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# CONTENTS

Abstract ................................................................. iii
Statement of Originality ........................................... iv
Acknowledgements ................................................... v
Glossary and Abbreviations ....................................... viii

Introduction ............................................................ 1

1. Constitutional Islamism in Indonesia ....................... 19
2. The Waning Influence of the Masyumi Tradition on Islamic Politics ............................................. 60
3. Islamism's Essentialist View on the Relation between the Indonesian Nation and Islam ...................... 116
4. The Call for Shari'ah: Motives and Features ............... 160
5. Islamism in Pluralist Politics: Dilemmas in Policy and Strategy ......................................................... 203
6. Between Idealism and Political Advantage: Pragmatism Prevails ......................................................... 264

Conclusion ..................................................................... 311

Appendices:

1. Results of the 1999 Parliamentary Elections ............... 320
2. Keluarga Bulan Bintang Notables ................................ 321
3. PPP Leaders .......................................................... 323
4. PBB Leaders .......................................................... 325
5. PK Leaders ........................................................... 327
6. Ministers of Islamist Parties and Fraksi Reformasi ........ 329

List of Interviewees ....................................................... 330

Bibliography .............................................................. 334
This thesis examines the nature and development of Islamism in Indonesia between 1998 and 2002. The New Order regime (1966-1998) suppressed ideologically driven Islam. Islamic political aspirations for most of this period were channelled mainly through the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP). In 1998, many new Islamist parties were established. The most important were Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK) and Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB). The main support base of PK was Islamic study groups from state universities. PBB intended to revive the ideals of Masyumi, the country’s largest Islamist party of the 1950s. A large part of this study focuses on the political behaviour of PPP, PK and PBB.

Much of the scholarly literature on Islamic politics undervalues Islamism’s constitutionalism and reformist credentials. At the same time, it is rarely sensitive to the contradictions in Islamist politics and the causes of this. Many scholars approach the subject from a Western liberal point of view. This thesis critiques this literature and advances a more nuanced approach by examining Islamist politics on its own terms.

The study gives particular attention to the dynamic between ideological idealism and political pragmatism. It will demonstrate that, for the most part, pragmatism prevailed in Islamist politics. It does not discount ideologically driven motives but holds that these were often subordinate to practical electoral considerations, in particular the need to appear pluralist and reform oriented. It will also point to political strategy as the crucial factor behind Islamism’s manifold ambiguities. The thesis also discusses ideological and strategic aspects in the re-formation process of Islamist parties and the downplaying of shari’ah (Islamic law) issues in order to maximise electoral support and the share of power politic.
I certify that this thesis is my own original work. It contains no material which has been accepted for the award of a degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published by another person, except where due reference is made in the thesis.

Signed

Bernhard W. Platzdasch
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Annemarie and—in fond memory—to my grandparents, for whom my happiness has always been paramount, no matter what. I dedicate this thesis to my family and Andrea.
GLOSSARY and ABBREVIATIONS

*adat*: local traditions and customs

*ad-din*: (Islamic) belief

ADZKIA: PK-close foundation containing educational institutions and consultations, centred in West-Sumatra

*ahl al-kitab* (Arab: *ahl l-kitab* or *ahl al-kitab*), lit. ‘People of the Book’, denoting the scripture-based religions of the Jewish and Christian communities (based on the Gospels and the torah), both acknowledged and, according to Islam, completed by the final revelation, the Qur’an

*ahl sunnah wal jamaah* (Arab: *ahl’l-sunna wa’l-jama’a*): adherents of the Prophetic tradition and the community; i.e. Sunnis

*akhidah*: (Islamic) ethics and morals; creed

*al-bara*: disobedience, ‘to free oneself’ (from un-Islamic rule), Islamist stipulation

al-Ghifari: Islamic student circle at the Horticultural Institute in Bandung (IPB)

al-Haraih: Jakarta-based foundation, PK-close

al-Haramain: Jakarta-based foundation, PK-close

al-Hikmah: Jakarta-based foundation, PK-close

al-Irsyad: modernist, puritan foundation of the early 20th century, led by Indonesians of Yemenite descend

al-Manar: Jakarta-based foundation, PK-close

*al-wala*: loyalty, obedience (toward a ruler/government implementing Islamic teachings), opposite of *al-bara*

*amar ma ’ru’f nahy munkar* (Arab: *amr bi al-ma ’ru’f wa nahy ’an al-munkar*): lit. ‘to enjoin good and prohibit evil’, Quranic stipulation, sometimes used as justification for pragmatic behaviour

*asas tunggal*: ‘sole ideological foundation’, government program of the mid-1980s enforcing the state ideology Pancasila on all political parties and socio-religious organisations

As-Syafiyyah: small modernist Islamic organisation

*aurat*: those parts of the female body which should be covered in public

BAKOMUBIN: Badan Koordinasi Mubaligh se-Indonesia (‘Indonesian Co-ordinating Body of Muslim Preachers’)

*bay’ah*: oath of loyalty toward a Muslim leader who in turn is obliged to implement Islam

*bayanat*: ‘official explanation’ (of a policy to constituencies by an Islamist party)

BKAM: Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin (‘Aiding Muslim Coordinating Body’)

BKPM: Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (‘Association for the Coordination of Modal Investment’)

BKSPPI: Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia (‘Indonesian Pondok Pesantren Cooperation Body’)

BKUI: Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam (‘Coordinating Body of the Muslim Community’), modernist-dominated body designed to establish a single Islamist party in 1998

BPUPBN: Badan Pimpinan Umum Perusahaan Bangunan Negara (‘Management Board of the State Construction Enterprise’)

BPUPKI: Badan Penelitian Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (‘Investigatory Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence’)

viii
Bulog: Badan Urusan Logistik (‘Logistic Affairs Agency’)
bupati: regent of a district
cadar: an Arab-style veil for women covering the whole body
Cides: ICMII-affiliated think tank
CSIS: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, government-close think-tank of the New Order years
CYFIS: Centre for Youth, Future and International Studies, PK-close think-tank
da’i: preacher
dakwah (Arab: da’wā): activities to propagate Islam (i.e. proselytisation, preaching)
dar-al Islam: ‘House of Islam’ (Islamic realm, i.e. House of Peace)
dar-al harb: ‘House of War’ (i.e. realm not ruled by Islam)
DDII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’), main custodian of the Masyumi legacy
DI: Darul Islam (‘Realm of Islam’), rebellious movement in Java and Sulawesi, 1948-62
DPA: Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (‘Supreme Advisory Council’)
DPP: Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (‘Central Leadership Board’), i.e. party executive
DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (‘People’s Representative Council’, i.e. the Indonesian parliament)
FAPI: Forum Aliansi Partai Partai Islam (‘Alliance Forum of Islamic Parties’), first of two umbrella organisations of smaller Islamist parties
fatwa: legal ruling (on Islamic law)
FID: Forum Indonesia Damai (‘Forum for a Peaceful Indonesia’), organisation comprising leaders from Christian and Muslim organisations, including Partai Keadilan
fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence
FKGMI: Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda Islam (‘Communication Forum of the Islamic Youth’), small activist group
FPI: Front Pembela Islam (‘Front of the Defenders of Islam’)
FSAPI: Forum Silaturrahmi Antar Partai-Partai Islam (‘Islamic Goodwill Forum’), umbrella group comprising smaller Islamist parties, including Partai Keadilan
FSUHTM: Forum Silaturrahmi Ulama Habaib dan Tokoh Masyarakat (‘Goodwill Forum of Habaib Ulama and Community Leaders’)
FUI: Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (‘Islamic Brotherhood Forum’), modernist-dominated Bulan Bintang group sustaining the Masyumi spirit, established in 1989
ghazwul fikri (Arab: [al-]ghazwu’l-fikri or [al-]ghazw al-fikri): lit. ‘invasion of ideas’; term depicting an eternal struggle between Islam and any other ideology with the goal to return each Muslim to Islam and establish Islamic world domination
GMNI: Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (‘National Indonesian Student Movement’)
Golkar: Golongan Karya, political vehicle of the state during the New Order years
GPI: Gerakan Pemuda Islam (‘Islamic Youth Movement’)
GPMI: Gerakan Persaudaraan Muslim Indonesia (‘Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood Movement’)
hadis, hadith (Arab: ḥadīth): Traditions of the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Mohammad
hajj: pilgrimage to Mecca
Hanbalism: strictest and most puritan of the four Islamic legal traditions, rejecting reason and philosophy to distil a body of laws from the Islamic texts though claiming to adhere to independent reasoning (ijtihad) and analogy (qiyas)

_haram_: prohibited by Islamic law

_hijra_: Muhammad’s ‘emigration’ from Mecca to Medina to foster unity among the Arab tribes in 622.

Hizbollah/Sabillilah: Islamic armed units fighting the Dutch colonial troops during revolution (1945 to 1949)

Hizbul Wathan: small modernist dominated Islamic group

HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (‘Islamic Students’ Association’), main modernist student organisation

HMI MPO: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Majelis Penyelaamt Organisasi (‘Council For Safeguarding HMI’), HMI splinter group, established in 1983

_hubbu l-watan mina l-iman_: ‘love of the homeland is part of faith’, famous maxim for Muslims to stress nationalist devotion, awarded to Rashid Rida

_hudud_: (lit. taboo, limit), Qur’anic regulations seen as unequivocal and unalterable; today more broadly referring to deeds for which the Qur’an demands particular legal penalties/punishments (for example theft and adultery)

_hukum_: (lit. to rule, to regulate, to judge), i.e. law

_ibadah_: (lit. ‘service to God’), originally: implementing God’s will on earth, now usually associated with the pillars of Islam, especially the five daily prayers

ICDR: Islamic International Council for Da’wa and Relief

ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (‘Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’), regime-close modernist organisation established in 1990

IIFSO: International Islamic Federation Student Organisation

_ijma_: ‘consensus’, originally referring to practise of Islamic authorities clarifying matters of Islamic law, today interpreted as Qur’anic consent to democratic procedures

_ijtihad_ (Arab: _ijtiha_): reasoning, individual interpretation of Islamic teachings and law, a central feature of Islamic modernism

_imam_: leader in Shiite theology, perceived as infallible (_mas’hum_)

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IMM: Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (‘Union of Muhammadiyah Students’)

IPB: Institut Pertanian Bogor (‘Bogor Agricultural Institute’)

IPM: Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (‘Association of Muhammadiyah Students’)

IPNU: Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama (‘Association of NU Students’)

IPS: Institute of Policy Studies, think tank involving several former PBB leaders

ITB: Technological Institute of Bandung

_islah_: Islamic stipulation of ‘reconciliation’ (between Muslims)

_izzul Islam wa l-Muslimin_: lit. the ‘glory of Islam and the Muslim Community’, proclaimed dictum of both the Masyumi and Partai Bulan Bintang

_jahiliyah_: lit. ‘(period of) ignorance’, originally denoting paganism in Saudi Arabia before the advent of Islam, today standing for the submission of Muslims to all life-styles and ideologies other than Islam, made popular by Sayyid Qutb

_jama’ah_: community (of Muslims)

Jamaat-i-Islami (Arab: _al-Jama’atul Islamiyya_), Indian-Pakistani Islamist
movement; inspired by the ideas of Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi

*jihad* (Arab: *jihād*): literally ‘to strive’ or ‘to endeavour’ to cultivate Islam, in a more specific sense to enlarge the scope of and defend the Islamic realm; this can both mean a spiritual, non-violent effort and armed force and physical war, *jihad* does not mean the forced acceptance of the Islamic religion by non-Muslims

*jilbab*: headscarf for Muslim women

*jinayah*: penal law

*kaffah*: “complete” Muslims, i.e. seen as living fully in accordance with Islamic teachings

*kafir* (Arab: *kāfir*): infidel (unbeliever), heathen (i.e. all non-Muslims)

KAMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (‘United Action Front of Indonesian Students’)

KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (‘United Action Front of Indonesian Muslim Students’), leading Islamist student movement in 1998

KAPPI: Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia (‘United Action Front of Indonesian Students’)

KAPPU: Komite Aksi Pemenangan Pemilihan Umum (‘Action Committee for Winning the General Election’), campaign-coordinating body of Partai Bulan Bintang

KASI: Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia (‘United Action Front of Indonesian Scientists’)

*keadilan, adil* (Arab: *‘adl*): ‘justice’, self-proclaimed guiding principle for Partai Keadilan based on a central Qur’anic imperative

Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang: ‘Greater Bulan Bintang Family’ or ‘keluarga’, originally naming Masyumi supporter organisations, today comprising various modernist parties, organisations and individuals of diverse doctrinal orientations

*kepercayaan*: mystic and syncretic creeds and faiths, adherents comprise many nominal Muslims

K.H.: abbreviation for Kiai Haji

*kharijites*: major Islamic secession movement of the 8th century

*khilafiyah*: difference in opinion over a matter of Islamic jurisprudence

*kiai*: Islamic teacher and scholar

KISA: Komite Indonesia Solidaritas Afghanistan, (‘Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with Afghanistan’), PK-close foundation

KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (‘Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World’), doctrinaire Islamist organisation, established in 1987 and a sign for increasing orientation of Masyumi legatees toward international Islamic issues

(F)KKI: Fraksi Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia (‘United Indonesian Nation Faction’), Christian-dominated parliamentary faction

KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (‘Central Indonesian National Committee’)

KNPI: Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (‘National Committee of Indonesian Youth’)


Konstituante: (‘Constituent Assembly’), popularly elected body formed in November 1956 with the task to draft a new constitution, dissolved in July 1959 by presidential decree

Korps Muballigh Indonesia: ‘Indonesian Islamic Preachers’ Corps’
Korps Muballigh Jakarta: ‘Jakarta Preachers’ Corps’
Kostrad: Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (‘Army’s Strategic Command’)

KPKPN: Komite Pemeriksaan Kekayaan Penyelengga Negara (‘Commission to Examine the Wealth of State Officials’)

KUI: Kongres Umat Islam (‘Congress of the Muslim Community’)

Lajnah Syuro ‘Ulama ‘il Ka’bah: ‘Consultation Committee of Ka’bah Ulama’, ulama -headed organisation of PPP subordinated to the central board, founded in June 2000

lakum dinukum wa liya dini: ‘your religion for you, my religion for me’, Qur’an: (109:6), popular reference for portraying Islam as tolerant and pro-pluralist

LDK: Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (‘Institution for Campus Proselytisation’), umbrella organisation of student activist groups

LIPPM: Lembaga Islam untuk Penelitian dan Perkembangan Masyarakat (‘Islamic Institution for Research and the Progress of Society’), DDII-affiliated research and dakwah institution, founded in Kuala Lumpur

LMD: Lembaga Mujtahidin Dakwah (‘Institution for Islamic Propagation Fighters’), pioneering Islamist study group at the Technological Institute in Bandung

Majelis Pakar: ‘Expert Council’, PPP advisory board

maklumat: ‘announcement’ (usually by a Muslim organisation)

manhaj: ‘concept’ (derived from Islamic law)

mas ‘hum: ‘infallibility/infallible’, Shiite concept of Islamic leadership

maslahat, maslahah (Arab: maslaha): literally ‘utility’ or ‘benefit’, concept in Islamic law endorsing the pursuit of public interest

Masyumi: Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (‘Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims’), from 1943 to 1945, henceforth ‘Masyumi’ as the proper name for the Islamist political party (1945-1960)

Masyumi legatees: contemporary Islamist parties or individual Islamists who base their political beliefs and ideals on that of the Masyumi (i.e. ‘Masyumi tradition’); particular section of the Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang (‘Greater Bulan Bintang Family’ or keluarga)

mazhab (Arab: madhhab): (medieval) school of Islamic law

MI: Muslimin Indonesia, name for Parmusi after 1973

MIAI: Majlisul Islamil a’la Indonesia (‘Indonesian Supreme Islamic Council’), federation of Islamic organisations, established in 1937

modernism: Islamic reform movement spreading in the late 19th century from Egypt to Southeast Asia endorsing the purification of Islam and freedom in the interpretation of its sources in adjustment to modern science and technology

mosi integral: ‘integral motion’, commended political verdict in 1950 to abolish the federal system and returning Indonesia to a unitary republic, particularly awarded to Mohamad Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara of the Masyumi

MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (‘People’s Consultative Assembly’), supreme decision-making body in Indonesia

MTI: Movement de la Tendence Islamique (‘Movement of the Islamic Tendency’), Tunisian Islamist movement, led by Rashid Ghannoushi
mualalah (Arab: mu'amala): issues in Islamic law dealing with social relations as opposed to man’s dealings with God

Muhammadiyah: largest modernist Indonesian Islamic organisation

MUI: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (‘Indonesian Ulama Council’)

Mukernas: Musyawarah Kerja National (‘National Working Consultation’)

Muktamar: ‘National Congress’, highest gremium for Islamic parties and organisations, deciding over policy guidelines

Muktamar Luar Biasa: ‘Extraordinary National Congress’

munafik: hypocrisy, i.e. Muslims dealing opportunistically with unbelievers

murobbi: Religious instructor, e.g. in Islamist study circles at universities and mosques

Muslim Brotherhood (Arab: al-Ichwanul al-Musliminun): most influential Islamist movement with branches in various Middle Eastern countries

Muslim League: Indian organisation representing Muslim interests, led mostly by Western-educated elites including the pragmatist Mohammad Ali Jinnah

musyawarah: ‘consultation’, traditional ideal in Indonesian politics to overcome disagreement

Musyawarah Besar Dewan Dakwah: ‘Great Consultation of the Dewan Dakwah’

New Order: name taken by the Soeharto regime (1966 to 1998)

NGO: Non-governmental organisation

NIF: National Islamic Front, Sudanese Islamist movement

NU: Nahdlatul Ulama (lit. ‘the Revival of Religious Scholars’), largest traditionalist Indonesian Islamic organisation, established in 1926

Ormas: organisasi masyarakat (‘societal organisations’), sometimes also denoting mass organisations

PAH: Panitia Ad Hoc (‘Ad Hoc Committee’) in the MPR.

PAN: Partai Amanah Nasional (‘National Mandate Party’), de-confessionalised party of the post-New Order era, comprising a pragmatic Islamist section

Pancasila: the five guiding principles of the Indonesian state: the belief in The One All-Powerful God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice

Parmusi: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (‘Indonesian Muslim Party’), largest modernist section of PPP, formerly MI

Parmusii (II): Persaudaraan Muslimin Indonesia (‘Brotherhood of Indonesian Muslims’), PPP-associated modernist social organisation founded in late 1999

PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’), self-proclaimed Masyumi successor party of the post-New Order era

PDII: Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia (‘Democratic Indonesian Islamic Party’), short-lived party project of the late 1960s

PDI-P: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (‘Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle’)

PDRI: Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia (‘Emergency Government of the Indonesian Republic’)

PDTI: Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam (‘Islamic Dakwah Highschool’)

(F)PDU: Fraksi Perserikatan Daulatul Ummah (‘United Faction of Muslim Sovereignty’), comprising PNU, PSII, PKU, Partai Daulat Rakyat (‘People’s Fortune Party’, PDR) and PPII Masyumi

Persis: Persatuan Islam (‘Islamic Association’), modernist puritan
organisation founded in 1924

Perti: Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia (‘Islamic Education Association’), smaller Sumatra-based traditionalist organisation, affiliated with PPP

*pesantren*: traditionalist Islamic boarding school under leadership of a *kiai*

Piagam Jakarta: ‘Jakarta Charter’, preamble to the 1945 constitution and/or supplement to paragraph 29 of the constitution on ‘religion’, equalling a formal recognition of *shari‘ah* as a source of law

Piagam Medinah: ‘Medina Charter’, pre-constitutional indenture between Muslims, Jews and Christians in foundational Islam under the Prophet’s leadership, permitting the ‘People of the Book’—Jews and Christians—to carry out their religion against the recompense of a tax (*jizyah*)

PII: Pelajar Islam Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Students’ Association’, secondary school)

PK: Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’), political arm of campus Islamism of the post-1998 era

PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Nasional (‘National Awakening Party’), NU-affiliated pluralist political party

PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia (‘Indonesian Communist Party’), banned since the New Order years

PKU: Partai Kebangkitan Umat (‘Party of the Awakening of the Muslim Community’), small traditionalist-dominated party

PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (‘Movement of Indonesian Muslim Students’), NU-affiliated student group

PNI: Partai Nasional Indonesia (‘Indonesian Nationalist Party’)

PNU: Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (‘Nahdlatul Ulama Party’), small traditionalist dominated party

Poros Tengah: ‘Middle Axis’, loose alliance of various Islamist parties (PPP, PBB, PK) and PAN that succeeded in installing Abdurrahman Wahid as president in the 1999 session of the MPR

PPI: Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia (‘Indonesian Students’ Union’), Saudi Arabia-based Indonesian student organisation

PPII Masyumi: Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (‘Indonesian Islamic Political Masyumi Party’), small Masyumi legatee party

PPMI: Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (‘Indonesian Muslim Workers Brotherhood’)

PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’), largest Islamist party in Indonesia, founded in 1973 and comprising both traditionalist and modernist organisations

PPP Reformasi: ‘PPP Reform’, PPP splinter group formed in January 2002, later changed its name to Partai Bintang Reformasi (‘Reform Star Party’, PBR)

PRD: Partai Rakyat Demokrat (‘Peoples’ Democratic Party’)

*pribumi*: Indonesian Muslims

PRRI: Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (‘Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic’). The regional government established in 1957 in West Sumatra in opposition to the central government

PSII: Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Union Party’)

PSII 1905: Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Union Party 1905’), small PSII splinter party of the *reformasi* era

PUDI: Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (‘United Indonesian Democratic Party’)

xiv
PUI: Partai Umat Islam (‘Muslim Community Party’)

PUI (II): Persatuan Umat Islam (‘Union of the Islamic Community’)

PUII: Persatuan Umat Islam Indonesia (‘Union of the Indonesian Islamic Community’)

PWJ: Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (‘Union of Indonesian Journalists’)

P 4: Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (‘Guideline for the Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila’), course for civil servants and students as part of the New Order’s Pancasila Education Program of the 1970s and 1980s

qadaf: personal accusations on religious grounds

qiyas: ‘analogy’ (practise in Islamic jurisprudence)

qoṭi, ṣat: regulations in Islamic law which are considered definitive and unalterable

Rakornas: Rapat Koordinasi Nasional (‘National Coordinating Meeting’)

Rapimnas: Rapat Pimpinan Nasional (‘National Leadership Meeting’)

reformasi: ‘reform’, dictum of the 1998 student-led movement with its pillars ‘democratisation’ and anti-corruption, policy-maxim for all parties in the immediate post-New Order era, particularly for the June 1999 elections

reformism (Islamic): seminal Muslim movement of the late 19th century with the central goal to purify Islam; reformism is now associated with Islamic modernism

Salman: pioneering mosque movement at Bandung’s Technological Institute (ITB) named after the campus’s main mosque

ṣhāri‘ah, ṣarī‘a (Arab: sharī‘a): can both mean the body of rules distilled from the Islamic canon together with educational and learning institutions and the jurisdictional expertise necessary to exercise and implement those rules and, more strictly, Islam-derived laws within national law. The latter can either refer to specific and detailed codes of conduct or general values and norms.

shura: Islamic advisory council, often interpreted as Qur’anic approval of democracy, originally only referring to elaborations of ṣhāri‘ah law

SI: Sarekat Islam (‘Islamic Union’), founded in 1912

SIDIK: Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer (‘Study and Information of the Contemporary Islamic World’), PK-close foundation, publisher of the Jurnal Umat Islam

SPSI: Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (‘All-Indonesian Workers’ Union’)

ṣunnah: Precedents by the Prophet Muhammad, recorded in the hadith

Syuro: Religious Council, formally highest body in Islamic parties, usually headed by ulama

tarbiyah: lit: ‘education’, depicting Islamist activism on campuses and mosques resting on Middle Eastern ideological sources and with a strong didactic component

tauhid (Arab: tawḥīd): the Oneness and Unity of God, fundamental Islamic theological principle

tawadūḥ: ‘humility’, Islamic ethical ideal

teori resepsi: Dutch colonial policy determining that Islamic regulations and laws had to be compatible with local customs and beliefs (adat) in order to be legitimate

TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, (‘Indonesian Armed Forces’)

tokoh: community leader

ukhuwah: Muslim brotherhood and unity of the Muslim community, fundamental
Islamic ideal

ulama (Arab: ‘ulama‘): Muslim jurists and scholars

umat (Arab: umma): Muslim global community, originally referring to the unity of all humankind. As the last Prophet, Muhammad’s mission was to restore the unity of the global umma

umroh: a less formal pilgrimage to Mecca at no particular time of the year

unsur: lit. ‘element’, i.e. political faction in Islamic parties based on socio-religious and geographical distinction, especially important in PPP

usroh, usrah: ‘cells’, small units of cadres for training and mentoring purposes, characteristic element of Islamist activist groups in universities and mosques

Wafd Party: non-Islamist Egyptian political party, accommodating members of the Muslim Brotherhood

Wahabism: Hanbalite puritan movement of the late 18th century, named after its founder al-Wahab

YIB: Yayasan Indonesia Baru (‘New Indonesia Foundation’), close to PPP’s dissident group

YISC al-Azhar: Islamic study and activist circle at Jakarta’s al-Azhar mosque

YLBHI: Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (‘Indonesian Legal Aid Institute’)

zakat: alms, one of the five pillars in Islam
INTRODUCTION

Indonesian politics was redefined between 1998 and 2002. On 21 May 1998, President Soeharto resigned. It was the end of the New Order (1966-1998) and the beginning of what became popularly known as the reformasi ('reform') era. Reformasi brought an end to authoritarianism and introduced democracy. There were high hopes that the new era would bring political stability, restore economic growth and halt social and ethnic conflict, issues which had characterised Indonesia since the mid- to late 1990s.

This study is about the beliefs and the behaviour of Islamist political parties in the dynamic and often unstable first four years of reformasi. The initial period from Soeharto's resignation to the parliamentary elections on 7 June 1999 was dominated by the proliferation of political parties and the endeavours of those parties to ensure electoral survival. Rivalry over the succession to interim President Prof. B. J. Habibie characterised the months between the elections and the first post-election meeting of the country's supreme decision-making body, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat ('People's Consultative Assembly', MPR) in October 1999. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President on 21 October, but escalating tension and eventually deadlock between him and the parliament dominated the ensuing 21 months and led to his dismissal from office in July 2001. He was replaced by Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri.

Several scholars and observers have commented on the role of Islamist parties during this period. Much of this scholarly work, however, was based on a western-secular predisposition and a liberal bias. It described Islam as a pluralism-friendly religion and as receptive to new thinking and interpretations. By contrast, it held Islamism to be doctrinally misguided. This work also did little justice to Islamist agendas when describing and analysing them. The following section argues in favour of a scholarly approach that attempts to understand and evaluate the varied features of Islamism on its own terms.
Liberal Bias and Binary Conceptions in Indonesian Islamic Scholarship

The scholarly discourse dismissive of Islamist politics in Indonesia became dominant in the mid- to late 1990s. By 1998 it had become the conventional approach. Its main advocates were western scholars and Indonesian intellectuals and academics, many of whom themselves were of a liberal disposition. The discourses in western and Indonesian scholarship were often similar in tone and mutually affirming. Western observers praised liberal Muslim leaders and intellectuals and they in turn reflected Western, secular ideas of what the role of Islam should be in Indonesian politics.

The mainstream of Western scholars regularly paid tribute to those Muslims stressing cultural and intellectual means of accomplishing Islamic aspirations rather than through politics and ideological struggle. Islamic political commitment, they argued, should be channelled through multi-religious parties. The popular name for this movement became ‘liberal Islam’. Western writers not only became very familiar with liberal ideas on Islamic theology and political thought but also established close personal links with leading liberal thinkers. Not surprisingly, their treatises revealed the sympathies of their authors. Many scholars of Indonesian Islam identified Muslim agents of democracy and civil society and acquired a number of favourites among its intelligentsia. Liberal Muslim views gave hope to the concern of these scholars that Indonesia could replace authoritarianism with democracy and lessen religious and ethnic tensions. The thesis was that Islamism was detrimental to civil political advancement.

This pro-liberal stance echoed the pattern in 1980s and 1990s American scholarship on Islam in the Middle East. Stirred by Edward Said’s controversial assault on the purportedly latent racism of European and American Islamic scholarship ("Orientalism") many academics began to see political Islam as having anti-

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authoritarian and democratizing potential. Efforts were made in both Middle Eastern and Indonesian studies to provide the more liberal and plural facets of Islamic groups and thinkers with historical depth and theological weight. In Middle Eastern scholarship, the promotion of Muslim democrats involved questionable assessments of a broad range of thinkers and led to a confusing plethora of typologies of Islamic politics.

In Indonesia, liberal Muslims obtained greater influence than in the Middle East. They attained a steadier public role and, in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, took root among the elites of major Muslim organisations in Indonesia such as Muhammadiyah (established 1912) and Nahdlatul Ulama (1926). The well-established position of liberal Islam in Indonesia perhaps inclined western scholars sympathising with its qualities to neglect or dismiss Islamism, including Islamist parties of the early post-New Order years.

Liberal Islam in Indonesia emerged out of modernist Islam but many traditionalist Muslims have become attracted to its positions as well. Modernist Islam is a wide-ranging label. It categorises those Muslims seeking to return Islamic practice and law to the "uncorrupted" originality of the primary texts, the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet Muhammad, as encapsulated in the hadis (Arab: hadīth) in order to purify faith of pre- and non-Islamic beliefs and practices. At the same time, modernist Islam is associated with the adaptation of western technological and scientific achievements and a number of western political models. Theologically, therefore, modernist Islam promotes greater individuality and freedom in the reading and interpretation of the Islam canon (ijtihad, Arab: یِتِهَاد). Modernists were critical of traditionalist Islam which in matters of jurisprudence (fiqh) drew on the legal

2 Important studies with this central thesis are, for example, John Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996 and Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996.

3 The range of thought broadly classified as "liberal" in Charles Kurzman, Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, includes the great Egyptian reformer Mohammad Abduh, Yusuf Qaradhawi, a chief Islamist ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamad Natsir, a crucial figure in Indonesian Islamism (his role and influence will be discussed in chapter two and three).

4 This stream of Islam originally was known as Islamic reformism, the seminal Muslim movement of the late 19th century with the central goal to purify Islam. The term is nowadays associated with Islamic modernism. The classic study about Indonesian modernist Islam is Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, O.U.P, Kuala Lumpur, 1973.
precedents of the great medieval Muslim jurists, a practice modernists view as outmoded and detrimental to the progress of Islam.5

Liberal Islam downplayed the purifying of Islam while stressing the freedom of the faithful to interpret and apply the Islamic sources. It is important that many of the most important liberal intellectuals had a strong western element in their education or personal history and some obtained university degrees in political or religious studies from US universities. As a result, liberal Islam adapted a number of theological and political traits that made it appealing to westerners, most importantly support for liberal democracy and religious pluralism. Its advocates sometimes argue that adherents of the scripture-based monotheist religions (Islam, Judaism and Christianity) were of matching value and held the same status before God.

Many scholars on Indonesian Islam approved of such western-style liberalism and highlighted its prominence in Indonesia. They argued that the predilection for liberal thought made Indonesian Islam the champion of a ‘civil’ Islamic model, which Robert Hefner described as ‘the world’s largest movement for a democratic and pluralist Islam’.6 Liberals were also depicted as genuine Indonesian patriots. They ‘appreciated the uniqueness of Indonesian history, civilization, and nationalism’ and were ‘particularly proud of the Indonesian heritage of ethnoreligious pluralism’.7 Moreover, liberals were described as constitutionalists who were ‘broadly committed to the ideas of civil society, constitutional democracy and the rule of law’ and committed to ‘negotiate their differences with others’ which was a ‘basic requirement of a functioning democracy’.8

Several arguments of this scholarly discourse are questionable. To begin with, it held to a liberal-secular view of Islamic political thought and modernity. Greg Barton, for example, referred to Indonesian Islamists as ‘an anti-modern force’ that was ‘threatening progress and clashing with the liberal democratic ideals that it was

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5 In traditionalist Islam, at the same time, local customs and folk practices tend to be accepted appendages to Islam. Ibid, pp. 302-3.
6 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 6.
hoped would take root in the post-Soeharto era.9 This predisposition tended to correspond with the trope of US Middle Eastern Studies in the 1980s and early 90s. Martin Kramer, one of its chief critics, held this literature as ‘present[ing] Islam in Western categories’, only prepared to acknowledge an Islamic brand personally favoured by western scholars.10 The approach also hinted that Muslims had to live up to Western expectations to be tolerable.11

Some Indonesian scholars flatly dismissed the doctrinal grounds on which Islamists argue their case. The discourse depicted Islamist views as misperceptions and contrary to true and virtuous religious spirit. It rejected that there were historical and doctrinal reasons for seeking Islamic governance or committing the government to implement Islamic law, aims these scholars often equalled with an Islamic state.12 The liberal bias was particularly evident in its understanding of “Islamic values” such as “justice” and “freedom”. Many Western scholars argued that the ambivalence of the Islamist view on pluralism simply misconstrued fundamental Islamic teachings. Hefner gave a clear expression of the liberal bias of much of Indonesian scholarship, writing:

Without any centralized coordination, a great movement for a civil Muslim politics was emerging among both “traditionalists” and “modernists”. Its intention was not the establishment of a monopoly-creating and diversity-denying “Islamic” state, but of a Muslim civil society dedicated to the Islamic values of justice, freedom and civility in difference.13

Strongly related to the Islamic state issue was the charge against Islamists of being ‘statist’. This sprang from the Islamist view that Islam demanded the government and its institutions to play an active part in the implementation of shari‘ah (i.e. Islamic law). Islamists, therefore, were criticised for their fixation to ‘capturing the state’.14

12 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 12.
13 Hefner, Statist Politics, p. 9 (italic in original).
Hefner challenged this by arguing that the Islamic canon would, theologically and historically, not know and not demand its own form of governance. He wrote:

The Qur’an of course knows no such concept of an “Islamic” state, least of all one with coercive powers of a modern leviathan.\textsuperscript{15}

Islam, therefore, would not demand a top-down enforcement of its teachings. ‘The Qur’an’, Hefner asserted, ‘abhors compulsion in religion’.\textsuperscript{16} Instead, Western writers tended to support the view of liberal Muslim leaders and scholars that ‘to fuse religious leadership with the state is itself the most profane of secularisations’, leading to an abuse of Islam’s ethical virtues and ideals for political and personal ends.\textsuperscript{17} ‘For believers’, Hefner asserted, ‘the biggest problem with this arrangement is that it ends by degrading religion itself’.\textsuperscript{18} Islamists, therefore, mistakenly promoted a ‘statist Islam’ that, in the name of implementing Allah’s commands, concentrates authority for religious affairs and morality in the hands of state officials’.\textsuperscript{19} Yet the ‘high ideals’ of Islam only prevailed where they were disconnected from any state responsibility to become involved in religious affairs. Hefner contrasted the Islamist view with civil Islam, recording:

... civil Islam rejects the mirage of the “Islamic” state, recognizing that this formula for fusing religious and state authority ignores the lessons of Muslim history itself. Worse yet, without checks and balances in state and society, the “Islamic” state subordinates Muslim ideals to the dark intrigues of party bosses and religious thugs.\textsuperscript{20}

The negative stand of these scholars seemed nurtured by experience in the remaining Muslim world. Once in power, Islamists seemed inclined to curb the independence of

\textsuperscript{15} Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{16} Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 12. Hefner obviously referred to the Qur’an, verse al-Baqarah (2:256) which holds: ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion...’. Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, amanapublications, Beltsville, Maryland, 2002, p. 106. Another, less “liberal”, reading of the verse is that it permits non-Muslims to decide whether to formally submit to Islam in a society that is based on Islam and ruled by Muslims. It does not necessarily refute the obligation of Muslims to live according to Islam and the Islamic aspiration for expanding its boundaries and spreading its teachings.
\textsuperscript{17} Robert Hefner, Cooptation, Enmitization, and Democracy: The Modernist Muslim Dilemma in Indonesia, unpublished paper for the conference “Consolidating Indonesian Democracy”, Ohio State University, 11-13 May 2001, p. 5 (quote); Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{18} Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{19} Hefner, Statist Islam, pp. 2-3
\textsuperscript{20} Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 20.
the judiciary and wind back democracy. The dwindling support by their Muslim populations required oppressive means to protect the systems erected in the name of Islam as in the Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan (to late 2001).

Common was an autocracy that maintained some democratic institutions and the façade of popular support. This literature cited Islamists declaring that democracy was a "corrupt and corrupting form of government". Democracy was "at best, an avenue to power, but an avenue that runs one way only" suggesting there was an "Islamic free-elections trap". Daniel Pipes wrote:

Like other non-democrats out of power...Islamists like democracy... Yes, Islamists do sometimes talk like democrats, but there is no reason to believe that these fine words are a true guide to their intentions, as opposed to a way to gain legitimacy and enhance their chances to get into office. Ballots are fine so long as Islamists are on the outside... If by democracy one means an occasional election, with a limited choice of candidates who cannot speak freely, and no voting for the most powerful position—then sure, Islamism has no problems with democracy. But if the term refers to a system in which citizens have those rights (freedom of speech, the rule of law, minority rights, an independent judiciary) needed to make free and intelligent decisions, that they have a real choice of candidates, and that they can vote for the top leader—then no, Islamism is resoundingly not democratic. Islamists believe in divine sovereignty and express a frank and deep disdain for popular sovereignty, which happens to be the key idea behind democracy.

The common view in Indonesian Islamic scholarship shared the disapproval of leading US experts on Middle Eastern Islamism. Its scholarly focus, however, was on liberal Islam; its conclusions on Islamism were based on a remarkably small quantity of research. Most Western scholars on liberal Islam in Indonesia have shown little interest in careful and exact descriptions of Islamist politics and parties, their various doctrines and policies. This reflected the discourse' liberal bias. It examined Islamism through the prism of modernisation and development rooted in the historical awareness and the liberal ideals of the US and Europe.

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21 These examples, Martin Kramer observed, have refuted the belief in the moderating impact of power on Islamists. See his "The Mismeasure of Political Islam", in Martin Kramer (ed.), The Islamism Debate, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv, 1997, pp. 161-73.
In the first decade of the 21st century, the US represents the first *de facto* global power displaying a firm confidence in the supremacy of its own political and doctrinal models. Against this claim, the struggle of other peoples and nations for defending and sustaining religious and cultural identities—often involved in the uncompleted process of former colonies developing into stable nation-states—is a most profound concern. In the diverse cultures of modern nations, Islamists have forcefully claimed a right to present a different perspective of modernity and thereby have revived the contests over local and national identities in a global context. 24 This happens in various ways and with differing emphases, according to the different histories and characteristics of Islamist groups and movements.

Many western observers, however, wrote in general terms about Islamist characteristics. The superficiality of the analysis appeared to be prompted by the view that Islamist politics was a ‘Pandora’s box’ and essentially illegitimate. 25 Irrationality and obstinacy were also cited as features of Islamist politics. By contrast, liberals and their sympathisers were described as ‘level-headed’ and ‘decent’. 26 Hefner therefore proposed:

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\text{[T]he survival and consolidation of a civil-democratic Muslim politics will require that responsibility for political Islam be taken out of the hands of those who would abuse Islamic ideals for narrow personal interests and restored to those committed to pluralist, democratic, civil ideals.} 27
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The disapproval and shallow approach toward Islamism generated a description of Islamic politics in Indonesia through binary categorisations. One recurrent charge was that Islamists were political and religious ‘conservatives’. Other descriptions were ‘militant’, ‘radical’ and ‘hardline’. Suggesting a strict dichotomy between Islamists and other Muslims, western writers with sympathies for liberal Islam often suggested that the two sides held commitments that were mutually exclusive

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26 Hefner, *Statist Politics*, p. 9.
27 Hefner, *Statist Politics*, p. 16. The author uses the Indonesian term *madani* for civil.
Throughout. Commenting on the rise of liberal Islam over the last five decades, Hefner held:

Whereas, in the 1950s, the great majority of practicing Muslims supported parties committed to the establishing of an Islamic state, today the great majority have indicated that they see their great religion as thoroughly consistent with democracy and constitutionalism.²⁸

Likewise, R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani observed a ‘great religious divide’ between non-Muslims, nominal Muslims, liberal modernist and traditionalist Muslims and ‘conservative modernist Muslims’.²⁹ There thus was, they proclaimed, ‘[an] Islamic challenge to democratic consolidation in Indonesia’.³⁰ Greg Barton observed an ‘Islamic drama’ taking place between pro- and anti-reform forces. In commenting on the quarrels between Islamist parties and President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000 and 2001, the President, Barton held, ‘suffered the indignity of being sacked by a parliament controlled by seasoned operators desperate to reign in reform...an opposition, that drew heavily on Islamist imaginary and rhetoric to undermine his authority’.³¹ Hefner similarly accused ‘conservative modernists’ of ‘backstage deals’ and ‘parapolitical intrigue’.³² He commented on the dispute over East Timor’s independence as follows:

When, in early 1999, interim President Habibie shocked the nation by announcing plans for a plebiscite in East Timor, conservative Muslims...joined with old-regime hardliners to use the East Timor issue as a club with which to beat back the democracy movement.³³

Liddle and Mujani contrasted democratic commitment and respect for the rule of law with the Islamist aspiration to apply shari‘ah, arguing:

...there is today quite a sharp distinction, at least among modernist intellectuals, between political liberals, who are fully committed to the democratic institutions of

³⁰ This was the title of the 2002 paper by the authors.
³² Hefner, Muslim Dilemma.
³³ Hefner, Public Islam.
elected governments and the rule of laws passed by those governments, and conservatives, who want to oblige Muslims to follow the syariat. 34

Further claims held that Islamist politics was a danger to political stability and social peace. Liddle and Mujani observed a ‘commitment to an Islamic State’ in Indonesia’s largest Islamist party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP) and advised the party to end advocating shari’ah in order to aid fostering democracy and harmony between religious constituencies. 35 They argued:

[More democracy] will eventually convince mainstream Indonesians of all religious persuasions that Indonesia will not become an Islamic State. PPP leaders could help this process along by giving up their quixotic but dangerous—because frightening to others—pursuit of a society governed by syariat. 36

Frequently, the religious conservatism of Islamists was related to a rigid attitude toward the interpretation of Islam and formulating its teachings into laws. Liddle and Mujani recorded that ‘[L]iberals read[ing] the Qur’an in a more open, metaphoric, or presentist way...’. By contrast, ‘[o]ther modernists have become conservatives, even fundamentalists. Conservatives read the Qur’an and other texts literally...’. 37 And further: ‘Islamists assert [that] [t]he Qur’an and other texts are clear and need little interpretation today’. 38

A charge against Indonesian Islamism coupled to that of being undemocratic and conservative was to be ‘regimist’. ‘Regimist’ denoted those Islamists who supported the New Order regime and former President Soeharto. The ‘rivalry seen here in Indonesia’, Hefner argued, was ‘between a civil Islam and an anti-democratic regimist Islam’. This was a dichotomy ‘illustrative of a line of contestation widespread in today’s Muslim world’. 39 He wrote about party politics in the early reformasi era:

[T]he prodemocracy wing of the modernist Muslim community has for the moment lost the momentum it had so proudly developed in the final years of the Suharto regime. As long as this wing of the modernist community continues to be trumped by its antidemocratic rivals, the consolidation of Indonesia's fragile democracy...will remain a distant dream indeed.\(^{40}\)

Hefner then concluded that it was the strength of 'the reform-minded wing of the modernist community' which was critical for 'the ability of Indonesia to get the democratic transition back on track'.\(^{41}\) Islamists, rejecting reform and democracy, 'seemed determined...to steal the sweet dream of a civil society and replace it with a civil society-denying statist Islam'.\(^{42}\)

This scholarly literature thus depicted Islamism through a mixture of broad characteristics, almost all of which were negative. It freely allocated accusations of conservatism and a lacking commitment to democracy and constitutionalism. Rarely did it put compelling arguments or evidence behind its judgments. The same woolliness went into the treatment of the Islamic state issue which often seemed to be a synonym for the inclusion of shari'ah terms into the constitution.

*The Idealist-Pragmatic Tension: Thesis Objectives*

This thesis examines the ideologies of Islamist parties in Indonesia in order to illuminate their political strategies and behaviour during the years 1998 to 2002. It seeks to describe and analyse the variety in Islamist agendas and their underlying motives in the context of national and global identities. It will point out that major Islamist parties defend a number of Islamist agendas without endorsing a comprehensive and solid set of beliefs that warrants classification as Islamist ideology. These beliefs will be defined as quasi-ideological.

The analysis focuses on the relationship between religious and political factors. It gives special consideration to the shifting dynamics between ideology and behaviour and thus between idealism and pragmatism. The idealist-pragmatist tension has led to

\(^{40}\) Ibid.
\(^{41}\) Ibid, p. 7 (first quote), p. 3 (second quote).
\(^{42}\) Hefner, *Statist Politics*, p. 12 (italic in original). The author uses the Indonesian term *masyarakat madani*, meaning 'civil society'.
a debate among observers and scholars. It is, Rhys H. Williams suggested, ‘the interactions among ideology, organization, and environment that are most interesting [in plural politics].’

Gary Alan Fine and Kent Sandstrom similarly see ‘the compelling issue’ as ‘when and how [ideologies] are announced and acted upon’. This puts the relation between ‘ideology’s internal processes’ and ‘external dimensions of strategy’ at the heart of constitutional Islamist politics.

A central argument of the thesis is that Islamist parties in Indonesia’s early *reformasi* era channelled their aspirations through representative institutions of the democratic system and showed a high willingness to cooperate and compromise with non-Islamist forces. It argues that in a plural political setting, Islamists succumb to the more practical ways of doing politics. Hence, Islamism was basically constitutionalist and basically pragmatic.

The thesis, at the same time, will show that many Islamists have sustained an ideological vision with anti-pluralist traits. It will elucidate the resulting dilemmas in policy and strategy through the contrast between public statements on one hand and personal conviction, internal documents and training material of Islamist parties on the other hand.

The thesis thus supports the view that ‘there eventually comes the point when the interest in the promotion of power takes priority over the ideology’. In pluralist politics, Islamists time and again give way to the necessities of particular situations.

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45 Williams, *Movement Dynamics*, p. 788. Gudrun Krämer and Daniel Brumberg are two scholars who have given particular attention to this dynamic. Both have written widely on Middle Eastern Islamism.

They promote and apply their principles according to the demands of particular situations and in hindsight to the strength and policies of their political contenders and preferences of their audiences.\textsuperscript{47} This is because, like others, Islamist politics 'are the product of interaction with government and society, of historical experience, trial and error and reactive rather than active'.\textsuperscript{48} Political participation requires consensus to negotiate; it rests on the will to compromise and to accept the possibility of defeat. Ideologies thus lose the self-sufficiency they had in a more closed environment.

An outcome of practical necessities has been the Islamist proneness toward ambivalence and, at times, dual agendas. Wary to present a program likely to overwhelm and confront political rivals, the internal Islamist discourse tends to diverge from the external discourse. Islamists, therefore, sometimes sound ideologically temperate in a non-Islamist and determined in an Islamist environment.

Islamist parties, like others, seek power through electoral success. They must consider the broader concerns of society and therefore are often more concerned with 'the humanly practical and strictly temporal'.\textsuperscript{49} People care for parties only if they transport messages relevant for how they organise and, possibly, intend to improve their lives. Hence, Islamists use images and terminology that reflect and touch on the worldview and, concretely, the concerns of particular communities.\textsuperscript{50} The public sphere is nearly everywhere culturally plural. The resulting proclivity for moderation has, in some cases, also facilitated political alliances between Islamists and

\textsuperscript{47} James Piscatori, "Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms", in Appleby and Marty, Accounting for Fundamentalisms, pp. 361-74 (esp. p. 366). For example, in the mid-1970s the Muslim Brotherhood discarded its goal to re-establish the caliphate by recognising the Egyptian government under President Sadat, in turn hoping to obtain permission to found a political party. See Abdel Azim Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups", in Scott R. Appleby and Martin E. Marty (eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State: remaking polities, economies and militance, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pp. 152-84, (esp. p. 166).


\textsuperscript{50} Compare with Fine and Sandstrom, Ideology in Action, pp. 28 and 35.
secularists. These were important issues in the immediate post-New Order years, especially during the run-up to the first elections held in June 1999.

The flexible and pragmatic Islamist imperative, therefore, often appears as a variable disparate from personal conviction. Islamist flexibility, Gudrun Krämer observed, was 'more noticeable in the domain of political organisation ("techniques") than in social and religious values.' Factors such as unanimity in Islamist leadership over party ideology and political strategy can be crucial whether these incongruities become manifest or remain cloaked.

The need to provide justification arises wherever underlying premises have been subordinated to compromises and practical considerations. Islamists characteristically seek to justify action of immediate advantage with references to the Islamic revelation. The motivation might be either to maintain moral authority in the eyes of constituencies or, possibly, to justify these actions in the face of God. Anthony Johns recorded:

> Every reform and revival movement seeks justification from it, and over the centuries, in Indonesia as elsewhere, no matter what political and social circumstances might have been relevant, no matter what ideological stimuli may have played their role. It is the Qur’an that is invoked as the ultimate source of guidance.

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52 Indonesian Islamist parties frequently laid bare an ambivalent stance toward non-Muslims. See chapter five.

53 Krämer, Cross-Links, p. 55. Max Weber explained this undercurrent of the idealist-pragmatist dynamic in the famous ‘switchmen’ metaphor:

> Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.


The seminal status of the Qur'an as the source of reference prevails in legitimising any political stance. Graham Fuller noted the difference to western political ideologies:

> When Westerners talk about political ideals, they naturally hark back to the Magna Carta, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution. Muslims go back to the Koran and the Hadith to derive general principles about good governance...and concepts of social and economic justice.\(^{55}\)

Two of the most common justifications for pragmatic Islamist action are to uphold national peace and unity and protecting the Muslim community.\(^{56}\) The most often cited Qur'anic stipulations include *maslahat* (Arab: *maslaha*, ‘benefit’ or the ‘public good’) or *amar ma'rfu nahy munkar* (Arab: *al'amru bil ma'rfu wa nahyu 'anil munkar*, ‘to enjoin good and prohibit evil’). Widely applicable and highly subjective, Islamists frequently use these stipulations to render compromise and pragmatic behaviour less deviating from the ideological ideal.

The dynamics between ideology and pragmatism lead to the broader question about the compatibility between Islamism and democracy. ‘It is not possible’, Krämer argued, ‘to talk about Islam and democracy in general, but only about Muslims living and theorising under specific historical circumstances’.\(^{57}\) And Brumberg recorded:

> Those scholars who argue that Islam is intrinsically illiberal, or who define away the problem by offering relativist concepts of “Islamic democracy”, offer little in the way of explanation, and of prediction still less. Yet...reduc[ing] Islamism to little more than a source of rationalizing ideologies are equally limiting. Islamist ideologies...are shaped by and encapsulated within a multitude of ideal social, political, and cultural identities and interests that can contradict as well as complement one another. Thus the challenge is not to figure out whether Islamism is “essentially” democratic versus autocratic, or liberal versus illiberal. Instead, it is to see whether this or that Islamist group is acting within a hegemonic political arena ...where Islamists, like other players, find themselves pushed to accommodate the logic of power-sharing.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{56}\) Krämer, *Cross-Links*, p. 48.


The thesis proposes that the answer to the Islamism-democracy question is somewhat gratuitous for the Islamist parties PPP and Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB). None of these parties has presented a clear idea what an Islamic society should look like and how it could come into existence. PPP and PBB did not support their calls for *shari‘ah* with patent conceptions for its implementation and they have allowed little insight into how they plan to adapt the scriptures for a modern state and administration, except for a few standard issues.\(^59\) Both parties and a number of their affiliated organisations rely heavily on the Jakarta Charter model. This model arguably sprang from the quixotic idea of finding an ideological middle ground between Muslims and non-Muslims in an independent Indonesia. More recently, however, it has been condensed to a bare-boned formula with little intellectual substance.\(^60\)

The study discerns two tendencies in what it defines as constitutional Islamism in Indonesia: ‘the Masyumi tradition’ and ‘imported Islamism’. Both types see a broadly defined Islam and Indonesian national culture as forming an integral unity. Masyumi legatees, it will point out, tend to be more outspoken in their claim to be shaped by and being in step with national or regional cultural traits and to be a dominant part of national identity. The two currents have different political strategies to cultivate Islam. The strategy of imported Islamism will be described as ‘gradualism’. Imported Islamism’s political outlet Partai Keadilan has followed a post-democratic political ideal. Overall, there is, apart from several individuals in PPP, a rather clear divide between the doctrinal determination of PPP on one side and one section of PBB, its associated groups (described in the thesis as the “doctrinaire Islamists”) and nearly the whole of Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK) on the other side.

The thesis describes the concept of *jihad* as a crucial undercurrent for the political struggle of Partai Keadilan. This party, in particular, understands *jihad* as having a vital role in Islamic ideology and history. The thesis adopts the definition of *jihad*

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\(^{60}\) See chapter four.
from the subjects of its study, broadly referring to a ‘striving’ or an ‘endeavour’ to cultivate Islam. In recent decades, this endeavour has more and more rested on the aim to defend the Islamic realm against other ideologies. Throughout recent years, much of the general public has come to understand the concept of jihad as synonymous with terrorism and violence. Jihad is now almost exclusively associated with militant Muslims in support of a physical struggle against the West. Those Islamists in PK highlighting the status of jihad in Islam see it as referring to both peaceful and physical means. This notwithstanding, they pursued a non-violent political and constitutional struggle.

Methodology

The study draws on documentary evidence and interviews as main sources of information. Important material was obtained from the archives of Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’, DDII). Documents of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP) and Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK) were mostly made available through party staff. These included records of party Congresses and official statements by party boards. Valuable material was also gained from the PBB and PK party journals Buletin Bintang (‘Star Bulletin’) and Suara Keadilan (‘Voice of Justice’), the books and pamphlets available at the PK headquarters and the DDII bookstore. Additional material comprising newspaper reports and articles was gained from the Indonesian press and the websites of PK. An important supplementary source was documentations of constitution assembly debates stored at the Hubungan Masyarakat bureau (Humas) of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) complex in Jakarta. This material comprised meetings of the MPR and various commissions and panels. More than one hundred interviews were conducted during fieldwork in Jakarta between May to August 1999, July 2000 to May 2001, mid October to late November 2001, November 2002, and January 2003. The majority of interviewees came from PPP, PK, PBB and DDII.
The largest part of the thesis covers the time period between the beginning of reformasi in May 1998 to the last round of constitutional amendments in August 2002. It examines the constitutional debates which took place a year into the Megawati Soekarnoputri presidency but pays no attention to other issues in that period. An analysis of Islamic politics under her government was premature and could not provide ample insight.

For the most part, the thesis is structured thematically. Chapter one discusses the central terms ‘ideology’ and ‘constitutional Islamism’. It introduces the categories ‘Masyumi tradition’ and ‘imported Islamism’ and discusses their roles in Indonesia. The topic of chapter two is the re-formation of Islamic politics in 1998 and 1999. It illustrates the declining importance of the Masyumi tradition in Islamist politics. Chapter three depicts the frustration among the devotees of Masyumi resulting from defeats and concessions to non-Muslims since independence, the continuity of this discourse in the New Order and its impact on the frame of mind of legatee parties in the reformasi era. Chapter four covers the motives and doctrinal approaches of contemporary Islamist parties to Islamise state and society and discusses the quality of their shari'ah agenda. Chapter five examines the political strategies of Islamist parties. It will describe the oscillation between Islamist concerns and those of broader political reform. It will portray the ambivalent Islamist position toward non-Muslims within the context of political necessities and the impact of Qur'anic passages on plural issues on the Islamist mindset. Chapter six surveys the behaviour of Islamist parties between ideological goals and political advantage, again depicting the tension between idealism and pragmatism as inimical to constitutional Islamist politics. It argues that political short-term goals prevailed, explained by the constitutionalism of Islamist parties.
CHAPTER ONE

CONSTITUTIONAL ISLAMISM IN INDONESIA

This chapter introduces various terms and problems addressed in the thesis. The first section makes a distinction between “ideologies” and “quasi-ideologies”. This distinction prepares the categorisation of Indonesian Islamist parties in later chapters. The first section also outlines two main features of Islamism: the claim to know God’s will how public and personal lives should be organised and a legalist outlook. The first feature will be described as “is and ought”; the latter feature as “shari’ah-mindedness”. Shari’ah rule (i.e. rule by Islamic law), it will be pointed out, is connected to the Islamist perception of ‘justice’. The second part of the chapter establishes the main constitutional features of Islamism and the ensuing dilemmas for the accomplishment of ideological goals. The third section gives an introductory overview of constitutional Islamism in Indonesia, discerning two main streams: “The Masyumi tradition” and “imported Islamism”.

Islamism and Ideology

Ideologies and Quasi-Ideologies

A succinct definition of Islamism is Islam understood and promoted as an all-encompassing and cause-oriented political ideology. Ideologies are explicit and rather cohesive sets of strongly interrelated and systematised beliefs and ideas, shared and endorsed by an internally integrated group, with a strong evaluative component and a firm determination on key propositions. The theoretical blueprint of ideologies for political action is unequivocal and there is ‘consensus demanded of those who accept them’.1 Ideologies constitute alternative visions of civilization.

The thesis will describe Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) as such an 'internally integrated group' that rested on a 'rather cohesive set of strongly interrelated and systematised beliefs and ideas' and performed on an explicit blueprint for political action.

Ideologies 'arise in conditions of crisis and in sectors of society to whom the hitherto prevailing outlook has become unacceptable'. The exact origins of ideological devotion, however, are notoriously diffuse. They are grounded in an intricate blend of tradition, religion and what Alan Dundes termed 'folk ideas'—the 'traditional notions that a group of people have about the nature of man, of the world and of man's life in the world'. For the design of this thesis, it is sufficient to note that ideology emerges from within a pre-existing socio-religious setting and value system. In the words of Shils:

An ideology cannot come into existence without the prior existence of a general pattern of moral and cognitive judgments—an outlook and its subsidiary creeds against which it is a reaction and of which it is a variant. It requires, in other words, a cultural tradition from which to deviate and from which to draw the elements which it intensifies and raises to centrality. An intellectualized religion provides the ideal precondition for the emergence of ideology, since the former contains explicit propositions about the nature of the sacred and its cultivation, which is what ideologies are about.

The thesis, at the same time, will argue that a number of Islamist parties and organisations defend a number of Islamist agendas without endorsing a coherent and comprehensive set of a belief that warrants classification as ideology. These agendas constitute a quasi-ideology. By definition, therefore, quasi-ideologies are indefinite and loose belief systems. Full and elaborate ideologies exist alongside more freely structured beliefs with mere ideological orientations.


2 Shils, Concept, p. 69.
3 Alan Dundes, "Folk Ideas as Units of World View", Journal of American Folklore, No. 84, pp. 93-103 (quote: p. 95).
4 Shils, Concept, p. 69.
5 Shils, Concept. It is difficult to always maintain a rigid differentiation between 'ideologies' and 'quasi-ideologies'. For example, though ideologies 'are not infinitely flexible', they, too—like quasi-ideologies—are not entirely closed to change or flexible application. Hamzah Alavi and Fred
The common adherent of a quasi-ideology has ideological needs less 'intense, comprehensive and persistent' than devotees of fuller ideologies. This adherent usually proposes a partial range of ideological goals and shows less zeal to change the nature of the society he or she lives in. Devotees of 'quasi-ideologies', however, often adamantly defend a certain number of beliefs and policies. Quasi-ideologies, thus, Shils recorded:

...become a program of aggressive demands and criticism against the central institutional and value system. Programs, like ideologies, are also emergents from prevailing outlooks and creeds; they “take seriously” some particular element in the outlook and seek to bring it to fulfilment within the existing order. A program accepts much of the prevailing institutional and value system, although it fervently rejects one sector. (Italic in original)

It will be argued that Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United Development Party', PPP), the largest Islamist party in post-New Order Indonesia defended such a partial ideological agenda and sought ‘to bring it to fulfilment within the existing order’.

This “program” often is a remnant of what was once a fuller ideology. Its demands may acquire a significant status in a party’s program. They thus become crucial in forming a distinctive party identity. To present a distinctive profile, of course, is often in the interest of a political group. This awards the defence of assorted ideological policies its practical value.

Furthermore, ideologies can transform into quasi-ideologies. Ideologies are often associated with a dominant individual, in Shils’ terms an ‘inspiring genius’, or a specific tradition of thought that has remained of intellectual relevance. Its main body of ideas has prevailed, passed on by its initiators to following generations.

Halliday, State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, Macmillan Education, Basingstoke, 1988, pp. 6-7 (quote: 7); also Krämer, Cross-Links, pp. 47ff.; Piscatori, Accounting, pp. 366 and 371.
7 Shils, Concept, p. 71.
8 See the following chapters.
9 Shils, Concept, pp. 66-9. Leading examples in 20th century Islamic politics are Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, the prevailing intellectual influences of the Muslim Brotherhood in various countries. Also Rashid Ghanouchi of the Tunisian Movement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI), Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi of the Indian-Pakistani Jama’at-i-Islami and Hasan al-Turabi of the Sudanese ‘National Islamic Front’ (NIF). The influence of these men went beyond their organisations and homelands.
Subsequent devotees, however, operate in a different social and political environment, both in domestic and global terms. As a result, the ideology’s clarity might have faded; its key positions might have become distorted or undergone a process of modification.

Where ideologies have turned into quasi-ideologies, their precise body of ideas often become a matter of internal contest amongst devotees. These devotees tend to have diverse levels of ideological awareness and award different significance to particular aspects of an ideology. Internal contest may also happen because key ideological concepts were directly founded on the ideas of a particular person or core group. Successive disciples conserve and often revere a particular intellectual tradition, but its dispositions may have not been further debated and developed or been adequately adjusted to a different socio-political environment. It is also possible that disciples fail or hesitate to spell out the hierarchical order of an ideology’s various components and do not clarify what conduct they dictate. These questions are thus left to negotiation.¹⁰

The thesis will portray the Masyumi leader Mohamad Natsir as coming closest to an “inspiring genius” in Indonesian Islamism. It will describe the main Masyumi legatee party Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB) as illustrating a case in which the meaning of a loose ideology and the hierarchical order of its assorted values has become further unclear and contested.

“Is” and “Ought”

Islamists believe in and, more so than ordinary Muslims, proclaim the existence of a Godly order of how to organise life and society. They therefore proclaim a ‘link between is and ought’, which, Fine and Sandstrom pointed out, stands ‘at the heart of ideology’.¹¹ As adherents of a belief that claims to defend the truth, Islamists typically assert to know what is in the best interest of “the people” or the sections of society they claim and wish to represent. John Garvey pointed out:

¹⁰ Shils, Concept, p. 71.
The connection between “is” and “ought” means that it is possible to have objective knowledge about how we should behave. That would be a good foundation for making laws. People would then agree once they understood the facts, even in a pluralist democracy. [Islamists] do not claim that we can reach political agreement through the use of reason alone. That belief is actually a form of idolatry because it assumes that men and women can get along on their own. ... [M]ost important from a political standpoint is this: he has given us, in writing, the foundation of a legal code.  

Islam, like other salvation religions, offers the incentive that proper execution of God’s will makes salvation more likely. For the believer there are thus definitive paths to follow and goals to struggle for though, in general, a doctrinaire Islamist might have a higher awareness about “what should be” than a pragmatic Islamist.

**Shari'ah-Mindedness and Justice**

Related to the “is and ought” feature is Islamism’s particular emphasis on Islam’s political assignment in order to enforce its teachings and laws (i.e. shari‘ah, Arab: شريعة). The notion of shari‘ah has a central position in Islamic theology and history.  

‘In its religious usage...and from the earliest period’, Fazlur Rahman wrote, shari‘ah ‘has meant “the highway of good life”, i.e. religious values, expressed functionally and in concrete terms to direct man’s life’.  

Marshall G. Hodgson termed the proclivity in the Islamic tradition to establish a ‘programme for private and public living centred on the Shari‘ah law’ as ‘shari‘ah-mindedness’.  

Shari‘ah-mindedness attempts to give the spiritual, ethical and philosophical aspects

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14 Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, p. 100. The original understanding of shari‘ah thus went beyond that of strictly being Islamic law or an Islamic legal system. Literally, the term ‘shari‘ah’ means ‘way toward the spring of water’. Water symbolises the essence of life. Understood as such, shari‘ah becomes identical with ‘belief’ (ad-din) itself and not strictly law-related. This is a common understanding, endorsed, for example, by Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party, PBB) ideologue Rifyal Ka‘bah in his “Syari‘at Islam & Amendemen Konstitusi”, *Buletin Dakwah*, No. 31, 4 August 2000.  
of faith a definitive outward form and to establish institutions and authority structures that ensure their observance.\textsuperscript{16}

The inspiring example for the operation of \textit{shari‘ah} is foundational Islam, a term referring to the organisation of society by the Prophet Muhammad in the 7\textsuperscript{th} century and the subsequent reign of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs. Islamists often assert that all central questions in modern Islam could be traced back to the immediate time after the death of the Prophet. This comprises the organisation of state and community and a basic scheme of governance. The Prophet and his immediate successors, the caliphs, were spiritual, political and military leaders. In his life, Muhammad established a state with attributes comparable to modern administrations though its features were necessarily of lesser complexity. It oversaw the collection of taxes, the establishment of laws, and leadership over an army. There was, Bernard Lewis wrote, ‘from the beginning an interpenetration, almost an identification, of cult and power, or religion and the state: Mohammed was not only a prophet, but a ruler’.\textsuperscript{17}

Foundational Islam stands for an exemplary Muslim community heading a plural religious society, known as ‘Medina Society’. Islamism perceives this social order as having applied to broader religiosity. Power rested increasingly with Mohammad.\textsuperscript{18} Christians and Jews obtained special recognition because they possessed scriptures (the Gospels and the torah), acknowledged by the Qur’an and which made them, like Muslims, ‘People of the Book’ (\textit{ahl al-kitab}, Arab: \textit{ahlu ‘l-kitab} or \textit{ahl al-kitab}).\textsuperscript{19} Islam teaches that religious communities classified as \textit{ahl al-kitab} share the belief in the singularity and unity of God. They, therefore, were permitted religious autonomy under a “protected” status.\textsuperscript{20} Yet Christians and Jews had a lower social and legal

\textsuperscript{16} The counterpart to \textit{shari‘ah}-minded-Islam is Sufism, attempting to know God through meditation, ascetic or ecstatic practices.
\textsuperscript{17} This particularly refers to Muhammad’s last years of his lifetime during which he attained domineering powers. Lewis, \textit{Historical Overview}.
\textsuperscript{18} Initially, the Prophet’s role was to settle disputes among members of the Medina society. But eventually, Mohammad became the central religious and political authority. See Montgomery Watt, \textit{Mohammad at Medina}, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956.
\textsuperscript{19} As such, the Gospels and the torah anticipate the Qur’an and have to be interpreted with hindsight to the word of the latter.
\textsuperscript{20} Other ‘People of the Book’ were permitted to perform their religions under Muslim leadership whilst compelled to pay a tax (\textit{jizyah}).
status than Muslims and, though they could carry out their faiths, they were not full
members of the Medina community.\textsuperscript{21} The Islamic tradition aspired a global religious
community in which Muslims constitute the leading populace. Hodgson compared
this universal appeal to that of other religious communities:

\ldots Muslims, unlike the Jews, did not regard their own community as a unique
and...hereditary body selected out from a world left otherwise without direct divine
guidance. The Muslim community was thought of as one among many divinely
guided communities such as the Jewish or the Christian, all (at their origin) equally
blessed. Thus far, Islam took explicitly the form that various Christian and Jewish
bodies had implicitly been assuming under the confessional empires—an
autonomous social organism with its own law for its own members. The difference
between Islam and the other communities was that Islam was first to rule over and
then to supersede all others. Islam was to bring the true and uncorrupted divine
guidance to all mankind, creating a world-wide society in which the true revelation
would [be] the everyday norm of all nations. It must not merely guide an
autonomous community like the Jewish; it must guide the practical policies of a
cosmopolitan world.\textsuperscript{22}

A heightened sense for not disconcerting secular Muslims and non-Muslims in
contemporary plural political systems, however, has caused an increasing number of
Islamists to either downplay or to step back from Islamism's appeal to broader
religiosity by claiming to target the Muslim population only.\textsuperscript{23}

Classical Sunni political theory stipulated that a ruling authority (i.e. a caliph) was
under obligation to protect and execute the Islamic canon of laws on Muslims.
Ruling authority had to be the custodian and implementer of \textit{shari'ah} rule. It was
God's representative on earth whose task was to ensure that the Muslims were able
to lead pious lives so that they would achieve salvation in the afterlife. A ruler's
legitimacy was based in the successful execution of this mission:

The Sunnites tend to look to the state as the organizer of their religious affairs. In
their traditional theory, the ruler is the implementer of the Word of God; and in this

\textsuperscript{21} The religious and material rights of the Jews were inserted in the Constitution of Medina, especially
in the famous phrase of Paragraph 25: 'to the Jews their religion and to the Muslims their religion'.
\textsuperscript{22} Hodgson, \textit{Venture}, p. 317. Present-day Islamist states like Sudan or Saudi Arabia reflect Islam's
broad religious zeal by prohibiting non-Muslims from drinking alcohol or forcing non-Muslim women
to wear a headscarf. Daniel Pipes critiqued the Islamist position in his "Islam and Islamism: Faith and
\textsuperscript{23} The Jakarta Charter clause illustrates this. It specifically excludes non-Muslims from the obligation
to follow Islamic law. See later chapters.
capacity obedience is due to him from every believer. And that Word of God is specifically translated, by the jurists, into law, the shari'a. 24

*Shari’ah*-minded Islam thus relies on governmental institutions and on decrees and verdicts that cultivate Islam in society. Fazlur Rahman noted:

Man on earth must discover and implement the will of God. The will of God lies enshrined in the Qur'an and is embodied in the Sunna of the Prophet. This will of God is the Shari’a. A community, which consciously sets out to implement the Shari’a, is a Muslim community. But in order to implement the Shari’a, the Muslim society must set up certain institutions, the most important of which is the state. No form of the state, therefore, has any inherent sanctity: it possesses sanctity only in so far as it is an effective instrument of the Muslim community. 25

The traditional understanding of *shari'ah* is ‘universal in scope’. 26 It covers fields of civil law such as marriage, divorce and inheritance, penal law and a number of religious laws and obligations. 27 Classical Sunni doctrine thus postulated a set of rules, which is under the supervision of the state and extended into private matters. It has been noted that Islam, in its original disposition, was in this regard very much unlike Christianity. 28

Islamists, at the same time, highlight the traditional Sunni stipulation that, being of Godly origin, surrendering to *shari'ah* rule will bring about a virtuous and happy life in a ‘just’ (*adil*, Arab: *'adil*) society. 29 This logic demands that a just organisation of society is only viable by living in fullest accordance possible with the rules of Islam. These rules automatically avoid perilous and barren governance and guarantee peace and wealth framed by the principle of justice. As Lewis noted, this correlation between justice and religious ruling is uniquely Islamic:

Westerners have become accustomed to think of good and bad governments in terms of tyranny versus liberty. In Middle Eastern usage, liberty or freedom was a legal not a political term... For traditional Muslims, the converse of tyranny was not liberty

26 Hodgson, *Venture*, p. 317.
27 This might include daily prayer (*salat*), fasting and the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*).
28 Lewis, *Historical Overview*.
29 ‘Justice’ is one of the most frequently mentioned key terms in the Qur’an.
but justice. [This meant] that the ruler was there by right and not by usurpation, and
that he governed according to God's law, or at least according to recognisable moral
and legal principles.\textsuperscript{30}

The term 'justice' played a central role in the polemics of the Partai Keadilan
('Justice Party', PK) and the party gave the clearest illustration of the intimate bond
between 'justice' and \textit{shari'ah} rule.\textsuperscript{31}

Classical Sunni political literature, however, has almost exclusively dealt with
theological questions and somewhat neglected the technical aspects of how Islam's
legal codes could be enforced and implemented in a particular environment.\textsuperscript{32}
Moreover, many instructions of the Islamic canon are worded briefly, have complex
semantics or are thematically set in a particular historical context. They, therefore,
are in need of recurrent scrutiny and interpretation. As a result, there is to the present
day no consensus as to what an Islamic system precisely consists of and how it has to
be organised and administrated.\textsuperscript{33}

A legacy of colonialism was the triumph of national law and inherently secular,
hierarchical and centralised legal systems. In most present-day Muslim countries,
therefore, Islamists operate in political and legal models of European origin or
comprising a strong Western element. The provisos of constitutionalism also
impacted on the understanding and promotion of \textit{shari'ah} regulations. They called
for a modification of \textit{shari'ah} approaches and their means of application. Islamists
have partly responded to the tensions arising from constitutional ruling by
reinterpreting the Qur'an through moral and ethical notions and less through literal
readings decoded into strict laws. As law, the term \textit{shari'ah} today stands for a
detailed and precise set of rules for regulating life and also for a set of general values

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{31} See especially chapter five.
\item\textsuperscript{32} This becomes evident in the writings of the great medieval scholars al-Farabi, al-Marwardi and Ibn
the Contemporary Arab World”, in Guazzone (ed.) \textit{Islamist Dilemma}, pp. 3-38 (esp. p. 11).
\item\textsuperscript{33} It is thus uncertain whether there is a historical precedent for the full realisation of a society under
\textit{shari'ah} rule. Nathan J. Brown, “Sharia and State in the Modern Muslim Middle East”, \textit{International
\end{itemize}
broadly in accord with Islamic temperament. It can both refer to specific Islamic regulations and directives and to principles shared by other creeds, most notably security, morality, order and prosperity; all of which stand on the basic principle of an Islam-sanctioned form of justice. Parallel to the ambiguity of these Islamic-deemed ideals, the notion of *shari‘ah* continues to bear a status as panacea for the problems of Muslim societies in modern times and its significance as a politically potent factor and a means of mobilisation has grown steadily.

**Islamism and Constitutionalism**

Constitutional Islamists are to various degrees confronted with the tension of practical and idealist concerns. They often have to modify their political approach, and follow practical-pragmatic considerations by accepting the provisos of a non-Islamic political system and recognising constitutional authority. Constitutional Islamists thus often differentiate between immediate and ultimate objectives, in accordance with what particular social and political circumstances permit and suggest being strategically wise. The dominance of nationalist and secular regimes in 20th century Muslim countries and the exclusion of Islamists from government, army and the high bureaucracy were additional factors necessitating this.

The idea of framing the body politic with a Constitution entered the Muslim world in the course of intensified contact with the West during the 19th century and the pressure of European powers on the Ottoman caliphate. The installation of a Constitution then became central to finalising the process of decolonialisation and establishing self-governing Muslim states. The purpose of a Constitution is to ‘bring[s] stability, predictability and order to the actions of government’. It works as ‘a set of rules that seek to establish the duties, powers and functions of the various institutions of government, regulate the relationships between them, and define the relationship between the state and the individual.’ It has been argued, significantly, that the attraction of constitutionalism to Muslims did not rest with the secular

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34 Krämer, *Islamist Notions.*
35 Krämer, *Integration and Cross-Links.*
origins of constitutionalism but because it promised to lead to order and stability in
the newly formed states.\textsuperscript{37}

Respect for the rule of law is the least ambivalent attribute of constitutional
Islamism. Most Islamists who are not active in political parties also operate legally
yet are often eager, and able, to safeguard some form of autonomy. Islamist
politicians, too, may preserve some inner detachment from a state and its values but
willingly decide to embrace a plural political system and to accept the limiting
provisos of its composition. Constitutional Islamism thus fully and consciously gives
way in its actions to the qualifications set out by the constitutional framework and
the government that is based on it.

Along with the promulgation of Constitutions in various states with a Muslim
majority persisted the desire to apply shari'ah. The ensuing tension has been
between those Muslims viewing the Islamic canon as a book of strict laws that limits
human freedom to locate its rules, and others prepared to install a Constitution that
gives humans the liberty to compose laws themselves, possibly in violation of the
Godly rules. Many of the newly formed Muslim states tried to overcome this impasse
by inserting a stipulation that nothing in the Constitution must go against Islam.\textsuperscript{38}

Islamic courts survived European intrusion into domestic legal systems but gradually
declined in significance. Many colonial powers, including the Dutch in the East
Indies, controlled and restricted shari'ah-based jurisdiction rather than abandoning it
completely. In the course of time, however, Islamic courts fell behind the
modernising force of the parallel operating civil courts. Institutions that once had
been central to a successful enforcement of shari'ah were transformed; educational

\textsuperscript{37} Prof. Sohail Hashmi, a leading authority on the relation between Islam and constitutionality, cited in
the Event Transcript from a conference at Mount Holyoke College, 22 November 2002.
http://www.eppc.org/conferences/pubID.1592,eventID.48/transcript.asp.

\textsuperscript{38} There is, however, no guarantee that the inclusion of shari'ah terms into Constitutions fulfils this
purpose if ruling elites object to the idea. In independent Algeria, for example, Islam was written into
a Constitution that sanctioned a hard-line socialist ideology and a secular elite. The 1972 Egyptian
Constitution defined Islam as state religion and shari'ah as the primary source for legislation. Yet
despite this, the Constitution was 'substantially secular'. William Shepard, "Islam and Ideology:
techniques and practices deemed to constitute an essential part of shari'ah disintegrated.  

Responding to the challenges of western-defined modernity, 19th and 20th century reformers such as Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) reopened shari'ah-mindedness to human reason. The scope of human reason in the application of shari'ah has been a lasting controversy in Islamic political thought. The 9th century Hanbalite legal school (mazhab, Arab: madhhab) and its main theorist Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) opposed reason and the use of philosophy in distilling a body of laws from the Qur'an. Hanbalism also demanded a literal adaptation of shari'ah. The school of al-Ash'ari (873-935), the main pre-modern theology in Sunni Islam, appropriated legal innovation through means of independent reasoning (ijtihad) and analogy (qiyaq) by qualified Muslim scholars (ulama, Arab: 'ulama'). Yet to be eligible, the moral content of any interpretation had to originate in the Qur'an and the collected sayings of the Prophet (hadith).

Modernism further accentuated a rational reading of the sources of Islamic law through an individual and layman's interpretation of religious texts. It also moved shari'ah-mindedness from the earlier predilection to adapt Islamic teachings literally. Arriving in the Dutch East Indies in the later decades of the 19th century, modernism introduced a rational interpretation of Islam; flexible and constantly readjusted to meet the needs of a certain time and place, though the reformers still desired that several Qur'anic stipulations be applied literally into laws and degrees.

Above all, the reformers strove to modify the character of Islamic state models to meet the new demands. Reformist ideas had meant a serious blow to classic Islamic political conceptions. They undermined the ideal of a global Muslim community (umat, Arab: umma) headed by a single ruler. Nationalism endorsed language as the

39 Brown, Sharia and State.
40 The school of the Mutazilites was the most radical advocate of human reason. The Sunni majority views the Mutazilite School as "heretic".
41 This is notwithstanding that Hanbalism claimed to adhere to independent reasoning and analogy in matters of exegesis. Hanbalism is one of Islam's four major jurisprudential traditions. The main law school in Indonesia is the Shafi'i school named after its founder al-Shafi‘i (d. 820).
common denominator, not religion. It ‘introduced the secular conception of authority’ and made the nation the basis of authority. This proved a lasting dilemma for Islamic political thought, aspiring to a global religious community in which Muslims form the governing peoples. Madjid Khadduri pointed to the impasses that the triumph of a modern law for plural nation states imposed on classical Sunni thought:

In contrast with the modern law of nations, which presupposes the existence of a family of nations composed of states enjoying sovereign rights and equality of status, the law of Islam recognizes no other nation than its own... [T]he law of Islam was based on the theory of a universal state. It assumed that mankind constituted one community...governed ultimately by one ruler. The aim of Islam was the proselytization of the whole of mankind. Islam’s law for the conduct of the state, accordingly, was the law of an imperial state which would recognize no equal status for the party (or the parties) with whom it happened to fight or negotiate. It follows therefore that the binding force of such a law was not based on mutual consent or reciprocity, but on the state’s own interpretation of its political and religious interests, since Islam regarded its principles of morality and religion as superior to others.

Islamic reformers laid bare this dilemma by approving nationalist sentiment only if it was addressed to a nation that respected Islam. Rashid Rida famously proclaimed that ‘love of the homeland is part of faith’ (Arab: hubbu’l-watan mina’l-iman), a saying later quoted by numerous Islamists to underscore their claim for nationalist credentials.

Dealing with western models of governance thus inevitably called for the re-interpretation of Qur’anic directives deemed in line with pluralist politics. An important upshot of the diffusion of western political concepts was Islam’s esteem of civil political authority, a ‘definite shift of emphasis away from the person of the ruler and the duty of obedience and acquiescence...to the authority of the community and the responsibility of every individual believer’. Along with this shift went a review of selective Qur’anic concepts. The most cited of these concepts is shura,

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46 Krämer, *Islamist Notions*. 
commonly defined as the duty of political consultation and participation and tied to
two sections in which the Qur’an honours those ‘who conduct their affairs by mutual
consultation’ and the stipulation ‘to consult them in affairs’.\(^{47}\) This was a
reinterpretation of Sunni doctrine in which *shura* stood for the practise of a
“qualified” ‘advisory board’ with the ‘freedom to express views, exercised by the
opinion leader only insofar as this does not affect any components of the religious
doctrine...’\(^{48}\) The equally popular notion of *ijma* has served to give Islamic
legitimacy to the democratic process of building a consensus. In Sunni doctrine,
however, *ijma* justified negotiation over matters not fully clarified by Muslim
jurisprudence (*fiqh*). The stipulation to confine authority to Muslims with superior
intellectual and moral qualities continues to have varied impact on the thought and
rhetoric of contemporary Islamists.\(^{49}\)

The reformers’ efforts to face up to Western-defined modernity also influenced the
perception of the term *shari’ah* and, ultimately, the quality of the *shari’ah*
discourse.\(^{50}\) In its broader legal sense, *shari’ah* covered knowledge about processes
and practices dealing with the question of distilling legal directives from the religious
texts and mediating interpretational disputes. The term was linked to and grounded in
a set of learning institutions that sought to create excellence in the fields of religious
commentary, exegesis, or understanding of earlier textual interpretations. As such,
the implications of *shari’ah* rule encompassed the existence of institutions that
enabled its execution and implementation, above all the prevalence of *shari’ah*-based
courts.\(^{51}\)

Modern legal reform reduced the importance of institutions vital to accomplishing
*shari’ah*. Yet, bereft of the institutions and practices once associated with *shari’ah*,
Islamists often lack proficiency in matters of jurisprudence and thus fall short of

quote) and p. 169 (second quote).

\(^{48}\) The al-Azhar (Cairo)-based sheikh Mahmud Shaltut quoted in Tibi, *Ideologies*, p. 16.

\(^{49}\) Traditionally, only so-called ‘people of authority’ had the right to elect the caliph. Reformers such
as Rida continued to support the idea that high offices should be limited to those who had proven their

\(^{50}\) See, for example, Brown, *Sharia and State*.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.
explaining how they intend to successfully apply Islamic regulations on a broader scale. At the same time, demands to adapt *shari'ah* became the trademark of Islamist movements in the second half of the 20th century. Ann Elizabeth Mayer recorded:

In its conversion for use as a political ideology, the Shari’a has inevitably become simplified and politicised; its elaborate jurisprudence and the complex and extensive rules worked out by the premodern jurists have been slighted. In many areas, what reinstating the Shari’a might involve in practice is often left vague by the proponents of Islamization when they are seeking popular support. 52

Parallel to this, the traditionally wide-ranging understanding of the term *shari'ah* as “the highway of good life” (p. 23) was transformed into a narrower understanding of *shari'ah* as being law itself. Brown observed:

The degree to which the shariah is seen as prevailing is connected less with the institutions and practices formerly associated with it than with the degree to which the law in force conforms to shariah norms... [A] set of identifiable rules, has become the most widely accepted indicator of the degree to which a society and political system are Islamic. 53

The *shari'ah* discourse in post-colonial states, therefore, took more the form of a competition between Islamic- and European-derived laws with the latter prevailing in many Muslim countries, including Indonesia. An Islamic order became defined through the influence of *shari'ah*-sympathetic laws in national legal systems, detached from the creation of Islamic political traditions such as the caliphate but combined with the endeavour to write *shari'ah* words into the Constitution supposedly in order to defend its status. 54

There has never been a formal incorporation of *shari'ah* terms in the Indonesian Constitution. In 1945, similar to other newly formed states, Indonesian Muslim representatives opted for a compromise constitutional proviso which was to ensure that Muslims would not act in violation of God’s commands. This aspiration ultimately was rejected but turned into a durable legacy for subsequent devotees.

54 Krämer, *Islamist Notions*. 

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During Guided Democracy (1959-1966) and the New Order (1966-1998) Islamism had no political outlet while maintaining a very strong advocacy for constitutionalism. In 1998, then, Islamism became part of a democratic multi-party system, channelling its aspirations through constitutional means and its representative institutions.

Constitutional Islamism in Indonesia

Indonesian Islamism emerged as an inbuilt component of a broader Islamic political scene in the early decades of the 20th century. Its conception of governance was adopted along Islamic modernism. At its programmatic core was the approval of a nation state as political entity, the rule of law, the belief in the political authority of society as opposed to arbitrary and despotic rule, and, at the same time, the reformer's conviction that being Muslim and succumbing to shari‘ah were indivisible and that the state was under an obligation to implement shari‘ah for adherents of Islam.

It is a scholarly truism that Indonesian Islam is highly diverse and plural. There is, therefore, a wide array of understanding about what it means and requires to be a Muslim. The position of Islamists toward their home nation, its history and cultures, including the specific nature of the Islamic faith, are matters of wide-ranging importance. In many Muslim countries, different identities compete with each other: national, Islamic and regional identities. Islamist groups have various and shifting senses of belonging to their nation and the global Muslim community. Often, they not only claim to be shaped by and to be in step with national or regional cultural traits, but also to represent national identity or “Muslims” (the umat Islam) in general.

Islamism is a quite recent term to depict the resurgence of Islam as an ideological movement in the second half of the 20th century. Indonesian Muslims of the 1920s, 30s and 40s necessarily had a less fragmented perception of the Muslim community.

Many authors have emphasized this plurality, most emphatically Clifford Geertz in his Religion of Java, The Free Press, Chicago, London, 1960.
The height of Turkish and Arab nationalism, both central to Islamic reformism, intersected with the parallel revival of pan-Islamic sentiment. Indonesian Islam of the 1920s up to the 1950s had comparatively few pan-Islamic leanings.\textsuperscript{57} Rising from within the broader political Islamic scene was a self-consciously home-grown Islamist current which always claimed to be orientated toward domestic themes and indigenous expressions of the Muslim faith.

These Islamists had traditions that distinguished them from other forms. One tradition was educational and intellectual. The vast majority of the first generation of Islamists was educated in the Dutch Indies. Many, especially those preoccupied with politics, had little formal Islamic education. They had a rather limited command of the Arabic language and little expertise in matters of Islamic jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{58} Even fewer had studied in Middle Eastern countries. Usually, they had received religious training from Javanese ulama (Islamic scholars and jurists) coupled with a formal Dutch education.\textsuperscript{59}

A significant number of organisations that were established approaching the end of Dutch colonial rule in the second and third decades of the 20th century were self-proclaimed Islamic reformers in the tradition of Abduh and Rida. Indonesian devotees of reformist Islamic ideas shaped their outlook. Central figures were Ahmad Surkati, Ahmad Dahlan (founder of the puritan reformist Muhammadiyah in 1912), Ahmad Hassan (founder of the Persatuan Islam or ‘Islamic Association’, Persis, of the same doctrinal orientation) and Haji Agus Salim, a moderate Muslim intellectual of the less doctrinaire Sarekat Islam (‘Islamic Union’).\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Noer, \textit{Modernist Muslim Movement}, p. 298. The pan-Islamic ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, an early reformer, were mainly influential in the Sarekat Islam (‘Islamic Union’, 1912).

\textsuperscript{58} Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama 1952-1967, PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1998, p. 82. Sarekat Islam leader Tjokroaminoto, for example, only started his Islamic studies after he founded the organisation. Also, he had little knowledge of Arabic but sympathised with the work of Dutch socialist writers. Noer, \textit{Modernist Muslim Movement}, p. 298.

\textsuperscript{59} The Bandung-based reformer Muhammad Yunus, for example, was the teacher of the Persis (‘Islamic Association’) ideologue Ahmad Hassan.

As the cradle of Islam and the birthplace of Muhammad, Middle Eastern custom and culture has always held an exemplary rank in the Muslim consciousness. Nonetheless, Middle Eastern lifestyle and thought had a much larger impact on Islamists of the 1990s. Islamic discourse in Indonesia’s 1930s or 1940s gave little attention to a sultanate or caliphate even though nationalist ideas never permanently replaced the foundational Islamic ideal of a global Muslim community. Abolished in the wake of Islamic reformism, the caliphate permanently fascinated early Islamists, though mostly without any practical relevance. These Islamists were preoccupied with domestic issues of national sovereignty, the diffusion of power among political and religious groups in a post-colonial state and the formal rank of Islam in such a state.

A significant number of present-day Islamists regard the central themes of their predecessors as the basis for their own legitimacy. Yet they have come to depict historical issues and the difficulties they involved not merely as the inheritance of a particular branch of Islam but of Indonesian Islam in general. This echoes Islamism’s intrinsic position in the broader Islamic political scene of the early and mid-20th century. At the same time, it exposes the enduring aspiration of subsequent devotees to represent the umat Islam. Accordingly, these present-day Islamists continue to defend the claim to profess and defend a brand of Islam embedded in domestic beliefs and practises.

Typical in the Muslim world of the 1950s and 1960s were hybrid concepts such as “Islamic democracy”. When the Dutch East Indies became independent, the vast majority of Muslim politicians favoured a democracy grounded in an unspecified Islamic temperament, a democracy loosely based in Islamic principles. They helped to create political institutions based on European-derived concepts. But as adherents of hybrid models they nevertheless strove to remain equally faithful to the commands

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61 Compare with Fakhry, Theocratic Idea.
62 Other such concepts were Islamic- and Arab socialism.
63 After the Second World War, the globally endorsed political system outside the communist world was the democratic. Quite necessarily, “popular sovereignty” became a principle of the independent Indonesian state and in the following years, all political camps claimed to endorse democracy as the best political system. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1962, p. 44.
of their faith. These ideas were still defined by the parameters of classical Sunni political theory.

The Masyumi Tradition

Islamism’s largest representative in Indonesia in the 1940s and 1950s was the Masyumi (Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi, ‘Indonesian Islamic Political Party Masjumi’).\(^{64}\) Masyumi took on key modernist influences such as a multiparty system, the separation of powers and parliamentary rule. It held that human rights and the ‘freedom’ for other communities ‘to adhere and to perform their religions and to develop their cultures’ had to be ensured if it held government.\(^{65}\) Most importantly, free speech and a formal opposition in parliament were deemed mandatory for a democracy.\(^{66}\) These were not inherently Islamic issues but denoted the impact of modernism on Indonesian political Islam, in which the ‘Masyumi tradition’ came to grow as an innate, undisclosed component. A lasting influence of western political ideas on this tradition was the emphasis on public opposition against unjust rule and that it was the religious obligation of each Muslim to control the actions of government. This emphasis accompanied a strong respect for the rule of law regardless of the aspiration that law should be in unequivocal accord with shari’ah. These propositions remained central for Indonesian Muslim organisations and parties from the 1920s up until the later years of the 1950s. The Masyumi tradition thus built on different thought models than the Islamist movement of the 1970s and 1980s. The former understood itself as part of the worldwide Muslim community, but only later forms rose as part of a self-consciously global Muslim movement with its distinct organisational model and political strategy.

\(^{64}\) Masyumi was first founded in 1943 as Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (‘Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims’) by the Japanese colonial administration to aid the mobilisation of Muslims against Western allies. It replaced the Madjilisul Islami A’laa Indonesia (‘Supreme Indonesian Council of Islam’, MIAI), a Japanese-initiated federation. Masyumi had strongholds in Sumatra and West Java. See Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945, W. van Hoeve, The Hague, 1958.

\(^{65}\) “Kalau Masyumi Pegang Pemerintahan” (‘If Masyumi held power’), Hikmah, 2 April 1955, p. 5 (quote); “Memilih Masyumi berarti...” (‘To vote for Masyumi means...’), Hikmah, 24 September 1955, p. 6.

\(^{66}\) “Konsepsi Presiden bawa ke Konstituante: demokrasi tak mengenal barat dan timur pendapat Moh. Natsir”, Hikmah, 26 January 1957. In order to find support in Islamic doctrine for these views, Masyumi, like most of its Muslim contemporaries, justified an approval of popular sovereignty by means of the Qur’anic principle of shura (mutual consultation).
Devotees of the Masyumi tradition, at the same time, have taken the offensive against the modernisation paradigm and its promotion of liberal democracy as it prevailed in 1950s Western academe. They contested suggestions that Islam was somewhat faulty if it could not prove congruity to a concept of democracy grounded in Western norms and philosophy. Attempts were made to reconcile a variety of European political conceptions with the ongoing sway held by doctrinal models over Muslim thought. The way Masyumi formulated its aims plainly exposed this predicament. It described a modern political system as a ‘democratic and constitutional state based on Islam’ (*negara hukum yang demokratis berdasarkan Islam*). In its 1945 statutes, Masyumi set the primary goals: to ‘implement the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic and the Islamic Religion’; to ‘carry out *melaksanakan* Islamic ideals [*cita-cita Islam*] in state affairs’; and, in a later version, to ‘carry out Islamic teachings and law in the life of each individual, society and the Indonesian Republic…’  

This means that, though permeated by modernist rationalism and devoted to European political concepts, the Masyumi tradition remained strongly dedicated to upholding the purity of the Islamic ethos and, therefore, demanded Islam be the ultimate source and the underpinning constraint for all reasoning. The somewhat indistinct understanding of a *negara Islam* (‘Islamic state’) thus became a democratic, popularly elected, constitutional state formally based on Islam and framed by Islamic principles with hazy attributes. Once Islamist parties had achieved to write *shari‘ah* terms into the Constitution, not every draft law would be

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68 This is the thesis of Mohamad Natsir in his *Islam dan Aka/ Merdeka*, (no publisher), Jakarta, 1970. There was thus a strong disapproval of the radical rationalism in the tradition of the Mutazilites and more recently the Young Turks, especially the most daring secularist of the Islamic-state relationship and ideologue of Kemalist Turkey, Sheik Abd al-Raziq.

69 Typically, Muslim countries adopted the western label “republic” whilst formally making Islam, in various forms, the main source of law. In practice, however, this was often ignored as governments widely adopted Western codes for their civil and public laws. Fakhry, *Theocratic Idea*.
eligible to parliamentary debate, but only those not predetermined by Qur’anic directives. Mohamad Natsir wrote:

Islam is democratic, in the sense that Islam is...anti-absolutism, anti-despotism. But [this] does not mean that parliament [has to] approve the abolition of lotteries, [issues dealing with] 'iniquity' [kecabulan], and it does not have to be negotiated whether the abolition of superstition [khurafat] and polytheism [musyrik] and so on is required. No! This all does not belong to the consultative right of parliament. What perhaps will be discussed, are the ways to carry out those laws... Islam is a sense, a concept, a principle for itself, which has at the same time its own features. Islam is not 100% democracy. Islam is...well, Islam.70

Moreover, devotees of the Masyumi tradition always ardently believed in the state’s obligation to implement and enforce Islamic teachings among the Muslim population. This led to controversy because it suggested that the government was to give special treatment to Islam and use its institutions to enforce the teachings of that religion. Non-Muslims, nominal and nationalist Muslims insisted that the state had to treat all acknowledged religions equally by non-interference. Yet supporters of formal status of Islam argued that rejecting their request for upholding shari‘ah infringed on an essential facet of Islam; that is, that political authority has a religious obligation. The majority of Indonesian citizens were Muslim, hence, it was only appropriate that the state ideology and the Constitution reflected this fact and enforced Islamic law on Muslims. Hamka, for example, alluded to classical Sunni beliefs by holding that ‘according to Islam, the state is nothing else than a tool to carry out the law of truth and justice on the people. And absolute truth and justice comes from Allah.’71 Significantly, while Masyumi was the driving force, modernists and traditionalists both supported these ideals.72 To institute Islamic political authority is a key aspiration of contemporary Islamism; thus until the later 1950s, a number of subsequently Islamist goals were part of the general agenda of Muslim politics.

72 NU, at this stage, shared the belief in the state’s obligation to implement Islam and endorsed it openly.
The triumph of the nation-state in the early 20th century meant that the perception of Islamic authority became confined to national boundaries.⁷³ An utter lack of clarity surrounded the position of the sacred law in a state that is formally based on Islam or featured shari'ah terms in the Constitution. The most difficult question was whether the state should legally bind Muslims to adhere to shari'ah. If this was affirmed, it remained undecided which aspects of Islamic law this would comprise and in which areas the state needed to become active as an implementer of shari'ah.⁷⁴ Other quandaries such as deciding a theological basis for the exegesis and application of shari'ah, the readiness of institutional and personnel resources for its implementation, and the correlation between civil and Islamic courts also remained scarcely addressed by the Muslim parties.⁷⁵

The pro-shari'ah camp claimed to be willing and to be able to maintain a pluralist state despite an Islamic state ideology and constitutional recognition of shari'ah. Pluralism could be upheld because Muslims would not interfere in the lives of religious minorities. Islamic law would impose an uncertain number of obligations on Muslim citizens. Displaying a purportedly indifferent attitude toward non-Muslim issues, these shari'ah advocates thus appeared to compromise on Islamism's—and arguably Islam's—appeal to broader religiosity.

The necessary outcome of democratic commitment and religious fervour was tension because the state could not take on its responsibility to implement Islam if popular support for such a role proved insufficient. Problems were also to be expected if subsequent elections brought a secular party to govern which, then, had to adapt its policies alongside the Islamic state ideology as written down in the Constitution.

⁷⁴ It was, for example, unclear whether the future government would have to collect zakat (alms) or whether it would need to advance its involvement in organising the hajj (pilgrimage).
⁷⁵ Despite the common efforts to implement shari'ah, there remained major differences in the Islamic bloc, partly grounded in theology. NU adhered to the Syafi'i school of law whereas Masyumi proclaimed toleration of all major Sunni schools. See Fealy, Ulama and Politics; Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking 1945–1965, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1970.
In the 1950s, however, Islamic commitment to the idea of nation-state and national law was backed by the conviction that it represented large parts of the public’s aspirations. Prior to independence in 1945, the Islamic camp expected to dominate the multiparty system and thus be able to set up the main pillars of the Constitution and law. There was, of course, for some years no empirical evidence for this assumption. To the contrary, the results of subsequent elections indicated that this hope had been unfounded. Nonetheless, until after the end of the New Order in 1998, Masyumi legatees maintained their consent to and backing of constitutionalism and procedural democracy. At the same time, they dealt with what proved to be the Masyumi camp’s historical misperception of its own strength in Indonesian society and an overestimation of the support of ordinary Muslims for *shari’ah*.

Hence, the self-awareness of the Masyumi camp is coupled to a number of domestic historical issues, which strongly impinged on the thinking, rhetoric and behaviour of later generations. Proclaiming allegiance to procedural democracy and a modern law of nations, Muslims from a wide organisational background also wanted Islam to be formally acknowledged in the Constitution and to become the ideological basis of an independent Indonesian state. Pivotal for both traditionalists and modernists had been the monotheistic (*tawhid*, Arab: *tawḥīd*) religious identity of the state. They also insisted on a number of other pre-concessions such as that the future President had to be a Muslim Indonesian. Nominal and nationalist Muslims and non-Muslims desired the nation to adopt a de-confessionalised basis.76 This dispute started in the 1920s and 1930s. It peaked between March and August 1945, when final preparations for independence were under way. Islamic parties saw the multi-religious state doctrine Pancasila as artificial and arid. A human idea, it was necessarily inferior to Islam.77 But they accepted Pancasila as a compromise if understood as a compressed pluralist

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76 The following sections benefited greatly from Dr. Greg Fealy’s contributions. He also suggested the term ‘de-confessionalised’ to me. It was introduced by the Dutch scholar van Nieuwenhuijze. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in post-colonial Indonesia: five essays*, W. van Hoeve, The Hague, 1958. The term refers to a religiously sanctioned moral and ethical ideology that comprises several creeds and promises to give those the same status.

77 Pancasila is a de-confessionalised doctrine claiming to give equal consideration to Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism and Hinduism. The first principle ‘the belief in The One All-Powerful God’, however, discriminates non-monotheistic creeds. The remaining four guiding principles are: humanitarianism, nationalism, popular sovereignty, and social justice.
version of a broader Islamic temperament.\textsuperscript{78} This consent faltered between 1952 and 1959. In the Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), a popularly elected body in session between 1956 to mid-1959 with the task of drafting a new Constitution, Islamic parties pleaded for Islam as the ideological base of the state.\textsuperscript{79}

Nationalists, nominal- and non-Muslims argued that an Islam-based Indonesia would jeopardise the formation of a unitary post-colonial state retaining the boundaries of the Dutch East Indies. To maintain colonial boundaries had been deeply ingrained in the proposition for independence. With the option of living under Islamic authority, however, areas in the East and West of the archipelago with large Christian and Hindu populations felt discriminated against, and thus were disinclined to join the Republic. At the same time, Indonesia’s folklore has always proudly asserted its inhabitants to be an innately religious people. This made the adaptation of a secular state ideology unlikely. The question at stake, therefore, became whether the state would be based on Islamic principles expressed in Islamic terminology or make use of religiously neutral terms. The parameters of this discourse were prolonged until the post-New Order era. By then, however, advocates of foreign Islamist ideology purposely sought distance from the dispute at home. They set up an ideological alternative to the Masyumi tradition, its established themes and the resulting political strategy.

This exploration of alternative political strategies was induced by the failure of the Islamic camp to achieve any of its major goals. In early 1945, the Japanese occupying power set up the Badan Penelitian Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (‘Investigatory Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence’, BPUPKI), deciding on a de-confessionalised ideology as the basis of the Republic, ‘Is the Pancasila at odds with Qur’anic teachings?’), reprinted in Natsir, \textit{Agama dan Negara}, pp. 158-66.

\textsuperscript{78} To reconcile itself with the Pancasila, the Islamic camp held that Pancasila consisted of five passages taken from the thousands in Islam. Pancasila was a ‘reflection’ (\textit{afspiegeling}) of Islamic teachings. The classical treatise is Mohamad Natsir, \textit{Apakah PS bertentangan dengan ajaran al-Quran?} (‘Is the Pancasila at odds with Qur’anic teachings?’), reprinted in Natsir, \textit{Agama dan Negara}, pp. 158-66.

\textsuperscript{79} The Konstituante was the result of the 1955 general elections. It had the task of forming a new Constitution and gave Islamic parties a legal platform from which to propose their concepts to write Islam into the Constitution. It began its work in late 1956, culminating in a deadlock in early 1959 and the dissolution of the Assembly on 5 July. Both the secular and the Islamic faction were unable to gain the necessary two-thirds majority to realise their proposal.
which Soekarno named Pancasila. This prevented the state giving specific attention to the Islamic religion. In a renowned address to the BPUPKI, Soekarno declared that he wanted Muslims to pursue their ideological aspirations through parliament. This was more than a shimmer of hope, as it promised that all Muslims had to do was gain a sufficient share of votes in the upcoming elections to fulfil their desire to Islamise the legal system. Soekarno said:

For Muslims, this [i.e. parliament] is the best place to promote religion... If we really are an Islamic people let us then work as hard as we can, to see that the greatest number of seats in parliament which we shall form, will be held by Islamic representatives. If we take it that parliament has 100 members, then let us work, as hard as possible, so that 60, 70, 80, 90 of representatives in parliament will be Muslim, Islamic leaders. Then the laws which parliament promulgates will naturally be Islamic laws. Yes, I am even convinced that only when something like this happens, only then can it be said that Islam really lives in the soul of the people, so that 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% of the representatives are Muslims, Islamic leaders, Islamic ulamas....

In 1945, this seemed to be a goal within easy reach. But as it turned out, the Muslim elite’s confidence that their ideological aspirations were shared by a majority of the umat (Muslim community) was misguided.

Having settled on a de-confessionalised ideology, a subcommittee of nine BPUPKI members gathered to find a solution that would reconcile the Islamic camp and pave the way for the full acceptance of Pancasila. On 22 June 1945, they hit upon a compromise in form of a document called the Piagam Jakarta (‘Jakarta Charter’). The Charter was to become the Preamble to the Constitution and a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between Muslims and secular-nationalists. The issue at stake became whether it should be implemented.

The key phrase in the Charter consisted of seven words: dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syari‘at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya (‘with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law’). Though the inclusion of this clause

80 The BPUPKI included President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta. These men represented the nationalists and thus the interests of religious minorities. The Islamic side was represented by both traditionalists and modernists, among them the NU leader K.H. Wahid Hasyim, Mohamad Natsir and Agus Salim.

would give Islam a special place in the Constitution, again it was unclear what precisely the implications would be. A central question was whether the wording would refer to the obligation of individual Muslims to carry out Islamic law or whether it made the state responsible to implement loosely defined *shari’ah* regulations.

For the Islamic camp, the Charter was the minimum goal. But nationalists, nominal- and non-Muslims opposed the compromise. They argued that the clause would burden the state with the heavy task of coercing all Muslims to adhere to *shari’ah* law. This echoed a familiar dispute in the Muslim world. It raised the question whether it is practicable for a state to enforce Islam on a Muslim population which is highly diverse, follows diverse religious customs, has thus different religious needs, and is therefore likely to require a varied handling of *shari’ah* regulations. Parts of this population, of course, might just be plainly unwilling to live according to *shari’ah* though it seemed that, at this stage, the Charter’s proponents were fully entrenched by the disposition that to be a Muslim meant to submit to *shari’ah*.

In mid-July 1945 it seemed that Muslims would emerge victorious from the debates. The BPUPKI approved a draft of the Constitution that included the Charter. It also accepted the stipulation that any future President must be a Muslim. The Muslim politicians’ sense of triumph was short-lived, though. The day following independence, on 18 August 1945, resistance to the Charter resurfaced. Christian-populated areas threatened to leave the Republic if concessions to the Islamic camp were not eliminated. They demanded the “seven-word” clause be dropped, to eradicate specifically Islamic terms in the Constitution and to open the presidency for non-Muslims. There also were demands, reportedly from Hindu Bali, to adopt a

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82 At this stage, there were further concessions made to the Islamic bloc. The Charter’s introduction comprised the words *rahmat Allah yang Maha kuasa* (‘by the Grace of the One All-Powerful God’). The mentioning of the Arabic word Allah was a clear victory over the secular nationalists and non-Muslims who had opted for the neutral Malay term *keTuhanan* (‘Godness’). The initial term for the Preamble was the Arabic word ‘Mukaddimah’.

83 Despite remaining reservations, the BPUPKI had accepted the Charter twice (on 11 and 14 July 1945). This was partly because Soekarno urged members of the committee to proceed and not to jeopardize the common ground that was established under great difficulties.

neutral wording of the first pillar of the Pancasila. The phrase *rahmat Allah yang Maha Kuasa* was to be changed into *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (‘belief in the One All-Powerful God’). The latter phrase pointed to religious faith in an unspecified Supreme Being. It remained monotheistic without implying a primacy of the Islamic religion.

The Islamic camp grudgingly agreed to these changes, thereby marking its historical defeat. By giving in, pro-*shari'ah* Muslims allowed a quick finalisation of the new Constitution whilst securing national unity. They regarded both issues as of more pressing importance. Yet significantly, they found some solace that they would have a chance to readdress the state ideology issue in parliament and the Constituent Assembly once the first national elections were held. These expectations were not fulfilled. The first elections in 1955 shattered the expectations of Islamic parties about their popularity among the *umat*. The polls established a 44% share for Islamic parties, a result insufficient to insert *shari'ah* terms into the Constitution.

In the Constituent Assembly neither ideological camp commanded the required two-thirds majority to pass constitutional revisions. Islamic parties, however, had eagerly waited for this opportunity as a second chance to make Islam the ideology of the state and to raise the status of *shari'ah*. During parliamentary democracy (1950-57), Masyumi had served in six of its seven cabinets. Three governments were led by Masyumi-based ministers. These cabinets were coalitions. The subsequent necessity for compromise with other parties made it difficult to realise ideological goals.

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85 I am indebted to Dr. Greg Fealy for pointing out the significance of this.  
86 Despite the overall defeat of the Islamic camp, the new Indonesian state acknowledged religious interests. With an overwhelming Muslim majority, these issues automatically were tinged Islamic. The most important creation was the Department of Religion, which, in the following decades, devoted much attention to the spreading of the Islamic faith. Under its auspices, Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) obtained state funds and it played an important role in organising the *haji*. The ministry inspected school programs and ensured they followed accepted Sunni theology while keeping out Islamic interpretations seen as “heretic”. It also oversaw the enforcement of various aspects of Islamic law. This mostly comprised aspects of family law issues such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. The favouritism of the ministry has drawn much criticism from non-Muslims and secular-nationalists. For them, it breached the de-confessionalised nature of the Pancasila.  
87 It was a two-third majority necessary to make amendments.  
88 The only cabinet from which Masyumi was excluded was the first Ali Sastroamidjoyo cabinet. The Masyumi Prime Ministers were Natsir, Sukiman Wirjosanjoyo and Burhanuddin Harahap.  
In the Constituent Assembly, Islamic parties proposed the drafting of a new Constitution, which was to be based on Islam. The nationalist camp was once again opposed. Eventually, the Islamic camp, pressed by Soekarno, agreed to re-install the 1945 Constitution on the proviso that the Charter be re-inserted. Soekarno, the Army and nationalists flatly rejected this. After three votes on the Charter, which failed to gain the necessary majority, the Constituent Assembly was deadlocked. All Islamic parties had previously voted in support for the Charter. Soekarno then, in an unconstitutional act, dissolved the Assembly and, on 5 July 1959, issued a decree that re-installed the 1945 Constitution. The result was a devastating blow for those Muslims who had set their hopes on the Constituent Assembly. Again the Charter was rejected and this time it was entirely unclear when the next opportunity would come up for re-addressing it. In a final, but in essence merely symbolic, concession to the Islamic bloc, Soekarno allowed the Charter to be described as *menjiwai* (‘providing spirit to’) and being *dalam rangka kesatuan* (‘in connecting accord’) with the 1945 Constitution. Once again, though, the legal implications remained unclear. Importantly, there was no mention of the word *shari‘ah* in the Constitution. Later Islamists with an allegiance to Masyumi’s struggle would relentlessly point to the *menjiwai*-status of the Charter; ultimately, however, *shari‘ah* had still no legal force if it was not mentioned in the Constitution. A further opportunity to force through the Charter emerged in 1967 and 1968 after Soeharto and the military had taken over government. Now, however, Islamic parties did not address the state ideology but merely sought to persuade the regime to reinstate the Charter. The generals, profoundly apprehensive of political Islam, dismissed the appeal.

Hence, in the immediate post-independence period until the 1955 elections and, to a lesser degree, until the Constituent Assembly, Muslim politicians perceived *shari‘ah*-mindedness as a natural and vital aspect of doing Islamic politics. This changed

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90 See Fealy, *Ulama and Politics*. At that stage, Indonesia was based on the 1950 Constitution on which the parliamentary-democratic interlude had rested. Soekarno and the military wanted to reinstall the 1945 Constitution because it provided the executive with substantially more power than the 1950 Constitution.
91 See Feith, *Decline*.
when the abolition of parliamentary democracy in 1959 brought an end to the political participation of shari’ah-minded Muslims. Until 1998, Muslims had to find more practical ways of engaging in politics if they were to be tolerated. The New Order regime suppressed any ideological debate and insisted on unquestioning loyalty to Pancasila. Many authoritarian regimes promoted dominant ideologies as inevitable to sustain national unity and harmony. The New Order, too, sought to profit from exploiting an image of both political Islam and leftist ideologies as threats to national unity, security and prosperity. It stepped up the criticism against Islamic governance as disruptive and inapt for Indonesia. To underscore this assertion, the government started an extensive propaganda campaign that Pancasila was the only safe doctrine for Indonesia.

Over an extended period of time, however, the accomplishments of dominant ideologies often proved to be shallow. Despite massive amounts of propaganda, delivered by means of school curricula and indoctrination programs, national and local beliefs proved resistant to the infiltration of official “state culture” into the public domain. Nonetheless, the resistance of Masyumi legatees against the New Order state touched on a limited range of factors; it did not question the state’s existence and legitimacy in general. This was partly because Pancasila still claimed a reference to religious values with parallels to Islamic principles. Masyumi legatees also sustained the historical themes of the Islam-state debate until after the demise of the New Order in May 1998. By then, a form of Islamism grounded in foreign concepts had risen against the intrusion of the state in religious matters such as education yet without displaying its highly political nature. Its key motive was the defence of Islam against other ideologies, domestic and foreign, through acquiescent means.

93 See Eagleton, *Ideology*. Doctrines such as Kemalism (Turkey), Baathism (Iraq, Syria), Nasserism (Egypt), Pahlavism (Iran) and Pancasila aimed to foster identification of a population with its nation. These doctrines promote that their enforcement served the common good or a higher ideal.

Imported Islamism

From the late 1960s on, decidedly defensive interpretations of the Islamic faith emerged in many parts of the Muslim world. This phenomenon was commonly termed as Islamic resurgence or revivalism. Its intellectual foundation was the highly politicised Islam of the Sunnis Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi (d. 1979) from the Indian-Pakistani organisation al-Jama’atu’l-Islamiyya (Jamiat-i-Islami), Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949) and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) from the Egyptian al-Ichwanul al-Musliminun (‘Muslim Brotherhood’), and from the leader of the Iranian Islamic revolution, the Shiite Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989).

Any ideology, Shils pointed out, ‘arises in the midst of an ongoing culture’. People rarely abandon completely the national or local specifics in which they live. As such, Islamic revivalism, too, dealt inevitably with preceding norms and customs in the countries and regions it emerged and, to various extents, arranged itself with the conditions. Based on diverse national and local traditions and histories and their social, political and religious features, revivalism took on various forms. Its political strategy and accomplishments depended on the types of government and political institutions, the social and economic strata of the societies it operated in, and the availability of a wide variety of facilities such as communication networks and patronage resources.

Islamic revivalism is the most recent addition to Islamic political cultures in Indonesia. One of its central themes was re-emphasising the foundational Islamic ideal of the Qur’an’s organisational unit, the global community of believers (umat).

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96 Shils, Concept, p. 67.
97 Some groups have attempted to shield their cadres through isolation. They sought separation from influences that they distrust and reject, attempting to create a homogenous society and space for ideological commitment. Among Islamist groups fitting into this category are the Indian Jama’ah Tablīq, the Malaysian Darul Arqam and its “Islamic villages” and the Indonesian Darul Islam (‘Realm of Islam’), whose goal in the 1950s and 60s was to establish a secessionist Islamic state within the Indonesian Republic.
98 See, for example, Kepel, Jihad, p. 60.
99 Compare with Fine and Sandstrom, Ideology in Action.
The traditional notion of the umat referred to the unity of all humankind. As the final prophet sent by God, Mohammad's task was to restore this unity which his predecessors, in the Qur'anic view, had failed to achieve. The Qur'an, verse al-Baqarah (2:213) holds:

Mankind was one single nation, and Allah sent Messengers with glad tidings and warnings; and with them He sent the Book in truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed; But the People of the Book, after the clear signs came to them, did not differ among themselves, except through selfish contumacy. Allah by His grace guided the believers to the truth, concerning that wherein they differed. For Allah guides whom He will to a path that is straight. 100

Revivalist Islam self-consciously took up the ideal to impose an Islamic system onto the world by resuming the foundational Islamic call for jihad (Arab: jihād). 101 The aim was first the defence and then the extension of the Islamic realm (dar-ul Islam); it was not supposed to include the forced conversion of non-Muslims because of the Qur'anic prohibition to do so. 102

The defence and cultivation of Islam is to be achieved through means which are social, political and educational; it takes peaceful means yet may also warrant armed struggle. 103 Revivalism put the credo that Islam was the universal, infallible and final creed handed down to all humankind into a political ideology which aims to overcome the moral degradation and identity conflicts of contemporary Muslim societies in the face of perceived Western cultural infringement and political-economic subjugation. In 1998, revivalism emerged in Indonesian politics as a

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100 Translation by Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 85.
101 The aspiration for Islamic conquest is, for example, based on the Qur'anic verse al-Anfal (8:39): 'And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in Allah, altogether and everywhere...'. Translation by Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 423.
102 Qur'an, al-Baqarah (2:256). Islamists have widely quoted this passage to back their claim for approving religious pluralism.
103 See, for example, Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law, p. 359; Hartmut Bobzin, Der Koran-Eine Einführung, C.H. Beck, München, 1999, pp. 83-5. The Qur'an speaks of al-jihad fi sabil Allah, the 'endeavour on the way toward God'. Verse al-Tawbah (9:36) demands: 'And fight the pagans (al-musrikun) all together as they fight you altogether.' Al-Baqarah (2:218) holds: 'Those who believed and those who suffered exile and fought (and strove and struggled) in the path of Allah—they have the hope of the mercy of Allah'. Translations by Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 448 and p. 87. These passages underline that the 'endeavour' also denoted war efforts to extend the Islamic realm. Physical struggle has played a crucial role in Islamic history. See, for example, Manoucher Parvin and Maurie Sommer, "Dar-al Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1980, pp. 1-21.
movement making use of strictly constitutional means and embracing procedural
democracy. Its devotees set the aim to defend Islam in the context of acquiescent and
non-violent governmental take-over by partaking in plural political systems.

Defensive religious sentiment is often spurred by developments perceived as a
threat. A frequent domestic factor was the perceived inability of national elites to
deal with the negative side effects of western-defined modernity on Muslims. The
intrusion of western culture suggested ‘a change (or the threat of a change) in
national identity’ and the expansion of secular state authority. Often
administrations of such states attempted to increase their influence by interfering in
areas that previously had been part of the personal and spiritual domain. In this
process, revivalist Islam emerged as an alternative moral authority for sections of
society alienated by a ruling order and the values it claimed to represent. In
Indonesia as in many other Muslim countries, this section was dominated by the
urban educated youth.

These young Muslims, active in campuses and mosques, epitomised a key pattern of
imported Islamism: to bring about better organisational models in order to revitalize
Islam. Organisational models are vital for the efficiency of a group; its success
depends on the ability to create strong identification among adherents with central
doctrinal positions and goals. In a loose network ideologies disintegrate or fade in
importance but they tend to prosper in stable conditions. Ideologies rely on the
number of people who have the same ideas and live according to the same rules.
Strong inter-personal relations therefore provide the best preconditions for
establishing and sustaining a code of belief. The organisational model of
revivalism is based on intense cohesion, persuasive guidance and conformity which

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104 Piscatori, Accounting, p. 361. The points in Garvey, Introduction, are similar.
105 Piscatori, Accounting, p. 361.
106 Garvey, Introduction, p. 20.
107 Compare with Shils, Concept; Piscatori, Accounting.
110 This, of course, does not only apply to religious groups, as shown in Gary Alan Fine’s “Small
Groups and Culture Creation: The Idioculture of Little League Baseball Teams”, American
together create unanimity. It consists of small training and mentoring cells (*usroh*) to ensure a tight environment that sets itself apart from highly diverse national cultures. These environments have cultivated distinctive beliefs and customs, the sharing of a system of knowledge and education (*tarbiyah*) and the application of strict behaviour codes. Its members tend to be bonded by common experience, allowing better protection against outside influences. Small entities such as Islamist cells are thus a 'frequent venue of ideological enactment', ensuring that fundamental beliefs remain intact.

Revivalism usually emerged more militant in abidingly closed and radically secular regimes. Here, state policies directly contravened the religious beliefs and customs of large sections of its people. The outcome was permanent open conflict between Islamism and the state. The revivalist Islamist movement in New Order Indonesia was comparatively small and seclusive. It did not have the broader social backing as did similar currents in various Middle Eastern countries. It therefore could not confront the state but sought consolidation through Islamic propagation programs (*dakwah*, Arab: *da'wa*) and political quietism.

This imported Islamism also advanced a number of traits that already had formed part of the Masyumi tradition. It put extra weight on Islam's egalitarian appraisal for the community of believers. This stance is grounded in Islam's emphasis on the community of the faithful with the same responsibilities and chances for salvation while giving less concern to extraordinary individuals: 'All Muslims were to be equal'. It stressed that each human being must endeavour to reach salvation and to bring about a public life in accordance with Islam. This became the ideological

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111 Fine, *Small Groups*, p. 734.
114 See, for example, Lisa Anderson, "Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism", in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo, 1997, pp. 17-31. Examples of such open conflicts are the events following Turkey's sweeping secularisation after the 1980 military coup, pre-revolutionary Iran which was based on a secular-capitalist modernisation program, and socialist and secular Arab countries such as Egypt under Nasser and Sadat or Tunisia under Bourguiba.
115 Hodgson, *Venture*, p. 317. This collectivism is very much unlike the individualism endorsed by mystical Islam.
foundation for an activist temper, social commitment and a critical intellect.\textsuperscript{116} Community leaders had to be reassessed strictly according to their moral and religious qualities.\textsuperscript{117}

It is an essential part of Islamist folklore that the most flourishing and just organisation of human society was achieved in the Arab city of Medina, helped by a short document known as the ‘Constitution of Medina’.\textsuperscript{118} This belief and the Medina Constitution feature prominently in the mind-set of Masyumi devotees, but they never explicitly targeted to build an analogous societal order in modern times. In 1945, Masyumi endeavoured to build a crossbreed form of democracy derived from Western institutional and doctrinal concepts, yet hoped this would become a tool to cultivate Islam in their home country. For followers of imported Islamism, by contrast, the Prophet’s organisation of community remains the model for a modern version of social order.

Various features of the Medina society impacted on the thinking of Islamists worldwide. Many present-day descriptions, however, tend to misconstrue the Charter underlying it, believing that the core of the treaty was equality rather than in fact being tolerance for a restricted number of other faiths. As Montgomery Watt recorded: ‘In so far as God was mentioned...and after Muhammad had become the strongest man in Arabia, there was no equality’.\textsuperscript{119} Despite Islamist notions of ‘justice’ (adil), Islam remains the final creed with its teachings completing those of preceding revelations.\textsuperscript{120} Also, the Medina society was a community of limited size and complexity and thus quite unlike large modern states, with their greater religious, social and cultural diversity.

\textsuperscript{116} The Qur’anic endorsement of political and social commitment is often related to verse al-Ra’d (13:11). It proclaims: ‘Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it themselves...’; Yusuf Ali, \textit{Meaning}, p. 589.
\textsuperscript{117} Traditionalist Islam, by contrast, centred on the patriarchal rank of the ulama and gave less credit to activism and reason, teaching that fate (takdir) alone determined the ways of life. In practice, of course, a radical form of submission to the divine will never existed. See Fealy, \textit{Ulama and Politics}.
\textsuperscript{118} In the year 622, Muhammad moved from Mecca to Medina to foster unity among the Arab tribes. This is known as hijrah and points to the actual beginning of the Islamic era. The Constitution of Medina represented a federation of several Arab clans and remains a significant symbol for Muslim unity.
\textsuperscript{119} Pagans, for example, were not tolerated. Watt, \textit{Muhammad}, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{120} Compare, for example, with Khadduri, \textit{Islam and the Modern Law}. 

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An incident of major historical dimensions was that the covenant with Jewish tribes failed because the latter rejected Muhammad's prophethood, challenging his leadership and claim that Muslims were the community chosen by God. An interpretation of the message in the Qur'anic verse al-Bayyinah (98:19) is helpful in this respect:

The People of the Book fell from the true, straight, and standard religion, into devious ways, and would not come to the true Path until...they were convinced by the arrival of the promised Prophet. But when the promised Prophet came in the person of Muhammad, they rejected him, because they really did not seek for Truth but only followed their own fancies and desires.121

These deviators came to be known as the traitors of the Medina treaty.122 But, as Martin Kramer pointed out, the steady rise of Islamic anti-Semitism over the last two to three decades of the 20th century cannot be strictly traced back to the Islamic canon as the Qur'an does not depict the Jews of the 7th century as 'the embodiment of Jews in all times in places'. For most of history, Jewish communities lived unperturbed amidst Muslims. Most present-day Islamists, however, respond to Jews in the tradition of European anti-Semitism: as an enemy in all places and at all times, not only because of the Israel issue but a menace to mankind, indistinctively and stereotyped.123 This loathing is nurtured by the diverse Qur'anic polemics against Jews and Christians.

The bond with Christianity was damaged because, as with the Jews, it failed to acknowledge Muhammad as the final prophet in the line announced by their own scriptures. With the concept of the trinity, Christians then further deviated from the message of God's singularity and thus were seen as "corrupted".124 The impact of colonialism reinvigorated this traditional rivalry with Christendom. By the final decades of the 20th century, anti-Semitism had encroached the mainstream Muslim

122 This resulted in the Jews being driven out of Medina. Watt, Mohammad, pp. 204-20.
124 I am thankful to Prof. Anthony Johns for his comments on this.
consciousness. A present-day outcome is the rigid, inflexible line in Islamist foreign policy characterised by a reflex antagonism against Israel and its perceived backer, the US. The active promotion of Islam’s superiority, backed by historical and doctrinally certified images of treason and hostility by other creeds, makes for extraordinary difficulties in the pluralist world or a certain plural state.

Virtually everywhere in the contemporary Muslim world, the domestic peril is embedded in a sense of global Muslim defeat and suppression coupled with the belief in a glorious Islamic past. Hodgson recapped the defining fissure in the history, and then in the history writing, of the Muslim peoples, which turned into the lamenting credo of Islamists worldwide:

In the sixteenth century of our era, a visitor from Mars might well have supposed that the human world was on the verge of becoming Muslim. He would have based his judgment partly on the strategic and political advantages of the Muslims, but partly also on the vitality of their general culture... The subsequent decline has cast a shadow over the greatness of the age, which by no means leaps to the eye any more; yet it was quite as much Muslim cultural splendor as Muslim political power that might have persuaded the Martian visitor that Islam was about to prevail among mankind...

‘The trauma of modern Islam’, Daniel Pipes wrote, ‘came about from this disparity between medieval successes and recent troubles’. This had triggered ‘a pervasive sense of debilitation and encroachment in the Islamic world today’. To revive the grandeur of the past, contemporary Islamists act on the presumption ‘that Muslims lag behind the West because they’re not good Muslims’.

It is the revivalists who most resolutely aim for a complete protection of their “Islamic-ness” to regain their religious purity and political influence. Mawdudi

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125 As many ordinary Muslims have come to share their hostility toward Jews and the US, foreign policy issues are of limited use for analysing Islamist politics. Krämer, Cross-Links.
126 Originally, Judaism and early Christianity also claimed the superiority of their own creed. The idea seemed to have remained more intact among adherents of the former.
128 Pipes, Islam and Islamism.
129 This search for authenticity inspired the Arabisation of the formal expressions of faith. In Indonesia, Arab-derived variants of the women’s headscarf (jilbab), the men’s beard and the popularity of Arabic idioms have been on the rise since the 1980s. An often-cited Qur’anic reference to support such appearances is verse al-Imran (3:64), calling on the believer: ‘Bear witness that
and, later, Qutb postulated an all-round suspicion and rejection of any thought model other than Islam and thus inspired this aim. One key characteristic, Garvey observed, was making out an ‘enemy’, a ‘force against which they react’. Revivalist thought postulated a ‘need for boundary setting, for affirming approval and disapproval’. It extended the perception of “enemy” to both domestic and foreign foes, at the same time perceiving “liberal” Muslims more strictly as traitors who helped to alienate the Muslim community from Islam.

As such, revivalism has been working on a rudimentary worldview. It asserted that adherents of the main scriptural Revelations had deserted their faiths and endeavoured to destroy the unity of the Muslim community. In this global struggle between the Islamic and Western civilisations, it has become customary to depict the Muslim world as trapped in an era of prolonged crisis and spiritual ‘ignorance’ (jahiliyya), both unwitting and wilful. Early expositions of this view can be found in the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah, but it was Mawdudi and then Qutb and their numerous legatees all over the world who called on Muslims to recapture their Islamic identity and challenge Western economic and cultural intrusion.

Jahiliyya initially stood for the pagan beliefs that Arabs adhered to prior to the advent of Islam. But modern writers expanded the meaning to an ‘un-Islamic’ (jahili) culture in Muslim societies. Modern Muslim societies resembled pre-Islamic Arabia, as a majority of Muslims, consciously and unconsciously, followed Western thought and behaviour, which brought harm and was heathen (kafir, Arab: کافر). The cultural imperialism of the West has thus created a new jahiliyah in which Muslim societies opportunistically took on Western concepts and customs, thereby

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130 Not necessarily is the ‘enemy’ a definite group or class; it might as well be a ‘certain way of thinking that can affect anyone’. Garvey, Introduction, pp. 21-2. Also Shils, Concept.
131 Piscatori, Accounting, p. 363.
132 Qutb’s Fi zilal al-Qur’an (‘In the Shadow of the Qur’an’) was one of the most influential commentaries on the Qur’an in the 20th century.
indulging in degenerate lifestyles unfettered by moral restrictions.\textsuperscript{135} The resulting conflict between Islamic and Western civilisations is inbuilt in the notion of ghazwul fikri (Arab: [al-]ghazwu 'l-fikri or [al-]ghazw al-fikri, lit. ‘the invasion of [un-Islamic] ideas’). Qutb wrote on jahiliyyah:

‘There are only two possibilities for the life of a people, no matter in what time and place they live. These are the state of guidance of [sic, probably: or] the state of error...the state of truth or the state of falsehood, whatever may be the varieties of falsehood; the state of light or the state of darkness...the state of obedience to the Divine guidance or the state of following whims...the state of Islam or the state of jahiliyyah...and the state of belief or the state of unbelief. People live either according to Islam, following it as a way of life and a socio-political system, or else in the state of unbelief, jahiliyyah, whim, darkness, falsehood, and error.’\textsuperscript{136}

Most contemporary Islamists ignore or downplay that some of the promoters of the endeavour to reassert Islam’s position deemed violence legitimate if it was considered necessary for or helpful to the Islamic cause. The common view became that not every Muslim had the duty to defend Islam, especially through force but to try to cultivate Islam in his or her immediate surroundings or to help to bring about better community standards in accordance with Islamic ideals, for example in education and health. This restraint was accompanied by ongoing revision of past strategies to foster Islam. It led to a modification of ideological goals according to their feasibility.

In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, there has been mounting awareness among revivalist Islamists that taking part in politics promised to be more beneficial than

\textsuperscript{135} See the later editions of Qutb’s ‘Social Justice in Islam’ and his ‘Milestones’. Qutb, especially in his later years, had a more sweeping perception of jahiliyyah than Mawdudi and al-Banna, comprising all Muslim societies except the communities guided by the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. See Shahrough Akhavi, “The Dialectic Discourse in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The Scripturalist and Modernist Discourse of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, August 1997, pp. 377-401.

\textsuperscript{136} Sayyid Qutb, The Islamic Concept and Its Characteristics, American Trust Publications, Plainfield, 1991, p. 78. The original title is Khasa’is al-Tasawwur al-Islami wa Muqawwamathi. His Milestones (as Seyyed Qutb), Dar-Ar-Ilm, Damascus, (no year) contains numerous like-minded passages. Mawdudi, in similar fashion, attacked the ‘legion of ism...racial and concerned with particular classes they eulogise...[and who] do not look beyond the geographic and national boundaries’. He based his plead for Islam on the conviction that ‘[w]hat humanity needs, and needs pressingly, is a system...based on a true perception of man and all the realities that pertain to him...based on principles that are universal, abiding and eternal—a way of life that may steer forth his course safely through all the vicissitudes of the present and the future, resolve the problems originating in them, and advance undaunted towards its goal without much ado’. S. Abul Al’A Maududi, The Religion of Truth, Islamic Publication Ltd, Lahore, 1978 (1967), pp. 15-6.
ongoing isolation and obscurity. By contrast, its first generation, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami had internal differences over matters of political strategy. There were sections insisting on education and mission as the only way of raising an Islamic society from below, and others who at the same time wanted to participate politically. For the latter, it was an obstacle that major ideologues postulated a one-party system consisting of “capable” Muslims with the task to establish God’s sovereignty. Moreover, Mawdudi and Qutb used revolutionary rhetoric and the latter at times approved armed struggle as a way to topple an “impious” political order. Later devotees recognised the disadvantages of strategic indecision and open enmity and opted for a more practical approach. This approach can be described as gradualism. Later chapters will describe Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK) as a typical representative of gradualism.

Throughout the 1980s, a number of authoritarian states undertook closely monitored political liberalisations. They accommodated Islamic opposition either by tolerating them while denying equal legal status, or by allowing them full legal recognition. But the ruling elites were always careful not to endanger their grip on power. Even so, Islamist groups more than ever before were able to organise and promote their views. These Islamists, as one scholar noted, ‘have not failed to recognize that

138 Other examples are the Hamas in Palestine and the Hizbullah in Lebanon. Guazzzone, Islamism and Islamists, p. 16.
140 Krämer, Cross-Links, pp. 44-7.
141 In most cases, the inclusion of Islamic opposition did not point to a significant shift in regime policy. Where openings were endorsed, they were often lengthy and wearisome, involving numerous setbacks and negotiation deadlocks. See Daniel Brumberg, “Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World”, in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo, 1995-98, pp. 229-59 (esp. p. 233) and Brumberg, “Liberalization Versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform”, Working Papers Middle East Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 37, May 2003, p. 3. Tunisia and Egypt, for example, set up multi-party systems but only allowed Islamists to run as independent parliamentarians whilst upholding the ban on parties using Islam as their symbol and ideology.
142 In countries such as Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen, Islamist parties participated in municipal and national elections. See, for example, Vickie Langohr, “An Exit from Arab Autocracy”, Journal of Democracy, 13.3., 2002.
pluralism and interdependence are the catchwords of the 1990s. Nasr wrote, ‘opened the political process for Islamists and provided an avenue for them to pursue their agenda’. Overall, the warm reception the Indonesian mosque- and campus-based Islamist movement gave to the demise of authoritarianism in 1998 entirely followed the global trend of the past one and a half decades.

Among the well-known self-moderating movements in the contemporary Muslim world were the main factions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Movement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI). Both became part of plural political systems and renounced rebellion. They became supporters of the main attributes of democratising states such as the rule of law, governmental accountability, human rights, periodical elections and the abolition of one-party rule, the establishment of independent judiciaries and the strengthening of a civil society through an independent media, unions and other non-governmental groups. Parallel to this, they pursued short-term goals such as dakwah (proselytisation) programs, the insertion of Islamic laws into national laws, and endeavours to Islamise school curricula.

Avoiding the rigidity of a previous generation, the strictly constitutional current of revivalism thus, to some extent, adapted to the prevailing apologetic Muslim discourse. The compliant rhetoric of leading revivalist ideologues such as the Sudanese Hasan al-Turabi or the Tunisian Rashid Ghannoushi worked as a model for others. It led to crucial refinements to Islamist political strategy by retaining Islamist core values and long-term objectives but adapting their promotion to the sensitivities of the 1980s and 1990s. These activists, many prominent critics of

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144 Nasr, *Democracy*.
145 The Brotherhood began its cooperative stand under the Sadat government and later took part in elections under President Mubarak. But the organisation remained internally divided over the pros and cons of political participation and it has maintained an ambivalent stance toward a multi-party system.
146 The promotion of these aims varied, though, and was rarely uniform. Jilian Schwedler, “A Paradox of Democracy? Islamist Participation in Elections”, *Middle East Report*, winter 1998.
147 See Krämer, *Islamist Notions, Cross-Links and Integration*.
148 The latter was leader of the MTI and its predecessor, the Hizb an-Nahda.
Islamism such as Martin Kramer argued, did not rewrite the ideological aims of Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini but ‘repackaged’ them.\(^{149}\)

The question as to whether Indonesian Islamist parties merely adjusted themselves opportunistically to the political circumstances in 1998, and as to whether and to what extent they sustained an anti-democratic and anti-pluralist agenda, and the dilemmas created though participation in a plural political system will be among the topics of later chapters.

Before this, the next chapter depicts the significance of pragmatism in the restoration of the Islamic political party scene in Indonesia in 1998. It shows that practical considerations prevailed. Islamic politics in its entirety anticipated the re-formation process against the backdrop of a state-sanctioned discourse that since the early 1960s tagged Islamist agendas as harmful for national unity and social peace. This 38-year interval necessitated remaining devotees of the Masyumi tradition to reappropriate their outlook and face new competition from within Islam. In the New Order, a partial form of Masyumi’s ideology had taken roots in form of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP). At the same time, other parts of the Muslim elite had come to disbelieve in the electoral potency of Masyumi-style Islamism. There were sections shifting their support behind pluralist parties while others had taken on the intellectual sources of foreign Islamist models instead which led to the formation of Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK).

CHAPTER TWO

THE WANING INFLUENCE OF THE MASYUMI TRADITION ON ISLAMIC POLITICS

This chapter examines the re-formation process of Islamic politics in the years 1998 and 1999. It argues that an associative spirit of the Masyumi tradition was sustained during the New Order. In the reformasi era, however, this spirit did not lead to joint political action. The chapter will show that the Islamism represented by Masyumi and a number of affiliated organisations has gradually diminished in significance. Practical considerations determined the re-formation of Islamist parties after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, which led to small support for the establishment of Masyumi legatee parties. Moreover, despite claiming ongoing adherence to the ideals of Masyumi, the devotion of main sections of contemporary adherents has turned formalistic and symbolic with the underlying ideology becoming increasingly hollow. Tensions among parts of today's Masyumi legatees also revealed a lack of clarity what behaviour, both politically and morally this dedication has to entail. This will be the topic of the chapter's final section.

The historical focal point of several of the Islamist parties formed in 1998 is the Masyumi. From 1949 to 1958 Masyumi was headed by Mohamad Natsir (d. 1993). Natsir turned into the most revered and intellectually dominating figure for later generations of Masyumi adherents. Among the parties that have carried on the Masyumi tradition are Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB), Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi ('Indonesian Islamic Political Masyumi Party', PPII Masyumi) and, to a lesser extent, Partai Umat Islam ('Party of the Muslim Community', PUI) and a number of very small parties.

Contemporary Muslim organisations which have continued the Masyumi tradition in a variety of ways and different emphases are Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council', DDII), Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam ('Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World',

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1 Dr. Robert Cribb suggested the term 'associative spirit' to me.
KISDI), Persatuan Islam ('Islamic Association', Persis), Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia ('Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals', ICMI), Persatuan Umat Islam ('Union of the Islamic Community', PUI), the student organisations Gerakan Pemuda Islam ('Islamic Youth Movement', GPI), Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam ('Islamic Students' Association', HMI), Pelajar Islam Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Students' Association', PII), the foundation al-Irsyad and two umbrella organisations, the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah ('Islamic Brotherhood Forum', FUI) and Majelis Ulama Indonesia ('Indonesian Ulama Council', MUI). Masyumi has also remained a point of historical reference for Parmusi ('Indonesian Muslim Party'), the modernist section of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United Development Party', PPP), which was the only Islamist party allowed to exist during the New Order years.

Until the mid– to late 1950s, political Islam approached the Islamic canon as a set of legal rulings. This approach was clearest among the modernist section of Masyumi, which comprised a spectrum of moderate and doctrinaire Islamists. The blend of Dutch and Islamic upbringing of modernist elites brought about a complex and, at times, uneasy amalgam of political views and conceptions. Later generations of Islamists would try to improve and purify their faith through studying Islamic matters only in Middle Eastern countries. Some of them went to join the Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) in 1998. By taking up religious studies in the Middle East, these Islamists were consciously avoiding those parts of Western thought and culture seen as harmful to sustaining a coherent ideology.

2 The doctrinaire camp mainly came from the puritan Persis. Its chief ideologues were Isa Anshary and Ahmad Hassan. Ahmad was a strict modernist Sunni with sectarian inclinations, regularly attacking Islamic sects active in Indonesia such as the Ahmadiyah, Christians and Communists. Michael Feener, Developments of Muslim Jurisprudence in 20th Century Indonesia, PhD Thesis, Boston, 1999, (esp. pp. 36 ff.). Also Isa Anshary Filsafah Perjuangan Islam, Medan, 1951 and his Sebuah Manifesto, Pasifik, Bandung, 1952.

3 Natsir, for example, was familiar with the religious texts of the pesantren (Javanese boarding schools) and later studied the work of the major Egyptian reformers. Yusril Ibha Mahendra, "Studi Islam di Timor dan Barat dan Pengaruhnya terhadap Pemikiran Islam Indonesia", Ulumul Qur'an, No. 3, Vol. V, 1994, pp. 12-20. Natsir's main domestic teachers were the moderate Haji Agus Salim and two puritans, Ahmad Hassan and Akhmad Surkati.
For those present-day Muslims devoted to Masyumi and its legacy, the party stands as a beacon for how to think and act as politically active Muslims. But despite sustaining an associative spirit, Masyumi’s legacy failed to inspire Muslims to undertake joint political action after the fall of the New Order. This was because of widespread awareness that elections could no longer be won with the label Masyumi, an observation confirmed by the meagre share of votes obtained by its legatee parties in the 1999 elections (Appendix 1). To an increasing number of Muslims, the shari’ah agenda of Masyumi now appeared anachronistic. Hence, despite the associative spirit, a great number of Muslim leaders decided not to support an Islamist party in the elections.

Despite the original appearance of a strong legitimacy, Masyumi only survived until 1960. There was a break of almost four decades between the ban on Masyumi and the re-formation of Islamist parties in 1998. In this period, changes in education and the globalisation of information impacted dramatically on the approach toward Islamic politics. Rising educational levels expanded a Muslim middle class. Globalised communication brought in new political and ideological concepts. Muslims gained much wider access to and understanding of a greater range of Islamic thought models and practices than in the 1950s and 1960s. Above all, the ideologisation programs of the New Order and the necessities that the regime’s patronage system had created made many Muslims think over more practical ways of doing politics. These factors resulted in the organisational and intellectual segmentation of political Islam and turned Masyumi legatee parties into a disconnected camp with decreasing popular support.

**Associative Spirit and the Fragmentation of the Masyumi Tradition**

It was a central ideal of Masyumi to unify Muslims politically under its banner. Among the most central Muslim virtues are brotherhood and communality (ukhuwah). Though this has been a traditional theme in Indonesian Islam, the modernist side paid more attention to it than traditionalists. The Kongres Umat Islam

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4 For the main arguments of this discussion, see also Fealy and Platzdasch, *Masyumi Legacy*.

5 Ibid, p. 88.
‘Congress of the Muslim Community’, KUI), held in 1945, sanctioned Masyumi’s wished-for status as sole Islamic party. Masyumi, then, comprised both modernists and traditionalists. Its political statutes and the conference that launched the party stated that it would unite the Muslim community. Its founding Constitution described it as the ‘one and only Indonesian Islamic political party’ and all special members had to acknowledge it as the sole vehicle for political struggle.

Masyumi started with a genuine spirit of concord. By the late 1940s, however, political unity began to crumble and revealed its somewhat artificial nature. Masyumi was openly divided into factions. It comprised ‘cultural, generational and ideological cleavages which largely transected organisational loyalties’. The party was loosely managed and did not impose high levels of discipline among its constituents. There also was a poor handling of financial matters. It contained individual (anggota biasa), organisational and extraordinary members (anggota istimewa). These diverse membership criteria, it was hoped, would result in wide support from the Muslim community. Corporate membership promised to be a practical solution by binding the constituencies of affiliated organisations to the party. Members of these organisations, the largest of which were the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), automatically became Masyumi members. A large proportion of these cadres, however, only had scant

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6 During this stage, all major Islamic organisations attended the Congress. It was held for the first time in 1926 as Kongres Khilafat and then under the auspices of Madjlisul Islami a’laa Indonesia (‘Indonesian Supreme Islamic Council’, MIAI). Yusril Ihza Mahendra, “Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia”, Media Dakwah, December 1997.

7 All member organisations of the 1943 federation re-grouped in the 1945 Masyumi party.


9 Feith, Decline, p. 134.

10 Fealy, Ulama and Politics, pp. 79-80.

11 Feith, Decline, p. 154; Fealy, Ulama and Politics, p. 79.

12 Masyumi core members were obliged to pay a monthly fee but they usually failed to do so. Also, there was no official list of core members up to the dissolution of the party in 1960. Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-65, Mizan, Jakarta, 1987, p. 56.

13 The anggota istimewa comprised Muhammadiyah, NU, Persatuan Umat Islam (‘Union of the Islamic Community’, PUI) and Persatuan Umat Islam Indonesia (‘Union of the Indonesian Islamic Community’, PUI).

14 Mahendra, Kongres.

knowledge about the party’s program and goals. As a result, support and loyalty toward Masyumi was uneven. The precise nature of the working relationship with its affiliates always remained sketchily defined. Moreover, the degree of autonomy was left open to members. These factors hampered the development of party cadres with matching degrees of ideological awareness.

Unity, therefore, was fleeting. The segmentation of political Islam began in the 1930s. The 1937 Madjlisul Islamil al’laa Indonesia (‘Indonesian Supreme Islamic Council’, MIAI) which initiated the establishment of Masyumi reunited Islamic forces but unity again faltered after 1949. Since the late 1940s, modernists increasingly dominated Masyumi’s outlook, causing resentment in NU. The first major blow occurred in 1947 when the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Union Party’, PSII) split from Masyumi after it had failed to join the left-leaning cabinet of Amir Syarifuddin. NU departed in 1952, aggravated over changes in Masyumi’s leadership and organisational operation. NU’s departure severely undermined Masyumi’s claim to stand for the Islamic community in its entire. Most traditionalist Muslims left Masyumi when NU seceded. Masyumi then turned into a party dominated by modernists, initiating its decline.

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16 Despite holding Masyumi membership, some even supported other parties. Noer, Partai Islam, pp. 51-7.
17 Noer, Partai Islam, pp. 51-4. The common, far-stretching and subjective prerequisite to become affiliated to Masyumi was to belong to the ahlu Sunnah wal jamaah (adherents of the Prophetic tradition and the community, a term usually used to distinguish Sunni from Shiite Muslims). Original Masyumi members were NU, Muhammadiyah, Perti and PUI. Later followed al-Irsyad, Persis and the north-Sumatran organisations al-Jamiyatul Washliyah and al-Ittihadiyah.
18 This was a matter of regular debate at Masyumi Congresses. Noer, Partai Islam, p. 55.
19 The party with the most lucid ideology and tightest cadresisation program was arguably the Partai Komunis Indonesia (‘Indonesian Communist Party’, PKI). Unlike Masyumi, PKI professionally catalogued its membership. Noer, Partai Islam, p. 57.
20 See, for example, Ward, Foundation, p. 9. The Sarekat Islam (‘Islamic Union’), which temporarily united Islamic groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU, had since the 1920s declined in importance.
22 The PSII was the successor organisation to the Sarekat Islam.
23 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 79. There were three main reasons for Masyumi’s break-up: the political sidelining of ulama, socio-economic reasons such as obstructed state patronage, and the loss of the Ministry of Religion to the modernists. The Sumatran traditionalist organisation Perti had originally refused to join Masyumi and became a rival party. Fealy, Ulama and Politics, pp. 94-105.
24 Traditionalist organisations such as al-Jamiatul al-Washliyah, al-Ittihadiyah and Mathlau Anwar remained in Masyumi, but they all were small and locally based.
The deadlock of the Konstituante in early 1959 and the New Order regime’s refusal to lift Soekarno’s ban on Masyumi settled the party’s demise. It was the final and formal step in the segregation of the Masyumi tradition from political Islam. Following the prohibition, it was no longer possible to organise freely and maintain an unrestricted formation of cadres. After Masyumi dissolved itself, the correlation with its associates further receded. In the early 1960s, Gerakan Pemuda Islam (‘Islamic Youth Movement’, GPI) was dissolved. Persis left Masyumi in 1960 though Natsir and Isa Anshary—both Persis notables—remained active. In 1971, Muhammadiyah formally severed its ties to political parties.\(^{25}\) Overall, the number of Islamic groups grew leading to increasing competition between factions of similar doctrinal and political orientations. This differed to the 1950s when Masyumi was the only modernist party and Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (‘Islamic Students’ Association’, HMI) the only tertiary student Islamic organisation.\(^{26}\) Then GPI was the only youth organisation and Pelajar Islam Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Students’ Association’, PII) solely covered the secondary school students.\(^{27}\)

In response, the Masyumi camp split into several currents. The first of these was the *dakwah* (Arab: *da’wa*) current, focussing on the propagation of Islam. Most senior Islamic leaders committed themselves to making *dakwah* the pillar of Islamising Indonesian society. This resulted from the New Order’s restrictions on Islamic politics but the disappointing election results of Islamic parties in the past also impacted on the view that many Muslims ought to enlarge their commitment toward Islam.

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\(^{25}\) Early in the New Order, the support of Muhammadiyah and other major Islamic organisations for Masyumi still had seemed unrelenting as they demanded to rehabilitate the party. Samson, *Islam*, p. 1005.

\(^{26}\) HMI has traditionally the most diverse membership among Islamic organisations.

\(^{27}\) GPII (later GPI) was founded in 1945, PII in 1946 and HMI in 1947. PII graduates normally proceeded through HMI. From the 1960s on, Muhammadiyah and NU increased the number of their own student outlets. In the 1960s, the NU-affiliated Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (‘Movement of Indonesian Muslim Students’, PMII) emerged, later the Muhammadiyah-affiliated Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (‘Union of Muhammadiyah Students’, IMM). Both were founded by former HMI members. Further splintering occurred through splits within organisations, like in HMI, Sarekat Islam and al-Isyad.
The *Dakwah* Current

The ensuing Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’, DDII) always saw itself as the main custodian of the Masyumi spirit. This self-awareness stemmed from the fact that most of the senior Masyumi leaders from the 1950s had joined and built up the organisation (see Appendix II). By 2001, the last of these men had died. Younger devotees of Masyumi based their own legitimacy on having served on the staff of Masyumi seniors. Others had obtained the permission of Masyumi leaders to assume high office in DDII. The doctrinal breadth of the *dakwah* stream covered both moderate and doctrinaire modernists. As self-proclaimed adherents of the *ahlul sunnah wal-jamaah* (‘adherents of the Prophetic tradition and the community’), DDII has been highly committed to stamp out “heretic” Islamic organisations and esoterism, such as in Shiite Islam.

The desire to sustain the spirit of Masyumi had been apparent throughout the New Order. An illustrative example was the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyyah (‘Islamic Brotherhood Forum’, FUI), formed in 1989. FUI was dominated by senior Masyumi, Persis and Majelis Ulama Indonesia (‘Indonesian Ulama Council’, MUI) leaders, most of whom had passed 70 or 80 years of age. Most modernists kept their distance from FUI because they depended on the government’s forbearance and...

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28 Among them Natsir, Mohammad Roem, Sjarfruddin Prawiranegara, Dr. Anwar Haryono, Prawoto Mangkusamito, Prof. Kasman Singomendo, Noer Ali, Prof. Rasjidji, Faqih Usman, Burhanuddin Harahap, Sholeh Iskandar and Yunan Nasution.

29 Fealy and Platzdasch, *Masyumi Legacy*, p. 82.


31 Doctrinal differences among DDII or Persis notables were often displayed in everyday habits such as the toleration of music and smoking or variations of female dress codes. Interview, Lukman Hakiem, Jakarta, 27 November 2001.

32 The founders included Natsir, K.H. Masykur (NU), K.H. Latief Muchtar (Persis), CH. Ibrahim (Sarekat Islam), K.H. Nur Ali, Nurulhulda (from the Perti faction in PPP), K.H. Sholeh Iskandar, K.H. Dadun Abdulkhohar (both Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia, ‘Indonesian Pondok Pesantren Cooperation Body’, BKSPPI), Dr. Ismail Sunny (Muhammadiyah), Nuddin Lubis and K.H. Sjaichu (both NU). Younger affiliates included Dr. Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah), the Salam-mosque co-founder A.M. Luthfi, GPI Chairman Anwar Shaleh, KISDI Chairman Ahmad Sumargono, Hussein Umar, K.H. Kholil Ridwan (Chairman BKSPPI), Rusdy Hamka (PPP) and Tamsil Linrung (Majelis Penyelamet Organisasi, ‘Council for Safeguarding HMI’, HMI MPO and DDII), M.S. Ka’ban (HMI MPO) and PPP politicians close to DDII such as Faisal Baasir, Hartono Mardjono and Mohammad Soleiman. Most initiators like Anwar Haryono, Rasjidji (a leading Islamist intellectual and critic of Nurcholish Majid) andMohamad Natsir were not affiliated to a political party. *Sejarah Pengerakan Umat: Visi & Misi Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyyah* (no publisher, no place, no date, probably 1996) and Ramian Mardjono, *Sejarah Partai Bulan Bintang – Dari MIAI sampai Deklarasi Partai Bulan Bintang*, DPP PBB, Jakarta, 2001, p. 59.
because they perceived Masyumi seniors as potential competitors. Curbed by the narrow limits set out by the regime, through associations like FUI Masyumi leaders aimed to anticipate the channelling of Muslim political potential into a single party in an unforeseen future. The achievement, however, was confined to that of reviving the emotional link to Masyumi’s legacy and to binding a few younger activists to the cause of its renewal. These ties led to strong identification with domestic Islamic themes and became crucial for the policies and rhetoric of Masyumi legatee parties and individuals in other groups and parties in 1998.

Other modernist sections dropped Masyumi’s agendas or established a modified version in reaction to the external circumstances. This continued the erosion of earlier ideals and reduced further their ideological rigour. These sections, however, maintained an associative spirit among former adherents of the Masyumi camp. This spirit was linked to the notion of the Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang (‘Greater Crescent and Star Family’ henceforth also ‘keluarga’), a popular reference since the 1960s. The term Keluarga Besar points to a hierarchical order in which members have diffuse degrees of commitment and engagement. It comprises Masyumi’s former ‘special members’ and affiliated organisations, which from 1952 to 1959 formed Masyumi’s support base. These organisations lacked a formal structural link with Masyumi, but the notion of keluarga created a sense of political commonality between members and was sustained as a ‘symbol of solidarity’ among Muslims. This spirit also survived among traditionalists with family connections to Masyumi. Yet in spite of an ongoing associative spirit, this never led to joint political action.

35 FUI had no external authority. Its decisions, therefore, had no impact on the policy outlook of organisations such as PII, Muhammadiyah or HMI.
36 The term was inspired by Masyumi’s symbol in the 1955 elections. Deliar Noer, Partai Islam, p. 61.
37 The keluarga included the major socio-religious organisations (Muhammadiyah, Persis, and PUI), the major youth organisations such as the tertiary HMI, the secondary school PII, GPI, the al-Irsyad foundation and several smaller local groups.
Keluarga members praised Masyumi for various reasons. In their “memories”, Masyumi lives on as a champion of democracy, a resolute guardian of Islam, a steadfast opponent of communism and an advocate of political fair play. Masyumi leaders, they stress, were hard working, principled and modest, with a gentle personality and forbearing attitude. Bulan Bintang leaders often commended what they see as Masyumi’s devotion to Indonesia’s religious and cultural diversity. This included maintaining good relationships with political opponents and cooperating with Muslims and Christians alike. Importantly, they also took pride in the fact that Masyumi’s tradition demanded a firm constitutionalism (taat hukum). There is general agreement that Masyumi leaders sustained these noble features despite ongoing hardship. Natsir, in the words of Prof. Yusril Ilza Mahendra, the later Chairman of the Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB), was described as ‘a well that never dried out although the dry season went on and on’. Masyumi’s goals, above all, the determination to strive for Islam through constitutional means, went beyond what a single generation could achieve. Another outlook shared by keluarga members was the strict anti-leftism of Islamic parties and, particularly, Masyumi’s unwillingness to cooperate and work together with communists. Party leaders gave as reasons both that communists were enemies of democracy and that they denied the existence of God and thus were kafir (infidels, heathen).

Though these “memories” persisted in the Parmusi current, it only sustained an innovated partial Islamist agenda adapted to the particular circumstances of the New Order. Parmusi stood for Partai Muslimin Indonesia (‘Indonesian Muslim Party’).

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39 The DDII-affiliated Media Dakwah, Suara Masjid, Serial Khutbah Jumat and Mimbar Ulama most actively cultivated these “memories”, in particular since Natsir’s death in February 1993.
41 Mahendra, Pendahuluan, p. 1. To highlight the modest character of Masyumi leaders, it was often mentioned that Natsir still rode his bicycle to office during his term as Prime-minister.
42 Mahendra, Pendahuluan, p. 4.
43 The anti-communist stance has been widely praised, including by leaders of contemporary pluralist parties. See for example Amien Rais “Tiga Prestasi Masyumi”, Serial Mediah Dakwah, November 1987, p. 17.
44 See, for example, “Komunisme Kufur Menurut Hukum Islam” (‘Islam holds communism to be heathen’), Hikmah, January 1955, pp. 13-4 and Mohammad Natsir, “Membela nikmat jg. diberikan demokrasi”, Hikmah, 16 March 1957.
45 When PPP was established, the regime required Parmusi and its three PPP associates to drop any reference to their former status as separate parties. Thereafter they were known as unsur (‘elements’) within PPP. Parmusi’s unsur name was altered to Muslimin Indonesia (MI).
It was Masyumi’s nominal replacement but the new regime banned senior Masyumi leaders from joining. Modernist politicians who chose not to support the government party Golkar came to perceive Parmusi as the only chance for ongoing formal political representation for the Islamic community while trying to remain independence from the New Order’s corporatist network. This proved of limited success and the regime’s political and security agencies frequently interfered in Parmusi’s internal matters. At the 1971 elections, the party merely won 5.4% of the vote by using the symbols and images of Masyumi.

PPP’s Partial Islamist Agenda

In the view of DDII and FUI, Parmusi did not carry on Masyumi’s ideals and program. Indeed, as opposition to the government, Parmusi was less dynamic than NU and this set an obvious contrast to the legacy continued by DDII. In 1973, Parmusi was incorporated into Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP). In the five post-1973 New Order elections, PPP’s results ranged from a high of 29.3% to a low of 15.9%. During the following years, the regime stoked rivalries between the Parmusi and the NU camp in PPP. It aimed at counterbalancing the larger and more outspoken NU made by making sure that Parmusi leaders obtained the chairmanship of the party. A smaller number of Parmusi politicians maintained active links with Natsir and DDII, for example, Mohammad Soleiman and Faisal Baasir.

46 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, pp. 82-3.
47 This was evident in the nomination of Parmusi’s Chairman Mohamed Mintaredja who was the choice of the government rather than the party.
48 Yusril Ilza, Activism and Intellectualism, p. 129.
49 NU leaders, for example, were more sympathetic toward the Petisi 50 (‘Petition of 50’), an outer-parliamentarian opposition group attacking the New Order’s repressive policies. The group also comprised several senior Masyumi leaders. 17 NU members signed the declaration of the Petition, triggering critique from within MI. Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim, The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: The Political Journey of Islam under Indonesia’s New Order (1973-1987), McGill University, 1993, p. 74.
50 PPP’s electoral results during the New Order were: 29.3% in 1977; 27% in 1982; 16% in 1987, 17% in 1992; and 22% in 1997.
Besides barring *shari'ah* agendas, the government, above all, appeared keen to eradicate formal expressions of political Islam. In 1973, both Islam and Pancasila were declared to be founding principles of PPP. In 1979, the status of Islam in the party was downgraded as an ‘identifying characteristic’. As a next step, PPP had to change its party symbol and electoral slogans.\(^{52}\) PPP was one of the first Islamic organisations to accept Pancasila as ‘sole ideological foundation’ (*asas tunggal*) and in 1986 the *kab’ah* (Holy Shrine) was replaced by a star symbol.\(^{53}\) PPP, then, officially became open for non-Muslims to join although this hardly ever happened. In fact, it always remained an exclusively Muslim party and a complete separation from its affiliated organisations never occurred.\(^{54}\)

Moreover, despite these restrictions, there were no substantial changes in PPP’s campaign material. The party was still able to claim to defend Islam as long as this claim was not expressed in *shari’ah* terms.\(^{55}\) Typically, authoritarian systems such as the New Order permit a limited number of “oppositional” issues and thus retain a restricted ‘space for dissent’.\(^{56}\) Such concessions prevent the complete disuasion of the opposition and a definitive inner break with the regime. The scope for such dispute, of course, was never sufficient to question the fundamental ideals on which the ruling elites based their authority. Yet restrictions in various Muslim autocracies tended to be more sweeping than those of the New Order. The latter controlled the political clout of any potential challenger, including Islam, but unlike many similar regimes, it strongly invested in the social and cultural aspects of Islam.\(^{57}\)

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\(^{52}\) The party symbol was under fierce debate at PPP’s 1984 National Congress (Muktamar). In 1985, the regime issued a regulation banning socio-religious organisations from being formally associated with political parties. It also banned the use of Arabic scripture and quotes from the Qur’an. During Djaelani Naro’s leadership, Islamic elements were removed from party regulations. Jean van de Kok, “A Survey of Political Developments in Indonesia During the Second Half of 1987: The Impact of the Election on Social and Political Developments in the Country”, *RIMA*, Summer 1988.

\(^{53}\) The pragmatist Naro, nonetheless, preserved the *ka’bah* as party symbol for maintaining links to PPP’s constituency. Hakim, *Political Journey*, p. 98.

\(^{54}\) For example, at the 1987 elections, PPP still claimed to represent NU. Syamsuddin Haris, *PPP dan Politik Orde Baru*, Grasindo, Jakarta, 1991, p. 140.

\(^{55}\) Haris, *PPP*, pp. 130-1.

\(^{56}\) Juan Linz has pointed to this ‘limited pluralism’ of authoritarian regimes, in contrast to totalitarian systems. Linz, *Regimes*, cited in Aspinall, *Opposition*.

As a result, PPP came to support several popular Muslim (umat) themes. Islamist-fuelled opposition concentrated on popular issues of that time such as the 1973 Marriage Law and the 1978 Kepercayaan Law. In both areas, PPP had some success in resisting the regime’s attempts to undermine the position of Islam.\(^{58}\) PPP also defended Masyumi’s primary concern to ensure a strictly religious reading of the Pancasila based on the first principle and restated in Paragraph 29, First Article: the state is based on ‘The One All-Powerful God’ (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*).\(^{59}\) But on the Jakarta Charter and *shari‘ah*, the party had to comply with the Pancasila-based tenet.

PPP thus defended a typical quasi-ideological program with a firm position on selected key issues. The governmental ban on *shari‘ah* issues made it at the same time necessary to give special vocal attention to the ethical and moral aspects of Islam. This was thus, above all, a matter of rhetorical adjustment to ensure the party’s political survival. It nevertheless remained pivotal for PPP to ensure that a number of umat-related themes continued to dictate its agenda in order to sustain links to its constituency.\(^{60}\)

As a ‘federation of different orientations’, PPP was never able or even willing to develop and sustain a coherent and full ideology. The party always centred on efforts to balance its independent power camps which necessarily led to doctrinal rifts.\(^{61}\) MI (later Parmusi), NU, Sarekat Islam and Perti protected their organisations’ interests which owed much to European socialist thinking and to secular states such as Turkey where the Constitution forbade its citizens to ‘even partially found the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious tenets’ (art. 24 of the Turkish Constitution, quoted in Garvey, *Introduction*, p. 15). The scope of secularism in authoritarian states was also wider in pre-revolutionary Iran, Nasser’s Egypt, Bourguiba’s Tunisia or Assad’s Syria (after 1963).\(^{58}\) The term *kepercayaan* refers to syncretic forms of Islam, attacked by PPP as being in violation of Islam’s strict monotheism. The bill had proposed to acknowledge *kepercayaan* as sixth officially recognised religion.

\(^{58}\) The term *kepercayaan* refers to syncretic forms of Islam, attacked by PPP as being in violation of Islam’s strict monotheism. The bill had proposed to acknowledge *kepercayaan* as sixth officially recognised religion.

\(^{59}\) During the 1978 MPR session, PPP MPs approved the re-election of President Soeharto but walked out after a controversy over the first principle’s interpretation. Geoffrey C. Gunn, “Ideology and the Concept of Government in the Indonesian New Order”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 8, August 1979, p. 759.


and used to strictly support party candidates along factional lines. A factional decision-making process was the key barrier for PPP to achieve unanimity: 'a problem comes up and each group first negotiates among itself'. PPP thus developed into a political alliance but never established a coherent body of ideas shared by all its components. As the rivalry between Parmusi and NU elites became a customary element of PPP’s political life, party Congresses tended to be tightly staged and passed up substantive debates on policy issues.

PPP was also fettered by intricate hierarchies. Up to 1984, the party appeared to have a double executive, divided into a Central Board and presidency plus two advisory boards. One of these advisory boards was the Religious Council (Syuro). These boards often issued conflicting policies and orders and there was an unclear allocation of duties and responsibilities. Policy decisions had very limited impact on the activities of regional boards and party cadres. After the formal deletion of the Syuro Council and the presidency in 1984, PPP’s internal structure seemingly became clearer. But working mechanisms between the parliamentary faction and the Central Board remained obscure and the quality of management a matter of concern. Disputes centred on lucrative positions and patronage resources in national or regional parliaments and the party bureaucracy. This rancour happened at the expense of a coordinated leadership, a clear political strategy and transparent policy-making mechanisms. During the 1980s, it was common that a small elite

62 Radi, Strategi, p. 150.
63 The main division was between Parmusi and NU, but, in addition, the two camps were often entangled in internal rancour. There were tensions over the composition of party boards, which often failed to get the unanimous approval from within the party. It was common that complaints were made toward the press and thereby compromised proper party mechanisms. The fragile internal stability was also due to inconsistent membership regulations. Haris, PPP, p. 133.
64 The central issue of these Congresses was the election of General Chairman. It was common to pay off local branches in return for their votes. The statutes required convening for Congress once every four years but only two of those Congresses were held between 1973 and 1991. A third Congress followed in 1994, once again strained by conflict between NU and Parmusi with each camp split into three competing factions. See Saiful Muzani, “The Devaluation of Aliran Politics: Views from the Third Congress of the PPP”, Studia Islamika, no. 3, 1994, pp. 177-223 (esp. pp. 184-5); Haris, PPP, p. 135; Radi, Strategi, p. 105.
65 Cees van Dijk, Survey of Political Developments in the Second Half of 1984: The National Congress of the PPP and the Pancasila Principle", RIMA, winter 1985, p. 179. This was a direct consequence of the many interests groups in the party which all had to be accommodated.
decided unilaterally about policies without consulting the party board. At the same
time, the regime ensured that PPP lacked strong figures able to create a sense of
unity. Prior to Congresses party activities peaked and the criticism was made that
PPP’s promotion of Islam centred on the lead-up to polls. The ongoing feuds and
apparent concern with power politics alienated PPP from its traditional following and
diminished sympathies among the Islamic student and mosque movement. Moreover,
from the late 1980s there were increasing signs of tension between older and younger
elites. The latter openly detested the way that senior leaders clung to status and
power. These issues would continue to hamper the party from 1998 on.

Campus Islamism

The associative spirit of the keluarga was, to some extent, also evident in the esteem
of foreign ideological teachings among campus Islam. While barred from practical
politics, Masyumi leaders and their associates in the keluarga had facilitated the
spreading of a self-protective religious spirit at secular state universities. When, in
the early 1980s, the New Order sought to shut down the political activities on
campus, student groups adopted the Muslim Brotherhood organisational methods,
most importantly the use of cells (usroh) for religious training (tarbiyah). These
cells were led by murobbi (itinerant preachers and instructors) and consisted of ten to
twelve cadres.

Senior Masyumi leaders such as Prof. Rasjidi and Natsir were vital in circulating the
doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i-Islami, translating and publishing

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67 Radi, Strategi, pp. 152-3; Haris, PPP, p. 132.
68 Jean van de Kok, “Dissension within the PPP”, RIMA, winter 1988, p. 171. The result of these rifts
was PPP’s worst performance in an election (1987) since its foundation.
69 Haris, PPP, p. 134.
70 Haris, PPP, p. 135.
71 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy.
72 An often-quoted statement by Natsir is his call to re-direct the Islamic struggle to mosques,
campuses and pesantren. The pioneering group was Latihan Mujahidin Dakwah. DDII senior leader
Dr. Imaddudin Abdulahim initiated it at the Salman mosque of the “Technological Institute of
Bandung” in 1974. Many activists see this group as having initiated the Islamist movement at
 campuses and mosques.
73 Qutb’s highly influential commentary on the Qur’an Fi Zilal al Qur’an (“In the the Shadows of the
Quran”) had, at least partly, been available in Indonesian translation since 1952. Johns, Coming to
Terms, p. 71.
the works of Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.\textsuperscript{74} These teachings imported a new political culture into Indonesian Islamism. They became the rationale for the Islamic student and mosque movement, which consciously sought distance from the traditions and themes of the Masyumi camp.\textsuperscript{75} Initially, the *keluarga* was disaffected by Shiite revolutionary thought, which had played a role in forming campus Islam. DDII and other Sunni groups see Shiism in the “heretic” tradition of the *kharijites* and other dissident streams.\textsuperscript{76} Shiite influences, however, never gained strong roots among campus based Islamists. After the enthusiasm triggered by the success of the first Islamic revolution 1979 in Iran led to a fleeting rise of interest in Shiite political theory, the campus movement detected contentious theological aspects and abandoned it.\textsuperscript{77}

DDII was not the only catalyst in this campus *dakwah* movement. Yet it played a momentous role in popularising foreign ideological approaches. A key Islamist activist held:

> What is clear, in concrete terms, is that campus mosques were the monumental achievement of Pak Natsir. So it was Pak Natsir who guarded the flourishing of campus mosques, beginning with Salman. And Natsir once declared ‘one day we will see Islamic cadre multiplying on campuses.’\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} DDII spread the works of Sayyid Qutb, Mustafa Masyhur, Abul A’la Mawdudi, al-Banna, Mohammad Qutb, Yusuf Qaradhawi, Said Hawa and Fathy Yakan. Other key DDII figures in thriving the circulation of Muslim Brotherhood writings were Abdi Sumaithi (known as Abu Ridho or Ridha) and Prof. Rahman Sainuddin, a prolific translator of Brotherhood works for Dewan Dakwah. DDII initiated mosque study groups at the University of Indonesia, at Surabaya’s Airlangga University, at the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta (Shalahuddin), and also at Ujung Pandang and in Padang. Interview, Rifyal Ka’bah, Jakarta, 5 January 2001. Several DDII leaders and affiliates played an active role in these groups, for example, Amien Rais in the Shalahuddin.

\textsuperscript{75} Among the Indonesian students in Arab countries who became closely acquainted with the new teachings were several later Partai Keadilan leaders: Dr. Salim Segaf, Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, Dr. Daud Rasyid, Abu Ridho and Abdul Hasib Hasan. Abu Ridho returned from Saudi Arabia in 1982. He co-founded *al-Islahy* press which translated the works of Muslim Brotherhood ideologues like Mustafa Masyhur. Hidayat Nur Wahid established the *al-Haramain* foundation in February 1993 after his return from Saudi Arabia. Salim Segaf founded the *al-Haraith* foundation, based in Sulawesi. Abdul Habib Hasan made *al-Hikmah* a *dakwah* center in South Jakarta, setting up study circles at various universities in Jakarta like the University of Indonesia. Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*, Penerbit Teraju, 2001, p. 165 and Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 12 April 2001.

\textsuperscript{76} Interview, Rifyal Ka’bah, Jakarta, 5 February 2001. The Shiite ideologue Ali Syariati became a major reference for the Salman movement. Shiite thought was later promoted by the book-publisher Mizan, disdained by DDII and other conservative Sunnis as a promoter of “heresy”.

\textsuperscript{77} Interviews, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 5 April 2001; Mohammad Hafiz, Jakarta, 16 April 2001. Shiite-influenced campus groups often adopted an esoteric or mystical approach toward Islamic teachings unacceptable for the main currents.

\textsuperscript{78} Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April 2001.
Campus activists readily paid homage to Masyumi but they also openly questioned the relevance of the traditional political approach in order to advance Islam. In particular, they viewed the open ideological frictions of the 1950s as exasperating. Furthermore, throughout the New Order Masyumi and DDII had neglected to bind new cadres to its cause. The political struggle for Islam, however, was inefficient without the systematic formation of devoted activists and campaigners. Mutammimul ‘Ula, a later Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK) leader who had been active in DDII, concluded that ‘history and political models have changed’. This meant that the Masyumi legacy ‘was not so important any more’.

DDII-based Mashadi, a later PK MP, expressed the view among campus activists on the cadreisation issue:

The old [Masyumi] figures always neglected cadreisation. The most they did was public lectures but there was nothing systematic. Natsir never gathered together people to win new cadres. Hence, the various ‘Masyumi’ parties did not get many seats. I think that is major reason why Masyumi is only a historical remnant with a big name.

Moreover, many younger activists regarded DDII’s post-Natsir leadership as quietist and docile. Natsir, who believed that leaders should rise “naturally” from society, left a legacy that was difficult for any successor to meet. His successor, Dr. Anwar Haryono, had substantive Masyumi credentials and was respected as an astute and productive intellectual but he lacked the personal authority and the historical weight of Natsir. Anwar’s own views were mostly based on Natsir’s. Hence, ‘for DDII’, Mutammimul summed up, ‘there was Anwar Haryono, for Masyumi there was no

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79 Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 April 2001.
80 Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 2000.
81 Interviews, Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000 (quote), Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 2000. Bulan Bintang leaders often argued that Masyumi had been unable to create cadres as the party had to dissolve itself. PK leaders held that, equally declared illegal during various periods, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jam‘aat-i-Islami successfully had maintained a devoted following. Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 April 2001.
85 Islamists have rarely adopted Anwar’s writings as a source on its own terms for their beliefs and actions.
successor'. But Anwar was 'not progressive' and 'too accommodative toward the government'. What is more, the campus activists claimed to act on a deeper understanding of Islam. In the words of Mashadi:

Our associates who studied in the Middle East did not agree with Anwar because they held that he did not really understand Islam [kurang faham Islam]. Anwar was more a politician than a da'i [preacher].

At the same time, when many senior Masyumi leaders died in the early 1990s, which initiated a leadership change in DDII, it weakened the link between Masyumi adherents and campus Islam, initiating a 'separation of generations'. In this course, the campus movement established its own leaders and formed with murobbi a type of religious instructor whose mission it was to form an evenly strong-mind assemblage of cadres. In the course of the mid-1990s, campus Islamism became increasingly self-reliant. From 1992 on, it took over student senates and by the mid-90s dominated campus politics.

Campus Islam's devotion to Muslim communality took on the ideals of foundational Islam, including the Prophet's perceived method of instructing disciples. Following a perception of the Prophet's guidance as unswerving yet compassionate, the dominant form of training upheld the possibility for debate and criticism. Unlike the Shiite perception of imamship as 'infallible' (mas'hum), the central stream of...
campus Islam identified the Prophet as the last ‘infallible’ human being. While stressing the need for discipline and rejecting libertarianism, it taught to oppose and disobey political repression. Abu Ridho, later a central PK ideologue, wrote:

A leader or a judge is not mas’hum [untarnished from mistakes and sin]. He or she [ia] is an ordinary human being who can be right and can be wrong, can be just or be cruel. It is an obligation for the Muslim society to constantly set straight leaders who have committed mistakes and fraud…

Hence, campus Islam fostered an alternative vision to the New Order and set up a counter-culture. Its central trait was a conscious retreat into an autonomous social hierarchy and value system. It redirected the traditional focus in the propagation of Islam, proclaiming that each Muslim had to endeavour to improve the moral life of the community. This orientation particularly stressed that the Islamic moral imperative was not individualist but communal. As such, Islam put ideological fervour into expanding inner resistance and fostered religiously motivated ‘civil disobedience’ (al-barā) against a regime classified as “impious”. It further sought to harness the alienation of younger Islamic elites from the materialist way of life promoted by the New Order’s pembangunan (‘development’) programs. In the words of Mutammimul ‘Ula:

This society that the bureaucrats say ‘is based in Pancasila’ is more and more mystified in distinguishing between noble and deprived values, between what is permitted [halal] and what is prohibited [haram]. This is what the developmentalist crowd calls pembangunan. Pembangunan with a set of diffuse values has brought

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94 Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April 2001.
95 A reverse motto of traditionalist thought demanding strict obedience toward authorities is ‘Better one hundred years of tyranny than a single week of anarchy’.
96 Abu Ridho, “Pemimpin Bangkrut”, Suara Keadilan, 16 January – 15 February 2001. While a religious instructor [murobbi] guided his disciples to learn about the fundamental nature of Islamic teachings, he lacked the enlightened status accorded to an imam. Such perceptions of traditional authority also contrasted with traditionalist doctrine in which the kyai stood at the peak of hierarchy with an absolute authority over students often enhanced through alleged supernatural abilities (taqlid: absolute obedience). Fealy, Ulama and Politics, pp. 18-9. The term usrah had similarly implied strict and uncritical obedience toward a religious authority. With its negative connotation, later dakwah organisations such as LDK, KAMMI and also PK deliberately avoided the term.
97 ‘Then it was as if we were running away from reality’. Interview, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 17 October 2001.
98 Traditionally, missionary activities (for example those of DDII) centred on secluded regions in the archipelago, anticipating the intrusion of Christian missionaries into “Muslim” terrain. Campus dakwah movements, by contrast, started with their immediate surrounding, for example, trying to engage the anak kafe (‘coffee shop kids’) in a dialogue about Islam and moral behaviour. Interview, Imam Rulyawan, Jakarta, 5 April 2001.
about double standards [nilai ganda] or a split personality. It has led to a philosophy ‘unity and conformity together with harmony’ both between what is true [haq] and what is wrong [bathil]... If this continues, the highest cost that has to be paid is the logical consequence of pembangunan itself [that is] the emergence of hypocrisy [kemunaifikan].

Many activists had perceived restrictions such as the ‘sole ideological foundation’ (asas tunggal) as calculated secularisation of national identity. With asas tunggal, the regime appeared to exclude Islam from the consensus Pancasila had claimed to represent because it portrayed Islam as damaging for national unity. The spiritual aridity of state-sanctioned propagation of religion enhanced the spirit to display formal Islamic attributes, demonstratively adapted to signal inner resistance and underlining the sense of a counter-lifestyle. Arabic was the counter-language to the arid bureaucratised terminology of the New Order.

There was no adequate response from established Muslim organisations to the influx of foreign Islamist concepts. Up to 1998, HMI struggled against an ‘Islam yes, HMI no’ attitude on campuses. PPP, in particular, never adapted to tarbiyah-type instruction and the systematic build-up of a protective outlook against influences from outside. The cell structure of campus Islam was very much unlike PPP’s flexible cadreisation methods and its purpose to create unanimity contrasted PPP’s internal lack of concord. In reverse, for most activists, PPP no longer represented the interests of Islam, lacking both the means and the willpower to establish an

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101 Interview, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 5 April 2001. It underscores the protest character of the movement that many campus activists came from a non-religious family background.
102 Much of the New Order’s ideological terminology was based in Sanskrit or ancient Javanese.
103 Anas Urbaningrum, “Menegakkan Khittah Perjuangan dan Visi HMI”, Republika, 27 September 1997. Under Soekarno, HMI had been an important oppositional force and the most influential student organisation. In the early 1970s, it managed to avoid incorporation into PPP. With the state’s meddling in campus politics, HMI’s influence declined. The ‘sole foundation’ campaign had further negative impact. In 1985, HMI split. By the mid-1980s, HMI Chairmen suffered from severe image-loss through incorporation into Golkar and the central bureaucracy. Increasingly dependent on the government’s patronage resources and thus wary to embarrass its seniors in influential positions, HMI lost much of its earlier prestige. By the 1990s, HMI was fiercely criticised for its unresponsive stance on umat themes such as the government’s ban on headscarfs at public schools. See Y. Setio Hadi (coordinator tim penulis), Masjid Kampus untuk Ummat & Bangsa (Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim UI), Lembaga Kajian Budaya Nusantara, 2000, pp. 119-20; Djoko Susilo, “50 Tahun Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI)-Habis Sudah “Lokomotif” Intelektual Itu”, Jawa Pos, 5 February 1997.
ideological alternative to the regime.\textsuperscript{105} PPP, in particular, came to be seen as having sold out the \textit{umat} on \textit{asas tunggal} when accepting the proviso much more quickly than NU and Muhammadiyah.

The Technocratic and the Militant Sub-Streams

A further proto-Islamist stream contained Muslims of an explicit ‘technocratic’ liking.\textsuperscript{106} This camp consisted of former Masyumi members and sympathisers who relinquished an Islamist agenda and pursued their careers via Golkar or one of its regime-endorsed affiliates such as Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (‘Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’, ICMI). Many ICMI activists were at the same time technocrats. They were attracted to the New Order’s developmentalist policies which showed some obvious parallels to prominent Islamic economic policies in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{107} With this technocratic outlook, they readily suppressed possible Islamist inclinations, especially to advance \textit{shari’ah}. Most were at ease to adopt Golkar’s secular disposition without proviso. A smaller number retained an aspiration to gradually Islamise the regime and society. Politicians of this current had become an influential force by the early 1980s. They were one of the first groups to gain advantage from the regime’s guarded siding with Islam almost a decade later.

Power within ICMI rested with public servants, academics and associates of Chairman Prof. B.J. Habibie.\textsuperscript{108} These were urban, middle-class modernists from the

\textsuperscript{105} When, in 1992, Natsir called on Muslims to vote for PPP, many campus activists continued to abstain from voting.

\textsuperscript{106} Fealy and Platzdasch, \textit{Masyumi Legacy}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{107} Since the late 1960s, HMI had produced many central figures of the New Order, among others Marie Muhammad, Tarmizi Taher, Adi Sasono (grandson of Masyumi founder Mohammad Roem), Abdul Gafur, Yusuf Kalla, Dr. Marwah Daud Ibrahim, Taari Abeng and Fahmi Idris. Among recent Golkar notables with a Bulan Bintang affiliation resulting from HMI leadership were Akbar Tanjung (HMI Chairman 1972-1974), Ade Komaruddin (Chairman Ciputat branch 1986, Chairman of the 1988 Central Board) and Ekky Syahruddin (Chairman Jakarta branch). Many of these people were at the same time involved in ICMI.

\textsuperscript{108} Edward Aspinall observed that ‘government bureaucrats with little apparent previous commitment to Islam...dominated its leadership’. \textit{Opposition}, p. 89. William Liddle described ICMI as ‘an organisation with an Islamic name but with minimal Islamic content’. The prevailing view is that ICMI was a direct result of Soeharto’s estrangement from the Indonesian army and thus a strategic attempt to build up an alternative support base. R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation”, \textit{Journal of Asian Studies}, Vo. 55, No. 3, August 1996, pp. 613-34.
non-Islamist current dominant among the Muhammadiyah and HMI elites.\textsuperscript{109} Islamists did not gain key positions; no DDII, Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (‘Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World’, KISDI) or Persis activists rose into ICMI’s higher ranks.\textsuperscript{110} The influence of ICMI cadre with an Islamist background such as Hussein Umar, Mohammad Soleiman, Yusril Ihza Mahendra and A.M. Luthfi remained minor and many obtained less important positions in its Majelis Pakar (‘Expert Council’).\textsuperscript{111}

Smaller splinter groups connected to the *keluarga* spirit surfaced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. One group consisted of militant elements. These Islamists became involved with the clandestine movement Darul Islam (‘Realm of Islam’, later known as Negara Islam Indonesia or NII) and a number of other militant offshoots. Its direct ideological counterpart became the “liberal” movement of which some initiators originally had risen from within the *keluarga* as well.\textsuperscript{112}

Those Muslims, most from an urban modernist background, who joined the New Order’s central bureaucracy and the political apparatus, had wide-ranging ideological views, with doctrinaire Islamists at one end of the spectrum and affiliates of “liberal” Islam at the other.\textsuperscript{113} It was impossible to demarcate these camps clearly, in particular since various groups were active in a variety of organisations with equally diverse ideological commitments. Apart from a few dozen prominent Islamists who had fled Indonesia or been sentenced to jail, in most of these organisations there was

\textsuperscript{109} Aspinall, *Opposition*, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{110} Among Masyumi senior leaders only Anwar Haryono and Hasan Basri joined the ICMI board. Donald Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia*, Routledge Curzon, London, New York, 2002, p. 89. Their influence was further lessened due to the unusual high number of 117 board members.
\textsuperscript{111} Porter, *Managing Politics*. Accordingly, the response by campus Islamists to what many saw as the government’s ‘tactical, partial, and artificial’ commitment to Islamise politics and national law remained reserved. Interview Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000. Also Interview, Andi Rahmat, Jakarta, 22 January 2001. ICMI-initiator Imaduddin Abdulahim had strong DDII affiliations but his influence in ICMI diminished gradually and, after 1998, he mainly worked as a business consultant.
\textsuperscript{112} Fealy and Platzdasch, *Masyumi Legacy*, p. 83-4. The designation *Natsir muda* (‘Young Natsir’) was most often bestowed on Nurcholish Madjid. But in the early 1970s, Nurcholish started to criticise Masyumi, especially its *shari'ah*-minded agenda.
\textsuperscript{113} Aspinall, *Opposition*, p. 333.
an intricate and unstrained intermingling of an Islamist minority and a less doctrinaire Muslim majority.  

The incorporation of significant sections of the *dakwah* and the technocratic streams of the Masyumi camp throughout the last decade of the old regime meant that, unlike many other liberalising Muslim countries, post-New Order Indonesia has not put the question of ‘Islamist participation’ and about ways to socialise Islamism into the new political system.  

There was no comparable ‘liberalization as crisis management’ or ‘a form of domestic peacemaking between enemies’. Islamists, including those coming from a campus-*tarbiyah* background, were free to found new parties, except that they had to adopt Pancasila as ideological basis until the law permitted them to adopt Islam as party ideology. The legal situation prior to the June 1999 elections was that, theoretically, no obstacle remained for Islamists occupying political power through electoral success.

Yet by then the weakening grip of the Masyumi tradition on Islamic politics had become a fact. Above all, it reflected the previous conversion of younger Muslim cadres to non-Islamist politics. Former Masyumi associates such as HMI, Muhammadiyah and PII formally dropped Islamist goals, above all the formalisation of *shari’ah* in the state. This suggested that neither of these organisations would back the re-formation of an Islamist party following Masyumi’s example. It was particularly unlikely that they would support writing *shari’ah* terms into the Constitution. However, though non-Islamism became the official policy of these organisations, support for *shari’ah* goals remained vital among sections of their...
cadres. This has resulted in a discrepancy between official policies of the elites and the secret sympathies of followers and, at times, between policies and the training material for cadres.  

Fragmentation of the *Keluarga*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Relation to Masyumi</th>
<th>Ideological Outlook 1950s</th>
<th>Political Affiliation during the New Order</th>
<th>Ideological Outlook 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>&quot;special member&quot;</td>
<td>Masyumi-affiliated as part of political Islam</td>
<td>Golkar, PPP</td>
<td>Non-Islamism as official policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMI</td>
<td>&quot;special member&quot;</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Golkar, PPP</td>
<td>Non-Islamism as official policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PII</td>
<td>&quot;special member&quot;</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>None, PPP, Golkar</td>
<td>Non-Islamism as official policy Ideologically and politically highly diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPI</td>
<td>&quot;special member&quot;</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>None, PPP</td>
<td>Islamist, defensive spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persis</td>
<td>&quot;special member&quot;</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>None, PPP</td>
<td>Islamist, de-politicised, low-profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Irsyad</td>
<td>&quot;special member&quot;</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>None, PPP</td>
<td>Islamist, de-politicised, low-profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Religiously Neutral</td>
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<tr>
<td>KISDI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None, PPP</td>
<td>Islamist, defensive spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None, PPP</td>
<td>Islamist, defensive spirit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As many previous leaders and cadres adopted more pragmatic and practical politics the Masyumi tradition lost its political and intellectual force. Nevertheless, remaining Masyumi leaders and their followers hoped to revive the support of the *keluarga* for establishing an Islamist party following the Masyumi example. Apart from historical and nostalgic reasons, it was, of course, pivotal for a new party to obtain a wide breadth of support bases that would ensure its survival at the 1999 elections.

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119 This is particularly the case in PII. PII’s cadreisation was comparatively taut in its ideological instruction while, at the same time, encouraging intellectual diversity and free political choices. The result has been internal diversity. PII was the only Muslim organisation successfully resisting the adoption of Pancasila as its ideological base. From 1986 to 1998, it operated as a semi-legal movement. Although it eventually adopted Pancasila in 1998, the training of PII cadres and the organisation’s statutes remained unaffected. In late 1998, PII formally returned to Islam but this, again, had no further impact. Underscoring its ambivalent doctrinal outlook, in 2000 PII supported Islamist parties in their bid to implement the Jakarta Charter in the Constitution. Interviews, Djayadi, Jakarta, 23 January 2001; Hillal Tri Anwar, Aye Sudarto and Surahman, Jakarta, 20 March 2001.
Expediency in the Re-formation of Islamic Politics after the Fall of Soeharto

Though most Muslims, especially modernists, have been paying tribute to the merits of Masyumi, in 1998 this appreciation did not translate into widespread practical support for the revival of the party. Only a few PPP, Golkar, Muhammadiyah or HMI leaders joined one of Masyumi’s self-styled successor parties. Particularly detrimental was the rejection by Muhammadiyah’s elite of a re-formed Masyumi, given that it had provided most of Masyumi’s support base in the 1950s. Nevertheless, few keluarga members openly dismissed the idea of an Islamist party and most organisations sent delegates to seminars held for preparation purposes. Their input, however, was not the same as giving practical support. It created an illusionary image of unanimity and concealed that most keluarga affiliates never contemplated backing an Islamist party.

DDII saw itself as custodian of the keluarga and took seriously its self-ascribed role of maintaining keluarga unity. This claim already had become evident in 1995 in the blend of anger and amusement following the foundation of the misleadingly named Masyumi Baru (‘The New Masyumi’) by the PPP politician Ridwan Saidi. Masyumi Baru’s connection to the “old” Masyumi was not compelling. In fact, it directly countered Islamist interests because Ridwan wanted his party to ‘stir up the honeymoon’ between ICMI and the government in the 1990s. Senior Islamist leaders were angered by the use of the Masyumi label and symbols and dismissive of

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120 Fealy, Ulama and Politics, p. 79.
121 Ridwan saw the religiously-neutral Golkar as ‘party of the future’ and as a possible coalition partner. Overall, Masyumi Baru was hardly designed as a serious political alternative. It did not have a clear leadership or perception of future constituencies. Former Masyumi official Mawardi Noer had planned to join but eventually decided not to do so. Interviews, Ridwan Saidi, Jakarta, 11 and 18 September 2000.
122 Interview, Ridwan Saidi, Jakarta, 18 September 2000. This was underscored through the partnership with groups such as the social-democratic Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (‘United Indonesian Democratic Party’, PUDI), the Sockarnoist neo-PNI party, the leftist Partai Rakyat Demokrat (‘Peoples’ Democratic Party’, PRD), the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) and several NGOs that loosely backed PDI (subsequently PDI-Perjuangan) Chairwoman Megawati and aimed to counter ICMI’s rise. These groups, unlike most Islamists, also opposed Habibie’s possible rise to the vice-presidency. Porter, Managing Politics, p. 185.
Masyumi Bam’s leadership, as it would lack an “appropriate” background and had ‘no significance whatsoever’. 123

Still it was hardly surprising that the opportunity to restore Islamist parties challenged the authority of the DDII leadership. 124 In the post-Natsir era, this authority centred in Anwar Haryono, Chairman from 1993 to his death in early 1999. When Soeharto fell in May 1998, only Anwar, Rasjidi and MUI-based Hasan Basri remained of Masyumi’s 1950s elite. 125 But the central authority for speaking on behalf of Masyumi was the ailing Anwar. 126 This was because when Masyumi was dissolved in 1960, Natsir handpicked the young cadre as party spokesman (juru bicara).

Many in the keluarga, however, questioned the wisdom of re-forming Masyumi and were, for various reasons, reluctant to support DDII. DDII held a Musyawarah Besar (‘Great Consultation’) in June 1998, shortly after Soeharto’s resignation, to foster ties among keluarga affiliates. Meanwhile, from April to August 1998, Muslim organisations, the vast majority of them modernist, were active in the Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam (‘Coordinating Body of the Muslim Community’, BKUI) with the objective of creating a single Islamist party. BKUI adopted Madjlisul Islamil a’laa Indonesia (MIAI) which led to the establishment of Masyumi as its model. 127 With its prestigious role in 1945 and 1949, the Kongres Umat Islam (‘Congress of the Muslim Community’, KUI) had considerable historical resonance. Accordingly,

124 In retrospect, some Islamist leaders devoted to reviving Masyumi linked these splits to Anwar Haryono’s and Hussein Umar’s weak grip on DDII. They argued that while it had been legitimate for keluarga members to join PPP in the past, the DDII leadership should have shown a stronger hand in re-directing cadres to the new Islamist party. Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001.
125 Rasjidi and Hasan Basri (Chairman of the ‘Indonesian Ulama Council’, MUI) died in 2001. Neither played a role in the re-formation process. Hasan had previously been another candidate to succeed Natsir. But he had a reputation for having been overly compliant toward the government as MUI had been a major pillar in Muslim support for Soeharto. Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000.
126 In 1996, Anwar suffered a stroke and, from 1998 on, was bound to a wheelchair.
127 Another example was the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin (‘Aiding Muslim Coordinating Body’, BKAM), active from 1965 to 1967, which hoped to lead Masyumi’s revival.
BKUI’s task was to prepare the third Kongres Umat Islam which—then—was to launch the Masyumi-successor party.\textsuperscript{128}

Contrary to rhetoric, there was wide awareness that their party would fail to get wide support from former Masyumi associates. One obvious cause for the dire outlook was that, by 1998, most senior leaders had died (Appendix II). The party, Anwar Haryono demanded, had to represent ‘in total’ Muslim aspirations and to ‘channel the aspirations of the Muslim community’.\textsuperscript{129} But the participation of many organisational envoys was only a gesture of reverence due to personal links to Masyumi’s senior leadership and nostalgic ties with its legacy as the sole Muslim party.\textsuperscript{130} Conflicting leadership ambitions and established patronage networks made a united modernist-based Islamist party a lofty goal. Hence, the keluarga, as Anwar observed, ‘is like a river which was sealed for decades; now as the seal has been removed, the water runs everywhere’\textsuperscript{131}

The expediency of several Islamist notables was a sign of the requirements of the early post-New Order days. Many DDII leaders, among them Hartono Mardjono, Mohammad Soleiman, Prof. Amir Yusuf Faisal, Ramlan Mardjoned and Kholil Ridwan, joined Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB), Masyumi’s official legatee. But a significant minority of DDII notables set up or joined new parties. Luthfi, Tamsil Linrung, A. M. Fatwa and Yahya Muhaimin were among the inaugural members of Partai Amanah Nasional (‘National Mandate Party’, PAN). They joined PAN despite being, in ideological terms, a religiously neutral party. PAN officially abstained from using Islamic symbols, terminology and shari‘ah

\textsuperscript{128} A.M. Luthfi, “Kita Berada pada Titik Reformasi Perjalanan Bangsa”, in Suharsono and Edi Ryanto (compilers), \textit{Partai Politik Era Reformasi}, PT Abadi, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 21-31. The Congress eventually took place in November 1998, three months after Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) was launched. Fewer organisations took part than in previous years. In contrast to the historic examples MIAI and KUI I, the traditionalist camp was only involved individually. Although DDII attended, the Congress was seen as staged by MUI-loyalists of the New Order regime and was widely met with cynicism. Interviews, Rifyal Ka’bah, Jakarta, 22 September 2000; Abdullah Hehamahua, Jakarta, 15 September 2000.

\textsuperscript{129} Anwar Haryono, “Mengamati Situasi di Era Reformasi”, \textit{Partai Politik Era Reformasi}, pp. 11-21 (This was Anwar’s address at DDII’s ‘Great Consultation’).

\textsuperscript{130} BKUI was established by consensus of leaders from DDII, Persis, SI, FUI, KISDI, BKSPPI, al-Irsyad, Perti, the Forum Silaturrahmi Ulama Habaib dan Tokoh Masyarakat (‘Goodwill Forum of Habaib Ulama and Community Leaders’, FSUHTM) and ICMI. Haryono, \textit{Mengamati; Naskah Pendirian dan Para Pendiri BKUI}, Jakarta, 28 April 1998.

\textsuperscript{131} Address (al-Azhar mosque) at the official declaration of PBB, reprinted under “Deklarasi Partai Bulan Bintang” in Mardjoned, \textit{Sejarah}, pp. 73-80 (quote p. 75).
goals, believing to stand for what one of its initiators called a ‘clean Golkar’ which could overcome ideological conflict and be an electoral winner. DDII activists with a strong commitment to foreign Islamist thought such as Abu Ridho, Mashadi, and Mutammimul ‘Ula had similar doubts about the benefits of reviving Masyumi. They played a central role in forming the Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK).

But most crucial was that key keluarga members such as Muhammadiyah, HMI and PII did not see support for an Islamist party as useful for their own interests; they perceived Masyumi’s Islamist approach and themes as anachronistic. With the exception of Persis and GPI which both supported PBB, none of the major socio-religious and student organisations backed an Islamist party and mobilised its constituencies for the 1999 elections. HMI and PII had well-established patronage links with Golkar and, to a lesser extent, with PPP, which they were unwilling to put at risk. These youth organisations have always depended on good links with people in high office providing them with patronage. A new Islamist party did not promise to fulfil this need. PII, for example, signed as participant in BKUI not as formal statement of support but ‘only to give evidence of attendance’. In 1999, PII’s leadership did not advise cadres to vote for a particular party. Moreover, keluarga members did not see a modernist-based Islamist party as an electoral winner. PII Chairman Djayadi (1998-2000) reasoned about what had remained of Masyumi’s appeal:

Only old people understand Masyumi’s symbols. Those who are active [today] know [them] but don’t really understand what Masyumi was. Why? Because there was no socialisation. An Islamic-political socialisation from the Old to the New Order-

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133 Muhammadiyah attended the preparations because of its historical status as a ‘special member’ of Masyumi. But participation was confined to several leaders close to DDII, such as the preacher and long-time activist A.M. Fatwa.
134 Among the representatives of 11 organisations registered in BKUI, only one, Ahmad Sumargono (for KISDI), became a leading PBB official. Among the representatives were Ahmad Tirtosudiro (representing ICMI), Geys Amar (al-Irsyad Chairman) and Shiddiq Amien (Persis Chairman). Kholil Ridwan, Chairman of BKSPPI, left PBB in mid-2000 after dispute. Laporan Sidang II Munas (Lanjutan) BKUI-1998, Jakarta, 10 June 1998.
135 Interview, Hillal Tri Anwar, Aye Sudarto and Surahman, Jakarta, 20 March 2001. Throughout the 1990s, former PII leaders gained influential positions in Golkar and ICMI and benefited from good relations to Habibie, among them Adi Sasono, Dr. Ryaas Rasyid, Dr. Fuad Bawazier, Jimly Assidiquie and Dr. Watik Pratiknya. None of these men joined an Islamist party in 1998.
generation did not happen. Therefore it is not possible to use [Masyumi's] symbols and obtain many votes.137

Similarly, prior to the 1955 elections, HMI instructed cadres to vote for an Islamic party. By contrast, at the 1999 elections, HMI only called on cadres to vote for a party ‘aspirational’ toward the Muslim community. It did not call to vote for a party formally based on Islam or pursuing shari’ah goals.138 Without formal political affiliation, HMI members dispersed their votes along the whole political spectrum.

ICMI, despite continuing Masyumi’s technocratic orientation, played a trifling role in reviving Islamist parties.139 Tellingly, none of its more prominent Islamic activists joined an Islamist party.140 As such, the involvement of the bulk of Islamic activists in ICMI’s elite in the preparation of an Islamist party through DDII was only symbolic.

Most in the traditionalist camp, unsurprisingly, never seriously considered joining a Masyumi successor party. Still, following Masyumi’s original conception as party for all Muslims, pleas were made to consult with both the Muhammadiyah and NU leadership before the party launch.141 In awareness that NU undertook separate preparations, these pleas appear as a mere formality.142 Eventually, almost all

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139 Only two ICMI founders attained leadership positions in Islamist parties: the academic Yusuf Amir Faisal and PPP Chairman Hartono Mardjono. The two men were among ICMI’s signatories in 1990. Both became PBB Chairmen. A substantial role of other ICMI members in the preparation process was confined to a few DDII leaders, particularly Anwar Haryono, Luthfi, Hussein Umar and Mohammad Soleiman.
140 ICMI’s Islamic activist section comprised Amien Rais, Watik Pratiknya (Muhammadiyah), the NGO veterans Dr. Dawam Rahardjo and Adi Sasono, the PPP dissenter Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Dr. Nasir Tamara (also PPP), Imaddudin Abdullahim and Dr. Muslim Nasution (both initiators of the Salman movement).
141 This was later formally decided. In the late 1940s, NU founder Hasyim As’jari was Masyumi Chairman and his son Wahid Hasyim Deputy Chairman.
142 NU’s distrust of the modernists had not substantially lessened since it seceded from Masyumi in 1952. Neither had the suspicion of other traditionalist affiliates of Masyumi in the 1940s and early 50s like Perti, al-Washliyah, al-Ittihadiyah, PUII and Nahdlatul Wathan. Most traditionalists close to the Bulan Bintang camp came from Perti and a small dissident section in NU. This camp, led by Abdurrahman Wahid’s uncle Yusuf Hasyim, had remained ideologically closer to Masyumi and was marginalised by the NU patriarch. Despite this, it founded its own traditionalist party offshoot.

87
traditionalists withdrew from supporting a modernist-dominated party after rumours that it was to be named Masyumi, described as a ‘psychological burden’ for NU.\textsuperscript{143}

Most in the Parmusi camp in PPP followed a similarly expedient line. PPP, of course, was reluctant to accept provisos by political newcomers.\textsuperscript{144} With its established networks and patronage opportunities, PPP leaders expected newcomers to merge with their party.\textsuperscript{145} Those PPP leaders more closely affiliated to the keluarga saw it as more important to sustain existing political allegiances. As a result, many Parmusi-notables with long links to DDII such as Prof. A. M. Saefuddin, Husni Thamrin and Faisal Baasir remained in PPP.

Those determined to set up a new Islamist party had to deal with the dilemma rising from an agreement to a drawn-out party establishment process, while realising that a quick launch would be more beneficial. To swiftly establish a party meant to stay ahead of political competitors in the run-up to the 1999 elections. Several DDII notables, most prominently Hussein Umar (Secretary-General), Abdullah Hehamahua and Luthfi, dissented over the eventual shortening of the inauguration process leading to the launch of PBB as early as July 1998. They criticised that colleagues had breached earlier agreements and put their own interests first.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{143} Interview, M.S. Ka‘ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000. More important were developments in the traditionalist camp, such as the rivalry between PPP and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (‘National Awakening Party’, PKB).

\textsuperscript{144} There were calls to reassess PPP’s policies, to adopt a new party symbol and leadership and even to dissolve the party due to its New Order image. “Konsep Aliansi dan Koalisi Partai-Partai Islam”, Profil 48 Ketua Umum Parpol RI, Kerjasama Kreasi Karya Wiguna dan NIAS, Jakarta, 1999; Interview, Abdullah Hehamahua, Jakarta, 15 September 2000.

\textsuperscript{145} PPP leaders offered Bulan Bintang notables such as Sumargono and Ka‘ban to become parliamentarians. The latter declined because of NU’s participation. They also argued that the ‘political identity of PPP wasn’t clear’. Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 31 October 2000.

\textsuperscript{146} There were charges of ‘political egoism’ and ‘overt pragmatism’, as many officials had desired to take over leadership positions and rushed to launch the party instead of following the procedures. Interviews, A.M. Luthfi, Jakarta, 7 November 2000; Hussein Umar, Jakarta, September 2000. Individual members of the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (FUI) separately met with other Muslim leaders, thereby ignoring DDII’s Congress decision in June 1998 to delegate authority to the Kongres Umat Islam to inaugurate a single party. Konsep Aliansi. There also were claims that Anwar Haryono had been tricked into approving of PBB’s declaration. Allegedly, he was told to be on his way to a press conference when, in fact, it was the official declaration of PBB. Taken by surprise, he approved the launch. Interview, Hussein Umar, Jakarta, September 2000. Other PBB leaders disputed that this has happened.
An issue under debate was whether and when the use of the name Masyumi and its symbol (the crescent and star) should be legalised. There was common agreement among keluarga leaders such as Anwar Haryono, Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Prof. Deliar Noer that Masyumi was never formally banned. Instead, under the pressure of Soekarno’s presidential decree (No.200 1960), Masyumi eventually dissolved itself.\footnote{Yusril Ihza Mahendra, “Neo Masjumi, Neo PNI”, Gatra, 11 November 1995; “Dr. Anwar Harjono SH. ‘Sekarang Mulai Ada Keseimbangan’” (Interview), Ummat, 10 July 1995; Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000.} Otherwise, the party was in danger of being declared illegal. They also argued that Natsir’s detention, too, had lacked legal grounds as acts of subversion laid against him were never proven. Hence, when Soeharto resigned from office, the ban was obsolete and prevailed merely as a political tool.\footnote{Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000; Mardjoned, Sejarah, pp. 69 and 74 and “Partai Bulan Bintang teruskan cita-cita besar Masyumi”, Buletin Bintang, No. 2, 1-14 September 1998.} But as the ban was still effective, there was hesitation whether to defy it.\footnote{In late June 1998, several DDII leaders (Anwar, Soleiman, Lutfhi and Hartono Mardjono) met with President Habibie, calling on him to rehabilitate Masyumi and abolish Soekarno’s decree. “Hasil-Hasil Musyawarah Besar Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia” reprinted in Partai Politik Era Reformasi, pp. 81-97. DDII leaders believed Habibie’s refusal was because of concern his supporters in Golkar would oppose the permission to revive Masyumi labels. Interview, Hartono Mardjono, Jakarta, 25 January 2001.} Eventually, most Bulan Bintang leaders agreed that there was no constitutional basis for reviving the label ‘Masyumi’ unless the ban was formally lifted. Explaining this position, Anwar pointed to Masyumi’s traditional respect for the Constitution.\footnote{“Partai Bulan Bintang Teruskan Cita-cita Besar Masyumi” (‘Partai Bulan Bintang continues the great ideals of Masyumi’), Bulan Bintang, No. 2, 1-14 September 1998, 1998, p. 2; “Ijtihad kita tidak salah”, Abadi, 5-11 November 1998, p. 8.} In addition, there were concerns that the label Masyumi would be a burden for the new party and its leaders.\footnote{Interview, M.S. Ka’ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000.}

Deliar Noer, a leading political scientist and former HMI Chairman, and Abdullah Hehamahua, a DDII affiliate and likewise a former HMI Chairman, were two main dissenters among Bulan Bintang leaders. Both insisted on Islam as the ideological base of the new party as ‘it was not wrong to defy a wrong regulation’.\footnote{Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000.} They fiercely opposed PPP’s decision to retain Pancasila as party base until the law

\footnote{By mid-1998, asas tunggal was still in place. Though only dropped in November 1998, it was of little significance for the party preparations. The reason was that in mid-1998 it seemed only a matter of time until it would be abolished. Hence, most Islamists suggested a compromise solution with Pancasila as doctrinal party base but with a reference to ‘Islamic faith’ (aqidah). Partai Umat Islam (PUI), PPII Masyumi and Partai Keadilan ignored the ban.}
permitted it to do otherwise.\textsuperscript{153} Moreover, both entered the re-formation process as outsiders because of a very critical stance toward ICMI and its Chairman Habibie.\textsuperscript{154} Both had remained uncompromisingly critical toward the Soeharto regime when it had approached modernist Muslims in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{155} Deliar Noer demanded a radical break by dissolving all New Order parties, together with PPP, because they all were ‘handicapped by history’.\textsuperscript{156} Such a stance, of course, obstructed relationships both with DDII and PPP as with individual Muslim leaders such as Yusril and Amien Rais, who had appeared more willing to collaborate with the regime.\textsuperscript{157}

Among keluarga senior leaders, however, only Deliar Noer publicly argued that reviving Masyumi was anachronistic.\textsuperscript{158} He asked:

Who among the younger people today knows of Masyumi? Ask them whether they know of Masyumi or not. They definitely will ask what Masyumi is. This has to be taken into account. What remains of Masyumi are memories. [It] therefore cannot be used to grasp the masses in our times.\textsuperscript{159}

Sharing this scepticism, Abdullah nevertheless was convinced that Masyumi’s name, symbols and original program should be revived.\textsuperscript{160} Once it became clear that the

\textsuperscript{153} The Deliar Noer-led Partai Umat Islam (‘Muslim Community Party’, PUI) approached the Kongres Umat Islam, MUI and PPP functionaries and urged them to return to Islam as party base. These declined, with PPP arguing that any alteration of the base would require the approval of a National Congress. “Deliar Noer: Elite Islam Kurang Bisa Bedakan yang Taktis dan yang Prinsipiil, Detak, 7 March 2001; Letter of the ‘Goodwill Forum of Islamic Parties’ (FSPI), an umbrella organisation PUI adhered to, addressed to Prof. K.H. Ali Yafie, Chairman of KUI, 3 November 1998.


\textsuperscript{155} Abdullah was listed as state enemy and fled to Malaysia. Deliar Noer worked as an academic in Australia.

\textsuperscript{156} Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000.

\textsuperscript{157} Deliar Noer chastised Yusril for working in the State Secretary as a speech writer for Soeharto in the mid- to late 1990s and Amien Rais for frequently changing his views. A long-time associate of Natsir and the old Masyumi elite, though never a party member, Deliar’s relations with DDII had cooled after Natsir’s death. Interviews, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000; Hussein Umar, Jakarta, September 2000.

\textsuperscript{158} His Partai Umat Islam featured Masyumi exponents (Dr. Mocthar Naim), HMI activists and academics (Prof. Harun al-Rasyid) and, initially, the doctrinaire preacher Dr. Daud Rasyid, a shari’ah graduate from Cairo’s Al-Azhar-university and fiery critic of Nurcholish Madjid (Daud Raysid later joined PK).

\textsuperscript{159} Deliar Noer quoted in “Anak muda tak ada yang kenal Masyumi” (‘Young people do not know of Masyumi’), Detak, 2-8 May 2000.

\textsuperscript{160} Abdullah’s behaviour in the party-building process and his insistence on formal Islamic attributes echoed his personal history. He had played a decisive role in HMI’s turbulent 1983 Congress in Medan that rejected asas tunggal. When HMI yielded he enforced a break-up, which led to the small

90
Kongres Umat Islam would not launch an Islamist party, Abdullah established the Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (‘Indonesian Islamic Political Masyumi Party’, PPII Masyumi).\textsuperscript{161} DDII leaders, not surprisingly, dismissed PPII Masyumi as a legitimate successor of Masyumi on grounds that the leadership and doctrine had flimsy Masyumi credentials. It rather was personal relations with Natsir which attested loyalty toward Masyumi’s ideology.\textsuperscript{162}

A major problem for the ambitions of Masyumi devotees became the dearth of popular leaders.\textsuperscript{163} The newer generation of DDII leaders such as Hussein Umar, KISDI Chairman Ahmad Sumargono or Anwar’s successor in DDII, Afandi Ridwan, did not have the intellectual stature or the personal appeal to draw a mass Muslim constituency. Many Muslims and the press either viewed these men as hardliners (as Sumargono) or hardly took notice of them (as Afandi). At the same time, many modernists in PPP and Golkar either had biographies during the New Order which counted against them or preferred to remain in PPP. Another damaging aspect was that most aspirants for leadership positions were academics with little mass appeal.\textsuperscript{164}
DDII recognised this weakness and thus tried to convince Prof. Amien Rais, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, to take on the chairmanship of an Islamist party.165 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a high-profile law professor at the University of Indonesia, was to become his Secretary-General. At this stage, few considered Yusril, who never held a senior position in a Muslim organisation, as a principal Natsir legatee. By contrast, Amien had been a member of the DDII board since 1993 and Media Dakwah had closely covered his career.166 By the time of Natsir’s death, keluarga circles held that Amien continued Natsir’s intellectual legacy and, on various occasions, Amien had referred to himself and his associates as ‘Natsirists’.167 Above all, he was the epitome of the 1998 reformasi movement, which automatically made him an attractive leader for most parties.

But Amien Rais was in doubt about the most useful stance for the 1999 elections. This hesitation had a deeply negative impact on his reputation in the Islamist camp. Previously, Amien had adopted a firm oppositional position against the regime.168 But he became convinced that both a formal Islamic label and affiliation with Masyumi would be unhelpful to gain many votes in the elections and would thus harm his presidential ambitions. Amien revealed the reasons behind his decision during DDII’s June 1998 Consultation when he spoke to an Islamist audience. He said:

The Bulan Bintang Family has to form a party in order to collect its scattered potentials [balung pisah]. However, it has to be considered not to return to the

‘It is entirely impossible to recognise with Deliar a skill to...steer the emotions of the masses. ... Deliar’s...speeches are flat [getar], ... brain fodder. [They] are insufficient to seize and to move the heart and the feelings of the masses...[T]heir content is...sophisticated, with orderly and academic speech which is good for an educated elite but not...appealing to normal people. People...enjoy playing with emotions, not to think.’ Moctar Naim, “Deliar Noer dan Pola Kepemimpinan Politik: Catatan atas Kegagalan PUI dalam Pemilu 1999”, in H.A. Saripurin (ed.), Begawan Politik: Deliar Noer 75 Tahun, Jakarta, 2001, pp. 248-57 (quote p. 256).

165 Amien was also professor of international relations at Yogyakarta’s Gadjah Mada University.
166 As early as 1985, Media Dakwah portrayed Amien as a leading example for the ‘rising hope’ that young Islamist intellectuals would emerge from campuses. “Tantangan Semakin Besar”, Serial Media Dakwah, January 1985, pp. 4-11.
167 In the early to mid-1990s, this group comprised Watik Pratiknya, Dr. Syafi’i Ma’arif (Muhammadiyah), Dr. Kuntowijoyo and Yahya Muhaimin. Djoko Susilo, “Siapakah “Natsir-Natsir Muda”?”, Jawa Pos, 7 February 1993. None of these men joined an Islamist party in 1998.
168 Especially after he was ousted from the ICMI board in 1997.
paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s. It is no longer the time for this [kind of] thinking. We certainly recall the result of the 1955 election. [T]he vote won by Islamic parties, that is Masyumi, NU, Sarekat Islam and Perti, was less than 50%. Hence, if we now gather this scattered potential...it is not guaranteed that we get 25%. [It is] almost definitely less than that. Now we have to think: first, it is not necessary to abandon idealism, but second, it also has to be based in realism. Third, [we have to] use astute political arts [seni berpolitik yang canggih]; the objective remains [the same] but [we have to be] flexible in its implementation, in its tactics, in its manoeuvres... For me there is somewhat of a dilemma, which we have to crush. If we form a new Islamic political party, with an Islamic character, with Islamic community leaders, its image will be more or less closed. For us to seize 20% only would already be very good. Because later there will be a NU party, a Syarikat Islam party [and] many more which will grab the Islamic masses from each other. Hence, it is us who [will] obtain the drawback from [forming] a specific Islamic party. Aside from mobilising masses, politics is also to fight to get as much as possible profit. An Islamic party will hold...a fifth of the votes at the utmost. But what can you do with regard to the presidential election, for filling...the executive and legislative, [a fifth] is possibly not yet enough. From there emerges the idea how about an open party, in its understanding still Islamic, the direction [lokomotifnya] also consisting of our friends but there are positions given to non-Muslims... Possibly this is tolerated from a shariah point of view. And second...after all, we cannot form our own people. What shall we do with those [remaining] 80%? They have also aspirations...have wishes that we need to accommodate...With regard to the responsibility of an open party I cannot answer this except if we go back to the Qur’an. What is prohibited is that we make Jews and Christians our leaders but if we lead them, it does not matter in my view... Hence, if we hold control [memegang kendali], for example in an open party, control is in the hands of people of faith [orang beriman]. But in a large party, there are Chairmen of sections...as an outcome of nationhood. Indeed, I think this is the country of many people, so why not? This is what I think.

Despite Amien’s compromise, up to its launch, the PBB leadership ‘very much hoped’ that Amien eventually would form a team with Yusril. They speculated that Amien could mobilise the bulk of Muhammadiyah’s large following for PBB. As Amien appeared the only leader capable of drawing many modernist Muslims into one body and to attract a considerable support base, PPP, too, was keen for him to join. But Amien’s belief that an open ideological platform would be more helpful for his presidential ambitions prevented this. He changed his stand on several policy

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169 Amien Rais’ address at a seminar during DDII’s Musyawarah Besar (‘Great Consultation’), 17-19 June 1998, reprinted as “Partai Politik Era Reformasi”, in Partai Politik Era Reformasi, pp. 44-9. Amien explicitly excluded Masyumi Baru when referring to the ‘scattered potential’ of the Bulan Bintang family. Pointing to the Qur’anic directive to shun non-Muslim leadership, he referred to the often-quoted verse (5:51), which holds that those Muslims who approved Christian and Jewish leadership had become part of these communities. PAN’s inaugural central board later included several prominent Christians like Albert Hasibuan and Prof. Frans Magnis Suseno.


issues, which alienated him from both from Bulan Bintang and the PPP leadership. He later declared publicly that PBB would be a ‘too tight a shirt’ for him, a statement that was widely quoted and that cost him much sympathy. During his speech at a BKUI session, Amien repeated his arguments against an Islamist party. Zubair Bakri, a PBB MP recalled: ‘I felt very offended. For him Islam was too narrow (sempit)’. Many Bulan Bintang leaders complained about his unreliability. In the words of DDII notable Kholil Ridwan:

Amien Rais has disappointed many people. He has made a promise. Several times we waited for him. He did not come. The last time he did not show up, the party [PBB] was about to be launched in about two weeks time. Amien did not come, so it was Yusri.

Another PBB and DDII official bitterly remarked:

Amien Rais is a clown when it comes to politics. He’s so inconsistent...and that is dishonourable. If Amien had led PBB, it would have been a large party because Muhammadiyah people would have supported [it]. Amien’s final decision was driven by [his search] for popularity.

Significantly, Islamists were convinced that Amien turned them down only because of pragmatic reasons. They, therefore, accused Amien of trading his ideological conviction for political exigencies. One DDII-affiliated PK leader held:

In the reformasi era, PAN did not have the courage to use Islam as a label and this was a political calculation... Amien feared that if he uses the label Islam he would not be supported.

In comparison, PPP’s interest in Amien joining was more strictly due to his central role in the reformasi movement through which he had emerged as a strong candidate.

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172 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. Also Interview Abdurrahman Saleh, Jakarta, September 2000. The next speaker was Yusril who reconciled the audience when he countered Amien by saying: ‘An Islamist party [partai Islam] — why not? Islam is also open... If there are non-Muslims who want to join an Islamic party, please do so.’ (Yusril cited by Zubair).

173 Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. PBB leaders were particularly irritated that Amien had made statements to the press without talking to them first.

174 Confidential interview with a DDII leader, Jakarta, September 2000. As conditions for joining the Islamists, Amien demanded the Masyumi-related label Bulan Bintang to be dropped in exchange for the neutral Partai Amanah Bangsa (‘National Mandate Party’, PAB; later PAN). He also demanded a prerogative to determine several Chairmen and to postpone the launch. “Sikap Amien Rais Tidak Moderat” (Interview with Yusril Ihza Mahendra), Tempo Interaktif, 22 July to 1 August 1998.

175 Confidential interview, Jakarta, 2000. Another PK leader similarly described Amien’s position as ‘a matter of win or loose, what matters is to get votes in the elections’.
for the presidency. Unlike DDII, there was very little mention of his credentials as an Islamist leader. Internally, however, the party was divided over the benefits of Amien’s leadership. Opposition came particularly from within PPP’s Muhammadiyah section. Otherwise, others were indignant that Amien was to rise through the ranks without previously holding a posting. This was because he had demanded the chairmanship without having to wait for the formal approval of branches at the party’s upcoming National Congress (Muktamar) in late 1998.

Hence, approaching the 1999 elections, the keluarga was dispersed across PBB, PPP, PAN, PK, Golkar, PPII Masyumi and PUI. But the families of the old Masyumi elite only recognised PBB as the single legitimate successor. Indeed, PBB most comprehensively adapted its doctrine to Masyumi’s core values. Anwar Haryono defined the connection as follows:

The Bulan Bintang [Party] is like one side of the coin with Masyumi on the other. So, with the Bulan Bintang Party, we want new blood and new freshness in order to continue the great ideals from the past. This Bulan Bintang Party indeed has an emotional connection with Masyumi, but nowadays we take a quite rational approach. There is a reason for this emotional [link].

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176 Interview, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Jakarta, 18 October 2000.

178 Interview, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Jakarta, 24 October 2000. In August 1998, Amien had signed a statement that he would head PPP’s newly established Majelis Pakar (‘Expert Council’). Then, however, he demanded to become General Chairman. PPP’s board declined, pointing out that changes in leadership had to be decided by regional branches at the next National Congress (Muktamar), scheduled for November 1998. By contrast, PBB was willing to give Amien a proviso chairmanship until holding its Congress.

179 This became clear when Natsir’s widow (and one of four initial Deputy Secretary-Generals) Ida M. Natsir, handed the patron’s golden pin over to Chairman Yusril Iliza Mahendra at PBB’s first National Working Congress (Mukernas, 25 to 28 February 1999). “Bersama Partai Bulan Bintang menuju Indonesia yang Demokratis dan Bermartabat”, Abadi, 20-26 May 1999. There were more signs for such a mandate: PBB’s headquarters and private homes of officials were decorated with a portrayal of an angel-like Natsir surrounded by a flash of light and below him, his inheritors, the current leadership of the PBB represented by the Chairman and Secretary-General M.S. Ka’ban. The painting shows Yusril receiving the Masyumi symbols crescent and star (personal notes, 2000).

180 The PBB party bulletin regularly paid homage to Masyumi senior leaders. Devotees of the party promote Masyumi together with Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood as the most significant representative of political Islam in the 20th century. However, unlike these organisations, Masyumi had little influence on Islamic political thought outside Indonesia. The significance of Natsir’s thought was entirely domestic.

181 Deklarasi in Mardjoned, Sejarah, pp. 73-80.
It was, nevertheless, clear that despite the tribute to Masyumi’s past there was little trust in the popular roots of Bulan Bintang leaders aside from Amien. Because of this, Yusril, in particular, appeared keen to forestall an overly close association with Masyumi. In an interview shortly after PBB’s launching, he said:

If one considers the number of Masyumi voters in 1955, only a very small number [of those voters] are [still alive] today…and they are now very old. Therefore, this new political force [i.e. PBB] has a commitment to Islamic values and its [support] is not limited to the descendents of [original] Masyumi supporters… If the grandparents are Masyumi, it’s not certain that the grandchildren will be Masyumi

Adian Husaini, a Deputy Secretary-General of PBB and one of its most forthright activists held a similar view:

Islamic leaders, especially the former Masyumi followers, have to be aware that one of the things they sell is a proud past. But the more time passes the more this [pride] declines. So, over time, the new generation no longer knows what Masyumi was. They don’t know who M. Natsir, Sjafruddin were. But [the] Bulan Bintang [Party] still perpetuates Masyumi’s idealism… [But] Masyumi’s symbols are, after all, fractured. The image of Masyumi is fought over by so many people. PPII Masyumi, Masyumi Baru, PPP, parts of PAN are also Masyumi family. Including Golkar.

The use of the symbols of Masyumi was thus first and foremost to underline this historical affiliation and to facilitate access to electorates. The symbol of the crescent and the star, Yusril argued, were particularly important for the uneducated masses.

Many senior Islamist activists from PII and GPI recognised PBB as future representative of their ideals and joined the party’s first, appointed, board (Appendix

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182 Compare with “KAPPU, Langkah Awal Partai Bulan Bintang Menangkan Pemilu” (‘KAPPU, The first step for PBB to win the elections’) (Interview with Farid Prawiranegara), Abadi, 28 January to 3 February 1999.
185 Address (al-Azhar mosque) at the official declaration of PBB, 26 July 1998, Jakarta reprinted in Mardjoned, Sejarah. He earlier wrote in his doctoral thesis that ‘leaders of modernist parties’ had to take into account the support of the ‘ordinary people (rakyat awam)’. Those would need ‘formal attributes’ like ‘Islamic state’ or ‘Islamic state base’. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jama’at-I-Islami (Pakistan), Paramadina, Jakarta, 1999, p. 204.
IV). After Amien declined, Yusril’s eloquency and urbane attitude convinced other inaugural members that he could be sold to the public. From then on, Yusril was to dominate PBB’s public profile much more than the party’s doctrinaire Islamists such as Sumargono and Abdul Qadir Djaelani (a senior PII leader).

Initially, there appeared to have been general agreement over Masyumi’s core values. Pragmatic and doctrinaire Islamists characterised Masyumi likewise as ‘the champion of democracy and anti-communist’. At the same time, however, it was left open how precisely a new Islamist party would stand in for these values and what they meant in concrete political situations. A particular cause for tension became what stance toward non-Muslims the Masyumi tradition called for.

Campus Islamist leaders, by contrast, had followed the efforts to restore Masyumi with little interest. Restoring Masyumi was seen as an over-ambitious plan and founding a new Islamist party on the themes of the past as out of touch with realities.

In the words of Mutammimul ‘Ula:

PK is comparable to a still innocent child [ibarat bayi yang masih bersih]. [It is] very different with PBB. PBB is affiliated to Masyumi and adopts the symbols of the

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186 An elected leadership only took office following the first National Congress in April/May 2000. The most prestigious entries were Abdul Qadir Djaelani, an infamously stern and outspoken activist and preacher and indefatigable opponent of the Soeharto regime, KISDI Chairman Ahmad Sumargono, Hartono Mardjono, an equally outspoken, experienced former PPP Deputy Chairman, Eggy Sudjana, head of Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (‘Indonesian Muslim Workers Brotherhood’, PPMI), Farid Prawiranegara, a well-to-do businessman and son of Masyumi senior economist Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Lesser known to the public were Kholil Ridwan, Head of BKSPI, Anwar Shaleh, a former GPI Chairman, the TV preacher Anwar Sanusi, M.S. Ka’ban and Sahar L. Hassan, two activists of the HMI splinter organisation HMI MPO and relatively unexperienced in party politics, Dr. Rifyal Ka’bah, an al-Azhar trained legal expert and Hamdan Zoelva, a younger lawyer. Notable entries from PPP were Zubair Bakri and Mohammad Soleiman. Among younger Islamic activists and intellectuals, Adian Husaini, a prolific KISDI-based writer, and Fadli Zon, an activist with close links to Soeharto son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, were significant.

187 Casting the position of Secretary-General, Hartono Mardjono let Yusril decide, who chose his HMI comrade Ka’ban whom he knew since university. Although Ka’ban had published a few times in DDII affiliated media, he had not been well acquainted with PBB’s other leaders.

188 As ideological party base, PBB initially adopted the compromise established by BKUI: ‘with the Islamic faith and based on Pancasila’ (beraqidah Islam dan berazas Pancasila). This was a formality as it was unanimously decided to return to Islam once it became legal. “Sekilas Sejarah Partai Bulan Bintang”, in Mardjoned, Sejarah.


190 See chapter five.
past... The past can become a problem. If our head is small but the hat is big, it becomes a problem.\footnote{191}

The aim behind Partai Keadilan was to ‘start from nil; a radical beginning’.\footnote{192} Whereas PBB was ‘Masyumi nostalgia’, PK was ‘not Masyumi in its thinking’.\footnote{193} Campus based Islamists believed that prominent community leaders would be detrimental to their ideological goals and their political culture. A charismatic reformasi leader could have damaged the party’s hierarchical balance.\footnote{194} As the national symbol for reform, however, Amien Rais was an interesting ally, because despite their primary drive to defend Islam these Islamists envisaged a gradual ideological strategy and thus shared the same short-term political goals as PAN.\footnote{195}

Typical for Islamism with an orientation toward tarbiyah (education) and dakwah (proselytisation), PK activists emphasised collective strength and egalitarianism while at the same time demanding strict submission to an ideological line. Partai Keadilan set up prohibitive conditions for recruitment. At the same time, it was, according to one of its leaders, ‘possibly the most egalitarian party in the world’ and this was ‘very different from [parties such as] PBB’.\footnote{196} Necessarily, the progress and public image of the party was less dependent on individual figures.

A preliminary aim was to proceed on a coherent and internally socialised ideology and a clear political strategy. A consensus on these matters was considered pivotal for the sustainability and the long-term success of the party. It was not of immediate relevance to form a united Islamist party and there were only few campus activists involved in the preparations of the keluarga.\footnote{197} Reversely, there was little influx from HMI’s and PII’s central streams into PK’s leadership (Appendix V).\footnote{198} The

\footnote{191 Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 2000.}
\footnote{192 Interviews, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 4 September and 10 October 2000.}
\footnote{193 Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, November 2000.}
\footnote{194 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 12 April 2001.}
\footnote{195 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 2000.}
\footnote{196 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 5 October 2000.}
\footnote{197 Only two subsequent PK officials, Abu Ridho and Mashadi, were directly involved in FUI and BKUI. Abu Ridho was a long-time affiliate of DDII and Mashadi, a former Media Dakwah writer, was an assistant to Masyumi leader Mohammad Roem. Abu Ridho became PK’s main voice on international Islamic politics and relations with the West.}
\footnote{198 The two most important entries from PII, Abu Ridho and Mutammimul ‘Ula, were both atypical PII activists. Mutammimul chaired PII from 1984 to 1986. During his time in office, he attempted to steer PII toward a more puritan course by establishing cell-like training structures within PII. After he}
organisational breadth of inaugural members was necessarily narrower than in PPP or PBB. A party, PK’s statutes granted, was a ‘manifestation of Muslim groupings’ [*manifestasi kejama’ahan*] of various ethnic backgrounds and languages ‘but with one ideology’. Bringing about party solidity was impossible if ‘its adherents consist of supporters of several ideologies’. The key to this solidity was the method of training cadres. This approach made an organisation ‘similar to a school’ in which new cadres ‘enter in internal diversity, then become standardised through guidance’. Abu Ridho wrote:

> For an Islamic party, Islamic ideology is the foundation of all structures of its actions [*fondasi seluruh struktur gerakan*] and, at the same time, [it works] as the axis of its political moves. In this context, the department [of] cadreisation is responsible to implant [*menanamkan*] Islamic ideology among all cadres so that their political mind-set [*kiprah*] unequivocally is based on ideology.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that campus activists saw a formal alliance with other Islamist parties as potentially undermining its internal strength and, as a consequence, its dedication to the Islamic struggle. It was ‘difficult to go together with parties affiliated to Masyumi, including the senior leaders’ because ‘PK’s system is unique’. Some *keluarga* figures were ‘flamboyant and egocentric’; by contrast, PK aimed for strict party discipline and was ‘interested in issues much broader than getting involved in little [internal] squabbles without any purpose’. These activists also felt a tinge of arrogance in DDII attitudes toward the political debutants. Senior Bulan Bintang leaders did not expect the inexperienced ‘students’ would manage to establish their own party.

The results of the 1999 elections confirmed that Masyumi symbols and references are unable to draw mass support in contemporary politics. PBB received a meagre

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200 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 5 October 2000.
202 Interviews, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 10 October 2000 (first quote); Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003 (second quote).
203 Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 10 October 2000.
1.94%. PPII Masyumi won merely 0.43%, Partai Umat Islam 0.25% and Masyumi Baru 0.04%, results which brought activities in these parties to a near halt. It was obvious that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims had not considered Masyumi’s labels and agendas a priority when casting their vote. Far more important was the party affiliation of leaders with a mass appeal such as Abdurrahman Wahid (NU) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (PDI). The appeal of senior keluarga Islamists like Qadir Djaelani, Hartono Mardjono or Eggy Sudjana proved to be limited to very narrow constituencies. In retrospect, PBB officials conceded that the party had been built on leaders ‘without having a body’. The party, Yusril told cadres, was only known in cities; the weak spot was that ‘PBB has not entered the villages yet’. Moreover, regional branches remained poorly managed. By 2001, the results of enhancing the quality of party management still were considered ‘far from optimal’.

After 1960, no Islamic group had appeared thoroughly devoted to a rejuvenation of Masyumi’s ideology. Serving as a guide for a number of broad attitudes and policies, in post-1998 the Masyumi model exposed obvious deficiencies in determining political behaviour. It left unspecified how its assorted values have to be carried out both in private life and in daily politics. Tensions among Islamists who consciously endeavoured to take on the lofty ideals of Masyumi were exposed during the crisis-ridden Abdurrahman Wahid presidency (October 1999 until August 2001). In PBB, the strains illustrated how disagreement over the exact nature of an ideological role

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204 The result would have only given two MPR seats to PBB. However, through a concordat between Islamist parties PBB obtained additional 11 seats and was therefore still able to fulfil the electoral threshold regulations, which required minimally ten seats in the legislative.

205 PBB had claimed to expect good results in West Java, a traditional stronghold of DDII, BKSPPI and Persis, and also in West Sumatra, Masyumi’s traditional voter basis. In the greater Jakarta era, the party claimed it would be able to benefit from As-Syafiyyah’s mosque network. See “Langkah Penerus Cita-Cita Masyumi”, Tekad, 7-13 June 1999. The influence of all these groups, however, was very limited.


207 Speech by Yusril reprinted as “Rebut Simpati Rakyat”, Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 December 2000, p. 23.

208 The central leadership lamented about low motivation and the time local cadres spend on activities outside the party. “Sahar L. Hassan: Akidah Kader Partai Segera Benahi”, Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 January 2001. In turn, regional branches often felt poorly informed about the headquarters’ policies. Cadres travelled to Yusril’s residence in Jakarta, queuing in the early morning hours to ask for his advice in order to overcome difficulties at home. Remarks by Ka’ban and Yusril to cadres in Padang, West Sumatra (personal notes, 18 November 2000).

model can trigger accusations against a leadership of being illegitimate. At its first Congress in late April 2000 the party board almost completely disintegrated.210

Further Splits of Islamist Parties

Originally scheduled for 2003, PBB’s Congress was brought forward due to the disappointing election results and due to the need to consolidate the party internally. It confirmed the leadership of the pragmatists, Yusril and M. S. Ka’ban.211 Critics declared the outcome illegal, blaming the pragmatic Islamists Ka’ban, Sahar Hassan, Rifyal Ka’bah and Anwar Shaleh of having orchestrated the proceedings to ensure the re-election of the incumbent leadership.212 As former senior activists in PII, the organisation ideologically closer to Masyumi than HMI, many doctrinaire Islamists claimed a greater affinity to Masyumi than their HMI-based colleagues. 213 Their accusations were closely connected to the tight grip Yusril had established on the party.214 Officials had become increasingly reluctant to confront him, underscoring the overriding position he had gained in the short period of less than two years.215

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211 Yusril gained the support of 24 out of 27 regional boards.

212 “Kelompok 16 tak Akui Hasil Muktamar”, Republika, 1 May 2000.

213 As such, the dispute between the pragmatic Islamists and their critics broadly followed a HMI and PII/GPI division. The senior GPI and PII activists claimed to be genuine Natsir cadres, perceiving Yusril as a studious outsider, who had learned and written about Masyumi. They also held that he had never been fully active in DDII. Confidential interview with a former PBB leader, 2001. Yusril met Natsir first in 1978 and the two men became personally close.

214 The reporting style of the Congress journal was seen as fawning. An uncritical book about Yusril titled Sang Bintang Cemerlang (‘The Shining Star’) published shortly prior to the Congress further added to the resentment. “Fadli Zon juga Calonkan Diri”, Kompas, 26 April 2000.

215 DDII’s leadership did not have the authority to bring about reconciliation. It was held against the new Chairman Afandi Ridwan that he had a Persatuan Umat Islam (‘Union of the Islamic Community’, PUI) background rather than rising from within DDII. Moreover, the dissenters saw him as pro-Yusril. At the same time, having remained in PPP, DDII Secretary-General Hussein Umar was in an awkward position to call for unity. Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001.

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But support from the regions for the dissenters remained scant as ‘Yusril had already taken roots [merakyat], already had become an idol’. 216

In PPP, internal struggles continued to be motivated by disputes between groups and individuals for political gain and positions. The 1998 party board was the oldest among Islamic parties and thus widely criticised for ignoring the aspirations of younger leaders (see Appendix III). 80% of officials were between 58 and 70 years of age. Moreover, together with PBB, the PPP parliamentary faction had the highest share of MPs above 56 years of age. 217 This hinted at a ‘lost generation’ in the party which was led by ‘the status quo group’, many of whom had been active since 1973 and, therefore, had become ‘unenergetic’. What was more, PPP’s elite was out of touch with younger constituencies. 218 This was significant, since the generation of 17 to 30 years of age had been a major support base for PPP. Deputy Chairman Zainuddin MZ criticised his own party:

...there are three types of cadre: [the] successor cadre [cader penerus], the “forever-waiting” cadre [kader tunggu terus] and the “forever-continuing” cadre [kader terus-menurus]. In PPP there are many ‘forever-waiting’ and ‘forever-continuing’ cadre. But the ‘successor cadre’ is...held back.” 219

Against such disgruntlement, the modernists’ self-proclaimed loyalty to the Bulan Bintang tradition was an opportune tool for countering PPP’s traditionalist leadership. The latter had come about as a result of the first post-New Order Congress (Muktamar) in November 1998. But PPP modernists expressed little concrete desire to bring about a clearer identification of their party with former Masyumi goals. Rather, reviving the associative keluarga spirit was stirred by competition over high office, at times alongside the continuing modernist-traditionalist discrepancy in PPP.

The enduring rivalry between its two main power groups was evident in the 1998 Congress. Yet on this particular occasion, it succumbed to the political necessities. PPP’s strategy for the 1999 elections led to a NU-dominated leadership with Hamzah Haz as the new Chairman. Hamzah became the first PPP Chairman from NU after the government had ensured that men from a non-NU background would hold the position continuously from 1973 to 1998. His victory was part of a wider effort to guarantee PPP’s survival in the new political situation. In mid- to late 1998, people’s sympathies appeared to gather behind Amien Rais and Megawati Soekarnoputri, both major symbols of past state repression. PPP lacked a personality promising to mobilise a comparable mass electorate. Its strategy for the elections thus was to advance its appeal among traditionalist constituencies. With Hamzah, PPP hoped to boost its result by attracting traditionalist voters and thereby minimising defections to its main rival party Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (‘National Awakening Party’, PKB), led by Abdurrahman Wahid. This was because of the strong fragmentation among modernists with none of the new parties likely to become a serious contender to PPP. Hence, whereas most modernist notables were likely to stay in the established PPP, there was a bigger likelihood that many in the NU camp would desert PPP if a modernist or somebody outside NU once again got the chairmanship.

Hamzah achieved victory in the Congress despite modernists being more strongly represented in regional boards than NU. But as a leader who promised to be more popular among constituencies and more helpful for the party’s electoral interests,

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220 PPP leaders insisted that the party’s management problems had receded after former Chairman Djaelani Naro was sacked in the 1989 Congress. As a result, the relationship between modernists and traditionalists improved and they were now regularly praying together. Nonetheless, the two camps held separate press conferences in the weeks leading to the 1998 Congress. Shortly beforehand, each camp met separately at two hotels in Jakarta. Interview, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Jakarta, 18 October 2000; Pertarungan di Taman Bunga”, Tempo, 7 December 1998.

221 Hamzah had been a member of the PPP’s DPR faction since 1971. From 1993-1998 he chaired the faction. His doctorate is a honourius causus from an unknown American university. A rarity among the Islamic elite in Indonesia, he is married to at least four women. There was no female candidate for any leading position except Aisyah Amini, active in the party since 1967 and a third time MP. “PPP Kembali Ke Lambang Ka’bah Dan Asas Islam”, Suara Pembaruan, 1 December 1998.

222 See also chapter six.


224 168 regional chairs were held by MI, 133 by NU, 22 by Sarekat Islam and 2 by the small, Sumatra-based traditionalist Perti. “Pertarungan di Taman Bunga”, Tempo, 7 December 1998.
many modernists supported the NU candidate. Moreover, Hamzah had a reputation as a strong pragmatist and promised to accommodate the interests of Parmusi. Indeed, after his victory, Hamzah approached the modernist elite by offering seats on the new party board, including to his direct rival A. M. Saefuddin.

This, however, only was a temporary consensus and there was continuing though mostly concealed factional competition in PPP. Modernists persistently claimed a right to leadership in PPP, asserting that they were more professional and efficient than NU people. They were discontented with the commitment of PPP MPs. In August 2000, a party Congress criticized its leadership for coming across as ‘too cautious, not decisive enough, not responsive and assertive enough, a wait and see leadership’. Moreover, the role of intellectuals in newly created boards such the Majelis Pakar (‘Expert Council’) had remained unclear and the ‘quality of the recruitment, role and effectiveness’ of cadres substandard. Most of the critique came from the modernists. Parmusi-based Chairman Bahtiar Chamsyah lamented that ‘it is as if we are drowning in the critical stance and the vocalness of members of other factions’. The centre and the leadership of the departments were ‘sterile’ [mandul] and the capacity of PPP’s internal administration poor.

Predictably, it did not take long for modernist opposition against Hamzah to rise. When he became minister in Habibie’s first post-New Order cabinet, rumours held

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225 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 31 October 2000. Hamzah’s camp won the support of the modernist leaders Alimarwan Hanan, Bahtiar Chamsyah and Muhsin Bafadal. Lobbying between the factions had begun around five months before the Congress. MI leaders were promised central positions in the party’s board if they backed Hamzah. “Kisah lain Kekalahan Pak AM”, Tekad, 7-13 December, 1998. PPP’s propensity for internal coercion was further illustrated through a pamphlet circulating at the Congress, in which a party faction threatened to split away if Hamzah was not elected. “PPP Kembali Ke Lambang Ka’bah Dan Asas Islam”, Suara Pembaruan, 1 December 1998.

226 Further MI leaders (including Husnie Thamrin, Hussein Umar, Faisal Baasir and Muhsin Bafadal) and one SI official (Syafiu Anwar Hussein) were included in PPP’s new line-up. Bahtiar Chamsyah became Deputy Secretary-General. In August 2001, when Hamzah became Vice-President both Bahtiar and Alimarwan received ministerial posts. “PPP Kembali Ke Lambang Ka’bah dan Asas Islam”, Suara Pembaruan, 1 December 1998; “‘Don’t Speak First About The Presidency (sic)’”, Kompas, 3 December 1998; “Hadinuloyo: Bukan Gol Bunuh Diri”, Merdeka, 4 December 1998.


228 Speech by Bahtiar Chamsyah at the first National Congress of Parmusi (Persaudaraan Muslimin Indonesia), Jakarta, 26 September 2002, pp. 9-10.
that sections in the party made corruption allegations against him because of anger over NU’s domination. In September 1999, several Parmusi-based MPs founded a new splinter organisation called Persaudaraan Muslimun Indonesia (‘Brotherhood of Indonesian Muslims’, Parmusi). This organisation was equal to a formal division within PPP. Parmusi had distinct structures complete with its own cadre programs. Initiators left open the possibility to split from PPP and form their own party.

Parmusi initiators claimed they acted on the ‘strong request’ from younger MI cadres, which in their view implied the weakness of MI leadership. Parmusi held:

When PPP changed its leadership it became difficult for MI to consolidate. With a weak MI leadership, it meant to further weaken the organisation which, in practise, is totally stuck. Not a single leadership mechanism and program works organisationally.

Because of this, MI leaders held they were to attempt a ‘breakthrough’ (terobosan) in order to achieve a ‘revitalisation’ in PPP, arguing that:

The reestablishment of Parmusi is a response toward the increasing decline, qualitatively and numerically, of MI cadres in various levels of PPP’s leadership. [This is] a result of weak bargaining position…

This endeavour, Parmusi claimed, would equal an attempt to revive the Bulan Bintang spirit. Those PPP leaders driving Parmusi’s revival claimed that they acted out of concern at the ‘scattering of the potential of the greater Bulan Bintang family’

229 “Getah untuk Yusril dan Hamzah”, Perspektif, 11–17 November 1999. NU cadres, including Hamzah, also obtained more key positions in Abdurrahman Wahid’s government. When Hamzah was appointed minister, his position as Deputy Chairman of parliament became vacant. This led to squabbles both between NU and MI cadres and also between senior and younger leaders. After the position was passed to the NU-based Tosari Widjaya, younger officials demanded an even distribution of posts alongside the various PPP camps. Feeling outmanoeuvred, Sarekat Islam and Perti also claimed a right to obtain the deputy chairmanship of parliament. “PPP pecah, rebutan wakil ketua DPR”, Suara Merdeka, 29 October 1999; “Hamzah ‘dijegal’ Orang Dalam PPP?”, Suara Merdeka, 2 December 1998; Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001.


231 Parmusi was not revived as a political party but as a ‘societal organisation’ (ormas). The name for the new organisation thus was Persaudaraan Muslimin Indonesia (‘Brotherhood of Indonesian Muslims’). The acronym, however, remained the same. Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, footnote 30.


233 Laporan Kerja DPP Parmusi.
and the need for a new ‘vehicle for the Islamic community’s struggle as a
continuation’ of PPP’s Parmusi faction. Similar to other Bulan Bintang groups,
Parmusi referred to what it termed the ‘Keluarga Besar Bintang Bulan’ as a historical
national movement which unified the ‘Islamic and national’ struggle. There was,
however, no explanation what this elusive spirit consisted of and what impact it was
supposed to have on party policies. Indeed, the dissent appeared to have been
triggered more by the preceding loss of modernist influence in PPP on NU. As such,
the keluarga association worked as an obvious and convenient brand name to unite
dissenters without bringing about a formal separation from PPP with its manifold
political and financial uncertainties.

Nonetheless, while Parmusi remained associated with PPP, in early 2002 the power
struggles eventually brought about a party split leading to the formation of PPP
Reformasi (‘PPP Reform’). The dissidents favoured the preacher Zainuddin MZ as
Chairman because of his immense popularity with traditionalist voters. While
Zainuddin claimed to have traditionalist credentials many dissident cadres came from
the modernist MI. This underscored that the schisms in PPP were no longer simply
a matter of rivalry between its two main components. The dissidents, however, failed
to win the crucial support of NU ulama affiliated with PPP. A meeting of Javanese
ulama in December 2001 decided to back the “old” PPP.

The aspiration to perpetuate Masyumi’s lofty standards in private life and politics
were necessarily more directly harmful for a homogeneously modernist party such as

234 Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar I Parmusi, p. 49; “Tak Puas dengan Hamzah Haz, Parmusi
Dideklarasikan”, Kompas, 29 September 1999; Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta 31 Oktober 2000.
Parmusi leaders prefer to speak of ‘Bintang Bulan’ rather than Bulan Bintang in order to distinguish
themselves from other groups.
235 Laporan Kerja DPP Parmusi, p. 5.
236 PPP Reformasi was officially founded on 20 January 2002. Inaugurates comprised Zainuddin MZ,
Djafar Badjeber, Saleh Khalid and Mohammad Buang, a former Deputy Secretary-General. “Gertak
237 Without being a formal party member, Zainuddin had campaigned for PPP at the 1977 and 1982
elections.
238 “45 Ulama Pekalongan Temui Haz”, Suara Merdeka, 11 January 2002. There was widespread
anger that Zainuddin MZ, who had been a newcomer in PPP’s board, had aggravated the split of the
party.
Here, initial agreement over allegiance to Masyumi policies proved to be shallow. There was common praise for Masyumi’s dedication to constitutionalism, democratic commitment and shari‘ah-mindedness but the miscellany of these values prompted disputes about their internal hierarchy and what behaviour particular ideals called for, especially from Islamist members of cabinet. Possible differences over how to do justice to Masyumi’s values were not considered significant prior to PBB’s launch and were not thoroughly discussed. The party ‘was just put on the way [dilepas saja]…with all our hopes and ideals’. Henceforth, pragmatic and doctrinaire Islamists battled over an attitude authentic to the historical example and to Islam.

Masyumi had always taken pride in its steadfastness and believed it to be a religious duty. Muslims had to ‘be radical in those domains that require a radical stance’. Natsir said:

Those who say that the ideology of Muslims is not practical [and]…far from reality: Indeed!… Do not people have to change the facts, change the situation; [and] follow the ideology? [It is] not the reverse, it is not ideology that has to move back and forth in accordance with times and situations, from one time to the next... [It is] difficult to realize ideology like that, they might say. We reply ‘Indeed’!

Hartono Mardjono and Qadir Djaelani carried on this credo by holding that Islam demanded a ‘straightforward attitude’ (sikap terus terang), a directive which had to be obeyed as it was a Masyumi core value. This concerned the transformation of shari‘ah-mindedness into political action. The doctrinaire leaders held PBB to be

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239 These rifts set an ironic contrast to the idea behind the ‘Islamic Brotherhood Forum’ (FUI) and the ‘Coordinating Body of the Muslim Community’ (BKUI) which both had endeavoured to unite Muslims.
240 Interviews, Ramlan Mardjoned, Jakarta, 12 November 2001 (quote); Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001; Adian Husaini, Jakarta, 30 October 2001.
241 Unlike PK, PBB leaders often assaulted each other publicly in blunt tones. At one point, Yusril attacked his critics for using means of agitation that are ‘usually used by Nazi activists, even communists’ in order to ridicule their foes in the eyes of the public. Quoted from a letter to Qadir Djaelani. Reprinted in Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, p. 215. PK leaders highlighted the Qur’anic ban of personal accusations [qadaj] on religious grounds and overcame almost any dispute internally. Mahfuz Siddiq, Shariiah Islam dan Penegakkannya, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2001, p. 20.
243 Natsir, “Bukan ideologi yang harus mondar mandir” (‘It is not ideology that has to waver’) reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, pp. 105-7.
undetermined in the struggle for Islam, thus abandoning the essence of Masyumi’s ideology. Though support for shari‘ah in earlier decades had comprised traditionalists and modernists, the latter invested greater intellectual and political capital in their campaign. PBB’s statutes announced to ‘carry out “trias politika” in accordance with Islamic principles’ and ‘transform Islamic law into national law’.

The guiding principle (khittah) was to ‘make Islam the motivational and inspirational source to be transformed into the national system’ and to ‘build up Izzul Islam wa’l Muslimin (the glory of Islam and the Muslim community)’. ‘Every statement, thought and activity’ of party officials ‘always’ had to ‘be based on universal Islamic teachings’.

It was not clear what attitude these provisions called for and how they were to be implemented in daily political practice. Claiming that the party would fall foul of its statutes, the doctrinaire camp demanded a commitment to shari‘ah that was ‘historically consistent’ with the struggle of Masyumi. Both Masyumi’s statutes from 7 November 1945 and PBB, Qadir emphasised, set out to bring about Izzul Islam wa’l Muslimin and ‘to establish Islam in oneself, family, society and state’ as goals, a directive which PBB would fail to comply with. He thus claimed:

[T]he PBB Central Board under the leadership of Yusril Ihza Mahendra is not serious in its effort to make Islamic values the ultimate source of the political struggle guideline of the party... [I]t increases evidence that the PBB does not want to implement shariah values [nilai-nilai Syariat Islam] to determine the personality of the party, both in relation to its organisation and [its] leadership... The name

245 A small book by Adian Husaini attacked Yusril’s understanding of Islamic modernism and his promotion of Masyumi. Adian Husaini, Yusril versus Masyumi – Kritik terhadap Pemikiran Modernisme Islam Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Dea Press, Jakarta, 2000. The number of Masyumi devotees who did not know the Chairman’s thesis baffled the author who then set off a debate to inform PBB’s elite. Interview, Adian Husaini, Jakarta, 30 October 2001. The Indonesian publisher of Yusril’s thesis was Nurcholish Madjid’s Paramadina foundation. This automatically raised suspicions given that the Chairman is a DDII member and formally chief editor of Media Dakwah. Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. Yusril never responded to the allegations, as he did not recognise Adian as a genuine scholar of Masyumi. Interview, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Jakarta, 22 November 2001.


247 Profil Partai Bulan Bintang, p. 3; Mengapa memilih Partai Bulan Bintang, KAPPU PBB, 1999.


249 It is noteworthy that the status of Islamist issues in the party was unrelated to the ideological base (Pancasila or Islam). The interpretation of the ‘Pancasila and Islamic ethics’ party base and the subsequent Islamic party base was almost the same.

250 See Program Perdoaongan Masjoemi, p. 4 and “Anggaran Dasar Masyumi”, in H. Aboebakar (Atjeh) (ed.), Sedjarah Hidup, p. 404; “Masa depan Indonesia dan Perdjuangan Masjumi”, Hikmah, 10 November 1956, p. 5. Qadir wrote he had joined PBB ‘because of the ideological awareness which I had been following for 38 years and for which I used revolutionary means so that I had to sit in prison for 15 years’. Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, p. 180.
“Islam” that sticks to PBB is only to deceive the Muslim community, so that Muslims join the party.251

PBB Deputy Chairman Kholil Ridwan revealed that, despite commonly paying homage to the legacy of Masyumi, there was disagreement over the precise nature of Masyumi’s ideology, especially in relation to alternative Islamist concepts and lifestyles endorsed by foreign organisations such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood:

Yusril thinks he fights for, defends and continues Masyumi but the Masyumi understood by Yusril is a secular Masyumi. [It is] being made the same as Ali Jinnah’s party in Pakistan [the Muslim League]. This means that Yusril is secular... In reality, Masyumi was not like that. Masyumi did not have the views of Ali Jinnah’s party... but its views were like Jamaat-i-Islami, Mawdudi. Or like Ichwanul Muslimin in Egypt. [These were] three political movements with the same ideas, the same soul [roh]... To strive for Islam by bringing into effect the shariah through parliament, democratically... For [Yusril] modernist is the same as Ali Jinnah. But Ali Jinnah is a secular Islam [Islam sekuler]... Yusril interprets Masyumi as if it was secular so that the people conclude that Masyumi is not fundamentalist. [But] if [we are] not fundamentalist, it means [we] can be secular, can be liberal.252

Avowals of straightforwardness also touched on the controversy following Abdurrahman Wahid’s proposal to abolish the legal ban on ‘Marxism, Leninism and Communism’ (an MPR decree of 1966). It became problematic due to Yusril’s position in cabinet. Tensions worsened when at an official visit to Amsterdam in early 2000 Yusril met a delegation that included former members of the outlawed Partai Komunis Indonesia (‘Indonesian Communist Party’, PKI).253 DDII and KISDI speculated whether Yusril had endorsed the return of PKI members by informing them about the plan to abolish legal hindrances.254 Although commonly devoted to Masyumi’s animosity toward communism, their reasons for supporting the ban differed. Basing his argument on Masyumi’s standpoint, Yusril asserted that his

251 Such was Qadir’s conclusion after the PBB board had blocked the distribution of his personal interpretation of PBB’s statutes which he saw as being in conformity with Masyumi’s ideology. Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 207-8 and 224.
252 Interview, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. Yusril’s doctorate is a comparative study of Masyumi and the Indian-Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami.
253 There are differing versions of this symbolically important meeting. Yusril pointed out that he was sent on a presidential order following an invitation from the Netherlands’ Ministry of Justice. Abdurrahman instructed Yusril to meet students sent overseas in the 1960s by the government and to assess the possibilities for them to return to Indonesia.
rejection would not be because communists were atheists but because they were hostile to democracy. Qadir recalled meeting the Chairman head-on in a plenary session in which he pointed out that communists were infidels and that PBB would dissent from the example of Masyumi:

...I said that Partai Bulan Bintang opposes Marxism, Leninism and Communism not merely because there is the MPR Decree... But because there is an ideological reason, as Masyumi at its National Congress in Surabaya in 1953 decided that Marxism, Leninism and Communism are prohibited as heathen [hukumnya kufur] and that those who consciously embrace this ideology are infidels [hukumnya kafir]. And PBB as the rightful heir of Masyumi is obliged to accept this decision.

After the pragmatic leadership refused to bring the party in formal opposition to the Abdurrahman government, the doctrinaire camp accused it of ‘plunging Islamic values in the struggle of the party into an abyss’ and having ‘deceived [mengecoh]’ participants of the (PBB 2000) Congress ‘even until they backed the position of...Yusril as the ‘assistant’ [pembantu] of President Abdurrahman Wahid’. The doctrinaire camp also saw it as pivotal to initiate the advance of a ‘formal opposition’ in the government and end the ‘transsexual system’ (sistem ‘kebanci-bancian’) of the Abdurrahman period. Again they pointed out that allegiance to Islam demanded straightforwardness:

On principle...a “two-faced” political position toward the regime of Abdurrahman Wahid infringes Islamic political ethics, which teaches honesty, truthfulness and

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straightforwardness in making politics... [W]e continue to defend the purity of the
struggling mission of PBB... which tries hard to defend Islamic ethics and values in
making politics in accordance with the ideological base and the ethics of the party,
that is Islam. We show this... by declaring [us] as an oppositional party and acting
fair and clear toward the leadership of Abdurrahman... We vigorously reject
misleading the Muslim community—by pretending to be continuously critical
toward President Abdurrahman Wahid (in order to hunt for sympathy from the
Muslim community)... We hold that such politics is unethical and uncivilised.

The pragmatists’ aim, however, had been to ‘join the government while maintaining
a critical stance’ and to be not ‘too close and not too far away from the
government’. They used typical Islamic stipulations to justify their stance. To
branches and supporters, they pointed to the Qur’anic injunction amar ma’ruf nahy
munkar (‘to enjoin good and forbid evil’). This, PBB argued, was a religious
platform for ‘developing an Islamic form of opposition’. As a small party, PBB
had become increasingly dependent on Yusril’s position as minister in successive
cabinets. Only with an access to power could Islamists hope to enter the high
bureaucracy as mayors, deputy regents (bupati) and governors. Regional branches
expected financial support from the centre, something that only high offices with
access to funding opportunities could ensure. Cadres would thus have resented it if
Yusril quit his prestigious post.

A second major charge linked to Masyumi was a lack of humility. Masyumi is
remembered as a party untainted by corruption. This made accusations of financial

259 Siaran Pers DPP Partai Bulan Bintang: Tentang Pemecatan atau Rencana Pemecatan DPP PBB
260 Interview, M.S. Ka’ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000 (first quote) and “Pidato Politik Ketua Umum
Prof. Dr. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, SH, pada Acara Miladnas II Partai Bulan Bintang 16 Juli 2000”,
14-5 (second quote).
261 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 68-9; “Dua Arus Besar Sikapi Peran Oposisi”, Republika, 27 April 2000.
Qur’an al-Imran (3:104) is the most cited verse.
262 During campaigning, however, Yusril had said that PBB would go into opposition if losing the
elections. “Skenario Menangkan Penggagalan Pemilu”, Republika, 2 June 1999. In a letter to the editor
of the journal Tekad, a self-declared ‘PBB constituent’ criticized:
I still remember the thundering ‘God is Great’ yells and clapping of thousands of Partai
Bulan Bintang followers... when Yusril... said ‘If we win, we govern. If we loose, we will be an
oppositional party’. When the elections were over and the cabinet of President Gus Dur was formed
... Yusril repeatedly explained an understanding of opposition as daring to have a different view....’
Tekad, No. 36, 10-16 July 2000.
263 Local cadres had wildly exaggerated expectations of what the party could achieve. Delegates of the
2000 Congress urged the Chairman to run for the next presidency and demanded to target 25% at the
2004 elections. Comments by Yusril and Ka’ban to cadres in Padang, West Sumatra, 18 November
2000 (personal notes).
malpractice against PBB particularly hurtful. In early 1999, inaugural member Fadli Zon accused Yusril of accepting a billion rupiah donation from then President Habibie. The Chairman made conflicting statements whether this was accurate, about the identity of the donors, and regarding the precise amount. Based on a report of board members, prior to the 1999 election campaigns, Yusril and Ka’ban distributed 75 to 200 million rupiah respectively to regional boards without notifying other board members. The critics claimed that the bulk of the money was secretly allocated to those branches supporting the incumbent leadership.

It also became a contested matter how the private life of Muslim leaders could live up to the example of Masyumi and, indeed, Islam. The doctrinaire Islamists deplored shortcomings in the ‘character’ and ‘morality’ and a dearth of ‘humility’ (ke-tawaduh’-an) among the lifestyles of party leaders and their families. A major scandal was that the Chairman’s wife was disinclined to wear a headscarf. In a letter to Yusril sent to all members of the Central Board and all regional branches Qadir wrote:

Since you [Saudara] have led the PBB, the dress and behaviour of your wife continuously met the sharp response from the PBB community [jama’ah] from almost all parts of our country. As a result...Kholil Ridwan, Ahmad Sumargono and

264 “Fadli Zon-Belum Ada Komunikasi dengan Yusril”, Media Indonesia, 21 May 2000; “Kami ingin Menyelematkan Partai”, Saksi, 17-30 May 2000. The reported sum varies between 1 billion and 1.6 billion. Yusril said to have received a donation of 1 billion rupiah in January 1999 from unidentified people known to Habibie. This had happened before a new law regulating party donations became effective and thus was legal. The donation had been reported to the National Congress (Muktamar) and was used for financing the Working Congress (Mukernas) in early 1999. “Yusril Ihza: Saya tak Tahu Dana itu Berasal dari Mana”, Kompas, 10 Kompas 2000. His opponents, however, asserted that Yusril had denied having received the money until a board meeting in June 1999. They feared the news that PBB had accepted money in exchange for channelling support behind Habibie would make the party look like a crony of the President. Farid Pertanyaikan Integritas Yusril di PBB”, Kompas, 13 May 2000.


266 Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. Against the openly expressed contempt of other participants of the 2000 Congress, Kholil lamented that ‘it is a historical note for the party which is heir to Masyumi and is based on Islam to allow fraud and money politics’. Hartono Mardjono, “Menyambut Muktamar I PBB”, Republika, 28 April 2000.

267 Local party leaders visited by the Chairman and his entourage pleaded with Qadir on the phone to remind Yusril that his wife was not veiled. Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, p. 221. Yusril also was publicly reprimanded for wearing jeans at prayer times and for smoking. His wife was chastised for wearing clothes that would show her body shape, receiving guests and enjoying a casual round at hotel swimming pools. Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, p. 208; Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. Article Eight in PBB’s interpretation of its ideological base demands party members to ‘follow the Islamic rules on...aurat’. The regulation of dress code is mentioned specifically. Hasil Muktamar I, p. 67.
I expressed our criticism toward the ways your wife dresses. But you once replied that the headscarf problem is a matter of ‘differing legal opinion’ [khilafiah]. As a result, up to the present day your wife has never shown her willingness to use the Muslim way of dressing [busana muslimah]. In April 1999... you were seen filling in gas at the station arena Jaya Ancol, North Jakarta. From there you directly went to a place called ‘Matador’ (an indecent, improper place) ... Since this incident, rumours began to spread... As a result, PBB board members... often were asked about this incident. We tried to keep this ‘shame’ [aib] secret. But obviously it leaked, although we had kept it secret for almost a year.269

Directly referring to Masyumi, Hartono asked:

Are the leaders of this party already capable to model themselves after [meneladani] the leaders of Masyumi among whom none ever gained pleasure to lay emphasis on themselves in order to demand position or rank? From Masyumi’s history it is interesting that we have never heard of a leader who was charged because of corruption. Also... Masyumi leaders consistently remained humble [tawadhu] when facing criticism... If the criticism was correct, they affirmed it with candour and if the criticism was wrong, they explained it patiently. Personal enmity was never heard of, although they were capable of differing sharply... Has all this already sank among the leadership of Partai Bulan Bintang?270

The doctrinaire Islamists thus only gradually became aware that their support for Yusril and Ka’ban was, in their view, a slip-up. They had backed Yusril on the premise that he was an eloquent intellectual who could draw votes; that had studied and published on Masyumi and presumed congeniality with their ideological attitude. Subsequent disagreement convinced the doctrinaire leaders that ‘Yusril’s heart is not with Dewan Dakwah’, and they believed that he had deliberately downplayed Masyumi’s Islamist disposition. The quarrels lessened after the doctrinaire leaders left the party and Yusril strengthened his grip over PBB, remarkably by steering greater attention to shari’ah issues.271

This chapter thus argued that it has been difficult to give a cohesive definition of Masyumi’s agenda due to the party’s supposed commitment to a miscellany of values comprising shari’ah-implementation, tolerance toward other religious

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269 19 March 2000, reprinted in Djae1ani, Anak Rakyat, p. 212. The headscarf polemics showed how religious standards have changed in the course of four decades as the issue had much less priority in Masyumi during the 1950s. Addressing the critique on his wife, Yusril countered by saying that Qadir’s wife would herself not meet the standards of Mawdudi who demanded that women had to wear the cadar (p. 216). The row escalated to a point where Qadir called on the Chairman to make an oath before God (mubahalah) which rules that the lying party will be doomed (laknat) (p. 218). Also “PBB Pasca Muktamar I: Mengulang Sejarah Kelabu”, Khutbah Jumat, June 2000, pp. 72-5.

270 Mardjono, Menyambut.

271 See chapter five.
communities and good relations with non-Muslim political parties, democracy, constitutionalism, anti-communism, anti-militarism and high standards of integrity and morality. The pragmatists in PBB emphasised the Masyumi values democracy and constitutionalism and whilst the doctrinaire leaders in the keluarga showed dedication to the same values, they at the same time detested that the pragmatists distracted from the controversially deemed facets of Masyumi’s Islamist program and what they saw as an attempt to disengage the Masyumi tradition from Islamist ideology. These controversial issues comprised Masyumi’s devotion to shari’ah and the party’s preferential treatment of Muslims and Muslim affairs. Still, on both the shari’ah and the pluralism issue, chapter five will point out, PBB leaders sought to convey an ‘undogmatic’ image to the public.

PPP’s dedication to the Masyumi tradition has been even harder to pin down. One obvious reason has been the presence of the traditionalist NU in the party. NU originally had been a division within Masyumi but then became a rival party. Another reason was the restrictions the New Order government imposed on Islamic politics and PPP, which, however, still enabled the party to uphold and defend a number of Islamic themes such as opposing cross-religious marriage, syncretism and a secular interpretation of the state ideology Pancasila. Debarred from making the Jakarta Charter a policy during the New Order, PPP re-adopted the Charter in the reformasi era. Still, as chapter four will argue, the party’s commitment to the Charter was strongly linked to political considerations and it showed little interest in a substantive discussion of shari’ah related issues. A certain superficiality regarding PPP’s identification with the Masyumi tradition was also revealed in the party’s split in early 2002. The rifts had no perceptible relation to different readings of the Masyumi tradition even though PPP’s modernist camp in Parmusi claimed to be motivated by reviving the spirit of the Bulan Bintang legacy.

Furthermore, this chapter argued that there has been widespread awareness in the Keluarga Bulan Bintang as to the dwindling of Masyumi’s legacy since the 1950s. This decline strongly suggested to keluarga activists that it was impractical to mould a party close to the Masyumi example in the post-New Order era. Most in the broader Bulan Bintang community who broadly identified with the historical role of
Masyumi therefore decided to remain in one of the established parties (PPP or Golkar). A smaller number joined Amien Rais in the religiously-neutral PAN. Again others swapped the Islamist struggle derived from the Masyumi model for an approach taken from contemporary Middle Eastern sources. Overall, the significance of the Masyumi tradition is likely to advance its decline in the years to come whilst the Islamist approach represented by PK is likely to enhance its impact on the country’s political culture.

Significantly, despite the decreasing role of the Masyumi tradition in Indonesian political Islam, its proponents have maintained an essentialist position on the role of Islam in Indonesia and officially sustained the assertion to be a central part of the national character. This discrepancy between the wish to dominate Indonesian political culture and the realities are the topics of the following chapter. At the same time, a religiously defensive spirit made an increasing impact on Indonesian Muslims. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, a perception of international politics as broadly anti-Islam had bolstered an unreflective sectarianism among many Masyumi devotees. Partai Keadilan and parts of the Masyumi camp have increasingly seen themselves in a global conspirational context.
CHAPTER THREE

ISLAMISM'S ESSENTIALIST VIEW ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN NATION AND ISLAM

Islamists in Indonesia claim to have greater socio-cultural authenticity than other religions and beliefs. This claim is framed by the truism that Indonesian cultural identity is grounded in a shared religious awareness. Islamists always claimed to be the vital component of this identity. They, in effect, guard an essentialist position of Islam’s role in Indonesian history and society.

All Islamists view the Indonesian nation and Islam as being interrelated and inseparable but Islamists following the Masyumi tradition have voiced this claim with special vigour. At the same time, they often speak vaguely about Islam whereas, in fact, referring to the explicitly political and shari‘ah-related aspects of faith. The Islamist view appears to defy the premise that all political cultures have, at some point in history, been learned and incorporated into society. This also applies to followers of the Masyumi tradition, as this tradition was shaped by the concepts of Islamic modernism coming from the Middle East in the early decades of the 20th century. This chapter will present the Islamist stance on the role and legitimacy of Islam in Indonesia before critiquing their claims.

Their essentialist view of the position of Islam in a religious society means that Islamists view “imported” ideologies such as atheism and materialism as alien and thus as illegitimate parts of Indonesian identity. Adherents of the Masyumi tradition are especially outspoken in their condemnation of ‘non-Indonesian’ beliefs. When the supposed atheists in the Partai Komunis Indonesia (‘Indonesian Communist Party’, PKI) declared allegiance toward Pancasila despite rejecting the monotheistic principle Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (The One All-Powerful God), the doctrine lost

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1 The Department of Religious Affairs interprets Pancasila as acknowledging Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism and Hinduism as official religions but does not recognise Judaism and mysticism.
its Islamic credibility. Once communists would agree to Pancasila as a ‘meeting point’, it would lose its spiritual quality and become ‘a dead concept’. It also meant that Pancasila could no longer be used as a tool against the rise of communism.

Conviction in the leading role of Islam had strong implications for how Masyumi legatees decreed the legitimacy of their ideals in the reformasi era. The open promotion of Islam’s ascendancy has been less common in Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK). While maintaining a preoccupation with defending Islam against domestic foes and threats such as Christian campaigns to convert Muslims and Sino-Indonesian economic hegemony, a number of Masyumi legatees adopted the notion of an absolute and timeless cultural tension between Islam and the West. The result combines a commitment to political participation through representative governmental institutions with feelings of cultural demise and global suppression of Muslims. This echoes a sentiment in much of the contemporary Muslim world.

Today’s adherents of the Masyumi tradition have upheld the claim to correspond to Muslim interests and national identity despite evidence of the increasing gap to the Muslim community they desire to represent. The 1999 election results affirmed that the significance of Masyumi’s style of Islamic politics had fallen sharply. The assertion of cultural ascendancy has thus been hollow. It is a repetitive discourse with a fixation toward the domestic past. Prior to Dutch colonialism and the influx of other ideologies and creeds, Masyumi legatees suggest, Muslims had embraced shari‘ah rule as the optimum political system. It was Western influence, they lament, that brought down the rule of sacred law. Shari‘ah thus became the lost heritage of the political community.

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Masyumi legatees are resentful at this loss and the little support they get from ordinary Muslims. In contrast to the constant highlighting of the supposed correlation between an unspecified “Islam” and national identity, not enough Muslims have been sufficiently committed to this belief and to support Islamist parties of any kind, either in elections or through a popular movement. These unfulfilled hopes helped to foster an increasingly distorted view of the history and legitimacy of Islamism in Indonesia while the paradigm of Indonesia as a “Muslim nation” triggered ongoing representational claims.  

The case of Masyumi typifies the lack of popular support. Masyumi founders believed that it would be the only Islamic political outlet and that it would become the governing party. With the grand majority of Indonesians being Muslim, Masyumi leaders as many secular nationalists and communists expected that it would dominate elections. Masyumi, however, never held more than one-quarter of all parliamentary seats. In the un-elected provisional legislature that was in place between 1950 and 1955, it was the leading party but held only 21% of seats. Neither did the first general election in 1955 turn out to be the hoped-for triumph. Slightly above Nahdlatul Ulama’s 18.4% share and behind the nationalist-secular Partai National Indonesia (‘Indonesian Nationalist Party’, PNI) 22.3%, Masyumi’s share of the vote was 20.9%.

The Dogma of a "Muslim Nation"

Islam as Bonding Agent

During the first half of the 20th century, Islam was a primary force in Indonesian movements that strove for liberation from foreign rule. It has been argued that

5 Of course, the awareness described in the previous chapter that the segmentation of Islam and the conversion of Muslim leaders to pluralist parties would obstruct forming a united Islamist party in the post-New Order era refuted those claims.
6 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 78. Feith and Castles observed that most politicians in the 1940s and 50s seemed to have only perfunctory knowledge of the political likings of electorates. Indonesian Political Thinking, p. 19.
7 In the preceding proto-parliament (KNIP, 1946 to 1949), Masyumi held 60 seats. This was more than any other party. Yet Masyumi’s position never exceeded 15% of the total number of seats. See also Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 79.
Muslim populations saw colonialism as a direct threat to their religion and identity. Masyumi devotees always sought to emphasise their legitimacy by pointing out that the “umat Islam” (Muslim community) was a forerunner in the struggle for national sovereignty. As such, they drew on the argument that Islam ‘came to provide the earliest channel of development of modern, mature Indonesian nationalism’.

Both nationalism and Islam demanded self-determination; Islam thus gave further impetus to the resistance against the Dutch colonialists and their Christian mission. Islamists thus proclaim that Islam became the bonding agent of nationalism and the national idea. It united the vast number of societies in the archipelago and created a sense of brotherhood and national unity. Islam had, in Natsir’s words, ‘first planted the seeds of Indonesian unity, removed the attitudes of isolation of various islands...’

In 1931, Natsir wrote

[At the time of the rise of Budi Utomo, the door had not been opened yet for those who are not Javanese...a long time before the notion of ‘the Indonesian nation’ was mentioned in our Indonesian sphere, [all] movements which were solely based on the religion of Allah had for a long time been endowed with the “Indonesian nation” tie [di masa itu pergerakan-pergerakan yang berdasarkan kepada Agama Allah semata-mata, sudah lama mempunyai ikatan “kebangsaan Indonesia”]...]

At the same time, Masyumi and its later adherents have proclaimed to operate within the framework of habits and customs of domestic communities. Natsir wrote:

People often presume that Islam opposes the existence of nations; it is said that Islam demurs the existence of a nation... This is not right! We can become a pious

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8 Kahin, Nationalism, p. 44.
9 See Amry Vandenbosch, “Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia”, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 21, Issue 18, 1952, p. 182; Kahin, Nationalism, p. 38. The ‘proud claim’ (Ward, Foundation, p. 9) to have constituted the main force in the nationalist movement is grounded in the Islamic character of anti-Dutch resistance in Minangkabau (West Sumatra), the Java war (1830s) and the three-decade long colonial war in Aceh. It also owes much to the struggle of the Java-based Sarekat Islam. This claim is contested by the secular-nationalists. For them, the Budi Utomo (established 1908 and seen as the first anti-colonial movement formed by nationalist, Dutch-educated Javanese) marked the beginning of the national fight for freedom. Indeed, in the course of the 1930s the Sarekat Islam became less important; hereafter the secular-nationalists in Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (‘Indonesian Nationalist Party’, PNI) headed the independence movement.
Muslim who with joy and pleasure sings [the song] ‘Indonesia my home’. How is it possible, that we could lose our Indonesianness [ke-Indonesiaan] when God made us of different nations... We have to be happy and pleased to show the outside world, that this is us the Indonesian people; this is our language, this is our culture, this is our batik, this is our wood-carving, this is our music and so on... There is no need for a Muslim to leave behind his/her nationality and culture. 13

Despite such assurances, Islamist pride in the achievement of independence has been inseparable from the belief that this was a struggle led by Muslims and driven by Islam. Nationalist sentiment, therefore, only became conceivable when Islam dictated it.14 ‘Nationhood’ (kebangsaan) detached from Islam was jahiliyya (‘ignorant’) and ashabiyah (‘an erroneous concept’) and as such, equal to tribal partisanship in pre-Arabic times.15 The Masyumi affiliate Hamka wrote

Islamic teachings establish that a feeling of service [rusa-kebaktian] in whichever place, whichever area we are... the fundament is devoutness toward Allah. People are not asked what their nationality [bangsmya] is; what is asked earlier is peoples’ religion and devotion [bakti]... Taking Islam, automatically, secures [menjamin] Indonesian nationalism [kebangsaan] and unity. But by exposing only nationalism without Islam, people again have to rummage in ancient traditions [tambo lama], and this is a disastrous... basis... We exist of hundreds peoples, which each have their own greatness. In order to foster this unity, search for a native bond [perekat yang aseli], [with] an example from heaven. Not with Gadjah Mada-Hajam Wuruk, not with Hang Tua and Tjindur Mata! But with ISLAM because this is the core [pokok] of our tranquility.16 (Capital letters in original)

Reflecting the central position of Islam in the notion of nationhood, Islamists have been pointing to Islam’s aspiration to act as a “protector” of other creeds and communities by stressing that a reverse order was not viable.17 They argued that, because of nominal Muslim supremacy, the umat Islam had more responsibility than

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14 This is at the same evident in the way Islamists have justified the use of the Islamic ideological party base. Islam, they asserted, acknowledges the concept of nationhood, hence there was no need for an explicit reference to kebangsaan. Natsir, “Apakah Pancasila Bertentangan dengan Ajaran Islam?”, reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, pp. 158-66. A few Islamic organisations such as GPII (later: GPI) used ‘Islam and Nationhood’ (Islam dan Kebangsaan) as ideological base. Masyumi rejected such double reference for the above reasons. Harjono and Hakiem, Natsir, p. 15.
15 Masyumi leaders from a Persis background, most notably Ahmad Hassan and Isa Anshary, most ardently voiced this view. Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 259; Harjono and Hakiem, Natsir, p. 16; Bakti, Islam and Nation, pp. 142-53.
16 Hamka, “Islam alat perekat kebangsaan & kesatuan Indonesia” (‘Islam is the tool for Indonesian nationalism and unity’), Hikmah, 9 March 1957, pp. 9-10. The text refers to Javanese and Malay heroes. Gadjah Mada, for example, was a famed leader of 14th century’s Majapahit Empire in East Java.
17 Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 278.
other religious communities to represent and defend the interests of the Republic and thus a right to steer public affairs. 18 This view held:

We, the Indonesian Muslim community who is the largest population, have the greatest responsibility toward the wellbeing and the development of the Indonesian Republic. We see this as a Godly gift [kurnia Ilahi] for which we are obliged to be grateful; by means of maintaining, cultivating and defending it, with all the strength that we have. 19

The particular logic that proclaims Islam as the final creed, the vital part of national identity and a “protector” of other religious communities deemed “Muslim” leadership good for Indonesian people in general. This dogma of a “Muslim nation” has always been an obstacle to a religious and cultural pluralism based on full equality.

Within the “Muslim nation” dogma, Islamists do not distinguish between their shari‘ah-minded brand of Islam and the Muslim peoples in general. This stance is rooted in Islam’s emphasis on communality and collectiveness, manifest in the notion of the global bond of believers (the umat). Islamists at all times endeavoured to highlight the historical roots and the prominence of a shari‘ah-minded Islam within the national idea. They underscored this position by arguing that Islam came to Indonesia on direct route from the Middle Eastern region, and that what is known in modern times as Arab customs was more important in shaping Indonesian Islam than commonly believed. This debate on historical legitimacy has been strongly flavoured by religious sentiment and pride. 20 Islamists see a politicised, rational and puritan brand of Islam as more comprehensive, purer and of higher value than an educational-intellectual (i.e. partial), mystic or “liberal” variant. It was thus claimed to be desirable for any Muslim.

Ironically, the self-awareness of shari‘ah-minded Islam corresponded with what European Orientalism identified as a pure, pristine form of faith, illustrating

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18 “Apa yang diperdjuangkan Masjumi Untuk Bangsa dan Tanah Air”, Hikmah, 12 November 1955, pp. 8-9 and 19.
19 Apa yang diperdjuangkan, p. 19.
Islamism’s unreflective essentialism. But contrary to the Islamist claim, the common view is that Islam came from the Indian subcontinent not earlier than the 12th century. Western scholarship taught that pre-Islamic beliefs were at the heart of Indonesian Islam. This became the scholarly excuse for the Dutch colonial policy known as *teori resepsi*, determining that local customs and beliefs (*adat*) should be taken as the main reference drafting laws for Indonesian Muslims. Islamic regulations had to be compatible with *adat* to be validated. As a result, later Islamists came to see Western scholarship as the agent of its governments whose target it was to repress the advance of Islam first in their colonies and later in the post-colonial states. Islamist scholars, of course, have always downplayed the frictions between local customs and their ideal of Islam. They believed and promoted that the agenda of Western scholarship was to disguise and distort Muslim unity in order to suppress Islam. This was how many academics came to be seen as a collaborator with imperialism and, in the view of contemporary Islamists, a very successful one.

Masyumi legatees such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’, DDII), Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (‘Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World’, KISDI) and Persis (‘Islamic Association’) maintained their stance after Masyumi’s dissolution. The discourse in these organisations reflected the wish to portray Islamism as something inherently Indonesian, often by stressing that Masyumi notables, above all Natsir, had been a ‘leader of the Muslim community [*ummat*] and the people [*bangsa*]’ and ‘a statesman [*negarawan*], not the leader of a [certain] group [*golongan*]’. To underscore Masyumi’s nationalist devotion, they pointed to Natsir’s and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s merits in drafting the ‘integral motion’ (*mosi integral*), which in

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22 This is a central argument of Geertz’ *Religion of Java*.
23 The main proponent of this view was Prof. Hurgronje, the Dutch colonial advisor. It also was proposed by European Orientalists such as Theodore Pigeaud and Adrian Reland and, though with a different emphasis, more recently by Geertz and Benedict Anderson.
25 Haryono dan Hakiem, *Natsir*, (first quote); “Sambutan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia”, in Natsir, *Agama dan Negara*, p. v (second quote). Proponents of this view liked to argue that Masyumi obtained support from more regions than secular parties like the Java-centred PNI, thus giving evidence of Masyumi’s claim to represent the national idea.
1950 dissolved the federal system and returned Indonesia to a unitary republic. Natsir’s name therefore was, as Anwar Haryono noted, ‘written with golden ink in the history of the struggle of our nation’. In a paper on Islam as the ‘essence of the nation’ (*jati diri bangsa*), Anwar attacked the academic output of Western historians as:

...a very coordinated attempt to dissolve the awareness of the people of the Melayu nations on the close spiritual relation [*hubungan rohani yang mesra*] between them and the Arab soil or [regarding] the Arab people as the first source in the arrival of Islam in Indonesia.

Anwar further reasoned that ‘we can say for sure’ that Indonesian Muslims had carried out Islamic law since it arrived, arguing:

[It is] not exaggerated [to] conclude that Islamic law and teachings had been living and had been the essence [*jati diri*] of the inhabitants of the archipelago Nusantara since the beginning of [Islam’s] arrival in Indonesia.

*Shari‘ah* was more appropriate for Indonesia than Western-derived “alien” civil law because Islam had preceded the advent of European rule in the archipelago. It was, therefore, closer to the way of life and spiritual sensibilities of the Indonesian people than civil law. In the Islamist perspective, therefore, the subsequent subordination of western legislation over Islamic law was the result of imperialist coercion. It was invasive and therefore came to be seen as an anomaly. Islam, Islamists believe, was at the cultural core of the Indonesian people and would have prospered in following centuries were it not for Dutch intervention. But this natural depicted process was interrupted by the arrival of the Dutch colonial power, who were aware that the ‘real strength’ and the ‘potential of the Indonesian people’ was embedded in their ‘Islamic soul’ [*jiwa Islamnya*].

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29 Also Fealy and Platzdasch, *Masyumi Legacy*, p. 90.

30 Haryono, *Memperingati*.
The Bitter History: Muslim Concessions

Islamists believe that the failure to convert Muslim historical and eschatological supremacy into political power was because the Muslim community had repeatedly made concessions to religious minorities in order to safeguard the existence of the unitary Indonesian state. Moreover, they hold that the minorities had used inappropriate means of imposing their will on Muslims. The first case in point was the failure to make Islam the ideology of the independent Republic. Muslims initially supported an Islamic state, then proposed the Jakarta Charter as a compromise, but eventually lost almost completely to the secular-nationalist camp. The final Indonesian Constitution of 1945 was de-confessionalised, lacking any particular Islamic terms including a reference to *shari‘ah*. Adding to the humiliation was the awareness that Indonesia was to become the largest Muslim country in the world.

Islamists have come to depict these defeats as outcomes of manipulation or inadvertent incidents. Indeed, proponents of a strongly Islamicised Constitution had been under-represented in the pro-independence committees handling constitutional matters such as the Komite Pusat Nasional Indonesia ('Central Indonesian National Committee', KNIP). Both real and perceived irregularities had strong implications for how Islamists came to understand the legitimacy of their ideological struggle. The parameters of this debate remained very much the same during the New Order and afterwards.

The trigger was the deletion of the Jakarta Charter. In 1945, Islamists have argued since then, the religious minorities had blackmailed Muslims to drop the clause. Referring to the Japanese officer who conveyed the opposition of non-Muslim communities, Natsir showed the indignation over the coercive means by which the intolerant minorities conferred their will on Muslims:

> This envoy did not come to discuss the issue. Only to convey a warning. Full stop! [The matter] does not need to be talked about any more. Up to you whether the

31 MIAI had also proposed a quota that two thirds of parliament and the President had to be Muslim. Nasution, *Islamic State*. The 1945 Constitution, however, only says that the President has to be an 'indigenous Indonesian' (*orang Indonesia asli*). It is unclear whether only a Muslim can be an *asli* Indonesian: I am grateful to Prof. Harold Crouch for his comments on this.
message is taken or not. The main thing is you know what the consequences are. This was an ultimatum. An ultimatum, not only against Indonesian Muslim citizens. But essentially against the Indonesian Republic itself which was only 24 hours old. The 17 August is Independence Day, our holiday. The 18 August is the day of the ultimatum by the Christian Indonesian community from the East. Both occurrences are historical. If we celebrate the first, at least do not forget the second. When we welcome proclamation day on 17 August we thank God. When we welcome the following day on 18 August we ask God for forgiveness [bertistighfar]. God-willing the Muslim community will not forget. 32

It is, however, clear that the Islamist stance on key issues such as the omission of the Jakarta Charter in 1945 and 1959 in the Konstituante (Constituent Assembly) was inseparable from the “Muslim nation”-dogma. Concentrating on rather isolated events such as the unclear role of the Japanese envoy, they have downplayed the broader social and religious circumstances without which a particular incident could not have taken place. 33 This discourse of loss formed an ideological folklore through which Masyumi adherents have come to see their commitment to cultivate Islam in Indonesia. Anwar Haryono recapitulated:

This is it—our national history. Twice a consensual result has been annulled. First: The consensual result of the state founders on 22 June 1945 was annulled only because an officer from Japan (his name is still not uncovered [gelap]) is said to have submitted a message that non-Muslims in East Indonesia would not join the Indonesian Republic if the supplement “with the obligation to implementing shari‘ah Islam” would not be deleted. Second: The consensual results of the Konstituante were annulled by the presidential decree only because there were factions, which boycotted the session, although it was known that the leaders of the largest factions undertook approaching efforts. 34

The painful defeat in the competition for state ideology and the misapprehension of Islamism’s mandate at home manifest in the 1955 election outcome biased a following generation of Masyumi legatees who acted on a personal affinity with their elders and their agenda. A 1995 DDII publication re-asserted that in early 20th century Indonesia ‘Islam was identical with nationhood’ and that all Muslims

32 Mohammad Natsir, “Tanpa Toleransi Tak-kan Ada Kerukunan” ('There will be no harmony without tolerance'), Media Dakwah, August 1989 and reprinted in January 2000, pp. 6-7.
33 See Anwar’s argumentation in his “Jati Diri Bangsa: Memperingati 22 Juni dan 5 Juli 1959 Bagian II”, (“The Essence of the Nation: Remembering 22 June and 5 July 1959”), Media Dakwah, September 1996, pp. 6-7. DDII, for example, regularly holds that a ‘party-outside factor’ had abolished the decisions of the Badan Penelitian Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (‘Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence’, BPUPKI). Common to all alleged incidents is that they are seen as interference and the cause for a disproportionately small share of “Muslim” power in the independent state.
regardless of their ethnicity were termed as ‘native’ (*pribumi*).\(^{35}\) DDII assured the reader that, despite the efforts of Christian missions, ‘Islam became increasingly identical with ‘indigenousness’ (*kepribumian*) and ‘nationhood’ (*kebangsaan*).\(^{36}\) Anwar highlighted the key role of the Jakarta Charter in this framework:

In our history, the Jakarta Charter has already taken in a position that is more glorious [*luhur*] than just in juridical-constitutional terms. The Jakarta Charter is already connected to the foundations of the morality of the nation, that is the sacredness of a promise [*kesucian perjanjian*]. Because of this, the Muslim community perceives the abolishment of the seven words, which once had made this gentlemen’s agreement, as breach of a promise [*pengingkaran janji*]. What is formulated in the Jakarta Charter is truly very profound, deeply rooted, part of our blood and flesh [*mendarah-daging*], and even inspires [*menjiwai*] every Muslim fighter [*pejuang Muslim*]. It is a life task [*panggilan hidup*] of every Muslim fighter to struggle that every Muslim carries out *shariah* Islam.\(^{37}\)

In accordance with the characteristic claim of ideologies to know ‘what is in the best interests of “the people”’, Islamists have been depicting the mass of ordinary Muslims to be devoted *shari’ah* supporters. The postulation of a collective Muslim aspiration and its promotion had always been important for the poise of Islamism. The aim to insert *shari’ah* terms in the Constitution and to oblige the state with the task to implement Islam has been portrayed as a Muslim desire. It was, Natsir argued, what distinguished a Muslim from a non-Muslim. He wrote:

...in our, the Muslim’s [*kaum Muslimin*] viewpoint, the Islamic religion is not merely a supplement that has to be infused in the state, but in our viewpoint, the state will be the tool and the instrument to put Islamic law into force [*alat dan perkakas bagi berlakunya hukum-hukum Islam*]. Here lies the difference of opinion between a Muslim [*seorang Islam*] and a non-Muslim [*orang yang bukan Islam*].\(^{38}\)

This has turned into a recurring premise: Islamists put emphasis on the numerical majority of Muslims compared to other religious groups and suggested that “Muslims” had the same desire and needs which the government needed to consider. This distorted the *umat* Islam necessarily to a uniform entity and an ideal. Masyumi depicted the 1955 elections as a ‘decisive time for our fight, the UMMAT ISLAM, to

\(^{35}\) Haryono and Hakiem, *Natsir*, p. 5.
\(^{36}\) Haryono, *Memperingati*.
implement the divine order [kalimah illahi] in our country, the Indonesian Republic’. It reminded Muslims through the Masyumi-linked tabloid Hikmah that an ‘anti-religious’ or ‘religiously-neutral’ government would ‘allow dozens of millions of Indonesian Muslims to be thrown into the valley of evil; physical and spiritual destruction’. In the case of a victory, Masyumi announced it would ‘adjust every paragraph to the wishes of the Indonesian Muslim community’ without recognising that these wishes may be very diverse. This assertion of a buried agenda and objective common to all Muslims prevailed aside from ongoing political frictions among modernists and traditionalists during the 1950s. Anticipating quarrels at the Konstituante, modernists sought solace by proclaiming a common ideological aim of the Muslim camp. Hamka wrote:

All this [difference] is political practice which to understand is sometimes not the same as to understand that two plus two makes four. [There are]...many complications [belit]. But when it comes to strive for Islamic law to become the basis of the Indonesian Republic, that the head of state has to be a Muslim, this is a matter of life and death for Masjumi, PSII, NU, Perti...and PPTI!

Up to the 1950s, shari‘ah had been an integral part of what made Islam a political force. The commitment for shari‘ah was braced by the supposition that such an agenda was the desire of a majority of the Muslim population. The view that an ideological, shari‘ah-minded Islam was at the cultural core of most Indonesians, however, continued despite the disappointing results of the 1955 elections. During the Konstituante, Natsir said:

For us, as state philosophy Pancasila is vague and unable to do anything for the soul of the Muslim community which already has and owns an ideology that is unequivocal...comprehensive and lives in the heart of the Indonesian people as an obligation for life and the source for spiritual and physical strength: this [ideology] is Islam... For us it is clear that the state must have roots which are directly implanted in society. Because of this the basis of the state, too, must be a belief that lives and is

39 “Seruan Umum” reprinted in Hikmah, 24 September 1955, p. 3 (capital in original). The author was Natsir.
40 “Kalau Masjumi Pegang Pemerintahan”, Hikmah, 2 April 1955, p. 5.
41 Kalau Masjumi.
carried out daily; which is clear and can be understood to arrange the daily lives of each individual in society and as a collective.43

Yet, as shown in Chapter two, many Muslim groups and intellectuals gradually receded from central Islamist goals, thus showing the erroneousness of representational claims. Most importantly, they ceased to promote the state as being the patron of *shari'ah* with the obligation to implement Islamic teachings among Muslims. Between the year of independence and the end of the New Order the ideological agenda of the Masyumi camp became disconnected from the Muslim mainstream. These setbacks led to palpable frustration among its adherents but they did little to revise their rhetoric. A recurrent pattern of Masyumi legatees thus became the exaggerated depiction of their potency and support in society, claiming that a state with a stronger Islamic component was the aspiration of the majority of Muslims.

**Frustration and Victimisation**

Masyumi legatees identified the enduring impact of regime repression and propaganda on the self-awareness and the confidence of Muslims as a major domestic factor in their decline.44 Interference in Islamic organisations had diluted Islam’s intellectual integrity and disrupted cadre formation. They lamented, in particular, that both the Old and the New Order successfully formed an image of Masyumi as counter-revolutionary.45 This had led to a misleading trend in history writing in which schoolbooks portrayed Masyumi as something “un-Indonesian”, a party of radicals and subversives. It was an intentional distortion of the Masyumi legacy, which estranged Islam from Indonesian Muslims. As a result, many gifted young cadres were deterred from becoming involved in Islamist organisations. They feared it would lead to problems with New Order security and undermine their careers. DDII’s ability to promote understanding of its ideological agenda both

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45 For critiques on this view see, for example, Yusril Ihza, *Activism and Intellectualism* and numerous Anwar Haryono editorials in Media Dakwah.
within and outside the organisation was also limited. The outcome was that only few members were well informed about Masyumi’s philosophy and legacy. These factors made it difficult to set up a cadre base for the future.

Disgruntled by four decades of political subjugation, the failure of the Masyumi camp to live up to its own expectations inspired a sizeable amount of literature lamenting the injustice of past defeats. Bulan Bintang leaders repeatedly attempted to disperse the view that Masyumi was directly involved in the establishment of the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (‘Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic’, PRRI), countering regime propaganda that their brand of Islam was “un-Indonesian”. They did so by underlining Masyumi’s own nationalist credentials and denying that of Indonesian leftists. History, DDII proclaimed, had proven that Masyumi’s dissolution in 1960 following the revolt was ‘the result of a conspiracy of pro-PKI forces’. Masyumi had never intended to replace President Soekarno but targeted the subversive communists. To obliterate Islam thus was part of PKI’s strategy to grasp power.

This domestically based frustration led to growing defensiveness. Masyumi legatees have increasingly come to believe in the existence of opponents who denied the involvement of Islam and nationhood and strove to sever this bond. They accused religious minorities of ‘intolerance’ as these were very rigid in their

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47 This blame was based in Masyumi’s support for Islam to become state ideology in the Konstituante and the involvement of Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara in the PRRI revolts. “Korban Penulisan Sejarah?” (‘A victim of history writing?’), *Suara Masjid*, February 1993. Bulan Bintang leaders, in response, deplored that Natsir found no mention in publications of the Department of Education and Culture such as the book ‘Indonesia’s National History’. Historians, they have demanded, ought to re-evaluate the role of the ‘Muslim community’ during the revolution and afterwards. Mahendra, *Kongress*. The PRRI was the regional government established 1957 in West Sumatra in opposition to the government in Jakarta.
48 *Siaran Pers: Pertemuan Pengurus Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) dengan Presiden Habibie tanggal (sic) 30 Juni 1998 di Bina Graha, Jakarta*. DDII leaders held that the involvement of Masyumi leaders was manipulated by Soekarno to control the party. Masyumi had affirmed that the PRRI rebellion was unconstitutional but its remaining leadership refrained from condemning party colleagues who had taken part in the uprising. According to Yusril, remaining Masyumi leaders, among them Prawoto, Prof. Kasman Singodimedjo, Yunan Nasution and Mohammad Roem had not been informed about the flight of their comrades to Padang, West Sumatra. See Yusril IJza Mahendra, “Prolang PRRI dan Keterlibatan Natsir-Sjafruddin”, in Endang Saifuddin Anshari (ed.), *Pak Natsir 80 Tahun: Buku Pertama Pandangan dan Penilaian Generasi Muda*, Media Dakwah, Jakarta, 1988.
50 Hefner mentions this in his *Public Islam and Print Islam*. 129
opposition against a greater political role of Islam, thus obstructing what Masyumi devotees wanted to see as the aspiration of the Muslim peoples to fully live in accordance with Islamic teachings. Natsir lamented:

They [the Christians] do not tolerate any regulation that gives an opportunity to the Muslim community to order its lives in greater accordance with Islamic teachings... If it already becomes customary [membudaya] that there is no tolerance for anything wanted by Islamic citizens...before no green light is given by the fellow Christian citizens—if this becomes customary, do not be surprised if the Indonesian Islamic community which has been fighting together for the existence of this Indonesia Republic will perceive itself to be seen as second-class citizen. Or even less—existing only if tolerated by others.51

Characteristic of later decades was the accumulation of perceived foes, domestic and foreign, coupled to an apologetic rhetoric. Masyumi devotees strove to influence fellow Muslims by portraying PKI as tool of the Soviet Union, underscoring its alien nature. The PKI, they held, ‘has to disguise as nationalist, has to feign to defend our national interests, because this is Stalin’s order’.52 These endeavours to persuade the public opinion rose from an increased awareness that shari’ah-minded Islam was only one contender for national identity despite a nominal Muslim majority. Hamka complained around the time of the Konstituante about what he spotted as an alliance of anti-Islamic forces:

For the majority of nationalists...only to hear the name Islam, not only to write [Islam] into the Constitution already is [a] sensitive [issue]. They endeavour not to mention this. Islam must not be advocated! They are unable to respect that for the Muslim community [Ummat Islam] this matter is a struggle of life and death! Any power, even if necessary a dictator, they do not mind; the main thing is that Islam does not emerge. And for this they have the same view as the communists. Because of this, they do not mind forming a united front with the communists... And they also agree with Catholics and Protestants, that the main thing is that Islam is not adapted into the Constitution! Therefore, the nationalists, communists and Catholic Christians and the Protestants do not mind forming a united front to oppose this.53

The sense of loss and dependency grew in the New Order years. This mindset built on the resentment that had started with Dutch attempts to downplay the impact of Islam on cultures in the archipelago. Now, however, it was indigenous religious minorities and the Christian missionaries who were specifically identified as the

51 Natsir, Toleransi, pp. 6-7.
52 “PKI alat Negara Asing” (‘PKI is a tool of foreign countries’), Hikmah, 16 March 1957.
53 Hamka, Harapan, p. 5.
enemy.\textsuperscript{54} In the longer run, Masyumi legatees have come to tackle the Christianisation issue in a similar absolute fashion as Islamists elsewhere. They associated it with the medieval crusades which Islamists tend to turn ‘into something like a holocaust, better to extract confessions of culpability from the West’.\textsuperscript{55} This victimisation inspired an idealised discourse of Islam’s role in history and the spreading of its teachings. Masyumi legatees always highlighted that Christians, unlike Muslims, used inappropriate means to proselytise. In 1954, Natsir wrote that ‘Muslims are only obliged to ‘call [memanggil]...! To call, unrelated to any coercion.’\textsuperscript{56} And in 1967 he lamented that ‘ten thousands [Muslims] were forced’ to become Christians because of ‘sweet-talk’ and the money of Christian missions.\textsuperscript{57}

Masyumi legatees did not so much envisage the New Order state as enemy, but rather competed for its favour to counter the Islamic decline. Their adversary was a supposed alliance of nominal Muslims and non-Muslim minorities shielded by the military. Together, this alliance had captured the state from its rightful Muslim “owners” and used missionary programs to further misrepresent the Islamic national character. Disillusioned that it lost the support of the urban Muslim middle-class as many chose to adapt to the “necessities” by dropping Islamist agendas, DDII stated in a typical resentful statement in 1993:

We together will be incessantly confronted...through several ways, from flattering to betrayal, many in the Muslim community are robbed. They even applaud with pleasure... We are not anti-minority. During the time of the Prophet there were also minorities... What we cannot approve is if the minority dominates the majority, because it will disturb the balance.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{54} This happened despite a 1967 government decree which excluded adherents of ‘religions’ as targets of missionary activities and other regulations that aimed to protect Muslims (No. 70 and 77/1978, Ministry of Religion). Islamist organisations held these decrees to be ineffective. Anwar Harjono, Melangkah Dalam Cuaca Yang Sedang Berubah (Penjelasan Mengenai Kebijakan-Kebijakan Dewan Da‘wah 1991-1993), Jakarta, 23 April 1993, speech at the Pertemuan Silaturahmi DDII, Jakarta, 23-24.4.1993, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{56} Mohammad Natsir, Keragaman Hidup Antar-Agama, (no publisher, no place), 1954. In reality, Islam had been spread through peaceful as well as through coercive means. See, for example, Kramer, Viewers.

\textsuperscript{57} Mohammad Natsir, Kode Toleransi Beragama, (no publisher), Jakarta, 1967.

The New Order regime further distorted the meaning of Pancasila from a uniting to a divisive doctrine. When the government enforced Pancasila as the ‘sole ideological foundation’ (asas tunggal) in the mid-1980s, Masyumi legatees saw it as the pinnacle of initiatives against Muslims; a development initiated 40 years earlier with the removal of the Jakarta Charter. In the regime’s language, the ‘sole ideological foundation’ was aimed at the final stage of Islam’s ‘inclusion’ in the state. But for the Masyumi camp and indeed many ordinary Muslims it debarred their religion from the shared platform Pancasila had promised to be. Natsir echoed this feeling of segregation:

Is the inner tranquillity [ketentraman perasaan] of the [Muslim] ummah in our country still equally seen as one aspect of what is said to be the national interests which are always mentioned in those official speeches? This is what needs to be answered, if not with words then with deeds and [improved] conditions. Please listen to our voice, too!  

The feeling of segregation prevailed despite the regime maintaining religious elements in politics which it aimed to control rather than to eradicate altogether. The government also attempted to make up for the political restrictions by ensuring that Muslims could privately pursue a pious life. Many Muslim activists saw asas tunggal as a chance to spread Islam to all parties, including Golkar. Yet though Golkar adopted a stronger Islamic temperament, it certainly never contemplated adopting an ideological agenda. With asas tunggal, the state once again suggested to constitutionally operating Islamists that their aims were illegitimate. This was the tenor of a letter by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to then President Soeharto:

If Pancasila, rather than being the foundation of the state has to be turned into the basis of human life, then this means that the religions revealed by The Almighty God...have to be exchanged for an ideology, which does not call itself a religion, but in its behaviour seems to wish to replace existing religions... Why...has the Islamic

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60 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 89 and 101. The best example for this was the continuing importance of the Ministry of Religion.
61 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 120. The active support for Islamic religious life contrasted with the Dutch policy of non-interference, with which the New Order, however, shared the dislike of a politically active Islam (p. 122).
62 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 122.
foundation to be replaced by the Pancasila? What crime has the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or the HMI, or any other Muslim organisation committed?\textsuperscript{63}

Such sense of victimisation rendered Masyumi legatees increasingly sectarian. The outcome was a more cheerless and gloomy mind-set that helped to isolate its proponents from the society they had claimed to represent and desired to lead. But in depicting themselves as victims, Islamist attacks against Christians and seculars took on a sense of a profoundly just cause. The resulting antagonism was, as a DDII document put it, ‘only to protect ourselves. It is self-defence’.\textsuperscript{64} A Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (‘Islamic Brotherhood Forum’, FUI) meeting summed up the stiff formulas and the dourness many Masyumi legatees had taken on by the mid-1980s. It held:

History shows that the colonialists who are minorities were able to prevail three and a half centuries because they used the tactics of ‘divide et impera’...by not permitting the majority (native citizens \textit{penduduk pribumi}) to form a united struggle. The strength of the majority is the spirit of togetherness which contravenes the tactics of divide et impera. History notes that when the Indonesian people regained their independence...after having faced colonialists (Portugal, Holland, Japan) for approximately five centuries, the majority of the Indonesian people are Muslim +- 90\% and the rest (+-10\%) are Christians, Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists. As a colonised nation [we] have deficiencies...toward the colonialist nation (the West) that is: poverty, stupidity and backwardness. And so the Muslim community, which is the majority...qualitatively is in a worse condition (poorer, more stupid, more backward, and more suffering!).\textsuperscript{65}

The belief in the encroachment of non-indigenous value systems on national identity turned gradually into an inseparable part of this conviction. Without the intrusion of incongruous concepts—most importantly communism—and customs, Islam, they insist, would have prospered. As Islam was closest to the character of most Indonesians, its undisturbed flourishing had prevented ideological conflict and the resulting social upheavals of recent decades. Indonesia, therefore, would be self-reliant and prosperous. The abolition of the Jakarta Charter merely remains as a focal point of vast symbolic meaning for this belief.

\textsuperscript{63} Letter by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to President Soeharto, 7 July 1983, reprinted as “Pancasila as the Sole Foundation”, \textit{Indonesia}, No. 38, October 1994, pp. 74-85.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Da’wah Bil-Lisan Dan Bil (Lisanil) Hal (Laporan Kebijakan Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia Selama 24 Tahun)}, (no place), 24 May 1991, p. 3.
With the obsession of Masyumi legatees of re-positioning Islam as the fundamental pillar of the state and nation, it was not surprising that, in the 1990s, they reacted pragmatically to the regime’s rapprochement. Their relationship with the bureaucracy smoothed and Islamist groups were allowed greater access to financial resources.\(^{66}\) The government also started to promote Islamic laws, though most of the initiatives only affected regulations on family law and inheritance. The laws were passed through the Religious Judicature Act of 1989 that restored and simplified the jurisdiction of Islamic courts handling inheritance.\(^{67}\) This promotion of Islamic laws suggested to parts of the Islamist camp that the Islamisation of the state was feasible without having to change the Constitution. In 1995, the government rehabilitated several Masyumi leaders. This was a symbolically important step.\(^{68}\) In the following years, Anwar Haryono intensified the guarded accommodation that had begun under Natsir and toned down criticism of the government. In the course of the rapprochement, several Islamist leaders joined Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP).\(^{69}\)

Many Masyumi legatees pragmatically adapted to the regimes’ shifts of policy but they sustained their deep distrust toward their secular and non-Muslim rivals. Anwar tellingly addressed a DDII meeting under the dictum, ‘Taking steps in the middle of
a climate change’, and advised ‘to make the best of it’.\textsuperscript{70} Citing Natsir, Anwar asked whether the ‘Dewan Dakwah Family forever only wants to be a spectator’ and contemplated strategic questions on how to consolidate Muslims politically. He raised the question by once again evoking the ideal of a uniform and united Muslim community leading Indonesia ahead. Anwar unintentionally revealed the futility of this hope by linking it to two umbrella organisations, MUI and FUI, whose impact on broader umat affairs were minor at best:

\begin{quote}
Are we, the Muslim community, already one community [$\textit{shaf}$] now? Indeed we have the Indonesian Ulama Council [MUI], which is a bridge between the umat and the government. Indeed we have the Islamic Brotherhood Forum [FUI], a receptacle for leaders of various Islamic organisations to meet. But can they already speak by representing the voice of the Muslim community? ...To the leaders of the umat...I invite them to answer this for themselves. In fact, the answers are already there, even have been there for a long time. But when are we capable of giving a joint answer? And on this basis, [will] we make joint steps? Make steps in which direction? We [will] have to answer this question together. Because, while proceeding, we have also to investigate the climate around us. Does the climate already allow us to make this joint step? I see that the climate already has changed. What was previously a climate strongly dominated by the winds brought by the minority; lately the wind of the majority has begun to blow. Whether this wind, which is only light at the moment, really will bring fresh air in our lives, is among other things dependent on our stand and the steps that we undertake. If we want to stay only spectators in the schemes [$\textit{permainan-permainan}$], which currently take place, then the light breeze might just turn into a haunting hurricane.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

The desire to regain what Islamist rhetoric typically depicted as “Muslim” political and economic power was most apparent in the contest over Soeharto’s successor as President. With the start of the economic crisis in late 1997, Masyumi legatees geared up to regain the political centre stage for which they had claimed legitimacy. But their weak position against the secular opposition suggested acting cautiously in bringing about the end of Soeharto’s presidency. At that stage, anticipating the end of Soeharto’s term, PPP and sections of the Bulan Bintang community stepped up support for the Chairman of ICMI, B.J. Habibie.\textsuperscript{72} This support was then channelled


\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Perlu Mawas Diri Seusai Idul Fithri}. For similar statements, see \textit{Penjelasan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia Tentang Situasi dan Perkembangan terakhir di Tanah Air & Penentuan Iedul (sic) Fithri 1414 H}, Sekretariat DDII Pusat, 1994.

\textsuperscript{72} In late 1997, PPP once again had been urged into backing Soeharto’s candidature for presidency. At the same time, PPP strongly supported Habibie’s bid for vice-presidency in anticipation of a change of regime in the near future. Faisal Baasir, “Mengawal Agenda Reformasi”, in Lukman Hakim, Sultan
through the Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam (BKUI), the modernist-dominated body that was charged to prepare a sole political vehicle for the Bulan Bintang community.\textsuperscript{73} The prospect of advancing their strategic position was the reason that Masyumi legatees opted to conserve the New Order rather than overthrowing it too early. It was pivotal to prevent the secular-nationalist opposition around PDIP Chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri from gaining power and thus once again obstructing the progress of Islam in the formation of the national character.

This mindset prompted several Masyumi legatees to look for influential allies in the political elite. To curb PDIP and its army allies, from the mid-1990s on, these Islamists strove to build up relations with the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI). The goal was for officers sympathetic to Islam to gain high ranks in the military. In return, their key ally, the Head of the army’s strategic command Kostrad, Prabowo Subianto, and his associates, provided funding for DDII and KISDI and helped to make individual associates in the wider Bulan Bintang camp quite well-heeled.

The anticipation of getting back centre stage was thus more immediately relevant than gaining instant political freedom.\textsuperscript{74} A DDII leader recapitulated his organisation’s focus on interim targets after having pragmatically collaborated with the regime:

DDII and parts of the Muslim community saw this as an...opportunity to enter into the political inner circle...When Soeharto was about to fall he...approached DDII and DDII saw this...as a moment of which advantage can be taken to return into the inner circle of politics...temporarily with Soeharto as President. So that in the post-Soeharto era [we] would be in a good position. But Soeharto fell too quickly... DDII and the others [Islamist organisations] did not have the chance yet to gain strength in


\textsuperscript{74} Islamist students groups also were more guarded in their actions against the faltering government than the secular opposition. The former demonstrated against regime policies without making the resignation of Soeharto a top priority. Their motive was not to endanger the position of Islam. Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Andi Rahmat and several KAMMI activists, Jakarta, 16 January 2001. Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (‘United Action Front of Indonesian Muslim Students’, KAMMI) was the largest and most influential of these groups.
power elites. DDII did not oppose reformasi and [did not want to] eternalise the New Order regime but desired for a chance to gain more power [ingin punya kesempatan berkuasa lebih kuat]… After Soeharto would have made a configuration in which Islam entered, only then he [was supposed] to resign and DDII could take part… Because [we] saw the danger of [our] political opponents seizing power.75

The representational claim of Masyumi legatees over national identity resumed in the post-1998 reformasi era. In a bid to re-write the historical assessment of Masyumi, in mid-1998 DDII requested President Habibie to rehabilitate the ‘fighter champions for independence’ (tokoh-tokoh Pejuang Kemerdekaan) Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap and awarding them the title ‘national hero’.76 In addition, they demanded the abolition of the ban on Masyumi (presidential decree No. 200/1960).77 The rehabilitation was realised in early November 1998 during a DDII summit.78 Habibie described Natsir as a ‘great man’ and extolled his merits in bringing about the unitary form of state. This was the first official appreciation by the Indonesian government in 32 years but it did little to halt the sentiment of victimisation among Masyumi legatees.79

By 1998, the globalisation of information had heightened Muslim awareness toward international political issues. This awareness was accompanied by an accumulation of perceived enemies. Masyumi legatees nowadays identify the policies of the US and its allies as historical continuation of the Dutch colonial power. Both operated on the same premise; that is, to inflict an alien value system and lifestyle on Indonesia and oppress the political and material progress of Muslims. The call from the Middle Eastern icons of Islamism to face up to the global Islamic crisis through a comprehensive effort to revitalise Islam gripped senior Indonesian Islamic leaders

75 Interview Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001.
76 A DDII press release reiterated Natsir’s role in drafting the ‘integral motion’ and his other efforts for the public weal such as being granted financial help from Japan for Indonesia in the 1980s. Further, DDII highlighted Sjafruddin’s role as President of the Emergency Government, managing to safeguard the republic internationally while Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta were imprisoned by the Dutch. Siaran Pers: Pertemuan Pengurus Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) dengan Presiden Habibie tanggal (sic) 30 Juni 1998 di Bina Graha, Jakarta.
77 Hasil-Hasil Musyawarah Besar Dewan Dakwah, in Partai Politik Era Reformasi, pp. 81-97.
78 This was the Silaturrahmi Nasional (‘National Goodwill Meeting’).
79 “Sambutan Presiden R.I. Prof. Dr. B.J. Habibie”, Silaturrahmi Nasional dan Peluncuran Home Page Keluarga Besar Dewan Dakhwah, 1-2 November 1998, Jakarta, p. 4. The meeting was attended by many state officials and opened by President Habibie in the state palace. Participants included State-Secretary Akbar Tanjung (Golkar), Minister for Religious Affairs Dr. Malik Fadjar (Muhammadiyah) and former Finance Minister Dr. Fuad Bawazier (HMI).
since the 1950s. The emerging thought pattern echoed that of other Muslim societies. As elsewhere, the adaptation of conspiracy theories that reinvigorated the belief in the perennial foes of Islam was, at its core, 'rooted in the frustration...of colonialism and dependency'. Nonetheless, its jihadist drive never became the intellectual basis for the actions of Masyumi legatees. They adopted a defensive spirit and the amassing of enemies but did not modify political strategies.

_Reconstructing Muslim Identity in a Global Conspirational Context_

The influx of foreign Islamist ideology incited a higher degree of ideological sensitivity and antagonism into Indonesian Islamism. It enhanced cross-religious suspicion and popularised the view that Islam was under siege by Western ideologies intruding on Muslim homelands. At the same time, it proclaimed that Islam was to finally emerge as the victor in this historic battle of cultures. The global impact of capitalist and communist rivalry and the perceived role of Christian and Zionist ideology in it encroached Islam no later than the 1950s. Islam's hostility toward communism had provided common ground with the US during the Cold War. In the 1950s, Indonesian Islamic parties, including Masyumi, looked with sympathy to the US, also for its conception of democracy. They had accepted constitutionalism and nationalism as the fundaments of the state, even though striving for a formal Islamic character. The adaptation of the nation-state model led to a revision of the ways Muslims conducted relations with other nations. It became customary to pursue a secular-pragmatic line in maintaining relations with other, non-Muslim, countries. They were no longer based on the stipulations of the Islamic canon but were brought within the framework of modern international law. They necessitated a peaceful co-

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80 Natsir's senior positions in several international Islamic organisations in the 1950s fostered this connection. He was Vice-President of the World Islamic Congress in Pakistan and headed a number of international Congresses in Saudi Arabia and Damascus.


82 See Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, _Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia_ ("Islam amidst the World's Turmoil") Bandung, Al-Ma'arif, 1950, p. 27. With its concentration on communal duties and the collective, Islamism is inherently hostile to capitalism. Though connected to technological and scientific advance, capitalism, the common judgment holds, had failed to bring about social justice. With its rejection of God, communism, of course, is an Islamic anathema, despite any social consciousness and sympathy for the deprived Islamists might share.

83 Khadduri, _Islam and the Modern Law._
existence and dropped the doctrine of *jihad* and the division of the world in an Islamic (*dar-al Islam*) and an infidel and thus unreceptive (*dar-al harb*) domain.\(^8^4\) They also marked the start of apologetic discourse in the Muslim world, which attempted to prove that Islam demanded an egalitarian co-existence of nations and not to conquer, both peaceful and through physical means, in the name of religion.

The first significant setback came in the later 1960s when the US gave military support to Israel in the confrontation with Arab nations.\(^8^5\) Around the same time, western pop culture invaded Muslim lands to an unprecedented degree and enhanced the antagonism of devoted Muslims who proclaimed the alienation of Muslims from their religion and suspected this to be part of a master plan to subdue them.\(^8^6\)

Responding to this, Masyumi leaders called on fellow Muslims to give consideration to the works of ideologues such as Qutb and Mawdudi, which were ‘already far different’ from earlier reformists such as Abduh and which became more easily available in Indonesia from the 1970s on. Hamka anticipated the common view in today’s Muslim world that Western nations desired to subvert Muslims to their secular life-styles with the goal of obliterating Islam. He said:

...[u]ntil today the Islamic world is an object, and its soil [seen as] extremely rich. At the same time [Islam] has an ideology which until now has been dormant... After the Islamic world found itself again, their [the West’s] aim is for [the Islamic world] to take on Western thought, Western teaching, Western life-style. Therefore, by the time the political colonisation has been finished, the West and the communist world endeavour to implant a new colonisation which is more shattering, that is, intellectual colonisation [*penjajahan fikiran*]... *Al-ghazwul Fikri* [lit: ‘the invasion of ideas’] is a tremendous propaganda technique, through all means, both uncouth and civil, both cultural and academic, so that the Islamic world departs its way of thinking from its religious basis... For this it is not necessary to change one’s

\(^{8^4}\) Ibid.

\(^{8^5}\) The US subsequently tolerated Israeli occupation of the Gaza strip, the West bank and East Jerusalem. This was despite that several UN resolutions had declared the occupations as illegal. US economic sanctions against Iraq and large sums of US foreign aid going to Israel were other factors making the belief in a global Jewish-backed US effort against Muslims accepted wisdom. The 1987 foundation of KISDI reflected the heightened concern of the ‘Masyumi community’ for international Islamic issues.

\(^{8^6}\) Islamists thus see Western ‘crusaderism’ as ‘a systematic plan to eradicate Islam linking medieval Christianity, modern imperialism, and Western consumer culture’. Though Southeast Asian Islam was untouched by the crusades, its notion, Kramer observed, has appeared to touch on ‘collective Muslim memory’. Kramer, *Fundamentalist*. 

139
religion. One may well remain a Muslim, while no longer holding on to [meyakini] the teachings of Islam.\(^{87}\)

With the presence of Israel amidst Muslim lands as its pinnacle, global events evoked latent prejudices and awareness of their religiously legitimated underpinnings. Muslims at all times put themselves on the defensive. Islam, senior Masyumi economist Sjafruddin Prawiranegara assured his readers, was established as a ‘synthesis’ of Christianity and Judaism and did ‘not act hostile but always sought brotherhood’ toward these faiths. But ‘in reverse, Christians and Jews always tried to destroy Islam though in vain.’\(^{88}\) Such preconceived formulas cemented a binary ideological and intellectual battle line between Islam and an assortment of other doctrines and creeds with Islam’s final victory depicted as a divine certainty. Aided by the fictitious anti-Semitic document ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion’, it postulated a Jewish plan for world domination.\(^{89}\) This pamphlet, which has been easily available throughout the Muslim world, portrayed any innovation of political and economic doctrine in the 20\(^{th}\) century—communism, secularism, liberalism, individualism and Women’s liberation—as threats for Muslim societies imposed and steered by a Zionist plot.\(^{90}\) Ready for use by Middle Eastern polemicists, an increasing number of Indonesian Muslims, too, came to see Jews as the heralds of societal transformation, infiltrating other countries with the goal ‘to destroy barriers of creed’ and reaping the benefit ‘into the hands of the great usurious Jewish financial institutions’.\(^{91}\) Sjafruddin evoked the allegations of the “protocols” when he proclaimed in 1950:

> In fact, communism has since long infiltrated the world. [Among the] Western Christians, in the form of cruel “capitalism” brought by Jews... The Jews’ entire


\(^{88}\) Prawiranegara, *Pergolakan*, p. 65.

\(^{89}\) In mid-19\(^{th}\) century, a French lawyer, Maurice Joly, wrote a fictitious dialogue between Montesquieu and Machiavelli as a veiled critique against Napoleon III. In the late 19\(^{th}\) century, Russian anti-Semites falsified their polemics as being based on a Jewish plot for world domination. See Martin van Bruinessen, “Yahudi sebagai Simbol dalam Wacana Islam Indonesia Masa Kini”, unpublished manuscript, 1993.

\(^{90}\) Van Bruinessen, *Yahudi*. Islamists, van Bruinessen points out, have distorted the meaning of Zionism. The term stood for the Jewish secular movement grounded in a Jewish national identity. Zionism was not related to religious zeal.

\(^{91}\) Zeidan, *Perennial Battle*, referring to Qutb’s *Social Justice in Islam*. 

140
soul is chained to the world, toward materialism [materie]... Communism and capitalism are different as a doctrine [paham] [but] with regard to those who establish and propose them it is the same... It is no coincidence that both the American capitalists and the Russian communists support the Israeli state, because both of them are Jews. It is the Jews who will eventually lead this world into a lethal fight on top of two dogmas, [that is] communism and capitalism, which in fact are completely hollow [hampa]. The life and fate of hundreds of millions of souls are manipulated [dipermainkan] and wagered [dipertaruhkan] in a devastating conflict as if the soul of humankind has no meaning, has no virtue.92

The tensions at home and cathartic events such as the 1967 Israel victory over an alliance of Arab states were fundamental in triggering the conviction in the incompatibility of hybrid ideologies such as Arab Socialism or Pancasila with Islam and the need to cultivate a comprehensive (kaffah) form of Islam instead. Muslims appeared in danger to “Westernise” Islam, in the sense that they seemingly detached their faith from its philosophical essence. This, Islamists argued, was enabled through uncritical submission to the Western modernity and progress paradigm, driven by the subordination of faith to reason. The epitome of this crisis in Islam and a major symbol for the demise of Muslim unity in a global context had been the downfall of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924.93 This set off the corrosion of Islamic identity. Natsir recorded:

With free reasoning the Turkish people have...endanger[ed] progress...destroy[ed] all the strength of the Turkish people... With free reasoning they modernised the administration of government, they introduced Western science, technics and Western organisations. With free reasoning they also discarded Islamic law, Islamic legal penalties [hudud]. Intoxicated by free reasoning they did not know to differentiate between what is harmful...and has to be dropped and...[what is] useful and has to be maintained. Free reasoning does not know limits, does not draw limits. With free reasoning they shed everything of the old traditions...without thinking critically...without...investigation, whether all of this is in agreement with the basis of Islam, in accordance with the “Spirit of Islam”. No, the main thing is that it

92 Prawiranegara, Pergolakan, p. 41. The charges against the Jews have rested on their perceived breach of God’s orders. Very common has been the naming of usury. Watt, Mohammad, pp. 205-6.
93 See, for example, Kepel, Jihad, p. 43. The Ottoman caliphate was one of several Islamic empires in which Muslim political power had reached its peak in the 16th century. The Turkish state, coming about as a result of its overthrow, brought about the first formal separation of the personal and the public realm in Muslim history and enabled the triumph of nationalism. Echoing the Islamist view that the demise of the caliphate marked the first major defeat of the Islamic civilisation against Western hegemony, Hamka described the founder of Turkey, Mustapha Kemal (Attatürk), as the ‘first pioneer’ of ghazwul fikri. Hamka, Beberapa Tantangan, pp. 9-10. The indictment that the end of the caliphate caused among Indonesian Muslims was nonetheless more reserved than in the Middle Eastern region, partly for geopolitical reasons. Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 316.
matches with the want of free reasoning; the main thing is [to be] in accordance with the “Spirit of the West”\textsuperscript{94} (Italic in original)

Despite such unease and bellicose rhetoric, the political themes of Masyumi legatees continued to be domestic, unlike the broader focus of adherents of foreign Islamist ideology. At the same time, litanies over the perceived acceptance by Muslims of Western conceptions showed that the Masyumi camp had, at no stage, resolved the problems arising from the blend of European state concepts and the desire to sustain an Islamic identity of this state including its obligation to execute shari‘ah law. Yet still there appeared to be greater willingness to succumb to the ‘law of nations’ based on European concepts and the belief that such a system could also be made suitable for Muslim lands. In comparison, foreign Islamist models, at least in their long-term conception, moved beyond such an allegiance and envisaged a different societal model.

One distinct trait of the Masyumi tradition has been unequivocal devotion to a constitutional struggle. Although groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami also mostly operated as a legal political participant rejecting armed struggle, this did not amount to the Masyumi principle of strict constitutionality (taat hukum), which persisted even if the laws it had to adhere to were deemed un-Islamic. The Muslim Brotherhood, by comparison, was at times a secretive organisation prone to revolutionary means including violence, and, at other times, a legal political party claiming to back democracy.\textsuperscript{95} The commitment to other key features of a democratic system varied as well. Mawdudi, al-Banna and Qutb at times argued in favour of a one-party system, an ideal of classless society. Masyumi saw this aim as contravening a central democratic principle. Masyumi also appeared more supportive toward freedom of speech, the separation of powers and parliamentary rule. Most Masyumi devotees also appeared flexible in their shari‘ah approach and application. By contrast, major non-Indonesian ideologues, especially Qutb, claimed to be

\textsuperscript{94} Mohammad Natsir, Islam dan Akal Merdeka, (no publisher), Jakarta, 1970, p. 21. This pamphlet was an attack against Ali Abd al-Raziq, the main conceptualist of Kemalist Turkey. Al-Raziq was pivotal in cementing the argument that Islam was not related to political authority. He strongly influenced later generations in sketching a modern Muslim state more strictly along Western lines.

staunch defenders of a literal adaptation of Islamic teachings. All, however, did little to specify the technicalities of the envisaged Islamic system.

Another difference was the direction and scope of the Islamisation of society. Mawdudi dismissed the concept of a nation as un-Islamic and postulated a Muslim homeland freed from state paradigms. By contrast, the Masyumi tradition, though equally devoted to the universality of the Islamic message, remained faithful to the idea of a national state desired to govern and to become active in the execution of Islam among Muslims. Both camps had a different sensitivity to the ideological enemy. Masyumi legatees, above all, remained dedicated to a struggle against groups whom they held to have captured the state from Muslims. *Jihadist* spirit, however, not only targeted impious governments but above all an “impious” worldview in its historical context.

Hence, the doctrinal arguments of post-New Order Masyumi legatees repeated those of other transitional periods in 1945, 1957 to 1959 and 1966 to 1968 but its awareness had turned international, depicting Muslims as victims of a global manipulation of commerce, wealth and political culture. In the major features of its outlook and rhetoric, Indonesian defensive sentiment entirely fitted in the global model. It did not add any distinctive features to a discourse that, by 1998, already had been evolving around binary stereotypes of good and bad. As such, a US-led campaign allegedly conspired to maintain Sino-Christian domination of the Indonesian economy. The ensuing associations from domestic to foreign plots and from Christian plots to Zionist ones illustrated the strong ties between the sense of loss, the need to make out culprits for the perceived defeat and accumulating them which at the same time shuts them off from rational debate. Domestic motives for

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96 Akhavi, *Dialectic*.
97 Kotob, *Accommodationists*. For Islamist parties’ promotion of shari’ah, see chapter four.
98 Mawdudi promoted an Islamic state covering the Indian subcontinent.
99 Islamists commonly condemn the West—especially the US—for backing authoritarian Muslim regimes for strategic and economic benefit and only supporting democracy if it does not bring Islamists to power. They also have critiqued US exploitation of the world’s oil resources and the alleged manipulations of global finances, the latter charge mostly being targeted against Israel.
100 Binary stereotypes, of course, are often mirrored on the receiving end.
101 These concerns supplanted the ubiquitous propaganda against Christian missionary activities in the New Order years.
Islamist suspicions against non-Muslims were fed by growing sensitivities for the plight of fellow Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere which appeared to confirm Qur’anic warnings. ‘Hatred and hostility’, the Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK) -based Almuzzamil Yusuf proclaimed, ‘are de rigueur [sunnatullah] for those outside Islam [and] will continue until judgment day, as alluded to [diisyaratkan] by the Qur’an’.102

The public Muslim discourse in the reformasi era showed that the translation of this sense of dependency and vulnerability into a defensive spirit had by now exceeded those Islamists embracing foreign ideological models as basis for their actions. Israel’s occupation of Palestine and the atrocities against Bosnian Muslims nurtured the pervasive belief in the contemporary Islamic world that Muslims are the community most discriminated.103 PPP claimed in the MPR:

In every place in the world with a Muslim majority, there is no repression of the minority. Difficulties only arise anywhere [dimana-mana] where Muslims are the minority; this is a fact from history itself.104

Muslim-majority countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Malaysia have a long history of discrimination against their non-Muslim minorities. This renders such incorrect statements as either ignorance on the part of the Islamists or intentional misinformation.

In particular, it has become a comfortable typecast for Islamism in all places to condemn the International Monetary Fond (IMF) as a Jewish-backed tool. The IMF was implicated in a ‘five-decade lasting strategy’ to ‘pull up a giant supermarket under the control of the US… To loan money as done by the Jews, the US and also the IMF is necessary for them to dominate and control the receiving countries’.105

103 The Palestinians, the Filipino Moros, the Chechens and the Chinese Uighurs are examples of oppressed minority Muslim populations.
The PK ideologues Abu Ridho and Dr. Irwan Prayitno put this condemnation in the context of the shared Islamist paradigm in the late 20th century:

For terrorist countries such as Israel, the US and its allies, blame[s]...against the actions of certain groups and countries who do not comply with their imperial spirit have...become an effective tool...to justify the destruction of a nation, movement or individual, even the destruction of a particular government. The objective is no other than to oppress, eliminate or control their political opponents so that they can freely apply their imperial politics on the world.106

Irwan further wrote by referring to Qur’anic warnings:

The Jews seek to dominate the world by gaining control of the [political and social] systems...of every other race or nation. The Jews, by manipulating the Zionist movement, have always had the goal of gaining control of the world by whatever means is available. At the present time, every effective political, economic and social system in the world is controlled by the Jews. The desire to rule the world is based on the conviction that God has chosen the Jews to be superior to every other race and rightful heirs of the world and everything within it. Islam has a similar conviction expressed by the word khalifa, an institution embodying faith and righteousness, which holds in trust responsibility for the development of and care for the earth and all it contains. It is this conviction of the Islamic community that motivates the Jews to wage war against Islam because Islam has the power to defeat the Jews... The Jews are doing their utmost to wage war [memerangi] against the Islamic umma until the Muslims subject to them as stated in the Qur’an: ‘The Jews and Christians will not tolerate until you follow their religion’ (al-Baqarah, 2:120)... They [the Jews] use all means available to realise their obsession. It is well known that the Jews are behind many secret organisations. They...are behind many calamities throughout the course of history. The history of the Jews is replete with wickedness—such as the shame of slavery, arrogance, extreme racism, blind fanaticism in preserving their blood-line, materialistic greed, an economic system based on usury together with other forms of wicked behaviour such as flattery, cunning, cruelty, hypocrisy, foul design, obstinacy, plundering the property of others by improper means, and preventing humankind from [entering and] following the Islamic path... Such is the conduct of Satan. They systematically plan wicked conduct in...a community, nation, country and organisation... An effective way of gaining control of the world...is through economy. History...shows that the Jews use economic might to subject others... To dominate the world, the Jews accomplished to take economic command over the US...the Jews control American policy.107

All Islamist parties advocated closer fiscal relations with Arab nations, arguing that the relationship with the IMF had worsened the country’s economic plight. The PPP,

107 Irwan Prayitno, “Yahudi Sebagai Hizbus Syaithan Mengusai Dunia”, reprinted in Prayitno, Kepribadian Daul, pp. 139-46 (quote pp. 139-41). The reference to Satan alludes to the Qur’an (7:17) which states that Satan swore to God to lead humankind astray after God had expelled him from heaven. I am indebted to Prof. Anthony Johns for his illuminating comments on this quote.
for example, appealed to reject ‘foreign interference in any form whatsoever’ and called on the government to pursue a ‘free and active’ foreign policy and ‘not to follow blindly [mengekor] the will of the superpower’ (the US). All Islamist parties demanded from the government not to resume the work with the IMF after the completion of the Memorandum of Intent in late 2003. The government had to free itself from its dependency from western donors by, instead, establishing relations with international Islamic financial institutions.

Promoting Islam as the nation’s bonding agent, Masyumi legatees have always displayed a very protective stance over national unity. During the transitional period in 1998 and 1999, there were mounting protests about perceived foreign meddling in Indonesian domestic affairs. Not solely an Islamist concern, these theories were readily accepted among ordinary Muslims. The belief that Western allies desired to control, weaken or break up Indonesia has been inseparable from the conviction that this was part of a broader plot to keep Muslims powerless. This underscored the traditional assertion that Islam and Indonesia’s national identity and fate were inextricably linked.

The doctrinaire Islamists in Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB) and its affiliated organisations DDII and KISDI were the most candid in addressing alleged foreign operations. Whereas the pragmatic Islamists such as Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Ka’ban did not appear to give conspiracy theories wide attention, doctrinaire Islamists nurtured the deeply embedded sense of susceptibility in the light of the global weakening of Muslim authority. Foreign interference thus became both a cause and a symptom of Muslim weakness. Official party statements demanding greater Muslim control over national affairs, however, were rare. In one instance, PBB demurred that religious conflicts and socio-economic woes had turned more volatile and unstable through the operations of ‘foreign forces’ who had an interest in

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109 Risalah Sementara Rapat Paripurna Ke-6 Lanjutan 1 Sidang Tahunan MPR Tahun 2002 10 Agustus 2002, Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2002, p. 31; “Pernyataan Politik Partai Bulan Bintang”, 17 September 2000, reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, October 2000, p. 6. This sentiment was not confined to Islamist parties but also common among the secular-nationalist camp. The receipt of foreign aid was commonly seen as humiliating; a loss of self-determination to the dictum of foreigners.
‘breaking up’ (memecahbelah) Indonesia in order to ‘dominate’ the ‘political, economical and cultural life’ according to their interests. The party, therefore, insisted that secession demands, in particular armed secessionist movements, had to ‘be overcome in firm [tegas] and unbending [tanpa kompromi] ways’ and ‘without opening the slightest chance’ for independence proponents to consolidate.\textsuperscript{110} Carrying on the suspicions by DDII or FUI against Sino-Christians, it further speculated that domestic groups would ‘prepare’ to become the ‘extended hand’ of foreign players.\textsuperscript{111}

Foreign interference purportedly planned to destabilise the Habibie government which came into power after President Soeharto’s resignation in May 1998. The Habibie administration had broad Muslim—including Islamist—support and its demise would have been seen as undercutting rightful “Muslim” aspirations to regain political supremacy. Islamist organisations expressed the hope of forming a wider bastion against this perceived conspiracy. They held:

At the moment the consolidation of anti-Habibie [forces] clearly begins to identify the current government as representation of Islamic power... The anti-Habibie force stretches on very wide spectrum: nationalist groups, secular-liberals, Christian-Catholics and leftist groups. They agree to topple Habibie, [to] dissolve the government. They picture that Habibie becomes the vehicle of modernist Islamic political forces, [that he] becomes the common denominator to unite them.\textsuperscript{112} (Italic in original)

In another comment by Qadir Djaelani, the point is made even more explicit:

The national domestic forces, both because of ideological similarity and political and economic interests, join a conspiracy with foreign countries to destroy Indonesia, in particular the government of BJ. Habibie.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{110} Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Bulan Bintang Atas Rancangan Undang Undang Tentang Program Pembangunan Nasional, 16 November 2000. PBB referred to pro-independence movements in Papua earlier the same year.
\textsuperscript{111} Pandangan Dan Sikap Politik Partai Bulan Bintang, Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Informasi PBB, Jakarta, (no date, probably 1998), pp. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{113} Abdul Qadir Djaelani, “Konspirasi Asing dan Nasional Menghancurkan Indonesia” (“The foreign and national conspiracy to destroy Indonesia”), reprinted in Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 166-79. The author claimed that Christian-Chinese conglomerates had taken large amounts of money to accounts overseas, particularly to Singapore. Furthermore, Indonesian mass media, ‘to 90% owned by Christians and Socialists’, had started a smear campaign ‘against the Muslim community, in particular
With their orientation toward domestic agendas, PPP and PBB appeared more adamant to safeguard the unitary state than Partai Keadilan. The scale and intensity of defensive rhetoric varied. Like other Islamist parties, PPP used the imagery of undesired foreign values making inroads. Prominent in the rhetoric of PPP, however, was the highlighting of the presumed religious character of Indonesians rather than an exclusively Islamic identity. Moreover, PPP had no policy of building up defensive religious sentiment among its cadres. Indonesia, the party held in more temperate rhetoric, was in the middle of ‘facing the removal (pelucutan) of its identity’ as a ‘religious people’. It was conceivable that the ‘internationalisation of values’ would ‘take away’ (melucut) ‘our human values’ (nilai-nilai kemanusiaan kita) if not anticipated on time.114

The main Masyumi legatees PBB and DDII most stridently maintained the perceived inseparability between the nation and Islam and the resulting demand for “Muslim” home rule.115 The PBB 2000 Congress echoed the concerns voiced earlier by DDII and other Islamist Masyumi successor organisations by stressing the principal role of the umat Islam in Indonesian affairs. It held:

As the largest national community, the Muslim community is more burdened and has more responsibility in leading Indonesia ahead. Because of this, the Bulan Bintang community opts to defend the existence of the Indonesian people and state against any force that attempts to destroy...it. This endeavour is part of the religious struggle because for the Bulan Bintang community Islamic-ness [keislaman] and nationality [kebangsaan] are not separated things but an integral unity. The Bulan Bintang community endeavours to become true Muslims and at the same time...true national patriots [patriot sejati bangsa]. The first commitment is to fight because of Allah for the greatness of the Indonesian people, of which the Muslim community is the largest component.116

against B.J. Habibie’ and initiated riots in places such as Ambon and Aceh, equipped by weaponry coming from the US, Australia and Israel. Abdul Qadir Djaelani, Persengkongkolan Jihat Kristen dan Yahudi Sedunia Menghancurkan Republik Indonesia (‘The malicious plot of the Worlds’ Christians and Jews to Destroy the Republic of Indonesia’). Qadir printed 10.000 copies of this pamphlet and sent them to mosques and campuses. Reprinted in Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 314-7.


115 Parallel to this highlighting of the national idea, the ideal of a global umat under Islamic guidance certainly prevailed. The PBB 2000 Congress, for example, described Islam as a ‘way of life for humankind’ and a ‘universal way of life’. Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 61-3.

116 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 74-5.
This conviction was manifestly brought to light through President Habibie’s consent to a referendum for East Timor in early 1999 and the subsequent warning by the US to impose an economic and military embargo if the Indonesian government would not step up efforts to guarantee the safety of Catholic East Timorese citizens in the aftermath of independence. These events evoked a strongly Islam-tinged and defensive nationalism against the perceived anti-Muslim biased interference by Western nations, especially the US and Australia, in Indonesian domestic affairs. ‘[I]t is nothing new—this is the American way’, the Buletin Bulan Bintang for example commented: ‘PROPAGANDA, DICTATING and INTERVENING. And all this is part of the ZIONIST INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY which is commonly undertaken against Muslim-based countries’.117 The common position by Islamist parties was that all Indonesians should have a say in the referendum as Indonesians had contributed and financed the development of East Timor with their ‘pouring sweat’.118 This stance depicted the Catholic population in the province as ungrateful dissenters, ignorant of the human resources and money a Muslim majority nation had invested to bring about their integration.119

At the same time, aware of constituting only a small section of the Muslim community, Masyumi legatees have been eager to win allies for their cause. To this end, they made frequent avowals of having a common purpose with the Indonesian army, giving another indication of their domestic political orientation and the weight of its parameters on their mind-set. It rested on the prevailing view that “Muslims” and the army were the two main pillars of Indonesian identity as they had been the achievers and guardians of independence. A crucial target of the West, particularly Israel, was the destruction of this historical bond. To achieve this, foreign intelligence attempted to undermine the reputation and the efficiency of the Indonesian armed forces and to ensure that officers unsympathetic to Islam

118 Hasil Mukernas (Musyawarah Kerja Nasional)-I Partai Bulan Bintang, DPP Partai Bulan Bintang, (no place), 1999, p. 34. Though all Islamist parties accepted the President’s decision, they were infuriated that Habibie had not consulted with parliament before making his proposal. By giving in to international demands, Habibie’s offer appeared to confirm the view that Indonesia had occupied East Timor. “Ada yang Menerima, Ada yang Menolak”, Media Indonesia, 16 October 1999.
119 There were other Islamists who argued that giving independence to East Timor had the positive side-effect of getting rid of a “rebellious” Catholic province. I am thankful to Prof. Harold Crouch for this point.
dominated its command. In these typecasts, the survival of the unitary state and the fortune of its Muslim population become the same:

Because Indonesia [is the country] with the largest Muslim population in the World, with a very strategic geographic location...destroying Indonesia is a Western priority... [H]istorically and factually, the backbone of the unity state of the Indonesian Republic is, apart from the Muslim community (integral motion Mohammad Natsir/Masyumi), the army. Hence, to destroy the Unitary State of the Indonesian Republic...and making it many small nations is impossible to be achieved well without destroying the role and the existence of the army. The right moment to realise the strategy to destroy the army is [the] reformasi [era].

Frequently, however, the same authors accentuating Muslim unity and cross-sectional alliances to face an external enemy argued from a deep sense of cultural defeat and inferiority. Speeches by doctrinaire leaders were strongly tinged with a sense of deprived self-esteem, the accumulation of enemies characteristic for *jihadist* rhetoric and, at the same time, a defiant attitude against the perceived assault. In the words of KISDI and PBB leader Ahmad Sumargono:

The problem is that the imperialist crowd has already destroyed our personality, [the personality] of Muslims. Our attitude and life-style is already like theirs. We see Western culture as something to be followed. We admire and are crazy about the West. We are not a priori [in our stand] toward Western culture. But the inferior mental attitude when dealing with the West is what devastates most of us. Especially the elite in our country.

Lamenting the surrender of a majority of Muslims to Western concepts and secular life-style, Sumargono thus deplored:

...the mentality of our people who are proud to become “slaves”. We are proud if other nations that morally are actually not better than us have too big a say in our affairs... We are already strangled, already trapped in debt... But what is saddening...we are already infected with pride in our debt...we already lost our self-esteem and dignity...the IMF [International Monetary Fund] is in fact not

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120 Abdul Qadir Djaelani, “Konspirasi Asing dan Marxis-Sosialis Menghancurkan TNI Angkatan Darat” (‘The foreign and Marxist-socialist Conspiracy to destroy the Indonesian Army’), 25 September 1999, reprinted in Djaelani, *Anak Rakyat*, pp. 317-9. An important part of the Western strategy was to separate the army from the police, with the latter failing to maintain security, which eventually would lead to the break up of Indonesia. Domestic helpers of the West were Human Rights institutions. The author again distributed 10,000 copies among mosques and campuses.

necessary...the problem is that we [feel] inferior [minder]... For the Indonesian Muslim community, national unity is very important because this country is the largest Muslim country in the world. I suspect that many foreign forces, especially the Zionists, do not want this country to be united, [they] want to weaken and diminish this country...\textsuperscript{122}

To counteract the cultural assault and Indonesia’s economic dependence on Western aid, Masyumi legatees adopted the emblematic \textit{jihadist} supposition that strengthening Muslim identity was the only way to prevail:

\textit{[W]hat makes us sad [is that]...policies are adopted because of the IMF’s pressure. Not because of our own self-determination, independence and wish...it is indeed difficult for us to reject the IMF’s presence because we are not capable... Fine, we concede our weakness, so that we gladly let foreign nations trample on our dignity, [nations] of which we are sure that in their background are the Jews. But what we have to evaluate is ‘why we turned weak”, so that we turned into the target [bulan-bulanan] of other nations... My brothers, we are weak because our mentality is indeed weak. Our quality [mutu] is indeed small. We do not develop and strengthen our character [jati diri] as a Muslim nation. It is as if we are ashamed of being Muslims. Say it to the world that we are a Muslim nation. Develop an Islamic personality in every Muslim citizen. We have to be sure that only the Islamic might is capable of facing the international imperialist crowd, which today is ruled by the Jewish and Christian force. Allah commands: ‘He is God who...sent His Prophet to bring guidance and the true belief [\textit{Ad Diin yang haq}] to be victorious over other beliefs. Even though the Polytheists detest it’ \textsuperscript{123}

In this as in most similar instances, Islamists themselves did not address material disadvantage separately but within the framework of resuming Muslim identity and regaining political power. This call was directed against non-Muslims who cannot claim to represent national identity and who have accumulated an inappropriate share of political power and prosperity.

Taking up the embittered stance of previous years, the crucial obstacle for returning Indonesia to its erstwhile Islamic personality, all Islamist parties argued, was the domestic and foreign deceit against Muslims through the stigmatisation of \textit{shari‘ah} law. Guided Democracy and New Order alike had further endorsed the view that Islamic ideology was irrational and harmful to Indonesia’s political and economic interests. The bitter tone of the rhetoric gave further indication that most Islamists

\textsuperscript{122} Untitled speech by Sumargono at the Technological Institute Bandung (ITB), 22 April 1999, reprinted in \textit{Media Dakwah}, May 1999, pp. 52-5.
\textsuperscript{123} Sumargono, \textit{Jangan Korbankan}. The quote is from the Qur’an, verse Al-Saff (61:9).
have come to see this as a successful undertaking. It was founded on the recurring historical pattern that, since colonialism, Muslims had been kept in thraldom. The deviation from Islamic law, PBB restated the customary lament in 2000, was rooted in the modification of Dutch policy with which its chief advisor Snouk Hurgronje attempted to weaken the influence of Islam on its adherents.\textsuperscript{124} The ensuing superior status of civil law in post-independence Indonesia thus came about as a fallacious diversion of the Muslim character of society.

In the 2000 MPR session, PBB depicted the effort of several generations of orientalists as responsible for an unfavourable image of \textit{shari'ah}. This had deformed its worth in the awareness of Indonesian Muslims and alienated Muslims from Islam. The statement by Ka’ban at the same time underlined the global framework in which Masyumi legatees have come to see the perceived assault on their faith:

\begin{quote}
Our faction very much indeed understands the anxiety of other groups toward shariah Islam. [This is] because...of a systematic effort to marginalise shariah Islam undertaken by the secular orientalists and their followers by establishing a public opinion of shariah Islam as cruel and inhumane...with the goal to divide shariah Islam from its adherents both in other parts of the Islamic world and in Indonesia... On the contrary, long before the Dutch came to Indonesia, Islamic law already was effective in Islamic kingdoms...from Aceh to Ternate and Tidore. Even during the Dutch period, before the arrival of Christian Snouk Hurgronje...shariah Islam was implemented [diberlakukan] toward natives of the Islamic religion... But after the arrival of...Hurgronje...the Dutch politics of law changed and were adjusted to the Teori Resepsi... Until now the impact of the Teori Resepsi...is still felt...\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

It has, of course, added to the frustration that many indigenous Muslims appeared to have accepted and absorbed this \textit{shari'ah}-stigma themselves and to have adjusted their political preferences accordingly. The lack of support of major Muslim organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama for the establishment of an Islamist party in 1998 and 1999 confirmed this tendency. Again, the party more frankly attacking this deflection of Muslims was PBB. It picked up the thought model of a preceding generation of Masyumi adherents by pointing out the character

\textsuperscript{124} "Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang pada Sidang Tahunan MPR RI Tahun 2000", reprinted in \textit{Buletin Bulan Bintang} (supplement), 1 September 2000, pp. i-iv.  
\textsuperscript{125} Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang 2000. Such references to the glory of \textit{shari’ah} law in the pre-colonial sultanates of Aceh, Banten, Demak, Tidore and Deli were made repeatedly. See, for example, "Syariat Islam: Solusi Krisis Bangsa", \textit{Forum Keadilan}, no. 15, 28 July 2003, pp. 44-5. In the Konstituante, both Masyumi and NU had defended their pro-\textit{shari’ah} position with a similar argumentation. Fealy, \textit{Ulama and Politics}, p. 208.
of the Jakarta Charter as an historical compromise, and held that the divine origin of *shari'ah* made it a religious ‘obligation’ for Muslims to follow and a panacea for solving Indonesia’s manifold problems. The faction argued:

The greatness of Syariat Islam drowned because of dominant bad public opinion; the impact of trauma and phobia brought on by those who say to follow Islam but who are secular, together with non-Muslims who are at random anti-Islam [*anti-Islam secara membabi buta*]. The wall of dislike toward Syariat Islam strongly touches the heart because Syariat Islam is an obligation for its people and historically the consensus of the founders of the republic… But all this is denied. This reality is something that has to be fought against by every member of the Indonesian Islamic community. The Indonesian nation will not achieve glory [*kegemilangan*] unless Syariat Islam is made the fundament on which to build the prosperity of its people.¹²⁶

Proclaiming *shari’ah* to be at the cultural core of Indonesian Muslims and Muslims to be the quintessence of being Indonesian, Islamists automatically railed against the claim that *shari’ah* issues would endanger social peace. Both PPP and PBB went to great lengths to anticipate the critique that special constitutional consideration for Islam was divisive and a threat to national unity. The general rationale for PPP, however, was to defend a form of Islamic ideology that appeared congruent with the needs of a plural society and thus to thwart antagonism from outside the party. PPP, therefore, promoted the Jakarta Charter disposed to give equal emphasis toward reassuring non-Muslims and nominal Muslims, by claiming that *shari’ah*’s universal values would create an all-purpose benefit and strengthen national unity by ‘increasing the bond (*mengikat*) between the whole Indonesian people’.¹²⁷ Although in content very similar to PBB, PPP did not base its stance explicitly on the assertion that *shari’ah* was closest to the identity of Indonesian Muslims. Accordingly, PPP leaders avoided addressing *shari’ah* themes exclusively, by putting them into the context of nationhood or religious pluralism instead. A typical statement aimed for reassurance, made in similar form during all MPR sessions between 1998 and 2002, was:


¹²⁷ *Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002*, p. 27.
The PPP Faction is convinced that this saddening crisis can only be overcome by
the obligation to carry out Islamic syari'at, which very much promotes moral values
and honourable ethics. This...can form the axis of brotherhood, the axis of national
brotherhood/friendship, which at the same time is the core or the glue for national
unity. The emphasis of this stance also...underlines the significance to depart from
the thought this [would lead to] a religious state or a theocracy. But once again: [it
is] to strengthen Indonesian nationalism [mempertukuh nasionalisme Indonesia]. To
re-solidify the significance of Islamic nationalism at home is also meant to avert
[menghindarkan] the characteristic of universal Islam, which pretends not to know
nationalism [seolah tidak mengenal nasionalisme].

Indonesia, the less cautious rhetorical variant asserted, had to recover its Islamic
identity to overcome its multiple difficulties. This view held that the separation of
Islam and the state was the real cause for the country’s social and religious conflicts.
Using a favourite metaphor, PBB proclaimed that because the ‘body’ (the
Constitution) and the ‘soul’ (shari’ah and the Jakarta Charter) were separated, ‘moral
decadence’ was able to spread, leading to conflicts such as in Ambon and Central
Sulawesi.129 Islam was the predominant cultural factor in Indonesian identity;
therefore a constitutional recognition of Islam was needed ‘because it is hoped that
the adherence (ketaatan) of the majority of the people to shari’ah Islam can
strengthen unity...and give peace and order to the whole nation’.130 A press release
from September 2001 even linked shari’ah exclusively to the objective of bringing
about national unity and religious harmony. The Jakarta Charter would be needed to
‘guide’ (mengarahkan) and ‘motivate [Muslim’s] discipline’ so that they ‘step up
participation in retaining’ the unitary state.131

The dogma of a “Muslim nation” combined with the depiction of shari’ah as
panacea, at the same time, reinvigorated the paternalistic image of Muslims as
protectors of other religions. Islam was the final, perfect creed in a nation of

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128 Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
Republik Indonesia terhadap Hasil-hasil Badan Pekerja MPR-RI tentang Perubahan Kedua Undang-
Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 dan Rancangan-rancangan Ketetapan
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Lainnya disampaikan pada Rapat Paripurna
130 “Pemetaan Politik Partai Bulan Bintang”, 17 September 2000, reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang,
Edisi 4, 1 Oktober 2000, p. 6
131 “Press Release Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang MPR RI ("Piagam Jakarta"), 10 September 2001,
reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 October 2001, p. 13. Such statements, at the same time,
highlighted the need to downplay the contentious aspects of shari’ah by pointing out shared values
like national unity. Compare with chapter five.
Muslims. If order and security were achieved because Muslims were obligated to carry out shari'ah, non-Muslims would automatically benefit. PBB, for example, proclaimed that with the implementation of shari'ah ‘those who are Muslims will improve the quality of their Islamic-ness and as a consequence will improve the quality of the Indonesian people as a whole’. In characteristic rhetoric, Islamist parties endeavoured to reassure other religious communities that their life would benefit by the constitutional recognition of shari'ah. To back this assertion, they pointed to the popular Qur'anic saying that Islam was ‘a blessing for all surroundings’ (rahmatan l’il alamin).

Hence, despite adopting jihadist sentiment and rhetoric, Masyumi legatees sustained the customary themes of Indonesian Islam to remake a “Muslim nation” in the post-New Order years. During the constitutional debates of the MPR between 1999 and 2002, PPP and PBB put strong emphasis on domestic historical reasons for a constitutional recognition of shari'ah. The arguments repeated those presented earlier, as during the constitutional debates of the late 1950s and by the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (‘Indonesian Muslim Party’, Parmusi) at the MPR session in 1968. At the core of the argumentation remained the charge of treachery against “Muslims”. It repeated the standard point that President Soekarno and the members of the Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), which included Catholics and other Christians, had approved the June 1945 draft Preamble of the Constitution featuring the Jakarta Charter as an ideal compromise between the secular-nationalists and the “Muslims” or the “umat Islam”. BPUPKI members came from various regions and featured Muslims and Christians, Islamists and nationalists; their decision, therefore, had equalled a national consensus. Removing the Charter shortly afterwards meant to violate this consent. The unremitting accusation is, therefore, that of a ‘broken promise’ (pengingkaran

132 PBB asserted this during various sessions of the constitutional panels between 2000 and 2002.
Moreover, highlighting the treacherous nature of the removal, they stress that the Charter was ‘unilaterally deleted’ without previous meeting and thus snubbing the commended Indonesian tradition of finding a decision through consultation (*musyawarah*).

A further tenaciously argued point was that the status of the Charter had been restrengthened by the presidential decree of 5 July 1959, proclaiming that the Charter ‘inspired’ (*menjiwai*) the Constitution. The Charter was thus not merely a historical document but entailed concrete juridical consequences. It was a source of law and, as such, required or at least authorised the state to pass *shari‘ah* laws. The inclusion of the clause by means of the constitutional amendments was a ‘logical consequence’ of this correlation. Most serious legal experts do not agree with this view.

The presumption of the ‘broken promise’ rendered ongoing commitment to the Charter to be a righteous endeavour to restore a lost Islamic identity for the Indonesian people. PPP and PBB, in particular, were the apologists of the Charter’s removal. PBB MP Zubair Bakri stressed:

> Other people see the incident on 16 and 17 August [1945] as insignificant. For us this is the most significant. This is the root of the problem. As long as this does not prevail, our nation will not be safe.

PPP and PBB further proclaimed that the removal of *shari‘ah* terms had severed the 1945 Constitution from its spirit. In illuminating rhetoric, PPP claimed in the MPR to be on a ‘holy mission’ (*misi suci*). The ‘seven words’ were the lost ‘soul’ (*jiwa*) of

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134 *Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000*. Islamist parties again highlighted the role of the Japanese envoy who did not belong either to Christian or secular groups and, therefore, could not be seen as their representative.


136 This argumentation followed the explanation of the Djuanda government before the DPR in 1957. See also PPP’s view in its *Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000*. Some Islamists claim that this ‘spirit of the Jakarta Charter’ had enabled the establishment of a number of Islamic laws in the 1990s. See, for example, Rifyal Ka‘bah, “Piagam Jakarta buat Umat Islam Indonesia”, *Buletin Bulan Bintang*, 1 September 2000.


138 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003.

139 *Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002*, p. 28. See also *Pemandangan Umum 4 November 2001*. 156
the Constitution that had to be reunited with the ‘body’ (badan). The constitutional amendments, PPP proclaimed, were the right time and place to ‘set straight history’ (meluruskankan sejarah). The party used the same metaphor as PBB, stating:

The PPP Faction asks whether we still acknowledge the 1945 Constitution, which has been made effective by decree if we accept that national life can develop without soul [jiwa] even though our anthem speaks of growing the soul [and] growing the body [badan]. Because of this, we first have to construct the soul of the 1945 Constitution, only then construct its body. For 41 years the 1945 Constitution has proceeded without soul. Now is the time for us to give the soul to our Constitution.

The continuation of the claim to know what was best for “the people” and thus portraying the majority of Muslims as shari’ah supporters is intriguing. The Islamist premise once again was that a legal system had to be in keeping with the sociological and religious conditions in society, which in Indonesia was predominantly Muslim. As foreign legal models had covered up this quality, these Islamists claimed to represent a ‘silent majority’ of Muslims who supposedly yearned for the reinstalation of the Charter clause. This assertion was strongest in PBB and PPP and prevailed despite a mere 2% and 11% respective share of the votes at the 1999 elections. In particular, support for shari’ah was strong among the lower social strata, such as among Muhammadiyah and NU cadres despondent with the policies of Muslim elites. Knowing of Amien Rais’s practical motives to refuse leading an Islamist party in 1998, Islamists in PPP and PBB claimed that privately he approved enhancing the role of Islamic law because he could not belie his own roots as Chairman of Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah, they held, only had adopted an anti-

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143 Interview Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003.

144 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002; *Risalah Rapat Pleno 13 June 2002*. PBB claimed to get strong support from local and regional Muhammadiyah boards for writing Islam into the Constitution, for example from the youth organisation Pemuda Muhammadiyah (ibid).
Charter position in order to back up Partai Amanah Nasional (‘National Mandate Party’, PAN).agli

Behind this, of course, stood the view that only a Muslim surrendering to shari’ah could be called a Muslim. In the 2000 MPR Session, PBB argued that ‘we should give the Muslim community the opportunity [kesempatan] to organise its life in accordance with the teachings of its religion’. Again claiming an obscured affinity between shari’ah and national identity, the party held:

[This time is the right moment [for] the MPR to become the forum to set straight history [meluruskan sejarah]...by forming a politics of national law which transforms the legal values and norms which live amidst society.]

A pledge by the party in 2001 made this desired correlation even clearer. It announced ‘to continue to fight for the aspirations of the majority of the nation [memperjuangkan aspirasi mayoritas bangsa] of which 85% are Muslims that “Piagam Jakarta” will be re-established’.

Such mantra-like statements have exhibited the mixture of incapacity and reluctance among many Islamists to come to grips with the fact that a majority of ordinary Muslims are lackadaisical about the shari’ah agenda of Islamic parties. The persistence of the Islamist representational claim is based on Islam’s perception of the community of believers as an entity with identical ‘aspirations’, the insistence that being a Muslim and submission to the shari’ah are indivisible and the belief in a doctrinal demand of a top-down enforcement of a number of Islamic laws. The chapter described the failure in 1945 to make Islam a central constitutional reference in Indonesia as a focal point for the Islamist belief that Muslims have both a right and a duty toward the establishment of Islamic law and the rendering of non-Muslims as intolerant, as they failed to recognise this duty as a central aspect of Islam.

148 Press Release “Piagam Jakarta”.

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The chapter further pointed to various repressive measures since the end of parliamentary democracy in 1959 as having increased a sense of victimization among Islamists and triggering an unreflective essentialism. Today's Islamists often cling to the notion of an Islamic past 'untainted' by colonialism and westernisation and allege a prominent status of an unspecified *shari'ah* ruling at that time. They, in effect, propose that the deeds of the west (i.e. non-Muslims) are to blame that a majority of Muslims does not support contemporary Islamist parties.

An increased awareness of international Islamic politics over the last decades coupled with the perception that western nations had a generic interest in oppressing Islam and promoting secularism in Muslim majority countries took the sense of victimization of Indonesian Islamism to a global scale. The desire for restoring a Muslim national identity within an international conspirational context has been a common Islamist theme. There were, however, great differences in the approaches to return Indonesian Muslims to a lifestyle comprehensively governed by *shari'ah* law and to face the challenge of ideologies seen as harmful. As the next chapter will show, the political themes and approach of PPP and PBB remained domestic and in various ways linked to the Masyumi tradition. Unlike the Masyumi tradition, foreign ideological concepts approached the restoration of Islam as a systematic long-term plan to counteract the impact of any other doctrinal models on Indonesia's Muslim society. This approach became central to PK. These Islamists transformed the awareness of the gulf between Islam and national identity into a gradualist political strategy.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE CALL FOR SHARI’AH: MOTIVES AND FEATURES

The previous chapter depicted shari’ah as being a focal point for promoting the restoration of a Muslim national idea. For reasons to be described now, despite the rhetoric, Islamist parties’ shari’ah politics have rather been both desultory and formalist-symbolic. Moreover, the quality of the shari’ah discourse has been markedly shallow. Islamist promotion of shari’ah and the Jakarta Charter clause comprised little or no plan for their realisation. A plain reason for this shallowness was the lack of Islamist political power. Gaining only a minority of parliamentary seats in 1999, Islamists were well aware that their bid for shari’ah would be defeated in parliament. This futility of the effort to succeed shari’ah in post-New Order Indonesia made a genuine and profound discussion of shari’ah issues gratuitous.¹

In present-day Indonesia, shari’ah is partly recognised and effective in family law (marriage, inheritance), banking, religious foundations (waqf) and parts of the economy. But it is not fully effective law. The marriage law, for example, above all handles divorce. Indonesia’s jurisdiction lacks a Shari’ah High Court. There is unclear and divided authority over the Religious Justice administration and an erratic application of existing regulations. Shari’ah laws, above all, have been subject to the willingness of the executive to carry them out.² In many ways, this continued in post-New Order administrations though these brought a number of new shari’ah regulations on the way. The Habibie administration (May 1998 to October 1999) and, to a smaller extent, the Abdurrahman Wahid government (October 1999 to July 2001), passed regulations on zakat (alms), an improvement of pilgrimage services and Islamic banking, and acknowledged a special status of shari’ah in Aceh. Yet

¹ Up to the 1950s, many prominent Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia had supported Islamist agendas. The theological and philosophical debate was extensive and of high quality (between 1936 and 1941 alone, Natsir produced around 90 commentaries and articles). But even then comparatively little attention was given to the practical challenges related to the execution of Islamic law in a diverse society. This perhaps reflects the dearth of political writing in classical Sunni doctrine devoted to technical aspects of shari’ah implementation (as mentioned in chapter one).
most of these laws were only intended to make the fulfilment of Islamic duties easier for Muslims, without making them compulsory.\(^3\)

This chapter and the next will argue that the motives of Islamist parties in resuming debate on shari‘ah issues in post-New Order Indonesia were broadly ideological whilst the disclosure and promotion of such issues followed practical considerations. The shallowness of the discourse in Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP) and Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB), however, gave the ideological motive an overall symbolic quality. There was little intellectual depth in a discussion often strongly tinged by emotions of loss and segregation. By calling for shari‘ah, PPP and PBB above all expressed what they regard as the rightfulness of the majority “umat Islam” to pursue Islamic political aspirations in their homeland after being barred from doing so for almost four decades. This chapter will also argue that, among the Islamist parties and organisations, the ideological motive of loss was strongest among the Masyumi legatees PBB and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’, DDII).

At the same time Islamist parties hoped that shari‘ah issues would give them a distinctive agenda to draw ideologically minded Muslims to their cause. A potential vehicle to promote shari‘ah demands were the iconoclastic “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter. The perseverance with which Islamist parties stressed the significance of the Jakarta Charter, however, was exaggerated. In fact, they had anticipated that the Charter has been left with very little real political meaning in post-New Order Indonesia.\(^4\) When it became manifest that most present-day Muslims have little concern for the Jakarta Charter agenda, PPP and PBB gradually began stipulating the implementation of “shari‘ah” because the appeal of the word seemed to surpass by far that of the “seven words”.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) Chapter five will show that Islamist parties did not openly promote shari‘ah issues or the Jakarta Charter until after the elections in June 1999.

\(^5\) This happened in late 2001.
Both the aim to instruct the Muslim public about the historical decline of shari'ah and the purpose—to appeal to ideologically minded Muslims—required little intellectual rigor. Contributing to the shallowness was a “pluralist”-dominant discourse. Present-day Islamists deal with the difficulty of cultivating shari’ah in diverse nation-states. Inevitably, the public promotion of shari’ah issues usually takes place in “politically correct” style. Supported by the necessity to consider non-Muslim sentiment, shari’ah supporters often argue cautiously, promoting shari’ah through broader moral norms and values, ethics (akhlak) or religious teachings (ajaran) and the flexible interpretation of individual shari’ah rulings. These affirmations take the edges from matters that might be contentious because of their association with explicitly Islamic rules. Avowals of flexibility also distract from the lack of methodology in deriving explicit legal directives from Islamic sources other than in the more unambiguous sectors of family and inheritance law.

Hence, in contrast to the historical and ideological commitment to shari’ah rule, most Islamists showed little interest in initiating a substantial debate to elaborate its details or the critical seven-word Jakarta Charter clause, or to develop a systematic rationale of how shari’ah could be implemented in Indonesia. There was, above all, little effort to overcome major disagreements between traditionalists and modernists who differ on sources of law; traditionalists seek to apply Syafi’i legal teachings whilst modernists promote freedom from any particular legal tradition. There also was little coordination between Islamist parties; officials conceded never having consulted among themselves in order to clarify or synchronise approaches to implement Islam. This neglect of the practical aspects reflected awareness that there was little prospect that shari’ah goals could have succeeded in the post-New Order constitutional debates.

6 Reality has often refuted this association between shari’ah and what are usually asserted to be “universal religious values”. The implementation of Islamic law in Aceh showed that many, perhaps most, Muslims give great importance to the most obvious symbols of Islam, such as that female Muslims must wear a proper headscarf, rather than “universal” values. There is thus a persistent gulf between such Islamist apologetics and the Muslim lay interpretation of his or her faith.
7 Compare with Brown, Sharia and State and chapter one.
8 For example, Indonesia’s marriage law only covers broader issues. It probably would be difficult to find a consensus on details.
9 Interviews, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002; Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002.
During the constitutional debates, Islamist parties proposed the insertion of both *shari‘ah* and neutral religious terms into Paragraph 29 of the Constitution (*Undang-Undang Dasar*) on ‘religion’ (*agama*). Three proposals were made on the First Article of Paragraph 29. The first proposal was to maintain the current wording ‘the state is based on the One All-Powerful God’ (*negara berdasar atas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*). The Army and Police Faction, the Golkar Party Faction, the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (‘National Awakening Party’, PKB) Faction, and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan (‘Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle’, PDIP) Faction proposed this. The PPP and the PBB revived the idioms and arguments rife in Indonesia’s 1940s and 1950s. Their exclusively Muslim-targeting clause (henceforth: Shari’ah Clause) took on the original wording of the Jakarta Charter: ‘the state is based on the One All-Powerful God with the obligation [*kewajiban*] to carry out [*menjalankan*] syari‘at Islam for its adherents [*penganutnya* or *pemeluk-pemeluknya*]’. The small Perserikatan Daulatul Ummah (‘United Faction of Muslim Sovereignty’, PDU) Faction supported PPP and PBB at the later stages of the constitutional amendments but also appeared open toward other proposals.\(^1^\) The Fraksi Reformasi (‘Reform Faction’), consisting of Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK) and Partai Amanah Nasional (‘National Mandate Party’, PAN), proposed a self-proclaimed pluralist variant of the Charter clause that replaced the term *shari‘ah* with the expression ‘religious teachings’ (*ajaran agama*, henceforth ‘Plural Clause’). It stated: ‘the state is based on The One All-Powerful God with the obligation [*kewajiban*] to carry out [*menjalankan*] religious teachings for its respective adherents [*bagi masing-masing pemeluknya*].\(^2^\)

The legal implications of both the Shari‘ah- and the Plural Clause were contested and poorly elaborated. There was a particular lack of clarity what the term ‘obligation’ (*kewajiban*) in the two proposals implied. As in the 1956-9 Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), the main question again was whether it made the state accountable to

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\(^1^\) Apart from the chance to promote Islam’s formal acknowledgment in the Constitution, the *reformasi* era opened a window to endorse *shari‘ah*-laws through the enhancement of regional autonomy and the decentralisation of the legal system. This debate took place separately.

\(^2^\) The Utusan Daerah Faction (‘Regional Representatives Faction’) was divided between maintaining the original wording and supporting the Shari‘ah Clause.

\(^3^\) The idea to use neutral religious terms was not new. 30 years earlier, NU leaders suggested ‘that followers of other religions should be put under obligation to abide by the doctrines of their respective religions’. *Api Pancasila*, 15 April 1968, quoted in Samson, *Islam*, p. 1013.
implement Islamic law/religious teachings among Muslims/non-Muslims or whether each individual Muslim/non-Muslim was to be held responsible for adhering to shari’ah laws/religious teachings.

Despite their shari’ah agenda, all Islamist parties were eager not to appear dogmatic. They all maintained that an Indonesian Islamic party had to pursue a shari’ah approach adjusted to domestic conditions. They also proposed additional clauses endorsing the right of religious freedom. Fraksi Reformasi’s proposal read: ‘the state guarantees the freedom of every citizen to embrace [memeluk] his/her religion and to live according to his/her religion’. The wordings of PPP and PBB were similar. The PBB proposal stated: ‘The state guarantees the freedom of every citizen to adhere [memeluk] to his/her religion and to live according to his/her religion.’ PPP suggested: ‘the state guarantees the religious freedom of every citizen to worship in accordance with his or her religion.’ These changes were supposed to be inserted into the Second Article of Paragraph 29. By opting for a wording solely targeted toward Muslims, PPP and PBB claimed that it was their Shari’ah Clause which guaranteed religious freedom. Its indifference to non-Muslim affairs was to ensure that religious communities would ‘not disturb’ each other.13

There were, of course, differences in the personal views and political authority of individual Islamist leaders which played a crucial role in how parties promoted and weighed their positions on shari’ah. PPP, for that matter, had always been short of figures able to provide a lucid doctrinal model and intellectual guidance. In post-1998, the party once again lacked individuals of guiding intellectual weight and influence. As an alliance of competing groups, PPP came into existence without a distinct historical reference for its ideology and has itself never formulated a doctrinal guide, written or oral, that on its own could be taken as a unifying intellectual source. It stands for a type of Islamist party in which leaders who are primarily politicians have supplanted the role of intellectuals and, to an important extent, theoretical discipline.

13 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002.
PPP’s Desultory Shari’ah Agenda

Between 1998 and 2002, PPP attempted to steer a course between Islamism and pluralism. The party wanted to draw more ideologically minded Muslims without alienating pluralist Muslims. To attract the former, PPP ultimately adopted the Shari’ah Clause as a defining party policy. In addition, PPP took on its quasi-ideological agenda of previous years, focussing on a limited number of Islamist issues. Overall, from 1998 on PPP continued its New Order legacy of an Islamism that is strongly based on pragmatic considerations.

The platform for PPP’s partial and cautious Islamist agenda had been established during the New Order. Throughout its history, PPP had lacked the strength and means to implement its own policies. Rather than desiring to bring about comprehensive change, its struggle became to be defined by fear of the state’s interference. The only option was trying to avert the New Order government’s stipulations. This was accompanied by a softening of ideological ambitions to what the government regarded as tolerable.

PPP has not called on the government to implement shari’ah issues but rather concentrated on warding off individual policies broadly seen as anti-umat. It staunchly opposed threatening policies such as the Pancasila education program but did not directly challenge or question the form of government or the legitimacy of

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14 Compare with Garvey, Introduction, p. 24 and chapter one.
15 Sidney R. Jones, “'It can’t happen here': A Post-Khomeini Look at Indonesian Islam”, Asian Survey, March 1980, p. 320. As voting against an undesired policy was futile in the New Order, PPP established to walk out of parliamentarian sessions as the last resort to voice opposition. In some cases, as in 1974, when PPP opposed the secularisation of marriage law, “walking out” proved to be somewhat effective as it threatened to undermine the political process and encouraged demonstrations from sympathetic religious groups on the streets. To “walk out” meant that PPP did not consent to the government’s decision. But the party, of course, had to accept the regulation after it had become effective. An example of this attitude was PPP’s position toward the Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (‘Guidelines for the Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila’, P4) regulation. Although opposing the policy vehemently, PPP announced in the 1984 statutes that it would ‘actively participate’ to develop and implement ‘Pancasila Democracy’ through P4. Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Khittah Perjuangan dan Pernyataan Politik Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Jakarta, 1984, p. 110; Umaidi Radi, Strategi PPP 1973-1982: Suatu Studi tentang Kekuatan Islam Politik Tingkat Nasional, Integrita Press, Jakarta, 1984, p. 152. To “walk out” remained an alternative way to voice dissent in the post-New Order years.
Pancasila. \(^{16}\) PPP never endeavoured to achieve sweeping societal change by thoroughly Islamising community and state, nor did it train its cadres to achieve this goal. The case of PPP confirms the view that the internal organisation of a party is critical for creating ideological steadfastness. PPP, similar to Masyumi but unlike many advocates of Middle Eastern models—such as the Muslim Brotherhood and PK—always had lax membership criteria and paid little attention to cadre training. \(^{17}\) The choice of training material, PPP decided, should be based on ‘a number of certain considerations’, ‘common sense’ and the ‘experience in the field until now with regard to the needs of cadres close to PPP’. \(^{18}\) The selection of cadres for high office more often depended on patronage rather than on merit or commitment to ideological goals. The willingness of PPP leaders to concede to these shortcomings has appeared greater than efforts to stamp them out. They held that

...cadres are not consistently indoctrinated. Until now the training of cadres is very diverse. Because...as for the method to train cadres, the Central Board never made a final decision which material has to be bestowed. ... [T]he regional and the local boards have been given the opportunity to put together [the material] according to their needs. So there is no ideological indoctrinisation... [It is] in accordance with what is needed [and] the interests of the regional and local leaderships. \(^{19}\)

Indeed, PPP’s whole party culture is obstructive for a more profound ideological approach. In PPP, several independent power groups have been operating independently. This always hampered developing an original ideology shared equally by its members. The factionalism particularly obstructed the development of an authoritative position on *shari’ah* issues. \(^{20}\) It also fettered a successful implementation of party policies. Chairman Hamzah Haz deplored how policy

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\(^{16}\) Rradi, *Strategi*, p. 151. Also, PPP expressed opposition toward unwanted policies indirectly. It commonly criticised the government for breaching an earlier agreement or violating its own principles. For example, the 1973 draft to amend the Islam-friendly marriage law was criticised on grounds that it violated Pancasila. In circuitous argumentation, the party held that the new draft would protect religious minorities but neglect Islam as the faith of the majority. Overall, PPP rarely pointed straightforwardly to the rules and stipulations of Islam to argue its case. A similar pattern can be found in PPP’s stance toward the regime’s policies. PPP approved broad provisos like the New Order’s economic policies and only questioned particular aspects of it by calling, for example, for a stronger consideration of small industry as it believed this to be beneficial to local (Muslim) traders.

\(^{17}\) See the cadreisation material in *Sistem Pelatihan Kader Persatuan Pembangunan (Buku Satu)*, DPP PPP Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan, Jakarta, 1995, which has been largely left intact in post-1998. Interview, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 24 October 2001.

\(^{18}\) *Sistem Pelatihan*, p. 17.

\(^{19}\) Interview, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 24 October 2001.

\(^{20}\) Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001.
resolutions of PPP’s 1998 National Congress (Muktamar) were ‘rarely’ considered ‘even by the majority of PPP leadership, personnel and party activists’.\(^{21}\)

Moreover, with different histories and intellectual traditions, modernists and traditionalists derive their political ideology from different sources. They vary over methods of exegesis and sources of law and have a wide range of views on the precise content and implementation of various aspects of shari’ah. With its historic links to Masyumi, Parmusi-based notables often have a higher commitment and emotional connection to the “seven words”, in particular after NU had returned to its original socio-religious platform (khittah) in 1984. Because of these differences, PPP at all times had to maintain a difficult consensus which narrowed its doctrinal options. It is illustrative that PPP notables have produced much less literature on Islamist themes than Masyumi legatees or groups emerging out of campus Islam, most prominently Partai Keadilan.\(^{22}\) Parmusi-based Chairman Faisal Baasir gave a hint of PPP’s pliable ideological self-awareness in comparison to other Islamist parties:

PPP is more flexible than others, for example PK... They [PK people] have doctrinal-ideological concepts. They have a record of forming cadres... [T]he system of their cadreisation is like the system of the...Muslim Brotherhood and this is different from PPP because PPP consists of the NU camp, Parmusi... These are two groups, which unite their shared political interests. But they differ with regard to religious doctrine and concerning the political concepts that are based on religion... In PPP two camps have compromised. The result of this compromise is that there is no firm position [tidak ada suatu sikap yang kentat].\(^{23}\)

It is an illustration of this that PPP evaded any ideological debates in the post-New Order era other than very broad statements in favour of Islamic principles. At the same time, however, PPP had to be alert not to erode the ideological issues central to party identity, as it otherwise risked alienating the core of its followers.

Lacking the ideological drive and the human resources to overhaul its identity and agenda, in 1998 PPP went ahead with its customary support for a religiously defined

\(^{21}\) Dr. H. Hamzah Haz Rapatkan Shaf Tegakkan Amor Ma‘rif Nahi Mungkar, DPP PPP, no date (probably 2000), p. 6.

\(^{22}\) Two exceptions, Hartono Mardjono and A.M. Saefuddin, have both a Dewan Dakwah background.

\(^{23}\) Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001.
Pancasila. More often and more emphatically than other Islamist parties, PPP declared allegiance to the state ideology and the 1945 Constitution and highlighted that it would ‘maintain, develop and defend’ the unitary republic while stressing its allegiance to religious and ethnic pluralism.\(^{24}\) It declared during the November 1998 MPR assembly:

> The Persatuan Pembangunan Faction is convinced that all Indonesian people, all factions [golongan] and socio-religious camps [aliran] see as final and feel comfortable living under the shelter of the state’s platform Pancasila. There is no more intention from any section whatsoever to replace this state platform, even though now there are demands, including from the Persatuan Pembangunan Faction to abolish...Pancasila as the sole [ideological] base. The Persatuan Pembangunan Faction holds that the demand to abolish the sole base Pancasila is related to respecting the reality of the diversity of our society.\(^{25}\)

PPP leaders often commented positively that even a “\(\text{shari'ah}\)-free” Constitution enabled the passing of Islamic laws through parliament. Of all Islamist parties, PPP argued most consistently that Pancasila was a spiritual doctrine and thus would allow the creation of Islam-friendly laws. Officials pointed to the 1990s, which produced several \(\text{shari'ah}\)-based laws without constitutional recognition of \(\text{shari'ah}\).\(^{26}\) The creation of such regulations, they argued, showed that there was an ‘informal consensus’ among a majority of parliamentarians of all parties to object to the making of laws conflicting with Islamic ethics and values.\(^{27}\) One month prior to Soeharto’s resignation, PPP once again argued that the promotion of what it customarily endorsed as Pancasila’s religious spirit had to be the basis for governmental policies and laws:

\(^{24}\) Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar IV Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, DPP PPP, Jakarta, 1999, p. 34.


\(^{26}\) Such as the regulations on the Muslim pilgrimage, alms (\(\text{zakat}\)) and the special status for Aceh.

\(^{27}\) Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002.
With Pancasila as basis of the state, the religious character [jati diri] of the Indonesian people has been again re-strengthened. Because the first pillar of the Pancasila is [the belief] in The One All-Powerful God... As for Paragraph 29 First Article of the 1945 Constitution which reads “The state is based on The One All-Powerful God” and the...Second Article...we hold that the pillar The One All-Powerful God cannot be linked to [anything] else than religion. Efforts to separate... The One All-Powerful God from religion, or to separate Pancasila from religion, is just the same as the effort to separate sugar from its sweet taste... With The One All-Powerful God as first pillar of the Pancasila, there must not be a single effective law and regulation in the Indonesian Republic that contradicts religious teachings.28

Hence, as in the New Order, PPP endorsed Pancasila as a spiritual ‘national unifier’ while strictly opposing readings of Pancasila as being quasi-religious itself. The party insisted that ‘only in the lap of firm adherents of religion’, Pancasila will ‘healthily grow’ as national doctrine.29 A definition of Pancasila as the ‘source of the Indonesian soul’, as suggested in the P4 statutes was intolerable because the intrinsically religious term ‘soul’ could not be related to a human construct.30 PPP thus remained first and foremost determined to prevent any further attempt to put Pancasila and Islam at odds, to restore Islam as its ideological base and to preserve its chances to insert Islam-friendly laws into the Constitution.

To this end, PPP obstructed efforts by secular-nationalists to label Pancasila as the philosophical law principle on which national law should develop in the future. In the October 1998 MPR session, PPP demanded the abolition of separate provisions such as the Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (‘Pancasila Moral Education Program’,

In the 2000 session, it objected to a re-statement of Pancasila principles in the Constitution itself and to introduce a MPR Regulation whose wording suggested further emphasis on the status of Pancasila as the source of national law, the 1945 Constitution and its amendments. This was because a definition of Pancasila as the ‘only source of national law’ was likely to hamper the struggle of Islam-friendly laws on a one-by-one basis.

Whilst pledging loyalty to a religiously defined Pancasila, PPP continued to defend a limited number of umat interests which had been its trademark policies and which it had shielded vigorously during the New Order. In 1998, PPP again publicly made known that it would ‘combat’ (memberantas) communism and atheism, characteristically avowing that such beliefs would violate not only Islam but also Pancasila. The 1998 Congress also resumed other umat core issues such as to increase the scope of religious education. In addition, PPP revived its previous determination to maintain shari‘ah regulations on marriage and divorce, including the banning of inter-religious marriages which had been another focal point in previous years.

PPP also continued to fervently oppose the acknowledgment of mystic and syncretic beliefs (kepercayaan) as formal religions by means of an MPR decree and to adopt kepercayaan for the constitutional Paragraph 29 on ‘religion’. Most pious Muslims hold that the term ‘belief’ (kepercayaan) would distort the fundamental nature of the paragraph and PPP, too, aimed to ensure that the state only recognised monotheistic religions. As in the past, PPP argued that, in its original wording, the ‘religion’ paragraph had been misinterpreted and distorted in order to foster the spread of ‘heretic’ (bida‘h) kepercayaan.

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33 Muktamar IV, p. 35.  
34 Muktamar IV, pp. 183-4.  
PPP’s promotion of the Shari’ah Clause to be inserted in Paragraph 29 claimed to be based in a genuine commitment to the Jakarta Charter’s importance as a ‘historical assignment’ (pesan sejarah). Party leaders claimed to respond to parts of the Muslim population who would desire a formal recognition of shari’ah by the state. They argued that since the beginning of the reformasi era, there had been increasing ‘demands from below’ to strive for shari’ah, which PPP then opted to ‘channel’ (mengkanalisir) through political institutions.

Most PPP leaders, however, adjusted promotion of the Shari’ah Clause and any clarification of its legal implications to what they believed to be useful. Presenting PPP as a firm shari’ah defender, party leaders shaped the basic tenets of its rhetoric with an eye to pluralist-minded Muslims and its main constituencies, under the prime consideration that PPP had always been a party for the average Indonesian Muslim and claiming a nationalist orientation as much as an Islamic. With the bulk of its voters consisting of self-aware Muslims perceived to have an assured but indistinct shari’ah commitment, the party’s stance appeared firm but the need to appear pluralist rendered this firmness hollow. Few in the party displayed an interest in exploring and spelling out clearly the consequences of a constitutional recognition of shari’ah. In fact, most PPP politicians remained convinced that a comprehensive enforcement of shari’ah and specific rulings such as corporate physical punishment for certain offences were not possible in present-day Indonesia. PPP MP Ali Hardi Kiai Demak said of his party’s actions:

“This is what is called struggle...we toss a statement...at the same time we wait for the maturity of the umat [kematangan umat]...after all we see the reality...the matter is only tactical because indeed [we] consider time and situation. As an analogy: in a war it is possible to announce war while the armies have already entered [the field]. We announce [and] attack first; then we set it up [persiapan] (laughing).”

Zein Badjeber, PPP’s representative in the constitutional commission that debated on Paragraph 29, commented on his party’s shallow approach toward shari’ah issues:

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37 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001.
38 Ibid.
We are still only in the political struggle... we are still only pursuing a concept what we call struggle program. We are still to develop a practical concept, a subsequent model on, say, Islamic marriage law on which we can agree... We are not yet at the finer details.  

Hence, while identifying the Shari’ah Clause as policy with a resonance among ideologically minded Muslims, PPP acted on the awareness that a formal constitutional recognition of shari‘ah would leave central jurisdictional matters and technical questions regarding its implementation unanswered. Because of the awareness of the ‘immaturity’ of the umat and its eagerness to simultaneously appeal to pluralist minded Muslims, PPP has shown little haste or fervour to suggest that the wording was linked to the state’s obligation to execute shari‘ah.  

There was ‘no guarantee whatsoever’ that with the insertion of the Charter clause ‘everything will be changed just like that’. Publicly, most PPP leaders thus opted for the less threatening reading which holds that ‘the interpretation [of the term] “obligation” does not mean the state but obligation of the Muslim community itself [kewajiban dari umat Islam itu sendiri]’. A formal recognition of shari‘ah was to bring about an ‘organic’ structure as it would ‘correlate’ and ‘connect’ existing shari‘ah-derived laws such as family law, alms, pilgrimage, and religious courts and the Constitution. 

Ali Hardi commented on the difference between a shari‘ah and a shari‘ah-free Paragraph 29:

If the second alternative [the Shari‘ah Clause] uses the words ‘with the obligation to carry out shariah for its adherents’, this really is... only... to bridge psychological factors in society [menjebatani factor-faktor psikologis]. [T]here are two positions in... society. [T]here are those who argue that already with the original wording: ‘the state is based on the One God’ ... [Islamic] laws... can be enforced. But there are [also] people who want it explicit [sejujurnya]. Well, if [they want it] explicit, then

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40 Also, PPP leaders held that the party had ‘never’ met to specifically discuss the technical aspects of implementing the Shari‘ah Clause. Interviews, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001; Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002.  
41 For example, PPP cautiously argued that the state indeed was not responsible for spreading a certain creed but to support the ‘development of religious communities’ (mengembangkan ummat beragama) in order to bring about ‘prosperity’ and ‘benefit’ (kemaslahatan). Risalah Rapat Pleno Ke-44 Panitia Ad Hoc I Badan Pekerja MPR 14 June 2000, Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2000.  
42 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002.  
that's the way we do it [ya kalau sejujurnya ya kita buka saja gitu]. This is the question of alternative one and alternative two...45

PPP’s central leadership, however, did little to attune internal positions, so that individual views among PPP politicians tended to be more diverse than in PBB and in PK.46 Some suggested that constitutional recognition of shari’ah would give an ‘enhanced guarantee’ that the law-making process takes into account the teachings of Islam. At least, there will be ‘an easing’ as the insertion of shari’ah terms will be ‘an umbrella’ or can be ‘a reference’ and a ‘common declaration’.47 Zein Badjeber pointed out:

We don’t fight for this [the Shari’ah Clause] to obtain a legitimation to implement a certain law that is in accordance with Islam. This is not meant! There is no impediment to this [at the present]. We only ask for a written guarantee in the Constitution in order to prevent differing interpretations [among political factions] so that the state must not issue regulations that go against Islam—under the Pancasila.48

In summary, though PPP adopted the Shari’ah Clause as key policy, the party downplayed that its insertion would oblige the government to implement Islam among Muslims. Party leaders did not link the constitutional recognition of shari’ah to the state’s obligation to revise existing regulations or to adopt new laws with an Islamic temperament even if several officials did not explicitly reject such an obligation, or that constitutional recognition would aid a wider instalment of Islamic laws or give the state more authority in carrying out existing laws.49

This effort to please Islamists whilst reassuring pluralist-minded Muslims rendered PPP’s promotion of shari’ah issues not only as eager to appear non-threatening but also as desultory. Common to all explanations was a profound lack of clarity and explicitness. In the 2000 MPR session, PPP argued that the purpose of the Shari’ah

46 PPP officials payed little attention to Masyumi’s standpoint that Islam demanded the state to implement Qur’anic stipulations dealing with ‘social relations’ (muamalah) among Muslims. See this chapter’s section on PBB.
48 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002.
49 PPP leaders described their colleagues in PBB to be more reckless in the struggle for shari’ah as Islamists in that party wanted to put obligation on the state to enforce shari’ah. See the further discussion.
Clause was ‘merely to give unequivocal legitimacy to the creation of public law to be made obligatory for adherents of Islam, which has been already effective until now’.\textsuperscript{50} PPP’s suggestion that the Shari’ah Clause would oblige individual Muslims to carry out Islamic law was not backed by explanations of what this meant in jurisdictional terms. A typically paradoxical assurance was that ‘if shariah will be made obligatory for the Muslim community [diwajibkan pelaksanaannya kepada umat], it will not lead to compulsion [paksaan]’.\textsuperscript{51}

Significantly, at the start of the reformasi era PPP appeared hesitant about whether it was likely to get many votes with shari’ah issues and the Jakarta Charter. This hesitation, chapter five will show, determined the party’s political strategy in 1998 and 1999. In the immediate post-New Order era, PPP promoted a reform agenda that focussed on non-Islamist issues and only included those Islamist themes which it considered to be widely accepted. Up until mid-2000, PPP hardly mentioned any shari’ah goals.

\textit{The Formalist-Symbolic Shari’ah Outlook of PBB}

Unlike the scarcity of intellectually dominant individuals in PPP, Chairman Yusril Ihza Mahendra quickly controlled the political course of PBB, Masyumi’s most devoted legatee. Yusril’s dominance meant that PBB’s shari’ah agenda appeared low-key. Again in contrast to PPP, PBB consciously adopted a single model to cultivate shari’ah. Entrenched in the thinking of Masyumi legatees has been the idea of some unspecified form of “restricted” democracy in which certain issues pre-determined by “the position of Islam” were no longer open for discussion.\textsuperscript{52} Its historic example is what Mohamad Natsir in the Constituent Assembly had called a “theistic democracy”.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000.
\textsuperscript{51} Pemandangan Umum 4 November 2001, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{52} An early PBB document in clumsy English seemed to reveal that party leaders were aware of the potential problems to pin down exactly what it means to be a democratic party that desires an Islamic Constitution to the largest extent practicable. The document stated: ‘we are doing our best to be democratic and Islamic at the same time’. \textit{A Brief Profile of Partai Bulan Bintang}, (no place, no date, probably 1998).
Masyumi differentiated between *shari’ah as ibadah* (worship or, more generally, the five pillars of Islam) and as *mua’malah* (Arab: *mua’malah*, rules on social relations, dealings between people). This equalled a quite common recognition among Islamists of two ‘differentiated spheres of human life and activity’. One area covered faith and worship and the other area dealt with worldly matters. At the Konstituante, Natsir said:

Islam is an ideology. Islam is not merely a religion understood as a relationship between humans and God. Islam comprises two elements...relationship between humans and their God and the relationship between humans: The element of ibadah [worship] and muamalah [social relations].

Masyumi further held that, in Islamic law, issues dealing with ‘social relations’ (*mu’amalah*) needed the involvement of state authorities. At the same time, other religious communities were to keep full rights to ‘carry out’ (*mengamalkan*) their faith and to ‘develop’ their culture. As the state’s assignment only concerned Muslims it would not contravene Pancasila or infringe on other religions.

Masyumi did not promote a literal application of Qur’anic stipulations but, for the most part, claimed to be content with the application of the main principles of the Islamic canon. Islam, it was argued, provided the ‘main fundamentals’ and not all the technical details for the organisation of the state. Natsir said:

People maybe wonder how Islam is able to rule this modern state that has to face 1001 complex issues. In order to banish such suspicion, may I clarify that people do not have to ask how, for example, Islam deals with...the exchange rate...traffic rules and so on...Islam does not regulate 1001 detailed things, which are technical...which can change according to the conditions and the necessities of time...Islam provides the fundamentals... [I]t clarifies the limits [*hudud*] of what is allowed and not allowed, the limits of what is proper and not... Apart from those norms already determined and several limitations that have to be implemented for the wellbeing of humankind itself, there is a field very wide open for humans to take initiative using its reason or its interpretation [*ijtihad*]...in accordance with advancement and the requirements of time and place. Religion...only meddles if endeavours toward *ijtihad* and reason will clash with the limits of morality, fairness [and] humanity already illuminated by religion.

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54 Krämer, *Islamist Notion*, p. 4.
56 *Kalau Masjumi*, p. 5.
These views became equally important for pragmatic Masyumi legatees promoting the party’s dedication to broader “Islamic values” and for doctrinaire Islamists who made little such accommodating efforts. The two camps differed on how and how much an Islamic party that claimed to continue Masyumi’s legacy had to promote Masyumi dedication to *shari’ah*. While equally vague about explaining *shari’ah* stipulations, the doctrinaire Islamists were more emphatic regarding the defence and promotion of what they broadly defined as Islam.

Led by two pragmatic Islamists—Yusril and Secretary-General M.S. Ka’ban—PBB promoted the state’s responsibility to take up steps as the promoter of Islam while depicting the distillation of *shari’ah* law as to strive for universal ‘Islamic values’ (*nilai Islam*), ‘ethics’ (*akhlak*) or ‘teachings’ (*ajaran*). The party was devoted to the idea that being a Muslim meant submission to *shari’ah* rule. But its pragmatic leaders also were aware that obliging a government with a non-Islamist majority with the task to enforce *shari’ah* on an unprepared society was unrealistic. To resolve this dilemma and citing Natsir, they promoted a flexible application of “Islamic values”. Islamic texts were not ‘self-evident’ and ‘a priori truths’. The results of the PBB 2000 Congress held that it was of secondary importance whether the state was termed ‘Islamic’ as long as Islamic ‘principles’ and ‘values’ were effective.

The belief in the state’s obligation to carry out Islam derived from classical Sunni political theory which holds that the major task of a government was to establish Islamic rule. Its legitimacy stood and fell with whether it complied with this task. PBB and other Masyumi legatees such as DDII, Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (‘Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World’, KISDI) and Persis (‘Islamic Association’) argued that a state with a majority Muslim population was obliged to facilitate its citizens to live in accordance with *shari’ah* to the largest extent possible. Otherwise the state would sin against Muslims and put at risk people’s salvation in the afterlife.

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58 See also chapter two, last section and chapter five.

59 *Hasil Muktamar I*, p. 72.

60 *Hasil Muktamar I*; Haril M. Andersen, Hamdani, Husni Jum’at, Nasruddin Muharor and Zaun Fathin (eds.), *Memperjuangkan Syariat Islam: Kumpulan Pidato Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Pada*
The view that nominal Muslims are not free to decide whether to succumb to Islamic rules stands for an unresolved matter between Islam and international rights norms.\textsuperscript{61} It showed that many Islamists, whilst operating in institutions representative of a plural democracy and supportive of its mechanisms, have not accepted the belief in religion as a matter disconnected from political authority. They appear to suggest that it is impossible for a Muslim to refuse putting oneself under the state’s religious supervision and still consider him or herself a believer.

PBB juxtaposed such insistence with avowals of flexibility. Ostensibly recognising the benefit of treading softly on potentially dividing issues, its large number of senior doctrinaire Islamists left the sketching of PBB’s ideological profile to Yusril and Dr. Rifyal Ka’bah, who had a much smaller public profile.\textsuperscript{62} Yusril had been known for comparative studies on Islamic politics, especially Masyumi, which he categorized as ‘Islamic modernists’ and set apart from ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i-Islami. In Yusril’s view, modernist and fundamentalists differed in their ‘tendencies to interpret doctrine to overcome political issues’. Modernism tended to read doctrine ‘elastically and flexibly whereas fundamentalism tends to interpret [doctrine] rigidly and literally’.\textsuperscript{63} ‘Fundamentalists’ wanted to establish shari’ah ‘totally’ (mutlak) and without compromise and contextualisation.\textsuperscript{64} ‘Modernists’ prioritised implementing shari’ah rules that dealt with mua’malah (social relations) and based the technicalities of the implementation on a generous application of ‘individual reading’ (ijtihad). Yusril wrote:

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\textsuperscript{61} This position is also alien to Christians. Christian doctrine puts less emphasis on community concerns and the rising individualism in Christian-majority countries has led to its further erosion. At the same time, many Muslims have difficulties in understanding Christian concerns that nominal Muslims may lose part of their religious freedom if the state enforces shari’ah. Ward already observed this in the late 1960s in his study on Parmusi: \textit{Foundation}, p. 47, Footnote 22.

\textsuperscript{62} Rifyal Ka’bah was appointed Supreme Court Judge in 2001 and had to resign from the PBB board.

\textsuperscript{63} Yusril Ihza Mahendra, \textit{Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jama’at-I- Islami (Pakistan)}, Paramadina, Jakarta, 1999, p. 304. This distinction seems rigid. In fact, ‘fundamentalists’ such as the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood have often been very pragmatic, especially since becoming active in plural political systems. Similarly, when Jamaat-i-Islami turned into a political party, it had to make a wide range of concessions.

\textsuperscript{64} Yusril Ihza “Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme sebagai Gejala Politik”, \textit{Media Dakwah}, November 1993.
[For] Modernism, the application of doctrine only concerns principles related to societal issues. These principles are eternal and universal values. Because societies constantly develop, individual judgment has to be emphasised to adjust doctrine to social change... Societal diversity, too, is seen as positive. Muslims, therefore, need to be open to adapt several ‘wisdoms’ [“hikmah”] that exist in other societies. [Fundamentalists] see the scope of individual judgment confined to maintaining the purity of doctrine. [For them] the precedent of Islam’s early days is comprehensively binding, as it is the most authoritative example in the application of doctrine from the sources... Because Islam is the only truth and outside there is misinterpretation [kesesatan], [fundamentalists are] inclined to see pluralism pessimistically and negatively.65

Their features made modernist parties ‘mass parties’ established by Muslim community leaders whereas ‘fundamentalists’ were cadre-based parties initiated by a charismatic ideologue. Natsir, Yusril proclaimed in obvious divergence to NU or PNI leaders of the 1950s, was a people-oriented leader rather than an ideologue or an aloof intellectual. Masyumi’s blend of Islamism was home-grown and inseparable from the indigenous socio-cultural setting. Jamaat-i-Islami and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, by contrast, were Islamic movements striving to enhance Islamist awareness on a broad scale.66

It was modernists, Yusril argued, who ‘tend to make compromises when they held parts of power or even themselves held power’. For Islamist movements, to be principled was easier because they operated at the fringes of society.67 In view of that, they were inclined to ‘see problems in black and white’. But ‘to overcome problems in a black and white fashion is less significant to prevail over current problems Indonesian society is facing’.68

The tribute to Masyumi and the alleged roots of its blend of Islam in Indonesia became a self-serving argument for PBB and DDII.69 The praise of Masyumi’s

65 Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme, pp. 304-5.
67 Mahendra, Natsir dan Maududi, pp. 71 and 80.
68 Mahendra, Studi.
69 According to Yusril, Masyumi’s broad repute was underscored through the inclusion and performance of its leaders in cabinet and opposition. Mahendra, Natsir dan Maududi and Studi. By contrast, when becoming a political party, Jamaat-i-Islami had still lacked a representative both in
alleged flexibility, in particular, was at odds with the view of the party’s political opponents in the past. Both NU and PNI had seen Masyumi as doctrinally stiff and opinionated, slating its blend of Islam as “anti-cultural” as it would collide with Indonesian religious customs.\(^\text{70}\)

Yusril thus promoted PBB in accordance with his earlier established view and attempted to distinguish the agenda of PBB from campus Islamism and Partai Keadilan. He often described the position of PBB as distinct from Islamists concentrating on proselytisation and preaching (\textit{dakwah}).\(^\text{71}\) To cadres, he said:

This [PBB] is a political party, not an ideological movement, [it is] not a dakwah movement... A political party has a clear political agenda. It drafts an organisation, [sets up] its structure; then puts together its policies. [(T)his is then] publicised, put into a program, [and then the party] takes part in the elections...[this is] generally different to establishing a dakwah organisation. A political party has a very clear political agenda; that is [it] wants to enter the corridor of power in a particular country. The scope and range of a dakwah movement is very wide. Those who pursue dakwah are not confined to a particular country...but the working place of [a] political party clearly is only in a particular country.\(^\text{72}\)

Paying no heed to his conviction that, by 1998, little popular support had been left for Masyumi, Yusril claimed that, like Masyumi and—by definition—modernist Islam, PBB was widely accepted in the broader Muslim community.\(^\text{73}\) The pace with which PBB could set up regional boards was a sign that ‘this party [PBB] has ideological, sociological and historical roots in our society’.\(^\text{74}\) Such avowals seemed to pick up representational claims in the Bulan Bintang camp throughout the New Order. Now, they had turned into a rhetorical tool to portray PBB as having strong

cabinet and national parliament. It only had one representative in a regional parliament (\textit{Natsir dan Maududi}, p. 71).

\(^{70}\) I am thankful to Dr. Greg Fealy for this point.

\(^{71}\) Yusril, under ongoing attacks from the doctrinaire camp, became increasingly thin-skinned. He brushed away debate over party ideology, arguing that he had never anticipated leading a political party and categorically dismissed any connections between the views on Islamic modernism presented in his academic output and his performance as PBB Chairman. Interview, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Jakarta, 8 November 2001.


\(^{73}\) “Yusril Ihza Mahendra: Bulan Bintang Bukan Gerakan Ideologi Islam” (‘Bulan Bintang is not an Ideological Islamic Movement’), \textit{Kompas}, 31 July 1998.

democratic legitimacy and being a major contestant in the June 1999 elections. Of course, a mere 1.94% share of votes clearly refuted these assertions.

The shari‘ah approach of Masyumi legatees remained entrenched in national history despite most of their leaders having taken on a more critical view of what they saw as Western-dominated global issues. Underscoring their claim for domestic roots, Masyumi and its legatees alike proclaimed to blend ‘Islamic-ness’ (keislaman) and ‘Indonesian-ness’ (keindonesiaan), which suggested an Islam infused with Indonesian qualities.²⁵ This blend proclaimed appreciation of “Indonesian-ness” in the application of Islamist agendas. Rifyal Ka’bah again made a distinction between the Masyumi tradition and PK:

[The] difficulty that the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] faces [is that] it wants to implement Islamic politics but the model is from overseas. For Masyumi [and] Bulan Bintang more examples come from Indonesia. Bulan Bintang looks more toward Natsir than al-Banna and others. An experiment [percobaan] that fits overseas cannot be suitable in Indonesia because we have a different environment. Even more so since the Ikhwan never succeeded in its struggle except a little in Jordan and in the Sudan... This has to do with the method. Indeed, Masyumi was applied [diterapkan] for the Indonesian conditions. This is the difference to PK. Because PK is a cell movement [gerakan usrah]. Usrah comes from Ikhwan. PK is even the Indonesian copy of Ikhwan.²⁶

In spite of the dual platform typical of Masyumi and PBB, Islam remained as the absolute, universal truth and the notional source of all actions. ‘Islamic-ness’ was the superior reference and circumscribed the application of ‘Indonesian-ness’. With ‘Indonesian-ness’ closely related to Islam, PBB merely re-confirmed the traditional claim of the Masyumi camp that the Muslim community had a common boundary with the nation. ‘Islamic-ness’ (keislaman) and ‘nationhood’ (kebangsaan), the PBB 2000 Congress declared, was an ‘integral unity’.²⁷

Reflecting the superior status of ‘Islamic-ness’, the advocates of a home-grown Islamism have always claimed propinquity to the ‘Islamic-ness’ of foreign Islamist groups. It was merely the adaptation of Islam that differed. The Muslim Brotherhood,

²⁵ This is thus different to the notion of ‘Indonesian Islam’. This notion suggests endorsement of Islam’s cultural diversity in Indonesia and the role of pre-Islamic customs in it.
²⁶ Interview, Rifyal Ka’bah, Jakarta, 5 February 2001.
²⁷ Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 74-5.
Jama’at–i-Islami and Masyumi, Rifyal Ka’bah argued, had ‘through means of an organisation, with strategies and tactics which perhaps were different but with an identical goal’ strived to bring about an Islamic society. For this aim, the superior position of Islam in the ideological platform must be ensured:

The perception of ‘an Islam infused with Indonesian qualities’ [Islam keindonesiaan] can only be accepted in the context of authenticity [al-aslahah]. If the idea [of Islam keindonesiaan] is put in this context, it refers to an original understanding and practice of Islam. [As such it] comes from an authentic reading [ijtihad murni] of Islam. [This is] perhaps what currently can be implemented in Indonesia but [it] is still authentically Islamic [tetap berciri asli Islam]. [Islamic] authenticity has a strong connection...with the consistency [and] solidarity...that still prevails among the international Islamic movement. [But] if the perception of Islam keindonesiaan is based on an image of Indonesian nationhood which is only emergent, [and] then adjusted to dismembered [telah pecah] Islamic concepts; the perception [of an Islam infused with Indonesian qualities] may be seen as having lost its Islamic authenticity [al-aslhalah al-islamiyah]. If the latter [approach] is forced, the idea will loose the consistency, solidarity and the international Islamic trait.

PBB promoted the insertion of the Shari’ah Clause into Paragraph 29 on ‘religion’, as did PPP. The party similarly argued that, first, inserting shari‘ah terms would give a ‘constitutional framework’ to Islamic laws currently existing and to people’s adherence to religious teachings which ‘until now has been taking place without a constitutional basis protecting [menaungi] it’. Second, the mentioning of shari‘ah in the Constitution was essential ‘because it will become a solid legal basis for the implementation of Islamic law within the framework of national law’. For Muslims alone state and religion were interrelated; the basis of the state would still rest on a nationalist-pluralist formula.

But of the parties advocating the Shari’ah Clause, only PBB argued that the term ‘obligation’ referred to an obligation of the state to implement Islamic law among Muslims. This perception of the state as executor of shari‘ah resumed Masyumi’s

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78 Rifyal Ka’bah, “Pergerakan Islam dan Permasalahannya”, in [?], Jakarta, 1987. I was unable to locate the title of the edited book which features this writing.
79 Ka’bah, Pergerakan, p. 147.
position. The Constitution, PBB argued, had to ‘bind [mengikat] the state’ to execute Islamic law among Muslims. 83 The reason was that crucial parts of Islamic teachings needed the active involvement of the state and its institutions. 84 It was the Charter’s ‘historical context and essence [hakekat]’ to ‘enable shariah Islam to become effective law for Indonesian Muslims’. 85 The deletion of the Jakarta Charter in 1945 had until now denied Muslims the right to fully live in accordance with Islamic teachings. Yusril wrote:

This [the deletion of the Charter] had the result that the Muslim people in Indonesia do not have national legal protection to carrying out the teachings [syariat] of their religion, in particular those relating to juridical legal dealings [perkara-perkara hukum peradilan, qada’i]. It is the obligation of the state to establish [menegakkan] the aforementioned law toward its Muslim citizens. This notwithstanding, the Muslim people are still able to carry out the teachings of their religion limited to individual legal dealings [perkara-perkara hukum perorangan, diyani]. 86

Yusril declared that other Islamist parties would misunderstand the legal implications of the term ‘obligation’. 87 The inclusion of the Shari’ah Clause would have to entail a comprehensive re-evaluation of laws, both those existing and those imminent, to ensure they follow Islamic principles. 88 PBB’s argumentation in the constitutional commissions adopted this understanding. 89 In the MPR 2002 session, MP Qasthalani once again touched on the friction between the Islamist view deriving from classical Sunni political theory and the Western affection for free individual decision over religious matters. He said:

‘Obligation’ means obligation for the state to implement syariat Islam, not the obligation of every citizen to adhere to the teachings of his religion. For a Muslim...he or she is obliged to carry out [melaksanakan] syariat Islam from the moment he or she becomes a Muslim. 90

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83 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002.
84 “Piagam Jakarta Perjuangan Tiada Henti”, Bulatan Bulan Bintang, 1 September 2000, pp. 4-6.
86 Mahendra, Sambutan, in Memperjuangkan, p. vii.
87 “Banyak Salah Faham” (‘Many misunderstand’), Bulatan Bulan Bintang, July 2002, pp. 8-9. In response to PPP’s promotion that the term ‘obligation’ referred to the obligation of each individual Muslim, Yusril pointed out that the Constitution could not give a direct order to the people but gave directives to the state and its organs (ibid).
88 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002.
89 The party’s stance, often presented by Hamdan Zoelva, was established in association with Yusril. Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002.
The party, however, made a general distinction between which aspects of Islam had to entail state involvement and which did not. Its obligation was to implement those sections of the Revelation that ‘are definitive and unalterable’ (qoti, qati). This excluded what the common non-Muslim view would most strictly deem as personal matters. Hamdan Zoelva said in the constitutional commission:

[T]hose issues which relate to worship [ibadah], the relation between humans and God [Tuhan], [this] we leave to human beings, and there is no need for the intervention of the authorities. But if we speak in the context of the implementation of syariah related to the enforcement of law that is qoti in syariah [considered definitive and unalterable], then it is impossible to be implemented without the help of an authority or the state. For example, how is it possible to implement Islamic family law, which is explained in the Qur’an in a qoti way, if there is no tribunal which is recognised and installed by the state? This is not possible. Like other qoti laws, what is clear is they cannot be executed without the help of an authority or the state... [t]here is a part of syari’at Islam which is related to public aspects, social relations and penal law [jinayah] which cannot be implemented without the state being responsible for being involved in their implementation.91

The promotion of a flexible interpretation of the Islamic canon also covered those aspects of shari’ah that were depicted as needing the state’s direct involvement. PBB’s 2000 Congress announced:

[The] party is aware that...mu’amalah [social relations]...is a field wide [open] for ijtihad to find [menggali] Islamic teachings [and] to overcome new problems which emerge at any given time, while always considering situation, place and era. The principles do not change, but the era always changes.92

Yusril had defined the goals of a modernist party accordingly. Avowals of flexibility aimed to counter the common charge held against Islamism that in various aspects ‘the gap between medieval and contemporary attitudes and customs is...seemingly unbridgeable’.93 The only area where Islam needed to be adapted literally was family

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91 Risalah Rapat Pleno 21 Maret 2002 reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002 (first part of quote) and Risalah Sementara 6 Agustus 2002, (second part: ‘[t]here is... ’). In a 2002 MPR session, Hamdan asked ‘How should a state be able to control whether somebody prays? Shall we have a policeman in every room? This is not meant.’ Risalah Rapat Pleno 13 Juni 2002 reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 3 Tahun 2002, p. 411. The term ‘worship’ refers to religious duties that are left to individual responsibility such as the five daily prayers (salat). In others like the pilgrimage (hajj), the state needed to become involved in organisation.
92 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 63-4. Also Hasil Mukernas I, p. 56.
law. In a 1998 article, Yusril outlined a position that was reminiscent of Natsir and which also became PBB’s stance:

[[In the field of law in the Qur’an...only two aspects of social relations [muamalat] are covered...in a detailed [rinci] manner: marriage law and...inheritance...in how we organise...economics, bank law, fiscal law, traffic law, penal law [pidana] and others it is left open to the widest extent to conduct individual reading by referring to the fundamentals...in shariah. In criminal law [pidana]... [w]hen the delict is clear...the sanction is clear [too]. But outside this, for example in computer crimes [and] bank crimes...the Qur’an only provides principles. Widest freedom is given to us the Muslim community to interpret [berijtihad], [and to] transform those shariah principles to crush the problems we face. These principles are truth [kebenaran], justice [keadilan]...]]

Assurances of flexibility, however, also cloaked the lack of insight into how a wide application of shari‘ah by the state could be realised in Indonesia. PBB demanded the state to enforce amorphous and indefinite “Islamic values” on Muslims but—as PPP—showed little interest to find ways to flesh out ways to distil and apply Islamic law. To party colleagues, Yusril called for circumspection. Obliging the state to enforce Islam would be difficult if society was not “prepared” and if the state lacks a Shari’ah High Court. Deputy Secretary-General Suaib Didu noted:

PBB has a concept for the Jakarta Charter but... not what technical steps [have to follow]... Yusril himself says: ‘do not rush until there is an infrastructure. Including a Shari’ah High Court. There has to be one. How do you want to rule a court case if there is no Shariah High Court?... And there is the question of human resources, people who really know about the content of the Qur’an in a technical way. This is not ready yet. Do not rush too much... You better set up such infrastructures first; only then [it] can be carried out’. But there is also another view, we implement it first, later we set up the infrastructure. But this is quite dangerous. It can rebound on Islam that Islam was not able to respond to the challenges.

At various occasions, Yusril pointed to the problems other Muslim countries had in implementing Islamic law. His frequent highlighting of the most universal of

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95 PBB hearing in Padang, West Sumatra, 18 November 2000, headed by Yusril and Ka’ban (personal notes).
97 Examples were Pakistan under Zial ul-Haq and Malaysia. “Yusril: Sistem Pemerintahan Islam Belum Tepat” (‘Yusril: The Islamic system of governance is not yet in order’), Jawa Pos, 8 May 2000. To cadres in Padang, Yusril cautioned that Islam’s imperative to trace 10 witnesses for cases of adultery showed that ‘the implementation of Islamic law was not simple [sederhana]’. PBB hearing in Padang, West Sumatra, 18 November 2000, (personal notes).
Islamic values directly responded to these challenges. Moreover, officials conceded that, by early 2002, the party was still struggling to establish itself in the regions and to improve the internal administration which meant that it had ‘not yet arrived at the Islamic conceptualisation of matters in order to carry them out’.\(^98\) Also, PBB held symposiums in which puzzled party officials asked Muslim scholars for advise on how to implement shari‘ah.\(^99\)

The current wording of Paragraph 29 ensures a monotheist state ideology which was minimal and not negotiable. It is a sufficient compromise, particularly for the pragmatic Islamists.\(^100\) A less than 2% share in the 1999 elections guaranteed that PBB’s efforts in the constitutional panels to argue its case for a formal recognition of shari‘ah in the Constitution would be futile. It was a formalist-symbolic struggle. The party was aware that it would get few votes and so PBB showed little concern for developing a concept that would go beyond a mere acknowledgment of shari‘ah terms in the Constitution.

Although Masyumi legatees continued to claim to defend umat interests by supporting shari‘ah, they have attracted support from only a small minority of those Muslims they claim to represent. A tiny minority in parliament, PBB did not have the people’s mandate to suggest there was extensive backing for its design of Islam’s position in state and Constitution and that its brand of Islam was strongly rooted in society. Despite such attempts to give legitimacy to its shari‘ah-mindedness, PBB or DDII leaders expected little public support for such an agenda. This was the chief reason that PBB downplayed shari‘ah goals up until after its 2000 Congress. By the time the party made shari‘ah and the Jakarta Charter an official policy, most doctrinaire Islamists, who had remained publicly tacit on shari‘ah issues due to the pragmatically endorsed domination of Yusril, had left the party.

\(^100\) Interview, Yusril Ilza Mahendra, Jakarta, 22 November 2001; “Tujuh Kata: Perintah Kepada Negara” (“The seven words: An order to the State”), Buletin Bulan Bintang, August 2002, p. 8. (Both references refer to the monotheist state as minimal compromise).
Both PPP and PBB politicians have shown awareness that their parties' lack of conceptual depth might be exposed if electoral success would require them to implement the Charter or shari'ah on a comprehensive scale. The nonchalant pretext for the time being has been that if the implementation of the Jakarta Charter fails then people are free to vote for other—i.e. non-Islamist—parties in next elections. Accordingly, PPP and PBB have no overriding reverie of a post-democratic society.

Unlike PPP and PBB, Partai Keadilan came into existence as a genuine cadre-based party. It acted on the conviction that the demise of Islam and the deflection of Muslim leadership to Western ideas only could be slowed down through a gradual strengthening of Islam through educational and social activities and dedicated cadres. As tarbiyah leaders, they had much less of an historical and emotional affinity with the Masyumi tradition, especially the struggle for the Shari‘ah Clause. Because of this, PK was wary of supporting the insertion of shari‘ah terms into the present-day Constitution.

The Gradualist Approach of PK

Islamists commonly deem nationalist sentiment that divorces religion from the state as hollow and illusory. This view ranges across a wide spectrum and is clearest among Islamists driven by the spirit to refuse to give in to any cultural influences from outside Islam. PK endorsed that it was permissible to defend national interests and protect the notion of nationhood. Nationalist sentiment and national sovereignty, however, served to maintain and defend an Islamic system in society. The borders of nationalism were determined by the boundaries of the Islamic realm rather than by the boundaries of nation-states.101 “The motive for people to love the nation”, PK Secretary-General Anis Matta held, ‘is religion. Religion encourages us to love our own country.’102 Echoing this agenda, the party adopted ‘patriotism’ as a guiding principle rather than ‘nationalism’. The notion of ‘Islamic patriotism’ was less attached to a national sentiment but stood for the aim to protect the sovereignty of the Muslim community in a nation and under a government that enabled Muslims to live

102 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 23 January 2001.
according to Islam. For this purpose, the idea of a nation and, its defence, was approved.\textsuperscript{103}

PK based its gradualist strategy on the belief that Indonesia had deserted its Islamic identity. Mahfudz Siddiq asked:

What actually is the core issue of this nation? ... First, this nation... does not have strong values of faith to form the spirit for the development of nation and state. Who are those ‘Indonesians’? ... If we call ourselves Indonesians, are we “proud as Indonesians”? Let us watch our environment and ourselves. How many things exist which are actually “not Indonesian”? This is our first core issue: the \textbf{crisis of identity values [krisis nilai identitas]} as a religious community and, simultaneously, a nation... The Indonesian nation is said... to be the world’s largest Muslim nation. So there is the question: has “Islam” become our “national identity value”? Is Islam something we are proud of? ... [H]as Islam already become the particular [khas] and dominant shade of the civilisational character of this nation? [Bold in original]\textsuperscript{104}

As Masyumi legatees, PK too asserted that \textit{shari’ah} was closest to the cultural identity of Indonesian Muslims; it equally resented the long-term impact of colonisation and imperialism and repeated classic statements of a global Jewish and American-led operation to suppress Islam. In the words of Dr. Salim Segaf, head of PK’s Shari’ah Council:

[The] chances to make syari’at Islam effective in Indonesia are extremely good... because the majority of our people are Muslims. The law that fits them... best is law based on syariat Islam. Not the law inherited from the Dutch colonialists, which already has been modified in several ways and proven unfit to overcome the problems of our nation... many provinces... already have adopted syariat before independence... All this is a historical fact, which this nation has to acknowledge... But very saddening are the efforts of Allah’s enemies who try to stigmatise syariat Islam as something scary. Because of this, a great deal of society has antipathy toward syariat Islam [even] before it has become effective... [M]any people especially Westerners are impelled...[terprovokasi, by the view] that syariat Islam is

\textsuperscript{103} Syamsul Balda, “Prinsip Negara Islam”, \textit{Peka Online}, 16 October 2001. The Muslim Brotherhood approved national sentiment for similar reasons. Al-Banna acknowledged cultural specifications of different people but rejected national and racial pride because it would revive \textit{jahiliyah}. This is giving a different twist to Rashid Rida’s widely cited precept that ‘love of the homeland is part of faith’. Patriotism is thus different from nationalism, which arguably has a wider and more aggressive overtone. Unlike patriotism, nationalism might be seen as a self-sufficient identity-platform for a community.

cruel or that Muslims are...extremists. And all this is propagandised by the Israeli Zionists.\textsuperscript{105}

In statements of PK leaders, there was, however, comparatively little suggesting that the broader Muslim community would identify with its Islamist goals. It thus was alone in adopting a \textit{jihadist} drive for a full ideology aiming to restore the Islamic identity of Muslims. PK sees the struggle to return Indonesian Muslims to their religious identity as part of a global clash of ideologies. Crucial was the notion of \textit{ghazwul fikri}. PK defined \textit{ghazwul fikri} as ‘a system for the defence of culture [\textit{system pertahanan budaya}]’ attacking ‘all regulations and systems that are not based in Islam and take mankind to apostasy [\textit{kesesatan}]’.\textsuperscript{106} These systems have become known as \textit{jahiliyah}, a notion made famous by Sayyid Qutb.\textsuperscript{107} Muslims were weakened by apostate education (\textit{tarbiyatan}) and culture (\textit{tsaqafiyyatan}). Their politics and economy, therefore, were infected by harmful (\textit{ashabiyah}) concepts like nationalism, secularism and capitalism. This had brought about a lack of morals, diluted Islamic missionary work, and eroded the authenticity of Islamic institutions.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Ghazwul fikri} enunciated a plain image of who was behind \textit{jahiliyah}. In a guideline written specifically for preachers (\textit{dai}) and leaders of Islamic study circles (\textit{murobbi}), Irwan Prayitno, ideologue and leading PK economist, addressed the topic of globalisation and Western hegemony. He described Christians and Jews as original ‘Peoples of the Book’ who have been corrupted and estranged from their faiths. Irwan wrote in a rehash of Islamist stereotypisation:

\begin{quote}
The infidels [\textit{pihak kafir}]...look for another way to destroy the Muslim community [\textit{menghancurkan umat Islam}]. They will never give in [\textit{rela}] and never cease to attack until Muslims follow their religious community [\textit{millah}]. The strategy that is chosen to destroy Islam is \textit{al-ghazw al-fikri}. \textit{Al-ghazw al-fikri} is an intellectual attack, cultural, mental, and conceptual, constantly and systematically undertaken... The objective of \textit{al-ghazw al-fikri} is to destroy morals and thought, dissolve
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107} See especially Qutb’s \textit{Milestones}.
\textsuperscript{108} See the contributions in Prayitno, \textit{Kepribadian Dai} and \textit{Kepribadian Muslim}.
[melarutkan] [Muslim’s] personality and to separate Muslims from their religion. This has been attempted... by severing the relations between Islamic nations under the Islamic caliphate, thus leading to the emergence of nationalism, ethnocentrism [kekauman] and national identity [kebangsaaan]. The separation of religion and state, orientalism, christianisation, and the women’s liberation movement, too, are activities of al-ghazw al-fikri, which already have shown results with a part of the Muslim community that now has changed to jahiliyah. The perpetrators of al-ghazw al-fikri, in general, consist of Jews, Christians, Parsees [Majusi], polytheists [Musyrikin], hypocrites [Munafikin], atheists and infidels... Returning the beliefs of Muslims to Islam is difficult except through propagation [dakwah] and individual endeavour [jihad], put into effect by a movement [harakah] and the tradition of the Islamic community [jama’ah Islamiyah].

In dealing with the perceived Western intrusion, shari’ah-minded Muslims characteristically demand to separate the useful from the harmful influences. Science and technology have merits if they can be morally verified. The technological and scientific inferiority of Muslims, PK repeated another familiar Islamist claim worldwide, was one particular result of the subjugation by Western powers of Muslim societies. In a 1996 sermon, the later PK MP Mutammimul ‘Ula said:

The West has experienced bankruptcy in all fields. [A] fragile [rapuh] ideological view; a hypocritical political system, the destruction of [its] social system with the family at its core...the only superiority they have left is TECHNOLOGY. [Capital letters in original]

The blatant proof for successful Western cultural intrusion was the appearance of the “liberal” Islamic movement in Indonesia as elsewhere in the Muslim world. Both PK and many Masyumi legates believed that fellow Muslim leaders and intellectuals had made the mistake of submitting to strategic necessities by forming non-Islamist parties and thus betraying their true self. Their compliance meant these fellow Muslims met the terms of foes that wanted to prevent Islamist parties from getting

109 Irwan Prayitno, “Al-Ghazw Al-Fikri”, reprinted in Kepribadian Dai, pp. 3-4. The Qur’anic references listed are al-Saff (61:8) and al-Tawbah (9:32). The author further stressed that it was the orientalists’ objective to establish jahiliyah. The text mentions the leftist Egyptian intellectual Thaha Husein as an example of a Muslim who participated in this effort.

110 Siddiq, Syariat Islam, p. 43.


political and technological power and developing military force.\textsuperscript{113} Granting Islam to be “liberal” thus was but the most recent example of Muslims yielding to Western imperatives.\textsuperscript{114} Surrendering to the Western allures and pressure, Dr. Daud Rasyid wrote, made Muslims like ‘fish baited by their enemies. Who gives the bait are the enemies and the fish is the Muslim community’. A prominent case of an Indonesian Islamist leader who had ‘taken the bait’ was Amien Rais, underscored by his refusal to lead an Islamist party into the 1999 elections. Daud Rasyid lamented:

\[\text{[I]}\text{t is difficult to comprehend why someone like Amien Rais who grew up as a son of Masyumi and lived in a Muhammadiyah environment until he became its top leader, dared to establish a secular party. The answer is that Amien has fallen into the trap of Islam’s enemies. The enemies of Islam very much did not want Amien to be in an Islamic party. If that had happened, Amien could have become the key to unite all components of the Muslim community... And that is very dangerous for the continuity of secularism in Indonesia... So what the enemies of Islam have planned indeed became reality.}\textsuperscript{115}

The crucial means to counter the forsaking of Muslims was the systematic build-up of ideological awareness among cadres. Protecting and defending Islam against threatening influences became a major aspect in PK’s sweeping cadreisation material. A main objective of its cadre training was to build an ‘historical awareness’ about Islam’s historical fight against non-believers and their desire to conquer Muslim lands and destroy Islamic civilisation.

The plan to destroy Islam is depicted as being something intrinsic to Western culture. Medieval Western leaders had come to notice that the ‘bravery of the Islamic armed forces in war’ was based in ‘the teachings of jihad as an integral part of Islamic teachings itself’. Recognising that armed force was inappropriate to destroy the Islamic spirit, the West decided to wage an ideological war to divide Muslims from

\textsuperscript{113} See, for example, “Tidak Lepas Dari Trauma Sejarah” (Interview with Abu Ridho), \textit{Sabili}, 21 April 1999, p. 36.
their Islamic identity. The cadreisation material echoed this change of tactics on behalf of the enemy. After Western armed aggression had proven to be ineffective, the opponents changed their strategy from confrontation to a ‘cultural invasion’ that undermined Muslim countries with Western ideologies and lifestyle. This was because of growing conviction in the West that ‘[we] can only defeat them [Muslims] if we can cut them off from their energy supply [Islam].’

To counter this assault, the party’s cadre training taught material on ‘ghazwul fikri’, ‘international Zionism’, ‘cloaked movements antagonising Islam’ and ‘institutions that oppose Islam’. It claimed that all physical efforts to oppress or destroy Islam had ‘always failed’. On the contrary, this failure had strengthened the resilience of Muslims. Therefore, the ‘enemies of Islam’ had changed their strategy toward a ‘very gentle assault, however, the result is lethal.’ Underscoring that “liberal” Muslims are essentially seen as victims, it held that Western ideas were ‘extremely professionally socialised’ which meant that this ‘appears like something beautiful to those who see it without Islamic glasses’. A key target of raising awareness about ghazwul fikri, therefore, was to build up vigilance against Muslims allying with the Western foes of Islam.

Particularly damaging was for Muslims to study Islam in the West. This was apparent in the “heretical” Islam taught by “liberal” pioneers such as the late scholars Prof. Harun Nasution and Nurcholish Madjid. Misleading Muslims about the true nature of Islam, the “liberal” movement was part of the apologetic trend in Islam which struggled to deny the importance of key concepts such as jihad, which, PK’s ideologue Abu Ridho pointed out, was ‘a proper [absah] way to bring about the

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116 Ridho, Jihad, p. 28. The author claims that the French king Louis IX had been the first Western ruler to recognise the Islamic might and, therefore, had proposed an assault on the Islamic civilization that comprised both armed force and cultural penetration.
117 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.
118 Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK-Sejahtera (compilers), Manajemen tarbiyah anggota pemula (‘Tarbiyah management for new members’), DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Departemen Kaderisasi, Seri Manjaj Tarbiyah, 2003, pp. 151-61. PK Sejahtera is the new name of Partai Keadilan.
119 Manajemen, pp. 155-56
120 Manajemen, p. 152.
121 Both scholars had received their doctorates in religious studies: Nurcholish Madjid from the University of Chicago and Harun Nasution from Montreal’s McGill University.
ideals of Islam, regardless whether the infidels like it or not'. As such, he argued, Muslim apologists

[...]like to gain the sanction [keridhaan] of those aggressive to Islam by defending themselves [by saying] that Islam was no religion of combat [agama perang]. This view clearly is based on a psychological defeat which causes one to evade everything that appears formally-legalistic and to declare oneself adherent of substantial Islam, cultural Islam and the like.¹²²

Abu Ridho concluded that ‘jihad is an obligation for Muslims to defend Allah’s religion’, reacting against ‘disturbance’ (gangguan) and ‘hostility against Muslims and their religion’ while at the same time consenting to a ‘rationalisation of the jihadist concepts’.¹²³ But because of its reduction of the Qur’anic meaning of jihad to a meek spiritual effort, “liberal” Islam becomes, quite necessarily, a Zionist-friendly ‘satanic ideology’.¹²⁴ To reverse liberalism’s “destructive” impact, PK more than other Islamist parties promoted the idea that appropriate training in Islamic studies cannot be acquired at Western institutions. Studying Islam in non-Muslim countries had a negative impact on the beliefs of Muslim graduates who, returning to their home countries, helped to prolong jahiliyah. It was only justifiable to study scientific and technological subjects in the West.¹²⁵

PK, moreover, saw it as crucial to spread knowledge among the umat about various ‘projects’ which appeared Muslim-friendly but had the goal of destroying Islam. These projects were undertaken by Western-led institutions, foundations and NGOs active in Muslim countries, which, PK held, ‘in essence want to destroy and sideline the existence of Islam and its community’. Cadres needed to be instructed how these institutions worked, what they promoted and how they were connected. They particularly needed to understand the danger of getting involved with these organisations and should only become active in Islamic bodies. Instructors taught

¹²² Ridho, Jihad, p. 30 (both quotes).
¹²³ Ridho, Jihad, pp. 28-40. (quotes p. 32 und p. 30). The author refers to Mawdudi, al-Banna and Qutb as having correctly interpreted the meaning of jihad.
¹²⁵ Interview, Daud Rasyid, Jakarta, 5 November 2001. Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail, PK’s first President received his PhD in Food Engineering from the University of Texas. All other PK leaders graduated from universities in the Middle East or Muslim Southeast-Asia. Among PPP and PBB leaders only a few received degrees from universities outside Indonesia (see Appendixes III to V).
cadres to ‘brace oneself’ in order not to ‘go down’ (terjerumus) in the assault against Islam. To foster this idea, they provided material to cadres which ‘can awaken emotions and strengthen belief’ (menggugah emosi dan menimbulkan kepercayaan). The overall goal was to build up ‘[cultural] suspicion’ (waspada [kebudayaan]) in order to protect an already severely blemished umat Islam from further harm. 126 Anis Matta argued:

It is necessary to build up cultural suspicion [kewaspadaan budaya]. Because we experience an invasion, a cultural invasion... We have the conviction that the umat Islam is finished. [It] does not have a solid intellectual structure. Because of this, they [Muslims] can easily be invaded. [We only have to] look at the TV soap operas, the magazines...people have no cultural defence system [system pertahanan kebudayaan] whatsoever. Actually, ghazwul fikri has more to do with revitalisation... Because we the Muslim society are severed [tercerabut] from our...own cultural roots. We do not have a reference in life. Our politics does not use its own reference. Our economics does not use its own reference. We create a cultural product, such as a film; [yet] we do not have our own reference. 127

To counter Western ‘invasion’ on a broad communal basis, the gradualist strategy focused on dakwah (proselytisation) activities. ‘Dakwah’, the first point of PK’s ‘vision’ proclaimed, ‘is the party and the party is dakwah’; the ‘dakwah to convey the truth’, the Shari’ah Board held, was ‘the primary jihad [jihad paling utama]’. 128

The backwardness and ignorance of Muslim people had to be halted through an ‘active and comprehensive form of dakwah (ad-da’wah al-harakiyah asy-syaamilah). 129 PK therefore promoted that:

There is only one simple solution: Dakwah has to tell to the umat and the people of this country: “You are Muslims!” until they openly declare with conviction: “We are Muslims!” Or in other words the solution is to REESTABLISH THE ISLAMIC IDENTITY. (Bold, capital letters and underlining in original) 130

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126 Manejemen, p. 160; Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.
127 To challenge cultural intrusion, PK organised what it called ‘cultural counter products’, for example, stage plays that were intended as alternatives to Indonesia’s popular but “un-Islamic” TV soap operas. Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003; Komisi C Kebijakan Dasar Partai, Musyawarah Nasional I Partai Keadilan, 18-21 May 2000.
128 Fatwa of the Shari’ah Board on “Political Parties in Islam”, in Fatwa Dewan Syariah Partai Keadilan, (no publisher, no place, no date), p. 96.
129 See the sections “Takwin Al-Ummah”, “At-Tarbiyah Al-Islamiyah Al-Harakiyah”, “Fiqh Ad-Da’wah” and “Membentuk Kepribadian Muslim” in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai.
130 Siddiq, Pemilu, p. 35.
This form of *dakwah* gave great attention to the duty of each Muslim to improve the moral qualities of society. This central significance of both cadre training and *dakwah* has been lacking in the organisational models of other Islamist parties in Indonesia.

On this commitment rests PK’s proud claim to promote an understanding of Islam that covered every aspect of life and highlighted its universality. Other Islamist parties, by contrast, separated social and political engagement. The long-term goal was one of liberation from servitude other than toward God. It was:

> ...to make Islamic ideology the spirit of humankind’s liberation fight from subjugation [*penghambaan*] amid humans toward subjugation only toward Allah...; the liberation of humankind from the poverty of imaginary human ideologies toward Islamic justice [*keadilan Islam*] and to lead humankind to happiness and serenity in life.\(^{132}\)

Islam, the party statutes stressed, was complete, self-sufficient and integral (*syumuliyatul Islam*).\(^{133}\) Islamic teachings, Mahfudz Siddiq pointed out, ‘are not just valid and not just designed for a certain people but for the whole of mankind [*untuk seluruh manusia*]’.\(^ {134}\) ‘All mankind is one’, Syamsul Balda reiterated a key position of Middle Eastern ideologues, with no separation between ‘the bourgeois’ and ‘the proletarians’, ‘the blacks and the whites’ or ‘Eastern and Western people’. It was Islam that gave ‘a revolutionary concept for the whole of humankind’ in accordance with the prophet’s mission to ‘unite humankind on Divine order and to revive the human consciousness [for His wishes]’\(^ {135}\). This is the reason that, although primarily targeted at Muslims, the propagation of Islam also aimed at non-Muslims, including those perceived as enemies.\(^ {136}\) The results of PK’s first National Congress in 2000 declared:

\(^{131}\) Interview, Mutamminul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 2000.
\(^ {134}\) Siddiq, *Syariat Islam*, (back cover) and, similarly, p. 39.
\(^ {136}\) Though speaking out against coercion, the Qur’an certainly welcomes non-Muslim conversion to Islam. Dakwah organisations such as DDII, however, often took particular care only to target fellow Muslims in order to distinguish themselves from the activities of Christian missionaries which they have accused to act in the tradition of the Crusades by trying to convert Muslims.
The form of dakwah adhered by Partai Keadilan is da’wah rabbaniyah ‘alamiyah, that is da’wah that guides humankind to know its God and da’wah that is targeted at the whole of humankind [seluruh ummat manusia]. It is da’wah that aims toward a just brotherhood in the human community far from forms of racism or tribal, racial or ethnic fanaticism. On this basis, dakwah is the prime axis of all actions [gerak] of the party... [B]oth the objective and also the target which will be achieved are global ['alamiyah (mendunia)] in accordance with the universality of Islam... It is an activity which does not know limits of a certain ethnicity, state or area.137

The transformation of society toward Islam was to be achieved by gradual ‘social engineering’ (rekayasa sosial). This involved a process in which humanity progressed from a status of ‘ignorance toward the truth [haq] to knowing it’ and from passive knowledge to drafting concepts which eventually will turn into deeds with a benefit for all humankind. Ultimately, the party held, these steps ‘lead to the accomplishment of the holy target of Dakwah, which is to obtain Allah’s blessing (ridha)’.138

Democracy, evidently, promised greater prospect for the success of dakwah than an authoritarian system. Unlike the New Order, democratic conditions enabled unrestricted possibilities for the propagation of Islam, which, the PK 2000 Congress demanded be ‘optimally’ utilised.139 Preachers could freely mingle with all parts of society to persuade them of Islam’s and thus the party’s strengths.140 A pivotal aspect in the dakwah teachings was to instruct people about the benefits of Islam so they could behave “responsibly” and vote for the right candidate. The aim was to ‘win the public mind so that the public opinion stands on our side’.141 Anis Matta informed potential constituencies in the Islamist magazine Saksi:

We, for example, want to eradicate pornography in this country [and] this is the way to do it: put together a structure of suggestions [struktur gagasan] to persuade the public how destructive pornography is for our life. If we win there, issue legal drafts to stamp out pornography in all forms. And if we win there, control tightly whether the government carries it out well or not. If not, we can sue the government. This is how dakwah has to work in the democratic era. There is freedom that we enjoy

137 Komisi C Kebijakan.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Anis Matta “Menikmati Demokrasi (‘To Enjoy Democracy’)”, Saksi, 3 April 2001.
141 Matta, Menikmati, and “Memenangkan Wacana Publik (‘To win over public opinion’), Saksi, 17 April 2001, pp. 2-3.
together. But there is also left a specific way to wipe out evil [kemungkaran] and to penetrate into power. Consider this an art, which dakwah politicians have to know.  

The message of Islam is seen as giving wide attention to the dignity of human beings. As Islamists commonly stress, humans could only be dignified in a moral environment that is based on religious teachings. Despite the immediate attention toward dakwah programs, PK strongly believed in the obligation of the state to implement shari‘ah in order to ensure that Muslims live decent lives. ‘Muslims’, Syamsul Balda insisted, ‘will not (and in fact are unable to develop into) true [sejati] Muslims except they wish to erect an Islamic state’. It was the duty of the individual Muslim and the family to ensure moral life, but ultimately it also became the task of the state. The formal acknowledgment of shari‘ah in the Constitution remained essential for the state to be able to comply with its task. This was because Islam provided the clearest concepts for efficient law enforcement. Unambiguous rules of right and wrong were the crucial underpinning to organise social life effectively. Where states and law enforcement were weak, societies would eventually drift into anarchy. In an ideal Islamic system, Salim Segaf stressed, ‘the key word is sanction; because without sanctions many laws are ineffective’. He further explained:

[W]e want this community that calls itself Muslim [mengaku orang Islam] to know that in Islam there are firm sanctions. Because there is no legal certainty in this country. Religion [agama] already provides [rules for sanctions]. But merely religious words [kata-kata agama] are not binding [menyambung]. They have a general character. But shari‘ah has implications, a meaning that binds [terikat] ... 

The lack of legal competence and security in contemporary Indonesia was because national law lacked a solid base and tradition and had not taken on Islam as philosophical foundation. In the section ‘law’, the PK statutes therefore called ‘to

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142 Matta, Menikmati.
145 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001.
146 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001. PK’s reaction to the new law on zakat (alms) illustrated the belief in the state’s responsibility to issue sanctions. Party leaders deplored that the state still lacked power to force Muslims to pay their religious dues and to issue sanctions if this was breached. They critiqued that with the existing regulation only institutions could be held liable but not individual Muslims (ibid).
end any hesitations in the choice of the character of Indonesian law (*kepribadian hukum Indonesia*). The ‘forced’ adoption of Western law had already ‘separated the law from the philosophical, sociological and historical roots of society’. Anis Matta asked:

What are the references for Indonesia in organizing [*mengatur*] the state? The references are legal sources [but] what are these sources?! [T]he state lacks an identity. Pancasila is not an ideology. Pancasila is a joint declaration... more or less that we are governed by religious principles... [T]he MPR wants to draft laws, where do they look for?... They only go overseas to learn about this, learn about that... That means that people lack a reference. Although Islam provides this reference.

The question remained over the right time for making Islam the philosophical law principle for national law. PK leaders, like PBB, argued that writing *shari'ah* terms into the Constitution gave order to the state to implement Islamic teachings. But acting on a self-perceived sense of moral superiority and of being the only genuine defender of Islam, PK leaders and cadres tended to have a cynical view of the motives behind the *shari'ah*-mindedness of other Islamist parties. They believed the motives of colleagues, especially PPP, in promoting *shari'ah* were ‘entirely pragmatic’. The juridical consequences of the constitutional mention of *shari'ah* would be ‘manifold’ which meant that ‘for us (PK) the implications are too strong at this point in time for the current condition of society... This is an issue too far-reaching to be trivialized’. As such, there was an amused sense of ‘surprise’ that western journalists and observers held the *shari'ah* stance of other Islamists parties to be ‘really serious’.

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147 *Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan.*


149 PK leaders believed that Yusril, who claimed that PK’s reading of the Charter’s wording was misguided, would do so only to promote his own party.

150 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. PK leaders pointed to the ineffectiveness of *shari'ah* laws that had been implemented in several regions. One example was the ban on alcohol that existed as ‘regional directive’ (*perintah daerah*). As the government needed the tax income, in reality the order had no meaning. Such examples had demonstrated to PK that the state’s enforcement of *shari'ah* was untimely and thus counterproductive (ibid).

151 Overall, PK interpreted the pro-*shari'ah* stance of PPP and PBB as merely grounded in the calculation that Muslim voters had ‘gone through a radicalisation process. Because of this they [PPP and PBB] use issues, which according to them can draw these groups’. PPP MPs had told their colleagues in PK that they would support *shari'ah* issues only for the Islamist public. Confidential remarks from a PK leader, 2003.
PK thus was disinclined to engage the state in the comprehensive implementation of shari‘ah due to the belief that such a role would be untimely. Endeavours to write Islam into the Constitution, under the current circumstances, would encounter strong resistance.\footnote{152} Abu Ridho pointed out:

There are those who say, first of all the [capture of the] state is important. This is not possible. We have to form the fundament [pola] first, only then the instrument.\footnote{153}

Inflicting shari‘ah law on an unprepared and reluctant population would erode the government and heighten people’s opposition.\footnote{154} Heading an infidel nation in the name of Islam therefore was a great risk for the prestige of Islam itself. Instead, society had to be forged from within toward moral restoration and a religious life. The most distinctive trait of this conviction was the strategic dakwah focus on every individual whose ‘thinking, feeling and behaviour was to be returned toward a complete Islamic identity (kaffah)’.\footnote{155} In the words of MP Mashadi:

Parts of society are still phobic against Islam because they do not understand. We attempt to change this through dakwah. After all a state is built on individuals. If we proselytise on an individual basis, there will be a large impact. It is of no use if we fight following a structural state approach without the understanding of society. The strategy has to start from below. Automatically it will have an impact upwards.\footnote{156}

Striving for the incorporation of shari‘ah into the Constitution required a set of preparatory steps, known as tadarruj (Indon: pentahapan, gradualism).\footnote{157} The first step was to establish an Islamic personality in each individual (gerakan individual or also known as takwimusy-sykhsiyah al-Islamiyyah), mirroring the frequently cited tarbiyah motto ‘if you want to establish an Islamic state, begin by establishing it in

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{152}{‘Ula, Mensikapi Isu; Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.}
\item \footnote{153}{Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 April 2001.}
\item \footnote{154}{It also was deemed futile to bring about Islamic rule by means of a popular uprising or revolt. Since the Iranian revolution, the idea to remove a government in a Muslim country through force has almost exclusively been linked to Shiite doctrine. Sunni Islamist groups, generally, have a deep distrust of Shiite theology and its concepts, including using the means of resurgence to topple a government. See, for example, Hidayat Nur Wahid, “Syi‛ah Dalam Lintasan Sejarah”, Mengapa Kita Menolak Syi‛ah (‘Why we reject Shiasm’), Kumpulan Makalah Seminar Nasional Tentang Syi‛ah, LPPI, 1998.}
\item \footnote{155}{Interview, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. Mahfudz extensively cited Hassan al-Banna in this belief. In Siddiq, Politik Dakwah.}
\item \footnote{156}{Interview, Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000.}
\item \footnote{157}{The following brings together information from Qamaruddin, Beginilah, pp. 30-31 and ‘Ula, Mensikapi Isu.}
\end{itemize}
The next step was missionary work on an individual basis (dakwah fardhiyyah), in particular to Islamise family (takwin al-bait al-muslim) followed by guiding and proselytising society (gerakan sosial or irsyadul-mujtama’ wa ishlahahu). The following effort was to Islamise the government (ishlahul-hukumah). This was divided into a ‘legislative movement’ (gerakan legislasli), referring to the parliamentary struggle and one-by-one legalisation of Islamic laws and, after that, a ‘constitutional struggle’ (perjuangan konstitutionalisme), referring to writing shari‘ah terms into the Constitution. The final two steps were endeavouring to restore the Islamic caliphate (i‘adatu kayanil-khilafah al-islamiyyah) and, lastly, to establish Islam as the fundament of human civilization (ustadziyyatul-‘alam). Abu Ridho summed up:

First, the state protects Islam that has been established [tegak] on an individual scale. Like a garden that is already growing but lacks a fence and therefore can be devastated by goats. The fence is the state. But apart from this, the state also spreads the starting point [titik tolak] to establish Islam on the scale of a civilisation. If Muslims want to contribute to human civilisation a state is required. The state distributes [menyebarkan] civilization. This constellation is proven by history... Why did the Prophet migrate to Medina? To form a state which develops civilisation. Civilisation is the final goal. The state is the starting point [titik anjang].

PK’s concentration on transforming the legislation rather than the Constitution gave a strong indication of its matter-of-fact mind-set. The day-by-day socialization of Islamic laws in parliament was much easier whereas constitutional changes engendered automatic resentment. Small support from Muslims made the constitutional struggle inopportune. PK, therefore, acted on the premise that there were no swift means to accomplish the re-Islamisation of society and diminish Western influences. They thus were dismissive of the endeavour of PBB to make the state responsible to carry out Islamic law among Muslims before these were

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158 The goals were to build a personality free from polytheist belief; to build correct worship, firm ethics, strong intellect, a healthy physique (PK activists regularly met for soccer sessions), self-sufficiency, personal restraint, efficient use of life-time, organised in all situations and activities and a social commitment. Qamaruddin, Beginilah, p. 34.

159 Many PK officials lead or have been active in social foundations or engaged in educational institutions (see Appendix V).

160 Qamaruddin, Beginilah, p. 3.


162 Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.
sufficiently prepared through missionary and educational activities. PK’s motive for the gradualist ideological approach was:

If our condition is still weak, but this [the constitutional struggle] is forced, there will be lasting consequences. It will] cause new resistance. Those resisting will consolidate. Eventually they will not only be resistant toward shariah but this will expand to issues, which appear [berbau] Islamic. They might question Islamic Banks and other things. Thus [they] might destroy the cultural movement that already gains momentum. In other words, this will add to the list of conflict sources. 163

Hence, PK concentrated on dakwah programs and cadreisation efforts whilst striving to insert shari‘ah laws on a one-to-one basis into the current legislation. The party explained this policy by holding that Islam continued to shape thought, everyday habits and custom, even though the cultural alienation throughout the last decades until the present day had obscured this or weakened its impact. Mutammimul ‘Ula argued:

Indonesian...Muslims, at least in their conviction [keyakinan] already chose Islam. The adoption of Islam, in particular its laws, indeed is arranged hierarchically [bertingkat-tingkar]. Despite this, Islam has become the dominant value in everyday life, both in...spiritual form, language, culture [and] practise. Muslims, regardless of the shallowness of their...execution [pengamalan] of Islam, still are the section, which ‘mostly’ carries out their religion compared to sections with other religions. Islamic law already has become the ‘living law’ in society. Hence, the step-by-step integration of Islamic law into national law, and supported by the expert development of dakwah, is the best alternative to overcome the complication of legal life... 164

The preliminary goal thus was for shari‘ah laws to gradually replace Western-derived law and local customs and beliefs (adat) law as the major legal source. The humiliating failure of Islamists in other Muslim countries to take over governments played an important role in establishing this view. The ongoing tensions in other parts of the Muslim world had proven the strategic benefit of the gradualist strategy. At the same time, Western-derived law, the party envisioned, was permissible in the field of science and technology. Mutammimul ‘Ula argued:

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163 Ula, Mensikapi Isu. For similar views see “Persoalannya Bukan Teks Piagam Jakarta An Sich, Tapi...” (Interview), Suara Keadilan, 1-15 September 2000, pp. 4-5.
The development of national law must take Islamic law as its main inspiration, supplemented by adat law to provide a local context and Western law...to take benefit of technological development and civilisation which earlier ['terlebih dahulu'] developed, especially, which concerns practical regulations. Islamic law becomes the 'mainstream' and adat law and Western law become 'complementary'. This is the choice that has to be emphasised... These [steps] decrease the level of resistance or the allergy of those who until now are afraid of shari’ah Islam. Only after that [comes] the last [step]: the constitutional struggle... One can say that no Muslim country succeeded in striving for constitutional [acknowledgment] through democracy. Turkey—clobbered. Algeria—clobbered. Indonesia itself, the Jakarta Charter and the Konstituante...abolished. Even more so since in Indonesia constitutional change needs a quorum of two thirds and this is difficult... So the qualification for the constitutional struggle is that the public as a whole supports it… We very much agree with the implementation of shariah Islam carried out on the level of governmental jurisdiction [tingkat tataran ketatanegaraan] but it has to become the agenda of the Muslim community not the agenda of party per party.\textsuperscript{165}

The gradualist approach toward a “re-Islamisation” of society was characterised by a romantic belief that this goal could be realised through the zeal that carried the struggle. With this long-term strategy, immediate attention automatically turned toward the consolidation of democratic rule and the promotion of general values such as ‘justice’. They signalled common interests and emphasised benefit for society as a whole. This separation of short-term goals and end objective, the following chapter shows, quite necessarily led to a concealment of the party’s dogmatic character.

This chapter thus established the motives and the qualities of the Islamist approach toward the implementation of shari’ah. It argued that PBB was the party which, while attempting to comprehensively follow the Masyumi-model, mostly was contented with a symbolic dedication to the Masyumi-derived ideal of a formal recognition of shari’ah in the Constitution through the Jakarta Charter. The shari’ah agenda of PPP was even more superficial and even desultory. The party desired to have it both ways: It wanted to appear pro-shari’ah and pro-pluralist at the same time. It called for the constitutional inclusion of shari’ah while downplaying, even denying the legal consequences of such a step. This stance has led to a number of sophistical explanations from party officials regarding their motives and objectives. There are no signs that PPP will develop a more substantive shari’ah approach in the future. This seems particularly unlikely because of the party’s fragmented character. A common ideological denominator for its traditionalist and modernists factions first

\textsuperscript{165} Combined quote from ‘Ula, \textit{Introduksi Hukum}, and ‘Ula quoted in \textit{Persoalannya}.  

201
became a formula deemed pleasantly familiar such as the "seven words" of the Charter and eventually—as chapter six will show—a more straightforward reference to shari'ah itself once party strategists believed the Charter to be an outmoded issue that had little support left. The significance of practical political considerations became further obvious as though Parmusi has been historically more devoted to Masyumi and its Charter agenda, eventually the party's NU leadership turned into the Charter's most determined backer.
CHAPTER FIVE

ISLAMISM IN PLURALIST POLITICS: DILEMMAS IN POLICY AND STRATEGY

This chapter deals with the dilemmas of constitutional Islamism in pluralist politics and their impact on Islamist policy and strategy. The first part discusses the hesitation of Islamist parties to promote shari‘ah issues until after the June 1999 elections. It argues that Islamists were uncertain about voters’ preferences; they therefore concentrated on issues of broader political reform. The second part discusses the Islamist position toward non-Muslims and religious pluralism. It proposes that the main challenge for Islamists is not tolerance for other communities but willingness to grant them equal status. For the Masyumi legatee parties with their strong domestic references, it is the perception of Indonesia as a “Muslim nation” that feeds their claim for supremacy. For Partai Keadilan, the organisation of communal life under the Prophet provides the superior reference for this conviction.

Voter Maximation: Highlighting Popular Issues over Shari‘ah Concerns

The 1998 student-led reformasi movement did not put pressure on political parties to Islamise the state and Constitution. This greatly influenced the policies and strategies of Islamist parties in the immediate reformasi era. At the outset, no Islamist party had an official shari‘ah policy. The electoral strategy of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP), Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB) and Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK) was based on a staunchly reformist agenda. They did not want to appear sectarian, while at the same time they wanted to ensure a broad appeal to Muslims. Between 1998 and mid-2000, they only showed determination on Islamist issues deemed uncontroversial and which did not seem to cost votes in the elections. The reason for downplaying shari‘ah goals was the uncertainty over voters’ responses. It appeared to be more helpful for Islamism’s political survival to focus on issues of broader political reform. Also, accentuating shari‘ah issues was likely to leave Islamist parties open to charges of sectarianism.
and endanger their democratic credentials. With the elections scheduled only a year after the fall of the old regime, it was crucial to avoid any images of Islamism as divisive.

In mid-2000, PBB and PPP added *shari‘ah* to their agenda. The policy outlook of PK, by contrast, was steadier as it temporarily put aside *shari‘ah* goals. This cloaked the party’s strong ideological spirit. All Islamist parties, therefore, pursued a strategy that differentiated between short-term and long-term concerns. After the end of the New Order, it was paramount for parties to struggle to foster democracy and combat corruption. Both the Islamist and the secular-national camp believed these issues to have great popular appeal. The shared claim to defend *reformasi* ideals meant that in the early post-New Order era, ideological differences between Islamists and secular-nationalists were somewhat hidden.

A central *reformasi* goal was to amend the 1945 Constitution. The Constitution was commonly seen as vague, and as enabling authoritarian rule and the breach of democratic checks and balances. The public and press, therefore, pressured parties to direct political power to the legislature. Other popular demands were to initiate direct presidential elections, to enhance political and economic self-rule of regional administrations, to end military participation in parliament and to expand the legal protection of human rights. In taking up these issues, Islamist parties did not target an exclusively Islamist electorate for the 1999 elections. This rendered assertions that *shari‘ah* was closest to the culture of Indonesians a rhetorical device illustrating the Islamist desire to represent national identity.

The consequence of the Islamist hesitation to disclose ideological issues was that in the constitutional panels, discussions on *shari‘ah* issues built up gradually. Serious debate did not take place before 14 June 2000. But from then on, PBB and PPP MPR members devoted a third of their speeches to the defence of the Shari‘ah Clause. At times, Islamist parties also modified their proposals. They changed the syntax of the clause or proposed to arrange the articles of the constitutional

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Paragraph 29 on ‘religion’ in a different order. The following table covers the proposals over four MPR sessions between 1999 and 2002.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>No mention of <em>shari’ah</em> agenda</td>
<td>Shari’ah Clause with obligation of every Muslim to live according to Shari’ah</td>
<td>Shari’ah Clause</td>
<td>Shari’ah Clause</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>Hesitant <em>shari’ah</em> agenda, incl. promoting Plural Clause for tactical reasons</td>
<td>Shari’ah Clause with obligation of the state to implement Shari’ah</td>
<td>Shari’ah Clause</td>
<td>Shari’ah Clause</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR (PAN &amp; PK)</td>
<td>No specifics</td>
<td>Plural Clause (unclear reading)</td>
<td>Plural Clause (unclear reading)</td>
<td>Plural Clause (unclear reading)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDU</td>
<td>No specifics</td>
<td>No specifics</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Shari’ah Clause</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>No specifics</td>
<td>Plural Clause with obligation of state to implement religious teachings</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Plural Clause without state obligation, eventually withdrawal</td>
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Highlighting non-Islamist reform goals, in November 1999 Islamist parties agreed to stay away from sensitive issues such as the Preamble of the Constitution, the unitary state and the presidential system. This reconfirmed Pancasila as state ideology and excluded the possibility of reinstalling the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter into

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2 They also did not address the question whether the President had to be Muslim. The agreement was made in one of two Ad Hoc Committees, which were formed to prepare the amendments. No formal declaration was made. The agreement was augmented when all parties repeated their commitment during speeches in the MPR. There also were severe technical hurdles to changing the Preamble. Procedures to replace or change the state ideology and the form of the state are time-consuming and costly. They require a national referendum in which the consent of more than half of the population is necessary before the MPR can debate on these issues. Such arduous mechanisms have made changes very unlikely.
the Preamble of the Constitution. Hence, the reforms were to be achieved without abandoning the religiously neutral characteristics of the political system. This ‘gentleman’s agreement for the sake of the amendments’ promised to facilitate revision of those sections of the Constitution on which a broader consensus existed.

The readiness to exclude the constitutional Preamble from the debates was strongly shaped by the memory of the Konstituante, where the dispute over Pancasila and Islam as state ideology had led to a stalemate, bringing about the end of parliamentary democracy. Resuming the debate over the Preamble promised to be ‘complex’ (rumit) and merely ‘using up energy’.

All Islamist parties therefore only proposed changes to the constitutional Paragraph 29 on ‘religion’. The Preamble has commonly been seen as an overriding philosophical directive for the character of national law. The precise difference to the inclusion of the term *shari‘ah* into Paragraph 29, however, is contested. PBB and PK leaders, particularly, held that the legal implications would be more or less the same: the state would receive the constitutional order to carry out *shari‘ah* or, in the Plural Clause of Fraksi Reformasi, various religious teachings toward the respective communities.

**PPP**

Islamist parties faced different challenges ahead of the elections, though. When President Soeharto resigned, PPP had to defend a party record to a public that appeared overwhelmingly supportive of non-Islamist political reform. PPP identified as one reason for its dwindling election results in the later New Order years the weak leadership under Djaelani Naro and Ismail Hasan Metareum (1993-1998). During

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3 See, for example, PPP’s *Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000*.
4 The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *Indonesia’s Road to Constitutional Reform: The 2000 Annual MPR Session*, 2000, p. 17. Amendments required a majority vote of more than two-thirds of MPR members present at the time of debate. They were first discussed in two commissions (A and B). If these commissions failed to achieve a consensus, the matter was re-allocated to the leadership of the factions, which then started lobbying. If this did not lead to an agreement, authority was referred to the Ad Hoc Committees. The final solution was a decision made through voting in the MPR.
5 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002.
7 Interviews, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002; Irwan Prayitno 4 and 5 December 2002.
both terms, PPP often caved in to the demands of the regime. From early 1998 on, PPP’s leadership—still headed by Ismail—put most of the blame on Naro. During his term, Ismail granted, PPP leadership and cadres had an indifferent attitude toward the ‘little people’ and seemed to be ‘dozing in an air-conditioned room’.8

PPP responded to its reputation for being flexible by vigorously taking up key reformist issues, helped by several publications portraying it as a devoted proponent of democracy and reform. PPP also sought to cast itself as a major victim of New Order repression. In November 1998, the MPR faction in ‘full humility’ ‘apologised’ to the people that the outcome of its efforts to bring about democracy had not been ‘yet optimal’ as the party had faced ‘very strong despotism’.9 At the same time, PPP insisted that people could no longer call it a ‘toady’ and ‘yes-party’ and that ‘those who don’t close their eyes’ knew that PPP ‘spoke with a clear voice’ when others were ‘still afraid to open their mouths’.10 PPP also insisted that, since the 1997 elections, it had repeatedly called for “reformasi”, stressing that this was at a time when the term had not yet been widely popular.11 It called other community leaders who equally claimed reformasi credentials ‘belated heroes’ who earlier had ‘with pleasure sawn the seeds’ to ‘silence and sideline’ PPP.12 In this regard, PPP could back its claim by pointing out its former opposition to several “inequitable” draft laws of the government, including endeavours to change the election laws.


9 Tinggalkan Kepentingan-Kepentingan Sesaat reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api Demokrasi Tidak Boleh Padam (‘The Fire of Democracy must not go out’), p. 9. Later in 1998, PPP considered a formal apology to voters in particular for backing Soeharto’s re-election at the MPR’s General Session in March 1998. This idea was eventually dropped.

10 Metareum, Reformasi, pp. 26-38 (quote: p. 29); “Pengantar Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Persatuan Pembangunan”, reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Menegakkan Kedaulatan Rakyat (‘To Implement People’s Sovereignty’), pp. 11-22. The contributions in this book are candid critiques of the New Order government’s repressive measures against PPP.

11 Interview, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Jakarta, 18 October 2000. In January 1998, Ismail told PPP cadres that 1998 had to become ‘the year of reform in all fields’. He attacked ‘undemocratic behaviour’ and made a ‘pledge’ to ‘pioneer change and renewal’ and ‘to initiate reformasi’. Metareum, Reformasi, in Perubahan demi Keadilan, pp. 33-4 and 37.

12 Tinggalkan Kepentingan-Kepentingan Sesaat, in Api Demokrasi, p. 21 (first quote) and Pengantar in Menegakkan, p. 13 (second and third quote).
At the first post-New Order MPR session in October 1998, PPP pursued a head-on attack on Golkar termed koreksi total (‘total correction’) which stood for a non-Islamist reformasi agenda. It spoke out against non-civilian presence in the legislature and firmly demanded the elimination of the military’s participation in parliament and MPR in one single step. Among the five factions in the assembly—TNI, Golkar, PDI, Regional Representatives and PPP—only PPP voted to end the appointment of parliamentarians, to initiate an investigation into the wealth of New Order leaders including the former President and his family, and to issue a decree on corruption.

This means that, initially, PPP concentrated on issues of broader political reform and then ‘step by step’ (bertahap-tahap) built up its shari’ah agenda. MP Ali Hardi Kiai Demak explained:

[This is] because the central topics in the reformasi era were macro political issues...hence, debating Islam was only part of general political issues [perpolitikan umum]... A campaign is about how to appeal to one’s constituencies. It remains for us to be smart to see what is the makeup [gaya] of constituencies... If constituencies have views like the [1998 reformasi] students we do not connect [nggak nyambung] if we talk only in Islamic terms ...so, we do not put Islam first but [stress] how we can create good living conditions...we are pragmatic in this...in the way we take steps, we look at the objective conditions around us. So we naturally start from the big issues [such as] democracy. Only then we hook up democracy with Islam.

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14 Tinggalkan Kepentingan-Kepentingan Sesaat, in Api Demokrasi, p. 40 and “Sikap Politik Kita: Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia terhadap Hasil-hasil Komisi Majelis Sidang Tahunan MPR RII disampaikan dalam Rapat Paripurna Sidang Tahunan MPR RI pada tanggal 15 Agustus 2000”, reprinted in Politik Amar Maruf Nahi Munkar: Perjuangan dan Sikap Politik FPPP pada ST MPR RI Tahun 2000, FPPP MPR, 2000, pp. 95-116 (p. 107). PPP proposed to regulate the composition of the DPR directly in the Constitution; other factions only opted for a MPR decree which would have secured the military’s position in parliament. It was particularly the party’s younger MPs who vehemently demanded the Army and Police Faction to instantly withdraw from politics. Senior PPP leaders such as Ismail, Hamzah Haz and Tosari Wijaya, had opted for greater restraint in order to prevent a quarrel with the Army. The final decision was made through an open vote in which PPP lost clearly. “Faisal Baasir, Produk Reformasi”, Kompas, 16 November 1998, “Kereta Api Cepat itu Tak Terhadang” and “WO untuk Militer di Senayan”, Tempo, 23 November 1998. Notably, PPP’s stance differed from the prime reform figures Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid around the same time. Both had, together with Megawati Soekarnoputri, agreed to gradually reduce the military’s political role.


16 Interview, Ali Hardi Kiai Demak, Jakarta, 7 October 2003.
In accordance with this strategy, PPP’s first post-New Order National Congress (Muktamar) which was held around the same time as the MPR session, evaded spelling out the Jakarta Charter and only mentioned the Second Article of Paragraph 29 ensuring religious freedom, described by PPP as ‘one of the most fundamental human rights’.17 In characteristic rhetoric, PPP defined Islamic law as values and norms and put references to it in a nationalist context. ‘Islamic values’, the Congress declared, ought to become the ‘moral, ethical, inspirational and motivational source’ for national development; PPP will ‘defend’ (mempertahankan) laws that reflect ‘religious, in particular Islamic values’ and, in a more straightforward passage, attempt to ‘propose, correct and improve legal regulations’ devoted to bringing about life in accordance with Islam.18 A summit soon afterwards in early 1999 restated the intent to ‘defend’ Pancasila as national ideology.19

To brace its reformist credentials before the elections, PPP recruited a number of well-known economists and thinkers for its Majelis Pakar (‘Council of Experts’), formed in early August 1998 and with the task to advise the Central Board on policy matters.20 Many of these ‘recruits’ were former Golkar cadres and had no particular Islamic credentials. There was also an influx of artists and singers to attract sympathy from ordinary Muslim voters.21 In early 2002, a dozen retired officers joined PPP, which the central leadership explained as strengthening nationalism in the party.22 Internally, these steps were seen as ‘increasing pragmatism’ in PPP.23

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17 Muktamar IV, p. 112.
18 Muktamar IV, pp. 92-114.
22 “Agar Ka’bah Jadi Nasionalis” (‘So that the Ka’bah becomes nationalist’), Tempo, 9 December 2001. Among these men were former Minister of Information Yunus Yusffiah and former Attorney General Andi Ghalib.
23 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001.
PPP, however, did not merely pursue genuine reformasi issues; the party attempted to steer a course between pluralism and Islamism. As argued in chapter four, it desired to remain attractive to ideologically more aware Muslims without estranging pluralist-minded Muslims. In early 1999 Zainuddin MZ, one of Indonesia’s most popular preachers, joined PPP to boost the party’s Islamic credentials. As further cause for the party’s decline in the 1990s PPP identified its meek resistance to asas tunggal (‘sole ideological foundation’). Quicker than Muhammadiyah and HMI, PPP had in the early 1980s given in to government pressure to accept asas tunggal and now felt this weighed down its Islamic credibility. The party concluded that in order to wipe out the blame of having ‘sold out’ the Muslim community, it had to re-establish the Islamic party base and the ka’bah (Holy Shrine) as party symbol.

In the 1977 and 1982 elections, PPP campaigners had said publicly that the party with the kab’ah symbol was the genuine Muslim party and thus it was obligatory for Muslims to vote for that party. The loss of the ka’bah and the Islamic ideological base thus had deprived PPP campaigners of a crucial asset. Both called immediate attention to PPP’s claim for an Islamic identity.

A further motive to revitalize PPP’s formal Islamic identity were fears that large sections of its voter base in Central and East Java would defect to the new Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (‘National Awakening Party’, PKB) led by NU’s most influential leader, Abdurrahman Wahid. PKB promoted Pancasila as its platform and campaigners had the problematic task of defending a pluralist doctrine to Muslims, in

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24 Passing over bureaucratic hurdles, Zainuddin instantly gained a Chairman’s position at PPP’s National Working Congress (Mukernas) in April 1999 so that he could campaign for the June elections. “Nakhoda Baru di Kapal Tua”, Tempo, 14 December 1998. Zainuddin later became Chairman of the Lajnah Syuro ‘Ulama ‘il Ka’bah (‘Consultation Committee of Ka’bah Ulama’), established in June 2002. Unlike the Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP), the other ulama-led body of PPP, the Lajnah had mainly campaigning tasks and to recruit constituents for PPP, including increasing its appeal to traditionalist ulama. Interview, Endang Zainal Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.

25 PPP’s National Congress in 1984 approved Pancasila as the party’s ideological base.


27 Haris, PPP, pp. 112 & 124.
particular, to the NU community. PPP hoped to attract Muslim voters unhappy with this policy.

At PPP’s Congress in late 1998, party branches thus strongly demanded the re-adoption of the Islamic ideological base and the \textit{ka‘bah} symbol. This provided PPP with strong ammunition for the 1999 election campaigns. PPP’s electoral slogan asserted to voters that ‘Islam is my religion, the \textit{ka‘bah} is my symbol; PPP is my party’ (\textit{Islam agamaku}, \textit{ka‘bah simbolku}, \textit{PPP partaiku}) and claimed that PPP was ‘the party inherited from the \textit{ulama}’ (\textit{partai warisan ulama}). This claim was also directly addressed at PKB. PPP Chairman Zainuddin MZ held that

PPP is liked because of its Islamic platform. If we imagine [PPP] as a football team [we can say that] in the 1999 elections PPP was a team that never practised but immediately played.

The return to the Islamic ideological base, however, did not impinge on the Islamic policy outlook which PPP officials liked to put together in a package with nationalism:

At the beginning the ideological base of PPP was Islam; then [PPP]...was forced to [adopt] the ‘sole base’, [all] this did not have a significant impact. After all, during the time of the ‘sole base’ PPP emerged as Islam-nationalist. It is just the same. It remained the same when [PPP] returned to Islam. There is no noteworthy difference.

The \textit{ka‘bah}, the Chairman of PPP’s MPR faction Faisal Baasir explained:

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29 Interview, Lukman Hakiem Saifuddin, Jakarta, 24 October 2000; “Katakan dengan Kabah (‘Saying it with the Ka‘bah’)”, \textit{Media Indonesia}, 6 December 1998. The Congress was held earlier than scheduled to prepare for the elections. Delegates also debated which party name and symbol would be most appealing to constituencies. They decided to retain the party name because of the closeness of the election, fearing that supporters might not recognise PPP under another label. “Dua Menteri Menuju Pucuk PPP”, \textit{Forum Keadilan}, 14 December 1998.

30 Personal notes during PPP’s 1999 election campaign.


...is a symbol with an appeal... We use it to appeal to the Muslim community. And to be able to say, that we are an Islamic party. This means that if the ka'bah is interpreted as being connected to the [party] program, there is no such thing... The party base stands for a moral, not an ideological platform. We endeavour that all governmental and political steps have their roots in Islamic morals and ethics.  

The Islamism-free *reformasi* directive and uncertainty how voters might respond to Islamist messages meant that it was not immediately clear which *umat* themes other than the Islamic party base and the ka'bah symbol, anti-communism and the fight against *kepercayaan* beliefs (chapter four) were beneficial for PPP. It, therefore, had no official *shari'ah* or Jakarta Charter agenda for the 1999 election campaigns. PPP, however, did not strictly settle on its political strategy. This meant that though *shari'ah* issues played a very small role in the rhetoric of the party’s elite in Jakarta, this did not stop individual campaigners from calling for Islamic law or *shari'ah* rule.  

After the elections, PPP gradually developed a more Islamist profile. The party’s consideration was that, by early to mid-2000, the general Muslim public and the press had shown more attention toward *shari'ah* issues. The awareness that “*shari'ah*” had become a popular topic while enthusiasm for *reformasi* had begun to wane, led to an increasingly Islamist rhetoric in PPP. In addition, there was a rise in *shari'ah* demands from various Muslim organisations from the radical fringes. Hence, when in the 2000 MPR session PPP for the first time demanded inclusion of the Shari’ah Clause, it believed to respond to a rising sentiment. Around the same time, non-Muslim organisations stepped up their opposition to *shari'ah* and the Jakarta Charter, ironically in analogous exaggeration of the Charter’s significance.

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33 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
34 Personal notes during PPP’s 1999 election campaign. 
36 According to PPP politicians, the Working Congress (Mukernas) in August 2000 formally approved the party’s support for *shari'ah* in the following MPR session. The Mukernas document, however, lacks a clear reference to *shari'ah* though it indirectly calls on the party to ‘be able to articulate’ current demands and ‘to understand the issues that come up in society’ and thus to put these into policies. *Keputusan Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (Mukernas) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Nomor: 01/Mukernas/PPP/VIII/2000) tentang Pemanatuan Visi, Misi/Khidmat, dan Paradigma Baru Serta Reposisi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, 2 August 2000.
Their position was similarly immovable as during earlier occasions in 1945 and 1956-9, with little willingness to understand the Islamist arguments.37

PBB

PBB, too, compromised shari‘ah issues in the interest of vote maximisation. Though claiming a comprehensive commitment to the legacy of Masyumi, the party did not devote the same immediate attention to all Masyumi values and policies. In the months following its launch, PBB emulated Masyumi’s devotion to democratic principles and maintaining the rule of law. The party also presented itself as opposed to militarism and staunchly anti-communist. While all these positions had been prominent with Masyumi, they also promised to meet widespread approval among Muslims.

PBB’s central agenda in 1998 and 1999, however, was to amend the Constitution, promoted as essential in establishing democracy.38 Yusril was the driving force behind this policy. He wrote prior to the first round of amendments:

To prevent the return of veiled dictatorial governance [pemerintahan diktator terselubung]—Sukarno and Suharto always hid behind the 1945 Constitution—there is no other choice than to amend the Constitution. The Constitution has to be more elaborated [rinci] so that there are no liberties left for the power-holder to furnish an understanding benefiting his/her own position. I would like to remind all camps, never will there be a real reform in any country in this world without a constitutional reform. Without amending the Constitution, the new imminent regime will only be...a regime status quo part two.39 (Italic in original)

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37 Christian interest groups such the Sulawesi-based ‘Minahasa Forum’ threatened to break away from Indonesia, if Paragraph 29 was amended. “Kongres Minahasa ultimatum MPR, Piagam Jakarta Diterima, Minahasa Merdeka”, Manado Post, 7 August 2000.


Other initial policy issues were to strengthen the power of parliament, introducing direct presidential elections and additional legislation on regional governance.\textsuperscript{40}

It became a Bulan Bintang credo that to rely on iconic leader figures was detrimental to the establishment of an efficient system.\textsuperscript{41} To glorify individuals undermined democracy as prominent figures found it hard to fit into a system.\textsuperscript{42} At the party launching, Yusril announced:

\begin{quote}
Partai Bulan Bintang fights to establish a system. Not to fight that A or B becomes President... In Indonesia, it is always a problem when the President is replaced. Why? Because we do not build a system. We only elevate \textit{[menokohkan]} somebody, whom we flatter, [whom we] see as having charisma. From Sukarno to Suharto recently, [these were] figures that we idolise and revere... But we forget that if a figure only relies on charisma without a solid system, [he] has the potential to become a dictator. History has proven this.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

The Chairman insisted that he, too, did not want to be idolised.\textsuperscript{44} There was also the call for frequent leadership change in order to prevent the domination of a single figure. This was intriguing as much of the Bulan Bintang community concentrated on the thought of Natsir and elevated him almost to beatific status. Above all, Yusril himself would quickly assume a dictatorial attitude towards PBB and trigger accusations of personal vanity and intellectual arrogance.

The other issues of anti-militarism and anti-communism were Masyumi-inspired and deemed uncontroversial. In 1998, Yusril said to PBB cadres:

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Hasil Muktamar I}, p. 63.
\end{footnotesize}
We reject vehemently [habis-habisan] two things: militarism and communism. We follow the guidelines of Masyumi. In the past, the Masyumi had a clear position. They were able to cooperate with everyone. The only one they could not work with was PKI. There are signs that communists are emerging again.\footnote{Speech in West Java reprinted in \textit{Bulan Bintang}, 15-30 September 1998, p. 5.}

PBB ‘strongly rejected’ any attempt to ‘give a chance’ for the revival of communism, asserting that it still was a ‘latent danger’ in Indonesia.\footnote{\textit{Hasil Muktamar I}, p. 115. PBB also called for ‘suspicion’ toward China, as it had once helped the communists in Indonesia (Ibid, p. 119).} Publicly, party leaders argued this case by declaring that communists were undemocratic rather than because they were believed to be atheists. The Chairman held he would ‘never trust communists, although they currently pretend to struggle for democracy’ and that ‘I am convinced that, after becoming strong, the communists will crush democracy and form a monolithic force’.\footnote{Quoted in “Yusril Siap Mundur”, \textit{Pelita}, 28 April 2000. He said the same at the 2000 Congress (\textit{Hasil Muktamar I}, p. 75). During the 1955 election campaign, Natsir’s statements were almost identical. Mahendra, \textit{Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme}, p. 226.} At the party launching, Yusril said:

\begin{quote}
The struggle platform [garis perjuangan] of Partai Bulan Bintang is clear: ‘this party is a democratic party’. In a democratic system all groups may exist. The only ones that may not exist are those anti-democratic and hostile toward democracy.\footnote{Address at the official declaration of PBB, 26 July 1998, Jakarta, reprinted under “Deklarasi Partai Bulan Bintang” in Mardjoned, \textit{Sejarah}, p. 80. Also \textit{Hasil Mukernas I}, p. 6. Whether this rejection meant that party members had to refuse meeting with former PKI activists in their responsibility as state officials was not spelled out. As chapter two has shown, in 2000 such unresolved matters triggered tensions in which the doctrinaire leaders attacked communists for religious reasons rather than merely for lacking democratic credentials.}
\end{quote}

This view became another credo of the party. For PBB, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’, DDII), Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (‘Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World’, KISDI) and other Bulan Bintang organisations, the obsessive warnings of a purportedly leftist threat were a tool to advance their own claim for cultural ascendancy. Accordingly, the doctrinaire Islamists attempted to brush aside doubts that the communists were national traitors and responsible for the 1965 coup attempt.\footnote{See, for example, Fadli Zon, “Komunisme tidak mati” (‘Communism is not dead’) and “Ada Upaya untuk Membelokkan Sejarah” (‘There are attempts to distort history’), \textit{Buletin Bulan Bintang}, 1-15 October 1998, pp. 20-3.} Such blame underlined the ongoing desire of Masyumi legatees to portray themselves as inherently Indonesian. Like the depictions of alleged Jewish conspiracies, anti-leftist rhetoric sought to foster Muslim solidarity against an enemy.
Wide sections of society could easily see communists as an enemy without necessarily sharing a shari'ah agenda. PBB, DDII and KISDI argued the assertion that communists were inherently anti- or non-Indonesian with greater vigour than PPP, whose rhetoric was less influenced by feelings of segregation.

In contrast to anti-militarism and anti-communism, PBB curbed Masyumi’s shari’ah-mindedness. Until the 2000 Congress, which initiated its split, PBB scarcely mentioned the aim to implement shari’ah through the state, both in party documents and in statements to the public and the press.50 Most Masyumi devotees obviously held that promoting non-Islamist reform issues had a better chance to ensure political survival. It was ‘not at all certain’ that promoting the Shari’ah Clause in the election campaign would increase votes. ‘For us’, MP Zubair Bakri pointed out, ‘the objective was: first the Constitution’ while ‘putting off [dibelakangkan] sensitive issues’.51

‘PBB’, a campaign booklet stated, ‘is ready to become the implementer of Allah’s religion’.52 As early as the February 1999 Working Congress, regional boards called on the central leadership to take on the Charter as policy.53 In the early reformasi era, shari’ah therefore was not yet ‘made a corresponding [setara] topic but the discourse [wacana] already existed’. But because ‘we could not act randomly (serampangan)’ the party warily exposed shari’ah goals over a period of one and a half years.54 PBB inaugural member Adian Husaini concluded by saying that early on, PBB was ‘very up to date to propose direct presidential elections...constitutional reform [and an] electoral district system. But the...strategy of PBB at that time greatly considered the realities’.55

50 Yusril’s speech at the party launch lacked any reference to shari’ah issues or the Jakarta Charter.
51 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. PBB leaders explained their caution because they needed to know whether PBB would obtain sufficient democratic legitimacy to strive for an Islamist agenda and that a decision to support a fundamental issue such as shari’ah needed the approval of the National Congress. A 2% share in the elections, of course, hardly provided such a mandate. Also, other key issues such as the campaign for constitutional reform apparently did not need the Congress’ endorsement.
52 ‘Inilah Jalanku’ Bahan Kampanye Untuk Jurkam Partai Bulan Bintang (‘This is my way’ ...’)
53 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003.
54 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003.
Hesitant to advance shari‘ah or the Jakarta Charter, PBB initially made known it would work toward Izzul Islam w‘al Muslimin (‘the glory of Islam and the Muslim community’) as target. Party strategists hoped that this catchphrase would turn into a trademark slogan but then realised that its meaning left electorates puzzled. They thought that people, due to ‘historical evidence’, would view the party as heir of Masyumi and hoped that ideologically aware Muslims would automatically think of it as a shari‘ah advocate. In an uneven election campaign the promotion of Islamist goals was left to the personal taste of the campaigner. Pro-shari‘ah statements were a matter of where campaigning took place. Some campaigners adopted the slogan Izzul Islam wal Muslimin; others more bluntly demanded implementing shari‘ah in the state, while again others promoted PBB’s goals as striving for “universal values”. The more adaptable rhetoric was used in non-Muslim dominated regions such as East Indonesia.

The performance of PBB in the constitutional debates, too, was slow. In early panel meetings in 1999 and 2000, PBB MPs did not mention Paragraph 29 directly. What is more, they had yet to declare championing the Shari’ah Clause. Notably, in 1999, MP Hamdan Zoelva appeared to back Fraksi Reformasi’s Plural Clause, proposing to implement religious teachings among the respective religious communities. Changing standpoints were part of the MPs’ strategy. In the early MPR sessions, PBB was also less inclined to put forward its central argumentation that the state needed to adopt a central role in enforcing Islam; instead Hamdan argued in a roundabout way that Indonesia was not a secular country, a fact which had to be further elucidated through amending Paragraph 29. In fact, PBB believed that only

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56 Interview, Agus Dwiwarsono, Jakarta, 6 October 2003.
57 Interviews, Zabair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003; Agus Dwiwarsono, Jakarta, 6 October 2003.
58 Interview, Agus Dwiwarsono, Jakarta, 6 October 2003.
59 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002.
60 Originally: “dengan kewajiban bagi para pemeluk agama untuk menjalankan ajaran dan syariat agamanya masing-masing itu” and “melaksanakan ajaran-agama bagi masing-masing pemeluknya”. “Risalah Rapat Ke-3 Panitia Ad Hoc I Badan Pekerja MPR 6 Desember 1999”, reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 3 A Hasil Rumusan Seminar Panitia Ad Hoc I (Sidang Tahunan 2000), Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2000, p. 122. This was a nice illustration of political strategy: Hamdan argued that the current wording of Paragraph 29 would refer to a ‘passive task’ of the state to enable religious life to prosper. The state thus only gave a ‘guarantee’ (jaminan) to its citizens that they were able to freely carry out their religion. The state would not obstruct religious life but allow ‘as much space as possible’ for every community to live according to its beliefs. PBB, however, argued that, in reality, the state had already taken on an active role in religious affairs. Therefore, to adjust Article One in accordance with the Shari‘ah Clause merely meant an adaptation to existing conditions. Thus, at that
specific *shari'ah* terms were communicable to Muslim constituencies and saw the Plural Clause as misguided.\(^{61}\)

The 2000 Congress for the first time mentioned inserting the Shari’ah Clause into Paragraph 29 officially as policy and provided the MPR faction with clear instructions. It announced a ‘permanent’ (*senantiyas*na) orientation toward ideology and cited Natsir, who was said to have compared a political program without an ideology to a robot. It expressed the participants’ ‘heartfelt desire to implement Islamic teachings and law’ and ‘strongly urged’ the MPR to amend Paragraph 29.\(^{62}\)

Moreover, it suggested that the goal to implement Islam through the state was more essential than non-Islamist goals, proclaiming that ‘for Bulan Bintang people, the state is the receptacle [*wadah*] and the tool to fulfil the target to implement [*menegakkan*] Islam. [T]he state itself is not the goal.’\(^{63}\)

Subsequent decisions reiterated this order. A Congress in 2000 instructed the party to ‘fight to the utmost in constitutional ways to implement *shari’ah* in Indonesia’.\(^{64}\)

From there on, the pragmatic leadership around Yusril and Ka’ban stepped up Islamist rhetoric, amplifying their condemnation of secularism and depicting it as the nucleus of national problems. In early 2001, M.S. Ka’ban wrote in the party journal:

> Up till now, the Islamic community has been infected with the disease of SECULARISM. This sickness is a chronic epidemic. The implications of this paradigm are the loss of ethics, the collapse of morality, the absence of a clear sense of responsibility and the lack of moral norms that bind mankind. With secularism, there are no limits to what is permitted and prohibited, everything is permissible...because with the secular paradigm, there is no absolute truth, everything is relative... There is no other way except for the Islamic community to return to the new paradigm [*sic*]: *worldly affairs are religious affairs, religion must regulate (mengatur) the state, community [and] individuals*... We should] begin by re-opening the Jakarta Charter discourse. This is not just an historical

\(^{61}\) Interviews, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002; Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. PBB leaders insisted that the party never saw the Plural Clause as an alternative and that Hamdan’s argumentation at the 1999 session was tactically motivated.

\(^{62}\) *Hasil Muktamar I*, p. 115.

\(^{63}\) *Hasil Muktamar I*, p. 71.

obligation but more importantly it [aims] to save the nation, which is beset by the storms of crisis.65 (Capital and bold in original)

In late 2001, Ka’ban led a delegation through the regions with the sole task of further promoting the party’s support for the Shari’ah Clause.66 Yusril steered the new policy focus, arguing:

[The] implementation of juridical legal dealings [syariat qada’i] by the state cannot be carried out without the establishment of a political party. Therefore, it is also a legal obligation for the Muslim people to establish a political party. The obligation to establish a political party is only a tool for the implementation [terlaksananya] of shari’ah by the state. Because of this, Muslims must not be fanatic [ta’ashub] about their party since to be active in a party is not the goal. The goal is the realisation [penegakkan] of shari’ah, so that the Indonesian state will not fall victim [melacurkan] to ideologies that are far away from the ideology of Indonesian Muslims as the majority population in Indonesia.67

In 2003, PBB published a book named ‘Fighting for Shari’ah Islam’ that was to give evidence of the party’s dedication to shari’ah. In this, Yusril informed cadres:

The Partai Bulan Bintang Faction... has already made an effort [berikhtiar] to return the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into... Paragraph 29.... What has been done by the Partai Bulan Bintang Faction from the Annual MPR Session in 2000 to the Annual MPR Session in 2002 was the maximal effort... [R]emembering that the effort to implement shari’ah Islam is Allah’s command [merupakan perintah Allah]; as a faction and party which is based on Islam, surely this struggle does not end here.68

Taking on the wish of party cadres for a shari’ah agenda helped the pragmatic Islamists to consolidate PBB after the 2000 split. The disappointing election result (2%) and the rise of shari’ah discourse in public and press were further practical motives for a change of agenda. The practical side-aspects of disclosing shari’ah goals became particularly clear as by the time the party strengthened its Islamist agenda most doctrinaire leaders were about to resign. The shari’ah policy

67 Mahendra, Sambutan, in Memperjuangkan Syariat Islam, p. viii.
68 Mahendra, Sambutan, p. ix. Yusril made no such public statements in 1998, 1999 and most of 2000. He often referred to the 2000 Congress mandate as the reason for his party’s persistent defence of the Shari’ah Clause. Given his skepticism that shari’ah can be comprehensively realised in present-day Indonesia, the motive behind his sudden pro-shari’ah stance was to provide PBB with a new key agenda in accordance with the Congress’ decision.
automatically weakened the dissidents who had hoped to snatch away cadres for the Islamist rival parties they intended to set up. 69

PK

More than the other Islamist parties, Partai Keadilan acted on a neat separation of ideological and political commitment. The party was staunchly devoted to reform and democratisation. But its ideal has been a society which is Islamicised to a degree that it blissfully embraces the rule of shari‘ah so that any elections will automatically reconfirm Islamist parties in power.

In 1998, PK appeared as a firm political realist. While drawing on the notion of ghazwul jikri, which stipulates that the West wants to destroy Islam, as tutoring material for party cadres, initiators of the same party stifled any confrontationist attitude. 70 This accommodationism received official confirmation at the party’s first major Congress (the Musyawarah Nasional) in May 2000. It formulated a ‘vision’ that highlighted the aim ‘to become the binding element and initiator of unity of the Muslim community and the nation (unsur perekat dan pengarah kesatuan umat dan bangsa)’. 71

PK initiators believed in the benefits of participating in a democratic system, in submitting to the confines of law and, therefore, in the pursuit of the possible through compromise. This was no contested political participation like in the case of the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood branches in the 1980s. Over a short period of time, PK strategists succeeded in promoting their party as devoted to peaceful struggle through democratic means with transparent policies. They displayed an awareness of the concessions that the entry into party politics would entail. 72

Mahfudz Siddiq argued:

69 See chapter two.
70 Compare with chapter four.
71 Komisi C Kebijakan.
72 Also, the party worked on a more sanguine image than the grim and gloomy posture of various Middle Eastern organisations.
Political parties necessarily enter a constitutional corridor and that is it. Whoever seeks complete withdrawal because of ideological reasons has to remove [his] party from the constitutional corridor... [P]olitical compromises or political consequences arise that have to be accepted. They come about from what we chose as means of [our] struggle [jalan perjuangan].

PK could only hope for a minor share of the vote in the 1999 elections and, thus, accepted that it was impossible to accomplish ideological goals in the foreseeable future. It was, therefore, important to signal a cooperative stance at an early stage, as it was to focus on short-term objectives. As a new party, the priority was to initiate a long-term dialogue with other political and religious sections and to build partnerships.

The ensuing orientation toward gradualism and dakwah programs had strong strategic value. The party saw it as an outcome of the lessons of history and underscored its long-term orientation:

[We are] aware that the objective of dakwah, which will be realised, is a large objective, that is to implement God’s religion on earth and to install Islamic Sovereignty in an Islamic caliphate system [tegaknya agama Allah di bumi dan berdirinya Dawlah Islamiyah ‘Alamiyah dalam system Khilafah Islamiyah] of which the results possibly can be enjoyed by following generations. Hence, every policy...and program...connects [to] three time dimensions. The past as lesson, the present as reality and the future as hope.

Aiming to implement Islam on a global scale and even restore the caliphate, the party’s dakwah approach remained firmly grounded in political realism. Politics were ‘a very strategic dakwah field yet with many risks and which can lead to conflict’. The 2000 Congress referred to the example of the Prophet as pattern for propagating Islam in a partly hostile environment. It held:

[One has to] remember that dakwah in the political field is a strategic step of the Prophet to align [mensejajarkan] his values with the objective of attesting one’s faith in a war effort on the road to Allah [perperangan di jalan Allah]. This reality of course brings about various...implications that cannot be neglected. Among others, dakwah will face logical necessities [tuntutan-tuntutan logis] coming from a number of internal and external challenges...which definitely hamper the progress of dakwah. Dakwah thus will be confronted by a number of problems...which demand

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74 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.
75 Komisi C Kebijakan.
For \textit{dakwah} to succeed, it had to be adjusted to the “Islamic qualities” of society and be temperate. A \textit{fatwa} of PK’s Shari’ah Board held: ‘If \textit{dakwah} is carried out too harshly [\textit{kasar}], they will not acquire it and even run away from it’.\textsuperscript{77} This \textit{dakwah} strategy went back to the model of the Prophet who advised to ‘speak with other people in accordance with their level/quality [\textit{tingkat}] of thinking’.\textsuperscript{78} Irwan Prayitno wrote as a guideline for cadres:

A form of \textit{dakwah} in correspondence with reality is the...concept of mission according to Islam [\textit{minhaj \textit{dakwah Islamiyah}]. \textit{Dakwah} has to be rooted where it is carried out; do not stray [\textit{melangit}] so that it [\textit{dakwah}] cannot be realised in everyday day situations [\textit{mad’u}]. [To] consider reality...was exemplified by the Prophet in undertaking \textit{dakwah} in Mecca and also in Medina. The very strong ignorance [\textit{jahiliyah}] in those days was likely to destroy Islam...but the gradual and exact \textit{dakwah} by the Prophet who began it secretly quickly prepared the situation in Medina. A non-controversial form of \textit{dakwah} is the approach conveyed by the Prophet as...result of his observation of the societal reality at that time.\textsuperscript{79}

The training material exposed the intimate connection between this acquiescent \textit{dakwah} approach and the combatant doctrine of \textit{ghazwul fikri}. It held:

The condition of Muslims today is...pitiful [\textit{hina}] and under the rule of the enemies of Islam. Muslims as the best and grand community [\textit{umat yang terbaik dan mulia}] obviously no longer display their grandness amidst other humankind; even appears to wane more and more [\textit{terpuruk}] because of ignorance [\textit{jahiliyah}]... Muslims today ha[ve] deficiencies such as ethics [\textit{aqidah}], training [\textit{tarbiyah}], culture [\textit{tsaqafah}]...organisational management [and] intellect [\textit{akhlak}]. This situation exists in a majority of Islamic countries. To improve all this, a comprehensive form of \textit{dakwah} is needed which follows basic values which are educational, programmed [\textit{minhajiyah}], and graded [\textit{marhaliyah, bertahap}], with a sense of priority [\textit{aulawiyah, prioritas}], in accordance with reality [and] balanced.\textsuperscript{80}

This understanding of \textit{dakwah} was uncommon among Masyumi legatees. DDII, for example, has traditionally confronted foes by sending Muslim preachers to remote

\textsuperscript{76} Komisi C Kebijakan.
\textsuperscript{77} Fatwa of the Shari’ah Board on “Hukum Tahlilan dalam Islam”, in \textit{Fatwa Dewan Shariah Partai Keadilan}, (no publisher, no place, no date), p. 19.
\textsuperscript{78} Anis Matta, “Memenangkan Wacana Publik”, \textit{Saksi}, 17 April 2001, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Manajemen}, pp. 150-1.
regions in order to counter Christian missionaries. PK, by contrast, understood the enemy as a *dakwah* target which underscored its desire to cultivate Islam beyond Muslims. It transformed a combative ideology into a form of political practice which pre-emptively rejected violence or the intimidation of opponents. Echoing this seeming paradox, Anis Matta asserted that it was possible to have a ‘sense of war’ while making diplomacy the rationale of behaviour:

> We do not view a person or a group or an ideology as permanent enemy. [Our] stance toward the US is that even though [the US] is categorised as enemy...but at the same time it is also categorised as an object to which we have to introduce Islam... When we build awareness toward ghazwul fikri we also build an understanding [gagasan] for dialogue. These are not things that contradict each other. When you have a sense of war you still can be in dialogue with others. This is not something that has to be put into opposition [dipertentangkan].

There was thus a conscious demonstration of moderation and intellectuality. PK did not deliver its moral message through hard-hitting propaganda but through a display of reserved behaviour, underscored by the customary use of what it promoted as universal virtues such as ‘courtesy’ (*kesopanan*) and ‘peacefulness’ (*kedamaian*). It also claimed to be ‘professional’ and ‘reformist’. These terms revealed a technocratic ‘problem-solving’ and a hands-on mentality, which gave particular attention to Islam’s call for social and political engagement. Other neutral values PK claimed to defend included ‘moderation’, ‘democracy’, ‘moralist’, ‘independent’ and, as mentioned earlier, ‘patriotism’. These western-derived terms highlighted common interests and called attention to their supposedly general benefit.

Promoted as a universal moral ideal, *keadilan* (‘justice’) was PK’s *casus belli* and a major rhetorical device. As a Qur’anic key term, its prominence derived from the belief that God had created the world on the principle of justice. The Qur’an and the

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81 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.
82 This is underscored through the references to western writers in the treatises of PK ideologues such as Abu Ridho, Anis Matta, Syamsul Balda and Mutammimul ‘Ula.
83 Siddiq, *Syariat Islam*, p. 45 once more quoted the Qur’an, verse al-R’ad (13:11) as the Divine order for self-initiative: ‘Verily never will God change the conditions of a people, until they want to change it themselves’.
84 *Jati Diri*, reprinted in *Sekilas Partai Keadilan*, pp. 15-51. It is illuminating that the party invited Nurcholish Madjid as a guest speaker to its first National Working Congress (Mukernas). This happened without causing uproar. Reportedly, only Daud Rasyid, the long-time critic of Nurcholish from DDII, left the summit when hearing that Nurcholish was to speak to the participants.
Sunnah, PK proclaimed, demanded to bring about ‘universal justice’ as the central objective of a state.\textsuperscript{85} It went so far as to describe ‘justice’ as the cosmic foundation on which any other virtue and accomplishment rested. Justice, it proclaimed ‘opens the way toward true virtues, the good, the beautiful and happiness in life’. It ‘not only provides the opportunity for every human to obtain his/her rights as a human being’ but also ‘contains all potentials of his/her innovation and creativity’. Justice ‘provides security and liberates mankind from all forms of intimidation and fear’. It ‘guarantees the proportional distribution of national wealth, giving equal opportunities to work and study. Justice installs law over power-holders and the people’ and ‘ensures effective social control mechanisms’.\textsuperscript{86} The party manifesto reiterated the justice focus and put it into the frame of globalisation issues. Without spelling it out, the statement implied that the pursuit of justice was directly linked to countering the perceived global subjugation of Islam. It announced:

In modesty, we want to make justice [keadilan] the mission of Indonesian international diplomacy, because this is a benefit [rahat], which has never been experienced by a majority of the current world population. The progress of transportation technology and telecommunication has already made this world increasingly integrated. Ironically, globalisation has changed and became the basis of a new hegemony and imperialism from various developed and strong countries toward the...remaining world. Endowed with the vision of autonomy, patriotism, democracy, moderation, reformasi and the message of Islam as a blessing for all surroundings, we aspire to Indonesia becoming a strong country, which brings the mission of the blessing of justice to all humankind, so that its [Indonesia’s] people become a contributor to human civilisation and its lands transform [and] become a garden to live in that is serene and peaceful.\textsuperscript{87}

This obliging rhetoric and the rationalism it was based on conspicuously contrasted with the unclothed bitterness of the doctrinaire Islamists in the Masyumi camp. As such, PK’s adaptation of western political ideas and terminology sought to blend the ideal model of an Islamic state and society to more common ideas and expressions in a way that comprised policies, attitude and language. To create good working relationships with other political camps, it suggested steering clear of quarrelsome themes. The aim was to brush aside any stereotypes as being fanatic or extremist by


\textsuperscript{87} Manifesto Politik, in Sekilas, pp. 12-13.
being ‘temperate’ (*imbang*) in attitude. Islam would call for a ‘middle position’ (*posisi pertengahan*) and ‘facilitation’ (*kemudahan*). It was enlightening that the statutes quoted a *hadith* that underscored that moderation and accommodation was a fundamental necessity. The *hadith* demanded:

Do what is easier and don’t make things more difficult  
Do what pleases them and don’t make them run away ([Muttafaq Alaih])

Such moderation blended harmoniously with the party’s gradualist approach toward *shari’ah* goals. Doubtful about the wisdom of writing *shari’ah* terms into the present-day non-Islamised Constitution, PK did not support the Shari’ah Clause despite the conviction that it was the state’s obligation to implement Islam. It specifically was sceptical of the Shari’ah Clause because of ‘too many distortions’. ‘People’, Anis Matta argued, ‘get a wrong perception of *shari’ah* issues if they are connected to the Jakarta Charter.’ The party thus approached the constitutional debates by evading ideological issues which could endanger the commitment toward broader political reform. Anis Matta reasoned

We did not want *shari’ah* Islam to be an issue, which will bring us into conflict with other groups. We wanted to become the national unifier [*pemersatu bangsa*]. Therefore, it was best to drop [*hilangkan*] all factors that could incite conflicts on the basis of religious difference. One of those [issues] was the Jakarta Charter.

Originally, therefore, PK did not have a strategic motive to support amending the constitutional stipulations on ‘religion’ in Paragraph 29. The party believed that despite its historical significance, comparatively few Muslims were devoted to reviving the Shari’ah Clause. Moreover, the Charter was ‘Masyumi’s property’ and ‘trump card’; it was the ‘product of Masyumi and PBB’ and ‘not ours’. PK’s eventual commitment to an alternative wording of the clause was because parts of its own constituency found it difficult to apprehend that an Islamist party would not do so. Contenders, in particular from PBB, had spread the word among Muslim voters

88 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001.  
89 *Jati Diri*. The quote was put under the heading ‘moderate’.  
90 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.  
91 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.  
92 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002.  
93 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.
that PK would not fight for the Charter.\textsuperscript{94} This, PK complained, gave the impression to Muslims that not supporting the Charter would be same as not supporting shari’ah. The charge was a ‘slander’ and a ‘lie’.\textsuperscript{95} It was ‘as if to say that the Jakarta Charter is Allah’s divine inspiration which must not be debated and must not be corrected’.\textsuperscript{96} Customarily brought up during the yearly MPR sessions, the Charter debates had turned perfunctory and stood for a partial devotion to Islam.\textsuperscript{97} The promotion of the Shari’ah Clause was in danger of becoming a ‘political commodity’ and a ‘political image tool’, sending the wrong message to Muslims.\textsuperscript{98}

A PK \textit{bayanat} (‘official explanation’) proclaimed that there were ‘many misperceptions’ regarding the party’s position on shari’ah and Paragraph 29.\textsuperscript{99} To back up its claim to represent the authentic Islam, the party listed broader ‘Islamic issues’ to which it was committed: it pointed to having forcefully rejected a ‘secular-communist’ phrase inserted into the Human Rights regulations, succeeded in the inclusion of zakat (alms) into the tax system, an incessant fight against corruption and its smooth handling of internal matters such as changes in the leadership. But the central argument was the persistent dedication to enforcing Islamic teachings on themselves and their families.\textsuperscript{100} Because of this, PK hoped that ‘fair and non-partisan observers’ would correctly assess the ‘commitment’ of each political party to make Islam the pivotal factor in their politics.\textsuperscript{101} Anis Matta said about PK’s shari’ah approach and its political strategy:

\textsuperscript{94} Other Islamist parties also spread the word that PK had to dissolve before the next elections. Interviews, Irwin Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002; Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.


\textsuperscript{96} Qamaruddin, \textit{Beginilah Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Menegakkan Syari’at Islam: Klarijikasi Fitnah Piagam Jakarta} (‘This is how Partai Keadilan...implements Shari’ah Islam: Clarification of the Jakarta Charter Slander’) Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2003, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{97} Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001.


\textsuperscript{99} Hidayat Nur Wahid repeatedly had to defend the party’s stance to constituencies. “Hidayat Tampik Tudingan PK Tidak Dukung Penerapan Shari’at Islam” (‘Hidayat rebuffs the charge that PK does not support the enforcement of Shari’ah Islam’), \textit{PeKa Online}, 26 July 2002, http://www.peka.or.id/dzoom.php?id=21\&cd=6\&no=0.

\textsuperscript{100} Unlike other parties, PK supervised the correct worship practices of members and cadres. Qamaruddin, \textit{Beginilah}, p. 35.

We avoid conflict with the secular camp so that we can come together. At the same time, we give an example of implementing *shari'ah* Islam in everyday life. The *umat* Islam can judge by itself that though we do not use the term *shari'ah* Islam, they [Muslims] still see that it is us who follow Islam in daily life... We carry out [*shari'ah*] first, only then we talk [about it]. We already said to them [officials of other Islamist parties]: deal first with your families, only then talk about *shari'ah* Islam. What is the point to talk about *shari'ah* Islam if...the families of [Muslim] leaders themselves are not all right [beres]? ... The family of the Vice-president is involved in narcotics. As with others, the wife does not wear the headscarf, ...smokes...so what do you talk about? We give a bad example to society. That Islamic leaders obviously only can talk. This is why people including the *umat* Islam little believe in Islamic leaders. Because they talk a lot but do not live what they say.\(^{102}\)

Moreover, pointing to the number of its graduates from the Middle East with a diploma in Islamic studies, PK leaders claimed superior expertise on matters of exegesis and Islamic philosophy.\(^{103}\) In a publication specifically designed to enlighten PK cadres on their party’s stance toward *shari'ah*, Tate Qamaruddin wrote, in a sideswipe to PPP and PBB:

> There are those who chose to urge those in charge and bureaucrats who are currently in power to execute syari'at Islam... [T]hey are very poor in their information—to avoid the word ‘stupid’—about Syari'at Islam. And there are those who with high spirits proclaim ‘syari'at Islam has to be implemented now’, while they are bewildered how and where they have to start.\(^{104}\)

PK’s parliamentary coalition with Partai Amanah Nasional (‘National Mandate Party’, PAN) by itself made *shari'ah*-based politics more difficult to implement. PAN’s claim to represent religious diversity made it impossible to support the Shari’ah Clause even though Islamists in the party quietly sympathised with it.\(^{105}\) The proneness of the Shari’ah Clause to charges of sectarianism suggested a wording that omitted to name “*shari'ah*” by using neutral religious terms. To comply with the

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\(^{102}\) Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. As usual, the dress code of the wives of Muslim leaders had a high symbolic status, especially that it was tolerable for these women to appear in public without a proper headscarf. Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 15 November 2000.

\(^{103}\) Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.

\(^{104}\) Qamaruddin, *Beginitah*, p. 19.

\(^{105}\) The large number of devoted Muslims in PAN’s administration, particularly in regional boards, meant that there was ongoing disagreement over the proper place of religion in PAN’s platform. The party, one of its nationalist Chairmen held, was unable to make up its mind whether ‘to become an open party or the party of Muhammadiyah’. Interview, Abdillah Toha, Jakarta, 24 August 2000. PAN’s nationalist camp had preferred to form a coalition with PKB or PDIP (ibid), whereas Muhammadiyah-based leaders had opted for PK. Interview, Patrialis Akbar, Jakarta, 29 August 2000.
demands from its constituencies, the Syuro Council adopted the organisation of the medieval Medina Charter as basis for the Plural Clause. In one instance the clause was termed as the ‘Jakarta Charter illustrated through [berwawasan] the Medina Charter’. 

It was the claim of the Fraksi Reformasi that its option would overcome the controversy of the Shari’ah Clause, as this option suited Indonesian plural society. Intriguingly, as did PPP and PBB, Fraksi Reformasi claimed to respect religious pluralism, arguing that the original wording was flawed because it dealt with Muslim piety only. The Plural Clause, Hidayat Nur Wahid argued, would be ‘more just’, as special status for Islam would be avoided and thus be more acceptable for other religious communities. To enforce religious teachings only on Muslims ‘[w]hilst [giving the impression] that other religious communities are freed from being obedient or not obedient toward their religion, gives the impression of injustice [ketidakadilan]’. 

Through the Medina framework, Islamic law could be implemented in ‘a plural civil [madani] society’ whilst ensuring the rights of other religious communities. Insofar as its proposal encompassed non-Muslims as well, PK claimed that it mirrored the spirit of Pancasila as a ‘word of togetherness’ [kata persamaan] and reflected the identity of the nation as ‘a religious people’. Fraksi Reformasi promoted its proposal as a ‘middle way’ on the premise that all religions were included. Salim Segaf noted:

We have to understand that we are not alone in Fraksi Reformasi... We understand that PAN also has concepts; we can’t force our will [on others]... It does not have to be sacral as in the seven words as PBB wants it. But what we want is that, because the majority of our people are Muslims, the implementation of shari‘ah should be given a chance, too…. It does not have to be through the Jakarta Charter but can be

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106 To persuade readers of the genuineness of his party’s devotion to shari‘ah, Qamaruddin reminded them that the original proponents of the Charter had included many ‘secular Muslims’ whereas it was the Prophet who under Divine guidance had worded the Medina Charter. Beginilah, p. 45.
108 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002.
112 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 5 October 2000.
extended, can be reduced. What is clear is that *shari'ah* terms are mentioned. That is what we want… [T]he debate on Paragraph 29 is also a blend between us and PAN. We understand that if we formulate with the language of the 'seven words', it may, for the time being, not be approved by parliament. We want to use wordings that are safe [ungkapan bahasa yang safe]… We want to use terms whose substance is not entirely different but which are easier to accept. 113

PK claimed to have obtained support from non-Muslims for their proposal. They asserted that party leaders had consulted with representatives of other religions, most of them Christian organisations. Those who did not insist on maintaining Paragraph 29 in its original form had expressed support as the wording supposedly had a positive impact on the moral life of non-Muslims, too. 114

Fraksi Reformasi’s justification for its proposition was characteristically Islamist. It claimed that stepping up moral restrictions on public life was the key to overcoming the nation’s problems. The state must ensure broader piety. The endeavours of other Islamist parties, including Masyumi, PPP and PBB, to convince non-Muslims that the inclusion of *shari'ah* terms into the conclusion would not affect their communities, has somewhat shrouded the fact that Islamism applies to broader religiosity. Both PK and PAN leaders argued that if people were obedient toward their religion they were also obedient toward the law; any violations were thus unlikely to happen on a large scale. The two parties shared the battle against corruption as a prime commitment, calling the corrupt ‘national traitors’, the ‘rats of the state’ that had to be ‘eliminated’ (dibasmi). The corrupt, the faction proclaimed, ‘know no God and have no nationalism’...’their God and nationalism is money’. 115

The best way to diminish corruption was to ‘endeavour to increase our individual piety’. 116 Fraksi Reformasi members suggested, though obliquely, that the Plural Clause put obligation on the state to achieve this obedience. They argued:

…[T]o ensure that religious life develops well and, indeed, as it should [agar beragama itu memang harus bisa berkembang dengan baik], there needs to be a

113 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001.
115 The speaker was Irvan Prayitno. Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002, p. 8.
116 MPR Chairman of Fraksi Reformasi A.M. Luthfi quoted in Risalah Rapat Pleno 21 Maret 2002 reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002. Indonesia had a little earlier been listed as the most corrupt country in Asia on which Luthfi remarked sarcastically: ‘Praise be. Now we are number one, Indonesia, the most corrupt country in Asia. We are the champions’. Ibid.
The wording of the Plural Clause, at the same time, resonated with the Shari'ah Clause as this was more familiar to Muslim constituencies. Inventing an entirely new formula would have risked an indifferent response by a population to whom the concept of the Medina Charter was unknown or overly abstract. With its similar wording PK, at least, demonstrated affinity with the pro-shari'ah policy of PPP and PBB. Boldly defying the position of fellow Islamist parties would have been difficult to sell to the Muslim community. Nonetheless, there remained considerable difficulties in explaining the Plural Clause to shari'ah-sympathetic constituencies.

The Plural Clause was one key indication that Islamists were keen to allay sectarian fears. They showed little hesitation in condemning communism openly but were wary of publicly attacking non-Muslims and so-called “secular Muslims”. All Islamist parties, however, maintained the premise that Indonesia was a “Muslim nation”. This “Muslim nation dogma” had various implications for the quality and sincerity of Islamist policies and statements on pluralist issues.

**Islamism and Religious Pluralism: Tolerance, not Equality**

In Muslim-majority societies, there have been a number of obstacles in the creation of pluralist politics based on genuine equality between the religious communities. The Islamic tradition discriminates in several ways against Jews and Christians. It rules out recognition of non-monotheistic creeds. The proper place for other ahl al-kitab (literally ‘People of the Book’) was under a Muslim protectorate. A qati (permanent) shari'ah regulation bars unrestricted relationships between adherents of

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118 Interviews, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003; Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.

119 Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. Underscoring that PK aimed to avoid a too-great distance from other Islamist parties, in August 2000, as a member of the umbrella grouping Forum Silaturahmi Partai Islam (‘Goodwill Forum of Islamic Parties’, FSPI), Hidayat Nur Wahid signed a declaration stating support for the original Jakarta Charter. Hamzah Haz, Yusril Mahendra, Deliar Noer (Partai Umat Islam), Abdullah Hehamahua (PPII Masyumi), Ohan Sudjana (PSII 1905) and leaders of the traditionalist Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU) and Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (PKU) were among the other signatories. Personal notes.
different religions, in particular forbidding Muslims renouncing the Islamic faith for
another (*murtad*). Here and elsewhere Islamists treat the *umat* as a uniform group
with the same duties and aspirations. Islamist use of the term “aspiration”—
Indonesian Islamists frequently speak of *kepentingan* or *aspirasi umat Islam* (‘the
aspirations of the Muslim community’)—is misleading because it is the Qur’an
which is taken as the ultimate source to determine the “interests” of every nominal
Muslim.

The stipulations of the Medina Charter epitomise the Islamist problems with
pluralism. The Charter’s concepts are in frequent conflict with modern constitutional
and international law.\(^{120}\) In classical Sunni theory, ‘infidels receive only guarantee of
life, property, and freedom of religion and not the rights of man qua man’.\(^{121}\)
Echoing these inequities, Islamists have limited appreciation for Western
philosophical roots of human rights and liberalism.\(^{122}\) Western values are examined
on the basis of whether they can be identified as ‘Divine privileges’, verified by the
Qur’an.\(^{123}\) Islamist acknowledgments of pluralism usually have engaged the classic
position in Sunni political theory that Islam would tolerate and “protect” religious
minorities.

The particular historical situation has, of course, greatly influenced how Islamists
have theorised relations with other religious communities. In Indonesia, the Islamist
stance is tied to the conviction that, in the past, Muslims had overtly made

\(^{120}\) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) legitimises the right to change religion
(Paragraph 18); many Muslim jurists demand the death penalty for the same act.

\(^{121}\) Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western
pp. 303-16.

\(^{122}\) Illustrating the Islamist logic, Mutammimul ‘Ula argued that if society perceived pregnancy
outside marriage as ‘shameful’ (*aib*), it acted correctly to uphold the human right of dignity.
has been widely held to endorse human dignity while it provided few grounds for supporting a liberal
position on the problems of unmarried mothers. Showing the Islamist indignation over perceived
Western bullying on human rights issues, PPP assured Indonesia’s seriousness in tackling human
rights ‘without having to be lectured by other nations’. *Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan Terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia 06
Nopember 2000*.

\(^{123}\) Donnelly, *Human Rights*. PBB, for example, assured to value human rights that are ‘in accordance
with Islamic principles’. Representing not only Muslims, the Reform Faction instead held that
Western human rights regulations needed to be adjusted to ‘the religious character of the Indonesian
people’. *Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Reformasi MPR RI Terhadap Hasil Hasil Komisi Majelis Pada
concessions to non-Muslims. This belief has a strong economic component as Islamists accuse non-Muslims, particularly Chinese Christians, of enjoying an unproportional share of political and economic wealth. The Muslim population in its entire, they have been insisting, suffered because of Chinese Christian control. Islamists, therefore, desired the state to issue affirmative action toward Muslims. The obvious example of this desire to “positively” discriminate in favour of Muslims is Malaysia.

The Corollaries of “Muslim Home Rule”

In PPP, affirmations of religious pluralism were a customary rhetorical component of its elusive doctrine. After re-adopting the Islamic ideological base and the *ka'bah* symbol to highlight its religious credentials, PPP worked to convince the public that the supposedly nationalist character of the party had not changed. In accordance with the popular Qur’anic maxim that there was no compulsion in religion, PPP declared to ‘fight’ for the right of religious freedom as stated in the Second Article of Paragraph 29 in the Constitution. Hamzah Haz assured that ‘[m]aking Islam its ideological base, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan will never become a sectarian party which thinks only of itself [mementingkan diri sendiri]’. PPP, the Chairman recapped his party’s mix of Islamism and pragmatism, was an ‘Islamic party which is openly inclusive’. These characteristically apologetic avowals stood against the fact that over the last 15 years, non-Muslims had consistently stayed away from PPP. Yet non-Muslim membership never became a divisive issue for PPP.

Despite pluralist affirmations, PPP in various ways subscribed to the dogma that defined Indonesia as a Muslim nation. It was predictable that due to the belief in a

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124 This resulted in newspaper headlines such as: “Asas Islam, tapi Tetap Partai Terbuka” (‘An Islamic base but still an open party’), *Media Indonesia*, 28 November 1998.
125 This is often combined with the saying: ‘your religion for you, my religion for me’ (‘bagimu agamamu, bagiku agamaku’, Arab: *lakum dinukum wa liya dini* (Qur’an 109:6)). *Muktamar IV*, p. 99. PPP’s previous Muktamar in 1994 similarly had stated the goal to bring about a ‘spiritual community’. *Keputusan Muktamar III Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, DPP PPP, 1994, p. 4.
disproportionate suffering of the “ummat Islam” in the past, this dogma would influence Islamist economic policies. At the November 1998 MPR session, PPP proposed to add the words ‘especially pribumi’ (native Indonesian) to an amended economy bill. As most native Indonesians are Muslims this was designed to boost the economies of the deprived umat. In an obvious attempt not to sound racist or bigoted and aware that the plea would cause indignation, PPP sought to word its appeal carefully. The result, however, described Muslims as ‘hosts’ and other communities, including the Arab community—an illustration that PPP’s Islamist orientation is more local- and pribumi centred—as ‘guests’. This allegory was a rebuff of cultural and religious pluralism. PPP held:

There are our brothers and sister citizens who are not pribumi [but] are Arab, Indian, European, Chinese...descendants. [They] come from a country outside Indonesia. We have different cultures and customs. We respect this difference and we welcome [them] as honoured guests amidst our society... Honourable as these guests are, they are still guests and not the hosts. We [Kitalah] are the host in our own country.... [The] special rights they [the guests] received during the New Order must not be sustained... As we know, around 200 Indonesian conglomerates come from Chinese descendants and obtain more facilities than pribumi... At the moment, the guest gets more facilities than the host. This is what we do not want. So this has nothing to do with racism.128 (Italic in original)

Islamist discrimination of other religious communities also became clear in the refusal to acknowledge syncretic beliefs (kepercayaan) in the constitutional Paragraph 29 on ‘religion’. PPP, underlining its traditional concern for the ‘kepercayaan’ issue, proposed an additional third article, reading: ‘The state prohibits the spreading of beliefs that contravene monotheism’.129 This proposal showed PPP’s
selectiveness in its self-proclaimed protection of religious pluralism. Both the Buddhist and Hindu communities would be severely fraught by such a stipulation.

As alternative, Islamist factions suggested inserting ‘beliefs’ into the newly created human rights paragraph. This, PPP asserted, would give equal recognition by the state but, in fact, it merely meant toleration short of full recognition. It also meant lesser financial support by the government than that given to the recognised “religions”. This episode was another example of a Western virtue being seen as a ‘Divine privilege’. Unlike in the Western mind, the Islamist perception of the human right to choose one’s faith remained grounded in a privilege given by God. This logic demanded that it could not be a human right to be an adherent of kepercayaan as many kepercayaan followers were nominal Muslims whom the Qur’an forbids to choose another religion than Islam. Illustrating the eminence of the Qur’anic rule, the Islamist camp in PAN also supported a minor status of kepercayaan beliefs.

Islamist alliance strategies also tested the sincerity of their pro-pluralism statements. The period between late 1998 and the elections was marked by many tactical agreements between political parties to gain a good position ahead of the polls. Islamist parties followed quite different alliance strategies. PPP, initially working toward an image as a committed reformist party while taking on the symbols of Islam and, eventually, the struggle for the Shari’ah Clause, appeared undecided about building political alliances. In 1998 and early 1999, PPP leaders announced they would only form coalitions with ‘reform-minded parties’, usually adding that these also had to strive for religious values. In May 1999, Hamzah Haz agreed to a ‘communique’ between PPP, PK and PAN in which the three parties expressed their

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130 The proposal for the human rights article stated: “everyone is free to choose his or her religion and worship in accordance with the teachings of the respective religion.” Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000.
131 In one instance, PPP proposed the illuminating phrase ‘to protect its citizens’ as further addition to the Third Article of Paragraph 29. Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000.
132 See Risalah Rapat Pleno 21 Maret 2002, reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002. But as a formal promoter of religious pluralism, the Reform Faction’s position was slightly more hesitant. One the one hand, it considered that adherents of kepercayaan had the same rights as other citizens. On the other hand, Fraksi Reformasi could not disregard the classic Islamist concern that “beliefs” could be mixed up with “proper” monotheist religions.
dedication to *reformasi* values. But shortly afterwards, PPP proclaimed it would seek coalitions with other Islamist parties. This was a tentative and often ill-synchronized quest for the most advantageous decision.

In PBB, Yusril again played the central part in delivering the message to the public and press that the party’s agenda was non-threatening. From cadres, he demanded they appear ‘calm’ and ‘rational’. They should not express views that add to the common bewilderment but be ends-oriented. ‘Most important for us’, Yusril said, ‘is to take hold of the sympathy and the hearts of the people’. The key message in his opening address at the party’s launch was willingness for cooperation to ensure a wide acceptability. These avowals were at the same time natural for a new party whose goal was to pass the electoral threshold of 2%.

Yusril also made direct efforts to appear open toward non-Muslims that appeared less contrived than PPP’s attempts. Any political approach toward Islam had to respect Indonesia’s diverse religious communities. Masyumi had considered the interests of Christian Parties and the inclusion of five Christians in Natsir’s cabinet gave proof of its ‘pragmatic and flexible’ character. He held that ‘when we talk about Islam, we talk about the Indonesian nation’; yet, ‘if we talk about the Indonesian nation it is not certain whether we will talk about Islam.’ As Islam taught to take up a position free of extremes (*ummathan wassathan*)

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134 “PPP hanya berkoalisi dengan partai Islam” (‘PPP only goes in to coalition with Islamic parties’), *Jawa Pos*, 29 May 1999.
135 Speech in Banyumas, reprinted as “Rebut Simpati Rakyat (‘To grab the sympathy of the people’)”, *Buletin Bulan Bintang*, 1 December 2000, p. 23.
137 Mahendra, *Activism and Intellectualism*, p. 126.
138 Speech at the inauguration of a party board in West Java, reprinted in *Buletin Bintang*, 15 – 30 September 1998, pp. 1-2 and 4-5. At PBB’s launch, Yusril indirectly equated the role of religion and the status of non-Muslim members in PBB to Germany’s ‘Christian Democratic Union’ (CDU), stressing that the CDU had many Muslim members. Speech at the al-Azhar mosque, Jakarta, 26 July 1998, in Mardjoned, *Sejarah*, p. 79.
139 See Qur’an, al-Baqarah (2:143). Moderation is the popular but slightly manufactured interpretation of *ummathan wassathan*. It is often interpreted as ‘intermediate’and thus God’s ‘best and chosen’ community.
‘adopt a moderate attitude in politics’ and ‘open the door as much as possible’ to work together with other camps. 140 Yusril said at the party launch:

Partai Bulan Bintang is...not designed to become a rival...for other parties and forces. For Partai Bulan Bintang applies: ‘cooperation, in the name of basic tenet [itikad], in the name of common interests’. And our approach is: ‘a cooperative approach, not a confronting approach.’ 141

And in another instance, he wrote:

[T]here is no need to fear that Partai Bulan Bintang will struggle only for the Muslim community. We fight for the whole society, our people. The platform of this party is ‘Islamic-ness’ and at the same time ‘Indonesianness’. 142

Several times, the Chairman proclaimed that Hindus and Christians would be welcome to join PBB as it was ‘an open party’. 143 If PBB won the elections, non-Muslims could be offered ministerial posts. 144

The sectarian discourse in PBB-close organisations such as DDII, KISDI and GPI was masked by the fact that Yusril gave a pro-reform, pluralist face to the public. PBB claimed to be non-sectarian but it did not approve of deals with non-Islamist parties and strictly banned alliances and coalitions with non-Muslims or secular parties. 145 PBB’s central leadership wanted to avoid appearing as bigoted but many doctrinaire Islamists remained fixated on Christianisation issues and were unwilling to conceal their misgivings. While PBB promoted openness, the defensive reporting in KISDI and Media Dakwah continued unabated. It continued to demand Muslim

140 “Deklarasi Partai Bulan Bintang”, reprinted in Mardjoned, Sejarah, p. 79.
141 Deklarasi, reprinted in Mardjoned, Sejarah, p. 80.
143 Deklarasi, in Mardjoned, Sejarah. Also “Partai Bulan Bintang Kumpulkan Kekuatan Umat Islam”, Pelita, 27 July 1998; “Yang tak Boleh Hidup yang Musuhi Demokrasi”, Republika, 27 July 1998. PBB’s statutes did not require that members had to be Muslim, which Yusril emphasised in the address.
145 Unlike other parties, PBB was reluctant to make any coalition deals prior to the elections. Worried not to be able to conclude a useful deal for his party, Yusril announced that PBB would face the polls alone, criticising cross-party pacts as political manoeuvring. “PBB Tidak Tertarik Koalisi”, Radar Bogor, 23 May 1999. PBB also abstained from two agreements, which produced vaguely worded goals aimed against so-called anti-reformasi forces. Aburrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Amien Rais were the signatories of one accord. Hamzah Haz, Amien Rais and Nur Mahmudi Ismail (PK) signed the second pact.
supremacy and to back this up with Qur’anic warnings of Jewish and Christian bad intentions.

Accordingly, doctrinaire notables like Sumargono, Qadir Djaelani and Eggy Sudjana wanted an Islamist coalition in the post-election parliament. Campaigning in Aceh, Sumargono said that PBB would go into coalition with Islamist parties to fight secularism and lead the economy away from dependence on western countries toward a closer relationship with Arab nations. In blatant contradiction to Yusril, Deputy Chairman Kholil Ridwan wrote in an early edition of the party bulletin, referring to a Qur’anic passage:

In political life, hypocrisy/opportunism [kemunafikan] becomes evident in the stance of opportunistic politicians... or who cannot and do not want to work together with genuine [istiqomah] Muslim [mukmin] politicians. How is it possible that a Muslim feels more at home in the surroundings of infidels [orang-orang kafir] than among his fellow Muslims? Even though, those infidels will not accept him until he follows their way of life... To ally [bersekutu] with the infidels who later will compete with Muslims in Islamic parties...is part of hypocrisy/opportunism. Consciously or unconsciously, he is acting in a way hostile to [memusuhi] Islam.

Despite assurances that it was an open party, PBB never fully opened the party to non-Muslims. It also left unanswered the question why non-Muslims would want to join a party in which prominent members promoted an Islamic religious supremacy buttressed by a defensive spirit.

Official statements were contradictory. PBB claimed to be cooperative in dealing with the West but its stance on national sovereignty was adamantly self-protective and grounded in suspicion against Western governments. Resentment over perceived Western and Jewish interference into Indonesian domestic affairs replaced

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148 In an effort to promote PBB’s openness, Farid Prawiranegara claimed that PBB could agree to form coalitions with secular parties, including PDIP, provided they were reform-oriented. This would comprise, among others, the aim to end TNI’s political role. The fact, however, that PBB saw PDIP as fulfilling neither precondition underscored the slight substance of such statements. “Partai Islam Tanggapi Hati-hati”, Kompas, 12 July 1999.
Masyumi’s generally sympathetic position towards Western nations. In a sense, however, anti-Western statements also appeared to have had practical benefit because of their appeal to many ordinary Muslims.

Mirroring the Masyumi legatees’ representational claims, PBB depicted external threats as targeted against both Islamic and national interests. A PBB Congress in February 1999 called on all Indonesians to defend the unitary state and to ‘distrust the conspiring international interests [kepentingan konspirasi internasional], who because of political and economic motives do not want the Unitary Republic of Indonesia to persist’. The section on ‘foreign policy’ laid bare the party’s ambiguity. It called for ‘enhanced cooperation with mutual benefit, both ideologically, politically, economically, and socio-culturally’ whilst insisting that the underlying motive of the West in stifling Indonesia’s self-determination was to prevent Islam from getting strong, for example, by installing a President sympathetic to Muslims or open to shari’ah issues. Yet the party declared to ‘highly appreciate the principle of brotherhood and the equality in status of all nations on earth’ and set as goal to ‘play an active role to interfere in the emergence of the seeds of disintegration’ among religious communities.

The principal obstacle for a genuine religious pluralism has been the Islamist haziness in determining the status of humans before God. In a typical example of Islamist apologetics, PBB declared that Islam would not discriminate against other creeds. Referring to the Qur’an verse al-Zalzalah (99:7-8), the party argued that all humans ‘essentially’ (pada hakikatnya) were of the same value and status. What would distinguish humans was their ‘piety’ (ketaqwaan) and their ‘closeness to God’. ‘Islamic teachings hold [menegaskan], Yusril said, ‘that humankind had to submit itself to God [Tuhan]... and [to] perceive humankind as being of the same value [dalam perspektif persamaan derajat].

149 Hasil Mukernas I, p. 33.
150 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 99 (quote).
151 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 78 & 100.
152 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 76, also Hasil Mukernas I, p. 7 (one text uses ‘Allah’, the other ‘Tuhan’ for the term “God”).
153 Yusril Ilza Mahendra, “Nilai Persaudaraan dan Hak Asasi Manusia”, Buletin Buletin Bintang, Juni 2002. Yusril gave this speech as Minister of Law and Human Rights.
At the same time, interpreting its Islamic ideological party base, PBB cited the Qur’an (al-Baqarah: 2:257), which states that ‘Allah is the protector of believers guiding them out of the darkness into light [whilst] the leaders of unbelievers [kafir] are idolisers [taghut] leading them out of light into darkness’.

Campaign guidelines cited Qur’anic verses with which Islamists commonly feed the prejudice that other religious communities were inherently hostile toward Islam and that Muslims needed to be suspicious. These verses included al-Ma’idah (5:51) and al-Nisa (4:144), the latter serving as the basis to proclaim that ‘PBB does not make non-Muslims leaders’. It cited verse al-Anfal (5:60), announcing that ‘PBB is ready to face the enemies of Allah and our enemies with everything that we have’. Other verses were al-Baqarah (2:120), interpreted as ‘PBB distrusts [mewaspadai] the opponents of Islam’ and al-Mumtahinah (60:1), on which the campaign booklet commented that ‘PBB will not go into coalition with the enemies of Allah [musuh-musuh Allah] and our enemies’. While the consideration of these passages did not necessarily impede cooperation, it certainly nurtured bigotry and prejudice among cadres and foiled the inclusion of non-Muslims in the party on equal terms.

In particular, the welcoming rhetoric did not cover the strong antipathies many Islamists had against the secular-nationalism represented by PDIP. Islamist parties had a general case against PDIP and the combined Military and Police Faction, as they could accuse both factions of being anti-reform. The reformasi paradigm of

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154 “Tafsir Asas Partai Bulan Bintang”, reprinted in Hasil Muktamar I.
155 These passages were part of a large collection of sayings on general topics. In each instance, the verse was illustrated by a party-message for campaigners to deliver to the electorate. Inilah Jalanku, DPW PBB Central Java, 1998.
156 Inilah Jalanku. The al-Ma’idah section warns: ‘Take not the Jews and the Christians for your protectors. They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them’. The al-Nisa verse orders: ‘Take not for friends unbelievers than Believers’, as this would entail God’s punishment. The al-Mumtahinah verse warns: ‘...Take not My enemies and yours as friends (or protectors)—offering them (your) love...(they) have...driven out the Messenger...’. Translations by Yusuf Ali, Meaning. Al-Baqarah (2:120) quoted earlier.
157 Eggy Sudjana, a PBB inaugurator, illuminated this difference between tolerance and equality in a letter to the editor of the polemical Islamist journal Sabili as he wrote:

'We are friendly [senang] with non-Muslim community leaders and will not question if our convictions are contrary. Because it is already clear that our communities are different. We are people of faith [beriman] and you are infidels [kafir]. Shari’ah teaches that we have to [follow the principle] ‘for you your religion, for me my religion’. What is important is that there is no conflict between us. If we lose [in elections, e.g.], we will gladly accept it as a logical consequence of democracy...’ Sabili, 6 September 2000, p. 9.
1998 meant that PDIP was often branded as the ‘new status quo’. Its most vocal opponents were PBB, DDII and KISDI, blaming ‘Soekarnoists’, referring to allegedly fanatic defenders of the 1945 Constitution, as the seeming arch-enemies of reformasi. At the 2000 session, M.S. Ka’ban notified the MPR that the constitutional debates had been deliberately slowed down in order from MPs who would ‘not want total reform’. The vagueness of the 1945 Constitution has tended to benefit parties and interest groups in power. As PDIP was widely expected to do well in the elections, other parties expected that it would try to retain extensive presidential powers.

Attacks against PDIP from outside parliament had a much stronger ideological tinge. Sumargono and Qadir Djaelani, especially, railed against the dangers of secularism and non-Muslim domination of government and bureaucracy. Resentment against PDIP mounted when, in early 1999, rumours spread that 42 percent of PDIP’s legislative candidates consisted of non-Muslims. At the core of the bitterness was the sense of past injustices which, following the Masyumi legatees’ representational logic, were directed against the *umat* Islam. Doctrinaire leaders in PBB, DDII and

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159 “Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Bulan Bintang Pada Sidang Tahunan MPR RI Tahun 2000” reprinted in *Buletin Bulan Bintang*, September 2000. Ka’ban, for example, mentioned PDIP’s opposition toward direct presidential elections.

160 For example, among PDIP’s leading four candidates in Jakarta, three were non-Muslims: Adian Husaini, “Ekspimen PDI Perjuangan”, *Republika*, 15 June 1999. In response, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (‘Indonesian Ulama Council’, MUI) and Muhammadiyah separately issued appeals (seruan) to Muslims to vote for a party that would guard Islamic interests, without specifying what this meant. In the following, PPP, too, called on Muslims not to vote for non-Muslim candidates. “Tekadku Sudah Bulat: Pilih Caleg Islam”, *Republika*, 2 June 1999; “Bola Salju dari Hamzah Haz”, *Republika*, 2 June 1999. Various reactions came from PBB. Yusril, who attempted to diminish suspicions from non-Muslims toward PBB, tried to evade the controversy. The doctrinaire leaders, by contrast, insisted that Muslims vote for Islamist parties and demanded representational Muslim leadership in the government and high bureaucracy. Kholil Ridwan cited in “Wajib Hukum Memilih Partai Islam” (‘It is an obligation to vote for Islamic parties’), *Abadi*, May 1999; Ahmad Sumargono “Agama dan Negara tak Dapat Dipisahkan”, *Kompas*, 28 May 1999. There was wide consensus among Islamists that there was a sensible reason for a proportional Muslim share of candidates. Most Islamist notables, among them Deliar Noer (Chairman of Partai Umat Islam), Didin Hafiddudhin (PK presidential candidate) and Abdullah Hehamahua (Chairman of PPII Masyumi) wanted candidates to make their religion public. “Pemilih Harus Kritis: Caleg non-Muslim Jadi Bom Wakta” (‘Voters have to be critical: non-Muslim MP candidates are a time bomb’), *Republika*, 3 June 1999. MUI’s and Muhammadiyah’s appeals caused a controversy despite that such calls had already been made in the past. Prior to the 1955 elections, an ulama Congress (the Alim-Ulama and Muballigh Islam) issued a legal ruling (fiatwa) that it was obligatory for Muslims to vote for candidates who endeavour to implement Islamic teachings and Islamic law. “Kalau Masjumi Pegang Pemerintahan”, *Hikmah*, 2 April 1955, p. 5.
KISDI opposed a PDIP-led government, fearing that ‘opportunistic minorities’, who had in the reformasi era switched sides from Golkar to PDIP, could install Megawati Soekarnoputri as a puppet President and thereby thwart Islamists from gaining positions in the cabinet and high bureaucracy. The ‘opportunists’ of the New Order, Farid Prawiranegara asserted, had now ‘taken a new flag, the PDIP’ and Hartono Mardjono noted the ‘red thread’ behind the ‘actual winners of the New Order’ and those ‘behind the “victory” of PDIP’.

Megawati, Sumargono wrote in reference to PDIP’s support for her, ‘has been made the horse [kuda tunggangan]’ of the ‘radical minorities’ who earlier ‘sat on Golkar and now are looking for a new horse’.

The doctrinaire leaders feared that PDIP would intend to block the amendment of crucial parts of the Constitution so that its ‘opportunistic group’ could protect the positions of their military allies in politics and tolerate repressive measures against Muslims to sustain secular domination. These qualms were especially common among Bulan Bintang notables who had been involved in the 1984 Tanjung Priok killings and who had been previously detained. They also stressed that, in the early 1990s, PDIP (then PDI) had attempted to foil the insertion of Islamic laws into national law. Theo Syafei, a Protestant retired officer whom DDII and KISDI had branded ‘Islam’s number one enemy’, fuelled these suspicions through a recorded speech in early 1999. In this speech, Syafei allegedly outlined TNI’s strategy to infiltrate PDIP and to prevent a district system being adopted for the elections in order to disadvantage Islamist parties.

Apart from being the new vehicle for New Order notables and Christians, Islamists in all parties appeared to see PDIP and, to a lesser extent, PKB as a hiding place for

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the political left. The underlying assertion was that, as PBB asserted, ‘leftovers of communist groups and other radical leftists’, ‘foreign mission forces’, their ‘extended hands in the country’ [kakitangannya], and remnants of the New Order were the ‘fare dodgers’ of the reform era. Notably, the view that leftist sympathisers had infiltrated PDIP and PKB was also predominant in PAN’s Islamist camp. Together, these groups would obstruct what Islamists considered rightful “Muslim” control over national affairs. Shortly after the election results, which established a 34% share for PDIP, had been made public, Hartono Mardjono wrote in an intriguing reference to ‘real and spurious nationalists’:

The facts show that those who are today in PDIP—both leadership and those who will represent them in the DPR and MPR—the majority is the minority group [kelompok minoritas] (not real nationalists [nasionalis sejati]) which during the New Order succeeded in making the New Order government and all its agencies their political vehicle. It is them who during the New Order succeeded in dominating ABRI [now TNI], the bureaucracy (especially the field of economy finance industry) and Golkar.

The doctrinaire Islamists again presupposed broad Muslim assent with their agenda and shared concerns against the ideological foe. They also appeared to take for granted that non-Muslims could not work politically in the interest of Muslims. Again exposing the unwillingness to officially acknowledge the scarcity of doctrinal aspirations in a very diverse Muslim community, Hartono wrote shortly before the elections:

The Indonesian people are almost 90% Muslims. How is it possible that if the majority of the people’s representatives are not Muslim, the aspiration of the Muslim community [aspirasi umat Islam] is implemented?

To curtail the ‘spurious nationalists’, Bulan Bintang leaders with strong links to KISDI such as Fadli Zon, Eggy Sudjana and Sumargono used their army connections to promote an Islam-centred economic nationalism, which identified the Sino-

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166 See, for example “Sedang Berkembang Gerakan Marxisme”, Media Dakwah, October 1998.
167 Resolusi Partai Bulan Bintang, 1 October 1998. Official statements of this kind were rare, though.
168 Interview, A.M. Luthfi, Jakarta, 7 November 2000. According to Luthfi, PKB’s support for Megawati’s presidency gave evidence of PKB’s leftist character.
170 Hartono Mardjono, “‘Stembus Accoord’ dan Caleg Non-Muslim”, Republika, 2 June 1999.
Christian business elite as traitors who had deliberately destroyed Indonesia's economy. Resuming the dogma of a Muslim nation, it postulated a union between Islam and Indonesia's national character. The post-New Order strategies of the Islamist parties had differed sharply here. PPP, to boost its anti-New Order credentials, took a very critical line on TNI at the 1998 MPR session. PBB made ending the army's political role a key policy, but the doctrinaire Islamists candidly backed those generals who seemed to be helpful in empowering Islamists.

It was personal statements, in particular, that stressed the supremacy of Islam and the primacy of Muslims in Indonesia. They linked the spirit to defend Indonesia against foreign interference to the idea that such interference was undertaken by non-Muslims against Muslims. Qadir Djaelani wrote:

> The wellbeing and the unity of the...Indonesian Republic are the wellbeing and the unity of the Indonesian Muslim community. Not only is the Muslim community [umat Islam] the largest component in Indonesia, but it is also the Muslim community which has most sacrificed its wealth and its life and soul to establish the Indonesian Republic. The Muslim community is the rightful owner [pemilik sah] of this country. Because of this, the Muslim community has the obligation to defend the wellbeing and the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic.¹⁷¹

The economic facet of the Muslim nation-dogma was most clearly found among Masyumi devotees. In characteristic rhetoric they described affirmative Muslim policies as empowering 'Muslims' or the umat Islam. Yet, the parties they belonged to addressed sectarian issues rarely and mostly indirectly. Officially, PBB only gave few pointers to constituencies that it was geared up to strive for Muslims to capture political power and attain a greater share of wealth. The program cloaked affirmative Muslim policies as being to 'enhance the equilibrium [pemerataan] and economic justice' and to 'stop giving special treatment or special rights for all business people who bring damage to the people and the nation'.¹⁷² Amidst an outline of its non-Islamist reform program, it exhibited the feeling of loss and dependency by calling on 'Muslims' (umat Islam) to become more active in politics, demanding that 'no more must the Muslim community only pull a stalled car' and remain 'an observer

¹⁷² In the section 'economy' of "Program Umum Perjuangan", Profil Partai Bulan Bintang, p. 11.
from outside the arena’ and that ‘[n]o longer must the Muslim community be made
the object of power, even turned into the victim of mean political manoeuvres ...‘. 173

It was hoped that the army would lend a helping hand. Sumargono wrote with special
consideration of Prabowo, the doctrinaire Islamist’s key ally in the army:

...everybody who dares to resist the domination of LB Moerdani [the former
catholic head of TNI] and CSIS [the influential Catholic-led think tank]
automatically gets [our] sympathy... Prabowo evidently dares to resist this
domination...on various occasions he explained that there are four forces who do not
want Indonesia to become a thriving country: the international Catholic lobby, Jews,
Chinese immigrants [Cina Perantauan] and Western countries. In this matter,
apparently, Prabowo’s nationalist sentiment becomes one with his Islamic attitude... 
Prabowo appears to position Islam as a significant factor to safeguard the unity and
the union of the nation. For this, Prabowo is also known to belong to those who
adhere to the understanding of ‘proportional democracy’, including in religious
matters... From the accounts of Prabowo and several groups can be concluded that
the plan to make the army the enemy of Islam is not only made up...the accounts of
Prabowo about the scenario to set Islam against the army are evidently matching
with the theory of Father Beek, the...founding leader of the CSIS who says that
Islam is the “big Satan” who has to be confronted with the “small Satan” who is
none other than the army. 174

The results of the 1999 elections showed that such propaganda against the supposed
schemes of ideological foes had limited impact on the political likings of a majority
of Muslims. This further illustrated the disconnection of the doctrinaire Bulan
Bintang Islamists from mainstream Muslims. Frustrated with the public
unresponsiveness, they bitterly complained about ‘illogical and uninformed’ support
many Muslims gave to PDIP and Megawati. Prior to the elections, Sumargono
lamented:

With this strategy of infiltration, the Christians later will occupy [‘menduduki ’] the
DPR [and] by far outnumber their proportions. They will emerge from PDIP, 
Goikar, [and] PAN... We don’t need to be surprised that non-Muslim legislative
candidates now dominate PDIP... Also, we can understand why PDI Megawati
categorically rejects a district system... We do not have to be surprised that there are
Islamic community leaders who act as mouthpieces for the Christians. This is an old
phenomenon, [it has been happening] since colonial times. [It is] to smooth the path
for [memuluskan] the Zionist mission of Israel in Indonesia...Netanyahu or Ehud
Barak do not need to walk around. Because here there are those who speak on their

174 Ahmad Sumargono, “Memahami Prabowo”, Tekad, 6-12 Maret 2000, reprinted in
behalf. Those who object to the MUI fatwa [ordering Muslims to vote for an Islam-friendly party] with all force are not only pastor Xaverius and priest Albert but also Muslims... We do not have to insult the right of our Christian friends to undertake Christianisation in Indonesia, because it is what their religious teaching orders. What we need is to strengthen faith, ethics and our understanding of Ad Dienul Islam and to teach our community to be suspicious toward moves of the devils [setan-setan] in order to deceive our community. We have to know that Satan never ceases to work.

By any objective analysis, these allegations were overstatements and factually questionable. These were ideologically motivated attacks whose repetitiveness brought to light the distortions in the Islamist’s worldview. Though including some former leading Golkar cadres, the PDIP board was hardly a bastion of New Order figures and it did not warrant being classified as a leftist stronghold.

The apologetic thrust that liberal political ideas have imposed on Islamists operating in plural politics did not shroud the bitter sense of anti-Muslim injustice during the New Order. Though promoting Masyumi as tolerant, the thought that Sino-Indonesians, of whom many were Christians and had represented the model foe in previous decades, could be accommodated in PBB was very disconcerting. The doctrinaire leaders, therefore, started to become distrustful of Yusril and his inner circle. One DDII leader recalled his feelings during an early party summit:

At the first plenary session of the PBB...Yusril...in front of 150 party administrators...said that “to win the elections, we have to take on non-Muslims”. Long before the Muktaamar; non-Muslims as party members! And the most important were Chinese! At that time, I was among those rejecting this because it was not in accordance with the statutes [which determine] that this party is based on Islam. At that stage, [PBB was still] based on Pancasila and Islamic ethics. But in my heart I noted: if it is like this it means that he [Yusril] is quite liberal in ideological matters. Only recently I got to know that many of his friends were Chinese, [that he] went to school in China and speaks Chinese. He once lived in a Chinese community.

176 Confidential interview with a former PBB leader, 2001. At the time of Yusril’s speech, PBB’s ideological base was still defined as ‘Pancasila and aqidah Islam’. The fact that the doctrinaire camp saw non-Muslim membership as contradicting PBB’s ideology gave evidence of the shallow adherence to the Pancasila party base. It was a mere legal necessity as the ban on the Islamic ideological base was still in place.
The unresolved contradictions in the position toward non-Muslims created confusion among branches, demanding clarification over the party’s non-Muslim stance. Ka’ban’s response was issued in the party journal and insisted that Yusril had only reiterated the sympathy PBB would receive from Hindus and Christians on the grounds that PBB would also struggle for their welfare. It also asserted that many non-Muslims would be eager to join. Yet Ka’ban declared he would not ‘dare’ (berani) to decide the matter, which therefore was delegated to PBB’s Religious Council. The council then decided to permit non-Muslims as ‘extraordinary members’ (anggota luar biasa) on grounds that they would not be able to go through the usual inauguration process, which included an oath toward Allah and the Prophet. The decision of the Syuro Council came after most of the doctrinaire Islamists had left the party.

The sense of dependency and loss played a stronger role among the Masyumi legatees than in PPP. The latter spoke and acted on an awareness of having stronger roots among ordinary Muslims. The origins of its leadership in the large Muslim organisations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah had not led to a comparable feeling of loss and segregation. Not surprisingly, PPP’s discourse was less embittered on the perceived historical bond between the army and the “umat Islam” and the alleged attempts by “spuriously nationalist” non-Muslims, seculars and foreign governments to untie this connection. PPP’s attacks against the army were more motivated by the desire to appear anti-New Order rather than to thwart an ideological foe. The lack of victimisation rhetoric in PPP was echoed by less attention toward popular conspiracy theories.

PK and PBB also gave greater attention to international Islamic issues. In PBB, a dispute over proper relations with Israel emerged because of Yusril’s ministerial

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177 Yusril, in an obvious contrast to the position of the doctrinaire Islamists, often said the Islamic base should not be interpreted as ‘exclusive’. See, for example, “Yusril Di Tanah Melayu”, Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 October 2001, p. 14.
179 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. By late 2002, PBB claimed to have both non-Muslim members and officials in branches in Sulawesi, Eastern Indonesia, Central Kalimantan and Papua. If this was true, these people only held the status of affiliates as they had not been formally inaugurated due to their status as non-Muslims.
responsibilities. Yusril allegedly told a visiting delegation of Muslim activists that it was acceptable to open trade relations with Israel because the Prophet had done so as well. The doctrinaire leaders saw this as violation of party policies. The affair triggered strong reaction from within PBB, DDII and KISDI. KISDI Secretary Adian Husaini publicly condemned the Chairman’s reported stance as ‘stabbing Muslims from behind’. He not only made political arguments against Israeli policies but reminded readers that ‘hundreds of Qur’anic verses’ warned of the consequences if Muslims deal with Jews.

Official reactions to the Israel issue attempted to sound undogmatic. They demurred Israeli human rights violations and cited constitutional reasons for why colonialism needed to be opposed rather than laying bare the anti-Jewish sentiment. Once again, Islamist parties appeared to speak on behalf of Indonesians and the umat Islam. The brawl over Yusril’s stance forced PBB’s board to clarify its stance by re-

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180 The activists came from the little known Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda Islam (‘Communication Forum of the Islamic Youth’, FKGMI). Yusril was reported to have argued that trade relations would not lead to diplomatic links and pointed Indonesia’s relations with Taiwan as an example. Bambang Pribadi, “Yusril: Tidak Ada Salahnya Membuka Hubungan Dagang Dengan Israel” (‘Yusril: There is nothing wrong with opening trade relations with Israel’), Media Dakwah, January 2000 (Bambang was leader of the activists who visited Yusril). He defended himself, saying the matter fell under the responsibility of Alwi Shihab, Foreign Minister in the Abdurrahman Wahid government. When talking to the activists, he only had repeated Alwi’s position. This had been subsequently distorted in the sense that he would personally support this view. In addition, rumours spread that Yusril had hosted an Israeli delegation in the ministerial room complex. One of the visitors allegedly was the nephew of Israel’s former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In response, Yusril explained he had been visited by a group of six Indonesians who wanted to inquire into investment regulations. They had announced they would bring along two Europeans, who turned out to be Israelis wanting to discuss trade relations. “YIM: ‘Saya Tak Pernah Terima Delegasi Dagang Israel’”, Risalah, March 2000.

181 “Mengapa Yusril Berkawan dengan Israel?” (‘Why is Yusril friendly with Israel?’). Letter to the editor of Media Dakwah, March 2000. Qur’anic warnings were equally emphasized by PBB Deputy Secretary-General Ramlan Mardjoned, “Yahudi: Pembohong dan Pengkhianat” (‘Jews: Liars and Traitors’), Serial Khutbah Jum’at, January 2000, pp. 5-14. The author specifically referred to a legal ruling by Yusuf Qaradhawi, the leading contemporary ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, not to open trade relations with Israel.

182 See, for example, “Pernyataan Sikap Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Bulan Bintang Terhadap Tindakan Biadab Tentara Israel 5 October 2000”, reprinted in Bulan Bintang, 1 November 2000, p. 14. Other Islamist factions, too, pointed to constitutional issues rather than calling Jews enemies of Islam. Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Perihal Negara, 21 March 2001. PBB, PK and PPP were among many Muslim organisations objecting to the visit of an Israeli delegation at the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Jakarta in October 2000. They were joined by many notables from religiously neutral parties, including Amien Rais and Golkar Chairman Akbar Tanjung.
emphasising its ideologically neutral argument, which held that trading with Israel would violate the Preamble of the Constitution.183

Although the dogma of a “Muslim nation” and the imagery of the enemy were just as present in PK, it was more successful by not boasting of these misgivings. The party’s dual agenda came about as an inevitable result of a calculated severance of ideology and behaviour. It led to an automatic containment of the party’s unbending worldview.

PK: The Automatic Concealment of Dogmatism

With cooperation as its overall guideline, the postulation of domestic and external threats necessarily became an obscured part of PK’s discourse. This was unlike the openly antagonistic attitude of DDII and KISDI. At the same time, their background in *tarbiyah* and being of a younger age than senior Bulan Bintang leaders meant that most PK leaders had fewer emotional fixations regarding domestic Christianisation issues.

In finding a coalition partner, PK followed a calculated strategy to downplay its Islamism. On this premise, it formed a good working relationship with the de-confessionalised PAN. It was the most stable of all major factions with only a minor squabble over the position of Secretary in September 2001.184 PK described the collaboration with PAN and other agreements as ‘tactical and strategic’ steps and as a ‘political ijtihad’, partnerships that ‘don’t yet amount to an ideological alliance’.185

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184 The row started when PAN unilaterally appointed the Chinese Catholic Alvin Lie as Secretary of the faction. Following this, the PK MPs Syamsul Balda, Mutammimul ‘Ula and Mashadi accused PAN of breaching the earlier agreement that such appointments needed to be discussed between the leaderships of the two parties. PAN eventually gave in and annulled Alvin’s appointment. “Ribut Kursi Sekretaris”, *Gatra*, 22 September 2001.

185 *Bayanat Tentang Fraksi Reformasi*, DPP PK, Jakarta, 4 October 1999. Gaining seven parliamentary seats in the elections, PK was unable to form a faction on its own. The coalition had obvious practical benefits. Together with PAN’s 34 seats, the two parties outclassed the TNI/Police Faction (38 seats). As a result, PAN and PK were able to defeat TNI’s candidate in the competition for the DPR vice-chairmanship. Eventually, the DPR elected Islamist PAN Chairman A.M. Fatwa.
This was only conceivable among groups with matching ideological views. With its cynical view on the Islamic credentials of other parties, PK sought a coalition partner with whom it shared non-Islamist short-term goals. PAN met this criterion and the subsequent partnership helped to soften PK’s initial doctrinaire image.

PK officials felt a natural affinity with PAN because the latter’s Islamist camp often quietly sympathized with their own views. They believed PAN’s claim for religious openness to be spurious and made a distinction between PAN’s ‘pluralism’ and their own party’s ‘plurality’. The difference was that plurality ‘conceded’ (mengakui) humanity to be divided into various ethnicities but theologically they were not on ‘the same level of quality’. Although PK did not confine membership to Muslims, it was held ‘impossible’ for non-Muslims to rise into important party positions. By contrast, PAN’s promotion of pluralism suggested that all religions were of the same value. What differed was the ‘understanding’. Yet PK leaders acted on the conviction that their fellow Muslims in PAN had chosen pluralism for pragmatic reasons rather than because of conviction. Moreover, PAN’s application of pluralism, they argued, was inconsistent as Muslims would make sure they controlled the party. Applied earnestly, PAN needed to give non-Muslims equal status. This gap between claim and reality underlined that PAN would not ‘deviate too far’ from Islam and its strong roots in Muhammadiyah. For PK, the difference between the two coalition partners had thus more to do with ‘Islamic political expression’ and was not based on substantial disagreements in understanding Islam.

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187 An interesting side-aspect was that the Islamic ideological party base did have little impact on coalition strategies. Although at the start PBB’s ideological base combined Pancasila with Islamic morals, most in the party’s leadership appeared only prepared to ally with other Islamist parties. PK, by contrast, had taken on Islam while asas tunggal was still in force. Nonetheless, PK’s coalition partner PAN was based on Pancasila. PBB, Ka’ban held, was ‘perhaps more consistent’ in its perception of Islam. PK’s coalition with PAN was an ‘ideological contradiction’. Interview, M.S. Ka’ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000.
188 This section is based on an interview with Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 2000.
189 Bulan Bintang leaders, too, held PAN to be insincere as the party had quoted Islamic sayings and hadith passages in its election campaign in order to appeal to Muslim voters. Sumargono, “Sekularisme dan Kejujuran Ideologis” (‘Secularism and Ideological Honesty’), Republika, 26 May 1999.
190 Regardless of its open platform, the belief that Islam was the superior religion prevailed among PAN’s Islamist leaders. The view that all religions were of the same value was ‘not compatible’ with Islamic theology. Interview, A.M. Luthfi, Jakarta, 7 November 2000.
the same'. With both championing democratic legal and political reform, identifying corruption as the main target and operating on a religiously delineated moral mission, possible long-term ideological differences were secondary.

The creation of cadres preoccupied with Islam’s perceived foes did not hamper PK’s cooperative approach. With the intention to ‘become a binding element (menjadi unsur perekat)’ among societal groups and the ‘national unifier’, the combative message of *ghazwul fikri* ‘automatically’ played a much smaller public role than the message of universal justice and reform. It was not targeted at the general public. It was absent from official statements, and only indirectly addressed in the party tabloid Suara Keadilan (‘Voice of Justice’). Toward the press and the public, PK members refrained from confrontational rhetoric, and the use of terms like *kafir* and *jihad*. In the initial stage of its strategy, common goals such as amending the Constitution became the noticeable element in the battle against *jahiliyah*.

In the interpretation and the training of PK, *ghazwul fikri* was a combative doctrine, though it did not call for a proactive attack and physical confrontation. The material emphasised the essential need for wariness and self-protection and, in view of the perceived assault against Islam, self-restraint. The instruction therefore taught self-defence that is non-violent. *Ghazwul fikri* was essentially an internal canon. Yet PK taught *ghazwul fikri* because its leaders believed it to be true. The intention was to create a suspicious and unyielding frame of mind among cadres. It stood neatly separated from guidelines for practical behaviour. This was very much unlike the contention by militant Islamists that cooperation and compromise with non-Muslims was wrong and that the oppression of Muslims in their own lands required that physical *jihad* be declared on the enemy. The success of teaching *ghazwul fikri* as a frame of mind intended to strengthen inner resilience without disturbing moderate behaviour. It held great risks, however, as it appeared very much dependent on the

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191 Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.
192 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.
193 This became evident in phrases like “Kembali ke UUD 45, Kembali ke Zaman Jahiliyah” (‘Back to the 1945 Constitution means to return to the times of ‘ignorance’), PeKa Online, 5 August 2002, http://www.peka.or.id/zoon.php?id=1&cd=1&th=02&bl=08. PeKa Online was one of several unofficial PK websites.
skills and intention of the cadre-instructor and the mental capabilities of his disciples.¹⁹⁴

PK leaders did not deny the importance of creating cultural suspicion among cadres. Writings dealing with the defence of Islam have been few and had very limited circulation but they have not been kept behind locked doors. Nevertheless, the party has not presented its dogmatic views openly. Its leaders had to be drawn on the matter, which is tantamount to deception. In effect, PK deliberately suppressed public expression of the doctrinaire facets of its thinking which meant that it was aware of and thus vigilant over the controversial aspects of its agenda.

PK, too, was cautious in demanding affirmative Muslim policies. Similar to the reserved official rhetoric of other Islamist parties, the statutes set to aim for an ‘economy that is fair’ which would take sides with the ‘small people’ but without ‘differentiating between race, tribe and religion’.¹⁹⁵ During MPR meetings, however, PK took on the position of PBB and PPP, calling on the government to especially consider the local Muslim community (pribumi) which was most affected by economic hardship. In the 2002 MPR session, Irwan Prayitno defended the Fraksi Reformasi’s view that saw Muslims as an underprivileged group and indirectly called for a disconnection from foreign monetary donors. He said:

Put plainly, but without intending...to be discriminating, we ask the President to take sides with the pribumi society, which until today has been identical with the weak section. We have been free already for 57 years, free in a political sense, but we are not yet free economically. We are already free and sovereign; let us regulate the economy of this nation with full sovereignty, by taking sides [pemihakan] for the weak pribumi, [who is] both weak in a cultural and in a structural sense... “[A]ffirmative policy” is...normally under way in many countries and this never was interpreted as discriminating politics.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Reports that local PK militia had been involved in the ethnic violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi, suggested that it might not be such a great step from combative rhetoric to violent behaviour.
¹⁹⁵ “Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan”, reprinted in Sekilas, p. 94.
¹⁹⁶ Irwan Prayitno, Mengkritisi Kebijakan Pemerintah: Tentang Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, Riset dan Teknologi, serta Lingkungan Hidup, Seri Pendidikan Masyarakat, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2003. Though worded carefully, the plea triggered immediate criticism from PAN-based Alvin Lie, the only non-Muslim MP in Fraksi Reformasi. Alvin deplored his colleagues’ emphasis on Muslims and demanded to refrain completely from using the term pribumi as it would create a dichotomy and threaten national unity. Also Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002, p. 7 (Irwan’s proposal) and p. 10 (Alvin Lie’s protest). The record in the Risalah slightly differs from that of the Prayitno book.
Aside from general announcements, such as the need to fight economic cartels and monopolies and to ‘initiate the development of Islamic economic projects and industry’, PK also made sporadic statements which more directly disregarded its claim for equality and tolerance, for example the call ‘not [simply] to allow one single coin to fall into the hands of non-Muslims’.\(^{197}\)

It automatically was a different matter with non-Muslim communities whose faiths the Pancasila did not recognise and who were not present in Indonesia. The Islamist-endorsed human rights paragraph was characteristically discriminatory as it strove to ensure that atheists and communists were unable to ‘shield behind’ (membentengi) human rights to spread their beliefs.\(^{198}\) In a press release, PK called on everyone involved in the drafting to be ‘very suspicious’ and reject any regulations not in accordance with religious teachings because there were indications that certain groups felt free to spread communism and ‘permissive’ views because they felt shielded by the human rights label.\(^{199}\)

Generic animosity against Jews had become widespread among Indonesian Muslims; thus any political party was free to take a firm stance against Israel. In some instances PK—as PBB and PPP—appeared careful to not to sound anti-Semitic. Officially, PK rejected trade relations with Israel ‘not because they are Jews’ but because to trade with a ‘colonialist nation’ was to act against human rights. The statement, however, also depicted Jews as a conspirational people as it briefly reminded Indonesians to ‘be suspicious’ toward Zionists as they had ‘tried to influence and control the Indonesian economy’\(^{200}\). The material for the training of cadres was more forthright. It depicted ‘an eternal conflict between truth [haq] and falsehood [bathil]’. Once again referring to the Qur’an, verse al-Baqarah 120, it portrayed Zionism as a ‘group which is spread all over the world’ and ‘which

\(^{197}\) Komisi C Kebijakan.
\(^{198}\) Sikap Partai Keadilan terhadap Penegakan Syari’at Islam, in Suara Keadilan, September 2000, pp. 4-5.
\(^{200}\) Pernyataan Sikap Tentang Pencabutan TAP MPRS NO. XXV/MPRS/1966 dan Hubungan Diplomatik dengan Israel, 5 April 2000.
everlasting wages war [melakukan perang] against Islam’. The goal therefore was for cadres ‘to know that there is a global conspiracy instigated by the enemies of Islam’, ‘to know the Zionist strategy toward Islam’, ‘to recognise Israel as a Zionist state’ and ‘to know how Islam/the umat Islam is able to prevail over the latter two issues’. But those were hardly controversial ideas, which meant that there generally was less need for restraint in the official stance.

The party’s proposed amendment to Paragraph 29 of the Constitution displayed the risks of its adaptiveness. PK’s promotion of the Plural Clause was in line with its rationalisation of the jihadist motive but inevitably it was hypocritical. The Medina model on which it was based stood for a plurality consisting of a Muslim-headed protectorate with Jews and Christians free to carry out their faiths. ‘Liberty’, the PK statutes asserted, was ‘a value implanted’ into humans, holding that an ‘intact life rested on’ liberty. To bring about the unity of the Medina society, its Constitution guaranteed citizens rights. These liberties comprised ‘religious liberty’, the ‘liberty to carry out good adat’, ‘liberty from poverty’, ‘liberty from repression’, ‘liberty from fear’ and ‘liberty of opinion’. Its advocates, however, either omitted or downplayed that the Medina Charter sanctioned religious plurality but ruled out full equality between the religious communities. The statement by Hidayat Nur Wahid touches on this predicament without spelling it out:

The Prophet issued the Medina Charter connected to the position of non-Muslim Medina citizens, especially the Jews...[and] non-Muslim groups to obtain the guarantee of justice to carry out their religion. This will guard the integration of the Medina nation, which consisted of various tribes and religious adherents, even though the Muslim people were the majority. And the Prophet was the role model [qudwah, Indon. panutan] in all matters... The Medina Charter is the guarantee of national integration and equality (sameness in face of [di depan] a plural society). (Italic in original)

An exception among a very uniform PK leadership was Daud Rasyid, one of the party’s more forthright doctrinaire leaders, who urged his colleagues to support the Shari’ah Clause. This promised to be more popular and honest because the praise for

201 Manajemen, p. 157.
the Medina Charter was misguided. More bluntly than other PK leaders, Daud spelled out that it was the Muslim community that ruled during the lifetime of the Prophet. He thus called on his party to ‘take up the lead’ in the Reform Faction to strive for the Shari’ah Clause:

Because its [PK’s] raison d’etre [asal-usul] is the struggle to implement Allah’s system on earth... [T]he Medina Charter needs to be understood in its context. A misunderstanding in this matter could obstruct a struggle that has been pursued for decades. First, the ruler at that time was Islam. The head of the state was the Prophet... Even though Islam was not spelled out, in fact, Islam held power.

The Plural Clause thus was a typical case of ideological innovation only taken up because of external necessities. Fear of acceptability motivated such modification. As such, it had not been an original part of PK’s ideological outlook but came about as a result of adapting it to outside circumstances, in which parts of Muslim constituencies expected Islamist parties to support the Shari’ah Clause, while secular Muslims and non-Muslims regarded such support as polarising, with the latter rejecting it categorically. The existence of independent power groups in PPP and PBB meant that any modification of ideology threatened to create internal conflicts. In PK, though individual leaders had differing opinions, no such independent power groups existed, which meant that modifying the ideological stance toward support for the Plural Clause did not lead to observable tensions.

At the same time, Fraksi Reformasi’s stance on the Plural Clause inadvertently illustrated that Islamists are unable to take on liberal positions if this means the acceptance of secularism. There was little compelling argumentation in Fraksi Reformasi about how the state was to become involved in the religious life of non-Muslims. As a pluralist party, PAN officials promoted a guarded interpretation of the legal implications of the term ‘obligation’ in the Plural Clause. They preferred to say that the wording would refer to the individual responsibility of the various communities and that ‘obligation’ would not mean that the state ‘issued sanctions’

This, of course, was not PK’s reading but the purely strategic value of the Plural Clause rendered such lack of clarity irrelevant.

The Plural Clause suggested a separation of significant sections of national law according to the teachings of respective religions and put the state in charge to execute these teachings. The first aspect brought it—as the Shari’ah Clause—at odds with modern constitutional law. Philosophically and technically, the Plural Clause was an inappropriate formula with loose ends. It asserted a vague pan-religious agenda on the basis of radical anti-secularism. Illustrating that it was not viable to be religiously indifferent, Patrialis Akbar, a PAN MP, proclaimed in the MPR that ‘we have to settle on [menyepakati] that there is no place for non-religious people to live in Indonesia’. In the 2001 session of the MPR, Fraksi Reformasi gave an indication of the impasses its proposal contained:

With this wording we give space/an opportunity [ruang] and an obligation [kewajiban] to everybody to carry out the religion he or she adheres to. The Muslim community has the obligation to carry out [melaksanakan] Islamic teachings, Christians are obliged to carry out the Catholic or Christian teachings; it is the same with the adherents of Buddhism and Hinduism. If the Indonesian nation consists of more pious human beings, whatever religion they adhere to, the...quality, image...and prestige of the Indonesian nation will improve.

Unlike other religious sources, the Qur’an laid down a number of definite rules of conduct and commands. Islam’s historical progress has been rather coherent and its tradition has been left comparatively intact since its genesis in the 7th century. Above all, the belief in the interpenetration of religion and state power has remained forceful in Islam. This is different with Christian teachings, Buddhism or

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206 Fraksi Reformasi’s lack of clarity over the precise legal implication of the term became particularly evident as in some of its proposals a passive wording of the Charter clause is used (‘obligated’ [diwajibkan]), ostensibly to de-emphasise the role of the state. The initial proposal was: ‘every adherent of religion is ‘obligated’ [diwajibkan] to carry out [melaksanakan] the teachings [ajaran] of his/her religion. It was entirely unclear to whom religious adherents are obligated. The final proposal put the clause from Article Three into Article One of Paragraph 29. It also used an active syntax, which was closer to the original “seven words”.


Hinduism. The Plural Clause eternalised Medinan religious life of the 7th century as if enlightenment and secularisation never happened to Christianity. The suggestion that religious communities other than Muslims could be ‘obligated’ to carry out their creeds, of course, is false. This is despite that various Christian community leaders reportedly expressed sympathy for the idea, naturally attracted to the gesture of compromise and, perhaps, the stipulation to increase morals in society.

Underscoring the—unsurprising—Islamic predisposition in the Plural Clause as in other policies has been the unilateral definition of broad values such as ‘justice’ (keadilan). In Islamist thinking, justice only exists where religious obedience has been accomplished. Because understanding of the term ‘justice’ was embedded in the Qur’an, by definition, for Islamists justice only existed in the Islamic context. The Qur’anic imperative was to ‘act justly because this is what is closest to piety (taqwa).’

The aim to bring about ‘justice’ was a mirror image of the dogma of ghazwul fikri which proclaimed that global oppression of Muslims has led to injustice. Though PK situated its opposition toward political repression in general terms, ultimately, tyranny and the message of ghazwul fikri were two sides of the same coin. PK stressed the Islamist liberation rationale in saying that God has expressed approval for just rulers and contempt for tyrannical rulers. Mankind had to be liberated from all forms of tyranny. Yet ‘actual justice’, Hidayat Nur Wahid emphasised, was ‘of divine origin [ilahtah], [something] that is religious, evolving from religious and moral values’. It had to do with the ‘fundamental principles’, supposed to prevent ‘anything that is tyrannic [zalim]’ as Islam prohibited any activity that ‘kills the soul

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209 As a set of beliefs, modern Christianity appears to have little in common with early Christianity. This is unlike Islam’s historical continuity. See, for example, Lewis, Historical Overview.
210 PK leaders have been fully aware of the separation between church and state in creeds other than Islam. Interviews, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 23 October 2000; Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. Acknowledging the profound historical and philosophical differences between the religious traditions, the purpose of the Fraksi Reformasi’s proposal—other than a tactical—becomes inexplicable altogether.
211 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 29 August 2000. The whole Qur’anic passage states: ‘And never shall your hate against something make you act unjustly because justice is what is closer to piety’.
212 HR Ahmad (Hadith). Quoted in Manifesto Politik, reprinted in Sekilas, p. 13.
213 Manifesto Politik, in Sekilas, p. 9.
[membunuh jiwa]’. 214 Hence, justice ‘liberates, whereas tyranny [kezhaliman] shackles [membelenggu]’. Justice was ‘light’, and tyranny was ‘darkness’. 215 Pivotal for this view were the Qur’anic warnings that tyranny and injustice inevitably would come about as a consequence of secular rule and the resulting disregard of morals. In sum, it stipulated that ‘[t]he infidels [orang-orang kafir] are the tyrants [zhalim]’. 216

As such, PK epitomised the archetypal Islamist claim that the only way to bring about justice ultimately was through shari’ah rule. ‘Islamic law’, Mutammimul ‘Ula brought this conviction to light, ‘has an intimate connection [memiliki kandungan yang sarat] with the theme of justice’. Islam was not only a ‘value system’ but also comprised a ‘methodology’ (minhaj) for the execution of its teachings. Every nation’s ‘value system’ had ‘the same and universal ideals’ such as ‘justice, order and peace’. Even so, these value systems would fail to provide a ‘comprehensive accomplishment methodology’ ("metodologi pencapaian" yang memadai) as ‘only Islam has a comprehensive methodology fitting with the human condition [fitrah]’. Islam’s big advantage was the lucidity of its principles and clear judgment of right and wrong. Other confessions shared similar moral and ethical aspects but only parts of their traditions could be translated into laws. 217

Reflecting this conviction, PK’s agenda contained a paradox in the promotion of non-Islamist values and the application of these values for specific situations and directives. Referring to non-Islamist principles such as ‘justice’ and ‘security’, the party in fact merely promoted the perceived advantages of shari’ah law. While the rhetoric suggested a common acceptability of these values, its elaboration and adaptation into real situations very often evolved around explicit Islamist patterns. That is, the technical specifics to adapt general values have been pre-formulated in the Islamic canon and, as such, were deeply imbedded in the minds of their proponents. The starkest example of this duality was the predilection for criminal law

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214 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 12 April 2001. In order to understand the meaning of ‘justice’, Hidayat argued, it was necessary to understand the origins of the Qur’an’s use of the term (ibid).
216 Jati Diri, in Sekilas, p. 25.
and the interpretation of punishment directives. In a just world, PK leaders believed, the state carried out strict *hudud* directives as a deterrent to criminals, to achieve its goal of an orderly society. Irwan Prayitno argued:

> As for the concepts, they are already standard *[baku]*, for example ‘justice’. What remains is the medium. Stealing—hand will be cut off. Whoever kills—is killed. If in ancient times with a sword, today there is the electric chair. These things can still be discussed but the concept is justice... We have thousands of corrupt men in Indonesia. Sentence one and the others will be afraid.\(^{218}\)

This view illustrated that, despite the frequent advocacies of independent reasoning, PK leaders preserved various mediaeval traditions in the elucidation of Islam. Ironically, while Islamists time and again have been lamenting over the West’s perception of Islamic law as cruel, most often these traditions dealt with *shari’ah* rules on punishment. Its clear directives made Islam the most efficient weapon against corruption and weak law enforcement. Salim Segaf argued:

> Already in effect *[in Indonesian law]* are marriage, the hajj, zakat and banking. But we also want criminal issues *[masalah pidana,* to be covered by *shari’ah]*... Those stealing become more and more audacious, those robbing, too, become more and more audacious. All become more audacious because there is no legal certainty. And it is not possible that we ourselves can bring this about. It must be through laws from the state... If somebody kills, and there is evidence, *[he/she]* has to be killed. Except if the family *[of the victim]* forgives *[him/her]*. That is what is needed. If not, things may get chaotic. This means all aspects together are linked to the involvement of the state.\(^{219}\)

A comprehensive and consistent application of Islamic edicts would evade the social costs in Western democracies caused by frequent revisions of laws and lengthy, unproductive debates in parliaments. Because of this efficiency, Islamists claim to defend an exceptionally rational point of view.\(^{220}\) In the long term, the ideal outlook, therefore, was a decreased need for political debate. Mutammmimul ‘Ula argued:

> When Islam prohibits something that is it; parliament does not have to debate it anymore. Hence the low *[social]* cost. No back and forth. No more political conflict, *[no more]* conflict of ideas *[gagasan]*... Islamic law is simpler *[sederhana]* and

\(^{218}\) Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002.

\(^{219}\) Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001.

\(^{220}\) Interview, Mutammmimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.
more efficient. Morality lives and questions that are already certain don’t have to be
discussed again. 221

PK ardently upheld the Islamist ideal of confining political authority to men of
acknowledged religious values and knowledge. The ideal holds that, eventually, an
‘advisory body’ committed to Islam, in Pipes’ words a ‘within-the-family
consultation’, had to assist the head of state in drafting laws that were of secondary
importance or which had to be adjusted from time to time. 222 An ideal government
merely consisted of an executive and a judicature; the legislative was not superfluous
but had strictly limited powers. The only task of the head of state was to implement
Islam and this made his rule legitimate. As with other Western values, democracy
was ultimately viewed as a Divine privilege; following this logic it thus cannot be
based on popular sovereignty. As PK MP Syamsul Balda pointed out, Islam
demanded leadership by male Muslims most ‘capable’ of performing independent
reasoning to establish laws without ‘amending’ God’s law. 223 He wrote:

There is no state without a legislative organ. It is the same with the Islamic state. But
in the Islamic state, public law and private law are in the power of those who are
capable of performing ijtihad that is to establish law, which is based on a foundation
of law [hukum induk] and does not amend these fundamental laws. Every time
period has its own problems and the legislative body will issue fatwas in accordance
with legal penalties...as already determined by the Quran.

This view leads to the peculiar Islamist logic that democratic processes are laudable
if people voted for “qualified” candidates, leading to strong Muslim representation in
parliament, and a democratic government was commendable if it enacted legislation
based on the Qur’an and Sunnah. Echoing this, Anis Matta wrote, ‘[t]he joy [of
democracy] has a price’. 224 As democracies may bring seculars to power, they
produced undesirable by-products which violated Islamic and, following the Islamist
appeal to broader religiosity, human ethics. 225 It was the state’s task to ensure that
people use their liberties responsibly and measured them. But a responsible dealing
with liberties only existed where humans perceived themselves as ‘moral beings’

221 Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.
222 Pipes, Today’s Islamic Movements.
March 2002.
225 Among the most often cited “destructive” liberties was sexual freedom, particularly homosexuality.
Matta, Menikmati.
(makhluk moral) whose thought was firmly based on the conviction that they would have to account for all deeds before God.\textsuperscript{226} Mutammimul ‘Ula pointed to this persistent and profound dilemma by arguing that in the Western view ‘liberty’ (kebebasan) was an ‘innate human right’. ‘But not so in Islam! Liberty in Islam essentially is coupled [terikat] to submission toward Allah!’\textsuperscript{227} Such avowals once again pointed to the Islamist impossibility to recognise the existence of a secular morality. Fear of God was an indispensable provision in bringing about a law-abiding, and thus free and just society.\textsuperscript{228}

 Democracies inevitably caused or prolonged “captivity” in secularism and thus injustice because they bear the risk of bringing secular parties to power. The reason that states descended into dictatorships or yielded to Western interests was because they adopted ‘Godless leadership concepts’ in which ‘Divine revelation [wahyu]’ had been ‘replaced by reason’ and the ‘Divine law’ by ‘worldly law’.\textsuperscript{229} This thesis of the inherent deficiencies of democracies cited the most prominent Islamist ideologues such as Mawdudi, Hasan al-Turabi or Rashid Ghannoushi. In almost identical fashion, Syamsul Balda argued:

In...a condition, in which a leader who successfully roused the emotions of others to vote for him/her to become the chief executive of a state, and, because of this is able to reach the status of a deity [dewa], the natural consequences are tyranny and exploitation, which definitely will happen.\textsuperscript{230}

 Democracies, Syamsul repeated another typical position of these sources, implemented the will of the majority of a people. But Muslims were merely

\textsuperscript{226} Jati Diri, reprinted in Sekilas, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{227} Mutammimul ‘Ula, Mencari Akar Sekularisme, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2001, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{228} See also Ridho, Jihad, pp. 11-23. The author quotes the Qur’an (16: 51) and (al-Ma’idah: 26) calling on humans to fear God only.
\textsuperscript{230} Balda, Moralitas, p. 19. The idea behind this view is that voting would not impose a sense of moral obligation on rulers like a religious oath (bay’ah). The oath would obligate the ruler to implement Islam which necessarily meant that he acted justly. Just rule, in turn, ensured the loyalty of the people. This is a standard Islamist argumentation. Syamsul Balda, “Bentuk Pemerintahan Masa Kini”, PeKa Online, 23 October 2001; Interviews, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April 2001; Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 April 2001.
obligated to implement and carry out the revealed will of God. The PK statutes gave evidence of the prevalence of this ideal:

Allah as the holder of all power wishes mankind to be His representative or vicegerent \[khalifah\] on earth. Therefore, mankind may assert its power as long as this is used only to fulfill His will. Thus the status of government in a state is, according to Islam, organised on the principle of people’s sovereignty \[kedaulatan rakyat\] to realise God’s sovereignty \[kedaulatan Ilahi\].

In sum, PK was committed to democracy as the best political system in a Muslim society beset by “ignorance” whilst anticipating that elections in a society freed from “ignorance” will automatically put virtuous Muslims into power. Democracy as an end in itself, without a larger purpose, remained little more than a dictatorship based on injustice. Muslims, and indeed human beings, would only be free under Islamic command, which in itself epitomised justice. Once in power, Islamists would install Islam as prime philosophical reference for national law. The state was only left to deal with the clarification of an absolute legal norm for particular situations and issuing laws for non-Muslim communities on the basis of their religious teachings provided that they broadly harmonize with Islam. The moral and philosophical truth of the government’s ideological underpinnings is no longer open for discussion because a majority of Muslims has been convinced of its truthfulness and superior quality.

Yet it was central to PK’s political culture that \textit{dakwah} programs first had to succeed in convincing people of the benefits of Islamic ruling so that they vote for a party promoting \textit{shari‘ah} rule. ‘The yardstick for the aspiration of the people’, Hidayat

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item PK members reiterated the standard Islamist position that Islam would not recognise an obligation to following the will of the majority although it did not explicitly reject the principle of majority rule. People’s sovereignty would ‘not be in opposition against’ \textit{(tidak bertentangan)} the meaning of \textit{syura}, and the existence of a parliament (i.e. the DPR) could be regarded as the complying with the Qur’anic consent to consultation as a means to overcome differences. \textit{Jati Diri}, reprinted in \textit{Sekilas}, pp. 35-6. Therefore, democracy was not the ideal system but, despite its flaws, it was still the best solution in the current circumstances. Syamsul Balda, \textit{Prinsip Negara Islam}, October 2001. http://www.peka.or.id/zoom.php?id=11&bcd=1&th=01&bl-10. Another obstacle for Muslims to become active in democratic processes was that \textit{a hadith} prohibits Muslims to draw attention to themselves, for example, through self-nomination. Syamsul Balda, \textit{Bentuk Pemerintahan Islam Kini}, 23 October 2001, http://www.peka.or.id/zoom.php?id=16&bcd=2&th=01&bl=10. The author conceded that it is difficult to fulfill this ruling in the process of finding qualified candidates.
\item Jati Diri, reprinted in Sekilas, p. 34. Mawdudi had earlier coined the term ‘popular vicegerency’ to emphasise that the only legal authority was God.
\item Interview, Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.
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Nur Wahid highlighted his party’s democratic commitment, ‘is the elections. Obviously, more people have voted for PDIP and Golkar. This means people have never thought about writing Islam into the Constitution’. Working to re-accustom Muslims to a kaffah Islamic life-style also meant to acknowledge more openly than Masyumi legatees the gulf between the umat Islam and Muslims who desire the rule of shari’ah law.

This chapter thus portrayed PK as acting on a clear separation of political strategy and ideological commitment; of short-term goals and end objectives and with a propensity to disengage controversial aspects of its beliefs from the public discourse. The party’s unbending worldview has been juxtaposed by moderation and conciliation in day-to-day political behaviour. Its gradualist strategy targets on an Islamic social transformation through a strong commitment toward dakwah activities. It holds that these endeavours need to show substantial progress in the larger Muslim community before a profound engagement with Islamic political goals can be undertaken.

The Islamist model of PPP and PBB, by comparison, acted on a narrower missionary scale and impetus with little mentioning of guiding all humankind to Islam. PPP and PBB comprised dakwah divisions as most Islamic groups of reasonable size do. These dakwah divisions had a modest scope and ambition so little attention has been given to the reverie that the Islamisation of society might some day advance to a degree in which any elections confirm Islamist parties in power—with the unuttered next step being that people would then hopefully regard democracy as superfluous. Some individuals in these parties might share this quixotic goal but it plays no role in party agendas.

All Islamist parties anticipated that a general reform agenda would be more beneficial for the June 1999 elections. They therefore curbed shari’ah themes and other agendas deemed unpopular or endangering them of being branded extremist. Initially, PPP sought to gain Islamic credentials through the restoration of the Islamic

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party base and the party symbol only. The party approached the June 1999 election with a non-Islamist reform agenda and a number of issues which had formed a significant part of the party’s Islamic identity during the New Order. PBB also suppressed its *shari‘ah* agenda because it thought that promoting general political reforms will get the party more votes.

The most important of agendas that brought Islamist parties in danger of being labelled extremist was their position toward religious minorities. The Islamist stance remained connected to the idea that Indonesia is a ‘Muslim country’, with the need for Muslims to be in control over public affairs. Islamist appreciation of the national idea is, to an important extent, subject to this perception. With their domestic orientation, PPP, PBB and other Masyumi legatees, however, had a more outright protective stance over national unity than PK. The chapter showed that while the Muslim nation dogma persisted in all Islamist parties, they went to some lengths to portray themselves as tolerant and pro-pluralist. PK made the most systematic attempt as the party went into a coalition with a pluralist party and proposed a pluralist variant of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter which, however, was impracticable; an impracticability the party was aware of and which underscored its strategic character.
CHAPTER SIX

BETWEEN IDEALISM AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGE:
PRAGMATISM PREVAILS

Islamist parties faced the challenge of finding a balance between promoting religious ideology and making the most of the chances provided by power politics. In 1998, reformasi had brought about the long-awaited opportunity to regain political power. This chapter will argue that, ultimately, the achievement of political goals was of more immediate relevance than ideological ideals.

Illustrative of this was the Islamists’ shifting support behind ideologically diverse candidates for presidency. The Islamist parties’ recognition of ideologically opposed governments again underlined their strong constitutionalism. Their willingness to support contenders for the presidency to whom they were ideologically opposed was at the same time coupled to the latter’s willingness to give Islamist MPs powerful positions in their cabinets. Short-term goals were thus of more urgent importance than long-term goals; a matter Islamists often explained with the predominance of constitutional rulings over ideological principles. This chapter gives particular attention to the Islamist parties shifting support from B.J. Habibie to Abdurrahman Wahid and eventually to Megawati Soekarnoputri’s presidency and explains the motives behind their actions.

As Islamist parties were strongly opposed to Megawati’s Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (‘Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle’, PDIP), they wanted to diminish that party’s chances of winning the election and securing the presidency for Megawati Soekarnoputri. In the circumstances of 1998 and 1999, Islamist parties saw Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (‘Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’, ICMI) Chairman and Soeharto’s last Vice-President, Habibie, as their best chance in the presidential race. When Habibie’s prospects dimmed, however, Islamist parties shifted their support behind Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (‘National Awakening Party’, PKB) Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid to thwart Megawati’s bid for the presidency. Despite this, these parties later depicted Abdurrahman’s
presidency as a failure and worked to bring about his downfall. In early 2001, parliament set up a commission to investigate Abdurrahman’s alleged mishandling of public funds. Though the cases were widely seen as insufficient basis for impeachment, Islamist parties and Fraksi Reformasi pressed ahead and eventually called on the MPR to initiate a Special Session to determine the President’s fate. The MPR removed Abdurrahman in July 2001 and Islamist parties voted to support Megawati as his replacement with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP) Chairman Hamzah Haz as her deputy.

For constitutional Islamism the practical imperative often came about as a consequence of political participation. It is different in countries such as Saudi Arabia, where the application of shari‘ah has not been framed by constitutional confines. Obtaining less than a fifth of parliamentary seats in the 1999 elections, Islamist parties had very little prospect of amending the Constitution to include the shari‘ah. Accordingly, the last day of the final MPR session on 10 August 2002 returned Paragraph 29 on ‘religion’ to its original wording following a decision through mutual consultation (musyawarah). The paragraph states in Article One: ‘the State shall be based upon the belief in the One All-Powerful God’; and Article Two: ‘the State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion and belief.’

Despite the small chance of success, Islamist parties defended shari‘ah issues and the Jakarta Charter during various MPR sessions from 2000 to 2002 while at the same time stressing their firm constitutionalism. Hamdan Zoelva said in the MPR:

\[\text{I think we have to explain to the public...that eventually we will accept the decision...made through democratic mechanisms...whatever the outcome is. This is our understanding of democracy. If we early on threaten each other, we do not learn}\]

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1 Poplarly known as ‘Buloggate’ and ‘Bruneigate’, the commission investigated the President’s use of 35 billion rupiah from the Logistic Affairs Agency Bulog and a donation of 2 billion rupiah from the Sultan of Brunei. “Buah Kekompakan Politik”, Forum Keadilan, 10 June 2001. This led to two so-called memorandums against the President. The first memorandum accused Abdurrahman of having violated the ‘presidential oath’ (Paragraph Nine of the Constitution) and an MPR decree to fight corruption (Resolution XI 1999). Hereafter, Islamist factions became increasingly assertive and allied with Golkar to issue a second memorandum in late April 2001. “Aksi Koboi Terantuk Megawati”, Tempo, 1 April 2001.


3 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003.
about democracy... Because of this, we emphasise again that we convey and agree with the aspirations of [those sections of] society that want the inclusion of ‘the seven words’ in Paragraph 29, Sub-Paragraph 1. This is our position. I think this is... appropriate, normal, there is nothing to be feared because this is the way we enact democracy, this is the way we understand this nation’s diversity. Eventually, when we take a decision... whatever the mechanisms, whatever the decision, we have to respect it.\(^4\)

When PPP Deputy Chairman Chozin Chumaidy addressed the MPR, he similarly said:

Please believe, the PPP Faction never thought in the slightest way [tidak pernah berpikir sedikit pun] about conveying its political struggle outside our democratic system. The PPP Faction will always pursue this struggle through the constitutional corridor.\(^5\)

The internal organisation of Islamist parties has mirrored the practical imperative. Religious Councils (Majelis Syuro) are supposed to ensure that Islamic principles are paramount. But almost inevitable they give greater priority to political expediency. This disparity was starkest in PPP which contained several high-ranking ulama in a separate council. In official statements, PPP politicians described the opinion of ulama as decisive for political decisions. But when the circumstances demanded the adoption of more expedient positions, the same officials downplayed the importance of ulama in a political party. They went further by pointing out that PPP ulama had never formed an autonomous religious body with an authority equal to that of Nahdlatul Ulama.

PPP debated religious issues in the Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (‘Party Advisory Council’, MPP), which comprised both ulama and other senior officials.\(^6\) Even though the MPP was officially on the same hierarchical level as the Central Board, its role remained largely symbolic.\(^7\) PPP ulama held that the “secular” name of the council was chosen in order to stress the difference from the Syuro Councils in non-

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\(^5\) Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002, p. 28. The dedication to democratic custom was also apparent in the attitude of Islamist MPs pleading for shari‘ah in the DPR and MPR, which was persistently calm and composed. “Soal Piagam Jakarta, Masyarakat Tidak Perlu Khawatir”, Tempo Interaktif, 8 August 2000.
\(^6\) Of the MPP’s 14 Vice-Chairmen in the 1998-2003 period, five had ulama status. Previously, from 1974 to 1979, PPP ran a Syuro Council that had more political clout.
\(^7\) Tellingly, there was not a single case in which the MPP and the Central Board differed. Interview, K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.
political organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and thus to emphasize a political party’s need to adopt positions flexibly. This argument was questionable. PPP’s flexibility was based on the political considerations of party strategists. In the words of MPP Chairman K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin:

The consideration...is that [in a political party] there is the possibility that political developments have to be taken into account. By contrast, in the socio-religious organisation, it is purely religion... If the religious fatwa says red, then it is red. In politics, to say three times two is six can also be four plus two. As for the Syuro Council, two times three is six. As for the MPP, which performs in politics, it is how much? Four plus two? Or five plus one? This is what makes the difference: the flexibility.8

Such statements reflected how, in practice, the verdict of the ulama tended to adapt to the circumstances and legitimise the course of the party executive. The ulama issued fatwa but adherence to them was not binding on the party leadership.9

Likewise, Masyumi never clearly defined the political authority of its religious elite. The Syuro Council, the 1945 statutes announced vaguely, would provide input and issue fatwas ‘any time this was seen as necessary’.10 As in post-1949 Masyumi, the Central Board of Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB) had much more political clout than the Religious Council. This division of power reflected Yusril’s perception of what a modernist party should be.11 The statutes defined the task of the Syuro Council as to ‘give input, both requested and not’ and to provide religious rulings ‘on issues which are fundamental and strategic’.12 This cautious description suggested that real power would rest with the Central Board and that the role of the Syuro Council would be to monitor in a broad sense the party’s policies.

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8 Interview, K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. The Lajnah Syuro ‘Ulama ‘il Ka’bah (‘Consultation Committee of Ka’bah Ulama’) was formally subordinated to the Central Board.
9 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001.
10 Anggaran Dasar dan Program Perjuangan Masjoemi, p. 5. The Syuro had real clout between 1945 and 1949; after 1949 its influence waned.
11 See Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme, p. 306, for a similar view on the role of Religious Councils in what the author defined as ‘modernist Islam’.
12 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 42. The role of the Religious Council was to ‘give its assessment’ (memberikan pertimbangan) to the Central Board and the DPR Faction. Interview, Sahar L. Hassan, Jakarta, 30 November 2001. It was common that the Chairman and the Secretary of the Syuro Council took part in leadership meetings. On explicit shari‘ah related and controversial matters such as whether non-Muslims may become party members, the whole council met. Yet there had never been a case in which the council objected to a decision of the Central Board. Also, the Chairman of the Syuro Council, DDII-based Mohammad Soleiman, had no particular expertise in jurisprudential matters. Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002.
In Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK), there was tighter relationship between its various internal bodies than was the case with other Islamist parties. The highest authority was the Religious Council. 13 Unlike in PPP and PBB, however, the Syuro Council consisted of members of all the other party bodies: the executive, the MPP (‘Party Advisory Council’) and the Shari’ah Board. 14 Politicians and religious leadership thus were directly interrelated which ‘makes it easier for us to interact and establish control’ and thus to guarantee obedience to party guidelines. 15 Overall, allegiance to policy decisions was seen as ‘very fundamental’ and the Syuro Council imposed tough sanctions if codes of conduct were breached. 16

Opposing Secularism and Megawati

The chances of the Islamist parties to win widespread acceptance of their religious ideology in the reformasi era were slight. It was of more important to them to prevent the secular-nationalist camp from dominating post-New Order politics. This was also a more realistic goal. In the period between May 1998 and the Special Session of the MPR in October 1999 that was to elect the successor to interim President Habibie, Islamist parties went to great lengths to thwart PDIP and prevent Golkar and elements of the former military elite from obtaining key positions in government. When PDIP emerged from the elections with 34%, it became the leading party, but it was not enough to ensure Megawati the presidency. Between the elections and the October 1999 MPR session, Islamist parties and Partai Amanah Nasional (‘National Mandate Party’, PAN) made a joint effort to prevent PDIP from turning its lead into a presidential election victory.

13 The 55-person Syuro Council was set up once every five years and met once every three months. Its main task was to discuss the elaboration of the general directives established by the party Congress, first held in May 2000. The Central Board only carried out the decisions of the Syuro Council, which were described as final. Although the President represented the party in public, he had much less real power than the executive Chairmen of other parties.
14 PK was the only party with a separate Shari’ah Board.
15 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 2000.
16 Interviews, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001; Mutammimul ‘Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 2000.
The political circumstances, of course, were profoundly unlike those that prevailed during the New Order. A major difference was that political fragmentation, the lack of a single dominating faction and a shared set of goals dictated by the *reformasi* mandate persuaded all parties of the necessity for broader cooperation and the overlooking of ideological differences. This was both the case in the lead-up to the 1999 elections and in its aftermath, particularly because its results led to a complex composition of parliament with 19 parties represented. Another factor was rooted in political culture. When the political circumstances allowed it, Indonesian cabinets traditionally embraced all major streams and allocated posts roughly in accordance with electoral shares. This inclination to share power has been one reason for the lack of a formal opposition.  

The practical motive for power-sharing arrangements was that most parties were extremely wary about the dangers of being excluded from lucrative cabinet positions, which gave access to much needed patronage funds. Moreover, they did not want to be seen as “oppositional”. There was wide acceptance that gaining prestigious positions in the bureaucracy or in parliament was the most pressing goal. Cadres traditionally expected party elites to be benefactors, using their powerful positions to collect funds and distribute them. As a justification to meet this demand, Islamist politicians invented the concept of *oposisi positif* (‘positive opposition’). Underlying the persistent wish to justify any policy with the Islamic tradition, they often related *oposisi positif* to the Qur’anic stipulation of *amar maruf nahi munkar* (‘to enjoin good and prohibit evil’). By doing so, they succumbed to the desire to play a part in power-sharing pacts while claiming to uphold a critical or ideologically pure stance.

A major challenge for the Islamist camp was the lack of a strong presidential candidate who represented their interests. Neither Hamzah Haz nor Yusril Ihza Mahendra enjoyed the public support of Abdurrahman Wahid or Megawati. Amien Rais was unwilling to stand for an Islamist party. Islamist parties thus were forced to support Habibie, the best candidate on hand in 1998 and 1999. The tendency for Islamist parties to snatch short-term goals in the bid to place Islamists in strategic

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17 This ‘consultation’ paradigm has been widely critiqued as *reformasi* also should have led to a clear distinction between government and opposition.

18 Confidential remarks by a PPP MP, October 2003.
positions had earlier been evident in the response to ICMI (established in 1990). Not Islamist ambition, but personal career advancement was the chief motivating factor for most ICMI cadres.\textsuperscript{19} A particular motive for Islamists to cultivate relations with ICMI had been that Chairman Habibie emerged as a potential future President. The arrangement between Habibie and modernist Islam, in which the Islamist camp was only a small component, was thus grounded in mutual pragmatic interest.\textsuperscript{20}

Habibie was an enthusiast for high technology and, though coming from a devout Muslim background, with little determination to foster Islamic ideology. Like the other main aspirants for the presidency, he was very unlikely to champion shari‘ah goals. Recognising this, Islamist parties focussed on promoting a candidate who could provide cabinet and senior bureaucratic positions as well as give some commitment to a number of umat interests. Habibie and ICMI were likely allies to enhance the number of committed Muslims in government institutions and the public domain and to introduce affirmative Muslim economic policies. Masyumi legatees in Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’, DDII) or Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (‘Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World’, KISDI), therefore, had earlier backed his rise up the ranks and bolstered his Islamic credentials.\textsuperscript{21} As ICMI Chairman, they asserted, Habibie ‘has already become an Islamic symbol’ and thus, as discussed in chapter three, supposedly a nuisance for the West. Claiming rewards for their support, Islamists often reminded their candidate that ‘part of the honour and the “image” [\textit{wajah}] of Islam have been entrusted [\textit{dipertaruhkan}] to the shoulders of Habibie’.\textsuperscript{22}

Again, realist short-term goals took precedence over idealist long-term objectives. When Habibie eventually took over as interim President on 18 May 1998, Islamist

\textsuperscript{19} Ramage, \textit{Ideological Discourse}, p. 224.
\textsuperscript{21} Aspinall, \textit{Opposition}, p. 91. Habibie lacked a mass following and, previously, was not affiliated with Muslim organisations. In 1993, Habibie said that he did not know Masyumi and what it stood for. Despite his indifference toward Islamist ideology, Habibie had a preference for ascetic practices and work ethics. Hefner, \textit{Civil Islam}, pp. 134-5; Porter, \textit{Managing Politics}, p. 93.
organisations stood firmly behind him, emphasising the constitutionality of the succession process and mobilising Muslim groups and militia for pro-Habibie demonstrations.\textsuperscript{23} They also argued that the law required Habibie’s term to last a full five years until 2003.\textsuperscript{24} During his tenure, Islamists, mainly from PPP, regained access to cabinet and the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. The party obtained two portfolios in Habibie’s ‘Reform Development Cabinet’: Hamzah Haz became Minister of Investment and A.M. Saefuddin, the Parmusi politician and DDII Deputy Chairman became Minister of Agrarian Affairs.\textsuperscript{25} These ministries enhanced PPP’s access to funding sources and promised a huge benefit in the form of contracts for party-aligned businesses.

But unequivocal support for Habibie’s presidential candidature at the 1999 MPR session soon proved electorally unattractive. The camp mostly affected by this was Bulan Bintang. PBB’s initial pro-Habibie stance was used by opponents to argue that it was ‘pro status quo’. It was claimed that, in its early days, the party had received funds from Soeharto. A particular negative factor was that Yusril had worked as a speechwriter for Soeharto in his final years in office.\textsuperscript{26} Overall, it was the Masyumi legatees rather than PK that were branded as sectarian and a potential threat to democratic life.\textsuperscript{27} These allegations in the Indonesian press were indiscriminate but they seriously undermined PBB’s efforts to gain wider support.

\textsuperscript{23} These comprised DDII, KISDI, BKSPPI, GPI and also factions of HMI, Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (‘Union of Muhammadiyah Students’, IMM) and PII. On 21 July 1998, together with an umbrella group named Komite Umat Islam untuk Reformasi Konstitutional (‘Committee of the Muslim Community for Constitutional Reform’), these groups demonstrated in favour of the constitutionality of Habibie’s interim presidency.


\textsuperscript{25} PPPs Jusuf Syakir was elected Vice-Chairman of the Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (‘Supreme Advisory Council’, DPA).

\textsuperscript{26} To save the credibility of the Chairman, the Bulan Bintang tabloid pointed out to party cadres that Yusril had neither been an active Golkar member nor was he involved in repressions against Muslims such as the Pancasila education programs of the 1980s. Moreover, the journal asserted that Masyumi leaders had agreed to all of the Chairman’s activities. For example, before joining the State Secretariat he had consulted with the old Masyumi leadership through Anwar Harjono who gave his approval. “Benih Fitnah Mulai Titabur’”, \textit{Bulan Bintang}, No. 1, August 1998, pp. 8-10.

\textsuperscript{27} Electorates were told that the party would represent rigid Wahabite Islamism and, in case of electoral victory, prohibit local religious customs.
Soon after the election returned a disappointing result for Islamist parties, the PPP politicians Zarkasih Noer and Faisal Baasir urged Amien Rais to lead a loose alliance of Islamist parties in nominating an alternative presidential contender. Once again underscoring the dearth of broadly popular Islamist leaders, they preferred Amien as alternative contender instead of Hamzah Haz, because the former was more ‘marketable’ and ‘more making news’. This led to the formation of the Poros Tengah (‘Middle Axis’), comprising PK, PPP, PBB and PAN, which together made up about 20% of electoral votes and held 140 of the 500 MPR seats. Cooperation between Middle Axis members did not go beyond a mutual dislike of Megawati and PDIP. Associates wavered between sentiments of Islamic brotherhood while aiming to secure personal and party interests. Underscoring the Middle Axis’ limited nature, Islamist leaders tried to give the impression that it was solely Amien Rais’ project. The alliance was however a success in preventing Megawati from becoming President, regardless of its pragmatic origins.

Whereas Amien Rais and several PPP leaders increasingly identified themselves with the Middle Axis, PK and PBB remained cautious. PK leaders, in particular, had sober views about the motives of their colleagues. They saw the plain, power-related

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30 The alliance was temporarily renamed under the neutral ‘Fraksi Reformasi’ to facilitate affiliation with PAN and parts of PKB. It also was another attempt to identify Islam as reformist in opposition to Golkar and PDIP, which were branded as status quo parties. Both PKB and PPP had refused to join the alliance under the name ‘Islamic faction’. PKB officials feared a fall-out with PDIP and many PAN officials believed a formal Islamic affiliation would contradict the pluralist platform of their party. “Menakutkan Minoritas” (interview with PKB Chairwoman Khofifah Indar Parawansa) and “Kemunduran, jika Membentuk Fraksi Islam” (interview with PAN Chairman Abdillah Toha), Siar, 26 July – 1 August 1999. PPP appeared most eager to uphold the Islamic credentials of the alliance by defending an Islamic label instead of the neutral ‘Middle Axis’. “Masih Diwarnai Banyak Friksi”, Media Indonesia, 3 August 1999.

31 Some Islamist leaders claimed to have taken up earlier efforts to bring about a federation of Islamic parties, such as the Forum Utkuwhah Islamiyah (‘Islamic Brotherhood Forum’, FUI). Hartono Mardjono, “Fraksi Islam’ dan ‘Poros Tengah”, Republika, 28 July 1999. In fact, whereas earlier examples such as FUI were based on a more heartfelt idealism to save the “Masyumi spirit”, in the case of the Middle Axis, the sense of brotherhood seemed spurious as it was entirely triggered by external causes and practical motives.

objective as damaging their claim to fight for virtuous politics. In a revealing statement, PK declared that the Middle Axis consisted of parties with ‘different visions and goals’ and suspected ‘hidden agendas’ among its affiliates. There was no faith that the pact would last beyond any short-term goals. But seen from a ‘practical-pragmatic’ perspective, PK acknowledged its benefits. 33

Furthermore, prior to the June 1999 elections and then again when parties began negotiating possible alliances to secure a majority in the presidential election in October, opponents of PDIP raised the question of whether Islam permitted a woman to become President. Ironically, though PK appeared most doctrinaire on the issue, the staunchest advocate of a male President became PPP. At several stages, non-Islamist contenders of Megawati such as Abdurrahman Wahid were fuelling the dispute. 34 It first surfaced in late 1998 and, ultimately, re-emerged under different circumstances when Megawati appeared as successor to the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid in August 2001.

Eventually, however, both the doctrinaire Islamists and the pragmatists in PPP proved open to compromise. Earlier, in late 1998, the Kongres Umat Islam (‘Muslim Community Congress’, KUI) had asserted that most Muslims would oppose a female President. 35 This stance was forgotten when Islamist parties backed Megawati’s bid for presidency in August 2001. 36 Moreover, with the high possibility of PDIP doing well in the elections, it early on appeared damaging for party-affiliated ulama to declare allegiance to the rejection of a female President. As this would have put Islamist parties in danger of appearing inconsistent, each religious advisory board of Islamist parties issued a separate ruling. Yet only PPP made its stance public; PK,

33 Bayanat Tentang Poros Tengah dalam Sorotan, 17 September 1999.
34 In a bid to foster his own growing ambitions to become President, Abdurrahman claimed that the Muslim community could not accept a female Head of State. By doing so, he conveniently discarded his previous “liberal” stance on the issue.
35 The Congress, however, did not issue a fatwa (religious ruling) prohibiting women from becoming President. Instead, KUI declared that a new edict was unnecessary as the respective Qur’anic verses had a general trait. There was, therefore, no confirmation or ‘emphasis’ (penegasan) in the Islamic sources that women may not lead politically. Interview, K.H. Ali Yafie, Jakarta, 22 July 1999.
36 Most fatwa rulings have limited influence and in the case of the KUI recommendation, there was no tangible impact. Muslim organisations have often issued separate rulings, often strongly influenced by political interests. A NU ruling from 1997, for example, decided that women were allowed to become President. The verdict was necessitated by Abdurrahman Wahid’s backing of Soeharto’s eldest daughter “Tutut”, who was a presidential aspirant at the time.
PBB and the Middle Axis never divulged their position. Thus, the objection all Islamist parties had against Megawati based on her gender was apparently spurious. Much more important were power-related motives to oppose her presidency while most of those referring to a specific theological reason had anticipated backing down if the political developments required it.

The separation of ideological conviction and behaviour was also predominant in the attitude of PK. Weighing benefits and risks of gender-related polemics, PK understood that it would undermine its efforts to appear open and temperate. Moreover, as a new party likely to gain few seats in parliament, the insistence on dogmatic standpoints was likely to have little impact on parliament or national politics. Official PK listings of leadership criteria did not specifically rule out a female President. Instead, the party referred to non-Islamist values such as an ability to value different opinions; strong commitment to build a ‘civilised society’ (masyarakat madani) and a commitment to human rights. Internally, however, PK leaders believed that only men could become President. A legal ruling of the Shari’ah Council declared that it was ‘illegal [tidak sah] and forbidden [haram] to make women head of state’. Referring to the standard hadith on this matter (HR Bukhari), it pointed out that ‘if this law was breached, it will become one cause of the destruction of the nation [bangsa] and the country’. Pointing to the intrusion of Western lifestyle into Muslim lands, the council held that western feminism attempted to shatter this decree by ‘deliberately destroying Islam and the Muslim community, especially female Muslims [kalangan Muslimah]’. Salim Segaf, Chairman of the Shari’ah Board, commented on this apparent friction between Islamic ideal and political advantage by highlighting the matter-of-factness in PK’s constitutionalism:

38 Bulan Bintang leaders claimed that PDIP members had deliberately exaggerated the Islamist parties’ nit-picking in order to undermine their credibility. Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 12 July 1999.
40 Interviews, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 20 October 2001; Anis Matta, Jakarta, 13 June 1999.
41 Fatwa of PK’s Shari’ah Council on “Presiden Wanita” (“Female President”), Fatwa Dewan Syariah, pp. 104-6. Unlike several leading ulama and intellectuals in NU and MUI, the Shari’ah Council argued that female leadership was not a matter of different legal opinion but had already been rejected by what it called ‘Sunni ulama’ (ulama ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah).
A fatwa [from PK] based on Islam exists. But not a rejection from the party... According to Islam, leadership has to be by men. But we live in a country that has not [fully] implemented [tidak menerapkan] shariah. This is something we have to understand. We have to agree to the Constitution because we are a political party. [If] Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid] resigns, says the Constitution, Mega follows... If we keep rejecting this, rejecting that, people will laugh about us. They will think we have very narrow thinking... We are aware of the Constitution. We are also aware of the condition of society. Change surely will take place; it only needs time.}

This realist approach again underlined the party’s commitment to democratic principles and processes despite clinging to a different ideological ideal.43

Despite the openly antagonistic attitude of the doctrinaire Islamists in the Bulan Bintang camp to PDIP, PBB was similarly careful not to appear hostile. There were different views in the party whether a Megawati presidency had to be assessed from a theological perspective or not. Press and public often connected PBB’s stance to doctrinaire Islamists such as Sumargono. Yet the doctrinaire leaders, too, early on conceded that ideological conviction could not claim superiority over constitutional regulations. In July 1999, Sumargono anticipated that falling in line with the circumstances was the only option. He said:

As a Muslim, I have the conviction...that I am not allowed to change because it is definitive [qaty] that women cannot become imam [head of state]. A qaty issue only can be seen through the point of view of faith [iman]; [it] cannot be assessed through relative rational considerations. Hence, I am consistent not to support Mega [to become President]. [A]lso [because] of her skills and [her] very dangerous environment... It may well be that Mega becomes a puppet. I fear that a Mega government won’t be better than the New Order. [But] as a democrat, if later Megawati will be elected, what is there left to do... I will accept the situation. I will not make any threats; I will not revolt or anything. But the principle that she is not my leader will prevail. In case I will be offered to join her cabinet, I will definitely refuse.44

43 Other Islamist leaders close to PK supported this stance. Shortly after PDIP was established as the winner of the elections, PK’s presidential candidate Didin Hafiddhuddin argued that it was inappropriate to use gender argumentation to reject the candidate who had gained most of the votes. Didin quoted in “Calon Alternatif, Siapa Butuh”, Merdeka, 29 June 1999.
44 Sumargono quoted in “Umat Islam PDI-P Jangan Mau Diadu Domba”, Abadi, 22-28 July 1999. Around the same time, he pointed out that at the 1999 MPR session, Muslims may have to accept a leader who is ‘less than ideal’ and that ‘we probably still will be forced’ to vote for somebody whom ‘we don’t really want’. Ahmad Sumargono, “Masalah Kepemimpinan Nasional”, reprinted in Saya Seorang Fundamentalis, Global Cita Press, Bogor, 1999, p. 123.
Aware of the futility of the issue, most Keluarga Bulan Bintang organisations evaded public comment. They pointed out that Masyumi never clarified its position on female leadership and used this as an example for the party’s hands-off attitude.\textsuperscript{45} Realists in PBB also used the glib argument that other Muslim countries had female leaders, too.\textsuperscript{46}

It was only PPP that openly rejected female leadership, apparently in the hope of further emphasising its Islamic credentials. It was clear, however, that for both modernists and traditionalists, the gender of the President was a religious matter of secondary relevance.\textsuperscript{47} Ironically, it was the pragmatic NU-based politicians such as Hamzah Haz and Secretary-General Tosari Widjaya who openly rejected Megawati’s nomination. This was quite astonishing as neither had in the past raised theological impediments to female leadership. Hamzah, in particular was later ridiculed when, in mid-2001, he accepted the vice-presidency under Megawati. PPP’s ruling that banned women from the presidency was made public at a party meeting in March 1999, shortly prior to the elections.\textsuperscript{48} It proclaimed:

PPP holds that the national leadership to be entrusted \textit{[dipercayakan]} to the best Muslim son of the nation \textit{[putera terbaik bangsa yang Muslim]}... \textbf{PPP will nominate a presidential and or a vice-presidential candidate from the best party cadres after having heard the ulama’s fatwa.}\textsuperscript{49} (Bold in original)

\textsuperscript{45} Interview, M.S. Ka’ban, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. The only Masyumi legatee rejecting a woman as President was the PPII Masyumi. This was striking given the unresponsiveness of the original Masyumi toward the matter. Contradictions of this kind have also puzzled fellow Muslim leaders. Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 28 November 2001; “Tidak Masalah Presidennya Wanita”, \textit{Suara Merdeka}, 14 October 1999.
\textsuperscript{46} Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 12 July 1999.
\textsuperscript{48} This was the first National Leadership Meeting (Rapimnas) from 31 March to 1 April 1999. Another of those meetings shortly after the elections re-confirmed this decision while determining that PPP would now be willing to support a presidential candidate from outside the party. “Capres PPP Putra Terbaik Beragama Islami” (PPP’s Presidential Candidate is the Best Male Muslim’), \textit{Suara Pembaruan}, 16 June 1999.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Pernyataan Politik Pertai (sic) Persatuat Pembangunan: Hasil Rapat Pimpinan Nasional I di Jakarta}, 31 March-1 April 1999. The meeting itself did not come to a formal decision but followed Hamzah’s information that \textit{ulama} had decided to support a male candidate. Once more, PPP’s explanations of the ruling appeared sophistical. Officially, the \textit{fatwa} was described as only being a ‘recommendation’ from the MPP, which, nonetheless, had the ‘authority’ \textit{(bobot)} of a \textit{fatwa}. In this form, the ruling was presented to the Central Board. Interview, K.H. Endang Zainul Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. These hair-splitting explanations showed the awareness that the \textit{ulamas}’ ruling would become practically irrelevant if political circumstances demanded it.
It is clear that the ulama verdict was well timed in order to provide PPP’s campaign managers with the right ammunition to explain to Muslim constituencies why it was wrong to vote for PDIP. The Parmusi-based Chairman Rusdy Hamka recalled with a smile, “Megawati was rejected; then we campaigned on this. Indeed it [the fatwa] was merely for the sake of the campaign [Memang untuk kepentingannya kampanye saja].”50 Subsequent criticism of PPP, however, suggested that the party had promised to uphold its initial rejection as a matter of principle. But as Tosari Widjaya anticipated shortly after the June 1999 elections: ‘if later a woman is voted by the MPR, we [PPP] won’t run into the woods [lari ke hutan] but accept the realities’.51 The ulama verdict was thus a temporarily helpful device.

While PDIP and Megawati were the unequivocal foes, up to the start of the October 1999 MPR session that established Abdurrahman Wahid as President, Islamist parties had yet to commit themselves to a candidate.52 The pragmatic Yusril Ihza Mahendra wanted the Middle Axis merely to facilitate negotiations with either the Habibie or Megawati camp for future power arrangements. Abdurrahman only appeared as an alternative contender after both Islamist parties and Amien Rais had become irritated with the complacency of Megawati, and her failure to negotiate with other parties over future power sharing.53 In contrast to PDIP and Megawati’s aloofness, Habibie’s associates were willing interlocutors.54

50 Interview, Rusdy Hamka, Jakarta, 1 December 2002.
51 Interview, Tosari Widjaya, Jakarta, 30 June 1999. Expediency and the symbolic role of ulama were just as much at hand in the position of PPP’s main competitor PKB. Up to the 1999 MPR session, PKB anticipated an alliance or a coalition with PDIP. As such, PKB politicians necessarily declared that there were no religious reasons against a female President, even though a significant number of NU ulama opposed Megawati on theological grounds. Compare with Ulil Abshar Abdalla, “Megawati dan Islam”, Tempo, 26 October 1998.
53 At this stage, Hamzah upheld PPP’s position prior to the elections, insisting that the goal was not to prevent Megawati’s presidency, but because a woman may not become President. Leaders of other parties did not mention this. “Fraksi Islam takkan singkirkan Mega”, Terbit, 15 July 1999.
Yet between May 1998 and mid-1999, Islamist support for Habibie had steadily declined. Promoting morals in politics and the necessity to be on the ‘anti-status quo’ side made backing Habibie highly problematic.\(^5^5\) During his term in office, Habibie was strongly criticised for failing to bring New Order cronies to trial.\(^5^6\) This was despite the fact that under his leadership, the government liberalised party politics, drafted new election laws and began to revise the composition and status of the MPR and DPR. It also initiated a number of shari’ah regulations. In fact, Islamist disenchanted with the interim President often was based on practical political considerations rather than on dissatisfaction with his reformasi accomplishments.

The irritation was strongest among the doctrinaire Islamists among the Masyumi legatees and those with close links to “Islamic” sections of the army, most notably the PBB politicians Fadli Zon and Farid Prawiranegara. Little more than a month into his presidency, Sumargono complained that it was as if Habibie ‘had lost his image as a Muslim leader’.\(^5^7\) Habibie, Farid held in July 1999, had ‘disappointed us so many times’, so ‘we are not going to give a blank check to Habibie’.\(^5^8\) Of particular concern was the belief that Habibie had not prevented the dismissal of several “Islamic” officers and their replacement by what were considered Islamophobic officers. For the doctrinaire Islamists, this reshuffle was a plot against

\(^{55}\) The deterioration of the relationship between Habibie and Islamist parties became particularly apparent through a declaration in May 1999 in which PK, PPP and PAN together declared that they would abstain from supporting another Habibie presidency.

\(^{56}\) PK, for example, attacked the Habibie administration for its ‘conservative spirit’ and for being ‘hesitant’ in exposing corrupt cliques of the old regime. \textit{Pidato Politik Presiden Partai Keadilan Pada Peresmian DPW Daerah Istimewa Aceh}, 11 October 1998; \textit{Bayanat Tentang Komunike Bersama Antara PPP, PAN Dan PK, DPP PK}, Jakarta, 21 May 1999. Adding to this, Habibie affiliates were linked to the Bank Bali corruption case. Later, PK demanded from PPP to unanimously withdraw support for Habibie as to do so would be ‘non-reformist’. Underscoring the battle for reformasi credentials, the party held that any cooperation would cease if one of the signatories ‘disobeys the principles of the reform agenda’. \textit{Pidato Politik Presiden Partai Keadilan pada Peresmian DPW DKI Jakarta}, 27 September 1998.

\(^{57}\) This was because Habibie had not initiated an investigation into the high-profile killing of Muslims in Tanjung Priok, he had hesitated to free Muslim prisoners, he had not immediately allowed the formation of Islam-based parties, he acted against KISDI and PBB associates in the military, he was ‘too lenient’ with separatist (non-Muslim) movements in Irian Jaya and East Timor, and he did too little to contain pornography and alcohol. Speech by Ahmad Sumargono at the al-Azhar mosque, Jakarta, 6 June 1998 reprinted as “Evaluasi 47 Hari Kepemimpinan BJ Habibie”, in \textit{KISDI Menggugat}, (no publisher), Jakarta, 1999, pp. 53-7

\(^{58}\) Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 12 July 1999. PBB thus tried to discard the public view it would nominate Habibie for a second term. The first National Working Congress (Mukernas) in February 1999, therefore, announced to appoint a party cadre as candidate. “Calon Presiden Harus Kader Partai” \textit{Kompas}, 28 February 1999. PBB, however, did not pursue a clear position. At times the party definitely ruled out support for Habibie. At other times, it claimed to be neutral. “Yusril Ihza Mahendra: PBB tak Calonkan Habibie”, \textit{Kompas}, 10 March 1999; “Yusril Ihza Mahendra: PBB Juga Nggak Kurang Difitnah”, \textit{Ummat}, 26 April 1999.
their yearning to strengthen the number of allies in the army.\textsuperscript{59} The sacking of Prabowo Subianto as head of the army’s strategic command, Kostrad, was critical.\textsuperscript{60}

There also was pressure to officially recognise the merits of Natsir and other Masyumi leaders:

\begin{quote}
...Habibie...did not give any response to the proposal that the state acknowledges the merits of ...Islamic national fighters such as...Natsir and... Sjafrudin and honours them as National Heroes. Habibie also had not done anything with regard to the demand to rehabilitate the good name of Masyumi...\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

While this aroused fierce commentary from Media Dakwah and KISDI, the pragmatic Islamists were more cautious in their response. Yusril, in particular, had been more lenient with Habibie and was anxious for PBB to stay out of military politics. This heightened frictions with those Bulan Bintang leaders who, disappointed with Habibie, accused Yusril of ‘having deserted Prabowo’.\textsuperscript{62}

In PK, greater restraint over political strategy facilitated a more even-handed and unemotional stance. One prerequisite for PK’s presidential candidate was not having played any negative role in either the Old or New Order.\textsuperscript{63} To boost the party’s claim to foster virtuous politics, PK nominated Dr. Didin Hafidhuddin, a lecturer from the Agricultural Institute in Bogor and a board member of DDII. Didin had written widely on matters of exegesis and was considered an expert on alms tax. A familiar name in Islamic study circles, Didin was never likely to draw a big public following. He rarely appeared on TV and had a very serious, dour demeanour. But winning the

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{60} “Habibie Menyerang Prabowo, Sumitro Prihatin”, \textit{Tempo}, 1 March 1999. In February 1999, President Habibie gave his version of the events leading to Soeharto’s fall, asserting that Prabowo had planned a coup against the government. Fadli Zon and Farid, however, repeatedly insisted that Prabowo was among Habibie’s most loyal supporters. Both men had initially hoped that Habibie would become President and Prabowo Head of the Armed Forces.
\textsuperscript{61} Evaluasi 47 Hari. Also Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 13 July 1999 (the President shortly later complied with this wish, see chapter three). Moreover, PBB claimed to have only received 1 billion rupiah from the government for campaigning whereas another party comprising several Habibie associates such as Adi Sasono, allegedly had more than 500 billion rupiah at its disposal.
\textsuperscript{62} Cited by Mohammad Soleiman. Interview, Jakarta, 29 September 2000.
\end{quote}
presidency was not the purpose of his candidature. To nominate a non-party member was to illustrate the party’s claim for political virtues and was a statement of principle ‘aiming to develop an image of national leadership’.

PPP was openly split on its presidential contender. For most of the time until the 1999 MPR session, its position remained unclear. Officially, PPP was reluctant to support the Habibie presidency. This hesitation was because Habibie endangered PPP’s strategy of presenting itself as a major advocate of reformasi. MPP Chair Jusuf Syakir wrote:

B.J. Habibie wanted to proceed but we knew Habibie’s weakness, [he] could not get away from Suharto. This was hard... To support Habibie was not logical, because he clearly was New Order, [there were] many who could not accept [him].

Nevertheless, due to the lack of alternatives, Habibie always remained the candidate promising the most benefit for Islamist parties. At the 1999 MPR session, PPP and the Reform Faction admonished him in their formal responses to his accountability.

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64 Didin had appeared reluctant to accept the nomination but eventually approved in February 1999. He never took on party membership, though. Unlike other parties, PK painstakingly gave insight into the process that led to the nomination of Didin and published a booklet for this purpose titled Pemimpin Yang Membawa Cahaya (‘A Leader who conveys Brightness’). Other nominees were listed as: Deliar Noer, PPP’s A.M. Saefuddin and—a blatant indication of the party’s flexibility—Nurcholish Madjid. The decision to halt Didin’s candidature was made in October 1999 after it had failed to receive any substantial response and because of the substandard election result. PK then urged Amien Rais to run as candidate. Bayanat Tentang Partisipasi Partai Keadilan Dalam Kabinet Persatuan Nasional, DPP PK, Jakarta, 29 October 1999.


66 Through characteristically ambiguous and cautious statements, Hamzah Haz said PPP would not support Megawati, but this would not mean backing Habibie. “AM Saefuddin: PPP mendukung Habibie sebagai Capres”, Kompas, 24 June 1999. At the same time, Hamzah appeared unwilling to support Amien as the Middle Axis’ candidate. Other PPP leaders chastised his indecisiveness. “Fraksi Islam lirik Amien Rais”, Tekad, 12–18 July 1999, p. 15. “Fraksi Reformasi Calonkan Gus Dur”, Kompas, 7 October 1999. Moreover, some PPP leaders insisted on nominating a party cadre, Hamzah did not rule out a candidate from outside the party. “‘The Real King Maker Baru”, Adil, 21-27 July 1999. At the same time, PPP Chairman A.M. Saefuddin, a long-time Habibie associate from ICMI, and PPP’s youth organisation Pemuda Ka’bah (‘Ka’bah Youth’) openly supported Habibie and urged all Islamic parties to do so as well. In mid-June 1999, Saefuddin announced that the party would only wait for the right moment to declare its nomination of Habibie. Pemuda Ka’bah urged PPP’s MPR faction to reject a candidature of Megawati as there remained doubts about her Islamic credentials. “GP Ka’bah dukung capres Habibie”, Pelita, 19 June 1999.

67 “Terserah Amien dan Gus Dur” (interview with Zarkasih Noer), Star, 26 July-1 August 1999.

68 Syakir, Arsitek Utama, p. 390.
speech. Nonetheless, Islamist leaders urged Habibie to maintain his candidacy. When this failed, they tried to convince Amien to proceed—something he steadfastly refused. It was, however, only Abdurrahman Wahid who could draw votes from the PKB Faction away from Megawati. Despite this, all Islamist parties waited until the last moments to steer their support toward Abdurrahman, which revealed their deep mistrust of him. Internally, PBB was divided over whether Yusril should withdraw his own nomination. The party faced the dilemma of whether to accept Megawati, as her election may have allowed Yusril to get the vice-presidency. This was the preferred option of the pragmatic Islamists. Such considerations were intriguing given the previous determination to thwart a Megawati presidency. It showed how short-lived ideological principles could be if lucrative political opportunities came within reach.

To a larger extent than Habibie, support for Abdurrahman Wahid could not have been based on the hope that his government would accommodate an Islamist agenda. Although Abdurrahman had played to Islamist sentiment in the run up to the presidential elections and the natural affiliation arising from Abdurrahman’s credentials as an Islamic scholar and leader, Islamists sanctioned his nomination because of his solid popular mandate and his reputation as a democrat.

It was at the same time apparent that practical considerations had overruled previous key policies. Backing Abdurrahman sat uneasily with the Islamist claim to be

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69 Interviews, Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000; Mohammad Soleiman, Jakarta, 29 September 2000. Many Islamist leaders of all parties continued to have a high opinion of Habibie. PPP, according to Mietzner, had already set up Habibie’s formal nomination. General Session, p. 46.

70 The shift toward Abdurrahman only happened after Amien Rais and Hamzah Haz refused to be nominated.


72 The unabated suspicion was nicely illustrated by the last-minute presidential nomination of Yusril. Islamist leaders feared Abdurrahman could at the last moment play foul and withdraw, thereby giving the presidency to Megawati unopposed. At the same time, the rivalry and apparent lack of trust between Middle Axis members caused PBB to conceal Yusril’s nomination, fearing it could be misunderstood as treachery. Rather than explaining to suspicious allies the tactical benefit of Yusril’s candidature, PBB stepped ahead unilaterally. “Hartono Mardjono: ‘Gus Dur Saya Sumpah’”, Forum Keadilan, 31 Oktober 1999.

73 They thus urged Yusril to uphold his candidature. Soleiman, Bukan Politikus, pp. 373-9; Interview, Mohammad Soleiman, Jakarta, 29 September 2000. Hartono Mardjono was decisive in convincing Yusril to withdraw and to make way for Abdurrahman.

74 He, for example, suddenly said that the push for shari’ah or an Islamic state was understandable. I am grateful to Dr. Greg Fealy for this point.
building up a healthy political system by rejecting popular but inexpert community leaders.\textsuperscript{75} An additional factor was the President’s bad health, arguably breaching a Qur’anic requirement for leadership. Notably, in an article from April 1999, the PK leader Anis Matta had mentioned physical health, in particular good eyesight and hearing as one of four prerequisites for a leader according to Islamic teachings.\textsuperscript{76} Physical criteria, however, were not listed in the requirements for the presidency stated in the party’s statutes. This suggested that in the more public political statements, Islamist parties were more selective and pragmatic in choosing their demands. For example, they downplayed theological provisos anticipating an Abdurrahman presidency. Moreover, though all Islamist parties had promised to oppose military participation in politics, they all pragmatically accepted the presence of retired officers in key cabinet and senior bureaucratic positions.\textsuperscript{77}

During Abdurrahman’s term there was very scant criticism, especially officially, about the low priority his government gave to implementing shari’ah.\textsuperscript{78} Islamist critiques against the President dealt with an alleged breach of reformasi issues and a number of ideological issues that guaranteed wide support from ordinary Muslims. The shari’ah-related critique was mainly restricted to within the parties. At the centre of the openly stated criticism were typical reformasi issues such as the failure to overcome the economic crisis, the administration’s unclear strategy to halt regional conflicts and failure to undertake resolute measures against corruption.\textsuperscript{79} Underscoring the alleged breach of non-Islamist reformasi issues, Islamist leaders proclaimed that the President ‘similar to Soeharto’ positioned his associates in the financial and economic cabinet posts and the bureaucracy in order to advance and financially back his political power.\textsuperscript{80}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Abdurrahman was the very opposite of the desired team-player and technocrat. He has regularly displayed indifference for policy details and disinterest in fields such as economics.
\item Anis Matta, “Sang Pemimpin”, Sabili, 7 April 1999.
\item Altogether, six ministries went to former officers. For example, the former Head of the Armed Forces Wiranto became Coordinating Minister for Police and Security, Surjadi Sudirja Minister of Internal Affairs and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Minister for Mining and Energy.
\item His government only issued two decrees, one on the coordination of zakat administration and one regulating the financial management of the government’s pilgrimage services.
\item The official critique of Islamist parties thus corresponded with that of most neutral observers.
\item Mashadi, “Gus Dur dan TNI”, Suara Keadilan, November - October 2000. Reflecting these allegations and characteristic Islamist concerns, PK called for a disclosure of private assets of all members of Abdurrahman’s new cabinet including the President and his deputy. Siaran Pers
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Masyumi legatees most clearly linked the supposed failures of the government to issues of national unity while underlining their own reformist credentials and representational claims. PBB stressed its bond with the 1998 student movement and the reformasi mandate by holding that Abdurrahman ‘disappointed us all, disappointed all children of the nation’. He had failed to comply with reformasi goals, the party stressed, ‘which were fought for by our comrades the students and all reformist groups’. 81 The President’s claim that several provinces would break away if he was dismissed exploited the issue of national unity and showed that he was ‘mesmerised’ (terpukau) by the ‘mirage of power’. 82 His dismissal was a ‘bitter pill’ that had to be accepted in order to continue reformasi, to protect national unity and the Constitution, which were threatened ‘as a consequence of the actions and undertakings of the President’. 83 Similarly, PK leaders held that Abdurrahman’s actions suggested a deep gulf between his reputation as an advocate of Indonesian democracy and his actions as President. 84 Later, in a dramatic yet ideologically neutral statement, PBB called on parliament, the MPR and the army and police to ‘save the people from the dictatorship of the power-holder’, asserting that if this were not immediately anticipated, it may cause ‘the destruction of the Indonesian state and its people’. 85

This sort of critique was misleading. In previous years, the doctrinaire Islamists, in particular from DDII, had vehemently campaigned against Abdurrahman as an ally of Christians and socialists and their perceived protégés in the military and

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intelligence. Not surprisingly, the doctrinaire leaders pre-emptively nurtured a negative attitude toward Abdurrahman’s presidency.⁸⁶ ‘We already knew exactly who Gus Dur was’, PBB Deputy Chairman Kholil Ridwan remarked, ‘we only feared that Megawati would become President.’⁸⁷ Highly suspicious of Abdurrahman’s wide relations outside the Muslim community, the doctrinaire Islamists were openly dismissive that PBB had joined the Middle Axis and supported Abdurrahman.⁸⁸ Qadir Djaelani said soon into his presidency in February 2000:

...I tell my colleagues in PBB that the general MPR session was not the victory of the Middle Axis but the victory of the Axis Ciganjur...the Ciganjur group cannot be separated from Benny Moerdani and Benny cannot be separated from Jews and the US. This is a mathematical calculation.⁸⁹

PBB’s affiliated organisations DDII and KISDI strongly echoed these suspicions. Hussein Umar, for example, argued in Mediah Dakwah:

Rarely the Muslim community and the Zionists cheer together. But when AW [Abdurrahman] was elected President...this really happened. The Indonesian Muslim community was happy, so were the Zionist leaders of Israel. This is not strange, because AW has been long known as a close friend of Zionist community leaders.⁹⁰

With these firm suspicions, it is not surprising that Islamist parties suspected the President and his inner circle to have a secret agenda, for example in its bid to drop the ban on leftist ideologies. Again Qadir Djaelani:

The election of Abdurrahman Wahid...is the starting point [titik cerah] to open a large chance for the Marxist movement... (H)e is a Marxist... As President [he] took great action for the Marxist-Leninist/Communist movement to rise...again in Indonesia. Starting with the apology to Xaxana Gusmao (President of East Timor/[and the] Marxist Fretilin), [the] apology to remnants of...[the] PKI for the killings of NU people in 1965 to 1967; the order to...Yusril Ihza Mahendra to meet expatriates of...[the] PKI overseas, efforts to abolish TAP MPRS

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⁸⁶ The chief concern was to keep all options open, reflected in statements such as that PBB would ‘not support and not reject’ Abdurrahman’s candidacy. Hartono Mardjono quoted in “'Ping-Pong' Poros Tengah”, Tekad, 16-22 August 1999.
⁸⁷ Interview Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001.
⁸⁹ Qadir quoted in Negara Islam. The term ‘Axis Ciganjur’ (Poros Ciganjur) referred to Abdurrahman’s home address south of Jakarta and implied his suspicious relations with a large number of non-Muslims.
No.XXV/1966...[the] nomination of Marxist cadres for high office [elite kekuasaan] both civil and military...the import of rice from Chinese merchants [cukong] which eliminates rice farmers... Those actions are useful and in line with class conflict theory in Marxism, to instigate a social revolution as prerequisite to bring...Communism to power.  

Such blunt allegations, however, were rare in official statements, arguably in order not to obstruct the daily work in parliament. Yet in one—less explicitly worded—example, PBB also formally alleged a systematic attempt by the government to trigger social unrest and indirectly called it a communist-sympathisant. The party stated:

There is a chain of statements and deeds of the President that definitely will lead to wider and deeper social divergence [kesenjangan] and which can be interpreted as attempt to provide scope [lahan] to pull off class conflict between societal sections, which indeed is the main art in the method [sendi metode utama] of the communist struggle.  

PK leaders shared these reservations but, typically, did not say so publicly. The party was similarly circumspect in stating ideological reasons for its attacks against PDIP and Abdurrahman. It held that to abolish the legal ban on leftist ideologies would endorse the spread of communism which was ‘anti-democratic’, ‘uncaring of human rights’ and irreconcilable with the Indonesian principle of monotheism. Nonetheless, echoing the Bulan Bintang camp, PK officials also asserted that dropping the ban on communism was ‘a strategic step to draw the support from

93 In April 2000, this difference in attitude led to a disagreement between the Media Dakwah and PK. The tabloid had reported that PK would actively back the President and organise mass demonstrations to support him; a claim that prompted a plainly worded reply from PK: “PK Tetap dukung Gus Dur” (“PK still supports Gus Dur”), Media Dakwah, March 2000 and “Tanggapan DPP Partai Keadilan”, Media Dakwah, April 2000.
94 PK argued on non-ideological terms, holding that to abolish the ban would require changing the Preamble of the Constitution. This was also the argument of PPP and PBB. Pernyataan Sikap Tentang Pencabutan TAP MPRS No. XXV/MPRS/1966 Dan Hubungan Diplomatik dengan Israel, DPP PK, 5 April 2000.
former PKI cadre and...Javanese syncretic Muslims which until now were in PDIP' to join PKB. At the MPR session, PK had only backed Abdurrahman’s candidature as a very last resort. Although officially the whole Reform Faction nominated Abdurrahman, only PAN leaders signed the formal declaration. PK MPs approved tacitly. Eventually, in the 1999 MPR session, they voted for Abdurrahman only after an instruction by the party’s board. At the same time, the party appeared to have anticipated that the ideological divergences would inevitably become evident. An official statement shortly before the presidential election pointed to Abdurrahman’s ‘unique character’ and almost apologetically added that he often insulted the feelings of the Muslim community. Whereas official statements were cautiously worded, personally PK leaders distrusted Abdurrahman because they believed his government would strongly resist the strengthening of Islam in state institutions and the Constitution and play in the hands of Islamic foes. This reservation included his

...extraordinary network among socialists. Among the socialist-seculars and the Christians there are huge fears regarding the rise of Islam. These groups need Gus Dur as a guarantee to prevent this. Because from the outset Gus Dur did not benefit [menguntungkan] Islam.

Roqib Abdul Kadir, a PK MP with a NU background said, in a rare case of open shari’ah-related critique:

To imagine the government of Gus Dur will carry out shariah is impossible because Gus Dur himself is a supporter of secularism who separates religious issues from government...there has not been a single instruction released in accordance with the

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95 Mashadi, Gus Dur. 
96 Abdurrahman’s closest ally in PK was the party’s first President Nur Mahmudi Ismail. Nur Mahmudi came from a traditionalist background and he had studied at the pesantren Salafiyah al-Islah in Bandar Kidul, which is managed by NU. He mediated between the Middle Axis and those ulama in East Java who initially had rejected Abdurrahman’s candidature. Taking up Mahmudi’s family affiliation with NU, he was able to reduce misgivings with regard to the motives of the Middle Axis and initial suspicions that PK promoted a “heretical”, anti-Sunni, theology. Bayanat Tentang Kunjungan Presiden Partai Keadilan Ke Pesantren Langitan Bersama Gus Dur, DPP PK, Jakarta, 2 September 1999. Abdurrahman later even offered Mahmudi a senior position in PKB. 97 Confidential interview with a PK MP, Jakarta, October 2000. 
98 Bayanat Tentang Poros Tengah Dalam Sorotan, DPP PK, Jakarta, 17 September 1999. 
99 Interview, Mashadi, Jakarta, 8 February 2001. Among the President’s most distrusted advisors were Marsilam Simanjuntak, Hendardi and other leaders of secular NGOs.
hope of the Islamic community... Gus Dur is written down as the President who has most often disappointed the Muslim community.\(^{100}\)

Given the misgivings PBB and PK had toward Abdurrahman prior to the presidential election, it is clear that they had neither expected nor prioritised the implementation of *shari‘ah* issues. In supporting him, they subordinated their ambition to realise *shari‘ah* to the pursuit of political power and non-Islamist goals. They proved to be dogmatic about short-term objectives such as stabilising the economy, battling corruption or inner security issues and flexible about their long-term ideological agenda. This priority was likely to have prevailed if the Abdurrahman government had been more successful in achieving non-Islamist goals.

Illustrating this, none of the commentary in PK’s journal linked critique of the government to a failure to implement *shari‘ah*. Tellingly, it was the party’s ideologue Abu Ridho who assessed that ‘not a single reformist mandate had been observed conscientiously’ by Abdurrahman.\(^{101}\) A highly eclectic thinker and idiosyncratic leader, Abdurrahman was anathema to PK’s leadership ideal, which demanded cogent and transparent management. On several cases, the frictions between the President and Islamist parties revealed opposing attitudes toward the rule of law with Abdurrahman willing to bend and, at times, breech regulations if it suited his interests.\(^{102}\) Fahri Hamzah’s critique encapsulated PK’s political culture:

>[Gus Dur] is called a *kiai* by his adherents. But if we look at him—how can we be loyal to somebody like him?! He lies every day, he changes his mind every day; he confuses everyone. Let him be a kiai, let him be a wali [local Islamic saint]. [We] campus people are critical people!\(^{103}\)


\(^{103}\) Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April 2001. Another illustration of this culture was that the PK leadership prohibited party cadres from exploiting Abdurrahman’s alleged outer-marital affair. “PK Larang Kadernya Sebarkan Isu Perselingkuhan Gus Dur”, *Suara Merdeka*, 3 September 2000.
A precondition to back Abdurrahman, of course, had been that he would supply Middle Axis parties with positions in cabinet.\(^\text{104}\) However, whereas PBB and PPP endeavoured to place their leaders into all post-Soeharto administrations, PK, despite also clinging to the principle of *oposisi positif*, declined to be considered for cabinet positions.\(^\text{105}\) This was another illustration of the party’s political culture and, in the case of Abdurrahman’s presidency, an expression of early scepticism. This stance, however, appeared to have been abandoned when former PK President Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail accepted the offer to become minister without consulting the party leadership, thereby putting his party in an awkward position.\(^\text{106}\) PK explained the change of heart by arguing that the ‘recommendation’ to continue to abstain had included the qualification that ‘if the government resulting from the SU MPR 1999 does not have (sufficient) legitimacy; is weak and unstable because of pressure from various sides’. The Abdurrahman government, it then insisted, was ‘legitimate and strong’ because it was a ‘reconciliatory government’ that included all political camps.\(^\text{107}\) This qualification, however, was not mentioned in the earlier statement from September 1999 that had ruled out participation. Moreover, such a positive assessment contradicted the qualms held by PK leaders about Abdurrahman and his inner circle of advisors.

In particular, Middle Axis parties disliked the fact that Abdurrahman had offered Megawati the vice-presidency and thus foiled PPP’s hopes for Hamzah to take that position. This was interpreted as an early sign that the President planned to disregard deals.\(^\text{108}\) Having thwarted PPP from getting the vice-presidency, a compromise was found in which Islamist parties settled for Megawati by ensuring several cabinet positions.\(^\text{109}\) Islamist parties and Fraksi Reformasi ended up with eight ministries.\(^\text{110}\)

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\(^{104}\) Both PPP, PAN, PBB, PK, PDIP, PKB, Golkar and the military received ministries. This arrangement between ideological camps, the Middle East expert Bromberg noted, was without parallel in the Muslim world with the possible exception of Lebanon. Daniel Bromberg, “Dissonant Politics in Iran and Indonesia”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 381-411.

\(^{105}\) *Poros Tengah*, 17 September 1999.

\(^{106}\) Nur Mahmudi remained PK’s only minister in all cabinets between 1998 and 2002.


\(^{108}\) Hamzah was particularly interested in the vice-presidency because Abdurrahman’s poor health could have meant that he had to resign prematurely, in which case the deputy would have replaced him.

\(^{109}\) “Kabinet Buah Kompromi”, *Panji Masyarakat*, 3 November 1999. There was fierce competition over ministries in order to ensure access to funds. See Marcus Mietzner, “Abdurrahman’s Indonesia: 288
The curious alliance, however, got off to a bad start. In November 1999, Hamzah and Yusril were unexpectedly accused of having received 14 billion rupiah from accounts of the bankrupt Bank Bali for election campaigns. Whereas Yusril was cleared, Hamzah resigned in mid-November.

Aside from this, it was not without irony that the government’s policies substantiated several Islamist suspicions. The President’s personal choices for senior bureaucratic appointments were seen by many Middle Axis members as strategic steps to strengthen the ‘socialist-leftist’ or the ‘Sino-Christian’ camp. Often, these choices had precedents in the New Order, a matter that Islamists, especially in PK, highlighted rather than revealing ideological suspicions. Furthermore, there was indignation about the perceived display of apathy toward regional conflicts and social woes, in particular if Muslims were the victims. Islamist parties were especially unforgiving toward the President’s claim that there had been merely five Muslim casualties in the Maluku conflict. He also appeared to display a carefree attitude toward the archetypal Islamist foes of communists and Jews. This validated initial worries that with Abdurrahman’s presidency ‘the conditions have become

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13 Abdurrahman’s Islamist critics asserted that he had protected conglomerates which ‘clearly had been cronies of the New Order’ and that he had placed New Order figures such as Sofyan Wanandi and Emil Salim within his team of economic experts. In late 1999, the President appointed Sofyan, a Sino-Indonesian, and businessman and PDIP leader Arifin Panigoro as heads of a new economic board and, curiously, named the former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, a prominent opponent of Islamism, as national economic advisor. In January 2000, Marsilam Simantanjuk and Bondan Gunawan, two leaders of the secular think tank Forum Demokrasi (‘Democratic Forum’) became presidential secretaries. Fahri Hamzah (ed.), *Inilah...Satu Dekade Kontroversi: Tabel-Tabel Kontroversi Abdurrahman Wahid Periode 1991-2000*, CYFIS Press, 2000.

14 This critique was linked to Abdurrahman’s unreasonably large number of overseas trips. Islamists, at the same time, suspected that the President aimed to foster ties with left-leaning governments such as the Brasilian. Interview, Mashadi, Jakarta, 8 February 2001.

15 Ula, *Mempreteli*. 289
more conducive for Zionists’ and that he had ‘embraced’ Marxists, Christians and Jews overseas while ‘alienating pious and consistent Muslims’. Islamists felt particularly embarrassed by widespread negative reporting in Arab newspapers about Abdurrahman’s policies. These issues, apart from rising internal tensions in PBB (chapter two) further reduced Islamist support for the government.

The government’s lenient approach toward separatist movements enhanced Islamist sensitivities on issues of national integrity, particularly because it matched their theories of infiltration by Western nations and their domestic allies endeavouring to weaken or even break up Indonesia. This had, for example, become evident in the President’s approval for Irian Jaya to change its name into Papua and financing a Congress that discussed a scenario for independence. Suspecting a global dimension to domestic issues, some Islamists alleged that the government was attempting to extend the influence of the Jewish gold industry in the region. Much of the Islamist parties’ critique, however, appeared to be self-serving. Rarely did they provide sound alternative concepts to overcome these challenges. For example, they appeared reluctant to comment on the resumption of military operations in Aceh in 2001 and the numbers of Muslim casualties.

Despite the growing dissatisfaction with Abdurrahman’s presidency, Islamist parties for a long time maintained their reservations about Megawati and PDIP. At the 2000 Annual Session of the MPR, PDIP and the TNI faction had continued to oppose crucial amendments to the Constitution and to introduce direct presidential elections.


118 Nur, Dunia Islam; Mutammimul ‘Ula, “Prasyarat Rekonsiliasi”, Suara Keadilan, September 2000. In addition, Abdurrahman appointed Henry Kissinger as one of his personal advisors and accepted membership of the Shimon Peres Foundation. Islamists like to point out that Kissinger was of Jewish descent and allege connections to the Freeport McMoran Corporation, which operates in Papua, purportedly pursuing an anti-Islamic agenda.
To find a loophole that allowed the dismissal of Abdurrahman while preventing Megawati succeeding him, Islamist parties began to consider ways to amend the constitutional provision that power must be handed from the President to the deputy in the case of former’s incapacity.119

*The Imperative to Secure Political Goals*

From February 2001 onwards, Islamist parties began to exhibit a sympathetic attitude towards Megawati. They started pointing out that Muslims needed to understand that the Constitution determined Megawati to be the rightful successor to Abdurrahman.120 Realising that Islamists were willing to seek new power arrangements in a post-Abdurrahman era, PDIP started to court Islamist parties and PAN. Megawati went on a much-publicised *haji*, embarked on the *umroh* (a less formal pilgrimage) and, in an important gesture, invited Ahmad Sumargono to accompany her. Islamist leaders interpreted this as an effort on PDIP’s part to increase Megawati’s Islamic credentials and to accommodate Middle Axis parties for future power-sharing arrangements.121 PDIP and Megawati appeared determined not to repeat their unreceptive attitude of the 1999 MPR General Session.

The calamities of the Abdurrahman administration made it easy for Islamist parties to point out the relative strengths of Megawati. In a sudden change of rhetoric, she now was praised for her willingness to listen to others and seek consensus. Her

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119 Paragraph Eight of the Constitution states: ‘If the President passes away, resigns, or is not able to fulfill his/her obligations during his term in office, he/she will be replaced by the Vice-President until the end of his/her term’. Endeavouring to prevent a Megawati presidency in the case of Abdurrahman’s downfall, some Islamist leaders favoured to temporarily allocate power to the MPR presidium, which should take over the President’s role while preparing the election of a new President. “Yusril Ihza Mahendra: Paling Krusial Amandemen Pasal 8 UUD 1945”, *Kompas*, 13 March 2000; Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001.

notorious reticence and passivity, previously held against her, now were portrayed as assets. Her intellectual abilities were no longer scoffed at. PK’s President Hidayat Nur Wahid, for example, declared that a taciturn President was preferable to one who constantly uttered controversial statements.\(^{122}\) Overall, PK continued to trade long-term ideological goals for short-term political goals. Declaring its support for a Megawati presidency, the party demanded adherence to the constitutional process and a devotion to ongoing non-Islamist reforms as conditions for its support.\(^{123}\) The support for Megawati did not include the prerequisite to give shari‘ah laws more priority.

Likewise, M.S. Ka’ban held that Megawati’s team and advisors indicated the new government would be more effective than the chaotic team of Abdurrahman. Most significantly, fears that Megawati and her backers might discriminate against Muslims were now depicted as exaggerated.\(^{124}\) This change in rhetoric was stunning given that, by early 2001, the PDIP leadership had not significantly changed since 1999. Opting for political advantage, those doctrinaire leaders who had remained in PBB after the 2000 split proved their fortitude in opposing the nationalist-seculars to be of secondary relevance if political advantages were attainable. Yet at the same time, the Islamist camp made it clear that support for Megawati was limited to until the 2004 elections. They also warned her not to forget that the Middle Axis and, in typical rhetoric, the “Muslim community” would help her to get the presidency.\(^{125}\) This was, once again, hardly a compelling argument, given that Islamist parties together had received less than 20% of the Muslim vote in the elections.

PPP, in particular, tried to cloak support for Megawati as having strong Islamic sanction. To argue its case and, particularly, its readiness to approve Hamzah Haz’s vice-presidency in a Megawati administration, the party followed the casuistical reasoning that has become a trademark of traditionalist pragmatism. ‘A law’, PPP

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\(^{124}\) “H. MS Kaban, SE., M.Si: Tak Ada Jalan Lain, Memorandum II”, Buletin Bulan Bitang, 1 April 2001, p. 11.

\(^{125}\) Sumargono quoted in “Jika Mega Jadi Presiden Adil-lah Terhadap Umat Islam!” (“If Mega becomes President, she has to treat the Muslim community fairly!”), Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 April 2001, p. 12.
ulama argued, ‘is determined by its cause’ (hukum ditentukan oleh sebab)’ and further pointed out:

We were looking for a ground for whether the ideological basis [Islam] approves it [Megawati’s presidency] in an emergency situation. We asked this as a reversal of the problem. The ideological basis [Islam] determines that ‘there is a qualification in a situation like this: the terminology is crisis’. Because the law says so. Hence, in an emergency situation, the ideological basis affirms that Mega succeeds... Religion says that in every stance we take, the first consideration has to be which [position] brings about the bigger crisis. To seize the vice-presidency or not. Therefore, according to religious consideration, if the predicament is larger if we reject the vice-presidency, it means that we have to take it. These are the teachings of fiqh [kaidah fiquiyah].

Having previously de-legitimised a Megawati presidency because she is a woman, ulama now fell into line with the pragmatism of the Central Board and even ‘to the contrary held that the vice-presidency is a position that has to be seized because it is of great strategic value’. This time, they therefore legitimised the executive’s decision to go all out to promote Hamzah as Vice-President. Ulama also had the task of explaining the party line to PPP cadres and electorates in the regions. But it was held that once ulama had accepted the board’s position, it was easy to persuade traditionalist constituencies that the decision was well founded. The Parmusi camp in PPP had been less zealous in jurisprudential matters and was not affected by possible resentment of constituencies. It thus had more promptly geared up for Abdurrahman’s dismissal.

Of course, PPP officials made it clear that their support for Megawati and the readiness to join her cabinet depended on PDIP’s willingness to accept Hamzah as her deputy in the session of the MPR in August 2001. As the combined votes by Islamist parties in the MPR were not enough to guarantee Hamzah’s victory, PPP relied on PDIP’s support. Hamzah directly reminded her not to repeat

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127 Interview, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003.
129 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001.
Abdurrahman’s mistake of alienating those who helped him into power. Once the position of Vice-President had been filled, Islamist parties, the Reform Faction and PDIP could work on a compromise to share the ministerial posts.

Unlike Yusril and Amien, who continued to be on quite good terms with Megawati, Hamzah’s relationship with her had always remained cool. In 1999, unlike PBB or PK leaders, Hamzah had boasted of PPP’s rejection of Megawati. To mend relations, PPP MPs had lobbied PDIP since late 2000. Prior to the 2001 MPR session, negotiations further intensified. To put further pressure on PDIP, PPP claimed that NU’s constituency, infuriated over the actions against Abdurrahman, could be compensated with Hamzah’s vice-presidency as he also came from NU. In fact, NU-based PPP leaders feared a negative reaction from within the organisation against the party and, therefore, had been more careful in openly attacking the former President. Hamzah Haz, particularly, was chastised by colleagues for being meek. One of his critics recalled:

I said to Hamzah: no more of this! Even if Gus Dur makes five PPP cadres ministers, he cannot be trusted. It is a lie... It is indeed typical for Hamzah not to be confrontational. He is [always] inclined toward compromise. Hence, during the New Order he was always safe.

133 “Calon Wapres dan Kabinet yang Gemuk”, Tempo, 29 July 2001. PPP nominated Hamzah in a meeting one day before the MPR’s Special Session. Directly afterwards, Hamzah met Megawati one to one in order to overcome personal differences. Eventually, the PDIP vote split mainly between Hamzah and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. “Hamzah Haz, Merdeka!”, Tempo, 5 August 2001. The voting process needed three rounds to come to a decision.
134 Lobbying became especially important after Akbar Tanjung insisted on proceeding with his candidature. PPP MPs claimed that Akbar had previously agreed to support Hamzah and asserted that PPP had a natural right to get the vice-presidency, arguing that the party had previously not been considered appropriately according to its 1999 election results. “Alimarwan Hanan, S.H.: Politisi Kabah dari Bumi Sriwijaya”, Forum Keadilan, 12 August 2001.
135 Confidential remarks by a PPP leader, Jakarta, 2001. Other officials expressed similar views.
Thus, in the final weeks leading up to the special session of the MPR in July 2001, PPP appeared wary and hesitant to finalise the impeachment process. Ultimately, however, the yearning to get the vice-presidency for the party was stronger.

In the session, the PPP and the Reform Faction nominated Hamzah whereas PBB abstained. Almost half of PDIP MPs voted for Hamzah. This was a sign that the secular-nationalists opted for reconciliation rather than alienating Islamist parties as this could have set the government off to a bad start. PDIP needed a clear parliamentary majority and was anxious to minimise any antagonism resulting from Abdurrahman’s dismissal. It used Hamzah to win over any reluctant Islamists. The nature of the preceding arrangements became evident in the first Megawati cabinet, which was comprised of many members of the previous national unity cabinet and six members from Middle Axis parties.

As Chairman of the largest Islamist party, Hamzah had been the Islamist candidate for the vice-presidency with the best chance of success. This calculation also resulted in the support of Parmusi leaders. The reason for the unity among the PPP elite was the financial and patronage opportunities, which the vice-presidency opened, and the prestige to push through a PPP-based Vice-President for the first time. It was anticipated that constituencies would be thrilled about their Chairman becoming Vice-President and thus would be more likely to vote again for the party. It therefore seemed beneficial to prolong Hamzah’s chairmanship beyond his original term. When he was elected Vice-President in July 2001, his supporters pressed for guarantees that he would remain party Chairman, considering that it would enhance

136 Soon after his election, Hamzah went to East Java to court NU leaders and to promote reconciliation. The aim was to minimalise the damage the resignation of Abdurrahman had cost Hamzah and to win over NU constituencies to vote for PPP in the 2004 elections. In 1999, PPP’s share in East Java had dropped from 27 to 5 seats. “Menggiring NU ke Kandang PPP”, Forum Keadilan, 23 September 2001.
138 The danger that PPP will try to capture the presidency was rather small as Hamzah’s popular appeal was very limited apart from PPP’s NU constituencies. It appeared also likely that Amien Rais would not support such as step as he planned to get the presidency himself in the long run. Harold Crouch, “Drifting Along: Megawati’s Indonesia”, Australian Financial Review, 10 May 2002.
139 Among those was PPP Chairman Bahtiar Chamsyah, former head of the Bulog committee, and PAN Chairman Hatta Radjasa, a main negotiator among the MPR factions. PKB refused to be considered for the cabinet.
PPP votes at the 2004 elections. As a result, a PPP Working Congress in October 2001 annulled the 1998 National Congress decision to hold the next of those Congresses (Muktamar) in 2003 and postponed it until 2004, after the elections.

The elite’s pragmatism at that stage worsened tensions in PPP. Critics claimed the board of the 2001 Working Congress had been stage-managed to approve the postponement of Hamzah’s chairmanship. Previously, Hamzah had made conflicting statements about whether he was willing to be considered for another term. In addition, critics held that Hamzah had no scruples in becoming Megawati’s deputy while the party’s earlier promotion of a female President as prohibited by Islam appeared conveniently forgotten. A local PPP leader summed up the contentious aspects of Hamzah’s pragmatic leadership:

[In Islam, a leader has to stick to his word. Hamzah Haz, however, has until now been demonstrating his inconsistency as General Chairman... Prior to the elections in 1999, he exposed to the press that he would resign as Chairman if the outcome of the votes was below 20%... After... the votes... dropped dramatically... he remained unconcerned, as if nothing had happened. The Muslim community and Allah... will note that he perceived his [earlier] statements as nil. Hamzah’s incoherent [plintat-plantut] stance did not stop here. After... Habibie resigned and the presidency was fought over by Megawati... and Abdurrahman Wahid, Hamzah clearly stated ‘[it is] prohibited for a woman to be President in a nation such as Indonesia, where a majority of citizens are Muslim’. But when a slight chance opened [to gain] a power position for him after Abdurrahman... resigned and Megawati became President, Hamzah did not hesitate at all. Giving various grounds, Hamzah was ready to be elected and to accept the position as Vice-President, [the] substitute of the female President he formerly confronted vehemently... He [also] said [that he] was no longer available to be elected again if there was another cadre willing to become General Chairman... Hence, is this the kind of Islamic party leader which we have to fight for as leaders of the nation...?

141 In mid-2000 news had spread that Hamzah would not be available for a second term as Chairman. As usual, modernists and traditionalists each named their own candidates for succession. “PPP: Tidak Perlu Cari Kambing Hitam”, Kompas, 23 January 2002.
143 H. Fauzi, Gugatan Menuju Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP, 2003, pp. 7-8. The author was Chairman of PPP’s Yogyakarta branch and dismissed from the party because of this publication.
PBB’s shift of support to Megawati had some similarities with PPP.¹⁴⁴ In March 2001, PBB sent a maklumat (‘announcement’) to regional boards emphasising its devotion to the succession arrangements set out in the Constitution. At the same time, the party recognised that there were still different views in the Muslim community on female leadership ‘which are all based on compelling arguments and explanations’. By conceding that there remained differing viewpoints, PBB attempted to cushion possible disenchantment among more doctrinaire sympathisers. The maklumat concluded that PBB saw a leadership change from Abdurrahman to Megawati who ‘coincidentally is a woman’ (yang kebetulan adalah seorang perempuan) as ‘a matter of no choice’ (bukan merupakan pilihan) and conformity as a ‘constitutional necessity’ (keharusan konstitutional).¹⁴⁵ At the time of the succession, party leaders again stressed that any application of doctrine had to take place in a ‘national context’ (konteks nasional).¹⁴⁶ But in highlighting the temporary character of such arrangements, the Central Board expressed hope that it would only have to live with this compromise until the next general elections.¹⁴⁷

To further prepare its supporters for the policy shift, the central theme of PBB’s bulletin of 1 April 2001 was reconciliation between ‘Islam’ and ‘nationalists’, supported by several short articles and interviews. The contributors, however, were careful not to overstate the significance of the pact, stressing that adhering to the Constitution was not the same as to collaborate with the ideological foe. Once again, Yusril’s view was crucial for the party’s stance. One article pointed out that:

¹⁴⁴ In February 2001, Abdurrahman had purged relations with PBB when he dismissed Yusril from cabinet. Official reasons were alleged ineptitude of the judiciary and problems in the Immigration Department. A more important cause for the dismissal was that Yusril had verified that the investigative committee that geared up to sack the President could continue to work on legal grounds. Moreover, Yusril had argued that a special MPR session to finalise the dismissal could be held without issuing a memorandum. Saldi Isa “Sekitar Pemberhentian Yusril Ihza”, Republika, 14 February 2001.

¹⁴⁵ “Maklumat Nomor: A-478/DPP-Sek/12/21” reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 April 2001, p. 5 (bold in original). Also interview, M.S. Ka’ban, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. The document was sent to all regional and local party branches, party factions in the MPR, the national, regional and local parliaments and the boards of PBB-close keluarga organisations.


¹⁴⁷ Maklumat Nomor: A. The Syuro Council immediately approved the board’s decision. Its Chairman, Mohammad Soleiman, declared that if the Central Board had clarified its position and issued a maklumat, the Syuro Council would follow. It would refrain from discussing problems related to gender, as the current constitutional ruling would reflect a stance to which Indonesians had agreed on earlier. Soleiman quoted in “Maklumat Tawarkan Solusi”, Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 April 2001, p. 4.
...[as] Yusriil explains, PBB does not elect the President; Megawati automatically becomes president. So we DO NOT SUPPORT THE SECULAR NATIONALISTS but support the Constitution, which automatically installs Megawati as President.148 (Capital in original)

With initiatives such as the maklumat, the PBB board hoped to head off internal debate and thus possible frictions among regional branches and affiliated organisations. But the party had few troubles to gain acceptance for its policy, pointing to the example of Masyumi’s constitutionality and building on the deep dissatisfaction with the Abdurrahman government.149

Yusriil had earlier appeared as another possible candidate for the vice-presidency. However, by then PBB leaders had become more circumspect over the battle for positions, aware that the ongoing power struggles had irritated the public. Moreover, not all PBB branches supported Yusriil’s candidature. Whereas Megawati’s presidency was accepted as an emergency solution, parts of PBB did not want to see the Chairman as her deputy, as this was not a matter of constitutional necessity but could be freely decided.150

Islamist parties had begun to voice their support for shar’iah in the MPR session in 2000 (chapter five). In order to promote Hamzah as Vice-President, PPP now had to drop the debate on female leadership and to make concessions in its struggle for shar’iah. In the months leading to the Annual MPR session, scheduled for November 2001, rumours held that PPP would back down on the Jakarta Charter as part of a previous arrangement to smooth the relationship with PDIP and President Megawati. Henceforth, media and PDIP legislators took—or pretended to take—PPP’s dropping of the Jakarta Charter as abandoning the struggle to insert the Charter clause into Paragraph 29 of the Constitution.151

149 “Maklumat Tawarkan Solusi”, Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 April 2001, pp. 4-5.
150 Other cadres were sticklers for procedures, arguing that there was no previous party decision—in this case during the previous National Working Congress (Mukernas)—to approve a candidature. Interview, Jurhum Lantong, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. Another reason was that had Yusril directly challenged Hamzah, the “Muslim” vote would have split.
Curiously, PBB, too, appeared to believe it had been left as the sole proponent of the Charter. As a competitor for the shari‘ah-minded Muslim vote since the 2000 Congress, PBB took up the rumours that PPP had dumped its central Islamist agenda. The party bulletin notified its readers that PBB now was alone in its fight for shari‘ah and presented the party as the last bastion upholding the historic pledge and the 2000 Congress mandate to implement the Jakarta Charter clause. Nur Syamsi Nurlan proclaimed in the journal:

For Partai Bulan Bintang, which is based on Islam, the constitutional struggle to return the seven words [of the] Jakarta Charter into the UUD 1945 is the instruction [amanah] of the first National Congress of the party, which has to be carried out by all sectors and cadres of the party. Even though later Partai Bulan Bintang will be left alone fighting in the MPR, it is prohibited to betray this instruction.

It appears, however, that when Hamzah became Vice-President, PPP once again pursued a double agenda. Whatever the political developments, which now had led Hamzah to be the deputy of Megawati; at every stage the party had to safeguard its Islamic profile. Since 2000, its Islamic credentials had rested solidly on the Jakarta Charter formula. PPP could not afford to create the impression of a political sell-out and had to secure its image as a defender of Islam in the eyes of its constituency. Hence, prompted by rumours the party had given up shari‘ah issues, PPP leaders emphasised their earlier concession to exclude the Jakarta Charter of the Preamble from the debates, further sanctioning the supposedly profound differences to the Charter clause of Paragraph 29 of the Constitution on ‘religion’.

This attempt was underscored by a softening of Islamist rhetoric. PPP MPs now depicted amending Paragraph 29 as strictly fighting for ‘Islamic values’ (nilai-nilai Islam) and as a purely legislative matter. Whereas this rhetorical emphasis was new, overall the party’s shari‘ah policy had remained the same as before. Above all, it

154 “Syariat Islam is a Solution”, Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 May 2002, p. 15. The author was one of four Deputy Secretary-Generals inaugurated in 2000.
155 At the 2000 MPR session, however, PPP MPs still often spoke of the ‘Piagam Jakarta’ when referring to an amendment of Paragraph 29. PPP also did not streamline the interpretation of individual PPP leaders about what exactly distinguished the “seven words” of the constitution from those of the Preamble.
continued to fail to communicate the meaning of key policies to the public. PPP MPs held:

[F]or the PPP faction, to reject the Jakarta Charter is the same as to reject the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Those who emphatically reject the Jakarta Charter do not or do not sufficiently understand this. Once again, we insist that there is not one faction in the MPR that attempts to return those seven lost words into the Preamble of the Constitution. What exists is the desire to rectify Paragraph 29, section 1 through a democratic mechanism on which we agreed together. 156

As such, PPP MPs propped up the promotion of inserting the Shari’ah Clause into Paragraph 29 as an ordinary legal amendment, open to change if proven unsuccessful or dismissed by popular vote. 157 According to Lukman:

This is to clarify because by inserting the ‘seven words’ PPP is perceived as reviving the Jakarta Charter. We want to set that straight because the purpose of the Jakarta Charter is very different from PPP’s current proposal. The Jakarta Charter refers to the whole Preamble, what remains today are the ‘seven words’... The Jakarta Charter is not only...those seven words inserted in the Preamble but, in those paragraphs, there are also things such as the President has to be Muslim and so on. Hence, the Jakarta Charter is associated with an Islamic state...what PPP strives for is not the Jakarta Charter in the context of wishing to establish an Islamic state. But... including the 'seven words' in the paragraph is strongly connected to the legislative process. This is a profound difference in our view. People must not misperceive that PPP will bring back the past; [the] struggle of the past to establish an Islamic state... 158

Stepping up these arguments, from September 2001 on, PPP officials explained to constituencies that they would carry on striving for shari‘ah at the MPR sessions. 159 Yet, illustrative of the factionalism in PPP’s elite, many party notables did not know whether a bargain with PDIP had been made. Parmusi leaders, in particular, suspected that Hamzah and Secretary-General Alimarwan Hanan had indicated to PDIP MPs to ease pressure to amend Paragraph 29 while sustaining Islamist rhetoric. One PPP leader recalled:

156 Pendapat Umum 4 November 2001, p. 5.
157 Alimarwan Hanan, “ Kontroversi Piagam Jakarta”, Media Persatuan, October 2001, p. 3; “ Pasal 29 Tidak Terkait Piagam Jakarta” (‘Paragraph 29 is not connected to the Jakarta Charter’) (Interview with Tosari Widjaya, same issue). The time of these assurances shortly before the 2001 MPR session is noteworthy.
159 The press appeared confused by the change of PPP’s rhetoric, evident in heading such as “PPP tak lagi permasalahkan Piagam Jakarta dan Gender” (‘PPP no longer makes the Jakarta Charter and Gender an issue’), Tempo Interaktif, 27 July 2001.
A part of the Muslim community wants that [we] continue the struggle for the Jakarta Charter. But when Hamzah became Vice-President, PPP had eased up on the issue because as we heard, once again as we heard...there was a political deal between several individuals of the board, probably Hamzah and the Secretary-General [Alimarwan] with PDIP: Okay, PDIP supports Hamzah if [PPP] ceases to struggle for the Jakarta Charter; stops making an issue of a ‘female President’. This is what we heard.160

The affair again revealed the cynical view of several PPP leaders on their colleagues’ motives for promoting shari‘ah goals. The critique was particularly directed toward Hamzah’s apparent commitment for shari‘ah issues, which many in the party saw as insincere. Hamzah was an ‘old product’ with a ‘thin’ (tipis) knowledge of Islam. The party’s support for the “seven words” had ‘more political nuances’, with the objective to ‘please the hearts of the Muslim community and PPP supporters’ (menyenangkan hati umat, hati pendukung PPP). A PPP leader held this about his party’s support for the Charter:

[This is] above all to please these groups, [it is] more inclined to make them happy [menghibur]... Maybe it [the Jakarta Charter] will be fought for but when being defeated...well then we have already fought for it.... Not more than that. Not more than the intention [ucapan] will be forwarded.161

Officially, however, PPP’s support for the Shari‘ah Clause remained strong and the MPR Faction continually defended it in the 2001 and 2002 sessions.162 The continuing commitment was echoed by a party-Congress in October 2001, one month before the MPR session.163 In this, PPP proclaimed it would ‘never cease’ the struggle for the clause.164 In the 2002 MPR session, the debate got increasingly tangled as several parties introduced new variations of their earlier proposals, ostensibly to find a compromise but presumably more in order to appear cooperative.

160 Interviews, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 25 October 2001 (quote); Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. Those assuming a deal did so without having full evidence but pointed out that MPs from PDIP insisted that an agreement had been made. NU-based leaders such as Zein Badjeber and Lukman Saifuddin denied this. The PPP leadership later consulted Hamzah Haz for clarification. Hamzah denied having made any concessions to PDIP.
162 It is not clear whether PDIP was informed that PPP would continue the struggle for the Charter clause on the basis that it ultimately would give in to compromise. It is likely that, individually, PPP leaders ensured PDIP of their willingness to slow down support for the Charter. However, neither was this official PPP policy nor is it likely that they specified what this meant precisely.
163 It was the second National Working Consultation (Mukernas).
Intriguingly, the PPP Faction appeared least willing to make concessions. PPP MPs scarcely responded to the suggestions made during previous sessions and appeared to drag out the negotiations. In mid-July 2002, PPP once again stepped up its shari‘ah rhetoric. On the title page of the July 2002 edition of its journal Media Persatuan, the party announced: ‘Defending [Pertahankan] Syariat Islam’. Another Congress underlined that the ‘struggle to implement shariah’ was ‘essential’ (amat prinsipil) and ‘must not be compromised by less profound issues’.

The moment for such assurances was certainly significant. Through statements such as these, PPP gave the impression to supporters that it would not easily back down in the final round of the constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, with the provisions that Hamzah’s new position as Vice-President had created, the shari‘ah agenda increasingly became perfunctory and was only retained as a rhetorical device. After all, ‘we also have to see how we can show to the masses that we already fought for it [the Shari‘ah Clause].’

Paradoxically, PPP’s NU camp, despite supporting shari‘ah issues, continued to claim doctrinal affinity with NU. In a conference in July 2002, NU ulama again rejected the Shari‘ah Clause. After this, Hamzah took on a more moderate position. He stressed that PPP would accept the will of the majority in the MPR who wanted to retain Paragraph 29 and refrain from walking out. Hamzah also asserted that, as a NU member, he would do what he could to follow the call of the NU ulama. This, of course, appeared illogical, given the latter’s rejection of the Shari‘ah Clause. Nonetheless, NU-based PPP leaders asserted that there were more similarities between their party and NU than their support for shari‘ah issues might

165 The PPP representatives Ali Hardi Kiaidemak (Parmusi) and Lukman Hakim Saifuddin (NU) were among the most steadfast supporters of the Shari‘ah Clause. Both appeared very unwilling to drop proposed changes to Article One. As a NU politician, Lukman previously had not shown a particular interest in the matter. I am grateful to Dr. Greg Fealy for pointing this out to me.
166 Media Persatuan, No. 85, Juli 2002. By then, Islamist parties more often used the term ‘shari‘ah’ than the ‘Jakarta Charter’ or the “seven words” because it appeared to be more popular.
167 This was the third National Working Congress (Mukernas). The result suggested steadfastness in the fight for shariah and pledged to fight ‘maximally and optimally’ for the “seven words”. Lampiran Keputusan Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (Mukernas) III Nomor: 04/Kep/Mukernas III/PPP/VI/2002, 29 July 2002.
169 This was the Musyawarah Nasional Alim Ulama NU.
suggest. They claimed that, substantially, PPP would not deviate from the legal opinion of NU ulama rejecting the insertion of the charter. Zein Badjeber suggested a purely political motive behind the disparity:

...PPP are basically NU and Muhammadiyah people. Therefore, their positions will not deviate from [tidak lari] what has been said in NU as well as Muhammadiyah... The fatwa [legal opinion] of PPP’s MPP will not differ from NU or Muhammadiyah because its ulama are ulama from NU and Muhammadiyah. Perhaps, in making a political decision, we are different. For example, PPP supports the insertion of this [the Shari’ah Clause]. 171

Such efforts to advocate ongoing consent with NU were echoed in the prevailing assurances of PPP politicians that the clause would refer to the individual responsibility to perform shari’ah laws. 172 Hence, despite formally opposite ideological policies, this position complied with NU’s stance that state authorities should not take up an active role in enforcing Islam. Such assurances again underlined that PPP, in this case particularly its NU members, were sophistical about the shari’ah policy. In particular, Hamzah’s reconciliation efforts with NU showed PPP’s underlying pragmatism and wariness to insist on controversial positions. They strongly suggested that, in the MPR sessions of November 2001 and 2002, PPP’s displayed determination to implement shari’ah was tactically motivated.

By mid- to late 2001, it became more important for PPP to ensure a good working relationship with PDIP and President Megawati. It therefore became necessary to back down on contentious issues despite maintaining a firm Islamist rhetoric. In October 2001, Faisal Baasir, head of PPP’s faction in the MPR, predicted:

I think that Hamzah will ask the MPR Faction to no longer force [memaksakan] the insertion of the seven words. Eventually, this will happen. Because, be that as it may, there is a political-pragmatic interest in that Hamzah wishes to build up the alliance with PDIP. We still have to develop this not only for the elections but more in the sense that later for PPP the chance might arise to get the presidency... This is the chance for PPP to have even bigger chances. [It might be] again different later when PPP is in power. A matter of tactics. This is called politics. One could say ‘to step back in order to later step ahead’ [mundur untuk nantinya lebih maju]. 173

171 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002.
Hence, by the time of the 2002 session, PPP already had been settling for a give-and-take solution. In particular, ongoing firm *shari'ah* rhetoric aimed to facilitate a compromise to include an Islamist phrase into the constitutional directives on ‘education’ (*pendidikan*).\(^{174}\) PPP, together with other Islamist parties and Fraksi Reformasi, proposed to insert the phrase ‘to increase belief [*iman*] and devoutness [*taqwa*] [and] noble character [*akhlaq mulia*]’.\(^{175}\) It had signalled it would follow a softer line in its *shari'ah* bid and not “walk out” if this clause could pass. PDIP and Golkar, which had previously blocked the supplement, yielded. Hence, PPP shifted toward a more practicable goal rather than going all out on Paragraph 29 for which there was no consensus even among Islamic parties.\(^{176}\)

Fraksi Reformasi, on the other hand, insisted on the alternative wording and was quite inflexible in the negotiations.\(^{177}\) PK’s decision to back calls to amend Paragraph 29 had mostly been to silence criticism within the party that it was not supporting *shari'ah* issues. Moreover, PAN could not possibly propose the Shari’ah Clause as this would have destroyed its pluralist commitment. The small Perserikatan Daulatul Ummah Faction (‘United Faction of Muslim Sovereignty’, FPDU) frequently changed position on Paragraph 29.\(^{178}\)

While PPP anticipated a win-win solution, PBB had no comparable opportunity to gain political advantage and thus turned into the staunchest backer of the Shari’ah

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\(^{174}\) Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002.

\(^{175}\) Education had been a major field of PPP opposition toward the New Order regime. PPP and PBB held the same position about Paragraph 31 on ‘education’. They pointed to the discrepancy between educational laws—already including a phrase on *iman* and *taqwa*—and the constitution that had lacked this until now. See, for example, *Notulasi Rapat*, p. 6.

\(^{176}\) Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002. The crucial article of Paragraph 31 was the third. It now reads: ‘The government shall manage and organise one system of national education, which shall increase the level of spiritual belief, devoutness and moral character in the context developing the life of the nation and shall be regulated by law.’ Translation from NDI, *1945 Constitution*.

\(^{177}\) PBB held that negotiations with PKB were more successful than with Fraksi Reformasi. *Notulasi Rapat*. In the 2002 session, PKB suggested to replace the term ‘obligation’ (*kewajiban*) in the “seven words” with the term ‘determination’ (*kesungguhan*) as the faction would ‘fear the legal implications of the term *kewajiban*’. See *Risalah Rapat Pleno 13 June 2002*, reprinted in *Buku Kedua Jilid 3 Tahun 2002*, p. 402.

\(^{178}\) During the 2000 MPR session, the PDU Faction appeared to support maintaining a *shari'ah*-free paragraph but in 2001, it called for the Shari’ah Clause. Eventually, PDU agreed to maintain Article One but shifting the “seven words” or the alternative wording of the Fraksi Reformasi to the Second Article. It was, however, left open as to what difference this shift meant.

Clause. The party remained opposed to the Plural Clause proposed by Fraksi Reformasi and PKB. It appeared to have had no popularity among shari‘ah-minded constituencies. Bulan Bintang leaders also held that other religious communities did not want the state to meddle in religious affairs, something, they argued, the Plural Clause demanded. Both PBB and PPP argued that it was the Shari‘ah Clause that would guarantee the freedom of other religious communities. Yet PBB appeared willing to discuss other formulations in order to accommodate the interests of other religions and lessen the fears of intimidation in the case of an inclusion of the “seven words”. To this end, it suggested a separate article to further emphasise the state’s responsibility to protect the freedom of religions other than Islam.

Islamist parties refused to vote on the ‘religion’ paragraph. Though a democratic mechanism, they asserted that voting on shari‘ah issues was provocative and futile. They argued that shari‘ah was not an issue they were allowed to vote on. It was a ‘duty’ (kehharusan) based on God’s will. Many, therefore, insisted that decisions on religious issues had to be made through consultation. Nonetheless, only PBB took this as reason for its faction to refuse to vote in the MPR or even to remain seated while such a voting took place. At several occasions PBB politicians, including Yusril, stressed that ‘syari’at Allah which is already qath’y [unyielding] is not for humans to vote on’. Hamzah Haz, in comparison, also declared that shari‘ah and Paragraph 29 were not open for voting, but, at times, he also appealed to Islamist colleagues to accept that there was strong resistance to their proposal.

Yet Islamist parties also had strong practical reasons to prevent a vote on shari‘ah. If decided by a ballot, the debate on the Charter was likely to be perceived as closed. Islamists thus feared they then would no longer be able to maintain the Charter

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179 In contrast to PPP’s rhetoric from late 2001 on, PBB did not link the term ‘Jakarta Charter’ to the Preamble. The party, however, somewhat adjusted its rhetoric after PPP had begun to strictly distinguish between the Charter of the Preamble and the “seven words” of the Constitution.
180 Notulasi Rapat, p. 17.
182 See, for example, “Syari’at Kembali Diganjal”, Buletin Bulan Bintang, August 2002, pp. 12-3.
clause as a party policy and to defend it during future MPR sessions. PPP, too, strove to secure the clause. Bringing the debate to a closure would have caused potential damage to PPP’s future political interests and deprived the party of a key trademark, in particular against its main competitor PKB. Therefore, the party, in the words of Zein Badjeber, ‘looked for a political manoeuvre which will not obstruct ways to resume the struggle sometime in the future’. 185 Because of this, PPP leaders insisted that the only difference to PBB’s seemingly more steadfast position was that they had ‘taken advantage of the momentum’ to insert a religious phrase in the law on education. Though staying in the MPR, PPP did not use their right to participate but left the decision to other factions ‘to agree to maintain Paragraph 29 for the time being’. 186 The PDU Faction took the same stance. PPP MP Ali Hardi Kiai Demak recalled:

Amien Rais [President of the MPR] said: This session does not decide to amend Paragraph 29 [stressing ‘this session’ and imitating falling hammer]. This means, the alternatives are still hoarded for the future... The chance [to amend Paragraph 29] has to be kept alive! If we chose the first option, this would mean to reject the others. Then it would be over. [But] saying that we do not make changes at this session, it means we are still able to at future sessions. 187

PBB pulled out from the session in dramatic fashion. The party belatedly exposed its shari‘ah commitment only from 2000 on but then displayed unfaltering determination. Paradoxically, this happened after most doctrinaire Islamists had left the party, suggesting that the fortitude with which it defended shari‘ah issues had turned into a key issue to consolidate the party internally. On the last day of the MPR session, the PBB Faction startled other camps, including Fraksi Reformasi and PPP, as it walked out of parliament. 188 In a press release on 10 August 2002, the last day of the MPR session, PBB announced it would not follow the MPR decision to maintain Paragraph 29 in its original form. Signed by the whole MPR Faction, the document was circumspectly worded yet defiant:

185 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002 (quote). Also interview, Rusdy Hamka, Jakarta, 1 December 2002.
186 Earlier, PPP had also announced it might “walk out”. “Pasal 29 UUD 1945 ke Naskah Asli”, Suara Merdeka, 11 August 2002.
188 The idea to “walk out” was originally proposed by Ahmad Sumargono, one of the few doctrinaire leaders who had remained in the party after the split in the first Congress in May 2000 (see chapter two). Notulasi Rapat, p. 17.
Today, [we] feel a heavy burden [beban berat], because we have to take a position that possibly displeases some members of the MPR. We take a position very congruent [lekat] with our conviction. Basically, we still maintain [berketetapan] choosing the second option for Paragraph 29... We have no intention to step back whatsoever [sedikitpun] from this position. If now some factions have decided to reject, as an analogy this is like a man who fights his way along a road full of...thorns. Although we don’t have the power to jump over this wall, we only wait until the time has come [when] we can continue our way. There is nothing that is not possible if Allah wishes it. If you still reject our proposal...please note that we, the complete PBB Faction won’t take part in making this decision [tidak ikut mengambil keputusan itu].

Earlier, in a PBB summit preparing the party’s strategy for the upcoming 2002 MPR session, regional boards had backed the defiant display of shari’ah determination. It dismissed the possibility of voting, as this would have brought the struggle for the Charter to a symbolic end. To the contrary, a steadfast position was to ‘lay the foundations for the future struggle’ and further distinguish PBB from PPP, whose yielding PBB leaders indirectly described as puny. The party once again beefed up its rhetoric. It depicted the view that the state had to take up a central role in implementing shariah as a matter of the heart and rationally undeniable, insisting that 'what we proposed was not wrong'. More than once PBB used a dramatic allegory which again underlined the self-perception of the ideologically determined keluarga leaders as being fighters for a just cause:

We wanted to fight but the wall was high. We do not have the power to jump over; we also do not have the power to tear it down. But we will not yield. We do not step back. We stay at the same place [berhenti di tempat]. Waiting until the time has come... Unlike the others.

In 2001, PBB already had underlined the perceived Divine authorisation of this struggle, telling the MPR:

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189 Pernyataan Sikap: Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, F-PBB MPR, 10 August 2002.
190 Notulasi Rapat, p. 15. PBB expected to win 12% of party support and not more than an additional 10% from sympathetic individuals if a secret ballot was held. In an open vote, supporters from other camps were expected to stick to the anti-shari’ah line of their parties. Ibid, pp. 3/6.
191 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002.
192 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. The ‘wall allegory’ appeared in several writings and statements of Bulan Bintang leaders in 2002. Indeed, some Islamists claimed that the outcome of the effort to implement shari’ah was second to the feeling of fulfilling a religious obligation. According to Ka’ban, striving to insert shari’ah into the constitution necessarily ‘was less connected to the final outcome [of the decision]; what counts is the effort we put behind our ideals.’ Interview, M.S. Ka’ban, Jakarta, 17 October 2001.
The Bulan Bintang Faction will never stop fighting for the implementation of shariah Islam. People may think that we are wrong. This is no problem for us, if only we are not wrong in the view of Allah.193

Another concern was to lose face. Casting a vote on the “seven words”, PBB held, would be internationally interpreted as if ‘Indonesian Muslims rejected shari’ah Islam’.194 Hence, for PBB the outcome of the 2002 MPR session only meant that Paragraph 29 will not be altered ‘for the time being’. Earlier, in the final statement at the 2000 MPR session, PBB had already promised to the Indonesian Muslim community that ‘your aspiration to insert the Jakarta Charter’ will be the agenda of the party ‘for all time to come’ (sepanjang masa).195

Other factions reprimanded PBB for allegedly breaching an earlier agreement to consult. Perplexed PK MPs in the MPR responded by phoning members of its Religious Council to request instructions. On their advise, the whole PK camp of the Reform Faction took up PBB’s protest and walked out.196 This change of heart was due to concerns that Bulan Bintang leaders could consider reaping political gain from their demonstration of resolute behaviour, particularly in the next election campaign. PK MPs, displaying a considerable sense for practicalities, feared that had they stayed in the MPR, ‘later, people will meet us with hostility’.197

This chapter thus described Islamist pragmatism as explained by their approval of the nation state and its institutions as being the authoritative source for legislation. Accommodation and compromise were central Islamist characteristics during 1998 to

193 Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Terhadap Rancangan Putusan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Hasil Sidang Tahunan 2001, FPBB MPR, (no date).
194 Notulasi Rapat. Debating the party’s strategy in the upcoming MPR session, regional boards insisted that Muslims made the biggest sacrifices for the nation, whereas the minorities—specifically referring to the Hindu population in Bali—contributed nothing. Several board members, for example Anwar Shaleh, suggested shifting support to Fraksi Reformasi’s proposal for strategic reasons. Others, like Ahmad Sumargono, rejected this.
195 Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang 2000. PK MPs have expressed amazement over this statement, as it seemed to suggest that to struggle for Islam necessarily had to mean to struggle for the Charter. Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002.
196 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002. These MPs were Mutammimul ‘Ula, Irwan Prayitno, Syamsul Balda, Mashadi, Rokhib Abdullah, Sumanjaya and Zivli Rosa, the only female PK MP. One PAN MP, Nurdiati Akma, joined PK. “Pasal 29 UUD 1945 ke Naskah Asli”, Suara Merdeka, 11 August 2002. Other PAN members were equally startled by PK’s reaction.
197 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002.
2002 despite the large amount of internal ideological rhetoric in PK and the doctrinaire sections of PBB and the keluarga. This pragmatic imperative has prevailed regardless of the inner resistance individual Islamists might preserve toward parts of the state’s legislation.

Islamist parties took a pragmatic and flexible stance on a number of high-profile issues such as the presidency, shari‘ah and the Jakarta Charter. This was particularly evident in the ultimate subordination of the Islamist goal to prevent the secular-nationalists from dominating post-New Order politics, especially by gaining the presidency. The Islamist flexibility was due to a priority given to constitutionalism. This notwithstanding, PPP and PBB also acted on a strong desire to position their people in post-New Order governments; they thus were inclined to suppress previous principles if this desire was met.

A good example for the pragmatic imperative was when PPP conveniently disregarded its previous opposition against Megawati’s presidency on doctrinal grounds once the chance for its Chairman Hamzah Haz emerged to join her cabinet as Vice-President. PPP’s emphasis of the argument that Islam disapproved female leadership felt in the same context as its support for the Jakarta Charter; both were largely motivated by the desire to boost its Islamic record. More pressing than doctrinal grounds had been power-related reasons to oppose Megawati from getting the presidency. PPP’s eventual soft-peddling over shari‘ah issues in the 2002 MPR session, however, did not mean that the party discarded shari‘ah goals altogether. PPP eased its backing of the Charter but, at the same time, the party ensured that it would be able to sustain shari‘ah as party policy in the future. In comparison, PBB, with its devotion to the example of Masyumi, unwaveringly advocated the Jakarta Charter until the last MPR session in 2002.

While PPP’s inconsistency on the presidential issue and shari‘ah once again gave an indication of the party’s internal factionalism, PK sustained its priority toward short-term reformist goals and carried on with its trademark matter-of-factness toward issues the party considered to be out of its reach. Indication of this gave PK’s instant subordination of sharia‘h issues when consenting to Abdurrahman Wahid’s
presidency, a leader the party saw as detrimental to a greater public role of Islam; and its neat separation of internal and external reasoning when assessing Megawati’s bid for presidency. Convinced that Islam does not permit women to lead a government, PK only gave ‘undogmatic’ reasons for opposing her, in the awareness that this was in greater correspondence with the outlook and public concern of the early reformasi years.
CONCLUSION

This thesis is a study into the nature of Indonesian Islamism. It argued in favour of a nuanced examination of the beliefs and behaviour of Islamist parties in the four years after the end of the New Order (1998-2002). Many scholars of Indonesian Islam have characterised Islamist politics as monolithic and contrary to the ‘essence’ of Islamic teachings. They, in effect, portrayed Islamism as an undesirable element in a transitional democracy such as Indonesia’s. The thesis has critiqued this anti-Islamist discourse as biased in its depiction and promotion of Islam as a pluralist-friendly religion and questioned the binary conceptions which it uses to analyse Islamist agendas. It argued that Indonesian Islamism’s faithfulness to the Constitution and reformist goals have been greater than this scholarship suggested. It also argued that rather than being clear-cut and unwavering, as many of their critics claim, many other aspects of Islamist politics have rather been contradictory (such as the stance on religious pluralism) and formalist-symbolic or desultory (such as the shari’ah agenda of several parties). Pragmatism, however, has, in most cases, prevailed following the need to appear pluralist and pro-reform.

A central theme of the thesis was the Islamist view that Islam should provide the major cultural and legal framework for Indonesian society. This conviction, to some extent, explains the Islamists’ aim to control the government in order to achieve Muslim supremacy. The thesis further pointed out that Islamist motives originate in a sense of loss of Muslim identity. For Islamists, gaining control of government meant shifting political power away from secular and non-Muslim forces, both of which they see as having accumulated a disproportionately large share of power since colonial times. The objective in controlling government thus meant to counter the long-term effects of colonialism, estranging Muslims from Islam and preventing devout Muslims from having a prominent political role in independent Indonesia. Because of this belief, Islamists are able to explain the electoral success of national and secular parties—such as in the June 1999 elections—as the consequence of a larger transformation of Muslims
along western-secular parameters together with the West’s negative propaganda against shari’ah.

This fixation toward perceived past injustices was greatest in Partai Bulan Bintang (‘Crescent Star Party’, PBB) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’, DDII) with their emotional and ideological ties to the legacy of Masyumi. With their obsession about domestic schemes to marginalise Muslims, PBB and DDII have shown a distinctive commitment to the national idea and to defending the place of Muslims in it. The view that Western interference has prevented Indonesia from becoming a great Muslim nation is critical to understanding their assertion that a broadly defined Islam was the vital element in Indonesian cultures and society.

At the same time, many Indonesian Muslims see themselves and Islam now as victims of a global plot to subjugate Muslim-majority countries. They perceive US policy as continuing Dutch interferences into domestic issues with the overall goal to hinder Indonesian Muslims from gaining political and economic power. Islamists take this for granted and have responded by taking on an unreflective essentialism. Moreover, they have remained attached to the assertion that only submission to shari’ah defines a Muslim.

The thesis also showed that Islam’s perceived superiority toward other religions has had a deep and pervasive impact on Islamists’ dealings with other religious communities. Islamists usually declare a desire to return Muslims to a full Islamic identity but the Islamist ideal has always rather been to make Islam the broader philosophical basis of legislation and public affairs. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (‘United Development Party’, PPP) and PBB, however, have abandoned this aim due to the controversies over the state ideology and the Jakarta Charter since independence. Both parties have since then taken on non-interference in minority religious affairs as their guiding rhetorical principle by adamantly asserting that non-Muslims would not be affected by the constitutional recognition of shari’ah.
The Reformasi Fraction in parliament—the non-Islamist Partai Amanah Nasional (‘National Mandate Party’, PAN) and Partai Keadilan (‘Justice Party’, PK)—claimed to overcome the controversy of the original wording of the Jakarta Charter by proposing an alternative wording of the Charter clause that omitted *shari’ah* terms. This option showed that the organisation of society in the medieval city of Medina has remained an important model for Islamist perceptions of how a Muslim-led society should function. It gave a clearer illustration of Islamism’s concern for broader piety in society with Islam being the overriding factor for creating laws. PK explained its initiative as an attempt to overcome the controversy of the Jakarta Charter. In reality, it was a rather blatant attempt to appear pluralist-friendly. Party leaders were aware of the impracticability of their proposal; their prime concern remained to bring about *shari’ah* rule.

The thesis, at the same time, emphasised that there was a gulf between the Islamist desire to mould Indonesian society and the awareness of how little support they can expect from most Indonesian Muslims. This desire is strongly based on a pre-1955 election premise for which there was no empiric proof at that time. The electoral share of Islamist parties in 1955 (44%) and 1999 (16%) strongly suggested that the majority of Indonesian Muslims do not identify themselves with the Islamist agenda, most importantly the aim to Islamise the state and the Constitution. Many Islamist notables reflected this awareness by refusing to join an Islamist party to face the 1999 elections. The thesis portrayed Amien Rais as the most prominent example of a pluralist stance that was based in pragmatic considerations.

Above all, Islamist parties were doubtful about the electoral appeal of *shari’ah* issues. They, therefore, downplayed their *shari’ah* agenda by promoting issues likely to have a broader electoral appeal. They considered non-Islamist *reformasi* goals such as modifying the Constitution to strengthen parliamentary powers, restoring economic growth, battling corruption and ending the army’s political role as in step with people’s hopes in the early *reformasi* years and as more helpful for increasing their vote.
Moreover, all Islamist parties repeatedly changed their positions according to political expediency. This became particularly evident in the effort to find a pro-Islamist President. In 1998 and 1999, Islamist parties backed President Soeharto’s successor B. J. Habibie in the belief that he was most likely to secure their position in government and prevent the electoral success of the secular nationalist Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan’s (‘Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle’, PDIP) candidate Megawati Soekarnoputri. When Habibie withdrew from the competition in October 1999, Islamist parties eventually backed Abdurrahman Wahid. By doing so, they put aside their strong misgivings about him, especially relating to his long opposition to an Islamic state and his closeness to religious minorities. In 2001, Islamist parties then declared support for Megawati. Islamist parties’ support for Megawati was contingent on their gaining a share of power in her government. The rapprochement with Megawati was particularly beneficial for PPP, as it allowed its Chairman Hamzah Haz to become Vice-President. The constitutionalism of Islamist parties explained this course of action. At the same time, the Islamists’ flexibility contrasted with the strong aversions many of them held against the secular-nationalism represented by PDIP.

PPP, PBB and PK pursued similar strategies in presenting themselves to the electorate but they followed different political approaches. The political behaviour of PPP and PBB was participationist. Both parties sought representation in all post-New Order cabinets. The focus on immediate political goals characterised their party culture. The ideological thought of both parties has been stagnant and neither had a long-term programmatic strategy. They were aware that any call for shari’ah and the Jakarta Charter would be defeated in parliament.

Of all Islamist parties, the thesis argued, PPP’s behaviour was the most blatant mixture of Islamism and pragmatism. The party’s shari’ah agenda has mostly been politically motivated and its quality was superficial. As there is little ideological depth and consensus over ideological propositions, PPP hardly qualifies as a full Islamist party. In 1998, PPP vigorously promoted central reform issues such as constitutional reform and
ending the political role of the military. But PPP has always endeavoured to appeal to ideologically aware Muslims and pluralist Muslims at once. In the pre-election period, it sought to appeal to the umat by restoring Islam as its ideological base and the kab’ah (Holy Shrine) as party symbol. These had been the party’s key programmatic issues during the New Order.

In mid-2000, PPP took on the Shari’ah Clause of the Jakarta Charter as one of its prime policies. Despite this, its preference for accommodation prevailed. This was apparent in PPP’s defence of its shari’ah policy. Most PPP leaders did not argue that the “seven words” of the Shari’ah Clause would put obligation onto the state to enforce Islamic law on Muslims, because to do so appeared much less threatening to non-Muslims. To portray itself as a champion of shari’ah while downplaying the consequences of its constitutional recognition, at the same time, rendered PPP’s shari’ah agenda desultory. Such a rationale was in accordance with the party’s long-held political culture defined by pragmatism and patronage. When PPP split into two parties in early 2002, it was due to squabbles over leadership positions both between traditionalists and modernists and between the old elite and younger leaders. It was not because of dissimilarity in ideology.

While more unswervingly pro-shari’ah than PPP, PBB appeared comfortable with a symbolic dedication to Masyumi and shari’ah. The party together with other Masyumi legatees such as DDII, KISDI and Persis carried on a central part of Masyumi’s tradition and program that is the state’s responsibility to establish shari’ah among Muslims. This group relies heavily upon the legacy of the thought of Mohamad Natsir. Unlike PPP, PBB insisted that the Shari’ah Clause would oblige the state to implement Islam, thereby taking up Masyumi’s position. Today’s Masyumi legatees however, have shown little interest in examining how Masyumi’s ideology could be readapted for today’s politics. PBB addressed the public on the supposed superiority of shari’ah rule and lamented what it sees as shari’ah’s tarnished repute among large sections of the Muslim public due to the ongoing impact of imperialism and westernisation. The disinclination of PBB to award its avowal for a constitutional acknowledgment of shari’ah any significant
intellectual value gives its commitment an overall formalistic-symbolic quality. Beneath the admiration for Masyumi there is bewilderment over the precise content of its ideology and what political behaviour it dictated. The conflict and eventual split of PBB in 2000 brought this to light. Similar to PPP, PBB seemed not explicitly concerned about realising the rule of shari‘ah in contemporary Indonesia and both parties were hesitant in making shari‘ah issues immediately public. But ultimately PBB displayed a greater eagerness to appear adamant in pursuing ideological goals.

PK most clearly disconnected the external from the internal discourse. The party followed a calculated separation of ideology and behaviour. Internally, PK instructed cadres to guard against a global conspiracy to destroy Islam. Externally, the party was strongly realist and accommodative toward non-Islamist parties. PK’s claim to represent virtuous politics made its political behaviour less determined by power concerns. Yet the party’s outlook entirely fitted the consciously acquiescent approach many Islamist parties and organisations had taken on since the 1990s in other parts of the Muslim world. Above all, PK’s devotion to reformist ideals and its compliant rhetoric cloaked the party’s motive to brace Muslims against Western cultural and economic influence and ideologies other than Islam. PK committed itself to ‘universal’ values, above all ‘justice’ (keadilan), yet its understanding of the term was fundamentally Islamist. It was convinced that justice could only be achieved through comprehensive implementation of shari‘ah. Though promoting broader religious values, the party’s understanding of a just society often centred on the execution of strict legal punishments stipulated in the Qur’an.

Indonesian Islamist parties thus pursued different forms of political pragmatism. The argument could be made that PK warrants acceptance as both a party of committed democrats and disciples of deeply dogmatic motivations. The paradox is that PK members often contributed substantively to policy issues related to democratisation whilst the party’s ideal perception of society makes democratic processes redundant. PK’s focus on dakwah (proselytisation) is central to understanding its democratic credentials. The party acted on the belief that society needed to be guided back toward a
complete Islamic life. Thus, religious enlightenment had to precede the recapture of state and government. Once *dakwah* succeeds, the position of devoted Muslims will automatically be strong.

PK, designed purposely for the fledgling democracy in the post-Soeharto era, thus most comprehensively adjusted its agenda to the circumstances while sustaining their vision of a post-democratic order in which society is organised along the lines of the medieval Medina society with Muslims as the leading community. They, recapping Martin Kramer’s verdict (page 59), premeditatedly and effectively “repackaged” Islamist ideology for a democracy.

There was no such “repackaging” among PPP and the Masyumi legatees (i.e. PBB). The Masyumi legatees adapted their ideology from Masyumi which—like PK—had acknowledged democracy and the rule of law as overriding principles for the ideological struggle. However, not only had the struggle for *shari‘ah* to be framed by these principles, the Masyumi tradition also perceived and endorsed democracy as the final political system. At the same time, PBB—again following Masyumi—maintained that for Muslims the judiciary, even in a multi-party system, had to be circumscribed in various aspects by the principles of *shari‘ah*. The party like other Masyumi legatees, however, never provided a sound concept of how such a judicial system could be practicable.

Furthermore, the thesis showed that Islamists of all parties displayed a frequent disconnection between the practical imperative and personal conviction. This was evident in the adjustment of rhetoric to particular circumstances and whether Islamists addressed Islamist or plural audiences. Islamists have perceived Indonesia as a country that is being “owned” by the Muslim community with non-Muslims being tolerated “guests”. They have insisted on “Muslim” cultural superiority and that Muslims should constitute the leading community in Indonesia. The restricted pluralism of Islamists is displayed in their stance on minority rights. Islamists, and again many Muslims in pluralist parties, have been tolerant toward the expression of monotheist religions but
have repeatedly attempted to discriminate against *kepercayaan* (syncretic beliefs) and polytheist creeds such as Hinduism. Not only Islamists but many politicians in pluralist Muslim parties as well see the Islamic canon as endorsing Muslim supremacism. Together they view tolerance between the religious communities as vital, although most believe that Muslims must also have a bigger share of political power, backed by their status as the largest populace in Indonesia. This perception is based in classical Sunni doctrine; it has been stirred up by the memories of colonisation and westernisation, and it has more recently been fuelled by international politics commonly seen as anti-Islam.

There were differences among the Islamist parties, however. In both PK and PBB, the anti-Semitic and anti-Christian sentiment was largely kept quiet because the parties' leadership sought to appear pluralist. PK, however, was more consistent in curbing its anti-pluralist side. PPP, in comparison, acted in awareness of having maintained stronger links with mainstream Muslims and the large socio-religious organisations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. PPP customarily endorsed religious pluralism in its endeavours to prove to the public that its self-proclaimed nationalist devotion continued despite a *shari‘ah* agenda and pro-Muslim economic policies.

In summary, Indonesian Islamism’s firm constitutionalism, its affirmation of free vote and a free choice of electoral candidates and the acknowledgment that the endorsement of ideological goals had to take place within these parameters, renders it compatible with democratic politics. The restricted pluralism, however, which is based on tolerance toward non-Muslims but bars full equality, has remained a persistent anti-democratic facet in Islamist agendas.

This study has provided some fresh data on the nature of Indonesian Islamism. First of all, there is a liberal bias in the scholarship on Indonesian Islam manifest in the endorsement of Islamic scripture as pro-pluralist and its dismissal of Islamist ambitions as contrary to Islamic theology and history. This scholarship, therefore, fails to see that Indonesian Islamism is largely pragmatic and ends-oriented. Islamist parties constantly turned to more immediately relevant political goals while putting second ideological
purity. Secondly, the Islamist call for shari'ah often works as a symbol for restoring a presumably Muslim national character against a global environment typecast as anti-Islam. The significance of shari'ah lies above all in its power as a symbol for this quest. Aside from this, Islamist parties tend to have little ideological profundity. PPP and PBB, in particular, seemed to care little about a thoughtful discussion of shari'ah issues. Thirdly, constitutional Islamism in Indonesia shows most of the contradictions of Islamism operating in multi-party systems elsewhere. This is explained by Islam's claim for being the final and true revelation given to mankind on the one hand and Islamism's constitutionalism and the demands for compromise and flexibility in power politics on the other hand.
APPENDIX I

RESULTS OF THE JUNE 1999 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote in %</th>
<th>Number of Seats (in total 462)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDIP</td>
<td>33.76</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>22.46</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>10.72</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>12.62</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPII Masyumi</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSII</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKU</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUI</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSII 1905</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masyumi Baru</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

Source Vote in %: Kompas, 27 July 1999
Source Parliamentary Seats: Komisi Pemilihan Umum ('Electoral Commission', KPU)
## APPENDIX II:

### KELUARGA BULAN BINTANG NOTABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisational Background</th>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohamad Natsir (died 1993)</td>
<td>Chairman Masyumi (1945-58), Founder DDII (General Chairman 1967-93), prominent member of Petition 50, FUI, Persis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Masjkur (1993)</td>
<td>Co-founder DDII (though minor role), NU (Chairman 1952-54, Chair NU Konstituante Faction, Rois II 1967-71), FUI, Vice-Chairman DPR (until 1982)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Mohammad Rasjidi (2001)</td>
<td>Co-Founder DDII (Natsir’s deputy 1967-97), first Minister of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunan Nasution (1996)</td>
<td>DDII (Chair), Masyumi (Secretary-General, 1959), PNI, KNIP</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Muchtar Latief (1997)</td>
<td>FUI, Persis (Chair)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurulhulda (2001)</td>
<td>DDII, FUI, Perti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Nur Ali (1992)</td>
<td>DDII (Chair), Hizbullah/Sabilillah, Komando Jihad, FUI</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Misbach (1999)</td>
<td>DDII (Chair East Java), NU, Hizbullah/Sabilillah, PII, MUI</td>
<td>PBB (honorary member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Sholeh Iskandar (1992)</td>
<td>DDII (Chair), Hizbullah/Sabilillah, Komando Jihad, FUI</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buchari Tamam (1994)</td>
<td>DDII (co-founder &amp; Secretary-General)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Anwar Harjono (1999)</td>
<td>DDII (Chair 1993-99), Masyumi (executive member, 1959), FUI, GPII, ICMI (board member), ICDR</td>
<td>PBB (honorary member, Vice Secretary-General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Basri (2001)</td>
<td>DDII (co-founder, treasurer), Masyumi (executive board member, 1959), GPII, MUI, ICMI (board member)</td>
<td>PBB splinter group (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Osman Raliby (2000?)</td>
<td>DDII (co-founder), Masyumi (Chair, 1959), scholar</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Deliar Noer</td>
<td>HMI (Chair, 1953-55)</td>
<td>PUI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afandi Rhidwan</td>
<td>DDII (Chairman since 1999), Persis, PUI, GPII, Batalyon Hizbullah</td>
<td>PBB (signatory, non-active)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein Umar</td>
<td>DDII, KAPPI, PII (Chairman 1969), GPII, ICMI (Board), KISDI, KOMPAK</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Rusyad Nurdin (2002)</td>
<td>DDII (Chair), NU</td>
<td>PBB (honorary member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Party or Fraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Rifyal Ka’bah</td>
<td>DDII (Chair)</td>
<td>PBB (until 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Soleiman</td>
<td>Masyumi (Secretary MPR Faction) Chairman DDII, ICMI, FUI PPP (Deputy Chairman MPP, 1989-1994)</td>
<td>PBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cholil Badawi</td>
<td>Masyumi, DDII (Chair), PII, PPP</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.M. Luthfi</td>
<td>DDII (Chair), Salman (co-founder), FUI, PII, ICMI</td>
<td>PAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hartono Mardjono (2003)</td>
<td>DDII (Chair), PII, MI, PPP</td>
<td>PBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. AM Saefuddin</td>
<td>DDII (Chair), PPP, ICMI</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Didin Hafidhuddin</td>
<td>DDII (board member), PPP (Secretary MPR Faction)</td>
<td>- PK presidential candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Amien Rais</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah, ICMI, DDII (board member)</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramlan Mardjoned</td>
<td>DDII, BAKOMOBIN, GPII, Editor ‘Khutbah Jumat’ (journal)</td>
<td>PBB (Vice Secretary-General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisal Baasir</td>
<td>Al-Irsyad, PII, KAHMI, DDII (board member)</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farid Prawiranegara</td>
<td>HMI, DDII (board member)</td>
<td>PBB (until 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Kholil Ridwan</td>
<td>DDII (board member), BKSPPI, KISDI</td>
<td>PBB (until 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahya Muhamim</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah, DDII (board member)</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Yusrl Ihza Mahendra</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah, ICMI, HMI, DDII board Member (since 1997), Chief Editor Media Dakwah</td>
<td>PBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Yusuf Amir Feisal</td>
<td>HMI, ICMI, DDII (board member)</td>
<td>PBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Imaduddin Abdulahim</td>
<td>ICMI, DDII (board member), HMI, Salman (ITB, founder)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geys Ammar</td>
<td>DDII (board member), Al-Irsyad (Chairman 1998-2000)</td>
<td>PBB (signatory, non-active)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamsil Linrung</td>
<td>DDII, HMI MPO (Chair 1988-90), GPII, ICMI, Centre of International Islamic Education Foundation</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Siddiq</td>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Hهامahua</td>
<td>DDII, KAMI, KAPI, HMI (Chair 1979-81), HMI MPO</td>
<td>PPII Masyumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawardi Noer</td>
<td>Masyumi, GPII, PII, Korps Muballigh Indonesia (KMI)</td>
<td>PPII Masyumi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Mochtar Naim</td>
<td>Masyumi, PPP</td>
<td>PUI</td>
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# APPENDIX III

## PPP LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisational Background</th>
<th>Educational &amp; Professional Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamzah Haz</td>
<td>General Chairman</td>
<td>NU, PMII (Chairman 1962-65), KAMI</td>
<td>BA, Tanjungpura University (economics) Former lecturer and journalist, DPR member since 1971, expert in budgetary matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alimarwan Hanan</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>MI, PII, HMI</td>
<td>Sriwijaya University (law), Former teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahtiar Chamsyah</td>
<td>Vice Secretary General, Chair</td>
<td>MI, HMI, Parmusi (II)</td>
<td>University Medan Area (economics) Former teacher, public servant (Medan, 1974-81), co-publisher (local newspaper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisal Baasir</td>
<td>Chair, Chair MPR Faction</td>
<td>MI, al-Irsyad (Chair Youth Branch 1964-70), PII, HMI, Parmusi (II)</td>
<td>Gadjah Mada University (law), Badan Pimpinan Umum Perusahaan Bangunan Negara (BPUPBN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zain Badjeber</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>NU (Deputy secretary-general 1967-71), PPP DPP since 1973, Chair education department (1984-89)</td>
<td>Islamic University of Jakarta (law), Former journalist and editor (Pelita, Harian Duta, Risalah), former lecturer (law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarkasih Nur</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>NU, PMII, Ansor</td>
<td>IAIN Hidayatullah (Islam), subsequently economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. AM Saefuddin</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>HMI, KAHI, KAMI, KASI, MI, ICMI (Expert Council), DDII, BKSPI</td>
<td>IPB, PhD, (Germany, Food Engineering) Former lecturer, consultant (World Bank, UNDP, IFAD), Director UIKA (Bogor), State Minister of Agrarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusjdi Hamka</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>MI, Muhammadiyah, Parmusi</td>
<td>Academy of Journalism, Former chief editor (Panji Masyarakat), Al-Azhar educational foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tosari Widjaya</td>
<td>Secretary-General, Chair</td>
<td>NU, IPNU, PMII, SPSI</td>
<td>IAIN Malang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukman Hakiem Saifuddin</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Pondok Pesantren Modern Gontor, University Islam As-Syafi’iyah (Dakwah Faculty), Active in the Pesantren Al-Hamidiyah and the Saifuddin Zuhri Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husnie Thamrin</td>
<td>Chair, Vice Chairman</td>
<td>MI, KAPPI</td>
<td>IAIN Yogyakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d. 2003)</td>
<td>MPR Faction</td>
<td>NU (self-proclaimed), Golkar</td>
<td>IAIN Hidayatullah, Prominent preacher (TV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KH Zainuddin MZ (= Muhammad Zein)</td>
<td>Chair, Head Lajnah Syuro*</td>
<td>NU, MUI, HMI, ICMI</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Hasan Metareum</td>
<td>Chairman MPP</td>
<td>HMI, PMII, PUI, MUI, Perti</td>
<td>University Padjadjaran (Socio-politics), STHI Sukabumi, Former teacher (pesantren)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KH Endang Zainal Abidin</td>
<td>Vice Chairman MPP</td>
<td>NU, MUI</td>
<td>University Nahdlatul Ulama (Solo), University of Baghdad, Former teacher (Institute of Qur’anic Science, As-Syafiyah etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KH Munzir Tamam</td>
<td>Chairman MPP</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah, KNPI, MI, Parmusi</td>
<td>University Sam Ratulangi (law), Former lawyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali Hardi Kiaidemak</td>
<td>Vice Chairman, MPP</td>
<td>MI, HMI</td>
<td>Chair of Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara (KPKPN), DPA Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jusuf Syakir</td>
<td>Vice Chairman MPP</td>
<td>PMII, GP Ansor, NU, KNPI, MUI</td>
<td>IAIN Sunun Gunung (Shari’ah), Former lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chozin Chumaidy</td>
<td>Vice Secretary-General</td>
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* resigned
# APPENDIX IV

## PBB LEADERS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisational Background</th>
<th>Educational &amp; Professional Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Yusril Ihza Mahendra</td>
<td>General Chairman</td>
<td>YISC al-Azhar, HMI, DDII, ICMI, Muhammadiyah, activist at ARH mosque (Salemba)</td>
<td>Madrasah Islam ‘al-Jihad’, Perguruan Islam (Belitung, MA), Law and Literature (Universitas Indonesia), Science University of Malaysia (PhD), Former university professor (law), staff in State Secretary and Soeharto’s speech writer (1994-99), assistant of Secretary of State, Director of law firm “YIM and Partners”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS Ka’ban</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>HMI, HMI MPO, al-Irsyad, FUI, KISDI</td>
<td>Economics, (University Jayabaya), Former student activist, lecturer at pesantren and several universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahar L. Hassan</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General, Deputy Chairman (since 2000)</td>
<td>Al-Irsyad, HMI MPO, DDII (LIPPM), PPP</td>
<td>Director of GAMI Press (until 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Soleiman</td>
<td>Chair Syuro Council</td>
<td>Masyumi, DDII, ICMI, PPP (Vice Chairman MPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Rifyal Ka’bah</td>
<td>Chair (until 2001)</td>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>University of Cairo (Law, PhD), Supreme Court Judge (since 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Kholil Ridwan</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (until 2000)</td>
<td>DDII, KISDI, BKSPPI (Head), PII</td>
<td>Head of pesantren (Cibubur, South Jakarta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Qadir Djaelani</td>
<td>Chair (until 2001)</td>
<td>KAPPI, PII, GPPI (Chair), Komando Jihad, Indonesian Islamic Preachers’ Corps (Korps Muballigh Indonesia)</td>
<td>Islamic University of Indonesia, Director (formerly lecturer) Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam, (‘College of Islamic Propagation’, PTDI), lecturer at Institut Pertanian Bogor (‘Bogor Agricultural Institute’, IPB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartono Marjdomo (d. 2003)</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (until 2001)</td>
<td>Parmusi, PPP (MI), HMI, PII, HMI, DDII (Deputy Chairman), ICMI, Hizbul Wathan, Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>University of Indonesia (Law), Lawyer and lecturer (Law, University Muhammadiyah Jakarta, IAIN Hidayatullah Jakarta), Vice Chairman Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (‘Supreme Advisory Council’, DPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Sumargono</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (2000-2004), Head of MPR Faction (since 2000)</td>
<td>KISDI, Darul Islam, Jakarta Preachers’ Corps (Korps Muballigh Jakarta)</td>
<td>Economics (University of Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
<td>Institutions/Positions</td>
<td>Education/Professional Experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zubair Bakri</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman</td>
<td>PII, Hizbul Wathan, PPP (MI)</td>
<td>University of Zaitun (Tunisia), Hasanuddin University (Literature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamdan Zoelva</td>
<td>Vice Secretary-General, Chairman (since 2000)</td>
<td>HMI, PPMI, API</td>
<td>Law (Makassar University), Former law consultant (1988-90), attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggy Sudjana</td>
<td>Chair (until 2000)</td>
<td>HMI MPO (Chair), PPP, PPMI, ICMI (Cides), Parmusi</td>
<td>Chairman Perserikatan Petani Muslim Indonesia ('Indonesian Muslim Workers Brotherhood', PPMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadli Zon</td>
<td>Chair (until 2000)</td>
<td>GPI, KNPI, CPDS</td>
<td>University of Indonesia (Russian Literature), former editor <em>(Horison)</em>, director of ‘Institute for Policy Studies’ (IPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdurrahman Saleh</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Former attorney, supreme court judge; now Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adian Husaini</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General, Secretary-General (until 2000)</td>
<td>PWI, HMI (Bogor), ‘Spiritual Islamic Body’ IPB (Chair), KISDI</td>
<td>IPB (veterinary studies), several pesantren, largely Ulil Albab (Bogor), prolific writer, former journalist (Berita Buana, Republika, Media Dakwah), Member of ‘Commission for Harmony between Religious Constituencies’ (affiliated with MUI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Yusuf Amir Feisal</td>
<td>Chair West Java</td>
<td>PPI, HMI, ICMI</td>
<td>PhD, IKIP Bandung (Teaching and Education), Former university professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anwar Sanusi</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (until 2000)</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>TV preacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anwar Saleh</td>
<td>Chairman (since 2000)</td>
<td>DDII, PII, GPI (Chairman)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farid Prawiranegara</td>
<td>Chair (until 2001)</td>
<td>HMI</td>
<td>Economist, President Director of Energi Nusantara Group, involved in ‘Institute for Policy Studies’ (IPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suaib Didu</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General</td>
<td>GPI (Chair)</td>
<td>Coordinator mission of Indonesian fighters to Afghanistan (2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX V

### PK LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisational Background</th>
<th>Educational &amp; Professional Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail</td>
<td>President (1998 to May 2000)</td>
<td>Al-Ghifari (at IPB)</td>
<td>IPB, PhD (University of Texas), (food technology), Scientist at BPPT (Institute for the Study and Application of Technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid</td>
<td>MPP Chair, President (2000-2005)</td>
<td>PII, HMI, PPI (Saudi Arabia), <em>tarbiyah</em> activist</td>
<td>Pesantren Walisongo, IAIN Yogyakarta (Shari’ah Faculty), PhD, Islamic University of Medinah (Faculty Dakwah &amp; Ushuluddin), Director al-Haramain Foundation, Jakarta, Head of Forum Dakwah Indonesia (‘Indonesian Dakwah Forum’ FDI), former lecturer at IAIN Jakarta, Co-founder Forum Indonesia Damai (‘Forum for a Peaceful Indonesia’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Rahmat Abdullah</td>
<td>Chair MPP, Chair Syuro Council (2000-5)</td>
<td><em>Tarbiyah</em> activist</td>
<td>Asy-Sya’iyyah (university), Preacher, Sabili co-founder (with Zainal Muttaqin), Director Islamic Centre Iqro’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Salim Segaf-Al Jufri</td>
<td>Chair Shar‘iah Council (2000-5)</td>
<td><em>Tarbiyah</em> activist</td>
<td>PhD (1986), University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, <em>(shari‘ah)</em> Preacher, Lecturer LIPIA (Shariah Faculty), IAIN Syahid, Head Shari‘ah Council PT. ARVA, Director of ‘Shari‘ah Consultation Centre’, Head of the ‘Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with Afghanistan’ (KISA), Head of al-Haraih Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Irwan Prayitno</td>
<td>Chair Public Relations/DPR member, PK Malaysia</td>
<td>HMI, ICMI</td>
<td>University Putra Malaysia (training management, PhD), training <em>(dakwah)</em> (Padang, UI), Economist, University Lecturer (Unand), Director of ADZKIA Foundation, business consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Daud Rasyid</td>
<td>Vice Chairman Shari‘iah Council</td>
<td>PUI, DDII,</td>
<td>University of Medinah <em>(shari‘iah Faculty, PhD)</em>, Lecturer (IAIN Hidayatullah, Jakarta) and preacher, prolific writer, member of shari‘ah ‘Team of Advisors’ for the Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahfudz Siddieq</td>
<td>Head of Cadreisation</td>
<td>Dakwah activist at UI (Socio-political)</td>
<td>University of Indonesia, Active at SIDIK (sometimes: ‘Siddieq’)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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327
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Affiliations</th>
<th>Role and Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutammi mul 'Ula</td>
<td>DPR, Head Politics &amp; Law Department DPP (98-00), OSIS al-Islam PII (Chair 1983-86), DDII and tarbiyah activist</td>
<td>Foundation, Jakarta, Director Islamic Centre Iqro’, Director of Islamic Centre Foundation, Jakarta, Professor of International Law, former lecturer at Asy-Syafi’yah University, Ibnu Khaldun University (Bogor) and Djuanda University (Bogor), prolific writer, editorial board Gema Insani Press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Habib Hasan</td>
<td>MPP, Chair Cadreisation Department Tarbiyah activist</td>
<td>University of Indonesia (Arab Literature), Founder of al-Hikmah Foundation, former leading student activist, religious instructor (UI), al-Manar Foundation, SYFIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdi Sumaithi (Abu Ridho)</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman MPP (2000-05) LMD (Salman), PII (West-Java), HMI, PPI (Saudi Arabia), DDII (affiliated), FUI</td>
<td>IAIN Sunan Kalijaga (Yogyakarta), University Ibn Suud (Riyad, journalism), Leading Dakwah activist, SIDIK (Siddieq) Foundation (Chair), co-founder al-Ishlahy Press, prolific writer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fahri Hamzah</td>
<td>Head, Department of Communication &amp; Networking KAMMI (Founding Chair), Tarbiyah, PPP (MPR Faction)</td>
<td>Economics (University of Indonesia), Former leading student activist, religious instructor (UI), al-Manar Foundation, SYFIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH Yusuf Supendi</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman Shari’ah Council PII (East Java), KISDI, DDII, GPI</td>
<td>Active at the Shari’ah Consultation Centre, Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashadi</td>
<td>MP PII (East Java), KISDI, DDII, GPI</td>
<td>Former journalist (Kiblat, Saksi, Media Dakwah), researcher at Siddieq Foundation, Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syamsul Balda</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Economics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rokib Abdul Kadir</td>
<td>MP IPNU, PMII</td>
<td>University Al-Azhar (Cairo).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VI

MINISTERS OF ISLAMIST PARTIES AND FRAKSI REFORMASI

Prof. Dr. Burhanuddin Jusuf Habibie Cabinet (22 May 1998 – 26 October 1999)
Hamzah Haz (PPP), State Minister* of Investment
Prof. A.M. Saefuddin (PPP), State Minister of Agrarian Affairs

First Abdurrahman Wahid Cabinet (26 October 1999 - 23 August 2000)
Prof. Yusriil Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Minister of Law and Legislation
Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail (PK), Minister of Forestry and Plantation
Yahya Muhamin (PAN), Minister of National Education
Bambang Sudibjo (PAN), Finance Minister
Hamzah Haz (PPP), Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare and Poverty Eradication**
Zarkasih Nur (PPP), State Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises
Hazballah M. Saad (PAN), State Minister of Human Rights Affairs
Al-Hilal Hamdi (PAN), State Minister of Transmigration and Population

Second Abdurrahman Wahid Cabinet (23 August 2000 – 1 June 2001)
Prof. Yusriil Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Minister of Law and Human Rights***
Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail (PK), Minister of Forestry and Plantation****
Yahya Muhamin, Minister of National Education
Al-Hilal Hamdi, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration
Zarkasih Nur (PPP), State Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises

Third Abdurrahman Wahid Cabinet (1 June 2001 – 9 August 2001)
Yahya Muhamin, Minister of National Education
Al-Hilal Hamdi, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration
Zarkasih Nur (PPP), State Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises

Megawati Soekarnoputri Cabinet (9 August 2001)
Hamzah Haz (PPP), Vice-President
Bahtiar Chamsyah (PPP), Minister of Social Affairs
Prof. Yusriil Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Minister of Justice and Human Rights
Hatta Radjas (PAN): State Minister Research and Technology
Aliwarman Hanan (PPP), State Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises

* State ministerial positions have no portfolios
** Dismissed in November 1999
*** Dismissed in February 2001
**** Dismissed in March 2001
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Abdillah Toha (24 August 2000): PAN chairman (nationalist section)

Abdul Habib Hasan (19 September 2000): activist in PK’s cadreisation department

Abdullah Hehamahua (15 & 21 September 2000, 6 February 2001): PPII Masyumi chairman, former HMI chairman

Abdurrahman Saleh (September 2000): PBB chairman

Abu Ridho (17 October, 15 November 2000 and 11 April 2001): leading PK Ideologue and activist, prolific writer on international Islamic issues

Adian Husaini (30 October 2001): doctrinaire Islamist PBB deputy secretary general (until 2000), KISDI secretary, prolific writer

Agus Dwiwarsono (11 April 2001 and 6 October 2003): deputy-secretary general PBB, head of cadreisation section

Ahmad Sumargono (10 November 2000): doctrinaire Islamist chairman and head of DPR faction of PBB, formerly chairman of KISDI

Ali Hardi Kiai Demak (7 October 2003): PPP chairman and MP, Parmusi chairman

Ali Yafie, KH, Prof. (22 July 1999): NU-based chairman of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) until early 2000

Anas Urbaningrum (16 March 2001): HMI chairman (1998-2000) and leading younger Muslim intellectual


Anwar Saleh (29 September 2000): PBB chair and former GPI chairman

Daud Rasyid, Dr. (5 November 2001): deputy chairman PK Shari’ah Council and DDII-affiliated tarbiyah activist

Deliar Noer, Prof., (9 October 2000 & 28 November 2001): chairman PUI and leading academic on politics and Islam

Djafar Badjeber (24 October 2001): Chair PPP DKI Jakarta (until 2002)

Fahri Hamzah (November 2000 and 2 April 2001): chairman KAMMI (until 1999), chairman PK, leading Islamic student activist


Faisal Baasir (31 October 2000 & 19 October 2001): PPP chair, head of MPR faction, Parmusi chairman

Farid Prawiranegara (12 July 1999): PBB chairman, son of Masyumi chief economist Syafruddin Prawiranegara


Hamdan Zoelva (6 September 2000, 4 December 2002): PBB politician and MP

Hartono A. Jaiz (16 November 2001): DDII-based journalist and writer


Hatta Radjasa (29 August & 6 November 2000): PAN secretary-general


Husein Umar (September & 3 October 2000, 24 November 2001): DDII general secretary, PPP chairman and MP

Imam Muchrozi (22 January 2001): chairman PK West Java

Imam Rulyawan (5 April 2001): Islamic activist at the Dental Faculty of the University of Indonesia (UI), Jakarta

Irwan Prayitno, Dr., (4 & 5 December 2002): PK ideologue and the party’s chief-economist


Jurhum Lantong (17 October & 6 November 2001): Deputy Chairman of PBB’s Jakarta branch

Ka’ban, M. S., (4 August, 19 September & 12 October 2000, 17 October 2001): PBB secretary general, head of MPR faction

Kholil Ridwan, KH, (8 November 2001): doctrinaire Islamist deputy chairman PBB (until 2000), DDII member

331
Lukman Hakiem Saifuddin (24 October & 2 November 2000, 14 January 2001): NU-based PPP MP

Lukman Hakiem (27 November 2001): DDII-based PPP activist, prolific writer and editor

Luthfi, A. M., (7 and 21 November 2000): PAN chairman (Islamist section), DDII chairman

Mohammad Hafiz (16 April 2001): leading DDII-affiliated tarbiyah activist

Mahfudz Siddiq (5 April & 17 October 2001): Head of PK’s cadresation section

Mashadi (9 November 2000 & 8 February 2001): PK-based MP of Fraksi Reformasi

Miqdad Hussein (26 July 2000 & 1 November 2001): PPP activist

Mohammad Soleiman (29 September 2000): DDII chair, chairman of PBB’s Syuro Council

Patrialis Akbar (29 August & 6 November 2000): PAN chairman (Islamist section) and MP of Fraksi Reformasi

Ridwan Saidi (11 & 18 September 2000): Masyumi Baru founder, former PPP MP and HMI chairman

Rifyal Ka’bah, Dr., (27 July & 22 September 2000, 5 February 2001): PBB DDII chairman, academic

Ramlan Mardjoned (12 November 2001): Deputy secretary general PBB, formerly Natsir’s secretary

Mutammimul ‘Ula (4 September and 10 October 2000, 14 January 2003): PK ideologue, Head of Department of Law and Human Rights, MP for Fraksi Reformasi

Rusdy Hamka (1 December 2002): MI-based, senior PPP politician

Sahar L. Hassan (15 March & 30 November 2001, 6 October 2003): deputy chairman PBB (since 2000), formerly deputy-secretary general

Salim Segaf, Dr., (20 October & 29 November 2001): Chairman of PK’s Shari’ah Council

Suaib Didu (16 & 19 November 2001): doctrinaire Islamist PBB deputy secretary general, chairman GPI

Tosari Widjaya (30 June 1999): NU – based, veteran PPP politician
Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Prof., (22 November 2001): pragmatic PBB general chairman, minister in various cabinets and leading authority on legal issues


Zein Badjeber (5 December 2002): veteran PPP politician

**Group Interviews:**

Fahri Hamzah, Andi Rahmat and several KAMMI activists: 16 January 2001

Hillal Tri Anwar, Aye Sudarto (PII board members) and Surahman (PII activist): 20 March 2001
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343

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