VALUES AND GREEN POLITICS:

A RHETORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF VALUES IN GREEN POLITICAL PROCESSES

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DECLARATION

Except where otherwise indicated

this thesis is my own work.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the role of values in the conduct of green politics. In political science and sociology this topic is most commonly addressed in terms of theoretical approaches that aim to identify green politics in terms of a distinct set of values. Such approaches attribute the emergence and growth of green politics to value change. I argue that this conventional wisdom is based on a misunderstanding of the significance of values in political processes. One consequence of this misunderstanding is that a number of typical issues that face green political organisations are not adequately addressed. In particular, attempts to identify green politics in terms of values disregard the ambiguity that is a central feature of normative political discourse.

In this thesis I develop an alternative approach which considers values as a type of good reason which is deployed in the context of rhetorical argument. In doing so, I investigate the relationship between values and other types of rhetorical reasoning. Green politics is a type of politics in which normative reasons are characteristically privileged in political discourse. I refer to this rhetorical privileging as 'value primacy'.

The second part of the thesis examines the consequences of value primacy for green political action taking as a case study a series of discussions among Australian green activists. These greens were engaged in drawing up structures and mechanisms for political co-operation with a view to forming a political party or network. This case study demonstrates the various ways in which values are used rhetorically in the practice of green politics. In particular, it reveals a great deal of ambiguity and flexibility in the conduct of normative discourse among greens. I also explore some of the perverse effects that follow from attempts to implement green political values in the light such ambiguity. Many of the problems identified in the Australian example can be generalised to the experiences of other green political organisations. This exploration of the perverse effects of green normative rationality suggests that the emphasis that both academic analysts and green activists place upon value change and conversion as a way of understanding green politics is unwarranted.

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Introduction

> We want to do politics differently (Christabel Chamarette, *The Canberra Times*, 5 June 1993).

Christabel Chamarette is one of two senators from the Western Australian Greens. Together with other minor parties, the WA Greens have held the balance of power in the Australian Senate since the March 1993 federal election. In the current Australian political context, Senator Chamarette's ideas about doing politics differently, and those of her senate colleague Dee Margetts, have taken on an enormous significance to major political parties, the media, and many other groups involved in the institutional political process. Because of their strategic position, they have been able to make a number of substantial changes to the ways in which significant government decisions have been made such as the 1993 Budget and the Native Title Act. Their demands are most frequently expressed in terms of greater community consultation and participation in government decision-making. In the Australian press, these demands have been characteristically portrayed as indicative of the maverick approach and naivety of the green senators.

From another perspective, however, the WA Green Senators are definitely not mavericks. They can be seen as the most visible Australian manifestation of an international political movement which has become increasingly prominent in western industrial democracies over the past two decades. The ways in which these senators see themselves as doing politics differently are not homegrown products of the political culture of Perth and Fremantle. These ideas are representative of the characteristic image greens present of themselves to the world. According to Sara Parkin, one-time spokesperson for the British Green Party, 'Green parties have been founded by a small number of people seeking to bring not only an ecological approach to politics but also a new set of principles for political practice' (Parkin 1990: 234-5). The name of one of the two national Belgian green parties, *AGALEV*, is an acronym for the slogan 'go and live differently'. Greens contend that this different mode of politics implies

profound political changes. In the introduction to Capra and Spretnak's *Green Politics,* James Robertson states '(t)he new ways of doing politics and governing ourselves will match the new patterns of activity, new structures of society and new systems of beliefs prevalent in the next historical period - the next stage of human development - that is now due' (Capra & Spretnak 1984: xxiii).

This new way of doing politics typically includes a number of ingredients. Green political actors have been noted for their willingness to question established features of representative democracy. They advocate consultative, participatory and 'non-hierarchical' methods of decision-making. The different ways of doing politics adopted by greens are not just a feature of their involvement in parliamentary politics. Many of these ideas and practices can also be found in a range of organisations that make up new social movements: the environmental, peace, anti-nuclear, feminist and indigenous peoples movements. This social movement backdrop to green politics is also indicative of the range and the content of green political orientations.

If greens 'do politics differently', what is it that is different about their action? Greens themselves frequently claim that their new ways of doing politics are *founded upon a distinct set of values.* Green political actors regard their actions as expressions of their commitment to values such as autonomy, equality, participation, consensus and sensitivity to ecological and social diversity. The world's most famous green party, *die Grünen* in Germany, describes itself as being built upon the foundation of four 'pillars' or 'basic principles': ecological sustainablility, economic and social justice, grassroots democracy and non-violence. These principles, like those referred to by Parkin and Robertson, are *normative* principles. Values constitute the name of what is considered by many greens to be the first ever national green party, the New Zealand 'Values Party', which was formed in 1972.

Many academic approaches share with green activists the assumption that green politics is indeed an expression of a distinct set of values. This assumption can be found in an enormous range of literature relating to green politics. It provides common ground between Michigan empirical

political science of Ronald Inglehart and Frankfurt school critical theory of Jean Cohen. It is a point of connection between the functionalism of Mary Douglas and the radical green political theory of Robyn Eckersley. It is an assumption shared by the conventional Anglo-American political philosophy of Robert Goodin and the French sociology of Alain Touraine. Such wide-ranging concurrence is impressive. Certainly, if these authors were to meet to discuss green politics they would find plenty of scope for disagreement. But none would have any problem with the idea that values and normative principles are at the core of a distinct green political identity. Accordingly, each of these approaches represent versions of what I have termed the 'value identity' interpretation of green politics.

I certainly agree that greens do things differently because of the values to which they express commitment and that there are certain political positions that are consistently taken by greens which they regard as underwritten by values. Nevertheless, the central argument of my thesis is that the value identity interpretation of the relationship between values and green politics is seriously misguided and does not survive close scrutiny. Value identity approaches make for rather restrictive depictions of the scope of green politics and set up impossible parameters for assessing green experience. For those who are broadly sympathetic to the aims and objectives of green politics, it constitutes a recipe for political pessimism.

My contention is that value identity approaches are inadequate because they operate from a basic misunderstanding about what sort of things values and normative principles are. As a consequence of this basic misunderstanding, these approaches are not in a good position to deal with the sorts of issues, tasks and problems that green political actors typically face. Indeed, the analysis pursued in this thesis suggests that many of the typical problems faced by green parties and organisations are either a direct result of, or are significantly exacerbated by the habit of thinking that green politics represents a distinctive value paradigm.

The assumption of value identity is typically accompanied by a number of other claims. Each of these approaches posit that the green value paradigm is internally coherent, and that those who adhere to the green system of

values do so on the basis of conscious choice. An even more significant accompanying assumption is that social change can be characterised in terms of movement towards (or away from) standards of green rationality. In this view, social conflict is understandable in terms of conflict between adherents of the green value paradigm and those who adopt different or opposing standards of rationality. These assumptions amount to rather strong conceptions of value rationality and the capacity of academic analysts to discern the implications of green values. Each of them offer versions of the green claim that a different set of social arrangements will result from increasing adherence and commitment to the alternative value paradigm. These analyses support the contention that green politics is a politics of conversion, and that the success of green politics can be assessed in terms of the extent of conversion. This applies regardless of whether or not these theorists are sympathetic to the green political project.

Greens are by no means the only political actors who have interpreted their own activities in terms of commitment to basic values. Max Weber, who has had a significant influence on the conceptualisation of values and politics, had much to say about political movements of his time which based their political actions upon an 'ethic of ultimate ends'. Weber was keenly interested in the effects of action based upon values. But he certainly would not accept that the proposed 'new structures of society' would come about as the consequence of 'doing politics differently'. His reason for not doing so is straightforward. Weber viewed all claims to rationality with a certain irony. According to Weber, any form of rationally purposive action produces unanticipated results. This is more than an assertion that we can never fully know the results of our actions. Systematic engagement in particular kinds of rational behaviour can be shown to lead to particular sorts of unintended consequences. The iron cage of formal rationality is the best known of many examples of this dynamic in Weber's writings.

Within this general conception of social action, there is a particular type of unintended consequence associated with value rationality that is of interest in this thesis. According to Weber, '....it is *not* true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, ...often the opposite is

true' (Weber 1958a: 123). Action consciously undertaken on the basis of value rationality frequently produces results that are hardly in keeping with such rationality, and which may even be the opposite to those that are intended. This dynamic can be identified as a 'perverse effect'.[1] Some parallels to this theme can be found the work of contemporary social theorists who have taken up themes of Nietzsche and Foucault. In particular, the work of Jeffrey Minson (1985; 1993) and William Connolly (1987; 1991) are useful here. Both authors have questioned the wisdom of grounding political action on fundamental ethical principles. The results of such action are often quite different to what is bargained for.

Minson has concentrated on what he calls the 'eccentricity' of political action that is derived from fundamental ethical principles. He is concerned to trace a number of characteristic problems that arise from basing political action first and foremost upon 'foundational' ethical principles. For Minson, '(i)t is not the (abstract) content but rather the deployment of ethical categories and principles as an ultimate and comprehensive evaluative yardstick which characterised foundationalism, and which renders these categories politically eccentric' (Minson 1985: 150-1). He draws our attention to the serious pitfalls of attaching political claims to 'non-negotiable' normative principles. These pitfalls are evident particularly when this non-negotiability involves a principled refusal to treat practical consequences as relevant considerations. Minson argues, for instance, that many highly normative approaches to politics actually make it easier for opponents to undermine substantive political claims (1985: 156-7). However, this relation is characteristically ignored by those for whom the principle is sacrosanct, because such practical considerations should not override matters of principle. He pursues this argument with reference to the political activities of both sides of the abortion debate (1985), and to the issue of sexual harassment (1993).

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[1] This term is attributable to Raymond Boudon. I have used it in a similar way to Herbert Kitschelt (1989: 5) with respect to green parties.

Connolly argues that any regime of ethical identity must at some stage deal with 'the problem of evil' (1991: 1-8).[2] That is, somewhere along the line it becomes clear to those who adhere to ethical identities that their experience is out of kilter with the normative interpretation of the world they espouse. This discordance usually requires some sort of explanation. Such explanations take on greater importance the greater the commitment to and investment in an ethical identity. Connolly argues that strongly held ethical identities exhibit strong tendencies toward establishing categories of deviance in order to cope with the disparity between normative ideals and reality. Thus, when normative rationality is not fulfilled, or when obstacles to value-based action are encountered, such difficulties tend to be attributed to the obverse of the normatively rational (i.e. evil, the irrational, subversive forces) that has some sort of 'other' existence (1991: 8). For example, the temptation that is confronted by the puritan Christian is attributed to the devil. The everyday obstacles to a communitarian utopia can be attributed to the inherent selfishness and imperfection of members. In such circumstances, those committed to ethical identities typically refuse to recognise that the 'other' is itself the product of the construction of ethical identity. They are blind to the circularity built into their definitions of identity.

Regarding the more limited range of issues pursued in this thesis, Connolly's formulation provides another way of approaching the possibility of perverse effects. One possible implication is that problems experienced by groups attempting to implement normative rationality are likely to be interpreted as evidence of the 'normative other'. Thus, the problems, tensions and difficulties that are acknowledged can be considered as direct products of value-based identities. This is a suggestion to be pursued in the course of this thesis.

Unfortunately, most standard treatments of values and normative rationality in the fields of political science, sociology and social theory have ignored the theme of unintended consequences and perverse effects.

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[2] As such, Connolly appears to treat any construction of identity as having an ethical dimension.

In contrast, more prominent Weberian notions of value choice and value conflict are woven into the fabric of value identity approaches. Accordingly, most of the academic literature about values and green politics adopts a noticeably unironic view of values and value rationality. But the phenomena of unintended consequences and perverse effects are highly relevant to the study of green politics. According to Herbert Kitschelt, 'the pursuit of a new form of organization in ecology parties produces results that are (not) in agreement with the intended logic of constituency representation' (1989: 5).[3] The core green constituency identified by Kitschelt is that which regards itself as committed to green political principles. Kitschelt's research contributes to a growing body of evidence about green groups and organisations which place a high priority on normative commitment and integrity. Such groups seem to be greatly susceptible to particular types of tensions and difficulties including sometimes bitter and destructive internal conflicts and entrenched political frustration. These effects are clearly not desirable from the point of view of activists themselves. If green political identity is defined in terms of values then there are good reasons to suspect that the problems experienced by these groups are closely linked to the intensity of their normative identity.

I have followed a rather different methodological path in order to pursue some of the same themes as those suggested by Weber, Minson and Connolly. Unlike Minson and Connolly, who approach these issues via the terminology of ethics, morals and principles, I have come to consider these questions from a background of political science and sociology where values are the pertinent concept. In order to find a framework that could support a more ironic treatment of values, however, it was necessary to cast further afield from the standard political science and sociological literature. The material I have found most useful has been the work of British social psychologist Michael Billig, who has investigated the rhetorical use of attitudes, opinions and values in the context of political

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[3] The entire quote is 'the pursuit of a new form of organization in ecology parties produces results that are in agreement neither with a logic of party competition nor with the intended logic of constituency representation'.

argument. This work has grown out of an internal critique of social psychological research techniques, but has far wider implications, I believe, for the ways in which we can think about the political context of normative discourse. In Billig's account, values are perhaps the most flexible, ambiguous, and at times downright contradictory elements of rhetorical discourse. This way of conceptualising values suggests significant problems for any attempt to *identify* political categories in terms of values.

Methodologically, this thesis starts from Billig's contention that values are rhetorically *ambiguous*. This observation is also significant for earlier writers on rhetoric such as Kenneth Burke (1969) and Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). From these materials I have attempted to construct an alternative framework within which it is possible explore the relationship between values and politics. I have termed this the 'rhetorical approach' to values. Under such a framework, values are discernible when they are articulated in discourse. The articulation of values, therefore, is considered as behaviour rather than the cause of behaviour. In drawing this line, I eschew a favourite device of much of the standard social scientific literature which attempts to diagnose values that underlie actors' behaviour and orientations.

The central focus of this methodology is the investigation of 'good reasons' in political discourse. The rhetorical dimension of political discourse is based upon the relationship between 'orators' who make rhetorical claims, and 'audiences' to whom these claims are addressed. Audiences are particularly significant. The nature of an audience, whether it be simply imagined by the orator or actually existing, defines the range of 'good reasons' that can be effectively deployed. Having identified an audience, the next key question of a rhetorical approach is what constitutes a 'type of good reason' with respect to that audience. Values can be considered as one much utilised 'type of good reason', as can facts, practicality, self-interest, aesthetics and tradition. This gives us a rather different and highly useful sense of the term 'normative rationality'. According to a rhetorical perspective, scientific arguments are constructed in terms of technical rationality because these are the type of reasons that

will be admitted by a scientific audience. In the same way, there are many claims constructed in terms of normative rationality because such arguments are deemed admissible for particular audiences. This provides a frame for analysing the place of normative rationality in political discourse without assuming a baseline standard for such rationality.

The next methodological element of the rhetorical approach is to compare the rhetorical weight of different types of reasons. In this thesis, the particular question I ask is how do normative reasons compare to technical, practical and self-interested reasons. When normative reasons consistently outrank other types of reasons, this is a state of affairs that I refer to as 'normative primacy' or 'value primacy'. (Within this framework, it would also be possible to identify 'technical primacy' or 'pragmatic primacy'). The final component of this approach, building on the previous elements, is the investigation of the political consequences of privileging a particular type of reasoning. In this thesis, I restrict my attention to the consequences of normative primacy. Like Minson, I am interested in investigating contexts in which normative reasoning is privileged.

An intriguing set of issues arises in circumstances where normative rationality overrides other types of reasoning. The key insight that emerges from a rhetorical approach is that the rhetorical efficacy of values is largely a function of their *ambiguity*. A central question that is pursued in this thesis regards what happens when values, as inherently ambiguous constructs, are expected to provide the basis for the establishment and maintenance of organisational boundaries, the conduct of decision-making and the resolution of conflict. These are sites where it is possible to discern a range of unintended consequences and perverse effects of normative rationality.

The thesis can be divided into two parts. The first part, consisting of Chapters 1 to 4 is a theoretical and methodological discussion of the relationship between values and green politics. My concern in this half of the thesis is to show why it is not feasible to identify the basis of green politics, or any type of politics for that matter, in terms of a distinct value rationality. I develop the rhetorical framework and methodology for

understanding the political significance of values, and show how this framework can be applied in order to understand a number of key features of green politics.

Chapter 1 reviews the academic literature on green politics with a view to establishing the background and common threads of value identity approaches. Much of this literature deals with the characteristic new middle class location of support for green politics. Value identity accounts offer more plausible connections between green styles of participation, political preferences and social location than explanations constructed in terms of interest. I outline the ways in which various theoretical approaches have identified green politics in terms of values and sketch a number of associated elements of the value identity thesis. The chapter concludes with an outline of some features of green politics in which the value identity thesis starts to fray around the edges. In particular, the prevalence of internal conflict within green parties and organisations is a strong indication of the weaknesses and blind spots of value-based approaches.

Chapter 2 attempts to demonstrate how the various approaches that share value identity assumptions come to regard values as the sort of thing that can be used to distinguish social actors and processes, and suggests reasons why this image of values is misleading and problematic. Analytical schemes of value distinction stumble across a great many examples of political action which are anomalous. Value identity approaches are not in a position to recognise the ambiguity and flexibility of normative discourse. However, these are features which should be regarded as central to the way in which values are actually deployed in political debate. This ambiguity of political values is dismissed by value identity approaches as indicative of value deviance, inconsistency or irrationality.

In Chapter 3, I provide an alternative framework for thinking about values and their role in green politics that takes into account ambiguity and flexibility. I argue that values should be considered as rhetorical materials that are deployed in the context of political argument. This chapter develops in more detail the rhetorical approach outlined above.

In Chapter 4 the focus returns to green politics. The main purpose of this chapter is to identify the parallels between activist and academic characterisations of green politics. Values occupy a privileged place in much green political literature, overriding reasons such as efficiency, practicality and self-interest as good reasons advanced in justifying or criticising political action. From the rhetorical interpretation of the role of values it is possible to re-interpret much of the established knowledge about green politics. In particular, I argue that the characteristic new middle class location of green support can be seen in terms of the social distribution of specific rhetorical skills and capacities. As such, the green movement provides the 'raw materials' for a politics of value primacy.

In the second part of the thesis, consisting of Chapters 5 to 7, I apply the concepts developed in the previous chapters to some examples of the practice of green politics. I am particularly concerned to draw attention to the unintended consequences and perverse effects of green normative rationality neglected by value identity approaches. Throughout these three chapters, my focus moves from microscopic to macroscopic. At the microscopic level is an investigation into the rhetorical use of values by a network of Australian green political activists. In this case study I cover the details of specific debates between greens involved in this network, and address some of the more general issues that arise from green value rationality and primacy. At the macroscopic level I raise a number of more general issues that arise from treating green political activity as primarily an expression of normative rationality.

One interesting feature of this case study is that it draws from quite a new source of data - that of on-line computer conferences. It is reasonable to assume that this medium of communication will become increasingly important as a space for political discussion and debate, and as a means of transmitting and accessing information. The environmental movement has been at the forefront of utilising this means of communication. The material for this case study is drawn from a particular conference which provided a forum for discussion and debate about the prospective formation of a nationwide green party. As I explain in Chapter 5,

electronic conference material provides a comprehensive record of discourse, thus lending itself to rhetorical analysis.

The bulk of Chapter 5 is spent outlining the political context for the discussions among Australian greens. These discussions revolve around the appropriate limitations to party membership and the design of organisational structures. I intend to demonstrate the centrality of values and value rationality in these discussions. From this exposition it is apparent that the implications of green values are highly ambiguous and contradictory in the context of these debates. This material provides strong evidence against the contention that green politics operates according to a coherent set of values, and questions the validity of assuming a rationality of green values.

In Chapter 6 I focus on some of the more general problems that are created or exacerbated by the rhetorical reliance these Australian greens place upon values. Fairly fundamental issues including the drawing of boundaries around a green party, and resolving conflict where it arises are found to be especially difficult to manage when participants regard the prospective organisation first and foremost as an attempt to embody green normative principles.

Chapter 7 is concerned with extrapolating from the Australian case study to a more general discussion of the vulnerabilities associated with the faith in value rationality. In this discussion I suggest that the characteristic cleavage between fundamentalist and realist approaches to green politics can be seen as a direct product of a value-based identity. I argue that value identity approaches are ill-equipped to make sense of fundi-realo conflict, because they share the problematic assumptions about values that are key factors in the creation and perpetuation of the fundi-realo distinction. At the end of this chapter I canvas the substantial limitations of a value-based approach to green politics, highlighting what I regard as characteristic areas of vulnerability when values are regarded as the foundation for political action. These investigations into the unintended consequences of green value rationality lead to the conclusion that the political emphasis on value change and conversion is substantially misplaced, and that

shared green values are a problematic basis for co-ordinated, sustained political action.

The empirical material used in this thesis leans towards a greater emphasis on those values that draw upon themes of participatory democracy, and less emphasis on the specifically ecological content of the green value repertoire. Nevertheless, I do not think it is feasible, as Robert Goodin (1992) does, to regard participatory themes as analytically separate from ecological themes. Goodin distinguishes between green theories of value (reasons to protect nature) and green theories of agency (reasons to favour radical participatory politics). In his framework, ecological values are essential to the identity and conduct of green politics, whereas participatory values may be desirable but are not essential. This thesis is certainly sympathetic to Goodin's aims to question the emphasis on decentralised participatory democracy in the practice of green politics. Unlike Goodin, however, I do not believe that the problem is one of distinguishing between first and second division values. Green activists typically refuse to make this separation as they regard participatory and ecological values to be closely interconnected. Ecological metaphors are frequently used to bolster participatory themes, and vice versa. For this reason I do not regard it as feasible to make any such demarcation, given the methodological concern in this thesis to explore the implications of the ways greens themselves conceptualise value politics. Instead, the problems I perceive stem from conceptualising green politics as a project of implementing green value per se.

Chapter 8 summarises the arguments of the thesis and concludes by suggesting how the insights gained from the rhetorical approach suggest a more ironic view of the relationship between values and politics. This analysis supports the suspicions held by Weber, Minson and Connolly about the pitfalls and dangers of placing excessive weight upon 'ethics of ultimate ends' in politics.

The problems associated with the rhetorical privileging of values are not necessarily endemic or inevitable in green parties and organisations. Undoubtedly, particular green organisations vary significantly in the degree to which they are prone to the problems I discuss. It is quite

possible that the dynamics identified are more applicable to newer 'greener' organisational settings, and are less characteristic of more experienced parties. My point is simply that the rhetoric of the green movement has provided the 'preconditions' for value primacy, and the kinds of problems associated with it. As such, green parties provide some of the best contemporary sites to explore the perverse effects of value-based politics.

Chapter 1: Green Politics and the Value Identity Thesis

The emergence of the green movement as a significant force in the politics of western democracies has raised many substantial questions for social theorists and social scientists. Attempts to explain the emergence of green politics have sought to establish appropriate ways of characterising this phenomenon. Much of the literature, therefore, is concerned with identifying what is different about green politics, and how it can be recognised and distinguished from other political projects. Since about 1980, a conventional wisdom has emerged which covers a wide range of theoretical approaches. This conventional wisdom suggests that the most appropriate way of identifying green politics is in terms of values. Participants in the green movement are regarded as possessing shared value commitments that distinguish them from the rest of the political landscape, and that lead them to adopt particular orientations, lifestyles and forms of political action.

The first part of this chapter shows that the apparent plausibility of value-based interpretations of green politics is related to the weaknesses of interest-based explanations. While it is true that there are characteristic sociological patterns of green support, these patterns do not easily lend themselves to interest-based interpretations of the content and style of green politics. Values are seen as providing the missing link between social location and green orientations. The range of theoretical approaches that adopt this conventional wisdom is certainly impressive. Whatever their differences on other points, there are remarkable similarities between theorists as diverse as Ronald Inglehart, Alain Touraine, Mary Douglas and Robert Goodin regarding the role they attribute to green values and value rationality. This chapter outlines the variety of value identity approaches that have emerged and highlights their common ground on a number of issues.

This standard picture of green politics carries with it a number of assumptions about the nature of green values, including the presumption

that green values are coherent, and that shared values imply shared interpretations of these values. The final part of this chapter demonstrates the limitations of these assumptions. I argue that the most striking problems with standard value-based accounts can be found in the experience of green parties and political organisations. There are a substantial number of grey areas in which the implications of green values are highly ambiguous, and raise more problems than they solve in relation to the day to day political dilemmas faced by greens.

1.1. The Distinctiveness of Green Politics

The term 'green politics' is used in this thesis to refer to an amalgam of political orientations that have their organisational expression in green parties. Although environmental issues are characteristically at the centre of these concerns, green politics has a far wider scope. In this wider sense of the term, green politics encompasses much the same territory as what have also been identified as new social movements, i.e. environment, anti-nuclear, peace, feminist, indigenous peoples and sexual identity movements. However, green politics should not be considered as simply the aggregate of all these movements. Activists from the first three movements typically form the core of the green movement. These are what Jan Pakulski (1991) refers to as 'eco-pax' movements, and are each characterised by highly universalistic claims. There is a high degree of overlap with respect to participation in these movements. The last three of this list exist far more independently of the green movement. Greens are generally supportive of the aspirations of the 'identity' movements, as well as some claims associated with the 'non-institutionalised' socialist movement. However, identity aspirations are supported in terms that are compatible with an overall universalist approach to politics, rather than emphasising the particularist element of these movements.

Hence, the word green is used because it has become the most widely accepted label which is attached to this package of orientations and forms of participation by activists themselves. If the term 'rainbow' had acquired such widespread acceptance I would have been just as happy to use this term. However, it has been the green banner under which most attempts to articulate the 'new politics' amalgam have been cast, and the term

'green politics' invokes a slightly sharper focus than the umbrella terms most frequently found in the academic literature, namely 'new politics' (Dalton 1984), 'left-libertarianism' (Kitschelt 1988; 1989) and 'new social movements' (Cohen 1983; Offe 1985). This slight difference in emphasis is inconsequential in the following discussions regarding political participation and social characteristics, such that the terms are used interchangeably.

1.1.1. New Politics, New Social Movements, New Demands, New Parties

One of the most common academic labels for locating green politics has been the term 'new politics'. Within the political science tradition, the recognition of new styles of political participation stems from an initial interest in extraparliamentary protest activity which was initially described as 'unconventional' and 'outside the political system' (Kaase & Marsh 1979). In fact, the initial formulation of new politics by political scientists such as Barnes, Kaase, Dalton and Marsh was directed more towards styles of participation than to the content of political demands. Hildebrandt and Dalton contend that the common denominator of new politics is the emphasis on access to the *means* of political decision-making, regardless of the *ends* (Hildebrandt & Dalton 1978). Concerns ranging from opposition to U.S. military intervention in Vietnam to environmental pollution and abortion, were interpreted as demands relating to participation in the political system.[1]

Notwithstanding the emphasis placed upon political participation, increasing attention has been paid to interpreting the issues that are advanced via new politics. New politics issues have been defined in contradistinction to class-based politics, which has been identified as the principal electoral cleavage of postwar western democracies. New politics issues, therefore, are those which do not fit into a class-based framework,

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[1] Thus, ethnolinguistic issues in Belgium and tax revolts in Denmark were considered to be new politics mobilisations because of their articulation through extraparliamentary protest (Hildebrandt & Dalton 1978).

and are not resolvable through the same corporatist mechanisms that have been a prominent feature of the postwar decades. Environmentalism is a typical example of such an issue. It is regarded as important by these political scientists because of both the 'unconventional' forms of political action adopted and because it cannot easily be made to fit a class-based framework.

A broader stream of sociological interest in new social movements has dealt with the emergence of these new styles of participation and new issues in a wider social and cultural context. Although there is debate about the degree to which this collection of movements can be called new, the commentaries on their political development have much in common with the new politics accounts. Theorists such as Alain Touraine (1981), Jürgen Habermas (1981), Jean Cohen (1983; 1985) and Claus Offe (1985) emphasise the novelty of forms of political participation that have emerged in response to problems arising from the delimitation of postwar politics in industrialised welfare states. The restriction of the political agenda to issues of technocratic management and the encroachment of state techniques of management into the realm of civil society are regarded as problematic developments. These changes foster new demands to expand the scope for participation in the political sphere and to protect civil society from state intervention. The issues and political demands raised by new social movements reflect dissatisfaction with the side effects of the compromise between labour and capital that marks postwar welfare capitalism. Green concern, in this account, emerges as the detrimental effects of the headlong pursuit of economic growth and technological innovation become apparent. These issues tend to be indigestible within the framework of conventional politics because by questioning political goals such as economic growth, movements threaten the existing bases for political legitimation. At least in the short term, new social movements occupy a marginal location with regard to institutional politics.

Closely related to these innovations in political participation and demands, many western industrialised countries have witnessed the emergence of new political parties and groupings that clearly fit the bill as

formalised expressions of new politics and new social movements. Many of these parties, particularly those that have been established since the late 1970s, have adopted the label 'green'. The closure of institutional political channels to innovative demands is a prominent theme of the literature that deals with the emergence of green parties. Kay Lawson, for example, argues that environmentalist organisations and parties demonstrate that traditional political parties are not the flexible 'linkage' mechanisms they once were, and are no longer able to represent and articulate emergent political concerns (Lawson 1988). Similarly, both Alan Scott (1990) and Herbert Kitschelt (1989) identify corporatist procedures of decision making between government, unions and business as unresponsive to new politics demands. The emergence of new political parties has been a key development of the 1980s. These institutional accounts regard this emergence as a reaction to the marginality of new politics issues, as participants in new movements experienced the limitations and frustrations of political action based upon extra-parliamentary protest (Frankland & Schoonmaker 1992; Papadakis 1984).

Central themes raised by these parties cover the same spectrum of issues that have been articulated by the new social movements. In his study of the programmes of European green parties Thomas Poguntke identifies ten characteristic elements including: environmentalism; anti-nuclearism; classical liberalism (support for abortion, divorce and minorities); self-determination (alternative lifestyle, individual autonomy); feminism; participatory democracy; leftism (worker's participation, societal control of economic processes, egalitarianism); support for the Third World (redistribution from North to South); unilateral disarmament and opposition to missile deployment (Poguntke 1989).[2]

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[2] Of the fifteen parties from twelve countries studied by Poguntke, twelve green parties demonstrated at least seven out of the ten characteristics. Kitschelt's category of left-libertarian parties is more inclusive than Poguntke's green parties. Kitschelt includes the 'New Left' parties that emerged in Scandinavia, France and the Netherlands in the late 1960s and early 1970s. An example of this type of party is the Danish Socialist Peoples' Party. Poguntke's list of programmatic features could easily be applied to these New Left parties.

Researchers into green parties and new social movement organisations, have identified another area of novelty, namely, the organisational form which these groups characteristically adopt (Kitschelt 1989; Müller-Rommel 1990). Often this organisational form is explicitly designed as an alternative to the structure of traditional parties and organisations in order to counter their exclusionary practices and barriers to participation. The new parties, as described by Kitschelt in his study of German and Belgian green parties, attempt to create structures derived from decentralised, libertarian and participatory principles. This, of course, is a further manifestation of the 'unconventional' forms of political action that have been identified as features of new social movement organisations. Innovative organisational structure and procedures also serve to indicate that greens are not content simply to establish themselves as new players in a well established game of politics. They show that greens are also intent on changing the rules.

1.1.2. Social Characteristics of Green Support

Perhaps the best developed and most utilised tool of both social theory and social scientific research, particularly throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, was explanation in terms of social-structural location. It is not surprising that this tool has been extensively applied to the phenomena of green politics. Investigations into the social bases of green political participation eventually turned up a remarkably consistent story. The picture was quite blurred if one was looking at general support for social movements and favourable orientations towards the issues they promoted. However, sociological patterns became somewhat clearer in attempts to explain participation in movement activities or voting for green political candidates. It has been clearest of all when focused upon the membership of green political formations.

Of the movements covered by the green umbrella, the environmental movement has been the most widely investigated. A number of early studies of the broad constituency of the environmental movement did not reveal much in the way of distinctive socio-demographic patterns of support (Buttel & Flinn 1976; Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). Van Liere and Dunlap's review article (1980) concluded that demographic variables were

of limited utility in explaining environmental concern in the United States in the 1970s. Of the possible explanatory variables suggested, only age and education appeared to be of any significance, and this significance was moderate at best. Van Liere and Dunlap interpreted the general low level of explanation for environmental concern as indicating that such concern was distributed widely and evenly throughout U.S. society. To support this contention they cited ambiguous associations between income and environmental concern, and negligible relationships between occupational prestige and environmental attitudes.

Other analyses, however, showed that the dismissal of social location of green politics was premature. When certain crucial distinctions within the middle class are made, significant structural patterns become apparent. Among the first of such studies was Frank Parkin's research into participants in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain in the 1960s. Parkin (1968) identified a specific fraction of the middle class, namely those employed in welfare and creative professions, as the basic constituency of CND. He made the distinction within the professional middle class between welfare and creative professionals and 'commercial' professionals engaged in the production and distribution process (Parkin 1968: 180). He also reported that three quarters of middle class CND activists were employed by public sector or non-profit organisations (Parkin 1968: 189). Basically, the cluster of occupations that Parkin terms as welfare and creative, has since been labelled the 'social-cultural' sector, or the 'reproductive sector'. It includes such occupations as academics, social service providers, arts and culture professionals, journalists and clergy.[3]

The profile identified by Parkin has been confirmed more recently. Hanspeter Kriesi's investigations into public attitudes to new social movements in the Netherlands found that participation in higher education and employment in social-cultural occupations had the largest effects upon mobilisation potential for these movements in general. Each

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[3] See Brint (1984) for a detailed discussion on drawing the boundaries of the new middle class and the social-cultural sector.

of these effects was multiplied when combined with age (Kriesi 1989).[4] Jørgen Goul Andersen's analysis of the social bases of environmental support in Denmark reported that employment in the 'public reproductive' sector for non-manual employees is of the same order of importance as age and education in accounting for differences in environmentalism (Goul Andersen 1990b). In Australia, Pakulski's study of Tasmanian green movement participants, and Papadakis' research into support for environmentalism confirm the distinctive profile regarding age and education (Pakulski 1991: 182; Papadakis 1993: 166).

Studies of the social profile have also highlighted categories of the population who are outside the scope of green politics. Kriesi investigated participation in the Dutch peace movement and found significant occupational barriers were present.

> no large employer, no protective agent, no computer specialist, and virtually no farmer and no unskilled worker have ever participated in the peace movement, while more than half of those engaged in other social and cultural services, half of the traditional professionals, more than a third of the medical personnel, and more than a fourth of teachers have done so. In other words, there seem to be class-specific barriers to a heavier involvement in the peace movement (Kriesi 1989: 1096).

The development of green political parties, particularly in Europe provided researchers with a new source of material. Research into green party voting has initially concentrated on the German Greens. Müller-Rommel reported that the support base for *die Grünen* in 1982 was constituted overwhelmingly by people under the age of 45. There was an over-representation of green supporters from the ranks of those who were either currently studying at tertiary level, or who had already achieved tertiary qualifications (Müller-Rommel 1985). Bürklin (1987), and Müller-Rommel (1989) found similar over-representation of young, highly educated voters among supporters of *die Grünen* throughout the 1980s.

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[4] He also reported significant influence for the variable 'parents without religious affiliation'. Religiosity is not a variable that has been used consistently in studies relating to green participation, although where it has it has been generally found to be significant. However, we would expect that its importance in the Netherlands is amplified due to the religious pillarisation of Dutch society.

Bennulf and Holmberg's analysis of 1988 Swedish Election Study data has provided some detail in terms of occupational categories (Bennulf & Holmberg 1990). Occupational groups over-represented amongst Swedish Green Party voters included 'middle white-collar' and 'professionals/ managers'.[5] Green Party voters were slightly more likely to be in public sector employment, and were younger and more highly educated than the electorate as a whole.

Research into membership of green organisations and political parties has brought these social and demographic contours into sharpest relief. This research confirms the broader findings regarding age and education, and enables a more fine-grained account of the labour force location of movement participants. Cotgrove and Duff's analysis compared the labour force locations of British environmentalists to the profile for the general public. They found the members of two prominent national environmental organisations were disproportionately employed in service, welfare and creative occupations, or were studying. Workers in manual occupations and housewifes were under-represented (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 342). This evidence led them to regard the occupational setting as crucial in accounting for environmentalism, particularly the distinction between market and non-market oriented workplaces.

The most thorough study of this kind was undertaken by Rüdig, Bennie and Franklin who surveyed 4000 members of the British Green Party. A clear pattern of age distribution showed that those under the age of 45 were over-represented in party membership, whereas all age categories over 45 were under-represented. Over half the membership reported holding a tertiary degree compared with just 7% of the total British population. Regarding those presently employed, professionals accounted for half the total of green party members. Correspondingly, manual workers, clerical and sales workers were heavily under-represented categories (Rüdig, Bennie & Franklin 1991). Only a quarter of members

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[5] With regard to sector of employment, Bennulf and Holmberg reported that 35% of Green voters were employed in health care and education, compared to 20% of all voters. Only 22% of Green voters were employed in primary or secondary industry, compared to 33% of the electorate (Bennulf & Holmberg 1990).

were employed by a private firm or company in comparison to over half the general population.[6]

1.1.3. Interpreting the Social Bases

Although the findings reveal substantial convergence regarding the social characteristics of green support, they present a number of problems of interpretation under standard social-structural explanatory frameworks. None of the key variables of age, education and location within the professional middle class had previously played large explanatory roles in political sociology, while the variables that had dominated political sociology, such as class, ethnicity and religious affiliation, were of tangential significance to the study of social movement participation. Membership of a specific class, ethnic or religious category could be easily linked to the notion of interest, as attitudinal and voting preferences of these categories could be interpreted as expressions of the interests of that category. The variables associated with movement participation did not easily lend themselves to interest-based accounts.

Some commentators on the German Greens have attempted to interpret the findings relating to age and education as evidence of a form of interest-based determination of green support. The analyses of Jens Alber and Wilhelm Bürklin focused upon the substantial levels of green support from social categories not in paid employment. Alber described the typical Green supporter in the early 1980s as young, highly educated and unemployed, as the labour market was not able to absorb the increased numbers of graduates which had been fuelled by rapidly expanding higher education and the baby-boom generation (Alber 1989). According to Bürklin, this oversupply created a significant category of voters who were not adequately 'socially integrated' and this lack of social integration accounted for their anti-establishment political orientations (Bürklin 1987). Alber contends that green party support should be treated

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[6] Interestingly, 19% of members identified themselves as self-employed, compared to 10% of the population (Rüdig, Bennie & Franklin 1991: 27). Although the study does not provide details of the scope of this category, it is likely that in includes occupations such as cottage craft production and self-sufficient farming.

as a temporary phenomenon, a 'phase-specific constellation of factors (that) has resulted in cohorts graduating from university with blocked mobility chances, becoming a negatively privileged acquisition class' (1989: 200).

Both authors have been criticised for ignoring contradictory indications from their own evidence, in particular their failure to deal with the substantial and increasing proportions of green supporters who were in paid employment (Kitschelt 1988; Papadakis 1988). Papadakis (1988: 446) also notes, with regard to Alber, that a higher proportion of German Green supporters were employed than Christian Democrat and Social Democrat supporters. Apart from these weaknesses, Alber and Bürklin also neglected the concurrent emergence of green constituencies beyond West Germany where the labour market conditions were not so unfavourable for the young tertiary educated.

An alternative basis for interest derived accounts of green politics shifts the focus to the specific location of green support within the paid labour force. These interpretations contend that green politics reflects the specific interests of an occupational or class category. Initially, some Marxian writers characterised environmentalism in terms of middle class protection of class privilege in universalist guise (Enzensberger 1974). However, as Robyn Eckersley points out, such critiques ignored the crucial distinctions within the middle class (Eckersley 1989: 210). More commonly, it has been the concentration of public sector employment that has attracted variations of class interest arguments. Rolf Gerritsen, for example, argues that the increased influence of environmentalism in the public policy arena facilitates redistribution of occupational power and the expansion of employment opportunities for members of the new middle class (Gerritsen 1990). This argument resonates with earlier discussions of the 'New Class' (Bruce-Briggs 1979) or the 'professional managerial class' (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich 1979) in which the interests of public sector employees in professional service occupations were linked to the maintenance and expansion of the knowledge-based welfare state.

However, these accounts that attempt to link participation in green politics with occupationally defined interest are somewhat problematic

interpretations. Goul Andersen is critical of the new class interest argument, noting the tenuous connections between the issues articulated by the environmental movement and the vaguely defined interests attributed to the new class (Goul Andersen 1990a: 103). Other commentators have similarly pointed out that the claims made by new social movement participants are not claims made on behalf of the new middle class. Any element of particularism in green politics involves claims made on behalf of other categories, which bear little relation to identifiable new middle class interests (Eder 1985; Offe 1985). In fact, many green political claims fit very uncomfortably with the interest-based argument. As Philip Lowe and Wolfgang Rüdig observe.

> The demands of radical political ecology for fundamental changes in industrial society do not accord with this model. The financing of the welfare state is dependent on continued economic growth - why should it be in the interests of those who work within it to demand the end of economic growth and a halt to major technological projects? (Lowe & Rüdig 1986: 522).

Robyn Eckersley extends this point to suggest that in terms of the definition of interest offered by the class interest hypothesis, the core participants in the green movement are well aware that through their actions and demands they are 'quite deliberately seeking to "bite the hand that feeds them"' (Eckersley 1989: 222).

Contrary to the above analyses that stipulate that the new middle class is well placed to pursue its interests, Cotgrove and Duff claim that the political marginality of green politics reflects a peripheral location in the occupational structure.

> environmentalism is an expression of the interests of those whose class position in the non-productive sector locates them at the periphery of the institutions and processes of industrial capitalist societies. Hence, their concern to win greater participation and influence and thus to strengthen the political role of their members (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 341).

This marginality is reflected in the alienation from decision-making experienced by employees in the non-productive sector. Environmentalists' interests, according to Cotgrove and Duff, lie in challenging the dominance of the industrialist interests that occupy the

central economic and political locations. In a similar vein, Claus Offe has interpreted the evidence regarding who does not participate in new social movements according to a similar distinction. He observes that 'the classes, strata, and groups that are penetrated least by the concerns, demands, and forms of action of the "new" paradigm are exactly the "principal" classes of capitalist societies, namely, the industrial working class and the holders and agents of economic and administrative power' (Offe 1985: 835). On this basis, Offe suggests that it is the absence of structural imperatives, defined as location in the principal classes, that enables new social movement supporters to adopt universalistic political orientations.

These interpretations are framed in terms of where new middle class interests do *not* lie. Similarly, political scientists such as Dalton and Inglehart have argued that engagement in new politics reflects corresponding disengagement from the constraints of class-based politics. According to Dalton, members of the new middle class, and the better educated are freed from the traditional social bases of the party system and are subsequently more likely to be influenced by new political concerns (Dalton 1984: 107). Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism is similarly built upon the contention that those who have had their immediate needs for economic security satisfied during adolescence and early adulthood are free to address political issues that arise from the pursuit of quality of life (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990). Because these conditions have been more prevalent for postwar generations than those born before 1945, there is a marked concentration of new politics support among the younger generation. Education, according to Inglehart, serves as a good indicator of formative affluence, but is not significant in its own right.

The simple correlation between formative affluence and new politics is not the only way of accounting for the significance of age and education. According to Goul Andersen, 'it seems more likely that it is the *exposure* to the political struggles and political mobilisation during formative years that is the relevant intervening variable between generation and values' and that this exposure is 'linked to knowledge and thus to education which may also as such affect consciousness of distant problems such as ecological problems' (Goul Andersen 1990a: 106). Offe asserts that the

constituency of new social movements is drawn primarily from 'those who have the easiest cognitive access to the particular nature of systemic irrationalities or those who are the most likely victims of cumulative deprivations' (Offe 1985: 850). Eckersley's interpretation is essentially the same: 'the class least likely to be constrained from pursuing remedial action is the new class .... by virtue of its high education and relative autonomy from the production process' (Eckersley 1989: 221). Tertiary education, argues Eckersley, enables people to adopt universalistic perspectives and conceive of society as a whole. The green constituency, by virtue of this capacity, engages in what Alvin Gouldner (1979) has termed a 'culture of critical discourse'.[7]

There are still some attempts to re-integrate these findings into familiar interest-based frameworks. Andre Górz (1985) and Andrew Dobson (1990), for instance, regard the green constituency as politically marginalised and suggest on this basis that all marginalised categories in industrial society have a stake in promoting green change, rather than being tied to protection of the old order. These are attempts to salvage some of the logic of revolutionary socialist positions, even though the carrier of the emancipatory role is no longer the working class but the 'mass of disaffected non-workers' (Górz 1985: 35). Such a version of social-structural interpretation relies on the use of the term 'marginalisation' to fudge the significant difference between the young, educated, articulate middle class who do participate in the green movement, and the long-term unemployed and retrenched older workers who do not have the same cultural resources at their disposal and who do not participate to any great extent.[8]

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[7] Eckersley departs from Gouldner's usage in crucial respects. According to Gouldner, both the 'technical intelligentsia' and 'humanist intellectuals' engage in the culture of critical discourse. Eckersley plays down the role of the former, claiming that they are too heavily implicated in industrialism to adopt a sufficiently critical stance (1989: 222). It is unlikely that Gouldner would endorse Eckersley's equating of the relative absence of structural constraint with the absence of structural interests.

[8] According to Kriesi, the unemployed are under-represented in new social movement activity (1989: 1106).

To summarise, Inglehart, Dalton, Offe, Eckersley and Goul Andersen all claim that green political participation is facilitated by the relative freedom from the structural constraints of industrialism, while Cotgrove and Duff emphasise the structural marginality of green participants. Either way, however, these analyses are not considered by these authors as complete accounts of green politics. These interpretations all place significant emphasis on characteristics which greens, for whatever reason, are considered not to have, and the variation between them centres around whether this absence signifies deficiency or freedom. Nevertheless, the placement of so much analytical weight upon the *absence* of particular characteristics makes for a somewhat fragile basis for explanation, and this is generally recognised.

Cotgrove and Duff, for instance, are mindful of the need to find other ways to supplement their account which emphasises the relative absence of structural interest. Put simply, how do environmentalists come to be in 'peripheral' middle class occupations rather than in those locations which are central to capitalist production? It would be implausible to suggest that their intra-class location is a result of generational inheritance. Nor is it plausible to suggest that environmentalists choose peripheral locations out of self-interest. Cotgrove and Duff suggest therefore that 'there are strong grounds for concluding that values are a major factor influencing occupational choice' (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 343) and that 'those who reject the ideology and values of industrial capitalism are likely to choose careers outside the market-place' (1980: 344). Once again, this line can be traced back to Parkin, who argued that social and cultural occupations in the non-profit sector are 'sanctuaries' protecting those who inhabit them from implication in the capitalist system (Parkin 1968: 187).

For Dalton and Inglehart, the link between the absence of interests and the presence of values is virtually definitional. Value-based politics is the sort of politics you have when you don't have interest-based politics.[9] The

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[9] Unless postmaterialist needs such as self-actualisation and autonomy are treated as interests, in which case no distinction can be made between values and interests. One could argue that Inglehart's use of the Maslovian framework of developmental needs dissolves the distinction. Needs can be portrayed in terms of both values and interests.

inverse relationship between class interests and normative commitments is also a feature of sociological approaches (Crook, Pakulski & Waters 1992: 147). Robyn Eckersley puts a finer point on this argument. It is the space opened up by this relative absence of interest in class-based politics that provides the opportunity for adopting a value-based politics. This is not an opportunity that all those in the position to do so (i.e. the new middle class) necessarily take up, as significant numbers of this sociological category still adopt self-interested political orientations (1989: 222-3). A common feature of all these accounts is that new politics, postmaterialist or green value orientations are regarded as *the* standard expression of value-based politics.[10]

1.1.4. Interpreting Movement Motivations

A rather different route to an account of green politics in which values are contrasted to interests stems from critiques of the resource mobilization approach to the study of social movements. Resource mobilization emerged as a reaction to depictions of collective action that emphasised subjective grievances and feelings of alienation. Resource mobilization studies attempt to account for the existence and activities of various movements in terms of organisation, resources and opportunities (McCarthy & Zald 1977).[11] In this context, the action of social movement participants is not derived from structurally defined interest, but from interests defined psychologically, such as goal achievement and personal gratification.

These are the shared interests of movement participants. Due to this emphasis on explanation in terms of objectively defined rational interests, resource mobilization theorists have not been methodologically disposed to take notice of the normative claims made by social movement

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[10] This is particularly noticeable in Inglehart's scheme, and he has been criticised for neglecting other forms of 'non-materialist' value based politics (Savage 1985; Flanagan 1987).

[11] The target of resource mobilization's critique of subjectivism is the 'collective behaviour' approach exemplified by theorists such as Smelser and Gurr, in which mass movements are treated as manifestations of irrational behaviour.

participants (Papadakis 1993: 30). Jean Cohen argues that this interest-based approach has ignored crucial issues such as how participants construct and recognise their individual and collective interests and how they define their goals. Resource mobilization approaches thus neglect the factors which give rise to collective identity, consciousness and solidarity of social movements (Cohen 1985: 685). These self-understandings often contradict, and are even explicitly constructed to combat the standards of rationality and definitions of success assumed by resource mobilization theorists. A number of commentators have argued that this strategic and tactical emphases of resource mobilization needs to be complemented by consideration of the normative content of social movement claims (Cohen 1985; Jamison, Eyerman & Cramer 1990; Papadakis 1993).

1.2. The Value Identity Thesis

Values, normative self-understandings and moral claims, therefore, have come to occupy a pivotal place in theoretical conceptions of green politics. In this section, I detail the main ways in which values have been woven into such accounts. Although there are a number of significant points of difference between these various accounts, my main concern is to build a picture that emphasises the similarities between them in terms of how they conceptualise the relationship between values and politics. A conventional wisdom has emerged that green politics can be feasibly identified in terms of value commitments and value rationality. Two broad categories of the value identity thesis can be distinguished. The first of these is what I have termed 'attributional' approaches, which cover the value change frameworks of Ronald Inglehart, Stephen Cotgrove and Lester Milbrath, and the cultural theory of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. The second category is that of 'transformational' approaches, including much of the new social movement literature, particularly Alain Touraine and Jean Cohen, as well as various attempts to develop a specifically green political theory undertaken by Murray Bookchin, Robyn Eckersley and Robert Goodin.

1.2.1. Attributional Approaches

Attributional approaches to green politics are those that have developed within the traditions of empirical political science, sociology,

anthropology and social psychology. Values are understood as objectively identifiable attributes which distinguish political actors from one another. The types of research problems that have prompted the development of these approaches include accounting for political behaviour, voting behaviour, the emergence of new parties in established party systems and the analysis of political preference formation. In distinguishing between value systems, researchers typically (but not necessarily) regard their own typologies as 'value neutral'. Attributional approaches generally eschew expressing preference for one set of values over another, in order to claim a certain objectivity of research methods.[12]

1.2.1.1. Value Change

Perhaps the most common form of attributional accounts are those in which values are treated as measurable variables via techniques of survey methodology. Individuals are assumed to 'hold' values or value-orientations, and are distinguishable from one another by virtue of the values they possess. Green politics, in these schemes, is associated with a particular type or cluster of value-orientations. The most well-known of these approaches is Ronald Inglehart's two-tiered typology of values (Inglehart 1977; 1981; 1990). Postmaterialist values are distinguished from materialist values on the basis of individual needs which are hierarchically ordered. Materialists seek to fulfil lower order needs of economic and physical security. Postmaterialists, having had these needs fulfilled, are motivated by higher-order needs such as 'self-actualisation', and individual autonomy. Inglehart claims that the materialism/ postmaterialism value dimension is becoming more significant as the importance of class-based political cleavage recedes. This is due to the fact that postwar industrial societies have been successful in meeting the material needs of large proportions of their populations (Inglehart 1987).

This framework offers a neat conceptual means of locating and explaining phenomena associated with green politics. Environmentalism, support for the women's movement and the anti-nuclear movement are clearly

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[12] Of the approaches outlined in the following section, Milbrath is an obvious exception to the norm of value neutrality.

identified by Inglehart as manifestations of postmaterialist values. Thus, green politics is a political expression of a wider conflict between value orientations endemic to industrialised democracies. According to Inglehart, green issues encapsulate the tension between the two types of values because they highlight 'questions of whether one gives top priority to economic growth or the individual's right to self-realization and the quality of life' (Inglehart 1990: 332). His operationalisation of values in terms of materialism and postmaterialism has become a standard feature of many value-based accounts of environmentalism and green politics (Pierce et al. 1987; Rohrschneider 1988; Watts & Wandesforde-Smith 1981).[13]

The same structure, locating green politics as an expression of a newly emergent, coherent set of values counterposed against an established value system, is adopted by Lester Milbrath (1984) and Stephen Cotgrove (1982) in their models of dominant and alternative paradigms. Milbrath adopts a framework of describing environmental politics that is similar to Inglehart's. He uses the labels 'New Environmental Paradigm' and the 'Dominant Social Paradigm' to distinguish the opposing value systems (Milbrath 1984). Milbrath posits three criteria to distinguish between adherents of the respective paradigms: how they perceive the condition of the environment; whether they believe social improvements can be facilitated through either better technology or 'basic change' in the way society is organised; and whether or not they agree that there are limits to growth (1984: 43-45). This value typology is explicitly constructed around the claims of the environmental movement, but is also intended to be read as covering far more political concerns than issues of pollution and environmental degradation. Milbrath's paradigmatic framework also covers issues such as democratic participation, economic organisation and lifestyle preferences (1984: 35-39).

A closely related, though more comprehensive theoretical attempt to identify green politics on the basis of values is provided by Stephen

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[13] Although it has been subject to criticism from some others who regard values as significant (Cotgrove & Duff 1981; Goul Andersen, 1990b).

Cotgrove in *Catastrophe or Cornucopia*. Cotgrove contends that the demands of the environmental movement must be regarded as part of a more fundamental oppositional stance towards the 'values of the wider society' (Cotgrove 1982: 9). The conceptual device of the paradigm, adapted from Thomas Kuhn's investigations into the development of scientific knowledge, is used to frame the analysis of contrasting values. Cotgrove suggests that the notion of paradigm is appropriate because, according to Kuhn, paradigms determine what sort of phenomena are recognised as facts, as rational, as problems and as valuable. Environmentalists, as subscribers to an alternative value paradigm, regard forests, species and ecosystems as intrinsically valuable and the construction of huge dams as irrational and normatively unjustifiable. By contrast, developers and industrialists adopt the contrasting standards of the dominant value paradigm which lead them to argue that such development is morally justified by the imperatives of wealth creation and stewardship of natural resources (Cotgrove 1982: 26-7). The conflict between environmentalists and industrialists is first and foremost a conflict between value systems rather than between sociologically defined groups.

These paradigms are oppositional in that the core values of the two paradigms are irreconcilable. In common with Milbrath, Cotgrove contends that the scope of paradigms is not limited to environmental conflict, but comprehensively covers broader social, cultural, political and economic issues.

> What is being argued then is that what differentiates environmentalists is a complex of beliefs about the nature of industrial society, about the effectiveness and desirability of many of its core institutions and values. Their world-view differs markedly from the dominant view. It constitutes an alternative paradigm, with different beliefs about nature and man's relations with his environment, about how the economy can best be organized, about politics and about the nature of society (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 340).

1.2.1.2. Oppositional Cultural Identity

Cotgrove adopted the idea that green values are inextricably connected to a basic worldview from the political anthropology of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. For Douglas and Wildavsky, this is an insight that not only applies to activists in the green movement, but is universally

applicable to social actors. The basic tenets of cultural theory that have emerged out of Douglas' work are that values have a symbiotic relationship with the structure of social and political authority, and that there is a finite number of viable societal forms. Therefore, there is a finite number of viable value systems that both support particular societal forms and reject the values associated with the alternatives that are not chosen (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982).[14]

One of this limited number of viable ways of life is defined variously as 'sectarianism' or 'egalitarianism', and it is within this category that cultural theory locates green politics. Egalitarianism, in this framework, denotes a cultural preference for strong commitments to the maintenance of community in conjunction with the absence of internal differentiation of role and status within the community.[15] Egalitarian culture is defined in contradistinction to individualist, hierarchical and fatalist cultural values. Cultural theory also stipulates that particular societies can be defined in terms of which culture (or cultures) are in the ascendancy, and which are marginal. According to Douglas and Wildavsky, egalitarian culture occupies a peripheral location in western industrial societies, such that egalitarians in these societies take a fundamentally oppositional stance toward the dominant organisation of authority and associated values of the centre. Egalitarians are opposed to the principles of organisation of the centre, namely hierarchy and individualism.[16] Instead they value a radical egalitarian participation-based on voluntary involvement.

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[14] This finite number has varied throughout the development of cultural theory. While originally limited to four categories constructed from two dichotomous dimensions (grid and group), a fifth category has been added more recently which is defined in terms of withdrawal from 'the coercive social involvement in which the other four social beings, in their different ways, are caught up' (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990: 10).

[15] In Douglas' terms, they are high on the group dimension and low on the grid dimension.

[16] The centre is defined according to a 'compromise' between the values of hierarchy, as evidenced by the ubiquity of bureaucratic structures, and individualism, as evidenced by the importance of the market.

Thus, cultural theory's depiction of egalitarianism covers the same range of political orientations as new social movements and green politics. In a later article, Wildavsky argues that viewing environmentalists in this way helps us understand the political alliances they form. In other words environmentalist sympathy towards the gay community is explained because the gay movement is 'antiestablishment and .... reduces differences among people' (Wildavsky 1987: 15). Thus, according to Wildavsky, political preferences can be deduced from an overall cultural framework defined in terms of support for or opposition to dominant institutional arrangements.[17]

1.2.2. Transformational Approaches

In transformational approaches, green politics is understood as a (or the) manifestation of progressive or emancipatory forces in industrial societies. The explicit normative identity that greens articulate is evidence of their alignment with these forces. Green activists are regarded as being committed to a particular type of normative rationality and it is this commitment that primarily distinguishes them as political actors. Methodologically, the transformational framework views greens as positive and progressive actors, and their opponents, where identified, as

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[17] This cultural theory approach has resonances in other depictions of green politics. According to Hans-Joachim Veen, 'the Green milieu', is markedly detached from the dominant societal structures, and is most readily identifiable as a 'community with a common way of thinking' (1989: 33). It is this common way of thinking, rather than any social structural characteristics that sets greens apart and serves to build and maintain a coherent identity. The notion of oppositional identity is also employed by Jan Pakulski (1991), who argues that social movements should be defined primarily in terms of the type of social and political organisational forms they oppose. For any movement, unity in the sphere of ideas is facilitated by 'shared opposition to, or even outright rejection of, institutions and practices perceived as distorted, corrupt, or neglectful of the affirmed central value-standards' (Pakulski 1991: 61). In his framework he identifies the eco-pax movements (i.e. environmental, peace and anti-nuclear movements) as anti-bureaucratic, on the basis of their resistance to centralisation and regulation. Pakulski, unlike Wildavsky and Veen, does not enter into speculation about the connections between these political orientations and a distinct cultural way of life. He emphasises that commonality of oppositional orientation does not in any way imply a shared positive and substantive political orientation. For this reason, many of the later comments about the value-identity thesis regarding value rationality and implementation do not apply to Pakulski.

negative and resistant to change. Value neutral analysis, therefore, is rejected, but claims to objectivity are retained.

1.2.2.1. New Social Movements

New social movements are conceptualised as social forces that are moving in the direction of truer manifestations of autonomy, participation and more undistorted forms of democratic deliberation, in opposition to the expansion of social forms and rationalities that give rise to practices of domination. A predominant and somewhat emblematic theme that has emerged has been the description of conflict articulated by social movements as one of civil society versus the technocratic or bureaucratic state (Cohen 1985; Touraine 1985). Alain Touraine was among the first to pursue this theme.

> Today, social movements can have no other aim than the very existence of social life against the growing technocratization of society and against the system of rules, decisions, and information which leave no room for exchange, discussion and communication, because they permit the concentration of power within the apparatus (Touraine 1977: 41).

Touraine is concerned with identifying the transformative potentials of social action in terms of the extent to which particular actors are in tune with the transition from industrial to post-industrial society. He sees such promise in the proliferation of ecological and anti-nuclear groups who have called into question the technocratic culture of expertise. In fact, the French anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s provides much of the basis for his interpretation of new social movement potential (Touraine 1981; Touraine 1983).

Cohen's characterisation of new social movements places greatest emphasis on the historical task of democratisation, and she clearly regards the eco-pax movements as at the forefront of contemporary efforts to open up more democratic spaces in both civil society and existing political institutions. Although she notes the existence of anti-modern elements in the peace and ecology movements, she is confident that by and large these movements are at the forefront of efforts to develop a more communicatively rational society. These movements are of interest because 'many features of the ecological problematic could be assessed in

terms of a demand for a communicatively reinterpreted ethic of responsibility regarding development and investment' (Cohen 1983: 98). It is these features that define the sociological significance of these movements.

Habermasian critical theory is clearly a significant influence upon Cohen's interpretation of green politics, even though Habermas himself regards the green movement as predominantly a defensive reaction to the colonisation of the life-world (Habermas 1981). Cohen, however, interprets the normative rationality of the new social movements as a more positive manifestation of the transformative agenda of Habermas' project.

> I would argue that the telos of movements is not simply the defense of strengthening of informal, familial or small-scale private networks of autonomous social relations. Rather, their most important democratic potential is the creation of new public spaces, of additional democratic forms, and the restructuring or revitalization of old ones (Cohen 1983: 111).

Greens, therefore, are characteristically identified in terms of their adherence or commitment to the new normative rationality in these new social movement accounts..

1.2.2.2. Green Theory

Robyn Eckersley, one of the most significant contributors to the rapidly growing body of green political theory, once described green politics as 'a practice in search of a theory' (Eckersley 1987). Almost without exception, attempts to articulate such a theory locates the essential ingredient of green politics in a distinct worldview that is defined in contrast to a dominant worldview. There is now a wide range of theoretical writing about green politics, and I do not intend to discuss all significant contributions to this literature.[18] For the purposes of this discussion, I will restrict the scope to four prominent authors who between them cover a wide range of ecopolitical theory: Murray Bookchin, who was probably the

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[18] Notable contributions not covered include John Dryzek, Andre Górz, the ecofeminist strand of green theory and the 'deep ecology' of authors such as Devall and Sessions.

first proponent of a specifically ecological political analysis; Andrew Dobson, whose text *Green Political Thought* has been widely utilised; Robert Goodin, who has attempted to bring green politics into the ambit of conventional Anglo-American political philosophy; and Robyn Eckersley who has sought to locate green politics in relation to other forms of emancipatory political theory. Many of the details of these approaches are examined throughout the course of this thesis, and it is hardly necessary to provide comprehensive accounts at this point. For the moment, my intention is to demonstrate the definition of green politics in terms of values and normative identity.

Andrew Dobson's exposition of green political theory is organised around the contention that 'Green politics self-consciously confronts dominant paradigms', by which he means the 'political, social and scientific consensus that has dominated the last two or three hundred years of public life' (Dobson 1990: 5). Such a project is an explicitly normative one, as not only does Dobson regard it as necessary for a green political perspective to describe the political world, it must also be capable of prescribing and motivating political action as a result of its diagnoses (1990: 12). According to Bookchin, the emergent practice of ecological politics is identified as 'the consciousness and sensibility that will help us achieve ....eminently desirable goals' (Bookchin 1982: 19). This ecological sensibility is not only appropriate to evaluating the relationships between humanity and nature, but is also a necessary standard for evaluating relationships between humans. This sensibility encapsulates values such as wholeness, diversity, spontaneity and interdependence which are systematically filtered from dominant modes of thought. An ecological sensibility is counterposed against hierarchy, which Bookchin identifies as the root of contemporary ecological and social crises.

In seeking to articulate the theory that green political practice has been searching for, Robyn Eckersley (1992) has marked out the basis of an ecocentric (ecology centred) perspective which stands in contradistinction to the anthropocentric (human centred) underpinnings of conventional political theory and practice. An ecocentric worldview is what differentiates the more radical exponents of green politics from the rest of the political landscape, including the anthropocentric assumptions of

moderate environmentalists. Finally, Robert Goodin describes green politics as a 'fundamental challenge to the existing political order' (1992: 13) informed by a 'single moral vision' which he terms a green theory of value (1992: 14). Both Eckersley and Goodin argue for the introduction of ecological criteria into political decision-making, and contend that such criteria should be based upon a fundamental normative premise. In Eckersley's case, this premise is the moral consideration of non-human entities, while Goodin's green theory of value is founded upon the contention that 'naturalness' is intrinsically valuable.[19]

Each of these expositions of green theory, therefore, presents green politics as a way of perceiving the world that is qualitatively different from 'mainstream' worldviews. There are important differences with respect to the way in which the normative kernel of green politics is characterised by green theorists. However, I am more concerned to draw attention to the overall similarity in form of argument in which a new green normative orientation is constructed as a comprehensive alternative which challenges established political modes of operation.

1.2.3. Value Identity and Rationality

The conventional wisdom can be summarised as the claim that *greens are distinguishable as political actors by virtue of the values they hold or to which they are committed.* To put it another way, values serve as an analytical tool that can be used to identify and distinguish green politics. Thus, postmaterialism contrasts with materialism; (Inglehart) the alternative environmental paradigm is the antithesis of the dominant paradigm (Cotgrove, Milbrath); the egalitarian culture is counterposed against the dominance of hierarchy and individualism (Wildavsky); new social movements constitute one project of society against another (Touraine); green politics confronts dominant paradigms (Dobson). Perhaps the 'paradigmatic' outline of opposing worldviews is that provided by Cotgrove.

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[19] Eckersley regards Goodin's thesis as anthropocentric because it maintains a clear-cut distinction between humanity and nature.

Table 1.1: Cotgrove's Counter-paradigms

	Dominant Paradigm	*Alternative Environmental Paradigm*
Core Values	Material (economic growth)	Non-material (self-actualisation)
	Natural environment valued as a resource	Natural environment intrinsically valued
	Domination over nature	Harmony with nature
Economy	Market forces	Public interest
	Risk and reward	Safety
	Rewards for achievement	Incomes related to need
	Individual self-help	Collective/social provision
Polity	Authoritative structures: (experts influential)	Participative structures: (citizen/ worker involvement)
	Hierarchical	Non-hierarchical
	Law and order	Liberation
Society	Centralised	Decentralised
	Large-scale	Small-scale
	Associational	Communal
	Ordered	Flexible
Nature	Ample reserves	Earth's resources limited
	Nature hostile/neutral	Nature benign
	Environment controllable	Nature delicately balanced
Knowledge	Confidence in science and technology	Limits to science
	Rationality of means	Rationality of ends
	Separation of fact/value, thought/feeling	Integration of fact/value, thought/feeling

Source: (Cotgrove 1982: 27)

I wish to suggest that this use of values to distinguish green politics produces a characteristic form of political analysis that cuts across the theoretical and methodological boundaries that separate these various approaches. The most significant feature of this conventional wisdom is that green politics constitutes a form of normative or value rationality. Opposing value systems or paradigms are regarded as supporting divergent and incommensurate standards of rationality. What is rational to greens is patently irrational to their opponents, and vice versa (Cotgrove 1982: 82; Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 22-3). The types of political action that greens engage in, and the range of concerns that constitute the green agenda are interpreted under value identity frameworks as being *derived* from core values. Adherence to these general values, therefore, implies adherence to the particular preferences associated with green politics.

This theme is pursued from a number of different angles. Value change researchers look for attitudinal consistency that reflects more general value orientations. Cultural theorists argue that specific political preferences are derived from normatively defined ways of life. Both new social movement and green theorists attempt to define the overarching rationality that binds together the diverse concerns of the green movement. All agree that greens do what they do because they are committed to a distinctive value rationality.

1.2.4. Value Coherence, Choice and Change

From this baseline of value identity and rationality, a number of other analytical tendencies are commonly found across the spectrum of attributional and transformational approaches, including the contention that the green value package is internally coherent, that social actors make a choice to be (or not to be) green, and that social change can be monitored in terms of the extent to which social arrangements are reflections of green normative rationality. A typical formulation of coherence is provided by Eckersley.

> The special appeal of ecology is that it offers a means of tracing the interconnections between the multifaceted crises facing the world today, ranging from pollution, resource depletion and species extinction

> to poverty, disease, social and economic injustice, alienation and political oppression. At the same time, it lends itself to a powerful critique of the status quo as well as a constructive vision of an alternative future (Eckersley 1987: 96-7).

Bookchin asserts that it is 'the *unity* of my views - their ecological holism, not merely their individual components - that give them a radical thrust' (1982: 3). The assumption that the green value paradigm is internally coherent is not restricted to transformational approaches, it is also an essential ingredient of attributional methods. Wildavsky, for example, offers a highly constrained picture of political coherence.

> Preference formation is much more like ordering prix fixe from a number of set dinners or voting a party ticket. Only those combinations that are socially viable, that can cohere because people are able to give them their allegiance, to share their meanings, may be lived. Some things - accepting authority while rejecting it - just can't be done (Wildavsky 1987: 4).

The conceptual device of opposing paradigms best exemplifies assumptions of coherence. The elements of the respective paradigms complement and reinforce each other, while scepticism about particular elements leads to a questioning of the whole paradigm. The survey-based analyses of Inglehart and Milbrath are also organised according to the assumption of coherence. The only value packages treated as significant for analytical purposes are the poles of the value dimensions they identify. Though large proportions of respondents do not fit into the polar categories, they are treated as in-between, either as fence-sitters, or as en route from one pole to another, and are thus not recognised as analytically significant.[20]

Another characteristic assumption of value identity approaches is that green political actors have made a conscious *choice* to adopt green values. Wildavsky contends that 'the major choice made by people (or, if they are subject to coercion, made for them) is the form of culture - shared values

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[20] At least 50% of respondents in any survey using the postmaterialist index cannot be categorised as either materialist or postmaterialist. In Milbrath's surveys, at least 60% of respondents characteristically do not fit into either the vanguard or rearguard categories. Inglehart suggests that his 'Mixed' category is subject to cross pressures from each side (1990: 76), while Milbrath refers to the 'undecided middle' (1984: 57).

legitimating social practices - they adopt' (Wildavsky 1987: 6). The same point is made polemically by Bookchin, who asserts that '(t)he social horizon presents the starkly conflicting prospects of a harmonized world with an ecological sensibility based on a rich commitment to community, mutual aid, and new technologies, on the one hand, and the terrifying prospect of some sort of thermonuclear disaster on the other' (Bookchin 1982: 18). In this frame, as in cultural theory, there are no other choices available, 'neutrality' is not an option.

Part and parcel of the language of paradigms to frame analyses of green politics is the Kuhnian notion of 'paradigm shift' as an appropriate way of conceptualising social change. Due to the divergent implications and rationalities of antinomic paradigms, large scale change in the perceptions and normative orientations in industrial societies produces radically different consequences in the same way that scientific paradigm shifts are thought to reorient the conceptual frameworks of particular sub-disciplines. Thus, in Inglehart's discussion, broad shifts in the proportions of materialists and postmaterialists in any society will be associated with fundamental social changes (1990: 333). Political change is characterised by Milbrath as a matter of changing the balance between the environmentalist vanguard and the rearguard, anticipating that the former will grow and the latter will shrink (Milbrath 1984: 61). Using rather different language, but charting much the same direction, Touraine locates social movements as the protagonists of conflict 'whose stake is *the social control of the main cultural patterns'* (Touraine 1985: 754), and that these conflicts highlight the teleology of historical development.

Inglehart, Milbrath and Touraine, at the end of the day, regard such cultural change as unidirectional. However, in some of the other accounts, the model of change is more akin to the Weberian image of 'struggle between the gods', the outcome of which is never settled (Brubaker 1984). Douglas and Wildavsky's general framework for conceptualising political conflict and change holds that established social and political formations are constantly subject to challenges from competing value systems. Social stability, they argue, is attributable to the fact that 'the upholders of the present constitution were able to win the

debate thus far and to muster public agreement to the supporting beliefs and values' (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982: 89-90).

1.3. Questioning the Value Identity Thesis

The previous section presented an inventory of analytical tendencies that are typically associated with value identity approaches. Not all of these points necessarily apply to all authors I have discussed. For instance, Goodin does not make any claims for the necessity of value choice (except, perhaps, for a moral claim), and Cohen does not attempt to portray political conflict in terms of competing value systems. It should be stressed that the nub of my critique is concerned with form of analysis which the value identity thesis, considered as an 'ideal type', most commonly supports, rather than the content of particular examples. Reference to specific theorists are made in as much as they provide examples of the ideal type of value identity analysis. It is quite possible that other parts of the work of these writers do not fit so well with the ideal type, but it is not my intention to evaluate their work as a whole. The pervasiveness and substantial lack of reflection regarding value identity assumptions are the key points I wish to highlight.

The critique of value identity approaches presented in this thesis hinges on questioning a particular assumption that is rarely, if ever, made explicit, but which is extremely significant. The identification of green politics in terms of values, and the associated conceptions of value rationality, rest on an assumption that *shared values entail shared interpretations* of these implications. If any two actors are identified as sharing commitment to participatory values for instance, then they are treated as being committed to the same thing. This may seem to be a rather trivial point to make, but it goes to the heart of the value identity thesis. My contention is that this assumption regarding the shared interpretations of values is not warranted as it rests on a serious misconception about the role of values in politics. If this assumption is not warranted, then the analytical use of values to make distinctions is undermined. There are a number of points at which this assumption looks somewhat frayed. These are instances where the implications and interpretations of green values are notably ambiguous.

1.3.1. Content of the Green Paradigm

The different versions of the value identity thesis have much in common regarding the content of the green value paradigm. Elements that appear in almost every version outlined above include ecology, diversity, self-realisation, participatory democracy, community, social justice, non-violence and autonomy. However, different authors draw the boundaries around green politics in different places. Goodin, for example, is at odds with almost all of the other approaches over the inclusion of participatory-democratic values within the core of green identity. Touraine and Wildavsky differ considerably with regard to the inclusion of alternative lifestyle perspectives. These academic differences reflect diversity among greens themselves over what is and what is not essential to green politics.

The accounts of the basic principles that unify the worldview of greens and contrast it to the dominant worldview, also vary considerably. Goodin regards the valuation of nature as the glue that holds the package together, while Inglehart describes the link in terms of individual self-actualisation. Wildavsky posits the levelling of differences as the core concept while Cohen emphasises the development of autonomy and democracy. At the very least, it is easy to identify significant grey areas where the different characterisations potentially conflict. One thorny area concerns the autonomy of individuals. In Cotgrove's descriptions and in Wildavsky's models of political culture, individual freedom appears as an element of the dominant paradigm manifest by the emphasis placed upon economic self-interest. Yet we have seen how Inglehart and new social movement theorists emphasise the centrality of individual self-realisation and autonomy to the green perspective. While the claim could be made that self-interest and self-realisation are conceptually distinct, it is a distinction which is highly prone to blurring. Where is the line to be drawn between legitimate pursuit of individual autonomy and selfish pursuit of individual interest? In which paradigm, for instance, would the consumption of artistic and cultural services be located?

Ambiguities are also present within the suggested green value packages. Bookchin, Dobson and Eckersley all regard both diversity and holism as

central to the green perspective. Individuals should be viewed in the context of the inter-relationship with each other and their relationship to the whole which they are part of. This image of interdependence is intended to counter the atomising perspective promoted by liberal individualist patterns of thought. However, the compatibility between holism and diversity on this issue hardly lessens the possibility of contradiction in other contexts. How, for example, should greens regard dissent within their own ranks - as a legitimate expression of diversity, or as something that jeopardises unity of purpose?

The claim that green politics constitutes a coherent value paradigm is also difficult to square with the observation that participants in the green movement are ideologically diverse. Commentators on the German Greens such as Hülsberg (1988), Parkin (1989) and Scott (1990) have provided detailed accounts of the breadth of ideological diversity in the party. Ideological positions range from splinter groups of the German radical left to 'pure' greens who focus almost exclusively upon environmental issues. The relationship between common values and ideological diversity is generally unexplored.[21]

1.3.2. Ambiguous Implications of Green Values

If the value identity framework is to be useful, a good test would be to apply it to the accumulation of green political experience over the past twenty years. At first glance there are a number of contexts in which green experience can be framed in terms of incompatible values. Cotgrove's depiction of irreconcilable value frameworks appears to be appropriate for describing disputes over environmentally destructive development proposals, pollution, nuclear power, the deployment of NATO weapons.

However, this is far too simplistic a framework to cope with the developments that have occurred in green politics over the last decade. It is much rarer than was the case ten years ago, for instance, for

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[21] An alternative interpretation is that the construction of green identity in terms of values is an attempt to bypass some of the problems posed by this ideological diversity. This idea is pursued in Chapter 4 below.

development interests to argue their case solely from economic and technically rational grounds while greens argue theirs solely from ecological criteria. Indeed, it is doubtful that this was ever really the case. Green debates have become far more complex and sophisticated as new forms of arguments and tactics have emerged over the course of time. The forestry industry attempts to portray itself as environmentally responsible. The emergence in Australia of 'ecologically sustainable development' as a politically contested term, for instance, challenges the value paradigm model (Papadakis 1993: 129). Even if one regards use of the term as a mere smokescreen for business as usual on the part of governments and developers, why do they find it necessary to dress up their actions using ecological terminology? If Cotgrove's contention of divergent rationalities applied, there would be no need to do so.

Value identity models purport to offer criteria for judging whether or not certain political actors, actions, processes, structures and decisions are consistent with green value rationality. It is not hard to find ambiguous situations in which these frameworks are not very helpful. One obvious example is size of the welfare state. On the one hand, the welfare state in its bureaucratic guise is exactly the type of large scale centralised decision-making structure which is recognised by Cohen, Bookchin and Wildavsky as a threat to autonomy and identity and/or social solidarity. On the other hand, cutbacks to welfare state spending are criticised because they are seen as having a detrimental effect on social equality. Both social equality and individual autonomy are elements of the same value system, but can be used to support conflicting evaluations.

In the Australian context another good example is the issue of immigration. Immigration may be regarded positively by greens in that it increases cultural diversity and may help to alleviate inequalities between Australia as a first world country, and the third world. Green values can also be seen as implying that Australia should reduce its population as a way of reducing environmental damage. While it may be possible to logically separate overpopulation from immigration by arguing that population may be reduced by means other than restricting immigration, such an argument is far removed from Australia's demographic and

political circumstances in which it is clear that reducing immigration will have an immediate impact upon the rate of population growth. Value identity perspectives are of little use in navigating through this debate.

The evaluation of engagement in established political processes and institutions is another case in point. Greens are usually identified as being committed to participatory democratic values, but it is not clear whether involvement in election campaigns, formation of political parties and negotiations with established political parties are consistent with such values or not. Some Australian activists have branded political parties and elections per se as contrary to green values (Martin 1989; Salleh 1987). Indeed, among green theorists there are significant differences over such issues. Dobson, for instance, expresses doubts about the green credentials of *die Grünen* (1990: 5), and questions whether any engagement in institutional politics is consistent with green principles. On the other hand, Cohen wholeheartedly supports the participation of *die Grünen* in the parliamentary arena.

1.3.3. The Pervasiveness of Normative Conflict

Another cause for concern regarding the value identity thesis relates to the experiences of green organisations. If green values are regarded as having inherent political implications relevant to political organisation, then it is reasonable to suggest that this would be apparent in bodies greens themselves have initiated. At first glance, this may well seem to be the case. Certainly, green party structures are very different to those of other parties. However, there are continual questions raised within these parties regarding the degree to which such structures actually reflect green values.

The experience of European green parties, and the German Greens in particular, has been characterised by significant and often debilitating internal conflict. The high profile of this conflict, compared to internal conflict in other political organisations and parties is in part a consequence of the openness of green deliberations that is valued as part of the ideal political process (Frankland 1989).

Nevertheless, the degree of conflict has often been recognised by participants themselves as debilitating and energy-sapping. The internal dynamics of the German Greens have been the most widely documented to this point, with the most recent accounts being offered by Parkin, Hülsberg, Kitschelt, Poguntke and Doherty.[22] Poguntke observes that '(t)he image of the German Green Party is marked by an almost masochist obsession with internal political conflict' (Poguntke 1990: 30), which has deflected attention and energy away from bread-and-butter environmental issues. Parkin (1989) devotes well over half her chapter on the German Greens to outlining internal cleavages, and the problems that stem from them. The view emerging from these studies is that internal conflict in *die Grünen* reached a point in the late 1980s in which the party's performance was severely affected. Failure to overcome the 5% hurdle in West Germany in the 1990 elections has been interpreted as a reflection on the internal state of the party.[23] Conflict has proven problematic for other green parties in Europe. The British Green Party witnessed the culmination of internal struggles in 1992 when its most credible public figures were ousted (*The Independent*, 16 September 1992). Similarly, infighting in the French green electoral organisation, Les Verts, has been identified as an obstacle to effectiveness and as off-putting to potential sympathisers (Prendiville & Chafer 1990: 201).

From the literature available, it is possible to draw together a number of common themes that have been recurrent in such internal conflict. One of the most significant recurring themes involves internal party structures and decision-making processes and attempts to implement decentralised mechanisms of grassroots, participatory democracy. Such debates have been noted in the British Green Party (Byrne 1989), *Ecolo* in Belgium

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[22] Some of the seeds of later conflicts had been recognised much earlier by Papadakis (1984).

[23] Indeed, Poguntke argues that internal division ensured that the Greens were unable to react to the issue of unification (1990: 31). Kitschelt argues that the response of the Greens during the election campaign was perceived as arrogant and insensitive to the aspirations of East Germans, and that significant portions of the green constituency rejected the parliamentary leaders' interpretation of unification as a return to chauvinistic nationalism (1991: 134-5).

(Deschouwer 1989; Kitschelt 1989), *Les Verts* in France (Prendiville 1989) as well as in *die Grünen*. Efforts to create and implement radically open democratic structures are also experienced as restricting the party's capacity for concerted action and are frequently resisted to some degree. The issue of centralisation of power within the party has proved problematic in Britain. The debate over structure has also spilled over into conflict over the role of prominent figures in the party which preoccupied the German Greens in the mid 1980s.

The most significant common denominator underlying the conflicts in the various parties has been that between fundamentalism and realism. As Brian Doherty demonstrates, this conflict is generalisable despite large differences in the ideological content of the actual debates (Doherty 1992: 95-6). In Germany, for instance, the debate cross-cuts distinctions between ecosocialists and pure ecologists, with both groups displaying realist and fundamentalist tendencies. In Britain, where there is no significant ecosocialist tendency within the green party, the debate has been just as heated in the early 1990s.[24] Many of the disputes in French, Italian and Belgian parties have also taken this form. It is difficult to characterise fundi-realo conflict in non-normative terms, as purely a tactical split. At a fairly basic level, this cleavage involves disputes over the interpretation of green political values: fundamentalist positions are characteristically articulated as the refusal to compromise green principles.

Finally, we can note an interesting manifestation of the difficulty of squaring a value-based green identity with the practical experience of green parties. Those who have studied the operation of green organisational structures are sceptical of claims of green value rationality. According to Kitschelt, the normative green political vision is not an appropriate basis for judging the development of green political parties, because 'the prominence of perverse effects shows that the parties'

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[24] Until 1989, according to E. Gene Frankland (1990), factionalism did not threaten to splinter the party because of its extremely weak electoral position. The newly-acquired credibility that resulted from polling 15% in the European elections of 1989 may have worked against such marginality, but Rootes (1991) argues that the British Green Party's marginality was still significant in the aftermath of these elections.

political practice does not directly reflect their militants' political discourse' (Kitschelt 1989: 74). Similarly, Doherty (1992: 95) contends that the radical participatory democratic ethos that supposedly binds greens together is the most significant source of internal tension between fundamentalist and realist approaches.

1.4. Conclusion

In the following chapters I wish to suggest value identity approaches have got it halfway right - values are crucial to any understanding of green politics, and interest-based analyses typically ignore or underestimate the significance of values. What I wish to take issue with is the way the value identity approaches have misconstrued the role of values in politics. I will argue that it is the assumption that values are tools for making distinctions that is at the heart of the problem of the mismatch between theories of green value identity and political experience. Now, it is hardly the case that these areas of value ambiguity outlined above have been peripheral issues in the growth and development of green parties over the past decade. These examples, I contend, highlight the most problematic features of the value identity thesis. My critique of the value identity thesis is based upon the contention that values are necessarily ambiguous, and that attempts to define any political phenomena on the basis of values are seriously misguided.

Chapter 2: Value Distinction and Ambiguity

The problems raised in Chapter 1 are part of a more general set of issues that arise from the practice of using values as analytical tools to make distinctions between social and political entities. The language of value rationality, consistency, choice and conflict is well entrenched in many areas of social and political theory. In this chapter, I deal in turn with attributional and transformational approaches, exploring the background to their respective epistemologies of values and value rationality. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which these approaches 'diagnose' the normative character of actors, structures and processes. Having done this, the chapter then explores the ways in which these methodological approaches deal with the 'empirical noise' that is produced as a consequence of value diagnostic techniques. Researchers encounter noise in expressions of values which do not fit their conceptual schemes. The cost of employing these techniques of value distinction is the inability to acknowledge the ambiguity and contestation of value usage. I conclude this chapter by suggesting a number of reasons why this value ambiguity should be taken more seriously.

2.1. Attributional Approaches

In social scientific literature, values have been commonly conceptualised as objectively identifiable attributes of individuals, groups, societies, nation states and institutions. Attributional approaches are based on a number of assumptions most commonly associated with the work of Max Weber, even though this attention to Weber is notably selective. The work of Parsons and other functionalists also represents most clearly a particular style of distinctive value analysis (and interpretation of Weber) which has remained influential. Often, these ways of thinking about values have been combined with a third element. The conception of values as predictive variables reinforces the notion that political phenomena can be identified in terms of values. It also means that values can be thought of as personal attributes in the same way as ethnicity, class

or gender. This section also considers the more general question of how values are used as means of identification in social sciences, and explores how problems generated by value classificatory schemes are characteristically dealt with.

2.1.1. The Weberian and Functionalist Background

When considering the use of values as analytic means of making distinctions, any discussion of this sort must take into account the influence of Max Weber's writings. Weber did not provide a theoretically neat conceptualisation of values and their role in social processes. Indeed, as commentators have pointed out, his writings about values are notably unsystematic (Brubaker 1984; Turner & Factor 1984). Rather, the reason Weber serves as an important reference point is that many of the conceptions about the nature of values that pervade sociological and political science literature can be found in, and sometimes directly traced to, his work. This applies particularly to the notions of irreconcilable values, value rationality and the 'necessity' of value choice.

Weber regarded value conflict as extremely significant. Value conflict is no trivial matter because, as Brubaker notes, it involves 'conflict over fundamental, all-embracing conceptions of the nature and meaning of life' (1984: 68). In speaking of an 'irreconcilable death-struggle' between values, Weber was acutely aware of the history and legacy of religious-political conflict in Germany, regarding them as conflicts between ultimate *'Weltanschauungen'*. He was emphatic that there is no overarching rationality, scientific or otherwise, according to which conflicting *Weltanschauungen* can be reconciled.

Weber regards value orientations as internal dispositions, such that the figure of the consciously acting subject is pivotal. Indeed, Weber considers the conscious adoption of value orientations from a store of available but irreconcilable alternatives as a positive indication of moral character.

> The shallowness of our routinized daily existence in the most significant sense of the word consists indeed in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware, of this motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values. They avoid the choice between "God" and the "Devil" and their own

> ultimate decision as to which of the conflicting values will be dominated by the one, and which by the other (Weber 1949: 18).

If and when such a value choice has been made, actions can be interpreted in terms of value rationality. Value rationality, defined in relation to 'ethics of ultimate ends', comes in as many varieties as there are normative worldviews. Different value worldviews are likened by Weber to railway switchmen that 'determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest' (Weber 1958b: 280). In other words, values have a significant influence on the definition of interests.

It is not hard to see how such a conceptualisation of values could be translated into the technology of value distinction that characterises attributional approaches, particularly when run in tandem with the Weberian methodological ethic of value neutral social scientific analysis. Nevertheless, Weber's writings on values would not appear to fit so comfortably with contemporary techniques of value distinction without a good deal of selective interpretation. A number of common features of value research are incompatible with Weber's *Verstehen* methodology.

In the first place, Weber did not suggest that value conflict could defined in terms of dimensionally opposing worldviews. Any pair of normative worldviews may be considered as incommensurate, but Weber does not, for the most part, formulate typologies of logical opposites in order to get a handle on value conflict. Rather, according to Brubaker, the propensity for and intensity of value conflict is exacerbated by the perpetual generation of new normative worldviews. The capacity to 'create' novel value-orientations increases with the loosening hold of traditional religious orientations (Brubaker 1984: 69). In essence, it is the crowding of the space of value judgements, rather than a tendency towards polarisation, that Weber regards as problematic. The conditions for value conflict, therefore, are historically contingent, as the various competing value orientations are products of specific historical circumstances.

An even more significant point to keep in mind is that when Weber talks about value rationality, he is making reference to rationality from the social actor's point of view. For instance, if a person undertakes fasting in order to achieve enlightenment, Weber is claiming that such an action is

rational only in as much as that person believes that enlightenment can be achieved through fasting. Weber is not making any claim, however, about whether fasting is really the best method to adopt given that ones' ultimate end is enlightenment. The rationality of the action is not in any sense an objective rationality, because the ultimate ends are not amenable to rational calculation. Indeed, Calvinists and Catholics engage in quite different means to achieve salvation, both of which Weber would consider as normatively rational, but Calvinist strategies are patently irrational to Catholics, and vice versa. Weber's stance is best highlighted when we consider the strong theme of unintended consequences that runs through his writings on rationality. Unintended consequences arise through the pursuit of rational means in order to achieve ultimate ends such as salvation, or a more just redistribution of wealth. In 'Politics as a Vocation', Weber stresses that some means adopted out of normative rationality, produce consequences that are not helpful to the cause.

> You may demonstrate to a convinced syndicalist, believing in an ethic of ultimate ends, that his action will result in increasing the opportunities of reaction, in increasing the oppression of his class, and obstructing its assent - and you will not make the slightest impression upon him. If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor's eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God's will who made them thus, is responsible for evil (Weber 1958a: 120-1).

This 'ironic' treatment of the role of values was lost in the translation to postwar functionalist sociology and anthropology. In contrast to Weber's own treatment, notions of value choice, conflict and rationality adopted by functionalists became abstracted and universalised.[1] In this respect it is worthwhile to briefly visit the work of Talcott Parsons for two reasons. Firstly, because he played a central role in the introduction of Weberian concepts into American social theory, and secondly because, more than perhaps any other theorist of that time, he endeavoured to systematise the concepts of value choice, conflict and rationality. The work of Mary

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[1] Clyde Kluckhohn (1951: 417) suggested in his influential article that some values should be considered as *universal*, in the sense that they transcend cultural differences.

Douglas provides another example of such systematisation, and we shall return to the legacy of her efforts later in this section.[2]

In contrast to Weber, Parsons was less inclined to view value conflict in terms of historical contingencies, and more inclined to locate such contingencies in terms of abstract frameworks. His analytical categories were developed with the expressed intention of mapping the moral universe, such that any instance of value conflict could be located.[3] Parsons representation of the moral universe in terms of dimensional space is by far the most ambitious of such schemes in that it attempts to categorise the components of social action in terms of fundamental 'compass points'. Actors make value choices between antinomic alternatives. One cannot simultaneously pursue instrumental and consummatory ends in the same sense that one cannot travel east and west at the same time. In this way, the interpretations of value conflict and choice are even more fundamental than those found in Weber's work.

In functionalist schemes, the implications of values in any specific context are, in principle, deducible. Parsonsian analysis of value rationality, therefore, is notably less ironic than Weber's, in that the notion of unintended consequences does not fit too comfortably with this assumption of deducibility. That is not to say that Parsons is oblivious to the possibility that there may be clashes between applications of particular values. However, when such clashes are apparent, he argues, they are attributable to the effects of extensive structural differentiation.[4]

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[2] Interestingly, cultural theorists claim that 'the spirit of (Weber's) work is highly consonant with ours', but that his work is deficient in that in his efforts to classify "styles of life" he 'ends up with as many ways of life as there are groups in society' (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 171), i.e. he was too attached to socio-historical contingencies and therefore neglectful of the opportunity to organise his observations into universal typologies.

[3] In doing so, Parsons came up with a very idiosyncratic scheme of values, in that his conception of values is somewhat different and more abstract than those of other functionalists. In this context, I am not so much concerned with the content of Parsonsian values as much as I am with the analytic strategies facilitated by his framework.

[4] Parsons argues that there is a certain degree of flexibility, or 'degrees of freedom' inherent in the application of values because they are often applicable in a wide variety of

Ultimately, Parsons works from a conception of theoretically unambiguous relations between values and action, and in so doing, offers a particularly strong reading of the concept of value rationality.

Values, (or value commitments in Parsonsian terms), are not only attributes of individuals, but of functionally differentiated elements of social systems. Maps of the value universe are as applicable to analysis of whole cultural systems as they are to the analysis of interactions within families. Value conflict takes place between elements that occupy different locations in the dimensional space of social systems. There is tension and conflict, for example, between economic agents acting in accordance with universalistic and performance values, and agents concerned with articulating the particularistic and qualitative values of the societal community. At the most general level, Parsons also regarded it as feasible to diagnose the value character of whole societies, in particular, that of American society (Parsons 1991). This theme was not as prominent as other aspects of his work on values.[5] Nonetheless, the idea of differentiating countries and societies on the basis of value orientations was one which was enthusiastically taken up by comparative political scientists of the time.

A particularly influential social scientific project of the 1960s involved linking the normative orientations of citizens with institutional political arrangements. Researchers such as Lipset and Almond and Verba, contended that widespread adherence to certain political values, as distinct from their opposites, would be reflected in citizens' preparedness to

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contexts, due to processes of differentiation. For example, the implementation of Christian value commitments has produced a range of applications which could be considered in certain contexts as incommensurate with each other. Parsons regards Christian fundamentalism as a reaction to this process of differentiation, in that fundamentalists seek a return to a dedifferentiated sphere in which such degrees of freedom are reduced or eliminated. However, for Parsons, modern social systems are capable of operating successfully with higher levels of flexibility due to the compartmentalisation brought about by differentiation, and fundamentalism represents abnormal reactions arising from greater levels of social stress (Parsons 1968: 153-157).

[5] Indeed, his 'Tentative Outline of American Values' (1991) was only published posthumously.

support corresponding political arrangements. Thus, individual value orientations and political structures were symbiotically related. Changes in either element induced corresponding changes in the other. Such a framework underpins Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* in which the viability of national democratic institutions is dependent on the degree to which citizens are prepared to participate in these institutions. As they put it, 'each kind of polity - traditional, authoritarian and democratic - has one form of culture that is congruent with its own structure' (Almond & Verba 1963: 34). In identifying the 'civic culture' as consistent with stable democratic institutions, they can also claim that deviations from the civic culture create political cultures 'incongruent with an effective and stable democratic political system' (Almond & Verba 1963: 496).

These features of the broadly Parsonsian treatment of value choice, conflict, rationality and functional symbiosis are also evident in the cultural theory framework, although Wildavsky and his colleagues wish to distance themselves from the specifics of Parsons' conceptual armory (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990: 183-188). As we have seen in the previous chapter, cultural theorists argue that there is a limited number of 'viable' ways of life. Each of these ways of life have a normative core - a preference for certain social arrangements over others - each, therefore, has its own normative rationality. Egalitarians are logically obliged to adopt certain cultural practices, regardless of whether or not they think it is rational (recalling Wildavsky's dictum that 'some things - accepting authority while rejecting it - just can't be done'). Accordingly, standards of rationality are determined by the functional requirements of a way of life. As with Parsons, there is no room for the irony of unintended consequences. Either one affirms one's way of life by acting in accordance with its normative rationality, or one jeopardises it by weakening commitment to its values.

2.1.2. Values as Variables

The final important element of attributional approaches, absent in both Weber and functionalist theorists, is the treatment of values as causal

variables in models of social explanation.[6] Techniques based on this assumption have been most extensively deployed in the field of social psychology. The attributional character of values is most clearly apparent in these frameworks. Individuals can be categorised according to value dispositions in the same way that they can be categorised in terms of sex, age, ethnicity, occupation or religious affiliation. Values are regarded as causal influences, and as such are treated in the same way as occupational status, ethnicity and level of education in these psychological models. A clear articulation of the reasons for conceptualising values as independent variables is provided by Milton Rokeach as part of his attempt to systematise the subject matter in *The Nature of Human Values.*

> Values are determinants of virtually all kinds of behavior that could be called social behavior - of social action, attitudes and ideology, comparisons of self with others, presentations of self to others, and attempts to influence others. Boiling all these down to a more succinct theoretical statement, it can perhaps be stated that values are guides and determinants of social attitudes and ideologies on the one hand and of social behavior on the other (Rokeach 1973: 24).

In order to demonstrate the explanatory power of values, Robin Williams cites a number of psychological studies of the postwar era which have shown that differences of values between individuals influence behaviour such as cheating on examinations, occupational career choices, juvenile delinquency and choice of friends (Williams 1979: 23). In political science research, values have long been marshalled as relevant causal variables in the prediction of voting and political attitudes and behaviour.

Values as variables are generally measured through the technology of the social survey. Social surveys constructed from attitudinal items have value choice, conflict and rationality built into the survey instrument. Respondents choose between alternatives that are indicators of values. Different value orientations are usually defined by the survey design as incommensurate or antinomic. Particular survey items are attempts to specify the implications of general values with regard to particular issues.

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[6] Parsons in particular cannot be regarded as being sympathetic to the conceptualisation of values as variables and as personal attributes (Parsons 1960: 469).

If, for example, an individual has a general value orientation of tolerance, we would expect him or her to exhibit favourable attitudes towards a particular cultural minority.

In the field of value research, there has been a considerable range of interest stretching from sociological interest in cultural and social systems to psychological research into individual values and value systems. Nevertheless, there has been a high degree of conceptual cross-fertilisation between the two streams. Williams (1979) certainly regards it as feasible to integrate the insights of Rokeachian social psychology with functionalist sociology. Much earlier, Almond and Verba used attitudinal survey data in an attempt to measure participatory values, having argued that concepts of political culture provided a way of linking micro level of individual attitudes to the macro level of national political systems (Almond & Verba 1963: 32-4).

The same combination of Weberian, functionalist and social psychological elements can be found in the attributional frameworks of Inglehart, Cotgrove and Milbrath. Milbrath's conception of values comfortably takes on board all the above elements, and he apparently sees no need to articulate and justify this conception of values, as it seems to be the taken for granted method one uses for investigating value conflict and change. Inglehart draws more explicitly on *The Civic Culture* in *Culture Shift*, and the latter work can be read as an attempt to resurrect many of the concepts and methods used by Almond and Verba.[7] Cotgrove combines cultural theory's interpretation of value rationality with a survey methodology concerned with locating environmentalists and industrialists on normative dimensions.

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[7] In particular, the final chapter can be read as 'an update on Almond and Verba, 30 years on'. The statement that 'the available evidence indicates that the values and cultural norms held by given peoples are a major influence on whether or not democratic institutions are viable' (1990: 432) is a reprise of classical political culture themes.

2.1.3. Techniques of Value Distinction

At this point it is worth re-emphasising the importance of *making distinctions in terms of values* to attributional analysis. To identify contemporary American society in terms of commitment to values of democracy and freedom, is to contrast it to other societies (e.g. the Soviet Union, Mexico, pre-revolutionary America) which are not characterised by these values. The point in claiming that security is a central value for materialists, is that it is not for postmaterialists. If one asserts that the environmentalist vanguard are concerned about the welfare of future generations, one is also claiming that the anti-environmentalist rearguard are not. Such claims cannot be made without calling into being these corresponding judgements, and these demarcations are necessary if value distinctive analysis is to have any purchase. How, then, do attributional analysts go about diagnosing which values are held by particular actors?

Williams suggests that '(p)reliminary clues may be obtained from *testimony:* individuals are able, to some extent, to tell what values they hold' (1968: 285). Evidence for discerning the value orientations held by individuals, groups or institutions can be gleaned from the articulation of preferences, from people saying what they prefer and why they prefer it. Most attributional approaches assume some capacity on the part of social actors to articulate their value orientations.

This, at first glance, appears to be a plausible way of proceeding. Robert Bellah et al's (1985) investigation into cultural orientations of middle class America contains a wealth of testimonial material about values. The authors presented a series of individual portraits based on in-depth interviews in which the interviewees were drawn to articulate and reflect on their lives in terms of the values they lived by (Bellah et al. 1985).[8] Although all interviewees were drawn from middle class locations, the study highlighted considerable variety in preferences, lifestyles and social circumstances. In Bellah et al's first chapter, four portraits were selected in order to provide an indication of this variety. Brian, a successful business

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[8] The limitation to the middle class is significant. It is doubtful that the assumption that respondents could articulate their own values could be made beyond this category.

manager, told of his career-oriented lifestyle in the corporate big league and his newfound commitment and priority given to his family. Joe, a civic leader and self-described American patriot, spoke of his deep commitment to the civic life of the small city in which he has lived all his life. Margaret, a psychologist and therapist, portrayed herself as someone who encourages her clients and those around her to reach new levels of self-understanding in order to make freer choices in life. Wayne, a professional political activist, defined his activity in terms of the struggle for empowerment of the powerless, which was expressed through his heavy involvement in tenant organisations.

These portraits provide the opportunity to make the sorts of distinctions characteristic of attributional value analyses. The frameworks of cultural theory and the culture shift typology of Inglehart could be easily applied to these examples. Both of these theoretical frameworks appear to capture significant features of these variations in terms of their value dimensions. If we take Inglehart's typology, for instance, Margaret the therapist would be emblematic of the postmaterialist category, as she clearly articulates the themes of self-actualisation and fulfilment of non-physiological needs. Wayne the activist, we would imagine, also comfortably fits the postmaterialist profile as indicated by his involvement in social movements. On the other hand, Joe, for whom the terms God, country and community have particular valence could be considered as a typical materialist. He is a long way removed from Inglehart's depiction of postmaterialism and is outwardly critical of many of the priorities espoused by people such as Margaret. Only Brian would seem difficult to place in either major category, given his apparent emphasis on self-fulfilment combined with his lifelong pursuit of material well-being.

Wildavsky and his collaborators might be tempted to claim an even clearer categorisation. In the cultural theory scheme, Brian would appear as an individualist par excellence. Joe, given his attachment to the traditions of Church, town and corporation seems unambiguously committed to a hierarchical way of life. Wayne, on the other hand, offers a model of the egalitarian culture, symbolised by his involvement in tenant unions and the Campaign for Economic Democracy. Only Margaret would

be difficult to categorise, as cases could be made for her adherence to individualist or egalitarian culture.

However, the material collected by Bellah and his colleagues also raises questions about such neat categorisations. The individualist is one of cultural theory's basic categories, while the egalitarian culture is presented as a stark contrast to the themes of self-help and autonomy espoused by individualists. Yet according to the authors, Wayne 'waxes passionate about how the freedom of individuals is limited by current economic and political arrangements' (Bellah et al. 1985: 25). Nor can Joe be regarded as unsympathetic to ideals of personal freedom and autonomy, although he offers a rather different interpretation of these terms to those found in both the cultural theory and culture shift frameworks. For Joe, according to Bellah et al, individual freedom is predicated upon community involvement (Bellah et al. 1985: 170-1). His civic participation, and his stress upon the benefits of political participation also appear to fit the image of politics captured by Inglehart's concept of postmaterialism.

Inglehart and Wildavsky, of course, could easily claim that Joe's notions of civic virtue are quite different to the emphases upon political participation typical of new social movements, and that Wayne is clearly not supporting materialist or hierarchical worldviews. However, in both cases, the question remains as to why Joe and Wayne use language normally associated with the adherents of opposing values and ways of life. As we shall see below, both theorists have recourse to techniques of value distinction that rely upon non-testimonial sources of evidence, such that these questions do not matter greatly. For the moment, however, I will continue to explore some of the fuzzier features of value testimony.

Consider an example highly relevant to Inglehart's distinction between materialism and postmaterialism. It is clear that Inglehart regards participants in the eco-pax movements as postmaterialists. One of the central planks of the campaigns of peace and anti-nuclear movements was that the build-up of nuclear arsenals constituted a serious threat to security (Rochon 1988). Such a claim, however, is clearly anomalous in Inglehart's typology based as it is on the assumption that postmaterialist

needs for security have been met, and that it is materialists who are most concerned about the achievement and protection of security. This results in a rather bizarre interpretation of opposition to nuclear weapons, in which the anti-nuclear activists' recourse to the value of security must be interpreted as a 'cover' for other more important motivations such as self-expression.

Now we could interpret the anti-nuclear example as a problem specific to Inglehart's typology. However, it is also possible to identify seemingly anomalous claims according to any framework of value distinction. Michael Billig (1991) provides an example from his studies of British National Front literature. As evidenced by its hostility to the presence of people of non-white ethnicity in Britain, the National Front are generally regarded in public discourse as purveyors of intolerant and prejudiced values. Such a diagnosis could be drawn from both postwar social research, typified by figures such as Allport and Adorno, and contemporary lay understandings (Billig 1991: 133-4).[9] Yet, once again there is evidence of values being deployed in direct contradiction to these conventional interpretations. Billig cites an article from the organisation's national newsletter that sets out to argue, not only that the NF is not prejudiced, but that the 'multiracialist' critics of the Front are the ones who are 'really' prejudiced because they have not considered the relevant 'facts' about non-white immigration outlined elsewhere in the article (Billig 1991: 122-3). It is highly unlikely that this interpretation would be supported by any academic value typology.

Of course, such anomalies need not particularly concern Inglehart, because he does not ultimately rely upon direct value testimony in order to discern basic value dispositions. Similarly, Wildavsky and his colleagues are not prepared to give a free rein to testimonial evidence, for they are well aware that there are some who will claim a particular normative orientation who clearly cannot be admitted as such in the terms of cultural theory frameworks. In any case, there are other reasons for not

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[9] Some more recent examples include (Sullivan et al. 1981; Flanagan 1987).

attaching too much weight to testimonial evidence. Many attributional approaches claim that social actors hold values regardless of whether they are actually expressed. Indeed, one of the limitations of testimony that Williams identifies is that individuals may not necessarily be aware of, or capable of articulating their value orientations (Williams 1968: 285). According to Milbrath, 'people in the rearguard and the vanguard may not perceive themselves as such; that is beside the point' (Milbrath 1984: 23). Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky assert that '(t)he extent to which individuals are aware of providing support to their way of life depends on their level of cultural consciousness' (1990: 2-3). If values are regarded as cultural universals, then the language used to depict these values would be secondary to the alleged meanings. Other forms of diagnostic technology are therefore required in order to reveal the character of hidden value orientations. Williams offers a list of suggestions regarding the supplementation of testimonial evidence.

> Further evidence may come from systematic study of *choices* of objects and actions, either in "natural" behavior or in various kinds of tests, interviews, and experiments. Research may chart indications of *directions of interest* as shown by cultural products as well as by behavior directly observed. Content analysis of verbal materials is often a suitable technique in this connection: identification of implicit assumptions in social discourse often reveals values not otherwise readily discovered (Williams 1968: 285).

As we have already seen, the technology of the survey has been a widely utilised method for diagnosing values. One of its attractions is that it does not altogether eliminate testimonial evidence, but rather shapes and constructs it to fit predefined analytic grids. The key element of all such surveys is that choices of some sort are forced. Respondents choose between a set of alternatives, but it is the researcher who ultimately must set the parameters of such choice.[10] Survey items are constructed to represent particular instances of more fundamental value conflict. In Inglehart's surveys, respondents are presented with a finite list of possible value orientations and asked to choose between them. In this way, the

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[10] This is true regardless of whether the dimensions are defined a priori (e.g. Inglehart, Milbrath), or using techniques such as factor analysis after the data has been collected (Cotgrove).

impossibilities, irrationalities and inconsistencies of value dispositions are created by the survey instrument and/or the interpretation of the data collected. Respondents cannot be *both* materialist and postmaterialist, vanguard and rearguard, catastrophists and cornucopians.

The same point is reached in the non-survey techniques of value distinction. The investigation of behaviour or textual analysis in order to discern unarticulated, hidden value priorities relies upon the identification of situations in which the actor is forced to choose, or is regarded as having chosen between two courses of action that represent incompatible value dispositions. One such test case, according to Wildavsky, is AIDS related attitudes and behaviour.

> The more hierarchical the group, I hypothesize, following cultural theory, the more it minimizes technological danger as the price of progress while maximizing fear of casual contact with people who have AIDS.... Conversely, egalitarians tend to grossly overestimate the dangers from technology.... while minimizing the dangers from casual contact with carriers of AIDS (Wildavsky 1987: 15).

AIDS, therefore, provides a litmus test for the choices people have made between egalitarianism and hierarchy. Wildavsky is claiming further that having both an attitude of faith in technology and a positive attitude to AIDS sufferers constitutes a problematic mixture of ways of life. Such an unviable mix between distinct value categories is an example of 'empirical noise'.

2.1.4. Accounting for Empirical Noise

The unreliability of testimonial evidence stems from the fact that it often does not neatly mesh with the imperatives of value distinction. Social actors make seemingly inconsistent or contradictory claims. From the perspective of those who are engaged in the project of making value-based distinctions, this ambiguity need not matter. It may be, to some degree, irritating to the researcher who has to cope with data which can make categorisation a more onerous task. However, Wayne's espousal of individual freedom or Joe's articulation of the importance of democratic participation can still be regarded as the sort of empirical noise that is part and parcel of the social researcher's lot. Inglehart's survey instrument

would not pick up the testimonial type of noise, such as Joe's espousal of participatory politics, or the anti-nuclear activist's concerns about security. When presented with this battery that forces a choice, it becomes clear where individuals such as Joe and the anti-nuclear activist would stand, as they would have to weigh the values of democratic participation and freedom of speech against those of physical and economic security. However, value surveys often produce a different form of noise. Researchers concerned to demonstrate the robustness of their analysis are not usually content to place to much weight on any particular simulated choice. More often than not they prefer to spread the weight over a series of decisions. Consequently, the more items that are designed to tap a particular choice of values, the more it is likely that respondents will make more inconsistent and noisy choices.

There are a number of well known studies in which researchers interpret the noise as sufficient evidence that large proportions of respondents do not operate according to coherent packages of values.[11] However, in other contexts, empirical noise may not matter terribly much to those doing the research. Cultural theorists methodologically ensure that they avoid noise as much as possible by limiting their discussion of empirical examples to those they regard as fitting neatly into one of their categories.[12] Among those who deploy survey techniques, Inglehart and Milbrath both have a high level of tolerance for noisy data, as their analyses proceed despite the fact that over half of their respondents do not fit their respective schema. In their view, their categories are good enough to chart large-scale shifts in value systems at the national level.

Nevertheless, there are a number of occasions where noisy data are recognised as requiring some sort of attention, and perhaps even some

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[11] Research undertaken by Converse (1964) into the coherence of belief systems is an example. This interpretation does not apply to the approaches dealt with in this thesis each of which regard values as central to definitions of green politics.

[12] Given that they describe what they do in terms of empirical social science, cultural theorists can be criticised for failing to provide a methodology for testing their hypothesis, and for failing to specify the conditions under which their hypothesis could be found wanting. Wildavsky is also criticised for failing to provide the ethnographic evidence to support the claims that he makes (Laitin 1988).

explanation within the terms of the analytical framework being used. A frequently adopted strategy for dealing with noise rests on the assumption that inconsistency is a form of ignorance, inadequacy or deviance.[13] These abnormal value dispositions, like other social scientifically defined abnormality, require some secondary explanation. It is noticeable, according to Rokeach, that people often go through life avoiding having to face up to inconsistencies of values. Rokeach sees the social scientific importance of studying values as one of revealing, or uncovering value preferences so that subjects may become more aware of their own basic value orientations. Having done so, they will then be able to identify and eliminate any incongruities that they may have.[14]

> The practical implication of such findings (of inconsistency) is that the potential for increased self-awareness and change in the values, attitudes, and behavior of Americans - indeed, of all human beings - would be very great if it were possible to bring contradictions such as these to their conscious attention (Rokeach 1979: 331).

The onus, therefore, is on these inconsistent individuals to make the appropriate changes, and the social psychological techniques of value diagnosis can also be used to facilitate such change (Billig 1987). Admittedly, in the case of those who resort to blatantly deviant uses of values, such as the National Front, some social actors are probably beyond reform, but such deviants can be dismissed as social 'outliers'.

Another strategy for dealing with inconsistency is to treat it as disingenuous, inasmuch as the purveyors of inconsistency will, sooner or later, be caught out. Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky admit that it sometimes does happen that adherents to one way of life use the normative language appropriate to a different worldview. They cite the example of anti-abortionists, who are located as supporters of hierarchical culture, articulating egalitarian values.

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[13] Much of the adverse reaction to Converse's analysis came from researchers who held that the greater the degree of ideological consistency, the healthier the polity, e.g. (Peffley & Hurwitz 1985).

[14] An example of inconsistency cited here was ranking equality highly on the scale of values whilst preferring George Wallace for President in 1968.

> To use the core values of one's opponents in order to undermine those opponents and broaden one's appeal is a path fraught with danger. Witness, for instance, antiabortionists who attempt to discomfort their prochoice opponents and appeal to those on the fence by referring to the "equal rights of the fetus". By insisting on the equal rights of all, antiabortionists abandon (and hence undermine) their hierarchical commitments to the community's right to make distinctions among its members and its duty to regulate the morality of its members (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 263).

According to these authors, this noise is not at all problematic. This is because attempts to commandeer elements of a 'foreign' value system in order to bolster the claims of one's own culture are counterproductive. Similarly, Wayne's articulation of his worldview in terms of the freedom of individuals is ultimately untenable as it will undermine his own commitment to an egalitarian way of life. Both Wayne and the anti-abortionists can be regarded as disingenuous and inconsistent in their appeal to the values of their cultural adversaries. Thus, the empirical noise that is a byproduct of schemes of normative categorisation can always be explained away as someone else's problem.

2.2. Transformational Approaches

Transformational approaches have adopted a similar analytical language of value rationality, change, conflict, coherence and consistency, albeit via quite different routes to those taken by attributional approaches. The common denominator of transformational social theory is the assumption that social action, processes and structures can be assessed in terms of movement towards, or fulfilment of a political rationality. With regard to green politics, there are three ways in which claims to rationality are advanced. The first is as a teleological rationality purporting to chart the movement of history, the second is in terms of a theoretically defined rationality against which political action *should* be assessed, and the third posits a formally logical rationality which purports to define the parameters of practical possibility.

2.2.1. The Rationality of the Green Movement

The teleological version is associated with new social movement theorists such as Cohen and Touraine. Cohen regards many of the new socio-cultural orientations articulated by movement participants as indicative of

a new layer of historical development (1983: 106).[15] Touraine's theory is overtly teleological. For each type of society there is only one social movement, and 'the' movement that leads the transition to a post-industrial society must recognise the process in which it is engaged (Touraine 1983: 4). Thus, the anti-nuclear struggle may or may not be an expression of this movement - whether it is or not depends upon its capacity to perceive itself in such a way by being able to name the adversary of dominant technocratic rationality.

The conception of an historical movement telos is notably 'idealist', in that progress towards new social arrangements requires the assent of historical actors. It is not, therefore, simply the expression of material forces. Touraine is emphatic that 'there is no class without class consciousness' (1981: 68). For Cohen, movement solidarities are formed and maintained 'on the basis of communicating, reasoning publics' (1983: 105). This 'reflexive' portrayal of social action places a great deal of emphasis upon the consciousness of actors, and their capacity to choose to be in tune with the historical direction of the movement.

> The access of interpretation to identity is through the interrogation of forms of consciousness. This procedure can take the form of an examination of theories so long as the theories in question are those of the participants, produced for movements and, to an extent, within movements. While rarely up to the level of systematic social science, such theories or "ideologies" receive their importance precisely to the extent to which they help the crystallization of already-emergent identities (Cohen 1985: 666).

The approaches of Bookchin and Eckersley share much of the conceptual repertoire of the new social movement theorists, most notably the view of history in terms of the struggle between dominant and emancipatory social forces. Both authors seek to cover a similar range of social issues and political projects in their discussions to that covered by new social movement theories. The main difference is that they each seek to locate the kernel of transformative potential in a specifically ecological core of

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[15] In this sense, she concurs with the Habermasian ideal of progress towards a more rationally legitimated social order that is predicated upon the already significant achievements of the west, and its preferability to other social forms when assessed against standards of rationality.

green politics. Ecological interdependence, for Bookchin (1982), is the most appropriate template for efforts to transform the nature of social relations and political institutions, because ecological relationships are inherently non-hierarchical. Eckersley approaches the same point from a complementary angle, arguing that the environmental crisis brings to the surface of modern industrial societies a corresponding 'crisis of culture and character' which presents us with 'an opportunity for emancipation' (1992: 17).[16] According to Eckersley, the distinctiveness and novelty of ecocentric thought is not indicated by the social and political forms it criticises or supports. Ecocentric theory is significant because it offers a more encompassing basis for these justifications and critiques (1992: 31).

These green theorists are less concerned with charting an underlying historical trajectory, and more concerned to argue that an ecological rationality *should* be adopted in order to save the earth. It is this imperative for political action to be in tune with an ecological rationality that requires the consciousness and assent of social actors. Saving the earth is not only a matter of preventing the destruction of the earth's life support systems. The green project purports to be a project of emancipation from all forms of social domination.

Although there is a range of elements used to define this emancipatory logic or rationality, including socio-structural forces, economic conditions and the increasing scale of environmental degradation, the normative component of these definitions is crucial. The consciousness and self-understandings referred to by Cohen, Touraine, Bookchin and Eckersley are normative. The social arrangements that are associated with the new or alternative rationality - whether they be greater democratisation of civil society, the dismantling of technocratic sources of power, or the abolition of hierarchical structures - are arrangements which reasonable people (i.e.

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[16] By locating herself within the same broad emancipatory tradition as the likes of Cohen, Habermas and Bookchin, the thrust of Eckersley's argument then turns to differentiating an ecocentric brand of emancipatory thought from these other manifestations. The points of divergence between ecocentric theory and critical theory are covered in Chapter 5, while the differences between her position and Bookchin's eco-anarchism are addressed in Chapter 7 of *Environmentalism and Political Theory*.

those without vested interests in the status quo) would be expected to prefer on normative grounds. There may be significant differences over what constitutes an overarching normative standard, but all regard such criteria as part of the grounding for political analysis.

The other main exponent of a transformative characterisation of green politics, Robert Goodin, is concerned to distance himself from all of the above formulations, expressing scepticism that the themes of domination, liberation and emancipation provide an appropriate umbrella for all the orientations (1992: 73-6). He regards some components that are usually included as part of the green package, including the preference for radical participatory democracy, as broadly desirable but nevertheless optional adjuncts to the core of the green project.[17] This attempt to draw tighter boundaries around green politics, however, must be seen in the context of Goodin's wish to argue strongly for the logical coherence of the green package. By placing more stringent limits on what can be included in the package, he believes he is in a better position to argue for this coherence.

Even though he rejects emancipatory concepts, Goodin's version of green politics can be clearly considered as transformative, inasmuch as he is wont to claim that the logic of the green theory of value is at work in social and political processes. This is a claim that is largely constructed in the negative. Goodin repeatedly stresses that political actors who defy the logic of a unified green program by picking some elements but not others, will find that their 'chickens will come home to roost' (1992: 172).

> Still, if logic really is like that, then logical inconsistency will entail practical impossibility. If two things are logically incompatible, then any practical program that attempts to put them together is bound to come to grief. What is impossible in logic is (if we are operating with the right logic, one which actually maps the real world) impossible in the real world, as well. The inevitable consequence of inconsistent promises is incompatible policies (1992: 171-2).

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[17] Thus, Goodin regards only three of *die Grünen's* four basic principles as essential to the green project, namely ecological sustainability, social and economic justice and non-violence. Grassroots democracy, he argues, should be considered as a subsidiary element (1992: 88).

Goodin's version of green rationality is therefore largely constructed from what he regards as the dictates of analytical logic, rather than from any notion of historical telos. What he does share with the emancipatory theorists, however, is a notion of green rationality that contains a substantial normative component. Indeed, the moral component is the very foundation of logical coherence as '(w)hat.... makes the green political agenda form a peculiarly tight package is the fact that all the elements within it are informed by a single moral vision' (1992: 14). As with emancipatory theory, the green package requires the conscious assent of social actors, it will not come about without widespread political conversion. Thus, for Goodin, as for the other transformationalists, green moral consciousness is the essential foundation of green change.

The notion of value conflict, therefore, is implicit within transformational approaches. Social actors, structures and processes are assessed in terms of whether, and to what degree, they are in tune with either transformational forces, or the forces that resist transformational rationality. Social conflict is always a conflict between normatively defined antagonists, between progressive and regressive forces, between those who accept and adopt the new political rationality, and those who would obstruct or ignore it. Normative choice, conflict and consistency, then, are just as much part of the vocabulary of transformational approaches as they are of attributional analysis.

2.2.2. Normative Diagnosis

A central analytical prerogative of transformational approaches, therefore, is the capacity to assess the character of political actors, structures and processes against standards of normative rationality. Cohen asserts that there is only one rational identity 'that is compatible with the organizational form and conflict scenario of movements today' (1985: 667). How, then, does one diagnose whether particular actors, structures and processes are in tune with this rational identity? Just as with attributional approaches, we can start by listening to what political actors, and green movement actors in particular, have to say about their normative orientations.

Cohen claims that new social movement identities are frequently articulated by movement participants.

> Indeed, many of the actors interpret their actions as attempts to renew a democratic political culture and to reintroduce the normative dimension of social action into political life. This is the meaning of self-limiting radicalism (Cohen 1985: 670).

But as with cultural theory, trust in testimonial articulations of values is rather limited and circumscribed. As Alan Cribb has noted, critical theorists such as Cohen reserve the right to override normative self-interpretation from an objectively critical standpoint (Cribb 1991: 8).

Transformational approaches encounter the unreliability of value testimony in two senses. The first is the same type of issue dealt with in the above section on attributional approaches. Political actors who are clearly beyond the bounds of progressive forces are liable to adopt elements of the green movement's normative language. New social movements are regarded as embodying the logic of further democratisation through their calls for greater citizen participation in decision-making. If this is the case then calls for citizen initiated referenda that are made by a right-wing organisation such as the Citizens Electoral Council cannot be treated as authentic in the same way that the German grassroots democracy movement of the late 1970s would be. This type of noise corresponds with the supposedly disingenuous claims of anti-abortionists, or the deviant use of normative language by the National Front.

However, an additional issue which is more to the fore in transformational approaches is the persistence within the green movement of political action that is not in keeping with its inherent rationality.[18] This is a quite different type of noise, and transformational commentators demonstrate acute sensitivity to it. Goodin is concerned to separate the optional elements of green practice from the essential green identity. He regards the insistence some greens place on the elements such

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[18] This problem of noise is also somewhat relevant to attributional approaches with regard to their treatment of internal conflict between fundamentalists and realists, as I shall argue in Section 7.1.2. below.

as 'whole-earthism', spiritualism and mysticism, and exemplary green lifestyles, as amounting to 'green heresy' (1992: 78-83). Similarly, Touraine regarded the concerns within the movement to develop communitarian forms of actions and exemplary lifestyles as digressions from the movement telos. Touraine was keenly aware of currents within the anti-nuclear movement which ran counter to his analysis, particularly the communitarian stream. As such, he was determined to resist what he regarded as a retreat into the counterculture (1983: 46-55). In Cohen's framework, the normative identity of some movement participants are to be taken more seriously than others, as she regards the fundamentalist faction of the German Greens as irrational and destructive (1985: 667). Similarly, Eckersley's project is to enhance the ecocentric character of the green movement by taking issue with the persistence of anthropocentric modes of thought within its ranks.

Thus, the focus for normative diagnosis in transformational approaches has more to do with making distinctions within the category of social movement actors, than identifying movements in relief from the rest of the political environment. Transformational theorists are concerned to argue for the correct or the best interpretation from a plethora of competing alternatives within movements. For this reason, testimony of value orientations cannot be accorded too much weight. Identification with the green movement is not a sufficient indication of transformational potential.

Given the presence of resistant elements *among* those who identify with the green movement, how do these theorists propose to distinguish these elements, if testimony is problematic? Theorists sometimes stipulate items or issues in which a forced choice is to be made. Eckersley (1992: 29), for instance, identifies 'litmus test' issues, namely, human population growth and wilderness preservation, which serve as a basis for distinguishing between ecocentric and anthropocentric thought.[19]

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[19] According to Eckersley, '(t)he ecocentric stream of emancipatory thought is noted for its greater willingness to advocate not simply a lessening of the growth rate of the human population but also a long term *reduction* in human numbers' and its 'greater readiness to

However, this avenue is rarely pursued with any rigour. Most of these theorists do not make concerted attempts to police their boundaries of green identity. As I argue below, the significance of these efforts to identify truer expressions of green rationality has more to do with accounting for movement failures. The resistant elements within the movement are seen as significant when movement rationality is unfulfilled.

Transformational theorists, like their attributional counterparts, are keenly aware of the presence and persistence of noise that afflicts efforts to apply classifications of green politics in terms of values. But transformational theorists are equally dismissive of the noise that they encounter, and they adopt similar strategies to deal with it. The most commonly adopted form of dismissal is analogous to cultural theorists' charge of disingenuity. Those who adopt green normative language inappropriately will not prosper, so the story goes. Goodin presents the case that green values must be considered as an indivisible, all-or-nothing package, and that non-green actors are behaving inconsistently if they attempt to graft green elements on to non-green frameworks. As such, he offers the following warning to those who would indulge in such practices.

> There are grave implications for mainstream parties trying to steal the greens political thunder. They hope that, by adopting a few of the less demanding planks of the green agenda, they can buy off the greens. But if the green agenda really is logically as tightly unified as I have here been suggesting - if it really does all derive from one and the same theory of value, at root - then the strategy of piecemeal borrowing will be logically inconsistent as well as politically unacceptable (Goodin 1992: 92-3).

For the moment, we shall leave aside the question of in what circumstances such actions would be considered politically unacceptable, and by whom, not to mention the penalties that would be incurred for such deviance.[20] The significant feature of Goodin's statement is that the noise (adopting some green planks, but not others) is a problem for those

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advocate the setting aside of large tracts of wilderness, regardless of whether such preservation can be shown to be useful in some way to humankind' (1992: 29).

[20] Goodin does deal with these questions, albeit unsatisfactorily. See Section 7.3.3. below.

who produce it, and not a problem for the analytical framework that defines it as noise. The same device is used to deal with the noise that emanates from within the movement. Cohen claims that '(t)he resurgence of quasi-religious fundamentalisms within the contemporary movements demonstrates, if negatively, the cost of evading the available new identity: irrationalism and/or self-destruction' (1985: 666-7). According to Robyn Eckersley, the privileging of anthropocentric forms of green politics to the detriment of ecocentric themes, argues Eckersley, will have counterproductive effects.

> More generally, an anthropocentric framework is also likely to reinforce attitudes that are detrimental to the achievement of comprehensive environmental reform in the long run because human interests will systematically prevail over the interest of the non-human world (Eckersley 1990: 74).

We can also trace the theme of 'normative therapy' in some transformational approaches. Alain Touraine's sociological interventions in the French anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s took the form of attempting to bring militants to correct consciousness regarding the real nature of their political action in a manner that was strikingly analogous to Rokeach's suggestions for normative re-education.[21]

To sum up, even though attributional and transformational approaches to green politics come out of very different analytical traditions, there are remarkable similarities between them regarding the importance of diagnosing value orientations, and in the techniques used for doing so. Both types of approach are concerned to distinguish social actors according to the values they hold or to which they are committed. In doing so, these approaches encounter anomalous and ambiguous normative claims, which are characteristically accounted for in terms of normative inconsistency, irrationality or deviance.

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[21] Not surprisingly, Touraine's efforts were met with significant resistance from movement participants, as his own accounts testify (1983).

2.3. An Alternative Reading of Value Ambiguity

At this point it is worth considering where value distinctive analyses leads us. Secure in the knowledge that some anti-nuclear activists and anti-abortionists are mistaken in their interpretations of values, or that the National Front is blatantly deviant in its claims, or that some political parties adopt green values fraudulently, we can sit back and wait for the irrationalities and inconsistencies of their positions to become apparent, and the ineffectiveness of political strategies based upon these claims to be brought home to them. Hopefully, they may become aware of the error of their ways (a process in which social scientists or transformational theorists are well suited to assist), and change their behaviour accordingly. More pessimistically, they may continue to behave irrationally, confirming the power of non-rational motivations in the political process, or the difficulties involved in attempting to normatively educate the general public or a social movement constituency. Subsequently, we might turn our attention to why they persist in acting in such a way, and continue to lament the entrenched irrationality of politics.

In all these examples, the noise, however defined, is effectively excluded from serious consideration. My concern here is not to suggest more appropriate or plausible ways for dealing with empirical noise generated by distinctive value schemes. Nor is it my intention to offer further suggestions for how the normatively inconsistent are to be encouraged to admit the error of their ways. Such diagnoses, I believe, do not do justice to what is going on in these instances. They are blind to much that is interesting. In contrast, I wish to argue that the anomalous usage of values that is regarded as noise by value identity approaches should be considered as an indication of the *ambiguity* and *contestation* of values and normative discourse. In doing so I advocate an approach which places this value contestation and ambiguity firmly in the foreground of the study of values.

The National Front turns the accusation of prejudice against its accusers, the anti-nuclear movement contests the argument that nuclear weapons provide a basis for security. Anti-abortionists seek to counter arguments constructed on the basis of womens' rights. Apparently, both pro and anti-

abortionists regard 'rights' as appropriate criteria in their arguments. Apparent also is the National Front's professed lack of sympathy for prejudice, which they share with their opponents, and the common concern with security shared by supporters and opponents of nuclear weapons. In each example, the same value supports opposing interpretations. Security, rights and prejudice are part of a common political vocabulary in each of these disputes. The close connection between the normative language of each of these advocates and the language of the claims they oppose and contest indicates the ambiguity and flexibility of these values. What's more, the antagonists are not unaware of this flexibility. Each of these claims are made knowingly in the context of alternative claims made by opponents.

The examples above indicate that the interpretation of rights, security and prejudice are considered by the various protagonists as worth fighting over. In each case, an established normative interpretation is directly challenged. Certainly in two out of the three examples, the challenge has been successful to some degree. Established interpretations of the meaning of rights in the context of the abortion debate and the meaning of security in the debate about nuclear weapons have been rendered ambiguous. These examples draw our attention to the historically constructed and contingent nature of value interpretations. An understanding of values as objects of political contestation subject to the contingencies of political change and debate can be contrasted to the assumption of stable value interpretations characteristic of attributional approaches. Such an approach, therefore, presents value ambiguity in quite a different light. Contestation of value interpretations is to be expected, and this must be taken into account in any understanding of political, social and cultural conflict and change.[22]

The ambiguous articulation of values is not limited to these combative contexts in which established interpretations are directly challenged.

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[22] Murray Edelman is one author who regards competing normative interpretations of specific events as definitive of politics. Events and issues that have political significance are those that evoke conflicting normative interpretations (Edelman 1988: 104).

Wayne's justification for his political activities in terms of the protection of individual freedom is deviant in terms of many of the value distinctive frameworks, particularly that of cultural theory. According to Bellah et al's interpretation, which emphasises the overlap, continuity and commonality of American middle class values, there is nothing surprising in such articulations, because Wayne the radical activist, in common with 'yuppies', psychotherapists and self-professed patriots shares a 'common moral language' of individualism (Bellah et al. 1985: 20). This raises the suggestion that shared values do not entail shared interpretations, as the commonly articulated values are deployed in a tremendously wide variety of contexts.

The case for taking value ambiguity seriously can be best illustrated if we consider those values which are prominent in contemporary political discourse. Evaluative criteria such as freedom, democracy and human rights have generated a plethora of interpretations and continue to do so. Attempts to pin down the essential meanings of these values have continually proven to be problematic. The problems in defining these concepts, however, bear little relation to their political efficacy. It is possible to regard this very flexibility of interpretation as a mark of their 'success' as basic values, as political claims continue to be formulated and reformulated in terms of these values. In late twentieth century international politics, few if any political actors publicly argue against the concept of human rights, though they will dispute its implications in particular circumstances. Such disputes, however, reinforce the political potency of the value, ensuring its status as something worth attaching political claims to. It is more plausible, for instance, to argue that the success of the value of human rights, exemplified by its incarnation as a United Nations Universal Declaration signed by most of the world's nation states, rests upon its capacity to support a variety of interpretations rather than its descriptive precision. The political leverage of concepts such as human rights may well be a product of their ambiguity.

The crucial elements of all the examples that is overlooked in value identity approaches is that all these value claims are made in the context of political argument, and that in advancing these claims, the protagonists

in these arguments are attempting to portray their own stances as normatively legitimate, often to the same audiences. Once these factors are taken into account, the ambiguity of value use no longer appears as the messy byproduct of imprecise language. Instead, it can be regarded as an expected feature of political discourse. The relationship between politics and values in such disputes is not that the antagonists in each of these disputes have different values, as Inglehart and Wildavsky suggest, but that the same values are used to support opposing stances. On this basis, attempts to make definitive interpretations of the links between values and specific actions and events would appear to miss the point, particularly if they are made as part of an effort to resolve or avoid contentious interpretations.

By assuming the contingency and contestability of value interpretations, one need not claim that there is no stability, or that there can be no boundaries to the meanings and interpretations of values. Some interpretations appear as more acceptable than their alternatives, and others sink without trace or are generally dismissed as outrageous. It would be generally considered unusual, for instance, to hear of physical torture being justified by reference to human rights, and it would raise more than a few eyebrows if the Catholic Church were to portray itself as an egalitarian organisation. But any such restrictions are indications of the historical and contextual contingencies of value usage and articulation that emerge out of social practice, rather than indicating the boundaries of essential meanings of human rights and egalitarianism. The claim that the National Front is not prejudiced, and that its critics are, would seem to be just as eyebrow raising, yet it serves to emphasise that taken for granted normative interpretations are actually contested. It may be that the NF's interpretation is considered as outrageous by most people who recognise the term 'prejudice', and it also may be true that the Front would abandon this line if it doesn't catch on or attracts more damaging criticism from its opponents. However, such prognoses should not preclude the possibility that this inversion of prejudice *could* be taken more seriously by more people in differing social and political conditions.

Thus, treating ambiguity of values as something to be expected does not rule out the identification of taken for granted, or established interpretations of values, but it serves as both an encouragement to investigate the conditions under which such establishment developed, and a reminder that even the most established interpretations may be subject to contestation at some point in time. Whether or not particular interpretations are contested or not, and if they are, under what circumstances and by whom, are worthwhile issues that can be further explored.

Many of the comments made in the above discussion of value inconsistency in political discourse are also applicable to the forms of normative deviance within social movements that concern transformationalists. If shared values do not imply shared interpretations of values, what does this tell us about processes of identity formation in social movements? Just as interpretations of human rights are politically contested in the international diplomatic community, we can also consider values such as participatory democracy, autonomy and ecology as ambiguous and politically contested *within* the green movement, and begin to describe emergent green value interpretations in the same terms of contingency and contestability.

Although most transformational approaches are generally mindful of the social processes involved in defining value implications, their accounts of such processes still carry with them the labelling of the different elements of movements as progressive or regressive, rational or irrational, enlightened or resistant. The suggestion that some interpretations of rights, democracy and autonomy are closer to a truth which is constantly being approached or revealed, and that some forms of political action are more in tune with an inherent logic, should be treated with the same scepticism directed at attributional approaches that posit objective standards of value interpretation.

The questions I raise about transformational value identity frameworks are of the same type that William Connolly raises in a more general way about the construction and maintenance of ethically derived identities. The transformational formulations elaborated above are instances of

'(t)he consolidation of identity through the constitution of difference' (Connolly 1991: 9). Connolly asks us to consider the side effects of these identity constructions such as the invention and proliferation of categories of deviance and techniques and therapies of intervention that are necessary to protect the integrity of identities. These tendencies are clearly evident in the above constructions of Cohen, Eckersley, Goodin and Touraine. One noticeable side effect, Connolly argues, is the tendency to suppress ambiguous instances that threaten the boundaries of identity.

If we take value ambiguity seriously, new light is shed on the problems identified in Chapter 1. Consider the seemingly paradoxical suggestion that greens identify themselves in terms of values as a device for dealing with their diversity. The existence of a common moral language among social movements, or within particular social movements may be a means by which attention is deflected from the significant ideological and programmatic differences among participants. Consider also the possibility that value conflict is a consequence of defining one's political and social project in terms of shared values. If values are located at the core of identity, then this is sufficient reason to suggest that value interpretation constitutes significant stakes in internal political conflicts.

Such possibilities call for a methodological abandonment of using values as the basis of drawing distinctions between social and political categories. In doing so, however, many new analytical avenues are opened. Some of these possibilities have been explored under the rubric of genealogies of morals and ethics. Genealogies trace the emergence of ethical and normative categorisations and reveal the contingent and constructed features of normative abnormality (Connolly 1991; Foucault 1977; Minson 1985). Typically genealogies seek to attack conventional or common sense normative categories by tracing the historical points at which ambiguities were buried.

I wish to pursue another path that is opened up by the acknowledgement of ambiguity. My interest, in contrast to the broadly historical focus of genealogies, is in contemporary settings where contestation over the use and application of normative categories is prevalent. As I demonstrate in Chapters 5-7, attempts to establish green political parties provide

appropriate examples of settings where there is much normative contestation. Values are both the tools and the objects of political conflict in this arena. Social scientists and transformational theorists are not the only ones who speak a language of value choice, conflict and identity and so construct standards of value irrationality. These terms are prevalent in green political discourse as well. Just as in attributional value studies, green value discourse creates the empirical noise of inappropriate value usage and inconsistent behaviour. Just as in transformational theory, much green political activity is regarded by other greens as normatively deficient. A question to be pursued in the latter part of the thesis concerns how greens interpret the presence and persistence of the normative misfits that their categories create.

2.4. Conclusion

The main methodological point arising from this chapter is that it is worthwhile suspending analytical standards of value rationality and consistency. French anti-nuclear activists who wish to critique technocratic decision-making *and* explore communal lifestyles, need not be regarded as inconsistent. Fundamentalist currents of social movements need not be construed as irrational. This is not to say that these activists will not strike problems in their attempts to act on the basis of their normative ideals. As I will demonstrate in the latter part of the thesis, there are characteristic frustrations and tensions that are associated with green normative identity. My point for the moment is that it is simply not necessary or helpful to trace these difficulties to the failure of participants to act in accordance with coherent normative frameworks. I would posit, on the contrary, that the political impact of the green movement has little to do with normative coherence. That is another argument to be pursued throughout the thesis. The task of the following chapter is to demonstrate that the ambiguity of value discourse can be harnessed to construct a rather different framework for analysing highly normative forms of political activity.

Chapter 3: A Rhetorical Approach to Values

The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a methodology for analysing the political role of values that takes ambiguity and contestation seriously. In order to find an appropriate methodology, it has been necessary to go beyond the sociological and political science literature that deals with values, most of which is tied to one or other of the approaches outlined in the previous chapter. Weber's notion of the unintended consequences of normative rationality is an idea worth pursuing further, but such follow up has been scant. Similar frustrations with the analytical practices of identifying actors on the basis of their values, beliefs, attitudes or opinions have been articulated by Michael Billig in the field of social psychology. His questioning of these standard tools of social psychological research led to an interest in the rhetorical dimension of attitudes, opinions and values.

From Billig's investigations into the art of argumentative rhetoric, a rather different image of values is suggested to that which is characteristic of value identity approaches. From a rhetorical perspective, values constitute a powerful type of good reason that can be deployed in the articulation of argumentative claims. This conceptualisation of values is appealing because it treats the ambiguity and contestation of value interpretations as highly significant. As we shall see, a rhetorical approach even suggests that this ambiguity is a crucial rhetorical property of values.

The first part of this chapter is dedicated to developing some of the key concepts of a rhetorical approach, and exploring many of the theoretical insights contained in such an approach. The middle part of this chapter deals with the various ways in which values are juxtaposed against other types of 'good reasons' such as practicality and self-interest. The final section shows how insights from a rhetorical perspective can inform sociological investigations of political action. This prepares the groundwork for a different account of the relationship between values and green politics which I shall pursue in Chapter 4.

3.1. The Rhetorical Approach

The central theme of a rhetorical approach is the investigation of practices of justification and criticism. These can be considered as key features of political communication and discourse. Over the past decade or so, there has been an increasing interest, apparent in the humanities and social sciences, in the subject of rhetoric. In the United States, there has been interest in the role of rhetoric in the production of knowledge in the social sciences. An eclectic collection of work around this theme was published in 1987 (Nelson, Megill & McCloskey 1987). The term has also been taken up by Michael Billig as a key to the understanding of such things as attitudes, opinions and values (1987; 1991). Other authors such as John Shotter (1989) and Jeffrey Minson (1989) emphasise, in very different ways, the significance of rhetoric to the formation of ethics. The common heritage of this approach includes Kenneth Burke's *A Rhetoric of Motives*, which first appeared in 1950, and Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's *The New Rhetoric* which was first published in French in the late 1950s and translated into English around a decade later.

The common concern of these writers has been to highlight the rhetorical dimension of all types of discourse. Thus, any discourse, be it conducted in the public sphere, or restricted to the boundaries of scientific communities, workplaces and religious communities, involves rhetorical reasoning. Drawing upon the work of historians of science such as Thomas Kuhn, the contributors to the Nelson collection illustrate the role of rhetorical reasoning in the production of the knowledge of both the natural and human sciences and the dissemination of that knowledge to wider publics. Billig's analyses of the rhetorical dimension of discourse ranges from case studies of specific organisations such as the Young Conservatives and the National Front in Britain, to the investigation of everyday discourse and common sense.

3.1.1. Rhetoric and Argument

Central to the rhetorical approach is the assumption that rhetoric refers to *all* forms of justification and criticism. Rhetoric is not considered inferior to rational arguments. Thus, the investigation of rhetorical dimension of communication and discourse is not intended as a strategy to invalidate

claims that are made. Nor is the object of the exercise to clear away the undergrowth of rhetoric in order to make a path for the bulldozer of rational reason. Rather, the revival in the study of rhetoric is part of a wider challenge to the superiority of objective, decontextualised standards of rationality. This is associated with a more general concern to rehabilitate pragmatic, contextualised and 'partial' forms of reasoning (Leff 1987; Toulmin 1990). This approach seeks to salvage the concept from the cliché of 'mere and empty rhetoric'. This rehabilitative effort is directed against images of rhetoric as the ugly sister of rational forms of argument (McGee & Lyne 1987), or the country cousin of ethics (Minson 1989). Rhetorical approaches instead treat claims to rationality as a particular 'topic' of rhetoric.[1]

In support of this project, authors such as Burke and Billig have reappropriated many of the insights into political communication contained in classical treatises on the art of rhetoric, as elaborated by Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. My scope of interest in this thesis is somewhat more limited. The area of rhetoric opens up some interesting possibilities for considering values in terms other than those in which they are characteristically treated. To this end, I draw mainly from concepts elaborated by Burke, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Billig, bearing in mind that many of the ideas contained in these works can be traced back much further.

Rhetorical communication covers the ambit of criticism and justification. For every justificatory or critical claim that is made, an alternative claim is implicitly or explicitly acknowledged. Argumentative positions are not defined in a vacuum, but in relation to competing claims. Thus, it follows that in order to make sense of a particular position, knowledge of the alternative proposition(s) is crucial. The importance of the argumentative

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[1] The challenge is advanced by investigating the rhetoric of antirhetoric, namely the ways in which the case for dismissing alternatives to logic and scientific method are advanced rhetorically. By suggesting that the deployment of standards of universal truth and objectivity is itself a rhetorical practice, students of rhetoric are critical of such claims to objectivity in as much as they deny or forget that their claims are constructed rhetorically (Leff 1987).

context of claims is underlined when we consider the difficulties of interpreting rhetorical discourse when the opposing position is not readily apparent. To the contemporary western ear, the claim that an infinite number of angels can dance upon the head of a pin sounds incredibly obtuse. It helps to know that such an argument engaged a competing claim that there was a limit to the number of angels, and that this conclusion had some serious theological implications regarding the extent of God's power.

The advancement of an argument involves advocating a position defined in contrast to alternative positions. However, this does not mean that alternative positions must already be articulated in order for new arguments to emerge. The articulation of novel arguments may well invent the opposing position at the same time. Novel arguments may also be advanced against positions that previously have not been defended because they have been regarded as obvious, self-evident or as things which 'go without saying'. These positions may only find active and articulate defenders once the initial challenge has been made. The suggestion that the sun and planets revolved around the earth required a defence only once it had been argued that all the planets revolve around the sun. One of the most significant achievements of the environmental movement has been its success in moving the goal of economic growth from the status of an indisputable political objective to one which now needs to be defended in many contexts.

3.1.2. Audiences

Rhetoric, as a form of communication, involves a speaker (or writer) and an audience. In order to emphasise the rhetorical dimension of communication, I follow the lead of both Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and Billig in referring to the speaker as an 'orator' who addresses an audience in the process of making argumentative claims. The audience occupies a central role in a rhetorical approach. Indeed, we can identify a number of specific settings in which orators and audiences regard their relationship as defined principally in terms of rhetorical performance. The orator's performance is judged within a set of relatively well known and well defined parameters that relate to the characteristics of each type of

audience. Forums such as parliament, the courtroom and the debating society spring to mind here. Of course, audiences are not limited to such settings, as any form of communication involves some sort of audience. They can range in size from one person to an international television audience of billions. Some audiences are constituted for no more than five minutes, whereas others persist for centuries.

At this point then, an important distinction needs to be made between what we might call the 'actual' audience who witness the orator's addresses and the audience assumed or 'imagined' by the orator. The two may well coincide, and classical treatises on rhetoric emphasise the importance of making accurate assumptions about an audience. Nevertheless, a separation is warranted. There may be, for example, circumstances in which the orator can at best only guess the nature of her audience. This is typified by the street corner orator addressing a fluid and variable public. However, even in settings in which an orator makes relatively safe and accurate assessments of his audience, the distinction between the actual and imagined audiences should still be made. The actual audience may react quite differently than the orator may have hoped. Communication between an orator and an audience may enable the orator to adjust her assumptions in reaction to audience responses.

As both Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and Billig argue, in order to prepare the groundwork for persuading an audience, it is necessary for the orator to establish commonalities between herself and the audience. The communicative priority of any orator, according to Kenneth Burke, is to establish an *identification* with an audience (Burke 1969). The orator must indicate to the audience that he is 'one of them', 'on their side', or 'has their interests at heart'. Relations of commonality can be defined according to characteristics such as place of residence, political affiliation, ethnicity, gender, recreational hobbies, language, generation or favourite TV show. The construction of an imagined audience identity may be limited to a particular occasion, such as in the case of a funeral eulogy, or it may draw upon well established constructions of identity such as nation or religion.

By stressing the importance of audience commonality, the rhetorical approach does not ignore the heterogeneity of audiences. On the contrary, diversity within audiences takes on much significance in shaping assumptions about commonality. Differences between elements of the imagined audiences need to be taken into account in order to assume common characteristics. Information about the range of diversity of audiences is therefore significant for orators in their attempts to establish commonality. If one is speaking on industrial relations to an audience that includes both unionists and employers, the repertoire of good reasons might include economic growth, 'best practices', and the need to attract investment. We would expect the scope and content of the rhetorical repertoire, however, to be significantly different if the audience consisted of only one of these groups. Indeed, orators frequently address a number of audiences or sub-audiences simultaneously. These multiple audiences can create both problems and potentials for the orator. The parliamentarian ostensibly addresses both the parliament and the public, and to this we could add the press gallery and the parliamentarian's own party as identifiable audiences in the mind of the orator. Orators need to be careful that in making connections with particular audiences, they do not inadvertently alienate others.

A significant type of imagined audience is that which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call the 'universal audience'. Invocations of the universal audience are evident when the orator is concerned to deny the particularism of his claims. Phrases such as 'any reasonable person would agree', 'objective validity', 'human nature' and 'God's will' are forms of common sense appeals to audiences deemed to be unencumbered by partial perspectives. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca put it, '(a)rgumentation addressed to a universal audience must convince the reader that the reasons adduced are of a compelling character, that they are self-evident, and possess an absolute and timeless validity, independent of local or historical contingencies' (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 32). The rhetorical force of such appeals, of course, depends upon the audience members' willingness to identify themselves as part of such a universal audience, rather than their capacity to reach the particular conclusions

being proposed (this may require revelation or technical competence, for instance).

Universal audiences should be treated as historically and contextually contingent constructions in the same way as any audience defined in particularist terms. The appeal of arguments invoking Nature, God or Truth are no less products of historical and social construction than appeals to national, sectional or class interests. There are countless examples in which these particularist categories, such as class, nation and religion, are characteristically 'universalised' by those who invoke them in order to bolster their arguments.

Having outlined some of the considerations to be taken into account by the orator in her imagination of an audience, there is an additional element that is integral to any rhetorical context. Not only are there those who are to be persuaded, there are also those who are located beyond the boundaries of persuasion: those who are to be ignored, alienated or provoked. These two components of the imagined audience are closely interconnected. Identification with an audience identity simultaneously constructs a category which is outside the bounds of that identity, a shadow cast by the light of identity. As well as paying attention to the 'we', the audience to whom the orator appeals, the picture is not complete without considering the rhetorical 'they' which is created at the same time. An audience identified as Australian invokes the state of 'non-Australianness'; an audience identified as 'concerned parents' calls into being those who are unconcerned. Even the most universalist constructs of audiences have in mind a contrasting category which collects the chaff once the wheat has been separated. Appeals to 'all reasonable people' suggests the possibility of unreasonable people who are beyond persuasion. Similarly, God's will is not intended appeal to those who are beyond redemption, while the term 'natural' alerts us to the existence of unnatural behaviours. Any construction of identity is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive.

Identification of the commonality that binds an audience defines the scope of rhetorical resources available to the orator. Billig uses the term 'common sense' to denote a repertoire of shared standards of evaluative

criteria that can be used in order to identify with or persuade an audience. The contents of this repertoire are what Billig refers to as 'the seeds of arguments' that orators can draw upon (1987: 196-7). The rhetorical deployment of common sense usually does not require justification, due to its taken-for-granted character.

Particular audiences are associated with particular repertoires of common sense. We might, for example, identify elements of the common sense of Seventh-Day Adventists, or of members of the Canberra press gallery, or of electric guitarists. Clearly, what is taken for granted by any one of these audiences will often be problematic or irrelevant to other audiences. In order to illustrate this feature, I will use the case of the anti-abortion activists as a useful example. Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky describe their campaigners as attempting to 'discomfort their prochoice opponents and appeal to those on the fence'. In setting the scene in this way, they inadvertently draw our attention to the fact that these activists are engaged in the activity of addressing a particular audience. This audience could be a parliamentary committee, or it may be a national television audience. Imagine a different context in which the anti-abortionists are speaking at a church meeting, in order to rally support for their political activities. We would not be surprised if no mention of rights was made in this context at all, and that arguments were drawn from themes such as church teaching or the word of God. Such arguments are the type which Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky would consider consonant with hierarchical values.

Need this difference in normative language deployed in the two contexts indicate inconsistency, bad faith or disingenuity on the part of the right-to-life activists? Quite clearly, the two arguments are directed towards different audiences in different argumentative contexts. Rather than focusing on the character of those advancing the arguments, this crucial difference suggests that it would be a good idea to pay more attention to the character of the audiences. Rather than gravitating to an analysis of the normative character of individuals and groups, a rhetorical approach shifts the focus of attention to the shared evaluative standards of audiences. For example, a particular individual may be employed as an

engineer, as well as being part of a church congregation, a shareholder in a public company and a member of a municipal council. As a result, this individual is potentially part of audiences constructed according to quite different assumptions.

If we adopt this audience-based focus, then the 'varying' behaviour of the anti-abortionists no longer appears as odd or perplexing. In both the public forum and the church meeting, the anti-abortionist arguments draw on standards of common sense. In the first case, the language of rights was used in order to appeal to the general public or policy makers, while in the second, a select range of themes was deployed in a setting in which the speakers could reasonably assume them to be salient. The language of rights may be less appropriate in the second setting than the language of Christian authority, but these Christian values are even more likely to be counterproductive when addressed to the general public, or when directed to an audience of policy makers. Audience diversity shapes the repertoire of common sense that can be used. The language of rights can be considered as useful precisely because it enables orators to address a broad and diverse constituency.

Appeals to common sense leave plenty of scope for rhetorical manoeuvre. The crucial element of Billig's argument is that common sense repertoires should not be regarded as internally coherent systems of thought. On the contrary, Billig suggests that it is worthwhile to think of any stock of common sense as containing numerous conflicting themes. Billig uses the term 'dilemma' to denote contradictory themes that co-exist within common sense rhetorical repertoires (Billig 1987: 207), and argues that dilemmas are embedded in language. The dilemmatic aspect of common sense is apparent in situations in which elements of the repertoire are used to support opposing evaluations. For instance, a parent may be faced with a choice between allowing and preventing their child to take part in a potentially dangerous bushwalking expedition. On one side of the argument, caution and prudence could be drawn from parental common sense to justify not allowing the child to go. On the other hand, the encouragement of independence could be drawn from the same common sense repertoire. Within this parental repertoire, prudence may be given a

rather different quality as over-protectiveness, and independence could be portrayed as recklessness. This 'double-sided' character of motives is a familiar resource to the professionally trained rhetorician, and is referred to by Kenneth Burke as the 'proving of opposites' (1969: 25). Instead of providing unambiguous solutions to dilemmas, common sense plays a significant role in the construction of dilemmatic circumstances. The sharing of a repertoire of common sense, therefore, is not in any way to be mistaken for consensus of interpretation.

3.2. Values and Rhetoric

Values loom particularly large in the discussion of rhetorical common sense repertoires for Billig and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. According to the latter authors, '(v)alues enter, at some stage or other, into every argument' adding that speakers 'appeal to values in order to induce the hearer to make certain choices rather than others and, most of all, to justify those choices so that they may be accepted and approved by others' (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 75). Similarly, Billig contends that values 'constitute elements of common-sense whose truth or desirability is taken for granted' (Billig 1987: 210). Values, when they are used to establish commonality with an audience, are a powerful rhetorical device.[2]

3.2.1. The Rhetorical Ambiguity of Values

Shared values are key resources used to forge identity and define commonality with an audience. Once again, such a formulation should not be mistaken as assuming audience homogeneity. According to the rhetorical reading of values, shared values do not in any way imply political consensus. In fact, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca interpret the significance of shared values differently by arguing that the usefulness of shared values is a product of their generality. The rhetorical force of

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[2] Taken-for-granted values are, of course, not the only ways in which values are invoked rhetorically. An orator may argue why certain values should be considered more or less important than they are. However, in such circumstances, these values are not used as the means of identifying with an audience.

values depends on 'their content not be(ing) specified; as soon as we try to go into details, we meet only the adherence of particular audiences' (1969: 76). It is worth quoting them at length.

> It is thus by virtue of their being vague that these values appear as universal values and lay claim to a status similar to that of facts. To the extent that they are precisely formulated, they are simply seen to conform to the aspirations of particular groups. Their role is accordingly to justify choices on which there is not unanimous agreement by inserting these choices in a sort of empty frame with respect to which a wider agreement exists. Though this agreement is reached over an empty form, it is nonetheless of considerable significance: it is evidence of the fact that one has decided to transcend particular agreements, at least in intention, and that one recognizes the importance attaching to the universal agreement which these values make it possible to achieve (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 76).

This is a long way from the image of shared values found in attributional approaches, and leads to some very different interpretations of the role of values in politics. As the passage indicates, simply invoking a shared value does not imply that an audience will agree upon the appropriateness of its use in a specific argumentative context. Consider a politician arguing for a health policy which gives more precedence to private rather than public provision of health services. This politician may choose to justify this policy to a public audience on the basis of its capacity to enhance the individual's freedom to choose. Among the audience, however, there may be pro-choice campaigners who conclude that such a policy would limit the availability of low cost abortions. Although these elements of the audience may reject the particular interpretation, this does not mean that they dispute the desirability of freedom of choice.

Applications of common sense values among communities and audiences should therefore be treated as contestable constructs rather than givens. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca illustrate the constructivist process by considering how the meanings of values are negotiated in political settings.

> Ambiguous notions present the person who uses them with difficulties whose solution calls for a handling of concepts, for a decision on how they are to be understood in a given case. This decision, once agreed upon, results in a clarification of the notion in certain of its uses in which it can exercise the role of a technical notion. A notion seems clear

> enough so long as one sees no situation in which it would lend itself to differing interpretations. When such a situation arises, the notion becomes obscure, but after a decision as to its univocal application it will seem clearer than it was before *on condition that this decision is unanimously accepted*, if not by everybody, at least by all the members of a specialized, scientific or juridical group (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 135, emphasis in original).

This implies that value interpretations are objects of political dispute, and that some form of decision-making is often required in situations in which multiple interpretations are problematic. Consider the context of nineteenth century American debates about slavery in which both sides deployed the value of freedom to support opposing positions. The state of Texas argued that it should be free to maintain slavery. In cases in which ambiguous interpretations are resolved one way or the other, the resolution can be considered as a licensed interpretation among the audience or community, whereas the defeated interpretation has been definitively ruled out. But such licensing and specification also has the potential to undermine the rhetorical potency of a value and/or redraw the boundaries of the target audience.

If it has been unambiguously linked to a particular implication, policy, or decision as opposed to another, a value may lose its capacity to have any other meanings and implications. For example, the tight connection between socialism and the state ownership of the means of production effectively tied the rhetorical effectiveness of socialism in public debate in the west to the fortunes of policies of state ownership. It is no coincidence that attempts since 1989 to reinvigorate and rehabilitate the concept of socialism do so by arguing the independence of socialist ideals from state ownership (Hindess 1991).[3] When a value becomes inextricably tied to a particular position, opposition to that position may be transformed into opposition to the value. In which case, the value is no longer shared by the disputants.

If common sense is dilemmatic, this has significant ramifications for how we think about value systems. We should not assume that common values constitute a coherent set of normative orientations. Far from it.

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[3] See the debates in the November 1991 edition of *Economy and Society*.

Value conflict, according to this reading, need not refer only to conflict between competing value systems or political ideologies, but as a dynamic that operates within value repertoires (Billig et al. 1988: 157). It is not unusual to find the co-existence of seemingly opposite value standards within a particular value repertoire.[4] Billig and his colleagues illustrate the pervasiveness of dilemmas framed by the tension between equality and expertise in educational, health and social work organisational and occupational settings (Billig et al. 1988: Ch 5). Both expertise and equality are important elements of the value repertoires of social workers, teachers and health semi-professionals. Managers of superannuation funds face pervasive dilemmas between investment safety and the importance of high returns. It is not necessary to suggest that there is anything 'inherently' contradictory in any of these pairings, just that they can be, and are frequently deployed on opposing sides of arguments. In other circumstances, both elements of these respective pairs can also be deployed on the same side of an argument.

3.2.2. Values and Other Types of Reasons

Under the rhetorical approach discussed above, values are only one type of rhetorical criteria deployed by orators. An interesting area of investigation, therefore, is the relationship between values and other sorts of 'good reasons'. By this I mean investigating argumentative contexts in which values are juxtaposed against other types of reasons. Values are not necessarily regarded as the best sort of reasons in numerous argumentative contexts. It is possible to identify a whole range of rhetorical commonplaces which can be drawn upon to 'devalue values'. The most prominent rhetorical competitors to values in contemporary political debate include criteria of technical rationality, practicality and self-interest.

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[4] Chapter 6 provides an illustration of this point, exploring implications of the co-existence of the values of unity and diversity within the green normative political framework.

3.2.2.1. Values and Technical Rationality

The rhetorical practices of the scientific method are built upon the superiority of facts and technical criteria as good reasons. Scientists do not publish journal articles on the basis of demonstrating that a particular conclusion is normatively preferable. Such reasons may at times be admissible, but only as supports for conclusive scientific evidence. In relation to values, a particularly influential element of scientific common sense has been the superiority of objective facts over values, in which the latter are deemed to be subjective and therefore not subject to verification. Alan Cribb (1991) has shown how this assumption provided the central plank for justifying the 'value free' approach to social sciences in general, and comparative politics in particular, during the 1950s and 1960s. Among the most strident expressions of the superiority of facts over values was the behaviorist treatment of values and normative commitments as the object of scientific investigation (Cribb 1991: 31-2). In a rather selective interpretation of Weber's dictum that value choices cannot be rationally justified, values are reduced to irrational expressions of emotional states that have no legitimate role in the formation of judgements.

This rhetorical image of technical rationality has had wide political applications. One familiar form stipulates appropriate modes of political decision-making in which decisions are taken dispassionately, on the basis of the facts at hand. Values get in the way of rational decision-making because they introduce non-rational or irrational elements into the decision-making process. This form of rhetoric is not restricted to audiences who are assumed to possess technical competence, if the orator establishes audience identity based upon trust in scientific and technically rational expertise. Another common way of juxtaposing facts and values is to claim that the latter are derived from, and subordinate to the former. The anti-nuclear movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s frequently used the rhetorical technique of presenting the facts about nuclear power and nuclear arms as sufficient basis for negative normative evaluation (Downey 1986).

In other rhetorical circumstances, however, facts are trumped by values. Three closely related ways of turning the tables are readily drawn from

rhetorical repertoires. The most established of these is the commonplace that technical rationality is associated with normatively distasteful consequences. Commentators writing in the aftermath of World War II, such as Kenneth Burke, were particularly sensitive to the use of scientistic justifications of atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime. Nazi science provided a powerful image supporting the contention that science should not be granted the autonomy from values. Such examples are frequently used to justify the subjection of scientific practice to normative and ethical evaluation.

The image of technical rationality as good servant, but bad master, has been influential in social theory. In particular, critical theory has sought to keep technical rationality in check and ensure its integration into the more comprehensive project of human emancipation. Ian Hunter (1992) observes contemporary expressions of this relationship between technical and normative reason in the language of critiques of bureaucratic practices. Deficiencies are identified in terms of the bureaucratic abandonment of moral responsibilities associated with the headlong pursuit of technical efficiencies.[5] Hence, the antipathy towards dispassionate modes of decision-making, particularly in regard to issues such as the closure of hospitals and schools, and cutting the size of the public sector in general. Hard-headed rationalism serves as an indication of moral callousness rather than political responsibility, given that ethical considerations are explicitly excluded from the decision-making calculus.

More recently, the supposed amorality of technical rationality has been subject to sustained attack on the basis that facts and values cannot be distinguished from each other so easily. According to this rhetorical commonplace, values play a significant role in defining what can be considered as facts. Facts cannot speak for themselves, but must be mediated through normatively loaded language. Following this line it becomes possible to construe values as a more honest and authentic type of reason. Facts are suspect because they can be deployed as screens which

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[5] For a classic example of this type of argument, see (Pusey 1991: 169-181).

improperly conceal normative orientations. It can also be argued that claims to value neutrality are actually normative, regardless of whether this is acknowledged by those advocate it.

3.2.2.2. Values and Pragmatic Rationality

Another type of criteria regularly counterposed against values is that of practicality or pragmatic rationality. The circumstances in which arguments based upon practicality could be expected to prevail over reasons derived from normative principles would cover a wide range of political contexts. Politically, a partially acceptable policy or statute that can be implemented and enforced may well be regarded as preferable to a policy with better normative credentials but less chance of effective implementation. The same type of calculation is a feature of settings in which it is necessary to form coalitions with other political actors in order to achieve a particular outcome. When such changes are interpreted as reducing the normative credentials, the practical evaluative criteria of 'something is better than nothing' comes into play. One might argue that the bounds of what is to be considered ethical are set by perceived range of practicable possibilities.

Political decision-making is frequently shaped by the need to provide practical or workable solutions to conflicts which are highly charged and irresolvable in terms of values. In contexts where the clash of values is the heart of the political problem, practical criteria provide a means of taking the heat out of such conflicts. The pursuit of practical solutions to political conflicts between proponents of incompatible value claims may often necessitate compromise. Any achievement of such compromise signifies that 'peaceful' political outcomes have precedence over commitment to principles.[6]

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[6] Perhaps the paradigmatic case here is the unprincipled but practical mechanisms that evolved in response to the religious wars of seventeenth century Germany which brought into being the Prussian political-administrative apparatus with its 'amoral' reasons of state (raison d'etat) (Koselleck 1988).

However, the rhetorical relationship between values and practicality can also work the other way. For instance, faithfulness to Christian moral principles may override considerations of practicality in decisions regarding student access to information about contraception in a denominational school. It is not difficult to imagine the circumstances in which integrity of these principles carries more rhetorical weight than the admission that such information would in all likelihood reduce the incidence of teenage pregnancies and abortions. It is also worth considering the negative image of compromise, in contrast to that presented above. Compromise is frequently associated with less than complimentary connotations such as betrayals and surrenders. Anti-pragmatic rhetorical commonplaces express distaste for 'doing deals' and 'sell-outs'. Deal-making is distasteful precisely because normatively principled positions are sacrificed for practical outcomes. Here, the refusal to compromise signifies the triumph of one's conscience or value commitments over more practical considerations.

There is also a well established cultural link in the west in which practical reasons are regarded as 'worldly' temptations. These are precisely the kinds of reasons that the morally educated should regard with a high degree of suspicion, and perhaps eschew altogether. Weber identified this as a characteristic habit of the cultural category he called religious intellectuals.

> It is the intellectual who conceives of the "world" as a problem of meaning..... As a consequence, there is a growing demand that the world and the total pattern of life be subject to an order that is significant and meaningful. The conflict of this requirement of meaningfulness with the empirical realities of the world and its institutions, and with the possibilities of conducting one's life in the empirical world, are responsible for the intellectual's characteristic flight from the world (Weber 1968: 506).

Under such a framework, it is to be expected that practical modes of action will be found to be unethical, and that withdrawal from the realm of worldly action is the only possible way of living a life of principled integrity.

3.2.2.3. Values and Self-interest

Another prominent and long established rhetorical sparring partner for values is that of self-interest. Argumentative settings in which interests characteristically constitute better reasons than values are those where audiences are actually defined in terms of common interests. Where common interests constitute identity, it is unlikely that any other type of reason would take priority over the collective self-interest. In this sense it is not surprising that French farmers as a group, for instance, cannot be easily exhorted to place the 'well-being of the world's economy' ahead of their own interests, seeing that the whole purpose of political mobilisation is the protection of their interests.

A related rhetorical commonplace in which self-interest trumps values is that which portrays normative considerations as a luxury that cannot necessarily be afforded by those struggling to meet their material needs. Brecht's one-liner of *'Erst kommt das Fressen, dann die Moral'* (first grub, then ethics) succinctly captures this commonplace, fitting neatly into the materialist framework of working class movement politics. Those struggling to make ends meet cannot be expected to place the interests of others ahead of their own. This formulation is also expressed most famously in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, in which the meeting of physical needs is an essential prerequisite for the pursuit of aesthetic and spiritual fulfilment (Maslow 1968).[7]

The most emphatic way in which self-interest takes priority over values is where appropriate normative rationality is derived from self-interest. Over recent years, many western democracies have witnessed the rise to prominence of a political discourse based upon the assumption that rationality is fundamentally derived from self-interest. Neo-classical economics, and its political correlate of public choice theory, is hardly a novel form of rhetoric in this respect. The significant change over the past twenty years has been the development of new audiences that are

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[7] Maslow's theory is one of the main building blocks of Inglehart's distinction between materialism and postmaterialism.

receptive to this form of rhetoric, particularly in the public sectors of these countries. These perspectives emphasise that the pursuit of self-interest is a highly ethical activity, and ultimately more ethical than the fruits of practices which restrain the free hand of market forces. In fact, normative preferences and interest-based rationality are synonymous according to many rational choice models. From this definition of rationality, values not derived from self-interest are among the most significant of the irrational factors that impede the development of rational forces.

The reversal of this hierarchy, in which normative criteria are clearly separated from, and given priority over self-interest is the defining feature of altruism. Altruistic themes in western societies are strongly shaped by Christian traditions. These influences can be easily seen in the political rhetoric frequently adopted by religious, philanthropic and non-government welfare agencies, all of which invoke the denial of self-interest in order to help others as a 'good reason'. However, the commonplaces of altruism are hardly limited to contexts of earthquake relief and Salvation Army Christmas appeals. 'Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country' presents the appeal to altruism in its clearest and most clichéd form.

Politically, altruism is regularly invoked through the accusation of selfishness. Employer groups criticise trade unions on the basis that the demands of the latter may be good for unions but bad for the whole country. According to this form of rhetoric, unions are morally culpable for their refusal to behave altruistically. Of course, such an instance may be dismissed as 'mere rhetoric', especially where altruism on the part of unions just happens to coincide with the self-interest of employers. Altruism also enters political debate in the form of the reluctance to consider negotiatory politics as a legitimate exercise.[8] The characteristic form here is that you cannot agree to give up what is not yours to give away, and that any preparedness to negotiate and compromise only constitutes a submission to the temptation of self-interest.

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[8] See Minson (1993: 205) for some examples of this juxtaposition in political philosophy.

Closely related to altruism is the rhetoric that claims made in terms of self-interest are morally inferior to claims based upon wider, or more universal interests. Universalist claims are presented as unencumbered by partial perspectives, and this 'impartiality' can, among other things, be equated with moral high ground, as working for the benefit of all is self-evidently better than promoting the interests of the few. At times, this rhetorical formulation has been used to different effect by intellectuals who take up the cause of particular groups. It can be a useful strategy to override the actual political claims of particular group when they appear to be out of kilter with the historical telos of that group as perceived by intellectuals. For example, Lenin contended that the proletariat's vulnerability to self-interested opportunism was an indication of its inability to transcend economic concerns for ideal goals without the help of a vanguard that could correctly perceive the trajectory of history (Sadri 1992: 136).

3.3. Value Primacy

Thus, there is an abundance of rhetorical commonplaces available to support both positive and negative characterisations of normative reasoning in relation to other criteria. This serves as a further indication of the range of resources available from repertoires of common sense, and the ease with which it is possible to identify opposing themes. This treatment of good rhetorical reasons is by no means exhaustive. There are many other types of reasons that are powerful in particular settings, such as emotional sensitivity, aesthetic appreciation or fashionability. I have paid closest attention, however, to those types of reasons which frequently compete with normative rhetoric in political discourse. I should stress that there is nothing inherently incompatible about the relationship between values and facts or values and practicality. As types of reasons, we can just as easily find them working in tandem as we can find them pulling in opposite directions in argumentative contexts. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of values *against* these other criteria are prominent features of western philosophical, political and common sense traditions. Reinhart Koselleck has drawn attention to the historical circumstances in which politics and morality became separated and pitted against each

other in political discourse (1988: 11). The rise of the claims of scientific rationality in contrast to normative rationality can also be seen in the historical context of the project of challenging the religious foundations of truth.

These different rhetorical commonplaces are not equally useful with respect to particular audiences. An audience consisting of a professional association of engineers is unlikely to grant values priority over technical rationality. An Amnesty International conference, however, would attach substantially more rhetorical weight to normative reasons. Thus, it is feasible to characterise audiences in terms of the relative weight attributed to different types of reasons. 'Value primacy' characterises audiences for whom values assume overall priority over any other type of criteria.

From the above exposition, the metaphor of a card game can be used to describe the relationship between different types of reasons. Value primacy is the assumption that values are always trumps. Under conditions of value primacy, normative criteria are not necessarily the only criteria, or 'suit', deployed in arguments, and different suits can be combined to good rhetorical effect. If one can bolster an argument by claiming that 'this proposal is in keeping with our values, and has the added advantage of being practical to implement', then all the better. But when juxtaposed against any other suit, values win out. If something is technically useful, but normatively questionable, the latter consideration takes precedence. If getting something done occurs at the cost of violating a normative principle, then the cost is too high. If behaving ethically demands personal sacrifice then that is all the more reason to behave in such a way.

Minson has labelled such privileging as 'ethical foundationalism', which he defines as the notion that ethical considerations always ground, and ideally override other considerations (1985: 149). This foundationalism is a way of perceiving the world in which all social structures, processes and activities are assumed to have a fundamental normative character. The identification of normative character determines one's orientation towards any given phenomena. The question one must ask before any other is 'is this morally acceptable?' By a somewhat different route, then,

we return to the imperative of making normative diagnoses and distinctions. The difference is that here the practice of making value distinctions, outside the academic context, takes on a greater significance as a pretext for political action.

3.3.1. The Rhetorical Use of Values as Techniques of Distinction

There are important parallels, therefore, between social scientific constructions of knowledge about values and the normative knowledge that informs political activity. From such a foundation, both types of activity are concerned, albeit for different reasons, with developing the capacity to diagnose normative inconsistency, irrationality and incompatibility. These ways of interpreting the social world share a faith in essential definitions of values, and the capacity of certain social actors, be they trained professionals or committed activists, to discern true manifestations and implications of these values.

Values, therefore, can be regarded as devices used in order to make distinctions between 'us', with whom the orator identifies, and 'them', the normative other. In some contexts, the normative other may be explicitly defined. This can be done in a number of ways. In contrast to the moral community identified by the orator, the other may take the form of those who are amoral (indifferent to values) or immoral (have no values). Alternatively, the other may be constructed as having value standards which are defined antithetically in relation to the community of orator and audience. 'We', the supporters of free market competition can be contrasted to 'they' who prefer collectivist models of social and economic organisation. In this case, the orator wishes to evoke a negative assessment of the latter value. Collectivist values, in this example, are located outside the boundaries of normative common sense for the orator and audience, and are not available to be used to establish commonality except in a negative sense.

As with transformational approaches, but unlike attributional approaches to value analysis, these rhetorical value distinctions are not intended to be interpreted neutrally. They are used to make distinctions between good and bad, desirable and undesirable, legitimate and illegitimate. Inasmuch

as making value distinctions constitutes a rhetorical practice we can also explore the construction of claims to knowledge about values such as who has them, where are they manifest and what are their implications. A rhetorical investigation takes into account the argumentative contexts in which these claims are located.

3.3.2. Rhetorical Competence and Recognition

What sort of audiences are subject to definition primarily in terms of values? Where are we likely to find audiences who regard values as better reasons than available rhetorical competitors? We might first consider the sectors of the population who we can reasonably assume will recognise particular rhetorical cues. The recognition of any rhetorical criteria is an acquired capacity that is not evenly distributed throughout populations. Indeed, the recognition of rhetorical repertoires can be closely linked to certain sociological characteristics. The most significant social indicator of such rhetorical training is tertiary education, where skills in criticism and justification are taught either directly, or indirectly in order to validate knowledge claims. Tertiary education is by no means the only or the most effective route by which rhetorical capacities may be acquired. Trade unions, religious organisations and voluntary organisations have all been instrumental in fostering a range of rhetorical capabilities.[9]

In addition, a well established finding of researchers who have attempted to define standards of attitudinal or ideological consistency is that any such consistency is strongly associated with tertiary education. A rhetorical interpretation of this connection is that the awareness and use of historically constructed attitudinal packages such as liberalism, conservatism, or new politics are learnt capacities. Once again, tertiary education need not be considered the only site where such packages are learnt, but the role of tertiary education in both the development and

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[9] There may well be a case, however, for suggesting that tertiary education has taken on an even greater importance in relation to these other sites over recent years as indicated by the increasing tendency for elites in unions and religious bodies to acquire tertiary qualifications in order to be recognised as legitimate contributors to public political discourse beyond their own institutional settings.

transmission of them, we would surmise, has increased as the reach of this sector has expanded.[10]

Apart from, and in conjunction with tertiary education, certain occupational locations provide more opportunities for the development of rhetorical skills. One could reasonably suggest that professional and white collar employment provides more opportunity for such enhancement. Business managers, public servants, educational and health administrators, science professionals, journalists, doctors and lawyers work in environments which require the capacity to advance and respond to justificatory and critical arguments in the course of carrying out occupational roles.

Secondly, we should consider the social distribution of the rhetorical importance of *values*. In particular, we could consider the social locations where values are rhetorically more significant than interests or facts. Normative criteria take on greater rhetorical importance in certain types of white collar occupations than in others. Training and socialisation for engineering and scientific occupations characteristically places low priority upon normative reasoning compared to technical rationality. In other white collar locations such as industry and commerce, arguments based upon interests carry more weight than, or subsume those based upon values.

Other sectors of the white collar and professional workforce promote various combinations of rhetorical abilities. Those involved in the provision of medical services give greater latitude to forms of normative reasoning in combination with scientific and technical rationality. Trade unionists, welfare lobbyists and much of the public policy and community services sector combine normative and interest-based reasoning. Many areas of public sector employment also involve some scope for the

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[10] Such a prognosis is well supported by the empirical research referred to in the first chapter. The *Political Action* tradition of Barnes, Kaase and Inglehart has attributed a great deal of significance to what they term 'cognitive mobilization' in their explanations of differing patterns of political participation. Similarly Converse found that the 'level of conceptualisation' correlated positively to the 'amount of political activity'.

professional deployment of normative reasoning in conjunction with technical rationality, particularly in areas of policy development. Standard criteria for evaluating public policy such as equity, accountability, quality of service and public responsiveness have both technically rational and normative elements.

The types of professional and white collar employment in which normative reasoning is accorded a relatively high priority, I would suggest, include some forms of journalism, teaching, religious vocations and cultural production.[11] In addition, there are important non-work sites that foster specifically normative rhetorical skills. Religious organisations, service organisations, political associations, voluntary welfare networks and other voluntary associations all serve as sites which encourage the development of value-based reasoning. Furthermore, membership of such organisations, with the possible exception of some religious organisations, is predominantly middle class in western democracies.

The point I am driving at is the characteristically neglected observation that members of audiences who are likely to define themselves in terms of the values that they hold, should not be regarded as 'universal subjects', but as the products of particular ethical regimes and practices of formation, to use the Foucauldian terminology. Those who habitually privilege normative criteria over other types of reasons can be regarded as an even more select type.

3.4. Conclusion: Contrasting Value Identity and Rhetorical Approaches

From this discussion we are now in a position to summarise the difference between value identity and rhetorical approaches to values in relation to a few key questions. The two approaches regard values as different types of things. Value identity approaches locate values as attributes of social actors, structures, processes and actions. A rhetorical approach, in contrast, regards values as 'good reasons' which are

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[11] Please note that this is not a claim that engineers are more practical, and that artists are more normative, it is a claim about the types of rhetorical reasoning that are accorded priority in these occupational locations.

articulated and deployed by social actors in argumentative contexts. Shared understandings of the implications of values are the product of social construction and rhetorical argument rather than expressions of an essential value rationality.

A second point of contrast relates to the treatment of value claims. A rhetorical method does not judge the validity or otherwise of the deployment of values, whereas the value identity approach maintains the right to define the range of appropriate application of particular values. Abstention from recourse to stable definitions enables the analyst to work with rather than against the grain of value ambiguity and contestation. This does not preclude the possibility that the analyst may consider some deployments preferable to others. However, by highlighting the definition of values as the object of political contestation, a rhetorical approach demonstrates that any such preference must be seen as a political interpretation rather than something justifiable on grounds of objectivity or essential meaning.

The advantage of this abstention is that the analyst avoids entanglement in disputes over the interpretation and meaning of values, and is able to read such disputes in ways that would not be possible otherwise. Thus, we can avoid the rather strained plausibility of Inglehart's interpretation of security and Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky's treatment of rights, as well as the pretence that these terms can be defined apolitically. A rhetorical approach regards conflicting interpretations as interesting rather than uncomfortable because they illustrate the fluidity and the constantly evolving character of political discourse. An awareness of this flexibility demonstrates that adopting the normative language characteristically used by opponents can be a highly effective political strategy used to support ones own claims. Anti-nuclear activists need not be inhibited by the orthodox coupling of security to the possession of state of the art military technology or by conventional interpretations of the national interest. Whether or not such innovative arguments succeed, of course, is another matter, but one which can also be fruitfully pursued under the rhetorical framework rather than by constructing standards of consistency and rationality.

The final point of contrast concerns what is meant by shared values. Both value identity and rhetorical approaches attach much significance to the phenomena of shared values. Whereas the former treat them as prerequisites for political identity and unity, the latter investigates the contribution of shared values to the management of audience diversity. In doing so it is possible to see how shared values delineate the stakes of political conflict, rather than providing a foundation for consensus. It is this connection between shared values and conflict that best illustrates the analytic potential of a rhetorical approach and this is one of the issues explored in detail in the remainder of this thesis. Thus, the rhetorical treatment of values lays the groundwork for a rather different way of analysing green politics. In the following chapter I investigate the strong reliance upon value rationality that is a notable feature of green political rhetoric.

Chapter 4: Value Rationality and Primacy in Green Politics Literature

It is now possible to offer an alternative interpretation of the relationship between values and green politics built upon the rhetorical approach outlined in the previous chapter. In this chapter I explore green political literature in order to illustrate the ways in which greens construct their identity in terms of values. I also draw attention to the ways in which greens adopt a language of value rationality, change, conflict and consistency that runs parallel to the terminology of value identity approaches. The construction of green identity in terms of universalist values marks out the range of rhetorical reasons that greens are prepared to adopt. It is possible to trace the links between this range of rhetorical practice and the characteristic social location of the green constituency.

The first section of this chapter demonstrates the ways in which greens identify themselves in terms of values, and how elements of the political landscape and processes of political change are characterised in terms of normative rationality. In the second section, I document how value rationality characteristically takes priority over other forms of reasoning. The third section demonstrates how a rhetorical reading of the relationship between values and green politics makes sense as way of understanding the practice and the social bases of green politics. The final section raises the question of the political consequences of normative primacy and suggests that the best places to investigate such an issue are those contexts in which greens attempt to construct their own political forms, usually as green parties.

4.1. Green Politics and Normative Identity

As value primacy is a feature of the relationship between orators and audiences, in the following sections of this chapter I will be drawing from material that has been written principally or largely with a green audience in mind. The authors cited are among the most influential in the development of green politics. Petra Kelly (1984) and Rudolf Bahro (1986),

key figures in the early parliamentary rise of the German Greens, have reached a wide international audience through the publication of their speeches and lectures. Jonathon Porritt (1984) and Sara Parkin (1989), central figures in British green politics, have been well known to English speaking audiences. In Australia, the most widely accessible local articulation of green political ideas has been the collection edited by Drew Hutton (1987a), who has been one of the main protagonists in the establishment of an Australian green party. In addition, I also draw upon sympathetic commentaries on green parties, in particular Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak's (1984) introduction of the German Greens to an American and British readership. The various Ecopolitics conferences that have been held annually in Australia and New Zealand since 1986 have provided a much utilised forum in which academic and activist greens address each other (Dyer & Young 1990; Harding 1992). Finally, the more academically oriented work of Bookchin, Eckersley, Dobson and Goodin are also important as articulations of green politics directed towards a green audience.

4.1.1. The Content of the Green Normative Repertoire

The four principles of *die Grünen*, which have been widely adopted by green organisations throughout the world, are translated as ecological sustainability, social justice, grassroots democracy and non-violence. The ten key values adopted by the United States Green Committees of Correspondence include personal and global responsibility, decentralisation, community-based economics, post-patriarchal values, respect for diversity and future focus/sustainability, alongside the four German principles (Goodin 1992). In addition to these formally adopted principles, positive political values frequently deployed by greens include equality, tolerance, autonomy, community, harmony, openness, sustainability, accountability, participation, emancipation, self-realisation, interdependence and consensus. The antonyms of these positive values such as centralisation, hierarchy, violence, unaccountability, patriarchy and inequality are frequently adopted 'negative values'. The list of characteristic negative values also includes control, technocracy,

bureaucracy, authoritarianism, exploitation, superficiality and dependence.

Most of these evaluative criteria are hardly unique to the green movement. Indeed there are many people and organisations aligned to New Left, anarchist and utopian socialist projects who would not identify themselves as green but would also use most of this normative language. A number of elements would also happily fit with standard liberal, conservative and even neo-conservative repertoires. The political rhetoric of these other traditions is related in many respects to the rhetoric of green self-description, notwithstanding the reluctance of many greens to acknowledge these links.[1] Those greens that do acknowledge the connections with the contents of older ideological repertoires often attempt to demonstrate the derivation of these values from ecological principles. Certainly, some of the more ecological normative criteria have emerged specifically through the environmental movement, but none of the accounts discussed here limit their characterisation of the green package to these ecological values. As such, the above list of values cannot be considered as the 'property' of the green movement.[2] Hence, the term 'green values' does not in any way denote green custodianship of these values. Instead, it is used in this thesis as a less cumbersome shorthand for 'the repertoire of values deployed by greens'.

The rationality of green values is also a prominent theme in the articulation of the green political project. Jonathon Porritt claims that '(t)here are enormous differences between our goals and values and those of society at large' (Porritt 1984: 15). Almost without exception, green literature uses the device of the new paradigm to bundle together the various elements covering ecological, economic, social, cultural and

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[1] Sara Parkin, for example, contends that many green parties 'were started by people who felt the need for politics to be based on an entirely new set of values that could not be found in any existing political tradition' (1989: 19).

[2] Further reasons are discussed in Chapter 7.

organisational concerns into the form of a coherent rationality.[3] It is worth comparing one of these activist versions of contrasting paradigms, formulated by Jonathon Porritt, with Cotgrove's version outlined in Chapter 1.

Table 4.1: Porritt's Counter-paradigms

The politics of industrialism	*The politics of ecology*
A deterministic view of the future	Flexibility and an emphasis on personal autonomy
An ethos of aggressive individualism	A co-operatively based, communitarian society
Materialism, pure and simple	A move towards spiritual, non-material values
Divisive, reductionist analysis	Holistic synthesis and integration
Anthropocentrism	Biocentrism
Rationality and packaged knowledge	Intuition and understanding
Outer-directed motivation	Inner-directed motivation and personal growth
Patriarchal values	Post-patriarchal, feminist values
Institutionalised violence	Non-violence
Economic growth and GNP	Sustainability and quality of life
Production for exchange and profit	Production for use
High income differentials	Low income differentials
A 'free-market' economy	Local production for local need
Ever-expanding world trade	Self-reliance
Demand stimulation	Voluntary simplicity
Employment as a means to an end	Work as an end in itself

[3] For other versions see (Capra and Spretnak 1984: xix; Bahro 1986: 152-3; Hutton 1987: 22-25; Dobson 1990: 5).

Table 4.1 (cont.)

Capital-intensive production	Labour-intensive production
Unquestioning acceptance of the technological fix	Discriminating use and development of science and technology
Centralisation, economies of scale	Decentralisation, human scale
Hierarchical structure	Non-hierarchical structure
Dependence upon experts	Participative involvement
Representative democracy	Direct democracy
Emphasis on law and order	Libertarianism
Sovereignty of nation-state	Internationalism and global solidarity
Domination over nature	Harmony with nature
Environmentalism	Ecology
Environment managed as a resource	Resources regarded as strictly finite
Nuclear power	Renewable sources of energy
High energy, high consumption	Low energy, low consumption

Source: (Porritt 1984: 216-7)

Radically different standards of rationality follow from the opposing paradigms, such that divergent social and political consequences can be readily traced to differences in values. What 'is' (the ecological crisis) is the logical consequence of the old or dominant rationality, and therefore the alternative rationality will lead to an entirely different and presumably favourable set of consequences. As Sara Parkin puts it, the ecological crisis is 'the logical consequence of the consumer-driven industrial regime which all the rich and most of the not-so-rich countries of the world endorse' (Parkin 1989: 18).[4] There are various suggestions regarding the origins and basic axioms of this errant rationality. Both

[4] At this level of formulation, the presence of phenomena other than values that have political and social consequences is either not made explicit, or regarded as manifestations of value frameworks. Thus, in a neat reversal of the classical Marxist image, economic arrangements are regarded as structures which are built upon normative foundations.

Dobson (1990: 38) and Porritt (1992: 86) claim that it is a consequence of the Enlightenment world-view predicated on control and domination.[5] Taking a rather more expansive perspective, Bookchin (1982) and Bahro (1986: 153) assert that things started to go seriously wrong when humans began to practice agriculture, which indelibly altered natural relationships between humanity and nature, and egalitarian relationships between humans.

4.1.2. Value Coherence and Choice

Greens typically argue that ecological and participatory themes are intricately intertwined. This has significant effects upon the deployment of green normative rhetoric. Principles pertaining to social organisation are regarded as having a close affinity to ecological precepts. An example of this connectedness, according to Bookchin, can be found in the relationship between ecology and equality. Because an ecological perspective stresses the interdependence of all living things, Bookchin claims that ecosystems 'cannot be meaningfully described in hierarchical terms' (Bookchin 1982: 26).[6] He contends that because nature is characterised by *non-hierarchical, egalitarian* relationships, such relationships are also natural in human societies.[7]

By a similar route, Dobson outlines the compatibility between ecology and tolerance. According to accepted ecological knowledge, ecosystem stability is a function of ecological diversity which provides resilience to environmental fluctuation. For Dobson this means that a healthy society 'is one in which a range of opinions is not only tolerated but celebrated, in

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[5] Both refer to the 'unholy trinity' of Descartes, Bacon and Newton.

[6] The object of his critique, is the claim that relations of domination and exploitation can be considered to be 'natural' in human societies. Bookchin's claims regarding the relationship between biodiversity and equality are directed at social Darwinist suggestions that hierarchy is natural. But in making such a claim, Bookchin is not disputing the utility of the terms 'nature' and 'natural' in describing social relationships.

[7] Bookchin's view of nature involves the definition of 'natural' as the opposite of 'artificial', i.e. something to be left to its own devices and not tampered with. In this sense, hierarchy is an artificial imposition on the natural state of equality.

that this provides for a repository of ideas and forms of behaviour from which to draw when confronted with political or social problems' (Dobson 1990: 25). This connection is also used to support ideological pluralism within the greens. Parkin asserts that '(c)elebrating the diversity of human culture is, after all, much more in tune with the immense variety to be found in nature than is trying to homogenise and then fossilise it into any ideology' (Parkin 1989: 18-9).

Such links are metaphorical, and Bookchin, Dobson and Parkin are engaged in the same sort of exercise as social Darwinist, sociobiological and functionalist social theory. Furthermore, these alternatives demonstrate that biological analogies invoking 'nature' can be harnessed to argue widely divergent claims about the nature of social relationships. Nevertheless, the new ecological use of the biological metaphor has become a central feature in the presentation of green politics as a coherent normative package. In this context, these arguments are significant in that they contribute to and reflect the rhetorical currency of the green movement.

Many green writers suggest that it is the totality of the value package, rather than particular elements, that defines green identity. From this standpoint, the coherence of green politics is axiomatic and self-referential. A common device for illustrating coherence is to reduce the totality of perceived crises to a single crisis with a single solution. In rather apocalyptic tones, Rudolf Bahro describes 'exterminism' (the old paradigm) as 'the sum of the interconnected dangers to make one single challenge' (Bahro 1986: 143). He stresses that the ecological crisis, the prospect of nuclear annihilation and the persistence of patriarchy are all symptoms of a unified and comprehensive pathology rooted in the human condition.

> Wherever we look, disaster seems to be looming. And the thought imposes itself spontaneously that these are not plagues which are independent of each other and by chance simultaneous. In them there is a law, a force which is working against us (Bahro 1986: 143).

Here, the sickness is reduced to a single force. The remedy for this sickness can also be reduced to a single, unified essence. Bookchin identifies holism as a basic and distinctive feature of ecological politics. As such, he

argues that the green political project must be treated holistically, that it cannot be dismantled and retain its integrity.[8] Furthermore, green politics is only viable in this coherent form.

> It has become clear to me that it was the *unity* of my views - their ecological holism, not merely their individual components - that gave them a radical thrust. That a society is decentralized, that it uses solar or wind energy, that it is farmed organically, or that it reduces pollution - none of these measures by itself or even in limited combination with others makes an ecological society (Bookchin 1982: 3).

Green politics also parallels value identity approaches in postulating that value choice is a basic feature of social analysis. However, there are right and wrong choices, as Parkin clearly asserts.

> My own diagnosis is that this regime has been constructed out of a series of wrong decisions - large and small, individual and collective - made over a considerable period of time. Building bombs instead of convivial life-sustaining communities, and failing to make spirituality and our personal potential the real challenges of our life on Earth, are examples of how the human species has tended to gravitate towards the easier option at moments of choice and decision, whether it be practical or intellectual..... In short, we are living the consequences of a compound error (Parkin 1989: 18).

This is an example in green literature of a 'litmus test' of green-ness that can be applied in particular circumstances which offer choices between green and non-green alternatives. Specific choices in specific situations can be regarded as manifestations of a more general orientation. Parkin adopts the following overarching formula to distinguish between paradigms.

> Perhaps the most relevant test of Green-ness of a political party (or indeed any person or organisation) should be its *approach* to a decision, a choice, a problem or an issue. How well has it understood the central

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[8] In the light of these approaches, holistic social theory based on biological metaphors is hardly a new enterprise, as many greens are apt to claim. Capra and Spretnak link the concept of 'social ecology' (a term also widely used by Bookchin) to the development of systems theory involving cybernetics, notions of system dynamics and positive and negative feedback, which they suggest is distinct from the 'conceptualisation of our bodies, the body politic, and the natural world as hierarchically arranged aggregates of discrete components' (Capra & Spretnak 1984: 31). Yet Talcott Parsons, drawing upon the same sources, assimilated elements of cybernetic theory into his own language of 'hierarchies of control'.

> role of the Earth in resolving the predicament of humankind? (Parkin 1989: 19).

The consistent theme of all these articulations of green politics is that being green requires a conscious choice and subsequent commitment to green values. In contrast to many other political identities, one is not 'born' green, it is an achieved, not an ascribed identity.[9] Self-conscious actors must choose to be green. The centrality of personal moral responsibility is readily apparent in the following extract from the British Green Party's 1989 election manifesto.

> The Green Party stands for a new kind of politics. We must take control of our own lives and learn to work together for a better future. We cannot allow ourselves to be ruled by remote control government, the power of big business and the media, and the lottery of market forces. We must begin by taking personal responsibility for the state of the planet and for the job of changing it. We can only do it by choosing what we know is right. We can begin by voting Green, but that is only the beginning (British Green Party 1989).

Such 'decisionism' helps to account for the prominence in green political rhetoric of references to lifestyle choices, and to the numerous contexts in which choices are made in industrial society such as voting, consumption, and decisions to have children. These 'small' choices can be treated as indicative of the 'big' choice of whether or not one subscribes to the values of the alternative paradigm.

4.1.3. Value Change and Implementation

The pivotal place of personal value choice has significant implications for conceptions of political action. In particular, it supports the conclusion that viable political change only occurs as the result of fundamental value change. According to Dobson, '(i)t follows that if the Green movement believes technological solutions to the limits to growth problem to be impossible, then it will have to argue for more profound changes in social

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[9] Except in references to 'traditional' societies that, according to some versions of green politics, are bearers of ecological wisdom. (Although, John Young cautions against such sweeping romanticisation (1990)). Members of such societies may be assumed to be green by virtue of being born into these societies. However, this form of ascription is not a possibility for most members of green audiences.

thought and practice - changes in human values and ideas of morality' (Dobson 1990: 77). The gravity of the change is also underlined by Capra and Spretnak who regard a resolution of the crisis as involving 'profound transformations of our social and political institutions, values and ideas' (Capra & Spretnak 1984: xix).

Before *becoming* green, political actors are perceived as acting in accordance with the logic of the dominant value paradigm. Changes from the dominant value rationality to the alternative rationality must occur in societies, institutions, and individuals. All of these are considered to be self-conscious and self-determining entities. Self-conscious actors are asked to acknowledge past mistakes that reflect the dominant value rationality and adopt the new ecological consciousness. Value change is not a matter of tinkering with particular values but of changing whole value systems. For some greens such as Bahro, value change is a cataclysmic experience akin to religious conversion.

> Those who stand for the transition from Having to Being must make it clear that this means a change in values such as can only succeed through what up till now has been described as a religious experience (Bahro 1986: 171).

For others it is not necessarily so dramatic. Porritt, for example, describes his conversion experience as a gradual transition process in which the logic of green politics became progressively more significant at the same time as old and redundant perceptions receded (Porritt 1984: xv-xvi). In this sense, becoming green is a matter of heading in the right direction. As long as one sets off in this direction, one will eventually end up green, provided that this direction is not reversed.

These descriptions of green change give rise to some characteristic distinctions between 'shades' of green-ness. The last ten years have seen a plethora of intra-green distinctions advanced; between dark green and light green, deep ecology and shallow ecology, ecologism and environmentalism, ecocentric and anthropocentric green, and capital 'G' green and small 'g' green. For the most part these distinctions are made in the context of advocating the first option as opposed to the second. Light green, shallow ecology, environmentalism, anthropocentric and small 'g'

green are all terms used to describe varieties of green politics which still retain or rely upon features of the political arrangements which greens wish to transcend. As 'lesser' forms of green, they are either accepted as temporary waystations en route to true greendom, or rejected as cop out positions that allow political actors to pass themselves off as green without taking on board the full implications of the green project. Either way, these lighter shades of green are not free from the influence of dominant values.

For some greens, this means that no change should be attempted within the existing structures *until* there has been a comprehensive shift from the old to the new paradigm. An Australian activist makes exactly this point, deploying the distinction between light and dark green:

> For dark green environmentalists, there is no short cut to power and influence through compromise. They believe that green values can only be incorporated into a policy making system which emerges after a paradigm shift. Many do not have the confidence in the sort of gradual reform espoused by light green environmentalists (Beder 1992: 58-9).

Many greens invoke the existence of a political greenprint even though its are not currently clear.[10] Establishing the details of political change is often treated as a matter of 'reading off' the implications of these values when they do become apparent.

> If Green politics is to develop in this country, we first must develop a coherent view. By that we mean a coherent world view, which would give rise to a set of values and ethics, which in turn would lead to political analysis .... from which would emerge specific programs and strategies (Capra & Spretnak 1984: 199).

Greens do not necessarily need to know all the implications of green rationality. All that is needed are a few uncontested and taken for granted applications of green values. Certainly, there are a number of stances that are notably uncontroversial, and perhaps non-negotiable for greens. As Pakulski (1991) suggests, such common stances are frequently defined in negative terms, such as opposition to woodchip logging, uranium mining

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[10] Dobson asserts that '(t)he obstacles to Green change have not been properly identified, and the result is an ideology that lacks an adequate programme for social and political transformation' (Dobson 1990: 23).

and nuclear power in the Australian political context. However, there are many common stances that are not purely negative. Support for aboriginal land rights and preferences for more participatory political structures are but two examples. Such unambiguous orientations are significant in that they are often taken by greens as indications of the value foundations of green politics. In what amounts to a 'creation myth', the links between these seemingly disparate orientations are understood as a coherent set of normative principles. This story, however, characteristically plays down or ignores the vast political spaces that are underdetermined by green principles. Policy areas such as immigration, orientations to economic growth, the provision of educational, health and welfare services, taxation, industrial relations, international relations, trade and defence policy are all areas which are nowhere near cut and dried among greens. Similarly, there is much ambiguity that surrounds questions of how greens are to arrange their own affairs according to normative principles, beyond the suggestion that organisational structure should, as far as possible, be non-hierarchical.[11]

4.2. Green Value Primacy

Having demonstrated a few examples of the ways in which green identity is articulated in normative terms, one could well ask whether there is anything unusual about this? Most, if not all political projects are keen to present themselves as being on the side of the angels. Establishing normative credentials would appear to be a basic rhetorical strategy for any political project. However, it is the way in which normative reasoning is juxtaposed against other types of reasoning that brings the importance of values to green politics into sharpest relief. In green literature, normative criteria typically trump other types of reasons.

4.2.1. Values and Technical Rationality

This dynamic can be clearly observed if we take a look at the relationship between technical and normative reason in green discourse. Scientific and

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[11] It is this arena of ambiguity that is explored in the following chapters.

technical reason has played a highly ambiguous role in green reflections on politics. A number of authors including Steven Yearley (1991) and John Young (1990) have noted that the emergence of environmentalism, as a key component of green politics, owes much to developments in scientific knowledge that reached public consciousness in the late 1960s and 1970s. The first wave of environmentalist literature, such as Rachel Carson's *The Silent Spring,* Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb,* and the Club of Rome's *Limits to Growth* were all written in academic scientific contexts and primarily, if not exclusively, directed towards a technically literate audience. The seeds of green claims have often been planted in debates within scientific communities (Yearley 1991). Scientific-technical knowledge has been essential in the construction of the major environmental issues in public debate, including pollution, toxic waste, Greenhouse Effect, threats to biodiversity and damage to the ozone layer. The influence of the discipline of ecology, which has developed within the academic boundaries of science, has had a significant influence upon green political conceptual frameworks.

Yet within the green movement there has been significant resistance to the practice of approaching environmental problems primarily in technical-rational terms. Technical rationality features prominently as the villain in green political rhetoric, as it is heavily implicated in the degradation of the environment. The environmental destructiveness of large-scale technologies such as nuclear power and hydro-electricity, as well as the more diffuse technologies of crop pesticides and modes of transport dependant upon fossil fuel are emblematic of the perils of technology. According to Drew Hutton, 'science and technology have become the tools which humanity has used to dominate and exploit nature' (Hutton 1987b: 19).

The suspicion of technical rationality is not confined to the environmental elements of green politics. Greens often characterise the logic of technical reason as a significant factor contributing to structures of human domination over humans as well as human domination over nature. A particularly undesirable feature of technical reason is the way in which decision-making capacity becomes concentrated in the hands of the

limited few who have the appropriate technocratic expertise. Also politically problematic is what greens see as the undemocratically large scale and hierarchical structure of organisations and society required to devise and implement policies dependent upon technical rationality (Bookchin 1982). Greens also dispute the assertion that scientific rationality is value free.

Given this background, there is still a substantial range of green assessments of technical-scientific reasoning. Positions range from the complete eschewal of technology to the enthusiastic effort to develop environmentally friendly technology. Anti-technological greens regard the track record of science and technology to be sufficient reason for deep distrust of technology in general.[12] Most greens, however, argue in terms of 'appropriate technology' in which appropriateness is defined in terms of green values. Thus, Bahro espouses the subordination of technical knowledge to the needs of small communities which would enable 'technology on a human scale' (Bahro 1986: 158). The British Green election manifesto of 1989 supported the use of scientific research funds 'to explore technologies which are most likely to serve a decentralised, sustainable society' (British Green Party 1989). Thus, any recourse to technical rationality must have normative support as good technical reasons cannot stand alone as sufficient justification for a particular course of action.[13]

4.2.2. Values and Pragmatic Criteria

When practical politics and green values are juxtaposed, the former is either subordinate or antithetical to the latter. Sara Parkin contends that greens have been notably 'squeamish' about the prospect of political power (Parkin 1989: 25). Green rhetoric contains a number of resources

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[12] See Australian activist Ally Fricker's objections to the sponsorship of an Australian Conservation Foundation conference by Apple Computers (1990: 224).

[13] This subordination of technology to normative reasoning differs, therefore, from the arguments of cultural theorists who characterise greens as rejecting technology (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982).

capable of portraying the acquisition and use of political power as normatively unpalatable. Traditional, institutional politics reflects the old paradigm, and is manifestly hierarchical, aggressive, patriarchal, centralised and authoritarian. Power in this context is equated with domination and manipulation. Ariel Salleh, for example, contends that party politics demonstrates '(t)he worst excesses of this "instrumental rationality"' and 'inevitably gets down to a manipulative scramble for numbers' (Salleh 1987: 83). Pragmatic politics is also identified with old paradigm politics because it thought to involve the necessity of trade-offs and making deals and the compromise of ideals.

Pragmatic rationality is often regarded as problematic by greens because it artificially separates the ends of action from the means to carry it out. As indicated by the above discussion on technical rationality, greens characteristically reject any suggestion that means are normatively neutral. Petra Kelly, in contrast, stresses the normativity of political means.

> For us, the ends do not justify the means. You cannot do away with violence by using violence, or war by waging war, or injustice by resorting to injustice. It follows, then, that the ends are a part of the method of action, and likewise that the method of action is included in the ends (Kelly 1984: 19).

Kelly posits a fundamental contrast between pragmatic and normative rationality when she asserts that a green party 'must always be capable of deciding between power and morality' (quoted in Porritt 1984: x). As I will demonstrate in the following case study, this view of pragmatic rationality as the opposite of value rationality is frequently adopted in Australian debates about green party formation.

But pragmatic rationality is not always regarded as the obverse of values. A common rhetorical formula allows the active pursuit of political advantage as long as those who pursue such strategies do not 'forget' their normative foundations. This relationship is indicated by the standard exhortation that instrumental actions such as participation in elections should be balanced by normatively pristine grassroots activism.

> Therefore, while contesting elections is an important part of our strategy, it is by no means the only one. We will also be involved in

> grassroots campaigns which are essential if destructive and undemocratic values in the community are going to seriously challenged by our movement. (Queensland Greens 1992).

Good green politics, according to Hutton, involves getting the balance between them right 'so that one builds on the other' (Hutton 1990: 19). Pragmatic rationality, therefore, can carry rhetorical weight, but only when it is linked to a more encompassing set of normative reasons.

4.2.3. Values and Self-Interest

The final indication of the rhetorical superiority of values in green literature is in the clear cut rejection of self-interest as a valid political motivation. The privileging of values over self-interest is most apparent in the emphasis placed upon universalist criteria in green rhetoric, and the corresponding downgrading of particularistic criteria. Greens often claim that the only interests they represent are those of the world as a whole, and that the benefits of green politics are benefits that accrue to all, because environmental crises ultimately affect all. The suspicion of self-interest is highly pervasive in normative green politics, and often extends to the stipulation that self-interest cannot be considered as a legitimate basis for political claims. Sara Parkin is quite clear about this.

> I know of only one such arbiter that cannot be accused of manipulative self-interest - and that is the Earth itself. Greens are suggesting that by abandoning our obsession with ourselves, and putting the Earth into the centre of all the models and plans we make for our personal activities, we can discover that, in the words of Theodore Roszak: 'The needs of the planet are the needs of the person .... the rights of the person are the rights of the planet' (Parkin 1989: 18).

Eckersley's distinction between ecocentric and anthropocentric politics is constructed upon the basis that ecocentrism, as the more radical and challenging expression of green politics, is founded upon an ultimately universalist conception of interests.

> In any event, ecocentric Greens are not only concerned to protect non-human life. Rather, an ecocentric perspective provides an *inclusive* ecophilosophical framework that recognises the full range of human interests in the non-human world; recognises the interests of future generations of humans and non-humans; and adopts a holistic rather than atomistic perspective insofar as it values populations, species, ecosystems and the ecosphere *as well as* individual organisms (Eckersley 1990: 78).

According to this formulation, the more universalistic an interest claim, the greater legitimacy it has. Human interests, for example, are not a sufficient justification for environmental action because action motivated by human interests 'will systematically prevail over the interest of the non-human world' (Eckersley 1990: 74). This is not to say that greens never use particularist interest as the basis for political claims. Greens are not averse to favouring particular interests over others, but only when the interests greens support, be they of forests, indigenous peoples or the unemployed, are portrayed as ultimately universalistic, i.e. in everybody's (and everything's) best interest. It is not feasible to construct politics in terms of 'us' versus 'them' using devices such as class, nationality or gender.[14] Greens typically wear their universalistic values as a badge of honour.

> Green politics does not accept the philosophical dualism which underpins modern industrial society (mind/body, humanity/nature, boss/worker, male/female) nor that of the traditional left (class struggle and class war leading to a classless society). Instead, it presents the goal of a society where people live in harmony with each other and with nature .... (Hutton 1987b: 30).

It is worth comparing green politics to socialist and feminist politics on the issue of self-interest. The latter two do not have such 'in principle' problems with self-interested arguments, and do not portray the relation between values and self-interest antithetically. Defending the interests of women against men, or of workers against employers is unproblematic. Altruistic motivations, though important in these movements, are not accorded quite the same prominence as in green politics. Both these movements have the advantage in many political contexts of claiming to speak for dominated social categories, but this is a rhetorical store that is simply not available for greens.

Although greens most emphatically eschew motivations construed explicitly in terms of self-interest, there is a significant back door through

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[14] Offe (1990: 234) makes a related point, when he notes that the 'enemy' to be overcome by green politics is not a social category. However, this feature of universalistic value politics does not exclude the possibility that political adversaries can be named as an identifiable actors with (deficient) moral personalities.

which such reasons can be countenanced. This applies when they are clothed in the normative legitimacy of autonomy and self-determination. Without too much difficulty the interests of the whole can be transformed into the big bad wolf of domination, intent upon trampling the fragile rights of autonomous parts. However, any such rhetoric depends upon the conflation of normative and self-interested reasoning, rather than their juxtaposition as opposites. This flexibility in the moral characterisation of 'selves' is a prominent theme in the case study pursued in the following chapters.

The habits of normative primacy thus ensure that the most significant non-normative means of justification and criticism in the arena of green politics are kept in check. Any of these rhetorical criteria may be of some use for greens in as much as they complement normative reasoning, but none are allowed to take precedence over values. More importantly, any of these types of reasons can be readily located on the wrong side of the normative fence. Technical, practical and interest-based reasoning are frequently criticised as exactly the types of reasoning which contribute to the ecological and political crises that greens identify.

4.2.4. Green Value Primacy and Environmentalism

While it is my overall contention that green politics exhibits a great deal of value primacy, there are some aspects of green-related political activity that have been noticeably less restricted in their scope of rhetorical resources. I have in mind much of the pursuit of specifically environmental agendas within a scientific institutional setting. These include attempts within the scientific community to take seriously issues such as ozone depletion and global warming. Scientific and technically rational contexts are associated with the development of environmentally friendly technologies, the development of environmental impact assessment techniques and an emergent discipline of environmental management. The rhetorical materials used in these contexts are drawn mainly from the realm of technically rational arguments. They typically involve concerted attempts to alter the scope of what is considered technically rational to include considerations of environmental damage.

The emergence of increasingly professionalised environmentalist political lobbying has highlighted another arena in which the rhetorical significance of values is somewhat attenuated. The prominence of organisations such as Friends of the Earth in Britain, the Australian Conservation Foundation, and Greenpeace International has indicated a preparedness of many green actors to engage in the realm of national and international pragmatic politics. Sites of practical engagement at the international level include attempts to achieve various green political objectives such as whaling embargoes, strategies to deal with global warming, and the protection of the Antarctic wilderness. Within national and local contexts we can note political objectives such as the prevention of construction of nuclear power plants, restriction of resource extraction, anti-pollution measures and creation of wilderness parks. The growth of governmental and semi-governmental agencies with environmental briefs also indicates sites where green agendas are pursued in realms where practical reasoning is more influential.

There has also been significant growth over recent years in the formulation of environmental claims within the scope of self-interest rhetoric. Certain elements of green agendas have been taken up by the corporate sector. Environmental awareness has opened up new product markets, and environmental credentials are increasingly important to the management of corporate images. Within the discipline of economics, there have been attempts to widen the scope of consideration for self-interest to include environmental goods including air quality, water quality and national parks as recreational amenities. Proposals for 'polluter pays' policies are associated with these developments. We can also observe the emergence of local initiatives such as Land Care groups in Australia, for whom protection of local environments is justified according to the interests of the local community and those who rely upon the land for survival.

It is no coincidence that these realms of action are the target of much criticism from greens because of perceived moral inadequacy. In Bookchin, Dobson and Porritt we can find strong criticism of technocratic environmentalism, and the search for 'technological fixes' for entrenched

environmental problems. Without an appropriate normative foundation, the application of technical rationality is likely to be counterproductive according to Porritt.

> With the best will in the world, I can't help but conclude that many of today's green pragmatists, for all their assiduous efforts to manage the Earth's resources more wisely through the more efficient application of technology and conventional reductionist science, are in the unwitting process of selling green politics down a very polluted river. A more holistic, Earth-centred vision of the world, in which spiritual values count for at least as much as the spur of materialism, has become a precondition for the emergence of genuinely sustainable systems of wealth creation (Porritt 1992: 91).

The political operatives of environmental lobby groups have been the subject of vehement criticism in Australia on the grounds that they are too prepared to sell out to the practices of 'mainstream' politics. The development of a professional elite network comprising of employees of Australia's two environmental peak bodies, the Australian Conservation Foundation and The Wilderness Society, has been characterised by Timothy Doyle as a markedly sinister development.[15]

> The power of the movement seems now to be in the hands of a small group of professional élites who, in turn, are far more interested in dealing with their counterparts in government than generating grassroots action.....The professional élite speaks the same language, utilises the same arguments, and is beginning to think the same way as the governors of our society. No more arguments about wilderness; no more talk of scientific diversity; instead the game is mainstream politics: deals, bargaining, pragmatism and money .... (The) élites, ... on their rise to power, brought with them an ideological package reflecting mainstream values. Means are not especially important to the élites. Ends - short-term ones - are top priority (Doyle 1991: 30).

Green consumerism, and the professed environmentalism of capitalist enterprises is generally greeted with great scepticism and suspicion.[16] Unless accompanied by appropriate changes in moral consciousness, these developments are to be regarded as cynical and manipulative exercises to lull consumers into a false sense of security. Porritt, for example, expresses

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[15] For other examples of such criticism, see (Arnold 1989; Beder 1992).

[16] The March 1991 edition of *Chain Reaction*, a magazine published by Friends of the Earth in Australia, contains a number of articles critical of corporate and professionalised environmentalism.

concern about the 'political and moral ambivalence of some of today's trendier variations on the green theme'. He regards green consumerism as problematic as long as it 'allows people to suppose that there is nothing wrong, philosophically or spiritually with the way we relate to the Earth' (Porritt 1992: 88).

Each of these less normative environmental activities are also regarded as myopic in that the exclusive focus on environmental problems means that little attention is paid to the broader constellation of concerns that constitute the green normative identity. According to Dobson:

> Fundamentally, ecologism takes seriously the universal condition of the finitude of the planet and asks what kinds of political, economic and social practices are (a) possible and (b) desirable within that framework. Environmentalism, typically, does no such thing (Dobson 1990: 205).

These arguments that downgrade technocratic environmental management, professionalised lobby politics and the greening of business, industry and farming are frequently made in the context of addressing green audiences.

4.3. A Rhetorical Interpretation of Green Politics

Greens most definitely *identify themselves* in terms of values. But the rhetorical approach interprets this fact quite differently to value identity approaches. It is possible to suggest some rather different ways of approaching many of the issues raised in Chapter 1. Firstly, self-identification in terms of universal values serves some useful political functions. Secondly, a rhetorical approach allows us to suggest further reasons why greens engage in certain types of political action, as particular actions are well suited to the skills of normative rhetoric. Finally, it is possible to offer a different reading of the relationship between green politics and its new middle class support base.

4.3.1. The Rhetorical Functions of Green Values

A rhetorical framework allows us to ask what it is that greens are doing when they invoke values as a basis of identity. When addressing audiences beyond their own constituency, greens are engaged in attempts

to appropriate and reinterpret the meanings of values that are already widely recognised and shared in western democracies. As Offe (1985: 849) notes, most green values are uncontroversial, it is the green interpretation of these values that is politically significant. The green movements' political sales pitch uses established universalist values as a rhetorical springboard. Greens argue that if autonomy, equality and participation are worthwhile, then green politics represents the most appropriate and contemporary expression of these values.

In the context of addressing green activists, the rhetorical nature of green values is also quite obvious. The starkness of the language adopted by Bahro, Bookchin, Kelly and Porritt is intended to exhort audiences to choose, or confirm commitment to the green cause (Coleman & Coleman 1993). The discourse of values serves as a means of identifying audience commonality. Indeed, under conditions of normative primacy, the invocation of values is the most rhetorically effective means of establishing commonality.

But most interestingly, when we adopt a rhetorical perspective on the role of values, the connection between the ideological diversity and the value identity of green politics is no longer a mystery. By identifying themselves in terms of values, greens are able to accommodate the ideological differences such as those between 'pure' greens, rainbow greens and socialist greens. This point is clearly illustrated from the evidence in Capra and Spretnak's interview with August Haussleiter, one of the founders of *die Grünen*. From their account it seems that the four basic principles, which have become a cornerstone of statements of green identity, originated as a way of circumventing serious ideological differences among participants at the 1979 Offenbach convention.

> I myself had been almost desperate with the situation because there were 3,000 people screaming their own positions in the convention hall. .... Although agreement seemed impossible, I took a piece of paper and wrote four (in German) words on it: ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence. Then I called together Gruhl (a leader of the conservatives) and Reents (a leader of the radical left) in the room where the journalists were and said, "Sign." We then went back into the convention hall and announces, "We have a program!" (quoted in Capra & Spretnak 1984: 36).

This account bears out the rhetorical functions of values highlighted by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in the previous chapter. As such, the reason value self-identifications need to be taken seriously has more to do their capacity to mean different things to different people than their specificity.

However, greens also use values rhetorically in order to make and maintain political distinctions. From the discussion in Section 4.1 above it is clear that the green 'theory' of values closely resembles the characterisation of green values found in the academic literature in the respects I have outlined above. In fact, there is significant cross referencing between activist and academic work. Hutton (1987b) and Beder (1992) both take their definition of the content of paradigms from Cotgrove's depiction, but it is also apparent that academic characterisations of green paradigms borrow heavily from green self-descriptions. Given these parallels, it should not be surprising that greens also deploy techniques of value distinction and standards of value consistency and deviance in their accounts of political activity. The case study reported in the following chapters provides a good example of the ways in which these techniques are applied by greens in specific debates.

4.3.2. Green Political Participation

A characterisation of green politics in terms of value ambiguity and primacy fits with the evidence regarding styles of political participation. Mass political protest and organised symbolic actions are forms of political participation particularly suited to normative primacy. The ability of the green movement to mobilise widespread support for focused campaigns demonstrates the efficacity of normative rhetoric in particular contexts. The Franklin Dam dispute in Tasmania illustrates well the political potency of normative campaigning. Anti-dam campaigners were able to deploy normative reasoning to capture the attention of a national audience and to persuade a significant portion of that audience. The widespread public opposition generated by this campaign was a crucial

factor in preventing the construction of the dam.[17] In contexts such as this, the ambiguity of values is definitely advantageous for greens in that it serves to maximise their support, particularly among the urban middle class.

The capacity to mount organised articulations of normative criticisms and justification has been a noteworthy strength of the green political movement. Universalistic values facilitate high levels of inclusiveness in these actions, mitigating against the exclusivity of particularistic identities. Normative arguments in public political discourse have been a constant feature of western democratic politics, notwithstanding significant changes in the value vocabularies over time. Greens have been highly skilled in the articulation of arguments that invoke shared values. In this respect, it could be argued, they may possess a significant advantage over other participants in the political process who, for various reasons, have not developed the same capability to argue on normative grounds, or who rely on normative standards that are less convincing now than they may have been previously.

Under the rhetorical approach, the capacity to articulate normative concerns can be considered as a political skill commensurate with the ability to mount technically rational arguments. Command of the normative repertoire is a resource that can be mobilised by green activists in their dealings with other political actors and amongst themselves. In this respect, the rhetorical approach dovetails with those elements of resource mobilization that emphasise the the role of social movements in the development of political skills and capacities.[18] However, the rhetorical approach differs significantly from resource mobilization in that it identifies normative skills as potentially more central to the movement's activities than pragmatic, tactical calculation. Under conditions of value primacy, these criteria are less significant. This

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[17] The success of the campaign to prevent construction of the dam also required the mobilisation of non-normative arguments to other audiences, such as the Federal government.

[18] Inglehart, particularly in his earlier work *The Silent Revolution* (1977) places much emphasis on the skill component of postmaterialist politics.

contrasts with the preferred stance of resource mobilization theorists who tend to regard the normative features of social movement activity (what they call ideology) as an impediment to effective utilisation of resources (Downey 1986).

4.3.3. Value Primacy and Social Bases of Green Politics

The rhetorical approach also sheds some light on another issue raised in Chapter 1. If we regard the green constituency as an audience with a high degree of value primacy, this gives us a useful framework for understanding the social-structural characteristics of green support in terms of values, without assuming that green politics is fundamentally derived from values. The consistent findings regarding the social bases of green politics have been that green support is concentrated among those born since the second world war, those with tertiary education, and those who work in white collar non-productivist occupations. Instead of approaching the topic of social bases in terms of who possesses green values as identifiable attributes, we can ask the question in terms of what type of audience is responsive to rhetorical appeals invoking green values.

Drawing on the discussion presented in Chapter 3, we can start by looking at the relationship between tertiary education and green politics. In that chapter we noted the general finding that ideological consistency, however defined, is strongly correlated with higher educational levels. It is not surprising that the tertiary educated show the highest levels of adoption of a broad green package that covers not only environmentalist orientations but favourable positions on the range of social movement issues gathered under the green umbrella. Thus, green political programmes that cover this range of issues appeal primarily to an educated constituency that have learnt to recognise and appreciate the interconnections between issues pertaining to the environment, nuclear power, women, indigenous people and participatory democracy.

Having said this, it is also clear that the green constituency is not drawn evenly from all sectors of the tertiary educated. In the 1990 survey of the British Green Party membership, graduates in arts, social sciences and biology were significantly over-represented, constituting a total of around

60% of all graduate members of the party, in comparison to around 35% of British student enrollments in 1988-89 (Rüdig, Bennie & Franklin 1991: 23). The areas of study most under-represented in green party membership included business, law, engineering and medicine. This indicates that the green package has a closer affinity to the types of knowledge accessible through training in arts, social sciences and biology. This educational profile is also reflected in the occupational data. Occupations most frequently associated with the green constituency include teachers, artists, cultural specialists, academics, journalists, and those in occupations closely related to the monitoring and management of environmental conditions. The green profile does not generally include entrepreneurs or engineers. From this evidence we can suggest that green normative repertoires are *learnt* or *acquired* in particular social and cultural environments.

The findings about generational differences in political orientations can also be related to the content of normative repertoires. The generational factor becomes relevant when we consider that normative rhetorical criteria are not static. A reasonable interpretation of findings that purport to show generational value change is that the rhetorical repertoires of each generation are different in significant respects to those of its predecessor. Different age cohorts have differing opportunities to develop particular standards of normative rationality. From a rhetorical perspective Inglehart's findings regarding age can be used to suggest that the postwar generation deploys a significantly different value repertoire to that used by the prewar generation.

This is a more plausible alternative to the interpretation of value change in terms of an ahistorical notion of personal need satisfaction. A rhetorical interpretation suggests that the types of normative stances taken by citizens in western democracies are closely tied to historical circumstances.[19] Following Eckersley (1989), we could suggest some of the

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[19] Indeed, Inglehart's items could be seen as standards which have had valency in particular historical circumstances. They capture differences in normative evaluations between the standards of the 1940s and 1950s on the one hand, and those of the 1960s and 1970s on the other. Some authors who have used Inglehart's theories more recently are suggesting that the battery is unable to pick up on significant differences between the

newer components of this repertoire that are a product of the common experiences of postwar generations. The emergence of the green package of values owes much to scientific and technological developments in which new forms of knowledge have been established, long-term experience of welfare capitalism, the cold war, internationalisation of economies, communication and culture, all of which have given rise to new forms of normative evaluation.

A rhetorical interpretation of the social location of the green constituency, therefore, has much in common with the interpretation advanced by Offe, Eckersley and Goul Andersen. It also resonates with Gouldner's notion of a class of humanistic intellectuals who perceive the world as a whole, and participate in a culture of critical discourse. But there is an additional element of these accounts that is more difficult to swallow. These authors have interpreted the social location of the green constituency as an indication of this constituency's potential to see more clearly the structural contradictions of industrial societies. On this basis the new middle class are allegedly more prepared to be mobilising agents of change.

This is most explicitly apparent in Robyn Eckersley's article (1989) in which she posits adherence to radical green politics as both a reflection of the capacity to perceive the ecological crisis, and as a measure of virtue. As she points out, there are significant numbers of the new middle class who do not adopt the normative stance identified as virtuous. Eckersley contends that this is because the adoption of an altruistic, ecocentric worldview is a *potential* facilitated by new class location, and that this potential is often unrealised. In other words, it comes down to the choice of individuals as to whether or not this altruistic potential is realised. As Eckersley expresses it, '(t)o answer the question as to why *particular* individuals take the step of embracing an ecocentric world-view would require an exploration of the realms of *personal* consciousness and experience and individual psychological make-up' (Eckersley 1989: 223). A

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normative standards of those who entered early adulthood in the 1960s and 1970s and those who have come of age in the 1980s and 1990s (Reimer, 1988; 1989).

significant proportion of the new class is simply content to continue to adopt basically selfish political orientations.[20] This is part of an effort to suggest that the radical green worldview is the benchmark normative orientation to 'the world' available to the new class, and that other responses must be judged as normatively deficient in relation to it.[21]

Such formulations warrant a healthy degree of scepticism. Even if we grant a degree of 'objective reality' to the social and ecological crisis as diagnosed by Eckersley, the green repertoire of values is one, but by no means the only, normative response to these changing social and historical conditions. Neo-conservatism and a resurgence of evangelistic Christianity have also emerged contemporaneously with green politics, both in response to the same societal conditions and as a counterpoint to green responses.[22] Furthermore, it is doubtful that the majority of the green constituency have achieved the type of green consciousness that Eckersley sets as the standard. As I have argued in Chapter 2, the suggestion of an objective green standard which actors approximate, generates a far more exclusive characterisation of the green movement.

A rhetorical reading of the social characteristics of the green constituency supports a somewhat more modest, but less exclusive interpretation. Green audiences are constituted by those who have acquired the cultural background to recognise elements of the green value repertoire and the interconnections between them. They are audiences that can be appealed to on the basis that values are better reasons for political preferences than any other type of reason. As such, the rhetorical approach offers an account of the social bases of green politics that focuses on the acquisition of normative competencies, without specifying a benchmark for the content of normative orientations.

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[20] Here she draws upon Gouldner's characterisation of the new class as 'morally ambivalent' in that it has the tendency to pursue both emancipation *and* self-interest (Gouldner, 1979: 83).

[21] This is what Eckersley sets out to argue in *Environmentalism and Political Theory* (1992).

[22] See (Minkenberg & Inglehart 1989).

4.4. Questions for a Case Study

I do not wish to suggest that value primacy is somehow endemic or inevitable in green politics. However, my concern in this chapter has been to establish that habits of value primacy are sufficiently strong in green self-description to warrant further investigation. I would now like to turn my attention to how these habits influence the conduct of green politics. Habits of normative primacy are typically expressed through the political pre-occupation with diagnosing normative character or normative integrity and the emphasis placed upon 'conversion' as a mechanism of social change. Yet there is ample scope in such a normative repertoire for the types of common sense dilemmas and contradictions identified by Billig. The co-existence of diversity and consensus, or emancipation and community, or harmony and self-realisation, in the same package of values indicate the potential for conflicting normative interpretations between greens.

As we have seen, a significant theme of green self-description is that political objectives are often defined in terms of implementing green value rationality. However, there is no agreed 'political greenprint' which can be put into action. One way of thinking about green value implementation, in the absence of any such greenprint, is to regard green political practice as an experimental site for this value rationality. There are few political contexts that would satisfy ideal experimental conditions, as far as greens are concerned, given the pervasiveness of modes of political conduct that are derived from the principles of the old paradigm. One set of circumstances that could satisfy experimental conditions, however, is the establishment of new green organisations from scratch. In this context, greens are not in the position of having to reform existing structures. Without such external constraints, greens sharing a commitment to the formation of a political organisation would appear to have the perfect opportunity to act in accordance with their value rationality.

Green parties, therefore, are an appropriate site for the investigation of normative rationality, given the explicitness with which their founders

regard them, ideally, as the embodiment of green values. This is indicated by the following quote from the Federal Program of the German Greens.

> Grassroots-democratic politics means an increased realization of decentralized, direct democracy. We start from the belief that the decisions at the grassroots level must, in principle, be given priority. We grant far-reaching powers of autonomy and self-administration to decentralized, manageable grassroots units..... We have decided to create a new type of party structure, one founded on the inseparable concepts of grassroots democracy and decentralization. We believe that a party lacking this type of structure would be ill-suited to support convincingly an ecological policy in the framework of parliamentary democracy (quoted in Capra & Spretnak 1984: 37).

The task for the remainder of this thesis is to investigate the influence of normative identity and rationality upon green political activity. In doing so I explore the dynamics of normative primacy played out in the contexts of green parties, and specifically in the processes of green party formation. By narrowing the focus of study in this way, I wish to draw attention to an area of green politics which, with the exception of the work of Kitschelt and Doherty, has been largely unexplored. This analysis will show that there are significant unintended consequences and perverse effects that can be traced to habits of value primacy.

Chapter 5: Green Value Ambiguity and Primacy in an Australian Context

This chapter explores the themes of normative ambiguity, value primacy and the dilemmatic quality of green rhetoric. In this chapter I explore the particular ambiguities of green values that relate to the formation of an Australian green party, in order to highlight the problems that arise from regarding green values as a basis for political organisation. My analysis focuses on a series of discussions and debates which took place over a four month period in mid 1991 among Australian greens who were interested in establishing a national organisational framework for conducting electoral politics. This situation provides a useful test case of the relationship between values and political organisation.

The first part of this chapter is spent outlining the background of Australian green politics and the issues that were being debated among Australian greens at this time. This is followed by a description of a particular setting in which these discussions and debates were recorded through the medium of a public access computer conference. In this set of circumstances, I show how green values and principles clearly form the foundation of a shared rhetorical common sense. Values can be seen to constitute the best type of reasons in these computer network debates. However, the shared repertoire of values highlight the differences rather than the similarities between greens. Far from being readily apparent, the implications of green values and the normative character of actors, processes and structures are the subjects of vigorous contestation. In the case study widespread value ambiguity can be observed at a number of levels. Firstly, contestation over particular issues among greens indicates that the same set of normative principles are readily harnessed to support opposing positions. Secondly, there are significant dilemmas embedded in the common sense of green normative discourse. These ambiguities ensure that under conditions of political dispute, the role of green values in the conduct of green politics is highly problematic.

5.1. The Argumentative Context

5.1.1. Australian Green Politics 1991

The material in this chapter is taken from discussions among Australian greens who wished to establish some form of green political formation and co-ordination. These discussions took place during the winter of 1991, approximately twelve months prior to the eventual launch of 'The Greens' in August 1992.[1] The March 1990 federal election had been widely regarded as an election in which the green issues moved to the centre of the Australian political stage (Bean, McAllister & Warhurst 1990). This federal election was held nine months after the historic formation in the state of Tasmania of a parliamentary 'Accord' between five Green Independent parliamentarians, including the internationally renowned Dr Bob Brown, and the Australian Labor Party.[2] However, despite the presence of such highly favourable conditions, and in contrast to developments in many western industrialised countries, greens in Australia had not come together to form a unified political party. Instead, in the 1990 Federal Election, a plethora of candidates stood under a variety of green banners.

In the state of New South Wales, no less than ten different groups stood for the 1990 federal election using the word 'Green' or a derivation thereof. Of these, six were local formations who wished to restrict their scope to particular lower house electorates. These local groups reflected the green emphasis on localised participatory democracy. However, the other four groupings were competing directly with each other at a statewide level. This contributed to the overriding impression of fragmentation of the green political effort, which was reflected in the

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[1] The Greens are a federation of state based green parties from Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the A.C.T. The Western Australian Greens, the only green group represented in Federal Parliament, is not a member of this national green party.

[2] In the 1989 Tasmanian election, Green Independents received over 17% of the vote, which under Tasmania's proportional representation translated into five seats in the thirty-five seat lower house.

decision of environmental peak bodies to endorse the Australian Democrats in preference to any of these groupings in NSW.

The development of a green electoral presence had taken different courses in different states. In Tasmania and Western Australia, greens had organised under single statewide bodies. In most other states, forums had been established in which already existing groups could interact and possibly co-operate at elections. These umbrella bodies, usually called Green Alliances, were networks of suburban, electorate-based, regional and statewide groups. Some viable co-operative arrangements between different green groups had occurred at more local levels. In Queensland, most existing green groups were part of the Green Alliance that contested the Brisbane City Council elections in 1991, and whose lord mayoral candidate, Drew Hutton, attracted 7.4% of the vote.[3]

The possibility of a co-ordinated national political formation had long been on the agenda in the Australian new social movement arena, as the 1980s witnessed a number of attempts to establish a presence in electoral politics at a national level. The first such concerted attempt, the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP), achieved spectacular electoral results, including the election of Western Australian candidate Jo Vallentine to the Senate, within six months of its formation in 1984.[4] Yet by mid-1985 the party had effectively disintegrated in all states except NSW and the Australian Capital Territory. In 1986, two new initiatives from different parts of the social movement sector, attempted to draw the various strands of movement politics together (Taylor 1989). Neither of the

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[3] The Brisbane City Council is by far the largest local government in Australia, with coverage of the majority of the greater Brisbane urban area, servicing a population of around one million.

[4] Characteristically, the NDP has been regarded as a single issue party, and during its brief time in the sun, its public pronouncements were predominantly related to nuclear issues. However, its candidates, memberships and support base could easily be considered as green in the wider sense. Vallentine stood for the Western Australian Greens in 1990, and at that time Garrett was president of the Australian Conservation Foundation.

resultant organisations, the New Left Party and the Rainbow Alliance, made any significant impact at a national level.[5]

In April 1991, a group of green activists including Bob Brown, Jo Vallentine and Drew Hutton initiated moves to convene a national meeting of green groups which were interested in the formation of a green electoral presence at the national level. This meeting, known as the National Greens Meeting, took place in Sydney on the weekend of August 17-18, 1991. A criterion for participation in this meeting was support for the proscription of members of other parties from green party membership. Proscription had been a highly contentious issue dating back at least as far as the NDP's first national conference in 1985. Failure to reach agreement on this issue was the biggest contributing factor in the NDP's subsequent disintegration. The proscription issue also contributed to the stillbirth of initial attempts to form the New Left Party in 1986 (Taylor 1989). Now in 1991, the issue had emerged as a significant stumbling block to co-ordination amongst greens. The common denominator to the all these disputes was the prospective involvement of members of a particular group, the Democratic Socialist Party, which had been known as the Socialist Workers Party prior to 1989. A number of DSP members were active in various local and state green groupings.

Many greens, including most of the convenors of the National Greens Meeting, regarded the involvement of these activists with suspicion, noting that the DSP had acquired a reputation for conducting takeovers of successful social movement organisations.[6] Other greens, however, felt that DSP members had made very valuable contributions to particular green campaigns, and to their local groups and parties. Some other groups

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[5] Of the two, the Rainbow Alliance was closer to the typical mode of a 'new politics' or green political party (the New Left party also having emerged from the remnants of the Communist Party of Australia). The choice of name 'Rainbow Alliance' involved a deliberate decision against using the term green, because it was thought by many delegates to the 1986 conference to be too closely tied to environmental issues with not enough emphasis upon other social movement concerns (Taylor 1989).

[6] This suspicion was vindicated when the DSP made a successful attempt to takeover the Queensland Green Network in August 1991 and an unsuccessful attempt to takeover the NSW Green Alliance in March 1992.

who accepted invitations to the National Greens Meeting were not sure of their position at the time of the meeting and preferred the issue of proscription to be discussed at the meeting. Some participants hoped that more groups could be involved in the process if outright opposition to proscription was moderated (for example by allowing party membership, but barring eligibility for office bearing positions).

The second issue of major concern was the structure of the party to be formed. Many greens favoured a unified body in the form of a federation of state parties, with a range of national co-ordinating functions including policy formulation, publication of a national newsletter, and co-ordinated research on green issues. Most of the convenors of the National Greens Meeting supported such a 'unitarist' structure. Others advocated a loose network model in which the structure would be limited to facilitating communication between local groups and would have no role beyond this. These 'localists' were wary of setting up national structures because they believed that these structures would disempower existing local green groups. Another version of a localist model was that of 'confederation' in which the national structure would have some administrative functions, but no capacity to determine policy.

Divisions over the two issues were highly correlated, though not identical. Those who favoured proscription and a party with national functions included the Queensland and Tasmanian delegates, those Western Australians aligned with Vallentine, and some NSW delegates from regional areas beyond Sydney (Campbell 1991). Others from Western Australia supported some form of proscription but wanted a localist organisation. Localist models were also supported by many NSW groups, particularly Sydney-based groups who contended that decisions over proscription should be made at the local, not the national level. Localists were quite prepared to enter into dialogue with the unitarists, in the hope that they could influence the shape of the emergent organisation. For their part, the convenors did not wish to exclude the localists, as the viability of the party in both New South Wales and Western Australia would be severely diminished without them. Although some localists had reservations about proscription, they nevertheless accepted the invitation to participate in the National Greens Meeting, hoping the issue

could be resolved there.[7] The Victorian and South Australian delegates were against proscription (Campbell 1991), and expressed concerns about potential of a national green party to exclude other groups (Brewer 1991a). These delegates represented their state Green Alliances which included DSP members, but were invited to the meeting so that there would be some representation from these states.

Another background concern of participants in discussions about green party formation was that of access to electoral registration. Concerns were raised by those who did not want to be part of a more centralised party with proscription, that the emergent organisation would prevent or inhibit the use of the word 'green' by others (Brewer 1991a). Under Australian electoral law, there is no restriction on the use of particular words such as green, provided that the full names of parties wishing to use the word are different.[8] Nevertheless, there was a common perception that any group wishing to be known as 'a' green party would be seen by the rest of the movement and the general public as 'the' green party. Any recognition afforded to the emergent party which included the likes of Vallentine and Brown was likely to be detrimental to others who wished to use the name green. The convenors and their supporters also regarded the existence of green parties competing on the same patch as bad public relations. This perception created pressure to keep as many groups involved in the process as possible in order to avoid the prospect of competing green parties.

Much of the discussion and debate about these issues was actually conducted publicly, in both the lead-up and the aftermath of the meeting. Some of this dialogue between many of the central characters in the negotiations has been recorded in the form of a computer conference. Thus, it is possible to gain a very detailed impression of the types of arguments that were put forward regarding these issues at the time. The

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[7] The exception being the delegate from the North Shore Greens who walked out after the two members from groups opposed to proscription were barred (Brewer 1991a).

[8] Only in NSW state electoral laws is there a restriction of the right to use the word green built into electoral registration.

conference, therefore, is of significant interest as a source of rhetorical material in which we can have a detailed look at the ways in which values are deployed in the conduct of green politics.

5.1.2. The Audience: 'Greens Policy and Networking Forum'

The Greens Policy and Networking Forum (hereafter grns.oz.forum) is a public access computer conference facilitated by the Pegasus computer conferencing network (see Appendix) with the purpose of providing a space for discussions about green political co-ordination and/or party formation. Grns.oz.forum is a unique source of material in which dialogue and debate among greens is recorded. The type of dialogue captured by grns.oz.forum ranges from spontaneous and unstructured postings to editorially polished contributions similar to articles or letters in printed publications. The length, tone and purpose of the postings all vary significantly, and the norms governing this novel form of communication are in the early stages of their evolution. Articles and documents from other publications are often contributed as postings. In the period in question, a number of articles from the newspaper *Green Left Weekly* were submitted.[9] Utilisation of the conference has also been subject to variation and fluctuation. There have been perhaps a dozen frequent contributors, but around a hundred participants who have made contributions at one time or another. Utilisation rose steadily in the two years after the establishment of the conference in 1989, reaching a peak between June and September 1991, but participation dropped markedly with the establishment of a private conference in September 1991 to discuss party formation and has remained relatively quiet since that time.[10] In the June to September period, the equivalent of well over five hundred pages of material was posted to the public conference. As such,

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[9] This publication is generally perceived in Australian green circles to be the mouthpiece of the DSP, although editors continually stress that it is not a DSP newspaper, but a broad platform for green and left activists generally. Nevertheless, the publication is largely financed and resourced by the DSP.

[10] From October 1990 to May 1991 inclusive, 28 topics and 13 responses to grns.oz.forum were posted (an average of 5 postings per month). In the period from June to September 1991, 74 topics and 79 responses were posted (38 per month). From October 1991 to April 1992, 20 topics and 34 responses were submitted (8 per month).

grns.oz.forum has been a widely utilised vessel for Australian intra-green discussion regarding the salient issues at that time.

This source of material is particularly well suited to a rhetorical analysis. One of the advantages is the quick turnaround between submission of a posting and its appearance on the network. This facilitates quick responses, and in so doing creates a form of communication that is much more amenable to dialogue between correspondents than printed material. Such a form of communication can function as a more effective forum for debate than newspapers or magazines for whom the facilitation of debate is logistically more difficult. It also makes possible a different kind of public debate than is typical of verbal communicative forums such as radio, television or public meetings. Responses may be more 'considered', and not subject to the same communicative norms as verbal communication. Dialogue can also take place without the presence of a moderator or facilitator. Grns.oz.forum contributions are also public, in that anyone subscribing to the Pegasus network has access to them. The conduct of the debates and arguments, therefore, must be considered as taking place in a public, and not a private context.

Another feature that meshes well with a rhetorical methodology is the absence of researcher intervention. The analyst does not need to consider any 'interviewer effect' that would have to be taken into account if the material were collected by interview. Specifically, there is no question that the orator's rhetoric may be tailored to appeal to the standards and commonplaces of the interviewer. Thus, it is possible to make relatively straightforward assumptions about the audience that grns.oz.forum orators have in mind.

Contributors to grns.oz.forum could be confident that they were addressing a sympathetic audience that did not include significant portions of members who are antagonistic or highly ambivalent to the green cause. It could also be assumed that those utilising the conference wished to see the emergence of a green electoral formation, as this had been the expressed purpose of the conference. Thus, there are few discussions about the desirability of organised electoral and political

participation per se.[11] From this pool of activists, a few other limitations can be noted. Participation in the forum was limited to green activists who are computer literate to some degree. The geographic distribution of contributors is mostly limited to New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia, which reflects to a large extent the development of interstate green political networks at an informal level at that time. Victorian and South Australian activists had only been weakly integrated into such networks, as was indicated by their minimal representation at the August meeting. Of those involved in the national debates, only contributions from Tasmanian activists are noticeably absent from the conference discussions.

The debates conducted through grns.oz.forum cover a wide range of perspectives, interests and positions relevant to the issues of proscription, structure, and the national process. They provide a clear indication of the range and content of rhetoric that can be used to address an audience who share an interest in developing green electoral participation. The public nature of grns.oz.forum is of central significance in this thesis. No doubt a different range of rhetorical language can be deployed in private discussions between greens, but that is not our concern here. As I seek to show in Chapter 6, the range of acceptable public rhetoric among green activists has a significant effect upon the ways in which green activists interpret and evaluate their political experiences, and the ways in which they can react to, and seek to shape their political circumstances.

For all of the above reasons, grns.oz.forum provides an excellent example of a forum in which to investigate the use of values. There is plenty of evidence that contributors to grns.oz.forum adopt a highly normative language in order to identify with their audience. An early posting to grns.oz.forum in 1989 provides a succinct formulation of the shared values of this audience of Australian greens.[12]

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[11] In Australia, the Friends of the Earth magazine *Chain Reaction* has been the main sounding board for anti-electoral arguments. See (O'Loughlin 1990 ; Martin 1989).

[12] See Appendix for details about the system of referencing computer conference material.

> Green politics is not only different in what it has to say but in its approach. It signals an end to the backroom deals with those having vested interests. It heralds a new driving force - that of the co-operative power of millions of people previously denied real access to political decision-making. Green politics must be consistently and resolutely democratic. Public representatives of our movement must truly represent the movement, not simply themselves. .... An open and democratic approach allows this diverse political movement to begin the discussion now that will allow us to reach agreement on proposals and solutions over time. Working through this to build a broad, inclusive movement poses a real challenge to all shades of greens; to leave behind the old discredited politics and stake out a new claim in the politics of ensuring a future (Green Political Network 1989b).

This extract was taken from an article entitled 'Principles and Aims for a Green Political Movement'. Similar formulations appear wherever particular groups announce to the green public who and what they are. These articulations typically appear throughout grns.oz.forum as parts of organisational constitutions, or as proposed general statements that seek to define the nature of green politics.

There are also plenty of references to the normative rationality of green politics. The premise that political activity is to be derived from foundational normative principles is well and truly articulated in the following contribution from a member of the Western Australian Greens.

> The essence of the greens party policies can be summed up as a statement of values. Our values are fundamental in determining our choices in life, and in refining both action and our understanding, both in a general sense, and in specific cases. The priority of values held by an individual constitute their ethics, and hence will reveal much about both policies, the basis for actions, and the direction of future changes in policies and actions. It is therefore worthwhile to outline our value priorities here (River 1991b).

5.2. Contentious Issues and the Ambiguity of Values

In this section, I intend to highlight the ways in which greens articulate normative rhetoric when discussing the issues of proscription, the DSP, organisational structure and the process of party formation. To do so, I have chosen, as much as possible, to utilise direct quotations from the contributors to grns.oz.forum, rather than attempting to paraphrase their comments. Such a preference follows from the methodological requirements of a rhetorical approach, which focuses upon the ways in

which political actors articulate criticism and justification. In this context, paraphrasing is inappropriate.

5.2.1. Proscription

The proscription issue provides the clearest example of the degree to which debates about issues are carried out in normative terms. The most common strategy for opposing proscription was to portray the practice as contrary to green democratic principles. One such argument was mounted by Lisa Macdonald, a member of both the DSP and the Western Suburbs Greens (WSG). WSG was a Sydney local group which opposed proscription and was not invited to the August 1991 national meeting.

> We hope and trust that other autonomous green groups will not be intimidated into non-attendance at the national meeting because they support the green political principle of openness rather than proscription (Macdonald 1991).

In the following quote, an even more extensive list of green democratic principles are invoked rhetorically by Macdonald both to criticise the proscription-based invitation process and to justify her group's attendance at the August meeting. In this quote she explicitly refers to the *shared* nature of green values which, in her view, are violated by the proscription proposal.

> The delegate chosen to represent us at the meeting on the 17-18 will, therefore, be chosen on the bases of their willingness and ability to represent the views of the members of the Western Suburbs Greens, NOT on the basis of their membership or otherwise of another political party. The directive that we do otherwise is yet another example of the totally undemocratic practices which have characterised this whole process of moving towards the formation of a national Greens organisation. To dictate permissible attendance at a meeting which was called to discuss organisational structure (which presumably includes the question of membership) so that particular points of view on the question of membership are prevented from being heard is quite outrageous and must be condemned in action as well as words. Whatever happened to "local autonomy", "grassroots democracy", "participatory decision-making" and all those other green ideals we all espoused so strongly not so long ago?! (Macdonald 1991).

Another frequently raised objection to proscription was based on the assertion that any decision made at the national level would be normatively unacceptable because it would override the autonomy of

local groups. This argument was commonly advanced by opponents of proscription who were not themselves DSP members. According to David Nerlich, a Sydney localist, even limited forms of proscription would be 'an imposition, innocuous or not, upon local groups from outside, or perhaps "above", depending how you look at it' (Nerlich 1991b).

Arguments in favour of proscription show similar recourse to the green normative repertoire. Dhanu River, a contributor from Western Australia, argued that some form of proscription was necessary in order to maintain the 'integrity of the participatory process' (River 1991g). According to this argument, the integrity of participatory decision-making requires that members should participate as individuals, not as representatives of other groups. This theme is developed further by Marit Hegge, a contributor from Queensland. Having asserted that the right to proscribe other political parties is consistent with the principle of autonomy, Hegge makes the following claim.

> I support proscription for my above outlined reasons but also because the sort of Green Party I wish to be part of is one in which I could engage in political and intellectual discussion with free-thinking individuals who are committed to exploring new ways of resolving global conflict nonviolently and to developing appropriate means of caring for this planet and policies to deal with the immediate environmental crises upon us. I am really not interested in having prolonged dialogue in a Green Party with individuals from another party who cannot speak on their own behalf, who are continuously reiterating the beliefs of someone higher up in their organisation and who come to meetings with the aim of manipulating the situation to fit in with their pre-ordained and often conflicting agenda (Hegge 1991b).

As with Macdonald's quote, this extract is also noteworthy for its attempt to draft as many elements of the green normative repertoire as possible, this time in the service of the argument in favour of proscription. In this case, the threats to autonomy and integrity are clearly identifiable in the shape of the DSP, rather than the proposed national structure. Arguing for the normative acceptability of proscription is predicated upon characterising the DSP as a particular type of organisation which merits disqualification on normative grounds.

A comparison between the two sets of arguments clearly shows that the same rhetorical terminology of values and principles are deployed by both

sides. This is often a consciously adopted strategy. For example, one *Green Left* journalist attacked proscription on the basis that '(i)t is unlikely that a viable green party can emerge from a top-down process based on exclusion of sections of a movement that prides itself on its diversity and tolerance' (Painter 1991b). In response, a supporter of proscription countered that '(i)t is, however, certain that a viable green party cannot emerge from a non-proscriptive membership base which is easily manipulated by external groups in pursuit of their own agenda' (Ozols 1991a). The charge that 'external groups' can easily manipulate membership and pursue their own agenda uses the same terminology that was evident in Nerlich's anti-proscription argument.

Indeed, the common content of green value discourse is regularly acknowledged and directly appealed to by participants from both sides of debates. Doug Hine, an advocate of proscription involved in organising the national meeting, responded to Macdonald's rhetorical question of 'whatever happened to all those ideals?' He asserted that '(t)he "ideals", or rather principles, of local autonomy, grassroots democracy, and participatory decision-making are only diminished when tightly organised factions, such as the DSP, seek to abuse them' (Hine 1991c). Both Hine and Macdonald invoke and appeal to the same body of normative common sense in order to present opposing cases.

The above extracts indicate that arguments in favour of proscription are closely intertwined with attempts to discredit the DSP. These attempts to attribute a negative moral character to the DSP cover a range of normative rhetorical strategies. One well rehearsed argument questioned the legitimacy of participation of DSP members on the basis that the organisation adopted what were considered to be anti-environmental stances on certain issues. For example, a NSW contributor regarded the DSP's opposition to population control as evidence of its 'active promotion of anti-environmental ideologies' (Ozols 1991b). A Queensland activist regarded DSP support for industrialised agriculture as sufficiently divergent from green thinking to be problematic (Murrell 1991b).

However, many contributors from both sides of the debate contended that disqualification of the DSP on account of its ideological disposition was not appropriate, in accordance with the principles of diversity and tolerance. Nerlich, who at the time supported the right of the DSP to participate in green political formations, asserted that '(g)enerally people don't try to argue anymore that its somehow a contradiction in terms to be both a socialist and an ecologist' (Nerlich 1991c).[13] As such, he was 'disinclined to alienate some of the more committed and better educated activists merely on the grounds of ideological purity'. Criticism of the DSP's stances on economic, social and environmental issues had been commonplace in the 1980s but the 1991 debate reflected the change in focus.[14] Hence, Hegge argued that '(w)hat the DSP believe in is not the issue. It is the method of operation of a national organisation which is being questioned' (Hegge 1991a).

The tactic more commonly adopted by opponents of the DSP was to focus upon features of its structure and activities in order to cast doubt over its normative credentials. Members of the DSP were not legitimate participants because in their own organisation they operated according to centralist and hierarchical principles. According to one contributor, '(t)he presence of people committed to democratic centralist principles is destructive of participatory decision making' (Wright 1991). Non-DSP activists critically recounted their experience of DSP members operating as a highly disciplined bloc in meetings (Hine 1991c; Ozols 1991a). According to Hegge, membership of such a highly disciplined organisation also amounted to an abandonment of participatory credentials that accrue to 'free-thinking individuals', such that DSP members were 'not truly capable of an independent and non-aligned point of view' (Hegge 1991c).

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[13] Nerlich's attitude to the DSP changed in early 1992 when the DSP attempted an organisational takeover of the NSW Green Alliance.

[14] This was, at least in part, due to the DSP's responses to these criticisms, in which they were quick to accuse their critics of prejudicial and McCarthyist tendencies (Fletcher 1991).

Conversely, the activities of the DSP could also be used to defend its normative character. Nerlich, for example, regarded their involvement in various green campaigns as commendable.

> I support most of the peace, environment and solidarity movements they get involved in, often constituting the force that keeps them going (some would call this "infiltration"). This kind of activity as far as I can tell takes up nearly all of their time (apart from survival-fundraising etc.). They extract no kudos for this work. They tend to keep a low profile because they are aware that people are prejudiced against their economic beliefs' (Nerlich 1991c).

Members of the DSP, however, did not attempt to directly defend their organisation. Instead, they adopted a strategy based on identifying themselves as participants in local green parties, rather than as DSP members. Thus, they defended their participation as legitimate by linking it to the autonomy of local groups, such that any proposals designed to limit their participation could be construed as attacks upon local autonomy. In doing so, they attempted to move the focus of normative attribution away from the DSP, and play off the normative distinction that the localists had established between autonomous local groups and a 'top-down' national process. Once again, this involved shifting the normative spotlight to other phenomena, namely the national process, its convenors and the proposed national structure.

5.2.2. Organisational Structure

Green Left published a number of articles which made extensive use of the repertoire of green values in order to cast doubt on the legitimacy these phenomena. A favoured technique for doing so was to refer to 'dissatisfied participants' of green groups who were critical of the process, and construe these criticisms as grassroots dissent. These participants were usually members of the DSP.

> .... members of the QGN (Queensland Green Network) had expressed dissatisfaction with top-down moves for a national meeting towards formation of a green party. .... The elected office-bearers of the QGN had written to express disapproval of the lack of grassroots democracy in preparations and proposals for the meeting (Sibelle & Fletcher 1991).

Many of these criticisms of the national meeting convenors were advanced in order to delegitimise the push for a unified national party, as those seen to be initiating the proscription-based process were also mostly in favour of a unitarist structure. DSP members were not the only contributors who criticised the national process on normative grounds. Localists used the same elements of the normative repertoire to paint the proposed unified structure as a contravention of green political values. River offered the following articulation of the concerns of some of the Western Australian Greens.

> The Greens (WA) first talked about a national party at a General Meeting in January, 1991, in response to a proposal we were told was put by the Sydney Greens at a meeting of the registration group. At the time, we concluded that we did not like the idea, feeling that it went inherently against the idea of decentralism, and would make real participatory decision-making more difficult than it currently is. We put forward that while we do not see the need for any national organisation, if one came into being, we would prefer that it be along the lines of a network or informal alliance, i.e. basically a forum for communication, not decision-making (River 1991k).

Some members of the NSW Green Alliance noted 'some concern about whether a uniform national structure could presently operate in a grassroots participatory manner' (Nerlich, Eager & Ash 1991), while Hine expressed fears that Brown, Vallentine and the other convenors appeared to be 'pushing for something much more authoritarian' (Hine 1991d). Articles in *Green Left* adopted a much more strident use of green normative rhetorical distinctions, attempting to locate the unified structure squarely in the realm of the dominant paradigm. Painter argues that 'it is unlikely many greens would accept the degree of centralisation necessary to impose such an undemocratic structure' (Painter 1991a). In another article he cited a particularly strong critique.

> Moreover, a number of groups expressed reservations about the structure proposals, and argued for a loose alliance to preserve existing unity and cooperation between diverse groups committed to fundamental green principles. The Lismore-based Richmond Green Alliance wrote to the national meeting organisers, saying: 'We wish to make it clear .... that our group does not support any sort of centralised party structure, or any decisions that are not seen to abide by the four principles, especially any betrayal of grassroots democracy .... there needs to be an Australia-wide Green Network, however we do not see the need for a centralised party structure run along mainstream party lines.' (Painter 1991b).

In the face of such criticism, based as it was upon alleged normative deficiencies, proponents of a unified party were concerned to defend the credentials of their preferred option. In June 1991, a group of Brisbane activists including Hutton, Hegge, and Malcolm Lewis, established the Australian Greens Working Group as part of their push for a national party.

> AGWG would like to see a national organisation comprising state groups with a common constitution and policy framework, agreed upon democratically. Within this constitution and framework states could develop their own structures and constitutions, and policies pertinent to their own agenda. This would satisfy the requirements of autonomy, diversity, and grassroots democracy and participation while also laying a organisational basis for cooperation at a national level (Lewis 1991e).

Hegge adopted similar language in defending the integrity of the unified party proposal. She claimed that 'the original convenors of the process, especially Bob Brown, have stressed how important the participation of grassroots activists is to the success of a party, and reiterated the need for regional autonomy to be built into a party constitution' (Hegge 1991c).

Advocates of a more decentralised structure adopted much the same language to support quite different proposals. Dhanu River maintained that he supported confederation 'as the only form of truly national organisation that is likely to maintain any form of participatory democracy' (River 1991a). Paul Fitzgerald from the Sydney Greens evaluated the competing models and concluded that his proposed network model was the only option which would be 'an achievable workable compromise through which a national organisation could be formed while the autonomy of the local Parties is maintained' (Fitzgerald 1991a).

The localists were not the only contributors who sought to propose that their opponents' preferred model was not in accordance with green political principles. Unitarists repaid in kind. Apart from asserting that a unified party could satisfy principles of autonomy, democracy and participation, and assuring that it would 'not be top-down' (Hegge 1991b), unitarists also found ways to question the normative legitimacy of localist proposals. This was done by claiming that the status of 'local autonomous

group' may not warrant the morally privileged status it had been given by localists, such that a structure based upon local autonomy could easily have un-green implications. Lewis, for example, points to the likelihood that local groups may at times operate outside the bounds of green principles.

> I require that our mutual agreements about such basic principals (sic) not be so wide that anyone could interpret them the way they chose. Thus it follows that I am not prepared to give local branch an unfettered rein to promote whatever policies they wish (Lewis 1991d).

According to Hegge, the interpretation of local autonomy and diversity offered by the localists opens the door to a membership 'including the "green" Liberals, Fred Nile "greens" and multinational corporation lobby groups keen to promote their environmental credentials' (Hegge 1991c).[15] Ian Murrell, who was also one of the Queensland unitarists, contributed another angle of attack on the status of local groups.

> The argument that one of the cornerstones of Green politics is autonomy is both true and false. I like the idea of autonomy for people but not for entities such as groups. To me one of the great unwritten laws of Green politics is co-operation. Autonomous people can co-operate. But to me there will be no, or very slow, co-operation in a tight network of autonomous local groups. Worse still it will be hierarchical (Murrell 1991c).

It should be noted that the defence of the unitarist structure is not predicated on the assertion that such a structure would be *sufficiently* grassroots democratic. Neither side constructs the issue as a matter of degree. Instead, the unitarists argue their case by mirroring the rhetorical strategy of the localists in that they too set out to persuade the audience that of the two competing alternatives, only one is in accordance with green principles, while the other is normatively suspect.

These debates highlight many pertinent points about the relationship between green values and attempts to construct green political organisation. It is clear from these discussions that the various

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[15] The Reverend Fred Nile is a member of the NSW Legislative Council who is commonly identified as a 'morals crusader', and who is well known for his unsympathetic stances to homosexuality and the 'erosion of family values'.

protagonists all appeal to the imprimatur of green values. As such, there is an enormous degree of flexibility in the deployment of the green normative repertoire regarding these issues. Rather than meshing tightly as a coherent system of thought with easily discernible implications, green normative discourse contains a range of rhetorical materials that are, in practice, easily pitted against each other in concrete debates and discussions. Far from being readily discernible, the implications of green political values are frequently the focus of intense political contestation among greens, due to the well developed capacities of activists to exploit the ambiguity and flexibility of normative standards.

5.3. The Rhetorical Primacy of Values

5.3.1. Values and Practicality

Given this pervasive recourse to normative criteria to criticise and justify particular actors, actions, processes and structures, just how significant is normative rationality to rhetorical discourse in grns.oz.forum? It would be misleading to suggest that values and normative principles are the only form in which in which justifications and criticisms are advanced. Non-normative rhetoric can be found in the course of both debates. The most prominent competitor to normative reasoning in the context of building national links and networks is that of practical or pragmatic rationality. There are occasional attempts to give practical considerations greater standing in green rhetoric in relation to value standards. Malcolm Lewis highlighted some of the impracticalities he believed to be implicated in the network model articulated by Fitzgerald, and in the calls for extensive, inclusive participatory mechanisms that were outlined in River's model of confederation.

> A system that takes 2 months to reach a decision might be inclusive but might condemn us to being ineffective. .... Perhaps it would be irresponsible to set up a system that was too cumbersome to apply the crowbar of pressure politics. Where would we be in our negotiations if we were made a great offer 3 weeks before the election, but had to wait 2 months for our membership to respond to plebiscite about the issue? (Lewis 1991d).

However, these non-normative reasons simply do not wash for many contributors, precisely because they are not normative. This move is made

by redefining the issue as simply a choice between implementing and not implementing green principles and highlighting the disastrous effects of the latter option.

> Altogether, I don't see any real problems getting a participatory, consensus-based process going. .... The idea that this is too "idealistic" and "impractical" is a nonsense. We've tried representative systems for a long time, and the 'best' they result in is a clone of "Yes, Minister". At their worst they result in corruption, secrecy, covert action against its citizens, and the sort of repression seen in the fifties McCarthyism, or its correlate Stalinism. The USSR, of course, is also a representative system (River 1991c).

As a useful adjunct to this strategy, arguments invoking practicality may also be countered by re-affirming the moral virtue of the practical difficulties generated by preferred, principled options. Nerlich typifies this reaction in declaring:

> We cannot sacrifice the fundamental principle of grassroots democracy for some expedient notion of nationalism/federalism or the expectations of the media. As far as I'm concerned the more we confound the media with our diversity and lack of centre, the sooner that grassroots message will take hold in the mind of the public (Nerlich 1991a).

The relationship between pragmatism and principled politics can also redefined in terms of how far green principles can 'practically' be implemented. Fitzgerald claims that there are important limits to the scale of participatory democracy, and that the problem with the national model is that it exceeds those limits. As such, attempts to go beyond local implementation of grassroots democracy are too ambitious and unrealistic. He contends that '(t)he difficulty in communication between and within the States and the amount of distrust that has been generated in the past few months indicate that we can't aspire to anything more, but I don't think we should anyway' (Fitzgerald 1991b).

The privileging of normative over practical reasoning is also apparent in the proscription debate. River notes that the involvement of DSP members affords some definite practical benefits, due to the skills these activists brought with them in the areas of meeting facilitation and campaign organisation. According to River, DSP members in Western Australia 'were the only activists that seemed to be able to get the right paper and glue so the posters didn't just fall off' (River 1991l).

Nevertheless, River remains a supporter of proscription, as such practicalities should not override consideration of the DSP's threat to participatory integrity. The same conclusion is reached by a NSW activist.

> It would be great if DSP members could genuinely participate in consensus decision-making, because they have great activist skills and energy. But the history of an organisation is difficult to shed (Wright 1991).

Supporters of proscription could well argue on pragmatic grounds that proscription should be considered as an administrative measure. It is hardly unreasonable for a fledgling organisation to institute measures to protect itself from takeovers by potentially hostile groups, and there was plenty of evidence to suggest that the DSP was such a group. Yet under conditions of value primacy, what would be considered as entirely reasonable pragmatic and self-protective arguments in other settings do not get very far. Such arguments simply do not appear, unless accompanied by the normative gloss regarding the DSP's threat to the spirit of autonomous decision-making. Within the context of grns.oz.forum, all the strong arguments in favour of proscription were based upon values. In order to portray proscription as normatively justifiable, supporters needed either to argue that the DSP was not truly green, or that those who wanted a party with proscription should be free to have one.[16] While practical arguments would appear to be the most straightforward way of justifying proscription, the primacy of values over practicality ensures that it is not the route taken with this audience. These non-normative criteria are not regarded as reasons which can override normative considerations, their only use as rhetorical resources is to support positions that have already been advanced on principled grounds.

5.3.2. Normative Primacy and Rhetorical Skill

The grns.oz.forum debates also indicate that 'mastery' of the normative repertoire is a highly useful capacity, and that the ability to deploy green normative rhetoric is a prerequisite for participation in public debate

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[16] This argument is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6.

among greens. One manifestation of rhetorical skill is the capacity to lodge normative identifications in more subtle ways than the sort of arguments that explicitly seek to show how X is democratic, or how Z undermines autonomy. There are some standard rhetorical ploys in which phenomena are characterised as possessing or lacking normative integrity by their very definition. The term 'local autonomous groups' is a typical example of this move. Local groups are invested with normative integrity, not by virtue of anything that they have done, but through the language by which they are defined. This term is loaded with the implication that anything that is seen to threaten these groups can then be categorised as normatively suspect. Similar efforts are made to give some phenomena labels which have inbuilt negative evaluations such as 'centralised structures' and 'highly disciplined groups', in the hope that these labels will become the standard for identifying such entities.

With this in mind it is not surprising that many of these attempts to attribute normative character by definitional fiat are resisted by those whom they are directed against. If the label 'local autonomous groups' was to stick as an accepted way of identifying individual green groups, the task of those arguing against a network structure would be made all the more difficult. Lewis was well aware of the political importance of control of language.

> .... we believe that the wording in Doug Hine's letter, "local autonomous green parties" preempts a decision to be made at the August meeting or at a subsequent agreed upon forum. Not only are we opposed to the precedent of assuming such an important issue, we also strongly concerned about this vague and naive wording. The phrase is ambiguous but would even seem to indicate a preference for a network or alliance structure rather than a party. If this is the case, we would strongly oppose this unilateral decision (Lewis 1991e).

The deployment of normative rhetoric is also significant in the building and breaking of alliances among greens. In this sense, skilful use of the normative repertoire can help establish or cement coalitions with regard to specific issues. DSP members' deployment of the term 'local autonomous group', for example, signified the connection between them and the localists.

Another element of normative rhetorical skill is the capacity to deploy standards of value integrity, consistency and rationality that can be readily recognised and adopted by green audiences. From the evidence in this chapter, it seems that members of the DSP are the most skilful greens in this respect. This supplements the assessment that these participants were relatively highly skilled in other aspects of green activity. Their preparedness to present normative arguments in the most vehement tones highlights the extent of their normative virtuosity. A *Green Left* article posted in the aftermath of the National Greens Meeting contained the following quote from Lisa Macdonald, which is a good example of 'pulling all stops out' rhetorically.

> What we saw in operation was no more than the first stage in a grab for the exclusive control of the name 'green' electorally, using methods more in common with the old, top-down, politics of power-grabs, behind-the-scenes manoeuvres, ultimatums and brinksmanship than with new politics based on diversity, participatory democracy and accountability (Brewer 1991b).

As we have seen throughout this case-study, this is something which DSP contributors were wont to do quite regularly when under threat. But they were by no means the only contributors to adopt a heightened tone of moral indignation. Commenting on reports he had heard about the National Greens Meeting, River made known that '(m)y objection and strong disquiet is based primarily on the process, which I see as aggressive, devisive (sic), unrepresentative, and totally antithetical to the values I hold' (River 1991h). Referring to the outcome of the meeting on the issue of proscription (which River supported), he protested.

> .... where a decision, or series of decisions is pushed through with such haste and force, that they leave a metaphorical "trail of bodies", the process probably goes against both the principle of participatory democracy, and that of non-violence in its wider sense. These are two of the four principles that are, at this time, the only elements the Greens purportedly hold in common (River 1991h).

This statement highlights both the creativity and force with which the normative repertoire is utilised in these discussions, in addition to its emphasis upon the value foundations of green politics.

Thus, the debates of grns.oz.forum typify a discursive context characterised by high degrees of normative primacy. For this audience, rhetorical persuasiveness is ultimately contingent upon demonstrating the principled nature of one's point of view, in contrast to unprincipled or inadequately principled alternatives.

5.4. Ambiguities in the Normative Repertoire

The above accounts of the debates over proscription and structure revealed substantial elasticity in the normative interpretation of specific proposals, events and actions. This should hardly be surprising, keeping in mind Billig's claim that any repertoire of common sense has the potential for ambiguous and contradictory evaluations. This insight is confirmed when we investigate normative ambiguity at another level, beyond the specific argumentative contexts discussed above. There are a number of 'types of actors', including individuals, groups, factions and political parties, that feature across the range of green political discourse, and which typically have highly ambiguous normative characters.

5.4.1. Individuals and Groups

Perhaps the best example of this type of ambiguity is the various ways in which 'individuals' are portrayed in green discourse. Participants in grns.oz.forum regularly appropriate liberal themes that locate the individual as a basic moral unit of society. This is usually expressed in the form of extolling the potential and capacity for self-realisation and autonomy that is inherent in individuals. In an earlier proposal for federation of green parties, some members of the Sydney Greens phrased their political ideal in the following terms.

> The Federation of local Green parties is based on the Green philosophies of grassroots democracy and thinking globally, acting locally. It is to help encourage and empower individuals and local communities where real change occurs (Sydney Greens 1989).

Individuals are capable of empowerment given the opportunity, and the green movement carries with it the promise of allowing such empowerment to flourish in 'non-dominating non-exploitative ways' (Lewis 1991d). As the Sydney quote indicates, individuals are not the only

moral agent defined in this way, and it would be mistake to characterise green rhetoric as merely a reformulation of classic individualist themes. The language of self-determination, potential and autonomy are just as easily applied to social categories, groups, communities and bioregions as they are to individuals. Nevertheless, special consideration is often given to individuals that is not available to other agents in green normative discourse.

The status of the individual may be morally privileged in relation to collective green agents. In the context of arguing against DSP participation in a national green party, it was suggested that autonomy only made sense with respect to individuals, not groups. Effective political participation was based on the capacity for individuals to make 'free-thinking' judgements about matters before them as opposed to the strictures of group or party discipline. Individuals, according to this line, are the only agents capable of true participation. Similarly, River asserts that participation in green consensual decision making is 'based on people speaking as individuals, with their own understanding and concerns' (River 1991d), while Murrell refers to the basis of consensus as 'people representing their own thoughts' (Murrell 1991c).

However, in other contexts, the normative legitimacy of individuals is on much shakier ground. This is most apparent in discussions involving 'representation'. While the local group, party or movement may be constituted by individuals, individuals cannot speak on behalf of these larger entities unless authorised to do so. The illegitimacy of individual action is most strongly indicated when particular actors are perceived as having acted without such authority. On one occasion, the letterhead of the NSW Green Alliance was used by three of its members to reply to some queries about the national process from greens in Western Australia. This prompted the reaction from an office holder requesting his audience not to 'write off the NSW Green Alliance as a DSP front because of the misbehaviour of three individuals' (Hine 1991b). At around the same time, another regular contributor made the following disclaimer.

> I .... wish to state that the views I expressed on Pegasus Network are my own, and I had no intention of acting as a representative of the Avon Greens or any other person. My decision to place them on pegasus was

> also my own, and not agreed to or approved of by any other person (River 1991f).

The downgrading of the normative status of the individual is encapsulated by Lewis' request to '(p)lease bear in mind that I am only speaking as an individual' (Lewis 1991a). One of the communicative norms that developed among contributors to grns.oz.forum was a caveat stating that postings were the contributions of individuals and not made on behalf of groups of which they were members.

An anti-individualist ethic also applies in the context of green dealings with those outside the movement. Nerlich proposes that a suitable public spokesperson for the greens would be someone who could articulate 'why the media shouldn't be talking to them as an individual anyway' (Nerlich 1991b). Similarly Macdonald expressed dissatisfaction with the prospect of 'spokespeople who are accountable to nothing in particular' (Macdonald 1991). Both Macdonald and River are critical of the individualism of what they call the 'conscience position' in which representatives do not follow the decision of the group if their conscience does not allow (Macdonald 1991; River 1991i).

As well as being potentially unrepresentative, individuals are prone to illegitimate self-interest. Such strategies draw upon the current of anti-individualism in green discourse which involves the deep suspicion of prominence and leadership. Centralised decision-making is, at least in part, a consequence of 'egocentric individualism' (River 1991k). One critic of the national process alleged that 'self-appointed leaders .... are afraid that, quite apart from the DSP, if they subject themselves to a truly democratic process they might not stay in the leadership, and they might not get their precious bums on those precious seats in parliament' (Fletcher 1991). Having established this distinction between the interests of the movement and those of individual leaders, it becomes feasible to assert that the interests of the latter are actually at odds with those of the former.

Normative ambivalence is hardly restricted to the consideration of individuals. Much the same dynamic can be observed regarding the evaluation of local groups. As with individuals, local groups have been

invested with moral privilege vis a vis other agents, particularly the suggested national green party and the state umbrella bodies. Any restriction of the autonomy of local groups was often presented as self-evidently in contravention of green principles. In the same way as individuals, however, specific local groups are unable to represent the movement or the party as a whole. According to Murrell, the localist models such as that proposed by Fitzgerald 'are all based on the premise that local groups are of paramount importance and are the primary consideration of all structures' (Murrell 1991c). In response, he offers the following critique of this paramount status of local autonomous groups.

> .... each autonomous local group will have power over the whole network. The small autonomous local groups will form a point of view on an issue, within themselves, with what may be limited information and a narrow discussion. .... The network, with a larger number of people participating, should have a wider point of view on an issue. The larger the number of people the more representative the point of view will be of all the Greens. Yet one autonomous local group will be able to stop the Network from making a decision (Murrell 1991c).

Less 'official' actors, such as sub-groups among greens, can also be easily presented in both positive and negative guises using the repertoire of green values. On the one hand, they can be characterised negatively as factions and cliques. According to River, simply focusing on recognisable organisations such as the DSP neglects the possibility that the same type of problem can occur due to the actions of informal groupings.

> Obviously the problem is equally applicable to "any" party. It is equally applicable to people into democratic centralism "within" a party. You can make sure that people who are openly members of another party, any other party, cannot do this. It's far more difficult when you're dealing with covert members of any outside group (political party or not), and even more difficult when you're dealing with some group within your own group (River 1991c).

In other circumstances, however, informal groups and sub-groups are regarded as having the right to pursue their positions when they are not equivalent to those of the wider body. An equally principled argument is advanced by the same correspondent who asserts that '(c)onsensus fails

where an action of the group runs against the interests and values of some section of that group' (River 1991d).[17]

5.4.2. Unity and Diversity

These examples highlight the more general pattern of conflicting language used by greens to describe relationships between 'parts' and 'wholes'. In River's first quote about sub-groups, the actions of parts are considered detrimental to the whole. But in the second quote we see the reversal of this moral hierarchy in which it is stipulated that the actions of the whole should not damage the integrity of its constituent parts. This normative 'Janus-face' pervades the discourse of participants in grns.oz.forum. One prominent image of the relationship between parts and the whole is that the whole should be imagined as greater than the sum of its diverse parts. According to Lewis, '(a)ll of us are smarter than any of us' (Lewis 1991d). In this formulation, no part, or even a collection of parts can claim to represent the whole. This image draws upon elements of the green repertoire such as harmony, community, solidarity, wholeness, interdependence and integration, all of which can be identified under the broad rhetorical theme of *unity*.

However there is also a repertoire of normative discourse in which the uniqueness of each part must be respected and protected at all costs against threats to this autonomy from other entities, which may include the whole. Here greens can deploy values such as autonomy, openness, self-realisation, tolerance, and celebration of difference. These exemplify the rhetorical language of *diversity*. Adding another level of complexity, there are also conflicting possibilities regarding which entities should be considered as parts and wholes. The group, for example, can be considered as 'the whole' in some contexts, or as a constituent part in others and is therefore subject to two types of divergent normative interpretation.

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[17] This statement was qualified by the contention that a 'clear majority' (as opposed to consensus) was permissible in order to 'allow decisions where self-interest of some is clearly seen as counter to the general interest of the group'.

The dilemmatic pair of unity and diversity are often embedded in single normative criteria. Perhaps the best example of this is the term 'grassroots', which has a remarkably chameleon-like quality. On the one hand the term is used to denote commonality. Leaders and would-be leaders are (usually by definition) out of touch with the grassroots. Here the term is used in the singular sense, the grassroots supposedly speak with one voice. Yet in other argumentative contexts, the grassroots are multifarious, representing a rich range of experience and outlooks that resists reduction to a singular characterisation. The plurality of the grassroots is emphasised as the source of normative integrity.

'Participation' is another normative standard that exhibits this rhetorical suppleness. Participatory democracy is regularly extolled in grns.oz.forum as a mode of self-expression in which individuals put forward their diverse points of view, and where the caucusing of overt or covert groups constitutes a threat to self development which is facilitated by democratic participation. In this sense, participatory action contributes to the autonomy of the parts, regardless of its effect on the whole. Alternatively, participatory democracy can be characterised as a practice that enhances the character of the collectivity, and is envisaged as a process which reveals a collective wisdom not accessible to individuals. Restrictions to participation, whether voluntary or imposed, detract from the legitimacy of both decisions and the decision-making body.

Normative two-sidedness is also apparent in the characterisation of political disagreement among greens. Participants constantly remind each other of the diversity of green politics and the differences of perspective that are gathered under the green umbrella. Internal political difference, therefore, can be regarded as an entirely legitimate indication of a healthy eco-polity. The corollary to this is that unity may not necessarily be desirable if it is achieved 'artificially'. This provides a rationale for letting conflicts and disagreements happen.

> If we have spokespeople telling the national media that such and such is the Australian Greens' position on an issue and at the same time local groups in various parts of the country are stating the opposite we will be accused of being disorganised and hypocritical because we are pretending to be united when we are not. Some people might be thinking that if we enforce total proscription we will be much more united. I

> don't think that's true. Getting rid of people who belong to other political parties won't get rid of the huge diversity of opinion among Greens about many issues (Fitzgerald 1991b).

However, differences of opinion can also be normatively problematic when viewed through the lens of green unity. Another interpretation of political disagreement and conflict is that if and where it exists, it needs to be worked through and overcome, albeit by legitimate means. The persistence of conflict is patently unhealthy as it indicates the persistence of adversarial 'old' politics that green politics hopes to avoid. According to one activist, '(t)he last thing the green movement needs is the back-stabbing and party political game you have in the Liberals, Labor and, now, the Democrats' (Brewer 1991b).

In addition to these differing characterisations of conflict, there is also significant ambiguity regarding the way in which antagonists should overcome their differences. Compromise, for instance, can be portrayed as a laudable means by which diverse perspectives are reconciled. But the green value repertoire also supports a highly jaundiced view of compromise. If altruism is the abrogation of self-interest, and the adoption of the interests of others, then the preparedness to negotiate and compromise can only damage the interests that one has vowed to protect. Compromise, in this sense, amounts to a capitulation to the temptation of self-interest.[18]

5.5. Conclusion

The green normative repertoire can be easily harnessed to 'prove opposites'. If one wishes to support the claims of a local group against the national body, one simply dips into the store of normative resources relating to the themes of diversity that portray the group as a valiant battler against the might of an oppressive whole that restricts free expression. If one takes the alternative position, there are plenty of green values pertinent to the theme of unity that can be used to build up a

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[18] The dilemma of compromise is covered in more detail in Chapter 6.

picture of a recalcitrant and maverick group acting out of self-interest and disregard for the wider cause of green politics.

I wish to emphasise that the types of normative dilemmas that are apparent in grns.oz.forum are hardly the unique preserve of greens, nor are the rhetorical tactics adopted notably novel. Similar contradictory evaluations from a common sense stock of principles are most likely a feature of internal debate within other political organisations, where processes of decision-making and organisational structure are subject to discussion and debate, even if the terminology differs. As Billig and his colleagues have argued, similar exercises could be carried out with regard to the common sense rhetoric of democratic liberalism, or Marxism, or conservatism (Billig et al. 1988). The greens of grns.oz.forum need not be singled out for criticism that their normative language is full of potential contradictions when applied to specific circumstances.

The point of interest in the grns.oz.forum debates concerns the implications for a style of politics that places so much weight upon normative rationality, when this rationality is highly flexible, ambiguous and dilemmatic. In the following chapter I pursue the argument that normative primacy greatly amplifies the practical difficulties and conflicts encountered by greens. The material in this case study offers an ideal opportunity to investigate the perverse effects of building a political identity upon the shifting sands of green values.

Chapter 6: The Perverse Effects of Value Primacy

The purpose of the previous chapter was to highlight the extent of ambiguity, contestation and open-endedness characteristic of the green normative repertoire. Following from this groundwork, the purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the political consequences of placing so much rhetorical weight on normative criteria in the light of this ambiguity. The habits of value primacy create significant problems for green political actors as the normative legitimacy upon which green action is to be built is precarious and unstable. The chapter highlights some characteristic perverse effects that can be traced to value primacy. I examine the ways in which participants in grns.oz.forum approach questions of party identity and deal with some the differences which pervade their discussions. I then explore the political vulnerabilities that arise from perceiving their political activity as being built upon distinct values.

The chapter will concentrate on two inter-related issues that have been particularly problematic for the greens of grns.oz.forum. These difficulties include the issue of setting organisational boundaries for the prospective party and the difficulty in resolving conflict when and where it arises. Both of these issues illustrate the dilemmatic quality of green rationality, especially the tension between diversity-related and unity-related values. They also demonstrate the perverse effects of using green organisational principles as a foundation for political action.

6.1. Reconciling Diversity and Unity

As a precursor to these issues, it is pertinent to address at a more general level the ways in which grns.oz.forum participants acknowledge and attempt to deal with the conflicting themes of diversity and unity. The normative ambiguity of grns.oz.forum discourse did not go unnoticed.

> I implore you all to think about a solution to our problems without thinking in terms of hierarchies or dualisms. I would like to challenge everyone in this dialogue to try and think about this question of

> structure and autonomy without using such vague terms as grassroots and without using concepts or diagrams that suggest levels (Lewis 1991b).

Interestingly, Lewis suggests that the way out of dilemmas between unity and diversity can be achieved by further application of green political principles. The task at hand is the design of a national party which 'will seek by a participatory structure and cooperative ethos to resolve the tension between diversity and unity without being fragmented or authoritarian' (Lewis 1991c). This is a motif that appears regularly in green discourse when normative dilemmas become apparent. There are a number of principled solutions to such dilemmas that have been suggested.

One method of managing the co-existence of potentially contradictory themes is to attempt to separate the contexts in which they are applicable. For instance, a hypothetical split is often posited between arenas within which the autonomy of particular green agents is valued and the arenas in which such agents act in unauthorised and unrepresentative ways. The most noticeable example of this is the delineation between autonomous participation within a group and representative activity on behalf of a group. In this formulation, representative participation is not appropriate within groups and autonomous activity is illegitimate beyond the group's boundaries. River articulates this model in his discussion of participatory democracy.

> The basic model of a participatory democracy involves meetings of the citizens who discuss freely an issue, often at some length, and over some period of time. They may chose some person or people and empower them to carry this decision out. The chosen person or persons have the power to do what is decided, and nothing else. .... Representatives are chosen by the people and charged with a specific task. Betrayal of the trust of the people in the name of "conscience" cannot be considered a moral action (River 1991d).

This device relies on the presence of clear boundaries between internal and external spheres of activity. The principle of diversity governs internal relations, whereas unity is the over-riding consideration for external dealings. People are entitled to participate as autonomous individuals within the group, but not when they are representing the group. A problem here is that such a neat separation between the

performance of autonomous and representative capacities simply was not applicable in many of the forums which Australian greens had established. For example, the NSW Green Alliance and the Queensland Green Network were forums open to the participation of both individuals *and* groups. Strict demarcation between autonomous and representative participation was extremely difficult in such settings.

Furthermore, the categorisation of actors as either autonomous or representative is frequently contested among contributors. Although DSP members are regularly identified by other participants as representatives of the DSP, they themselves claim that they are participating as individuals. Similarly, when DSP contributors claim that their Queensland opponents participate in the green forums as members of a party-like formation and caucus together at meetings, Lewis is at pains to point out that he participates 'as an individual' (Lewis 1991a). River and Nerlich both point out that greens, regardless of the DSP, must be ever vigilant against the formation of cliques and informal sub-groups whose members claim that they are acting as individuals when they are really presenting a rehearsed group perspective. Thus the conditions for making clear separations between spheres of autonomy and representation are rarely, if ever, present.

Another attempt to separate realms of diversity and unity can be seen in efforts to distinguish matters of principle from issues in which diversity of opinion is accepted and valued. Fiona Campbell, a Sydney-based activist, suggests such a separation.

> This raises the issue .... of the relationship between a national body and groups that abide by the four principles (for example) but disagree on the issue of membership not being up to the local group to decide based on their local conditions (Campbell 1991).

Defining the party as unified in terms of principles but allowing for diversity in 'other areas' is undoubtedly a flexible approach, but one which begs more questions for green activists than it answers with regard to contentious issues. River identifies a number of relevant intra-green debates where this delineation may not be altogether straightforward.

> I also agree with Malcolm that some control needs to be set on the limits to diversity. I certainly wouldn't wish to be identified with any organisation at any level which advocates, or allows members to advocate, nuclear weapons/nuclear power, or racism, or sexism, or exploitation of the third world. At the same time, these are far less likely to be at question than diversity on economic/social issues. How many Green parties are willing to adopt a "no economic growth" position, for example? What about population control? There are contentious issues within green thought, and we somehow need to work out which are "black and white" issues, and which are issues where maximum diversity is allowed. The example of population control springs to mind. .... This appears a far more real issue than the suggestion that any Green Party would support nuclear weapons (River 1991i).

The population/immigration issue is an apt example of the difficulty of separating the realm of diversity and tolerance from the province of unity. This issue can be readily constructed as one in which diversity is accepted, because divisions are evident. However, either side of the debate can be expected to argue that its position is derived from the green principles which supposedly form the basis of green party unity. Overlaid on to the dispute over whether immigration restrictions are consistent with green values and principles is a second-order dispute about the role this contentious issue plays in the definition of green identity.

A more decisive way of dealing with conflicting themes of diversity and unity, if collisions between them are acknowledged, is to make a principled stance of privileging one over the other. This is what Paul Fitzgerald seems to be doing in his proposal for a 'tight network'.

> The confederation proposals would result in a mess. If we call ourselves by a name that indicates we are unified but at the same time we allow any significant degree of local autonomy there will be chaos. If we have spokespeople telling the national media that such and such is the Australian Greens' position on an issue and at the same time local groups in various parts of the country are stating the opposite we will be accused of being disorganised and hypocritical because we are pretending to be united when we are not (Fitzgerald 1991b).

Fitzgerald suggests that such a situation could be avoided simply by deciding in favour of diversity and autonomy in circumstances where they cannot be reconciled with unity.

> .... this package of proposals won't work if we don't have a name that makes it clear from the start that we are not pretending to be unified. One suggestion is "The Australian Network of Green Parties". In any

> case we need a name that PROCLAIMS the autonomy of the Green Parties, that shouts it from the roof-tops. Local autonomy is an asset. Not something to be hidden (Fitzgerald 1991b).

Similarly, Hine contends that the acceptance of the local autonomy of parties means that 'the fear of who controls the central resources disappears at a stroke' (Hine 1991b). These characterisations are notably pessimistic in their assessment of the prospects of reconciling unity and diversity at the level of relations between local green groups and parties. Reasons given for the impracticability of unitarist structures include problems of scale (River 1991j) and the difficulty of communication (Nerlich 1991a). It is interesting to note that the capacity of local groups to speak with one voice is simply taken as given, so that the difficulty of attaining unity is only ever acknowledged and dealt with in the context of co-ordination between, rather than within, local groups.

The localist strategy of privileging diversity and autonomy over unity was criticised by other grns.oz.forum participants who saw it as an obstacle to concerted political action. Murrell offered the following caricature.

> The Greens could spend the rest of time not co-operating, keeping their little power bases intact, and "spitting the dummy" if they do not get their way. In the mean time there is a highly organised group of people out there destroying Gaia (Murrell 1991c).

The price of this strategy of dealing with conflicting themes is a marked tendency towards inertia and inaction, as initiatives, efforts to construct consensual decision-making processes, and attempts to achieve consensus all come to grief against the rocks of non-negotiable autonomy. Fitzgerald, River and Nerlich all frequently argue that there is little prospect of supra-local structures operating according to grassroots and participatory democratic principles, and this, in their view, is sufficient argument against building any supra-local structures that have the capacity to act.

These contributors are aware of the costs of privileging diversity. Nevertheless, localists would not concur that they are abandoning the ideal of unity. On the contrary, they argue that only the type of unity worth having is that which is based upon fundamental respect for diversity. Initiatives taken to achieve co-ordinated and unified action cannot be considered as producing 'real' unity if the structures and

processes adopted bypass the input and assent of all constituent groups. Their interpretation of experience is based on the perception of failure, up until now, of green structures to meet the conditions that could facilitate such unity, and perhaps more interestingly, the lack of desire for unity among local groups.

Each of the above strategies represent theoretical attempts to reconcile the tension between diversity and unity. However, the co-existence of dilemmatic themes is frequently encountered by greens in more concrete circumstances. In other words, the problem faced by greens is one of dealing with circumstances in which the implications of different elements of the normative repertoire appear as contradictory. The task of establishing the boundaries of a new political party is one such issue where it is virtually impossible to avoid collisions between dilemmatic themes.

6.2. Managing the Boundaries of Green Party Identity

As I have repeatedly observed, the distinction between greenness and non-greenness is defined in terms of adherence to values and principles. Such a definition excludes, therefore, only those who do not adopt these principles. As the normative legitimacy of greenness is built into its definition, once exposed to the desirability and rationality of these principles it is expected that *most* people, apart from those with entrenched and vested interests, will reasonably adopt these principles. Beyond this common denominator of adherence to green principles, the boundaries of green identity, symbolised by the concept of the green movement, are highly inclusive. No-one need be excluded from being considered green on grounds of gender, race, religious affiliation, geography, class, age or education. The benefits of a green polity accrue to all. The inclusive green movement ideal celebrates diversity. As a universalistic movement, greens perceive themselves as well-placed to draw together a broad range of support without particularist limits.

> What inspires me is that it is apparent that there are many people in different places, from different backgrounds who have come to share a similar outlook that is identifiably Green. Any difficulties need to be put in that perspective (Hine 1991b).

Among contributors to grns.oz.forum, there is a tendency to regard green movement identity and green party identity as the same thing. Perhaps the best indication of this tendency to isomorphism is the definition of local green party membership in the same terms in which the movement is identified. For example, a newly-formed suburban Sydney group, the Inner West Greens stated that they 'seek to extend membership of The Greens to all in the community who are in accord with our fundamental objectives' (Inner-West-Greens 1992). These objectives are predicated on the Four Principles. Similar formulas are found throughout green-forum discourse.

According to River, his local group asserted that 'as a group, we are less interested in "Greens" as a political party than in "Greens" as a social movement' (River 1991k). The propensity to identify the party as the political expression of the movement is not surprising in the light of green concepts of value rationality.

> I would like to think that people see Greens as the true alternative political force in this country.... as I see it, Greens are about defining a totally new Australian politic. I hope this process can be embraced by those representing the Green movement at the August meeting where a national party will be proposed (Garton 1991b).

The practical problem for party founders, therefore, is how to operationalise this highly inclusive and therefore highly ambiguous identity. Some provision for exclusion from green party membership of those who do not adhere to green principles is deemed to be necessary when party membership is predicated upon normative identity. Here, Lewis and River provide clear statements of the link between movement principles and party identity.

> I for one, after having risked my life on several occasions swimming in front of nuclear ships will not be in the same organisation as other people who are pro-nuclear power or nuclear weapons. If they advocate pro-nuclear or pro-nuclear deterrence policies, I can not credit them as being believers in nonviolence or in ecological sustainable values (Lewis 1991d).

> Well, I'm not happy about living with a group that is overrun, and putting out views I consider fundamentally anti-green, e.g. racism etc. .... Yes I agree that this view implies some discipline. .... There has to be ways of divorcing ourselves from groups, or de-registering them (River 1991j).

Defining organisational identity in terms of values and principles places an enormous amount of weight upon the need to discern the normative character of actors who seek to align themselves with the party. Interestingly, suggested techniques of diagnosing the normative character of actors bear close resemblance to the techniques used by social scientists to categorise the value dispositions of their objects of study. However, being able to distinguish green-ness from non-green-ness is a practical issue for green political activists, rather than a task of data categorisation. How, then, do grns.oz.forum participants propose to make such diagnoses?

Criteria such as 'all who are in accord with principled green objectives' seem to suggest that prospective members know their normative orientation, because they have consciously chosen it, and that parties can accept the truth of their testimony. In this sense, normative character is considered transparent, and those who fall outside the boundaries of green identity are also considered to be beyond the scope of recruitment. The assumption of the transparency of green credentials has been a feature of most Australian green party statements of identity, and this interpretation is definitely useful in the context of maximising the scope or potential of party membership and support.

However, circumstances arise in which the assumption of transparency is problematic. Lewis points to what he considers as a highly unsatisfactory possibility opened up by green self-identification.

> If I was the owner of (a) Chemical factory, or a uranium mine, then I could arrange for enough of employees and cohorts to pretend to agree with Green Principals (sic), and to apply for membership of the local Green Party, to take it over and play all sorts of political games (Lewis 1991d).

Just as academic authors such as Cohen and Wildavsky are suspicious of a reliance upon testimonial claims to green identity, so too are participants in process of forming a green party. According to Hegge, '(m)any groupings have adopted these principles out of expediency rather than conviction' (Hegge 1991c). These comments cast doubt on the transparency of a green identity. If it is possible that some individuals and groups are insincere about their own values then the task of normative diagnosis

must be managed in somewhat different ways. Instead of relying on the direct discernment of 'internal' normative states, one looks for appropriate 'external' features which reveal normative character. It is not sufficient to say that one is green, therefore, as one's green-ness must demonstrable in other ways.

Participants adopt much the same techniques suggested and used by attributional and transformational theorists in their attempts to discern the normative dispositions of individuals. Actors can be attributed a normative character by others on the basis of their behaviour. Fitzgerald suggests that such an activity would be part of the function of a Registrations Committee that would make decisions after 'rigourous examination of the credentials and intentions' of those wishing to form local parties. Some members of the North Shore Greens, a suburban Sydney group, suggested that in the national organisation or party, public spokespersons would be selected on the basis of their capacity to 'articulate and demonstrate (by their actions) the principles of the green movement' (Jas 1991).

In grns.oz.forum, however, normative diagnosis is much more than an exercise of categorisation. These techniques are also widely utilised by participants as rhetorical devices in debates about proscription and structure. References to the actions of the convenors, or the actions of DSP members are taken as evidence of their true normative disposition. Poisoning the national greens process, or riding roughshod over the autonomy of local groups serve as behavioural indicators of normative character, which are counterposed against claims of normative legitimacy based on self-identification in rhetorical contexts in which they are used.

In the evidence presented in Chapter 5, a common form of the 'attribution by behaviour' approach was the allegation that particular actors have betrayed or abused green principles. There was also the assertion of incompatible 'cultural codes', in the Wildavskian sense, as a basis for normative diagnosis. The observation that '(s)ome individuals belong to groups which have a constitution which is hierarchical and uses a simple majority voting system' (Murrell 1991a) served to indicate that these individuals reject consensual, egalitarian cultural modes.

The diagnosis of normative character was one of the central rhetorical strategies for those who wished to institute proscription and exclude the DSP. If members of the DSP by their actions betray their lack of respect for green principles, they cannot be considered as bona fide greens, and are therefore ineligible to be considered as participants in a truly green party. Hegge, in fact, is quite clear about this equivalence.

> There are obvious fundamental anomalies in existence amongst those who call themselves "green", and amongst groupings who see themselves as contenders for ownership of such a name. It is not so much the name that is at stake but rather the ideological direction which green politics will take in this country. A national Green Party with proscription would go a long way to clarify these anomalies. There would be no members of other political parties unsure about whether they were in "support non-violence" mode for this meeting and later on in the day at a different meeting supporting armed resistance. A forum would also exist where green activists who were truly committed to these four principles could have discussion and develop policy appropriate to their beliefs (Hegge 1991c).

In claiming that there are activists who are 'truly committed to green principles', Hegge is alluding to the spectre of normative deviance. Contestation reveals incorrect interpretations which can either be recognised as problems of inconsistency, error, or lack of knowledge, or more negatively as abuse and betrayal of the values and principles concerned. Perpetrators of such betrayal therefore demonstrate their lack of normative legitimacy through their insincere or expedient invocation of green values. The process of constructing a formalised green identity, therefore, implies some recourse to an objective definition of green-ness, and its associated possibilities of normative inconsistency, irrationality, ignorance, deceitfulness and deviance.

However, there is a rather serious problem with this normative justification for defining the boundaries of a green party in such a way as to exclude participation by DSP members. In the context of the Australian green discussions of 1991 there is no available mechanism that is capable of laying down and sanctioning any such normative orthodoxy. Recourse to the essential definition of green political principles is like appealing to a non-existent referee. The absence of normative authority ensures that particular interpretations do not come with sanctions attached. Those excluded by any attempt to draw normative boundaries can simply reject

the interpretation upon which their exclusion is based, and question the right of those making such distinctions to do so. Attempts to exclude DSP members from the definition of green identity were caricatured by the editor of *Green Left Weekly* who remarked that the motto of some members of the Queensland Greens was '(t)here are no Greens in the world but thee and me, and sometimes I'm not so sure about thee' (Myers 1992). The disadvantage of rhetorically using techniques of normative distinction without any authority to back up these diagnoses is that such delineation of green identity can be easily portrayed as petty and divisive.

An alternative strategy for the supporters of the national process was to put aside the question of whether or not members of the DSP were really green. This strategy was built upon the claim that those who wanted a party with proscription should be free to form one, and that the resultant formation does not constitute a monopoly on political and electoral greenness. Proscription, in this light, is not so much a matter of drawing boundaries around the movement as it is stipulating a basis of exclusion from party membership irrespective of definitions of green identity. At one point in the debates, Lewis argued that the national process was 'no longer about trying to include absolutely everyone' (Lewis 1991c). Lewis was at pains to point out that the formation of a unitarist party was not an attempt to achieve exclusive access to green electoral and political identity. Instead, it should be seen as just one manifestation of a diverse movement.

> The Green Party that I want to be a part of will complement the present diversity of the green movement. It will not be the green movement. It will (be a) separate and distinct organisation but it will be a part of the wider green movement. Each will be enfolded into the other. It will not be the green movement. .... It will not even be "the" green movement's electoral wing. It will be a electoral wing; one of many complimented by other parties .... and by environmental and community based independents (Lewis 1991c).

Significantly, moves to prevent or obstruct the formation of a unitarist party could be portrayed as attempts to limit diversity and autonomy. Such an argument is highly principled as it is supported by requests for autonomy from those who wish to initiate a national party, just as those

who preferred some other model should also be free to pursue their own claims (Hegge 1991c). Lewis made the following plea.

> I don't want to stop other people doing other things but I think they have to be honest. If they don't want a national Green Party then please let the people who want one have one (Lewis 1991c).

So, in this formulation the party constitutes only a part or section of the movement, not a complete representation of the range of activists that constitute the whole green movement. Likewise, the party cannot be considered as a complete political expression of the movement according to other criteria. According to Lewis, 'there is no way that a green party can be formed that has exclusive control of green political ideas' (Lewis 1991d).

This strategy for supporting proscription, however, is just as problematic because it undermines a different source of normative legitimacy for the party, namely its portrayal as a manifestation of alternative political rationality. The projection of the party as 'a' (as opposed to 'the') manifestation of green principles makes for much weaker claims to normative legitimacy, especially when there are other greens who claim adherence to the same rationality but are not, for whatever reasons, part of the same organisation. Furthermore, the admission that the membership scope of the party differs from that of the movement suggests the possibility that the party is *not the same as* the movement. This opens another rich vein of rhetorical possibility for opponents of proscription. A more exclusive party is an actor capable of acting out of self-interest, rather than in the universalistic interests of the movement as a whole. If the proposed party cannot possibly represent the movement in its entirety, the door was well and truly open for Sue Bolton, an opponent of proscription to argue the following.

> It was very clear that delegates from Tasmania, Queensland and West Australia had no real idea of how the process has proceeded in other states. What's more, they didn't care. .... Those who say they want a proscribed party and it's their right to have one, ignore the way the process has developed elsewhere (quoted in Brewer 1991b).

This rhetorical possibility would be open to opponents of proscription, to some extent, without it being flagged by supporters. There are a number of other more mundane factors that suggest that the boundaries of a green

party must be somewhat different to those of the green movement, regardless of whether or not activists choose to make such distinctions. Participation in a party requires some means of formal recognition in the form of membership. Looking at any green party in terms of actual membership, there is much scope for discrepancy between membership and the movement ideal. At any time there are many actors considered to be of the movement who are not members of the party. There is an abundance of reasons as to why people who identify with the movement do not or choose not to participate formally in a green political party. These reasons would include lack of time, potentially conflicting expectations between the party and other commitments, or the preference to invest one's activist energies in other movement related activities. We may also reasonably assume that people are not considered to be members unless they approach or are approached by other members. Restrictions of such contact and access, whether intentional or not, inevitably exclude many from party membership. The green movement, in contrast, is not defined in terms of formal membership, and is not subject to the formal requirements of boundary maintenance. This discrepancy ensures that there is always the possibility to portray the party as divergent from the movement as a whole, given that the movement as a whole can only be identified ambiguously.

Thus, claims of unrepresentativeness in relation to the movement are a stock element of the green rhetorical repertoire. They cannot be definitively refuted in the absence of mechanisms capable of defining what can be considered as representative. Hutton, in response to his DSP critics knows that he can turn the accusation of unrepresentativeness back upon those who use it against him.

> A thorough process of consultation with community groups will reveal how hollow are the DSP's claims that, somehow, they represent the wishes of the grassroots of the movement (Hutton 1991).

The problems of managing green identity for the participants in grns.oz.forum, then, can be traced back to ambiguities inherent in value-based identities per se. Attempts to formalise party identity can always be shot down on the basis of green principles. Drawing membership boundaries, the prerogative of any organisation, can be easily made to

appear illegitimate. Opponents of proscription simply can wait and see which way supporters will jump. When they favour unity-based arguments, the themes of diversity can do the job. If they adopt diversity-based arguments, the repertoire of unity will be most useful. Such are the rhetorical perils and possibilities of a highly ambiguous store of common sense.

6.3. Resolving Conflict

The conflicting themes of unity and diversity are manifest in the range of specific debates among Australian green activists. Many of these differences are tolerated without activists attempting to resolve them. The divergence over immigration is one that, up until this point at least, has been largely left to one side in grns.oz.forum. The proscription issue, however, was not such an issue that would be indefinitely shelved. It had been brought to a head by the calling of the August 1991 meeting. This meeting, then, serves as a useful point to explore the dynamics of value rationality in a context where a definitive resolution to an intra-green conflict is sought. Many of the regular contributors to grns.oz.forum, including Lewis, Hegge, Hutton, Nerlich, Fitzgerald, and Hine were among the thirty participants.[1]

The first day of the National Greens Meeting was marked by heated debate over the proscription issue. The convenors had hoped to avoid such a debate by stipulating support for proscription as a precondition for attendance. Delegates from anti-proscription groups had turned up at the meeting but were ruled ineligible to attend, helping to precipitate extensive discussion of the issue. Subsequently, some of the invited delegates wished to officially debate the matter and achieve some form of resolution. Straw-polls taken early in the day indicated that sixteen of the twenty-three voting delegates supported proscription and of the

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[1] The meeting was attended by 10 delegates from NSW, representing the NSW Green Alliance and 8 local groups. 6 delegates came from Queensland, 3 from Tasmania, 2 from W.A. and one each from Victoria and South Australia. Lisa Macdonald from the Western Suburbs Greens (NSW) and Sue Bolton from the ACT Green Democratic Alliance were barred from participation (Hine 1991a; Brewer 1991a).

remaining seven, only four delegates actively opposed it (Hine 1991a). However, debate continued throughout the day on the understanding that the meeting required a consensual outcome. Late in the day, one of the meeting convenors suggested a compromise of a six month sunset clause, in which members of other parties would not be barred until February 1992. This was accepted by the meeting as something that 'could be worked with' (Campbell 1991).

The proscription debate at the national meeting was a graphic illustration of a context in which the ambiguity of green values is translated into a series of practical contradictions and double-binds. What emerged throughout the meeting was a multiplicity of seemingly irresolvable conflicts exacerbated by value dilemmas. On top of the proscription debate, there was ambiguity regarding whether or not the proscription issue required a unified stance, or whether it was an area in which diversity and tolerance should be valued. There was also divergence over whether it was appropriate to take steps to resolve the conflict, and whether compromise was acceptable as a form of resolution. There was dispute over whether the issue should be discussed, given that support for proscription was a precondition for attendance. There were divisions regarding the legitimacy of the meeting itself, and whether it should make such decisions or leave them to be made in other forums.

The six month sunset clause adopted as a compromise did not win enthusiastic normative endorsement. On the one hand, some proscription supporters were quite happy with the deal and the way it had been reached. Hegge described the adoption of the sunset clause as 'a credit to (the participants') preparedness to compromise', considering the fact that the two positions were 'virtually impossible to reconcile' (Hegge 1991c). However, others soon raised questions about the legitimacy of the way in which the decision was made. Fiona Campbell, one of the participants at the meeting, questioned the legitimacy of the compromise in terms of the delegates' authority to change their stance. The compromise eventually adopted, according to Campbell's account left some delegates wondering whether or not they had acted without the authority of their group in agreeing to the amended proposal of the sunset

clause. She also reports in her account of the meeting that participants representing their groups and organisations at this meeting did not feel authorised by their groups to change their mind even if they wanted to. According to Campbell, the reason the compromise was adopted had more to do with the weariness of the participants than the successful application of consensual democracy.

> Also not evident from the voting record is the way people felt by this time. I, for one, felt totally exhausted from debating this issue for about eight hours. .... I think many of us felt that if some agreement wasn't reached, the same issue would be on the agenda of the next meeting and the one after that. We would never ever get to talk about policy (Campbell 1991).

In this example, there is a striking lack of fit between a green principled account of conflict should be dealt with, and the way in which it was actually resolved. According to green rationality, hopes for conflict resolution are placed squarely on the shoulders of a participatory and consensual decision-making process. Consensual procedures are expected to achieve some form of resolution that can cater for everyone's concerns. If all members are allowed to participate fully, the 'best' solution to conflict can be achieved.

> In consensus or co-operative decision-making the emphasis is on working out the best possible solution, one that addresses everyone's concerns and is a reflection of the cumulative wisdom of the group. A proposal is put, and everyone can speak to it. As people put forward their objections, and ideals for modifications, the proposal becomes stronger, clearer, and more generally acceptable. People's concerns can also be addressed, information shared, and people modify their views as they gain a better understanding of the problem. Ultimately, the goal is to arrive at a resolution that effectively addresses the problem while satisfying everyone's concerns (River 1991d).

However, the above account of the national greens meeting indicates that concerted efforts to follow such procedures in aiming to achieve consensual decisions does not necessarily lead to outcomes that meet either criteria of resolving problems or satisfying everyone's concerns. Campbell paints the picture as follows.

> So, two very different positions, neither feeling they could budge. Both sides seemed willing to 'just work with the groups that agreed with them' i.e. split, before compromising. Hardly any basis for consensus. After much debating, in fact very much debating, we still didn't seem to

> be getting any closer. There was a short speech from Al (Lismore) on how we should try and reach consensus. Each side tried harder to get the other side to see their point of view (Campbell 1991).

The entrenchment, rather than the resolution, of conflict throughout the day could be seen as a product of the attempted conscious implementation of green principles of decision-making and representation. Such efforts are just as likely, and perhaps more likely to result in entrenchment of opposing positions in circumstances in which significant disagreements have emerged. The National Greens Meeting was one instance of a situation in which consensual procedures and guidelines, rather than facilitating a resolution, were a significant factor in escalating and prolonging the debate between supporters and opponents of proscription.

The lack of fit between principles and experience is also problematic if there are no back up mechanisms when principled procedures do not appear to be working. According to the principles of participatory democracy, differences should be transcended by a collective wisdom, which is only accessible to the group as a whole. It was clear that none of the participants identified anything approximating such wisdom on the first day of the national greens meeting. In the absence of collective wisdom, no formal mechanism was available to resolve the dispute over the normative character of proscription. There was no standing committee to which the question could be put, nor was there any figure invested with the authority to discern which side's position was more in keeping with green principles.

The absence of any such umpire in normative disputes ensures that issues are not resolved by one side 'succeeding' in proving the superiority of its normative credentials. On the contrary, it is far more likely that disputes are resolved by decidedly worldly and apparently unprincipled means. For example, proscription was successfully instituted by the emergent party not because it became apparent to all protagonists that proscription was consistent with green values, or even because its supporters won over those who were ambivalent or opposed through the force of rhetoric. Instead, proscription was successfully adopted in 1992 largely because the coalition between the localists in NSW and the DSP disintegrated in the

months following the national meeting, culminating in the failed 'takeover' attempt by the DSP of the NSW Green Alliance in March 1992.[2]

The power struggle between the two groups also ensured that within NSW there was no remaining localist network of any significance to defend against the unitarists. At this point, many of the ambivalent local NSW groups joined the national initiative. The elimination of the most serious obstacles in NSW was a crucial factor in the eventual formation of a national party. A national green party, known as 'The Greens' was formed in August 1992, one year after the Sydney National Greens Meeting. At its launch, the new party consisted of membership from Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania. The Western Australian Greens decided not to join on the grounds that they preferred a more localist structure, but agreed to work co-operatively with the newly formed national party. Branches were soon established in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria.

What the denouement of this conflict shows is that where values are simultaneously the primary source of identity and the grounds upon which disputed identity are fought, there is little prospect of normatively acceptable resolution. Normative primacy also diminishes the possibility that non-normative circuit breakers will be seen as legitimate. Thus, where values have no purchase in the resolution of conflict, the development and denouement of political conflict appears as even more unprincipled and debilitating to those involved.

Indeed, it was apparent that the wash-up of the National Greens meeting brought to the surface significant levels of frustration and dissatisfaction

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[2] On March 1, 1992, the DSP 'stacked' a NSW Green Alliance meeting, and attempted to oust Nerlich and Fitzgerald as secretaries of the Alliance and dismantle the body that had been established to administer electoral registration. These actions were taken in an effort to thwart the emergent national green party from having access to the name green in NSW state elections. This attempted takeover, initiated two weeks after the expiry of the six month sunset clause, would have created substantial public relations problems for the national green party, who would not then have had access to the use of the word 'green' in NSW state elections. The NSW Electoral Commission, however, decided in favour of the non-DSP petitioners such that The Greens do have access to the name.

with the process as it had panned out. There was a period of soul-searching from all sides of the debate in which various suggestions were offered as to what had been going wrong. Significantly however, the protagonists do not perceive any problem with the ideals of participatory democracy and consensual decision-making. What is of interest here, then, is how the participants themselves interpret the escalation of conflict and the problems of resolution.

Blame for the inadequacies of the conflict resolution process could simply be sheeted home to the other side. Lisa Macdonald claimed that '(t)he conflict resolution practitioner who was facilitating the meeting on the Saturday commented that she had never struck such an intransigent bloc vote in any meeting, and if this was how a national green party operated, she wouldn't have a bar of it' (quoted in Brewer 1991b). The 'intransigent bloc' was a reference to the supporters of proscription. From the other side, River saw fit to identify the DSP in normatively pathological terms as 'working to divide, poison and weaken the Green Parties in Australia' (River 1991j).

But River, who was not present at the National Greens Meeting, also presents a far wider diagnosis of the procedural ailment. His perception of what should happen when greens find themselves in conflict as they did in the National Greens Meeting was critical of the behaviour of all participants. He claimed that the meeting and its processes were inadequate on a number of grounds, including the fact that not all invited green parties were represented, therefore decisions made by those there could not be taken to represent the wishes of all greens. That decisions that were 'pushed through' indicated a lack of respect for the sensitivities of participants. River claimed that the process was inadequate because it was not a sufficiently concerted attempt to implement green principles.[3]

> If we are going to involve ourselves in any kind of caring, participatory system, it is also <u>not</u> adequate to discount those who do not voice an opinion. Is it insecurity? Are they feeling bullied or pissed off at the

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[3] Elsewhere in the same posting, River argues that the decisions were not made by a legitimate quorum of green groups.

> process? Do they just not care? Do they not understand, or are they unclear as to the issues and consequences? Why are they not voting? WHY have only half the potential delegates turned up? (River 1991h).

The most popular explanation for the perceived failures of consensual and participatory processes was 'inadequate communication'. Lewis notes the 'present confusing climate of poor communication and bad faith' (Lewis 1991a), while Fitzgerald cites that substantial distrust has been generated by the 'difficulty in communication between and within the States' (Fitzgerald 1991b). An activist from the North Coast of NSW contended, '(a) formula for balanced and empowered grassroots representation to a national Greens process is still unclear in light of inadequate methods of communication' (Garton 1991a). Having recognised the link between value ambiguity and internal conflict, Lewis maintains that solutions could be reached if protagonists were able to communicate more clearly.

> People who think green politics is good idea use words like autonomy, grassroots, participation in decision making, diversity and assume that the people who they are talking to share the same meanings of these concepts. .... I believe this debate could be harmonised if people defined the sense in which they use these concepts (Lewis 1991b).

Lewis' quote best encapsulates the habit of normative primacy. Even though he recognises significant tensions within the repertoire of green values, they are resolvable, according to Lewis, through more conscientious adherence to procedural green democratic principles. Greens express faith that such clarity will extract them from the political quagmire that these greens have found themselves in. They hope that better communicative practices will defuse and depoliticise the heated debates that are exacerbated by divergent normative interpretation, a point exemplified by Lewis' belief that the debates can be harmonised if people were clear about what they meant.

The significance of these claims does not lie in the provision of practical solutions to the problems green acknowledge, as they are typically not accompanied by suggestions of novel or untried mechanisms of communication. From Campbell's account of the latter stages of the first day of the National Greens Meeting, communication does not appear to be the problem. Both sides of the argument clearly understood each other's

position and neither was prepared to budge. Instead, the term 'communication', I would suggest, is a rhetorical device that refers to a space which is untainted by political contestation, in order to retain faith in the transparency of green normative principles. This is the rhetorical role once occupied by 'consensus'.

Communication is but one device for displacing conflict. Similar hopes are invested in an improvement of participatory practices. River stressed that effective participation required the elimination of 'emotional or intellectual manipulation' (River 1991a). Campbell suggested that the process could be redeemed if 'members of all groups look at improving negotiation, communication and conflict resolution skills so that we are equiped (sic) with the skills necessary for effective grassroots participation' (Campbell 1991). Echoing River she also suggested that improvements would follow if 'everyone feels included and consulted'. Participants seeking a means of reconciling their awareness of the apparently destructive effects of DSP participation, with the undesirability of excluding committed activists perceive the possibility of a further impeccably principled solution. The solution to the 'security risk' posed by the DSP is more committed participation by non-DSP members.

6.4. The Failures of Normative Rationality

The problems being experienced, therefore, serve to highlight the assessment that green value rationality has not been adequately realised. This assessment, however, spurs participants to redouble their efforts to discover the essence of these values. True implementation of green political principles is displaced to some ideal future. Grns.oz.forum activists characteristically maintain that the implementation of green political principles 'hasn't worked *yet*', rather than conclude that it 'hasn't worked'. This commonly adopted reaction anchored in the habit of value primacy provides an all-purpose rhetorical device for coping with the contradictions that arise out of value ambiguity. The solution to manifest failures of value implementation is ever more rigourous implementation. Unintended and unprincipled consequences will be avoided, theoretically, if greens work harder to ensure that ideal conditions exist. We could paraphrase this habit of thought in the

following way: 'ideal political conditions cannot be created until ideal political conditions are in place'. The price of retaining a normative definition of politics is the admission that the ideal is not realised in present circumstances.

In this way the characteristic gap between the green ideal of political organisation located in the future and the current 'reality' is maintained and even widened. At a number of points in the debates the choice between the two appears in a stark form. Some participants in the debate were prepared to put on ice the possibility of concerted action when it was apparent that consensus on issues such as proscription and structure would not be forthcoming.

> .... I believe any attempt to push ahead with the current process, is more likely to cause discord, and split the Green political movement, than it is to provide unity and a process we can trust and have faith in. I would like to make a personal plea, therefore, to 'stop' now, put a moratorium on further action in forming a national party, and do some fence mending. I personally do not feel that if things go ahead on this basis, the resulting party will be anything I wish to be a part of, no matter how good its policies are (River 1991h).

Thus, each of the above ways of dealing with internal tensions highlights the characteristic pitfalls of normative primacy. Where greens perceive that orientation to their political landscape is fundamentally derived from distinctive values, the discernment of normative character is of paramount importance. Indeed, it constitutes the most utilised rhetorical strategy. However, we have seen in grns.oz.forum that normative character is constantly open to contestation. This in itself is not so much the problem, as this is true for most settings in which normative assessments are made. The problem is that the amount of weight placed upon normative character is untenable. In the context of the Australian case study, the normative legitimacy of actors, processes, structures and organisational mechanisms can never be satisfactorily 'proven' in the absence of an accepted authority.

The destructive potential of this habit of normative primacy is most evident in times of stress, when the spotlight is directed inwards. Consistent with green diagnoses of 'the problem with the world', conflict, tensions and frustrations are indications of normative irrationality and

deviance within green ranks. After all, if the deployment of normative evaluations is what greens are best at, it should not be surprising that it is their first response to difficulties experienced among themselves. Under such conditions, much rhetorical effort goes into the characterisation of the actions of ones' internal opponents as unprincipled, or beyond the bounds of green-ness. As long as every element of the green landscape can, at sometime, be characterised as illegitimate or normatively deficient, this possibility will be taken up by antagonists in internal debates when and where it suits.

Now one can speculate about the motives of the DSP in these discussions, but if their main priority was to undermine the emergent national process and its convenors, then they certainly had pinpointed a most effective way of going about it. Indeed, sustained white-anting of normative integrity proved to be a most useful strategy, judging from this reaction from one of the staunchest supporters of proscription.

> Much damage has been done in this reportage and the seeds of doubt must have been sown in many an activist's mind as to the motives of the organisers. I know that several months ago I became so enraged after reading various articles in GL (Green Left), so that as a result of that reading and after conversations with various DSP members in Brisbane, I wrote a scathing letter to Jo Vallentine criticising her motives and the process. I also through those articles had cause to doubt Drew Hutton, an activist I have known and worked with for years, and to doubt several close friends in the Rainbow Alliance (Hegge 1991b).

This penchant for criticism contributes to the marked asymmetry in the deployment of values which is striking in the grns.oz.forum discussions. In these debates, green principles were invoked far more often to identify shortcomings, inadequacies and breaches of normative rationality than they were to affirm normative integrity. In cases where integrity was affirmed, such affirmation was usually combined with criticism of a competing position, but these affirmations tended to have a much weaker rhetorical status. For example, positive evaluations of a unitarist structure were made in the form of assurances that it *would not be* top-down and that it *would be* able to conform to principles of autonomy and grassroots democracy, but these assurances cannot be satisfactorily guaranteed. On the other hand, criticisms tended to be far more strident and definitive, indicating specific features of phenomena that *were* inconsistent with

green principles. Thus, instances of the fulfilment of value rationality were rarely clear to grns.oz.forum orators, but instances of such value rationality having been violated were vividly apparent.

Occasionally, there is also a sense of the normative fragility of green efforts, notwithstanding what are presented as the best of intentions. Hine acknowledges that '(o)f course there have been mistakes made in this process, but in virtually every case, they are the result of inexperience and the imperfection of individuals rather than of some conspiracy' (Hine 1991c). It is somewhat ironic that even the best of intentions can lead to non-green outcomes given the moral weight that greens invest in such intentions and the associated devaluation of green outcomes that are not the consequence of principled intentions. Given the constant vulnerability to normative criticism that pervades grns.oz.forum discourse, it is also apparent that greens sometimes express normative uncertainty about their own actions. Participants can be seen to acknowledge this uncertainty, and attempt to inoculate themselves from normative criticism. Thus, it is possible to detect a notable 'confessional' tone in grns.oz.forum. Sensitivity to the possibility of attracting criticism is apparent in River's plea to his audience, upon contributing a suggested model for national co-ordination, of '(p)lease don't abuse me personally, I'm only a person trying hard' (River 1991e). The shadow of normative rationality is often projected inwards.

6.5. Conclusion

The case study of grns.oz.forum indicates that there are many unintended consequences and perverse effects that can be traced to habits of normative primacy. The process of negotiation over the formation of a national green political organisation or network presents an ideal opportunity to observe the implementation and rationality of green political principles. According to the new politics model, diversity of perspective and differences of opinion could be accommodated and synthesised through participatory and consensual decision-making processes in which everyone's views were considered and respected. Yet the experience of Australian greens in dealing with the issues that divided them indicated that this was an extremely elusive and distant ideal.

Instead, from the evidence of grns.oz.forum, the experience of difference and diversity among greens is divisive and debilitating, and characterised by the absence of effective mechanisms capable of handling internal conflict. Once conflict was apparent, it was prone to escalation and exacerbation as the well-honed and sharpened rhetorical tools of normative distinction were turned against fellow greens. The damage was all the more serious in circumstances where there were attempts to resolve conflicts. Hopes for unambiguous and uncontested interpretations of green political principles were well and truly misplaced, as the green rhetorical repertoire was easily marshalled to 'prove opposites'.

In this case study, I have identified a number of parallels between the ways in which academic interpreters of green politics and activists themselves deal with the 'noise' of normative ambiguity. In Chapter 2, I noted the circularity of value identity approaches. These approaches characteristically suggested that fulfilment or vindication of normative rationality is postponed to some unspecified future, or asserted the need for normative education or re-education. Australian green activists typically adopt the same escape routes. However, these escape routes do not provide much comfort for activists, particularly under circumstances of internal tension. From the material presented in this thesis, greens who are confident in their version of normative rationality can diagnose deviance and inconsistency as much as they like, without their opponents taking any notice of them. There is no capacity to enforce a value identity and rationality, when it is breached or abused. The shutting out of noise seems to be achieved by covering ears and closing doors, thereby ensuring that activists who adhere to a well defined value rationality must operate in a much more confined space than they would wish. The use of normative identity as a means of exclusion also works against the inclusivity that is a feature of the ambiguity of green politics, and which is an important strength of green politics.

Alternatively, commitment to normative rationality does not have to mean that the implications of green ideals are known by those who commit themselves to it, but it can rest on the presumption that such implications are, in principle knowable. If activists start from the premise

that there is a value rationality, even though its implications are not currently clear, this is also a problematic strategy for dealing with noise. Noise is regarded as dissonance which will somehow eventually be harmonised. From this study, there appears to be little point in basing actions and assessments on the hope that such a greenprint will become more apparent in the future. The vigorous utilisation of values as rhetorical weapons in internal disputes of the past and present indicates that the noise, if anything, gets louder and more excruciating.

The debates of grns.oz.forum bring to the fore perhaps the most eccentric element of green normative primacy, the faith that it is somehow possible to define party boundaries and resolve conflict *apolitically*. This is manifest in the tendency to perpetually displace the problems that arise to a space free of political contestation. If conflict occurs, it can be resolved apolitically through consensus. If consensual procedures don't work, the problem can be fixed through better communication. If communication breaks down, participants must learn to avoid manipulative behaviour, and so on. The failure to recognise that practical applications of participatory democracy, autonomy, representation are constructed and contested, and that they *can only be established through political means* condemns participants to a state of frustration with the apparent inevitability of 'old paradigm' politics.

To use the famous Weberian metaphor, grns.oz.forum participants have built for themselves a different type of iron cage - one of normative rationality. Their attempts to construct organisational mechanisms are constantly subject to more intense scrutiny, and their efforts to be faithful to green political principles constantly produce apparently perverse and unprincipled results. The following chapter moves beyond the case study level in order to demonstrate that these dynamics can also be observed more generally in the practice of green politics.

Chapter 7: The Misplaced Faith in Green Value Rationality

The case study in the previous chapters provided a rather fine grained analysis of political practices that come with the territory of value primacy. This chapter broadens the scope to a more general discussion of the perverse effects of a politics that is preoccupied with the fulfilment of normative rationality and the achievement of change through value conversion.

In the first section of this chapter I follow up two areas of perverse effects which were identified in the Australian case study and which are generalisable to the experience of other green parties and organisations. I discuss some consequences of attempts to design political organisations according to green political principles. I also draw attention to the ways in which internal conflict is largely created and exacerbated by the rhetorical emphasis placed upon values. Both of these issues reveal much about the habits of viewing the world in normative terms. The assessment of political experience within a framework of green rationality exposes a wide variety of breaches of rationality. These breaches are characteristically interpreted as evidence of the persistence of normative irrationality. As a foundation for political action, green normative rationality supports a range of self-fulfilling prophesies of failure when it becomes apparent that experience does not match rationality. In exploring these issues, I press further with a critique of academic treatments of green politics which share the pre-occupation with value-based identity, indicating how they are ill-equipped to grapple with the issues raised in this analysis of green political dilemmas. These academic treatments suffer from the same blindspots to the perverse effects of green value rationality as the activists themselves.

In the final section of the chapter I discuss a number of more general vulnerabilities and limitations of a green political project when it is defined primarily in terms of values. The new middle class location of green politics can be seen to place significant restrictions on the scope of

green political activity, and the habits of value primacy limit the range of potential green converts. I also show that the green emphasis on value conversion and integrity has little political purchase in the absence of more formal mechanisms that can underwrite the 'correct' interpretations of green values. For all these reasons, the preoccupation with value change shared by academics and activists is manifestly unwarranted.

7.1. Self-fulfilling Prophesies of Failure

Recourse to standards of value rationality involves complementary standards of 'anti-rationality' indicated by terms such as irrationality, ignorance, deceit or even evil. I will refer to this anti-rationality as the 'shadow' cast by the 'light' of normative rationality. In green discourse, where the most commonly suggested source of value rationality is the alternative paradigm, the shadow of normative rationality appears in the form of the dominant paradigm. In the Australian case-study, the experience of green political actors revealed a series of 'self-fulfilling prophesies of failure', in which feedback from political experience overwhelmingly confirms the normative deficiencies of the world and the enormity of the political task. The dynamic of self-fulfilling prophesies of failure can also be clearly seen more generally in the development of green politics throughout the industrialised world. The 'devil' of the dominant paradigm manifests itself in unexpected and ever more pervasive forms. Political action, therefore, requires ever more integrity on the part of those committed to green rationality.

7.1.1. Normative Organisational Design

In material available on European green parties there are a number of indications of the ways in which greens interpret the results of attempts to consciously implement normative rationality. As has been argued in previous chapters, the development of green organisations can be viewed as attempts to create normatively designed structures. An important feature of normative primacy in these circumstances is that criteria of grassroots democracy, autonomy, participation and the elimination of hierarchy and domination characteristically carry more rhetorical weight than criteria of practicality, efficiency and effectiveness. Literature on

green parties and organisations elsewhere indicates that these dynamics are not unique features of the Australian green political context.

Perhaps the most prominent instance of normative design in green parties is the practice of rotation of parliamentary seats instituted by *die Grünen* in the early 1980s. Just as was evidenced in the Australian discussions, debate over the issue was subject to value primacy. Rotation of parliamentary representatives was introduced as a way of minimising the prospect of a parliamentary green elite. As such, it was clearly regarded as a method of implementing principles of participatory democracy and as a means of preventing the emergence of an oligarchical leadership. Those who had been elected to the Bundestag in 1983 were therefore asked by the party to relinquish their seats after two years, to be replaced by a new batch of deputies. Capra and Spretnak summarise the normative justifications for rotation advanced by German Greens in terms of combating undemocratic consequences of parliamentary representation. These consequences allegedly included the development of inegalitarian expertise which contravenes grassroots principles, the insulation from the community that develops with long-term parliamentary tenure, and the dangers of fostering personal, charismatic authority of parliamentary 'stars' (Capra & Spretnak 1984: 41-2).

The practice of rotation required each parliamentary representative to work with an alternative who would become their successor. Administratively, these *Nachrücker* were employed as the legislative assistants of their respective parliamentarians. The policy of mid-term rotation was contested when it became clear that it was causing a number of difficulties for the German Greens' participation in parliament, and was responsible for a degree of internal tension in the party. The hoped for co-operative working relationships between Bundestag members and the *Nachrücker* were rendered difficult by the implied competition between them (Capra & Spretnak 1984; Kitschelt 1989). This development of competitive relationships was clearly an unintended consequence of the practice of rotation.

The issue came to a head in 1985 when a number of the original group of Bundestag representatives, including Petra Kelly, objected to relinquishing

their seats on the grounds that rotation would seriously affect the capacity of the party to communicate its message. They argued that the knowledge that had been built up in the first two years by these representatives was too valuable a resource to be so easily discarded. But, in addition to calling attention to the practical problems experienced as a result of rotation, Kelly's stance sought to establish the normative legitimacy of abandoning the practice. One of Kelly's normative arguments against rotation was that the eradication of old paradigm politics was built upon long-term processes of personal growth and development, and that two-year rotation would not give the process time to work.

> We are all caught up in a painful and terrible process of finding ourselves as new persons in an old society, and before we find ourselves, we may all be rotated (quoted in Capra & Spretnak 1984: 157).

From the perspective of supporters of rotation, however, the dispute was read in terms of defending the integrity of green political principles. These principles were threatened by the constraints of the parliamentary context that was itself a product of dominant paradigm structures. According to this interpretation, the experience of practical difficulties does not indicate that there is anything at fault with the normative principles. Instead, it merely confirms the normative deficiency of the institution of parliament. For Andrew Dobson, this incident represented the inappropriateness of institutional politics as a vehicle for implementing green values.

> Since 1983 commitment to rotation and the principles it embodies waned and it May 1986 it was formally abandoned. This is not because the principles in themselves were found wanting but because they were unworkable, as originally conceived, in the context of parliamentary politics (Dobson 1990: 138).

Thus, the impracticality of two year rotation is not denied, it is simply not a good enough reason to abandon the practice. An abandonment would amount to a compromise of these alternative paradigm principles and an unwarranted concession to the 'reality' of the parliamentary arena. Kelly's opposition to rotation was also regarded as confirmation of the fears of those members of *die Grünen* who held strong objections to the emergence of parliamentary stars.

So although there are varying accounts of the 'failure' of two year rotation as an innovative feature of green organisational design, they share a theme of normative deficiency. Either the parliamentary context was sufficiently foreign to the principles of the new paradigm to be an insurmountable obstacle, the commitment of green parliamentarians insufficient to overcome this obstacle, or the alternative political consciousness of the parliamentarians needed time to 'mature' in order to have an effect. There is a notable absence, however, of assessments that rotation had 'worked' as an application of principled normative design.

Rotation is not the only example of perverse effects of normative rationality documented in the secondary literature. The consequences of normative design are also dealt with extensively in Herbert Kitschelt's case studies of green party structure and process (Kitschelt 1989; Kitschelt & Hellemans 1990). Kitschelt claims that in Belgian and German ecology parties, Michels' iron law of oligarchy has been used as a standard interpretative frame with regard to party organisation. Leadership, on this basis, is characterised by many members as normatively suspect because leaders are tempted by their political opportunities to compromise the integrity of green political principles. Leadership is also suspect because it creates scope for green political actors to be motivated by self-interest. By contrast, the grassroots are considered to be the custodians of green principled integrity. They are 'naturally radical' (Kitschelt 1989: 197).[1]

This has resulted in the design of green parties which explicitly seek to prevent the emergence of both organisational and personal sources of power. This tendency has been well established in both the British and German parties. Antipathy directed towards identities such as Kelly and Bahro from within the German Greens was based upon the perception that they found their status as media identities personally satisfying and gratifying (Capra & Spretnak 1984). Incidently, Bahro's intriguing response

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[1] See also the discussion by Rüdig, Bennie and Franklin (1991: 46-56) of the design of British Green Party decentralised structure, and perceptions of this structure by party members. For an Australian example of the formulation Kitschelt describes, see Doyle (1991).

to criticisms of his prominence was to interpret them as the expression of normative deficiency in a different form.

> There are a lot of unfulfilled needs for self-realization, so the very kind of competition we want to abolish thrives within the party. There is a great deal of jealousy toward anyone who emerges (quoted in Capra & Spretnak 1984: 156).

Kitschelt provides evidence that the structures that result from anti-hierarchical design have a number of consequences that create significant problems for greens. Beyond criticisms based upon practicality, Kitschelt shows how the fruits of normatively designed structures are not necessarily in keeping with the green ideal of a grassroots participatory organisation (Kitschelt 1989: 188). The structures of green parties designed according to anti-hierarchical principles have produced informal sources of power that proliferate because so little autonomous power is invested in formal positions.

> Power migrates out of the realm of formal authority to informal groups of political entrepreneurs who sway a party's course with their rhetorical skill and personal following. This dynamic is an unintended consequence of the militants' efforts to create a tightly coupled, inverse hierarchy with democratic control through the rank and file. The party apparatus, unable to maintain a regular flow of communication between local party units and representative organs, produces a stratarchal fragmentation of power (Kitschelt 1989: 188).

Processes organised along radical participatory lines, framed by a Michelsian picture of organisational politics produce results that are recognised by activists as lacking legitimacy. So much attention is paid to the political and financial conduct of party leaders, who are assumed to be highly prone to acting out of political and financial self-interest, that little time is spent discussing and making decisions about policy, leaving policy determination informally in the hands of parliamentarians (Kitschelt 1989: 179).

The heavy commitment of time resources and skills that are required in order to participate in party decision-making is also regarded by many green party members as normatively problematic (Kitschelt 1989: 123; Goodin 1992: 142). These resources and skills are unevenly distributed among activists such that activists with few conflicting commitments and

with developed rhetorical skills tend to predominate in these forums. Rüdig, Bennie and Franklin report that members of the British Green party were not confident that there were sufficient political resources and skills necessary for grassroots democracy to operate satisfactorily within the party (1991: 53). Although these differential patterns of political skill formation are a feature of any political party, they are features which are recognised as normatively problematic by party participants because they work against the ideal of egalitarian participation. Another commonly voiced frustration with green organisation, according to Kitschelt, is that of unfulfilled normative expectations of individual self-expression, communal co-operation and disciplined political action (Kitschelt 1989: 133). In terms of the analysis presented in the previous chapter, these tensions are not surprising, considering the dilemmatic features of green rationality. The consequence of these unfulfilled expectations, according to Kitschelt, is high levels of membership turnover, a point also borne out in the British study (Rüdig, Bennie & Franklin 1991: 64-72).

Failures of normative rationality are not limited to contexts in which greens wish to design their own structures. I have, until now, concentrated on this area of green political activity because it represents the best testing ground for green attempts to implement alternative political structures. But normative deficiencies are also frequently diagnosed as a consequence of green party forays into the wider political environment. In fact, the shadow of normative rationality looms large when greens are concerned with overall strategies for green change. I wish to suggest that the failure of green rationality is an appropriate framework for understanding the pervasiveness of disputes among greens framed in terms of fundamentalism versus realism.

7.1.2. Internal Conflict: 'Fundi v Realo'

The issues that have been played out in terms of fundamentalism versus realism cover enormous scope, from issues of organisational structure, through perceptions of the role of green parties in parliament, to the prospect of forming coalitions with other political parties. Particularly prominent in the German Greens' realo-fundi dispute has been the issue of co-operation with other political actors, and specifically the relationship

between *die Grünen* and the SPD.[2] In Britain, however, where the prospect of co-operation with the Labour Party has never been a realistic option, the cleavage emerged around whether or not the ultimate aims of the party were directed at forming governments (Doherty 1992: 111-2).

In the light of this breadth of scope, it is useful to read fundi-realo disputes as about form rather than content. The form of such conflict is shaped by value primacy. The following discussion concentrates on the rhetoric associated with this form of conflict, rather than on the content of specific fundi-realo disputes. It is important to take into account what realos and fundis have in common, namely their shared commitment to a green normative rationality. Both share the view that there is a significant gap between the green ideal of the alternative paradigm and the current reality of the dominant paradigm. The cleavage between realo and fundi positions is typically a matter of how to respond to the existence and perpetuation of this gap.

Throughout green literature it is possible to find a number of readings of the process of conversion from the dominant to the alternative paradigm. I start with the most optimistic account of political change, from the green point of view. In this scenario, the dominant paradigm will inevitably collapse due to its internal contradictions and unsustainable practices, leaving space for the new paradigm to emerge in its place. The political task for greens is to provoke and hasten the collapse of the old, and to nurture the emergence of the new. In some characterisations, such as those articulated by Rudolf Bahro (1986), the transition from the dominant to the alternative paradigm involves a withdrawal of energy and support from established power structures. These structures, and those who are dependent upon them, are not expected to be able to initiate the appropriate change, but nor are they expected to survive the withdrawal of allegiance.

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[2] The terms fundi and realo need not be consistently applied to particular protagonists. Petra Kelly, for example, took a clear fundamentalist stance in relation to coalitions, yet her attitude to rotation located her on the realist side of the fence in that dispute. Similarly, those who favour realist party strategies such as Porritt have hardly been averse to characterising issues using the language of 'refusal to compromise principles'.

> Clearly, existing political parties (and their backers) are not willing to countenance even the first steps towards a sustainable society. Such a society can only be achieved by millions of people deciding that the time has come to change societies whose day to day economic operations menace the biosphere (Green Political Network 1989a).

According to British activist Penny Kemp, the purpose of green participation in established political institutions is limited to making them ungovernable (Frankland 1990: 23). The predominant criteria for evaluating political activism is the degree to which political activities highlight the degeneracy, corruption and moral bankruptcy of the dominant paradigm.

Unsurprisingly, the political experience of greens confirms the normative shortcomings of the political system. But in as much as collapse is expected, experience also demonstrates the survival and perpetuation of the dominant paradigm. While for many greens, the timing of collapse may be perpetually postponed, a political strategy based upon waiting for the collapse of dominant structures is regarded as both frustrating and counterproductive. Jonathon Porritt gives voice to some of these frustrations, in order to justify political engagement with established political institutions.

> To suppose that such a transformation will just come about of its own accord is extraordinarily naive even by green standards. I shudder to think of the number of initiatives that have wasted away, the amount of idealistic energy that has been squandered, and the whole gamut of opportunities that have been lost because of foolish regulations, a lack of financial support, and every conceivable form of political and institutional obstruction. .... The voice of transformation must be also be heard and be influential within the existing system - otherwise we're wasting our time (Porritt 1984: 167).

Porritt's concerns suggest a different image of how a paradigm shift occurs. Exposure to the wisdom of the alternative paradigm enables those who subscribe to the dominant paradigm to see the error of their ways and embrace the new wisdom. This can be dubbed as a 'transformative' interpretation of green politics and it is this formulation of the paradigm model that provides the normative justification for realist political strategies to green audiences. Such an interpretation typically encourages an engagement between the forces associated with the alternative paradigm and those of the dominant paradigm. The aim of such

engagement is to encourage political parties, bureaucracies and organisations to do green things for green reasons, and to precipitate a change of heart on the part of these political actors. The cumulative effect of such conversions is the dismantling of the old and the supplanting of the new. Political action, in this view, is assessed on the grounds of the perceived success of efforts of conversion, that is, how much the bureaucracy or the social democratic party has 'turned green'.

Realists do not readily accept the characterisation that their strategies amount to a dilution or compromise of green normative ideals. Instead, they argue that green politics can be characterised by a complimentary pursuit of strategies of engagement with the dominant paradigm alongside strategies designed to build the strength of the alternative paradigm. We can characterise this as the 'two-feet' (one foot outside, one foot inside) approach to green politics. By and large, realists do not oppose the forms of political action preferred by fundamentalists, but they argue that viable political strategy cannot be built on symbolic protest and consciousness raising alone. The transformative depiction of the 'chemistry' between the two paradigms is essentially positive. Realists suggest that a meeting of the two paradigms facilitates the transformation of dominant into alternative.

By justifying engagement with established political institutions in these paradigmatic terms, realist greens leave themselves open to a charge of naivety. Political experience would seem to indicate that there is little evidence that engagement with parties, bureaucracies and other political actors has resulted in any noticeable 'greening from within'. Put in these terms, the criteria for evaluating successful political action become quite constrained. Simply achieving a favourable policy result, such as implementing tougher environmental standards for industry, does not in itself demonstrate the acceptability of the realist strategy. If it is apparent that such a success was achieved as a political trade-off, this would patently demonstrate that the motivations of the decision-makers who brought in the tougher regulations were not particularly green. According to an Australian activist:

> The willingness to compromise and make trade-offs in return for influence and favourable decisions promotes the view that environmentalists are just another lobby group protecting their own interests, which is anathema to dark greens who believe politicians should protect the environment because it is the right thing to do (Beder 1992: 59).

Any claims that other political actors, structures and institutions have successfully greened from within are usually met with considerable scepticism. In Australia, few greens would accept that Senator Graham Richardson, the Minister for the Environment from 1987 to 1990, was acting according to an ecocentric world-view, even though his tenure in the portfolio facilitated the most pro-environmentalist phase of the ALP government, and perhaps of any government in Australia. According to a newspaper report, Porritt himself had little faith that the Labor government's motivations were particularly green.

> It was extremely dangerous for the green movement to back any political party. .... They are always playing at the business of being green to suit their own political ends. As soon as they believe there is no electoral mileage to be gained out of it, they will drop it (*The Age*, 4 April 1991).

Green critics of this phase of environmental politics point to what was seen as the subsequent untrustworthiness of the Labor government in 1991.[3] They argue that the closer relationship between conservation peak bodies and government established during Richardson's tenure was not worth the price that was paid. Much the same judgement was reached by greens evaluating the accord between Green Independents and the Labor Party in Tasmania, the furthest reaching exercise of institutional engagement in Australia. None of these participants believed that the Labor Party in Tasmania had turned green as a consequence of this accord. On the contrary, these experiences of political engagement have left participants heavily bruised and have emphatically demonstrated the willingness of other political actors to neutralise, marginalise and subvert the green challenge rather than be converted to it. The 1992 state election which ended the Green Independent's balance of power prompted

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[3] The green movement saw the Labor government's proposal of resource security legislation as a significant breach of trust (*The Age*, 11 October 1991; 7 November 1991).

expressions of relief that the green participants were no longer subject to as intense political pressures that such arrangements produced.[4]

The realist scenario of political change has not yet materialised as a result of realist strategies, leaving the way clear for the fundamentalists to say 'we told you so!' From a fundamentalist standpoint, what's worse is the damage done by strategies of engagement to the emerging political paradigm. Bookchin expresses this response to realism in typically stark language.

> The fear of 'isolation', of 'futility', of 'ineffectiveness' yields a new kind of isolation, futility and ineffectiveness, namely, a complete surrender of one's most basic ideals and goals. 'Power' is gained at the cost of losing the only power we really have had that can change this insane society - our moral integrity, our ideals, and our principles (Bookchin 1980: 82).

In reaction to the realist rhetoric, the chemistry between paradigms is reversed in fundamentalist rhetoric. Experience demonstrates the capacity of the dominant paradigm to contaminate the integrity of green politics. The poisonous potential of the former should never be underestimated, as indicated by this quote from an Australian activist:

> Never can we delude ourselves that such an all-embracing system is going to reform its character and work with us to heal this planet. We reject totally any such co-option into the very value system which is killing us (Fricker 1990: 225).

The political imperative of this interpretation is a defence of the integrity of the alternative paradigm against infiltration and co-option by elements of the old paradigm. Integrity is perpetually threatened by the actions of those within the movement or party as much, if not more, than by political opponents. In this scheme, compromise can only be dangerous for greens as it opens the door to co-option and contamination. As Beder argues:

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[4] After the Tasmanian state election in February 1992, the Greens' election co-ordinator commented: 'It's the end of being taken in by this system. ....It's the end of forgetting our vision and our clear-sightedness' (Cumming 1992: 12).

> Within the dominant paradigm, the environment is a resource and those who subscribe to this paradigm believe it is acceptable to compromise in order to save the most valuable areas. For deep ecologists, the environment has intrinsic value and so trade-offs have no place, whatsoever (Beder 1992: 59).

Thus, the fundamentalist stance becomes a matter of claiming a role of defender of the principled integrity of the green movement. This means that the realos' willingness to compromise is regarded as a reflection of patently non-green motivations. Getting elected to parliament or having the ear of a government minister serves as an 'ego boost' reflecting normatively problematic aspirations for power and influence (Martin 1990: 14). Jutta Ditfurth, one of the well known fundis in *die Grünen*, claimed after her May 1991 resignation that the Greens had 'changed the meaning of political responsibility from responsibility for humans and nature to submission to the logic of being in coalition with Social Democrats' (Merkenich 1991).

The defensive interpretation that characterises fundamentalism carries a high price for greens as it also generates a self-fulfilling prophesy of failure. Not only is experience of the world construed in these terms as overwhelmingly immoral, but the integrity of alternative politics is continually threatened from within. The objective of green political activity is reduced to its symbolic effect, that is, its capacity to present symbolic contrasts between good and evil. For the realists, this principled defence is no more than a retreat to the shelter of a self-imposed political ghetto. This is then condemned as irresponsible because it makes no impact on the status quo and steadfastly refuses to respond to the political opportunities which do arise for fear of contamination. Hutton points to the fundamentalist impediment to green change that is a consequence of the 'schismatic behaviour of greens intent on marginalisation' (Hutton 1990: 19).

Entrenched cleavages such as fundamentalism v realism threaten the faith in value rationality within the green movement. Such conflict either draws attention to the ambiguity and indeterminate implications of value-based green politics, or it fosters interpretations that one view is correct and the other is mistaken. When green activists argue that some of

their colleagues are operating within a flawed interpretation of green values, or according to illegitimate motivations, normatively ideal decision-making procedures - such as widespread consultation and consensus - are greatly impaired. This is because the assumption that all participants share the same value perspective is undermined. As fundi-realo conflict becomes entrenched or escalates in internal disputes, the 'other' side tends to be represented as an obstacle and impediment to authentic forms of green politics, rather than as a legitimate indication of diversity. The shadow of normative rationality exists within the green movement as well as outside it.

In these ways, the significant problems experienced by greens are habitually attributed to normative deficiency, whether it be of specific actors, structures and processes, or of the wider context within which greens operate. The typical interpretation of the experience of difficulty, frustration and destructive conflict is the recognition of the ever more pervasive face of the dominant paradigm within green processes. This occurs despite the best efforts of resistance from those with the requisite commitment and integrity. A recognition of the unintended consequences and perverse effects can easily serve to reinforce the habit of normative primacy. As perhaps the most strident exponent of normative primacy, Bahro contends:

> All the aggravation in the alternative projects - including such political projects as the Green party - comes from the fact that the monadic and frustrated personality structure in general enters in an unreformed state (Bahro 1986: 158).

Thus, through the circular logic of normative primacy, it is possible to attribute the source of conflict and difficulty to the selfishness and egotism that green politics attempts to eradicate. In this way, there is even more cause for political pessimism, as self-interest abounds in the very political processes which were designed to transcend it. From the point of view of those who adhere to it, the integrity of the alternative value paradigm need not be threatened by difficulties and conflicts and contradictions between the different demands it generates. As the Australian case study shows, there are numerous ways of using the experience of political

difficulty to confirm rather than deny the validity of a purely principled approach to politics.

Problems experienced by greens can be attributed to the failure of non-green actors to be converted to green consciousness, the failure of greens to live up to green principles, resistance to the adoption of appropriate green orientations within the movement, or the preparedness of some greens to compromise the integrity of these principles. The ambiguity of the green normative repertoire ensures that the shadow of normative rationality can be cast in any direction. The positive moral status of particular green formations is always tentative and liable to be undermined by the experience of difficulties which illustrate the pervasiveness of the dominant paradigm.

7.2. Blindspots of Value Identity Approaches

A central argument of this thesis has been that the terms used in the academic literature to identify and assess green politics run parallel to those used by greens themselves. Because value identity approaches adopt the analytical language of value paradigms, they are in no better position to escape the circularities of normative logic that afflict much of the practice of green politics. Thus, where the issues addressed above are recognised, they are dealt with unsatisfactorily. Value identity approaches typically entail a set of parameters for conceptualising green politics which are just as problematic as those employed by greens themselves.

The interpretation of green party organisational structure is a case in point. Dobson's reflection on the German Greens' abandonment of rotation leads him to pose the question 'how far can Green politics be achieved .... if it demands the progressive abandonment of the principles of such politics?' (Dobson 1990: 138). This progressive abandonment, argues Dobson, has been a notable feature of all green political actions that have attempted engagement in established institutional politics. Apparently, Dobson expects true green political practice to emerge in a vacuum, a space uncontaminated by the residue of old paradigm models of organisation. From the evidence of greens themselves, this is an

extremely forlorn hope, given the surreptitious ways in which the dominant paradigm finds its way into green organisation.

These parameters for assessing green political structure are not restricted to those who see greens as agents of desirable political transformation. Kuechler and Dalton construct a similar calculus.

> Realistically, one cannot expect that the movement parties will fully succeed in establishing and practicing non-hierarchical forms of communication and decision-making. Measured against the utopian ideal, the parties may fall short, but the differences from established parties are clearly discernible. Yet, in their attempt to function effectively in the long run, they may have to compromise, partially resorting to more traditional organizational patterns (Kuechler and Dalton 1990: 295).

Yet these authors also insist that green politics is defined in terms of its distinctive value profile (1990: 278). If this is the case, Dobson's question is apt. The gradual formalisation of green parties and the moves towards traditional organisational forms that Kuechler and Dalton identify can only be regarded as an erosion of this identity. Either green parties undermine the very basis of their identity or they remain marginal to political processes. Neither option allows much scope for the positive evaluation of political activity.

Value identity approaches also parallel activist interpretation with regard to the issue of broader social change. Both fundamentalist and realist rhetoric have their academic equivalents. A number of commentators on fundi-realo conflict have accepted the claims that fundamentalists are the custodians of green values and that realist strategies constitute a dilution of green principles. According to Dobson, the failure of strategies of engagement should not be particularly surprising as the institutions realists wish to engage with are by nature a part of the dominant paradigm. Here, the shadow of the dominant paradigm assumes monumental proportions:

> The problem that has informed this discussion of the possibility of bringing about Green change through the parliamentary process centres on the difficulty of bringing about a decolonized society through structures that are already colonized - structures that are deeply (perhaps irremediably) implicated in the status quo that Green politics seeks to shift (Dobson 1990: 139).

Once again, such a reading is not restricted to those who are sympathetic to the fundamentalists. In a review article of green politics literature, Stephen Young claimed that in as much as green parties have to address themselves to 'the problems facing governments now', they are forced to choose between 'compromising their principles, or more or less opting out of the political system' (Young 1992: 9). Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky represent realo strategies as an attempt by adherents to an egalitarian culture to form alliances with other cultural types, a process which must involve some sort of compromise with non-egalitarian culture. As they argue:

> .... egalitarians who wish to rule and not just criticize (the "Realos" as opposed to the "Fundis" in the current parlance of the German Greens) may seek out an alliance with one of the other active ways of life. An alliance with hierarchy promises to make it easier for egalitarians to make decisions. .... In order to do this, however, egalitarians must moderate their suspicion of authority. .... So, ... egalitarians worry that coercive hierarchical means may pervert voluntary egalitarian ends (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 89).

The language of compromise and of the dilution of identity figures prominently in this account. The cultural theory approach claims that egalitarians are more comfortable remaining true to their values than they are at venturing beyond their self-imposed boundaries (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 90).

Not all analysts of green politics, however, take the fundi interpretation as given. Jean Cohen attempts to give credence and legitimacy to the realist interpretation of paradigmatic politics. For Cohen, the new social movement values of autonomy, plurality and difference mitigate against normative absolutism, fundamentalism and the insistence on one true path. Her analysis supports realist interpretations inasmuch as she is sceptical of fundamentalist claims to moral custodianship, and in her articulation of a normatively principled justification of institutional engagement. Cohen shares with the realists a hope in the transformative potential of new forms of politics within existing institutional settings. Her argument is based upon a Habermasian vision of political action in modern industrial society. She suggests that '.... the selective realization of the potentials of modernity entails institutional developments in civil

society that involve domination but *also* the bases for emancipation' (1985: 712). The forum of parliament in liberal democracies is cited as exactly the type of institution that contains the potential for both domination and emancipation. Cohen, therefore, seeks to give credence to the 'one foot inside, one foot outside' approach to political change.

A different route to a principled defence of the realist approach is advanced by Robert Goodin who, having outlined the normative arguments of both realos and fundis, asks the question 'which is the correct characterization of the green ethic in particular?' (Goodin 1992: 111). He decides, on the basis that green ends should carry more weight in the argument than green means, that strategic political action is normatively preferable to inaction. Goodin also speaks in similar terms to Porritt when he insists that green action on the part of governments, political parties and business, must be informed by green values (Goodin 1992: 92).

The parallels between activist and academic interpretations of fundi-realo conflict make for rather pessimistic assessments of green political activity. If fundamentalists are regarded as the true custodians of green values then it would appear that enormous efforts are required from the faithful just to protect the principled integrity of green politics from those who wish to compromise it. This is to say nothing of what may be required to precipitate normative conversion on a wider scale. If the core green political actors are prone to sell-outs, what hope is there for a more widespread green conversion? If, on the other hand, the realo interpretation is treated as closer to the essence of green politics, there appears to be little basis for claiming that such a transformation has been set in train by green participation in the electoral and parliamentary sphere.[5] Goodin acknowledges that conversions among the ranks of established political actors have not generally been forthcoming. However, he asserts that this is the problem of the governments and

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[5] With regard to parliament in particular there are also greens who would argue that a successful transformation would mean little given the irrelevance of parliament in western democracies. Martin Jänicke, a former *die Grünen* parliamentarian, offers such an account (Jänicke 1990: 22-4).

parties rather than a problem for the realists, who cannot be held responsible for the moral orientations of those from whom they gain political concessions (1992: 110). Either way, there is little to suggest that social and political changes are taking place according to any logic of green transformation.

The failure of normative rationality also looms large in the conclusions of the theorist who most strongly believes that transformation is inevitable. Touraine's interventions in groups of French anti-nuclear activists illustrate perhaps the most concerted attempt to implement normative rationality and weed out irrational or resistant orientations. In Touraine's commentary it is possible to detect the same tendency to diagnose the failure of current political efforts as an indication of the persistence of resistant elements.

> Should we say that the reconversion had failed? Yes, in so far as the struggle was unable to transform itself into a social movement. Those who still appealed to the mobilising force of the rejection of industrial values knew as well as the others the weakness of the struggle and its inability to undertake new actions (Touraine 1983: 165).

Aside from this tendency toward pessimistic assessments, all of these approaches underwrite a markedly restrictive definition of green politics by buying into the terms of internal green conflicts. If significant sections of the green movement are to be considered not as representing the new political directions of green politics, but as resistant to them, it is somewhat more difficult to retain a characterisation of the green movement as a formidable and broad-based political force.

7.3. Limitations of Green Rationality

The interpretation of green political experience within normative parameters reinforces claims for the urgency of right green action and the paramount importance of upholding the integrity of green principles. In other words, 'crisis' accounts play an important part in generating commitment on the part of green actors (Coleman & Coleman 1993). Exhortation to urgent action and greater commitment undoubtedly has some political utility. I have noted that green activists adopt a rhetorical language of value primacy as a device to facilitate conversion and

maintain commitment to the green cause. Could not the same be said about the theoretical attempts to stipulate the essence of green movement politics undertaken by Cohen, Touraine, Bookchin, Dobson, Eckersley and Goodin? Like their activist counterparts, such efforts are regarded as important and significant in that green change is dependent upon the normative orientations of political actors in general, and of greens in particular.

But is this emphasis on the normative conversion, consciousness and integrity of political actors warranted? The analysis presented in this thesis raises serious questions about both the usefulness and appropriateness of regarding personal value change and integrity as the lynchpins of green political strategy. If green change is thought of as being embedded in a normatively principled rationality that is freely chosen, then considerable weight must be placed upon the normative state of political actors. Having identified the tendency towards analytical circularity and political pessimism that is a general feature of value identity approaches, there are a number of other reasons why I would suggest that the emphasis on conversion and integrity is misplaced.

7.3.1. New Middle Class Politics

There is, for example, the issue of the social location of green political support. Social science data indicates that the pool of potential green converts, while theoretically universal, is in actuality drawn from a limited subsection of the population of industrial societies. It would appear then, that the voluntaristic altruism of green politics has its roots firmly planted in middle class soil. The literature on the 'genealogy of morals' offers some suggestions about the connection between the new middle class and value-based politics which fits comfortably with the rhetorical interpretation offered in Chapter 3. The work of Minson (1993) and Hunter (1993) could be used to suggest that the limited social location of green support reflects the social distribution of acquired capacities to perceive the self in a particular way, namely, as an individual subject for whom political orientations are to be based upon normative principles. If this is the case, then the concentration of green support among the postwar generation, the educated and the new middle class maps out the

sociological limits of these practices of self-formation. The majority of the population of industrial societies have not been trained to aspire to this historically and sociologically peculiar form of moral subjectivity. This interpretation is a plausible antidote to the tendency of value identity approaches to assume that all individuals are coherent moral subjects who choose from a menu of packaged alternatives. It also supports a sceptical attitude towards objective standards of green normative consciousness against which political actors are assessed.

The social boundaries of green politics also demarcate the *situses* where a morally integrated green life can be lived. These *situses* most definitely do not include working for multinational mining corporations, being a member of a conservative political party, or helping to develop more efficient nuclear energy technology. But apart from these obvious examples, there are many other social locations in which it is difficult to live a life of green integrity. These locations include much of the private sector, the traditional rural sector, and employment associated with the defence industry. In terms of a capacity for green conversion, these locations are effectively written off. By contrast, the locations in which greens are found, namely the public sector, tertiary education, arts and cultural occupations, present fewer ethical problems for greens. In this way, there are significant self-imposed limits on the scope of conversion.

If these social limits to the acquisition of green consciousness are acknowledged, a question then arises about the extent to which political change can be achieved by those elements of the new middle class who have already acquired green consciousness. Members of this category are comparatively well equipped with cultural resources and with the capacity to articulate normative claims. However, as I have argued earlier in this chapter, there is little point in regarding green normative rationality as appropriate baselines for the analysis of political change. Keeping this in mind though, it *is* feasible to suggest that the normatively literate new middle class has a significant influence upon the rhetorical repertoires available to political actors. The link between a changing rhetorical repertoire and changing social practices is hardly a straightforward one, a point that I will argue in a later section of this chapter on the 'ownership'

of green rhetoric. With this in mind, I would venture that the effect of the new middle class normative rationality within green politics is best interpreted in terms of changes in discursive practice rather than as changes of heart.

Whatever the benefits of the new middle class location of green support, there is also a range of political vulnerabilities that go with this sociological territory. As a correlate of middle class location, the altruistic eschewal of self-interest can be a considerable Achilles heel, particularly when greens enter debate in the wider political arena. Recalling that there are a number of rhetorical commonplaces that can be counterposed against the privileging of values over self-interest, the vulnerabilities of green politics come into sharper focus. For instance, there is an ever-present danger that greens will appear insensitive to the legitimate interests of particular groups. Greens are frequently criticised on the basis that their political objectives are skewed against the interests of workers. Blue collar unions in particular have regularly voiced suspicions that the employment and distributional implications of environmental demands hit the industrial working class the hardest.[6] In Australia, the same problems have also been raised in relation to the aboriginal community; green proposals are sometimes said to ignore, or have the potential to adversely affect the interests of aboriginal communities (Lark 1990; Mansell 1990). In such circumstances, the relatively restricted social base of green politics returns to haunt greens, as it becomes easier to paint some green claims as the latest manifestation of middle class meddling.

Examples abound of greens paying serious attention to the potential inequities that arise from green policies, and of collaborative efforts between greens and marginal groups. But what remains problematic for greens is the essential difference between universalist and particularist promotions of group claims. Where the legitimacy of the claims of

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[6] According to a newspaper report on the Australian Council of Trade Unions' policy on the environment, 'low income earners must not bear a disproportionate cost of environmental reform' (*The Age*, 16 September, 1991). The main story in this article contained a speech by the ACTU president attacking the influence of the green lobby in Australia.

aboriginals, women, workers and local communities are acknowledged and taken up, they are still interests taken up 'on behalf of' others. The 'unselfish' and universalistic normative standpoint adopted by greens can also carry with it the suggestion that greens are in a better position to know or assess the interests of these groups than the groups themselves. Paradoxically, some claims by aboriginals (for land rights with the capacity to benefit from mining royalties) or the unemployed (for greater spending on government job-creation schemes) may also carry less normative weight because they reflect self-interested motivations.

The reliance upon the legitimacy of universalist in contrast to particularist criteria creates other dangers for greens. After all, in very obvious ways, greens can be easily depicted in particularist terms. Recall that the 'selfishness' card was played in the Australian grns.oz.forum debates because any identifiable actor constituted a 'self' whose interests could be construed as at odds with the greater whole. In other contexts, the political opponents of greens have been just as adept at deploying this rhetorical strategy. The very existence of green organisations is seen to constitute 'selves' capable of self-interest. The unavoidable particularist location of greens allows opponents to play the 'selfish greens' versus the 'needs of the whole community' card.[7]

Criticisms of 'unrepresentativeness' are easy to make when greens are drawn from a relatively limited range of social locations. Furthermore, these charges do not depend upon showing how the new middle class benefits from green proposals, (notwithstanding the occasional attempt to do so). Should greens be so surprised if trade unionists or newspaper columnists play the selfishness card in this way? It is difficult for greens to respond to such charges because they have no recourse to the virtues of a particularistic identity.

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[7] One long-time and trenchant critic of the green movement, former Finance Minister Peter Walsh claimed '(w)e know that the "green" lobby does not care how many other Australians it puts out of work or how much debt it passes on to the next generation. It basks now in a warm inner glow ' (Peter Walsh, *Australian Financial Review*, 9 July 1991).

A middle class politics that places so much weight upon altruism is also a soft target in circumstances where the pursuit of 'grub' before ethics seems reasonable, as in the case of electoral politics in recessionary times. The habitual normative primacy of green rhetoric simply cuts no ice under these conditions, because the ecocentric brand of altruism greens espouse is precisely that which currently can be successfully portrayed as a luxury.[8] These are significant vulnerabilities, not so much because the accusations levelled against greens are 'true' or 'accurate', but because they resonate with the common sense of wider audiences. As long as green politics can be portrayed as a middle class luxury, opponents will adopt this argument. And as long as green politics is defined in terms of an alternative value rationality, it will have limited appeal beyond the middle class.

7.3.2. Audience Reach

This raises a closely related limitation built into a value rational green politics. The privileging of values, and of green values in particular, in rhetorical practice places significant limitations upon the 'reach' of green oratory. If the habits of normative primacy are well entrenched in green forums, it is worth considering how this affects the conduct of green politics in settings where different types of audiences, such as the media, the electorate, the parliament or the bureaucracy are addressed. Indeed, one of the noticeable side-effects of normative primacy is the ambivalence about addressing audiences who are not presumed to share green values.

The fundamentalist current constitutes a strong impediment to any such green oratory unless it is dedicated to the task of green conversion. For fundamentalists, electoral activity presents the opportunity of convincing the uncommitted. If this translates into votes, well and good, but if not, it simply serves as further evidence of the influence of the dominant paradigm. Thus, a characteristic fundi argument regarding elections is that votes should not be pursued for their own sake, especially if this involves

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[8] This is in contrast to notions of altruism inherent in 'social justice' rhetoric which become more acceptable in harder economic times. Greens compete with social democratic parties over this normative ground, whereas until now they have benefited electorally when environmental issues are at the forefront of the public issue agenda.

making concessions to dominant paradigm logic. In their view, this is exactly what occurs if appeals to standards of living, economic prosperity and the 'nimby' (not-in-my-backyard) syndrome are offered as good reasons to vote for green candidates. These criteria are problematic elements of what is characteristically thought by greens to be the common sense of the whole electorate.

Fundamentalists are not predisposed to address policy-makers, other political parties or parliaments in other ways, as these forums are regarded as audiences beyond persuasion. Occasions on which they do advocate direct engagement with policy-makers are largely limited to protest actions in which the rhetorical objective is to articulate strong symbolic normative contrasts between themselves and their adversaries. In these antagonistic settings, the object is not so much to win the offending politicians and bureaucrats over to the normative view being espoused, as it is to articulate fundamental opposition.

The majority of green activists do not have such a restrictive view of political action. Nevertheless, the constraints of paradigmatic thinking are still apparent in the activities towards the realist end of the spectrum. A well known problem for greens who have engaged in electoral and parliamentary politics is the difficulty in reconciling the demands of attracting votes with those of addressing the highly principled ecopolitical constituency.[9] This is a problem particularly in those circumstances where the core constituency is inclined to equate the widening of the scope of acceptable evaluative criteria with the watering down of the principled basis of green politics. But even where strategies of extension are more acceptable, the demands of addressing wider audiences can quite easily be seen as threatening to green normative integrity. Drew Hutton tells the following anecdote.

> When I was campaigning for the Green Party in the 1985 Brisbane City Council elections I was asked by a radio talkback host, "But you're not one of those Greenies who are against *all* development, are you?" The

[9] The work of Kitschelt (1989) contains much material on the tension between the 'logic of constituency representation' and the 'logic of electoral competition'.

> question was obviously guiding me towards some statement of moderate "rationality" and I responded accordingly. In retrospect, however, I would have answered this question quite differently, even at the expense of confusing many listeners (Hutton 1987b: 15).

The dilemma for Hutton was how to access the common sense of a talkback radio audience and host on the topic of 'development' without abandoning green common sense. Such dilemmas, of course, are no different to those faced by any political actor presenting a challenging message to a wider audience. Hutton's reflections on his performance, however, focuses upon his failure to use the interview as an opportunity for conversion to the alternative paradigm.

> Instead of pointing out that Greens were opposed to development that was needlessly destructive of nature, my response should have explored the assumptions underlying the question. Greens, because they reject many of the assumptions of the old world view and so much of the system of industrialism, mean different things when they use words like "development" and "rational" (Hutton 1987b: 15).

So although Hutton is prepared to take the green message to wider audiences, he still regards the common sense of the radio audience as indicative of old paradigm values. As such, he reveals a considerable ambivalence regarding the purpose of the interview. Post hoc, there is regret that he did not 'tell it like it is' and risk confusing significant sections of his audience. Any difficulties caused would be entirely consistent with their 'attachment' to the dominant worldview. In addition, we could surmise, there is a hint of regret that his oratory may have successfully persuaded some listeners to vote green without them realising that green politics represented a radically contrasting worldview. Either way, Hutton's reappraisal reinforces the green habit of perceiving the principal political task as one of conversion from one value paradigm to another.

Thus, for green activists who are prepared to widen the scope of their audience, the habit of thinking in terms of distinct paradigms can place considerable restrictions upon the ways in which they are prepared to argue their case. Hutton is right in sensing that the questioning of assumptions about rationality and development would confuse a talkback radio audience, but I would suggest that this is largely because the

willingness and ability to engage in the 'questioning of assumptions' is limited to an audience with experience of tertiary education. Once again, this strategy is unlikely to make much headway with those sections of the population who are more remote from the characteristic social milieu of greens.

7.3.3. The 'Control' of Normative Rhetoric

The third area of limitation relates to the point made earlier regarding the political influence of a normatively rational new middle class. Among the most striking political changes induced by green political activity has been the emergence of normative standards such as biodiversity and sustainability into public political discourse. The green movement has also played a substantial role in re-emphasising and re-interpreting older normative criteria such as democracy, autonomy and participation. In a sense, greens have been among the most successful 'normative entrepreneurs' in recent decades in western democracies. However, this significant influence upon the normative common sense of western publics is not without its downside. The introduction of these criteria to the stock of more public common sense by no means implies that they will be used and deployed appropriately, from a green perspective.

The trajectory of the term 'sustainability' in Australian political processes illustrates that greens may have very little influence over the ways in which green values are deployed in the public arena. In Australia, the most commonly cited problem of values being misappropriated by non-green actors has been in relation to the term 'ecologically sustainable development' (ESD). This tripartite process involving the government and business and environmental peak bodies was established by the Hawke government in 1990 as a framework for the implementation of the Brundtland Commission report *Our Common Future*. Among commentators on Australian environmental policy, a common view has emerged that the ESD process has enabled both government and industry to co-opt green language in order to justify development proposals (McEachern 1993). ESD allows business and government to respond to or sidestep green criticism by claiming the environmental legitimacy of its actions. The ESD example illustrates that any success in introducing a new

standard to the political process is also associated with a lack of control over the deployment of that standard. Indeed, it has been argued that the various interpretations of sustainability which were produced in the ESD process reduced or neutralised the utility of the concept of sustainability. It had been rendered too ambiguous in public political discourse to be of any use to greens.[10]

The problem of stolen rhetoric highlights further significant problems regarding the emphasis upon normative integrity and character. The lack of control over the deployment of green rhetoric is particularly disturbing when values are regarded as underpinning a distinct green identity. If green values are used by actors who are not regarded as legitimately possessing them, the characteristic response is to interpret such actions in terms of violation of property rights. Green values are stolen, adopted fraudulently, and hijacked when they are deployed by non-green actors. 'Ownership' is of most concern when green rhetoric is deployed to support manifestly non-green actions. This is an issue that concerned David Nerlich, the Sydney activist, in his reaction to a story that received widespread coverage in the Australian news media at the end of 1990.

> This year in Port Augusta, South Australia, a poll was held on a proposal by the Mayor, Alderman Joy Balluch to impose a curfew on teenagers - banning children under 16 years from the streets after 10pm. Less than half of registered voters turned out (of total 10,000 registered) but of those who did, 80% voted in favour of the curfew. This was hailed by Alderman Balluch as "a victory for grassroots democracy". What do we make of this (both the method and the result)? Is this what we mean when we promote the idea of community self-determination? Should we worry that the decision and similar initiatives often tend not towards the enhancement but to the erosion of civil liberties? Should the vote have been compulsory? (Nerlich 1990a).

This posting prompted debate and discussion about how greens should respond to this suspect deployment of green values, and how they might ensure that their values are interpreted in the right way. A Californian activist responded to Nerlich's questions by suggesting that:

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[10] See, for example (Hollick 1990).

> Decentralized power works best with an enlightened, educated population. Greens will do the educating, of course (Marcus 1990).

Regardless of whether or not this remark is facetious, it exposes a new set of normative dilemmas, as Nerlich reminds Marcus:

> Who's teaching the Greens? Who defines the higher moral ground? Will anybody listen? It was federal law, not federal education, that stopped lynching and torture of blacks (Nerlich 1990b).

Value identity approaches also mirror their activist counterparts in lamenting the capacity of non-green actors for normative ignorance or deceitfulness. Goodin, for one, is concerned about the tendency of mainstream political actors to 'mimic' green values.

> They (mainstream parties) will often argue, imply or allude that they are not only doing green things but that they are also doing them for green reasons. Occasionally they say as much; more often they merely allow voters to believe as much, without actually saying so themselves. Either way, though, it is a simple form of fraud (Goodin 1992: 95-6).

Indeed, it is a common complaint, just as noticeable in the academic literature as in green rhetoric, that non-greens, either knowingly or unknowingly are wont to misleadingly adopt green mantles, because it is considered politically good to be green (Dobson 1990: 2; Eckersley 1992: 8). Fraudulent usage of green values is regarded, therefore, as a significant impediment to the cause, especially when mere tinkering with the status quo could be passed off as green change. For Goodin, this is a political practice which is both morally flawed and logically untenable (1992: 96).

However, it is worth asking what is the point of invoking a foundational set of green normative principles without the political capacity to make such definitions stick? Let's assume for the moment that greens agree among themselves upon relatively unambiguous boundaries to interpretations of values such as grassroots democracy and autonomy. It is doubtful that they would be able to discourage other political actors from deploying these values 'fraudulently', or that these deployments would cause the sky to fall (selectively) upon the perpetrators of such fraud. At the very least, if the offenders were to be punished, their deviance would have to be recognised by a far wider or more powerful audiences than those who share green values. Goodin is not oblivious to this point. He

admits that political parties, have and will continue to engage in piecemeal borrowing, and will do so regardless of logical incompatibility. They can afford to do so because of the short-term nature of the electoral cycle, as the chickens might take a bit longer to come home to roost than the next election. Accordingly, 'the only remedy for this myopia of political parties is farsightedness among voters' (1992: 172). If this then is the means by which political inconsistency does not pay, it seems that it has very little to do with inherent logic. Goodin makes no claim that there is any such logic that is currently manifest in the conduct of electoral politics.

In any case, effective control over the deployment of normative rhetoric in public political discourse is a tall order. Such control, I would argue, is significantly more difficult to achieve than control over the use of technical criteria which can be largely facilitated through the licensing of experts. The contexts in which moral authority is formally licensed are heavily circumscribed in contemporary western societies.[11] Furthermore, the power of 'external' normative authority, which would be required in order to uphold the requirements of a normative rationality, has been subject to sustained challenge from the sovereignty of the individual conscience. Greens are among the most vocal contemporary champions of the latter against the former, and because of this distaste for formalised moral authority, they are even less predisposed to 'do the educating' even if they were in a position to do so. Greens, therefore, are both unable and, by almost all indications, unwilling to protect their normative repertoire against abuses, whether from within or without.

If this is the case, then there is little point to grounding green political activity in foundational value definitions when there is virtually no prospect of formal measures to underwrite them. Therein lies a highly ironic aspect of green normative primacy and the rhetoric of conversion. The very suggestion of normative authority and expertise that would be required as part of any regime of moral intervention is itself normatively

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[11] The Catholic Church can be regarded as the few large remaining setting where normative authority is formally sanctioned.

problematic for greens who have emphasised the sovereignty of the individual conscience. In the absence of normative authority, all that remains is a vague faith that individuals from beyond the orbit of the new middle class will spontaneously see the green light.

7.4. Conclusion

The dynamics outlined in this chapter raise serious questions about treating value conversion and implementation as appropriate frameworks for assessing green political and social change. Values cannot support the weight of expectation that is placed upon them. Green habits of value primacy systematically produce self-fulfilling prophesies of failure and exacerbate internal tensions. When new political paradigm values are regarded as the foundation of green party design greens discover that old paradigm politics is extremely difficult to eradicate. When green values are seen as underwriting social change, the frustrations of political experience are translated into internal battles between fundamentalism and realism. In addition to these perverse effects, the rhetoric of green conversion is ineffectual beyond certain sociological boundaries, and the integrity of green values is constantly violated by political opponents. These are the ways in which the world appears to greens when politics is assessed in terms of value rationality. Academic analyses that assess green politics within these same terms of reference support these pessimistic evaluations. This is the price to be paid for regarding values as appropriate bases for a distinctive identity while ignoring their rhetorically ambiguous character.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Green parties are among the most prominent exponents of the 'ethic of ultimate ends' in contemporary politics. They definitely do 'do things differently' on the basis of the values they espouse. However, the evidence in this thesis demonstrates that green normative rationality does not work in the manner that its own terms of reference would suggest. Commitment to normative rationality, particularly when combined with the exclusion of other types of rationality, produces a range of unintended consequences and perverse effects. Unfortunately, the bulk of literature that deals with green values adopts a notably unironic interpretation of claims of green normative identity and rationality. This form of interpretation of the role of values in green politics, I have endeavoured to show, is highly unsatisfactory for academic analysis and for the conduct of green politics.

In this thesis I have attempted to develop an alternative to the standard ways of conceptualising the relationship between values and green politics. A rhetorical framework of analysis avoids defining green politics as a coherent value paradigm, but allows us to give credence to the important fact that greens characteristically describe themselves in these terms. Values are significant as a type of good reason that supports justifications and criticisms. They are not the only type of reason, but in many contexts they carry more rhetorical weight than other types of reasons.

8.1. The Argument Against Value Identity

The most important element of this different understanding is that the rhetorical importance of values can be seen as a function of their *ambiguity*. Values are rhetorically powerful because they can mean different things to different people. This central rhetorical characteristic of values serves as a useful basis for investigating the ways in which values are actually used. It allows a variety of different usages of which two are particularly significant in political discourse. On the one hand, values

provide ways of *identifying with audiences*. In this sense, values serve as mechanisms of *inclusion*. This is where rhetorical ambiguity, flexibility and suppleness is most definitely advantageous. The 'inclusiveness' of green politics is most evident in the highly universalistic content of green values.

On the other hand, values are deployed rhetorically in attempts to *identify boundaries*. In this sense, they serve as mechanisms of *exclusion*. Both value identity academic analyses and green political practitioners have relied heavily upon the 'exclusive' deployment of values in order to distinguish green politics from the rest of the political landscape. This is usually achieved by locating green politics in terms of an alternative value paradigm. Emphasis upon the rationality of green values implies that the correct implications of green values can be distinguished by academics and activists alike. However, the unavoidable ambiguity of values ensures that their usage as mechanisms of distinction is somewhat problematic for both groups.

Efforts to define green politics in terms of a distinct set of values encounter the ambiguity of normative discourse in a number of forms. Firstly, greens are not the only political actors who deploy the values commonly identified as green. Green values are frequently deployed by other actors to bolster claims that greens themselves would not support. Secondly, greens regularly differ significantly among themselves regarding the interpretation of these values in specific contexts. The same values are frequently used to underpin quite different and often opposing claims. Thirdly, the green repertoire of values is itself highly ambiguous. There is enormous scope for contradiction between green political values such as unity and diversity, consensus and autonomy, emancipation and community. The weaknesses of value identity accounts are most apparent in the ways in which they characteristically dismiss these forms of ambiguity as insignificant in their attempts to construct a coherent normative foundation for green politics. In all of these approaches, this ambiguity is regarded as 'noise'.

Value identity approaches adopt interpretations of value rationality that exclude noise from consideration. Breaches of value rationality are

typically attributed to ignorance, disingenuity or to resistance within the green project itself. These moves are patently circular. Anomalous recourse to values is always somebody else's problem, not that of the analytical framework. Those who are mistaken regarding the implications of values should be educated appropriately. Those who breach the rationality of values will find that their chickens come home to roost. These are rather hollow claims that have little to offer the analysis of green politics. In any reading of the development of green politics it is clear that political actors frequently pay little heed to the implications of normative rationality, however it is defined. Their chickens do not come home to roost. The cacophony of inappropriate value interpretations continues unabated.

Attempts to define green normative rationality only succeed in demonstrating the extent of irrationality both outside and within the green movement. As such, value identity approaches do not provide feasible frameworks for analysing green dynamics, and have the added disadvantage of presenting highly restrictive depictions of the acceptable range of green politics in their attempts to filter out the noise.

8.2. A Summary of Perverse Effects

The practice of using values in order to make distinctions is hardly restricted to academic settings. Green political actors of the past twenty years have displayed a marked tendency to privilege normative rationality over other types of reasoning. Under such circumstances, values become the most, and sometimes the only legitimate means of making distinctions. However, the ambiguity of normative discourse also becomes apparent to green political actors. Activists put aside or dismiss value ambiguity in similar ways to their academic counterparts, as the price of retaining faith in a distinctive normative rationality. But the problematic consequences of producing and ignoring noise are all the more apparent in green organisational settings which serve as experimental sites of value implementation. The second part of this thesis has outlined a range of systematic perverse effects of commitment to value rationality.

The sites that I have explored are those in which greens are involved in constructing and maintaining organisations and decision-making processes. The grns.oz.forum discussions explored in the case study revealed a strong tendency to normative primacy. Under such conditions, the emphasis upon value rationality reveals many perverse effects and unintended consequences. Ultimately, the limitations on what can be said in green political forums places significant constraints on what can be done by green political actors. This means that some very basic and perennial tasks of political organisation are highly problematic under conditions of value primacy.

In the construction of any political party or organisation, some mechanisms of exclusion are necessary in order to define the boundaries between the organisation and the political environment. The intensity of normative primacy, however, will have a big impact upon the degree to which this is possible. Because of their ambiguity and rhetorical flexibility, values are patently ill-suited to the task of defining party or organisational boundaries. Value-based definitions that exclude some activists from participation are easily contested and in green parties are rarely if ever backed up by authority or sanctions. The evidence from the Australian case study graphically demonstrates the type of trouble that greens can get into when values are the only legitimate tool they have to make organisational distinctions.

Values are also problematic as bases for decision-making because the process of making decisions inevitably involves the creation and maintenance of distinctions. Difficulties are most apparent in stressful circumstances where there is significant internal conflict. Faith in a distinct and coherent normative rationality is of little utility in such circumstances. Normatively designed green structures are typically ill-equipped to deal with the possibility of conflicting interests within organisations. When conflict occurs and becomes entrenched, the options for interpreting and dealing with it are heavily restricted by the habit of privileging normative criteria. Once again, conflicts are not resolved according to value rationality in the absence of recognised normative authority. Value primacy, therefore, constitutes an enormous obstacle to

decision-making and conflict resolution in green organisations. This inability to deal with conflict is a serious problem because it is unrealistic to expect any organisation to sail through life without internal tensions. It is even more unrealistic for organisations that eschew hierarchical and authoritarian modes of discipline. A significant eccentricity of principled green politics lies in the assumption that there are possible solutions to conflicts which are impeccably principled.

The final problem associated with value primacy is that it typically inhibits the development of political action beyond the rather limited range of symbolic protests. One of the most important features of value primacy is that non-normative reasons are easily construed as anti-normative reasons. Pragmatic rationality is the alternative basis for evaluation that is most often juxtaposed against normative rationality, and, as such, often takes on the guise of dominant paradigm rationality. This disjunction between principled integrity and practicality is often the source of much organisational distress. Because of the flexibility of normative rhetoric, any political action can be construed as a compromise of green principles. There is no site of value interpretation that is immune from these attacks. This is not because political actors are inherently immoral or untrustworthy. It is because whenever difficulties arise for green parties, they are liable to be interpreted first and foremost as a failure of normative character. Such characterisations are easy tasks for activists with the appropriate rhetorical skills.

Furthermore, whenever greens operate according to a basic distinction between the politics of the present and normative integrity, the term green politics is self-contradictory. The escape route of the future realisation of green rationality is of no use when decisions are to be made in the present. If the word green is defined in terms of values, and politics of the present is continually confirmed as antithetical to value rationality, then a green politics of the present is *by definition* an impossibility. In fact, Petra Kelly encapsulated this in declaring *die Grünen* as an anti-party party. Such a phrase may be rhetorically crisp and appealing, but on the day to day level sounds more like the recipe for chronic organisational schizophrenia that it has been for *die Grünen*. From these investigations

into green parties and forums, much of the political anguish experienced by these groups is attributable to habits of normative primacy.

8.3. Characterising Green Politics

My interest in the topic of this thesis stems from a more general interest in the political consequences of normative rationality. As such, my critiques of the value identity thesis and habits of normative primacy are made primarily with this issue in mind, rather than as a means of preparing the groundwork for a different way of characterising green politics. I do not wish to suggest that green politics can somehow be identified in terms of the rhetorical primacy of values. Nor am I attempting to argue that green parties are inevitably prone to value primacy. I have restricted myself to four more specific claims. Firstly, green politics, as it has been constructed by influential figures such as Kelly, Bahro, Porritt and Parkin, contains the 'raw materials' of value primacy. Secondly, the Australian discussions in 1991 about the formation of a green party are a good example of value primacy in operation. Thirdly, some of the dynamics identified in the Australian case study have their resonances in the experiences of other green parties, and fourthly, the most pervasive cleavage within green politics, realism v fundamentalism, is explicable in terms of value primacy.

Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this thesis raises more general questions about the normative rationality of green politics. Perhaps the most pertinent of such issues is the extent of connections between value primacy and green politics. Green political projects have provided generally fertile ground for the habits of value primacy to take root. It is plausible to suggest that this strong connection is a predominant feature of the formative stages of green parties, but it is uncertain that it will always be so prominent as such organisations age. Indeed, the accumulation of political experience in complex and ambiguous institutional environments may well lead to attenuation of this tendency. There have been many other political organisations with highly normative origins that have changed as a result of political experience. However, I would caution against suggesting that such a process is inevitable. There are numerous counter-examples of parties and political organisations that

resolutely remain characterised by normative primacy. The British Green Party, nearly twenty years after its formation, elected the 'Messianic' David Icke to the role of spokesperson. This seemingly entrenched value primacy may have something to do with its extremely remote chances of getting any of its candidates elected to parliament.

Having noted the possible connection between normative primacy and the formative stages of green parties, the question arises of to what extent such parties can establish themselves without a strong basis of commitment to normative rationality. Once again, I would be cautious about claiming that green parties can only come about in such ways. There are recent examples, most notably from Eastern Europe, which do not appear to have followed the highly normative western path. There is also evidence, however, that these parties are less broadly green (in the sense of acting as an umbrella for new social movements) and more an expression of 'single issue' environmentalism.

A third more general consideration relevant to the relationship between values and green politics concerns how green parties compare to other parties and organisations in terms of their reliance upon normative rationality. This is also a question that cannot be adequately addressed within the confines of this thesis, because the focus has not been upon comparison. My hunch, though, is that it is reasonable to suggest that established political parties have far greater flexibility in the range of rhetorical reasons they are prepared to adopt. Undoubtedly, many parties and organisations are particularly adept at utilising normative rhetoric, not necessarily drawing from the same repertoire as greens. However, I would posit that, by and large, these groups can also easily switch into technical, pragmatic or self-interest mode (the relevant self being the state or the country). These switches can be made without such rationalities being trumped by values.

Finally, a somewhat broader issue raised in passing by this thesis is one which I am in no position to address, but others may well regard as significant. That is, if green politics can't be identified in terms of distinct values, then how else might it be identified? I certainly don't advocate a return to attempts to interest-based definitions, and the analysis pursued

does not lead to the suggestion of new alternatives. It may be useful, however, to turn the issue around. Instead of searching for an alternative basis of identity, one can well ask for what purposes is it necessary to identify green politics. It may be sufficient to simply describe green politics as a particular project or series of projects, the motivations for which may change significantly over time. There may be little point in attempting to go beyond historically specific contingent definitions. It may well be that the term green, as an identifier of a particular package of political orientations and practices, has a limited lifespan. The package of green political orientations, though politically cohesive in the 1980s and 1990s, may turn out to be less cohesive in the future, as differences of preference and emphasis between (and within) the various elements of ecologism, peace, womens and indigenous movements become more apparent.

This is not to say that green parties would not survive under such conditions. It is quite feasible to suggest that, once institutionally established, green parties could withstand such a fracturing of the package, and represent and articulate quite different combinations of political orientations. This analysis suggests that green parties should not be treated as qualitatively different from other political parties because they happen to vociferously claim adherence to political principles. A rhetorical understanding of values removes the somewhat mystical connotations of a value-based identity. All that is distinct about green parties at this point in time compared to other parties is the rhetorical weight attached to such principles.

8.4. Some Final Reflections on the Role of Values

Given the potential for conflict and contradiction demonstrated in this thesis, the political efficacy of green values clearly is not a function of their coherence. Both the ambiguity of the values which have been used to define the green paradigm, and the ambiguity of relationships between these values render judgements of coherence and consistency somewhat irrelevant. It is important to keep in mind that this is not an observation restricted to green politics. It also applies to political ideologies in general when they are considered as repertoires of rhetorical common sense rather than logically consistent packages. Indeed, it is worth considering

what a coherent normative framework without dilemmatic themes would look like. Any attempt at moral coherence designed to deal comprehensively with the dilemmatic and ambiguous nature of the green repertoire would be a dubious achievement, if it were even possible. For instance, green discourse might be less dilemmatic if a choice was made between unity and diversity, or between autonomy and co-operation, but I doubt that greens would be any better off for having rejected a substantial store of rhetorical resources. The flexibility and potentially contradictory nature of green values need not be a problem, it is only a problem if one craves normative coherence in order to fend off ambiguity.

Instead, it may be worth considering the impact of green values in contexts where their inclusive functions are more to the fore. Value ambiguity and flexibility is well suited to the task of addressing wider audiences than the green constituency. Green values, therefore, are an important resource that can be deployed in wider political battles. Many green values can be used to appeal to non-green audiences. After all, most of these values do have a history of usage independent from the green movement. But the other side of this coin is that greens are in no position to be too precious about 'their' values. 'Deviant' deployment of green values cannot be avoided. Greens must always be prepared to argue for their interpretations (if they are clear among greens). This does not require the foundation of a coherent normative framework. It does, however, require the ability to muster political skills and resources, including the resources of normative rhetoric, and the capacity to effectively utilise channels of communication.

But this strategic view of values may prompt a particular concern. If values are considered as artful rhetorical resources, is this just another way of saying they are simply excuses, post hoc rationalisations, and insincere attempts to gloss over more basic, mundane or cynical motivations? While the deployment of values in these ways is always possible, this does not mean that the rhetorical usage of values should be considered as inherently shallow or cynical. The articulation of values in this thesis covers a wide spectrum from the cynical to the incredibly sincere. A focus on the rhetorical aspect of values, however, suggests that

it is not all that helpful to be concerned with the sincerity or otherwise of normative discourse. Such criteria are only significant in terms of what audiences make of an orator's sincerity, and this suggests a different set of issues. In this thesis, I have hoped to steer the focus on green values away from issues of conversion, integrity and sincerity which are inevitably raised under value identity frameworks. If 'bad' consequences can be seen as the fruit of 'good' green intentions, then the predilection with diagnosing the normative character of political actors is hardly a useful path for analysts of green politics to pursue, be they academics or activists.

This thesis has shown that greens have often severed the connection between the perverse effects of their actions and the normative rationality that grounds them. There are numerous examples in which, to paraphrase Weber, 'the Green does right and leaves the rest to Gaia'.[1] Responsibility for unfortunate consequences of right action is attributed to the forces opposed to green rationality. Within the confines of this circular habit of thinking, green experience of the political world emphatically confirms the ethical irrationality of the world. It is difficult to conceive of a more debilitating scenario for a value-based politics than that in which it is impossible to be both principled and 'worldly'. Yet the restrictions value primacy places upon legitimate political discourse often forces green activists into such an impossible corner. In this sense, there are many resonances between green rhetoric and the rhetoric Weber attributes to the 'other-worldly' religious intellectuals of the Christian tradition. This reveals a further irony of green normative primacy. Rejection of worldly rationalities had some attraction if one believes that a life of principled integrity ensures eternal life beyond this world. But such a rationale is hardly an option available to greens, considering that their political objectives are framed by the need to save this world.

The rhetorical framework offers another route to questioning conventional portrayals of the relationship between ethical principles and politics. In particular, it lends support to the efforts of Minson and

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[1] Weber's original quote is 'the Christian does right and leaves the rest to God'.

Connolly to steer the way we think about values and politics away from assumptions of fundamental antagonism. Awareness of the rhetorical flexibility of values leads to the conclusion that green political processes and structures cannot feasibly be constructed on the fluid foundation of values. Sensitivity to the perverse effects of attempts to do so calls for a rethink of many well developed green political habits. By highlighting the perverse effects of green values I do not expect to sway those who are most attached to a value-based identity that does not admit the validity of non-normative considerations. It is worth keeping in mind Weber's observation that demonstrating the perverse effects of normative rationality may not make the slightest impression on those who are committed to it. However, the exposure of these perverse effects will hopefully be of some use for those who are sympathetic to green political objectives, but are unhappy with the constraints of privileging normative rationality.

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Appendix

Pegasus Networks is an Australian computer-based communications network which enables individuals and organisations to communicate relatively quickly and cheaply. Pegasus began as a network facilitating communication between grassroots environmental groups, and is a founding member of the global Association for Progressive Communication (APC). Pegasus and its sister networks from other continents (such as EarthNet, The Web) played a large role in the networking of non-government organisations at the United Nations Earth Summit in Brazil. Access to the Pegasus network can be gained through subscription. Virtually all personal computers and modems are compatible with the network. Subscribers to Pegasus also gain access to a number of international computer networks including InterNet.

One of the most important services provided by the Pegasus network is that of 'conferencing'. Computer conferencing is a growing and highly innovative form of electronic communication. It has been described as a 'many-to-many' communication medium. A conference is a space for discussion in which contributors 'post' items to the conference via electronic mail. Postings can be read by anyone with access to that conference. Conferences serve various purposes such as information dissemination, reporting of events and developments, and open-ended discussion around particular themes. Public access conferences are available to all Pegasus subscribers, and some conferences with restricted access are also in use (for example, for specific committees or organisations). Subscribers to Pegasus have access to hundreds of Australian public conferences and around two thousand international public conferences.

Postings to conferences take a variety of forms. As well as submitting personally written contributions, some participants also submit pieces of work written by others, or articles that have been published elsewhere in another form. Contributors may also respond to specific items posted by

others such that dialogue can be generated. Perhaps the closest resemblance in the area of printed publications would be to newsletter articles and letters to the editor. However, electronic conferencing is a far more flexible medium than printed publications as it requires much less administration than the latter (formatting, publication deadlines and the like). Thus, dialogue and debate can be generated with extremely fast response times. Any posting is usually accessible on the same day that it is posted. Conferences only require a facilitator who can decide whether or not a particular posting is suitable for the conference. Notwithstanding the significant novelty of this medium, contributions to public access conferences can be considered analogous to contributions to publicly available newsletters and magazines for research purposes.

Conference postings are structured according to topics. Postings take the form either of new topics or responses to existing topics. All conference material is accessible on-line. In order to read a particular posting, subscribers type the name of the conference, the number of the topic and, if necessary, the response number.[1] Topics are numbered in chronological order of posting, as are responses to topics. (For example, response number 2 to topic number 148 follows response number 1.)

For some conferences, particularly those which attract a lot of material, postings are archived after a certain length of time. However a number of conferences, including grns.oz.forum, are not not subject to archival. When conferences are not archived, all topics retain the topic number which they have been originally allocated, and all postings are accessible to subscribers. All contributions to grns.oz.forum, therefore, are permanently available for research purposes.

At this stage, I am not aware of any academic referencing conventions for computer conference material. As such, I have attempted to base a referencing style on that which I have used for journals and magazines. The information contained in references to computer conference material is as follows:

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[1] The 'help' facility gives details of exactly how this can be done.

(i): Hine, Doug **(ii):** 1991d. **(iii):** 'A View From a Green of WA'. **(iv):** *grns.oz.forum* **(v):** Topic No. 94 **(vi):** (6), **(vii):** 13/6/91, **(viii):** Pegasus Networks.

i) Name of contributor.

ii) Year of contribution. Almost all contributions are from 1991. Where there are multiple postings from a particular contributor for a particular year, these are sorted in alphabetical order of title, and given labels 1991a, 1991b etc.

iii) Title of topic (in single quotes). Where the posting is a response to a topic, the title of the topic is retained.

iv) Name of computer conference (in italics). The computer conference name is considered as analogous to the name of a journal, newsletter or magazine.

v) Topic number. In grns.oz.forum this number is permanent.

vi) Response number (if applicable). This is cited in parentheses after the topic number.

vii) Date of posting (in the form of dd/mm/yy).

viii) Name of network.

Any enquiries regarding access and utilisation of Pegasus conferences can be directed to the following address:

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