod, M: *How Russia is Ruled*, Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1967, pp. 229-234. Those treatments of the Soviet system which profess to use a general theoretical framework rarely deal with PPO's at all. See, for example, Brzezinski, Z. and S.P. Huntington: *Political Power: USA/USSR*, Viking Press, N.Y., 1965; Meyer, op. cit. As an exception to this one should mention Jerry Hough's book. However he deals almost exclusively with production PPO's. Hough, J.F: *The Soviet Prefects, the local party organs in industrial decision-making*, Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1969.

2 In some cases Western writers seem to completely misunderstand the place of non-production PPO's in the system. For example, B.M. Frolic, in his article on Soviet municipal administration, speaks of the party group of the department of a city Soviet. In fact party groups, as described in Paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Party Rules, exist only in the Soviet itself and its executive committee. Departments have PPO's. It is not a terminological misunderstanding, since he refers to PPO's in production enterprises. In some circumstances the mistake could be of considerable significance, since the subordination of PPO's and party groups can be different. Frolic, B.M: "Municipal Administrations, Departments, Commissions and Organizations", *Soviet Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3, January, 1971, pp. 376-393.

benefit if it were able to provide information on the relatively neglected non-production PPO's. That they make up 41.0% of the total number of PPO's and that their members constitute 25.3% of total party membership should be sufficient to indicate that they deserve detailed investigation.¹

I have based the general theoretical framework of this thesis on Western line-staff theory. However some extensive modifications to what might be called "traditional" line-staff theory are necessary before we have a framework suitable for our purposes. There are two basic features of the "traditional" view of staff agencies. Firstly, staff agencies have specialised skills which they use in advising and assisting the "generalist" line hierarchies in their particular areas of expertise. Secondly, although they might have some limited operational powers in these particular areas, in general it is considered desirable that such operational powers be strictly limited. A staff agency which encroaches too much into the area of line authority is considered likely to stifle line initiative and will eventually be forced to take over all operational activities, with subsequent neglect of its proper staff functions.

1 See Appendix A for more detailed statistical data on non-production PPO's and their members.

If this were the only possible conception of line-staff relations the theory would clearly be unsuitable for a study of PPO's, since they are not specialised agencies and because, although the Soviet authorities recognise and guard against the dangers of excessive party involvement in "line" operations, they do give PPO's considerable formal and informal powers over everyday operations.

However, certain writers on Western organisational theory criticise these very elements of the traditional theory. They criticise it because they feel that it is both a poor reflection of reality and that also the reality it calls for is an undesirable one anyway. What is most interesting for our purposes is that the alternative models these critics have devised call for the development of institutions which, if they were to be introduced into practice, would in many ways resemble PPO's.

I will focus on three particular Western treatments - Sampson and Golembiewski on line-staff models and Burns and Stalker, writing together, on "mechanistic" and "organic"

modes of management.¹

1. Sampson's "staff generalist"

Sampson's treatment is the most straightforward. He criticises the traditional line-staff theory primarily for its over-emphasis on staff specialisation, but his analysis is traditional to the extent that it opposes staff encroachment on line authority. He considers that over-specialisation results in the staff specialist being concerned with only his own narrow ideas and therefore being imperfectly aware of the situation around him.

1 Golembiewski, R.T: *Organizing Men and Power*; patterns of behavior and line-staff models, Rand-McNally, Chicago, 1967; Sampson, R.C: *The Staff Role in Management: its creative uses*, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1956; Burns, T. and G.M. Stalker: *The Management of Innovation*, Tavistock, London, 1961. Although Burns and Stalker are not concerned specifically with line-staff problems, the problems with which they are dealing and the solutions they offer have a lot in common with those of Golembiewski. Certainly they provide the basis for some interesting insights into the Soviet system. Sampson's and Golembiewski's models, although based on empirical observations, are essentially prescriptive. They have apparently never been consciously implemented in practice. The prescriptive element of Burns' and Stalker's analysis goes no further than a call for recognition of the advantages of the processes that they have observed arising in certain empirical circumstances. The analysis in this thesis, while using many of the concepts developed by Burns and Stalker, will contribute little to their further development. However it could contribute considerably to the further development of the other two models by providing the opportunity for empirical testing of their efficacy.

This leads to line-staff conflict and lack of coordination.¹ Staff operational authority stifles line initiative, which, combined with the former difficulties, means that staff tends to become involved in short-term operational activities and that problems come to receive no broad attention at all.²

It is Sampson's treatment of the problem of over-specialisation that is of the greater interest to us. He has two solutions, both of which have some application to the Soviet case. Firstly, he calls for greater use of staff "generalists", that is, staff officers without any particular technical specialties, but with an overall understanding of the policies, structure and operations of the organisation as a whole.³ This concern with overall policy and operational matters does not exclude involvement in the solving of individual operational problems. What he stresses is that the staff generalist should always approach such problem-solving with the eventual aim of not only solving the immediate problem, but also attacking the underlying cause.⁴

1 Sampson, op. cit., p. 29.

2 *ibid*, pp. 30-31.

3 *ibid*, p. 92.

4 *ibid*, p. 101.

The role of the party workers of PPO's appears to be close to that of the staff generalist. Much of this thesis will be concerned with presenting empirical evidence which suggests that PPO's involve themselves in all areas of the activities of their "host" line organisations, including policy-making.¹

Sampson hints at an aspect of "generalist" concern further developed by Burns and Stalker and of fundamental importance to an understanding of the role of PPO's, when he speaks of the staff generalist, also known as the staff representative, as, ideally, behaving in the following way:

The representative views himself as a student who tries gradually to help executives to understand and accept the best of modern thought as far as their own problems are concerned. We might call him 'the persistent conscience of the management'. He exercises a dynamic influence working for better management and stronger managers.²

1 The examination in Chapter 5 of biographical data on PPO secretaries suggests that many of them by training and career backgrounds are "staff generalists". However many others do not have the training and experience that the activities of their PPO's would suggest were necessary for the performance of such a role.

2 *ibid*, p. 110.

There is much about this which reminds us of the "leading" role of PPO's. The members of a PPO are expected to acquaint themselves with the most advanced thought in their areas of concern and to spread it throughout the working collective. The tasks of ministerial PPO's in persuading ministerial leaders to act in the spirit of recent administrative reforms, discussed in Chapter 4, is a good example of this.

The similarity becomes greater when we read that Sampson also gives the staff generalist a "value counselling" role, "for it is axiomatic that to secure a change in behavior, one must first secure a change in attitude and values".¹ Thus the overall view, or ideology, of the staff generalist enables him to inculcate new values among line executives. Although, as will be elaborated later, ideology in the Soviet Union has no true parallels in Western theory or practice, the "value counselling" role of Sampson's staff generalists is interesting in view of the close link between the party's "leading" role and its ideological authority.

Sampson's second solution to the over-specialisation of staff is the integration of line and staff organisations. He calls for an organisational structure in which each line

1 *ibid*, p. 151.

hierarchy has built into it a hierarchy of staff generalist units. These units are assigned to all levels of the line hierarchy.¹ PPO's, being situated directly within and having overlapping memberships with organisations at all levels of the Soviet "line" hierarchies, structurally closely resemble the lowest level staff units prescribed by Sampson.

It cannot be claimed that Sampson's model provides even a close approximation to the structure or functions of PPO's. Specific structural and even functional differences have little effect on the utility of the broad analogy, and Sampson's contribution to it, to be used in this thesis. However one feature of Sampson's model which cannot be included in the concept of staff generalism to be used here is his insistence on the need for the staff units not to exercise any sort of authority over the line, not to involve themselves in any way in operational command or control. In this Sampson aligns himself with the "traditional" view of proper line-staff relations. However, in the Soviet case PPO's do dispose of considerable formal and informal powers to exercise authority over those organisations.

However it could be said that Sampson is contra-

1 ibid, pp. 203-205.

dictory on this point. Although he stresses that staff must not supplant the line, he does throughout his book exhibit a high degree of confidence that his staff generalist units will manage to "persuade" line management of the desirability of the changes they desire. When he describes, in very vague terms, the staff method as "planned opportunism" and declares that the "staff concern will be that of setting up line and fitting staff to it", one wonders how this will be possible without the use of some authority.¹ It appears very unlikely that Sampson would escape the problem of creeping staff encroachment on line authority, with the problems it brings of line-staff conflict and lowered effectiveness of both line and staff organisations. Sampson's problem raises the very important question of how PPO's go about achieving goals similar to those of Sampson's staff units with some, but still limited, formal powers.

Although it would be dangerous to exaggerate the degree to which Sampson's model approximates the functions and structure of PPO's, there are sufficient parallels that some benefit can be obtained from applying it to the Soviet case, mainly in providing hypotheses for empirical testing. For example, Sampson concludes his book by putting forward two objections that could be made to his

1 *ibid*, p. 101, 201.

model. Firstly, that staff generalists will not be able to cope with the range of functions entrusted to them; and secondly, that if they become too closely integrated with line units, they will lose their independence and objectivity.¹ A study of non-production PPO's could help decide whether Sampson's doubts are justified.

2. Golembiewski and the Colleague model

Golembiewski's staff model has many similarities to Sampson's, although he goes further than Sampson in criticising traditional line-staff theories not only for the over-specialisation they demand of staff agencies, but also for their denial of the need for staff operational authority.

He claims that the traditional theory emphasises the superiority of the line hierarchy, denying staff organisations the right to issue operational orders and restricting their role to service and advice.² He feels that such a theory ignores the fact that staff units do in fact, both formally and informally, exercise considerable influence over line organisations, going far beyond service

1 *ibid*, pp. 207-208.

2 Golembiewski, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

and advice. He then goes further in claiming that the traditional theory's denial of staff power and the staff's reaction to this is the root cause of line-staff conflict. The usual reaction is that the staff organisation, equipped with technically well-qualified but organisationally inexperienced specialists with easier access to higher authorities than line officials have, encroach on line authority. This results in line-staff conflict which, whatever its outcome, ensures that neither line nor staff will be doing its job properly.¹

With regard to staff authority Golembiewski takes an opposite point of view to that of Sampson in that he declares staff exercise of power to be a proper and necessary thing, the requirement being to develop some system in which such power will have a place which is recognised as legitimate by the line.

1 Guest describes the process well in the first part of his book on Plant Y. If the conflict continues the different organisations become more concerned with protecting or extending their powers than with the good of the organisation as a whole. This reduces lateral communication and produces an excessive reliance on rules by the defensive organisations, thereby leading to inflexibility and problems of coordination. If the conflict is resolved in the line's favour, the staff usually will end up neglecting its proper control functions; while if the staff wins, the line will abdicate its responsibilities to the staff, which will often prove incapable of fulfilling them and would certainly have to neglect its proper staff duties in order to do so. Guest, R.H: *Organizational Change*; the effect of successful leadership, Tavistock, London, 1962, pp. 24-37.

In the Soviet Union PPO's do have some degree of formal authority over line hierarchies, essentially the powers contained in the right of control. Whether it is considered legitimate by line authorities and whether it reduces or contributes to conflict between party and line organisations are questions to be examined. But Golembiewski's discussion also raises for us the question of whether PPO's find it necessary to go beyond the formal limits of their power, and if so, what forms does such encroachment on line authority take and what effect does it have on party and line organisations and the relations between them.

Golembiewski makes a further point about "cultural" differences between line and staff. It would appear that in Western organisations the staff element tends to be younger, better educated and with less service in the organisation than line officials. Such differences cannot fail to reinforce any tension that might already exist, if not be a source of tension in themselves.¹ It is worth asking ourselves whether the CPSU faces similar problems.

One additional point worth mentioning is that Golembiewski believes the problem of line-staff relations to be particularly critical in times of technological change. He declares that developing technology increases

1 Golembiewski, op. cit., pp. 70-73.

the importance of specialists' occupying those staff positions which carry responsibility for introducing new techniques and procedures and for seeing that they are used properly.¹ This is especially interesting for us in that the Soviet authorities lay particular emphasis on technological development and yet the party apparatus, while concerned to recruit technical specialists into its organisations, does not play a technically specialised role. How it copes, therefore, with technological development will have to be looked at closely.

Integration of line and staff organisations is the basis of Golembiewski's solution to the problems of the traditional theory. He goes further in this than Sampson, apparently removing altogether the structural differentiation between line and staff. His Colleague model calls for the formation of a hierarchy of Colleague units, at each level consisting of officials fulfilling line and staff functions. It is interesting that at the lowest level he sees the assignment of staff "generalists" as being desirable.² Golembiewski hopes that making the Colleague unit as a whole responsible for the successful fulfilment of the tasks around which it is organised will

1 ibid, pp. 43-45.

2 ibid, p. 160.

reduce conflict between line and staff functions, since their relations will be based on close cooperative effort for the success of their collective, rather than a functionally specialised hierarchy; that it will speed up the implementation of new techniques by bringing staff specialists closer to production; that non-conflict-based horizontal communications within groups will largely replace vertical communications along hierarchies; and that close working relations and general lack of conflict will reduce the significance of cultural differences.

This solution bears some similarity to that adopted by the CPSU, with its primary organisations so closely integrated with the "host" non-party organisations. Certainly Golembiewski goes further than this, removing the specialist staff structure altogether and giving the decentralised Colleague unit a far greater degree of autonomy than any low-level organisation in the Soviet Union would ever attain. However the party's solution is close enough to Golembiewski's that it suffers from the same major problem, that of collusion and subsequent loss of control. It appears inevitable that the greater the degree of integration the greater the possibility of collusion. Golembiewski appears to be running the risk of having to establish a whole new staff hierarchy just to control his Colleague units.¹ It appears that at times the party uses

1 *ibid*, pp. 230-231.

its Party Control Committees for this purpose; however on the whole it would appear to prefer to avoid this and rather to strike some uneasy balance between separation and integration; conflict and collusion. An examination of the mechanics of this process will make up an important part of this thesis.

3. Burns' and Stalker's "organic" mode of management

An interesting feature of Golembiewski's treatment is the extent to which his criticisms of the traditional line-staff theory are in fact criticisms of the line hierarchy as much as the staff structure.¹ It can be seen that his solution would modify the line structure as fundamentally as the staff structure.

This provides a link with Burns' and Stalker's treatment of the "mechanistic" and "organic" modes of management. Although they are not specifically concerned with line-staff relations, Burns and Stalker share with Golembiewski a concern with the inadequacy of the traditional "mechanistic" system, in times of change, and develop a solution based on similar principles.

Burns and Stalker describe the traditional system of management as the "mechanistic" mode. It is characterised

1 *ibid*, pp. 31-38.

by such features as functional specialisation; precise definition of roles, rights and obligations; a hierarchical structure of control, authority and communication; vertical rather than horizontal interaction between members of the organisation; and a tendency for operations to be governed by instructions issued by superiors.¹ Although line-staff relations are not specifically mentioned, this system closely resembles the traditional principles of organisational theory attacked by Golembiewski.

Burns and Stalker describe the mode, along with its "organic" opposite, as an ideal type, unlikely to ever exist in pure form; in fact they recognise that elements of the two modes probably exist side by side at the same time.² However in general terms the mechanistic system is suitable for stable conditions, but is not able to cope with changing conditions. The functional specialisation which forms the basis of the mechanistic mode, if the system is to work efficiently, has an inherent need for full definition of the roles and functions of *all* members of the organisation. Anyone whose role is insufficiently defined or overlaps with anyone else's cannot fit into the system, and indeed will probably disrupt it. So once roles and functions are adequately defined the system depends on stability for their maintenance. A change in just one

1 Burns and Stalker, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

2 *ibid*, p. 122.

would necessitate change in a whole host of others.¹

The authors claim that such perfection of definition and such perfect stability is not possible in practice, which explains why there are always some "informal" relations in any organisation, that is, relations outside the formal structure and principles of the mechanistic mode.² Further, their empirical research has indicated that in organisations where instability is endemic, where continual change and innovation is necessary, relations outside the framework of the mechanistic mode become dominant. The extreme case is the "organic" mode of management. The essential principles of the organic mode are a lack of definition or continual redefinition of individual tasks; a network structure of control, authority and communication; lateral rather than vertical interaction of organisation members; and reliance on information and advice rather than

1 *ibid*, pp. 123-124.

2 Informal relations can be mechanistic. Burns and Stalker describe one firm where organisational problems had led to the development of extensive informal relations. However these were of a highly static nature and were based essentially on a strengthening of vertical communications. *ibid*, pp. 99, 238-239.

instructions and decisions.¹ The stress on lateral communications and avoidance of vertical hierarchy calls to mind Golembiewski's Colleague model.²

4. The Soviet case

It could not be said that anything approaching a pure form of the organic system operates in the Soviet Union. It is true that at times, notably in the course of

1 *ibid*, p. 121.

2 It is interesting that the case studies undertaken by Burns and Stalker have uncovered "organic" behaviour and organisation which, although not developed according to any pre-established theory or plan, bear some interesting parallels to the sort of changes demanded by Golembiewski. For example, in one factory where the introduction of a laboratory development team had led to serious conflict with production executives, the managing director abandoned the mechanistic system of dividing the production side of the firm into small departments, each responsible for a single part of the overall process. It was replaced by new "developmental groups", each responsible for production problems as they arose. The result was that jobs took on a more elastic nature and vertical communications were replaced by lateral communications. *ibid*, p. 236. However there was no sign of anyone playing a "staff generalist" role since functionally specialised roles were retained. Something of more relevance to our concerns was the simultaneous development of courses for personnel which entailed not only training in technical matters, but also in managerial methods. Such courses presumably had an important role to play in the psychological preparation of personnel, to facilitate their acceptance of a new organisational "ideology".

crisis campaigns in agriculture, roles and functions have lost most of their formal definition, the local party functionaries taking over from the normal non-party hierarchies and operating in whatever way they feel to be necessary in the circumstances.

However in normal circumstances the Soviet system shows a considerable degree of commitment to the mechanistic mode. There are well-established functional hierarchies with formal definitions of functions and powers, with the stress on a vertical and unitary chain of command.¹ Thus the Soviet system, being one in which change of one kind or another is a significant feature, exhibits many of the problems that strike all mechanistic systems. The existence of functionally-specialised "line" hierarchies leads to a concentration by the members of those hierarchies on their own narrow interests at the expense of the interests of the system as a whole. It is not my task to describe in detail the problems of the Soviet system. Suffice it to say very briefly that the specialised hierarchies produce such problems of "sectionalism" (*vedomstvennost'*) as hoarding of materials and supplies, duplication of ancillary services and manipulation of prices and plan indicators. In the course of this thesis we will see that all the

1 The current concern with computer-based system-wide planning and control would seem to be aiming at the ultimate development of the mechanistic mode.

non-production branches of Soviet society have their own forms of such "sectionalism". The bureaucratic complexities of the system, exacerbated by line hierarchy jealousies, lead to enormous problems of coordination. The effect of these problems is increased by over-centralisation. Because the line hierarchies are essentially concerned with production, and this means in the Soviet Union perhaps more than anywhere else the maximum output in the shortest possible period of time, they tend to concentrate on the short-term at the expense of longer-term and wider considerations such as improved quality, balanced development, capital construction and the development and implementation of new technology.

These are major problems facing the Soviet administrative system today, problems with which the party apparatus is expected to deal. While it would be foolish to claim that the use of the party apparatus is the only means employed to solve these problems, it does seem to be one of the most important. It is hoped that the organisations of the party apparatus, deeply involved in operational activities through their proximity to the line hierarchies, but without the commitment to specialised interests and supposedly without the same absolute dependence on the fulfilment of short-term tasks, will be able to combat the evils of sectionalism, and coordinate the activities of the different line hierarchies, and will have the long-range

view to enable them to see the importance of the most advanced forms of production and management.

It would be tempting to apply the staff generalist approach to the activities of the party apparatus as a whole. Since it is organised on a territorial basis each of its organisations have generalist concerns within its territory, while its hierarchy runs parallel to all non-party hierarchies. Statements on the functions of middle-level party organs such as that made by Fainsod could be taken as suggesting a "staff" role for the party apparatus. He says:

The party leadership holds its local representatives responsible for the fulfilment of plans in all areas and organizations to which they are assigned. To be sure, day-to-day operating responsibilities are vested in the governmental hierarchy of managers and administrators. But every level of the governmental hierarchy is both interpenetrated with, and subject to check by, the corresponding level of the Party hierarchy ... As a matter of accepted practice, (the Party leadership's local emissaries) are expected to keep in touch with all enterprises and activities within their jurisdiction, to be alert to

any failure of performance, to report constantly to their own higher authorities on the state of plan fulfilment, and to take such measures, in collaboration with local administrators, as will ensure the realisation of the goals and tasks which the Party high command has set.¹

However the activities of the middle and higher-level party organs go far beyond even the most generously defined "staff" role. The openly admitted direct involvement of the party apparatus in the making of policy and operational decisions and the giving of operational orders and its absolute superiority over all other hierarchies give it a far more "commanding" role than can be allowed for by the staff concept.²

PPO's, the lowest organisations of the party apparatus, fit the staff generalist framework far more closely. As demanded by both Sampson and Golembiewski they are closely integrated into line hierarchies and

1 Fainsod, op. cit., p. 215.

2 Although a comparison could still perhaps be made with the General Staff of the German Army as described by Golembiewski, op. cit., pp. 17-18. Nevertheless Hough's comparison of the secretaries of local party organs with the prefects of the French regional administration is probably a more useful use of Western parallels at this level. Hough, op. cit.

fulfil generalised tasks. They are not given the degree of formal operational powers that Golembiewski would desire, but do not have to rely simply on powers of "persuasion", as expressed by Sampson. An examination of the precise significance of the formal powers of PPO's, summed up in the right of control, is a fundamental part of this thesis.

Golembiewski is of the opinion that the extensive devolution of formal powers that his Colleague model demands would provide sufficient decentralisation to avoid the problems of over-centralisation inherent in traditional "mechanistic" systems. While in the Soviet case the right of control in itself does bring about some degree of decentralisation, the greatest contribution to decentralisation is made by the variable and ambiguous interpretation of the meaning of the right of control by the Soviet authorities.¹

They apparently feel that this type of informal decentralisation gives them the flexibility to allow them to avoid or minimise the problems of line-staff conflict in

1 André Gunder Frank has dealt theoretically with this type of decentralisation within an organisational model known as "conflicting standards analysis", while Jerry Hough has examined it in the Soviet Union. Frank, A.G: "Goal Ambiguity and Conflicting Standards: an approach to the study of organization", *Human Organization*, vol. 17, no. 4, Winter, 1958-59, pp. 8-13; Hough, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

reaction to which Sampson and Golembiewski developed their models, but which one suspects they would not succeed in entirely avoiding. Sampson hopes to prevent conflict by firmly denying staff any operational powers; Golembiewski, by granting staff some formal powers and making line and staff equally responsible for performance. Sampson is unlikely to be able to prevent staff encroachment on line authority; Golembiewski is likely to find his Colleague units colluding to the detriment of organisational performance. The Soviet authorities try to strike a variable balance in the powers of "host" organisations and PPO's. Although at different times they are likely to face all the problems of line-staff relationships - line-staff conflict, staff usurpation of line functions, and collusion - the balance of power can be changed relatively quickly in reaction to the problem that appears most serious at the time. The degree of ambiguity and decentralisation is closely controlled by higher party authorities. Monitoring and control are strong enough to ensure that the top authorities are able at any time and reasonably quickly to induce PPO's to provide either greater conflict or cooperation with line hierarchies.

As a support to this control by higher authorities, and to reduce the incidence of higher authorities actually having to intervene, the party authorities use a form of ideological indoctrination similar to that discussed by Burns

and Stalker. The latter stress that the changing and unpredictable nature of roles and functions means that a strong commitment to the overall goals of the organisation is required if it is not to fall apart. In one firm they examined, one with a high degree of organic features, "the disruptive effects of this preoccupation (with defining and redefining roles) were countered by a general awareness of the common purpose of the concern's attitudes. While this awareness was sporadic and partial for many members of the firm, it was an essential factor in, for example, the ability of the 'product engineers' to perform their tasks, dependent as they were on the co-operation of persons and groups who carried out the basic interpretative processes of the concern".¹ They further declared that effective organic systems "rely on the development of a 'common culture', of a dependably constant system of shared beliefs about the common interests of the working community and about the standards and criteria used in it to judge achievement, individual contributions, expertise and other matters by which a person or combination of people are evaluated".² We have already seen the mention made by Sampson of the need for staff generalists

1 Burns and Stalker, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

2 *ibid*, p. 119.

to inculcate values in line executives.¹ And so in the Soviet Union it is the task of the party to formulate and propagate the system's ideology. The party authorities hope that through the propagation of the ideology their organisations will gain moral authority and the workers in the line hierarchies will be motivated to accept the "staff" role of the PPO's. It is also designed to produce the proper attitudes in the party workers, particularly those such as PPO secretaries who are closely integrated into line organisations, so that they will behave with the right degree of compromise between collusion and conflict.

5. Some problems

To summarise the Soviet system in terms of the model I have been describing, it could be said that it is basically organised as a mechanistic or traditionally vertically hierarchical system. The party inserts a staff element into this system in an effort to control and improve the performance of the non-party hierarchies. However there are many features of this staff element which distinguish it from the traditional Western staff model.

1 Burns and Stalker are not speaking of indoctrination being deliberately undertaken by Western firms. However Sampson seems to suggest that such deliberate indoctrination should in fact take place. See also R.C. Davis: *The Fundamentals of Top Management*, Harper and Row, N.Y., 1951, pp. 561-563. He discusses the importance of the indoctrination of a sound philosophy of management in Western business firms.

It could be described as a relatively closely integrated generalist staff element.

There are problems with the methodological orientation provided by the "staff generalist" model. Firstly, there is the problem of the relative rarity of staff generalist models in Western literature and especially practice. The benefits of a methodological approach such as I am using, based on an analogy, are twofold. Firstly, the analogy should give us a broad understanding of the object to be studied through comparing it with some more familiar object. Secondly, the easier access to the more familiar object should provide interesting working hypotheses to be tested in similar conditions. But the staff generalist model, either in theory or practice, is not very familiar to students of political organisation. Therefore it might be said that it cannot provide the broad understanding of the role of PPO's that I am seeking. Because staff generalist models have received no serious practical application in Western organisations, it might also be said that no useful working hypotheses will be forthcoming.

However in justification of the staff generalist model it could also be said that it is so closely based on well-established line-staff theories and practice that a general understanding should be readily attainable, particularly if the reader is not totally ignorant of PPO's. Anyone with even a rudimentary knowledge of line-staff

theories, even of the traditional kind, and of the activities of PPO's, should be able to see those activities within the staff generalist framework.

The direct derivation of the staff generalist model from traditional line-staff theories also enables the taking of working hypotheses from it. Sampson's and Golembiewski's models have been developed in reaction to the working difficulties of traditional line-staff practice. The same pressures should be evident as contributing to the Soviet development of PPO's. Burns and Stalker developed their concepts directly from empirical investigation of English and Scottish firms. There is, therefore, sufficient practical experience to provide us with some working hypotheses.

The fact that there has been no conscious attempt to give practical application to the staff generalist model in the West makes the position of PPO's particularly interesting. Being a practical application of the staff generalist model they should provide us with some understanding of the sorts of problems to be faced by any practical applications of it in the West. The Western writers I have been using appear to be aware of the problems and have provided some hypotheses for testing in the thesis. PPO's become valuable, therefore, as a testing ground for hypotheses that cannot be easily tested in a Western context.

The second problem is more serious. Existing staff generalist models fail to allow sufficient and proper stress to be given to the ideological functions of PPO's. I have extracted some account of ideology from Sampson and Burns and Stalker; however it is inadequate. Their accounts are valuable in that they allow us to identify two largely separate, but both extremely important aspects of ideology; Burns and Stalker speak of the legitimising and mobilising aspects of ideology, while Sampson sees ideology in more "technological" terms, of superior and innovatory organisational values and techniques. We will see that both these aspects of ideology are of fundamental importance to PPO's; indeed, particularly in the case of the aspect of ideology discussed by Burns and Stalker, of far greater importance than those authors suggest. While they are aware of the importance of a binding organisational ideology in times of rapid change, they cannot, in their context, allow for a system-wide application such as is found in the case of the Soviet ideology, with its coverage of all aspects of economic, social and intellectual life. We should remember that this pervasive ideology is not conveyed only through specialised ideological agencies, this being equally the function of PPO's operating at the work-place level. The organisational ideology of which Burns and Stalker speak also contains no hint of the total control implicit in the Soviet ideology. While their ideology has legitimising and mobilising functions, the Soviet ideology takes on a whole new

repressive function of social and intellectual control.

Another aspect of Soviet ideology not allowed for in any of the Western staff generalist models is the special role it gives to rank-and-file party members. While they do not have the political significance of the elected and career party officials, they do have a special "vanguard" role to play in society, providing a good example to and the lowest-level check on the behaviour of all citizens. The staff generalist model fails to provide for this. While the elected officials of the PPO's can be seen as the "staff" personnel of the system, it is difficult to fit the rank-and-file party membership into such a framework.

The orientation towards the ideological offered by Sampson and Burns and Stalker will be used, but far greater emphasis will be given to the ideological functions of PPO's outside the framework of existing Western staff generalist models.

There are other less serious shortcomings of the model. One aspect of the activities of PPO's not covered at all by the model is the running of their own affairs - their own internal operating procedures. This at first glance might appear to be of little significance for their system-wide operations. However we will see that what formally speaking must be described as intra-party concerns

in fact have enormous significance for the external operations of PPO's. Firstly, the PPO relies for its successful operation on the most effective organisation and distribution of its membership. Secondly, and more importantly, the PPO relies very heavily on the powers of party discipline to exercise its influence over institutional leaders and rank-and-file workers.

Another thing not provided for in any Western staff models are PPO functions in the area of leadership of other social organisations, primarily the trade unions and the *komsomol*. However these functions can be quite easily fitted into the framework. To the extent that social organisations contribute to the "production" activities of a line organisation, the control of them by PPO's can be seen as a further weapon in the fulfilment of their staff functions.

All these problems should be recognised, but not seen as taking away the usefulness of the staff generalist approach. Beyond offering a basic understanding of PPO's in terms of a reasonably familiar Western model, it provides a more specific focus on some matters. The most important to arise from the discussion so far, those that are basic to this thesis, are concerned with the nature of relations between line and staff hierarchies. The basic questions are: what formal powers do PPO's have, how do

line organisations react to these powers, what further informal powers do PPO's come to gain and what is the line reaction, and how much are these power relations controlled and manipulated by higher authorities. It is hoped that Western experience, as well as providing the motivation for the asking of these questions, can also give some clues as to the answers.

CHAPTER ONE

THE IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES OF PPO'S

While some Western writers have been willing to ignore the emotive connotations of such words as "ideology" and "indoctrination" and have used them in analyses of Western society and organisations,¹ there is still considerable reluctance among many to recognise that ideology and indoctrination fulfil broadly the same functions in the West as they do in the Soviet Union. There are enormous differences between the two systems, but Western organisational theory can be used to some good effect to gain an understanding of the functions of ideology in the Soviet Union. As mentioned in the Introduction the "staff generalist" approach cannot in itself entirely provide an adequate framework for this understanding. However the ideological functions of PPO's are important in that they contribute very significantly to the successful fulfilment of the PPO "staff generalist" role.

Western organisational writers have long been aware of the need for some commonly-held organisational "culture", "doctrine", or "code of conduct" - although the word "ideology" is never used, its meaning is very

1 For example, Brzezinski and Huntington, op. cit., pp. 17-27; Davis, R.C., op. cit., pp. 542-582.

similar - if the organisation is to operate effectively. While many different words are used, what the writers all have in mind can be described in terms of R.C. Davis's "organisational doctrine", that is, "any formal statement, either express or implied, of objectives, ideals, principles, points of view, and general modes of procedures"¹. These Western writers see this doctrine as fulfilling two basic functions. Firstly, it builds up the organisation's legitimacy amongst its members, leading to their willingness to continue as members of the organisation and, hopefully, to perform to the limit of their abilities. I will speak of work in this area as "value indoctrination". Secondly, it provides a common language for members of the organisation so that they all, even those with very different functional tasks, will have a common understanding of what they are working towards. I will refer to work in this area as "operational indoctrination".

Western writers recognise the very different natures of these two functions, and that they will be present to different degrees in different organisations. They are most careful when speaking about the first function,

1 Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 588. Burns and Stalker provide another definition, for their "code of practice for conduct". It is "both revealing and acting as the medium for specifying the limits of defeasible action, whether they are elastic or fixed, and for intimating what span of all the rational, technical, cultural, and emotional elements of a situation or problem may be counted as admissible". Burns and Stalker, op. cit., p. 259. See also their definitions quoted above, p. 27.

since it has the greatest "political" ramifications. They generally recognise that the legitimacy of an organisation depends very heavily on the legitimacy of the social system in which it is situated. R.C. Davis, in speaking of "indoctrination for morale development", his term for value indoctrination, writes:

It has to do with the development of a community of ideas concerning values and organizational relationships between owners, managers, and operatives on the one hand, and customers and the general public on the other. It involves consideration of the property rights of employees in their services and of owners in their capital. Most opinions about such values, conditions and relationships have an emotional as well as factual base. They concern the foundations of an industrial economy. They therefore have political and social as well as economic significance.¹

While he declares that a high degree of such indoctrination is neither possible nor desirable in a democratic society, Davis believes that some basic acceptance of the capitalist system by employees, and employers, is essential if an organisation within that system is to work effectively.

1 Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 592.

Davis's idea of "basic acceptance" becomes perhaps more controversial with the statement that the optimum condition of indoctrination for morale development "requires merely an acceptance of management's philosophy to the extent that will cause employees to think as well as listen to opposing arguments, that will prevent their being stampeded into action which is contrary to the organization's interests by emotional appeals to their short-term personal interests. Such appeals are often opposed to their long-term interests".¹ It could be said that such a statement bears an unfortunate resemblance to Soviet statements on the subject.

Amitai Etzioni gives less significance to philosophical indoctrination in Western corporations. He speaks of consensus, the result of indoctrination, and sees it in six different areas - consensus on general values, organisational goals, policies on means, participation, performance obligations and cognitive perspectives. According to the particular definitions he gives the different aspects of consensus, the first three, those that have the greater "philosophical" content, are considered to be of the greatest importance in normative organisations, such as religions, political parties, etc. However utilitarian organisations, among which he includes Western corporations, do not rely on these types of consensus.

1 ibid, p. 593.

"The basic reason for this is that production is a relatively rational process and hence can rest on contractual relationships of complementary interest, not shared sentiments or values. It is not mandatory for effective operation that management and workers hold congruent views of general values, organizational goals, or organizational policy"¹. Etzioni underestimates the importance of this type of "philosophical" consensus in a utilitarian organisation. It appears probable, for example, that employees who believe that shareholders are entitled to the profits of a concern will work more willingly than workers who disagree fundamentally with such a view.

Burns and Stalker's treatment of this matter is interesting, and not really comparable with Davis's and Etzioni's, since they do not relate the philosophical values of the organisation to the outside world. Their neglect of the general philosophical context in which an organisation works could be considered a shortcoming, particularly when they do recognise the importance of internal philosophical values. But what we can take from their treatment and use to good effect is the recognition that philosophical commitment to the values of the organisation becomes particularly important in organically

1 Etzioni, A: *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*, on power, involvement, and their correlates, Free Press of Glencoe, N.Y., 1961, p. 136.

organised institutions. In a mechanistic organisation philosophical commitment is replaced by rational procedures established by those at the top of the hierarchy. As in Etzioni's utilitarian organisations, in a mechanistic organisation an employee does not need to concern himself with the ultimate values and goals of the organisation as long as there is a vertical hierarchy telling him precisely what his job is. But when the hierarchy and established procedures break down the employee comes to rely on his own values to give him a guide and motivation to action. Burns and Stalker write:

A second observation is that the area of commitment to the concern - the extent to which the individual yields himself as a resource to be used by the working organization - is far more extensive in organic than in mechanistic systems. Commitment, in fact, is expected to approach that of the professional scientist to his work, and frequently does ... The distinctive feature of the organic system is the pervasiveness of the working organization as an institution. In concrete terms, this makes itself felt in a preparedness to combine with others in serving the general aims of the concern."¹

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Burns and Stalker, op. cit., pp. 122, 125.

We have already seen in the Introduction that the Soviet system cannot be described as a highly organic one, indeed it shows a strong degree of commitment to mechanistic procedures. This limits the applicability of Burns and Stalker's concept to some extent. However, if we accept the party apparatus as a focus of organic elements operating within a relatively mechanistic system, it may be of some use to us. Being a party member, particularly a party worker, should involve a sense of commitment like that of the professional scientist. Whatever the task to be done by the party member it should be done with a sense of commitment to the supreme values of the Soviet ideology. This is particularly important in the case of "staff generalist" PPO secretaries and rank-and-file party members. The special nature of their role, particularly the role of the secretaries, means that commitment to the system's values is particularly important. Thus much of the value indoctrination in the Soviet Union is directed specifically towards party members.¹

Value indoctrination is not limited to party members. While party members are inculcated with special values, it is still important that non-party members of the society have a basic commitment to the Soviet ideology, that they give it sufficient legitimacy that they will not reject

1 Etzioni's discussion of consensus in normative organisations is relevant here.

it altogether, and more positively that they work with enthusiasm towards fulfilment of its goals. That is, value indoctrination, indoctrination in the basic principles of Soviet Marxim-Leninism, has two main functions - legitimisation and mobilisation.¹

While Davis, of the Western authors I have cited, places the most emphasis on value indoctrination, he still differs fundamentally from Soviet authorities in his desire to keep it to the absolute minimum. Why is it that the Soviet authorities find it necessary to keep indoctrination at as high a level as possible? Why is it that the Soviet ideology must be extended to cover all areas of social and economic activity? A cynical observer might say, with some justification, that the values of a Western democratic society are so much more naturally acceptable to the population that they do not have to be indoctrinated into them.

1 There are three levels of the basic principles of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. There are such timeless principles as the eventual building of a fully communist society and collapse of capitalism, and the leading role of the party; more variable principles such as the timing of the arrival of the communist stage of development, the number of permissible roads to socialism and the currently desirable attitude to capitalist societies; and other principles not necessarily derived from Marxist philosophy such as Soviet patriotism, friendship between different national groups, respect for the family and differential levels of wealth and income.

But a more thorough examination of Soviet ideology is required for a proper understanding of this matter. Soviet ideology is based on a social theory, Marxism, which claims to provide not only the means for understanding all social and economic processes, but also for their manipulation for the betterment of mankind. While Western society incorporates an enormous range of values, including "state interventionist" ones, none lay the same degree of stress on predetermined historical change and active use of social measures to achieve that change as does the Soviet ideology. Lenin's addition to Marxism only gave extra emphasis to these elements by firmly and irrevocably giving the responsibility for undertaking these measures to the Communist Party. As Brzezinski and Huntington say:

Thus the ideology, with its stress on ideological change, creates a built-in compulsion in the ruling Party for permanent social engineering, which in turn permits the Party to lay claim to continued power."¹

Thus, if the ideology and the party's place in it are to maintain their legitimacy it is essential that historical progress be seen to be continuing and that the social engineering of the party be seen as providing that progress.

1 Brzezinski and Huntington, op. cit., p. 49.

Putting it rather crudely, it could be said that traditional Western liberal values fail each time government involves itself in social engineering; the CPSU and its ideology fail each time they are not involved.

Brzezinski and Huntington make the point that for the legitimacy of the ideology to be maintained it is necessary that the population see the involvement of the party in historical progress and social engineering as having a positive effect on their lives. Since the death of Stalin a dramatic decline in the reliance on coercion has produced a greater reliance on the legitimisation of the Soviet regime for achieving popular compliance with the regime's wishes. Legitimacy will be maintained only as long as the regime is seen as being effective. Brzezinski and Huntington say:

A positive commitment could gradually replace the earlier reliance on violence, while Russia's increased international stature and technical achievements gratified the Russian's sense of national pride. Indeed, as far as the masses are concerned, the legitimacy of the regime as well as the political integration of society has been achieved less by conscious mass acceptance of the ideology as such than by the linkage of the regime and its doctrine to such nationally satisfying achievements as the

launching of the sputnik and Gagarin's and Titov's orbital flights, as well as by improvements in the material welfare of the people. ¹

It appears probable that in the Soviet Union it is the undoubtedly great improvements in material conditions in recent years that give the Soviet regime, including the role of the party, its legitimacy in the eyes of the mass of the people. The Soviet leaders seem well aware that their survival could well depend on continued improvements in the standard of living. Certainly Soviet agitation and propaganda lay very great stress on the material achievements of the Soviet application of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

There is the further question of whether Soviet ideology provides positive mobilisation of the masses. While the vast majority of the population apparently accept the legitimacy of the ideology and its practical consequences, it is less easy to say that it mobilises them towards great efforts on behalf of that ideology. While it is true that the ideology lays great stress on the need for collective effort and the responsibility of the individual to the collective, it is also true that probably the most fundamental principle of the ideology is that one elite group is totally responsible for deciding policy objectives

1 ibid, p. 48.

and procedures. The ideology, and by implication that one elite group, promise the population a great deal. The present combination of apparently insistent demands for improved standards of living and low labour productivity suggests that the mass of the population see themselves as decreasingly responsible for improved standards of living and the party increasingly so. With legitimacy depending on improved standards of living, mobilisation therefore becomes of crucial importance. Although agitation and propaganda are still used for mobilisation purposes, increasing emphasis is being laid on the very non-ideological systems of material incentive. These are largely outside the scope of this thesis, but will be examined at least to the extent that PPO's are involved in them.

One sign of the pervasiveness of the Soviet ideology compared to the Western value system is the far greater degree of ideological control that is practised in the Soviet Union. The use of coercion has decreased enormously since Stalin. However there is still extremely tight ideological control of all areas of life, control that often takes on a highly coercive colouring. But this coercion is not used, as it was before, as a substitute for legitimacy, but rather as a support for legitimacy. It is a basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism that it provides a scientific basis for the understanding and control of all aspects of life. Once such a tenet is put forward, is used

to justify party control of all aspects of life, and comes to be generally accepted by the population, it must be maintained. If the general population accept the legitimate role of the party to determine the "scientific" attitude in all areas of life, any action the party takes against someone who advances a different position is seen as supporting and advancing the legitimacy of the party's role. While party leaders no longer interfere as actively in scientific life as they have in the past, they probably still have a strong negative influence. Certainly all scientific knowledge must still be explicable in Marxist-Leninist terms if it is to be acceptable. In art and literature the influence is probably still a positive one, positive in the sense of telling artists and writers what sort of work they should do, as well as a negative one of simply preventing inadmissible work.

At the beginning of the chapter I said that Western writers see two main functions of an organisational "doctrine". The first was to provide legitimacy and mobilisation; the second to provide a common language for all sections of the organisation. All the writers agree that a high degree of operational indoctrination is permissible and necessary if an organisation is to work efficiently. R.C. Davis says that the degree of indoctrination "may be high when the problem involves the inculcation of concepts concerning operative objectives, principles,

and procedures".¹ Etzioni says:

Utilitarian organizations require a high degree of consensus for effective operation mainly in spheres concerning instrumental activities ... Basic consensus about the scope of performance and participation obligations is functionally required, although the system can operate quite effectively when there are limited differences of opinion. Consensus is vital also in the sphere of cognitive perspectives. If the employees do not accept the organization's definition of the technical aspects of production, effective production often becomes impossible.²

It should not be thought that these writers are referring simply to the training necessary to do one's specific job. They are placing that training in a wider context, so that the individual can not only undertake the specific activities required for him to do his job, but that so he will also understand the relevance of that job, and other jobs around him, for the fulfilment of organisational goals. R.C. Davis makes the importance of this clear when he says:

The degree of decentralization that is

1 Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 591.

2 Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 135-136.

practicable tends to vary directly with the degree of indoctrination of the organization ... A considerable indoctrination with operative objectives, policies, and practices is necessary wherever considerable individual and group initiative is required.¹

Decentralisation relies on value indoctrination - if a superior is to delegate authority to a subordinate he must be confident that the subordinate will not take advantage of his new authority and abandon the organisational interest in favour of personal interests. But it relies perhaps even more on operational indoctrination.

Decentralisation implies that the subordinate will be faced with decision-making situations. To be able to cope with these he must have a sound understanding of general organisational policies and procedures.

This is illustrated well in Burns' and Stalker's treatment. In the situation of the organic mode of organisation, where decentralisation is almost total, operational indoctrination becomes of crucial importance. The quotations from their book in the Introduction make this clear. Firms that they studied with a high degree of organic features relied on a "common culture" to order working relations between individuals in jobs with very

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Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 591.

little formal definition of responsibilities and performance criteria.¹

The significance of operational indoctrination is clearly enormous. If the Soviet system is seen as one single organisation, it is a very large one with extremely long lines of command and an enormous variety of functional specialisations within it. Some degree of decentralisation is inevitable, while effective performance requires considerable cooperation between different functional groups. For both decentralisation and cooperation to work effectively it is essential that all levels and all areas of the system have a common understanding of current organisational policies and procedures. The party, and its PPO's, have an enormous role to play in this area. Their agitation and propaganda activities are concerned with basic matters such as the supremacy of heavy over light industry, the importance and methods of centralised economic planning and control, and the role of material incentive. They are also concerned with more immediate matters such as the aims of the current Five Year Plan, the role of different branches and regions in their fulfilment, and communication of the production priorities of the time. Particularly in face-to-face agitation it is impressed on individuals precisely what

1 See above, p. 27.

work is expected of them and how important that work is for the success of the collective as a whole. All these matters must be presented in such a way that all elements of the system understand precisely their role, and the role of others, in dealing with them.

This is one aspect of operational indoctrination that is of particular significance for PPO's. I said in the Introduction that one of the most important benefits of the staff generalist role is that it allows a degree of decentralisation of party control. The broad understanding of organisational goals and procedures provided by operational indoctrination is essential for this decentralisation. The training of PPO secretaries therefore requires careful attention.

But it is not only the PPO secretaries who must be so indoctrinated. The rank-and-file party members have an important part to play in the PPO's staff generalist role - they undertake a great deal of the on-the-spot observation of organisational activity that is essential for control. They must have a broad understanding of the organisation's functions and the role of the PPO within it. But it is perhaps more important that organisational leaders understand the role. Although they are almost certainly party members, in their role as non-party leaders they have to see the activities of the PPO in a different perspective. The system assumes that while they are working

for satisfaction of the sectional interests of their organisation they understand the purpose of the wider perspectives of PPO involvement and accept them.

From Western organisational theory we have been able to take the concept of an organisational "doctrine" providing legitimisation, mobilisation and operational understanding. We have had to recognise that Soviet value indoctrination, including as it does close ideological control of all areas of life, is far more extensive than such indoctrination in the West, a function of the basic nature of the Soviet system. Extra allowance has also had to be made for the special role of the party, not only its apparatus, but also its rank-and-file membership.

We must now look in some detail at the involvement of PPO's in value indoctrination - legitimisation, ideological control and mobilisation; and operational indoctrination - communication of the policies and procedures current in the system, including staff generalist procedures. Special attention will be paid to this work among party members, including building up a special "mystique" of party membership. Thus I will describe PPO propaganda activities, agitation activities, their involvement in material incentive, and their role in the development and maintenance of a party mystique.

1. Propaganda

Robert Conquest quotes Plekhanov for a definition of the difference between propaganda and agitation:

A propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator presents only a few ideas, but he presents them to a whole mass of persons. ¹

Propaganda generally speaking concerns itself with long-term value indoctrination, while agitation tends to concentrate on shorter-term operational indoctrination. A greater proportion of propaganda is directed towards party members than agitation, although this is not to say that the Soviet people in general are not subjected to considerable propaganda.

Party propaganda is defined as the "oral and printed explanation and propagation of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the Communist Party ... a means of ideological and political tempering of cadres, members and candidate members of the party and of all Soviet people".² A Soviet handbook for PPO secretaries (henceforth described simply as the *Spravochnik*) says that "propaganda work must disclose the scientific bases of the party and government's

1 Conquest, R: *The Politics of Ideas in the USSR*, Bodley Head, London, 1967, p. 100.

2 *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, quoted in Conquest, op. cit., p. 101.

internal and external policies, inspire a feeling of confidence in the validity of these policies of the party, and disclose the connection of the everyday affairs of the Soviet people with the great perspectives of our development, with the victory of communism".¹ This quotation indicates the importance the Soviet authorities attach to the expression of the benefits of the Soviet ideology in terms of concrete achievements even in their most basic indoctrination efforts.

The chief means of propaganda are the press, the various institutions in the party indoctrination system, from the lowest to the highest levels of society, oral propaganda and the independent study of party history and Marxist-Leninist theory. The role of the press and the highest levels of the party indoctrination system do not concern us here.²

Most propaganda activity at the PPO level can be included under the rubric "independent study" or "self-education". However it should not be thought that this means individuals studying entirely by themselves. Conquest

1 *Spravochnik sekretaria pervichnoi partiinoi organizatsii*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1960, p. 505.

2 For a detailed account of the party indoctrination system, see Mickiewicz, E.P: *Soviet Political Schools*, the Communist Party adult education system, Yale U.P., New Haven, 1967. For studies of the Soviet press, see Buzek, A: *How the Communist Press Works*, Pall Mall, London, 1964 and Conquest, op. cit., pp. 67-81.

quotes a Soviet source:

In political self-education the main attention must be concentrated on collective and seminar forms of independent study.¹

"Independent" means that as part of the indoctrination process the individual is expected to undertake private study to prepare himself for collective seminars and discussions.

Unlike agitators, who as we will see later are chosen and trained within the PPO, propagandists are usually trained at higher-level party schools.² However the PPO's are still expected to control their work. They are also expected to organise the collective forms of indoctrination and the peripheral services needed for independent study. These peripheral services include "offices of political indoctrination" where books, journals and various study aids are provided and advice is given by consultants on methods of independent study.³ Some PPO's have their own methodological councils for propaganda. For example, the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Transport Construction

1 Conquest, op. cit., p. 103.

2 *ibid*, pp. 109-113.

3 *Spravochnik*, op. cit., pp. 510-511.

has such a council, led by the head of the BAM Construction Administration, a deputy minister, and has 25 members. It helps the party committee select lecturers and prepares methodological and analytical information and visual aids.¹ The council in the RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction assists the propagandists selected by the party committee, controls the quality of their work and disseminates leading experience in indoctrination work.²

But the most important task is the organisation of the indoctrination courses themselves. There are various types of study circles and lecture series,³ but more interesting are the various political, methodological and philosophical seminars. Particularly in non-production institutions these appear to be the most highly organised form of indoctrination and are particularly interesting because of the very close links they establish between Marxist-Leninist ideology and specific branches of educational, scientific and administrative life.⁴

1 *Partiinaiia zhizn'*, 12/75, pp. 58-62.

2 Khaldeev, M.I: *Pervichnaia partiinaiia organizatsiia, opyt, formy i metody raboty*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1975, p. 192.

3 Conquest, op. cit., pp. 105-107.

4 The greatly increased use of seminars can be seen in the data given by the chairman of the Council for Tertiary Educational and Research Institutions of the House of Political Indoctrination of the Moscow *gorkom*. Whereas in 1974-75 academic year there were 564 methodological seminars conducted in the tertiary educational and research institutions of Moscow, with over 15,000 people, including 7,800 communists, participating, in 1975-76 there were 750 seminars with over 20,000 participants. *P.zh.* 10/76, p. 25.

While seminars in research institutions cover such areas as political economy, problems of international communism and workers' movements, and the internal and external policies of the CPSU, they usually place these in a scientific context. The seminars are expected to show to scientists the close and practical union of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, dialectical materialism, and scientific matters. Thus the medical workers of Minsk studied in their theoretical seminars such topics as "The system of categories of the dialectic in the theory and practice of biology and medicine".¹ Nearly all the staff of the Arkhangel Medical Institute participate in the political indoctrination seminars run by the party organisation, including those concerning the philosophical problems of the natural sciences and medicine.² It is difficult to say how sceptical one should be about the serious attention that might be devoted to these seminars by scientific and academic personnel. If they only have a value indoctrination role, that is, if they are only concerned with presenting the dialectical materialist interpretations of science, a large dose of scepticism would probably be justified.

1 *Kommunist Belorussii*, 9/69, p. 14.

2 Barkusov, N.V. and others: *Partiinyi kontrol' deiatel'nosti administratsii*, Moscow, 1973, p. 69. In recent years a great deal of emphasis has been given to economics, apparently of the applied variety. In 1974 up to 65% of political indoctrination in the Siberian section of the Academy of Sciences was in that area. Ianovskii, P.G: *Politicheskaiia uchëba v nauchnoi kollektive*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1974, pp. 19, 60.

However there is some evidence that they are used for more than this, that they are used for operational indoctrination. If the seminars are used for discussing and establishing educational and scientific procedures, they cannot be ignored by academics and researchers. At a philosophical seminar in the Latvian Institute of Physics the participants were examining some articles that had appeared in *Voprosy filosofii*. In the course of the discussion a dispute arose over the commonality of matter and the possibility of establishing a single theory of fields, both gravitational and electromagnetic. The conclusion was reached that evidently the two types of field are of the same nature.¹ Clearly a scientist continuing research based on the opposite conclusion could have difficulties.

There is evidence that involvement of this kind can become close and detailed. A report on methodological seminars in the institutes of the Siberian section of the Academy of Sciences indicates the use made of them in determining or communicating research priorities. The report says:

One could say the following about the essence of the work of methodological seminars. It is

1 *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, 1/61, pp. 52-53.

extremely important for scientific collectives to investigate the directions of scientific discoveries towards which the attention of scientists must be turned in order to achieve the greatest research effectiveness.¹

Another report goes further. Ianovskii writes that often concrete suggestions on the organisation of scientific work come out of seminars. He gives the example of the party buro of the Institute of Inorganic Chemistry of the Siberian section of the Academy of Sciences which, in examining the results of the work of the institute's seminars, alleged that the consideration of such matters as "Science - a direct force of production in the construction of communism" and "Communist labour in science and forms of its development in the research institute" had led to a great improvement in the organisation of the implementation of the results of scientific work in production.² Although again scepticism about the degree of improvement resulting from the seminars would be justified, the implication is strong that they are used to influence scientific work.

However apparently such processes can go too far. There have been complaints that seminars in some institutes

1 *P.zh.*, 20/61, p. 32.

2 Ianovskii, op. cit., p. 48.

have lost their philosophical content and become essentially forums for the consideration of the results of applied research and other current matters of concern in the institutes. In these cases it is considered necessary that PPO's remedy the situation by closely examining seminar programmes and working with seminar leaders.¹

In educational institutions the seminars are concerned with both the content and style of the educational process. Between 1962 and 1963 the party organisation of the Moscow Conservatorium ran seminars on the philosophical-aesthetic problems of music and the aesthetics of musical performance. However in November, 1963 a party meeting called for a re-examination of these seminars in order to strengthen their ideological content. The Departments of the Social Sciences were charged with working out the aesthetic and philosophical problems of music and their links with the musical departments were strengthened.²

Concern with the style of the teaching process can be seen in the Central Committee decision of 1972 regarding political indoctrination activities in Tashkent:

Alongside the mastering of the general theoretical problems of Marxism-Leninism

1 *ibid*, p. 55.

2 *Bol'shoi put'*, iz istorii partiinoi organizatsii Moskovskoi konservatorii, Moscow, 1969, pp. 110-111.

(the study of) the theory and practice of training (students) in communism is recommended ... for those employed in secondary and tertiary education.¹

Moscow State University has 22 methodological seminars running in its faculties, most of which are concerned with the philosophical and methodological problems of teaching.²

In administrative institutions the seminars are primarily concerned with administrative and technical matters.³ There has been particular emphasis on them since the 1965 reforms. This again suggests an important operational indoctrination role for the seminars, in that they appear to be more concerned with current policies than the general principles of Marxism-Leninism. For example, after the 1965 reforms the party committee of the Moldavian Ministry of Food Industry ran thirteen theoretical seminars on planning and administration of the economy in the light of the reforms.⁴

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- 1 *Voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty KPSS, sbornik dokumentov, 1965-1973, Politizdat, Moscow, 1973, p. 369.*
- 2 *P.zh., 10/76, pp. 26-27.*
- 3 Dubkov, A.E: *Raikom partii i partiinye organizatsii uchrezhdenii i vedomstv, Khabarovskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, Khabarovsk, 1971, pp. 10-11; Moskovskaia pravda, 9/2/71, p. 2; Zaria Vostoka, 22/9/73, p. 3; P.zh., 15/66, p. 65.*
- 4 *Kommunist Moldavii, 8/67, p. 60.*

The seminars conducted in the All-Union Ministry of Transport Construction consider such topics as "The December Plenum on perfecting economic administration", "Forms and methods of party leadership of the economy", "Experiences in administration in Eastern Europe", "The participation of the ministry in a general automated system for the collection and analysis of economic information", "The organisation of wages under the new economic conditions", etc. Seminar courses conclude with examinations, conducted by a commission of propagandists and administration, party and trade union representatives. Leading workers do not have to attend examinations, but have to hand in written essays to be examined by the collegium and party committee.¹

2. Ideological control

Most of this information on indoctrination seminars suggests that they are not used to any great extent for value indoctrination despite the fact that they are part of the propaganda network. The topics listed and some of the details on their content strongly suggest a primary concern with current policies and procedures, Soviet ideology occupying a secondary role. While it appears probable that they attempt to reinforce legitimacy

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P.zh., 12/75, pp. 58-62.

by exercising some degree of ideological control over participants, their main task is to present information on current party policies.

Does this mean that PPO's have no role to play in value indoctrination, that the authorities rely entirely on socialisation processes and press propaganda for the establishment and maintenance of legitimacy? It appears true that PPO propaganda is not used to any great extent for value indoctrination, with the partial exception of that conducted by educational PPO's. This will be discussed in more detail later. Yet there is still an enormous amount of PPO activity in the area of ideological control that has not yet been discussed. It has already been said that ideological control is used in the Soviet system as a device for maintaining legitimacy.

Thus it is of relevance in cases that have little direct connection with Marxist-Leninist ideology as such, but which, because they include attacks, conscious or not, on the power and omnipotence of the party, threaten the legitimacy both of the party and its ideology. Thus when in 1957 a small group of scientists in a research laboratory, under the pretext of criticising the cult of personality, allegedly attacked the policies of the party in a party meeting, the All-Union Central Committee took action against the group and the PPO for allowing the

incident to occur.¹ One would imagine that following such fundamental changes as Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Party Congress PPO's would have had a difficult time ensuring that the changes were not "misunderstood". However it is essential for the maintenance of the party's legitimacy that such "misunderstandings" be dealt with.

Appearances of nationalism should be seen in the same light. The problem apparently appeared in the Latvian Institute of Economics in 1960. The party buro was criticised for failing to deal with the political mistakes of the institute's director who had called for the development in Latvia of only those branches of the economy the means of production of which were locally available.²

Much ideological control is exercised directly in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology, even attacks on various natural and social science doctrines being prompted by claims that they distort Marxist-Leninist ideology. The most unusual are the attacks on natural science doctrines and theories that one would think had no connection with the essentially social theories of

1 *Kommunist*, 17/57, p. 41.

2 *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 1/60, p. 13.

Marxism-Leninism.¹

The best known case of such ideological interference in the natural sciences, and the one providing the best opportunity for uncovering the reasons behind it and the use made of PPO's in it, is the notorious case of the Lysenkoist suppression of Soviet genetics. Attacks on genetics were given extraordinarily crude ideological justifications. Zhores Medvedev, in his account of the rise and fall of Lysenko, gives numerous

1 Thus for a long time quantum physics was regarded with disfavour by Soviet ideologists because it denies the existence of causality in sub-atomic processes. The introduction of probability and spontaneity into nuclear physics was seen by Soviet philosophers as attacking the deterministic foundations of the Soviet ideology. Cybernetics was attacked on somewhat similar grounds. It was considered to undermine the Marxist assertion "that consciousness is determined by processes of objectively developing matter in that it (cybernetics) gives human consciousness the capacity to exert a controlling influence over other forms of reality". Vardy, A: "Party Control over Soviet Science", *Studies on the Soviet Union*, vol. 10, no. 1, 1970, pp. 59-60. The opposition to these doctrines from the ideologists was sufficient to prevent research work connected with them being undertaken, with disastrous consequences for Soviet science and production.

examples.¹ Because Lysenko had such difficulty proving the superiority of his scientific "discoveries" through experimental and practical testing, he had to rely on ideological arguments to justify the suppression of opposing scientific beliefs. It is obvious from the history of his career that although he had no trouble finding philosophers and ideologists willing to further his ideological arguments, the ideology was in fact only a cover for

1 Medvedev, Z.A: *The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko*, Columbia U.P., N.Y., 1969. Very early in his career Lysenko claimed that genes could not exist since they were contrary to the principles of dialectical materialism. He considered the very rare and accidental mutations produced by genes to be incompatible with the deterministic and steady changes in nature allegedly demonstrated by dialectical materialism. *ibid*, p. 31. The point was developed years later by, for example, Poliakov, a supporter of Lysenko, who wrote about genetic biology, equating it with "bourgeois biology", as follows: "Bourgeois society prefers the 'theory' of immutability of the old, the appearance of something new only from the combination of the old or by happy chance. This 'theory' leads to a passive contemplation of supposedly eternal phenomena of nature, to a passive expectation of accidental variation." *ibid*, pp. 119-120. The ideological argument could descend to the absurd depths of Present, Lysenko's most vociferous supporter, contributing to the downfall and ultimate death in prison of the great Soviet biologist Vavilov by noting the similarity of terminology in Vavilov's views on the desirability of "homologous rows" of plant classification and the anti-Marxist philosopher Dühring's views on "row positions" in social development. *ibid*, p. 54.

attacks that were motivated by Lysenko's personal desire to secure and widen his power in the scientific community.

Thus Lysenko's support from the ideologists is not explained by the ideological soundness of his theories. They gave their support only because their superiors, the party leaders, had already decided for more pragmatic reasons that support should be given to him. The basic reason for the top authorities' support of Lysenko had nothing to do with ideology or the regime's legitimacy. They were probably always attracted by the possibilities of enormous increases in agricultural production suggested by Lysenko and his supporters.¹ These possibilities probably continued to hold an attraction, particularly in the fertile imagination of Khrushchev, throughout Lysenko's career. Further once Lysenko's theories had been accepted as party policy any attacks against them, even on purely scientific grounds, had to be vigorously rejected as attacks on the legitimacy of the party. This explains the durability of Lysenko even at times when the practical benefits of his theories were most open to criticism.

Medvedev gives a number of examples of the use made of PPO's in the Lysenko affair. The examples indicate

1 The possibilities arising, for example, from the ability of a plant to change from one species to another simply through a change in environment, and of living organisms even being produced from non-living matter, if they had any scientific basis at all, would be clearly enormous.

that the PPO's were extensively used as forums for attacks on geneticists and as a means of taking administrative action against them. For example, in 1937 Lysenko and Prezent used a party meeting in the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences to "expose the large scale errors" of Muralov, the president of the Academy. The meeting was followed by Muralov's arrest.¹ In 1948 Rapoport, a geneticist well-known for his work on mutagens, was called on at a party buro meeting (Medvedev does not make clear in which institution the party buro was situated) to repudiate the chromosome theory of heredity. He attempted to demonstrate the practical value of genetics, but his arguments were refuted by quotations from a speech on the occasion of the 31st Anniversary of the October Revolution in which Molotov had sanctioned the theories of Lysenko. Medvedev reports Rapoport as retorting: "Why do you think that Molotov knows genetics better than I?" For this he was expelled from the party and dismissed from his post.²

Vavilov's dismissal as director of the All-Union Institute of Plant Breeding and his subsequent arrest,

1 His "errors" consisted of failing to support without qualification intra-variatal crossing and to condemn inter-variatal crossing, which depends on genetic mutation. *ibid*, p. 52.

2 *ibid*, p. 122.

imprisonment and death were preceded by an examination of his activities by a party commission made up of five leading Lysenkoists. The commission wrote the following draft resolution to be adopted by the PPO of the institute:

The party organisation considers essential for the purposes of reconstruction of the institute the dismissal of Vavilov as director, since, as the ideologist of formal genetics in the USSR, by remaining at his post he aids the activation and consolidation of anti-Darwinians throughout the Soviet Union, thereby interfering with the rapid rebuilding of the experimental and plant breeding network of the Soviet Union along Darwinist lines.

In this case Medvedev makes the point that he has no positive proof that the draft was adopted by the party meeting.¹ Two years earlier Vavilov and El'nitskii, the secretary of the institute's party buro, had been criticised for failing to prevent various geneticist-inspired practices and for harbouring politically unreliable people in the institute. Presumably the secretary was a geneticist himself. I do not know his eventual fate.²

1 *ibid*, p. 56.

2 *ibid*, p. 53.

Medvedev's final example concerns his own experiences with the writing of his book. He had already published an article strongly critical of Lysenkoism in the "liberal" Leningrad literary journal *Neva*. Following this the manuscript of the first draft of his book was examined in special study sessions organised by the secretary of the party committee of the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy, in which Medvedev was working at the time. The manuscript was found to be anti-party, anti-Soviet and anti-science. As a result of this it was strongly criticised by Egorychev, the first secretary of the Moscow *gorkom*, at the famous June, 1963 Central Committee plenum on ideological and literary affairs. The book has never been published in the Soviet Union.¹

Clearly extensive use was made of PPO's as the forum for attacks on scientists who had gained the disapproval of the authorities. It is not clear how much independence they were given in the implementation of these attacks. Once it had become clear that all scientists holding geneticist views were to repudiate those views or be dismissed from their posts, was the party secretary expected to implement that general policy on his own initiative, or were all targets and the action to be taken against them decided from above? Criticisms of party secretaries for failing to take action, such as that directed against

1 *ibid*, p. 206.

El'nitskii, do not speak of specific directives being disobeyed. Whether they were expected to exercise initiative or not, there is some evidence that the PPO's did not always play the role expected of them. For example, there is Medvedev's uncertainty about whether the draft decision of the 1939 party commission in the Institute of Plant Breeding was accepted by the PPO. He also speaks of *attempts* to expel from the party a number of Leningrad University professors following their dismissal from their posts after the 1948 Academy of Agricultural Sciences conference, at which a strong new anti-genetics campaign had been launched.¹ The case of El'nitskii is a good example of a PPO failing to play its proper role.

A similar case has occurred in a completely different area, but one of even greater political significance. Within the context of the power struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev in the mid-50's, there was an important debate between economists and others over investment priorities. Malenkov, or his supporters, expressed the belief that investment in consumer and light industry, sector "B", should be increased in proportion to sector "A", made up of heavy industry. Khrushchev defended the maintenance of sector "A" in its dominant position. The protagonists in this struggle were at a far higher political level than

1 *ibid*, pp. 267-268.

Lysenko. Nevertheless there were considerable similarities with the Lysenko affair. It was an issue that could very easily be expressed in ideological terms and it was in the interest of both sides to attack the ideological validity of the other. Khrushchev's control of the party apparatus and stronger position among the ideologists gave him eventual victory. However it was not without some resistance from within the party apparatus itself, particularly at the PPO level. Just as El'nitskii apparently refused to attack the geneticists in the Institute of Plant Breeding, so the secretary of the party buro of the All-Union Institute of Economics in 1955 refused to admit that views in support of sector "B" that had been expressed in the Scientific Council were anti-Marxist. For this he was criticised and dismissed from his post by the Moscow gorkom.¹

1 *P.zh.*, 5/55, pp. 53-57; *Kom.*, 6/55, p. 61. Agursky writes that after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 a wall-paper appeared in the Department of Mathematical Methods of the Research Institute of Machine-Building Technology (*NIITM*). (It was in this department that the "Young Turks" of the institute were concentrated). The paper contained an article critical of the invasion, but the PPO did nothing. Agursky implies that this lack of action was the result of a lack of power, not desire. He observed that the PPO of *NIITM*, a defence industry institute, was apparently of considerably less significance than those of the civilian industry institutes in which he had worked. Agursky, M: *The Research Institute of Machine-Building Technology*, a part of the Soviet military-industrial complex, Soviet Institutions Series, Paper No. 8, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, September, 1976, p. 51. For a particularly interesting example of a PPO apparently failing to exercise the required political control, see Appendix B for an account of the events in the Moscow Union of Writers between 1962 and 1964.

PPO's were clearly not crucial to the success of Lysenkoism or to Khrushchev's defeat of Malenkov. However they did have a role to play and to the extent that the ideological context in which these struggles were conducted contributed to the legitimisation of the regime in the eyes of the general population, the PPO's made a contribution.¹

Cultural PPO's are expected to ensure that the correct values of the Soviet ideology are upheld in all

1 PPO's are also used in politically motivated attacks on scientists when ideological considerations are not involved. Thus when Baraev was removed from his post as deputy minister for Agriculture in the Kazakh SSR for persisting with his demands for the implementation of clean fallow sowing methods as a weapon against erosion in the Virgin Lands, he was appointed director of the All-Union Research Institute for Grain Growing at Shortandy. There he continued experiments along clean fallow lines. In early 1963 Khrushchev visited the institute and criticised the experiments. The matter was then considered in a party meeting and by the Scientific Council. The party meeting acknowledged the criticism as justified and noted that in the course of experimentation in the institute a number of breaches of the rules of agrotechnology had been allowed. The meeting directed a group of scientists, headed by Baraev, to conduct their experiments according to the established methods of sowing. The party buro then recommended the establishment of methodological commissions which would establish closer control of research, examining research plans and where necessary adjusting them. Although in this case ideological arguments were not used, the attacks on Baraev were as politically motivated, and as scientifically indefensible, as the other cases just discussed. For details, see Cleary, J.W: *Politics and Administration in Soviet Kazakhstan, 1955-1964*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, A.N.U., March, 1967, p. 333; *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/63, pp. 60-62.

cultural and creative works. Some values are of a more directly ideological nature than others. For example, in 1970 the editorial board of the journal *Teatr* was criticised in a party meeting for allowing dramatic works with "one-sided" views of history to go unattacked.¹ After there had been criticism of the Latvian State Publishing House in *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* as a result of the publication of a book with allegedly incorrect historical facts, the matter was considered at a conference in the editorial office of the Political Literature Section and an open party meeting. The criticism was acknowledged as justified and the party meeting requested that communist leaders look more closely at manuscripts before publication. It also suggested that the party buro strengthen its indoctrination work.²

It is in the category of cultural institutions that the best examples of the concern of PPO's for the maintenance of less obviously ideological values are to be found. These values are concerned with a "proper" portrayal of life in the Soviet Union and the correct attitude to matters such as the quality of performances, etc. It is part of the party's leading role in society that it be responsible for ensuring the maintenance of the correct

1 *Kom.*, 12/70, p. 53.

2 *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 2/63, p. 87.

"tone" of social life. Thus the communists of the Moscow film studio *Mosfil'm* are held directly responsible for the lack of films showing the great changes in the economic life of the country, particularly in the countryside, and in the nature of relations between people.¹ In 1973, when the *Mosfil'm* studio was making a film on the work of a *raikom* secretary, the studio's communists invited a local *raikom* secretary to view the film with them. The secretary wanted some changes made in order to bring out the film secretary's "sincere nobility". The communists supported her suggestion and the film was considered now to be much better.²

The PPO's responsibility for quality can be seen in the case of the Leningrad State Academic Drama Theatre. When audiences were down there was a proposal to change the theatre's repertoire policy and to begin showing "box office attractions". However the PPO took a firm line and

1 *Mosk. pravda*, 27/8/71, p. 3.

2 *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 6/3/73, p. 2.

serious drama was continued.¹

PPO's in educational institutions have special responsibilities for value indoctrination, since schools and tertiary institutions are among the most important settings for socialisation. PPO's have a responsibility to ensure that students are socialised into holding the right values, both in their curricular and extra-curricular activities.

Within the area of curricular activities PPO's are expected to place all academic work within a Marxist-Leninist ideological framework. In 1968 the secretary of the PPO of the First Moscow Medical Institute declared in connection with the role of the natural science faculties

1 *Pravda*, 17/1/71, p. 2. PPO's have extensive powers in the area of repertoire policy. The party buro of the *Mossovet* Academic Theatre participates in the formation of the repertoire and makes decisions about suggested plays. *Sovetskaia Kirgiziiia*, 8/2/73, p. 4. The party organisation of the Moscow Art Theatre has a control commission for the quality of the repertoire, while a 1972 *Kommunist* article spoke of control by PPO's of the selection of repertoire through the party memberships of Artistic Councils. *Mosk. pravda*, 18/9/71, p. 2; *Kom.* 13/72, p. 60. This suggests that in individual cases the PPO probably has no more than a veto power, but that it is able to involve itself in deciding the general directions of repertoire policy. One report suggests that PPO's have some power to initiate works. In 1971 the party committee of the Moscow Union of Writers passed a decision that a literary-artistic collection on the Krasnaia Presnia district of Moscow be published. *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 17/3/71, p. 3.

in value indoctrination:

We consider that in our institute those in the process of giving students knowledge must actively uncover the materialist character of the biological and medical sciences, demonstrate in action the dialectical method of analysis of the phenomena being studied, deeply examine the social aspects both of the fundamental categories of science and the applied sciences, and show the superiority of the Soviet system of health care. ¹

Most of the work in this area in tertiary institutions is done through the Departments of the Social Sciences. The social sciences in the Soviet Union include such ideological subjects as Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy and the history of the CPSU. The departments that teach these subjects are known collectively as the Departments of the Social Sciences.² The interesting thing about these departments is that they exist in all tertiary educational institutions, even those with no other connection with the

1 *P.zh.*, 1/68, p. 49.

2 The party organisation of the Departments of the Social Sciences in Tomsk State University combines the communists of the Departments of Party History, Political Economy, the Theory of Scientific Communism, Philosophy, Teaching Practice, and Psychology. *P.zh.*, 6/73, p. 36.

social sciences or even the humanities.¹

In the larger general educational institutions, such as Moscow State University, there are All-University Departments of the Social Sciences, part of the Philosophy Faculty. These departments are involved in teaching those students who specialise in such disciplines. However all other faculties, whether of the humanities or natural sciences, have their own social science departments. These departments conduct compulsory courses and examinations for the students of those faculties and apparently are responsible to some degree for the ideological control of their faculties. Their work is coordinated by an All-University Scientific-Methodological Centre.² They are in no way controlled by

1 It should also be noted that there are, in the more social-science oriented institutions, other departments for what one might call "pure" philosophy, economics and history. Presumably in these rather more "technical" instruction is given.

2 The Kishinev Polytechnical Institute has a Council of the Departments of the Social Sciences, presumably similar to the Scientific-Methodological Centre at Moscow State University. It coordinates the academic, research and indoctrination work of social science teachers. The council has 29 members and is headed by the rector. Also as members are the party committee secretary, the *komsomol* secretary, the pro-rector for academic work, the heads of the departments, and leading researchers and teachers. The council gives recommendations to the rectorate and controls their fulfilment. *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 6/64, p. 8.

the All-University social science departments, which are not even involved in the Scientific-Methodological Centre. I spoke about the departments to a senior member of an All-University department at Moscow University and expressed surprise that his department had no control over faculty departments. He repeated that this was the case and that their only contacts were at occasional methodological seminars, to which he appeared to attach little importance. Therefore it would seem that the faculty departments are the more important in terms of ideological control, something which must increase the importance of faculty party buros, since presumably they have direct responsibility for the departments' activities.

The Departments of the Social Sciences formally speaking are a normal part of the structure of a tertiary institution. However, although formally they are subject to the same degree and type of control as any other department, PPO's appear to pay them particular attention. A secretary of the Semipalatinsk *gorkom* wrote in 1965:

The departments of the social disciplines play a special role in ideological work with the young. Directing their work, we in the *gorkom* recognise precisely how they are a support for the party organisations of tertiary institutions.¹

1 *Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana*, 12/65, p. 50.

Kommunist lays particular stress on the role of the PPO's in the strengthening of the personnel of Departments of the Social Sciences.¹ *Partiinaia zhizn'* similarly singles out courses in the social sciences when speaking of the need for PPO's to ensure that course content is lively and true to life.² At Rostov University the work of the Departments of the Social Sciences is described as being under the direct control of the party committee, which together with the rectorate conducts systematic conferences of social science teachers.³

1 *Kom.*, 5/60, p. 80.

2 *P.zh.*, 1/58, p. 17.

3 Chekhorin, E.M. and G.N. Filonov: *Partiinoe rukovodstvo narodnym obrazovaniem i nauchnym uchrezhdeniam*, Izd. "Mysl'", Moscow, 1967, pp. 39-40. At Moscow University it was on the initiative of the party committee that the texts of lectures in the social sciences were examined and found wanting. *P.zh.*, 1/68, p. 49. In 1964 *Partiinaia zhizn'* described how the party committee of the Moscow Teachers' College organised a conference of teachers of the social sciences in order to prevent the overlapping of course content. *P.zh.*, 21/64, p. 54. The Departments of the Social Sciences should not be confused with purely party research and study organisations. Some educational PPO's have their own organisations for social research. For example, the party committee of the Moscow Technical College has a special group for sociological research, established to analyse the content and effectiveness of ideological indoctrination work and to give recommendations for its improvement. Work in this group is presumably part-time. *Kom.*, 10/71, p. 60.

Primary and secondary schools do not have Departments of the Social Sciences. However teachers of Russian language and literature, history and social studies (*obshchestvovedenie*) in schools occupy a similar position to the teachers of the social sciences in the higher-level institutions.¹ The interest of school PPO's in the teaching of these subjects can be seen in the report in a 1962 issue of *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*. When a secondary school PPO had an open party meeting to consider why students had such materialistic views of communism, it was decided that it was due to shortcomings in the teaching of language, literature and history. The practice was therefore introduced of teachers, communist and non-communist, checking each other's teaching.²

This concern with Russian language, literature and culture is of such significance for the general value system of the child that it can hardly be seen in terms simply of academic work. Similarly the teaching of atheism is a matter of social concern far beyond the bounds

1 In the non-Russian republics the teaching of Russian language, literature and culture is considered a fundamental part of the non-Russian's education and one of enormous political significance. *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, 8/68, p. 68. See also the report in *The Times* (London) on the teaching of Russian language in Georgia, 8/6/76.

2 *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 8/62, p. 62. It is interesting that the secretaries of school PPO's appear usually to be teachers in these areas. See p. 423.

of academic work. Thus educational PPO's are responsible for the attitudes towards religion held by students. In 1954 the PPO of the Stavropol Language Institute was criticised for not noticing that one of the students was religious.¹

Indeed educational PPO's are responsible for forming the correct values in students in all areas of life. In 1969 *Kommunist Uzbekistana* declared that the party organisations of tertiary educational institutions were not sufficiently concerned with the aesthetic development of students and that they needed to be more interested in what students were reading and watching.² In 1961 a school PPO was criticised for doing too little to improve the aesthetic education of students in the area of dancing and similar pursuits.³ The secretary of the party organisation of a Kazakh school was praised for his enthusiasm over the aesthetic education of students, teaching them the beauty of nature and art.⁴

PPO's are expected to be interested in the physical as well as aesthetic development of students. The PPO of a school worked together with the director to

1 *P.zh.*, 15/54, p. 19.

2 *Kom. Uzbekistana*, 10/69, p. 51.

3 *P.zh.*, 7/61, p. 50.

4 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/66, p. 49.

improve the sport situation in the school.¹ In 1970 a party meeting of the PPO of the Digi-Dzikhsh Technical College decided on the need for physical education for students in their spare time.²

Two reports describe two more unusual areas of PPO concern with the social values and conduct of students. *Kommunist Estonii* reports that a struggle has been undertaken by the PPO of the Tallin Teachers' College against alcoholism among students,³ while the party organisation of a Kazakh school was criticised in *Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana* for doing nothing when teachers arranged the marriage of an underaged girl student!⁴

Later in this chapter we will examine the practice of giving rank-and-file party members party tasks as a method of inculcating in them the special status and responsibilities of party membership. Similar reasoning lies behind the practice of assigning students to various types of "social work". The work is designed to impress on students the responsibilities each individual has towards society and to foster in students the "collective spirit".

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- 1 *P.zh.*, 6/56, p. 60. The Moscow Technical College for Mechanical Technology has a party commission for sport. *P.zh.*, 5/68, p. 59.
- 2 *P.zh.*, 10/70, p. 59.
- 3 *Kommunist Estonii*, 3/73, p. 46.
- 4 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 8/60, p. 33.

Is usually takes the form of construction and agricultural work. The best known example is probably the work of students in the Virgin Lands during the Khrushchev era.¹ There are more mundane cases. For example, in the Novosibirsk Engineering and Construction Institute the *komsomol* committee, under the supervision of the party committee and rectorate, organises construction brigades to work on collective and state farms.²

There are other forms of student "social work". The *komsomol* organisation of the Moscow Technical College organises the sending of student agitation brigades to collective farms and military units. The young lecturers

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- 1 For example, in 1958 the secretary of the PPO of Perm State University was proud to announce that he had been able to send 600 students to the Virgin Lands. *P.zh.*, 1/58, p. 18.
- 2 *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 8/71, p. 58. In "For the Good of the Cause" Solzhenitsyn describes the efforts of *komsomol* students, inspired by a teacher attached to the *komsomol* by the party buro, in the building of their new school buildings. Solzhenitsyn, A: *Stories and Prose Poems*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 49. The emphasis in recent years has been on the Student Construction Brigades. The brigades are organised by university trade union and student committees and are made up of students who work at various construction jobs throughout the Soviet Union during the summer vacation. Although the work is considered as contributing towards the fulfilment of one's socialist obligations, it is paid, how well I do not know, and so could be a quite useful supplement to students' incomes.

receive their preparation in the school for propagandists within the Department of Scientific Communism.¹ We also find that students often act as *druzhiniki*, civilians who patrol the streets "maintaining peace and public order".²

I will conclude this section with some brief summary and further discussion of the means available to educational PPO's in indoctrination work among students.

Kommunist listed the more commonplace forms of indoctrination work in 1960. The list included personal conversations, the use of propagandists, the giving of lectures, and question-and-answer evenings.³

The use of propagandists, agitators and lecturers is one of the most widespread forms of indoctrination work and that providing the most usual means for teachers to fulfil their "social work" obligations. The work can take a number of forms. For example, in 1957 there was some debate in the Soviet press about this matter. In one issue of *Kommunist* in that year the secretary of the party buro

1 *Kom.*, 10/71, p. 60.

2 Iuldashev, Kh. and others: *Partorganizatsiia uchebnogo zavedin'ia, iz opyta raboty partiinykh organizatsii shkoly, tekhnikuma i instituta*, Combined Publishing House of the Uzbek Central Committee, Tashkent, 1968, p. 25.

3 *Kom.*, 5/60, p. 80.

of the Finance-Economics Institute in Kazan wrote that every study group in the institute had an indoctrination "tutor" permanently attached to it. He told the students about current affairs and party decisions, involved himself in their everyday lives, took part in *komsomol* meetings, etc. The director of the Kazan Aviation Institute reacted to this negatively. Apparently rather disturbed at the thought of having party-directed indoctrination "tutors" present virtually permanently in all study groups, he declared that such a practice is unnecessary. He declared that the PPO needs to raise, not reduce the independence of students and that he was attempting to give students a greater say in their every-day affairs. *Kommunist* supported the director, although stressing that the degree of student independence was already sufficient and that it only needed to be more fully developed.¹

School PPO's are able to make use of parents in their indoctrination activities.² In 1972 the party buro of a Kazakh school recommended that the Academic Council prepare and conduct a conference of parents with the theme "The role of the family in the international education of

1 *Kom.*, 7/57, pp. 122-123. A similar debate occurred in *Partiinaiia zhizn'* early the next year. This time the journal took a middle view, declaring that it was necessary to look at each individual case. *P.zh.*, 1/58, pp. 16-17.

2 In Chapter 3 we will also see the use made of parents in maintaining class discipline.

children".¹ School party organisations also invite parents to open party meetings.²

Soviet schools have parents' committees apparently resembling the Parents' and Citizens' Committees of Australian schools. These committees are expected to help the PPO's with their indoctrination work. The parents' committee of one Uzbek school is headed by an old communist, the chairman of a *makhalinskii* committee. On the initiative of the committee there was established a parents' university "which helps in the character training (*vospitanie*) of children by working through their parents".³

In 1966 the PPO of a Krasnoamursk school and the local *raikom* found themselves in trouble over attempts to put relations with parents on a highly formal basis. The dispute had been foreshadowed in the previous year by a letter to *Partiinaia zhizn'* from a parent of a school child complaining that he had received a letter from the school demanding that he come to a meeting of communist parents. He claimed that there were already sufficient means for the mobilisation of parents - parents' committees, fathers' and mothers' councils, etc., and that an incorrect distinction

1 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 9/72, p. 37.

2 *Kom.Sov. Latvii*, 7/70, p. 79.

3 Iuldashev, op. cit., pp. 9-10. The *makhalinskii* committee is a local administrative organisation staffed usually on a voluntary basis, often by retired communists.

was being made between communist and non-communist parents. He had complained about the matter at the meeting, which was attended by a *raikom* secretary, and to his own PPO (in the *raispolkom*), but had received no satisfaction. No reaction was evident from *Partiinaia zhizn'* on this occasion.¹

However there was a negative reaction to a later letter from a parent of a child at a Kuibyshev school, complaining about the formation of an artificial party organisation made up of communist parents. The organisation had a party buro of 15 people and party groups with group leaders and deputies in each class. The letter writer claimed that the organisation was contrary to the Party Rules, in that its members were already in the PPO's of the institutions where they worked full-time. However the party buro was supported by a *raikom* instructor in its view that no breaking of Party Rules was involved.

A later issue of the journal announced that the *raikom* had claimed to have got around the problem by renaming the organisation "the Council of communists in the School's micro-raion". *Partiinaia zhizn'* expressed dissatisfaction with this, hoping that the matter would be resolved in fact, not just in name. Eventually it was reported that the *raikom* had recognised its mistake and

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P.zh., 13/65, pp. 64-65.

abolished the organisation.¹

One wonders what the background to these cases was. It would appear that previously, presumably during the time of Khrushchev's rule, such organisations had been allowed, since in both cases *raikomy* supported them. However the reports give no idea of the tasks of the organisations and I have found no mention of them in earlier years, although interestingly I have seen one report since of a school party organisation having meetings of communist parents. This time the practice was not criticised.²

The planning of ideological and social training is one of the most important tasks of educational PPO's. In recent times the stress has been on long-term planning, plans that last for the full period of an individual student's course. In 1969 *Kommunist Uzbekistana* criticised the party organisations of tertiary institutions in Tashkent for working out yearly plans that have the same activities year after year. The article claims that these should be replaced by plans covering the whole period of a student's course.³

The process is described well in the case of the Tallin Teachers' College. The programme for the long-term plan was originally devised by the party buro secretary. The draft programme was then examined in meetings of the Department of Marxism-Leninism, the party buro and the party *aktiv*.

1 *P.zh.*, 2/66, p. 66; 11/66, p. 78; 17/66, p. 78.

2 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/70, p. 79.

3 *Kom.Uzbekistana*, 10/69, p. 53.

Many changes were made as a result of these examinations and of the consideration of directives of higher authorities and the experience of other institutions throughout the country. The general institute plan was then confirmed in a combined session of the Academic Council and the party buro. The faculty plans were confirmed in combined meetings of faculty councils and party buros, while the study group plans were confirmed in meetings of the buros of departmental *komsomol* organisations. The institute's council and party buro were to take control of fulfilment, hearing reports (*otchëty*) from the deans and party buro secretaries of the faculties. Similarly faculty party organisations were to hear reports from department heads. Also faculty heads, deans, party buro secretaries, pro-rectors for academic and scientific sections and the rector, as well as the *komsomol* and trade union leadership, were entitled to personally check fulfilment.¹

There have been basically three types of control discussed in this section. Firstly, there was ideological control in the narrowest sense of the term, ensuring that individuals do not express unacceptable views on the basic principles of Soviet ideology. The importance of such control for the maintenance of legitimacy needs no more explanation. Secondly, there was control of intellectual attitudes, but in areas that have no direct relevance to the basic principles of the Soviet ideology. Such control is important for legitimacy because the Soviet ideology claims to be relevant for all areas of life. Finally,

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Kom. Estonii, 3/73, pp. 38-40.

there was control of social values in the broad sense. The aim here is to ensure that social life in the Soviet Union is seen to be organised on a just, friendly basis, that the quality of life is at a high level.¹ This type of control also contributes to legitimacy. The party seeks to show that the society it is building is a happy one without serious social problems.

3. Agitation

So far I have discussed the role of PPO's in value indoctrination. It was found that their activities in the propaganda area are in fact only marginally directed towards value indoctrination - such propaganda activities as theoretical seminars are used primarily for operational indoctrination. However PPO's are still responsible for fostering the proper values in the Soviet population. These include the correct "political" values, that is, the correct attitudes to the basic goals and structure of the Soviet system, maintained primarily through strict ideological

1 Later in this chapter we will see the responsibility PPO's have for ensuring the correct behaviour of party members. PPO's and other social organisations are in fact responsible for the social behaviour of all members of society. One of the leading actors of the Novosibirsk *oblast'* Drama Theatre got drunk and ruined a tour by the theatre. It was not the first time he had done so, but previously he had been considered indispensable. This time the party members decided that it was necessary to show that no degree of artistic merit can justify drunkenness. They demanded that the director dismiss the actor. *Sov.kul'tura*, 23/11/73, p. 2.

control, and the correct "social" values. These latter are not of such immediate political significance, but are still of ideological importance, because they legitimise party involvement in all areas of life and because they foster the type of social behaviour necessary for a stable society. This fostering of the social values necessary for correct behaviour is of particular importance for educational PPO's, since it is in educational institutions that much of the basic socialisation work in this area takes place.

I will now describe those PPO activities that are specifically concerned with operational indoctrination. We have seen that propaganda is theoretically directed primarily towards the legitimation of the regime. By way of contrast agitation is generally concerned with more immediate and topical matters, Marxism-Leninism providing only the general framework. The *Spravochnik* declares:

Political agitation will be militant, concrete and realistic only when the explanation of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the policies and decisions of the Communist Party is given, not in general terms, but with an organic connection with the concrete tasks before each *oblast'*, *raion*, enterprise and collective and state farm, and when agitation instructs the

masses in the resolution of these tasks on the basis of the experience of leading people.¹

This quotation suggests that the main function of agitation is communication. The massive agitation campaigns that accompany, for example, each Party Congress and Five Year Plan are designed to explain to each collective and each individual worker what is expected of them in the fulfilment of the particular goals set by the Congress or Plan. The explanation of these tasks should take account of the general context in which the collective or individual is situated and the immediate production concerns of the collective. The party buro, when working out the topics for agitation work, is expected to consult with the "host" organisation's leadership to ensure that the most important production problems are covered.²

What are the various forms of agitation and what role do PPO's play in them? The means of agitation include all the media and various forms of face-to-face communication, oral and visual. PPO's are involved only with the latter. Face-to-face communication consists primarily of meetings, smaller informal conversations, and visual agitation through the use of posters, placards, etc.

1 *Spravochnik*, op. cit., p. 519.

2 *ibid*, p. 525.

Meetings can be organised under party or non-party auspices. Other social organisations such as trade unions and the *komsomol* conduct mass meetings for their members to publicise recent events and policy announcements. While the PPO is not directly involved in such meetings it can be confidently stated that it controls these activities as closely as it controls all other activities of social organisations. The *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entisklopedia*, quoted by Conquest, declares that the Central Committee of the CPSU "has charged Party organisations with convening general meetings of the workers in all enterprises and collective farms to hear reports on current political events at least once every 1-1½ months".¹ I have not found any specific mention of such regular general meetings for all workers organised by PPO's. However trade union and *komsomol* meetings, combined with the usual PPO meetings, would certainly have the same effect as such meetings.

Many regular general PPO meetings are essentially exercises in agitation. The key-note addresses at these meetings are usually concerned with the tasks of the collective in the fulfilment of the latest economic and other policy goals of the party leadership. It is particularly evident that, after a Party Congress, the announcement of a new Five Year Plan or a particularly

1 Conquest, op. cit., p. 114.

important Central Committee Plenum, party meetings are used as forums for explaining the role of the collective and its individual members in the fulfilment of national policy. The wide, and apparently increasing, use of open party meetings means that these forums are not closed to non-party members. Certainly there are occasions when party members will be informed of their own particular tasks in closed meetings. However party meetings concerned with publicising recent important announcements of the top leadership are usually open to non-party people. The *Spravochnik* says:

It is well known that the decisions of plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU on questions of agriculture and industry are addressed not only to the party, but to the whole Soviet people. Primary party organisations, in considering these decisions, work out practical measures which they will be putting into effect with the cooperation of the non-party masses. It is understood that the enlisting of non-party people in the consideration of these questions can only help the party organisation more completely uncover shortcomings in work, take into account the advice of the non-party masses, and heighten their political and production activity (*aktivnost'*).¹

1 *Spravochnik*, op. cit., p. 519.

These general meetings are complemented by closer contacts between agitators and smaller groups of workers. Conquest quotes Lenin to the effect that "mass meetings are not enough; what is needed is personal agitation - 'every free day, every free hour of the conscious worker must be used for personal agitation'."¹ Conquest gives the best brief description of the style of such close forms of agitation.² The "chats" (*besedy*) conducted by agitators are concerned with recent policy decisions, best illustrated by reading aloud from Soviet newspapers, so carefully portrayed in photographs in the Soviet press. However they also deal with more specific and immediate production problems and are expected to contribute to the mobilisation of workers towards greater efficiency and productivity.

While it is said that agitators should display some initiative in the choice of the topics of chats, in fact they are closely controlled by the PPO. Conquest quotes a Soviet handbook to the effect that "usually a model list of the most topical themes at a given moment is recommended to agitators every month".³ The PPO is also responsible for the appointment, organisation and training of agitators. Work as an agitator is one of the most common

1 Conquest, op. cit., p. 114.

2 *ibid*, pp. 114-117.

3 *ibid*, p. 116.

ways for a party member to fulfil his obligations to do some party work in addition to his normal job. Conquest speaks of the *agitkollectivy*, the groups of agitators run by the PPO. While the group will not usually be headed by the party secretary, he must personally direct its work, "because he knows the concrete tasks of the enterprise or collective farm, and the *raikom*'s or *gorkom*'s instructions better than anyone else and can ensure that agitation is carried out not in an abstract manner, but closely linked to life".¹ The formal head of the group will be one of the best-trained party activists. Presumably in PPO's big enough to have a deputy secretary for ideological affairs he will be directly responsible for agitation.

The training and preparation of agitators is also the responsibility of the PPO, with the party secretary again being directly involved. The *Spravochnik* declares:

The quality of agitational work depends largely on how party organisations assist in expanding the political vision of agitators, how they arm them with concrete knowledge of industrial and agricultural production and teach them how to conduct explanatory work.

In seminars for agitators there must be

1 Conquest, op. cit., p. 116. The quotation is from the *Spravochnik*, p. 504. It is a good illustration of the staff generalist qualities which must be possessed by a PPO secretary.

presented general political reports, consultations must be arranged and exchange of experience conducted. There should be sample illustrations (*predmetnyi pokaz*) of how to conduct a chat, how to best make some fact or other easy to understand.

But along with the whole range of reports and seminars no less significance for the training of agitators should be given to everyday contact between them and the party organisation secretary.¹

Conversations between an agitator and one other person are also common, particularly, it seems, in cases where the subject of attention has persisted in holding incorrect views. In these cases the control element appears to be dominant over the communication function. The party secretary will often be involved in such conversations. The secretary of the party committee of the *Mossoviet* Theatre is praised for the fatherly attitude he has towards the younger generation, particularly in the individual conversations he conducts as part of the PPO's agitation work.² When the party buro of Kazan State University found out that one fourth year student in the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics

1 *Spravochnik*, op. cit., p. 520.

2 *Teatral'naia zhizn'*, 4/69, p. 9.

had confused and inconsistent opinions on party policies and Soviet power, the party secretary set matters right by answering all the student's questions in a personal conversation.¹

Some brief mention should be made of visual agitation. Little need be added to Conquest's treatment of the matter.² All visitors to the Soviet Union will have seen the placards, posters, large photographs and stands for the display of newspapers that are found in the streets and on buildings. The messages conveyed are usually of a very general nature. They are complemented by further placards, charts, graphs, "boards of honour", wall newspapers, etc., inside working organisations. These displays usually carry a more concrete message for the working collective. They are not necessarily arranged by the PPO; for example, charts on the progress of socialist competition are probably put up by the trade union. However the PPO has overall responsibility for visual agitation.

As Conquest makes clear, some Soviet writers are themselves aware of the inadequacies of most forms of visual agitation. It is impossible to measure their overall effectiveness. My own observations suggest that they are paid very little conscious attention. While the possibility

1 *Kom.*, 7/57, p. 118.

2 Conquest, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

of a sub-conscious effect should not be entirely discounted, some considerable scepticism is justified.

How widespread and effective, then, is the work of agitators? Conquest makes the interesting point that agitation meetings provide one of the few forums available to Soviet citizens for making complaints, not about the system as a whole, but about specific grievances they might have.¹ It is difficult to say just what advantage is taken of such a forum. The fact that the *Spravochnik* finds it necessary to devote several pages to the "explanation of difficult (*ostrye*) questions" suggests that considerable advantage is taken.² It is even more difficult to decide what effect the answers to the questions have. Do they contribute to the legitimation of the regime and the positive mobilisation of the masses, or do they serve to further alienate them? It must depend enormously on the quality of the particular agitator and the nature of particular questions. However the general tone of the *Spravochnik's* treatment of the matter is not reassuring. If someone complains about living conditions the agitator must not express sympathy, but is to strengthen the person's confidence that life for the masses is improving. It goes on:

Of course, we meet some people who do not want

1 *ibid*, p. 115.

2 *Spravochnik*, *op. cit.*, pp. 521-525.

to take into account anything, who do not wish to see our great successes or achievements or the reasons for any shortcomings. For them everything is bad. And there are others who see everything only from their own point of view (*sudiat obo vsëm so svoei kolokol'ni*), who do not think about state interests ... One has to explain things patiently to those who really do not understand something and wish to satisfy themselves with the truth, but those who stir things up should receive a decisive rebuff.¹

Indeed other statements lead one to suspect that ideological control plays a prominent part in the minds of the authorities who have established the system of agitation. The *Spravochnik* declares that "party organisations must directly interest themselves in the questions that the masses put to agitators so that these questions can be generalised, conclusions can be derived from them and the agitator himself will consider it essential to go to the party organisation to tell about how a conversation had gone and what matters of interest had arisen from it".² Although the control function of agitation should not be stressed at the expense of its communication function the close and

1 *ibid*, pp. 522, 525.

2 *ibid*, pp. 520-521.

continuing contacts between agitator and the masses that characterise so many forms of agitation give it a great potential for contributing to that constant and pervasive observation of the everyday activities of the Soviet masses which is such an important part of rank-and-file party members' functions and is so important for maintaining the supremacy of the party's ideology.

Thus it appears that while propaganda activities make a very significant contribution to operational indoctrination, agitation activities could make their contribution to value indoctrination. But before we can confidently assert this we have to look at the actual extent of agitation activities in non-production institutions. There have been complaints in the Soviet press that PPO's neglect agitation because they consider "agitation (to be) work of minor importance, destined only for the backward strata of the population".¹ Such an attitude would presumably be most widespread in the PPO's of non-production institutions, with their virtual monopoly of the Soviet intelligentsia. Evidence of the unwillingness of communists in non-production institutions to involve themselves in agitation work gives some limited support to this view.² The

1 *Kom.*, 10/65, p. 51; quoted in Conquest, op. cit., p. 117.

2 In 1966 the secretary of the party committee of Moscow State University complained about the unwillingness of academic workers to become involved in party work. *Kom.*, 10/66, p. 36. In 1968 in the Obninsk branch of the Physical Chemistry Institute only seventeen of the 79 leading workers were involved in political work. *Kom.*, 18/68, p. 43.

fact that there is an almost total lack of detailed information on agitation activities in non-production institutions constitutes stronger evidence. Even articles by party secretaries on the ideological activities of their PPO's give few details on the type of agitation work described in this section. The emphasis is usually on the political indoctrination seminars already described. It is unlikely that non-production PPO's entirely ignore agitation work - my own observations at Moscow State University suggest that they continue; visual agitation was very much in evidence, while large-scale meetings and smaller-scale chats appeared to be conducted in order to discuss current political events. However the evidence, circumstantial as it is, strongly suggests that the PPO's, and their party superiors, believe in the superiority of political indoctrination seminars for providing a combination of ideological control, communication and practical training in a form that intellectuals will not find totally ridiculous. The evidence suggests that of the types of agitation activities discussed in this section only party meetings, including open party meetings, are used to any significant degree for operational indoctrination.

4. Material and other forms of incentive

One important matter that none of the forms of

indoctrination discussed so far have really touched on is mobilisation. Value indoctrination provides a passive acceptance of the legitimacy of the Soviet ideology and party power. However there is no evidence that it produces positive mobilisation of the working masses. Operational indoctrination, in the form of agitation, undoubtedly lays considerable stress on the material benefits, both long and short-term, to be gained from dedicated production performance. However the effectiveness of such agitation seems to depend heavily on the workers being presented with actual evidence of those benefits, particularly the short-term ones. In effect agitation activities become little more than publicity for various systems of material incentive. It can hardly be said, in that case, that the agitation is providing the mobilisation.

When we speak of material incentive we mean mobilisation through the material reward of individual workers by their working collectives. Soviet theorists recognise that Soviet citizens, not yet living in a society that has reached the stage of full communism, do not see work as an "organic" need, but primarily as a necessary means to life. This makes it possible, and indeed necessary, to motivate people to work through material reward.¹ Wages

1 *Ekonomicheskie nauki*, 10/71, pp. 37-38.

are the basic form of material reward, providing the essential means of life.¹ However it is recognised that wages are of limited mobilising value. Because they are fixed at a certain level that will not be changed regardless of work done, short of promotion or dismissal, they motivate little more than minimum job fulfilment.

This fact has enabled, or required, the Soviet authorities to develop an extensive and complicated system of material incentive beyond the payment of a fixed wage. Using as justification the socialist principle of "to each according to his work", Soviet theorists and administrators have worked out a system in which material rewards to individual workers are tied to the degree of their fulfilment and their collective's fulfilment of set tasks.

In practice the range of different systems of material incentive is enormous. Even a brief survey of them is far beyond the scope of this thesis. However I will give some idea of the problems facing the systems, an indication of the extent of their use in the different categories of non-production institutions, and one relatively detailed example that shows PPO involvement in material incentive.

The main problem with systems of material

1 *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 5/71, p. 4.

incentive is finding ways to effectively measure performance. This is particularly a problem in non-production institutions where "output" is so rarely a physical object which can be either quantitatively or qualitatively measured. The Soviet authorities are well aware that material incentive depends on the worker being able to see that an increase in effort will lead quickly to a comparable increase in material benefit. This is difficult in a situation where output is such an intangible matter as the quality of education or administrative performance. Even in research institutes, where at least there are concrete results in terms of scientific discoveries, there are enormous difficulties in measuring the value of discoveries. The problem is compounded by the difficulties of isolating one individual's or collective's performance from outside factors.¹ The other reaction to this problem is to pay all workers exactly the same amount, with perhaps some allowance being made for the level of

1 This difficulty is best illustrated in administrative institutions. The only way the quality of the performance of an administrative institution can be measured is by looking at the production performance of subordinate enterprises. *Khozraschët* accounting procedures mean that the financial situation of administrative institutions, and therefore the amounts of money they have available for material incentive is placed in dependence on the effectiveness of work of subordinate enterprises. Soviet writers on these matters give no idea of how it is possible to determine the degree of responsibility of administrative workers for an enterprise's performance. *Vopr. ekonomiki*, 12/68, p. 43; *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1/72, p. 79.

position held and formal qualifications. Clearly the mobilising effect of such a system is minimal.¹

The second problem is working out indicators that do not allow for abuse. The system should be designed so that in working for his own individual or collective interests, the worker will automatically fulfil the interests of society as a whole. This is not always easily done. For example, many scientific institutions have used the number of scientific articles published as an indicator of research performance. This has led to a great increase in the practice of leading workers forcing their subordinates to add their names as co-authors of articles.²

The third problem has been finding the right level of material benefit to provide maximum mobilisation. If bonus payments make up too small a percentage of total income, their mobilising effect will be slight; if they

1 It is also contrary to the fundamental socialist (as distinct from communist) principle of "to each according to his work". This principle is of enormous practical significance in that it justifies differential rates of material reward. See *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 6/72, p. 72.

2 Gvishiani, D.M: *Voprosy teorii i praktiki upravleniia i organizatsii nauki*, Izd. "Nauka", Moscow, 1975, p. 213; Agursky, op. cit., p. 42; *P.zh.*, 12/76, p. 41. On the broader scale there has been the problem of ministries and their enterprises raising profitability, since 1965 the main indicator of performance, simply by raising prices rather than by improving productivity. *Sov.gos. i pravo*, 11/71, p. 71. Scientific institutes have also been guilty of this practice. *Sov.gos. i pravo*, 12/71, p. 8.

make up too-large a proportion, there are two possible effects. If total income varies too much, enough to affect the worker's life style, the effect on his sense of security could produce such discontent that a decline in productivity results, and a loss of the regime's legitimacy; if bonuses are artificually kept steady at such a level as to guarantee workers a predictable standard of living, they will come to regard the bonuses in the same light as wages - a guaranteed income for which no particular effort needs to be made. Soviet writers believe that they have found the right level at about 10 to 15% of total income.¹ However the problem then becomes a more serious one of finding sufficient cash to be able to pay bonuses at such a level. Many non-production institutions cannot be expected to make a profit. Therefore they are unable to build up any sort of fund for material incentive. Fixed payments for material incentive from the state budget destroy one of the fundamental principles of material incentive - that it be financed by the efforts of individuals working together in a collective, who then share in the benefits of their efforts.

This problem is probably the main reason that systems of material incentive are virtually non-existent in

1 Zav'ialov, V.G: *Problemy material'nogo stimulirovaniia truda rabotnikov nauchno-issledovatel'skikh organizatsii*, synopsis of a dissertation for degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences, Leningrad State University, 1971, p 12.

educational and cultural institutions. Indicators, even if not entirely satisfactory, have been devised for socialist competition in these institutions. If indicators, therefore, are not the main problem, the problem must be obtaining the financial resources to operate a system of material incentive.

Indicators appear to be the main problem in administrative institutions. There have been problems with building up funds for material incentive to an effective level.¹ However as time passes this problem should be reduced.²

For measurement of the quality of the performance of the collective as a whole we have seen that administrative institutions use the performance of subordinate enterprises measured in terms of profitability.³ But there is the is the further problem of determining the performance of

1 *Sovetskaia Moldavia*, 22/9/73, p. 4.

2 Of course this refers only to institutions that have subordinate production enterprises. Their funds for material incentive are almost invariably financed through deductions from enterprise profits. Administrative institutions that supervise non-production organisations have no such source of funds. Thus in 1968 bonuses constituted only 2% of the incomes of the officials of the Latvian Ministry of Education, although in 1971 the percentage had reached 3.38. *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 6/72, p. 72.

3 Again administrative institutions which supervise non-production organisations have no such measure.

individual administrative officials. They cannot be tied individually to any physical output.¹ But what little information I have on the indicators actually used to determine payments to individual administrative officials suggests that they are determined by collective plan fulfilment. Officials in the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry are paid bonuses quarterly according to three basic indicators of production plan fulfilment - the volume of production, the assortment of products, and the level of profitability of the branch as a whole - as well as other variable indicators presumably like those described in a 1971 *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* article. They included some sort of measurement of the quality of decisions made and documentation prepared, the efficiency of work with letters and grievances, and the fulfilment of orders and other tasks.² Whatever indicators are used, in administrative institutions with subordinate production enterprises systems of material incentive have been developed and widely applied.³

1 Thus socialist competition in the Turnover Department of the All-Union Ministry of Finance is based on the following rather extraordinary indicators: the improvement of relations between workers, development of a feeling of collectivism, friendliness at and away from work and the help officials give to each other to foster better moral qualities in Soviet man! Figurin, T.A: *Partiinye gruppy v sovetskikh uchrezhdeniakh*, Izd. "Sovetskaia Rosiia", Moscow, 1974, p. 10.

2 *Sov. gos. i pravo*, 4/71, p. 54.

3 For details on, for example, the system in the Ministry of Instrument Making, see *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 11/71, p. 15; *Pravda*, 9/2/69, p. 2.

In other institutions they are much rarer.¹

Among non-production institutions only scientific research institutes have the objective conditions to allow reasonably effective operation of systems of material incentive. It is possible to devise indicators to measure the performance of both individual scientists and their collectives, and with institutes being increasingly involved in contract work, it is possible for them to build up funds for material incentive of an effective size. Therefore it is not surprising that it is in this category that material incentive has experienced its greatest development.

One of the pioneers of material incentive in research institutes is the Karpov Institute of Physical Chemistry. In 1976 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* published an article by the director and party secretary of the institute on the system. From this article we can derive a good idea of a well-developed system of material incentive, and the part of the PPO in it.²

1 When I asked the head of a relatively small, but republican level, administrative organisation whether his organisation had a system of material incentive, he said that it was impossible since there was no way to measure performance or provide bonuses. But he then went on to say that he, working with the party buro and trade union committees, was able to reduce the wages of officials not working adequately, and to give good workers free trips.

2 *P.zh.*, 6/76, pp. 48-51.

When the system was introduced in 1968,¹ guaranteed wages were reduced by 25 to 30% and the director, in accordance with decisions of an attestation commission, was given the right to pay bonuses on the basis of the effectiveness of each individual's work. The bonuses are paid yearly. For scientific workers without academic degrees bonus payments cannot increase income more than 40% over the pre-1968 level; for those with degrees the limit is 25%.²

The institute has four attestation commissions, three sectional and one central, made up of leading scientists and party, trade union and *komsomol* representatives.³ Attestation is done first by the head of the section in which the individual works, then by the sectional commission, the central commission, and is finally confirmed by the director. The following criteria are used in evaluation: the theoretical and experimental quality of research; the level of initiative and creative independence; the scientific and practical significance of the results of research; and

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- 1 The system replaced one where the main way to get higher pay was to gain an academic degree.
 - 2 Production workers, laboratory assistants and administrative workers are not covered by the system.
 - 3 The membership of the central commission includes a secretary of the party buro, although not the first secretary, the chairman of the trade union committee, and the secretary of the *komsomol* organisation.

participation in the implementation of research in production. Although bonuses are paid yearly, attestations take place once every two years. The results of all attestations are examined in a meeting of the party buro and then in a general party meeting.¹

From the discussion so far it can be seen that the PPO has a continuing role to play in the operations of the material incentive system. There is party representation on the attestation commission, although no firm conclusions on the precise effect such representation might have are possible.² One could expect that workers who had caused any trouble of a political or ideological nature would meet problems from this quarter. The same could be said of the subsequent examination of the commissions' findings in the party buro and party meetings.

1 The article reports that the system has met with very few problems. After the first attestation there were only seven complaints. There were 483 scientific workers examined on this occasion, of whom 256 retained their former level of pay, 126 had theirs raised, and 71 had theirs lowered. These last were mainly highly paid and qualified people.

2 *Kommunist (Vilnius)* speaks of the influence of the communists who are members of the commissions for the payment of scientific workers in Lithuanian research institutes. *Kommunist (Vilnius)*, 6/72, p. 33. One book on the organisation of scientific research speaks of the role of the *treugol'nik* (triangle) of a laboratory or department in defining the coefficients used to evaluate the work of individual workers. *Treugol'nik* usually refers to the head of the laboratory or department, its party secretary, and trade union chairman. Gvishiani, op. cit., p. 216.

However in keeping with its staff generalist role the part the PPO played in the introduction of the system and in broad control of its continuing operations are particularly significant. When permission had been received from higher authorities for the introduction of the system the party buro held a meeting with invited guests, including the secretaries of subordinate party organisations and communist members of the Academic Council. The meeting examined the matter of the formation and the memberships of the attestation commissions. The whole system was then examined in an open party meeting. Before the second attestation in 1970 the party buro established a special commission for examining suggestions put forward by workers on the conduct of the attestation.¹ The article also refers to the importance of the institute's communists convincing the collective of the value of the system and ensuring that it is not implemented in an "administrative" way. This shows the role of the PPO in operational indoctrination, in this case persuading the members of the

1 For another account of such PPO involvement, see *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 1/71, p. 61. The PPO in the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry took an active part in working out the system of payments for officials. The PPO also has an influence over such matters through the trade union organisation. The establishment by institutional leaders of the procedures for the use of material incentive funds must be done with the agreement of the trade union organisation. *Plan. khoziaistvo*, 11/71, p. 15; *Iampol'skaia, Ts.A: Obshchestvennye organizatsii v SSSR, nekotorye politicheskie i organizatsionno-pravovye aspekty*, Izd. "Nauka", Moscow, 1972, p. 63.

collective of the value of new operational procedures, and the links of such indoctrination with the staff generalist role.

We have seen that problems of defining indicators and obtaining funds have seriously limited the use of systems of material incentive in non-production institutions, particularly in cultural and educational institutions. This has helped increase the emphasis on socialist competition and other forms of "moral" reward as a means of mobilisation. These have the advantage that because they lay the stress on "moral" considerations less concrete indicators can be used, and because they do not rely on material reward for any effect they might have they can be implemented in institutions without their own sources of income.¹

1 In fact, however, many so-called "moral" rewards have a very materialistic appearance. One book on moral incentive included among its list of moral rewards such things as valuable prizes, trips to rest homes, tourist trips, subscriptions and tickets to theatres, etc. *Moral'noe stimulirovanie truda v usloviakh khoziaistvennoi reformy*, Institute of Economics of Industry of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the Donets *oblast'* organisation of *Znanie*, Donets, 1971, p. 14. Even such apparently non-material rewards as Diplomas of Honour, Red Banners and signatures in the work book appear to have a material significance not generally publicised. After one book gave some data on the relative popularity of various forms of moral reward, the statement was made that "the least popular is the use of the work book as a means of encouragement, since this gives the worker practically no advantages with regard to transfers to other work, with regard to retirement onto a pension, or in the process of his work activity". Smol'kov, V.G: *Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie v neproizvodstvennoi sphere*, Profizdat, Moscow, 1975, p. 132.

Therefore it is not surprising that educational institutions have well-developed systems of socialist competition. The most detailed account of one appears in a 1972 article in *Vestnik vysshei shkoly* on the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute.¹ The competition was organised jointly by the institute's rectorate, party committee and trade union committee to determine the best faculty, department (*kafedra*) and academic group. The indicators for faculties and departments are in four sections. Firstly, the quality of personnel is considered - the numbers of faculties or departments headed by professors or doctors and the qualifications of their teaching and scientific staff. Secondly, account is taken of research work undertaken - the volume of contractual work, the degree of fulfilment and its effectiveness, the fulfilment of projects allocated under the state plan, the participation of students in research work, links with and the introduction of the results of research into production. Thirdly, there is consideration of academic work - the publishing of textbooks and scientific manuals, the work of students on individual plans, and an evaluation of diploma projects and work. Finally, an evaluation is made of the work done outside class - the indoctrination work of teachers outside their class duties, the participation of students in social work, physical education and sport, and the "third semester"

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Vestnik vysshei shkoly, 10/72, pp. 68-70.

(work done, usually on farms or in construction, during the summer vacation), and a consideration of student discipline. For faculties there is a total of 29 indicators, for departments, 25.

For the academic groups there are three sections with a total of 12 indicators. Firstly, there is the study process - the pass rate, work on individual study plans, and the monthly evaluation of progress made. Research work is again considered - the participation of students in scientific work, the level of scientific work in the educational process, and scientific discussions and seminars. The third section is concerned with work outside class and is identical to the fourth section described above.

Scores for all these indicators are determined by permanent all-institute and faculty commissions with representatives of the party, trade union, deans' offices and rectorate.

Successful sections are rewarded with various titles and diplomas, while lists of results and photographs of the leaders of the best sections are publicly displayed.

Administrative and scientific institutions also have well-developed socialist competitions. Usually the same sort of indicators, based on the fulfilment of production tasks, as were developed for the systems of

material stimulation are used, but with some less "material" indicators added.¹

One would expect that PPO involvement in socialist competition would take much the same form as its involvement in material incentive, that is, influence over commissions responsible for setting indicators and evaluating performance and extensive agitation activities. Indeed the greater "moral" character of socialist competition and the setting of agitation work as a common task for people involved in competition could lead one to expect even greater PPO involvement. In fact there is no evidence of this greater involvement. Although reports such as that quoted above on the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute make it clear that PPO's do play a significant role in the organisation of socialist competition, there is some evidence to suggest that much of the work in this area is left to the trade union. Lakhtin declares that the conditions for socialist

1 For example, the section on "social indoctrination and ideological work" in the competition adopted by the Institute of Physical Chemistry of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences includes such indicators as work in the institute *aktiv* (work on the editorial board of the wall newspaper or in people's control groups and various commissions), political study, participation in artistic activities, in the beautification of the institute's grounds, and in trips to the Young Pioneers' camp, and in sport, including consideration of successes gained in that area. Lakhtin, G.A: *Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie v nauchnykh uchrezhdeniakh*, Profizdat, Moscow, 1975, p. 50.

competition could be determined by a specially formed commission of representatives from the administration, party committee, trade union and other social organisations, but feels that probably the trade union could do it by itself.¹

Conclusions on the effectiveness of material and moral incentive are not easy, and are beyond the scope of this thesis. What is of concern to us is the involvement of the PPO. We have seen evidence of PPO agitation on behalf of these systems of mobilisation. Agitation about socialist competition tends to be more in terms of value indoctrination, with the emphasis on its "collective spirit", the importance attached to it by Lenin as a fundamental feature of socialism, etc. The authorities recognise the greater instrumental nature of material incentive, and agitation on its behalf is more in operational terms. Direct PPO involvement in the mobilisation process foreshadows their involvement in the "production" activities of "host" organisations - close day-to-day overseeing of operations, plus a broader staff generalist control.

1 Of course the trade union is closely supervised by the PPO, so this is not to reduce the importance of the PPO.

5. The special role of the PPO

That completes the description of PPO involvement in general value and operational indoctrination. However examination of indoctrination in the special values inherent in the PPO's role in Soviet society and the special indoctrination of party members is required.

Indoctrination of the working population in the special role of PPO's in Soviet society is based on indoctrination in the leading role of the CPSU. This is one of the most important aspects of value indoctrination. However more specific indoctrination is required in the particular role of the PPO - what powers it has and what means it can use for what purpose. It is particularly important that such indoctrination take place among institutional leaders, who will feel the effect of PPO involvement most. Its need will be more severely felt at times of major changes in PPO powers, such as the 1971 extension of the right of control.

Unfortunately we do not have a great deal of detail on the content of operational indoctrination work at lower levels. However we can presume that it takes its lead from the sort of material which appears in the Soviet press, particularly *Pravda* and the more politically specialised journals such as *Partiinaiia zhizn'*, *Kommunist* and their republican equivalents. These journals are full

of information on administrative and managerial procedures, including considerable detail on the role of PPO's. Western students of the system rely almost entirely on such sources for their information. Although the journals are sometimes vague, contradictory and confusing, Western students are usually able to discern the current state of Soviet policies and procedures from them. Combined with other forms of communication and training available to those actually working in the system, the press should provide quite a good guide on the role of PPO's. Articles appearing in such journals form an important basis for a great deal of agitation work.¹ They are also undoubtedly required reading for all leading workers.

In later sections of this thesis I will describe various seminars and conferences run by higher level party organs to explain to PPO secretaries and other party workers their roles in new policies and procedures.² Very often

1 For example, in 1971 the party buro of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry decided to encourage the collective to look at a number of articles that had appeared in *Pravda* as the basis for the examination of a reorganisation of the ministry. The articles were studied in all party groups before the matter was considered in a general party meeting. *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 1/71, p. 59.

2 See pp. 369-372, 493-395.

institutional leaders also attend these conferences.¹ Although we have few details on the content of such conferences and seminars, undoubtedly the role of PPO's receives considerable attention.²

Letters and reports in the Soviet press suggest that institutional leaders have a good understanding of the proper role and procedures of PPO's, probably better than many PPO secretaries. This is not to say that they conduct

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- 1 For example, the Tallin *gorkom* has permanent seminars for the directors and party secretaries of specialised secondary schools and the directors, their deputies and party secretaries of technical colleges. *Kom. Estonii*, 4/73, p. 13. The Kharkov *obkom* has permanent seminars for the rectors, pro-rectors and party secretaries of tertiary educational institutions and the directors and party secretaries of research and design institutes. *Kommunist Ukrainy*, 3/71, p. 92. In 1968 the Frunze *raikom* of Moscow ran a seminar to which it invited a wide range of leading officials and party secretaries from a number of ministries and agencies. *P.zh.*, 11/68, pp. 20-21.
- 2 The fact that institutional leaders are almost invariably party members means that they are subject to the special value and operational indoctrination procedures that are applied to party members, including party discipline. We have seen that many institutional leaders undertake propaganda and agitation work as part of their party duties. This means that they will probably be subject to special courses for propagandists and agitators run by Universities of Marxism-Leninism, Higher Party Schools, etc. For descriptions of these organisations, see Conquest, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-113; Mickiewicz, *op. cit.*,

their activities in accordance with their understanding. However this is a matter to be considered in a later chapter.

6. The special values of party members

The final matter to be considered in this chapter is the introduction to and maintenance of special values in party members. These values are basically a willingness to give unquestioning obedience to the party and at all times to behave in such a way that the party will not be brought into disrepute.¹ Such values are important for a number of reasons. If the party is to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the people as the "vanguard of the socialist society" it is essential that its members be seen to behave in a way worthy of a vanguard. If the party is to be able to effectively implement its policies and maintain its position of power in Soviet society it is essential that all party members obey orders. This includes obeying orders in the most general sense of directing all their efforts to the implementation of the party's policies, and in its literal sense of obeying specific orders. In both situations it is required that party members put social interests, effectively party interests, above their own personal or sectional interests. We will see that this is particularly important in the case

1 These values can be seen expressed in the Party Rules. *Ustav KPSS*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1971, pp. 7-10.

of PPO secretaries. Finally the party's control of the population relies to an undetermined, but probably quite heavy, degree on the willingness of all party members to maintain a close watch over their colleagues, to provide a continuous intelligence operation on the general mood of the population and the beliefs and activities of individual citizens.

The process of the indoctrination of party members in these special values begins long before the individual becomes a party member. It begins with his basic socialization and his continuing indoctrination as a non-party Soviet citizen. The leading role of the party is probably the most basic ideological tenet in the Soviet Union, one to which all citizens are subject from childhood. This means, according to the Soviet authorities, that simply being invited to become a party member should have an enormous effect on a citizen. It should put him in the right frame of mind for the process of preparation for becoming a party member.

The selection and preparation of new members is one of the most important tasks of PPO's. Although the highest party authorities are undoubtedly responsible for setting general membership policies, including setting the required proportions of party members according to occupation, sex and nationality, only the PPO's are in a

position to know individual members of "host" organisations well enough to be able to recruit new members in accordance with these proportions and in order to achieve the best spread of communists through all sections of the "host" organisations.¹

To satisfy the requirements of the categories is

1 In 1962 the PPO's of Latvian tertiary educational institutions were criticised in *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* for not doing enough to get good people into the party. Some faculties in a number of institutions had too few communists. *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 6/62, p. 57. The 1973 party conference at Tartu State University found that there were too few communists among the university's *aspiranty*. *Sovetskaia Estonia*, 7/12/73, p. 2. In 1958 it was considered that there were too few student party members in the Moscow Agricultural Academy. *P.zh.*, 1/58, p. 15. In 1972 the party committee of the Tashkent Institute of Engineers for the Irrigation and Mechanisation of Agriculture took steps to improve the spread of communists by distributing the party members of the rectorate throughout the faculty party organisations, rather than grouping them all together with the party members working in the institute's administrative section. *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2. It appears that PPO's are held responsible for any problems that might arise from observing the quotas that are undoubtedly established by the higher party authorities. A 1976 Central Committee conference for heads of Party-Organisational Departments of Union Republic Central Committees, *kraikomy* and *obkomy* declared: "The activity of primary party organisations here and there is regulated by and tolerates elements of a mechanical regulation of the growth in the party ranks". *P.zh.*, 16/76, p. 15. It appears that at times PPO's are virtually obliged to accept new party members. If the resulting membership is not of the desired quality, the PPO is criticised for its poor indoctrination work. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 3/65, p. 7.

not enough. The PPO's must ensure that the people selected for party membership become good communists. A 1971 article in *Kommunist Uzbekistana* describes the work the party committee of the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute does with candidate and new party members.¹ The party

1 The conditions for the admission of party members are set out in the Party Rules and are best summarised by Fainsod: "The applicant must file a declaration of his desire to enter the Party, fill out a detailed questionnaire which includes a complete life history, and submit recommendations from three Party members of not less than three years' standing who have known and worked with the applicant for not less than one year. These recommendations must be verified by the secretary of the primary unit, and the applicant must serve a probationary period as a Party candidate for at least a year. In Party organizations where bureaus exist, applications for membership are first subject to examination by the bureau, which then makes its recommendation through the secretary to a general membership meeting of the unit. If the meeting approves the applicant, his application is forwarded to the bureau of the next higher committee for ratification. Applicants for admission to the Party must be at least eighteen years old. Young people up to twenty-one can join the Party only after affiliation with the Komsomol or Young Communist League. The recommendation of the district committee of the Komsomol organization is counted as the equivalent of the recommendation of one Party member". Fainsod, op. cit., p. 232. Although this appeared in the 1967 edition of Fainsod's book, some changes occurred in 1966. Since then the party standing required of those giving recommendations on admission to the party has been increased to five years. Also, whereas previously a simple majority vote in a party meeting was required for admittance into the party, since 1966 a two-thirds majority vote has been required. *Ustav KPSS*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1966, pp. 24-25.

committee conducts seminars for candidate members based on the theme "The candidate stage - an important step in the formation of a communist". Meetings for candidates and new members are organised with party veterans. (They are divided into three groups - lecturers, *aspiranty* and students.) Faculty party buro meetings examine their progress. The PPO is helped in its work by a part-time *raikom* commission concerned with the personal affairs of communists and admission into the CPSU.¹

Once they have become established party members rank-and-file communists are subjected to the continuing indoctrination processes that have been described in this chapter, including regular discussions of their particular roles as party members in party meetings. Many of them, particularly those occupying leading non-party positions, will go on to higher level party courses in Universities of Marxism-Leninism and Party Schools.²

What I have called the "mystique" of party membership is maintained by a close regulation of party members' social and working lives. This mystique is important in order to maintain the elite status of party membership, on which the legitimacy of the leading role of

1 *Kom. Uzbekistana*, 6/71, p. 41.

2 See Conquest, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-113; Mickiewicz, *op. cit.*

the party to a large extent depends, in the minds of both party and non-party members. It entails various little rituals to set the party member aside from the rest of the population, sacrifices of his time to party work, and the maintenance of strict rules of personal conduct.

Concern for care of party cards could be described as a ritual. Party cards are invested with something approaching a sacred nature and the member's responsibility for care of his card is a heavy one. A school teacher lost his party card on a Young Pioneers' outing. Since he had no previous party reprimands, the PPO decided to be lenient and not expel him from the party. Instead they gave him a strong reprimand to be recorded on his party card (the highest penalty short of expulsion).¹ In 1969 a party meeting in the Administration of Internal Affairs of the Astrakhan *oblispolkom* agreed that it had been an accident when a party member's wife had washed his party card and therefore that it should be replaced without penalty. However when the *raikom* buro learnt of the decision it gave him a reprimand for carelessness. The party organisation secretary complained to *Partiinaiia zhizn'* but the journal supported the *raikom*.²

1 *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 11/69, p. 49.

2 *P.zh.*, 14/69, p. 75.

A great deal of a party member's spare time is taken up by various party duties. These include attending party meetings and various indoctrination courses. But this method of emphasising the responsibilities of being a party member is best illustrated by the party tasks that all party members should accept. Most of these entail conducting propaganda and agitation work with the non-party masses.¹ This type of work has the advantage of bringing the responsibilities of party membership to the attention of non-party members. It is considered important that all party members have party tasks, PPO's being regularly criticised for giving too many tasks to some communists, while others have none.² Leading institutional officials are expected to have party tasks as well as rank-and-file communists.³

The correct standards of personal behaviour in the party member's social and working life are maintained through party discipline. In 1965 the PPO of the Central Planning Bureau *Teplopribor* in Kazan decided to expel a candidate member from the party for immoral behaviour, although in this case the *raikom* reduced the penalty to a

1 *Kom.*, 5/60, p. 80; *P.zh.*, 13/73, p. 53; 19/73, p. 40.

2 *P.zh.*, 4/63, p. 80.

3 *Kom.*, 18/68, p. 43; *P.zh.*, 13/73, p. 53; 19/73, p. 40.

strong reprimand to be recorded on his party card.¹

In 1974 the Committee for Party Control directed the party committee of the Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking Industry to examine the case of some ministerial officials who were getting drunk while they were away on business trips.²

PPO's are expected to be particularly vigilant against examples of communist leading workers using their official positions to gain special privileges. For example, the PPO of the Institute of State and Law of the All-Union Academy of Sciences took action over senior researchers who insisted on being cited as co-authors of articles and monographs towards which they had done no work.³ When it was discovered that the head of a *rainspolkom* Department of Public Catering had used his official position to get himself illegally into the second category of war pension, there was an argument within the party organisation over the action to be taken. In this case a firm party reaction triumphed and it was decided to give him a strong party reprimand and to recommend his removal from his post.⁴

1 *P.zh.*, 18/65, p. 71.

2 *P.zh.*, 2/74, p. 51.

3 *P.zh.*, 16/63, p. 37; Gvishiani, op. cit., p. 213.

4 *P.zh.*, 1/67, p. 36.

Often party discipline is used in cases concerning production performance. Party "mystique" appears to be a minor consideration in these cases, although usually actual disciplinary action is only taken after the communist involved has failed to respond to an earlier party demand for action, at which stage it becomes a matter of a challenge to party authority. Thus in 1973 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* reported that the party committee of the RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction had received a letter from a construction trust complaining that *glavk* workers were not fulfilling ministerial instructions. The head of the *glavk* was directed (*porucheno*) to examine the matter and do something about it. However he did not even answer the letter. The party committee could only take this as a direct challenge to its authority and responded by giving the *glavk* head a party reprimand. Matters then allegedly improved greatly.¹

Finally in this section some mention should be made of "renewals of party cards". The most recent such renewal occurred in 1973-74. Although this renewal, the first since 1954, did not hold the terrors associated with those that accompanied the purges of the 1920's and 1930's, it was still the occasion for a campaign for the intensification of discipline within party organisations.

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P.zh., 8/64, p. 36.

"To this end a whole series of preparatory measures was conducted over a period of many months: special seminars and information meetings, meetings of the primary party organization at which each party member was obliged to give account of himself, and - the culminating phase - personal interviews of each member by a secretary or other senior official of the city or district party committee."¹

At the 25th Party Congress Brezhnev stated that 347,000 members and candidates, or 2.4% of the 1972 party membership, "who had committed breaches of the norms of party life, violated discipline or lost contact with their party organizations", had not received new party cards.² Thus the process of the exchange and the possible result for individual party members were of considerable significance for the maintenance of party discipline.³

1 Rigby, T.H: "Soviet Communist Party membership under Brezhnev", *Soviet Studies*, vol. 28, no. 3, July, 1976, p. 321.

2 Quoted in *ibid.*

3 Another interesting feature of the exchange was the opportunity it gave for further ritualisation of party cards. The exchange was the occasion for extravagant paeans of praise of party membership and the importance of party cards, the well-publicised granting of the party card bearing No. 00000001 to V.I. Lenin and No. 00000002 to Brezhnev, and reminders of the significance of displays in museums of the party cards of Soviet heroes. *Zaria Vostoka*, 2/3/73, p. 1. Baruch Hazan speaks of the ceremonial accompanying some presentations of new cards. Following the solemn presentation of new cards in the *raikom* or *gorkom* buildings to a group of communists, usually including some Old Bolsheviks and leading production workers, the recipients marched in procession to the central town square where they laid flowers at Lenin's memorial. Hazan, B: "Die sanfte Säuberung der KPdSU. Mobilisierung durch Umtausch der Parteidokumente", *Osteuropa*, vol. 24, nos. 11-12, 1974, pp. 797-800.

One can only expect to find impressionistic data on the effectiveness of party indoctrination. A reasonable hypothesis would be that party membership is seen by many communists in a careerist light. Membership is a career necessity - its advantages should be accepted, but the responsibilities avoided if possible. The apparently widespread avoidance of party tasks gives support to the hypothesis. The degree of illegal and semi-legal behaviour of party members occupying leading official positions can be taken as further evidence of the failure of indoctrination in the values of party membership. There is also evidence that it has not worked even among party workers. This is more serious as far as we are concerned since it affects the performance of PPO's. Examples will be seen later in consideration of administration-PPO collusion.

7. Conclusion

The bulk of this chapter has been concerned with the role of PPO's in the two types of indoctrination. We have seen that they have little positive role in value indoctrination. The basic establishment of the legitimacy of the Soviet ideology in the minds of the Soviet population is achieved through socialisation processes and the provision of material benefits that are far beyond the capacity of the PPO's. However special mention has been

made of the role of educational PPO's, which participate to some extent in the organisation, implementation and supervision of socialisation.

The role of PPO's in value indoctrination is primarily a maintenance one. They publicise the achievements of Soviet society and relate these to the ideology; but more importantly they work to prevent the appearance of any intellectual or practical opposition to the ideology through ideological control. If such opposition were allowed to go unchallenged it would destroy the carefully built-up sense of party infallibility and omnipotence, something that would strike at the very foundations of its legitimacy. Ideological control is probably the most important of all PPO ideological activities. It is the one which is of greatest importance for the continued existence of the Soviet system in its present form and the one which has the greatest effect on Soviet citizens.

Operational indoctrination is also very important. Working primarily through party meetings and indoctrination seminars PPO's are an indispensable part of the communication process which transmits to the leading and rank-and-file members of working collectives the current policies and procedures favoured by the leadership. The process includes relatively specific tasks to be fulfilled by single

collectives and individuals, but also more general matters.

It is among these more general matters that we find one which introduces a completely new element to this chapter. Not only are PPO's important for indoctrination; indoctrination is also important for PPO's. The effective operations of PPO's depends on the members of "host" organisations, particularly the leading officials, understanding the role PPO's are to play in their organisations. Therefore a most important element of operational indoctrination is a concern for the staff generalist role of PPO's. In this chapter I have not examined in detail the sort of information which is given on the staff generalist role of PPO's. A detailed examination will appear in the next chapter. Here I have simply indicated the various means available for the communication of such information.

There are two ways of looking at the effectiveness of both value and operational indoctrination. Value indoctrination could be said to be effective to the extent that the majority of the population accept the Soviet ideology and its practical implementation as legitimate; however it is ineffective in that it has not produced positive mobilisation of the population. Similarly operational indoctrination, in the area of the staff generalist role of PPO's, could be said to be effective

in that institutional leaders understand that role; but some doubt is justified about its effectiveness in producing a willingness among institutional leaders to act according to that understanding. However that is a question which will receive more attention in later chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MEANING OF CONTROL

Although a staff generalist element was evident in some aspects of PPO ideological activities, the staff generalist approach is most useful in a consideration of PPO "production" activities.¹ Since the approach is derived from line-staff relations in Western corporations it is most widely applicable in an examination of Soviet PPO-administration relations. These tend to be concentrated in the "production" areas.

I have already described in the Introduction how the PPO can be seen as a closely integrated staff generalist element within the line hierarchy. The question then becomes what is the function of this staff generalist element. Sampson and Golembiewski, dealing with essentially theoretical models, do not go into specific detail on how their staff agencies would operate in practice. However their general intentions are clear.

1 The word "production" is used somewhat reluctantly to denote the "output" or "outcome" of the operational activities of an organisation. In non-production, particularly educational and administrative, organisations "production" can be of quite an abstract nature. However no one word entirely satisfactorily describes the enormous range of activities with which Soviet non-production institutions are concerned.

Sampson lays his main stress on the general concern of his "staff representative" for improving the methods of work in the line organisation, "for developing an atmosphere in which executives will be stimulated, not forced, to change".¹ The representative, with a general understanding of the operations of the organisation as a whole, goes from department to department examining structural organisation and procedures. If he finds particular problems he gives assistance in solving them. But with his awareness of the wider implications of such problems he is in a position to work out and ensure that top executives become aware of and therefore implement broader measures to prevent their recurrence. Of course, he does not need to find a problem before taking action - he should be able to suggest measures that will prevent problems even occurring.

I have already described Sampson's concern to keep the staff element out of the operational implementation of the measures decided on. He says that the staff generalist can participate in working out particular decisions if necessary, but that he should not be responsible for the final adoption of the decisions as organisational policy, nor be responsible for their implementation.² I have

1 Sampson, op. cit., p. 98.

2 *ibid*, p. 148.

already expressed doubt about the extent to which, despite the formal situation, the staff generalist would leave himself out of such operational concerns. The whole direction of Sampson's model suggests the impossibility of maintaining the "correct" distance of staff elements from line operations.

While in general terms Sampson sees it as undesirable that staff be involved in "control" and evaluation, he qualifies this by saying that it is inevitable that it involve itself in checking and inspecting procedures. He concludes rather weakly that the staff agency should not be involved in the evaluation of the information it gains, but that it should pass it on to the responsible line executives.¹ This seems to make rather a nonsense of the whole role he has already given staff generalists.

Golembiewski recognises the impossibility of maintaining any "correct" division of line and staff responsibilities, particularly one based on denying staff operational power, and in reaction has developed a closely integrated line-staff unit with an apparently variable share in operational responsibility given to the staff element. His model is based on what he describes as the Colleague model, developed in the German Army, where direct representatives of headquarters were sent into critical

1 *ibid*, p. 200.

battle areas, not as line commanders, but as chiefs of staff. These chiefs of staff participated in, and sometimes assumed command. Golembiewski claims that the exact nature and degree of staff power was indeterminate, depending on the situation and relations between the staff man and the field commander. He speaks also of the tendency of the staff man to have an overall view of policy and strategy, as against the narrower view of the field commander.¹

In time the power of the German General Staff and its officers became even more extensive and formalised. The functions of planning, organisation and control became the formal prerogatives of the policy-making staff group, while the Chief of Staff was given the power to issue operational orders to carry out war plans.²

Golembiewski, while maintaining a general distinction between line and staff functions (program and sustaining, in his terms), tries to avoid the formal definition of roles such as eventuated in the German Army. The sustaining officials are essentially responsible for such functions as control, inspection, development of work standards, maintenance and accounting, but whether a particular matter comes under these categories is decided

1 Golembiewski, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

2 *ibid*, p. 18.

together by the program and sustaining officials, closely integrated in, and jointly responsible for the success of, their Colleague units.

The other aspect of his model is its decentralisation. It is evident in the deliberate lack of definition of roles and relations. It is also evident in the proposed unwillingness of superior units to interfere in the operations of lower-level units, except when the members of a lower unit are unable to agree on the nature of a particular task and who should play what role in it. The functions of the higher levels are otherwise limited to policy determination and the establishment and monitoring of measures of performance.¹

Sampson's model is the most useful for us in indicating the formal role of PPO's, while Golembiewski's is useful in drawing attention to those informal and decentralised elements of the Soviet system, of which, although not openly acknowledged, one suspects the authorities are well aware and over which they exercise considerable control.

Although Sampson tries to say that staff generalists should not have a "controlling" role, much of what he says about their role bears a close resemblance to the control role of PPO's. The essential features of this role

1 ibid, p. 119.

are threefold. Firstly, there are the limitations on the operational powers of PPO's - they are not empowered to issue operational orders, but must operate through "persuasion".¹ Secondly, within this limitation, the range of their legitimate concerns is limitless. Finally, they are expected to be involved in specific problems, but with an overall approach hopefully leading to the removal of the basic cause of the problems, and if possible to prevent such problems even occurring.

A Soviet political dictionary has defined control as "the verification of the fulfilment of decisions or tasks which have been entrusted to a particular organisation, institution or individual".² This definition is in essential agreement with D.J.R. Scott's description when he says that the word "has the sense of its French rather than its English near-homonym ... *Kontrolj* is particularly associated with the checking on the fulfilment of instructions by individuals or collective organs in the

1 I will use the Russian word *podmena* to describe occasions when PPO's encroach on the authority of "host" organisations. The word is used in two senses. Firstly, it describes occasions when a PPO issues operational orders directly to line workers. This is a rare occurrence. Secondly, it refers to PPO's concentrating attention on "production" affairs to the detriment of their ideological concerns. This is a common occurrence against which extensive campaigns are periodically directed.

2 Aleksandrov, G., V. Galianov and N. Rubinshtein: *Politicheskii slovar'*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1940, p. 277.

state machine, and synonymous with 'verification of fulfilment' (*proverka ispolnenija*) - another term in frequent use".¹

In itself this is an extremely limited concept. It appears to say that the PPO, in exercising control, will only check on the completion of a task, presumably at the end of the period that has been set aside for it. It also makes no mention of the measures to be taken by the PPO if the task is not completed.

Control, if it is to have any significance as an administrative concept, must go further than this. In those Western corporations that have control agencies the term means more than simple "verification of fulfilment". The control duties of the Control Section of the Koppers Company, reported by R.C. Davis, include:

- (a) to review objectives, programmes and progress

1 Scott, D.J.R: *Russian Political Institutions*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, 2nd edition, p. 150. Such control is not unknown in the Western context. K. Davis lists four types of staff control: functional control, the right to issue orders regarding some highly specialised part of someone else's job and to take appropriate action if he does not comply; agency control, the issuing of orders in the name of a line superior, even if that superior might never see the order; policy control, the verification of the implementation of a policy; and procedural control, the verification of the use of the correct procedures. Davis, K: *Human Relations at Work*, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1962, pp. 212-214. The last two appear to be close to what Scott was describing.

as execution proceeds, making the appropriate reports to top management;

- (b) to provide the chief executive with analytical as well as statistical reports of results;
- (c) to collect opinions and facts concerning the value of current programmes and to report the findings to the chief executive.¹

The two further elements introduced into this concept of control are that the control agency concerns itself with the *progress* of fulfilment, not just the final result, and that it is entitled to report shortcomings in the progress of fulfilment to higher authorities. These are fundamental aspects of the duties of PPO's. Much of their control activity consists of examining the progress of the fulfilment of tasks, while reporting shortcomings to higher authorities is one of their most important weapons.

However Golembiewski has made the point that staff agencies will inevitably go further than this. Certainly Soviet experience bears this out. Golembiewski considers that if staff agencies are to feel any responsibility for the areas with which they are concerned, and that if top management is to be spared from continually acting on reports sent to it by staff agencies, then these agencies must be given some powers of their own to influence the activities of the line.

¹ Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 417.

The Soviet concept of control has developed in accordance with the situation foreseen by Golembiewski. Firstly, it includes the prevention of the appearance of shortcomings, not just the recording of their existence. A Soviet textbook declares:

The task of control is not so much to uncover breakdowns and lags as to prevent and exclude the possibility of their appearance.¹

If this is combined with the fact that the PPO's are given powers for the task, best summarised in terms of the formal right of control, which they can exercise on their own initiative, it can then be seen that they play a basic and continuing role in the organisation of the conduct of affairs in "host" organisations.

The basic principle underlying this continuing role is the "leading" position of the party in Soviet society. It is the task of the PPO to represent, protect and further the social interest against the narrow group interests of the "host" organisation. In practice this means ensuring that party policy is implemented. The degree of importance of PPO control for the system varies according to three possible situations derived from how well party policy is understood and accepted by line

1 *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, uchebnoe posobie*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1972, p. 382.

authorities. If party policy is well understood and accepted PPO control will be a routine "verification of fulfilment". If party policy is not well understood the policy-making significance of PPO's becomes evident. The task of the PPO becomes most difficult and important when party policy is not accepted by line leadership.

The first situation should not be considered insignificant. It still means that the PPO should be involved in remedying shortcomings and preventing their occurrence, while always using an overall staff generalist approach. But the general agreement on "production" objectives and procedures means that the degree of decentralisation, and therefore possibility for PPO decision-making, is limited.

Decentralisation becomes most important in the second situation, where there is uncertainty about party policy. Generally such a situation arises when the party leadership deliberately encourages decentralisation by leaving the objectives and procedures to be pursued by line organisations undefined and ambiguous.¹ André Gunder Frank describes the decentralising effect of such lack of

1 The control by higher and middle level party organs is probably sufficiently strong that uncertainty is unlikely to occur, or to last for long, simply as a result of communications problems. That is, PPO's only act in a decentralised way when they are allowed to by higher party authorities.

definition in his theoretical study of goal ambiguity in organisations.¹ Ambiguity in the goals of the organisation and conflict in the standards to be observed by the organisation's members can be deliberately fostered by organisational leaders. This contributes to decentralisation and therefore organisational flexibility in three ways. Firstly, organisational leaders can transmit changes in objectives and, more importantly for PPO's, procedures without disrupting the system.² The procedures that interest us the most are those that determine PPO-administration relations. The fact that I will describe these, for the sake of simplicity, primarily in terms of the formal right of control will not disguise the great amount of informal manipulation of these procedures. The degree and style of PPO involvement in "production" concerns can be changed quite quickly and dramatically without changing the formal status of the PPO and therefore without requiring any reconsideration of the essential place of the PPO or the party in the system.

The second contribution to organisational flexibility comes about because uncertainty about objectives

1 Frank, op. cit.

2 The degree of definition of the objectives of Soviet policy in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the degree to which they can be changed by subtle reinterpretations of the ideology is a very interesting matter that is completely beyond the scope of this thesis.

and procedures forces subordinates themselves to take and adapt decisions to the specific conditions of their local circumstances. Frank writes:

The existence of conflict among standards prevents subordinates from following rules alone, forces them to handle and decide each issue individually, and thus turns all members of the system, subordinates as well as superiors, into policy-makers.¹

The party authorities recognise that in some circumstances the people working on the spot are in a better position to make decisions than they are. In the Soviet case overall objectives are rarely left undefined. However ambiguity is left in the specific tasks and procedures needed to achieve the objectives. As long as the PPO's at all times work towards the objectives they are allowed to take advantage of the ambiguity over specific tasks and procedures to choose those that best suit local conditions. Jerry Hough describes this phenomenon in the Soviet context. He is primarily concerned with production enterprises and speaks of the broad definition of responsibilities of an enterprise director and the impossibility of all these responsibilities being met. Hough writes:

Because the manager has no precise set of rules and regulations to follow, he has much

1 Frank, op. cit., p. 11.

more room for maneuver than might be expected for an official low in a very centralized hierarchy ... The nature of the Soviet planning system has not only left the manager with freedom of action vis-a-vis his superiors, it has also had a major impact on the nature of the *kontrol* exercised by the primary party organization. Because there is no precise plan or set of regulations, the *kontrol* cannot be a routine 'verification of performance' in the usual sense of that phrase. If, as one Party secretary expressed it, regulations are broken continuously 'for the sake of production', the Party secretary cannot be an official who merely checks off regulations that have been violated. To be sure, he and his organization must be interested in machinations and law violations of a gross character, but their basic role must be much broader. In checking the overall performance of the enterprise, the organization inevitably becomes involved in policy-making, if for no other reason than that the mere choice of the indicator or regulation to emphasise constitutes a decision of significance.¹

1 Hough, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

Although the significance of movements towards decentralisation of Soviet economic administration since 1965, and indeed since the death of Stalin, should not be over-emphasised, it is nevertheless the case that lower-level line organisations now have important formal powers, not to speak of informal powers, to determine the specific tasks they will undertake and the procedures they will follow. This gives their PPO's the opportunity to assume a considerable decision-making role in ensuring that the line organisations' choices are not outside the parameters of party objectives.

The third contribution conflicting standards and goal ambiguity make to organisational flexibility is in the greater initiative and willingness to criticise, innovate and improve that they allow subordinates. It is essential to the staff generalist role that PPO's take advantage of their decision-making powers to improve the performance of "host" organisations. Of course such criticisms and improvements can only be within the limits set by party policies.

It is evident that the second situation in which PPO's are likely to have to exercise their control functions, when line organisations' tasks are undefined or ambiguous, gives the PPO's the opportunity to be involved in considerable decision-making.

The third situation which PPO's are likely to confront occurs when "host" organisations understand but are unwilling to accept party policies. Usually this situation involves specific cases of PPO-administration conflict over particular decisions or tasks. The PPO has specific powers it can use in such cases, the ultimate being an appeal to higher party authorities. However the situation is particularly interesting when it involves more fundamental line opposition to basic party policies. The importance of PPO's will be greatly enhanced if it can be shown that they are involved in the implementation of basic party policies against line opposition. I will attempt to show this in one particular case - the case of the post-Khrushchev administrative and economic reforms. Chapter Four will be devoted to an examination of the role of ministerial PPO's in implementing those reforms against the opposition of the state apparatus.

But before becoming involved in a detailed discussion of such matters it is necessary to look at the powers PPO's have available for the exercise of their control function, remembering that direct intervention in decision-making and the giving of orders to administrators is forbidden.

The most important weapon at the disposal of the PPO is the right of control, as described in Paragraph 60

of the Party Rules.¹ Although the right of control is not essential to the PPO's exercise of control, it is most easily understood in terms of the right, the right giving formal expression to powers that are already available.

PPO's were certainly expected to exercise control before the formal right was introduced at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939.² Although the introduction and extension of the right of control undoubtedly widened the powers exercised by many of the affected PPO's, this was more because once they had gained the formal right of control those powers which had already existed could no longer be misunderstood or ignored by PPO officials or institutional leaders. An article in *Bol'shevik* in 1939 claimed that the right of control in effect already existed before the Eighteenth Party Congress:

In the Rules it is necessary to have clearly set out what party administrators are already using: control of the administration of enterprises and collective and state farms.

1 *Ustav KPSS*, 1971, op. cit., pp. 53-55.

2 *Pravda*, 4/4/39, p. 2. The same applies to non-production PPO's before they were given the right in 1971. The situation with regard to the 1971 changes will be examined in more detail later in this chapter, pp. 203-209.

The right in fact already exists.¹

Remembering then that the right of control is the formal expression of the powers involved in party control we will now look at what is entailed. The two basic elements involved are the right to receive and examine information on the state of affairs in the institution and then the right to take certain action once an understanding of the situation has been gained. A *Partiinaiia zhizn'* article of 1973 summarises the powers entailed in the right of control as follows:

- (1) to hear reports (*otchëty*) from leaders when necessary;
- (2) to establish permanent and temporary commissions;
- (3) to study affairs on the spot and acquaint oneself with relevant information;
- (4) to express suggestions and recommendations in accordance with party decisions and Soviet laws and strive for their implementation.²

1 *Bol'shevik*, 4/39, pp. 46-47. An article in *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo* in the same year said that it was necessary to make clear through the right of control that PPO's now *must* concern themselves with economic matters. *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, 4/39, p. 26. Cheplakov, a party official from Azerbaidzhan, said at the Eighteenth Party Congress that the right of control was a necessary weapon to be used against administrators who previously claimed that PPO's had no control over them because the Party Rules said nothing about it. *Pravda*, 21/3/39, p. 6.

2 *P.zh.*, 7/73, p. 5.

Points (1), (2) and (3) are concerned with obtaining information, while point (4) outlines the powers of action available to the PPO. I will now look at each of these points in some detail. Although authoritative statements are in substantial agreement with this list, in interpretation and practice considerable differences appear.

A consideration of point (1) brings these differences out well. There appears to be a difference between categories of PPO regarding the hearing of reports from the heads of "host" organisations. Authoritative statements stress that any leading official is obliged to give reports before the PPO.¹ It appears that the directors of schools and the rectors of tertiary educational institutions do so regularly.² However lists of leading officials in administrative and research institutions that do so always exclude the head of the institution. For example, *Pravda* reported in 1971 that the party committee of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine Construction heard reports (*otchëty* and *doklady*) from communists working in the ministerial apparatus right up to the deputy ministers.³ Research institute party committees hear reports (*otchëty*) from deputy directors, laboratory heads

1 *P.zh.*, 14/65, p. 24; 10/68, pp. 41-42.

2 *P.zh.*, 23/66, p. 61; 24/71, pp. 37-38;
Turkmenskaia iskra, 12/9/72, p. 2;
Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 4/8/72, pp. 2-3.

3 *Pravda*, 29/11/71, p. 2.

and department heads.¹

The other feature of the coverage given to the hearing of reports in the Soviet press is that it usually refers to the hearing of reports from "communist leaders". Most leaders of Soviet institutions are party members and are therefore bound by party discipline to account for their behaviour before their PPO's. Presumably this is an indication of some controversy over the hearing of reports. Party officials prefer to avoid any possible difficulties by reference to the requirements of party discipline.

Another important matter to be noted is a difference in language that disappears in translation. There are three Russian words all translated into English as "report". *Soobshchenie* and *doklad* tend to have the sense

1 *Kom. Estonii*, 8/73, p. 2. At times the uncertainty has been in the opposite direction. Thus in 1939, at the time of the public discussion of the coming introduction of the right of control, *Pravda* was asked whether the right involved hearing reports (*otchëty*) from directors *only* or from shop heads as well. *Pravda*, 19/2/39, p. 4. In 1972 the secretary of the party buro of the Ukrainian Institute of Mechanics reported that with the granting of the right of control the party buro hears reports (*otchëty*) from *aspirant* (post-graduate student) supervisors, not just from the communist deputy director as before. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26/1/72, p. 2. What is interesting about these two cases is that the PPO's were interested in gaining access to *lower-level* workers. Presumably it is these lower-level leaders who are directly involved in whatever it is the PPO's wish to examine.

of reports primarily for information purposes. The speaker simply reports on the state of affairs in his section of the institution or even on some very general matter. These words do not imply accountability. However the word *otchët* has the sense of accounting for one's behaviour. It would appear that an *otchët* is a more serious matter. A case could be made that administrators that are not party members, or who are not appearing as party members, are more likely to give *doklady*. That is, administrators try to avoid giving *otchëty* unless party discipline forces it on them. For example, in 1971 the secretary of the party committee of the State Committee for Science and Technology wrote that meetings of the party organisations, party buros and party committee of the State Committee, in order to influence the work of all its sub-divisions, hear *doklady* from sub-division leaders and *otchëty* from communists.¹

However this linguistic difference does not fully explain the confusion in Soviet commentaries and practice. The list of powers entailed in the right of control given above uses the word *otchët* and makes no mention of communist leaders. Also we can see that many of the examples I have given refer to hearing *otchëty* without any mention that the person giving the report is a party member.²

1 Mosk. pravda, 17/9/71, p. 2.

2 I have found three examples of reports being heard from individuals specifically recognised as not being party members. One refers to *soobshchenia*, one to *doklady* and *soobshcheniia*, and one to an *otchët*. P.zh., .4/65, p. 24; 20/67, pp. 56-57; Kom. Estonii, 11/71, p. 34.

Although the right of control strictly speaking refers to hearing reports from institutional leaders, particularly in recent years there has been considerable emphasis on the desirability of PPO's hearing reports from rank-and-file workers on their fulfilment of their official tasks. Usually the people giving such reports are party members subject to party discipline.

It appears that formally speaking all PPO's have always had the right to hear reports of all kinds from anyone. In practice, reports, particularly those implying accountability, are usually limited to those leaders below the top level of the institution and spoken of in terms of a report from a party member as much as an organisational leader. The extent to which reports are heard and the degree of their significance depends primarily on the general policy on such practices established by the top authorities at the time.

The second element of the right of control listed is the right to establish permanent and temporary commissions. The most formally defined of these are the permanent commissions for the exercise of the right of control, established by a Central Committee decree of June, 1959.¹ The decree declared that there was a need for

1 *Kommunisticheskaia Partia Sovetskogo Souiuza v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s''ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, Politizdat, Moscow, 7th edition, vol. 4, 1953-60, pp. 525-530.*

systematic control of the prompt completion by enterprises of their tasks. The commissions were specifically designed to provide an institutional means of control, to end the practice of party control being limited to hearing reports from institutional leaders on figures of plan fulfilment. It was stressed that the commissions were not to work parallel to the PPO's, but were to work within them and under the control of the party buro or committee and its secretary. Throughout the period of their existence it has been stressed that the commissions are not to be used for general control of all the activities of "host" organisations, but are to be used for examining particular important areas.¹ The areas covered by typical party control commissions can be seen in the three commissions operated by the PPO of the Tashkent Institute of Rail Transport Engineers. One controls scientific work, one the organisation of the academic and indoctrination process, and one the managerial and financial activity of the institute.²

Commission members are elected by open vote at general party meetings, although changes can be made by the party buro or committee. Commissions do not make decisions themselves, but send their recommendations to the party committee or sometimes direct to a party meeting.³ The

1 *P.zh.*, 24/65, p. 30

2 *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2.

3 *ibid.*

chairman of a commission is usually a deputy secretary of the PPO.¹ The opinion is usually expressed that there is no need for permanent commissions in small PPO's, since in them all necessary control can be exercised by the party organisation as a whole.² Control commissions have the power to investigate anything within their area of concern. Detailed accounts of their operations can be seen in later chapters.

Some doubts are expressed by PPO members as to the value of permanent control commissions, primarily because in competing with other information-gathering organisations, they have been left with the consideration of long-term, *perspektivnyye* matters.³ Given that control of *perspektivnyye* matters is a rather nebulous concept, particularly when it has to be distinguished from control of specific, day-to-day situations, it is not surprising that preference is shown for other bodies.

Among these other bodies are temporary and special-purpose party commissions. It appears that the main function of these commissions is obtaining on-the-spot information. Apparently PPO's find *ad hoc* groups to be most useful for this. They are also used for "verifying the fulfilment" of

1 *Kom.*, 13/64, p. 124.

2 *Kom. Ukrainy*, 2/72, p. 67; *P.zh.*, 17/71, p. 18.

3 *P.zh.*, 6/64, pp. 40-41; 15/70, p. 24; 24/71, p. 39.

measures decided on by the PPO as a result of their investigations. The style and importance of their operations will become evident in later chapters.

The third element of the right of control, the right "to study affairs on the spot and acquaint oneself with relevant information", is a summary of the whole information element of the right of control, of which points (1) and (2) are the institutional expression. However its inclusion as a separate point indicates that the formal hearing of reports and establishment of commissions are not the only ways of obtaining information.

Although I do not have any specific statements to the effect that administration leaders are obliged to furnish PPO's with all draft decisions on a routine basis, there are sufficient reports of this occurring in practice to suggest that it is at least an informal rule. It appears to apply particularly in personnel and planning matters.¹ However statements to the effect that "nothing is done in the collective without the approval of the PPO" suggest that it applies to all areas.²

Another important source of information is informal contacts between party officials, particularly

1 See pp. 236, 269-274.

2 *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 7.70, p. 79.

the party secretary, and institutional leaders. The Soviet press often mentions the need for party business to be conducted whenever suitable outside constraining and time-consuming meetings. An *obkom* instructor wrote in 1972 that the right of control raises the role of the PPO secretary in that people will more often come to him so that he, together with the director and other responsible people, might decide production, cultural and welfare (*bytovye*) matters in the course of work (*v rabochem poriadke*), without scheduling a meeting of the PPO or its committee or buro. He declares that "this personal contact, this exchange of opinions, undoubtedly is a form of control and has its uses".¹ However it is unlikely that any institutional leader is under a formal obligation to engage in such conversations.

Finally we should not forget that rank-and-file party members are expected to closely observe the everyday work of the "host" organisation and report any possible shortcomings to the PPO.

Point (4), allowing the PPO to make suggestions and recommendations, introduces a fundamentally different element into the right of control. Points (1), (2), and (3) gave the PPO unlimited access to information. The only

1 *Turkmenskaia iskra*, 12/9/72, p. 2.

matter over which it was suggested in Soviet sources there were significant differences of opinion or practice was reports by organisational leaders to party organs and organisations. However these differences occur as a result of the unwillingness of organisational leaders to be put in a position where they are forced to account for their behaviour before the PPO. To this extent the disagreement is more closely connected with the essence of point (4), that is, what powers does the PPO have to act on the information it receives and analyses. This is an exceedingly complex and obviously sensitive question. It is a question the answers to which are often contradictory both in theory and practice, and one on which authoritative commentators are often loath to commit themselves. I will try to set out the different opinions I have come across, try to explain some of these differences, and then give a brief summary of what happens in practice.

Any list of the powers contained in the right of control, such as the one I have given above, goes no further than to say that the PPO has the right to give recommendations, although most add that the organisational leader must consider these recommendations (the usual phrase is *ne mozhnet ne schitat'sia*).¹ But to simply consider a recommendation is not to do very much - the important thing

1 *P.zh.*, 19/66, p. 21; *Kom.*, 11/72, p. 57.

is whether the organisational leader is under any obligation, in theory or practice, to act on the recommendation.

The great majority of the cases appearing in the Soviet press assert that recommendations have in fact been accepted and acted upon, and many give the impression that the organisational leader had little choice in the matter. However these reports are concerned with cases where the PPO has successfully dealt with the situation and where, as far as we can tell, the leadership has simply accepted its recommendations. There could be many reasons for such acceptance, none of them necessarily implying any obligation on the part of the leadership.

There is no formal obligation on leadership to accept recommendations, since that would constitute *podmena*. Thus *Partiinaiia zhizn'* wrote in 1955:

The primary party organisation does not have the right to change the orders of the administration or to give any type of orders concerning production work, to demand (*trebovat'*) that the director, the fully-empowered master (*khoziain*) of the enterprise, submit his orders for the party organisation's approval; nor may it remove, appoint or recommend workers in production. These are the functions of the administration,¹

1 *P.zh.*, 1/55, pp. 67-70.

and in 1971:

May a primary party organisation, having the right of control, bring to account the leader of an institution? May it oblige him to do this or that? Is that what control means? Of course not.¹

However Soviet reports do refer to the right of PPO's to give obligatory orders in exceptional circumstances. In 1972 the party committee of a hospital was reported to have obliged the office head and the deputy chief doctor for medical services to improve the organisational-methodological and medical-consultative assistance to hospitals, ambulance stations and medical assistance points in the countryside.² In 1972 the secretary of the party committee of the Omsk Institute of Rail Transport Engineers claimed that since gaining the right of control the party committee's decisions have obliged the rectorate and the deans' offices to remove shortcomings, rather than simply informing them of their existence as before.³ Hough reports the case of the party committee of the Elektrosila plant which in 1952 obliged the plant director "to be more attentive

1 *P.zh.*, 12/71, p. 36.

2 *P.zh.*, 12/65, p. 53.

3 *Pravda*, 11/2/72, p. 2. He also commented that there had been deep conflict in the institute over the meaning of the right of control.

to the workers, to have more contact with them, to take into account criticism which comes from below".¹

However the decisions in these cases are couched in very general terms. One report that suggests the PPO's might have the right to oblige institutional leaders to take specific action appeared in *Partiinaia zhizn'* in 1965. The report is concerned only with a hypothetical situation, but says that the right of control includes the right of the PPO "in exceptional circumstances to oblige the director of a state farm to introduce into practice particular measures, naturally in strict compliance with party documents and Soviet laws".² However this report is too vague to cause the rejection of the rule that the PPO's formal power of obligation does not extend

1 Hough, op. cit., p. 92.

2 *P.zh.*, 14/65, pp. 24-25.

beyond the most general demands.¹

This conforms with the idea of control as not extending as far as giving direct orders on specific matters to institutional leaders. The decisions are not specific orders but rather official notification to the leader that the PPO is dissatisfied with the state of

1 There are a number of words that are used by PPO's in their decisions requiring action from institutional leaders. The strongest is "to oblige" (*obiazat'*); the weakest "to ask" (*prosit'*). Somewhere in between are "to suggest" (*predlozhit'*) and "to demand" (*trebovat'* or *poruchit'*). Soviet commentators are often at pains to point out that the right of control should not be understood in terms of the different words PPO's can use in their decisions. *Uchitel'skaia gazeta* complained in 1973 that some people had the wrong idea of the right of control. They believe that it gives the party organisation the right to "suggest" measures to the director, whereas before they could only "ask". Without actually saying that this view is incorrect, the paper stresses that the basic question is not the form of decisions, but the content, the essence. *Uchitel'skaia gazeta*, 13/1/73, p. 1. However the essence would appear to be in these words. When I asked the former secretary of a ministerial PPO what the right of control meant, he replied that it meant that a PPO could now "suggest", as against "ask" an institutional leader to take action. When I asked the difference between the words, he replied that a "suggestion" meant that a certain period of time would be set aside for fulfilment of the PPO's recommendation. If the "suggestion" was not fulfilled in this time, the institutional leader could have party disciplinary action taken against him.

affairs and that some remedial action is expected.¹

The next question we have to ask ourselves is what can be done if remedial action is not forthcoming. Does the PPO have the power to discipline any institutional leader?

The PPO does not have the power to directly discipline anyone in his administrative or production capacity. However the easiest way around this is to rely on party discipline. *Kommunist* speaks in general terms of the use of the right of control to maintain state discipline, the ability of PPO's to use reports from individual communists to prevent breaches of state discipline, and the close links between party and state discipline to bring institutional leaders to account before the party.²

The same journal gave a more concrete example in 1973. The party committee of the RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction received a letter from a construction trust complaining that *glavk* workers were not implementing ministerial instructions. The head of the *glavk* was

1 This does not mean that recommendations cannot be in specific terms. We will see in future chapters many examples of quite specific recommendations being given by PPO's. How much notice institutional leaders take of them depends very much on the particular situation.

2 *Kom.*, 10/68, pp. 41-42.

directed (*porucheno*) to examine the matter and do something about it. However he did not even answer the letter. The party committee then gave him a party reprimand and matters apparently improved greatly.¹ The same journal reported the case of the engineer in the Central Genetics Laboratory who was given a strong party reprimand by the party buro for unsatisfactory fulfilment of construction-planning tasks.²

It can be seen that neither of these cases involve the head of the "host" organisation. I have not found any examples of PPO's giving orders or reprimands to the institutional leader in the name of party discipline.

Another problem arises in the case of non-party members. In these cases it appears that the PPO is able to examine their behaviour, but clearly cannot take any disciplinary action. It has to rely on making recommendations to the relevant non-party bodies. For example, the party buro of the Irkutsk *oblast'* branch of Gosbank criticised the head of the main office although he was not a party member, but because of this put the matter of shortcomings in the

1 *P.zh.*, 8/73, p. 39.

2 *P.zh.*, 10/70, p. 34. This raises the question of whether or why a party reprimand is an effective sanction. I have no information that can provide a confident answer to this question. However party reprimands are often accompanied by party recommendations to institutional leaders that the disciplined individual be demoted or dismissed from his post. Serious party reprimands, particularly those arising from poor "production" performance, probably affect promotion prospects.

work of the office before the manager of the branch.¹

Partiinaiia zhizn' explains the matter more fully in its reply to a letter from a combine party secretary who asked if his party organisation had the right to examine and come to a decision on the behaviour of a non-party worker. The party members had done so in an open party meeting and suggested to the administration that it give him a reprimand and a final warning. However the deputy secretary of the party committee of the local production committee (the PPO's immediate superior in 1964, the equivalent of today's *raikom*) said that they did not have the right to do so and that the matter should have been dealt with in the trade union committee. The secretary declared that the trade union committee had not shown sufficient initiative. *Partiinaiia zhizn'* answered that although the party organisation does not have the right to discipline a non-party worker it can talk to him about his behaviour. However, the journal continued, it is better that the party organisation not deal with the matter, but that it should help develop the initiative of the trade union committee or the people's court.² The answer indicated that the official attitude is that the PPO should be able to manage affairs, using its "leading" role in

1 *P.zh.*, 10/61, pp. 55-56.

2 *P.zh.*, 20/64, pp. 45-46.

social organisations, without involving itself directly, although if it becomes essential it can do so.

It should be remembered that once the situation becomes so serious that some radical action is required, particularly applying party discipline to institutional leaders, the nature of the system ensures that higher party authorities become involved. The system is deliberately organised so that higher authorities will immediately know if the state of affairs in any institution becomes serious. The consequences of an error are so severe that no PPO secretary would be willing to risk a full-scale assault on an institutional leader without at least being strongly confident of support from higher party authorities. The Soviet press is full of complaints from PPO secretaries who feel that they are not getting the necessary support from their *raikom* or *gorkom*.

Therefore means have been developed of attracting the attention of higher party bodies. One is failure to elect an institutional leader to the party committee or buro. This is probably not a common example of the use of party membership to influence the behaviour of an institutional leader, but it is one that is highly effective. It is unheard of for the head of an institution not to be a member of the party committee or buro for any period of time;¹

¹ It appears that ministers are probably an exception to this rule. See below, pp.578-581

the organisation could not act in anything like the proper way in such a situation and the *raikom* or *gorkom* would have to take quick action if such a situation arose. A case reported in *Partiinaia zhizn'* in 1955 illustrates this well. The PPO of a research institute failed to elect the director of the institute to the party buro. The *raikom* investigated and found serious shortcomings in his work. The *raikom* sent the information to the relevant ministry, upon which the collegium of the ministry dismissed him.¹ In 1963 the party members of the Moscow Design-Construction Office *Glavsantekhmontazh* of the State Production Committee for Assembly and Special Construction Work was dissatisfied with the head of the office. At the election-report meeting he was nominated for election as a member of the party buro. He refused the nomination, but the party members rejected his refusal, placed him on the the ballot, but then failed to elect him. The consequences are not recorded.²

Another means of attracting the attention of higher authorities is to use party meetings to criticise institutional leaders when it is certain that the authorities will become aware of the proceedings of the meetings. For example, at the election-report meeting of the PPO of the Ukrainian Institute for the Design of Heavy Machine

1 *P.zh.*, 5/55, p. 80.

2 *P.zh.*, 13/63, p. 52.

Construction Factories the director and chief engineer were criticised for poorly organising and planning the production process. This was probably for the benefit of the *raikom* first secretary who was present at the meeting.¹

The reliance on higher party bodies must play an enormous role in the informal relations between PPO's and "host" organisations. But higher party bodies figure largely even in the formal expressions of PPO powers. Many of the statements regarding laying party charges against institutional leaders add that this can be done only after application to higher party bodies.² This therefore is a formal as well as practical necessity.³

PPO's have the right to make recommendations to institutional leaders, recommendations that should carry some weight. It appears that in some circumstances they are able to oblige the institutional leaders to act, but even

1 *P.zh.*, 22/74, pp. 45-46. Although in any case such as this we cannot be certain that the criticisms were not made at the instigation of the *raikom*.

2 *P.zh.*, 10/68, pp. 41-42.

3 There is some confusion over who must appeal to higher authorities in the case of dispute. Some reports make PPO decisions obligatory for institutional leaders, it being up to the latter to appeal if there is disagreement. *P.zh.*, 23/65, p. 34. However most make it the responsibility of the PPO to appeal. *P.zh.*, 4/68, pp. 40-41. This is what one would expect, given the PPO's place in the system.

then they are not able themselves to make the decision on what is actually to be done. The directives can only be generally-worded demands for action.

It is difficult to say how seriously an institutional leader has to take these generally-worded orders. The fact that Soviet sources stress that such orders can be given only in exceptional circumstances and that there are in fact few examples of them being given suggest that on those rare occasions an institutional leader would do well to take notice of the PPO. A PPO driven to such extremes, if it had not already conferred with higher party representatives, would at least be confident of their support. In such cases some rapid improvement in the situation is expected and probably gained.

The situation with regard to PPO recommendations is even more uncertain. The vast majority of reports in the Soviet press declare that recommendations were accepted without disagreement. However cases where recommendations were rejected are perhaps less likely to be reported. A number of other factors also have to be mentioned. Firstly, there is a strong possibility that recommendations have already been agreed on by the PPO and institutional leaders. Institutional leaders are almost always members of the party buro or committee, the organs where final decisions, including the recommendations to be presented by general

party meetings, are made. In normal circumstances any differences of opinion are presumably worked out in the meetings of these organs. Our knowledge of what happens in these meetings is extremely limited. Complaints about institutional leaders using party meetings simply as forums for giving operational orders suggest that party recommendations could often be little more than party support for such orders.¹

At times when the role of PPO's in "production" control is being particularly emphasised, at which times the PPO's are more likely to receive support, and even suggestions on what recommendations should be made, from higher party authorities, it is probable that recommendations often are not arrived at in collusion with institutional leaders. In such a situation the general state of party-state relations and support for the PPO from higher authorities make it probable that recommendations will be accepted.

It can be seen that the powers of the right of control are of great potential in the hands of PPO's. The

1 In 1954 a party group organiser in the Administration for Bridge Construction complained that the decisions of party meetings in the administration were written with the cooperation of the administration leaders and were usually taken from their own administrative orders and decisions. *P.zh.*, 5/54, p. 57.

degree to which that potential is realised depends on the general state of party-state relations at the time and specific local relationships between local party authorities, PPO leadership and "host" organisation leadership. The unlimited access to information and the right to make recommendations give PPO's sufficient power to play a staff generalist role.

The PPO does have other means at its disposal for the exercise of control, usually used in close conjunction with the right of control. One of these is the use of party influence over the various organs of collective leadership that exist in Soviet institutions. Ministries have collegiums, while other types of non-production institutions have the various Academic, Teaching, Scientific-Technical and Artistic Councils. The situation with regard to the collegiums and councils is rather different and must be considered separately.

The councils have very extensive, if only advisory, powers within their institutions. Their main concerns are in the areas of planning - academic plans, research plans and artistic repertoires, but they also involve themselves in personnel matters and other matters

of current concern.¹

Collective organs, being part of the administration of the institution, are subject to the PPO's right of control. The secretary of the party organisation of the Moscow Technical College writes:

Obviously the party organisation of the educational institution or faculty cannot directly influence the activity of the Academic Council in such matters as, for example, the granting of academic degrees and the defence of dissertations. But to control the organisation of this work, to control the activity in general of the Academic Council is, in our view, the primary duty of the party organisation.²

1 For the legal position and functions of the councils of tertiary educational institutions, see *Vysshaia shkola, osnovnye postanovleniia, prikazy i instruktsii*, Izd. "Sovetskaia nauka", Moscow, pp. 36-37; of schools, *Narodnoe obrazovanie v SSSR, obshcheobrazovatel'naia shkola, sbornik dokumentov, 1917-73gg.*, Izd. "Pedagogika", Moscow, 1974, p. 208; of research institutes, Zaleski, E. (ed.): *Science Policy in the USSR*, OECD, Paris, 1969, pp. 219-220; of cultural organisations, Iampol'skaia, Ts. A. (ed.): *Tvorcheskie soiuzy v SSSR*, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 1970, pp. 165-168.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 8/69, p. 21.

Thus PPO's hear reports from the council chairmen, usually the heads of the institutions,¹ and offer recommendations for the removal of shortcomings.² PPO's also form control commissions that interest themselves in the work of the councils.³ PPO's also participate in the planning of the

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- 1 The party committee of the Saratov Polytechnical Institute hears reports (*soobshchenia*) from the chairmen of the institute's Council and faculty councils. Usually before any conclusions are reached on the reports the committee consults with the communist members of the councils. *Pravda*, 15/2/72, p. 2. The party committee of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute hears reports (*doklady*) from the institute director on the work of the Scientific-Technical Council. *P.zh.*, 16/63, p. 34. The party buro of the Moscow Conservatorim hears reports (*otchëty*) from the rector in his capacity as chairman of the Artistic Council. *Sov.kul'tura*, 1/7/72, p. 2.
- 2 A party meeting was held in the All-Union Research Institute of Grain Growing to examine the work of the communist members of the Scientific Council. Shortcomings were found and the meetings gave the director detailed recommendations for corrective action. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 6/67, p. 44.
- 3 The commission for the control of scientific work of the Central Research and Design-Construction Institute for the Organisation and Technique of Administration examined the activity of the Scientific-Technical Council and its sections. *Kom.Belorussii*, 8/70, p. 21. The chairman of the commission for the control of scientific work of the Geological Institute of the Far East Scientific Centre attends meetings of the Scientific Council. *Pravda*, 24/2/72, p. 21.

the councils' activities.¹

The most common form of control is through the party membership of the councils. It appears probable that party members always form a majority of their memberships.² At least in the case of the councils of tertiary educational institutions party representatives are formally guaranteed a place on the councils.³ There is some evidence that the councils' party members are formally organised as party groups. These groups, consisting

1 The administration, party secretary and trade union leaders of a Groky secondary school draw up the work plan of the Teaching Council together. *P.zh.*, 12/73, p. 60. The PPO of a Moscow school has often advised the director to include questions of study and teaching practice on the agendas of meetings of the Teaching Council. *P.zh.*, 6/56, p. 60.

2 Over half the members of the councils of the educational and scientific institutions of the Chere'mushki raion of Moscow are communists. *Kom. (Vilnius)*, 2/70, p. 58. Seventy-nine percent of the members of the Academic Council of the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute are party members, as are the majority of the members of the Scientific Council of the Institute of Elementary Organic Formations of the All-Union Academy of Sciences. *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p.2; *Kom.*, 6/72, p. 94. It is surely no accident that 16 of the 31 members of the Artistic Council of the Kirov Ballet in Leningrad are communists. *P.zh.*, 19/70, p. 55. It should also be noted that PPO's participate in the selection of the membership of the councils by having positions on them on their *nomenklatury*. *Mosk.pravda*, 10/9/71, p. 2; *Kom.Ukrainy*, 2/72, p. 66; *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2.

3 *Vysshaia shkola*, op. cit., p. 36.

of all the party members in an elected non-party organ, provide a unified party approach in the organs' deliberations. One report declares that before any decisions are made by a council a meeting of communist council members is usually held.¹ Another article, speaking of the importance of party influence over councils, says:

In this matter a big role is played by the party groups of Scientific Councils, which are important instruments of party influence on the scientific-production activity of the institute.²

It is not easy to come to a decision on the significance of party groups, if they exist. I have not found any description of formal procedures for councils. There is some evidence that decisions are made on the basis of a vote.³ Whether PPO's attempt to or are able to

1 *Pravda*, 15/5/72, p. 2.

2 *Kom. (Vilnius)*, 2/70, pp. 57-58. Whether party groups are formally organised or not, PPO's closely control the work of communist council members. Party buros and committees hear reports (*otchéty*) from them and examine their work. *P.zh.*, 16/63, pp. 38-39; 19/70, p. 55.

3 I.A. Mel'chuk declares in open letter to his colleagues that, following the publication of a letter by him in "The New York Times" disassociating himself from the campaign against Sakharov and the jailing of Kovalëv, the Council of the Institute of Linguistics of the All-Union Academy of Sciences voted in a "secret" ballot 19 to 2 (with three abstentions) against his reappointment to his post.

gain party bloc voting is unknown - it probably depends on the issue and the situation in the particular institution.

There is considerable evidence that PPO's make great use of councils for putting forward the party point of view and for exercising control of operations.

Kommunist Ukrainy, without being specific, claims that organs of collective leadership, such as Academic Councils, modify the operation of the right of control, since PPO's are able to act through them.¹ PPO's regularly refer matters to councils, including sensitive political matters.² Relations in the Physics-Energy Institute are close enough that combined meetings of the party committee and the Scientific-Technical Council were held to consider problems that had arisen in setting up a number of atomic power stations.³

1 *Kom.Ukrainy*, 2/72, p. 66. The secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Elementary Organic Formations also claims that the right of control produces the need for greater party influence on the institute's council. *Kom.*, 6/72, p. 94.

2 The communists of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences referred an article suspected of taking a "non-Marxist" position to a combined meeting of the Councils of the institute and the Institute of History. The councils confirmed the non-Marxist point of view of the article and expressed regret that the journal *Kul'tura Moldovei* had published the article without consulting experts. *Kom.Moldavi*, 2/63, pp. 78-79.

3 *P.zh.*, 2/74, p. 32.

More examples of the use made of councils by PPO's will be seen in the next chapter. However it should already be evident that they are significant weapons. Because the councils do not have final power of decision, control over them does not give the PPO's total control of the "host" organisations. However PPO's do use them as a means of putting forward their own points of view in such a form that institutional leaders find them hard to ignore.

The evidence does not give ministerial collegiums such an important role. Like the councils they are advisory bodies, with responsibility for examining matters in all areas of a ministry's concern.¹ They are under the close control of the minister. Membership, although confirmed by the Council of Ministers, is recommended by the minister and changed on his orders; agendas are decided by the minister; if the collegium disagrees with the minister his opinion becomes law anyway; and a decree of the collegium can be put into effect only by order of the minister.² However the collegium should not be underestimated.

1 The most detailed source of information on collegiums is Davitnidze, I.L: *Kollegii ministerstv, pravovoe polozenie i organizatsiia raboty*, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 1972. For a discussion of their functions, see pp. 81-99. For a briefer description of their powers and functions, see *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 10/72, pp. 55-59.

2 Davitnidze, op. cit., pp. 60-62; Shabanov, Iu.V: *Leninskie printsipy raboty gosudarstvennogo apparata*, Izd. "Vysheishaia shkola", Minsk, 1971, p. 189. *Sov.gos. i pravo*, 3/67, p. 18.

If it is seen as an organ for collective discussion, rather than an organ for collective leadership, its role can be seen as significant. If the minister wishes to gain the support of his subordinates it becomes an important forum for consensus-building. It is also useful as a collective means of checking on the implementation of important policies and decisions.¹ In recent years there has been particular emphasis on the importance of collegiums, including calls to give them more than advisory status.² Nevertheless there have been no changes in their formal powers. However one should not exclude the possibility, depending perhaps above all on the style of work of the particular minister and the nature of the problems facing him, of collegiums playing an important role in the long and short-term operations of ministries.

The question that particularly concerns us is the use that PPO's are able to make of collegiums. We saw that PPO's relied on party membership and party control of councils to exercise their influence over them. Can ministerial PPO's exercise the same influence over collegiums?

I do not have any data on party membership of collegiums. One would expect, given the high-level positions

1 *Aktivnye pomoshchniki partiinykh komitetov, iz opyta raboty partiinykh komissii*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1974, p. 203.

2 *Sov.gos. i pravo*, 1/66, p. 11; 3/67, p. 17; Lunev, A.E. (ed.): *Organizatsiia raboty ministerstv v usloviakh ekonomicheskoi reformy*, Izd. "Nauka", Moscow, 1972, pp. 22, 33-36.

of most collegium members, that communists would be a large majority. However I have not found any examples of PPO's exerting party influence over communist members, and certainly no suggestions of the existence of formal party groups.¹

There is some doubt about whether PPO secretaries are members of collegiums. Particularly in recent years the formal statutes for some ministries have required representatives of social organisations to be given places in collegiums. However PPO representatives are not included in any lists of collegium memberships.² There are reports referring to the presence of the PPO secretary at collegium meetings.³ However there is no suggestion that he is a member of the collegium or participates in its discussions.

There are some reports of close cooperation between ministerial PPO's and collegiums. The party

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- 1 There is even some doubt as to whether a party bloc would be given the opportunity to vote in a collegium meeting. Whereas Shabanov declares that decisions are passed by a simple majority vote, Davitnidze claims that since the minister's opinion always prevails, collegiums do not usually put matters to a vote, but rather try to build up a consensus opinion. Shabanov, *Iu.V: op. cit.*, p. 184; Davitnidze, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
- 2 Davitnidze, *op. cit.*, pp. 64066; *Iampol'skaia: Obshchestvennye organizatsii v SSSR*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
- 3 For example, *Pravda*, 10/3/69, p. 2. See also reports of PPO secretaries attending meetings of the administration of *Tsentrsoiuz* and the councils of two *sovnarkhozy*. *P.zh.*, 6/58, p. 65.

committee of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine Construction works with the collegium on personnel matters.¹ A case in the All-Union Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry suggests that the collegium is in some respects of inferior status to the PPO. When a *glavk* head had not reacted in the necessary way to criticism in the collegium, the matter was considered by the party committee and a full investigation followed.² A statement by the secretary of the party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry suggests that PPO's might use collegiums in the same way as they use councils, as forums for presenting their point of view:

Between the party buro and the collegium there have been established close contacts. Some members of the buro are also members of the collegium. This allows the party buro to widely place before the leadership vital questions of the life of the collective and party organisations.³

While these examples suggest that collegiums are used by PPO's in the same way as the councils, as a forum for the authoritative presentation of party views, there is not the supporting evidence of PPO influence over collegiums.

1 *Pravda*, 29/11/71, p. 2.

2 *Aktivnye pomoshchniki*, op. cit., p. 210.

3 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 8/69, p. 21.

There is no evidence of PPO control over communist members of collegiums or of PPO control over the collegiums themselves through the powers of the right of control. This suggests that the collegiums are not used to the extent that the councils are.

Similar, but not identical, to organs of collective leadership are the various specialised commissions that operate, particularly in educational and research institutions. Because they often fulfil important functions they are of interest to PPO's; because they are collective bodies they are particularly open to PPO influence. Just two examples are sufficient here as a preview of the more detailed discussion in the next chapter. The secretary of the party organisation of the Moscow Technical College speaks of the party organisation's control of the formation and operation of expert, scientific-technical, methodological, staffing, admission and examination commissions.¹ *Kommunist (Vilnius)* talks of the party committee members that are on a school's "authoritative" commission for vocational guidance.²

The final weapon available to PPO's is the use they can make of social (*obshchestvennye*) organisations. At

1 *Mosk.pravda*, 10/9/71, p. 2.

2 *Kom.(Vilnius)*, 9/71, p. 3.

the level with which we are concerned social organisations are situated, like the PPO's themselves, within working institutions. I have included in the category of social organisations all "mass" organisations, ranging from those with politically significant administrative duties, primarily the trade unions, the *komsomol* and the "people's control" system, through other mass organisations with All-Union hierarchies, such as *Znanie*, an organisation for managing public lectures by scientific experts and administrators, to locally-organised groups such as school parents' committees.

There are two features of social organisations that make them of value to PPO's. Firstly, they have functions to fulfil that are not directly accessible to primary party organisations. For example, trade unions have powers in the area of workers' discipline, safety regulations, and in the payment of wages and bonuses.¹ In recent years there has been much discussion of extending the administrative functions undertaken by social organisations, as part of the movement towards citizen self-administration. The practical effect of such a movement is dubious. However, to the extent that social organisations have these functions, the way is open to PPO's, through their control of the organisations, to have a significant

1 Iampol'skaia: *Obshchestvennye organizatsii v SSSR*, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

influence on the exercise of their functions. Some idea of the possibilities open to PPO's in this area can be gained from the report of the party organisation of the Perm *oblast'* office of Gosbank that worked through the trade union to give its recommendations on the transfer of the office to a seven-hour working day.¹

The other feature of social organisations is their mass nature. If the PPO has control of them it has at its disposal a far larger number of people than it has in its own membership. For example, all Soviet workers belong to a trade union and 80-90% of tertiary students are members of the *komsomol*.² We could see the sort of use made of this mass membership in the work of *komsomol* students in the virgin lands. In "For the Good of the Cause" Solzhenitsyn describes the efforts of *komsomol* students, inspired by a teacher attached to the *komsomol* by the party buro, in the building of their new school buildings.³ The party organisation of the All-Union Institute for Ferrous Metallurgy relies largely on the institute's *Znanie* organisation for publicising the institute's technical achievements.⁴

1 *P.zh.*, 3/61, p. 46.

2 *P.zh.*, 22/56, p. 6.

3 Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 49.

4 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 6/67, p. 43.

The system of "people's control" is a good example of this feature of social organisations.¹ Like other social organisations they enable PPO's to use non-party members in the exercise of their functions. The primary task of control groups is information-gathering and in this they are very like the party commissions described above.²

The control groups can be established in all collectives, production and non-production, and they have the right to examine documents and information, to hear figures, reports and explanations, from the director and

1 The people's control system is not an easy one to classify. Some idea of its long and complicated history can be gained from Hodnett's article. Hodnett, G: "Khrushchev and Party-State Control" in Dallin, A. and A.F. Westin (eds.): *Politics in the Soviet Union, seven cases*, Harcourt, Brace and World, N.Y., 1966, chapter 4. The system is organised as a hierarchy, the lowest level of which is the control group. The fact that the people's control hierarchy is subordinate to the central and republican Councils of Ministers suggests that the control groups are state organisations; however Soviet commentators often describe them as social organisations, this definition arising from the mass nature of their membership. *P.zh.*, 19/64, p. 7; 9/65, p. 20. I have chosen to place them in the latter category, primarily because in being situated within a "host" organisation they closely resemble other social organisations.

2 See above, pp. 156-159.

his subordinates, and to issue directions (*ukazaniia*) on the removal of shortcomings.¹ Although it would appear that some of these powers are rarely used fully, they are clearly important powers that could be very useful to a PPO.² The whole process is summed up well in the following quotation from *Partiinaia zhizn'* (note that this quotation comes from the time when the party and people's control apparatuses were combined):

The action groups under the committees of party-state control have become the organising centre of all social control. With the establishment of action groups and posts the significance of primary party organisations in controlling the implementation of the party's directives has become even greater. The party organisation leads the formation and work of the group; the chairman of the latter is a deputy secretary of the party buro; the committee or party buro examines the plans of the action group, and acquaints its leaders and members with the

1 *P.zh.*, 2/69, p. 14; *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/63, p. 26; 10/65, p. 72.

2 It would appear to be rare for a control group to examine the activity of the head of the institution, while the groups' directions (*ukazaniia*) appear to have only the force of recommendations.

most important directions and decisions of the party and state. In this way the influence of the primary party organisation on control has been greatly strengthened, especially in administrative apparatuses and educational establishments which may not exercise the right of direct control of the activity of the administration.¹

Some idea of the activities of control groups can be gained from a report on the activity of the group in the institute *Gidroaliuminiia* in 1963.² The group checked how the most recent technical achievements were being used in new designs and equipment. It uncovered many shortcomings in design among enterprises concerned with electrical production. The chairman of the group sent the results of the investigation to the party organisation of the institute. The institute director and the party buro then had a conference with department heads and chief specialists to work out what to do. This appears to be typical of the groups' activities. They conduct an investigation and find shortcomings which they report to the party organisation which then takes the necessary action.

1 *P.zh.*, 9.65, p. 20.

2 *P.zh.*, 9/63, p. 19.

I am not specifically concerned with control groups; so this treatment has been somewhat oversimplified. Although I have mentioned that the people's control system has its own hierarchy, I have ignored the fact that the control groups can turn to this hierarchy, possibly at the expense of the PPO secretary. This is illustrated by the following story, although one should note that the story comes from the time when the party and state control apparatuses were combined. The combined hierarchy was more powerful than the present people's control hierarchy. This means that although the story is still valuable in showing us the way "politics" works even at the lowest levels of a bureaucratic state, it is unlikely that the people's control apparatus of the present day would be used in the same way as the combined apparatus was in 1964.¹

The story began in a reasonably straightforward way with a letter from the secretary of the party organisation of the Institute of Toys, declaring that the institute party organisation had dismissed a deputy secretary after he, as chairman of the control group, had opposed the party buro. Apparently the chairman had made a report to the city committee of the party-state control apparatus, as a result of which the chairman of the city committee criticised the PPO secretary for political

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P.zh., 22/64, pp. 45-47.

immaturity and misunderstanding the role and functions of the control organs. The secretary declared in his letter that raising the authority of the control organs, the subject of something of a campaign at the time, did not mean ignoring the opinion of the PPO.

Partiinaia zhizn' began by replying in the same relatively straightforward way. It disagreed with the secretary and filled in some of the details of the story. The control group had found some shortcomings in the institute. Recommendations were made to the administration of the institute which issued the necessary orders. However nothing was done about implementation of the orders. Eventually the chairman of the group published an article on the situation in the city newspaper. The article was examined in a party meeting where it was attacked by the secretary, who at this stage had the chairman removed from his post.

But then a characteristically Soviet element came out. *Partiinaia zhizn'* revealed that actually the secretary had another reason for removing the chairman. The secretary had been denied a new flat by the trade union committee and therefore decided to attack the trade union activists. He called a meeting of the party buro and had it pass a resolution requiring the trade union committee to change its position. Only the deputy secretary/chairman complained about this, insisting that it was a breach of

trade union democracy. At this point the secretary decided to get rid of the chairman.

This story should be enough to show the dangers of ever generalising about the power of party organisations and secretaries over trade unions and other social organisations. It also shows the danger of looking for easy institutional explanations of events.

However, despite this warning, I feel that we can say that generally PPO's have tight control over social organisations. Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution, expressing one of the most fundamental Leninist principles, assures PPO's a leading role over social organisations. *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* wrote in 1961 that giving state functions to social organisations required changing their methods of self-administration if any true democratisation was to occur. One change needed was to strengthen the control of the organisations "from below".¹ Soviet commentaries often describe the control exercised by PPO's as control "from below".²

The first weapon PPO's have over social organisations is the use of party discipline over the

1 *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 10/61, pp. 27-28.

2 Bugaev, E.I. and B.M. Leibson: *Besedy ob Ustave KPSS*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1964, p. 201; *P.zh.*, 10/68, p. 42.

communist leaders of the organisations. The leaders of trade union and *komsomol* organisations are to a large degree party members. In 1974 in Zaporozh'e *oblast'* 68.7% of the secretaries of *komsomol* primary organisations were party members and this proportion is increasing.¹ Somewhat surprisingly the percentage among trade union leaders is slightly lower. *Pravda Ukrainy* reported in 1976 that 64% of 124,000 enterprise-level trade union committee chairmen were communists.² Nevertheless the leadership of a trade union or *komsomol* committee is considered as little different from a regular party post. Work in lower-level trade union or *komsomol* organisations is a common beginning to a party career.

As with state organisations PPO's do not have the power to give direct orders to social organisations. Nor does there appear to be any formal definition of their powers over social organisations such as the right of control in the case of state organisations. However in general terms the powers appear to be the same. A PPO has access to any information or officials of the particular social organisation, can make recommendations on any matter,

1 *Pravda*, 9/9/70; 5/4/74. The All-Union percentage for 1974 was 44.1%. The very rapid increase over the last few years can be seen in the following data: in 1958 the percentage was 9.5; in 1966, 14.7; and 1970, 31.2. The upward trend apparently began in 1965. Apresian, Z.G. and V.A. Sulemov: *Partiinoe iadro v komomole*, Izd. "Znanie", Moscow, 1975, pp. 40-49.

2 *Pravda Ukrainy*, 13/2/76.

and in exceptional circumstances can demand a change in the state of affairs.

In practice, in fact, a PPO's control of a social organisation is much tighter than of a state organisation. In 1972 a reader asked *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* whether the PPO secretary should attend trade union committee meetings. The letter was answered by the deputy head of the party-organisational department of the republican Central Committee. He declared that it was up to the secretary to decide but that it would be a good thing, even if there were members of the party buro on the committee (the trade union committee chairman is usually a member of the party buro). In response to the question whether all matters considered in trade union committee meetings should be checked with the party organisation secretary first, he replied that usually matters are worked out in advance in order to prevent duplication, and that if a matter comes up suddenly it would not be superfluous to consult with the party secretary.¹

I have already cited an example to show the opposite, yet this would appear to show that generally the PPO has fairly complete control of the social organisations

1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 4/72, p. 66. For concrete examples of the importance of PPO control over and support for the trade union committee, see Sazonov, N.A: *Partiinoe biuro i profsoiuznaia organizatsiia*, Rostov Publishing Office, Rostov-on-the-Don, 1958.

in its institution.

The discussion of the powers available to PPO's in their relations with their "host" organisations should have given some idea of the nature of their leadership of these organisations. Control does not mean that the PPO runs the institution - it cannot give orders to any administrative or production worker. In the case of real difficulties in the operation of the institution the PPO has the power to demand corrective action, although not in specific terms. However quite specific recommendations can be made, and these will usually be given serious consideration by the institutional leadership.

But control means more than simply ensuring that the institution and its leaders fulfil specific demands made of them and even more than reacting to difficulties as they occur. It means further that the PPO is to ensure that the "host" organisation is at all times running as efficiently and productively as possible, and as part of this it can suggest positive initiatives. The extent to which such initiatives are taken notice of depends on a number of empirical factors, particularly relations between the individuals concerned and the attitudes of higher authorities. This is the essence of the "staff generalist" role - a real enough concern with specific problems, but with sufficient detachment from everyday operations and a sufficiently

general view of the operations of the institution that even specific actions will have long-term beneficial results.

Before examining in detail the extent to which PPO's actually fulfil this function, I would like to briefly outline in historical terms the variations in the powers of PPO's. I have said often enough already that the tasks and means of PPO's vary considerably over time, that in their efforts to maintain a balance between excessive party-state conflict and collusion the top authorities make variable demands of PPO's. The detailed discussion of PPO activities in the next chapter is in functional, not historical terms. Therefore some broad knowledge of historical developments is required. I will devote some particular attention to the changes since the fall of Khrushchev, including the 1971 extension of the applicability of the right of control, since these changes have affected non-production PPO's more than any others.

Survey of party-state relations since 1955

The general changes in the nature of party-state relations are not necessarily reflected in the activities of all non-production PPO's. There are two main reasons for this, closely related to each other. At those times recognised as times of increased power for the party

apparatus, the main, almost the sole, concern of middle-level party organs is production, in the narrowest sense of the word. Therefore they tend to ignore non-production institutions and their PPO's. The other side of the coin is that at times of decreased party involvement in economic affairs, the emphasis will often turn to ideological control. Such control is of particular importance in non-production institutions. Therefore these periods can see an increase in the importance of non-production PPO's. Of course these arguments do not apply to the PPO's of administrative, and to some extent, research institutions, since they are more closely connected with production. They, therefore, follow more closely the general trends in party-state relations.

In the mid-1950's, there was a major factional struggle in progress. In very general terms the struggle was between Khrushchev, with the support of the party apparatus, and Malenkov, with his support based in the state administrative apparatus. Khrushchev prevailed and with him the party apparatus. Even before the struggle had concluded there was evidence of strong party activity, including among PPO's. This was particularly evident with regard to ministerial PPO's, perhaps engaged in struggle with the enemy from within. However it was reflected in all non-production institutions - I have given one example

above of the involvement of the PPO of a research institute in a dispute with clear factional implications.¹

The triumph of Khrushchev brought the abolition of the central branch ministries and the establishment of the *sovnarkhozy*, dispersing the power of the state apparatus and increasing enormously the role of the party apparatus in administrative and economic affairs. This power of the party was reflected in the PPO's of the *sovnarkhozy*.² However it seems probable that this increase in the power of the party apparatus was not particularly reflected in the activities of other non-production PPO's. What information there is on their activities does not suggest any significant increase in power or importance.

The climax in the power of the party apparatus could be seen at the end of the 1950's and early in the 1960's. As far as PPO's were concerned a major development was the Central Committee decree of June, 1959 establishing

1 See pp. 71-72.

2 *Partiinaiia zhizn'*, for example, declared in mid-1957 that *sovnarkhoz* PPO's were able to work better than the old ministerial party organisations. Being closer to production they were allegedly better able to understand the administrative process and what had to be done in different circumstances. *P.zh.*, 11/57, p. 28. I have information on one *sovnarkhoz* party secretary which supports the view that they were an important source of party influence. Smirnov, the party secretary in the Kemerovo *sovnarkhoz* in 1957, was the former first secretary of a city *raikom*. *P.zh.*, 18/57, p. 21. Ministerial PPO secretaries with such backgrounds have appeared at other times of great administrative PPO activity. See below, pp. 437-441.

commissions in the PPO's for the implementation of the right of control. Oddly enough, considering that they had never been given the right of control, the PPO's of planning organisations, construction bureaus and research institutes fulfilling orders for production enterprises were given permission to establish these commissions.¹ It was considered that the party organisations would benefit from them because they were situated so close to production.²

However in 1961, at the same time as the research PPO's fulfilling orders for production enterprises were finally given the right of control,³ there were several calls in the Soviet press for the granting of the right of control to administrative party organisations.⁴ The requests were not granted, although at the same time the press was emphasising that the lack of the right of control did not mean that PPO's were not to involve themselves in administrative and organisational matters.⁵

However this marked the highpoint of the power of the party apparatus. The following year Khrushchev divided the apparatus into industrial and agricultural wings,

1 *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh*, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 917.

2 *P.zh.*, 15/59, p. 37.

3 *Ustav KPSS*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1961, paragraph 59.

4 *P.zh.*, 18/61, p. 49; 20/61, pp. 49-50; *Kom.*, 13/61, p. 90.

5 For example, see *P.zh.*, 10/61, p. 54.

particularly disastrous for the non-production PPO's, which found themselves in no-man's land. At the same time, although the *sovnarkhozy* continued in existence, they were being consolidated so that they no longer so neatly fitted into party territorial boundaries and an increasing number of centralised agencies were being formed. Khrushchev was not deliberately attacking the party apparatus. Indeed the division of the party apparatus should be seen as an attempt to increase party control of operational production affairs. Khrushchev felt that more specialised party organs would be better able to control these areas of concern.

However Khrushchev's reorganisations were becoming increasingly unpopular among party officials, probably more because of their economic than their political implications. Eventually this unpopularity contributed to the party apparatus' removal of support from Khrushchev. The state apparatus still had no reason to support him and at the end of 1964 he was removed from power. The immediate introduction of a strong anti-*podmena* campaign would suggest that the developments of 1962 had not reduced the degree of involvement of the party apparatus in operational affairs. It also suggests some sort of agreement between the party and state apparatuses to maintain a reasonable balance between the functions and powers of the

party and state apparatuses in the future.¹ However, strangely, this very strong campaign was not strongly reflected in the activities of non-production PPO's. Firstly, administrative, and particularly ministerial, PPO's very quickly found themselves involved in the economic reforms of 1965, involving the re-establishment of the central administrative structure and some decentralising administrative procedures. Although the reforms showed considerable concessions to the interests of the state administrators, they were still not popular with them, and the ministerial party organisations were assigned an important part in ensuring their implementation.

The period of the anti-*podmena* campaign was marked by an increasing emphasis on ideological control. Partly a reaction to the excessively independent attitudes of the intellectuals under Khrushchev, partly a reaction to the party's neglect of ideology during the period of *podmena*, a harder ideological line appeared in the press and there was a stepping up of police activity against dissenters and increased attention to indoctrination within the party. This was reflected in the relative reactivation

1 The agreement had its most "public", if never officially announced, manifestation in the separation of the posts of Party General Secretary and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

of educational, research and cultural PPO's.¹

Thus in the first years of the Brezhnev era educational, research and cultural PPO's were becoming a significant force. While the emphasis was on ideology, at the expense of production, in the party apparatus as a whole, the effect, if anything, on party organisations of institutions the large part of whose "production" activities was ideologically oriented was positive. It is doubtful that ministerial PPO's gained any power over their *sovmarkhoz* predecessors. There may have been some restrictions on their methods of operation. However any loss of power was probably negligible.²

By 1967 the right balance of party-state relations had apparently been reached and so the anti-*podmena* campaign

1 L.L. Greenberg writes that before 1965 research PPO's had little say in the activities of institutes. (She is speaking primarily of the theoretically oriented institutes of the Academies. The earlier reactivation of the production-oriented branch institutes' party organisations has already been mentioned.) However after 1966 their role became greater, particularly through the new emphasis on party-mindedness (*partiinost'*) in science. L.L. Greenberg: "Soviet Science Policy and the Scientific Establishment", *Survey*, vol. 17, no. 4, Autumn, 1971, pp. 51-63.

2 As evidence that the main attack was on methods of operation there is a 1966 *Kommunist* article in which the journal was unable to deny the need for a ministerial PPO to be involved in "production" matters, in this case solving a factory's supply problem, but could criticise its style of involvement. *Kom.*, 16/66, pp. 57-58.

was wound down. The Czechoslovak events the next year ensured a new emphasis on the "leading" role of the party. However the continuing agreement between the party and state factions, and possibly a recognition of the shortcomings of *podmena* by the party faction, ensured that Khrushchev style party operations were not resumed. The party apparatus was not to become involved in the petty details of day-to-day operations, was not to neglect its ideological duties, and not to neglect non-production institutions. The effect was an even greater emphasis on the role of non-production PPO's.¹

Therefore it was no surprise that the 24th Party Congress in 1971 granted the right of control to non-production PPO's. This was only the consolidation of a trend that had been evident to some degree since 1965 and particularly since 1967. The precise significance of the granting of the right of control is difficult to determine. I have said that it was only a consolidation of an already existing trend, and there is ample evidence from before 1971 of non-production PPO's using the powers of the right

1 One could also make the rather general point that the new emphasis on non-production institutions was a sign of the "modernisation" of the Soviet economy. An adequate productive base had been developed; further significant improvements in output would be based on improvements in "service" industries.

of control.¹ However reports suggesting that the granting of the right of control did change the activities of PPO's, both in the areas of their concern and the means used, are equally numerous. *Partiinaia zhizn'* wrote, perhaps rather misleadingly, in 1971:

If in the recent past party organisations

1 For example, in 1973 the secretary of the party buro of the Kalinin *oblast'* clinical hospital said that his party organisation had had no trouble in handling the right of control, since it had exercised control of the activity of the administration before 1971. General party meetings and party buro meetings had regularly heard reports (*otchëty* and *soobshchenia*) from the chief doctor and his deputy, department heads and other leading personnel; commissions had been established to investigate conditions, the findings of which were examined in party meetings; and personnel matters were decided with the participation of the party organisation. *Kom.*, 4/73, pp. 26-30. In 1961 *Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana* received a letter asking whether an educational PPO had the right of control of the director and whether it could hear reports (*otchëty*) from him in party meetings. The journal replied that the party organisation did not have the right of control, but continued: "The party organisation may hear a report (*doklad*) from the school director in a meeting on the results of the school year or quarter and examine in connection with this the tasks for improvement in the education and training of students. The director must concern himself with this if he is to be supported in his work by the party organisation." *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/61, pp. 68-69. For similar accounts in research PPO's, see *P.zh.*, 16/63, p. 36. It will also be evident in the detailed discussion in the next chapter that many of the examples of PPO control, using all the powers of the right of control, date from before 1971.

of research institutes that did not have the right of control of the activity of the administration in party meetings examined, as a rule, questions of ideological work and intra-party life, now in discussions communists often concern themselves with current problems of research work, its planning, the distribution of scientific resources and specialists, progress in the fulfilment of plans, the working through of the most important projects and the introduction into production of the achievements of science.

Since gaining the right of control these PPO's have listened to reports from institutional leaders and now there is no shifting of personnel without consideration of the opinion of the PPO's.¹ The account of the effects on the party organisation of the Magadan institute *Dal'stroiproekt* is not as extreme. Before the party organisation gained the right of control it was involved in control of the administration. However this control was of an episodic nature without having the necessary sense of direction. This was because the party organisation had limited possibilities for holding workers accountable for the condition of production affairs.²

1 *P.zh.*, 22/71, pp. 28-30.

2 Barkusov, op. cit., p. 98.

In the category of educational PPO's there is an enormous number of reports. Most of them are concerned with personnel matters.¹

However there are reports speaking of other areas. A 1971 book on the Khabarovsk *raikom* claimed that before 1971 school PPO's were not involved in personnel work, nor in the activities of Pedagogical and Academic Councils and that they could hear reports (*otchëty*) only from communists and not from leading officials. Now they can hear reports from anyone.² An editorial in *Uchitel'skaia gazeta* declared that the party organisations had displayed a greater interest in the pedagogical activities of the school since 1971.³

1 The secretary of the party organisation of a secondary school in Vladimir declared in October, 1971 that before the right of control the director did not always consult with the party organisation on personnel matters, but since 1971 they have always been decided together. *P.zh.*, 17/71, p. 14. The secretary of the party organisation of a school in Kuibyshev similarly claimed that the party organisation had been more actively involved in personnel work since the 24th Party Congress. *P.zh.*, 16/72, p. 50. In 1973 the PPO's of the tertiary institutions in Tomsk were said to have exercised a greater influence over personnel business since receiving the right of control. *P.zh.*, 6/73, p. 32. In the Riazan Teacher's College it has become common that the selection of departmental heads and deans takes place with the participation and agreement of the party committee. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26/1/72, p. 2.

2 Dubkov, op. cit., p. 42.

3 *Uchitel'skaia gazeta*, 13/1/73, p. 1.

These reports have emphasised the change in the areas of involvement. Others are more concerned with the means available. The secretary of the party committee of the Omsk Institute of Rail Transport Engineers wrote to *Pravda* to say that before gaining the right of control the PPO was interested in everything that happened in the institute. However in some areas it had been unable to make its influence felt. This had led to the situation where some communists started to say that there were some things they could not change and were therefore no concern of theirs. He hoped that the situation would now change.¹

The secretary of the party committee of the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute wrote that in general the duties of the PPO had not changed with the granting of the right of control. However it was now able to work with greater effectiveness since the right of control had changed the methods and form of its work. He mentioned specifically that whereas previously the communists had heard reports from and given recommendations to institutional leaders as communists, they could now deal with them as administrators.²

The secretary of the party committee of the Saratov Polytechnical Institute wrote in 1972 that using the right of control the party committee had begun to regularly hear reports (*otchëty*) on the work of the deans, department

1 *Pravda*, 11/2/72, p. 2.

2 *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2.

heads, the rector and pro-rectors.¹

One cannot ignore all these reports and so must come to the conclusion that the 1971 change did have a significant effect on non-production PPO's, despite the equally overwhelming evidence that many such organisations used all the powers of the right of control before 1971. Why then did the 1971 change have such an effect on some PPO's? The main reason is that the formal right of control, officially expressed in the Party Rules, now made it impossible for reluctant institutional leaders, and PPO secretaries, to deny that non-production party organisations were entitled to control the activity of the administration. The secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Mechanics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences wrote in 1972 that the right of control had great "moral" meaning, that it produced changes in the "psychology" of institutional leaders.² In 1966 the secretary of the party committee of Moscow State University complained about misunderstandings of the significance of the lack of the right of control which had led to limitations on the content of discussions in party meetings.³ Giving the party organisation the right of control would make such misunder-

1 *Pravda*, 15/2/72, p. 2.

2 *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26/1/73, p. 2.

3 *Kom.*, 10/66, p. 35.

standings impossible. A school PPO secretary also speaks of the "psychological" effects, the right of control having raised the authority of the party organisation in the eyes of the teaching collective.¹

Therefore the granting of the right of control has apparently strengthened the role of non-production PPOs. It has been particularly important in that it has made it possible for all PPO's, even against opposition from institutional leaderships, to hold individual members of working collectives accountable for production performance. Perhaps its main significance was in showing up the degree of opposition to PPO activities, opposition which one suspects still exists. However that is a matter for further consideration. This short and oversimplified survey of developments since 1955 should provide some historical background for the detailed discussion of the activities of non-production PPO's in the next chapter. Since little attempt will be made to distinguish the different degrees of PPO involvement at different times, it should be kept in mind that in general the party apparatus as a whole was closely involved in production affairs throughout the Khrushchev era and, in a more controlled way, since about 1967. Administrative and production-oriented

1 *P.zh.*, 16/72, p. 46.

research PPO's follow this general pattern. Other non-production party organisations have only become well established as significant forces since 1965 and more so since 1967.

CHAPTER THREE"PRODUCTION" CONCERNS

When discussing a PPO's "production" control functions,¹ it is crucial to have some understanding of the functions of the "host" organisation. The degree of involvement of the PPO in "production" concerns clearly depends to an enormous degree on whether the "host" organisation itself has some independent, initiating function in a particular area of "production" activity. A full description of the powers and functions of "host" organisations would amount to a multi-volume encyclopaedia of Soviet institutions and obviously it would be out of place to attempt it here. Even to establish the formal, legal functions of "host" organisations is difficult. If the informal activities that are endemic in Soviet institutions were to be included the task would become impossible. However some understanding of these formal and informal activities is essential if we are to attempt an analysis of the PPO's "production" control function, particularly any policy-making role that PPO's might play as part of that function. Even if there is no possibility of undertaking a full exposition here, I will describe the

1 For a description of my use of the word "production", see p. 136.

situation to the extent that is necessary for an understanding of PPO control.

There are roughly three categories of PPO production concern. The first relates to the structure and organisation of the "host" organisation, the second to the closely connected question of personnel, and the third to the operational activity and performance of the "host" organisation.

1. Structure and organisation

The least controversial control function of PPO's is in the area of structure and organisation. This category includes the concern of the PPO in ensuring that the "host" organisation is structured and operating smoothly and efficiently, but excludes consideration of the actual content of "production" activity. The distinction is an important one, since the latter consideration introduces an element of controversy into the proper concerns of PPO's, particularly administrative PPO's, that is not present in the former concern.

One of the main reasons for the lack of controversy over the concern of PPO's for structure and organisation is the lack of independence of "host" organisations in these areas. The structures, overall personnel levels and wage funds (which largely determine the possible mix of different

types and levels of personnel) are usually fixed by higher authorities.

The Statutes establishing the various institutions with which we are concerned are invariably issued by superior authorities.¹ The statutes themselves rarely give specific

1 The statutes for ministries are approved by the Council of Ministers. Union and Autonomous Republic Constitutions define which departments and administrations should be formed in local *ispolkomy*. While they are actually formed by the *ispolkomy* themselves, their formation must be confirmed by the Union Republic Council of Ministers. Kozlov, Iu. M: *Pravovoe polozhenie ministerstv SSSR*, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 1971, pp. 100-101. Academy research institutes are established and have their statutes confirmed by the Presidium of the relevant All-Union or republican Academy of Sciences. *Administrativnoe pravo*, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 1967, pp. 411-412. Branch institutes are formed by the relevant Council of Ministers on the suggestion of other relevant bodies and with the agreement of the All-Union scientific co-ordinating body, presently the State Committee for Science and Technology. (See, for example, the decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers establishing the All-Russian Research Institute for the Organisation and Payment of Agricultural Labour. *Sistematicheskoe sobranie zakonov RSFSR, ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR i reshenii Pravitel'stva RSFSR*, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 1969, vol. 12, p. 487). Tertiary educational establishments are formed and dissolved by the All-Union Council of Ministers, except teachers' colleges which are the responsibility of Union Republic Councils. Specialist secondary schools are formed by the Ministry of Tertiary and Specialised Secondary Education. Kozlov, op. cit., p. 99. The most recent General Law (*Ustav*) for schools was confirmed by the All-Union Council of Ministers in 1970 for general secondary schools. It declared that schools are formed and dissolved by the Union Republic Councils of Ministers. *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, op. cit., pp. 228-229. The fact that the old eight-year schools were opened on the decision of the *raion* or city *ispolkom* with the agreement of the Ministry of Education of an autonomous republic or the *krai* or *oblast'* Department of Education suggests that primary schools are probably also established by lower-level authorities than are secondary schools. *ibid*, pp. 197-198.

details on the structure or staff levels of institutes, but usually give at least powers of confirmation in these areas to higher authorities. Thus the total outlay of funds, including wages funds, for Academy institutes is established by higher authorities - presumably the State Committee for Science and Technology, working with Gosplan, the Ministry of Finance and the Academy of Sciences.¹ The State Committee, again together with Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance, defines the overall number of workers in branch research institutes throughout the country,² but within this limitation individual ministries establish the general totals of expenditure on research work, including wages, within the branch.³ In 1970 all research institutes were granted by a decree of the Council of Ministers the same rights of relative independence that enterprises had been granted in 1965.⁴ This means that within the limits of the wages fund established by an institute's centrally-confirmed yearly plan, it can determine its own structure, staffing, and average wage.⁵

1 Zaleski, op. cit., p. 223.

2 *Administrativnoe pravo*, op. cit., p. 408.

3 Kozlov, op. cit., p. 211.

4 *Reshenia partii i pravitel'stva po khoziaistvennym voprosam*, vol. 8, 1970-72, Politizdat, Moscow, 1972, p. 54.

5 See the *Polozhenie o sotsialisticheskikh gosudarstvennykh predpriatiiakh*, para. 82 in *Ekonomicheskaiia gazeta*, 20/10/65, p. 28; Zaleski, op. cit., p. 223.

Within tertiary educational institutions faculties and departments can be formed and dissolved only by a decision of the Ministry of Tertiary and Specialised Secondary Education,¹ while staff levels are also determined by the Ministry.²

The 1970 Rule (*Ustav*) for general secondary schools defines the number of classes and other services to be provided, but gives no details on structure and staff levels. It mentions the formation of the Teaching Council, but refers to the Statute for Teaching Councils for details on its activities (to which I unfortunately do not have access).³ The 1959 Statute for eight-year schools gives

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- 1 *Vysshaia shkola*, op. cit., p. 333. A 1938 example Rule (*tipovoi ustav*) for tertiary institutions gave details on the formation of faculties and departments and the membership and general functions of Academic Councils. *Vysshaia shkola*, op. cit., pp. 35-37; see also, *Sistematicheskoe sobranie*, op. cit., p. 333.
- 2 *Vysshaia shkola*, op. cit., pp. 34-35. This includes specialised tertiary institutions that are subordinate to other branch ministries, although in 1974 the All-Union Council of Ministers directed Union Republic Councils and the Ministry to examine and come to a decision on the question of transferring specialised secondary schools from local subordination to subordination to the ministries for which they produce specialists. *Sobraniepostanovlenii Pravitel'stva SSSR*, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 18/74, art. 103.
- 3 *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, op. cit., p. 234.

details on the Council's membership and general functions.¹ It also says that "the staff of the eight-year school (administrative, pedagogical, study-indoctrination and service personnel) is defined in the established manner according to the staff establishment". No details are given on who defines the staff establishment.²

Lower-level administrative apparatuses appear to have little control over their structures and personnel levels. While the organisational establishments of local *ispolkom* departments and administrations are confirmed by the *ispolkom*, their structures and personnel levels must be confirmed by higher authorities.³

The greatest degree of independence is given to ministries. Ministerial statutes declare that while the structure and number of apparatus officials must be confirmed by the Council of Ministers, the minister has the right to confirm the organisational establishment of the central apparatus and the statutes of the *glavki*, administrations and departments.⁴ All-Union industry associations

1 *ibid*, pp. 201-202.

2 *ibid*, p. 200.

3 Kozlov, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

4 See, for example, the Statute for the All-Union Ministry of Agricultural Construction, *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 1/72, art. 2, para 13.

are formed by the relevant All-Union ministry with the agreement of the relevant republican Councils of Ministers, while republican associations are formed by the republican Councils with the agreement of the relevant All-Union ministry. Their structures and staff levels are confirmed by their superior ministry.¹ It is left up to the minister to transfer *glavki*, administrations and departments onto *khozraschët* procedures, an important matter indeed.²

Iu. M. Kozlov goes further than the formal statutes, claiming that ministries are also able to decide themselves what the general structure of the ministerial system will be - whether it will be the two-level ministry-production association (combine) system, the three-level ministry-industry association-production association (combine) system, or some other possibility.³ This suggests that an individual ministry has a considerable degree of freedom in the structural implementation of the recent

1 *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 7/73, art. 32, paras. 9, 22.

2 *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 11/73, art. 57, para. 13.

3 Kozlov, op. cit., pp. 97-98. The production associations or combines are made up of a number of enterprises. The administrative section of the head enterprise usually provides administrative services for the whole association. The associations are essentially production organisations and so receive no particular attention in this thesis. Industry associations replace the old ministerial Chief Administrations (*glavki*). They are, therefore, administrative organisations and will receive some specific attention, unfortunately seriously limited by a lack of information.

economic reforms. This is particularly important for the consideration of the role of ministerial PPO's in these reforms to be considered in Chapter Four.

Kozlov also claims that although the structure and number of officials of the central apparatus is established by the Council of Ministers, the minister has the right to change the levels set by the Council. He says that ministers use this right quite often. After the Council had confirmed the structure of the central apparatus of the All-Union Ministry of Special Construction and Assembly Work, the minister made some changes and many functional administrations and departments were reorganised into *glavki* and administrations respectively.¹

Kozlov's claims are supported by the many examples of PPO involvement in these types of changes. As far back as 1925 it was considered essential that administrative party cells take part in the working-out of plans concerning the organisation of administrative apparatuses.² The mechanics of the process in more recent times were described by the secretary of the PPO of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry in a 1971 *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* article.

1 *ibid*, pp. 96-97.

2 Petrovichev, N.A. and Ia.V. Storozhev (eds.): *Pervichnaia partiinaia organizatsia, dokumenty KPSS, posleoktiabrskii period*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1970, pp. 92-93.

His party buro had decided to have the collective examine the structure of the apparatus in the light of a number of articles that had appeared in *Pravda* on the new economic reforms. As preparation for a general party meeting the articles were studied in all party groups. A number of suggestions were made, some concerned with a narrower definition of the functions of the Departments of Production Management, Planning and Finance, and Material Incentive. A commission was appointed by the party buro to look at the suggestions. Together with the leadership of the ministry the commission worked out a number of measures. These were examined in a party meeting which recommended that the minister issue an order on the matter. This was done and the party buro took control of the fulfilment of the measures. As a result the tasks of each department and administration and of individual officials were allegedly better defined. Also there was a reduction in the number of meetings and conferences.¹ Similarly the party committee of the Ministry of Instrument Making considered the question of raising the role of department and administration party organisations in perfecting the administrative apparatus. It established a permanent group of communists headed by a deputy minister to examine and act on any suggestions received. As a result it was claimed measures were worked out for improving the structure

1 *Kom. Sov. Latvii*, 1/71, p. 59.

of the apparatus, for removing superfluous units and raising the organisational role of the *glavki*. The measures were put into effect by the collegium.¹

The relative freedom of ministries in the area of establishing apparatus structures gives PPO's the opportunity to become closely involved in such matters. There is no suggestion in these examples that there was any controversy over the involvement of the PPO's. The details available are such that only speculation is possible on the precise nature or significance of the PPO role. However if we can believe the reports, the activities of the PPO's, through their investigations of the situation, broad examination and discussion of any findings and subsequent recommendations, had a beneficial effect on the "host" organisations. This is the ideal mode of operation of a staff generalist agency.

In these cases the recommendations suggested by the PPO's were able to be implemented by the "host" organisation itself. However ministries appear to have greater powers to decide their own structures than do other non-production institutions. This has not prevented PPO's in these other institutions involving themselves in matters of organisation and structure. There are numerous examples of PPO's being involved in matters of structure

1 Khaldeev, op. cit., p. 375.

that are apparently, formally at least, beyond the control of the "host" organisation. In 1971 a meeting of the party committee of the Moscow Technical College examined the question of the rational combination of teaching and research activities. In some faculties scientific research had been interfering with teaching. After examination by experts and consideration in the party committee it was decided to establish a separate research institute and new scientific structural sub-divisions. The same report mentions that on the recommendation of the party committee one branch (*filial*) of the college was closed down.¹ To undertake such major structural changes is beyond the formal power of scientific institutions. On what basis, therefore, are the PPO's involved and to whom do they make their recommendations?

One possibility is that educational and scientific institutions are given informal powers to undertake their own structural reorganisations. Such a view is supported to some extent by the case of the Rostov Research Institute for the Technology of Machine Construction. It had seemed

1 *Mosk. pravda*, 10/9/71, p. 2. In the same year on the recommendation of the party buro a new laboratory was set up in the State Institute of Glass. *Mosk. pravda*, 15/9/71, p. 2. In 1972 the party buro of the Kazakh Energy Research Institute established a special commission to examine all aspects of the introduction of the results of scientific work into practice. After consultation with the commission the party buro suggested the unification of a number of separate laboratories. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/72, p. 31.

a good idea to establish laboratories for the long-term prediction of scientific-technical developments in the institute. However some (unspecified) elements opposed the laboratories on the grounds that they were simply an excuse to increase the institute's staff. Thus it was left to the party organisation to explain the necessity of the laboratories and the right results were said to have been achieved.¹ The report does not suggest that the institute has the power to establish the laboratories by itself. But it does suggest that the decision is effectively made in the institute, at least to the extent that opposition within the institute apparently jeopardised the establishment of the laboratories sufficiently that the PPO had to use its powers of "persuasion".

Some other examples suggest another interesting possibility, that PPO's use their influence with higher authorities to gain decisions on structural matters that are advantageous for their "host" organisations. In 1961 a school in Pavlodar had only recently been converted into a technical school. The communists were concerned about the administration's leadership of production education. The director of the school was a "responsible worker", but he had little knowledge of production affairs. Therefore, working through the *gorkom* and the city Education Office,

1 *Kom.*, 5/73, pp. 54-55.

the party members succeeded in having a position for a head teacher (*zavuch*) for production studies added to the establishment.¹ Similarly in 1969 the directorate and PPO of the Institute of Fruit, Vegetable and Potato Growing in Minsk suggested to the *raikom* that the institute's production base be re-located. The *raikom* supported the suggestion and with the help of higher authorities one of the state farms in the *oblast'* became the new base.²

In these cases the power of final decision certainly did not lie with the "host" organisation. Therefore it became necessary for the PPO to present the interests of the "host" organisation to the decision-making bodies. While this should not necessarily be seen as PPO-administration collusion, neither can it strictly speaking be called control.

However control was evident in those cases where the "host" organisation had independent powers, whether formal or informal. It cannot be ascertained from the evidence available whether the control took on the policy-making aspect it gains in a situation of decentralised decision-making. In the case of the Rostov Research Institute for the Technology of Machine Construction the PPO was certainly responsible for defusing opposition to the official

1 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/61, p. 62.

2 *Kom.*, 15/69, p. 54.

policy. Unfortunately the report does not make clear who provided the opposition. Neither in this case, nor in the other cases cited, can it be positively claimed that the PPO was responsible, in a situation of decentralised decision-making, for deciding what the official policy should be. It is more than possible that in these cases, as in the cases where the PPO's were making representations to higher authorities, the PPO was simply following the line suggested by the institutional leadership. There is no evidence of PPO's opposing institutional leaders on structural matters.

Of course control does not necessarily mean opposition to institutional leadership. The Soviet authorities consider that control involves conflict only in abnormal situations. The examples could be seen as evidence that PPO's play a positive staff generalist role in structural matters. They investigate the current situation, consider within themselves and with expert advice their findings, and on that basis make both specific and wide-ranging recommendations to the relevant authorities.

This examination of the first category of PPO production concerns has suggested that PPO's might undertake staff generalist functions. There has not been sufficient evidence to determine how beneficial these functions in fact are or how much the PPO's present independent view-

points that go beyond supporting the narrow sectional interests of institutional leaderships. The interesting possibility has also been raised that PPO's act as the representatives of "host" organisation interests, although not necessarily in a collusive way, in higher-level party policy-making circles.

The next two categories of PPO concerns, dealing with matters of more fundamental importance and in which "host" organisations have greater opportunities for independent action, should shed more conclusive light on these important questions.

2. Personnel

A personnel concern that is closely connected with structure and organisation is the definition of the functions of individual workers. The functions of leading institutional officials are usually defined in Council of Ministers' decrees,¹ but institutional leaders, particularly

¹ For example, the 1939 Rule (*Ustav*) for tertiary educational institutions lists the functions of the director, deputy director for academic and scientific work, the director's administrative assistant and faculty deans. *Vysshaia shkola*, op. cit., pp. 35-36. The 1970 school Rule defines the functions of the director, deputy director for study-indoctrination work, class leaders, the organiser of extra-curricular indoctrination work, the Young Pioneers' leader, the person in charge of military affairs and the director's administrative assistant. *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, op. cit., pp. 232-234. Kozlov writes that the basic rights and duties of ministers, their deputies, the heads of independent structural sub-divisions of the central apparatus and the heads of enterprises and organisations are defined by acts of the government, that is, decrees of the Council of Ministers. Kozlov, op. cit., p. 114.

ministers, have powers of definition of the functions of lower-level officials.¹ This is an area where one would expect some decentralisation. Once this decentralisation occurs one might expect greater PPO involvement. Thus when a Lvov secondary school party organisation was unhappy with the distribution of information on intra-school affairs and the number of meetings that were being held in the school, a party meeting was held. The director gave a report (*doklad*), after which the communists offered recommendations on a better division of responsibilities between the director and head teacher (*zavuch*). The recommendations were accepted.²

Another less important aspect of personnel policies, but nevertheless one which provides some interesting insight into the role of PPO's, is the concern with *soumestitel'stvo*. This means taking two jobs at the same time. At times, particularly in the years 1957 and 1958, there have been campaigns against *soumestitel'stvo*, with

1 The minister has the right to distribute functions among his deputy ministers, while ministerial acts distribute functions among the individual officials of the central apparatus and subordinate organisations, confirm *nomenklatury* (both the positions on the *nomenklatura* and the organisation responsible for the listed positions), and define positions requiring special qualifications. *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 1/72, art. 2, para. 7; Kozlov, op. cit., p. 113.

2 *P.zh.*, 23/66, p. 54.

PPO's expected to lead the way. In 1958 the PPO of Perm State University was expected to ensure that teachers did not interfere with their teaching duties by taking other jobs.¹ At one stage in the mid-50's nearly 50% of the scientific workers in the Ukraine worked in two or more institutions. The director of the Institute of Machine Management of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences only managed to visit the institute a couple of times weekly. PPO's were criticised for doing nothing about the situation.²

However *sovместitel'stvo* is not something to be banned altogether. Particularly with the emphasis in recent years on research in educational institutions, the Soviet authorities have realised the need to in fact encourage lecturers to undertake research work and vice versa. Since 1956 the rectors of tertiary institutions have had the right to authorise faculty members to supplement their regular work with work in other institutions.³ Presumably the campaign just mentioned was a reaction against excesses following the granting of this right. Since that time the process has been increasingly subject to regulation. In 1972 the Council of Ministers issued a decree in which scientific workers were encouraged to

1 *P.zh.*, 1/58, p. 20.

2 *Kom. Ukrainy*, 8/55, pp. 48-49.

3 Zaleski, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

undertake *soumestitel'stvo* in educational institutions. However they were to receive only a half to a quarter of a regular lecturer's salary, and no more than 2% of the positions in an institution could be occupied by people from other institutions.¹ The increasing regulation of the practice would seem to have reduced the role of PPO's in this area. There has been no mention of it in recent years, despite the fact that *soumestitel'stvo* is still very common.²

It is interesting that PPO involvement appears to have been reduced as the practice of *soumestitel'stvo* became increasingly subject to regulation. The explanation for this might simply be that with the authorities' more positive attitude towards it, PPO control is no longer as necessary. However, one would expect that the regulations would be very much open to abuse, leaving the PPO the simple but significant task of ensuring the observance of specific regulations. The fact that there is no evidence of PPO's undertaking this task emphasises the generalist nature of their functions. They are not agencies suitable or intended for close examination of specialised, routine areas. While generalism does not exclude involvement in specific problem areas, such involvement is not routine, nor is it limited to simply registering the breaking of regulations.

1 *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 14/72, art. 73, para. 15.

2 Conversations in Moscow made it clear that most university lecturers undertake some paid research work. I spoke to one person doing an *aspirantura* in architecture. He claimed to have four other jobs and to be earning a total of about 700 roubles per month!

A far more important aspect of personnel policy is the selection, distribution and dismissal of personnel. The power of decision over who fills particular posts is of fundamental importance for control of the implementation of policies and the general control of the working collective. The role of the PPO in this area is very complicated. Again it is greatly affected by the powers of the "host" organisation - if the "host" organisation has no power over selection to and dismissal from a particular position, the PPO's influence is limited.

Formally speaking institutional leaders appear to have full powers of selection and dismissal of all but the top positions in their institutions.¹ However there are some

1 While the minister and his deputies are appointed to their positions by the Council of Ministers, the minister has the right to appoint and dismiss the staff of the apparatus. *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 7/72, art. 36, paras 7 and 10. Ministries are also responsible for the confirmation of the appointments of rectors, deputy rectors and faculty deans of subordinate tertiary educational institutions and directors of subordinate research institutes. Zaleski, op. cit., p. 303. The directors of Academy institutes are elected by the General Assembly of the relevant Academy Division with the approval of the General Assembly of the Academy and the confirmation of the Academy's Presidium. The assistant directors and the Chief Academic Secretary are appointed by the Presidium on the nomination of the director. *ibid*, p. 219. The directors of general secondary schools are appointed by the Union Republic Ministry of Education in republics without *oblast'* sub-divisions, by the Ministry of Education of autonomous republics, by *krai*, *oblast'* or *okrug* Departments of Education, or in the case of Moscow and Leningrad, by the city Department. *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, op. cit., p. 229. The deputy director for study-indoctrination work is appointed by the city or *raion* Department of Education on the suggestion of the director. *ibid*, p. 233. The directors of primary schools are appointed by the city or *raion* Department. *ibid*, pp. 232-233.

limitations on these formal powers in some institutions. School directors have the right to appoint teachers and assign them to particular posts, but only with the agreement of the local Department of Education.¹ The rectors of tertiary educational institutions and the directors of research institutes are also subject to the decisions of the special councils of the All-Union Attestation Commission (VAK). These councils are established in leading scientific and tertiary educational institutions and recommend to VAK the appointments of individuals to positions as *dotsenty* and senior scientific workers in the institutions in which they are situated as well as surrounding institutions. Confirmation to the positions of assistant and junior scientific worker is made through an order (*prikaz*) of the institutional leader on the basis of the decision of the council, on the suggestion of the relevant department or laboratory. These positions do not have to be considered by VAK.² The councils have only recently been established and exactly how they influence the personnel powers of the rector or director is not yet clear. Similarly there is no information on party influence over them.

A major informal limitation on the personnel powers of institutional leaders, and of PPO's, are the

1 *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, op. cit., pp. 232-233.

2 *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 14/75, art. 81, para. 3; 3/76, art. 14, para. 99.

nomenklatury of higher party organs. The *nomenklatura* lists the positions appointments to which must be confirmed by the higher party organ. If the higher party organ exercises this right, something of which we cannot be certain,¹ it complicates the institutional leaders' task of making appointments and dismissals. However the effect on the PPO is even greater, presumably taking away its influence altogether. Unfortunately information on the *nomenklatury* of higher party organs is extremely hard to find, especially on any non-production posts that might be listed. In 1966 the Riga *gorkom* had 662 positions on its *nomenklatura*, divided up as follows:²

| | |
|---|-------|
| Workers in party and soviet organs | 253 |
| Workers in ideological organs | 83 |
| Managerial personnel (primarily enterprise directors, chief engineers, personnel heads) | 107 |
| Workers in construction and local services | 61 |
| Workers in administrative, trade and financial organs | 85 |
| Workers in educational institutions | 71 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 660 |

1 In 1954 the head of a *raikom* Organisational Department informed *Partiinaia zhizn'* that there were too many positions on the *raikom's nomenklatura* (the number quoted was 450) and that most appointments were dealt with "formalistically", without any details been given on what this means. *P.zh.*, 10/54, p. 65; see also, 1/56, p. 7.

2 *Kom.*, 1/66, p. 36. As is often the case with Soviet statistics, the sub-totals given do not add up to the total claimed.

Most positions on *raikom*, *gorkom* and *obkom nomenklatury* are the heads of local institutions.¹ One would not expect PPO's to have power over appointments to these positions. What is interesting is the degree to which the *nomenklatury* include workers other than the institutional head. The lists change according to the situation at the time and the importance of the institution.² However it appears that the most important leading positions in an institution are on a *raikom* or *gorkom nomenklatura*.³

1 See the list given in *P.zh.*, 10/54, p. 65 and the *nomenklatury* in the Smolensk Archive, WKP33, 1928; WKP215, 1929.

2 *P.zh.*, 10/54, p. 65.

3 Deputy directors, chief engineers and the heads of personnel departments of enterprises and the deputy chairmen of collective farms and rural Soviets are listed. *Kom.*, 1/66, p. 36; *P.zh.*, 3/55, p. 57; 10/54, p. 65. There is confusion over the heads of structural sub-divisions of enterprises and institutions. A 1954 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* article claimed that brigade leaders and farm heads on collective farms were on *raikom nomenklatury*. A later article in the same journal agreed that this was the formal situation, but claimed that in fact *raikomy* showed little concern for such positions. *P.zh.*, 10/54, p. 65; 1/56, p. 7. *Partiinaiia zhizn' Kazakhstana* in 1969 claimed that these positions were on *raikom nomenklatury*. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 9/69, p. 28. However it appears that positions as shop heads in industrial enterprises are dealt with by the PPO. *P.zh.*, 3/55, p. 57. These details are unfortunately of little use in deciding on the situation in non-production organisations.

The direct information available on positions in non-production institutions is very slight. One report says that 20% of the workers of the Belorussian Design-Technical Institute *Belbyttekhproekt* are on the *raikom's uchëtnaia nomenklatura* (this refers to the list of positions notification of appointments to which must be sent to the *raikom*, although the *raikom* itself is not involved in confirming the actual appointment itself).¹ There is also a complaint from the secretary of the PPO of the Kazakh branch of the All-Union Academy of Construction and Architecture about communists who think too highly of themselves, considering that once they are on an *obkom* or Central Committee *nomenklatura* they are beyond *raikom* control.² Unfortunately in neither case is any idea given of what positions might be on these lists. A 1954 *Partiinaia zhizn'* report lists some non-production positions on *raikom nomenklatury* in the Altai *krai* - newspaper and printing officials, accountants of *raion* offices of the Ministry of Supply and instructors of *raion* departments of the Central Statistical Administration.³ A 1929 *nomenklatura* in the Smolensk Archive makes the *obkom* responsible for confirming the appointment of the deans of the Pedagogical and Medical Faculties and the pro-rector

1 *Kom. Belorussii*, 6/69, p. 63.

2 *P.zh. Kaz.*, 9/61, p. 34.

3 *P.zh.*, 10/54, p. 65.

and vice rector of Smolensk University. The chief accountants of the *gubernia* offices of Gosbank, the Agricultural Bank and the Communal Bank were on the *gubkom*'s *nomenklatura*, while the department heads of the *gubernia* Insurance Office, the financial controllers, inspectors and the chief cashier of the *gubernia* Finance Department and Gosbank office, the head of the Inspectors' Department of the Agricultural Bank, and the members of the administration of the Yartsevsk Mill Union were all on the *nomenklatura* of the *ukom* (*uezdnyi komitet*; roughly equivalent to a *raikom*) or *raikom*.¹

This information is both very old and very scattered. It is fortunate that there is considerably more information on the *nomenklatury* of the PPO's themselves, although none is available on the *nomenklatury* of administrative PPO's. This should not be taken to mean that *nomenklatury* do not exist in this category, or that these PPO's are not involved in personnel affairs. There are numerous references to show that they are closely involved in this area of concern. The *nomenklatury* for educational and research institutions include all leading personnel with the exception of the head

1 *ibid*, WKP33.

of the institution himself.¹

Nomenklatury refer to positions appointments to and removals from which must be confirmed by the relevant party organisation. However many reports suggest that such formally defined lists of positions are somewhat redundant. The vast majority of reports express the view

1 The *nomenklatura* of the PPO of the Tashkent Institute for Engineers for the Irrigation and Mechanisation of Agriculture lists the members of the Academic Council, the selection (*konkursnaia*), admission and subject commissions, the pro-rectors, department heads and the leaders of social organisations. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 1/4/72, p. 2. In the Kiev Teachers' College department heads and deans are chosen with the participation and agreement of the party committee. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26/1/72, p. 2. The party committee of the Kalinin Polytechnical Institute also examines applicants for the positions of department head and dean, while the faculty party buros do the same for senior lecturers, assistants and research workers. *P.zh.*, 24/71, p. 38. The *nomenklatura* of the party committee of the Moscow Engineering-Economics Institute includes the pro-rectors, the faculty deans and sub-deans, the heads of all ancillary services serving the institute as a whole, department heads, teachers in the Social Science departments, all professorships and the heads of research laboratories and departments. All other positions are listed on the *nomenklatury* of subordinate party buros. Samsonov, N: *Partkom vuza*, Izd. "Moskovskii rabochii", Moscow, 1973, p. 10. *Nomenklatury* of research PPO's usually include such positions as deputy directors, heads, deputy heads and academic secretaries of sectors and heads of departments. *Kom.*, 11/72, p. 62; *Kom.Ukrainy*, 6/71, p. 88.

that PPO's should confirm *all* appointments, transfers and dismissals.¹

Confirmation means that once a decision has been made by the relevant authorities a general party meeting, or more usually a party buro or committee meeting, must approve the appointment. *Partiinaia zhizn'* gives a rather confusing idea of the process in reply to a 1973 letter from a member of the party buro of a research institute about the role of the party organisation in the *konkurs* method of making appointments. (In many academic and scientific institutions a number of positions, usually the heads of structural sub-divisions, are filled by competition (*konkurs*), that is, the director names someone to the position only after a majority of members of the Academic or Scientific Council or special selection (*konkursnaia*) commission have voted for the candidate in a secret ballot). He asks specifically whether the PPO has

1 Such statements are made for all categories of institutions. Among the research institutes of the Leninskii raikom in Moscow there is no shifting of scientific personnel without the institute PPO's giving their opinions. *P.zh.*, 22/71, p. 30. Similar statements are made about such educational institutions as the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute and Moscow State University. *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2; *P.zh.*, 20/76, p. 36; hospitals such as the Podol Central raion hospital and the Kalinin oblast' clinical hospital. *P.zh.*, 12/72, p. 52; *Kom.*, 4/73, p. 30; and ministries like the All-Union Ministry of Railways and the RSFSR Ministries of Agriculture and Procurements. *P.zh.*, 4/66, p. 44; 9/69, p. 52; 12/73, p. 20. *Pravda Vostoka* declared in 1972 that school party organisations must confirm the appointments of all new teachers. *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2.

to confirm the candidate after his election. The journal concludes a long reply rather confusingly with the statement that there is no necessity for the party organisation to confirm the appointment of the selected candidate. This is strange considering that the positions usually decided by *konkurs* are listed on the *nomenklatury* of research PPO's.

However there is much about the journal's reply that suggests that confirmation would be rather redundant anyway, since the PPO would have had ample opportunity to express its point of view on any particular appointment long before it came to the confirmation stage. The journal says that mistakes are unlikely to be made in the selection process if the institute's leadership confers with the party organisation, presumably before the event.¹

Other reports, while never being specific, make it clear that communist members of councils and commissions responsible for making appointments act as representatives

1 *P.zh.*, 12/73, pp. 42-43.

of the PPO during the selection process.¹

In ministries the collegiums have considerable personnel powers. As a rule personnel appointments and dismissals can be made by a minister only after examination of the matter by the collegium. Collegiums also have *nomenklatury* of positions for which they are specifically responsible.² The role of collegiums in this area could

1 The article just cited states that occasionally the party organisation can recommend someone for appointment itself, the recommendation being presented by the communist members of the council or commission conducting the *konkurs*. *P.zh.*, 12/73, pp. 42-43. The party organisation of the Arkhangel Medical Institute has representatives who take an active part in the work of the commission for the filling of teaching positions and the granting of academic ranks. Barkusov, op. cit., p. 69. The party committee of the Tashkent Institute of Rail Transport Engineers influences the work of the selection commission through its communist membership. *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2. *Kommunist (Vilnius)* speaks of the role of the party members in the work of the Scientific Council and the selection commission for the appointment of new workers in the Lithuanian Institute of Economics. *Kom. (Vilnius)*, 6/72, p. 33. Party representatives actively influence the work of the personnel commission of the Institute of Mathematics. Ianovskii, op. cit., p. 102.

2 However the *nomenklatury* are defined by the minister. They usually include such positions as *glavk*, administration and department heads, deputy heads and chief engineers, the head of the ministerial office, the chief accountant of the ministry, the directors and chief engineers of the biggest enterprises and the directors of research institutes. In the case of the Lithuanian Ministry of Construction the collegium decides its *nomenklatura* for itself. Details are not available on the procedure with regard to these positions; almost certainly the ministers have at least the right of confirmation. Davitnidze, op. cit., pp. 99-103.

be an important one. Therefore a report that the party committee of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine Construction works together with the collegium is worthy of note.¹ Another report goes into more detail. After the Moldavian Central Committee had criticised the personnel situation in the Moldavian Ministry of Food Industry the ministry's PPO had a meeting to consider the criticism. The matter was then considered in a widened collegium meeting, after which measures were taken to improve the situation.² The implication is strong that the party organisation had some direct influence over the collegium.

PPO's also use the usual powers of the right of control in personnel matters. They can hear reports from institutional leaders on personnel matters.³ The information gained from such reports is supplemented by the investigations of various party commissions established for personnel purposes. Educational PPO's, such as that in Tartu State University, have control commissions for

1 *Pravda*, 29/11/71, p. 2.

2 *Kom. Moldavii*, 8/67, pp. 60-61.

3 In 1961 the party buro of the Irkutsk *oblast'* office of Gosbank heard a report (*doklad*) from the head of the Personnel Department. *P.zh.*, 10/61, p. 56. A *Pravda* editorial in 1967 declared that ministerial PPO's could hear from (*zaslushivali*) *glavk* and department heads on how they select, assign and use personnel and how they prepare reserves for promotion. *Pravda*, 16/6/67, p. 2.

the selection and distribution of personnel, as do those, such as that of the Institute of Mathematics of the All-Union Academy of Sciences, in research institutes.¹

The PPO's are then able to make formal recommendations. Thus when the party members in one school noticed the keen attitude of one non-party teacher, they recommended to the administration, with good effect, that she be promoted.² The party organisation of the All-Union Research Institute for the Application of Polymer Materials to Irrigation and Water Use goes further. Sometimes the administration changes its mind on the appointment and transfer of scientific personnel on the party organisation's insistence (*po nastoianiiu*).³

What is it that PPO's are concerned with in their involvement in the appointment of personnel? Soviet sources stress their responsibility for ensuring that people

1 Ianovskii, op. cit., p. 102; *Kom.Estonii*, 9/71, p. 9.

2 *P.zh.*, 20/63, p. 51. A Soviet book on PPO's declares that since they are in a good position to know the capabilities of workers down to the lowest levels, they should take the initiative in suggesting people for promotion. It also claims that voluntary social work keenly undertaken is a positive factor that will be taken into account by PPO's in recommending people for promotion. Khaldeev, op. cit., p. 234.

3 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 9/73, p. 52.

are of high quality and suitable for the positions to which they have been appointed. For example, bureaucratic PPO's are expected to ensure that administrative officials have high levels of education, technical ability and experience; that the type of work suits their experience and qualifications; and that as much as possible younger people are introduced into positions of responsibility.¹ Particular emphasis is laid on the importance of using trained personnel in jobs suitable to their qualifications.²

So far the discussion has been concerned with the appointment and transfer of personnel. However the PPO's concern does not stop there. It is expected to continue after appointments have been made. Firstly, PPO's are expected to be concerned with raising the qualifications of leading rank-and-file workers. We have already described the extensive party indoctrination networks, with their

1 *P.zh.*, 14/54, p. 21; 19/63, pp. 40-41; 4/66, pp. 43-44.

2 The PPO of the Riazan *oblast'* library advised the administration not to use administrative workers in library positions. Barkusov, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96. It is also considered the responsibility of research PPO's to get specialists out of bureaucratic jobs. *P.zh.*, 1/56, p. 21. The party committee of the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute opposed the appointment of a teacher with a background in applied economics as head of the Department of Political Economy. Apparently in this case support for the party committee from higher party authorities was the deciding factor. *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2. Ideological considerations were presumably of considerable significance in this case.

involvement in administrative, technical and scientific, as well as ideological training. However PPO's are not limited to party indoctrination; they are also able to involve themselves in a more indirect way in the formal professional training and qualifications of workers. Thus in 1961 *Partiinaia zhizn'* reported that school PPO's were more and more often looking at questions of the professional qualifications of teachers.¹ In 1958 the same journal criticised research PPO's that pay insufficient attention to the preparation and qualifications of scientific personnel.²

PPO's have the usual means available to them for undertaking these tasks. They hold institutional leaders responsible for their performance in this area. In 1974 at a party meeting in the North Donets branch of the All-Union Research and Construction Institute of Chemical Machine Construction communists severely criticised

1 *P.zh.*, 2/61, p. 38.

2 *P.zh.*, 11/58, p. 15. *Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana* considers that a low number of candidates and doctors of science in an institute is a sign of a lack of concern on the part of the institute's PPO for the qualifications of scientific workers. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 3/62, p. 8. The party buro of the *Mossovet* Academic Theatre is said to keep all questions of the professional training of actors at the centre of its attention, while in 1961 the editorial board and the party organisation of the West Kazakh *oblast'* newspaper were criticised for paying insufficient attention to the journalistic professionalism of journalists. *Sov. Kirgiziia*, 8/2/73, p. 4; *P.zh.Kaz.*, 2/61, pp. 111-112.

the director and his deputy for scientific work for the unsatisfactory preparation of scientific personnel.¹ In 1972 the party committee of the Kuibyshev Aviation Institute heard a report (*otché't*) from the pro-rector for scientific work on the fulfilment of plans for the preparation of scientific-teaching personnel. This party organisation also has a control commission for raising the effectiveness of scientific work and the preparation of scientific personnel.²

One of the most important means available is the exercise of party influence over the deliberations of non-party commissions concerned with qualifications. The most important organisation as far as academic qualifications are concerned is the All-Union Attestation Commission (VAK). I have already made some mention of its involvement in recommending appointments. It is also responsible for the granting of academic degrees. In the past Academic and Scientific Councils were the immediately responsible organs, although subject to the control of VAK.³ However attestation councils were then established specifically for the examination of applicants for degrees. They were established for

1 *P.zh.*, 24/74, p. 72.

2 *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 10/72, p. 64. In 1968 all the institutes of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences had control groups which examined the preparation of scientific personnel. *Kom.* 1/68, p. 8.

3 *Vysshaia shkola*, op. cit., p. 326.

single disciplines and were expected to provide a more specialised, and therefore more knowledgeable, examination. However there were considerable difficulties resulting from a shortage of qualified people to become members of the commissions. VAK issued detailed instructions on the minimum numbers of doctors and candidates of science in the particular discipline that were required to be members of the councils. However with the great proliferation of councils it proved impossible to find sufficient people.¹ Therefore in 1975 and 1976 new procedures were announced, by which the councils were concentrated in the largest and most important academic and scientific centres. They are formed on the petition of the Academy of Sciences or the relevant ministry. Doctors' degrees are granted by the Presidium of VAK on the basis of a recommendation from the special attestation council and the conclusions of an expert council set up within VAK and made up of specialists working in VAK on a part-time basis. A candidate's degree is granted by decision of the special council. VAK has the right to control the granting of a candidate's degree and can change the special council's decision.²

1 In 1974 Rostov State University had 15 councils, of which almost half did not meet the minimum membership requirements. *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 12/6/74, p. 12.

2 *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 14/75, art. 81; 3/76, art. 14.

One would expect to find evidence of considerable PPO influence over the activities of the councils. The granting of degrees is a process which suffers from considerable abuse. The case most publicised in the Soviet Union concerned the chairman of the Council for Economic Sciences of the Yakutsk State University. His numerous misdeeds included taking the thesis of an *aspirant* from the Moscow Teachers' College for which he had been appointed examiner, giving it to one of his students for transcription, and then arranging for the "new" thesis to be accepted by his council.¹ One would expect PPO's to be involved in preventing such abuse. The granting of degrees can also be politically sensitive. One person I spoke to in Moscow was

1 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 5/6/74, p. 11; *P.zh.*, 19/73, pp. 50-51. A. Pravdin, in his interview with M. Matthews, claims that senior party workers often arrange to have someone write dissertations for them. To have a degree can provide insurance against future political problems, since with a degree one can always find an academic position. Pravdin, A., interviewed by M. Matthews: "Inside the CPSU Central Committee", *Survey*, vol. 12, no. 4, Autumn, 1974, p. 102. In 1964 *Partiinaiia zhizn' Kazakhstana* reported, without any criticism, that one K.D. Diiarov had been granted a Candidate of Agricultural Sciences degree by an expanded meeting of the Academic Council of the Alma-Ata Zoological Institute. Although he did not work in any institute, had never done an *aspirantura* or even written a dissertation, he had worked in agriculture for many years as an *obkom* and ministerial official. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 2/64, p. 66. Agursky claims that abuse is particularly common in the defence industry, since the secrecy surrounding that industry means that VAK has no right to examine applicants for degrees. Agursky, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

of the opinion that the reason one of his students was finding it difficult to have her excellent candidate's dissertation accepted was that she was Jewish. This should increase the likelihood of PPO involvement.

However there is not overwhelming evidence of PPO involvement. It is true that the Council of Ministers' Statute on attestation councils declares:

In the membership of the council with a deciding vote, according to established procedures, are included representatives of the party and trade union organisations,¹

and that "socio-political" references from the party buro of the Moscow Economics-Engineering Institute are required before a dissertation can even be submitted for examination.² One must assume that PPO's exercise influence over the work of the councils through the members of the councils who are communists. However I have no positive statements to that effect. When the case of the Council for the Economic Sciences in Yakutsk State University was considered by the Committee for Party Control, the lack of control exercised by the university's party committee, and local party organs, was mentioned, but

1 *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 3/76, art. 14, para. 14.

2 Samsonov, op. cit., p. 10.

no party workers were specifically criticised or reprimanded.¹

One complication for PPO's in their control of the councils is that they are situated only in leading institutions. Is the "host" PPO responsible for control of the council even when it is working in another institution, or does the PPO of the institution where the council is working at the time assume responsibility? It is not clear whether the council's members are drawn only from the "parent" institution. However membership is derived, is each communist member of a council under the control of his own PPO, or the PPO of the institution in which the council is working at the time? Even with the great increase in contacts between PPO's in recent years these problems of overlapping jurisdiction probably lead to a decreasing involvement of the work of PPO's in the work of the councils and the increasing involvement of higher party organs. This would be in keeping with the

1 In a similar, if much earlier case, the party's role was quite inadequate. In 1955 the Council of the Agronomic Faculties of the Omsk Agricultural Institute rejected a candidate's dissertation. But the director of the institute was the *aspirant's* supervisor. He arranged for the head of the *obkom* Department of Science and Culture to support the dissertation at its second defence, the result being that it was accepted. The institute's party buro was criticised for doing nothing about this illegal behaviour, and for ignoring the lack of qualification of the council to examine dissertations in some branches of science. *P.zh.*, 17/55, pp. 62-65.

apparent centralisation of control that is implicit in the formation of the special councils. However the new arrangements are very recent. Before any definite conclusions can be reached some further empirical evidence is required.

The final area of PPO involvement in personnel is an on-going evaluation of the work of individuals. Academic and scientific organisations have formally established organisations and procedures for the periodic examination of performance which can result in dismissal. It appears that usually an individual's performance is evaluated every three (for junior workers) or five (for senior workers) years by a special "attestation" commission (presumably different from the council responsible for academic degrees, but also sometimes known as a *konkurs* commission, presumably the same as is responsible for recommending new appointments). Final confirmation of the commission's decision is made by the head of the organisation or its Council. A 1974 Decree of the Council of Ministers describes the formation of commissions for the attestation of teachers from general secondary schools. They are formed under the Ministries of Education of Union and Autonomous Republics not having *oblast'* divisions or otherwise under *krai*, *oblast'* and capital city Education Departments. The commissions must have representatives of party, trade union and *komsomol* organisations in their

membership. They make recommendations to the heads of the organisations which formed them on the granting of honorific titles or dismissal depending on the individual teacher's performance.¹ Evidently in schools formal evaluation by attestation commissions is quite highly centralised. Although the decree specifies party representation, there is presumably little room for the direct involvement of school PPO's.

However tertiary educational institutions have their own attestation commissions. In 1954 the All-Union Ministry of Culture issued an instruction on how to conduct the attestation of senior laboratory workers in tertiary educational institutions. The attestation takes place once every three years and is to be undertaken by a commission consisting of the deputy director of the institution for academic and scientific work, the dean of the faculty, the head of the department, the head of the institution's Personnel Department, and representatives of the party and trade union organisations. The commission takes into account such factors as academic work completed, participation in scientific work, assistance given to students, work done to improve one's own qualifications, the raising of one's ideo-political level, and social work done. The commission can recommend promotion, demotion or

1

Sobranie postanovlenii, 11/74, art. 53.

dismissal, its recommendation being decided by a majority vote and then confirmed by the director of the institution.¹

There are cases of individuals failing to be re-appointed to their positions for apparently "technical" reasons. Although *Literaturnaia gazeta* complained loudly about the procedure used in adopting the 1972 decision of the Scientific Council of the Leningrad Institute of Oncology not to re-appoint the head of the Laboratory of the Physiopathology of Tumorous Growths to his post, it appears that the decision was made on the grounds that for fifteen years the scientist's work had produced no practical results, not because of any internal "political" considerations.² However clearly the opportunity exists for the process to be used for "political" reasons. Thus, when the Academic Council of the Institute of Linguistics of the All-Union Academy of Sciences considered the re-appointment of I.A. Mel'chuk to his post, it voted 19 to 2 (with 3 abstentions) against. This was following the publication in "The New York Times" of a letter by him disassociating himself from the campaign against Sakharov and protesting about the gaoling of Kovalëv.³

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- 1 *Vysshaia shkola*, op. cit., pp. 306-308.
Apparently some time since 1954 the power of confirmation has been given to the Academic Council.
- 2 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 16/8/72, p. 12; 1/11/72, p. 11.
- 3 An unpublished "Open Letter" to his colleagues by I.A. Mel'chuk.

The PPO exercises the same sort of influence over the commissions and the councils in this process as in any similar processes. Just as the communist members of Councils influence their work, so the communist members of attestation commissions are said to actively influence their work.¹ The secretary of the party buro of the Magadan institute *Dal'stroiproekt* considers that simply having representation on the commissions is not enough. He says:

Obviously the party buro must take upon itself, together with the directorate, the formation of the attestation commissions and the day-to-day control of the objectivity of the approach to the attestation of workers.²

As with new appointments, so with re-appointments the PPO has the right to make apparently binding recommendations in its own right. A book on the Moscow Engineering-Economics Institute says:

Transfers in the faculties, research subdivisions and other service divisions of the institute, re-appointment to positions, and also the granting of academic degrees to the institute's workers can only take place with

1 Ianovskii, op. cit., p. 102.

2 Khaldeev, op. cit., p. 108.

the granting of a positive social-political reference from the party committee or party buro. Without a social-political reference the documents for the participation of lecturers and scientific workers in the *konkurs* process will not be accepted.¹

One of *Literaturnaia gazeta*'s complaints about the dismissal in the Institute of Oncology was that the vote went against re-appointment despite the fact that a positive reference had been given by the institute's *treugol'nik* (director, PPO secretary and trade union

1 Samsonov, op. cit., p. 10.

chairman).¹

1 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 16/8/72, p. 12. Allen Kroncher has written an interesting article on socialist competition in the Plekhanov Institute of Economics in which such references play a part. Kroncher, A: "Socialist Competition at the Plekhanov Institute", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, 480/76, Nov. 23, 1976. Basing his analysis on an article by B. Mochalov, the director of the institute, in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, he claims that a negative evaluation of an individual's performance in socialist competition can result in failure to be re-appointed to his position. He stresses that it is the party buros of the institute's faculties and departments which make these evaluations. In fact Mochalov says that only in the Departments of the Social Sciences is the evaluation of the work of lecturers made by faculty party buros, in the form of references which are still only granted with the agreement of the deans of the faculties. *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 2/73, pp. 60-61. I have already made the point in Chapter One that the Departments of the Social Sciences are under much closer party control than others. Also, while it is true that Mochalov expresses doubt about the effectiveness of the usual *konkurs* system, his main objection being that it takes place only once every five years, and speaks vaguely of the new system of socialist competition providing the opportunity for "a change in the system of re-election of professors and lecturers", the details he gives on the new system differ little from the old. Evaluation is apparently still made every five years by faculties and their *konkurs* commissions, which can recommend to the Academic Council not to re-appoint. *ibid*, pp. 59-61. The only apparent difference from the old system is that definite indicators for socialist competition, of the type described in Chapter One, are used in evaluation. The old system could be used no less than the new, as I.A. Mel'chuk found to his cost, for removing politically unacceptable individuals. Therefore the points made by Kroncher about the new system leading to tighter party control in the institute should be considered with some caution. This is not to deny the basic point that Soviet institutions have the opportunity to remove individuals unacceptable for either "technical" or political reasons, and that PPO's play an important part in this.

It is impossible to determine whether the PPO influences the actual voting in the councils once it has given its reference. The voting is supposed to be secret. However it is admitted even in Soviet sources that the ballot often shows signs of having been manipulated.¹ However no details are given on how this might occur. This makes it impossible to determine the role of the PPO.

Nevertheless there are ample opportunities for PPO influence over the re-appointment process. That the process is used for politically motivated job discrimination can be seen in the case of Mel'chuk.²

The re-appointment process gives the best opportunity for the removal of undesirable personnel. However it is rather formal and does not occur often. PPO's have far more flexible means at their disposal for at least evaluating the work performance of individuals. The most popular in recent times has been the hearing of reports from individual party members in party buro, committee and general party meetings. In the last chapter, in describing the right of control, I concentrated on the

1 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 16/8/72, p. 12.

2 For further evidence of politically-motivated job discrimination, against Jews in the defence industry and overseas appointments, see Agursky, op. cit., pp. 26-27 and Myagkov, A: *Inside the KGB, an expose by an officer of the Third Directorate*, Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., Richmond, Surrey, 1976, p. 38.

hearing of reports from institutional leaders. However in recent years, with the increased emphasis on the "party style of work" and the personal accountability of individuals, great use has been made of hearing reports from rank-and-file communists on their production performance.¹

PPO's also use the other powers of the right of control, to establish investigative commissions and to offer recommendations to the administration, in their control of individuals' production performance. Thus when a number of complaints started coming in about the state of work and behaviour of one of the leading workers of the Institute of Gold and Rare Metals, the party buro recommended that the administration talk to him. When he did not react, the party buro established a commission and directed it to look into the matter. It uncovered serious shortcomings. The party buro considered the commission's findings and made certain unspecified recommendations to the directorate.² The recommendations probably included some

1 The two communists who gave reports (*otchéty*) on their administrative performances to a party meeting of the Uritsky *raipotrebsoiuz* (*raion* Consumers' Union) were asked many questions by their fellow communists, including how they were working to improve themselves and how they were influencing non-party people. *P.zh.*, 9/69, p. 49.

2 *Pravda*, 9/2/72, p. 2.

administrative penalty, perhaps even dismissal. After a rather obscure dispute in the Odessa Polytechnical Institute between a professor and an engineer over the engineer's new invention, the institute's party committee blamed the professor, upon which the rector dismissed him from his post as head of the Research Department. Similarly, after another dispute between two professors over plagiarism, the party committee examined the matter and as a result one of the professors was dismissed from his post as a department head.¹

Involvement in personnel matters appears to be one of the bellweathers of PPO power. The evidence suggests that it has increased considerably since 1965 and particularly since 1971.

1 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 28/3/73, p. 12;
Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, 29/5/74, p. 3.
 As mentioned in Chapter One party discipline can also be used in such cases. The *glavk* head in the RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction who failed to respond to the party committee's demands to improve the work of the *glavk* was given a party reprimand. *P.zh.*, 8/73, p. 39. If the PPO feels that the individual to be attacked is too powerful for it, it will turn to higher authorities for assistance. When the PPO of the All-Union State Committee for Construction (*Gosstroi*) considered that a deputy chairman of the State Committee was behaving badly towards his subordinates, he was warned by the party committee. When there was no improvement, he was reported to and warned by the Moscow *gorkom*. Eventually he was given a party reprimand by the Committee for Party Control and removed from his post. *P.zh.*, 3/69, p. 46.

How compatible is this power with the staff generalist role? The Western line-staff models on which the staff generalist model is based curiously ignore personnel matters. Personnel policy is of fundamental importance for the staff generalist role, since a concern with the overall and long-term efficient operation of the line organisation presupposes a concern with the quality of personnel. However the tone of especially Sampson's and even Golembiewski's prescriptions on staff power suggest that they would be of the opinion that the powers of PPO's in the personnel area are too extensive. The right to vet all personnel appointments before they are made, indeed even to prevent the consideration of applicants for positions, the right to influence the granting of qualifications and titles, and to initiate the dismissal of personnel involves the PPO very closely in the "operational" activities of the line organisation. Sampson would probably see the proper staff role in personnel matters going no further than a general concern for recruitment policy and the training of workers and the ability to draw general conclusions on the success or otherwise of general policies and training from the specific problems of individual workers. While he might grant the staff agency the right to participate in defining the general type of person that should be recruited into the organisation, he certainly would not give it the right to decide on the suitability of each and every applicant for a position.

However it could be said that PPO involvement in personnel matters is in the spirit, if not the strict form of the staff generalist role, if it were used to achieve staff generalist aims, if it were used for the general improvement of the operations of the "host" organisation.

The Western orientation of the staff generalist models on which the methodological orientation of this thesis has been based makes it difficult to adequately analyse the significance of the more politically-oriented involvement of PPO's in personnel matters. Whether this sort of involvement could be said to contribute to the achievement of staff generalist aims depends on subjectively held organisational values. The top party authorities, and their PPO representatives, are presumably of the opinion that politically-motivated job discrimination contributes to the more effective operation of individual institutions and the Soviet system as a whole. Most Western observers would be of the opposite opinion.

These difficulties do not apply in cases where PPO involvement is apparently motivated by "technical" considerations, the ability of individuals to function successfully in their operational roles. Of course this in itself does not constitute a staff generalist involvement. It should be the responsibility of the line hierarchy to

ensure that individual workers are able and willing to undertake their operational tasks. The staff generalist agency should be interested in individual cases only to the extent that they provide an insight into the general problems in personnel policy and the implementation of organisational goals.

There has been little in this section to suggest that this is the concern of the PPO's. There were some brief and vague reports on their general concern for the qualifications of workers, but the great bulk of the powers and concerns described are directed towards the close control of specific workers in specific situations with little long-term perspective evident. If, as it appears, one of the main aims of the 1971 widened application of the right of control was to give PPO's the power to hold all workers individually accountable for operational performance, this tendency is increasing under official sponsorship. This raises serious questions about the staff generalist role of PPO's, since it appears that non-staff generalist methods of operation are being encouraged in one of the most important areas of PPO activity.¹

1 It could be said that close control of personnel is necessary for the successful implementation of long-term policies, that it is therefore a necessary foundation for a staff generalist role. This will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on ministerial PPO's. There we will find particular emphasis placed on the accountability of each worker before the PPO for his role in the implementation of the economic reforms. However I come to the conclusion in that chapter that although the PPO's might have staff generalist aims, their means, such as this control of individuals' performance, are not staff generalist and could well lead to their lack of success.

Thus, while this section has made evident the major importance of the PPO in the operations of the "host" organisation, it has cast some doubts on its staff generalist role, the central theme of this thesis.

3. Operational performance

The final category of PPO production concern is the operational performance of the "host" organisation. This does not mean the simple measuring of the effectiveness of performance, but includes providing the setting for performance. Thus we have to consider the planning process and the material conditions in which production takes place. We then have to consider the concern of PPO's with the actual operations of the "production" process, including the links of the "host" organisation with outside organisations. This is particularly important in the case of administrative institutions, since they themselves are not directly involved in "production". There is the relatively limited matter of the internal administrative procedures of the institutions themselves to be considered, but most of their "production" concerns are centred in subordinate production enterprises.

(a) Planning

Centralised planning is probably the most fundamental feature of the Soviet administrative and economic

system. It is an enormously complicated matter, and one that appears to become more complicated as time goes by. However for the purposes of the present discussion we can ignore most of the complexities and speak in simple terms of a highly centralised system in which all production and all financial and material expenditure are determined and directed by a centrally established plan.¹

Zaleski describes the general stages of the planning process in the following terms. It begins with the transmission of centrally determined general directives to lower-level organisations. As the general directives pass down through the hierarchies they are broken down into more and more specific tasks for each lower-level organisation. These lower-level organisations then draw up detailed plans for the sections of the general directives for which they are responsible. These detailed plans go up through the hierarchy, being consolidated into a combined plan which is approved at the top level and then transmitted back through the hierarchies to the "producing" organisations as obligatory production tasks.²

1 In the chapter on ministerial PPO's I will go into some detail on recent changes in the planning process. While these are of enormous political, administrative and economic significance, they do not change the essential nature of the centrally planned system and so will not be discussed here.

2 Zaleski, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

All the organisations with which we are concerned are subject to higher planning authorities. Educational, research, hospital and cultural institutions will usually be at the bottom of the hierarchy. This does not mean that they have no role to play in the planning process - they are largely responsible for drawing up the detailed plans setting out how they will fulfil their section of the tasks set out in the general directives. They will be helped and closely supervised in this by their ministries. Ministries have a particularly important role to play in planning, because they are responsible for working up entire plans for the development of their branch, in keeping with the rather general centrally determined directives. However these directives still come to the ministries from above, and there are agencies standing above the ministries in the planning process with considerable powers in the detail of branch planning.

Zaleski goes on to make a crucial statement about the nature of the planning process. He is speaking specifically about science planning, but sees the statement as being generally applicable:

As is the case for general planning, the distinctions or stages represent only a first approximation. In fact, planning done by higher and lower organs is generally simultaneous, and the directives

and approvals are often replaced by bargaining and mutual agreement.

It appears that through this bargaining process, less important projects are often included in the Plan, since these require fewer targets and are relatively easy to execute.¹

At other places in his book he makes clear what has been said by many different writers, that the planning process is by no means as centralised as one might at first think. Speaking of the institutes of the Academies of Science, he says that it appears that they have substantial freedom in determining their activities. It appears that there is no really comprehensive centralised planning, that the central plan is little more than a simple sum of all the

1 ibid.

different projects suggested by different institutes.¹

The freedom appears to continue into the plan fulfilment stage. Adjustments to plans during the period of their fulfilment are a perennial feature of the Soviet system. Often these adjustments are determined from above to the detriment of the efficiency of the producing organisation.² However the producing organisations them-

1 *ibid*, p. 271. Agursky's statement about planning in the Research Institute of Machine Building Technology (*NIITM*) supports Zaleski's view. He writes: "The list of projects (*tematika*) of *NIITM* was formed spontaneously, not according to a plan. It reflected the combined results of the activities of individual workers, the orders of enterprises and only partly planned projects, set by decisions of the All-Union Council of Ministers, by coordinated plans, etc." Agursky, *op. cit.*, p. 47. Raymond Hutchings, writing of the All-Union Research Institute for the Technology of Aesthetics (*VNIITE*) says: "*VNIITE* is apparently its own master in the choice of projects to be included in its plan. If that is so, the word 'plan' in a Soviet context is even a misnomer. Rather, *VNIITE* is drawing up its programme of work for the coming year, as any Western business firm would do". Hutchings, R: *Soviet Science, Technology, Design, interaction and convergence*, Oxford University Press, London, 1976, p. 167. Both these writers stress the importance of the predominance of contract work in the institutes' work in contributing to this state of affairs. Contract work also makes up a major proportion of the research work of the faculties and departments of Moscow State University, which are criticised by the university's party secretary for their almost complete freedom in deciding research projects. *P.zh.*, 20/76, p. 34.

2 Kozlov, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

selves appear to have some opportunities for adjusting plans. Zaleski makes the point that the sheer detail and number of tasks contained in plans give some degree of freedom to producing organisations. He describes and criticises the over-bureaucratisation of the scientific process, the paperwork and delays involved in getting research projects approved, and the tight financial control, but concludes by saying that the detail expected by higher authorities in fact makes real control and planning impossible. Because plans are essentially over-detailed aggregations of individual projects with little attempt to either indicate or encourage priority areas, once an institute director has received his funds he is relatively free to decide on the priorities for himself.¹

Zaleski also implies that research institutes have the power to initiate formal adjustments to plans during the process of their implementation. In citing the report that 25% of planned research projects in the RSFSR are changed during the course of the year, he wonders

1 Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 280-281. The Institute of Experimental Biology of the Armenian Academy of Sciences provides a good illustration of the freedom research institutes have in deciding the direction of their research concerns. In 1974 the institute's administration and party buro were criticised because since its foundation in 1966 the institute had consistently avoided concentrating on molecular biology, for which it had been established, and instead worked in areas that were better left to other institutes. *Pravda*, 11/2/74, p. 2.

how binding these projects are on institutes.¹ He does not present any evidence that it is the institutes themselves, rather than higher authorities, that initiate these adjustments. However some of the examples given immediately below of PPO involvement in planning support Zaleski's implication that the institutes themselves can initiate adjustments.²

The degree of decentralisation in planning permitted by these factors should not be over-emphasised. Plan fulfilment is still the most important task facing an institution's leadership. While these factors give him some flexibility in deciding what will be in the plan, the plan must still be fulfilled. Developments since 1965 have probably even decreased the amount of *de facto* decentralisation to some extent. The reduction in plan indicators reduces enterprise freedom to make priority decisions of its own, while the actual increase in the number of priority indicators further reduces enterprise freedom. Whereas previously volume of output was the only priority indicator now there is a wide range of them such as profit, profitability, sales and labour productivity.³

1 Zaleski, op. cit., p. 470.

2 See the examples of the Institute of Plastics and the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute, pp. 272-273.

3 Schroeder, G.E: "The Soviet Economic Reform at an Impasse", *Problems of Communism*, vol. 2, no. 4, July-August, 1970, p. 42.

It is true that this greater control through planning indicators is somewhat offset by the greater use of contractual relations between buyers and suppliers. Although contracts are subject to considerable regulation from above,¹ they are, as Zaleski says, a decentralising device:

As well as directing part of the activity of research establishments towards projects which are of immediate practical importance, it also provides the research institute with an important element of flexibility. The director of a research institute is much less subject to the control of superior authorities in contract work than in work financed by budgetary allocations, both in the choice of research projects and in the use of funds. Some of the complaints published about the contract system - for instance, that contracts are insufficiently planned, or that research workers have to devote valuable time to seeking out contract money for projects and to persuading enterprises of their value - unwittingly admit some of the advantages stemming from these arrangements.²

1 Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 465-469; Igitov, V.I.: "Legal organisation of economic-contractual scientific-research work in *vuzy*", *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, Seriya 12, Pravo, 5/68, pp. 8-11.

2 Zaleski, op. cit., p. 469.

The overall effect on enterprise freedom of the changes since 1965 is very difficult to evaluate, and certainly impossible from the overly simple description just given. However it appears probable that there is still sufficient freedom to give PPO's a policy-making role in determining priorities from among the numerous incompatible planned tasks.

What we have to try to discover is whether in fact PPO's take advantage of this opportunity and if so, what policies they pursue. Although Western observers like Zaleski are aware of the advantages of *de facto* decentralisation, it can and often does lead to undesirable consequences as far as the "social interest" is concerned. Zaleski himself refers to the bargaining side of the planning process leading to some less important research projects being included in research plans. Once the plans have been finalised the freedom still available to enterprises can be used in a way that benefits the group interest at the expense of the social interest. One of the most difficult problems in this regard since 1965 has been the manipulation of prices to increase profits. The greater complexity of pricing regulations has made this possible.¹ The emphasis on profit also seems to have contributed to the serious quality problems experienced in Soviet production.²

1 Schroeder, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

2 *Kom. Belorussii*, 11/73, p. 39.

The Soviet authorities, therefore, require PPO's to ensure that *de facto* decentralisation is not used to the detriment of the social interest. Clearly "host" organisations hope that they can gain party organisation support for their more selfishly determined activities. This is a crucial test of the effectiveness of PPO's and indeed of all low-level, integrated staff generalist organisations.

There is considerable evidence of PPO involvement in the planning process. The best description is provided in a 1966 *Vestnik vysshei shkoly* article on the evolution of the five-year plan at Moscow State University. Commissions were established to work out the first draft. The draft was sent out to all the faculties and then considered in a conference called by the rector. The second draft was then sent back to the faculties. This draft was also examined in an expanded meeting (that is, one with invited guests) of the party committee. A final draft was then drawn up and confirmed by the rector and the buro of the party committee. It was then sent to the RSFSR Ministry of Tertiary and Specialised Secondary Education.¹

This report illustrates well the possibilities that both the members of the "host" organisation, but more

1 *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 2/66, pp. 19-20.

particularly, the PPO have for influencing the content of the plan.¹ To what ends do PPO's influence the content of plans? Firstly, they must ensure that the plans are drawn up in accordance with party policies of the time. This type of control becomes particularly important at times of major changes of policies. Thus in early 1959, not long after Khrushchev's educational reforms, the tertiary educational institutions of Kharkov, on the initiative of their PPO's, re-examined study plans and programmes with the aim of ensuring that all educational planning was in accordance with the recent changes.² The majority of the party buros in research institutes in the Leninskii raion of Moscow are said to study the requirements and define the general principles of the composition of

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- 1 There is further information on the style of PPO involvement. When the communists of a Lvov secondary school became dissatisfied with the planning of the educational process, they considered the matter in a party meeting and offered detailed recommendations that were accepted by the director. *P.zh.*, 23/66, p. 61. In the Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences draft perspective plans for research are worked out by the directorate together with the party committee. After the drafts have been drawn up they are examined in meetings of the party committee and the Scientific Council. *Kom.Ukrainy*, 6/71, p. 85.
- 2 *P.zh.*, 4/59, p. 21. This report is particularly interesting in that it suggests that the same sort of evaluation of the role of PPO's at times of important policy changes that I intend undertaking in connection with ministerial PPO's and recent economic and administrative changes could be undertaken in connection with the 1958 educational reforms. Unfortunately it is not something I will be able to examine in any detail.

plans in terms of current party policies.¹

It is not always clear whether reports on PPO involvement in determining educational and research priorities are speaking of involvement before, during or after the plan has been drawn up. The information just given should indicate that the PPO has ample opportunity for exercising its influence before or during the formulation of draft plans. However we have already seen that Soviet plans leave considerable room for enterprise choice of which planned tasks should be given priority. This is a process in which PPO's should be heavily involved.

The 1960 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* claim that PPO's in tertiary educational institutions in Tomsk were expected to ensure that plans directed professors and lecturers to the most important educational areas appears to be concerned with influence before or during the formulation of plans.² This is certainly the case with the PPO of the Institute of Acoustics, on the initiative of which a perspective plan determining the road of development for the science of acoustics in the following years was worked out.³

1 *Mosk.pravda*, 18/2/71, p. 2.

2 *P.zh.*, 6/60, p. 34.

3 *Mosk.pravda*, 18/2/71, p. 2.

Cases where influence was apparently exercised after the formulation of the plan include that of the Institute of Plastics in 1958. After the May, 1958 Central Committee Plenum it became clear that the institute was working on too many research projects. Therefore at the suggestion of the PPO the institute's list of research projects was re-examined. The PPO is said to have ensured that all projects were connected with the current needs of Soviet production.¹ The secretary of the PPO of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute writes:

Sometimes the leaders of the institute themselves develop suggestions for changes in the character and direction of individual aspects of work, and in such cases they by no means consider it superfluous to consult with the party organisation about their intentions.

When the deputy director had an idea about reducing the number of indicators for the development of mercury transformers, he took it to the party organisation of the relevant department. A widened party buro meeting

1 *P.zh.*, 10/58, pp. 26-27.

considered the matter and made a recommendation.¹

These reports show the close involvement of PPO's in the planning process. However they have all been

1 Barkusov, op. cit., pp. 63-64. One of the best illustrations of the PPO's involvement in determining research priorities comes from the Skochinskii Institute of Mining Affairs, although unfortunately the report does not make clear at what stage of the planning process the PPO became involved. Within the institute there were two views on the sort of projects that should be adopted in connection with the development of the Norilsk Mining-Metallurgical Combine. The first view was that first priority should be given to research into the pressures in ore deposits and to an examination of the widest possible use of purifying plants and the introduction into production of vibrating machines; the second view was that all attention should be turned to the development of new technology, leaving aside an examination of the ore deposits. Many organisational decisions depended on which view was adopted. The party buro took an active part in discussions, until eventually a meeting of the buro was held to which the communist members of the Scientific Council were invited. The meeting decided that the first view should be adopted as institute policy and directed (*poruchilo*) the communist members of the Council to convey to it the party buro's opinion. The Council supported the party buro's view, a decision which the report claims was proved correct in the light of the tasks set by the 25th Party Congress. *P.zh.*, 14/76, p. 46. There are many other examples of the involvement of PPO's in determining research priorities. Under the influence of the PPO of the Institute of Physics work is said to be concentrated on the most important areas of concern. *P.zh.*, 1/70, p. 52. In 1971 the secretary of the PPO of the Institute of Geology and the Use of Fuel Minerals considered that the most important task of his party organisation was the choice of the best long-term directions of research. *Mosk.pravda*, 18/2/71, p. 2. In the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute in 1963 there was a party control commission for particularly important areas of work. *P.zh.*, 16/63, p. 36. Presumably the party committee decided which were the most important areas.

concentrated in the area of education and research, particularly the latter. The apparent lack of involvement of administrative, particularly ministerial, PPO's in the planning process is most curious.¹ Given the importance of ministries in the planning process and the involvement of their PPO's in their other activities it is a strange phenomenon, and one for which I have no convincing explanation. Certainly the formulation of plans for branch development is a matter of far too great importance to be left entirely to PPO's. The Central Committee apparatus is directly involved. However, as we will see later, relations between Central Committee workers and ministerial PPO's are very close and in other areas the Central Committee is apparently willing to use the PPO's to implement its policies. Its apparent lack of willingness to do so in this area of concern is inexplicable. If it is true that ministerial PPO's have little involvement in planning matters, it is a serious limitation on their powers and importance and their staff generalist role.

For planning is inherent in the staff generalist role. Although Western staff generalist theorists do not

1 The only case I have found of Soviet authorities demanding control of planning by ministerial PPO's occurred in the 1976 discussion by the Belorussian Central Committee of the activities of the Republican Gosplan. As well as the expected criticism of Gosplan's PPO, the Central Committee also suggested that the PPO's of ministries, governmental agencies and enterprises strengthen their control of planning sectors and departments. *Pravda*, 2/9/76, p. 2.

prescribe the highly centralised Soviet-type planning for Western organisations, it is usually relevant in their structural sub-divisions.¹ But even at this level centralised planning, if it is to work within a staff generalist framework, must take into account long-term developmental considerations. Therefore, while it is disturbing to find no evidence of ministerial PPO involvement in planning, it is reassuring to find that educational and research PPO's are apparently deeply involved. This involvement, particularly in the research category, includes making policy decisions on long-term directions of development based on the general objectives of the national leadership and the needs and objectives of the particular branch of the economy in which the institution is situated. This corresponds very closely with the staff generalist role.

(b) Material conditions

Concern with the material conditions of work is curious in that the available information is almost entirely concentrated in educational institutions with some little information on cultural institutions. It is perhaps not surprising that administrative apparatuses are excluded.

1 Strictly speaking, since we have described the Soviet system as mono-organisational, it is these sub-divisions which are analogous to independent Soviet institutions.

While office space, equipment, etc., are obviously essential for an administrative institution, they are not a sufficiently basic aspect of the institutions' operational activity to warrant specific mention in the Soviet press. However the omission in the case of research institutions is more curious. While concern with setting up new laboratories, departments and sectors described in the section on structural organisation presumably includes the equipping of the new units, the lack of any specific accounts of party organisation interest in scientific supplies and equipment is inexplicable, particularly considering that the concern of educational PPO's is so evident.

In this regard schools are not so significant. However the information concerning them is of some interest. A 1960 report on a secondary school in Gorky said that the party organisation had done a great deal to mobilise parents and the teaching collective to provide laboratories, workshops, etc., for the school.¹ This suggests that the school itself has some responsibility, rather like schools in Australia, to provide some of its own equipment. Although information is hard to find, accounts of the obligations of schools do not bear this out. One textbook on the operations of schools goes no further than to say that the

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P.zh., 9/60, p. 27.

school finances such things as help to the needy and extra-curricular activities.¹ Presumably as part of extra-curricular activities, the book devotes some attention to the construction by students of sporting facilities.² Thus after a party meeting had discussed shortcomings in physical education in a school in Bataisk (Rostov *oblast'*) the communists recommended to the director that certain sports facilities were required.³

The vagaries of the Soviet construction process also lead to administration and PPO involvement in the construction process, although they have no formal rights or obligations in this area. Whenever there were problems with construction work at the Gorky school just mentioned the director worked out a solution together with the party secretary.⁴ Solzhenitsyn, in "For the Good of the Cause", illustrates well the school's involvement in construction, but also its lack of rights in this area.⁵

The most interesting and extensive report concerns a tertiary institution, the Moscow Engineering-Economics Institute. The party committee of the institute was closely

1 Volkovskii, A.N. (ed.): *Voprosy shkolovedeniia*, Izd. Akademii pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR, Moscow, 1955, p. 128.

2 *ibid*, p. 158.

3 *P.zh.*, 20/63, pp. 50-51.

4 *P.zh.*, 9/60, p. 27.

5 Solzhenitsyn, *op. cit.*

involved in getting a new building for the institute, in order to overcome the problems of having buildings scattered throughout Moscow. The party committee had a special commission for construction matters headed by one of the members of the committee's production sector. The committee and the commission were concerned with solving the problems involved in construction. The party committee suggested that the institute's faculties and departments assist in construction planning. It obliged the party organisation of the Faculty of Construction and Urban Affairs and the institute's *komsomol* committee to give permanent *shefskaia* assistance for contracted work through voluntary Saturday work, the sending of student construction brigades and the strengthening of agitation-propaganda work and visual agitation.¹ In March, 1972, on the initiative and under the permanent leadership of the party committee, there was signed with the 20th Moscow Construction Trust a "contract for creative cooperation". The institute's obligations included the organisation of managerial training for trust workers, the sending of students to the construction site, the conduct of mass-cultural and propaganda work, and the organisation of research work on a contractual basis and

1 The noun *shefstvo*, from which the adjective *shefskaia* is derived, is usually translated as "patronage". Soviet institutions, particularly schools, accept other institutions as their "patrons", receiving from them material assistance. In this case the relationship seems to have worked in both directions. For further accounts of *shefstvo* work, see *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/61, pp. 61-64; 12/64, p. 22.

according to the trust's instructions. The trust undertook to pay maximum attention to the early completion of the institute's building and to effectively use the students sent to it, including using them in work useful to their courses. Not less than once a semester the party committee would hear a report (*otchët*) from the rectorate on progress in the preparation of the building. The committee, in hearing the report, would utilise information from the special commission.¹

This account is particularly interesting in that it shows the close connection between indoctrination, academic and organisational activities. It also suggests the possibility of special agreements being reached, with close party participation, to ensure favoured treatment for one's own institution. This parallels the use of party influence to gain special attention from higher authorities that was discussed in the section on structure and organisation.

In all there is not a great deal of evidence of PPO involvement in these matters of material conditions, even in educational institutions. But what evidence there is is quite strong.² It appears probable

1 Samsonov, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

2 The single piece of information I have in this area for cultural institutions does little more than indicate party involvement. In 1973 the party committee and Artistic Council of the film studio *Mosfil'm* examined such matters as the reconstruction of studios and the introduction of electronics and automation. *Sov.kul'tura*, 6/3/73, p. 2.

therefore, that it is not an everyday, continuing concern, but one that arises at times of particular difficulty. It is unfortunate that information is so difficult to find on the precise procedures for the construction and equipping of educational and research institutions. One would imagine that in normal circumstances it would not be the responsibility of the institution which will be using the buildings to construct and equip them. There are specialised construction organisations for this purpose. However the Soviet construction industry is notoriously unable to supply all requirements. Low priority institutions are therefore likely to find their requirements seriously neglected. At this stage it becomes necessary for the higher-levels of the party apparatus to step in to determine priorities and PPO's as much as possible to work for the interests of their "host" organisations. Thus in Solzhenitsyn's "For the Good of the Cause" the *obkom* decided that the technical college's new building would have to go to a higher-priority research institute.¹ There was strong implied criticism of the college's party secretary for doing

1 Not entirely for reasons of state interest. The *obkom* secretary was also interested in building up the status of his own region by having a high-status institute situated there.

nothing about the situation.¹ We have seen that the party organisation of the Moscow Engineering-Economics Institute made its own arrangements. The reason, therefore, that there is no information available on such activities by the PPO's of research institutes is probably that research has higher priority and therefore research institutes are less likely to have to concern themselves with construction problems.²

If PPO's become involved in construction and equipment concerns only in exceptional circumstances, it becomes very difficult for such involvement to be put into a staff generalist context. By definition it is a short-term involvement in specific problems, with any long-term improvement in it being beyond the powers of the PPO. However it is interesting that the PPO of the Moscow

1 The party secretary refused to allow the issue to be discussed in the college, defending the right of the institute to the building with the words: "In fact you can get away without explaining any of it. Just say: 'The institute is vital to the state and it's not up to us to question its suitability.'" Solzhenitsyn, *op. cit.*, p. 90. Of course it cannot be claimed that Solzhenitsyn was representing the official Soviet view. However this story was published in the Soviet Union, as were letters praising Solzhenitsyn's criticisms of the party secretary. See the Pall Mall edition, London, 1964, p. 101.

2 Although another factor to be considered is that research institutes are not in as good a position for making their own arrangements. They do not have students available for "voluntary" labour. A construction organisation is more likely to make arrangements with an institution that can provide its own labour.

Engineering-Economics Institute appeared to be willing to use its essentially short-term construction problem in a much wider indoctrination and educational context. Within the limits of the situation the PPO played a staff generalist role.

(c) Content of work process

Concern with the content of the actual work done by the "host" organisation is such a diverse matter that it will have to be dealt with according to the different categories of non-production institution. Although some concerns, such as that for quality, are evident in all categories, the nature of the output of the different categories means that not only the types of concerns vary, but also to some extent the relative importance of different concerns. Thus research PPO's, working in institutions often closely connected with production, control the performance of their "host" organisations in such production-oriented terms as plan fulfilment and over-fulfilment and economic effectiveness. Educational and cultural PPO's do not see their concerns in such production-oriented terms. Administrative PPO's are quite different again. Because administrative institutions do not themselves "produce" anything material, the discussion in this section will be limited to the style of bureaucratic procedures. It will become evident that a concern with the style of

bureaucratic procedures inevitably leads to a concern with the content of bureaucratic work. Since this content is usually the production activities of subordinate enterprises, the next topic for discussion, namely relations with outside organisations, becomes of fundamental importance for administrative PPO's.

(i) educational institutions

In the chapter on ideology I discussed the involvement of educational PPO's in the socialisation of students, through their control of their extra-curricular activities, and in the ideological control of the content of education. In this section I will discuss the involvement of the PPO's in more purely academic matters, although it will be seen that ideological or "political" considerations can never be entirely excluded.

The first of these matters is student admissions. Admissions to Soviet tertiary institutions are determined by quite strict and severe entrance requirements and competitive examinations.¹ The final decision on admission

1 According to the 1956 rules for admission to tertiary education, students who have graduated from school with a gold medal "For excellent results and exemplary behaviour" can enter a tertiary institution without doing an entrance examination. Others have to do entrance examinations in a number of subjects depending on the faculty they are entering. However the lists of subjects always include Russian language and literature. The examinations are conducted by a special examination commission established by the rector or director. *Vysshaia shkola*, op. cit., pp. 39-42. For the Statute of the examination commissions, see pp. 45-46.

is made by an admissions commission, under the chairmanship of the rector and having as members the pro-rector for academic and scientific work, the deans of the faculties, two professors, and representatives of social organisations.¹ The PPO's exercise their influence over the admissions commissions through the party members on the commissions.² The extent of their powers is not certain. However a 1973 article on tertiary institutions in Tomsk declares that although the institutions have competitive systems to decide admissions, party organisations must still involve themselves in making recommendations for admittance.³

The methods of influence are clear, but for what purposes is influence exercised? Admission to tertiary education in the Soviet Union is held, undoubtedly correctly, to be of enormous importance for any young person's future. The regulations covering admission are

1 *ibid*, p. 42.

2 *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2.

3 *P.zh.*, 6/73, p. 36. The importance and apparent effectiveness of party control of admissions commissions can be seen in statements that educational PPO's do not need control commissions on admissions since there are non-party bodies with party, as well as administration, Academic Council, *komsomol* and trade union representatives, that can do the work. *Kom.Ukrainy*, 2/72, p. 66. It is interesting to note that members of the admissions commission of the Tashkent Institute for Engineers for the Irrigation and Mechanisation of Agriculture are on the *nomenklatura* of the party committee. *Pravda Vostoka*, 1/4/72, p. 2.

extensive and require a considerable amount of administrative supervision. This means that the motivation and the opportunity exist for abuse of the regulations. It is an area where the use of influence and bribes is probable. It would be part of the PPO's task to prevent such abuses. In fact I have found no reports of the involvement of educational PPO's in such activities. This could simply be because I have not found the available information, because the presence of the PPO as a "watchdog" is so successful that nobody tries anything illegal, or that the PPO allows abuses to go unhindered.¹

PPO's probably also influence student admissions for more positive and politically motivated reasons. A 1969 article in *Kommunist* speaks of the recommendations of party, soviet and *komsomol* organisations on sending students for tertiary studies with the aim of getting more industrial

1 In the early 1970's the head of the Chief Administration for Schools of the Armenian Ministry of Education was allegedly arranging that some school leavers receive gold medals, giving them automatic admission to tertiary education, on the basis of artificially raised results for written examinations. In this case the chairman of the people's control group of the ministry reported the *glavk* head's behaviour to the 1972 election-report meeting of the ministry's PPO. Ministerial officials responded by opposing the chairman's election as secretary of the party buro and fabricating incriminating evidence against him, leading to his appearance in court. At no stage in the report on the case were any educational institutions or their PPO's mentioned. *Pravda*, 5/5/76, p. 3.

and agricultural workers into tertiary institutions.¹
 This is a clear case of party involvement in the implementation of a policy which is almost certainly regarded with disfavour by educational administrators. One also suspects party involvement in present discrimination against Jewish applicants for tertiary education, although not surprisingly it is not something spoken of in the Soviet press.²

Once a student has been admitted to an educational organisation PPO interest in him continues. PPO's are concerned with the organisation and conduct of examinations. The party committee of the Voroshilov State Medical Institute heard a report (*otchët*) from the pro-rector on progress in the preparation for examinations. The party committee had a special commission help the pro-rector to prepare his report.³ The PPO of the Moscow Technical College controls the formation of the college's examination commission.⁴ These reports suggest no more than a

1 *Kom.*, 11/69, p. 65.

2 D. Ogen speaks of this discrimination in the case of the Leningrad Conservatorium. Informants in Moscow assured me that the practice is widespread. Jewish applicants for places in tertiary institutions usually fail entrance tests in Russian language! Neither Ogen nor my own informants spoke specifically of PPO involvement; however it is highly likely. Ogen, D. (pseud.): *The Leningrad Branch of the RSFSR Union of Composers*, Soviet Institutions Series, No. 2, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 57-59.

3 *P.zh.*, 5/74, p. 41.

4 *Mosk.pravda*, 10/9/71, p. 2.

"technical" concern with the conduct of examinations. However one cannot exclude the possibility of more politically motivated influence over examination commissions.

There is a strong probability that there is a link between control of examination commissions and concern with pass rates. While I have no evidence of PPO involvement in the matter, it seems probable that pass rates in Soviet educational establishments are kept artificially high.¹ Because they affect the evaluation of a teacher's performance and scores in various socialist competitions, pass rates of over 90% are the norm.² Whether they manipulate them or not, PPO's are certainly concerned with the pass rates. In 1974 the PPO of a boarding school in Nizhnii Tagil had a party meeting which considered the question "The struggle of communists for a high quality of knowledge and discipline among students". At the meeting there was an analysis of pass rates in the school.³ A secondary school had an open party meeting to consider how the party organisation was leading the struggle of the collective to raise the pass rate in the school.⁴

1 In Solzhenitsyn's "For the Good of the Cause" it is mentioned that the director of the technical college always does everything the *obkom* secretary wants, including raising the pass rate. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 98.

2 It is for this reason that a *troika* (three out of five), while officially a pass, can be considered an unsatisfactory mark.

3 *P.zh.*, 2/74, p. 58.

4 *P.zh.*, 18/74, p. 68.

In the chapter on ideology we saw the concern of PPO's with the behaviour of students outside class. They are also interested in their behaviour inside class. Educational PPO's are responsible for the efficient and effective operation of the educational process. This implies a concern for discipline. In 1963 *Partiinaiia zhizn' Kazakhstana* declared that the PPO's of educational institutions must be concerned with producing the right attitude to study among students.¹ A considerable amount of indoctrination work is directed to this end, but PPO's also take more direct and specific action when problems arise. The PPO discusses the situation itself,² but it will also work through other organisations, usually the *komsomol*, to bring about changes. For example, in Moscow State University each faculty *komsomol* organisation keeps a book on every *komsomol* member in the faculty (usually about

1 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 1/63, p. 20.

2 In 1955 a party meeting in a Primorsko-Akhtar secondary school considered the state of discipline in the school. *P.zh.*, 8/55, pp. 78-79. In 1973 another school had an open party meeting to discuss its difficult students. *Uchitel'skaia gazeta*, 12/1/73, p. 2. When a school in the Gagarin raion of Moscow had a discipline problem, the *raikom* recommended that the school's communists meet and consider the topic "The work of the school party organisation in raising the responsibility of communists for the state of affairs in the collective in the light of the decisions of the 24th Party Congress". They heard a report (*otchët*) from the school director on improving the system of leadership of the school. *Kom.*, 16/73, pp. 86-87.

90% of the student body) recording all social and academic activities. The book is examined yearly and if progress is unsatisfactory an explanation is required. If unsatisfactory for two years running expulsion from the *komsomol*, apparently the precursor of expulsion from the university, is likely. Party involvement is obvious when it is seen that the books have sections for signature by the faculty dean, the *komsomol* secretary and party secretary. It can also be seen in the 1972 recommendation of the party committee of the Omsk Institute of Rail Transport Engineers that all cases of expulsion should go from the dean to a *komsomol* meeting before going to the rector.¹

PPO's often directly involve themselves in solving specific discipline problems by sending party members to see the parents of misbehaving children. When a pupil in a Pavlodar school had been consistently misbehaving some communists from the school and his teacher went to the Pavlodar *oblast'* Prosecutor's Office where his father worked. There they spoke to the father in the presence of the office's party secretary. The talk was said to have had the desired effect.²

1 *Pravda*, 11/2/72, p. 2.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/61, p. 64. When two students in a Moscow school were not coming to school the PPO contacted the PPO's and trade unions of their fathers' places of work. *P.zh.*, 6/56, p. 64.

A concern for quality is something which will run through the discussion in all categories of non-production institutions. Particularly since the 25th Party Congress "quality" has become the subject of a considerable campaign, so we can expect to see PPO concern with it increase.

Quality, of course, is a somewhat subjective matter. Thus some people might disagree that the PPO of Kishinev State University raised the quality of education when in 1965 it brought about the re-introduction of compulsory attendance at lectures in one faculty.¹

Ideology is likely to have a very prominent place in a concern with the quality of lectures and lecturers in the minds of PPO leaders. Those cases where ideology is clearly dominant have already been described.² However there is evidence of a genuine concern with "technical" quality. The case of the party committee of Moscow State University providing the initiative for an examination of the texts of lectures to check on whether they were up-to-date in terms of presenting the most recent

1 After the party committee and faculty party buro had examined the effect of allowing voluntary attendance they found that it had weakened discipline, attendance and results. The party buro therefore recommended that the practice be discontinued. Later the party buro heard a report from the chairman of the control group on the implementation of the decision. *Kom. Moldavii*, 5/65, p. 37.

2 See above, pp. 76-80.

achievements of Soviet science can be considered ambiguous.¹ Other cases seem to show an unambiguous orientation towards the "technical". Very often the PPO's concern with the quality of the educational process is stimulated by problems in a particular subject. Problem-solving is an important part of the staff generalist role, as long as it is conducted within a long-term and broad perspective.

The examples available on PPO problem-solving do not allow firm conclusions on whether PPO's approach the matter with a staff generalist outlook. However they certainly are not incompatible with staff generalism. Thus the Moscow Institute for Electronic Technology has a special department for the preparation of new students. Some of the lecturers in the institute doubted the ability of people passing through the department to cope with their courses. The party group of the department asked the party committee to examine the matter. The party committee heard reports (*soobshchenia*) from faculty heads on work with the department's graduates.² In the mid-60's the party organisation of the Moscow Conservatorium became concerned at the appearance of *laureatomania* among teachers and students. Their concern was only with winning prizes in prestigious national and international competitions. The result was that teachers concentrated all their efforts on

1 *P.zh.*, 1/68, p. 49.

2 *P.zh.*, 17/74, p. 56.

potential prize winners, and that reduced demands were made on these students in non-musical subjects, especially the social science disciplines. Therefore in 1965, on the initiative of the conservatorium's social organisations and rectorate, the collegium of the All-Union Ministry of Culture adopted a decision to reduce the number of students competing for international prizes and to allow only those students to compete who had fulfilled all musical and non-musical obligations.¹

When the evidence of PPO involvement in specific problems is combined with examples of their concern with long-term directions of educational policy it is possible to speak of staff generalism with some degree of confidence.

1 *Bol'shoi put'*, op. cit., pp. 109-110. The PPO of Leningrad State University examines teaching practice in each subject and works out suggestions for consideration by the faculties and the Academic Council, while in 1973 the party buro of a secondary school recommended to communist leaders of the school's subject committees that they analyse the condition of the teaching of subjects and give their suggestions. *Uchitel'skaia gazeta*, 13/1/73, p. 2. School PPO's in Bender in Moldavia organise conferences for the spreading of leading teaching experience. *Kom.Moldavii*, 11/64, p. 25. The party buro of a Kazakh school was worried about poor results in physics. The buro received advice from a party meeting and recommended that a Ten Day Period (*Dekada*) of Assistance be conducted for physics teachers. The results were examined by the director, the party secretary and *zavuch*. One physics teacher declared at a party meeting that one of the reasons for the difficulties was that the students were backward in mathematics. When the mathematics teacher disagreed the communists suggested that there be a combined physics-mathematics class. The experiment was reported to have worked well. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 1/67, pp. 25-26.

In recent years it has been claimed, for example, that school PPO's have taken the initiative in the introduction of the "cabinet" system in schools.¹ Of course the cabinet system is a matter of party policy, so the initiative of PPO's in its implementation must be limited. Nevertheless an ability to apply general policies in specific local conditions is an essential element of the staff generalist role. Thus when there were problems in the introduction of the system in a secondary school in Cheliabinsk *oblast'* the school's party members decided to hear the school director speak on the matter in a party meeting. As a preparation for the meeting the party members consulted with all the teachers in the school and gained their opinions. Following the director's statement the meeting worked out a plan of action which was said to have met with great success.²

Another aspect of the concern for the quality of education is ensuring the right balance is maintained between teaching and research. In 1976 the secretary of the party committee of the Belorussian Economics Institute declared that the PPO had taken corrective action after discovering that the head of the Department of Higher

1 The "cabinet" system entails each classroom being set up for the teaching of a particular subject. Students move from room to room according to the subject they are studying in a particular period, rather than remaining always in the same room.

2 *P.zh.*, 12/76, p. 53. See also *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 13/1/72, p. 2.

Mathematics was damaging educational work by over-emphasising research.¹ The report in no way suggests that the PPO was responsible for determining the correct mix of academic and research work. However one would expect it to have a considerable degree of independence in at least assessing the effect research work has on academic standards. This would give it considerable influence over any deliberations at higher levels. It is a question which will become of increasing importance as the present campaign for the rapid development of research in educational institutions takes effect.

Educational PPO's continue their concern with students right up to the time they have finished their courses. Vocational guidance is considered to be of great importance in the Soviet Union. It might have been discussed in the chapter on ideology since it is often seen in terms of ideological indoctrination.² However it is

1 *Pravda*, 22/5/76, p. 2.

2 The party organisation of a school situated within a collective farm works closely with the farm's administration and party committee in vocational guidance work, being concerned to "foster a love of agricultural labour" among students both inside and outside class. *P.zh.*, 12/76, p. 52. See also *Kom. Estonii*, 3/72, pp. 42-44. *Partiinaiia zhizn'* declared in 1958 that indoctrination work includes explaining to students of economics at Leningrad State University why they have to go to work in *raion* planning offices in the country when they have finished their courses. *P.zh.*, 1/58, p. 17. That this means persuading students that the interests of the individual are to be subordinated to the interests of the state can be seen in the statement in *Kommunist* that the vocational guidance given to students should be in accordance with the needs of the city or *raion*. *Kom.*, 16/73, p. 82.

more appropriate to treat vocational guidance in this present context because there is evidence that the means of "production" control are used, and probably to greater effect.¹ Thus a secretary of the Lithuanian Central Committee speaks of a secondary school which has an authoritative commission, which each year consults with senior students to help them make the right career decisions. The report does not make clear what "authoritative" means.²

Perhaps the most significant point that can be made about this discussion of the concern of educational PPO's with the content of the academic process is the number of times I have surmised that PPO's exercised a political influence, but without having evidence. It is almost

1 A school PPO in Vinnitsa *oblast'* heard in one of its party meetings a report (*soobshchenie*) from the director on the condition of work in vocational guidance and the labour indoctrination of students. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 19/3/72, p. 2. The party buro of a school in Kuibyshev included on the agenda of one of its meetings consideration of the problems of an improvement in vocational guidance work. Barkusov, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

2 *Kom. (Vilnius)*, 9/71, p. 3. I have no evidence of PPO involvement in the *raspredelenie* (distribution) of students who have finished their courses. The *raspredelenie* is the process by which tertiary graduates are sent to work for at least two years anywhere the state cares to send them. Although it is probably decided outside the educational institution itself, one would still expect the PPO to be involved to some degree.

certain that PPO's introduce considerations of political and ideological control into student admissions, and probably do so also into the conduct of examinations and the application of discipline. However I have not found any evidence of them doing so. This is largely explained by the natural reluctance of the Soviet authorities to openly admit that political discrimination is practised in Soviet education.

"Political" considerations of another sort are evident in the concern of PPO's with pass rates and vocational guidance. In these areas PPO's must react to special policy considerations not necessarily linked with educational quality. With regard to vocational guidance they are expected to defend social interests in a way which might seem slightly repugnant to Western observers, but which cannot be seen as incompatible with the functions expected of them by the Soviet leadership. (There was one similar case cited with regard to student admissions.) If they are engaged in the manipulation of pass rates, that is a "policy" that is determined by local interests, regional and internal, and in the eyes of the Soviet leadership would be dysfunctional.

PPO's appear to show some genuine commitment to education itself only in the admittedly amorphous area of the "quality of education", primarily of teaching. Only in this area do they show any commitment to staff

generalist principles. The most interesting thing about the examples given is the degree to which the PPO's are involved in solving problems in particular areas. They take measures to correct the immediate problems, but in some cases also appear to be aware of the wider implications of the particular problem. They are concerned with general examinations of teaching practice and the propagation of the best techniques. The ability to use specific problems to arrive at general conclusions is one of the fundamental features of the staff generalist role. More details of this type of work should come to light in our consideration of the two categories of non-production institutions most closely connected with production.

(ii) research institutions

Before presenting information on the involvement of research PPO's in the operational activities of their "host" organisations some discussion on the possible differences between branch and Academy institutes is necessary. The discussion is necessarily brief and speculative since little information is available.

There are two main reasons that one might expect the PPO's of Academy institutes to be given less opportunity to involve themselves in the research activities of their "host" organisations. Firstly, the Academies themselves are strong and independent groups perhaps well able to

resist party interference in scientific affairs; secondly, the more theoretically oriented research undertaken in the Academies is less susceptible to close party control.

The apparatuses of the Academies of Science have considerable powers of coordination and control of research undertaken in their institutes.¹ They constitute powerful bureaucratic organisations presumably well able to exert their independence in bureaucratic politics. They also have very high prestige in scientific matters. This prestige not only contributes to the unwillingness of outside groups to oppose the Academies on scientific matters, but also strengthens the internal solidarity of the Academies, a solidarity that could well affect PPO secretaries. These factors are enough to cause one to ask how much authority does the party, at any level, exert over the Academies. There are examples of party-sponsored organisational demands failing to be accepted.² These suggest that the party would be less willing and even less likely to succeed in influencing scientific policy-making. However one cannot entirely discount party influence. We have already seen in Chapter One the influence the party, using ideological justifications and working through PPO's, has exerted over scientific policy, including within

1 Zaleski, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-287.

2 Medvedev, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-215.

the Academies. It could be said that the more theoretical nature of Academy research increases its susceptibility to this type of interference. One must assume some degree of party involvement in scientific decision-making, even in Academy research. The question then becomes at what level is this involvement evident. The Academies are organised at All-Union and republic level. One would therefore expect considerable links between the Academies and the party Central Committees. But this question is greatly complicated by the uncertainty about the precise role of the Academy party committees. In Appendix A, although I am unable to determine the formal place and powers of these party committees, I present evidence that they exercise some influence over scientific decision-making, *working through* institute PPO's. If that evidence reflects the normal means of party communication in matters concerned with Academy research, presumably the party committees have close links with Central Committees. The institute PPO's are not excluded from this process.

Even if that is the normal means of party communication, and that is by no means certain, it still remains to be asked how important it is for the operational control of Academy research. We have seen the reasons that the Academies might be in a position to resist party pressure in general policy-making. We must also consider the susceptibility of Academy research institutes to PPO

pressure in their everyday operational activities. I will examine the involvement of research PPO's in general in terms of three main aspects - control of plan fulfilment, quality and effectiveness. Most of the information I have concerns branch institutes. This is not surprising since these aspects of concern, which as we will see immediately below are not well-suited to any type of research, are particularly unsuited to the theoretically oriented research undertaken in Academy institutes.

The evidence suggests that the PPO's of Academy institutes are expected to involve themselves in controlling the implementation of centrally determined scientific policies. These policies are transmitted to them from the All-Union and republican Central Committees, perhaps through the Academy party committees. However at all levels of this process one could expect strong opposition to party involvement. At the institute level the commitment that even PPO secretaries have to the independence of the Academies could make this opposition even more effective.

The nature of the research undertaken makes PPO involvement in everyday operational control difficult. However this is a problem that afflicts branch research as well, and can be best understood in terms of an examination of the concern of branch institute PPO's with the operational activities of their "host" organisations in terms of the three aspects already mentioned. Plan fulfilment has

traditionally been the top priority task in Soviet production, but also considered important, and increasingly so in recent years, have been the quality and effectiveness of production.

There are two sides to plan fulfilment - that the tasks set by the plan be completed, and that they be completed on time. There are considerable problems facing research institutions on both counts. Clearly few scientists can be certain at the time they undertake a project that it will ever meet with success. By its very nature research requires a great deal of failure and non-fulfilment of projects. Further, even if a project continues to promise success, there is no way that final success can be tied to a timetable. Research does not involve predetermined and regular procedures such as occur in industrial production. The whole concept of plan fulfilment is one that is largely incompatible with scientific research. The considerable "slack" in Soviet research planning suggests at least *de facto* recognition of this fact. Nevertheless research PPO's are still expected to ensure that plans are fulfilled on time. Thus at the 1974 election-report meeting of the PPO of the Ukrainian Institute for the Design of Heavy Machine Construction Factories the communist director and chief engineer were criticised for doing nothing about the breaking of deadlines in the institute. The party buro was also criticised for showing little

interest in the activity of the control commission concerned with deadlines.¹ In 1954 *Kommunist* criticised the party buro of the Sverdlovsk *oblast'* branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences for failing to instil in scientific workers the feeling of their responsibility for finishing projects quickly.² It is interesting that in both these cases the PPO's were criticised for failing to control the fulfilment of plans. Could it be that the scientist-secretaries of research PPO's are unwilling to work for something which they feel is both impossible and undesirable?³ There is no other indication in these reports that PPO's or their party superiors are aware of the difficulties in fulfilment of research plans.

1 *Kom.Estonii*, 8/73, p. 54.

2 *Kom.*, 18/54, p. 60.

3 Of course there are examples of research PPO's taking positive action for plan fulfilment. In 1963 the party buro of the Institute of State and Law had an expanded meeting where the matter of overdue projects was examined. Many research workers were questioned on their work. *P.zh.*, 16/63, p. 37. The party organisation of the Department of Civil Construction of the Magadan institute *Dal'stroiproekt* heard a report (*otchët*) from the head of the department on the work results of the previous six months. Barkusov, op. cit., p. 101. The PPO of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute has two permanent control commissions, one for progress in the fulfilment of important research and construction work, and the other to observe progress in and the quality of capital investment. *P.zh.*, 10/72, p. 40. The party buro of the State Institute of Glass has a scientific production sector responsible for control of the fulfilment of planned work. *Mosk.pravda*, 15/9/71, p. 2.

Plan fulfilment and the quality of scientific work are not always compatible, and this provides the PPO with a perfect opportunity to become involved in control at a policy level, where a decision has to be made in the "host" organisation because demands on it are ambiguous or conflicting. It is probable that in general plan fulfilment receives the higher priority and PPO's make the decision in its favour. However, as the following report shows, this is not necessarily so. In fact it is possible that with the increasing emphasis on and use of bonus payments, for which plan fulfilment is still a major indicator, that PPO's have had to redress the balance against a desire to fulfil plans with undue haste. Brezhnev's emphasis on quality at the 25th Party Congress will presumably strengthen this trend. Evidence of this can be seen in the case of a design sent by the Kaunas department of the Kursk branch of the Institute of Electronic Control Equipment to the Vilnius Special Construction Bureau for Organisational Technology. The communists of the Bureau were of the opinion that the design was out of date and needed more work done on it. General opinion was divided - some considered that it was too risky to endanger fulfilment of the plan; others considered it shameful to work with backward technology. In this case the latter view prevailed and in an open party meeting the

engineers and workers decided to rework the design.¹

A disturbing thing about reports of PPO concern with quality is the lack of account they take of the problems involved in deciding indicators for the evaluation of the quality of scientific work. One could be justified in wondering how significant or useful the involvement of PPO's is if they are unconcerned with these problems.

The same can be said of the evaluation of the effectiveness (*effektivnost'*) of scientific work. Soviet writers show themselves increasingly aware of the importance of and difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of research and have produced some quite sophisticated work in this area.² However there is not a great deal of

1 *Kom. (Vilnius)*, 7/71, p. 2. Other reports are more straightforward. In 1973 the party organisation of the Department of Machine Construction Technology in the institute attached to the Tallin electrotechnical factory heard, in an open party meeting reports (*otchety*) from the head of the department and from laboratory heads on the quality of hard alloy dies. The resulting work plan was examined in a meeting of the institute's party buro. *Kom. Estonii*, 8/73, p. 55. In 1969 *Kommunist Ukrainy* declared that it was pointless for research PPO's to achieve an improvement in the organisation of the work of designers without improving the technological content of the designs as well. *Kom. Ukrainy*, 5/69, p. 70.

2 Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 458-464; Gvishiani, op. cit., Chapters 3-12; Amirov, Iu.D: *Organizatsiia i effektivnost' nauchno-issledovatel'skikh i opytno-konstruktorskikh rabot*, Izd. "Ekonomika", Moscow, 1974, pp. 169-223.

evidence that PPO's are aware of such matters. True, there is one case on record from the All-Union Electro-technical Institute. The heads of a department and a laboratory had presented a suggestion to the directorate that the institute undertake the whole process of production of new types of insulators for high powered turbo- and hydrogenerators, rather than farm some parts of the process out to other organizations. The leadership was inclined to accept the suggestion. However the party committee did not agree, on the grounds that such a method would use too much time and resources. With the help of qualified workers the party committee investigated the matter and opposed the suggestion. Its conclusion was accepted.¹ It is quite possible in this case that the PPO was doing no more than blindly obeying a directive from above; it is also quite possible that it was using quite rational methods of evaluation to come to an independent conclusion. However there is no other evidence to support the latter possibility. One must doubt whether research PPO's have the personnel available to make the sophisticated analyses required for rational decisions on research effectiveness.²

1 *P.zh.*, 1/67, p. 29.

2 Research party secretaries are usually research scientists. This does not imply any ability to evaluate the value of their research. However in view of the special training apparently being given to party workers in new administrative techniques it is possible that research party secretaries receive some training in evaluation techniques at the seminars and conferences run for them by higher authorities.

In discussing educational institutions I mentioned some reports of PPO's being involved in solving problems that arose in the educational process. The work of PPO's in research institutes in this area is even more noticeable. We saw in the Introduction that this is expected of staff generalist agencies although in doing so they are not to assume operational command, nor are they to ignore the long-term significance and solutions to problems that arise.

Some of the information allows us to say no more than that PPO's are involved in problem-solving. Thus when the party buro of the institute *Dal'stroiproekt* examined work in the Mining Concentrates Department and heard a report (*otchët*) from its head, it found serious shortcomings. It then demanded (*potrebovalo*) that the directorate bring about an improvement.¹ There is nothing in this report to suggest a concern for or awareness of long-term considerations. However when a laboratory in the Institute of Metal Physics was having problems with its experiments the PPO examined the work of the whole laboratory and had discussions with the leaders of other scientific institutions and big factories.² Although it gives no idea of the outcome of the party organisation's involvement, the report does suggest that the party organisation was interested in examining the problem in a wider perspective.

1 Barkusov, op. cit., p. 101.

2 *Kom.*, 18/54, p. 64.

The same concern with an examination of problems in a wider perspective can be seen in the All-Union Research Institute for Grain Growing in 1967. The party committee drew the attention of the directorate to a weakening of work in the area of grass seed growing. The party committee decided to have an open party meeting on the subject. It was revealed that the weakest sector was feed production, and so it was suggested in the meeting that the production of cheap feed be increased. The workers of the institute and its experimental farm noted a number of measures that would allow realisation of the communists' suggestions.¹ This type of activity suggests precisely the sort of role that Sampson gave his staff generalists. It can also be seen, but on a much smaller scale, in the case of the Kazakh Institute of Chemical Science. In 1963 the head of one of the institute's laboratories reported to a party buro meeting on progress in one project. He declared that all was going well except that there was a lack of dolomite in Kazakhstan. The participants of the meeting suggested that astergranite could be a substitute. The suggestion was accepted.²

In both these cases the importance of a sound knowledge of the particular area of research is great, but, particularly in the former case, within an overall

1 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 6/67, pp. 43-44.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 12/63, p. 34.

understanding of the needs of the general area of research.

Again the best examples of the staff generalist role have come from those areas where PPO's are trying to solve specific problems, in areas where the party members, and presumably the party secretary in particular, being scientists themselves, are able to examine these problems and apparently offer useful solutions. The combined experience of the party members is such that recommendations are likely to be offered that will be of general benefit to the institute, branch and society as a whole.

However in other areas the PPO's are not in such a happy situation. In their control of plan fulfilment, quality and effectiveness they are frustrated in playing a staff generalist role by the general situation and their own shortcomings in qualifications and experience. They are expected to commit themselves to plan fulfilment, largely incompatible with scientific research, and therefore there is some evidence that they are unwilling to accept the commitment. Questions of quality and effectiveness are too complex and specialised for the average scientific researcher. Thus the PPO's show themselves unaware of the complexities.

Nevertheless on balance the evidence presented in this section suggests that research PPO's are willing to

play a staff generalist role.¹

(iii) administrative institutions

As mentioned in the introduction to this section the discussion of administrative PPO's will be limited here to a concern with the style of bureaucratic work. Soon we will see claims by some Soviet commentators, both before and since 1971, that administrative PPO's are entitled to be involved *only* with such matters. It is undoubtedly an important part of their work, but the brief discussion here should suffice to show that it is impossible to maintain the distinction between a concern with the style and the content of bureaucratic work. This provides the introduction to the last section of this chapter, dealing with relations with outside organisations.

The first matter of bureaucratic style and procedure to be examined, efforts to reduce the amount of paperwork involved, might appear to be straightforward. In 1966 a party meeting of the Moldavian Ministry of Light Industry considered the excessive paperwork in the Administration for Production and Technology and the Department of Material Incentive.² In 1954 the communists

1 There is further discussion of problem-solving in the later account of research PPO's work with outside organisations.

2 *Kom.Moldavii*, 7/66, p. 36.

of the Department of Technical Services of the Ministry of Electrical Machine Construction tried to reduce the amount of paperwork involved in ministry-enterprise relations. Their concern was prompted by the 1,638 messages that had been sent to a single enterprise in one year by ministry officials.¹ Neither case suggests any concern with anything beyond simple bureaucratic procedure. However when we read that ministerial PPO's are entrusted with the task of preventing the sending of trivial (*melochnye*) directives from ministries to enterprises, the need for them to decide which directives are trivial could well give them some significant influence over the content, not just the style of bureaucratic activities.²

The same problem can be seen in the concern of PPO's to reduce the number of business trips undertaken by administrative officials. Keeping the number of trips to a minimum cannot simply mean banning trips without having any interest in their purpose and likely outcome. This was the approach adopted by the party committee of the Moscow *oblast' sovnarkhoz* when it recommended to the leadership that the calling of leading enterprise workers to the *sovnarkhoz* more than once monthly be banned.³ *Partiinaiia*

1 *P.zh.*, 2/54, pp. 56-57.

2 *P.zh.*, 8/64, p. 36.

3 *P.zh.*, 2/62, pp. 13-14.

zhizn' was apparently aware of the problem of such a "formalistic" approach when in 1967 it criticised the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Geology for not being interested in the *effectiveness* of business trips.¹

The efficiency of the administrative apparatus in dealing with letters and grievances from subordinate enterprises, customers of the institution and the public is another matter than can be dealt with from a narrow point of view, but hardly successfully. Nevertheless in 1954 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* declared that while ministerial PPO's should make sure that letters are answered quickly, they should not interest themselves in the contents of the letters or the replies.² Nor surprisingly many PPO's apparently find it impossible to ensure that their "host" organisations are dealing properly with letters and grievances without being interested in their content. Thus in 1964 the head of the Department of Road Construction Machines of the Rostov Administration for the Supply and Sales of Heavy Machinery of the State Committee for Transport Construction was removed from his post by the head of the administration after members of the party-state control brigade, under the leadership of the party organisation, found that he had been "sitting on" about 400 documents

1 *P.zh.*, 4/67, p. 22.

2 *P.zh.*, 5/54, p. 6.

requiring urgent attention.¹ Presumably the PPO was sufficiently interested in the content of the documents to know that they were urgent.²

It can be seen that the matters considered here, paperwork, trips and correspondence, eventually go beyond controlling simple bureaucratic procedures. It appears inevitable that any effective concern with bureaucratic procedures will come to involve a concern with the content of those procedures.

4. Relations with outside organisations

The content is almost always the work of production enterprises subordinate to the administrative institution. Nevertheless administrative PPO's are still formally denied

1 *P.zh.*, 8/64, p. 36.

2 There is one report which does not make clear whether the PPO was interested in the content of correspondence, but gives sufficient detail on the way PPO's work that it is worth quoting. In 1962 the party committee of the State Committee for Labour and Wages was strongly criticised at a plenum of the Bauman *raikom* in Moscow for doing nothing about poor work with grievances in the State Committee's apparatus. The party committee acknowledged the criticism and selected a group of communists to look into the matter. The group produced statistical data and a number of concrete suggestions which were examined by the leadership of the State Committee. The chairman of the State Committee issued an order (*prikaz*) on the need for improvement, the implementation of which the party committee took under its direct control. *P.zh.*, 2/62, p. 14.

the right to involve themselves in the work of subordinate enterprises. The denial of the right has often been confusingly linked to the denial of the right of control to administrative PPO's. When the right of control was given to production PPO's at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, the PPO's of the People's Commissariats were specifically excluded "as a consequence of specific conditions". The Party Rules limited their role to improving the work of the apparatuses in which they were situated and their power to signalling the existence of shortcomings in the working of the apparatuses to higher authorities.¹

The specific conditions were detailed by *Partiinaiia zhizn'* in 1954. The journal pointed out that a ministry, and any other administrative institution, has many institutions and enterprises subordinate to it with their own PPO's, often in other localities and so subordinate to different *raikomy* or *gorkomy*. For the ministerial PPO to concern itself with the activities of the subordinate organisations would involve usurping the rights of those superior party organs.²

1 *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh*, op. cit., vol. 2, 1925-53, p. 917.

2 *P.zh.*, 5/54, p. 8. The journal gave a concrete example in 1958. The *raion* inspectorates of the Kashka-Daria *oblast'* Statistics Administration often received instructions from the administration signed by its head and the secretary of its PPO. One such order said that a party meeting had "examined in detail the shortcomings in the work of the administration in general and also in each inspectorate". The inspectors were instructed to discuss the matter of the shortcomings in their work with the communists and send the results to the administration. *Partiinaiia zhizn'* declared that the administration's PPO was assuming the functions of the *obkom* in directing *raion* organisations. *P.zh.*, 6/58, p. 62.

This argument has been used to justify limiting the functions of administrative PPO's strictly to the style of bureaucratic procedures. Since the content of those procedures is almost invariably connected with the work of production enterprises, the administrative PPO's must not involve themselves in it lest they usurp the rights of superior party organs.¹

Clearly the right of control should have no direct application to this argument. The right of control defines a number of powers a PPO can use in its relations with the leadership of its own "host" organisation, and in itself implies no powers over outside organisations.

Nevertheless when in 1971 administrative PPO's were granted the right of control it was considered necessary to ensure that it was not interpreted as meaning that the PPO's were gaining any right of control over subordinate enterprises by limiting their control to "the work of the apparatus in the fulfilment of the directives of the party and state and the observance of Soviet laws", and describing their functions in terms similar to the 1939 description, "to actively work for the perfecting of the work of the

1 Thus when a factory complained to the party committee of the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry that two *glavki* were making conflicting demands of it, the party secretary claimed that the PPO, not having the right of control, could not act on such a matter. *P.zh.*, 13/55, pp. 52-53.

apparatus, to foster in officials a spirit of high responsibility for assigned tasks, to take measures for the strengthening of state discipline and improving services for the population, to conduct a resolute struggle against bureaucratism and red-tape, and to promptly inform responsible party organs of shortcomings in the work of institutions and individual officials, regardless of their positions".¹

The 1971 Rules are still misleading to the extent that they fail to recognise the opportunities that administrative PPO's have long had and exercised, regardless of the right of control, for influencing the work of subordinate enterprises. An administrative PPO is easily able to justify some degree of involvement in subordinate enterprises simply by expressing it in terms of the performance of administrative officials in their dealings with enterprises. Thus in 1958, long before administrative PPO's received the right of control, *Partiinaiia zhizn'* wrote:

Of course the primary party organisation (of an administrative apparatus) may not directly lead the periphery. But it is clear that it cannot remain indifferent to work there. If necessary, if subordinate enterprises are not fulfilling production

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Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

plans, the party organisation is obliged to concern itself with the shortcomings in the work of the apparatus that have created the conditions for this, and to take all measures available to it to remove them.¹

In the same journal in 1972, after the granting of the right of control, the following statement appeared:

The party organisations of administrative institutions, as everyone knows, cannot directly influence the activity of subordinate enterprises. But, all the same, in controlling the work of the apparatus, they give concrete assistance to the collectives of factories, construction sites and collective and state farms in the mobilisation of reserves and in the fulfilment of plans and socialist obligations.²

1 *P.zh.*, 15/58, p. 18.

2 *P.zh.*, 21/72, p. 5. In 1973 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* declared that although a *gorispolkom* PPO cannot hear a report from the head of the Consumer Trade Department on the condition of consumer trade in the city because this is the concern of the *gorispolkom* itself or the *gorkom* buro or plenum, it can consider the question "The tasks of the communists in the *gorispolkom* apparatus in improving control of the condition of consumer trade in the city". The journal considered that "this is permissible, since the primary party organisation of the *ispolkom* influences the state of affairs in subordinate enterprises and institutions through the apparatus officials, primarily the communists, connected with this or that branch of the economy". *P.zh.*, 12/73, pp. 51-52.

Thus the right of control is not strictly speaking relevant to the permissible relations of administrative PPO's with subordinate enterprises. Examples of administrative PPO involvement in the affairs of subordinate enterprises date both before and after 1971. The degree of involvement permitted has always depended on official policy of the time on the role of the party apparatus in production affairs. Thus examples of administrative PPO involvement in production affairs abound in the late 1950's, a time when the party apparatus as a whole was heavily involved in production affairs.

This is not to deny entirely the significance of the 1971 granting of the right of control. As with other categories of non-production institutions the right of control has had considerable significance in showing all affected people that the role of the PPO's was to be strengthened and in making it impossible for both institutional leaders and PPO officials themselves to avoid the implications of the strengthened role of

the PPO's.¹ Nevertheless from the concrete examples I will give it is evident that these types of activities have been undertaken by administrative PPO's well before 1971.

The least controversial aspect of administrative PPO's involvement in the activities of subordinate enterprises is control of the behaviour of administrative officials in their dealing with them. This is uncontroversial because it need not imply any concern with the actual activities of the enterprise. The PPO of the Kazakh Ministry of State Control was criticised in 1956 for not showing any concern over the fact that when senior ministry officials visited factories they showed no interest in

1 A member of the party buro of the Irkutsk *sovnarkhoz* was aware of this when he wrote to *Kommunist* in 1961: "Can the party organisation of the *sovnarkhoz* really stand aside when, through the fault of *sovnarkhoz* officials, many subordinate enterprises cannot cope with their production plans, and when bad management is allowed? In the existing situation party organisations are limited to passing 'delicate', non-obligatory decisions regarding administrative leaders: to 'ask', 'direct attention to', 'recommend', etc. Not considering themselves responsible before the party organisation some leaders of administrations exclude it from a close study of conditions and reasons for shortcomings in work, considering that this would diminish their authority. Therefore it is considered that it is necessary to give the party organisations of *sovnarkhozy*, agencies, local soviet and administrative institutions the right of control of the activities of communist administrative leaders." *Kom.*, 13/61, p. 90.

talking to the workers or in reporting to their meetings.¹
 This is no more than a concern with the style of bureaucratic operations, only in this case it is operations taking place outside the central apparatus.²

However administrative PPO's are expected to be more vitally concerned with production than this. There is evidence to suggest that ministerial PPO's are held responsible to some degree for the fulfilment of branch plans.³ The concern for fulfilment of production plans is primary. If plan fulfilment is at stake administrative

1 *P.zh.*, 6/56, p. 32.

2 However the greater significance such a concern can have can be seen in more recent reports. In 1967 the party buro of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry was reported to be concerned, in the light of the economic reforms, to make party members active innovators not only in the ministerial apparatus, but also in the enterprises they periodically visit. *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/67, p. 54. This could suggest that the ministerial PPO's are expected to ensure that ministerial officials implement the economic reforms in production enterprises. For further discussion of this matter, see Chapter Four.

3 A *Partiinaia zhizn'* article of 1964 stressed that the lack of the right of control did not reduce the responsibility of the PPO of the North Caucasus *sovnarkhoz* for the fulfilment of production plans and tasks. *P.zh.*, 17/64, p. 37. The party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of Construction was criticised in the same year because the party buro had not mentioned in its meetings that the ministry was not fulfilling its production plans. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/64, pp. 60-61.

PPO's are expected to take any action necessary, even of dubious legality. Thus in 1966 when a Ukrainian factory had run out of some essential materials and one shop had lain idle for three months it sent representatives to the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Construction Materials. The party committee quickly got in touch with the responsible organisations and the necessary materials were sent to the factory. While *Kommunist* criticised the party committee for the style of its response, it admitted that some action had been necessary.¹

This case indicates that enterprise managers are aware of the fact that ministerial PPO's are ultimately responsible for the fulfilment of production plans, and so will turn to them in crisis situations. This must mean that PPO's become involved in the everyday operations of the ministries and their enterprises. In 1954 the director of a factory could not get an urgent order dealt with by the relevant *glavk* of the Ministry of Agriculture. He wrote to the party committee of the ministry, which sent it to the party buro of the *glavk*. However the buro considered the matter for a month before sending it back to the committee, saying that the officials of another *glavk* were to blame. The party buro was criticised for this.²

1 *Kom.*, 16/66, pp. 57-58.

2 *P.zh.*, 4/54, pp. 65-69.

Sometimes party contacts are used to solve production problems. When there was a problem in the Ministry of Chemical Industry over the dispatch of some insulating materials, the party buro of the Transport Administration contacted the party committee of the Ministry of Electro-technical Industry. This was reported to have improved the situation greatly.¹

Administrative PPO's appear to be willing to become involved in removing shortcomings in subordinate enterprises on their own initiative. For example, the party organisation of the Gas Administration of the State Committee for Labour and Wages conducted technical and managerial conferences on the work of its apparatus. One of these, with the title "The conditions of research work and the role of the apparatus in it", is said to have uncovered serious shortcomings in the work of subordinate research institutes, as well as in the leadership given them by the *glavk*.² At the election-report meeting of the PPO of the RSFSR Ministry of the River Fleet "the participants of the meeting turned particular attention to the removal of the existing shortcomings in the activity of the apparatus of the ministry and subordinate shipping enterprises (*parokhodstva*)."³

1 *P.zh.*, 7/56, p. 76.

2 *P.zh.*, 2/62, p. 14.

3 *P.zh.*, 24/73, p. 33.

Neither of these reports gives any idea of how administrative PPO's might change the situation in subordinate enterprises. Their information-gathering rights appear to be relatively uncontroversial, although considerable.¹ More important is what action the PPO can take once shortcomings have been uncovered. It is not permitted to exercise even the recommendatory powers of the right of control over subordinate enterprises or their PPO's. However the PPO does have the full powers of the right of control over all administrative officials and of party discipline over those of them who are party members.

Thus the PPO can hear reports from administrative officials on their work with subordinate enterprises and

1 In the wine-making industry in Moldavia there was considerable delay in the utilisation (*osvoenie*) of capital investment resources. On the recommendation of the party committee of the republican Ministry of Food Industry it was decided to find out why. A group of ministry specialists were sent out to the construction sites. The group, of unspecified total number, included eleven communists recommended by the party committee. *Kom.Moldavii*, 8/67, p. 58. The party buro of the Kirgiz Ministry of Health organised a commission to look into medical services in the villages. *Pravda*, 7/10/71, p. 2. That these commissions sent to subordinate enterprises, even if they are not party commissions, are under the direct control of the PPO can be seen in the statement in one Soviet book that it is permissible to establish a party group among a delegation of officials travelling from a central apparatus. *Figurin*, op. cit., p. 6.

make recommendations to them.¹ In some circumstances it can take party disciplinary action against recalcitrant leaders.²

What is so important about these powers is that they give the administrative PPO the opportunity to influence the activities of subordinate enterprises. While the PPO does not have the right to exercise control directly over them, it does have the right of control over the administrative officials who, after all, give enterprises direct orders. There appears to be no reason that the PPO cannot give recommendations, with the usual force of PPO

1 In 1973 the party committee of the RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction heard a report (*otchët*) from a *glavk* head on shortcomings in construction. There was a wastage of capital on many projects. The party committee recognised the need to change the planning of capital investments and to give resources to those enterprises that were in a position to utilise them best. The party committee suggested that the *glavk* head put things in order and informed the minister of the shortcomings and asked him to take the necessary measures. *P.zh.*, 8/73, p. 37. This indicates that the PPO played some policy-making role, in that it at least participated in deciding which enterprises deserved capital investment priority.

2 See the case already quoted of the *glavk* head who was given a party reprimand by the party committee of the RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction after failing to take any action, as directed by the party committee, on a complaint from a construction trust that *glavk* workers were not acting according to ministerial instructions. *P.zh.*, 6/73, p. 36.

recommendations, to administrative officials on the action they should take in subordinate enterprises. Thus we find administrative PPO's apparently directly influencing the work of subordinate enterprises through their control over administrative officials. In the Kuibyshev *sovnarkhoz* in 1958 a subordinate factory which had been given responsibility for producing some parts for tractor hydraulic systems failed to fill its orders and send the parts on to the next factory in the production chain. The *sovnarkhoz* PPO decided that some action was necessary and so examined how each communist in the apparatus "defended state interests".¹ No details are given on the results of its examination, but it was directly motivated by a problem in a production enterprise and it presumably resulted in some positive action to remove that problem.

Another case from the same report gives an example of the *sovnarkhoz* positively changing production procedures in a subordinate enterprise. The communists in the *sovnarkhoz* apparatus had learnt from a letter sent to the *sovnarkhoz* by a factory that it needed its supplies of cable earlier than was possible when the cable was produced at the end of the quarter. The communists spoke to the people concerned in the Construction Materials Administration and ensured that the cable was produced at the beginning of the quarter.²

1 *P.zh.*, 11/58, pp. 16-17.

2 *ibid.*

The widespread use by administrative PPO's of such powers must be of enormous significance. However there is also evidence of more direct involvement. One statement even suggests that administrative PPO's can make recommendations to the party organisations of subordinate enterprises. In 1971 the secretary of the party buro of the Orel department of the Moscow railway said:

It is well known that the party organisation of the department's apparatus cannot influence the work of enterprises and organisations situated in other *raiony*. The interests of business demand that the actions of all the collectives, and above all the communists in them, should be agreed upon. This means that it is necessary to have permanent communications with these party organisations, to inform them about our affairs, and at times to suggest something (naturally with the agreement of the relevant party organs).¹

The qualification about the agreement of the relevant party organs, that is the *raikom* or *gorkom*, is an important one. Nevertheless the suggestion that the PPO can make recommendations to the party organisations of subordinate enterprises, the recommendations presumably carrying with

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P.zh., 2/71, p. 39.

them some authority, is an interesting one.¹

Few reports go as far as this. However in recent years there has been an enormous increase in emphasis on the utility of cooperation between PPO's. We should remember when discussing the involvement of administrative PPO's in production matters and subordinate enterprises that often they are the only party organisations with access to the whole of a particular area of concern. Enterprise PPO's are not in a position to examine affairs within the bureaucratic apparatus, which is where many of the operational decisions affecting production are made, while *raikomy* and *gorkomy*, even those that have a preponderance of administrative institutions on their territory and therefore specialise in administrative management, are not in a position to investigate the situation at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy, especially if subordinate enterprises, as they very often are, are situated in different *raiony* or cities. The administrative PPO's therefore occupy an important strategic position.

Combined meetings and commissions of ministries and enterprise workers, under the direct supervision of the administrative PPO, are becoming increasingly popular. The

1 Also interesting is the inference that when the subordinate organisations are in the same *raion*, the department's party buro can influence their work.

party committee and subordinate party organisations of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry organise meetings of apparatus officials with the leaders of enterprises,¹ while to facilitate the working of the new administrative system the party buro of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry conducts similar meetings.² In 1969 one of the factories of the Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry was working poorly. An engineer-technician from one of the *glavki* went to the factory and decided that its technology was out of date. He returned to the *glavk* and turned to the party buro for advice. The buro and the *glavk* leadership suggested the formation of a brigade of factory and *glavk* specialists to be sent to the leading factories in Moscow and Leningrad.³ The party organisation of the North Kazakh *sovnarkhoz* had a number of brigades, with enterprise representatives, concerned with technical progress. One brigade was responsible for working out

1 *P.zh.*, 24/66, p. 27.

2 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/67, p. 54. The secretary of the party buro also mentions that enterprise PPO's ask the party buro to help them in the managerial training of their personnel.

3 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 8/69, pp. 20-21.

and putting into effect measures for raising the productivity of labour in industrial transport.¹

One would expect that in any cooperation between administrative and enterprise PPO's the administrative PPO's

1 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 7/60, p. 37. The strategic position of ministerial PPO's can also be seen in the increasing use made of direct contacts between them. In 1972 the secretary of the PPO of the All-Union Ministry of the Oil Industry spoke of the consideration of key problems of technical progress in combined meetings of the party committees of his and related ministries. He gave as an example the combined meeting of the party committees of his ministry and the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, in which the leaders of both ministries participated. The meeting considered the question of the improvement of the quality of pipes for oil grading and what the party organisations could do about it. *Sotsialisticheskaiia industriia*, 27/10, 72. In 1971 *Moskovskaia pravda* published quite a long article on the subject, written by the secretary of the PPO of the State Committee for Science and Technology. The PPO had held a conference of its party *aktiv* in order to consider the forms and methods available to establish control of the work of the apparatus. The secretaries of the department and administration party organisations had supported the further development of contacts with party organisations in other ministries and agencies. There then took place a combined meeting of the communists of the Department of Energy of the State Committee and the Technical Administration of the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry. The meeting examined the question of raising the effectiveness of the work of research organisations and speeding up the introduction of scientific discoveries into production. The party conference in the State Committee had also raised the possibility of the formation of special commissions for the control of important inter-branch problems of technical progress. The proposal was still being examined, there being problems deciding who would head the combined commissions. It was thought it would probably vary according to each individual situation. *Mosk.ppravda*, 17/9/71, p. 2.

would occupy the dominant position. Their "host" organisations are superior to the "host" organisations of enterprise PPO's and the matters discussed will usually be put into practice by means of administrative orders to the enterprises. In the case of ministerial PPO's, relations between them and the Central Committee apparatus are apparently very close, which suggests that they could be in a position not only to exert their authority over the enterprise PPO's, but also over the *raikomy* and *gorkomy* in the territory of which the enterprises are situated.

The general impression to be gained from the evidence in this section is that the powers of administrative, particularly ministerial PPO's, over subordinate enterprises are considerable. Although they are formally denied the right to directly control subordinate enterprises, their exercise of control over administrative officials even when they are carrying out assignments in the enterprises gives them the opportunity to significantly influence the administrative supervision the enterprises receive and therefore their production operations. Such powers have been increasingly complemented by direct contacts between the party members of different PPO's, contacts presumably dominated by the administrative PPO's.

Administrative PPO's have taken considerable advantage of the opportunities offered them. They have

often taken the initiative in changing procedures in subordinate enterprises in order to remove shortcomings; perhaps even more often they have reacted to appeals from enterprises to change the procedures of administrative officials or other enterprises.

These activities are of considerable significance for short-term problem-solving, but are they relevant to the staff generalist role? None of the examples given in this section have suggested any awareness of the long-term implications of particular problems. Even the cases dealing with problems of capital investment appear to go no further than the immediate difficulties in the use of capital resources, not the long-term needs of the branch (with the possible exception of the case of the RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction, where the PPO made decisions on investment priorities). The problem is well illustrated in the case already mentioned of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Construction Materials which contacted the responsible organisations to ensure that a Ukrainian factory that had been short of supplies received what it needed. In reporting the case *Kommunist* admitted that the situation was a serious one and that some action had had to be taken. However the journal criticised the party committee on two counts. Firstly, in such a situation it is not the task of the party committee to contact the

responsible organisations, that is, the party committee was usurping the functions of other organisations. Secondly, and more interesting for us at this stage, the journal claimed that the party committee did nothing to uncover the underlying causes of the problem and to remove them.¹ The party committee was happy to have solved the immediate problem, but was unable to see that its staff generalist responsibilities required it to take much broader, longer-term action. The other cases reported in this section suggest that *Kommunist's* criticisms could be applied to most other administrative PPO's. While their operational powers should not be underestimated, they are used in the way warned against by Sampson, to solve short-term problems by interfering in day-to-day operations, leading to a situation where the PPO becomes a "problem-fixing" agency which is appealed to in all cases of difficulty. It will probably be able to solve the problem through various informal and perhaps disruptive means, but will eventually come to be relied upon to permanently play this role. Meanwhile the causes of the problems are ignored and so the situation never improves. In such a case it could be concluded that the PPO is failing in its task.²

1 *Kom.*, 16/66, pp. 57-58.

2 In the special chapter on ministerial PPO's there is greater evidence of PPO's acting with staff generalist aims in mind. Nevertheless the conclusion is reached that they do not act in a staff generalist style and so again they fail.

We have already seen that research PPO's play a considerable problem-solving role and often apparently with a staff generalist outlook. One of the great problems of Soviet science is the introduction of scientific discoveries into production.¹ PPO's are closely involved in attempts to solve this problem.

Their involvement begins with such "social" activities as ensuring close and "friendly" relations between scientists and producers.² Such efforts are not solely directed towards improving brotherly relations. They are designed to ensure greater technical understanding among producers and understanding of production requirements among scientists, with the aim of easing the difficulties of introducing scientific discoveries into production.

Relations between scientists and producers can be organised on quite a formal basis, as can the involvement of research PPO's in questions of the introduction of scientific discoveries into production. Thus in the

1 See Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 425-486.

2 Party meetings in the Urals branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences looked on the development of "friendly" relations between scientists and production workers as one of their fundamental tasks. *Kom.*, 18/54, pp. 63-64. The party committee of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute considers that it is its task to foster the "strengthening of the friendly cooperation (*sodruzhestvo*) of scientists with production". *P.zh.*, 1/67, p. 26.

Cheliabinsk Research Institute of Metallurgy there are combined brigades of workers from the institute and factories. The institute has a combined Technical Council with one factory with which the institute works particularly closely. The council was formed on the initiative of the *raikom* and is controlled by the two PPO's, its activities being discussed in party meetings and in meetings of the factory's party committee and the institute's party buro.¹

Often these combined meetings, councils and brigades, still under the control of research PPO's, are involved in solving particular problems. Thus the brigades organised by the PPO of the Institute of Catalysis, combining specialists from the institute, other institutes and factories, as well as helping foster a sense of the collective spirit in the scientists, are also said to help solve current problems in important areas of the chemical and oil-chemical industry.²

1 *Kom.*, 9/70, pp. 16-17. The party committee of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute has a permanent control commission specifically concerned with the introduction of scientific developments into production, while its department party organisations have links with factory PPO's. *P.zh.*, 16/63, p. 36; Barkusov, op. cit., p. 64. The party buro of the Kazakh Research Institute of Energy set up a special commission to look at all aspects of the introduction of its work into production. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/72, p. 31. In 1965, on the initiative of the PPO of the institute *Karagandagiproshakht*, communist scientists went to party meetings in the mines. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 10/65, p. 32.

2 Ianovskii, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

A most interesting case concerns the Rostov Research Institute of Machine Construction Technology. In 1959 the party buro of the institute suggested the study of the group method of detailing work used in two factories. The leadership of the institute sent two groups of specialists to the factories. They found that the orders given by the *sovnarkhoz* on the process were inadequate. The specialists informed the party and trade union organisations of the factories and they decided on measures to be taken. The party buro of the institute gave the results of the investigation, including conclusions and suggestions, to the *sovnarkhoz*'s Machine Construction Administration.¹ In this case the institute's party buro appeared willing to attempt to influence the *sovnarkhoz* as well as the factories.²

1 *P.zh.*, 20/59, p. 45.

2 There are numerous other examples. The All-Union Design-Technical Institute for Electrical Appliances and Instruments has a control commission for the introduction of progressive developments (*razrabotki*) into production. Following complaints from factories the commission investigated the use of non-standardised machinery designed by the institute in the factories. It required information from the factories and so recommended that the administration obtain information from the factory managers, while communists check the situation during inspection tours through the factories. The commission collected data on the reasons for delays in the use of machinery and uncovered deficiencies in the technical documentation for the machines. It offered practical recommendations to the party buro. A party meeting was then held at which the institute's chief engineer gave a report (*otchët*). After the meeting the administration issued an order. *P.zh.*, 24/75, p. 46. In 1963 the party committee of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute sent a commission to a Tallin factory to look at problems involved in the introduction of new technology. It found that some new techniques were being misused, but with the help of republican party organisations things were put right. *P.zh.*, 16/63, p. 35.

This type of activity has a lot in common with the activities of administrative PPO's in subordinate enterprises. They appear to be usually limited to the solving of short-term problems, although there are some suggestions that there is a longer-term concern with the implementation of new technology. Nevertheless there is not the same degree of staff generalist concern as was evident in the earlier section on research PPO problem-solving. This is presumably a consequence of limitations in the power that research PPO's have to influence customer enterprises. While the evidence suggests that they have adequate powers of investigation and recommendation with regard to specific problems, these powers do not extend to the expression of general policy inherent in a staff generalist role. Given the general position of research PPO's in the Soviet system this cannot be considered surprising.

Tertiary educational establishments are also involved in the introduction of scientific discoveries into

production.¹ However the relations of educational institutions with production enterprises are not only for research purposes. They are also important for the educational process itself. *Kommunist* says:

The party organisations of educational institutions and industrial enterprises examine together many questions of the improvement of the practical and theoretical training of students ...

The party organisation of the Cheliabinsk Polytechnical Institute supports relations with the enterprises where the institute's first-year students work.²

1 A secretary of the Leningrad *gorkom* said in 1958, in a discussion of Khrushchev's speech at the 21st Party Congress, that the party organisations of tertiary institutions had begun more closely to involve themselves in the introduction of the achievements of science into production. *Kom.*, 18/58, p. 31. The party committee of the Tomsk Polytechnical Institute recommended to the institute's leadership that contracts be drawn up with the association *Tomlesprom* to speed up scientific-technological progress. *P.zh.*, 6/73, p. 34. The PPO of the Lvov Polytechnical Institute used the "voluntary" work of the institute staff to establish a scientific-technical faculty in the institute with branches in large industrial enterprises. *P.zh.*, 4/60, pp. 78-79. The Moscow Engineering-Economics Institute has a special party commission concerned with "creative links with production". Samsonov, op. cit., p. 6.

2 *Kom.*, 5/60, p. 74.

A 1963 article in *Partiinaiia zhizn'* describes the concern of school PPO's with the shortcomings not only of their directors, but also of the leaders of the enterprises with which their schools have relations, especially those enterprises where their students work. For example, an open party meeting in a Leningrad eleven-year school criticised the administration of the enterprise where the school's students worked, for failing to establish training work-shops. The meeting recommended to the enterprise leaders that the situation be changed. The enterprise PPO's gave assistance to their school counterpart.¹ This report goes very much further in giving non-production PPO's the right to influence the activity of outside organisations than any other I have found.

Conclusion

The overall impression to be gained from this chapter is that non-production PPO's do not fulfil staff generalist functions. Although they make significant use of their control powers, both in routine "verification of fulfilment" and in the decision-making made possible by the ambiguity left in the tasks of "host" organisations, they do not usually use them in a staff generalist way, in a way that exhibits a concern with the broad understanding of

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P.zh., 5/63, pp. 49-50.

the "host" organisations' functions or with a long-term improvement in their fulfilment. There are exceptions to this generalisation. By definition a concern with planning is a concern with the long-term. All categories of non-production PPO's, with the exception of those in administrative institutions, apparently play an important part in the formulation of plans. Although formally speaking the planning process is highly centralised there is in fact a considerable degree of *de facto* decentralisation, particularly in the research category. This gives PPO's the opportunity to participate in the determination of the long-term objectives of "host" organisations.

Again particularly in the research area there is evidence of PPO's concerning themselves with short-term problem-solving within a staff generalist context. Research PPO's have been shown to place a particular research problem within the broad context of the general research objectives of the branch and system as a whole. Although the evidence is not as strong, the possibility cannot be excluded that educational PPO's are involved in the same way in solving problems that arise in the educational process.

However the great bulk of the involvement of the PPO's of all categories in problem-solving appears to take a form that is fundamentally opposed to staff generalism.

PPO's are able to use apparently quite effectively the powers of the right of control and their contacts with higher party authorities and other PPO's to solve short-term operational problems that have arisen both within their own "host" organisation and in other institutions. Although in such activities they do not use any formal powers of operational command, they are nevertheless closely involved in operational decision-making. Such activities are not necessarily incompatible with the staff generalist role. Sampson admits that such involvement can be both necessary and useful. However they should not be allowed to displace the true staff generalist concern, which is to use short-term problem-solving to provide the impetus and access to a broad understanding and removal of basic shortcomings in the "host" organisation. If this latter concern is neglected the short-term problems simply continue to occur; the PPO continues to solve the problems, but without ever doing anything to remove the basic difficulty. This is disruptive for the organisation not simply because it means that problems are continually re-arising, but also because it means that the PPO is continually involved in operational concerns outside the normal channels of command and communication. If these informal channels come to be relied on, and there is some evidence that enterprise managers might rely to some extent on administrative PPO's, the normal channels atrophy,

while the party organisations find it increasingly difficult to get back to their staff generalist and other political-ideological functions. This problem, very evident among higher-level party organs, is one which, despite the periodic campaigns conducted against it, is continually reappearing. It seems that it could also be a problem among non-production PPO's.

The other aspect of PPO functions that appeared in this chapter and is quite outside the framework of the staff generalist model is the use of the operational powers of the right of control for political purposes. This was most evident in the case of educational PPO's, where ideological control and indoctrination is such a fundamental party of the "host" organisations' activities. However political and ideological concerns probably have an important part in the involvement of all PPO's in personnel policies. These concerns are best understood in terms of the legitimisation considerations discussed in the chapter on ideology. It cannot be said that such concerns are inherently opposed to staff generalism. However political manipulation of personnel policies and other ideological concerns can hardly lead to long-term improvements in operational performance.

Two factors contribute most strongly to the involvement of PPO's in short-term problem-solving and

their neglect of staff generalist concerns. Firstly, there is their responsibility for plan fulfilment. If plan fulfilment is threatened the PPO must take any measures necessary to solve that essentially short-term problem. Secondly, there is the fact that PPO's are in such a good position to become involved in such activities. They are so closely integrated into their "host" organisations and they are able to develop such extensive party contacts, including with higher authorities, that they are in an ideal position to provide the alternative means of command and communication that is so useful for drawing attention to and solving short-term problems. These two factors complement and contribute to an image of party work best summed up in the phrase "get the job done". The party apparatus is seen as an agency able to solve all problems - this is a necessary part of the image required for its legitimacy; it is also an image that has arisen through the experiences of the most difficult periods of Soviet development. Much of the activity of non-production PPO's described in this chapter suggests that they partake of this image. If it is one that has caused the PPO's pre-occupation with short-term problem-solving, it is in the long-term a dysfunctional one.

Later chapters will contribute more information on these questions. The next chapter examines a particular

case-study, the role of ministerial PPO's in the implementation of the post-1964 economic and administrative reforms. That role is in itself a staff generalist one. Therefore in the chapter we will see more evidence than has been given in this chapter of ministerial PPO's undertaking staff generalist functions. Nevertheless the conclusion will be reached that their style of work in the role is not a staff generalist one; it is rather the traditional style of party work. The chapter following that will present biographical data on PPO secretaries to test two largely opposing hypotheses - one, that PPO secretaries display the training, experience and expectations that would encourage them to behave in either a staff generalist or the traditional party style; and two, that their training, experience and expectations would encourage them to neglect state interests in order to collude with institutional leaders in the furtherance of narrow sectional interests. In earlier chapters I suggested that the close integration of a staff agency in a line organisation would cause serious problems of collusion. This chapter has not been concerned with this problem. However the final chapter before the Conclusion will devote considerable attention to it.

CHAPTER FOURMINISTERIAL PRIMARY PARTY ORGANISATIONS AND THE
POST-KHRUSHCHEV REFORMS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of the primary party organisations of ministries and other central bureaucratic agencies in the implementation of the economic and administrative reforms that have been introduced into the Soviet system since the fall of Khrushchev. It is still too early to come to any conclusions on how significant these reforms are in the long-term. While they certainly do not have the radical *appearance* of Khrushchev's reforms, indeed in some ways they could be seen as reversions to the system in force before Khrushchev, the present leadership appears to have somewhat more determined and clear-headed objectives than Khrushchev ever had. One might suspect, therefore, that the long-term significance of its reforms will be greater than that of many of Khrushchev's.

One can expect to find one of two motivations behind almost any government reform, and often a combination of the two. Firstly, there are political considerations - these can include factors connected with factional politics among the top leadership and factors concerned with general political control of the population. Secondly, there are economic and administrative

considerations - genuine efforts to improve the working of the economic system.

Both these considerations are evident in the post-1964 reforms, although perhaps the feature which helps give these reforms their "serious" appearance is that political features seem to have been largely stabilised and restrained, while the greatest attention is being paid to economic considerations.

There are a number of factors that are basic to an analysis of the post-Khrushchev reforms. I will now briefly describe them:

(1) The top leadership appears to have come to some agreement within itself that top-level factional conflict will be kept to a minimum. While the "party" has remained supreme, and that means essentially those top leaders who base their power in the party apparatus, above all Brezhnev, a slightly uneven balance with the top leaders basing their power in the administrative apparatus has been maintained. This can be seen best in the continuing separation of the posts of General Party Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the relative balance maintained between the two sides in membership of the Politburo.¹

1 Rigby, T.H. and R.F. Miller: *Political and Administrative Aspects of the Scientific and Technical Revolution in the USSR*, Occasional Paper No. 11 of the Department of Political Science, R.S.S.S., A.N.U., Canberra, 1976, pp. 38-39.

At lower levels this agreement can also be seen in the concern to maintain the "proper" division of labour between party and state officials - the party apparatus is to establish strong control over state bodies, but is not to engage in *podmena*.

(2) The population must be kept under strict control. Party and police influence on the intellectual and social life of individuals has been generally more evident. We will see that this has had its effect in the economic and administrative sphere.

(3) Genuine efforts are being made to improve economic and administrative performance. While the above factors remain in force, relatively radical measures will be adopted to streamline administrative procedures, to stimulate labour productivity and science and technology, and to improve the quality of production.

(4) The efforts made to improve economic and administrative performance are likely to affect the interests of various sectional groups in the economic and administrative system. The main groups are the party apparatus, the ministerial apparatus, the enterprise-level managers, and the central functional agencies such as Gosplan. All these groups have particular interests that will be affected by the reforms and all occupy such strategic positions in the system that their attitudes can influence the success or failure of the reforms. There are two

fundamental questions to be asked in connection with this factor. Firstly, at what stage do the interests of these sectional groups become significant for the balance described in point (1), for example, at what stage would the dissatisfaction of ministerial officials over some policy become so great that their representatives in the Politburo would feel it necessary to make it a point affecting the party-state balance? Secondly, there is what is in the general context perhaps a minor question, but for my purposes a major one - what role do ministerial PPO's play in ensuring that these sectional considerations do not adversely affect the reforms?

What are the reforms of which I am speaking? The first change after the fall of Khrushchev was the re-organisation of the party, and then the state apparatuses into more or less the same structures they had had before Khrushchev's changes. Such a change was consistent with all the points listed above. Certainly it appeared to be a pre-condition for any serious improvements in economic and administrative performance. The administrative chaos and confusion, probably even more than the rampant regionalism, of the *sovnarkhoz* system, had had disastrous consequences for economic performance. While the re-establishment of a centralised branch system narrowed the powers and responsibilities of the party apparatus, particularly when combined with the anti-*podmena* campaign that began

at the same time, party officials still gave every indication of being glad to be again in a reasonably predictable situation. Also the party apparatus was presumably confident it would soon find itself again in a strong position, in that it could again play an "anti-departmentalism" and coordinating role in regions now without regional industrial organs. This was made even more likely by the re-unification of the party apparatus. The coordinating role of the party had been seriously hindered by Khrushchev's bifurcation of the apparatus. The joy of former ministerial officials need not be explained - just getting back to Moscow was probably enough for most of them!

However the re-establishment of the branch system could hardly be described as a reform. Something a great deal more positive was required to stimulate the economy. The first moves were in the direction of the increased enterprise freedoms that had long been the object of attention from a number of economists, the best known of whom is Evsey Liberman. The same September, 1965 Central Committee which decided on the re-establishment of the branch system also decided on a number of measures designed to increase enterprise freedom and accountability. A detailed analysis of the changes is beyond the scope of this thesis. However a general impression of the aims and practical effects of the changes is essential for an understanding of the attitudes of the various sectional

groups towards the changes.¹ Essentially the changes involved reducing the number of planning indicators made obligatory for enterprises,² allowing enterprise management to dispose of a larger proportion of profit for material incentive and technological development, and increasing the accountability of enterprises by reducing their dependence on direct budgetary allocations and subsidies for investment and operating capital and increasing the use of bank credit and direct financing out of net profits and amortisation funds.

The changes were hailed by some observers in the West as the first steps on the road to "market socialism" and convergence with the West. It is doubtful that the Soviet authorities ever had such developments in mind; certainly they have never appeared in practice. The effect of the changes on enterprise freedom and on the general character of the Soviet economic and administrative system has been minimal. What is difficult to decide is the precise reason for this. The attitudes of the different

1 For accounts of the 1965 reforms and developments since then, see Keizer, W.: *The Soviet Quest for Economic Rationality, the conflict of economic and political aims in the Soviet economy, 1953-1968*, Rotterdam U.P., Rotterdam, 1971; Katz, A: *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, Praeger, N.Y., 1972; Rigby and Miller, op. cit.

2 With doubtful effect on their flexibility. See the section on planning, p. 266.

sectional groups in the system cannot be stated with complete certainty. One would expect that organisations involved in day-to-day administration would have been opposed to the changes, if they gave producing organisations greater freedom and strengthened the role of "economic", as against "administrative" methods of management.¹ The ministerial apparatuses had been closely

1 The division between "economic" and "administrative" methods is often insufficiently precise for more specialised discussions of Soviet economic administration. However it is very commonly used in Soviet sources and adequately, for our purposes, distinguishes between traditional "administrative" methods, based on obligatory planning indicators, covering all aspects of the enterprise's activities, and set and enforced by superior administrative bodies; and "economic" methods such as *khozraschet* accounting procedures and systems of material incentive. Material incentive has been described in Chapter One. *Khovraschet* is more complicated. However its essential meaning can be gained from V. Shtunbiuk's description of its application to ministries: "The transfer of ministries onto *khovraschet* means that all expenditure of the branch connected with production is covered by its receipts." *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 12/68, p. 43. Afanas'ev sees it as meaning that the operations of an organisation "are based on trade relations (with a new socialist content) and the use of value categories as regulating instruments and levers." Afanas'ev, V.G. and others: *Upravlenie sotsialisticheskim proizvodstvom, voprosy teorii i praktiki*, Izd. "Ekonomika", Moscow, 1975, 2nd edition, p. 304. Although the output of the organisation is still determined by a central plan, the use of such indicators as profit, profitability and sales give the organisation some degree of freedom in the methods of its operations. Thus "economic" methods imply some degree of decentralisation.

involved in day-to-day administration, and a lack of enthusiasm for the new system has always been evident, often taking the form of active and presumably deliberate violations of its principles.

But party organisations have also traditionally been involved in day-to-day administration. The emphasis on economic methods, in which there appeared to be no direct role for the party apparatus, particularly when accompanied by an anti-*podmena* campaign, could not have been favourably regarded by party officials.

One would expect that if anyone would have welcomed the changes, it would have been the enterprise managers. The changes had been preceded by complaints from work-place managers of the lack of freedom available to them.¹ However there have been suggestions in Western sources that in fact they did not welcome the changes, or at least failed to take advantage of the opportunities they offered.² There is Soviet evidence to support this view.³ Conversely, as R.F. Miller points out, many managers appeared to take excessive advantage of the changes. Many used the increased flexibility to narrow

1 Rigby and Miller, op. cit., pp. 87-89.

2 *ibid*, p. 81.

3 *Ekonomicheskie nauki*, 10/71, p. 28; *Sov.gos.i pravo*, 3/70, p. 137; *Kom.*, 3/66, p. 84; Lunev, op. cit., p. 82; *Pravda*, 6/4/69.

product assortments, neglect improvements in labour productivity, and to manipulate prices and plans so as to maximise their own profits at the expense of the social interest.¹ What is interesting is that on occasions management was assisted in such activity by ministerial officials.² It would appear that while ministerial officials might not have considered the new system as ideal, it was felt to be better than the one it replaced and they were able to adapt themselves to it.

In general, support for enterprise freedom appears to have been unenthusiastic at the lower levels. However one must wonder how much the relative ineffectiveness of the 1965 changes should be attributed to the lack of enthusiasm of the lower levels or the lack of enthusiasm of the top authorities. The original changes themselves were very limited in scope and the top authorities showed little interest in forcing their implementation even within these limitations. The relative lack of involvement of the party apparatus in encouraging the full implementation of the changes cannot be explained entirely in terms of its own lack of enthusiasm - the freedom of the party apparatus goes only so far.

1 Rigby and Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 81. For some Soviet evidence, see *Kom.Belorussii*, 11/73, p. 39; *Kom.Moldavii*, 3/72, p. 57.

2 *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 20/3/74, p. 2; *Kom.Moldavii*, 5/69, pp. 56-57; *Sov.gos.i pravo*, 11/71, p. 71.

One suspects that the top authorities' lack of enthusiasm can be quite adequately explained by their general fear of the consequences of allowing too great a degree of freedom to the lowest levels of the system. I mentioned above that the need to fully control the social and intellectual life of the population carries over into the economic sphere - this is evident here.

Eventually the worst fears of the top leaders were fully realised in Czechoslovakia. Here the full logic of the freedom of enterprises and the extensive use of economic methods seemed to have developed. T.H. Rigby says:

For the rationale of the party 'Reform Programme' in Czechoslovakia was that a socialist economic system relying primarily on 'economic' rather than bureaucratic mechanisms could only work if the traditional character and role of the party were also sharply modified, and the primary thrust of the changes in Czechoslovakia during 1968, complex and contradictory though they were, was towards emancipating social and economic collectivities from systematic party direction and supervision and the coordination of their activities through processes of autonomous interaction.¹

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Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 19.

The Soviet authorities had no intention of allowing such developments, either in Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union. The tanks entered Prague and in the Soviet Union the anti-*podmena* campaign came to final halt¹ and the emphasis of the reform turned even more resolutely away from enterprise freedom to increased and improved central planning.

It is perhaps a sign of the hollowness of the claims of "enterprise freedom" under the 1965 reforms, that the emphasis could change without any significant changes in formal organisation and procedure. Indeed any changes that have taken place since 1968 have been largely in the area of developing and extending the use of the "economic" methods first introduced in 1965. It would be quite wrong to believe that the 1965 changes were done away with in 1968 - quite the reverse. What in fact happened was that it was made clear, to those within and outside the country, that the 1965 changes were not what they were probably never intended to be - a movement towards "market socialism".

Thus since 1968 the stress has been on a combination of strong centralised planning and "economic" methods. The verbal and theoretical stress has been very much on

1 Which is not to say that *podmena* was now permitted - the end of the campaign signalled only that closer party control of the economy and administration was expected.

the planning side. The loud commitment to central planning by the ideologists is accompanied by the impressive, but still essentially theoretical development of models involving the massive injection of computer technology and mathematical techniques and the transformation of planning and production operations into largely automatic and computer controlled responses to centrally determined objectives and priorities.

Theoretical developments in planning techniques should not be disregarded altogether. If the Soviet authorities are as serious about them as they appear to be, they could be among the most significant developments of the future, and not only for the Soviet Union. However actual developments to the present day have largely been in the area of "economic" methods. While the already limited freedom of enterprises has been further reduced, efforts are being made to maintain "economic" methods and to further encourage the decentralisation of administration through the establishment of industry associations (*ob''edinenia*) operating on *khozraschet* principles and situated between the ministries and enterprises.¹

What are the attitudes of the different sections of the system to these new directions? The party apparatus seems quite satisfied. It is difficult to gauge what its

1 For a brief description of industry and production associations, see above, p. 217.

attitude to a fully developed computerised system might be. At first glance it might appear that such a system would remove all mid- and lower-level administrative decision-making and thereby take away the party's main field of operation. However as R.F. Miller says:

Party officials throughout the system would have an important supervisory role in seeing to it that economic and social functionaries conformed to the clear organizational and procedural requirements of 'systemness'.¹

However in a fully operational computerised system this would still entail a considerable curtailment of their present power and relative freedom.²

1 Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 83.

2 Another point to be considered is the extent to which training in the new techniques is being concentrated among party officials. At the 1971 conference of the Bauman *raion* party organisation the secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of the Gas Industry declared that it is essential that all administrative workers have special training in the area of automated systems of management. He particularly stressed the importance of such training for party cadres, since only through this would they "be able to place themselves in the vanguard of the implementation of scientific methods of management". *Mosk.pravda*, 29/1/71, p. 2. See also Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 27. Could this be a sign that the party apparatus will be directly involved in the establishment and operation of a computerised system, beyond a simply "controlling" role?

The main point, however, about the fully computerised system is how far into the future it lies. The consequences of its establishment are sufficiently uncertain, probably as much to the party apparatus as to Western observers, and, more importantly, sufficiently far into the future that party officials probably pay them little attention.

They are more concerned with the present situation. Although there must be some matters causing them concern at the moment, such as the spread of all-Union and republican industry associations, which because of their territorial dispositions escape the control of middle-level party organisation, in general they are allowed, indeed expected, to provide close control over all operations of the administrative and economic system and to involve themselves in coordination. Although the top leadership consistently stresses the importance of maintaining the "correct style of leadership", that is, *podmena* is still frowned upon, the present time must still be considered as one of great, and perhaps increasing party activism. The party apparatus shows every sign of appreciating it.

Enterprise management is less appreciative of recent developments. Although "economic" methods of management have been maintained, the limited degree of freedom which such methods entail has been largely taken

away from the enterprise level. The administration of the economic methods has been concentrated in the production and industry associations. Usually these are very large organisations and the influence of enterprise-level management on their operations is not great.¹

However one must not overestimate the significance of the attitudes of enterprise management in the thinking of the Soviet policy-makers. It is not a sufficiently important sectional interest to greatly influence top-level policy-making. This is in contrast to the ministerial apparatuses. Because the attitudes of ministerial officials can become a factor in the top-level party-state balance, considerable efforts have been made to gain ministerial support for the reforms. Great emphasis has been put on the central role of the ministries in developing their branches. Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Party Congress emphasised that the new system of administration raised the role and widened the independence

1 *Pravda* speaks in 1972 of the psychological barrier to associations among enterprise leaders, who fear losing their independence. *Pravda*, 24/1/72, p. 2. See also 27/3/72, p. 2. Ryavec sees the associations as being negations of the rights of enterprises, since the independence that had apparently been granted them is now being taken by the associations. Ryavec, K.W.: "Soviet Industrial Managers, their superiors and the economic reform: a study of an attempt at planned behavioural change", *Soviet Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2, October, 1969, p. 219.

of ministries.¹ Kosygin, also at the Congress, emphasised their role in developing unified policies for technological development within their branches.² We have already seen the considerable operational powers they still have.

Whether this stress on the continuing role of ministries is the result of a genuine feeling among policy-makers that the ministerial system is the best one, or the result of top-level political considerations, that is, such a policy is necessary to maintain the top-level party-state balance, is difficult to say.

Whatever the reason the ministries show themselves rather sceptical. It must be obvious to ministerial leaders that they lose much through the reforms. Firstly, functional central agencies tend to monopolise the policy-making in the most important areas

1 *Mosk.pravda*, 31/3/71, p. 7.

2 *Mosk.pravda*, 7/4/71, p. 5.

of the economic and administrative system.¹ At the other end of the scale the continued use of "economic methods" and the establishment of the industry associations are designed to remove much of the day-to-day operational power of the ministries. The ministries are expected to welcome this loss of operational power, since it enables them to concentrate their attention on their larger analytical and policy-making tasks.² They show no signs of being impressed by the argument.

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- 1 See the 1970 conference in the Academy of Sciences on "The organisation of work of ministries in the conditions of the economic reform", especially the declaration by Iu.V.Subotskii of the Institute of Economics that ministries are not designed for high-level specialised functions such as supply, communication and coordination, etc. *Sov.gos. i pravo*, 3/70, pp. 136-141. Gosplan maintains its traditionally considerable powers in planning, while gaining responsibility for developments in the area of computer technology. Tubol'tsev, M.N. (ed.): *Organizatsiia upravleniia*, Izd. "Ekonomika", Moscow, 1975, p. 40. The State Committee for Science and Technology has enormous powers in the direction and coordination of scientific research, while Gosnab has taken over many of the ministries' supply functions. Kozlov, op. cit., pp. 128, 241. Ryavec speaks of the conflict between Gosnab and the ministries over supply rights. Ryavec, op. cit., p. 223. The functions of Gosbank, Gosstroi and the State Committee for Labour and Wages must also be considered. Kozlov, op. cit., pp. 128, 254.
- 2 See the conference referred to above, especially the statement of M.I. Piskotin, *Sov.gos. i pravo*, 3/70, p. 137.

Indeed signs of ministerial obstruction of the reforms are considerable. At the 24th Party Congress Kosygin criticised some ministries for failing to implement the new methods of administration with any enthusiasm, for supplanting economic with administrative methods and for undermining the *khozraschët* rights of enterprises.¹ Before the general introduction of the new structures based on industry and production associations in 1973 there were obvious difficulties in the various experimental and pilot schemes operating around the country. There were regular complaints that the formation of the associations and the extension of *khozraschët* relations were proceeding slowly,² and that even when introduced they were not being used in the intended way.³

1 *Mosk.pravda*, 7/4/71, p. 5.

2 *P.zh.*, 6/71, p. 17. See Masherov's speech at the 24th Party Congress, *Pravda*, 1/4/71, p. 5.

3 *Sov.gos.i pravo*, 2/70, p. 55; *Kom.*, 10/66, p. 12; 3/70, p. 90. The lack of enthusiasm for the new systems was also evident in the words, as well as the actions of ministerial officials. In a 1970 issue of *Kommunist* (Vilnius) the chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers could write a whole article on the administration of the economy with a single mention of associations and no mention at all of economic methods, including *khozraschët*. *Kom.* (Vilnius), 1/70, pp. 39-45. In 1971 *Kommunist Moldavii* interviewed the Moldavian Minister of Construction. Twice he was asked direct questions on the new system of planning and economic incentive. Both times his answers were distinctly evasive, vague and unenthusiastic. *Kom.Moldavii*, 2/71, pp. 27-29.

In March-April 1973 the two- and three-level structures of ministries became general policy for all industrial ministries. This led to an enormous increase in the number of production and industry associations operating in the Soviet Union. By early 1976 25% of industrial production of the Soviet Union was being produced under the new systems.¹ Nevertheless ministerial obstruction continues. There are still complaints that the implementation of the new systems is proceeding slowly,² and that the formation of associations has had no practical significance.³ There are also continuing complaints of excessive ministerial involvement in day-to-day operational decision-making and petty supervision of subordinate enterprises.⁴

1 *Pravda*, 12/4/76, p. 1.

2 *P.zh.*, 7/74/ p. 12; *Pravda*, 12/4/76, p. 1.

3 *Pravda*, 31/7/74, p. 1. A 1976 *Pravda* editorial complained that some ministries have formed unnecessarily small and powerless production associations. This is presumably to ensure that the associations do not become sufficiently powerful that they can exert some degree of independence from or pressure on the ministries. *Pravda*, 12/4/76, p. 1.

4 Katz quotes a 1966 *Izvestia* editorial to the effect that 20-30% of the time of top-level enterprise management was still taken up with paperwork imposed by their bureaucratic superiors. Katz, A; op. cit., p. 161. For complaints about continuing ministerial involvement in planning and operational activities that are now the rights and responsibilities of the enterprises themselves, see Lunev, op. cit., pp. 13, 80.

It should not be thought that such behaviour is not altogether unexpected of ministries. They have been left considerable formal powers in this area and lack of involvement will be criticised.¹ The maintenance of such ministerial powers and involvement can presumably be explained by the natural conservatism of the Soviet leadership and its desire to ensure that the party-state balance is not unduly upset.

However the changes in ministerial-enterprise relations are neither irrelevant nor insignificant. The powers of the industry associations in particular are not to be lightly dismissed, and it appears that the leadership is serious about the associations asserting these powers.² The associations must be seen as considerable threats to

1 In 1973 the chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers could criticise ministries which did not "thoroughly examine the state of affairs in every enterprise, in order to mobilise all their reserves". *Kom.Moldavii*, 12/73, p. 22.

2 If the apparent commitment of the leadership to inter-branch associations comes to fruition, their role in reducing the powers of the ministries will presumably become even greater. Brezhnev declared at the 24th Party Congress that administrative boundaries and branch subordinations must not be allowed to interfere with the establishment of associations. *Mosk.pravda*, 31/3/71, p. 7. However in 1974 a leading official in Gosplan complained that associations were still confined to single ministries, when there was a need to construct them across ministerial boundaries. *Sots.industriia*, 26/6/74, p. 1.

the power of the ministries. They appear to be the main weapons for the implementation of the new economic and administrative reforms which, although with long-term aims of a fully computerised, centrally directed economy, have the short-term aim of administrative decentralisation, no longer directed at the enterprise level, but nonetheless directed at a level below the ministerial. These developments are clearly unpopular within the ministries.

This is hopefully a situation, therefore, where we can test the strength and effectiveness of PPO's. There is ample evidence that the party apparatus in general, and the ministerial PPO's in particular, have been entrusted with the task of achieving the implementation of the new reforms in the unenthusiastic ministries.

I have already described the anti-*podmena* campaign immediately following the fall of Khrushchev. By 1967 the campaign had come to an end, probably both because the campaign had achieved its goal of establishing the proper division of responsibilities between party and state, and because the leadership was already becoming disturbed by trends in Czechoslovakia. Since then, while the stress has been consistently on the need to maintain the proper division of responsibilities, party involvement in economic and administrative activities has been close and perhaps increasing.

I am primarily interested in the increased role of ministerial PPO's. However it should be mentioned that there are other means for the assertion of greater party influence over the central state apparatuses. T.H. Rigby assumes that Central Committee secretaries, briefed by their departmental personnel, have their say about the operation of government agencies at Politburo meetings.¹ Brezhnev has used Central Committee meetings as the forum for attacks on the work of ministries, particularly in December, 1969 and December, 1973, while formal party decisions are passed on the work of ministries and their subordinate enterprises, decisions which can include quite specific instructions on particular measures to be taken by ministries.²

But to return to PPO's. Their first task, a traditional one which quickly became again evident at the time of the reestablishment of the ministerial system in 1965, is to combat "sectionalism" (*vedomstvennost'*). This phenomenon, institutions concerned with a particular section of the economy protecting their interests even at

1 Rigby and Miller, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

2 See Rigby and Miller, op. cit., footnote 60, pp. 55-56. The latest Central Committee decision on a ministry was in June, 1976, "On the work of the Ministry of Construction of Enterprises of Heavy Industry for raising the productivity of labour, reducing periods and raising the quality of construction in the light of the instructions of the 25th Party Congress". *Pravda*, 13/6/76, p. 1.

the expense of the social interest, inevitably accompanies a ministerial system of administration, since such a system provides a ready-made institutional structure for it. There is ample evidence of its resurgence since 1965.¹ One point that should be made about industry associations is that they tend to contribute to "sectional" behaviour perhaps even more than ministries. They have the same sort of sectional solidarity, but are often established across the usual administrative

1 Dzhabadov complains of the tendency for ministries to neglect the financing of inter-branch projects. Tubol'tsev, op. cit., p. 11. At the 24th Party Congress the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk *obkom*, probably exhibiting more a concern for his region than proper party indignation at sectionalism, said: "Unfortunately we often meet with cases when different ministries and agencies orient themselves to the development of their branches, not taking into account the real material and labour resources of the local regions or the development of local industry . . . In developing production on the branch principle, it is necessary to take into account territorial peculiarities and conditions." *Pravda*, 2/4/71, p. 5. In 1975 *Pravda* related a typical case of the Ukrainian Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy refusing to construct the necessary industrial plant to build the equipment for new furnace techniques to be utilised by other ministries. *Pravda*, 19/9/75, p. 2. An article in *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia* attacks the sectionalism inherent in having the production of a single range of products, in this case clothing items, scattered throughout a large number of ministries. The suggestion is that the production of such items would be better concentrated under one authority, such as the Ministry of Light Industry. *Sots.industriia*, 23/9/75, p. 2.

boundaries. This, combined with their supposed increased operational independence, reduces both party and state control over them.¹ One would therefore expect to see considerable evidence of efforts on the part of PPO's to work against "sectionalism". Actually such evidence exists in surprisingly small quantities. Neither general statements on the need, nor accounts of them actually doing so are common. As exceptions, in 1966 a *Pravda* editorial declared that ministerial PPO's must "not tolerate sectional narrow-mindedness or localism",² while in 1968

1 In 1973 *Sotsialisticheskiia industriia* described the case of the All-Union Scientific-Technical Association in the Ministry of Food Industry which forbade the use of one particular innovation outside the boundaries of the ministry. *Sots.industriia*, 11/9/73, p. 2. One can sense a certain degree of cautiousness in the comments of a secretary of the Yaroslavl *obkom* about factories joining all-Union associations. He feels that under such an arrangement little changes as far as the essentially sectional character of the associations is concerned, and suggests that more decentralised territorial groupings might bear better fruit. *Pravda*, 27/3/72, p. 2. The common ground of regional party and state officials, usually with rather "regionalist" leanings, can be seen when we compare the *obkom* secretary's comments with those of the deputy chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers. He also complains of larger-scale associations allowing their subordinate enterprises to avoid control by local party and state organs and so to neglect the fulfilment of local production targets. He claims that true economic development comes with the correct combination of territorial and branch principles. *Sov.Estonia*, 19/12/73, p. 2. This is an area on which far more has been written about production associations, but since they are not strictly speaking administrative organs, they will not be included in this discussion.

2 *Pravda*, 30/12/66, p. 1.

Kommunist declared in general terms that a ministerial worker placing his departmental interest before the general interest was "committing a crude violation of party principles" and should be dealt with by the party. ¹

One can also look to the increasing activities of ministerial PPO's in the area of coordination as a sign of their involvement in opposing sectionalism. Combined meetings of the party committee of the Ministry of the Oil Industry with the party committees of related ministries are said to help in overcoming a sectional approach and to give general state interests the prime place in the development of production. ² Efforts such as those of the party committee of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine Construction to strengthen links with the party organisations of ministries using their ministry's products, ³ and the combined meetings of the communists of the Energy Department of the State Committee of Science and Technology and the Technical Administration of the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry designed to improve the work of research organisations must also contribute to such a goal. ⁴

1 *Kom.*, 7/68, p. 8.

2 *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 20/2/73.

3 *Pravda*, 29/11/71, p. 2.

4 *Mosk.pravda*, 17/9/71, p. 2.

However the paucity of evidence of PPO involvement in activity specifically directed against sectionalism is somewhat surprising. What is particularly surprising is the apparent lack of demands from higher authorities that ministerial PPO's be involved in such activities. Although both middle and top-level party workers appear to be disturbed by the existence of sectionalism, they appear to give ministerial PPO's little role in combating it. The reasons for this are not obvious. While it is understandable that the larger policy issues of deciding priorities and assigning tasks to different branches such as would be involved in the reorganisation of the clothing industry mentioned above would be considered beyond the functions of PPO's, the case referred to of the Ukrainian Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy would seem to provide a good opportunity for PPO involvement.¹

Whatever the reasons for this apparent lack of involvement, sectionalism is a traditional evil of the branch system of administration and need not be seen as peculiar to the new reforms. In the specific area of these reforms the role of ministerial PPO's is more evident. Efforts to ensure that ministerial PPO's play a strong role can be seen from 1965 onwards. One important feature

1. See above, p. 365.

has been the direct involvement of the Central Committee and the close involvement of the *raikomy* and *gorkomy* of the capital cities, particularly Moscow, in the supervision of ministerial PPO's.

The first sign of the concern of higher authorities to give ministerial PPO's a significant place in the new system came as early as October, 1965 when N. Egorychev, the first secretary of the Moscow *gorkom* wrote in *Pravda* that as a result of the September Central Committee plenum the *gorkom* had fully realised the need for militant (*boevye*) party organisations, headed by experienced party workers, in the newly reconstituted ministries. He made it understood that the work of these party organisations would be at the centre of the attention of the *gorkom*.¹ Since then the *gorkom* has run various seminars and conferences for ministerial party workers, and plenums for the consideration of their work.² The Moscow *raikomy* have been even more heavily involved in this type of work. For example, in November, 1966 a plenum of the Frunze *raikom* examined the work of the party organisation of the Ministry of Instrument-Making, since the ministry was such a vital one for the new administrative system.³ In 1968 the *raikom* ran a seminar to which a wide

1 *Pravda*, 4/10/65, p. 2.

2 *Pravda*, 10/3/69, p. 2; *Mosk.pravda*, 19/6/71, p. 2.

3 *P.zh.*, 21/66, p. 28.

circle of leading workers and party committee secretaries from a number of ministries and agencies was invited.¹ The *gorkomy* in republican capitals are also expected to engage in such activities. Even before the September, 1965 Plenum, in July, 1965 the Kishinev *gorkom* had run a seminar for ministerial party secretaries.² However in 1969 the secretary of the party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry was still able to criticise the Alma Ata *gorkom* and *raikomy* for their lack of seminars for ministerial party workers.³

Perhaps more significant is the closeness of direct Central Committee involvement with ministerial PPO's. At the end of 1966 a seminar was convened in the Central Committee for the secretaries of the party organisations of All-Union and RSFSR Ministries and agencies. The seminar was addressed by the Central Committee secretary for organisation and personnel and by several Central Committee department heads. The seminar appeared to aim both to encourage greater activity on the part of the party

1 *P.zh.*, 11/68, pp. 20-21.

2 *Kom.Moldavii*, 7/65, p. 39. It is interesting that the next month the Moldavian Central Committee ran a conference on questions of party-organisational work at which all the secretaries of ministerial party organisations whose speeches at the *gorkom*'s seminar had been reported without criticism were quite severely criticised, primarily for *podmena*. *Kom.Moldavii*, 8/65, pp. 3940.

3 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 8/69, p. 21.

organisations, particularly for the wider implementation of the economic reform in 1967, and to warn ministerial leaders that the PPO's could no longer be taken lightly. Specific mention was made of particular problem areas - the overly bureaucratic supervision of enterprises and shortcomings in planning, organisation of the apparatus and material-technical supplies. It was stressed that at party meetings controversial matters were not to be avoided, while ministerial leaders were not to treat criticism of them as a sign of lack of discipline or as personal attacks. The seminar stressed the obligation of the PPO's to report shortcomings to higher party authorities, including the Central Committee.¹ The Central Committee has continued to conduct meetings for party secretaries, often for particular sections of the economy, such as the 1974 meeting for those from agricultural agencies and ministries.²

The first signs of republican Central Committees' interest in the new ministerial PPO's was the criticism, early in 1965, by the Presidium of the Uzbek Central Committee of the party organisations of some ministries and agencies for *podmena*, but also for not being sufficiently strong in their fight against bureaucratic methods and for

1 *P.zh.*, 24/66, pp. 25-36; *Pravda*, 30/12/66, p. 1.

2 *Pravda*, 11/2/74, p. 1.

not informing higher authorities of shortcomings. The Central Committee passed a decision directing the attention of the Tashkent *gorkom* and *raikomy* and the Central Committee departments to these problems.¹ Early in 1967 the Moldavian Central Committee ran a seminar for the secretaries of the party organisations of ministries and agencies at which the emphasis was on the new system of planning and material incentive,² while the Seventh Plenum of the Moldavian Central Committee, later in 1967, devoted considerable attention to the shortcomings of ministries and their party organisations in the conditions of the new system.³ Following the 24th Party Congress and the granting of the right of control to ministerial PPO's the Moldavian Central Committee ran another conference for their secretaries.⁴ Since the 24th Congress there have been a number of meetings for the secretaries of the party organisations of Estonian ministries and agencies, in which secretaries and department heads of the republican Central Committee took part.⁵

1 *P.zh.*, 1/65, pp. 79-80.

2 *Kom.Moldavii*, 1/67, p. 47.

3 *Kom.Moldavii*, 12/67, p. 5.

4 *Kom.Moldavii*, 2/73, p. 57.

5 *Kom.Estonii*, 9/72, p. 30.

The Central Committees do not rely solely on such seminars, conferences and plenums to convey to ministerial party organisations their tasks. Central Committees in recent years have shown themselves very willing to involve themselves in the work of individual PPO's. In the years 1967 to 1971 the Buro and Secretariat of the Uzbek Central Committee heard reports (*otchëty*) on 21 PPO's, including that of the Ministry of Motor Transport.¹ In 1974 the Buro of the Turkmen Central Committee examined the activity of the party organisation of the Ministry of Culture.² At the 25th Party Congress Brezhnev said that in the years since the 24th Congress the Central Committee had discussed reports (*otchëty*) on the work of the party organisations of a number of institutions, including ministries.³ There are two All-Union Central Committee decisions on ministerial PPO's that serve as guides for all such party organisations, the 1970 decision on the party committee of the Ministry of Meat and Dairying Industry and the 1974 decision on the party committee of the Ministry of

1 *Kom. Uzbekistana*, 7/71, p. 26.

2 *P.zh.*, 10/74, p. 61.

3 *Pravda*, 25/2/76, p. 7.

Communications.¹

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- 1 *P.zh.*, 4/70, pp. 3-6; 23/74, p. 4. See the article by the secretary of the party committee of the State Committee of Science and Technology claiming the Meat and Dairying Industry decision as the guide for his PPO in working out the Five Year Plan for the development of science and technology. *Mosk.pravda*, 17/9/71, p. 2. He does not give any details on how the decision might have been a guide. Only summaries of both decisions are available to us. In both cases points are made in very general terms, areas needing urgent action not even being made particularly clear. The 1970 decision, the summary of which is far longer than that of the 1974 one, is generally more critical. It is interesting that this decision is critical of the PPO for its failure to adequately use reports from individual communist officials, while the 1974 decision expresses satisfaction on this point. The 1970 decision is also critical of the PPO for its failure to make adequate use of social organisations, while the 1974 decision makes no mention of them. Both decisions are critical of the PPO's for their failures to take action against shortcomings that arise in the work of the ministries. Both decisions devote considerable attention to the failure of the ministerial apparatuses to adequately lead and supervise the work of subordinate enterprises. It is interesting that the 1970 decision puts this in the framework of the implementation of the economic reform, while the 1974 decision fails to mention the reform. (This can be partly explained by the non-production nature of the Ministry of Communications.) Both decisions are sufficiently wide-ranging and general in their criticisms to provide Central Committee, *gorkom* or *raikom* instructors with ample opportunity to criticise ministerial PPO's in any aspect of their work in the name of the Central Committee.

Finally there are the informal contacts between higher authorities and ministerial PPO's. I have been assured in conversations in Moscow with a former ministerial party secretary that contacts between ministerial party secretaries and Central Committee officials are very common, including informal telephone conversations on a completely *ad hoc* basis.¹ Such contacts should probably be seen as much as a means of upward communication as the reverse.

1 When I asked what consideration was given to the *raikom* or *gorkom* in these contacts, I was told that they would naturally be informed of the outcome of more important discussions. However there was no need for their participation in these informal contacts. A former Central Committee worker, in a 1974 interview in *Survey*, claims that traditionally Central Committee officials would not deal directly with PPO's, but relied on the reports (*spravki*) coming up through the party hierarchy. This meant that the information received was subject to considerable distortion. To counteract this a special Information Sector was established, initially in 1956 with re-organisations in 1962 and 1966. While being responsible for collecting and analysing information received through traditional channels, the sector was also given the right to collect information directly itself. However the interviewee claims that the sector met with considerable opposition, resulting in significant curtailment of its powers and reduction of its role to a largely symbolic one. Pravdin, *op. cit.*, p. 97. Nevertheless my conversations, the number of seminars and conferences run by the Central Committee for ministerial PPO secretaries, and the stress in the Soviet press on the need for ministerial PPO's to report shortcomings directly to the Central Committee all suggest that normal party channels are often bypassed.

It would be interesting to know what percentage of contacts are connected with the economic reforms and what percentage with more routine administrative activities. Perhaps the evidence would show above all that it is not easy to distinguish the two. However there are some matters specifically concerned with the reforms that one would expect to have been the subject of some contacts. Firstly, the PPO's seem to have been quite closely involved in the actual implementation of the organisational measures set out by the reform. The PPO of the Ministry of Instrument Making was said to be closely involved in the implementation of the rather radical re-organisation in that ministry. The proposals put forward by the collegium were closely examined in the party committee and meetings of the party *aktiv* of the ministry and its *glavki*.¹ In 1969 the party buro and party meetings of the Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry also considered the introduction of *khozraschet* relations into the ministerial system.² The party committee of the All-Union Ministry of the Chemical Industry was reported to have been of great assistance in the formation of associations. The party committee was also responsible for the decision that the old system of material-technical supply was no longer adequate. There had been argument over whether the old decentralised system was adequate or

1 *P.zh.*, 11/68, p. 17.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 8/69, p. 17.

whether a specialised department was required. After the party committee had sent specialists into the localities and to other ministries, it became evident that the system must be changed. The party committee offered its opinion, along with concrete proposals based on the suggestions of the communists, to the leadership of the ministry. These proposals were taken into consideration when the matter was examined in a meeting of the collegium and when the formation of the Chief Supply Administration began.¹ The party organisation of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry took an active part in the formation of a central fund for material incentive and in working out a system of bonus payments for apparatus workers.²

One of the most important factors affecting the implementation of administrative changes is the personnel who will be responsible for it. The Central Committee has shown its awareness of the importance of personnel. In 1967 it passed a decision on personnel work in central administrative organs, critical of a number of ministers and their deputies for a "liberal attitude" to established officials and for failure to prepare younger, well-qualified people for responsible positions.³ The All-Union Central

1 *Pravda*, 10/3/69, p. 2.

2 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 1/71, p. 61.

3 *Pravda*, 16/6/67, p. 1.

Committee decision was quickly followed by similar republican Central Committee activities. For example, in mid-67 a plenum of the Moldavian Central Committee criticised personnel work in administrative agencies.¹

In 1973 *Pravda*, commenting on the recent combined Central Committee and Council of Ministers resolution on measures for the perfecting of the administration of industry, specifically the general introduction of industrial and production associations, wrote an editorial on the special responsibility of ministerial PPO's in the management of personnel. Party organisations were called upon "to move into leading work those who to the fullest degree possess a sense of the new, who exhibit initiative and who skilfully realise the possibilities uncovered by scientific-technical progress and the perfecting of the methods of administration."²

The suggestion of the Central Committee decision and *Pravda* editorial is that ministerial party organisations are expected to ensure that personnel receptive to the new economic reforms are moved into leading positions. There is evidence that PPO's are able to do this. For example, the secretary of the party buro of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry wrote an article immediately after the

1 *Kom. Moldavii*, 8/67, pp. 60-61.

2 *Pravda*, 4/4/73, p. 1.

Central Committee's 1967 decision on ministerial personnel which declared that the first matter that had been considered by the party organisation after the formation of the ministry in 1965 had been the staffing of the ministry's apparatus.¹ About the same time the party committee of the Moldavian Ministry of the Food Industry reacted to the republican Central Committee's consideration of the matter by discussing its findings in a meeting and recognising the validity of the Central Committee's criticisms. The matter was also considered in a widened meeting of the collegium and measures were decided on to improve personnel work.²

The secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry showed his reliance on the 1973 *Pravda* editorial by using the exact words quoted above in his description of the party organisation's personnel tasks. He also described the activities of a commission appointed by the party committee which had examined the personnel work of a *glavk* head who had failed to react to criticism of him in the collegium. The commission found evidence of "subjectivism" in his selection of personnel, that is, he had not paid attention to the guidelines set down by higher authorities.³

1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/67, p. 53.

2 *Kom.Moldavii*, 8/67, pp. 60-61.

3 *Aktivnye pomoshchniki partiinykh komitetov*, op. cit., p. 210.

But probably the most important development in this area has been the power ministerial PPO's have gained to vet personnel appointments, movements and dismissals before they take place. I have already listed considerable evidence of powers such as that of the party committee and administration party buros of the All-Union Ministry of Energy and Electrification. They are to be consulted by ministerial leaders on all appointments and dismissals of ministerial workers and are to have their recommendations seriously considered.¹

1 See p. 236. One point of interest in this area, although it cannot be considered evidence of any kind, is the party background that several ministerial personnel officials have. In 1964 Novikov, the secretary of the party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of Construction, was simultaneously head of the Personnel Administration. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/64, p. 62. In 1966 V.V. Pavlovskii was deputy secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of Railways, and in 1971 the deputy head of the Personnel Administration. A 1966 article by him, in his capacity as deputy party secretary, speaks at length about personnel. *P.zh.*, 3/66, pp. 43-44; *Zhelezno-dorozhnyi transport*, 11/71, p. 26. V.N. Iagodkin, presently deputy minister in charge of personnel in the All-Union Ministry of Education, was once secretary of the party organisation of Moscow State University and then Moscow *gorkom* secretary for ideological affairs. *P.zh.*, 1/68, p. 49; *Oktiabr'*, 9/70, p. 3; *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 5/76, p. 26. In 1973 A.A. Pomortsev was secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Agriculture. The next year he became deputy minister for personnel. *P.zh.*, 12/73, p. 17; *Sobranie postanovlenii*, 10/74, art.48. Data of this type are not easily accessible. One relies above all on the random collection of information over long periods of time, rather than exhaustive research specifically directed at this point. The evidence given here could almost certainly be supplemented given time.

PPO involvement does not cease once appointments have been made. The *Pravda* editorial based on the 1967 Central Committee decision on personnel declared that ministerial party committees must take under their unremitting control the ideo-political indoctrination of apparatus workers.¹ I have already described in some detail the indoctrination activities of ministerial party committees. It was seen that much of this activity is specifically aimed at the political *and* administrative knowledge required for the implementation of the reforms.²

I have also previously referred to the widespread practice of hearing reports in PPO meetings from individual communists on their fulfilment of their operational tasks. This practice is most common in ministerial PPO's. Since 1965 there has been great and increasing emphasis on the need for ministerial PPO's "to raise the sense of responsibility of administrative personnel for the state of affairs in production" and to foster "the party style of work" among administrative officials.³ This is done by systematically hearing reports from administrative officials.

1 *Pravda*, 16/6/67, p. 1.

2 See above, pp. 61-62.

3 *Pravda*, 4/4/73, p. 1, *Kom. Moldavii*, 7/65, p. 11.

The reports are a particularly valuable weapon in ministerial PPO's because in ministries such a high proportion of officials are party members.¹ Although evidence to be presented in the next chapter suggests that PPO secretaries are sufficiently independent of normal bureaucratic career patterns not to be bound to sectional bureaucratic interests, the same cannot be said of rank-and-file party members who are making their careers in the state apparatus. It is these people who are directly involved in the implementation of the reforms. If the PPO were able to closely control the bureaucratic behaviour and performance of all communists in the apparatus through the systematic hearing of reports and, if necessary, the use of party discipline, it could be confident of success in ensuring the implementation of the reforms.

The most notable thing about the content of these reports, and indeed about all the activities of ministerial PPO's since 1965, is the concentration of attention on ministerial relations with subordinate enterprises. In the last chapter I described the restraints that have often been placed on administrative PPO's in their relations with production enterprises. There has been little evidence of such restraint since 1965. When the importance of

1 See below, p. 577.

ministry-enterprise relations for the success of the reforms is considered, it is not surprising to see such restraints removed.

By far, a majority of the reports on the role of ministerial PPO's in the conditions of the reform concentrate on this matter. The 1966 seminar of the Moldavian Central Committee mentioned above was the forum for considerable discussion by ministerial party secretaries of questions relating to the transfer of enterprises to the new system of planning and material incentive.¹ In November, 1966 the secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of Instrument-Making described its activities in the following terms:

The party organisation of the ministry does much for the implementation of measures connected with the transfer of factories to the new system of planning and economic incentive. These questions have more than once been raised for discussion in the party committee and party meetings in the *glavki*. The communists have given a personal example in the working out of methodological indicators, standard (*tipovye*) regulations and basic economic

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Kom. Moldavii, 1/67, p. 47.

indicators for the first factories transferred to the new system.¹

The communists of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry actively participated in the preparation of enterprises for transfer to the new methods of work, including arranging meetings between apparatus workers and enterprise managers and sending communist ministerial workers to give reports (*doklady*) and training courses for enterprise personnel.² The secretary of the party committee of the Moldavian Ministry of the Food Industry sees the change in character of ministry-enterprise relations, a direct result of the greater role of "economic methods" in administrative leadership, as contributing to raising the role of his party organisation. As part of this new role the party committee has considered the work of the communists of the Chief Administration for the Wine Industry in helping the transfer of enterprises to the new conditions of work.³ The party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry has considered the identical question. It has heard reports from the leaders of the Chief Administrations for the Textile Industry and for the Footwear Industry and strongly criticised them for breakdowns in the preparation of plans for the transfer of enterprises

1 *P.zh.*, 21/66, p. 29.

2 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/67, pp. 54-55.

3 *Kom.Moldavii*, 8/67, pp. 57-58.

to the new style of work.¹ The party committee of the Ministry of Instrument-Making similarly criticised the leaders of the Chief Administration for Analytical Instruments for being too slow to decide questions concerned with the transfer of its enterprises to the new system. The secretary also tells us that the communists of the Planning-Economic, Production, Financial and other administrations had been given the task of designating the first group of factories best prepared for transfer to the new system.²

More detailed descriptions of the activities of ministerial PPO's, including their involvement with subordinate enterprises, can be seen in the previous chapter. These descriptions, combined with the above reports, give a good impression of the role of ministerial PPO's. The reports just cited suggest that the PPO's were at the forefront of the transfer of enterprises to the new system, and some of them imply that they were working against opposition from leading ministerial officials. This would suggest that the party organisations had a real concern for the principles of the reform, with granting enterprises some degree of freedom from bureaucratic interference. However the more detailed descriptions in the previous chapter contain little indication of this. Indeed their involvement

1 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 8/69, pp. 17-18.

2 *P.zh.*, 11/68, p. 19.

in the affairs of subordinate enterprises through the numerous commissions, meetings, etc suggest that the ministerial PPO's are among the most important contributors to the maintenance of close bureaucratic control over enterprises. For example, I have just cited criticism by the secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of Instrument Making of ministerial officials who are slow to make decisions on the transfer of enterprises to the new system. In the same report the secretary, working in a ministry considered to be at the forefront of the implementation of the reforms, speaks, apparently approvingly, of the daily reports received by the ministry from enterprises on plan fulfilment and of the party committee's directives to ministerial communists to examine the operations of factories under the new system and control their observance of economic indicators.¹ There is little about the reports of ministerial party organisations' involvement in the affairs of subordinate enterprises to suggest that it is anything but routine interference in their day-to-day operations. As indicated in the previous chapter, there is little to suggest a "staff generalist" approach.

Another interesting point in this regard is the relative lack of involvement of ministerial PPO's in the formation of industry associations. The associations

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P.zh., 11/68, pp. 17-19.

can be seen as the main focus of the reform at this stage and we have seen that their introduction has been progressing rather slowly. I have quoted one report on the good work done by the party committee of the Ministry of Chemical Industry in the formation of associations. But even here the report goes on to say that the party committee does not always work as well in matters concerning associations as in other matters.¹

Information concerning the work of the party organisations of industry associations (as distinct from production associations) is almost nonexistent. What information there is suggests that they are subordinate to the party organisations of the ministries,² and that they are used as a means for even closer ministerial involvement in the affairs of enterprises. In 1972 the party buro of the Ministry of Construction, Road and Domestic Machine Construction organised a combined meeting of the communists of some *glavki* and an all-Union industry association to examine the question of the

1 *Pravda*, 10/3/69, p. 2.

2 In 1974 the Committee of Party Control directed the party committee of the Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking Industry to examine the question of the improper behaviour of the deputy head of an all-Union industry association. *P.zh.*, 2/74, p. 51.

failure of factories to fulfil export orders.¹

Conclusions on the role of ministerial PPO's in the implementation of the economic and administrative changes since 1964 are not easily made. The basic assumption is that the PPO's are expected to make a major contribution to the implementation of the central authority's new economic and administrative policies. The first difficulty lies in deciding just what these policies are and how seriously the top authorities are pursuing them. Ignoring for the moment the long-term policies of integrated systems management and computerisation, since the operational significance of these policies at the moment seems limited, the basic thrust of the new policies seems to be towards a degree of decentralisation and reduction in the scope of administrative decision-making. It is hoped that the general productive performance of the economy will improve if units in the economy are allowed a greater degree of initiative, are freed from petty administrative regulation, and are given the means to accurately assess their performance and to gain rewards directly for improved performance. The main organisational methods to be used are the "economic" methods of performance assessment and reward, and the decentralised administrative units, the

1 *Kom.*, 1/72, pp. 54-55. Note that industry associations are formally given the right to organise their own exporting through specialised export agencies independently of their superior ministries.

industry associations. Doubts were expressed in the earlier chapters about the effectiveness of Soviet methods of performance assessment and reward,¹ while earlier in this chapter we saw evidence of the slow progress being made in the formation of industry associations, particularly associations with a true degree of decentralised authority. The more general comment could also be made that there is no evidence that the Soviet administrative system is freeing itself of its traditional problems of sectionalism and over-bureaucratisation.

This having been said one would have to conclude that the PPO's have failed in their task. The evidence is that even in cases where they have succeeded in bringing about the formal organisational changes required, often it would seem with some difficulty, the changes have not brought about subsequent changes in the actual nature of bureaucratic performance. They certainly appear to have failed to bring about bureaucratic operations in what I take to be the spirit of the reforms.

What are the reasons for such a failure? The ministerial PPO's appear to have the formal power to bring about the required changes. Their control of personnel, their rights to investigate and act upon the performance of individual workers and to involve themselves closely

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See above, pp. 104-106, 304-305.

in ministry-enterprise relations should enable them to ensure the desired changes in organisational structure and performance.

There is the problem, recognised by the Soviet authorities, of a "psychological" barrier to change, of bureaucratic officials so set in their ways that they find it hard to change, particularly when the changes involve their giving up what they have seen as their main opportunities to exercise power. The Soviet authorities recognise that this problem is a long-term one, and their extensive indoctrination and training activities must be seen in this light.

But there is much about the problems facing the economic reforms that suggests more than "psychological" conservatism. There also seems to be the realistic recognition on the part of ministerial leaders of the implications of the reforms for their positions. There is also much about the activities of the PPO's, particularly in the area of ministry-enterprise relations, which suggests that their failures are not simply the result of the psychological backwardness of ministerial workers, but that they themselves are involved in old-style bureaucratic methods. The question then becomes whether the failure is the result of collusion between ministerial leaders and ministerial party workers or of some "psychological" backwardness of the party workers themselves.

I have suggested that collusion is a real problem in other categories of PPO's, where secretaries tend to be making careers in the area of work with which the "host" organisation is concerned and where the interests of that area of work, professional and sectional, are quite clearly defined. The same motivation for collusion does not seem to be present in the case of ministerial PPO's. We have seen that ministerial leaders possess strong sectional interests. However it seems unlikely that these interests would have the same close hold over members of the apparatus below the very top level - the promotion of branch interests has little obvious effect on the welfare of officials below the very top level. This becomes particularly so if, as appears probable, the secretaries of ministerial party organisations are more likely than those in other categories to be career party workers, or at least to have strong backgrounds in party work.¹ Certainly there are fewer reports of collusion in ministries than in other institutions, and fewer since 1965 than before. Collusion, in the sense of party workers failing to fulfil their tasks because they feel that to do so would be contrary to their closest, sectional interests, does not appear to be a problem or an explanation for the apparent failure of ministerial PPO's.

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See below, pp. 437-441.

The explanation then must be the "psychological" backwardness of the PPO officials. The backwardness could be of two types. Firstly, the party workers could possess the same bureaucratic ways of thinking as the workers surrounding them. Although they may not consciously feel the need to defend the sectional interests of the bureaucracy, they may be so determined by their bureaucratic surroundings that they are unable to act in any way other than one that defends the old methods.

However the data on modern-day ministerial party secretaries suggest that they are not typical bureaucratic officials, that they are subject to considerable indoctrination activities stressing their vanguard role specifically in the area of the economic reform, and therefore they should realise that the economic reform provides the framework for a successful career. Finally, in many of their activities they have shown themselves ready to act against the traditional bureaucrats.

This leaves the second type of "psychological" backwardness, derived from party secretaries' role as party workers, that is, the party's position towards the reform is "psychologically" backward. I have already said that the top authorities appear to be seriously committed to the reform, although the continuing formal restrictions on the associations could cause one to wonder

whether the commitment extends to its full logical development. While one can see the commitment to the reform, there is always some doubt as to what the reform is committed to. Have the authorities been able to entirely separate the reform from political considerations? Both history and the facts of the reform would justify some doubts.

So there can be some doubt about the "psychological" position of the top authorities. But the problem is perhaps more in the ranks of the party apparatus itself. We have seen that the party apparatus workers do not have any particular strong objections to the reform. However they have no reason to be enthusiastic about it - while it reduces the power of the ministries, it does not particularly increase their own. This lack of commitment, and indeed probable opposition to some elements of the reform must be of some significance for the success of the reform and the role of the ministerial PPO's in it.

But the "psychological" backwardness of the party apparatus goes deeper than this. The natural tendency of the party apparatus, without necessarily seeing it consciously in terms of power considerations, is to involve itself directly in administrative and economic affairs. Even in times of campaigns against *podmena*, and since 1967 criticisms of *podmena* has been muted, the party apparatus is always ready to step in when problems occur,

solve those problems, often very capably, and to consider its actions virtuous. The approach can be seen at present in the top levels of the government. The "party generalists", those top party officials who pride themselves above all on their ability "to get the job done", are being moved into those areas of government that have been causing particular problems. The best example is the appointment in recent years of party generalists as ministers in the difficult construction ministries.¹ We have seen in the previous chapter the continuing involvement of ministerial PPO's in this sort of problem-solving.

The critics of the operation of traditional staff agencies, whose concepts have provided the basic framework for this thesis, dealt well with the shortcomings of such an approach. If the party is to operate as any sort of "staff generalist" agency its concern is not above all with "getting the job done", but with how the job is done and whether it will be done any better next time. While the ministerial PPO's have apparently become powerful organisations within the ministries, and through their close links with the Central Committee have probably helped establish the predominance of the party over the

1 Tokarev, who became Minister of Industrial Construction in 1967, had had a long career in the party apparatus, as had Khitrov of the Ministry of Rural Construction. Shcherbina, also a party generalist, became Minister of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises in 1973.

state in the area of administrative management, they have not properly played their "staff generalist" role. Not only have they failed to induce the ministerial apparatus to operate in the spirit of the reforms, they have failed to so act themselves. While they have become highly important political bodies, they have not become true "staff generalist" bodies. While this could undoubtedly be explained to some extent in terms of political considerations, both at the top and middle levels of the party hierarchy, much of the explanation lies in the traditional but still reigning style of party work.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECRETARIES OF NON-PRODUCTION

PRIMARY PARTY ORGANISATIONS

Clearly the most important person in the primary party organisation is the organisation's secretary - in normal circumstances he virtually *is* the organisation. The principles of party discipline and democratic centralism ensure that he has virtually total control over the organisation and its membership. He will almost always be the only member of the organisation in a position to devote all or most of his time to party work. The personal contacts between PPO secretary and institutional head that are often preferred to formal contacts in party organs, as well as the personal contacts of the PPO secretary with higher party organs ensure his supremacy over other members of the PPO.¹

1 It is possible that a rank-and-file party member, particularly one interested in advancing himself through his enthusiasm for "political work", could escape the authority of a meek and reluctant PPO secretary. Such could be the situation in cases when administration-PPO collusion has been reported to higher party authorities. However for the purposes of this chapter it can be reasonably assumed that the secretary has total power of his PPO. Another, perhaps more serious problem, is that particularly in large PPO's there is some division of labour among PPO secretaries and their deputies. It might not, therefore, be necessary for the secretary to be experienced in all aspects of the PPO's tasks. I have some data on deputy secretaries, although they will probably only emphasise the problem, rather than contribute to solving it.

In order to help make a prediction of the effectiveness of PPO's we must look at the type of people occupying positions as secretaries, why they occupy the position, and what their qualifications, backgrounds and ambitions are. While a study of PPO secretaries does nothing to enlighten us as to the formal powers of the party organisations, it can provide us with some data relevant to the ability of secretaries to use these powers and the possible effect this ability has on their relations with institutional leaders. These relations can lead to a conflict situation, affecting their ability to fulfil their functions; or to a collusive situation, affecting their willingness to fulfil their functions. In "staff generalist" terms a PPO secretary should have a wide-ranging, general knowledge of the goals and operations of the "host" organisation, but with a sufficient degree of more specialised knowledge to enable him to contribute to short-term problem-solving. He must have all this knowledge within a context which will not encourage collusion with institutional leaders.

I will begin by presenting some data on the backgrounds, qualifications and career patterns of some PPO secretaries. The data will hopefully help us decide whether the secretaries have the necessary skills to fulfil their various functions, and whether their career patterns are likely to lead to cooperative, conflict or collusive

relations with institutional leaders.

A brief discussion of the methods used to gain the information will make clear that there are significant methodological and statistical problems involved. I do not claim that the data have any statistical significance. However I consider that some general trends can be discerned and some general conclusions arrived at.

The procedure for gaining information begins with the identification of a PPO secretary (I have included some deputy secretaries and secretaries of subordinate organisations) simply by coming across mention of his name and post in the course of my reading.

I have found a considerable amount of additional information simply by noticing the names when they appear again in other sources. But most information has come through a more systematic procedure. The *Letopis' zhurnal'nykh statei* and *Letopis' gazetnykh statei*, as well as setting out the author, title and reference of all articles published in Soviet journals and newspapers according to subject, also provide an alphabetical listing of authors. By using the lists of authors and articles it is possible to identify articles written by the secretaries whose names I have recorded. The titles in themselves can often be useful to us. But it is hoped that the actual article will be accompanied by some additional information on the author.

The first problem with this procedure is that I have not had time to subject all secretaries to the same degree of search through the *Letopisi* particularly since new secretaries are being identified all the time. A problem more inherent in the method itself is that one cannot always be certain that the author of the article and the party secretary are the same person, especially in cases of the more common surnames and when initials are missing.

Before beginning a detailed analysis of the information gained I will set out some basic figures - the number of secretaries identified, according to institutional category, the extent of search procedure applied to each, and the basic figures on the amount of different types of information gained. I have used six institutional categories:

- (1) educational primary party organisations - these will be in tertiary institutions only, since I have not attempted to record the names of school party organisation secretaries. However I do have some information on unnamed school party secretaries.
- (2) scientific - this category contains only institutes involved solely in scientific research. Institutes also involved in teaching are in the first category.

- (3) bureaucratic - primarily ministries,
State Committees and central agencies.
- (4) hospitals
- (5) Academies of Science
- (6) cultural - I have combined cultural
institutions such as theatres and orchestras
in the same category as creative unions.

There are six rather complicated categories showing the different degrees of systematic search applied to each secretary:

- (1) been subjected to search through *Letopis' zhurnal'nykh statei* for 1957-72 and *Letopis' gazetnykh statei* for 1971-73.
- (2) *L.zh.s.*, 1962-72; *L.g.s.*, 1971-73.
- (3) *L.zh.s.*, 1962-72; *L.g.s.*, 1972.
- (4) *L.zh.s.*, 1957-69.
- (5) *L.zh.s.*, 1962-69.
- (6) no search has been conducted in the *Letopisi*.
However information could have come from other sources in some cases.

The number of secretaries identified and the degrees of search undertaken can be seen in the following table.

Table 1: The degree of search to which
PPO's secretaries have been subjected

| Categories | Total | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| educational | 99 | - | 42 | 1 | 6 | 34 | 16 |
| scientific | 97 | 2 | 25 | 1 | 6 | 51 | 12 |
| bureaucratic | 115 | 11 | 47 | 1 | 11 | 33 | 12 |
| hospitals | 3 | - | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| Academies | 12 | 1 | 6 | - | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| cultural | 57 | 1 | 19 | 4 | - | 22 | 11 |
| total | 383 | 15 | 140 | 8 | 24 | 144 | 52 |

The most important information to be gained from this procedure includes articles written, other positions held, general description of occupation, and degrees and various academic and honorific titles held. The amount of information gained can be seen in the following table.

The different categories are as follows:

- (1) no information found
- (2) number of secretaries for whom articles have been identified.
- (3) academic degrees identified.
- (4) academic and honorific titles.
- (5) other posts held. These need not be simultaneous or even in the same institution.
- (6) work in other institutions or sub-units of the

same institution. (Where actual position is not known).

(7) occupation. (Only where specifically mentioned).

(8) social work, including membership of delegations to conferences, etc.

In this chapter I have generally only utilised information from categories (2), (3) and (5).

Table 2: Information found on PPO secretaries

| Categories | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| educational | 23 | 61 | 36 | 8 | 32 | 8 | 10 | 2 |
| scientific | 38 | 57 | 32 | 7 | 18 | 25 | 4 | 4 |
| bureaucratic | 53 | 49 | 13 | - | 31 | 9 | 11 | 10 |
| hospitals | - | 3 | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| Academies | 5 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| cultural | 32 | 27 | - | 6 | 9 | - | 10 | 4 |
| total | 151 | 199 | 86 | 22 | 95 | 45 | 39 | 22 |

My main concern in a more detailed examination of this information is to discover the basic orientations of PPO secretaries. It is hoped that the information will enable us to decide whether secretaries in different categories of party organisation tend to be above all ideological experts, technical specialists, administrative experts,

party workers of the "party generalist" type, or some combination of these possibilities. The nature and strength of the different types of orientations could have a considerable influence on the degree to which PPO secretaries are able and willing to fulfil their various functions.

There are some further methodological problems which should be mentioned. These are primarily concerned with the great reliance I have placed on articles written, both as information in themselves and as providing the lead to further information. Firstly, there is the difficulty of evaluating the quality of an article simply from its title or even from a reading of the article by someone with no expertise in the particular discipline concerned. I am forced to assume that the fact of publication of an article in a periodical is evidence of the expertise of its author.

There is the further problem that the listed author in fact might not have contributed at all to the writing of the article. Collective authorship has long been common practice in scientific publications throughout the world. In recent years, apparently for ideological reasons, it has become increasingly prevalent in Soviet science, including the social sciences. This has often suited senior members of institutions who are able to include

themselves in lists of authors without in fact having contributed anything to the articles.¹

There is the serious problem that some types of people are far more likely to have articles published than others. For example, an active researcher in a scientific institute is more likely to have articles published than an administrative worker in that institute. I will later come to the conclusion that party secretaries in research institutes are overwhelmingly research workers, since that is the nature of their articles. However it is a disturbing thought that the 54 research party secretaries on whom I have done some search but found no articles might all be administrative workers.²

There is also the problem that even when an article has been found, it is not always easy to classify

1 See above, p. 106. The same can be said about academic degrees. See p. 245.

2 It would be particularly interesting if a significant proportion of them worked in institute Personnel Departments, given the importance of Personnel Departments as centres of control of the working population and as the work-place bases of the security police. Nadezhda Mandel'shtam has a great deal to say about Personnel Departments in her memoirs. See, for example, Mandel'shtam, N: *Hope against Hope*, Collins and Harvill, London, 1970, pp. 344-345. In the last chapter we saw that a number of ministerial PPO secretaries have personnel backgrounds. See above, p. 380.

it. For example, many party secretaries in tertiary educational establishments work in the area of party history. An article on the work of the Kazakh Communist Party in agriculture during the 1930's might be, to the historian author, a technical article, and need say nothing about his ability to engage in ideological agitation activities. Articles by economists on such matters as material incentive are also often difficult to categorise. However where an article implies a familiarity and some facility with Marxist ideology I have included it in the ideological category. There are similar difficulties in distinguishing technical and organisational articles in some areas.

I recognise these as serious problems. However I feel that the following information can still be of some value. I will now examine the secretaries I have identified according to the category of institution in which the party organisation is situated and attempt to decide on their basic orientations.

(1) Educational PPO's

Given the great emphasis laid on the importance of the ideological indoctrination of students and the ideological control of their teachers, and the extensive activities actually undertaken by PPO's in these areas,

one might expect educational PPO secretaries to show strong ideological orientations, especially when we remember that all Soviet tertiary institutions have Departments of Social Sciences able to provide well-trained ideologists.

(a) ideological orientation

In fact only fourteen of the 76 educational party secretaries on whom I have some information appear to have purely ideological orientations, and three of these come from party schools, where one would expect a particular emphasis on ideology. Six of the fourteen are from universities. Kh.A. Aminov (Samarkand), T.E. Dudareva (Belorussia), B.V. Zolotarev (Leningrad - deputy secretary), E.A. Kuznetsov (Kazakhstan) and N.M. Shilintsev (History Faculty of Kishinev State University) are all historians writing in the area of party history. S.D. Roshka, of Kishinev State University, is a Candidate of Philosophical Sciences who has written one article "The struggle of ideas in contemporary philosophy" (*Kom.Moldavii*, 10/71, pp. 9-16), but also a more historically oriented one, "Some social questions in the parliamentary speeches of Mikhail Kogelnichanu" (*Uchënye zapiski Kishinevskogo universiteta*, vol. 95, 1968, pp. 144-154). Five come from specialised institutes, yet show no evidence of expertise in the area in which their institutes' specialise. N.Sh. Inoiatov, of the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Agricultural

Mechanisation Engineers, has apparently had one article published, on "The historic struggle of the Communist Party for the establishment and development of socialist culture" (*Trudy Tashkentskogo instituta inzhenerov irrigatsii i mekhanizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva*, 21/62, pp. 98-125).

I.A. Konstantinov, secretary of the party buro of the Moscow Conservatorium in 1972, was at the same time a *dotsent* and head of the Department of Marxism-Leninsim. There is no evidence that he has any musical expertise. Likewise there is no evidence of any medical expertise on the part of T.T. Mustafin of the Karaganda Medical Institute. Indeed, as well as being described as a *dotsent* and head of the Department of Party History and Scientific Communism one year after appearing as party secretary, he was also described as a Candidate of Historical Sciences who has written such articles as "From the history of the establishment of the Karaganda coal basin and the formation of labouring cadres" (*Uchënye zapiski Kazakhskogo universiteta, seriia istorii*, vol. 54, no. 12, 1963, pp. 26-42). V.I. Iurchuk, as well as being secretary of the party committee of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy, was also a Doctor of Historical Sciences and head of the Department of Party History. His articles show no orientation whatsoever towards agricultural matters. (Iurchuk later went on to become director of the Institute of Party History of the Ukrainian Central Committee.) An interesting example of how far this

can go can be seen in the case of E.S. Petropavlovskii, deputy secretary of the party committee of the Plekhanov Institute of Economics, who, although working in an economics institute, is not even a political economist, but rather an historian, writing such articles as "Memorials to comrades killed in the years of the Great Patriotic War", and "Leaflets as a guide to the pre-October period of the history of the CPSU" (*Istoriia SSSR*, 6/68, pp. 201-213; *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 8/63, pp. 105-111).

(b) technical orientation

A considerably larger number, twenty-six, of educational party secretaries show purely technical orientations. Such technical specialties might be of some use for a staff generalist role in a specialised institute. But in universities and polytechnical institutes, providing teaching of a wide-range of disciplines, specialisation in one discipline is of little use. Thus only six of the 26 come from these types of institutions (Iu.K. Burlin - Moscow State University, a geologist; R.K. Buman - Latvian State University, a chemist; B. Voinov - Volgograd Polytechnical Institute, an engineer; V.V. Pushkar"ev - Urals Polytechnical Institute, a chemist; L.M. Tereshchenko - Moscow Technical College, an engineer. It would appear appropriate that B.A. Sokolov

be a geologist, since he was secretary of the party buro of the Geology Faculty of Moscow State University. But considering that the Geology Faculty has its own social science teachers, it must still be considered significant that one of these teachers is not used as party secretary.¹⁾ All the others are from specialised institutes and appear to have specialisations consistent with the interests of their institutes, without any apparent orientation towards ideology at all. Just as one example we can take V.A. Beloguzhev who in 1972 was secretary of the party committee of the Uzbek Institute of Rail Transport Engineers. In 1962 he had been an *aspirant* writing such articles as "Some questions of the application of polarity in the resolution of the most general tasks of the homology of second order curves" (*Sbornik trudov Leningradskogo instituta inzhenerov zhelezno-dorozhnogo transporta*, vol. 94, 1962, pp. 65-81). The following year he was described as a senior lecturer in the Graphics Department of the institute, writing similar articles, something he was still doing in 1966. (See, for example, *Nauchnye trudy Tashkentskogo instituta zhelezno-dorozhnogo transporta*, vol. 39, 1966, pp. 3-32.)

1 Although there are cases of social science teachers being used in such cases. In 1971 the secretary of the party buro of the Faculty of the Mechanised Analysis of Economic Information of the Moscow Economics-Statistics Institute was a *dotsent* in the faculty's Department of Party History. *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 3/71, p. 85.

It is interesting that such a great proportion of educational party secretaries have totally technical orientations compared to those with ideological orientations. Could this be taken as evidence that educational PPO's are not as concerned with ideological matters as one might have thought? Such an extreme conclusion would not be justified. However it can be taken as evidence that, especially in specialised institutes, the technical expertise needed for involvement in control of the content of educational and research work is considered of first priority. This is not evidence that ideology is completely ignored in these institutions. It is quite possible that other party workers with more specialised ideological training, say a senior member of one of the Departments of the Social Sciences, are given responsibility for ideological activities. Although I have no data which would allow any firm conclusions on this some interesting observations can be made. We have seen that ideological training in specialised educational institutions is conducted within the framework of the institutions' specialisations.¹ Yet we have just seen that in cases where PPO secretaries have had ideological orientations they have *not* been in the framework of their "host" organisations' specialisations. There is no evidence that Mustafin, for

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See above, pp. 76-77.

example, has any medical expertise. This raises the very interesting question, one on which I unfortunately have no information, of what is the training and experience of teachers of the social sciences in specialised institutions. Is Mustafin typical of all social science teachers in such institutions? If he is, considerable doubt must be cast on the effectiveness of the ideological activities both of the Departments of the Social Sciences and the PPO's.

The data does not allow any conclusions on this question. However it could be seen as suggesting that in the eyes of the party authorities technical expertise, and therefore technical control, are of higher priority, or greater practical applicability, than ideological expertise and control.

This discussion has applied primarily to the specialised institutes. In these a technical speciality might be enough to provide a sufficiently broad understanding of the goals and operations of the "host" organisation for the fulfilment of staff generalist functions. However even in these institutes, and certainly in the universities and polytechnical institutes, it appears unlikely to be sufficient. Some combination of technical and ideological orientations would be better, but best of all would be general educational and organisational expertise.

I will now give detailed information on those secretaries possessing broader and combined orientations in an attempt to decide the capability of educational PPO's to fulfil staff generalist roles.

i) Berezhnoi, A.F. - Leningrad State University (1954)

(a) degree - Doctor of Historical Sciences and of Philological Sciences.

(b) other posts - member of the editorial board of *Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta: seriia istorii, iazyka i literatury* (1964)

- *dotsent* and dean of the Faculty of Journalism (1966-70)

- chairman of the editorial board of *Voprosy zhurnalistiki* (1960).

(c) articles - he has written articles of an ideological nature, both on the history of journalism ("V.I. Lenin and the press", *Voprosy zhurnalistiki*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1960, pp. 175-184) and more contemporary topics. ("Reviewing achievements", *O publitsitiki i publitsistakh*, 2/66, pp. 24-44). I have identified 14 such articles. However there are also articles on educational matters. ("On some questions of the study and teaching of the history of the party-soviet press", *Vopr.zhurnalistiki*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1960, pp. 3-24). I have found five

such articles.

- ii) Duchenko, N.V. - Kiev State University (1973)
 - (a) Doctor of Philosophical Sciences
 - (b) *dotsent* (1969)
 - deputy director for scientific work of the university's Institute for Raising the Qualifications of Social Science Teachers (1972)
 - (c) There is one article on the use of foreign languages in the university (*Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 5/69, pp. 31-38), but also an ideological one, "The raising of the role of communist ideology in contemporary conditions". (*Kommunist Ukrainy*, 8/72, pp. 37-46).

- iii) Diuriagin, I.Ia. - Sverdlovsk Juridicial Institute (1970)
 - (a) Candidate of Juridicial Sciences
 - (c) His articles show a concern with an aspect of the law, the nature of legal norms, which would require special ideological care. However he clearly also has legal expertise.

- iv) Ivanov, A.S. - Timiriachev Agricultural Academy (1969)
 - (a) Candidate of Economic Sciences
 - (b) junior scientific worker in the All-Union Research Institute for Agriculture (1963)
 - worked in the Administration for Collective Farm Affairs of the All-Union Ministry of Agriculture (1966)

dotsent in the Department of Political Economy of the institute (1966)

- (c) While in the research institute he wrote a technical article. However after that articles became more varied and difficult to classify. Some were clearly propaganda ("The historic half-century (the 50th anniversary of Soviet power)", *Izvestiia Timiriazevskoi sel'skokhoziaistvennoi akademii*, 5/67, pp. 5-10); others closely related ideology and agricultural practice ("The September, 1965 Central Committee plenum and some questions of agrarian-economic theory", *ibid*, 1/66, pp. 3-21). There are articles on general Marxist ideology ("V.I. Lenin on the union of the working class and the peasantry", *ibid*, 1/70, pp. 3-15); while there are some showing an interest in economic theory ("The role of economic interests in the development of socialist production", *Doklady TSKhA*, 139/68, pp. 67-73). There is no evidence of any particular concern with educational matters.

v) Il'in, R.N. - All-Union State Institute of Cinematography (1971)

(a) Candidate of Art Criticism

(b) dean of the Faculty of Camera Work (1964)

- (c) He has written articles on camera techniques, TV lighting and links between film and TV studios (*Tekhnika kino i televedeniia*, 5/62, pp. 17-20; 7/62, pp. 66-72; 4/64, pp. 66-67). However articles on the need for cameramen to be "close to life" show a greater awareness of ideological concerns (*Iskusstvo kino*, 5/62, pp. 111-118).

vi) Koger, K.E. - Tartu State University (1971)

- (a) Candidate of Historical Sciences
 (b) rector of Tallin Teachers' College (1973)
 (c) His promotion to rector indicates some organisational skills. However his article on Lenin's views on socialist competition indicates ideological expertise. (*Uchënye zapiski Tartuskogo universiteta*, vol. 202, no. 4, 1968, pp. 3-30). Promotion into a teachers' college is a sign of educational experience and interests.

vii) Krutov, V.I. - Moscow Technical College (1956)

- (a) Doctor of Technical Sciences
 (b) chairman of the Scientific-Technical Council of the Ministry of Tertiary Education (1968)
dotsent (1960)
 (c) He has written numerous technical articles on the manufacture of gears in machine construction. His articles on educational practice have either a

technical bias (see his article in *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 9/72, pp. 29-30, on teaching students computer techniques), or an ideological bias ("Such is the formation of communist world view in *vuzy*", *ibid*, 6/64, pp. 7-19).

viii) Lavrov, S.B. - Leningrad State University (1969)

(a) Doctor of Geological Sciences

(c) He has written technical articles on geological geography. Sometimes these articles take on an ideological tinge ("On fundamental differences between capitalist and socialist regional production-territorial complexes", *Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta*, no. 6, vol. 1, 1966, pp. 80-87). Although there is some evidence of a concern with the educational side of geography ("New methods or new principles", *ibid*, no. 6, vol. 1, 1971, pp. 79-84), this does not spread to the area of general educational practice.

ix) Men'shikov, V.V. - First Moscow Medical Institute (1968)

(a) Doctor of Medical Sciences

(b) head of the institute's Inter-clinic Hormone Laboratory (1971)

(c) He has written numerous purely technical articles, usually on illnesses of the glands. Some articles show a concern with laboratory services,

which might indicate some organisational interests ("On the organisation of laboratory services in healing-prophylactic institutions of health care in the Czech Republic", *Laboratornoe delo*, 5/71, pp. 311-314). The only evidence of any ideological orientation is one article describing the achievements of the laboratory on the occasion of Lenin's birthday (*ibid*, 3/70, pp. 131-134).

- x) Mochalov, B.A. - Moscow State University (1966)
- (a) Doctor of Economic Sciences
 - (b) rector of Plekhanov Economics Institute (1972)
member of the editorial board of *Tekhnologiya estetiki* (1976)
 - (c) His earlier articles were on economic subjects with considerable ideological significance ("The development of social forms of satisfaction of the essential needs of workers", *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, series 8, no. 2, 1963, pp. 13-24). Later articles show a concern with educational matters (an article on the quality of admissions into universities, *Sovetskaia trgovlia*, 24/8/71).
- xi) Parimbetov, B.P. - Kazakh branch of the All-Union Academy of Construction and Architecture (1961)

- (a) Candidate of Technical Sciences
 - (b) Kazakh Minister of the Production of Construction Materials (1968)
 - (c) His promotion to minister would indicate some facility with all technical, ideological and organisational concerns. However I have been able to find only purely technical articles and articles of a general propaganda and informative nature written while minister. There is no sign of special ideological expertise.
- xii) Prokof'ev, M.A. - Moscow State University (1948-51)
- (a) Doctor of Chemical Sciences
 - (b) chemist-press operator in the Derbenov Chemical Factory
 - student, *aspirant* and deputy director of the Chemical Institute of Moscow University (all before WW2)
 - senior scientific worker and deputy director of the Institute of Chemistry (1946)
 - head of the Chief Administration for Universities and deputy minister of the All-Union Ministry of Tertiary Education (1951)
 - First deputy minister of the ministry (1959)
 - RSFSR Minister of Education (1966)
 - All-Union Minister of Education (at present)

- (c) I have not looked for articles by Prokof'ev, having only learnt recently that he had been a PPO secretary.

xiii) Protopopov, V.A. - Moscow State University (1975)

- (b) *aspirant* in the Department of Accounting and Analysis of Economic Activity of Industrial Enterprises of the Economics Faculty (1967)
first secretary of the *Leninskii raikom*, Moscow (1975)
- (c) His technical articles are on *khozraschët* and of a reasonably technical nature. There are also organisational articles ("The faculty and the factory", *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Ekonomika*, 2/67, pp. 71-77). However promotion to *raikom* first secretary should be enough to show that he is considered by the authorities to possess all necessary skills, although there is no specific evidence of an interest in educational matters.

xiv) Rud', A.S. - Plekhanov Economics Institute (1972)

- (a) Candidate of Historical Sciences
- (c) There is no sign of economic expertise. He has published one article on party history (*Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 5/68, pp. 104-111) and articles on organisational matters ("Scientists in the factory", *Moskovskaia pravda*, 28/12/71).

- xv) Chukhno, A.A. - Kiev State University (1968)
- (a) Doctor of Economic Sciences
 - (b) head of the Department of Political Economy of the Humanities Faculty (1971)
 - (c) He has written articles on interest theory and material incentive. This topic is one of ideological sensitivity, although some of his articles are quite technical ("The distribution of labour and consumption funds", *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 3/63, pp. 49-54). There are other articles on economics, but with strong ideological content (an article on the importance of maintaining the supremacy of heavy over consumer industry, *Pravda Ukrainy*, 24/2/71, pp. 2-3). There are also articles on educational matters ("Creatively work with foreign students", *Ekonomicheskie nauki*, 2/71, pp. 76-79).
- xvi) Iagodkin, V.N. - Moscow State University (1968-70)
- (a) Candidate of Economic Sciences
 - (b) *dotsent* in the Department of Political Economy of the Economics Faculty of MGU (1967)
Moscow *gorkom* secretary for ideological affairs (1970-76)
deputy minister for personnel of the All-Union Ministry of Education (1976)
 - (c) He has written articles and books on personnel policies, productivity and material incentive.

Such articles must have some ideological content. His later promotions (although his last change of job could not be considered a promotion) show some trust in his ideological, organisational and educational expertise.

It can be seen that by no means all of these secretaries can be described as having staff generalist qualifications. Although the combination of ideological and technical orientations exhibited by Diuriagin, A.S. Ivanov, Il'in, Lavrov and Men'shikov presumably makes them more able to cope with their various functions, more is required to indicate an ability to play a staff generalist role. In educational establishments some concern with general educational matters is also required, although evidence of considerable organisational expertise and experience could be sufficient. Of the secretaries listed only Berezhnoi, Duchenko, Koger, Krutov, Mochalov, Parimbetov, Prokof'ev, Protopopov, Chukhno and Iagodkin could be said to exhibit a sufficient range of qualifications and interests to be described as "staff generalists". This is only ten secretaries out of the 76 on whom some information has been found. Of course I am not claiming that none of the other secretaries would be able to play a staff generalist role. However it could be said that to the extent that educational PPO's fail to fulfil staff generalist functions, the lack of the necessary training and experience of party secretaries is one of the reasons.

The effect that the strong technical orientations of so many secretaries has on the possibilities for collusion is something which will be examined later.

Before going on to research PPO's I will give what data I have on school party secretaries. I have not gathered data on these secretaries by name; however I do have some interesting information on background and orientations. The amount of information is very small, but quite consistent. I have identified the non-party positions of ten school PPO secretaries. Of these one was the school's head teacher (*zavuch*) and two were deputy directors for academic work. This combination of responsibilities is rather frowned on by the Soviet authorities. In one of these cases a member of a school party organisation asked *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* whether it is right that the deputy director for academic work be party secretary as well, as happens in his school, year in, year out. The journal replied that although the secretaryship is an elected position and it is up to the party organisation to decide who holds it, it is better that such positions not be held by the same person, since it makes it very difficult for the party organisation to involve itself in "production" control in the correct way. It says that it is better if the party organisation is headed by someone who does not have administrative power over all members of the collective, although it recognises that at times the deputy director

might be the only person suitable for the job.¹ That statement indicates, firstly, that the party authorities recognise the problems of collusion, and secondly, that the deputy director's skills are the sort of skills required for secretaries.

However what is perhaps more interesting is that six of the ten are teachers in the social sciences area. Four are teachers of Russian language and literature; one of history; and one of history and social behaviour (*obshchestvovedenie*). Only one taught in a technical area, a teacher of mathematics. The scope of the activities of a school are probably sufficiently narrow that wide-ranging experience and qualifications are not essential for the successful fulfilment of a staff generalist role. It is interesting, therefore, that when more general expertise is not essential the Soviet authorities turn to teachers in the more ideologically oriented disciplines for their party secretaries.

(b) Research PPO's

Research institutions are in a very different position from educational institutions. They do not have social science departments, that is, they do not have

1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 9/72, p. 49.

structural sub-units of the institution specialising in ideological matters and providing ideologically trained personnel. However we have seen that ideological control of scientific research is considered to be of considerable importance by party authorities. Yet there is no evidence that secretaries in research institutions have ideological backgrounds of any type, except of course those working in institutions that specialise in areas of particular ideological content. For example, it is not surprising that L.E. Repida, secretary of the party buro of the Institute of History of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences, writes rather ideologically oriented articles ("The establishment of the Leninist ideas of the union of the working class and the peasantry of Moldavia in the process of the socialist re-organisation of agriculture in the republic", *Uchenye zapiski Kishinevskogo universiteta. Kafedra istorii KPSS*, 5/71, pp. 18-33).

There are some curious exceptions to the rule that research secretaries do not show ideological interests. V.A. Sergeev, the secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Elementary Organic Formations of the All-Union Academy of Sciences, wrote an article "According to the directions of Lenin, (on the role of the conference called in 1918 for working out methods for the manufacture of synthetic rubber)", (*Nauchno-tekhnicheskoe obshchestvo SSSR*, 6/69, p. 5) although he is a Doctor of Chemical Sciences

who has written 27 other articles, all on purely scientific subjects. Similarly F.I. Furdui, secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Zoology of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences, despite working in the Biophysics Laboratory and writing eight other articles on purely scientific matters, also wrote an article entitled "F. Engels and contemporary natural science" (*Izvestia AN MSSR, Seriiia biologii i khimicheskikh nauk*, 2/71, pp. 3-6). Finally V.S. Iablokov, deputy secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Geology of the All-Union Academy, as well as writing technical articles on geology and being a Candidate of Geological-mineralogical Sciences, has also written an article "The role of V.I. Lenin in the resolution of problems of the mineral resources of the USSR" (*Litologiya i poleanye ispokaemye*, 2/70, pp. 6-34). These exceptions, curious as they are, are not sufficient to invalidate the generalisation that research party secretaries show little orientation towards ideological affairs.

Another aspect that must be considered is how well-equipped research party secretaries are in terms of organisational expertise. My data would indicate not very much. Few of the secretaries I have identified appear to have occupied more senior organisational positions or to have written organisational articles. The fact that a significant proportion are department or laboratory heads

(eleven out of the 59 on whom I have information) does, however, indicate some experience in dealing with people and organising their work. The only secretaries who could be said to have exhibited organisational expertise beyond this level are L.E. Repida, already described as secretary of the party buro of the Institute of History of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences, who up to 1958 was apparently the Minister of State Control in the republic; and V.S. Iablokov, who, before being deputy secretary in the Institute of Geology in 1956, had had a wealth of experience dating from the 1930's in the apparatuses of different ministries and the Presidium of the All-Union Academy of Sciences, as well as being deputy director of the institute from 1950-52.

G.I. Popov could be another interesting case. In 1971 he was secretary of party buro of the All-Russian Institute for the Organisation and Payment of Agricultural Labour. The next year he was described as party secretary in the All-Russian Institute for Agricultural Labour and Management. If these are two separate institutes it is interesting that he was party secretary in both. In 1969 he wrote a reasonably technical article "New developments in the organisation of agricultural labour" (*Sotsialisticheski trud*, 10/68, pp. 74-79).¹

1 In the same year one G.I. Popov also published a book entitled "On the style of party work". However Popov is an exceedingly common name.

But the overwhelming proportion of the secretaries of research party organisations on whom I have information, forty-seven of the 59, show interest purely in technical matters. The lack of orientation towards ideological or organisational matters can only make their task more difficult.

(c) Bureaucratic PPO's

It is probably in bureaucratic institutions that some organisational expertise on the part of the party secretary is most necessary. However this is not to deny the importance of technical and ideological expertise.

(1) technical orientation

Of the sixty bureaucratic party secretaries on whom I have found some information, eleven had some sort of academic degree. There were five economics degrees (all candidates), four degrees in the technical sciences (three candidates and one doctor), one Candidate of Physical-mathematical Sciences and one Candidate of Historical Sciences. All but the last seem to indicate a technical specialisation. The Candidate of Historical Sciences is I.E. Legas', of the Moldavian Ministry of Education, where a technical specialisation would be less appropriate.

One of the Candidates of Technical Sciences was

described as an engineer, as was the Candidate of Physical-mathematical Sciences. Besides this, another seven secretaries were described as technical professionals, although without mention of academic degrees (six engineers and one economist).

In terms of articles, 36 secretaries wrote technical articles. In fact this is the total number of secretaries who show some involvement with technical matters. Of these 21 show evidence of interest in technical matters only.

(2) ideological orientation

Bureaucratic institutions are like research institutions in that they do not have any in-built ideological sub-units to provide a pool of ideologically trained party workers. It could be said that ideology is less important in bureaucratic institutions. However it is still worth looking at the degree to which administrative secretaries have ideological orientations.

It would appear very little. I have already mentioned Legas' of the Moldavian Ministry of Education. He has written articles on party history. Beyond this ideological articles are rare. V.S. Kulikov, secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Finance, apparently wrote an article entitled "K. Marx on the place

of the formal subordination of labour to capital in the formation of the capitalist method of production" (*Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Ekonomika*, 3/68, pp. 23-33). V. Rudnev, the deputy head of the Agitprop Department of the Kazakh Central Committee, has written ideological articles. This might be the same V.F. Rudnev who earlier was the secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of General Machine Construction. Similarly it is uncertain whether the M. Soldatov, writing ideological articles as deputy head of the Agitprop Department of the Uzbek Central Committee, is the same M. Solatov who previously worked as secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Production of Construction Materials. In 1959 A. Iarilov was secretary of the party committee of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Force. In 1963 he wrote an article entitled "For ideological (*ideinuiu*) concreteness and reality" in his position as head of the Political Department of the Moscow territorial Administration of the Civil Air Force. (*Grazhdanskaia aviatsiia*, 10/63, pp. 10-11).

It can be seen that this constitutes little evidence of ideological expertise. However one important matter in this regard not yet discussed, although hinted at in the unconfirmed cases of Rudnev and Soldatov, is the number of secretaries in bureaucratic institutions who have come from or go onto more senior party positions. Many of these would require considerable ideological expertise.

However the data on these secretaries will be left until later.

(3) organisational orientation

Organisational expertise is of particular importance in bureaucratic institutions. We have seen the tasks ministerial PPO's have in ensuring the implementation of the new economic reforms. Soon we will look at the administrative positions occupied by the party secretaries of this category of institution. However firstly I will give other evidence of organisational expertise. I have already given the data on academic degrees, taking these as evidence of technical expertise. It is possible that such degrees, especially in economics (of which there were five out of eleven), in individual cases provide organisational expertise. However this can only be confirmed by looking at the nature of articles published. Again classification is difficult, but these are the data as well as I can determine them.

- i) M.A. Amstibovitskii of the Kazakh Ministry of Construction has written articles on the organisation of construction, for example, "The quick construction of the Chimkent Cement Factory (*Ekonomika stroitel'stva*, 3/62, pp. 37-40) and "Spreading leading experience" (*ibid*, 6/68, pp. 35-39).
- ii) S.I. Bogoliubov, All-Union Ministry of Construction - "To perfect the material-technical supply of

construction" (*ibid*, 7/64, pp. 35-53).

- iii) Ia.I. Groisman, North Kazakh *sovnarkhoz* -
 "Transport barriers and costs (on the improvement of the material-technical supply of industrial enterprises)" *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Kazakhstana*, 8/65, pp. 37-38).

- iv) V.S. Kulikov, All-Union Ministry of Finance -
 articles on the economic reforms, for example,
 "The new system of economic incentive in action" (*Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, 3/66, pp. 50-57) and more general organisational matters, for example, "To activate rationalising work" (*Finansy SSSR*, 2/69, pp. 24-25).

- v) V. Nefedov, Krasnodar *krai* Finance Department - articles on the economic reform and bureaucratic organisation, for example, "We are controlling the quality of production" (*ibid*, 5/69, pp. 64-65).

- vi) F. Popov, Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry - "The reform at the centre of attention" (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo Kazakhstana*, 1/67, pp. 35-37).

- vii) V. Shepetovskii, Ministry of Railways - "Cadres - our great riches" (*Gudok*, 20/7/71).

- viii) I. Shlab'e, Latvian Ministry of Local Industry -
 "In new conditions" (*Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*,
 7/67, pp. 53-56).
- ix) M. Essenemanov, Kirgiz Ministry of Health - "Prompted
 by practice (on the preparation of medical
 personnel in tertiary and secondary medical
 study institutions)" (*Meditsinskaia gazeta*,
 19/1/71).

This is hardly overwhelming evidence of organisational expertise. It is true that bureaucratic expertise does not attract as many articles as does scientific research. Stronger evidence of organisational expertise can be found when we consider other non-party positions held by bureaucratic party secretaries. I will now list these other positions, although excluding for the moment other party posts.

- i) M.A. Amstibovitskii - head of the Planning Administration of the Kazakh Ministry of Construction (1960, 63)
 - deputy chairman of the Scientific-Technical Society for the Kazakh construction industry (1962)
 - (former) secretary of the party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of Construction (1964)
 - member of the ministry's collegium (1964)
 - member of the collegium of the Kazakh Ministry of Heavy Construction (1970).

- ii) S.I. Bogoliubov - (former) deputy secretary of the party buro of the All-Union Ministry of Construction (1954)
- head of the Supply Administration of the RSFSR Ministry of Construction (1964)¹
- iii) N.M. Verbitskii - senior scientific worker in the Laboratory for Grain Cultures of the Zernograd Selection Farm (1965)
- secretary of the party committee of the Moldavian Ministry of Food Industry (1967)
 - head of the laboratory (1971)
- iv) I. Gal'tsov - secretary of the party organisation of the Kirgiz republican Farm Machinery Association *Kirgizsel'khoztekhnika* (1975)
- head of the Association's Administration for Production Services to Collective and State Farms (1975).
- v) Ia. I. Groisman - head of the Transport Department of the North Kazakh *sovnarkhoz* (1959)
- deputy secretary of the *sovnarkhoz's* party organisation (1960)
 - deputy head of the Supply Administration of the Virgin Lands *sovnarkhoz* (1969)
 - head of the Supply Administration of the Kazakh Ministry of Meat and Dairying Industry (1971).

1 This identification is far from certain.

- vi) N.A. Danilov - secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry (1966)
- engineer-captain in the Air Force (1966)
 - engineer-colonel (1971).
- vii) K.K. Ivanov - head of the Technical Department of the Administration of River Fleet Construction (1963)
- secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Transport Construction (1966).
- viii) V.S. Kulikov - chief editor of *Finansy SSSR* (1963)
- secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Finance (1966)
 - *glavk* head in the All-Union State Insurance Office (1971)
 - chairman of the Central Commission for Rationalising Suggestions and Innovations of the Ministry of Finance (1971).
- ix) A.A. Malinin - secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (1966)
- chairman of *Raznoeksport* (1973).
- x) V. Nefedov - secretary of the party organisation of the Krasnodar *krai* Finance Department (1971)
- deputy head of the department's Department of State Revenue (1972).

- xi) Novikov - secretary of the party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of Construction (1964)
- head of the ministry's Personnel Administration (1964).
- xii) V.V. Pavlovskii - deputy secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of Railways (1966)
- deputy head of the ministry's Personnel Administration (1971).
- xiii) R.M. Polis - secretary of the party committee of the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building (1966)
- deputy minister of the Ministry of Machine Building for Livestock and Fodder Production (1973).
- xiv) A.A. Pomortsev - head of the Administration of Seed-growing of the All-Union Ministry of Agriculture (1970)
- deputy head of the ministry's Chief Administration of Grain Cultures and General Questions of Land Use (1970)
- secretary of the ministry's party committee (1973)
- deputy minister for personnel (1974).
- xv) F. Popov - head of the Financial Administration of the Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry (1967)
- secretary of the ministry's party buro (1969)

xvi) S.V. Silkin - head of the Department of Credit and Financing of Agriculture of the Moldavian republican office of Gosbank (1964)

- secretary of the office's party buro (1965).

xvii) G.A. Tret'iakov - Air Force Major General (1966)

- secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Radio Industry (1971).

This is stronger evidence of organisational expertise. Nearly all of these secretaries (seventeen of the 62 on whom I have some information) have or will come to occupy relatively senior managerial positions within their "host" organisations, usually at head of department or administration level. It is interesting that eight of these seventeen are leading workers in strictly "staff" type departments - planning, technical, financial, supply and particularly personnel.¹ This could be taken as a particularly interesting pointer towards the types of skills the Soviet

1 With regard to personnel a curious report appeared in *Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana* in 1964. The new secretary of the party organisation of a Thermal Energy Centre had worked in the steam shop. However he wrote that there is an unwritten law in the Centre that the party secretary must also be head of the Personnel Department, and so he was shifted there on election as secretary. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 6/64, p. 69. Neither the secretary nor the journal express any surprise over the matter. However I have not seen any other such statements.

authorities see their bureaucratic party secretaries as requiring.¹

(4) orientation towards party work

Perhaps the most interesting thing about bureaucratic secretaries is the number of them who have come from or go on to other party posts. In 1965 Brezhnev made a point of the need to have high-level, experienced party workers as ministerial PPO secretaries, a sign of the party authorities' distrust of the technically specialised personnel who had been introduced into party work, without prior party experience, by Khrushchev.² Since the end of the sixties particularly, it seems to have

1 Two very interesting cases here are those of Danilov and Tret'iakov. Both were at one time secretaries of the party committees of electronic and communication type industries, and at other times Air Force officers. I have identified two articles by Danilov: "The influence of obstacles on the lines of radio-telecontrol" (*Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony*, 2/66, pp. 53-58) and "The organisation of the choice of maximal signals (in the use of radio-localational techniques)" (*ibid*, 5/71, pp. 66-67). I have identified one article by Tret'iakov, also described as an engineer as well as a first-class combat pilot; "The pilot and flight safety" (*ibid*, 7/66, pp. 21-25). Agursky describes the Ministries of the Radio and Electronic Industries as both parts of the soviet "military-industrial complex". Agursky, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

2 Rigby and Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

been realised that some sort of combination of the two is required.¹

I will now list all other party posts identified as being held by administrative party secretaries:

i) V.E. Aleshnikov - deputy secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Chemical Industry (1969)

- at the time of his appointment as deputy director he was described as a chemist with experience of party work.

ii) N.Ia. Varakin - secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Chemical Industry (1969)

- similarly described as a chemist with experience of party work.

iii) N.M. Verbitskii - secretary of the party committee of the Floreshty Collective-State Farm Production Administration (1963)

- secretary in the Moldavian Ministry of Food Industry (1967).

1 Although there is evidence that the pendulum might have swung back too far the other way again. Recent complaints have been made about PPO secretaries on the grounds that while they have the technical qualifications to cope with their control functions, they do not have sufficient experience in the ideological and party work areas. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 2/73, p. 11; *P.zh.*, 5/75, p. 59.

- iv) K.K. Ivanov - secretary in the State Committee for Shipbuilding (1958)
 - secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Transport Construction (1966).

- v) P.P. Kalitin - secretary of the party committee of the Moscow Combine for Heavy Alloys (1966)
 - secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine Construction (1971-72).

- vi) Krasnov - secretary of the party organisation of the Kuibyshev *oblast'* Agricultural Administration (1955)
 - secretary in the Kuibyshev *sovnarkhoz* (1958).

- vii) V.N. Krylov - secretary in the All-Union Gosplan (1966)
 - instructor of the Kazakh Central Committee (1974)

- viii) N.N. Orlova - deputy secretary for ideological affairs in the All-Union Ministry of Chemical Industry (1969)
 - formerly instructor dealing with ministries of the Bauman *raikom*, Moscow.

- ix) V.F. Rudnev - secretary in the Ministry of General Machine Building (1966)
 - instructor in the Agitprop Department of the Kazakh Central Committee (1967)
 - deputy head of the department (1969)

- x) Smirnov - secretary in Kemerovo *sovnarkhoz* (1957)
- referred to in the same source as the former first secretary of a city *raikom*.
- xi) M. Soldatov¹ - secretary in the All-Union Ministry of the Production of Construction Materials (1966)
- instructor in the Agitprop Department of the Uzbek Central Committee (1971)
- xii) A.A. Solonitsyn - first secretary of Kashira *gorkom* (1961)
- secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Energy and Electrification (1966)
- first secretary of *Moskvoretskii raikom*, Moscow (1971).
- xiii) A.I. Fateev - secretary of the party committee of the Likhachev Automobile Plant (1954)
- secretary of the *Proletarskii raikom*, Moscow (1959)
- inspector in the Trans-Caucasian Buro of the All-Union Central Committee (1963)
- chief inspector of the All-Russian Committee of Party-State Control (1964)
- secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Automobile

1 Taken individually the identifications of Krylov, Rudnev and Soldatov are not certain. However the similarities in the three cases increase the probability that the identifications are correct.

Industry (1966)

- first secretary of the Dzerzhinskii *raikom*,
Moscow, (1969).

It can be seen that many of these cases follow the pattern outlined above.¹ In 1966 new secretaries with previous relatively senior party experience were elected. One should not underestimate the technical experience of these secretaries (see Fateev). Gradually these people went back to other full-time party positions and were replaced by people still with party experience, but apparently at a far lower level (see Varakin). The technical qualifications of these people were probably more emphasised.²

In conclusion I am somewhat surprised by the emphasis on the technical specialisations of bureaucratic, primarily ministerial, party secretaries. But as long as this is combined, as particularly in recent years it seems to have been, with organisational expertise gained from middle and higher level managerial work in the "host" organisations and the general organisational and ideological expertise gained from party work, there is little reason to doubt the ability of the secretaries to cope with their tasks.

1 See above, p. 437-438.

2 It is interesting to note that *sovnarkhoz* party secretaries also tended to have previous party experience. Like the post-Khrushchev ministerial party organisations the *sovnarkhoz* party organisations were apparently very active.

(d) Academies of Science

In Appendix A I discuss the difficulties entailed in deciding the functions of the PPO's of the Academies of Science. I do not have enough data on the secretaries of these PPO's to assist in reducing these difficulties. However I have information on seven of the twelve secretaries identified, which makes them quite a visible group. I will present all the information I have on the seven and then give some brief commentary on it.

- i) F.S. Akhmedbeili - secretary of the party committee of the Azerbaidzhan Academy (1970)
 - has written technical articles on geology and in 1968 worked in the Academy's Institute of Geology.
- ii) Dzh. Malabaev - secretary in the Kirgiz Academy (1964)
 - a Doctor of Historical Sciences who has written ideological articles, on Marxist and Leninist history (for example, "Leninist teaching on the Soviets", *Izvestiia AN Kirgizskoi SSSR*, 2/70, pp. 19-27) and more general articles on the foundation of the Soviet state (for example, "The political foundation of the Soviet state", *Sovetskaia Kirgiziia*, 14/6/73).
- iii) G.S. Migirenko - secretary in the Siberian department of the All-Union Academy (1961)
 - a professor and Doctor of Technical Sciences

- deputy director of the Academy's Institute of Hydro-dynamics (1970)

- a member of the buro of the Novosibirsk *gorkom* (1971)

- chairman of the administration of the Novosibirsk *oblast'* organisation of *Znanie* (1973)

- he has written one technical article, one on the organisation of technical education and one on teaching practice. His concern with teaching is curious, since there is no evidence of him being involved in teaching except as part of his social obligations, through *Znanie* and Novosibirsk's people's university, where he lectured, in 1970, on the most recent achievements of science and technology. His membership of the buro of the Novosibirsk *gorkom* suggests that he is an important personage in Novosibirsk, more important than any other of his positions suggest.

iv) E.N. Mukhin - secretary of the party committee of the Presidium of the All-Union Academy (1974)

- a biochemist who has worked in the Academy's Institute of Biochemistry and Photosynthesis and has published numerous technical articles.

v) M.M. Radul - born in 1910 in the Ukraine of poor peasant family

- began his working life as a shepherd and did not

go to school until after the Revolution

- being one of the leading *komsomol'tsy* of his village he took part in the formation of the collective farm and the liquidation of the kulaks

- graduated from Tiraspol Pedagogical Institute (1933)

- did a course through the Ukrainian Central Committee for the preparation of teachers in the socio-economic disciplines and for nine years lectured in economic geography in Tiraspol Pedagogical Institute

- in 1936 he completed externally a course in the Geography Faculty of Odessa University and then became a part-time *aspirant*

- deputy director for academic and scientific work of the Tiraspol Pedagogical Institute (1938)

- director of the institute (1939)

- became a party member in 1940 and organised and became director of the Kishinev Pedagogical Institute (after Bessarabia became part of the Soviet Union)

- deputy Commissar and Commissar for Education in Moldavia; deputy chairman of the Moldavian Council of People's Commissars (1942-46)

- one of the organisers and deputy chairman of the Moldavian section of the All-Union Academy (1946-47)

- secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee (1947)

- went back to scientific work in the Moldavian Academy (1949)

- organiser and director of the Academy's Institute of Economics (1960)

- secretary of the Academy's party committee (1963)

- head of the newly formed Department of Geography of the Department of Physical-Technical and Mathematical Sciences of the Academy (1965)

- he died in 1971

- other positions included: member of the Kishinev *gor'kom*, deputy of the City Soviet, deputy chairman and chairman of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet, head of the Moldavian Geographical Society, member of the editorial board of *Kommunist Moldavii*, chairman of the editorial board of the Moldavian Encyclopaedia, member of the Scientific Councils of several institutes.

- he has published many books and articles, usually propaganda-type articles on geography, although there are some on the teaching of geography.

vi) K.A. Tomulets - secretary in the Moldavian Academy (1971-73)

- deputy head of a department of the Moldavian Central Committee (1970)

- a Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, but

also described as an economist

- his articles are technically oriented, but often deal with the new economic reforms, and so could be seen in an organisational light.

vii) S.S. Chibotaru - secretary in the Moldavian Academy (1963)

- deputy director of the Academy's Institute of Language and Literature (1965)

- director of the institute (1973)

- a Doctor of Philological Sciences who has published many articles on literary criticism and history, usually with a strong ideological content.

It can be seen that Akhmedbeili and Mukhin show evidence only of technical expertise, and Malabaev only of ideological expertise. The other four show some mixture of skills, including organisational skills. Tomulets and Radul both have party backgrounds, while Migirenko has played a reasonably strong role in local party politics. One interesting and rather curious feature is that Tomulets, Radul and Migirenko all show interest in teaching practice, strange considering that the Academies are not teaching institutions. On the whole the Academy party secretaries appear to be highly qualified. The data does not help in solving the problem of the functions of Academy party committees, although the apparent calibre of the secretaries

suggests that they are not insignificant organisations.

(e) Cultural institutions

Ideological control would seem to be of particular importance in cultural institutions, while technical specialisations are of less relevance. Thus I have only one possible case of the secretary of a cultural PPO exhibiting a technical orientation. One V.K. Marinchik has written technical articles on optics and the technical aspects of photography (for example, *Optika i spektroskopiia*, vol. 28, no. 5, 1970, pp. 955-960). It seems possible that this is the same Marinchik who earlier was the secretary of the party committee of the Leningrad film studio *Lenfil'm*.

However there is more evidence of ideological orientations. I will now list those secretaries who in their artistic activities and articles have shown a special commitment to ideological concerns:

- i) T. Akhtanov of the Kazakh Union of Writers: he has written a novel on the "new style of leadership" and a play about a conflict between an *obkom* first and second secretary. He has also written ideological articles, for example, "National characteristics and the vigilance of literature" (*Prostor*, 12/69, pp. 101-103).

- ii) A. Balodis of the Latvian Union of Writers: he has written a poem about Lenin and one addressed "To communism".
- iii) I.F. Vinnichenko of the Moscow Union of Writers: he has been writing publicist essays (*oчерki*) with a strong political content for over twenty years, for example, a story about a delegate to the Supreme Soviet (*Ogon'ek*, 10/62, pp. 6-9).
- iv) G. Grozova of the Latvian museums of history and revolution: she has written an historical article on the first Soviet state in Latvia (*Nauka i tekhnika*, 1/69, pp. 3-5).
- v) E.F. Dzigan of the Moscow film studio *Mosfil'm*: he has written an article on the ideological requirements of a producer in his choice of subjects for films (*Iskusstvo kino*, 5/72, pp. 2-39).
- vi) B. Egorov of the Sverdlovsk Union of Writers: he has written an article entitled "Thoughts arising at the table of incorrect form" (*Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 31/3/72, p. 17).
- vii) Ia. Kokha of the Estonian Union of Composers: he has written cantatas entitled "Song of Lenin" and "Song of the Party".

- viii) Ia. Niedre of the Latvian Union of Writers: he has written a biographical trilogy about P.I. Stuchka, a review of a book on the Latvian Revolution, and articles such as "Art serves the people" (*Voprosy literatury*, 1/63, pp. 22-24).
- ix) N.P. Protasenko of the *Artem* Musical-Drama Theatre (Ukraine): his roles include one as a *komsomol* organiser and one as a *chekist*.
- x) N. Skrëbov of the Rostov Union of Writers: he has written poem on party work and Lenin, a wartime ballad "The ballad of the *raikom* flag" and an article "The party in the life of my generation".

Thus, of the 25 secretaries of cultural party organisations covered ten have written works or articles with a direct ideological content. (Most of them have also written things not so directly ideological.) It should be noted that seven of the secretaries just listed come from creative unions. There are only six secretaries from such unions identified who did not appear on the list.

The proportion of cultural secretaries showing an ideological orientation is quite high. The proportion of those whose other posts suggest organisational expertise is considerably lower:

- i) L. Balandin of the Novosibirsk theatre "Red Torch" (1955)
 - chief producer of Novosibirsk Radio (1965)
- ii) B.A. Egorov - Sverdlovsk Union of Writers (1967)
 - deputy chief editor of *Krokodil* (1962)
 - chairman of the Commission for Satire and Humour of the Moscow Union of Writers (1972).
- iii) V.P. Kozachenko - Ukrainian Union of Writers (1966-71)
 - chairman of the Prose Section of the Union
 - first secretary of the administration of the Union (1974).
- iv) A. Syber - Estonian Union of Composers (dates not known)
 - director of the Estonian State Academic Theatre.

There are three secretaries with other party experience.

G.K. Cherkasov has been secretary of the party organisations of both the Moscow Conservatorium and the Moscow Operetta Theatre. G. Enukidze in 1969 was the secretary of Tbilisi's *Pervomaiskii raikom* for ideological affairs. He had previously been secretary of the party organisation of the film studio *Gruzia*. A. Vasil'ev, in 1962 the secretary of the party committee of the Moscow Union of Writers, in 1971 was the Moscow *gorkom* organiser attached to the Moscow Union.

The data on the secretaries of cultural party organisations confirms the conclusions made in the body of

the thesis, that ideological control is considered particularly important in these types of organisations.

(f) Conclusion

In general the evidence suggests that the secretaries identified are not "staff generalists". The majority of them appear to be technical specialists, as the accompanying table shows.¹ This is not surprising in the case of research institutes; however it is somewhat so in the cases of educational and administrative institutions. I recognise that, particularly in the case of administrative institutions, technical expertise is more likely to show up in published articles, the basis for my conclusions, than organisational expertise. The data on other positions held in fact suggest that administrative party secretaries do have organisational experience. However the stress on technical specialisations is still curious. It is probably to be seen more as a characteristic of the Soviet administrative system as a whole than specifically of PPO secretaries, the traditional Soviet bias towards engineering and similar technical skills being evident throughout the administrative apparatus.

The strange thing about the technical orientations of so many educational secretaries is that in all these institutions there are readily available ideological experts.

1 See next page.

| Category | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| educational | 76 | 26 | 14 | 3 | 7 | 7* |
| research | 59 | 39 | 4 | 13 | 17 | 2** |
| bureaucratic | 62 | 21 | 2 | 27 | 28 | 16*** |
| Academies | 7 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2**** |
| cultural | 25 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 16 | - |
| hospitals | 3 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | - |
| Total | 232 | 91 | 24 | 53 | 73 | 27 |

(1) numbers on whom we have information

(2) purely technical orientations

(3) purely ideological orientations

(4) some signs of organisational expertise

(5) signs of mixed orientations

(6) with sufficiently varied qualifications and experience
to be classified as staff generalists

* Bereznoi, Krutov, Mochalov, Parimbetov, Prokof'ev,
Protopopov, Iagodkin

** Repida, Iablokov

*** Amstibovitskii, Bogoliubov, Groisman, Ivanov,
Novikov, Pavlovskii, Polis, Pomortsev, Popov,
Krylov, Orlova, Rudnev, Smirnov, Soldatov,
Solonitsyn, Fateev

**** Radul, Tomulets

In the case of specialised institutes presumably technical knowledge is considered indispensable for control purposes. Could this be an indicator of the relative importance of ideological and "production" control functions? In the case of the general educational institutions this explanation can hardly be valid, in that no one technical specialisation can cover the technical concerns of the whole institution. When I asked a friend of Burlin, the present secretary of the party committee of Moscow State University, why Burlin, a geologist who had not wanted the job because it interfered with his scientific work, got the job rather than an economist, historian, philosopher, etc., he was unable to answer except to say that perhaps the authorities felt it necessary to give the natural sciences a turn after the position had been held for some time by economists.

It is only in cultural institutions that ideology seems to have a reasonably firm hold, presumably an indication that in literature and the arts ideological correctness is still considered of greater importance than professional ability and quality.

The overall proportion of secretaries attributed with staff generalist qualities might appear small. Their absence in the small cultural and hospital PPO's cannot be considered surprising. The absence of PPO secretaries with ideological backgrounds in research institutions also cannot

be considered surprising, as long as the authorities continue to coopt their PPO secretaries from among the institution's research personnel. However it is a factor which must be given some significance in judging the effectiveness of research PPO's in ideological control. The relative lack of secretaries with organisational expertise is more surprising, in that institutes presumably have organisationally experienced personnel available for the post. The lack of ideological expertise is perhaps unavoidable. However if the authorities were seriously concerned to have staff generalist PPO secretaries in research institutions, one might expect to see greater attempts to recruit more experienced organisers.

The situation with regard to ideological expertise in educational institutions is quite different from that in research institutions. There is still the same relative lack of such expertise among secretaries, and yet in all tertiary educational institutions ideologically trained personnel are available. Equally strange is the lack of organisational expertise among educational PPO secretaries. It is dubious whether a purely technical specialisation provides the general knowledge of the functions of the organisation needed for a staff generalist role even in specialised institutes, much less the universities. Although there is evidence of the use of staff generalist PPO secretaries, particularly in the larger universities,

the Soviet authorities do not appear to have taken full advantage of the personnel available.

It is in the bureaucratic category, especially among ministries, that the strongest evidence of the use of staff generalist secretaries lies. Although only 25.8% of the bureaucratic PPO secretaries on whom information has been found could be described as staff generalists on the basis of that information, given the difficulties inherent in the search method and gaps in the search due to problems of time, the percentage must be considered significant. The use of staff generalist PPO secretaries appears to have been particularly evident since 1965. This development tends to confirm the changes in the role of bureaucratic PPO's described in the last chapter.

On the whole the biographical data presented in this section are disappointing and fail to support even the limited evidence of PPO staff generalism gained from empirical data in earlier chapters. This is particularly so in research institutions. The data in this chapter must contribute to doubts about the ability of PPO's to play a staff generalist role. They do confirm one point made in earlier chapters, that the ability of PPO's to exercise ideological control is doubtful.

The motivations of primary party organisation secretaries

Qualifications are not the only matter of concern in an examination of the functioning of PPO secretaries. There is the second question, beyond the ability of secretaries, concerned with their willingness to fulfil their functions. This is a matter of their motivations for working in the position. If a person is primarily oriented towards technical research, why would he want to become a PPO secretary? The answer to this question should help us to decide more definitely what effect a technical orientation has on the treatment of ideological matters and the nature of party-administration relations.

We must begin by asking ourselves whether people want to be PPO secretaries. Firstly, there are scraps of evidence appearing in Soviet sources that suggest that at least not all PPO secretaries are entirely happy with their positions. *Partiinaiia zhizn'* reports in 1971 the difficulties in one factory with shop organisation secretaries. They were all part-time party workers and many of them had not wanted to be involved in party work.¹ Although shop organisation secretaries are of considerably inferior status to PPO secretaries, the shop organisations in this case did have primary organisation rights and so the secretaryship was a reasonably important position. I

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P.zh., 9/71, p. 55.

feel that the experience could be applied to primary organisations.

In 1956 the same journal reported the case of the secretary of a shop organisation who applied to the party committee to be freed from his post. The party committee and the *raikom* granted the request without referring the matter to the members of the shop organisation, for which they were criticised by the *gorkom*, which reversed the decision.¹

In 1964 *Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana* reported a reverse case. The deputy secretary of a hospital PPO was expelled from the party by the organisation, a decision that was upheld by the *raikom* buro, for refusing to accept the position of secretary. However a commission from the *obkom* looked into the matter and found that the deputy secretary had a sick wife and daughter living some distance from his place of work and that therefore he would be unable to do the job properly. The commission recommended that the *obkom* buro reverse the decision, the recommendation being accepted.²

In 1955 *Partiinaia zhizn'* reported the case of an individual who was recommended by the *obkom* to fill a position as Machine Tractor Station party organisation

1 *P.zh.*, 5/56, pp. 79-80.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 3/64, p. 41.

secretary. However he did not want to work in agriculture, and so behaved in such a way as to necessitate his removal from the post, for which he was given a strong reprimand to be recorded on his party card.¹ In 1964 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* received a letter from the secretary of the PPO of the Cheliabinsk *oblast'* office of Gosbank in which he rather hopefully suggested that the party members had made a mistake in re-electing him since he was unable to control the behaviour of his son. The journal supported the re-election since the secretary was doing all he could about his son. It also mentioned that he should not try to avoid his social obligations.²

In 1971 an article appeared in *Ogon'ok* about the Institute of Atomic Energy. The article spoke of one communist who had been away on field work collecting material for his doctoral dissertation. When he returned to the institute he needed leave in order to write up the dissertation. However it was decided that it was important that he stay in party work and he was elected to the position of party committee secretary. The article declares that it appeared that the interests of society and the individual were in conflict, but that this is sometimes unavoidable. In a socialist society it is essential that society's interests have priority. In this case the communist accepted his

1 *P.zh.*, 6/55, p. 77.

2 *P.zh.*, 12/64, pp. 44-45.

social responsibilities and the position.¹

Partiinaiia zhizn' declared in 1970 that communists can be made candidates for party positions without their consent, the suggestion clearly being that it is not unknown for at least willing consent to be withheld.²

Kommunist Estonii included as one of the factors leading to a 31% turnover rate among the republic's PPO secretaries in 1971, without any sign of disapproval, lack of time due to the demands of the individual's basic job or study.³

Finally, personal conversations in the Soviet Union with a former party secretary and rank-and-file party members confirm that the position is often not regarded with favour. I spoke with the former secretary of the party organisation of a natural science faculty of Moscow State University who claimed that the job was a burdensome one, in that it forced one to neglect one's research for some number of years and that it often entailed disputes with faculty members that are embarrassing for all involved. He incidentally claimed that the present secretary of the university's party committee, also a natural scientist, had

1 *Ogonëk*, 1/71, p. 15.

2 *P.zh.*, 20/70, p. 23.

3 *Kom.Estonii*, 1/72, p. 70.

not wanted the position.

A department head and rank-and-file party member in a medical institute told me that most people, especially good scientists, were unwilling to act as party secretaries because it meant giving up their scientific research for some time and could, therefore, have a serious effect on their careers.

This seems to be confirmed to some extent by the data I have on articles published by party secretaries. V.V. Men'shikov, identified as the secretary of the party committee of the First Moscow Medical Institute in 1968, published technical articles prolifically each year from 1963 up to 1967 (1963 - six articles; 1964 - nine; 1965 - eight, 1966 - three; 1967 - six). However in 1968 he published only one, another one in 1969 and two in 1970. This could be taken as indicating that he was secretary for three years, a normal term. In 1971 it was back to six and in 1972, four. D.B. Dunaevskii, described as secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Research Institute of Leguminous Plants in 1970, had articles published in 1965, 1966 and 1967, none in 1968, one in 1969, and none in 1970. Again one could presume that his term began in 1968. B.A. Zhubanov was identified as being deputy secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Chemical Sciences of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences in 1963. He published articles in 1962 and 1963, but none in 1964 or 1965. From 1966 he

became a very prolific publisher of articles. V.A. Sergeev was spoken of as the secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Elementary Organic Formations of the All-Union Academy in 1972. His previously regular articles stopped appearing in 1969. P.I. Iushkov has never been a prolific publisher of articles. However they have appeared under his name quite regularly except for the years 1967 to 1969. He was reported to be secretary of the party organisation of the Institute of the Ecology of Plants and Animals in 1968.

Admittedly there are cases where periods as party secretary have not led to a slackening of published articles. B.P. Parimbetov of the Kazakh branch of the All-Union Academy of Construction and Architecture continued publishing while secretary, as did A.A. Borisov of the All-Union Academy's Institute of Chemical Physics, Iu.M. Polukarov of the Academy's Institute of Physical Chemistry, and F.I. Furdui of the Moldavian Academy's Institute of Zoology.

However, despite these exceptions there seems to be good evidence to support the views expressed in the conversations reported above. It could be said that the conversations and data apply only to educational and research institutions, where the publication of articles and a scientific career are of great importance and not easily

reconcilable with party work. Can the same be said of administrative institutions? We have already seen evidence that, within the limits of the method used, suggested that a large number of technical specialists have held positions as administrative party secretaries. Although I have not collected data on the point, it seems probable that there is a fair degree of mobility between administrative and research institutions.¹ It therefore seems possible that a term as an administrative party secretary could be seen as an unwelcome interruption to scientific work.² However further examination of the motivations of administrative party secretaries would have to be made before this could be confirmed.

I have had one conversation with a former secretary of a ministerial party organisation. He expressed no dissatisfaction with the position, apparently considering

1 I have found sixteen such cases among the party secretaries in my file.

2 I have only one case where a term as an administrative party secretary has produced a reduction in published articles. N.M. Verbitskii has never published many articles, but his articles on agricultural science have appeared in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1970 and 1971. In 1967 he was identified as secretary of the party committee of the Moldavian Ministry of Food Industry. Incidentally, in 1963 he was described as secretary of the party committee of the Floreshty collective-state farm production administration. No articles appeared before 1965.

it as part of his career.¹ I have also spoken with the head of a quite small, but Union Republic level bureaucratic organisation who told me that his party secretary had not welcomed the position simply because it took up so much of his time and made it very difficult to fulfil his non-party administrative duties.²

This problem raises the question of the number of full-time party secretaries in non-production organisations. There is not a great deal of data on the question. However it can be said that in general the authorities prefer to keep the numbers of full-time secretaries as low as possible, but that their attitudes also change over time. Up until very recently it appears that the number was very low indeed. In 1957 196 of the 215 PPO's in Noginsk raion (Moscow oblast') were part-time, and in the same year *Partinaiia zhizn'* reported that the

1 This career had included party work at the *obkom* secretary level, but was now concluding with a university teaching position.

2 He also told me that his wife, the full-time editor of the student newspaper of a very large tertiary educational institution, was a member of the institution's party committee and spent three hours daily on party work! However a Soviet survey of party workers in the city of Mytishchinsk found that part-time PPO secretaries spent an average of 1.44 hours daily on party work, and party buro members, 1.03 hours. *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 1/74, p. 106.

number of full-time secretaries was being reduced.¹ In 1964 it was reported that only 8% of the PPO secretaries in Moscow were full-time, while in 1966 only 9% of the secretaries in Latvia were full-time.² Both the reports giving these figures expressed satisfaction that the figures were so low and criticised those wanting more full-time secretaries for their "distrust of the strength of the collective". However since then the numbers of full-time secretaries have risen. In 1968 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* declared that a PPO does not usually have a full-time secretary unless it has more than 150 members.³ This should produce a higher percentage than those just given. *Kommunist Estonii* reported in 1973 that all the farms of the republic had full-time party secretaries, while in 1975 40% of the Soviet Union's farms had full-time secretaries.⁴ In recent years the faculty party organisations of Moscow State University have gained full-time party secretaries, although they still teach half the normal hours in order to keep them in touch with their disciplines.

It would appear probable therefore that in recent years the larger non-production PPO's have gained full-time

1 *P.zh.*, 9/57, p. 57; 11/57, pp. 39-41.

2 Bugaev, op. cit., pp. 177-178; *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 3/66, p. 57.

3 *P.zh.*, 8/68, p. 43.

4 *Kom.Estonii*, 9/73, pp. 50-51; *P.zh.*, 4/75, p. 14.

secretaries. Whether this is a long-term development remains to be seen, but is discussed in more detail in a broader context in the Conclusion to the thesis. However there are still sufficient party organisations in the non-production sphere too small to have full-time secretaries that the problem of too little time to do two jobs is still a significant one.

The practice in Moscow State University of full-time party secretaries maintaining some teaching indicates that the authorities are aware of the problems the position causes to career scientists and teachers. I have also been told by a Soviet official that after scientists have finished their terms as party secretaries they are often given time off by the administration of their institutions to finish their dissertations or to catch up on recent developments in their fields.

But this is enough in itself to indicate how dependent the career scientist-secretary is on his institution's administration. A secretary who had antagonised the head of the institution during his term in office could find it difficult to get this period of leave. The secretaryship is a position which can require taking stands against what might be popular demands within the "host" organisation, and often against the institutional leader, who is, after all, the secretary's institutional

and professional superior. This was the complaint of the faculty party organisation secretary in Moscow State University to whom I spoke. The medical institute department head said that the combination of the absence from his research for a number of years and the professional enemies the secretary inevitably makes during his term means that if he was not a party "hack" before the term as secretary, he had little choice but to become one when it had finished.

Another reason that being secretary of a PPO might be considered undesirable is the degree of ambiguity apparently deliberately built into the position. It is not a position where one can every be sure of where one stands. One suspects that it is a job which could well be used for the provision of a scapegoat. Most of the people I have spoken to have said that the job is a difficult, demanding one, regardless of the effects it might have on the secretaries' careers.

If these are the possible reasons for not wanting the position, why is it that individuals accept it?

The most obvious reason is that the higher authorities give one no choice. Despite some of the references given above, where people have apparently successfully avoided the post, most of them suggest that the post is obligatory once the selection has been made.

Partiinaiia zhizn''s statement that consent is not required for candidature, as well as suggesting that secretaries do not always welcome their selection, also suggests that they really have no choice in the matter.¹ The party member from the medical institute mentioned above told me that once one had been chosen for the post, the selection being made incidentally by the *raikom*, one had no choice but to accept.

Another possible reason is a simple sense of duty. We could take at face value the report already cited from *Ogonëk*.² The article claims that although it was very inconvenient for the individual he recognised his social responsibilities and accepted the post. When I asked the former faculty party secretary from Moscow University why he took the position when he had not wanted it, he told me, I believe quite sincerely, that it was one's social and party responsibility to accept such positions.

Finally we must ask ourselves whether a term as party secretary might be useful for one's career, whether it be a party one or not, despite the data given above on interruptions to scientific and academic work. There are two ways one can see that work as party secretary could contribute to one's career. Firstly, particularly if one

1 See above, p. 459.

2 See above. pp. 458-459.

were interested in a managerial or party career, the post could be an excellent way of gaining experience and demonstrating one's abilities in these areas. Secondly, it seems likely that the Soviet Union is at least as likely as anywhere else to experience the phenomenon of people gaining promotions not because of their abilities, but through their willingness to ingratiate themselves with their superiors. Again it is unfortunate that I am in no position to judge the quality of the scientific work done by the secretaries I have identified. However the party member from the medical institute referred to above complained bitterly about people who, although they were poor scientists, were given promotions simply because of their willingness to accept party and other "social" positions. There is other evidence that the party secretaries in institutes are not always top-rank scientists. In 1955 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* referred to the secretary of the party organisation of the Omsk Agricultural Institute who had finally received his candidate's degree after working on his dissertation for twenty years and then decided that his involvement with scientific work was over.¹

Vucinich declares, unfortunately without any references or statistical evidence, that the leading positions in the party organisations of the Academies of Science tend to be

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P.zh., 17/55, p. 64.

occupied by scientists who have only distinguished themselves by their willingness to support the party at all times.¹ Agursky implies that the promotions given retiring PPO secretaries in the Experimental Research Institute of Metal-cutting Lathes were not the result of scientific ability. He cites one particular case of a secretary who after completing his term became deputy director of the institute "for the development of the branch", a post with no clear functions. However he adds the qualification that he worked in the institute at the time of Khrushchev's rule on the turnover of PPO secretaries and is apparently reluctant to generalise.²

The disadvantage of such secretaries is that they have so little authority among their colleagues that it is impossible for them to properly fulfil their functions. It should also be remembered that to be party secretary is no easy task and requires considerable organisational and diplomatic skills. There appear to be strong disincentives against selecting party "hacks" as PPO secretaries.

Consideration will now be given to career data collected on PPO secretaries, to see what evidence there is

1 Vucinich, A: *The Soviet Academy of Sciences*, Hoover Institute Studies, Series E: Institutions, No. 3, Stanford U.P., Stanford, California, 1956, p. 38.

2 Agursky, op. cit., p. 51.

on where a term as party secretary fits into a career and to what degree and in what way it is useful for that career. (Note that the years given refer only to the identifications I have made and almost certainly do not cover the whole period that the particular position was occupied).

(a) educational party secretaries

- i) V.A. Beloguzhev - *aspirant* in the Uzbek Institute of Rail Transport Engineers (1963)
 - senior lecturer in the Graphics Department (1964)
 - secretary of the party committee (1972).
- ii) A.F. Bereznoi - secretary of the party committee of Leningrad State University (1954)
 - head of the department at the university (1958)
 - *dotsent* (1960)
 - dean of the Faculty of Journalism (1966-70).
- iii) G.I. Budylnkin - *aspirant* at the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy (1965)
 - secretary of the party committee (1971).
- iv) N.V. Duchenko - *dotsent* at Kiev State University (1969)
 - deputy director for scientific work of the Institute for Raising the Qualifications of Social Science Teachers of the university (1972) (Note that this is not a full-time, but a "voluntary" position.)
 - secretary of the party committee (1973).

- v) I.Ia. Diuriagin - *aspirant* at Sverdlovsk Juridicial Institute (1965)
- *dotsent* (1969)
- secretary of the party buro (1970).
- vi) I.G. Ermolaev - secretary of the party committee of Gorky Higher Party School (1965)
- senior lecturer at Gorky Polytechnical Institute (1971).
- vii) A.S. Ivanov - junior scientific worker at the Research Institute for Agricultural Economics (1963)
- *dotsent* at the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy (1966)
- secretary of the Academy's party committee (1969).
- viii) R.N. Il'in - dean of the Camera-operating Faculty of the All-Union State Institute of Cinematography (1964)
- secretary of the party buro (1971).
- ix) N.Sh. Inoiatov - senior lecturer in the Tashkent Institute of Engineers of the Irrigation and Mechanisation of Agriculture (1963)
- secretary of the party committee (1972).
- x) K.E. Koger - secretary of the party committee of Tartu State University (1971)
- rector of Tallin Teachers' College (1973).

- xi) I.A. Konstantinov - secretary of the *komsomol* committee of the Moscow Conservatorium (1960)
- secretary of the party committee (1968-72)
 - *dotsent* and head of the Department of Marxism-Leninism (1972).
- xii) V.I. Krutov - secretary of the party committee of the Moscow Technical College (1956)
- *dotsent* (1960)
 - chairman of the Scientific-Technical Council of the Ministry of Higher Education (1968) (probably a part-time position).
- xiii) Li Chan Van - secretary of the party organisation of the Tselinograd Agricultural Institute (1961)
- senior lecturer (1965).
- xiv) L.D. Lipkin - secretary of the party committee of the Leningrad Finance-Economics Institute (1939)
- head of the Department of Trade Finance of the Moscow City Financial Administration (1970).
- xv) B.M. Mochalov - secretary of the party committee of Moscow State University (1966)
- rector of the Plekhanov Economics Institute (1972).
- xvi) R. Murel' - secretary of the party buro of the Tallin Teachers' College (1969-72)
- dean of the institute (1973).

- xvii) T.T. Mustafin - secretary of the party buro
of the Karaganda Medical Institute (1964)
- head of the Department of Party History and
Scientific Communism (1965)
- *dotsent* (1971).
- xviii) B.P. Parimbetov - secretary of the party organisation
of the Kazakh branch of the All-Union Academy of
Construction and Architecture (1961)
- minister of the Kazakh Ministry of the Production
of Construction Materials (1965).
- xix) M.A. Prokof'ev - chemist-press operator in the
Derbenov Chemical Factory
- student, *aspirant* and deputy director of the
Research Institute of Chemistry in Moscow State
University (all 1928-41)
- senior scientific worker and deputy director of
the Institute of Chemistry of Moscow University (1946)
- secretary of the party committee of Moscow
University (1948)
- head of the Chief Administration for Universities
and deputy minister of the All-Union Ministry of
Higher Education (1951)
- first deputy minister in the ministry (1959)
- minister of the RSFSR Ministry of Education (1966)
- minister of the All-Union Ministry of Education
(at present).

- xx) B.A. Protopopov - *aspirant* in the Department of Accounting and Analysis of the Economic Activity of Industrial Enterprises of the Economics Faculty of Moscow State University (1967)
- deputy secretary of the party committee (1971)
 - secretary of the party committee (1975)
 - first secretary of *Leninskii raikom*, Moscow (1975).
- xxi) Ia. Reimand - deputy secretary of the party committee of Tartu State University (1971)
- secretary of the party committee (1973)
 - acting *dotsent* in the Department of the Methodology of the Teaching of Mathematics (1973).
- xxii) S.A. Roshka - secretary of the party committee of Kishinev State University (1973)
- *dotsent* (1973).
- xxiii) V.E. Sokolov - deputy secretary of the party committee of Moscow State University (1969)
- director of the Institute of Evolutionary Morphology and Ecology of Animals of the All-Union Academy of Sciences (1973).
- xxiv) P.M. Studennikov - secretary of the party committee of the Kuibyshev Agricultural Institute (1964)
- first secretary of the *Bol'she-Chernigov raikom*, Kuibyshev (1966).

- xxv) L.M. Tereshchenko - secretary of the party committee of the Moscow Technical College (1969-74)
- senior lecturer (1970).
- xxvi) K.M. Tiutina - secretary of the party organisation of the Moscow Chemical-Technical Institute (1966-71)
- *dotsent* (1966).
- xxvii) F.P. Uryvskii - secretary of the party committee of the Kuibyshev Aviation Institute (1972)
- *dotsent* (1972)
- xxviii) A.A. Chukhno - secretary of the party committee of Kiev State University (1968)
- head of the Department of Political Economy of the Humanities Faculties (1971).
- xxix) N.M. Shilintsev - secretary of the party buro of the History Faculty of Kishinev State University (1965)
- *dotsent* (1968)
- head of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History (1973).
- xxx) V.I. Iurchuk - head of the Department of Party History of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy (1969)
- secretary of the party committee (1973)
- director of the Institute of Party History of the Ukrainian Central Committee (1975).

xxxii) V.N. Iagodkin - *dotsent* in the Department of Political Economy of the Economics Faculty of Moscow State University (1967)

- secretary of the party committee (1968-71)

- secretary for ideological affairs of Moscow *gorkom* (1971)

- deputy minister for personnel of the All-Union Ministry of Education (1976).

Of these thirty secretaries it could be said that ten have gone on to quite senior positions. Koger, Mochalov, Murel', Sokolov and Iurchuk have gone on to become directors, deans or rectors of institutes; Krutov, Parimbetov, Prokof'ev and Iagodkin have gained senior bureaucratic positions; while Protopopov, Studennikov and again Iagodkin have gained significant party positions. Another five secretaries went on to positions as heads of departments and Berezhnoi became dean of a faculty. Thus it could be said that at least 50% of secretaries were later promoted beyond rank-and-file status of their institutions, surely a significant proportion.

It is interesting that of all these secretaries only one (Il'in) could be said to have occupied a reasonably senior position before he was party secretary, although perhaps Duchenko could be included in this category.

A period as party secretary at Moscow State University appears to be particularly valuable for a career. Of the five past secretaries of the university I have identified, one became a rector, one a director, one a minister, one a *gorkom* secretary and deputy minister, and one a *raikom* first secretary.

It should be noted that although a majority of those secretaries who went on to senior positions were from the general education institutions, they had by no means a monopoly of promotions. Although it is difficult to isolate the importance of the party post in these people's careers the evidence is that it has not hindered those careers.

(b) research party secretaries

- i) P. Avdeev - secretary of the party buro of the All-Union Research Institute for Grain-Growing (1963)
- chief agronomist of the Novonikolaevsk Agricultural Production Administration, Volgograd *oblast'* (1967).
- ii) V.A. Gudkovskii - secretary of the party organisation of the Research Institute for Fruit and Wine Growing of the Kazakh Ministry of Agriculture (1970)
- head of the Department of Fruit Storage Technology (1972).

- iii) A. Gul'binskas - *dotsent* and senior scientific worker in the Institute of Economics of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences (1969)
 - secretary of the party organisation (1972).
- iv) V.P. Derkach - secretary of the party committee of the Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian Academy (1971)
 - head of a department (1971).
- v) D.B. Dunaevskii - head of the Department of Mechanisation of the All-Union Research Institute for Leguminous Plants (1965)
 - secretary of the party committee (1970).
- vi) I.V. Erëmin - head of the Technical Department of the institute *Teploproekt* (1962)
 - secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Geology and the Use of Fuel Minerals (1971).
- vii) G.T. Kodyk - secretary of the party organisation of the Karaganda Coal Research Institute (1969)
 - head of a laboratory (1969).
- viii) L.M. Liamshev - secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Acoustics of the All-Union Academy (1971)
 - head of a department (1971).

- ix) V.M. Mel'nikova - senior scientific worker in the Central Institute for Traumatology and Orthopaedics (1969)
- secretary of the party committee (1971).
- x) Iu.M. Polukarov - secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Physical Chemistry of the All-Union Academy (1967-71)
- senior scientific worker (1971).
- xi) L.E. Repida - minister of the Moldavian Ministry of State Control (1955-58)
- secretary of the party buro of the Institute of History of the Moldavian Academy (1970)
- senior scientific worker in the institute (1970).
- xii) A.V. Frolov - secretary of the party committee of the Research and Design Institute for the Production of Rare Metals (1971)
- laboratory head (1971).
- xiii) K.G. Chulkov - head of the Laboratory of Automation and Cybernetics of the All-Union Research Institute for the Mechanisation of Agriculture (1968)
- secretary of the institute's party committee (1972).
- xiv) E.V. Shorokhova - secretary of the party committee of the Institute of Philosophy of the All-Union Academy (1970)
- sector head (1970).

- xv) V.S. Iablokov - studied at Moscow State University while teaching natural sciences at Moscow Gubernia Party School (1921-26)
- head of the Geological Search Administration of the Moscow Basin (1934)
 - chief engineer and deputy head of the Administration of Coal Exploration of the All-Union People's Commissariats of Heavy Industry and Coal (1937)
 - did responsible work in the apparatus of the Presidium of the All-Union Academy of Sciences (1943)
 - organised and became head of the Department of Coal Geology in the Institute of Geological Sciences
 - deputy director of the Academy's Institute of Geology (1950-52)
 - deputy chairman of the Commission on Sedimentary Rocks of the Department of Geological-Geographical Sciences of the Academy (1954)
 - deputy secretary of the party buro of the Institute of Geology (1956)
 - work in the Department of the History of Geological Science of the Academy (1963).

It can be seen that research institutions present a rather different picture to that presented by educational institutions. Here no secretaries have been identified as going on to senior positions. Both Repida and Iablokov seem

to have been in the decline of their careers while secretaries. The rest seem to have been middle-level workers - at worst, senior scientific workers; at best, department heads. They might have reached these positions before or after their terms as secretaries. It seems that their terms as secretaries have had no positive influence on their careers.

(c) Academy party secretaries

Are the secretaries of the party organisations of the Academies of Science like their research colleagues? Unfortunately I have career information on only four Academy party secretaries. The information, on Radul, Migirenko, Tomulets and Chibotaru, is given above.¹ They are a mixed lot; Radul at the end of a long and quite illustrious political and academic career; Tomulets presumably still involved in his party career; and Migirenko and Chibotaru going on to academic positions. I think we can conclude that an Academy party secretary is likely to be a quite important person, and quite possible one on the way up.

(d) administrative party secretaries

All the relevant data have been given for the secretaries of administrative PPO's in the section above

1 See above, pp. 442-447.

on their organisational and party experience. Again there is no strong evidence of bureaucratic party secretaries going on to more senior positions after the completion of their terms. Like research party secretaries they seem to be usually from the middle-level of their institutions and their rising to this level does not seem to be necessarily after their term as party secretary - it is more likely to be before. However there is also no evidence that these party secretaries are at the ends of their careers. Thus it would seem that although administrators of some proven competence are required, the position has no particular relevance for their careers. Even when we are considering those ministerial party secretaries who are pursuing party careers, the post as party secretary does not appear to indicate any particular stage in their career, being neither a sign of promotion or demotion. One can presume that adequate performance in the position would be grounds for promotion, particularly to more senior party posts.

(e) cultural party secretaries

We have already seen the limited amount of information available on the career patterns of cultural PPO secretaries. There is little evidence that the position is used in furthering a party, administrative or professional career. Balandin went on to be a radio chief producer, while Syber became a theatre director. Kozachenko served a

term as first secretary of his Union's administration. Enukidze became a *raikom* secretary for ideological affairs, while Vasil'ev became a *gorkom* party organiser. The others appeared satisfied to continue as professionals in their particular area of cultural activity.

(f) Conclusions

Thus it is only in the educational category that there is any relatively strong evidence that a term as PPO secretary can be useful for one's career, although there is some supporting evidence in the case of bureaucratic secretaries. Research party secretaries appear to have no reason to welcome the position as a means to further their careers. Although cultural secretaries are more ideologically oriented than their research counterparts, they also seem to gain nothing from the position in terms of their career.¹

1 As some indication that a term as PPO secretary is by no means obligatory for a party career can be seen in the figures given by Mzhavanadze, the party first secretary in Georgia, in 1976 that of 260 *raikom* and *gorkom* secretaries in Georgia, only 122 had been PPO secretaries. These figures include secretaries of PPO's of *all* types of institutions and enterprises. *Zaria Vostoka*, 23/1/76. Of the 72 first secretaries of RSFSR *kraikomy* and *obkomy* (and the Moscow *gorkom*) examined by T.H. Rigby, only 9 of those occupying their posts in 1965 had first entered party work at the work-place level, while in 1976 the number had risen to thirteen. Rigby, T.H: "The Soviet Regional Leadership: the Brezhnev generation", forthcoming article.

Therefore, if career is the only positive reason that people might welcome appointment as a PPO secretary, it appears that only some people working in educational establishments, particularly non-natural scientists working in general education establishments, would welcome the position. People in bureaucratic institutions would have little reason to oppose it, while scientific workers would have strong reasons to be opposed.

What, therefore, are the sort of problems one might expect the top authorities to be having with the people selected as party secretaries?

Firstly, one would expect to find them in many cases incapable of fulfilling their functions, through lack of the necessary ideological and administrative training and experience. One must particularly question the ability of research party secretaries and secretaries in specialised educational institutions to cope with the ideological requirements of the position. We should remember the extent to which technical specialisations and ideology are combined in the various methodological and philosophical seminars that seem to be such an important part of ideological indoctrination and control. We have seen some complaints about the use made of these seminars.¹ The data on party secretaries in these types of institutions

1 See above, pp. 59-60.

suggest that the successful organisation of these seminars would be beyond the average party secretary.

The frequent lack of ability to fulfil their functions is evidently often compounded by the lack of desire to do so. If the position is of no benefit to their career, could in fact be a hindrance, one would not expect to see them making things even more difficult for themselves by antagonising their professional colleagues and superiors. The pressure towards collusion with administration would appear to be strong.

With regard to staff generalist party secretaries, they are most common in administrative institutions. In the sections of the thesis on administrative PPO's I came to the conclusion that in recent times they have tended to play some sort of staff generalist role, even if not entirely adequately. The data on administrative party secretaries do not contradict this conclusion.

The party secretaries in the general educational institutions are also likely to have staff generalist qualifications. Again the categories that seem to lack such secretaries are the research and specialised educational institutions. This might seem to contradict the findings in the body of the thesis, where I said that the party organisations in these institutions, through their problem-solving activities, do play a staff generalist role. However

I qualified this by saying that the staff generalist role in such institutions is a much narrower concept since it can, to some extent, be concentrated within a single technical specialisation. It is therefore possible that the narrow technical specialisations of the secretaries, combined with the middle-level positions they usually hold within the "host" organisation, are enough to provide them with a sufficiently broad staff generalist view.

CHAPTER SIX

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PPO'S

The last chapter examined two basic questions - whether PPO secretaries are able to play their role, and whether they are willing to play it. These are questions which must be asked in the wider context of non-production PPO's as a whole. Many of the examples given in previous chapters concerned cases where PPO's were criticised for failing to take action on particular issues. However general conclusions on the effectiveness of PPO's are not easily made.¹ Nevertheless, some areas of particular ineffectiveness on the part of PPO's can perhaps be identified.

PPO's are most commonly criticised for their failures in the control of the illegal personal and operational behaviour of individuals and shortcomings in ideological indoctrination and control. In both these

1 Even if we were able to come to general conclusions on the performance of Soviet institutions in the categories with which we are concerned, it would be very difficult to isolate the part played by PPO's. There is the further problem that press reports are probably weighted towards PPO's failing to play their roles effectively. Certainly it is difficult to decide whether the more spectacular cases reported are aberrations or typical Soviet occurrences. The principle of criticism and self-criticism further ensures that all reports contain their measure of critical comment.

areas reports critical of PPO's are sufficiently common to suggest that the problems go beyond individual aberrations, but are to some degree endemic in the system.

Often the existence of undesirable behaviour in institutions is officially explained by the failure of PPO indoctrination activities. For example, when a communist in the Latvian Ministry of Forestry was found to have used his administrative position to gain access to state funds for the building of a personal *dacha*, *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* considered this to be a sign of the weak involvement of the PPO in the indoctrination of party members.¹ After the director of the All-Union Research Institute for Medicinal Plants had been dealt with by the Committee for Party Control for serious violations of party and state discipline, the party secretary undertook to improve indoctrination work in the institute.² Complaints of poor indoctrination work appear to be most common in the research category.³ It is perhaps no coincidence that it is in this category that the authorities appear to have the greatest difficulty with lax PPO ideological control. Ideological control is one of the

1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 10/60, p. 4.

2 *P.zh.*, 19/69, p. 46.

3 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 12/60, p. 51; *Kom.*, 3/65, p. 24; *P.zh.*, 17/67, p. 6; *Kom.Moldavii*, 9/67, p. 5.

most important features of the Soviet system - failures in this control are of the greatest concern to the Soviet authorities. Many cases are reported of such failures among educational and cultural PPO's, the categories of the greatest inherent ideological sensitivity.¹ However many more cases concern research PPO's. We have seen the examples in the chapter on ideology of the group of scientists in a research laboratory who in 1957 allegedly attacked party policies in a party meeting without the PPO taking any action, of the Latvian Institute of Economics in 1960, the Institute of Plant Breeding in 1937 and the Institute of Economics in 1955.² PPO failures in such cases are of great significance for the legitimisation of the regime and control of the population.

There are also complaints of the failure of PPO's to take action on specific operational problems.³

1 For example, in 1955 the party buro of the Leningrad film studio *Lenfil'm* was criticised for allowing praise of a "vicious, degraded" film in a party meeting, while in 1963 the secretary of the PPO of the Kazakh Union of Writers was dismissed for allowing the appearance of nationalist tendencies in the works of some writers. *P.zh.*, 1/55, p. 23; *P.zh.Kaz.*, 3/63, p. 15. In 1955 *Kommunist* complained of the low level of party discipline which had allowed some philosophers to praise the "bourgeois theory of sincerity" (*iskrennost'*) in a party meeting of the Philosophy Faculty of Moscow State University. *Kom.*, 6/55, p. 61.

2 See above, pp. 63-69.

3 See, for example, *P.zh.Kaz.*, 1/63, p. 40.

However the majority of complaints in the operational area are directed against the style of PPO involvement, rather than the lack of involvement, and can usually be interpreted in terms of the failure of the PPO's to act in a staff generalist way. There are great numbers of complaints about PPO *podmena*, not so much in the narrow sense of taking formal decisions which it is not in their formal authority to take, but of involving themselves in the minor details of everyday operations.¹ It is of course essential to the staff generalist concept that staff agencies not be involved in petty operational decision-making. Even in cases where some degree of involvement is recognised as unavoidable by the authorities, PPO's are often criticised for not drawing the right conclusions from the action they have taken, for not seeing the need for further, deeper remedial action. For example, at the 1976 election-report meeting of the Uzbek Ministry of Power and Electricity the secretary of the party buro criticised the party control commission in the following terms:

They only note shortcomings, but do not uncover the reasons for them and do not place before the party buro the big, well-entrenched problems. Thus the commission

1 *P.zh.*, 8/65, pp. 42-43; *Kom.*, 4/67, p. 66; *Kom. (Vilnius)*, 5/70, p. 50; *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 23/11/73.

for the control of the fulfilment of the directives of the party and state often limits itself to a perfunctory statement of facts without attempting to suggest any effective decisions.¹

In 1971 Shelest, at the time the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, criticised the party committee of the Ukrainian Union of Writers for failing to do anything about preventing the recurrence of shortcomings, ideological and artistic, in individual works, although it was able to deal with them as they occurred.² This is criticism of the failures of the PPO's to play their roles in the staff generalist style.

In summary the main areas of shortcomings in the activities of PPO's are in the prevention of the illegal behaviour of institutional leaders, in ideological indoctrination and control, and in the style of their involvement in operational "production" concerns. It is now necessary to examine the reasons for these shortcomings.

As indicated in the last chapter there are two basic possibilities - that PPO's are unable to fulfil

1 *Pravda*, 4/11/76, p. 2. We have already seen the comments of *Kommunist* about the work of the PPO of the Ministry of Construction Materials. See pp. 330-331.

2 *Kom. Ukrainy*, 6/71, p. 18.

their functions in these areas, or that they are unwilling to do so. The latter is essentially a matter of PPO collusion with the "host" organisation; there are two possible reasons for the former - that the PPO leaders and members do not know what they should do or how to do it, or that they do not have sufficient power to do it.

(1) The uncertainty of PPO secretaries about their roles

In the last chapter we saw that the majority of PPO secretaries are part-time party workers, often with no particular background in party work. When we consider the variable expectations made of them, the onerous nature of their tasks and the consequences of error, it is not surprising that many of them exhibit a considerable degree of uncertainty about the tasks and the means of fulfilment. Sometimes the uncertainty is openly expressed, as in the case of the chairman of the party control commission for academic and indoctrination work (almost certainly a deputy party secretary) in an Estonian secondary school who told the election-report meeting of the PPO that the commission had not done anything because nobody had told him what it was supposed to do.¹ In 1963 at a party meeting of the *Donetskuglenosstroi* Construction Administration a communist made the suggestion that the party buro be

1 *Kom. Estonii*, 1/73, p. 32.

directed to recommend to the relevant people that there be changes in the organisation of the supply of fuel in the Ukraine. The PPO secretary opposed the suggestion because the *raikom* had not asked for any suggestions and therefore it was not clear what it was that they were supposed to concern themselves with.¹ Much uncertainty has been exhibited over the right of control. One suspects that often it is in fact no more than a cover for the secretaries' unwillingness to do their job. However, given the ambiguity over the right of control in authoritative sources, one is willing to believe that much of the confusion is genuine. For example, in 1972 a member of the party buro of a polyclinic in Vitebsk wrote to *Kommunist Belorussii* asking if the right of control gave the secretary of the party buro the right to sign sick-leave certificates. Not surprisingly the reply was that he may not, unless it is part of his non-party administrative duties.² It is extraordinary that any party member should feel the need to ask such a question and surely indicates considerable uncertainty about the powers of PPO's.

It also causes one to wonder about the effectiveness of the various seminars and conferences run by higher

1 *P.zh.*, 1/63, pp. 60-61. For complaints about PPO's that only take action on matters that have been indicated to them from above, see *P.zh.*, 15/56 p. 15; 11/58, p. 23.

2 *Kom.Belorussii*, 1/72, p. 59.

party authorities for PPO workers and the work of higher level instructors in PPO's. The seminars are designed to provide both basic training in the requirements of party work and communication of specific changes in policies and new campaigns. Their general training role can be seen in the case of the Riazan *obkom* which in 1958 called a conference of administrative PPO secretaries, at which the head of the Riazan *gorkom*'s Organisational Department spoke of the proper style of PPO involvement in control activities.¹ Similarly, when the Lvov *obkom* found that many secretaries of *ispolkom* party organisations did not have clear ideas of their functions, it organised seminars for them.²

In the chapter on ministerial PPO's I have shown how the seminars are used as a means of communication of new policies. There are other examples in other categories of PPO. The Zubovo-Polianskii *raikom* in Mordovia runs combined seminars for PPO secretaries on general and theoretical matters, but on more specific matters divides them into four groups - agricultural, industrial, educational and administrative.³ In 1971 the Moscow *gorkom* ran a conference for school party secretaries. One of the

1 *P.zh.*, 15/58, p. 17.

2 *Kom.Ukrainy*, 7/70, p. 51.

3 *P.zh.*, 1/74, p. 47.

gorkom's secretaries addressed the conference on the main educational task of the moment - universal secondary education.¹ The permanent seminars organised by the Kharkov *obkom* for rectors, prorectors, department heads and party secretaries of tertiary educational institutions look at the most important questions of current policy on scientific work in educational institutions.²

The various instructors of higher party organs are expected to provide on-the-spot advice to party

1 *Mosk.pravda*, 9/1/71, p. 3.

2 *Kom.Ukrainy*, 3/71, p. 92. The most detailed report on seminars for PPO secretaries was published in *Kommunist Estonii* in 1971, describing a seminar run by the Kingisepp *raikom*. The first secretary of the *raikom* gave a report on the conclusions reached by the 27th *raion* party conference and spoke of the tasks ahead. The second secretary then analysed the work of political lecturers (*politinformatory*) and examined the results of an exchange of opinions the local newspaper had conducted on the matter. Next a lecturer from Tallin State University spoke on relations between the members of his working collective. In the second half of the seminar there was a discussion of PPO work plans, during which the party secretaries of a production association workshop and collective and state farms spoke. The PPO secretaries were then divided into two groups - farm secretaries had a session with the head of the *raion* Agricultural Administration on the fulfilment of tasks set by the previous Five Year Plan, while enterprise and institution secretaries looked at the problems involved in establishing a cost-cutting policy in collectives. *Kom.Estonii*, 4/71, p. 30.

secretaries uncertain about their responsibilities.¹ However most reports on the involvement of *raikom* and *gorkom* instructors in the work of PPO's concentrate on their supervision of PPO meetings, whether they be election-report meetings or ordinary meetings. At election-report meetings their involvement is designed above all to ensure the election of the higher organ's candidate for secretary, whether the party members are in favour or not.² In 1966 the Novopromyshlennyi *raikom* was subject to the very common criticism that it shows interest in the PPO of the Kalinin *oblast'* Symphony Orchestra only at the yearly election-report meetings.³ Complaints from PPO secretaries that they are being ignored by *raikomy* and *gorkomy* are very widespread. Sometimes the complaints specify that the higher party organs fail to advise the PPO secretary about

1 *Partinaiia zhizn'* stresses the importance of *raikom* and *gorkom* training of PPO secretaries on the spot, not just in formal seminars. *P.zh.*, 15/54, p. 25.

2 *P.zh.*, 15/55, pp. 61-62; 20/56, pp. 61-63; 13/61, p. 7; 21/63, p. 49; 19/64, p. 53; 16/65, pp. 43-44.

3 *P.zh.*, 8/66, pp. 64-65.

his duties.¹ Although the Soviet authorities and PPO's appear to be relatively satisfied with the seminars run by higher party organs for PPO secretaries, the complaints about on-the-spot instruction are so common that one must conclude that it is a considerable and continuing problem.²

The uncertainty of PPO's about their roles, for which *raikomy* and *gorkomy* must take most of the blame, is of particular relevance in explaining the failures of PPO's to work in a staff generalist style. The degree of involvement in operational concerns that the staff generalist

1 In 1955 the secretary of the party organisation of the Saratov *oblast'* Savings Bank Administration complained to *Partiinaiia zhizn'* that the *raikom* insisted that he organise socialist competitions, but would not give him any details on how to go about it. *P.zh.*, 2/55, p. 69. When the secretary of the PPO of a Kazakh *raion* hospital was first appointed to the position she described herself as completely lost. She complained that she was given no help by the *raikom*, despite three visits to see one of the *raikom* secretaries. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 2/63, p. 45. The neglected PPO's tend to be concentrated in non-production institutions, particularly smaller administrative and service agencies, since these do not figure so largely in local production plans, on which basis the success or failure of the local party organ is decided. A 1974 *Pravda* editorial discussed the special problems small administrative PPO's face as a result of *raikom* and *gorkom* neglect. *Pravda*, 13/5/74, p. 1.

2 In 1973 *Partiinaiia zhizn' Kazakhstana* made an interesting comment on this matter. The journal claimed that PPO secretaries were now technically qualified enough not to need advice from *raikom* or *gorkom* instructors on "production" matters. However they did need advice on party work. The report did not mention ideology. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 2/73, p. 11.

style demands, particularly in its Soviet application, varies considerably. Not only are there periodic changes in general policy on the degree of involvement required, but decisions need to be made in particular cases.

Raikomy and *gorkomy* are not expected to involve themselves in all such decisions - one of the advantages of the PPO system is that it provides an opportunity for decentralisation.¹ However the number of complaints about PPO *podmena*, and the need to implement periodic campaigns against it, suggest that *raikomy* and *gorkomy* often fail to establish even a general understanding of the proper requirements in the minds of PPO secretaries.

The feeling of uncertainty experienced by PPO secretaries could well be a factor in some of their failures to control the illegal behaviour of institutional leaders. It is recognised by the Soviet authorities that in some cases illegal administrative procedures must be tolerated, since legal procedures have shown themselves to be inadequate. It is part of the PPO secretary's role to decide when an action of dubious legality is justified by circumstances. There are some cases where it seems possible that the PPO secretary was criticised for failing

1 Burns and Stalker write that the feelings of role ambiguity experienced by people working in an "organic" system, while perhaps being uncomfortable for the individuals concerned, are not necessarily dysfunctional for the system. Burns and Stalker, op. cit., pp. 134-135.

to take action over a matter that at other times might not have been considered as requiring any action. For example, the PPO's of the RSFSR Ministry of Consumer Services and the ministry's Central Design-Construction and Technical Bureau were criticised in 1974 by the Committee for Party Control for failing to take action against the director of the bureau and the ministerial *glavk* supervising it after the bureau had neglected research and development work in the improvement of consumer appliances and equipment in order to concentrate on filling orders for outside organisations.¹ Since the orders from outside organisations were a better source of income for the bureau, it was quite possibly ministerial policy to encourage such orders. Probably this was a case where the PPO secretaries, subject to conflicting demands, made the wrong choice. Similarly, in 1976 the Committee for Party Control criticised the secretary of the party committee of the Kharkov Aviation Institute for taking no action when the rector employed twenty more technical and administrative workers than the establishment allowed.² This is a situation which in some circumstances could go unnoticed or be permitted.

Thus uncertainty about the tasks, powers and proper style of operations is a significant factor in the

1 *P.zh.*, 16/74, p. 53.

2 *P.zh.*, 12/76, p. 41.

failure of PPO's in the control of behaviour and the control of "production" concerns.¹ However this is not necessarily a matter of concern to the Soviet authorities, since a degree of ambiguity is probably deliberately built into the PPO system in order to gain the benefits of its *de facto* decentralisation. In such a situation the selective supervision given PPO's by higher party organs, particularly *raikomy* and *gorkomy*, becomes critical. They are apparently increasing their supervision and instruction through formal seminars and conferences. However such formal supervision is not the main requirement - what is needed is constant monitoring of the activities of PPO's in order to set things right when decentralisation is producing undesirable results. It is in this area that there is considerable evidence of *raikom* and *gorkom* neglect particularly among smaller PPO's. However this is not a problem inherent to the PPO system, nor is it the main reason for PPO failures.

1 Uncertainty appears to be less adequate as an explanation for the failure of PPO's to exercise strict ideological control, the other area of PPO failure. Although some scientist PPO secretaries might be confused by some applications of Marxist-Leninist ideology to the natural sciences, the evidence suggests that their failures in this area are better explained by unwillingness, not uncertainty. This will be discussed in more detail soon.

(2) The inability of PPO secretaries to play their role

A more serious problem arises when a PPO secretary knows what he has to do, but does not have the power to do it. Neither Sampson nor Golembiewski, on whose models the staff generalist concept is above all based, see this as a problem. Sampson specifically denies staff agencies the right to have any powers over the line, but assumes that the line will be happy to accept any staff suggestions. Golembiewski recognises the need to give staff agencies some formal powers for the implementation of measures they have decided on, assuming that the formal, open nature of these powers will be sufficient to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of the line and therefore reduce line-staff conflict.

The Soviet authorities have adopted the latter's point of view. Chapter Two describes in detail the formal powers granted PPO's, including the strengthening of those powers with the granting of the right of control to non-production PPO's in 1971. Not surprisingly they have not been readily accepted as legitimate or led to the end of PPO-administration conflict. Thus, for example, the secretary of the party committee of the Omsk Institute of Rail Transport Engineers is still able to complain that even with the right of control his party organisation is treated in the same old way by institutional leaders.

When the Academic Council is studying the plan for research work it is required that the party organisation and party committee be given the opportunity to express their opinions. However "out of habit" they are only given the draft plan at the last moment. In the same article the secretary of the PPO of the Minsk Teachers' College comments that there have been sharp arguments in the college over the limits of the right of control.¹ The secretary of the PPO of the Podol central *raion* hospital wrote in 1972:

We must note that at the beginning of the establishment of control we had to break through a unique 'psychological' barrier. The administration and some other workers had the idea that control was something absolutely incompatible with a hospital. They were ever on the alert for the word 'control'. The work of medical institutions and health organs, as is well known, has always been under party and soviet control. This was clear to all and well established. But the control of the activity of the administration by the primary party organisation - would this not lead to a lowering of the role of the leaders of the hospital

1 *Pravda*, 11/2/72, p. 2.

in the organisation of the medical process? Some of our comrades asked this question more than once.¹

But while granting the right of control has not led to the disappearance of PPO-administration conflict, it certainly appears to have ensured the PPO's sufficient power and authority to fulfil their functions. Before the granting of the right of control there were many examples of PPO's successfully controlling their "host" organisations. However there were also many cases of institutional leaders ignoring the work of PPO's and treating them with complete disdain.² Although cases of institutional leaders ignoring

1 *P.zh.*, 12/72, pp. 50-51.

2 The frustration of the PPO secretary is particularly evident in the complaint about the director of the Institute of Chemistry of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences who did not speak at party meetings, but "just sat there as if he's somebody special." *P.zh.*, 6/56, p. 34. But he at least attended party meetings. It was reported in 1954 that no top officials of the Ministry of Agriculture attended the election-report meeting of the PPO. *P.zh.*, 4/54, p. 69. In 1963 the party committee of the State Committee for the Chemical and Oil Industry was criticised for failing to operate as a collective body. Of the last 21 meetings one deputy chairman of the State Committee had attended only four, as had three other members of the party committee, while three others had missed the majority of meetings. There had been meetings attended by only three of the eleven members. *P.zh.*, 19/63, p. 42. The head of the Administration of Leather Footwear Production of the North Caucasus *sovnarkhoz* did not attend a single party buro meeting in three months. 7/64, p. 37. For cases of institutional leaders ignoring PPO recommendations, see *P.zh.Kaz.*, 2/63, p. 47; *P.zh.*, 5/63, p. 51.

PPO's are still reported,¹ the powers of PPO's appear to have been strengthened by the 1971 changes. The change can be sensed in the 1972 report in *Pravda* from the chairman of the party control commission for research work in the Far Eastern Polytechnical Institute on the participation of party members in the meetings of the Academic Council. *Pravda* reported an interjected question: "Does the administration like your activity?" to which the chairman replied: "It's possible that some people don't like it much. But, control . . . Well, business is business."² The suggestion is that the opposition does not count for much.

However, as was made clear in Chapter Two, the power of PPO's depends above all on support from higher authorities. It is not desired by the Soviet authorities that PPO's have absolute power over institutional leaders. Ideally some sort of balance is sought, so that whenever possible PPO's and administration cooperate. In cases where cooperation is impossible it is considered essential that higher authorities become aware of the conflict and adjudicate. Therefore neither side to the dispute is given dominating power.

1 See *Kom. (Vilnius)*, 5/69, p. 67; *Pravda*, 15/10/71, p. 2; *Kom.*, 6/72, p. 99; *Uchitel'skaia gazeta*, 13/1/73, p. 1; *Kom. Estonii*, 8/73, p. 53.

2 *Pravda*, 24/2/72, p. 2.

In the last section I mentioned *raikom* and *gorkom* neglect of smaller PPO's. Usually such neglect is rather benign. The PPO's are not considered important enough to warrant regular attention. This is not to say that they would not be given assistance if it were specifically required. However there is always the danger that a PPO secretary who is consistently ignored by local party organs will not feel confident of their support in a conflict situation and so will be unwilling to oppose the institutional leadership, especially if the secretary is already inclined towards the leadership's point of view.

Sometimes the failure of higher authorities to support a PPO results from a conscious desire to maintain a balance between the party organisation and the administration. In 1972 a party member from the Central Research and Design-Construction Institute for the Preventive Inspection of Pneumatics wrote to *Pravda* complaining that the institute's director opposed the party organisation's use of the right of control. A party meeting had elected a commission to check the scientific activity of the institute and had found serious shortcomings in the work of a deputy director. The latter was removed from his post, but four members of the commission received a reprimand to be recorded on their party cards from the *gorkom*. The same issue of *Pravda* also published a letter from the administrative secretary of the institute who complained

about the one-sided nature of the commission's work, saying that it had been decided to make an example of the deputy director, in whose work there were admittedly some shortcomings, and concentrated on him at the expense of an examination of anything else in the institute. It had proved necessary to refer the matter to the *gorkom* after the party buro had done nothing about the commission's mistakes.

A little later *Pravda* summed up the conflict. It criticised the PPO for its poor direction and supervision of the work of the commission. The commission had concentrated on the deputy director to the exclusion of all else when the case of the deputy director had already been decided and his dismissal was in hand. *Pravda* generally found in favour of the *gorkom* in its opposition to the commission, although declaring that it had somewhat over-reacted.¹ This case is interesting in that it illustrates well a local party organ attempting to maintain a balance between functional and dysfunctional conflict. The main question was one of degree of reaction, rather than dispute over facts, and it was the *gorkom*'s task to establish the correct degree of reaction.

The role of higher party authorities is not always so disinterested. Cases of their siding with the

1 *Pravda*, 10/1/72, p. 2; 28/3/72, p. 2.

institutional leadership even when the PPO appears to be in the right are common. The Soviet phenomenon of "family circles" obviously extends to this level, and PPO secretaries who upset the "family" are not likely to be welcomed. An excellent example of a "family circle" and the effect it has on PPO's could be seen in the Omsk Agricultural Institute in 1955. When a student of the institute's director had had his dissertation initially rejected by the institute's Council of Agronomic Faculties, the director enlisted the support of the head of the *obkom* Department of Science and Culture for the dissertation at its second defence. This ensured that it gained majority support and that the party buro did nothing about the situation.¹

There are many examples of local party organs protecting institutional leaders from the proper criticisms of PPO's. In 1955 a deputy director of the Institute of Land Use of the Kazakh branch of the All-Union Agricultural Academy was expelled from the party by a PPO meeting and then removed from his post for being a troublemaker. However the decision was reversed by the *raikom*, before being re-affirmed by the Buro of the Kazakh Central

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P.zh., 17/55, pp. 62-65.

Committee.¹ *Raikomy* and *gorkomy* are often in a position to have a PPO secretary causing too much trouble removed from his position. At the election-report meeting in 1964 in a Dubovskii eight year school (in the Mari ASSR) the *gorkom* instructor present at the meeting opposed the election as secretary of a woman with many years success as a teacher ostensibly because, not having been deputy secretary, she did not have sufficient experience. However *Partiinaiia zhizn'* reported that the real reason was that she had criticised the school's director in meetings.²

1 *P.zh.*, 8/55, p. 80. In 1968 the *raikom* similarly reversed the decision of the PPO of the Volgograd City Electricity Board to expel the deputy director from the party and instead strongly reprimanded him. This was after he had been gaoled for various misdeeds! *P.zh.*, 6/68, p. 48. When the secretary of the PPO of the Uralsk *oblast'* Highways Administration wrote to the Uralsk *gorkom* asking it to deal with the head of the administration for misappropriating state funds, the *gorkom* did nothing. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 11/61, p. 62. In 1975 at an open party meeting in the Kirgiz Farm Machinery Association (*Kirgizsel'khoztekhnika*) there was strong criticism of the first deputy chairman. The secretary of the PPO was chairman of the meeting, while a member of the Kirgiz Central Committee's Agricultural Department was present. After the meeting the Central Committee official and the deputy chairman criticised the secretary for allowing criticism of a leading official in an open party meeting. *P.zh.*, 11/75, p. 71.

2 *P.zh.*, 19/64, p. 53. See also *Pravda*, 8/8/73, p. 2. After the secretary of the party organisation of an Ordzhonikidze secondary school had reported the illegal activities of the director to the City Prosecutor, the *raikom* organised an election-report meeting, even though one was not yet due and the majority of the party members were away on holidays. The meeting elected a new secretary convenient to the director and the former secretary was subsequently transferred to another school. *P.zh.*, 20/64, p. 77.

Despite these examples of lack of support from higher authorities and of disagreements over the right of control, the evidence is that in recent years, with the right of control and support from higher authorities, PPO's, on the whole, have been able to exert their influence over "host" organisations. This is not simply a matter of Sampson's "force of persuasion" or Golembiewski's "legitimacy through formalisation" leading to amicability between staff and line; it is more a matter of PPO's having the organisational power to make their presence felt despite administration opposition.

(3) The unwillingness of PPO secretaries to play their role

While Sampson ignored the problems of conflict, he recognised the possibility of collusion. Golembiewski recognised conflict, but ignored collusion, although he was inviting its presence with his closely integrated Colleague units. He hoped to avoid conflict and render collusion irrelevant by making the staff and line elements jointly responsible for performance. But this can only be successful when the functions of line and staff are separate, complementary and working towards the same goal. When the staff function is to exercise control over the line, that is, when their activities largely overlap but are directed to essentially different goals, such integration will almost inevitably lead to at least some cases of

collusion at the expense of general organisational performance. The Soviet authorities recognise this, but lack a full solution. They want the sort of cooperation sought by Golembiewski and hope to achieve it by making both the institutional leader and the party secretary responsible for performance. However they recognise that the administration and the PPO are, or should be, acting according to different priorities. While the PPO is expected to give priority to protecting the state interest, it is recognised that the institutional leadership is primarily concerned with promoting the sectional interests of its branch or enterprise.¹ A concern with different priorities seems to be implied in any controlling situation. Generally priorities are sufficiently compatible that the PPO and the administration are able to cooperate for the benefit of each. If priorities are incompatible the authorities expect PPO's to maintain their adherence to the social interest, try to persuade the administration to adhere to it also, and if necessary to signal to higher

1 Particularly since the mid-1960's Soviet philosophers and economists have devoted considerable attention to what could be called "Soviet interest theory". They recognise the legitimacy of sectional interests and endeavour to devise mechanisms by which a pursuit of sectional interests by sectional leaders will automatically benefit the social interest. The systems of material incentive described in Chapter One fit within this theory. However in situations where suitable mechanisms cannot be devised, or the mechanisms are open to abuse, PPO's are expected to protect the social interest.

authorities that a conflict has occurred. But if the PPO's themselves abandon the social interest and adopt the sectional priorities of the institutional leadership conflict becomes unlikely. In such cases cooperation becomes dysfunctional since it will probably be at the expense of the social interest. Cooperation changes its nature and becomes collusion.

That is why the possibility of conflict between the administration and the PPO is recognised as, if not a good thing, at least a necessary evil. The desire to control the conflict so that a suitable party-administration balance is maintained is well illustrated in the case described above of the Central Institute for the Preventive Inspection of Pneumatics.¹

Despite these efforts, collusion still occurs. We have already seen examples of administrative collusion with higher party authorities. Collusion between the administration and PPO's is also a considerable problem.

There are some cases where one suspects that the degree of cooperation is tending towards the excessive, without positive evidence of collusion. For example, there is the practice of school PPO's receiving advice from school directors on the agendas of party meetings.² The

1 See above, pp. 505-506.

2 *P.zh.*, 6/56, p. 60.

director of the Institute of Atomic Energy was so impressed by the attitude of the new party secretary (who had accepted the post although it seriously hindered completion of his thesis) that he made him his personal assistant. Although the Soviet report commented on this favourably, it would seem to leave room for abuse.¹ The situation was more serious at an open party meeting in the Lgov Hospital when the question "The conditions and tasks of surgical services in the *raion*" was considered. The chief doctor was chairman of the meeting. She invited her deputy to the meeting and then directed him to write the minutes. There was also the suggestion that the presidia of party meetings in the hospital were "stacked". The effect was that the party meetings were exactly the same as the work meetings of medical personnel.² The same thing occurred in the Moscow Construction Administration in 1954. Decisions of party meetings were written with the cooperation of institutional leaders and indeed most were taken from their administrative

1 *Ogon'ok*, 1/1/71, p. 15.

2 *P.zh.*, 10/63, p. 48.

orders and decisions.¹ Developments such as these seem to be the logical consequence of the involvement of party organisations in short-term problem solving and operational procedures. As Sampson's analysis made clear, this would divert the party organisation from its proper functions and make further collusion more likely.

There are innumerable cases in the Soviet press of administrative and party officials actually conspiring together to protect each other from criticism, to cover up shortcomings and unacceptable, if not illegal, activities. For example, in 1971 the director of a boarding school in Chapaevsk gave her relatives jobs in the school. The party secretary and the City Education Office allowed it. The *gorkom* buro gave the director a strong reprimand to be recorded on her party card and referred the matter

1 *P.zh.*, 5/54, p. 60. *Pravda* had an interesting comment to make about the use made by institutional leaders of party organisations in 1969, when it wrote about the All-Union Ministry of the Chemical Industry: "Reading the decisions of the party committee, at times one begins to suspect that some *glavk* leaders are not entirely disinterested in their requests to be allowed to give reports (in the party committee). Clearly some hope to use the authority of the party committee to break through some administrative 'road block', to remind once again the minister and collegium of their needs, or to insure themselves against some future possible situation they could find themselves in." *Pravda*, 11/3/69, p. 2. Statements such as this suggest that the dividing line between PPO's representing "host" organisation interests to higher authorities without damaging the social interest, of which examples were given in Chapter Three, and cases of collusion is a fine one.

of her dismissal to the Education Office. The head of the Education Office was given a reprimand on his party card, while the secretary was also blamed.¹

The suppression of criticism is not always over illegal activities. Often the cover-ups involve the inadequate performance of institutions. Thus the curriculum of the Dagestan Agricultural Institute required that fourth-year students undertake practical training on the leading farms of the republic. However the rector of the institute decided to send 39 of them to the institute's own experimental farm. The students appealed to him to change this decision as they were of the opinion that they would learn nothing there. The rector still refused, so the students appealed to the *obkom*. The *obkom* sent their letter to the rector, who then expelled the complaining students from the

1 *Pravda*, 13/3/71, p. 2. In 1972 the deputy chairman of the trade union committee in the All-Russian Research Institute for Agricultural Labour and Management criticised the administration for allowing illegalities in the distribution of housing and for restricting the rights of the trade union. The party secretary, director and trade union chairman responded by accusing him of a number of shortcomings and raised the question of his dismissal. The party buro supported the accusations. The Committee for Party Control investigated and gave the three leaders strong reprimands to be recorded on their party cards. *P.zh.*, 12/72, pp. 48-49. At a party meeting in the Ukrainian Cooperative Union in 1955 a communist criticised the deputy chairman. The deputy chairman called him a slanderer and initiated party disciplinary proceedings against him. The primary party organisation secretary organised his expulsion from the party and removal from his administrative position. *P.zh.*, 18/55, p. 20.

institute. The next day the party buro decided to expel the two ring-leaders from the party.¹

Some of the most serious cases of collusion in the eyes of the party authorities occur when the PPO fails to defend Marxist-Leninist ideology against "anti-Marxist and bourgeois distortions". A number of such cases are cited at the beginning of this chapter, where lack of ideological control, particularly in research institutions, was described as one of the major failings of PPO's. Although there is not positive evidence that the lack of proper ideological control is due to collusion, there is no other convincing explanation. While at one particular moment a PPO secretary might be unsure of the correct ideological line to take, this uncertainty would not be allowed to continue for long. Similarly in the area of ideological control a PPO secretary could be strongly confident of the support of higher party authorities, and so a lack of power should not be a serious problem.

1 *P.zh.*, 12/64, pp. 4-5. In 1963 *Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana* criticised party organs which tried to cover up shortcomings in their "host" organisations, for example, party buros which failed to mention in party meetings that numbers of students were failing. *P.zh.Kaz.*, 1/63, pp. 19-20. In a party meeting in the Minsk Special Construction Bureau for Road and Irrigation Machinery a party member criticised the head of the bureau for his inoperative decisions on production matters and shortcomings in his work with personnel. The head of the bureau demoted the party member. The party organisation did nothing. *P.zh.*, 18/67, p. 19.

Thus collusion occurs in three main areas - in illegal behaviour, in covering up poor production performance, and in turning a blind eye to ideologically objectionable behaviour. The basic reason for all these types of collusion is the same, that the interests of the PPO, or its secretary, and institutional leaders become the same.

Often PPO secretaries involve themselves in or fail to prevent the illegal activities of institutional leaders because they stand to gain materially from the activities themselves. In 1960 the chief doctor and party secretary of the Kemerovo railway hospital cooperated to pay themselves for extra work which they had not done.¹ Bribery of PPO secretaries, usually by paying them a salary for a position which they occupy in name only, is not uncommon.²

1 *P.zh.*, 1/60, p. 80.

2 In 1959 the head of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet was severely criticised for paying the party committee secretary. *P.zh.*, 18/59, p. 71. In 1954 the secretary and deputy secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Construction were removed from their posts and reprimanded when it was found that they had been receiving salaries for occupying fictional posts as deputy minister and *glavk* head respectively and had been given good new flats to which they were not entitled. *P.zh.*, 3/54, pp. 46-50. One of the arguments that have been advanced against full-time secretaries is that they are subject to financial pressure from institutional leaders. In 1961 the Central Committee declared: "Sometimes the establishment of full-time party workers, who are paid by the administrative organ, places them in dependence on the administration, interferes with their independence, and seriously damages the development of criticism and self-criticism and the correct indoctrination of personnel." *P.zh.*, 15-16/61, p. 142. Of course there is no reason to assume that part-time party workers are not subject to similar pressures.

One should also remember that if party secretaries are making their careers in the area of the "host" organisation's activities rather than the party apparatus, the institutional leaders are in fact their official superiors and will probably still be so when the secretaries have finished their terms in party work. This is particularly so if party secretaries serve relatively short and fixed terms.¹ A party secretary is unlikely lightly to antagonise the institutional leader and thereby jeopardise his whole future career. This, combined with the increased difficulties that antagonising the institutional leader makes in the conduct of his activities as party secretary, makes the secretary unwilling to take strong action. Thus in 1960 *Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana* criticised the secretary of the party buro of the South Kazakh *sovnarkhoz* who allowed the PPO to avoid its responsibilities in the apparatus, "fearing to spoil relations with the leadership of the *sovnarkhoz*."²

1 The data given in the last chapter on interruptions to the publication of articles, what data I have on the terms served by party secretaries, and conversations in Moscow suggest that a three-year term is common. Data on secretary turnover suggest that a normal rate is about 33% per annum, giving an average three-year term. Armstrong, J.A.: *The Politics of Totalitarianism*, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the present, Random House, N.Y., 1961, p. 332; *P.zh.*, 6/71, p. 12; *Kom.Estonii*, 1/72, p. 70; *Kom.Belorussii*, 7/71, pp. 11-12.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 6/60, pp. 79-80.

One would expect collusion in the "production" area to increase with the greater opportunities given for the furthering of sectional and personal interests through the use of such "economic" methods of management as *khozraschët* and material incentive schemes. In recent times there have been cases reported of abuses of these methods with some evidence of PPO involvement. For example, in 1974 the Committee for Party Control considered the situation in the Ulianovsk Research and Design-Technical Institute for Machine Construction. It found that leading officials had been overstating the value of research work that had been introduced into production. This would increase the profits and therefore the bonus funds of the institute. The party buro took an unprincipled attitude and condoned the misrepresentation.¹

PPO efforts to cover up shortcomings in production performance usually result from joint responsibility with the administration for performance. It is an inevitable

1 *P.zh.*, 17/74, p. 58. Twice within three issues of *Partiinaiia zhizn'* in 1976 there were reports of the misuse of bonus funds and improper payments of bonuses in Soviet institutions and enterprises. The first, concerning the enterprises of the Kalinin *oblast'* Transport Administration of the RSFSR Ministry of Road Transport, makes no mention of PPO's. *P.zh.*, 11/76, p. 51. The second concerns the locomotive depot in the city of Charsk (Semipalatinsk *oblast'*). The PPO is criticised for taking part in the illegal activities. *P.zh.*, 13/76, pp. 52-54.

side effect of attempts to reduce conflict by establishing joint responsibility for performance that when performance is poor collusion becomes necessary in order to avoid the consequences.

The effect joint responsibility has on performance is well illustrated in the case of the RSFSR Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. The party buro of the Chief Administration of Supply and Sales defended the practice of the *glavk* ordering new supplies of materials rather than using internal reserves.¹ It is clearly as much in the interest of the *glavk* party organisation as the *glavk* leadership to have bigger reserves of materials in case of possible future shortages. The party organisation would be held as responsible for shortages as the leadership.

A case could be made for the view that the correspondence of interests goes deeper than this. Members of PPO's, beyond their party membership, are the same as any other workers in the "host" organisation. They are teachers, researchers, bureaucrats, etc. with the same sectional and professional interests as their colleagues. The last chapter showed that to a large extent this is equally true of PPO secretaries. *Partiinaiia zhizn'* wrote in 1958 that many administrative PPO's ignored bureaucratic

1 *P.zh.*, 15/58, p. 20.

shortcomings because the bureaucratic (*sluzhebnye*) attitudes of the party officials were stronger than party attitudes.¹ The same journal complained in 1954 that ministerial PPO's were reluctant to deal with staff levels, the simplification of procedures, etc, because the bureaucratic interests and attitudes of administrative officials were being carried over into their party work.²

The effect of common professional interests is most strongly felt in the area of ideological control in research institutions. Research scientists have strong common interests going beyond material rewards. Although rivalry might be keen, they share a desire to unravel the problems of their particular areas of research. The traditional scientific values of truth and honesty in research provide scientists with a ready-made alternative ideology to the party's. These common values are most likely to become evident at times when the party's competing ideology introduces conflicting values. Scientists are likely to react strongly when they feel that the party ideology is compromising their professional principles of scientific truth and honesty. It is noticeable that a very large proportion of Soviet dissidents are natural scientists. In the last chapter we saw that research PPO

1 *P.zh.*, 6/58, p. 66.

2 *P.zh.*, 5/54, pp. 7-8.

secretaries are usually co-opted research scientists. There is nothing in their training, experience or motivations to suggest that in cases where the demands of the party's ideology conflict with the scientific values of their discipline the party's ideology will necessarily be victorious. The number of cases listed above in which research PPO's have failed to take action over "distortions" of Marxist-Leninist ideology lends support to this conclusion.¹

1 It is interesting to speculate why dissent is not proportionally greater among cultural institutions and their PPO's. The basic reason is undoubtedly that the Soviet authorities, despite Lysenkoist aberrations, consider the quality of research in the physical sciences to be more important than the quality of literature and the arts. Scientific quality largely depends on the values of scientific truth and honesty. This is reflected in the relative degree of ideological control exercised over the two categories through non-party organisations. The non-party administration of science is largely free of ideological influence. The Academy of Sciences, for example, is not an ideological organisation. Indeed, with its long and illustrious traditions, it contributes significantly to the formation and maintenance of an independent scientific ideology. (It is interesting to read, therefore, Medvedev's claim that Khrushchev thought seriously of abolishing the Academy. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 218.) By way of contrast, the day-to-day administrative organs of the creative arts, the various creative unions, are important ideological bodies in their own right. They help ensure that no non-party ethos of artistic freedom can take any institutional form. It is also interesting to note that while research PPO secretaries have no ideological connections, most creative and cultural PPO secretaries show strong ideological orientations.

As foreshadowed in the Introduction, collusion appears to be one of the main problems facing the staff generalist system in its Soviet application. Problems of uncertainty about roles, to the extent that they are not deliberately built into the system, can be removed by better training and supervision. The formal powers of PPO's now appear to be at least adequate for a staff generalist role. They have considerable powers of investigation and recommendation, and institutional leaders must now find it difficult to ignore them altogether. There is still a considerable problem of PPO's being frustrated in their legitimate activities by lack of support from higher authorities. However this is essentially a problem of collusion - collusion between local party organs and institutional leaders.

There are features inherent to the staff generalist system that make collusion inevitable. It is essentially a control system. This means that both sides, the staff and the line, work on the same processes, but with different aims. The line aims at the most advantageous operation of its section of the process; the staff should derive its advantages from the best operation of the process as a whole. Control will be exercised only as

long as these aims are different.¹ But efforts must be made to prevent excessive conflict arising from these different aims. This is achieved by the close integration of line and staff agencies. The staff personnel are drawn from the membership of the line organisation in order to emphasise their basic compatibility with the line (this has the added advantage of ensuring that the staff personnel have a good understanding of the line organisation's functions) and they are made jointly responsible for performance in order to promote cooperation. But these developments, particularly when combined with the greater decentralisation that is seen as one of the advantages of the system, provide the ideal objective conditions for collusion, for the adoption of identical interests by line and staff. Decentralised procedures provide the opportunity for collusive manipulation of the work process in order to maximise the material rewards of all line and staff personnel; joint responsibility for performance makes it in the interest of the staff agency to hide operational problems, rather than work for their removal; and the overlapping memberships of the line and staff

1 Golembiewski appears to be hardly aware of the difference between a control staff agency and a functional staff agency. A functional staff agency relates to the line in a completely different way. Because it works on a different part of the process than the line, their successful cooperation no longer depends on, in fact it could be hindered by, different aims.

organisations ensure that their attitudes, particularly in the more value-laden areas, are identical. All these problems show up in the Soviet system, in the failure of PPO's to prevent illegal behaviour in "host" organisations, in their willingness to cover up operational problems, and in their failure to maintain strict ideological control. They appear to be inherent to the PPO system. In the Conclusion I will attempt to determine how serious they are for the overall success of the system and what measures might be taken to overcome them.

CONCLUSION

In the Introduction to this thesis I claimed that non-production PPO's had been seriously neglected, and in some cases actually misunderstood, by Western analysts of the Soviet system. The large amount of descriptive data presented in the thesis should hopefully serve as the basis for a fuller and more systematic understanding of the character and activities of non-production PPO's.

I have taken the view that this understanding can best be provided by using a methodological framework I have called "staff generalism". Staff generalism is a composite concept derived from a number of different Western sources. However its basic principle is that, particularly under conditions of technological change, a system organised solely on the basis of functionally specialised operational hierarchies is too "departmentalised", too centralised and insufficiently flexible. The necessary response is the development of agencies with a combination of specialised skills and a general knowledge and understanding of the system's objectives as a whole. These agencies are closely integrated with the specialised hierarchies in order to assist them in coping with the demands made of them by administrative complexity and technological change. They should have sufficient powers

to provide this assistance for long-term development without making it possible for them to become too closely involved in short-term operations.

The major hypotheses I have been concerned to test in the thesis are, firstly, that the top Soviet authorities expect PPO's to act according to staff generalist-type principles, and, secondly, that PPO's fulfil the expectations held of them. I have presented a considerable amount of evidence to support both hypotheses. The expectations of the top authorities are reflected in the Soviet concept of "control", discussed early in Chapter Two. Authoritative sources insist that control entails a broad concern with the activities of "host" organisations and their long-term development and improvement. The expectations of the authorities are further reflected in the structure of the PPO's, closely integrated with "line" organisations, to some extent in the recruitment of PPO secretaries (particularly in the case of ministerial PPO secretaries there is an evident desire to recruit people with the widest possible range of skills and experience), certainly in the training, particularly the technical training, given to PPO secretaries, and perhaps most importantly, in the nature of the powers given to the PPO's. These powers, described in Chapter Two, are wide-ranging and can be used to good effect for achieving staff generalist goals.

However they are applied in such a way as to discourage an excessive involvement by PPO's in short-term operational activities.

The descriptive data in Chapters Three and Four contained some evidence that non-production PPO's do in fact behave according to staff generalist-type principles. The activities of ministerial PPO's since 1965, described in Chapter Four, constitute a particularly clear case of PPO's working for the long-term development of their "host" organisations and the system as a whole, often against the opposition of elements with shorter-term, sectional interests to protect. A narrower use of a staff generalist style was evident in individual cases of PPO concern with problem-solving. The Western staff generalist theorists stress that the involvement of staff agencies in solving short-term operational problems is not incompatible with staff generalism, as long as they are concerned with understanding the basic causes of the problems, taking remedial action to remove those basic causes, and thus preventing the recurrence of similar problems. In all categories of PPO, and especially the research category, examples were found of PPO's apparently behaving in this way. The other important area of staff generalist-type activity was planning. PPO's in all categories, except, strangely, the administrative, took advantage of the *de facto* decentralisation evident in the Soviet planning process to involve themselves closely in

the essentially long-term concerns of plan formulation and the establishment of priorities.

Nevertheless the balance of the evidence collected in the thesis tended to cast doubt on the hypothesis that PPO's behave in a staff generalist way. It is difficult to speak about the ideological activities of PPO's, described in Chapter One, in terms of the staff generalist model. The latter has been developed in a Western context and therefore is not easily able to cope with the highly ideological nature of the Soviet system. Admittedly, it could be said that even in a Western context some degree of value and operational indoctrination is essential for the working of a staff generalist system, indeed of any organisational system. Even the very close control of social values and behaviour exercised by PPO's could be seen as not being incompatible with staff generalism. However it is hard to reconcile with staff generalist principles the use of ideology to directly influence the "production" activities of "host" organisations, often in very specific terms. There is strong evidence of PPO's in research institutes using ideology to justify and provide the means, through ideological seminars, for direct involvement in every-day research work. Neither the fact of the involvement nor its justification is compatible with staff generalism.

Chapter Three concentrated on the "production" activities of PPO's, although in some cases ideological considerations were again evident. It was in this chapter that one of the most important areas of PPO involvement - personnel - was discussed. PPO's have the right to vet and veto all appointments and re-appointments to all positions in "host" organisations below the very top level. This clearly is a right of enormous significance. Whether it is used for "political" or "technical" reasons, it gives PPO's far too much power to involve themselves in operational activities to be compatible with staff generalist principles. A proper staff generalist concern with broad recruitment and training policies does not imply the right to vet all appointments.

There is similar evidence of excessive PPO involvement in all other short-term operations of "host" organisations. Much PPO problem-solving takes on a form strongly warned against by Western line-staff theorists, a concern to solve the immediate problem by whatever means are available without any consideration of the underlying causes or without any inclination to prevent recurrence of the problem. There was a surprising amount of evidence of this type of problem-solving, with its implication of a very close involvement of PPO's in the short-term operations of "host" organisations, in all categories. In the ministerial and research categories, and even to some extent in the educational, it was particularly evident

in the relations of the PPO's with organisations subordinate to the "host" organisation. The ability of ministerial PPO's particularly to directly influence the day-to-day operations of production enterprises through their control of supervisory officials was considerable. It alone must force us to raise greatly our evaluation of the significance of ministerial PPO's in the Soviet administrative system, although at the same time we must devalue the degree of their commitment to staff generalist-type principles.

There was even some evidence, in the administrative and other categories, of line elements, both within "host" organisations and outside them, making use of, if not entirely relying on, PPO's in purely short-term operations. Western line-staff theorists are well aware of the consequences of such a development - the informal channels of command and communication through the staff agency come to be used as a matter of course, the formal channels atrophy even further, and the staff agency becomes so much a part of the short-term operational activities of the "host" organisation that it becomes impossible for it to play its staff role.

Why is it that PPO's apparently depart quite significantly from the principles of staff generalism? There are two likely explanations. The first is that, despite my first hypothesis above, the top party authorities

in the Soviet Union have never intended PPO's to behave as staff generalist agencies. The second is that there are difficulties inherent in staff generalism that make its practical application impossible.

The first explanation appears to have some degree of truth in it. While there are signs of a genuine commitment by the authorities to staff generalist-type principles, they do expect considerably greater operational involvement by PPO's than would seem to be compatible with staff generalism. Much of the blame for this must be attributed to the ideological functions of PPO's. The nature of the Soviet system demands that the top authorities require PPO's to strive for the ideological purity of Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism. The immediate effects of this on even operational activities of a "production" nature have already been mentioned. But it seems also to have a more indirect influence on PPO activities, through the effect it has on the "psychology" of party officials. It appears to have encouraged the belief of party officials that party involvement in all areas of Soviet life is required, even when there is no ideological justification at all. The one ideological principle of the "leading role of the party" makes any further ideological justification unnecessary. It appears that it has become part of the "psychology" of party officials (and if PPO secretaries are not as strongly affected by the "psychology"

as higher officials it must still be reflected in the role expected of them) that no non-party organisation can be entrusted with *any* task without party supervision. It is this cautiousness which gives that strong conservative element to what is still in many ways a radical political organisation.

The development of this "psychology" has been assisted by the history of the Soviet state. The fact and nature of the successes of Soviet development have encouraged party officials in the belief that problems can only be solved by the direct energetic and dictatorial involvement of the local party boss. Although there is no evidence that PPO secretaries are expected to act in the same way as local party bosses, the experiences of the bosses must affect the expectations they hold of the efficacy of a "party style of work" even at PPO level.

The top party leadership has a basic commitment to staff generalist-type principles for its PPO's. The nature of its careful and deliberate training of PPO secretaries and manipulation of PPO power makes this conclusion inescapable. However the traditional belief in the invariable effectiveness of direct party involvement in crises, combined with the perceived need for the closest possible ideological control of all aspects of Soviet life, has fundamentally compromised that commitment.

This is a problem specific to the Soviet system. Are there further problems that are inherent to the staff generalist concept itself? Western staff generalist theorists have developed their models primarily in reaction to the conflict that has inevitably appeared in line-staff relations in traditional models. They have different views on the powers that staff agencies should be given and the effect these will have on conflict. In the Soviet case the view has been adopted that limited but variable powers should be granted. Institutional leaders are expected to recognise the legitimacy of these powers. In the Soviet Union as in the Western models the integration of PPO's into "line" organisations is also expected to reduce conflict by making the PPO's and line administrations more familiar with the problems and tasks facing each other. Making both sides jointly responsible for performance is expected to make it too costly for them to engage in conflict.

But it could be said that all these measures aimed against line-staff conflict contribute to encouraging PPO encroachment on line authority. Although this need not necessarily lead to further conflict, it is certainly against staff generalist principles. Granting staff agencies powers over the line, particularly when, as in the Soviet case, these powers are deliberately left variable and ambiguous, encourages and simplifies staff involvement in everyday operations. Integration further

simplifies such involvement by ensuring that staff officials have the necessary training and are in the physical position to involve themselves.

These pressures certainly do exist and are evident in Soviet experience. However they do not constitute an inherent or insoluble problem for the staff generalist model. The difficulties arise when attempts are made to remove conflict from line-staff relations altogether and to define in precise terms the powers of staff agencies. Golembiewski recognised the dangers of the latter and prescribed a system of variable power relationships. Burns and Stalker recognised that conflict, anxiety and uncertainty are not necessarily dysfunctional in a situation of change since they encourage flexibility. The Soviet authorities have adopted both these views. Although they are concerned to encourage cooperation between PPO's and institutional leaderships, they are equally determined to ensure that when circumstances demand it, particularly when administrators are reluctant to accept and implement party policy, conflict will occur. This means that at times PPO power will be emphasised and PPO encroachment on line authority even encouraged. However the ambiguity left in PPO power means that when such encroachment is no longer necessary or becomes excessive, it can be reduced.

There is the danger that such a system will come to rely too much on supervision from above. If the correct balance of power between PPO's and "host" organisations can be maintained only by close and continual supervision from above, one of the advantages of the staff generalist system, its decentralisation, is removed. It could be said that the separate staff hierarchies called for by Sampson and Golembiewski (although in the latter case a very closely integrated one) and implemented in the Soviet Union are excessively wasteful of resources and likely to discourage the decentralisation that is one of the supposed advantages of staff generalism. In the Soviet case this can be blamed to some extent on the "psychological" factors described above. However a large part of the problem is probably inherent to the staff generalist system.

This aside, the Soviet authorities' solution to the problem of staff encroachment on line authority appears to be adequate. While it is true that for the "psychological" reasons given above they have chosen an excessive level of PPO involvement, they have shown that it is possible to manipulate the level of involvement to suit organisational goals.

Collusion can perhaps be dealt with in the same way. However it appears to be a more difficult problem. Efforts to prevent line-staff conflict certainly contribute

very strongly to pressures towards collusion.

Integration means that line and staff tend to share the same values and concerns, usually the narrower ones of the line. Joint responsibility for performance further unites them by providing another very strong common concern - the desire to avoid the consequences of operational failure. Although it can lead to cooperative effort for production success, it can equally lead to collusive effort to hide production failure. Collusion resulting from both integration and joint responsibility for performance has been very apparent in the case of PPO's. PPO secretaries have failed to take action over ideological deviations apparently because they share the philosophical values of the deviationists.¹ They have also colluded with institutional leaders to cover up illegal behaviour and production failures.

Collusion appears to be a problem inherent to any staff generalist system. Any measures taken against it compromise the other principles of staff generalism. The very close supervision of PPO's described above is probably more a reaction against collusion than against PPO encroachment on line authority. It is an area where the party authorities' cautiousness is to some extent justified. However it cannot be seen as contributing to

1 Evidence of the failure of PPO's to provide sufficiently strict ideological control is one of the most important findings of the thesis.

a staff generalist mode of behaviour since it reduces the degree of decentralisation intended by staff generalism.

To the extent that collusion is caused by the relative lack of power and authority of PPO secretaries it could be reduced by strengthening PPO powers. However there are two main difficulties with such an approach. Firstly, not all collusion is a result of the lack of PPO power. Only in some cases have PPO's allowed unacceptable behaviour because they could not find a safe way to prevent it. Very often their lack of action was a result of the common interests of PPO and line leadership. In such cases increased PPO power would have no effect. The second difficulty with this approach is that PPO's cannot be given much more power without encouraging an undesirable degree of PPO interference in line operations. Already PPO powers are such that they tend to become excessively involved in line operations. While in many individual cases there is certainly room for strengthening the position of PPO secretaries vis-a-vis institutional leadership, as a general principle the authorities have little room for increasing the powers of PPO's.

Collusion must be attacked at its source, which is the common interests of the PPO's and their "host" organisations. Increasing the professionalism of PPO secretaries, that is, using as PPO secretaries people that are interested in pursuing party careers, would

certainly have this effect. A professional party official is less likely than a co-opted rank-and-file party member to hold unacceptable ideological views or have sectional interests. A trend towards professional PPO secretaries is already evident in ministerial PPO's. One might expect a similar trend to appear among other categories of non-production PPO's, although probably only in the larger and more important ones. Such a development would have the added advantage of enabling more concentrated "generalist" training of PPO secretaries. Most of them at present, particularly outside the ministerial category, are narrowly trained specialists. Such training does not necessarily equip them for a useful understanding of the broad functions and objectives of their "host" organisations. Such part-time training as does presently occur, although very interesting in its content, can only be rather superficial. Particularly if the party apparatus is to assume a leading role in the "scientific-technical revolution", something which is allowed for by staff generalist principles and appears to be an empirical probability, more extensive and concentrated training of PPO secretaries in managerial and evaluation techniques is required.

The difficulty with increasing the professionalisation of PPO secretaries is that it reduces the degree of staff integration and therefore considerably increases the amount of conflict that is likely to occur. Institutional leaders and rank-and-file workers are more likely

to resent a party professional, particularly when one of his main tasks is to directly oppose sectional interests. Similarly a PPO secretary could see it as increasingly important to oppose the administration, since advancement in his career would rely on a striking performance. With continued responsibility for short-term production performance and belief in the efficacy of the "party style of work", the use of professional PPO secretaries would increase the interference of PPO's in operational activities.

Another way of separating the interests of PPO and administration would be to take away the PPO's responsibility for short-term production performance. This would both decrease its need to involve itself in short-term operations and the temptation to collude. However the technical difficulties of such an approach appear to be insurmountable. How could a PPO be held responsible for long-term improvements in performance, but not for short-term performance? This would be particularly difficult in a situation where the limits of PPO power are deliberately left variable. Even if such a division of responsibilities were possible, it would surely lead to an increase in conflict in that institutional leadership would strongly resent any attempts at long-term improvements that would jeopardise their short-term success. It appears very unlikely that any attempt will be made to take the responsibility for short-term performance away from PPO's.

In the future the Soviet authorities will probably maintain and even strengthen their belief that PPO's should act in a staff generalist way. However a number of factors appear likely to continue to contribute to the non-staff generalist behaviour of PPO's. The problem of collusion, apparently inherent in the staff generalist model, and the need for more concentrated training of staff generalist officials makes the wider use of professional party officials as PPO secretaries probable. Although the limit to the powers that can be given to PPO's appears to have been already reached, greater emphasis will be laid on the need to use these powers fully. The greater use of party professionals will assist in achieving this. However it will also strengthen at the PPO level a feature of party activities that has previously been concentrated at higher levels - the belief that a party official, through direct intervention, can solve any problem, short or long-term. This will serve, in turn, to strengthen the expectations of the party leaders that party organisations, including PPO's, closely supervise all operational activities. The overall effect should be a strengthening of the already excessive involvement of PPO's in the short-term operations of "host" organisations. Whether that results in endemic PPO-administration conflict or the PPO becoming an essential element in informal short-term operational procedures, the staff generalist tasks of PPO's must suffer.

While it has not been possible to show in this thesis that PPO's behave strictly as staff generalist agencies, the intentions of the Soviet authorities and actual practice have been close enough to it that PPO behaviour can at least be examined in staff generalist terms. Departures from staff generalist principles are partly the result of features peculiar to the Soviet system and partly problems peculiar to the staff generalist model itself. Nevertheless one can see a basic Soviet commitment to a staff generalist-type system. While future developments are likely to strengthen the effect of some of these features, the basic commitment is likely to remain.

Finally it remains to be asked what the implications of the Soviet experience are for the staff generalist model in a Western context. The Soviet problems of the pervasiveness of ideology and the traditional belief in the efficacy of party involvement in all operational activities do not appear likely to be problems in Western organisations. It is not easy to generalise about Western organisational values and traditions; however there appears to be little reason to believe that senior authorities in Western organisations are influenced by ideologies or traditions that demand a high degree of staff involvement in everyday line operations.

This is not to say that there is no tradition among staff agencies themselves to become excessively involved in short-term operations. This was one of the problems in reaction to which the staff generalist models were developed. Soviet experience suggests that a staff generalist approach can solve this problem. The Soviet authorities have recognised that it is not necessary to have the powers of PPO's strictly defined. By manipulating these powers they are able to manipulate the degree of PPO operational involvement. There appears to be no reason that such a system could not be adapted to Western use, as long as it is recognised that a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity in low-level power relations is not necessarily dysfunctional. The Soviet method does have a problem, in that it relies on a high degree of supervision of PPO activities. Higher authorities must be constantly aware of the state of PPO-line relations in order to be able to decide which side to support in specific conflict situations and when to effect more fundamental power shifts.

This high level of supervision is made even more necessary by what is probably the most serious problem of the staff generalist model, the problem of collusion. We have seen that many of the basic features of staff generalism contribute to collusion, and that it is a serious problem in the Soviet Union. Western organisations operating on a staff generalist basis would be equally susceptible to it. The reaction which seems to have the

least effect on the basic nature of staff generalism is increased supervision. In the Soviet Union the enormous allocation of resources to the party apparatus's supervisory functions is such a fundamental part of the system that it probably does not enter into Soviet calculations of organisational efficiency. However Western organisational leaders are likely to regard the creation of a whole supervisory staff network parallel to line hierarchies with less favour, although it is true that most Western organisations do already have extensive supervisory networks. The increase in the amount of supervision might not be enormous.

The essential principle of having staff officials with broad experience and training closely integrated into line organisations, with powers of investigation and recommendation and the task of encouraging long-term improvements in performance, is therefore one that could be of interest and benefit to Western organisational leaders. Although it should not be thought that I am advocating the use of staff generalist systems, or the PPO system, in Western organisations, Soviet experience suggests that such a development would be feasible.

APPENDIX ASOME DESCRIPTIVE AND STATISTICAL DATA
ON THE NUMBERS, MEMBERS AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION
OF NON-PRODUCTION PPO'S

Although in my "staff" analogy I have compared the PPO to an administrative unit, the comparison cannot be considered precise, since the PPO is, after all, a group of members of a political party. While the CPSU is a long way from being a party in our Western sense, it does have some of the features possessed by almost all political parties, such as a membership only a small proportion of which is made up of full-time party officials and some semblance of democratic procedures. If a PPO is to fulfil its administrative and political control functions, it is essential that these features, the mass membership and quasi-democratic procedures, be properly organised. Thus when we speak of the internal operational concerns of PPO's we are speaking of far more than simple internal administrative procedures such as collecting party dues and keeping membership records. In fact these tasks are routine and have little significance for the life of the PPO in the wider social system. Therefore they will be left aside.

I) Organisation and structure

The first internal matter of significance to the workings of the PPO within the social system is a concern with attaining adequate and proper party membership levels and distribution of party membership, and the organisation of the membership into useful PPO's and subordinate party organisations.

Therefore in this section I will give data on the numbers of PPO's and where they are situated; their memberships; and their internal structure.

(a) Numbers of PPO's

The best source for brief, but authoritative and relatively comprehensive information on the structure of PPO's is the relevant paragraphs of the Party Rules.¹

The party authorities are concerned to have PPO's in a position to control as many working establishments as possible. However the Party Rules state that an establishment must have at least three party members before an

1 *Ustav KPSS*, 1971, op. cit., pp. 44-49. The point is often made in Soviet sources that the Party Rules do not and cannot cover every possible situation. *P.zh.*, 11/61, p. 66. Therefore from time to time the Central Committee issues official instructions on the conduct of intra-party affairs. For a list of these instructions, see *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy KPSS, spravochnik v voprosakh i otvetakh*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1973, p. 241

independent PPO can be formed. If an establishment has fewer than three party members, the party members it does have become members of a territorially organised PPO, based in the country or in a housing unit, or of one combining the party members of a number of establishments.¹

Before presenting what statistical data I have on numbers and membership of PPO's, I would like to discuss some problems connected with the formation of PPO's. The first problem lies in deciding exactly where PPO's may be situated. In general terms the problem is not a great one, since in the great majority of cases it is quite simple to identify the sort of institution which will have its own PPO. Factories and collective and state farms will, as long as they have at least three party members, a condition almost universally met in modern times. However the entitlement of some other types of institutions to their own PPO's is open to some doubt.

For example, there is no doubt that a *glavk* (chief administration), *upravlenie* (administration) or department of a ministry do not have their own PPO's. Yet

1 For example, *Kommunist Estonii* writes of editorial offices with only one or two communists. The communists of six of the editorial offices are divided between two combined party organisations while those of another six offices and a publishing house are in the party organisations of higher institutions. The communists of one journal are in the PPO of the Union of Writers, while those of another are in the party organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture. *Kom.Estonii*, 3/69, p. 48.

it is considered possible, and indeed desirable that the departments of local soviet *ispolkomy* (executive committees) have independent PPO's.¹ Similarly it is considered desirable that a school situated within a collective farm have its own PPO, while a research institute situated within a factory need not.²

The general principle appears to be that the more independent the institution the more likely it is to have an independent PPO. This is a principle undoubtedly both too obvious and too vague. The precise criteria for deciding when an institution is sufficiently independent are difficult to ascertain. However if we take *ispolkom* departments and collective farm schools as likely to have independent PPO's, while ministerial *glavki* and departments do not, the greater independence of the former can be seen in a number of ways.

Firstly the former are not subordinate to any one superior institution - they are both examples of the Soviet administrative principle of dual subordination. An *ispolkom* department is subordinate to the *ispolkom* and the ministry of which it is a territorial sub-unit. A collective farm school might be subordinate to the farm directorate, but it is also subordinate to the local

1 *P.zh.*, 12/73, p. 50; 7/74, pp. 73-74.

2 *P.zh.*, 11/67, p. 35; 12/69, p. 19.

Department of Education.

This is reflected in the legal status of the institutions. While ministerial *glavki* and departments are established at the discretion of the minister, the formation of *ispolkom* departments is referred to in republican constitutions. Collective farm schools are established by the Ministry of Education, not the collective farm.¹

It is also reflected in the functions of the different institutions. The Soviet handbook on organisational questions already cited says that independent PPO's should be established in *ispolkom* departments, since they are "Soviet institutions, each of which fulfils its own specific functions".² While there are obvious difficulties in deciding which functions are sufficiently "specific" to warrant independent PPO's, the difference can be seen between *ispolkom* departments, all pursuing quite separate functions, and ministerial *glavki*, which while functionally specialised nevertheless are united together in the fulfilment of the tasks of a specialised branch.

The concept of the "independence" of institutions enabling them to have independent PPO's is clearly a vague

1 See above, pp. 213-218.

2 *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., p. 20.

one. The principle of dual subordination appears to be the most effective formal explanation. The other legal and functional explanations support the practice determined by it, that *ispolkom* departments and collective farm schools can have independent PPO's, while ministerial *glavki* and departments cannot.

Another possible explanation is the territorial situation of the particular institutions. In a recent handbook on PPO's there was a discussion on whether the medical services within enterprises should have their own PPO's or only subordinate party organisations within the enterprises' PPO's. The conclusion was that it depends on the individual circumstances. Some of the factors to be considered are the numbers of communists and the territorial situation of the enterprise and its sub-units.¹ The point of the territorial consideration is that a sub-unit could be situated in a different *raion* or even city, in which case it would be considered better for the control of the sub-unit's party membership if that sub-unit had an independent PPO, subordinate to a closer higher party organ. Thus the study farm of the Saratov Agricultural Institute in 1964 had an independent PPO, subordinate to the party committee of the Alamedinsk production administration (the equivalent at the time to a *raikom*). The fact that the PPO of the

1 Khaldeev, op. cit., p. 391.

institute itself was subordinate to the Frunze *gorkom* would indicate that the farm and the institute were situated in different administrative areas.¹ Similarly, the PPO of the Academy of Community Services combined the communists of the Academy's sectors and departments and of the Research Institute of Communal Water Supply and Purification, while the communists in the sub-divisions of the Academy in other parts of Moscow and other cities have independent PPO's.²

Of course this explanation does not help with *ispolkom* departments and collective farm schools. However for some other difficult cases it does seem applicable.

So far I have referred only to the *possibility* of forming PPO's in particular institutions. This raises another matter that warrants some attention - the extent to which it is obligatory to form a PPO in an institution which has made itself eligible by being the right type of institution and having at least three party members. The Party Rules say simply that PPO's "are formed" and that this is done by *raikomy* or *gorkomy*.³ There is no suggestion that it is obligatory. Yet some commentators have attacked *raikomy* and *gorkomy* for failing to form PPO's in institutions that have fulfilled the formal requirements. Some

1 *P.zh.*, 5/64, p. 36.

2 *P.zh.*, 4/75, pp. 49-50.

3 *Ustav KPSS*, 1971, op. cit., pp. 43-45.

commentators claim that the failure to establish PPO's whenever possible is a breach of the Party Rules,¹ while others admit that it is entirely up to the local party organisation to decide.² It seems probable that the latter is the correct interpretation, although of course local party organisations can be subjected to considerable pressure from above regardless of the formal situation.³

Another problem is connected with the place of the PPO's in the party hierarchy. It is a general principle that they are the lowest level of the hierarchy and are directly subordinate to a *raikom* or *gorkom*. This excludes the possibility of one PPO being subordinate to another. However there appear to be some situations where the matter is clouded.

For example, *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia* recorded in 1974 a report from the secretary of the party committee of Moscow *oblast'* organisations and institutions

1 *P.zh.*, 5/63, p. 55; *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, 7/71, pp. 17-18.

2 *P.zh.*, 3/67, pp. 68-69.

3 *Raikomy* and *gorkomy* are often reluctant to see more PPO's established in their areas, since this means more work for them. This reluctance seems to be particularly evident in the case of school party organisations, although there are examples in lower-level administrative apparatuses. *P.zh.*, 3/58, pp. 13-14; *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, 7/71, pp. 17-18; *Kom. Belorussii*, 6/70, pp. 37-39; 8/73, p. 4; *Kom. (Vilnius)*, 4/66, p. 37; *Kom. Uzbekistana*, 3/69, p. 16.

(*uchrezhdenii*) that criticism of the head of the Construction, Repair and Building Adjustment Administration of the Construction Trust of the Moscow *oblast'* Consumers' Union had been found to be justified. He had been given a strong reprimand and dismissed from his post by the leadership of the trust. Also the party buro of the administration was criticised for poor control of the activity of the administration. However practical measures were worked out by the party buro and these measures were put into practice, under the control of the party committee of Moscow *oblast'* organisations and institutions.¹ This party committee played an even more unusual role later in the same year. After an examination by the Committee of Party Control of the activity of the rector of the Moscow *oblast'* Teachers' College, the party committee of Moscow *oblast'* organisations and institutions removed the secretary of the institute's party committee from his post and gave the former secretary a strong reprimand to be recorded on his party card.²

I am unable to discover what sort of party organisation this party committee of Moscow *oblast'* organisations and institutions is. It has no place in the Party Rules and people in Moscow, knowledgeable in these areas,

1 *Sotsialisticheskaiia industriia*, 2/6/74, p. 2.

2 *P.zh.*, 11/74, p. 65.

have assured me that there can be no such organisation. If the party committee is the executive organ of a PPO, how does it have such authority over other PPO's? It is possible that it is not the executive organ of a PPO, but is a higher-level party organ established to supervise the PPO's of institutions which have sub-divisions scattered throughout Moscow, and therefore not having any single *raikom* to which they can be subordinated. This seems particularly possible when one considers the case of the construction administration but less so in the case of the Teachers' College.

The committee appears to bear some similarity to the party committees of the Academies of Sciences.

The research institutes of the Academies of Science have their own PPO's. One would expect these PPO's to be entirely subordinate to the *raikom* or *gorkom* in whose territory they are situated. However there is considerable evidence that to some extent they are also subordinate to the party organisation of the Academy of Science of which they are part. Before presenting this evidence I should mention that the party organisations of Academies of Science are of the administrative (*uchrezhdenski*) type. The reason that commentators always gave for administrative PPO's not having the right of control is that such institutions often have numerous subordinate

institutions with their own PPO's, often in other areas and so subordinate to different *raikomy*. For the administrative PPO to concern itself with the activities of the PPO's in these subordinate institutions would involve *podmena* of the *raikomy*.¹ This would seem to indicate that the authority of the "host" organisation over a subordinate institution does not give the PPO of the "host" organisation authority over the PPO of the subordinate institution.

Yet Vucinich states, unfortunately without reference to any source, that the party organisation of the Presidium of the Academy of Science controls the entire network of party organisations operating within the Academy of Science.² A member of the PPO of the Institute of Economics of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences wrote to *Partiinaia zhizn'* in 1964 complaining that the party committee of the Academy changed the decisions of his party organisation on internal PPO matters without even telling anyone. The journal found the criticism justified. However neither the letter writer nor the journal were complaining about the fact that the decisions were changed, but rather about the fact that they were changed without the institute party organisation being told.³ A report on

1 See above, pp. 312-313.

2 Vucinich, op. cit., p. 36.

3 *P.zh.*, 14/64, pp. 54-55.

the Tenth All-Academy party conference of the Azerbaidzhan Academy of Sciences speaks of the need "that the link between the Academy party committee and lower party organisations be stronger and that its help to them be more substantial and concrete". This is immediately, within the same paragraph, followed by discussion of the shortcomings in the internal administration of the PPO's in the Academy's institutes.¹ The party committee of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences involves itself in the philosophical seminars run as part of the party indoctrination programmes of institute party organisations.² The same party committee concerns itself with ideological mistakes made by scientists.³

Other reports show that the involvement of Academy party organisations is not limited to internal and ideological matters. For example, at the election-report meeting of the party organisation of the Moldavian Academy in 1963 the organisation was criticised for failing to take measures to raise the role of the Scientific Councils of research institutes.⁴ In 1955 the party committee of the Ukrainian Academy was criticised for doing

1 *Bakinskii rabochii*, 2/12/70, p. 2.

2 *Kom. Moldavii*, 8/68, p. 53.

3 *Sovetskaia Moldaviia*, 14/7/72, p. 2.

4 *Sovetskaia Moldaviia*, 19/11/63, p. 2.

too little about scientists of the Institute of Machine Management occupying two positions at once (*sovmeštitel'stvo*) and for not sufficiently concerning itself with evaluating scientific work and its introduction into production and not demanding these types of concerns of institute party organisations.¹ In 1971 the party committee of the Moldavian Academy examined the work of the party organisation of the Institute of Chemistry, paying particular attention to raising the "vanguard" role of communists in science.² A general party meeting in the same Academy heard a report (*otchéťt*) from the secretary of the party organisation of the Institute of Geophysics and Geology, in which was summarised the experience of communists in deciding such matters as perfecting the organisation of labour and planning research activity.³

What are the possible explanations for this influence of Academy party organisations over the party organisations of Academy institutes?

The first explanation that comes to mind is that the Academy party organisations are large enough to be given the rights of a *raikom*. The secretary of the party organisation of the Siberian section of the All-Union Academy declared in

1 *Kom. Ukrainy*, 8/55, pp. 48-49.

2 *Sovetskaia Moldavia*, 8/7/71, p. 2.

3 *Sovetskaia Moldavia*, 14/7/72, p. 2.

1961 that the organisation had over 1,000 members.¹ This would certainly be enough to give it the rights of a *raikom*.

However there are a number of problems involved with this explanation. Firstly the rights of a *raikom* extend only to internal PPO matters - matters such as confirming the admittance of new members and applying party discipline. Therefore this cannot explain activities in the ideological or science areas, such as I have described above.

Secondly the granting of the rights of a *raikom* to a PPO does not give it any powers over other PPO's. For example, a ministerial PPO with the rights of a *raikom* is not entitled to exercise these rights over the PPO of a factory in the ministerial system. Having the rights of a *raikom* means no more than the PPO is able to take decisions on internal matters concerning its own members without having to have them confirmed by the *raikom*.

Clearly this explanation is inadequate. The second possibility is that the party organisations of Academies (and of the Moscow *oblast'* organisations and institutions referred to above) are not in fact PPO's. There is some evidence to support this view.

1 *P.zh.*, 20/61, p. 31.

Firstly there is the membership of these organisations. I have already said that research institutes have their own PPO's. All party members working in these institutes belong to their institute's PPO. Since a communist cannot belong to more than one PPO, this leaves only those party members working in the administrative apparatus of the Academy to belong to the Academy's party organisation. It is hard to imagine that the apparatus of the Siberian section of the All-Union Academy would have over one thousand party members. This figure probably refers to all party members working in the apparatus and institutes, regardless of the PPO to which they belong. The same could be said of the 1,500 members that work in the Azerbaidzhan Academy.¹ These 1,500 communists were represented at the Tenth All-Academy party conference. Apparently this conference was different from a party meeting of the Academy's PPO. Similarly there are references to *general* party meetings of the Moldavian Academy, again attended by communists from all institute PPO's.²

Presumably the Academy party committees are the executive organs of some party organisation higher than a PPO. The existence of PPO's specifically situated in the apparatuses of Academies supports this conclusion. Thus *Kommunist (Litva)* received a letter from a worker in the

1 *Bakinskii rabochii*, 2/12/70, p. 2.

2 *Sovetskaia Moldaviia*, 14/7/72, p. 2.

central apparatus of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences.

He wrote:

Our central institution (*uchrezhdenie*), the party organisation of which I am a member, exercises leadership over research institutes. The party organisation is basically made up of the leaders and workers of individual departments, little connected with each other; the party organisation does not have the right of control of the activity of the administration, the leaders of the institution themselves being in other organisations.

He asks what this PPO may do. The journal replies that it may not directly concern itself with the work of subordinate institutes, that it must limit its concern to the operations of the apparatus itself.¹ It is this PPO that is the equivalent to the party organisation of a ministry - it can concern itself with its departments etc., but not with subordinate, but independent institutions.²

1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 8/70, pp. 67-69.

2 I have also seen a reference to the "party committee of the Presidium of the All-Union Academy". *Sotsialisticheskaja industrija*, 28/3/74, p. 1. Unfortunately the reference gives no information about the membership or tasks of this committee. All I know is that its secretary, E.N. Mukhin, had in earlier years worked and published as a botanist in the Academy's Institutes of Photosynthesis and Biochemistry.

It appears probable that there are PPO's purely for Academy apparatus workers and that the party committee of Academies about which we read are *not* simply the executive organs of these organisations. They appear rather to be the executive organs of the general organisations of all Academy party members. The basic problem is what kind of organisations and organs these are. There are no references to them in the Party Rules nor have I read any specific or detailed discussion of their formal status in the Soviet press. Also I have read no reports of their relations with other party bodies - particularly with *raikomy* or *gorkomy*. We should remember that Academy institutes are not necessarily all situated in the same *raion*. Therefore their party organisations are subordinate, according to the normal understanding of the party hierarchy, to different *raikomy*. This makes it difficult to decide which party body the Academy party committees might be subordinate to and what might be their relations with these different *raikomy*.

One possibility is that the All-Academy party conferences are similar to the general meetings of the party *aktivy* of creative unions referred to in Appendix B. These party *aktivy* are seen by Soviet commentators as being subject to the rules applying to party groups in non-party organisations, as set out in Paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Party Rules.¹

1 See below, pp. 660-661.

This means that they are directly subordinate to the "relevant" party organisation, in the case of the Academies presumably the All-Union or republican Central Committees.

There are considerable differences between the situation in the Academies and the creative union. Firstly, the party *aktivy* of the creative unions do not appear to have such formalised executive organs as the Academies', with party committees and buros and elected secretaries. The more formal the structure the more surprising it is that it has no formal expression.

More importantly there is the difference in the subordinate organisations of the Academies and the creative unions. The creative unions do not have the extensive network of subordinate organisations with independent PPO's that the Academies have. There appear to be no parallels to be found in the party *aktivy* of creative unions or party groups in non-party organisations with the powers of Academy party committees to influence the activities of the PPO's of subordinate institutes.

It is unfortunate that, because we can come to no conclusions about the formal status of the party committee and buros of Academies, it is difficult to come to any conclusions on their status and significance in

practice. While the empirical evidence suggests that some considerable powers exist in practice, it is not sufficient for us to essentially modify our view of the workings of the party apparatus and research PPO's according to the general understanding of its hierarchical structure.

In this examination of the place of PPO's in the party hierarchy there is one last problem that is rather more straightforward. What at first glance appears to be a similar situation to that I have just been describing turns out to be no more than terminological confusion. Soviet commentators use a number of terms to refer to PPO's and their subordinate party organisations. I have always referred to "primary party organisation" as the organisation of all party members in a single working institution (with the qualification that some PPO's will have communists from a number of institutions). Such an organisation is subordinate to a *raikom* or *gorkom*. Yet we read that the All-Union Ministry of Chemical Industry has forty PPO's and a single party committee supervising the lot.¹ This is despite the fact that the Eighteenth Party Congress, formally defining the status and powers of the different types of PPO's for the first time, declared that there would be a single PPO for the entire apparatus of each People's Commissariat.²

1 *P.zh.*, 14/54, p. 18.

2 *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh*, vol. 2, 1925-53, op. cit., p. 922.

But what is actually meant is that the ministry's PPO has 40 subordinate party organisations with the rights of PPO's in their internal affairs.

Paragraph 54 of the Party Rules states:

In enterprises, collective farms and institutions, having over 50 members and candidates, within the general primary party organisation, with the permission of the *raikom*, *gorkom* or *okrzhkom*, there may be established party organisations in shops (*tsekhi*), sections, farms, brigades, departments, etc.¹

Throughout the rest of the Rules these party organisations are referred to generically as shop (*tsekhovye*) party organisations. *Tsekh* is the Russian word for shop, in the sense of a workshop in a factory. In administrative apparatuses the equivalent of the shop is the chief administration (*glavnoe upravlenie* or *glavk*), administration (*upravlenie*) or department (*otdel*). Sometimes one sees the words *kantselariia* and *kontora* (office). In universities the equivalents are faculties and departments and in research institutes departments, sections and laboratories.

But in Paragraph 57 the Party Rules go on to declare:

1 *Ustav KPSS*, 1971, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

In large enterprises and institutions, numbering over 300 members and candidates, and in special circumstances, taking into account production peculiarities and territorial factors, in organisations numbering over 100 communists, with the permission of the *obkom*, *kraikom* or Union Republic Central Committee there may be formed party committees, upon which the shop party organisations of these enterprises and institutions receive the rights of primary party organisations.¹

Thus the Ministry of Chemical Industry had at least 300 party members working in its apparatus and therefore in 40 *glavki*, administrations and departments there were subordinate party organisations with PPO rights in their internal affairs.

Throughout this thesis I use the term "primary party organisation" to refer only to the party organisation of a whole working institution. I usually speak of the party organisations in subdivisions of the institution as simply "subordinate party organisations" or else by the specific name of the subdivision, for example, *glavk* party organisation.

1 *ibid*, pp. 47-49.

I will now try to ignore the problems just discussed and give as clearly as possible some general statistics on PPO's. Unfortunately Soviet statistics are rarely complete or consistent. However, since I am not so much concerned with strict statistical accuracy as with giving some general impression, I will present what data I have.

1. Numbers of PPO's

(i) Numbers

Table 1 gives the simple figures for the numbers of PPO's in the Soviet Union according to category. The categories with which I am concerned are the fourth and fifth. Tables 6 and 8 give the figures for these same two categories for Moscow city and *oblast'* and for Kazakhstan. The figures for Estonia and Azerbaidzhan, presented in Tables 2 and 7, give some further breakdown of these categories. They give some idea of the proportions within the fourth category, although one could wish for greater detail on educational establishments. Unfortunately they do very little to give us a better picture of the fifth category.

(ii) Numbers of institutions with PPO's

Considering the party's motives in having PPO's in working institutions, more significant data are those that show the proportion of institutions having PPO's. Unfortunately Soviet data on the number of institutions in different categories are hard to come by, and also often

infuriatingly difficult to correlate through different years, categories and regions. However such general data as I do have are presented in Table 3. It is obvious that there are very large gaps. Some commentary, supported by any additional statistical data, could help fill in the gaps.

(a) Educational establishments

It is almost certain that all tertiary educational establishments, particularly universities, have their own PPO's. The situation with regard to lower-level establishments is less certain. It was reported in 1964 that the majority of secondary and primary schools in the Soviet Union had PPO's.¹ In 1962 Orenburg *oblast'* reported that all its secondary and most of its primary schools had PPO's.² In 1964 it was reported from the city of Bender in Moldavia that all but one of its schools had PPO's, while in 1972 it was claimed that in Latvia every general education or technical school had a PPO or party group.³ Yet it was reported that in Moldavia in 1971 there were 735 secondary schools while there were only 413 school (apparently of any type) PPO's.⁴ Similarly in Khorezm *oblast'* in Uzbekistan in 1972 there were 400 schools and

1 *P.zh.*, 17/64, p. 7.

2 *P.zh.*, 17/62, p. 13.

3 *Kom.Moldavii*, 11/64, p. 25; *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 8/72, p. 54.

4 *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, 3/71, p. 11.

227 school PPO's.¹

Although none of these figures allow any firm statistical conclusions, it would appear that by no means all non-tertiary educational establishments have their own PPO's. This would particularly apply to rural areas. However the trend probably is towards more and more PPO's and the time when the vast majority of educational establishments have their own PPO's might not be far off.

(b) Science, health and culture

Unfortunately statistics on scientific institutions, whether collated or isolated, appear to be almost non-existent. About all I can do is make the rather obvious statement that the more important, and more particularly, the larger the institution, the more likely it is to have its own PPO. However it is less probable that all construction buros and design offices would. One other consideration, mentioned in the discussion above, is the possibility of a research institute being part of a large production enterprise. For example, the Institute of Heavy Machine Construction is part of the *Ural'mashzavod* and its party committee is closely watched over by the factory party committee.² This presumably means that the research institute does not have its own PPO, unless the

1 *Kom.Uzbekistana*, 1/72, p. 51

2 *P.zh.*, 14/62, p. 19.

type of situation that applies to Academies of Science also applies here. We should also remember that research institutes are becoming parts of scientific-production associations, with the apparently as yet undetermined party structures in these organisations.¹

The same comments apply to health and cultural institutions. Large hospitals and cultural institutions would probably have their own PPO's. However many such institutions, particularly those situated in more remote areas, are small and feature in lists of institutions without PPO's.²

(c) Administrative organs

The statistics for this category are again unfortunately sparse. It is clear that all ministries and equivalent agencies have their own PPO's. However when we get to the innumerable administrative units at lower, particularly city and *raion* levels, PPO's probably become rarer. Such institutions feature among lists of institutions that do not have PPO's.³ In Spasskii *raion* in Riazan *oblast'* in 1967 half the administrative units of the

1 Territorial disposition and size are apparently the main determinants of whether the member units of an association retain independent PPO's.

2 *Kom.*, 2/57, p. 22; *P.zh.*, 1/62, p. 9; 1/65, p. 80.

3 *P.zh.*, 15/58, pp. 17-18; 1/65, p. 80.

the *raion* did not have PPO's.¹

2. Members of PPO's.

Even when an institution has a PPO, for that PPO to work properly it is important that it be strong in overall membership and that the membership be well distributed throughout the institution. The PPO leadership needs a reasonable number of rank-and-file party members to provide the constant informal observation of individuals and institutional sub-units and to fulfil the numerous formal indoctrination and control tasks.² Also, if party discipline is to be a significant weapon in the hands of PPO's, a significant proportion of "host" organisation members, particularly leading members, must be party members.³

(i) Numbers of communists

The figures on numbers of communists come from the same sources as those on numbers of PPO's. Therefore there are the same problems of inadequate breakdown of categories. The figures are presented in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

1 *P.zh.*, 16/67, p. 68.

2 *P.zh.*, 21/74, p. 58.

3 I have already described the involvement of PPO's in implementing party membership policies. See above, pp. 123-126.

The most interesting feature about Table 4 is the drastic decline in the percentage of communists working in administrative organs. Presumably party membership is now granted to a greater proportion of non-administrative workers as party control of all sections of society strengthens. Table 5 shows that the fall was originally accompanied by a fall in the average number of communists in each administrative PPO. Indeed there was a fall in the average size of all non-production PPO's between 1946 and 1956, after which date they again rose and then substantially stabilised. The original fall can only be interpreted as a result of a drive to increase the number of PPO's, despite the fact that party membership was not growing at the same rate. Strangely the original fall is not reflected so strongly, or not seen at all, in the data from the republics in Tables 7, 8 and 9.

The figures on the proportions of communists working in different categories of institutions show that non-production institutions have far fewer party members than production enterprises. One might suspect, therefore, that middle and higher level party organisations might tend to neglect non-production PPO's. However the overall figures can be misleading in this regard, since often individual *raiony* and cities have far greater proportions of non-production communists than national and republican averages. Thus in 1971 in the Soviet Union as a whole only

16.5% of communists worked in science, education, health or culture, while the figure for Moscow was 33.7%. The proportions for administrative organs were: Soviet Union, 8.6%; Moscow city, 19.5%. In 1963 27.5% of the communists in Leningrad's Petrogradskii *raion* worked in scientific establishments; 24.2% of those in Smol'nii; 23/9% of those in Vasil'eostrovskii; and 19.9% in the Vyborg.¹ In 1970 over one third of the communists in the Cherëmushkii *raion* of Moscow worked in scientific institutions, while the same proportion in Moscow's Oktiabrskii *raion* worked in scientific and tertiary educational institutions.² About one half of the party members of the Bauman *raion* of Moscow and the Leninskii *raion* of Kuibyshev are administrative workers.³ About 20% of the communists in the Leninskii *raion* in Kishinev work in ministries and other administrative agencies.⁴

(ii) Average membership of PPO's

It is the number of party members in each PPO which is perhaps the best statistical indicator of strength. Overall averages can be seen in Tables 5 to 9. Except for the decline between 1946 and 1956 already mentioned non-

1 *P.zh.*, 9/63, p. 18.

2 *Kom.*, 7/74, p. 43; *Mosk.pravda*, 21/2/71, p. 2.

3 *P.zh.*, 2/62, p. 13; 18/72, p. 31.

4 *Kom.Moldavii*, 7/66, p. 35.

production PPO's have reached not insignificant membership levels that appear to have stabilised somewhat in recent years. Of course, the categories used are very general. I can only present some scattered data in an attempt to break the categories down further.

(a) Educational establishments

I have collected figures on 31 tertiary educational establishments. These have a total of at least 27,333 party members at an average of 881.7 each. They ranged from over 7,000 party members in Moscow State University to the 25 members of the First Donetsk Mining Institute.¹ I have figures for four universities. They are:

| | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|
| Moscow State University | - 3,114 (1958) |
| | - over 5,000 (1966) |
| | - over 7,000 (1976) |
| Kiev State University | - 2,700 (1973) |
| Kazakh State University | - 710 (1974) |
| Latvian State University | - 430 (1969) |

(Sources: *P.zh.*, 1/58, p. 15; 20/76, p. 32;
Kom., 10/66, p. 34; *Pravda Ukrainy*,
 5/10/76, p. 1; *P.zh.Kaz.*, 1/74, p. 51;
Kom.Sov.Latvii, 1/69, p. 39.)

Among schools in general I have identified 172 establishments with 2,420 party members between them, making

1 *Kom.*, 15/71, p. 48; *P.zh.*, 20/76, p. 32.

an average of 14.1. These ranged from 23 party members in a secondary school in Kirov *oblast'* to seven members in a Latvian secondary school.¹

Among secondary schools I have found 13 with 178 party members, an average of 13.7. These range from 25 in a secondary school in Akhtiubinsk *oblast'* in Kazakhstan to the seven in the Latvian school mentioned above.²

I have also identified four technical schools that had 201 party members at an average of 50.3.

As one would expect the tertiary PPO's are far larger than those in schools. However I am somewhat surprised at the apparent size of school PPO's. However the data in the tables and my own data do not include schools without PPO's. If these data are considered we could conclude that schools, particularly those in rural areas, are among the poorest institutions in terms of party presence.

(b) Scientific institutions

The science category cannot be broken down further than the average seen in Table 7. However we can compare the figures for Azerbaidzhan given in that Table with some

1 *P.zh.*, 7/61, p. 50; *Sovetskaia Litva*, 10/4/71, p. 32.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/67, p. 23; *Sovetskaia Litva*, 10/3/71, p. 2.

All-Union figures:

| year | average number of communists |
|------|---------------------------------|
| 1956 | 45 |
| 1962 | 74 |
| 1965 | 86 |

(Sources: *Kom.*, 2/62, p. 58; *P.zh.*, 17/65, p. 18.)

The increases in average size are quite dramatic. The smaller size of the Azerbaidzhani scientific party organisations indicates the republic's relative unimportance as a scientific centre.

Party memberships in scientific institutions I have identified range from 20 in the Moscow *oblast'* Tuberculosis Institute to the 700 approximately in the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute and the Paton Institute of Electrical Welding.¹ One could conclude that, in general scientific party organisations are large enough to work efficiently.

(c) Medical institutions

Hospital party organisations vary considerably. The Azerbaidzhani averages can be seen in Table 7. These compare with the 1967 All-Union average of 21.4. I have identified a size range from six (a *raion* hospital in

1 *Pravda*, 25/6/39, p. 2; *P.zh.*, 10/72, p. 38; *Kom.*, 6/4/73, p. 28.

Magadan *oblast'*) to 245 (the Podol' central raion hospital).¹

(d) Cultural institutions

Some republican averages for cultural institutions in general can be seen in Tables 7 and 9. I can give some scattered figures for a further breakdown. I have identified 8 theatres with 161 party members, an average of 20.1, ranging in size from the Serov Drama Theatre of Sverdlovsk (3 party members) to the Riga Academic Theatre for Opera and Ballet (40 party members).² The only orchestra whose party membership I know is the Sverdlovsk Philharmonic with 25.³ I have identified a single cinema, in Ulianovsk, with 19 party members, although 16 of these are pensioners.⁴ The Moscow House of Culture has 16 communists, of whom 6 work in the institution.⁵ While in 1972 the Estonian Central Library had 17 party members, the Riazan *oblast'* library had 28.⁶ The Pavlodar Museum had 30 party members in 1968.⁷ The PPO of the Latvian museums of history and revolution has a membership of 32. It combines the communists of three collectives, while 7 of the communists are pensioners.⁸

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- 1 *P.zh.*, 16/67, p. 42; 3/70, pp. 41-42; 12/72, p. 50.
 2 *P.zh.*, 2/67, p. 53; *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 8/72, p. 46.
 3 *P.zh.*, 2/67, p. 53.
 4 *P.zh.*, 19/70, p. 56.
 5 *P.zh.*, 19/70, p. 59.
 6 *Sovetskaia Estonia*, 10/10/72, p. 2; *P.zh.*, 17/71, p. 16.
 7 *Kom.Ukrainy*, 12/68, p. 41.
 8 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/71, p. 59.

(e) Administrative organs

I have found the party membership levels of ten ministries and equivalent agencies. These range in size from the 1,085 party members of the All-Union Ministry of Chemical Production to the 65 of the Moldavian Ministry of Food Production.¹ The average membership of these ten is 232.5. However it should be realised that six of these are Union Republic and republican level ministries, which are smaller than All-Union ministries. When we read that in 1966 there were 46 ministries and State Committees whose PPO's had the rights of a *raikom*, that is had at least 1,000 party members, we realise that our average is probably too low for the All-Union level, although possibly reasonably accurate for the lower levels.²

Of administrative organs at the *oblast'* level I have identified five, with 380 party members at an average of 76.0.

At the city and *raion* level I have found 30 units with 615 communists at an average of 20.5. These range from the Spasskii *raion* Office for Local Enterprises with 5 party members to the apparatus of the Leninskii *raispolkom* in Alma-Ata with 36 communists.³ Note that five of the members of the latter are pensioners.

1 *Pravda*. 10/3/69, p. 2; *Kom.Moldavii*, 8/67, p. 59.

2 *P.zh.*, 24/66, p. 30.

3 *P.zh.*, 16/67, p. 68; 1/67, p. 36.

(iii) Proportions of workers that are communists

A better indicator of the strength of a PPO is the proportion of the work-force of the "host" organisation that belongs to the party, and who the party members are, particularly whether they are institutional leaders.

Table 10 gives some very general proportions. The only comment I would like to make is further to the note on the proportions among administrative workers. They are clearly overstated. However I would like to emphasise that the proportion of communists among administrative workers in the central apparatuses of ministries and equivalent agencies is very high. The usual figures is about 50%.¹ *Partiinaiia zhizn'* wrote in 1966 that often up to 70% of workers in ministerial apparatuses are communists.² The proportions of communists in the work-force of other non-production categories can also be high. In 1973 half the teaching staff of Soviet tertiary educational establishments were communists.³ In Estonia in the same year a surprising 40% of the teaching staffs of general education schools were communists, and 33% of the teachers

1 *P.zh.*, 21/66, p. 30; 11/68, p. 18; 12/73, p. 18; *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/67, p. 53; 1/71, p. 58; *P.zh.Kaz.*, 8/69, p. 17; *Kom. Belorussii*, 11/72, p. 43.

2 *P.zh.*, 24/66, p. 26.

3 *Kom.Moldavii*, 9/73, p. 36.

in technical schools.¹ However in 1974 in Moscow only 12,700, that is, 28.9%, of the 44,000 school teachers were communists.² This presumably indicates a far lower proportion of communists in primary schools. Similarly in Moscow in 1972 of the 70,196 workers in scientific institutions, only 15,630, or 22.3% were party members.³

Probably more important than the proportion of the work-force that are communists is who these communists are. The only general figures I have apply to the workers of the *Moskovskii raïspolkom* in Leningrad. They are presented in Table 11. The table confirms the impression that most leading personnel in an institution are party members, but that as we pass down the ranks party membership becomes ever rarer.

Isolated data I have found supports this impression, although they also suggest that to presume that all leading personnel are party members would be dangerous.

(a) Educational establishments

In one *raion* in Magadan *oblast'* all school directors and *zavuchi* (head of studies) are communists and all secondary schools in Shilal'sk *raion* in Lithuania are headed by communists.⁴ Yet in Lithuania in 1966 only 75%

1 *Sovetskaia Estonia*, 1/9/73, p. 1.

2 *P.zh.*, 15/74, p. 12.

3 *Kom.*, 11/72, p. 51.

4 *P.zh.*, 23/68, p. 64; *Sovetskaia Litva*, 23/12/71, p. 2.

of directors of primary schools and *nearly* all directors of secondary schools were party members.¹ With regard to lower-level leading personnel, 78% of department heads at the Moscow Technical College were party members in 1971 and 72% of the professors and 58% of the *dotsenty*.² However the dean of a faculty of the Taganrog Radiotechnical Institute and the deputy director for administration of a secondary school were not party members.³ Apparently for many years the rector of Moscow State University was not a party member.

It is considered important that students of tertiary institutions be represented in the party membership. In 1958 there were just over 250 student communists (28.7% of all communists) at the Moscow Agricultural Academy; 296, that is 9.5%, at Moscow State University; and 77, 23.3%, at the Moscow Institute of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy. These percentages were considered too low.⁴ At the Moscow Conservatorium in 1971, out of 173 party members, 20 were students and four were *aspiranty*.⁵ In 1976 the PPO of Moscow State University had over 7,000 members. There were

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- 1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 4/66, p. 34.
 - 2 *Kom.*, 10/71, p. 58.
 - 3 *P.zh.*, 2/72, p. 47; 18/74, p. 69.
 - 4 *P.zh.*, 1/58, p. 15.
 - 5 *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 1/7/72, p. 1.

over 7,000 academic workers in the university, but only one third of these were party members. This means that a surprising two-thirds of the PPO membership were administrative, service and technical workers and students.¹

(b) Scientific institutions

It was reported in 1972 that communists were in charge of nearly all important departments of the All-Union Institute of Elementary Organic Formations.² Yet it could only be said that over half the heads of departments and laboratories of the Central Scientific-Research and Design-Construction Institute for the Organisation and Technique of Administration were party members in 1970.³ However ten out of twelve departments of the Institute of Acoustics were headed by communists in 1971 and 83% of departments and laboratories of the research institutes and construction buros in *Obninsk oblast'* in 1974.⁴

(c) Administrative organs

In 1964 communists headed all the administrations and over two-thirds of the departments of the North Caucasus *sovnarkhoz*.⁵ Communists usually headed administrations and

1 *P.zh.*, 20/76, pp. 32-36.

2 *Kom.*, 6/72, p. 93.

3 *Kom.Belorussii*, 8/70, p. 20.

4 *Mosk.pravda*, 18/2/71, p. 2; *P.zh.*, 2/74, p. 30.

5 *P.zh.*, 17/64, p. 33.

departments of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry.¹ Although the heads of the office and a department of the Irkutsk *oblast'* branch of Gosbank were not party members their deputies were.²

3. Subordinate party organisations

This concludes the sections on probably the most important aspects of statistical data on PPO's - overall numbers and membership. However there are other aspects that are also of significance, particularly when related to the question of the strength and effectiveness of party organisations.

Firstly we have to consider the number and strengths of subordinate party organisations. I have already mentioned the importance of having party members well distributed throughout the "host" organisation, so that all areas of its work will be under constant party observation. I have also already referred to Paragraphs 54 and 57 of the Party Rules, relating to the establishment of subordinate party organisations, and the possibility of them gaining some further powers.³

1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/67, p. 53.

2 *P.zh.*, 10/61, pp. 55-56.

3 See above, pp. 563-564.

Statistical data on such organisations are presented in Tables 12 and 13. From data already identified on party membership in different categories of institutions it is not difficult to determine where subordinate organisations are likely to be concentrated.

(a) Educational establishments

One would expect that subordinate party organisations would be concentrated in the PPO's of tertiary educational institutions, rather than schools, since they have the larger memberships. Of the 172 school PPO's whose memberships I have identified, none have the required 50 party members to establish a subordinate party organisation.¹

¹ However subordinate organisations are not unknown in schools. For example, in Simferopol *raion* in the Crimean *oblast'* in 1971 there were 13 school PPO's that had between them 235 party members and 15 subordinate party organisations. Note that the average party membership of these is only 18.1. *P.zh.*, 24/71, p. 61. Even stranger is the case of the 44 schools in Belgorod *oblast'* with subordinate party organisations with the rights of PPO's. *P.zh.*, 12/69, p. 61. Clearly in these cases the Party Rules have not been adhered to. *Partiinaiia zhizn' Kazakhstana* did say in 1961 that educational establishments having *kursy* could have a PPO in each *kurs* (that is, a subordinate party organisation with PPO rights). *P.zh.Kaz.*, 5/61, p. 69. Unfortunately I am unsure what a *kurs* is. Usually it means a year of study - first year, second year, etc. Perhaps the Kazakh journal is differentiating those schools that have students separated into different classes for their years and those with so few students that they all work, physically, together, as in Australian country schools. However this would lead to an enormous number of very small subordinate party organisations with PPO rights, something which I feel is rare in practice.

(b) Scientific, health and cultural institutions
Of the 183 scientific institutions whose party membership I have identified only 16 had over 50 party members, while six had over 300. Of 16 hospitals seven had less than 50 party members, as did all 15 cultural institutions.

(c) Administrative organs

Table 13 confirms what could be expected, that the PPO's of central and regional administrative apparatuses are more substantial than those of *raion* apparatuses. I have not identified any *raion* or city-level administrative PPO's with over 50 party members. However all administrative units at higher levels do.

One thing that will affect the number of subordinate party organisations at lower administrative levels is the periodic campaigns to establish PPO's in *ispolkom* departments. In 1974 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* was of the opinion that it was better to have independent PPO's in each *ispolkom* department, since they have greater powers than subordinate party organisations.¹ Such a development would obviously reduce the number of subordinate party organisations in the administrative category.

Among the ten ministries and equivalent agencies I have identified four have the 300 party members necessary

1 *P.zh.*, 7/74, pp. 73-74.

to establish subordinate party organisations with PPO rights. Most seem to have quite extensive subordinate structures, ranging up to the 50 subordinate party organisations, all with PPO rights, in the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture.¹

4. Organs of PPO's

The final aspect to be covered statistically is the executive organs of PPO's. The existence of a party buro rather than simply a secretary, or of a party committee rather than a buro is primarily an indicator of the strength of a PPO, rather than the source of that strength. The Party Rules state that primary or subordinate organisations of less than 15 members have no executive organ, the conduct of everyday affairs being left to the party organisation's secretary and deputy.

However most party organisations elect for a period of one year a party buro, although those with more than 300, and in special circumstances, 100 members, elect a party committee. Party committees are elected for two to three years, their size being decided by a general party meeting.²

1 *P.zh.*, 9/69, p. 51.

2 *Ustav KPSS*, 1971, op. cit., pp. 46-49.

The figures show that in 1973 a surprising 40.5% of PPO's had fewer than the 15 members needed to elect a party buro.¹ It should already be evident to which categories these PPO's are likely to belong - schools, the lower levels of the administrative apparatuses and smaller cultural institutions.

In 1973 33,269 PPO's had party committees, of which 16,854 were non-production organisations.² This compares to the 1,981 non-production PPO's that had party buros or committees in Moscow *oblast'* in 1970, out of a total number of 4,119 PPO's with such organs.³ Figures for party committees in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Estonia are shown in Table 14. It can be seen that the numbers are very low.

(i) Membership of party buros and committees

In 1925 the All-Union Central Committee established that a party organisation with up to 50 party members would have a buro of 3 to 5 members; between 50 and 100 members, a buro of 7 to 9; and 100 and over, 9 to 11.⁴ Although the Party Rules now say that the size is determined by a party meeting, there is no evidence that sizes are different today from those determined then. Party buros

1 *P.zh.*, 14/73, pp. 22-23.

2 *P.zh.*, 14/73, pp. 22-23.

3 *Moskovskaia gorodskaiia i Moskovskaia oblastnaia organizatsii KPSS v tsifrakh*, Moskovskii rabochii, Moscow, 1972, p. 178.

4 Petrovichev, op. cit., p. 88.

range in size in my reading from 5 to 11 members; party committees from 12 to 39.¹

The people making up the membership of party buros and committees is predictable up to a point. Naturally the party secretary and his deputies are members. One would expect the head of the "host" organisation to be a member, although this does not appear to be always certain.² Besides the party workers and in most cases the

1 However very large PPO's, particularly those with *raikom* rights, have far larger party committees. For example, the party committee of Moscow State University has 61 members. Such committees usually have a buro of about 11 members for everyday decision-making. *P.zh.*, 20/76, p. 32.

2 It appears probable that ministers and the heads of governmental agencies equivalent to ministries do not belong to the party committees. I have never seen them mentioned as members or even as giving reports before a committee. There are some reports that suggest, without being definitive, that deputy ministers are the senior officials in party committees. *P.zh.*, 19/63, p. 42; 4/66, p. 47. In 1958 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* complained about leading workers in tertiary educational institutions who try to avoid becoming members of party buros and committees, claiming pressure of work as their excuse. However there is no evidence that directors or rectors were included in the complaint. *P.zh.*, 1/58, p. 19. I have only one full list of party organ members from which the head of the institution is excluded. Although the chief doctor of the Penza Infectious Diseases Hospital is listed, the director of the hospital is not. *P.zh.*, 1/70, p. 58. There are those occasions mentioned in Chapter Two when exceptionally serious PPO-administration conflict has led to the failure of the institutional head to gain a place on the party buro or committee (pp. 169-170). However in normal circumstances the directors of research and design institutes are members of the party buro or committee, as are the directors or rectors of educational institutions and the directors of film studios. *Kom.Ukrainy*, 6/71, p. 88; *Ogonëk*, 1/1/71, p. 16; *P.zh.*, 9/60, pp. 34-36; 13/73, p. 53; 15/69, p. 50.

head of the institution, the chief executive official of the institution - the academic secretary, chief producer, chief doctor, etc. - usually seems to be a member of the party buro or committee.¹ The chairman of the institution's trade union organisation seems to be an automatic choice for the party organ,² while the secretary of the *komsomol* organisation, if the institution has one and particularly if it is an educational institution, would probably also be a member.³

These appear to be what could be called the *ex-officio* members. The rest appear to be other important people in the institution - occupying important staff positions or heading important subdivisions.⁴ There is however some suggestion that an effort is made to have a less important member of the institution on the party organ - a pensioner on a *raispolkom* party buro;⁵ a statistician on an hospital party buro;⁶ and a radio fitter on the party committee of the Institute of Atomic Energy.⁷

1 *P.zh.*, 6/63, p. 43; *Kom.Ukrainy*, 6/71, p. 88.

2 *P.zh.*, 1/70, p. 58; 15/69, p. 50; *Kom.Ukrainy*, 6/71, p. 88.

3 *Kom.Ukrainy*, 6.71, p. 88.

4 *Pravda*, 3/2/39, p. 2; 17/1/71, p. 2; *P.zh.*, 5/73, p. 15.

5 *P.zh.*, 1/67, p. 38.

6 *P.zh.*, 1/70, p. 58.

7 *Ogon'ek*, 1/1/71, p. 17.

I have full lists of the membership of two party organs. The party buro of the Penza Infectious Diseases Hosptial has six members - the party secretary and his deputy, the chief doctor, a doctor concerned with ideological matters, a statistician and the chairman of the trade union committee.¹ The party committee of the *Gruzia-fil'm* film studio includes the party officials, the director, the chief editor of the scenario-editing collegium, a producer, an actor, the head of the sound shop, the chairman of the control group (probably a deputy party secretary), the chairman of the trade union committee and the director of the filming group.²

The number of deputy secretaries a PPO has depends on its size. The party organisation of the Moscow Aviation Institute, with about 2,000 members, has three deputy secretaries, one for party-organisation work, one for ideological work, and one as the chairman of the control group.³ This appears to be a normal situation.

(ii) *Raikom* rights

The final statistical matter to be considered is the number of PPO's with *raikom* rights. If a PPO has over

1 *P.zh.*, 1/70, p. 58.

2 *P.zh.*, 15/69, p. 50.

3 *P.zh.*, 4/65, p. 30.

1,000 members its party committee can be given the rights of a *raikom* on questions of admittance to the party, keeping membership records, and the examination of the personal affairs of communists. These are significant rights in that they give the PPO relative freedom in deciding on new members and on disciplinary measures. Under normal circumstances all such decision must be confirmed by the *raikom*. As we saw in Chapter Six it is not unusual for such decisions to be reversed by the *raikom*.

The All-Union figures for all categories of PPO are as follows:

| year | nos. of PPO's with <i>raikom</i> rights |
|------|--|
| 1965 | 425 |
| 1967 | 449 |
| 1971 | 610 |
| 1973 | 694 |
| 1976 | 783 |

(Sources: *Kommunist*, 5/65, p. 46; 15/67, p. 101; *P.zh.*, 14/73, p. 23; 10/76, p. 18.)

In 1968 the Ukraine had 60 PPO's with *raikom* rights.¹ In 1970 the figure was 91.² In 1966 there were 46 ministry and State Committee PPO's with *raikom* rights.³ Among the 31

1 *Kom.Ukrainy*, 1/68, p. 61.

2 *Kom.Ukrainy*, 12/70, p. 4.

3 *P.zh.*, 24/66, p. 30.

tertiary educational establishments whose party memberships I have identified, eight had the necessary 1,000 party members. I have identified no other non-production PPO's with over 1,000 party members.

(e) Conclusion

Judging from the data presented in this section it would appear likely that school, cultural and lower-level administrative PPO's face problems relating to their size - problems of not having the manpower to do the work expected of them, and problems of not being taken seriously by the institutional leadership and higher party organs. Other non-production PPO's, particularly those in tertiary educational establishments, major research institutions and high-level bureaucratic organisations, appear to have no problems of size or membership.

II. Internal operations and conduct

Having established the structure of PPO's, it now remains for us to examine their internal activities. The basic question is whether it matters whether party meetings and elections are properly conducted, or is this irrelevant to the work of the PPO secretary?

One could only believe it irrelevant if one believed that the only function of a PPO was for the

secretary to personally control the activity of the administration. From the discussion in the body of the thesis it should be clear that the PPO has many other highly important functions - communication, mobilisation and control of *all* members of the "host" collective. We have seen that even control of the administration requires far more than the personal involvement of the secretary, particularly in the information-gathering area. Finally, there is the importance of maintaining the legitimacy of the social system, and the "leading" role of the party within it. All this requires the efficient organisation of *all* members of the party organisation, the presentation to the masses of the party and its organisations as highly efficient, and the maintenance of the contented commitment of party members by ensuring the proper operation of what democratic procedures they have available to them.

Thus the proper conduct of party elections and meetings is considered important. The election of secretaries and party organs takes place at election-report meetings, usually yearly.¹ There will almost always be a *raikom* or *gorkom* representative at the meeting

1 PPO's with party committees hold their election-report meetings every two or three years, depending on the regularity of *raion* or city party conferences. All others are yearly. *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., p. 129.

to present the officially recommended list of candidates. It is stressed that these official candidates are only recommended. One *raikom* Organisational Department which gave its representatives a chart before going to meetings, including one section showing the recommended candidate, was criticised by the *obkom* for a breach of intra-party democracy. The *raikom* defended itself by saying that the chart was only a guide for representatives, that the meetings never saw it, and that the meetings were under no obligation to vote for the indicated candidates. *Partiinaiia zhizn'* supported the *obkom*, although making the point that it was sometimes necessary for a *raikom* to recommend a candidate.¹ In 1970 *Kommunist Belorussii* was optimistic that most communists would agree with the local party organ's choice.² In the vast majority of cases this optimism is undoubtedly well-founded. However it appears to be not unusual for the party members to express dissatisfaction with the recommended candidate. Often in these cases the *raikom* or *gorkom* representative will then adopt anti-democratic methods in order to get his candidate accepted. At the 1963 election-report meeting in the Dubrovka *raion* hospital the communists found the work of the secretary satisfactory and he was put forward as a candidate for re-election. However the representative of the party committee of the production administration (the

1 *P.zh.*, 20/56, pp. 61-63.

2 *Kom.Belorussii*, 10/70, p. 25.

equivalent at the time to a *raikom*) declared in turn that his candidature was against Party Rules, against Party Instructions on elections, and finally against a party committee decision on the replacement of all secretaries. Eventually he got his way.¹

Higher party representatives are also unwilling to allow the possibility of a non-official candidate getting onto the party buro or committee. This means that, like the *raikom* representative at the election-report meeting of a secondary school in Vilnius, they are unwilling to allow more candidates onto the list than there are positions. However I should add that in this case, as in many others, the communists eventually got their way.²

The higher party representatives are not the only people liable to be involved in illegal procedures. It is the usual procedure for elections in one school PPO that the list of candidates for the party buro be prepared before the meeting and then simply read out by the *zavuch* on the instructions of the school director. *Partiinaiia zhizn'* reacted to this case by declaring that the preparation of lists of candidates was forbidden, except in large PPO's where conferences of representatives of subordinate party organisations could be arranged in order

1 *P.zh.*, 21/63, p. 49.

2 *P.zh.*, 13/61, p. 7.

to decide on a list.¹ Despite this statement there is little doubt that there will always be some list of official candidates, which will be adhered to unless there is very strong opposition to it.

It is not easy to generalise on the democratic nature of PPO elections. It would appear that democracy does work in a rough-and-ready way, to the extent that party members have a good chance of eventually getting rid of anyone they are strongly opposed to. The higher party authorities realise that the PPO's rely on the active support of party members - this can only be guaranteed by ensuring that they are happy with leading personnel.

Next we have to consider the conduct of party meetings. Party meetings are important occasions, providing an important forum for both upwards and downwards communication. The first consideration is the regularity of meetings. A Soviet handbook declares that PPO's without subordinate organisations should hold a general meeting not less than once monthly. In PPO's with subordinate party organisations the subordinate party organisations should meet not less than once monthly, while a general PPO meeting should be held not less than once every two months.²

1 *P.zh.*, 3/75, p. 73.

2 An extraordinary party meeting can be called if one third of the party organisation's members so desire. *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

The History Faculty of Kishinev State University has a party meeting at least once monthly, and at least two party buro meetings each month.¹ The secretary of the party organisation of the institute *Kazgipropishcheprom* was criticised in 1963 for holding party meetings only once or twice in three months. The secretary claimed that he did not have enough matters to discuss to warrant more regular meetings.² Subordinate party organisations in the North Caucasus *sovnarkhoz* were criticised when they had not met for two to three months.³

The meeting having been called, it is then necessary to get a reasonable attendance. There is no suggestion that attendance at party meetings is compulsory or that there is a formal quorum. However there is evidence to suggest that the attendance of all party members is expected, and particularly at election-report meetings. At the election-report meeting of the Krasnoiask Machine Assembly Technical College 26 of the 34 party members were in attendance. Four of the absentees were sick; three were on leave; and only one, a candidate member, failed to attend without an excuse. The *raikom* representative at the meeting, the head of the Agitprop

1 *Kom.Moldavii*, 5/65, p. 37.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 2/63, p. 45.

3 *P.zh.*, 2/72, p. 73.

Department, claimed that the meeting did not have a quorum and forced it to disperse. Although *Partiinaiia zhizn'* in commenting on the case declared that it was reasonable to expect full attendance at election-report meetings it made no claim that it was obligatory. Indeed it said that the action of the *raikom* representative was wrong in the form that it took. (In usual Soviet fashion no indication is given of what might have been proper action in the circumstances).¹ This report indicates both that such a large number of absentees is unusual, but that there is no formal rule to say that it is illegal. The Soviet handbook already referred to declares that there is no quorum for election-report meetings, but that they should not proceed if a significant proportion of communists are missing. It also gives as reasonable excuses for non-attendance; busy with work, accident, illness, holidays, attendance at examinations, business trip, etc.²

In recent years open party meetings, which non-party members are able to attend, have become an increasingly common occurrence, and apparently an important means of extending the party's communication network and influence among non-party workers. There are complaints from party secretaries about the difficulty in getting non-party

1 *P.zh.*, 2/72, p. 73.

2 *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., pp. 42, 140-141.

workers to attend such meetings. In 1974 the secretary of a secondary school party organisation complained to *Partiinaiia zhizn'* about the difficulty she was having in this regard. By way of reply the journal allowed the secretary of another secondary school party organisation to describe her experiences. She claimed that by considering important matters from a different point of view, from the point of view of the "leading role of the party organisation in the resolution of academic tasks", and by preparing the meetings well, there were no problems of poor attendance. Although none of the measures she mentioned would have inspired me to attend her meetings, there was no suggestion in her reply of pressure being brought to bear on teachers to attend.¹

While speaking of non-party attendance at party meetings, it should be mentioned that it is possible to invite non-party people to attend even closed party meetings, including those of party buros and committees. In cases where leading officials in the "host" organisation are not members of the party, this becomes necessary on a regular basis. Out of necessity the party buro of the Radiotechnical Electronics Faculty of the Taganrog Radiotechnical Institute invited the non-party dean to its meetings.² Apparently for many years there was a non-party

1 *P.zh.*, 18/74, pp. 68-69.

2 *P.zh.*, 2/72, pp. 48-49.

rector of Moscow State University. As a matter of course he was invited to party committee meetings.¹

Party committees and buros, it seems, are not immune from attendance problems. For three months in 1964 the head of the Administration for Leather Footwear Production of the North Caucasus *sovnarkhoz* came to none of the administration's party buro meetings.² In 1963 *Partiinaiia zhizn'* criticised the party committee of the State Committee of Chemical and Oil Industry. Of its last 21 meetings a deputy chairman of the State Committee had attended only four, while three other members had missed a majority of meetings. Some meetings had gone on with only three to five of the eleven members in attendance.³ This suggests that party organs, like party meetings, have no formal quorum, but that high attendance levels are expected.⁴

Once the meeting has been called and those attending have arrived, it is then essential to ensure that the meeting runs smoothly. It would seem that meetings are highly organised beforehand, and that this is considered a good thing.⁵ Firstly, it is important that a good agenda

1 Conversation with party member in Moscow University.

2 *P.zh.*, 17/64, p. 37.

3 *P.zh.*, 19/63, p. 42.

4 The Soviet handbook already cited confirms this. *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., pp. 140-141.

5 *P.zh.*, 18/74, pp. 68-69.

be prepared by the party buro or committee or commission used for preparing meetings.¹ In 1954 the agendas of the party meetings of most research PPO's were criticised by *Kommunist* for being too general.² In 1966 the communists of Moscow State University were reported to be dissatisfied with party meetings because of the limited nature of the items being placed on the agendas.³ When the party buro of a Kuibyshev school put three matters, the role of class leaders in raising the quality of student knowledge, the socialist obligations of the collective in the new academic year, and the problems involved in improving vocational guidance work, it was considered by some to be immediately obvious that this was too much to be done in one meeting. This feeling was said to be confirmed when the meeting consisted of a lot of short "formalistic" speeches containing no specific discussion of shortcomings or specific suggestions for remedial action.⁴ Matters outside the limits of the agenda can be considered, although no conclusions are possible on how common this is.⁵

1 *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., p. 135.

2 *Kom.*, 18/54, p. 65.

3 *Kom.*, 10.66, p. 35.

4 Barkusov, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

5 *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., p. 53.

As well as the agendas being prepared beforehand, it seems that the list of speakers is also prepared. In 1963 a party member complained to *Partiinaiia zhizn'* that before the election-report meeting in the PPO of the apparatus of the Donets *oblast'* Council of Trade Unions he gave a list of those who wanted to speak to the *raikom* representative. However the representative used a list that had been prepared by the party buro secretary. The letter-writer complained that the secretary's list had been prepared the day before, suggesting that his had been prepared during the preliminaries to the meeting, and that it included one person who had not agreed to speak. Eventually the eight people on the secretary's list did speak, but all avoided any mention of any shortcomings in the work of the party organisation and apparatus.¹ A report on a party meeting in a Kazakh secondary school declares that nobody wanted to speak during a party meeting, so the chairman just read names of speakers off a list.²

It seems that not only are the speakers decided beforehand, but that, particularly in the case of key-note addresses, what they will say is also prepared. When a

1 *P.zh.*, 4/63, pp. 46-47. This report is also interesting in that it suggests that it is the *raikom* representative who runs the meeting. It is unfortunate that there is no general data on who chairs PPO meetings.

2 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 4/65, p. 35.

communist deputy minister in the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry gave a report (*doklad*) at an open party meeting, he had been helped in its preparation by eight party members, including members of the control group.¹ The Soviet handbook already cited declares that the main report (*otchëtnye doklad*) at an election-report meeting, usually given by the secretary, must be confirmed beforehand by the party buro or committee.²

Even further than this, it appears that the decisions of the meetings are also prepared beforehand. *Partiinaia zhizn'* considers it permissible for the party secretary or his deputy to prepare a draft decision by himself, although it is far better if more people are involved.³ The Soviet handbook declares that the decisions of party meetings are usually prepared beforehand, but that they should be checked before the meeting with all those affected by them.⁴ In 1970 *Partiinaia zhizn'* spoke of a collective farm PPO that uses special commissions to prepare the decisions of party meetings. The process is described as follows:

1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 7/67, p. 55.

2 *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., p. 136.

3 *P.zh.*, 18/74, p. 71.

4 *Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy*, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

A few words about these commissions would be in order. Once they were elected by the meetings in the process of discussion of a question. This interfered with their ability to deeply study the question and work out a solid draft decision. Now the commissions are formed, as a rule, earlier. At the party meeting, after the report has been given, one of the members of the commission immediately gets up and acquaints the communists with the draft decision.¹

In 1955 the same journal reported a rather different procedure. At a party meeting of the Sverdlovsk Union of Writers there was apparently no decision prepared beforehand. But when the meeting found serious shortcomings in a book, it came to no decision itself, but directed the presidium of the meeting to work out one itself. When the minutes of the meeting appeared they allegedly contained a verbose, empty decision, about which the members knew nothing.²

Given all this preparation, one might ask oneself how democratic a party meeting is. There are many cases of wide discussion of the shortcomings of various leaders

1 *P.zh.*, 6/70, p. 36.

2 *P.zh.*, 4/55, p. 33.

that strike one, when reading the reports, as being patently unspontaneous. However there are many examples of the various controls and preparations either failing or being pressured to such an extent that they pass the bounds of legality. Criticisms of occasions when party meetings have been used as the forum for putting forward various allegedly anti-party positions indicate that party members are willing to discuss controversial political matters in party meetings.¹ It appears that meetings, like elections, can provide the opportunity for rank-and-file party members to express extreme discontent. However the discontent, if it is to have any positive effect, must be so extreme that higher party authorities will have no option but to take it into consideration.

What we must remember is that to some extent it is in the party's interest to leave room for spontaneous involvement in party meetings, since they should be an important source of information on grass-roots feelings and activities. Thus in 1970 we find *Partiinaiia shizn'* was concerned at the apathy in PPO meetings that had derived from the number of motions that came from higher authorities. However it considered that the situation was improving - in the last ten months of 1969 only 117 of the 443 motions considered in PPO meetings in the Demidov *raion* of Smolensk *oblast'* came from above.²

1 *P.zh.*, 5/55, pp. 53-57; *Kom.*, 17/57, p. 41.

2 *P.zh.*, 3/70, pp. 31-38.

It is because PPO meetings are considered so important as a means of upward communication that so much attention is devoted to the minutes of the meetings. PPO secretaries clearly find it burdensome to have to send the minutes of all meetings to the *raikom* or *gorkom*. In 1974 the secretary of the PPO of the Pskov *oblast'* administration of the State Savings Bank complained to *Partiinaiia zhizn'* that the *gorkom* expects the minutes of all party meetings. However the journal emphasised the importance of minutes being sent on to higher organs, although also making the point that they should not be relied on to the exclusion of the on-the-spot presence of *gorkom* instructors.¹

In Chapter One I discussed the importance of party meetings for downwards communication. This section has given some indication of the importance the party authorities attach to them as a means of upward communication. This means that some degree of democracy must be permitted. Indeed in all aspects of the internal operations of the PPO's there is an apparent awareness of the functional necessity of a minimum of democratic procedure, to enable the PPO's to operate as an effective means of communication and to preserve the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of the masses and its own members.

1 In recent years there has been considerable enthusiasm over a punch-card system of recording PPO activities. Special codings of matters considered in party meetings are devised. When translated onto punch cards these allegedly allow the quick analysis of all the information coming from different PPO's. *Kom. Belorussii*, 5/69, p. 35.

TABLE 1.

Numbers of primary party organisations
in the Soviet Union

| Types of PPO's | 1946 | | 1956 | | 1967 | |
|--|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| | Nos.of PPO'S | % of Total | Nos.of PPO's | % of Total | Nos.of PPO's | % of Total |
| Enterprises | 34965 | 14.3 | 73631 | 21.0 | 85899 | 25.4 |
| State farms | 4045 | 1.7 | 5806 | 1.7 | 14053 | 4.2 |
| Collective farms | 35200 | 14.4 | 80015 | 22.8 | 37086 | 11.0 |
| Science, education, health, culture | 13326 | 5.4 | 50258 | 14.3 | 76800 | 22.7 |
| Administrative organs | 46717 | 19.1 | 59809 | 17.0 | 54389 | 16.1 |
| Trade & social nourish. | 6133 | 2.5 | 11810 | 3.4 | 14146 | 4.2 |
| Others | 104321 | 42.6 | 69920 | 19.8 | 55542 | 16.4 |
| Total | 244707 | 100.0 | 351249 | 100.0 | 337915 | 100.0 |

| | 1971 | | 1976 | |
|----------------------------|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| | Nos.of PPO'S | % of Total | Nos.of PPO's | % of Total |
| Enterprises | 95375 | 25.8 | 101472 | 26.0 |
| State farms | 16972 | 4.6 | 18941 | 4.9 |
| Collective farms | 33644 | 9.1 | 29081 | 7.4 |
| Science | 5148 | 1.4 | 6018 | 1.5 |
| Education | 61881 | 16.7 | 67446 | 17.3 |
| Culture | 5169 | 1.4 | 5280 | 1.4 |
| Health | 15341 | 4.1 | 16147 | 4.1 |
| Administrative organs | 59809 | 16.2 | 65060 | 16.7 |
| Trade & social nourish. | 14848 | 4.0 | 14488 | 3.7 |
| Others | 61508 | 16.7 | 66454 | 17.0 |
| Total | 369695 | 100.0 | 390387 | 100.0 |

(Sources: *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, nagliadnoe posobie*, Moscow, 1971, chart 24; *Kom.*, 15/67, p. 100, *P.zh.*, 10/76, p. 18.)

TABLE 2.
Numbers of primary party organisations - Estonia

| Type of PPO | 1945 | | 1949 | | 1959 | | 1966 | | 1971 | |
|--|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| | Nos. | % | Nos. | % | Nos. | % | Nos. | % | Nos. | % |
| Enterprises | 38 | 27.7 | 304 | 26.0 | 513 | 24.8 | 800 | 29.9 | 860 | 31.9 |
| Trade & social nourishment | 5 | 3.7 | 72 | 6.2 | 67 | 3.2 | 90 | 3.4 | 90 | 3.3 |
| State farms | - | - | 45 | 3.9 | 104 | 5.0 | 174 | 6.5 | 188 | 7.0 |
| Collective farms | - | - | 15 | 1.3 | 610 | 29.6 | 499 | 18.7 | 317 | 11.8 |
| Study institutions | 1 | 0.7 | 71 | 6.1 | 181 | 8.8 | 435 | 16.3 | 448 | 16.6 |
| Scientific institutions | - | - | 4 | 0.3 | 22 | 1.1 | 26 | 1.0 | 48 | 1.9 |
| Cultural-enlighten- ment institutions | 2 | 1.5 | 5 | 0.4 | 22 | 1.1 | 60 | 2.2 | 52 | 1.9 |
| Medical institutions | 1 | 0.7 | 21 | 1.8 | 53 | 2.6 | 80 | 3.0 | 98 | 3.6 |
| Administrative organs | 53 | 38.7 | 196 | 16.8 | 210 | 10.2 | 244 | 9.1 | 281 | 10.4 |
| Institutions of rural raion centres | 27 | 19.7 | 104 | 8.9 | 173 | 8.4 | 142 | 5.3 | 206 | 7.6 |
| Others (incl. territorial) | 10 | 7.3 | 331* | 28.3 | 107 | 5.2 | 123 | 4.6 | 109 | 4.0 |
| Total | 137 | 100.0 | 1168 | 100.0 | 2062 | 100.0 | 2673 | 100.0 | 2697 | 100.0 |

(Source: *Kom. Estonii*, no. 1, 1971, p. 11.)

* The very high figure for others in 1949 is due to the high number (310) of rural territorial party organisations in that year. Soviet power and the CPSU had become well established by 1949 but not well enough established that individual farms and rural institutions had their own PPO's. By 1959 the number of rural territorial organisations had declined to 44. Thus the "others" category declined also.

TABLE 3.

Numbers of primary party organisations, as proportions of the total number of institutions

(i) Soviet Union

| 1965-67*** | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Types of PPO's | Nos. of institutions | Nos. of PPO's | % with PPO's |
| Science, education, health, culture | 375098** | 76800 | 20.5 |
| Administrative | NA | 54389 | NA |
| Others | 1281817* | 206726 | 16.1 |
| Total | NA | 337915 | NA |

1970-71

| | | | |
|----------------|----------|--------|------|
| Science | 5307# | 5148 | 97.0 |
| Education | 195028 | 61881 | 31.7 |
| Culture | 129324 | 5169 | 4.0 |
| Health | 26200 | 15341 | 58.6 |
| Administrative | NA | 59809 | NA |
| Others | 1416625* | 222347 | 15.7 |
| Total | NA | 369695 | NA |

(ii) Estonia

| 1965-66 | | | |
|----------------|--------|------|------|
| Science | NA | 26 | NA |
| Education | 1109 | 435 | 39.2 |
| Culture | 1055** | 60 | 5.7 |
| Health | 198 | 80 | 40.4 |
| Administrative | NA | 386 | NA |
| Others | 9123* | 1686 | 18.5 |
| Total | NA | 2673 | NA |

TABLE 3 (contd.)

| Types of PPO's | Nos. of institutions | Nos. of PPO's | % with PPO's |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1970-71 | | | |
| Science | NA | 48 | NA |
| Education | 855 | 448 | 52.4 |
| Culture | 920** | 52 | 5.7 |
| Health | 188 | 98 | 52.1 |
| Administrative | NA | 487 | NA |
| Others | 9742* | 1564 | 16.1 |
| Total | NA | 2697 | NA |
| (iii) Uzbekistan | | | |
| 1965-66 | | | |
| Science | NA | 130 | NA |
| Education | 8854 | 2813 | 31.8 |
| Culture | 4933** | 182 | 3.7 |
| Health | 1205 | 396 | 32.9 |
| Administrative | NA | 2090 | NA |
| Others | 40578* | 4563 | 11.2 |
| Total | NA | 10174 | NA |
| (iv) Azerbaidzhan | | | |
| 1965-66 | | | |
| Education | 5573 | 1411 | 25.3 |
| Science | NA | 87 | NA |
| Cultural-indoct. | 2446** | 117 | 4.8 |
| Medical | 724 | 273 | 37.7 |
| Administrative | NA | 1267 | NA |
| Others | 22295* | 3374 | 15.1 |
| Total | NA | 6529 | NA |

TABLE 3 (contd.)

| Types of PPO's | Nos. of institutions | Nos. of PPO's | % with PPO's |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1970-71 | | | |
| Education | 5207 | 1835 | 35.2 |
| Science | NA | 110 | NA |
| Cultural-indoct. | 2971** | 126 | 4.2 |
| Medical | 779 | 311 | 39.9 |
| Administrative | NA | 1598 | NA |
| Others | 25595* | 3700 | 14.5 |
| Total | NA | 7680 | NA |
| (v) Kazakhstan | | | |
| 1965-66 | | | |
| Science, education, health, culture | 19324*** | 3369 | 17.4 |
| Administrative | NA | 3045 | NA |
| Others | 57506* | 7221 | 12.6 |
| Total | NA | 13635 | NA |
| 1970-71 | | | |
| Science, education, health, culture | 19960*** | 4637 | 23.2 |
| Administrative | NA | 3805 | NA |
| Others | 65562* | 8362 | 12.8 |
| Total | NA | 16804 | NA |

* "others" is made up of industrial and other enterprises¹, state and collective farms,² communications organisations, banks, trading organisations and organisations for the provision of everyday services.

** "culture" is made up of libraries, museums and theatres.

TABLE 3 (contd.)

- *** there are no figures for the numbers of PPO's by category for the Soviet Union for 1965 or 1966, so 1967 figures have been used.
- ' excludes all scientific institutions.
- ' ' excludes all scientific institutions except the research institutes of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences.
- # taken from *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972, statisticheskii ezhegodnik*, Izd. "Statistika", Moscow, 1973, p. 129.
- 1 All-Union figures for enterprises are derived from a chart showing the numbers of enterprises working on the new economic system and these as a proportion of the total. The Estonian figures for enterprises are further derived from the result of this calculation and the application to it of the proportion of the total number of industrial personnel working in Estonia.
- 2 the Estonian figures for state and collective farms are derived from the proportion of the total value of agricultural production that comes from Estonia.

(Sources: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v 1970, statisticheskii ezhegodnik*, Izd. "Statistika", Moscow, 1971, pp. 527-689.
Partiinoe stroitel'stvo nagliadnoe posobie, op. cit., chart 24.
P.zh., 10/76, p.18.
Kom.Estonii, 1/71, p. 11. *Kom. 15/67*, p. 100.
Kommunisticheskaia Partia Turkestana i Uzbekistana v tsifrakh (Sbornik statisticheskikh materialov) 1918-1967 gg., Izd. "Uzbekistan", Tashkent, 1968, p. 193.
Kompartia Kazakhstana za 50 let (1921-1971 gg.), *rost i regulirovanie sostava partiinoi organizatsii respubliki*, Izd. "Kazakhstan", Alma-Ata, 1972, pp. 287-288.
Kommunisticheskaia Partia Azerbaidzhana v tsifrakh, statisticheskii sbornik, Azerbaidzhanskoe gos. izd., Baku, 1970, pp. 62-78.)

TABLE 4.

Numbers of communists - Soviet Union

| Type of PPO | Numbers of communists | % of total |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| 1946 | | |
| Science, education, health, culture | 567619 | 10.3 |
| Administrative | 1195857 | 21.7 |
| Others | 3747386 | 68.0 |
| Total | 5510862 | 100.0 |
| 1956 | | |
| Science, education, health, culture | 896690 | 12.5 |
| Administrative | 1104722 | 15.4 |
| Others | 5172109 | 72.1 |
| Total | 7173521 | 100.0 |
| 1967 | | |
| Science, education, health, culture | 2092882 | 16.5 |
| Administrative | 1128878 | 8.9 |
| Others | 9462373 | 74.6 |
| Total | 12684133 | 100.0 |
| 1971 | | |
| Science | 574903 | 4.0 |
| Education, health, culture | 1796570 | 12.5 |
| Administrative | 1236040 | 8.6 |
| Others | 10765050 | 74.9 |
| Total | 14372563 | 100.0 |

TABLE 4 (contd.)

| Type of PPO | Numbers of communists | % of total |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|------------|
| 1976 | | |
| Science | 672472 | 4.3 |
| Education, health, culture | 1939223 | 12.4 |
| Administrative | 1344945 | 8.6 |
| Others | 11732251 | 74.7 |
| Total | 15688891 | 100.0 |

(Sources: *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, nagliadnoe posobie*,
op. cit., charts 9, 24.

Kom., 15/67, p. 99.

P.zh., 10/76, p. 17.)

TABLE 5.

Average memberships of primary party
organisations - Soviet Union

| Type of PPO | Numbers of PPO's | Numbers of communists | Average No. of communists |
|--|---------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1946 | | | |
| Science, education, health, culture | 13326 | 567619 | 42.6 |
| Administrative | 46717 | 1195857 | 25.6 |
| Others | 184664 | 3747386 | 20.3 |
| Total | 244707 | 5510862 | 22.5 |
| 1956 | | | |
| Science, education, health, culture | 50258 | 896690 | 17.8 |
| Administrative | 66407 | 1104722 | 16.6 |
| Others | 234584 | 5172109 | 22.0 |
| Total | 351249 | 7173521 | 20.4 |
| 1967 | | | |
| Science, education, health, culture | 76800 | 2092882 | 27.3 |
| Administrative | 54389 | 1128878 | 20.8 |
| Others | 206726 | 9462373 | 45.8 |
| Total | 337915 | 12684133 | 37.5 |
| 1971 | | | |
| Science | 5148 | 574903 | 111.7 |
| Education, health, culture | 82391 | 1796570 | 21.8 |
| Administrative | 59809 | 1236040 | 20.7 |
| Others | 222347 | 10765050 | 48.4 |
| Total | 369695 | 14372563 | 38.9 |

TABLE 5 (contd.)

| Type of PPO | Numbers of PPO's | Numbers of communists | Average No. of communists |
|----------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| | 1976 | | |
| Science | 6018 | 672472 | 111.7 |
| Education, health, culture | 88873 | 1939223 | 21.8 |
| Administrative | 65060 | 1344945 | 20.7 |
| Others | 230436 | 11732251 | 50.9 |
| Total | 390387 | 15688891 | 40.2 |

(Sources: *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, nagliadnoe posobie*, op. cit., charts 9, 24.

Kom., 15/67, pp. 99-100.

P.zh., 10/76, pp. 17-18.)

TABLE 6.

Numbers of communists and PPO's

(i) Moscow oblast'

| 1966 | | | | | |
|--|---------------|------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|
| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | % of total | Nos. of coms | % of total | av. no. per PPO |
| Science, education, health and culture | 1841 | 32.5 | 49131 | 16.5 | 26.7 |
| Administrative | 704 | 12.4 | 16756 | 5.6 | 23.8 |
| Others | 3122 | 55.1 | 231765 | 77.9 | 74.2 |
| Total | 5667 | 100.0 | 297652 | 100.0 | 52.5 |
| 1971 | | | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 2077 | 33.0 | 64369 | 18.3 | 31.0 |
| Administrative | 686 | 10.9 | 18698 | 5.3 | 27.3 |
| Others | 3535 | 56.1 | 268366 | 76.4 | 75.9 |
| Total | 6298 | 100.0 | 351433 | 100.0 | 55.8 |

(ii) Moscow city

| 1966 | | | | | |
|--|---------------|------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|
| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | % of total | Nos. of coms | % of total | av. no. per PPO |
| Science, education, health and culture | 3257 | 38.3 | 210939 | 34.8 | 64.8 |
| Administrative | 1361 | 16.0 | 108382 | 17.9 | 79.6 |
| Others | 3880 | 45.7 | 286152 | 47.3 | 73.8 |
| Total | 8498 | 100.0 | 605473 | 100.0 | 71.2 |

TABLE 6 (contd.)

| Type of PPO | Nos.of PPO's | % of total | Nos.of commos | % of total | av. no. per PPO |
|--|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1971 | | | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 3571 | 40.9 | 240319 | 33.7 | 67.3 |
| Administrative | 1500 | 17.2 | 138953 | 19.5 | 92.6 |
| Others | 3657 | 41.9 | 334257 | 46.8 | 91.4 |
| Total | 8728 | 100.0 | 713529 | 100.0 | 81.8 |

(Source: *Moskovskaia gorodskaia i Moskovskaia oblastnaia organizatsii KPSS v tsifrakh, Moskovskii rabochii, Moscow, 1972, pp. 124-127, 155-156.*)

TABLE 7.

Numbers of communists and PPO's - Azerbaidzhan

| Type of PPO | Nos.of PPO's | % of total | Nos.of commos | % of total | av. no. per PPO |
|--|-----------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1946 | | | | | |
| Education | 222 | 4.4 | 3941 | 4.6 | 17.8 |
| Science | 21 | 0.4 | 520 | 0.6 | 24.8 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 30 | 0.6 | 469 | 0.6 | 15.6 |
| Medical | 123 | 2.5 | 1846 | 2.2 | 15.0 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 496 | 9.9 | 12433 | 14.5 | 25.1 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 477 | 9.5 | 6011 | 7.0 | 12.6 |
| Others | 3651 | 72.7 | 60351 | 70.5 | 16.5 |
| Total | 5020 | 100.0 | 85571 | 100.0 | 17.0 |
| 1956 | | | | | |
| Education | 1101 | 16.8 | 11895 | 9.9 | 10.8 |
| Science | 55 | 0.8 | 1760 | 1.5 | 32.0 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 77 | 1.2 | 1023 | 0.9 | 13.3 |
| Medical | 182 | 2.8 | 2698 | 2.3 | 14.8 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 674 | 10.3 | 15910 | 13.3 | 23.6 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 702 | 10.7 | 9047 | 7.5 | 12.9 |
| Others | 3767 | 57.4 | 77441 | 64.6 | 20.6 |
| Total | 6558 | 100.0 | 119774 | 100.0 | 18.3 |

TABLE 7 (contd.)

| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | % of total | Nos. of commos | % of total | av. no. per PPO |
|--|---------------|------------|----------------|------------|-----------------|
| 1966 | | | | | |
| Education | 1411 | 21.6 | 21117 | 10.0 | 15.0 |
| Science | 87 | 1.3 | 5259 | 2.5 | 60.4 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 117 | 1.8 | 1987 | 0.9 | 17.0 |
| Medical | 273 | 4.2 | 5588 | 2.6 | 20.5 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 563 | 8.6 | 16849 | 8.0 | 29.9 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 704 | 10.8 | 13380 | 6.3 | 19.0 |
| Others | 3374 | 51.7 | 147789 | 69.7 | 43.8 |
| Total | 6529 | 100.0 | 211969 | 100.0 | 32.5 |
| 1970 | | | | | |
| Education | 1835 | 23.9 | 26629 | 10.7 | 14.5 |
| Science | 110 | 1.4 | 6322 | 2.5 | 57.5 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 126 | 1.6 | 2092 | 0.8 | 16.6 |
| Medical | 311 | 4.0 | 6417 | 2.6 | 20.6 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 759 | 9.9 | 20189 | 8.1 | 26.6 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 739 | 9.6 | 14865 | 6.0 | 20.1 |
| Others | 3800 | 49.5 | 173156 | 69.3 | 45.6 |
| Total | 7680 | 100.0 | 249670 | 100.0 | 32.5 |

(Source: *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Azerbaidzhana*, op. cit., pp. 62-78.)

TABLE 8.

Numbers of communists and PPO's - Kazakhstan

| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | % of total | Nos. of comchos | % of total | Av. no. per PPO |
|--|---------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|
| 1946 | | | | | |
| Non-production | | | | | |
| - rural territ. | 247 | 2.4 | 2935 | 2.0 | 11.9 |
| - others | 2869 | 28.8 | 45164 | 30.4 | 15.7 |
| Production | 6863 | 68.8 | 100513 | 67.6 | 14.6 |
| Total | 9979 | 100.0 | 148612 | 100.0 | 14.9 |
| 1956 | | | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 2147 | 11.7 | 25712 | 10.0 | 12.0 |
| Administrative | 2969 | 16.2 | 50867 | 19.8 | 17.1 |
| Others | 13248 | 72.1 | 180476 | 70.2 | 13.6 |
| Total | 18364 | 100.0 | 257055 | 100.0 | 14.0 |
| 1966 | | | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 3369 | 24.7 | 57558 | 12.0 | 17.1 |
| Administrative | 3045 | 22.3 | 68413 | 14.2 | 22.5 |
| Others | 7221 | 53.0 | 355611 | 73.8 | 49.2 |
| Total | 13635 | 100.0 | 481582 | 100.0 | 35.3 |
| 1971 | | | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 4637 | 27.6 | 70725 | 12.3 | 15.3 |
| Administrative | 3805 | 22.6 | 82981 | 14.4 | 21.8 |
| Others | 8362 | 49.8 | 421733 | 73.3 | 50.4 |
| Total | 16804 | 100.0 | 575439 | 100.0 | 34.2 |

(Source: *Kompartiiia Kazakhstana za 50 let*, op. cit., pp. 204-205, 246-247, 328, 287-288.)

TABLE 9.

Numbers of communists and PPO's - Uzbekistan

| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | % of total | Nos. of commos | % of total | Av. no. per PPO |
|--|------------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1949 | | | | | |
| Education | 470 | 5.3 | 7895 | 5.9 | 16.8 |
| Science | 45 | 0.5 | 1376 | 1.0 | 30.6 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 44 | 0.5 | 684 | 0.5 | 15.5 |
| Medical | 161 | 1.8 | 1935 | 1.5 | 12.0 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 903 | 10.1 | 16466 | 12.4 | 18.2 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 849 | 9.5 | 9832 | 7.4 | 11.6 |
| Others | 6452 | 72.3 | 94730 | 71.3 | 14.7 |
| Total | 8924 | 100.0 | 132918 | 100.0 | 14.9 |
| 1958 | | | | | |
| Education | 1510 | 19.6 | 18071 | 10.4 | 12.0 |
| Science | 48 | 0.6 | 1248 | 0.7 | 26.0 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 113 | 1.5 | 1367 | 0.8 | 12.1 |
| Medical | 198 | 2.6 | 2436 | 1.4 | 12.3 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 1000 | 13.0 | 21642 | 12.5 | 21.6 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 1018 | 13.2 | 14044 | 8.2 | 13.8 |
| Others | 3814 | 49.5 | 114296 | 66.0 | 30.0 |
| Total | 7701 | 100.0 | 173104 | 100.0 | 22.5 |

TABLE 9 (contd.)

| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | % of Total | Nos. of commos | % of Total | Av. no. per PPO |
|--|---------------|------------|----------------|------------|-----------------|
| | 1966 | | | | |
| Education | 2813 | 27.6 | 38910 | 11.5 | 13.8 |
| Science | 130 | 1.3 | 4867 | 1.4 | 37.4 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 182 | 1.8 | 2600 | 0.8 | 14.3 |
| Medical | 396 | 4.0 | 6806 | 2.0 | 17.2 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 1150 | 11.3 | 28786 | 8.5 | 25.0 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 940 | 9.2 | 15702 | 4.6 | 16.7 |
| Others | 4563 | 44.8 | 241055 | 71.2 | 52.8 |
| Total | 10174 | 100.0 | 338726 | 100.0 | 33.3 |

(Source: *Kommunisticheskaia Partia Turkestana i Uzbekistana v tsifrakh*, op. cit., pp. 148, 171, 193.)

TABLE 10.

Numbers of communists

(i) Soviet Union

| Type of PPO | Nos. of workers | Nos. of commos | % of worker-commos |
|--|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1967 | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 17646000 | 2092882 | 11.9 |
| Administrative | 1980000 | 1128878 | 57.0* |
| Others | 62648000 | 9462373 | 15.1 |
| Total | 82274000 | 12684133 | 15.4 |
| 1970-71 | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 16755000 | 2371473 | 14.2 |
| Administrative | 2271000 | 1236040 | 54.4* |
| Others | 71160000 | 10765050 | 15.1 |
| Total | 90186000 | 14372563 | 15.9 |

(ii) Azerbaidzhan

| | | | |
|-----------------------|---------|--------|--------|
| 1965-66 | | | |
| Science | 28000 | 5259 | 18.8 |
| Education and culture | 114000 | 23104 | 20.3 |
| Medical | 72000 | 5588 | 7.8 |
| Administrative | 24000 | 30229 | 126.0* |
| Others | 807000 | 147789 | 18.3 |
| Total | 1045000 | 211969 | 20.3 |

TABLE 10 (contd.)

| Type of PPO | Nos. of workers | Nos. of commos | % of worker-commos |
|--|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1970 | | | |
| Science | 37000 | 6322 | 17.1 |
| Education and culture | 157000 | 28721 | 18.3 |
| Medical | 89000 | 6417 | 7.2 |
| Administrative | 37000 | 35054 | 94.7* |
| Others | 953000 | 173156 | 18.2 |
| Total | 1273000 | 249670 | 19.6 |
| (iii) Kazakhstan | | | |
| 1965-66 | | | |
| Science, education health and culture | 822000 | 57558 | 7.0 |
| Administrative | 93000 | 68413 | 73.6* |
| Others | 3168000 | 355611 | 11.2 |
| Total | 4083000 | 481582 | 11.8 |
| 1970-71 | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 870000 | 70725 | 8.1 |
| Administrative | 117000 | 82981 | 70.9* |
| Others | 3667000 | 421733 | 11.5 |
| Total | 4654000 | 575439 | 12.4 |

TABLE 10 (contd.)

(iv) Uzbekistan

| Type of PPO | Nos. of workers | Nos. of commos | % of worker-commos |
|-----------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| | 1965-66 | | |
| Science | 53000 | 4867 | 9.2 |
| Education and culture | 279000 | 41510 | 14.9 |
| Medical | 139000 | 6806 | 4.9 |
| Administrative | 58000 | 44488 | 76.7* |
| Others | 1591000 | 241055 | 15.2 |
| Total | 2120000 | 338726 | 16.0 |

(Sources: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1965*, pp. 562-563; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970*, pp. 514-515; *Kom.*, no. 15, 1967, p. 100; *Kommunisticheskaia Partia Azerbaidzhana v tsifrakh*, op. cit., pp. 62-78, *Kommunisticheskaia Partia Turkestana i Uzbekistana v tsifrakh*, op. cit., p. 193; *Kompartia Kazakhstana za 50 let*, op. cit., pp. 287-288, 328; *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo negliadnoe posobie*, op. cit., chart 9.)

* One of these percentages is clearly absurd and most of the others look too high. The probable explanation is the number of pensioners, housewives and communists from subordinate organisations that are placed in lower-level administrative apparatus PPO's. For example in 1954 only three of the 31 members of the party organisation of the Stalin *raisobes* in Gorky were workers in the institution,¹ while only eight of the 33 party members of the Zlynkov city soviet apparatus in Briansk *oblast'* worked in the apparatus in 1956.²

1 *P.zh.*, 17/54, pp. 66-68.

2 *P.zh.*, 22/56, p. 71.

TABLE 11.

Party membership of apparatus workers - Moskovskii
raispolkom, Leningrad

(in percentages)

| Type of worker | 1962 | | 1964 | |
|---|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|
| | Party member | Non-party | Party member | Non-party |
| Chairman, deputy chairmen and secretary | 100.0 | - | 100.0 | - |
| Heads & deputy heads of departments; heads of sectors | 88.8 | 11.2 | 90.4 | 9.6 |
| Specialists (inspectors, instructors, etc) | 23.6 | 76.4 | 27.5 | 72.5 |
| Clerical | - | 100.0 | - | 100.0 |
| All apparatus workers | 35.2 | 64.8 | 37.8 | 62.2 |
| | 1966 | | | |
| Chairman, deputy chairmen and secretary | 100.0 | - | | |
| Heads and deputy heads of departments; heads of sectors | 95.4 | 4.6 | | |
| Specialists (inspectors, instructors, etc) | 28.4 | 71.6 | | |
| Clerical | 9.0 | 91.0 | | |
| All apparatus workers | 39.5 | 60.5 | | |

(Source: B.D. Lebin and M.N. Perfil'ev: *Kadry apparata upravleniia v SSSR, sotsiologicheskie problemy podbora i rasstanovki*: Izd. "Nauka", Leningrad, 1970, pp. 194 and 197.)

TABLE 12.

Numbers of subordinate party organisations - Kazakhstan

| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of <i>tsekhorgi</i> | Nos. with PPO rights |
|--|---------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| 1956 | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 2147 | 61 | 17 |
| Administrative | 2969 | 130 | 79 |
| Others | 13248 | 976 | 283 |
| Total | 18364 | 1167 | 379 |

| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of <i>tsekhorgi</i> | Nos. of party groups |
|--|---------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| 1967 | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 3626 | 347 | 626 |
| Administrative | 3241 | 446 | 425 |
| Others | 7500 | 11262 | 12201 |
| Total | 14367 | 12055 | 13252 |

| | | | |
|--|-------|-------|-------|
| 1971 | | | |
| Science, education, health and culture | 4637 | 512 | 828 |
| Administrative | 3805 | 533 | 711 |
| Others | 8362 | 14046 | 14154 |
| Total | 16804 | 15091 | 15693 |

(Source: *Kompartia Kazakhstana za 50 let*, op. cit., pp. 244-247, 326-328.)

TABLE 13.

Numbers of subordinate party organisations - Uzbekistan

| Type of PPO | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of <i>tsekhorgi</i> | Nos. with PPO rts. | Nos. of p. groups |
|--|---------------|--------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| 1958 | | | | |
| Education | 1510 | 90 | 32 | 143 |
| Science | 48 | 27 | 27 | 8 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 113 | - | - | 15 |
| Medical | 198 | - | - | 4 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 1000 | 211 | 89 | 51 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 1018 | - | - | 8 |
| Others | 3814 | 1462 | 520 | 2086 |
| Total | 7701 | 1790 | 668 | 2315 |
| 1966 | | | | |
| Education | 2813 | 144 | 110 | 331 |
| Science | 130 | 39 | 12 | 57 |
| Cultural-indoct. | 182 | 2 | - | - |
| Medical | 396 | 4 | - | 13 |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 1150 | 224 | 129 | 141 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 940 | - | - | 7 |
| Others | 4563 | 11695 | 10772 | 4155 |
| Total | 10174 | 12108 | 11023 | 4704 |

(Source: *Kommunisticheskaia Partia Turkestana i Uzbekistana v tsifrakh*, op. cit., pp. 171, 193.)

TABLE 14.

Numbers of party committees

(i) Kazakhstan

| Type of PPO | 1960 | | 1963 | | 1966 | |
|--|---------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of p. cttees | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of p. cttees | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of p. cttees |
| Science, education, health and culture | 2452 | 4 | 2832 | 4 | 3369 | 26 |
| Administrative | 2690 | 3 | 2860 | 5 | 3045 | 16 |
| Others | 7354 | 339 | 6984 | 609 | 7221 | 1468 |
| Total | 12496 | 346 | 12676 | 618 | 13635 | 1510 |

(Source: *Kompartia Kazakhstana za 50 let*, p. 289.)

(ii) Uzbekistan

| Type of PPO | 1958 | | 1966 | |
|---|---------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of p. cttees | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of p. cttees |
| Education | 1510 | 4 | 2813 | 14 |
| Science | 48 | 1 | 130 | 4 |
| Cultural-enlight. | 113 | - | 182 | - |
| Medical | 198 | - | 396 | - |
| Administrative (centre to <i>rai.</i>) | 1000 | 5 | 1150 | 8 |
| Rural <i>rai.</i> admin. | 1018 | - | 940 | - |
| Others | 3814 | 46 | 4563 | 1096 |
| Total | 7701 | 56 | 10174 | 1122 |

(Source: *Kommunisticheskaia Partia Turkestana i Uzbekistana v tsifrakh*, op. cit., pp. 171, 193.)

TABLE 14 (contd.)

(iii) Estonia

| Type of PPO | 1966 | | 1971 | |
|-------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|
| | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of p.cttees | Nos. of PPO's | Nos. of p.cttees |
| Education | 435 | 4 | 448 | 3 |
| Science | 26 | - | 48 | - |
| Cultural-enlight. | 60 | - | 52 | 1 |
| Medical | 80 | - | 98 | - |
| Administrative | 386 | 2 | 487 | 4 |
| Others | 1686 | 29 | 1564 | 54 |
| Total | 2673 | 35 | 2697 | 62 |

(Source: *Kom.Estonii*, 1/71, p. 11.)

TABLE 15.

Numbers of subordinate party organisations and
party committees - Soviet Union

| | 1971 | 1976 |
|---|--------|--------|
| No. of PPO's with party committees | 31219 | 35951 |
| rights with <i>raikom</i> | 610 | 783 |
| No. of subordinate party organisations | 352871 | 400388 |
| with PPO rights | 235660 | 274454 |
| party committees | 415 | 955 |
| No. of party groups | 443233 | 528894 |

(Source: *P.zh.*, 10/76, p. 18.)

APPENDIX BTHE PRIMARY PARTY ORGANISATIONS OF CREATIVE UNIONS¹

There are three reasons for dealing with the PPO's of creative unions in a separate appendix. Firstly, their "host" organisations are completely different from all other "host" organisations in the non-production sphere; secondly, there are such considerable gaps in my knowledge of the operations of both the creative unions and their PPO's that they could not be included in the body of the thesis. Finally, despite these gaps, a study of the activities of creative PPO's, particularly in the context of the 1962-64 literary debate, provides an interesting example of the ideological activities of PPO's in general.

What sets the PPO's of creative unions apart from all other PPO's is the special and uncertain nature of the creative unions themselves. The basic difficulty arises in deciding just what type of organisation a

1 "Creative" is a direct translation of the Russian word *tvorcheskii*. While sounding perhaps slightly strange in English, it seems to be the best word to include the whole range of activities covered by the unions, while excluding such institutions as theatres, orchestras, etc. that are included in the word "cultural". There are six unions, for writers (including literary critics), for artists, composers (including musicians), journalists, cinematographers and architects. This appendix will be devoted primarily to the first three.

creative union is. A.I. Shchiglik describes the various views held by Soviet authorities regarding the nature of creative unions. Some consider them to be voluntary social organisations like organisations such as *Znanie*. Others consider that because they profess to protect the legal and economic interests of their members they contain some of the characteristics of trade unions. Others would wish to put them in a category of their own.¹ The last would appear to be the necessary view - a creative union has significantly greater powers over its members and more influence in its area of concern than a voluntary organisation such as *Znanie*,² while they cannot be seen as trade unions because their members usually belong to a trade union as well as the creative union, because the creative union does not have its own organisations within working institutions, because trade union membership is decided by the branch of the economy in which one works rather than by a strict definition of one's profession, and because membership of a creative union is not guaranteed to a potential member but is only available to those with the necessary qualities.³ For these reasons Shchiglik comes to the conclusion that creative unions are not covered by any legal statutes for voluntary

1 Iampol'skaia: *Tvorcheskie soiuzy*, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

2 *ibid*, p. 17.

3 *ibid*, pp. 15-17.

organisations or trade unions, but only by Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution¹ and the Rules of the unions themselves. The exact legal situation and subordination of creative unions appear to be uncertain. Shchiglik writes:

An analysis of relations between the Soviet state and creative unions at the present time indicates that they are established not on the basis of subordination, control and supervision, but on the principles of collaboration, coordination and agreement and on the basis of help for these organisations and rewards for their activities on the part of the Soviet state.²

Shchiglik considers that the Rules of the creative unions, being rules for the conduct of the internal affairs of the unions, cannot be considered legal acts. Certainly none of them have been confirmed by any Soviet government organ.³

1 Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution declares that the CPSU is "the vanguard of the workers in their struggle for the construction of communist society and embodies the leading nucleus of all organisations of workers, both social and state". This it gives the party, and its PPO's, the same authority as they have over any other non-party organisations.

2 *ibid*, p. 34.

3 Although Shchiglik states that some of the earlier ones, in the 1930's, were confirmed "by the Soviet government." *ibid*, p. 18.

However there is some evidence that the Soviet government, specifically the Council of Ministers, does have some legal powers over creative unions. Thus in 1959 the RSFSR Council of Ministers was able to confer on the administration of the RSFSR Union of Writers the right to confirm the structure and staff of the administrative-managerial component of the RSFSR Literary Fund.¹ The 1967 edition of the Soviet textbook *Administrativnoe pravo* claims that the All-Union Ministry of Culture directs (*napravliaet*) the activity of the Union of Composers, Writers and Artists, and that its local departments direct the activity of the local departments of these unions.² Other orders appear to exclude the formal subordination of creative unions to any government organs, but strongly imply such subordination in practice. For example, in 1958 the All-Union Ministry of Culture obliged administration and department heads to help in the preparation and conduct of plenums of creative unions and to examine the work of the plenums.³ This order places the obligation on the ministerial officials to involve themselves in the plenums, rather than on the creative unions to take any notice of them. One can confidently predict, however,

1 *ibid*, p. 112.

2 *Administrativnoe pravo*, 1967, *op. cit.*, pp. 419-421.

3 Iampol'skaia: *Tvorcheskie soiuzy*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

that in practice the role of the ministerial officials is an important one.

In some cases the leaders of state organs have *ex officio* positions in creative union administrations - the chairman of the State Committee for Cinematography is elected as a member of the administration of the Union of Cinematographers and the chairman of Gosstroi's State Committee for Civil Construction and Architecture of the administration of the Union of Architects.¹

The legal situation of creative unions appears to be somewhat uncertain. Their financial situation is apparently equally uncertain. It appears that they are responsible for their own finances. They obtain money from membership subscriptions and profits from subordinate enterprises.² From these funds they pay for their full-time apparatuses. However it is possible for the state to give them direct financial assistance. In fact they are usually heavily subsidised by state funds, the apparatuses of all local organisations of the Union of Writers even being financed directly by local Soviet budgets.³

1 *ibid*, p. 32. It is not made clear how they are elected *ex officio*.

2 *ibid*, p. 33.

3 *ibid*, p. 93; Ogen, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

Subordinate enterprises include the Literary, Art and Music Funds, publishing houses, educational institutes and various other production enterprises such as the ceramics factories and factories for the production of paints and other art materials of the Union of Artists. These enterprises are not subject to any non-union control beyond the usual functional control exercised by Gosplan, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Committee for Labour and Wages.¹

It appears that creative unions are largely free from direct ministerial supervision. The relations between state organs and creative unions are important in deciding the degree of party involvement in the affairs of the unions. If there is no particular government supervision of creative unions, the party is far more likely to be directly involved.

Another thing that might make direct party involvement more likely is the nature of the unions' tasks, although paradoxically this might in fact at the same time reduce the significance of their PPO's, in so far as the creative unions themselves are specialised ideological agencies. Although creative unions have quite significant administrative functions, particularly in the areas of determining payments to creative workers

1 Iampol'skaia: *Tvorcheskie soiuzy*, op. cit., p. 106.

and the conditions of their work,¹ the most important areas of their activities have a strong ideological colouring. Shchiglik describes the work of creative unions in consideration of "ideological-creative problems". These problems become "the subject of wide discussion in the course of which is worked out the collective opinion of literary-artistic society (*obshchestvennost'*) on the cardinal questions of literature and art".² These discussions have their public airings at the congresses and plenums of the creative unions. The book goes no further than to say that such topics as "Contemporary problems of realism and modernism", "Actual problems of socialist realism" and "Problems of national drama" are considered in the unions' congresses, conferences and plenums.³ It gives no idea of their political significance, of the debates and conflicts that can occur over them within creative unions, and the concrete measures used to ensure that the "collective opinion" is observed by all.

Some idea of the degree to which such creative matters take on political significance and become the subject of political debate, and the role creative unions

1 The book on creative unions edited by Iampol'skaia describes in some detail the concern of creative unions with protecting creative workers' rights, giving them financial and creative assistance, and ensuring their material welfare, *ibid*, pp. 144-252.

2 *ibid*, p. 64.

3 *ibid*.

play in that debate, can be seen in Priscilla Johnson's account of the literary debates of 1962 to 1964,¹ while Ogen describes the more prosaic, but nevertheless total control of the appearance of creative works by the Union of Composers.²

Our task is to discover how much the PPO's of creative unions are involved in these matters. Is there any particularly strong party involvement in creative matters reflected in the activities of the PPO's, does the strongly ideological nature of creative unions' activities increase the importance of their PPO's, or does it take away some of their functions? How closely and in what way are these PPO's involved in policy-making and disputes in the creative area?

Firstly, it is necessary to examine just where the PPO's of creative unions are situated. Unfortunately, this is difficult to specify with precision. Structural units of creative unions exist at the All-Union and union

1 Johnson, P.: *Khrushchev and the Arts, the politics of Soviet culture, 1962-64*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.

2 Ogen, op. cit.. Accounts of such control are also available in Soviet sources. Thus *Partiinaiia zhizn' Kazakhstana* writes that not a single thing is published in Kazakhstan without being examined by the relevant section and secretariat and presidium of the Kazakh Union of Writers. *P.zh. Kaz.*, 10/64, p. 67.

republic level. Departments (*otdeleniia*) of union republic unions are established at autonomous republic, *krai*, *oblast'* and city levels. The Unions of Journalists and Architects have primary organisations situated within working institutions, while in territorial-administrative units not having a department, organisational groups can be established.¹ Although I have nowhere read of any formal or informal rules on which of these structural units should have PPO's they seem to be concentrated at union republic and department level. Most union republic unions have PPO's, although the RSFSR and Ukraine are apparently different from the rest in also having PPO's at department level - Moscow, Leningrad, the Tatar ASSR, Orlov, etc in the RSFSR; Kiev, Donets, etc in the Ukraine. Presumably the PPO's are decentralised as much as possible. The smaller union republics either do not have department level units or they have too few communists to support a PPO.²

But the more important point when speaking of the membership of the PPO's of creative unions is that in

1 Iampol'skaia: *Tvorcheskie soiuzy*, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

2 It is uncertain who belongs to the RSFSR and Ukrainian Republic PPO's. If the unions in these republics have departments with PPO's, presumably the union-republic level party organisations are made up only of the communists working full-time in the unions' apparatuses. In this case they would be very small PPO's.

fact not all communist members of a creative union are members of the union's PPO. Communist creative workers who are on the payroll of a working institution are members of the PPO of that institution, not of the creative union. Only those communists who work full-time in the administrative apparatus, those who are not attached to any particular working institution, and those working in institutions too small to have their own PPO's belong to the PPO of the creative union. Thus in 1970 there were 640 communist members of the Moscow department of the RSFSR Union of Writers. However only 350 of them were in the department's PPO.¹

This fact will obviously have a great effect on the functioning of creative PPO's. Firstly, it significantly reduces their size.²

1 Iampol'skaia: *Tvorcheskie soiuzy*, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

2 However in most cases they seem to be of significant size. Up to 1959 the party organisation of the Moscow Union of Artists had 273 members; in that year the party members working in the Moscow department of the National Art Fund were included in the party organisation, raising the membership to 550. *Zhizn' - istochnik vdokhnoveniia, iz opyta partiinoi raboty v tvorcheskikh organizatsiakh Soiuza khudozhnikov RSFSR*, Izd. "Khudozhnik RSFSR", Leningrad, 1960, p. 15. In 1967 the Sverdlovsk Union of Writers had 25 people in its party organisation, while the Sverdlovsk Union of Artists had 14. *P.zh.*, 2/67, p. 53. However in 1973 the Estonian Union of Composers had only six people in its PPO, all the other communists of the Union belonging to workplace PPO's. *Kom.Estonii*, 12/73, p. 58.

But it is not the numerical reduction in membership that is most significant. More significant is that the PPO no longer represents or controls all party members of the union. This makes necessary the use of other forms of party organisation - party groups, meetings of the party *aktiv*, etc. While these forms of organisation are in no way signs of limitations on the role in creative matters of the party as a whole, they could represent a significant limitation on the role of PPO's. It is something to be discussed in more detail when we attempt to come to some conclusions on the effectiveness and strength of creative union PPO's.

But first we will look at some examples of their activities. I have said that the most important tasks of creative unions have a strong ideological colouring. This fact is reflected in the activities of their PPO's. Their functions can be broadly divided into the ideological, the organisational and the creative, but all would seem to have some ideological content. Their ideological functions can be divided into legitimisation and control.¹

The party organisations of creative unions run the same sort of political indoctrination seminars for legitimisation purposes as other PPO's. A 1972 Central

1 I have not found any evidence of organised mobilisation activities in creative unions. However the sending of union members on trips, to be discussed in more detail on p. 648, has been described as a form of moral incentive. See above, p. 114.

Committee decision said:

Alongside the mastering of the general theoretical problems of Marxism-Leninism it is recommended . . . for cadres of the creative intelligentsia (the study of) current problems of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and aesthetics and of the contemporary ideological struggle.¹

In 1969 *Kommunist Belorussii* reported that for several years Belorussian creative workers had been studying Marxist-Leninist aesthetics in their theoretical seminars.² The party buro of the Estonian Union of Writers has one member who specialises in the organisation of political indoctrination seminars.³

Of all categories of non-production workers none are more directly affected in their everyday work by ideological considerations than creative workers. The effect the ideological control of PPO's has on creative workers can be seen in the following examples.

PPO's are concerned to prevent the appearance of various disturbing ideological aberrations among creative workers. In 1965 the creative PPO's of Kazakhstan were

1 Quoted in Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 25.

2 *Kom. Belorussii*, 9/69, p. 14.

3 *Kom. Estonii*, 2/70, p. 53.

criticised for concerning themselves with minor matters while such things as nationalism were appearing in the works of some creative workers.¹ Presumably the same tendencies were the subject of concern of the party organisation of the Estonian Union of Composers when it considered the question of Estonian emigres who were allegedly trying to split the unity of Soviet Estonian creative work.² In 1955 the party organisation of the Leningrad Union of Artists was criticised for allowing some artists to maintain the anarchistic belief in the creative "freedom" of the artist.³

The general concern PPO's have for the ideological attitudes of creative workers is most practically illustrated in the specific actions taken by the party organisations over particular creative works. The control exercised by the PPO's in the area of the selection of works for publication, performance and exhibition appears to be considerable. A party meeting of the Lithuanian Union of Artists examined the laxity shown by some artists in the choice of works for reproduction,⁴ while the party buro of the Moscow Union of Artists examines the selection of works for exhibitions.⁵ In some cases the PPO appears

1 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 3/63, p. 15.

2 *Kom.Estonii*, 12/73, p. 55.

3 *P.zh.*, 1/55, p. 23.

4 *Kom.*, 14/71, p. 58.

5 *Mosk.pravda*, 18/9/71, p. 2.

to have the initiative in the commission of works. Thus in 1971 the party committee of the Moscow Union of Writers passed a decision that a literary-artistic collection on the Krasnaia Presnia section of Moscow be published.¹

In 1955 the party organisation of the Leningrad Union of Artists was criticised for allowing a "liberal" attitude to appear in Artistic Councils during creative discussions and considerations of new works. For example, some artists were allowed to express the opinion that two paintings, "Rest after the Fight" and "Latest Issue of the Workshop Paper", were in opposition to the principles of socialist realism, when really they were the best paintings to have come out of Leningrad in recent years.² The party committee of the RSFSR Union of Artists examined the question of the supposedly unhealthy tendencies evident in the paintings of some artists being exhibited in the Central House of Artists and gave a correct evaluation of them.³

Don Ogen describes in some detail the process leading up to the banning of the opera "The Master and Margarita" by the Leningrad department of the RSFSR Union of Composers. He makes the point that such an occurrence

1 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 17/3/71, p. 3.

2 *P.zh.*, 1/55, p. 23.

3 *Zhizn' - istochnik vdokhnovleniia*, op. cit., p. 11.

is rare, in fact it was the only time such a thing had happened in twenty years. However he also makes the point that the PPO has no special responsibility for defending "socialist realism" in music, primarily because the party leadership itself is not particularly interested in socialist realism in music. One might expect, and the cases described above tend to support the view, that in the artistic and literary areas ideologically unacceptable works are more easily recognisable.¹

When the opera "The Master and Margarita" was first presented to the Administration of the Leningrad Union of Composers, some party members were concerned and turned to the *gorkom* for advice. So it was played again at a meeting of the Administration with a *gorkom* instructor present. There was then a meeting of the Administration leadership, PPO members and the *gorkom* instructor, where the decision was taken not to allow the public performance of the opera.² This case makes a number of interesting points - firstly, that the matter was decided, apparently quite independently at Leningrad level, without the involvement of the All-Union Union. But more importantly for us is the degree of party involvement. Probably most

1 Indeed one suspects that in this case it was the novel which provided the basis for the opera as much as the music itself which was considered unacceptable.

2 Ogen, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

significant is the role of the *gorkom*. However that will be discussed in more detail later. For the moment the significant point is the involvement of the PPO.

Ogen does not specify what was considered wrong with the opera. However other case histories give us some idea of what is likely to be considered unacceptable. We have already seen the concern with such obviously ideologically sensitive matters as nationalism, "freedom" of the artist and socialist realism. However concern with the nature of creative work can be far more specific and less obviously ideologically motivated. In 1971 a party meeting of the Lithuanian Union of Artists examined the abandonment of contemporary themes by some artists.¹ The party buro of the Rostov department of the RSFSR Union of Writers went further. When it was felt that a poet was concentrating too much on war themes the party buro, together with the editorial board of the journal *Don*, sent him on a tour of the countryside in order to provide him with new ideas.² Similarly the communist members of the RSFSR Union of Artists spoke to and sent on a trip a young painter who had limited his paintings to Russian fairy tales.³

1 *Kom.*, 14/71, p. 58.

2 *P.zh.*, 7/63, pp. 52-53.

3 *Zhizn'* - *istochnik vdokhnovleniia*, op. cit., p. 27.

PPO involvement in deciding candidates for trips seems to be an important incentive and means of discipline of creative workers. The deputy secretary of the party buro of the Latvian Union of Writers could say no more than that the party buro and the administrative secretaries of the Union concerned themselves with the material incentive of workers. However it was clearly no coincidence that the party buro's concern with trips for writers was mentioned in the same paragraph.¹ The party committee of the Moscow Union of Writers must confirm candidates for trips, while the party buro of the RSFSR Union of Artists itself sends artists on trips abroad.²

Another area in which PPO's are directly involved in creative matters is the establishment of creative contacts with other organisations, generally production organisations. It is considered important for the ideological and cultural development of the general population, as well as for widening the horizons of creative workers, that the latter have a close connection with production affairs. On the initiative of the Moscow Union of Writers in 1974 creative contacts were established with Moscow production enterprises. Writers' brigades were

1 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 2/70, p. 61.

2 *Zhizn' - istochnik vdokhnovleniia*, op. cit., p. 57.

established directly in workshops.¹ The party buro of the Latvian Union of Writers has combined open party meetings with production enterprise communists on matters of literary interest in production enterprises.² The same party buro, together with the secretariat of the administration of the Union, widens the horizons of writers by organising meetings with leading administrative and party officials.³

The PPO's of creative unions also have organisational tasks, although again with a political or ideological colouring. These tasks are primarily in the preparation and conduct of meetings and conferences of creative unions and their organs. The party buro of the Leningrad Union of Artists hears reports (*doklady* and *soobshchenia*) on the preparation of congresses.⁴ In early 1971 the party committee of the Moscow Union of Writers was involved in preparations for the Third RSFSR Writers' Congress.⁵ Later in the same year it was reported that the party committee took an active part in the preparation of the election-report meetings of the creative sections within the Union.⁶

1 *P.zh.*, 1/75, pp. 54-55.

2 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 8/72, p. 47.

3 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 2/70, p. 59.

4 *Zhizn' - istochnik vdokhnovleniia*, op. cit., p. 57.

5 *Mosk.pravda*, 22/1/71, p. 2.

6 *Mosk.pravda*, 18/9/71, p. 2.

Ogen discusses the process in some detail in the case of the Leningrad Union of Composers. In elections for the representatives of the Administration in the leadership of the various sections of the Union, the party organisation offers a list of candidates. The list would have been agreed to by the *gorkom*. He goes on to say:

In 'recommending' its list, the party organisation must consider the popularity among the masses of different composers. Otherwise an embarrassing situation (*konfuz*) might arise in the failure of the list recommended by the party,

but adds that there has never been a case of a *konfuz* in the Leningrad Union.¹

The evidence suggests that the PPO's of creative unions have the opportunity to and do in fact involve themselves in both the creative and organisational aspects of the unions' activities, the involvement being concerned above all to ensure the maintenance of the correct ideological attitudes in creative work. However the party organisations' activities seem to be very like the activities of party organisations in other categories of "host" organisation. The highly ideological nature of the activities of creative unions appears to neither increase

1 Ogen, op. cit., p. 60.

nor decrease the degree of involvement of the PPO's, nor to change the nature of that involvement. The emphasis is still on "control" and the avoidance of *podmena*. Control of individuals and the work of the administration is still exercised through the usual recommendations to the administration and influence over bodies of collective decision-making. Reporting to higher authorities still appears to be one of the PPO's most important weapons. Ogen, in summarising the role of the PPO in "The Master and Margarita" affair, says:

Thus, the role of the low-level party cell consists simply of signalling, in good time, 'danger'.¹

The evidence suggests that the PPO's of creative unions are not unduly concerned by the fact that many of the communist members of their "host" organisation do not belong to them. There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly, for the fulfilment of many of the functions of the PPO's the representativeness of its membership is irrelevant. Particularly in the area of the control of the administration the rank-and-file membership of the party has little role to play. The PPO has a formal right to engage in various activities that both in theory and practice are quite independent of the rank-and-file

1 *ibid*, pp. 36-37.

membership. As long as the leading officials of the creative union are members of the PPO,¹ the PPO is able to question them about their activities, offer recommendations, and if necessary take party disciplinary action against them.

However the membership problem could be significant in the control of rank-and-file workers. If the individual to be controlled is not a member of the union's PPO, the party organisation could face difficulties, since it presumably would not have the right to question or discipline him. However it appears likely that cooperation between PPO's would surmount these difficulties, although I have little specific evidence of such cooperation. We have reports of the combined party meetings of the Estonian Union of Writers, the Estonian Publishing House and the State Committee for Publishing, Printing and the Book Trade, and the close contacts between the party organisations of the Tallin Art University and the Estonian Union of Artists.² Unfortunately these reports give no details of the nature or the reason for such cooperation, nor whether it is truly cooperation among

1 Since they usually work full-time in the union's apparatus, and are therefore unlikely to work in any other institution, they almost certainly are members of the PPO.

2 *Kom. Estonii*, 12/73, p. 55; *Sovetskaia Estonia*, 2/6/71, p. 2.

equals or whether one party organisation assumes dominance. Despite the lack of detail one can feel confident that such cooperation could go a long way towards solving the membership problem.

While there is evidence to the effect that the PPO's of creative unions are able to effectively involve themselves in all areas of the activity of their "host" organisations and that they are able to cope with the membership problem, there is also evidence of the failure of PPO's to do so. The implication in some reports often is that the lack of involvement and the membership problem are connected. The connection is in fact most doubtful. I think that we will find that organisational measures implemented by the authorities, ostensibly to solve the membership problem, have in fact been designed to deal with problems of PPO ineffectiveness which have arisen for reasons quite unconnected with the membership problem.

Cases of criticism of the PPO's of creative unions can be seen above. All the cases have a very strong ideological content - allowing the appearance of nationalism, the criticism of socialist realist paintings and the belief in the "freedom" of the artist.¹ If such lack of involvement is common it is highly significant, since this is probably the most important area of PPO

1 See above, pp. 643-645.

concern - to maintain the correct ideological line in all creative endeavour.

Of course it is not possible to quantify how much PPO's allow such ideological aberrations. However we can speculate, using somewhat circumstantial evidence, about some of the pressures that might be on PPO workers to allow laxer ideological control than is expected of them by higher authorities. Most Soviet authorities pay at least lip-service to the special nature of the creative process. The deputy head of a Kazakh Central Committee department wrote in 1973:

Clearly the tasks of each (creative) party organisation can be formulated in such expressions as: to influence the collective and each individual person. But when we consider that in a particular case 'each person' is an artist with his own view of the world, with a whole complex of uniquely individual features making up his creative character, which requires enthusiasm as well as understanding, then the difference in approach to the methods of party work in a creative collective become evident. . . . The approach to the consideration or resolution of creative matters in a meeting of the party organisation or party buro must be creative itself.

But such an attitude can go too far. The author complains that some party organisations, in attempts to avoid complications, have deemed it not to be among their functions to deal with creative matters.¹ The deputy secretary of the party organisation of the Latvian Union of Writers is treading on dangerous ground when he begins a 1970 article by speaking of the special nature of the role of party organisations in creative unions:

In art, as in science, it is dangerous to react against creative searches even when they sometimes at first glance appear questionable.²

The Kazakh Central Committee worker concludes his article by saying:

Of course, when we are speaking of party discipline and the observance of legal requirements, then there can be no allowances for the 'peculiarity' (*svoeobrazie*) of the artist.³

Should we be surprised if PPO's, made up after all of creative workers, are reluctant to impose ideological limitations on their own creative work? It can be seen that this is the same problem that questions the effectiveness

1 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 4/73, p. 66.

2 *Kom.Sov.Latvii*, 2/70, pp. 58-59.

3 *P.zh.Kaz.*, 4/73, p. 66.

of all primary party organisations - the controllers are basically no different in attitudes and interests from those they control. Ogen says that the PPO of the Leningrad Union of Composers does not press for socialist realism in music since many of the members of the PPO's themselves do not write socialist realist music.¹

However it is significant that this problem appears to be more serious in scientific institutions than in cultural and creative institutions. This is because state interests, the technological development of the Soviet economy, demand that greater intellectual freedom be given to scientists than need be given to creative workers. This means that far tighter ideological control can be exercised over creative workers, that dissident writers, artists and composers are more readily dismissed from their jobs, gaoled or exiled, and that far more party "hacks" are permitted to pursue their "careers" in creative work than could ever be allowed to occur in scientific research if the quality of Soviet science were not to suffer drastically. This means that lax ideological control is far less evident in the creative unions than in research institutions.

1 Ogen, op. cit., p. 36. Although it should also be mentioned that he believes that the top leadership is not particularly concerned about socialist realism in music.

Such a view is supported by the data on the orientations of the secretaries of creative union PPO's. What data I have suggest that they are firmly committed to the party line.¹

Despite this, evidence does exist to suggest that at times creative union PPO fail to control the ideological content of creative work as firmly as higher authorities might wish. Such failures should be explained as a sign of lack of will, not a lack of means.

One particularly interesting case that illustrates this revolves around the literary debates of 1962 to 1964 in the Moscow Union of Writers. Although information on the role of the PPO in the events is sketchy, some speculation is possible.

Priscilla Johnson describes the whole conflict in her book *Khrushchev and the Arts*. It began in April, 1962 when the "liberal" writers gained control of the administration of the Moscow Union of Writers, while the conservatives were on tour in the provinces. Unfortunately no details are available on the role of the PPO in the election. Presumably there was a *konfuz*,² since the membership of the party committee was not yet to the liking of the liberals.

1 See above, pp. 447-451.

2 Ogen, op. cit., p. 60.

It was not until December, 1962 that the old party committee was replaced by a new one, headed by Mal'tsev and containing such liberals as K. Simonov and A. Tvardovskii.¹ The report in *Literaturnaia gazeta* gives no details of the election, except the results and to say that the meeting was addressed by the first secretary of Moscow's Frunze *raikom*. It appears, therefore, that there were no representatives from the Moscow *gorkom* present at the meeting. The higher authorities must have been expecting trouble, so one can only take the absence of a *gorkom* representative as a prior admission of defeat.

Johnson shows that the reaction against the liberals and their eventual defeat was centred at a far higher level than the PPO, Khrushchev himself being closely involved. However the action taken against the PPO indicates that it did have some role to play in the conflict - that the liberals could not be finally defeated until the PPO had been dealt with. But more interesting are the methods used to deal with the PPO. It was bypassed and dismantled.

1 The full list of members of the new party committee is:

(secretary) E. Mal'tsev; (deputies) I. Sutyryn, T. Matyleva, P. Sazhin; (others) Iu. Korol'kov, P. Nilin, A. Solynskii, K. Simonov, A. Tvardovskii, I. Chicherov, S. Shchipachev. *Lit.gazeta*, 29/12/62, p. 2.

The dismantling took the form of transferring the members of the party organisation to other party organisations in working institutions.¹ I have already spoken of communist members of creative unions working in other institutions as being members of the PPO's of those other institutions. But this development was different - there is no evidence that the communists transferred at this time worked in the institutions to whose PPO they were transferred. It was simply a tactic, and one probably strictly speaking against the Party Rules, to break up a party organisation which was unwilling to accept control from above.² Although it is unlikely that the PPO went

1 *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 31/8/63, p. 2; *Lit.gazeta*, 11/7/63, p. 1. For example, the writer Tikhon Semushkin became a member of the PPO of the Arctic and Antarctic Administration of the Chief Administration for Hydrometeorological Services of the All-Union Council of Ministers. He claims to have already been friendly with scientist members of the PPO, so presumably his literary work had been concerned with the Arctic and Antarctic. The reason given for the transfers was that it enabled writers to become closer to production. Semushkin wrote that previously writers had had only episodic access to the enterprises of Moscow, "but to be in the party organisation and live its life is a completely different matter. This means being at the source of the stormy activity of this or that collective, and is nothing like conducting an interview". *Lit.gazeta*, 14/1/64, p. 1.

2 In Appendix A, I discuss the uncertainty about the formal obligations to create PPO's. However the implication of the relevant paragraphs of the Party Rules and Soviet commentaries on them is that PPO's should be formed in institutions with three or more party members and that all party members in that institution should be members of the PPO.

out of existence altogether, it appears certain that it ceased to function in any meaningful sense.

What replaced the PPO as the source of party influence in the Union? General meetings of the party *aktiv* and meetings of union party groups have always been used as part of the solution of the membership problem. (However the problem has usually been a naturally occurring one, not an artificially manufactured one.) "Party group" is a difficult and very loosely used term which deserves much more attention than I am able to give it here. I have referred elsewhere in this thesis to party groups in sub-units of institutions - these groups are subordinate to the PPO and do not concern us here. We are concerned with the "party groups in non-party organisations" described in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the latest Party Rules. The Rules state:

In congresses, conferences and meetings called in Soviet, trade union, cooperative and other mass organisations and in the elected organs of these organisations, where there are no less than three party members, there are organised party groups. . . . The party groups are subordinate to the relevant party organisations (Central Committee of Union Republic parties, *kraikom*, *obkom*, *okruzhhkom*, *gorkom*, *raikom*).¹

1

Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., para. 68-69.

This means that all communist delegates to the All-Union Supreme Soviet form a party group subordinate to the All-Union Central Committee, all communist delegates to an *Oblast'* Soviet and all communist members of the *oblispolkom* belong to party groups subordinate to the *obkom*, etc.

Shchiglik applies these paragraphs of the Party Rules to creative unions:

Such party groups are established, consequently, in the congresses of creative unions, and also in the administrations, presidiums and secretariats of the administrations of these unions.¹

He goes on to say that just as these party groups are under the direct leadership of the responsible party organ, so the party *aktivy* of creative unions also work under the leadership of this party organ.²

Meetings of the party *aktiv*, that is meetings of all the communist members of the union regardless of their PPO, have always been used to avoid the membership problem. However in 1963 they were used quite blatantly as a means of bypassing the PPO altogether.

1 Iampol'skaia: *Tvorcheskie soiuzy*, op. cit., p.43.

2 *ibid*, pp. 43-44. However he does not make clear how the quoted paragraphs of the Party Rules are connected with meetings of the party *aktivy*. They are not conferences, congresses or elected organs of the creative unions. Neither can they be considered as examples of the meetings referred to in the Party Rules - a party group is of no relevance in a meeting made up exclusively of party members.

In this case the relevant party organ was the Moscow *gorkom*. It acted primarily through its party organiser attached to the Union of Writers, Tevekelian. The post of Moscow *gorkom* party organiser attached to the Moscow Union of Writers is a mysterious one. It seems doubtful that it existed before 1963 - if it did exist the holder of the post was apparently not present at the 1962 election-report meeting.¹ Nevertheless, it was clearly an important one. Egorychev, the first secretary of the Moscow *gorkom*, declared in 1963, following mention of the transfer of creative union communists to work-place PPO's:

For the party leadership of the ideological life of the unions we have formed in them party groups headed by party organisers of the Moscow *gorkom*.²

The secretary of the party buro of the Arctic and Antarctic Administration asked Semushkin: "How do things stand now

1 But neither did he attend the 1966 election-report meeting. *Lit.gazeta*, 22/12/66, p. 1. Yet the post was still in existence in 1970. In fact it was filled by one A. Vasil'ev, presumably the same A. Vasil'ev who was removed as secretary of the party committee in the liberals' "coup" of December, 1962. *Lit.gazeta*, 29/12/62, p. 2; *Voprosy literatury*, 10/70, p. 26.

2 *Lit.gazeta*, 19/6/63, p. 5. This report suggests that the same process that occurred in the Writers' Union also occurred in other creative Unions.

with literary questions? Surely in our party organisation they will not be considered to the degree you would find necessary?", to which Semushkin replied that "we have in the Moscow department of the Union of Writers a party organiser of the Moscow *gorkom*. The party organiser will gather together the scattered writers specially for the consideration of our creative problems."¹

Thus Tevekelian, incidentally also a member of the Union's secretariat,² assumed direct command of the party presence in the Moscow Union of Writers. On July 9, 1963 he opened the meeting of the party group of the Union, newly established as the combined organ of all Moscow communist writers. The status of this party group is not altogether clear. It appears to be very similar in concept to the party *aktiv* of the creative union. In practice it appears to have operated quite differently, in that its membership apparently changed from issue to issue. Tevekelian once said:

We have already convened meetings of the party group on individual questions. In these meetings writers meet who have a direct interest in the questions to be considered.³

1 *Lit.gazeta*, 14/1/64, p. 1.

2 *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 2/8/63, p. 3.

3 *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 31/8/63, p. 2.

It appears that the *gorkom* determined which communists would be called on to discuss particular matters.¹

The party group became the effective party body in the Moscow Union of Writers. Tevekelian was assisted at the July 9 meeting by the first deputy head of the Ideology Department of the Central Committee and the head of the Cultural Department of the Moscow *gorkom*, quite a different presence from that which had been evident in December, 1962. The meeting considered the June Central Committee Plenum, heard that the work of distributing communist writers throughout the workplace organisations of the city would soon be completed and that the group would be called together whenever creative matters needed to be discussed.²

Whether it was this meeting of the party group or a subsequent one that discussed the August Plenum of the Moscow Union is not clear. However that plenum was the shortest on record, having been preceded by two meetings of the secretariat and the administration and a meeting of the party group. It was at this plenum that a large-scale

1 Like the party *aktiv* proper there is doubt about whether this party group is covered by the Party Rules. It does not appear to be based in any conference, congress, meeting or elected organ of the Union and so formally is not covered by Paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Party Rules.

2 *Lit.gazeta*, 11/7/63, p. 1.

re-organisation of the Union was announced. Tevekelian spoke at the meeting.¹

By this time the liberals' revolt had virtually ended. Certainly all the organisational re-arrangements needed to quell the revolt had been effected. I am not concerned here with the basic issues of the revolt as a whole. What does interest me is the apparent importance of the PPO in it. The liberals' victory in the PPO came after their initial victory in the elections to the administration, so it cannot be said that control of the party organisation was an essential forerunner to gaining control of the Union itself. However the rather extreme organisational re-arrangements that the PPO was later subjected to suggest that it was a considerable stumbling block to the re-establishment of control by the higher party authorities. If the authorities were concerned to maintain at least a facade of democracy, in what was already an embarrassingly public dispute, it became very difficult for them to force changes in the PPO, which in turn, with the reliance on the party organisation for recommending candidates in elections and disciplining recalcitrant members, made it very difficult to establish party control over the Union itself.

1

Literaturnaia Rossiia, 2/8/63, p. 2.

Conclusions

A great deal more research could be done into the activities of creative unions and their PPO's. However the information in this appendix, sketchy as it sometimes is, has been useful for a number of reasons. It has provided more evidence of the difficulties the Soviet authorities face in establishing ideological control in institutions, the members of which share common non-party values. The 1962-64 episode illustrated this particularly well. It was a clear example of a PPO adopting and defending the attitudes of those elements of society which it was supposed to be controlling. While it could be said that the PPO's resistance was quickly rendered ineffectual, the fact that there was resistance, and resistance which in Soviet terms required a rather radical response, must be considered significant in any general discussion of the value of PPO's to higher authorities.

Further attention was drawn to the different treatment the research sciences and the arts receive at the hands of the ideologists. The ideological control of the arts is apparently very much tighter than that of the research sciences and cases of failures of that control fewer. PPO's contribute to it significantly.

Finally, it was made apparent that even when the functions of a PPO are primarily ideological it still uses essentially the same methods of operation as the

more "production" oriented PPO's. The PPO's still rely above all on the powers of the right of control, the powers of investigation and recommendation, and the power of party discipline. The highly ideological nature of their task does not change or strengthen the means they have available for its fulfilment.

SOURCES

The main source of information for the thesis has been the Soviet political press, principally the journals *Partiinaia zhizn'* and *Kommunist*, the newspaper *Pravda* and their republican equivalents. I have not referred to, nor have I listed in the Bibliography, individual articles from these sources. Articles published in Western journals have been referred to and listed individually.

I have not listed in the Bibliography journals in which articles by PPO secretaries referred to in Chapter Five were published. There is an enormous number of such journals, they are usually technically specialised, and their contents are of no direct relevance for this thesis.

All Western and Soviet monographs and books referred to and quoted in the thesis are listed in the Bibliography.

While attached to Moscow State University from September, 1975 to February, 1976 I had conversations with Soviet citizens directly involved in or knowledgeable of the activities of non-production PPO's. Although some of these conversations were semi-official, I have decided - in a situation where it is always better to err on the side

of caution - not to identify the people with whom I spoke or the occasions on which the conversations took place.

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2) Articles published in Western sources

Frank, A.G: "Goal Ambiguity and Conflicting Standards: an approach to the study of organization", *Human Organization*, (Lexington, Kentucky), vol. 17, no. 4, Winter, 1958-59, pp. 8-13.

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Pravdin, A. (interviewed by M. Matthews): "Inside the CPSU Central Committee", *Survey*, (London), vol. 12, no. 4, Autumn, 1974, pp. 94-104.

- Rigby, T.H: "Soviet Communist Party Membership under Brezhnev", *Soviet Studies*, (Glasgow), vol. 28, no. 3, July, 1976, pp. 317-337.
- Rigby, T.H: "The Soviet Regional Leadership: the Brezhnev generation", forthcoming article.
- Rigby, T.H: "'Totalitarianism' and Change in Communist Systems", *Comparative Politics*, (N.Y.), vol. 4, no. 3, April, 1972, pp. 433-453.
- Ryavec, K.W: "Soviet Industrial Managers, their superiors and the economic reform: a study of an attempt at planned behavioural change", *Soviet Studies*, (Glasgow), vol. 21, no. 2, October, 1969, pp. 208-229.
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- Vardy, A: "Party Control over Soviet Science", *Studies on the Soviet Union*, (Munich), vol. 10, no. 1, 1970, pp. 52-60.

3) Soviet journals

(periods are indicated for those journals which were read systematically)

- Bol'shevik*, published 18 times yearly, theoretical and political journal of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow. (Superseded in 1952 by *Kommunist*).
- Ekonomicheskie nauki*, monthly, journal of the All-Union Ministry of Tertiary and Specialised Secondary Education, Moscow.
- Kommunist*, published 18 times yearly, theoretical and political journal of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow. (Read from 1952).
- Kommunist (Vilnius)*, monthly, theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Vilnius. (Read from 1969).

- Kommunist Belorussii*, monthly, theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, Minsk. (Read from 1969).
- Kommunist Estonii*, monthly, theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, Tallin. (Read from 1969).
- Kommunist Moldavii*, monthly, theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party, Kishinev. (Read from 1963).
- Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, monthly, theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, Riga. (Read from 1960).
- Kommunist Ukrainy*, monthly, theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Kiev. (Read from 1965).
- Kommunist Uzbekistana*, monthly, theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, Tashkent. (Read from 1968).
- Letopis' gazetnykh statei*, twice monthly, organ of the All-Union State Bibliographical Office, Moscow.
- Letopis' zhurnal'nykh statei*, weekly, organ of the All-Union State Bibliographical Office, Moscow.
- Narodnoe obrazovanie*, monthly, journal of the All-Union and RSFSR Ministries of Education, Moscow.
- Ogon'k*, monthly, socio-political and literary-artistic journal, Moscow.
- Oktiabr'*, monthly, literary-artistic and socio-political journal of the RSFSR Union of Writers, Moscow.
- Partiinaia zhizn'*, twice monthly, journal of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow. (Read from 1946).
- Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana*, monthly, theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party, Alma-Ata. (Read from 1960).
- Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, twice monthly, journal of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow. (Superseded in 1946 by *Partiinaia zhizn'*).

Planovoe khoziaistvo, monthly, politico-economic journal of the All-Union Gosplan, Moscow.

Sobranie postanovlenii Pravitel'stva SSSR, 24 issues a year, Iuridizdat, Moscow.

Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, monthly, organ of the Institute of State and Law of the All-Union Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

Teatral'naia zhizn', twice monthly, organ of the RSFSR Ministry of Culture, All-Russian Theatrical Society and the RSFSR Union of Writers, Moscow.

Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, seriia 12: Pravo, Moscow. (Igitov, V.I: "The legal organisation of economic-contractual scientific-research work in *vuzy*", no. 5, 1968, pp. 8-11).

Vestnik vysshei shkoly, monthly, organ of the All-Union Ministry of Tertiary and Specialised Secondary Education, Moscow.

Voprosy ekonomiki, monthly, journal of the Institute of Economics of the All-Union Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

Voprosy istorii KPSS, monthly, organ of the Institute of Marxixm-Leninism of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow.

Voprosy literatury, monthly, organ of the All-Union Union of Writers and the Gorky Institute of World Literature of the All-Union Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

4) Newspapers

Bakinskii rabochii, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaidzhan SSR, Baku.

Ekonomicheskaiia gazeta, weekly, organ of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow.

- Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, Alma-Ata.
- Literaturnaia gazeta*, weekly, organ of the Administration of the All-Union Union of Writers, Moscow.
- Literaturnaia Rossiia*, weekly, organ of the Administration of the RSFSR Union of Writers and the Moscow Writers' Organisation, Moscow.
- Moskovskaia pravda*, daily, organ of the Moscow *gorkom* and City Soviet, Moscow.
- Pravda*, daily, organ of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow.
- Pravda Ukrainy*, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev.
- Pravda Vostoka*, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR, Tashkent.
- Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, daily, organ of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow.
- Sovetskaia Estonia*, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR, Tallin.
- Sovetskaia Kirgiziia*, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirgizia, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Kirgiz SSR, Frunze.
- Sovetskaia kul'tura*, organ of the All-Union Central Committee, Moscow.
- Sovetskaia Litva*, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR, Vilnius.

Sovetskaia Moldavia, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Moldavian SSR, Kishinev.

Sovetskaia Rossiia, daily, organ of the All-Union Central Committee and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, Moscow.

Turkmenskaia iskra, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenia, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Turkmen SSR, Ashkhabad.

Uchitel'skaia gazeta, three times weekly, organ of the All-Union Ministry of Education and the Central Committee of the Trade Union for School, Tertiary Education and Scientific Workers, Moscow.

Zaria Vostoka, daily, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR, Tbilisi.

The Times, daily, London.